1974


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SOLDIERS IN THE ARMIES OF HENRY VII AND
HENRY VIII, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
THEIR ORIGINS, RECRUITMENT, AND EMPLOYMENT
IN THE FRENCH WAR OF 1544-46. (VOLUMES I AND
II)

The Louisiana State University and Agricultural
and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1974
History, general

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MERCENARIES AND AUXILIARIES:
FOREIGN SOLDIERS IN THE ARMIES OF HENRY VII AND HENRY VIII,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THEIR ORIGINS, RECRUITMENT,
AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE FRENCH WAR OF 1544-46

Volume I

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by
Gilbert John Millar
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1964
December, 1974
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This work is dedicated to my parents and my wife whose corporate patience, love, and sacrifices have sustained me through many years of graduate and undergraduate education. I am deeply indebted to the Graduate School of Louisiana State University whose generous award of a two-year fellowship enabled me to conduct my research in England. Special thanks are due to my friend and mentor, Dr. Walter C. Richardson, Boyd Professor of History at Louisiana State, who not only directed this thesis but introduced me to the early Tudors.

The author also wishes to acknowledge his debt to the many British associates who assisted him in this endeavor. Many thanks to Professor S. T. Bindoff of Queen Mary College, University of London, and his entire band of seminarians for accepting me into their midst; to my Scottish friend, Dr. C. G. Cruickshank; and finally to the officials and personnel of the Institute of Historical Research, the British Museum, and the Public Record Office, all of whom gave unstintingly of their time and advice.
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ABSTRACT

The utilization of foreign soldiers by the sovereigns of England is as ancient as the monarchy itself. The Anglo-Saxon kings employed their *hussarles*, William the Conqueror, his Norman barons, and the later Plantagenets and Yorkists, a motley host of European adventurers, including Flemings, Burgundians, Gascons, and Brabançons, who almost invariably formed a sizeable, if not in fact the strongest, element in the English army.

The early Tudors were no different. Lacking standing armies, the foundations of which had been laid on the Continent during the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, these rulers were obliged when they made war to seek out foreign professionals in large numbers. Some of the alien warriors were auxiliaries, soldiers provided at no cost to the Tudors by gracious allies; others were mercenaries, soldiers of fortune with no national allegiance, whose sole business was war and the selling of their martial talents.

During the early Tudor period, from the accession of Henry VII until the death of Henry VIII, auxiliaries were obtained most commonly from the Hapsburg Empire and Spain, since it was with these two powers that England normally threw her lot. Mercenaries, on the other hand, were hired in whichever quarter they were available. Italy provided
many; not a few were obtained indirectly from Greece and Albania; some were acquired from Denmark; but the majority—used in the reign of Henry VIII—were drawn from the Hapsburg states of Germany, the Low Countries, and Spain, whose rulers, whether allied with the Tudors or not, found it impossible to prevent their soldier-subjects from taking employment with England.

Auxiliaries were rarely used within the realm itself, and mercenaries only sparingly so until the last years of Henry VIII. That it happened thus can be attributed to the stability of the first two Tudor regimes and to the weakness of England's island neighbors, Scotland and Ireland, neither of which possessed the political cohesion, financial resources, or manpower needed to upset English hegemony in the British Isles.

It was only in competition with non-island foes that the weakness of Tudor armies revealed itself. On the Continent, a veritable revolution in which England played no part had transfigured the face of war. Spain, the Empire, and France, the most contentious of the European monarchies, had modern military establishments before which the strength of England paled. But, since it was against one of these powers, France, that England chose to compete for military laurels, it was found necessary by her sovereigns to recruit mercenaries and auxiliaries in the largest numbers possible.
### ABBREVIATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

In conformance with the popular notion of history as the plaything of pedants and historians as students of microscopic glosses, the idea for this present treatise was provided by nothing more than a single footnote in an intriguing study of the reign of England's short-lived Tudor sovereign, Edward VI. The note in question, appearing in W. K. Jordan's Edward VI, the Young King, alludes briefly to the use of German and Italian conscripts in the suppression of the Western or "Prayer Book" Rising of 1549. More to the point its author concludes, after insisting that the recruitment of mercenaries "was relatively recent in England" and that it was the Duke of Somerset, uncle to Edward and Protector of the realm, "who really first employed them on a considerable scale," that the entire subject of foreign troops is deserving of more thorough investigation. Implied in this latter observation is a challenge, and what follows in the body of this work is an attempt within the framework of the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII to place in some kind of perspective the role of


\[2\] This rebellion, centering as it did in the counties of Cornwall and Devon, sprang from the fear of Edwardian Protestantism and the new liturgy as contained in the first Book of Common Prayer.
The foreigner in the English army of that time.

The choice of this period, extending as it did from 1485 to 1547, has been made for good reason. First, it was the early Tudors who engaged these soldiers in the greatest numbers; second, there exists such a plethora of material on the subject that the problem for the researcher is not the lack but the superabundance of sources; and third, disregarding the fact that scholars have all but ignored these foreigners, in the context of Tudor history the bulk of military studies produced have been Elizabethan in their bias.

Inasmuch as a work of this sort is exploratory in nature, the narrative approach has been largely avoided in favor of the historical survey. The object is not to dissect campaigns or analyze battles but rather to answer a number of fundamental questions respecting the origins, prevalence, prevalence, prevalence, prevalence, prevalence, prevalence.

3 A notable exception was the late Sir Charles Oman, who in his standard survey, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1937) recognized fully the importance of continental troops in Tudor armies. Hereinafter cited as The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century.

availability, and competence of the alien element in early Tudor armies. Who, for example, were these foreigners; how wide-spread was their employment; which monarch most availed himself of their services; and why was it considered necessary to engage them at all? Some unanticipated disclosures are hopefully in store. For one thing, to the reader who so far has been disconcerted by the infrequent use of the term "mercenaries," it may come as a surprise that not all foreigners were. Many at least in early Tudor armies were auxiliaries, that is to say allies provided at no cost by sympathetic but nonetheless self-serving heads of state, who more often as not stood more to gain from such transactions than the Tudors themselves.

As is generally the case when new ground is broken, certain problems have been encountered which for the moment seem impossible of solution, the most frustrating being the absence in contemporary accounts of any substantial estimates of how well these foreigners performed in English service. That they did fight is incontestible, but precisely how they fought goes largely unrecorded in Tudor annals, so that to provide the reader with some assessment of the skills and accomplishments that made these men so desirable as recruits in English armies it has been necessary to resort to continental sources and

5Below, p. 44.
military histories in order to trace their rise to prominence as experts in the profession of arms.

The omission of such critical information from contemporary Tudor descriptions of particular actions in which mercenaries and auxiliaries are known to have participated seems incomprehensible, since it appears somehow reasonable to expect amid the myriad battle-front despatches, eye-witness reports, and published narratives that someone somewhere would have been sufficiently moved to provide for posterity an actual analysis of how, in a given engagement, these men helped to win the day or lose the field. Why early Tudor commentators, who in most other respects were faithful recorders of military occurents, should have shied away from such analyses is a mystery unless, as this writer sometimes suspects the case to have been, it was deliberately done to avoid the inevitable comparisons in which the gross inadequacies of the English military establishment would have been revealed.

Plainly speaking, Tudor annotators had good reason for withholding information of this type since, for reasons made clear in Chapter One, mercenaries and auxiliaries made better soldiers than Englishmen. Further, not only were they better; they were also indispensible when it came to fighting in France where the most protracted campaigns of the period were waged. Such dependency would not be readily admitted by proud inheritors of a glorious military tradition, whose not
so distant forebears had been esteemed for their warlike proficiency.

Unfortunately, for early Tudor Englishmen the glory belonged to the past, and all that remained of the tradition was the wasted remnant of a medieval military organization which, if capable of intimidating primitive Scots and Irishmen, was hardly likely to survive without mercenary or auxiliary help on the Continent where wars were modern and the foundations of Europe's first professional armies had already been laid.

It is strange, considering the attention showered upon foreign soldiers in other eras of English history, that those who served the early Tudors should have been so far overlooked. Except for my own article on the German Landsknechte, the substance of which appears in Chapter Three, no in-depth investigation of this absorbing aspect of Tudor history has been attempted, with the result that, if mentioned at all, the foreigners have been afforded little more than a few short notices in the monographic and general literature of the period.

In seeking partially to fill the void the plan followed has been first to examine the state of the Tudor army itself with a view towards uncovering those factors which made the

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enlistment of foreigners both desirable and essential. Chapter Two reviews the history of mercenary and auxiliary warfare in the reign of Henry VII, while the remainder of the dissertation is devoted to a survey of the particular national "types" employed, their organization, recruitment, and military skills. As will become apparent, considerably more attention is devoted in the later sections to the reign of Henry VIII than to that of Henry VII. Chapters Eight through Ten, for example, concentrate on the Boulogne campaign of 1544-46. For this the author makes no apology because it was Henry VIII who engaged mercenaries and auxiliaries on the grandest scale, and it was in the taking and subsequent defence of that town that the largest contingents were involved. No apology is made either for skirting clear of the Scottish campaigns, the Western Rising, of Kett's Rebellion of the later Edwardian period; each is deserving of its own separate study. Besides, no auxiliaries were engaged in any of these endeavors, and of the mercenaries employed their strength pales before the numerically superior forces hired earlier for Henry VIII's wars in France.

The subject treated herein, despite its somewhat constricted focus, is vast, and having chosen to concentrate mainly though not exclusively on its continental aspects, it is time to mention some of the working conventions observed in its writing. Full bibliographic information is provided xiii
on the first mention of a work with only a short-title notation thereafter. For those unfamiliar with certain of the more specialized references to manuscripts, calendered materials, and the like, a "Table of Abbreviations" is provided as likewise is a "Glossary" of technical terms. In most instances in quoting original sources, spelling and punctuation have been modernized. Except for a few colorful phrases or passages incapable of literal translation quotes from foreign materials have been rendered in English.
CHAPTER I

THE EARLY TUDOR ARMY

Albeit that war is to employ men of divers quality; yet ought they only to be reputed soldiers that make profession of arms.


From the vantage point of the twentieth century, the armies of the early Tudors appear unimpressive and puny, and comparison with the numerically and professionally superior forces of England's chief rivals during the same period elicits a wonderment that she survived the era at all. Tudor troops might with confidence give battle to Scottish raiders and Irish rebels; for these foes ranked among the most backward of adversaries. But even so, English success against them was never complete. Flodden Field, the most convincing victory of an English army between Agincourt and Blenheim, provided no more than a stopgap in Scottish troubles, while in Ireland, after years of exhaustive effort, the narrow coastal Pale between Dublin and Dundalk remained the extent of Tudor authority.

1France, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire.

2The battle was fought just below the Scottish border in Northumberland on September 9, 1513. Perhaps as many as ten thousand Scots were slain, including their king, James IV, ten of twenty-one peers of the realm, and thirteen of twenty-nine barons.
On the Continent, English arms were hardly more impressive. Every Tudor monarch between 1485 and 1558 sent armies to the mainland of Europe either to enlarge upon that remnant of empire remaining to England from the Hundred Years' War or to retain it. Henry VII's success in 1492 gained a French pension but no territory, and given the circumstances of Charles VIII's Italian ambitions and the Franco-Spanish rivalry, Charles's award of the pension had every appearance of being more a bribe to an annoyance than a surrender to a real military threat. Henry VIII invaded France on three occasions: 1513, 1523, and 1544. On two of these forays, without actually defeating the French, he succeeded in adding to his continental holdings. Tournai was seized in 1513 and the fortress of Boulogne in 1544, but both triumphs were marred by an inordinate wastage of men and matériel, and both prizes were relinquished by treaty long within the decade after their occupation. Tournai was returned in 1519, and the sum of Edward VI's military adventures was reflected in the surrender of Boulogne in 1550. Under Edward's successor, Mary, the lack of military accomplishment was similarly reflected in the loss of Calais, originally the first, and then the last, hope of continental empire for the Tudors.

\textsuperscript{3} For the Tournai campaign, see the recent study by C. G. Cruickshank, \textit{Army Royal: An Account of Henry VIII's Invasion of France in 1513} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), Chaps. X, XI. Hereinafter cited as \textit{Army Royal}. 
It is easy of course to be overly critical of the Tudor army. Foreign observers, who could be expected to be most harsh in their appraisal of the English military establishment, were often lavish in their compliments. The author of the Italian Relation, an oft-quoted critique of English life written at the beginning of the sixteenth century, mentions the high esteem in which English soldiers were held. According to this anonymous onlooker, they had "a very high reputation in arms," one which, "from the great fear the French entertain of them," had to be justly acquired; and writing sometime later, the Venetian ambassador, Sebastian Giustinian, while regarding the Englishmen's insistence on regular pay and dislike of hardship as weaknesses, maintained that "when they had their comforts" they would fight unabated with a "valor that defied exageration." Even the cynical Ferdinand II of Aragon conceded that English troops had strength and courage, an attitude shared by his grandson, the great emperor Charles V.

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Nevertheless, even if it is accepted that the combative spirit of Tudor soldiers remained high and relatively constant throughout the early sixteenth century, the conclusion that English armies were inferior to their counterparts on the Continent can scarcely be escaped. Basically, the root of the problem lay in the nation's unprofessional approach to war, the most obvious failing being that the Tudors lacked a standing military force. Elsewhere the foundations of the first professional armies had been laid. The pikemen of Switzerland had been building on their reputation as Europe's steadiest infantrymen since the fourteenth century, though they were fast being equalled, if not superseded, by the landsknechts of the Germanies. Spain, too, after the initial campaigns of the Great Italian Wars (1494-1559) had an enviable professional army, while in France experiments with permanent forces had been in progress since before the close of the Hundred Years' War.  

The Tudors of course were not without some regular troops. Henry VII, the founder of the dynasty, had created by statute a body of archers, the Yeomen of the Guard, and his son, Henry VIII, raised by similar means a mounted contingent, the "King's Spears," which he later reconstituted

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7On these developments, see the works of Sir Charles Oman: A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (2 vols.: London: Methuen and Company, 1924) and The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century.
as his Gentlemen Pensioners. Finally there were the garrison
troops strategically placed at various critical points through­
out the kingdom and which from the standpoint of experience
and preparedness came closest to fulfilling the requirements
of a standing army. Dover, Berwick, Carlisle, and Calais had
the largest contingents, though in all there were over one
hundred such posts. However, the majority of them, unless
directly threatened, were manned by no more than a handful
of soldiers. In the 1530's for instance, when in the midst
of Henry VIII's religious revolution fear of Catholic inva­
sion prompted a spate of defense building, the twenty-six
fortified places between Portland and Gravesend contained
somewhat less than 170 soldiers. In peacetime on the Scot­
tish border, the frontier most regularly menaced by attack,
if the major strongholds at Carlisle and Berwick are ex­
cluded, the typical tower or bulwark was garrisoned by no
more than a constable or deputy and his household retainers.
The total strength of garrison troops in England did not ex­
ceed three thousand men, which number could have served as
a strong nucleus around which to build a standing army; but
such a move was out of the question, since any incendiary

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8 John Jeremy Goring, "The Military Obligations of the
9 Ibid., p. 241.
situation, such as rebellion or invasion which would have
necessitated the withdrawal of these forces from their posts,
would have left the country more vulnerable than such deploy­
ment would have justified.

The Yeomen of the Guard, the other of the two remaining
bodies of regulars, had been raised as a royal bodyguard, but
its numbers fluctuated drastically. Two hundred at its incep­tion in 1485, the Guard rose to six hundred in 1513, but there­after fell away in subsequent economy moves to about three
hundred in 1528, less than 250 in 1541, and somewhere near
125 during the French war in 1545. Further, the military
duties of the Yeomen varied as often as their complement;
when not attending the king in person, many were assigned to
garrisons both at home and in France, and occasionally they
served at sea. However, first and foremost they were a
royal guard, not an army.

The third body of regulars, the Gentlemen Pensioners,
were originally established in 1510 under the title of the
"King's Spears." Fifty in number, each man was served by
a retinue of three including an archer, a demilance, and

11 See Glossary.
a custrel, making in all a company of two hundred. The initial contingent, the "King's Spears," was deactivated in 1515 again, as in the pruning of the Yeomen of the Guard, as an economy measure, the liveries and expense being so great in the estimate of one contemporary as "there were none of them but they and their Horses were apparelled and trapped in Cloth of Gold, Silver, and Goldsmith's work and their servants richly apparelled also." After lying dormant for twenty-four years, the unit was resurrected in 1539 on the occasion of Henry VIII's marriage to Anne of Cleves, but this time as the "King's Honorable Band of Pensioners," each Pensioner receiving £50 in wages per year "for the maintenance of themselves, two Horses or one Horse and a Gelding of service." Recruited from among the cadets of noble households and from the upper grades of the gentry, these horsemen formed an elite corps perhaps in imitation of the French king's pensioners, the "gentlemen of the vingt escus," so named after the twenty crowns a month they drew in wages. Henry's "spears,"

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as they continued to be called, complemented the Yeomen of the
Guard, since their principal function was the protection of
the royal person; but moreover their unit assumed the impor-
tant secondary role of training future officers, becoming a
"pool" from which, after having served an apprenticeship, re-
cruits could be deployed to various captaincies either in
England or abroad. ¹⁵

Nevertheless, by no stretch of the imagination could
these miniscule detachments of "spears," Yeomen archers, and
garrison troops be regarded as an army. Even at maximum
strength and allowing for the impossibility that most of
these professionals could be drawn together at one place at
one time, somewhat less than four thousand regulars could
hardly have been expected to accomplish much when confronted
by the combination of internal and external dangers posed
England in the early sixteenth century. At the very best,
what few professionals there were could only furnish a lit-
tle continuity in military affairs, thereby linking what was
in essence the last phase of medieval militarism in England
with a British "Army," whose real beginning lay in the seven-
teenth century.

As has been noted, England was lagging far behind her
continental neighbors in the development of permanent forces.

¹⁵ Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo-
ple, 1511-1558," p. 239.
Why this should have been so is not entirely explicable, especially when the most immediate result of the trend towards professionalism had been the expulsion of the English from France during the Hundred Years' War. England's insular position no doubt abetted her conservatism in military innovation and, moreover, there was the matter of national pride: generations after the fall of the empire which Henry V had so manfully built in France the memory of Agincourt still blinded Englishmen to the realities of the situation. No Tudor Englishman worth his salt believed that he was not a fair match for ten Frenchmen, and even in 1549 on the very eve of the surrender of Boulogne to the French, an Englishman could write that despite the existence of a professional French army "we have been counted hitherto superiors in success through stoutness of our subjects only."16

A modern historian has written of the Tudors that their "progress towards a permanent professional army may have been hindered by accidents of genetics."17 For most of the sixteenth century, England was without an active commander-in-chief: Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth were all barred from the battlefield, the first by age and the latter two by sex,


17Cruickshank, Army Royal, p. 189.
so that during the nearly sixty years of their combined reigns "the monarch had no personal professional interest in developing a standing army." But what of the first two Tudors? Both Henry VII and Henry VIII were active commanders-in-chief, and together they ruled England for sixty-two years. Why, therefore, during their reigns beyond the creation of the Yeomen of the Guard and the Gentlemen Pensioners was there no attempt at imitating the example that had established itself on the Continent?

In answering this question, it is necessary to consider the condition of England at the time of Henry VII's accession. The country was still engrossed in the civil Wars of the Roses which feud had been sapping the patience and resources of the nation since the close of the French War in 1453; for the Tudor victory at Bosworth was not made secure until the defeat of the last Yorkist army at Exeter in 1497. After that time Henry was an assiduous practitioner of peace. War as an end in itself did not interest him, and though he accumulated the largest train of artillery in the realm he preferred statecraft to force, persuasion to military despotism. If Henry VII devoted few thoughts to a permanent army, it was not because he was not an innovator--that was far from true. Rather it was because it was not in his interest to create such a force. As the founder of a new dynasty barely fixed on the throne, Henry would have invited the charge of tyranny,
a charge which for centuries past and centuries to come in England was equated with a standing army.

The position of Henry VIII was much the same. Only the second of his line and forever worried about a successor, he could not afford to antagonize his subjects by forcing on them the physical and financial responsibilities which a permanent army would have entailed. A permanent army was not wanted in Tudor England as the Discourse of the Common Weal makes amply clear: "God forbid," says the Husbandman in the Second Dialogue, "that we should have any such tyrants amongst us." "Merry," agrees the Merchant, "I think that would be rather occasion of commotions to be stirred than to be quenched, for . . . the stomachs of Englishmen would never bear that." The Doctor in the Dialogue reinforces the argument: the establishment of a professional army "for avoiding of sedition among people" would, by curing the smaller ague, only cause a greater evil in that its creation would "bring in a continual yoke and charge both to the king and his subjects."18

Among contemporaries it would appear that the yoke was as much feared as the charge; for the reputation of English soldiers in times of peace was far from honorable. Sir Thomas More was but one of many who inveighed against the

18Hales, Discourse of the Common Weal, p. 95.
disreputable lives led by discarded warriors, men who having no trade but war turned in peacetime to brigandage: "robbers," he wrote, "do not make the least active soldiers, nor do soldiers make the most listless robbers; so well do these two pursuits agree."  

In France, a nation which seemed perennially at war and thereby served opponents of regular armies as an example to be avoided, permanent military garrisons were the scourge of the civilian population. There it was said that professional soldiers satisfied their every craving and paid nothing "except it be an evil turn, as to ravish [a man's] wife or daughter for it."  

The popular feeling against standing armies was backed by centuries of tradition and by the not entirely misplaced faith in existing arrangements; for while England lacked substantial bodies of regular troops, it would be a grave mistake to imagine her in the sixteenth century as void of defenders. The military organization of the state was such that in theory at least England was a nation in arms, as from his medieval predecessors Henry VII inherited the remnant of feudal levy in its bastard form of noble retainers under contract

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20 Hales, Discourse of the Common Weal, p. 95.
and the _posse commitatus_, a national conscript militia based on quotas supplied by the counties, which in time of crisis could be quickly mobilized to produce "an enormous array of well-equipped bowmen and billmen, who would be capable of beating back any invasion or of overcoming any rebellion."\(^{21}\)

Of these two types of forces, those raised for the militia were of more ancient origin, having been utilized by the kings of England from Saxon times. Behind their service lay the principle of allegiance which bound all men to fight when called upon in war or civil emergency in defense of the realm; and though it is impossible to accurately gage the number of citizen-soldiers available for this duty, with England's population approaching four million, the estimate of the Italian, Giacomo Soranzo, of one hundred thousand in 1554 seems plausible.\(^{22}\)


The machinery for exploiting this vast national reserve was ingeniously simple, as by law every able-bodied man between the ages of sixteen and sixty was obliged, according to his estate and degree, to furnish himself with arms and equipment and to keep himself in training and readiness for action. Supervision of this system was entrusted to Commissioners of Array, local officials who within each shire were empowered to review the militia with an eye towards assessing the fitness of the men, as well as enforcing all statutes that pertained to the possession and maintenance of weapons. It was their responsibility when the militia was levied for war to see that the fittest and most expert men were chosen and that these reached their destination in good order.

Only in the gravest emergency, however, was it likely that the entire militia would be called on to serve, as so large a muster "would have been quite unmanageable, would have robbed the land of its cultivators, and left the country undefended except at headquarters." Such practical considerations required that only a percentage of the men eligible in each shire be raised, these being ideally not only the strongest and best armed but also the closest to the action;

23 The principal authority was the Statute of Winchester of 1285.

for geography along with fitness and preparedness played a crucial part in determining which units should be placed on a war footing. As the Venetian ambassador noted in the reign of Edward VI, it was customary for the English to muster the southern counties when threatened by France and the northern counties when menaced from Scotland. This was a slight overstatement, but in general the formula held true, and for all practical purposes, with the River Trent as the line of demarcation, England was divided into two military provinces, each respectively and roughly corresponding to the ecclesiastical jurisdictions of Canterbury and York. Scottish invaders were therefore opposed by militiamen recruited predominantly from the northern shires beyond the Trent, while trouble in the south was met by their counterparts below that boundary.

The armed retainers under contract, the second source of fighting men available to Henry VII, were of more recent origin than the militia. Their initial appearance has been traced to the thirteenth century when written contracts in the form of indentures replaced the classical feudal obligation of knight's service as the customary mode of raising the aristocracy and the landed gentry.

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In times past, between the Norman Conquest of the eleventh century and the introduction of indentures in the thirteenth, it had been incumbent upon the holder of a knight's fee, the basic unit of feudal land tenure, to serve the king in full armor and on horseback for forty days in every year. Landholders who held several or even hundreds of knight's fees, as in the case of the greater magnates, were expected to provide a requisite number of deputies, so that in theory there was always a substantial body of heavy cavalry ready to answer the royal call to arms. In practice, however, this method of raising troops was far from efficient or even desirable, since the knights' tour of duty was limited and hardly conducive to long campaigning, and there was strong resistance to foreign service. 27

By the reign of Edward I the feudal host had ceased to have any practical importance, so that the crown, to ensure itself of that core of men-at-arms who formed the backbone of all medieval English armies, was obliged to develop a system of pay by awarding regular wages and granting annuities to knights who would fight when summoned. Efforts to improve the system led to the evolution of indentures, formal contracts which provided the leaders in both the Hundred Years' War and the Wars of the Roses with the larger part of

their forces and set forth the precise terms of military service, regulating the numbers of troops to be levied, their wages, equipment, length of enlistment, and rewards that might be expected for satisfactory performance during the course of campaigns.\textsuperscript{28} Such a system was highly more preferable than the vagaries of feudalism, since the method of recruitment by indenture, one of the most important military innovations of the Middle Ages, proved a great boon to English kings, for by "including all soldiers as contracting stipendiaries, [it] made even the greatest dependent to a large degree on the crown, produced discipline and a quicker response to orders, and led to an effective subordination of commands."\textsuperscript{29}

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, after the perfection of indentures, the structure of the English military establishment experienced few changes. When in 1485 Henry


\textsuperscript{29}Prince, "The Army and Navy," p. 352.
Tudor stood poised to invade England, the army of his rival, Richard III, was raised in traditional fashion by commissions of array and private indentures. Henry's triumph brought no change. His creation of the Yeomen of the Guard may indeed have marked a positive advance towards professionalism in the English armed service, but in every other respect he retained the methods of his predecessors, relying for the security of his realm on the militia and on the loyalty of his indentured retainers.

Significant attempts to improve on the system did not come until after the accession of Henry VIII. In 1511, in the face of growing estrangement with France, the second Tudor took steps to tighten up the general obligations of those of his subjects who would be called upon to serve him in the wars. The first step had as its primary objective "the revival of the militia system which, though always theoretically in force, [had] practically of late [been] displaced by the baronial levies." More precisely, what

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Henry VIII sought was the better enforcement of the provisions on which the militia was grounded, namely those set forth in the Statute of Winchester. Thus on July 5, 1511, writs were issued to the sheriffs ordering them to make proclamation "that every man have in his house armor for keeping of the peace according to his havior and substance, as they have been and shall be ordered by the commissioners after the old assize." 32

The re-issue of this statute, which was "translated out of French into vulgar tongue of English" and incorporated into the proclamation for its better enforcement, marked possibly its first renewal since the reign of Richard II. 33 Since that time, particularly during the Wars of the Roses when heavier reliance had been placed on indentured baronial levies, the kings of England had not been overly concerned about the armament of their shire forces. The crown had been content as long as the militiamen had appeared with some arms and in sufficient numbers. Now in 1511, Englishmen were strictly charged to equip themselves as the law required;

32 Public Record Office (hereinafter cited as P. R. O.) C66/615, mem. 7d. See also L. & P., I, pt. 1, No. 1771.
for by this proclamation, as the original statute intended, future Commissioners of Array once again became the instruments through which in peace and war the military obligations of the public sector were enforced.  

Henry VIII also took steps in 1511 to tighten up the military obligations due from the private sector of the community, that "other half of the military system" comprised of his noble lords and gentlemen. On September 8, soon after the publication of the Statute of Winchester, letters issued under the Privy Signet were sent to various lords and gentlemen commanding them to make their retinues ready for the wars with orders to submit their number to his secretary, Thomas Ruthall, Bishop of Durham, by November 1. This at first glance was but a continuance of the indenture system; however, included in the letters was the significant proviso which instructed the recipients to

neither prepare nor take any persons for the war but only such as be your own tenants or inhabitants within any office that ye have of our grant or of the grant of any other person or persons or commonality, not being tenants or officers to any other person or persons having semblable commandment.  


This rendered the indenture system a blow from which it would not recover. Heretofore an indentured captain could recruit where he wished; he had not been required to recruit among his tenants and dependents as henceforward he must.

This new manner of contracting with the chief landholders differed appreciably from the older indenture system which Henry VIII in effect abandoned by reemphasizing the ancient feudal prerogative which demanded military service as a right from those who held fees of their lord. As the system of recruiting within the private sector, it has been described by Dr. Jeremy Goring as quasi-feudal, "for it was a system under which the crown sent out writs of military summons to the principal landowners, and the principal landowners answered the call by taking steps to enforce the military obligations of their tenants." 37

By and large throughout Henry VIII's reign the greater part of the English troops were raised by private individuals, and it was on the country gentry that the main burden of providing forces for the wars fell, particularly for the French wars. It was from that remnant of the feudal host, the quasi-feudal aristocracy, that the larger part of the troops for the

37 Ibid.
The 1513 expedition were recruited. The same procedure was followed in Suffolk's invasion of 1523 and for the Boulogne campaign in 1544.

The practice of relying on private levies, as opposed to the militia, for service in foreign parts was sanctioned both by custom and law. Custom held that the militia could on no account be made to serve outside the realm, while by a statute of Edward III's reign it was stipulated that no man could be compelled in the service of his king to leave his shire except to meet the threat of foreign invasion. Such contingents as were necessary for the waging of war on foreign soil were by strict interpretation of the statute to be composed of volunteers or those tenants who owed knights' service. In practice, however, the crown successfully evaded such restrictions by "taking its stand on the ground of national emergency or the common law," doggedly holding to the precept that it was a subject's duty to serve his sovereign. Thus, while it

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40 Edward III, c. 5. The pertinent phrase in the statute which was reissued in 1402 (4 Henry IV, c. 13) reads "that none shall be constrained to go out of their counties, but only for cause of necessity of sudden coming of strange enemies into the realm." A. Luders, T. E. Tomlins, J. Raithby, et al., *Statutes of the Realm* (11 vols.; London: Record Office, 1810-28), I, 255.
is true that the vast majority of the soldiers provided for
the French wars in early Tudor times were supplied by individu­
al lords and gentlemen, militiamen were never entirely ex­
empt. 41 In fact, while quasi-feudal recruitment remained in
vogue through the reign of Mary, Goring notes that a decay of
the system can be observed as early as Henry VIII's last
French campaign:

Ever since 1544 the crown had been gradually
abandoning it in favor of the national [i.e. 
militia] system. The militia had become the
principal fighting force in the realm, not
so much because the [Tudors] had become strong
enough to disregard the old custom that the
shire levies must never be sent overseas, as
because the national military system had be­
come efficient. The frequent issue of commis­sions of musters in the years after 1535 had
caused the gentry to become skilled in the
machinery of the militia and the people to be­
come more conscientious in the fulfillment of
their military obligations. 42

Eventually, by the early years of Elizabeth's reign, the
national militia system would prevail, although the quasi-feu­
dal system would continue in use at least through the reign
of Charles I. Nonetheless, the regularization of the new

41 Militiamen served in all of Henry VIII's overseas cam­
paigns. One of the largest contingents, four thousand strong,
was ordered across the Channel in July, 1544, to reinforce the
army before Boulogne. See L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 292, 347,
397.

42 Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo­
office of Lord Lieutenant under Elizabeth, by creating "a truly effective local authority," negated the value of private commissions, with the result that they were rarely used and gradually disappeared. But these developments lie outside the scope of this study. Through the early years of the sixteenth century, private commissions were the means by which the predominant number of English troops destined for service outside the realm were levied.

From the purely military point of view, despite the praise heaped on them by foreign observers, the caliber of the forces raised by the first Tudor sovereigns left much to be desired. Whether recruited by private commission or shire levy the average conscript, even when most proficiently

43 The office of Lord Lieutenant originated in 1539 as an emergency creation designed to meet the military exigencies of the time, namely the domestic unrest created by Henry VIII's religious reformation and the threat of invasion from Catholic Europe. Lieutenants were first appointed on a temporary basis over one or more counties, and in 1551 the system was made permanent. Their commissions gave them wide authority at the local level, but their main task throughout the Tudor period remained the control of the county militia. The Lord Lieutenant's commission "gave him the right to call up the men of his county; to array, to try them out, and arm each according to his capability; to lead them against the enemies of the crown; and, still within the county limits, 'to repress, subdue, slay, kill and put to execution or death these enemies by all ways and means.'" C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (Oxford; University Press, 1966), p. 19. The fullest treatment of the office is provided in Gladys Scott Thomson, Lords Lieutenants in the Sixteenth Century (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1923).
trained and armed, was at best a talented amateur. Intermittent practice at the butts, the muster, or even the knightly lists was a poor substitute for actual combat experience. To be sure, England was not without her veterans and native soldiers of fortune, but more often than not in the arts of war her rank and file were as unskilled as they were inexperienced.\(^4\) The same shortcomings permeated the officer ranks, particularly at the lower levels. In theory "only the most suitable gentlemen" were picked to command, but the complaint was rife during the reigns of the early Tudors that "captains be chosen in England by favor and not by worthiness;" hence if the quality of the English soldier was poor, it was because "his captain [was] as ignorant as he and was made captain ere ever he was a soldier."\(^5\)

To a great degree the situation reflected errors of omission rather than commission. The problem was not that the English high command was wilfully neglectful. Rather it operated in the vacuum of its own limited experience, and for better or for worse that experience was medieval.

Allusion has already been made to the military record of the early Tudors. All these sovereigns were sufficiently


successful in stamping their authority on English rebels, in policing the Irish, and in defending the northern frontier against the Scots. However, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this was so in large part because the aptitude for war of these troublemakers was somewhat less than that enjoyed by the Tudor state itself. From the point of view of military progress, the British Isles lagged sadly behind the Continent. Inevitably then, if a true indication of England's military worth is to be determined, her record on the Continent must be considered.

Though it is far from glorious, it is surprisingly not a bad record. Technically, if the debacle of Calais at the end of the period is excluded, no Tudor army lost a war, but by the same token strong arguments can be brought forward as to whether the Tudors ever waged a continental war, at least in the literal sense of what war had actually become in that quarter.

In France, Spain, Italy, the Germanies, and not the least in Switzerland, military techniques and institutions were undergoing revolutionary change at a time when English military innovation was at a virtual standstill. Across the

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46 It is difficult to attribute the loss of Calais to the defeat of an English army; the incompetence of the Marian government would be a better place to lay the blame. When the French Duke of Guise launched his attack in January, 1558, the defenders of the principal garrison numbered only eight hundred.
Narrow Sea before the death of Henry VII the first series of modern wars, the Great Italian Wars of 1494-1559, were already in progress, and the first professional standing armies were already in their formative state. These armies were unlike anything Europe had yet seen. Everywhere, for the first time since the demise of the Roman legions, the emphasis was on infantry; not hastily raised militiamen or volunteers, though these were certainly employed, but highly drilled and well furnished veterans, whose expertise and specialization, as in the case of the pikemen and the newfangled arquebusiers or hand-gunners, made them the bane of the knightly class which had dominated European battlefields since the beginning of the Middle Ages. Even this latter class, unlike its English counterpart, was moving with the times, if only to preserve its position as first in war. The dense masses of unruly feudal horsemen were fast giving way before a more skillful heavy cavalry which now tended to be well trained and well paid, not by the great nobles as in the past but by their sovereigns as commanders-in-chief; and encased as they still were in steel from head to toe, the gendarmes "were 'professional' cavalry capable of tactical manoeuvre."

enjoyed by the continentals in tactics, organization, artillery, small arms, fortification, and siegecraft could be mentioned. However, to critically appraise the developments in each of these areas would be to restate that which is already common knowledge. 48

How then, if England was so woefully behind the times, did she escape disaster? Excluding fate, part of the answer lies in the premise suggested above that England simply did not wage war on a scale or with a proficiency great enough to merit the type of opposition that might have assured her defeat. The Tudors' interest in war was as transitory as their armies. While continentals waged continuous war and, as a result, provided themselves with permanent armies, England, when it so moved her to participate in the greater European struggles, "only furnished expeditions" between which her forces were disbanded. 49

Her part in any of the campaigns thus far mentioned has a certain sideshow quality about it. Never were English armies forced to fight the main body of the enemy; nor were her

48 The best single-volume survey of military developments in the sixteenth century is still Sir Charles Oman's standard History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, though it can be profitably supplemented by Frederick Lewis Taylor, Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529 (Cambridge: University Press, 1921).

49 Barnett, Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970, p. 16.
forces ever put to the test of a pitched battle like Marignano or Pavia. The reason for these seeming anomalies is not hard to find, since England's part in the military drama being enacted on the Continent was that of bit player. The starring roles belonged to the established protagonists: Valois France on the one hand, and England's allies, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, on the other. That England's intervention on the side of the latter powers had some nuisance value cannot be denied; still, the main actions involved the major combatants and were always fought far from the theater of English participation, as Italy in 1513 and 1523 or Italy and Champagne in 1544. Neither Louis XII nor Francis I were ever foolish enough to ignore an Imperial or Spanish army for the privilege of defeating an inferior English force; for Tudor practice in war was sufficiently clear to France, exemplifying as it did "a pattern of thought and result long to be repeated in British military history: transient intervention by an army unfit to encounter and defeat a continental power's main body . . . and intervention therefore without effect on the issue of the war."50

Though England was not considered a threat sufficient enough to warrant the full attention of her Valois foe, the survival and even limited successes of her expeditionary

50Ibid., p. 12.
forces were attributable to more than French preoccupation with the Tudors' more dangerous confederates. England might have lagged behind in military proficiency, but she was not entirely unreceptive to the changes being made. For example, practical Henry VII stimulated the growth of a native iron industry in the Sussex Weald by ordering large quantities of shot and sponsoring experimentation in the casting of iron guns.\(^\text{51}\) However, of the early Tudors it was Henry VIII who demonstrated the keenest interest in military science. He was the first to break the monopoly enjoyed in England by the foreign merchants of modern military hardware, though he had to employ continentals to do it. Sizeable numbers of alien armorers and gunfounders were not only encouraged to settle in England, but also beginning about 1515 "to form schools for the production of war material . . . .\(^\text{52}\)

A large colony of German armorers worked for a time in Southwark. Other Germans, plus contingents from Milan, a principal center for the production of small arms, were maintained on a permanent basis at the Armoury at the Tiltyard at


Greenwich. Later in the reign the Italian, Peter Baude, "the best founder of bronze guns in the king's service," presided over the production of cannon by a group of his fellow countrymen off Fleet Street in Salisbury Court, while in the eastern London suburb of Houndsditch a group of French masters engaged in similar work. Henry VIII also served as patron of a nascent English gunpowder industry, but again the need was felt for foreign technicians and specialized skills, so that, as in the case of the manufacturers of firearms, native English craftsmen served their apprenticeship under continental instructors.

The king's interest in modernization was not confined to firepower. "Alien military engineers and fortifiers were employed throughout the reign, but especially in the later years when extensive work was done on the Scottish border." Among the more noteworthy were the Moravian, Stephen Von Haschenberg, and the Italians, Archangel de li Arcane and

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54 Ibid., p. 135.

55 Ibid., p. 141.

56 An excellent article detailing Haschenberg's not altogether happy work in England has been written by B. H. St. J. O'Neil, "Stefan von Haschenperg, An Engineer to King Henry VIII, and His Work," *Archaeologia*, XCI (1945), 137-55.
Girolamo da Treviso.\(^{57}\) Other alien artificers in the military arts included French crossbow-makers, pike-makers, and harness-makers,\(^{58}\) the latter no doubt practiced in the manufacture of the famous "almain rivets," suits of flexible armor which, unlike the metal prison worn by men-at-arms, allowed for greater freedom of movement.

Early Tudor armies were therefore not completely devoid of the benefits of modern military science. However, at the expense of belaboring the obvious, the technological resources available to a Henry VIII pale before those available to leaders like Francis I or Charles V: what were a few score gun-founders and pike-makers in England by comparison to the thousands of skilled armaments workers on the Continent?

Viewed from any angle England was a second-rate power. Domestic manufacture of war matériel never kept pace with need at any time during the early Tudor period, as evidenced particularly during times of trouble by the substantial orders placed abroad. A few random examples from the reign of

\(^{57}\) For some interesting details of Treviso's life, see A. E. Popham, "Hans Holbein's Italian Contemporaries in England," The Burlington Magazine, LXXXIV (1944), 12-17; and Philip Pouncey, "Girolamo da Treviso in the Service of Henry VIII," ibid., XCV (1953), 208-11. Girolamo or "Jeronimo," as he was known to the English, began his career as a painter. Examples of his artistic work, several in "the style of the Bolognese and Ferrarese imitators of Raphael," are on exhibition at Hampton Court, the Louvre, and in Bologna.

Henry VIII will suffice to illustrate the point. Prior to the French crossing in 1513 special heavy guns, including the famous "Twelve Apostles," and an assortment of lesser caliber were ordered from the foundries of Hans Poppenruyter in Malines. For the same expedition Henry commissioned John de Castro, a Spanish merchant, to supply him with eighty hand-guns, while additional orders were placed for war furnishings of all sorts, including arquebuses and thirteen thousand suits of almain rivets. More artillery was obtained from Poppenruyter for a raid in France in 1522 and the campaign there in 1523. In fact, from Malines alone, within the first two decades of his reign, Henry received from Poppenruyter "at least 140 bronze guns of all calibers." The invasion of France in 1544 and the subsequent efforts to retain possession of captured Boulogne produced the best equipped of Henry VIII's armies. Nevertheless, the forces employed, "the most formidable," in Oman's estimation, "which ever crossed the Channel during the existence of the old English monarchy" were particularly dependent on foreign suppliers of the necessaries of war: 1,050 suits of armor for horse and foot and fifteen


60 (B. M.) Stowe MS. 146, ff. 60, 61, 62, 65, 68.

61 Cipolla, Guns, Sails and Empires, p. 38.
hundred arquebuses ordered from Brescia, 1544; five thousand pikes and munitions from the Low Countries, 1545; saltpetre, glaives, and gunpowder from the Low Countries, 1546. Certainly England's ability to wage war was not solely restricted by the relatively depressed state of her armaments industry, for guns, munitions, and pikes were not her only lack. More basic to England's problem in time of war was her want of modern soldiers. Engrossed in domestic affairs since the close of the Hundred Years' War and only fitfully engaged in the wider quarrels around her, the nation's "military ideas had failed to progress beyond those of Agincourt." Bills and bows were still the order of the day, the bowyers' trade being specially protected in the law both by obligatory use of the weapon on the part of the subject and from export by foreigners. The act of 1511 concerning "shooting in long bows" required that "every man being the King's subject not lame, decrepit, or maimed . . . being within the Age of forty years, except to those men, spiritual men, Justices of the one bench and of the other, Justices of Assize, and Barons of the Exchequer, do use and exercise shooting in longbows, and also have a bow in his house and do use himself in shooting."

62 Harold Arthur Dillon, "Arms and Armour at Westminster, the Tower, and Greenwich, 1547," Archaeologia, LI (1888), 229-30; L. & P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 131, 147; Ibid., XXI, pt. 1, No. 162. England even found it necessary to import bowstaves at this time. On this point, see Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, p. 103.
Fathers, guardians, "and rulers of such be of tender age" were instructed to raise their charges "in the knowledge of the same shooting." The statute likewise ordained that "Butts be made in every City, Town, and place . . . . And that the Inhabitants and dwellers of every of them be compelled to make and continue such butts and to exercise themselves with long Bows in shooting at the same . . . ." Where necessary, Justices of the Peace were empowered to appoint bowyers for the making of bows "to serve the commonality," and aliens were forbidden both to export or to use longbows without the king's license. 63 This statute was made perpetual in 1515. 64

The use of modern weapons was actually discouraged. The act of 1515 bemoaned the fact that certain of "the King's subjects daily delight themselves in shooting of Crossbows and hand-guns." To remedy the situation the government provided confiscation and stiff fines: "no person from henceforth [will] shoot in any Crossbow or any handgun upon pain of forfeiture of the same bow and gun unless he or other to his use or use of his Wife have lands tenements, fees, annuities, or other profits to the yearly value of three hundred marks, And for every time so using to shoot in Crossbows or hand-guns to forfeit £10 for every time so offending." A similar act was

passed in 1541.  

Small wonder that the early Tudors lacked modern infantry, that every expedition mounted for service either against the Scots at home or the French abroad was practically devoid of modern armament, artillery excepted. At Flodden in 1513 the most novel weapons employed by the English commander, the Earl of Surrey, were a few light pieces of ordnance: his men had no pikes, no handguns of any kind, and relied for victory on their conventional bows and bills.  

A few pikes and arquebuses were utilized during the French invasions of 1513 and

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65 33 Henry VIII, c. 6, Statutes of the Realm, III, 832-35. At the time of the French war in 1544, for the only time during the period, encouragement was given to the users of modern weapons when by royal proclamation "all and singular his majesty's subjects born within his grace's dominions being of age sixteen and upwards" were permitted to "shoot in handguns and hagbushes [i.e. arquebuses]" without penalty. See Cruickshank, Army Royal, p. 81, who quotes the pertinent text. The proclamation was rescinded in 1546. As Cruickshank correctly perceives it, the proclamation of 1544 "was much too liberal for the time." Though "the danger of war had receded" --the reason given for the revocation of the proclamation -- "it seems likely that the change of heart was as much a social as a military decision. If too many people had guns, it would encourage lawlessness in a variety of forms; and in the long run it would put dissident groups into a position to challenge the authority of the crown."

1523; yet neither weapon figured conspicuously in English hands at any time during the first half of the sixteenth century. Even in the French campaign of 1544 bows and bills predominated as of old, and of the twenty-eight thousand infantrymen of the army of invasion hardly more, and perhaps less, than one-tenth had modern weapons.

In the other military arm, the cavalry, much the same canker is found, namely the failure to keep abreast of the times. Heavy cavalry in particular was lacking in early Tudor armies, in part because the tactics of the Hundred Years' War and the Wars of the Roses had conditioned the English knightly class to fight on foot, a habit not easily overcome,

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67 Cruickshank, *Army Royal*, p. 68, makes mention of "payments for repairs to harquebuses" in the 1513 expedition, while on the eve of that invasion one English captain alludes to news that he was to be furnished, among other things, with pikes. See *L. & P.*, I, pt. 2, No. 855. Similarly, see above, p. 33. Why would Henry VIII make purchases of small arms if he did not intend his soldiers to use them? No mention is made of English gunners or pikemen in Suffolk's army in 1523, partly, one suspects, because the records pertaining to that affair are much scantier than those available for the earlier and later campaigns of the reign. However, in the autumn of 1523 firearms were being purchased abroad. *L. & P.*, III, pt. 2, No. 3494.

68 The elaborate preparations and the majority of the muster lists for the 1544 invasion are preserved in *L. & P.*, XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 271-76. A fair number of English infantrymen were armed with "sprinklers," that is a type of spiked club or cudgel. See *ibid.*, No. 275 (4), p. 164.

the more so when it was recalled that such methods had won the day at Crécy and Agincourt. Unfortunately, what had been forgotten was that this self-same stratagem of fighting from the defensive with knights afoot interspersed with billmen and flanked by archers had resulted in the expulsion of the English from France, and that the Hundred Years' War, which had begun so gloriously and ended so shamefully, had reversed the positions of the two most famous adversaries in northwestern Europe. England had emerged from the struggle a second-rate military power, while France had developed one of the best armies in Europe; and the strength of that army was built around permanently employed companies of men-at-arms, the Compagnies d'Ordonnance, in which each knight rode off to battle with a squire, valet, page, and two mounted archers to serve him. Mobile, numerous, and above all disciplined, the French gendarmerie was generally acknowledged the best of its kind.

How contrary the English situation. Writing to the Doge in 1519, Sebastian Giustinian observed that in England little use was made of men-at-arms, adding that "The real military force of the country" consisted of its infantry whose prowess was in archery. The paucity of heavy cavalry in early Tudor armies is made painfully clear by examining the personal retinue of Surrey at Flodden Field: of the five hundred men

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assigned to him, only one, Avery of Berwick, was a full-fledged man-at-arms. Heavy horse were singularly scarce among the twelve thousand Englishmen recruited for Suffolk's expedition in 1523, while at Boulogne in 1544, except for the fifty Gentlemen Pensioners assigned largely to the person of the king, English men-at-arms were almost non-existent.

The early Tudors were somewhat better served by light cavalry: demilances, "prickers," mounted arquebusiers, 

71 Ibid., I, No. 4376.
73 See below, pp. 109-10.
74 "Prickers," utilized primarily as scouts and foragers, were also referred to as "northern horse" and were recruited largely from among the moss-troopers which infested the borderlands with Scotland. Their principal weapon was a light spear or "chasing stave" shorter than the demilance and not unlike the boar spear which they may also have used. For a description of the boar spear, see Dillon, "Arms and Armour at Westminster, the Tower, and Greenwich, 1547," p. 238.
75 These, of course, were not very numerous, appearing in the English army for the first time around the date of Henry VIII's last French war. Patterned after the mounted arquebusiers with whom the English had come in contact during their earlier forays in Scotland (which nation employed French auxiliaries) and in France, they were variously used as scouts, skirmishers, and protectors of convoys on the march. Their equipment, at least that which was most desired was described c. 1548: "The arquebusier shall likewise be well mounted, and their armor shall be like unto [light horsemen], except the head-piece: for they only shall have Morions to the intent to see the better round about them, and to have their heads more at liberty, a sword by their side, a mace at the pommel of their saddles on the one side, and an arquebus in a case of leather on the other, which must be made fast that it stir not: which arquebus may be two foot and a half
and archers on horseback. The Venetian, Barbaro, estimated in 1551 that a levy en masse of the militia might produce as many as fifteen thousand light cavalrymen, but certainly no such mounted force of Englishmen was ever put into the field between 1485 and 1558.

How then, with such feeble and antiquated forces, did the early Tudors hope to win success in that martial cockpit which was sixteenth-century Europe? The answer is simple: they did not expect success, not if they had to fight a continental war alone; and the Tudors, with the exception of Henry VII, who took a calculated risk and won in 1492 but otherwise abstained from long-term military adventuring, never fought on the mainland of Europe alone. In 1513, England campaigned in France as a member of the Holy League with Spain, the Papacy, the Holy Roman Empire and, at least for a

or three foot long or rather more, so [long as] it be light.” Paul Ive, trans., Instructions for the Warres. Apply, learndely, and politiguely discoursing the method of Military Discipline. Originally written in French by . . . Monsieur William de Bellay, Lord of Langey . . . (London: Thomas Man and Tobie Cook, 1589), p. 62. This work was in fact written by Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie, Sieur de Fourquevaux. For a modern edition in French and an explanation of the confusion regarding the authorship, see G. Dickinson, ed., Instructions sur le Fait de la Guerre of Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie, Sieur de Fourquevaux (London: The Athlone Press, 1954). Hereinafter cited as Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Fait de la Guerre. Dickinson’s edition provides a useful Introduction in English which analyzes the French army under Francis I.

Venetian Calendar, V, No. 703, p. 350.
time, Venice and Switzerland as allies, while the armies of 1523 and 1544 fought in partnership with Spain and the Empire. Nevertheless, despite well laid plans and good intentions, the French wars waged by England and her confederates were never truly coordinated affairs. Each member of any particular alliance had its own general staff, its own objectives, and its own strategy, with the result that concerted action as a team was out of the question and never attempted. Never did an early Tudor army combine with the main body of an allied army in joint action, for that main body was always elsewhere generally engaging the principal array of the enemy's forces; but herein lay the military value of continental alliances to the Tudors. Only when France was distracted in other quarters could England's substandard soldiery dream of battle honors beyond the Channel.

However, the first Tudors could never afford the luxury of overconfidence; for even if France could not commit her full strength to repelling English intruders, it was inevitable that she would resist and that whatever forces she

77 Since 1519 both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire had enjoyed the same ruler, Charles of Burgundy, grandson and heir of Ferdinand the Catholic (d. 1516) and of Maximilian I (d. 1519). As Charles I he ruled Spain until 1556, in which year he resigned in favor of his son, Philip II. As Charles V, the title by which he is more commonly remembered, he ruled the Holy Roman Empire until 1558, abdicating a few months before his death that same year in favor of his younger brother, Ferdinand I.
could spare in that endeavor would be representative of her best. Therefore, to assure themselves of at least a chance of victory the early Tudors were obliged, when fighting on the Continent, to retain in their service foreign mercenaries and auxiliaries, dedicated professionals who could hopefully counter the stratagems of an equally professional foe. It is to the study of these foreigners that the remainder of this thesis is dedicated.
CHAPTER II

MERCENARIES AND AUXILIARIES

I do affirm 'tis not money (as common opinion will have it) but good soldiers that is the sinews of war; for money cannot find good soldiers, but good soldiers will be sure to find money.

Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Bk. 11.

Before proceeding further some attempt at a definition of terms must be made, specifically with regard the meaning of "mercenaries" in sixteenth-century parlance and the difference between them and auxiliaries. Fortunately, there is no need to be original, as the most famous contemporary student of the art militaire, Niccolo Machiavelli, provides the answer. It is manifest from his chapters in The Prince and the Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius which explicitly treat of these two kinds of soldiers that mercenaries were free lancers, owing allegiance first, to themselves, second, to their officers, and third, and sometimes only incidentally, to their employers. Mercenaries were the lineal descendants of the "free companies" of the Middle Ages, transient bands of rugged

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individualists, professional warriors temporarily recruited from among all nations, and held together by leaders of strong personality. While "not entirely indifferent to the claims of honor and legality or to the interests of their country of origin," they were motivated principally in the exercise of arms by their desire for financial gain. Consequently, whichever prince's purse was fullest, he it was who could expect to attract them in the greatest numbers.

Auxiliaries were a somewhat different breed. These were troops, to use Machiavelli's phraseology, who were borrowed from and, more importantly, paid for by an ally: "When one asks a powerful neighbor to come to aid and defend one with his forces," he noted in The Prince, "they are termed auxiliaries;" they are soldiers "who are sent to you by a prince . . . under his own officers, under his own ensigns, and who are paid by him . . . ." Potentially more troublesome than mercenaries, since they were united in their allegiance to the ruler who lent them, auxiliaries were nevertheless employed in considerable numbers by the early Tudors, being acquired from France by the uncrowned Henry VII and from Spain and the Empire by Henry VIII.

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4 Machiavelli, Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius, in Chief Works, I, 382.
However clear their differences in theory, it is not always possible to distinguish between mercenaries and auxiliaries. Both were foreign; both were professional; both served under alien officers; and both were impelled to a greater or lesser degree by hope of material reward; for even auxiliaries, though drawing no pay from the ruler in whose cause they fought, could hope, like mercenaries, for pensions, booty, ransoms, and similar extraneous emoluments. In addition, it was relatively simple to switch roles, to play the part of auxiliary one day and become a thoroughgoing mercenary the next. If, for example, as frequently happened, an auxiliary's natural prince chose to withdraw from an alliance, there was little more than moral censure to prevent him from continuing in the service of his foreign master; and in an age when patriotic nationalism was still in its infancy, such censure had little effect provided wages remained sufficiently attractive.

The retention of mercenaries and auxiliaries by English sovereigns was nothing new; hence the practice was not, as has recently been suggested, a Tudor innovation. On the contrary, employment of foreign soldiers by the rulers of England

5 Though mercenaries did serve under their own officers, the units which they formed, unlike those comprised of auxiliaries, were incorporated directly into the army of their employer and as such were subject to his dictates and the orders of his subordinate commanders.

6 Above, p. vii.
is as old as the military history of the nation itself. Tacitus speaks of the Batavi, the Tungri, and the Usipi, German auxiliaries who assisted Agricola in the conquest of Britain. The Venerable Bede, writing some three hundred years after the fact, recounts the not implausible tale that the first Anglo-Saxons were invited to Britain as mercenaries, that they were awarded grants of land "on condition that they protect the country." Modern students of military history are no less cognizant of the importance of foreign arms in England's development: C. Warren Hollister, in two recent studies, devotes a chapter in each to the mercenaries and auxiliaries who served the earlier dynasties of English kings. Mercenaries

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10 Hollister does not in fact distinguish between mercenaries and auxiliaries, classifying both as stipendarii, i.e. "soldiers who served for pay." However, from the examples he cites, it is plain that many of the troops would better fit the description of auxiliaries. For instance, the great barons from France and the Low Countries who, from time to time, served the Anglo-Normans were often independent rulers in their own right and were frequently committed to the kings of England by treaty. When wars were waged in a common cause, some troops provided for English use must occasionally have been auxiliaries.
comprised "the elite corps" of the Saxon fyrd, the forerunner of the national militia, while under the Normans, "the most significant military expense" was the outlay for hired soldiers. Hollister quotes no figures on the probable strength of these foreigners, but he makes it clear that they played a substantial part in pre- and post-Conquest warfare: "perhaps the similarities between Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman mercenaries outweigh their differences. The most startling similarity is the very fact that mercenaries were important to the military structures of both societies in an age when they were relatively rare elsewhere in Europe."\(^\text{11}\)

John Schlight's study of the eleventh and twelfth centuries advances the more controversial thesis that it was mercenaries rather than the baronial levy which "constituted a dominant institution in feudal society."\(^\text{12}\) The unreliability of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy in the performance of it military obligations "led . . . to a mercenary policy" on the one hand, while preventing "the operation of an effective

\(^{11}\)Hollister, *Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions*, p. 19.

\(^{12}\)John Schlight, *Monarchs and Mercenaries: A Reappraisal of the Importance of Knight Service in Norman and Early Angevin England* (Bridgeport, Conn.: University of Bridgeport, 1968), vii. Schlight does not distinguish between mercenaries and auxiliaries either, though again examples could be cited demonstrating that certain of the stipendarii were probably auxiliaries, receiving pay from their own princes rather than from the kings of England.
system of knight-service" on the other. Other authors of more standard works dealing with almost any period pre-dating the Tudors could be quoted with the same effect. Representative of these is the late Sir Charles Oman, an authority with few equals in the field of early military history, who in a simple sentence sums up in general terms what was common practice: "From the time of Stephen onward, we perpetually find the feudal levies of the realm supplemented by great bodies of professional soldiers, nearly all foreigners." Mercenary and auxiliary troops, therefore, have a long, if not always distinguished, career in the service of England.

As regards the Tudors, foreign troops figure prominently in the very foundation of their regime. Henry VII, while yet Earl of Richmond and fugitive in France, received from the Yorkist-hating government of Charles VIII money, ships, artillery, and auxiliaries in quantities sufficient to secure a beachhead in the kingdom whose crown he claimed. Philip de Commines, French councillor-historian and witness to the events surrounding the successful invasion of 1485, placed the number of auxiliaries at between three thousand and four

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13 Ibid., p. 75.

14 Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, I, 368.
thousand, though modern estimates favor a figure closer to two thousand. Little is known of these Frenchmen, though Commines states plainly that they were Normans, "the loosest and most profligate persons in all that country." Writing sometime after the fact, the blind poet André, a chief apologist of the first Tudor, tells of horsemen and foot and identifies their leader as Philibert de Chandée.

Concerning this man, some few details do survive. He was

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apparently a Breton by birth and may have counted among his relations the powerful Dukes of Savoy.\(^{19}\) At the initial landing at Milford Haven, prior to the advance through Wales and the English Midlands, Chandée was knighted, presumably by Henry himself. How he and his men performed at Bosworth has not been recorded, but their assistance must have been invaluable. The exact size of the contending armies has long been a subject of debate, as no reliable contemporary account of the battle was ever produced. Nonetheless, the consensus of modern scholarship places the number of troops brought to the engagement by Henry at approximately five thousand or six thousand, while Richard III may have had twice that amount.\(^{20}\) Thus Chandée's command comprised a third or more of the pretender's array before it was joined, late in the fray, by the additional five thousand or six thousand men of the phlegmatic Stanleys,\(^{21}\) who fortuitously chose that


\(^{20}\)One of the best and most readable accounts of the battle of Bosworth is to be found in Kendall, Richard the Third, Chap. XI.

\(^{21}\)Lord Thomas Stanley, Constable of England under Richard III, was Henry Tudor's step-father, being the third husband of Henry's mother, Lady Margaret Beaufort, Countess of Richmond. Lord Stanley's brother, Sir William, also held high office in Richard's government, holding--among other things--the Chief Justiceship of North Wales. Both Stanleys
August day for reasons best known to themselves to gamble on
the prospective rather than the actual king of England.

Evidence of Henry's satisfaction with the performance of
his auxiliaries manifested itself within three months of his
October coronation. On January 6, 1486, in an action with­
out precedent in Tudor annals, the Breton adventurer, Phili­
bert de Chandée, was created Earl of Bath with 100 marks
yearly out of the issues of Dorset and Somerset. This was
the stuff of which the dreams of soldiers of fortune were

had pledged themselves to defend King Richard, but at Bos­
worth they refused to commit their forces until Richard had
committed himself in person to attacking the Lancastrian
lines. This done, the Stanleys betrayed their trust; they
attacked Richard from the rear, enveloped him, and brought
about his death. For details of the Stanleys' treachery
see ibid.

22 The preamble to the letters patent, in which Chandée
is styled "consanguinem nostrum" is reproduced in William
VII from Original Documents Preserved in the Public Record
Office (2 vols.; London: Longmans and Co., Trubner and Co.,
1873-77), I, 246. A darker aspect of the history of the
Norman auxiliaries is related by William Hutton, The Battle
of Bosworth Field . . . (Birmingham: Pearson and Rollason,
1788), p. 17: the auxiliaries were "charged with bringing
over that dreadful scourge called the sweating sickness."
From all accounts this unknown malady appeared towards the
end of September, 1485, a month after Henry's triumph. It
first appeared in London and spread from there through most
of the realm. Symptoms included a foul-smelling sweat, high
fever, and thirst. Highly contagious but of short duration,
epidemics of sweating sickness were frequent in England until
c. 1551, when the disease seems to have made its last appear­
ance. For further information see Busch, England Under the
Tudors, King Henry VII, pp. 24, 323.
made: a guaranteed income and, above all, that most signal honor, a peerage, both won on the strength of a good sword arm. Somewhat abruptly, though, the name of Philibert vanishes from view. He functioned briefly as ambassador for France and was in residence for some undetermined length of time at the court in Greenwich in the winter of 1486-87. After that, nothing further is known, his title presumably becoming extinct at his death.

Foreign soldiers figure prominently in the military

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24 A second possibility suggests itself. Chandée may have forfeited his peerage. His native Brittany was an independent country, but at that time, it was involved in a losing struggle to prevent its absorption by France. Henry VII, despite his obvious debt to the government of the latter, was intent on aiding the Breton cause. Francis, Duke of Brittany, had been the first on the Continent to grant him sanctuary; but more to the point the fall of Brittany meant the extension of French power in a quarter most threatening to England. Brittany, flanking the mouth of the Channel and jutting ominously towards the west, was as much a pistol aimed at the heart of England as ever were the Netherlands.

All Bretons did not, however, share Duke Francis' passion for freedom. There existed within his duchy a strong French party. Philibert de Chandée, since he was appointed French ambassador, must be presumed to have been a member of that party. Similarly, since Henry VII's active assistance on behalf of Breton independence began in 1487, it must again be presumed that his friendship with Chandée was of short duration. It was, as noted above, in the early days of 1487 that mention of the new Earl of Bath ceases. For diplomatic relations and problems during the period, see R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy, 1485-1558 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), Chap. II. Hereinafter cited as Before the Armada.
annals of the remainder of the reign, though curiously, follow­
ing Henry's success at Bosworth, the new dynast appears to have made but sparing use of them; for when mercenaries or auxiliaries are mentioned, they are almost always in the employ of the opposition, the supplanted Yorkist faction of the deceased Richard III.

Bosworth did not end the Wars of the Roses; rather it marked the beginning of the last phase of that civil conflict, the fortunes of which had oscillated back and forth in favor of one side and then the other for over thirty years. This fact was appreciated by the Yorkists, who almost immediately set to work in an attempt to win back that which had been wrested from them. Their hopes normally would have lain with a principal member of their house, either Elizabeth of York, daughter of Edward IV, or Elizabeth's cousin, the ten­year-old Earl of Warwick, son of Edward's brother, the Duke of Clarence. But Henry VII, to strengthen his own position, had, on taking the crown, married Elizabeth and placed Warwick in the Tower. The Yorkists' ploy, since they lacked access to actual candidates of the first blood, was to manufacture them.

The first imposter was Lambert Simnel, a joiner's son and the twelve-year-old prodigy of an Oxford priest named Symonds. Lambert was groomed to play the part of Warwick, who rumor had it had been privily murdered by Henry after
the manner of Edward IV's heirs, the boy-king Edward V and his brother, Richard of York. The plot was inspired by three staunch Yorkists, John de la Pole, Earl of Lincoln, Francis, Lord Lovell, and Margaret, widowed Duchess of Burgundy and vengeful sister of the dead Richard III. Her dowager's court in the Low Countries was probably where the Simnel conspiracy was hatched, and it was certainly Margaret who served as broker in the hiring of the German captain, Martin Schwarz, and his two thousand landsknechts, who were sent to aid Simnel in the late spring of 1487.

Of this Schwarz little is known except that he was a native of the free Imperial city of Nuremberg, a former shoemaker, and a mercenary leader of some reputation. Certain English commentators erroneously describe him as a Dutchman or a Fleming, and Polydore Vergil, a native of Urbino and

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25 These two boys, better known perhaps as "the little princes in the Tower," were presumably dispatched in 1483 by their uncle, Richard of Gloucester, afterward Richard III. This theory is still generally adhered to in historical circles, though two fascinating books, Kendall's Richard the Third and Josephine Tey's critically acclaimed "detective story," The Daughter of Time (London: The Macmillan Co., 1952), have done much to rehabilitate the character of the last Yorkist king, while at the same time raising the possibility that the first Tudor may have had a hand in the murders.

26 Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst (7 vols.; Berlin: G. Stilke, 1900-36), IV, 10.

official historian to Henry VII, while emphatically stating that he and his men were German, makes the interesting observation that the latter were "rugged men of the mountain," thus raising the very real possibility that some at least were Swiss. 28 Whatever the case, these mercenaries sailed from the Netherlands to that hotbed of Yorkist affection, Ireland, where in May they joined Simnel and Symonds in Dublin, and from whence, strengthened by an undetermined force of wild rebel Irish, they spearheaded an invasion of England in early June.

The Yorkist host landed in Lancashire where it was met by the retinue of a notorious sympathizer, Sir Thomas Broughton, 29 and from thence it proceeded to Yorkshire, the home of the cause, in the hope of rallying more to the standard. Few men came: Henry VII, long aware of the trouble brewing, had already made a number of arrests, and the real Warwick had been paraded in London, revealing to the world the futility of the sham being attempted. But the Yorkist leaders, undeterred by their limited following and buoyed by the presence


of the mercenaries in their midst, pressed southward, resolv-
ing "to try the fortunes of war, recalling that two years
earlier Henry, with a smaller number of soldiers, had conquered
the great army of King Richard."\(^{30}\)

The two armies met near Stoke on June 16. Almost nothing
is known of the tactics employed or of the disposition of the
combatants, though the official summary of the fight indicates
that the strength of the government troops was such that only
one of Henry's three divisions or "battles"\(^{31}\) was sent into
action: "For some time the struggle was fought with no advan-
tage to either side, but at last the first line of the king's
army (which was alone committed to the fray and sustained the
struggle) charged the enemy with such vigor that it at once
crushed those hostile leaders who were still resisting."\(^{32}\)

The mercenaries and the Irish fought with desperate cour-
age. The latter under their captain, Lord Thomas Fitzgerald,
were armed so lightly, having only knives and spears and no
body armor, that they were fitter "to move wonder than to op-
pose good defenses and well ordered troops." Employed essen-
tially as skirmishers, they were the first to be overwhelmed.
The Germans, as Vergil indentifies them, proved more resolute

\(^{30}\)Ibid.

\(^{31}\)See Glossary.

\(^{32}\)Vergil, The Anglica Historia, p. 23.
"and yielded little to the English in valor . . . ." They stood their ground, but in the end, their ranks decimated by hails of arrows and artillery fire, they too went down, fighting fiercely almost to the last. What few of the enemy remained fled the field, only to be ridden down and killed or captured: "of their leaders, John, Earl of Lincoln, Francis, Lord Lovell, Thomas Broughton, the most bold Martin Schwartz, and the Irish captain, Thomas Geraldine were slain in that place."33 As for Lambert Simnel and his mentor, Symonds, they were taken alive; but their lives were spared, the boy because he was held too young to bear the responsibility of his treason, Symonds because he was a priest.

After Stoke foreign troops next receive attention in connection with the second imposture of the reign, that of the Fleming, Perkin Warbeck. This young man was discovered at age seventeen by Yorkist partisans in Ireland, wither he had gone in 1491 in the service of a Breton merchant. Approached by the mayor of Cork, he was persuaded after some initial hedging to impersonate Richard, Duke of York, youngest of the murdered sons of Edward IV.

Warbeck was from the outset a more dangerous threat than Simnel had ever been. Handsome, aristocratic in bearing

33Lovell's corpse was never identified, giving rise to the conjecture that he somehow escaped the field. A skeleton found in a hidden room at his manor house at Minster Lovell in Oxfordshire in the eighteenth century may have been his.
and possessed of a keen intelligence he successfully sustained the role of legitimate king of England for five years. Much of Europe fell under his spell, and at one time or another he was befriended by all the many troublesome princes who desired an end to Tudor rule. The Earls of Kildare and Desmond sustained his cause in Ireland, until in the spring of 1492 he was invited with all the honor befitting his deception to France. There Charles VIII intended to use him as a counter to the support then being supplied Brittany\(^{34}\) by Henry VII, but the hazard to England was averted when, following Henry's invasion of France and the investiture of Boulogne,\(^{35}\) peace

\(^{34}\)See above p. 52, n. 24.

\(^{35}\)The attack on France, such as it was, was not undertaken until late 1492. Henry did not disembark in Calais until October 2, and he and his army of twenty-six thousand spent two weeks in further preparation before moving on Boulogne, which fortress was not attacked until the 22nd. Under normal circumstances the investiture of Boulogne would have been considered an act of the gravest provocation. However, the lateness of the season, the lukewarmness of the siege operations, and the fact that both sides had been seeking a settlement since February served as proof that Henry's warlike notions were intended solely as a goad to peace. The demonstration had the desired effect. Charles VIII, his Italian schemes looming ever larger on the horizon, agreed to Henry's principal demands, including payment of an indemnity of almost £159,000 and the abandonment of Warbeck, and the Treaty of Etaples was signed on November 3, twelve days after the commencement of the siege. For bibliography regarding operations see Busch, England Under the Tudors, Henry VII, p. 333. There is little at all to suggest the employment of foreign troops in this brief campaign except for reference to a payment of £10 earlier in the year to one Jacob van Walthuysen, a Dutch captain of 155 "men of war of Holland." See James R. Hooker, "Notes on the Organization
was arranged at Etaples and Warbeck was expelled from the country.

It was a frustrating setback for the counterfeit Duke of York, but at this juncture hardly critical. Across the frontier in Flanders, Margaret of Burgundy had everything in readiness, and Warbeck was publicly received as her nephew, son indeed of her dead brother, Edward IV. Through the dowager's good offices a more dangerous champion was gained in the person of the emperor, Maximilian I. As an enemy of France and sometime ally of England during the Breton affair, Maximilian looked upon Henry VII's negotiation of the Etaples agreement as a betrayal, so that he was more than eager to use Warbeck to repay the slight to his dignity. Money was found to outfit an expedition, and in midsummer, 1495, fourteen ships and a small army led by the pretender sailed for the Kentish coast.

Few particulars survive regarding this operation. Warbeck appeared off Deal on July 3 with a mixed following of English renegades, Imperial auxiliaries, and a few hundred mercenaries led by French and Spanish captains: "Here were all nations and conditions of men, bankrupts, sanctuary men, thieves, robbers, vagabonds, and divers servants of

and Supply of the Tudor Military under Henry VII, "Huntingdon Library Quarterly, XXIII (1959-60), 23.
dishonest rebellion." Six hundred of these desperados were set ashore, while Perkin remained safely aboard ship. Cautious to the point of indecision, a weakness fatal to would-be usurpers, he had high hopes of being welcomed as Richard IV: but his flight of fancy was short-lived. The mayor of Sandwich, having been alerted in advance of the landing, had the local militia in readiness and compelled the invaders to fight, slaying or capturing above a third of their number before the survivors made it back to their ships. Of those siezed eight were captains, among them four or possibly five Englishmen, one Frenchman, and two Spaniards, Don Fulano de Guevara and Diego el Coxo. Francis Bacon describes how the prisoners, yoked liked horses in harness, were dragged to London where they were sentenced and afterwards executed at divers spots along the southeast shore, their remains being used "for seamarks or lighthouses to teach


38 Spanish Calendar, I, No. 98. El Coxo ("the Lame") was the derisive name given Diego by his captors.
Perkin's people to avoid the coast." Special attention was given the principal captains, the Englishmen no doubt, as well as one of the Spaniards and the Frenchman: they were drawn and quartered at the beginning of September and their heads impaled on London Bridge.  

Meanwhile, Warbeck had sailed for Ireland where the fiasco at Deal was completed. Part of his squadron, dispersed in a panic-stricken flight through the Channel, abandoned him, and an attempt to take Waterford in Munster was repulsed with further serious losses among his international recruits. After this defeat the pretender momentarily disappeared, only to resurface in November at Stirling in Scotland as the protégé of James IV.

To Henry VII, Warbeck in Scotland constituted as grave a threat as Warbeck either in Ireland or on the Continent. The latter's benefactor, the king of Scots, was young, able, impetuous, and above all wedded to the goal of increasing Scottish influence in European affairs. The hegemony of England in the British Isles naturally rankled so ambitious


a monarch, with the result that no opportunity was lost by James in impressing upon Henry how far Warbeck's presence north of the Tweed could be used to suit Scottish interests.

Plans for an attack on England were laid almost immediately, with James in the role of allied and, therefore, auxiliary commander. He agreed to provide Warbeck with an army at Scots' expense on the written understanding that when Perkin was victorious the town and castle of Berwick would be surrendered into Scottish hands and that "for the costs made on him" 50,000 marks would be delivered to James within two years of his accession. Simultaneously, appeals for military aid were lodged in France, the Empire, and the Netherlands, as clearly Warbeck and James hoped to mount a grand campaign; but sadly their pleas fell far short of expectation. Charles VIII had already embarked on his Italian adventure and had no intention of chancing an English attack on his unprotected western front. A canvass of the Imperial court and the Netherlands provinces produced the same negative reaction, for the months immediately following the collapse of the Deal expedition had brought an almost complete reversal of the


attitude of these states toward England. Each for its own purpose now sought to conciliate Henry VII, the emperor because he was committed with Venice, Milan, Spain, and the Papacy to a new Holy League to drive the French from Italy, the Netherlands because of the crippling economic sanctions imposed on her trade in 1493.44

In the end, in a skillful exercise of give and take, the continentals placated the English king by leaving James and Warbeck to their own devices, denying them the massive support in mercenaries, auxiliaries, and military supplies that they had hoped would be theirs for the asking. By the terms of the *Intercursus Magnus*, a commercial agreement signed in February, 1496, trade was resumed with the Netherlands in return for which that government agreed to in no way sustain Henry's enemies and to insist on the stringent enforcement of these provisions in the lands of the dowager duchess. It was not specifically mentioned in the treaty, but all knew that Warbeck and his confederates were encompassed in its language.

Maximilian was less inclined to forsake his former client; nonetheless, the needs of the hour forced him to be practical.

44 Because of the moral support given Warbeck by the Netherlands and the Empire and the mercenaries and auxiliaries provided him through the Flanders ports, Henry VII had prohibited all trade with the Low Countries. This had proven extremely damaging to the Imperialists, but more particularly to the Flemish cloth industry whose chief supplier of unfinished woollens was England.
He had neither the men nor the means to spare for subsidizing Warbeck. Habitual wars had insured a chronically empty Hapsburg purse, and in the end good common sense persuaded him that France, not England, was his real enemy. In exchange for Henry VII's adhesion to the Holy League which Henry joined in September, 1496, Maximilian grudgingly abandoned Warbeck. Characteristically, even though all hope of foreign backing was gone and his councillors raged against the stranger in their midst, the chivalrous James stood by his undaunted guest. The king of Scots may have genuinely believed Warbeck to have been the authentic Duke of York, for in truth he treated him well. James gave him a yearly pension of £1200 and married him to his own kinswomen, Lady Catherine Gordon, daughter of the Earl of Huntly.

The long-awaited campaign against England was finally gotten underway in mid-September, 1496. Needless to say, it fell considerably short of the great crusade envisioned during the planning stages of the past winter and spring. The whole people and baronage of Scotland were opposed to the enterprise, with the result that the army, if such it can be called, which James and Warbeck mustered at Ellam Kirk within ten miles of the borden consisted of scarcely fourteen

\[45\] For the background of events leading up to the signing and Maximilian's part in the proceedings see Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry VII, pp. 124-27.
hundred men "of all manner of nations," but chiefly of poorly disciplined borderers and a few Yorkist Englishmen who had followed Perkin into Scotland. Of the non-British element, only one company can be identified, that of Rodyk de la Lane, who came "out of Flanders with two small ships" and sixty Germans. It was hardly a force with which to conquer a kingdom, though undeniably its leaders were disposed to think that once in England a popular rising on Warbeck's behalf would sweep Henry from his throne. No such rising materialized, and except for the foreign component in the army, there was little to set apart the undertaking from any other frontier raid. It was over in three days; Warbeck and James quarreled over the excessive depredations of the Scots auxiliaries, who distinguished themselves in burning and looting before recrossing the border well in advance of the four thousand English troops sent north from Carlisle to intercept them.

It was not appreciated at the time, but this impudent and miserable incursion into English territory proved Warbeck's undoing. Henry VII, safe in the friendship of his continental neighbors, was free at last to concentrate his

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considerable energies on ending the threat from Scotland. On September 25, four days after the invaders had recrossed the Tweed, he issued a proclamation declaring that a state of war now existed between the two kingdoms; £120,000 in taxes and £40,000 in loans were voted for its prosecution; and two armies, one by land and the other by sea, were ordered to be made ready for an offensive in the summer of 1497.48

In the interim, the collection of supplies in England proved hardly popular. Among the men of Cornwall there were murmerings "that for a little stir of the Scots soon blown over" they were being ground down by payments.49 Led by Michael Joseph, a blacksmith, and Thomas Flammock, a lawyer, the West Countrymen decided on a demonstration rather than a rebellion and marched, fifteen thousand strong, in May, 1497, towards London to demand exemption from their taxes and removal of those ministers who had so evilly advised the king. It was a dangerous situation, more so as the Scots themselves were girding for the war which had been declared against them.

Henry had been caught unaware by the Cornish outbreak, but he could not afford to parley with contumacious subjects in arms. With internal security and the safety of the

49 Bacon, Works, I, 360.
northern frontier at stake, he quickly concentrated an overwhelming force about London. An army, already enroute to the north, was recalled, and the gentry of the home counties were mustered. Finally, on June 16, as the protestors lay below the city of Blackheath, Henry launched a sudden attack which overran their defences. Two thousand West Countrymen died in the onslaught, while the captured survivors were held to ransom by the victors. Of their leaders, Joseph, Flammock, and James, Baron Audley, were executed. Henry pardoned the remainder, moved perhaps by the slaughter on the heath or, as Bacon would have it, because "he made a great difference between people that did rebel upon wantonness and them that did rebel upon want."  

With the West Country restored to obedience, attention was once more riveted on Scotland where with untoward slowness James IV and Warbeck prepared to exploit the Cornish trouble with one last assault on Henry's throne. For this purpose Warbeck was sent into Ireland where it was expected he could rally a force for the White Rose and lead it into England. James, meanwhile, would try to coordinate the landing by leading another army of auxiliaries across the border.  

50 Audley was a desitute peer whom Flammock and Joseph had recruited during their passage through Somerset.  
51 Bacon, Works, I, 363.  
It was another grand scheme doomed to failure, for already it would seem that the Scottish king was at pains to be rid of this pensioner on whom he had showered so much attention at great expense and for such small return. There were rumors that all was not well between the two troublemakers, and it is to be suspected that when Warbeck took ship for Cork at the beginning of July, James was not sad to see him go.53 Everywhere enthusiasm for the "Duke of York" had waned, even in Ireland where the imposter found there were few Irishmen to be had. Kildare and Desmond, the rebel earls who had befriended him at the beginning of his odyssey, had gone over to Henry, and Sir James Ormond, the turbulent war chief who had solicited his coming on this occasion, was dead, slain in a brawl with the feuding Butlers.54

How many men joined Warbeck in Ireland is uncertain. In two dispatches Raimondo de Soncino, the Milanese envoy in England, makes mention first of "eighty savage Irishmen" and later of "about three hundred persons of various nationalities,"55 among whom was a Spanish veteran of wars in the Low Countries, Don Pedro de Guevara, who might well have been

54 Gairdner, Henry the Seventh, pp. 130-31.
the brother of that Fulano de Guevara who had died in London for his part in the Deal landing of 1495. If this be the case, Don Pedro and the other foreigners, who are described as having "followed [Perkin] for some time before," may have been the remnant of that mercenary and auxiliary force with which, after the repulse at Deal, Warbeck had attacked Waterford, and which on the latter defeat had been stranded in Ireland. Whatever the case, Warbeck's reception in Ireland was poor: a price had been placed on his head, and he and his retinue had to be surreptitiously smuggled out of Kinsale harbor aboard three Spanish merchantmen lest the inhabitants of the district cut their throats and claimed the bounty on their skins. A course was set for Cornwall, and on September 7, nearly two months after leaving Scotland, Warbeck and his company put ashore in Whitesand Bay.

The delay in Ireland cost Warbeck dearly. He had gained no army; but more hurtful, he had frustrated his only worthwhile confederate, James IV, in the latter's attempt at a simultaneous demonstration in the north. As agreed at Warbeck's

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56 Concerning Don Pedro, see Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry VII, p. 115; see also Spanish Calendar, I, No. 98.

57 Milan Calendar, I, No. 327.

58 Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry VII, pp. 115-16. There is some question as to the nationality of these vessels. Busch describes them as Spanish merchantmen, while Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p. 144, refers to one as a Breton pinnace.
departure, James had waited some weeks, and then, when he might reasonably have expected his ally to be ready to take the field, he advanced on Norham Castle in the East March while his scourers laid waste the countryside. Forced to retreat before the superior army of the Earl of Surrey, his kingdom was invaded, and many strong towers and castles between Coldstream and Ayton were pulled down, all before Warbeck had made his move. Small wonder that James withdrew his support: negotiations for ending the war with England were immediately begun and were successfully concluded by the signing of a seven years' truce on September 30.

Left to his own devices in Cornwall and deprived at last of foreign aid, Warbeck's luck soon ran out, though one final merry chase was needed to bring him to bay. The West Country, still chafing under the exactions of Henry's assessors, had enough dissidents to risk their lives again in a cause which held out the possibility of financial relief. Eight thousand rallied for an attempt on Exeter, but as with Warbeck's previous military undertakings, his demonstration was contemptible in the extreme. Two days of shouting at the defenders and

59Bacon, Works, I, 363; Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p. 147.

60Fisher, History of England, p. 73. The initial agreement was extended on December 5 to the lifetime of the two sovereigns, and in July, 1499, "until one year after the death of him who should survive the longer."
prying at the gates of the city with crow bars accomplished nothing, and with four hundred dead he marched off to nearby Taunton towards which loyalist forces were hurrying in relief. At this place his courage failed him. On the eve of the intended attack on the town he rode secretly from camp and in a vain attempt tried to reach the coast. Tracked to Beaulieu Abbey in Hampshire by the horsemen of the king, he surrendered, throwing himself on Henry's mercy. A public confession and Henry's generosity saved his life, but only for the moment. Held under easy house arrest for almost a year he attempted to escape in June, 1498, after which he suffered stricter confinement in the Tower. A second try for freedom involving the still imprisoned Earl of Warwick sealed his fate, and on November 23, 1499, he was hanged, drawn, and quartered a week after his public trial at Whitehall.  

Warbeck was twenty-five years old when he died. He had been a cunning and resourceful challenger for Henry's crown but, as the record shows, too timid a leader to have ever made a success of the charade he attempted. While the forces at his disposal, in particular the mercenary and auxiliary levies

61 For good accounts of the operations at Exeter, Warbeck's flight, and his subsequent capture, see Bacon, Works, I, 365-70, and Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry VII, pp. 116-21. Sad to say no mention is made of the fate of the foreigners, though one must assume that if they fell into loyalist hands they were executed, as this had been the end reserved for those taken in 1495. See above, p. 60.
supplied by the Imperialists and the Scots, were not numerous or for that matter proficient, more able men in similar circumstances had achieved their purpose with less. On the question of foreign troops some writers have queried Warbeck's wisdom in utilizing them at all. The implication is that he would have been more readily supported had he forgone their use entirely and relied wholly on his appeal to the English. Such reasoning is but empty rhetoric, since it confers on the pretender a popularity far in excess of that which he actually enjoyed. Similarly it ignores what was, and long has been, common practice among usurpers of the English crown, namely that from Hengist to Henry VII those who would make themselves king had accepted relief from whatever quarter it could be obtained.

It is strange, however, that after Bosworth instances of foreign soldiers in Henry VII's service are both hard to find and difficult to substantiate. There is no question that he used them, but apparently only sparingly and as specialists. The instance of the Dutch captain, Jacob van Walthuysen, and his band of 155 men of war has already been cited; and André, in an obscure passage of his Historia Regis, relates that in August, 1508, there was a band of Germans in the

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63 See above, p. 58, n. 35.
country and that they were sent on some unknown errand by the
king. Unquestionably the Dutchmen were mercenaries, but the
status of the Germans is less clear since André provides no
clue. Most probably they too were mercenaries, though the
possibility exists that they were merely transients blown
ashore, as were so many wayfarers, in that age of sail; for
certain it is that in 1508 Henry VII had little need of for­
eign troops. England was at peace with herself and the world.
Only in Italy, where Pope Julius II was urging the destruction
of Venice, were war clouds threatening.

That the first Tudor should in fact have shied away from
the use of alien conscripts is understandable. He had, after
all, campaigned at Bosworth as king of England, and his Eng­
lish subjects could not have been expected to take kindly to
policing by continental hirelings. On the other hand, it is
too much to presume that a progressive monarch like Henry
would have dispensed with foreign soldiers entirely. He there­
fore did maintain a few mercenaries from time to time, if only
like the French gunfounders he employed in the Weald, to

64Andre, Historia Regis, p. 27. The pertinent text reads
as follows: "Rex autem magnum Teutonum numerum, nescio quorum,
hujus mensis initio misit cum apparatu bellico, Hevetiorum more."

65A number of these have been identified in an illumina­
ting article by H. Schubert, "The First Cast-Iron Cannon Made in
England," The Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, CXLVI
(1946), 131-40, among them Patrick de la Mote, an appointee of
Richard III. Not only was la Mote retained by Henry; he was
serve as an example and an inspiration to native practitioners of the military arts.

Nonetheless, it is with the reign of his son and successor, Henry VIII, that one finds the first mass exploitation of mercenaries and auxiliaries by a Tudor. The second Henry, the most remarkable man, in Pollard's estimation, who ever wore the English crown, came to the throne in April, 1509, just two months prior to his eighteenth birthday. He ruled England for thirty-eight years, during which time he engaged in three wars with France, wars which in their sterility and high expenditure bankrupted the nation and marred an otherwise brilliant reign. In none were England's essential interests ever served, while in each, as is universally conceded, Henry was used as a cat's paw to secure advantages for his principal allies, Spain and the Hapsburg Empire.

66 The best military history of the reign is still the brief summary provided by Oman, *The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 285-357. The French aspect of Henry VIII's first French war has been admirably covered by

promoted to the office of chief "'canoner' or master founder and surveyor and maker of all the King's cannon in the Tower of London and elsewhere." Two other Frenchmen, Theobald Ferrount and Gland Pyroo were assigned to him as assistants, while shortly after 1490 three of their countrymen, Pierre Roberdes and Simon and Blasius Byllard, "gunners of the Tower of London," were employed as founders in and around the Ashdown Forest in Sussex. Another Frenchman, John Stile, operated a forge near Hartfield to the north of Ashdown, and it was near Newbridge within the forest itself that the first iron cannon were cast in 1508 by yet another Frenchman, Pauncelett Symart, who remained at his foundry in the Weald until 1511.
Contrary to the recent assertion that the second Tudor made only modest use of alien troops, the fact is that Henry VIII enlisted foreigners by the thousands. True, most were used on the Continent, and none were employed in England or against Scotland, France's pugnacious ally, until 1545; but the impressive revelation is that in all of Henry VIII's wars "the only engagements during his reign at which they were not present were . . . Flodden and Solway Moss," both of which were fought with makeshift northern levies. Five hundred German mercenaries, the first foreign troops ever to serve the second Tudor, accompanied the Marquis of Dorset on the ill-fated Spanish expedition in 1512. From that time up to the end of the reign the numbers of "soldiers strangers" utilized by Henry increased until for the defence of captured Boulogne and the intimidation of the Scots he sought to retain them by the tens of hundreds at a time.

Those mercenaries and auxiliaries obtained at the beginning of the reign were almost exclusively landsknecht pikemen

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Cruickshank, Army Royal. No monographs have yet been attempted on the later wars, though the accounts of Fisher, History of England, Chap. IX and pp. 454-71; Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, pp. 267-85, 402-10; and Wernham, Before the Armada, Chaps. VIII and XII can be read profitably.

67 See above, p. 45 and n. 6.


69 On their recruitment see L. & P., I, pt. 1, No. 1146.
and heavy cavalry; but for his last military foray Henry showed keen interest in supplementing these with arquebusiers and light cavalry. Pikemen and men-at-arms were recruited mainly in the Germanies and the Low Countries, while light horsemen, acquired initially in the same territories, were increasingly sought following the seizure of Boulogne among the bands of Italian and Spanish free lancers and among the exiled Albanian and Greek stradiots. Those soldiers equipped with firearms were invariably Italians or Spaniards, though in consequence of the changing tactics in the Great Italian Wars of which Henry's continental jaunts were but extensions, each company of landsknechts contained a definite quota of arquebusiers, the figure increasing as the reign progressed.

The employment of such specialists attests to the obvious deficiencies of Henry's own national force. The English army lacked pikemen; it lacked handgunners; and it was almost totally deficient in heavy horse. As to the actual numbers of foreigners utilized by Henry VIII, the sources, while not entirely satisfactory, fairly bulge with information. The English army which invaded France in 1513 totalled about twenty-four thousand men. These were joined by approximately seven

70These were the famous "Albanoyes horsemen" on whose history see below, pp. 169 ff.

71The rise and development of the landsknecht is recounted below, Chap. III.
thousand mercenaries,\textsuperscript{72} of which six thousand were "Almain pikemen" and the remainder "Burgundian horse," that is, heavy cavalry raised in the Netherlands patrimony of the Hapsburg dukedom of Burgundy. Seven thousand mercenaries out of a total force of thirty-one thousand can scarcely be termed a modest number, considering the size of early Tudor armies. Relative to total strength, in 1513 foreigners comprised between one-quarter and one-fifth of that English army which forced the surrender of Therouanne and Tournay and which drove the chivalry of France from the field in the farcical Battle of the Spurs.

Henry's second war with France, "one of the most purposeless and unnecessary contests" in which England ever engaged,\textsuperscript{73} began in 1522, the major thrust coming in 1523 when the king's brother-in-law, the Duke of Suffolk, led an invasion force as far as Montidier. This was the deepest incursion into French territory by an English army since the close of the Hundred Years' War, so it is unfortunate that there is much less reliable information about this exercise than the earlier and later expeditions of the reign. Nevertheless, the strength of the invaders, including contingents from the garrisons at

\textsuperscript{72}Dr. John Taylor, the king's chaplain and clerk of Parliament, left a diary of this campaign. He placed the number of mercenaries at eight thousand. \textit{See L. & P., I, pt. 2, 1058.}

\textsuperscript{73}Fisher, \textit{History of England}, p. 240.
Hammes, Guisnes, and Calais, can be safely fixed at around fourteen thousand, which host, in accordance with an agreement signed by the Imperialist commissioners at Valladolid, was supplemented by three thousand auxiliary foot and a similar number of auxiliary horse provided at the expense of Margaret of Savoy, Governess of the Netherlands. Suffolk would have had several thousand more had not his ally, Charles V, diverted them for the use of the French rebel, Charles of Bourbon, whose failure to effect a juncture with the English led to the demoralization of the invaders and the abandonment of the campaign. Six thousand men out of a combined strength of twenty thousand: hardly an awesome figure but almost a third of the allied army.

The great undertaking of Henry VIII's last years was the aborted "Enterprise of Paris," an overly ambitious scheme aimed at nothing less than the destruction of France. Attempted in

74 Margaret of Savoy was the daughter of Maximilian I and aunt of his successor, Charles V. The treaty against France which placed upon her the burden of providing these troops is outlined in L. & P., III, pt. 2, No. 3149.

75 During the previous year, in 1522, an undetermined number of foreigners participated in the Earl of Surrey's vicious but inconsequential raid through the French district of Picardy. One veteran of this and the later French campaigns, in alluding to those foreigners who served in 1522, leaves no doubt that they too were auxiliaries; for he writes of them that "the King of England did not have to pay any of the cost . . . ." Elis Gruffyd, "Suffolk's Expedition to Montdidier," trans. M. B. Davies, Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Fouad I University, VII (1944), 43.
the summer of 1544 in conjunction with Charles V, the project called for a simultaneous invasion of France, the Imperialist forces to drive west through Champagne, the English forces south through Picardy. Both monarchs in accord with the schedule worked out between them were to effect a meeting on the Marne and then make a combined assault on the French capital where the spoils of war were to be divided between them, French Burgundy to Charles and the remainder, including the French crown, to Henry. In the end, since neither monarch advanced more than a few miles inside French territory, the trophies obtained fell considerably short of the heady claims of the confederates. The emperor withdrew from the war by the September Peace of Crépy, renouncing in the process all title to Burgundy and engaging with the French king, Francis I, to unite in defending Christendom against the Turk. Meanwhile Henry, to assuage his martial pride, satisfied himself with the useless conquest of Boulogne, which fortress he committed himself to defend until a face-saving formula allowing for its eventual return to France could be worked out in 1546.76

During those two years of ruinous war, from the first invasion to the cessation of hostilities, England assembled what was certainly the largest and most cosmopolitan army ever

76By the terms of the Treaty of Ardres or Camp, as it is variously known, Henry agreed to return Boulogne to France in 1554 in return for 2,000,000 crowns.
raised by a Tudor. Forty-two thousand men participated in the initial operations resulting in the taking of Boulogne. Of these fully ten thousand were foreigners, the largest contingents being auxiliaries, six thousand foot and horse supplied by the Imperialists. The bulk of these were employed in the subsidiary siege of neighboring Montreuil, an almost theatrical affair which served to cover Henry’s main offensive at Boulogne, and as anticipated, all were recalled to the Netherlands within days of the emperor’s entente with France. 77

The loss of the auxiliaries cut deeply into English effectiveness, and the withdrawal of the Imperialists could have proved fatal, as France was now free to concentrate all her resources against the invader. But the over-caution of Francis I and the availability of mercenaries combined to preserve at least the illusion of victory for Henry. No precise estimate of these latter troops is possible for the last phase of this war, though it was far in excess of the four thousand or so involved in the capture of Boulogne. In truth between October, 1544, and the Treaty of Camp which ended

77 The part played by the mercenaries and auxiliaries during the Boulogne campaign is treated in detail below, pp. 256 ff.
formal hostilities\textsuperscript{78} in June, 1546, so many were retained, both for service in France and against the Scots, that there were times, as in the summer of 1545, when express orders were issued that no more should be hired.\textsuperscript{79}

In the quest for mercenaries Henry's agent scoured all Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. Few, if any, of their spawning grounds were missed: Denmark, the Hanse towns of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck; the duchies of Mecklenberg, Lüneburg, Cleves, Württemberg, and Brabant; the counties of Flanders, Artois, and Hainault; Friesland, Holland, Gelderland; and a score of Imperial cities, chief among them Aachen, Cologne, Frankfurt, and Metz. In addition Henry had his special agents in Italy, the best known being the Englishmen, Edmund Harvel, who doubled as ambassador to the Venetian Doge. Four others were Italian condottieri, among them the notorious bravo, Ludovico da l'Armi, nephew of one cardinal, Lorenzo

\textsuperscript{78} Despite the terms of the peace, the agreement of Camp, at least as regards Boulogne, was hardly honored, and the garrison there was under almost constant threat of attack until 1550 when the fortress was ceded to the French for 400,000 crowns.

\textsuperscript{79}(B. M.) Harl. MSS. 283, f. 305.
Campeggio, and terror of another, Reginald Pole, detested cousin of Henry VIII, opponent of the English Reformation, and supporter of Catholic orthodoxy.

As will be shown in the analysis of Henry's last French war, the which will be used to illustrate the extent of England's reliance upon foreign troops, the hunt for soldiers of fortune was not always successful. Contracts made with rapacious captains were easily broken; princes in distant corners of Europe were reluctant to grant passports for the transit of unruly men of war through their dominions; and in the case of auxiliaries, allies were as easily lost as won. Finally, England hardly had a monopoly on war: competition for the hire of mercenaries was rife, for despite the Hapsburg-Valois reconciliation the Boulonnais was not the only battleground in the West. In the Germanies alone, even before the signing of the Treaty of Crépy, a dozen petty conflicts raged, as Lutherans and Catholics sparred for advantage in a series of preliminary bouts that were to culminate in the Schmalkaldic

80Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggio had sat in judgement on Catherine of Aragon at the initiation of Henry's divorce proceedings in 1528. He incurred the wrath of the king by postponing a decision, thus allowing the case to be translated to Rome where it was eventually decided, though too late, in Catherine's favor.

81On the extraordinary career of da l'Armi see below, pp. 344-52 and Appendix B.
Nevertheless, even in the face of such impediments, Henry's liberality attracted stipendiaries in droves, with the result that around Boulogne and the Calais Pale he had in his army "many depraved brutal foreign soldiers from all nations under the sun... . . Scots, Spaniards, Gascons, Portingals, Albanians, Greeks, Turks, Tartars, Almains, Germans, Burgundians, Flemings"—all of whom, in the estimate of one dour Welshman who was forced to serve with them, came "to have a good time under the king of England, who by nature was too hospitable to foreigners."\footnote{83}

This was a harsh, though entirely justified, indictment. Henry VIII did, as a rule, treat mercenaries far better than his native conscripts; and for good reason. In the absence of a standing army and without reliable allies, he was dependent upon them, since beyond his Yeomen of the Guard and Gentlemen Pensioners they were the only professionals constantly available to him. Besides, any man like Henry VIII, who indulged in the fancy that by waging war he could be the arbiter of Europe, was in need of all the help he could muster.

\footnote{82}{The Schmalkaldic War (1546-1555) was the first of the several wars of religion which, with little pause, kept Europe in turmoil until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.}

\footnote{83}{Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," trans. M. S. Davies, Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Fouad I University, XII (1950), p. 14-15,}
CHAPTER III

THE LANDSKNECHT: ORIGIN, RECRUITMENT, AND ORGANIZATION

A landsknecht thrown out of paradise cannot get into hell because he would make the devil afraid.

Sixteenth-century French proverb.

Of the mercenaries and auxiliaries who served Henry VIII, the overwhelming majority were Germans, and of these the preponderant number were landsknechts. This fact says much for the veritable revolution which had transformed the face of continental warfare even before the beginning of the Tudor century. For a thousand years following the collapse of Rome, battlefields in the West had been dominated by the aristocratic and heavily armored knight on horseback. But during the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that domination had been ended, as first the Swiss and later the German peasant had unleashed on an unsuspecting nobility the dreadful power of the phalanx reborn, an infantry formation against which no cavalry in Europe could prevail.

While the origin of the Swiss pikeman has been carefully documented,¹ the genesis of his counterpart, the German landsknecht, is somewhat obscure, though it is generally agreed.

¹For a brief but solid account see Beeler, ed., The Art of War in the Middle Ages, Chap. V.
that the latter was ultimately the creation of that famous King of the Romans and later Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian I. Hardly a consistently successful commander-in-chief, Maximilian was nevertheless capable of learning from his enemies. This he demonstrated early in his career when, as acting-Duke of Burgundy,² he adopted the Swiss tactics of the Netherlands rebels to defeat them.

Heretofore, Hapsburg armies had been the laughing stock of Europe. Now a new army was born, the soul of which was formed of infantry pikemen recruited in the Hapsburg dominions in south Germany. In 1486, Maximilian had two regiments skilled in the Swiss tactics in the field, each numbering between three thousand and four thousand strong. They had been trained by a Swiss captain, and significantly in this year, for the first time, the name Landsknechte appeared to describe them. They were not "lance soldiers;" nor were they "servants of the land," as some have called them to distinguish them from the Swiss Gebirgsknechten or "servants of the mountains."

What precisely was originally understood by the term

²Maximilian was not elected emperor until 1493. He had become ruler of Burgundy in 1477 by his marriage to Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold. However, the title of duke automatically devolved at birth on their son, Philip the Handsome, and on Mary's death in 1482 a struggle developed between Maximilian and his opponents in the Netherlands for control of the regency.
Landsknechte is still a subject of considerable debate, but what is certain is that before the end of the fifteenth century it was employed exclusively to describe those soldiers who were trained and fought after the manner of the Swiss.

In copying the arms and to some extent the organization of the Swiss, Maximilian laid the foundation of that awesome German infantry which did such effective service in Italy and elsewhere for his grandson, Charles V. Yet the creation of the landsknechts was not without its disadvantages. Once they had achieved the efficiency of the Swiss, they like the Swiss found themselves in great demand. They adopted the mercenary habits of the Swiss and frequently took service with the enemies of their country. Too, the recruitment of landsknechts was never the sole privilege of the emperor, as in fact, except when there was an Imperial pronouncement to the contrary, those subjects who held directly of the emperor claimed the right, by ancient custom and the constitution of the Reich, to enter foreign employment and to recruit unlimited...

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3Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, IV, 9-10, points out that the word Landsknechte was not new to the German vocabulary, that it had been in use in both High and Low Germany from at least the beginning of the fifteenth century and could be variously translated to mean bailiff, marshal, court messenger, or policeman. He further suggests that Maximilian deliberately chose a confusing term to obscure his real purpose, the establishment of a military force which would strengthen his position as King of the Romans.
numbers for the same service.\textsuperscript{4} But Imperial pronouncement or no, the mercenary predilection of the landsknechts was such that wherever war was waged they were invariably found in the ranks of the belligerents.

More than the Swiss, their most serious competitors in the mercenary market, the Germans lacked a permanent political commitment. At least the Swiss, after 1516,\textsuperscript{5} tended to serve but one master, France. The landsknechts, however, remained free agents, bound to no one in particular and to all who could afford them. As Germans they were tied perhaps to a particular territory but not to a political community, for unlike the Gebirgsknechten they were "singularly indifferent about their nationality:" "We care little about the Holy Roman Empire," runs a line from one of their ribald songs.


\textsuperscript{5}The year 1516 marked the signing of the "perpetual peace" of Freiburg, concluded some months after the battle of Marignano in which the Swiss suffered terrible losses at the hands of the French. This agreement created a special relationship between Switzerland and France which lasted until after the French Revolution. Gabriel Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Françoise (2 vols.; Paris: Jean-Baptiste Colignard, 1721), II, 287-90, traces in broad outline the early history of this relationship. Sir Sibbald Scott, in his history of The British Army (3 vols.; London: Cassell, Petter, and Galpin, 1868-80), I, 324, includes a quote from the Revue Militaire Swiss (June 1856) which states that between 1477 and 1830 "750,000 Swiss fought and spilled their blood" in the service of France. More recently Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 103, makes the claim that "Over a million Swiss served in the French army from the time of Louis XI to that of Louis XVI."
"Whether it perishes today or tomorrow is all the same to us." 6

Only in unusual circumstances, such as in civil war, did the Swiss take up arms against each other; for it was the policy of the confederated cantons that their troops never be contracted to both sides in any conflict. 7 Time and again Maximilian and Charles V decreed that landsknechts would not take service abroad, and those who ignored the ban and were unlucky enough to be caught suffered, and expected to suffer, the supreme penalty. Nevertheless, throughout the sixteenth century the lure of foreign gold proved forever irresistible. But in the landsknechts' defence let it be said that their lack of national conscience was but a mirror of the state of things in Germany, a country which at this time was among the most heterogeneous in Europe. Rent by political faction and divided in faith, it was both unwilling and unable to provide a place for the landsknechts as national soldiers. Small wonder then that their ultimate commitment was generally to themselves.

As the mercenary habit was so deeply ingrained in the landsknechts, it was comparatively easy, providing resources were available, to recruit them. In fact any sixteenth-century ruler engaged in war could expect to be deluged by

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6Quoted in Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 99.

offers to provide troops from German captains who were either unemployed or dissatisfied with their current assignments.

Typical was the letter received by Henry VIII in 1545 following the occupation of Boulogne:

Henry, Lord of Duren, esq., offers His Majesty the King of England, France, and Ireland etc. to lead in His Majesty's service six hundred fighting horsemen, men of war and of service, which he will levy in the country of Ostland and surrounding districts upon such letter of retainer as His Majesty had given the horsemen in the charge of Christopher van Prysborch [Pressburg?] and other commanders before Boulogne during His Majesty's last war . . . .

Furthermore, the said Lord Henry, with the aid of Captain William van Dinther, who was one of the five captains under the command of Mons. the Count of Buren in the service of His Majesty, offers four thousand good landsknecht footmen, men of war and of service . . . which he will levy in the countries of the Duchy of Gelders and Ostland upon such letters of retainer and terms as His Majesty of whosoever will agree to with the said Lord Henry and William van Dinther.

During the struggle around Boulogne, Henry VIII's court in England and his agents on the Continent attracted mercenaries in droves, not all of them Germans by any means; for as has been noted Henry had under contract soldiers from many lands. True were the words of Sebastian Frank, the contemporary Swabian chronicler and despiser of mercenaries: "Whenever the devil offers pay, then there is a humming and crowding together like of flies in the summer, so that you will be completely baffled.

8(P. R. O.) s. P. 1/212, f. 173.
and wonder where . . . this swarm came from and how it survived the winter." 9

The first step in hiring landsknechts or for that matter any mercenary band was to find a leader, one in whom the eventual recruits could place their trust. Not any man would do; and ideally the mercenary captain was an experienced warrior, a man of some reputation and accomplishment. This leader, after he had been found, entered into negotiations with his prospective employer to agree upon the terms of service. Once these had been mutually approved a contract was drawn up in the form of a "letter of articles" or "capitulary" in which the obligations of both parties were set forth. 10

If several companies, otherwise known as ensigns or standards, were contracted for, the normal procedure was for the ruler to appoint their leader his colonel. However, if the contract called for but a single company, the officer who supplied it normally had to be content with the rank of captain. This business out of the way, the ruler next issued a letter patent authorizing his new placeman to raise the number of troops specified in the contract. 11

If he were to earn his pay the mercenary leader had his

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9 Quoted in Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechts, p. 13.
10 For an example of a landsknecht contract see Appendix F.
work cut out for him. First, to be on the safe side, he ob­
tained written permission and passports from the princes in
whose territories he planned to recruit.\textsuperscript{12} This was only good
business practice, for if he were to retain his contract he
had to convince his employer that he was capable of delivering
the promised men; and what better way than to be able to dem­
onstrate that he had the goodwill and cooperation of the au­
thorities from whose states his men would be drawn and through
whose lands they would have to travel before reaching their
prearranged destination.\textsuperscript{13}

Once a landsknecht colonel had obtained permission to re­
cruit from the Emperor and the local magnates his next step
was to choose, usually from among his acquaintances, his senior
officers. A lieutenant-colonel was appointed second in command,
and beneath him the requisite number of captains. This done,
the actual recruitment of the rank and file could begin, which
function was the primary responsibility of the captains, each

\textsuperscript{12}Refusal of these passports by Charles V after his sepa­
rerate peace with France in 1544 caused considerable strain on
Anglo-Imperial relations. \textit{See Ibid.}, No. 471; XX, pt. 1,
\textit{xii-xiii}, and pt. 2, No. 283.

\textsuperscript{13}This is not to say that mercenary captains always
sought the cooperation of local officials. Henry VIII’s cor­
respondence during war years, 1544-46, is full of complaints
from European heads of state inveighing against the depreda­
tions of his hired bands. \textit{See Ibid.}, XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 860,
941; XX, pt. 2, Nos. 124, 287; \textit{Spanish Calendar}, VII, No. 147,
and VIII, No. 151.
of whom was delegated the task of raising his own company. After the countryside had been informed in advance they set off with fife and drum and copies of their commissions in search of volunteers. Their efforts were rarely disappointed, and one can imagine the desperate characters which such calls to arms attracted: "unchristian, God-forsaken folk," robbers, burners, slayers, gamers, "who delight in wine-bibbing, whoring, blaspheming, and in making widows and orphans." Faced with an assemblage like this, it took a hard man with a veteran's aptitude to select wisely.

Fortunately, entrance into a mercenary company was never automatic. Certain rules, specified in the contracts, existed which governed the arming and condition of the men. This simplified the captains' task. In the letter of articles agreed upon in 1544 between Henry VIII and Maximilian, Count of Egmont-Buren, it was stipulated that his two thousand

14 The strength of landsknecht companies could vary considerably. Generally, however, those contracted for by Henry VIII numbered four hundred.

15 Quoted in E. Belford Bax, German Society At the Close of the Middle Ages (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1894), p. 158.

16 Buren, besides raising mercenaries, was also entrusted as Charles V's lieutenant-general in the Low Countries with the leading of four thousand auxiliaries which the emperor had agreed to lend Henry. The bulk of the count's troops, both mercenaries and auxiliaries, served with the Duke of Norfolk at the siege of Montreuil. Below, pp. 274-75.
footmen be "well disciplined and equipped for war . . . . And that for each ensign there will be so many pikemen, halberdiers, and small shot up to the number of four hundred." Buren's captains in this particular instance were charged to sign on no more than fifty of sixty arquebusiers, "up to thirty halberdiers, and the rest pikemen."

Naturally, a monarch like Henry VIII was not likely to take for granted that his admonitions would be complied with in a foreign land by foreign soldiers who were as quick as ever he was to turn a situation to their own profit. Therefore, to protect his interests and to oversee the proceedings surrounding the recruitment of mercenaries he appointed native English commissioners of the musters who served as intelligence agents, his eyes and ears. Their finely detailed instructions were designed to prevent any misunderstanding or misconstruction of the letters of articles. Note for instance their charge re-grading the mustering of the eight thousand landsknechts of Friedrich von Reiffenberg:

They shall first diligently see that every Standard be furnished with four hundred of good persons sound and able, and to muster out of them those that be crooked, lame, or faulty, and to see that their furniture of harness, weapons, etc., be according to their covenants, and the whole ensign be well appointed and in good order . . . . they shall not muster nor let pass any that is reported to be a strifemaker, wrangler, or quarreller, or that is of any inordinate fashion.

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17 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/185, f. 142.
They shall also refuse them that be wounded and especially in the hand . . . diligent heed shall they take that in Mustering one Soldier not borrow any other Soldier's harness, weapon, Morris pike, or gun.\(^{18}\)

From these instructions it is obvious that the type of man to be entertained by the captains should be experienced, physically fit, properly armed, and conformable to discipline. This ideal was not always possible to fulfill, but even unscrupulous officers like Reiffenberg, who in the end managed to escape his obligation completely, seem to have done their best to select good men.

If a landsknecht met the requirements of a recruiting captain, his name, place of birth, age, and speciality\(^{19}\) were entered on a tentative muster roll. He was then given a sum of money, "conduct money," informed of the place of assembly of the regiment, and instructed to be there by a specific date. After he and his follow recruits had been assembled, the

\(^{18}\)(B. M.) Add. MS. 6362, ff. 8-9. Reiffenberg, a subject of the Protestant Landgrave of Hesse, agreed to serve Henry VIII with eight thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse. This force was supposed to enter France through the Ardennes Forest and march to the relief of Boulogne which in 1545 was being threatened by the French army. In the end, having extorted three months pay from the English commissioners, Reiffenberg was bought off by the French, and in 1546 entered the service of the Landgrave, who with other Protestant princes in Germany, was arming for the impending Schmalkaldic War with the Catholic Imperialists. For the trials and tribulations of the English commissioners appointed to negotiate with him see below, pp. 367 ff.

\(^{19}\)That is, halberdier, arquebusier, pikeman, etc.
actual mustering of the troops took place under the watchful eye of the regimental muster master, the Musterhernn, and the English commissioners of the muster, who were the final assessors of how well the captains had done their duty in selecting the men.

In an open place where all the prospective hirelings could be gathered, a gateway was constructed "by planting two halberds into the ground and laying a pike across them." The landsknechts were then ordered by the muster master to arrange themselves by companies in double ranks facing each other behind the gate. Next the men filed through the gate singly, their persons and weapons subjected to a last inspection. Unscrupulous captains were the order of the day, and fictitious names for non-existant men meant extra pays in their pockets. Therefore, in accord with the letter of articles and the instructions of the English commissioners, great care was taken that the full compliment of each company was provided and that no weaklings or cripples were recorded in the final muster book. Every man was sharply watched that

20 From the Old French monstre, to show or "pass inspection."


22 The names of those chosen to serve were entered in the muster book by the muster master's assistants, the clerks of the muster. There were several of these in each regiment, ideally one for each ensign. Within the ensign each clerk
he might not pass muster twice or pass through with deficient weapons or weapons borrowed from a fellow landsknecht.

On completion of the muster the men were called together as a regiment for the first time. They formed a circle around their colonel, who read aloud the letter of articles in which were defined the conditions of service. Also, agreement was reached on the common points of discipline, for in a war community rules and regulations governing the soldiers' conduct in the field, on the march, and in camp were essential. Loyalty to the king and the officers serving him was expected. The violation of women, clerics, and churches was forbidden; cowardice and desertion were punishable by death; private feuds were to be laid aside until the completion of the campaign; quarrelling with fellow landsknechts or allied troops was prohibited, as was gambling, drunkedness, the selling of spirits during divine service, and womanizing. 23 It was an unfulfilled hope, particularly when large numbers of mercenaries were involved, that the men would bring with them none

was responsible for the bulk of the paperwork that needed to be done. Not infrequently these men were multi-lingual, since they often acted as liasons between the company commanders and the foreign commissioners of the muster.

23 For these and a multitude of other prohibitions not infrequently imposed for the sake of good order, see Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, pp. 16-20.
but their legitimate wives.  

Following the reading of the letter of articles and agreement upon discipline an oath was administered, binding the mercenaries to obey that which they had heard and to which they had given their consent. Finally, the principal officers of

24 So onerous was the problem of camp followers and hangerson that a special officer with the rank of captain was often appointed to keep them in line. He was known by the colorful title of Hurenweibel, the sergeant of the whores. See ibid., pp. 27-28, and Fortescue, A History of the British Army, I, 89. I have not been able to find mention of this officer in any of the foreign bands employed by Henry VIII, though there is every reason for believing that his peculiar talents could have been put to good use, especially by the English commanders at Boulogne. During the English occupation Henry's troops proved no less lusty than the landsknechts: "Adultery was frequent among them, for scarcely one lived with his married wife, but kept a mistress or two... numbers of shameless prostitutes came at every tide from England... These descended on Boulogne dressed as gallantly as they knew how in velvet and silk of the finest cloth, and the soldiers took them up so that no one could call himself worthy without a whore or two following him from every house like the sheath after the dagger." Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," pp. 13-14.

25 A copy of such an oath to be administered to the "captain strangers in the marches of Calais" in 1545 is to be found in (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/198, f. 50a. It reads as follows:

"You will swear to be [a] good and loyal servant of the King, our sovereign Lord, and that you will serve His Majesty well and loyally against all his enemies. The things that will be entrusted to you [to do] on the part of His Majesty, His Majesty's Governors or Captains you will handle and conduct according to the best of your ability and understanding and will keep secret so far as will be necessary and meet. You will be obedient and attentive in all things to the orders of His Governors and in all that will be good and will touch the office and profession of good soldiering and accordingly will govern those under your charge. In no way will you consent to any treason or mutiny,
the regiment were introduced and the company standards entrusted to the ensign-bearers, the latter swearing a special oath to defend their flags unto death.

This concluded the common business of the regiment. The community of warriors separated, each company gathering round its captain to be presented to the men whose appointments formed part of his patronage and would assist him in the management of the company. A lieutenant, chaplain, company quartermaster or harbinger, and surgeon were introduced in that order. Then followed the election of the non-commissioned officers by the landsknechts themselves, which election was presided over by the colonel's appointee, the Feldweibel or sergeant.  

Under his direction voting took place for two

but you will produce in evidence the authors and all others who will do anything improper so as to be punished as may be required.

And to do all you possibly can to maintain all and singular the rules, orders, and laws which have been made or hereafter will be made and ordained by the King, our said Lord, or by the Lords of His Great Council or otherwise by the Lieutenant-General for the war."

His principal function was the drilling and training of the men and their arrangement in battle.
corporals, a conductor, and a furrier. Finally, the ensign was divided into twenty-five files of sixteen, each file electing its own leader, the Rottmeister, whose election completed the company hierarchy.

However, at regimental staff level another hierarchy existed, comprised of a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, bailiff, watchmaster, regimental quartermaster, paymaster, master of supplies, and provost. In a memorandum entitled "precautions to be taken by [King Henry VIII] in retaining German soldiers," the recommendation made is that "these high officers . . . must be men highly experienced in the art of war." The colonel, as commander of the regiment, bore chief responsibility for the performance of his troops, which responsibility devolved on the

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27 The corporals or Gemeinweibels acted as assistants to the Feldweibel and as liaison agents between him and the rank and file.

28 He served as a type of scout or reconnoiterer, seeking out the best routes on the march.

29 Known on the Continent as fouriers, these officers served as assistants to the company quartermasters; among their duties was the assignment of living quarters in camp.

30 These men enjoyed no special privileges except that in crowded conditions, if a bed were available they were entitled to it. They would seem to have been responsible for the distribution of food and, if the men of their file were arquebusiers, ammunition.

31 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/212, f. 171.
lieutenant-colonel during his leader's absence. The bailiff was a man skilled in martial law. Known to the Germans as the Schultheiss or Justizamptmann, he was expected to be a seasoned soldier; for when the martial law was contravened his was the duty to select the jury, appoint the officers of the court martial, and pronounce sentence on the accused. The master of the watch "was in charge of the proper ordering of guards . . . rounds and patrols," while the regimental quartermaster, travelling in advance of the troops, was accountable for finding lodgings for the men on the march. The paymaster, assisted by a staff of clerks, was in charge of the financial business of the regiment and acted as chief banker. All wages and debts incurred on behalf of the regiment were paid out of his treasure chests. The master of supplies or Proviantmeister, aided by the company harbingers, had the task of securing and dispensing victuals. Lastly, police power was exercised by the provost, an officer whose functions broadly paralleled those of an English justice of the peace. He had the power to arrest and prosecute offenders of the law and to establish markets and fix prices of the goods sold in camp. It was a most lucrative post, for he was entitled to demand a fee from every prisoner released from his jail, and in return for the protection granted to the sellers in his market and for the rating

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32 Otherwise, except for the fact that he drew extra pay, the lieutenant-colonel exercised no more authority than an ordinary captain.
of foodstuffs he levied a share. The tongue of every slaughtered animal was his, and from every cask of wine or barrel of beer he drew a liter or two.  

The principal weapon of the landsknecht was the pike, though the complexity of the developing art of war necessitated that he be proficient in several others, notably the halberd and arquebus. The pike, like much else in the landsknecht's arsenal, was borrowed from the Swiss. It was an eighteen foot long ashen shaft to which was fitted a spearhead of steel. Sir Charles Oman, following Blaise de Montluc's commentary on the battle of Ceresole (1544), gives an account of how differently the weapon was employed on that occasion by the opposing German and Swiss forces:

... the difference between the landsknechts and the Swiss is that the former hold the pike very low down [towards the blunt end of the shaft] and always keep the point down, which is much better in 'push of pikes' when the staves are crossed. ... I presume that the advantage was that when the two pike-columns had clashed men whose points were held high were likely to find them shoved up well over the heads of the enemy, while those whose points were down would get a better chance of thrusting at the body of an opponent.  

Whatever the advantage or disadvantage of holding the pike-point up or down, that weapon, before the perfection of

\[33\] All these officers and their duties are described at length in Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, pp. 24-27, 37.

\[34\] Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 76-77.
firearms, was the surest defence against heavy cavalry, and in massed formations against infantry armed with less, the shock of the pike charge was near invincible.

The second most useful weapon of the landsknecht was the halberd. In fact, before the development of the pike, the halberd had been the favorite weapon of the Swiss. It was a combination short pike and battle-axe. About eight feet in length, it was tipped by a sharp stabbing point beneath which was a blade like a hatchet. A curious feature was the iron hook attached to the blade, which hook could drag a horseman from his saddle or his mount to the ground. "If the enemy succeeded in checking the onset of the pikemen, it was [the halberdiers'] duty to pass between the front ranks . . . and throw themselves into the fray."35

The arquebus or hackbut was relatively new to the battlefields of Europe. It made its first appearance around the middle of the fifteenth century, and, from the first landsknecht companies included a certain proportion of handgunners in their ranks.36 Arquebusiers were utilized as skirmishers

35Beeler, ed., The Art of War in the Middle Ages, p. 78.

36Since England lacked sufficient handgunners in the early sixteenth century, the letters of articles agreed to by Henry VIII with mercenary captains are quite specific about the numbers to be recruited. The agreement with the Count of Egmont-Buren in 1544 stipulated fifty or sixty arquebusiers per ensign. See above, p. 93. Friedrich von Reiffenberg's articles in 1545 called for one hundred arquebusiers per
and to protect the flanks of their units in retreat or on the march. In massed formations they were interspersed with the pikemen and their firepower used to thin the ranks of the advancing enemy.

Almost without exception German infantry confronted their foes in defence and offence in solid bodies of enormous depth. The usual formation employed by the landsknecht in battle array was the gevierte Ordnung or square, which formation had been copied from the Swiss and which in prototype was traceable to the Macedonian phalanx. Whole regiments, some of them containing as many as ten thousand men, are known to have been arranged in this fashion, though the Swiss tactic of dividing the regiment into three divisions or battles in echelon was more commonly adopted. Discipline was the key to success, as "victory could only be won if submission to the unit was perfect, if the advance was resistless." 37

37 Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p. 47. The type of terrain and the nature of the obstacle to be overcome could result in a variety of formations.

Failure to act in concert invited disaster, and for this reason cowards and deserters were cut down with impunity by their fellow landsknechts.

The square or hedgehog (Igel), as it was sometimes called, was formed by arranging the men at regular intervals in equal numbers of ranks and files. Around it, guarding the four sides exposed to the enemy, were ranged three rows of the best armed pikemen, weapons extended and with gaps between into which could step the reserve or "rear-rank men" in the event of casualties. Behind the wall of pikes in special units stood the men with shorter weapons, the halberdiers, arquebusiers, and the wielders of the terrible Zweihanders, great two-handed swords which in the press of the pikes were employed in hacking the way into the enemy ranks.

If it were possible before a fight, the chaplains led the men in prayer and, in the case of Protestant landsknechts, in the singing of hymns, a custom which the Italian historian, Jovius, foolishly attributed to the landsknechts' fear of

39 Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p. 49.
40 Ibid. Allusion is made to the two different grades of pikemen in the "Articles Somair" of Reiffenberg which pertain to the recruitment of his twenty ensigns of foot: "Firstly, Friedrich von Reiffenberg promises that each ensign must be four hundred head, having 150 well armed men carrying pikes, one hundred arquebusiers or a little less, and the rest 150 pikes, according to the order of war." These latter pikemen are presumably the "rear-rank men" mentioned in Blau. See (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 18b.
cannonballs. This done, the men performed a more primitive
rite: they shook the dust from their doublets or scooped up
cloths of earth and threw them over their shoulders in an act
of symbolic purification, dedicating themselves to death and
the gods of war.\textsuperscript{41} The landsknechts were now ready to give
battle.

The widespread use of landsknechts and other mercenary
and auxiliary troops in the sixteenth century demonstrates
two obvious facts. First, the success of armies during the
period relied upon the skillful combination of a variety of
arms, and second, no single government had the resources in
manpower and quality to provide that variety. Only by hiring
mercenaries or by engaging allies to lend auxiliaries could
these drawbacks be overcome. It would be wrong, however, to
assume that foreign troops were recruited as mere cannon-fod­
der. With some duplication and overlapping of talents each
national group was able to provide a certain type of unique
service of which it was the recognized master. Thus, in the
early sixteenth century the French men-at-arms were adjudged
the best heavy cavalry in Europe; Spaniards and Italians made
the best handgunners; Gascons were the best crossbowmen; and

\textsuperscript{41}Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p. 49; Franz, "Von
Ursprung und Brauchtum der Landsknechte," p. 90. The origin
of this ceremony is by no means clear. It would not appear
to be of Christian derivation and was probably a holdover
from the pagan past.
the Albanian stradiots, until towards the middle of the century northern Europeans learned to imitate them, made the best light cavalrymen. To this list one may add the landsknechts, who, with the Swiss, ranked as the finest foot soldiers in Europe. They had done something which no other infantry had been able to do; namely, they had combined shock with mobility. In these troops were united the attributes which had made the mounted knight the prince of medieval battlefields. The compact mass and serried pikes of the landsknecht regiment gave it the solidity and weight heretofore only enjoyed by men-at-arms. Coupled with this was rapidity of movement, the ability to execute maneuvers coolly, and, most importantly, discipline. The pikeman's competence in meeting and defeating heavy horse had established his reputation, and it was this singular skill which had first brought him into favor with the paymasters of Europe.

Unfortunately perhaps for the landsknecht, who bore the brunt of many a brave fight, it was not fully appreciated that by the middle of the sixteenth century his supremacy as the most effective infantryman was being successfully challenged by a new power, the infantry of Spain. The father of this force was the "Great Captain," Gonsalvo de Córdova, who

42This reputation had first been made by the Swiss in their national wars against the chivalry of Austria and Burgundy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
during the initial stages of the Great Italian Wars developed
the rudiments of the tactics which were to end forever the
paramountcy of the pikeman.\textsuperscript{43} To do so he not only followed
Maximilian's example by including landsknechts in his forma-
tions; he increased the mobility of his foot soldiers by arming
them with shorter weapons. For defence he issued them
shields, and to increase their firepower he added more hand-
gunners. Half of his infantry was armed with pikes, one-sixth
with firearms, and the remainder, after the fashion of the Ro-
man legionnaires, with short thrusting swords and bucklers.\textsuperscript{44}
Except for a few bodyguards attached to principal officers,
the halberd was not adopted, so that in comparison with German
and Swiss contingents a far larger portion of Spanish infantry-
men carried weapons that were more manageable. This meant that
in close fighting pikemen and halberdiers were at a disadvan-
tage. The instant a breach was made in a German or Swiss
square the great length of their weapons became their undoing.
Without shields they were at the mercy of the sword and buck-
ler men, and their only hope of safety was in flight.

\textsuperscript{43}The development of Spanish tactics is treated at some
length in F. L. Taylor's \textit{Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529}
(Cambridge: University Press, 1921), Chap. VI and passim.

\textsuperscript{44}Towards the latter part of Henry VIII's reign sword
and buckler men began to be discarded in the Spanish army in
favor of increased numbers of arquebusiers, and eventually
the percentage of pikemen and handgunners came to be about
even.
Given these developments one might ask why the pike was not abandoned. The answer is simple: "the sword was not suited for repulsing a cavalry charge, [and] the pike continued to be used for that purpose [until] the invention of the bayonet at the end of the seventeenth century." Even Machiavelli, who had little confidence in pikes or in the men who handled them, was obliged to concede that for those ideal armies, for whose instruction he intended his *Art of War*, large numbers of pikemen had to be retained. As has been noted, this was the view of the Spaniards, who were to succeed the landsknechts as Europe's most admired infantrymen. Therefore, as long as the need for pikes existed, there were Germans to use them.

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CHAPTER IV

THE SPANISH INFANTRYMAN: NATIONAL SOLDIER

AND SOLDIER OF FORTUNE

War is my country, my harness, my house;
I am ready at all time to fight for a sous.

François de la Noue, The Politicke
and Militarie Discourses, p. 118.

Of the many turbulent foreigners who fought as mercenaries and auxiliaries in English causes during the early Tudor period, none were more deserving of their reputation as professional soldiers than the Spaniards whom Henry VIII engaged in the taking of Boulogne and in his concurrent war with the Scots. Employed mainly as infantrymen, their unique talent was in the use of the arquebus, which weapon they had adopted late in the fifteenth century on the formation of their national army, and for which they had devised the tactics that had made them along with the German and Swiss pikemen the most feared foot soldiers in western Europe.

The foundations of Spanish greatness were laid during the reigns of the Catholic Sovereigns, Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile. Their marriage in 1469, while it had produced no actual union of the Christian kingdoms of Spain, 1

1Each ruler enjoyed sovereign power only within his own dominions, being allowed a mere courtesy title within those of
did result in the establishment of a common policy which achieved among other things the centralization of the two administrations, the creation of royal absolutism, and the expulsion of the Moors from Granada. From the military point of view this latter accomplishment is particularly noteworthy, since it was during the Granadan War of 1481-1492 that the Spanish army began the transformation which before the end of the Great Italian Wars would make it the most proficient national force in the Renaissance world.

To fully appreciate the vast changes in recruitment, armament, and tactics that occurred within this relatively short span it must be understood that at its outset the Spanish army operated in the best of feudal tradition. Much more deeply ingrained in the Spanish character than in the English was the obligation of personal service, for in Spain in the fifteenth century the noble who could not afford the cost of a horse and arms lost his status and with it his immunity from taxation. As in the majority of late medieval states, when the sovereigns made war the bulk of their soldiery was provided by vassals whose contingents varied in size in accord with

the other. As for the official union of Aragon and Castile, that had to await the succession of Charles of Burgundy, better known to history as the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V. As grandson and heir of Ferdinand, he succeeded to the throne of Aragon on the latter's death in 1516, assuming shortly thereafter the administration of Castile from his mother, Joanna la Loca (d. 1555), who had become queen of that state on Isabella's death earlier in 1504.
their wealth and the extent of their estates. Lords generally commanded their levies in person, but might on account of age, infirmity, or royal dispensation be permitted to provide some other leader. Conscripts raised on crown lands were brought into the field by *adelantados*, provincial governors whose broad civil and military powers were reminiscent of the later Elizabethan Lords Lieutenant. Municipal militias were sent under their own captains or entrusted to *corregidores*, royal officials who supervised the affairs of the locally elected town councils.²

Once a Spanish host had been marshalled it was divided like any medieval army into numerous companies, ranging in size from a few hundred to several thousand mixed horse and foot. There was little rationale behind this organization, companies customarily being formed by grouping together troops from the same locality. This inevitably led to disparities among these units, for not only were they "unequal in numerical strength and solidity," but also was there no proportion between the different arms: "one [company] was stronger in cavalry, another in infantry, all according to chance or the whims of the leaders."³ Yet, despite its feudal appearance


³Ibid., pp. 192-93.
the Spanish army was already experimenting with new methods of organization and recruitment which quickly lent themselves to its modernization.

Hernando del Pulgar, secretary to Isabella and chronicler of the war in Granada in the early part of the joint reigns, speaks of the existence of regular troops, native professionals paid by the crown. One such body was permanently maintained in Castilian Galicia, while another patrolled the southern frontier against the Moors. The same author describes a royal guard of heavy and light horse, its members, one thousand strong, trained from youth to serve the king. Finally, adding to this air of nascent professionalism, was the presence in Spain of numerous foreign volunteers and mercenaries. These, drawn from such militarily advanced states as France, Germany, and Switzerland, taught their employers much by their example. This was true even of the backward English, for at the second siege of Loja in 1486, when the three hundred followers of Sir Edward Woodville dismounted to fight the enemy with sword and axe the Spanish knights

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were astounded at the destruction they wrought. However, of the foreigners in Granada it was the hardy Swiss pikemen who made the greatest impression. Their reputation having been so recently established, they were held in complete awe, and as a mark of respect to their notoriety, the corps which they formed was assigned to fight under the royal standard.

The high esteem in which the Spaniards held the Swiss was largely due to the increased reputation won by infantrymen in general during the fighting in the south, for the Granadan War, unlike some of the earlier phases of the Moorish crusade, was not essentially a cavalryman's war. Granada, a land of rugged sierras and highland fortresses, was unsuited for widespread mounted operations, so that inevitably there were few pitched battles and many long sieges in which infantry and artillery predominated. This is indeed significant, as henceforward the foot soldier remained the mainstay of the Spanish army, so much so that fifty years later, with a French army hovering on the frontier, less than two thousand horse of any kind could be raised for the defence of the kingdom.

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5 The story, as told by the Audalusian chronicler, Peter Martyr, is related in Prescott, History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic, I, 397-98.

6 Ibid., p. 396.

Behind this development, which had its parallel in English history, one can perceive the wily machinations of Ferdinand and Isabella, who saw in the war to crush the Moors an opportunity of wresting control of military affairs from the barons. In 1495, three years after the conquest of Granada, the serious attempt at the organization of a non-feudal force was begun with the issuance of an ordinance requiring all subjects to provide themselves with arms proportionate to their wealth. This was followed by a census, and in February, 1496, a second ordinance decreed that of every twelve able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty-five, one would be taken to serve the state both "at home and abroad." These conscripts were not regular troops, as they were mobilized only in the event of war, "but they were paid by the crown from the day on which they entered active service, and their employment may be justly regarded as a long step towards the formation of a standing army." 9

The Great Italian Wars into which Spain plunged in 1495

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8 Due to severe losses of stock in both the English Wars of the Roses and the Granadan War and to a contemporaneous decline in good breeding practices, there was a severe shortage of heavy horses in both countries, which shortage produced a natural reduction in the numbers of men-at-arms. On the Tudor aspect of this problem, see H. C. B. Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army, 1066-1945 (London: Seeley Service and Co. Ltd., 1959), Chap. II.

revealed certain deficiencies in the system, chief of which was that irregularly trained militiamen did not make good soldiers when forced to fight on foreign soil. Still, all things considered, these new wars, coming so close on the heels of the last, accomplished the end desired in that protracted service through several campaigns made professionals of the very recruits who sought to avoid the taint. By the close of the fifteenth century war had become a way of life in Spain, and since the central government controlled conscription the days of mustering feudal levies soon passed forever. Yet, the reorganization of recruiting procedures did not of itself create a modern army; the first encounters with the French in Italy demonstrated that tactics and armaments had to be improved to complete the transformation.

With this originative phase the name of the Great Captain, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdova, is inseparable. The younger son of a Córdovan nobleman, he had better than twenty years' experience as a leader of men behind him when at the age of forty-one he commanded the expeditionary force which crossed to Calabria in support of Ferrante II, ruler of the Aragonese kingdom of Naples.¹⁰ Gonzalo's effective strength did not

¹⁰ The kingdom of Naples passed into the hands of Alfonso V ("the Magnificent") of Aragon in 1443 after a twenty-three year struggle with the last Angevin rulers of the realm. On Alfonso's death in 1458 he divided his inheritance, bequeathing Naples to his illegitimate son, Ferrante I (1458-94), and
exceed 3,100, mainly sword-and-buckler men supported by arbal­
lesters, some pikemen, a few arquebusiers, and six hundred
horse of which only one hundred were men-at-arms. The re-
mainder of the cavalry, and the arm on which he initially de-
pended, were jinetes, a type of light horse of ancient origin
that apparently developed in Castile and bore a marked resem-
blance to the Moorish light horse of Granada. These troops
took their name from the jennets or small coursers they rode
and from the jinetas or javelins which they carried in pairs
and were their characteristic weapons. The rest of their
gear was not unlike that worn by Albanian and Turkish light
horse, as for their protection they wore steel helmets and
mail shirts and carried huge shields. Swords were used in
close fighting, albeit only after their javelins had been ex-
pended or the enemy taken unawares. 11 Useful troops for light-
ing raids and ambuscades, they were hardly the equal of the
heavy gendarmerie and mercenary pikemen of France who swept
them from the field at Seminara in Gonzalo's first Italian
engagement in June, 1495.

11George T. Denison, A History of Cavalry from Earliest
also Oman's description of the "genetours" in his History of
the Art of War in the Middle Ages, II, 180-81.
This defeat proved to be the Great Captain's first and last in the Italian wars, as in the years following he set himself the task of adapting Spanish infantry methods to meet the threat of the French and Swiss military systems as he found them there. His immediate problem was the terrain over which he fought, relatively open country which favored the shock tactics and close formations of the enemy, while it placed his own forces at a definite disadvantage. Raised essentially as guerillas to fight in mountain fastnesses they excelled in stealth and agile movement, but were helpless without cover against couched lances and long pikes. Nevertheless, their very flexibility and speed "were precious assets which could not lightly be cast aside; the problem was to preserve them and gain needed stability at the same time."

In solving the dilemma Gonzalo de Córdova reacted in a number of ways: pitched battles were temporarily avoided, while the Roman art of entrenchment was revived in an effort to force upon the enemy the burden of attack. The proportion of arms rapidly changed, the ratio becoming fixed in Gonzalo's army at one-half pikes, one-third swords-and-bucklers, and the remaining sixth firearms of the most portable variety. In the matter of pikes and small arms the influence of the

Swiss and landsknechts is most perceptable, though Gonzalo did more than borrow from these men he so admired. The footmen on whom he came to rely so heavily were protected with more body armor than their northern counterparts, their pieces being morions, gorgets, cuirasses, and tasses, the which combined to preserve freedom of movement and give the men a decided advantage in close action.

Since new harness alone was unlikely to win battles the modifications in arms and equipment coincided with a simultaneous reorganization of tactical formations. The company, the basic unit in the Spanish army as in all others at the time, had proven too weak to be of value in the early fighting in Naples, so that to increase the strength of his army in action Gonzalo experimented with new groupings by combining several companies under the "regiment" of colonels. The number of companies combined to form a colonelcy or squadron, as the new formation was variously labelled, fluctuated considerably, but was eventually fixed by Gonzalo at twelve.

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13 It is a fact that the Great Captain recruited many landsknechts in Italy, and it can be safely assumed that they were employed to instruct the Spaniards in their methods as well as to fight. See Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 16, 37.

14 For these and similar terms see Glossary.

15 On the origin of this term see Glossary.

16 Ibid.
Each company contained five hundred men, so that in theory at least the first Spanish regiments totalled six thousand men. Of the twelve companies, ten consisted of pikemen, sword-and-buckler men, and arquebusiers in equal proportions of two hundred, two hundred, and one hundred respectively, the two remaining companies being formed of pikemen alone. The squadron thus formed was commanded by a colonel, each company by a captain, and every one hundred men by a company chief or cabo de batalla, who was assisted by ten cabos de diez, non-commissioned officers corresponding in rank to our present-day corporals. Finishing out the complement were a standard-bearer, two drummers, and a fifer.

Mariejol relates that a regiment on the march was led by pikemen, behind whom in order came the sword-and-buckler men, the arquebusiers, and several additional rows of pikemen bringing up the rear. Six hundred cavalrymen, a meager contingent for so large a body of foot, comprised of genitours and men-at-arms, were generally attached to each colonelcy under their own captains, their small number indicative of the rapid changes being effected in the sixteenth-century mode of waging war. Infantry was fast eclipsing the mounted

17Mariejol, The Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella, p. 206. The size of these infantry units was reduced to one thousand effectives sometime during the first decade of the sixteenth century, perhaps by Ferdinand's renovations in 1505. On this point see Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 56-57.
service as the indispensible component in Renaissance armies, and before Gonzalo's death in 1515 Machiavelli could write that infantry was "the substance and sinew" of any army, "that part of it which ought constantly to be most considered."¹⁸ This maxim was in part inspired by Spanish example, and it is instructive to note that in 1505 King Ferdinand divided his whole military force into twenty colonelcies of pikemen and handgunners with a proportion of sword-and-buckler men in each.¹⁹

To his everlasting fame Gonzalo de Córdova created a professional infantry which soon came to equal and finally surpass the pikemen of Switzerland and Germany. What gave the Spaniards their eventual margin of superiority was the adaptability of their formations and their refusal to be wedded to a single tactical system. Swiss and Germans made formidable opponents in the field, but their method of war had definite limits. When fighting over broken terrain or in narrow confines they either left gaps in their ranks or were unable to form the phalanx in which lay their power. Stubbornly they refused to adjust to changing conditions and occasionally refused to participate in sieges, so that a generally held reproof was that while Swiss and landsknechts had no superiors

¹⁸Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 322.
¹⁹Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 56.
on open ground they were very little esteemed when used in the defence or storming of fortified positions. 20

The conservatism which sapped the reputation of Europe's most famous infantrymen did not afflict the Spaniards, who by a continuing process of observation and experimentation constantly modified their tactics and became the most innovative soldiers of the day. As has been intimated above, the experimentation began promptly after Gonzalo de Córdova's lone setback at Seminara. Pikemen were increased to provide the steadiness necessary to meet alike the serried masses of French horse and mercenary Swiss. Arquebusiers, too, were employed in greater numbers to tear breaches in the enemy ranks; and into these, to paraphrase Machiavelli's colorful description of the Spaniards in action, poured the sword-and-buckler men who could nimbly rush in with their shorter weapons and make great slaughter in the hand-to-hand combat which inevitably followed. 21

The Spanish manner of fighting at the beginning of the sixteenth century was reminiscent of the victories won by the Roman cohorts of Aemilius Paullus over the Macedonian

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21 Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 600-01.
pezataeri in the second century B.C. In the former as in the earlier contest, the thrusting sword proved superior to the long pike. Even Spanish body armor recalled a likeness to Roman equipment, but Gonzalo, in contrast to many of that epoch, was no slave to the past in that he supplemented the lessons taught by the ancients by adding a few nuances of his own.

This was particularly true of his exploitation of the tactical potentiality of small-arms fire. He discovered early in Naples that he could defend extensive frontages and outmaneuver numerically superior French forces by deploying arquebusiers in Roman fashion behind field fortifications. In April, 1503, Gonzalo won the first major triumph fought on these precepts at Cerignola in northern Apulia. The French and their Swiss hirelings, induced to charge the hillside vineyard in which the Spanish had entrenched themselves, were cut down by withering arquebus-fire, their commander, Louis d'Armagnac, Duke of Nemours, being among the slain. "Cerignola was a battle of small political significance, and small armies were engaged; but in the history of warfare it was a major turning-point. Gonzalo de Córdova had raised the infantry soldier armed with a handgun to the status of the most important fighting man on the battlefield—a status he was to

22See Glossary.
retain for over four hundred years."\textsuperscript{23}

For the remainder of the century the infantry tactics of the Great Captain received more than acceptance; they were built upon by the commanders of Spanish troops who succeeded him, Pedro Navarro, Prospero Colonna, and the Marquis de Pascara.

Navarro was a superior leader of infantry, though he was famed largely as an engineer whose achievements in a long career were legendary. As Gonzalo's captain in Greece against the Turks in 1500, he devised "the first mine that was predominantly explosive in character," while as commander of the Spanish infantry in 1512, he introduced a version of the Hussite war-wagon in Ferdinand's losing cause at Ravenna. Captured in that fight, he transferred his allegiance to France when his pecunious master refused to ransom him and ended his days in 1528 as the trusted advisor of Francis I.

Prospero Colonna, one of the most resourceful of the Italian condottieri, also combined the engineers' craft with soldiering. Like Navarro, with and against whom he served in several campaigns, he was a master of siege warfare ...


\textsuperscript{24}A portable wagon filled with arquebusiers which was designed to check the shock of charging cavalry. For notices on the career of Navarro, see Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 87-88, 137, 145.
in which the Latins, both Spaniards and Italians, excelled. Fighting "with his brains more than his sword," he earned the title Cunctator for his conquest and successful defence of the Milanese for Charles V in 1521-2 by "accept[ing] battle only when it was needful and when he had placed all advantages on his own side." 25 His crowning triumph was Bicocca, during Charles V's first war with Francis I, when he led the Spanish arquebusiers to victory over the French and the Swiss. Like Gonzalo de Córdova he entrenched himself in a strong defensive position in a garden fronted by a sunken lane, flanked on the left by a marsh and on the right by the main road to Milan.

He built up the bank on the garden side into a rampart, mounted some artillery on it, disposed his arquebusiers four deep to man the rampart, and in the rear of them placed continuous units of pikemen. As the Swiss pikemen advanced across the fields they were mown down first by artillery and then by arquebus fire. Those who succeeded in pressing forward to jump down into the lane found themselves trapped in an abattoir and were slaughtered by the arquebusiers who were so high above them that the Swiss pikes could not even touch them. 26

The contribution of Fernando de Avalos, Marquis de Pescara, was no less an outgrowth of Córdova's tactics. At

Bicocca, this man, who became the most famous Spanish general after the Great Captain, evolved the method of firing in ranks by volleys on command, and at the rout of the Sesia two years later, a refinement of this system won for him a victory as yet unparalleled in the history of warfare. The battle was preceded by an auspicious Imperial offensive designed to clear north Italy of the invading French, who under William de Bonnivet, Admiral of France, were threatening Milan. The decisive engagement, the Sesia, matched the retreating French against a mobile force of light cavalry and infantry directed by Pescara, and when the battle was joined arquebusiers supported by pikemen poured in on the striken foe on foot, on horseback, and on the cruppers of the Italian light horse. Withering volleys wounded Bonnivet and destroyed his Swiss who bravely tried to stem the tide, and the Chevalier Bayard, the knight "sans peur et sans reproche," died in agony from a stone shot which shattered his spine while trying to mount a counter-attack.

Before this time handgunners had sniped at will from behind breastworks and natural cover preliminary to the push of pikes. Henceforward, after the Sesia, in what became the

pattern for Spanish units, arquebusiers maneuvered indepen-
dently, with pikes, formerly the pivotal arm, operating in
relief. This did not mean that the longer weapon had been
superseded. On the contrary: pikes were still essential to
 shield arquebusiers from the shock of attack and to protect
them while they recharged their heavy pieces, some of which
weighed in excess of thirty pounds.\textsuperscript{29}

Although this function was defensive, the pikes
served also to deliver the counterstroke. The
eighteen-foot shaft, weighing ten pounds, ap-
peared a fearsome thing to foemen awaiting the
oncoming thicket of steel points. The arquebus
in contrast seemed no more than a harassing wea-
pon. After its work had been done, then came
the turn of the iron-clad pikeman to advance
shoulder to shoulder . . . .\textsuperscript{30}

This was Pescara's tactic at Pavia, "the most decisive victory
of that generation,"\textsuperscript{31} when after his arquebusiers had broken
the French formation by an enfilading fire along its flanks

\textsuperscript{29}Dudley Pope, \textit{Guns: From the Invention of Gunpowder to the 20th Century} (New York: Delacorte Press, 1965), p. 52
and passim. Hereinafter cited as Guns. See the excellently
illustrated Chaps. IV and V on the development of gunpowder
weapons during the first half of the sixteenth century.

\textsuperscript{30}Lynn Montross, \textit{War Through the Ages} (New York: Harper

\textsuperscript{31}This battle, fought on Charles V's twenty-fifth birth-
day on February 14, 1525, resulted in the capture of Francis I
and gave the Imperialists the preponderant influence in Italy.
Though Francis, after his release in 1526, and his successors
attempted to reassert themselves, no Frenchman succeeded in
controlling Italian affairs until Bonaparte made his appear-
ance in the peninsula.
they were joined at close quarters by pikemen and cavalry to render the coup d'grace.

Throughout the first quarter of the century the European military phratry had marvelled at, but largely ignored, Spanish inventiveness; but the havoc reaped by Imperial firepower at Pavia shocked it into the realization that a new era was at hand. Not surprisingly the French, who formerly complained that Spanish tactics were "against all laws of war and the order of battle," were the first to react, and when in 1534 Francis I sought to reform his infantry with a view towards avoiding the hiring of mercenaries, the numbers of arquebusiers were vastly increased. Contemporaneous trends can be detected in other quarters, notably among the landsknechts, who raised their ratio of handgunners from sixteen per hundred men at the beginning of the century to roughly twenty-five per hundred by 1544. Even in England where conservative

32Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre, pp. xxxii, xliii. Handgunners in the French army up to this point were something of an aberration, and there was a definite antipathy towards them on the part of those commanders raised in the older medieval tradition. Blaise de Montluc, later to be a Marshal of France, wrote of firearms that he had "seen brave and valiant men killed with [them] in such sad numbers, and it generally happened that they were struck down by those abominable bullets which had been discharged by cowardly and base knaves, who would never have dared to have met true soldiers face to face and hand to hand." Firearms, he concluded, were definitely the Devil's invention.

33Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 41; (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 18b
tradition and government policy eschewed "the newfangles and wanton pleasure" obtained from "shooting in handguns," the frequent attempts to limit the use of firearms by statute and proclamation indicate, despite the absence of precise figures, a steady increase in their popularity. Cavalry troops also took to handguns more readily after Pavia, and imaginative tactics were devised for them; but no Renaissance state ever relied upon small arms more heavily than Spain.

Despite the acceptance of the handgun, the years following Pavia generally witnessed a return to military conservatism, a period distinguished by cautious advances, hurried withdrawals, and battles avoided. The reaction which set in had its roots in myriad causes, not the least of which was a healthy concern for costs. The wars in Italy had been fought with little pause for over thirty years, and the consumption of men and matériel had been horrendous. Peace, the obvious answer for ending the drain, was never seriously contemplated, for the emperor's victory at Pavia had been too complete.

34 In the reign of Henry VIII, between 1523 and 1546, three parliamentary statutes and at least five proclamations prohibited the possession or use of firearms, excepting only those "persons having lands, tenements, fees, annuities, or other yearly profits in his own right or in his wife's to the yearly value of £100." 14 Henry VIII, c. 7. Permission to "shoot in any handguns, hackbutts, or other guns" was extended in 1546 to all Englishmen who obtained the king's license under the Great Seal. For the pertinent proclamations see Hughes and Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Proclamations, I, Nos. 107, 121, 171, 194, 271.
With Francis captive in Spain, it seemed to the lesser European princes that they soon stood to share the same fate. And so they drew together in self-defence, the Pope, the Venetians, the Florentines, and Milan, with encouragement from Henry VIII, concluding with France the Holy League of Cognac in 1526.  

The scene was set for the revival of hostilities, but the subsequent campaigns were unlike those of the past generation. Gone were the dash and daring of frontal assaults, or pitched battles between contending arrays willing to risk their all. The only contest in the later stages of the Hapsburg-Valois rivalry "in which both sides met with a fixed intention to fight" was at Ceresole in Piedmont which, fought in 1544, postdated Pavia by almost twenty years.

Wastage of manpower and treasure does not alone account for such temerity, so that other operational factors need to be considered: the unreliability of mercenary and auxiliary troops, who continued to constitute the backbone of the contending armies; the near impossibility of provisioning men

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35 The alliance was actually signed on May 22, four months after Francis' release. Henry VIII's dealings with the League are recounted in Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 142-46.


37 In 1536 at the commencement of the third war between Charles V and Francis I, the breakdown of troops in the Spanish army, totalling 65,153 effectives, was as follows:
and beasts through long campaigns in unfriendly territory; and, not the least, the expertise of the military engineer, who in the science of fortification between 1525 and the end of the Great Italian Wars in 1559 more than held his own against the artilleryman. 38

For whatever reasons, war after 1525 became more defensive, albeit if the tactics of caution replaced those of conquest, Spanish superiority in small arms firepower remained.

Spahiards of all arms, 12,160; German cavalry, 2,060; Italian cavalry, 950; German infantry, 24,080; Italian infantry, 25,903. Ibid., p. 61.

38 The sixteenth-century revolution in fortification was in part inspired by Gonzalo de Córdova, who pointed the way by his return to the Roman practice of entrenching. Artillery weapons, though they failed to keep abreast of the rapid development of small arms, achieved such destructive power in the earlier part of the century due to the increased caliber of cannon that towering defences of medieval design were useless against them. High ramparts gave way to walls that were lower and thicker, both to inhibit breeching and accommodate defensive artillery. Triangular outworks, called bastions by contemporaries, were built into walls, allowing additional guns to cover the approaches to the stronghold. Ditches were deepened and widened to discourage subterranean mining, and in a further attempt to keep besiegers at their distance, a counterscarp was constructed on the exterior slopes of the ditches beyond which light artillery could be positioned to play on the attackers. Lastly, downward and outward sloping glacis were devised of the earth excavated from the ditch, thus reinforcing the defensibility of the counterscarp by shielding its defenders from direct fire. Though most of these aforementioned developments were manifest before Pavia, their full worth was not realized until the last three-quarters of the century.

unchallenged, with few changes discernable. However, in the matter of armament and organization two important modifications deserved mention.

First, for motives that are by no means clear, sword-and-buckler men were gradually phased out of the Spanish formations. They performed well at Ravenna in 1512\(^{39}\) and were present at Pavia in 1525; yet in 1534, when larger infantry units were fashioned out of the older colonelcies,\(^{40}\) the swordsmen had given way completely to increased numbers of handgunners. The new units were tercios, forerunners of the modern regiments. Each had a strength of over three thousand and was composed of anywhere from ten to twelve companies of some 250 men, the companies being equally divided between pikemen and arquebusiers. Company officers included a captain, an ensign or alférez, a sergeant, a quartermaster, and ten corporals. At the staff level the tercio was commanded by a colonel or maestre del campo, who was assisted by a descending hierarchy of officers including a major, an adjutant, a staff captain, and his lieutenant. Halberdiers, so prominent in the German and Swiss armies, were all but excluded by the Spaniards, there being only eight in each of the three original tercios commissioned by Charles V, all of whom served as orderlies or


\(^{40}\)See below, p. 119, n. 17.
bodyguards, to the colonel. The spiritual needs of all ranks were ministered unto by thirteen chaplains, an inordinate number for a single regiment when it is considered that of medical personnel there were only three.

41 A physician, a surgeon, and an apothecary. For the material on the tercio I have relied heavily on the description provided by Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 59-61. No such large Spanish corps ever served the early Tudors. However, in the spring of 1545 a daring experiment may have been attempted when Pedro Gamboa, a Madrilenian captain recently hired by Henry VIII with some eight hundred or a thousand of his countrymen for service against the Scots, was made "Captain General" of all the Spaniards in the king's service. To the English, who had no well defined command system at that time, the title conveyed the meaning of "senior captain." However, to continental observers familiar with Spanish military organization it is obvious that they considered Gamboa's command to be a colonelcy and his rank to be that of colonel, for as such they refer to him in their dispatches. See Spanish Calendar, VIII, Nos. 186, 193, and passim. The circumstances surrounding Gamboa's appointment are related in M. A. S. Hume, trans., Chronicle of King Henry VIII, Being A Contemporary Record of Some of the Principal Events of the Reigns of King Henry VIII and Edward VI (London: George Bell and Sons, 1889), p. 124. Hereinafter cited as Chronicle of King Henry VIII. If indeed Henry empowered Gamboa to serve him as colonel-in-chief of his Spanish mercenaries, this would make Gamboa the first officer to function with that rank in England, as no native English colonels were created until circa 1572. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, p. 53. At least two other foreign soldiers served in early Tudor England as colonels, both like Gamboa against the Scots. One was the German knight, Conrad Pennink, who was hired initially with what amounted to a regiment of landsknechts some three thousand or four thousand strong in January, 1546, and who was later reemployed with something less than three thousand of the same by Edward VI in 1549. (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/123, ff. 151-52; E 101 531/39, mem. 16. The other was an Italian, "Cornall" Malatesta, about whom little is known except that he led a body of men-at-arms at the battle of Pinkie in the Duke of Somerset's invasion of Scotland in 1547. (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mem. 10; Jordan, Edward VI: The Young King, p. 253. On the further history of Gamboa and Pennink, see below, pp. 355-56, 358-59 and Appendix C.
The striking feature about the new infantry organization was the high percentage of arquebusiers. Fully half of the men were armed with handguns, a higher proportion than could be found in any other army of that day. In the very year that the tercios made their appearance it is recorded that in a French army of forty-two thousand only twelve thousand served with firearms, while in 1544, ten years after the Spanish reform, Henry VIII felt himself well served if his German captains could, in their companies of four hundred men, provide him "more or less" with fifty handgunners.\textsuperscript{42}

Esprit de corps and its adjunct, good discipline, were other hallmarks of the Spanish soldiery, while among the officers and men there persisted a comradeship atypical of other national armies. In disparaging his own countrymen for their lack of spirit, François de la Noue, the celebrated French Huguenot who fought against the Spaniards many times, sought to uphold his enemies as an example to be emulated:

I wish they [the French infantrymen] would practice some of the Spanish customs which in my opinion are very good. One is that when any new Soldier cometh into their bands, the old do instruct him in his duties: if he transgresseth they reprove him: and if he be meanly apparelled they help him, lest he should be a dishonor to their nation: and he likewise taketh these admonitions as courteously where we do the contrary . . . . Secondly, among the

\textsuperscript{42}R. Coltman Clephan, "The Military Handgun of the Sixteenth Century," The Archaeological Journal, LXVII, n. s. (1910), 115; (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/185, f. 142.
Spaniards ye shall not have a brawl in six months: for they disdain quarrellers and delight in modesty: so as if any do happen, they endeavour diligently to take them up: and yet when they cannot be ended without blows they discharge themselves honorably ... Thirdly, if a Soldier among them be hurt, he that hath but one crown will give him half. Fourthly, if any one do any notable act, all his companions will praise and honor him, and seldom do they through envy conceal any virtue. This likewise is good in them that in their military commandments even the bravest Soldiers and of greatest military calling will obey a simple Sergeant; so pliable are they to their officers ... Finally, in the body of their guard they will not suffer any insolency, but the same are as Schools where their ordinary talk is of the duty of Soldiers, Captains, Honor, and such like matter concerning Arms ... these be no customs of Monks, as the proverb goeth, but of excellent Soldiers.

La Noue's picture of the Spanish army as a seedbed of honor, virtue, and discipline must not, however, be taken too literally. Professional as that establishment was, it can scarcely be said to have been free of those defects which perenially plagued less practiced military establishments. Like armies everywhere the Spanish army too often functioned as the refuge of malefactors and violent men for whom military service afforded an opportunity to slake their thirst for plunder and carnage. That nation, wrote Bartholomew Sastrow, notary in 1544 to the Margrave Ernst of Baden, was "greatly addicted to pilfering;" its soldiers were worse brigands than

landsknechts; and they were guilty of unspeakable atrocities. Arrears in wages were no more tolerated by Spaniards than by Germans or Swiss, and mutinies, though perhaps more rife in the second half of the century, were not unknown, as witnessed in the brutal sack of Rome by the Imperial army in 1527.

Yet, when all is said and done, Spaniards made exceptional soldiers. Competency more than atoned for their shortcomings, and in studying the documentary and published literature which pertains to these men, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that at all times Spaniards in the field, whether in the service of their king or in the pay of some foreign potentate, esteemed themselves professionals, eminently superior to mere citizen-soldiers or mercenaries.

Nonetheless, however much they may have resented the epithet Spanish fightingmen did hire out for wages, and in the capacity of mercenaries, like all of that stamp, they were rarely discriminating in their choice of paymasters. Spain's foremost national rivals were, of course, France and the Ottoman Empire. Notwithstanding, Spaniards served both with zest. Five hundred genitours accompanied Francis I in the recovery of Milan in 1515, and eight years later, subsequent to the battle of Pavia, when the same king invaded Italy six thousand
Spaniards marched in the French rearguard. Spaniards sold their talents in Italy and Denmark; they fought side by side with Lutherans against their coreligionists in Germany; and among the least of their accomplishments, they graced the hollow triumph of Henry VIII at Boulogne.

The first Spanish mercenaries to fight in an English cause in Tudor times postdated the Boulogne affair by some fifty years. It has already been remarked that Perkin Warbeck employed at least three, two of whom, Fulano de Guevara and Diego el Coxo, were captured at Deal in 1495, while the third, Pedro de Guevara, sailed with the pretender from Kinsale to Cornwall in 1497. From that year until Charles V's withdrawal from Henry VIII's third French war in 1544, nothing further is heard of Spanish mercenaries in English pay, though in 1523 brief reference is made to Spanish auxiliaries, a small but indeterminate band of infantrymen who served with the Burgundian contingent of Floris d'Ysselstein, the emperor's Captain-General in Flanders, in Suffolk's energetic drive across the Somme. They appeared to have been competent troops and distinguished themselves during the struggle for Bray.

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45 Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre, pp. xlv, xlviii.
46 See below, pp. 285, 286.
47 See above, pp. 60, 68.
which town was taken preparative to the descent on Montdidier. In all, however, the 1523 war presents a perfect example of the futility of joint operations in the sixteenth century. The Anglo-Imperialist strategy, agreed upon in advance of the campaign, called for a vigorous triple attack converging on poorly defended Paris, the emperor with a Spanish army advancing from the south, and his pensioner, the Constable Bourbon with ten thousand landsknechts subsidized by Henry from the east, both in support of Suffolk, who alone of the participants fulfilled his assignment by striking inland from Calais. The English general executed his charge in admirable fashion by advancing to within eleven leagues of the French capital in the face of the most alarming difficulties. Virtually every promise made him by his confederates went unhonored. While Bourbon vascillated and eventually bolted for Italy on the desertion of his troops, Charles and his Spaniards, after a weak probe towards Guienne, withdrew behind the Pyrenees; the Imperial commissariat set up in Flanders to supply the English broke down; and Burgundian and German auxiliaries meant for Suffolk were siphoned off in an unsuccessful attempt to reinforce the army of Bourbon. It was, as the Calais recorder so aptly

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put it, "an evil journey for the Englishmen." In the end, harassed by smallpox, destitute of pay, of powder, and above all of the Imperialist reinforcements they had daily looked for, they turned their backs on Paris when "grey bearded winter began to show his face in black cold frost" so intense that among the indolent or those too weak to properly care for themselves "the nature of the flesh was unable to strengthen the blood to give natural warmth to the members which had been overcome by the cold, wherefore they were lost . . . ." 

The 1523 campaign was unfortunate when viewed in the light of Henry VIII's martial ambitions which were eternally blighted. To be king of France was a puerile fancy which recurrently tormented him, and he may, on the return of Suffolk's emaciated company, have pondered his Chancellor's prediction that never would he have "such or like opportunity . . . thereafter for the attaining" of that prize. Self-serving allies once more had played him false, but in this regard Henry VIII unlike his father failed to profit by experience, remaining to the end of his days an easy mark for scheming princes who would use his

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50 Gruffyd, "Suffolk's Expedition to Montdidier," pp. 40-42. This account of the campaign has been largely ignored by historians.

adolescent enthusiasm for war to meet their own ends.

Twenty years elapsed before Henry again had use for foreign troops, Spanish or otherwise, though he considered offensive action on the Continent on several occasions during the interim. Most always the intended victim was France, albeit once, in a fit of real megalomania, he audaciously declared war on Charles V only to think better of the idea and tender his apologies. When continental war did come again it was with Francis I, a monarch whose love of self and military aspiration ranked scarcely above Henry's.

This conflict, the most herculean undertaking in early

52 The declaration was made on January 21, 1528 at the initiation of his divorce or "great matter." Having separated from his first wife, Catherine of Aragon, the previous summer, he desired the pope, Clement VII, to grant him an annulment, but the anti-Imperialist Clement, who had joined with France in the League of Cognac, was now, since the occupation of Rome by Charles' Lutheran and Spanish troops in 1527, the pawn of the emperor; and the emperor was the English queen's nephew, his mother, Joanna la Loca, and Catherine being sisters. The declaration was probably not seriously intended to lead to an Anglo-Imperial rupture, though Henry hoped that if he could persuade the League to act on his behalf Charles might be encouraged to support the annulment. On both counts, however, Henry was soon disappointed: the forces of the League were decisively defeated on June 20, 1528, at Landriano near Genoa, and in the year following the pope composed his quarrel with the emperor, with the result that in July, 1529, the divorce case which had opened in England was ordered transferred to Rome where it was eventually decided in 1534 in Catherine's favor. As for the war between England and the Empire, except for some mutual interference with shipping and trade, nothing came of Henry's bellicose posturing. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p. 199.
Tudor military annals, involved a capital outlay far exceeding any previous expenditure, an army, the largest which had passed out of the realm in a hundred years,\(^5^3\) and the engagement of mercenaries and auxiliaries in quantities unheard of since the close of the Hundred Years' War. Among these latter forces none were to be more prized than the companies of Spanish arquebusiers utilized first in the capture of Boulogne and later in the desultory and collateral brawling with the Scots.

\(^{53}\)The words are those of Thomas Wolsey (d. 1530), Cardinal and Chancellor of England, who used them euphorically in describing the puny command of less than thirteen thousand with which Suffolk crossed to Calais in 1523. See L. & P., III, pt. 2, No. 3281.
CHAPTER V

THE CONDOTTIERS: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND MANNER OF WARFARE

The Italian soldiers are spirited and courageous, but proud and insubordinate. They are so badly paid by their Commanders that they have often been driven to mutiny and to seek for better masters and more reasonable terms.

Bernardo Navagiero, Address to the Doge and Senate of Venice, p. 460.

Among the more renowned mercenaries to ply their trade for English gold in the early sixteenth century were the Italian condottieri, who not unexpectedly most closely conformed in style and technique to the Spaniards. Sixty years of direct exposure in the Great Italian Wars to such as Gonzalo de Córdova, Pedro Navarro, and the Marquis de Pescara could scarcely have failed to leave its mark, though in point of fact Spaniards, more so than Italians, were deemed the steadier troops.

Francesco Guicciardini, the Florentine statesman and historian, in describing the military forces in Italy on the eve of the French invasion of the peninsula in 1495 wrote of them that they were unreliable and treacherous, driven by ambition

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1On these commanders' contributions to the art of war see below, pp. 115ff.

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and greed, faithless in any cause. The major determinant of these contemptible flaws in character was of course Italy itself. Like the Germany of the landsknechts that region was but a geographical expression, an agglomeration of sometimes powerful but petty states which viciously competed as political and commercial rivals. Since Italian armies were almost exclusively mercenary they suffered from "the instability of changing masters," and "many men-at-arms, peasants of common citizens were subjects of other rulers and entirely dependent on captains with whom they agreed to serve and who were responsible for recruiting and paying them, so that neither by nature nor circumstances had they any special incentive to give good service."  

The way of the Italian condottieri was an ancient and time-honored one, dating in its then current form from the twelfth century, though the impetus which had given it birth was somewhat older. The years 1000 to 1300 had brought the revival of Mediterranean trade, destroyed in the chaos attending the collapse of the old Roman Empire. With the revival

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3A contemporary term often used to denote ordinary foot soldiers.

4Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, p. 154.
came the growth of towns, some of which, like Milan and Genoa, developed as republican communes, self-governing city-states which resisted alike the overlordship of nobles, popes, and emperors. However, as proficiency in arms was not a pursuit happily engaged in by capitalistic merchants and struggling tradesmen, it became necessary for them to hire others to do their fighting. Thus in Italy the profession of mercenary came into being.\(^5\)

Machiavelli explained the emergence of the condottieri in less delicate terms:

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\ldots \text{as soon as the empire began to be repudiated in Italy and the Pope to gain greater reputation in temporal matters, Italy was divided into many states; many of the principal cities took up arms against their nobles, who, favored by the emperor, had held them in subjection, and the Church encouraged this in order to increase its temporal power. In many other cities one of the inhabitants became prince. Thus Italy having fallen almost entirely into the hands of the Church and a few republics, and the priests and other citizens not being accustomed to bear arms, they began to hire foreigners as soldiers.}\(^6\)
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The title of the Italian mercenary was functional, a condottiere being the leader of a free company who engaged


\(^6\)Machiavelli, The Prince, trans., Ricci, p. 75. The term 'foreigner' as employed in the above passage does not necessarily mean just the hordes of non-Italians who swarmed into Italy as soldiers of fortune in the late Middle Ages, but also men from one city-state who contracted to fight for another.
his band by a written contract or condotta to serve an em­
ployer. The condotta, of which there were several variations, 
specified, like Edward III's indentures, "length and terms of 
service, number of men, pay, and so on" and was carefully 
drafted by lawyers representing both parties. Anthony Mockler 
lists three of the more typical types of condotte in use in 
fifteenth-century Florence: the condotta a soldo disteso 
which bound the condottiere and a fixed number of his men to 
active service under a native-born commander; the condotta a 
mezzo soldo which was less restrictive in that it allowed the 
mercenary leader his own command with freedom to harass the 
enemy more or less at will; and the condotta in aspetto which 
was "basically a retainer paid to condottieri in time of 
peace in order to keep their loyalty." Whatever the shades 
of difference between them, these instruments of hire were 
calculated business ventures in which both employer and wage 
earner hoped to gain, the former, if nothing else, the uncer­
tain comfort that his adversaries had been denied the good 
obfiles of his client, the latter, the equally uncertain prom­
ise of regular pay, without which his mercurial recruits 
would melt away in search of a more circumspect agent through 
which to peddle their highly saleable wares.

7Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 44.
8Ibid.
In the fifteenth century the major subscribers to, and hence the most liberal rewarders of, mercenary labor in Italy were the Papacy, Florence, Milan, Venice, and the kingdom of Naples,⁹ and the condottieri they employed were as numerous as their quarrels. A conspicuous case in point was Venice, whose army at least through the Renaissance, was exclusively mercenary, her citizens barred by law from military service even as officers.¹⁰

Through the greater part of the later Middle Ages the condottieri, first non-Italian captains like the Essex-born adventurer, Sir John Hawkwood, and subsequently native captains like the lowborn Francesco Bussone who won fame as the Count of Carmagnola,¹¹ gained international reputations of

⁹Deiss, Captains of Fortune, p. 21.
¹⁰Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, 586, 924.
¹¹The careers of Hawkwood and Bussone demonstrate respectively how remunerative and dangerous the lives of soldiers of fortune could be. The former was a native of Sible Hedingham, Hinxford, Essex. A veteran of the Hundred Years' War and organizer of the famed "White Company" of mercenary freebooters, he entered Italy in 1362 and successively served the Marquis of Monferrato, the Republic of Pisa, the Visconti Dukes of Milan, and various other masters before ending his days in 1394 as an honored pensioner of the Florentine government. As a soldier of great renown, his remains at the request of Richard II were presumably returned to England and are thought to rest in the chantry erected to his memory in the parish of his birth.

Bussone, the son of a shepherd, was born at Carmagnola, which name he assumed as his own, in the Piedmont in 1390. A soldier by trade, he rose by dint of his own ability to command the army of the last Visconti duke of Milan, Filippo
sorts, and their contemporary, the humanist scholar and educator of princes, Piero Paolo Vergerio or Vergerius, as he styled himself, could write that Italy was "the best possible school of warfare" and that those who had not fought there were "of no military use anywhere." Yet less than a century later, on Charles VIII's invasion in 1494, the Italians were found to be peculiarly ineffective as soldiers, permitting the French, who "scarce considered [them] men," almost free passage to Naples.13

What had happened in the intervening years was that Italy had become, at least from the standpoint of military progress, a closed community. Too intensely involved in her own inter-necine struggles, she, like England, had marked time, while such states as France, Switzerland, the Germanies, and Spain had passed her by. In contrast to them Italy was singularly

Maria, in 1424. Shortly thereafter he passed into Venetian service, and as Captain-General of the republic's forces defeated the Milanese army in 1427. However, in ensuing campaigns against his former employer, Duke Filippo, he was defeated for which he was treacherously siezed and executed in 1432. For brief accounts of the careers of both Bosone and Hawkwood, see Deiss, Captains of Fortune, Chaps. III and IV.


13 Commines, Memoirs, II, 164.
uninfluenced by the military revolution that was about to engulf her. As in Vergerius' time the chief reliance of the condottieri was on cavalry, the footsoldier being still despised: "He skirmished in open order with his crossbow," leaving the important fighting to the knight on horseback; "he was unacquainted with the halberd. Firearms were regarded as a novelty of very doubtful value, [and] many rulers still encouraged the practice of archery on appointed days."  

Machiavelli somewhat exaggerated the faults of the condottieri at whose door alone he laid the blame for Italy's shameful performance at the opening of the Great Italian Wars. Nevertheless his endless diatribes, if considered objectively against the background of his personal experience, have a certain ring of truth that are worth considering.

It is in The Prince that he most eloquently berates the condottieri: "the present ruin of Italy is the result of nothing else than her reliance upon mercenaries for a stretch of many years. For some princes they gained real advantages, and they seemed valiant against each other; but when the foreigners came they showed what they were, so that Charles, the

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14 Vergerius, De Ingenius Moribus, p. 115.
king of France, was allowed to take Italy with chalk.\textsuperscript{16}

Their employment, along with auxiliary troops, whom Machiavelli considered no better than condottieri, was to be utterly avoided:

The mercenary and the auxiliary are useless and dangerous; if a prince continues to base his government on mercenary armies he will never be either stable or safe; they are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, disloyal; valiant among friends, among enemies cowardly; they have no fear of God, no loyalty to men. Your ruin is postponed only as long as attack on you is postponed; in peace you are plundered by them, in war by your enemies. The reason for this is that they have no love for you nor any cause that can keep them in the field other than a little pay, which is not enough to make them risk death for you. They are eager indeed to be your soldiers as long as you are not carrying on a war . . . .

As for their manner of giving battle, Machiavelli mercilessly lampoons it: "these men," he writes in his History of Florence, "made among themselves a compact and understanding . . . by which they turned war into a technique for so wasting

\textsuperscript{16}Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 47. The reference to chalk originated with Commines, Memoirs, II, 153. In alluding to the faint hearts of the Italians, Commines had this to say: "though they beheld the storm afar off, yet had they not courage or wisdom enough either to resist or avoid it. For, except the castle of Naples, there was not one place which stopped the progress of the king's arms for one day, which occasioned Pope Alexander VI to say that the French came into Naples with wooden spurs and chalk in the harbingers' hand to mark out their lodgings which they took up without any more trouble . . . . In short, this expedition into Italy was performed with so much ease and so little resistance that our soldiers scarce ever put on their armor . . . ."

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
time that when two states made war both of them generally lost."

How this was accomplished is described in The Prince:

First, in order to give reputation to their own forces, they took away the reputation of the infantry. They did this because, being without territory and dependent on their employment, a few infantry did not give them reputation, and for a large number they were unable to provide pay. Hence they turned to cavalry, which, with manageable numbers, brought them income and honor. And things came to such a state that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers there were not two thousand footmen. Besides this they used every effort to rid themselves and their soldiers from hardship and fear, not killing one another in their combats but taking one another prisoner without asking ransom.

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18 Ibid., III, 1079.
19 This practice is supported by the independent testimony of an eyewitness, Commines, Memoirs, II, 127, who reports that in a skirmish in the Piedmont in 1494 at the beginning of the Great Italian Wars, when Charles VIII's ally, Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, took some prisoners they "were stripped to their shirts . . . and dismissed . . . for in Italy that is the law of arms." As to be expected, however, the condottieri did not long continue in this custom and quickly adopted the more remunerative North European habit of ransoming their prisoners.

In the early Tudor army foreigners, like native English conscripts, were constrained by martial law to turn over "all dukes, counts, captains, generals, sovereigns, high officers" and princes of the blood royal to the king or his principal commander, with the understanding that the captor would receive adequate compensation for his pains. All other prisoners could be ransomed by their captors at pleasure and for whatever sums they could bring, except that before such transactions could be initiated permission had to be obtained from the company commander and, in the case of foreigners, from the English commander-in-chief. (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 16.

In reward for the capture of "Monsieur Dostanges, French gentleman, whom they took prisoner at Broughty Crag" on the estuary of the River Tay during the Duke of Somerset's
did not fire on cities at night, and the mercenarys in the cities did not fire on tents; around their camps they did not provide either stockades or ditches; they did not campaign in the winter. And all these things that they allowed among their military customs they are said to have devised in order to escape hardship and dangers—with the result that they conducted [an intentional play on condotta] Italy to slavery and infamy.20

The History of Florence recounts at least three battles in which no single casualty resulted from hostile action. One in 1424 involved the defeat of the Florentines at Zagonara by Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan. The contest was fought in a rainstorm, and "in so great a defeat, reported everywhere in Italy, nobody died except Lodovico degli Obizzi with two of his followers; these three, falling from their horses, were drowned in the mud." At Anghiari in 1440, "In this great defeat and long fight lasting from two until six o'clock, not more than one man died, and he perished not from wounds or any honorable blow, but by falling from his horse and being trampled." Finally, in the war between Florence and Venice in invasion of Scotland in 1547, Gualtero Bergamo and Bernardo Piezon da Lodi, two Italian arquebusiers, received £200. (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mem. 10. The rules and regulations governing the ransoming of prisoners of war by the soldiers who fought for Henry VIII in France in 1513 were set forth in a proclamation of that year and have been included in Hughes and Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Proclamation, I, 116-18. For further details on the subject consult Cruickshank, Army Royal, Chap. IX.

20Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 51.
1467, in the battle of Molinella "which lasted half a day without either side yielding . . . nobody was killed; merely some horses were wounded and some prisoners taken . . . ." 

Machiavelli's casualty lists are not to be taken too seriously, and other historians, both contemporary and modern, have criticized his too harsh assessment of the condottieri. Nonetheless, the consensus of scholarly opinion still holds that in the fifteenth century Italy's mercenary captains had made of war a kind of game in which maneuver and selfish pecuniary interest took precedence over obligations to employers or the hazardous verdict of arms. But all this came to an abrupt end owing to the invasion of the French, who according to Guicciardini turned everything "upside down as if by a sudden storm . . . .:" states were conquered "in less time than it used to take [the condottieri] to occupy a villa;" cities fell "not in months, but in days and hours. Battles became savage and bloody in the extreme. In fact states were now saved or

21 Ibid., III, 1192-93, 1280, 1363.

22 See, for example, Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, II, 309, for the appraisal of the sixteenth-century historian, Ammirato, of the battle of Molinella, and Denys Hay, Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (London: Longmans, 1968), p. 185. Machiavelli himself heaps praise on any number of condottiere whom he regards as atypical because they fought to win. Francesco Carmagnola was such a captain, as was Castruccio Castracani ("Dog Castrator"), who served as the subject of Machiavelli's biographical study, The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca. This work in translation is included in the Chief Works, II, 533-59.
ruined, given and taken, not by plans made in the chancery, but by feats of arms in the field." 23

A similar pragmatic approach to war attended Spain's entry into the conflict on behalf of the king of Naples in 1495, and like the French, Gonzalo de Cordova held the Italians in considerable contempt. 24 Nonetheless, to the credit of the condottieri, after the initial shock of scorched earth and war to the knife had abated, they adjusted their thinking and quickly imbibed of the lessons the foreigners had to teach.

The condottieri, in assessing the strengths of the latter, had much on which to reflect. In almost every practical aspect of campaigning the Italians had been out-matched: their tactics of delay and maneuver had failed miserably against the more direct approach of the French; their cavalry, mainly through lack of support from other arms, had been ineffective; and as was to be expected of a people who had long regarded infantry as next to worthless, they had been embarrassed by their lack of sufficient numbers of foot soldiers and the obsolescent weapons with which they had been armed.

23 Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, p. 20.

24 Prescott, History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic, II, 305. Rather than trust his Sicilian and Calabrian auxiliaries to defend the strongholds which still held out against the French, Gonzalo detached "a considerable part of his Spanish forces to garrison these places."
Of tactics and cavalry something has been said elsewhere, but the deficiencies of the Italian infantry were rapidly rectified by simply conscripting more men and training them in the methods of their adversaries. In 1497, within two years of Gonzalo's first triumphs in Naples, Vitellozo Vitelli, a condottiere later murdered by Cesare Borgia, drilled native troops in the "ultramontane fashion" of the Swiss and led them to victory, albeit on behalf of Charles VIII, at Soriano in central Italy. Borgia himself used similar troops in his wars in Romagna, while Machiavelli's attempt at forming an efficient Florentine militia based on a combination of Roman, Spanish, and Swiss methods is so famous that it is best read elsewhere.

As for the Italian aversion to firearms so prevalent in the fifteenth century, that too was amended, though grudgingly perhaps in some quarters. In his Art of War published in 1521, Machiavelli could still describe the arquebus as "a new weapon."

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25 Above, Chap. VI, passim.

26 Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, p. 345. For the manner of Vitelli's death consult the "Description of the Method Used by Duke Valentino In Killing Vitellozo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, and Others" in Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 163-69. The "execution," as Cesare called it, took place at Senigallia, near Fano, on the Adriatic at the end of December, 1502.

useful for terrorizing raw levies in that the noise of "one arquebusier [could] frighten them more than twenty other armed men." Obviously the philosopher-statesman-historian put little faith in firearms, and if the arquebus was chiefly useful for making noise, artillery, he felt, was of no value at all, particularly in the field, where the heavy guns obstructed an army's view of the enemy by their smoke. For these reasons Machiavelli preferred for his model infantrymen the swords and bucklers of Spain, while of artillery he would have limited its use to sieges.

There were others, Guicciardini for instance, who considered gunpowder weapons a "great pest," but among the condottieri these were a minority. Gone were the days when such men as Gian Paolo Vitelli, who during an illustrious freelancing career unflinchingly tore out the eyes and cut off the hands of captured arquebusiers because it offended his sense of honor that gentlemen on horseback should be struck down by common infantrymen. Instead, on the outbreak of the Great Italian Wars the use of handguns rapidly increased in Italy. About 1510, when the ratio of arquebuses to other arms in the landsknecht companies stood at one in sixteen, the proportion

28Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, 607, 625, 637, 654.

29Deiss, Captains of Fortune, p. 25. Gian Paolo (d. 1499), the brother of Vittelozzo, was executed by his Florentine employers who feared he might make himself their lord. See Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 49, 166.
in Italian armies was as high as one in ten, and in 1527, in the Duke of Urbino's command, more than one-third, all of them Italians, were arquebusiers. Even that great skeptic, Machiavelli, felt constrained to bend to the bias of his times by recommending that one-sixth of all infantry units be provided with firearms. 30

The later history of the Great Italian Wars demonstrates only too well how completely the condottieri assimilated the instruction of the foreigners, as names like Prospero Colonna, Giovanni de'Medici, and Piero Strozzi fairly leap from its pages. Each of these men were notable commanders of Imperial and Valois troops, and none of them, the foremost condottieri of their age, were content to simply imitate, so that the Italian military genius applauded by Vergerius a century earlier reasserted itself through them. It was Colonna the careful practitioner of Fabian strategy and meticulous entrencher who expelled the French from Milan in 1521 and destroyed the army sent to retake it at Bicocca. 31 His systematic sapping during the siege of Padua in 1513, though it failed for lack of laborers, was the first instance of a besieging army moving on a citadel "with its artillery by means of zigzag trenches," while his field fortifications before Milan in

30 Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1495-1529, pp. 41, 47; Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, p. 601.

1521 were considered by Guicciardini "as the finest military work of the age." 32

Giovanni de'Medici, better known to his compatriots as Giovanni delle Bande Nere from the black accouterments of his followers' harness, was a highly talented cavalry officer whose exploits will be recounted more at length in a subsequent chapter, but who in a short but meteoric career developed a force of mounted arquebusiers, thereby enlarging upon the infantry system of Gonzalo de Córdova. 33

The house of Strozzi bulks large in the annals of sixteenth-century Italy. The founder of the family's fame was the Florentine, Filippo, who amassed a fortune in various mercantile enterprises before his death in 1491. His son, Filippo II, acquired considerable status as the husband of Clarice de'Medici, niece of Leo X, who first as cardinal and later as pope restored the Medicis to control in Florence after a brief republican interlude between 1494 and 1512. 34 Unfortunately, Filippo II's ill-considered attempt to force the overthrow of Cosimo I, Duke of Tuscany, led to his undoing in 1537, when as one of the leaders of an army of French and Italian mercenaries he was captured and either took his

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32 Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 143, 149.
33 Below, pp. 182-84.
own life or was murdered after excruciating tortures in one of
Cosimo's dungeons. 35

It was with his son, Piero, that the family reputation
was restored. An able leader and condottiere, he entered the
French army, having made himself persona non grata in Florence
by his involvement in his father's treason, and after distin­
guishing himself in a score of hostile actions died a Marshal
of France at the siege of Thionville on the Moselle in 1558. 36
As an innovator, Piero was intimately associated with the adop­
tion of the musket, a new weapon which by the close of the cen­
tury displaced the arquebus as the predominant type of infantry
handgun in Europe. While in the service of Francis I he is
credited with having devised the drills by which the first
picked units of French infantrymen learned to handle this un­
wieldy piece. 37

The condottieri contributed towards the development of

36 Ibid., p. 578.
37 Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 225. The
musket, introduced in its original form in the Great Ital­
ian Wars, perhaps as early as 1521, "was six feet long and
fired balls weighing two ounces. Its weight necessitated the
use of a fork-shaped rest, but its unwieldiness was compen­sated
for by its greater killing power--its ability to bring
down two armored cavalrymen with one shot." Taylor, The Art
of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 46-47. Oman suggests 1527
as the date of the musket's origin and gives 1584 as the year
in which the weapon is first mentioned in an English company.
the soldier's art in another and perhaps more unique fashion
by being the first of the modern practitioners to approach
the study of war as a science. Vergerius, about 1404, refer­
red to training in arms as second to none among the Liberal
Arts and recommended as an educator and tutor of princes the
cultivation of the broader aspects of war, namely, "the prin­
ciples of generalship, strategy and tactics, discipline, sup­
plies, and the ordering of camps and winter quarters." 38
Later, condottieri founded military schools, those of Fran­
cesco Sforza, who succeeded Filippo Maria Visconti as Duke of
Milan in 1450, and Braccio Fortebraccio, who contemporaneously
made himself master of Umbria in central Italy, being among
the most renowned. The scuola sforzeschi excelled in the
教学 of tactics and maneuvering; the graduates of the
scuola braccesca were feared for the ferocity of their attack;
and virtually all of the leading condottieri at the outset of
the Great Italian Wars were products of one or the other of
these institutions, some of them no doubt hired by Catherine
Sforza, granddaughter of Francesco, for her son Giovanni de'
Medici. 39

As Taylor so clearly points out, the study of warfare as

38 Vergerius, De Ingeniis Moribus, pp. 114-15, 116. He
actually refers to military training as a "scientific" under­
taking.

39 Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 70; Young, The Medici, p. 535.
a theoretical discipline was in no small way due to the unique mental and political climate of Renaissance Italy. Its "intense intellectual life" and "the aggregation of a number of competing states within a small area" combined to provide "both the atmosphere and the soil for fostering this new branch of knowledge." In the military schools teachers and students were not unlettered peasants, but more usually lords and gentlemen to whom the benefits of neo-classical education had been made available, with the result that in the lengthy sessions on tactics and strategy masters and pupils could be expected to fortify "their arguments with citations from the Greek and Latin classics." Such military dilettantism unavoidably contributed to the type of opera bouffe set-pieces that Machiavelli so sharply inveighed against, "but this degeneration should not obscure the fact that the condottieri were the medium through which the Renaissance, both as a classical and as a scientific movement, influenced the development of the art of war in Europe."40

It is, however, in their capacity as mercenaries and auxiliaries rather than disseminators of culture that the condottieri are of most concern herein. Materialists at heart, they were easily tempted by foreign pay, and if in the early sixteenth century the majority of them remained in Italy

where war between Valois and Hapsburg and signory and republic reached epidemic proportion, not a few were enticed to try their luck beyond the Alps where their long experience and exceptional virtuosity were assets readily saleable to northern princes such as Henry VIII, whose own armies were deficient in both professionalism and specialization.
There ought nevertheless to be some cavalry . . . because for scouting, for raiding and laying waste hostile country, for keeping an enemy harassed and worried and under arms all the time, for cutting off his provisions, they are necessary and very useful. But as to the battles and encounters in the field that are the chief thing in war and the end for which armies are organized, cavalry are more useful for pursuing the enemy when he is routed than for any other service in battle; they are much less efficient than the foot soldiers.

Machiavelli, The Art of War, Book 2.

Professionalism and specialization are indeed correct terms to utilize in describing the metamorphosis which transfigured the face of war during this period. To briefly sum up what already has been said, the first half of the sixteenth century saw the coterminous existence in Europe of several battle-hardened infantries which by exceptional mastery of their art ranked far above their less vocationally oriented counterparts in other armies. Only the French, among European states not previously assayed, came close to approximating the high reputation for infantry gained by Germans, Swiss, Italians, and Spaniards; nonetheless, French commanders exhibited such a distinct preference for mercenary foot soldiers, notably landsknechts and Swiss, that contemporaries were led on occasion to complain that without foreign
conscription there would have been no French army at all.¹

Of considerably more significance, however, was the fact that in the early sixteenth century among the various national infantries available for hire a universally recognizable "type" was beginning to evolve as a consequence of their repeated encounters in Italy. By a combination of self-preservation and cultural osmosis each of the combating forces liberally borrowed from its rival those special weapons or tactics which provided their competitors with an advantage: thus the Germans adopted the Switzers' pike, which weapon was soon appropriated by the Spaniards, who made restitution be demonstrating to the Italians and the world at large the value of small arms firepower. The general outcome of such diffusion was that, while each protagonist retained their regional flair and never completely relinquished control of those skills on which they had built their fame, the German, Swiss, Spanish, and Italian infantrymen emerged from their struggles as the prototypes of the first modern European foot soldiers.

This was no mean accomplishment, considering that, since the early Middle Ages, Europe had persisted in regarding only the mounted knight as worthy of the appellation, "professional."

¹On the French reliance on German and, more particularly, Swiss infantry see Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre, p. 5 and passim, and Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Française, I, 257; II, 287 ff.
Opinion was slightly modified in the aftermath of such fourteenth-century debacles as Crécy, Poitiers, Laupen, and Sempach, when hardy yeomen armed with longbow and halberd crushed the pride of Europe's haughtiest gendarmerie. Yet it took twenty-five years of slaughter, culminating in Francis I's impulsive charge at Pavia, to convince the sixteenth-century votaries of medieval warfare that the day of the heavily armored horseman had all but run its course.

It must not be presumed, however, that after Pavia cavalry either vanished from battlefields in the West or that mounted service became obsolete. Rather, earlier experience in the Great Italian Wars had taught that cavalry, if it were to be viable and effective in operations, had to adapt itself to meet the challenges in tactics and weaponry with which the new infantry had armed itself. Fortunately, like their infantry counterparts, commanders of horse soldiers responded well to the problems posed them and experimented successfully with any number of stratagems which insured their service's continued usefulness.

There were of course many kinds of cavalry, and Gervase Markham, the celebrated Elizabethan horseman and breeder, categorized the principal troops of horse as they existed "In the old Wars" of the generation which preceded his own as men-at-arms, demilancers, and light horse. Men-at-arms, because of the expense of maintaining their equipment, were
invariably noblemen or at the very least gentlemen: they were armed with defensive Arms at all pieces, 
Cap a pie, from head to foot; that is to say with close Casks on their heads, Gorgets about their 
necks, fair Breastplates of Arquebus proof, and Backpieces of less proof for their bodies; Pould-
rons for their shoulders; Vambraces for their arms, Gauntletts for their hands, Taces for their belly, 
Cuiisses for the knee, and Greaves for the legs and feet, and about their waists rich Bases of Velvet, 
Satin, Silk and other stuff, and Girdles and Hang-
ers. For offensive Arms they had fair gilt Swords 
and Daggers, strong Lances headed with Steel, and 
[a] Cask of short Pistols, with priming box, Flask 
key, and Bullet bag, a well armed Battle-axe, and 
a strong pair of Spurs . . . with long necks and 
long Rowels.

As described, the horses for these heavy cavalrymen were
"strong, well shaped, of great courage, and thoroughly [man-
aged] and ridden." Of "lusty age," they were stoned "(because tiring hurts them not) . . . and fair trotting:" and of these mounts in Markham's estimation the Neopolitan were the best, followed by the Greeks, the Spanish, the English, "the Almain or the French." In action such horses were as heavily armored as their riders, their breasts and flanks protected either by bards of steel or caparisons of the toughest bend-leather. ³

The heads of the animals were enclosed in steel headpieces or chamfrons, and their reins were "of broad leather" lined with iron chain to prevent cutting. A "fair Bit," a steel saddle,

²See Glossary
³Ibid.
and a decorative saker for the tail completed the outfitting of the horse for war.\textsuperscript{4}

The second type of horsemen common to all the armies of western Europe are called by Markham "demilancers," a word which everywhere seems to have been unknown in the sense employed here except in England. Elsewhere, as in France for instance, demilancers were classified as chevaux legers, literally "light horse," a generic term indiscriminately applied throughout Europe in denoting all cavalry troops other than men-at-arms. Why the English, who eschewed the greater part of the technical jargon arising from the military revolution, should have been alone in finding a name for these troops is a mystery; but that a kind of cavalryman recognizable as a demilancer existed on the Continent is attested by the records of the payments made to them by the English muster masters who hired them. In 1549, for example, Jacques Jermigny, a Venetian captain, led more than 150 demilancers and other assorted cavalrymen, both "gunners" and men-at-arms, against the West Country rebels in the Prayer Book rising of that year, while in 1550 Petro Sanga, an Albanian, served in the same theater

\textsuperscript{4}Gervase Markham, \textit{The Cavallarie, or the Formes and Manner of Trayning of Horse, as it hath beeene received from the latest and best experienced Armies} (London: I. D., 1625), pp. 38-39. Hereinafter cited as \textit{The Cavallarie}.\textit{}}
with a contingent of 134 demilancers. The heaviest type of light horsemen, they were wholly armored like men-at-arms, except that from the knees down they substituted long leather boots for cuisses and greaves, which picture roughly coincides with the description of the "three thousand demilances, whole armed ... except the legs," referred to in the estimate of needs prepared for Henry VIII in 1512. Their offensive weapons were the lance, a battle-axe, a sword and dagger, and towards the middle of the century a case of pistols, and as they were more lightly accoutered than gendarmes, they rode smaller mounts which were themselves less encumbered. Markham specifies that the horses were strong, "well ridden for the field," and equipped with steel saddles and breastplates, but without the barding and caparisoning of the destrier.

Of the third sort of "ancient Horsemen" called light horse, Markham relates that "they were armed for defense with Burgonets or Steel caps, Gorgets, Cuirasses or Plate coats, Gauntlets or Gloves of Mail." Their offensive arms consisted

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5 (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mems. 5, 7. Other foreign demilancers in English service are mentioned in (P. R. O.) E 101 531/39, mem. 26.


7 Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 40. Destrier or "great horse" was the name applied to the mount of the men-at-arms. There were many breeds, as the passage above (p. 164) indicates, all of them raised specifically for war.

8 See Glossary.
of a light spear or "chasing Staff," a sword, and a dagger to which arsenal was later added a pistol or two. Their horses, furnished with headstalls, breastplates, and leather saddles, "were nimble light Geldings, fair trotting, and well ridden." As light cavalry employment was the least prestigious of the mounted services, those drafted normally came from the lowest social grades. Such were the "prickers" who rode for the Tudors, the genitours of Spain, and the argoulets of France, "handsome Yeomen or Serving-men," Markham calls them, "light timbered and of comely shape," who like "little David (many times) puts down the greatest Goliath."11

Markham of course compressed a great deal of history into a very few words. His categorization of early sixteenth-century cavalry troops is accurate, and allowing for a few sectional idiosyncrasies, his generalizations regarding the offensive and defensive habilments of men and beasts is admirable in its economy and exactitude. What he failed to say is

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9Above, p. 39, n. 74.

10Argoulets, possibly raised for the first time by Louis XII (1462-1515) in 1499, were a native French light cavalry trained in imitation of the Albanian stradiots (for whose history see below, pp. 112 ff.). They fit Markham's stereotype perfectly, being "armed with a light cuirass and cabasset to protect the head. They had as offensive weapons the sword, the mace, the crossbow, and afterwards the [wheel-lock pistol]." Denison, A History of Cavalry, pp. 242-43.

11Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 40.
that, except for heavy cavalry which remained the mainstay of European armies until the inception of the Great Italian Wars, no other regular standing bodies of horse were to be found anywhere in the West.\textsuperscript{12} Put in other words, before the opening of the Hapsburg-Valois struggle for the mastery of Italy, Europe had no professional light cavalry. Obviously light cavalry forces existed; but whereas the gendarmerie in the course of a millenium had acquired the character and prestige of an international institution, light cavalry up to the beginning of the sixteenth-century was everywhere underdeveloped, indisciplined, and held in the lowest respect.

A major restriction on the progress of light cavalry had always been that it had functioned in conjunction with heavy cavalry; it had no independent existence of its own. By medieval convention, the untitled light horseman usually served the man-at-arms as an ancillary both on and off the field, as is easily demonstrated by examining the "lance" or, as the French termed it, lance fournie, the basic tactical and administrative unit into which most cavalries in the later Middle Ages came to be divided.

By definition, a lance consisted of a single man-at-arms and a variable number of light cavalry auxiliaries. In

\textsuperscript{12}An exception may be made of Spain where by 1494 the genitours recruited for royal service had begun to be organized as distinct units. Taylor, \textit{The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529}, p. 69.
France, in the reign of Charles VII (1403-1461), this unit contained a knight, his armor-bearer or coutilier, three mounted archers, and a page. The coutilier doubled as serving-man and fighter, while the page, whose domestic chores were many, functioned as horse tender when the unit fought on foot.\(^\text{13}\) A similar dichotomy of purpose can be detected among the Italian and English light horsemen. In the Italian lance the capolancia or chief was served by a squire, one mounted archer, and a page, while in 1509 each of the Gentlemen Pensioners created by Henry VIII was assigned a demilance, an archer, and a custrell, the latter being simply the Tudor counterpart of the French coutilier.\(^\text{14}\)

As in the Middle Ages, during the early phases of the Great Italian Wars light and heavy cavalry were sent into action in mixed formations. Only with the introduction of a new type of light cavalry did commanders begin to perceive the advantages that could be had by utilizing the more mobile horsemen as specialized forces with particular responsibilities.

\(^\text{13}\) H. C. B. Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army, 1066-1945 (London: Seeley Service and Co., Ltd., 1959), p. 31. The coutilier took his name from the Old French coustille, the long poinard with which he was armed.

\(^\text{14}\) Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army, 1066-1945, p. 35. On the organization of the Italian lance see Deiss, Captains of Fortune, p. 18, and Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 69. According to Deiss, on long campaigns the Italian page or ragazzo might expect to be used as a woman.
The new light horse in question were the "Albanians," a predatory and mercenary host of Balkan warriors who must rank among the foremost cavalry troops of their or any other age. Principally Albanians and Greeks among whom perhaps mingled an occasional Croat or Rumanian, they were Christian émigrés who chose exile in the West, settling in large numbers in Sicily, Naples, Venice, and Calabria, rather than submitting to Moslem rule which was fastened on their homelands during the inexorable advance of the Ottoman sultanate in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.

It was the Venetian authorities who initially exploited the mercenary predilections of the Albanians, organizing them before the close of the fifteenth century into what almost certainly were Europe's first regular corps of light cavalry. "Stradiots"\textsuperscript{15} was the name devised to describe these colorful horsemen, and as Venice was one of Italy's great mercenary markets, it was not long before the Albanians came to the attention of other western powers.

\textsuperscript{15}Gabriel Daniel (d. 1728), the French priest who was among the first to attempt to unravel the history of the stradiots, erred it would seem in deriving their name from the Greek stratiotus (soldier). Their name in fact comes from the Italian strada (road or way), signifying "wanderers," persons of no fixed abode. See Konstantinos N. Sathas, Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au moyen age (9 vols.: Paris: Maisonneuve et Cie., Éditeurs, 1888), IV, p. lx. Hereinafter cited as Documents inédits. What is perhaps the most comprehensive collection of stradiotic materials is contained in volumes VII, VIII, and IX of this series.
The earliest reference made by the historians of north Europe to the Albanians is found in the history of Commines. He relates that at the battle of Fornova, during Charles VIII's withdrawal from Italy in 1495, the French troops were terrified of these men because in their appearance and manner of fighting they were like nothing the French had ever encountered.\textsuperscript{16} Regardless, Louis XII, Charles' successor, had two thousand Albanians in his service when he punished the revolting Genoese in 1507, and six years later when the English army of Henry VIII laid siege to Therouanne, it was stradiots whom the French employed in a vain attempt to revictual the town.\textsuperscript{17} The Albanians had now entered the mainstream of western Europe, and having found their way across the Alps, they became in the process a permanent feature on the battlefields in the West for almost the duration of the sixteenth century.

Stradiots not only figured prominently among the mercenary troops hired by France. They were introduced early to Spain, where like the native light cavalry they too were dubbed \textit{jinetes}. In 1534 many thousand late-comers from Greece, fleeing before the continuing Turkish advance, were granted sanctuary in the Italian dominions of Charles V, and

\textsuperscript{16}Commines, \textit{Memoirs}, II, 205, 207.

in gratitude they entered his service en masse. Stradiots fought in Germany and in 1545 were hired for the first time by the English, whose Albanian captains led bands of "Peloponnesians" against the Scots and brawled with the French in the Pas-de-Calais and around the fortress of Boulogne which had fallen to Henry VIII in the previous year.

This wide-spread employment of stradiot troops is an indication of their worth as fighters. Likewise, it is an indication that they filled a particular need, and where the Tudors are concerned what that need was is manifestly revealed in the exceptionally detailed reports prepared for the Venetian government by its accredited representatives at the English court.

In a word, the Venetians judged English cavalry to be entirely insignificant during the early Tudor period. Sebastian Giustinian doubted in 1519 whether a hundred men-at-arms or a thousand light horsemen could be raised in the entire realm. The latter figure is almost certainly too low; yet thirty-five years later, Giacomo Soranzo, Venetian ambassador

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19 Sathas, Documents inédits, IV, lix, and below, pp. 356, 378 ff.

to Edward VI and Queen Mary, though placing the number of English light horse at fifteen thousand, hastened to add that it was "not good for war," an opinion sustained by his successor, Giovanni Michele, who in 1557 laid the blame for this deficiency squarely on the shoulders of the English horse breeders:

As to the cavalry (I speak of light cavalry), if it were but a good description, it might be very numerous as that island produces a greater number of horses than any other region of Europe; but the horses being weak and of bad wind, fed merely on grass, being like sheep and all other cattle kept in field or pasture at all seasons... they cannot stand much work, nor are they held in much account, but nevertheless as they are mettle-some and high couraged, most especially if they chance to be Welsh, they would do much better were they better fed.

The Albanians labored under no such handicaps, both they and their swift Turkish mounts being noted for their tenacity and endurance in war. Guerillas on horseback, they specialized in sudden attacks and weakened their enemies by frequent skirmishing. Their peculiar offensive weapon was the assagai, a twelve-foot javelin equipped with a stabbing steel point at both ends. At their side they wore a scimitar, and from their saddlebows hung a heavy club which they employed after the

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21 Venetian Calendar, V, No. 934.

22 Quoted in Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army, 1066-1945, pp. 41-42. According to Soranzo’s predecessor, Daniel Barbaro, the English light cavalrymen used "any sort of horse."
fashion of a mace. Their principal defensive weapon was a targe or shield, and for armor they wore a type of cuirass with sleeves and gloves of mail, over which was worn a padded sleeveless jerkin. Commines described them as he saw them in 1495:

These Estradiots are of the same nature with the Genitours; they are horse and foot, and habited like Turks, only they wear no turbans upon their heads. They are hardy people, and lie abroad all the year round with their horses; they were all Greeks from the places which the Venetians possess in those parts, some of them from Nauplia [in] the Morea, others from Albania and Durazzo. Their horses are all Turkish and very good; the Venetians employ them often in their wars and put great confidence in them . . . they are stout, active fellows and will plague an army terribly when they once undertake it.23

These were the warriors who at their first encounter terrified the French in northern Italy, who "with short stirrups, beaver hats, small spears, and swords" harassed the English before Therouanne in 1513,24 and who later fought to save beleaguered Boulogne for Henry VIII in 1545.25

The functions which light cavalry carried out in the sixteenth century fell roughly into two categories—those of a combative nature which involved actual fighting and those of

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23 Commines, Memoirs, II, 201.
24 Hall’s Chronicle, p. 543.
a non-combative nature which encompassed the more-or-less routine activities connected with military life. In the first category it was the task of light horsemen to reconnoiter the enemy and when ordered cause confusion in his ranks by harassing him on the march or while encamped. Once an army had been attacked and routed, the light cavalry elements divided into small squads to pursue the retreating foe, the primary object being to complete the victory by slaying or taking prisoner as many of the defeated enemy as possible. Such work was generally beyond the endurance of men-at-arms, who with their barded chargers, if they had taken part in the main action, were now exhausted. As for routine duties, light cavalry was the obvious choice for patrols, the escorting of small convoys, and foraging. Albanians were admirably suited to perform all these functions, but it was as fighters they distinguished themselves.

The manner in which Albanians fought was strange by western standards. In action their primary weapon was the assagai, that spear with a point at both ends. It was often wielded with both hands, so that at close quarters in hand-to-hand combat the wielder could defend himself or maim an enemy on two fronts by rapid thrusts either fore and aft or from side to side. While the assagai was normally employed as a cavalry weapon, it could be used when circumstances demanded as an infantry weapon against superior numbers of attacking
horse. Perhaps in imitation of the Swiss, whom they first encountered in the Great Italians Wars, the Albanians were known to use their javelins as pikes.

Their scimitars provided their adversaries with another cause for concern, for once a foe had been vanquished it was their not uncommon practice to behead him, and if he had been a foe of some distinction, to carry away his severed head on the end of their spears. This it would seem was but one of several traits acquired from the Turks. After Fornova the heads of Swiss mercenaries were sold to the Venetians for a ducat apiece.

Savage and bold though the Albanians were they had their weaknesses. They are spoken of as vain, and while they may have collected the bloody heads of their victims for bounty money, the sound of artillery so terrified them that they were reputed to have carried amulets to protect them from it. They are said to have been "fonder of booty than of battle," and at the Battle of the Spurs in 1513, in the only continental action involving an English army during the early Tudor

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26 This would perhaps explain Commines' description of the stradiots as "horse and foot." He is the only author of the many consulted to suggest that Albanians served as anything other than cavalrymen.

27 Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Francoise, I, 231.

28 Commines, Memoirs, II, 201

29 Ibid.; Sathas, Documents inédits, IV, lvi.
period to approximate a pitched battle, it was the collision of the stradiots with the French heavy horse which triggered the headlong flight of the Gallic chivalry. However, other authors have gloried in their triumphs. Indeed, their most ardent publicists came from within their own ranks, and a considerable body of their literature has been preserved, much of it poetry which was composed in a dialect analogous to that now spoken Calabria. Stradiotic literature reflects the intense love these exiles had for their subjugated homelands, the common theme running through much of it being their rabid hatred of the Turks and a longing to return to the Balkans. The stradiot, however, was mightier with the javelin than with the pen. Unfortunately, the thrusts he gave were rarely struck for his lost patria, and the heads he collected were rarely Turkish heads, his victims being more often fellow Christians against whom he had no real quarrel.

In the end the stradiots went the same way as the mercenary pikemen, though perhaps quicker. Like the landsknechts, unable to keep abreast of the ever-changing habits or war, they became redundant. The last Albanians in English service appear to have been discharged in 1550 when on the overthrow

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30Hall's Chronicle, pp. 530-31.

31Sathas, Documents inédits, IV, lvii, Volumes VII, VIII, and IX of this series contain a number of poems representative of the best in stradiotic literature.
of the Protector Somerset peace was arranged with France and Scotland, and while they lingered longer on the Continent, they vanished everywhere in the West before the close of the sixteenth century, their principal north European employers, the Valois kings of France, recruiting them for the final time shortly before Courtrias in the final stages of the religious "War of the Three Henries." It is difficult to assess the influence of the stradiots on the development of sixteenth-century warfare; for while there is a considerable amount written about them in western histories, it is largely superficial, so that it provides little insight into any impact they may have had. Nevertheless, it is incontestable that in the development of light cavalry tactics in the West the Albanians exerted a powerful influence, if for no other reason than that they themselves proved the worth of, and the need for, such well organized forces at a time when the greater part of Europe was without them. Daniel may have been correct in refuting Brantôme's contention that

32 (P. R. O.) E 101 531/39, mem. 2b, lists among the sundry foreign captains who served Edward VI in the French and Scottish wars John de Lanciano and Andreas Rennzor, Albanians, who according to this accounting drew their last month's wages on June 28, 1550, four months after the formal cessation of hostilities.


33 Pierre de Bourdeilles, Seigneur de Brantôme (1540-1614), was a native of Périgord in northern Guienne. He served in
it was upon the model provided by the stradiots that regular companies of French light cavalry were formed, but certainly it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these strange men from southeastern Europe helped germinate the idea.

One thing is certain: the example set by the stradiots, first in the opening rounds of the Great Italian Wars, and second in the related and subsidiary campaigning north of the Alps, encouraged the more enlightened commanders to venture upon the training of light cavalry for independent action. The Spaniards, who previously had made some headway in this area, used their genitours to good effect in expelling the French from Naples, and it was actually these troops who after a night ride and the fording of a river secured Gonzalo de Córdova's first victory, the capture of Laino in Calabria in numerous armies under many famous commanders, fighting in Malta, Italy, Africa, Hungary, and against the Huguenots in the religious wars in France. On his retirement from active duty about 1594 he began to write his memoirs. In one passage in his famous Vies des Grands Capitaines he says that in the time of Louis XII "one did not speak of French light cavalry," only of the gendarmerie "which surpassed all the others in the world . . . . But the French made use of the so-called 'Albanois,' who brought to us the form of the light cavalry and the method of making war like they did. The Venetians, who wore us down at Fornova, called them their stradiots; they also called them Croats because of their nation. The Spanish called them genitours." Ludovic Lalanne, ed., Oeuvres Completes de Pierre de Bourdeille, Seigneur de Brantôme (11 vols.; Paris: Chez Mme. Ve. Jules Renouard, 1864-82), II, 410.

1496. About this same time other bodies of light cavalry began to appear as separate units, heralding the beginning of the abandonment of the lance system in both France and Italy. In 1495 the condottiere, Camillo Vitelli, routed a sizeable formation of landsknechts at Lucera in Apulia with mounted bowmen, a type of horse which heretofore had acted only in conjunction with heavy cavalry. Henceforth, until the wholesale adoption of firearms by cavalrymen towards the middle of the sixteenth century, mounted archers would rank among the most common of regular light cavalry troops in the West. Every army had its share: the Italian, the Spanish, the French, and the English, though the latter's bowmen, except for those few assigned to garrison duty, could hardly be looked upon as regulars; nor were they organized independently, but rather like those attached to the Gentlemen Pensioners submerged in a lance system which was retained at least through the end of the early Tudor period. The argoulets, two thousand of which were raised for the French army in 1499 in

36 Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, p. 322.

37 Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 70. Brother to Paolo and Vitellozo Vitelli, Camillo was killed in the following year while attempting to storm the fortress of Circello. Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, p. 319.

38 Above, p. 6-8.
imitation of the Albanian light horse, provide the typical archetype of this widely adopted service. Only the German states seem to have lacked them in substantial quantities, a phenomenon which might be accounted for by the unpopularity of the lance system in that part of the West, and if German knights did not utilize mounted ancillaries, then there were no bowmen to organize into independent companies.

After the initial enterprise of the Albanians and Spaniards, Italians next emerged as the most venturesome promoters of professional light cavalry. Camillo Vitelli, the same condottiere who launched the experiment with regular companies of mounted archers, was among the first to use regular bands of mounted arquebusiers, a logical stratagem considering the accelerated dissemination of firearms among infantry. The practice was maintained by his brother, Vitellozo, who had three hundred gunners on horseback in his pay in 1502, as

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39 Below, p. 167, n. 10.

40 According to Machiavelli, the lance system was not in vogue in Germany. Criticizing Italian practice, he says in his Art of War that "each man-at-arms has four horsemen in his service; but to allow it is an abuse, for in Germany the man-at-arms is alone with his one horse [i.e., with but a single mount] . . . ." Chief Works, II, p. 625. It was common where the lance system flourished for the man-at-arms, and sometimes his entire retinue, to maintain several mounts.

41 Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1495-1529, p. 70.
opposed to fifty for his nemesis, Cesare Borgia, and by the end of the second decade of the century the practice of arming light horsemen with firearms had become so widespread that even Machiavelli, who preferred the crossbow, advised the conscription of at least a few cavalry handgunners, if only to frighten the opposition.

It was left to another condottiere, Giovanni de'Medici, to fully exploit the potential of this new cavalry by combining its rapidity of movement with the massed broadsides of infantry firepower. Giovanni's reputation as a soldier was already well established when, on April 22, 1522, he and his storied Black Band of Tuscan light horse were swept from the field at Bicocca by the precisioned volleys of Pescara's footmen and the hedge of German pikes. Though scarcely twenty-four, this veteran, who at eighteen had been awarded his first command by his uncle, Pope Leo X, pondered his defeat and devised the tactics which became the foundation of all future

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43 Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, 625. Machiavelli's preference for the crossbow is not to be ridiculed, for among his contemporaries the older weapon was more popular. It was less expensive, easier to handle and maintain, and less susceptible to the elements. The intricate mechanical parts of handguns tended to foul if not meticulously cleaned, and damp weather caused rust and spoiled the powder.
operations involving mounted arquebusiers. His solution in coping with infantry handgunners and pikemen was ingeniously simple: following Bicocca he drilled a proportion of his lancers as foot soldiers, so that in battle they could dismount and fight like infantry when required. The men of the Black Band were all Italians and Albanians, the latter being chosen because they rode Turkish horses, a breed preferred by Giovanni. Their armor was light and conducive to high mobility; their weapons were of the highest quality; and discipline was rigidly enforced. The men wore no beards and their hair short "to save time and discourage lice." They even wore a uniform of sorts, a black harness "without bright colors, ribbons, plumes, and ornaments."\(^44\)

Two years after Bicocca, Giovanni's efforts were richly rewarded when, this time in conjunction with Pescara on whose side he fought, his mounted infantry, the precursors of Oliver Cromwell's dragoons, pursued and destroyed the French rear-guard on the banks of the Sesia River west of Milan.\(^45\) This martial disquisition, so proficiently synchronizing the tactical advantages of missile weapons and cavalry, was not wasted on either side. Mounted arquebusiers henceforth became a permanent feature in Imperial armies, and in the autumn

\(^{44}\)Deiss, Captains of Fortune, pp. 263, 274.

\(^{45}\)Above, pp. 124-25.
of 1524 when the French, seeking to recoup their loss, reentered Italy, Giovanni was retained by Francis I and added to his general staff. Significantly, however, native French arquebusiers a cheval remained few in number and of indifferent worth until after 1537 when Piero Strozzi brought one of his companies to France and instructed the king in its proper deployment.\textsuperscript{46}

As always, the Tudor English were much slower to benefit from the military experiments on the Continent, and few if any English gunners on horseback can be found before the end of the reign of Henry VIII, when even on the eve of that sovereign's last French war in 1544 they were still a comparative rarity, probably the weakest in terms of numbers of any of the English light cavalry services which included in addition demilancers, "javelins," "light staves," "chasing staves," and archers.\textsuperscript{47} One of the largest commands of horse troops, that of Sir Anthony Browne, Constable of Calais, Master of the Horse and standard-bearer to King Henry VIII, contained 514 light cavalrymen of whom only forty-six were arquebusiers, while the "main battle," that largest of the three divisions of the royal army and the one in which Henry served in person,

\textsuperscript{46}Brantôme, Oeuvres completes, II, 268-70; VI, 72-79.
\textsuperscript{47}L. & P., XIX, pt. I, No. 275 (1).
\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., No. 275 (3).
departed Calais for the siege of Boulogne with only fifty mounted arquebusiers in a total force, excluding foreigners, of some fourteen thousand. To the king's credit, nonetheless, the deficiency had been anticipated and was soon remedied: shortly after Henry's arrival in the English camp before Boulogne he was jointed by fifteen hundred German cavalry, whereof one third, an entire ensign, were gunners.

While the evolution of the mounted arquebusier was no mean accomplishment, that service was not without its problems, chief of which was the unwieldiness of the weapon on which it most relied. The arquebus, even when used by infantry specialists, was difficult to manage, since it required both hands for priming and firing. Powder in reasonably exact quantities had to be poured into the barrel and a touch pan which carried the flash into the chamber, and a bullet, also dropped into the barrel, had to be rammed home. The weapon was then aimed

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50 In addition to the fourteen thousand English and fifteen hundred Germans, the invaders were joined at Boulogne by five hundred Flemish foot and a hundred horsemen from Cleves. Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
from the chest or shoulder, and a "slow match" applied to the touch pan by means of a matchlock trigger. It was a difficult process for the foot soldier and certainly a prodigious feat for a horseman, who might prefer to dismount but was often forced to fire from the saddle.

It was left to German ingenuity to devise a less cumbersome firearm which could be managed with one hand. The new invention was the pistol, a word derived, not from the Italian town of Pistoia where the first models were wrongly believed to have been manufactured, but from the Bohemian pistal, meaning "pipe" or "arquebus." Its chief advantage, besides its lighter weight, was the wheel-lock, a mechanism which produced a spark similar to that of a cigarette lighter thus eliminating the need of a slow match. As explained by Pope,

The lock consisted of a steel wheel with a milled edge attached to a spring and chain so that it could be wound up. When the trigger was squeezed, the pan cover opened and the wheel spun round. Its serrated edge, pressing against a piece of iron pyrite... struck sparks which fell on the priming powder exposed in the pan.52

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51 This was another awkward feature of the arquebus, a slow match being a fuse of cotton or hemp, so-called because it was impregnated with saltpetre or other chemicals to make it burn slowly. The match was lit before the soldier went into action and fitted to an 'S'-shaped clamp or matchlock attached to the side of the gun. "To fire, the gunner pulled back the lower part of the "S," and the serpentine or upper part arched over and pressed the glowing match against the pan." Pope, Guns, p. 55.

52 Ibid., p. 73.
Early attempts by infantry troops to affix the wheel-lock to their longer, heavier weapons were abandoned for the most part, as the mechanism was highly sensitive to rough handling, the end result being that the matchlock gun remained the primary firearm of European infantries until its displacement by the flintlock in latter half of the seventeenth century. However, despite its frailty, the wheel-lock in the form of the pistol proved in every way the superior firearm for cavalrymen. Capable of being wielded in one hand, weighing between four and five pounds, and with a barrel of about one foot in length, it was easy for horsemen to carry several, all of them loaded and ready to fire in rapid succession.

Because the pistol was a lighter, smaller weapon that lacked the power of the arquebus and was only effective at close range, special tactics were required to exploit it fully. Once again it was the Germans, its inventors, who devised them, their most characteristic maneuver being the "snail" or "caracole," a practice specifically intended to smash compact squares of infantry. Charging in deep formations, the pistoleers delivered their fire in successive ranks at point-blank range, each rank after its discharge filing to the rear to reload.53 Developed during the religious wars in the latter half of the reign of Charles V, these Schwartzreiters, or

53 Delbrück, Geschichete der Kriegkunst, IV, 147-49.
cuirassiers as they soon became known, found employment outside of Germany and were present in the pay of all the combatants in the French invasion of 1544. One thousand one hundred and twenty under 117 captains accompanied the emperor on his march through Champagne; \(^{54}\) Francis I recruited an indefinite number through his agents along the Rhine; and Henry VIII, in raising his bands of Burgundians, required "of every man of arms having eight horses belonging unto him to have a 'kouritzer,' for which person he should have by the month, besides his own wages, twelve philips." \(^{55}\)

Ensheathed from head to knee in black armor to heighten the effect of their formidable demeanor, the Schwartzreiters were equipped with three or four pistols, a sword, and a light spear, and except for their firearms they were not unlike the English demilancers, who themselves adopted the pistol and the name "cuirassier" in Elizabeth's reign. \(^{56}\) As the


\(^{55}\) (B. M.) Lansdowne MS. 155, f. 356b. Hereinafter cited as (B. M.) Lansd. See also L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 752. The philip or philipus guilder, a common unit of currency in the Netherlands which varied in value from 3s. 1 1/2d. to 3s. 3d. between c. 1544 and 1546. (B. M.) Add. MS. 5753, ff. 179b, 190, 191.

\(^{56}\) Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army, 1066-1945, p. 44.
heaviest of light cavalry troops, in their own countries, Schwartzreiters and demilancers gradually replaced men-at-arms, whose barded horses, lances, and full armor fast became superfluous in a gunpowder age. By 1600 only Spain and Italy among European states retained large bodies of gendarmes, whereas elsewhere, including Tudor England, the first and principal cavalry troops were pistoleers.  

Still, throughout the first half of the sixteenth century heavy cavalry was as yet several generations away from obsolescence; for as Markham noted of this period the handgun, which resulted in the evanescence of the armored knight, had not attained that height of excellence to which it would soon arrive. True enough, the proportion of heavy horse in most armies had been dwindling at the expense of increased numbers of light horse and infantry since before the initiation of the Great Italian Wars. Charles VIII had thirty-four hundred lances in the Piedmont in 1494; at Pavia in 1525 Francis I operated with roughly thirteen hundred; while at Ceresole in 1544 Enghien, the French commander, had less than one thousand. The same process can be noted in Spanish army "which began to reduce

57 Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 41.
58 Ibid.
its proportion of cavalry before 1494,\(^{60}\) and in England, where throughout the Tudor era the scarcity of heavy horse was endemic, a similar trend is detectable. In the three expeditions sent into France by Henry VIII, the numbers of Tudor men-at-arms are so inappreciable as to defy even an approximate reckoning, thus lending support to Oman's observation that the English aristocracy had lost the art of fighting on horseback in the fifteenth century "and had not recovered the habit."\(^{61}\)

The gradual subordination of the gendarmerie to the other services seems logically to lead to the conclusion that the military revolution of the sixteenth century produced at the least a partial eclipse of heavy cavalry. As demonstrated, when dealing in mere arithmetic such a generalization is easily sustained. There is no question that in general infantry outstripped cavalry, both heavy and light, in the race towards modernity, and in consequence, abetted by the defensive guise which war assumed as the century progressed, the mounted arm was relegated to a subordinate and supportive role. Nevertheless, the importance of that role can be deduced from the professional air assumed by the new light cavalries and the still considerable squadrons of men-at-arms that continued to be

\(^{60}\)Taylor, *The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529*, p. 61.

conscripted.

Until firepower definitely established itself as the primary adjudicator of battles, the steel-clad knight remained the unequalled weapon of shock. Obviously, as Taylor insists, the horseman's tactics could easily be neutralized by the landsknecht's pike or the engineer's entrenchments; but the latters' stratagems were no substitute for the former. No troops but heavy cavalry could produce such driving power. "Consequently the man-at-arms remained essential in every battle" and is known to have decided a few on his own account.

The annals of every European nation are replete with accounts of the prowess of their fighting men-at-arms, but in the sixteenth century the highest reputation for discipline and professionalism belonged to the gendarmes of France, "la vraie ecolle de la discipline militaire, la deffense et bouclier du Royaume." Originally raised as regular companies by Charles VII, they were not only a standing but also a national force which enjoyed a continuous history dating back to 1445. The number of companies, in which service was voluntary, was


63 Heavy cavalry, largely Burgundian and German auxiliaries, won the Battle of the Spurs for Henry VIII in 1513; Francis I, who personally led twenty-five charges, credited his men-at-arms with the victory at Marignano in 1515; and Philibert Emmanuel of Savoy destroyed the French before St. Quentin in 1557 with his heavy horse.

64 Denison, A History of Cavalry, p. 221.
highly variable, rising in war, declining in peace. Most such units were assigned within France to frontier and garrison duties, but when offensives abroad were undertaken the majority were mustered as the nucleus around which the French army was built. 65

From the first, the organization of these compagnies d'ordonnances was grounded in the lance system. Forty to eighty "furnished lances," each by the reign of Francis I consisting of a man-at-arms and four light horsemen who fought independently under their own banner, made up a normal company. "Captain" was the usual rank of the company leader, and under him served a lieutenant, an ensign, a guidon, and a maréchal des logis or sergeant. 66 Every heavy cavalryman was of gentle birth, and captains were appointed for life. Death by hanging was the punishment for desertion, and the enlistment of foreigners was discouraged. 67 French men-at-arms, wrote Guicciardini,

were nearly all from the King's subjects, and no

65Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre, p. xxvi.

66Ibid., pp. xxxvi, 24. According to Fourquevaux, "the Men of arms should follow the Ensign: and the Light Horse, Stradiots [i.e. the argoulets attached to the lances fournies], and Arquebusiers a Cheval should follow the Guidon." The function of the sergeant was to find and prepare lodgings for the company.

67Ibid., pp. xxxvi, lv, lx, lxix.
common people but gentlemen, not just taken on or laid off at the wish of the captains, and as the companies were paid, not by them, but by the King's ministers, they not only had their full numbers, but were well set up and well provided with horses and arms—not being unable through poverty to equip themselves—and all competed to serve best from the instinct of honor which noble birth breeds in men's breasts as well as from the hopes they had of rewards for courageous deeds both inside and outside the service, which was arranged so that they could be promoted through various ranks up to captain. The captains had the same incentives, being nearly all barons and lords, or at the least of very noble birth, and nearly all subjects of the King of France. When they had their full complement of lancers... they had no other ambition than to earn their King's praise; so that there did not exist among them either the instability of changing masters out of ambition or greed or rivalries with other captains... 68

Such was the devotion of French men-at-arms: except in times of peace, few were ever found on the side of their country's enemies, and with no such horsemen of their own, sovereigns like Henry VIII, who picked quarrels with the kings of France were obliged to find gendarmes in the Netherlands and Germany, the two regions which produced heavy cavalry of comparable value.

The reputation of the Netherlands men-at-arms was, as might be expected, almost as high as the French, because beginning in 1471 they had been organized on the same model as the compagnies d'ordonnances by Charles the Bold.

68 Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence, pp. 153-54.
"Burgundians" is the name by which they were called in the sixteenth century, being raised within the Circle of Burgundy, that administrative district comprising the Netherlands and Franche-Comté created by the Imperial Diet in 1512. Excellent troops when led by competent officers, they were the Empire's first line of defence in the Low Countries, which region, with the neighboring German states, served as England's chief entrepôt for mercenaries and auxiliaries.

The estimate of the worth of German men-at-arms underwent a drastic transformation in the early decades of the century. In 1512, Machiavelli, who four years earlier as head of a Florentine legation to the emperor at Innsbruck had occasion to observe them, judged these troops to be greatly inferior to the French, whom he rated the best. German knights, though numerous and warlike, were lightly armored and poorly equipped. Their horses were hard to manage and for lack of barding

69 In 1544 there were thirty compagnies d'ordonnance, totalling seven thousand horse, in the Army of the Low Countries. Of these, three thousand were assigned to Charles V for the invasion of France; two thousand were retained at home for the defence of garrisons and frontiers; and the remaining two thousand, with four thousand landsknechts, were sent at the emperor's expense as auxiliaries under the Count of Buren to join the English. Buren was separately commissioned by Henry VIII to raise additional forces of mercenaries, both horse and foot. Concerning the number of the latter, see below pp. 274 ff. Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Française, p. 88.
vulnerable to disabling wounds,\textsuperscript{70} and according to the Venetians, they in no way cooperated with other troops in battle.\textsuperscript{71} Yet, in 1544 the English commissioners at Aachen near the Luxemburg frontier described the German "gentlemen" with whom they were sent to bargain as "wondrously well armed as men of arms," well mounted, and "such a goodly company . . . as they have seen the like nowhere."\textsuperscript{72} Outwardly, then, little distinguished the cavaliers of Germany from those of other countries; but if, as the Venetian ambassador to the Imperial court reported in 1546, they were clad in steel and carried a sword and lance,\textsuperscript{73} there were differences in their organization and mode of making war that were unique.

The style of fighting in which the German men-at-arms had been trained since the fifteenth century required them to charge in compact bodies many ranks deep. Some of their formations involved as few as nine ranks, but one military manual

\textsuperscript{70}Niccolò Machiavelli, Portraits of the Affairs of Germany, in Niccolò Machiavelli and the United States of America, ed. Pansini, p. 652.

\textsuperscript{71}Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{72}L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 666, 713.

of 1532 recommended the ordering of six thousand horsemen in no less than eighty-three. This was in complete contradistinction to the French and Burgundians, who operated with shallower formations, the former preferring to range their heavy cavalry en haye along a broad front in no more than two lines of battle, the latter favoring a narrower front with four lines.

Another trademark of the Germans was the deliberate and comparatively slow pace of their attack. Most heavy cavalry in delivering an assault rushed their adversaries at full tilt, an excellent tactic only when the whole body charged home. Too often, though, men arrived at the shock in loose order, the more impetuous having raced ahead to claim the first coup, the cowards having held back or left the field. The Germans, however, sacrificed speed for good order, advancing at a trot.

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74 Oman, *The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*, pp. 82-83; Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, IV, 141.

75 E. H. Wickham, trans., *The Influence of Firearms Upon Tactics* (London: Henry S. King, 1976), p. 9. The word "haie" is retained in the modern French language with the meaning of "hedge" or "row of troops."

76 See La Noue's remarks in Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, I, 102.

77 Navagiero, in his *Relazione*, p. 456, describes this peculiar gait in the following terms: Just as the landsknechts "have a peculiar style of march," so also do the men-at-arms, who "are mounted on horses which have a particular pace or slow trot." The horses of the German pistoleers
relying on the weight of their deep masses to push their way through the defences of their opponents.

Such fearlessness under fire was an asset that could hardly be wasted, and considerable effort was expended by the emperors in efforts to ensure themselves of their horsemen's loyalty. But like landsknechts, the habits of the German cavalry were entirely mercenary. Of all the nations employed by the Empire, it was argued that "the best paid and the least available was the German." Their insolence was insufferable; they were pious towards God and cruel towards their neighbors. In war they turned churches into stables, and whenever their arose among them a scarcity of money or provisions they abandoned their commanders "without any chance of remedy." 78

But if German men-at-arms displayed little patriotism or faithfulness they were at least amenable to new ideas, so that when, in the middle years of the reign of Charles V, the emperor sought to increase their efficiency by regulating their formations and standardizing their tactics they cooperated. Charles is cited as being the first to organize his cavalry into squadrons, 79 those principal units into which before the

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78 Ibid.
disappearance of the horse soldier modern cavalry regiments were divided. These bodies, three or sometimes four to a regiment, retained the deep order of the medieval German horse but formed up in squares, forsaking the pointed formation or Spitz which had gained ascendancy in Maximilian's day. The strength of squadrons varied, as did the number of ranks; but uniformity of sorts was gained by matching ranks with an equal number of files, so that the whole body was as great in depth as in breadth of front. As regards the organization of squadrons, the chief officer or Rittmeister was a captain, whose deputy, a lieutenant, had under him an ensign and a quartermaster. Pre-eminent among non-commissioned officers was the sergeant or Wachtmeister, who as the mounted equivalent of the landsknecht Feldweibel was responsible for all matters pertaining to drill and the arrangement of the

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80 Wickham, trans., The Influence of Firearms Upon Tactics, p. 9.

81 Though the square formation was typical, a rectangular battle order was not unknown. In fact there were times when the "broad square" was preferable, as for instance against a numerically superior force which would find it easier to envelop a square than a rectangle.

82 Below, p. 98, n. 26. Besides the above-mentioned personnel it was not unusual to find attached to each squadron a surgeon, blacksmith, chaplain, and trumpeter. Just as the footsoldier was trained to respond to the beat of the drum, so likewise was the horse soldier trained to respond to the call of the trumpet. Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 60, lists the six "Soundings" of the trumpet "which are most necessary for the Soldier's knowledge."
horsemen in battle.

That the squadron system was effective is attested by the fact that it was adopted by all the Imperial cavalry, light as well as heavy, before 1544. Francis I experimented with the new formation but soon abandoned it, the French gendarmerie continuing to fight en haye until utterly routed by the Imperialist squadrons at St. Quentin and Gravelines in 1557 and 1558 respectively. In the meantime the English stuck to the lance system and the mixed companies of light and heavy horse which it produced. At best, however, it was an unsatisfactory solution, if only because of the extreme shortage of Tudor men-at-arms. In the French war of 1544, for example, if the muster rolls are to be believed no more than two or three hundred heavy horse were mobilized, and of these the only professional unit was the Gentlemen Pensioners, seventy-two of whom under the leading of Sir George Carew were told off against the main battle. Other than the "Spears" the remaining men-at-arms appear indiscriminately and in small numbers: six in the company assigned to the Master of the Horse; four to guard the king's "tents, hales, and pavilions;" four in the retinue of John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, after his appointment as Lord Lieutenant of Boulogne.

84 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 275 (1, i).
in October, 1544. Needless to say men-at-arms were particularly necessary to ward off the French gendarmerie, and it was the threat of annihilation by Europe's chief exponents of heavy cavalry warfare which drove Henry VIII to enlist as many German and Burgundian knights as he could procure.

The choice of these latter horsemen by the English is instructive, because of the states drawn on for foreign troops Germany and the Netherlands were alone in their ability to supply them in quantity. Spain by way of illustration had few heavy cavalry. As in England, poor breeding habits had led to the diminution of great horses, so that among the Iberian gentry mules were the commonest mode of transportation. Moreover, the Granadan War had developed light cavalry, and the success of Gonzalo de Córdova's reformed infantry had removed much of the stigma attached to that service. The grandest hidalgos now competed with the humblest peones for the command of foot soldiers, and even the emperor on occasion was not above shouldering a pike or carrying a musket. Of the thirteen thousand Spaniards in Italy at the commencement of Charles V's third war with France in 1536, only 580 were men-at-arms, and two years later with a French army operating in

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85 Ibid., No. 275, pp. 163, 165; pt. 2, No. 799.
the Pyrenees a mere 961 were mustered in all of Spain.\footnote{Oman, \textit{The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century}, pp. 61-62.}

Like the early Tudors, the emperor relied on his Germans and Burgundians for the bulk of his heavy horse, and with the exception of the Duke of Albuquerque,\footnote{Beltran de la Cueva, third Duke of Albuquerque.} who was loaned by Charles to the English council of war in 1544, not a single Spanish man-at-arms can be found under either Henry VIII or Edward VI, the two Tudors who most heavily drew on Spaniards for military support. Hundreds of Iberians did serve these monarchs on horseback, but always as light cavalrymen and invariably against the Scots, who to their great discomfort at Pinkie in 1547 were almost certainly subjected by them to the first caracole ever performed in the British Isles.\footnote{William Patten, \textit{The Expedition into Scotland of the Most Worthily Fortunate Prince Edward, Duke of Somerset} in \textit{Tudor Tracts, 1532-1558}, ed. A. F. Pollard (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1964), p. 123. Hereinafter cited as \textit{The Expedition into Scotland}. See also Sir Charles Oman, "The Battle of Pinkie, Sept. 10, 1547," \textit{The Archaeological Journal}, XC (1933), 14-15.}

Much more numerous was the Italian gendarmerie, but here, as in Spain, light cavalry and infantry service experienced a steady increase in popularity at the former's expense. At Fornova in 1495, before the lessons of the military revolution had been fully accepted, the whole pride of the Italian
army lay in its men-at-arms. Forty-nine years later in 1544, after the French and Imperialists had divided the allegiance of the peninsula between them, not one Italian gendarme participated in the summer fighting in France, and in the preliminary struggle at Ceresole in April of that year, in one of the rare pitched battles of the last three-quarters of the sixteenth century, less than two hundred were engaged.  

Some few may have fought for Henry VIII in the taking and subsequent defence of Boulogne, but the first Italians in Tudor livery identifiable as men-at-arms do not appear until September, 1547 in the reign of Edward VI, when the colonel, Malatesta, led a band of undetermined strength against the Scots at Pinkie under the standard of the Lord Protector,  

\[\text{Lot, } \text{Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Française, Chap. VI; Oman, } \text{The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 231, 232-33.}\]

\[\text{Large numbers of Italian foot and light cavalry were retained for these undertakings. In February, 1546, for example, the garrison at Boulogne contained six companies of Italians, nearly all of them arquebusiers, totalling 696 soldiers, while in Calais and other strongholds kept by the English there were a thousand Albanian and Italian horse. S. P. 1/214, ff. 177-78; State Papers, XI, 60.}\]

\[\text{It is unfortunate that this soldier of fortune cannot be more adequately identified since the house of Malatesta was famous for its condottieri. For an abridged history of the family which sank into obscurity in the second quarter of the sixteenth century see Orville Prescott, } \text{Princes of the Renaissance} \text{ (New York: Random House, 1969), Chaps. XVI-XVIII.}\]
Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset. Later in Edward's reign, during the Prayer Book rebellion in 1549, twenty-nine men-at-arms served in the company of the Italian adventurer, Jacques Jermigny, while in the following year at Sheen, after the nuptials of John Dudley, Lord Lisle, and the Lady Anne Seymour, the wedding party was entertained by the king's pensioner, Count Pallavicino Rangone, who with three of his countrymen "ran with all the gentlemen four courses and afterward fought at tourney." 94

No more than in England or Spain the scarcity of Italian heavy cavalry was in part caused by the lack of good mounts. Machiavelli thought that Italian stockmen were more accustomed to breeding calves and mules, and "for the sake of a large supply of horses" he advised those princes who would raise armies to distribute mares of good blood throughout their rural estates, so that husbandmen might gain experience in raising colts. In recommendations suggestive of the English legislation under Henry VIII, he proposed that men be denied the right to keep mules if they did not also keep horses and that no one be permitted to dress in silk if he

93 Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 359; (P. R. O.) E351/43, mem. 10.

did not own a horse.  

The main cause of the decline in heavy cavalry was of course only coincidentally related to unscientific breeding practices, for at the root of the matter lay the changing nature of war. Since sieges and skirmishes came to be preferred over pitched battles fewer men-at-arms were needed, and as the cost of armor proofed against shot increased in proportion to the effectiveness of small arms fire, gentlemen of meager means with a penchant for soldiering were easily persuaded to set aside the lance and take up other weapons. Many young French and Spanish nobles served their masters as infantrymen, and the Italian condottieri, some of whom occupied the leading posts in the Imperial army, distinguished themselves as quartermasters, artillerymen, and

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95 Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, 720-21. In 1542 the English Parliament passed a "Bill for Great Horses" in which all persons of means were required to maintain a prescribed number of stallions: archbishops and dukes, seven; marquesses, earls, and bishops, the value of whose bishoprics was £1000, five, viscounts, barons, and bishops with a 1000 marks a year, three; lords spiritual and temporal with 600 marks a year, two; and those spiritual persons with incomes less than 500 marks, one. The novelty of the act was that it decreed that "all and every other person temporal not aforementioned whose Wife . . . shall wear any gown of silk or whose Wife shall wear any French hood or bonnet of Velvet, with any habilments past or egg of gold, pearl, or stone or any chain of gold . . . shall, after the Feast of St. Michael . . . have, find, keep, sustain, and maintain . . . one stoned trotting horse" on pain of a fine of £10. Judges of assize, justices of the peace, and sheriffs were authorized to proceed against offenders. (33 Hen. VIII, c. 5), Statutes of the Realm, III, 830-31.
captains of light horse. In England too, where only the greatest lords appeared regularly in full armor, a similar trend is detectable. For Henry VIII's first invasion of France in 1513 not a few of the gentry enrolled as "spears afoot," while of the 389 captains assigned to the leading of the companies in the army of 1544 only 52 were appointed to mounted units in which for lack of heavy cavalry light horse elements predominated.

Though new strategy, new weapons, lack of strong coursers, and rising costs militated against men-at-arms and brought about a steady decline in their supply, they remained a tactically indispensible branch of all armies in this age of transition. Until the evolution in the seventeenth century of a new type of cuirassier, who abandoned the caracole and was trained to charge home with the sword after discharging his pistol, men-at-arms were essential in every action where the utmost momentum was required in an assault. Their prestige, though somewhat tarnished by the materialization of professional infantry and light cavalry troops, remained the highest of any service, but no longer could the view be upheld that they were the most important levy in war. In fact in the sixteenth century, so far did the waging of war depart

96 Navagiero, Relatione, pp. 451-52, 453.
from the medieval ideal that no sector of the military could claim supremacy. The best commanders were those who relied on a combination of arms, fully cognizant of the advantage that might be theirs if the enemy did not.

Nothing better indicates the arrival of an age of soldierly professionalism than the fact that in the sixteenth century functions and duties became more clearly differentiated. Men-at-arms divested themselves of their light cavalry ancillaries; these in turn were grouped as independent units for the carrying through of specialized operations; highly mobile arquebusiers evolved to support the less agile pikemen; and victory went to the side in which these disparate yet complimentary elements could most skillfully cooperate. Shock and missile power were mutually supportive, and disaster awaited the army which favored the one at the expense of the other. Pike columns were most easily disposed of when deficient in shot, hackbutteers when unprotected with pikes. As for cavalry, it could not go everywhere since terrain dictated its movements. More difficult to maneuver, more easily disordered in violent action, it was, though best equipped to check the advance of infantry bodies over open ground, useless unless artillery and missile fire could be brought to bear on the stationary target which its flanking charges had created.

In the light of these particulars an absolute essential
in sixteenth-century armies was the creation of some sort of balance between the power of missile and shock, infantry and horse. However, for individual governments the capacity to provide this balance through exclusively domestic conscription was a cherished but unrealizable goal. As has been fully demonstrated, no particular nationality or single region produced soldiers skilled in all the aspects of war. Burgundians and Frenchmen alike shone as cavalrymen but were unsteady on foot; both Italians and Spaniards excelled in defending and attacking fortifications, but in the open for the press of pikes Germans and Swiss were preferred; the best theoreticians were perhaps the Italians; but whereas Germans ranked among the best gunfounders, the foremost artillerymen were French. And so the list of superlatives may be extended to include as well the English, who though military progress had passed them by still retained something of their past reputation as formidable bowmen.

The simple fact is that in Europe in the sixteenth century there was no such thing as a militarily self-sufficient state, as no country could from its own citizens provide that combination of arms which military convention and necessity dictated, so that every warring nation was constrained to hire mercenaries and to seek out allies. France, Spain, and the Empire were easily the most voracious consumers of foreign professionals and auxiliaries, for as these were the most
aggressive states, being almost continually at war, their need of specialists and manpower was greatest. England by comparison was only a moderate employer of foreign troops, and within the narrow limits of her own geographic setting a case could be made for her self-sufficiency. Protected by the sea which acted as a potent deterrent to invasion, she had little need of mercenaries or auxiliaries, as long as her government remained aloof from continental campaigning. Nondescript as Tudor forces were, Englishmen knew them to be superior to the half-wild levies of their island foes, the Scots and the Irish. It was only when Tudor sovereigns sent their armies out of the kingdom, across the Channel, and into Europe at large that military superiority was lost. Fortunately, few appreciated this better than the Tudor monarchs themselves. All of them were aware of the limitations of English troops, and in part for that reason every Tudor government save one strove with some degree of success to avoid protracted military entanglements abroad. Of his line only

\[98\] In addition to the Imperial and Spanish campaigns against the Turks in eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean, the Hapsburg-Valois struggle provided at least one war per decade between 1494 and 1559.

\[99\] Neither Henry VII nor his granddaughters, Mary and Elizabeth, ever sought to extend their dominion beyond the frontiers of England and Ireland, and though Edward VI inherited the forward policy of Henry VIII, it was abandoned by the Northumberland regime when its objectives, the retention of Boulogne and the conquest of Scotland, proved impractical.
Henry VIII craved battle honors. Yet it is inconceivable that he, who was thrice enticed to send armies to France, would have dared to stir himself without strong assurances of mercenary and auxiliary support. Henry knew the cardinal maxim of war: on the Continent no army survived without foreign assistance. Barring miracles, if that maxim held true for the most militarily advanced states, it could hardly be less applicable to England.
MERCENARIES AND AUXILIARIES:
FOREIGN SOLDIERS IN THE ARMIES OF HENRY VII AND HENRY VIII,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THEIR ORIGINS, RECRUITMENT,
AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE FRENCH WAR OF 1544-46

Volume II

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by
Gilbert John Millar
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1964
December, 1974
CHAPTER VII
FRANCE OR SCOTLAND?
THE BACKGROUND OF THE FRENCH WAR OF 1544-46.

Who that intendeth France to win,
With Scotland let him begin.

Sixteenth-century English proverb.

In 1541 when Henry VIII resolved for the last time to pursue an aggressive policy in Europe no English army had fought on the Continent since the Duke of Suffolk's withdrawal from Montdidier nearly twenty years before. During the interim, except for her brief flirtation with the League of Cognac, the full thrust of England's diplomatic and military efforts had been of necessity defensive, since the international situation created by the king's divorce from Catherine of Aragon and the resultant breach with Rome had raised the spectre of invasion by Catholic powers bent on forcibly returning the nation to papal allegiance.

The gravest threat to English security in the early and critical stages of the Henrician Reformation came from Charles V, who as Catherine of Aragon's nephew seemed most likely to lead his Hapsburg aggregate of Spain, the Netherlands, and the Empire to his aunt's defence. Between the

1Above, p. 139, n. 53.
calling of Henry's "Reformation Parliament" in 1529 and the death of his unfortunate first queen in 1536 the fear of Imperialist attack was constant, as is witnessed by the manner in which the emperor's enemies were carefully cultivated. Conversations were opened with the Lutherans, with Denmark, and the German Hanse; peace was renewed with the Scots, and in 1532 a league was concluded with France which bound the Most Christian King to assist Henry with a fleet and fifteen thousand auxiliaries should Charles decide to invade.\textsuperscript{2}

Fear of Imperialist intentions produced a plethora of protective measures at home during the same period, particularly during the summer of 1533, when following the king's marriage to Anne Boleyn and the framing of the papal bull of excommunication invasion appeared especially imminent. Notes were drafted "To remember the king for the reparation of his navy;" "for granting money for the fortifying of the frontiers;" "for repairing the fortifications;" and "for the repair of ordnance and the provision of munitions for war;" while from the Council commands were issued ordering a survey of the works at Calais and the building of blockhouses against the risk of an Imperialist descent.\textsuperscript{3}

Twelve months passed with little diminishment of tension,


\textsuperscript{3}L. & P., VI, Nos. 997, 1381, 1460, 1487.
but in the following year there occurred an event which temporarily relieved the pressure. In October, 1535, the death of Francesco Sforza, the childless Duke of Milan, led immediately to a quarrel between France and the Empire over who would succeed him. By April, 1536, the French had overrun Savoy and Piedmont, and the third war between Francis I and Charles V had begun. Well did Henry receive the news, for by his own admission he feared no enemy "so long as there was not perfect amity between the Emperor and the Christian King." But his jubilation was short-lived: Francis' mercenary Swiss failed to take Milan, and Charles' counter-invasion of Picardy and Provence ended in stalemate. Temporary armistices ended hostilities in all theaters by November, 1537, while through the intercession of Pope Paul III the truce was extended for ten years by the signing of an agreement at Nice in June, 1538. A month later the same intermediary effected a formal reconciliation of the two monarchs at Aigues Mortes, the ancient port-city from which had been launched the sixth and seventh Crusades.

For England it seemed an ominous portent confirmed by word from Rome that the sentence of excommunication, held in

5 L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 1197.
abeyance from 1533 in the hope that Henry would recant, had at last been promulgated and that at Paris and Madrid, Paul's agents were urging a new crusade for the extirpation of that "most cruel and abominable tyrant," the king of England. That the full weight of Catholic Europe would soon fall on England appeared certain when on January 12, 1539, Charles and Francis met in Toledo and set their names to a treaty which bore all the earmarks of a preliminary declaration of war. By it the parties agreed to make no compact with Henry without the consent of the other, while in London speculation was rife that the ambassadors from France and the emperor would be recalled.

England assumed the aspect of an armed camp, as the expectation of some sudden assault goaded the nation to extraordinary efforts of defense preparedness. During the winter of 1538-9 and in the ensuing spring, men, women, and even children turned out in places with shovels to fashion bulwarks and trenches, and down the coast from Berwick to Lizard Head the chain of seaboard forts begun in 1533 was extended to discourage attack from the most obvious quarter, the sea.

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7 Spanish Calendar, VI, No. 33; L. & P., XIV, pt. 1, No. 36.
9 Pollard, Henry VIII, pp. 300-01.
for action; and coastal patrols constantly circled the kingdom "in order to explore and to correspond . . . by fires with those who watch by night . . . so that no foreign vessel could show itself without the country being warned." But the fires were never lit. In spite of England's fears no attack was ever launched, as the secular rivalry of the Hapsburgs and the Valois proved more divisive than any unity that might have sprung from their common Catholicism.

Though outwardly cordial, relations between Charles and Francis were unlikely to produce lasting peace so long as the latter was predisposed to have a share in the governance of Italy. Milan lay at the heart of their difficulties: ruled by Charles as an Imperial fief, it was claimed by Francis as his rightful inheritance through his descent from Valentina, heiress of the Visconti predecessors of the Sforzas and wife of his illustrious ancestor, Louis, Duke of Orleans (d. 1407). The disposition of the duchy proved the main stumbling-block to a genuine Franco-Imperialist détente, and after two years of intense negotiations failed to effect the compromise that the emperor hoped would assuage Valois pride, Charles

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11 Francis' claim was hardly valid, as in the investiture of the duchy females were excluded.

12 Among the solutions proposed by the Imperialists was that Francis' youngest son, Charles, marry the emperor's.
turned his back to Francis in October, 1540, by installing his son, Philip, as duke. Twenty months elapsed before the renewal of war, but in the certain knowledge of its inevitability the two parties began at once their preparations which meant, among other things, a scramble for allies, including bidding for the support of the heretic king, Henry VIII, who was only too willing to receive their offers and fashion their dilemma to suit his own design.

What precisely Henry VIII's design was in 1540 is not entirely clear. However, it is at least arguable that the dissolution of his fourth marriage to the German princess, Anne of Cleves, effected on July 7, may be taken as an indication that after more than a decade of bad relations his mind was beginning to turn back towards a realignment with his Catholic Majesty, Charles V. For Anne had been a bride of convenience, a tangible symbol and the binding tie in what had originally been intended as a grand anti-Imperialist and anti-papal alliance between England and the Lutheran states.

eldest daughter, Mary, with Milan as her dower, on the understanding that the duchy would remain in the gift of the Empire. Alternately it was proposed that if Francis would withdraw his garrisons from Savoy and Piedmont, renounce his claims in Italy, and relinquish control of the Duchy of Burgundy, Mary's dower would be the Netherlands. Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, 268 and n. 1; Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 147.
of Germany designed to discourage invasion from Europe and no doubt to provide Henry with a full storehouse of Protestant auxiliary and mercenary support in the event the dread popish offensive had become a reality.

The treaty of marriage had been hastily concluded in the fall of 1539 hard on the heels of the war scare of the previous spring and amid reports that the emperor, preparing to crush rebellious Ghent, would be allowed passage through France and consultation with the French king in Paris. But if the union of Henry and Anne had been conceived as a defensive measure it proved unnecessary since, as Charles could not be cajoled into yielding Milan and prepared to confer it upon his son, the revival of the Hapsburg-Valois feud was as certain as the abrogation of any Franco-Imperial plan for the invasion of England.

Once the uselessness of the Cleves alliance was ascertained Henry felt no compunction in setting aside his German

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13 Though neither Anne nor her brother, Duke William of Cleves, were Lutherans they had strong ties with the Schmalkaldic League, their sister, Sibylla, being wife to John, Elector of Saxony, who with the Landgrave Philip of Hesse shared supreme command of the forces of this Lutheran association.

14 The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, pp. 512-15, included in Bradford, ed., Correspondence of the Emperor Charles V, contains some interesting details of Charles' journey through France. The emperor, who entered France on November 27, 1539, did not arrive in Paris until New Year's Day, 1540.
consort. Only expediency and self-preservation had held him to the match; but with Anne pensioned off, as indeed she was with a yearly income of £500 and the manors of Richmond and Bletchingly\footnote{The details of the divorce are presented in Scarisbrick, \textit{Henry VIII}, pp. 371-73.}, the king was free to pursue what seems to have been one of the overriding goals of his life, namely the performance of some "notable enterprise" in France. But before turning on the French Henry complicated matters, at least for modern-day historians, by turning on their allies, the Scots, whom he feared might violate the safety of England as they had done in 1513 while the elite of his forces were committed to the fighting on the Continent.

Unfortunately, because of this determination to settle first with the Scots, it has become a commonplace of Tudor history to assign as the major cause of Henry VIII's French war of 1544-46 that monarch's resolution to complete his lordship of the British Isles by fastening his rule on Scotland, that part of the islands which alone had preserved its independence of English control. The northern kingdom, so runs the theory, was seen by Henry in his last years as the chief threat to his country's security, a figurative back-door through which any partisan of the Stewart government might
enter England unmolested. To bolt that door he sought first by fair words to lure the Scots into England's orbit; but when fair words failed, as they did in 1541 when his nephew, James V, failed as promised to meet with him at York, he resorted to the more forceful approach of war which unfortunately drove James back upon the "auld alliance" with France and compelled Henry, whose desire to control north Britain remained fixed, to mount a secondary attack upon France to prevent the latter's support of the Scots.

It is an attractive thesis and not without merit. Ruled in the French and Catholic interest by James, whose own father had been done to death by the English at Flodden in 1513, Scotland was hardly friend to the schismatical southern king, who had ever shown himself the enemy of her people and more recently the betrayer of her religion. Scotland then did pose a threat to England, but at this juncture, with Francis I, the sheet anchor of her defence, willing to offer Henry "carte blanche for an alliance" against the

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16 The idea that Scotland and not the war in France was the main object of Henry's desire was popularized in Tudor historical circles through the medium of Pollard's classic biography of the great king. See his Henry VIII, Chap. XIV, passim.

emperor, it is safe to say that the threat was more potential than real and would have remained so but for the Tudor king's decision to abandon his neutrality apropos the struggle that was shaping up on the Continent. In actual practice, as Henry's earlier campaigns bear witness, Scotland posed a genuine danger only at such times as Henry had made war in France, and it was probably his resolution to do so again rather than any farsighted policy to unite the British Isles which led him in August, 1542, to show his preference for the Imperialists by openly breaking with James by sending a raiding party led by the warden of the Middle March, Sir Robert Bowes, into Teviotdale.

The timing of the raid, which led to undisguised warfare, is significant in that it followed by a month Francis I's July declaration of hostilities against the emperor.

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18 L. & P., XVII, No. 124.

19 There are no adequate studies of Henry's Scottish wars. The best accounts are to be found in the following: P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland (3 vols.; Cambridge: University Press, 1908-09); Fisher, History of England; and Mackie, The Earlier Tudors.

20 L. & P., XVII, Nos. 650-51, 661. The raid actually resulted in the defeat and capture of Bowes at Haddon Rig, but prompted the more savage incursion of the Duke of Norfolk, who invaded Scotland with an army of several thousand in the last week of October. Ibid., Nos. 994, 996.

21 Francis declared formal war on July 10, six weeks and three days prior to Bowes' capture on August 24.
Adherents of the Pollardian view see in this sequence of events proof of Henry's broad vision and confirmation of their contention that Scotland, not France, was foremost in his mind: with the two titans of Europe again at loggerheads, the time was ripe for weaning the Scots from their French dependency and for permanently closing the back-door into England; otherwise the Franco-Scottish combination would have ended any possibility of a British Empire. That Henry eventually failed in his objective and managed solely to stiffen Scottish resistance to the idea of union with England is attributed to bad luck and the poor management of his political and military overtures. His aim, however, is represented as a noble one since he sought "not mere military glory" but the creation of a United Kingdom which "was the real objective of his last war with France." 22

Again the argument has much to recommend it, not the least of which is the fact that it is upheld by virtually every major historian of the Tudor period. 23 Nevertheless as Elton pointed out a decade ago, the evidence rests on little more than "a story so slanted as to support the interpretation." Pollard "never argued his case," but like those

22 Pollard, Henry VIII, p. 328.
23 One of the more resourceful and ingenious restatements of Pollard's view is to be found in Wernham, Before the Armada, Chap. 12.
who have since clung to it "he assumed it"\(^{24}\) in part perhaps because there is a certain irresistible logic in the idea that a great king like Henry would have been able to perceive the mutual benefits to be gained from a merger of the two crowns. But precisely how obsessed with obtaining Scotland was Henry? Hardly at all, according to J. J. Scarisbrick, the only scholar in better than seventy years to seriously challenge the Pollardian position:

> we may be . . . skeptical about the farsightedness of royal dealings with England's northern neighbor. It is very arguable that concern for Scotland during the last years of his reign was secondary to his preoccupation with France and that, as in 1513, he looked to the North only because he was about to plunge into the Continent . . . . The assault on Scotland, far from springing from any long-term design for the British Isles, was a concomitant of a new upsurge of ancient belligerence and ancient dynastic ambition against the king of France.\(^{25}\)

Scarisbrick spends little time in substantiating his view, though the weight of the documentary evidence is certainly in his favor. As early as April 2, 1542, four months in advance of the eruption of the Scottish war and nearly a year before the formal resumption of friendly relations with Charles, Henry revealed his true mind by confiding in Chapuys, the Imperial ambassador, his plans for an attack upon France,


the invasion of which he promised to lead in person if Charles would do the same and assist him in the procurement of foreign cavalry.\(^{26}\)

That Henry was serious at this juncture cannot be doubted, since before the end of June his commissioners with the emperor in Spain had agreed in principle to a league offensive and defensive that when concluded in February, 1543, would bind the two sovereigns to attempt a joint conquest of France.\(^{27}\) Meanwhile, before the rupture of the Hapsburg-Valois peace by Francis on July 10, to increase his credit with Charles, Henry dallied with the notion supplied him by Chapuys of sending an English army to cooperate with Adrien de Croy, Grand Master of Flanders, in a surprise assault upon the town of Montreuil. Located deep in the Boulannais on the banks of the River Canche it was a chief supplier of victuals and war material to the French strongholds in western Picardy and a potential threat therefore to the success of any future Anglo-Imperial operations in that sector.

From June through August, in anticipation of this feat the already substantial detachments within the English Pale at Calais, Hammes, and Guisnes were increased by several thousand, Guisnes, the foremost outpost against the French

\(^{26}\) Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 124.
\(^{27}\) L. & P., XVII, Nos. 446-47.
frontier, receiving the largest contingents, including the promise of three hundred arquebusiers for the training of the garrison troops in firearms. Eighty pieces of artillery and an undetermined number of gunners were despatched to Calais; offers from certain mercenary captains of the Netherlands were considered in London; while in the Thames ten great ships of war laden with campaign necessaries rode anchor at the ready.

Nothing, however, came of the Montreuil enterprise due mainly to the hesitation of the Imperialists who balked at the aid demanded of them for the undertaking. Ten thousand auxiliaries was Henry's price for the capture of the town which was to remain in English hands after it had been won, and three thousand horsemen of the Low Countries were to be made available to him as often as necessary for the victualling of it.

In the interim, as English and Imperial functionaries haggled over these terms in Spain, Flanders, and London, Henry's enthusiasm for the project waned when in mid-July the French, siezing the initiative, robbed him of the

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28 Ibid., Nos. 559, 740.
29 Ibid., Nos. 405, 415, 532 (p. 307), 559.
30 Ibid., No. 447. In addition to the three armies sent against the Low Countries the Dauphin, Henry, led a fourth which on August 25 initiated an attack on Rousillon. The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, p. 533; State Papers, IX, 101.
element of surprise by striking with unexpected fury at the ill-prepared Netherlands defences of his prospective ally. Luxemburg, Brabant, and Artois were invaded in short order, and on August 1, as an added deterrent to any attempt on Mon­treuil, the suspicion was raised by Sir John Wallop, captain of the castle at Guisnes, that the French troops mustering for the war in Artois were in reality intended for an incursion into the Pale.

Clearly, as Henry perceived, with so much of France in arms it was not an auspicious summer for continental cam­paigning. The idea of taking Montreuil was immediately shelved, for even though the Imperialists mounted a successful counter­offensive and in September drove the French from the Low Countries, the season was too far advanced, and Fran­cis, forewarned that Henry essayed some spectacular feat bey­ond the Channel, was on his guard. Nevertheless, the Eng­lish king's mind was set: the build­up of arms around Calais continued, and though Henry utterly refused Charles' every request for military cooperation, he steadfastly pursued the satisfactory consumation of that alliance that would commit them both to the invasion of France. Henry would have his war with the Valois, if not this year then at some later date.

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31 L. & P., XVII, Nos, 503, 533 (2), 534.
32 Ibid., No. 561.
of his own choosing; but for the moment it was best that he pretend neutrality.

Accordingly, on August 8, Chapuys and Marillac, the French ambassador, were summoned to Windsor where the Duke of Norfolk, speaking for the king, begged them to excuse to their masters any alarms which Henry's warlike preparations might have caused. It was, said Norfolk, his sovereign's wish to live in peace; but as Henry "was resolved to endure no wrong," and since Francis and the emperor had assembled great armies to the prejudice of his subjects both on and beyond the Narrow Sea, he "had decided to make such preparation that he could prevent and [resist] any attack." Chapuys who had been briefed in advance of this attempt to propitiate the French made suitable reply: he had already forwarded an account of Henry's doings to Charles and was certain that neither the emperor nor the Netherlands authorities would misconstrue the king's intentions. Marillac tendered a similar rejoinder, though the transparency of Henry's dissemblings did not escape him. In his report of the Windsor interview to Francis he indicated his conviction that beneath the sweetness of Norfolk's words there was "much poison hidden," noting ominously that in revealing their preparedness by land and sea to preserve their

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33 Ibid., No. 601.
neutrality the English were in fact announcing their resolution to make war, if not immediately against Francis then against his ally, Scotland, warning that to hurt France "in the future they must either overthrow or greatly enfeeble the Scots in order that, while occupied elsewhere, the Scots should not be able to harass them." 34 No more succinct analysis of what in fact Henry now proposed could have been made. With Francis and Charles locked in struggle and the easy capture of Montreuil beyond his grasp, he would turn to smite the Scots to secure their quiescence before confronting the French.

From its beginnings, therefore, the Scottish war was envisioned as preventative rather than punitive with no thought of conquest in mind, a fact which Pollard himself seems to have come to accept some eight years after the appearance of his monumental biography:

Such conquests were beyond the military capacity of the sixteenth century; popular indifference to foreign masters which had facilitated the continental exploits of Edward III and Henry V had passed away; and the growth of national feeling imposed upon invaders tasks with which they were as yet ill-equipped to deal. Wars were border affairs and were never fought to the finish . . . All that Henry VIII sought to do in Scotland was to make himself so unpleasant that the

34 Ibid., No. 770.
Scots must needs prefer his friendship to that of the French. But in that hope he never succeeded, if only because Celtic pride proved mightier than Sassenach coercion.

As in most Anglo-Scottish clashes, the bulk of the honors were won by the English, though considering the strategic results they were hardly worth the exertion. After the initial mauling of Sir Robert Bowes' party by the Gordon Earl of Huntly at Haddon Rigg on August 24, the Duke of Norfolk with perhaps ten thousand militiamen crossed from Berwick into Scotland on October 22 and for six days spoiled the country as far north and west as Kelso, burning that town and a score of lesser places in the east and middle marches. Excepting a few Scots "pensioners," thieves and other desperate sorts recruited from within the "Debatable Ground" which formed the border between the two nations, no foreigners served on the English side. Requests for Germans sent through Mary of Hungary, sister of the emperor and Governess of the Netherlands, were apparently spurned, while the offer of the Parmesan count, Ludovico Rangone, to lead a


36 (B. M.) Add. MS. 10,110, f. 237 consists of a brief account of the Norfolk campaign.

37 Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p. 434, states that Norfolk was accompanied by a few mercenaries recruited in the Low Countries, but I have been unable to verify this.
company out of Italy arrived too late to be acted upon.\textsuperscript{38}

Considering the horrendous capital outlay which for this expedition amounted to something in excess of £60,000,\textsuperscript{39} Henry was lucky to escape the added expense of providing for mercenaries. At 8d. the day, the going rate for German and Italian infantrymen, the cost could have been substantial, the more so as half the army was retained in winter quarters on the frontier. However, as the sequel to Norfolk's raid proved, Henry needed no foreigners to contain the Scots: his objective which might normally have been expected to take months to achieve was attained in a single day when on November 24 in Cumberland, between the Rivers Esk and Sark at Soway Moss, three thousand Englishmen destroyed a Scottish army six times their number and accomplished at a stroke the neutralization of Scotland as a military power.

The battle, if it could be called such, was a Scottish disaster of major proportion. Hardly of the same magnitude as Flodden Field, the humiliation of the defeat was nevertheless greater in that the invaders refused to fight. Panicked by the sight of the northern "prickers" they broke ranks before first contact and fled back towards the border only to

\textsuperscript{38}Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 66; L. & P., XVII, No. 978.

\textsuperscript{39}L. & P., XVII, No. 718.
be caught by the inrushing tide flowing up the Solway. Many drowned in the sea or in the swollen torrent of the Esk; twelve hundred, including two earls, five barons, and five hundred gentlemen, were made prisoners; and among the other trophies counted by the English were three thousand horses, twenty-four cannon, four cartloads of spears, ten pavilions, thirty standards, "and all flags among the footmen."  

The enormity of Solway Moss was not wholly realized until some three weeks later when James, the Scottish king, died, as it was said, of the shame of it. He had not actually been present at the rout itself, but lurking six miles away on Burnswark Hill in Dumfriesshire he had witnessed the van of his broken army straggle back across the border. Heavy in spirit and with many evil words he had ridden off by way of Tantallon Castle and Edinburgh to Falkland beyond the Forth where on December 6 he took to his bed. On the eighth his French consort, Mary of Guise, gave birth to his heir, and a week later he died, vacating his throne to the infant Mary, Queen of Scots.  

If ever it had been Henry VIII's aim to make himself ruler of the northern kingdom, the moment of truth was

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40 Ibid., No. 1142 (2); (B. M.) Add. MS. 32,648, f. 156; Add. MS., 289, f. 17.  
41 L. & P., XVII, Nos. 1142, 1193, 1214; XVIII, pt. 1, No. 44 (p. 29); (B. M.) Add. MS. 32,648, ff. 207, 218.
surely at hand. The bitter combination of Solway Moss and James' death had rendered Scotland as vulnerable as at any time in her tragic history; yet because he had only aspired to bar his back door before striking at France the golden opportunity was allowed to pass without so much as a minor demonstration. In fact, as it did not seem to Henry's honor "to make war upon a dead body or a widow or a suckling, her daughter," all raiding across the "Debatable Ground" was immediately suspended, and the Duke of Suffolk in his capacity as lieutenant-general in the north was sent to the frontier to treat of peace. 42

Only now, with his reputed chief adversary prostrate before him, did Henry think to take Scotland, but not by constraint. In his instructions to Suffolk the king commanded the duke to seek a lasting concord with orders to propose terms for the marriage of the queen of Scots and her cousin, the English heir apparent, Edward, Prince of Wales. If, therefore, Henry were to have Scotland it would not be directly; and the establishment of any Tudor sovereignty of the British Isles would have to await his passing since the union of the two kingdoms could hardly take effect until Edward's accession.

Nevertheless, the marriage in itself was a worthy goal

towards the fulfillment of which a formal abstinence from war was declared on Henry's part in February, 1543. English garrisons along the border were reduced as a gesture of good will, and on March 3 word came out of Scotland that ambassadors would soon be sent to initiate the nuptials and conclude a peace perpetual. The Scottish commissioners arrived in London in May, signed the necessary documents at Greenwich on July 1, and were sent back to Edinburgh with many thanks before the end of the month. Scotland it seemed had been made submissive: the back door into England appeared to be tightly shut, which meant that the side-door through Calais into France could now be forced.

Though the affaire d'Ecosse had seemed at times to engulf everything, the romantic obsession of personally leading an English army into France had never left Henry's mind. The date in fact had been tentatively fixed even before the commencement of the interim truce with the Scots when on February 11, 1543, the long considered closer amity with the emperor became a reality on the signing at Westminster of an Anglo-Imperial alliance. The chief clauses of the agreement

43 L. & P., XVIII, pt. 1, Nos. 139, 173.
44 Ibid., Nos. 198, 237, 239.
46 A transcript of the treaty as it appears in Rymer, Foedera, appears in Ibid., No. 144.
established peace and free intercourse between the subjects of the two princes; provided for the joint defence of the other's territories should either be invaded, the invader to be proclaimed the common enemy of both; and committed Henry "within two years" to the prosecution of war against France with an army of twenty-nine thousand, including two thousand landsknechts and two thousand Burgundian horse provided at the emperor's expense. Lest such auxiliary support be considered insufficient, free rein was given the English to recruit mercenaries within the emperor's dominions, but for this their king scarcely needed encouragement.

Henry had been seeking to cultivate friends among mercenary leaders for some time. Word to this effect had come from France in June, 1542. In August of that same year Sir Thomas Seymour, Henry's operative in Vienna, was instructed to keep an eye out for likely captains who might be able to get troops through to Calais, while in December "wishing to be prepared for war" the English king, acting through Seymour, tried unsuccessfully to procure two thousand horsemen and three thousand foot under the Brandenburg baron, George von Heideck. The sticking point was costs: for five months pay and pensions for his officers Heideck's estimate was nearly £42,000, a sum considered excessive by Henry. It was perhaps a wise decision if the baron was in any way like his brother, who was dismissed from French service for drawing wages for
almost double the landsknechts he had under contract.\textsuperscript{47} Besides, there was no lack of soldiers of fortune, and further to his chagrin the "notable enterprise" in France which Henry had intended for the summer of 1543 had to be postponed for a year by the revival of troubles in Scotland. Mercenaries were therefore considered at this juncture an expensive and unnecessary luxury. He had chastened the Scots in the past without foreign assistance: he would husband his finances by doing so again; or so at least he hoped.

At the heart of the new imbroglio in the north lay the marriage treaty between Mary Stuart and Prince Edward. Though Henry had yielded on the main points, that the queen was to remain in Scotland until her tenth birthday and that in the event of the union of the two crowns the ancient liberties of her nation were to be preserved, the Scots remained suspicious and hostile, remembering his initial stance in the weeks following their discomfiture on Solway. Claiming the right as suzerain of Scotland he had demanded immediate possession of Mary's person and an end to the "auld alliance."

Though in consequence of the Scots willingness to negotiate Henry's position had softened, his original terms still rankled thereby strengthening the hands of the pro-French party in the north championed by the dowager queen, Mary of

\textsuperscript{47} L. & P., XVII, Nos. 701, 1246; XVIII, pt. 1, Nos. 29, 42.
Guise, and her chief supporter, David Beaton, Cardinal-Archbishop of St. Andrews, who soon after the Greenwich treaties were ratified at Holyrood was freed from the close confinement he had been subjected to at Henry's connivance, reinstated as Chancellor, and with the queen mother admitted to the council of regency which governed the realm. The reversal of policy was almost immediately felt when on December 11 the Scottish Parliament annulled the peace and the contract of marriage with England and renewed the old alliance with France with whom Henry was now officially at war. Thus, as regards Scotland, did the year end, everything in smoke and confusion, the high hopes of the previous summer dashed beyond repair with the nation thought so secure in Henry's thrall more defiant and hostile than ever.

The diplomacy of conciliation might yet have worked had the king been willing to forego the quest for glory abroad, but the Tudor's pride would not admit that possibility. Hence in the winter of 1543-44, while ships, guns, and men were gathered for the satisfaction of his obligation to Charles, the Duke of Suffolk, Henry's commander in the marches, was employed in devising a plan for a spring invasion of the Scottish lowlands. As with Norfolk's incursion

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48 Dickinson, Scotland From Earliest Times to 1603, 316-17.
in 1542, what was intended was a raid rather than a con-
quest. Having suffered a loss of face by the repudiation of
the treaties of Greenwich, Henry by thrashing the Scots again
would accomplish the double purpose of restoring his honor
and insuring their quiescence during his absence in France.

The foray, as finally approved by the king, was, like all
previous Tudor set-tos with the Scots, a wholly English af-
fair. Henry, fearful that Francis might interpose with pro-
fessional mercenary and auxiliary support, did try with an
offer of 20,000 ducats for the emperor's war in Italy to in-
duce Charles to lend him a thousand Spanish arquebusiers for
the venture, but the request was denied on grounds that the
Spaniards were needed for the defence of Luxemburg and the
Low Countries. More to the point, as is clear from the
secret instructions drawn up for Don Ferrante de Gonzaga,
Viceroy of Sicily and special emissary to London, Charles was
anxious lest Henry become so carried away with Scotland that
the Imperialists would be left to fight the French single-

136, in which the duke, indicating his preference for an ex-
pedition by land, estimates that the English army "might be
in Scotland by April 14 and back by May 15." For details
of the various proposals submitted by Suffolk to Henry see also,
ibid., Preface, xi-ii; Nos. 71, 83, 95.

50 Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 272; VII, Nos. 17, 22.
handed. He need not have troubled himself: the Earl of Hertford, whom Henry appointed to smite the Scots, accomplished his task within two weeks. Sailing into the Firth of Forth on May 3 with an army of ten thousand reinforced by four thousand more from the east and middle marches, Hertford by his own account cut such a swath of destruction that "the like devastation hath not been made in Scotland these many years." Faithful to Henry's command, that the upper stone should be the nether and not one stick left standing by another, the earl systematically burned Leith, Edinburgh, Holyrood House, and the entire country as far south as the border across which he passed into Berwick on May 18. Having read this grim lesson to the Scots the earl returned to London to aid the king in the invasion of France, the largest military undertaking any English sovereign had contemplated on the Continent, and one which involved the greatest numbers of mercenaries and auxiliaries ever to serve a Tudor.

51 Ibid., VI, pt. 2, No. 269.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INITIATION OF THE FRENCH WAR OF 1544-6

It followeth of strangers, who are rather brought in by custom than reason, yet tolerable necessity urging it: So that the Countrymen be the body and Strength of the Army and Strangers but a part and member thereof. For they are unfaithful and shake off both right and law for greater pay. They are stubborn and love to do what them liketh. They are Runaways in the very Conflicts, And Spoilers of the Country & people . . . .

Anonymous, "Brief Collection of Excellent Instructions to be Observed in the Exercise of Military discipline." (B. M.) Harl. MS. 444, f. 121.

By modern standards it is sometimes impossible to uncover the true reasons for war in the early sixteenth century, the problem being, as Elton phrased it, that "the most obvious feature of the age was the near-absence of any coherent set of principles against which policy could be measured," that "the era of Charles V," to whose name might be added that of Henry VIII, "had difficulty even in finding words for its hypocrisies." ¹

No war was ever initiated, at least by the early Tudors, without "defiance," that is to say without an ultimatum or ritualistic preferring of charges by the aggressor. The English, wrote Chapuys, were so grounded in this procedure that they held it a point of honor not to begin hostilities.

without defiance.\(^2\) The intended victim was allowed a fixed period of time in which to consider the charges and make amends. If satisfaction was not forthcoming on the expiration of the deadline a state of belligerency was held to exist between the two states.

The origin on this gentlemanly convention is perhaps as old as war itself, but in its sixteenth-century style it was medieval, the rules and regulations governing its use having been set during the high age of chivalry whose legalists in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries had evolved the theory of the "just war," the sole form of legitimate warfare countenanced by them. Lawfully, by the sixteenth century such wars "could only be waged by sovereigns,\(^3\) that is by heads of state who in their own right and within their own dominions were supreme: "only he who has no superior can declare a just war," wrote the lawyer Bartolus of Sassoferrato; or again according to Nicholas of Tudeschi, "wars which are not declared by a prince are not properly wars."\(^4\)

The just war of course required just causes, and these too had been fairly well delimited by the end of the Middle

\(^{2}\text{L. & P., XVIII, pt. I, No. 288.}\)

\(^{3}\text{M. H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 246.}\)

\(^{4}\text{Ibid., p. 69.}\)
Ages. "Wars are defined as just when their aim is to avenge injury, that is when that people or city against whom war is to be declared has neglected either to redress injuries done by its subjects or to restore what they have wrongfully seized:" so ruled St. Augustine in his City of God. Later jurists were more precise, so that in general by the Renaissance the grounds on which wars could be justifiably fought were universally recognized as in support of the Christian religion, to avenge the dishonoring of a prince or his state, self-defence, and as a last resort to obtain rightful possession of some desired object wrongfully withheld.⁵

It is patently obvious, however, that just causes were not necessarily the actual reasons why in the sixteenth century princes went to war. Just causes more often as not were mere pretexts utilized to clothe aggression and ambition in legal garb. The murderous raids of Norfolk and Hertford into Scotland in 1542 and 1544, though made in the name of honor to avenge respectively the disgrace of Sir Robert Bowes' defeat and the breach of the Greenwich marriage contract, were both intended to enfeeble the Scots and render them harmless. The Most Christian King claimed honor as his justification for his resort to arms in July, 1542.⁶ The previous summer his

⁵Ibid., pp. 66-67.
⁶Byrne, ed., The Letters of King Henry VIII, pp. 355-56.
ambassadors, Antonio Rincon and Cesare Fregoso, had been murdered by Imperialist agents in the Milanese.\(^7\) It made no difference that they had been on a secret mission to further an alliance with the infidel Turks against a fellow Christian, the Catholic emperor, or that Rincon was a Spaniard born and therefore a traitor to his king: the satisfaction of honor was a sacred duty. It was also a convenient guise under which to wage legitimate war for the recovery of Milan, war which by juristic definition was the exclusive right of princes.

The just causes and the just wars which they provoked were in a sense so much play acting. When on May 28, 1543, Christopher Barker, Garter King of Arms, was despatched to Francis I to offer Henry VIII's defiance, the list of grievances it contained reeked of righteous indignation but "had little to do with the actual fighting."\(^8\) Francis was charged to end his unholy alliance with the Turks; cease his depredations against the emperor; pay the arrears of Henry's annual pension promised by the treaty of 1532 of which for nine years past he had not been paid a penny; "and deliver in security for the pension in the future the towns of Boulogne, Ardres, Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire*, III, 269.

\(^7\) Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire*, III, 269.

\(^8\) Lucey Baldwin Smith, *Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p. 154. As safe-conduct was denied Barker by the French, Henry's ultimatum was actually delivered to Francis through his ambassador in London. See *L. & P.*, pt. 1, No. 754 (1).
Montreuil, Therouanne, and the county of Ponthieu." The French king was further instructed to abstain from practicing with the Scots; liberate all English subjects wrongfully imprisoned; and deliver into Henry's hands all rebels to his government, including a demented Yorkist, a cobbler's son, who called himself "la Blanche Rose." Finally, "for the quiet of Christendom," Francis was to unite with Henry and Charles in driving the Turks from Europe. His très chrétien Majesté was apportioned twenty days in which to perform these feats, at the end of which if he had failed to act Henry would denounce war against him, adding for good measure his demands for "the realm of France, the duchies of Normandy, Gascony, the Guienne," plus all the lands which Francis and his ancestors were held to have usurped from him on the Continent.  

It would be easy, as most Tudor historians have found, from "such an imaginative array of international grievances" to isolate the Scottish question as the "true" cause of Henry's ire; but the fact of the matter is that in his defiance there is no "true" cause at all: "the entire challenge was window-dressing, merely a formal recognition that a 'just' war could only be waged between sovereign princes."  

The true cause of the French war of 1543, as in Henry's case

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9State Papers, IX, 388; Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, Nos. 163-64.

10Smith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, p. 155.
it always had been, was glory. He would fight in France again, not for political gain or economic aggrandizement but, as Vergil had perceived at the beginning of his reign, to "create such a fine opinion about his valor among all men that they could clearly understand that his ambition was not merely to equal but indeed to excel the glorious deeds of his ancestors."\(^{11}\) Through him the halcyon days of English chivalry would live again. With Edward III and Henry V he would tread the sacred battle-ground of Picardy: "A single town added to the Calais foothold, a hundred acres of territory trod by the heroes of Agincourt and restored to England, was worth all the lochs and moors of Scotland."\(^{12}\)

At its roots the romantic justification for Henry's last reentry into the continental lists might have been medieval, but it was an incontrovertible verity that in Europe the fight into which he proposed to plunge himself was modern and that the troops employed there were professionals. According to a Spanish informant whose information is said to have come from Francis I's own secretary, the French in 1542, excluding garrison troops, had some seventy thousand men in arms against the Imperialists in Italy, the Low Countries, and Roussillon. Among these the preponderant number

\(^{11}\text{Vergil, Historia Anglica, p. 161.}\)

\(^{12}\text{Smith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, p. 199.}\)
came from the most advanced military races of Europe: forty-three thousand Swiss and German pikemen; four or five thousand Italians, arquebusiers and heavy cavalrymen; two thousand Clevelander horse; an assortment of Basque jinetes and Albanian stradiots; not to mention the native French forces, including "four thousand old soldiers formerly in Piedmont, the best troops in the world;" and a vast collection of up-to-date artillery of varied caliber. A year later, in October, 1543, for the relief of Landrecies in Hainault, Francis is said to have raised almost as large an army: fifty thousand foot and fifteen thousand horse, the majority again mercenaries from Switzerland, Italy and the German states.

The military strength of the emperor was if anything greater. The mind boggles at the thought of the potential forces available to him: the soldiery of Spain, Naples, the Milanese, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and when it was not engaged against the Turks that of his brother, Ferdinand I, king of Hungary and Bohemia, heir-designate of the Holy Roman Empire. In Italy alone at the opening of his third war with Francis I in 1536 he had in excess of sixty-five thousand men of all arms, the bulk of them being mercenaries

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13 Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 23; L. & P., XVII, Nos. 517 (3), (4), (5); 528, 554.

and auxiliaries recruited to supplement his permanent Spanish tercios in Lombardy, Naples, and Sicily. 

Conservatively speaking, considering the many fronts on which the emperor might at any time be engaged, Charles probably had at his command and in his pay in excess of one hundred thousand men, nearly all of them professionals, either mercenaries, as were the majority of his Italians, or veterans of standing units like his Spanish tercios, the Netherlands bandes d'ordonnance, or the various military orders like the Teutonic Knights, whose Grand Master, Wolfgang Schuzbar, led a contingent of "cavaliers" for the emperor during the Anglo-Imperial invasion of France in 1544.

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16 Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659 (Cambridge: University Press, 1972), p. 6, places the number of Charles' effectives in 1552 at one hundred-fifty thousand.

17 Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, pp. 87, 98. The Grand Masterships of the three great crusading orders of Spain—Alcántara, Calatrava, and Santiago—were conferred upon Charles by Pope Adrian IV in 1523. Merriam, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, 192. Don Sancho Bravo de Mardones (or Lagunas), commander of the Order of Alcántara, served on Charles' general staff during the French war of 1544. Founded in the twelfth century during the Spanish reconquest of Castile, these military-religious societies acquired great wealth and property in the years of fighting against the Moors. By Adrian's bull their assets were united with the crown, but to satisfy his creditors Charles was obliged to relinquish control of the administration of those assets to the Augsburg banking house of Fugger.
The military establishment of the early Tudors is so weak by comparison that one must consider them audacious indeed for ever having so much as contemplated war outside of their own bailiwick, the British Isles, except that it is to be remembered that no large-scale operation was ever considered on the mainland without at least the promise of support from either Spain, the Empire, or both. Henry VII, though in the end he had to go it alone, had invaded France in 1492 on earlier assurances of cooperation from Ferdinand of Aragon, and so likewise had it been arranged by the treaty signed between Henry VIII and the emperor in February, 1543: in conjunction with Charles V the second Tudor, using the specious and time-worn claim of his ancestors to the French throne, would hazard the possible humiliation of defeat, the security of his realm, and the bankruptcy of his government for the satisfaction of a bellicose urge. The eighth Henry was "a prince of royal courage;" therefore, in the words of the late Chancellor, Cardinal Wolsey, everything and anything would be risked "rather than he [would] miss or want part of his appetite."19

18 See above, pp. 231-32.

The risk to England probably appeared slight at the beginning of 1543. Scotland, recovering from the debacle of Solway Moss, was properly submissive; the French offensives of the previous year had been beaten back by the Imperialists; and by the end of the summer, after the deliverance of Henry's defiance to Francis and the signing of the Greenwich treaties in July, things augured well for Charles' success. Another attack on the Netherlands by the French and their confederate, Duke William of Cleves, after some anxious moments had been repulsed. In March the duke, who disputed the claim of the emperor to the reversion of the duchy of Gelders, had invaded the county of Juliers, invested Heinsberg, and defeated the forces of the Imperialist Duke of Arschot at Sittard in neighboring Westphalia; while in June with the Netherlands government thus distracted Francis himself had forced entry into Hainault, occupied Landrecies, and for a time ravaged defenceless Luxemburg.

By now, however, the Imperialists had rallied under the energetic leadership of the emperor, who in July marched out of Italy to Bonn where he mustered a polyglot army of

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20 William, brother to Ann of Cleves and therefore former brother-in-law to Henry VIII, had actually occupied Gelders on the death of its last duke, Charles of Egmont, in 1538.

21 Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, Nos. 117, 121, 125, 159, 181; State Papers, IX, 512.
Dutchmen, Germans, Burgundians, Italians, and Spaniards with which towards the end of August he struck into the territories of the Duke of Cleves. Duren in Juliers was taken by storm on August 24, and in a terrifying display of summary justice the male defenders were put to the sword, the town itself being given over in plunder to the Spaniards and Italians who had distinguished themselves in the assault. This bloody example brought the rebellious vassal to heel. Juliers was surrendered, and on September 7 the duke himself tendered his humble submission to the emperor, renouncing all claim to Gelders as the primary condition of his pardon.

In the meantime Charles' English alliance had borne its first fruit, as in June, in the weeks immediately following the opening of the French offensive against the southern Netherlands, Henry was induced, as the treaty required, to send a force of English auxiliaries to participate in the defence of the Low Countries. Command of the expedition which was raised entirely from retinues provided by private gentlemen was entrusted to Sir John Wallop, who as "chief captain" with some five thousand men departed from Calais on July 22 with instructions to employ his men as required by the government of

23L. & P., XVIII, pt. 2, Nos. 86, 97, 126, 143, 162, 168.
It was originally hoped by Henry that Wallop might be used, as had been contemplated in 1542, in seizing Montreuil or Boulogne. However, the rapid build-up of French reserves in the Boulonnais and the danger to Brussels caused by Francis' irruption into Hainault compelled Mary to utilize Wallop's not inconsiderable talents in the more practical business of expelling the French from her lands. Landrecies in southern Hainault was her especial concern. An otherwise insignificant dot on the map until captured and fortified by the French in the last days of June, it was seen as the key to the control of the whole province and an entrance through which Francis could strike at Artois and possibly even Brussels. It was therefore to the siege of that town that the English auxiliaries were sent, but in the almost nineteen weeks they labored in the company of soldiers from every corner of the Hapsburg empire nothing of consequence was accomplished.

Not even the appearance of Charles, fresh from his triumph over the Duke of Cleves, could effect the reduction of the fortress. On October 29 when Francis approached his beleaguered prize in order of battle the siege was lifted thus allowing the French to resupply the town with victuals and a

24 State Papers, IX, 440.
fresh garrison. Following this, as neither commander was willing to risk a full engagement, the two sides retired to winter quarters, and on November 11 amid assurances that they had acquitted themselves well, the English took their leave of the emperor and headed back to Calais, their sole consolation being that they had gained some badly needed exposure to military methods they could hardly have obtained elsewhere: "I promise your Majesty," wrote Wallop on departing: Landreccies, "that in all the wars I have been in, I have not seen such another time for youth to learn... especially since the emperor's coming, who brought with him horsemen and foot of all nations, so as your Majesty's men here might learn and choose what fashion they liked best."  

This revealing statement, coming as it did from one of Henry's most expert soldiers, contained within it the thinly

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26 Ibid., Nos. 354, 384.
28 Sir John Wallop was one of but a handful of Henrician Englishmen who could qualify as a professional soldier, as most of his career was spent on active duty. His military experience is presumed to have begun in 1511 when it is supposed he was sent as part of an English expedition to the Low Countries to assist the Regent, Margaret of Savoy, in suppressing a revolt in Gelders. Knighted for his services he was next employed as a captain at sea in Henry VIII's first French war, after which between 1516 and 1518 he fought
veiled admission that Englishmen had in fact a great deal to learn about the ways of war and the manner of waging it.

Since this was the case, and as there were few about the king who were likely to dispute Wallop's knowledge in such matters, it was felt that before the English leader withdrew from the Netherlands he should attempt to secure from among the hundreds of foreign captains with whom he daily came in contact the names of a few who might on Henry's crossing the Channel be willing to join the English in their attack upon France. 29

Accordingly, Wallop began to take notes. From Landrecies, just before the lifting of the siege, he informed Sir William Paget, Henry's late ambassador in Paris and one of the king's two Principal Secretaries, 30 that he knew of forty or fifty Albanians who could be used to augment the squadron

as a gentleman-volunteer in the army of Manuel I of Portugal against the Moors in North Africa. On his return to England he was posted for three years in Ireland and in 1522 and 1523 distinguished himself under Surrey and Suffolk in France. Apparently a man of considerable experience in fortifications and in leading men, he was created High Marshal of Calais in 1524, elevated to the lieutenancy of that town in 1530, and finally raised to the captaincy of Guisnes in 1541. For commanding the English forces before Landrecies he was elected Knight of the Garter on Christmas eve, 1543. William Arthur Jobson Archbold, "Sir John Wallop," Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Sir Leslie Stephens and Sir Sidney Lee (22 vols. and supplis., London: Oxford University Press, 1949- ), XX 609-12. Hereinafter cited as D. N. B.


30 The other was Sir Thomas Wriothesley, who was succeeded in that office by Sir William Petre on the former's elevation to the post of Lord Chancellor on May 3, 1544.
of Northern horse stationed at Guisnes; to Henry he wrote from Douai that he had the names of "divers chiefs" of infantry and cavalry, Spaniards, Germans, and Italians; while on November 8 he was ordered by the Privy Council to consult with the best captains of Cleves "to learn how the emperor was served by them." Though the latter instructions arrived after the disbandment of the Imperial army Wallop anticipated them, having, as he wrote in reply, previously "practiced with them" through his intermediary, the Netherlands Count of Buren, who besides promising an unlimited supply of Cleve-lander cavalry offered of his own retinues "horsemen, footmen, gunners for mortars, drumslades and fifers, as many as the king shall need." There was no end of mercenary applicants: Joergen van Lesken and Borges van Moncke, residents of Gotten in Germany, each proffered between three and four hundred horse; the Saxon Count of Mansfeld promised five thousand foot; while out of Italy, Alexandro Gonzaga, bastard son of the Duke of Mantua, offered on two months' notice four thousand infantry and three hundred mounted arquebusiers. 31

Such declarations of intent were gratifying, particularly as it was now certain that the combined assault on France would take place sometime in the new year. The details had yet to be hammered out, but on December 10, as Wallop

settled back in at Guisnes for the winter, Don Ferrante Gonzaga, the Imperial Viceroy of Sicily, was sent from Brussels by the emperor with full authority "to conclude all things pertaining thereto."32

A firm timetable for the invasion and a plan of action were Charles' primary concerns, the more so as Henry's deepening rift with the Scots suggested to his cynical mind a weakening of the king's resolution towards their precontracted enterprise. Scotland the emperor felt would ruin everything, if Henry was in fact intent upon having it. But the king was not. For the sake of honor besmirched by the broken treaties of Greenwich and for the security of the northern frontier, the border wars might continue; however, the greater glory was to be had in France. Therefore, when Don Ferrante appeared at Hampton Court about Christmas it took less than a week to dispel the emperor's doubts and devise a new compact by which France might best be undone.

By the articles signed on the last day of the year, Henry and Charles pledged to commence their war against the common enemy no later than June 20 with separate armies increased in strength from their original twenty-nine thousand to forty-two thousand, including on the English side the Imperial auxiliaries promised in February and as many mercenaries from the

32Ibid., Nos. 457, 485.
emperor's territories as Henry chose to hire. But as for objectives, other than the defeat of France none were clearly stated. Both princes were to strike in the general direction of Paris, the emperor through Champagne and the English by such passage across Picardy as seemed least defensible. However, each commander reserved the right, on Henry's insistence, to alter his course as strategy, availability of supplies, and the disposition of the enemy dictated. At face value this could be taken as an indication of prudent generalship, but unfortunately, as events would prove, it was nothing less than another demonstration of the gargantuan monarch's wilful appetite. Henry would have his few yards of France at minimum risk to himself and his army. For by voting himself a free hand at a time when he knew his ally must pursue a fight already begun, he had arrogated unto himself the right of deciding his own objectives, and these in all likelihood never included Paris. The throne of France, more so than the crown of Scotland, was beyond his reach. Of this reality Henry was doubtless aware, so that when it came to the point, as a man who "attempted nothing which he did not bring to a successful conclusion," he would settle for much less, leaving Charles to shift for himself, but employing Imperial soldiers to attain his end.

33 Ibid., No. 526. See also No. 525 (1), (3). See p. 154.
What Henry would eventually settle for was a minor extension of his Pale in France. The fortified town of Boulogne, a fishing port located a mere twenty-two miles from Calais, was his goal, though for fear the emperor would withdraw his support if the truth were out that objective remained the secret of the king alone until the very eve of his departure for the campaign. In the interim, every effort was made to give the Imperialists no cause for reproach. Plans for carrying through the invasion were implemented immediately, beginning at the first of the year with an attempt to assess costs. The sum of £250,000 was the figure arrived at, but as Henry could lay his hands on barely half that amount and was not prepared at present to "molest his loving subjects for money unless thereto coacted," commissions were issued in March and April authorizing the sale of various royal properties in England and Ireland.\textsuperscript{34} As provisions, guns, ships, and munitions were collected, other extra-Parliamentary means were resorted to, as for example the sale of wards and manumission for bondmen, and loans were also required because of the added expense of outfitting Hertford's expedition against the Scots. In mid-May, about the time of the earl's triumphal return to Berwick, Stephen Vaughan, one of Henry's principal factors in the Low Countries, was commissioned to negotiate for £20,000 a month

\textsuperscript{34}L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 278 (4), (5), (67), 443 (7).
with the German and Italian bankers of Antwerp.  

As to the raising of the English forces which Henry would lead into France, it had long been decided that the bulk of the troops were to be provided not by the militia, which was to be held in readiness for the defence of the realm, but by the private retinues of England's lords and gentlemen. "Special" musters had been ordered in the spring of 1543 following the successful negotiation of the preliminary treaty with the emperor. The crown was therefore possessed of considerable information about the military power of its magnates and knew precisely which could serve and how many retainers each could provide. In the muster rolls prepared from the certificates returned in 1543, the exact number of English effectives drafted for "voyage into France" was 32,389: 9,978 for the vanguard under Norfolk; 12,847 for the middle or king's ward; and 9,564 for the rearguard under the Lord Privy Seal,


36 "General" musters and "special" musters were the normal means in early Tudor England by which the government inquired into the military preparedness of the kingdom. "By means of the former ... the crown attempted to ascertain the strength of the militia in every shire; by means of the latter it attempted to ascertain the 'power' of every gentlemen of standing in the land." Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English People, 1511-1558," pp. 85, 268.

Sir John Russell. Allowing for a few last-minute withdrawals because of sickness, death, or changes in assignments, Henry was under obligation to find six thousand mercenaries. That sum combined with the amount of the English effectives and the auxiliaries volunteered by Charles would raise the army royal to the treaty strength of forty-two thousand.

The quest for mercenaries had begun in earnest the past November in the emperor's camp at Landrecies. Wallop had supplied many names, but it was apparent from the first that there would be difficulties in recruiting. The Italians were felt to be untrustworthy; others, presumably like the Saxon Count of Mansfeld, were "too distant;" while the few free lances willing to bargain could not be made to accept the terms. Typical of the latter was one Gymynck, the master of Gymnyhe Castle near Cologne. Advanced a pension of 200 crowns on the expectation he would raise a thousand horse,

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Ibid., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 274 (p. 159), 275 (2), 276. These figures do not include the hordes of brewers, bakers, millers, carters, masons, smiths, tentmakers and other such workmen necessary for military provisioning and maintenance. One estimate of the number of non-combatants alone required for the victualing of the king's battle listed two chief masters of victuals, two clerks, eight sellers of bread, sixteen sellers of drink, sixteen butchers, thirty conductors and "watchers" of victuals, sixteen herdsmen and drovers of cattle, 480 carters for 240 wagons, three cooper, three cartwrights, three smiths, and twenty common laborers, not to mention one hundred millers, one hundred brewers, and one hundred bakers, plus their various helpers, totalling in all 1,372 persons. Another estimate gives as the number of English non-combatants attached to the whole army 2,328. (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/184, ff. 56-62.
he absconded with the money and refused to serve.  

A more flagrant case of larceny involved the landsknecht leader, Christopher von Landenberg, described in one of his fulsome missives to the English government as "from the side of Landenberg near Schramberg" in Baden. Commended to Henry by the emperor himself, he received from the king's own hand the commission of "colonel" with authority to provide a thousand cavalrymen for the main battle and four thousand infantrymen to be divided between the van and the rear. The colonel's letter of articles stipulated that his forces be ready at Maastricht by May 26. Consequently, well in advance of that date Henry appointed as special commissaries Stephen Vaughan and Thomas Chamberlain, two skilled mediators and experts in finance, to oversee their muster and expedite their rapid transit through the Low Countries.

The commissioners left England on March 12, arriving

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39 L. & P., XVIII, pt. 2, No. 385; XIX, pt. 1, No. 188.
40 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/185, f. 187.
41 L. & P., XVIII, pt. 2, Nos. 479-80, 488; XIX, pt. 1, No. 653. Chapuys in the Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 267, describes the composition of the horsemen as follows: two hundred men-at-arms, three hundred arquebusiers, and five hundred lancers.
42 On the careers of these two prominent public servants consult Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial Agent of Henry VIII, Chap. V and passim.
with layovers at Bruges and La Noye at Antwerp on the twenty-third. Here they parted company. Chamberlain remained behind to arrange for supplies and the exchange of English currency for additional foreign troops, while Vaughan rode off to Speyer where Landenberg awaited receipt of the conduct money his recruits would demand before setting out for Calais. Vaughan had been warned to expect the worse, Landenberg having "failed the emperor six weeks the last summer" in Juliers, so that what transpired was not totally unexpected.

The trip to Speyer was completed on the last day of March. At the interview held on April 1 with the colonel's interpreter present to explain the meaning, the condottiere balked during the review of the articles contained in his contract. He had, he asserted, been deceived as regards the valuation of the florin which at 20 stuivers of Brabant or 2s. 6d. sterling "was less than the emperor gave in these presents to his own subjects." To be well served the English must pay no less than the emperor which by the month for

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43See L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 245-46.

44This was not the English florin of the value of 2s. but the Flemish florin or philipus guilder which brought at the rate of exchange current in March, 1544, about 3s. 1 1/2d. sterling. State Papers, IX, 621. Six months or so later the philip or guilder, as the Flemish florin is variously designated in English documents, had risen in value to 3s. 2d. It is cited as having the same value on April 21, 1546. Cf. (B. M.) Add. MS. 5753, ff. 179b, 190, 191. It was the normal money of account on which soldiers' rates of pay were calculated.
footman was four florins or 25 stuivers of 12s. 6d. sterling. The price of hiring four-horse wagons proved another sticking point. These carriages, one assigned to every twelve cavalry-men for the conveyance of their baggage and implements of war, had been promised at a charge of 24 kreutzers or 1s. a day. But Landenberg, "because he understood not the French tongue" and claimed ignorance "in the things he did in England," demanded again the emperor's price which in this case was 2s. 6d. the day.

To Vaughan's further discomfiture a final argument was raised. When read the article specifying the mustering place, the colonel begged to be excused, as Charles had ordered him to collect his men at Cologne and would in no wise permit any muster to be made around Maastricht. The Englishmen could only marvel at these variances and upbraided the officer for having no better weighed his obligations before concluding the bargain; but as nothing was likely to be gained by recriminations, Landenberg was excused with a request to reconsider and to let Vaughan know his mind within the next day or two.

At their next meeting on April 3 things were somewhat

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45 This rate had been verified by Dr. Nicholas Wotton, Henry's regular ambassador in Germany, on March 19, almost two weeks before Vaughan's arrival in Speyer. See State Papers, IX, 621.

46 Vaughan's first contact with Landenberg is described in full in (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/185, ff. 182-83.
better resolved. The English Council, in advance of Vaughan's departure from Antwerp, had been advertised of the likelihood of trouble by Henry's resident ambassador in Germany, Dr. Nicholas Wotton, and authorization had been posted to Speyer that if Landenberg would not be content with the florin of 20 stuivers he should have what the emperor paid. While Vaughan had been in possession of this information at the previous conference, like the faithful steward he was, he had tried to safeguard his sovereign's treasure by holding to the colonel's original engagement. However, as the mercenary was set upon the higher wages, it was agreed with a certain amount of relief on both sides that he should have them, Landenberg receiving shortly thereafter on Easter Sunday in Frankfurt 16,000 florins in conduct money for his soldiers and the emperor's permission to gather his men at Aachen before proceeding to Aire in Artois where Henry planned a general muster of the bulk of his free lances on June 20.47

The matter it seemed was settled, though in truth the problem of satisfying that imperious war-lord had just begun. Landenberg kept tryst at Aachen, bringing his companies thence on May 24, though the arrival of Ralph Vane and Richard Wyndebank, the two commissioners sent to deal with him on this

47(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/185, f. 187 contains Landenberg's acknowledgement of the receipt of this money. See also L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 328 (p. 216), 349.
occasion, was delayed by rain until the twenty-ninth. The Englishmen found him intractable, promising his adherents "mountains of gold" and demanding, besides a full month's wages, entertainment for an additional four hundred horsemen that had followed him out of High Germany. Henry was incensed as well could be expected. Landenberg's band represented almost one-eighth of his invasion force, the forward elements of which were already in Calais, and the date fixed for the start of the campaign was three weeks away; but in these straits there seemed no other recourse but to compromise.

Vane and Wyndebank were accordingly charged by the Council to humor the troublemaker and in a gesture of goodwill retain half of the excess horsemen. But regrettably each concession brought new demands. Landenberg had gone beyond his bargain once and intended the same again, as on June 12 four of his captains were sent to England to discuss certain "weighty matters," including immediate disbursement of the first month's wages and allowance for seventeen hundred "dead-pays" over and above the one thousand granted by the second compact. It was a calculated move on the part of an


49 The term "dead-pay," more familiar in Elizabeth's reign than in the early Tudor period, had several meanings. It could be a legitimate pension awarded to a retired or
experienced extortioner, for even as his paladins embarked in England, before Henry had a chance to study the remedy, further pecuniary difficulties were being raised in Aachen concerning men-at-arms, wagons, and messengers. It was another "evil journey." Amid these wild men Vane and Wyndebank feared for their very lives, while Landenberg flaunted his power, boasting that "he had been bold in his days to displease an emperor and a king of the Romans" and now would not hesitate to do the same to a king of England.  

Such outrageous talk was hardly tempered to suit a man of Henry's violent capacity, and as it reached his ears before the leave-taking of the colonel's emissaries from London, the king resolved to wash his hands of him; but to show the world that the fault was not his own he agreed that at Landenberg's release his band should have an extra month's pay "at

disabled veteran, or an illegal pay drawn in the name of a dead man, usually by the deceased's commanding officer. In this case, however, "dead-pay" is synonymous with "double-pay," as in the German sense of "doppelsoldner," "arquebusier" in modern translation, but in origin a "soldier who received double-pay" either because of his rank or experience. Such double-pays were offered by recruiting officers to attract at least a core of the most experienced fighters. Landenberg's first articles had provided for sixty dead-pays per ensign, but in consideration of the colonel's reputation, "and to have picked men," Henry in the second compact "con-descended to raise from sixty to one hundred dead-pays ... which is the largest entertainment that the emperor now gives." L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 623, 689, 728-29.

50Ibid., No. 648.
the emperor's rate of one hundred dead-pays in an ensign." 51

This verdict was announced to the landsknecht envoys by
the Council on June 18 and forthwith relayed to the commis­sioners in the camp of the Germans, who two days earlier,
having eaten up the countryside around Aachen, suddenly re­moved to Liege where such was their spoilation and thievery
that in the judgement of the Queen of Hungary the occupation
of the neighborhood by an invading army would have been infi­nitely more desirable. 52 Moreover, the plight of Vane and
Wyndeband was desperate. Threats and abuse were daily show­ered upon them for their alleged illiberality. For fear they
would be waylaid and their money taken from them, the English­men refused to accompany Landenberg to Liege and instead
sought safety in nearby Maastricht where the king's instruc­tions regarding the acquittance of the mercenaries reached
them.

In pursuance of their orders a gentleman of Liege was
sent to the German leader to inform him of his discharge,
while on the twenty-first with an armed guard begged from the
magistrates of Maastricht in the small hours of the morning
they fled to Diest in Brabant. From thence a short time
later, Vane travelling in advance to report their proceedings

51 Ibid., No. 728.
52 Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 128.
to the regent in Brussels, both made their escape to Antwerp by the end of the month. In all they had paid out 29,000 crowns on Landenberg which sum, if added to the 16,000 florins advanced him in Speyer, came to £9,266. But for what? Not a single day's service had been performed, whereas at Brussels and the Imperial court the claims of the plundered inhabitants of Liège for compensation for their ravaged goods created ill-feeling towards the English allies for several months to come: "no affair," complained the queen regent, "had given us so much trouble as this one of Landenberg's men." Though unwilling "to inculpate any of the parties," there being faults on both sides, the present trouble sprang, she felt, "from some misunderstanding or other on the part of [Henry's] commissaries, owing no doubt to their being insufficiently acquainted with the manner of dealing with recruits from Upper Germany, who are in the habit of asking first unreasonable prices for their services and, if they find that the contractors are inexperienced in affairs of that sort, making most excessive and preposterous demands."

Much could be said for the regent's point of view,

53The crowns here in question were Flemish crowns valued in February, 1546, at 38 stuivers or 4s 8d sterling. See L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 254. For the satisfaction of the second month's pay and the remainder of the first, Vane and Wyndebank estimated on July 16 that Landenberg was owed an additional 41,426 crowns. Ibid., XIX, pt. 1, No. 926.

54Spanish Calendar, VII, Nos. 143, 159.
except that the Imperialist authorities were only minimally better equipped for dealing with such brigands. The last act in this sordid drama was staged in the first weeks of July when already the English army, in a masking movement preparatory to its assault on Boulogne, was besieging Montreuil. On the fifth, in a letter to Chapuys, Charles admitted that since every effort had failed to induce Henry to retain Landenberg there was no other cure but that his delinquent vassal be taken into his own service. Otherwise there would be no end to the colonel's mischief in the Low Countries, or worse, being disappointed of a liberal paymaster he would cross over to the French. 55 This latter course which might well have been contemplated was eventually prevented, as on August 11, Landenberg appeared in the emperor's camp at Saint Dizier at the head of 2,492 High German foot. 56

Perfidy it seemed had its own rewards, but the case of the predaceous colonel was scarcely an isolated one. On March 6, 1544, contemporaneous with the appointments of Chamberlain and Vaughan as commissioners of the musters, Nicholas Wotton, the ambassador with the emperor, was engaged to retain a

55 Ibid., No. 144.

56 Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, p. 99. The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, p. 547, though it does not mention Landenberg, states that "On the eleventh the Imperial camp was reinforced by the arrival of six thousand Germans."
thousand horse to replace the band withheld by Gymynck. 57
Resident at the time in Speyer where the Imperial Diet was considering what military aid, if any, should be granted the emperor, Wotton was required to inaugurate his search by making inquiry of Baron Heideck, the same who had been approached by Sir Thomas Seymour on a similar errand in 1542. 58 Heideck, however, had other commitments. As a lord from the Imperial electorate of Brandenburg, he would have to fight for the emperor, so Wotton, as a last resort and in compliance with his directives, was obliged to apply directly to Charles. 59

The business was quickly concluded. On April 4 the subject was broached to the Imperial minister, Nicholas Perrenot, Sieur de Granvelle, and on the seventh word was brought that the emperor had nominated one of his own pensioners, Hans von Sickingen, son of the famous Franz von Sickingen, late friend of Martin Luther and scourge of every paymaster along the Rhine until his death in 1523. 60 With Jean de Lyere, Charles' muster-master, acting as interpreter, a preliminary meeting was held that same evening at Wotton's lodgings to discuss

57 Above, pp. 256-57; also p. 266; L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 188.
58 Above, p. 232.
60 Ibid., No. 312. For notices on the elder Sickingen, one of the most legendary of the landsknecht commanders, consult Blau, Die deutschen Landsknechts, pp. 95-97 and passim.
what amounted to Sickingen's impositions which he had carefully drawn up in advance.

Since he would act as colonel and would be chiefly responsible for the recruitment of the horsemen, he demanded as his retainer 10,000 guilders on the spot, a salary of 200 guilders a month for his lieutenant, which was exactly double the rate allowed in the Imperial army, and 500 guilders for himself, a mere quarter more than was normally issued to ordinary colonels. Further, as special warranty against the defalcation of these extortionate sums, he demanded to have an Imperial city or one of the German banking houses bound in surety by the English for the payment of his men. Wotton was mortified, answering that if Sickingen "had any good knowledge of his master, Henry," he would not ask for so unreasonable a pledge. It was unfortunate, but, countered the war chief, the Sickingens were well acquainted with potentates. At his father's death he and his brother had been cheated of certain monies owed by princes whom their father had served, and for this reason no Sickingen served any lord, "not even the Palsgrave" whose subject he was, without such

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61 The Imperial cities of Nuremberg, Ulm, Augsburg, Frankfurt, and Cologne were specifically mentioned, along with the South German mercantile empires of the Fuggers and Welsers whose principal and original seat of power was Augsburg.

62 Frederick II, Elector-Palatine of the Rhine.
assurance.\textsuperscript{63} At this point the dragoman, De Lyere, interrupted to ask what town or company had been given as security when he served the French king, to which Sickingen in a reply hardly geared to endear him to the proud Tudor in London retorted that Francis "did ever pay truly."

As the colonel refused to moderate his conditions, the conversation was broken off, Wotton promising to forward his articles and the discussion on them to Henry. The ambassador plainly disliked the man whose face he described as "so red and fiery and garnished with rubies as it may well appear that his mother never taught him to water his wine." His intention was to find another captain, one who would "serve without this assurance of towns," particularly since "to prevent grudging" the emperor aimed to have his men and Henry's foreigners at the same wages. Albeit, before he could act he was hopelessly compromised by Charles. On his own authority, but in Henry's name, the emperor pledged the securities that Sickingen desired with the Welsers, Fuggers, and various merchants to the effect that the colonel's horsemen would "be regularly paid from their arrival until they quit the English service." Charles excused his impolitic presumption on the grounds of expediency. If his dear uncle did not act immediately, he reasoned, then either the best gentlemen would be

\textsuperscript{63}L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 312 (pp. 197-99) contains Wotton's full account of his deliberations with Sickingen.
taken up or Henry entirely deprived of much needed cavalry. 64

The king and his Council thought otherwise. There were, as Henry told Chapuys on April 21, plenty of other German captains willing to serve if only the emperor would permit them, and one who had been contracted was even then on his way to enlist 450 horsemen in Maastricht. 65 As for Sickingen, in Henry's humble opinion it was he and not the colonel who needed assurances. There were reports which had reached the Council that that officer had been deliberately overlooked by Charles' recruiters in March because he was not the experienced soldier he pretended to be. Moreover, Henry complained, Sickingen had once served King Francis "and done other unreasonable acts." Chapuys was to inform the emperor that he would not employ his colonel, adding between his teeth "and with evident signs of resentment" that he would rather forfeit what had already been paid on account than continue the negotiations further. 66

The amount involved was considerable, 10,000 florins or £1564 10s 0d. It had been wrung from the reluctant Wotton by Charles, who subsequent to the minister's consultation.

64Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 64.

65The captain here in question was Thomas Lightmaker, a merchant-turned-mercenary. See below, pp. 271-74. Also p. 269.

66Spanish Calendar, VII, Nos. 72-73; L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 360.
with Sickingen had applied such pressure that the hapless ambassador had gone through with the man. The sum represented a retainer which if not backed by the required pledges guaranteeing regular pay was to remain in Sickingen's possession "and to his profit without his being obliged to do any service at all." 67

It was hardly an equitable arrangement, and the Council lost no time in berating Wotton for his lapse in judgement. The wretched man was enjoined to ask that the money be returned, but naturally on making inquiry his answer was that it had already been spent. Afraid, therefore, that it might fall personally upon him to make restitution he wailed out his plea for forgiveness: while he would not excuse himself, he had been importuned by the emperor and through inexperience had been used for an evil purpose. Nonetheless, "as God hears no man's petition sooner than theirs who trust to his goodness for mercy," so also would he trust Henry "(who in his supreme dignity most resembles God in this world)." In the face of so contrite and truckling an entreaty the king was content to let the matter pass. Wotton was absolved, and the business of Sickingen, who like Landenberg was

67 Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 64. The retainer was paid in two installments of 2,000 and 8,000 florins, the last being brought from Frankfurt to Speyer by Vaughan on April 16 and turned over to Sickingen on the day following. Cf. Ibid, and No. 66; L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 347.
It was obviously in Charles' best interests to try to foist or even force upon the English those truculent free lances whom he distrusted himself and who, if denied employment on the one side, had no trouble in finding it on the other. However, from the perspective of the Council in London it was daily becoming more obvious that the invasion schedule worked out in March would not be met. It was Henry's plan that his foreign captains would have their men ready at Aire by June 20 for an eastward march through Artois and into the Pale, there to join the English van and rear which were to await their coming at Guisnes or the French town of Licques on the verge of the Boulonnais. Unhappily the misprision of Sickingen and Landenberg had thrown everything into confusion. April was now drawing to a close, but as six thousand mercenaries still had to be found somewhere, and the emperor in Henry's mind had been guilty of nonfeasance, the king began immediately to seek out captains on his own.

Among the first approached was the Dutchman, Thomas Lightmaker, who at the height of the Sickingen controversy was retained to bring 450 horsemen out of Maastricht in

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68 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 555; pt. 2, No. 199. Sickingen was commissioned to raise five ensigns of foot.

69 Ibid., pt. 1, Nos. 271 (4), 349, 380, 399, 690.
Limburg. Little is known of him except that he had been a merchant, a London-based agent of the German financial house of Stillar, who on the bankruptcy of his employers turned to trafficking in mercenaries. 70 The saga of what might very well have been his first commission is one of the most tortuous and revealing of the war in that it demonstrates that the dilemmas encountered in obtaining troops were not always faced by those rulers for whose armies they were recruited.

Lightmaker must have left England shortly before the arrival from Speyer of Wotton's letter of April 9 in which the diplomatist informed Henry that for the mustering of free lances the Imperialists had declared Maastricht off-limits, the reason being that, as it lay close to Juliers within the late territories of the Duke of Cleves, it had already "been too much oppressed with soldiers" in the fighting in 1543. 71 How or when the apprentice-captain learned of this ban is not known, for he is next heard of in a note composed on June 12 in Brussels and sent to the Duke of Norfolk, commander of the foreward in the Pale. Its authors were Thomas Palmer, Edward Vaughan, and Thomas Chamberlain, the three commissaries

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70 Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 147. L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 866 (p. 540) renders a somewhat different translation of this letter from Chapuys to Charles V. Lightmaker is called "a merchant of the Stillars here, who since his bankruptcy has meddled in war."

71 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 312.
appointed in May to enroll the Dutchman's band. From its contents one can gather that Lightmaker had just failed in his appointment to bring his men to Utrecht and was not likely to make the muster at Aire on the twentieth. But why he had failed to rendezvous is made painfully clear in a series of communiqués exchanged between him, the commissioners, and the Council.

He had ranged far in his search for men through the Bishopric of Utrecht and the North German territories of the Schmalkaldic League, both of which areas were in a high state of religious and political agitation. In the former province, his passage had been slowed by the Catholic authorities who believed he had come to assist the "naughty sect" of Anabaptists entrenched there, while in the adjacent lands of the Lutheran confederation the Protestant lords had closed the gates of their towns against him, supposing him to be a partisan of the Catholic duke, Henry of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel,

72Ibid., No. 582 (2) contains the names of all "the commissioners which take the musters of the Almains." This author has been unable to further identify either Palmer or Edward Vaughan. The former may have been a relative of Sir John Palmer (d. 1553), a native of Sussex who in a long career as a soldier held many posts in the Calais Pale and who in 1545 was made captain of the tower known as the "Old Man" in Boulogne. If there was a relationship between Edward Vaughan and the more famous Stephen Vaughan, I have failed to establish it.

73Ibid., Nos. 752-53, 823. See also Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 151 (p. 250).
who was then levying war in an unsuccessful bid to win back the duchy from which the League had driven him in 1542. But despite this nettlesome treatment Lightmaker did not fail in his obligation to the English. Though he came late he brought with him a sturdy band of five hundred "swart reiters," lancers and arquebusiers, among them Dutchmen like himself, Westphalians, and Danes.74 They were at 's Hertogenbosch in northern Brabant on July 30, and within the next week in compliance with Lightmaker's original orders they were prested in haste to join the Duke of Suffolk, lieutenant-general with the main battle, and the king before Boulogne.75

By far the largest single contingent of free lances obtained by Henry after the failure of Landenberg and Sickingen in 1544 was the nearly three thousand-man force brought by Maximilian d'Ysselstein, Count of Buren. His story is of particular interest in that he alone of the score or more foreigners who led troops for Henry in the first phase of the French war enjoyed the distinction of being at one and the same time both a mercenary and an auxiliary, an ambivalent status that happily is quite easy to explain: Buren, on the one hand, was the general appointed at Henry's request to

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74 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 823 (p. 515), 925, 1018.
75 Ibid., No. 753. For a transcription of Lightmaker's capitularies reproduced from (B. M.) Lands. MSS. 155, ff. 356-58 see Appendix. Also see below, pp. 284-85,
command the four thousand auxiliaries pledged by the emperor; on the other, by separate indentures negotiated at various times, the count consented for the usual pecuniary considerations to furnish a supplemental force of mercenaries.

Henry's enthusiasm for Buren can positively be said to have begun with Wallop's letters from Landrecies in 1543. It will be remembered that among the variety of exotic captains approached by the English officer in the course of that affray, Buren had been the most encouraging. He not only had promised mercenaries in bountiful supply, but had himself expressed a desire to lead them. It was therefore for these reasons that Henry applied for his services as the leader of the auxiliaries during Gonzaga's Christmas embassy to Hampton Court. The matter was quickly decided, the emperor allowing that for the speedier commencement of their common enterprise, although he had anticipated using the lord of Buren himself, he was content to give him with two thousand horsemen and two thousand landsknechts to the king.

76 Above, p. 251.
78 Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 22. When the question of Buren's service was first broached in the Imperial court, the emperor was advised to lend the general only on condition that both he and his men be paid by Henry. Afraid however that the English would ally themselves with France if he failed in his obligations to the king, Charles refused to press the point.
It was a few weeks later in January, 1544, that Henry through Wotton contacted Buren on the feasibility of adding to his detachment two thousand mercenary foot whom the king hoped could be raised from among the same bands that had served him at Landrecies. Why the English sovereign felt it necessary to hire these adscititious forces is a puzzle, unless by some mysterious prescience he had divined the impending cozenage of Landenberg and Sickingen; or more likely, to a monarch who "bet only on a sure thing," with an eye perhaps already on Boulogne, Henry was simply seeking to set by some extra insurance. Regardless, for whatever reason the king wanted the mercenaries, Buren was only too happy to provide them, and in March, while Stephen Vaughan made his way to seek out Landenberg in Speyer, Thomas Chamberlain opened debate with the general in Antwerp on the subject of wages.

On Henry's directions Chamberlain tried but failed to set the same terms with Buren as those that were understood

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79 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 89.


81 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/183, f. 205 is a corrected draft of the king's instructions to his commissaries. According to the directives it was Chamberlain who should have gone to Speyer and Vaughan who should have remained behind to deal with Buren. Cf. Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial Agent of Henry VIII, p. 47.
to have been fixed with Landenberg. The count agreed to be bound like the German in every particular except as concerning the valuation of the florin wherein he felt that Landenberg was abused. It was impossible, he said, to hire good soldiers for anything less than the emperor's rate of 4 florins of 25 stuivers a month. Chamberlain demurred. He had to consult his superiors in London, so the affair was arrested—but only momentarily; for on April 8, barely two weeks after the suspension of the talks, a contract was arbitrated in Brussels by which Buren agreed to a lower computation of the florin on condition that Landenberg would serve at the same price. If the German would not, then Buren's two thousand infantrymen were to have "4 philips per month at 25 pattars in Brabantine currency for each philip" or such pay as the emperor would allow the auxiliary foot which Buren would also have under his leading. 82

The Dutch commander's frank dealings and willingness to serve pleased Henry to the extent that, even though in the end Charles' "solde" of 12s. 6d. the month had to be disbursed, a second contract was conferred upon Buren which, issued in April for five hundred cavalrymen and modified in June, eventually netted Henry 706 "fighting horse," 18

82 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/185, art. 4. The "articles and agreement passed between the Count of Buren and Thomas Chamberlain" are reproduced in full in Appendix F.
officers, 37 messengers, 208 cart horses, and various wagons at a monthly rate of £1,774 13s. 9d. The men were mainly Burgundians recruited in the Netherlands to make up in part the critical loss of cavalry caused by the defections of Sickingen and Landenberg. They proved somewhat of a disappointment in that not all were men-at-arms. Many came equipped as demilancers and others, in the fashion then popular in Germany, as pistoleers. But all were taken, and in the second week of July, having arrived too late for the general muster at Aire, they were reviewed by the English

83(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/191, ff. 34-35, gives the total number of horse and foot which served under Ysselstein "at the king's majesty's solde." Wages were computed in karolus guilders, silver coins struck for the Netherlands by Charles V about 1540 at the rate of 2s. 6d. sterling per karolus. Every "fighting" horseman was paid 15 guilders per month, while messengers and cart horses were allotted 7. For references to the second contract and its amendments see L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 399, 410, 580, 667, 752, 811.

84L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 667.

85It is not clear if this assembly was ever held. To ease the strain on the Netherlands government Buren's force, which numbered near seven thousand mercenaries and auxiliaries of all arms, was collected in widely separated areas. The infantry was gathered in the Lordship of Mechlin, the cavalry in extreme northern Brabant around 's Hertogenbosch and Grave. On June 3 Sir Thomas Palmer, muster-master to the foreigners in Henry's pay, reported that at a recent view of the footmen furnished at both the king and the emperor's charge "above a thousand men" were lacking, and it was not until the fifteenth that these vacancies were filled. The major part of the concourse had now descended upon Saint Omer within ten miles of Aire, but here it may have remained another six or eight days awaiting the non-arrival of Buren's
commissaries at Saint Omer and marched off immediately to join the mercenary foot and the Imperial auxiliaries who in their blue and red livery had preceded them to Montreuil on July 4.

A quick check of the mercenaries so far accounted for yields the sum of 3,224. These in brief were the five hundred Danish, Westphalian, and Dutch Reiters of Thomas Lightmaker, the 724 Burgundian cavalrymen and officers of Maximilian d'Ysselstein, and the latter's two thousand landsknecht footmen, roughly half of the number of free lances that would eventually participate in the taking of Boulogne and the unavailing siege of Montreuil. The remaining mercenaries—in round figures, three thousand—were acquired from divers sources in the frenetic months of July, August, and September

Burgundian mercenaries, who did not appear in Saint Omer until sometime after July 2. Ibid., Nos. 610, 687, 710, 830.

It is difficult to determine the origin of this band, but probably it contained a high percentage of veterans from the Dutch provinces of Friesland, Groningen, and Overyssel, and the adjacent district of Westphalia. Buren was governor of the provinces and was accustomed to leading troops from that region. By his own admission he distrusted Germans, being loath, as he said, to serve among men he did not know. To prove the point, in March when he was informed by the queen regent that the auxiliary foot he was to conduct for the king of England were to be provided him out of Germany, he successfully petitioned the emperor that he be allowed to recruit them himself from among the Dutch and Westphalian retinues which had served him at Landrecies. But whatever the origin of the mercenaries they were preponderantly pike-men and made a brave show when paraded in Mechlin before Sir Thomas Palmer on June 1. L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 245, 308 (p. 195), 392, 465.
at the very height of operations, some entering service within mere days of the surrender of Boulogne. Their eleventh-hour conscription can in most cases be tied directly to the belated rescission of Landenberg's contract in the final days of July when, with the French and Imperialists still recruiting, choice soldiers were hard to find.

On the default of the Badener colonel's forces, Henry's first impulse was to cover the loss with Englishmen. Sickingen's dereliction had already cost him valuable time, and it was the opinion of his advisers that it was too late "for recruiting elsewhere." Wisely, however, the king overruled himself. His subjects had not been keeping abreast of military developments, and his army of bows and bills was not likely to impress the French. What he needed most was men-at-arms, pikemen, and arquebusiers. Unable to secure them in sufficient quantity in England he turned once again to find them on the Continent, knowing full well his quest meant further delay and that upon their acceptance or rejection of his

\[87\] Both the English and the Imperialist armies were supposed to be fully mustered and ready for action in France by June 20. However, in discussion with Chapuys on June 16 concerning the Landenberg debacle Henry intimated that he could not cross to Calais until July 8. \textit{Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 124}. The king in fact embarked for that port on July 14. It is obvious to this writer that the pettifoggery and naked avarice of both Landenberg and Sickingen, who between them had they been less obstreperous could have enjoyed a near monopoly of the English monarch's patronage of mercenaries, played the major part in Henry's late departure for the war.
offers hung possibly the difference between victory and de­feat.

Henry's immediate concern was for the main-battle of his army royal. This was the division from which he would personally command; yet except for the five hundred foreign horsemen of Thomas Lightmaker every mercenary thus far re­tained was assigned to the van and the rear. Drastic action was called for. The Imperialists had been campaigning in Luxemburg since May, and with a foreknowledge born of bit­ter experience Henry knew that he must strike soon if he were to achieve his moment of glory. For if Charles were defeated or decided on peace before his forces could gain a lead on the preoccupied French his chances of success were slight.

In a volte-face made necessary by the exigencies of the hour, a conciliatory approach was made in the last week of June to Landerberg's horsemen, who still lingered near Liège with the colonel's infantry, claiming full remittance for the months of May and June plus, as was customary in continen­tal armies, their Abzug or "severance pay," a sum designed to cover expenses on their return home. Henry had no

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88Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Fran­çaises, pp. 88-91.

89In the war of 1544-46 infantrymen and virtually all light cavalry troops were allowed an Abzug of two weeks pay, while men-at-arms and demilancers received a full month's severance. Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 131. Note (P. R. O.)
thought of rehiring Landenberg, who at any rate with his landsknechts had been offered employment by the emperor. That man, said the king in conversation with Chapuys, had been insolent and had openly defied his commissioners, introducing thereby "such bad custom" as might be followed in the future. The horsemen on the other hand, albeit certain had pursued Vane as far as Brussels, and Wyndebank had to be rescued from forty or fifty in Diest, had ever shown themselves more conformable and "affectionate." These, therefore, would be accorded every consideration and paid their arrears if they would ride immediately to aid the king and his middleward "in the present wars with France." 90

It took four weeks of deliberations and the good offices of Mary of Hungary, who volunteered Hugo de Souastre, chief lieutenant of her guard of archers, as mediator; but eventually on or about July 13 an understanding was reached and five companies of High German heavy cavalry decamped from Liege and by leisurely degrees arrived at Boulogne, where at Henry's headquarters on the north side of the town they were mustered with two other German squadrons and an

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90L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 776 (p. 475), 788, 793, 934; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 128 (p. 210).

S. P. 1/185, art. 16, for Buren's two thousand mercenary foot, and ibid., 1/203, f. 16, for the fifteen hundred men-at-arms recruited by Reiffenberg in 1545.
ensign of mounted arquebusiers on Thursday, August 21. 91

Positive identification of the captains and the respective strength of at least seven of these eight bands can be fixed by careful collation of certain folios in Additional Manuscript 5753 with various entries in the official diary of the Boulogne expedition and the Letters and Papers. The five High German captains and their numbers tell off as follows: Ittelwolf van Goetenberg, Lord of Itter, 92 470; Hillemar van Quernem, 127; Christopher van Pressburg, 415; Otto, Count of Ritberg, 41; and Hans van Winsigenroot, whose surname sounds suspiciously Dutch, 321. 93 As regards the other German units, they were under the pilotage of Albert Bischof, one of the countless foreign "servants" of the king, and Philip van Heurde, a Westphalian inebriate whose genial dipsomania so moved Stephen Vaughan, whom the captain approached in Antwerp,

91 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 831, 833, 838-39, 887, 896, 922, 926; Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120; (B. M.) Add. MS. 5753, ff. 170-80, which consist of a series of receipts received of the German horse soldiers who served the king at Boulogne. The diary, reproduced in Rymer, op. cit., states that the High German cavalry, although not mustered until August 21, came to the English camp on Tuesday, the nineteenth.

92 There was a castle by this name in the Austrian Tyrol.

that the English agent had recommended him to the king. 

Neither of the latter bands were large. Bischof's showed eighty-six "combatants on horseback" and two cuirassiers, "Junker" Philip's, fifty. But, saving the two cuirassiers, every trooper was a man-at-arms.

The identity of the mounted arquebusiers is more problematic, though it seems a safe assumption to presume them to be the five hundred "swart Reiters" of Thomas Lightmaker. The diary of the campaign refers to them as "gunners" of which Lightmaker's ensign contained a high percentage. Also, they are specifically said to have arrived in camp with Bischof and Heurde's contingents on August 13, thus signifying, if they were Lightmaker's troops, that they had the better part of two weeks to cover the roughly 170 miles between their staging-area at 's Hertogenbosch and Boulogne. Finally, though the "gunners" are referred to as "Almains" in the diary, they are excluded from the inventory of "the king's German soldiers," indicating perhaps the large concentration of Danes and Dutchmen among them. Whoever they were and from

94 On Bischof's original offer to bring three hundred men to the king's service see (B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, ff. 375-76. For Heurde's love of drink and his interview with Vaughan see L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 1006-7.

95 Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.

96 Above, p. 274.
wherever they had come they were mustered along with the other seven units, and together these bands functioned as a bodyguard until the king's return to England on September 30 and as a corps d'élite until the demobilization of the Germans at Calais on October 10. 97

Excluding Buren's four thousand auxiliaries, the number of foreigners now stands at 4,736, but other free lances can be discerned, including for the first time a fair number of Latins, mainly arquebusiers on foot, among whom were the eighty-eight Italians of Giovanni de Salerno and the three Spanish companies of captains Alonzo Salablanca, Antonio Pompeo, and Alejandro Moreno.

Of these battle-hardened warriors the most interesting was Salerno. A professional soldier for twenty-four years, he had first offered himself to Henry in 1543, but as there was then "no occasion for war" he had been dismissed "with 100 crowns reward" and license to cross to Flanders, intending, as he said, to return to Italy. He had, however, been arrested with his "base son" at Vilforde, between Mechlin and Brussels, and was detained there for fourteen months for fear he would go to King Francis whom the elder Salerno had

97 Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120; L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 105. The date and place of the demobilization can be gathered from the copies of the pay receipts retained by the English paymasters. (B. M.) Add. MSS. 5753, ff. 170, 173, 174, 176, 193, 195, 197.
served in the past. It was while in ward to the provost of Vilforde that the captain's plight became known to Stephen Vaughan, who had made his acquaintance in London and had heard him boast of his familiarity with the fortifications of both Montreuil and Boulogne.

Vaughan visited the prisoner in mid-August with a view towards ascertaining the depth of his knowledge. It was remarkably profound. Salerno "could not tell how Boulogne was now fortified, but when he was last there it was very strong and only 'saultable between the Calais Gate and a bulwark on the right of that gate as one goes towards Calais." As for Montreuil, when last there, "being brought by Monsieur de Vendôme to view the strength thereof," Salerno had "pointed out that the great bulwark beside the Abbeville Gate which looked wonderfully strong was really the weakest part of the town; but he knew not if it had been mended since."

The captain further advised of the danger to the king's army from "Therouanne, Ardres, and other towns." For the escort of supplies which came mainly from Calais and St. Omer he suggested mounted hackbutters, but not Germans, since in his

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99 Ibid., and No. 67. Vaughan was by this time engaged almost completely as a financial factor, attempting to raise Henry's credit in the Antwerp bourse.

100 Anthony de Bourbon, Duke of Vendôme, was Lieutenant of Picardy and also father of the future king of France, Henry IV.
opinion "their great and heavy horses" were of small worth except in set battles.

Having heard such tantalizing tidbits, Vaughan hastened the information to Henry on August 16 with Salerno's offer of service and an entreaty that the king intercede with the Netherlands government on his behalf. The Italian's release was secured on September 2, twelve days before the fall of Boulogne. Whether the captain was present at the capture of the town is sadly impossible to determine, but the fortress was breached by mining at precisely the point he had indicated it could be, that is at "the northeast corner of the upper town," between the Porte de Calais and the castle. The chances are good that Salerno was not present since on his liberation from Vilforde he would have been faced immediately with the task of recruiting his men. However, shortly after the occupation of Boulogne which began on the fourteenth

102 Ibid., No. 177.
103 L. R. Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 64-65. Mining operations and other engineering aspects of the sieges of Boulogne and Montreuil were directed by another Italian, Girolamo da Treviso [above, p. 31]. Assisted by Cornish sappers Girolamo exploded his mine under Boulogne Castle on September 11, but he was killed the same afternoon during an unsuccessful attack against the broken wall. L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 216.
he was attached to the permanent garrison and was still serving there in February, 1546, but with the elevated rank of colonel.  

Considerably less can be discerned about the Spanish captains, Salablanca, Pompeo, and Moreno. It is possible that they were sponsored by Beltran de la Cueva, Duke of Albuquerque, the "ceremonious" grandee assigned by the emperor to Henry's general staff: but there is no question that they preceded the duke to France and had seen several weeks of action before the main-battle and Albuquerque were properly entrenched before Boulogne. One of the captains, in all probability Salablanca, was transferred with his company of one hundred gunners to the main-battle on August 11, and ultimately on the collapse of the siege of Montreuil on August 26 all of the Spaniards came to Boulogne and joined Salerno's Italians as part of the regular garrison.

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104 L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 799; (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/214 f. 177.

105 Bowles, Henry VIII, p. 270. For additional reference to the life of Albuquerque see Manuel Fernández Álvarez, La España del Emperador Carlos V (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1966), pp. 446, 524, 535, 839, 840, where he is variously mentioned as Viceroy of Aragon (1528), Viceroy of Navarre (1553), and Captain-General of Navarre. He died in 1559.

106 Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120. In an "Estimate of wages due at Boulogne," drawn up in December, 1544, Salerno and his eighty-eight men are listed as "within the high town and castle" which were then in the keeping of Henry's
Of the mercenaries still to be uncovered three bands alone remain, two of which converged on the king's camp in the Boulonnais on Tuesday, August 12. The smaller of these was a one hundred-man company of Clevelander horse led by none other than Thomas Lightmaker, who for persevering in the fulfillment of his earlier assignment appears to have been rewarded with a second contract about the time of the departure of his swart reiters from 's Hertogenbosch. The larger contingent was that of Stephen and Nicholas Tap­horen, a father and son team, and consisted of between four and five hundred infantry arquebusiers. Paid at the normal rate of four philips a month they were mustered by John Dymock, another of the English agents in the Low Countries, at Eekloo near Bruges on August 5 and sent soon thereafter lieutenant, Viscount, Lisle. The Spaniards were in the lower town. Moreno's company numbered 176; Pompeo's, 125; and Salablanca's, 97, he himself being "yet prisoner" of the French. L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 799 (1), (2).

107 Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.

108 Ibid., places their number at five hundred and identifies them as Flemings, but the elder Taphoren's letter of retainer cites the figure 406 and speaks of the men as Low Germans, that is to say, inhabitants of North Germany. L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 1008 (1). One interesting detail about Nicholas, the son: he was already Clerk of the Musters of the High German cavalry. Rymer, op. cit., pt. 2, 123-24.
to the army at Boulogne. 109

The last contingent of mercenaries retained for the first round of fighting was that belonging to Jacques Dittre, Sieur de Neville, 110 who received £200 in prest for his five hundred Burgundian landsknechts from Sir Richard Southwell, Vice-treasurer of the Middle-ward, on September 7. Dittre's ensign was dispatched to Montreuil where it was active in operations until disbanded in October. At that time its captain turned to espionage, arranging espials on the French for the English high command at Calais. 111

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109 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 1008 (1); pt. 2, No. 30. The band was allowed 159 extra pays, that is to say that for 406 men the captain drew 565 pays per month.

110 Perhaps this surname should be rendered Neuville, as in Neuville-Saint-Vaast, a settlement located four miles north of Arras in Artois.

111 (B. M.) Add. MSS. 5357, f. 172; L. & P., XIX, pt. 2 Nos. 259, 381.
CHAPTER IX

THE ENTERPRISE OF BOULOGNE

So it was that God would not suffer these princes to agree . . . ; and I have often heard . . . that when two princes jointly undertake the conquest of a kingdom they never agree; for each of them is always suspicious of being over-reached by his companion and evermore jealous of one another . . . . For my part, I should more apprehend one great single enemy than two who would divide the cake between them . . . two nations do not easily agree, as you see here.

Montluc, Commentaries, p. 76.

At the very least, from June to October, 1544, 6,228 free lances¹ fought for Henry VIII at the opening of the French war. This power, if combined with the strength of the Imperial auxiliaries and the numerical might of the English conscripts, gave Henry an army in excess of 42,500 effectives of which roughly one-quarter were foreigners. It was an impressive array, the most formidable force ever gathered under the aegis of the old English monarchy.

By prior agreement with the emperor, Henry's native contingents should have been in France by May; yet it was not until that month that the first retinues, gathered in the southern and central shires, began to move towards their ports of

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¹Two thousand eight hundred thirty-six men-at-arms, mounted pistoleers, and light cavalry, plus 3,392 landsknechts, arquebusiers, and assorted infantrymen. Adding the auxiliary forces, Henry had 4,836 foreign horsemen and 5,392 foreign infantrymen.
embarkation. Most converged on Dover, the nearest gateway to the Continent, but every haven from Harwich in Essex to Winchelsea in Sussex was utilized in a massive transport operation which lasted from early June through mid-July. Norfolk and the forward component of his "vaward" sailed from Dover on June 6, Lord Russell and the rearguard between the eighteenth and the twentieth. Henry meanwhile delayed his departure until July 14, though the main body of the middle-ward, including the Duke of Suffolk passed to Calais by July 3.2

The king's somniferous pace was unquestionably predicated, in part at least, upon concern for his safety and comfort. Henry was fifty-three years old, grossly overweight, prone to fevers and headaches, and suffered continuous and excruciating pain from varicose ulcers on both legs.3 But even without these maladies a prince, even one of "royal courage," was not expected to make undue haste; nor was he expected to risk his life: it was not until the end of June that the major part of Buren's force left Saint Omer for Montreuil, and it was the second week in July before his Burgundians put in their appearance. By the same token Lightmaker's


3Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 484-86.
horsemen were known to be behind schedule; negotiations were still in progress with the High Germans at Liège; and Bischof, Heurde, and the Taphorens, all of them captains assigned to the king's battle, were at this juncture struggling to recruit their units and bring them through to Boulogne.

As for Henry's comfort, despite the careful planning and fantastic expenditure the commissariat had failed to live up to expectations. The Imperialists also had failed to keep their word as regards supplying the English with transport and victuals. "Plain writing" had begun on Norfolk's landing at Calais, for it was clear there was "marvellous scarcity" of nearly everything on which the army would run. There was no fodder for animals nor carriages for ordnance. Dray horses were either too few or too weak. Flemish sutlers were selling bread, the smallest loaves, at 6d., and beer, which with bread formed the chief staple of the sixteenth-century soldier's diet, fetched 11s. a barrel, and that "two or three gallons short," barely "better than beer at three farthings the gallon in London." 4

In the interval, while the generals awaited the arrival of their foreign allies and the advent of their king, there was another and more important problem to be wrestled with:

no one, not even Suffolk, Henry's second-in-command, was cer-
tain of how to proceed. The main objective was still unde-
fined, and when Norfolk made inquiry on June 16 on how he
should employ himself till Henry's coming his disconcerting
answer was that he could occupy himself as he pleased either
in besieging Montreuil, or if, for lack of Buren's horsemen,
that was "not convenient," he could use his time "in assaying
it upon Ardres." 5

This reply was received on the twentieth on which date
Russell's rearward completed its detrainment in Calais and
marched out to join Norfolk at Beaulieu just south of Guisnes
in the Boulonnais. Henry now had more than twenty thousand
troops in France; but without a plan or the chaperonage of
their mercenary and auxiliary allies his subordinates wisely
hung back, refusing to commit themselves unilaterally to a
course for which if miscarried they would be held accountable.
Instead, they opened discussion with Adrien de Croy and Buren,
who both rode down with a small company of Imperialists from
Saint Omer to Alembon on June 26, and there, now that the
guilt could be shared, Norfolk and Russell agreed to besiege
Montreuil. 6 This objective having been resolved Buren

5 (B. M.) Harl. MSS. 6,989, ff. 121-22.

6 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 786. De Croy, Grand Master of
Flanders (above, p. 148), acted as chief liaison officer be-
tween the English army and the Imperial court in Brussels.
returned to Saint Omer to collect the Dutch, Belgian and German force which he would personally lead as a separate command during operations, bringing them forward to link with the English army before Montreuil on July 4.  

The town, sitting on a high plateau on the south bank of the River Canche, was troublesome to approach and strongly garrisoned. From intelligence gathered by their own scouts and from De Croy the English generals learned that its governor, Oudart de Biez, Deputy-Lieutenant of Picardy and a Marshal of France, had thrown his field army of "Bolognians, Italians, and Picards" inside, so that its compliment of defenders was at least six thousand.  

De Biez had also been fortifying for weeks, and up-river around Hesdin the Duke of Vendôme was believed to be lurking with five hundred lances and ten thousand infantry, preparing to move either in support of the beleaguered marshal or to contest the main-battle's advance on Boulogne. In any event Montreuil would be hard to get, in fact, as it proved, impossible; for the upwards of twenty-eight thousand men who were committed to its taking proved incapable of laying more than a half-siege, the allied commanders settling down before the south and east quarters of the town. It was, as Norfolk and Russell both lamented, a strange investiture:

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"Two gates are left open and a third might be used by night;" or again, "the town cannot be won, for men and victuals go at pleasure." 9

No satisfactory reason for this totally unorthodox behavior can be extracted from official accounts. The Imperialists remained silent on the subject, while Norfolk and Russell, in all likelihood eager to protect their own hides, laid everything at their allies' doorstep. It was on De Croy and Buren's advice that Montreuil had been invested so; neither one nor the other of those captains would "consent to divide the siege;" nor could the gates be blockaded since the foreigners would "in no wise lie in any quarter but near unto us." 10

Somehow these excuses ring hollow. What they do not indicate is that Buren and De Croy, though concurring in the decision to attack Montreuil, had done so only because neither Norfolk nor Russell had shown any enthusiasm for their plan which was to march directly towards Paris and juncture with the emperor. Buren's feeling was that if five or six thousand defenders were put into Montreuil, as they were by De Biez, it would be difficult to take; De Croy argued that the place should have been by-passed; and both Imperialists

10 Ibid., Nos. 795, 909.
agreed that "it was a pity to delay going over the Somme."¹¹ In addition, what neither Norfolk nor Russell admit was the intense rivalry between them, the desire of Russell to lead the van and the duke's concern lest the Privy Seal out-general him. These things are learned from Elis Gruffyd, the garrulous Welsh veteran of the campaign and a non-commis­sioned officer in Norfolk's ward.¹² Twice on the march from Beaulieu there were heated words because Lord Russell presumed to pitch his tents "in front of the duke," and at the commencement of the bombardment of Montreuil each claimed the honor of the opening barrage for his own artillery.¹³ But a further and more apposite consideration was that while Norfolk made no attempt to encircle the town with his own substantial forces, when Russell volunteered to do the job himself his superior forbade him on the grounds that it was "too dangerous."¹⁴

Clearly, there is more to be considered here than the imputed faint-heartedness of the mercenaries and auxiliaries. Gruffyd, who rarely hides his dislike of foreigners, nowhere suggests in his account of the siege that Buren's

¹¹Ibid., Nos. 700, 758, 806.
¹³Ibid., pp. 52, 53-54.
contingents acted dishonorably. On the contrary, he reserves his barbs for the unsoldierly conduct of the English, whose officers permitted black marketeering in food and drink and whose camp discipline was so lax that "the guts of every kind of animal" slaughtered by the butchers of "which daily died" were left within the host to putrify "for want of anyone to bury them." 15

Touching the lackadaisical envelopment of Montreuil, Gruffyd tenders the opinion that sixty thousand men were not sufficient to surround it. "This," he says, "was partly because of the shortage of bread and drink," every morsel of which during the first month of the siege was regularly conveyed out of Saint Omer, more than twenty miles to the north. Such sorties took several days, and the presence of the French at Therouanne, between Montreuil and Saint Omer, necessitated the consignment of tens of hundreds of men, who might otherwise have been employed in the siege, to the escort of the victuallers. 16

16Ibid., pp. 53, 58. The danger from Therouanne was originally believed to have been circumvented by the construction in England of portable ovens and breweries, but these, built on special wagons, made it only as far as Beau­lieu before shaking apart. L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 654. According to Gruffyd, they were returned to Guisnes for repair and from thence transported up the River Aa to Saint Omer.
This too would sound like rationalization if it did not come from Gruffyd. The Welshman agreed with Russell: it was a "wild war" much to the king's dishonor and not likely to win him "one foot more than he had forty years past." It was July 7, while Suffolk and the main-battle lay encamped at Mar­quise, before Henry divulged his real intention to his subor­dinates. Boulogne, which as he later remarked to Chapuys was worth "ten Parises," was to be his target, though for the mo­ment, and for the benefit of the Imperialists, he insisted that his confidants keep that information secret. Buren and De Croy, considering the rejection of their earlier ad­vice, had probably long since guessed at the decision. Never­theless, to paraphrase Gruffyd, "to put a good face on the matter," notwithstanding that the king did not intend them to capture Montreuil, he would keep them at the task so that he and his host might have their leisure "and sleep more eas­ily in their beds in the camp round Boulogne."

As Professor Lacey Balwin Smith has been quick to note, it is one of the more unfathomable puzzles of the war as to precisely why Henry marked out Boulogne as his primary

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17L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 817.
18Ibid., No. 863; pt. 2, No. 355.
20Smith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, p. 205.
objective. The standard argument, that the capture of Boulogne "would rob France of her nearest port to Scotland and strengthen England's grip on the Straits of Dover,"\(^{21}\) is totally untenable. For one thing, as a port Boulogne was inferior to Etaples, ten miles further to the south on the broad estuary of the Canche; and as for strengthening England's hand in Scotland, French supplies and troops could be as commodiously ferried by the western route from Norman and Breton ports like Cherbourg, Brest, and Le Harve to Scottish ports like Ayr and Dumbarton.\(^{22}\) From the standpoint of strategy, Boulogne was a second-rate objective compared to Montreuil. The latter place was by far the more important since it served as the chief marshaling ground for western Picardy, and if captured would have placed in serious jeopardy the entire French defence system from the Calais Pale to the Canche, including those perennial thorns in Calesians' sides, Ardres, Therouanne, and Hesdin, as well as Boulogne.

Though the "why" of Henry's strategy was never explained it can be hypothesized. Boulogne was the safest trophy available to him. Less heavily defended than Montreuil, with


\(^{22}\) The eventual occupation of Boulogne had no effect in cutting off French aid to Scotland. As Smith, *Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty*, p. 205, says, the amount of French assistance to the Scots "increased during the period of English control (1544-50), and in the end [England's] defeat in Scotland led to her withdrawal from Boulogne."
alternate routes of retreat, either overland to Calais or by ship to England, it was in fact the perfect prize for a bullying king whose legs were so inflamed he was often carried about indoors in a sedan, who was so fat he was hoisted up stairs by machines, and whose abundance of wives and lack of sons made him feel he was "not a man like others." More­over, costs had gotten seriously out of hand. The price tag of £250,000 which the Lord Chancellor, Sir Thomas Wriothesley, and the Secretary of State, Sir William Paget, had placed on the campaign had been sorely underestimated, and in June, as Chapuys prepared to leave England with the king, the ambassa­ dor could report that "at present" Henry did not have "too much money to dispose of." Boulogne therefore, in addition to being safer, would be cheaper to assay than Montreuil.

The royal debouchment for France began on the north bank of the Thames on Friday, June 11. Amid much pomp and circum­ stance Henry boarded his barge at Westminster Dock, travelled in state to Erith in Kent, and spent the night before continuing to Gravesend. Here he left the river and took horse to

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23Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p. 486; Spanish Calendar, IV, pt. 2, No. 1061 (p. 638).

24Above, p. 254; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 144. The complicated business of financing the French war is treated in Dietz, English Government Finance, 1485-1558, Chap. XII and passim, and in Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial Agent of Henry VIII, Chaps. V and VI.
Faversham. On the thirteenth he progressed to Forde, a country residence of the Archbishop of Canterbury. There he dined before proceeding to Dover, from whence on the fourteenth with the flag of Saint George at the masthead he passed to Calais, landing at nine at night with his host in "liveries of red and yellow in the gallantest fashion could be."  

All this while Suffolk, the king's lieutenant, having made things ready for Henry's reception, lay ensconced with the larger part of the main-battle at Marquise, nine miles down the Calais road towards Boulogne. On July 15 the duke, Sir Anthony Browne, "and other noblemen" visited Henry and remained with him three days, inspecting the defences of Calais and checking equipment before marching forward. Much was amiss. Sterling money, which was the tender expected by English troops, was in high demand and short supply; "horse-meat" was equally scarce; the "limoniers" brought from England were too lean; and the wagons provided out of Flanders, "Instead of carrying the 30 cwt. or 40 cwt. apiece as had previously been agreed, ... could scarcely carry 20 cwt.," and a much greater number was required.  


26 Shaft horses.  

27 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 654, 911, 922. The controversies with the Netherlands government over carts, draft animals, and victuals were endless. Queen Mary, in an
the want of mercenary handgunners, pikemen, and heavy cavalry
and Henry should have been beside himself; but he was not.
The king had geared himself up to win "a notable victory."
Vaughan would find cash aplenty in Antwerp; a few more carts
and shaft animals would be wheedled out of Mary; pasturage,
if unavailable around Calais, would be found in the Boulonnais;
mercenaries were bound to appear; and as long as the besiegers
of Montreuil sustained their attack, no main French army was
likely to impede his progress to Boulogne. Quite simply, by
no lucky chance Henry had wagered on a relative certainty,
and for that reason he was ebullient. Camp life agreed with
him. He was up late and rose early, in better health appar­
etly than he had been for years. Still, it paid to be care­ful.

The king was in no rush to meet the enemy. Comfortably
lodged in the Exchequer of the Merchants Staple, Henry re­
ained in Calais until July 25 and did not actually put in

[28]One of the oldest of the English trading companies, the
Merchants of the Staple dealt in raw wool, woolfells, and
hides. Their chief mart or staple was fixed at Calais in
1363. It was here that all buyers from North Europe were
obliged to make their purchases.
an appearance at Boulogne until the twenty-sixth. Suffolk meanwhile made first contact with the foe while reconnoitering on the eighteenth. A party of Frenchmen, hoping to discourage him from coming too close to the town, sallied out to meet him but were repulsed, leaving him free to note the best places for attack. The duke completed his survey that afternoon, returning to report to Henry that there was sufficient soil for mining, welcome news, as Suffolk had believed the main works stood on solid rock. The siege was inaugurated the following day when the duke's pioneers began tunneling their trenches towards the castle.

Boulogne was by all accounts a sturdy stronghold. Occupying the summit and slopes of a ridge of hills which skirted the north bank of the Liane, it was actually two towns, the Haute Ville to the east on the highest eminence, and beneath it to the west the Basse Ville adjacent to the harbor. Both, connected by thick curtain walls of thirteenth-century construction and protected by an outer fausse-braye or lower earthen rampart, were strongly bastioned; but it was the smaller high town with its dominant castle and steep sloping sides on the southeastern, southern, and western approaches which commanded the area and would have to be won if Boulogne were to become English. The only practical

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line of assault against the Haute Ville was therefore from the northeast "where the ground is more or less on a level with the walls." For the time being, however, the high town was safe. Trenching was slow business, and the fausse-braye in front of the castle would have to be taken if, as had been decided, entrance was to be forced by mining. For the moment Suffolk focused his attention on the more superable Basse Ville with its lower walls and less precipitous gradient, and on Monday morning, July 21, after an artillery barrage along the eastern flank beyond the harbor, the place was taken by direct assault. 31

The exercise was strategically sound; it was likewise efficiently executed. But it was hardly an equal contest, as in all of Boulogne there were less than three thousand soldiers, among them a hundred men-at-arms, a thousand Picards, and a single company of Italian hackbuters, the aggregate under a young and inexperienced officer, Jacques de Cousy, Sieur de Vervins. 32 Against them Suffolk had at least ten thousand, a number which at the coming of Henry and the

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32 Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, p. 116; Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 343. Vervins was the son-in-law of Marshal de Biez.
mercenaries would swell to over fourteen thousand.

On Tuesday, once the lower town had been cleared and sufficient troops appointed to prevent a counter-stroke, Suffolk moved to the west upon the citadel's only outlying defence, "the Old Man," an ancient watchtower that stood a quarter of a mile from the Basse Ville near the sea on the cliff which formed the north bank of the Liane. Reputedly of Roman origin, it commanded the mouth of the river as well as the area to the north along the coast which Suffolk had marked out for Henry's camp. Its garrison of fifteen had held off several minor thrusts on the twenty-first, but they surrendered meekly when the duke dragged his first gun into place to batter them.

Henry was now chafing at the bit. The larger part of Boulogne had been taken without him, while within the crowded confines of Calais "the sickness," probably plague and dysentery, was beginning to take its toll. He was anxious for the "good air" of which Suffolk had written him from the royal camp at Boulogne, air which would be that much more salubrious since it blew from a quarter well out of range of cannon

33 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 964. Caligula and Julius Caesar have variously been given credit for building the Old Man or the "Tour de l'Ordre," as the French knew it.

34 Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 119. The guns of the Old Man were also feared to command "the Advocate's House," the residence within Boulogne which Suffolk proposed to assign Henry on his later entry of state. L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 946.
The pusillanimous king would have bolted Calais on the twenty-first, but as brave old Suffolk was too busy in the Basse Ville which its defenders had tried to burn before escaping to the high town, Henry's field headquarters were not made ready thereby delaying the princely evacuation until the twenty-fifth. And when the exodus from the Pale was made, though regal and grand, it was hardly befitting a conquering hero; for Henry rode not at the head of his troops but tamely in their midst, being met by horsemen "all the ways" until his camp itself was reached on Saturday, the twenty-sixth.

At Boulogne Suffolk had done well, though no impression had yet been made on the Haute Ville. A mound for artillery had been raised to the level of the walls beyond the fausse-braye at the northeast corner beside the castle, and two other batteries were ordered thrown up on each flank of the mound, one along the eastern side near the Porte de Montreuil, another towards the west and the Porte de Calais. It was

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35 In pitching the king's camp Suffolk was instructed to first secure or destroy the Old Man and to note "how far the shot of the town may reach." L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 946, 964.

36 Ibid., pt. 2, Preface, xvi. Henry VIII had a morbid and excessive fear of the plague. See Smith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, p. 229.

37 Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
dangerous work, and it took its toll in lives, particularly among the sappers, many of them Cornish and Devonshire men brought from Montreuil where they had been unsuccess fully trying to mine for weeks. But Suffolk kept them at the task, while Henry, again well out of harm's way, hovered to the south in the least exposed position "well furnished for the relief of all and prevention of rescues" by the enemy.

Emplacements for the guns were completed by August 2, and on Sunday, the third, the artillery, part of a siege-train of over 250 pieces, began its barrage of the Haute Ville in earnest. Huge "plums" of round shot, some weighing in excess of sixty pounds, were directed at the curtain around the castle, while incendiary "apples" fired from mortars rained death on the town and its terrified citizenry. These latter were shells, the first ever employed by an English army, and were the invention of two of Henry's foreign armaments-makers, Peter Baude and Peter of Cologne, whom the king had lured from the emperor's service in 1543.

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39L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 1003. Suffolk, the most revered of Henry's commanders after Norfolk, was then entering his sixtieth year. In the field, according to the Lord Admiral, Viscount Lisle, he demonstrated remarkable energy and courage, enforcing all "to be hardy" and going as far in the trenches "as any gunner." Ibid., No. 949.

40Above, p. 31.
Hollow shot of cast iron filled with explosives which were
detonated by burning match, many were fired from Suffolk's
own battery in which the chief mortarman was a Frenchman, 41
Bernardine de Valois.

For two weeks a furious bombardment was maintained, but
though the curtain was weakened no actual breach was made,
and the fausse-braye outside the ramparts was still in enemy
hands. Henry was sorely displeased, for as the Council with
the king had written his queen he had anticipated in the
face of Buren's warnings a rapid conquest. Nevertheless, on
the eighteenth he ordered that another battery be prepared,
at the same time sending into England for additional men and
guns. 43

It was during the second week of the bombardment and the

41 Pope, Guns, p. 68; Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120;
Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 57;
was relatively common in the early Tudor period. There were
eleven German gunners at Newcastle in 1514 and upwards of
thirty foreigners employed in the Tower in 1536. Wyatt,

42 Catherine Parr, Regent of England in her husband's
absence, was the sixth and last of Henry's wives. Thirty-one
and twice widowed at the time of her marriage to the king in
July, 1543, she outlived Henry and took as her fourth spouse
Thomas Seymour, Baron of Sudeley. She died in September, 1548,
shortly after the birth of a daughter, her only child.

relative lull which followed that the larger part of the free lances meant for the main-battle appeared, beginning on Tuesday, August 12, with the Taphorens' five hundred "voetknechten busschutten" and Lightmaker's "Clevoit" cavalry. Over the next week they drifted in: the "three ensigns of Almains well horsed," "the captain of the Spaniards," and finally on the nineteenth the High Germans from Liège, who with the other German horse "were well allowed" and personally mustered by the king on Thursday, August 21.

As is noted in the Introduction of this study, one of the sad misfortunes is that among the extensive collections of military papers for the sixteenth century there is no account of how the foreigners performed for the Tudors either at Boulogne or in any other engagements. The historian is always left to speculate. Henry, in a letter written to Queen Catherine shortly after his mercenaries had had their baptism of fire, speaks harshly of them: such as he sent against the ditch between the fausse-braye and the castle did "no good where any danger is," the Frenchmen being "much manfuller" than either Burgundians of Flemings. Still, here is proof that the free lances fought where the action was hottest, and it is perchance suggestive of their value that the

44Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
first meaningful headway against the Haute Ville was made after their arrival.

On September 1 "without any loss of men" an assault swept the French from a long section of the fausse-braye from behind which the besiegers began to cut several mines towards the castle, the ramparts beside it, and a salient to the southeast called the Fleming's Tower. The army was now so close to the walls that there was as much danger from flying stone as from the ordnance within, though on September 2 a frontal attack on the castle and the curtain below was driven back with heavy casualties. The "men in the braye broke open certain doors but found much resistance of men, hailshot, and ramparts within of stone and earth, so that they could not enter, and at the breach of the castle the enemy cast down great abundance of fire and stones, so that our men were fain to recoil, many of them burnt and hurt at both places." September 4 brought further disappointment, for though the mine under the Fleming's Tower was sprung, "scaking and tearing" the bastion, it failed to go down. The charges beneath the castle were exploded with better results a week later. A sizeable gap was torn in the curtain, but three separate assaults miscarried in one of which Girolamo, the

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47 Ibid., pt. 3, 121.
Italian engineer, was slain. A few lodgements, probably man-
ned by the Spanish and German arquebusiers, were established
in the broken wall, but no access to the Haute Ville could be
secured.

Up to this moment the high town had held out for fifty-
five days with no relief of any kind and no hope of deliver-
ance. Picardy and the Boulonnais, save for Vendôme's force
concentrated now around Thérouanne to prevent the free pass-
age of supplies to Montreuil, was virtually devoid of French
men of war since King Francis had assembled his troops beyond
Paris to confront the greater threat of the emperor's army in
Champagne. Meanwhile, within the high town of Boulogne not a
house was left whole; munition was near depletion, and with
the most experienced officer, Philip Corse, captain of the
Italian hackbuters, dead, slain on the eleventh by a burst
of artillery, Thérvins, the governor, decided to capitulate. 49

Against the wishes of the civilian population which was
perhaps fearful of abuse at the hands of the victors, two
French officers, the Lords of Saint-Blimont and Freumeselles,

48 Arquebusiers, particularly those from southern Europe,
were unexcelled in fighting from covered positions.

49 Gabriel Daniel, The History of France from the Time
the French Monarchy was Established in Gaul to the Death Of
Lewis the Fourteenth (5 vols., London: G. Strahan, 1726),
III, 376. Hereinafter cited as The History of France.
Gabriel makes the claim that the management of the defence
of Boulogne had been placed in Corse's hands.
were sent to Henry to treat for terms on the afternoon of the twelfth. The king proved magnanimous as he was anxious to take possession. All within the Haute Ville were guaranteed their lives and could depart peaceably if they would deliver up the citadel with its artillery and supplies. Everything was arranged on the thirteenth, and on the day following, the king providing wagons and an escort to transport the baggage of the vanquished chiefs, the survivors of the siege evacuated the upper town for Abbeville. The downcast soldiers led the retreat, preceding the nearly two thousand civilians "who were in great sadness, anger, and affliction" and of whom many were to die of exposure in the cold and damp which accompanied them in their journey. But a sadder end was reserved for Vervins, the young commander of Boulogne. Having endured for eight weeks a siege which even the king of France had expected to last no more than six, and having withstood an almost constant


51Hall's Chronicle, p. 862, gives the number of the garrison to march out of Boulogne as follows: 67 horse, 1,563 footmen, 800 arquebusiers, and 87 wounded. Ignoring civilian casualties, several hundred of the defenders must have been killed, but Philip the Corsican is the only one of note to be recorded. No estimate of the English dead is given, but the number if anything must have been greater. Of the foreigners on Henry's side who met violent ends, besides Girolamo, only two are mentioned, both Spaniards who were hanged for leaving their posts at Montreuil to hunt for treasure around Boulogne. Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
cannonade in which it is estimated that over one hundred thousand rounds of heavy shot were fired against his encircled faubourg, he was arrested almost as soon as he reached his own lines, tried for cowardice, and eventually beheaded in the reign of Henry II. 52

Now that the English king had his trophy and had proven himself "a noble and valiant conqueror," he made haste to establish ownership of his prize. Physical control of Boulogne had of late been much on his mind, his anxiety prompted by the knowledge that for weeks Imperialist mediators had been talking of peace with the king of France. 53 Possession being nine-tenths of the law it was to Henry's advantage that his forces assume occupancy before the emperor agreed to terms. Otherwise, if they did not and Charles drew off his substantial assistance in men and provisions, Vervins might be encouraged to fight on in the hope of relief which was almost

52 Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, p. 117. An informant with Francis wrote that Vervins, whose good name was restored by Henry III in 1575, fired 140,000 rounds from his artillery.

53 Peace feelers had been sent out by Francis to both the English and the Imperialist camps in an almost constant stream. For three weeks or more Henry's Council had been entertaining a French delegation at Hardelot Castle and has rejected the offer of Ardres and an indemnity for raising the siege. Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 72. The emperor meanwhile had begun to seriously consider a different set of French proposals on August 29 after a four-hour conference with Claude d'Annebaut, Admiral of France, at Saint Venay in Champagne. The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, p. 547.
sure to come. Therefore, on September 14 Suffolk was sent into Boulogne to receive its keys and set up English polity before Vervins withdrew. Somewhat ironically Henry postponed his own entry into the town until the eighteenth, the day on which, unknown to him, the emperor signed the Peace of Crépy.

The war had been an immense disappointment for Charles. Though a force under his general, Ferrante Gonzaga, had starved the French out of Luxemburg in May, invaded Champagne, and began the preliminary investiture of Saint Dizier on June 7, it was not until July 6 that the emperor himself took to the field. As with Henry, there were difficulties in finding troops, the more so as Buren, Landenberg, and the Prince of Orange recruited in too close proximity. In June, Landenberg caused near mutiny in Orange's camp by spreading abroad the false report that Henry paid more than Charles, while around Strasburg, French agents lured away landsknechts about as fast as the Imperial commissioners enrolled them. Recruitment however was the least vexing of the emperor's problems. The quotas fixed by the treaty with England were

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54 Hall's Chronicle, p. 862.
55 Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, p. 89.
56 Ibid., pp. 89-90; L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 682.
finally met and probably exceeded; but a lack-lustre campaign, an insufficient commissariat, and the stubborn defence of Saint Dizier were quandaries that could not be cope with.

When Charles left Metz on July 6 he had hopes of a rapid triumph. In accord with his commitment to Henry he marched straight on the Marne, intending to follow its valley to Paris, but Champagne which had been burned and cleared of everything of value proved incapable of maintaining his army. This necessitated the capture of some strongholds to secure the supply trains which followed, and as Gonzaga was already before Saint Dizier, Charles determined the place should be taken: it was a repeat of Henry VIII's Boulogne Campaign.

No better garrisoned or provided than the object of Henry's desire, the town held out for sixty days, during which

57 Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, p. 100, makes the claim that the Imperial army contained only thirty-five thousand. However, the sources he accepts in arriving at that figure are no more reliable than those he rejects. On June 29, Chapuys, in trying to persuade Henry to rehire Landenberg, used the argument that, while Charles was willing to take the colonel into his service, the emperor "already had too many men," more in fact than he wanted. Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 138. If this was the case, Charles then, like Henry, invaded France with more than forty-two thousand.

period well over a thousand attackers were slain. Equally depressing was the fact that its capture accomplished nothing, for having taken and reinforced it Charles found his rear blocked and no way to get either provisions or money by the road he had opened up from Metz. Unable to retreat from fear of famine he pushed on down the Marne, scouring fields and attacking towns, not for military advantage, but to secure food, his men a horde rather than an army, "inobedient and mutinous from lack of victuals and payment." Only the least defensible places were attempted. Jalons and Chalons because of their strong detachments were avoided; Epernay with its full granaries was surprised; Chateau-Thierry made no resistance; but on seizing La Ferté-sous-Jouarre on September 8 Charles turned north on Soissons, arriving there on

59 The siege began in earnest on June 19, the garrison surrendering on August 17. As at Boulogne, the walls of Saint Dizier were breached, but no forcible entry was made. Among the Imperial casualties was the Prince of Orange, mortally wounded on July 14, and in a later assault into the breach over seven hundred of the besiegers died. Ibid.; Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, p. 93.


61 Ibid., pp. 109-10. Charles owed his soldiers a month's wages, but because of the effective guerilla tactics of the French light horse and exceptionally wet weather it was impossible to bring through the pay wagons from Lorraine. See Wotton's despatches to Henry VIII, L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 267-68.
September 10. With Paris less than two days away the emperor had taken the road to the Low Countries, forsaking the French capital because peace talks had begun with Francis.

Charles' decision to cut his losses and run is perfectly understandable. The overlong siege of Saint Dizier, the ineffectuality of the logistical experts, and indiscipline had broken his army's morale, and should it have come to a pitched battle the odds, it was feared, favored the French. In informing Henry that the Treaty of Crépy had been signed the emperor's excuse was that he had been constrained to make peace because his ally, so far from joining in the descent on Paris, had hung back in Picardy content to besiege two fortresses only a few miles from Calais. It was a true enough accusation, but in Henry's defence hardly fair, since every step of Charles' advance from Saint Dizier was in reality a retreat, a frantic series of forced marches designed to carry him into the Low Countries via the path of least resistance. The English king had been inconsiderate and barely helpful in choosing to sit down before Boulogne, but the "enterprise of Paris" failed as much because the emperor undertook the

62 Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, p. 106.

63 Morale on the French side was perhaps only marginally better. Paris was in a panic, and Francis was as careful to avoid an all-out encounter as Charles. Ibid., pp. 102, 104, 106.
reduction of Saint Dizier.

Henry took the news of the Treaty of Crépy calmly, even "benignly," with no outward show of emotion. Charles, as part of a general pacification, endeavored to comprehend him in the treaty, the French offering large sums of money by way of pensions, arrears, and indemnity for the return of Boulogne; but Henry would not be included. Any other pretensions he would willingly give up--the throne of France; Ardres, the County of Guisnes--everything that is except the recently acquired proof of his manliness, the concrete evidence that in the noble art of making war he had outmatched his compeers, the king of France and the Holy Roman emperor, neither of whom won anything but peace. But Henry's initial coolness

64 L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 281; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 215.

65 This was not exactly the case. By the Treaty of Crépy, Charles and Francis agreed to return all conquests made since the Truce of Nice of 1538. The emperor renounced all claims on Burgundy, while Francis on his part relinquished his to Naples, Flanders, and Artois. Charles also assented to the marriage of Francis' second son, the Duke of Orleans, to either his daughter with the Netherlands, or one of his nieces with the Duchy of Milan, the emperor reserving the right of deciding which of these unions should take place. More dangerously, by a secret signed at Meudon on September 19, Francis agreed to "declare himself the enemy of the king of England" should Henry "wish to quarrel or make war upon the emperor" and "to aid in the reformation of schism in the Church." L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 260. The duke of Orleans died before either marriage could take place, and fortunately for Henry's peace of mind the "secret Treaty of Crépy" was never divulged.
soon evaporated, as word arrived by way of Chapuys and the departing French negotiators at Hardeicot, that the dauphin and an army braced with mercenaries dismissed from Charles' service was moving on the Boulonnais. 66

On the English side the military outlook was grim. Their forces were divided, and the larger part, still covering Henry from Montreuil, were in dreadful condition, their camp a pest-hole of filth and carrion. No trenches could be dug for lack of tools or guns fired for lack of powder; there was no bread, or beer, or forage; men ate horseflesh and much worse; while in every billet dysentery reaped a deadly toll, more than seven hundred of Buren's horsemen alone dying from that cause. But Henry's worry was neither Montreuil nor its pathetic assailants; it was his own safety and that of Boulogne which troubled him. His Germans and Netherlanders were under no obligation to serve him beyond Saint Michael's day, September 29, and technically all of his foreigners if subjects of the emperor could retire at any time since, as their master was at peace with France, they could no longer legally bear arms against her. 67

66 Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 213.
67 L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 178, 237, 244, 248, 259; Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, pp. 107-08. Buren's men were reported on September 17 to be dying at the average rate of more than twenty per day.
Henry's first impulse was to run; yet, though his departure had been planned for some time, summary escape was impossible. The flotilla scheduled to escort him to England was late in arriving, and the way to Calais was blocked by plague, a far less discriminating opponent than the dauphin. Under the circumstances the only option was to call in reinforcements; so to that effect the van and rear of Norfolk and Russell were ordered on the twenty-fifth to fall back at once on Boulogne.

The resulting retiral from Montreuil was a harrowing affair, made more so by the emperor's punctillious reminder to Buren that his mercenaries and auxiliaries could remain in Tudor service no longer than the twenty-ninth. This gave the English four days in which to utilize the foreigners in their retreat, and the precipitate speed with which the camp was struck gives a fair indication of how afraid the English commanders were of making the eighteen-mile trek to Henry's camp without them. To reduce the baggage train and have beasts enough to draw the artillery, mills, bakehouses, tents, and pavilions, some worth £100, were burned where they stood; the untransportable wounded, the sick, and infirm were abandoned to the French; and in an unreasoned outburst of anger

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68Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 211 (pp. 270-71); L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 258-59, 307.
the Duke of Norfolk in his impotence and frustration lashed out at Buren and the Imperialists as the sole authors of his discomfiture. It was the emperor, the count was told, who "had betrayed and sold the men of England," the duke's implication clearly being that he fully expected Buren to leave him to face the dauphin alone. It was a strained moment, but the Netherlands general let it pass; he could not, he replied, hinder his master from making treaties any more than Norfolk could hinder Henry from doing the same; but as for himself and the men at his command, they would maintain England's quarrel with France until Norfolk's divisions reached the safety of their own lines. This was a magnificent gesture, more typical perhaps of a Dutch gentleman than a mercenary. Nonetheless, the promise was kept, and with Buren's men in support the siege of Montreuil was lifted on the morning of September 28. A path was beaten to Etaples where the host spent the night before firing the town and next day continued to Neufchâtel, some three French leagues from Boulogne. Here, with an English column marching in relief, Buren took his leave, striking off to the north and east towards Artois, his honor intact but doubtless feeling that his martial efforts had been poorly expended in a useless exercise, the which had

69Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," pp. 81-82.
never been meant to succeed.

Back in Boulogne, Henry's earlier unease had subsided. The dauphin's advance was not as rapid as anticipated; the Imperial mercenaries within his own command gave every indication of remaining in service; and "the agreeable intelligence," that Norfolk, "unmolested," had effected his retreat and was already close by revived the king's confidence. Equally comforting to the timorous monarch was the presence outside the harbor of the squadron of warships that would take him home. The vessels, among them at least three provided by the Netherlands, had begun arriving on the twenty-seventh; but by then Henry felt brave enough to postpone his sailing until the thirtieth when, after the troops had come up from Montreuil and Suffolk, Norfolk, and Russell had been instructed in how to defend the king's "pieces and country" in France, he was rowed to his flagship and carried to Dover.

70 See the letter of September 3 to Charles, L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 181 (p. 99), in which the Imperial agents at Boulogne express the view that Henry, as he had told them in the past, "has no other intention . . . than to win [Boulogne] which . . . is much more important to him than Paris." The king was not averse to siezing Montreuil, but only if it could be taken easily. However, even if Montreuil did fall, Chapuys was convinced that Henry would never try to keep it. Rather he would use it "to make better conditions" at the peace which was then in the offing.

71 Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, p. 118; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 218.
the same afternoon.

Henry's direct participation in the war was at an end; after his own fashion the bluff Tudor had waged his last campaign. He had been in France, including his layover in Calais, for precisely seventy-nine days and at the fighting front for sixty-seven. During that period he was probably never once within gunshot of the enemy lines or ever remotely in danger. Now as the dauphin approached, with a real opportunity to demonstrate that his prowess in battle ranked as high as his other accomplishments, "he took his way from his tents to the sea shore," persuaded that he could make away with honor in that he had gained his "enterprise of Boulogne" and that Francis "was not coming in person" to reclaim it. Suffolk, Norfolk, and Russell were left behind as surrogates to defend Boulogne and the Pale against a reported fifty thousand enemy horse and foot with an army much thinned by casualties, sickness, and the recall of Buren's mercenaries and auxiliaries. It had been neatly arranged: the English lords would

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72 Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 213; Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 77. That Henry's naval escort anchored off Boulogne and not in the haven was due to the fact that the harbor was unusable by ocean going vessels except at high tide.

receive full blame for any disasters that might befall, their king the lion's share of the glory if the dauphin were turned back.
CHAPTER X

IN THE MIDST OF LIONS:

THE SEARCH FOR MERCENARIES AND THE RETURN TO WAR

They are now in the hands of no reasonable men, but in the cruel handling of a most cruel and wicked sort; God, which helped Daniel in the midst of lions, deliver them out of the hands of so wicked a people.


Though Henry's removal to England was rapid, it was not so hasty as to prevent him from devising a plan which hopefully would avert the recapture of Boulogne. It was simple enough, requiring little more than the concentration of all available forces in and around the occupied city to resist the expected onslaught of the French.

Precisely how large the English army was is not known, but even in its weakened state it was considerable, well in excess of twenty thousand. Within Boulogne itself Henry had placed John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, as governor of the town and seneschal of the Boulonnais. Under him was a garrison of better than two thousand effectives and several hundred pioneers, these drawn in the main from the original occupying force of Suffolk, who with the residue of the middle ward

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1The full roster of Henry's military and civilian appointments can be found in (B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 269.
held the king's former camp by the sea. South of the town across the Liane lay the camps of Russell and Norfolk, the former at Outreau, a hamlet on the left bank just east of Boulogne haven, the latter at Le Portel, a village by the sea. Between them, the unsuccessful assailants of Montreuil could muster nearly thirteen thousand, though plague and dysentery reduced their ranks daily.  

Of the numbers of foreigners left in Tudor service, it is impossible to be exact. There were of course no auxiliaries, these having marched out of the war with Buren and his mercenaries at Neufchâtel on September 29; but in spite of those losses there was as yet a large body of free lances left. In fact, as best as can be determined, when Henry sailed for home every foreign unit which had been present at the surrender of Boulogne was still in wages, and, the emperor's ban to the contrary, each was being urged to extend its enlistment. What inducements were offered have not been recorded, but it is abundantly clear that the king took his leave in the full expectation that his terms would be accepted. Unfortunately, in this presumption Henry was sorely disappointed, for within a week of his landfall at Dover, as he carefully picked his way through Kent to avoid the

contagion which had preceded him from France, the stunning news arrived that the bulk of his free lances had abandoned him, and that unnerved by their exodus his own commanders had disobeyed orders by leading the greater part of his army away from Boulogne to Calais.³

What triggered the withdrawal of Henry's soldiers of fortune is not specifically mentioned, but it was certainly not the Imperial edict forbidding the bearing of arms against France. Such bans were ineffective, as Charles indirectly admitted in conversation with Wotton at Cambray on September 24: no subject of his, he assured the ambassador, would be allowed to take service in France; those who did would be punished as rebels.⁴ Obviously, there would have been no need for a penalty if it were not expected that there would be violators of the law, as in fact there were, "a few varlets," to use the emperor's words, "that could not be stopped."

Henry's mercenaries it seems left the Boulonnais for considerations more basic than fear of Imperial retribution. In brief, their living conditions had become intolerable, due mainly to the fact that the campaign in which they had

³L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 347, 352-54. For mention of the plague which forced the evacuation of Queen Katherine Parr from London, see ibid., Nos. 246, 258.

⁴Ibid., No. 374.
fought was one of the wettest on record. From beginning to end, the struggle had been punctuated by tempestuous storms and driving rains which had brought in their wake pestilence and death. As at Montreuil, the mortality rate at Boulogne was staggering, not only among the free lances, most of whom were cavalrymen, but among their precious mounts as well. Gruffyd, who came to Boulogne with Norfolk, paints a grim picture of a sodden, barren land devoid of shelter, an almost grassless sea of mud in which there was nothing to feed the horses except a little mouldering pulse which the animals refused and therefore died from lack of nourishment.  

There had been since before Henry's departure some indication of mercenary discontentment, but nothing to suggest an imminent pull-out. In the week following the surrender of Boulogne, one German in a fit of ill-humor had wounded an Englishman in the throat, and another in a fray with certain Irishmen had run his opponent through the breast with a boar spear. Such incidents, though serious, were normal and even expected in armies as heterogeneous as Henry's. Tempers were bound to flare on occasion when warlike men of divers nations were thrown together, and when the English captain on the spot demanded and received amends from his German

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counterparts, the matter was dropped in consideration, no doubt, of the genuine hope that the mercenaries, however irascible, would heed the king's plea to remain. That hope was dashed on October 1 when, in the wake of a successful action fought against the advanced guard of the dauphin's army, morale among the Germans and Netherlanders collapsed completely.

To get at the enemy who suddenly appeared between Outreau and Le Portel, the mercenaries and Suffolk's English forces had forded the Liane. Soaked to the skin and exposed to a freezing wind, they had kept to the field all afternoon, recrossing the river only after Norfolk and Russell had relocated their camps on the north bank round the Old Man. Once back at Boulogne, "through extreme cold and wading the water," many fell sick, and when pressed to remain to defend the threatened city the foreigners "waxed very forward," demanded their release, and retired to Calais where on the tenth of the month most drew their final weeks' wages before passing on to the Low Countries and home.

The tergiversation of the free lances sent a shock wave through the entire Tudor military establishment, and something close to panic gripped the high command. On Friday

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7 Ibid., Nos. 353, 402.
morning, October 3, the very day on which the Germans and Netherlanders appear to have initiated their walk-out, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Russell ordered their forces to fall back on Calais, leaving behind what under the circumstances was a meager garrison of thirty-three hundred effectives to face an almost certain French attack on the torn walls and unrepaired breaches of battered Boulogne. 8

The withdrawal from the Boulonnais was a chaotic flight. Each man set his own pace, no one keeping order or posting scouts to guard the way. Near Wimille, between Boulogne and Marquise, a party of English gunners who strayed from the main body were set upon and mauled by a roving band of French horsemen. Once past Marquise, with three or four miles of potentially hostile territory still to be negotiated, the chiefs of staff fled with the artillery, and on reaching Calais shut the gates of the town against the rest, so that from lack of warmth and medical attention many of the common soldiers died. 9

It was a thoroughly disgraceful episode, totally ignored in the official reports of Norfolk and the other generals. In their letters to the king they employed the most incrediable logic to justify their withdrawal from Boulogne. All agreed

8Ibid., No. 353.

that in their present state the Basse Ville and the adjacent harbor were indefensible and were likely to be burned in any assault. Defence-works, which Henry had ordered, were needed to strengthen these places, but in the considered opinion of the English leaders it was not the season to build. Winter was upon them, and fearing "great destruction of people" from the cold and damp, and professing to have intelligence of an attempt upon the Pale, they resolved to "leave Boulogne the better furnished" by retiring with the whole army to Calais.  

How the threatened fortress could be "the better furnished" by depriving it of the troops who were to have served as its main line of defence is difficult to comprehend. Norfolk argued that the retreat had conserved on victuals, that left on its own the Boulogne garrison had provisions enough to last four thousand men three months, whereas had the army remained it would have consumed in a single day as much as would otherwise have sufficed for seven.  

It was a point well taken, except that it ignored the important fact that most of the garrison's supplies, including munitions, had been stored in the weaker lower town which by his own admission was likely to be overwhelmed if attacked.

Henry was in no mood for excuses invalid or otherwise,


11Ibid.
and ignoring his own late shortcomings in the field, he
roundly lambasted his commanders for their rank ineptitude
and unsoldierly conduct. His affairs, as he berated them
through his Council, were being "very loosely handled many
ways." By their "light coming away from Boulogne" they had
demonstrated that they were "too well minded to come home­
ward," while their "bolstering and unapparent reasons ... inculk[ed] a feigned necessity to cloak and maintain faults
too much apparent to indifferent eyes." To Norfolk, Suffolk,
and Russell the king wrote a blistering reprimand on October
8. Their "ill-favored retreat," he lectured them, had
touched his honor, and to make restitution they must return
to Boulogne. 12 It was a plain enough directive, but impos­
sible to execute, for by this time the dauphin had blocked
the roads south with thirty thousand men. Moreover, as
Henry's discomfitted generals ruefully explained, without
the support of their now departed German and Netherlands
horse there was no hope of fighting their way through, par­
ticularly since among the English disease had so debilitated
the ranks that the sick and dying lay untended in the
streets. 13

   In the meantime, as Henry raged and his army languished

12Ibid., Nos. 374, 383.
13Ibid., No. 402.
in its impotence within the Pale, the dauphin, after diversionary thrusts towards Hammes and Guisnes, essayed the great undertaking of the winter, the ill-starred "Camisade of Boulogne," whose failure saved not only the city, but perhaps as well the careers of those noble lords at Calais to whom had been entrusted its protection. The onslaught, when it came, was made by twenty-three companies of French and Italian infantry who attacked near midnight on October 9. Aided by the negligence of the English pickets and by what Gruffyd termed the "prodigious dark," the French, with the Italians in support, poured into the lower town from the west side through no fewer than four breaches, the lead units wearing white shirts over their battle dress to distinguish them from the foe. Superior in strength to the defenders, the assailants carried the Basse Ville in a rout. Hundreds of Englishmen were slain as they ran to arms, and many in the garrison were made prisoners, among them perhaps Alonzo Salablanca, the captain of a Spanish company in the Old Man,

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who in December, though still carried in the musters, was listed as being yet a captive of the French. 15

There were on the occasion of the "camisade" fewer than five hundred mercenaries on the English side at Boulogne; and these, excepting a single band of 120 Netherlands horse retained at Calais, 16 represented the only foreigners to continue in Tudor service following the walkout of the week preceding. Why these should have remained is a mystery, but to a man the Boulogne free lances were Latins, the Italian and Spanish arquebusiers of Salerno, Salablanca, Pompeo, and Moreno.

Of the companies which they formed, the smallest was the Italian. Posted within the main citadel that was the Haute Ville, its eighty-eight men escaped completely any direct confrontation with the French, whose depredations were confined entirely to the lower town. It was the larger Spanish units under Moreno in the Basse Ville and Salablanca and Pompeo in

15 L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 799 (2, iii). How and when Salablanca was released is unknown, but by the end of the summer of 1545 he was in Essex. In the beginning of September he was ordered to Calais as part of an army destined for the relief of Boulogne, the city having been subjected to steady French pressure since July. Ibid., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 271, 272, 345.

16 Ibid., XIX, pt. 2, No. 402. These cavalrmen were seemingly under the command of the resourceful Thomas Lightmaker.
the Old Man that were exposed to the gravest danger, but save for the captured Salablanca no other mercenary victims of the "camisade" can be found.

As regards the Spaniards' role in resisting the enemy, they appear to have been as ineffective as their English comrades-in-arms. Being hackbutteers whose forte was fighting from the defensive behind obstructions, it seems natural to assume that they would have been stationed on the walls or even in the trenches beyond them. This would explain the seizure of Salablanca, for the Old Man, though subjected to assault, was never entered. In all likelihood, it was the Spaniards along with the English watch who were hurled aside in the initial rush; but in defence of the free lances, as can be verified in written accounts on both sides, the rain fell in such torrents throughout the night that along the front where the French attacked no gun of any kind could be fired. 17

Given the ease with which entry was made into the lower town and the unpreparedness of its guardians, the "camisade" should have spelled total disaster for the English. However, on the brink of success the French through greed allowed victory to escape them. Confronted with the piles of

17Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 91; Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 204-05.
provisions left by the Tudor army on its retreat to Calais, they began to pillage, ignoring the danger from the Haute Ville where the main English garrison prepared a counter-attack. The French standards which were planted here and there about the lower town had not, according to one eyewitness, as many as twenty men around them. Worse, the officers lost complete control over their soldiers, so that when the English charged down upon them the plunderers, with losses of upwards of six hundred, were forced out of the Basse Ville in less time than it had taken them to win it.  

For the dauphin, who throughout the proceedings had remained inactive in the hills beyond the Old Man with a reserve of six thousand Swiss, the sight of his stricken van as it struggled back to camp was unsettling. Casualties among his key personnel were critical: Jean de Tais, chief captain of the raiders, was badly wounded, while the Sieur de Fouquerolles, leader of the French contingents, was dead. Nonetheless, had the prince had his way, the affair would have been recommenced, but for once conditions favored the English. Continued rains, low morale, and short rations forced a French retreat. Boulogne, for the time being, was left to its defenders, and the dauphin, after a weak feint towards Guisnes, fell back on Montreuil, from whence, after

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18 Montluc, Commentaries, pp. 81-82.
disbanding his army, he retired for the winter to Paris.  

If Henry VIII took comfort in his good fortune, the lesson of the "camisade" was not lost upon him. The lower town in its ruined state was indefensible, so on October 14, with the French still probing the Pale perimeter, emphatic instructions were issued from Westminster for the immediate reinforcement of his prize. Two thousand men were ordered to Boulogne from Calais, and the recruitment of mercenaries, in particular any willing to forsake French wages, was encouraged, with the obvious view of learning the enemy's intention.  

How many deserted for Henry's gold cannot be accurately gauged, but by the end of October several hundred, mainly Italians, succumbed to his overtures.  

Even counting the free lances already in service, compared to the multitudes hired for the summer fighting at Montreuil and Boulogne, the numbers retained in the winter of 1544 were miniscule indeed. Perhaps, all told, by the end of the year Henry had a thousand mercenaries under arms, and it

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19 Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armées Françaises, p. 119.  
21 Ibid., Nos. 434, 454, 497. The only captain who can be identified was the Piedmontese condottiere, Bartholomew de Céres, a renegade from the dauphin's host, who volunteered himself, forty mounted arquebusiers, and three hundred footmen "of the bravest of all the French army."
is obvious, as well it should have been, that the dearth of foreign levies was cause for the gravest concern. The "camisade" of Boulogne had been a close run thing. More to the point, with that city and the entire Pale bidding fair to be subjected to further French aggression in the spring, the season was ripe, as Chancellor Wriothesley noted in a communique to Secretary Paget, "to meet the practices of the world in time."²²

Winter, then, while it brought in its wake the usual lull in hostilities, was a time of frenetic activity, especially on the diplomatic front, as the Henrician government, devoid of allies and naked to its enemy, strove to find new confederates and mercenaries in whatever quarters seemed most likely to produce them. In November serious consideration was given to the opening of negotiations with the Lutheran princes of Germany, with the Hanse towns along the Baltic, and with the kingdom of Denmark. It was, or so it momentarily seemed, 1539 all over again. Protestant fears, no less than Henry's, had been revived by the Treaty of Crépy, whose subscribers even at this moment were being exhorted by the common enemy, Rome, to unite in holy war against schismatics on both sides of the Channel.²³ There were reports that

²²Ibid., No. 614.
²³Ibid., Nos. 677, 679, 700.
certain of the Hanse towns had expressed a willingness to serve the English king on the sea; talk was heard of an alliance with the Schmalkaldic League; and two of the foremost Protestants, Frederick, the Elector-Palatine of the Rhine, and Maurice, Duke of Saxony, went as far as to send servants offering troops for the war against France. Such overtures Henry found pleasing in the extreme, but the promise they held forth of unlimited quantities of mercenaries and auxiliaries evaporated with the spring. Fear of the emperor, internal jealousies, and personal ambition had weakened the Germans' resolve. The Hanse, as it transpired, provided neither men nor ships; the Saxon Elector, John Frederick, who had succeeded his father as one of the joint commanders-in-chief of the forces of the Schmalkaldic League, would not deign to meet with Henry's envoys; while the Elector-Palatine and the Saxon duke were bribed into happy neutrality.

In retrospect, the loss of the Protestant alliance was

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\[24\] Ibid., Nos. 508, 699, 746; XX, pt. 1, No. 90.

\[25\] John, Elector of Saxony (d. 1532).

\[26\] L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 212; pt. 2, Nos. 67-69; A. H. Johnson, Europe in the Sixteenth Century, 1494-1598 (London: Rivingtons, 1898), pp. 222-23. Frederick the Elector-Palatine was supported by Charles V in an unsuccessful bid to gain the throne of Denmark. On the other hand, Maurice of Saxony was lured into an alliance with the emperor in the hope of gaining electoral Saxony from his cousin, John Frederick. The Electorate was in fact bestowed upon Maurice on the outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War in 1546.
fortunate indeed. At best it only could have served to irritate the emperor, who far from craving a quarrel with England desired most to isolate the Lutherans that he might the better chastise them. Likewise, such a compact would have been useful to Henry solely in the event of an actual break with Charles, but that was to be avoided. For sure, there came a moment early in 1545 when rupture seemed imminent. An awkward dispute arose concerning the impounding of certain Flemish ships which had been caught trading with France, but the matter was amicably composed on April 6.\textsuperscript{27} Meanwhile, a scant week earlier, in answer to the Lutheran Landgrave of Hesse, regarding his offer of ten thousand landsknechts and two thousand horse, the Privy Council informed him that the king intended to satisfy his requirements elsewhere, having more supplicants daily than he would need.\textsuperscript{28}

It was an exaggerated claim calculated to assuage Imperial Catholic tempers, as with the Elector, John Frederick of Saxony, Landgrave Philip stood highest in authority among the princes of the Augsburg Confession. Henry did not have the mercenaries he needed, though by April his deficiency in that area was less keenly felt. Throughout the winter there had

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Spanish Calendar}, VIII, No. 2; \textit{L. & P.}, XX, pt. 1, Nos. 8-10, 494; (B. M.) \textit{Add. MS. 28,594}, ff. 66-67b.

been hirings. Most were nameless recruits, campaigners and deserters from the war of 1544. Many who can be identified were acquired in the Low Countries through contacts like the resident English factor, Stephen Vaughan, who secured employment in December for two adventurers, an Italian, Angelo Mariano of Cremona, and a Spaniard, Antonio de Mora, veteran of the expeditionary force which had besieged Montreuil. 29 Another captain with previous English experience was Ytellowf von Gudenberg, the same Lord of Itter who had served Henry at the capture of Boulogne. He and a fellow German, Gottfried von Bocholt, were commissioned in January, each entrusted with the raising of five hundred men-at-arms for the wars.

January was an auspicious month for recruiting as it was a time of mass disbandments of the emperor's Spaniards in the Netherlands. Having been engaged for the defence of the Low Countries in 1544, they were at their discharge provided nine transports to convey them back to Spain. All of the vessels carrying several thousand of these men briefly put in at Rye where an offer of their services was sent to the king. The masters of the ships would not, however, wait upon an answer, but on making a second landfall at Falmouth six

30 Ibid., XX, pt. 1, No. 88 and below, p. 371.
hundred came ashore and were placed under contract by one of the king's gentlemen ushers, Sir Philip Hoby. 31 It was one of the largest, fastest, and apparently most amicable of such signings during the entire war.

The majority of the free lances obtained in 1545 and thereafter were not, however, so easily come by, for the Hapsburg emperor took his new found neutrality seriously. With the conclusion of the Treaty of Crépy, Charles made it a capital offence for any of his men of war to take employment with foreign princes, and in January of the new year he added some teeth to the measure by positively refusing safe-conducts through his lands for mercenaries Henry planned to recruit in Germany and in Italy. It was, as the Imperial Secretary, Granvelle, told Wotton, an importune season to ask for Germans, since the Grand Turk, Suleiman, was expected momentarily to descend on Hungary, whereas Italians, with or without safe-conducts, were certain to be set upon by the Germans and would only infect Englishmen "with their adominable vice." 32

Such logic appeared fatuous to the Tudor king, who complained loudly of the emperor's "discourtesies" and "inhumanities." Germany, whether at war with the Infidel or not, had troops enough for many armies, while the morals of Italians

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31L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 59, 106, 326.
32State Papers, X, 291.
were of no consequence whatever given the fact that Henry had already commissioned four, including Angelo Mariano, to raise thirty companies—some foot and some horse—in the territories of the Venetians. The remaining condottieri made an impressive trio. One was a count, Bernardo di San Bonifacio of Verona, whom Henry through his intercession with the Imperialists had saved from possible execution of 1543. Taken prisoner that year in Luxemberg while allegedly "wearing secretly" a French uniform, he had been incarcerated at Rippenmonde in the Low Countries until his release towards the end of August, 1544. After that date nothing else is heard of him until January, 1545, when he was cited by Chapuys as having been recently retained to find troops for the English in Venice. 33

The third captain involved in the Italian venture was Filippo Pini of Lucca, erroneously identified in a letter to the emperor as the "Prince of Bucharest," 34 while the fourth member of the quartet was Ludovico da l'Armi, whose misdeeds both in and out of English service make some of the most lurid reading in all the annals of mercenary warfare. Born into the petty aristocracy of Bologna, the product of the

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33L. & P., XVIII, pt. 2, No. 225; Spanish Calendar, VII, Nos. 198, 109; VIII, No. 2.

34Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 2.
marriage of Lord Gasparo da l'Armi and Lady Aurelia Campeggio, he had chosen the condottiere's life after being outlawed from his native city for a homicide committed in his youth. His first employment had been in France, where he became the familiar of the dauphin, who in 1541 had accorded him the honor of engineering the overthrow of the Imperialist-controlled government of Sienna. However, Ludovico's intrigues were uncovered, and when he himself was apprehended while fleeing through the Florentine territories of the emperor's ally, Duke Cosimo de' Medici, he volunteered such information as saved his life and assured the rout of the French party in Sienna.  

In the wake of his arrest, all trace of Da l'Armi is lost for three years. When next he is found it was in Germany, where in June, 1544, on the eve of the Boulogne campaign, he was commended to Henry through the troublesome Badener, Landenberg, by the bishops of Augusburg and Trent. In August he was a brief visitor at the siege of Boulogne, where by his disparaging remarks and pro-French bias he incurred the wrath of many an Englishman, including Sir William


Paget, who considered him an upstart and more likely a spy.37
But if Henry ever doubted the man, the feeling soon passed.
By the end of the year he had secured Da l'Armi with his
gold, accrediting him to the Venetian Republic as his colo-
nel at fifty crowns a month, with orders to recruit eight
captains who themselves were exhorted to entertain the most
select men that they could find.38

Surely, as that illustrious Victorian, Froude, pointed
out over a century ago, there was no stranger phenomenon of
the times than the high esteem of Henry VIII among younger
Italians.39 Their response to his call to arms was so over-
whelming that Edmund Harvel, the resident Tudor envoy in
Venice, was kept hopping for months by the flood of suppli-
cants begging employment. Captains, he reported to Henry on
March 1, resorted to him daily "as though all Italy were
under your Majesty's empire and at [your] commandmant."40
There is no certain explanation for this attraction aside
from the obvious reason that both king and condottieri had
mutually supportive needs, Henry for fighting men, the free

37Ibid., pt. 2, Nos. 93, 117.
38Ibid., XX, pt. 1, No. 650 (1).
39James Anthone Froude, History of England from the
Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth (12 vols.; New York:
Scribner, 1870), IV, 415.
lances for work. Yet, perhaps there was something which the
Italians found more alluring than English gold. It is just
possible that among those who flocked to Henry's standard
many were attracted by that monarch's hatred of Rome; for
though it is hardly proof of their religious predilection a
suspiciously high percentage of officers taken into wages
came from noted hotbeds of Italian Protestantism. Cremona,
the city in the Milanese which produced Angelo Mariano, was
a center of Lutheran and Calvinist activity; Verona, on the
Venetian mainland, from which sprang San Bonifacio, lay
close to Vicenza which sheltered a large Anabaptist commu­

nity; while Flippo Pini's Lucca and Da l'Armi's Bologna har­
borne Protestants of many persuasions. All told, of the
thirty captains hired by that foursome, nine can be posi­
tively identified as citizens of towns in which the reformed
faith flourished; and it is perhaps only coincidental that
one of the men most vigorously occupied in the enrollment of
this force was Harvel's secretary, Baldassare Altieri, a

41 Bartholomeo Moreni, Modena; Ludovico de Monte and
Count Antonio Benilacqua, Verona; Bambino de Carpi, Ferrara;
Battista Oliva, Mantua; Count Bonifacio Tresino, Vicenza;
Lorenzo Carli, and a captain Ventura, Lucca; and one Captain
Gramegna, Bologna. The names of all thirty captains can be
gleaned from the following documents: Ibid., Nos. 650 (2),
751 (2). On the impact of the Reformation in Italy, consult
Elton, ed., The Reformation, 1520-1559, Chap. VIII.
native of the Abruzzi and vociferous champion of Lutheranism.

For whatever reasons, recruitment in the Venetian Republic was a huge success. The four senior officers were allowed three months' wages in advance and commenced the enlistment of troops in April, Da l'Armi establishing his headquarters in Venice, the others concentrating on the mainland towns of Verona and Vicenza. How many rank and file were actually mustered has gone unmentioned, but signings were heavy enough to alarm Francis I and his ally, Pope Paul III, both of whom feared an invasion of French-controlled Piedmont and the disruption of the Council of Trent, that chief instrument of the Catholic Reformation which the pontiff had decreed should open that spring.

43 Venetian Calendar, Nos. 334, 337-38.
44 One of Da l'Armi's captains, Ludovico de Monte, writing to an agent of the Venetian government on July 29, 1545, projected that ten thousand foot and six hundred horse were to be raised by Henry and given to Charles II, the dispossessed Duke of Savoy, for the recovery of "his territory of Piedmont." Ibid., No. 343. If such a course was actually planned, nothing came of it.
45 The Council of Trent, after long delays, officially convened in December, 1545. In three great sessions lasting until 1563, it touched upon all aspects of religious life. It corrected many of the abuses in the Roman Church which had brought on the Reformation, clarified Catholic doctrine, and set the pattern for modern Catholicism.
Paul, indeed, had immediate cause for concern, since Trent, on the Italian side of the Alps, lay within easy reach of every center where Henry's condottieri were gathering. Moreover, Da l'Armi was his rebel, and in the pope's view that desperado had been hired specifically to ensnare none other than the English cardinal, Reginald Pole, who with two fellow legates, Marcello Cervini and Giovanni de Monte, had been ordered from Rome to convene the council in March.

There is scant evidence on the English side, but enough from other sources, to suggest that Pole's life was in truth in danger. He alone of the legates arrived late in Trent, reaching the city by a circuitous route in April, more than a month behind his colleagues who were there at the appointed time. In the interim, the pope applied to Da l'Armi for a safe-conduct, so that his hunted prelate could pass through Romagna in safety; but the document was refused, despite the arrest of Da l'Armi's father, who was briefly detained in

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46 Bologna, from which Da l'Armi eminated, lay within the boundaries of the papal state of Romagna.

47 L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 686, 743, 751. Its opening was delayed by the Imperial Diet of Worms (December, 1544, to July, 1545) in which the emperor, for a final time before the outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War, sought to comprise his religious differences with the Lutherans.

48 Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 33.
Rome and later sent to Venice to urge his son to remove himself from Tudor service. Pole ultimately arrived in Trent without incident, yet only after hiring his own band of cutthroats in Bologna, wherein, he reported, men were continually kept by Ludovico.

That Henry in this instance had ordered the elimination of the ecclesiarch is certainly within the realm of possibility. Like Da l'Armi, Pole too was a traitor and an outcast, having been attained by the English Parliament in 1539 for a multitude of offenses, not the least of which was his authorship of that violent assault on Henry's sensibilities, Pro Ecclesiasticae Unitatis Defensione. The cardinal, who in that manuscript compared his sovereign to the despots, Nero and Domitian, was dearly hated, and a number of attempts had previously been made to assassinate him. That he had escaped

49 Ibid.; L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 417, 425 (pp. 188-89), 842. See also Venetian Calendar, V, Nos. 334-35.
50 L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 602.
51 This polemic, completed in Venice in 1536, had been intended to turn the king's course from religious revolution to reconciliation with Rome, but its effect had been otherwise. Unsparking in its abuse and threatening in the extreme, it inveighed against Henry's persecution of the Catholic faithful and denounced him as a plunderer of his subjects. Its end result was to hasten the destruction of Pole's brother, Lord Montague, and his mother, the Countess of Salisbury, who were respectively executed in 1538 and 1541. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558, pp. 396, 547-48.
death at the hands of Henry's agents in the Netherlands in 1536, in Venice in 1538, and in Viterbo in 1540 is reason enough to suspect that Da l'Armi had been specially commissioned to murder him; yet, by the same token it is abundantly clear that Henry's main object in Italy was not the liquidation of Pole but the acquisition of mercenaries for his ongoing war in the north. He had hired the captains, and by all accounts they could deliver the men. What remained to be done, but could not be accomplished, was the transmission of the troops to the English front.

As from the first, the chief impediment to the movement of the Italian free lances remained the lack of passports. The logical path for them to have followed would have been overland through the Empire to the Netherlands and Calais, except that, as has been noted, the emperor would grant no license through his dominions to any soldiers whom it was the English government's plan to engage. Memories of Landerberg's depredations around Liège still rankled in Imperialist minds from the previous year, and the best that Charles could suggest regarding the Italians in the Venetian territories was that Henry bring them by sea from the Mediterranean. It seemed on the surface a reasonable alternative,

53 Spanish Calendar, VIII, Nos. 8, 15.
but it was not. Henry did not have the ships, and even if he had, the journey through the great inland sea, alive as it was with French galleys and Turkish corsairs was too hazardous to risk. The mercenaries from Venice were lost to him. Of the thousands that might have been activated, barely two hundred were called to duty, Da l'Armi sending two companies of light horse, one to England and another to Guisnes, in July. All the while, hope was held out that the emperor would change his mind about the passports. But as he did not, with the year far spent, Harvel was ordered in September to come to an understanding with the principal officers: Da l'Armi, San Bonifacio, Pini, and Mariano would continue to function as English agents; their captains, however, were to be discharged with the promise that next year, if needed, Henry would not refuse their services.

As will later appear, the English failure to bring the Italian companies from Venice was keenly felt, for militarily 1545 was a busy year. Nonetheless, everything considered,

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54 Henry's navy, comprised of about fifty vessels, was needed in home waters to protect and supply Boulogne, to harass the Scots, and to defend against that constant danger, invasion from France. On the size of the navy, see Williamson, The Tudor Age, p. 447. See also, L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 107 (p. 50).

55 Venetian Calendar, V, No. 343; L. & P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 196, 997.

Henry had good luck in finding mercenaries. The build-up through the spring, though slow, was constant. Free lances, individually and in small bands, inobtrusively materialized, most, it would seem, at Calais, where in the last days of February Secretary Paget reported so many had gathered that they were beginning to cause the civic authorities there concern. Musters were supervised by Sir George Broke, Lord Cobham, who as Deputy of Calais, and the king's chief officer in the town had general responsibility for the issuance of contracts, the administration of loyalty oaths to individual foreign captains, and the maintenance of discipline among the latters' men.

57 Ibid., pt. 1, No. 257.
58 See above, p. 97, n. 25.
59 The disciplinary ordinances for mercenaries then in force in Calais and its immediate environs required:
"That the captain of a band will neither attempt nor practice in any way to fill or supply his band of soldiers with others having office under the King, our Lord, nor receive any soldier to be enrolled in his said band, without first having informed my Lord, the deputy . . ., under pain of [blank]. That when musters are taken, no soldier answers for or in the name of another on pain of [blank]. That no Captain practices to supply his band at the musters with other soldiers who are not his own, in order to deceive the Commissioners [of the Musters] and for his own profit under pain of [blank]. The said soldiers will not fight with one another under pain of [blank]. The said soldiers will not sow any mutiny or faction among the band on pain of [blank]. No one will leave the outskirts of the camp for
No accurate count of the mercenaries retained by Cobham in early 1545 can be provided for lack of particular information. Nevertheless, some idea of their strength can be gathered from the large numbers trans-shipped to England, where as winter ended another alarum had been sounded along the northern frontier. On February 27, an English force of five thousand returning from a raid in Teviotdale was ambushed by the Scots on Ancrum Moor. Fourteen hundred English soldiers were killed or captured, and their leaders, Sir Ralph Evers, Warden of the Middle Marches, and Sir Brian Layton, Captain of Norham Castle, left dead on the field. The defeat in itself was serious enough, but compounding the disaster, and

the place where the band will be ordered to stay and serve, without having leave of the Captain. No one will sound the alarm without the order of the Captain on pain of [blank].
When the band or some number thereof will be ordered to do some exploit or strike the enemy, they will do it without any contradiction or difficulty on pain of [blank].
That in all things convenient and lawful they be obedient to the commands of the Captain, without running counter thereto on pain of [blank].
That none leave or embrace practices with the enemy without the knowledge and command of those who will have oversight on pain of [blank]."

The preceding ordinances can be found in (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/198, f. 50b.

A somewhat romanticized, but useful, account of this action is provided by Colin J. M. Martin, "Ancrum Moor: A Day of Reckoning," The Scots Magazine, n. s. LXXXIII, No. 2 (May 1965), 146-52.
thereby prompting the transfer of mercenaries from Calais, was the intelligence that six thousand French auxiliaries might be expected in Scotland in March, the vanguard of an army of forty thousand which under the Duke of Guise would attempt a landing on the northeast coast.  

Though the French attack would be postponed until the summer and would be launched against the south coast, there were no sages to divine the future at Westminster. Instead, at the beginning of March the Council had to grapple with the necessity of laying strong garrisons along the borders, of hastening the completion of coastal fortifications, and of providing an army for the defence of the northland. A general levy of the northern counties produced a respectable array of 27,500 men, good troops with experience in border warfare. But, as it was Frenchmen as well as Scots that they were expected to repel, Henry made the decision to reinforce them with mercenaries.

The movement of free lances from Calais was begun in March, the first to be deployed being Spanish arquebusiers. Thirteen hundred under their colonel, Pedro de Gamboa, were

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61 State Papers, V, 412.

62 The "schedule of the numbers appointed in every shire" is outlined in L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 555 (2).
collected at Dover and conveyed by sea to Newcastle. Thereafter followed smaller bands, mainly cavalry, to the tune of nearly two thousand, German men-at-arms, Italian "hacquebutiers of horseback," and Albanian stradiots, the first companies of which had been enlisted by Cobham in February. All told, therefore, Henry's army to withstand the Frenchmen and the Scots showed a strength of thirty thousand, one-tenth of which, and that the strongest part, was comprised of foreigners.

Without doubt, the incorporation of these mercenaries into the army in the north represented something of an innovation for Henry. His subjects had not seen the like since his father's reign, the last time free lances had tramped the roads of England in such numbers. Henry's use of them to defend the realm sprang certainly from his fear of the French. However, there existed another reason for their employment in England, namely the need to keep them active; for in France, where the war had temporarily wound down, boredom had so undermined their morale that they had taken to deserting and fighting among themselves.

63 Ibid., No. 435; State Papers, V, 439.
64 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/198, f. 48; L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 513. Henry also contemplated sending four thousand landsknechts into the north of England, but he was unable to get them out of Germany.
In Calais, in March, killings and woundings occurred on an almost daily basis, the market place being a favorite battleground of the mercenaries. Spaniards and Italians surpassed all other nationals in mayhem, and as is confirmed by Gruffyd, it was the former who most inclined towards desertion.  

Two Spanish captains, De Mora and Arze, fled into France with a hundred men and sixty new handguns on April 11; another, Juan de Haro, and twenty-five of his company was killed in a similar attempt; while mistrust of Spaniards at Boulogne caused the eventual transfer of three hundred to Tilbury and Dover.  

If there was a lesson to be learned from the troublesome behavior of these men of war, it was simply that idleness among mercenaries bred mischief. New outlets were needed for their violent energy, but lamentably these were not presently available in the English north country, where, as the accretion of free lances continued, the immediate threat of invasion receded. French succours in Scotland did not arrive as early as anticipated, nor in the strength expected, and the projected landing of the Duke of Guise was


shelved in favor of a larger demonstration in the Channel. But that, too, would be delayed until July, so that once again Henry's "soldiers strangers" were provided time to amuse themselves with not always salubrious results.

Most of the free lances removed from Calais were posted to Northumberland, the majority being retained in small bands along the seaboard between the Tyne estuary and Berwick. Problems with the commissariat forced many to live off the land, and in Newcastle, where the Spaniards were deposited en masse on an unwilling citizenry, trouble brewed instantly. On May 21, Robert Lewen, the mayor of the town, catalogued his complaints in a letter to Cuthbert Tunstall, Bishop of Durham. The Spaniards were rapacious; they paid for nothing. Lodgings, fuel, candles, salt, and victuals were gorged from their hosts, who quartered them in their own homes, without charge. Every creature comfort was demanded, including laundry service, so that the citizens on the verge of penury were fain to leave their houses. Only an emergency advance on the Spaniards' wages saved the situation. On May 26, Tunstall and his colleague, Sir Ralph Sadler, High Treasurer of the Wars Against Scotland, paid out

67Ibid., Nos. 767, 867, 906, 909; Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 49.

68L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 787.
to Gamboa 1000 marks in prest "to avoid inconvenience betwixt the inhabitants and them which agree not the best." 69

It was a mild understatement, considering that in the streets of Newcastle two of the king's subjects had already been butchered by Spanish hands. 70

Anarchism among the mercenaries in England never attained the heights that had been reached in Calais. Still, the events related above were no isolated incidents. A troop of Clevelander horsemen, on their way north in June, touched off a riot in Islington in Middlesex in which a member of the town watch was killed; the same month, French spies were said to be actively enticing the foreigners in Northumberland to join with the Scots; and in July, in Newcastle, a "camp" or duel between two Spaniards, one of whom in a quarrel had struck the other in the face, was authorized by the Privy Council to prevent even greater bloodshed among the partisans of each who had taken sides. 71

The moral again was clear: no employer of mercenaries could afford them the luxury of inaction. Peace, like nothing else, exposed their wickedness, and in war alone lay their redemption.

Where Henry's free lances were concerned, their salvation

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69 Ibid., No. 815.
70 Ibid., No. 811.
71 Ibid., Nos. 749, 770, 1000, 1068, 1085, 1315.
lay with France. Against that nation they had been hired to
fight in defence of Boulogne and the frontier against Scot-
land, but throughout the spring, after the unsettling fright
on Ancrum Moor, no serious danger arose on either front. Of
the war in France during the first five months of this year,
little can be said. The marshal, Du Biez, and twelve thou-
sand men, while attempting to raise a bailey to command the
mouth of the Liane, were surprised by Hertford near Le Portel
and driven back on Montreuil. A short while later, the Eng-
lish garrisons at Guisnes and Hammes, raiding in the vicinity
of Ardres, took the tower of Outings, and in May, Sir
Thomas Poynings, Lisle's replacement as Governor of Boulogne,
occupied the castle of Hardelot.

Of the Scottish war during the same period, there is
much less to relate. There were no exploits of which to tell.
Not even the discovery that the French auxiliaries had landed
at Dumbarton on May 31 caused Henry to stir, though Hertford,

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72 The only full record of the seizure of Outings and the
overthrow of Du Biez from the English side is provided by
Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," pp. 2-4.
The information presented compares favorably with the French
account supplied in Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 206.

73 Poynings assumed his duties on January 31, at which
time Lisle returned to England to resume his post as Lord
Admiral. L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 121, 125 (30).

74 State Papers, V, 458, cites the number of Frenchmen
at thirty-six hundred.
then in Newcastle in his capacity as Lieutenant and Captain-
75 General of the North, proposed the capture of Kelso to im-
pede any Scots advance on the borders. Had the plan materi-
alized, the mercenaries in Northumberland would have seen
their first action, in anticipation of which Hertford held a
view of his Spaniards in Newcastle and hurried off a request
to London for the horsemen of Cleves, detained by their trou-
ble in Islington. 76 Kelso, however, was spared. For short-
age of victuals, the enterprise was forborne, and the earl
contented himself in the hope of carrying through an earlier
plan, that of invading Scotland in August when the harvest
had been collected and was ripe for destruction. 77

Meanwhile, the true objective of French strategy had
finally revealed itself. Francis I, having moved Henry to
commit the larger portion of his mercenary strength to the
defence of England, had resolved to isolate Boulogne. To do
so, Francis proposed to gather a fleet powerful enough to com-
mand the Channel, blockade the southern ports, and detain
Henry's troops in England. Towards these ends, he began to
assemble his flotilla in March. Vessels and seamen were

75 L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 846 (2). Hertford, who re-
placed Suffolk, Norfolk, and Russell in Calais at the begin-
ning of the year, was recalled to England in April.

76 Ibid., Nos. 883, 890.

77 State Papers, V, 451.
pressed into service from Bordeaux to Brest. Six ships were sent from Scotland, but the larger part of the armada, including carracks from Genoa and galleys Rome, was convoyed in May from the Mediterranean port of Marseilles. The whole, consisting of 150 great sailing ships, twenty-five galleys, and sixty transports, was collected in July in the Norman havens of Havre de Grace, Eure, Harfleur, Hanfleur, and Dieppe with ten thousand men to destroy Lisle's squadrons in Portsmouth and close the harbor of Boulogne.

Such specifics of French intentions, however, were not available to Henry, who had little to rely on but hearsay gathered from every diplomatic pouch and newsmonger he chose to credit. The king could be certain that Francis meant to recover Boulogne: Du Biez, after his earlier overthrow at Le Portel, had returned with an army to the Liane to build an even larger fort. But, to the Tudor's greater consternation, what could not be plumbed was the target of the expedition into England. Rumor pointed alternatively to Scotland, Kent, the western counties, and Sussex as the likeliest places for the French diversion, so that as summer began, to

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78 Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 49; L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 1073.
79 Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 213-14.
discourage a landing Henry was forced to mobilize the whole power of the counties. Hertford, with his thirty thousand, remained in Northumberland; the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Russell, with equal forces, stood guard respectively in the East and West; while the Duke of Suffolk, "with some horses out of Almain," mustered a fourth army in Sussex, Kent, and Hampshire.

Speculation regarding French purposes ended on July 18 when their fleet entered the Solent. An attack by their galleys on Portsmouth harbor in a calm sea on the nineteenth momentarily threatened disaster, and only the sudden rising of a seaward breeze averted the sinking of the English sail-powered squadrons within. With the wind against them, the French retired to the Isle of Wight where their landing parties were rudely welcomed by its defenders. Three days of aimless skirmishing failed to establish a stable beachhead, and on the twenty-fourth Admiral Claude d'Annebaut, commander of the invaders, drew his fleet off into the Channel, depositing on the French side on the last day of the month three thousand pioneers and four thousand soldiers to assist


82 The fullest account of French operations is presented by Froude, History of England, IV, 389-400.
Du Biez in shaping the land siege of Boulogne. 83

Two more weeks of naval demonstrations, including an indecisive action off Shoreham in Sussex, accomplished nothing further. The great effort which was to have rendered Boulogne indefensible by paralysing England ended ignominiously on the night of August 15 when, under cover of darkness, on the eve of the morrow on which Lisle intended to re-engage, D'Annebaut withdrew under full sail for France. 84 Never, reported Lisle from his flagship, was there a journey "so costly to France as this has been for so short a voyage, nor more shame spoken of amongst themselves." 85 Yet, England too had paid a price. D'Annebaut's month of desultory sailing had sufficiently distracted Henry as to allow Francis to reinforce his army before Boulogne. Word of the French build-up in the Boulonnais was sent to Henry on July 6 by Poynings, whose staff, in a report prepared for the Council in London, recited the garrison's troubles. Plague and the bloody flux, stemming from rotted herring supplied during Lent and the "corrupt loathsomeness of much barrelled beef,"

83L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 1263 (p. 628), 1332.

84It was disease, however, and not Lisle's cannon from which the French so precipitously ran. At sea a month, with foul water and rancid stores, plague had broken out in the quarters below decks. See Froude, History of England, IV, 399-400.

85State Papers, I, 820.
had reduced its numbers by almost three hundred. Men, therefore, were in short stock as were munitions, money, and fresh provisions. Of equal concern was the attitude of the Italians in the high town, many of whom had taken offence at the appointment of Salerno to be their colonel. In the end, to ease tensions, some, like the Spaniards, were sent from Boulogne into England to guard the south coast.

As if these problems were not enough, the French began the construction of their fort at Outreau on July 7, and on the thirteenth, from a vantage point nearer the harbor, their gunners sunk a supply ship and drove away others which accompanied her. Poynings was hard pressed to retaliate. Vigorous sorties by his light horsemen enabled him to keep the enemy off balance, but the sickness among his troops and the dispersal of his mercenaries prevented him from attempting to oust the French from Outreau. There, by July 24, construction of the fort was so well in hand that the English commander felt compelled to ask for reinforcements, five thousand foot and two or three hundred horse, with which to

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86 L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 1122-23.
87 Ibid., No. 796.
88 Above, pp. 356-57.
89 L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 1130; Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 95.
drive them off completely. \(^{90}\)

Had D'Annebaut not held the Narrow Sea, Poynings' request would have been honored immediately. The Privy Council, sitting in Portsmouth on July 30, commissioned Norfolk's son, the Earl of Surrey, to lead five thousand infantrymen to Boulogne's relief. \(^{91}\) However, with the French fleet in the Dover Straits, the order was rescinded in favor of a more ambitious undertaking. Surrey's orders were countermanded on August 13, and word was sent to the Duke of Suffolk to prepare to cross the Channel with an army, the troops to be drawn from the thirty-two thousand he commanded as Henry's lieutenant of the southern counties. \(^{92}\)

The aim was to implement the plan as soon as Lisle cleared the seas, for news from Boulogne indicated a need for haste. On the fifteenth, the day of the seafight at Shoreham, Poynings wrote that the French camp around Outreau now numbered twenty-one thousand effectives and twelve thousand pioneers, adding that Francis in person was daily expected out of Abbeville or Montreuil with a supplementary force of landsknechts. Further information that for three

\(^{90}\) L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 1146, 1160, 1179, 1187, 1197, 1200, 1264.

\(^{91}\) Ibid., No. 1311.

\(^{92}\) Ibid., Nos. 1078, 1081 (33); pt. 2, No. 117.
days past Poynings had been forced to bed with the bloody flux was almost as discomforting. The governor trusted to recover but did not; he died on August 18, leaving orders for the management of Boulogne until his replacement could be had out of England.

The demise of Poynings, if it was a bitter blow, was nothing to the shock delivered to the Council on the twenty-second. On the evening of that day, as it sat at Woking in Surrey, word arrived that Suffolk had died in nearby Guilford, the victim most likely of plague or fever contracted from infected crews in Portsmouth where earlier he had been about the king's business. The duke's army was stayed; Surrey was appointed to Poynings' place at Boulogne, and for the moment, the hope of disrupting French operations was pinned on a force of German mercenaries engaged to march through France.

The free lances in question were those of the knight, Friedrich von Reiffenberg, a native of Sayn in the Westerwald

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93 State Papers, X, 569, 570, 572.

94 L. & P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 238, 346, 368; XXI, pt. 1, No. 131. See also, Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 25. In Gruffyd's estimation, Suffolk, whom he describes as "the flower of the captains of the realm," and Poynings, referred to as "the best soldier under the king," were the most able commanders in Henry's army.

95 Ibid., Nos. 225, 496 (8).
near Koblenz. In June, having offered Henry twenty ensigns of infantry and a thousand horse, he was summoned to England for an interview, for which purpose Philip of Hesse, whose vassal he was, provided him with letters of commendation and the promise that the men to be raised might be gathered within his principality. Reiffenberg's audience with the king was eminently successful. He was commissioned as a colonel, and the number of his horse was increased to fifteen hundred on the understanding that the whole body be mustered and ready to march from Koblenz to Boulogne by August 20. July 24 found Reiffenberg in Antwerp. There, from the hands of Henry's factor, Stephen Vaughan, the mercenary leader received £5,500 Flemish in conduct money, a "jocdal" or Joachimsthaler for each of his eight thousand footmen, plus the usual half-month's pay for his horsemen, their wagons,


98 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 138.

99 On October 8, 1545, by the rate of exchange then current the English pound sterling brought 24s. 6d. on the Antwerp money market. L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 552.
"and all other things." 100

After such a promising start, the operation soon disintegrated. Ralph Vane, Thomas Chamberlain, Francis Hall, and Thomas Avery, the English commissioners appointed to oversee the musters of Reiffenberg's men, were delayed in Antwerp by the late arrival of the king's instructions. Problems in securing safe conveyance for the better than £20,000 to be distributed among the Germans on the day of muster prevented their leaving Antwerp until the end of August, so that it was September 2 before they caught up with Reiffenberg in Cologne. There, in a long interview lasting until the morning of the third, the colonel agreed to march forward from "a place beyond the Rhine" on the eleventh, though the commissioners were doubtful that, as the contract stipulated, he could reach Boulogne in a fortnight, the more so, as at the conclusion of their talk, Reiffenberg was summoned to consult with the Landgrave in Hesse. 101

The Englishmen's misgivings were soon realized. From Sayn, Reiffenberg reported as he rode into Hesse that three hundred of his horsemen and nearly one thousand foot had deserted, seduced by the Duke of Brunswick who had received

100 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 203. The Joachimsthaler, the original "dollar," was valued at something slightly less than 2s. 3d. sterling.

8,000 crowns from the French to "miscarry" the soldiers from the king of England.\footnote{102} Hereafter, calamity followed calamity in rapid succession. In mustering the landsknechts near Andernach between September 14 and the twenty-sixth, the commissioners found several ensigns under strength. Many of the soldiers lacked armor, for which Reiffenberg borrowed 1,200 crowns and an additional 8,000 crowns to satisfy his people and reimburse the country folk for damage done in "gathering and eating their grapes."\footnote{103} The horsemen presented problems of a different sort: their captains had over-recruited by several hundred, the which, to preserve goodwill, the commissioners were compelled to enroll, "a page for every twelve horses, besides a baggager or messenger as they had last year."\footnote{104} But the gravest difficulties were reserved for the march which began under changed orders at Andernach on September 26.

The accumulation of French reserves in eastern Picardy and an unreliable commissariat had persuaded the Privy Council that a passage to Boulogne could not be forced over so long a distance without inviting Reiffenberg's destruction. New instructions were therefore communicated to the

\footnote{102}{Ibid., Nos. 299, 300.}
\footnote{103}{Ibid., No. 437.}
\footnote{104}{Ibid.}
commissioners on September 19 to the effect that the Germans should advance no further into France than Champagne, there to annoy the countryside in the hope of drawing the French from Outreau. It was an easier assignment, free of the hazards which the long journey across France would have entailed. Reiffenberg, on leaving Andernach, seemed pleased, but by this time, from what unfolded in the days ahead, it is questionable if he planned any honest exploit at all.

Though it had been decided to invade Champagne near Mézières, a garrison town on the western fringe of the Ardennes, the commissioners were led off to the north and Aachen, where Gottfried von Bocholt lay with seven hundred men-at-arms and an ensign of foot. On the way, Reiffenberg's landsknecht companies were filled to the required eight thousand, and two additional ensigns were allowed the colonel, so that the whole number of free lances intended for the irruption into France exceeded thirteen thousand. Following

105 Ibid., Nos. 403, 468.
106 Ibid., Nos. 437, 509.
107 These two ensigns were mustered with Bocholt's footmen in Aachen on October 3. Ibid., No. 527.
108 In a long letter written by the commissioners to the Council on October 17, the German force is described as containing 2,809 horsemen and 10,400 footmen, the monthly charge for the whole being £26,950 Flemish, "about £20,212 10s. sterling." Ibid., No. 605 (p. 279).
Bocholt's musters on October 2 and third, the army proceeded to Visé, a village on the Meuse within the Bishopric of Liege some four days' distance from the French frontier. Here, almost certainly with Reiffenberg's knowledge, the guides hired to lead the expedition were bribed, probably, as Gruffyd suggests, by the gentry of Champagne, who, lacking sufficient strength to guard their frontier, "raised a large sum in 109 crowns" to turn the Germans from their purpose.

For a week, after crossing the Meuse on the seventh, the mercenaries wandered aimlessly through Liège, "being led out of the straight way" to Florennes, a town below the Sambre near Dinant in Luxemburg some thirty miles from Mézières. It proved to be Reiffenberg's last stop. His men, having consumed their victuals, their pay, and several thousand pounds in extra perquisites extorted from the hapless commissioners,

109 Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 37. There is some question as to who the malefactors were. The commissioners initially laid the blame on agents of the Bishop of Liege, who anticipated a repeat of the destruction caused by Landenberg in 1544. Later letters throw suspicion on the emperor and Philip of Hesse. Charles naturally desired to avoid giving offense to the French by allowing the mercenaries to pass through his countries. On the other hand, during Reiffenberg's march to the Meuse the Landgrave was attacked by the Duke of Brunswick and openly solicited the commissioners for the men at Rheinbach, on the road to Aachen, on September 28. Reports that French agents had infiltrated the ranks had, however, been circulating since September 4. On the whole question, consult the following: L. & P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 299, 300, 468, 489, 679, 680 (1), 730, 954 (2), and Appendix, No. 43 (26).
refused to move further unless guaranteed an additional month's wages. When, on instructions from Henry, it was refused, the unfortunate Englishmen were threatened with irons, menaced with death, and finally dragged off in wagons, obtaining their release at Ciney in Liège only on November 10 after full compliance with their jailers' demands. At a cost of over £80,000, the journey which was to have saved Boulogne in August had accomplished nothing, while Reiffenberg, his pockets filled double with that which he had squeezed from the English and accepted from the French, returned to Hesse and the service of the Landgrave.

Never, as Thomas Chamberlain complained, had a king's money been so evilly used, though Reiffenberg was not alone in his nonfeasance. Contemporaneous with Henry's efforts to raise levies in the Rhineland, John Dymock, another of the English factors in the Low Countries, was sent into North Germany, his instructions, to muster and obtain shipping in Bremen, Hamburg, or Lubeck for two thousand landsknechts recruited by Peter, the Bastard of Gelders. Dymock left

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111 Lilliencron, Wegele, Bethelehein, et al., eds., Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, XXVIII, 687.

112 I have been unable to positively identify this man, who appears to have been a prominent leader of mercenaries.
Antwerp in the first week of July, but before he could reach Bremen the mercenaries, impatient at his coming, dispersed. Far worse was the decision of the city's governors. They could provide no ships, for the emperor had sworn them to neutrality, so that Dymock, being daily attended by a horde of angry soldiers continually "crawling for money," made off to Hamburg, the men of war in close pursuit.

The Englishman's reception in Hamburg was no better and the clamor of the landsknechts no less loud. At Lubeck which Dymock reached on July 29, the truth revealed itself: the entire Hanse had pledged itself to the emperor.¹¹³ No passage for troops could be had by sea, and though consideration was given to sending the men overland to muster with Reiffenberg's bands on the Rhine, that, too, proved impossible. The distance to be covered was great, and the whole country between was alive with enemíés, soldiers of the fiercely Catholic Henry of Brunswick, who had initiated a war for the recovery of his duchy from the hands of the Schmalkaldic

He may have been the son of Charles of Egmont, last Duke of Gelderland, who on dying without legitimate issue in 1538 left his lands to the Duke of Cleves.

¹¹³ L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 69 (p. 34).
¹¹⁴ Ibid.
Dymock, whose mission for all good purpose ended in Lubeck, returned to Hamburg. He remained there for a month on Paget's request, supplying intelligence and living by his wits to escape assassination by the Bastard of Gelders, whose ravenous landsknechts descended on the unhappy Duchy of Westphalia. Twice Dymock was apprehended by certain of the soldiers sent to solicit funds, and, as he wrote, had he not "wrought wisely" would have remained a prisoner "or cost the King 18,000 crowns for his release." He would not, he confided in a letter to Ralph Vane, have another such assignment for £5,000. "I have been fain," he continued, "to ride with forty, thirty, or twenty horsemen at the least, and at this present hour the lords of Hamburg warn me that there is wait laid for me in divers places." Vane, having suffered similar indignities at Landenberg's hands, could readily sympathize, being even then entered upon a new time of troubles with Reiffenberg. But of the correspondents, Dymock was the

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115 Ibid., No. 342. One of Brunswick's captains was Christopher van Pressburg, the same who had fought for Henry VIII at Boulogne. This conflict, which cost the English king the services of Peter van Gelders, ended with Brunswick's capture by the Landgrave of Hesse in October, 1545. For particulars see Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, trans. C. V. Wedgewood (London: Jonathan Cape, 1965), p. 538.

luckier by far. He was recalled from Hamburg in August;\(^{117}\) Vane's travail, and that of his fellow commissioners, was pro-
longed until November.

\(^{117}\)Ibid., No. 598. Dymock left Hamburg on October 2.
there were so many depraved, brutish soldiers from all nations under the sun—Welsh, English, Cornish, Irish, Manx, Scots, Spaniards, Gascons, Portingals, Italians, Arbannoises, Greeks, Turks, Tartars, Almains, Germans, Burgundians, Flemings, who had come there . . . to have a good time under the king of England, who by nature was too hospitable to foreigners.


Thus far in 1545, circumstances had cheated Henry VIII of the services of copious numbers of mercenaries. The emperor, because of his policy of non-involvement in the Anglo-French war, had forced the demobilization of Da l'Armi's Italians. The same monarch's power over the Hanse and the Duke of Brunswick's attempt to be revenged upon the Lutherans cost the Tudor king the support of Peter van Gelders. And lastly, Reiffenberg's duplicity deprived Henry of the largest single contingent of free lances it was ever his privilege to raise. In these miscarriages, by rough estimate as many as twenty-six thousand mercenaries may have been involved. The Veronese, Ludovico da Monte, one of the eight captains in Da l'Armi's personal following, had anticipated the conscription of 10,600 of his countrymen; Reiffenberg's command,
excluding pioneers, at the time of its defection totalled
13,209; while the Bastard of Gelders' force was reputed at
one point to have contained as many as three thousand.\(^1\)

Despite these enormous losses which were never made up,
Henry was hardly bereft of foreign troops, though, as his
contract with Reiffenberg stands witness, there were fewer at
Boulogne than he cared to admit. Even so, and allowing for
the Spaniards and Italians who had been removed to England in
the spring,\(^2\) over the summer the number of free lances within
the fortress noticeably increased. The schedule of the sol­
diers and laborers prepared in August for the Council on Poyn­
ings' death reveals that 737 of the 6,920 effectives were for­
eigners,\(^3\) most of them deserters out of France, as were the
102 Albanian horsemen and the French company of one Byons,
"a Provençal born, who entered the King's service from being
a prisoner."\(^4\)

Larger numbers of mercenaries lay within the Pale, for
which, unfortunately, no similar schedules are available; but

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\(^1\)Above, pp. 373 ff.

\(^2\)Above, pp. 357, 365.

\(^3\)L. & P., pt. 2, No. 200 (3).

\(^4\)Ibid., No. 200 (1). Byons, captain of a French galley
taken off Boulogne, died on August 26, a victim apparently
of the plague.
the garrisons there, before D'Annebaut's blockade, were at the lowest fifteen thousand. At Guisnes, Hammes, and Calais, soldiers of all manner of nations had gathered. Some, like the Spanish light cavalryman, Alfonso Padillo, were sent out of England, while others, the Albanian, George Moszia di Napoli, and the Italian, Lodovico Morescotto, among them, came from France or through the Low Countries. 5 To Guisnes in August, once the French fleet had left the Channel, two hundred Germans and three hundred Spaniards were sent to join an already considerable garrison of Englishmen, Albanians, and Italians, some of the latter provided by Da l'Armi, 6 who despite the loss of his own command continued in his role as Henry's envoy-extraordinaire in Venice. Calais, in the same season, was home to many foreign units whose officers, if their tastes matched those of the English captains, lived well.

The latter, by Gruffyd's account, "took things as merrily as the heart of man could desire." They ate and drank of the best, spent their leisure in cards and dice, "each one with his oaths, blasphemous in the mouths of people who.


6(B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 313; Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, 1, 234.
called themselves Christians, and plenty of shameless whores on whom they spent all their own money." Gruffyd's estimate of all officers, English or otherwise, was low. Their only object was to return home wealthy, "if by no other way, then on the wages of their men," who "were compelled to lie in the low country" outside the town "where there was great shortage of bread and drink."  

In England, meanwhile, the numbers of mercenaries had swollen to proportions thus far unheard of in Henry's reign. In May and June, the crush of free lances in the southern and eastern ports was such that Henry was at a loss as to how they might be employed. "My lord," ran a typical letter penned on the king's behalf to Cobham at Calais, "after most hearty commendations I have received your lordship's letter in the commendation of John Baptista de Beni da Gobi, and marvel not a little forasmuch as you have been the occasion of the sending hither of so many [free lances] as are already come over, with the which we are here all wearied." If any more, the writer continues, are sent to England, "we will not fail hereafter to send as fast back to you again."  

That letter of June 6 had its counterpart in another sent to Cobham on July 12:

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7Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 27.
8(B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 305.
After my right hearty commendations . . . the same shall understand that the King's Majesty hath received my lordship's letters and advisements which his Highness taketh in very thankful part. And where his Majesty perceiveth that my Lord Poyning[s] hath by his letters required you to stay there such horsemen as shall arrive to serve his Majesty, his highness being pleased therewith prays your Lordship to do the same and with the advice of my Lord Grey⁹ and others of the council [at Calais] to employ them in his Majesty's service there until you shall be advertised when his Majesty shall further determine, and to place them for the time as you shall think convenient, praying you to advertise the names of horsemen which be already arrived, and likewise to continue the same as they shall from time to time arrive accordingly.¹⁰

The names of many of the mercenaries retained in England appear in the financial account of Sir Thomas Chaloner, a Clerk of the Privy Council, employed in the summer of 1545 as a courier of funds to various persons, "strangers and others," engaged for Hertford's army in the north. In May and June, he dispensed prests, conduct money, or wages to no fewer than ten units,¹¹ Albanian, Clevelander, German, Italian, and Spanish. Some consisted of no more than a captain and two or three followers, as, for example, the bands supplied by the Italians, Nicholas Tooso and Antonio de Sancta

⁹Lord William Grey of Wilton, commander of Guisnes.

¹⁰(B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 317.

¹¹That is the number which, from the dates supplied in the manuscript, can be positively identified as having come into England in the late spring of early summer of 1545. There were almost certainly others.
Cecilia, each of whom were taken into wages on May 1 with three horsemen apiece.\(^\text{12}\) A few soldiers, like the Spaniards, Don Andreas Cacillo and Pedro Michaele, were enlisted individually; but larger contingents, with full compliments of officers, were not unusual, the most formidable being the three companies of German lancers brought over from Calais by Captains Matthew Lightmaker,\(^\text{13}\) Peter Hoen, and Vollard van der Lughe. Hoen's squadron, which on June 12 attained a strength of nearly two hundred, had attached to it a lieutenant, a standard-bearer, three file leaders, a musterclerk, a quartermaster, two furriers, and a trumpeter.\(^\text{14}\)

Chaloner's entries reveal something of stradiot organization. In the two Albanian squadrons paid by him for the period ending May 30, a primitive chain of command not unlike that which existed in English companies can be detected. Three officers are mentioned: a captain; his assistant, a

\(^\text{12}\) (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mems. 4, 6. This document, comprised of thirteen membranes, covers the period from May, 1545, until February, 1550, during which time Chaloner was active in supplying mercenaries with funds. It contains a wealth of information and would of its own warrant a separate study.

\(^\text{13}\) Matthew Lightmaker was the brother of Thomas, who was still in wages at Calais.

\(^\text{14}\) (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mem. 8.
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"petty-captain" or lieutenant; and under him an ensign.\(^{15}\)

By way of contrast, the ultimate in military organization was provided by the infantry company of the Italian captain, Muscovito, whose 160-man unit showed a lieutenant, alfiere,\(^{16}\) sergeant, seven caporalles, musterclerk, two quartermasters, three drumers, and a fifer.\(^{17}\)

Altogether, that summer perhaps a thousand mercenaries were financially serviced by Chaloner, whose funds, amounting to thousands of pounds, were received from the hands of the various Treasurers of the Augmentations, First Fruits and Tenths, Exchequer, and Mint.\(^{18}\) Henry, therefore, at this juncture had in England between two and three thousand free lances; for Hertford had at least an equal amount in Northumberland,\(^{19}\) and several hundred Italians and Spaniards lay

\(^{15}\)Ibid., mem. 7. These officers respectively were paid at the rate of £15, £7 10s., and £6 6s. per month. The ordinary trooper received 50s. The two captains were Theodore Luchisi and Antonio Stesino, the latter being the first of that nation recorded in English service. (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/198, f. 48. Both had come from Calais, Luchisi with forty-seven horsemen, Stesino with fifty-two.

\(^{16}\)An ensign or standard-bearer.

\(^{17}\)(P. R. O.) E 351/43, mem. 4.

\(^{18}\)On the functions of these institutions, the principal governmental agencies in Henry's reign for the collection and administration of royal revenues, see Glossary.

\(^{19}\)Gamboa's Spanish "regiment" contained about eight hundred men.
in garrisons in Essex and Kent.

The campaign in southern Scotland, as always, was brief and bloody. In two weeks of raiding and burning, the dishonor of Ancrum Moor was expunged with a vengeance. Having drawn his "strangers" towards the border, Hertford advanced through Roxburgh on Kelso, which town was reached in September 9. His Spanish arquebusiers drew his praise for their assault upon the abbey which, with the rest of the town, was taken after a bitterly contested fire-fight on the tenth. In the days following, Melrose, Dryburgh, their abbeys, and near a score of lesser settlements were incinerated, so that Hertford could write that, excepting his own late journey to Edinburgh, as much hurt had not been done in Scotland for a hundred years. 20

From Kelso, the army moved unopposed on Jedburgh. On the sixteenth, while Hertford razed that town and the country around, fifteen hundred light horsemen, the Albanian contingents assuredly among them, carried the conflagration six or seven miles further. That same afternoon, with their supplies dwindling, the raiders turned back towards Northumberland, burning their way through the Merse until they came to...


21 The Merse was the "march" or southern borderland of the Scottish county of Berwick.
Norham. There, on English ground, on September 23, the army was dissolved. The damage that had been inflicted on the Scots was now, in Hertford's judgement, twice that which had been accomplished in 1544; for as the conquering earl had anticipated, his attack had coincided with the end of the Scottish harvest. Assuredly, he informed London, "there is burnt a wonderful deal of corn . . . for they had done much of their harvest" which his soldiers had found "in stacks about their houses or had it lying in shocks in the field." Scotland's eastern marches, he was sure, had been wasted; the nation was powerless to molest England.

It only remained to cement the victory by making some "good exploit" in the Scottish west marches, through which Henry felt his beaten foe might seek to enter England. Accordingly, Hertford arranged the siege of Carlaverock Castle, property of Lord Robert Maxwell, prisoner in England since his capture at Solway Moss in 1542. The fortress, which stood at the mouth of the River Nith, was within easy reach of Dumfries, the likeliest stronghold from which any Scottish offensive might originate. Though there are no records of the enterprise, Carlaverock was taken, delivered,

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22 L. & P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 323, 328, 400. Hertford, in his dispatches to the Council, boasted of destroying no fewer than seven monasteries and over 240 villages and towns. His record of the places "brent, razed, and cast down" is calendared in Ibid., No. 456.
it would seem, to Lord Maxwell, who for the purpose was released on bond from his cell in Pomfret.

Once in this assured Scot's hands, an English garrison was almost certainly placed within Carlaverock, and immediately the castle was besieged. From this result, some thought was given to raising an expedition for its relief. Gamboa, who with his Spaniards had returned to Newcastle, was petitioned to provide two hundred mounted hackbutters; but as the weather turned foul, and the castle stood "in a great strength of creeks and moss," the whole idea was discarded, and Carlaverock was retaken on November 2.

Another plan involving Hertford's free lances was devised soon after by Sir Thomas Wharton, Warden of Henry's western marches. About this enterprise nothing is known, except that for an exploit to be done in Scotland a thousand northern "prickers" and Gamboa's two hundred cavalrymen were ordered to be in Carlisle by November 20. Besides the Spanish horse soldiers, Gamboa was asked as well for the whole power of his infantry which had increased to over one thousand, while at the Privy Council's request, Bishop Tunstall was instructed to send back to the borders the Cleveland and German

23Ibid., Preface, xxii-iii.

24Ibid., xiii-iv; Nos. 685, 700.

25Wharton, in the same capacity, had commanded the English borderers at Solway Moss.
men-at-arms, who were to have been lodged for the winter in York.  

Perhaps, like the aborted march on Carlaverock, Wharton's mission was set aside; but if some feat was attempted, it was accomplished by December, at the beginning of which month, with the onset of winter, the mercenaries were placed in garrisons, three hundred Clevelanders at Norham and Wark, the bulk of the Spaniards at Berwick and Carlisle, with some few at Alnwick, Workworth, Bamburgh, and the "villages abowtes." However, not all the free lances remained in the north. Some like the Albanians and certain other horsemen, were dispatched "homeward" after Hertford's return from the Merse. This, too, was the fate of the Italian companies of Muscovito and Morgante Mansron, who "for the avoiding of his further clamors," was advanced £25 by Chaloner in partial payment of a greater sum he claimed as due.

By this late date, as well from the changed situation in France as from Hertford's disbandments, mercenary strength in England had fallen considerably. Boulogne, after some


27 Ibid., 269-70. The majority of the German men-at-arms were likewise retained in the north, but precisely where I have been unable to ascertain. See ibid., 298.

28 Ibid., 262, 279; L. & P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 572, 621; E 351/43, mem. 9.
heart-stopping moments, had survived the French offensive which had been sprung in earnest in September with a bold attack upon the Terre d'Oye, the low and boggy plash-land which, within the Pale, lay between Calais and Gravelines. The object of the assault was three-fold: to surprise Guisnes, destroy whatever supplies lay stored in the Pale, and prevent the reinforcement of Boulogne from Calais.

The raid, led by Du Biez, was meticulously planned. Entering the land of Oye through the unprotected frontier with the Netherlands, the French, with twenty thousand men, broke suddenly into the Calesian parish of Olderwick, whose English defenders in their confusion were slain almost to a man. Near the township of Oye, along the downs from Calais, Lord Cobham offered battle, Du Biez having "pitched a strong camp" there on the twenty-first, his footmen flanked on either side by cavalry, a hackbutter between each horseman and a large body of Dutch curassiers "trained in the use of guns and lances."²⁹ To oppose this array Cobham mustered eight thousand Englishmen, among them "many callow boys" and "senseless" captains, twenty-five hundred foreign horse

soldiers, and more than six thousand mercenary footmen.

The fight, as described by Gruffyd, was opened by the English, whose "prickers" rode out to skirmish and to attempt to lure the enemy into breaking ranks; but as the tactic failed, the English heavy cavalry were called upon to charge. What happened next is dramatically told by Gruffyd:

As soon as the English advanced and some of them broke their lances they expected the foreign horsemen to support them, but they did not move a foot, so the English had to retreat. As soon as the footmen saw the horsemen doing nothing but standing in order, although the light horsemen were running back from the French, who were trampling the earth and looking daggers at the footmen, they began to move back, each one getting in the way of the other, the horsemen pushing the footmen into the ditches, and the footmen doing the same to the horsemen. By this time night was falling, and the English army returned to Calais, leaving the French to do what they would . . . .

The battle of Oye, fought on September 21, showed Henry's mercenaries for yet another time in a bad light. Nonetheless, Gruffyd's harshest criticisms were reserved for his English superiors and the French, the former for their timidity in refusing to counterattack, the latter for their caution in failing to follow up their victory. Had, in fact, the French advanced on Calais, they would have found it defenceless; for Cobham and his council had shut themselves safe within,

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30 Ibid., p. 31. Gruffyd identifies them as "Saxons, Cleves, Almains, and Italians."
31 Ibid.
leaving his spiritless army spread in total disarray over more than a mile of Calaisian countryside. The French, meanwhile, after a few more days of burning at their leisure, retired to Le Portel, soaked by rains which, by rendering their cavalry useless, had deprived them of their major objective, Guisnes.

It was left to Cobham to report to Henry the damage done in Oye. By the governor's account, contrived at, says Gruffyd, "by means of letters" to his friends on the Council, he persuaded the king "that not more than a hundred Englishmen had been killed as against more than two hundred French," and that Du Biez "had not done more than a thousand marks worth of damage. This was one of the worse lies the Council ever made the king believe," for the damage to the Pale was extensive. By Gruffyd's reckoning, which in general terms bears close resemblance to the French version, three Calaisian parishes had been razed, along with five hundred dwellings, and "seven farms, the poorest of which was worth £7,000." In addition, the English had lost uncounted hundreds of dead, whose bodies, by the Welshman's grim report, lay unburied "with dogs and wolves and birds gnawing them for

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32 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
33 See Du Bellay, Memoires, pp. 252 ff.
six weeks,  "34

An interesting letter composed a week after the battle at Oye seems to substantiate Gruffyd's charges against Cobham. Its authors were Italians, five captains whom the Deputy prevailed upon to write to the Council on his behalf, explaining the reasons for his defeat and alluding to the little "hurt" done by Du Biez. 35 The whole blame for the overthrow was thrust by these correspondents, who themselves had participated in the fight, upon the Clevelanders, who, they alleged, had triggered the retreat by fleeing to Calais when called upon to succour Cobham's infantry. It is a plausible story, except that the writers themselves were cavalrymen, attached to the company of gentlemen provided by Ludovico da l'Armi; and it was the entire body of foreign horsemen which Gruffyd accused of disobedience. If the Welshman's evidence is accepted at face value, what likely happened here was a double cover-up, the Italians concealing Cobham's guilt which favor was returned in kind.

That the deputy should have chosen men of that nation to aid him in this subterfuge is, again, explained by Gruffyd.

35 L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 464. The names of the captains were as follows: Hyppolito Pallavicino, Piacenza; Bartholomew Moreni, Modena; Antonio Gramegna, Bologna; Jacomo de Zabarelli; and Alisandro Marengo.
Earlier in his chronicle, when reporting the wild doings of the mercenaries in the spring, he flatly states that of all the foreigners in Cobham's service none were more in favor than the Italians.\textsuperscript{36} If this, then, was the case, and if the Clevelanders were not alone in their waywardness, it is not too highly fetched to assume that to clear themselves of wrongdoing, which they did in their letter, the Italians would have been more than willing to retain their commander's good will be writing in his defence. Besides, as Gruffyd further reveals, the Italians at Calais had additional incentive to protect their honor, since it had been one of their nation, a certain Bartholomew, who had spied out the way for Du Biez's entry into Oye.\textsuperscript{37}

Whatever the real cause of the disaster in the Pale, it was the Clevelanders, or at least a part of them, who paid for the defeat. On October 8, following an investigation by

\textsuperscript{36}Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 15.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., 25-27, 28-29. The Bartholomew here in question is almost certainly Bartholomew de Céres (or Kers), a Piedmontese captain, who served at Guisnes during the winter of 1544 and was later, in the summer of 1545, transferred to some post within the March of Oye. That he was under suspicion by the Council at Calais and that he deserted to the French can be gleaned from the following notices: Dasent, \textit{Acts of the Privy Council}, I, 171-72, 198, 204-05, 216; L. \& P., XXI, pt. I, Nos. 296, 567. He was slain "to avenge the honor of the Italian soldiers" early in 1546 at Lyons by four Florentine gentlemen who had lately served Henry in the same theater.
the Council at Calais, the Privy Council from Windsor ordered the cashiering of Thomas Lightmaker and his band. It proved an easier injunction to issue than to execute, since there erupted the inevitable dispute over severance pay. Lightmaker, who had contracted for five hundred horsemen, had provided more, and the "overplusage" at their dismissal demanded an Abzug of fifty days. The amount was considered exhorbidant by the English, whose answer to the Dutch captain was that, even had his men come from the farthest corner of Germany, they could return in much less time. But the Clevelanders stuck to their price until, during the second week of November, the Privy Council authorized Cobham to offer them forty days for their Abzug. This was apparently the sum agreed upon, as hereafter they are heard from no more.

At Boulogne, meanwhile, French plans which had held out such promise for success in August had gone miserably awry. Francis I had proposed a grand campaign: it was to have been he in person who led the attack on the Terre d'Oye, he who held the Calais marches in subjection, while a smaller force from Outreau starved out the English in Boulogne. But bad

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38 One hundred of these men-at-arms had been sent over to Hertford in Northumberland.

39 (B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 332.

luck and plague had forced the king to resign his command to Du Biez, for at Forest Montier, a hunting lodge to which Francis advanced to be nearer his army at Outreau, his son, the Duke of Orleans, was seized by a pestilential fever and died.

This young prince's death, which occurred on September 8, rendered useless the main clauses of the Treaty of Crépy, drove Francis from the field in grief and terror of contagion, and left Du Biez to carry on as best he could a war which neither side, it was now apparent, was likely to win. The marshal's success in the Terre d'Oye was easily offset by the inadequacy of his arrangements at Outreau. His fort, built to the specifications of an Italian engineer, Antonio Melloni, was so far distant from Boulogne that Paget, who viewed it from the English lines in December, assured his fellow Secretary of State, Sir William Petre, that it could do "no hurt in the world." The stronghold showed proudly, wrote Paget, but from his vantage on the battlements of Boulogne, he could scarcely determine a white horse from a black, and Outreau's guns were "only troublesome for the noise." 41

Fort d'Outreau suffered a graver disadvantage; it was too small. Intended to house a permanent garrison of between three thousand and four thousand, it was when completed

41 L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 919.
barely able to hold five hundred. Mellon had paced off the wrong measurements. Still, Outreau could not entirely be scoffed at. Its gunners were not wholly ineffective, as is proved by the rash of stone defence-works that were thrown up around Boulogne to protect the harbor and the Basse Ville's southern exposure which lay directly in the Frenchmen's line of fire. In July, Henry's engineer, John Rogers, began construction of the Citadel, a stone bulwark in the southwest corner of the town to which was attached a pier to shield ships in the haven. On September 8, just as Surrey entered upon his brief tenure as Governor of Boulogne, resolution was taken in the Council for the building of jetty or mole to cover the above mentioned pier which, when finally completed was described as sufficient even at high tide to "defend all of the ships entering the port in such a way that the French gunfire is unable to harm them."

Surrey's appointment, coinciding as it did with Du Biez's preparations for his descent into the Terre d'Oye, was marked by a sharp increase in hostile contact. The young earl, a soldier and a poet, did not lack courage, but he was "a

42Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 240-42.
43L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 1160.
44Ibid., pt. 2, No. 323; Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer, pp. 70-71.
dangerous neurotic," swollen with an over-high regard of his own martial abilities, a dangerous war-hawk who had gained the king's ear only because wiser councils were at last inclining towards peace.  

The cost of the war was stupendous. "This year and last," lamented Wriothesley to the Council on September 14, "the king has spent about £1,300,000, his subsidy and benevolence ministering scant £300,000; and the lands [from the dissolution of the monasteries] being consumed and the plate of the realm molten and coined, I lament the danger of the time to come." A new loan had been made in Flanders; the scarcity of corn had driven up wheat to 20s. a quarter, and yet, bemoaned the Chancellor, "you write to me 'Still pay, pay, prepare for this and for that!' "I am at my wit's end," Wriothesley wrote again in November, "how to shift for the next three months:" £24,000 alone was owed at Boulogne; £11,000 had been dispatched to the garrison against Scotland; the Augmentations had not the wherewithal to pay the Italian brokerage firm of Bonvisi; the coffers of First Fruits and Tenths were nearly empty; the Exchequer could not release any more funds until February; and the Court of General Surveyors was in such financial straits

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45For a brief and lucid assessment of Surrey, see Smith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, pp. 243-45.

46Glossary.
that when its creditors had been satisfied no more than £5,000 or £6,000 was expected.  

Norfolk and the chiefs of the Council were aching for peace, but were afraid to press for it. Hot-bloods like Surrey were, for the moment, in vogue with the grossly posturing king, who lectured Chapuys' replacement as Imperial ambassador, Francis van der Delft, on the virtue of honor among sovereigns, and bluntly informed the new envoy that since he had won Boulogne at sword's point he meant to keep it.  

Norfolk, who knew too well from experience how quickly his sovereign's favor might be lost, tried to caution his son. Writing Surrey in late September, the old Duke rebuked the earl for animating "the King too much for the keeping of Boulogne," adding the warning that "who so doth at length shall get small thank." It was an omen which the younger Howard in his pride ignored. No amount of fatherly scolding could turn Surrey from his purpose. The bellicose earl played Belisarius to Henry's Justinian, the aging monarch vicariously basking in the sometimes foolish feats of his

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48 Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 140 (p. 251).

49 Nott; The Works of Henry Howard, I, 178. Van der Delft, who had joined Chapuys at Boulogne during the siege in 1544, came to England in January, 1545.

50 See L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 738.
lieutenant, who delighted the king by inviting him to Boulogne to see "the willingness of his men" and how easy it was to set the French on the run.

A different face, however, was revealed in defeat. Early in the new year, Surrey met with a reverse that was to loom large in his fall from grace and eventual ruin. On January 7, 1546, a French convoy laden with provisions from Montreuil and escorted by five thousand landsknechts was set upon by the earl and a smaller contingent as it approached Outreau. The English horse, in a magnificent charge, drove the French cavalry back on the carriages of which ninety were destroyed; but the English and Italian foot, commanded by Surrey, panicked by the superior numbers or fire power of their adversaries, abandoned the field. Strategically, the action was a success in that the resupplying of Outreau had been prevented. Yet, by the chivalric standards of the age, it was an utter disaster: twenty-two English gentlemen died along with four Italian captains, and a number of standards were taken.

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51 Surrey was reported to the Council by an Italian captain, Giovanni Thomaso, for recklessly exposing himself to French gunfire, for which offence the earl was reprimanded by the king. Ibid.


53 This is the figure given by Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," pp. 41-42. L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 33, gives the smaller number of fourteen.
In his agitation, Surrey called on his surviving officers "to stick their swords through his guts" to end his shame, though any feelings of personal responsibility soon passed. That night, within the safety of Boulogne, courts-martial were held, and next morning a captain and two or three of the rank-and-file who had returned from the carnage were hanged, "more for telling the truth . . . than for anything they had done against the king." It had been Surrey in his "unreasoning bravery" who had caused the overthrow by attempting the impossible. His footmen, many of them inexperienced recruits who had been fed on stale rations and driven to the fight with beatings and curses, had been outnumbered by the Germans nearly three to one. But rank had its privilege. Unwilling to admit to any fault, Surrey made the wretched common soldiers his scapegoats: "We assure your Majesty," he wrote through his council to the king, "there was no default in the rulers, nor lack of courage to be given them, but a humor that sometime reigneth in Englishmen."  

While this excuse was momentarily accepted, news of the reverse was not well received by Henry. Paget could write, as he did to Surrey on the eighteenth, that the king, his

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54 Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 42.

55 State Papers, XI, 3.
majesty, "like a prince of wisdom," knew that whosoever played at games of chance "must sometimes lose." Yet, such was Henry's concern for the safety of Boulogne that, even before the Principal Secretary's soothing words had been penned, order had been taken to dispatch Hertford across the Channel to assess the real extent of the damage and to send with him certain of Gamboa's Spaniards to make up, at least in part, for the casualties suffered on the seventh. Surrey would be superseded by Hertford in March; he was arrested for treason in December; and on January 19, 1547, having been found guilty, he was executed.

Surrey did not die for his disgrace at Boulogne, but rather for pride. Specifically, he dared to quarter his own arms with those of Edward the Confessor, thereby flaunting for all to see a claim to the throne equal, if not superior, to that of the Tudors themselves. This is not the place to list the sins of the house of Howard; they are better examined elsewhere. But what had driven the unstable earl to such

56 L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 81.
57 Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, I, 314; Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 186.
58 Anglo-Saxon king of England (1042-1066) from whom the Howards claimed descent.
59 Froude, History of England, IV, 465-77, gives a detailed account. See also, Smith, Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, pp. 442 ff.
mad action was in part his unreasoned hatred of Hertford, with whom he had been competing for some years for Henry's favor and whom in addition he viewed as a parvenu, a commoner raised to the nobility through the union of the king to his third queen, Hertford's sister, Jane Seymour. 60

Jealous of his rival, Surrey returned to England in a choler of spite and malice. Unable and unwilling to curb his tongue, he publicly slandered many about the court. In an effort to supplant Hertford in Henry's eyes, he stooped so low as to suggest to his sister, the widowed Duchess of Richmond, 61 that she offer herself as royal concubine. Harsh words and open threats against Hertford netted him a few weeks of close confinement in Windsor Castle in July, 62 but worst of all, Surrey privately projected the death of the king. 63

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60 Edward Seymour was created Viscount Beauchamp in June, 1536, a week after the royal marriage. A year later, on the birth of his nephew, the future Edward VI, he was made Earl of Hertford.

61 Mary Howard had been the wife of Henry Fitzroy, the king's illegitamate son by his mistress, Elizabeth Blount. Born in 1519, the boy had been vested with the Dukedom of Richmond in 1525.


63 To "imagine" the king's death was in itself treason, as defined in the act of 1534. 26 Henry VIII, c. 13; Statutes of the Realm, III, 508-09.
Privy Chamber, the earl gave it as his considered opinion that should Henry die Norfolk, his father, was the "meetest" man to control the regency.  

It was the younger Howard's heraldic presumption, however, which brought him to grief. Unable to win back the king's affection or wean the monarch from his growing dependence upon Hertford, the artless Surrey in his pique resorted to the childish act of emblazoning the escutcheons of his palace with the leopards of England and the arms of the saintly King Edward. Cast into the Tower on December 12, he was tried at the Guildhall on January 13 and beheaded six days later on Tower Hill.

In returning to the French war which by this late date had officially ended some six months before, there is much to relate, especially as effecting the employment of mercenaries. The winter in France of 1545/6, except for Surrey's zealous efforts to beat the enemy single-handed, had witnessed a number of "cassings," usual in armies of that age and in that season when large-scale military operations were most difficult to carry out. Within the Pale, which after Du Biez's

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64 For several of the more damaging depositions against Surrey, see L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, No. 555 (pp. 283-89).
65 Ibid., (7, i, ii).
66 The word used in the sense of "to pay off" or "cashier."
escapade soon returned to normal, the cashierings began in November with the dismissal of Lightmaker's Clevelanders who, as was noted above, would have been discharged earlier but for the dispute over their last month's wages. Certain of the Italian's band provided out of the Venetian Republic by Ludovico da l'Armi and stationed at Guisnes were released at the same time, and on December 2 the Council in England authorized the abrogation of the services of one "Joste Clautz, Almain," and his ensign of four hundred landsknechts.

On the whole, however, the termination of contracts, both within the Pale and at Boulogne, was kept to a minimum. If anything, the numbers of foreigners under arms in the English garrisons in France increased, for Du Biez's raid had had a chastening effect. Besides, as experience was beginning to teach, it was cheaper to keep mercenaries through the winter than to release them and seek to hire replacements in the spring. This, at any rate, was Paget's observation; if, he explained to the Council in December, "the King will next year use no Italian horsemen, it were well to cass them, which cost £523 monthly; but, if he will use Italian horsemen, it is to be considered that the enemies will begin to stir in March, and the men must have one month's wages.

for their departure home and six weeks' wages for their return to service."68

New recruits appeared everywhere, at Calais, in the Pale, and at Boulogne, the latter establishment attracting Albanians in such quantity that it was deemed necessary to appoint one of their number, the "Cavalier" Thomaso Bua, as their colonel.69 One hundred Spanish horsemen, recruited by Gamboa in Flanders, were placed in Calais, while another company, under Gamboa's subordinate, Carlos de Navarro, were allowed at Boulogne.70 Italians, too, figured prominently in the hirings. On February 21, Amerigo Antenori received appointment "to serve above Mark in the Marches of Calais" with two hundred of his countrymen, and Surrey's Italian colonel, Giovanni de Salerno, was permitted several new captains to make up, no doubt, for the four who had fallen in the engagement on January 7.71.


69Bua, a stradiot emigre who resided in the Venetian Republic, was possibly of Greek extraction. He is mentioned as being a colonel as early as January 20, 1547, though his commission was not signed until sometime in February. Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, I, 318; L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 301 (45). Sathas, Documents inédits, IV, lxx, gives him the name of Thomas l'Argien, signifying the area of Greece from which he supposedly eminated, and describes his as the leader of "550 Peloponnesians."


71Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 184.
Most of the increase in France among Henry's free lances came not, however, from new signings, but through transfers from England. The French and Scottish threats having been effectively dealt with, and the Council's intelligence already pointing towards a spring attack on Boulogne, the larger part of those men of war shuttled into the kingdom from Calais in 1545 were sent back, their reassignment timed to coincide with Hertford's appointment as the king's Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief of the army and armada sent in March "in the parts beyond the sea." Hertford's main force of five thousand or six thousand Englishmen crossed to Calais on March 22. Already, the general had been preceded by the bulk of the mercenaries that had served under him in Northumberland. Two Albanian captains, Antonio Stesino and Nicholas Cresia, survivors of the winter "cassings" in England, were admitted in January with fifty horsemen apiece to Bua's command at Boulogne. In the same month, Cobham received five hundred Clevelanders out of Dover, while in February the Mayor of Newcastle provided shipping bound also for the Pale for fifteen hundred of Gamboa's footmen.

Some idea of the total strength of the land forces under

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72L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 250, 262.
73Ibid., Nos. 431, 449; Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 223.
Hertford in France is provided by Paget. In a letter to Christopher Mont drafted a month before the earl's departure, the Principal Secretary divulged that Seymour's effectives would amount to thirty thousand: 75 sixteen thousand Englishmen, two thousand Spaniards, two thousand Italians, four thousand unidentified horsemen, 76 and six thousand German landsknechts, who even then, as Paget was writing, were being levied in Low Germany by their leader, a native of Saxony and denizen Hamburg, Colonel Conrad Pennink.

Paget's estimate of the size of Pennink's regiment was exaggerated by a half. The commission, which this highly respected old war-chief had been extended at Hampton Court on January 23, called for the raising of three thousand rather than six thousand landsknechts, 78 the mustering of whom was

75 State Papers, X, 60. Though it is by no means clear, Paget's figure would seem to have been meant to include as well the soldiers in the garrisons at Calais, Hammes, Guisnes, and Boulogne.

76 Definitely among them were many foreigners, as for example Bua's Albanians, Gamboa's mounted arquebusiers, the German men-at-arms transferred from England, and the Italian troopers of Ludovica da I'Armi.

77 For notices on this man's career, see the unsigned article, "Der Oberst Cort Pennink," Zeitschrift des Vereines für hamburgische Geschichte, V (1886), 32-45. Hereinafter cited as "Oberst Cort Pennink.

78 L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 112 (1, 2). For the original contract, see (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/213, ff. 151-52, which gives the number to be raised as four thousand,
completed within, of all places, the cloistered confines of the convent of Elten near Emmerich on the Rhine in the final days of March. Surprisingly, though the men were staunch Lutherans, no outrages were committed. If anything, the landsknechts' conduct was exemplary. The Mother Superior was made a gift of 200 gilders; smaller gifts of money were made to the incredulous peasants who lived about the nunnery; and no untoward incidents of any kind were reported.79 Henry VIII had found a foreign officer whom he could trust implicitly; but equally amazing was the assistance tendered by the Imperialists, who with a minimum of foot-dragging allowed the soldiers to pass through the Low Countries.

The emperor's change in heart stemmed, naturally, from a change in his politics. The death of the Duke of Orleans, whose marriage to an Imperial princess was to have cemented the Treaty of Crépy,80 absolved Charles from all obligations

79 L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 473, 474, 531, 533. The exact number of men, "elect personages and old landsknechts, armed and weaponed accordingly as it is convenanted," was given by the English Commissioners of the Musters as 2,983. The commissioners in this instance were John Brende of Beccles in Suffolk, and John Brigandine, step-son of Lord Edward North, Chancellor of the Court of Augmentations. Both were experienced in military affairs, Brende as a planner and surveyor of fortifications, Brigandine as an officer and veteran of the Scottish raids in 1545. This author is indebted for much of this information to Professor S. T. Bindoff and his staff on the History of Parliament Trust.

80 Above, p. 319, n. 80.
to placate the French. He had lost a potential son-in-law, but from the Hapsburg point of view it "was no bad thing for him." The Netherlands were left intact, and there was no longer any doubt that Milan would go to Spain. More immediately, the declining state of the French king's health, the exhausted condition of the latter's kingdom, together with the burden of the war against England, insured the emperor of a free hand in seeking to solve the problem which had weighed most heavily on his own mind the past few years. Charles had resolved to fight the Lutherans. He was to begin seriously to marshal his forces in June. In the interim, it was to his advantage to cater to Henry VIII. By weaning the English king from the Protestants and by allowing him the services of a known sympathizer of the Schmalkaldic cause like Conrad Pennink, Charles was simply strengthening his own hand in a struggle in which the odds against him were already considerable.

Pennink's landsknechts repaired through Holland and Zeeland to Sluys and from thence along the sands to Calais, which the first contingents reached on April 14. Their

81 Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, pp. 545, 547-48. The War of the Schmalkaldic League (1546-1555) began on the night of July 5 when the Lutheran contingents raised in Swabia moved on the Imperial forces at Nesselwang and Fussen.

82 L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 569-71, 599.
assignment was to assist Hertford in the construction of a new fort within the Boulonnais at Ambleteuse. This place, situated about six miles north of Boulogne on the coast of the Pas de Calais, had been viewed by the English general during his earlier visit in January and was occupied, apparently without violence, sometime in February or March to preserve overland communications between Boulogne and Calais and to deter the French from building a similar stronghold at neighboring Marquise.

Hertford advanced to Ambleteuse on March 30 with some seven thousand men, of which number about twenty-six hundred were mercenaries. That figure was soon increased by the dispatch from Boulogne of the larger part of the foreigners there, and the percentage of free lances in this English army was further enhanced by the arrival at Ambleteuse of Pennink's three thousand on April 18. The immediate

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83 Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 215. From this letter dated March 18, Ambleteuse would already appear to have been in English hands.

84 Gamboa's fifteen hundred Spaniards; the five hundred Clevelanders of Hoen and Van der Lughe; five hundred Italians under Captains Amerigo Antenori, Francisco Agello and Francisco Tiberio of Calabria; and the one hundred stradiots of Stesino and Cresia. L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 356, 416, 612, (B. M.) Add. MS. 5753, ff. 190-91.

85 L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 438 (1, 2), 481, 494, 614 (ii), Most of Salerno's command of nearly seven hundred infantrymen and the larger part of Bua's stradiots were assigned to Hertford.
objective, that of forestalling the erection of a French fort at Marquise, was quickly obtained, the enemy failing to reinforce the town before Hertford's departure from Calais. Some thought was given to an attack on Etaples, but as the place was strongly defended the attempt was forborne. A "camisade" by the Spaniards on Ardres was next considered. However, that too was ruled out because there were no ladders to scale the ditches and for fear of heavy casualties. Finally, it was agreed to hasten the construction of the new camp at Ambleteuse, and that having made it tenable, remove with the larger part of the army to Boulogneberg, an unfortified observation post lying a few miles east of Boulogne atop Mont Lambert. From this eminence, which would provide the English an excellent view of French activity, Hertford hoped to lend some protection to the north bank of the Liane and, moreover, to the foragers from Boulogne, who were dependent upon the surrounding woods and pastures to supplement their not always adequate supplies coming in by sea. 86

The move to Boulogneberg was undertaken with some speed on May 23. With French troops massing at Saint Etienne across the river from that outpost, Hertford advanced from Ambleteuse with a thousand Englishmen, an equal number of Spaniards, Pennink's landsknechts, and the foreign horsemen

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86Ibid., Nos. 892, 893, 1016.
"save the scout." Joined enroute by two thousand footmen and the cavalry from Boulogne, the English general marched to Mont Lambert, drove back the enemy who had approached to within skirmishing distance, and appointed John Rogers, Surveyor of the Works at Boulogne since September, 1544, to begin the construction of some defensible structure at Boulogneberg. 87 Pennink, his Germans, the Clevelander horse, and six hundred Englishmen were left behind under Lord William Grey, 88 who on the morning of the following day, assisted by forty Albanians of Bua's band, laid an ambush for a troop of the Duke of Vendôme's cavalry.

To Henry's delight, the action was wholly successful. At a cost of one or two footmen, some forty or fifty of Vendôme's knights were captured, about one hundred men and horses were slain, and Boulogneberg, which the French had hoped to occupy themselves, was secured. 89 The king expressed his thanks for the victory in a letter to Hertford on May 26, but at the same time bade his captains in the Boulonnais to avoid any further exploits which might hinder negotiations for

87Ibid., Nos. 892, 893; Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer, p. 55.

88His appointment as Governor of Boulogne and the Boulonnais had become effective on April 9. L. & F., XXI, pt. 1, No. 716 (10).

89Ibid., Nos. 907, 908.
peace which were now on the brink of conclusion. A formal treaty was actually concluded at Camp, between Guisnes and Ardres, on June 7, not because either side had gained an advantage, but because the two countries, their decrepit monarchs, and abused taxpayers were exhausted. Just as important, Henry and Francis had found a face-saving stratagem that preserved the honor of both.

The main provisions of the Treaty of Camp allowed in theory that Francis owned Boulogne, but that in consideration of Henry's conquest the city, with that part of the Boulonnais immediately north of the port, should remain in English possession for eight years, at the end of which time on the payment of an indemnity of 2,000,000 crowns Boulogne and the occupied territory should be returned to French hands. Scotland too was comprehended in the agreement. England would not make war on her neighbor unless the Scots broke the peace, in which case Francis, as Henry's re-found "good brother," should "take part against them."

Outwardly, the Treaty of Camp was greeted with great enthusiasm on both sides. Henry, within days of the signing,

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90 Ibid., No. 927.
91 Two modern copies of the treaty, misdated July 17, are to be found in (B. M.) Harl. MS. 1064, f. 116b and (B. M.) Lansd. MS. 141, f. 141.
92 (B. M.) Add. MS. 9835, f. 18.
stood as godfather by proxy to Francis' granddaughter, and D'Annebaut, when he came to London to witness the ratification of the peace, received a tumultuous welcome. Privately, however, away from the public's gaze, considerable tensions remained. Reductions in the numbers of garrison troops in the Boulonnais and the Pale began almost immediately. Sir Edward Carne, Henry's ambassador in the Low Countries, was instructed on June 13 to commence negotiations to procure passage through the emperor's lands for the discharged mercenaries, whose demobilization was initiated during the third week of the month.

Their retiral was attended with a minimum of inconvenience. Though there was some delay for lack of ready funds, the money was quickly gathered and the free lances were sent on their way, most of the captains receiving special letters of commendation from Hertford at Ambleteuse, except for Salerno, whose service in the earl's estimation, had left much to be desired. Only one problem marred the foreigners' withdrawal. Pennink's three thousand, being notorious

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93 State Papers, XI, 227-28; Hall's Chronicle, p. 867.
94 State Papers, XI, 217, 222; Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 278.
partisans of Lutheranism, dared not return to the Baltic through the Netherlands. The way was blocked by the Count of Buren, who under orders from the emperor was mobilizing the Catholic forces of that region for the Schmalkaldic War. Henry's former Albanian, Italian and Spanish charges were in fact welcomed by the count; many hundreds were recruited; but Pennink's bands, who assuredly would have been cut to pieces, had to be ferried to England from whence they were transported by sea to Hamburg towards the end of July.\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{96}Ibid., Nos. 1070 (4), 1109, 1282, 1438.
EPILOGUE

Although this peace pleased both the English and the French nations, yet surely both mistrusted the continuance of the same . . . for the Frenchmen still longed for Boulogne, and the Englishmen minded not to give it over.

Hall's Chronicle, p. 867.

The Peace of Camp, if it ended a war, did not terminate hostilities. Violence among the parties continued, on a lesser scale in France and with renewed vigor in Scotland, until March 29, 1550. On that date, the government of Henry VIII's successor, Edward VI, accepted the Treaty of Boulogne agreeing for the sum of 400,000 crowns to surrender immediately all title to that city and the Boulonnais and to withdraw its troops from Scotland, which unfortunate land had been invaded again in 1547.

The pact made at Camp had taken effect only for a moment. By July 17, 1546, the day on which that peace was ratified in London, Henry VIII barely had six months to live. A month earlier, in the midst of the withdrawal of his mercenaries, he had given specific instructions for the reduction of his English effectives in the territories ceded to him by the French. For all the Boulonnais, including

1Henry VIII died on Friday, January 28, 1547.
Boulogne, Boulogneberg, Ambleteuse, and Blackness, a mere 2,160 English soldiers were appointed with less than fifteen hundred free lances to sustain them. "Extraordinary garrisons," that is to say, garrisons above the normal complement, were retained only within the Pale at Guisnes, Hammes, and the principal bulwarks within the Terre d'Oye.

Overnight, in response to the evacuation of the French army before Boulogne, Henry's forces in France declined by better than two-thirds, from a high of some thirty thousand, which is where the figure had stood in March, to considerably less than ten thousand, all of them in quarters in widely separated posts and the vast majority of them Englishmen, part-time soldiers whose lack of military demeanor was matched only by their desire to be home. The few foreigners remaining in service were Italians and Spaniards. The former four or five hundred under five captains, were stationed in

2 A new fort on Cap Gris-Nez begun by Hertford a few days before the signing of the Treaty of Camp. See L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 927, 960.

3 Ibid., No. 1092 (2).

4 Ibid.

5 On the poor quality of the English common soldier, see Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," pp. 23-24, 31, 41-42.

6 Piero Giovanni Luti, Paolo Serdo, Thomaso Deferencia, Giovanni Domingo Calabroza, and Nicolo Demoyena.
Boulogne, the latter, about one thousand strong under Colonel Gamboa, at Ambleteuse. Why these were kept is not exactly clear, except that the Spaniards were in disfavor with the emperor, who threatened to send into Hungary those in Buren's army, who against his ban had taken wages from Henry. It was perhaps for the same reason that the Italians remained; for at least one of the captains, Piero Giovanni Luti, hailed from a state, the Republic of Siena, in which there existed strong anti-Imperialist sentiment.

Be that as it may, the more probable rationale for the retention of the mercenaries was suspicion of the French. That it was high is made manifest in a remarkable document drawn up in August, 1546, by William Paget in which the gifted Principal Secretary sought to project the diplomatic dangers his nation then faced. The pope is ranked as an obvious enemy, the emperor, because of his ties to the papacy, as an uncertain friend. But heading the list of foes is France, which country, Paget reasoned, would soon be moved by motives of revenge to retake Boulogne. The diplomatist knew his business well.

7 L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 1301.
8 (B. M.) Cotton MSS. Titus B., ii, 47, ff. 79-81.
9 Strangely, Paget made no mention of Scotland, against whom Henry at that moment was considering war.
Even as Henry's minister wrote, the cycle which would lead to war began again. On August 29, Lord Grey informed Paget that the French, in defiance of the Treaty of Camp, had begun another fort, Chatillon, at the entrance to Boulogne haven, directly across the water from the Old Man. Protests were lodged in Paris, and on the night of September 5, on direct command from Henry himself, Grey ordered a raid on the diggings and the new works were razed. The French rejoinder was a call to arms. Montreuil and other garrisons on the frontier against the English were placed on alert, while on Henry's part his forces in the Boulonnais were strengthened. Hertford, at home since July, was recommissioned to cross the sea as the king's Lieutenant-General; the thousand pioneers at Boulogne were bolstered by the dispatch of five hundred more; and seven thousand troops were embarked at Dover and on the Thames for immediate transportation to the imperiled city.

The demonstration of force temporarily averted a crisis. Before Hertford's sailing, the French, who had resumed their occupation of Chatillon and made it defensible, abandoned their position, referring the whole matter of fortifications

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11 State Papers, XI, 289.
to a commission to determine what might be permitted under the treaty. Chatillon, to Henry's relief, was disallowed; but for the remainder of his reign incident piled upon incident, culminating in the breach of the articles of peace by the English themselves. In the first weeks of the new year, as the headstrong Tudor monarch's life ran out, Grey's pioneers collected material on the French side of the Liane which was used in the spring of 1547 for the construction of a new jetty across from Boulogne haven. Ostensibly, this fresh outwork was to control the tides within the harbor, but in reality it was designed as a fort to protect English shipping and provide a first line of defence against Outreau. Despite rancorous objections from Paris, the English persisted. The Dunette, as the structure was dubbed, was built, thereby providing justification to the French to begin anew the bastion at Chatillon.

What part the Latin mercenaries played in these proceedings or how they were deployed is left unsaid. The Italians most surely remained at Boulogne, while some few of the Spaniards provided a diversion in the summer of 1546 by enlivening

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13 Ibid., Nos. 131, 157; State Papers, XI, 319.
15 Ibid., No. 715; Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer, pp. 71-72, 106.
the celebrations attendant upon the christening of the French princess, Elizabeth, when one of their company, Julian Romero, fought a duel before the French king at Fontainebleau. Romero's opponent was a fellow countryman, Antonio de Mora, the same who, with part of his men and sixty new hand-guns, had fled from the Pale to join Du Biez in April, 1545. At the heart of the quarrel was De Mora's desertion, it being considered treason, even among mercenaries, for a soldier under contract to change sides during a campaign. Somewhere, after the Peace of Camp, the traitor and Romero had met; Julian issued the challenge; and De Mora, accepting it, arranged through Francis that the combat be fought according to the law of arms in the lists at Fontainebleau.

For the occasion, the English Spaniard was outfitted with the aid of "a thousand broad angels," a gift from Henry, and having "put himself in order" he travelled into France in the company of Gamboa, Captains Cristobal Diaz, Pedro Negro, "and divers other Spanish knights and gentlemen."

\[16\] See below, Appendix D.

\[17\] Above, p. 357.

\[18\] Several instances of this type of mercenary honor could be cited. Thomaso Bua, the Albanian colonel at Boulogne and Ambleteuse, was seized on his return to Italy in September and executed in Turin for having left the French service for Henry. L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, Nos. 163, 457.

\[19\] This at least according to Hume, ed., Chronicle of King
The fight, which took place on July 15 and which Julian won, proved highly profitable, not only to the victor but to his companions as well. Lifetime annuities were awarded to all the Spanish captains, 20 Gamboa, as colonel, receiving no less than £250 and in January, 1547, denization and the grant, "for his services in the King's wars," of the lordship, manor, and advowson of the rectory of Stanmer in Middlesex. 22


20 L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, No. 332 (14, 17, 19, 20, 21). The captains received as follows: Pedro Negro, £100; Cristobal Diaz, £100; Alonso de Villa Sirga, £100; Ludovico de Nogera, £100; and Julian Romero, £150, who previously, if the anonymous Spanish chronicler is to be believed, received of the French king a golden chain "which weighed more than seven hundred crowns," a tunic "stamped with gold that was worth more than the King's chain," and numerous lesser gifts from the French nobility.

21 This term implies that Gamboa became a naturalized Englishman with all the privileges of a citizen excepting those of inheritance and the right to hold public office.

22 L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, No. 771 (5, 34). The property with its appurtenances included over 276 acres of land, a number of closes, two "horse-mills," and a windmill, plus "all the messuages, etc., in St. Sepulchre's parish in the suburbs of London and in Westham, Middlesex."
As always, to the lucky few the mercenary life paid handsome dividends. On the whole, however, for the ordinary soldier of fortune the way of the free lance provided no more than a living and not infrequently much less. Death in the field or from disease were common rewards for those who followed the wars, and if these natural hazards were overcome, debilitating injuries and crippling poverty forever loomed as possibilities. The latter fates struck at more than a few of Henry's mercenaries. Giovanni Potito, Albanian, Diego Romero Spaniard, and Antonio de Milanino de Parma, Italian, to name but a few, were all part of the carnage of the Scottish wars. Maimed in the hands or the legs, they received no accolades, no annuities or grants of land, but rather a few paltry shillings and passports out of the country. Demetrio de Milano, "sore impoverished by his service" and himself imprisoned for a time in Scotland, pocketed no more than £12 10s. for his pains, while Artillio Siciliano and Antonio Greco, "poor soldiers," for "their conduct homeward" were awarded between them the princely sum of £5.

Mercenaries, of course, were paid considerably higher wages than were national conscripts. The average English

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23 (P. R. O.) S. P. 351/43, mems. 9, 11.

24 Ibid., mem. 11.

25 The entire area of mercenary financing is ripe for further investigation.
infantryman in Henry's reign drew 6d. per day as compared to the foreigner's 8d. The disparity was greater where cavalry-men were concerned. "A horsemen with 9d. a day, if his horse is killed, cannot buy another," raged Paget, "and seeing a stranger get £3 a month and he but 20s. his heart is killed." 26 It was a legitimate enough argument, but only on the surface. The English cavalryman might have been every bit as brave as his German, Spanish, Italian, or Albanian comrades, but the former, to point out but one discrepancy in Paget's logic, did not have the foreigners' overhead. The mercenary, whether mounted or on foot, had to be fully equipped before his final muster. "Firstly," begins the initial article of Reiffenberg's unfulfilled contract, "... lancers will be armed with their head gear, with vizors, helmits and salades, throat pieces, axes, vambraces, corselets, breeches and tassets covering the knees, and with long gauntlets." 27 There was probably not one English gentleman in a hundred who owned such equipment and even fewer who could afford the upkeep of the six or eight destriers which some of the German knights brought with them.

Reiffenberg's contract is as specific again on the harness required of his mounted arquebusiers. These also were

26 L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 691.
27 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 15.
expected to be "well furnished," providers of their own "am-
munition, breeches, axe, sleeves of mail, gorgets, gauntlets, 
corselets, and good head gear, with a 'swynspetts' and a gun."  
Considering early Tudor legislation against firearms,  
there were proportionately likely as few of the English commonality 
who could outfit themselves with arquebuses as there were Tu-
dor gentlemen who could pass muster as authentic men-at-arms.

Besides the armor, the weapons, the war horses, and the 
like which foreign soldiers had to pay for out of their own 
pockets,  
there was also the matter of military experience. 
No amount of money could be placed on that commodity, and in 
the final analysis it was that experience which all employers 
of foreigners sought to profit from. How much, the reader 
might legitimately ask, did the military expertise of Europe's 
continental legions benefit the earliest Tudors? And the 
truthful answer must be that it is quantifiably impossible to 
say. Nowhere is there categorical proof that foreigners, 
whether mercenaries, auxiliaries, or combinations of both, 

28 Ibid. I have been unable to trace the meaning of 
swynspetts. 

29 Above, p. 128 (n. 34).

30 The Statute of Winchester notwithstanding, English sol-
diers received free of charge in most instances equipment 
which they failed to bring to themusters. Cruickshank, Army 
Royal, p. 77. Whatever the English recruit did not receive, 
he was expected to return to the government in reasonable 
condition on his demobilization.
turned the tide in any campaign or for that matter in any single action in either the reign of Henry VII or Henry VIII. Mercenaries were blamed for the loss inflicted in Cobham's Calesians at Oye in 1545, and for that they rightly received some censure. Harsh words and faint praise were in fact the normal lot reserved for foreign men of war throughout the Tudor period. They were faithless "knaves," "wild beasts," "consumers of princes treasure," "Runaways in the very Conflicts, and Spoilers of the Country," "imported with loss" from "far off."  

Every charge made in the foregoing collage is easily substantiated. What Henrician employed in the thankless business of procuring foreign soldiers for his country's wars did not cringe before the rapacity of a Sickingen, the infidelity of a Reiffenberg, or the potential for mindless mayhem that lurked beneath the surface of all recruitment proceedings? "I pray God," wrote Thomas Chamberlain from his prison in Florennes Abbey in October, 1545, "his Majesty never need more this nation, but send us perpetual peace."  

31Above, p. 390.  
32The agglomeration of quotes was gleaned from the following sources: (B. M.) Add. MS. 5753, f. 155: (B. M.) Harl. MS. 444, f. 121; L. & P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 536, 750.  
33L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 681, See also, ibid., No. 656.
How many Tudor emissaries, commissioners, moneychangers, and paymasters must have echoed that disconsolate invocation.

Yet, how would the Tudors have fared without their foreigners? It has not been demonstrated anywhere in this work that alien soldiers won so much as a single battle. Still, it seems to this author, based solely on the sheer numbers in which they were hired, that mercenaries and, when available, auxiliaries formed the backbone of virtually every major force worthy of the name of army which the English government raised between 1485 and 1547. Employed initially, after the accession of Henry VII, almost exclusively for the wars in France, they became by the end of Henry VIII's reign both at home and abroad the mainstay of the early Tudor military establishment.

Auxiliaries were never used much in England. Except for those who fought for the Earl of Richmond at Bosworth Field and the few supplied to the pretenders, Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck, they were always utilized in France. Auxiliaries, the last appearing under Buren at Montreuil, were of the foreign contingents certainly the most highly prized by the Tudor sovereigns, if only because they were provided by England's allies free of charge. For this reason, auxiliaries were also the most difficult troops to obtain. The wages of a landsknecht colonel amounted to 400 guilders a month; his
lieutenant drew 100 guilders. Two thousand German footmen and five hundred Burgundian cavalry cost 24,000 florins or about £3000 a month; the pay of an Italian hackbutter on horseback was anywhere from 1s. to 1s. 8d. per day; while the charge by the month of fifteen hundred Spanish infantry-men, including officers, was £1,585. No government, not even the mighty Hapsburg conglomerate, could long sustain expenses of this nature.

Emperor Maximilian I successfully pled poverty when approached on the subject of auxiliaries for Henry VIII's first French war in 1513. The Burgundian and landsknecht levies supplied the English on that occasion were paid for by Henry. And in 1544, on the eve of the second Tudor's last French undertaking, the Imperialists tried briefly through Chapuys to persuade Henry to assume the cost of Buren's auxiliaries, giving up only for fear that if the emperor failed in his commitment Henry would ally himself with Francis and thus conceivably bring defeat upon the Hapsburgs.

34 State Papers, IX, 648.
35 L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 773; XX, pt. 1, No. 883; (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mem. 5.
36 Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, The Life and Reign of King Henry VIII; Together with A General History of those Times (London: 1741), pp. 27, 38; Cruickshank, Army Royal, P. 32.
37 Spanish Calendar, VII, Nos. 22, 41 (p. 56).
In two of Henry's three continental campaigns, those of 1523 and 1544, auxiliaries served as his armies' chief prop. After the Peace of Crépy, which deprived England of military allies, that nation was forced into exclusive dependence upon mercenaries, who for the first time in many years came to be used almost routinely within the kingdom itself\(^{38}\) for defence against the possibility of cross-Channel invasion, as in the summer of 1545, and for the continued punishment of the Scots. Though the question of mercenary utilization after the death of Henry VIII has been left untouched, cursory investigation bears out Professor Jordan's contention that their employment in Britain, against Englishmen as well as Scots, increased in the reign of Edward VI.\(^{39}\)

Where Scotland is concerned, more free lances were being sought for an attempt upon that northern land at the very moment the old king lay dying.\(^{40}\) When the assault was finally launched in September, 1547, the English army contained an


\(^{39}\)Jordan, *Edward VI, the Young King*, pp. 466-67 (n. 2).

unknown, but fairly high, proportion of mercenaries. Accompanying the force which was led by Edward Seymour, Lord Protector and recently created Duke of Somerset, was Pedro de Gamboa, who led a troop of two hundred mounted arquebusiers, at least three of his infantry captains, and a reasonable sprinkling of Italians, the chief company of which was a body of heavy horse under an Italian colonel, Count Malatesta Baglione.\(^{42}\)

The destruction of the Scottish army at Pinkie on September 10 gave the English temporary control of southeastern Scotland. Leith, the port-city of Edinburgh, was burned. Inchcolm and Blackness, astride the Firth of Forth, Broughty Castle at the mouth of the Tay, Roxburgh and Home in the eastern lowlands, and, above all, Haddington in East Lothian were occupied by mixed garrisons of Englishmen and mercenaries and held until the summer of 1549. But in Edward's reign, it was in England proper that the most notable use of free lances displayed itself.

In the two risings, the Western or "Prayer Book" Rebellion and Kett's Rebellion, which rocked the realm in 1549 and

\(^{41}\)Cristobal Diaz, Pedro Negro, and Alonso de Villa Sirga, all of whom were knighted for their part in the expedition.

brought disaster to the king's uncle, the Duke of Somerset, thousands of mercenaries, the majority of them veterans of the Scottish war, were used. The names of many of the captains are preserved in the Public Record Office. Italians, Germans, Spaniards, and Albanians figured prominently in the suppression of the "Prayer Book" insurgents, the Italian horse and foot of Captains Jacques Jermigny and Paolo Baptista Spinola particularly distinguishing themselves in that campaign. In Kett's Rebellion, brutally crushed by the Earl of Warwick at Norwich and Dussindale in Norfolk in August, 1549, it was the turn of the German landsknechts to excel. Twelve hundred or fourteen hundred under Conrad Pennink, lured back to England from Hamburg in 1548, carried much of the fighting, ably assisted by motley bands of Italians and Spaniards, among the latter being the light horse contingents

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43 See especially, (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mems. 1-13, and (P. R. O.) E 101 531/39, mems. 103. Both of these documents, covering between them the years 1545 and 1551, deal almost exclusively with payments made to mercenaries who served in England.


45 Formerly John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, who was granted the earldom on February 17, 1547.
of Gamboa and Carlos de Guavarra. Germans, the ensign of Clayne van Buren and 420 horsemen led by an Englishman, Henry Hartford, were retained to guard the Court and the king in the summer of 1549; while at the surrender of Boulogne which was returned to the French in 1550, of the foreigners who made up the larger part of the garrison, Germans, again, were in the majority.

The relinquishment of Boulogne, bringing as it did peace with France and Scotland, allowed for a sharp lowering in military expenditure. Immediate savings were realized in the rapid "cassing" of free lances. The greater part were dismissed, but John Dudley, who as the Duke of Northumberland had succeeded Somerset as head of the Council on the restoration of public order in 1549, retained eight hundred foreigners to police six counties where chronic disaffection had been rampant since the close of Henry's reign. Two hundred each were placed in Essex and Sussex, and the remaining four

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46 Smith, Certain Discourses Military, p. 98. The names of the seven captains serving under Pennick are given in (P. R. O.) E. 101 531/39, mem. 3. For Gamboa and Guavarra, see (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mem. 13.

47 No relation to the Dutchman, Maximilian, Court of Buren. For notices of Clayne, who also served under Warwick at the time of the Kett uprising and in Calais, see (P. R. O.) E 101 531/39, mems. 1b, 2a, 3a; (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mems. 12, 13.

hundred were equally distributed in Dorset, Hampshire, Kent, and Suffolk. 49 This aberrant use of mercenaries, unheard of since the days of the early Plantagenets, was not liked by Englishmen; but from Northumberland's point of view it seemed necessary. His regime was unpopular, and as the late disturbances in the West Country and Norfolk had shown, local levies, with opinions at variance with those of the government in whose name they were raised, could not be relied upon. 50

In 1552, however, with England's financial reserve depleted, further cuts in military strength were called for. Garrisons in Ireland, Berwick, and Guisnes were pared; some coastal defences were abandoned; ships of the line were decommissioned; and the mercenaries, untoward luxuries in an administration faced with penury, were disbanded. 51 This diminution in power proved an evil portent for Northumberland, for on Edward's demise in 1553, when the duke attempted to usurp the throne in the name of Lady Jane Grey, his English levies melted away, leaving him naked and unprotected from the vengeance that followed swiftly on the accession of


50 Jordan, Edward VI, the Young King, p. 465.

of Queen Mary. It is intriguing to speculate on how different English history might have been had Northumberland had a force of mercenaries to fall back on. Why he, a believer in mercenary arms, did not provide against the contingency of mass popular support for Edward’s successor by gathering round him foreign pikes and arquebuses remains something of a mystery. Perhaps, as Oman suggests, it was a defect in the man himself: "he was so unscrupulous . . . , that he had forgotten that others might have scruples."53

In Mary’s brief reign, English reliance on foreign troops fell off drastically as part and parcel of the austerity program inherited from her predecessor. Few free lances, if any at all, were employed in England.54 Gottfried von Bocholt, whose units had been amalgamated with those of the

52 The story of Northumberland’s unsuccessful machinations to retain his power by depriving Mary, Edward’s lawful heir, of her crown is ably told by W. K. Jordan, Edward VI: The Threshold of Power (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), Chap. XIV.


54 The majority of the names which this author has uncovered were those of a handful of veterans of the campaigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI, who wrote from abroad begging the continuance of the pensions which these defunct sovereigns had awarded them. Robert Lemon and M. A. E. Green, eds., Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, 1547-1580 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1856), pp. 85, 87. Hereinafter cited as Calendar of State Papers (Domestic), Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth.
despicable Reiffenberg at Aachen in October, 1545, offered himself with four thousand landsknechts and one thousand horse for service against the Scots, but there is no evidence that his overture was accepted. Only in the Calais Pale were alien conscripts employed, all of them auxiliaries; but not before 1557 when, as a by-product of the queen's ill-advised marriage to Philip II of Spain, the nation was drawn unwillingly into war with France.

In that short-lived struggle, which among contemporaries redounded as much to Mary's infamy as her burning of religious dissenters, England was thoroughly abused by her selfish Spanish ally. Philip, after receiving assistance from the English fleet and using five thousand English auxiliaries to win the French town of Saint Quentin, refused to reciprocate. To preserve the commercial interests of his Netherlands' provinces, he refrained from declaring war on the Scots; but far worse, he diverted to his own use munitions, arms, and three thousand German landsknechts acquired for the defence of his wife and her northern border.

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55 Below, p. 371.
56 Calendar of State Papers, (Domestic) Edward VI, Mary Elizabeth, pp. 85, 103.
57 The nuptials were celebrated on July 25, 1554, at Winchester in Hampshire.
58 The landsknechts were under the command of the German colonel, Wilhelm Wallerthum, who had received
Philip's callous indifference to English needs revealed itself also in the fall of Calais. That city and the entire Pale came under French attack on January 1, 1558, from an army of twenty-five thousand. To oppose it, Lord Thomas Wentworth, the Deputy of Calais, had on hand a force of about two thousand: five hundred men within the main town and its outlying strongholds, plus two hundred or three hundred armed citizens; twelve hundred or so effectives at Guisnes; and but a handful of defenders at Hammes. On the English side, despite the presence of substantial Spanish troops around Grave-lines, the only auxiliaries supplied were four infantry companies at Calais and but one ensign of arquebusiers, Spaniards and Burgundians, at Guisnes. 59 The conquest was

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59 Two hundred arquebusiers sent out by Philip from Grave-lines for Calais were driven back on or about January 5 by French reiters. As for the ensign at Guisnes, it was comprised of but five hundred men, fifty Spaniards under Cristobal de Mountdragon and the remaining Burgundians under an officer named Dieffkie. It fought ferociously in defence of Mary Bulwark, an isolated tower detached from the castle. Most of the Spaniards and a high percentage of the Burgundians, including Dieffkie, were killed. For several eye-witness accounts of the capture of the Pale, see the intriguing collection gathered in Pollard, ed., *Tudor Tracts, 1532-1588*, pp. 289-330.
effected in three weeks. Calais fell in six days; Guisnes capitulated on January 20; while two days later, the garrison at Hammes retired in secret to Gravelines.

This rapid collapse of England's last outposts in France had lasting military significance. The loss of the Pale, for one thing, ended England's quest for empire on the Continent; but of more pertinent significance where this study is concerned, the crushing defeat substantiates the thesis that without the supportive crutch of large-scale foreign recruitment early Tudor armies were incapable of effective effort in those contests which matched them against anything but their island foes. English writers of the sixteenth century argued that Calais could have been saved had the Marian government been less negligent in reinforcing the garrisons there or in putting to sea the navy which at the time of the assault had been laid up for the winter. This was nothing but chauvinistic tripe. Calais was doomed to fall as had Boulogne before it. England's continental possessions were isolated by what, for that age, was a wide expanse of water. They were dependent for supplies and reinforcements out of England on uncertain winds and contrary weather. While they remained in Tudor hands, great reliance for their maintenance and

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60 See, for example, George Ferrers, The Winning of Calais by the French in Pollard, ed., Tudor Tracts, 1532-1588, pp. 290, 294.
protection was placed on the cooperation of the Empire. When Paget, in 1549, failed to persuade Charles V to take the field on England's behalf, Boulogne was lost, and Philip II's venality insured the capture of the Pale.

The moral, therefore, seems clear. Without massive infusions of foreign manpower, early Tudor armies courted disaster in their continental wars. In every fight waged outside of British waters, those armies were outrivaled by the superior numbers, training, and technology of their opponents. Mercenaries and auxiliaries were almost unheard of in Elizabeth's reign. But, then, Elizabeth was not a warlike queen. The forces which she raised for foreign service to aid the Huguenots in France and the Dutch in their war of independence were instruments of policy rather than engines of conquest. At home, her government, like those of the earlier Tudors, never created a standing army; but unlike others of her house, Elizabeth never aspired to military glory.

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61 Jordan, Edward VI, the Young King, pp. 302, 304.
62 It was said by some that the English defenders of the Pale consistently refused aid from the Spanish king, since "in many English minds there was a rooted suspicion that Philip wanted not so much to help, as to help himself to Calais." H. M. F. Prescott, Mary Tudor (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 377.
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APPENDIX A

MAXIMILIAN, COUNT OF BUREN
MAXIMILIAN, COUNT OF BUREN

Maximilian von Egmont, Count of Buren and Leerdam, Lord of Ysselstein, Sint Maartensdyk, Grave, and the region of Ruyck, was the only son of Floris d'Ysselstein from whom, on the latter's death in 1539, he inherited the foregoing dignities. It was while his father still lived that Maximilian gained his first martial laurels when, in the spring of 1537, he repulsed a sudden French attack upon Arras. That same year, as an officer in his father's army, he distinguished himself by storming the fortress of Saint-Pol near Dunkirk, in which action he saved the life of the French captain, Martin du Bellay, author of the famous Memoires, who was taken by his landsknechts.

In 1540, as a reward for his gallant service, Maximilian was made Governor of Friesland and shortly thereafter a knight of the Golden Fleece. Other honors quickly followed. The provinces of Groningen and Oberyssel were placed under his jurisdiction, but as always with power came responsibility. On the outbreak of Emperor Charles' war with France in 1542, the defence of the northern Netherlands was given over to Buren, and later in the year he cooperated with Philibert of Chalons, the Prince of Orange, in reoccupying Luxemburg which had been overrun by the Duke of Orleans.

In 1543, Maximilian participated in the emperor's
campaign against the Duke of Cleves. During the subsequent siege of Landrecies, he made the acquaintance of Sir John Wallop, captain of the English auxiliaries, and tried without effect to draw the relieving army of Francis I into battle. His activities in 1544 as commander of the Imperialist contingents before Montreuil and recruiter of mercenaries for Henry VIII have previously been noted. English service did little for his reputation. His talents, perhaps because they were not fully appreciated or because, as the Imperialists suspected, Henry never intended that Montreuil should be taken, were never fully utilized. But in 1546, in the opening phase of the Schmalkaldic War, he established himself as one of the most valuable commanders in the Catholic camp.

Commissioned that summer to prepare the Netherlands against the possibility of attack from the Protestant leaguers, he was suddenly called with thirteen thousand troops to march in August to the relief of the emperor, who was caught unprepared by the Landgrave of Hesse in Bavaria. Buren's fulfillment of his charge was one of the great feats of the war. In the face of formidable odds, he led his army unscathed through better than two hundred miles of hostile

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1 Above, p. 247.
3 Above, pp. 322-23 and n. 70.
territory, effecting in the process a night crossing of the Rhine at Bingen and the capture of the fortress of Walluf in Hesse, all under the fretful gaze of fifteen thousand Protestants commanded, among others, by Henry VIII's old nemesis, Friedrich von Reiffenberg. Buren's juncture with the emperor near Ingolstadt on September 15 swelled the Imperialist ranks to over sixty thousand, robbed the Lutherans of their original confidence, and permitted Charles V over the next two months to stamp his complete authority on South Germany.

As a final service to the Empire, Buren sieged Boxberg, Darmstadt, and Frankfurt. Confined to bed by a severe illness in Bonn, he returned to the Netherlands early in 1547 and died towards the end of the next year, having taken no further part in the fighting. 4

4 The bulk of the information contained in this sketch was drawn from Paul Kannengeiser, Karl V und Maximilian Egmont, Graf von Buren. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des schmalkaldischen Krieges (Freiburg and Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1895), pp. 1-10. Buren's physician during his last illness was none other than Andreas Vesalius. The count's only child and heir, Anna, became the first wife of William of Orange, who as William the Silent is remembered as the chief founder of the Dutch Republic.
APPENDIX B

LUDOVICO DA L'ARMI
LUDOVICO DA L'ARMI

The sinister career of Ludovico da l'Armi, after his engagement by Henry VIII, is easily followed in both the Letters and Papers and the Venetian Calendar. His intrigues, felonies, and homicides remained the scandal of the Republic of Venice until justice was served him in 1547.

Precisely why Da l'Armi and the other captains hired with him were retained is open to question. That they busied themselves in the spring of 1545 in raising troops for England's war with France is a certainty, but how, after those forces were denied passage through the Empire, the officers were meant to be employed is another matter. A rumor which became current in Italy in May, 1545, that Da l'Armi and his confederates might in the name of the English king attempt some enterprise in Piedmont on behalf of Charles II of Savoy appears to have had some basis in fact. Luigi Gonzaga, Lord of Castiglione and kinsman to the Gonzaga dukes of Mantua, was offered at about the same time the generalship of all of Henry's forces in Italy. Unfortunately, the danger of

1Angelo Mariano, Count Bernardo di San Bonifacio, and Filippo Pini. See above, pp. 343 ff.

2Savoy was lost to the French in 1537. The duchy was not restored until the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559.

3Above, p. 348.
offending the emperor, who feared the French might think him behind the scheme, forced the abandonment of the plan in October. 4

In the meantime, Da l'Armi ran afoul of the authorities in Venice. On August 7, he and a band of his ruffians assaulted the night watch, wounding one of the officers, and on the twelfth fresh news from Treviso indicated that three of his men had entered that town and inflicted grievous wounds on one Count Curio Bua. 5 The gravity of the crimes left the Venetian government no choice. Da l'Armi and fourteen of his followers were expelled from the republic. Harvel, without Henry's commission, was powerless to act on his behalf, and the felon left Italy.

This might have ended the matter but for the English war in France. Da l'Armi, again for reasons not entirely clear, was still important in Henry's plans. On August 31, Ludovico surfaced in Brussels where, in an audience with the Venetian ambassador, Bernardo Navagiero, he sought the diplomat's intercession with the Doge. The attack upon the Signory's

4L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 751 (1); pt. 2, No. 193; Venetian Calendar, V, No. 343; State Papers, X, 646-47.

5Venetian Calendar, V, Nos. 344-48. Bua, quite possibly a relative of that Albanian colonel, Thamos, who fought for Henry in the Boulonnais, was scarred about the face, a mark of infamy, for accepting money to serve the Tudor king but refusing to do so.
officials, he asserted, had been a mistake. He had many powerful enemies, and mistaking the night watch in the dark for some of them, "he could not do otherwise than he did." As for the scarring of Bua, Da l'Armi pled his honor: "... a person who had taken money to come and serve the King of England and then failed to do so deserved greater punishment than what he had received, and for this the Signory ought not to evince resentment, both out of respect for the King, and for the Doge himself, who being a sovereign should dissemble this case to prove how much it displeased him that Princes should be wronged by private individuals."  

The matter was soon concluded in Da I'Armi's favor. Personal intervention by Lord Chancellor Wriothesley, Principal Secretary Paget, and Henry himself secured the condottiere a reprieve and a safe conduct, awarded December 9, for five years.  

Ludovico, armed with letters for the thirteen year-old Duke of Mantua, Francesco Gonzaga, returned to Italy early in 1546. The letters were delivered in April, but the duchess, the duke's mother, refused to grant an interview. Rumors were again flying that Da l'Armi was seeking men for

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6Ibid., No. 356.  
7Ibid., Nos. 367, 370; L. & P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 491, 964.  
8These, if they could be discovered, would throw considerable light on what it was that Henry had in mind.
an invasion of Piedmont; and on advice from the Imperial Chancellor, Granvelle, the duchess declined the English sovereign's request for troops, "not purposing," as she put it, to draw on herself or her son "the enmity of any Christian Powers." Moreover, she continued, proclamations had been issued of late forbidding her subjects to enter the service of others. 9

The signing of the Treaty of Camp in June negated Ludovico's commission, and the death of Henry VIII in January, 1547, assured the mercenary colonel of a fate which had pursued him since his youth. 10 On November 3, 1546, the Venetians outlawed one of their own noblemen, Ser Maphio Bernardo on the charge of treasonous dealings with France. On the sixteenth of that month Ser Maphio, a fugitive in Ravenna, was murdered, and upon investigation the murderers were discovered to be none other than the paid assassins of Ludovico dal'Armi. Further inquiry revealed that the victim and Ludovico had been collaborators, that each shared secrets that might have been a danger to the other. 11 If captured and tortured, Ser Maphio might have implicated his accessory in

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10 Above, pp. 344-45.
11 Venetian Calendar, V, Nos. 413, 424, 431.
treacheries against England and Venice.

Da l'Armi was arrested and examined. Released briefly on his own recognizance, he fled to Milan where, on February 6, 1547, at the court of the Imperial Governor, Don Ferrante Gonzaga, he was seized and placed in custody. Though he sought help from England and from the emperor, none was forthcoming. He was successfully extradicted to Venice in April, found guilty, and publicly beheaded between two columns on the mole fronting the sea on Saturday, May 14. ¹²

¹²Ibid., Nos. 439, 455, 456, 487, 495, 500, 502, 508-09.
APPENDIX C

PEDRO DE GAMBOA
PEDRO DE GAMBOA

One of the most honored and highly valued of Tudor mercenary commanders was the Madrilenian, Pedro de Gamboa, the soldier who holds the distinction of being the first to serve in England proper with the rank of colonel.1 His appearance in London in March, 1545, coinciding as it did with the disbandment en masse of Charles V's Spaniards in the Netherlands2 suggests that Gamboa entered English service direct from a stint with the emperor's forces in that part of Europe, though there is no evidence to prove that he was among the bands of his countrymen earlier prested at Falmouth.

There is no question but that he served in the Imperial army during the French war in 1544. A Spanish despatch relative to the siege of Saint Dizier lists him among the casualties. He had been "shot near the thigh bone, almost touching on the genitals," a wound which rendered him partially crippled for life.3 His appointment in March, 1545, as maestre de campo or colonel of all the Spaniards in English service was not universally popular. It caused "no lack of

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1Above, p. 132 (n. 41).
2Above, p. 342.
3Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 163, Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 16, describes him as being small in stature and lame, "one leg being shorter than the other, and so deaf that he could only hear if he was shouted at."
envy and malice" among his subordinates, particularly at Calais, where the attempted flight of Juan de Haro and the
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desertion of Antonio de Mora were attributed directly to it. 4

Regardless of that enmity which sprang as much from his origins 5 as from the 150 ducats a month he received in wages,
Gamboa's service pleased his masters. Diligent and unafraid,
he proved his worth many times over in recruiting troops,
which he seems to have had little trouble in finding, and in
leading them in battle. Edward Seymour, under whom he served
almost constantly, had great faith in him, as witnessed in
the winter of 1545 when Gamboa and his Spaniards were not
only retained--at a time when other mercenaries were being
dismissed--but left in some of the most forward positions
against the Scots. 6 It was Gamboa also whom Seymour took
with him to France to survey the damage done by Surrey's over-
throw in January, 1546, 7 and at Ambleteuse in May the English
general's trust was fully confirmed when, on a threatened

4Hume, ed., Chronicle of King Henry VIII, p. 124;

15-16, says of the colonel that "two or three times" he had
been Captain General under the emperor, adding somewhat fece-
tiously that he was "a man of great rank in the realm of
Spain, where there was not a mound, a hill or mountain which
was not blood relation to Captain Gamboa."

6State Papers, V, 532; Dasent, Acts of the Privy

7Above, p.
stir by some of Pennink's landsknechts for an additional month's wages, the Spaniard rallied his men to Seymour's defence and thereby averted a mutiny. 8

For these and other services, Gamboa was knighted, Henry himself performing the honors at York Place near Whitehall some months before his final illness. 9 But, perhaps, his greatest reward was the grant of denization and the subsequent gift of the lordship of Stanmer. 10 Technically, since denization was a form of citizenship, Gamboa became an Englishman and in the process lost his free-lance status. In practice, however, it was as "Colonel of the King's Spaniards" that he continued to serve the new government of Edward VI. Likewise, when in the field he continued to lead foreigners, as at the battle of Pinkie in 1547 and the siege of Haddington in 1548. And he always drew a mercenary colonel's wages.

Gamboa might have led a long and happy life in England.


10 Above, p. 422.
His religious predilections, if in fact he had any, did not disturb his Edwardian paymasters, and under the Catholic, Mary, who was partial to Spaniards, he would probably have found favor. Unfortunately, he did not live that long. On January 19, 1550, while walking near his London home in Saint Sepulchre's parish, Gamboa and his friend, Alonzo de Villa Sirga were waylaid and murdered by four of their countrymen. At the root of this deed was some quarrel which had developed during the war against the Scots. The chief assailant was Carlos de Guavara with whom Gamboa had rode at Pinkie. He and his accomplices were rounded up by William, now Lord, Paget in Smithfield, and at their arraignment on January 23 they were condemned, their execution by hanging following on the twenty-fourth.

11 Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," pp. 77-78.

12 Wriothesley, A Chronicle of England during the Reigns of the Tudors, II, 31-32. The author provides the chilling detail that on the way to Smithfield, where the sentence was exacted, Carlos de Guavara "had his right hand stricken off on the cart wheel with an axe by the executioner," Those who died with him were his kinsman, Balthazar de Guavara, Miguel de Salvaron, and Francisco de Salvasto.
Though he earned his reputation in later years, the most bloodthirsty and noteworthy of all the mercenary captains to serve the early Tudors was Julian Romero. Born in humble circumstances in the village of Huelamo in the Serrania de Cuenca, he was, in a career which spanned over forty years, to advance through the ranks to become, as one of his contemporaries phrased it, "commander-in-chief of great enterprises."¹

Romero's early history is only dimly known. When still a boy, in the winter of 1534, he enlisted as a common footman in an expedition against the Moors in North Africa, and for the next ten years drifted unnoticed through Charles V's several wars in Tunis, Italy, Flanders, and in France. In 1545, he was one of the Spaniards to come ashore at Falmouth.² Enrolled as a captain in Gamboa's regiment, he was posted to Newcastle, saw action against the Scots under Hertford, whom he accompanied to Ambleteuse, and was attached to the garrison there at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Camp.

¹Cabrera de Cordova, quoted by M. A. S. Hume, "Julian Romero--Swashbuckler," in The Year After the Armada and Other Historical Studies (Reprint; London and Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970), p. 121. All of the information contained in this sketch, unless otherwise noted, is taken from this source, pp. 73-121.

²Above, pp. 342-43.
Following his successful duel with the traitor, De Mora, at Fontainebleau, he returned to London, where his excessive extravagance led to his arrest for a debt of 200 ducats. He was saved from jail by Gamboa, who made the money good, but shortly thereafter he was hauled before the Council for loose talk about Henry VIII’s religious innovations. In this instance, he was saved from dismissal and punishment by Secretary Paget’s intercession.

It was not long after these events that Henry VIII died, and on Seymour’s invasion of Scotland in the autumn of 1547, Julian went north with Gamboa. His bravery at Pinkie, according to the unknown author of the Chronicle of Henry VIII, earned him a knighthood; he participated in the relief of Haddington in August, 1548; and was captured along with Pedro Negro sometime before the peace of 1550, perhaps while serving at Broughty Castle near Dundee.

Romero’s captivity could not have been long. On the outbreak of Charles V’s war with Henry II of France in 1551, he answered his sovereign’s call to the colors. As commander of the castle of Dinant in Namur in 1554, he was obliged to

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3 Charges were pressed by a Milanese merchant, Baptista Baron.

4 This author has been unable to substantiate this claim.

5 (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mem. 10.
surrender to the French, but for his gallant defence of that stronghold he and his unit were allowed the honors of war, being permitted to depart "without loss of goods, . . . their swords by their side." He was now a recognized leader, fast becoming, as the contemporary Spanish historian, Sandoval, assessed him, one of the foremost soldiers of his day. He distinguished himself at the storming of Saint Quentin in 1557, while ten years later, as colonel-in-chief of Philip II's Regiment of Sicily, he accompanied Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of Alva, as part of the Spanish army of ten thousand sent into the Low Countries to suppress the revolt of the Dutch. As Alva's henchman, Romero "was marked out now conspicuously as one of the most unscrupulous of [his] officers," a man "who could be depended upon in any emergency, . . . fanatically loyal to his sovereign and the faith for which he was fighting."

When the English adventurer, Thomas Stucley, entered Spanish employment in 1569, Philip II promised him five thousand troops under Julian for the invasion of Ireland. However, the scheme was scrapped, and Romero continued to serve in the Netherlands, where he presided over some of the most brutal episodes in all the sad history of the Eighty Years' War.

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6 Calendar of State Papers (Foreign), Mary, No. 222.
War. He and six hundred of his arquebusiers massacred the citizens of the Flemish town of Naarden in November, 1572; on the fall of Haarlem, during the siege of which he lost an eye, his troops similarly were allowed to get out of hand; and on his authority, on the capture of the fort of Mansendus in Holland, the throats of six hundred of its defenders were cut.

Even greater atrocities followed in the wake of Don Juan of Austria's appointment as Governor of the Netherlands in 1576. The Spanish soldiery in the still loyal southern provinces, unpaid in nearly two years, ran amuck to indemnify themselves. Romero's troops, attacked as rebels at Lier by the largely Belgian forces of the Council of State, turned on their tormentors and routed them, carrying the slaughter, including that of innocent bystanders, to the gates of Louvain itself. Immediately thereafter, having joined forces with other mutinous units from Breda, Maastricht, and the Spanish garrisons along the Schelde, Romero descended on weakly defended Antwerp.

This city, the greatest port and richest commercial center in the West, was reduced within a matter of hours to a charnel house in the terrible "Spanish Fury" of November 4, 1576. In the course of this and the two days following,
eight thousand men, women, and children were murdered, 6,000,000 ducats worth of property was plundered, and for his part in the pillage Romero and his fellow officers received high praise: "They deserve well of his Majesty." wrote the Spanish politician, Jerome Rodas, "for the services they have rendered in this great victory."^9

The upshot of the "Spanish Fury" was the "Pacification of Ghent," a shortlived, but nevertheless important, alliance between the Catholic provinces of the southern Netherlands and the militantly Protestant provinces of the north. This temporary agreement, unifying as it did the military power of the whole Netherlands against the oppression of Spain, forced by negotiation the withdrawal of the entire Spanish Army of Flanders from the Low Countries in April, 1577. 11

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9 The classic account of the "Spanish Fury" in English is rendered by John Lothrop Motley, The Rise of the Dutch Republic (3 vols.; New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1883), III, 104 ff. According to one Spanish estimate consulted by Motley, twenty-five hundred victims were dispatched with the sword, while double that number were burned alive or drowned.

10 The "Pacification of Ghent," provoked by the "Spanish Fury," held the Netherlands together until 1579. In that year, the allegiance of the southern provinces was won back by Spain through the Treaty of Arras. The Protestant provinces continued the fight for freedom under the articles of the Union of Utrecht, declaring themselves independent of Spanish control in 1581.

11 Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659, p. 236.
Romero was posted to Italy. But on the outbreak of fresh fighting in July, he was ordered with an army of six thousand to return to the scene of his earlier crimes. As he set out on his march from Cremona, he fell from his horse, dead. He had served two kings of Spain for better than forty years. In that time, he had lost an arm, a leg, one eye and an ear. As his reward, he had been appointed general of his last command.12

12 This according to Hume, "Julian Romero—Swashbuckler," pp. 76, 120. However, Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659, p. 118, states categorically that Romero never rose above the rank of colonel.
APPENDIX E

A LIST OF MERCENARY KNIGHTS AND THE DATES OF THEIR CREATION

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A LIST OF MERCENARY KNIGHTS AND THE DATES OF THEIR CREATION

1. Pedro de Gamboa, York Place, 1546.  
2. Julian Romero, after the battle of Pinkie, September, 1547.  
4. Pedro Negro, Roxburgh, September 28, 1547.  
5. Cristobal Diaz, Roxburgh, September 28, 1547.  
6. Alonzo de Villa Sirga, Roxburgh, September 28, 1547.  
7. Jean de Barteville, a French deserter, Berwick, September or October, 1547.  
9. Conrad Pennink, 1549 or 1550.  

1 Shaw, The Knights of England, II, 58.  
2 This only on the authority of Hume, "Julian Romero--Swashbuckler," p. 90.  
4 Ibid., 62, to be compared with Patten, The Expedition into Scotland, p. 150.  
5 Patten, The Expedition into Scotland, p. 150.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid., p. 151, to be compared with Shaw, The Knights of England, II, 62.  
8 Shaw, The Knights of England, II, 64.  
9 Ibid., 65.
10. Wilhelm Wallerthum, "for service in the French and Scottish wars."¹⁰

¹⁰The date of Wallerthum's creation is unknown, but the award was made sometime during the reign of Edward VI. See Calendar of State Papers (Domestic), Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, I, 85. Such creations appear to have stopped with Mary's accession, indicating perhaps how little she employed foreigners.
APPENDIX F

PRELIMINARY ARTICLES AND AGREEMENT

PASSED BETWEEN THE COUNT OF BUREN AND THOMAS CHAMBERLAIN
PRELIMINARY ARTICLES AND AGREEMENT
PASSED BETWEEN THE COUNT OF BUREN AND THOMAS CHAMBERLAIN

Hereinafter ensue the articles and agreement passed between the Count of Buren and Thomas Chamberlain on the part of His Majesty the King of England, according to which the said Count has promised His Majesty the King of England to bring two thousand footmen.

Item: The Count of Buren says and promises to bring up to two thousand footmen, well disciplined and equipped for war with all officers and appurtenances. And that for each ensign there will be so many pikemen, halberdiers, and small shot up to the number of four hundred man, of which there will be fifty [or] sixty more or less harquebusiers in each, up to thirty halberdiers, and the rest pikemen.

Item: The Count of Buren promises to be ready at Bois-le-duc [i.e. 's Hertogenbosch] or thereabouts with his footmen to take the musters on 14 May next.

Item: His Majesty agrees to give the Count of Buren for the conduct of each foot soldier from his home to the town of Bois-le-duc aforesaid or thereabouts where the musters will be taken by His Majesty's Commissioners a Karolus florin, each of which is understood to be worth 20 pattars in

\(^1\)(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/185, ff. 142-43.
Brabantine currency, besides 100 Karolus Florins for each ensign, with which each of the said footmen will be satisfied without demanding further entertainment or wages for their coming.

Item: His Majesty agrees to pay to each footman after the musters 4 florins per month for his wages. And the said Count of Buren promises that the said footmen will serve His Majesty for the said pay on condition that a captain Christopher de Landerberch [i.e. Landenberg], may serve His Majesty for the same. And in case the said Landerberch will not take part with His Majesty, promises (to serve him) AT THE SAID rate of 4 Karolus florins per month. [Mutilated] he will pay the Count of Buren and his footmen 4 Philipus per month, at 25 pattars in Brabantine currency for each Philipus, or such pay as the Emperor will give to his footmen, which the said Count of Buren will lead in his pay to serve the King. And to the captains, lieutenants, and other officers contained in the articles hereafter mentioned, such number of florins as is declared in the said articles.

Item: The said Count of Buren promises that His Majesty will not be charged with double pay for more than sixty in each

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2 The valuation of the pattar, which was of the same worth as the stuiver, had to be raised. Above, p. 277.

3 This is a reference to the auxiliary foot to be led by Buren.
ensign of foot, one carrying the other without including the pay of captains, lieutenants, and other officers in the articles hereafter mentioned.

Item: The said Count of Buren promises that His Majesty will not be charged to pay the wages for battle or assault, if the battle be not joined or if he be speedily beaten by the enemy, or if siege be laid and attack made by battery and the assault given. And that no others will receive this pay other than those who will be at the battle and will give the assault.

Item: It is agreed that the wages of footmen, their captains, lieutenants, and other officers will be paid in a certain number of florins per month. It is understood that each month contains thirty days, and each florin is worth 20 stuners Brabantine, which 20 stuners are each worth 2 sous six pence sterling. And that the florins which will be sent for the conduct of the foot soldiers will be of the same value aforesaid.

Item: The Count of Buren promises that the aforesaid footmen will be held to serve and will serve His Majesty well

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4 On double pays, see above, p. 261, n. 49.

5 Assault pay was a type of bonus awarded landsknechts when, and if, they carried their objective in pitched battle. This author had found no indication that it was ever allowed by the early Tudors which is not unusual, since the majority of engagements in which landsknechts were used consisted of siege operations.
and loyally without fraud, feint, or ill device during the
term of six months. And will swear, the said men of war,
both foot and mounted, to be loyal to His Majesty against all
his enemies and ill-wishers, except the Emperor and the Holy
Empire.

Item: The said Count of Buren promises that the said men of
war will be held to serve the King, marching against His ene-
mies and showing themselves valiant and joining with the ene-
my, doing and using extreme vigor and cruelty against the in-
vader if they can, as far as to make them submit to the author-
ity of His Majesty.

Item: Mons. de Buren promises that the said men of war will
keep the day and night watch as they will be commanded to by
the Lieutenant-General of the Army, without being able to
contradict what they are ordered.

Item: Mons. de Buren promises that the said men of war—foot-
men, will not contradict what they will be commanded both as
to the skirmish, as in battle, assault, or other combat what-
soever. And in case of battle or assault, His Majesty pro-
mises to give a month's pay besides what is said in the pre-
vious article.

Item: Mons. de Buren promises that the said men of war and
the principal officers will be held and charged according to
their oath to uphold and maintain justice to both great and
small, so that no inconveniences may fall out to the
prejudice of His Majesty's army.

Item: Mons. de Buren promises that if His Majesty entertains the said footmen as aforesaid, they may be held and charged to serve His Majesty for so much or so little time as will seem good to him.

Item: After, the said men of war will be paid and entertained the length of time that they will serve His Majesty without fraud or ill design from month to month, as is aforesaid, in mustering, as is customary.

Item: His Majesty will order how they will take the oath.

Item: Should it happen that His Majesty would like to give leave to the Germans, the custom is to pay them by the half month for their return, and those who serve longer, His Majesty will have regard to favor them more than the others, according to his pleasure.

Item: If florins, pattars, and stuners are not current in France of [if] the said men of war will find themselves outside of Flanders country, Mons. de Buren and his men of war will be content and held to receive their pay in angelots, ducats, escus sloters [?] and demi-scoters [?], and all other kinds of money current in England and France and elsewhere and at the rates and values they now have.

Made at Brussels, 8 April, 1544.
APPENDIX G

THE CAPITULATIONS OF THOMAS LIGHTMAKER
THE CAPITULATIONS OF THOMAS LIGHTMAKER

First, the said Lightmaker shall be bound to bring to the King's Majesty's service five hundred men of war, well trained and equipped for the wars as shall appertain, among whom he shall have 350 lances, and of them 150 arquebusiers, the which men of war carrying lances shall be armed with their habilments of the head with vizzards and salades on.

Item: The arquebusiers shall likewise have good arquebuses, well equipped with all manner of munition thereunto pertaining.

Item: The said captains of one hundred horses shall have for every horse passing the musters 1 philip by the month.

Item: Every horseman passing the musters shall have 12 philips by the month, the philip amounting to twenty-five patars of Flanders or the value which makes in sterling money 3s 2d.

Item: The standard bearer shall have besides the wages of his own person 24 philips by the month.

1(B. M.) Lansd. 155, ff. 356-58. This is a copy of the original capitulations written in an eighteen century hand. Though the transcriber writes that these articles "seem to have been made to Matthew Lightmaker," Thomas' brother, he assigns them to the year 1544. Matthew did not enter English service until 1545. The articles could in fact be Matthew's, but no matter, since all contracts followed a similar form.
Item: Every man of arms having eight horses belonging unto him to have a cuirassier, and for him he shall have by the month besides the wages of his own person 12 philips.

Item: The said cuirassier shall be armed from the top to the foot.

Item: To every twelve horses they shall be bound to have one waggon drawn with four good horses with their appurtenances and shall have for the said waggon by the month 23 philips.

Item: They shall not put any horse of war passed the musters into the waggon, and if any there be with all attrapped, the Masters of the same horses shall be punished with the confiscation of the said horses and of their wages for one whole month.

Item: To every twelve horses passed the musters shall be allowed one horse for baggage with 12 phs. by the month.

Item: To the said five hundred horses shall be allowed two Scribners, two furriers, two trumpets, five marshals, one surgeon with 12 phs. by the month.

Item: Every horse that shall tarry before the enemies after the musters made they shall be paid for every horse 30 phs.

Item: They shall be bound to serve thirty days for a month, and their services shall begin the day of the musters.

Item: They shall be paid monthly, and their money and victuals shall be delivered unto them according to the value and not otherwise.
Item: Though they be not paid within eight days more or less after the pay day, they shall be content to do all things nonetheless as become them in like case as if they had received their wages before hand.

Item: They shall swear to serve the King's Majesty three months and as long as shall please his Majesty to have them at the said sold, so it be signified unto them before the three months expire.

Item: They shall have from the coming from their own houses, every horseman to the place of the musters, for a day and a night 23 kreuzers or the value, and for every waggon drawn as aforesaid passing the musters 48 kreuzers for their expense for a day and a night, and they shall be bound to go three leagues of Almain a day, and the fifth they may rest themselves.

Item: When we shall have done with them, they shall have licence to depart in a convenient place and shall have a months' wages for their return.

Item: None shall go to any skirmish, booty or pillage, or against the enemies without consent of the General or his Ritmaster, and in case any do the contrary, whatsoever shall happen of them, they shall stand to their hurt and yet nevertheless be punished as shall be thought reasonable.

Item: All Dukes, Earls, Captains, Generals, head officers of the king, and of the King's blood shall be reserved to the
King's Majesty's use, saving that his Majesty shall depart somewhat liberally with their takers [?]; so that they shall be in reason contented. All other prisoners shall be theirs that shall take them, and they shall ransom them at their liberty: saving that they shall not be sent away without consent of the General or Ritemap.

Item: None shall make [mutiny], strife, or debate in any wise, but if any do any such or other undue thing, he shall be punished as shall be thought reasonable. And the Rimap shall have power to put him out of wages, saving that the Ritemap shall give knowledge to the Clerk of the musters to appoint him that shall depart the day of his departure and to appoint a day when the said Ritemap shall take another in his place.

Item: The King's Majesty shall pay them being come from their houses for three months, although they be licensed to depart before the said three months expired.

Item: That none shall use any falsehood, craft, or subtlety at the musters upon pain of confiscation of his wages as shall be thought reasonable.

Item: The King's Majesty shall have all such towns, villages, castles, fortresses, artillery, and all manner munition found in the same as they shall win at any time.

Item: They shall observe all letters of passport or safe conduct granted by the King's Majesty or his General.
Item: They shall do no displeasure in any wise, neither to
the merchants, Victuallers, or such as shall bring any muni-
tion or victuals, or any such thing to the Camp, nor to the
Waggoners.
Item: They shall serve the King's Majesty against all manner
of persons, saving the holy Empire.
Item: Such as have any old strifes or debates shall in no
wise revenge themselves during the wars unless the Ritmaster
can friendly appease them upon pain to be punished.
Item: The sick soldiers shall be paid as others, saving that
they shall be visited soon by the Clerk of the musters, and
the horse and harness of the sick shall be brought to the
musters without.
Item: The said men of war shall in nowise do any displeasure
to the King's Majesty's countries, or the countries of his
Majesty's friends or confederates, but shall be bound to pay
for all things honestly, upon pain to be punished as reason
requireth.
Item: They shall not use to swear any great or 'enorme'
oaths upon pain to be punished.
Item: They shall be bound to keep their Ward and Watch as
shall be unto them commanded by the General without contra-
diction.
Item: They shall muster as often as the King's Majesty shall
command them.
Item: Every fifty horse shall have a Ritmaster who shall have above the wages of his person 25 phs.

Item: The Ritmasters shall have a Lieutenant who shall have 40 phs. by the month.

Item: They shall have two head officers of Master of the Watch and a Master of the quarter [?], every of them 40 phs. by the month.

Item: Lightmaker shall have to maintain his table 100 phs. by the month.

Item: The said Ritmaster, Captain, and men of war shall be bound to serve the King's Majesty without offending to the contrary, upon pain of punishment as the Ritmaster shall think reasonable. And if the said Ritmaster shall not punish them, then the Marshal of the King's Majesty's army see them punished as shall be thought meet.

Item: As soon as the said number of Horsemen shall come into the King's Majesty's countries, they shall straight ways pass the musters and be paid a months' wages before hand.

And to the intent these articles be firm and stable, it shall be subscribed and sealed accordingly.

\[2\text{It seems likely that this term should be rendered as "quartermaster."}\]
APPENDIX H

HENRY VIII'S LETTER OF RETAINER TO FRIEDRICH VON REIFFENBERG
SPECIFYING THE COMPOSITION OF HIS FIFTEEN HUNDRED MEN OF ARMS,
THEIR PAY, AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

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HENRY VIII'S LETTER OF RETAINER TO FRIEDRICH VON REIFFENBERG
SPECIFYING THE COMPOSITION OF HIS FIFTEEN HUNDRED MEN OF ARMS,
THEIR PAY, AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

Henry, by the grace of God, King of England, France and
Ireland, Defender of the Faith, and on earth, supreme head of
the church of England and Ireland; to all who may see or hear
these presents.

Be it known that we have committed and retained, and by
these commit and retain, our dear and beloved, the Lord
Friedrich of Reiffenberg, to serve us as captain and to bring
us for our service fifteen hundred men-at-arms, of war, and
of service, well mounted and disciplined and equipped as good
and honest men of war. And upon such treatment, agreement,
and articles as follow, the which articles we wish to have
observed and maintained without contravention in any way,
Promising to hold firm and fixed all that we promise them in
every form and way, as is contained in the following arti-
cles. Firstly, that the said captain will be held to bring
to our service fifteen hundred men of war, well armed and
mounted as is meet, with good servants, of which there will
be for each ensign of five hundred horsemen, 350 lances and
150 harquebusiers, the which lancers will be armed with

1(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, ff. 15-19.
their head gear, with visors, helmets and salades, throat pieces, axe, vambraces, corselets, breeches and tassets covering the knees, and with long gauntlets.

Item: The harquebusiers likewise well furnished with all ammunition, breeches, axe, sleeves of mail, gorgets, gauntlets, corselets, and good head gear, with a swynspetts and a gun.

Item: To the captain of the fifteen hundred horsemen will be given for each horse passing muster a florin per month.

Item: For each horseman passing muster, twelve Philipus florins per month will be given, each philipus containing 25 Flanders patars of the value thereof.

Item: The standard bearer will be given beyond the wages of his person 25 Philips per month.

Item: Every man-at-arms with eight horses belonging to him will be able to have a cuirassier and will be paid 12 Philips beyond the pay of his person, and the said cuirassier will be armed from head to foot in everything appertaining to a man of arms.

Item: For every twelfth horse there will be a wagon with four good horses and their good furnishings and well equipped. 24 Philips will be paid per month for those wagons.

Item: No war horse passing muster will be put in harness in

\[^{2}\text{I have been unable to find the meaning of this term.}\]
the wagon[s], and if it should happen that one or more horses be harnessed, the masters of them will be punished with confiscation of the said horses and [loss] of a whole month's pay.

Item: For every twelve horses passing muster, a baggage horse or carrier will be maintained at 12 Philips per month.

Item: For the said fifteen hundred horses, six clerks, six furriers, six trumpets, fifteen farriers, and three surgeons will be maintained at 12 Philips per month.

Item: For every horse slain by the enemy after muster, we will pay 30 Philips apiece.

Item: The said men of war will be held to serve us for thirty days a month.

Item: The service of the horsemen will begin on the day of muster.

Item: They will be paid from month to month, and the money and victuals will be given and administered to them according to their worth and in no other way.

Item: If payment of silver is delayed by a week, more or less, the men of war will have patience, and notwithstanding, do all that good and loyal men of war should and ought to do, and they will be charged to become neither more nor less slack than if they had received their month's pay on the [day due].

Item: They will swear to serve us for three months and after
the said three months for so long as it may please us for the same pay and treatment, each time informing them before the said months expire.

Item: We will give the said men of war for the journey from their home to the place of muster six batz by day and night. And they will be held to advance four German leagues by day and to rest the fifth.

Item: When we shall have nothing more for the said men of war to do, we will disband them at some suitable place and give them a month's pay for their Return.

Item: None will proceed to go on skirmish or against the enemy or for booty or pillage without the consent of the captain-general or of his Ritmaster, and if anyone does the contrary, all that he may carry off will be sold without recompence, and [he] will be chastised and punished according to what is rightly thought reasonable.

Item: All dukes, counts, captains, generals, sovereigns, high officers of the King or of royal blood will be assigned to us or to our captain-general, except that we will make some compensation to those who will have taken them, so that he will have reason to be content. All other prisoners will be given to those who will take them or will have the means to ransom them at their pleasure, except that they will not be returned without the consent of the captain-general and their Ritmaster.
Item: None will proceed to make any mutiny, question or argument in any way, and if anyone does the contrary [or] chooses to be unreasonable, he will be punished according to what is deemed right and reasonable, and the Ritmaster will have power to dismiss him, except that the said Ritmaster will inform the commissioners and the clerk of the musters thereof to sign the date of the dismissal of the said dismissed, and thus to sign the day when the said Ritmaster may take someone else in his place.

Item: None will proceed to make or cause to be made any deception, falsity or sly practice in the musters upon confiscation of all his pay and punishment as is rightly deemed reasonable.

Item: All acquisitions from towns, chateaux, marches or villages of artillery and all war munitions will fall to us.

[Item:] The said men of war will be held to observe all reprieves, safeguards, and passports given by us, our captain-general, and Marshal of the camp.

Item: None will proceed to do any displeasure to the corps [?] or to the sutlers or to those who conduct ammunition, victuals or merchandise, nor to any wagon drivers thereof.

Item: The said men will be held to serve us against all our enemies, excepting only the Holy Empire.

Item: All those who will have old quarrels or disputes may not avenge themselves, but must allow them to rest during
our war, if the Ritmaster cannot reconcile them, on pain of being 'Roue.'

Item: All invalids will be paid as other men of war, except that they will be viewed and visited by the clerk of the musters, and the horses of the said sick and their harness will be brought to the muster without any ill device.

Item: The said men of war will not proceed to do any damage to our country nor to the countries of our friends and allies and will be held to pay in all honesty, on pain of being corrected and punished according to what is deemed reasonable.

Item: The said men of war will not proceed in any way to blaspheme or take in vain the blessed name of God the creator or any great lewd oaths on pain of being punished according to what the Ritmaster will deem right.

Item: The said men will be held to stand watch by day and night as they will be commanded by the lieutenant-general of our army, without being able to contradict.

Item: The said men of war will be held to permit the musters to be held so much and so often as it may please us.

Item: For every fifty horse a Ritmaster will be maintained, who will have for his person beyond the pay of his corps, 25 Philips per month.

Item: The said Ritmaster will have a lieutenant maintained for every five hundred horse at 60 Philips per month.

Item: For every 150 horse six other officers will be
maintained, that is to say, three master of the watch and three quartermasters, each maintained at 40 Philips per month.

Item: To the said Captain Friedrich, 300 Philips per month will be given for his board.

Item: We want to have observed and maintained all our right institutions and proclamations regarding the levying of the war, without anything being done to the contrary, on pain of being punished as the Ritmaster and officers deem to be reasonable, and if the said Ritmaster by negligence does not punish the said transgressions as reason demands, then they will be punished by our Grand Marshal of the camp according as justice rightly deems reasonable.

Item: The said captain and men of war will be held and charged to be unable to demand of us or our commissioners other treatment, pay or anything else, if not contained in the present letter of retainer and compact with the captain, made and contained in this letter.

Item: And in order to hold firm and fixed what we have promised in this present letter of retainer, and as we want to have the contents of these presents observed and maintained, we have signed these with our hand and here affixed our seal.

Item: Each horseman in the service of His Majesty will have four month's soldiering in hand and at the place of muster will receive, each according to his journey from home thereto, to be paid from month to month.
GLOSSARY

Abzug: literally, departure; severance pay.

Albanians (Albanois, Albanoys): name given to the mercenary Albanian and Greek light horsemen who served in all the armies of Western Europe in the sixteenth century.

Argoulets: French light cavalry troops believed to have been raised and organized by Louis XII in imitation of the Albanian stradiots.

Arquebus (harquebus, hagbush, hackbut): term applied to a variety of handguns of varying caliber, weight, and length in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries; prototype of the modern rifle.

Arquebus proof: term used to describe armor which had been specially reinforced to protect the wearer against small arms fire.

Assagai: a two-handed lance with a steel point at both ends; the distinctive weapon of the Albanian stradiot in the early sixteenth century.

Augmentations, Court of: a prerogative court created by statute in 1535 to administer the lands, wealth, and etc. of dissolved religious houses; merged with the Court of General Surveyors in 1547, it was abolished in 1554 and its functions transferred to the Exchequer.

Bard: any of various defensive pieces of armor for a horse.

Battle: the traditional units into which English armies were divided in the late Middle Ages and early sixteenth century; synonymous with "ward," as in fore-ward, middle-ward, and rear-ward.

Bend-leather: the thickest, strongest leather; acquired from the back and flank of cured hides, it was used in harness-making and for the soles of shoes.

Bowyer: a maker and/or seller of bows.

Bravo: Italian slang expression with the English meaning of "bully," "ruffian," "tough;" a man of violent habits.
Burgonet: a type of casque or steel headgear for the use of infantrymen; a helmit with a visor so fitted to the gorget or neck piece that the head could be turned without exposing the neck.

Butt: a target shot at by bowmen and handgunners; used in practice.

Camisade: a surprise attack usually launched under cover of darkness.

Camp: beside its usual meaning of the lodgement of an army, the word was employed in Tudor England to indicate a duel or honor always fought, apparently, under the ritualistic laws of war.

Caparison: a covering--sometimes decorative, sometimes protective--for a horse.

Cask: an archaic and alternate spelling of "casque," a steel helmit of which there were many styles; also occasionally used in the sense of "case," as in "a case of pistols."

Cass: pay off, discharge, cashier.

Chamfron (chanfron): the headpiece of a horse's bard.

Colonel: originally the cabo de colonella, the head of a column; the chief officer of a regiment; the title did not come into use in English armies until Elizabeth's reign.

Corselet (corslet): an armored covering for the body, as distinct from the limbs.

Crupper: the leather hoop passing under a horses tail and fastened to the saddle to keep it from slipping forward.

Cuirass: a piece of armor for the protection of the body between the neck and waist; more particularly, one consisting of a coupled breastplate and backpiece.

Cuirassier: a mounted soldier wearing a cuirass; specifically, in the early sixteenth century one of the heaviest types of light cavalrymen outfitted with a cuirass and armed with a lance and a handgun or handguns.

Cuisses: armor for the protection of the front part of the thighs.
Custrel: from the Old French, coustillier, a squire, esquire of the body, servant to a man-at-arms. The French word is retained in the modern word, coutillier, a can opener.

Dead-pay: though this term has several meanings, it was used in early Tudor times in the sense of "double-pay;" extra pay awarded to officers or to particularly experienced soldiers from the rank-and-file.

Demilance: the light, short lance employed by demilancers, the heaviest type of English light cavalry in the early sixteenth century; also, a light horseman armed with a demilance.

Destrier: a war horse or charger; the mount of a man-at-arms.

Drumslade: a drum or drummer.

Ensign: a military or naval standard; a flag; the officer assigned to carry the ensign; a standard bearer; and also the body of men who served under a particular banner, as for example "an ensign of infantry."

Exchequer: in theory this department of state functioned as the royal treasury, though in practice it was only one of many treasuries during the early Tudor period dealing with the income and expenditure of the crown's ordinary and extraordinary revenue. See below, First Fruits and Tenths, and above, Augmentations.

Farrier: one who shoes horses; the officer in a cavalry troop entrusted with the care of the horses.

Fausse-bray: literally, a false hill; an artificial mount thrown up in front of a rampart.

First Fruits and Tenths, Court of: court established by Henry VIII in 1540 to administer the revenues accruing to the crown through the appropriation by the state of the "first fruits" (or annates) and tenths formerly paid to the pope. "First Fruits" consisted of a part of a year's income of a benefice paid to Rome by bishops on appointment; tenths, in theory one-tenth of the annual profit of every church living in the realm, had been collected since the twelfth century for the recovery of the Holy Land. A chief competitor of the Exchequer, the prerogative Court of First Fruits and Tenths was heavily drawn on for revenue to support Henry VIII's last French war.
Furrier: the officer charged with securing and arranging accommodations for his unit.

Gauntlet: a glove usually made of leather but covered with steel plates worn as part of the battle dress of a man-at-arms.

Genitour: the name applied to the light horsemen of Spain.

Glaive: a variation of the halberd; a type of bill.

Gorget: neck piece; an armored collar; a piece of armor to protect the neck.

Great horse: destrier; charger; mount of a man-at-arms.

Great Italian Wars: a term current among military historians used to describe the series of campaigns waged between France and Spain for control of the Italian peninsula. Initiated by Charles VIII's invasion of Italy in 1494, they continued until the signing of the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559.

Greaves: Armor for the legs below the knee.

Hackbut (hagbut): an arquebus.

Halberd: a combination of spear and battle-axe, consisting of a sharp-edged blade ending in a point and a spear-head mounted on an eight-foot shaft.

Halberdier: a soldier armed with a halberd.

Jinetes: see above, genitour.

Lieutenant: in Tudor England the term retained the medieval meaning of deputy or substitute for a higher officer until well into the reign of Elizabeth; in continental armies, however, the term was used to designate the officer next in rank below a captain.

Limonier (limoneer, lymoner): a draft horse; a horse which is attached to the shafts of a wagon.

Match: a wick so prepared that it is not easily extinguished; used for firing cannon and other gunpowder weapons.

Matchlock: a type of gun equipped with a lock in which match is placed for igniting the powder.
Mint: located in the Tower of London with various branches throughout the realm, it supervised the coining of money in England. Its revenues were drawn on heavily for the wars.

Northern horse: English light cavalrymen recruited from the northern counties against Scotland.

Pezetaeri: a type of hoplite or heavily armed infantryman popular in ancient Greece and Macedonia. Armed with thirteen foot-long sarissas or spears, they were among the earliest forerunners of the Swiss Gebirgshechte and the German Landsknechte.

Pioneer: sapper; one of a body of foot soldiers employed primarily as laborers to dig trenches, erect fortifications, repair roads, build bridges, and etc.

Plashland: marshland.

Pouladrons (pauldrons): a shoulder-plate; a piece of armor designed to protect the shoulder.

"Pricker:" a light horseman, as for example a Northern horseman, employed as a skirmisher or scout; one who "pricks" either his horse with his spur or his opponent with his lance.

Regiment: employed in early Tudor England in the medieval sense of the authority enjoyed by an officer over his men; on the Continent, the term had earlier come to mean a fairly large body of troops forming a definite unit within an army.

Reiter (rutter): literally, a rider; a German or Dutch cavalryman, particularly a cuirassier armed with lance and pistol; a pistoleer.

Salade (sallet): a light, globular helm, with or without a visor, and without a crest, the lower part curving outward at the neck.

Scimitar: a short, curved single-edged sword popular among Orientals, especially Turks and Persians; a favorite side-arm of the Albanian stradiot.

Seneschal: steward.
Sergeant: in Tudor England the word was employed with the meaning of servant or attendant; in continental armies of the period, the title was applied to the chief non-commissioned assistant to the captain of a company.

Standard: synonymous with ensign; a body of men; a flag; an officer entrusted with the keeping of the standard; a standard bearer.

Stoned horse: a stallion; an uncastrated horse.

Stradiot: name applied to the Albanian light cavalrymen of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Tasses: A series of articulated and overlapping metal plates descending from the corselet which form a sort of kilt of armor to protect the thighs and lower part of the trunk.

Vambrace: defensive armor for the forearm.

Ward: see battle; one of the principal divisions into which Tudor armies were divided.

Wheel-lock: a form of gun-lock in which the powder was ignited by the friction of a small, spring-wound wheel against a piece of iron pyrites.

Zweihander: a slath or slashing sword; an immense, two-handed sword some five feet or longer in length.
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Date of Examination: November 15, 1974