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THE CONTENTIOUS PERFORMANCES OF CULTURE JAMMING:
ART, REPERTOIRES OF CONTENTION, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University in
partial fulfillment of the
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Doctor of Philosophy

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The Department of Political Science

by
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This dissertation is the culmination of a project first engaged in the Fall of 2007. Either in whole or in part, some of the chapters below are elaborated and refined versions of earlier papers, including Chapters Six and Twelve. My Master’s thesis crystallized many of the questions and approaches of this project. Indeed, the heart of the project (Chapters Two and Three) and its climax (Chapter Twelve) were first forged in the crucible of the thesis. During that period I gathered not moss but kindness and direction from Dr. Xi Chen, Caroline Payne, Omar Khalid, Jeremiah Russell, Natasha Bingham, and Shaun King.

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ABSTRACT

Culture jamming is a form of contentious politics in which activists utilize ironic frames to challenge a dominant set of social relationships and institutions. Despite its contestational nature, scholars rarely apply the insights of social movement theory to explain this curious phenomenon. The main concerns of this project are to provide an empirical analysis of culture jamming organizations and to develop a theoretical approach to explaining repertoire change and tactical choice. The primary thesis mediating these empirical and theoretical concerns is that a close relation exists between the development of twentieth century art in advanced Western democracies and culture jamming. Developing this argument and addressing these concerns entails three basic tasks. First, in view of the failure of the literature to provide a robust concept, I develop a rigorous conceptualization of culture jamming as an oppositional tactic. Second, I present an approach to theory that begins to integrate the macro- and micro-levels of analysis. This task involves both a dialogue between sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu and their reconciliation with collective action theory, the application of rational choice theory to social movements and protest. Although multi-faceted, this synthesis focuses on collective identities and resources as explanations of the evaluations of tactical alternatives. Third, I improve on previous efforts to study culture jamming empirically by applying the most rigorous methodological techniques available under significant data and sampling constraints. I compare and contrast the data from a sample of twelve culture jamming organizations to generate the most comprehensive empirical portrait of such groups in the literature.
INTRODUCTION

A small group of young men and women sit in supermarket aisles and pray to the products before them. At a tourist site a crowd gathers around a man playing with a train and harasses security personnel that threaten to arrest him. A group of performers enact a play directed at a particular audience: the surveillance camera recording them. The subtitles of old martial arts films are replaced with radical leftist propaganda. Impersonators of ExxonMobil representatives give an ‘honest’ presentation of energy policy at an oil conference. An individual exchanges e-mails with a Nike representative over his request for a customized shoe with the word ‘sweatshop’ on its side. Activists swap the voice boxes of G.I. Joe and Barbie toys and place them back on the shelves for customers to purchase for their children. Entire city streets are suddenly overwhelmed by dance parties that turn the functional accoutrements of the road into festive decor. A small group of people climb atop a billboard and turn an advertisement against itself.

These eccentric acts are protests, performances of resistance that traverse a rich terrain of politics, art, economics, culture, pleasure, and everyday life. Their claims are numerous: anti-consumerism, anti-sexism, anti-road, the right to privacy, corporate social responsibility, freedom of speech, and opposition to the privatization of public space, to name a few. Such contentious actions have a storied history from the early artistic avant-garde to the turmoil of the 1960s to contemporary environmental, global justice, and other movements. The practitioners of this art of protest are culture jammers. Product sabotage, plagiarism, space reclamation, “shopdropping”, ad subversion, street theater, counter-surveillance, media pranks, and other acts of mischief, creativity, and resistance constitute
the culture jamming *repertoire of contention* or the available means of protest (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1977; 1978; 1986; 1995a; 1995b; 2006a; 2008).

**Research Questions**

The study of social movements, protest, and resistance seeks to answer three broad questions concerning the determinants of specific clusters of dependent variables. The first question, *mobilization*, concerns the mechanisms and conditions involved in the decision to participate in protest. The second, *strategy*, considers those factors that influence the form that activism takes once the decision is made to protest. In other words, what are the determinants and mechanisms that are relevant to the choice in how to protest? The third, *outcomes*, seeks to determine the effects of protest once it has transpired.

This dissertation engages the study of strategy from two angles. The first is problem-driven. *How can we explain the particular character of the culture jamming repertoire of contention? Why do activists decide to engage in contentious politics using these methods of contestation?* At bottom, this concerns a series of curious observations. First, as noted above, culture jamming takes a number of bizarre forms. To the casual observer, it is not always obvious what is intended and thus what constitutes effective action. Second, culture jamming as a form of ironic rhetoric (Chapter One) suggests a puzzle: Why would activists utilize forms of rhetoric and performance that increase the cognitive demands on audiences relative to straightforward communication? Why would activists do so in the context of democratic regimes, under which the penalties for open dissent are (mostly) comparatively mild, and given that a wide range of alternatives are available?
In approaching this broader question of culture jamming and some of the precipitating observations, I entertain a host of others. What is culture jamming? How do culture jammers make sense of their actions and the actions of their opponents and allies? What skills, competencies, and resources do they draw on in their contentious performances? What are their grievances and goals? Which organizational forms do they utilize? What are the strategic logics that culture jammers use to organize, explain, and justify their actions? What are their targets and issues? What are their subjective evaluations of the range of tactics available to them? What is the relation of repression and facilitation to culture jamming? Answering these questions and others should provide some leverage in tackling the second angle of this project: theoretical development. While this research is motivated by an interest in explaining culture jamming, that is not the sole objective. The central theoretical concern is this: How do we explain change in social movement tactics over time? Throughout this dissertation I avoid what Lofland (1996, 117) calls “theory bashing” in favor of what Lichbach (1998) calls “lumping” by developing a synthetic approach to explaining protest tactics. This approach integrates macrosociology and behavioral rational choice theory with existing explanations of protest and resistance. I thus engage diverse and often antagonistic strains of social movement theory in an effort to guide my empirical analysis of culture jamming and to further theoretical development.

Studies of protest tactics generally engage one of two approaches: the study of tactical variation across populations and long temporal horizons and the study of tactical choices among organizations and within protest events in shorter temporal horizons. This study contributes to a small body of work that seeks to link these two perspectives (Tarrow 1989; 1998). First, this dissertation contributes to the literature on repertoire change: how
do the available means of protest of a population change over time? However, a proper answer to the question of repertoire change necessitates the posing of a second question concerning tactical choice: what factors influence the selection of tactics from the available means of contention? In other words, explaining changes in repertoires requires that we understand the conditions and calculus of tactical choice. It is ultimately the diffusion of specific choices in contentious interaction that constitutes a change in repertoires of contention. Likewise, explaining choices in tactics requires a grasp of the range of actions available to activists; specifying the range of actions available ultimately resolves into an historical analysis, for repertoires are always shaped by their history.

To some degree, these questions are addressed elsewhere in relation to culture jamming. Within the social movement literature, culture jammers and culture jamming in general are often described as akin to or adjuncts to new social movements (Binay 2005; Kozinets and Handelman 2004; Wettergren 2005). New social movement (NSM) theory is a loose collection of scholarship purporting to explain the development of new forms of activism like the peace, women’s, and environmental movements that sprang up in the second half of the twentieth century (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985). NSM theorists typically develop a holistic view of the social system by focusing on fundamental shifts in the nature of social organization over this period of time. These shifts in turn facilitate new conflicts over self-determination, the environment, identity, and other post-materialist issues. The repertoire that unfolds in such struggles, including efforts to fashion identities and achieve novel goals, are specific to the conditions of contemporary society.
NSM theory offers a wealth of expectations about culture jamming organizations (CJO). In several instances over the course of this dissertation I draw on this approach to structure my theoretical developments and empirical analyses. However, only a handful (or fewer) of NSM studies deal with culture jamming in particular. One especially relevant application of NSM theory is Wettergren’s (2005; 2009) study of culture jamming. Wettergren explains culture jamming in part as conditioned by the emotional culture or regime of late capitalism, the sets of prescribed and proscribed emotions and behaviors that maintain the hedonic structure of consumerism. In order to resist this structure, culture jammers seek to develop an alternative emotional regime based on genuine or authentic pleasure and freedom. In explaining the choice to engage in culture jamming as the means to fashion this regime, Wettergren relies on a variant of the micro-foundational approach Flam (2000) calls, in contrast to homo economicus and homo sociologicus, the “emotional man.” Collins’ (2004) theory of interaction ritual chains serves as the theoretical template for Wettergren’s (2005) analysis. In this theory, individuals and groups accrue or expend emotional energy through social interactions. Such energy can range from a high of confidence and happiness to lows of depression and a lack of initiative. Actions are chosen principally for their contribution to an individual or group’s level of emotional energy.

Wettergren’s emotional explanation of culture jamming as a tactical choice is the most thorough in the literature on culture jamming. Her observations provide numerous valuable insights that are referenced throughout this text, but they also provide points of comparison. However, this project is not a strict comparison of the utility of an emotional versus a rational explanation of social movement activity.
Art and Protest

The explanatory emphasis of this dissertation is placed on the development of twentieth century art. In *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Charles Tilly (1978, 143) states, “collective action usually takes well-defined forms already familiar to the participants, in the same sense that most of an era’s art takes on a small number of established forms.” If we entertain the analogy further, a number of activist works on culture jamming provide possible insights. In his seminal pamphlet on culture jamming, Mark Dery (1993) defines it as a form of art. For him, culture jammers engage in a wide variety of actions that consist in some motley concoction of humor, protest, and art. David Cox's (2005) quasi-autobiography also considers culture jamming as a set of tactics specific to artists. While both employ general definitions of art and artists, I argue that the perceived relation between art and culture jamming indicated in these and other works requires more detailed theoretical and empirical attention.

Many important works in the study of social movements and protest emphasize the significance of cultural production among oppositional agents and their opponents (Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Gramsci 1971; Jasper 1997; Johnston 2009; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Klandermans 1997; McAdam 1999; Melucci 1989; 1996; Rochon 1998; Snow and Benford 1988; Snow Rochford, Jr., Worden, and Benford 1986; Tarrow 1998). However, art as a specific type of cultural production, including music, visual arts, performance, etc. has gathered relatively sparse attention. Despite this paucity of research, some studies do find support for a relationship between art and protest. First, art appears to play a valuable role in the mobilization process in some movements. For example, some studies show that it contributes to processes of consciousness-raising and preference.

Second, art also appears to play a number of roles in shaping the strategic approaches of movements. All of the above mentioned processes are often the result of strategic efforts by activists to increase mobilization. In addition, art is itself a form that action takes (Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Reed 2005; Teune 2005). Film, performance, literature, poetry, graffiti, music, painting, etc. are all part of the repertoire that activists can choose from in achieving objectives. For example, art can also play an important role in strategic framing processes (Adams 2002; Chaffe 1993; Eyerman and Jamison 1998), shaping intra-organizational relations, (Roy 2010) and can help generate or accumulate resources and external support for activism (Adams 2002; Sanger 1997).

Third, art also helps shape the outcomes of and is itself an outcome of activism. Forms of art and expression associated with a movement can diffuse into the broader culture and continue to shape values and practices long after the movement has dissipated (Eyerman and Jamison 1998).

Of particular interest for this dissertation is the work of Rolfe (2005) and Teune (2005). They argue implicitly and explicitly that art as a social practice endows artists with
unique sets of skills and perceptual schemas. Rolfe suggests that “innovative hothouses,” small groups that are exceptionally experimental and creative, generate tactical innovations that social movements appropriate. These groups are predominantly artist collectives. Teune considers the role of art in protest from the 1960’s to the movements against global capitalism. He suggests that various art movements performed the critical function of elaborating certain ideas and practices that were absorbed into the protest activities of these periods. Specifically, he argues that these ideas and practices dramatically shaped the tactical behavior of activists in these movements by providing unique sets of perceptual schemas that interpreted reality and everyday life as aesthetically exploitable, as “raw material for self-expression” (2005, 5).

This study contributes to the growing literature on the relation between art and protest by conceptualizing art as a historical practice and as a social field that endows actors with practical dispositions for perception, appreciation, and action specific to the field. Like Teune, I consider whether the artistic avant-garde performs the critical work associated with critical communities in the sense intended by Rochon (1998). In addition, this dissertation builds on the work of Teune (2005) and Rolfe (2005) by attending to the specialized sets of skills and competencies available to artists, but goes further by situating this analysis within a broader theoretical framework. It applies Bourdieu’s (1984; 1993; 1996) sociology of art in an effort to explain the culture jamming repertoire of contention as a consequence of changes in everyday social organization, the history of conflict, and the practical agency of artists.
Organization of Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I establishes the broad contours by clarifying its conceptual, theoretical, and methodological dimensions. In Chapter One, I argue that a lack of consensus and rigor in the relevant literature necessitates a more systematic effort at conceptualizing culture jamming. Chapter Two is the theoretical core of this study. First, I review the three approaches to explaining repertoire change. Second, I contrast and compare the contributions of sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu to a conceptualization of everyday life and an explanation of contentious politics. Informed by this comparison, Chapter Three develops an incomplete model of tactical choice that incorporates macro- and meso-level variables. In order to more effectively link these levels of analysis and specify mechanisms of choice, I enlist collective action theory. I construct a model of tactical choice and focus on twin effects of socialization: the distribution of familiarity and the attribution of effectiveness. Chapter Four establishes the methodological challenges and opportunities encountered in this research project, especially procedures for data collection and sampling. It also introduces the twelve CJOs that constitute this study’s sample.

Part II begins the empirical focus of this dissertation by identifying the major explanatory variables that I argue are essential in explaining the culture jamming repertoire of contention. In Chapter Five, I explore the structure of, and growth in, the field of cultural production, including the incentives, skills, and competencies specific to the field, especially the aesthetic disposition. Chapter Six presents data identifying three critical communities in the development of a politicized aesthetic disposition by attending to three artistic avant-garde movements: Dada, Surrealism, and the Situationist.
International. In Chapter Seven, I establish the relationship between the sample of CJOs and the field of artistic production. This entails both descriptions of the content of their collective identities and of the academic and occupational resources at their disposal. Chapter Eight concludes the analysis of everyday social organization by identifying the social networks and resources that CJOs possess and utilize in contention, including the structure of their organization.

Part III concludes the empirical focus of this dissertation by linking the field and practices of cultural production to the strategic and tactical approaches of CJOs. Chapter Nine presents descriptions of the goals, strategies, and issues of CJOs. Chapter Ten develops theoretical relationships between collective identities and strategic orientations by specifying two concepts: ideologies and opportunity structures. This chapter also provides descriptions of the ideologies and targets of CJOs. In Chapter Eleven, I construct a relationship between goals, identities, and strategies that helps explains the attribution of effectiveness across the repertoire of contention. In addition, I present descriptions of the tactical repertoires of CJOs, their attribution of effectiveness, the distribution of familiarity and its relationship to skills and uncertainty. Finally, Chapter Twelve considers the importance of the variety of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives that may affect tactical choice. This entails in part a consideration of the dynamics of tactical interaction.
PART I:

PROBLEM AND THEORY
CHAPTER 1. CULTURE JAMMING

While debates heated up in the last few decades over various methodological concerns in political science and the social sciences in general (Brady and Collier 2010; George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2001; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Ragin 1989), a small body of work developed to explore the difficulties associated with conceptualization (Bevir and Kedar 2008; Brady and Collier 2010; Collier and Mahon 1993; Gerring 1999; 2001; 2003; Goertz 2005; Ragin 2000; Sartori 1970; 1984). The fundamental problem driving this literature is the inability to establish intersubjective agreement on basic concepts like democracy and power. I argue that this problem is also, to a lesser extent, symptomatic of work on culture jamming. Thus, the first challenge this work presents is conceptual. Competing definitions of culture jamming necessitate a conceptualization both sufficiently rigorous to satisfy social scientific inquiry and consistent with the discourse among culture jamming activists and theorists.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify the conceptual approach of this work. First, in order to mark the boundaries of the concept, or to increase conceptual coherence (Gerring 1999; 2001), the definition proposed here establishes a set of analytic properties that together classify a phenomenon as culture jamming.

Second, I find it imperative that the concept I construct draw extensively from current usage and prominent cases. Gerring (2001) refers to resonance, or the degree to which a concept comports with existing usage in ordinary language and existing research, and validity, or the degree of fit between the intension (properties) and the extension (cases) of a concept. The more a concept departs from the existing lexicon, the more confusing it is likely to be. Thus, I sample from existing definitions from academics and
activists and check these definitions and my own against cases of culture jamming almost universally identified as representative.

Finally, I seek to achieve coherence in part by considering the semantic field surrounding culture jamming, or by establishing the field utility of the concept (Gerring 2001). This entails a series of clarifications regarding the boundaries between culture jamming and numerous other related concepts, including resistance, contentious politics, tactical media, framing, irony, and others.

The broad goal of this chapter is to provide a relatively rigorous definition of culture jamming and to delineate the conceptual contours of this study. This effort ultimately falls short of a strict delineation of the concept. Instead, I aim to unfold and explore the contours of culture jamming and ruminate on the particular conceptual challenges it provides. I first review academic works on culture jamming in order to contextualize this research project within the existing literature. Second, I survey the academic and activist literatures on culture jamming in order to identify the issues associated with defining this concept and to tease out an appropriate definition. Next, I present the definition that will guide this work and carefully consider the utility of each analytic property. I then carefully distinguish culture jamming from a number of potentially overlapping concepts. Finally, I explore culture jamming as a form of ironic framing.

1.1. Culture Jamming and Social Movement Theory

Few studies of social movements and protest engage the subject of culture jamming. Existing research tends to briefly survey culture jamming within a broader discussion of alternative media or activism (Carroll and Hackett 2006; Downing 2001; Heath and Potter 2004; Jordan 2002; Jordan and Taylor 2004; Lievrouw 2003; Meikle 2002; Strangelove
regard it as a particular expression of anti-consumer or global justice movements (Binay 2005; Carty 2002; Kozinets and Handelman 2004; Rumbo 2002), or focus on a single action or organization (Binay 2005; Farrar and Warner 2008; Haiven 2007; Hynes et al 2007; Peretti and Micheletti 2004; Rumbo 2002). A great deal of literature critiques it as an oppositional practice, meaning they consider the outcomes of culture jamming (Binay 2005; Carducci 2006; Haiven 2007; Harold 2004; 2007; Heath and Potter 2004).

Only a handful of works focus on culture jamming as a specific contentious practice. Some describe the strategies and consider the outcomes of culture jamming from a political communication or rhetorical perspective. Cammaerts (2007) analyzes culture jamming as a nomadic discourse that critiques the status quo by flowing from counterpublic discourse into the mainstream public sphere. Harold (2004; 2007) determines the rhetorical logic of different forms of culture jamming: ad parodies, pranking, and appropriation, and evaluates their outcomes. Others seek to identify the origins of culture jamming in the sociological tradition of expressionism (Carducci 2006) or the literary techniques of William S. Burroughs (Tietchen 2001). Sandlin and Milam (2008) explore the utility of conceptualizing culture jamming as critical public pedagogy. Sandlin and Callahan (2009) illustrate an emotion cycle of resistance through two case studies of culture jamming groups. Woodside (2001) evaluates the relationship of humor to culture jamming.

The most directly relevant academic work to this dissertation aims to identify some of the conditions and mechanisms that shape the strategic and tactical approaches of culture jammers. The most consistent finding is the relation between the novel forms of collective action forged by various twentieth century art movements and the culture jamming repertoire of contention (Binay 2005; Cammaerts 2007; Day 2008; Meikle 2007;
Movements that are frequently cited as particularly influential include Dada, Surrealism, and the Situationists.

The work of Nomai (2008) and Wettergren (2003; 2005) are also relevant to this dissertation. Nomai identifies the strategic and tactical approaches of three CJOs as practical manifestations of critical theory from the Frankfurt School to more recent works by Frederic Jameson and David Harvey. Through interviews with nine CJOs and the sociology of emotions, Wettergren establishes the emotional constraints or regime unique to late capitalism and the emotional dynamics and strategies of culture jamming within this context. She argues that culture jammers engage in their particular style of activism because it provides them with higher levels of emotional energy than other forms of political activity.

Although it has not received a great deal of attention among social movement scholars, a study of culture jamming does offer the field a number of benefits. First, I expand on a small literature that aims to explain culture jamming as a contentious practice utilizing the tools of social movement theory. Second, culture jamming is a challenge to institutions and authority (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Snow 2004). As such there is an intrinsic value to its study. Third, analyses of the conditions and mechanisms associated with this form of contention are conducive to generalizations, as I will argue in the conclusion of this dissertation. For example, this study draws from and contributes directly to the study of culture in social movement studies. Fourth, although culture jamming may or may not be a social movement, culture jammers are often (though not exclusively) associated with the anti-consumer and global justice movements. The latter especially has captured the attention of movement scholars (Della Porta 2006; 2007;
Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Smith 2001). Finally, as demonstrated below, culture jamming often deals with a range of issues: the privatization and rationalization of public space, the effects of media concentration on public discourse, personal autonomy and creativity, and many others. Thus, this study contributes to the literature exploring issues and challenges focused on institutions beyond the state (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Snow 2004; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004; Walker, Martin, and McCarthy 2008; Zald 2000).

1.2. Conceptual Review

There is no consensual definition of culture jamming within the academic literature. I suspect that this condition is in part a consequence of the paucity of studies and the lack of such a definition in the activist literature (see below). Still, various scholars have crafted definitions from prevailing scholarship, the texts of culture jammers and their critics, and the particular constraints and imperatives of research. Before reviewing this literature, I briefly consider the origins and component terms of the concept to provide some direction.

The term ‘culture jamming’ was coined by the group Negativland on their 1984 album jamcon ’84. This early definition was minimalist in its focus on subversive alterations of billboards, though it was clear that it was intended more generally. Indeed, once broken in two, the term harbors significant possibilities (Branwyn 1997; Cox 2005; Meikle 2007). First, jamming is appropriated from the concept of radio jamming, which refers to the transmission of radio signals in order to disrupt or obstruct communications. Jamming also refers to playful improvisation and collaborative spontaneity, usually in the context of musical performance. The term culture thus refers to that which is jammed and the means by which it is jammed.
A number of academic works do attempt to define culture jamming. Table 1.1 provides a sample of some of the most significant offerings. Most share at least three common themes. First, they emphasize that the target and the means of action are roughly the same: mass media or culture. For example, the terrain of action includes mass media messages, mass culture, cultural codes, dominant discourses, and dominant cultural expression. Second, they focus on the anti-consumerist claims often associated with culture jammers. Third, all of these definitions emphasize the use of culture jamming as an oppositional practice and not as a tactic available to targets or other actors.

Each of these themes is problematic for a satisfactory conceptualization of culture jamming. First, emphases on the media and consumerism exclude some action or organization generally acknowledged to represent or practice culture jamming. For example, any exclusive focus on the media as means and/or targets ignores a great deal of performance-based culture jamming by organizations like the Critical Art Ensemble, the Yes Men, or the Billionaires for Bush (or Gore). The focus on anti-consumerism in some definitions does not permit analysis of culture jamming groups like the Surveillance Camera Players, the Yes Men, and the Barbie Liberation Front (Meikle 2007). Even Strangelove’s emphasis on anti-commercialism is likely too restrictive. Moreover, if tactics are defined as exclusive to a specific class of claims (anti-consumerism) and targets (mass media), then the risk of crafting narrow concepts ill-equipped to travel seems significant, especially when a body of work explores the appropriation of the tactic by opponents and others (Cammaerts 2007; Harold 2007; Klein 2000). Other shortcomings plague a fewer number of these definitions. Woodside forecloses a number of interesting

1 Many groups often purposefully engage the media, but this does not distinguish their action from other forms of protest.
Table 1.1. A Sample of Academic Definitions of Culture Jamming

“The practice of critiquing mass media messages and their influence on culture by subverting their messages through artistic desire” (Binay 2005, 1).

“The re-purposing, deconstructing, or hijacking of mass culture, using the media as a means to critique the media” (Day 2008).

“An attempt to reverse and transgress the meaning of cultural codes whose primary aim is to persuade us to buy something or be someone” (Jordan 2002, 12).

“An organized, social activist effort that aims to counter the bombardment of consumption-oriented messages in the mass media” (Kozinets and Handelman 2007).

“A practice that insinuates itself within some form of dominant cultural expression in an effort to critique it and promote change” (Nomai 2008, 21).

“An investigation into the apparatus of representation in late modernity, as it relates to both images and discourses of the media and commodity systems, and the expression of political will” (Carducci 2006, 116).

“The destruction of commercially produced meanings” (Strangelove 2005, 104).

“An interruption, a sabotage, a hoax, a prank, a banditry, or a blockage of what are seen as monolithic power structures governing media and culture” (Harold 2007, xxv).

“A symbolic form of protest in the sense that it targets a central symbol of dominant discourses, deconstructs the discourses, and reintroduces the symbols in alternative contexts” (Wettermgren 2003, 29).

“The practice of taking familiar signs and trying to transform them into question marks” (Meikle 2007, 167; 2002).

“An activity aimed at countering the continuous, recombinant barrage of capitalist laden messages fed through the mass media” (Sandlin and Callahan 2009, 81).

“The innovative and alternative ways in which people are offering a form of creative, non-violent resistance against the way we view the world, either for the sake of the interruption or for getting an alternative message across” (Woodside 2001, 9).

empirical questions, such as the relation of creativity and innovation to culture jamming.

His insistence on non-violence, however, I take up below.
The activist literature is more diverse and ambiguous in its efforts at conceptualization. Table 1.2 samples from among the most prominent definitions. Three texts in particular are generally ascribed a prominent role in this literature: Naomi Klein’s (2000) *No Logo*, Kalle Lasn’s (1999) *Culture Jam*, and Mark Dery’s (1993) seminal pamphlet *Culture Jamming*. Klein’s minimalism contrasts sharply with Lasn, the founder of the seminal culture jamming publication *Adbusters*. Dery’s pamphlet offers a conceptualization without a succinct definition, hence his omission from Table 1.2. However, his conception of culture jamming is highly inclusive as well, consisting of nearly any project or performance that welds art, protest, and humor together in a sort of “guerrilla semiotics,” a hijacking of dominant signals.

Table 1.2 A Sample of Activist Definitions of Culture Jamming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“The practice of parodying advertisements and hijacking billboards in order to drastically alter their messages” (Klein 2000, 280).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Rerouting [of] spectacular images, environments, ambiances, and events to reverse or subvert their meaning, thus reclaiming them” (Lasn 1999, 103).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The process of taking bits of the media out there in the mainstream: its screens, its airwaves, its networks, and its pages, and re-infusing them with new types of messages – political ones, which aim to lay bare the true nature of the times in which we live (Cox 2005, 3).”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Any form of media sabotage designed to call attention to the media environment and how it’s used to manipulate us” (Branywn 1997, 42).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“A strategy that turns corporate power against itself by co-opting, hacking, mocking, and re-contextualizing meanings” (Peretti 2001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“The creative disruption of everyday human activities and environments” (Stern n.d., 1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aside from Lasn, Dery, and Stern, activist conceptions again emphasize the media (or in the case of Peretti, corporations) as well as the oppositional use of culture jamming. Though these three exceptions are more general, they remain insufficiently rigorous to provide proper conceptual boundaries.

1.3. Conceptualization

1.3.1. Definition

I begin with a broad conception of culture jamming: (D.1) an act involving the disruptive re-contextualization of a particular practice, object, or discourse of an ensemble of representation that is constrained by the elements of that particular representation.

It is imperative to make some careful distinctions for the purposes of this study. First, this definition does not distinguish between individual or collective forms of action. Some well-known culture jammers engage in individual actions. However, this study considers only collective culture jamming actions, meaning the involvement of more than one person in the planning or execution of actions in their common interest.

Second, this definition does not assume that the action is contentious, meaning that the interests of two parties in interaction conflict (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 1998). Indeed, a culture jam may well be crafted in order to further the interests of both parties, as when corporations hire advertising agencies to engage in innovative marketing campaigns (Klein 2000). For this study, however, attention is focused only on contentious culture jamming. However, the definition of contention crafted by McAdam et al (2001, 5) in which claims made by some subject on an object, such as a social movement organization (SMO), “would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants,” fails to tackle an important question: does the object of the claim recognize the act as
contentious? Presumably, McAdam et al (2001) assume the condition of mutual recognition. With contentious culture jamming, whether some actions are recognized as oppositional by most audiences is debated (Binay 2005). Still, the intention is for targets to recognize the culture jam as oppositional.

Third, this dissertation is a study of oppositional culture jamming. While definition D.1) is neutral in terms of the claims or ideology driving the action, this project focuses on those contentious collective actions that aim to disrupt dominant ensembles of representation in society, however it is perceived. It is thus political in a broad sense, meaning it is concerned with social relations of power or authority. Thus, this dissertation considers a more restricted population of actions than is initially suggested by the above definition. Altogether, these considerations yield a more specific definition of culture jamming: (D.2) a contentious collective act involving the disruptive re-contextualization of a particular practice, object, or discourse of a dominant ensemble of representation that is constrained by the elements of that particular representation.

1.3.2. Resistance and Contentious Politics

It is helpful to think of culture jamming from this perspective as a form of protest or resistance. Like so many concepts in the social sciences, these are also contested. However, we can begin by thinking of resistance as constituting a basic concept; protest is thus a form of resistance. In their efforts at clarifying the conceptual issues associated with resistance, Hollander and Einwohner (2004) find a consensual core: opposition and action (included in D.2). In order to organize the issues of conceptualization, they identify three dimensions upon which scholars seem to disagree: whether actors intend their acts as resistance (intentionality), whether targets recognize the act as resistance, and whether
observers recognize the action as resistance. Actions that are positive on all three are
defined as overt resistance. Overt resistance includes, but is not restricted to, public acts of
opposition like social movements and revolutions. If we further distinguish between
collective and individual acts of resistance, then we can preliminarily describe protest as
collective overt resistance.

Within the social movement literature, a debate has erupted over the implications
for conceptualization and research following two recent trends: 1) protest event coding
and 2) the effort by leading scholars in the field to develop a consensual research agenda.
The methodological staple of quantitative research in this field is protest event analysis, or
the content coding of collective action events found in newspapers (Kriesi, Koopmans,
Duyvendak, and Guigni 1995; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1983; 1999; Olzak 1992;
2008; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). These events generally must satisfy a number of criteria
specific to the constraints of the data source. At the least, they must be public, collective
(generally beyond some threshold regarding the number of participants), and expressive of
a grievance or claim. In addition to the widespread use of this approach, some of the
leading scholars in the field have developed a dynamics of contention (DOC) agenda for
studying protest (McAdam et al 2001). Specifically, they define the broader object of study
as contentious politics:

   Episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at
   least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or party to the claims and (b) the
   claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (McAdam et al
   2000,5).

The criterion of episodicity excludes continuous or regularly scheduled interactions like
elections and meetings. Politics refers to the government as a party in the conflict, whether
as a third party or a central party in contention. Criterion (b) clarifies that the interactions
are contentious. All action is intended as such and recognized as such by all parties, thus satisfying Hollander and Winwohner's criteria for overt resistance.

The success of protest event analysis and the conceptualization of contentious politics together spurred a round of criticisms and proposals for alternative approaches (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Crossley 2002b; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Snow 2004; Snow et al 2004; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Zald 2000). First, because of source constraints specific to newspapers, event analysis systematically over-represents certain contentious phenomena like strikes and demonstrations and underrepresents less conspicuous tactics (Mueller 1997; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). In other words, publicity is operationalized as reported and newsworthy events. Such an operationalization (and conceptualization) excludes most instances of culture jamming.

Second, many critics judge the definition of politics utilized by DOC scholars – “at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or party to the claims” (McAdam et al 2001, 5) – as too restricted (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Crossley 2002b; Snow 2004; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Instead, these critics propose a broader, inclusive conception of protest. This emerging multi-institutional approach attends to forms of opposition to social relations of power and authority in institutional settings like the military, the family, corporations, church, the mass media, and many others. Some instances of culture jamming are likely to apply to the state-centered perspective, for example actions by Billionaires for Bush (or Gore), the Surveillance Camera Players, and Negativland. However, it is likely that most culture jams do not involve any form of regime intervention.

While this broader conception of politics and activism is inclusive of culture jamming, it may in some instances lack the Hollander and Winwohner criterion of
recognition by the target. Still, the intention is for targets to recognize the culture jam as oppositional. Whether they fail to do so is a matter not addressed in this conceptualization.² Thus, culture jamming, as defined here (D.2) satisfies all three criteria. Contentious collective action is by this definition intentional and recognized by targets.

Finally, the question remains as to whether culture jamming is a social movement. While there is a lively debate on precisely what constitutes a social movement (Staggenborg and Taylor 2005), I have clearly and unambiguously defined culture jamming as a tactical approach. Moreover, I find it more useful to describe those who practice culture jamming as a “loose network” (Lasn 1999) of activists who engage in activities that I define as culture jamming. While some organizations occasionally engage in culture jamming, I focus on those organizations that are generally regarded as CJOs and those organizations that primarily engage in this form of action.

1.3.3. Analytic Properties

I now complete the intensional analysis of the definition of culture jamming utilized here (D.2) in order to further interrogate its scope and utility. First, to reiterate the above discussion, as a contentious collective act a culture jam is an interaction involving more than one individual whose claim would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants. This excludes individual actions and those actions in which there are no claims or in which claims do not affect the interests of any of the claimants.

Second, culture jamming is a contentious collective action involving disruptive re-contextualization. The definitions presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 utilize a series of verbs to clarify the meaning of culture jamming: re-purpose, critique, counter, subvert, deconstruct,

² Nor is it addressed in the alternative conceptualization of tactical repertoires offered by Taylor and Van Dyke (2004; Taylor, Van Dyke, Kimport, and Anderson 2009).
hijack, reverse, destroy, interrupt, block, reintroduce, transform, parody, reroute, re-infuse, co-opt, hack, mock, re-contextualize, and disrupt. I argue that some of these are inappropriate. Destruction, blocking, and reversing do not speak accurately to the full intended process of culture jamming. Transforming and mocking are too vague. Though appropriate for (D.2.), subverting, countering, and critiquing are oppositional in nature and thus inappropriate for the more general definition (D.1). Some are redundant: interrupt and disrupt; re-introduce and re-contextualize; co-opt, hack, re-purpose, and hijack.

Wading through this list yields several possible routes for definition. However, careful review of the literature leads me to the phrase, disruptive re-contextualization. Merriam-Webster defines the verb disrupt as “to break apart: to throw into disorder” and “to interrupt the normal course or unity of” (“Disrupt” 2011, def. 1, def. 2). Disruption assumes first a relative state of unity, order, or coherence in some object or intention. The act of interrupting or throwing is thus a process that unfolds into disunity. There is also the connotation of throwing off course from an initial course or intention. Culture jamming is precisely this diversion, a throwing or shifting off from some initial course or intention.

Yet, as I define it, culture jamming is also a re-contextualization. This suggests that the initial unity or intention is disrupted through its diversion into a new context. The process of re-contextualizing, of situating within a set of relationships that brings sense to an object, is not in itself disruptive; the initial unity of the object may be maintained if there is sufficient similarity in contexts. However, a disruptive re-contextualization is a diversion that repurposes, or shifts the sense or meaning of an object away from its original path or intention. This disruption is not total, for always the debris of prior intention leaves a trace, a contamination, a fragment of the original unity that speaks to its former course. In
other words, the object is pregnant and riven with both its former unity or intention and its new intention. The original intention or meaning is thus not destroyed or blocked, but rather positioned adjacent some other intention or meaning, thus opening up the object to fresh readings. It is a set of juxtapositions, a tangling of contexts that expresses a claim that, if realized, would affect the interests of the original object.

Third, culture jamming operates on the plane of representation, of signs and symbols, of culture. It assumes the validity of the thesis that all practices, objects, and discourses, even the mundane, are saturated with a surplus of meaning, of significance through signification. In addition, it assumes that there is no single total system of meaning. Rather, each society houses multiple *ensembles of representation*. Each of these ensembles is relatively coherent, meaning that each object refers to a wider set of objects that together constitute a totality of meaning. In a sense, I am referring to something like Wittgensteinian language games. However, I do not assume there is a high degree of incommensurability between two ensembles; they may have more or less permeable boundaries. The point is that internally they are relatively dense with references.

With definition (D.2), ensembles of representation take on a political sense. Some ensembles organize meaning in such a way as to legitimate, rationalize, and perpetuate some set of social relations that favor one group(s) in society over others. A classic example is Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. Through various institutions like the family, schools, and religion, the dominant interests in a society organize the production and maintenance of consent. It is the task of the subordinate classes to fashion a counter-hegemonic system of values and beliefs. However, I raise three objections to this example

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3 I chose this concept rather than culture to emphasize degrees of heterogeneity, internal coherence, and external differentiation.
that should further clarify my terminology. First, Gramsci’s concept suggests that there are only two ensembles; definition (D.2) makes no a priori claims about the number, status, or nature of particular ensembles. Instead, activists draw the lines and name the names.

Second, like Gramsci’s hegemony, the concept of an ensemble of representation seems strikingly similar to ideology. Indeed, Nomai (2008) argues that culture jamming operates on the plane of ideology. However, I chose this broad concept to be inclusive of not only ideology and challenges to ideology, but also of whatever activists may determine they are criticizing or struggling against: frames, narratives, hegemony, codes, etc. Thus, I make no a priori claims about whether culture jammers engage ideology.

I also make no a priori claims about the scope or content of ensembles. They may be grand or narrow, political, cultural, economic, scientific, etc. I simply assume that culture jammers perceive themselves to engage some ensemble of representation, which maintains some minimal level of internal coherence (D.1) and is perceived as dominant (D.2).

Definition (D.2) further clarifies that only a particular practice, object, or discourse of a dominant ensemble of representation suffers disruptive re-contextualization. To offer some examples drawn from the opening paragraph of the introduction, some of these practices, objects, and discourses would include supermarket aisles and consumer products, the police and security practices, surveillance cameras, martial arts films, energy policy, tennis shoes and corporate brands, and many others. Culture jamming (D.2) assumes that each of these examples is expressive of a dominant ensemble of representation in their original intended context. However, through disruptive re-contextualization this intention is diverted into juxtaposition in order to confront the very
question of its position in relations of power. Thus, each particular expression refers to and implicates the ensemble and the social relations it implicates.

However, a significant objection arises: does not all action operate on the plane of representation, including the actions of protesters? As I will show in more detail in Chapter Ten, some efforts to build typologies of goals emphasize certain goal dichotomies: expressive or symbolic and instrumental; identity and strategy; culture and politics (Cohen 1985; Jenkins 1983; Melucci 1989; 1996; Rucht 1988; Touraine 1981). However, several scholars have argued that activism employs both logics, though it may stress one or another at any given time (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Bernstein 1997; Breines 1982; Ennis 1987; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; McAdam 1996; Polletta 2002; Turner and Killian 1987). Moreover, culture jamming often seeks a number of seemingly instrumental goals, such as increasing the salience of an issue, shaping preferences, and occupying spaces. These goals involve significant symbolic and expressive dimensions.

While all action does convey meaning, culture jamming is an intentional disruptive re-contextualization of dominant representations. It involves the diversion of some initial representation from its original intention into a collision with a politically contrasting representation. Moreover, the operation of a culture jam on dominant ensembles of representation is a tactical emphasis. The goal may be instrumental, but the process of jamming culture is an explicit intentional process of crafting meaning. It is in this sense a form of framing, of meaning or signifying work (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Noakes 2005; Snow and Benford 1988; 2000a; Snow et al 1986).

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4 I consider differences in goals in Chapters Three and Nine.
Finally, culture jamming involves a particular constraint: *the elements of the particular representation*. A culture jam is performed within the dominant ensemble. It does not refer to it from without, but rather nests itself inside the representation or a replication of the representation. Thus, the position of criticism is established within and unfolds through the perception of contrast. In this way, the representation becomes the vehicle for its own criticism; in this sense, power is less spoken to than made to testify against itself. The original representation is made to “speak” its own damnation. Moreover, the unfolding criticism is always structured as such by the dominant representation; the form imposed by the dominant representation, though it can be structurally deformed or broken, as in collage, always predominates. In this sense, the content hijacks the form. One means of clarifying this point is through comparison. While a group like Negativland re-assembles the sonic fragments of consumer culture into critical music tracks, groups like Public Enemy launch largely direct social and political criticism within sonic structures assembled from elements themselves largely immune to these criticisms.

Before considering concepts related to culture jamming, I briefly elaborate. First, I provide an extended definition (D.2) of culture jamming:

A form of overt resistance constituted by an interaction (a) involving more than one person in the planning or execution of the action in their common interest; (b) whose claim would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants; (c) which shifts the sense or meaning of an object away from its original path or intention, thereby re-positioning this intention or meaning adjacent some other intention or meaning (d) within the original object itself or a reproduction of that object such that the form of the original representation dominates but the content is bifurcated (d) in order to oppose a set of referents (of which the original object is a component) that organizes meaning in such a way as to legitimate, rationalize, and perpetuate some set of social relations that favor some group(s) in society over others.
Second, figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 provide concrete examples of culture jams. The first, a jam of a caution sign, exemplifies those actions included within definition (D.1) but excluded by definition (D.2). It is not oppositional or contentious, though it may well be collective or individual. Figure 1.2 is a classic example of a culture jam as defined by (D.2). Produced and published in the culture jamming publication *Adbusters*, this jam replicates a marketing campaign for Absolut Vodka in order to juxtapose the preferred interpretation of the corporation (virility, sexy, stylish) with the well-known association of alcohol consumption with male sexual impotence. The jam targets the advertising campaign, the corporation, alcoholism, and ultimately an ethic of consumerism and commercialism. Finally, Figure 1.3 portrays a performance from the Billionaires for Bush (now the Billionaires for Wealthcare). In this action, the group stages a satirical counter-protest of opponents of the Bush administration’s tax policies. Like all culture jams, this performance works through disruptive re-contextualization: the initial intention or representation (the wealthy [activists impersonating their garb and mannerisms] in support of the Bush administration) is confronted with opposing intentions or representations (statements and signs expressing presumably unpopular but sincere framings of their support).

### 1.3.4. Semantic Field

In order to achieve conceptual coherence, it is imperative to explore the semantic field which culture jamming inhabits (Gerring 2001). Indeed, culture jamming is often discussed within the context of other forms of action. Such an effort should draw out some of the challenges and limitations of conceptualizing culture jamming. First, as my discussion of the literature on culture jamming suggests, many activists and academics equate culture jamming with a form of media activism. At least four concepts are relevant:
Figure 1.1. Culture Jam. A simple culture jam involving the motion picture *300* and a common daily item conveying a message of caution regarding the slippery floor.

Source: http://itaysworld.com/blog/2008/07/04/funny-signs-graffiti-hand-written/

Figure 1.2. *Adbusters* Absolut Impotence. A culture jam involving an advertising campaign for Absolut Vodka and the relationship between alcohol consumption and male sexual impotence.

Source: http://www.adbusters.org/content/absolut-impotence

Figure 1.3. The Billionaires for Bush. Activists dress as the wealthy and ‘support’ the tax policies of the Bush administration by ‘protesting’ opponents of these policies.

Source: http://www.fungagement.org/pro-others/billionairesforbush.htm
oppositional media (Lievrouw 2003), alternative media (Atton 2002; Downing 2001), tactical media (Braman 2002; Garcia and Lovink 1997; Raley 2009), and hacktivism or cyberactivism (Jordan 2002; Jordan and Taylor 2004). The first two are very general terms that seek, depending on the formulation, to encompass forms of media whose production and dissemination represent a challenge or alternative to the mainstream media. Many culture jams are self-reflexive media practices. Under definition (D.2) these would fall under a conception of alternative or oppositional media that encompasses the disruptive re-contextualization of practices and products of the mass media, though it is of no importance whether a culture jam is presented in an alternative outlet (as in Adbusters). However, I argued above that this emphasis on media limits the scope of the concept.

The same argument concerns hacktivism or cyberactivism. Though variously defined, hacktivism involves the integration of activism with computer hacking, or “the nonviolent use of illegal or legally ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends” (Samuel 2004, 2). This form of activism is exclusive to online activity, while culture jamming can occur online or offline. However, not all forms of hacktivism can be classified as culture jamming; actions like data theft, virtual sabotage, virtual sit-ins, and denial-of-service attacks are basically translations of civil disobedience into the online context. Others, however, can be classified as culture jamming, such as a number of website parodies and site defacements. These involve oppositional disruptive re-contextualization.

This discussion does bring out two issues of significance in conceptualizing culture jamming: violence and legality. First, like hacktivism, culture jamming is a nonviolent form of action; while it may deface property it is not in principle a form of action that brings physical harm to a person. Second, culture jamming can be legal or illegal. It often
operates on public or private forms of property, including intellectual property, in such a way as to deface or violate the property. In principle (and often in practice), these replications enjoy the protections offered by U.S. copyright law due to their status as satire or parody.

Tactical media, however, is a more difficult concept. Raley (2009, 6) defines it as “the intervention and disruption of a dominant semiotic regime, the temporary creation of a situation in which signs, messages, and narratives are set into play and critical thinking becomes possible.” This definition could sit comfortably in Table 1.1. Although some discussions aim to distinguish the two, I contend that in practice there is little difference between culture jamming as broadly understood and tactical media.

The common equation of tactical media with Michel de Certeau’s concept of tactics provides no clear conceptual boundaries (Garcia and Lovink 1997; Raley 2009). De Certeau (1984) argues that tactics are the myriad everyday ways in which users temporarily exploit for their own purposes strategies, or rationalizing structures of power (types of ensembles of representation). Culture jamming can be described as a set of tactics in that it also exploits some manifestation of a dominant ensemble. For de Certeau, tactics are primarily temporal in that they must operate within the space of strategies. For theorists and practitioners, tactical media has a ‘hit-and-run’ quality. For example, Raley (2009) and Garcia and Lovink (1997) identify its unique temporality (swift and temporary) as one of its core characteristics. However, this does not distinguish tactical media from culture jamming. First, some prominent tactical media actions do not bear out this temporal structure; Übermorgen’s Google Will Eat Itself (n.d.), though invasive and covert,
had a more sustained temporality. Second, culture jamming can be as swift and temporal as any tactical media action.

Even the emphasis on media does not capture the full range of actions often described by tactical media practitioners. The Critical Art Ensemble, self-professed tactical media artists and likely the single most cited example of the practice, employ a wider tactical repertoire than an emphasis on media would suggest. Thus, I argue that under definition (D.2), culture jamming encompasses tactical media.

Next, I consider the relation between culture jamming, protest art, and artistic appropriation. To be succinct, protest art is the use of artistic practices and works to convey an intentional political message of opposition. However, defining the concept of art, or defining particular works as art, is a highly contentious affair in the field of aesthetics and among artists (Carroll 2000; Davies 1991). There is little value in reviewing the myriad approaches to defining this most contested of concepts. However, what is clear is that the process of definition is contested. Defining art in general and categorizing specific works as art is always a rolling confrontation and a staking of positions. Attempts to define art are, in this understanding, boundaries that beg transgression. Thus, it is clear that defining art is a social process. For the purposes of this work, I argue that the conferral of the status of artwork on specific objects, practices, and discourses is essentially contestable. The object, practice, or discourse is thus always potentially artistic. Empirically, I rely on the framing of the practices and products of culture jammers; they may identify an action or such as artistic or aesthetic, or they may not. Particular culture jams are, as a tactic of oppositional representations, only an instance of (potential) protest art if they are recognized as art by practitioners or observers.
I make the same claim with respect to artistic appropriation. This artistic method shares an important structural affinity with culture jamming; it re-contextualizes an existing representation. However, artistic appropriation need not be oppositional. Thus, if we consider oppositional artistic appropriation, we consider a specific class of protest art.

Finally, other terms are frequently cited as synonyms of culture jamming. Umberto Eco (1986, 138, 140, 143) proposes “semiological guerrilla warfare,” the use of the “residual freedom” abundant in the ambiguity of mass communication to “control the message and its multiple possibilities of interpretation.” Activist organization Autonome A.F.R.I.K.A. (1999, 310) describes guerrilla communication thus:

It is direct action in the space of social communication. But different from other militant positions (stone meets shop window), it doesn’t aim to destroy the codes and signs of power and control, but to distort and disfigure their meanings as a means of counteracting the omnipotent Prattling of power. Communication guerrillas do not intend to occupy, interrupt or destroy the dominant channels of communication, but to detourn and subvert the messages transported.

Indeed, Dery (1993) defines culture jamming as “guerrilla semiotics.” The emphasis on the channels of (mass) communication (in other words, mass media) is criticized above, though both concepts, if extended to other means of organizing and projecting ensembles of representation, speaks to an assumption within culture jamming that all particular objects, practices, and discourses can tell multiple tales, including critical ones.

1.3.5. Ironic Framing

As I noted above, culture jamming is a framing process in which two competing frames are made to speak to each other directly. In particular, under definition (D.2) the original frame is made to “speak” its own damnation. This structure bears a striking resemblance to that of irony. This opens the question: what is the relation of culture jamming to irony?
Attention to frames and framing processes in the study of social movements has grown dramatically and is today a staple of the field (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Noakes 2005; Snow and Benford 1988; 2000a; Snow et al 1986). A frame is a cognitive schema of interpretation that selectively represents a social situation. Frames are the practical means of organizing experience and perception in a complex social reality such that we can capably navigate this reality. As in everyday life, frames are put into play in the course of contentious collective interaction in texts, images, speeches, and even actions (McAdam 1996). Whether in discussion or contention, the definitions of social reality represented in such contentious frames can define a social situation as unjust, attribute blame and responsibility, identify victims, clarify threats and urgency, suggest courses of action, and motivate individuals to engage in action, among others. Framing is thus a significant part of the ‘meaning work’ involved in generating and sustaining a sense of common interest in particular courses of collective action.

Frames are often couched in rhetorical appeals in order to persuade actors to adopt some definition of reality. Actors can employ different rhetorical devices like metaphor and irony. However, little research has focused on strategies of rhetorical appeal in collective action framing. A number of scholars have noted that the repressive opportunity structure in authoritarian regimes makes more overt contentious frames too risky (Thornton 2002; Wedeen 1999). Instead, activists in these situations often use more subtle rhetorical devices involving irony and ambiguity. Some works have explored the use of irony in more democratic contexts. Without referring to framing, Stewart, Smith, and Denton Jr. (2007, 195) identify rhetorical strategies in social movements that contribute to the construction of ridicule, including the use of irony. Some works consider the role of
irony in culture jamming. Day (2008; 2011) argues that irony helps to create stronger feelings of collective identity by appealing to a sympathizer’s sense of humor. Wettergren (2005) finds that most culture jammers do not define their activities as ironic. Instead, they define it as a persuasive use of humor, because for them it breaks down barriers to communication. Irony, as they define it, can generate significant negative emotional reactions. Harold (2004; 2007) explores the rhetorical strategies utilized in three forms of culture jamming: subvertisements, pranks, and appropriation. The first emphasizes what she describes as the negating impulse of the parodist, while the latter two are more affirmative.

As Dery’s conceptualization suggests, many people argue that culture jamming is inherently humorous or playful in its reliance on rhetorical techniques of irony. Indeed, to disruptively re-contextualize a representation in such a way as to simultaneously present prior and new meanings does suggest irony. As Linda Hutcheon (1994, 30) observes, “It is the superimposition or rubbing created by a difference of context that makes irony happen.” It speaks with two voices though one mouth, expressing beyond expected or obvious intention. Irony in this sense is characterized by a certain semantic structure, one of difference, or as I call it, disruptive re-contextualization.

Culture jamming as defined in both (D.1) and (D.2) is thus a rhetorical (including performative) strategy of irony. Though Wettergren (2005, 123) initially agreed with her interviewees that culture jammers relied more on humor than irony, she eventually distinguishes between the means and ends of culture jamming in this elaboration. Here, she notes that while culture jammer’s unease with irony is rooted in the goals of action, it nonetheless characterizes their actions.
What is common to...[culture jammer’s] accounts of irony is that irony seems to be connected to the telos of an action, rather than considered as a means to an end. If something is intentionally ironic, it is also not sincere. The sincerity of the cause of culture jammers notwithstanding, irony seems to be an outcome of the “hide-and-seek” character of culture jamming, which often appears from the inside of a discourse but reveals itself as a critique of the very same discourse. In doing what the opponents do, just doing it a little bit more extreme, irony is produced as an unintended effect (original emphasis, Wettergren 2005, 123)

Irony is thus the means, however subtle or unintended, of drawing a discourse or representation into conversation with itself in order to critique itself.

1.4. Conclusion

Culture jamming is a concept that prior to this work had undergone little systematic conceptual analysis. This chapter both reviews the academic literature on culture jamming and endeavors to craft a relatively rigorous conceptualization for the purposes of social science research. To advance the goals of this chapter, I collect samples of definitions from academic and activists sources, provide a broad definition (D.1) and a working definition (D.2) for this project, probe the analytic properties of these definitions, draw out the semantic field within which culture jamming relates to other concepts, and consider culture jamming as a form of ironic framing.
CHAPTER 2. TILLY AND BOURDIEU

This chapter and the following have as their central purpose the elaboration of a theoretical explanation of both repertoire change and tactical choice. This focus calls for three successive discussions. The first involves a concise review of the major approaches to explaining tactical change. Chapter Eleven provides the occasion for a thorough review of the theoretical approaches to explaining tactical choice. The second involves the presentation of the general argument of this dissertation. Third, I develop theoretical instruments that contribute to an explanation of repertoire change and tactical choice.

This latter effort is broken down into two tasks. First, I consider the basic contributions of the sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu to an analysis of contentious politics. While the former is renowned for his work in the field, the latter is primarily regarded as a scholar of culture and social stratification. I thus conclude this chapter with a dialogue between these two eminent scholars and develop a robust conception of everyday social organization in the process. Chapter Three considers the relation between the socializing structures of everyday social organization and tactical behavior through the lens of collective action theory. Parts II and III of this dissertation utilize these theoretical developments in an exploration of culture jamming as an oppositional tactical approach. More specific theoretical instruments are developed in later chapters.

2.1. Repertoire Change

Studies of tactics rely on at least one of three broad approaches to explaining change in the available means of protest among populations over time: Tilly’s relatively general model, cycles of protest, and NSM theory. One of Tilly’s driving concerns is the question of
repertoire change (1977; 1978; 1986; 1995a; 1995b; 2006a; 2008). Much of this work has focused especially on Great Britain, though he has also applied his insights to the United States and France, among others. In particular, he identifies and aims to explain a shift in the means of collective action from the 1750s into the first quarter of the nineteenth century, in which localized direct actions gave way to more modular campaigns directed at national political institutions.

Although the particular specifications have changed over the years, in general he attributes the shape of a repertoire in a particular society to three broad factors (Tilly, 2006a). The first, the *everyday social organization* of a given population, refers to the array of collective identities, social networks, and organizational forms that organize the rhythms of daily life. Together, these inform the claims and house the resources for potential collective action. The second, the *cumulative experience of contention*, emphasizes that the history of contention in a given population shapes conflict by providing important examples or representations of actions, issues, goals, and frames. This history shapes the expectations that activists have in contention by generating a signaling system actors use to make sense of claims. Finally, the *intervention of the political regime* specifies the arrangement of threats and opportunities offered by the various actors in a political regime, including the government, political parties, labor unions, corporations, media organizations, and religious organizations, among others. These actors are especially important insofar as they contribute to the degree of access, facilitation, and repression meted out to challengers.

The development of new forms of collective action is a gradual process that occurs at the margins of established forms as a result of changes in these three factors and their
interactions. For example, shifts in demographic patterns and the nature of the economy can alter such factors as: communication and transportation systems, the distribution of resources, the relationship between domestic and occupational life, etc. Such changes reconfigure the relations of power in society and the organizational bases of collective action by shifting populations and resources. Changes in the political regime, such as a transition from dictatorship to democracy or the incorporation of the working class into the political process, can also dramatically reshape the nature of conflict by redistributing resources and power. The contentious interactions that unfold under these conditions thus diffuse new forms of contentious politics and regime responses.

The change that Tilly identifies in his model is gradual and cumulative in nature; innovations form at the margins of established actions. In contrast, scholars have developed conceptions and mechanisms of repertoire change involving much more rapid innovation and diffusion. Sewell (1996) argues that transformative events like the storming of the Bastille can quickly reshape prevailing conceptions of collective action. Zolberg (1972) argues that the effervescence of sudden and widespread social unrest weakens previous constraints on contentious action and thus contributes to widespread experimentation. Tarrow (1989; 1998) provides a more refined variant of this approach of this explanation: cycles of protest. Protest cycles form when movement activities and successes generate externalities that indicate to other movements and activists an unusual degree of responsiveness in the political system. He refers to this phenomenon as a shift in political opportunities. Activists mobilize to take advantage of these newfound opportunities. The ensuing escalation of interactions between activists and political authorities involves the mobilization of previously quiescent sectors of society as political
entrepreneurs anticipate decreased risks for protest organization and collective action. These conditions facilitate the increased development of tactical, framing, and organizational innovations and thus the diffusion of collective action. In this sense, Tarrow’s protest cycle differs from Tilly’s general model only in its temporality; rapid changes in the strategies utilized by political authorities and the mobilization of everyday networks, identities, and organizations together produce a relatively rapid change in repertoires of contention.

Though diverse, NSM theorists share a common observation: a significant change in the repertoire associated with the arrival of new movements like the women’s, environmental, and gay rights movements over the last half of the twentieth century (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985). In order to explain this shift in tactics, they turn to what many sociologists have identified as a fundamental shift in the nature of social organization. The most popular of these conceptions concerns differences between industrial and post-industrial society. Characterized by tremendous social changes like industrialization, urbanization, and glaring inequality, industrial society is split by the industrial cleavage between workers and employers. Forged on the basis of established solidarities like class, forms of collective action like the labor movement addressed central issues of economic well-being and physical security.

NSM theorists argue that contemporary forms of collective action developed in response to the emergence of new patterns of organization in post-industrial society. With the general prosperity of postwar democracies, material considerations receded in significance. New or modified mechanisms of control – a growing state tasked with
extensive regulatory and social insurance imperatives alongside a global market eroding the state’s capacity and will to meet these imperatives – increase the depth of intervention of political and economic interests into private everyday life. Such developments facilitate new conflicts over self-determination, the environment, identity, and other post-materialist issues. Unlike the movements of industrial society, new social movements forge new solidarities based on values and lifestyles, while they engage in collective actions oriented towards shaping autonomous institution and practices. The repertoire that unfolds in such struggles, including efforts to fashion identities and achieve novel goals, are specific to the conditions of postindustrial society.

The approach taken in this dissertation is primarily informed by Tilly’s general approach to explaining repertoire change. Below I develop my argument and situate the primary theses of this dissertation in relation to the approaches to repertoire change.

2.2. Summary

2.2.1. Integrated Theory

Efforts in the social movement literature to synthesize, integrate, or otherwise bring together in *ad hoc* fashion various theoretical perspectives are numerous (Dalton 1994; Klandermans 1997; Jasper 1997; Lichbach 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; McAdam et al 2001; Opp 2009; Passy 2001; Tarrow 1998). The approach adopted here contributes to an explanation of repertoire change and tactical choice by integrating the major theoretical perspectives prevalent not only in the study of protest, but in sociology and political science in general. Considering structural, cultural, and rational approaches together involves attention to the role of institutions and networks, resources and incentives, and collective identities in shaping social conflict. The primary theoretical
imperatives of this dissertation are to identify the sets of relationships between the core endogenous variables of a rational choice approach and exogenous variables like opportunities and identities. An example of this model is Opp’s (2009, 328) structural-cognitive model of social movement mobilization (see Figure 2.1). A brief description will suffice. The model is synthetic; it develops a causal argument by linking the macro to the micro level and integrating the relevant insights of various theoretical approaches.

Analysis begins by identifying the cognitive structures of actors: their beliefs, values, and frames. Next, an array of explanatory variables are identified: macro-level variables, such as changes in state repression, or economic prosperity, meso-level factors such as organizational structures and group characteristics, and finally micro-level variables such as social interaction. These factors are considered principally for their relation to changes in these cognitions. The key mechanism in the model is the relation of these cognitions to incentives; changed cognitions result in changes in incentives. From Opp’s perspective, shifts in costs and benefits lead to the decision to protest or to remain inactive. Collective action is ultimately an aggregation of these individual decisions. In other words, only those conditions that systematically affect subjective perceptions alter the rate of protest.

As Opp repeatedly notes, none of the existing social movement theories, including the foundation of his approach, collective action theory, have a well-developed theory of

![Figure 2.1. Opp’s Structural-Cognitive Model of Mobilization](image-url)
tactical choice. Neither does he offer such a theory. This study is thus a tentative and exploratory effort to gather the relevant explanatory variables into a single model. While Opp’s model of mobilization and the partial model presented in this chapter and the next are causal models, this study is modest in that it primarily seeks to explore the utility of the constituent explanatory instruments with respect to a sample of positive cases of CJOs. It thus has a strong illustrative character. I begin with a concise presentation of the central argument and theses of this dissertation.

2.2.2. Basic Argument

This project is oriented by two basic concerns: 1) a problem-driven effort to explain culture jamming as a set of oppositional tactics, and 2) a theory-driven effort to develop a more robust synthetic approach to explaining repertoire change and tactical choice. This chapter and the following are concerned primarily with developing more refined theoretical instruments. It is important, however, to briefly consider the nexus of these complementary priorities in order to anchor the remaining more abstract considerations.

The primary argument of this dissertation is that a close relation exists between the development of twentieth century art in advanced Western democracies and certain novel forms of collective action called culture jamming. Figure 2.2 schematizes the basic but incomplete argument. I consider art as a property of everyday social organization: a 1) social field or institution, 2) situated within networks of durable social interaction, and 3) generative of sets of identities. These generate the incentives for various forms of collective action, here considered as a 1) repertoire of contention available to a population at a given time and as 2) contentious performances specific to certain organizations. I reduce the basic relation between art and contentious politics to at least three key arguments.
1. The development of art as a social field is a gradual development in the everyday social organization of advanced Western democracies.

2. Culture jamming organizations are associated with the social fields, social networks, and collective identities of artistic production.

3. These social fields, social networks, and collective identities shape the preferences and incentives for contentious performances.

This set of theses involves movement from the macro to the meso-level (1 and 2) as well as a series of relations between structural, cultural, and rational variables in an effort to explain the culture jamming repertoire of contention (2 and 3).

This argument can be fleshed out in a number of preliminary but essential ways. First, I utilize the basic framework of Tilly’s explanation of repertoire change with special attention to the concept of everyday social organization. I consider the remaining two approaches to repertoire change, once broken into their constituent parts, partially reducible to Tilly’s basic model. In contrast to Tilly, NSM theorists rely on holistic conceptualizations of social systems to posit changes in repertoires over time. Focusing on changes in the everyday social organization, political regimes, and signaling systems of advanced Western democracies over time should offer a more rigorous and empirical approach to considering whether new forms of domination and resistance have emerged.
Additionally, the cycles of protest thesis is fundamentally compatible with a focus on change in everyday social organization, political regimes, and/or signaling systems (Tilly 2006a). Specifically, the cycle of protest is the result of shifting opportunities as well as the mobilization of previously quiescent sectors of everyday social organization.

A second point involves the temporality of change. I am not trying to distinguish between whether or not the set of contentious performances I am focusing on were developed in a relatively brief period of heightened conflict (cycle of protest) or gradually over the longue durée of the twentieth century. Teune (2005) argues that these tactics and other related sets of tactics, germinated by various avant-garde groups, diffused in the ferment of the 1960s and appeared again in the anti-globalization movements of the 1990s and 2000s. My argument is more modest, yet supplementary. I emphasize changes in everyday social organization and a novel history of collective action to explain repertoire change in the advanced Western democracies over the second half of the twentieth century.

Third, the concepts presented in Figure 2.2 concern relations among different levels of analysis. At the macro-level are fields and repertoires; at the meso-level are networks, identities, incentives, and contentious performances. This argument thus attempts to relate macro- and meso-level structures to meso-level phenomena. This exclusion of the micro-level contrasts with Opp’s macro-to micro-level model in which objective structural features and processes shape individual perceptions and evaluations of action. The primary reason for this truncation of the model is the assumption that the collective action problem has already been solved. In Chapter One I define culture jamming (D.2) as a collective action. Chapter Four concludes this consideration by specifying the CJO as the principal focus of this study. Because the question here is strategy and not mobilization,
the micro-level recedes into the meso-level under the assumption that individuals in CJOs are sufficiently organized to operate as a unit. When appropriate, differences in distributions of characteristics are treated as meso-level group characteristics.

In order to flesh out these arguments, I first clarify the concept of a repertoire of contention and its relation to performances in Tilly’s work. Second, I consider the concepts of field, capital, and habitus in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Third, in order to approach a fuller conceptualization of everyday social organization I compare and contrast these approaches. Fourth, in the following chapter I develop an approach translating the socialization effects of these macro- and meso-level structures into a rational choice perspective. In so doing, I detail two socialization factors relating everyday life to tactical choice: identity and familiarity. Together, these shape the preferences for certain forms of action, reduce the costs of some actions but not others, and reduce the uncertainties associated with some actions but not others. These processes form the core of a synthetic approach: I relate the structures and cognitions of everyday life to choices in contentious performances through an analysis of the preferences and incentives for tactics.

2.3. Tilly and Bourdieu

2.3.1. Tillyian Repertoires and Performances

Charles Tilly’s concept of a repertoire of contention has drawn significant attention as a useful device for analyzing the diversity of forms of contentious behavior. Since its

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5 This is not to argue that the question of strategy must operate at the organizational level of analysis. Rather, important questions regarding intra-organizational dynamics, inter-organizational relations, and tactical repertoires are simply not covered here.

inception, the core of most conceptualizations has been the totality of available forms of contention, described as a set of well-defined and familiar forms of collective action (Tilly 1978, 143), “the ways that people act together in pursuit of shared interests” (Tilly 1995b, 41) and, more recently, as “ensembles of mutual claim-making routines available to particular pairs of identities” (McAdam et al 2001, 138). At a given time and place a population makes use of a limited set of means in its efforts to project contentious claims.

Though they do diverge on some points, in general these definitions and others stress at least three key points. First, the repertoire is Tilly’s most celebrated cultural concept; it is conceived as a cultural creation with structural constraints, for “at any particular point in history... [people] learn only a rather small number of alternative ways to act collectively” (Tilly 1995a, 26). While theoretically actors may choose to utilize any potentially conceivable tactic, the number of observable types of collective actions is relatively limited and exhibits significant continuity across time. The means that actors find most familiar, feasible, and efficacious are the tactics most likely to find repeated and diffuse use and thus form a repertoire. Such actions are “learned, understood, sometimes planned and rehearsed by the participants” (Tilly 1986, 207). As Crossley notes (2002a, 48-9), an implicit assumption of moral economy informs much of this work. Cognitive skills and shared understandings are essential for actors to act and make sense of their action and the action of others. The limits of these cognitions and understandings constitute constraints on the forms of action available to potential actors.

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7 All of this despite his claim made roughly a decade ago that the concept has not been a resounding success. Although it is frequently used as a heuristic device, Tilly (1995a) bemoaned the lack of efforts to empirically test the hypothesis of a repertoire of contention. At its most general and rigorous, this dissertation cannot contribute such a test.
Second, the theatrical metaphor is instructive. Tilly identifies contentious interactions as performances, as expressive actions that communicate the claims, demands, or grievances of collective actors. In their discussion of repertoires, McAdam et al (2001, 138, 49) refer to “adopting scripts,” “ritual,” and the limits to feasibility and intelligibility. The analogy serves to illustrate the relational core of the concept; actors are not only constrained by their cognitive capacities, but also by the cognitive capacities and understandings of their audiences. Performances must be interpreted by multiple parties in order to convey the claims of each party. Furthermore, it highlights the “learned character of the performance and the limits of that learning, yet allows for variation and even continuous change from one performance to the next...[It] typically leaves plenty of room for improvisation, innovation, and unexpected endings” (Tilly 1986, 307). Themes like drama, symbolism, innovation, bargaining, and deliberation are common throughout Tilly’s discussion of the repertoire. In general, repertoires of contention are the available sets of performances that actors enact and improvise in their contentious interactions.

Third, repertoires are distinct from everyday life. Everyday life is social structure, the rhythms of quotidian existence organized by work, education, family, and other mundane concerns and pursuits. Of particular importance are the formal and informal social networks, or sets of durable social ties, that house the identities and resources of populations (Tilly 1991; 2005; 2008). These social ties are the products of repeated social transactions, abiding interactions between actors. Unlike episodes of contentious politics, networks maintain an enduring temporal structure that provides valuable predictability in social life. Such durable relations are the foundations of larger social processes and
structures. For Tilly the individual is not the fundamental unit in social inquiry because individuals, like structures, are an emergent property of interactions.

In order to navigate this everyday social milieu, people draw on scripts (Tilly 2005) or repertoires of everyday life (McAdam et al 2001, 140).8 Social interactions vary along two dimensions; performances are both scripted and improvised. Scripts draw on general and available models of action specific to certain relations and situations. They are the sedimented result of prior social transactions. Because few situations are repeated perfectly, scripts cannot perfectly anticipate the consequences of action. Interaction also relies on local working knowledge that supplements the gaps between scripts and actual unfolding interactions. This allows for degrees of improvisation and learning in order to grapple with the exigencies of situations (Tilly 2005). Though inevitable, errors and unintended consequences are often opportunities for learning and correction, and thus accumulations of local knowledge and, over time, the refinement of scripts (Tilly 1996). Performances are the scripts or repertoires enacted and improvised in context; they are the structured but situational relationship between various actors and their environment.

2.3.2. Bourdieusian Fields and Habitus

Of critical importance in any effort to grapple with Bourdieu are the concepts of field, capital, and habitus.9 Fields are plural; they presume the internal differentiation of a society into various institutionalized spheres of social activity. They distinguish a level of analysis above that of organizations or networks and below that of the whole social

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8 Descriptions of these sets of non-contentious performances are reminiscent of the rich analyses of everyday behavior offered by Erving Goffman (Collins 2010).
arena. The characteristics of fields induce independent constraining effects on individual or organizational behavior. These effects typically involve the socialization of attitudes, values, and preferences, as well as the structuring of incentives and resource endowments. Some describe these effects as governed by a central orienting or “institutional logic” that guides this social activity within the field (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton 2004).

Bourdieu’s approach to field theory has found favor in a number of studies of social movement activity (Auyero 2003; Bilic 2010; Crossley 2001; 2002a; 2003; 2006; Edelman, Leachman, and McAdam 2010; Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Epstein 1996; Haluza-Daley 2008; Jasper 1997; Ray 1999). This study contributes to this growing literature by considering how Bourdieu’s sociology, specifically his sociology of art, provides a robust supplement to Tilly’s emphasis on everyday social organization.

For Bourdieu, modern industrial societies are characterized by numerous relatively autonomous and highly distinct fields, or “social microcosms,” e.g. the literary, political, religious, etc (Bourdieu 1998, 83; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). Through successive struggles to mark off social terrain distinct from the dominant field of power and economy, fields accrue their own resources and practices that institutionalize these struggles. Fields are thus delineated cultural and structural contexts, institutionalized spheres of social activity that shape behavior through the construction of ways of seeing and acting, of behaving, but most importantly, of classifying and differentiating. Such organization is not neutral, however, for fields are the products of power, or inequalities in resources. Indeed,

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10 Similar concepts are not alien to social movement theory. Early efforts in resource mobilization theory specified the organizational structure of a movement as a social movement industry (McCarthy and Zald 1977; 1987b). Others defined multi-organizational fields as the population of organizations relevant to a social movement (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Klandermans 1997). Today, work in organizational ecology approaches has blossomed (Minkoff 1995; Olzak and Ryo 2007; Soule and King 2008).
Bourdieu uses two metaphors to capture the general concept of fields: games and markets. Like a game, fields are sites of struggle, with the caveat that even the rules themselves are ultimately stakes in the game. Like a market, fields are sites of the production and consumption of products (services, goods, knowledge, status) where agents struggle over profits (different forms of capital). *Capital* is any resource which is the object of action in a social field. It includes material or economic capital (money and material assets), cultural capital (knowledge, skills), social capital (networks and influence), and symbolic capital (status, prestige) (Bourdieu 1986). One’s endowment of capital is a marker of one’s position in social space. The unequal distribution of the different forms of capital structures society, or the universe of social fields, as well as each distinct field. Fields are thus the durable organization of power in each sphere of social activity.

In this struggle, agents occupy positions. The concept of positions points to the relational core of Bourdieu’s theory of practice; positions in a field are constituted by their relationship to other positions. Actors occupy positions by virtue of the structure of the field, which is structured as such by the unequal distribution of capital. Thus, the distribution of capital and the positions of other actors determine particular positions in social space. Bourdieu’s favored method of graphically representing fields and their positions is correspondence analysis, which plots positions along indicators of capital in *n*-dimensional space, though the space is usually organized by two variables: the total amount of capital and the ratio of cultural capital to economic capital.\(^{11}\) Concrete social interaction is secondary in this analysis; capital defines position, and thus social meaning and resource endowments, not the networks of relations among actors. Networks are

\(^{11}\) Chapter Five presents a fuller analysis of the structure of fields, specifically the field of cultural production.
merely a social resource for the acquisition, preservation, and deployment of other forms of capital, strategies that are structured by the field. In addition, fields are dynamic; positions are constantly in flux as actors employ strategies to acquire, utilize, or conserve the capital relevant to the field, new actors emerge in the field, and other actors recede from the field, thereby redefining every position. Hence, fields are sites of struggle where actors pursue the maximization of capital in order to improve their position in the field.

At the micro-level, Bourdieu (1998, 25) conceives of individuals as, “active and knowing agents endowed with a practical sense.” This sense:

which does not burden itself with rules or principles...still less with calculations or deductions, which are in any case excluded by the urgency of action 'which brooks no delay,' is what makes it possible to appreciate the meaning of the situation instantly, at a glance, in the heat of the action, and to produce at once the opportune response

is characteristic of the relation between habitus and field (Bourdieu 1990, 103-4). It is what allows us to navigate the highly complex but seemingly simple rhythms of everyday life. This instantaneous and non-calculative sense of an unfolding situation is pre-reflexive and non-intentional. Action is a structured phenomenon; it is habitual and unconscious, yet it follows a logic that is contextual and situational, not universal and abstract. In addition, action is practical and directional. Actors are always interested and strategic; “practices never cease to comply with an economic logic” in the pursuit of clear objectives (Bourdieu 1990, 123). Talk, walking, tastes in dress and arts: all of these actions and more are actions of impression management, of a constant and unfolding process of locating oneself and others in a social space organized by power.

Habitus refers to the matrices of dispositions, structures of schemas, habits, and know-how which actors acquire in the navigation of social fields. Through action in the social world - what Bourdieu variously calls one’s social trajectory or individual history -
agents acquire dispositions. The dispositions generated through this process together constitute the habitus. Dispositions structure the ability to practically (unconsciously) perceive a situation and its distinct attributes, classify and render meaningful each attribute and the situation in general, and act on the perception and appreciation of the situation in a manner that furthers one’s practical objectives. Dispositions refer to the tacit knowledge and skills embodied and applied in the practical movement of an actor through social interactions. Habitus are thus the incorporated structures of social life, of ways of judging and acting prescribed and proscribed by the field.

The sense of the game that animates practical action and thus the habitus is a practical sense of the lines, means, and stakes of conflict specific to each field. Conflict is symbolic in Bourdieu’s sociology; habitus is a set of classificatory schemas that both judges the actions of others and allows one to anticipate the perception and judgment of one’s own actions by others. When employed in social relations, these incorporated structures of symbolic differentiation confer on forms of capital (social, cultural, economic) an additional element of prestige or status. Like all species of power, this symbolic capital is unequally distributed; some actors are able to draw on their resource endowments in order to define the struggle and its objects in their interest. Symbolic capital thus allows for the definition of what constitutes cultural capital in a field, and thus confers the power to define the social world through categories of perception and action. Practices are the production and consumption of these sets of symbolic classifications, all of which are organized by the field and habitus in concrete social interaction. In other words, action is subordinated to the logic of dominant social classifications that identify objects and actors as good/evil, profane/sacred, ugly/beautiful, efficient/wasteful, clean/dirty, etc. Even subversive or
heterodox action within the field often merely inverts the dominant classification schemes. Social identity itself is the position of an actor in social space, the set of representations that classify and position them. It is through strategies of distinction, the carving of identity through symbolic conflict, that actors strive to maximize their resource endowments in order to authoritatively define social reality (Bourdieu 1984).

Social fields contribute to the accomplishment of the habitus, and thus the structure of its dispositions, through their distribution of capital and the position of the actor. Fields require actors to acquire different skills, competencies, and resources or capital specific to the field in order to maximize their standing. These acquisitions are classified and classifying actions, practices generated by the habitus. In other words, the friction between habitus and field is generally minimal, because practical action acquires a “feel for the game,” the subtle sense of the contours of the field that ensures an investment in the stakes. This sense of the conflict is a practical sense of the possibilities of action within the field, of the threats, opportunities, and constraints offered at any given time. Such a sense of the field is conditioned by one’s position in the field and the nature of the conflicts endemic to the field. For example, the artistic field operates according to the conflict between the logic of its fundamental law, “art for art’s sake,” for which the acquisition of material or economic capital is anathema, and the logic of the market, for which financial and popular success are lauded. The acquisition of field-specific attributes - the “internalization of an objectively selected system of signs, indices, and sanctions,” of systems of classification - is the process of socialization to this conflict of values (Bourdieu 1993, 133).

Deposited practical infra-conscious schemes or dispositions - the sets of symbolic classifications that actors use to name the social world - are the source of social structure
as well. As noted in the right side of Figure 2.2 above, while agents continually perform a process of acquisition, they simultaneously perform a process of reproduction. This process is the key to understanding the continuity of social relations and structures. Individual actions are in truth collective or relational efforts reconstructing or reactivating the social fields that in turn generate and reinforce the habitus (Bourdieu 1990, 73).

2.3.3. Bourdieu and Social Movements

Though Bourdieu himself was active in the various movements against global capitalism in France, his theoretical writings on protest are minimal. His most noted concept of relevance is crisis (Bourdieu and Wacquiant 1992, 131). He describes it thus:

> The critique which brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation, has as the condition of its possibility objective crisis, which, in breaking the immediate fit between the subjective structures and the objective structures, destroys self-evidence practically (Bourdieu 1977, 169).

At its most essential, crisis is a moment of reflexivity. Reflexivity refers generally to the ability to think about the conditions of thought and action (Bourdieu and Wacquiant 1992, 40). If the reproduction of social structures is a pre-reflexive loop of habitus and field, crises are breaks in the loop, disjunctures between the habitus and its social field. When one’s expectations or one’s sense of the game is dashed by unfolding events, the flow of action is interrupted. Bourdieu seems to suggest that reflexivity and deliberation substantially shape practice when pre-reflexive practical sense is unable to adequately navigate such dissonant situations.

Bourdieu’s (1998) polemical work argues that reflexivity figures decisively into the importance of intellectuals for the progress of social movements. For him, some fields, specially the scientific fields, socialize agents through the incorporation of dispositions of reflexivity; reflexivity then becomes another element of pre-conscious practical sense.
Social scientists, for example, through practical pre-reflective strategies must acquire the cultural capital associated with reflexivity to advance their positions in their native field. As a scientist, the reflexive agent *par excellence*, Bourdieu has incorporated through action the particular conditions of the French field of academia, one of which is the habitual capacity to reflect on these very conditions and those of other fields.

In contrast to the dominant emphasis on supply theories and their focus on the capacities for mobilization (opportunities, resources, etc), Bourdieu’s implicit theory of social movements is a demand theory of mobilization. It focuses on the conditions for the emergence of a consciousness of injustice, for “cognitive liberation,” the recognition or realization that collective actions can shape outcomes in a group’s favor (McAdam 1999). However, this study focuses on the question of strategy and tactics. Below, I explore how Bourdieu can contribute to an explanation of strategic and tactical choice.

### 2.4. Dialogue

#### 2.4.1. Networks and Fields

The core of the argument guiding this dissertation is the notion of everyday social organization. Tilly’s unpacking of the concept into identities, networks, and resources is in part a recognition of the voluminous and cumulative work done in the study of social movements to specify the most important causal variables outside of political institutions. Bourdieu’s sociology offers a somewhat different conception of everyday life and social organization that privileges the influence of social fields, habitus, and capital in the shaping of social interaction. The following engagement with Tilly and Bourdieu is not exhaustive;

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12 Bourdieu (1998, 11) does suggest the hint of a supply theory when he briefly discusses the preconditions for group mobilization: proximity in social space. However, this is not much of an advance over existing social movement theory.
it is guided by their contributions to the study of everyday life and contentious politics. I
do not consider resources here, though they are certainly important for an understanding
of everyday social organization. Instead, I take them up in Chapter Eight.

The key theoretical disagreement between these eminent sociologists lies in their
differing emphases on structure and interaction (Emirbayer 2010). Bourdieu prioritizes
the social field in explaining social life. Objective relations among actors are mutually
constitutive and determinative of patterns of social behavior and meaning. Interactions
among discrete units or actors are not causally significant. More significantly, he regards a
focus on interaction without pre-eminent attention to objective relations as misguided;
social ties are an effect of position-takings within the field, and thus more broadly of the
structure of power in society (Bottero and Crossley 2011; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992,
113-114; Nooy 2003). Structure is thus prior to interaction. In contrast, for Tilly, patterns
of social transactions are at the core of social life. Structures and individuals are an
emergent property of durable social relations.

Whatever a strict interpretation of Bourdieu may entail, fields, social interaction,
and agents are not locked in a simple reproductive process in which only exogenous factors
modify the structure of the field. Several authors have noted that while he espoused a
structural as opposed to an interactional relationalism, Bourdieu was inconsistent in his
empirical work (Bottero and Crossley 2011; Nooy 2003). The chorus of criticisms
especially problematizes the assumption that dispositions are internally consistent.
Bottero (2009) argues that Bourdieu's assumption of homophily in social relations – the
tendency for people to associate with others most like themselves – can be relaxed in favor

13 A critical defense of Bourdieu, beyond the scope of this chapter, would charge that Bourdieu's theoretical
developments are always derived from, and subordinate to, the play in the data.
of variable network structures. While a homophilous structure is likely to generate a strong social reproductive process between field and habitus, more diverse networks are more likely to problematize simple social reproduction over time by producing potentially contrasting or novel ways of seeing and acting. Nooy (2003) and King (2000) argue that Bourdieu's theory of practice is distinct from his theory of habitus. In essence, practical theory stresses the strategic and virtuosic interactions of individuals and groups, while habitus emphasizes the structures of the social world and their incorporation into the bodily dispositions of actors. At the core of Nooy's argument is the assumption that the structure of a field is partly constituted by unfolding practices. Practice is not entirely determined by fields as a rigidly structuralist rendering of habitus would suggest. Considering these criticisms, social interaction can lead to the systematic production of dispositions that are imperfectly tuned to their field, thus introducing elements of improvisation and error into the social reproductive process. This study thus presupposes that fields, networks, and identities (to be elaborated in relation to Bourdieu below) are mutually constitutive, while each produces independent effects.

2.4.2. Identities

Conspicuously absent from Figure 2.2 is the concept of habitus. Instead, the model relates identities to networks and fields. Both Tilly and Bourdieu work with conceptions of collective or social identity. For Bourdieu, habitus is social identity, the sense of positioning that an actor develops through immersion in a field, meaning participation in symbolic conflict. Identity is established through the struggle to confer classifications on objects and actors in the field. These sets of classifications are both constitutive of the
dispositions that form the habitus and made sensible as a property of the social field they reproduce through classifying and classifiable practices.

For Tilly (2002, 2006b), social identity is grounded in social relations. Through concrete and durable social transactions among pairs of actors, the rights, obligations, expectations, and other binding and shared understandings that animate social interaction are forged. Such relations are characterized by a particular structural characteristic: boundaries. All actors or entities erect boundaries in order to distinguish themselves from others. However, the process is uneven. Some are able to employ their definitions more effectively than others. Political authorities in particular are prone to crafting and imposing identities upon previously heterogeneous groups. In this sense, some actors can be routinely ‘called out’ or ‘called to’ by the organization of their everyday experience (repression, institutional forms of identification, etc.) Such boundaries are constructed discursively in a social process involving the adoption, elaboration, and modification of what he calls shared stories. Shared stories are explanatory accounts of human action that represent social relations and their binding understandings of these relations in the construction of actors. Such stories “typically include names for the sites [actors or entities] on either side of the line, accounts of where they came from and imputations of shared attributes to the entities on each side of the line” (Tilly 2002, 11). Stories represent the cultural content of relationships by classifying actors across and within boundaries. Social identities are thus composed of relations, boundaries, and stories. They are the social experience of these relations and the public representation of these experiences in the form of boundary stories (Tilly 2002, 49).
First, I note a point of convergence. Both Tilly and Bourdieu describe identity as a contested and unequal social process of classification. Tilly (2005, 61), for example, identifies, though not exhaustively, “contested representations of crucial actors as worthy or unworthy, unified or fragmented, large or small, committed or uncommitted, powerful or weak, well connected or isolated, durable or evanescent, reasonable or irrational, greedy or generous.” Stories narrate these properties often as intrinsic characteristics of entities. Actors are thus constructed with positive or negative attributes. Bourdieu’s entire sociology rests on the importance of schemas of appreciation, perception, and action in the classification of actors and actions to the advantage of the classifying agent. Like Tilly, identity is a contested process, because “only in and through the struggle do the internalized limits become boundaries, barriers that have to be moved” (Bourdieu 1984, 480). The symbolic conflict that organizes the activity of each field is thus, in effect, a struggle over the means or resources to establish the classificatory schemas most advantageous to each group’s interests.

Tilly and Bourdieu differ ultimately on the grounding of identity: interaction or structure. This is particularly notable with respect to the origins of schemas of classification. For Bourdieu, they are the distinguishing features of social fields, the unique products of accumulated, and thus historical, symbolic struggles over various definitions of religion, art, politics, etc. For Tilly (2002, 49), the materials of identity are specific to each actor’s sets of social relations, though constrained by collective memory and available cultural means.14

14 In part, this difference of approach with respect to the origins of cultural distinctions is a consequence of their attitudes towards Durkheim. Durkheim’s emphasis on social forces in the formation of categories is clearly relevant to Bourdieu. Tilly (1981) has openly expressed his disdain for Durkheim’s sociology.
2.4.3. Performances

Both Tilly and Bourdieu stress conceptions of action that aim to balance constraints and agency. As noted above, Tilly identifies a repertoire of everyday life. Like repertoires of contention, these available performances differentiate along sets of social relations; pairs of actors with durable relations obtain their own routine sets of interactions that accumulate shared understandings. Such routine performances, or scripts, vary in the degree to which local knowledge can empower improvisation. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus likewise aims to captures the available means of action, the schemas of perception, appreciation and action acquired in social fields, and like Tilly, the employment of these schemas is situational, constantly assessing the environment and relations in order to determine proper (advantageous) action. This analogy between repertoires of everyday life and habitus may seem strained unless one considers the importance of Erving Goffman for both accounts. As Collins (2010) notes, despite Tilly’s distance from symbolic interactionism, the last decade of his life was marked by a Goffmanesque concern for performances and interactions. In Why? (2006b), Tilly addresses Goffman on affable terms, appropriating his analyses and identifying him as a fellow relational sociologist. For his part, Bourdieu makes frequent references to Goffman, to the point of describing his analysis of strategies in social fields as Goffman applied in the context of struggles over the power to impose definitions of reality (Bourdieu 2000, 187).

The essential difference in relation to their conceptions of action is the importance for Bourdieu of the social field. Habitus are always more or less tuned to the contours of the field of their making, while for Tilly repertoires or scripts and local knowledge are acquired in social contexts determined more by social interaction than by objective
structures of power. It is my argument that Bourdieu offers a significantly richer analysis of everyday behavior than Tilly offers in nearly all of his works. This is likely a reflection of not only his interest in pragmatism, which Tilly shares, but also phenomenology and psychology, which Tilly does not. However, as Nooy (2003) observes an insistent emphasis on Bourdieu’s theory of practical action provides a more robust model of action. Such a conception puts a stronger premium on interaction as an independent level of analysis, while suggesting that action involves confronting multiple possible courses of action with variable outcomes, all of which are constrained by the social context. Throughout this dissertation, I employ an understanding of agency along these lines using the language of performances so amenable to both Bourdieu and Tilly.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I present my general argument and lay the groundwork for theoretical development by interrogating some of the similarities and differences between Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu. The ultimate goal of this development is to elaborate a conception of everyday social organization and its relation to contentious performances. The following chapter utilizes collective action theory to clarify the relation between macro-variables, motivation, and action.
CHAPTER 3: SOCIALIZATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY

The principle goal of this chapter is to present a set of theoretical instruments for explaining tactical choice. In Chapter Two I discuss the contributions of Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu to a model incorporating social fields, social networks, identities, and models of action as key constraints on action. In this chapter this model is supplemented with the incorporation of collective action theory and bounded rationality. I focus on two basic effects derived from variation in socialization across a population of SMO members. First, I consider the importance of collective identity in establishing basic constraints on the expectations generated for a set of tactics. Special attention is given to the evaluation of tactics on a scale of effectiveness. Second, I consider how these expectations may vary in the degree of confidence with which they are held by an SMO. I suggest that this variation can be explained as a consequence of their familiarity with the everyday correlates of tactics. In general, the two chapters together argue that the effects of the socializing structures of everyday life – the networks and fields that organize activities and the shared understandings that they generate – can be translated into a consideration of the effects of a variety of costs and benefits on choice among a variety of tactics.

3.1. Socialization

This chapter further explicates the relationship between everyday life ad contentious politics by turning to a revealing analogy:

Just as thoroughly bilingual friends often switch from one language to the other when signaling a shift of mood, subject, or context, they move into an alternative mode of communication. They do so because the social networks and shared understandings at hand channel participants into available definitions of what is happening, available means of communication and cooperation, available practices of conflict resolution, and available cultural idioms (McAdam et al 2001, 140).
The means are provided by existing social infrastructure - durable sets of social relations and their attendant shared understandings but also material conditions that facilitate communication and render resources available. The available models and practices are the scripts of everyday life and previous collective performances. It is precisely this availability I hope to consider below.

In order to specify this relationship between everyday social organization and contentious performances, I consider two basic sets of socialization effects on the process of selecting tactics. Figure 3.1 schematizes these processes. The first process involves collective identities. The shared understandings of social relations contribute to the definition of the salient properties of actions, including the effectiveness of tactics. Such properties contribute towards the estimation of expected outcomes and utilities among a choice set of tactics. The second process involves the distribution of familiarity that actors have with certain ways of acting and seeing. Such a distribution contributes a variety of effects to tactical choice, particularly the management of complexity through the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs.

In explaining choices in organizational practices, Polletta (2002, 19-20) argues that identity and familiarity explanations are distinct (though she does not then argue that they are strictly exclusive). Identity aligns what one chooses with what one believes about oneself; actions are thus expressions of oneself. Familiarity refers to making choices based on one’s sets of routine experiences. I approach familiarity from two perspectives. First, I argue that familiarity and identity are not as exclusive as this may suggest. Our shared understandings and public representations of our social relationships, including the everyday practices that reinforce them, are in fact what are most familiar to us. These help
activists recognize and evaluate the opportunities and constraints offered by social environments and situations, thus reducing uncertainties and shaping our choice set. As Polletta (2002, 20) observes, “our very criteria for assessing what is instrumental, strategic, efficient...are based on the social associations underpinning those conceptions.”

Second, however, this distinction between identity and familiarity, between our sense of self and our daily routines, brings the discussion to a crucial point. The argument here is that familiarity breeds relative certainty and predictability. How can we explain choices that deviate from what is most familiar? Why would anyone move from a decision of relative certainty into the area of uncertainty and risk? In order to answer these questions and others, I turn to a third but crucial theoretical approach.

3.2. Collective Action Theory

3.2.1. Bourdieu, Tilly, and Rational Choice

Perhaps controversially, I enlist collective action theory to complete this account of repertoire change and tactical choice. Both Bourdieu and Tilly were famously critical of the

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15 These two concepts point to a possible strategic dilemma: while decreasing uncertainty may lead to strategic moves in which one has a better ex ante estimate of the situation, in strategic interactions it may provide one’s opponents with better information about one’s future strategic moves. The safety of relative certainty may thus be illusory; opponents may strategically utilize your predictability by being themselves unpredictable. McAdam (1983) famously argued that even innovative and effective tactics can be neutralized by the tactical responses of opponents. Advantages may be thus always tentative. This possibility provides one compelling reason for tactical deviations from that which is most familiar. In this dissertation, especially this chapter and Chapter Twelve, I aim to provide a more generalized explanation inclusive of this argument.
broader theoretical approach inclusive of collection action theory, rational choice theory. For example, Bourdieu (1990, 49) regards rational choice as one of the more pernicious manifestations of the scholastic fallacy, the tendency of academics to impute “the things of logic to the logic of things.” Tilly (1991; 2002) is critical of the reductionism to the individual. Most objections are leveled at the thin psychology of *homo economicus.* Particularly scorned is the assumption that individuals exhaustively calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to determine which option maximizes their utility. In part this involves the expected utility hypothesis, in which individuals assess the probability of securing future states of the world resulting from their actions. A second criticism involves the assumption that actors take into account more than the material incentives of income or physical well-being when they make decisions (Fireman and Gamson 1979).

None of these assumptions are integral to a collective action theory account of tactical choice (Opp 1989; 2009). First, wider versions of the theory incorporating bounded rationality make more relaxed assumptions about the decision-making process. In contrast to classical or unbounded rationality, bounded rationality begins with the basic observation that humans lack the cognitive capacities to exhaustively evaluate complex environments. Consequently, it employs a basic strategy of satisficing in which choice is governed by the achievement of an acceptable or appropriate threshold of satisfaction. Second, *contra* Olson (1965) non-economic incentives can be incorporated into rational

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16 Tilly and Bourdieu have commented on the utility of bounded rationality. In one essay, Tilly (1996, 543) endorses the view that humans are satisficers. In his discussions on repertoires, however, he regards bounded rationality as a rationalist innovation that remains hamstrung by an inability to model history, culture, and social relations (Tilly 2006a, 41). Bourdieu (2005, 211) likewise acknowledges the contribution of the concept, but like Tilly stresses the lack of social constraints in the model (which for Bourdieu include culture and history by definition).
choice models. Such intangible costs and benefits can include psychological, solidarity, and moral incentives like pleasure, love, a sense of justice, and social interactions (Clark and Wilson (1961)).

It is my contention that Tilly and Bourdieu’s unease with rational choice theory is borne of a focus on classical or unbounded models.\(^{17}\) Opp’s (2009) structural-cognitive model, partially reproduced in Chapter Two, serves as a starting point for this study in that it integrates structural, cultural, and interactional variables into a rationalist account of the constitution of collective action. Likewise, Tilly (2001; McAdam et al 2001) argues that a full accounting of social life must integrate three varieties of causal mechanisms. These include, first, environmental mechanisms, or structural factors that are external to actors and action such as political structures, resource distributions, etc. Second, analysis must turn to cognitive mechanisms, or alterations in the mental states and perceptions of individuals. Finally, he identifies relational mechanisms as shifts in the relations among individuals and groups.\(^{18}\) Tilly suggests that these classes of mechanisms basically exhaust the range of causal factors available to analysts. My suggestion is that these mechanisms are in essence no different from Opp’s range of causal variables.

Such synthetic efforts are not uncommon in the literature. New institutionalism integrates decision theory into hybrid structural/rational analyses, while game theory formalizes dynamic interactions and provides partial explanations for cultural phenomena like norms of reciprocity, trust, and reputation.\(^{19}\) Though individuals are often the singular

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\(^{17}\) Of course, both are often criticized for standing too close to the economist’s fire (Calhoun 1993a; Rule 1989).

\(^{18}\) However, he argues, in contrast to Opp (1989; 2009), that environmental and relational mechanisms can have direct effects on collective action. This seems to be the real point of contention.

\(^{19}\) For an example of thicker game theoretic accounts of collective action, see Chong (1991) and Gould (2003).
actors, there is no inherent assumption that they are asocial egoists. For the purposes of analysis, organizations can be said to behave rationally as well. Additionally, models of interaction can include solidarity incentives (Chong 1991) and constraints like norms (Opp 1989). The most heated animosity remains between rational choice and social psychological approaches despite impressive synthetic work (Chong 1991; Klandermans 1997; Scott 1978). Finally, in contrast to Tilly’s (2006a) insistence that history cannot be modeled with an individualist ontology (despite a not infrequent emphasis on organizations), bounded rationality conceives of behavior as an adaptive process (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002a). In this view, choice is weighted by the experiences of actors. I thus argue that Tilly and Bourdieu are in fact compatible with models of individual behavior so long as care is taken to incorporate the contextual dimensions of social life.

3.2.2. Rational Choice Theory

This collective action theory account of tactical choice includes the fundamental architecture of rational choice models. At the core of this approach is the basic hypothesis that actors are goal-directed. At the least, to be rational is to utilize efficient means in pursuit of ends. Specifying this very general hypothesis, however, has led to a variety of approaches. At least two conceptions of rationality are considered here: classic and bounded. According to Opp (1999, 171; 1989; 2009), the minimal assumptions of the theory common to both spring from three basic propositions:

1. PREFERENCE PROPOSITION: Individual preferences (or goals) are conditions of behaviors which are instrumental in satisfying the respective preferences.

2. CONSTRAINTS PROPOSITION: Anything that increases or decreases the possibilities of an individual to be able to satisfy his or her preferences by performing certain actions (i.e., opportunities or constraints) is a condition for performing these actions.
3. **UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROPOSITION:** *Individuals choose those actions that satisfy their preferences to the greatest extent, taking into account the constraints.*

Rational choice analysis (in this case decision theory: single actor decision-making) first involves the identification of the preferences and constraints that determine the utilities for each option among the set of behavioral alternatives. Preferences and constraints offer incentives for or against certain courses of action. Incentives are the intervening motivational variables between constraints and decision that make particular actions more or less attractive. Increases in costs make an option less attractive and vice versa, while increases or decreases in benefits make an option more or less attractive. In accordance with the utility maximization proposition, actors choose the alternative with the most benefits at the least cost from among the range of options.

Incentives vary also in their relation to the locus of action. Extrinsic or prospective incentives refer to the costs and benefits associated with the consequences of action. From this perspective, actions have anticipated repercussions on the environment that make the action more or less attractive. Such actions may yield negative consequences: decreased public support, repression, decreased membership, etc. They may also yield corresponding positive consequences. Some of these effects may constitute the goal of a SMO, as I will discuss below with respect to extrinsic goals. However, even when an SMO seeks to change some aspect of the environment, such as public policy, aspects of the environment may respond (SMOs, governments, media, etc.) in such a way that they generate incentives distinct from the investment in changing public policy.

Intrinsic, participation, or transaction incentives refer to the costs and benefits derived

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20 This distinction does not necessarily correspond with the well-known distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in psychology. The latter distinction functions at the individual level, while the former operates at the organizational level.
from the act of protesting. The costs of such social exchanges are many: the effects of intra-organizational bargaining and negotiating in the selection and preparation of actions; the information and search costs involved in conceiving and evaluating possible outcomes and utilities; and the surveillance and enforcement costs relating to the various stages of cooperation within the SMO. The benefits may include the various joys of social interaction, edification, building reputation and character, and a sense of efficacy.

Choice is thus governed by the arrangement of costs and benefits associated with the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of each course of action. In Figure 3.1 familiarity and identity affect contentious performances through the reduction of costs and uncertainty and the specification of expected outcomes and utilities. As I will show below, both involve incentives: familiarity reduces both transaction costs and the costs associated with uncertainty (ambiguity aversion), while identity specifies the expected consequences of actions and their related costs and benefits.

Three considerations follow from this presentation. First, there are several assumptions embedded in most versions of rational choice theory. Establishing a rational preference ordering, for example, requires that the preference relations satisfy sets of axioms including, but not limited to completeness, continuity, reflexivity, and transitivity. However, the approach taken here is not axiomatic.

Second, the final proposition of utility maximization is controversial. Maximization or optimization is often contrasted with satisficing. Gigerenzer and Selten (2002b) are particularly critical of the tendency to assume that bounded rationality is in essence ‘optimization under constraints.’ Other interpretations are available. Recall that the search for more complete information is aborted when an option hits a threshold of utility.
provision, not necessarily when the search yields the highest utility of all possible options. However, within the set of searched options, choice is guided by utility maximization. From this perspective, the primary distinction between maximization and satisficing is the fullness of the choice set as defined by the decision-maker.

Third, the nature of the question facing decision-makers in this dissertation strongly suggests that bounded rationality offers a better set of underlying assumptions. The question of mobilization generally involves the modeling of a dichotomous choice: to engage in political action or not.\(^{21}\) If we are to study tactical choice with any level of specificity, however, the potential range of strategies and tactics does not yield a dichotomous choice. Tactical choice is a more cognitively demanding choice problem. Thus, bounded rationality looks like a more useful conception of decision-making.

### 3.2.3. Bounded Rationality

There is no singular general theory of bounded rationality (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002a). However, some important points are available to guide the approach taken in this dissertation. In his most celebrated presentation of the concept of bounded rationality, Simon (1997) builds three key criticisms of classical economic rationality.\(^{22}\) This assault is founded on the assumption (and empirical evidence) that finite cognitive capacities and environmental complexities constrain decision-making. First, knowledge about the nature and probability of outcomes regarding each action is incomplete. Instead, possible

\(^{21}\) Despite the fact that participation in protest often involves various levels of contribution (Klandermans 2004; for an exception in the collective action literature see Marwell and Oliver 1993).

\(^{22}\) “(1) Rationality requires complete knowledge and anticipation of the consequences that will follow on each choice. In fact, knowledge of consequences is always fragmentary. (2) Since these questions lie in the future, imagination must supply the lack of experienced feeling in attaching value to them. But values can be only imperfectly anticipated. 3. Rationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviors. In actual behavior, only a very few of all these possible alternatives come to mind” (Simon 1997, 93-94).
outcomes are weighted heavily by previous outcomes. In other words, we tend to repeat actions that ourselves and others define as previously successful and drop actions that ourselves and others define as previously unsuccessful. Thus, action is adaptive; it develops in a trial-and-error process of exploration and evaluation.

Second, knowledge about the utilities of these outcomes is incomplete. Put another way, the evaluation of alternatives is an imperfect process, because individuals lack the information and the capacity to accurately determine the relevant costs and benefits of various courses of action. However, as Opp (2009) notes, subjective evaluations of costs and benefits need not be objectively accurate in order to constrain action. They need only conform to a pattern in which the choice set is represented as sets of relative values arranged from best to worst.

Third - assuming a medium-to large-\(n\) choice set - knowledge about the range of options is incomplete. Bounded rationality is characterized not by perfect information of all possible courses of action, but by a limited search among options. While the previous points leave open the assumption that the choice set is complete, this final criticism suggests that at some point in the process of searching - depending on the possible breadth of the choice set - a point is reached at which wide swaths of possibilities are left unexplored or underexplored. Together with the second point, this insight has the consequence that preferences may also be incomplete, precisely because unknown options yield unknown utilities.

3.3. **Theoretical Development**

In order to reduce the friction between Bourdieu, Tilly, and collective action theory, I focus on a specific area of agreement by extracting some of the crucial elements from each
regarding the process of decision-making. Before doing so, I establish some basic assumptions about the objects of inquiry.

3.3.1. Preliminaries

The theoretical approach taken here is organized around an ideal situation in which, once a CJO has formed (solved the collective action problem), it is faced with a series of questions about how best to achieve the goals of the collective. The first basic question, addressed in Chapter Nine, concerns the establishment of an overarching strategic orientation. The second question, and the orienting concern for this dissertation, is the identification and elaboration of the conditions and mechanisms of tactical choice. The primary dependent variable is thus the choice an organization makes among a set of tactics. Likely, the soon-to-be-members of actual SMOs are engaged in the question of strategy before the act of organization. This approach is thus a highly stylized effort to isolate a central problematic.

The dependent variable, at least for the majority of the study, does not vary. Nonetheless, this chapter treats it as an explicit variable in accordance with the general theoretical concerns of this project. Further below I distinguish between different sets of tactics. For now, I assume for the sake of simplicity that the range of tactics available to the SMO is a finite set of all possible tactics, X. For now I assume that these tactics vary continuously and not discretely.

3.3.2. Schemas and Information

One of the basic implications of Chapter Two is that, though they differ in specifics, Tilly and Bourdieu utilize a similar and very general model of action. For both, actions or performances are a function of the interaction of environments (or situations) and
behavioral structures. I utilize the same model in order to lay the foundation for an analysis of the relation of socialization to tactical choice.

When confronting a decision context (a situation that yields more than one possible payoff) characterized by uncertainty, actors utilize both schemas and information to produce a reasonable choice. As described in Chapter Two, schemas are durable, organized structures of information that produce relatively efficient interpretations of situations or interactions and thus appropriate action. These structures are at once cognitive-behavioral (they endow individuals with means of perception and action) and communicative (they are shared such that they cue our meanings and expectations to others). Information is the data pertaining to the situation or interaction, whether ex ante (to cue a relevant schema) or ex post (feedback). It varies in degrees of organization that range from unstructured data (information bits as Downs called them) to highly organized and structured frames. In order to provide guidance for actors, information (including frames) must be integrated into the schemas of actors.

The decision context demands of the organization the evaluation of multiple possible courses of action. These evaluations can be summarized as expectations. These expectations involve three basic elements: outcomes, utilities, and probabilities. Outcomes

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23 Notice my emphasis on cognition and behavior, while above I regarded Bourdieu and Tilly's commensurate emphases on 'behavioral structures.' Bourdieu's anti-representationalism emphasizes bodily dispositions as opposed to mental structures, while Tilly is prone to regard consciousness as a black box. I preserve a cognition-behavior distinction primarily for analytic purposes.

24 It also varies in at least three other ways: 1) in terms of the salience of the information (trivial or crucial depending on whether it contributes towards a more robust sense of the decision context); 2) in terms of the accuracy of the information (accurate or inaccurate); and (3) in terms of its intent (whether it is strategic or inert; an example of the latter being datasets on employment produced by parties not implicated in the conflict). For now, I assume that information is only problematic in terms of quantity, not quality, meaning information is crucial, accurate, and inert. Of course, one of the more interesting aspects of real-world uncertainty is the quality of information. For example, consider the implications of a distinction between knowledge, misinformation, and disinformation.
are those states of the world (including the organization, but also other actors, resources, institutions, etc.) resulting directly or indirectly from organizational action. Utilities are the net value of these outcomes for the organization, a consequence of the preferences for certain actions, constraints imposed on each choice, and the incentives they offer. Probabilities are the subjective degrees of uncertainty (or confidence) attached to each outcome. Here, I focus on schemas as inferred knowledge of the actors, constraints, incentives, outcomes, utilities, and probabilities pertaining to a decision context. It follows that schemas are generative of future expectations based on previous decisions.

A point of objection arises at this juncture. Frames generally denote schemas of interpretation. A common though contentious distinction in the framing literature identifies frames and framing as either cognitive structures or as interactive processes. Snow and Benford (2000b) are particularly keen on conceptualizing framing as a social process, at least so far as explaining social movement participation is concerned. Perhaps the most important concept in their approach is frame resonance. Frame resonance refers to the degree to which an SMO’s frame resonates with an audience. Resonance here signifies commensurate and congruent interpretations; the tighter the fit between an SMO’s frame and an individual, the higher the likelihood of participation. However, as a consequence, any theory of framing as a theory of mobilization must attend to two different conceptualizations of frames: first, to the discursive and strategic processes that generate and distribute frames (Snow and Benford 2000a), and second, to the cognitive structures within audiences that translate frames into incentives for or against collective action. A simultaneous distinction is implicitly made between SMOs and audiences: the former are

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25 Frames are "schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large" (Snow et al 1986, 464).
strategic actors that choose among sets of tactics in order to appeal to audiences, while audiences are comparatively inert actors with the potential for mobilization once an appeal to them has been made. The degree to which strategic actors are themselves cognitively constrained is not plainly considered. While a similar distinction is sometimes made in the voter turnout literature (Aldrich 1993), the basic question of this study is not a question of mobilization, but a question of strategy. For my purposes, I regard frames as schemas in contentious play, as strategic communicative processes. Thus, while schemas in general are cognitive-behavioral and communicative, further usage of the term schema will refer primarily to their cognitive-behavioral aspect, while the usage of frames will refer to the strategic communicative aspect. Thus, SMOs produce and distribute frames that they hope will be congruent and commensurate with the schemas of their audiences.

Figure 3.2 presents the relation between the shared schemas within an organization and information. First, organizational actors develop perceptions of the decision context that are shaped both by schemas and information derived from the actual situation. This initial Information animates those schema(s) that are most congruent with this initial stimulus. Second, with even low information, the activated schemas produce a generally robust sense of the situation, thereby generating choice sets and expected outcomes pertaining to each choice. Finally, once an action is chosen – necessitating action within

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26 This is not to say that audiences are not strategic or that they do not weigh the costs and benefits of different courses of action.

27 This distinction is important with respect to explaining mobilization. While voting is likely to be a marginal activity with low cost, activism can range from marginal to significant costs.

28 The model adapted and modified in Figure 4.2 differs in some crucial ways from the original (North and Denzau 1994, 17-18; Ostrom 2005, 105). First, the original model focuses on individual, not organizational decision-making. Second, in the original, while expected outcomes are internal to the participant in the action situation, chosen actions and actual outcomes are found in the external action situation, outside of the participant’s mental processes. Figure 4.2 distinguishes extrinsic from intrinsic outcomes.
Figure 3.2. Schemas, Information, and Decision-Making

and without the organization – it produces outcomes that generate feedback processes from the environment and internal to the organization.

Through these basic insights, I suggest that socialization shapes the preferences for certain forms of action over others, reduces the costs of some actions but not others, and reduces the uncertainties associated with some actions but not others.

3.4. Identity and Preferences

Figure 3.3 represents the relation between identity and action. First, this model is a partial reproduction of Figure 2.2. Both social networks and fields are mutually constitutive and determinative. Second, it unpacks the concept of identity as a social process of definition and classification of relations among actors and institutions, of
Everyday Social Organization, Socialization, and Contentious Performances

ideologies, including the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of actors and institutions and the normative evaluations of each, and thus of the salient properties of available means of action, especially their perceived effectiveness.

3.4.1. Socialization and Identity

If we consider Figure 3.3 in the context of Figure 2.2, we can begin to elaborate on the relation of everyday social organization to the contentious performances of interest in this study. The conception of collective identity utilized in this dissertation concerns an individual’s mutually constituted sense of his or her’s particular categorical membership encompassing the shared understandings and public representations that define the boundaries and the relations among social categories. The content of these identities is organized by social classifications that are differentially distributed across various social groups. These classifications identify the properties of actors, institutions, environments, and objects and evaluate their utility in establishing valued social positions. Through this process of selective categorization, employed and recognized classifications identify the locations of actors in social space by betraying the strategies that they utilize to mark others and themselves in a manner that furthers their interests. Thus, identification as an experience and as a representation entails cognitive and evaluative processes – the activation of schemas - that construct a social space of actors.
These constructions of good/bad, friend/enemy, moral/immoral, etc. are not simply constructions of actors, however. Identity is a social process of defining actions with respect to audiences and targets. In other words, the field of actors and institutions is not neutral in its implications for action; each construction of an actor closes off some options and opens up others by defining their relative strengths and weaknesses. For our purposes, these shared understandings that undergird and constitute identities help define *ideologies*. Ideologies are relatively sophisticated and coherent organizations of shared schemas that construct a group's position in social space. In this sense they identify the strategic significance of social relations. They thus refer to the array of “opportunities, threats, available means of action, likely consequences of those actions, evaluations of those consequences, capacities to act, memories of previous contention, and inventories of likely parties to any action” recognized by SMOs and other parties to the conflict (Tilly 2005, 61). Such constructions define the vulnerabilities that different relations offer for influence by the protagonist(s), as in the extraction or control of resources, in the solicitation of cooperation, etc. They also denote the motivations of other relations, including their perceived interests and constraints, in order that protagonists may exploit the interests of actors. Moreover, they express the generalized capacities that actors and institutions possess to influence the protagonist(s), whether in the degree and efficiency of force and coercion, in their capacity for subterfuge, their legitimacy and means of persuasion, their financial and material assets, etc. Thus, the field of actors that identities construct is a field strewn with possibilities for action. These evaluations are not merely cognitive, but affective and normative as well, thus providing a general capacity and
motivation to evaluate and manipulate, acquiesce to, or venerate a given set of social relations. I consider ideologies in more detail in Chapter Ten.

### 3.4.2. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals

Defining these possibilities, however, requires prior assessments of the actions in relation to their targets. Actions can have variable significance for different individuals and groups because actions, like all social phenomena, come to sense as social constructions. No potential action has content separate from perceived targets and audiences (though these can be highly generalized); they possess no universal and strategic value, even though to activists they are likely to feel this way. It is, in part, the orientations or attitudes towards actions, the comparative properties of possibility, desirability, acceptability, among others, which shape choices in regular social interactions as well as episodic contentious collective actions. They confer a degree of strategic sense to possible courses of action and their outcomes. In this sense, they involve the processes of identification and evaluation of possible courses of action and outcomes, processes implicit in the ideologies defined by shared understandings and constrained by the opportunity structures available to activists. Such attitudes define the meaning structure of a repertoire (Ennis 1987).

In order to translate this insight into a useful consideration for tactical choice, I focus on a particularly salient attitude towards actions: the perception of the effectiveness of a tactic. I argue that the appropriate way to consider effectiveness is as a function of goals and objectives. Of course, it is not logically necessary that defining how appropriate a tactic is for a situation entails specifying a relation between actions and goals. For example, tactics may have intrinsic value (Jasper 1997). In their study of protest potential (attitudes towards participating in protest), Barnes and Kaase (1979, 67) find that, when asked to
evaluate a variety of protest tactics in particular issue contexts, survey respondents expressed attitudes more generalized than context-dependent. In other words, tactics were judged in an apparently abstract sense devoid of a reference to issues or goals. This does not necessarily contradict my charge of the relation of effectiveness to goals, however. It seems plausible to assume that the generalized attitudes about protest tactics are at least constrained by the general goals of (extrinsic) influence or (intrinsic) development, especially considering the issue stimuli broadly framing the survey questions. In addition, the ideal situation sketched in section 3.3 of this study stresses the organizational level, not the individual level of Barnes and Kaase’s study. Presumably, the act of organization itself involves a discussion of the interests and goods common to the individuals involved and thus the goals of the organization.

Goals presuppose a basic type of relation between means and actions. I distinguish between two goal types by clarifying their expected action-outcome linkage. Some points of clarity to begin. First, I do not consider the literature on goals, logics, and orientations until Chapter Nine. Second, I assume that all evaluations are prospective, meaning that they function as prior estimates of future actions and outcomes. Above, Figure 3.2 situates an organizational actor within a decision context. As noted already, expected outcomes are produced through a comparative process informed by shared schemas and information. Chosen actions, which unfold internal and external to the SMO, produce outcomes both intrinsic and extrinsic to the SMO. Information about these outcomes is then produced internal and external to the SMO as a result of intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes. This information is then utilized to revise the shared schemas.
Both of the goal types discussed here conform to the model presented in Figure 3.2: schemas and information produce expectations about future actions. However, they differ along two crucial dimensions: temporality and extrinsicality. Table 3.1 presents the relations between action-outcome structure (time, the utility of the SMO, and the state of affairs) and goal type. Three time periods are relevant: the point at which expectations are developed, represented as t-1; the period during which the action unfolds, represented as t; and the period following the action in which information about outcomes is provided, which is represented as t+1. Extrinsicality is expressed as the relation between changes in utilities and states of affairs. U represents the utility of an SMO at a given period of time. U' specifies a change in the utility of the SMO. The state of affairs at a given moment, or the world external to the SMO, including the utility of opponents, resource availability, public support, etc., is specified as Ω. Ω' represents a change in the state of affairs.

To continue requires an analysis of temporality. Time, t-1, represents the baseline: U_{t-1} and Ω_{t-1} are stable. As I will show below, U' and Ω' are further defined only temporally.

### Table 3.1 Goals: Expected Action-Outcome Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Utility of SMO</th>
<th>State of Affairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>t-1</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Ω</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>Ω</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t+1</td>
<td>U'</td>
<td>Ω'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Extrinsic Goal**

**Intrinsic Goal**

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29 It is important to note that all of these time periods are subjective evaluations of future intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes. In other words, \(\{t-1, t, t+1\}\) occurs at the point, t-1, in which expected outcomes are generated in Figure 3.2. Thus, chosen actions and outcomes in Figure 3.2 are not included in this discussion; only the temporal structure of expectations is involved in this analysis.
Changes in utility are derived from the link that SMOs make between their actions and outcomes. Outcomes include intrinsic outcomes, $U'$, and extrinsic changes in the state of affairs, $\Omega'$. While the nature of intrinsicality allows $U'$, $\Omega'$ only succeeds action: $\Omega'_{t+1}$.

An extrinsic goal refers to a goal that presupposes a conceptual link between SMO actions and extrinsic outcomes. At first glance, this conforms to what several scholars regard as the instrumental or strategic logic that conceptually relates actions to outcomes: actions oriented towards the change or maintenance of political or economic institutions and policies (Aberle 1966; Breines 1982; Gusfield 1963; Kriesi et al 1995; Rucht 1990). Effectiveness is often defined solely as the ability to achieve this type of goal. McAdam (1983) argues, for example, that tactical interaction involves a process in which activists utilize tactics in order to yield political advantages. However, consider an SMO whose stated goal is to challenge social norms (for example, patterns of everyday waste disposal) in order to increase awareness of the implications of individual behavior on the environment. While such a goal is not directed at changing political or economic institutions and policies, it still involves an outcome extrinsic to the action itself insofar as the changing of behavior outside of the SMO is expected to lead to an increased probability of behavioral change. To briefly clarify, Table 3.1 yields the conclusion that expected utility derived from this action is wholly extrinsic.

An intrinsic goal refers to a goal that assumes a conceptual link between SMO actions and intrinsic outcomes. Intrinsic outcomes refer to outcomes that are internal to the group, such as the growth of moral character or the establishment of a space or experience free from political, cultural, or economic interference. Referring again to Figure 3.2, chosen actions occur both within and without the SMO, because intra-
organizational processes are essential to engaging in extrinsically oriented actions, and because actions oriented internally always affect the environment in some way, even minimally by disrupting the available resources of members of the SMO. However, intrinsic goals define extrinsic outcomes as constraints, while they rank some intrinsic outcomes as preferences and others as constraints.\textsuperscript{30} With respect to intrinsic goals, Table 3.1 yields the conclusion that the expected utility derived from this action is wholly intrinsic.

But an objection may arise when one considers the possibility that intrinsic goals may necessitate sub-goals or objectives that are extrinsically oriented. While certainly actions that are oriented towards extrinsic goals can yield intrinsic incentives, I sense no reason to object to the argument that indeed some tactics oriented by intrinsic goals can also exhibit non-zero estimates of extrinsic efficacy. In other words, the pursuit of intrinsic goals is potentially constrained by the production of $\Omega'$. To clarify, it is important to make three assumptions. First, I assume that each SMO pursues one primary goal. Obviously, SMOs pursue a variety of goals, but preliminary analysis is greatly aided by this simplifying assumption. Second, despite the interesting implications of relaxing it, I assume that organizational maintenance is subordinate to the primary goal.

An auxiliary assumption specifies the goal structure of an SMO – the sets of goals and objectives that orient its choices – as perfectly hierarchical and subordinate to the primary goal, as well as potentially heterogeneous. Hierarchy and subordinate are relatively clear, but the latter needs some elaboration. I define heterogeneity in a goal structure as a plurality of expected action-outcome structures. In other words, while an SMO may pursue a goal with the object of intrinsic change, it may also possess a series of

\textsuperscript{30} Further below I consider the inverse: extrinsic goals define intrinsic outcomes as constraints (transaction costs and benefits), while they rank extrinsic outcomes as preferences and constraints.
objectives that include the acquisition of resources or a change in laws ($\Omega'$) necessary to achieve this goal. The only assumption here is that these objectives are entirely subordinate to the goal. Figure 3.4 illustrates distinctions between homogenous and heterogeneous hierarchical goal structures as well as a non-hierarchical structure. Here, differences lie not only in the nature of objectives (secondary goals), but also in the relation of objectives to goals. It is thus no contradiction to suggest that an SMO that pursues intrinsic goals may nonetheless pursue extrinsic outcomes.

3.4.3. Effectiveness and Goals

With these concepts in tow, I begin with a set of assumptions that contribute to a fuller specification of the relationship of effectiveness to goals. First, I assume that SMOs want to maximize their chances of achieving their goals and objectives. Additionally, SMOs derive utility from these achievements such that this process of pursuing goals can be interpreted as a utility maximizing process. In order to maximize utility, they must engage in a variety of actions, or tactics. In choosing tactics, SMOs select from a finite set of all possible tactics. While they may use a variety of criteria to determine which tactics are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Included in Analysis</th>
<th>Excluded from Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous Hierarchy</td>
<td>Heterogeneous Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ = Intrinsic Goal</td>
<td>○ = Intrinsic Objective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4. Goal Structures
most appropriate, the working assumption of this study is that SMOs seek to achieve their goals by choosing the most effective tactics (Klandermans 1984).

I define effectiveness as the perceived ability of a tactic to further the goals and objectives of an SMO. Conceptually, effectiveness can extend from highly effective to counter-effective. It seems reasonable to conjecture that activists will avoid actions that they believe will not contribute to the achievement of their goals, and that they will avoid actions that they believe will make it harder for them to achieve their goals and objectives. If I accordingly conceive of the effectiveness of a tactic as a continuous variable ranging from negative to positive, I can additionally assume that SMOs will not choose tactics that they believe have non-positive effectiveness. For now, I avoid the difficulties arising from a set of tactics that yield only non-positive effectiveness by assuming that the set of possible tactics always includes some tactics with positive effectiveness.

Additional points arise from this preliminary discussion of effectiveness. First, I do not consider targets as actors; they do not enjoy strategic agency. Thus, this analysis is not game theoretic. Second, while a given SMO seeks to achieve goals or objectives and thus maximize utility by choosing tactics that increase their ability to achieve their goals (i.e., effectiveness), they nonetheless choose tactics under constraints. Some have been noted already. With an extrinsic goal, an SMO incurs both extrinsic constraints and transaction costs or benefits, whereas with an intrinsic goal, extrinsic outcomes can produce constraints, including repression, facilitation, and variation in public support. Below, I introduce sets of constraints on the preference for effectiveness among the set of tactics.

31 This translates to the perception of a tactic’s contribution to the production of a public or club good.
3.5. Familiarity and Uncertainty

3.5.1. Uncertainty in Contentious Politics

A realistic assessment of the information endowments of actors involved in contentious politics – indeed politics in general - would identify significant uncertainties. Decision making under uncertainty is typically cast as the maximization of expected utility, which involves the assignment of definite probabilities to future alternative states of affairs. A more radical notion of uncertainty developed especially by economist Frank Knight (1921) involves the inability of actors to estimate the probability that future states of affairs will come to pass. Between definite and unquantifiable uncertainty lie a range of conditions in which information is incomplete such that expectations are better represented by imprecise probabilities, often denoted by intervals of probability instead of singular probabilities (Walley 1991).32

What level of uncertainty - represented by the specificity of probabilities of future states of affairs (from a singular probability [say, 0.4] to an interval 0 to 1 under Knightian uncertainty) - characterizes contentious politics? A variety of responses are possible. First, a natural response to such an inquiry is that because contentious politics can occur in a range of environments, it is an empirical question as to which degree of uncertainty plagues which specific type of contentious interactions. A second response is that deductions from specific theories should provide testable hypotheses about degrees of uncertainty. Variations in determinant conditions would be endogenous to whatever theory is relevant. A third response is an educated ad hoc approach in which researchers

32 These can also be represented by ordinal probabilities such that one can determine rankings but not degrees of probability (Keynes 2004 [1921]). Of course, the question of how to incorporate uncertainty into models of choice remains a problematic area of decision theory. This is a generic attempt to consider the relation between provisions of information and uncertainty.
weigh the body of empirical evidence and theoretical work on a particular research question. While the most preferable means of specification is the second approach, it seems evident that the third approach is not only the most common and the least costly operation, but also the most feasible considering the lack of specificity in social movement theory. Considering existing research and frequent anecdotal empirical observations, the most defensible option is to assume that SMOs in general operate under a condition of uncertainty such that imprecise probabilities are the best that they can assign to the range of options before them. The remaining analysis of familiarity will specify more clearly the importance of information and the assignment of interval probabilities.

3.5.2. The Distribution of Familiarity

In order to relax the assumption of perfect information, it is important to consider the concept of familiarity. Familiarity involves means that are “ready-at-hand” in the Heideggerian sense, a contextual and immersive involvement with the tasks we are often engaged in and the materials we employ in their achievement. From a more sociological perspective, Bourdieu identifies this immersive but attentive practice as the “practical sense” that we utilize in order to navigate the various constraints (opportunities, threats, etc.) offered by our positioning within various social fields. Situations and their accoutrements are most familiar when action is characterized by a practical mastery of its utility in particular situations. Familiarity is always a feel for a situation, for a context such that its constraints can be exploited and avoided. Like Bourdieu, I use the concept of schemas and their relation to action as a basic unit of organized information.

I contend that a tentative but useful way of thinking of the notion of bounded rationality with the theoretical developments thus far elucidated involves the relation of
information to schemas. Familiarity can be described as the relationship between 1) the information required to navigate a situation, and 2) an individual or group’s endowment of schemas, or dispositions. If the information is a generally good fit for some of the schemas in a disposition - if it cues a basically confident sketch of the situation (actors, constraints, incentives, outcomes, and utilities) - then the actor is familiar with the situation. This fit between schemas and initial information can be construed as a continuous variable ranging from 0 (absolutely no fit and no familiarity) to 1 (a perfect fit and total familiarity).

Intuitively, the concept of familiarity appears synonymous with information. If we think of a complete lack of information about some phenomenon, we define it as a state of pure ignorance. It is an unknown unknown. There can be no familiarity with such an object. Once the amount of information is increased, however, we can begin to make sense of the object by linking it to other objects about which we possess more information. At the height of information saturation, it is an understatement to say that one is familiar with the object. Strictly speaking, however, familiarity is not a perfect function of information. Even extensive amounts of information cannot by themselves provide a robust sense of a situation, as anyone reading a novel in a foreign language that they do not understand will attest. Such information requires schemas – themselves organized structures of information - to simplify the process of interpretation, for example, by endowing an actor with knowledge of the language.

The endowment of schemas or dispositions varies in at least two important ways. First, most sets of skills and knowledge are specialized and thus unevenly distributed across a population. Familiarity is not only potentially variable for a particular object or situation (we may learn more about some phenomenon, for example, thus increasing
familiarity, or we may fail to reinforce our experience with an object, thus decaying our familiarity with the object), it also varies across objects. To state the obvious, we are more or less familiar with some objects than others. For example, the capacity to engage the legal system competently, to understand it and to utilize it to one’s advantage, is distributed primarily to people and groups that have extensive knowledge and experience with the system, especially lawyers. Everyday life is thus a mosaic of individuals and groups with variable competencies with respect to variable tasks. In other words, due to the different tasks and routines they engage in on a relatively regular basis, some are familiar with different sets of tasks and routines than others. They obtain, maintain, and employ more information and thus, over time, schemas on certain actions than other people. If schemas and information yield familiarity, a social life invariably yields familiarity with certain ways of seeing and acting.\textsuperscript{33}

Second, skills and knowledge range from highly specialized and scarce (media, legal, military, etc.) to highly generalized and abundant. As Downs (1957) argued with respect to the search costs of voting, everyday forms of activity like consuming mass media and interpersonal contact produce a free and abundant stream of information. Some studies characterize the act of voting as an instance of low information rationality, in which the everyday lives of citizens provide them with bits of information that they use to determine their vote (Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). In the long-term, this stream is a source of socialization about politics, history, economics, psychology, and various other

\textsuperscript{33} Within rational choice theory, Downs (1957, 79) similarly describes contextual knowledge as a “grasp of the relations among the fundamental variables in some area” of knowledge, the set of specializations that characterize an advanced division of labor. He does not explicitly include practices, but the concept of practice employed by Bourdieu abrogates the distinction between cognition and action, because both ultimately require the deployment of schemas of classification in social activity. Again, for analytic purposes, I distinguish the behavioral-cognitive aspect of schemas from their communicative or framing aspects.
areas of concern. Unlike the heterogeneous distribution of schemas associated with specialized sets of skills and knowledge, this free stream produces a comparatively flat distribution of schemas, because they are forged from abundant information.

3.5.3. Familiarity and Tactics

In describing the relation between the performances of everyday life and contentious performances, McAdam et al (2001, 140) state, “the social networks and shared understandings at hand channel participants into available definitions of what is happening, available means of communication and cooperation, available practices of conflict resolution, and available cultural idioms.” I argue that an essential mechanism in this channeling process is the role of familiarity in evaluating decision contexts, including expected outcomes, utilities, and incentives, as well as the scope of choice sets.

The core of my concern lies in the relation between the degree of familiarity with some subject, action, or situation in everyday life and the range of expectations regarding tactical alternatives in contentious politics. In other words, it concerns the degree of congruence between two apparently different decision contexts, one in everyday life and another in contentious politics. Familiarity involves an interaction between environments (or, alternatively, the information they give off and give up) and schemas. This channeling mechanism concerns variation in the former while holding the latter constant. In this sense, it is a process involving the transposition of schemas developed in one decision context to another. This process occurs in everyday life, wherein we apply our experience with some phenomenon to others, typically because 1) our experience with and knowledge of the old experience exceeds our experience with and knowledge of the new experience, and/or 2) the available information suggests the schema is appropriate for this experience.
My argument is that this process likewise occurs in contentious politics; schemas developed in everyday life are applied to contentious politics, because they reduce uncertainties and transaction costs.

I clarify the concept of familiarity further by distinguishing among the everyday correlates of contentious politics. Everyday correlates refer to those socializing sources (decision contexts) and the schemas they generate that are potentially applicable to contentious political activity. First, direct everyday correlates refer to imminent and concrete experiences. For example, driving, talking, reading, walking, and hammering: all of these represent experiences that over time impart deep senses of familiarity such that they become second nature. Direct everyday correlates can range from extremely abundant to extremely scarce: from talking and walking to organization and public speaking and persuasion to military, scientific, and legal training. The concept also encompasses experience with actual contentious politics. Like any form of social activity, activism is potentially a habit-forming activity (Crossley 2003).

Indirect everyday correlates of contentious politics refer to those socializing sources and the schemas they generate that are independent of actual or concrete experience. These include those schemas generated by impersonal forms of information distribution, especially the mass media. Downs’ stream of free information partially captures this flow of distant experience. Importantly, indirect everyday correlates include schemas about the history of contentious interaction, basic knowledge about the forms of protest and resistance available to individuals and groups. Even without direct experience of strikes, riots, bombings, or petitions, many people encounter some information in their daily lives that provides them with basic sketches of what these concepts constitute and implicate. I
assume that this stream of information is such that a given population of SMOs can produce expectations for a set of tactics, $Y$ (defined in Section 3.5.5). Additionally, I assume that every SMO is likely to have an endowment of schemas such that they can produce minimally confident expectations for a range of tactics, $Y_1$ (defined in Section 3.5.5). SMOs may also simultaneously be endowed with scarce schemas such that they can produce more confident expectations regarding a smaller range of tactics.\(^{34}\)

An obvious implication of this analysis involves the relation between tactics and the distribution of schemas. Familiarity with everyday correlates of contentious politics is abundant for some tactics, while familiarity is scarce for others. In other words, tactics vary in the degree of skill specialization that they require. Some notable examples of scarce schemas with tactical implications include legal tactics, military training, and relationships with the media. Somewhat less scarce but still not abundant schemas might involve basic organizational and communication skills. Obvious examples of abundant schemas with tactical implications may include shared understandings of pickets, petitions, rallies, and strikes.

To further clarify, the (implicit) process of estimating expectations is not specific to contentious politics. Familiarity is a product of the history of navigating similar sets of situations and interactions involving generally similar people, equipment, language, and practices. This process of socialization – an accumulation of choices and feedback -

\(^{34}\text{One object of schemas requires further discussion. Consider a city with its defining terrain: roads, bridges, signs, parks, buildings, etc., as well as its cultural features: specific places, history, etc. Local residents have abundant schemas about this environment, all of which can contribute to more confident estimates of utilities and outcomes. However, such schemas may also be regarded as scarce outside of the local population. The simplest solution to this difficulty is to note that, again, the nature of the conflict determines the particular parameters within a general model. Thus, the actual content of abundant and scarce schemas is determined by the conflict structure, though they are still distinguished by their degree of dispersion across the population.}\)
involves the implicit engraving of expectations within schemas such that Bourdieu (1990, 103-4) can describe the ‘practical sense’ as an “urgency of action” that “makes it possible to appreciate the meaning of the situation...and to produce at once the opportune response” without deduction or calculation. This opportune response is precisely the accumulation of repeated experiences such that estimation becomes an implicit practical process.\textsuperscript{35} The process of generating expectations is thus a sort of meta-schema transposed from the everyday to the contentious.

\textbf{3.5.4. Confidence and Transaction Costs}

The familiar is attractive for a number of reasons. First, it reduces levels of uncertainty about the consequences of action. If we take a classical rationalist perspective, all possible courses of action produce finite numbers of different outcomes, all of which are known by the actor (or they behave as if they know). A boundedly rational actor is likely to have more information and a better understanding of the possible outcomes of some actions as opposed to the outcomes of other possible actions. At the least, the former should include those actions and their conditions that an actor is most familiar with, such as actions that the actor engages in everyday with a generally predictable set of outcomes. The latter should include actions which the actor is generally unfamiliar with, such as actions that the actor has never experienced with little to no information regarding possible outcomes. Of course, this act of transposition is generally not totally congruous (everyday life is mostly not contentious politics), but it nonetheless provides some minimal guidance. The hypothesis here is that familiarity reduces the uncertainty of (or increases the confidence in) expectations about future outcomes.

\textsuperscript{35} Crossley (2001) describes a somewhat similar process in his effort to reconcile purposive habit-forming choices with the habitus.
Two, through the same process familiarity reduces levels of uncertainty with respect to the estimation of expected costs and benefits. Again, because of an actor’s familiarity with some courses of action as opposed to others, the relevant values of the former are more firmly grasped than the latter. The less familiar courses of action (and outcomes) are burdened with higher relative uncertainty.

A third effect of familiarity is to reduce learning and cooperation costs. All forms of exchange and collective action involve transaction costs. With contentious collective action, for example, there are intra-organizational bargaining and negotiating costs in selecting and preparing actions, information costs involving assessments of outcomes, incentives, and choice sets, and surveillance and enforcement costs relating to various stages of cooperation. Shared understandings and social relations provide an existing infrastructure that actors can utilize with less effort than if action was to involve strangers, unknown technologies, or new actions. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, familiarity is inversely related to transaction costs.

Fourth, familiarity provides pre-existing awareness of some behavioral options in the choice set. Those courses of action already privileged with familiarity regarding outcomes and incentives are more likely to ‘come to mind’ when faced with the task of decision. Depending on the search, stopping, and decision rules (Gigerenzer and Selton 2002b), the extent to which individuals rely on this initial set of familiar options varies. But what does higher or lower uncertainty mean in this context? Above I briefly considered a continuum of levels of uncertainty. I can further flesh out my position of imprecise probabilities by referring to Figure 3.5. Familiarity’s function thus far elucidated is to contribute to a partial reduction in uncertainty by endowing actors with schemas that
can serve as models or materials for contentious actions. In order to represent this relation, Figure 3.5 presents an idealized schema of three tactics ($x_1$, $x_2$, $x_3$) with variable levels of familiarity. For each tactic, represented as a quadrilateral, probabilities for the realization of future states of affairs run from left to right, 0 to 1, as clearly demonstrated with $x_1$. The most important aspect is the set of variable interval probabilities represented as dotted lines; here, $p$ and $\tilde{p}$ represent the lower and upper probabilities. Clearly, as familiarity increases the difference between $p$ and $\tilde{p}$ contracts. If we take the span of an interval probability as a measure of uncertainty regarding $\Omega'$ and $U'$, then we can develop a set of relations from Figure 3.5: if $|p - \tilde{p}| = \Delta p$, then $\Delta p_1 > \Delta p_2 > \Delta p_3$. Thus, there is an inverse relation between familiarity and uncertainty, or if we want to use a different terminology, a positive relation between familiarity and confidence (Downs 1957, 77).\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{familiarity_uncertainty.png}
\caption{Familiarity and Uncertainty}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{36} Of course, as Downs (1957, 77) notes, some information can create more uncertainty by contradicting already held information. This objection seems less pertinent to the use of schemas in this context, although clearly feedback can challenge whether or not a schema was the appropriate one to apply in a situation.
Four points are worth considering following this discussion. First, schemas are not necessarily specific to one tactic. Familiarity is the degree of fit between initial information and schemas such that an everyday decision context is implicitly grasped. In the transposition of this process to contentious politics, schemas are potentially applicable to wide ranges of tactics. Skills like holding signs, walking, or joining a boycott are widely applicable. Organizational skills, for example, can be utilized in a significant variety of contentious contexts. Even scarce legal skills can be used not only for crafting and implementing legal strategies and tactics, but also for educating others about their rights, avoiding provocative tactics by the opposition through knowledge of the law, creating provocations that can legally support the SMO, endowing the SMO with various legal paraphernalia, and providing legitimacy and authority in a media campaign, among others. Art skills, to foreshadow, can be used in a wide array of activities: varieties of protest art useful in fundraising, designing signs for marches and rallies, and designing websites.

Second, schemas are not the only means that SMOs utilize in order to generate expectations. Current information about the situation is crucial in reducing uncertainties and filling in the gaps between the schemas developed in previous everyday interactions and unfolding contentious interactions.

Finally, I incorporate the hypothesis that SMOs are ambiguity averse (Epstein 1999). Ambiguity aversion refers to a basic preference for known risks over more ambiguous risks. In other words, SMOs will tend to prefer definite probabilities to more imprecise probabilities and smaller interval probabilities to wider interval probabilities. Figure 3.6 below can be interpreted as the effect of ambiguity aversion.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 graphically represent the relationships between familiarity, transaction costs, and the probability that a particular tactic is adopted by an SMO. Figure 3.6 focuses on the importance of familiarity. Here, the probability of a tactic being adopted within a population of SMOs is a function of the familiarity that actors have with the everyday correlates of action and the percentage of the population that possesses these schemas. These latter two variables together specify the scarcity of schemas in a population, the range of which is captured in the grey zone. Moving diagonal from the lower left to the upper right is thus an increase in the abundance of schemas across the population. Tactics can be placed anywhere within the grey zone. Both familiarity and the probability of adoption are continuous and range from 0 to 1, while the percentage of the population ranges from 0 to 100. It is worth noting that this should not be interpreted as a precise indicator of probability, but rather as an ordinal ranking in terms of the probability of tactical adoption.

In general, this probability is here presented in a perfect positive correlation with familiarity (though note again the preceding paragraph): an increase in a unit of familiarity with the everyday correlates of tactics increases the probability that that tactic will be adopted by a corresponding degree of probability. However, as noted, familiarity can be distinguished by its degree of scarcity or abundance in a population. First, I consider tactical adoption as a negatively decelerating function of scarce schemas (specialized skills and knowledge). With very low levels of familiarity (whether scarce or abundant), actions are highly unlikely to find favor with activists. In fact, activists are likely to never be aware of them as even remote possibilities. In this way, they are excluded from the choice set. However, scarce schemas are distributed unequally throughout a population; increases in
familiarity and adoption are marginal until the population possessing the skills and knowledge pertaining to the everyday correlates of contentious politics is represented in the lower percentiles. Second, I consider tactical adoption as a positively decelerating function of abundant schemas. Again, low familiarity yields a low probability of adoption. However, a marginal shift down the upper percentiles of the population (a shift crossing a
space that represents that small part of the population that is generally ignorant of common everyday routines and tasks with contentious correlates) yields extensive increases in the probability of adoption. Here, the general abundance of familiarity sustains a high probability across the remaining population.

Familiarity provides a second set of incentives for or against certain courses of action: transaction costs. Figure 3.7 concerns the relation between familiarity, transaction costs, and the probability of tactical adoption. Here, I focus on scarce schemas. For the rest of the analysis I assume that abundant schemas are constant. Such a distribution has uninteresting effects on transaction costs. Additionally, transaction costs are represented as decreasing as opposed to a more standard presentation of increasing costs. Thus, movement up the y-axis yields lower costs and thus a lower probability of tactical adoption.

As noted above, the degree of familiarity is inversely related to the costs of transacting with others. Thus, more familiarity yields lower costs. However, the relation takes the form of a positively decelerating curve. At very low levels, marginal increases in familiarity engender significant decreases in transaction costs. As familiarity continues to increase, however, it yields a decreasing rate of return as a more confident sketch of the possible situation comes into view. Once the major details of the situation are in place, increases in familiarity are of less and less value in altering probabilities of tactical adoption. The relation between costs and probability of adoption is strictly negative according to rational choice theory. *Ceteris paribus*, assuming variation in transaction costs across any set of tactical alternatives, differences in such costs (indeed any costs) account for differences in the probability of the adoption of the tactic.
A broader way of looking at Figures 4.6 and 4.7 is as a static portrait of the relation of everyday life to contentious politics. The closer a contentious performance relates to a non-contentious performance, meaning the degree to which the conditions of actions in everyday life inform the contentious performance, the more likely the tactic is to be chosen. Thus, Figure 3.6 is a formal representation of channeling. It suggests that everyday life constrains contentious politics through the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs. This is not to suggest that factors like social networks and resources are not part of the channeling dynamic. What it means is that the familiarity with people and the means to act can be expressed as variable provisions of schemas.

An additional point begs for discussion. In their revision of the renowned SES model for explaining political participation, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) focus on the sets of organizational and communicative skills that mediate between the effects of socioeconomic variables and political behavior. They hypothesize a close relation between three organizational settings (school, work, and religious organization) and the development of these skills. Descriptively, they find that these skills are not purely abundant nor are they strictly scarce according to the model developed above. Instead, they occupy the middle of the grey zone of Figure 3.6. The approach taken in this chapter regarding familiarity can be seen as a generalization of this SES-resource model. The skills developed in particular network settings (themselves shaped by broader field forces in, for example, education, occupations, and religion) generate particular competencies and knowledge that can be transposed into other settings, such as activism. This relation between the SES-resource model and the approach taken in this dissertation will be further considered in Chapter Eight.
3.5.5. Defining Sets of Tactics

Familiarity is operative on only a subset of all possible tactics, however. To clarify, it is useful to first define possible, recognized, and probable tactics. A possible tactic is a purely abstract construction denoting an action that can occur, even if it has not been or ever will be. A complete set of possible tactics does not include impossible tactics nor does it involve probabilities; possible tactics defined solely as possible have no more probability of selection than any other possible tactic (unless the latter are included in the sets of recognized or probable tactics). Generally speaking, this conception of possibility is irreducible to specific situations and interactions. Recognized tactics are any tactics that obtain a minimally confident set of expectations such that their probability of adoption among a population of SMOs is less than an interval probability of 0 to 1. Probable tactics are any tactics that possess a reasonable chance of being employed across the population at a given time. Using the notation developed in the discussion of effectiveness and goals, the set of possible tactics is represented as X. Y denotes the set of recognized tactics, while R specifies the set of probable tactics. Considering these definitions, we can logically state that, \( X \supseteq Y \supseteq R \).

An important consideration is left unattended: the choice sets specific to a given SMO. Recall the marker of membership for a tactic in Y: a minimally confident set of expectations. I assume for convenience that the set of tactics in Y is constant across all SMOs in a given society. I justify this assumption on the basis of two arguments. First, recall Downs’ (1957) notion of a free stream of information. At a minimum, such a distribution of information should allow for a given population to produce expectations for
a range of tactics. Although the distribution is not perfectly flat (see Figure 3.6), for this analysis I assume that variations in the distribution do not correlate with SMO estimates of utility. Second, I assume - as a means to decrease the search costs for effective tactics – that SMOs cluster sets of tactics into a smaller number of categories of tactics and produce expectations for these clusters. For example, instead of listing all of the tactical variations of the street demonstration and producing estimates for each one, SMOs instead lump them together in a category like ‘street demonstration.’

However, though I assume a constancy of tactics, each SMO obtains its own set of tactics, $Y_j$, because SMOs assign different expectations to each tactic in the set, $Y$. I define a fourth set, $K$, as the set of possible but unrecognized tactics. Because I am most concerned with $Y$, I can define their relations formally. If $Y \subseteq X$, then $X / Y = K$ such that $K \subseteq X$. Thus, below a certain threshold of familiarity, the probability of tactical adoption is effectively zero, because there is no information relating the accoutrements of everyday situations to the outcomes or utilities of contentious action. Unlike $Y$, $K$ is not defined heterogeneously across SMOs, because by definition tactics in $K$ do not obtain interval probabilities.

The third subset of $X$, denoted $R$, is the repertoire of contention. $R$ is defined by the population of SMOs at a given time. While a given SMO defines their set $Y_j$ as the set of recognized tactics with their unique (to the SMO) set of expectations, set $R$ constitutes the array of tactics that all groups recognize as reasonably probable. Thus, like $Y$, $R$ is a set of

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37 Partial empirical support for this assumption is available:

Respondents...were asked to indicate whether there were any [protest] items they failed to recognize...Only the boycott item drew more than a few ‘Don’t recognize” responses, and this mostly in mainland Europe where they averaged about 7 percent of each national sample. This result, simple enough in itself, is of more than methodological interest. It indicates support for our basic idea that a substantial level of consciousness about protest behavior has indeed permeated the wider political community. Everyone knows what protest behavior is, though not everyone will necessarily recognize it by that name (original emphasis, Barnes and Kaase 1979, 70).  

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tactics constant across a population of SMOs. Similarly, like Y, R is heterogeneous with respect to expectations. Reasonable probability is thus a property of a tactic (and the set, R) in relation to the entire population of SMOs, not a property with respect to a specific SMO. This last qualifier is significant, because while the population of SMOs may regard a tactic (say r₁) as obtaining a reasonable probability of being adopted (it is part of the repertoire of contention), within the set Rj the same tactic may obtain an extremely low probability of adoption. Thus, reasonable probability is not an organizational-level variable, though by definition a tactic in the repertoire must possess a relatively high probability of adoption for at least some minimal number of SMOs.

To give this distinction some concreteness I consider two tactics: suicide car bombing and picketing. Both tactics are recognizable in the United States in the sense that some basic expectations can be generated by the general population. However, for a vast majority of SMOs, suicide car bombing is given a fairly definite improbability of adoption (some possible reasons: it likely rates as counter-effective and normatively unacceptable and those SMOs that would use the tactic would find immediate and overwhelming repression). Picketing, on the other hand, may find significant favor among some SMOs. The latter, of course, is a well-known member of set R, the repertoire of contention, whereas suicide car bombing, though well-known, does not obtain a reasonable probability of adoption, and thus lacks membership in R, though it is a member of Y.

3.6. Familiarity, Effectiveness, and Incentives

I continue a sketch of an uncertain world by considering the relation between familiarity and effectiveness. Familiarity produces at least three basic effects: a reduction of uncertainty, lowered transaction costs, and a more manageable choice set. Effectiveness
defines alternatives within a set of tactics in terms of their utility as preferences and constraints. Thus, we can say that while the above analysis of effectiveness assumes perfect information, uncertainty implies: 1) some tactics (K) possess no expectations, and 2) the expectations of recognized tactics vary in their degree of uncertainty.

Additionally, recall that recognition is defined as the attainment of minimally confident expectations, or, in other words it achieves a minimal level of confidence without falling into complete Knightian uncertainty. With respect to effectiveness, it is important to consider the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic goals. It seems safe to assume that the representation of uncertainty (or confidence) as interval probabilities is primarily a property of the relation between an SMO and the world. If this is a safe assumption then the assignment of interval probabilities falls primarily on the property of extrinsic efficacy. However, intrinsic goals can concern the relation between an SMO and the world. For example, Kriesi et al (1995) argues that some movements seek to craft identity through highly disruptive contentious interactions. I thus assume for the purposes of analysis that SMOs with either intrinsic or extrinsic goals face uncertainty.

3.6.1. Ambiguity Aversion and Effectiveness

Tactics vary for an SMO both in their perceived effectiveness and the confidence with which this perception is held. If these vary independently, important consequences follow. Familiar tactics may not be perceived as particularly effective, while tactics that are not as familiar may be perceived as effective. Figure 3.8 presents a hypothetical scenario involving three tactics: $y_1, y_2, y_3$. Each tactic is assigned an effectiveness score and an interval probability by the SMO. The latter, of course, represents the degree of confidence.
or certainty (and, conversely, the degree of uncertainty) attributed to the effectiveness score by virtue of the familiarity that the SMO has with everyday correlates of these tactics. A first crack at a preference relation for this set of tactics might look something like this: \( y_3 \succ y_2 \succ y_1 \). However, variation in confidence problematizes this initial structure. Consider the relation, \( y_3 \succ y_2 \). A significant overlap persists between the range of probabilities assigned to both \( y_2 \) and \( y_3 \). Under this condition, the actual probability of \( y_2 \) may yield a higher effectiveness score than \( y_3 \). Aware of this possibility, an SMO may find no decision rule to rationally distinguish between the two options.\(^{38}\) Sadly, despite numerous efforts to solve this problem (Walley 1991), none has yet proven generally acceptable. Even more complicating is the effect of ambiguity aversion (Epstein 1999). Above, I assume that SMOs have a preference for tighter interval probabilities, meaning a generalized aversion to more uncertain outcomes relative to more certain outcomes.

### 3.6.2. Searching and Information Costs

I consider one general means by which an SMO may cope with these difficulties: the acquisition of information. The preceding analysis involves a sequential process in which

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\(^{38}\) Obviously, a fuller consideration of the question of when a reasonable decision can be made requires a deeper rendering of the question of incentives. This discussion assumes that all costs and benefits (excepting the aversion to ambiguity and effectiveness [an investment cost or benefit]) are constant.
initial information activates schemas that construct various tactical alternatives such that a reasonable decision can be made. The following analysis extends this process by allowing the search for information after an initial sketch does not provide the conditions for a reasonable decision. A great deal has been written on information search, especially in economics (Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright 2005). As far as I am aware, nothing comparable has been published on the question of tactical choice in contentious politics. The effort will be very cursory.

A basic assumption of rational choice theory is that costs reduce the attractiveness or utility of options. Tactics vary for an SMO in how much they are expected to cost. Above, I discussed variation in transaction costs. I assume that a notable component of the search process is the incurring of specific types of transaction or intrinsic costs: search and information costs. Of course, the decision to search is made only when the expected benefits of searching exceed the expected costs. At the least, the benefits of searching include the reduction of uncertainty (Downs 1957, 77). Thus, searching entails the acquisition and processing of information in order to reduce the costs of uncertainty. Search is concluded whenever the costs of search equal or exceed the marginal returns.

One aspect of searching deserves extensive comment here. Above I assumed that the population of SMOs possesses minimally confident expectations for a set of tactics, Y. Recall that set Y is the set of recognized tactics, and not the repertoire of contention, or R.

39 But how can an SMO know that search will yield crucial information (see footnote 9 and Downs 1957, 77) such that confidence is increased? Can an SMO assign a probability to the expected benefits of search? Should an SMO weigh this probability against the probability that the effectiveness of $y_2$ exceeds that of $y_3$? If the probability of reducing uncertainty through search is lower than the probability that the effectiveness of $y_2$ exceeds that of $y_3$, does the SMO choose $y_3$ because the highest probable effectiveness of $y_3$ exceeds the highest probable effectiveness of $y_2$, while the lowest probable effectiveness of $y_3$ is lower than the lowest probable effectiveness of $y_2$? Though these are important questions, for now I assume that the expected benefits are minimally sufficient to generate a search decision.
the set of tactics with a reasonable probability of being utilized. Recall as well that familiarity with some everyday correlates of tactics can vary from an abundant distribution across a population to a scarce distribution. Again, the latter implies that while some tactics require a basic level of cognitive awareness that is widely distributed, others are more specialized in the means by which they are practiced. Consequently, confidence regarding the expected estimates of outcomes and utilities for the former should be high relative to the latter.

Under these assumptions, how is it that tactics requiring some specialized awareness can also be given minimally confident expectations by the entire population of SMOs? In other words, if they require scarce schemas, how can those lacking these schemas recognize them? One solution has already been described. In a classic study of attitudes towards protest, almost all respondents in surveys administered over five advanced industrial democracies were able to recognize sets of tactics ranging from petitioning and writing a letter to newspapers to various legal, illegal, and violent tactics like demonstrations, occupation of buildings, and damage to property (Barnes and Kaase 1979, 70). Such a list is not exhaustive, but it does suggest an interesting approach to explaining the process of search. Most of the items in the survey were general terms that, though perfectly valid as categories, nonetheless covered significant heterogeneity in tactics. The blocking of traffic, for example, can come in numerous variations: terrain (roads, footpaths, trains, ports, and now, the Internet), materials (barricades, human chains, vehicles, disruption of existing traffic), modes (street theater, confrontations, etc.), etc. In order to navigate this complexity, I assume that SMOs cluster sets of tactics into a smaller number of categories and produce expectations for these clusters. Each cluster is
thus characterized by a singular bundled estimate of expected outcomes, utilities, and probabilities; all of the tactics included in a cluster possess these sets of values for the SMO.

Categories or tactical clusters with high familiarity are susceptible to decomposition; in other words, the more familiar an SMO is with the everyday correlates of a tactical cluster, the more likely an SMO is to make subtler distinctions within the cluster and thus to introduce variation in expectations. An opposing proposition thus holds that the less familiar an SMO is with a tactical cluster, the more extensive and potentially heterogeneous is the set of tactics included in the cluster. An example may be the very wide range of tactics available on the Internet. Those unfamiliar with the Internet may cluster all of these tactics together and generate a set of expectations despite the variety of this online repertoire. A similar process occurs with respect to clusters with high effectiveness, though with an important caveat: *ceteris paribus*, perceived higher effectiveness is more likely to lead to the expenditure of resources (costs) in order to decompose the cluster into finer distinctions. Information is usually sought regarding the set of tactics with the highest perceived effectiveness in order to make more careful distinctions among more attractive options. Of course, this process occurs only under conditions of search, itself a consequence of uncertainty.

There are at least two important exceptions to the transaction costs of searching that posit basically non-negative incentives. First, recall my Downsian assumption that a free stream of information affords the population of SMOs in a society (through socialization) the ability to produce minimally confident expectations for a set of tactics, \( Y \). This free stream of information also provides current information on actual interactions or situations. These streams (which may vary systematically across contexts in terms of the
quantity and quality of information) are intervening variables between the opportunity structures that activists face - sets of institutions and interactions that produce up-to-date contextual information - and the perception and evaluation of these opportunities and threats. The initial stimulus that activates schemas may or may not derive from this stream of information, but subsequent search by the SMO draws on this diffuse stream in order to provide more confidence in the estimates of expected outcomes and utilities. The search of the stream includes incidental acquisitions of information (a generic property of social interaction and media) and intentional acquisitions by the SMO. The latter involves both the mining of the stream by the SMO and the efforts by actors outside of the SMO to provide information to it, including family, friends, other SMOs, interest groups, and even government and media sources.

Additionally, it seems reasonable to suggest that members of SMOs in general may have larger streams of free information. Studies are consistent in showing that, like those who engage in other forms of political participation, activists are relatively high in motivational attitudes and behaviors like political interest and political discussion (Jennings and Anderson 2003; Norris 2002; Schussman and Soule 2005). Interest in politics involves an intrinsic motivation to acquire political information. Activists may thus be more inclined to enjoy the process of acquiring and processing the information that they encounter in their daily lives as well as the information that they actively pursue outside of this stream, even if it is costly.

Taken to the extreme, these qualifications suggest that some activists are prone to acquire information such that uncertainty is reduced to certainty. However, at least two
objections are relevant. First, uncertainty is a generic property of contentious politics. Considering even the intrinsic benefits of acquiring information, the search process inevitably yields increasingly marginal returns in the reduction of uncertainty. Second, uncertainty is reduced until a reasonable decision can be made. In the example provided by Figure 3.8, a reasonable decision could be made once the overlap between $y_2$ and $y_3$ dissolves. Further search may yield continued intrinsic benefits, but this search is not motivated by the desire to reduce uncertainty in the particular decision context. Thus, a terminal decision to act is made even though information acquisition continues.

3.6.3. Other Intrinsic Incentives

Other intrinsic costs and benefits are potentially relevant in determining the attractiveness of tactics. Expenses incurred in social exchanges include, as noted before, 1) bargaining and negotiation costs, and 2) surveillance and enforcement costs. Individually and additively, these costs should negatively correlate with the probability of tactical adoption. As demonstrated in Figure 3.7, a more complex relation emerges with the consideration of familiarity.

Does the theoretical discussion above suggest a corresponding relation between familiarity, intrinsic benefits, and the probability of tactical adoption? Rational choice theory is unequivocal on one point: \textit{ceteris paribus}, an increase in benefits should be associated with an increase in the probability of tactical adoption. Some scholars incorporate various intrinsic constraints and their corresponding incentives, including

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40 Other important objections involve the relaxation of certain information assumptions, including the assumptions of crucial, accurate, and inert information.
41 These incentives should primarily be consequential insofar as they discriminate among tactics. Any costs or benefits that are generic to the act of choosing and engaging in tactics such that the costs are constant across all options are inconsequential in this analysis.
conforming to norms against violence, the thrill of action, and enjoying the company of others (Jasper 1997; Opp 1989). My contribution is to suggest that whatever the expectations, increases in familiarity should be associated with increases in confidence in these expectations. I consider intrinsic incentives in Chapter Twelve.

3.6.4. Other Extrinsic Incentives

Above, the concept of an ideology established an interface between shared understandings and the opportunity structures that will be considered more in depth in Chapter Ten. This relationship is essentially a relation between schemas and information: shared understandings are durable structures of information, while structures of opportunity produce more contextual updates on the opportunities and threats facing actors. The durability of many aspects of opportunity structures (institutional frameworks like electoral systems and federalism as well as the persistence of specific organizational relations like political parties, militaries, religious bodies, media organizations, and the police) is thus supportive of the generation of shared understandings regarding the vulnerabilities, motivation, and capacities offered by these structures.

Recall that familiarity reduces the uncertainties associated with the expectations of action regarding both intrinsic and extrinsic processes. It follows that expected extrinsic outcomes and incentives are derived in part from this prior sketch of the field of action: the sets of vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities offered by the arrangement of actors, institutions, and resources. Importantly, as suggested by Figure 3.2, an SMO with an intrinsic goal must nevertheless engage in actions that can produce extrinsic outcomes like repression or increased public support. This is so not only because of the possibility of a heterogeneous hierarchical goal structure (intrinsic goals can nevertheless produce
objectives that require extrinsically-oriented actions), but also because of the tendency for oppositional practices, intrinsically oriented or otherwise, to generate dynamics of opposition and support.

3.7. Conclusion

This principle goal of this chapter is to present a set of theoretical instruments for explaining tactical choice. In this chapter I supplement the discussion from Chapter Two with collective action theory and bounded rationality. I focus on two basic effects derived from variation in socialization across a population of SMO members. First, I consider the importance of collective identity in establishing basic constraints on the expectations generated for a set of tactics, including the attribution of effectiveness. Second, I consider how an SMO’s familiarity with the everyday correlates of tactics may affect the degree of confidence in these expectations. In general, the two chapters together argue that the effects of the socializing structures of everyday life – the networks and fields that organize activities and the shared understandings that they generate – can be translated into a consideration of the effects of a variety of costs and benefits on choice among a variety of tactics.
CHAPTER 4. DATA

In order to navigate the encounter between theoretical reflection and empirical scrutiny, means of research must be devised that both maximize the risks to the multiplicity of theories involved and minimize the uncertainties associated with faithfully interpreting empirical results. Such conditions are seldom satisfactorily met in any research project in the natural or social sciences. Consequently, a critical responsibility for any researcher is to acknowledge, enumerate, and explore the limitations and constraints of research as well as to identify the scope of, and opportunities for, knowledge claims.

The core task of this chapter is to present the foundations of the methodological approach of this dissertation and its attendant responsibilities. First, I situate this approach within the field of social movement studies, especially with respect to advanced quantitative methods such as protest event analysis. Second, I detail the procedures pertaining to the design of the sample utilized in this study and its constraints, especially selection bias and the lack of representativeness. Third, I explore the means and methods of data collection used in this study ranging from the use of primary and secondary textual sources to semi-structured interviews. Fourth, I present brief descriptions of the twelve cases that constitute the sample in this study.

4.1. Research Constraints

4.1.1. Methods and Data in Social Movements Studies

With the exception of experimental methods, the field of social movement and protest studies is methodologically pluralist (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002). As noted in Chapter One, the principal means of quantitative research is protest event analysis, or the content coding of collective action events reported in newspapers, though
police and organizational archives have also been used as supplemental or even primary sources (Kriesi et al 1995; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1983; 1999; Olzak 1992; Tilly 1995; 2008; Tilly et al 1975). This approach to quantifying the character and frequency of protest has yielded significant progress by providing the field with a firm empirical foundation for testing explanations of protest behavior. It has also garnered a great deal of criticism (Davenport 2009; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000). While this debate is extensive and informative, I focus on two critical points of contention for this dissertation related to source constraints.

Event analysis systematically over-represents contentious phenomena like strikes and demonstrations and under-represents less conspicuous tactics like small symbolic actions (McCarty, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Mueller 1997; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). First, the criteria for coding events often include publicity. Publicity is operationalized as reported and newsworthy events or actions deemed significant by the political and legal authorities, hence the utility of newspapers and government documents as the sources of event data. Such an operationalization (and conceptualization) excludes most instances of culture jamming. Although some culture jamming events, especially Reclaim the Streets! actions, create newsworthy spectacles, most culture jamming is public in a general sense yet lacks newsworthiness.

Second, protest events are conceptualized as collective actions. This criterion is generally operationalized as the reporting of some action involving at least ten or twenty individuals. Though the definition of culture jamming utilized in this dissertation stresses culture jamming as collective action, the number of individuals involved ranges from two to thousands. As a consequence, unlike other protest phenomena like riots, petitions,
demonstrations, or strikes, culture jams do not generally receive frequent or systematic mass media coverage. Despite the fact that the definition of culture jamming used in this study defines it as a form of action, I conclude that no sources of systematic event data are currently available and that compiling such a dataset is unrealistic.

Another quantitative approach in the field, especially in organizational ecology studies, focuses on a different unit of analysis: the SMO (Edwards and Foley 2002; Everett 1992; Gamson 1990; Lofland 1996; Minkoff 1995; Soule and King 2008). In order to compile a sample frame of SMOs in a given territory at a given time, scholars typically utilize directories of organizations, especially the *Encyclopedia of Associations* in studies of American social movements (Minkoff 1995). After a sample is extracted, information on each SMO is collected through various methods on topics ranging from organizational structure and resources to tactics and alliances. Variables are then coded, thus enabling the exercise of a range of statistical techniques.

**4.1.2. Unit of Analysis**

The protest event and the SMO do not exhaust the many possible units of analysis. Others include the individual in survey research and ethnographic studies as well as frames or discourses in qualitative textual and quantitative content analyses. The primary unit of analysis in this study is the CJO. In part, this follows from the research definition (D.2) of culture jamming utilized in this study, which distinguishes collective from individual actions. Only collective actions constitute culture jams under this conception, and thus those groups of individuals who come together to perform such collective actions are a more suitable unit of analysis than individuals who engage in culture jamming. Thus, while
this study tends to speak broadly of culture jamming, more constrained generalizations are made based on the population of CJOs.

However, another approach to the individual as the unit of analysis is available. CJOs are composed of individuals and, as the discussion below will suggest, variation among individuals on key variables within such groups may arise in the collection and analysis of data. Indeed, some criticisms of Bourdieusian concepts like habitus and field insist on their intractable individualism (Bottero and Crossley 2011). In my judgment, the generally small size of culture jamming groups affords this study the opportunity to assume, in general, that an analysis at the level of the organization sacrifices little in the way of empirical leverage over my research questions. Moreover, the data acquired in this study allows me to identify intra-organizational variation at the individual level as an organizational variable whenever such a procedure is necessary or productive.

4.1.2. Sampling Constraints

The ability or inability to compile an adequate sampling frame of SMOs has significant consequences for research. First, without something approximating a population list, the degree to which a sample is representative of the population of cases is uncertain. Consequently, inferences and generalizations about populations are substantially more problematic. Although the sampling frame is always a difficult issue in social movement studies (Klandermans and Smith 2002, 14), obtaining a population list of culture jamming organizations is still more laden with difficulties due to the lack of directories or reliable substitutes. In studies with complete or adequate sampling frames in which samples are drawn from the population (as opposed to an analysis of the entire population in a census), the problem of obtaining a representative sample is generally
tackled through the random selection of cases. Case selection in this study is thus by necessity nonrandom.

Second, all of the cases included in the sample for this study are positive cases of culture jamming. Sample designs that select on the dependent variable severely constrain the range of possible knowledge claims that a study offers (King et al 1994). Still, a variety of claims are available in such circumstances, such as descriptive inferences, identification of necessary and/or sufficient conditions, and theory and hypothesis development (George and Bennett 2005). In addition, whenever possible, variation will be introduced into the dependent variable.

Third, the number of cases may affect the degree to which results are generalizable or inferences are sound. Other research strategies, such as case studies, enable confident inferences and generalizations based on smaller numbers of cases though under more constraints (Gerring 2006). Previous research on culture jamming includes the two case studies performed by Sandlin and Callahan (2009), three culture jamming groups studied by Nomai (2008), and the seven organizations engaged by Wettergren (2005). While these studies generate important insights into their specific cases as well as culture jamming in general, it is my intention to expand the number of cases normally studied in works on culture jamming in order to maximize the generality of my argument to culture jamming in general as defined by the more restricted research definition (D.2).

4.2. Sample Design

4.2.1. Case Selection Criteria

Obtaining a sample of CJOs first requires that we translate the definition of culture jamming utilized in this study into an operational definition capable of specifying a
negative or positive case. For this study, a positive instance of culture jamming occurs when a collection of individuals durably self-identify as a formal or informal actor whose set of public actions include a significant subset of actions identified as (D.2) culture jamming.

This operationalization and other considerations yield a set of case selection criteria: organization, contentious claims-making, ironic structure, location, and activity. Most lack the determinist assumptions common in many quantitative selection criteria. Case selection is thus a messier process than desired. First, it emphasizes the actor as the unit of analysis. Although included under the broad conception of culture jamming (D.1), the research definition (D.2) excludes individuals. At a minimum, individuals identify themselves as engaging in collective actions attributed to themselves and others as a durable collective actor with formal or informal organizational properties including especially decision-making procedures. Thus, individuals like Ron English or Banksy do not qualify as cases in this analysis, because they lack this essential element of durable collective organization.

Filling out some of the remaining criteria requires an operationalization of the definition of culture jamming utilized in this study. While any SMO may engage in a range of public actions, this definition focuses on culture jams. The second criterion involves the claims-making process in culture jamming that implicates an identity or subject in a

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42 An implicit criterion is publicity. The operationalization stresses those actions that are public. For McAdam et al (2001, 5), this defines a scope of activity that excludes intra-organizational action. In Goffman's (1974) terminology, this excluded set of actions refers to the 'back stage' of organizational presentation. Humorous office memos do not suffice. However, this criterion did not prove particularly discriminatory in selecting cases.

43 (D.2) A contentious collective act involving the disruptive re-contextualization of a particular practice, object, or discourse of a dominant ensemble of representation that is constrained by the elements of that particular representation.
contentious relation to another identity or object. Thus, the claims of one actor should be identified as contentious, meaning if they were realized they would affect the interests of the object, though the criterion of mutual recognition implicit in McAdam et al (2001) is relaxed in favor of an intention of recognition (see Chapter Two). Thus, positive cases of culture jamming involve the intentional aspiration to realize interests potentially detrimental to some object. This criterion effectively excludes a great deal of culture jamming from the analysis. For example, the Hypothetical Development Organization, a New Orleans based group of culture jammers that creates practically impossible architectural designs for derelict urban structures and presents them both on-site and in institutional settings (art galleries), fails to register as a positive case of culture jamming, because they do not regard their actions as contentious.

Third, a significant component of the action is its symbolic nature. Culture jams are relatively sophisticated symbolic statements. Thus, while all actions express some meanings, and many contentious collective actions express relatively simple meanings such as threat, culture jams involve an ironic structure and thus a subtly more complex representation. As noted in Chapter One, this ironic structure is dominated by the form of the dominant representation. This criterion is critical in that ideally it excludes culture jammers from other acts of symbolic politics. For example, while a group like Negativland re-assembles the sonic fragments of consumer culture into critical music tracks, groups like

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44 A second implicit criterion is opposition. When this contentious relation is identified as involving the perception of asymmetric power relations and the pressing of claims upon a dominant object, it is classified as culture jamming. In other words, positive cases of culture jamming for this study are identified by their opposition to perceived dominant representations. However, like publicity, this criterion failed to provide additional leverage in identifying positive cases of culture jamming.

45 More accurately, they do not regard a political interpretation of their actions as especially illuminating (Hypothetical Development Organization 2011).
Public Enemy launch largely direct social and political criticism within sonic structures assembled from elements themselves largely immune to these criticisms.

Fourth, I chose to restrict my analysis to CJOs that locate themselves within the United States or Canada. While a more thorough study would certainly include the large number of well-known groups in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and France, and many other countries, resource constraints necessitated a narrower and more practical focus.

Finally, organizations that are currently active or that have engaged in collective actions within the last five years are included. Older organizations are excluded.

4.2.2. Sampling Procedures

The sampling strategy adopted for this dissertation has two phases. During Phase I an initial list of CJOs was gathered from various sources. The closest approximation to a directory of culture jammers is the website Sniggle.net (Gross n.d.), an unofficial ‘encyclopedia’ of culture jamming events, texts, individuals, and groups. Sniggle.net is a website created and maintained by Dave Gross and supplied with content on a wide array of subversive or irreverent cultural activities by various contributors from across the Internet. The content is typically arranged in the form of short descriptions with hyperlinks to relevant sites.

However, Sniggle.net is not an ideal source. There are no means to verify whether the website’s content is comprehensive or the degree to which its content represents culture jamming as a whole. The procedures for identifying culture jamming content are less than explicit or systematic. Voluntary contributions are the primary source of content; however, Gross does not explain his criteria for acceptance or rejection, though it seems
fairly relaxed. Perhaps more telling is the disclaimer: “The *Culture Jammer’s Encyclopedia* isn’t meant to be an encyclopedia of culture jammers, so much as an encyclopedia for culture jammers” (original emphasis, Gross n.d.) However, Sniggle.net offers the best starting point for compiling a sample of culture jammers. Case selection thus began by compiling a list of positive cases of culture jammers from Sniggle.net. This list was supplemented by the inclusion of a small number of other sources, including the Wikipedia article on culture jamming (Wikipedia contributors 2012), various culture jamming texts (Klein 2000; Lasn 1999), and finally the cases analyzed by Wettergren (2005). There was a high degree of overlap among these sources, though Wikipedia and especially Sniggle.net were the most extensive. It is worth noting that in the case of the Wikipedia page, the selection process is similar to Sniggle.net’s process in that it involves contributions. A difference is noteworthy as well; contributions are not selected by a single individual, but are the result of a cooperative equilibrium established by multiple contributors.

Phase II trimmed this initially messy list down to the twelve cases identified in Table 4.1. Groups like newmindspace, ®™ark, Evolution Control Committee, and California Department of Corrections were excluded from the sample principally as a consequence of resource constraints, the paucity of data, and/or a lack of overt opposition. Analyzing twelve cases does present numerous difficulties somewhat alien to case studies of one to three cases or large N-studies. In particular, the depth of analysis is in part constrained by the time and space available. Each chapter handles this difficulty in its own way.

### 4.3. Data Collection

Within the constraints described above, studies of culture jamming utilize two basic methodological strategies. Some studies rely on existing data (Cammaerts 2007; Harold
Table 4.1. Sample of Culture Jamming Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture Jamming Organization</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adbusters Media Foundation</td>
<td>AMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Advertising Agency</td>
<td>AAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billboard Liberation Front</td>
<td>BLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Billionaires</td>
<td>BIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Tactical Magic</td>
<td>CTM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Art Ensemble</td>
<td>CAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Applied Autonomy</td>
<td>IAA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institute for Infinitely Small Things</td>
<td>IST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negativland</td>
<td>NVL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah!</td>
<td>RBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance Camera Players</td>
<td>SCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Yes Men</td>
<td>YM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2007; Jordan 2002; Meikle 2002; Sandlin and Callahan 2009; Strangelove 2005). This includes primary sources such as the websites, organizational documents, and interviews of CJOs and individuals as well as secondary materials such as Mark Dery’s (1993) pamphlet or Naomi Klein’s (2000) *No Logo*. Others supplement these data with interviews with culture jammers (Nomai 2008; Wettergren 2005; Woodside 2001). This dissertation employs the latter strategy.

### 4.3.1. Primary and Secondary Sources

For this work I gathered data from a diverse array of primary and secondary sources. Chapter’s Seven through Twelve focus on my sample of CJOs and rely primarily on the former including group websites, published group texts, interviews, news and journal articles, and a number of video and audio resources, all of which are cited in the Case References section of this work. I also utilize an array of secondary sources including commentaries and research on culture jamming groups and activities.

Selecting these sources was a relatively unsystematic process aside from a guiding principle akin to a kitchen sink approach: grab anything of potential relevance. The
sources were obtained in four ways: through repeated searches over the Internet from roughly 2010-2013, various sites like Wikipedia and Sniggle.net, Lexis Nexis searches for relevant newspaper and magazine articles, and citation tracing in both academic and activist texts. More often than not problems stemmed from sparse data. Only Adbusters Media Foundation, the Yes Men, Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah!, and the Billionaires generated enough sources to make this process unwieldy. For example, Lexis Nexis searches from 1980 to 2013 yielded 422 results for Reverend Billy, a figure that does not include the highly prolific blog posts of Reverend Billy. Haugerud (2013, 175) observed the publication of 550 articles concerning the Billionaires between January 2000 and June 2007. Adbusters in particular presents problems of data saturation. First, a Lexis Nexis search yields 995 results. Second, its primary organ of action is a bi-monthly (since 2001) magazine, *Adbusters*, which began publication in 1989. From the summer of 1989 to the final issue of 2012, the organization has produced nearly a hundred issues. In order to engage this latter mass of data, I generated a random sample of issues over a five year period, 2008-2012. One issue was chosen out of every six issues in a year. Along with Lasn’s (1999) *Culture Jam* and various interviews, these are the most essential sources for the Adbusters Media Foundation.

In general, this type of data has a number of drawbacks. Some sources are limited in scope, content, clarity, coherence, and analysis. The bulk of the material is subjective and asystematic. Much of this data provides a singular perspective, the self-presentation of the culture jammers themselves. Some sources, particularly mainstream news articles but also community or activist journals, help to access a broader perspective within which the actions and discourses of culture jammers can be brought to intelligibility. A notable
problem lies in the source of much of the data on the cases. As a perusal through the Case References section reveals, much of the data on CJOS in this project derives from Internet sources. While this is not crippling, such sources are at risk of relocating to other URLs or simply vanishing off-line. The most significant constraint is the temporality of the data. In order to maximize the coherence of data presentation, I ignore the chronology of sources in almost all cases. This handicaps my capacity to make substantive claims about the causal relations between concepts like identities and tactics. The primary focus of this dissertation is thus illustrative.

Several chapters go beyond these data sources in order to consider specific research questions deviating from the direct focus on culture jamming organizations. Data collection and construction in each instance is addressed in each chapter and any corresponding appendices.

4.3.2. Interviews

Cognizant of the paucity of data for some groups, I supplement this initial set of sources with richer data derived directly from the Institute for Infinitely Small Things and the Surveillance Camera Players through a series of semi-structured in-depth interviews. An initial test interview was conducted with the group newmindspace in Toronto, but the group is excluded from the sample because of a lack of overt opposition. Although he is not strictly a part of the sample (not a collective actor, but an individual identity that engages in collective actions with a shifting group of people), a short e-mail correspondence yielded a number of insights from Ron English, a notable culture jammer. Requests for interviews with the AAA, members of three chapters of the Billionaires, CMT, the CAE, the IAA, Negativland, Reverend Billy, and the Yes Men failed due to either a lack of response,
overseas trips, my lack of funds, or a refusal to entertain academics with exclusive
attention. Nevertheless, both interviews provided invaluable data, especially the IST.

The interviews draw from a basic question template reproduced in Appendix One. However, the construction of each interview took into account the information already available via other sources in order to avoid excessive repetition and to maximize the amount of new information. In New York City, I interviewed Bill Brown of the SCP. While they espoused an anarchist politics, Brown is the first to admit that the group was really centralized around his efforts. Thus, while at any one time the group consisted of a dozen or so people, Brown was the consistent core of the group and thus provides a very useful vantage point on the SCP as a whole. In Boston, I interviewed three members of the IST at once: Catherine D’Ignazio, James Manning, and Savic Rasovic. D’Ignazio and Rasovic are the co-founders of the IST, while Manning joined the group after its formation. Each interview was audio recorded, transcribed, and returned to the individuals and groups for final comments or corrections. No comments or corrections were provided.

4.4. Case Descriptions

Below I give brief descriptions of each of the twelve groups in my sample. When available, I use those provided by the group itself.

The Adbusters Media Foundation is a non-profit organization founded in 1989 (and still active today) by Kalle Lasn and Bill Schmalz and based in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. They describe themselves as “a global network of artists, activists, writers, pranksters, students, educators and entrepreneurs who want to advance the new social activist movement of the information age” (AMF n.d.(a)). Generally, they espouse an anti-consumerist and pro-environmental politics. The group is the most well-known case in this
study and the most well-known example of culture jamming, particularly for their flagship magazine, *Adbusters*. They are the only Canadian case in this sample.

The Anti-Advertising Agency was a collaboration between Steve Lambert and other artists from 2004 to 2010 and primarily based in San Francisco, California. Sponsored by a non-profit arts organization, the group was concerned with issues of public space and advertising and typically engaged in acts of public artistry.

The Billboard Liberation Front is a loose and secretive organization founded in 1977 (and still active today despite several hiatuses) by members of the Suicide Club in San Francisco, California. The group focuses on the ‘improvement’ of outdoor advertising. They are one of the most prominent examples of culture jamming and directly inspired other groups like the California Department of Corrections and Artfux.

The Billionaires is a loose network of performance activists founded in 1999 (and still active today) by Andrew Boyd of the non-profit United for a Fair Economy in Boston, Massachusetts. The moniker of the group is malleable and shifts according to the action or campaign, i.e. the Billionaires for Forbes or the Billionaires for Wealthcare. The group(s) focuses on two basic concerns: the role of money in politics and economic inequality. They are one of the most prominent examples of culture jamming. Dozens of chapters are active across the United States.

The Center for Tactical Magic is an arts collective founded around 2003 (and still active today) by Aaron Gach and based in the San Francisco Bay Area. The group pursues experimental means for generating discourses and practices critical of oppression and authority.
The Critical Art Ensemble (2000a, 136) is “five tactical media artists dedicated to exploring the intersections between art, technology, critical theory, and political activism.” Founded in 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida by Steve Kurtz, Steve Barnes, and others, the group aims to develop pedagogical practices that open up spaces autonomous of authoritarian culture. They are especially noted for their theoretical text, *The Electronic Disturbance* (1994) and the trial of founder Steve Kurtz concerning charges of bioterrorism.

The Institute for Applied Autonomy is “a collective of engineers, artists, designers, theorists” founded in 1998 and disbanded in the late 2000s (Brusadin, Mattes, and Mattes n.d.). The group seeks to develop technologies that invert power relationships between citizens and authorities.

The Institute for Infinitely Small Things is a loose organization of artists founded in 2004 in Boston, Massachusetts by Catherine D'Ignazio and Savic Rasovic. As an extension of the non-profit arts organization Ikatun, the group “conducts creative, participatory research that aims to temporarily transform public spaces and instigate dialogue about democracy, spatial justice and everyday life” (IST 2012).

Negativland is an experimental music and now arts group founded in 1979 that originated in the San Francisco Bay Area, though the members have since dispersed geographically. Particularly critical of current U.S. copyright law and the ubiquity of advertising, they are noteworthy for their legal battles with U2 record label, Island Records, over copyright infringement. In addition, they are one of the more well-known culture jamming outfits, in part because they basically coined the phrase in 1985.

The Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah (formerly the Church of Stop Shopping) is a non-profit New York City-based performance collective and choir founded in
Originally a solo performance by Bill Talen as Reverend Billy, the group now pursues direct action in challenging consumerism and defending both public space and the environment. They are one of the more well-known culture jamming groups in the sample.

The Surveillance Camera Players was a performance group founded in 1996 and disbanded in the late 2000s/early 2010s in New York City. For a brief time, numerous other chapters sprang up in the U.S. and Europe. Led by Bill Brown, the group was concerned with the proliferation of surveillance cameras in public spaces.

The Yes Men is a loose network of activists founded in 1997 (and still active today) and fronted by members by Jacques Servin (a.k.a. Andy Bichlbaum) and Igor Vamos (a.k.a. Mike Bonanno). They seek to “focus attention on the dangers of economic policies that place the rights of capital before the needs of people and the environment” (TYM n.d.(b)). The group is one of the more noteworthy culture jamming groups in the sample and are noted especially for their documentaries.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter concludes Part I of this study by specifying the basic methodological constraints and capacities of the project. In particular, it considers issues of representativeness, selection bias, case selection criteria, sampling procedures, and data collection. Finally, it briefly describes each of the twelve cases in the sample of CJOs that frames the bulk of this study.
PART II:

EVERYDAY SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER 5. THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION

The goal of this chapter is to briefly describe the history and structure of the field of cultural production in advanced Western industrial democracies. Though this field includes a wide variety of activities, including news media, science, the arts, and literature, the primary focus here is artistic production. By necessity, this chapter is the least comprehensive presentation in this entire project. In order to economize, description is primarily informed by the work of sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Diana Crane. The following chapter details sets of actors and networks that played pivotal roles in the structuring of the field of cultural production in the twentieth century. Together, the two chapters begin to develop the argument that repertoire change can be productively studied as a consequence of changes in everyday social organization.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, utilizing the conceptual tools introduced in Chapter Two’s review of Bourdieu’s sociology I explore the origin and structure of the field of cultural production and the aesthetic disposition. Second, I consider some relevant criticisms involving the application of Bourdieu’s model to contemporary postmodern society and to cases outside of France. Third, I present some of the broad structural changes in the American field of artistic production in an effort to lay the groundwork for further chapters. Special emphasis is placed on the formal institutionalization of the field.

5.1. Bourdieu’s Sociology of Art

5.1.1. Structure of the Field

As noted in Chapter Two, Bourdieu begins with the assumption that in the history of complex societies the agents of various types of activities (politics, economics, religion, art, etc.) sought to carve their own spheres of values, norms, rewards and sanctions apart from
political authorities and economic markets. These contexts, or social fields, are constituted by sets of strategies, positions, and distributions of capital that organize the institutionalization and habituation of the field’s struggle for autonomy. For Bourdieu, the field of cultural production provides one of the more interesting instances of the emergence of an autonomous field. Cultural production (and consumption) is a highly inclusive sphere of activity encompassing journalism, literature, film and television, visual and plastic arts, academia, and science among others, produced and consumed by a wide variety of actors, including journalists, novelists, painters, actors, academics, critics, editors, publishers, media conglomerates, museum curators, universities, and others. Below, I detail the essential dualistic structure of this field.

Every field is internally differentiated into a dualistic structure by the struggle for autonomy. To make sense of this process and structure, however, one must begin at a further remove from the analysis of a single field. Figure 5.1 provides a basic model of the relations of dominance between the field of cultural production and the fields it is embedded within. The most comprehensive field is the field of social space (earlier referred to as the field of class relations [Bourdieu 1993, 38]). This refers to the most general structure of relations among people at the national level. As the diagram specifies, Bourdieu regards this field as composed of a dominated and a dominant pole. In general, those possessing the most capital valued in society reside in the upper half or dominant section of social space. Within the dominant sector resides the field of power:

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46 Bourdieu’s two extensive studies of this phenomenon, The Field of Cultural Production (1993) and The Rules of Art (1996), as well as his focus on taste, Distinction (1984), engage in particular the French field of cultural production. The former two deal primarily with the literary field of the second half of the nineteenth century.
the space of relations between agents or between institutions having in common the possession of the capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in different fields (notably economic or cultural). It is the site of struggles between holders of different powers (or kinds of capital) (Bourdieu 1996, 26).

To be more specific, the field of power is the “space of play in which holders of various forms of capital struggle in particular for...statist capital that grants power over the different species of capital” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 115). The field of power is thus the struggle over the state, a struggle over the rules that govern all other fields.

The relation between the fields of cultural production and power is more closely illustrated in Figure 5.2. As in Figure 5.1, the field of cultural production is situated at the dominated end of the field of power. Here its bifurcated structure is clearly demonstrated. Attention to some of the relevant variables should tease out this structure. First, the total

Figure 5.2. Combined Model of the French Literary Field of the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

volume of capital agents or organizations possess and are capable of deploying is represented vertically across all fields, thus distinguishing those with high levels of capital from those with low levels. Second, horizontally represented and also structuring all fields is the ratio of cultural capital to economic capital. This inverse relationship between species of power extends from the left, in which actors possess high levels of cultural capital but low levels of economic capital, to the right in which the reverse holds. The relation between these variable constitutes in part the external structuring of the field of cultural production.

The specific relation of the field of cultural production to the field of power is expressed in the two opposing principles of hierarchization: autonomy and heteronomy. Both are institutionalized features of the struggle over the power to define the principles that legitimate artists and work of art by defining both what is (and is not) art and what is good (and bad) art. The heteronomous principle governs the agents and organizations of the field by rewarding strategies subordinate to the field of power. Lacking autonomy, art and other forms of specific cultural production would be organized by market or political imperatives, an activity in which success is measured in terms of revenue and popular honors, among others. These producers tend to possess the least amount of cultural capital and the greatest amount of economic capital. The autonomous principle, in contrast, guides agents and organizations by rewarding strategies that seek distance from the economy or politics by inverting the field of power’s strategies of reward and sanction. Autonomous cultural production inhabits a particular “economy of practices...a systematic inversion of the fundamental principles of all ordinary economies” in which success as defined by the heteronomous principle is a sign of compromise, of ‘selling-out’ (Bourdieu 1993, 39). This
world, the subfield of restricted production or high culture, “is so ordered that those who enter it have an interest in disinterestedness,” in the disavowal of the economy of success (Bourdieu 1993, 40). The subfield is thus structured in part by its valuation of forms of capital distinct from the wider field of power. Consequently, cultural capital is generally in great abundance for these producers, while they tend to lack economic capital. The guiding logic of this alternative valuation in the art field is “art for art’s sake,” the production and distribution of works not for their role in generating wealth or affecting political change, but in their purity of aesthetic purpose and the artistic prestige they bestow. Figure 5.2 clearly expresses this antagonism between both principles of hierarchization.

Of course, this basic dualistic structure is far more complex than Figure 5.2 teases. For example, each genre or area of cultural production from poetry to theatre to music to journalism to science has its own structure that roughly mirrors the broader field. More importantly, the degree to which the field(s) is bifurcated between two opposing principles varies with the strength of the autonomous pole across time and space. Again, fields are sites of struggle; only through struggles among actors and organizations do fields generate their own laws and logics, but it is also through struggles that the field of power can maintain or renew the force of its sanctions and the attraction of its rewards. For Bourdieu, the French literary field of the second half of the nineteenth century is an exemplary instance of an autonomous field. Other cultural fields such as journalism are almost entirely dominated by the field of power. The degree of autonomy may be ascertained by

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47 It is a subfield of restricted production, because the lack of extensive economic capital and the disregard for popular audiences tend to constrain the scale of the production of works. In contrast, that space of the field of cultural production oriented toward heteronomy and endowed with extensive economic capital is composed in part of strategies of large-scale production such as Hollywood films.
the degree “to which the field is capable of functioning as a field of competition for cultural legitimacy” (Bourdieu 1996, 224).

Finally, in Figure 5.2 the field of cultural production is bisected by the degree of consecration that actors and organizations obtain. Consecration is a specific form of symbolic capital positively correlated with age and accruing to actors by virtue of their acceptance and recognition by ‘legitimate’ authorities. Counterclockwise from the bottom right corner (also indicating a decline in the size of audiences) the extremely broad space of non-consecrated producers lacking in cultural capital and relatively lacking in economic capital includes popular culture such as journalism. Here the guiding principle of legitimacy, in contrast to ‘art for art’s sake, is popularity. In the heteronomous wing of the field of cultural production, consecrated producers (lacking in cultural capital but well-endowed with economic capital) are those generally recognized as producers of academic or bourgeois art, for whom legitimacy is bestowed in the form of recognition by the dominant fraction of the dominant class. In the subfield of restricted production, recent but not contemporary waves of the avant-garde lacking economic capital but well-endowed with cultural capital are consecrated by the organizations and authorities that hold sway over the subfield. Lacking in both economic and symbolic capital, the contemporary and non-consecrated avant-garde generate strategies that produce their own cultural capital.

5.1.2. Permanent Revolution

The totality of these relations of dominance and the strategies they favor produce a particular set of incentives for those entering the subfield of restricted production. As noted, in order to compete, an effective strategy for new entrants (typically younger
generations) with low resources is to generate their own cultural capital or artistic
prestige. Bourdieu (original emphasis, 1993, 106) describes this process:

It is the continuous creation of a battle between those who have made their names and are
struggling to stay in view and those who cannot make their own names without relegating
to the past the established figures. ...On one side are the dominant figures, who want
continuity, identity, reproduction; on the other, the newcomers, who seek discontinuity,
rupture, difference, revolution. To ‘make one’s name’ means making one’s mark, achieving
recognition (in both senses) of one’s difference from other producers, especially the most
consecrated of them; at the same time, it means creating a new position beyond the
positions presently occupied, ahead of them, in the avant-garde.

These new positions are staked by virulent heterodoxy, by “imposing new modes of
thought and expression which break with current modes of thought and hence are destined
to disconcert by their ‘obscurity’ and their ‘gratuitousness’” (hence their excessively small
audience) (Bourdieu, 1996, 239-240). New and hungry entrants thus generally have an
interest in subversion, in equating the old guard, the custodians of the subfield, with the
hierarchy of the field of power. This challenge from below comes in the form of a
redefinition of the field and its artifacts. Because the incentive structure specific to the
structure of the relations of the fields of dominance is maintained by the struggles it is a
product of, and it produces, the process of innovation in the more autonomous fields of
cultural production, such as art and literature, is perpetual. Bourdieu christens this
tumultuous process permanent revolution. Each wave of innovation not only redefined art
and the artist, but the entire history of art and, in some cases, the world around them.

This model of artistic revolution only hints at the history of art, however. Embedded in his
discussion of the process of artistic revolution is the general notion that
cultural innovation is increasingly determined by the history of the field itself. The effect of
the isolation of an autonomous field of art, for example, from the burdens and imperatives
of politics and economics is that artistic practice was “accompanied by a sort of reflective
and critical return by the producers upon their productions” (Bourdieu 1993, 265-6; 1996, 242). This reflection increasingly determined cultural innovation through a logic particular to the field. Duchamp’s *Fountain*, for example, as an act of distinction and rebellion, presupposes Duchamp as the artist with an acquired knowledge of the field of art and its history such that his position-takings are calculated with masterful precision. Innovations like Duchamp’s ready-mades and many others are negatives of negatives of negatives, distinguishing classifications, a perpetual struggle of overturning prior modes of thought and expression and thus a struggle constrained by this history. This deconstructive process culminates in the *closure of fields*, meaning the exhaustion of artistic forms (Bourdieu 1993, 119). Bourdieu uses the example of painting to note that this effect of exhaustion leads to the questioning of the process of painting itself, a process mirrored in other genres and arts. The notion of the closure of fields assumes agents in the field are endowed with the reflexivity and dispositions necessary to exhaust forms, as with Duchamp. He seems to suggest, for example, that closure tends to be preceded by the fetishism of technicality (Bourdieu 1993, 119).

5.1.3. The Aesthetic Disposition

As noted in Chapter Two, social fields and the habitus are involved in a dance of structuration in which the accumulation of struggles over certain goods strongly determines the unfolding strategies of contemporary agents and organizations, while these actors are nonetheless endowed with the capacity to play (and even in rare cases transform) the game with variable virtuosity. The game itself favors certain strategies over others. The sense of the game required to play is socialized in the form of the habitus of those actors that successfully enter the field. Habitus is a matrix of dispositions, or sets of
schemas of perception, appreciation, and action. The field of cultural production, specifically the fields of art and literature, endows it’s agents with an aesthetic disposition, the product, according to Bourdieu, of a nineteenth-century struggle.

The crucial moment for Bourdieu was, in literature, Gustave Flaubert, and in painting, Édouard Manet. These two extraordinary individuals sought to impose a radical creativity on their respective mediums. They developed what Bourdieu calls the “creative” or “pure gaze,” the revolutionary thrust that ultimately yielded the autonomy of artistic production, the institutionalization of the struggle over the irreducibility of art (Bourdieu 1993, 265). Buttressed by well-endowed agents and organizations, the contours of this new game ultimately favored the institutionalization of an aesthetic disposition. Generally speaking, the aesthetic disposition is the capacity to locate oneself in this game of art and to assess the opportunities and constraints available for advancement in the field. Importantly, this disposition is not simply a practical knowledge of particular techniques of artistic production, such as painting murals, sculpting granite, or performing Shakespeare. It is composed of sets of knowledge and competency regarding the classificatory schemes and hierarchies that are both products of and constraining on the struggle. It is thus a continuous variable ranging from a weak knowledge of the field to a virtuosic grip on the game, typically a product of education and participation.

In addition, the aesthetic disposition, of which the pure gaze is an attribute, connotes “the capacity to consider in and for themselves, as form rather than function, not only the works designated for such apprehension, but everything in the world, including cultural objects which are not yet consecrated... and natural objects” (Bourdieu 1984, 3). There are consequently no limits to what cultural producers can appropriate and
transform into an art object: a urinal, Brillo boxes, a cough in an auditorium, a stapler.

Performance artist Allan Kaprow (1993, 219-221) offers a superb and extreme illustration of the creative gaze at work:

I decided to pay attention to brushing my teeth, to watch my elbow moving. I would be alone in my bathroom, without art spectators. There would be no gallery, no critic to judge, no publicity. This was the crucial shift that removed the performance of everyday life from all but the memory of art. I could, of course, have said to myself, “Now I'm making art!!” But in actual practice, I didn't think much about it...

Brushing my teeth attentively for two weeks, I gradually became aware of the tension in my elbow and fingers (was it there before?), the pressure of the brush on my gums, their slight bleeding (should I visit the dentist?). I looked up once and saw, really saw, my face in the mirror. I rarely looked at myself when I got up, perhaps because I wanted to avoid the puffy face I'd see, at least until it could be washed and smoothed to match the public image I prefer. (And how many times had I seen others do the same and believed I was different!)

This was an eye-opener to my privacy and to my humanity. An unremarkable picture of myself was beginning to surface, an image I'd created but never examined. It colored the images I made of the world and influenced how I dealt with my images of others. I saw this little by little.

But if this wider domain of resonance, spreading from the mere process of brushing my teeth, seems too far from its starting point, I should say immediately that it never left the bathroom. The physicality of brushing, the aromatic taste of toothpaste, rinsing my mouth and the brush, the many small nuances such as right-handedness causing me to enter my mouth with the loaded rush from that side and then move to the left side — these particularities always stayed in the present. The larger implications popped up from time to time during the subsequent days. All this from toothbrushing.

Through Kaprow's analysis of his hygienic performance, one witnesses the gaze as it invests the movements and nuances of everyday life with not only their typical practical meaning but also an aesthetic detail. Duchamp, Warhol, and Kaprow and many others are for Bourdieu the logical extension of Flaubert and Manet's achievement. This gaze, the pure gaze of the aesthetic disposition, the capacity to appropriate aesthetically literally anything, is now a legitimate schema of perception and appreciation in the field of art.

Bourdieu contrasts the pure gaze of the aesthetic disposition with the naïve gaze of the popular aesthetic. The subordination of function to form, of life to art, is systematic; the
pure gaze is essentially agnostic and amoral, irreligious and apolitical. If there is to be purity to art, art for art’s sake, then it must bleach its vision of external influence in the form especially of economics and politics. The field of cultural production thus generates a peculiar way of seeing and doing in the world in which everything and anything can bear a new witness, a testament to the purity of creation. Lacking the perceptual and appreciative schemas specific to the field of art, the naïve gaze applies the schemas that inform practical behavior in everyday life to artworks (Bourdieu 1984, 44). These ethical dispositions, as Bourdieu is quick to call them, tend to subordinate form to function, art to life; through these schemes the ethical, moral, or political impose on contemporary art.

5.2. Critical Analysis

While Bourdieu’s sociology of art and the research program it has spawned is generally regarded as the most productive and compelling synthesis of theory and evidence in the field, predictably it has its critics. I briefly focus on two of these criticisms, the first is diachronic and the second, synchronic: postmodern critiques of aesthetic perception and the generalization of his conclusions beyond the French case.

5.2.1. General Aestheticization and Cultural Omnivorism

Without inflicting too much violence to their diversity, strong postmodern critiques of Bourdieu’s sociology of art perception can be succinctly captured with a quotation from French philosopher Jean Baudrillard: “our society has given rise to a general aestheticization in the wake of the postmodern collapse of the domains of the economy, art, politics, and sexuality into each other” (emphasis added, 1993b, 16; see 1975; 1993a; 1994; Featherstone 1991; 1992). Prior to this development, production and consumption were organized by the scarcity of material commodities. The domains of social life were
governed by distinct hierarchies. In the society described by Baudrillard and his contemporaries, commodification has crept into all spheres of activity; everyday life is saturated not with material commodities, but with endless streams of spectacular imagery and signs. In such a consumer society subtended by the capacities of a truly mass visual media, everything is absorbed into the play of images. Under these conditions of widespread spectacle, art *de facto* reigns. More importantly, this condition of spectacular saturation entails an extreme shift in the modes of perception available to the inhabitants of such social conditions. Culture is no longer a stable terrain but an accelerating stream of indiscrete simulations, a gratuitous instantaneity of experiences that dissolve the deliberative and classifying capacities so dear to Bourdieu’s social theory. No longer can one speak coherently of an aesthetic disposition or a pure gaze; the aesthetic is diluted, the eye distracted and mesmerized by a parade of images that collapse all oppositions and hierarchies. General aestheticization is thus a leveling process, a demolition of hierarchies of classification by indiscriminate flows. Class, gender, and other forms of social stratification are no longer symbolically sustainable.

The aesthetic disposition is a resource, a supply of cultural capital for both producers and consumers. As such, Bourdieu’s basic model predicts that social stratification constrains the supply of cultural capital available to individuals, and thus the distribution of the aesthetic disposition. This postmodern perspective predicts that there is no longer a proper correspondence between perceptual schemas and field positions. In other words, if the aesthetic is now general, then anyone can be familiar with the game of art, precisely because, “[art] will...soon be gone, leaving behind an immense museum of artificial art and abandoning the field completely to advertising” (Baudrillard 1993b, 17).
Because his initial studies of consumption utilize data from the 1960s (1984), postmodern criticisms often suggest that Bourdieu missed the pattern of general aestheticization that followed.

Weaker postmodern arguments suggest a similar outcome, though they still attach some strength to the relation between stratification and cultural capital. The general pattern identified by these scholars is captured by the concept of the ‘cultural omnivore’ (Peterson 2002; 2005; Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson and Simkus 1992; see also DiMaggio 1996). Proponents of the omnivore thesis find evidence that previously differentiated consumption patterns reflective of socio-economic background have combined in postmodern society; the tastes of the cultural omnivore, typically of the higher class, span across a variety of cultural forms, including high art and popular culture.

These arguments are not without their own critics. Criticisms of strong postmodern social theory are so widespread it is hardly worth restating them here, except to note that they consistently lack empirical verification. However, one important point of contention is the rigidity with which Bourdieu separates high art from popular art (Fowler 1997; Prior 2005). Transformations in the field(s) over the last century have dramatically re-organized the production and consumption of artistic practices and objects. Developments in media, performance, and pop art, for example, have to some degree collapsed symbolic hierarchies. Part of this argument will be addressed in the following chapter.

Weaker postmodern arguments are vulnerable to the fact that Bourdieu argues quite clearly that the aesthetic disposition is not restricted to the consumption of fine arts; it is a generalized disposition available to those most capable of consuming fine arts but also including the “capacity to constitute aesthetically objects that are ordinary or even
‘common’ or to apply the principles of a ‘pure’ aesthetic in the most everyday choices of everyday life, in cooking, dress, or decoration, for example” (Bourdieu 1984, 40; Lizardo and Skiles 2008). To be an omnivore is still to distinguish oneself.

5.2.2. Beyond the French Case

Finally, some scholars question the degree to which Bourdieu’s model is applicable outside of its original context of France. For example, Lamont and Lareau (1988) suggest that symbolic boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate cultures in the United States may be weaker due to a number of factors, including the importance of ethnicity and frequent cultural innovation. Another variant of this argument is Lopes’ (2000) study of modern jazz in the United States in which he posits the need to integrate the concept of ‘popular restricted art’ into the subfield of restricted production. Additionally, the omnivore thesis was developed in the context of American studies of consumption, though whether it actually strikes a blow to Bourdieu’s model is debatable, as noted above.

However, numerous studies of the United States find general support for Bourdieu’s model of cultural production and consumption (DiMaggio 1996; DiMaggio and Mukhtar 2004; Holt 1997; 1998). More generally, in their study of the reception of Bourdieu into American sociology, Sallaz and Zavisca (2007, 37) find that not only is he frequently cited in the major journals in the field, but that his “central theoretical concepts are increasingly used to design empirical research and to advance debates in core sociological subfields.”

5.3. The United States

5.3.1. Institutionalization

Bourdieu (1984; 1993; 1996) posits a powerful link between educational achievement and cultural capital. Specifically, he argues that the aesthetic disposition in
France is generated by a socially differentiated educational process. This process favors those households possessing higher levels of capital (economic, cultural, etc.) by endowing their progeny with the means (cultural capital) to reproduce their social status. Those with lower levels of capital are constrained by this same process; obtaining higher levels of capital than their households is more difficult. Consequently, they likewise tend to reproduce their own social situation.

One aspect of this process is the reproduction of culture itself, which amounts to the re-generation of sets of classificatory schemes that actors utilize in order to advance their social position. The link between education and cultural capital that characterizes this relationship is stronger the more institutionalized and regulated the social activity. Bourdieu notes, for example, that the field of cultural production is uniquely characterized by a high degree of boundary permeability. This means that the “conditions of entry that are tacitly and practically required (such as a certain cultural capital [i.e., knowledge] or explicitly codified and legally guaranteed [academic degrees, for example]” are insufficient to uniquely determine the social characteristics (dispositions, resources) that yield successful positions in the field (Bourdieu 1993, 43). In other words, the field of cultural production, especially artistic production, is riven with conflict over basic principles (autonomy and heteronomy) in part because formal institutionalization (educational achievement) lacks a sufficient monopoly over the production of meaning (social classifications). This means that embodied cultural capital like the aesthetic disposition does not strictly correlate with institutionalized cultural capital like educational degrees and awards (Bourdieu 1996). Still, the stronger the institutionalization process the stronger the link between embodied and institutionalized capital.
While education may be significant for the generation of certain sets of skills and knowledge, I suggest that occupations are also important. While Bourdieu’s claims regarding education are relatively clear, I argue that expansion in arts occupations should be also indicative of a process of institutionalization, because it may reflect the general recognition and appreciation of the institutionalized and embodied cultural capital generated by arts education, namely degrees and skills. Demand for arts education should ultimately reflect expectations of future income. Arts education is a capital investment that more or less pays off with a corresponding occupation. In other words, the cultural capital generated by education is recognized by a corresponding market.

In their revision of the renowned SES model, Verba et al (1995; Brady et al 1995) establish a set of relations between organizational contexts, skills, and political participation. They hypothesize that extensive experience in each context (work, school, church) generates sets of organizational and communication skills that actors can utilize in political contexts like voting or campaigning. Following the theoretical developments in Chapters Two and Three, I apply these arguments to artistic practice and political behavior specifically; experience in certain contexts should generate certain sets of skills that should in turn reduce the costs and uncertainties of political actions in which these skills are applicable. In particular, educational and occupational contexts associated with artistic production and consumption should generate sets of skills and knowledge particular to the field of art.

As a preliminary step, the remainder of this chapter aims to provide a general but cursory description of the American field of artistic production. This chapter thus

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48 Clearly, the human capital literature is relevant here, but this theoretical treatment is sufficient for my purposes.
establishes some of the content of everyday social organization. While I focus on institutionalization, it is worth noting that the data presented below also pertains to the simple expansion of the field of art. The relation to activism is considered in Part III.

If I anticipate the development of a set of protest practices as a consequence in part of a politicized aesthetic disposition (elaborated in the following chapter), and if this disposition is an institutionalized feature of the field of artistic production, then I should expect to find evidence of a process of institutionalization in the American field of artistic production. In other words, I expect to find evidence of the development and growth of formal institutions like academic degrees and occupations. Attention is thus focused here on the narrower fields of artistic production and consumption, especially basic structural trends in arts-related education and occupations in the United States over the twentieth century. In her work on the avant-garde, Crane (1987) demonstrates the tremendous growth of an art world in the United States. Increases in auction markets, galleries, museums, private collections, and government funding of artists all point towards an exceptional process of institutionalization. However, her consideration of education and occupations is comparatively cursory (Crane 1987, 9-10).

Following Crane’s general hypothesis of the growth of the art world, Bourdieu’s hypothesis of the relationship between education and capital, and the hypothesized process of institutionalization and the aesthetic disposition, I anticipate two general patterns in this analysis. First, I expect an increase in formal arts education that outstrips population growth. Second, I expect an increase in arts-related occupations that outstrips growth in the labor market. Demonstrating such patterns would help lay the groundwork for the remainder of this project: an expanding institutionalizing art field is more likely to
generate sets of skills and knowledge characteristic of the aesthetic disposition. In other words, it potentially tightens the link between social context and skill sets.

5.3.2. Arts Education

Crane (1997, 9-10) notes that from 1950 to 1980 the number of Master of Fine Arts degrees increased from 525 to 8,708. The difference amounts to a 1,659% increase, a figure far exceeding the growth in population (67% from 1950 to 1980). Such a higher growth rate of Master’s degrees relative to population likely indicates explosive growth in the sets of educational organizations, institutions, and resources relevant to the production and consumption of aesthetic objects.49

Figure 5.3 pursues this line of inquiry further.50 I employ two measures of the growth in arts education (see Appendix Three for a full account of the construction of these measures). The first, Fine Arts, is a conservative indicator expressing the annual percentage change in the number of Master’s and Doctorate degrees in the Fine Arts minus degrees in Music and the Dramatic Arts. In other words, it is primarily focused on the visual arts. The second, All Arts, is a more inclusive measure incorporating the Fine Arts (including Music and the Dramatic Arts), English, and Architecture. Finally, Population refers to the annual percentage change in the population of the United States. While from 1950 to 1982 the latter marginally decreases from highs never in excess of 2% and lows never below zero, the measures of arts education follow distinct trajectories. The early to

49 This method is more effective at indicating growth than the percentage change in the proportion of the population obtaining arts-based degrees. Because of the general scarcity of these degrees (a point I consider in depth in Chapter Seven), absolute population growth quickly outpaces absolute growth in degrees, thus falsely suggesting a shrinking art world.
50 The relevant data is limited and incomplete. Detailed Census data on specific degrees dates back to only 1949. Relevant categories begin to vanish after 1970. Still, while ideal data would extend beyond the Roosevelt administration and the federal government’s generous support of the arts, the data are helpful especially considering that Crane focuses on the middle of the century as a pivotal period of growth.
mid-1950s provide mixed results, but a clear pattern of sizable sustained growth emerges from the late 1950s into at least the 1970s where the data cut off. The chunks of data into the 1980s indicate a stalling of growth. While the gist of Crane’s argument is intact, it is clear that the trajectory is slightly more nuanced. In addition, this period of increasing arts degrees corresponds with the emergence of several groundbreaking art movements including Conceptual, Performance, and Pop Art and representative figures such as Warhol and Kaprow that heralded the institutionalization and popularization of the dissolution of the distinction between art and everyday life, a mark of the aesthetic disposition.

5.3.3. Arts Occupations

Crane (1987, 4) observes that the number of artists dramatically increased in the third quarter of the twentieth century. This is especially indicated by the 67% growth in
the number of self-identified artists from 1970 to 1980. Like arts education, this figure clearly outstrips population growth. However, unlike arts education, population growth is a misleading comparison. The mid-to-late twentieth century saw a tremendous expansion in labor force participation. Thus, as a function of this increase we should expect a corresponding increase in arts occupations beyond population growth. This should not in itself point towards greater institutionalization in the field.

In order to counter this difficulty, I compare the percentage change in the number of arts occupations to the percentage change in the size of the labor force. If there is little difference in the rates of growth, then change in the size of the workforce largely explains change in the number of arts occupations. If arts occupations grow significantly faster than the labor force, then this supports the argument that increasing arts occupations indicates a significant expansion of the artistic labor market. Coupled with increases in arts education, this would provide additional but marginal support for the charge that the field of artistic production increasingly institutionalized over this period of time.

Before I begin, it is worth noting that the data on occupations is sparser and more scattershot than the data on degrees. As a consequence, a plurality of measures is employed in order to capture variance over time in the two principal objects of interest: arts occupations and civilian labor force (see Appendix Three for a full account of the construction of these variables). Table 5.1 presents three measures of arts occupations. The first (Artists, Actors, Architects, Musicians, Writers) is a composite variable for the years 1940 to 1960, while the second (Artists, Entertainers, and Writers) measuring artist occupations from 1960 to 1970 is lifted directly from the Census. The third employs National Endowment for the Arts data on all artist occupations from 1970 to 1990. The
Table 5.1. Arts Occupations and the Civilian Labor Force

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<th>Occupations (in thousands)</th>
<th>Civilian Labor Force (in thousands)a</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artists, Actors, Architects, Musicians, Writersa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>393</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>495</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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Civilian Labor Force measure is straightforward. Percentage change over each decade is calculated for each variable, and attention should fall here. Comparing these changes yields the insight that growth in arts occupations significantly outpaces growth in the labor force. While the 1940s show a similar growth rate, over the 1960s arts occupations outstrip growth in the labor force by over 10%, while the 1960s witness a more dramatic difference of over 25%, a pattern that increases through 1990. Figure 5.4 continues the analysis by joining the measures of percentage change in arts occupation together to generate a single measure of arts occupations change from 1950 to 1990. The chart clearly presents a pace of growth in the arts labor market far exceeding the growth in the general labor market.

5.4. Conclusion

This chapter briefly considers Bourdieu’s sociology of art. First, the basic structure of the field of cultural production and it’s relation to the fields of power and of social space,
which is shaped by the distributions of various forms of capital, is presented. Second, I emphasize endogenous mechanisms of change in the form of aesthetic revolutions specific to the subfield of restricted production. Third, I consider the the incorporation of the aesthetic disposition, the perceptual and actionable schemas of classification that favor certain strategies over others. Fourth, a series of criticisms of Bourdieu’s sociology of art are discussed. Finally, I consider evidence regarding the degree of institutionalization in the field of art. Specifically, I present data on arts education and occupations that suggests a dramatic expansion of the field over the third quarter of the twentieth century. The following chapter extends this broader set of analyses by considering, from the perspective of networks of agents in the form of the avant-garde, the politicization of the aesthetic disposition and the creation of novel forms of collective action.
CHAPTER 6. CRITICAL COMMUNITIES: THE AVANT-GARDE

There are two general defining characteristics of the aesthetic disposition that contribute towards the ability of players to play the game of art. The first is the capacity and the tendency to view art as irreducible to moral, political, or economic valuations or functions. The second is the capacity and the tendency to appropriate anything aesthetically, even the common accoutrements of daily life. For Bourdieu, though the aesthetic disposition varies in degree across agents, these two characteristics or classificatory schemas are basically inseparable. This chapter explores the relaxation of this first principle, the principle of autonomy, in the permanent process of artistic revolution across the twentieth century. In so doing, analytic emphasis shifts from the structures of cultural production, the subject of the preceding chapter, to the strategies of the avant-garde.

First, I review the literature on the relation between intellectual labor and contentious politics. Second, I review the literature on the avant-garde art movements of the first half of the twentieth century. Third, I establish a theoretical relation between the analysis of cultural production presented in Chapter Five and the politicization of the aesthetic disposition in the avant-garde. With the assistance of Crane (1987), Teune (2005) and Bürger (1984), I argue that these art movements developed a specific oppositional practice and discourse on aesthetics and politics in reaction to the autonomy of the field, a practice and discourse that in turn came to inform the tactical behavior of protesters. Along with other movements, they performed the critical intellectual labor of “critical communities,” discursive publics that generate oppositional ideas, values (Rochon 1998) and practices (Teune 2005). Finally, I analyze the Dada, Surrealist, and the
Situationist movements as critical communities, as collective efforts to politicize the field of cultural production.

6.1. Review

6.1.1. Intellectual Labor and Contention

Early work on forms of protest considered the relation of intellectual labor to contention from two normative directions. Conservative approaches regarded the crafting of ideas as an essential component of the explanation of various forms of ‘collective behavior.’ An extreme version of this perspective is represented by Gustave LeBon’s (1896) work on the dynamics of crowds. He argues that the critical ideas propagated by philosophers, intellectuals, and others constitute remote structural factors that broadly constrain crowd formation. The corrosion of the esteem and wonder of authority as a consequence of these ideas lays the ground for civil disturbances. Once these ideas propagate and gain a general sympathy, what remains is the instrumental work of leaders and orators. These actors frame the ideas such that they excite people into mobilization.

Marxists regarded the generation and diffusion of critical ideas as either irrelevant (only economic factors are of any relevance) or of key importance to the struggle for socialism. The most prominent representative of the latter school of thought is Antonio Gramsci (1971). Gramsci argued that the coercive apparatus of the state was not sufficient to explain the persistence of capitalism. He thus turned to cultural production as a necessary factor in capitalist hegemony. For him, revolutionary activity under the capitalist mode of production must be preceded by consistent counter-hegemonic activities that not only corrode bourgeois ideology, but also provide an alternative culture and consciousness. This cultural work is produced by a fraction of the traditional intellectuals -
those who perform the social function of thinking – and more importantly, *organic intellectuals*, those who develop ideas and practices organically from within their class. For Gramsci, revolutionary protest is preceded by revolutionary culture, including art.

Despite their vast disagreements, conservatives and Marxists sketch an account of cultural change in which actors craft critical ideas that contribute to a shift in consciousness and values among wider audiences. A contemporary version of this argument is presented by Rochon (1998). He demonstrates that while structural conditions shape the context within which opposition develops, the process of relatively rapid cultural change begins with the creation of oppositional ideas. These are formed and debated in discursive publics he calls “critical communities.” Critical communities are not formally organized; rather, they are delimited by the networks of communication that critical thinkers use to define and elaborate problems and propose remedies. Similar to LeBon’s emphasis on oratory, promoting these ideas requires framing efforts that resonate with audiences. These collective action frames are fashioned out of the cloth of the ideas of critical communities. Together, critical communities and their ideas constitute an important condition for the development of social movements.

Others have suggested similar concepts and processes. Eyerman and Jamison (1991) argue that a necessary condition for the formation of major social movements is the development of ‘movement intellectuals.’ Movement intellectuals are a variety of actors – scientists and a host of other professionals, including engineers, lawyers, media specialists, and government employees - that develop critical ideas and disseminate them in a variety of contexts. Once the movement begins, the lines between activist and intellectual, or between thinking and doing, blur. Together, they engage in a continual process of identity
formation through the specification of the particular logic of the movement. Critical of Rochon and Eyerman and Jamison, Tesh (2000) breaks down the critical community-movement-audience distinction. She argues that critical ideas are not only circulated by professionals and academics, but also by audiences that often directly interact with these critical thinkers.

The work of Rolfe (2005) and Teune (2005) highlights the role of small skilled groups in the formation of ideas and practices. Rolfe suggests that “innovative hothouses,” small experimental groups, produce tactical innovations that social movements appropriate. The groups he looks at are artist collectives heavily influenced – and self-consciously so – by many other artist groups. Teune looks at the role of art in protest from the 1960’s to the movements against global capitalism. He suggests that various art movements performed the critical function of elaborating certain ideas and practices that were later absorbed into the protest activities of these periods. In particular, he turns to the bohemian subcultures of the 1950’s and the Situationists by modifying Rochon’s initial understanding of a critical community. Instead of limiting the conception of critical communities to the incubators of new ideas, Teune argues that we must also consider the development and elaboration of new oppositional practices as critical cultural production. Both Rolfe and Teune thus argue that certain artistic groups and movements generate innovative symbols and practices that were assimilated into contentious politics.

6.1.2. The Avant-Garde

Originally a military term designating the front line of an advancing army, the avant-garde took on new connotations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries signifying a relatively homogeneous group of artists, writers, and thinkers that seek to
produce works beyond the margins of what is defined as legitimate art, theatre, and literature. By the turn of the century, the avant-garde was associated with perpetual innovation and experimentation in nearly every field of cultural production.

Early works on the avant-garde were generally couched within broader discussions regarding the nature of modernity. Some of the more innovative work came from Marxists. From György Lukács (2001), Bertolt Brecht (1964), Walter Benjamin (1970 [1936]) to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2002), the interwar years were witness to a feverish attempt within the currents of historical materialism to found and articulate a revolutionary project for aesthetics. Some of the fruit borne by these critical efforts was an early specification of the position of the avant-garde relative to economics and politics. For example, Greenberg (1939) offered one of the first systematic analyses of this relation. He argued that the avant-garde took its marginal commercial position by opposing itself to kitsch, what he described as both academic art and commercial art. Although initially sympathetic to radical politics, the avant-garde eventually sought to create for art a position of transcendence and absolute value.

In developing a specific theory of the avant-garde as opposed to a general theory of modernity, Poggioli (1968) defined the avant-garde as sets of oppositional arguments distinguishing some set of actors and groups from the wider society. Vanguardism is an expression of the romantic reaction to the development of the mass audience, to the introduction of industrial production to cultural objects. This manifests in opposition to older generations of artists, but especially to the vulgarity of popular or mass culture. The avant-garde thus responds to a set of norms and motivations arising from the bohemian condition in which artistic production begins to separate itself from commerce. This
complex of oppositions subtended by a vibrant cultural life is characterized by a set of durable norms and psychological motivations regarding cultural production that vary in their extremes. These constraints are exceptional for their anti-conventionality; for Poggioli, the avant-garde is inherently nonconformist, anti-traditional, and experimental.

In contrast to Poggioli, Bürger’s (1984) theory of the avant-garde focuses on a narrower set of movements, specifically Dada, Surrealism, and the post-revolutionary Russian avant-garde. He argues that the key point of discontinuity in art history is not the rise of Aestheticism, the most potent expression of the autonomy of the institution of art (art for art’s sake). Aestheticism is merely the culmination of a gradual separation of art from what he calls the ‘praxis of life,’ meaning everyday life and social and political concerns; it is the inevitable outcome of the bourgeois conception of art. However, with the historical avant-garde, “the apartness from the praxis of life that had always constituted the institutional status of art in bourgeois society now becomes the content of works” (Bürger 1984, 27). Whereas previous art movements focused their critical energies against certain aesthetic practices and various concerns outside of the institution of art, the avant-garde that interests Bürger is a protest against the entire institution of art and its relation to the wider world. Only when the purity of art reveals its inconsequentiality in the world does the vicious criticism of the avant-garde seek rectification.

6.2. Theoretical Development

6.2.1. Bürger and Bourdieu

There thus appears a tension between Bürger’s emphasis on the discontinuity of the historical avant-garde and Bourdieu’s emphasis on the development of an autonomous

51 This list also includes to some extent Futurism and German Expressionism.
field of cultural production. The point of contention is the degree of (dis)continuity posited at two historical points: autonomy and self-critique. This study is not concerned with determining whether the creation of an autonomous field of cultural production was a rupture or not, but rather with the critique that developed in reaction to the historical reality of a field of strategies structured in part by the ambition of an irreducible or pure aesthetic. I consider two possible (but not mutually exclusive) Bourdieusian responses to Bürger’s argument: Dada as supreme art and Dada as heteronomy.

For Bourdieu (1996, 257), Dada’s “refusal to separate life from art” is “an artistic act, even the supreme artistic act.” Perhaps it is no accident that Bourdieu’s favorite subject in this context is Duchamp, the most enigmatic and likely apolitical individual involved in the Dada movement. His deployment of a common manufactured urinal in the context of artistic appreciation shocked the art world. Despite the shock value of the event, the Dada maneuver as exemplified by Duchamp is not in this sense a historical rupture; it is rather the most radical crystallization of an aesthetically pure appropriation of everyday life conceived up to that point. Duchamp is thus the finest example of a virtuoso at the game of art.

From another Bourdieusian perspective, Dada’s refusal is also another form of social art. Bourdieu and Bürger define autonomy essentially the same: the freedom from demands that art be useful. Bürger’s error, from this perspective, is in supposing that Dada’s critique of art is qualitatively new, whereas for Bourdieu it would represent merely the reassertion of demands for usefulness. In other words, the criticism of art as an institution could be seen as a set of strategies appealing to the heteronomous principle, the
subordination of art to imperatives derived from beyond the field. Dada’s radicalism can thus be interpreted as part of the traditional affinity of the avant-garde with leftist politics.

Of course, Bürger has his own retort. Until the early twentieth century, art itself was left unscathed by the vigorous attacks of the avant-garde. With the arrival of the avant-garde of the early twentieth century, the very idea of art as an institution came under attack. Bourdieu’s model predicts that however actors and organizations behave, they do so in response to the objective conditions of the field in the form of position-takings in relation to contemporaries and previous generations and their resource endowments. Bürger’s model specifies that the historical avant-garde turned their critique upon art as a whole. This self-critique can be understood as a potential set of strategies within the field. That Bourdieu does not emphasize self-critique as much as Bürger is likely in part a consequence of his focus on the nineteenth century as well as the two points made above. Thus, in principle, the basic arguments, despite their baggage, are compatible.

6.2.2. Strategies of Distinction

First, this argument – that the aesthetic disposition is politicized in a radical critique of the field of art - requires a more elaborate consideration of strategies of distinction within the subfield of restricted production. Bourdieu’s discussion of the strategies available to the avant-garde is generally restricted to technical fetishism and his general argument that the avant-garde redefines the field of cultural production by selectively inverting or negating some of the core arguments of the consecrated avant-garde. His emphasis is primarily focused on the development of an autonomous aesthetic. This generally deters him from attributing significance to other innovations in the strategies of art movements (though see Bourdieu and Haacke 1995).
Crane (1987, 14-15) argues that avant-gardes differ not only in the extent to which they challenge existing conventions and institutions but also in the focus of their criticism. She argues that identifying an art movement as avant-garde requires attention to any one of three factors: the aesthetic content of art, the social content of art, and/or the norms surrounding the production and distribution of artworks. From her elaboration of each point, one can devise a set of strategies that those staking positions in the field can utilize in order to accumulate cultural capital and aim to redefine the artistic field in their image. This list is presented in Table 6.1. Like Bourdieu, most discussions of artistic revolution or the avant-garde involve changes in the aesthetic content of works. One of the virtues of Crane’s effort is her identification of the range of issues beyond formal considerations that artists can take positions on in order to establish their credentials as avant-garde or innovators. Moreover, she tends to refuse to lock in the direction of redefinition.

This final consideration is a telling indicator of the importance of a contextual understanding of the exigencies of the field and the opportunities they offer. For example,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1. Strategies of Distinction Available to the Avant-Garde</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Aesthetic Content of Art</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Redefinition of artistic conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilization of new artistic tools and techniques</td>
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<tr>
<td>Redefinition of the nature of the art object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Content of Art</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression of social or political values that is critical of or different from the mainstream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redefinition of the relationship between high art and popular culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criticism of artistic institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norms Surrounding the Production and Distribution of Artworks</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redefinition of the social context for the production of art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redefinition of the organizational context for the production of art</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redefinition of the nature of the artistic role</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Crane (1987, 14-15)
Crane (1987, 14) argues that those movements that seek to resurrect prior conventions are unlikely to be identified as avant-garde. However, a dramatic example of a set of strategies of resurrection is available with Stuckism. The Stuckists are an art movement forged at the dawn of the twenty-first century in opposition to the more extreme variants of modern and especially postmodern art. One manner of summarizing their position is a quotation from one manifesto: “Artists who don’t paint aren’t artists” (Childish and Thomson 1999). Marxist literary critic Terry Eagleton (2011) argues that the Stuckist’s bombast is indeed subversive; “Today, rejecting the easel is as conventional as the iambic pentameter.” In other words, when the subversive becomes conventional, the formerly conventional can be subversive. Below, I argue that looking at the avant-garde in this chapter from this perspective helps us to see the politicization of art in the avant-garde as subversive.

6.2.3. Politicizing the Aesthetic Disposition

According to Bourdieu, there are two general defining characteristics of the aesthetic disposition. The first is the capacity and the tendency to view art as irreducible to moral, political, or economic valuations or functions. The second is the capacity and the tendency to appropriate anything aesthetically. Together, these institutionalize the separation of a sphere of transcendent aesthetic experience. Though the aesthetic disposition varies in degree across agents, these two characteristics or classificatory schemas are basically inseparable.

What Bürger adds to this account is the politicization of artistic production at the frontier of the avant-garde in the early twentieth century. In Bourdieu’s model, the avant-garde is the bearer of autonomy, though the degree of autonomy characterizing the field is
variable across time. Bürger emphasizes the focusing of the critical efforts of artists on the field itself as it relates to a broader social world. Another manner of putting this argument is that the historical avant-garde acquired and crystallized the second characteristic of the aesthetic disposition while relaxing the first. They employed the means to constitute the world and all of its objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic materials, while simultaneously constituting them as political, as suffused and traversed with a dimension of power, of social significance. Referring to Table 6.1, these avant-garde sought more or less to challenge existing conventions and practices utilizing at one time or another all of the available strategies. This includes a marked emphasis on dramatically expanding the aesthetic frontiers of art, developing the most virulent opposition to existing social and political arrangements, including the institution of art itself, and finally, a critical focus on the context of artistic production and distribution, including the advancement of a decidedly militant role for the artist in social life.

For Bourdieu, actors respond to the objective possibilities available in each field. In the field of cultural production, this yields the particular dynamic of perpetual revolution. This process involves an incentive structure that rewards various strategies of distinction at various times. Bürger’s argument can be translated thus: as the process of autonomy intensified, the objective possibilities open to an emerging avant-garde included a radical critique of cultural producers and the conditions of production in relation to the broader field of power. The rallying cry of the subfield of restricted production is the autonomy of art against the fields of politics and economics. But, like Eagleton’s characterization of Stuckism as subversive, the field ultimately incentivizes a turn against even this principle in order to subvert the field in a revolution against art, against a vision of society that seeks to
expunge the social responsibilities of artists. Perpetual revolution thus ultimately yields institutional critique; there are precious few sacred cows in the butcher shop of revolution.

6.2.4. Avant-Garde as Critical Communities

I argue, like Teune (2005), that a modified version of Rochon’s (1998) model offers a meaningful way of approaching these critical art movements. As noted in the review above, Rochon posits a basic two-phase process in which critical communities develop critical ideas that are then framed by movements in order to appeal to audiences. Critical communities are informal networks of communication distinguished by their concern over some social problem(s). Through discussion in published works, these networks develop innovative diagnoses and prognoses that are critical of existing practices and values. For Rochon, “scientists, academics, and a variety of social analysts and commentators” are the primary producers of critical ideas (1998, 97). This is clearly illustrated by his ideal example of a critical community: the philosophes that promoted the Enlightenment.

Eyerman and Jamison’s (1991) criticism expands the range of intellectual labor by including professionals of all types. Still, the concept may be too exclusive. Rochon’s ideal example provides a lead. The philosophes included a wide range of public intellectuals that engaged in a variety of critical activities. Their medium was not always that of academic or scientific analysis. Voltaire’s biting satire provides an illustration of the aesthetic instruments utilized by some of the philosophes. Moreover, the philosophes sought not just to cultivate and disseminate ideas, but also to disseminate practices, the most general of which was rational discourse itself. Finally, the infrastructure of their ‘republic of letters’ was firmly embedded in more intimate forms of social intercourse. In France, for example, the salons were especially significant in fostering climates of critical discourse (Kale 2004).
While Rochon’s analysis suggests a strictly cognitive, discursive, and academic definition of the activities of critical communities, a more appropriate conceptualization should include the practices promoted by critical actors (for example, recycling in the environmental movement), a wider range of actors, including but not limited to artists and others familiar to bohemian or countercultural networks and lifestyles (Teune 2005), and more direct forms of critical discourse (as in clubs, academic conferences, and think tanks).

Critical communities are defined primarily by the problems they address. Rochon (1998, 22) identifies three key features of critical communities.

1. **Sensitivity**: actors are in a condition of heightened awareness with respect to the conditions of a problem, whether as a result of some vulnerability or interest.

2. **Diagnosis**: actors develop an analysis of the sources and the nature of the problem.

3. **Prognosis**: actors develop prescriptions for solving the problem, including policies, strategies, and in some cases practices or tactics.

The degree to which the discourse within a community coheres around a single diagnosis and a single prognosis is variable. The early period of discussion is often confused and exploratory. Over time, some communities narrow their sets of diagnoses and prognoses.

In accordance with the academic and rationalist bias his conception harbors, Rochon cites the importance of higher educational institutions in the formation of critical communities. It seems plausible that the development of such communities can be analyzed as phenomena emerging from the incentive structures offered by social fields, including the academic field. My argument is that the field of artistic production described in Chapter Five offers sets of opportunities that are exploited by the strategic acumen of various artists and organizations like art critics, galleries, museums, governments, etc. The sensitivity of avant-garde artists to these opportunities is shaped by their endowments of
capital and the incentive structure of the field or fields that they occupy, which in turn is shaped in part by broader field dynamics and exogenous factors. Much of Chapter Six focuses on the question of the sensitivity of actors to opportunities. The process of perpetual revolution is particularly relevant in this context. Others are important as well, however. Technological change is a significant exogenous variable. For example, during the period of the networks under study, artists were increasingly occupied by the concept and the reality of the machine and scientific advances in general. The onset of World War I was a particularly potent force in the radicalism of Dada, including the acquiescence of the socialist parties of Europe in the struggle. After the Second World War, the acknowledgement of a failed socialist experiment in the Soviet Union was important for the development of the Situationist International (SI).

Exploiting these opportunities involved developing critical strategies (Table 7.1) that, first, diagnosed a social problem and, second, generated solutions to the problem, including appropriate tactics. This entailed, as discussed above, the politicization of the aesthetic disposition and the field of artistic and cultural production as a whole. In Bürger's language, they criticized art as an institution for its relation to structures of domination outside of the world of art.

Teune (2005) turns to the Bohemian subcultures of the 1950’s and the Situationists through his modification of Rochon’s initial understanding of a critical community. Whereas Teune emphasizes and demonstrates the effects of the diffusion of these forms of criticism into social movements in the 1960’s and 1990’s and beyond, I turn to the art movements themselves to determine whether they perform the function of criticism.
6.3. Data and Method

I employ three case studies of art movements: Dada, Surrealism, and the SI. The primary objective in this chapter is to determine whether these movements can be identified as critical communities. I explore the range of strategies that they utilized, especially the diagnoses and prescriptions that they offered through their activities. These studies thus provide only a hint at the question of sensitivity.

Primary and secondary sources are utilized in order to isolate each movement’s diagnoses and prognoses. The object of primary significance is the public discourse the movement presents to the outside world in the form of manifestoes, artworks, interviews, periodicals, memoirs, etc. Attention is focused on the actual practitioners and participants in the movements and whomever they directly respond to in their discourses. Attempts by others to define the discourse of each movement and to situate it in a context the movement’s participants themselves do not address or explicitly disagree with are ignored.

Bürger’s historical avant-garde includes Dada, Surrealism, the post-revolutionary Russian avant-garde, Futurism, and German Expressionism. This chapter’s case selection yields disagreement with Bürger on one movement: the Situationist International. The three movements of this study were chosen principally as a response to the literature on culture jamming. Numerous authors recognize a debt to the historical avant-garde in contemporary culture jamming (Cammaerts 2007; Cox 2005; Klein 2000; Nomai 2008). The Situationists are the most commonly cited of these movements. Other movements, such as Fluxus, are considered less central to the development of culture jamming.

These three movements are not the only generators of critical practices and ideas of import in the first half of the twentieth century. Their discourses are part of wider critical
discussions on aesthetics, politics and economics flowing from the nineteenth century. In particular, Marxist analyses of cultural production addressed similar concerns. However, in defining themselves, each movement addresses their specific sets of questions. It is also worth stressing again that critical communities vary in the degree of pluralism in their diagnoses and prognoses. The case studies below will not represent all veins of discussion particular to the movements. Instead, the most salient and the most general diagnostic and prognostic discourses will be presented. The cases are presented in chronological order.

6.4. Dada! (1916 – 1923)\textsuperscript{52}

Dada began more or less independently in Zurich, Switzerland and New York City around 1916 in the milieu of various avant-garde and radical circles during World War I. Through lively discussions and provocative actions and pieces in the Cabaret Voltaire in Zurich and the apartment of the Arensbergs in New York, groups of artists and writers forged an increasingly confrontational aesthetic. It spread quickly to Germany, the Netherlands, and many other urban areas, in part thanks to the efforts of Tristan Tzara. His indefatigable networking and promotion pulled together a heterogeneous and far-flung set of individuals into the most radical movement of ‘art’ in the history of art. By 1920, most of the major figures involved in Dada activities had immigrated to Paris. After a brief period of external provocation and internal conflict, the movement gradually dissolved and by 1923 was no longer a coherent force.

6.4.1. Diagnosis

A central problematic can be ascertained in the discourses of Dadaists: \textit{the role of cultural production in a world of false values and mass slaughter}. Much of the impetus for

\textsuperscript{52} My resources for the Dada movement include anthologies of Dada writings (Ades 2006; Lippard 1971, Motherwell 1981), memoirs (Richter 1997), and histories (Lewis 1988; Sanouillet 2009; Sheppard 1979).
this concern was World War I. The Dadaists were resolutely anti-nationalist and anti-war. The values of the nation, of martial valor and honor were, for them, tools of manifest absurdity used to send millions to their deaths. Moreover, the spectacle of the war furthered the perception that the pretenses of progress, rationality, science, religion, morality, even socialism (except in Germany) were hollow, though dangerous. Ball (1916) asserted, "It is necessary to define the activity of this cabaret; its aim is to remind the world that there are independent men, men – beyond war and nationalism – who live for other ideals." In Germany, Grosz (2006, 308) expressed the alienation engendered by the war: “I could see that the individual freedom that I had enjoyed until then was being threatened... I viewed this war as a monstrous and denatured manifestation of the ugly struggle for ownership.” Tzara (1981, 403) clarifies further: “Honor, Country, Morality, Family, Art, Religion, Liberty, Fraternity, etc. – all these notions had once answered to humans needs, now nothing remained of them but a skeleton of conventions.” Aragon fumes:

[N]o more religions, no more royalists, no more radicals, no more imperialists, no more anarchists, no more socialists, no more communists, no more proletariat, no more democrats, no more republicans, no more bourgeois, no more aristocrats, no more arms, no more police, no more nations, an end at last to all this stupidity, nothing left, nothing at all, nothing, nothing, nothing (Picabia et al 2006, 181).

His final repetitions represent a common slur used by the Dadaists against practically the whole of Western civilization: nothing. The 1918 Manifesto launches into another characteristic series of negations:

Every product of disgust capable of becoming a negation of the family is Dada; a protest with the fists of its whole being engaged in destructive action: Dada; knowledge of all the means rejected up until now by the shamefaced sex of comfortable compromise and good manners: Dada; abolition of logic, which is the dance of those impotent to create: Dada; of every social hierarchy and equation set up for the sake of values by our valets: Dada; every object, all objects, sentiments, obscurities, apparitions and the precise clash of parallel lines are weapons for the fight: Dada; abolition of memory... (original emphasis, Tzara 2006, 42).

Fighting and dying for such values could only be hideous meaninglessness.
This savage and comprehensive destruction of values, especially ‘bourgeois’ values, was particularly pronounced in the rejection of art and aesthetic values such as beauty and genius as complicit in the façade. Picabia et al (2006, 188) exclaims, “Essentially what’s behind the word BEAUTY is unthinking, visual convention. Life bears no relation to what grammarians call beauty.” He further states, “We don’t believe in God any more than we do in Art” (Picabia et al, 188). Tzara (cited in Richter 1997, 35) casts more aspersions: “Art is a pretension, warmed by the diffidence of the urinary tract, hysteria born in a studio.” Art in the classical sense is singled out for two interrelated reasons. First, it represents the loftiest realm of absolutes and human achievements. Second, like patriotism and other values, it was complicit in the maintenance of the entire artifice of a society that marched so many of its young men to senseless death. In other words, it performed something of the function of ideology in Marxist terminology: a mechanism of justification. Huelsenbeck (1971, 50) is straightforward: “The Dadaist considers it necessary to come out against art because he has seen through its fraud as a moral safety valve...[Art] (including culture, spirit, athletic club), regarded from a serious point of view, is a large-scale swindle.”

Though destructive, the Dadaists did affirm a number of general values. At the least, there was basic agreement on values like individual freedom and spontaneity, though these were variously defined and never clarified. “Dada was born of a need for independence, of a distrust toward unity.” Tzara (2006, 37) continues, “Those who are with us preserve their freedom.” At length, he declares:

Dada; absolute and unquestionable faith in every god that is the immediate product of spontaneity: ...to respect all individuals in their folly of the moment: whether it be serious, fearful, timid, ardent, vigorous, determined, enthusiastic; ...Freedom: Dada Dada Dada, a roaring of tense colors, and interlacing of opposites and of all contradictions, grotesques, inconsistencies: LIFE. (original emphasis, Tzara 2006, 42).
As indicated above, a general and vague notion of life and/or nature was also frequently affirmed. This is not to be confused with everyday life, which was anathema to Dada; the common and the ordinary were part of the suffocating detritus of bourgeois civilization. Picabia’s wife is clear: “Dada aspires to escape from everything that is common or ordinary or sensible” (cited in Coutts-Smith 1970, 23). Spontaneous and irreducible to logic, life or nature (often summed up in the word Dada) was a sphere beyond sense or even awareness that captivated the Dadaists. It is the positive valuation of life and freedom, variously defined, that seems to justify so much of the loathing expressed by the Dadaists. Indeed, the problem with the war, with rationality and bourgeois values and institutions, was their infringement on the freedom of the individual and the spontaneity of life. Arp (1971, 24) reasoned, “The confusion of our epoch results from [the] overestimation of reason.”

6.4.2. Prognosis

To some extent, the answers that Dada provided for this problem of art are general and vague. Tzara lays down the gauntlet: “There is a great task of destruction and negation to accomplish. We must sweep and clean!” The corroded values and institutions so inimical to freedom, spontaneity, and life had to come down. The goal was total destruction. Yet, there was little systematic in this cleaning. Richter (1997, 49) goes far as to argue that while everyone else had a program, Dada was defined by its rejection of any and all programs.

In truth, part of the tension in the group was the degree to which certain individuals were interested in developing a positive approach to the problem identified above. While some, like Tzara, were more concerned with the destruction of language as a vehicle of sensemaking and thus values, others, like Richter and Breton, felt that Dada should forge a
balance between destruction and creation. Janco (1971, 36) identified this distinction as the two ‘speeds’ of Dada: one negative and nihilistic; the other positive and primal.

This tension was apparently subtended by a general agreement regarding their principal means of protest: art. As Richter (1997, 48) states, “we were looking for a way to make art a meaningful instrument of life.” While existing art was complicit in the maintenance of false values, Dada was in the process of crafting a new art, not for art’s sake, but for the task of criticism. Huelsenbeck (1971, 23) declares: “the highest art will be that in which in its conscious content presents the thousandfold problems of the day.” Arp (1971, 24) reminisced, “We searched for an elementary art that would, we thought, save mankind from the furious folly of these times.” Ball (cited in Richter 1997, 48) describes discussion in the nascent Zurich group thus:

We discussed the theories of art current in the last few decades, always with reference to the mysterious nature of art itself, its relationship with the public....It is true that for us art is not an end in itself we have lost too many of our illusions for that. Art is for us an occasion for social criticism.

This was especially pronounced in the promotion of ‘anti-art.’

For Dada, anti-art was the willing and defiant rejection of the basic principle’s upon which bourgeois art was erected. The concept was variably interpreted depending on the ‘speed’ of Dada. For some, it meant celebrating the end of art through the creation of defiant or primitive works, as in Tzara’s constant refrain: nothing. For others, it signified the end of an empty art and the dawn of a new art that tapped into life and nature.

However, most of the innovations of the movement were less ‘new’ than modifications and elaborations of prior practices. Richter (1997, 217-8) argues that much of the movement’s repertoire derived at least formally from its predecessors, especially Cubism and Futurism. These include confrontational cabaret gatherings accompanied by shock effects and rioting,
the manifesto, posters and wall tags, phonetic poetry, photomontage, collage, grotesque costumes, and various techniques involving the use of color in painting. The most notable innovation he does not mention, the ready-made, is in fact a Dadaist innovation.

Instead, what distinguishes Dada and anti-art strategically is the cultivation of the virtues of chance, spontaneity, and the irrational in their performances, literature, and visual works. Richter (1997, 51-52) relates how the concept of chance filled their conversations and works; random pieces of pictures and texts thrown together, the use of whatever materials were stumbled upon, the random application of materials like sand. For some, the destruction of meaning and the values of a decaying belligerent society were effected principally by the use of chance in the creation of works. Tzara in particular preferred the deliberate effacement of meaning through the random association of words as principally destructive. Others saw chance as a way to tap into the spontaneous order of life and nature beyond the rationality of their contemporary society. Arp (1971, 28) declared, “Dada aimed to destroy the reasonable deceptions of man and recover the natural and unreasonable order.” Janco (1971, 36) defined Dada as “a synonym for pure, childlike, direct, primal.” Chance also played a role in the important relation of everyday life to Dada activities and works. Ball (cited in Richter 1997, 49) clarifies:

It was an adventure even to find a stone, a clock-movement a tram-ticket, a pretty leg, an insect, the corner of one’s own room; all these things could inspire pure and direct feeling. When art is brought into life with everyday life and individual experience, it is exposed to the same risks, the same unforeseeable laws of chance, the same interplay of living forces. Art is no longer a ‘serious and weighty’ emotional stimulus, nor a sentimental tragedy, but the fruit of experience and joy in life.

Life itself was spontaneous; cultivating the creative potentiality of chance required attention to its ubiquitous operation.
Though they seemed to tap an aesthetic impulse, techniques like collage also had critical psychological effects. Richter (1997, 114) writes:

[T]hey cut up photographs, stuck them together in provocative ways, added drawings, cut these up too, pasted in bits of newspapers, or old letters, or whatever happened to be lying around – to confront a crazy world with its own image.

Torn from their familiar context, bits of meaning were suddenly brought under a new critical light. Such techniques generated specific effects involving the juxtaposition of previously incongruous elements. Ernst (1948, 13) describes it thus:

A ready-made reality (a canoe), finding itself in the presence of another and hardly less absurd reality (a vacuum cleaner), in a place where both of them must feel displaced (a forest), will, by this very fact, escape into anew absolute value, true and poetic: canoe and vacuum cleaner will make love. The mechanism of collage, it seems to me, is revealed by this very simple example.

Out of these formerly estranged materials, new meanings, new truths arrived, shaking up any supposedly fixed set of references. A significant function of such practices was to create controversy. Dada performances as well were typically chaotic juxtapositions of various elements designed in part to shock unwitting audiences. Richter (1997, 66) describes it thus: “The devising and raising of public hell was an essential function of any Dada movement....And when the public, like insects or bacteria, had developed immunity to one kind of poison, we had to think of another.”

As a critical community of artists and writers, Dada developed a set of diagnostic and prognostic discourses regarding the problem of artistic production in the early twentieth century. For them, art served an essential function in maintaining the bellicose bourgeois façade of Western civilization and its pervasive rationalization. In order to remedy this state of affairs, Dadaists developed and adapted various avant-garde
techniques to a new emphasis on chance and everyday life. Such means of protest were intended to provoke the development of a critical space.

6.5. Surrealism (1924 – 1938)\textsuperscript{53}

In 1924, former Dadaists Breton, Aragon, Soupault, and others announced the formation of the Surrealists. The center of this new movement was Paris, though groups also organized in dozens of other countries and major events were held in London and New York. Breton exerted a powerful leadership over the Parisian group and steered it through difficult times; he established Surrealism as an independent force in the avant-garde, responded to various events like the French war in Morocco and the rise of fascism, and navigated a tumultuous and ultimately unsuccessful relationship with the French Communist Party that was the primary impetus for internal conflict. In exile during World War II, the movement came home to France somewhat discredited for its lack of participation in the Resistance. In part from the sustained efforts of Breton, Surrealism survived into at least the 1960s as a coherent intellectual force.

6.5.1. Diagnosis

The central problematic that occupied the Surrealists throughout almost the entirety of their existence was the role of cultural production in the social revolution.\textsuperscript{54} The consolidation of the Bolshevik regime in Russia following the Civil War was a principal catalyst for this focus. The arrival of an alternative to capitalism precipitated the development of a new orientation towards political action among artists and writers (Maerhofer 2009). The Surrealists represented the most prominent avant-garde effort to

\textsuperscript{53} My resources for the Surrealist movement include a collection of manifestoes (Breton 1969), essays (Lippard 1970), and histories (Lewis 1988; Nadeau 1965; Short 1996; Suleiman 1991).

\textsuperscript{54} The term most often used by the Surrealists was ‘expression in all its forms.’
navigate this difficulty. Like Dada, the Surrealists regarded much of their contemporary culture, especially art, as complicit in the maintenance of a general system of oppression. This system manifested itself especially in wars and colonization, the repression of speech, especially artistic expression, and the growing threat of fascism as the 1930s proceeded. However, under Breton the Surrealists developed a more systematic diagnosis of the problem than Dada.

This ‘rationalization’ of Dadaist revolt was especially inspired by Freudian psychoanalysis. Like Freud, the Surrealists posited the existence of a mental realm or sphere corresponding to the unconscious. Often described as the ‘marvelous,’ manifestations of this vast psychic domain included dreams, madness, childhood, imagination, the play of chance, and other experiences and products that challenged routinized ways of seeing and acting. These routinized patterns are best understood as the logical antinomies or oppositions that organized human life: morality/immorality; rationality/irrationality; love/hate; death/life. This psychic realm of the marvelous evidenced the transcendence of these contradictions. Breton (1969, 123) is clear: “Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a certain point of mind at which life and death, the real and the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as contradictions.” Further, he states: “I believe in the future resolution of these two states, dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a surreality” (Breton 1969, 14).

This deep wealth was for the Surrealists the root of human freedom. The capacity to imagine, to break down all barriers in thought, was the highest Surrealist value; conversely, “to reduce the imagination to a state of slavery...is to betray all sense of absolute justice
within oneself” (Breton 1969, 4). This freedom is organized and animated by desire, the cacophony of mental movements initiated by the unconscious that burst into the waking mind. From desire and freedom springs all true creativity, unhinged and unencumbered. Only with true freedom do the contradictions that sustain everyday life dissolve. As Breton (Breton 1969, 14) states, “the marvelous is always beautiful, anything marvelous is beautiful, in fact only the marvelous is beautiful.”

This realm of the unconscious lay beyond the confines and strictures of the mental structures, the values and norms that maintained the nationalist, capitalist, religious, familial, and above all rational order. This dominant order of bourgeois rationality appalled the Surrealists, because it represented the slavery of the imagination. Breton (1969, 4) describes it thus:

Though he may later [following childhood] try to pull himself together upon occasion, having felt that he is losing by slow degrees all reason for living, incapable as he has become of being able to rise to some exceptional situation such as love, he will hardly succeed. This is because he henceforth belongs body and soul to an imperative practical necessity which demands his constant attention. None of his gestures will be expansive, none of his ideas generous or far-reaching. In his mind's eye, events real or imagined will be seen only as they relate to a welter of similar events, events in which he has not participated, abortive events.

Maintained by logical antinomies, this structure of mental oppression constrained the desires that raged within each individual to unleash fundamental creative forces.

6.5.2. Prognosis

In response to this discovery, Surrealism proposed a project of expressive liberation. Aragon (1970, 37) begins: “the relationship born of the negation of the real by the marvelous is essentially of an ethical nature, and the marvelous is always the materialization of a moral symbol in violent opposition to the morality of the world from which it arises.” The duty of the Surrealists, then, is to “make the point of the marvelous,”
to engage in symbolic conflict with the morality of their time, with the logical antinomies of daily life. As Breton (1969, 128) states, “everything remains to be done, every means must be worth trying, in order to lay waste to the ideas of family, country, religion.” This conflict of ideas established the opening salvos of a social revolution, a revolution of the mind. However, the means to this liberation required elucidation and experimentation.

Above all, the Surrealists saw their actions as experimental attempts to explore the marvelous. Breton (1969, 136) again clarifies:

The idea of Surrealism aims quite simply at the total recovery of the psychic force by a means which is nothing other than the dizzying descent into ourselves, the systematic illumination of hidden places and the progressive darkening of other places, the perpetual excursion into the mist of forbidden territory...

In their view, the excavation, or ‘materialization’ in Aragon's terminology, of this rich source of counter-logic was fundamentally corrosive of the established bourgeois order.

Various means of exploration were developed. Most notably, the Surrealists argued that through the “fortuitous juxtaposition” of apparently unrelated objects, words, or images - processes relatively unmediated by rational procedures - the organized recesses of the unconscious broke through the confines of rationality (Breton 1969, 37). Ernst (1970, 135) explains:

It became evident that the more arbitrarily elements were brought together, the greater was the certainty that a totally or partially new interpretation had to occur through the transcending spark. The joy accompanying every successful metamorphosis does not correspond to a miserable aesthetic propensity to distraction, but to the intellect’s very ancient, vital need for liberation from the deceptive and boring paradise of fixed memories, and for explorations of a new, greater range of experience.

Thus, the Surrealists either created or formalized various techniques of cultural production ranging from automatic writing to exquisite corpse to the further utilization of means like photomontage and collage. Each of these tactics sought to replace the conscious and
deliberative creator with the random unconscious act, known as automatism. As defined by Breton (1969, 26), Surrealism was, “pure psychic automatism, by which one proposes to express, either verbally, in writing, or by any other manner, the real functioning of thought. Dictation of thought in the absence of all control exercised by reason, outside of all aesthetic and moral preoccupations.”

The desired effect of these methods was liberation. Breton (1969, 123) argues, “Surrealism attempted to provoke, from the intellectual and moral point of view, an attack of conscience, of the most general and serious kind.” Tactics like automatic writing were designed to provoke and shock by the suggestion of heterogeneous association. Breton (cited in Nadeau 1965, 104) claims that “the immediate reality of the surrealist revolution is not so much to change anything in the physical... order...as to create a movement in men’s minds.” Elsewhere, he offers a more detailed explanation:

The hordes of words which...Dada and Surrealism set about to let loose...will slowly but surely make their way into the silly little towns and cities of literature such as it is still being taught in this day and age and, here confusing without any difficulty the poor and rich sections, they will calmly consume a great number of towers. The population, taking the tact that the only edifice which has, thanks to our efforts, been seriously shaken to date is that of poetry, is not overly on its guard; it is setting up insignificant little defensive dikes here and there. People pretend not to pay too much attention to the fact that the logical mechanism of the sentence alone reveals itself to be increasingly powerless to provoke the emotional shock in man which really makes his life meaningful. By comparison, the products of this...activity, such as those which Surrealism offers him in ever-increasing numbers in the form of books, paintings, and films, are products which he looked at dumfounded at first, but which he now surrounds himself with, and begins, more or less timidly, to rely on to shake up his settled ways of thinking (Breton 1969, 152).

Surrealist means of influence thus rely on the gradual corrosion of the reified consciousness of everyday life though the corruption of language (and symbols). These techniques rely on a series of psychological mechanisms that satisfy the basic human desire for meaningful experience.
At first glance the social revolution that the Surrealists anticipated was solely at the level of consciousness. This apparently idealist emphasis seemed to close off the field of practical political action. Still, Breton consistently sought a cooperative relationship with the French Communist Party in an effort to align his movement with the most powerful revolutionary organization in France. This entailed at one point the disavowal of the very notion of a Surrealist revolution. Referring to the party, Breton (1969, 140) noted, “I really fail to see...why we should refrain from supporting the Revolution, provided we view the problems of love, dreams, madness, art, and religion from the same angle they do.” The most heated debates, aside from charges of idealism and immaturity, often raged over the preference of many communists, including important party organs, for proletarian literature over the avant-garde. Outside of these efforts, the Surrealists were also involved in various political campaigns against French nationalism and fascism. More generally, they saw the liberation of the subconscious as a necessary condition for revolutionary political action.

As a critical community of artists and writers, the Surrealists developed a series of diagnostic and prognostic discourses regarding the problem of artistic production in the early twentieth century. They defined the unconscious as the source of human freedom and the existing social regime as detrimental to its exercise. In order to remedy this state of affairs, the Surrealists developed and adapted various avant-garde techniques to a new emphasis on the psychic realm and everyday life. Such means of protest were intended to provoke the disintegration of existing values.
6.6. The Situationist International (1957-1968)\textsuperscript{55}

After World War II, a diversity of avant-garde groups sought to take the mantle of innovation and opposition from the Surrealists. In 1957, several of these groups merged to form the SI. The movement was centered primarily in Paris, though it had affiliated groups and activities across Europe. Held together in large part by the efforts of Guy Debord, the chief theoretician of the movement, the SI established an increasingly belligerent position against not only Western capitalism and Soviet socialism, but also nearly all Leftist groups and individuals that claimed to represent the vanguard of social revolution, including especially the French Communist Party and the artistic avant-garde. Immediately prior to the massive French general strike of 1968, the group published their two most important works: Debord’s (1995) theoretically sophisticated *The Society of the Spectacle* and Raoul Vaneigem’s (1983) playful and poetic *The Revolution of Everyday Life*. Soon after the end of the protests the group gradually dissolved.

6.6.1. Diagnosis

The central problematic that animated the SI was *the role of cultural production in consumer capitalism*. The SI sought, first, to explain how capitalism had survived the tumultuous first half of the twentieth century and, second, to identify the effects of this consumer-oriented society in the field of resistance and revolution. Addressing the perceived failings of Surrealism, especially their reliance on Freudianism, the SI developed a relatively novel variant of Marxism, which they applied not only to advanced Western economies, but also to the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{55} My resources for the SI are the movement’s journals (Knabb 2006), an early series of correspondences (Debord 2009), SI books (Debord 1995; Vaneigem 1983), and histories (Home 1988; Marcus 1990; McDonough 2007; Plant 1992).
The SI argued that in order to survive, capitalism (and state socialism) was forced to create new markets by perpetually crafting new desires. The unprecedented economic condition in which human nature and subjectivity – the terrain of desire - are brought under the sway of the economy is that of the “spectacle.” This essential Situationist concept, an elaboration of Marx’s notion of alienation, is an attempt to describe human life under a consumption-oriented social system. It specifies the inverted image of social relations, relationships that are characterized by a fundamental distance and separation enforced by the mediation of spectacular imagery, by representations of desires. Debord (1995, 12) described it thus: "The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images." Such a state of affairs attests to the notion that, "All that once was directly lived has become mere representation” (Debord 1995, 12). The images that saturate everyday life include advertising billboards, television programs, Hollywood cinema, Soviet propaganda, the entire edifice of mass media, all of which decree the infinite scope of human desire. These ensembles erect gulfs between individuals, who now relate to each other and themselves through the imagery of an unsatiated desire. When everyone wants an impossibly beautiful Hollywood starlet, and when ads implore one to live life to the fullest and celebrate endless spontaneity and leisure, the reality of economic necessity is a perpetual disappointment. The spectacle, which seeps into every crevice of everyday life and leaves no urge or desire unturned, thus tends towards the “colonization of social life” by the commodity, by the economic imperatives of efficiency, and thus, ultimately, of rationalization (Debord 195, 29). Debord (1995, 28) explains: “the economy transforms the world, but transforms it into a world of the economy."
The gulf between individuals is the source of inauthenticity. The SI argued that an economy that dominates everyday life so thoroughly that it commodifies all forms of mediation between individuals necessarily yields a degraded human experience. The inferior existence occasioned by this economic condition is multiply flawed: it fails to satisfy the desires it creates; it extinguishes community, the direct relations that survived even under pre-spectacular capitalism; it dissolves the capacity for critical thought; and it engenders a perpetual malaise of isolation, passivity, and inefficacy. At its cruelest, the spectacular invasion of everyday life masquerades as authenticity in the moment of leisure; the consumption of leisure time manages to only reproduce the spectacle in more refined forms: “what has been passed off as authentic life turns out to be merely a life more authentically spectacular” (Debord 1995, 112).

The SI believed that despite the abundance of capitalism the spectacle paradoxically amplified the conquest of bare necessity. Once capitalism achieved the ability to produce and distribute beyond the means necessary to reproduce its population, it continued to reproduce the alienation specific to commodity relations. In other words, because consumers must purchase commodities in the market system, they are still, despite the productive capacity of the system, hitched to the imperative of survival; their lives are still determined by consumption, by the possession of things. In direct opposition to the vulgar economism of survival, the SI’s highest value was life. Life represented the fullest expression of creative energies and impulses. It stood for the passionate exploration of infinite possibility and spontaneity, the only condition of existence that could satisfy the desires generated by the spectacle.
It is this fundamental distinction that animates the SI. Vaneigem (1983, 159) argues that, "Capitalism has demystified survival. It has made the poverty of daily life intolerable in view of the increasing wealth of technical possibilities.” This very intolerance is the stuff of passion, of life. Elsewhere he notes, “By force-feeding survival to satiation point, consumer society awakens a new appetite for life” (Vaneigem 1983, 98). The system is doomed to collapse precisely because it offers what it cannot fulfill, mainly the desire to live an authentic life. In fact, for Vaneigem (1983, 6), “the desire to live is a political decision.”

6.6.2. Prognosis

The very nature of the spectacle necessitated conflict on the terrain of culture, the topography of images and desires. Art was clearly complicit in the maintenance of the regime of survival. As Debord and Wilman (2007, 14) put it:

Every reasonably aware person of our time is aware of the obvious fact that art can no longer be justified as a superior activity, or even as a compensatory activity to which one might honorably devote oneself. The reason for this deterioration is clearly the emergence of productive forces that necessitate other production relations and a new practice of life.

Art, understood as a specialized activity, was only valid when it renounced its specialized position in the social structure and sank into the interventions practiced on the everyday.

The situationists consider cultural activity in its totality as an experimental method for constructing everyday life, a method that can and should be continually developed with the extension of leisure and the withering of the division of labor (beginning with the division of artistic labour).

Art can stop being an interpretation of sensations and become an immediate creation of more highly evolved sensations. The problem is how to produce ourselves, and not the things which enslave us (Debord 2007c, 53).

The SI’s response was to formulate a strategy of propaganda and experimentation. This entailed “the systematic provocative dissemination of a host of proposals aimed at turning the whole of life into an exciting game, combined with constant depreciation of all current
diversions” (Debord 2007a, 9). Experimentation involved activity which, “consists in setting up, on the basis of more or less clearly recognized desires, a temporary field of activity favorable to these desires” (SI 2007, 49). Such fields are new ambiences, areas in which new behaviors and languages are forged and discarded; in other words, situations, the construction of which is a central goal of the SI, involve the “immediate participation in a passionate abundance of life by means of deliberately arranged variations of ephemeral moments” (Debord 2007b, 53). The strategy of propaganda and experimentation ultimately sought to create situations as the organizing principle of a new society.

The SI formalized two distinct tactical means. The first is the derive, a wandering or drifting through an urban environment in order to explore the contour of the environment and its emotional and behavioral effects on individuals. Derives and their attendant mappings were part of a more systematic attempt at developing psychogeography, a mapping of these effects. Psychogeography assumed that physical environments were variably conducive to cultural expression. Constant (2007, 71), for example, argues that the commercialization and increased automobile traffic of certain Parisian neighborhoods stifled “the natural expression of collective creativity,” a possibility only when direct social relations are possible. Psychogeography itself was part of the broader attempt to fashion a radical architecture, a prospective ‘unitary urbanism’ in which the function of structures was subordinate to their ludic or playful potentialities.

The second means of resistance, détournement, refers to the appropriation of materials in the cultural environment in such a manner as to invert or lead astray its initial function.

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56 The concept of derive owes its origins largely to the poet Baudelaire’s concept of the flâneur and the Surrealists emphasis on spontaneous activity, especially as recounted in their novels.
meaning in order to subvert the article and the spectacle as a whole. In a surrealist
description, Debord and Wolman (2007, 15) described it thus:

Any elements, no matter where they are taken from, can be used to make new
combinations. The discoveries of modern poetry regarding the analogical structure of
images demonstrate that when two objects are brought together, no matter how far apart
their original contexts may be, a relationship is always formed. The mutual interference of
two worlds of feeling, or the juxtaposition of two independent expressions, supersedes the
original elements and produces a synthetic organization of greater efficacy. Anything can be
used.

This process of détournement, of juxtaposing distinct elements in order to build new
meanings and relationships, was conceived as an almost universally applicable tactic. In
principle, everything and anything can be détourned, can be made to expose its role in the
spectacle as well as the spectacle itself: “all goods proposed by the spectacular system,
from cars to televisions, also serve as weapons for that system” (Debord 1995, 28).

Because the spectacle has colonized everyday life, it is precisely on this terrain where it
must be fought with its own weapons, from films to comics to radio to advertising.

Because détournement involves the appropriation of the spectacle, it is constantly in
danger of being recuperated back into the service of the spectacle. Recuperation is, "the
process whereby the spectacle — take[s] up and use[s] [the vocabulary of revolutionary
discourse] to support the existing networks of power" (Plant 1992, 76). It is the de-
politication or re-commodification of revolutionary weapons. “Words forged by
revolutionary criticism are like partisan weapons; abandoned on the battlefield, they fall
into the hands of the counterrevolution” (Khayati 2007, 225). Situationist propaganda
thus required a perpetual vigilance against and cognizance of the spectacle’s ability to

57 This concept is part of the Situationist critique of the Soviet Union, labor unions, and the avant-garde, all of
whom they regarded as insufficiently aware of the degree to which their practices supported the spectacular
mode of production, whether it was run by capitalists or bureaucrats.
neutralize oppositional means. In such a situation, “the only historically justified tactic is extremist innovation” (Debord and Wilson 2007, 14).

At a more general strategic level, the SI also sought to express their general disdain for alienated relations, relations of separation and passivity. This entailed the fundamental rejection of all relations of hierarchy, especially in the State but also, importantly, in the organizations tasked with revolution. Debord (1995, 88) is clear:

In the struggle between the revolutionary organization and class society, the weapons are nothing other than the essence of the combatants themselves: the revolutionary organization cannot reproduce within itself the dominant society's conditions of separation and hierarchy.

True revolutionaries do not give orders; they together erect a total participatory democracy that, through the momentum of its own novelty, crafts perpetual situations.

The SI developed a set of diagnostic and prognostic discourses that identified a pattern of conflict on the terrain of culture and everyday life. This theoretical project was strongly informed by its predecessors in the avant-garde. As the SI acknowledged, détournement has a fairly esteemed genealogy running through Dada and Surrealism. By juxtaposing different elements and decontextualizing cultural artifacts, creative acts and works can disorient perception and cognition to such a degree as to open up new possibilities for consciousness. For Dadaists, Surrealists, and the SI, these possibilities included critique of the values and practices of bourgeois society and capitalism and, especially for the latter two, new conceptions of values and practices that could organize a future and better social order. As a critical community, the SI formalized these techniques and the logic of cultural resistance on the terrain of the everyday at a new height of conceptual and practical rigor.
6.7. Conclusion

This chapter considers whether Dada, the Surrealists, and the SI can be described as critical communities in the sense suggested by Rochon (1998) and Teune (2005). Together, these movements developed not only a theoretical foundation for cultural contestation but also various means by which to do so. This logic postulates that contemporary culture and everyday life is the battlefield and everything found therein are the weapons. Through a radical critique first aimed at art as a separate sphere of activity, the tremendous experimental and innovative capabilities of modern artists are unleashed on the world of objects, words, and practices. In doing so, they progressively formulated a coherent method of criticism. This critique and the attendant wealth of means of contestation evidence the development of a politicized aesthetic disposition, a weaponized capacity to aesthetically appropriate virtually any object, practice, or discourse. It thus appears that these avant-garde movements did behave as critical communities offering several novel forms of collective action for future activists.
CHAPTER 7. FIELD AND IDENTITY

Broadly construed, everyday social organization is composed of fields, networks, and identities. This chapter aims, first, to present evidence of the content of collective identity within the sample of CJOs. A secondary goal is to provide empirical support for hypothesized relationships between CJOs and the field of cultural production.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I review the literature on collective identity. Second, I situate this analysis within the theoretical developments presented previous chapters. Specifically, I establish the relevant relations between identities, biographies of cultural production, and fields. Hypotheses and propositions are developed to flesh out these theoretical relations for empirical inquiry. Third, the developed hypotheses and propositions provide guides for empirical inquiry.

7.1. Collective Identity

7.1.1. Political Participation and Social Movements

The literature on collective identity is enormous and spans a variety of disciplines including social psychology, anthropology, political science, and sociology. As might be expected, the dialogue between the fields is minimal. This is especially frustrating considering the importance attributed to collective identity in social movement studies. Because contentious politics is a form of political activity, I briefly consult both the social movements and political participation literatures on the question of collective identity.

Efforts to explain conventional political behavior often utilize collective identity as an explanatory variable. Two relatively distinct literatures are relevant: partisanship and group consciousness. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes’ (1960) argue that party identification – the direction of identification with a particular political party and the
strength of the resulting attachment - acts as a perceptual filter. Individuals process information and make voting decisions in part by selecting facts that favor the object of their attachment and rejecting information that disfavors it. Subsequent research wrestled with the myriad implications of this conception of partisan identity, including the origin of partisanship and the degree to which voting is rational (Fiorina 1981; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Key 1966; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976).

Work on voter turnout and other forms of political participation addressed a focus on group consciousness beyond partisanship. In order to explain high levels of involvement in politics among resource-poor minorities, Verba and Nie (1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) argued that group membership was a potent factor in explaining group-based mobilization that, unlike voting, require resources and organization. However, the particular mechanisms linking identification to participation were left unspecified. Others further developed the concept by distinguishing between group identification and group consciousness (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Chong and Rogers 2005). These scholars argued that group consciousness - a politicized awareness of the status of one's group relative to others – mediates the relationship between identifying with a group and participating in political action. Thus, while identification is a necessary condition in the causal chain, more proximate factors include group efficacy, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status of one’s group, support for collective action, ideology, and others.

In social movement studies, scholars also utilize the concept of collective identity as an explanatory variable. Though typically marginalized in resource mobilization theory (RMT) and the political opportunity approach (see Chapter Ten), the concept is paradoxically central. The polity model offered by Gamson (1990) and Tilly (1978)
stresses a key distinction between the members of the political system and those with
limited or no access to it. Tilly’s early concept of a ‘catnet’ emphasized the importance of
close relational ties and their categorical definition in the shaping of collective identity.

NSM theory is especially associated with the effort to link identification with activism
The most prominent conceptualization is offered by Melucci (1996, ch. 4), who defines
collective identity as a meso-level property of certain social interactions. For him, identity
is a negotiated and conflictual process defining the basic orientation of a group of
individuals and the field of actors, opportunities, and constraints they face in pursuing their
goals. At the macro-level, Melucci uses this concept to explain the mobilization and
orientation of the peace, women’s, and environmental movements among others.

Irreducible to social class, collective actors associated with these identities – lifestyles,
sexual orientations, environmentalism, etc. - forged new collective concerns and goals, and
thus new social and political issues. At the micro-level, Melucci and others endeavored to
explain the decision to participate in activism through an individual’s level of subjective
identification with a group (Pizzorno 1978; Melucci 1996). Early efforts to synthesize RMT
and social psychological approaches were motivated by the failure of the former to
adequately account for mobilization through a cost-benefit analysis. In order to fill out the
explanation, scholars turned to concepts like ideology, solidarity, and identity that focused
attention on subjective relations to groups (Klandermans 1984).

7.1.2. Collective Identity and Ideology

In studies of voting behavior, one of the more stubborn questions involves the
relative weight of partisanship and ideology in determining vote choice. At a more general
remove, this question concerns the degree to which an individual's identification with a social or political group and that same individual's ideology affects individual political decisions. Verba and Nie (1972; Verba et al. 1978) demonstrate that the aggregate level of objective and subjective group identification in a society strongly constrains the level of participation in political activities that require non-trivial costs and risks, i.e., campaign activity. They anticipate this finding because, in contrast to acts like voting, group conflict requires the mobilization of group resources. While Verba and Nie explicitly exclude protest from their analysis, Chong and Rogers (2005, 352) extend this argument in two ways. First, in distinguishing group identification and group consciousness they argue that the latter is the more proximate cause of political activity. Second, they suggest that the political actions that require the most significant costs and risks are direct action tactics like demonstrations. Recall that developments in the group consciousness literature construed the concept as a bundle of mediating motivational variables between identification and action. Chong and Rogers essentially reduce this bundle to group ideology and solidarity. In other words, they argue that the effect of ideology is particularly strong with respect to the decision to protest. Yet, ideology is rooted in identity, the latter occupying a more distant causal position relative to action.

Beyond the question of mobilization, scholars explain variation in the strategies and tactics of activists through collective identity (Dalton 1994; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Jasper 1997; Jasper and Polletta 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1992). In contrast to the political participation literature, the approach taken in social movement studies generally utilizes a qualitative emphasis in order to determine the relation between collective identity and strategic and tactical choice. Thus, it has more or less assimilated studies that
focus on ideology. Several scholars have utilized the beliefs and values held by activists as a prominent independent variable for explaining tactical choice (Dalton 1994; Downey 1986; Gamson 1989; Nepstad 2008; Zald 2000). The literature on the environmental movement is particularly well-developed in its work on the relationship between ideology and strategy (Brulle 2000; Carmin and Balser 2002; Dryzek 1997). In his study of the strategies of environmental movements, Dalton (1994) uses identity and ideology interchangeably. Below, I consider the implications of this discussion.

7.2. Theory and Hypotheses

In order to establish a relationship between culture jammers and the field of cultural production and determine the content of their collective identities, I elaborate on the theoretical developments of Chapters Two and Three. First, I develop hypotheses regarding the contexts of artistic socialization and the aesthetic disposition. Second, I consider the most relevant aspects of collective identity: identification and evaluation, and briefly establish a relation between identity and ideology.

7.2.1. Biography

The first task of this chapter is to generate a brief sketch of an objective basis for collective identity by situating CJOs within the field of cultural production. This entails a biographical analysis. First, I suggest that culture jammers possess extensive experience with cultural production, especially artistic production, prior to activism. Complementing Chapter Five, experience with artistic production includes an education in art, literature, or art history, and/or a work environment that requires familiarity with forms of cultural production. Both of these social fields represent significant opportunities for immersion in the world of cultural production, especially the field of art. According to the theoretical
approach taken here, such contexts encourage the development of sets of skills and
knowledge specific to the arts, what Bourdieu calls the aesthetic disposition. NSM theory
likewise anticipates a specific demographic profile for participants and sympathizers, one
that stresses the development of a new middle class of professionals and semi-
professionals. In particular, this new class includes those who participate in cultural
production, such as journalists, academics, artists, and others (Klandermans and Tarrow
1988; Kriesi 1989; Kriesi et al 1995; Melucci 1989; 1996). My focus is on the skill sets that
such biographies may express.

If culture jammers are endowed with sets of artistic skills and knowledge that shape
their tactical choices, and if these skills sets are derived from extensive experience with
social contexts of artistic production, we should expect culture jammers to possess such
experience. This expectation is borne out in Wettergren’s (2005, 48) finding that culture
jammers are highly educated. Thus, I hypothesize:

H7.1: those with an arts education or arts occupation prior to participation in culture
jamming are more likely to participate in cultural jamming.

My primary expectation with respect to this hypothesis includes evidence of a pattern of
experience with artistic production prior to politicization.

In order to move beyond inferring the possession of skill sets from social context, I
develop hypotheses concerning more direct expressions of the aesthetic disposition.
Ideally, these hypotheses would pertain to pre-political activity as well. However, I am
unable to empirically demonstrate the absence or presence of a pattern of aesthetic

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58 In order to increase clarity, it may be crucial to reiterate here the relation between the aesthetic
disposition, artistic skills and knowledge, skill sets, and cultural capital. The aesthetic disposition is here
regarded as synonymous with artistic skills and knowledge. Skill sets in general are synonymous with bodily
dispositions, also known as embodied cultural capital.
dispositions possessed by my sample of culture jammers either before or immediately after any relevant educational or occupational experience. Thus, any demonstration of both pre-political arts education and/or occupations and contemporary artistic skills and knowledge draws on a theoretical relationship between social context and cultural capital in order to establish the values on my independent variable of interest. In other words, I infer such a relationship with less than ideal information.

I am also unable to demonstrate the presence or absence of the acquisition of an aesthetic disposition prior to participation in culture jamming. This opens up a possible charge of reverse causation: participation in culture jamming may foster an aesthetic disposition. If participation in culture jamming precedes any possession of an aesthetic disposition, then the strength of the relationship between culture jamming and artistic skills and knowledge may lie solely in an endogenous loop (social reproduction), if a relation actually exists at all. It is the tremendous burden of this chapter, and specifically the analysis below, to increase confidence in the explanation I offer as opposed to the null hypothesis or the reverse causation hypothesis. This effort will rely on both the strength of theory and the teasing possibilities of data.

Additionally, Wettergren (2005, 48) finds that culture jammers possess extensive symbolic and cultural capital. The aesthetic disposition is the general embodied culture capital of the artistic field. Bourdieu (1986) refers to this form of cultural capital as the durable dispositions of the mind and body, the particular ways of seeing and doing that marks one’s position in the field. Beyond the distinction between embodied and institutionalized cultural capital discussed in Chapter Five, Bourdieu also discusses objectified cultural capital. The objectified state of capital is expressed “in the form of
cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.),” as “the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.” (Bourdieu 1986, 47). The following hypotheses straddle the distinction between embodied and objectified cultural capital. First, recall that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the aesthetic disposition is the capacity and the tendency to appropriate anything aesthetically, even the common accoutrements of daily life. If culture jammers possess an aesthetic disposition, then at the least they express this capacity. Thus, I hypothesize:

H7.2: the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic is associated with participation in culture jamming.

This hypothesis suggests the expectation that culture jammers will tend to describe everyday materials as art or aesthetic or situate such items within an artistic setting. I consider the difficult questions of operationalization in my analysis below.

The aesthetic disposition is not merely the capacity for aestheticization. It is generally the ability to situate oneself and others in a social space defined by the production and consumption of artistic objects. A possible expression of the ability to play this game of art is the utilization of particular organizational settings oriented towards the presentation of artistic goods. Thus, I hypothesize:

H7.3: the tendency to deploy artistic productions in organizational settings oriented towards the exhibition of artistic goods is associated with participation in culture jamming

This hypothesis suggests that culture jammers engage organizations and spaces like art museums, art galleries, or art centers in order to present the objectified cultural capital that they produce. However, it is worth noting that artists may not engage such organizations or spaces because they seem them as fundamentally illegitimate or counter-effective.
hypothesis just suggests that a positive finding would be additional evidence, while a negative finding would, strictly speaking, not support a more general null hypothesis. 

As discussed in Chapter Six, Bürger stresses the politicization of artistic production at the frontier of the avant-garde in the early twentieth century. These movements, especially Dada and Surrealism, developed a politicized aesthetic disposition; while employing the means to constitute the world and all of its objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic materials, they simultaneously constituted them as political, as suffused and traversed with a dimension of power. The principal expectation here is that culture jammers regard art as a set of cultural activities imbued with political significance. Art is not a neutral phenomenon, as the purely aesthetic disposition would suggest. Instead, I suggest that culture jammers possess a politicized aesthetic disposition, an institutionalized artifact of the revolt of the avant-garde against the institution of art. One who possesses a politicized aesthetic disposition should tend to transmute their daily surroundings into expressions of power relations. I thus develop a descriptive hypothesis:

**H7.4: the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as political is associated with participation in culture jamming.**

This suggests that culture jammers construct their environment such that the materials of everyday life serve some function of domination or resistance.

However, the definition of culture jamming used in this study seems to guarantee an affirmative answer to this expectation. As noted in Chapter One, some ensembles organize meaning in such a way as to legitimate, rationalize, and perpetuate some set of social relations that favor one group(s) in society over others. Culture jammers engage in contentious collective actions that aim to disrupt these dominant ensembles of representation. Such actions are defined here as political. However, I make a basic
distinction between the perception of everyday objects, discourses, and practices as political and the range of perceptions of the political that is characteristic of the average person or even a fierce partisan or political ideologue. As with the second hypothesis, I consider these questions of operationalization in my analysis below.

7.2.2. Categorization and Evaluation

As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the conception of collective identity utilized in this dissertation concerns an individual's mutually constituted sense of their particular categorical membership encompassing the shared understandings and public representations that define the boundaries and the relations between actors and institutions. It unpacks the concept of identity as a social process of definition and classification of relations among actors and institutions, but also a subjective identification with a group situated within these relations. Thus, this definition attempts to reconcile individual and interactional conceptions of collective identity.

This point is particularly salient with respect to the dimension of evaluation. All social relations are saturated with judgment; social classifications are not merely cognitive, but affective as well. In other words, relations and classifications are organized by hierarchies of value and belonging that construct a 'hot' field of action. Individuals thus possess positive or negative attitudes towards the relevant social category. This partially contrasts with the approach taken by many social psychologists. In an effort to develop a general conceptual framework for the analysis of collective identity, Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) focus on the multidimensionality of identification with a particular social category. As an example, they define evaluation as “the positive or negative attitude that a person has toward the social category...that one claims or
acknowledges as one’s collective identity” (2004, 86). My conception focuses instead on the sets of relations that social groups have with other groups. Here, evaluation is characterized by the classifications brought to bear on the field of actors, not just those pertaining to a single social category.

While much of the research on voting behavior clearly distinguishes partisanship from ideology, the question is more complex when consulting the literature on group consciousness. In identifying specific mediating mechanisms between identity and action, attention falls in part on ideological beliefs. Ashmore et al (2004) describe this elaboration of collective identification as the content and meaning of identity. In particular, they describe ideology as beliefs about the social position of one’s group. Such positioning should require evaluations of other social groups. However, people vary in the degree to which their evaluations are internally coherent or organized (Converse 1964). In other words, some people possess more belief constraint or more developed ideological conceptions of the world around them. In this sense, ideology is a relatively sophisticated or coherent organization of the shared schemas that construct a group’s position in social space, including the field of politics. Schemas are not merely cognitive; they are affective and normative, such that the scope and coherence of this organization provides a general capacity and motivation to evaluate and manipulate, acquiesce to, or venerate a given set of social relations. In other words, one might say that the more coherent the organization of the schemas, the more constraining the effects on choice.

59 This is not an outright attempt at a definition, but a general characterization of what ideology constitutes. The literature on ideology is enormous and riddled with difficulty (Gerring 1997). Bourdieu regards ideology (doxa, symbolic domination, etc.) as the dominant logic of a field, the set of structures or social classifications that conceals knowledge of the essential nature of the game such that those who dominate the field can perpetuate their rule (Bourdieu and Eagleton 2012). The approach taken here simply construes ideology as a more general (potentially dominant or subordinate) sense of social relations.
While I consider ideology in Chapter Ten, the descriptive analysis offered here elaborates on both the particular social category and the field of social categories that CJOs construct in their shared understandings and public representations. However, particularly vexing is the difficulty of measurement. Work in political participation tends to utilize variants of a Likert scale to measure the degree of identification with a social category. In social movement studies, however, more qualitative analyses identify typically discrete collective identities. I take the latter approach here emphasizing both the actors and institutions pertinent to a CJO’s sense of positioning and the social classifications that are attributed to them. In particular, I focus on the array of actors and social groups that may be broadly designated as protagonists, antagonists, and others.

7.3. Analysis I

In this chapter, none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations developed above is tested in the strictest sense. The closest approximation to a test burdens the first hypothesis (H1), but even this effort is handicapped by the focus on one explanatory variable and the indeterminate representativeness of the culture jamming sample. Instead, they provide more precise guides for illustration. Hypotheses can systematically direct our attention to specific patterns or observations that would otherwise escape scrutiny. The means of inquiry are specific to each set of hypotheses and propositions. The data used in this chapter includes, first, the sample of CJOs specified in Chapter Four, and second, additional sources specified in the course of analysis.

7.3.1. Gender, Race and Ethnicity, and Age

First, I consider a general but brief analysis of some objective indicators of social position: gender, race and ethnicity, and age. The rest of the project deals with other
indicators, including occupation and class. The distribution of genders across the sample generally skews male, an observation noted by Wettergren (2005, 36) regarding her sample. However, some partial exceptions include the BIL, IST, RBC, and SCP. With regards to race or ethnicity, white non-Hispanics constitute almost the entire sample; only RBC exhibited notable variation. The data for these observations is far less than ideal, but data on age is even less. Casual observation suggests that the sample is widely distributed from the twenties to middle age.

7.3.2. Participation in Artistic Production

The first hypothesis (H7.1) assumes a positive correlation between the independent variable: *history of participation in artistic production prior to politicization*, and the dependent variable: *participation in culture jamming*. While the dependent variable is dichotomous (you either participate or you don’t), the independent variable offers more possibilities. Participation in artistic production can theoretically range from no participation (one has had no contact with any form of artistic production, whether as a spectator or as a participant), through a range of levels of engagement (some schooling but no degree, for example) to full participation (one has obtained a college level degree in the arts and is employed in a cultural industry). To simplify the analysis, I reduce this complexity to a dichotomous variable in which one either has a certain minimum level of participation in cultural production or one does not. However, in order to properly satisfy a causal argument, participation in artistic production must be temporally prior to participation in culture jamming.

One means of provisionally ‘testing’ this hypothesis is through the use of population data. If we compare culture jammers to a representative sample or census of the
population, then a simple pattern should support the hypothesis, however weakly: culture jammers should *ceteris paribus* have a higher rate of prior participation in artistic production than the general population. In order to detect such patterns, I develop a set of operational criteria for identifying prior participation in artistic production.

Table 7.1 presents data on arts education and occupations in the United States. The first operational criterion for participation in artistic production is the possession of a bachelor’s degree in a field relevant to artistic production: visual arts, art history, communications, theatre, graphic design, literature, etc. Clearly, this measure indicates the distribution of institutionalized cultural capital in the population. Data from the 2009 American Community Survey provides the distribution of bachelor degrees by field in the United States for everyone over 25 years of age. Under the general field of *arts, humanities, and other*, three fields are particularly relevant: literature and languages (including English literature), visual and performance arts (including fine arts, commercial art, music), and communications (including communications, journalism, and mass media). 3.41% of the American population over 25 years of age in 2009 (and 12.24% of all those with bachelor degrees) held an undergraduate degree in one of these fields. One should expect this figure to be somewhat inflated as a measure of history of participation in artistic production, however; there is no reason to expect fields like foreign languages or communications to have much if any relation to artistic production.

A second operational criterion is employment in a field of artistic production. I argue in Chapter Six that occupations may indicate a process of institutionalization, thus providing marginal evidence for the distribution of institutionalized cultural capital. Data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provide two measures of the number of people
## Table 7.1. Arts Education and Occupations in the Arts, United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>In thousands</th>
<th>Relevant Bachelor's Percentage of...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevant Bachelor's Degrees&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6,899</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature and Languages</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual And Performance Arts</td>
<td>2,307</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>2,023</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Bachelor's Degrees</td>
<td>56,366</td>
<td>12.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Population&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>202,045</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>In thousands</th>
<th>Relevant Occupations Percentage of...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment Data&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Data&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2,724</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Occupations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment Data</td>
<td>130,648</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Data</td>
<td>139,877</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Population Over 16 Years of Age</td>
<td>243,323</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment Data</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Data</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>c</sup> The Bureau of Labor Statistics utilizes two sources of data: establishment and household. The former surveys businesses, while the latter surveys households. The difference between each approach’s procedures does produce differing results. For a summary of these procedures and their effects on their respective samples, see Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2001. “Differences Between Data Series.” *Bureau of Labor Statistics*. accessed July 26, 2012 <http://www.bls.gov/lau/lauhvse.htm#hvse>


employed in the arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media sectors in 2009. Those employed in these sectors account for 1.34/1.95% of all occupations. Those employed in these sectors account for .72/1.12% of the population of the United States over 16 years of age. However, like the previous figures for education, this occupational measure may be inflated; some media and likely all sports occupations need not have any relation to artistic production. The measure only specifies, however, the respondent's present occupation; previous employment may be in one of the relevant fields.

While ideally I would generate a single index, a more practical alternative is to utilize a variety of comparisons between the figures in Table 7.1 and the history of participation in artistic production in the sample of CJOs. Turning to the sample of CJOs, analysis shows that six of the twelve groups (AMF, AAA, IST, RBC, SCP, TYM) provide strong evidence for an arts occupation or education credential prior to participation in the CJO. The early founding members of the AMF were “all some sort of film maker, designer, illustrator or cartoonist” (Lasn 2005). Both the AAA’s Steve Lambert (n.d.) and the IST’s Catherine D’Ignazio (Kanarinka 2012) are practicing artists, arts teachers, and Masters of Fine Arts. Other members of the IST have histories in theatre, arts administration, English, film, and architecture; as co-founder Savic Rasovic states: “we have a lot of education” (Catherine D’Ignazio, James Manning, and Savic Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). The SCP’s Bill Brown earned a doctorate degree in American Literature and taught English (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 362). The RBC’s Bill Talen was a playwright, actor, and artist before developing his Reverend Billy persona (Lane 2002, 63), while his partner Savitri D was an artist and dancer (D. and Talen 2011, 208-9). Both of the most visible members of the Yes Men possess advanced degrees in the arts and teach the arts in the
university (Cusp Conference 2010; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 2013), though their culture jamming activities famously precede the creation of the Yes Men.

The remaining six groups (BLF, BIL, CAE, CTM, IAA, NGL) differ in some key respects. First, the only group that clearly fails to conform to the hypothesis is Negativland. The two founding members of the group were still in high school when the first recordings were made in the late 1970s (NGL 1985). This does not mean that the early members had no experience with cultural production. Domestic environments saturated with avant-garde music may perform a similar function as an arts education or occupation, but there is no evidence either for or against this supplemental hypothesis. Second, the BLF and the IAA are largely anonymous and use pseudonyms, though many of the BLF’s members work for advertising companies (Berger 2000; BLF 1999; Hua 2006), while the IAA describes itself as a collective of engineers, designers, and artists (Brusadin et al n.d.).

The remaining three groups exhibit a possible simultaneity of artistic experience and culture jamming practice. While the CTM’s Gach is a practicing artist, teaches art, and possesses a Master of Fine Arts (California College of the Arts, 2013), he states that he engaged in Situationist and Dadaist activities while he was an undergraduate (Gach 2007). A similar pattern appears in other cases. While Billionaires founder Andrew Boyd (2001-2) did have some experience in arts education (“somewhere along the way, I completed… various course series in new media production, computer programming, and creative writing”), I found no evidence that places this experience prior to his immersion in the fields of street theater and creative tactics. The CAE began while the first two members, Steven Kurtz (a PhD in Interdisciplinary Humanities) and Steve Barnes, were in school.

When asked about his earliest art projects, Kurtz states that he didn’t have “an a-ha moment; [he] slid into art slowly.’ He was on an academic, scholarly path but found himself
surrounded by those whom he didn’t find very much fun. Instead he was “attracted” to a circle of artist friends, and began to face “a crisis moment of too much thinking and not enough doing” (Parisi 2008).

Kurtz “was teaching film studies at the time and was interested in film/video production” (Hirsch 2005, 25). Additionally, all CAE members work in arts-related occupations like education, editing, and photography (Hirsch 2005, 28).

Strictly speaking, these three cases do not run afoul of the hypothesis; it concerns experience, while degrees are merely an operationalization. However, they fail to provide evidence for or against strictly prior experience in an arts occupation or education. If I consider only the six groups that show strict evidence in favor of the hypothesis, they constitute 50% of the sample, a figure far exceeding the prevalence of arts degrees and occupations in the population. Even excluding the Canadian Adbusters from the analysis does not dampen the conclusion that the data generally support the hypothesis.

7.3.3. The Aesthetic Disposition

Like the first hypothesis, the following three hypotheses concern the same dependent variable: participation in culture jamming. The second hypothesis (H7.2) involves the relation of participation in culture jamming to an independent variable: *the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic.*

While theoretically a range of values of aesthetic perception may be considered (complete non-aesthetic perception to comprehensive aesthetic perception), I treat the independent variable as dichotomous: absence or presence.

The evidence here is textual and at times phenomenological: how do members of these groups perceive and engage their reality? An example of the aesthetic disposition is provided by the Critical Art Ensemble. The CAE employ a rhetoric that blurs the line
between art or aesthetics and everyday life. They refer to the production of culture, the process through which the semiotic regime, the symbolic order, or authoritarian culture, among other monikers, negotiates its domination, as their arena of contention. At the micro-level, everyday life is where this process is negotiated; their practice “is a struggle over the micro-sociology of the performative matrix of everyday life (CAE 2001, 76). This matrix is “the aggregate interactions within social space – the dramaturgical activities of everyday life” (McKenzie and Schneider 2000, 149). In order for art to achieve its critical function, it must make itself intelligible to the viewer. Art discards its opacity by insinuating itself into the familiar. This process seeks to penetrate everyday life, the repetitious concerns, pleasures, anticipations, memories, and habits of the viewer, thereby bringing to consciousness the relation of the particular to the general, of the concrete to the abstract, of the real to the virtual. CAE’s high regard for the Living Theater is instructive: “The Living Theater collapsed the life and art distinction...After all, only by examining everyday life through the frame of a dramaturgical model can one witness the poverty of this performative matrix” (CAE 1994, 62).

Similar expressions of an aesthetic sense of everyday life are available across the sample of CJOs. The AMF aim to safeguard or reinvigorate the mental environment: the images, ideas, and flows of information that we encounter in our daily lives. But “the ideas, expressions, and concerns of individual citizens no longer matter very much. Culture isn’t created from the bottom up by the people anymore – it’s fed to us top down by corporations (Lasn 1999, 189). “Layer upon layer of mediated artifice come between us and the world until we are mummified (Lasn 1999, 12). Like the Situationists, the AMF and Lasn view culture and everyday life as overlaid by a media spectacle that is all-pervasive...
The CMT too have an extremely expansive sense of the terrain of art or aesthetics. “One of the things that concerns us about contemporary art is that it positions itself as the authority on culture, but culture explodes beyond the parameters of art” (Gach 2007). Yet, culture is the artists’ playground; “artists produce culture, participate in culture, and reflect culture” (CTM 2007). Art is the elaborate and pragmatic integration of all things related into an associative life/practice…it is creative problem-solving” (CTM n.d.(c)). NGL (1995, 23) appropriate an endless stream of sounds from the media but also a vast array of everyday sounds; “artists have always approached the entire world around them…as raw material to mold and remold.” Similar to the CAE, the RBC senses a performative color to everyday life:

I was studying thousands of shoppers…Shopping is the cornerstone of modern American life and this essence began to show itself, coming through the surface of regular dailiness. I had to stand there for months to see under the patterns…I began to suspect that shopping had a second underlying dance. The gestures of driving, parking, walking, taking escalators and elevators...they make up a formal dance, one that sustains everything in the world around it...The shopping became a kind of marching etc. (Reverend Billy 2003, 50, 56).

The SCP (2006, 174) appropriates the language of spectacle (a pervasive system of images that mediates social relations) directly from the Situationists and links it surveillance:

[T]hese two tools of power (surveillance cameras and ritualized spectacle) have become ever-more relied upon since the 1970s. As Orwell understood, [they] are closely related...If they are not properly conditioned by the spectacle, people will not accept the imposition of transparency; without the imposition of transparency, people will not derive any satisfaction from spectacle.

The Billionaires founder authored and edited a volume cataloguing creative protest:

This blending of art and politics is nothing new. Tactical pranks go back at least as far as the Trojan Horse. Jesus of Nazareth overturning the tables of the money changers mastered the craft of political theater...art, culture, and creative protest tactics have for centuries served as fuel and foundation for successful social movements (Boyd and Mitchell 2012, 1).

The most dramatic example of the tendency to perceive everyday life as aesthetic is the IST, one of whose projects include a highly participatory “expedition...to collect research
samples of infinitely small things” (IST 2005, 78). These include text on a mirror, telephone poles, lottery tickets, falling leaves, and roughly 500 other examples of mundane items.

Additionally, some confidence may be drawn from another bit of evidence: inferring the capacity (but less certainly the tendency) to perceive aesthetically from a particular occupation: arts instruction. This particular position requires a sense of the aesthetic disposition sufficient to impart it to students. As noted previously, the AAA, IST, CAE, CTM, IST, SCP, and TYM all contain seminal members with histories of teaching in the arts. Some groups appear to actively disparage an expansive sense of aesthetics or especially art. The AAA (2013b; 2013c) strongly distinguishes advertising and art and raises concerns that the former saps the creativity out of the population. The BLF’s Napier clearly states, “We don’t consider what we do to be Art” (Napier 2009), and elsewhere, in response to a question regarding whether the BLF produces art, member Kalman (2008) dryly replies, “No more than anyone would consider advertising ‘art.’ If art is a reflection of life as the artist sees it, and your life is marketing then I guess you could consider it art.” Napier notes with regard to equating their actions with art, “It’s funny that anybody would think that it was” (BLF 1999). There is little information on the Yes Men, while the IAA (2005, 99) only hint at the scope of aestheticization when they describe their projects as “tactical aesthetics - we use the visual and rhetorical devices of sanctioned research organizations in an elaborate performance aimed at infiltrating engineering culture.”

Overall, eight groups exhibited the capacity and the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic. Two did not (though better data may resolve otherwise), and two groups lacked sufficient data to identify a positive case. Considering the latter two as negative cases, this finding still supports the hypothesis.
The third hypothesis (H7.3) involves the relation of participation in culture jamming to another independent variable: *the tendency to deploy artistic productions in organizational settings oriented towards the exhibition of artistic goods*. This hypothesis suggests that culture jammers engage organizations and spaces like art museums, art galleries, or art centers in order to present and distribute the objectified cultural capital that they produce. While theoretically an additive index of the degrees of involvement should capture this phenomenon, I again reduce this complexity to a simple dichotomous variable: absence or presence of the behavior. Importantly, this activity must suggest something more than a twenty-year retrospective exhibition.

An example of the extensive use of art spaces is the Institute for Infinitely Small Things and co-founder Catherine D'Ignazio. The Institute itself employs actions in a variety of art settings, especially art galleries and art festivals (IST n.d.). As an established artist before the founding of the IST, D'Ignazio presented works from 2001-2013 in such venues as physical and online art galleries, art festivals, art museums, media centers and conferences (Kanarinka 2012). Other groups perform similarly. The AAA and Steve Lambert (n.d.) have extensive histories of art world exhibition, as do groups like the CAE, CTM, IAA, and the SCP. As a musical group, Negativland performs many live shows and is featured in music magazines and music web sites. The RBC regularly performs on stage at various locales, such as theatres and art auditoriums. Even the Yes Men have enjoyed the use of art spaces like galleries and museums as well as film festivals (Suparak n.d.). In contrast, I have found only minor evidence of extensive use of artistic venues by the BLF or its members and no evidence for the AMF or the Billionaires.
Notable engagements with the art world occur with nine of the twelve groups. The remaining three groups do not appear to exhibit this tendency. This suggests strong support the hypothesis.

The final hypothesis (H7.4) of this chapter involves the relation of participation in culture jamming to the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as political. Like the second hypothesis, a range of values of political perception may be considered (complete apolitical perception to comprehensive political perception). I treat the independent variable as dichotomous: absence or presence.

Again, the evidence here is textual and at times phenomenological. An example of this pervasive sense of politics is provided by the Institute for Infinitely Small Things. According to co-founder D’Ignazio, the IST asks the question, “how are you invited as a citizen to participate in the public realm” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012)? From this perspective, the materials and rules of public and quasi-public space – even infinitely small things - all possess some political potentiality. In reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s argument that the French Revolution began with the absence of a simple formality – a greeting – the IST (2005, 80-1) state, “[T]hese everyday spaces – the absolute war of a missing signal – are micropolitical...They are beginnings of whole other worlds that might also materialize to nothing.” The minutiae are especially significant, because all objects and actions are embedded in wider social and political contexts.

The myths of individuality, originality, an authenticity are all emphasized by corporations as advertising constructions, to sell more products. It’s not just about artistic authority, but the whole we are embedded in. It’s always political and always economic. What I see as the Institute’s mission is a way of engaging people in conversation, producing these strange situations and dealing with politics of everyday life (Kanarinka and Pirun 2006).
Other examples of the pervasive politicization of everyday life can be found across the sample. With a bit of tongue-in-cheek, the BLF stress the ubiquity of advertising. For them, it “suffuses all corners of our waking lives; it so permeates our consciousness that even our dreams are often indistinguishable from a rapid succession of TV commercials” (Napier and Thomas 2006). Great fields of human pursuit and creativity are reduced to “marketing strategies,” while the Ad itself not only defines the self but also the world. This condition is a symptom of an asymmetric power relationship between corporations and the public; “[P]ublic space should include areas in which the public can truly express itself,” rather than just running around the hamster wheel of commerce at the mall” (Black n.d.). The CAE seek to “develop tactics and tools of resistance against the authoritarian tendencies of a given cultural situation” (Hirsch 2005). Such situations include “galleries and museums, radio, TV, festivals, bars and clubs, the net, [and] the street” (McKenzie and Schneider 2000, 136). The group insist that “no matter what variety of everyday life systems a person participates in, an element of radical practice can always be initiated within it” (CAE 1996, 52). Thus, “politics [can] not be separated from...cultural practice” (Little 1999, 194). The RBC, much like the AMF, mark out a wide sense of the political:

Consumerism is normalized in the mind of the average person, sometimes we even refer to ourselves as consumers forgetting that we are also citizens, humans, men, women, animals. We forget that we share many resources, public spaces, libraries, information, history, sidewalks, streets, schools that we created laws and covenants and governments to protect us, to support us, to help us...

Above all we try to complexify the moment of purchase, to snap people out their hypnosis and back into the mystery of being human. We remind people that things come from somewhere, that products have a resource past, a labor past (RBC 2012).

Reverend Billy (2006, 112) continually expands the scope of politics: “They are trademarking the water and the air, the radio frequencies and the cyber portals, the forests
and the horizon and the street corner to the left of or front door.” More dramatically, “our opponent is everywhere and nowhere, does not have to retreat or advance. It melts into the air” (Talen 2003, 127). In this sense, resistance entails taking control of one’s stories and one’s life. Similar patterns of politicization are seen in the CTM (2006b): “Authority commonly wields power through the manipulation of sign systems which individuals are collectively programmed to accept as valid structures of discipline and control.” The scope extends beyond the abstract sense of culture, however. The group began as a concrete investigation into micro-politics at the individual and community level by peculiar practitioners of power: a ninja, a private investigator, and a magician. Like others, Negativland stress the all-pervasive presence of advertising and an environment saturated with media. The SCP also exhibits a comprehensive politicization. Even the “transparent surfaces, mirrored surfaces, and surveillance cameras” of contemporary urban architecture are symptoms of the spectacle and it’s relation to surveillance (SCP 2006, 176). Television shows, voyeurism, the Internet: these merely tap into the total rendering of everything as image, as transparent and recorded, the mediating principle of the spectacle. Bound with surveillance the spectacle organizes desire and discipline at the service of the State.

Other groups do not provide evidence of such pervasive politicization and instead seem to focus on more specific areas of politicization. The IAA’s politics centers on the cultures of engineering, surveillance, and militarization, while the AAA focuses on the politics of outdoor advertising. The Billionaires and the Yes Men likewise provide little to no evidence of a comprehensive politicized perception.  

Yet, TYM member Bonanno was involved in the Barbie Liberation Organization, an action that critiqued the gender stereotypes of toy action figures and dolls.
Overall, eight of the groups in the sample exhibited the capacity and the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as political. The remaining four suggest a limited conception of politics. This finding supports the hypothesis.

Table 7.2 summarizes the data on the biographies of artistic production. While the results are not overwhelming, they do suggest a general pattern: most of the groups possess a politicized aesthetic disposition either developed or honed in an educational or occupational setting (IST, RBC, SCP, with the AMF, CTM, CAE close as well). Still, some groups appear to avoid the expression of an aesthetic disposition, the BLF especially, although they clearly appreciate Art and distinguish it from advertising, a point made as well by the AAA.\(^{61}\) While the BLF admire the creativity of advertisers, the AAA suggests that it dulls creativity. Others appear to possess a narrower conception of the political. This is especially the case with the Billionaires and the Yes Men. Importantly, the quality of

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Education or Occupation & Aesthetic Perception & Organizational Settings & Political Perception \\
\hline
AMF & Yes & Yes & No & Yes \\
AAA & Yes & No & Yes & No \\
BLF & 2 & No & No & Yes \\
BIL & 1 & Yes & No & No \\
CTM & 1 & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
CAE & 1 & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
IAA & 2 & 2 & Yes & No \\
IST & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
NGL & No & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
RBC & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
SCP & Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes \\
TYM & Yes & 2 & Yes & No \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\(^{1}\) - mixed \(^{2}\) – insufficient data

\(^{61}\) It is worth stressing that the aesthetic disposition is not itself a set of value judgments. One possessing the aesthetic disposition may utilize the world and its myriad objects aesthetically, but define other forms of appropriation as non-aesthetic.
the data pertinent to all four hypotheses is not ideal. As I note above, formal education in
the arts or an arts occupation are not the only social contexts that may generate or
maintain a sense of the aesthetic game. More data may reveal and earlier history of culture
jamming in my positive, mixed, or insufficient data cases. If so, the skills and knowledge
developed in these contexts may be a function of activism. More data may also reveal the
form of activism is a function of education. However, the results are broadly consistent
with the relation explored by my theoretical approach. The CJOs considered here have a
far higher rate of immersion in these contexts than the population. As noted, some culture
jamming groups precede the operational measures of education, while only one (NGL)
precedes any experience in college-level arts education or an arts occupation.

Still, it is worth reiterating that I am not offering the argument that formal education
and occupation are the only individual-level determinants of culture jamming. As I noted in
the introduction, culture jamming is an age-old practice, part of the wider history of
creative activism noted by Boyd above. Instead, and as I will show in later chapters, I am
arguing that the sets of skills and knowledge that constitute an aesthetic disposition offer
incentives for culture jamming as a tactical choice.

7.4. Analysis II

The rest of this chapter elaborates on both the particular social category and the
field of social categories that CJOs construct in their shared understandings and public
representations. I emphasize both the actors and institutions pertinent to a CJO’s sense of
positioning and the social classifications that are attributed to them. In particular, I focus
on the array of actors and social groups that may be broadly designated as protagonists,
antagonists, and others.
7.4.1. Protagonists

Most of the groups in the sample (AMF, AAA, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, RBC, and the SCP) view themselves as part of a wider community of artists or, more generally, as cultural producers or cultural activists. The AMF are especially keen on identifying themselves as culture jammers, part of “a loose network of media activists who see ourselves as the advance shock troops of the most significant social movement of the next twenty years” (Lasn 1999, xi). At the launch of the AMF:

we were all some sort of film maker, designer, illustrator or cartoonist and right from the start we decided that if we were going to launch this culture jamming movement then it would have to be driven by TV, posters, postcards, art, statues, performance art and all those tricks of the trade (Lasn 2005).

The CAE define themselves as “five tactical media artists dedicated to exploring the intersections between art, technology, critical theory, and political activism” (McKenzie and Schneider 2000, 136). Elsewhere, they identify with a contemporary, though unrecognizable, avant-garde consisting of artists-activists who eschew the traditional role designations assigned to either group. Hence, CAE (1996, 48-9), “call for artists, once outside the parameters of cultural production for other members of the culture industry, to separate their work from the system of signs which shape the non-specialist’s perception of art.” As they argue, both “the political activist and the cultural activist (anachronistically known as the artist) can still produce disturbances” (CAE 1994, 12). By opening the website with the statement, “The Anti-Advertising Agency was a collaboration between myself and dozens of other artists,” founder Steve Lambert also emphasizes an artist self-presentation (AAA 2013a). Negativland (1995, 23) “respond (as artists always have) to our environment.” Like CAE, Gach emphasizes a ‘shape-shifting’ identity that respects the exigencies of each situation by utilizing artistic or more generally cultural materials:
We don’t think of ourselves as artists doing an art project unless we’re doing it in an arts venue or applying for an arts grant. Instead, we recognize that, like all people, we are essentially shape-shifters. Specialization is a temporal condition – different identities at different times (CTM 2007).

But the work of the artist, including the magical and the martial, extends beyond the art context: “art can be creative and poetic and spiritual, [but] it is also in many respects utilitarian” (Gach 2008a). It can be used to solve problems, because art is, at its most general, “a way of manifesting your intentions, as a way of creating change in the world” (Gach 2007). The RBC (n.d.(a)) identify as “a radical performance community.”

Some groups are somewhat more idiosyncratic or general. Instead of artists, the BLF present themselves as Jarry-esque pranksters, a point underscored by their frequent use of humorous masks when engaging the media or other public audiences. Groups like the Billionaires and the Yes Men (and to some extent the BLF) often eschew reliance on such categories in order to either focus attention on their ironic identities as billionaire protesters or to empower potential imitators.

Another notable category aside from, but inclusive of, artist-activist is a de-centered conception of identity. The CTM’s shape-shifting has already been discussed, while the CAE (2012b, 62) welcomes “any kind of hybrid – artist, scientist, technician, craftsperson, theorist, activist.” Similarly, the IAA plays up a diversity of identities from which members can draw on, especially engineer and artist. More generally, some groups develop a universal sense of identity:

Consumerism is normalized in the mind of the average person, sometimes we even refer to ourselves as consumers forgetting that we are also citizens, humans, men, women, animals. We forget that we share many resources, public spaces, libraries, information, history, sidewalks, streets, schools that we created laws and covenants and governments to protect us, to support us, to help us (RBC 2012).
As activists, many groups locate themselves relative to other activists and social movements. By far the most common movements that CJOs show strong identification with, or sympathy for, are the anti-globalization or global justice, environmental, and civil rights movements (AMF, BIL, RBS, SCP, TYM). The Occupy movement also gathers a great deal of positive sympathies. While groups like the Yes Men and the RBC directly participated in both the Occupy and anti-globalization movements, and the AMF famously provided the spark for the former movement, some, like the IST and the SCP, keep their distance from the Occupy movement. AIDS activists ACT-UP are particularly inspirational for the CAE, while the AMF are highly critical of, though sympathetic to, activists like that focus on identity politics.

As artists, many groups in the sample situate themselves relative to artists as well as the field of art as a whole. By far the most common positive associations are with the Dadaists, Surrealists, and the Situationists (AMF, BLF, BIL, CTM, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP). Others include Augusto Boal, Antonin Artaud, the Living Theatre, Abbie Hoffman, and Alfred Jarry. Some are mildly critical of the Situationists (BLF and TYM) and typically fall for less intellectualist pranksters like Hoffman and Jarry. Delicate distinctions are made by groups like the CAE and the SCP. A unifying theme is the importance of many 1960s artists, including many that flowered in the counterculture and developed various practices and justifications for cultural resistance. The CTM’s Gach sizes it up nicely: “In terms of contemporary art there is certainly a debt of gratitude that deserves to be paid to the Situationists, Provo, the Yippies, the Diggers, and everyone else organizing happenings, interventions, and provocations over 50 years” (CTM 2007).
The art world in general is often viewed with a degree of ambivalence. While The CAE and the IST are particularly critical of the art world's ideology of individual genius and controlled environments, both regard art institutions as basically allied spaces and networks that serve some functions but not others. This ambivalence is nicely captured by a discussion between IST members Manning and Rasovic:

What's interesting is that the few times that we've fallen flat is when we try to do those projects in the context of the art world like in the museum. They strip it down to this point where it is basically a window display...

If we are going to look for allies where else do you have them? Most of the people working there understand what you are going through. Most of the people working there work for little money and love of art (D'Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012)

The relationship between the art world and many of the groups is nicely captured by CTM’s Gach (2007):

For me, personally, I went through a period when I was anti-institutional. Wanted nothing to do with the artworld. Part of the difficulties is wanting something from the art world that it could not offer. The shift came appreciating the art world for what it can offer, shouldn’t try to squeeze blood from stone. We are definitely incorporating aesthetic strategies.

But what properties inhere in these sets of categories? A prevalent sense of self in this sample is one of agency, awareness, and freedom. With regard to the AAA, Lambert (2007) contends that, “It may not be completely obvious, but part of this project is about freedom. Freedom from these commercial images and ideas that permeate and limit our imagination of what is possible in the world – ideas about what life is for.” The BLF stress the freedom and agency that comes with talking back to the media and corporations. While ironically touting the virtues of heteronomy over freedom (Segal n.d.), they emphasize the stakes more clearly: “It’s either write, or be written. I can raise a pen or a brush in defense of my own mental environment, or allow myself to be the passive, infinitely impressed
palimpsest” (Black n.d.). Such values are especially prominent in the self-presentations of the AMF. Lasn (1999: 146) consistently evokes images of freedom and autonomy:

> the goal of this workshop is to spark a dramatic personal mindshift that will change the way you relate to corporations. Once you've experienced this shift, you'll feel ashamed for having been so docile and subservient for so long. Your days will be charged with a new sense of autonomy and mission.

And elsewhere, he sketches a strong sense of revelation, of an awareness of truth:

> Once you experience even a few of these 'moments of truth,' things can never be the same again. Your life veers off in strange new directions. It's very exciting and a little scary. Ideas blossom into obsessions. The imperative to live life differently keeps building until the day it breaks through the surface (Lasn 1999, xiv)

The IAA are clear as well in their operators manual: “our goal is to provide you with a comfortable venue in which you can function as an autonomous entity ascribed to the simple ideologies of truth, love, and courage” (IAA Operative 2008, 8).

Freedom, awareness, and agency are conditions for a life of spontaneity, creativity, and authenticity. The AAA’s (2013c) Lambert views freedom as in part the expression of creativity. The RBC defines freedom as in part the creation of original, authentic stories, stories forged in a rich spontaneous life, the “hot, complex human living” of public life (Talen 2006, 108). Likewise, the CTM (n.d.(c)) view themselves as engaged in a fundamentally creative enterprise, “creative problem-solving” in the service of a “complete realization of a creative liberation of the ‘true will to live.’” The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 106) lays it on thick: “Living in the moment, pursuing the authentic gesture, living close to the edge-call it what you will-when it’s genuine, it’s the force that makes life worth living.” Importantly, this understanding of life and authentic culture supersedes economic motivations. Negativland (1995, 22) state it thus:

> How and why should these laws apply when the infringement is not done for economic gain?...For the law to claim that this alleged motive is the whole criterion for legal deliberation is to admit that music, itself, is not to be taken seriously. Culture is more than
commerce. It may actually have something to say about commerce. It may even use examples of commerce to comment upon it.

The AAA (2013b) expands this understanding to the mundane: “Look around and you’ll notice all the important things in life don’t make money – like loving others, giving gifts, sharing time with friends. It might not make financial sense, but this is a new kind of company with new kinds of goals.” The BLF concur when they state, “the movement to convert open or public space into display advertising is deforming the community and pitting those who value art and community against those who respect only money” (Black n.d.).

Culture jamming groups also tend to express a strong sense of social responsibility, honesty, and egalitarianism. Politically, many construct a sense of self as citizen, democrat, and participant. The AAA’s Lambert (2007) is clear: “Personally, what we call it isn’t important to me. I think it’s about being a citizen. I am an artist and I am a citizen.” The CTM (n.d.(b)) defines the purpose of tactical magic as, “activating the social imaginary with notions of responsible citizenship through creative action.” The RBC (n.d.(a)) emphatically declares that through action in public space, “we become citizens again” and become responsible for the environment and others. The CAE dissents on this point as they regard the concept of the citizen as “completely bankrupt” (Little 1999, 197). A constant theme is support for real democracy. This is especially pronounced in the importance of dialogue in the public sphere. The BLF construe their activities as “simply having a dialogue with the advertisers” (Haller and Napier 2006, 93). The IAA contributes to the reinvigoration of public space, including the free exchange of ideas and widening the scope of debate (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 117). The AMF’s emphasizes a battle of ideas, the opening up of a wider dialogue between corporations, consumers, and citizens. The CAE (1994, 27) declare
that “artists-activists...have been left with the responsibility to help provide a critical discourse” with respect to the frontiers of power, whether it is cyberspace or the body. This discourse is one of honesty and truth. Both the RBC and the SCP speak of reclaiming a suppressed history: “Celebratory history, or condemning & counteracting suppression & failure of historical memory, is what the SCP attempts to do when it performs its performances on important dates” (SCP 2006, 43). The Yes Men are unconcealers by trade: “these things that are not really presenting themselves honestly, or that hide something about their nature that is really scary, we want to bring that to, we want to show that, we want to demonstrate that (Ollman, Prince, and Smith 2004).

The most radical understanding of democracy is provided by the SCP and the CAE. Most of the SCP self-identify as anarchists (Bill Brown, personal communication, July 6, 2012), a point Brown clarifies when he advocates direct democracy on a community-level as opposed to representative democracy (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 373). The CAE describes themselves as practical anarchists devoted to principles of liberty and social justice (Little 1999, 194). Like the SCP, this anarchism connotes a strong sense of democracy, egalitarianism, and anti-authoritarianism, though the CAE are extremely skeptical of almost all forms of social organization. In contrast to the SCP, the CAE refer to ‘community’ as a mythical concept and undesirable reality; “Solidarity based on similarity through shared ethnicity, and interconnected familial networks supported by a shared sense of place and history, work against the possibility of power through diversity” (McKenzie and Schneider 2000, 146).

Importantly, some groups are prone to distance themselves from the Left. The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 118-9) declares: “we are not Lefties.” He describes the traditional
opposition as “tired, self-satisfied, and dogmatic,” lacking in passion, and “no longer pin[ing] for real change.” Yet, they smother every effort at legitimate change, “muscl[ing] in on every major struggle and social protest of the past half century...but[now] they are the problem.” The CAE are clear:

Admittedly, CAE isn’t fond of progressives primarily because they still believe the state will save them. The Law/the Logos/the Patriarchy is not going to help anyone, and empowering it further only serves to increase the gravity of power bearing down on us. But because of faith in democracy (or at least its simulation), they are always ready to be the dupes of various power vectors (CAE and Dery 1997).

However, others like the Billionaires and Yes Men are quite clear on their affinity for the Left as an agency for positive social change.

Thus with some deviations, the CJOs studied here define themselves as authentic and creative artist-activists fulfilling their roles as responsible and free democratic citizens by engaging in a public dialogue with power and authority.

7.4.2. Antagonists

The primary antagonists of my sample are economic elites and the economic system that favors them. Eight groups situate multi-national corporations (MNCs), economic globalization, international organizations like the IMF, and the legal frameworks that empower and sustain them as their primary antagonists (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, IST, NGL, RBC, TYM). Media corporations are especially common antagonists. According to the sample of culture jamming groups, these foes possess a number of distinguishing characteristics. First, they are essentially non-democratic organizations and structures. Corporations possess enormous resources that effectively subvert the egalitarian principles of political democracy. Negativland (1995, 24) provides an example:

One failing of the U.S. legal system is that it treats the plaintiff and the defendant as though they are equally powerful entities, regardless of the actual resources each may have...when
a corporation goes after a small business or low-income individual, the conflict automatically rolls outside of the court system because of the defendant’s inability to pay the costs of mounting a proper defense.

The AMF’s Lasn summarizes the relationship between economic power and political power: “Considering their vast financial resources, corporations thereafter actually had more power than any private citizen. They could defend and exploit their rights and freedom more vigorously than any individual and therefore they were more free” (Lasn 1999, 68). The Billionaire’s Monet Oliver DePlace (say it slow) is clear as well: “I actually believe in a fair and balanced capitalist system — it’s just that’s not what we’re living in” (Schartz 2010). The RBC is stark: “The ideal conditions for consumerism [free market capitalism] are almost never the ideal conditions for civic democracy” (D. and Talen 2011, 136). The enormous resources they wield and the influence they possess stands in stark contrast to their lack of accountability. For example, the Yes Men (2004, 9) are incensed at the global power of the World Trade Organization, because like so many such institutions, “they were not elected by anyone. They are not accountable to any constituency.”

Moreover, corporations are perceived as monologic structures. Whereas democracy entails a dialogue, the marketing campaigns, advertisements, and media products of MNCs are not conceived as part of a broader process of public dialogue, but of an imposition of texts and images. The IST implicitly makes this point in a fascinating work in which they publicly enact the commands of advertisements. Such monologues are dishonest and conceal important truths about corporate behavior. The Yes Men describe corporations as “things that are not really presenting themselves honestly, or that hide something about their nature that is really scary” (Ollman et al 2004). The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 19) describes the language of the corporation, adspeak, as “anti-language that, whenever it runs into
truth and meaning, annihilates it.” Finally, MNCs and other economic actors are portrayed as opposed to the freedoms of others. The Yes Men (2004, 16) explain:

‘free trade’ elevates the freedom of transnationals to do business however they see fit above all other freedoms, including freedoms that are crucial to the vast majority of the world’s people: the freedom to organize a trade union; the freedom to grow your own crops; the freedom to maintain social services or protect the environment you live in; the freedom to eat, the freedom to not eat certain things, the freedom to drink water.

One noteworthy press release from the BLF wryly claims:

The value of freedom has been rendered obsolete. There is no longer any need for individual choice in this age when all decisions can be left to a skilled professional who specializes in knowing our every desire and need: the Advertiser...The people know better. Let heteronomy reign! (Segal n.d.).

Thus the majority of the sample identifies their antagonists as non-democratic, resource rich, monologic, dishonest, and opposed to the freedoms of others. This conception of economic elites is diametrically opposed to the free and responsible citizen. Negativland clarify: “It means to build this society up into an amazing consumer society, where everyone is consuming all the time” (Hossler and Joyce 1997). The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 54) hits at the general concern: “the notions of citizenship and nationhood make little sense in this world. We’re not fathers and mothers and brothers. We’re consumers.”

Second, many groups note that MNCs are non-persons or fictions. For many, the Supreme Court decision Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886) wrongly granted corporations extensive rights equivalent to the rights of individual citizens (AMF, BIL, NGL, RBC, TYM). The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 157) charges that, “corporations are in the most literal and chilling sense, dispassionate.” They lack fundamental human qualities like compassion and responsibility. This is by design, as they simply function as instruments of profit maximization. For groups like the Yes Men and especially the RBC this singular
purpose calls to mind highly charged language like evil and sinister, a callous disregard for the concerns and freedoms of others.

More generally, many groups in the sample view a system as destructive when such single-minded entities proliferate and gather a wide sphere of influence. While a number express positive evaluations of capitalism, the same cannot be said for the unfettered variety. Note again Monet Oliver DePlace’s confession: “I actually believe in a fair and balanced capitalist system — it’s just that’s not what we’re living in” (Schwartz 2010). The BLF’s Napier explains, “My beef is not with capitalism…the free market is wonderful” (Burkes 2012). Yet, the unfettered variety consumes all value in its wake: “Old fashioned notions about art, science and spirituality being the peak achievements and the noblest goals of the spirit of man have been dashed on the crystalline shores of Acquisition; the holy pursuit of consumer goods” (Napier and Thomas 2006). An ideal system lacks oppressive MNCs and is tempered by concerns over “community need” (Napier 2009). The RBC sums it up well: “a principal strategy of Consumerism [unfettered free market] is to bring all public institutions – public spaces and, of course, the government – into the market” (D. and Talen 2011, 54). This understanding of unfettered capitalism has grown progressively apocalyptic as the political debate over climate change continues unabated. The AMF, RBC, and TYM are especially prone to deploy catastrophic imagery and urgency in depicting the economic and cultural system’s relationship to the environment. Corporations and the economic system are viewed as fundamentally anti-environmental. TYM (2010) weighs in: “capitalism is a machine that will destroy itself given enough time and given enough rope and you’d just hope that it doesn’t destroy us all with it.” For the RBC, capitalism destroys culture. Talen (2012, 39) notes the prevalence of mono-culture,
the “Sea of Identical Details” that pervades a highly corporatized area like Times Square. The AMF’s Lasn (1999, xii) describes contemporary American culture as a product of “top-down” corporate influence: “our stories are now told by distant corporations with something to sell as well as to tell.”

The corporate elite are not the only foe of CJOs. For many, the political elite also fit much of the description of the economic elite. A prominent Billionaires chant celebrates, “This is What Plutocracy Looks Like.” Billionaire Hal. E. Burton describes the government as captured (Roselund 2004). More specifically, political parties feature prominently as antagonists. Republicans are almost uniformly condemned as legally corrupt lackeys of the economic elites. The Yes Men (n.d.(b)) refer to the Bush administration as the Bush cartel. Democrats take a beating as well. An early incarnation of the Billionaires was Billionaires for Bush (or Gore). However, the Billionaires and the Yes Men see a Democratic administration (in this case Obama) as sympathetic but constrained by regular politics:

In the ’30s, things changed dramatically in a progressive direction, similar to after a crash. And after everybody saw that there was a major problem with the way things had been done—which was a very free-market way. It had led to a collapse, and there was a progressive president who was ready to make those changes. But people took to the streets and forced it to happen. And what we need to do is recognize that we have a progressive president now, and we need to actually take to the streets and give him the pressure that he needs (TYM 2009b).

Here, Obama and FDR are progressives basically in tune with the demands of the group.

Aside from this relatively concrete vision of economic and political elites, more nebulous constructions are common. Whether described as culture, spectacle, signs, or simply consumerism a common characterization of this sense of the enemy is its ubiquity. Negativland summarize their work as, “self-defense against the incessant barrage of corporate messages” (Baldwin 1995). For the AMF’s Lasn (1999, 140), consumer
capitalism diffuses responsibility. The culture is the problem, not the agents. The RBC’s Talen (2003, 147) is succinct: “our opponent is everywhere and nowhere, does not have to retreat or advance. It melts into the air.” This sense of an all-pervasive corporate influence is often given the description of colonizing. The BLF note, “advertising suffuses all corners of our waking lives; it so permeates our consciousness that even our dreams are often indistinguishable from a rapid succession of TV commercials” (Napier and Thomas 2006). Elsewhere, BFL member Black (n.d.) claims, “our minds and attention-span are a resource that will be colonized and exploited, unless we work to conserve them.” The RBC “connects the enjoyment we can have in the theatre or in the streets with the need to free our colonized imaginations” (D. and Talen 2011, 13).

The CAE and the CTM regard the state and corporate power as part of a general system of power and domination operative at the micro-level. Both speak of authoritarian power vectors originating in a variety of contexts and institutions. Although they refuse to pin down a single term (Spectacle, Machine, etc.), the CTM (2006b) view these sources of authority as “commonly [wielding] power through the manipulation of sign systems which individuals are collectively programmed to accept as valid structures of discipline and control.” Whether described as panceapitalism, authoritarian culture, or semiotic regime, the CAE define their adversary broadly as the overarching structure of power in society and the globe that serves to impose control over individuals. The group contrasts nomadic liquid power with sedentary power. *Sedentary power* is located in “halls of power” dubbed bunkers: “castles, palaces, malls, government bureaucracies, monuments, factories, the media, etc.” (CAE 1996, 6). Power today is not so anchored. As a “nomadic electronic flow,” it moves through “ambiguous zone[s] without borders,” and is composed of a “diffuse field
without location, and a fixed sight machine appearing as spectacle” (CAE 1994, 6, 11, 15). Bunkers still exist, but only as “colonize[rs] of the mind (CAE 1996, 37).” More generally, CAE view all of these processes and structures as expressions of the rationalization and instrumentalization of culture and social life. The incessant homogenizing reductivism of efficiency and profit is at the core of the pancapitalist imperative. The IAA is somewhat more restrictive in its focus on corporate and government modes of authority. Like the CAE (2012b, 81-82), which views the pre-Bush United States mode of governance as “friendly fascism” and the Bush mode of governance as “neofascism”, the IAA describe corporate and state authority as “fascist” and authoritarian (IAA Operative 2008).

The SCP (2006, 43) is unique in the sample for focusing exclusively on the state - the “police state” - as the locus of oppression. Like the CAE, the SCP describes the social system as spectacle. However, the SCP’s focus on surveillance highlights state imperatives that reinforce order, fear, and dependence: “We don't worry for ourselves anymore...There are specialists that do the worrying for us. This is warping human beings” (Tavernise 2004).

Like the construction of economic elites, governance structures and practices like surveillance weaken the critical faculties necessary for freedom. Elsewhere, the SCP (2006, 172) describe contemporary society as the “transparent society – the universal destruction of the rights to privacy, anonymity, and free assembly.” The IAA comment as well on this dynamic between surveillance and democracy:

Cameras take any kind of agency or responsibility that an individual citizen might have out of the question. Then you place your trust in this mechanism that you have no connection to. It has no accountability to you. It relies on fear as the overwhelming force, rather than co-operation. Any of the traditional social values we like to associate democracy with in America – all of those become really unnecessary (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 114)

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62 The sight machine basically refers to the spectacle (CAE 1994, 15).
Thus, most groups in the sample negatively evaluate economic elites and to a lesser extent political elites. Many groups view their antagonist as a more generalized culture of oppression or consumerism. The SCP and to some extent the IAA, CTM, and the CAE focus on the State as a significant foe, but many of the same properties are attributed to political institutions and actors as other groups attribute primarily to economic elites.

7.4.3. The Public

Along with sketches of protagonists and antagonists, CJOs construct a sense of the public. Here I focus on three broad angles: contextual, dominated, and potential. First, some CJOs differentiate among publics. One distinction separates direct and indirect audiences (CAE, IST, TYM). Here, the IST's D'Ignazio distinguishes a general from a specific audience, the latter largely determined by the nature of each project:

There is always a kind of general audience...like the person who comes to the website...There’s always that audience...People who would be interested from a general sense. Every project, like the Renaming project, was for the audience in Cambridge...In a sense, they were our first order of audience. It’s really small, really tight (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).

The Yes Men’s direct audiences are typically conference attendees. In the case of their WTO events, the direct audience consisted of “foot soldiers in WTO’s war on trade unions, environmental protections, and indigenous rights “(TYM 2004). As they discovered:

our audience of lawyers in Salzburg had a theory—that the free market could bring happiness to the world at large—and they had the deepest possible faith in it. We had imagined that if we pushed our proposals into the outer limits of ugliness, we could horrify our audience into objecting. But the nature of their faith was such that so long as our proposals derived from the one true theory, there was no way they would ever see anything wrong with them. (TYM n.d.(b))

The CAE are cautious about generalizing about anything like a general audience. For them, the idea of a public (like a public sphere) is a myth, because public space is so thoroughly managed and the homogenization of an audience is a move of power. Instead, they develop
counter-publics “directly constituted by those who occupy” them (CAE 2012b, 15, 134). The Billionaires, on the other hand, are concerned with ‘voters,’ whom they parcel into categories like leftists, swing voters, Bush voters, and the middle.

A second distinction involves general versus specialized audiences (AMF, CAE, CMT, IAA, IST, TYM). The AMF distinguish between their general audience and two particular groups: economics students (Lasn 2012) and graphic designers (Lasn 2006). Both are critical actors in the perpetuation of consumer society and suffer the same ambivalent descriptions as the general public below, but they are both more directly complicit and more crucial to resistance than the general public. The IAA distinguishes between the public and engineers. Like the AMF’s specialized publics, engineers are both more complicit and more crucial to resistance than the general public (IAA 2005). Much the same can be said of the CAE’s focus on cultural producers and hackers (CAE 1994, 1996). Finally, some groups distinguish between audiences constituted in an art context and those encountered outside of this context. The CMT’s Gach (2007) notes that art audiences receive the Center’s actions differently. The IST’s Rasovic notes the contextual differences:

It is a very different experience. And it is one where the audience is again that audience that looks at art and looks at things, a sophisticated audience versus an audience that we kind of composite based on the context, a specific place, an urban place. A museum or a gallery feels like a temple. Everybody shows up for the service, and then everybody disperses (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).

Second, many CJOs view the public as dominated by economic elites or the economic system, an oppressive culture, and/or the state. Because this domination involves the third dimension of power – the acquiescence to power either as resignation or preference – the dominated are caught in a perilous zone encompassing victimization and complicity. The victimized are variously portrayed as unaware, lacking agency, colonized, exploited,
unwitting, predictable, etc. The Yes Men view the public as highly susceptible to free market ideology:

Ready to goosestep. Fully in sync with the bottom line... And not just the corporate man: the corporate woman, the academic man, the political woman, the alcoholic child. Many, many people, regardless of education, are easy prey for the ideas of the corporate decision-makers. Present them with a decision, they will accept it! (TYM n.d.(b))

The AAA (2013c) describes advertising as naturalized and normalized, as “understood by the public that [it] has the right to own, occupy, and control any available space," a process facilitated by feelings of powerlessness. The IST’s Rasovic states, “our point was you are not immune to it. Don’t think you are smart enough to reject it. It’s seeping into us, this constant fear, this constant bombardment with messaging” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). The RBC’s Talen (2006, 23) notes that, “the consumers, upon seeing the imagery of the product or corporation, often immediately have memories, fantasies, anticipations” that compel them to buy. The BLF’s Napier (2009) suggests that advertising supersedes free will if it is effective. More generally:

I think we’re in a transition period right now with popular culture kind of consuming everything. The center of the universe in our world now seems to be Madison Ave and Hollywood, and everything emanates out of there and ricochets all over the place. That’s what people are interested in, that’s what motivates them, that’s what they aspire to. If you look at it one way, it can be very disturbing and frightening (BLF 1999).

Yet, elsewhere Napier (2009) cautions against making assumptions about the awareness of the public: “I feel that presupposing ‘self-awareness’ in any demographic sector is as dangerous as presupposing stupidity or close-mindedness.”

The AMF provides the most extreme and detailed constructions of a public straddling complicity and victimization. For the AMF, consumers live mediated, inauthentic, unaware lives that unwittingly sustain consumer capitalism. No longer do people enjoy direct relations with other people, nature, or even themselves; instead, they
live through the images of the spectacle of news, entertainment, and advertising. Such a life, “erode[s] our ability to empathize, to take social issues seriously, to be moved by atrocity” (Lasn 1999, 19). The process is sustained by a socialization process that Lasn (Lasn 1999, 40-1) equates with programming and brainwashing:

The modern consumer is a Manchurian Candidate living in a trance. He has a vague notion that at some point early in his life, experiments were carried out on him, but he can’t remember much about them. While he was drugged, or too young to remember, ideas were implanted into his subconscious with a view to changing his behavior.

Everyone is “recruited into role and behavior patterns we did not consciously choose” (Lasn 1999, 53). Those who have not developed the agency and freedom that comes with awareness of their programming are equated with pigs that roll over for MNCs, slaves, and parts of a machine. Yet, this trance-like enslavement is strangely desirable. Lasn’s favorite analogy is Huxleyan soma. The spectacle appeals to our basic human desires and exploits our weaknesses. He notes, “the strange thing is, you don’t’ really mind. In fact, on some level, you’re happy as a clam” (Lasn 1999, 143). While the AMF tend to create a distance between themselves and the public or consumers by stressing awareness and agency despite the shared experience of living in the same media environment, the Yes Men’s Bichlbaum highlights a political complicity common to all: “No one can govern without the consent of the governed. So making fun of power enables people to see in themselves how they are the power, and how they are propping it up—how we are all propping it up” (Bichlbaum 2012a). Likewise, the SCP’s Brown declares, “we are unwitting citizens of a surveilled society” (Kirby 1999). The RBC’s Talen (2006, 112) speculates:

Perhaps because we are the subjects of consumerism, we cannot show to the public air our original selves. We are in a hurry, exhausted, worn down. Or we are giving out signals that are too predictable and fashionable, not surprising – we are simply sinking into a larger culture.
Third, many CJOs regard the public as ripe with potential for awareness, agency, and freedom. In other words, while they are dominated, people are also capable of becoming cognizant of their domination and even participate in resistance. Adopting a first-person perspective, the AMF's Lasn (1999, 143) speculates: “Once in a while, in a flash of light, you understand that something is wrong.” He charges: “There is an anger, a rage-driven defiance, that is healthy, ethical, and empowering. It contains the conviction that change is possible...Learning how to jam our culture with this rage may be one of the few ways left to feel truly among the quick” (Lasn 1999, 143). The AAA’s Lambert (2007) expresses optimism at the potential for people to move into a state of awareness:

In the world I encounter, the trend is always upward. I get more emails and letters from people all over the world thanking the AAA for what we do, asking for more information and more ways to be involved. I also teach and I see students that more or less move from passive consumers towards engaged citizens in the course of a semester. I meet more fellow artists who are responding to the world around them, who want to make work that involves itself in popular culture, work that addresses ideas of social control. People see the relationship between the short-term desires reinforced by advertising and the long-term problems like global warming and war. I admit, this may be the bubble that I walk around in, but regardless, I know once people are educated, they can’t turn back.

The BLF (1999) promotes “the idea that people can do this kind of thing because it makes them more alive.” The CAE (2001) promote amateurism as a basic principle of tactical media. While this applies to practitioners, it also applies to the wider public. The group argues that the discourses and practices of science and other spheres of knowledge are perfectly accessible to wider audiences, and that their actions are designed as interfaces not to simplify knowledge, but to demystify it and thus generate a sense of critical agency and awareness. For the Billionaires, not all voters are alike. The group defines the middle and swing voters as susceptible to the notion that voting for a Republican is voting against their own interests (Boyd 2004; Haugerud 2013, 57).
In general, the CJOs in the sample distinguish among different publics, sketch them as dominated and thus straddling a distinction between victim and complicit, and endow them with the capacity to resist this domination.

7.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I develop hypotheses about the relationship between CJOs and the field of artistic production and describe their collective identities. The evidence presented basically supports the hypothesized relationship and establishes that CJOs have a strong connection to the art world and possess artistic skills and knowledge. The content of CJO’s collective identities supports this relationship as well. Most of the groups self-identify as artist-activists or cultural activists.

A clear observation of this chapter is that among the CJOs studied here none engage in identity politics. Such an observation might be anticipated when considering Kriesi et al’s (1995) study of new social movements in Europe, in which they show that some new social movements are not identity-oriented. The following chapter fills out the concept of everyday social organization by attending to the networks and resources utilized by culture jammers.
CHAPTER 8: NETWORKS AND RESOURCES

As the final element of Part II of this study, this chapter concludes the analysis of fields, networks, and identities. Only in social interaction are social fields and collective identities forged, yet together their independent effects reverberate upon the course of future social interactions, including contentious interactions. This chapter aims to clarify this portrait of everyday social organization by presenting data regarding the various resources that culture jammers utilize. This includes especially the durable social relations and organizational structures specific to my sample of CJOs. Chapter Seven considers the role of particular social networks (school and work) in the production of specific resources (the aesthetic disposition). This chapter thus attempts to establish a fuller accounting of the resource constraints of CJOs.

This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I review the literature on social networks and resources in social movement theory. Second, I situate this focus within the broader theoretical developments of this dissertation. Specifically, I explore the structure of organization in culture jamming as well as the relevant links between networks, organizations, and resources. Hypotheses and propositions are developed to flesh out these theoretical relations. Third, the developed hypotheses and propositions provide guidance for an exploration of my sample of CJOs.

8.1. Review

8.1.1. Social Networks

Everyone knows someone. This is the core of the concept of a social network: the sets of social relationships between actors, the structures of durable social interaction that characterize social life (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Such relations possess a number of
important variable properties. Granovetter (1973), for example, argues that interpersonal relations vary in strength from strong to weak to absent depending on the degrees of investment, intimacy, and commitment. Relations are also distinguished by positive, negative, or neutral evaluations: people or organizations may be enemies, friends, or simply aware of one another (Labianca and Brass 2006). Finally, social relations can be formal or informal (Wilson 2000). In the former, social ties are determined by the formal organizational setting, as in the relation between students and teachers. Informal social ties are interpersonal relationships that transcend the routines and roles of formal organizations; friendship and family relations are two common informal ties.

Two of the great debates in social movement theory over the decades revolved around the structure of social relations. The first involves the question of mobilization and outcomes: which network structure is most conducive to the generation of social movements (and thus to political instability)? For breakdown theorists, a healthy society is characterized by dense networks that channel political concerns into political institutions, whether through identification with the community and its values (Kornhauser 1959; Lang and Lang 1961; Smelser 1963) or through the mediation and moderation of discontent (Gurr 1970). When these ties are eroded, when individuals are isolated from community or when grievances find no moderating medium, patterns of mobilization emerge in which the mass of isolated individuals in society take their grievances to the streets. In contrast, solidarity theorists (McAdam 1999; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978) argue that isolated individuals lack the social connections to organize collective action. Instead, dense networks provide the infrastructure of resources and commitments, including interpersonal trust and cultural frames that lower the transaction costs for mobilizing large
numbers of people. While empirical studies support solidarity theory, more recent efforts have considered the potential multivalent effects of social ties in which different sets of ties or network structures have different effects (Kitts 2000; McAdam and Paulsen 1993).

8.1.2. Networks and Organization

In the early years of the twentieth century, revolutionaries in Europe and the United States debated whether the social revolution would come under the guidance of vanguard parties (Lenin) or spontaneous mass uprisings (Luxembourg). More recently, this debate, now less urgent, centers on the question of what effects organizational form have on mobilization, strategy, and outcomes. Especially for proponents of RMT, formal and centralized organizations are more capable of responding to changes in the political environment, maintaining and deploying significant resources, and mobilizing large numbers of people, while the use of more conventional or institutional tactics promises more significant outcomes (McAdam 1999; McCarthy and Zald 1987a; Oberschall 1973). Others, notably Piven and Cloward (1979) in their work on poor people’s movements, argue that such organizations actually inhibit mobilization and settle for small concessions, because they develop an accommodation to the political environment that prioritizes organizational maintenance. Moreover, more informal and de-centralized organizations tend to utilize innovative and disruptive tactics that constrain the resistance of authorities and thus offer better rewards for activism.

Today, the debate has begun to eschew the dichotomy between formal centralized organizations and informal de-centralized organizations. In her study of feminist organizations, Staggenborg (1989; Lofland 1996) argued that formalization (especially the division of labor) and centralization should be understood as distinct continuous variables.
For example, a particular SMO may be highly informal with a weak division of labor but extremely centralized. Lofland (1996) considers a wider range of qualitatively different means of organizing. More dramatically, Clemens (1993; 1997) developed the concept of an organizational repertoire, the set of organizational forms, practices, and roles that citizens can draw on when engaging in politics. Like the repertoire of contention, the organizational repertoire draws from the apolitical means of organization characteristic of everyday life. Organizing for social change can thus take a wide variety of forms.

Finally, Polletta (2002) explores the varieties of organizational practices associated with participatory democracy. Of note is her consideration that many such practices are often grounded in basic social relations, such as kinship and friendship. This proposition points to an extreme case of the common argument among solidarity theorists that movement organization often builds directly onto the existing organization of a population. The “bloc recruitment” of “solidarity communities” (Oberschall 1973), the “catnets”, or networks formed of categories of people (Tilly 1978), and the “indigenous organizational strength” of a population (McAdam 1999), among others, all refer to the same notion: existing social networks reduce the costs of organizing by providing the identities and resources for nascent movements. Most notably, Southern black churches were one of the organizational cores of the burgeoning civil rights movement (McAdam 1999; Morris 1984). They provided not only the infrastructure for the movement in its early years, including facilities and members, but also a great deal of its collective action frames and the sense of belonging and commitment. In this argument, formal organizations are formed and grown primarily through informal relations and their attendant commitments and
cognitions. Such work points directly to the strong links between social networks and the collective identities and resources they house.

8.1.3. Resources

Resources are the assets that actors use to achieve their goals. One of the most important resources for any form of human activity is the sets of commitments that bind people together. Through these sets of social networks, resources are gathered, accessed, identified, and utilized. But while social relations are essential for collective action, a full accounting of social movements and protest must attend to a wide variety of resources.

The basic importance of resources to social movements became a systematic topic of concern primarily with the advance of RMT. One of the central theses of this approach is that shifts in the availability of resources affect patterns of mobilization. Despite its significance, often ruefully noted is the fact that little effort has been spared to theoretically ground the concept of resources (Cress and Snow 1996). The strongest advances are typological. Two basic methods are used to generate tentatively exhaustive lists of the resources relevant for collective action: inductive and deductive. Through their study of homeless mobilization, Cress and Snow (1996) inductively develop a typology of resources incorporating moral (legitimacy, authority), material (basic goods, money, transportation, facilities, etc.), informational (knowledge relevant to collective action and organization), and human resources (audiences, leaders, and members).

In contrast, Edwards and McCarthy (2004) develop a deductive approach through a reading of the social movement literature and the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. At least two categories are familiar: moral resources refer to solidarity and legitimacy, while material resources include physical and financial capital, including money, property,
equipment, etc. The three remaining categories include cultural resources (forms of knowledge and cultural products, including tactical repertoires), social-organizational resources (social networks, physical infrastructure, and organizations), and human resources (labor, skills, leadership). The key distinction between human resources and cultural and social-organizational resources is that the former are more proprietary and less widely available, while the latter are accessible. Cultural and moral resources are distinct principally with respect to the latter’s scarcity; while large numbers of people can access cultural resources like a repertoire of contention, moral resources are harder to tap, because they are accrued through performance and position.

8.2. Theory and Hypotheses

In order to describe the sets of resources that CJOs have at their disposal, I briefly elaborate on the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of resources and political action. First, I consider some basic efforts at distinguishing among types of resources before I return to Bourdieu’s concept of capital. Second, I develop hypotheses regarding the relation between the social networks that members of CJOs are embedded within and the organizational structures that they erect for their collective cultural jamming efforts. Third, I briefly consider other resources that may be of interest with respect to culture jamming.

8.2.1. Resources

While Edwards and McCarthy (2004) develop their taxonomy in part through their reading of Bourdieu, I argue that this effort is not quite satisfactory. First, they distinguish cultural from human resources by arguing that the former are generally accessible while the latter are under the exclusive control of individuals. This is particularly confused in
their insistence on equating cultural resources with habitus and human resources with skills and experiences. Strictly speaking, the habitus is the sets of skills and knowledge possessed by an individual, group, or organization. Second, the emphasis on propriety is unevenly employed. While cultural and human resources are distinguished solely on this basis, social-organizational resources include proprietary and non-proprietary resources. Moreover, while material resources are highly proprietary, another material resource, infrastructure (a clear example of physical capital in the economic sense), is classified as social-organizational because it is nonproprietary. In other words, while an analysis of variation in propriety is essential for a full accounting of resources, Edwards and McCarthy’s effort is taxonomically inconsistent.

It is perhaps valuable to return to one of their primary inspirations. Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes four forms of capital. Economic capital refers to physical and financial capital, to that which “is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights” (Bourdieu 1986, 243). It includes money, real estate, infrastructure, and various material assets like equipment, vehicles, and basic supplies that can be readily converted into money. Cultural capital includes the skills and knowledge embodied in ways of seeing and acting (bodily dispositions), the ownership of cultural objects like works of art, and possession of various forms of institutional recognition, as in academic degrees and honors. Social capital specifies those resources that are, “linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1986, 248). It thus includes not only the range of commitments available to a particular agent and which can be called upon under various circumstances, but also the totality of capital (economic,
cultural, symbolic) that can be mobilized by others through these commitments. Finally, symbolic capital refers to the variable property of all forms of capital that confers legitimacy, prestige, honor, and other forms of authority and competence. Together, these four species of capital, or power, are both the objects and the materials of strategies.

This Bourdieusian scheme is inclusive of the categories of Edwards and McCarthy. Economic capital incorporates material resources and nonproprietary social-organizational resources. Cultural capital includes cultural and human resources. Symbolic capital is a generalization of moral resources, while social capital incorporates proprietary social-organizational resources. The primary focus of this dissertation is on cultural capital, specifically the aesthetic disposition. However, to understand culture jamming requires a broader understanding of the resource priorities and constraints of CJOs. Emphasis will fall primarily on the various forms of social, cultural, and economic capital. It is to nonproprietary social organization, or social capital, that I now turn in order to begin a discussion of the resources of culture jammers.

8.2.2. Social Networks and Organization

For solidarity theorists, social networks and existing organizations reduce organizing costs by providing the resources and commitments necessary for nascent movement leaders to mobilize large numbers of people (McAdam 1999; Morris 1984; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Thus, it is through the provision of incentives for action that prior social organization constrains the structure of movement organization; community organization yields social movement organization. As this dissertation aims to demonstrate, Tilly’s concept of everyday social organization as a constraint on repertoires of contention reflects this argument with relation to tactical choice.
The relation of organizing to social networks is more complex, however. SMOs vary in the degree to which they are organized formally. A high degree of formalization describes an SMO in which decision-making and action are organized by established procedures, “a developed division of labor by function, explicit membership criteria, and formal rules governing any subunits such as chapters and committees. SMOs that lack formalized structures have few established decision-making and operational procedures, a minimal and changing division of labor, and loose membership requirements” (Staggenborg 1989, 75). Formal rules and roles thus tend to distinguish individuals from their functions by clarifying the structure of the organization, while informality is more likely to personalize responsibilities.

All decision-making processes in organizations and collective actions, even those characterized by extensive formalization, are governed by an informal etiquette of deliberation (Polletta 2002, 16). This etiquette pertains to those concerns either unaddressed or inadequately addressed by the formal rules and roles, as in appropriate body language and emotional expression, the framing of issues, and principles of legitimate argumentation, among others. Such practices often operate at the level of the habitus. As Chapter Two argues, the habitus is the accumulation of the practical responses, in the form of the employment of social classifications, to social situations. It is the nexus of the relation between social fields and unfolding social interactions. In other words, it guides a practical sense of relationships that governs, among other behaviors, proper and acceptable discussion and other essential organizing practices. Decision-making in SMOs, even in formal settings, require this foundation of ‘unspoken’ coordination.
The more informal the process in SMOs, the more likely the etiquette specific to basic social relations will govern the decision-making and organizing process. Organizing in highly informal SMOs is more likely to draw on basic social ties like religious fellowship, student-teacher relations, friendship, and kinship, relations that are deeply embedded in the habitus. Part of reducing the costs of organization is found in the mobilization of familiar practices. Creating new formal and informal procedures for intra-organizational interaction is likely a costly and risky affair. Drawing on existing and familiar models of interaction, often unconsciously, frees up precious resources for other tasks. As Chapter Three also argues, familiar deliberative practices may also increase the benefits of interaction by building viable expectations and commitments regarding future interactions. In other words, familiarity breeds trust and solidarity and thus reduces uncertainty. As solidarity theorists would argue, there is a tight relation between social movements and existing social networks.

NSM theory amends the basic solidarity hypothesis by situating the arrival of new organizational forms within developments in the political economy (Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985). According to this perspective, previous movements generated hierarchical, bureaucratic, and large political organizations in order to represent the interests of some sector of society, such as the working class. In contrast, for the peace, women’s, environmental, and other movements,

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63 This is a generalization of Polletta’s (2002) argument that participatory democratic decision-making in SMOs draws on the norms of interaction characteristic of certain basic associational ties. I justify this procedure on the observation, recognized by Polletta that not all everyday social relations, and thus not all etiquettes of deliberation, are transparent, egalitarian, and anti-authoritarian. Friendship, for example, is exclusivist; pedagogical etiquette is fully capable of significant inequality (though Polletta [2002, 75] argues it also capable of more equitable applications); and ties based on faith can draw on a model of authoritarian charisma. Other examples abound, particularly relations resting on significant inequalities: race, gender, etc.

64 This is clearly an application of the argument regarding familiarity, information, and incentives found in Chapter Three.
contemporary “collective mobilization assumes forms...which do not fit into traditional categories, and which make evident a distinct analytical discontinuity” in the transition from old to new movements (Melucci 1996, 113). These organizational forms and the broader organizational structure of specific movements are decentralized, autonomous, diffuse, amorphous, disorganized, reticular, etc. Such forms are latent structures, “relatively permanent forms of network” that “interweave closely with daily life” beneath the vagaries of mobilization (Melucci 1996, 116). Such submerged networks (Melucci 1989) reflect and refract the existing social organization of everyday life upon which they subsist and shape the forms of contentious collective action that emerge from them.

Existing data supports the relation between activism and social organization with respect to culture jamming. Wettergren (2005, 48) finds that CJOs are composed of individuals with strong friendship ties existent prior to the establishment of the organization. NSM theory anticipates precisely this manner of organization. For example, Melucci (1996, 330) argues that friendship circles “are rather common in the movement networks and seem to perform the function of enabling simultaneous investment in two fields (friendship and commitment), thereby restricting possible losses”66. Furthermore, NSM theory suggests that such groups tend to eschew formal rules for informal task allocation (Melucci 1996, 329-331). Thus, I develop two descriptive hypotheses:

H8.1: CJOs are informally organized.

H8.2: CJOs are primarily composed of pre-existing friendship networks.

65 This implicitly establishes a layered distinction between routine social life, contention-connected social interaction, and collective mobilization, one later recognized by Tilly (2008, 8).

66 However, Melucci (1996, 330) qualifies this hypothesis by suggesting that this is the case “especially where professional or cultural skills are weaker.” Considering the findings in the previous chapter, if I find evidence of friendship-based organization, then the hypothesized pattern of low skills and friendship circles does not seem to apply to culture jamming organizations.
Both hypotheses consider the nature of the social relations within the organization. However, it is worth noting that formalization is not merely a property of intra-organizational relations, but also the manner in which an organization relates to other actors. For example, obtaining 501(c) or non-profit status in the United States is a formal status recognized by the federal government that incentivizes the formalization of some internal tasks, such as record-keeping. I develop no hypotheses relating CJOs to this sense of formalization.

Other descriptive hypotheses are also developed inductively, though there is some basis in the preceding discussion of NSM theory for valid expectations consonant with the available data. First, SMOs vary in their degree of centralization. Centralization refers to the extent to which an SMO’s primary decision-making prerogatives are concentrated in a small group or individual relative to the rest of the membership (Staggenborg 1989). Some groups are highly concentrated, as when an individual makes all important authoritative decisions, while others are highly decentralized, thus diffusing important decision-making functions across many units or individuals without significant veto power at a center. Wettergren (2005, 48) argues that CJOs are highly individualistic. I argue that together these insights suggest a general pattern of decentralized organization. I thus hypothesize:

H8.3: CJOs are organizationally decentralized.

I thus expect to find evidence of non-hierarchical, participatory procedures for decision-making in my sample of CJOs.

Second, SMOs vary in the degree of commitment that they require of their members (Downey and Rohlinger 2008; Jasper 2006; Lofland 1996). Inclusive SMOs tend to vary wildly in the amount of effort that members provide for the organization and the degree of
indoctrination required for their participation. Exclusive SMOs tend to require significant contributions from all or most members and thus tend to exclude from the organization those who may be less committed. Polletta (2002, 140) finds that friendship, though a strong tie with powerful commitments, is exclusivist;

If friendship supplies the trust, mutual affection, and respect that facilitate fast and fair decisions, it also makes it difficult to expand the deliberative group beyond the original circle. Newcomers lack an understanding of the history of the issues at stake as well as the idiosyncratic practices of this organization...Since newcomers by definition threaten existing friendships, they may find it difficult to secure the trust, respect, and solicitude that veterans enjoy.

Wettergren (2005, 48) observes that CJOs tend to be very exclusivist. In fact, they are usually composed of only two to five friends. Thus, I offer a descriptive hypothesis:

H8.4: CJOs are exclusively organized.

This hypothesis leads to two expectations. First, membership and participation in CJOs tend to require a relatively high degree of commitment. Second, contrary to Staggenborg’s (1989, 75) description of informal SMOs, membership is not “loosely” defined; though they are unwritten, there are nonetheless significant barriers to membership.

Finally, the size of an organization may be anticipated by considering at least three key variables: financial resources, membership size, and geographic scope. As noted above, Wettergren (2005, 48) observes that CJOs tend to be extremely small in terms of membership. If this is so, then it suggests that the economic resources of the organization are significantly constrained. Additionally, the capacity for geographic scope should be constrained. Furthermore, small financial resources and small memberships suggest that the capacity for geographic scope should be constrained in part by financial and labor resources. I thus hypothesize:

H8.5: CJOs are organizationally small.
8.2.3. Organizational Resources

This hypothesized image of CJO paints a portrait of a relatively small, highly personalized, individualistic, decentralized, and exclusivist set of informal arrangements for organizing collective actions. However, while organizations and social networks are themselves crucial resources that activists can utilize in order to further their goals, they often provide a variety of other resources that are crucial or beneficial to collective action. First, CJOs may have significant social relations with other organizations and networks. Such relations may include other CJOs and individuals, family, friends, websites, educational institutions, and a variety of other potential social, political, and economic arrangements. Through these relationships culture jammers may obtain access to potential members, audiences, money, supplies, facilities, infrastructure, information, skills, and credentials, among others. One task of this chapter is to decipher the most relevant social capital to culture jammers and their attendant resources. However, while I do consider relations between inter-organizational resources and CJOs in Chapter Twelve, I do not develop any hypotheses or propositions here.

Second, CJOs may draw on different forms of economic or material capital. Infrastructure is crucial to a variety of social activities, including activism. Of particular importance is the Internet. Access to the Internet and the requisite skills for its navigation performs at least two important functions. First, advanced communications technologies reduce transaction costs for organizing, including political activism (Bonchek 1995; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010). A variety of costs are involved in collective action, including the acquisition and processing of information, communication, and coordination of individuals. The Internet especially provides efficient, fast, and convenient means for addressing these
difficulties. Second, and more importantly, the Internet offers a distinct terrain of action with unique capacities. As one of the major structural changes in nearly every aspect of life in the last two decades, the Internet offers new spaces and issues of contestation. I consider as well the myriad ways in which CJOs utilize this structural development. Additionally, a variety of facilities and equipment may be crucial to collective action. At the least they should provide space for planning and action as well as the essential materials for particular actions. Finally, financial resources, especially money, should also be important resources. Although I considered the size of financial resources above, I do not develop specific hypotheses about the sources of these resources and culture jamming.

8.3. Analysis

As with the previous chapter, none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations developed above is tested in the strictest sense. Instead, they provide more precise guides for illustration. Hypotheses can systematically direct our attention to specific patterns or observations that would otherwise escape scrutiny. The means of inquiry are specific to each set of hypotheses and propositions. The data used in this chapter is derived from the sample of CJOs specified in Chapter Four. As a preliminary point, the following five hypotheses are descriptive and involve a singular variable: CJOs, and its relationships with five variables. I consider the nature of these variables below.

8.3.1. Networks and Organizations

First, I hypothesize (H8.1) that CJOs are informally organized. The degree of formalization is here constructed loosely, meaning that while it is basically treated as dichotomous difficult cases may be coded as mixed. A high degree of formalization occurs when organizational practices - division of labor, membership criteria, operational
procedures, relations among subunits, etc. – are constrained by formal rules and role assignments are highly impersonal. Conversely, a low degree of formalization involves informal if not unstable organizational practices and personalized responsibilities. I consider formalization from two perspectives. Internal formalization refers to intra-organizational relationships and responsibilities. External formalization refers to inter-organizational relationships and responsibilities. While the two are likely to co-vary, I analyze them as distinct phenomena. However, principal weight is given to internal formalization for two reasons. First, the latter is not considered by NSM theory and, second, while external formalization is of intrinsic descriptive interest, I am primarily concerned with its possible effects on internal formalization. External formalization such as nonprofit status or contractual relations may incentivize the formalization of internal procedures such as record keeping and task allocation in order to maintain the integrity of the relationship.

Five groups exhibit extremely low formalization (CAE, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM). For example, the CAE (2012b, 20) describe their model of organization as ‘organic,’ in the sense that specialization and interdependence arise through practice and are in part ad hoc and dependent on the nature of each project. The IST’s D’Ignazio also describes the organizational process as ad hoc and “organic” in that projects develop out of spontaneous initiative (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). Like the CAE, specializations developed out of practice and are personalized. The SCP’s Brown (personal interview, July 6, 2012) describes a looser form of organization in which he develops the basic action and tasks are taken up as needed by whoever appears to participate.
Data on the question of internal formalization is less than ideal with some groups. None is available for three groups (AAA, CTM, IAA). Five provide some indications of formalization (BLF, BIL, RBC), but they vary in the capacity for conclusion. The data here primarily concerns the division of labor and role personalization. The BLF (n.d.) assign *nom de guerre’s* to colorfully named roles such as Rico T. Spoons, Director of Offence and English Major, Editor-at-Large. However, the group’s strict secrecy undermines efforts at determining whether tasks correspond to any real role assignments. Still, because the group’s list of alumni allows some comparison across time I can conclude that role descriptions vary in transmissibility. Some roles like field op, security, and copywriter are common and thus suggest the possibility of the depersonalization of roles. However, all of this is speculation. The more earnest RBC (n.d.(a)) has a Board of Directors as well as a choir. Over the course of the 2004 presidential campaign, the Billionaires developed three salaried positions at the national level (Haugerud 2013, 125, 153-5). A further division of labor was established in an executive committee and relations with chapters were marginally tightened, though it is not clear that anything like formal relations were established. The AMF is the most internally formalized group with a clear division of labor among nearly two dozen people and impersonal task differentiation (with the obvious exception of Kalle Lasn’s position as Editor-in-Chief).

One prominent expression of external formalization is non-profit status. Four groups in the sample possess(ed) 501(c) non-profit status (or its Canadian equivalent) or are closely linked to such an organization. The RBC (n.d.(b)) is a federally-recognized non-profit organization through their Immediate Life, Inc. The IST is a project of iKatun, a 501(c) non-profit organization (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview,
August 27, 2012). The AAA (2013d) is officially supported by the Lab, a 501(c) non-profit organization. Finally, for the first four years of its existence, the Billionaires was an adjunct to the 501(c) non-profit organization, United for a Fair Economy (Haugerud 2013, 125). In 2003, the group splintered off and acquired tax-exempt status under Section 527 of the IRS tax code (Haugerud 2013, 125; Billionaires for Bush 2004a). A later iteration, the Billionaires for Wealthcare (n.d.(a)), are supported by the Institute for America’s Future, a 501(c) non-profit foundation. Other forms of external formalization are evident. Negativland operates the record label, Seeland Records, which also produces recordings for other artists. For a time, the group signed to SST Records, the contractual relation to which constituted grounds for a lawsuit against the group (NGL 1995). The AMF have contractual relations with printers (Quad/Graphics) and a variety of distributors.

Among the nine groups with sufficient data to make tentative conclusions, only one appears to obtain a significant degree of formalization (AMF). Three groups exhibit a low but noticeable degree of formalization (BLF, BIL, RBC), while five exhibit low formalization (CAE, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM). External formalization is spread across these three classifications, including two groups in the lowest category (IST, NGL). While any conclusion is at best tentative considering the variety of data and methodological constraints, it is clear that the majority of CJOs in the sample lack the kind of formalized procedures and practices associated with bureaucratic organizations. This provides minimal support for the NSM hypothesis.

Second, I hypothesize (H8.2) that CJOs are primarily composed of pre-existing friendship networks. I treat the latter variable as dichotomous and focus on whether or not friendships constitute the basic social organization of CJOs. Data on this hypothesis is even
more scarce. Only seven groups provide evidence of such friendship networks (AMF, CTM, CAE, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM). The AMF began as a collaboration between friends Kalle Lasn and Bill Schmalz (Sommer 2012). Negativland originated in a friendship circle in high school (Joyce 2007), while the IST drew friends toward collaboration (D'Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). The SCP began as the meeting of two friendship networks (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 359) and gathered fresh members from a combination of customers and friends:

The thing that kept the group constantly with new members, who were quite varied actually, which I will return to in a moment, was Black Out Books, anarchist bookstore, in which I worked every single Sunday, so that I met people and became friendly with them, and also that was a way of finding people that would be interested in performing in the group (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012).

The CMT as well began as a conversation among friends (Gach 2008b), while the CAE (2012b) is composed of a friendship network originally established in the art and academic worlds of Tallahassee, Florida. The Yes Men were introduced by mutual friends before their fortuitous absence at the battle of Seattle. More recently, member Ostertag (2008) describes the group as a, “network of friends. As you would imagine, to do this sort of things, it takes a lot of friends.” However, much of these data are inconclusive. It is unclear how many members of the AMF, CMT, or SCP are part of a basic friendship network underlying the organization. While the data is somewhat suggestive, it is not sufficient to draw even tentative conclusions.

Third, I hypothesize (H8.3) that CJOs are organizationally decentralized. Like formalization, the degree of centralization is constructed loosely. Centralization refers to the proportion of the membership of an organization that has effective decision-making power. High centralization refers to a low proportion of effective decision-makers. In the
extreme this means one person determines the actions of the organization, whereas low centralization or decentralization diffuses this power to a wider portion of the membership.

Three groups clearly exhibit highly decentralized organization (CAE, IST, NGL), though there is some evidence that the IAA does as well. Importantly, no group in the sample explicitly rejects, at least in practice, the principle of hierarchy. In the case of the CAE (2001, 66), while they,

[do] not follow the democratic model, the collective does recognize its merits; however, CAE follows Foucault's principle that hierarchical power can be productive (it does not necessarily lead to domination), and hence uses a floating hierarchy to produce projects. After consensus is reached on how a project should be produced, the member with the greatest expertise in the area has authority over the final product. While all members have a voice in the production process, the project leader makes the final decisions.

This principle of a floating hierarchy is evident as well with the IST, though consensus is not a necessity:

I feel like the projects end up taking on organically, like, who is leading the project. And encouraging leaders. We don’t follow a process like consensus-decision-making like Occupy Boston. The projects often have clear administrative leaders. Right now Jim is leading a project to put on a failure support group at BU this fall. We have another member for us who is leading project where three people are going to the Philippines to do some peace-building workshops with some youth there....I'm very in favor of leaders; having leaders and organizers. They don't have to be autocratic. Someone who takes responsibility for it.

Negativland (2005) describe their creative process as “one brain," a stew of collaboration and contributions: “I don’t have a strong sense of which idea was whose, and who did what, and I don’t care. It just doesn't matter. If the idea’s great, and it's evolving and good, then I’m excited." Less can be derived from the information on the IAA, but what can does suggest a collaborative process: “Brainstorming session. Three is the best. Can fit in a booth at a bar. Everybody can take a stake in it, have a part they call their own. When you aren’t making any money and it's your money, that's really important" (Brusadin et al n.d.).
Data are insufficient to determine the degree of centralization in seven cases (AMF, AAA, BLF, CTM, IAA, RBC, TYM). However, two groups do show signs of organizational centralization (BIL, SCP). The Billionaires are exceptional in the sample because they established a large network of chapters across the country many of which were nominally under a national leadership. However, according to Haugerud (2013, 156) the national leadership primarily provided models for action (songs, slogans, images, etc.), advice, and hands-on aid especially in electoral battleground states. She also finds that the group’s organizing principle approximated meritocracy, not radical egalitarianism or consensus decision-making; while they sought to encourage participation, those who did the most work tended to have the most power (Haugerud 2013, 154-5). The SCP’s Brown describes the group’s organization as a loose form of personalized centralization, in which Brown generally established the initiative by organizing actions and from there feedback and suggestions would shape the unfolding project. Within the NY-SCP it was hierarchical, as in I was the one, not so much in control, but I wrote the plays, was the media spokesperson, chose the time and place for performances, was the one who invited people, so that inside of the group, we were not really anarchist in organization (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012). Elsewhere he describes in more detail how the group was organized:

It was collaborative in that.....I fancied myself leading something like a big band, like the Mingus Big Band, led by Charles Mingus. He’s always gonna be playing bass there and it can still sound like the Mingus Big Band even though the horn players change. So what I’d do is I had an e-mail list of 10-15 people who were interested in performing. So I’d invite all of them and say, “the proposal is to perform on July 4th of 2012, let’s say. I propose that we do this, that, and the other thing. I propose that we do this play.” There would be a self-selection process, which was whose available. Then the people who were available would say, “nah I’m getting tired of that play that you proposed, why don’t we do something else?” Which would either be they would propose something else, write something else, which would take place in another location, so they had advanced notice, the freedom, and the opportunity to choose other things (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012).
However, because of the paucity of data on other groups, conclusions are at best tentative. What is clear is that of the groups with available data, none exhibit strong centralized organization. Even among the Billionaires and the SCP, feedback, collaboration, and participation are cultivated among the less committed.

Fourth, I hypothesize (H8.4) that CJOs are exclusively organized. Similar to formalization and centralization the degree of exclusivity is constructed loosely. Exclusivity refers here to organizational membership requirements. Several groups in the sample strongly support the development of like-minded groups and copycat actions (AAA, BLF, BIL, SCP, TYM). However, such efforts do not in themselves constitute inclusive organization. Inclusive membership is principally characterized by low-cost commitments and a lack of exclusionary criteria like race, gender, age, income, ideology, religion, occupation, education, family, or friendship.

Five groups in the sample exhibit exclusive organization (BLF, CAE, IAA, NGL, SCP). McManic (2003) notes, “you can’t sign up for the BLF. It has to tap you. ‘Not just anybody gets invited into the BLF, because it’s dangerous and essentially illegal,” says Napier’. Addressing the scope of the group, the CAE (2012b, 20) argue that it, “had to stay small enough that everyone felt their voice was heard, and could see themselves in the process and the product.” Opening up the group to more members would dilute the balance of contributions and sense of participation. The IAA make similar statements about optimal group organization:

It changes, but we keep it 3-5. Small, like a cell. It’s small enough that whatever does happen, everyone can take a part in it. Brainstorming session. Three is the best. Can fit in a booth at a bar. Everybody can take a stake in it, have a part they call their own. When you aren’t making any money and it’s your money, that’s really important (Brusadin et al n.d.).
Like most musical groups, Negativland have restrictive criteria for joining. The SCP’s Brown describes their brand of exclusivity:

If you want to give it a bad spin, we’re sectarian. If you want to give it a good spin, we prize our autonomy. So, that means like the Situationists, that we don’t just admit anybody into the group. We don’t want to have a big group in which lots of people join. The idea is just a proliferation of independent groups who have the name in common (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 363).

Elsewhere, the SCP (n.d.(b)) lays out there criteria:

On occasion, we (the New York Surveillance Camera Players) are contacted by people who want to "get involved" in what we are doing. Though we wish to encourage everyone to get involved in the struggle to protect and defend our collective and individual rights to privacy, anonymity and free assembly, we need to make clear the types of involvement that we encourage, and those that we do not.

We encourage potential performers to contact us. To become a performer with the SCP, you 1) must be unreservedly in accord with the SCP’s basic positions; 2) must be someone who lives in or near New York City, or is passing through NYC when the SCP is scheduled to perform; 3) must be comfortable with and (ideally) capable of deriving pleasure from appearing in public and, of course, on the closed-circuit television monitors of who-knows-how-many surveillance systems; 4) need not be one of the SCP’s media spokespeople, but should be comfortable with the fact that the group is media-friendly and so is often videotaped and interviewed; 5) need not have any professional training as an actor; 6) cannot be a professional actor; 7) cannot expect financial compensation for your involvement; 8) must be an anarchist, autonomist, libertarian, free-thinker or "independent"; 9) cannot be a Communist, Socialist, Marxist, Leninist, Trotskyite or Maoist, an adherent to the ideologies of the Republican, Democratic or Reform Parties in the United States, or someone who is racist, sexist or homophobic; and 10) cannot be a police officer, an informant of any kind, a private security guard or a member of any of the United States’ armed forces or intelligence agencies.

Data are insufficient to make a determination with respect to four groups (AAA, AMF, CTM, TYM). For example, the Yes Men (n.d.(b)) explicitly address the question how a “person turn[s] into a Yes Man?”:

A person (male or female) becomes a Yes Man by exposing, perhaps deviously, the nastiness of powerful evildoers. If this describes what you do, or want to do (the exposing, not the evildoing), please visit [link provided]...More precisely, there are all kinds of ways of doing what we call "Identity Correction." Soon, we’ll post a little list of some ways that we’ve thought of. There are plenty of ways that we haven’t thought of, too.
The link provided leads readers to the Yes Lab’s “Get Involved” page. From there, it is clear that by Yes Men (2013) they simply mean like-minded groups (‘progressive’ is their term) and similar actions. It thus remains unclear what organizational membership entails beyond a “network of friends” (Ostertag 2008). With the AAA (2013c), there is some evidence that the group expresses a very loose sense of membership:

1. Start your own Anti-Advertising Agency campaign! Look around the site, see what we’re about, and do your own Anti-Advertising campaign. Send us pictures and we’ll post them here.
2. Sign up on Steve Lambert’s mailing list.
3. Look for free downloads with our projects, or go to our downloads page to download recent AAA poster designs, stencils, stickers, and other projects to put up in your town!
4. Send us a self addressed, postage paid, business sized envelope and we’ll send you these “you don’t need it” stickers.
5. Check back for news, project updates, new downloads and opportunities to work with the AAA.

Yet, elsewhere Lambert describes the AAA (2013a) as a “collaboration between myself and dozens of other artists.”

The remaining three groups suggest an inclusive sense of membership. The Billionaires cultivated chapters and participation with varying levels of commitment. The RBC (n.d.(c) address the question directly: “What is Membership in the Church of Stop Shopping? When we tour in your part of the world, we’ll let you know, maybe you can help us visit. We’ll send notice of "Spiritual Trespassings" in the lobbies of big banks that finance climate change... things like that.” A loose and inclusive sense of membership is provided by the IST:

First of all, if anyone wants to be a member, you’re just a member. You join the e-mail list, and you’re in. So when we do talks, for example, we say, If you wanna join, you can just come up and say, I wanna join, and then you are on the e-mail list. And then it’s up to you if you want to participate (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).
Clearly, relatively little commitment is needed to join these groups and no apparently exclusive criteria are publicized.

Although the data are better for his hypothesis than the preceding ones, the results remain inconclusive. Five groups exhibit exclusion (BLF, CAE, IAA, NGL, SCP), while three groups practice inclusion (BIL, IST, RBC) with four suffering from insufficient data. What this does suggest is that inclusive membership may be more prevalent than the NSM hypothesis suggests.

Finally, I hypothesize (H8.5) that CJOs are organizationally small. While I initially analyze the sample with a conception of organizational size ranging from small to medium to large, I ultimately treat it as dichotomous—the organization is small or it is not—considering the hypothesis. Distinguishing small from medium and large is somewhat arbitrary, but the presentation of data should allow for reasonable evaluations of my classifications. I break the concept of organizational size down into two component variables: membership size and financial resources. For example, a small organization will have a membership of two to twenty-five people, a bare minimum of financial resources usually derived from member’s day jobs or some meager source of income, and a local organizational distribution across a city, county, or state. The balance of these variables in determining organizational size is not clearly laid out here, but ideally the effort will be transparent. Table 8.1 summarizes the data.

First, at least seven CJOs have memberships of less than twenty-five people (BLF, CTM, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP). These range from the three to five of the IAA to slightly large groups like the BLF, IST, or the SCP. Two groups lack sufficient data to make a determination as to the extent of their membership (AAA, TYM). The AAA (2013a) has a
clear core membership of a dozen people; however, as noted above a looser sense of membership may make their network notably larger. The Yes Men’s refusal to publicly delimit organizational membership makes a determination impossible, although the group at least includes three members: Bichlbaum, Bonanno, and Ostertag). The remaining three groups are larger (AMF, BIL, RBC). The RBC (n.d.(a)) is a core of roughly fifty performers, but they claim a congregation in the thousands. The AMF is a core of ten to eighteen members with hundreds of contributors (AMF 2005; Lasn, Nurse, and Torbett 2012). Again, the Billionaires are unique. While most chapters are primarily composed of a few dozen people, at one point the Manhattan chapter included roughly 150 members (Haugerud 2013, 131). Altogether, the franchise or hub-node structure of the organization incorporated at its height in the fall of 2004 over a thousand people, though dispersed over roughly 100 chapters.
Second, seven groups in the sample tend to utilize few financial resources (AAA, BLF, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP). The AAA began as a $35,000 grant that stretched over a six year period (Creative Work Fund 2004; Vartanian 2010). The CAE (2000b) do not receive grants. Instead, “we just hobble along from project to project, usually working with an extremely limited budget. A lot of our imaginative power goes into figuring out how to make things for minimal cost.” The IAA is slim on funding as well: “We sort of use the access we get at our day jobs to sort of allow us to make projects that we couldn’t otherwise. We don’t have any funding ever. Every now and then we get something. But for the most part it’s basically out of pocket” (Brusadin et al n.d.). The SCP receives “no funding. This requires just money for the mail, the post-office box, and the webhosting—that’s it” (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 365). The meager financial position of Negativland (2005) was transparent following lawsuits from Island and SST Records. The IST describes its parent organization, iKatun, as “probably the 501(c)(3) with the smallest budget in the country” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012), while the BLF describe the extremely minimal resources required for ‘billboard improvement’ (Thornhill and DeCoverly 2006).

Three groups exhibit notably larger financial requirements and resources (AMF, BIL, RBC). The AMF produces and markets a magazine with high production quality, markets a shoe product – Blackspot sneakers – and staffs ten full-time employees (Lasn et al 2012). At their height, the Billionaires managed to employ three full-time salaried staff and acquired from $150,000 to $200,000 in the first half of 2004 (Haugerud 2013, 126). The RBC (n.d.(b)) claims a “low budget,” but they also have “office costs,” frequently tour nationally and internationally (recall the size of the membership), and enjoy a “matching
grant” in which, “every dollar you give means two dollars for The Church.” Finally, two groups lack sufficient data to determine their financial resources (CTM, TYM). The Yes Men claim a small budget: “There’s no budget, so you have to find sofas to sleep on, and frequent flyer tickets, and somebody who is willing to print a business card, and, you know, just a network of friends (Ostertag 2008).” Elsewhere, they note:

> It just so happens that we can’t afford to take a vacation, so we’ve had to rely on the generosity of friends and acquaintances in various places...As for the money to build our Survivaball and other props, and to print up the fake New York Times ($6000 for 80,000 copies), it came from our mailing list (TYM n.d.(b)).

Yet, they raised over $100,000 in less than two months for their current film (TYM 2012c).

Considering the distribution of membership size and financial resources across the sample, eight out of twelve groups are classified as organizationally small (AAA, BLF, CTM, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP). Three of the remaining are somewhat larger than small (AMF, BIL, RBC), while the Yes Men provide insufficient data. Still, even considering the variation between groups like the IAA and the AMF, the core of the AMF and the RBC is still relatively small compared to larger SMOs and interest groups. It is the Billionaires that truly stands out as a relatively sizable organization, a status principally a consequence of its large numbers of chapters. Considered individually, most of these chapters would be as large as the average group in the sample. In contrast to the four preceding hypotheses, these findings provide some support for the notion that CJOs are organizationally small.

Table 8.2 summarizes the data on all five organizational hypotheses. While glancing only at sufficient data points towards a confirmation of the NSM hypotheses, the paucity of information muddies confidence in this conclusion. Moreover, evidence of degrees of formality, inclusivity, centralization, as well as medium-size suggests that the structures of CJOs vary more than simple dichotomous conceptions of organization would imply. In
particular, the AMF, BIL, and RBC appear somewhat organizationally distinct from the rest of the sample in being larger and possibly more formalized, if not inclusive. In addition, there appears to be too little data to note any correlation between friendship networks and exclusivity, as Polletta suggests.

### 8.3.2. Organizational Resources

In this and the previous chapter I consider particular skill sets and organizations as resources that activists utilize in their contentious interactions. Here, I look further at the social and economic capital available to CJOs. It is worth noting that while social capital helps individuals and organizations gain access to economic and other forms of capital, economic capital can also be converted into social capital through investments in relationships.

The previous section considers two particular forms of social capital: friendship networks and the organization itself. However, social capital encompasses a diversity of resources including relations with other organizations: other SMOs, interest groups,
foundations, businesses, universities, and others. I begin with other activists, SMOs, and related organizations. CJOs develop and utilize extensive networks of activists for various purposes. The most intimate forms of relationships are cross-memberships. For example, the Yes Men and the IAA shared members (Brusadin et al n.d.). The Billionaires shared members with groups like United for a Fair Economy, its parent organization until 2003, Reclaim the Streets!, and many other groups (Haugerud 2013, 84, 192). The BFL are nominally part of the Cacophany Society (Burkes 2012). The AAA and the San Francisco Print Collective enjoyed overlapping memberships as well (AAA 2013d). Now a university professor, Ricardo Dominguez held memberships in the CAE, ACT UP/Tallahassee, the Electronic Disturbance Theater, and thing.net (Dominguez 2004). The BRC (n.d.(a)) shares members with the Living Theatre (2009). Many groups in the sample also collaborate with other activists. The AMF have an extensive network of relations with activists, including sister publications in four countries. They also run the Powershift Advocacy Advertising Agency, a campaign assistance organization (AMF 2005). The AAA (2013a) collaborated with hosts of different activists and artists for each project, including the Graffiti Research Lab, the Yes Men, Code Pink, and Improv Everywhere. Hagerud (2013, 192) finds that the Billionaires collaborated with the Yes Men, US Uncut, and others. BIL founder Boyd collaborated with dozens of activist individuals and organizations in compiling his 2012 book Beautiful Trouble. The BLF famously worked with culture jammer Ron English on some projects. The CAE (2001, ch. 6) worked with the IAA on developing contestational robots, while the CTM (n.d.(a)) frequently collaborates with activists in various campaigns. Negativland run their radio program “Over the Edge” on a station owned by the progressive non-profit corporation, Pacifica Radio (Joyce 1995). The group also connected
with activist documentarian Craig Baldwin (1995) and contributed to Creative Commons (Parkins 2008). The RBC participates in Buy Nothing Day, a campaign initiated by the AMF, and collaborates with local activist groups across the world. The SCP (2006) worked with the New York Civil Liberties Union, various independent anti-surveillance groups, and Not Bored journal, while the Yes Men have collaborated with many groups in the sample and more, especially with the establishment of the Yes Lab. Finally, some CJOs utilize their websites to post long lists of links to like-minded organizations and individuals (BIL, BLF, IAA, RBC, SCP).

As further evidence of the placement of CJOs within the field of art, many groups in the sample possess notable relations with arts organizations (AAA, CAE, CTM, IST, RBC, TYM). In the previous chapter I noted the extent of arts occupations in the sample, especially arts teaching. Art departments, universities, and centers such as the San Francisco Art Institute, the Lab, Eyebeam Art and Technology Center, MIT Media Lab, the Museum of Modern Art, the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, Creative Work Fund, Rhizome, Creative Capital, and others are prominent examples of arts-related organizations with long-lasting or significant relationships with some of the groups in the sample.

Some CJOs engage in regular beneficial relations with business enterprises or, similarly, relations with non-profit organizations that produce and distribute objectified cultural capital like books or films. The AMF, BIL, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP, and TYM all produce books and magazines that require printers, distributors, and retailers. The RBC and the TYM produced feature-length documentary films with the aid of filmmakers, studios, donors, and retailers. The AMF (n.d.(b)) markets the Blackspot shoe that is produced by a family-owned union shop in Portugal. Somewhat different relations are also evident. The
SCP’s Brown (personal interview, July 6, 2012) worked at an anarchist bookstore that provided numerous opportunities to meet and recruit people. The BLF and the IAA confess to utilizing time and materials at their jobs at private companies (Kalman 2006; Brusadin et al n.d.). The Yes Men (2012c) funded their latest documentary film through Kickstarter.

Social capital is important for many reasons, but here it is significant for the access it provides to other resources. First and foremost, social relations provide much-needed access to economic capital. I discuss financial resources above, many of which come in the form of grants and non-profit status. Many of the groups in the sample set up donations pages on their websites that streamline the act of individual monetary contributions (AMF, BIL, CTM, IST, RBC, TYM). Such groups occasionally utilize mailing lists or other online means to plead for donations for particular projects or other contribution. The Yes Men (n.d.(b)) provide one example:

As for the money to build our Survivaball and other props, and to print up the fake New York Times ($6000 for 80,000 copies), it came from our mailing list, to which we sent calls asking for help. Today, a fundraising platform like Kickstarter could do pretty much the same thing.

Other forms of relevant economic capital include physical infrastructure such as offices, places to eat and sleep, and exhibition spaces. Other resources include office supplies and equipment, clothing, and valuable information.

A final form of economic or physical capital is the Internet. Access to the Internet provides a number of advantages for CJOs. As noted, it allows groups to establish regular public links with like-minded groups through their websites as well as simplify the donations process. It also decreases the costs of communicating both within the group (email) and with others. Every group in the sample operates a website that serves numerous functions, including publicizing the goals, strategies, and tactics of the organization,
disseminating collective action frames, and offering various ways to contribute beyond
donations, including purchasing media, joining the mailing list, and joining the organization
or engaging in similar actions.

8.4. Conclusion

Chapters Five and Six establishes the structures and incentives of the field of artistic
production, while Chapter Seven presents descriptions of the content of CJO’s collective
identities as well as evidence relating culture jammers to the artistic field. Through an
analysis of the social and economic capital available to CJOs, especially the structure of
their organizations, this chapter concludes the analysis of the fields, networks, and
identities constituting everyday social organization. Part III of this dissertation follows
with an analysis of the relationship between everyday social organization and tactical
repertoires.
PART III:

STRATEGY AND TACTICS
CHAPTER 9. GOALS AND STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS

While Part II of this study details the set of independent variables (networks, fields, and identities, and by extension their resource constraints) that constitute everyday social organization, the primary dependent variable of this study is tactical choice. However, although a great deal of existing research has focused exclusively on the relation of tactics to variables like identity, incentives, politics, or organization, more recent work argues that tactics must be studied within the context of other components of the strategic approach of a social movement organization: issues, frames, targets, alliances, solutions, etc. Together, these constellations of strategic elements constitute the logics or “strategic orientations” of organizational actors. The primary task of this chapter is to present data regarding the goals and the strategic orientations of my sample of CJOs.

This chapter is segmented into three parts. First, I review the literature on goals and strategic orientations. While the latter concept is decomposed into issues, targets, and tactics, this review will focus only on the general logic of strategy. Second, I develop several descriptive hypotheses and propositions that aid in the description of culture jamming goals and strategic orientations. Third, I present evidence of the goals and the general strategic approaches of my sample of CJOs, including their issues, by utilizing the hypotheses and propositions developed in the preceding section. This chapter is thus primarily descriptive. Description of the targets and tactics of the CJOs in my sample is left to the following two chapters.

A final preliminary point is in order. Strictly speaking, goals are not the dependent variable in this study. While implications may be deduced from Chapters Two and Three
that can contribute to an explanation of goal selection, for this study goals are an exogenous variable.

9.1. Review

9.1.1. Goals

Strategy is oriented towards goals, also called demands or claims. Consequently, an analysis of strategy requires a preliminary analysis of goals. Scholarly efforts to broadly describe the goals of SMOs and social movements are numerous. I focus on three basic and mutually inclusive approaches.67

Traditionally, the issues and goals of social movements were designated as either instrumental or symbolic (Aberle 1966; Breines 1982; Gusfield 1963), while more recent scholarship utilizes a similar strategy-oriented and identity-oriented distinction (Cohen 1985; Rucht 1988; Tourraine 1981).6869 Instrumental or strategic goals involve a desired change in the external environment, especially in economic or political institutions, actors, and policies. Such conceptions identify action-outcome linkages that specify movement action as means towards tangible or material ends. The emphasis on this set of goals is principally associated with RMT (Gamson 1990; Jenkins 1983; Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1987a) and political process or opportunity theory (Kitschelt 1986;...
McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978; 1986). These approaches criticized earlier scholarship for assuming that while normal political activity is channeled into official institutional channels, protest is a frustrated response to social change. In contrast, these scholars developed an approach in which activism is a strategic means to influence policy (Gamson 1990; Tilly 1978). In this polity model, the government is inclusive and responsive to the pressures of insiders, but those lacking access to the polity, typically as a result of low resources or institutional exclusion, must utilize more disruptive means in order to gain entry. The primary concern of challengers, then, is the state, the set of political institutions, actors, and resources that defines the scope of the polity.

In contrast, symbolic or identity-related goals are personal, expressive, or cultural; they seek to challenge practices or ideas in the private sphere or in civil society and involve the creation and maintenance of solidarity and collective identity. Such goals are in general means as well as ends; the action is directed inwards or is diffuse in its intentions. In this sense, action symbolizes or expresses some change instead of forging a causal link between action and environmental effects. While early attempts to explain social movements and other forms of collective behavior argued that protest was a symbolic or expressive attempt to reduce psychological distress (Blumer 1951; Kornhauser 1959), the emphasis on rationality and strategy by RMT and political process theory theory led to a rejection of social psychological explanations of activism. In response, NSM theorists developed accounts of movements focusing on the development of conflicts over the creation and expression of new ways of living (Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985). As Melucci (1985, 801) describes it:
The medium, the movement itself as a new medium, is the message. As Prophets without enchantment, contemporary movements practice in the present the change they are struggling for: they redefine the meaning of social action for the whole society.

Recent efforts utilize less holistic explanations of social conflict but nonetheless retain the emphasis on goals of value or identity expression (Gamson 1989; Jasper 1997).

A similar distinction in the literature considers whether activism is guided by materialist or postmaterialist values and goals. Inglehart (1977; 1990) famously argues that variation in the economic security of a generation in its formative years determines their long-term value structure. Under conditions of scarcity, the development of materialist values prioritizes goals of economic and physical security such as national security and wages. Under conditions of affluence, the development of postmaterialist values prioritizes quality of life and personal development issues such as human rights, the environment, and the quality of democracy. According to Inglehart, this generational shift in values and goals has far-reaching effects on political participation, including the development of new political issues, political parties, and social movements.

While the instrumental/symbolic distinction focuses on the internal or external orientation of the movement or group, scholars also developed a basic distinction between movements or groups that desire limited or moderate social or political change and those that pursue complete or radical change, though it operates more or less like a spectrum (Downey and Rohlinger 2008; Gamson 1990; Haines 1988; McAdam 1999). Moderates or reformists tend to be in broad agreement with the existing social and political order such that their most basic values are not in conflict with this system. This typically implies an emphasis on reforming or modifying existing institutions. Conversely, radicals or revolutionaries are characterized by a general disagreement with the existing political and
social structure and significant dissonance between their values and the values of the system. Their goals express the desire to abolish and replace or radically transform the organization of power in society. A third and related set of goals regarding the SMO’s orientation towards the social system involve not the degree of change desired in the system, but the degree of autonomy from the system. Turner and Killian (1987, 292) refer to this objective as ‘separation,’ the establishment and maintenance of a space free from control or interference from political or social authorities.

Finally, within rational choice theory efforts to explain collective action principally focus on the question of mobilization (Chong 1991; Harris 1982; Lichbach 1995; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Olson 1965; Opp 1989). This question is particularly vexing from this perspective, because it is presented as a paradox of participation: rational individuals will not join collective actions, yet we observe collective action everywhere. This paradox arises in part from what is called the collective action problem. This dilemma is determined in large part by the nature of the desired object of a group: public goods. Goods vary along at least two important dimension: 1) the degree to which people can be excluded from their consumption, and 2) the degree to which the quantity of the good is reduced through consumption (rivalrous). This produces a typology of four types of economic goods (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9). Table 9.1 specifies the relevant dimensions. Private goods, like gasoline or apples, are highly rivalrous and excludable. Common goods, like fisheries or oil reserves, are rivalrous but non-excludable. The most

70 However, these dimensions do not exhaust variation in the nature of public goods. For example, many note that some public goods, known as step goods, do not yield benefits until a certain threshold or discrete amount of contributions is met, while continuous goods are more gradual in their production (Hardin 1982; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Opp 2009). Accordingly, variable production functions affect a variety of social movement activity, including strategy.
Table 9.1. Types of Economic Goods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rivalrous Non-Rivalrous</th>
<th>Excludable</th>
<th>Non-Excludable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Good</td>
<td>Common Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Club Good</td>
<td>Public Good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Important goods for this analysis are club goods and public goods. Public goods are generally non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Typical examples include clean air and national defense. Club goods are non-rivalrous but excludable. Typical examples include religious services and country clubs. Club goods are distinguished from public goods by the capacity to exclude others from consumption, including non-contributors to the production of the club good. Public goods, on the other hand, are characterized by the inclusion of non-contributors from the consumption of the good. It is this quality of public goods that makes their provision so theoretically problematic: why contribute to the production of a good everyone will benefit from when someone else can incur the costs?

9.1.2. Strategy

But goals are only the telos of strategy. In order to integrate organizational activities, employ organizational resources, and conceptually link their activities and resources to outcomes internal and external to the organization, actors develop strategies (Ganz 2000, 1010). Strategies are basic or general plans that organizations utilize in order to achieve their goals. By constraining an SMO’s sense of what is appropriate and effective strategy facilitates a variety of choices including the selection of issues, tactics, frames, alliances, recruitment programs, targets, and others. Recent work considers the interdependence of the various elements of strategy as essential to the explanation of any one component. As Downey and Rohlinger (2008, 6) argue:
the choice to utilize highly confrontational tactics has implications for choices about organization models, who to appeal to, and who to secure resources from, among others. As such, discrete strategic choices must be seen as components of broader decision-making processes.

Together, these clusters of choices and the strategy that organizes them are referred to as strategic logics or strategic orientations (Downey and Rohlinger 2008; Larson 2011; Rucht 1988; 1990). Scholars have focused on different configurations of these components. Dalton (1994) suggests five factors are constitutive: efforts to mobilize participants and their contributions, the selection of issues and their solutions, the alliances with other SMOs, and the tactics they use to pursue their claims. In his study of effective leadership in activist groups, Ganz (2000, 1010; 2009) conceptualizes strategy as the “conceptual link we make between the places, the times and ways we mobilize and deploy our resources, and the goals we hope to achieve.” Strategy is thus composed of the types of tactics utilized, the targets of these actions, and the timing of the action. Meyer (2007; Meyer and Staggenborg 2012) decomposes strategy into the claims or demands of actors, their tactics, and the particular sites or venues within which they choose to press their claims. The more common approach, however, is to focus on the issues, targets, and tactics utilized by SMOs (Earl and Kimport 2008; Larson 2009; 2011; Walker et al 2008).

9.1.3. Dimensions of Strategic Orientation

Scholars have identified a number of important dimensions that allow finer distinctions among varieties of strategic approaches.71 I briefly consider three.72 First, as

71 Strategies may also be distinguished as discrete categories, such as bargaining, or subcultural retrenchment (Rucht 1990) as opposed to dimensions. I focus here only on dimensions of strategic orientations.
72 Downey and Rohlinger (2008) include the depth of the challenge presented by an SMO or movement as an additional dimension of strategic orientations. However, my distinction between goals and strategic orientations emphasizes that whether a movement or SMO is moderate or radical is a reflection of its goals and not of its general strategic approach to their goals. In fact, the two may vary for strategic reasons: radical groups may utilize a relatively non-confrontational strategy in order to avoid heavy repression or engage
with goals, a basic distinction between logics or orientations that are instrumental and strategic from those that are expressive, symbolic, or identity-oriented has proven relatively durable (Aberle 1966; Breines 1982; Gusfield 1963; Jasper and Polletta 2001; Jenkins 1983; Rucht 1988; 1990). I elaborate more on this distinction in my theoretical discussion below.

Second, scholars consider the degree of risk involved in engaging in actions and the closely related dimension of the degree of disruption introduced into everyday life when characterizing strategies (DeNardo 1985; Kriesi et al 1995; Piven and Cloward 1979).\(^{73}\) This set of dimensions is often described as a spectrum ranging from conventional to unconventional (or disruptive) to violent (Tarrow 1998). From this perspective, strategies range from a low to a high threshold for adoption. While some generate relatively low risks or little anticipated financial or physical harm, others produce much higher expectations for high risks for participants, including financial ruin, physical harm, or even death. The corresponding social consequences of such variation in risks involve the degree of disruptiveness of the strategic approach; the more the strategic approach involves the disruption of social routines and expectations, including sources of support for opponents, the more risks that are involved in engaging in contentious politics. Because disrupting social life can increase the costs that opponents are willing to pay in order to repress activism, activists can face increasingly extreme threats of harm. However, the basic strategy of disruption involves increasing negative sanctions on opponents (blocking traffic, mobilizing public support, etc.) such that the costs of non-compliance outweigh the channels of influence they perceive to be more effective, while moderate SMOs may utilize more disruptive strategies to gather media attention.

\(^{73}\) This distinction is synonymous with a similar distinction in tactics, principally because tactics are the means of disruption.
costs of compliance (Lipsky 1968). Movements and SMOs are thus faced with the difficult strategic and tactical question of how much disruption to generate before the authorities can respond with more extensive and effective repressive measures.

Third, scholars distinguish strategies along a continuum representing the variable scope of the appeal of an SMO to the population, often couched in terms of the distribution of commitments required by an SMO (DeNardo 1985; Downey and Rohlinger 2008; see also Jasper 2006). Some SMOs focus their energies and resources on a small circle of heavy contributors, a hard-core of activists. While the vast majority of SMOs must cultivate a core of committed members, others are oriented toward developing a broad support base with a low set of commitments. Downey and Rohlinger (2008) refer to the former as insular orientations; they help SMOs maintain ‘abeyance structures:’ internal organization, solidarity, and collective identification during periods of relative demobilization. Mass orientations are conducive to mass mobilization, including the development of large social networks, access to significant resources, and wider public appeal.

9.2. Theory and Hypotheses

In order to determine the content of the goals and strategic orientations of culture jammers, I elaborate on each relevant concept. First, I consider a set of expectations regarding the goals of CJOs, in part relying on some basic but disputed distinctions in NSM theory. Second, I develop propositions and hypotheses regarding the strategic orientations of these groups.

9.2.1. Goals

Collective action is defined in part by the pursuit of shared interests. Thus, action is oriented towards the attainment of some array of goals or priorities in order to focus the
organization of resources and actions. As noted in Chapter Three this variety can in part be analyzed hierarchically (Jasper 2006, ch. 3). The broadest and most comprehensive goals are the primary orienting principles of strategies. These may be generally referred to as goals. Examples may include gender or racial equality, ending a war, establishing a communist system, developing solidarity, criminalizing abortion, generating a space temporarily free of the market economy, or ending local corruption. Lower levels are referred to as objectives; they guide more specific courses of action. If the broad goal of an SMO is to end a war, then more specific objectives may include maintaining an SMO, fundraising, increasing public support for ending the war, pressuring political leaders to oppose the war, mobilizing people for demonstrations against the war, training activists in styles of protest and leadership, etc. Goals and objectives serve as the ends in this analysis, but objectives are simultaneously means towards an end of goal attainment.

Of course, objectives can contradict or defer resources from goals. There is no necessary complicity between organizational goals and objectives. This is so because goals, as I define them here, are the public representation of an SMO’s central purpose, while objectives, which need not be publicly disclosed, are more specific concrete directives. Slippage between the two can result from a number of conditions, including intra-organizational conflict or the strategic advantages of misrepresenting the goal of an organization.74 One of the most common forms of misdirection is captured by a generalized paraphrasing of Ambrose Bierce (1999 [1906], 148): private interest masquerading as public interest. In democratic contexts, however, large voluntary

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74 In the context of a dictatorship, an NGO that claims to further the interests of some constituency may in fact represent the interests of the state in surveilling communities, acquiring foreign aid, and projecting a reformist and democratic political process.
organizations may be constrained by the importance of aligning their actions with their public statements of purpose. As established in Chapter Three, I assume that SMOs pursue one primary goal and that all objectives, including organizational maintenance, are subordinate to this goal.

Preliminary to the analysis of strategy is the description of organizational goals and objectives. Thus, while individuals have their own interests relative to organizations (Jasper 2006; Olson 1965), I consider only the sets of collective goals and objectives specific to my sample of CJOs. This offers an opportunity to consider a set of hypotheses regarding the characteristics of new and old social movements. As noted in Chapter Two, NSM theorists (Melucci 1985; 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985) argue that movements like the women’s, environmental, DIY, and other movements are distinct from old social movements due to their emphasis on culture and identity as opposed to politics and strategy, civil society as opposed to the state or the economy, and post-materialist as opposed to materialist values. However, criticisms of these NSM approaches point to the political and instrumental goals of these movements and the cultural and identity-oriented goals of old social movements (Calhoun 1993b; Pichardo 1997). Within the social movement literature, culture jammers and culture jamming in general are often described as akin to or adjuncts to new social movements (Binay 2005; Kozinets and Handelman 2004; Wettergren 2005). Their goals are pegged as symbolic, expressive, personal, post-materialist, and cultural. The following sets of hypotheses draw from this set of expectations.

Table 9.2 schematizes some of the disputed differences between old and new social movements. First, instrumental goals are organized like extrinsic expected action-outcome
Table 9.2. The Goals of Old and New Social Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Old Social Movements</th>
<th>New Social Movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>Symbolic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Orientation</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Materialism</td>
<td>Post-materialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Club</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

structures.\textsuperscript{75} Such structures are characterized by the expectation that actions produce outcomes or changes in the state of the world, which in turn produce changes in utility for the SMO. Most importantly, this change in utility is determined by the perceptions of effectiveness. In other words, this structure is defined not by the effects of any or all sets of incentives on the SMO’s utility, but by the capacity for an action to achieve the goal.

Symbolic goals are organized as intrinsic action-outcome structures. Such structures are characterized by the expectation that actions are outcomes within the set of direct relations imminent to the action itself. Such intrinsic outcomes produce changes in the utility of the SMO. Again, this change in utility is determined by the perceptions of effectiveness. With respect to this type, effectiveness still involves the capacity of an action to achieve a goal, but the goal is not change in the state of the world, but a change in the state of the SMO or those who identify with it.\textsuperscript{76} Melucci (1996, 329) considers this distinction with respect to the new social movements:

\textsuperscript{75} My use of the terms instrumental and strategic should, at some point, raise eyebrows considering my theoretical emphases on goals and the weighting of expectations. It is clear from the discussion in Chapter Three and this chapter that the theoretical approach taken in this dissertation does not recognize “non-strategic” or “non-instrumental” goals. I assume that SMO activity is goal-directed. The goal may be intrinsic or extrinsic, but to distinguish one type of goal as instrumental or strategic either presumes that the remaining goals lack instrumentality or strategy or that they possess some attributes in addition to their instrumentality or strategy. Neither of these seems appropriate. My argument is that the temporality of incentives is essential for a rational actor model, not the type of incentive.

\textsuperscript{76} This does not exhaust the distinction, however. SMOs with instrumental goals may also pursue symbolic objectives, such as the creation and maintenance of solidarity and collective identity. However, as discussed in Chapter Three and above, what distinguishes this set of goals and objectives from an SMO with symbolic
In the movements’ networks, a large quantity of resources are (sic) allocated to the creation and maintenance of a specific identity rather than to the pursuit of external objectives. In contrast to traditional collective actors, there has been a substantial shift from investment for the purposes of political action to an allocation of resources for the maintenance of an internal market for symbolic goods.

Insofar as existing scholarship suggests a pattern of variance of expected action-outcome linkages across SMOs, and insofar as CJOs resemble the collective mobilizations of new social movements, we can develop a descriptive hypothesis:

H9.1: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of intrinsic goals.

This leads to the expectation that CJOs are generally oriented towards achieving goals that primarily focus on the processes of action as opposed to tangible effects on institutions or actors.

Second, often associated with this classification is a distinction among the fields of action that SMOs or movements operate within. At their most basic, the goals of SMOs can involve politics or culture. Political goals entail, for example, challenging or protecting laws, statutes, regulations, office holders, enforcement and bureaucratic practices, and judicial decisions; in other words, they involve an orientation towards the state. In contrast, culture goals focus on and through civil society or the private sphere or, more generally, non-state structures. Such goals entail, for example, changing or protecting the personnel or practices of various social organizations like churches, schools, corporations, non-profits, the media, other SMOs, etc., or challenging or protecting norms and practices relating to various social institutions like marriage, patriarchy, hetero-normativity, public property, capitalism, or culture in general. These examples make it clear that the instrumental/symbolic and politics/culture distinction, if they are viable, may easily vary...
independently. An SMO may pursue instrumental goals aimed at changing the policies of the Catholic Church or Starbucks, or they may pursue symbolic goals aimed at challenging the state’s capacity and/or right to organize public space or engage in war.

The most persistent characterization of culture jamming common among academics (Kozinets and Handelman 2007; Sandlin and Callahan 2009) and activists (Klein 2000; Peretti 2001) is that it involves a critique of consumer capitalism. Consequently, the appropriate field of action is culture. As I stressed in Chapter One, however, I do not define culture jamming by a particular emphasis on capitalism or excessive commercialized consumption. I do define culture jamming as a technique at the level of representation, however. While this would seem to suggest that the goals of CJOs are by definition oriented towards the cultural field of action, the distinction I consider here is not whether the action is intrinsic or extrinsic, nor whether the tactic is cultural in nature, but whether or not the goal is political (the state) or cultural (civil society). I argue that such a distinction is helpful in identifying an additional goal dimension. Still, the tendency to equate culture jamming with a critique of consumer capitalism does suggest a plausible descriptive hypothesis:

H9.2: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of cultural goals.

This leads to the expectation that CJOs are oriented towards changing or challenging actors or institutions outside of the state.

Third is a distinction between materialist and post-materialist goals. Goals that are inspired by materialist values tend to emphasize economic and physical security, while postmaterialist goals tend to emphasize self-expression and quality of life. Several studies purport to show a link between post-materialism and participation in new social
movements (Inglehart 1990b; Kriesi 1989). The most extensive effort to link culture jamming and post-materialism is found in the political consumerism literature (Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005). These observations suggest a third descriptive hypothesis:

H9.3: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of post-materialist goals.

This leads to the expectation that CJOs are generally oriented towards issues concerning the environment, rights, and lifestyle, among others.

Fourth, a public/club good distinction is analytically distinct from the previous three classifications. While strictly speaking, public goods are not by definition provided by the state, the authoritative capacity of the state to develop and implement public policy on a wide variety of issues is often an implicit focus of collective action analyses. In this sense, public good goals would essentially mark the intersection of extrinsic and political goals. However, public goods like knowledge are frequently produced and distributed by other actors, while states also produce club goods such as libraries and food stamp programs. Club good goals are distinguished by the presence of crowding or congestion (only so many can consume the good at any time) and exclusion mechanisms so that those who consume the good contribute to its provision. In this sense they can be extrinsic or intrinsic objects operative in either field of action. For example, an SMO may seek to change the membership criteria of an organization, such as the Catholic Church or the Boy Scouts. More generally, intense social interactions, which are generative of collective identification and solidarity, function as exclusionary mechanisms but are also susceptible to crowding or congestion. Like religious services, SMOs and movements with intrinsic goals are concerned primarily with the goods specific to the group, such as the experience of

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77 Though there is considerable evidence supporting the more general descriptive null hypothesis that post-materialism does not constitute a distinct cluster of values, I do not consider this literature here.
opposition, autonomy, and community. Finally, a public/club goods distinction varies independently of the material/post-material classification. While Opp 1990) considers post-material values as public good preferences, Kriesi et al’s (1995) concept of subcultural movements implies that most such movements, including the women’s movement and the gay rights movement, are concerned with producing club goods. Materialist goals can involve the production of either club goods or public goods.

Kriesi et al (1995, ch. 7) offer the best analysis of the nature of the good desired by some of the new social movements. While their work does not strictly support the overarching hypothesis represented in Table 9.2, along with the discussion above it does suggest that only club goods are associated with the intrinsic goal structure expected of CJOs. While both types of goods may be found on all other values, this consideration does suggest that:

H9.4: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of club goods.

This leads to the expectation, though weak, that CJOs are prone to pursue the production of goods that do not deteriorate through consumption but are nonetheless characterized by the capacity to exclude people from their benefits.

Finally, there is no a priori reason (no deductive or inductive hypotheses) to expect CJOs to pursue radical or moderate goals. However, because autonomy is a post-materialist value, one weak hypothesis can be developed:

H9.5: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of autonomous goals.

This leads to the expectation, though weak, that CJOs are prone to pursue a space or practice free of interference from forces that they deem objectionable.
9.2.2. Dimensions of Strategic Orientation

One of the two primary tasks of this chapter is to offer empirical descriptions of the strategic orientations of CJOs. I seek to guide this operation by suggesting descriptive hypotheses and propositions that tease out some of the essential properties of oppositional strategy. The general hypothesis of the dimensionality of strategic orientations is that variation in strategic choices is structured along whichever dimension is hypothesized to be of interest. First, like goals, strategic orientations can be distinguished based on their emphasis on intrinsic or extrinsic challenges. In general, we might anticipate that groups that pursue intrinsic goals will express intrinsic orientations. I thus hypothesize

H9.6: CJOs are associated with intrinsic orientations

This leads to the expectation that CJOs develop basic orientations that are isomorphic with their goal structure.

Second, SMOs are distinguished by the breadth of appeal they aim to cultivate. At one extreme, an SMO may appeal to a broad swath of people and seek to develop a mass base by lowering the commitments required. At the other extreme, an SMO may seek to maximize the commitments of a core membership at the expense of developing a broad base. The hypothesized exclusivity of CJOs suggests that insularity may be the preponderant strategic orientation. I thus hypothesize

H9.7: CJOs are associated with an insular orientation.

This leads to the expectation that CJOs focus their energies on developing tight and committed support bases as opposed to a broader mass support base.

Finally, SMO strategies vary in the costs they incur for participants or the degree of disruption they introduce into everyday life. While the two concepts are conceptually
distinct, the general assumption is that they tend to co-vary, though we can posit a causal hypothesis: the more disruptive a tactic, the higher the costs of participating. It is precisely this relationship, however, that suggests that it is more fruitful to classify strategies by their degree of expected social disruption. Recall that costs can be distinguished as either intrinsic or extrinsic. Focusing on disruption allows us to disaggregate the transaction and prospective costs (and benefits) of actions and to determine the nature of their relationship with social disruption as a strategy. For example, in their classification of tactics Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010) develop what amounts to an additive index that sums the two types of costs. Tactics with high costs have high thresholds for adoption, while actions with low costs have low thresholds. Culture jamming is classified as a high-threshold action, because 1) it requires more knowledge of communications technology than e-mails or online petitions, and 2) the potential costs of engaging in possibly illegal actions are not insignificant. While culture jamming is intended as a disruptive process, it is positioned at roughly the same point along the threshold dimension as Internet-supported tactics like sit-ins and occupations. While the costs incurred by these actions may or may not be roughly equivalent in this instance, it seems hard to imagine that in general the degree of social disruption is equivalent, even roughly so. This suggests the obvious implication that, at the least, the transaction costs of actions should be distinguished from the level of expected disruption. Consider, for example, Tarrow's (1998, 94) observation that, “[V]iolence is the easiest kind of collective action for small groups to initiate without encountering major costs of coordination and control.”

So what can I conclude about the degree of social disruption intended by CJOs? Much of the work on social movement strategy focuses on the capacity of activists to
initiate social disruption and its effects on other actors (Lipsky 1968; Piven and Cloward 1978; Tarrow 1998). Disruption involves a sudden change in social routines and understandings, an obstruction in the daily activities of various social groups. It results not only in an increase in uncertainty for various actors, but also costs that may be regarded as negative inducements to comply with the demands of activists.

In order to measure the level of social disruption, it is useful to consider two indicators: the size of mobilization and the level of violence. DeNardo (1985) argues, first, that the number of people that an SMO or movement mobilizes in actual demonstrations is not only an expression of the scope of their support in society, but is itself an indicator of disruption. During political events like marches and rallies, people take up space, especially public space. A consequence of this occupation of space is the cessation or detouring, at extra expense, of the mundane activities that typically occupy this space, as well as the costs incurred by authorities in policing or suppressing the collective action. Consequently, an increase in numbers (or, perhaps more specifically, an increase in the mobilized proportion of the population) is more or less an increase in disruption. Violence as well is disruptive. The use of force, especially in the threatened or actual damaging of property of the harming of people, increases the sense of insecurity and threat posed by activists. Although there are direct costs to violence, the threat of violence or mild coercion can, like the size of mobilization, deter normal social activity and increase policing costs. Recall that I defined culture jamming as a form of intended disruption in Chapter One. While this disruption occurs on the plane of representation, this does not exclude the disruption of actual social routines. Recall as well that culture jamming is non-violent.
These considerations weakly suggest that the strategies of CJOs are typically oriented towards minor or low disruption. I develop a descriptive hypothesis:

H9.8: CJOs are associated with the tendency to mobilize relatively small numbers of people.

This leads to the expectation that CJOs tend to develop basic plans for action that typically involve as few as two or as many as ten or twenty people. This hypothesis would seem to pass too close to Chapter Eight’s exclusivity hypothesis. However, it is important to note that that hypothesis refers to organizational membership. This hypothesis refers to the total number of mobilized at an action. However, because Chapter One essentially and sensibly defines culture jamming as non-violent (though without actually defining it as such), it seems fruitless to consider a further hypothesis regarding an orientation towards violence.

9.2.3. Interdependence

Strategy refers to the broader organization of interdependent choices that aim to further the interests of the organization. In decomposing this conception, the most common perspective is to focus on the issues, targets, and tactics utilized by SMOs (Earl and Kimport 2008; Larson 2009; 2011; Walker et al 2008). This is the approach taken in this chapter. Larson (2011, 3) provides some elaboration.

**Issues** - the perceived problems and proposed solutions that animate social movements – e.g., worker protections, civil rights, tax relief, protection of clean water.

**Targets** - the objects of challengers’ campaigns that are expected to take action on an issue – e.g., lawmakers, a private business, university administrators, the public, the President.

**Tactics** - the practices that challengers perform when interacting with and attempting to influence those outside of their ranks – e.g., lobbying, picketing, meeting with elites, destroying property, speaking to the media, petitioning.
While clearly this list does not exhaust the wide range of activities and concerns that organizations engage in, it does capture the most important set of strategic elements. Strategy need not be explicit or coherent. Actions and choices may stray from even the formal expression of strategy through experimentation and improvisation. However, all actors ultimately seek to link their actions to actual or potential outcomes. SMOs may be constrained by demands both internal and external to justify their actions and relate them to outcomes. Participants and members need to know more or less why their contributions and why the action as a whole are crucial to the campaign. SMOs may also justify their action to the media, bystanders, the state, and other important organizations, because they possess important desired resources. SMOs may also define their actions in opposition to counter-framing efforts by opponents or media frames that aim to discredit or trivialize the SMOs strategies and solutions. These justifications of past, present, and future actions come in the form of prognostic framing actions (Snow and Benford 1988). Such framing efforts seek to explain and justify the actions of SMOs as expressions of broader strategic orientations to the problems identified in diagnostic framing efforts.

Recall that the interdependence of strategic choices is a hypothesis. It suggests that strategic elements (issues, targets, and tactics) tend to cluster together and mutually constrain one another. For example, issues constrain targets, as when anti-sweatshop campaigns focus on corporations and the institutions and organizations that support them.

9.2.4. Issues

In this chapter I describe the issues pursued by CJOs. Issues are the problems that SMOs seek to solve and that other actors like political parties engage in order to pursue
their interests. I distinguish between two approaches to issues. Multi-issue SMOs tend to take broad approaches to politics, often as a result of the claim that they represent significant sectors of society, such as labor unions. Single-issue SMOs take a narrower approach by focusing on one issue or a small set of issues that are closely related. In contrast to the general focus of the labor or socialist movements, new social movements are associated with a plethora of single-issue organizations (Melucci 1996; Rucht 1990; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988). I thus hypothesize:

H9.9: CJOs are associated with a focus on single issues.

This leads to the expectation that the sample of CJOs will tend to pursue a relatively small or minimal set of social problems and specific issues, as opposed to a broad, general approach that encompasses a variety of issues.

9.3. Analysis

9.3.1. Goals

Like the other concepts in this project, attempting to summarize the goals of twelve CJOs offers numerous difficulties. The approach taken here will engage the relevant hypotheses of this chapter as guides to disciplining efforts at goal description. As a preliminary point, the following five hypotheses are descriptive and involve a singular variable: CJOs, and its relationships with five variables. These five variables are constructed loosely, meaning that while they are treated as dichotomous, i.e. extrinsic or intrinsic, difficult cases may be coded as mixed.

First, I hypothesize (H9.1) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of intrinsic goals. An example of a group that pursues such goals is offered by the IST. They succinctly

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78 This distinction may also be construed as another dimension of strategic orientation. I consider it here separately, because in my analysis below I consider qualitative variation in issues as well.
describe their goal as “creative, participatory research that aims to temporarily transform public spaces and instigate dialogue about democracy, spatial justice and everyday life” (IST, 2012). For member D’Ignazio (Karanika), “often what the Institute’s projects are about is calling attention to [the] assumptions” surrounding public space (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). But calling attention, while it can and perhaps does extend to the wider audience that accesses the group’s websites and other related media, is primarily performed in the immediacy of interaction. Member Manning states:

I don't think we ever walk into a project thinking, we'll have the delusion that we'll change the world or we are going to have this mass following. I think it is very much about the one-on-one or small group that maybe they will get something out or maybe they will think we are annoying. At least we have that interaction or that moment where we changed an idea. (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).

One particularly insightful consideration of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is offered by the AAA’s Steve Lambert (2007):

Basically the idea is that everyone has to move through certain steps to change their behaviors...For example, you can't adopt a new behavior without first being aware that there is an alternative to what you are currently doing. Once you are aware, you need information on how to change that behavior. Once you have the information, you need motivation to start...And on and on.

So part of the measure of success for me is not just how many people saw this, but did I move them along on a step? Did this piece really make a difference in this person's life? Did it have a profound effect on their thinking? Did it change their perspective on the world? Will it change their behavior in the future?

Lambert’s extrinsic goal is ideally to dramatically reduce the amount of outdoor advertising in the urban landscape and replace it with works of art. This involves both supporting legal efforts to remove illegal advertising (not a culture jamming tactic) as well as moving people towards behavioral change, one that involves an increased awareness of the ubiquity of outdoor advertising and the political and artistic preference to change it. It is the emphasis
on a movement towards behavioral change – an emphasis on actions that potentially change the state of affairs - that establishes the extrinsicity of the action.

One case that suggests the difficulties of measurement is the BLF, a group whose primary goal appears to be an effort to weaken the power of advertising on the individual consciousness. Members Napier and Thomas (2006) state, “Each time you change the Advertising message in your own mind...you enter into the High Priesthood of Advertising.” Elsewhere, Napier is paraphrased as arguing that, “When people realize advertising is NOT a one-way street – that this is a liberated country and dialogue is expected – then the market will truly be free, and on top of it, the world will be a more fun place to live (Burkes 2012). Member Black (n.d.) claims that, “the battleground, the theater of operations is human consciousness.” Here, the emphasis is on realization, a shift in consciousness that empowers the individual. Although the group positively evaluates the possible effects on behavior, their focus is more modest:

[W]e’re all just telling people, ‘Advertising is a language. You’re being spoken to constantly through these ads. But you can talk back to them! You can make it a dialogue. And you don’t necessarily have to climb on up and alter a billboard’ (Haller and Napier 2006, 93)

Measurement is extremely fuzzy on this question. However, across the sample as a whole a slight majority of CJOs appear to pursue extrinsic goals. While two groups pursue intrinsic goals (BFL, IST), eight pursue extrinsic goals (AMF, AAA, BIL, CTM, RBC, SCP, TYM), with the IAA and NGL straddling the distinction.79 What I can conclude, if anything, is that I have found little support here for this hypothesis. I try to make sense of this finding further below.

79 “I think our projects generally play a dual role. On the one hand, they are pedagogical devices that provoke public discussion of critical issues. This conception of work fits neatly within the confines of "art practice." At the same time, our projects are functional tools that dissidents can actually use. In this regard, our work has more to do with engineering (or at least hacker) practice” (Schienke and IAA 2002, 104).
Second, I hypothesize (H9.2) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of cultural goals. One clear example of a group pursuing such a goal is the CAE. The CAE seek to develop practices of resistance against what they term the semiotic regime or the symbolic order, the particular dominant structure of power that constitutes the pervasive “instrumentalization/rationalization of culture” (Little 1999, 194). Power is expressed and enacted in cultural practices irreducible to political institutions, although they perform a function of reification, as do a variety of social, economic, religious, and cultural institutions. In contrast to the CAE’s manifestly cultural goal, the SCP is a clear example of a group with a political goal. The SCP aim to completely eradicate the public surveillance camera. The focus here is principally on the perceived unconstitutionality of the state surveillance of public areas, especially as found in New York City. As founder Bill Brown states, “the people who operate the cameras that worry us are the FBI, the NYPD, and the state, not the corporations” (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012).

This distinction between cultural and political goals appears problematic, however, when considering groups like AMF or Negativland. The AMF clearly pursues objectives within the political field of action. For example, one of their most noteworthy efforts involves the Media Carta, a charter aimed at challenging the corporate control of television and other means of mass communication. The charter states:

As a start, we demand the right to buy radio and television airtime under the same rules and conditions as advertising agencies. We ask our media regulators to set aside two minutes of every broadcast hour for citizen-produced messages. We want the six largest media corporations in the world broken up into smaller units (AMF 2009).

Yet, this apparent emphasis on the political field of action is subservient to a broader goal of cultural revolution, of which the Media Carta is merely a means. Opening the airways is part of a broader project of initiating ‘meme warfare,’ “a war of ideas against the keepers of
the current system, and we go right to the very foundations of that system, then we can begin a war of ideas where the good guys can eventually win” (Lasn n.d.). This war of ideas is at the core of the AMF’s mission, for they see their ultimate goal as a fundamental shift in lifestyle. As Lasn (2007) notes, “We are rather a philosophical than a political movement. We want people to think, to rethink their way of life.”

For their part, Negativland, the CTM, and the IAA seem to straddle the cultural/political distinction. On the one hand, Negativland seek to raise consciousness by breaking the spell of corporate advertising. With respect to their Dispepsi album, for example, member Mark Hosler states that “I hope that by the time you get to the end of the record you’re starting to get sick of hearing about this one product,” but “it’s also at the same time symbolic of any large corporation and the kind of advertising they do. And I hope people take it both ways (Hosler and Joyce 1997). On the other hand, in the wake of their lawsuit with Island Records over their U2 single, they’ve pursued modifications to copyright law that expand protections for artists that utilize fragments of copyrighted works (NGL 1995). The CTM and the IAA are less clear examples, and thus constitute more precarious measurements. With the CTM, for example, this arises in part because the group does not identify a specific or even general goal to which their actions may contribute; instead, they focus on crafting and testing tactics that they or others may deploy in the service of cultural or political goals. As member Gach (2007) states, “One thing we are doing and one of the reasons we are called the Center for Tactical Magic is that we are creating templates for tactics. You may not create your own tactical ice cream unit, but you might borrow your mom’s minivan, and conduct nomadic activities on your street.” These templates are intended to serve purposes beyond merely raising consciousness; instead, they function as
investigations into the particular sets of power relations – typically involving governments, militaries, and/or corporations - as well as augmentations of existing strategies (Paglen and Gach n.d.).

Across the sample as a whole about half of the CJOs pursue cultural goals (AMF, AAA, BLF, IST, CAE, RBC). Only three groups (BIL, SCP, TYM) pursue clearly political goals, with Negativland, the CTM, and the IAA straddling the distinction. Like the first hypothesis, this one finds cautious support.

Third, I hypothesize (H9.3) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of post-materialist goals. Nearly the entire sample unequivocally pursues post-materialist goals, thus supporting the hypothesis. The goal of the SCP, for example, is to maximize freedom and autonomy by completely eradicating the public surveillance camera and its pervasive invasion of privacy. There are some notable partial exceptions. One of the two major goals of the Billionaires (the other is campaign finance reform) is to increase awareness of increasing inequality in the United States, especially among swing voters in battleground states during presidential election years. Another prominent materialist value concerns protection of the environment. While this has long been construed as a post-materialist concern, especially in terms of the aesthetics of nature, it is also clear that questions of pollution and climate change also directly impact concerns over health and physical well-being. Most prominently expressed by RBC and the AMF, a focus on the environment straddles a materialist/post-materialist goal distinction by pursuing the reorientation of lifestyle along a more environmentally sustainable path. The Yes Men also pursue materialist/post-materialist goals, for example goals concerning social insurance and the
allocation of natural resources like water. I do not include the CTM in this particular analysis due to the ambiguity of their goal.

Fourth, I hypothesize (H9.4) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of club goods. The IST presents a clear example of the pursuit of a club good in which the immediate field of interaction and those who participate is restricted by an exclusion mechanism. In their case, usually the particular spatial confines of the scenario limit the number of people that can participate. As Manning notes, “I think it is very much about the one-on-one or small group that maybe they will get something out or maybe they will think we are annoying. At least we have that interaction or that moment where we changed an idea” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). This moment of interaction for the IST is the production of a club good of spontaneity, participation, conversation, and inquiry into the politics of the everyday. In contrast, groups like the Yes Men ultimately pursue the production of public goods, principally the reduction of corporate power and the democratization of globalization, although some club goods, such as social insurance programs, are included as a consequence of this general focus.

Most of the cases in the sample pursue public goods (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, NGL, RBC, SCP, and TYM). Only two groups pursue club goods (CAE and IST), while IAA straddle the distinction. I excluded the CTM from the analysis. This finding provides little support for the hypothesis. I attempt to explain this finding further below.

Fifth, I hypothesize (H9.5) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of autonomous goals. One example of a group pursuing an autonomous goal is the Billboard Liberation Front. As Napier urges, “Advertising is a language. You’re being spoken to constantly through these ads. But you can talk back to them! You can make it a dialogue” (Haller and
Napier 2006, 93). This dialogue constitutes an assertion of freedom and autonomy from the oppression of corporate advertising, which supersedes free will:

It’s either write, or be written. I can raise a pen or a brush in defense of my own mental environment, or allow myself to be the passive, infinitely impressed palimpsest which is the consumer caught in the maw of a marketing campaign (Black n.d.).

The Billionaires pursue a moderate goal of restricting the influence of corporations in elections and public policy. Member Hal E. Burton explains that “the purpose of Billionaires is “to expose the capture of the government by corporations” (Roselund 2004), a point upon which founder Andrew Boyd (2002, 370) elaborates: “to educate the public about the twin evils of campaign finance corruption and economic inequality.” However, this pedagogical focus not only involves drawing in media attention to their issues, goal, and objectives but also affecting voter turnout and political preferences (Boyd 2004).

Groups that pursue both extrinsic and autonomous goals appear to straddle the distinction between moderation or reform and autonomy. Like the RBC, the AMF provides an example of a group pursing a goal of autonomy and reform in their emphasis on lifestyle change. These groups express broad opposition to consumer and neoliberal values, while emphasizing freedom and community. In the principle book-length treatment of the AMF’s philosophy, Kalle Lasn (1999, especially 165-184) argues at length for a “downshifter” lifestyle, one that is more attuned to the non-material, more aware of the social and environmental repercussions of individual actions, and free of the slavery of the consciousness by corporations. While such a cultural shift would have wide-reaching political, social, cultural, and economic effects, they only constitute a reformist agenda. As noted by Nomai (2008, 147), Lasn does not oppose corporations, the pursuit of profit, or
consumerism. Instead, he calls for the reassertion of the ultimate power of individuals over culture and corporations and an environmentally sustainable future.

Unlike the previous goal dimensions, this dimension (or more accurately, two dimensions) offers three values: moderate, radical, and/or autonomy. Two groups pursue goals of autonomy (BLF, CAE, IAA), but three other groups pursue a mixture of autonomy and moderate goals (AMF, IAA, and RBC). While the RBC and AMF pursue the most relatively radical goals, even these goals can best be described as moderate. Six groups pursue moderate goals (AAA, BIL, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM), while the CTM is not included in the analysis. While roughly half the sample dabbles in autonomy, it is not clear that this constitutes strong support for the hypothesis.

Table 9.3 summarizes the data on each hypothesis. The only group that unequivocally conforms to every expectation is the CAE, while the SCP and the Billionaires are the furthest from the expected goal profiles of CJOs. Clearly, the evidence strongly supports only one of the hypotheses: post-materialism, while the expectation of club goods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Intrinsic</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Post-Materialist</th>
<th>Club Good</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Moderate/Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Post-Materialist</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLF</td>
<td>Intrinsic</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Post-Materialist</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIL</td>
<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAE</td>
<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Post-Materialist</td>
<td>Club</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Post-Materialist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moderate/Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IST</td>
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<td>Post-Materialist</td>
<td>Club</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Post-Materialist</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBC</td>
<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Moderate/Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
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<td>Political</td>
<td>Post-Materialist</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYM</td>
<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 = mixed  2 = insufficient data
is almost completely frustrated. The rest of the hypotheses offer mixed results, though the majority of cases appear to be cultural, as expected, and extrinsic and moderate, which is not what was expected. Importantly, the number of mixed cases suggests the difficulty in determining the specific qualities of the general or primary goal of an SMO. Below I seek to explain some of these findings.

9.3.2. Dimensions of Strategic Orientations

One of the two primary tasks of this chapter is to offer empirical descriptions of the strategic orientations of CJOs. First, I hypothesize (H9.6) that CJOs are associated with intrinsic orientations. The data on this hypothesis proves difficult to summarize due to the heterogeneity of the goal structures in the sample. This makes it imperative that I reconsider the distinction between goals and objectives. Goals constitute the primary concern of an SMO, whereas objectives constitute the set of secondary goals that contribute to the achievement of the goal. I assume that objectives are subordinate to the goal and hierarchical, though they may be heterogeneous. In Chapter Three I define heterogeneity or homogeneity as the intrinsicity or extrinsicity of a goal and an objective. Here, I expand that definition to include the array of values specific to each of the dimensions specified above.

The gist of my argument is that while a particular group's primary goal may be extrinsic and/or focus on the production of a public good, a central objective may involve an intrinsic action/outcome linkage or the production of club goods. In order to flesh this argument out I consider the Yes Men. The Yes Men see themselves as contributing to the anti-globalization or global justice movement(s), the series of collective actions and organizations that basically defines itself as pursuing a more equitable and democratic
globalization. As they state: “When people ask us whether what we’re doing makes a
difference, or ask what we accomplish, we say that mainly, we see our work as contributing
to a cumulative movement that does effect change” (TYM n.d.(b)). This change involves the
development of a “new legal framework to govern the behavior of corporations” in order to
replace a focus on short-term profits with a more socially responsible agenda (TYM
2009b). Such a goal is extrinsic, political, moderate, and concerns the production of a
bundle of primarily public goods.

In order to achieve this goal, however, the Yes Men engage in strategies and tactics
that concern the pursuit of objectives that in some cases vary significantly in their formal
characteristics from their wider goal. Many Yes Men actions involve impersonating
members or representatives of some target (the WTO, Chamber of Commerce, Shell, etc.)
and presenting satirical but ‘honest’ content at conferences. These audience members
constitute what Nomai (2008, 73) calls the Yes Men’s direct audience. For the group, “the
direct audience is crucial because without them there would be no scene” (Bichlbaum
2008, 255). Such actions are organized by the pursuit of specific objectives – the staging of
actions - that are intrinsic, cultural, moderate, and concern the production of a club good.
Once the scene is generated, however, a more significant objective is concerned, namely the
diffusion of the action to a wider viewing public. This involves accessing the mass media,
especially the mainstream media. This wider indirect audience of media and public
opinion is their primary audience; “this is just a gimmick to get a certain amount of press
attention for a certain number of issues. It’s nothing more and in no way a movement”
(Bichlbaum 2008, 259). Some of their actions essentially bypass the initial objective of the
club good, such as their impersonation of a Dow Chemical spokesperson on a BBC news
broadcast. They also produce documentaries and books about their actions, do press, releases, and operate a website. In reaching this wider audience, however, their specific objectives seem less clear. For example, member Mike Bonanno claims:

For the people who see the film, it just seems to work in a different way. It's a slower-burning thing, more people see it and talk about it. In terms of changing people's consciousness in a slow and subtle way, it really has an effect. We see high school students, for example, who see The Yes Men and show it to their friends and so on. It makes a difference (TYM 2009a).

Yet, elsewhere member Andy Bichlbaum suggests: “what we do is galvanize people who are already on our side. Changing the minds of people on the other side is something this work can do, and does in extraordinary moments, but doing that is more of a fact-to-face kind of thing” (TYM 2012b). Elsewhere, Bonanno makes “no large claims about trying to build a social movement or even necessarily making much of a difference in the world. He simply said he saw himself helping to build morale for those really are in the trenches doing the hard work of organizing for change” (Haugerud 2013, 195). These modest claims suggest that the Yes Men hope to increase the amount of scrutiny brought to bear on certain issues relevant to their wider goal of social change. In particular, they seek to increase awareness and solidarity among an ideologically sympathetic population, if not those on the fence. Such an objective is apparently intrinsic, cultural, moderate, and concerns the production of a public good, namely the diffusion of information through the media and possible preference change among some of the audience.

These objectives are, again, subordinate to the wider goal. The Yes Men see the production of these goods as contributing to part of the wider effort; one that is sustained by both legal and electoral challenges as well as civil disobedience. What they do is “just one piece of the activism puzzle. It’s not the whole thing at all” (TYM 2012b), because the
actions of the Yes Men “only [go] so far. The real engine is street protest and other forms of mass movement” (Bichlbaum 2008, 259).

This strategic orientation is roughly similar across the cases of groups with extrinsic goals. The Billionaires’ Andrew Boyd (n.d.) expresses the same sentiment as TYM:

I just emphasize this again and again with people with whom I do workshops and talk to – creative actions, creative interventions can draw attention to an issue; they can push a corporate target which is stealing from the people or getting away with an ecological crime, and you can put a spotlight on them and it can be extremely useful. But then there has to be a larger movement that keeps holding their feet to the fire.

Elsewhere, Boyd (2004) states a further clarification:

There are a lot of forms of activism that are massively more effective...It’s only really fair to compare [Billionaires for Bush] to other things of the same order. It’s very effective at getting media attention. It’s very effective at inviting people who don’t have a strong history of political activism, but share progressive values and views, and are skilled, creative professionals...Whether it’s actually effective at changing anybody's mind is a whole other matter. Whether it’s the most effective voice with which to engage individual swing voters face to face...some ways no, and some way (sic) yes.

Much like TYM, this final modest point finds a more robust counterpart:

What we tell funders is that we’re trying to reach voters in battleground states. One part of it is suppressing Bush voters by confirming their nagging suspicions that he is serving corporate interests at the expense of the average voter. We’re also trying to persuade those in the middle (Boyd 2004).

This sense that these groups seek to raise consciousness, awareness, change political preferences, or change political behavior as part of a wider struggle distinguishes them from groups that pursue intrinsic goals. While the IST and the BLF do situate itself within particular artistic and political milieus populated by similar groups past and present, their strategic orientation is less conceived as part of a broader movement, and instead focuses on developing specific instances or events of freedom, community, or discourse; in other words, they try to create spaces of difference and dissent. For the BLF, this space or event is a public good, one accessible to all through a reading of the billboard in person or in the
media and crafted through the production of a club good: the expression of autonomy and freedom by the BLF itself in the creation of a culture jam on a billboard. For the groups pursuing broader extrinsic goals, this process is ultimately subordinate to a wider goal – democratizing globalization, reforming corporate behavior, reducing advertising or surveillance, changing authoritarian culture, etc.

Next, I hypothesize (H9.7) that CJOs are associated with insular orientations. Six groups in the sample conform to this expectation (BLF, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP). These groups express little to no interest in utilizing the resources of a broad support base and cultivating wide appeal. Instead, they are more interested in developing internal relationships and engaging audiences. Two groups lack sufficient data to determine their orientation (CTM, TYM), while the remaining four express some degree of mass orientation (AMF, AAA, BIL, RBC). For example, the AMF boasts of a network of activists approaching 100,000 (Lasn et al 2012). The AAA (2013c) asks for others to engage in AAA actions on their own and share the experience on the group’s website. The Billionaires is the closest thing to a mass organization in the sample. While insularity is the predominant orientation in the sample, the four cases of mass orientations do not provide strong support for the hypothesis.

Finally, I hypothesize (H10.8) that CJOs are associated with the tendency to mobilize relatively small numbers of people. This hypothesis aims to determine the extent of social disruption specific to my sample of CJOs. As expected, almost the entire sample of CJOs is oriented towards relatively small mobilizations (see Table 9.4). Some groups (BLF, NGL, and TYM) are concerned not with attracting non-members, but with simply performing their actions, though the TYM require the unwitting participation of large numbers of
people in some of their actions. Still others pursue small engagements with a handful of participants and audience members, some of them bystanders (AAA, CAE, CTM, IAA, IST, and SCP). Three groups differ somewhat from this pattern: the AMF, BIL, and RBC. The AMF in particular are occasionally oriented towards large mobilizations with events such as Buy Nothing Day. The Billionaires are also keen on mobilizing more than a small handful of participants, though even their largest actions involve less than a hundred participants. The RBC are clearly the most civil disobedient of the entire sample. While their actions range in size of participation from very small store interventions to larger protests, they also visibly and dramatically occupy private space, such as a Starbucks or Disney store. They claim that “the fastest way to reclaim public space is to go and get in it...The only real authority in public space is public action. Bodies in space, talking and listening: the freedom starts there” (D. and Talen 2011, 136). Contact with the police and security guards are routine features of this approach.
9.3.3. Issues

In order to further flesh out the strategic orientation of culture jamming orientations as the interdependence of strategic choices, I consider in this chapter the issues that CJOs select as relevant. Analysis of targets and tactics proceeds in the following chapters.

I hypothesize (H10.7) that CJOs are associated with a focus on single issues. For example, the AAA is strictly concerned with the issue of outdoor advertising, while the SCP is exclusively concerned with the presence of public surveillance cameras. In contrast, the AMF focuses on an extremely wide set of issues including the relation of mass food production to various physical and psychological conditions, access to media outlets, the environmental impact of automobiles, and the harmful effects of the cosmetics and advertising industries, as well as more recent concerns with U.S. foreign policy.

As expected, most cases in the sample pursued a single-issue agenda (see Table 9.4). Nine groups conformed to this expectation, while the AMF and the RBC pursued multi-issue agendas. The CTM again proves difficult to pigeonhole.

I briefly move beyond a general characterization of the scope of a group's issue agenda by attending to some of the substantive concerns of the groups. Some issues do appear common across some or much of the sample. These include especially the harmful effects of advertising, the privatization of public space, and media concentration, all of which are issues bound up with the freedoms of speech and expression. The AMF, AAA, BLF, CAE, CTM, IAA, IST, NGL, RBC all exhibit strong concern over these issues and define their actions as addressing them. The BLF’s Napier state:

But I have to admit I'm pretty irate at a handful of billboard corporations controlling all the public spaces. I find that completely undemocratic and I didn’t vote for it – and yet these
billboards are in a public space and I have to look at them...Those spaces belong to all of us” (Berger 2000).

The AMF’s Media Carta charter directly targets the problem of the concentration of media outlets in the hands of a small number of corporations, while their entire mission takes issue with the harmful pervasiveness of advertising. Other issues of note include economic inequality, the power of corporations in politics, and the environment. Opposition to surveillance cameras is notable in four groups: the CAE, IAA, RBC, and SCP. More idiosyncratic issues include biotechnology (CAE), the relation between defense research, engineering departments, and protest policing (CAE and IAA), the resurgence of nationalism (CAE and IST), and copyright law (NGL), among others.

9.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I develop hypotheses regarding the goals and strategic orientations of CJOs. Results were mixed on the general NSM hypothesis. The majority of CJOs in this sample tends to develop strategic orientations that are either extrinsically oriented but involve the production of club good or intrinsic objectives or they primarily focus on intrinsic goals. Groups like the BLF and the CAE conform to this latter understanding of culture jamming, one that appears to confirm the generic hypothesis of NSM theory. However, the majority of the sample does not strictly conform to this understanding. I suggest two ways to consider this frustration. First, as suggested in the conclusion of Chapter Seven, most CJOs are not engaged identity politics. Instead, they consider themselves part of what Kriesi et al (1995) call instrumental movements. This is made clear by many of the goals of the groups in the sample, goals broadly sympathetic to the anti-globalization or global justice and environmental movements, a point casually made in the introduction to this dissertation.
Second, one of the reasons that CJOs may choose to utilize the strategies that they do – low social disruption - is that they may perceive the political environment to be inopportune for more extrinsically oriented objectives, what Yes Men member Bichlbaum (2008, 259) described as the real engine of social change, “street protest and other forms of mass movement.” Kriesi et al (1995) suggest a similar mechanism at play in the relation of subcultural movements to political opportunities. They argue that movements like the gay rights or women’s movements are prone to shift to a more instrumental approach when they encounter sustained facilitation (a concept explored further in Chapter Twelve) and a more counter-cultural (aggressive) approach when they encounter sustained (though not too heavy) repression. More generally, scholars now acknowledge the importance of ‘abeyance structures,’ networks and organizations of dissent that maintain solidarity, ideology, and identity as well as resources during periods of low mobilization (Taylor 1989). However, such structures and relations do not necessarily evaporate during periods of high mobilization. Social movements are diverse and in many cases characterized by extensive organizational specialization (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Haines 1988). Thus, I suggest here that part of this process of responding to the perception of adverse opportunities involves an emphasis on modest strategies that maintain solidarity, ideology, and identity, generate media awareness, and change political preferences. With respect to my sample of CJOs, this involves the structure of strategic orientations described above: extrinsic and public good goals with an emphasis on intrinsic and club or public good objectives and low social disruption. In the following chapter I consider the question of political opportunities, while this more general hypothesis I consider in the remaining chapters.
CHAPTER 10. IDENTITY AND STRATEGY

Chapter Nine describes the goals and strategic orientations of CJOs. This chapter’s primary task is to relate these strategic considerations to the collective identities of these organizations using data collected from my sample of CJOs. The primary argument of this chapter is that identities are the shared understandings that shape the ideologies of these organizations. Ideologies refer here to the cognitive, affective, and normative evaluation of relevant social relations and the capacity and motivation to modify or venerate these relations. These social relations are the stable and volatile aspects of the available structure of opportunities and threats. In turn, these evaluations form the foundation for strategic orientations. This chapter thus begins the analysis of a relation of culture jamming to everyday social organization.

This chapter is organized into three parts. First, I review the concept of an opportunity structure and consider the literature on targeting strategies. Second, I develop theoretical relations between strategic orientations and collective identities. In order to relate identities and strategies, I focus on the ideologies of CJOs and opportunity structures. Third, I present data on the variety of targets that CJOs engage in their strategic choices.

An important caveat concerns the scope of this chapter. Chapter Nine develops the relation between goals and strategic orientations. This chapter elaborates the relation between collective identities and strategic orientations. My additional emphasis on targets in this chapter implicitly suggests that sets of hypotheses may be developed relating goals to targets through strategic orientations. However, while Chapter Nine explicitly avoids addressing the determinants of goal selection, the model utilized in this dissertation does suggest that collective identities and goals constitute two independent explanatory
variables. However, because the focus of this dissertation remains an explanation of tactical choice and due to space and time constraints, target selection is only considered as part of the constraining context on the choice in tactics.

### 10.1. Opportunity Structures

#### 10.1.1. Political Opportunities

Along with RMT, political process theory helped revive the study of social movements in the 1970s (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Earlier social movement theory largely neglected political motivations and the political context in favor of an emphasis on social structure and psychology (Blumer 1951; Lang and Lang 1961; Smelser 1963).80 As political scientists sounded the call to “bring the state back in,” opportunity theorists situated protest activity adjacent to the political environment. This explicitly political perspective calls attention to a variety of factors exogenous to a social movement: regime type; laws, regulations, and judicial decisions; relationships between political actors, especially the party in government; public opinion and the mass media. These contextual features offer opportunities and constraints that inhibit, channel, or instigate collective challenges to elites and activists.

However, identifying the salient factors that constitute political opportunity structures (POS) as well as their relative stability over time has proven somewhat contentious. Early efforts typically conflated durable structural characteristics with more unstable situational or conjunctural factors. For example, Kitschelt’s (1986) classification

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80 Even Olson’s (1965) groundbreaking theory of collective action disregards both political institutions and political motivation; political activity is only rational insofar as economic inducements are offered in the form of material selective incentives.
of West Germany as a closed opportunity structure was at odds with most scholars of West German politics. Instead, closed opportunities were the result of contingent strategies by various political actors, especially the SPD, in spite of the open federal structure of the West German constitutional system (Rootes 1999). This reduction of agency to structure sparked one of the longest-running critiques of the approach (Goodwin and Jasper 2003; 2011). Later practitioners would acknowledge this problem by distinguishing stable from volatile aspects of the environment (Kriesi et al 1995; Meyer 1990; Rucht 1990; Tarrow 1998). For example, Tarrow (1998) identifies five sources of opportunities and constraints on contentious politics: the degree of access to the political system, the stability of political alignments, divided elites, influential allies, and repression and facilitation. However, drawing on Kriesi et al’s (1995) conceptualization of stable opportunities, he stresses that these situational opportunities function within a broader context of stable opportunities, including variation in the strength of the state and the prevailing strategies that authorities utilize against challengers. Still, Tarrow is quick to stress that even concepts like state strength are too general and abstract to capture the nuances of politics.

The chief import of political variables is their perceived facility in explaining variance in protest mobilization, strategies, and outcomes across time and across institutional contexts. However, the form of the relationship between opportunities and mobilization is often ill-specified or ignored (Opp 2009). Eisinger (1973) distinguishes a negative linear relation – closed opportunities yield more protest through a frustration-aggression mechanism – from a curvilinear relation in which expanding opportunities signal decreasing costs for activism and thus initially yield increasing protest. As the structure continues to open, however, rising expectations are met by increases in
satisfaction. Many scholars utilize an implicit hypothesis of a positive linear relationship in which increasing opportunities produce increasing protest (McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998). Goldstone (2004) argues that the primary predictive utility of POS is minimal, consisting primarily in the argument that once access is opened – once effective democracy is instituted – social movements become a regular feature of the political landscape.

With respect to the question of strategy, Marks and McAdam (original emphasis, 1999: 102) provide the most succinct theoretical proposition:

Organizers are also very likely to tailor their efforts to the specific kinds of changes they see taking place in the political systems they seek to challenge. In particular, where and how they seek to press their claims will reflect their view of where the system is newly vulnerable or receptive to their efforts

Yet this reasonable conjecture has led to relatively anemic theorizing on the relationship. For most POS scholars, institutional contexts are specified at the national level with little effort to specify mechanisms. For example, one hypothesis suggests that the more open the political system, the less disruptive the protests (Kitschelt 1986). Kitschelt suggests that the structure of opportunities in each context translates directly into the calculus of protest mobilization. While this may be helpful for explaining variation in strategies and tactics across entire populations and across time, opportunities and constraints are not uniform across movements or SMOs. The distribution of these factors across a population of activists can yield variable strategies and tactics. For example, the perception of the level of threat posed by an SMO may yield repression by authorities, thus making some actions more or less attractive to other SMOs (Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998).

10.1.2 Discursive Opportunities and Irony

Over the last decade, scholars have identified several other possible opportunity structures of relevance to the study of contentious politics ranging from the economic
(King 2008; Soule 2009) to the discursive (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McCammon, Newman, Muse, and Terrell 2007). In an effort to amend the framing literature’s relative lack of emphasis on exogenous framing constraints, several scholars suggest that discursive processes in a given society are constrained by the overall discursive opportunity structure. As Lipsky argued (1968), protest is a process oriented not only towards the target (government), but also the reference publics that have influence over the political process. In order to maximize their bargaining capacity, activists develop strategies and tactics that appeal to the mass media, which in turn publicizes the protests to these reference publics. Like the POS, this sphere of publicity is not neutral. The discursive environment is a field strewn with opportunities and constraints that can channel, inhibit, or facilitate collective action. The most important discursive players are the various mass media, but other major political actors, as well as various SMOs, utilize their own discursive repertoires in an effort to increase support for their goals while criticizing their opponents (Steinberg 1995; 1998; 1999a; 1999b). In addition, this discursive struggle – frames, counter-frames, and the framing contests within a social movement – mediates between objective POS and social movement mobilization, strategy, and outcomes. Defining a political context as open or closed is itself a discursive conflict. For example, a government that is opposed to an SMO may characterize the activists demands as illegitimate and marginal, while simultaneously arguing either that the government is unable to concede or that it refuses to do so. If the mass media refuse to cover the group’s non-violent demonstrations, parrot the government narrative, or utilize their own set of frames depicting the activists unfavorably, the SMO’s prospects for success are indeed bleak, and mobilization may suffer accordingly.
The concept of discursive opportunities travels to non-democratic regimes as well. State monopolies on mass media as well as the frequent use of surveillance and informants to identify dissenters can severely constrict the opportunities available even for political discussion. This repressive environment makes the articulation of overt contentious frames very risky (Johnston 2006; Johnston and Mueller 2001; Thornton 2002; Wedeen 1999). As a consequence, “opposition movements have become skilled at mounting unobtrusive, symbolic, and peaceful forms of disruption that avoid repression, while symbolizing contention” (Tarrow 1998, 103). In particular, ‘unobtrusive’ (Johnston and Mueller 2001) or ‘small’ (Johnston 2006) contention involves secure spaces of discourse: cafes, official cultural organizations, literary or scientific circles, etc., wherein grievances, ideologies, and identities can be articulated free from the overwhelming repression of the state. Johnston and Mueller are explicit that the contentious nature of oppositional talk is a function of the overwhelming risks that critical public speech holds for ordinary citizens, let alone activists. Following this logic, Tarrow (1998, 103) hypothesizes that “the more closed citizens’ access to legitimate participation, the more sensitive citizens are to the meanings of symbolic forms of protest.” Presumably, this sensitivity translates into a widely distributed capacity to decipher more sophisticated, subtle, or covert forms of expression. Many note, for example, the use of irony and ambiguity in contentious expressions under authoritarian regimes (Johnston 2006; Thornton 2002; Wedeen 1999).

Some works have explored the use of irony in more democratic contexts. Without referring to framing, Stewart et al (2007, 195) identify rhetorical strategies in social movements that contribute to the construction of ridicule, including the use of irony. Some works consider the role of irony in culture jamming. Day (2008; 2011) and Wettergren
(2005, ch. 8) argue that irony helps to create stronger feelings of collective identity by appealing to sympathizers’ sense of humor. In Chapter One, I identify culture jamming as a form of ironic framing. One interpretation of rational choice theory would suggest that, assuming that activists regard their audience as endowed with variable degrees of interpretive sophistication (varying resource constraints), framing strategies would be constructed as maximally simplistic and straightforward (low cognitive costs) in order to appeal to the most adherents. From this perspective, frames are created and distributed in order to be effective. However, if a frame increases the cognitive demands on audiences – if it requires more effort and more skill to successfully interpret – how can it be said to be a rational choice? Under repressive conditions, sophisticated frames are not anomalous, because the (repression) costs of overt simple contentious frames are presumably higher than the (cognitive) costs of the more subtle frames. Under less repressive political contexts like democracy, however, the use of ironic framing, or culture jamming, would appear to be an occasion in which movement actors choose a deliberately more difficult discursive device over the overt straightforward alternative that risks little to no costs. This dissertation is an effort to explain this subtle anomaly in rational choice theory.

10.1.3. Targets

Within the literature on targets there are two basic but related ways to conceptually distinguish among targets. The first concerns differences in the basic orientation towards the target (Gamson 1990; Lipsky 1968; McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996). According to Tilly (2008; McAdam et al 2001), by definition all contentious political action is directed towards some object of claims. These objects are those collective actors or identities to which activists press their claims. These actors, however, are only one form of target.
Scholars have identified a number of other important targets that social movement actors engage. Gamson (1990) distinguishes between antagonist, beneficiary, and constituency targets. Antagonists are Tilly’s objects of claims: those actors or institutions whose actions the protagonists believe can address their grievances. They are in this sense the targets of influence, the group that an SMO seeks in order to provide benefits to beneficiary targets. Beneficiaries are those actors or institutions that the protagonists believe will benefit from these desired changes. Finally, constituency targets are those actors or institutions whose commitment the protagonists seek—in the form of participation and contributions—in order to pursue the desired changes of the SMO. Importantly, while Gamson introduced some methodological qualifications, these categories are not logically exclusive. Beneficiaries can also be constituents, for example.

In his study of local, ad hoc, and relatively powerless SMOs, Lipsky (1968) identified four audiences that the group seeks to influence. Some are essentially the same as Gamson. Both distinguish between constituents and antagonists or target groups. However, Lipsky assumes that beneficiaries and constituents are the same: the SMO initially draws support from those they seek to benefit. However, because the support base of the SMO is low in resources, it lacks the capacity to bargain with the target group. In order to generate an effective bargaining capacity, it must interact with two other basic types of actors: the communications media and the reference publics of the target group. Through the media, the SMO can ramify its actions and message and generate a favorable reaction among these reference publics. In turn, the target group will respond to the reference publics.

McCarthy, Smith, and Zald (1996) makes an effort to distinguish SMO targets by identifying four arenas in which movement actors seek to further their goals. These actors target the
agenda within each arena, the hierarchy of issues most salient to that arena. The public agenda refers to the general population’s aggregated concerns. Those issues that are given the most attention across the mass media are the media agenda. The electoral agenda denotes the set of issues that drive campaigns for political office. Finally, the governmental agenda specifies the salient concerns of officials within political institutions.

The second means by which scholars distinguish targets is inductive or ad hoc, though it relies on a basic distinction between state and non-state targets. While the state is the most common single focus of protest, a variety of other actors are also prominent targets, including schools and school boards, corporations, labor unions, religious and medical organizations, and the public (Van Dyke et al. 2004; Walker et al. 2008). Often this approach is premised on the assumption that protest events are primarily oriented towards objects of claims or Gamson’s antagonists. In attempting to capture variation in targets across my sample of CJOs, I utilize both approaches below.

10.2. Theory and Hypotheses

In order to relate the identities of my sample of CJOs to their strategic orientations, I develop the theoretical insights initially presented in Chapters Two and Three. First, I consider the relation of opportunity structures to everyday social organization, especially the shared understandings constitutive of collective identities. Second, I relate these considerations to the ideologies I discuss in Chapter Three and to the strategic orientations I describe in Chapter Nine. Finally, I consider differing targeting strategies.

While I draw extensively from Tilly in this chapter, my efforts to elaborate on concepts like strategic situations and their relations to opportunity structures are largely my own. This is primarily, though not exclusively, a consequence of the static decision
theoretic analysis pursued so far in this dissertation. I offer only a rudimentary analysis of objective structures here. Most of the focus here is on the subjective or attitudinal correlates, the perceptions of these actors and institutions by SMOs. Instead, this single-actor model of tactical choice primarily focuses on the perception of the general structures of opportunity and threat. Clearly, any consideration of interactions with political authorities and media outlets, to name a few, would require a more robust and dynamic analysis. I tentatively venture such an analysis in Chapter Twelve. Consequently, the focus here is on establishing the generalized sense of the strategic situation recognized by SMOs and represented in their ideologies. This leads to the related point that the initial utility of analyses of opportunities and threats lay in the quantification of objective environmental characteristics in order to facilitate rigorous cross-case comparison. However, the distinction between perceived and objective opportunities is now recognized as a fruitful one (Tarrow 1998). These considerations lead me to briefly note that, “the evaluation of one’s capacities [and those of other actors] is itself shaped by former experiences with authorities – [which] may explain why, contrary to what would be expected on the basis of a simple [objective] POS model, people sometimes do not use the opportunities available to them” (Kriesi et al 1995, 246). The following section considers this relation between structures of opportunity, patterns of attribution and evaluation, and collective action.

10.2.1. Collective Identities and Opportunity Structures

Downey and Rohlinger (2008, 31n1) rightly point out that the concept of strategic orientation is broader than Tilly’s repertoires of contention. They argue that in contrast to the focus on tactics, strategic orientation “emphasizes collective identity as an organizing principle.” However, in his work on repertoires of contention Tilly developed hypotheses
relating claims or issues and identities to the sets of tactics that actors would utilize. McAdam et al (2001, 138) define repertoires of contention as “ensembles of claim-making routines available to particular pairs of identities.” This definition clearly clusters claims, performances, and identities. For Tilly, one of the defining features of a repertoire of contention is that it can contribute to an explanation of tactical choice through the specification of, networks, identities, and claims. Preferences for certain tactics tend to cluster around these variables.

The model presented in Figure 10.1 introduces a set of relationships in order to better explain the relation of identities to strategic orientations. Linking the shared understandings of actors with the opportunity structures available to them is the set of durable social relations and social fields that these actors are embedded within. In order to elaborate, I consider the concept of an opportunity structure. As noted above, the POS refers to the arrangement of threats and opportunities offered by both durable political structures and the more volatile alignments among political actors. Opportunities refer to the features of this environment affecting “the probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome,” while threats connote those constraints shaping “the costs that a social group will incur from protest or that it expects to suffer if it does not act” (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 181, 183). Such factors include the degree of access, facilitation, prior success, and repression meted out to challengers by political actors. For example, high capacity democratic regimes are generally tolerant of a wide variety of political activity, but generally effective at suppressing highly disruptive activism, including violence.

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81 He hypothesizes: “For a given set of actors and issues, those performances change relatively little from one round of action to the next” (Tilly 2008, 27).
As stressed in Chapter Three, my conception of structures of opportunity and threat emphasizes the production of information through interactions with protagonists, antagonists, and neutrals. While it is clear that direct interactions with actors can produce updated estimates of the probability of success or the costs of inaction or protest, in some ways the indirect effects of interaction are more crucial (Koopmans 2005). Figure 10.2 is a simple formalization of the mediated relation of opportunity structures to action. Here, opportunity structures, including the more volatile configurations of power within a political regime, constitute constraints played out in the strategic interactions (direct and indirect) among the major political actors in a given political regime: police, courts, militaries, other SMOs, countermovement SMOs, interest groups, the public, media organizations, political parties, and other groups. Importantly, these interactions are not exclusively antagonistic. In the broader political participation literature, for example, a prominent explanation of variation in political activity is the degree to which individuals are actively mobilized by organizations like parties, interest groups, and candidate
campaigns (Hansen and Rosenstone 1993; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978), an argument echoed in solidarity theorist’s emphasis on the mobilizing effects of political entrepreneur’s use of pre-existing networks (McAdam 1999; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978).

These strategic interactions produce information externalities that provide updated perceptions of the prevailing opportunities and threats available to actors. In turn, these constraints provide updated expectations regarding the costs and benefits of various contentious collective actions. A notable illustration of this process is found in Tarrow’s (1998) claim that social movements are generated partly through the effects of ‘early risers’. In his model, early successes by activists produce flows of information about the political environment. This information signals new prospects for collective action that diffuse to the wider public, including other activists. Conversely, perceived collective action failures may generate information flows that dampen the prospects for success.
10.2.2. Ideologies

Recall the basic relation between schemas and information established in Chapter Three, especially Figure 3.2. While current information initiates the decision process by offering the relevant cues for a sketch of the situation, the shared schemas activated by this information constrain the effects of additional information on the decision process. In other words, we tend to experience and analyze events through the lens of our prior experiences. Figure 10.1 employs a parallel consideration. The distinction between understandings and opportunities mirrors the relation between schemas and information; shared understandings are composed of schemas, while the opportunities and threats offered by an opportunity structure through strategic interactions are carried along by an updated stream of information. One consequence of this distinction is that the sets of actors and institutions that comprise the stable and volatile aspects of opportunity structures are also embedded in sets of social relationships and social fields. As noted in Chapter Two and as hinted in Figure 10.1, these durable social relations and the fields in which they are embedded are maintained in part by collective identities, the shared understandings and public representations that define the boundaries of these relations. Thus, socialization into a set of social relations and social fields produces shared understandings about sets of actors and institutions, while direct or indirect interactions with these same institutions and actors produce the information flows that update actors.

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82 As I noted in Chapter Three, these (free and costly) streams (which may vary systematically across contexts in terms of the quantity and quality of information) are intervening variables between the opportunity structures that activists face - contexts inclusive of sets of institutions and interactions that produce up-to-date contextual information - and the perception and evaluation of these opportunities and threats.
on the opportunities and threats available to them and others. This point is crucial. Within the constraints offered by these information-generating contexts, SMOs and authorities respond to each other with tactics that vary across the system (chosen actions). The POS – a significant constraint on the responses of political actors to activists and other actors - thus generates current information about the various constraints the political context offers, as well as updated information on the effectiveness of actions.

However, corresponding to the constraint imposed on choice by schemas (see Figure 3.2), choices in tactics are constrained by the definition of the strategic situation facing an SMO and the motivations to engage in collective action. These assessments constitute a shared sense of the strategic significance of social relations; they identify the range of appropriate (and thus inappropriate) means for action. As shared schemas, these ideologies refer here to the relatively sophisticated or coherent organization of the cognitive, affective, and normative evaluations of relevant social relations and the motivation to modify, acquiesce to, or venerate these relations. Thus, ideologies are not merely “the verbal image of a good society,” (Downs 1957, 96) but, as implied by Downs’ analysis, the preference structure relating different configurations of social relations – the good society being the upmost desired.

In this understanding of ideology, each actor assesses their position relative to others, especially the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of actors. Vulnerabilities are an SMO’s sense of the degrees or points of access available to them within a structure and the basic means of governing or restricting these points. Motivations refer to an SMO’s

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83 Recall, for example, the notion that the practical sense that animates the habitus – the sets of dispositions generated by social fields and social interaction - is a variably efficient capacity for exploiting the opportunities available in a social field.
sense of the preferences of actors and the incentive structures they are embedded within. Capacities are an SMO’s sense of the resources and the autonomy that actors and institutions constituting a structure possess that may be utilized to influence the protagonist(s). From the perspective of an SMO, each structure of opportunities and threats possesses some configuration of these basic factors. For example, imagine an SMO that perceives the political environment to be extremely open, but believes that the major actors, say Congress or Parliament, are greedy survivalists unwilling to act against the interests of corporate campaign donors. Such a sense of the strategic situation does not necessarily close off all strategic options, but rather makes some or many options far less attractive than a neutral sense of the situation.

A preliminary point must be considered. As noted in Chapter Seven, people vary in the degree to which their evaluations are internally coherent or organized (Converse 1964). In other words, some people possess more belief constraint or more developed ideological conceptions of the world around them than others. Consequently, one might say that the more coherent the organization of the schemas – the stronger or the more rigid the ideology - the more constraining the effects on choice. I note as well in Chapter Seven that the rejection of grand narratives – an observation by Wettergren (2005, 48) regarding her sample of CJO’s - may suggest the possibility that these organizations do not exhibit the coherence of a constraining ideology. Yet, Mueller and Judd (1981) found that political activists, like political elites, possess high belief constraint and belief consensus, likely as a consequence of higher levels of commitment and participation than the general population. These possibly contradictory expectations may be reconciled with the observation that the rejection of grand narratives itself constitutes an ideological position, insofar as we
recognize that ideologies need not be totalistic. How coherent such an ideology may be relative to others remains an open question. Nevertheless, insofar as an “incredulity towards metanarratives” anticipates the reliance on local or micro-narratives – from the rejection of totalizing universal schemas like Marxism, religion, etc. to the embrace of heterogeneous and particular ‘languages games’ (Lyotard 1984, xxiv) - this discussion does suggest a particular hypothesis:

H10.1: CJOs are associated with the preference for micro-narratives over metanarratives.

I thus expect to find evidence of a tendency to restrict or qualify claims of knowledge while embracing or emphasizing local conditions or situations as particular or singular events.84

Additionally, one characteristic of the embrace of micro-narratives is the celebration or toleration of pluralism and difference, of heterogeneous interests, capacities, and behaviors. A wealth of research in political science and psychology supports the charge that self-identified liberals tend to be more tolerant of other groups than conservatives (McAdams et al 2008; McClosky and Brill 1983; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Tetlock 1983). If we construe ideology generally and quantitatively, much like the standard Likert scale of liberalism, then a preference for micro-narratives should be broadly associated with liberalism. This tentative conclusion and the tendency in the literature to associate culture jamming with opposition to capitalism suggests a hypothesis:

H10.2: CJOs are associated with the expression of liberal ideology

Empirically, this chapter focuses on that aspect of the structure of opportunities and threats that is captured by a more robust conception of ideology, meaning a more qualitative and expansive conception. Thus, the first task is to build on the previous

84 The degree to which this distinction holds empirically will be addressed as well.
description of collective identities by stressing the preferences for various configurations
of social relations and the strategic significance of actual social relationships. Two
preliminary considerations are relevant. First, a focus on targets would seem paramount in
determining which social relations are strategically significant. Strictly speaking, such a
consideration would violate the incredibly simplified order of relations established in
Figure 10.1; strategic orientations, shaped both by collective identities and goals (in this
model), are the interdependencies of strategic choices, including choices in targets.
Instead, ideologies sketch the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of those actors
most important for determining the occurrence and trajectory of conflict and cooperation.

As a simplifying procedure I focus on three basic structures of opportunity and
threat that constitute the most salient social relations for contentious collective action: the
state, the media, and the market. Political process or opportunity theorists argue that the
political regime is the most important factor explaining social movement activity (Eisinger
1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Meyer
2004; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Much attention has already fallen on this argument here.
Also noted above, others argue that the discursive environment offers sets of opportunities
and threats for contentious collective action (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McCammon et al
2007). Finally, because of the common targeting of corporations in contemporary
contentious politics, many scholars emphasize the importance of economic or market
opportunity structures in determining whether the characteristics of economic institutions
and actors and their relations to other actors and institutions affect the mobilization,
strategy, and outcomes of protest (King 2008; Soule 2009).
Second, an exclusive focus on an actor's perception of the structure of opportunities and threats available to them risks subjectivizing all objective correlates in the environment. However, the learning process presented in Figure 3.2 emphasizes a role for information obtained from the environment, especially direct and indirect interactions with other actors. As a consequence, at least two implications follow from the conception of ideology. First, because relations with relevant institutions and actors are generally durable (repeated interactions) over time they accumulate sets of schemas expressing the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of these relations. Second, these schemas, which constitute an SMO’s sense of the strategic situation, provide the crucial capacity for an SMO to more or less effectively interpret the opportunities and threats available to them indirectly through the stream of information or directly through interaction with political actors. They also establish the relation of actual social relations to ideal social relations, as in the good society or dystopian societies.

10.2.3. Ideologies and Strategic Orientations

The positioning of an actor relative to other actors and institutions and the strategic situation that this positioning offers is deeply informed by their collective identities. These identities are part of the shared understandings generated by social relations and the exigencies of social fields and, as such, are constitutive of everyday social organization. These shared understandings of our social world define not only who others are, but also who we are. In this sense, they contribute to the definition not only of the capacities and motivations for strategic interaction (ideologies) but also of our basic preferences for strategy (strategic orientations). Downey and Rohlinger (2008, 31n1) are straightforward: strategic orientation “emphasizes collective identity as an organizing principle.”
In Figure 10.1, strategic orientations are distinguished from shared understandings in general and ideologies in particular. Ideologies highlight the basic strategic significance of social relations and the motivation to modify, acquiesce to, or venerate them; strategic orientations are the basic plans that organize action around these relations and motivations. Strategic orientations are thus the basic organization of interdependent choices informed by descriptions and intuitions of vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities; they inform basic strategic choices, including the issues, tactics, and targets that are most appropriate. Because of this close relationship, however, a strict causal relationship is not considered for the purposes of this dissertation. Instead, the empirical analysis here will focus on identifying patterns of association between ideologies and strategic orientations. Crucially, as argued in Chapter Nine, strategic orientations are oriented in part by goals. Because this dissertation does not consider the determinants of goal selection, ideologies are here considered independent of goals.

10.2.4. Targets

In Chapter Nine I provide empirical analyses of the issues of CJOs, but I delayed my analysis of their targets and tactics. In order to further my account of the strategic orientations within my sample, it is imperative that I describe their targets. As a preliminary point, I note that a target is some object towards which an SMO directs its actions.

According to Tilly (2008; McAdam et al 2001), by definition all contentious political action is directed towards some object of claims. These objects are those collective actors or identities to which activists press their claims. As noted in Chapter Eight, collective identities involve public representations of relations between actors and institutions.
Strictly speaking, only actors are capable of interaction, either as individuals or organizations in the guise of collective or personal identities. Tilly (2008, 6) describes contentious claims making as “always involving at least one subject reaching visibly towards at least one object.” However, when this reaching extends towards a disembodied, abstract system, such as art, nature, or communism, how can this be said to be an object capable of interaction? The answer, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) argue, is that all action, no matter how abstract the description of its object, must target some concrete objects that represent this object. In this sense there are potentially two targeted objects: a concrete object and the object represented in the concrete object, as when a banker or an insurance company represents capitalism or a stop sign or the police station represents the state. The question remains as to whether or not the concrete object’s interests are involved. McAdam et al (2001, 5) define contention as an interaction in which claims made by some subject on an object, such as an SMO, “would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.” One may speculate that if the rules, norms, and practices governing situations and relations are altered (institutions), then the interests of actors organized by these rules, norms, and practices are affected.

In this chapter, I focus only on Gamson’s (1990) antagonist targets. Antagonist targets are those actors or institutions whose actions the protagonists believe can address their grievances. I do not consider here an analysis of represented targets. Such an analysis unfolds in Chapter Seven. However, I utilize an inductive or ad hoc approach to identifying the actual range of targets through an analysis of my sample. In Chapter Nine I

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85 This is conceptually distinct from the concept of proxy targeting: “the strategy of protesting or disrupting one institution in order to effect change in a secondary, removed target” (Walker et al 2008, 25). Of course, the two may overlap.
draw on NSM theory in hypothesizing that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of cultural goals. Moreover, in Chapter One I noted how many understandings of culture jamming assume that it opposes corporate policies. Together, these suggest that CJOs target corporations. I thus hypothesize:

**H10.3. CJOs are associated with the targeting of corporations.**

I thus anticipate that the preponderance of targeting strategies in the sample focus on corporations, specifically MNCs.

**10.3. Analysis**

As with the previous chapter, none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations developed above is tested in the strictest sense. The data derives from the sample of CJOs specified in Chapter Four. Below, I describe the ideologies of the groups in the sample, their relation to goals and strategic orientations, and their targeting strategies. Due to the space constraints of this dissertation, the process of presenting this data necessarily does violence to variation within the sample. However, when possible I note this variation.

**10.3.1. Ideals and Ideology**

I begin with a general sketch of the ideal set of social relations for the groups in the sample. To be brief, many appear to have a preference for a more egalitarian and sustainable economic system coupled with a more responsive and accountable democratic political system. The Billionaire’s Monet Oliver DePlace is clear: “I actually believe in a fair and balanced capitalist system — it’s just that’s not what we’re living in” (Schwartz 2010). The BLF’s Napier explains, “My beef is not with capitalism...the free market is wonderful.” But like the Billionaires, Napier’s vision is not one of an untempered free market. His ideal is a system in which “individuals and small businesses [interact] with each one another out
of choice as well as necessity driven by self-interest tempered with community need” (Napier 2009). Channeling Churchill, he throws a bone to democracy, the “worst form of government, except for all the others” (Napier 2009). The Yes Men (2009b) describe an ideal state of affairs as one in which the:

Corporate bottom line...is defined as being a benefit to people and the environment, and that necessarily is going to eliminate the imperative for endless growth and the imperative for endless profit...Because short-term profitability is not what’s going to make the world a better place. So we need to create a new legal framework to govern the behavior of corporations...The basic idea is really simple...It should just be straight up taxes and incentives. Regulations and incentives, regulations sometimes in the form of taxes and regulations in the form of simple outright laws against practices that we know are going to kill us in the long run.

Similarly, despite their rhetoric the AMF appear to view an ideal world as one in which democratic institutions are responsive to individual and community needs and markets reflect the true (ecological) costs of goods and services, what Lasn (2007; 2001) calls “radical democracy” and a “more grassroots kind of capitalism.” This vision does not annihilate corporations per se, but simply grounds them in the public interest and revokes the charters of those who transgress against that interest. An example of such an interest is the ensured access of citizens to participate in the public discourse on public airwaves.

There are cultural correlates as well to this political economy of freedom and community. Such a system allows for a more spontaneous authentic culture and thus the crafting of a genuine participatory public sphere. For the AMF, only a culture created from the bottom-up by free autonomous citizens is lived and authentic. This world of meaning draws from actual experiences with nature, community, creativity, and our emotional unmediated selves and provides us with a proper sense of our social responsibilities. Similarly, the RBC describe an ideal world in which the Commons is a public space in which authentic stories are created and shared, in which “hot, complex human living” is
unencumbered by power (Talen 2006, 108). For the BLF, such a world involves a dialogue among citizens as they note with tongue-in-cheek: “Our ultimate goal is nothing short of a personal and singular Billboard for each citizen” (Napier and Thomas 2006).

This general ideal of soft-core capitalism is not the only vision offered within the sample. The SCP in particular presents a distinct anarchist vision:

A gradual collapsing back to the human scale. Replace both [surveillance cameras and police departments] by communities who watch themselves. So this very much rhymes with whether or not you believe in direct democracy or representative democracy, which in many ways the police are the representative democracy, the governance. You can still have governance, it would be self-governance politically, as well as in communities the police come right from the community instead of being an artificial prosthesis (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 372).

Other groups either provide insufficient data (CTM, IAA, IST), or they refuse to express one. Instead of a clear prescription, the CAE (2000b) stresses a preference for abstract ideals such as tolerance and autonomy: “Our practice is about process only--the process of resistance. We have no final cause in mind, no utopias, and no solid social categories. CAE interacts with the becomings of lived time in an effort to expand difference.”

10.3.3. Narratives and Liberalism

In light of these ideals, I consider this chapter’s two hypotheses. Such an analysis provides additional leverage in understanding the ideological approach of CJOs. First, I hypothesize (H10.1) that CJOs are associated with the preference for micro-narratives over metanarratives. Metanarratives are totalizing philosophies, myths, or ideologies of history and knowledge that aim to legitimize a particular version of the ‘truth.’ Traditional examples include Christianity, Marxism, and Enlightenment rationalism and progress. In contrast, local or micro-narratives are comparatively modest stories that pertain to particular contexts in a manner similar to Wittgenstein’s language games.
Nearly without exception, the sample of CJOs rejects traditional grand narratives. The IST is an example of a group with a relatively clear focus on micro-narratives. Rasovic states, “Our political agenda is completely transparent. And it feels true to the audience, and it feels like the audience knows that it’s true. Meaning, it’s right now, right here between us. Not like some abstraction that I have to then interpret” (D'Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). Explicit in this statement is a focus on the imminence that characterizes the politics of the IST. From project to project, the group stimulates the spontaneity and potential of a situation by providing extremely minimal but provocative narratives. Another prominent example is the IAA:

We sort of shy away from promoting a particular ideology. If we had an answer, we might promote it. We ask questions. We try to get other people to ask questions. Too many voices promoting their particular ideology, and I really don’t think any of them are right. The important part is to get people who aren’t talking to one another, talking to each other (Brusadin et al n.d.).

In contrast, the CAE is the group in the sample that suggests a metanarrative. The group’s comparatively theoretical output is a voluminous effort to identify and promote effective resistant practices. This task entails assessing historical and existing approaches to dissent and, most notably, sketching the political, economic, and cultural context of resistance. In fulfilling the latter objective, the group argues that over the course of the last century the nature of power shifted from a sedentary model based in an analogic cosmology to a more pervasive liquid or nomadic power rooted in a digital cosmology.

Capitalism is primarily a digital political-economy, much as the medieval economy was primarily analogic. Pancapitalism’s use of the digital thus far has been horrifying, whether one considers the pathological separation and alienation of Taylorist production, the false democracy of consumption, the repressive apparatus of surveillance, or the biotechnologies of eugenics. Digital culture is on this same trajectory, with its primary manifestation being an invasive mass media that functions as a reproduction and distribution network for the ideology of capital (CAE 2001, 76).
Such changes are rooted in material conditions, including technological change. Importantly, “We believe that resistance to authoritarian structures and trends is permanent and forever” (Little 1999, 194). The CAE thus appear to suggest a metanarrative of permanent resistance.

At first glance, with the exception of the CAE, Wettergren’s (2005, 48) finding that culture jammers privilege micro-narratives is reproduced here. Yet, her conception of a metanarrative is never elucidated. Instead, she appears to rely on a strict Lyotardian sense of a metanarrative. A looser conception does suggest that some CJOs adhere to an environmental or ecological grand narrative. This is especially the case with the AMF, which describes capitalism as a “Doomsday Machine” enabled by consumerism (Lasn n.d.), and the RBC, for whom consumerism, militarism, and catastrophic climate change are intimately linked in Talen’s (2012) *The End of the World.* While there is evidence that other groups link the economic system to climate change (AAA, NGL, TYM), only the AMF and the RBC make environmentalism a key aspect of their projects. Still, three out of twelve does not bode well for a counter-hypothesis.

Second, I hypothesize (H10.2) that CJOs are associated with the expression of liberal ideology. The Likert seven-point scale of liberalism arguably measures a respondent’s answer to the question, “how much government intervention in the economy should there be?” (Downs 1957, 115). It may also refer to one’s position on other dimensions, such as attitudes toward social change and equality: “By left we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic or social; by right we shall

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86 Both the AMF and the RBC are included in Wettergren’s (2005) sample. However, the RBC is clear that it was only in 2006 that the group clearly linked consumerism to environmental degradation and climate change (D. and Talen 2011, 91).
mean supporting a traditional more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change toward equality” (Lipset, Lazarsfield, Barton, and Linz 1962, 1135). These famous understandings of ideology point towards the means (government) and/or the ends (equality) that constitute the liberal or left end of the scale. I do not consider the enormous literature on ideology, but instead take this general sketch of liberalism and determine how closely the groups in the sample approach it.

The brief analysis of ideal social relations does offer a sense of the degree to which the sample of CJOs adheres to the ‘ends’ of liberal ideology. In addition, in Chapter Seven I note how CJOs construct their understanding of the political Left. It is perhaps safe to say that on a uni-dimensional scale of ideology the entire sample registers liberal, but the evidence for four groups is not quite sufficient (BLF, CTM, IAA, IST). The remaining eight groups provide some evidence that a multi-dimensional scale may prove more helpful in simplifying ideology (AMF, AAA, BIL, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP, TYM). Groups like the AMF and the Yes Men are relatively straight-forward liberals. The AMF feels that part of the solution to the problem of consumer culture is to develop laws, regulations, and court decisions that effectively curtail the translation of economic power into disproportional political power. Above, the Yes Men (2009b) describe their ideal as one in which corporations are heavily constrained by taxes and incentives in order to produce a more egalitarian and sustainable system. However, the CAE and the SCP – the two avowed anarchists of the sample – are strictly anti-state and focus heavily on autonomy, freedom, and privacy. As usual, anarchism does not neatly fall into the usual “means” sense of ideology. While they clearly answer Downs’ query with a resounding ‘no government at all,’ anarchists are also radically egalitarian. The CAE tackle this conceptual problem:
To reduce CAE’s position to a distorted simplicity, we are, admittedly, antistate and committed to liberationist practices. The radical Right would probably say the same thing about itself. However, CAE is not dedicated to racism, sexism, militarism, Christian (or any other) fundamentalism, patriotic revolution, laissez-faire capitalism, or blind obedience to authority. These are, however, characteristics representative of the radical Right. Given these characteristics, one has to question how committed this movement is to principles of anti-state or liberationist practice (CAE and Dery 1997).

The SCP (2006, 57; Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012) is concerned with sexual, religious, racial, and political profiling, and perhaps puts the matter to rest when Brown describes himself as “ultraleft” (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 361).

Table 10.1 summarizes the data for both hypotheses. It appears that in general the sample of CJOs rejects meta-narratives and adheres to a generally liberal ideology, though an environmental narrative has taken hold for a few groups. The adherence to anarchism does suggest that a multidimensional view of ideology may be more helpful. In the analysis that follows I briefly describe the predominant ideological currents in the sample of groups by focusing on the motivations, capacities, and vulnerabilities of the actors in the relevant opportunity structures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micro-Narratives</th>
<th>Liberal Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLF</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIL</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAE</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>IST</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>NGL</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBC</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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1 = mixed
2 = insufficient data
10.3.2. Motivations and Capacities

In contrast to the ideal set of social relations, CJOs sketch a present and in some cases a past that spells out the problematic nature of contemporary society. In so doing they assess the strategic situations that surround them.

A central concern for most in the sample is the conversion of economic power into political power. For these groups, democracy is based on the principle of political equality. Underlying this institution of formal equality, however, is an economic system that generates enormous inequalities in wealth. Such a system reflects its social and economic disparities in its political outcomes despite the principles of its political institutions. The wealthy enjoy a disproportionate amount of influence in politics, while the interests of the middle class and especially marginalized groups like the poor will either be infrequently accommodated or rationalized out of the political system. The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 68) summarizes the relationship between economics and politics: “Considering their vast financial resources, corporations thereafter actually had more power than any private citizen. They could defend and exploit their rights and freedom more vigorously than any individual and therefore they were more free.” This unequal freedom enjoyed by economic elites is associated with free market capitalism. Capitalism aims to absorb (commodify) all possible goods and services in order to maximize profits. To do so, it must encroach on those areas of life essential to a healthy society, strong democracy, and sustainable environment. As the RBC sums it up: “a principal strategy of Consumerism [unfettered free market] is to bring all public institutions – public spaces and, of course, the government – into the market” (D. and Talen 2011, 54). Because markets generate and aggravate economic inequalities and underinvest in public goods, the effort to roll back the
mechanisms (like government and community) that can alleviate some of these perceived ills can generate significant backlash and potentially threaten the entire project of expanding the market system. Consequently, economic elites pursue profits and social control measures that ensure the continued existence and growth of the system, even to the detriment of true democracy. As the RBC states, “The ideal conditions for consumerism [free market capitalism] are almost never the ideal conditions for civic democracy” (D. and Talen 2011, 136).

The conversion of economic resources into political power is accomplished in multiple interrelated ways. First, economic elites utilize direct means such as lobbying, advising, writing legislation, lawsuits, and the funding of campaigns and super PACs. These means of influence are particularly addressed by the Billionaires, who point to the variety of actors that contribute to the structure of plutocracy, including the Chamber of Commerce, the American Legislative Exchange Council, and both major political parties (Opprecht 2012). Negativland (1995, 24) provides an example of the clash of formal equality and economic inequality in an institutional context:

One failing of the U.S. legal system is that it treats the plaintiff and the defendant as though they are equally powerful entities, regardless of the actual resources each may have...when a corporation goes after a small business or low-income individual, the conflict automatically rolls outside of the court system because of the defendant's inability to pay the costs of mounting a proper defense.

Some of these techniques are perceived as legal corruption and represent a particularly odious expression of the degree to which the government is captured by corporate interests.

A more insidious means of converting economic into political power involves the control of mass media, public space, and copyright law. Many groups see the concentration
of media outlets in the hands of an increasingly small number of major multinational corporations and the deregulation of the industry as a serious threat to democracy. Because ownership amounts to effective control over the content of media outlets, corporations narrow the range of issues and media frames that citizens encounter in their news consumption. As the Billionaires for Bush (2004b, 15) wryly note, “we bought up and merged the media to ensure that our economic policies were the standard by which all policy must be judged.” The AMF chime in: “in North America there’s a lack of media space in which to challenge consumptive, commercial and corporate agendas” (Lasn 1999, 33). This has the unfortunate consequence of providing viewers and readers with insufficient information to properly perform their roles as critical citizens. The AMF bear witness to the “loss of diversity” in the mass media (Lasn 1999, 25) Another means for constricting public discourse is the use of copyright and trademark law to repress dissent: “we’re taking on the powers that be, which is really the world of corporate business. They’re the powers that be...they have made themselves, through a whole set of copyright and trademark laws, practically immune from criticism” (Hosler and Joyce 1997).

The notion of the paucity of media space keys in to a wider sense in which economic power narrows the range of public debate. Many groups in the sample see physical public space as increasingly colonized by private interests (AMF, AAA, BLF, IAA, and RBC). They view billboards and other forms of outdoor advertising as ubiquitous and effective in squeezing out citizen and dissident messages. The BLF’s Jack Napier fumes, “I’m pretty irate at a handful of billboard corporations controlling all the public spaces. I find that completely undemocratic and I didn’t vote for it – and yet these billboards are in a public space and I have to look at them” (Berger 2000). Similarly, AAA founder Steve Lambert
was driven to challenge outdoor advertising when he witnessed muralists driven from the walls by owners selling their space to advertisers (Newman 2008). Groups like the IAA and the RBC view the enclosure of the modern commons as a general phenomenon involving the proliferation of quasi-public spaces like malls. The IAA notes:

> One of the key functions of a public space within a healthy society is to be a place where people tend to congregate, where you have a free exchange of ideas, and encounter those that may not be like you...As public spaces disappear, they are replaced by privatized ones that not play these roles (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 117).

These crucial roles evaporate because:

> The privatization of public space has had a chilling effect on activist communications. As malls replace marketplaces and parking lots replace parks, distributing unsanctioned information is becoming an increasingly high-risk endeavor. Once protected by free-speech laws, activists now face fines, imprisonment, and bodily harm for distributing literature on what had previously been considered public property (IAA n.d.(b)).

Thus, corporations indirectly translate economic power into political power through the control of space and public dialogue.

> Many groups also bear witness to the utilization of a third dimension of power in the translation of economic resources into political power. For example, the Billionaires note the importance of the creation and maintenance of ideology, or the sets of justifications that legitimate the capitalist free market system by equating the interests of economic elites with the common good (Opprecht 2012). The Yes Men’s Bichlbaum argues:

> Somehow over the last thirty-forty years with Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the US and all for Milton Friendman...We’ve gotten this ideology that you just let companies do what they want, don’t bother them, don’t incentivize them or regulate them or anything. Things’ll be great. It’s completely preposterous (Yes Lab Media 2009).

For other groups, these justifications are engrained in habits of consumption and perception deliberately crafted and exploited by corporations and advertisers in order to maximize profits. Negativland member Don Joyce describes advertising as “desire mongering. To put a desire in you, to make you feel insufficient, inadequate, unhappy,
dissatisfied” (Hossler and Joyce 1997). The BLF likewise link advertising to the definition of self and the world: “He who controls the Ad speaks with the voice of our Age” (Napier and Thomas 2006). This voice bypasses our free will and submerges in our subconscious (Napier 2009). The IST’s Rasovic urges awareness: “You assume immunity to a lot of these [advertising] messages and you are not immune, you’re a sponge” (Kanarinka and Pirun 2006). The AAA’s Lambert sketches a cycle of what he calls normalization:

Outdoor advertising has become unavoidable. Traditional billboards and transit shelters have cleared the way for more pervasive methods...In urban areas commercial content is placed in our sight and into our consciousness every moment we are in public space... Through long-term commercial saturation, it has become implicitly understood by the public that advertising has the right to own, occupy and control every inch of available space. The steady normalization of invasive advertising dulls the public’s perception of their surroundings, re-enforcing a general attitude of powerlessness toward creativity and change, thus a cycle develops enabling advertisers to slowly and consistently increase the saturation of advertising with little or no public outcry (AAA 2013c).

The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 54) hits at the general concern: “the notions of citizenship and nationhood make little sense in this world. We’re not fathers and mothers and brothers: We’re consumers.” Some groups view this third dimension of power at a somewhat deeper level than the other groups. For them, concepts like community and public are problematic, because they homogenize populations and practices that are inherently characterized by difference. Technologies like the Internet and biotechnology are largely colonized by corporate interests in perpetual efforts to increase the efficiency of productive forces like the body and to render capital and thus power free of the moorings of the real. To put it bleakly, “We are currently witnessing an ongoing process of aggressive body invasion, guided by authoritarian demands for thoroughly rationalized flesh and instrumental human behavior” (CAE 2012b, 55). The CAE (1996, 37) stresses the alienation of the spectacle as an important factor in the operation of power:
While mass media brings its viewer the world, the world is also held at bay while the viewer commits her gaze to the screen, forever separated from others and from communal space. In this case, the bunker is both material and ideational. On one hand, it serves as a concrete garrison where images (troops) reside. On the other hand, it confirms state-sponsored reality, by forever solidifying the reified notions of class, race, and gender.

Similarly, the AMF describes the mediation of the spectacle as a distance from nature and other people. The RBC’s Talen (2012, 17-18) emphasizes the catastrophe of alienation:

> There is a direct relationship between each additional minute that we are separated and every pound of greenhouse gas that is added into the air. The greater the distance that individual human beings are from one another, the more CO2 we put in the air...Our global economy, fundamentalist religion, and national security are each based on increasing the distance between us.

CJOs thus sense a variety of increasingly penetrating means to ensure control and profits.

The state performs a supportive role in the myriad ways that economic elites pursue their interests. Many groups view the relationship between the government and corporations as asymmetric and dependent. Negativland states they are, “taking on the powers that be, which is really the world of corporate business. They’re the powers that be! More powerful than government, more worldwide influential than any government” (Hosler and Joyce 1997). In this vision, government is subservient. Billionaire Hal E. Burton “explained that the purpose of the Billionaires is to expose the capture of the government by corporations” (Roselund 2004). In concrete terms, this means that political actors produce political outcomes – judicial decisions, laws, regulations, etc. – that advance the interests of economic and political elites. Activists encounter the state in numerous ways, but a prominent one is on the streets. Many argue that the police are less concerned with protecting citizen’s freedoms of speech and assembly than with protecting property and profit. Reverend Billy describes an RBC mall action:

> We ended up in Abercrombie and fitch underneath a big stuffed moosehead hanging his head over the cash register, while hundreds of us are on our knees to this great dead moose-
face, with the snoopy ferris wheel spinning in the background and a dozen police persons clucking PRIVATE POPERTY PIVATE PROPERTY (Talen 2006, 133).

Elsewhere, he links the Patriot Act and surveillance to corporate marketing:

The police can ask their large friends the skyscraper to get the master shots. The buildings of New York City are now bristling with surveillance cameras cocked down like that know something about us pedestrians....The buildings are soaking up our images, the patterns of our wanderings, who we kiss and why and who we shout at and who we pay....It’s for security, we’re told, but we know that ultimately the Patriot Act has it’s evil twin information sucker: corporate marketing. Someday it will all be fed into Christmas (Talen 2006, 190).

The CAE are clear: “Our position is that government is not a public apparatus. Public and private vectors really don’t exist as discrete entities” (Little 1999, 194). Furthermore:

[The] function [of the political sector] is to mediate the contradictions [between economic and moral ideology]. As an arm of the economy, the legitimized political sector has the unenviable task of keeping the economy as free of regulation as possible, while seeming to meet contradictory cultural demands. For example, the master narrative of the welfare state has been a key site of inertia in the United States. The idea that the destitute must be given a second chance, the sick be cared for, and the ignorant be educated, is antithetical to the construction and maintenance of bourgeois economy. The government’s role in this conflict is to maintain a symbolic order conducive to the perception that the welfare state is functioning on behalf of its citizens, while allowing the business sector to follow its anti-welfare agenda (CAE 1994, 113).

A notable consequence of this perceived relationship between the political and economic elites is that CJOs are extremely distrustful and cynical of government. The BLF’s Napier (n.d.) expresses this skepticism as directly as he knows how: “If you think that the (any) government works in YOUR best interest, I’ve got a great bridge in Manhattan you might be interested in buying.” In this hostile political environment, the groups in the sample tend to possess a tempered sense of the prospects for basic social change. The BLF’s Napier claims that, “it’s getting to the point where you can’t do any real serious political work without being threatened by the Powers That Be” (Haller and Napier 2006, 90). This is especially the case during a Republican White House: “When the Bush cartel was in office,
there was not a whole lot of hope of creating actual change. It was more a matter of keeping
spirits up and hope alive” (TYM (n.d.(b)).

While most CJOs recognize little autonomy for government, some exceptions are noted. The Yes Men (original emphasis, n.d.(b)) explain, “There's nothing mysterious about
it: when Obama finds himself cornered by industrial lobbyists, he needs to be able to point
out the window (or at CNN) and say "Sorry, I can't do what you’re asking me to – those
people won’t let me." Still, the pattern is clear: in a plutocracy, government is only
responsive under exceptional circumstances. However, other groups in the sample afford
political actors significant independence from corporate interests. Political elites and the
state are driven by the desire for private gain, but more importantly, they are also driven
by distinct imperatives for social control and the establishment of an ever-penetrating
order. Most notably, the SCP focuses on the state as the locus of hierarchy and oppression
in the social system as opposed to the economic system. While he is largely sympathetic to,
and indeed utilizes the concept of the spectacle as a means to decipher an image-saturated
social system, member Brown is very clear: “I think that the Commodity is in service of the
State, and the State is not in service of the Commodity” (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 366).

For example:

When we hear the word “privatization” we almost always think of it in terms of private
companies taking on the functions that used to be public, as if it's purely a corporate
phenomena. So, I would agree provided that we register that privatization could also be a
strategy of governing. It isn't simply a way to give goodies over to the private sector and
bankrupting the government. The government has something to gain from the destruction
of public spaces that may not be financial, but that it makes the public easier to control. So,
it is a strategy of both the corporate entities as well as the government. To enrich upon it
more privatization as a term in that way catches both of those senses—privatization is
privatizing government functions and having them run by corporations. But, it is also
teaching people to stay in their own private lives, to no longer have a political awareness, in
a sense, that your private life is always a public life. So, privatization is a turn away from
public life towards the private as well. It’s mimicked by governmental functions, but the
functions continue to exist, even though police have become privatized, the plaza has
become privatized, the government still very much exists (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 370).

Brown stresses as well the function of surveillance in a transparent society: social control. By transgressing the fundamental right to privacy, surveillance weakens an individual’s and a community’s capacity for responsibility and freedom.

**10.3.3. Vulnerabilities**

According to CJOs the deck is stacked against activists hoping to effect meaningful social change. Actors with enormous resources utilize a variety of means to establish their control over political and economic outcomes. Yet, all of the groups in the sample identify vulnerabilities in their antagonists and the public that allow some measure of success in pursuing their goals.

First, as noted in Chapter Seven, the sample of groups constructs a sense of the public as to some degree capable of acknowledging domination and engaging in resistance. For example, the Billionaires recognize that not all voters are alike. Some hold less tenaciously to conservative ideology, while some that do may have a personal distaste for corporate influence. As Boyd (2004) notes:

> What we tell funders is that we’re trying to reach voters in battleground states. One part of it is suppressing Bush voters by confirming their nagging suspicions that he is serving corporate interests at the expense of the average voter. We’re also trying to persuade those in the middle.

Another straightforward vulnerability recognized by some groups lies in the nature of the political system. Because politicians are ultimately concerned with political survival, citizens can signal that they are sufficiently upset with some set of laws and practices to outweigh the enormous influence of capital. This is most clearly expressed by the Yes Men: “The people’s only real control, or the only power, is through government unfortunately”
(Yes Lab Media 2009). As noted above, “When Obama finds himself cornered by industrial
lobbyists, he needs to be able to point out the window (or at CNN) and say "Sorry, I can’t do
what you’re asking me to – those people won’t let me" (TYM n.d.(b)).

Beyond this conventional sense of possibility, CJOs identify various points of
exploitation. The most basic vulnerability is the observation that efforts to control meaning
and perception are never complete or total. Communication, language, signs, images, and
symbols are too fluid and polyvalent to impose a singular reading. The CTM (2006b, Gach
2007) regard magic, defined broadly as one’s will manifesting one’s creative energy, as “an
open-source technology that doesn’t exclusively belong to advertising execs and policy-
makers.” Elsewhere, they acknowledge that “technologies can be used to control and
oppress just as they can be used to liberate and make life more enjoyable” (CTM 2006a).
The AMF explicitly reject the notion that recuperation by corporations and marketers
makes culture jamming irrelevant: “Instead of saying, ‘Oh no, our images are being sucked
up by the system – our images are being neutralized by their images.’ I don’t believe in that
kind of cynicism! I’ve seen enough images, jams, and détournements work to not be afraid
of that” (Lasn 2002). Such instability of meaning offers challengers countless paths to
corrupt the originally intended message.

Next, CJOs recognize the perceived successes of their antagonists’ strategies and
tactics in engaging audiences (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, IAA, NGL, TYM). Recall that
corporations (and governments) develop and deploy extremely persuasive forms of
rhetoric and imagery, forms that, according to the BLF’s Napier (2006), bypass our faculty
of reason and capacity for free will. In other words, they utilize emotional and
physiological mechanisms as opposed to rational persuasion. Argumentation is
comparatively ineffective: “I don’t think any amount of whining, especially using the 26 letters of the alphabet—writing stories that whine about our culture and complaining about corporations—will do much. It has been proven to be totally ineffective” (Lasn 2005). The AAA (2013b) explains:

We’re borrowing tools that have been researched and tested by marketers for decades and using them to our own ends. Many of those marketing methods are very effective, that’s why businesses are so invested in them. So why reinvent the wheel when we can just insert one gear to make the whole thing run in another direction?

Negativland describe their record Dispepsi as a mimicking of advertising: “I hope that by the time you get to the end of the record you’re starting to get sick of hearing about this one product....I think the whole record simulates Pepsi’s multinational corporate form of advertising, which is basically saturation (Hosler and Joyce 1997). The AMF’s Lasn (original emphasis, 1999, 131-2) also discusses the vulnerability of the advertisement:

A well-produced “subadvertisement” mimics the look and feel of the target ad, prompting the classic double take as viewers realize what they’re seeing is in fact the very opposite of what they expected...Suppose you don’t have the money to launch a real print ad campaign. What you can do is mimic the million-dollar look and feel of your opponent’s campaign, thereby détourning their own carefully worked out, button-pushing memes in your favor. They spend millions building their corporate cool, and you keep stealing their electricity.

Antagonists are also vulnerable to other forms of mimicry. In a culture that privileges the wealthy, the Yes Men simply pretend to be the privileged. ”Well, the culture that we’re in respects money, and so if you pretend to be very very fabulously wealthy and powerful, then people listen to you. It’s miraculous. Whereas if you’re a regular individual like us, they’re never gonna listen to us” (Yes Lab Media 2009). Similarly, the Billionaires adopt the garb and mannerisms of the wealthy to invert the stereotype of the leftist activist (Haugerud 2013).
CJOs also note the importance of humor in engaging audiences by bypassing initial misconceptions or reducing tensions. The BLF’s Kalman (2008) uses humor because it is a common marketing tool, while Napier notes, “We try to use humorous messages so people aren’t overtly offended by them. You don’t go up and spray paint “Fuck Exxon” on a billboard, because the average working guy or cop looks at that and they go, Commies!” (Haller and Napier 2006). The Yes Men’s Bichlbaum (2012a) agrees: “If you’re angry about something, you rant. But pushing facts down people’s throats doesn’t work. Humor can really sideswipe this problem. It’s like there’s a wall between you and a person, and if you make a joke, it’s a crack in the wall.” The Billionaire’s Boyd (2004) suggests that humor is, “very disarming. It’s very pleasurable, so people choose to engage with it, or if they find themselves engaging with it, they choose to stick around or pay more attention to it.”

The mass media are vulnerable as well. The SCP’s Brown (2009) sums it up well: the media “are not a monolith and you can exploit cracks, inconsistencies, and contradictions within them.” Beyond the essential contested nature of language and images, the media as a set of actors and practices also lacks the capacity and the motivation to impose totalized control:

The media is not nearly as conniving, sophisticated and in control as we think it is. From what I’ve seen behind the scenes, it comes out looking so well just because it is technically flash. But these people are not in full control of what they are doing...they do lose control on occasion (Brown 2009).

How and why do they lose control? Brown (2009) asserts that “the great weakness of the news media is that they need to fill their content 24/7. In the moments when they are stretched thin they might put something on the air that in their better judgement would probably keep off the air.” The Yes Men describe some of these cracks:
I think of journalists as collaborators. There are a lot of really bad journalistic organizations—there’s nothing good about CNN or MSNBC—but there are a lot of individual journalists, including at CNN and MSNBC, that are really friendly and love Occupy. When you do creative actions, it’s like you’re giving journalists an extra token that allows them to say something important. (Bichlbaum 2012a)

The BLF note as well that being creative and humorous catches the eye of the media (Thornhill and DeCoverly 2006). Haugerud (2013, 168) notes that the Billionaires exploit the cracks in the ‘unwitting’ media and thus maintain a position neither of resistance nor of complicity.

Some groups express more suspicious positions than the majority of the sample. This is especially the case with the CAE. In their many published works, the group deciphers the political, social, and cultural environment in order to find points of vulnerability. In essence, indirect means of influence are considered completely unproductive if not counter-effective aside from the exigencies of some local conflicts. Indirect means include media manipulation: “using [a] spectacle of disobedience designed to muster public sympathy and support is a losing proposition” because “mass media allegiance is skewed toward the status quo” (CAE 2001, 15). “Since the airwaves and pressure owned by corporate entities, and since capitalist structures have huge budgets allotted for public relations, there is no way that activist groups can outdo them.” Likewise, political and corporate authorities are unresponsive to mass movements, because the structure of power has shifted from concrete ‘bunkers’ like monuments, bureaucracies, banks, and barracks to a virtual stream characterized by velocity without place. Consequently, disrupting the streets and confronting tangible authoritarian entities are practices similar to attacking a shadow. Ultimately, vulnerabilities lie in two positions: the
interfaces between everyday life, the body, and liquid power, and the blocking of information. The SCP is more direct with respect to political authorities:

> People would invariably ask why are we not petitioning the various local politicians to do something about surveillance, or to have politicians actually involved in regulating them, so that there’d be like a city-wide list and be regulated that way. And in all cases the response was, “These are the people who didn’t do anything and created the problem. Either did nothing or created the problem themselves. So it seems pointless in either case to ask them to produce the solution, to go to somebody else” (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012)

For the anarchists in the sample, systemic, especially political, vulnerabilities are somewhat less apparent. Notably, the IST gives little to no indication of a relationship to wider political or economic structures. For the majority of groups, the system is somewhat closed, but mass progressive movements and careful engagement with audiences can exploit some cracks in the system.

**10.3.4. Ideologies and Strategic Orientations**

Above, I suggested that the structures of motivation, capacity, and vulnerability that CJOs perceive and the ideal systems they construct - what I am calling ideology - constrain the strategic orientations of these groups. In Chapter Nine I find that the strategic orientations of the sample are primarily intrinsic and concern low social disruption, though there are notable exceptions, while their degree of insularity varies. My effort to explain these findings rested on an argument relating structures of opportunity to organizational specialization. In the same chapter I argue that some CJOs pursue extrinsic goals with intrinsic strategic orientations because they view their organization as a part of wider activist efforts. They thus define themselves as occupying a position in the division of labor that characterizes progressive movements or wider networks of cultural and political activism. This position involves the maintenance of solidarity, ideology, and identity,
generating media awareness, and changing political preferences. They occupy this niche in part because of the perception of adverse opportunities.

This general expectation of the perception of a relatively closed opportunity structure is supported by the findings in this chapter. CJOs bear witness to a closed structure with a few points of access. There is some variation in this perception. Relative to the rest of the sample, the Billionaires sense a mildly closed system. They also pursue extrinsic goals with some mix of an intrinsic and extrinsic mass strategic orientation and utilize a medium-sized organizational model. In contrast, the CAE, which views the structure of opportunity as inhospitable, is highly insular, small, and pursues an extremely vague and ill-expressed extrinsic goal. An adverse climate should also be associated with the low social disruption characteristic of almost the entire sample (the RBC being the notable partial exception).

10.3.5. Targets

Above, I hypothesize (H10.3) that CJOs are associated with the targeting of corporations. Unlike previous hypotheses in this study, the targets of CJOs constitute a variable with values constructed post hoc. However, the categories employed are basically standard. I focus on five: corporations, governments, political parties, interest groups, and militaries. In this analysis, government refers to not only local, regional, and national government, but intergovernmental organizations like the WTO or the World Bank. Although somewhat unconventional in the social movement literature, a focus on political parties and interest groups is appropriate from a political science perspective. Moreover, while there may be considerable overlap between government and political parties, relevant CJOs do perceive some important distinctions. Finally, the military refers here to a
subset of the government: the agency or department that constitutes and directs a government’s military forces. In the case of the United States, the particular agency would be the Department of Defense and any subunits therein. Some excluded targets are religious and educational institutions. Negativeland does take swipes at Christianity and the IAA does concern itself with engineering departments, but these are exceptional cases. I focus here on the most prominent concrete target pursued by the CJOs in the sample.

Table 10.2 presents the data for this hypothesis. With the sole exception of the SCP, CJOs target corporations. Prominent examples include Exxon, Monsanto, Dow Chemical, Time Warner, Disney, Bank of America, etc. The targeted corporations tend to be multinational in scope and industrial, media, or financial in nature. There are other examples, however. The Billionaires often target corporations involved in the health care and insurance industries. At a prominent second place is government. Only one group (BLF) does not target government. In many cases, governments are conceived as the agents that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporations</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Interest Groups</th>
<th>Military</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>BLF</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAE</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAA</td>
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<td>IST</td>
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<td>RBS</td>
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<td>SCP</td>
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<td>TYM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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87 Other examples abound. For example, outside of the sample the Guerrilla Girls target the art world.
can help manipulate corporate behavior. All levels of government, including the international, are targeted, as are foreign governments. The remaining three categories denote less frequent targets. The AMF, BIL, and TYM prominently target political parties and interest groups. By far the most notable interest group is the Chamber of Commerce, but lobbyists in general are targets. Finally, four groups target the military (AMF, CTM, CAE, IAA). This data provide substantial support for the hypothesis, but it also emphasizes the importance of government for CJOs, a target often ignored in analyses of culture jamming.

10.4. Conclusion

The primary argument of this chapter is that identities are the shared understandings that shape the ideologies of these organizations. In turn, ideologies constrain the strategic orientations of SMOs. I present descriptions of these ideologies, or the structures of motivation, capacity, and vulnerability that CJOs perceive - the durable social relations that generate opportunities and threats - and the ideal systems they construct. Next, I relate these ideologies to the strategic orientations described in the previous chapter by focusing on the degree to which CJOs perceive these structures to be open or closed. Finally, I describe the targets of CJOs. By focusing on identities and ideologies, this chapter thus begins the analysis of a relation of culture jamming to everyday social organization. The following chapters directly concern the question of tactical choice.
CHAPTER 11. EFFECTIVENESS, FAMILIARITY AND TACTICAL CHOICE

Chapter Ten develops theoretical relationships between collective identities, opportunity structures, strategic orientations, and the variety of strategic choices governed by strategic orientations. The primary task of this chapter is to expand upon these advances by further developing the theoretical insights of Chapters Two and Three as well as illustrating and, when possible, providing some semblance of a test of hypotheses using the data described in Chapter Four. Whereas Chapters Nine and Ten put special emphasis on issues and targeting respectively, the focus here shifts to explaining tactical choice. In other words, this chapter begins to account for why CJOs choose to culture jam as opposed to petition, demonstrate, strike, or riot.

This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I review the various approaches to explaining tactical choice. Second, I develop a set of theoretical relationships between the goals and ideologies of SMOs. These involve the attribution of effectiveness and the distribution of familiarity. Out of this discussion I develop a number of hypotheses. Third, I employ these hypotheses in an effort to guide an empirical analysis of the tactical choices of my sample of CJOs.

11.1. Tactical Choice

Explaining variation in tactics has received less attention than the question of mobilization. Still, efforts at theory construction do provide some direction. Below, I present the most noteworthy independent variables offered by the field. The review is organized by three basic approaches found in the literature: RMT and its prominent relation political opportunity or process theory, collective action theory, and cultural
perspectives. Importantly, this review highlights those variables distinctly associated with each approach.

11.1.1. Resource Mobilization Theory

RMT identifies organizational, resource, and interactional variables as the principle explanations of variation in strategic and tactical choices among SMOs (Gamson 1990; Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; 1987a; Oberschall 1973). These include the effects of the organizational structure of the SMO (Piven and Cloward 1979; Polletta 2002; Staggenborg 1988; 1989), the variable resource endowments of the constituency of the SMO (Gamson 1990; Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1999; Piven and Cloward 1979; Tarrow 1998), and the SMO’s dependence on different sources of resource contributions (Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1999; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; Piven and Cloward 1979). The theory’s primary insight is that variation in the capacity for protest is decisive in accounting for mobilization. It is not a function of grievances or social breakdown, as decades of research had argued. The motivations for protest are assumed to be basically constant. While more transient forms of activism do not require strong organization, social movements necessitate the development of formal divisions of labor and rules of decision-making in order to manage the resource requirements of sustained conflict. Professional activists must develop formal organizations that can mobilize resources (money, membership, legitimacy, etc.) in the pursuit of goals on behalf of a movement constituency.

The conditions that shape an SMO’s ability to mobilize are of particular interest. While other actors like corporations, political parties, and interest groups compete and cooperate for resources in a given population, SMOs are at a distinct disadvantage due to the nature of their goals and the generally low resource endowments of their constituency.
Each SMO seeks the acquisition of scarce resources from a variety of sources such as donations, volunteers, foundations, or the media in order to further their organizational interests. Competition and cooperation among SMOs, authorities, counter-movements, the media, and the general public for these scarce resources is affected by variation in the general resource endowments of a population. However, organizational strategies are also essential in adapting to whatever resource environment an SMO faces. These strategies typically involve the marketing of a product: the set of goals and tactics that each SMO offers in the pursuit of shared interests. Thus, according to RMT, organization, resources, and interaction shape variation in tactical choices.

**11.1.2. Political Opportunities**

Political process theory or opportunity models joined the chorus in political science to ‘bring the state back in’ by turning to political variables to explain contentious phenomena (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). While closely akin to RMT in its emphasis on resources and strategic interaction, these approaches argue that the political context decisively shapes the nature of political action. The state especially performs this unique structuring role primarily for two reasons. First, it crafts authoritative public policy for a territory and population. Actions of the state are public goods or public bads that often affect the entire incentive structure of a population. Second, the state possesses capacities far in excess of the other organizations in society, including the use of organized violence. Thus, the structure of a population’s political institutions and actors at a given moment - the POS - may provide varieties of opportunities for and constraints on contentious collective action. These characteristics range from the basic features of the
political regime such as federal or unitary structures and the capacity of the state to enforce policy to more flexible configurations of power among political elites such as changes in governing parties. In order to take advantage of the opportunities offered by a vulnerable political space and further their agenda activists develop strategies and deploy tactics tailored to these conditions.

A general proposition ventured by this approach is that the relative openness of the political system to challenge shapes tactical choices. While this is may be helpful for explaining variation in strategies and tactics across populations and across time, opportunities and constraints are not necessarily uniform across movements or SMOs; the distribution of these factors across a population of activists can yield variable strategies and tactics. For example, the perception of the level of threat posed by an SMO may yield different forms and levels of repression by political authorities, thus making some forms of action more or less attractive to other SMOs (McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998). Thus, political opportunity theory extends the RMT emphasis on interaction by focusing on the political context.

11.1.3. Collective Action Theory

Collective action theory also provides notable contributions to an explanation of tactical choice (Chong 1991; Harris 1982; Lichbach 1995; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Olson 1965; Opp 1989). The principal goals of such analyses lie in determining under what conditions a collective action problem is operative and identifying the range of solutions to the result: the underproduction of public goods. The problem can be stated thus: if one assumes that individuals are self-interested rational utility-maximizers, then they will tend to underinvest in the production of public goods. As noted in Chapter Nine, public goods
are goods with at least two basic properties: non-rivalry and non-exclusion. Rational actors have little to no incentive to participate in the production of a good that they will consume regardless of whether they contribute to its production. In other words, the good generated is an externality; benefits can be received with no costs. Rational individuals thus have incentives to ‘free-ride.’ If everyone free rides, then there is no public good.

Collective action theory’s emphasis on the free rider problem has generated a tremendous literature oriented toward explaining mobilization. Efforts to explain strategic and tactical choices are not as common (DeNardo 1985; Freeman 1983; Marwell and Oliver 1992; Opp 2009). They start with the basic assumption, in line with the general model, that each strategic and tactical option has a set of associated costs and benefits shaped by the constraints unique to the decision context.\textsuperscript{88} Choice is constrained by any number of factors, including resources, values, and political repression. Whichever action yields the highest utility under constraints, or the highest benefits minus costs relative to the alternatives, is the chosen action.

\textbf{11.1.4. Cultural Approaches}

Cultural approaches in the field of social movements also offer a number of explanations for tactical choice. In general, they consider the various processes and products of sense-making that activists utilize in order to interpret their environment and achieve their goals. They assume above all that actions are sensible only as a virtue of the meanings that actors provide them. Before actors can be rational or strategic, they must

\textsuperscript{88} Both RMT and political process theory appropriate this concern over the costs and benefits of collective action in order to provide some semblance of micro-foundational theory (Eisinger 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; 1987a; Oberschall 1973). For example, Tarrow (1998, 76-77) defines political opportunities as features of the political environment that create incentives for action. However, the position of collective action theory within these approaches is ambiguous and incomplete. Opp (2009) is critical of both their failure to explicitly assimilate the collective action approach into their analyses despite their implicit and often explicit reliance on it and their misinterpretations of the theory.
make sense of their world and the actions of other actors. These meanings are shaped by a variety of social determinants, including social interaction and/or social structures. These determinants configure and reproduce the sets of meanings that constrain social life by inducing cooperation and animating social conflict. Because each action can express variable meanings and thus have variable effects on political behavior, understanding the range of interpretations and their determinants is a decisive procedure in explaining social movement activity. Although the literature is replete with a diversity of cultural variables that are often ill-defined, three in particular constitute the bulk of the literature: framing, collective identity, and ideology.

Utilized in numerous fields from psychology to economics to sociology, though lacking in any common theoretical framework, frame theory explains variation in strategy and tactics through a variety of framing processes (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Noakes 2005; Snow and Benford 1988; 2000a; Snow et al 1986). In the context of social movement studies, framing is a social process of crafting and employing meaning in a strategic effort to further one's interests. These meanings are constellations of representations that simplify reality by highlighting certain elements and excluding others. Whether in discussion or contention, the definitions of social reality represented in contentious frames can define a social situation in myriad ways that are conducive to or inhibitive of social movement activity. Framing is thus a significant part of the ‘meaning work’ involved in generating, sustaining, and inhibiting collective action. This labor includes the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational functions essential to collective action as well as the countering of such frames propagated by opponents. For framing scholars, the diagnostic framing efforts of activists, specifically the identification and elaboration of problems,
grievances, and responsibility for injustices, restricts the range of solutions available, including choices in tactics.

NSM theories (Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985) and recent cultural and cognitive approaches (Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Jasper 1997; Jasper and Polletta 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1992) turn to collective identity in order to explain social movement activity. As noted in Chapter One, NSM theories identify new forms of collective action as products of broad structural changes in the nature of the political economy. These changes, many of which focus on the development of new class configurations amidst the rise of information and service industries, tend to shift the focus of contention from issues of material well-being to post-materialist life politics. However, beyond the effects of the structural position of actors, these theorists are not explicit about the factors that shape differences in tactical choice among activists (Opp 2009). More recent approaches are more explicit. Activists choose tactics that best conform to who they believe they are. Choices are expressions and confirmations of their values, beliefs, and their construction of themselves and others. In other words, variation in the content of collective identity shapes the tactical choices of activists.

Early studies of social movements attended to ideology as an explanatory variable (Turner and Killian 1987; Wilson 1973), but emerging RMT and political opportunity theory dismissed social psychological explanations of mobilization. Recent emphases on resources, politics, and frames prompted several scholars to propose a reintegration of ideology into studies of social movement activity (Dalton 1994; Zald 2000). This “ideologically structured action” approach develops the argument that basic sets of value
and beliefs constrain social movement activity ranging from organizational choices to tactical approaches. Several studies utilize the beliefs and values held by activists as a prominent independent variable for explaining variation in tactics (Downey 1986; Gamson 1989; Nepstad 2008). The literature on European environmental movements is particularly well-developed in its work on the relationship between ideology and strategy (Brulle 2000; Carmin and Balser 2002; Dalton 1994; Dryzek 1997).

11.2. Theory and Hypotheses

11.2.1. The Structure of Repertoires

DeNardo (1985, 262) observes that “to explain why one strategy [or tactic] is adopted is to explain why other strategies [or tactics] are not.” This entails first the identification of the range of tactics available to protesters. As Ennis (1987, 522) argues, “A theory of tactics must start with the range of options available to a given actor at a moment in time.” There are at least two possible avenues: deduction and induction.

In the most complex formal analysis of strategic choice in the literature, DeNardo (1985) classifies radical strategies and tactics along two continuous variables in order to capture their degree of disruption: the number of people mobilized and the degree of violence. Evaluations of the utility of strategic choices are functions of various constraints, including the level of support in the population, the degree of responsiveness of the regime to radical demands, state repression, and a number of dichotomous psychological variables including the intensity of preferences among radicals and their patience with respect to the desired outcomes of action. While the virtues of his theory are numerous, it does not attempt to capture variation in choices among tactics that introduce roughly the same level of disruption when the action is peaceful. In other words, when both mobilization and
violence are held constant, qualitative variation in strategic and tactical choices is not explained. Finer theoretical instruments are required.

In this chapter, I begin a cursory effort to identify what Ennis (1987) refers to as the structure and meaning of culture jamming repertoires. Beginning from a list of tactics utilized in the Boston area over a five year period, Ennis measures the similarity and differences in attitudes towards tactics regarding their support, use, and effectiveness. Structures of association are then identified across the data that cluster and distinguish sets of tactics. Ennis’s approach is thus to develop a list of tactics from recent local practice and allow respondents to evaluate them. An alternative approach is to allow respondents to develop their own sets of classifications and evaluate them appropriately. While the former assumes that the list derived prior to the survey is sufficiently exhaustive and complete to offer a compelling source of comparable data, the latter approach makes no such assumption but instead seeks to identify what such a list might look like. Additionally, the latter approach allows for more rigorous testing of a theory of tactics that involves variation in intersubjective recognition and evaluation in the categories of tactics.

This question requires some engagement here in order to answer the question: how do I conceive the range of tactics available to activists for hypotheses development? This concern will be addressed in two ways. First, through my sample of the culture jamming repertoire of contention I develop a description of their tactical repertoires, while also incorporating a wider set of data to fill out what constitutes the culture jamming repertoire of contention. The effort is thus entirely inductive. Second, I rely on conventional distinctions between tactics in the development of hypotheses. For example, in the first
hypotheses I distinguish conventional or institutional tactics from all other tactics and violent tactics from all other tactics.

**11.2.2. The Attribution of Effectiveness**

In Figure 3.3, I present a schematic set of relationships in which the attribution of effectiveness across a set of tactics is in part a result of an SMO’s ideology. As Polletta (2002, 20) observes, “our very criteria for assessing what is instrumental, strategic, efficient...are based on the social associations underpinning those conceptions.” In Chapter Three, I defined effectiveness as *the perceived ability of a tactic to further the goals and objectives of an SMO*. It constitutes a continuous variable ranging from counter-effective to ineffective to effective. Accordingly, an SMO defines its preference structure over tactics by attributing varying degrees of effectiveness to the tactics of the repertoire of contention. Figure 11.1 presents the general relationships that attribute effectiveness. Effectiveness is defined and constrained in this analysis principally by the goals of an SMO and its ideology. Strategic orientations are developed in response to these considerations, clarifying an SMO’s sense of what constitutes effective action for them.

In the previous chapter I link ideologies and strategic orientations, while in Chapter Nine I develop descriptions of goals and strategic orientations. The task here necessitates a return to all three. Table 11.1 recaps the relevant descriptive hypotheses. In Chapter Nine

![Figure 11.1. Relations of Effectiveness](image-url)
Table 11.1. Hypothesized Goals and Strategic Orientations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Strategic Orientations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic</td>
<td>Intrinsic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Insular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-materialism</td>
<td>Low Disruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club Good</td>
<td>• Small Mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>• No Violence</td>
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</table>

I identify CJOs as associated with the pursuit of intrinsic, cultural, post-material, club good, and autonomous goals. As the basic organization of strategic choices, strategic orientations – intrinsic, insular, and low social disruption - are general guides to an SMO’s sense of what is effective in the pursuit of their goals and objectives. The pursuit of intrinsic, post-material, club good, and autonomous goals does not provide any *a priori* reason to distinguish across strategic relations. However, consider the pursuit of cultural goals, goals that focus on and through non-state structures. From this starting point it seems plausible to suggest that what I referred to as the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of the discursive and economic opportunity structures are the most determinant in shaping the group’s sense of effectiveness. The relation between cultural goals and political actors and institutions offer one of two conditions for such an SMO: 1) politics is an irrelevant sphere of activity, or 2) an indirect route into politics (through non-state structures) is made more attractive than a direct route by some feature(s) of the political environment. This is supported by Wettergren’s (2005, ch. 8) finding and the findings of Chapter Ten that for CJOs the political opportunity structure is not considered favorable to larger-scale actions and that political institutions are perceived as basically untrustworthy if not irrelevant. A hypothesis may be developed:

**H11.1:** *CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to conventional or institutional tactics.*
This hypothesis does not specify whether such tactics are generally ranked as low in effectiveness or if they are defined as counter-effective. It does lead us to anticipate that conventional or institutional tactics like voting, petitions, or lawsuits are not perceived as particularly useful for achieving the specific goals of the organization.

Second, SMOs develop strategic orientations that most efficiently exploit their environment in order to most effectively pursue their goals. Consider the low level of social disruption expected of culture jamming activities. In part this entails a generally non-violent posture. In and of itself this should bear no necessary hypotheses about the relation between effectiveness and violence for CJOs. For example, violence may be regarded as effective but morally repugnant. Still, it does suggest a plausible hypothesis:

H11.2: CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to violent tactics.

This leads to the expectation that actions involving personal violence and property damage are not construed as especially efficacious.

The paucity of hypotheses does not mean that we lack guidance for the theoretical approach taken here, but rather that the process remaining is messier. The empirical descriptions of ideologies and strategic orientations offered by chapters nine and eleven should divulge richer implications for further clarifying what kind of preference structure might be expected.

11.2.3. Familiarity and Tactical Choice

This dissertation involves the explanation of tactical choice in part through a translation of the concept of familiarity common to both Tilly and Bourdieu into a behavioral approach to collective action theory. Figures 11.2 and 11.3 reproduce the formal depiction of this relation offered in Chapter Three. In Figure 11.2, the probability of
a tactic being adopted within a population of SMOs is a function of the familiarity that actors have with the everyday correlates of the action and the percentage of the population that possesses these schemas. The latter may be broadly distinguished as scarcely or abundantly distributed. In the case of abundance, skills that are widely distributed provide certain tactics with a substantial probability of adoption across a population of SMOs. Conversely, skills that are scarcely distributed provide certain tactics with an increased probability of adoption among a small number of SMOs in the population, precisely because these schemas are possessed by a small part of the population. According to the analysis provided in Chapter Three, schemas reduce the uncertainty in a decision context by providing more confidence in the estimation of expectations for some tactical alternative but not others. This variation in confidence produces incentives for SMOs to discriminate among their tactical options on the assumption that the SMO is ambiguity averse.

Figure 11.3 identifies a further relation between familiarity and the probability of tactical adoption: transaction costs. Here, the relation takes the form of a positively
decelerating curve. At very low levels, marginal increases in familiarity engender significant decreases in transaction costs. As familiarity continues to increase, however, it yields a decreasing rate of return as a more confident sketch of the possible situation comes into view. Once the major details of the situation are in place, increases in familiarity are of less and less value in altering probabilities of tactical adoption. *Ceteris paribus*, assuming variation in transaction costs across any set of tactical alternatives, differences in such costs (indeed any costs) account for differences in the probability of the adoption of the tactic.

If the foregoing relation between familiarity and tactical adoption is true, then similar to Jasper’s (1997) argument and Carmin and Balser’s (2002) finding that personal experience tends to shape an SMO’s tactical repertoire, I expect those with biographies of artistic production to develop tactics that utilize their experiences. In Chapter Seven I establish the scarcity of schemas associated with the aesthetic disposition. The skills and competencies of cultural producers, especially artists, are more likely to dispose them to

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Figure 11.3. Familiarity, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Adoption.
act in ways consistent with these skills and competencies, because, in part, they reduce both the uncertainty and the transaction costs associated with some action and not others. But does an aesthetic disposition shape tactical choices? In a synthesis of Tilly and Bourdieu, Crossley (2002a, 62) offers a hypothesis: “Given the skills and competencies which specific fields presuppose, [actors] from different backgrounds will tend to have different dispositions for action in those various fields.” Given the skills and knowledge which the field of artistic production presupposes, I hypothesize:

H11.3: *CJOs are associated with the adoption of tactics that utilize the skills and knowledge associated with the aesthetic disposition.*

This hypothesis suggests that the tactics used by CJOs will involve the various skills and knowledge associated with artistic production.

### 11.3. Analysis

As with previous chapters none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations developed above is tested in the strictest sense. The data derives from the sample of CJOs specified in Chapter Four. Below, I describe the tactical repertoires of CJOs and illustrate hypotheses related to the attribution of effectiveness across the set of available tactics and the distribution of familiarity and it’s relation to culture jamming.

#### 11.3.1. Tactical Repertoires

The tactical repertoires of CJOs (and the collective culture jamming repertoire of contention) are the primary dependent variable of this study, though the research design of this study provides almost no variation in repertoires. This effort at description is largely inductive. First, CJOs are prolific producers of media. Every group, defunct or active, maintains a website. Many utilize Facebook and Twitter accounts. Ten of the twelve groups published books, magazines, and/or articles (AMF, BIL, CAE, CTM, IAA, IST, NGL,
RBC, SCP, TYM). Like many of the groups, the BLF provides theoretical and practical texts on their website as well as press releases for the media. Only the AAA lacks equivalent textual media production. Notably, some produce texts that are themselves culture jams including websites (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, TYM), books (BIL, IST), magazines (AMF), and audio (NGL). While almost every group produces and distributes some form of video content on sites like Youtube, some produce commercials, music videos, and films for offline distribution (AMF, BIL, NGL, RBC, TYM). In addition, all of the groups have some members that participate in interviews for various media outlets. Typically these media are local or alternative outlets, but some groups do engage mainstream media (AMF, BIL, NGL, RBC, TYM).

Second, I develop a basic distinction between experimental and non-experimental tactical repertoires. In the case of the former, CJOs utilize a wide variety of tactics that are experimental, highly creative, and typically change over time. Such CJOs are “innovative hothouses,” organizations that possess a “high level of critical awareness, technical expertise in various fields, small organizational structures, an innovative and cooperative mindset, and a flexible agenda” (Rolfe 2005, 70). Non-experimental repertoires are characterized by a narrower range of tactics and consistency in tactical choice with only minor variations. In other words, the experimental CJO repertoire tends to be unstable and diverse, while the non-experimental variant tends to be stable and comparatively uniform. I define experimentation in-depth in the following chapter, but for now a general common sense understanding is sufficient.

Four groups in the sample exhibit experimental repertoires (AAA, CTM, CAE, IST), while the IAA is a mixed case. I consider the CAE here in detail. The CAE aim to “develop
tactics and tools of resistance” (Hirsch 2005, 28). Many CAE tactics are variations on street theater, which they define as “those performances that invent ephemeral, autonomous situations from which temporary public relationships emerge that can make possible critical dialogue on a given issue” (2001, 87). Key references here are the invisible theater and happenings, performances that blur the distinction between theater and everyday life.

Blending pedagogy, participation, and experimentation, CAE’s signature approach is what they describe as recombinant theater. I provide two examples:

1) Critical Art Ensemble designed this work to be performed at tourist sites and locations of extreme consumption. Note that such locations are heavily garrisoned and fortified, so only the slightest act of deviance is needed to provoke a coercive response.

The performer selected a spot near an entrance/exit area at a public site, taking a position at the side of the entrance way so as to minimize blockage. In place, he began to set up a toy car track and then proceeded to push toy cars around the track. Other cars were displayed for anyone else who wanted to participate. Other collective members insinuated themselves into the crowd that developed, and spoke with the onlookers.

The results: The crowd generally began by speculating on the mental health of the performer. Common themes were that the performer was “loony,” “on drugs,” or a “Viet Nam vet.” Some people would join the performer in pushing cars around the track, sometimes as a taunt, but mostly as gesture of sympathy. Within two to five minutes security guards or police would arrive on the scene. They would approach cautiously, fearing it was a disturbed person who might be prone to violence….The sight of security forces would attract more people to the scene. F

2) CAE chose a harmless [Sheffield, UK] action that took place in a location where the typical activities of the local population would not be disturbed. The activity chosen was to give away beer and cigarettes. The location selected for the action was a pedestrian mall and transportation artery. Here CAE attempted to inject the expressive possibilities of open exchange found in a public bar into a space that was reserved exclusively for consumption. Although the area was allegedly a public space, no conversation, conviviality, or coming together of diverse groups (or any other characteristic of bourgeois utopian public space) occurred there. Once this managed space was broken by the alien gesture of offering free beer and cigarettes, these very same elements of utopian public space immediately emerged…The most interesting reaction from the male participants was complete astonishment at the action. The whole context — a moment of meeting new people, having conversations, getting drunk while waiting for the tram, getting free commodities, and so on—seemed so unbelievable that as one man put it, “It’s a dream come true.” Years of socialization had made it seem impossible that members of the public could appropriate the space of the commodity. In this case, prior to the event, reterritorialization of the space of
the commodity through public process could only be imagined in the confines of a personal, interior dreamspace (CAE 2001, 90-91).

The group engages in a number of other actions. They deploy a variety of installations within art contexts like museums and galleries. Some of the more interesting involve forays into bioart and the politics of biotechnology. An example is the Cult of the New Eve, a live performance akin to a spectacular teach-in in which the group re-contextualize the rhetoric of biotechnology by masquerading as a cult (CAE, Vanouse, and Wilding 2000).

One of Adbusters’ favorite tactics and a typical one for the CAE is the un-commercial.89 Along with the culture jamming group the Institute for Applied Autonomy, CAE employ what they refer to as contestational robots (2001, ch. 6). These robots are designed to take the place of the physically vulnerable human while performing certain functions that elicit the attention of authority, such as graffiti writing and pamphleteering. Another tactic is the shopdropping of informative works, such as those that comment on the medical regime in the United States and the superfluity of technology. Other notable actions include bicycle radios that blare détournements, plagiarized texts, small digital devices placed in various environments that display humorous and critical messages, “sorry” bricks and flags at tourist sites or monuments, and the renaming of streets.

Other groups exhibit a similar pattern. The AAA (2013a) developed an app for the Mozilla Firefox browser that replaces advertisements with art, printed and distributed a fake New York Times, replaced public bench and video advertisements with subvertisements and art, shopdropped a variety of products, recorded interviews on outdoor advertising and played them through small covertly placed sound systems in

89 As Wettergren (2005, 8n2) notes, the term un-commercial actually refers to two distinct tactics. One involves the spoofing of a corporate commercials in order to critique the message the corporation is sending, while the other resembles a short film that ‘advertises’ the concerns of the group.
various high traffic locations, and a variety of others. The CTM identify their efforts as “experiments” and “training exercises” (Gach and Sholette 2006), as “templates for tactics” (Gach 2007). They developed dozens of actions: during a protest against the 2000 Bush inauguration they handed out doughnuts to activists and offered them to cops; they set up a fortune-reading space on the sidewalk and offered to curse malignant institutions and provide means to resist them; developed a black-painted ice cream truck (think SWAT truck) with multiple functions: surveillance, dispensing ice cream, and offering propaganda; and many more (CTM n.d.(a)). The IST (2012) also developed a variety of approaches: they offered to sell their patriotism while intoxicated, publicly perform the commands explicit in advertising, shopdropped their dictionary of fear and security related terms, and re-staged the U.S.-Mexican border fence at a Native American reservation.

Seven groups possess largely non-experimental tactical repertoires (AMF, BLF, BIL, NGL, RBC, SCP, TYM). An extreme example of this phenomenon is the BLF. The group engages exclusively in the culture jamming of billboards. While there are some variations in this tactic – for example, the subversion of a neon sign, the addition of mechanical elements, or the explicit use of Kantian philosophy – the basic idea remains intact. As a variant of street theater, the SCP performs silent plays in front of surveillance cameras using poster boards to display text. They also offer walking tours of the surveillance environment and produce maps identifying the cameras. The Billionaires ‘protest’ leftist protesters and ‘support’ right wing protesters by engaging in street theater and crashing events. They adorn the garb and mannerisms of the ‘wealthy, sing satirical songs, and wave satirical posters with phrases like these from the Billionaires for Wealthcare (n.d.(b)):

- Leave No Billionaire Behind
- Let Them Eat Advil

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• Because Nothing Says Freedom Like Denying Claims
• Our Death Panels Turn a Profit

Negativland’s musical production is their primary tactic, although they also have a radio show. The AMF produce un-commercials, a culture jamming magazine, and famous subvertisements, as well as develop campaigns such as Buy Nothing Day and TV Turnoff Week (now Digital Detox Week) and pursue lawsuits.

Two remaining groups have somewhat wider repertoires, though they do not have the character of experimental repertoires. The Yes Men acquire and maintain fake websites for the WTO, the Bush Campaign, Dow Chemical, and other antagonists. These allow the group to receive messages and requests for appearances in the media and at industry conferences. Accepting the invitations in the name of their antagonists and carrying the pretense throughout their speaking engagements, the group present outlandish presentations critical of those they impersonate. Their media hoaxes – for example, portraying Dow Chemical as accepting responsibility for the Bhopal, India industrial accident after they purchased Union Carbide – likewise seek to “correct” the identity of the offending party. Other actions include fake petitions, subvertisements, masquerading as part of the Bush campaign, and producing and disseminating fake New York Times and New York Post editions.

The two remaining groups are slightly more difficult to place. The IAA (n.d.(a)) developed an app that identifies the location of surveillance cameras, a text messaging service that allows quick broadcasts of messages (useful for activists in the streets), an “airline” that helps users track private airplanes contracted by the CIA for the rendition program, and worked with the CAE in developing contestational robots. The RBC engages in a variety of performance actions, what they call “Art Attacks” (Talen 2006, 26). A typical
action involves the Reverend Billy, a crusading, wild-eyed, thundering, Elvis-style preacher of a gospel of shop shopping, and members of the choir either infiltrating private property (Starbucks, Wal-Mart, Bank of America, etc.) or occupying public space with singing, praying, and preaching. Exorcisms are performed on cash registers and credit cards. Variations within this basic model are legion: a Thanksgiving dinner at Bank of America, spilling oil in the Tate Museum, congregants adorned in toad costumes symbolizing an extinct species. Other performances are somewhat more idiosyncratic. The group frequently participates in Whirlmarts:

In a Whirl you go up and down the aisles pushing an empty shopping cart, in a long line that turns and turns and goes straight and turns again, through the Big Box, for an hour. You never put anything into the cart and keep pushing, looking straight ahead. If anyone stops you and demands an exclamation, just say “I’m not shopping” (Reverend Billy 2006, 141).

Another example includes the cell phone opera (Talen 2003, 71. In this action, participants dress inconspicuously and pretend to shop at some corporate establishment. Each member engages in a cell phone call about shopping that evolves into a rousing condemnation of the entire shopping experience. Soon, the shop is filled with a cacophony of indignation. Products are lifted into the air and accused of a variety of social and psychological ills. Suddenly, the anger turns into singing and the reverend bursts into a sermon as congregants place audio players in covert positions throughout the store. Once the event is concluded, recordings of testimonials from sweatshop workers blare throughout the store. Beyond these actions, the RBC is also involved in more conventional civil disobedience actions like the blockage of construction equipment and police.

Along with the production of media, the most common tactical forms in this discussion are performance-based actions (BIL, CTM, CAE, IST, RBC, SCP, TYM) and subvertisements (AMF, AAA, BLF, CAE, NGL, TYM). Variations on shopdropping are also
prominent (AAA, CAE, IST, RBC), as are subversive objects situated in non-retail contexts (AAA, CAE, IAA, IST, RBC). Impersonation and role-playing are prominent features of the performance-based actions (BIL, CAE, RBC, TYM). Non-culture jamming actions include lawsuits (AMF, RBC), demonstrations (AMF), and more conventional forms of civil disobedience (RBC, TYM). However, what is clear is that the examples provided and the many that were not included due to space constraints strongly suggest a performance and media-based repertoire of contention with dramatic variations and experimentation.

11.3.2. Attribution of Effectiveness

Above I define effectiveness as *the perceived ability of a tactic to further the goals and objectives of an SMO*. This emphasis on goals and objectives emphasizes that while some tactics may be oriented directly towards the ultimate goal, others may focus on an objective supporting the goal. In fact, I argue that the bulk of an SMO’s actions are oriented towards objectives. This makes an analysis of effectiveness potentially extremely complex. To simplify the analysis, I begin with descriptions of how CJOs perceive their actions producing outcomes. I follow with an analysis guided by the two hypotheses (H11.1, H11.2) pertinent to the question of effectiveness.

First, I consider a point of concern. In the account pursued by this chapter, behaving strategically appears to imply that tactical choice is governed simply by effectiveness. However, choices are governed by constraints as well. This means that tactics perceived to be less effective than others may still be chosen if some constraint makes them too costly or another option is more beneficial. Importantly, this implies that sets of discrete causes (incentives) exact independent effects on tactical choice. The design of this study is unable to systematically distinguish these effects. Moreover, a more insidious problem looms:
rationalization. A group may rationalize an action as effective if it is chosen primarily for some other set of incentives, such as intrinsic enjoyment. In this scenario, conclusions based on the evidence risk a type I error in which the effectiveness of a tactical approach is falsely identified as a factor in tactical choice. An opposing hypothesis is offered by Polletta (2002). She demonstrates that many so-called cultural or personal benefits do perform important strategic functions. An incentive like intrinsic enjoyment may perform important functions such as building commitment and solidarity or developing skills pertinent to protest or some activity crucial to the SMO’s goal (Staggenborg 1991, 100).

The research design of this study does not allow me to reject the rationalization hypothesis, and thus leads to me emphasize illustration over testing.

Effectiveness may be defined intrinsically. For example, a tactic must be capable of changing an audience member’s individual consciousness, however temporary, in the general direction of the CJO’s ideology in order to be regarded as effective. Another example is the generation of solidarity, or the reinforcement of an audience member’s individual consciousness in the event that it already aligns with the CJO’s ideology. Effective tactics may also involve the generation of a dialogue or engaging a wide audience. Such notions of effectiveness constitute the common denominator among the sample of CJOs. For example, the BLF describes their actions as “fauxvertising, [in which] an existing message is creatively falsified to reach a higher truth or deeper meaning. It takes an unacceptable sales pitch and turns it into a provocative statement” (Black n.d.). Fauxvertising, their term for subvertising, thus expresses the ‘truth’ in advertising. However, provocation is not the result of simple pedantry. For the bitter pill of truth to “[stick] in our minds” (Berger 2000) and [encourage] thinking (Napier n.d.), it demands a
more covert and pleasing coating. Riddles serve this function: “My favorite billboards are ones that are enigmatic – the ones that people have a hard time figuring out right away.” Humor as well lubricates the processing of the message: “You don’t go up and spray paint “Fuck Exxon” on a billboard, because the average working guy or cop looks at that and they go, Commies!” (Haller and Napier 2006). Thus, truth slides in with a Trojan Horse.

But truth does not simply lie fallow or inert; it paradoxically inspires frustration and hope. Member Kalman (2008) suggests that “what resonates most with our audience is expressing a collective frustration” with the ubiquity of advertising. Once it settles into the mind, however, the frustration gives way to a playful anger without impotence, to hope. Napier (2009) describes his own experience of a sense of hope arising from the “chance juxtaposition of disparate images or essences that I might come across in my daily excursions.” This hope arises in the realization that one need not be subject to the monologue of advertising; rather, one can “change the Advertising message in your own mind,” and “enter into the High Priesthood of Advertising” (Napier and Thomas 2006). The AMF posit a similar process in which a subadvertisement introduces a ‘moment of truth’ into an otherwise dishonest means of communication. However, crucial differences betray the extrinsic focus of the group. First, the AMF strongly emphasizes behavioral change following the spark of authentic life. Lasn (1999, xiv) is clear:

“Once you experience even a few of these ‘moments of truth,’ things can never be the same again. Your life veers off in strange new directions. It’s very exciting and a little scary. Ideas blossom into obsessions. The imperative to live life differently keeps building until the day it breaks through the surface.

Here, Lasn (2001) emphasizes not dialogue, but an arrest of the spectacle: “It’s a way of stopping the flow of the consumer spectacle long enough to adjust your set.” Second, the AMF stress the diffusion of ideas. Lasn (1999, 123) calls the germ of the subadvertisement a
meme, “a unit of information that leaps from brain to brain. Memes compete with one another for replication, and are passed down through a population much the way genes are passed through a species.” Here, he emphasizes the capacity of ideas to travel through an entire culture and defeat the ideas in power. Elsewhere, Lasn (2001) notes: “The point is to break out of a trance. But culture jamming works on a social scale - a whole culture’s satori is at stake.” Thus he identifies culture jamming as a crude means of cultural change: “When all this cognitive dissonance reaches critical mass in our collective unconscious, our minds will open, the old consumer culture will heave its last” (Lasn 2001). Finally, as with many other groups pursuing extrinsic goals means other than culture jamming are required to open up the channels of communication to allow the memes to proliferate. Because a meme war requires a level-playing field, the AMF advocates an “Industrial Pincer,” a movement on the level of the media (the meme war) and a grassroots level of action involving lawsuits, citizens groups, and protests to open the airwaves (Lasn 1999, 134).

The Billionaires (like the Yes Men) offer more consideration of a relation between intrinsic objectives and extrinsic goals. The group uses a process similar to the previous examples: a masquerading ‘truth’ sticks in the mind and inspires both anger and a sense of agency and freedom. This performs a number of intrinsic functions: “It’s very effective at inviting people who don’t have a strong history of political activism, but share progressive values and views, and are skilled, creative professionals. It’s good at inviting young people with ironic tendencies. It’s good at replicating itself” (Boyd 2004). Yet, organizing is the stuff of social change. “There are a lot of forms of activism that are massively more effective. Like MoveOn...or Greenpeace” (Boyd 2004). These groups and others know:

You have to make email lists and stay in touch with the community. You have to figure out what is your relationship with elections and maybe have an outside strategy where you are
doing some of the boring, painful compromising work of running an election. You also have
to think about how to build power over the long term and build organizations and NGO
infrastructures. You have to do all this stuff. You have to have powerful charismatic leaders
who are maybe not “creative”, fancy, artsy or humorous (Boyd 2004).

The crucial contribution of the Billionaires is to generate “media attention” (Boyd 2004).

“Media attention is not the goal; the goal is to reach people. But media attention is a sub-
goal, in that it’s probably the most important way we have of reaching people. It’s not an
ultimate goal of the campaign, but it is an operational goal” (Boyd 2004). The media diffuse
the message of the Billionaires to audiences far larger than the direct audiences they
encounter on the ground. Yet, media attention is not in itself sufficient. It merely carries
the message, a message that ideally shifts the salience of an issue:

I just emphasize this again and again with people with whom I do workshops and talk to –
creative actions, creative interventions can draw attention to an issue; they can push a
corporate target which is stealing from the people or getting away with an ecological crime,
and you can put a spotlight on them and it can be extremely useful (Boyd n.d.)

Spotlighting an issue ideally performs a number of functions, including elevating the profile
of like-minded groups working on that issue: “But then there has to be a larger movement
that keeps holding their feet to the fire” (Boyd n.d.). The Billionaires thus see their action
as buttressing long-term organized efforts to generate social change.

Unlike the Yes Men, however, the group suggests a possible behavioral effect
resulting from media coverage. For example, the group speculates on the role of the
message in voting behavior:

What we tell funders is that we’re trying to reach voters in battleground states. One part of
it is suppressing Bush voters by confirming their nagging suspicions that he is serving
corporate interests at the expense of the average voter. We’re also trying to persuade those
in the middle (Boyd n.d.).

First, the message – economic inequality and corrupt campaign finance – may exploit the
general distaste for the translation of economic power into political power felt even by
conservative voters. If these suspicions are sufficiently confirmed, the suggestion is that the voters may simply refuse to vote, thus reducing the overall turnout of Bush supporters. Second, a similar mechanism is at play on those voters in the middle, typically centrists, independents, or undecideds. However, because these voters are not loyal to a conservative candidate, persuasion may generate votes for the liberal candidate.

Another means of effecting change is expressed by the CAE. As one of their primary tactics, the CAE fashion social interactions - what they call recombinant theater - that aim to temporarily undermine authoritarian culture. The process of such performances begins with the oppressive codes and practices that "normalize" and "homogenize" an audience through extreme expression management, such as a pedestrian walkway at a mall. In such managed contexts, the group deploys performance pieces and interactive installments that aim to provide an interface between the abstraction and the immediacy of contemporary power: "Experiencing the material effects of the real hyperreal as a means to understand its politics in a lived way is at the heart of our performances. It is in this realm that the transparent codes become opaque" (CAE 1996, 142).

Under these conditions, a loose-knit ephemeral public can emerge. An actual construction of a public (temporary though it may be) through an open field of performative practice makes possible a productive pedagogy...In this way, a participatory process can emerge out of both rational social interactions and nonrational libidinal trafficking that creates skepticism in an individual about the taken-for-grantedness of the social codes of a given situation (CAE 2001, 90).

Like the previous culture jams, such scenarios generate ‘moments of truth,’ but with the CAE there is less of an emphasis on behavioral change. The focus is strongly directed at creating moments of autonomy. However, the group does posit a connection to action, however vague. First, they make a key distinction:
Some activities, though they are performed, are not performative. These are activities that directly intervene in the distribution of power on a macro level. A strategic form is policy construction and reform; a tactical form is electronic civil disobedience. These types of activities CAE considers political. The other form of intervention is in changing perceptions through representational exchange. Tactical media practitioners initiate social processes that aid people in perceiving a social system and their roles within it in a manner that is different from the normalized perception of these phenomena. This type of action is pedagogical (emphasis added, CAE 1996, 142).

Political action is thus explicitly oriented towards reshaping the environment. It is what I call extrinsic. The CAE identify their actions as pedagogical. Such actions “allow [participants and viewers] to...gain a greater measure of autonomy (the affirmation of their own desires and control over their surroundings)” (CAE 1996, 40). Such autonomy is crucial in developing new ideas and conceptions - “alternative possibilities in relation to the specific or general issue addressed” - apart from those imposed by the authoritarianism of the managed situation (CAE 2001, 25). Pedagogy thus “prepares the consciousness of individuals for new possibilities, and in the best cases, moves them to political action” (CAE 2001, 25). This work of preparation is crucial considering that much of the CAE’s texts are ruminations on the possibility of political action in contemporary capitalism. Elsewhere, the group engages directly the question of cultural change when they emphasize, “a single project can at best only restructure a limited situation, while it is the aggregate of politicized cultural actions that can create a break or shift in culture as a whole” (CAE 2012b, 104). The CAE thus adhere to a basic critical mass model similar to the AMF, although the former refuse the efficacy of a war of ideas in an open mass media.

The IST fashions performative contexts intended to produce a similar function to the CAE, although they do not emphasize the imminence of autonomy. As they note, “We want people to use what we’re given in everyday life to start new conversations or think about a new way of inhabiting a public space...We want to invent new ways of life and new
ways of being social – if only temporarily” (Kanarinka and Pirun 2006). However, the group are ambiguous in relating the construction of these events and broader social change. While at one point, Rasovic declares “a million small influences make a change,” (McQuaid 2005), in a personal interview the group refused to express such a relationship (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).

Other models of action-outcome linkages are available. While some of the IAA’s actions adhere to the common denominator of generating moments of truth, the same actions are also intended to perform functions such as increasing the distribution of activist pamphlets and removing the danger of physical harm by police from graffiti-writing. The AMF developed the Blackspot sneaker as a means to showcase alternatives to megacorporations and develop local economies. “Our hope is that people with similar philosophies will be inspired by our experiment in grassroots capitalism and start their own business ventures, spreading indie culture and providing ever more alternatives to buying from megacorporations” (AMF n.d.(c)).

This construction of the relationship between actions and intended, if not hoped for, outcomes thus constitutes a basic sense of how a group construes their own actions as effective. Some comparative analysis of tactical effectiveness is already demonstrated. Such an analysis is difficult, because tactics can perform different functions in the achievement of an extrinsic goal. Nevertheless, the two hypotheses provide a guide to discuss the relationships between culture jamming and other forms of action.

11.3.3. Comparative Effectiveness

The first hypothesis (H11.1) states that CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to conventional or institutional tactics. Recall that effectiveness varies from highly effective to
no effect to countereffective. Ideally, I would utilize some measure of effectiveness similar to Ennis (1987). However, the data restrict me to far more modest efforts. Here, conventional or institutional tactics refer to those means of influence that engage legal and regular political channels such as voting, campaigning, contacts with public officials (Verba et al. 1978), public discourse (newspaper opinion pieces, blogs, etc.), and judicial activity such as lawsuits. The argument raised above claims that a hypothesized cultural goal may suggest an irrelevant or inhospitable political environment. Consequently, it seems plausible to suggest that such tactics are likely perceived to yield little in the way of goal achievement. Nevertheless, other possibilities are plausible; cultural goals may involve political objectives. Under this condition of heterogeneity, such tactics may in fact rate as highly effective.

Some groups in the sample find noteworthy utility in conventional or institutional tactics. Among their many activities, the AMF pursue numerous lawsuits against media corporations (Lasn 2005). As noted above, the Billionaires view voting as a crucial part of the linkage between intrinsic actions and extrinsic outcomes. The IAA speculates that lawsuits, not legislative activity, will ultimately turn the tide against the privatization of public space (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 118). The RBC engaged in a lawsuit following an arrest and used it to champion the First Amendment. They also “often partner with large NGO’s and advocacy groups, while they negotiate and lobby for policy change we raise the profile of the effort and involve citizens more directly - creating classic inside/outside campaigns” (RBC 2012). The Yes Men (n.d.(b)) regard “politics, lawsuits, letter-writing,” as “needed for change to happen.” While this evidence lacks a sufficient distinction between the use of a tactic and the perception of effectiveness, it does suggest that some CJOs
evaluate conventional or institutional tactics positively. Such endorsements are not uniform across all such tactics, however. For example, the AMF's Lasn (2005) argues, “I don’t think any amount of whining, especially using the 26 letters of the alphabet—writing stories that whine about our culture and complaining about corporations—will do much. It has been proven to be totally ineffective.”

Other groups express either no evaluation of such tactics (AAA, BLF, CTM, IST, NGL) or a general disregard for them (CAE, SCP). The SCP’s Brown (personal interview, July 6, 2012) argues that appealing to the actors that created the problem of surveillance cameras, and in so doing utilizing those means that the same actors designed for citizens to influence them, is ineffective.

People would invariably ask why are we not petitioning the various local politicians to do something about surveillance, or to have politicians actually involved in regulating them, so that there’d be like a city-wide list and be regulated that way. And in all cases the response was, “These are the people who didn’t do anything and created the problem. Either did nothing or created the problem themselves. So it seems pointless in either case to ask them to produce the solution, to go to somebody else.

Although the data is extremely limited, the analysis does suggest that CJOs do not offer a blanket evaluation of conventional or institutional tactics as ineffective or countereffective. The second hypothesis (H11.2) states that CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to violent tactics. Violence here refers to actual or threatened physical harm to people or property. The close approximation of vandalism to many acts of culture jamming, at least according to some antagonist, leads me to exclude such acts as property damage here. Little is offered by the sample of groups regarding the question of the efficacy of violence. All clearly endorse nonviolence, but only a small number comment in general on violence. The Yes Men (n.d.(a)) ruminate on the relatively low start-up costs of violence relative to their ‘interest’ in non-violence:
For a non-violent mass movement to succeed it has to have an incredible amount of support. Unfortunately, it's pretty easy to do these things the violent way, you just need a relatively small force that’s really well trained. But that’s not what we’re interested in; we’re interested in doing this nonviolently, like they did in India to achieve independence, and like the Civil Rights movement did to change the system at the time.

This does not comment on effectiveness, however. The SCP’s Brown (2009) is clear on the efficacy of property damage: “in the American environment if you were destroying cameras people would see you as a reason for putting more cameras up: you’re just another violent activist.” The AMF are the only group that appears to explicitly condone the damaging of property. For example, Lasn (1999, xiv-xv) describes the efficacy of his physical jamming of a shopping cart dispenser with a bent coin:

Once you experience even a few of these ‘moments of truth,’ things can never be the same again. Your life veers off in strange new directions. It’s very exciting and a little scary. Ideas blossom into obsessions. The imperative to live life differently keeps building until the day it breaks through the surface.

Elsewhere, the group appears to endorse anarchist elements like the Black Bloc (AMF 2012). While they do not mention violence in their endorsement, the Black Bloc is known to occasionally engage in property destruction. Far too little information is available to make any conclusions, however tentative, regarding this hypothesis.

Violent and institutional means of influence do not exhaust the wide array of activities available to activists. Here I consider forms such as boycotts, demonstrations, and civil disobedience. As should be evident from the discussion above, mass mobilization and demonstrations are often regarded as effective or essential ingredients of social change. However, the CAE (1996, 11) views such actions as ultimately ineffective because they focus on an increasingly antiquated understanding of power: “As far as power is concerned, the streets are dead capital! Nothing of value to the power elite can be found on the streets, nor does this class need control of the streets to efficiently run and maintain
state institutions.” Others stress the efficacy of civil disobedience. The Yes Men (2011) compare the power of demonstrations and civil disobedience:

> Millions of people in the streets couldn’t prevent the Iraq War. If a tenth of that many people committed civil disobedience and had actually gotten arrested, what would have happened? Maybe it would have stopped the war. If it was a real threat to the system, maybe the war wouldn’t have happened. It’s definitely something to try. You make it impossible for the system to continue, and it stops.

In contrast, the CAE (1996, 9) argue that although civil disobedience “is still effective as originally conceived (particularly at local levels), its efficacy fades with each passing decade.” This is the case because power has evacuated the streets and gone hypermobile. Only in local conflicts does it retain its potency. Finally, boycotts receive mixed support as well. While the IST declare that actions like boycotts work (D'Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012), the Yes Men’s Bichlbaum argues otherwise: “Actually buying products that we like and not buying products that we don’t like really achieves extremely little” (Yes Lab Media 2009).

This analysis of the attribution of effectiveness suggests that for most groups in the sample culture jamming is constructed as effective for certain limited objectives and goals. More ambitious goals require other means of influence. Which tactics are useful in regards to the latter is not terribly restrictive, although violence may not be conceived as terribly effective.

11.3.4. The Aesthetic Disposition and Tactical Adoption

In Chapter Seven I provide evidence supporting the argument that participation in culture jamming is associated with an aesthetic disposition. I build on this effort with the third hypothesis (H11.3) of this chapter, which states that CJOs are associated with the adoption of tactics that utilize the skills and knowledge associated with the aesthetic
disposition. Here, tactics vary in the skills and knowledge associated with their deployment, a specific expression of the more general Tillyian hypothesis that repertoires are constrained by cognitive constraints. I focus here on those skills associated with the field of art. Although most of the practices associated with CJOs are not so difficult or costly that they effectively exclude all those without the requisite skills and knowledge (the skills are not strictly necessary to most of the actions), skills function as resources constraints in that their possession increases the likelihood that such actions will be taken, while the lack of skills decreases the likelihood that such actions will be taken. While I spend nearly half of Chapter Seven providing evidence of the aesthetic disposition, here I engage two strategies: providing 1) a description of the skills utilized in the tactical repertoires of CJOs, and 2) evidence that CJOs link the skills of art with their tactics.

First, I describe the culture jamming repertoire of contention above as constituted by a basic set of tactical approaches (media production, subvertisements, performances, and subversive objects, including shopdropping) supplemented by experimental tactical repertoires. I focus on the first four categories. It is sufficient to suggest that more experimental tactics vary widely in the degree to which artistic skills are required to produce them. Importantly, I focus on the techniques required to produce these actions. However, technicality is not the only means of establishing the degree to which artistic skills are relevant to actions. The conceived relation of performances to outcomes may also be informed by theoretical awareness of the reception of performances and media, an awareness that is itself constructed by an aesthetic disposition. I assume that this question has been more or less addressed in previous chapters.
By definition, media production, including film production, writing, costume and website design, musical production, and others, utilizes skills associated with the field of art. While in some cases these tasks are handled by non-CJO agents, a great deal is produced DIY-style. For example, the Yes Men's Bichlbaum and Bonanno (2010) directed their second documentary, *The Yes Men Fix the World*.

Subvertisements vary in their technical sophistication. Some involve the simple covering or blacking out of letters in an advertisement text to change or delete a word, while others involve elaborate modifications integrated into the design of a billboard. A reasonable conjecture suggests an interactive relationship between technical sophistication and the resource constraints imposed by skills. Under low technical sophistication, technical artistic skills are not a determinate asset. However, with increasing sophistication the value of such skills increases. Figure 11.4 provides an example of a technically sophisticated *Adbusters* subvertisement. Here, practical knowledge of painting and graphic design is required.

Performance-based actions also vary in the degree to which they require technical knowledge and skills. At their most sophisticated, they involve elaborate props, costumes, songs, and characterizations, while at their least sophisticated they require performers engaging in improvised public dialogue and actions. The CAE perform actions that span the spectrum of technical difficulty. For example, their Sheffield action involved nothing more than a location, simple improvised performances, and beer (CAE 2001, 90-91). Yet, actions like the *Cult of the New Eve* required elaborate art direction (CAE et al 2000). Because of this variation in technical sophistication, the same argument that applies to subvertisements should apply here. However, Haugerud (2013, 139) notes that even the
simple act of public performance often requires some degree of skill in order to develop confidence and translate performances into outcomes:

Billionaires had to transform what they knew about great wealth into embodied knowledge conveyed through bodily expression – in order to perform their political dissent convincingly. Improvisation and performance workshops, therefore, were part of the Billionaires’ Manhattan chapter meetings. Participants learned how to make desirable impressions on audiences or deal with hecklers (don’t take the bait and step out of character) or with overly enthusiastic spectators who joined in shouting slogans with them – and thereby disrupting the Billionaires’ carefully crafted media image.

These workshops were led by thespians, veteran performers imparting formal and tacit knowledge of how to achieve effective public expression.

Subversive objects, including shopdropping, also vary in their degree of sophistication. Many such objects are actually media like pamphlets and books. Others include food items (see Figure 11.5), unmarked packages, bricks, flags, and a host of others. More sophisticated forms involve elaborate graphic designs and product packaging.

Many CJOs recognize a linkage between the skills of art and their tactical repertoires. The AMF’s Lasn (2005) is clear: “I think artists, designers and visual
communicators are extremely important. They use their skills to give people epiphanies and wake them up from this media consumer nightmare that most of us are caught in. When discussing why his group focuses more on consciousness and less on government regulation, the AAA’s Lambert (2007) reasons, “I think the reason we land on the side of awareness and critical thinking is because we are artists and that’s our area.” The CTM’s Gach (2008a) describes his realization that art can be utilitarian (creative problem-solving) and thus political:

I’ve always been interested in art. I drew and painted in high school and college, and I was also interested in politics from a pretty young age. I didn’t see a connection between those two for a very long time. Then I realized that art was more than just objects or things hanging on walls. This opened me up to thinking about what the effect of art is on people, what people bring to the art, what the art brings to them, and the relationship between the art and the audience. At that point what became interesting to me was interactivity within art, getting rid of objects altogether and getting into early performance art. I was also coming to terms with the idea that the art is actually happening between the viewer and the object, and it’s that space which is essential. Then when the object is less important, then all of a sudden you start figuring out that the art object in many ways is, while it can be creative and poetic and spiritual, it is also in many respects utilitarian.
Art as creative-problem-solving is thus a set of understandings and skills that shape the world according to the will of the artist. More to the point, art is a meta-skill set that allows the integration of whatever skills are necessary to a task. The CAE emphasizes eclectic skill sets as well:

Each artist in the group has his or her own specialized talents. The pool of skills includes performance, book arts, graphic design, computer art, film/video, text art, photography, and critical writing. CAE generally uses these skills in a tactical manner. We choose a subject matter, place it in a particular context (and hence address a particular audience), and then attempt to construct a meaningful work in relation to the selected context (McKenzie and Schneider 2000, 136).

The IST’s Rasovic comments as well on skills and practice:

There is this art technology, new media thing that could influence, politically, strategically, artistically, but we have the skills and we could do this. I didn’t have to go to some kind of a painting school to do this shit. I mean literally, for me anyway. It was a desire to experiment, and a desire to really really use our skills, for something other than paying rent and working for the man (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).

The RBC’s director, Savitri D., describes her transition from a dancer to RBC activist:

When I was in my teens I was very political. I organized lots of things at my school – hunger protests and peace concerts, and I was very active. It was when I became an artist that I stopped being politically active. They were very distinct pieces of my life; I didn’t know that I could put them together, though that seems so obvious now.

Then a lot of things coincided – meeting Billy and September 11th – and over about a year’s time, I had the sudden understanding that I really had to dedicate myself to justice in a different and new way...Yeah, I could continue being a dancer and performer and making plays, but there were a lot of people doing that and a lot of people doing it really well and that world wasn’t necessarily going to miss me. But I had a sense that I had a set of skills and experiences that could feed a different kind of movement in a much more powerful way (D. and Talen 2011, 209).

In contrast to the importance of skills demonstrated here, the SCP’s Brown offers the sole example of a contrary position when he notes that the SCP avoided specialists in performance by relying on volunteers without formal training (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012; SCP 2006, 185).
Despite suffering from data deficiencies, this analysis does suggest that many of the CJOs in the sample are associated with the adoption of tactics that utilize the skills and knowledge associated with the aesthetic disposition.

11.3.4. Uncertainty in Culture Jamming

Throughout this dissertation I argue that sets of skills and knowledge reduce the uncertainty associated with using some tactics but not others. In Chapter Three, I made the assumption that SMOs, including CJOs, are ambiguity averse, meaning they have a basic preference for actions with more certain outcomes. *Ceteris paribus*, this suggests that tactics associated with certain skills possessed by an SMO are more likely to be chosen than tactics lacking such qualities. In this section, I provide a cursory description of CJOs construction of uncertainty. I focus here on uncertainty relating to CJO actions, not uncertainty about the future state of the world absent CJO action.

Many CJOs in the sample express a strong sense of uncertainty regarding their actions and outcomes. The CAE (2001, 89-90) are straightforward when they note:

This model remains permanently experimental. The method itself may not be experimental, but its application is. This type of performance is risky because the outcome is always unknown. Like all experiments, this one can fail, and fail in the worst sense. While failure from audience indifference to one’s gestures is always possible, experimental performance can decline into a worst case scenario: a raving reinforcement of authoritarian culture.

Here, the group expresses a notable sentiment: performances like the group specializes in are uncertain in that they can generate outcomes ranging from desirable to ineffective to counter-effective. When describing their refusal to engage in illegal activity, the CAE comment on the uncertainty involving the discretion of law enforcement:

No, we will walk up to the line, but we don’t cross it. There isn’t a work of art anywhere that is worth going to jail for. However, as we all know you don’t have to break the law to go to jail. Just exercising one’s rights is all it takes. There are plenty of laws on the books that are there so that arrest remains discretionary—creating a false public emergency for example -
and it’s often a way to disguise that the people being arrested are in fact political prisoners (Hirsch 2005).

Despite their confident rhetoric, the AMF’s Lasn (n.d.) strikes a modest tone when he states, “I think that Adbusters is an experiment in activism that is still unfolding. We’ve learnt a hell of a lot over the last twenty five years.” The BLF’s Napier wonders whether corporate power is so ubiquitous that only the necessity of trying justifies it:

I have thought about this question of whether it’s even possible anymore to question or ridicule advertising given that it has become so accepted as the language of the culture,” he says. “All I can say is, you have to at least try. If there isn’t some kind of insurgent spirit popping up between the cracks, you might as well give it up as a society. We’re not at that point yet – not even close” (Berger 2000).

The IST’s Manning describes the group’s flirtation with spontaneity: “part of our thing is that we don’t really know what’s gonna happen” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). In their action involving the placement of unmarked packages in public spaces, Manning again refers to the uncertainty of such actions:

We thought a few times, “Should we actually do this? This might actually cause trouble?” We did it of course, and nothing actually happened. I guess there is always a little bit of that feeling of are we gonna be accosted the cops. Especially in the beginning when we were doing the corporate Commands. We were basically trespassing in a way, sneaking into malls or stores or wherever we are doing these commands. How are they gonna react? Are they gonna come after us, throw us in jail? Is there gonna be big incident(D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012)?

The IAA describes the first deployment of a contestational robot in Washington, D.C.: “We didn’t know what was going to happen. We were fairly certain it was going to get taken from us. We were gonna get caught. We expected that to happen” (Brusadin et al n.d.).

The same compulsion to act regardless of uncertainty is evidenced by the Yes Men (n.d.(b)):

Before setting off from the States, we had tried to anticipate what might happen to us in the city of Mozart. Never having addressed an audience of international lawyers before, we had no idea how they would react. They had invited us thinking that we were ordinary trade functionaries. They expected a garden-variety trade-conference lecture—not WTO
dogma carried through to conclusions that are better left unstated in polite company. We were sure to be confronted with outrage. But would we face physical danger?

These emphases on uncertainty stress what every SMO likely knows: activism is a relatively uncertain form of political behavior. Uncertainties about effectiveness and repression are particularly salient concerns. Yet, these CJOs describe the uncertainties they encounter prior to actions they nonetheless employ. I consider why this might be the case in the following chapter.

11.4. Conclusion

The primary concern of this chapter is to develop theoretical relationships between everyday social organization, including the social relations that constitute opportunity structures, and tactical choice. In so doing, I provide descriptions of the culture jamming repertoire of contention; consider their sense of effectiveness; the aesthetic skills crucial to the production of their tactics; and their construction of uncertainty. In other words, this chapter begins to account for why CJOs choose to culture jam as opposed to petition, demonstrate, strike, or riot.
CHAPTER 12. TACTICAL INTERACTION AND INCENTIVES

Previous chapters rely on a static model of tactical choice in which an SMO, once formed, must choose certain tactics over others in order to effectively pursue the group’s goals. In this chapter, I refrain from developing a complete dynamic model. In its place, I provide some theoretical direction for an empirical analysis of some of the incentives that CJOs face in choosing tactics. My strategy focuses on three efforts. First, I develop theoretical analyses of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and generate hypotheses and propositions regarding the relationship between particular incentives, resource constraints, and tactical choice. Second, I elaborate on theoretical developments in previous chapters by considering the dynamics of tactical interaction. In so doing, I draw on the concepts of détournement and recuperation presented in Chapter Six. Third, I present data drawn from the sample of CJOs to illustrate these dynamics.

12.1. Constraints and Incentives

12.1.1. Intrinsic Incentives

Although the central arguments of this dissertation concern effectiveness and familiarity, choices in tactics are made under constraints. It is imperative to consider the variety of constraints and incentives faced by CJOs in their tactical choices. I begin with intrinsic incentives, which have partially been considered with the relation of schemas to transaction costs. Recall first that in the case of intrinsic goals, effectiveness is determined by the degree to which SMO’s perceive that actions are expected to achieve desirable intrinsic outcomes. Importantly, the achievement of the specific goal does not exhaust the range of costs and benefits that are also anticipated consequences of interaction. I focus on two incentives: normative acceptability and intrinsic enjoyment.
First, the normative acceptability of an action refers to how the action is expected to comport with what an SMO’s members believe is just or right. For Jasper (1997), all actions have a moral component. They contribute to the story of our lives, the development of character, a continual process of affirmation, innovation, and transgression that helps guide our choices in life. In this sense, the action and its associations can be the benefits (building or affirming character) or the costs (transgressing and suffering guilt). Normative acceptability ranges from moral proscription to moral indifference to moral prescription. For the former, actions are written off as unacceptable, because they violate fundamental values and norms. Some actions have a relatively neutral moral hue to them. However, for some SMOs, some actions may be morally prescribed, meaning not to engage in them would be morally repugnant. The most obvious example involves violence. For some, violence may be efficacious or counter-efficacious, but it may also be morally repugnant or morally prescribed. For this work, normative acceptability is primarily important for what it may proscribe, such as violence.

Second, the intrinsic enjoyment of an action refers to how much the members of an SMO are expected to enjoy participating in the action itself. Opp (1989) finds no support for a hypothesized positive relation between the intrinsic benefits of participating in protest and the propensity to participate in collective action. However, by shifting the question I suggest that the degree of intrinsic enjoyment that SMO members expect to obtain by engaging in some actions over others can affect the choice in tactics. Intrinsic enjoyment ranges from highly unpleasant to indifference to highly enjoyable. Some actions can be highly unpleasant, meaning they produce negative expectations regarding participation in the action itself. For example, some may find high-risk activism, including
violence, to be intrinsically unpleasant (dangerous, stressful), while others may feel the opposite. Participation in some actions as opposed to others may also include the joys of political expression, socializing with friends, and the thrill of danger. Enjoyment is thus a composite term. Wettergren (2005, 143) finds that participants in culture jamming find it highly enjoyable. I thus hypothesize:

H12.1: CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as highly enjoyable relative to other tactics.

12.1.2. Resource Constraint

All collective actions require the consumption of some level of time, labor, and a variety of other resources as an investment in either extrinsic or intrinsic outcomes. Because SMOs are limited in the resources they possess they are constrained in the tactics they choose. Tactics can be distinguished by the amount of resources that they require organizers and participants to consume. Actions that derive their force from withdrawing support like boycotts, long-term occupations, and strikes are defined especially by the opportunity costs incurred by participants. Other actions may differ in their size or scope. Actions that are labor- or money-intensive like mobilizing for large-scale demonstrations are presumably more expensive than actions that involve smaller mobilizations.

In previous chapters I suggest familiarity reduces the transaction costs incurred by some actions. However, the only resources that familiarity directly involves are skill sets and social networks. Recall the sets of hypotheses describing the organizational structures and strategic orientations of my sample of CJOs. Most of the groups were organizationally small and possessed few resources. These lead me to hypothesize:
H11.7: CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as low cost.\footnote{This hypothesis is basically a recasting of H8.5, except here the emphasis on contentious collective actions as opposed to the manifold operations of an organization.}

In general, the lower the cost of the action, the higher the probability it will be chosen.

12.1.3. A Note on Organizational Structures

Before proceeding, I briefly consider the importance of organizational structures in relation to tactical choice. In Chapter Eight, I develop hypotheses that anticipate a pattern of organization in my sample of CJOs. I describe such groups as small, informal, decentralized, exclusive, and composed of pre-existing friendships. The literature suggests that variation in organizational structure should help explain variation in tactical choice. One promising expectation is that decentralized organizations tend to utilize more unconventional and disruptive tactics, whereas centralized organizations tend to utilize more conventional tactics (Staggenborg 1989). Whatever the hypothesized mechanisms involved, they are typically internal to the organization. Some of the incentives considered below, especially intrinsic enjoyment and resource expenditure, are closely related to the structure of organization. First, Wettergren (2005) finds that the predominant form of organization among culture jammers, especially the emphasis on exclusivity and friendship, generates intense feelings of commitment. I argue that this commitment has a discriminatory effect on the evaluation of tactics; some tactics benefit disproportionately from these intimate social relations, especially with respect to the intrinsic enjoyment derived from the action discussed below. Some actions may generate more intrinsic enjoyment than others. Enjoyment may derive, in part, from engaging in fun, thrilling, or intellectually or creatively stimulating actions. These may be determined in part by one’s company, especially one’s friends. While it may be reasonable to assume that just about
any contentious collective action is made more attractive by the participation of friends (a
minimal homogenous benefit across the set of tactics), it seems plausible that the character
of some actions may generate more intrinsic enjoyment than others as a consequence of
the mobilization of friendship networks. In part, this may involve actions that exploit
particular homogeneous interests across the group distinct from the collective interest.
Such individual intrinsic interests may involve engaging in the utilization of skill sets, such
as art or violence.

Next, most attention in the literature has fallen on decentralization and
formalization. At least two factors are relevant. First, decentralized structures appear to
increase the diversity of inputs into the decision-making process by increasing the
proportion of decision-makers (Staggenborg 1989). However, in itself this does not
necessarily imply that decentralized structures are associated with disruptive tactics.
Instead, it suggests that an increase in the degree of centralization is associated with a
narrowing of the repertoire of tactics. In this case, decentralized structures would be more
likely to incorporate disruptive or nonconventional tactics simply because increased input
diversity increases the probability of more inclusive tactical repertoires. Second,
formalization tends to increase the likelihood for adopting conventional tactics by
increasing the incentives for efficiently apportioning resources. In other words, the more
that procedures and divisions of labor are clearly delineated and recorded, the more actors
within SMOs are compelled to identify clear objectives and performance metrics in order to
advance the organization’s interests and their own within the organization. The reason
may be simple (Morris 1984, 35-36). Social disruption and tactical experimentation
involve greater degrees of uncertainty, both internally and externally, than conventional or
more institutional tactics. Through incentives to increase efficiency and clarity and thus produce clear results, formalization reduces the uncertainties that actors within SMOs may be willing to bear.91 Such incentives and structures may also decrease the capacity of an organization to quickly respond to new opportunities, an incapacity that may favor institutionalized tactics (Staggenborg 1991, 72).

I do not develop hypotheses here, however; instead, I consider the relevant sets of intrinsic incentives further below.

12.1.4. States and Corporations

Extrinsic incentives refer to motivational factors external to the action or to the SMO itself. I consider three sets relevant to this dissertation: facilitation, repression, and artistic experimentation. I also consider effectiveness in light of these developments. In Chapter Ten I consider the relation of opportunity structures, especially political institutions and actors, to the attribution of effectiveness. There, the generalized sense of the strategic significance of these relations, or ideology, is the result of the accumulation of experiences and information from direct and indirect interactions with these actors and institutions. Here, I consider more specific dynamic relations between political and economic actors and institutions and CJOs, especially repression and facilitation.

As with other contentious collective actors, the state and corporations respond to the actions of CJOs with one or more of three basic postures: repression, toleration, and/or facilitation. Repression is “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost

91 Morris also argues that these internal forces coincide with isomorphic processes (the word is DiMaggio and Powell’s 1983) derived from the field of organizations that an SMO finds itself within, which includes political parties and interest groups. However, his argument regarding the civil rights movements rests on the observation that such organizations preceded the onset of contention. He thus argues that their inability to develop disruptive mass strategies results in the founding of more flexible informal organizations. I make no assumption about the temporal priority of formal decentralized organizations.
of collective action,” whereas facilitation refers to an “action that lowers a group’s cost of collective action” (Tilly 1978, 100). In a democratic regime, toleration refers to the permissive posture of political actors with respect to the extensive set of possible SMO actions that do not elicit facilitation or repression. My amendment to these definitions simply stresses that facilitation and repression are intended courses of action. In practice, they may yield unintended consequences with possible adverse effects.

I treat states and corporations simply. The state is both the set of legal and regulatory institutions governing a social system, especially property and speech rights in this account, and those collective actors with the authority and the resources to change and enforce these institutions. The importance of the (democratic) state can be summarized: “Legality matters because laws state the costs and benefits which governments are prepared (or at least empowered) to apply to one form of action or another” (Tilly 1978, 102). Of course, even democratic governments may utilize illegal or covert forms of response to contentious collective action, but for the purposes of this model the state and state actors perform roughly within the parameters of legal institutions. Corporations are collective actors with enormous resources that pursue the maximization of profit.

I assume that states and corporations are motivated to repress when they perceive potential benefits from increasing the costs of a group’s collective action.92 For the state, these benefits hinge on the strength of the threat to social groups posed by the group’s tactics and goals and the strength of these social groups in determining political outcomes. For corporations, benefits primarily accrue from avoiding the opportunity costs of

92 These benefits may accrue from positive support derived from repressive action, or they may derive from the avoided opportunity costs of choosing toleration or facilitation, i.e. a loss of support. I refer to this approach as simplistic, because I do not consider the host of incentives that can differentially affect political actors like the police, courts, legislators, etc.
toleration or facilitation: negative publicity and thus lower profits. Thus, the choices that SMOS make in how they will pursue their goals can affect the probability of whether states and corporations choose to engage in repressive action. In contrast, I assume that states and corporations are motivated to facilitate when they perceive potential benefits from increasing the benefits of collective action. For the state, these benefits hinge on the strength of the social group the SMO is perceived to represent. For corporations, these benefits hinge on the perceived capacity of the SMO to increase the corporation’s profits.

12.1.5. Repression

I begin with repression. An extensive literature on the relation between repression and mobilization eventually arrived at the conclusion - following the failure to identify a specific curve that fits the data - that repression is better conceptualized as a multi-dimensional and highly contextual explanatory instrument (Hoover and Kowalewski 1992; Johnston and Mueller 2001). This difficulty is not alien to the question of strategy. Regime responses are always strategically selective; consequently, not all actions suffer the same level or type of repression. Here, I distinguish four forms of repression potentially relevant to CJOs: violence, arrest, litigation, and harassment. Violence refers to the actual or threatened physical harm of personal property or the body. Arrest refers to the actual or threatened deprivation of liberty and/or economic sanctions. Litigation refers to the process of conducting a lawsuit, a set of actions associated with potentially high economic and opportunity costs for defendants. Harassment refers to actions that are typically repetitive and/or disruptive such as surveillance, interrogation, verbal abuse, etc.

With respect to CJOs, occasions for state and corporate actors to repress are constrained. Though I quote Tilly on the importance of law, my definition of the state
includes not only institutions but actors as well. Tilly (1978, 103) notes that legal practice – the actual practical interpretation and application of the law in concrete circumstances – is crucial to understanding the constraints on state actors; in other words, the law is effectual partly as a function of enforcement. Culture jamming as a form of action operates across the tolerant and repressive space of state and corporate strategies. The reason is two-fold. First, the very nature of culture jamming as defined in Chapter One risks infringing on the intellectual property rights of corporations. Often this risk is low, because parody and satire are protected forms of speech. However, in actual practice legality may be insufficient to deter certain limited forms of repression. Second, culture jamming actions may unfold within the private property of corporations. This risks a strategic response from corporate or state actors aimed at removing the action or the actors from the territory. With perceptions of vandalism or suspicious collective action even performances in public space risk repression.

These considerations lead to an elaboration of the relations between types of repression and CJOs. First, I consider violence and harassment as the least likely responses to the tactic of culture jamming. The modern democratic state both establishes broad institutionalized procedures for the processing of demands and possesses an overwhelming monopoly on violence (Rucht 1990). Consequently, violence as a tactic, like other highly disruptive actions, is extremely costly in part because it dramatically increases the probability that effective violence will be used as a tactic of repression by state actors. For CJOs, however, violence is unlikely to be encountered, because state actors are unlikely to perceive such groups as posing a threat or as opportunities for violence. This is the case because CJOs are composed of extremely small memberships with extremely few resources
that instigate small collective actions without intentions of violence; they thus typically involve low levels of social disruption. Corporate actors may perceive them to be a threat, but corporations are highly constrained by the legal institutions of the state and public opinion. If violence is utilized by private actors it is likely to be arbitrary, minimal, and extremely short-lived, as when a security guard takes the initiative.

Unlike violence, harassment typically involves repetitive or disruptive responses to culture jammers. As such, in many cases it requires the perception of a level of threat sufficient to maintain contact with the CJO beyond an initial offending collective action. It also poses high risks, because repetition courts anticipation and thus possible data collection on the harassment. The information can then be used against the corporate or state actors in the courts or in the media as an effective tactical response. If CJOs meet with harassment, it is likely to come from state actors. The police or the FBI, for example, not only possesses significant resources and actors proficient at modes of harassment like surveillance; they are also mandated to develop and utilize the skills and technologies of harassment. However, a more prevalent form of harassment is transient and weak, as when a group is forced to abort an action in public space by security guards or police.

The nature of culture jamming as an oppositional tactic suggests that litigation and arrest are the more likely forms of repression to be meted out by state and corporate actors. Although political speech is given powerful protections in democratic states, corporations may still significantly increase the costs for using culture jamming by filing lawsuits to protect their intellectual property rights and their brand image. Because of the significant resource asymmetry between CJOs and corporations, corporations may engage in litigation because drawing the conflict into the judicial system heavily favors the types of
resources they possess. Even if they ultimately lose the case, the drain on the resources of the CJO can significantly curtail their activities, though culture jamming is not a resource-heavy activity. Thus, like many SMOs and other collective actors, CJOs are forced to expand their tactical repertoire to include litigation when private actors sue them and possibly fund-raising activities in order to support the financial challenges of a lawsuit. However, like all forms of repression, litigation may backfire. As endowed as a corporation is in the legal game, the case may draw other experienced actors on the side of the defendants, such as the ACLU, or the corporation may lose quickly and swiftly (though corporations presumably know the risks better than CJOs), or the case may draw undesired media attention. What is important to note here is that a legal response by corporations shifts the objectives of CJOs such that more institutional tactics are perceived as more effective.

With respect to occupation of physical property, state actors may utilize arrest as a means to defuse situations, while corporate actors may file criminal charges to bolster the costs of this form of repression. In the event of arrest, CJOs may voluntarily engage in litigation if they perceive sufficient opportunities for victory, though the costs may deter them.

This discussion suggests culture jamming is susceptible to some state and corporate strategies that intentionally increase costs. Ceteris paribus, this makes a variety of other actions more attractive options, especially institutionalized modes of action and the wide spectrum of unambiguously tolerated non-institutionalized actions.

12.1.6. Facilitation

Corporate or state actors may also facilitate collective action by lowering its costs. These lowered costs are not obtained by symmetrical material exchange. In other words, SMOs that purchase aid as a matter of simple financial transaction are not facilitated. Such
actions do not constitute a lowering of costs, but rather a redistribution of costs. In the case of culture jamming, significant facilitation is less likely than repression for the simple reason that neither states nor corporations may find particularly significant advantages in supporting CJOs. There are at least two notable exceptions, however. First, if my argument that culture jamming is associated with the development of art is true it seems plausible to conjecture that CJOs may receive art grants and other forms of related support from state actors. Such forms of facilitation typically provide material resources such as money and facilities, freeing up other resources like time and labor to focus on the production of contentious politics. In the United States, such grants may come from federal agencies like the National Endowment for the Arts, state agencies, and universities, but they may also come from private arts organizations and corporations. Grants and fellowships from federal, state, university, and private arts organizations are unlikely to provoke a negative response from CJOs. However, considering the general antagonism to economic elites established in Chapter Seven, private corporate grants are far less likely to be accepted, because they may be perceived as a form of co-optation or compromise. Corporations may utilize strategies to ensure the effectiveness of their marketing strategies. One way they do so is by mining minority, subcultural, or countercultural trends for possible mainstream appeal (Klein 2000). Another approach involves hiring contemporary artists to counsel and develop tactics, especially those with risky (for a corporation) approaches to consumerism. It is likely that CJOs will tend to avoid these forms of facilitation.

12.1.7. Artistic Experimentation

In Chapter Five I outline the structure and development of the field of cultural production, especially of artistic production. One of its more notable processes is the
permanent state of revolution. I note that the totality of the relations of dominance – in other words, the unequal distribution of capital - and the strategies that they favor in this field and it’s relation to other fields produces a particular set of incentives for those entering the subfield of restricted production. In order to compete, an effective strategy for new entrants (typically younger generations) with low resources is to generate their own cultural capital or artistic prestige by staking positions of difference, new positions “beyond the positions presently occupied, ahead of them, in the avant-garde” (Bourdieu 1993, 106). These new positions are staked by virulent heterodoxy, by “imposing new modes of thought and expression which break with current modes of thought and hence are destined to disconcert by their ‘obscurity’ and their ‘gratuitousness’” (Bourdieu, 1996, 239-240). In Chapter Six I re-consider this process by suggesting that though Bourdieu focuses on the revolutionary principle of autonomy, twentieth century movements like Dada and the Situationists eventually subverted this principle by politicizing the institution of art despite their pioneering efforts to aestheticize everyday life.

This discussion suggests that artists face competing incentives for artistic production. I distinguish between incentives for producing pieces with mass popular appeal in order to maximize popular success (the heteronomous principle) and incentives for producing pieces with highly restricted appeal in order to maximize some highly valuable cultural capital (the autonomous principle). For Bourdieu, one’s initial resource endowment heavily constrains the relative force of each incentive. In particular, higher education in the arts endows actors with the capacity to produce and consume works of restricted artistic production. For producers, this aesthetic disposition allows in principle for the exploitation of opportunities for the accumulation of cultural capital through artistic
innovation. Within the game of art, the incentives for innovation – a product of the structure and the history of field – may be crudely construed here as a distribution of incentives for the production of a set of possible art works. In Figure 12.1, I suggest that these incentives are distributed unevenly across this set of works. I argue that works can be described in relation to existing works by placing them on a spectrum from no experimentation to pure experimentation. Below I consider what tactical experimentation entails. For now, I reject the use of the term ‘innovation’ for experimentation principally because the latter suggests more of a groping effort and the former suggests too clean of a break from existing practice. Experimentation is a testing, an uncertain employment, yet experiments are performed with existing materials. In this sense, an artistic experiment is never strictly “new,” but instead ‘plays’ with what is already existent. Here, experimentation refers to two dimensions: the degree of difference from existing works and the degree of popularity or diffusion of the work. Low experimentation thus refers to an extremely minimal difference from existing works that are highly popular and familiar.

Figure 12.1. Incentives for Artistic Experimentation

93 Importantly, I consider experimentation to entail the list of strategies of distinction offered in Table 6.1.
High experimentation refers to comparatively significant differences from existing works that are marginal and recognizable by only a small audience. A summary of Figure 12.1 begins by emphasizing its most salient characteristic: artists derive expected benefits from producing artistic experiments. However, these incentives diminish as the degree of experimentation wanes. Moving down the slope, positive incentives give way to disincentives for the production of works that increasingly rest on popular works.

Insofar as CJOs both construe their contentious political activity as artistic practice and possess the capacity to effectively navigate the artistic field – in other words, insofar as they play the game of art as the game of contentious politics - this basic incentive should increase the probability that they will choose tactics that are relatively experimental.

12.1.8. Shifting Effectiveness

In addition to repression or facilitation, CJOs may find that the tactics they use do not generate the degree of effectiveness that they seek. This perception may result from any number of phenomena, including a change in the perception of how audiences react, a change in the perception of the marketing strategies of corporations, or a change in the field of conflict, i.e. from the streets to the courts. However, because of the constraining effects of the initial schemas, new information obtained from interactions is less likely to fundamentally alter the selected tactics. Moreover, tactics vary in their modularity (Tarrow 1998), meaning they vary in their capacity to travel from one context to another and retain basic core features. Even minimal modularity suggests that the perceived effectiveness of a tactic may remain basically unscathed, because the particularities of a

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94 One may conjecture that the only other social activities that reward experimentation as fiercely as the field of art are the fields of science and technology.

95 While the extreme values on the experimentation dimension are logically coherent, the highest extreme does not correspond to any conceivable or possible artistic work.
specific undertaken action may not have yielded the optimal utility capable of the tactic. In other words, because tactics can be employed in a variety of ways (terrains, materials, modes, etc.), declines in effectiveness following bad results are likely to be marginal. If it doesn't work the first time, try it differently the second time. Below I consider the range of responses by SMOs to updated expectations to more fully flesh out this discussion.

12.2. Tactical Interaction

Finally, I consider the dynamics of tactical interaction. In the static model, CJOs select an action from a set of recognized tactics under a variety of constraints. Because expectations are not dynamic, all estimates represent a stable state of the world according to the CJO. In this preliminary dynamic model, expectations include estimates of the costs and benefits generated by extrinsic constraints, including repression, facilitation, and artistic experimentation. Once an action is made, outcomes unfold, and information is received about the actions and the outcomes, including the effects of extrinsic constraints on outcomes. This information is used to either modify or confirm the expectations used to initially select a tactic. To clarify, information about the process and the outcomes of the initial action generates new sets of expectations regarding the set of recognized tactics. These new expectations are, like the initial expectations, both retrospective and prospective; they establish estimates of costs and benefits as well as levels of confidence about future possible actions based on previous actions and the environmental cues that help establish the second decision context.

12.2.1. Confirmed Expectations

Above, I note the information generated by outcomes may confirm or modify initial expectations. Confirmation refers to any updating of expectations that yields a repetition
of the initial selection. This should not be taken too literally, however, for repetition is never perfect. Repetition may either be maximally repetitive or marginally variable. Maximum repetition coasts on increased confidence and satisfactory outcomes. In contrast, owing to differences in circumstances or specific changes in expectations, a tactic may be reproduced with marginal variations. In this case, the tactic may be regarded as basically sound but require some minor adjustments. Minor or marginal adjustments include such changes as shifting the time of the action from morning to noon, adding more public speakers at rallies, making larger signs, etc. They involve preparations and executions that in no way fundamentally alter the basic nature of the collective action. However, such adjustments involve a process analogous to searching as described in Chapter Three in that they involve the accumulation of information. The resulting expectations are marginally adjusted to account for these marginal variations. Similar but more pronounced processes occur with modification.

12.2.2. Modification

Modification connotes any updating of expectations that yields a change in the selection of a tactic. When the updated expectations about the set of recognized tactics shifts the distribution of costs and benefits such that the initial tactic no longer yields the most efficient response to opponents, the SMO will select that tactic which does yield the highest benefits at the lowest cost. Change in the selection of a tactic refers to at least two possible outcomes: new selection or experimentation.

Before proceeding, it is useful to consider the conditions under which expectations may be sufficiently updated to generate modification. I focus on two: unexpected negative outcomes and circumstantial change independent of outcomes. Recall the consideration of
the tendency towards certainty in Chapter Three. There I present two objections: the
fundamental uncertainty of contentious politics and the terminal decision to act. In order
to elaborate on the conditions productive of modification I elaborate on the first objection.
First, unexpected responses by other actors to the initial action may force new
expectations. For example, although initial expectations may estimate repression as
notably costly but unlikely, vigilant responses by opponents may increase the expected
likelihood of repression in further interactions, thus making that particular iteration of the
tactic less attractive. Second, expectations may shift, because the circumstances of action
may change independent of outcomes. For example, this may refer to a change in public
opinion on an issue of relevance to a movement, such as the the accident at Three Mile
Island and the environmental movement. I consider this further below, but both conditions
may constitute threats or opportunities for action.

The tendency towards perfect certainty is a consequence in part of the static model
assumption that information increases certainty. I modify this important assumption by
suggesting that the information generated from interactions may lead to more uncertainty,
and not through the consumption of strategic or inaccurate information. This may hold for
at least two reasons. One, while one may assume that information about an initial
interaction can aid an SMO in reducing the uncertainty about future actions, the initial
failure may haunt the second effort to predict the actions of other actors - haunt the very
act of prediction itself - such that expectations are saddled with higher uncertainty. Two,
outcomes may sufficiently alter the distribution of resources and motivations across the
field of actors - the state of affairs from Chapter Three – such that the information
generated by these outcomes may be insufficient to maintain the same sense of certainty into the second selection from the set of recognized tactics.

12.2.3. Tactical Experimentation

McAdam (1983) argues that the pace of insurgency – the dramatic shifts in mobilization associated with the trajectories of social movements – is a function of a process of tactical interaction. In his model, challengers sustain their campaigns either through institutionalization or tactical experimentation. The latter involves the diffusion of tactical innovations that provide challengers with newfound political advantages – social disruption - and thus increased mobilization. However, though initially caught off guard, authorities eventually develop tactical adaptations that neutralize the tactic and depress protest participation. In this model, tactical innovation is indistinguishable from tactical diffusion; innovations are tactical experiments that successfully diffuse. In a later iteration, McAdam et al (2001, 8) define innovation contextually as unprecedented or forbidden means of contention within a particular regime. Olzak and Uhrig (2001, 700) argue persuasively that measuring innovation is nearly impossible and almost always erroneous; what appear to be innovations tend to be iterations of previous actions.

An alternative approach concerns tactical experimentation. Tactical experimentation refers to the production of tactics that involve more than marginal adjustments to recognized tactics. In the preceding analysis of incentives for artistic experimentation, I define a dimension of experimentation in which art works range from no experimentation to pure experimentation. Here, I clarify this dimension by suggesting that experimentation only occurs beyond marginal changes to existing tactics. In other words, experimentation is a property of actions that yield positive incentives in Figure
12.1. However, experimentation is highly constrained and relies on existing schemas to develop variations on existing actions, as in processes like bricolage or more generally transposition.

However, they are not unrecognizable, meaning that SMOs can produce a minimally confident set of expectations regarding their application. This is so because they can still be grouped into existing clusters of tactics. Recall Chapter Three’s discussion regarding the clustering of tactics. Clusters are assigned singular expectations. However, these clusters vary in their degree of homogeneity of tactics. In Chapter Three I argue that the more familiar an SMO is with the everyday correlates of a set of tactics, the more homogeneous the cluster. More homogeneous clusters are the result of a capacity and an interest in making finer distinctions among tactics, especially for the purposes of choosing a particular tactic. Without this level of discrimination SMOs would not be able to discern any significant variation between a tactical experiment and an established tactic.

Under what conditions do SMOs experiment tactically? In line with my emphasis on motivational variables, I argue that the probability that SMOs will experiment increases under at least two basic motivational conditions: low utility ambivalence and the elusive high benefit opportunity. First, SMOs may experiment when, under the condition that their previous tactic now provides low expected utility, they perceive the set of recognized tactics to likewise produce low expected utility. In this condition, SMOs perceive only marginal differences among their previously preferred tactics in their capacity for generating desired outcomes. This state of ambivalence thrusts an SMO into searching for more information. Like those characteristic of marginal variations, these searches also involve finding ways to change existing tactics in order to increase effectiveness, exploit
some set of positive incentives, or reduce the force of some negative incentives. Experimentation is thus one of many possible ways that an SMO may deal with ambivalence.

The second condition is the perception of a high benefit opportunity. Recall the definition of opportunities: “the probability that social protest actions will lead to success in achieving a desired outcome” (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 181). Opportunities refer here to constraints in the environment that increase or decrease the perceived effectiveness of a tactic or sets of tactics. The process of search that follows an initial interaction may yield crucial information that dramatically decreases the utility a tactic provides for an SMO. This may generate a condition of low utility ambivalence. However, information may dramatically increase the expected utility that a tactic provides for an SMO, including the perceived effectiveness of the tactic or lowered expectations for repression. This is an opportunity, a result of the information derived from direct and/or indirect interactions. This information may also yield updated perceptions of threats, though I do not suggest here that threats distinguish among tactics.

Why would such opportunities increase the probability of tactical experimentation? Might we simply expect the tactics that experience the increase in effectiveness to be chosen? I suggest that certain opportunities may be sufficiently novel – that is, they may be phenomena that are relatively distinct qualitatively – that the process of search yields sufficient modifications to an existing tactic(s) that the modification is chosen.

One way to consider this qualitative novelty is to refer again to the mechanism of transposition. Transposition here refers to the employment of a set of schemas from one

\[ \text{McAdam (1983) does find evidence that the increased use of previously successful tactics follows the diffusion of tactical innovations.} \]
field or decision context to another. While strictly speaking SMOs choose from among a set of contentious tactics, tactics themselves may be decomposed into sets of schemas that can originate in a variety of other contexts. The use of the sit-in in the early civil rights movement, for example, relied on sets of schemas involving such disparate phenomena as the extensive set of normal social interactions operative inside of business establishments in the South; the possible responses of authorities, white customers, and business owners and employees to transgression of the rules and norms of these interactions (the mixing of races, silence, disobedience, refusal to respond with violence); the legal order regulating these interactions; the responsiveness of mass media to social disruption, including local media; business-customer relations; the wide array of commitments and ideals partly constitutive of the relations among participants (typically friends); and many more.

If tactics are composed of sets of schemas, then experimentation may be regarded as the generation of new sets of associations between schemas or between elements of them. Note already my use of the term experimentation in two different contexts: artistic production (field of art) and tactical production (contentious politics). Here, I focus on the transposition of three general sets of schemas: art, protest, and everyday life.

Three points are relevant. First, as noted in Chapters Five and Six, the field of art paradoxically refuses and reinforces a distinction between everyday life and art. Second, the subfield of restricted production heavily incentivizes experimentation. A consequence

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Ganz (2000; 2009) makes a similar observation when he describes the importance of creativity in generating effective strategy. He defines the creativity of a leadership team as a practice joining varieties of salient contextual knowledge – skills and know-how regarding some specific sphere of activity - and learning processes and experiences. Together, they allow for a greater capacity to adapt to new circumstances by re-contextualizing or synthesizing diverse experiences and data. In my terminology, creativity or experimentation involves the variable capacity to generate new sets of associations between schemas or between elements of schemas. Ganz thus implicitly assumes that tactics can be decomposed into elements from diverse contexts. Transposition is thus a mechanism involving the creative use of schemas.
of this structural arrangement is that the universe of schemas available to artists for experimentation is effectively total. Any object, discourse, or practice outside of the field of art immediately offers an incentive - a high benefit opportunity - to experiment by aesthetically appropriating it. Third, I argue in Chapter Six that the same structure of incentives also generates a tendency towards the politicization of the aesthetic disposition. Consequently, SMOs that operate within the field of artistic production - organizations that play both the game of art and contentious politics - encounter significant incentives to experiment aesthetico-politically.

12.2.4. Tactical Adaptation

Once an SMO acts, other actors respond. If an actor’s response decreases the utility expected of the initial tactic in future interactions such that modification is in play – whether by increasing costs or reducing benefits (including effectiveness) – the initial tactic may be regarded as neutralized. This pattern of response is equivalent to McAdam’s tactical adaptation. I argue that one way to consider this dynamic in the context of culture jamming is to analyze the processes of détournement and recuperation.

In Chapter Six I discuss two forms of resistance formalized by the SI: the dérive and détournement. Détournement refers to the appropriation of materials in the cultural environment – comics, street signs, toys, movies, clothing, cars, etc. - in such a manner as to invert, lead astray, or detour its initial meaning in order to subvert the article and the spectacle as a whole. At its most general, it is synonymous with the conception of culture jamming utilized in this work. Debord and Wolman (2007, 15) described it thus:

Any elements, no matter where they are taken from, can be used to make new combinations. The discoveries of modern poetry regarding the analogical structure of images demonstrate that when two objects are brought together, no matter how far apart their original contexts may be, a relationship is always formed...The mutual interference of
two worlds of feeling, or the juxtaposition of two independent expressions, supersedes the original elements and produces a synthetic organization of greater efficacy. Anything can be used.

This process of *détournement*, of juxtaposing distinct elements in order to build new and critical meanings and relationships, was conceived as an almost universally applicable tactic. In principle, everything and anything can be *détourned*, can be made to expose its role in power relationships; “all goods proposed by the spectacular system, from cars to televisions, also serve as weapons for that system” (Debord 1995, 28).

Because *détournement* involves the appropriation of the spectacle (or whatever ensemble of representation is targeted), and because it plays on the same terrain with the same weapons, it is constantly in danger of being recuperated back into the service of the spectacle. Recuperation is, “the process whereby the spectacle —take[s] up and use[s] [the vocabulary of revolutionary discourse] to support the existing networks of power” (Plant 1992, 76). This process involves, like *détournement*, the re-purposing of some object, practice, or discourse. However, while *détournement* is a tension between multiple representations — a critical tension that aims to disrupt the power of an original representation through association — recuperation seeks to resolve this tension. It is the de-politicization, re-commodification, the effective neutralization of subversive weapons. “Words forged by revolutionary criticism are like partisan weapons; abandoned on the battlefield, they fall into the hands of the counterrevolution” (Khayati 2007, 225).

Situationist propaganda thus required a perpetual vigilance against and cognizance of the spectacle’s ability to neutralize oppositional practices. Recuperations are legion: the working class movement, Dada, ‘revolution,’ punk rock, hip-hop, and even forms of culture jamming itself. Plant (1992, 77-78) observes:
Dada’s anti-art and surrealism’s subversions have both assumed the mantle of institutionalised art, with their works exhibited, consumed, and reproduced in contexts which relieve them of all critical content. Forty years after their adventures, the dadaists looked in dismay at the fate of their agitations…Not merely are the actual works of such movements transplanted into foreign soil, but the forms, techniques, and the magic they worked are also used to ends entirely different from those with which they were developed.

The result of recuperation is the renewed vitality of the system of power relationships. Because recuperation points to the capacity of this system to neutralize a nearly limitless variety of insurgent meanings and practices, “the only historically justified tactic is extremist innovation” (Debord and Wilson 2007, 14). Thus, détournement is born and an incessant dynamic of criticism and neutralization proceeds.

Generically, this model of détournement and recuperation mirrors McAdam’s (1983) dynamic model of tactical interaction. Détournement represents the creative capacity of insurgents to generate novel experiences of disruption for audiences. In turn, recuperation connotes the eventual effort of opponents to adapt to and neutralize this disruptive process.

12.3. Analysis

12.3.1. Intrinsic Incentives

In the analysis below I relate the theoretical developments above to the sample of CJOs introduced in Chapter Four. A preliminary observation conjures a particular difficulty haunting any effort to distinguish these incentives from a sense of effectiveness regarding intrinsic goals and/or objectives. In Chapter Three I state that intrinsic goals can have intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. However, a particular intrinsic goal (or objective) may involve intrinsic enjoyment or normative acceptability. For example, an SMO may pursue the practice of alternative morality as an expression of resistance to existing dominant moral practice. My effort below attempts to distinguish a sense of effectiveness from
distinct motivations. For example, the Yes Men (2012b) observe: “It’s not only that we should get attention for these kinds of things, but it’s really fun.” Elsewhere, the group considers ‘fun’ strategically (meaning effectiveness). But here, they stress that such actions are fun regardless of the goals. I seek to preserve this narrow distinction below.

I begin with two intrinsic incentives: normative acceptability and intrinsic enjoyment. Perhaps the most glaring observation regarding the ethics of tactical alternatives is that tactics are rarely described by CJOs in explicitly moral terms. Straightforward ethical pronouncements are made by the AMF’s Lasn. He suggests that with culture jamming, “Once you start thinking and acting this way, once you realize that consumer capitalism is by its very nature unethical, and therefore it’s not unethical to jam it” (Lasn 1999, xv). He further insinuates that an ethical rage manifests in culture jamming:

There is an anger, a rage-driven defiance, that is healthy, ethical, and empowering. It contains the conviction that change is possible...Learning how to jam our culture with this rage may be one of the few ways left to feel truly among the quick in the Huxleyan mindscape of new millennium capitalism (Lasn 1999, 143).

The CAE (2012b, 15) also define their actions as ethical: “CAE has been able to provoke a direct confrontation with the instances of political power...The ethical act opens the possibility of a counter-public sphere that is not merely formal, since it is directly constituted by those who occupy it.” It is thus clear that for the CAE instances of resistance are by definition ethical in that they open spaces of freedom and dialogue. Yet, it is unclear if, in the case of the CAE, distinguishing normative acceptability from effectiveness is legitimate. Beyond these paltry examples, CJOs in the sample refrain from coloring their tactics or others in strong moral tones.

Much more is expressed regarding the intrinsic enjoyment of tactics. Above I hypothesize (H12.1) that CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as highly enjoyable
relative to other tactics. The AMF’s Lasn demonstrates above that culture jamming is not only ethical, but healthy and emotionally satisfying. The RBC emphasize that their art interventions are “fun!” (D. and Talen 2011, 13). The Yes Men “enjoy both the mischief and fun” of exposing the ills of their adversaries (Bonanno 2004), and emphasize that such actions perform a prefigurative function; they show “people that life can be fun” (Bichlbaum 2012a). Haugerud (2013, 200-01) testifies that the Billionaires derive considerable joy from their creative actions. In the case of the BLF, however, distinguishing intrinsic enjoyment from effectiveness is untenable. The group describe their billboard escapades as “a lot of fun, mostly. It’s exciting, it’s adventurous,” (BLF 1999) but as BLF Member Kalman (2008) argues the group emphasizes the “simple joy of changing a billboard.” This joy is the moment of dialogue between advertisers and billboard bandits, the point of resistance itself.

Joy is not the only intrinsic incentive offered by culture jamming. Haugerud's (2013, 200-01.) list extends to “social connection, affective solidarity, and a path to self-knowledge and psychic well-being,” to which I can add a sense of political efficacy and freedom. Such diverse motivations are frequently expressed, but many of them are regarded as intrinsic objectives or goals. For example, the IST regards its projects as investigations, research projects that aim to develop an imminent and spontaneous awareness of the opaque trappings of social situations. Member D’Ignazio describes the possible overarching interest of the group as a consideration of the question: “How are you invited as a citizen to participate in the public realm?” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). Thus, the spontaneity of the group’s actions is itself a measure of their effectiveness.
The hypothesis stipulates that CJO tactics are perceived relative to other tactics. Implicit comparisons abound in the discussions of groups like the Billionaires and the Yes Men. These concern the relatively difficult long-term mass movement organizing instrumental to social change and culture jamming, which performs ancillary but possibly crucial functions. The most overt consideration is offered by the Billionaire's Boyd (emphasis added, n.d.) consideration of planning for electoral activism: “You have to figure out what is your relationship with elections and maybe have an outside strategy where you are doing some of the boring, painful compromising work of running an election.”

Thus, while there is ample evidence supporting the charge that CJOs view their own actions as intrinsically fun and pleasurable apart from their effectiveness, only a hint of data suggests that other actions are not as fun or enjoyable. Of course, there is no evidence for an opposing hypothesis. No CJO described actions other than culture jamming as fun or pleasurable. I thus offer extremely tentative support for the hypothesis, but note the emphasis on culture jamming as an enjoyable practice.

12.3.2. Resource Constraints

I hypothesize (H12.2.) that CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as low cost.

Some support is available. The IST’s Rasovic notes:

We are the consumers, so we operate at that level. We’re not Yes Men. We do not have an HBO Special. We also don’t have weapons and listening equipment and everything else so we can fight the govt. Let’s be realistic: you wanna change the laws, you have to do a lot of work, and to do that you need millions of dollars, and you need a different infrastructure. We concentrate on...direct democracy.

The Billionaires' Boyd (2002), who describes the Billionaires as a grass-roots concept, highlights the advantages of such approaches: “Cheap and fast are generally good qualities for a grass-roots movement.” Implicit references to low cost actions abound. Groups like
the AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, SCP, and TYM provide simple how-to guides and workshops for replicating their actions. The IAA offers a contrasting example. They note that making contestational robots is not easy, because it requires specific mechanical skills and lots of money (Brusadin et al n.d.). Though data are not ideal, overall the hypothesis is supported.

12.3.3. Repression

The remaining constraints and incentives are extrinsic in nature. First, I consider repression. Nearly every group in the sample acknowledges or experiences various forms of repression (BLF, CTM, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP, TYM). I take a number of approaches to considering the relation of repression to tactical choice. First, I describe how the CJOs treat the four relevant types of repression. Second, I focus on the relationship between effectiveness and repression. Finally, I present data on the means by which CJOs deal with repression. All of these analyses are oriented by an emphasis on the ways that antagonists and authorities respond to different tactics.

Above I suggest that violence is the least likely form of repression that CJOs face in response to their contentious performances. Only two groups suggest the threat of violence (SCP, TYM). In one attempted action, a private security guard sufficiently threatened the SCP such that they aborted the performance. The SCP’s Brown (Art Toad) describes the guard as large and aggressive. The guard “showed himself willing to use physical force to prevent the show from going on” (SCP 2006, 43). The Yes Men (n.d.(b)) describe the anxiety of their early Salzburg action: “We were sure to be confronted with outrage. But would we face physical danger?” These slim examples exhaust the range of violent repression presented by CJOs in the sample.
Harassment is somewhat more prevalent. Three groups emphasize their encounters with surveillance, interrogation, verbal abuse, etc. (CAE, SCP). When asked about the typical reactions to the CAE’s actions, member Kurtz responds, “Mostly condemnations and threats from police, lawyers, churches, political figures, the FBI and just about any disciplinary agency you can think of” (Hirsch 2005, 32). In the documentary Strange Culture, the group describes possible instances of harassment following the FBI’s bio-terrorism case against Kurtz (Leeson 2006). These actions include surveillance and attempts to provoke members of the group into engaging in illegal activity. The SCP (2006, 40, 49) describes various forms of harassment from the NYPD, including phone calls pre-empting performances. Short-term and mild harassment is somewhat more prevalent for several groups (BIL, CTM, RBC, SCP, TYM). The CTM’s Gach (2007) sketches a portrait of such repression: “Inevitably we would be shut down by the authorities, whether police, private security. If you do anything vaguely interesting in public space that’s not consumerist or not transportation, at some point you’re likely to get shut down.”

While I argue above that violence and repetitive harassment are not the most common forms of repression for CJOs, I do suggest a different conclusion for arrest and litigation. At least four groups express some concern or experience with arrest or similar law enforcement measures (BLF, CAE, RBC, TYM). The RBC’s Reverend Billy has been arrested and/or fined countless times by authorities across the United States. Typical charges include trespass, harassment, and disturbing the peace. The most noteworthy incident involved the Reverend reciting the First Amendment to an officer. The officer promptly arrested him for “Harassment of a Public Official” (Carlson 2007). The CAE’s Kurtz was arrested in 2004 under multiple charges, including most controversially
bioterrorism (Hirsch 2005; Leeson 2006). The ensuing legal entanglement lasted four years. More generally, the group often stresses the enormous discretion that law enforcement officers possess in the execution of their general duties.

As we all know you don’t have to break the law to go to jail. Just exercising one’s rights is all it takes. There are plenty of laws on the books that are there so that arrest remains discretionary—creating a false public emergency for example—and it’s often a way to disguise that the people being arrested are in fact political prisoners (Hirsch 2005, 30).

Thus, while the CAE emphasizes the legality of its actions they have come under scrutiny. The Yes Men’s Bichlbaum (2009) was arrested in an act of creative civil disobedience while his fellow participants were ticketed for trespassing. Finally, although the BLF have never been caught in action, they do acknowledge the risks of arrest when they counsel security-mindedness when ‘improving’ billboards (Thornhill and DeCoverly 2006).

Litigation is a particularly notable form of repression because it can dramatically increase the costs of engaging in protest and it dramatically changes the field of action. The RBC is clear on this point: “For a group like ours, there are too many unknowns in lawsuits, too much of the work is in the hands of other people and experts, and being tied up in court depletes our resources and keeps us of the street” (D. and Talen 2011, 134). At least three groups encountered some form of litigation (CAE, NGL, RBC, TYM). The CAE’s four year legal battle dramatically affected the group, especially Kurtz. Negativland (1995) suffered two lawsuits: one from the rock band U2’s record label for trademark violation and another from NGL’s record label. Both lawsuits spurred the group to further pursue reform of intellectual property law. In 2009, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued the group for trademark and copyright infringement following the start-up of the Yes Men’s faux-Chamber website and a corresponding well-publicized impersonation of the group at the National Press Club (Mulkern 2009).
With these descriptions of CJO’s encounter with repression in tow, I now consider how repression can be an indirect indicator of effectiveness. Two groups argue that the degree of repression an action elicits demonstrates the degree to which that action threatens antagonists (CAE, RBC). The CAE (1996, 12) argue, “The assumption here is that key indicators of power-value are the extent to which a location or a commodity is defended, and the extent to which trespassers are punished. The greater the intensity of defense and punishment, the greater the power-value.” This is the primary argument of much of the CAE’s attribution of effectiveness. It constitutes the group’s primary disregard for the “streets” as a site of political action. The RBC’s Talen makes a similar argument in regards to their interventions. He notes, “One of the ways in which we are so sure that there is power in Backing Away [from the Product] is that police and journalists and their camera people come running with such dedication when we practice it” (Talen 2006, 89).

Once repression is anticipated (either through initial expectations generated by collective identities and ideology or through information gleaned from contemporary events, i.e. opportunity structures), CJOs develop a number of responses intended to either reduce the effect of repression or re-purpose repression into aiding in the cause of the CJO. Several groups attempt the former. The SCP (2006, 40) often have lawyers present at their actions. The BLF have “an attorney on retainer and a legal strategy in place” (McManis 2003). Napier elaborates:

Not only do we not permanently damage these billboards, but, in fact, we improve them… Look at it from an advertising point of view. Any sophomore in an advertising program understands that any product exposure at all increases unit sales. Look at the Apple Computer improvements we made. There was a photo on the front page of The Chronicle. Our legal counsel tells us that not only should we not be fined for what we’re doing but that we should be paid for what we’ve done (McManis 2003).
BLF member Amanda argues, "We might be able to plead the parody defense because what we do is not malicious, profane or offensive" (McManis 2003). The BLF also utilize various security measures in their billboard actions (Thornill and DeCoverly 2006). The CTM’s Gach (2007) describes the advantages of using art as a critical medium: “When you gain support from them [art institutions] in a town, they are usually connected to upper economic structure of town. So when you roll into a town, and the cops stop you, you get sort of carte blanche because of this.”

Some groups see at least some repression as a means to further their goals. For example, TYM’s Bichlbaum (2009) describes the repercussions of his arrest:

Sleeping on concrete was a challenge, but I met a lot of interesting people, and my arrest meant major prime-time news coverage we wouldn’t have otherwise had...Civil disobedience is a great way to put pressure on leaders to do things we need them to do - either direct heat they can feel, or via public opinion, which they also feel.

The group describes a more general sentiment: “Anytime anyone has done something about us—saying they ‘deplore’ us, complaining that we’re a Political Action Committee, whatever—they’ve looked ridiculous to the press” (TYM n.d.(b)). The CAE go a step further and design some of their actions to instigate public displays of repression. For example, in one of their actions a member of the group plays with a train in a public space:

Security would eventually tell the performer to “move along.” The performer would ignore the command, and act as if he were oblivious to the people around him. Security would then threaten the performer with arrest if he did not move. This is the moment when the most interesting dialogue began, and the greatest understanding of public management emerged. The spectators were suddenly confronted with the reality that a person was about to be arrested simply for playing with toy cars (CAE 1996, 52-54).

The RBC took the initiative – in my language an opportunity arose - after the arrest of Reverend Billy for his recital of the First Amendment. The reverend voluntarily pursued the case into the legal field and sued the city (Hartocollis 2007).
With data constraints in mind, this consideration of repression suggests that CJOs do not typically face grave repression. Violence is exceedingly unlikely. However, CJOs do experience the other costly form of repression, litigation, along with arrest and some minor forms of harassment. Both governments and corporations are the primary purveyors of repressions. Notably, the most severe cases of repression – countless arrests - occur in response to the RBC’s confrontational tactical approach.

12.3.4. Facilitation

Another means by which authorities and antagonists pursue their goals with respect to SMOs is facilitation. I argue above that facilitation is more likely to come from governments and private arts organizations than corporations and that it comes primarily in the form of grants and fellowships. In Chapter Eight I note that many CJOs derive various forms of support from a variety of organizations, including especially arts organizations. For example, the AAA began as a $35,000 grant (Creative Work Fund 2004).

Co-optation is one possible approach by which a corporation may attempt to facilitate critical activity on the part of a CJO. However, like so many active efforts to instigate activity it comes at a price, namely the immunity of the facilitating corporation and a harmed reputation. The AAA’s Lambert describes the quandaries of co-optation for anti-corporate artists:

But what if [activist] Neckface’s Van’s billboard paid for a round of chemo for his grandmother?...There’s a measurement and you need to see who comes out ahead. On the artists’ side, they get a space and get to work in the daylight, but how does working with a company compromise what they are saying or could say? Do they leave with their integrity? The corporation invariably comes out ahead, it gets borrowed legitimacy and credibility with customers. Whatever money the artists gets, the company makes more (Wolf 2007).

No corporation successfully facilitated any group in the sample. The most striking example of such an attempt is offered by Negativland. Member Hosler observes:
Yeah, Weiden & Kennedy, an ad agency based in Portland. They're gigantic. They do the ad campaigns for Microsoft and Nike. They're considered to be a "cutting edge" advertising firm. When we were working on the Dispepsi project, both [Negativland member] Don Joyce and myself pretty much simultaneously got phone calls from them. They wanted to hire Negativland to create these radio ads for Miller Genuine Draft Beer. We were right in the middle of doing the Dispepsi project on advertising, so it was a depressing, sort of shocking, but very healthy kind of wake-up call. The degree to which these people try to appropriate and absorb the people that are appropriating and critiquing them... it knows no bounds. These ad people thought it would be really cool to hire Negativland. They wanted to give us their ads to cut up and do things with and mock them and manipulate and do our Negativland "thing" to. Since they were offering us a lot of money - $25,000 or so - both Don and myself immediately thought, "Wow, we'd like that money, that sounds great. Is this an opportunity we could do something with?" Because over the years when weird things have happened to us, like when we've gotten in trouble, we've looked at these things as opportunities, not problems...

And I've heard people say, "Well, you were stupid to turn them down- you could have just taken the money and used it for your own projects." I think that's the rationale a lot of people would use. But I think for us, given some of the content of our work and how we're perceived, if we had taken that money, I feel like it would make our work and our point of view seem like a farce, and I don't see how we'd be seen as having any integrity anymore. Another thing is, I just feel like somebody has to say "no" to these kinds of guys, you know? We aren't going to sell out to them (NGL 2003)!

Corporations do seek to facilitate culture jamming, but for some CJOs such offers are tainted.

12.3.5. Experimentation

I argue above that incentives associated with artistic experimentation may drive some groups to engage in tactical experimentation. Moreover, I suggest that this process may look like the dynamic between détournement and recuperation. This final section considers the data relative to these theoretical developments.

In Chapter Eleven I present data identifying four groups in the sample that clearly exhibit experimental repertoires (AAA, CTM, CAE, IST). In Chapter Seven I present data regarding the possession of an aesthetic disposition among the groups in the sample. Table 12.1 reproduces this data but highlights the four cases of experimental repertoires. Some observations are worth noting. First, of the three groups with sufficient data that clearly
possess all four indicators of an aesthetic disposition (IST, RBC, SCP) only one utilizes an experimental repertoire (IST). In fact, the three groups register across a spectrum of tactical variation; while the SCP has a very narrow repertoire, the RBC has a relatively wide repertoire. Second, two of the experimental groups (CTM, CAE) nearly accomplish possession of all four indicators but are handicapped by a mixed classification on education or occupation. In order to compare CJOs with experimental and non-experimental repertoires I develop an admittedly crude measure if the aesthetic disposition – an additive index of each group’s values on the four indicators. In this variable, I code No and insufficient data as zero, a mixed value as .5, and Yes as one. The Total column presents the data. The mean across the entire sample of twelve groups is 2.7, while the mean for the four experimental groups is 3.25, a difference of .55. If the IAA is excluded (a mixed tactical repertoire but sorely lacking in sufficient data with respect to the aesthetic disposition), then the mean shifts to 2.86, sharpening the difference to roughly .4. No test of significance

<table>
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<th>Education or Occupation</th>
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<th>Organizational Settings</th>
<th>Political Perception</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
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</tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBC</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYM</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 - mixed  2 – insufficient data
is provided; the sample is small and the measures are crude, but some sense of the relation of experimentation to the aesthetic disposition may be gleaned from Table 12.1, however minimal and insecure. If anything, this analysis suggests the possibility that an aesthetic disposition is not sufficient for experimental repertoires, but that it may increase the probability that a group possesses such a repertoire.

Beyond this penchant for experimentation, how do CJOs construct their dynamics of tactical experimentation? Some acknowledge the process of recuperation. Above I note the AAA recognition of recuperation through co-optation. Perhaps most clearly, the CAE’s determination to develop effective tactics runs directly into the finesse of capitalism. They caution that “the rate at which strategies of subversion are co-opted indicates that the adaptability of power is too often underestimated” (CAE 1994, 12). Their warning is dire: “Once named and defined, any movement is open to co-optation. Should tactical media become popularized, its recuperation is almost inevitable” (CAE 2001, 5). Yet it is the interval between subversion and co-optation that the CAE recognizes itself and others as occupying when it notes, “credit should be given to the resisters, to the extent that the subversive act or product is not co-optively reinvented as quickly as the bourgeois aesthetic of efficiency might dictate” (CAE 1994, 12). Negativland (2003) describe their experience with the cutting-edge advertising agency:

Over the years when weird things have happened to us, like when we’ve gotten in trouble, we’ve looked at these things as opportunities, not problems. In this case, my brain was doing the same thing: ”Can we somehow subvert these guys and do something interesting with this, and turn the tables on them?” And what I then realized was, ”Wait a minute, they called us because they want me to be thinking exactly what I’m thinking right now! That’s what they want the ad to be.” So then I realized that we’d been had, we were fucked. There wasn’t any way you could out-think them.
Most troubling for the group is member Hosler’s charge that, “[I]nstead of just absorbing different fringe, oppositional ideas, they’re absorbing the very idea of opposition, no matter what form it takes” (Hosler and Savan 1998). This pessimism about the capacity of antagonists to recuperate seems to gnaw at some of these groups. The BLF (1999) expresses a less melancholic take on recuperation:

I know some of the advertising agencies are already keeping an eye on the billboard hackers to see what they can use to sell their product. The first time I ran across it I found it annoying, and then I thought I can either be pissed off about this or I can do something about it. BLF 1999

The AMF’s Lasn (2002) is more optimistic: “Instead of saying, ‘Oh no, our images are being sucked up by the system – our images are being neutralized by their images.’ I don’t believe in that kind of cynicism! I’ve seen enough images, jams, and detournements work to not be afraid of that.” Still, a careful analysis of several years of Adbusters magazine by Nomai 2008, 164) strongly supports the argument that the group’s subvertisements increased in technical sophistication in response to advertising campaigns that often mimicked the style of the AMF and other culture jammers.

Thus some CJOs appear to recognize an imperative to avoid recuperation. However, only one of the groups noted here utilizes experimental repertoires (CAE). The data are consistent with an explanation of experimental repertoires (AA, CTM, IST) as the result of CJOs playing the game of art while playing contentious politics. Yet, considering this relationship further as one of tactical interaction, of détournement and recuperation, is not generally supported.

If this represents a general pattern, one way to explain it is that the dynamic of détournement and recuperation as tactical experimentation functions less on the level of the CJO – individual CJOs experiment tactically, witness or anticipate recuperation of the
tactic, and respond with more tactical experiments – and more as a set of incentives characterizing the field of contention. This is how McAdam explains tactical interaction. Individual SMOs don’t develop tactics and themselves immediately respond to neutralizations of their actions. Instead, SMOs respond to the actions of other SMOs and their perceived opponents. The process can be largely indirect and mediated, like much of my emphasis on opportunity structures. Thus, while some CJOs may perceive their individual enterprise as a continually shifting game of détournement and recuperation (like the CAE), what may be at play is the more general struggle of the two in the field of conflict.

12.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I refrain from developing a complete dynamic model. In its place, I provide some theoretical direction for an empirical analysis of some of the incentives that CJOs face in choosing tactics. First, I develop theoretical analyses of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and generate hypotheses and propositions regarding the relationship between particular incentives, resource constraints, and tactical choice. Second, I elaborate on theoretical developments in previous chapters by considering the dynamics of tactical interaction. In so doing, I draw on the concepts of détournement and recuperation presented in Chapter Six. Third, I present data drawn from the sample of CJOs to illustrate these dynamics.

One of the more interesting findings of this chapter is that CJOs describe their own actions as intrinsically enjoyable. In the previous chapter I note that groups pursuing extrinsic goals tend to see culture jamming as part of a broader struggle. In fact, the more directly effective means for achieving these goals include institutional and conventional tactics, civil disobedience, and mass movements. While culture jamming is effective at
performing certain important objectives within wider projects of social change, it is also clear that for members of CJOs these actions are highly enjoyable. Wettergren (2005, 143) makes an astute observation about her sample of CJOs: “the notion of fun and joy seem to be closely connected to the jammers’ evaluation of a project, more than judgment of efficiency in changing the system.” In the language of incentives and preferences, CJOs may choose tactics that they perceive as less effective (a less preferred tactic) because they offset the loss in anticipated benefits by increasing the intrinsic benefits (fun and joy). Wettergren (2005, 142) observes elsewhere: “a fundamental component of culture jamming is the idea that human beings share a capacity towards ingenuity and creativity [see Chapter Seven’s description of protaganists and the public]…The act of protest is conceived as something that creates and reinforces autonomy as unpredictability and refusal to follow consumer impulses.” Part of this unpredictability involves risk-taking. Repression is not too costly in the case of CJOs, as this chapter demonstrates. I can thus contribute one possible explanation of why CJOs appear somewhat risk-tolerant in the preceding chapter; risk-tolerance or risk-seeking can be construed as an intrinsic incentive, part of the thrill of being free and developing political agency. As a final word, this chapter suggests that tactical choices are made under resource constraints that make actions like culture jamming more attractive, including their skill sets, organizational memberships, and financial resources. Tactical choice in the case of CJOs may thus involve assessments of effectiveness, intrinsic enjoyment, and resource constraints, including the aesthetic disposition.
CONCLUSION

Throughout this dissertation I endeavored to provide an empirical analysis of culture jamming organizations and to develop a theoretical approach to explaining repertoire change and tactical choice. The primary thesis mediating these empirical and theoretical concerns is that a close relation exists between the development of twentieth century art in advanced Western democracies and culture jamming. Developing this argument and addressing these concerns entailed three basic tasks: the conceptualization of culture jamming, the development of a theoretical explanation of repertoire change and tactical choice, and an empirical analysis of twelve CJOs and their social, political, and historical contexts.

Each of these tasks highlights some of the key contributions of this dissertation to the study of protest and social movements. In response to the lack of an adequate concept, I developed a rigorous conceptualization of culture jamming as a form of ironic framing, a contentious collective action that involves the disruption of the dominant ensemble of representations in a given social system. Explicit in this conceptual analysis is the argument that culture jamming is a means of engaging in contentious politics. The empirical analysis that follows demonstrates this insight: CJOs operate in a contentious and oppositional manner. The analysis of repression in Chapter Twelve is especially supportive. While repression is not overwhelming in the case of culture jamming, many CJOs engage in activities that elicit repressive responses from the state and corporate actors. The most dramatic example is the RBC, a group whose confrontational style is frequently met with arrest and fines. Other CJOs experienced varying efforts intended to handicap their capacity to dissent, including the use of litigation and harassment.
In order to account for the decision to culture jam and to help explain the development of culture jamming as a set of tactics, I present an approach to theory that begins to integrate the macro- and micro-levels of analysis. While synthetic approaches to social movement theory are not uncommon, my contribution is novel in several ways. First, I bring eminent sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu into dialogue on questions of social structure and contentious politics. Although certainly not the first effort to engage both scholars, it appears this dissertation is the first to open this discussion to collective action theory. While both scholars were famously hostile to rational choice theory, I argue that bounded rationality offers a possible means of reconciling these disparate research programs. Second, while social movement theory primarily focuses on explaining changes in mobilization, I deploy the tools of social movement theory to advance the beginnings of a theory of tactical choice. Of particular interest is my use of rational choice theory, an approach whose myopic focus on mobilization has, as of yet, produced hardly a handful of reasonable efforts to explain why actors choose one means of protest over others. Third, emphasizing the boundedness of rationality in a collective action theory account allows for an analysis of the variable information and resource endowments possessed by actors. I relate these endowments to the language of familiarity, a concept whose use by Tilly and Bourdieu is both generous and cavalier. Here, I develop the notion of familiarity as sets of constraints and incentives that vary across actors, everyday activities, and sets of tactics. The key resource of interest is Bourdieu’s concept of the aesthetic disposition, the set of skills developed in the field of art. Fourth, the core of my theoretical approach lies in relating social contexts associated with artistic production to the choice to engage in culture jamming. My emphasis on the field of art provides a crucial
link between context and action. I argue that the aesthetic disposition is imparted through experience with sets of educational and occupational networks. As familiarity with certain social activities over others, dispositions contribute to the definition of the set of expectations and their degrees of uncertainty that distinguishes tactical alternatives. My emphasis on art is not necessarily the limit of the argument, however. Rather, my general emphasis is on skill sets or dispositions and their relation to tactical choice. Finally, I claim to link collective identity and ideology to an SMO’s attribution of effectiveness. While many scholars sense an opposition between identity and strategy explanations of tactical choice, I construe the variety of ways that actors define effectiveness as an expression of the relation between goals (and objectives) – intrinsic or extrinsic, political or cultural, club good or public good, materialist or post-materialist, and moderate, radical or autonomy - and actions. Such an approach accommodates identity and strategy by opening collective action theory to non-material incentives.

This study also makes a number of methodological contributions to the study of culture jamming. First, the sample of CJOs utilized in the study is nearly twice as large as the nearest study (Wettergren 2005). While a sample of twelve cases is not ground-breaking, it does offer a number of opportunities to compare and contrast a wider selection of activities. Such an analysis is more likely to detect overly simplified generalizations. For example, while much of the academic literature on culture jamming emphasizes the mass media and multinational corporations as targets of CJOs, I find that many of these groups target government as well (if not the government alone) and, to a lesser extent, interest groups, political parties, and the military. Second, the methodological constraints of this project, especially data and sample limitations, are recognized and incorporated into my
effort to make substantive knowledge claims about culture jamming. Such claims are constrained by a number of conditions: selecting on the dependent variable, small sample size, the lack of a representative sample, ignoring the element of time in the data, and the prolific use of Internet sources. In the analysis of the sample, other important concerns arise, especially missing or insufficient data. Third, data collection was comprehensive and involved a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, including two in-depth interviews.

While novel, the general thrust of the arguments of this dissertation is not at variance with a great deal of social movement theory. The broadest theoretical contribution of this project lies in merely synthesizing and filling-in-the-blanks of a far larger body of work. However, rival explanations of repertoire change and tactical choice are available. I briefly focus on two apparent rivals here: what I call a mischief hypothesis and Wettergren's (2005) emotional hypothesis.

I argued in this dissertation that culture jamming is related to the development of art in the twentieth century. However, this argument appears to run directly counter to the observation that this phenomenon has a history preceding the twentieth century. Though Dery (1993) restricts culture jamming to a post-Dada world the notion that ironic dissent is a recent addition to the repertoire of contention flies in the face of the evidence. Satirical performances and artifacts are plentiful throughout history. I do not claim here to identify the particular conditions and mechanisms that drove individuals and groups to engage in satire or related actions (for example, the disruptive antics of Diogenes of Sinope). Instead, I argue that to posit the historical continuity of this phenomenon is to suggest that some
constant condition is available to individuals or groups.\textsuperscript{98} For simplicity’s sake, and without any presumption of strictly psychological determinants, I call this condition, mischief. Thus, a mischief hypothesis posits that culture jamming is an expression of some durable characteristic of the human condition. I will not critique this hypothesis. It seems to me that some durable factors are likely accountable for the continuity of such forms of action across time. However, we lack data on the prevalence of this phenomenon. Impressionistic accounts are necessary, but insufficient to make the case concretely. More to the point is my charge that the argument of this dissertation is not that culture jamming is a uniquely twentieth century development, but that the culture jamming repertoire of contention as we see it in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is shaped by the development of twentieth century art. This relationship takes two related forms. First, the historical trajectory of the field of art described in Chapters Five and Six highlights some of the incentives available to those associated with the field of artistic production to engage in culture jamming actions. These include especially a general tendency towards experimentation. These effects are more widespread today across the population due to the increasing size of the art field relative to the social system as a whole. Second, and more importantly, the skills associated with the aesthetic disposition, itself more widely distributed across the population than artistic skills in previous centuries, provide numerous incentives to engage in culture jamming. I argue in Chapter Eleven that such skills are especially important the more technically sophisticated the culture jamming

\textsuperscript{98} I am referring here to the simple instance of such phenomena across time, not to the ebbs and flows of ironic dissent. An example of an explanation of the latter is provided by Haugerud's (2013, 188) argument that such activism is more prevalent under one of two conditions: the repression of traditional dissent (a hostile political opportunity structure) or the inadequacy of "conventional political categories, modes of expression, and organization" to task of capturing social reality.
action. Thus, the focus of this project is, again, not on the rise of a new type of repertoire, but a shift in the incentives available to contentious actors that in some cases favor the actions under study here. However, clearly, such an argument implies the hypothesis that culture jamming is more common today than in previous historical periods. Again, comparable data on this question are not available.

This discussion clearly suggests that the mischief hypothesis can be construed as more than a strict alternative to my explanation; it can be regarded as a potential supplementary hypothesis. I make a similar argument with respect to Wettergren’s emotional hypothesis. Wettergren explains culture jamming in part as conditioned by the emotional culture or regime of late capitalism, the sets of prescribed and proscribed emotions and behaviors that maintain the hedonic structure of consumerism. In order to resist this structure, culture jammers seek to develop an alternative emotional regime based on genuine or authentic pleasure and freedom. In explaining the choice to engage in culture jamming as the means to fashion this regime, Wettergren relies on a variant of the micro-foundational approach Flam (2000) calls, in contrast to homo economicus and homo sociologicus, the “emotional man.” Collins’ (2004) theory of interaction ritual chains serves as the theoretical template for Wettergren’s (2005: ch. 8) analysis. In this theory, individuals and groups accrue or expend emotional energy through social interactions. Such energy can range from a high of confidence and happiness to lows of depression and a lack of initiative. Because collective actions can vary in the amount of emotional energy they will provide, tactics are chosen over others principally for their contribution to an individual or group’s level of emotional energy.
While Wettergren does find strong evidence that members of CJOs derive significant positive emotional energy from engaging in their actions, she makes the additional argument that CJOs engage in second-order interaction rituals. First-order interaction rituals are immediate and direct forms of interaction. In the case of CJOs this points to participation in the action itself. Second-order rituals involve the circulation of symbols, “in which individuals re-circulate the symbols in other contexts and groups than the original, or through the mediation of television and so on” (Wettergren 2005, 143). She argues that “[t]he innovation and dispersal of symbols is itself an activity that generates solidarity and [emotional energy] because it includes an imagined and internalized community of the lik-eminded that will admire and acknowledge the meaning of these symbols” (Wettergren 2005, 144). What Wettergren is arguing here is that CJOs engage in culture jamming in part due to the intrinsic enjoyment of expressing collective identification and establishing reputations (social positions) among their fellow activists, artists, and pranksters.

An initial draft of Chapter Eleven involved an analysis of what I identified as symbolic identification with a collective identity. Whereas intrinsic enjoyment refers to direct benefits like social interaction, identification refers to a broader sense of self that expresses solidarity with others not directly implicated in the action. Although identification is sometimes utilized as a more general explanation of mobilization (McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Rochon 1998), I suggested that SMOs believe that some tactics are more indicative of collective identity than others. Such incentives are typically expressed through the use of frames or tactics that establish a symbolic connection between the action and a wider community of activism or sympathizers. Thus, it seems plausible to
suggest that CJOs derive benefits from utilizing tactics associated with actors under the condition that the SMO strongly identifies with these actors. The inverse proposition – that CJOs may derive costs from utilizing tactics that they associate with their antagonists or those they identify negatively – seems less plausible in part because the nature of a conflict may generate a tendency towards the use of similar tactics, especially when the conflict is drawn into a highly institutionalized field like the courts, legislatures, or elections. 99

My reasons for omitting this variable from Chapter Eleven involve the arguments close relation to Wettergren’s argument (considered in this Conclusion) and the difficulty of providing direct evidence to support it. This is made obvious in Wettergren’s study. Her explanation of culture jamming as first and second-order interaction rituals follows her empirical analysis. It draws its force primarily from the logic of the theoretical argument. The evidence supports it, but it is not conclusive. Even the data she summons in her discussion of these effects falls short (Wettergren 2005, 145). She quotes the AMF’s Lasn and a member of the French Adbusters, but they express strongly individual values of anti-commercialism and autonomy.

Broader theoretical concerns are at stake. The emotional man approach is a clear rival to theories based on rationality assumptions. I do not have the space to engage these approaches in an extended dialogue. However, I do want to note some points of interest regarding the mutual application of each to the subject of culture jamming. First, the expectation of an emotional hypothesis – that both first and second-order interaction rituals increase the probability that these actors will engage in culture jammers – is not

99 Of course, the literature on isomorphic processes in organizational fields suggests a set of incentives that may produce pressures for organizational (and presumably tactical) homogeneity even in conventional political activity (DiMaggio and Powell 1987). This process is most pronounced in more institutionalized spheres of activities like the market or many professions.
strictly opposed to a hypothesis utilizing the language of incentives. In other words, both approaches can generate the expectation that, in the case of CJOs, the circulation of symbols as a form of collective identification is associated with an increased probability of tactical adoption of culture jamming. From this singular perspective, data can provide no reason to reject or accept either approach against the other. However, from a theoretical standpoint, Collins’ theory is marginally more satisfying in that the concept of emotional energy is at home in the theory of interaction rituals. In contrast, a collective action theory account of collective identification must rely on distinct theoretical approaches. In other words, while the concept of emotional energy is endogenous to the theory of collective identification, rational choice theory possesses no endogenous theory of collective identification. For example, I employed Bourdieu and Tilly to fill-in-the-gaps of a rationalist account. Here, it would require a supplementary explanation of collective identity, an account I argued Bourdieu offers in his concepts of habitus and field. Moreover, some may suggest that an emotional model of action is more descriptively accurate than one based on bounded rationality. However, at their core each model is a radically simplified model of motivation. For the emotional man action is a consequence of the balance of emotional energies derived from actions, while for the rational man action is a consequence of the balance of incentives derived from actions. Within the emotional perspective incentives can be reduced to their emotional register. Within the rational perspective the lack of a presumption of conscious reasoning opens the door to incorporating emotions, including pleasure, into the language of incentives. However, Bourdieu’s sociology, which is part of the exogenous background (the filling in the blanks) of my collective action theory account, abandons a distinction between rationality and emotion by positing a complex psychology
of investment in social activity (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005, 482-483). As a reflection of his somewhat structural bias (structures are more determinate than agency) Bourdieu is less inclined to posit a pervasive cynicism and more mindful of the level of practice operating below consciousness and clear intention. Ultimately (and hopefully), descriptively and empirically satisfying theories of action will arrive with greater advances in psychology and the neuro and cognitive sciences.

This last comment obviously suggests a rather daunting task for future researchers. In concluding this dissertation I point to modest proposals for further study that highlight some of the difficulties experienced throughout this project. First, the theoretical consideration of uncertainty in Chapter Three draws on a wide literature and several concepts including economic theory, ambiguity aversion, bounded rationality, and contentious politics. There is no extensive theoretical or empirical treatment of risk and uncertainty in social movement theory despite the fact that politics is a fundamentally uncertain social activity (Downs 1957) and that forms of action outside of institutions are potentially more uncertain. Such an analysis should consider a variety of questions. How can the literatures on uncertainty in psychology, economics, and to a lesser extent political science and sociology contribute to a more robust understanding of uncertainty in contentious politics? What kind or level of uncertainty do the various actors in contentious politics encounter? How do actors utilize uncertainty strategically? How does uncertainty vary across SMO strategies and tactics? What are the risk orientations of actors?

Answering these questions and others should bring the field closer to an understanding of the nature of contentious politics.
Second, I noted in Chapter Eleven that effectiveness presents theoretical and methodological difficulties because SMOs may rationalize their actions as effective. In other words, they may choose an action due to some reason or incentive other than effectiveness and yet produce a justification for their choice that stresses how the tactic contributes to the achievement of the group’s goals and objectives. Any micro-level theory of tactical choice must determine how an SMO attributes effectiveness to their actions and the actions of others and the nature of the distribution of effectiveness across the set of tactics. This problem is compounded by the fact that SMO’s do not merely pursue a goal(s) but a variety of objectives. Such an account of effectiveness must recognize the process of rationalization as a possible confounding factor.100

Third, social movement theory is nearly void of micro-level theoretical accounts of tactical choice. If this dissertation should sound one resounding call in the area of theory, it would be the necessity of developing such approaches and providing clearly articulated implications for testing them. The question of mobilization absorbs much of the energy of the field, and rightfully so as it represents the crucial testing ground for a methodical approach to studying social movements. However, a proper balance has not been struck. Social movements not only emerge and die off they choose to act in different ways. The implications for such choices are widespread and affect outcomes, mobilization, and the tactical and strategic choices of other actors. Moreover, while I utilized a theoretical approach associated with formal modeling, the methodological approach taken here was modest in its more traditional qualitative emphasis. Formal modeling can offer a means to develop rigorous theories and derive hypotheses for testing and illustration. It is not

100 Of course, it seems too obvious to mention, but as a general suggestion all theories of choice must ultimately include a theory of rationalization.
merely applicable to theories based on strong assumptions of rationality. It can be used to develop any kind of theory insofar as such theories are logically consistent. Yet, as this project makes clear even a theoretical approach that utilizes assumptions of rationality need not utilize such methods. However, a particularly interesting suggestion for future research is the formalization of existing social movement theories in an effort to not only determine their logical consistency, but also to derive testable implications and identify clear differences of prediction across theories. Such an effort could also formalize the theory of tactical choice provided in this dissertation.

In this conclusion I present a consideration of the contributions of this study to the field of social movements, some alternatives to my explanation of tactical choice, and some avenues for further research. Such a conclusion is necessarily incomplete, but it should provide a general sense of the possible implications of this study for the study of political behavior.
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Center for Tactical Magic


Critical Art Ensemble


Institute for Applied Autonomy


The Institute for Infinitely Small Things


Negativland


Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah!


Surveillance Camera Players


**The Yes Men**


APPENDIX 1. INTERVIEW SURVEY

I conducted three interviews for this study. Two of these interviews involved engagements with members of culture jamming organizations that are part of the final sample of twelve groups (IST, SCP). Each interview was semi-structured. Below I present the baseline set of questions developed prior to any of the three interviews. In each interview, some questions were deleted because existing sources of information provided sufficient answers. Other questions were not answered because of a lack of time.

Survey Questions

Warm-Up:
- Description of Organization
- Role in Organization

Issues and Goals
- What are the general and specific issues that your group engages?
- If you see your actions and your organization as opposing something or someone, how would you define it or them?
- Generally, what do you hope to achieve with your actions?

History
- When and how was the group formed?
- How did these early members know each other?
- Why did the group form when it did?
- What kind of environment did the group form within? Activism?
- What kind of groups or individuals inspire the organization?

Structure of Group:
Nature of Membership
- What does it mean to be a part of the group?
- What responsibilities do you and others have?
- Is the group inclusive or exclusive with respect to membership?

Decision-Making Practices
- How do you go about making decisions as a group?
- How are conflicts resolved?

Resources
- How do you meet and communicate? Internet?
- How do you finance the organization and your actions?
- How do you find time for the group amidst your other responsibilities?
What resources are most important to the group?
Do you receive any support from outside sources?

Relations to other Actors
Are you or any other member of your group part of another similar group?
What organizations are you or other members of the group involved with that are not like this organization, such as unions or book clubs?
Has your group worked with or collaborated with individuals that were not considered part of the group?
What about other groups like yourself?
Are there any recurring relationships which you would classify as alliances?

Audiences
Who is your audience?
How do you intend your actions to affect them?
What about the media?
Mass media? Activist media?
Political institutions?

Strategies and Tactics
How would you describe your actions?
What kinds of actions do you do?
How do you promote or present your group?
Where did the ideas for these actions come from?
Have your tactics changed over time? How?

Alternative Options: Costs, Benefits, Effectiveness, Normativity
What are the other ways that you believe you could act politically? Voting?
Marches? Violence?
Have you engaged in any of them?
Why do you not choose the ones you have not engaged in?
Which of these do you find to be the most effective for addressing your concerns and issues?
In general, which actions do you believe require you to expend most of your energy and effort and resources? Which require the least?
In general, which actions do you believe provide you with the most benefit, whether intrinsic or extrinsic?

Biography: Work, School, Family
Did you and/or the other members of the group have any experience outside of the group with art or cultural production (as in theatre, film, visual arts, writing) at work, school, your family, or as a general hobby or interest, etc.?
November 18, 2013

To: Gary Dyerly
Dean of the Graduate School
Louisiana State University

Through: Matthew Lee
Associate Vice Chancellor

Last week I was informed that a graduate student, David M. Isles III, in the Department of Political Science defended his dissertation but never went through the IRB. His graduate committee consisted of Dr. William Clark, Dr. Leonard Ray, and Dr. Cecil Eubanks. Mr. Isles claims his committee told him IRB approval was not required.

I talked with Mr. Isles on November 14 by phone. I also asked him to send me a copy of his dissertation and the interview questions. I told him it is not possible for the IRB to give retroactive approval to a study. However, I would review his project and send my recommendations to you.

Mr. Isles’s study involved interviews of three members of culture jamming organizations. His interview does not cover any sensitive questions. His sample does not include any vulnerable people. He obtained oral consent from his participants but not written consent. These procedures would be allowed under IRB rules if he had applied for an exemption. Had he applied for an exemption, it would have been granted.

I found no evidence that he harmed anyone in his study.

In summary, I believe that, while putting LSU in jeopardy of federal audits by violating LSU policy on the use of human subjects, he did no harm to any of his participants.

Sincerely,

Robert C. Mathews,
Chair LSU Institutional Review Board
APPENDIX 3. MEASURING ARTS EDUCATION AND OCCUPATIONS

In order to measure the relative increase in arts education and occupations across the third quarter of the twentieth century, I employ a series of indicators graphically displayed in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 and Table 5.1. In this appendix I detail the construction of these variables.

In order to provide as much leverage over the question at hand, I develop two measures of arts education. The first, Fine Arts, is a conservative indicator expressing the annual percentage change in the number of Master’s and Doctorate degrees in the Fine Arts minus degrees in Music and the Dramatic Arts. Conceptually, this emphasizes the visual arts. It is also distinguishable from Crane’s (1987, 9-10) broader measure of Master of Fine Arts degrees which includes Music and the Dramatic Arts, though it is more inclusive in that it also incorporates Doctorate degrees. Such a measure should under-represent the absolute level of arts education. Using these raw numbers, I calculated a new variable measuring the annual percentage change in Fine Arts degrees.

The second, All Arts, is a more inclusive measure expressing the annual percentage change in the number of Master’s and Doctorate degrees in the Fine Arts (including Music and the Dramatic Arts), English, and Architecture. In part, this indicator draws on Bourdieu’s insistence on the significance of the literary field, though I exclude foreign languages. While the conservative measure of arts education is likely to under-represent absolute levels of art education (though not necessarily annual percentage change), this measure is more likely to over-represent absolute levels of art education, because English degrees may involve emphases on grammar as opposed to creative writing.
In constructing this indicator, I encountered the changing categorizations of degrees in the Census. From 1949 to 1955, the Fine Arts, Speech and Dramatic Arts, and Music are discrete categories. From 1956 to 1966, the Fine Arts category is inclusive of Speech and Dramatic Arts and Music, though these are distinct subcategories. Beginning with the 1967 data, these categories exclude music education and speech correction, the latter of which clearly over-represents arts education. However, there appears to be no distortion in the data from this shift as the downward trajectory it heralds continues through successive years. Finally, from 1976 on, the categories for English and Journalism are replaced by Letters and Communication. I chose to substitute Letters for English.

Occupations data presented the most difficult problems. First, for 1940 and 1950, the Census provides detailed occupations data inclusive of a diversity of arts-related occupations across both the experienced labor force and employed persons. By 1960, only the experienced labor force data on occupations remains, and by 1970 this diversity is aggregated into one category: Writers, Artists, and Entertainers, though which of the previous discrete categories is included is unclear. As demonstrated in Table 6.1, in order to maximize the comparable data over five decades (1940 to 1990), I utilize one composite measure of multiple categories of arts occupations, one measure derived from a single category of arts occupations, and a single measure obtained from the National Endowment of the Arts. The first variable is the sum of the values of four categories: Art and Art Teachers, Musicians and Music Teachers, Actors and Actresses, and Authors, Editors, and Reporters. The second is derived from the single inclusive category: Writers, Artists, and Entertainers, while the third is also a single Category measure. The 1960 and 1970 data overlap and thus allow a comparison of two indicators at a time, from which I conclude that
the singular Census measure is a more conservative measurement of arts occupations. From this data, I calculated percentage changes to generate some tangible metric of comparison. Despite the limitations of this approach, I argue that these procedures allow a general sketch of change in the arts labor market relative to the larger labor market, and thus provide some measure of confidence in reaching the conclusions of Chapter Six and beyond.
VITA

David Iles, III, was born in 1982 in Denham Springs, Louisiana. He is a 2001 graduate of Denham Springs High School. In the spring of 2002, he began undergraduate studies at Southeastern Louisiana University, from which he received in 2006 a B.A. in political science and history. He continued his studies from 2006 to 2013 at the graduate program in the Department of Political Science at Louisiana State University. In December 2008 he received an M.A. in political science, and to receive a Ph.D. in political science in December 2013. His major field of interest is comparative politics, and his research interests include contentious politics, voting behavior, political institutions, media and politics, and sociological theory. He currently resides in Denham Springs, Louisiana.