Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons

2015

People's Perception of Free Trade and Economic Sophistication

Igor Kuznetsov
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses

Part of the Political Science Commons

PEOPLE'S PERCEPTION OF FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC SOPHISTICATION

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Art

in

The Department of Political Science

by
Igor Kuznetsov
M.A., Institute of Management, Business and Law, 2009
December 2015

Table of Contents

Abstract

The question of which factors form people's attitudes toward free trade has occupied scholars' minds for no less than two decades.[1] Many theories were suggested in an attempt to explain why some individuals strongly support protectionist policies while others prefer trade liberalization. These explanations range from classical economic models of factors of production to nationalism, the fear of foreign cultures, and gender differences. The contribution of this paper is that I combine economic and non-economic approaches, introducing the possibility that individuals may think from an economic perspective or draw on other considerations depending on what they know about economics. That is, non-economic factors such as nationalism/patriotism are anticipated to prevail among individuals with a low level of sophistication while variation in the preferences of highly sophisticated individuals should fit into the economic framework of factors of production. I use a probit model with sample selection and test proposed hypotheses on the American National Election Study (ANES 2012) dataset. The selection model determines the factors that influence the probability of having an opinion about trade versus no opinion and the main model is designed to explain why individuals support or oppose trade liberalization. Statistical analysis demonstrates that the strength and magnitude of the effect of education that I use as a measure of human capital rises with an increase of the level of sophistication. However, the influence and significance of the nationalism/patriotism variable that represents non-economic factors also increase for higher levels of economic sophistication, which stands against proposed theory.

---

[1] In this paper, I use concepts "free trade" and "trade liberalization" as synonyms.

Introduction

The prospect of signing the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) reignited public attention in the U.S. to such issues as the impact of globalization, the competitiveness of the U.S. economy, and the influence of international trade on the well-being of each citizen and on the economy as a whole. Scholarly attention to trade liberalization and its relationship with public opinion has never faded. The estimates of the effect of TPP divide economists, politicians, scholars, and activists into roughly three camps. Senator Elizabeth Warren and other Democrats together with StopFastTrack Project oppose TPP (DeBonis and Mufson 2015). President Obama, the majority of Republicans and many established economists decisively defend the potential merits of this agreement (Baker 2015), while proponents of free trade such as Paul Krugman do not foresee any substantial impact on the supply and demand sides of the economy (Krugman 2015).[2] Although scholars agree in general about the validity of Ricardian efficiency of trade, there is no consensus about what determines public perception of free trade. The goal of this paper is to investigate the question of how individuals' knowledge of economics influences their perception of trade liberalization.

An economic approach to people's attitudes about trade liberalization implies that individuals act and behave as factors of production and their preferences depend on their factor endowment (Rogowski 1989; Irwin 1995). Non-economic theories suggest that there are many other factors not directly related to material gain that can explain observed variation in public opinion about free trade.

---

[2] It should be noted that in this paper, I consider only economic aspects of trade agreements. In reality, however, the impact of international trade agreements can be much wider. For instance, such agreements can change the balance of power and even contribute to the reshaping of international security.

The contribution of this research project is that I combine economic and non-economic approaches introducing the possibility that individuals may think from an economic perspective or draw on some other considerations depending on what they know about economics. That is, non-economic factors such as nationalism/patriotism are anticipated to prevail among individuals with a low level of sophistication while variation in preferences of highly sophisticated individuals should fit into the framework of trade theories. The other contribution of this work is that I divide the variable which reflects respondents' answers on the survey question about trade into two separate dependent variables, first evaluating the probability of a randomly chosen individual having an opinion regarding trade policies and then estimating the probability of supporting or opposing trade liberalization under the constraint that individuals have an opinion in the first place.

I employ a probit model with sample selection and test proposed hypotheses on American National Election Study (ANES 2012) dataset. The results of this analysis partially support the presented hypotheses. The level of human capital measured through the level of education has a higher effect on more sophisticated respondents and its direction matches initial expectations. That is, the factor endowment model predicts preferences of only highly sophisticated individuals. At the same time, non-economic factors approximated through the level of nationalism/patriotism do not follow the suggested pattern.

In the next section I provide a literature review of free trade and economic voting concepts and construct hypotheses. Then I proceed with the research design and describe data and measurement. The section that illustrates the results of the analysis follow. I conclude with a brief overview of this research project and provide some possible explanations for the observed results.

Literature Review, Theory and Hypotheses

The post-World War II era has been marked by a tremendous increase in trade flows triggered by a series of political and institutional changes brought to life by the desire of international leaders to avoid the international disorder of the interwar period. Ruggie (1982, 393) contrasts the post–World War II international regime of 'embedded liberalism' with the laissez-faire liberalism of the pre–World War I era and interwar period by asserting that "unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism." Thus, governments that set a course for international economic integration after World War II repeatedly had to address the internal demands for domestic economic security and full employment with each new step of globalization, balancing between the desire to achieve Ricardian efficiency and the need to resolve the concerns of their citizens.

Many scholars who have studied the causes of variation in people's attitudes toward trade liberalization have employed the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of factors of production (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Beaulieu, Benarroch and Gaisford 2004; Mayda and Rodrik 2005). This theorem suggests that trade openness has a different effect on factors of production such as labor, capital and land depending on its relative scarcity or abundance. Thus, capital in the US is expected to benefit from free trade because of its abundance relative to other countries while labor will suffer because it is relatively scarce in the U.S. (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). Following this logic, scholars suggested that high-skilled (unskilled) labor in countries where it is abundant (scarce) favors (disfavors) trade liberalization. The impact of trade on the labor factor is traditionally considered through two competing frameworks. According to Heckscher–Ohlin model (HO) of factor endowment, workers can move freely from one sector to another;

therefore, trade openness harms or benefits them equally across all sectors (Rogowski 1989). The Ricardo-Viner model (RV) of specific sector endowment assumes that moving between sectors is costly for workers which means that trade liberalization can make labor better off in some sectors and worse off in others, depending on whether new policies stimulate exports or imports in these sectors (Irwin 1995).

Following this framework, O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) examined economic determinants of people's attitudes toward protectionism and arrived at the conclusion that the observed covariation between professional skills and people's preferences is consistent with the HO model. Beaulieu, Benarroch and Gaisford (2004) demonstrate that workers in skill-intensive sectors tend to support trade protectionism less than unskilled workers because intensified intra-industry trade leads to an increase in income inequality in favor of the former. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that skills measured by years of education and occupation are important determinants of individuals' attitudes toward free trade, which fits the HO model. They also find support for the RV model showing that people's attitudes vary across different sectors, although the relationship is weaker.

The HO and RV models comprise the mainstream of studies of people's preferences toward trade liberalization. More recently, political science scholars have started to explore the underling mechanisms that determine people's preferences toward trade liberalization through the lens of new-new trade theory. The Heckscher–Ohlin and Ricardo–Viner models analyze the effect of trade liberalization on public opinion on the state level (factors of production) and inter-industry level (industry sectors) respectively. Recently, Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) developed a new-new trade theory which moves the analysis down to the firm level, suggesting that firms across all sectors will react to increases in international trade

differently depending on their specific characteristics. Adopting this new-new trade theory, Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth (2015) use national- and county-level data on U.S. presidential elections to demonstrate that workers in firms which employ primarily high-skilled labor increase their support of incumbents who increase international trade, while workers of firms that employ primarily low-skilled labor vote for contesters. Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth (2015) specifically distinguished the effect of international trade from other economic variables (such as unemployment, inflation, and growth) that are traditionally used in economic voting literature.[3] They also contend that incumbent vote shares are negatively associated with employment volatility.

This approach has one substantial disadvantage. The new-new trade theory describes behavior of individual firms based on aggregate data at the county level and an extrapolation of this theory to the domain of people's preferences toward trade may hinge on the "ecologic" fallacy problem (see Kramer and Gerald 1983; Green and Shapiro 1994; Duch, Palmer and Anderson 2000). On the other hand, individual-level data provide insufficient information about firms where respondents work which makes it almost impossible to test the new-new trade theory on this type of data. The research question of interest is primarily concerned with the behavior of individuals which is expected to vary depending on their specific characteristics such as their level of economic knowledge so my analysis is limited to individual level data. Given

---

[3] In fact, what they demonstrate is that low-skilled and high-skilled workers become more volatile with an increase of international trade flows. Low-skilled workers essentially start to oppose the current authority voting for opposition candidates while high-skilled labor begin to favor current authority regardless of the ideological standing and political platform of contending parties. It means that voters ignore what competing candidates might do were they elected and concentrate solely on choosing whether to punish or reward an incumbent. This assertion goes against a substantial part of literature about voters' decision-making process some examples of which are mentioned in this paper, and therefore requires thorough analysis.

that the HO model has received far more support than the RV model in the scholarly community (see Margalit 2012; Scheve and Slaughter 1999), the primary explanatory mechanism of the effect of economic factors on individuals' preferences toward trade policies used in this analysis will be based on the factor endowment approach.

The alternative explanation for the variation in people's perceptions of trade liberalization is related to a range of non-economic factors such as education, culture, gender, and nationalism. Traditionally, an individual's level of education is used as a proxy for her level of professional skill. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006), however, find that education plays a rather different role. In particular, they argue that one of the key determinants of people's attitudes toward free trade is their exposure to economic ideas. Indeed, when years of education are grouped into educational levels (high school, college, graduate, etc.), college level has a noticeably stronger effect.

Further, Margalit (2012) demonstrates that concerns about social and cultural openness and changes in the salience of negative socio–cultural issues related to openness can account for variation in people's attitudes towards trade liberalization. He names this factor the "cultural threat" and it represents the weighted average of respondents' perceptions of traditional ways of life, foreign influence, the impact of consumerism and commercialism on culture, the spread of American ideas, customs, and culture.

Respondents' perception of trade liberalization is found to strongly negatively correlate with patriotic, nationalistic, and chauvinistic views (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Mayda, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2007). In the same vein, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find that the impact of nationalism on trade preferences should be considered through the tendency of some individuals and cultures toward ethnocentrism and isolationism.

Some scholars also point to gender as a decisive factor, showing that women are consistently less inclined to favor trade liberalization than men (Scheve and Slaughter 1999; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Drope and Chowdhury 2014). Moreover, Drope and Chowdhury (2014) find that it is not women, per se, who favor protectionism, but more precisely economically vulnerable women because, as the factor endowment approach suggests, women are more sensitive to economic security issues.

In sum, apart from some specific demographic factors, non-economic factors such as nationalism, chauvinism, ethnocentrism, or cultural threat captures facets of a single phenomenon: aversion to foreign influence and globalization. Although these factors reflect different aspects of perceived globalization threats, they are all grounded on the premise that these attitudes are not related to potential economic effects of trade globalization. In this research project, I am mostly interested in the salience of non-economic factors as an alternative to economic factors rather than scrutinizing the complexity and depth of this phenomenon itself. Therefore, I will concentrate on the nationalism/patriotism concept as defined by Mayda and Rodrik (2005) assuming that other non-economic factors should work in the same manner provided that they together comprise one multifaceted phenomenon of the perceived globalization threat. The choice of nationalism/patriotism as an operational concept is mainly dictated by data constraints, although I will try to account for other factors when the data allow.

The existing scholarship on people's preferences toward trade liberalization for the most part takes for granted that both economic and non-economic factors affect respondents equally and with a comparable strength, assuming homogeneity of population in terms of their competency in economics. The role of respondents' knowledge of the economy in the formation of their worldview and the degree of their understanding of economic processes remains largely

unexplored. At the same time, it would be reasonable to suggest that individuals' perception of

the effect of trade policies is a result of their evaluations of the effect of such policies that, in

turn, rest on their knowledge of economics. Depending on what they know about economic

theory and current state of the economy, respondents might process the same signals differently

and arrive at different conclusions.

Although individuals' sophistication is mostly neglected in free trade literature, it has

been widely studied in the related area of economic voting. To begin with, it is important to be

clear about what we mean by the term "sophistication." Luskin (1987, 857) defines the concept

of sophistication in the following way:

> Sophistication… is a matter of cognition. The most elementary cognitions - of individual,
> tangible objects - are the bits of memory the words in the grammar of thought. More
> complex cognitions link more elementary ones in much the same way as phrases or
> sentences link words. Cognitive psychology speaks of associations, social psychology of
> beliefs and attitudes.

According to Luskin (1987), political sophistication is perceived through interaction of its

three building blocks: size, range, and constraint of political belief system (PBF). Size and range

of PBF translate into integration, which refers to the intensity of connections between ideas, and

constraint translates into differentiation, which reflects different levels of assessment and

judgement (Tetlock 1986). Essentially, Luskin (1987) equates political sophistication to political

knowledge. In this paper, I will consider a narrow aspect of individuals' sophistication, i.e. their

level of economic knowledge, using it to demonstrate heterogeneity of individuals with respect

to their perceptions of trade liberalization.

The depth and accuracy of voters' knowledge is of prime importance for the economic

voting literature in general and for scholarship on people's preferences toward trade in particular.

For instance, for the HO factor of production or RV specific sector of production models to hold

8

true, individuals should understand how an increase or decrease in trade flows will affect their wellbeing as high- or low skilled labor (in case of HO model) or as workers in a particular industry (in case of RV model). They should also be convinced that potential costs of free trade will overwhelm the benefits. In essence, all individuals should think and behave as factors of productions, i.e. the way scholars that advance these models expect them to think and behave. However, it was shown that the accuracy of voters' knowledge about economy is far from perfect.

Thus, the accuracy of the electorate's judgements about economy and its ability to hold the government accountable for economic conditions was found to be dependent on one's personal economic situation and knowledge about the economy (Conover, Feldman and Knight 1986). Holbrook and Garand (1996) demonstrate that on average individuals' knowledge about the national economy substantially deviates from reality. The accuracy of their knowledge about the level of national unemployment and inflation varies depending on (1) individual characteristics such as socioeconomic status, gender, age, race etc.; (2) perceived economic threat to personal wellbeing; (3) personal interest in acquiring information about political and/or economic issues; and (4) the impact of the media. In a similar vein, Duch, Palmer and Anderson (2000) show that individuals' beliefs about the state of the economy vary depending on their political orientation, economic sophistication, socioeconomic status and personal experience.

Given that individuals' knowledge of economic circumstances on average deviates considerably from reality and varies depending on a set of diverse subjective and objective characteristics, the way sophistication influences voters' assessment of trade policies and their choices becomes particularly important. One of the differences between high and low sophisticates is that the latter group is more inclined to make retrospective judgements about the

economy and to use 'heuristic' shortcuts to compensate for an insufficient level of knowledge, and that it may be more difficult for them to distinguish their egocentric and sociotropic interests (Krause 1997).

Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2006) find that in addition to the cost of information acquisition, the ability to attribute responsibility for economic conditions leads to different estimations of government performance. Thus, individuals with a low level of sophistication are usually not able to trace changes in their personal economic conditions to particular government actions. This group of voters, nevertheless, can recognize causal connections between more proximate issues such as upturns and downturns in the national economy and government actions. It means that unsophisticated individuals vote based on sociotropic perceptions. Highly sophisticated individuals, on the other hand, can attribute changes in their well-being to particular government actions and therefore pocketbook voting is more evident in their behavior, although they also consider the state of the economy as a whole. [4] Gomez & Wilson (2003) also suggest that only relatively more sophisticated U.S. voters are capable of linking the performance of the national economy to congressional representatives' actions, while less sophisticated individuals attribute the responsibility for the national economy solely to the President as the most visible political figure.

Drawing on this scholarship of heterogeneous economic voting, I argue that sophistication conditions the set of factors that affect the formation of individuals' preferences toward trade liberalization. In other words, an individual's knowledge of the economy constrains

---

[4] In a later work, Hansford and Gomez (2015) acknowledge that the effect of sophistication may be conditional on some other political factors. On the example of Presidential elections in the U.S., they show that the degree of sophistication affects economic perception only if an incumbent does not run for office.

his estimates of the potential effect of trade liberalization on his life by assigning disproportional weights to some considerations relative to others. Scholars have observed that individuals tend to map their views and opinions into a coherent and consistent system of beliefs (McGuire 1960; Converse 1964; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). When a voter faces the need to make a choice, he or she refers to a set of considerations that are relevant to this particular decision. The range of these considerations covaries with their degree of sophistication such that more comprehensive knowledge in a given area broadens the set of possible aspects that a voter may take into account. Better awareness of the subject matter allows voters to conduct a more thorough and detailed analysis of the issue by relying on more specific and relevant information rather than on that which is more distant and subjective. In other words, highly sophisticated individuals use their knowledge about economics when they make judgements about topics related to the economy such as trade liberalization. The lack of knowledge among individuals with a low level of sophistication, however, does not compromise the need for consistency in their views. Unable to rely on objective information about a particular decision, this group of individuals draws on a broader field of beliefs that appear to them to be related to this particular question. As Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991, 5) describe it, "citizens compensate for a lack of information about political issues by relying on shortcuts in reasoning, or heuristics… [that] systematically vary according to their level of political information and awareness." That is, individuals with a low level of sophistication form their opinions about economic issues heuristically invoking a broader set of views and beliefs that, to their mind, related to a particular economic question.

In regard to trade policies, individuals with low levels of sophistication will make their judgements about the effect of free trade based on what they believe the broadimpacts of

globalization will be since their lack of knowledge about economics would prevent them from making a coherent evaluation of the effect of trade liberalization purely in economic terms. It should be noted that high or low levels of sophistication do not completely prevent voters from taking into account particular aspects of trade liberalization, but they predetermine the weight that they put on these considerations.

To sum, my hypotheses can be formulated in the following way:

H1: The higher the level of sophistication, the stronger the positive effect of the level of human capital on individuals perception of trade liberalization.

H2: The higher the level of sophistication, the weaker the negative effect of the level of nationalism/patriotism on individuals perception of trade liberalization.

Research Design

The literature on individuals' preferences about trade liberalization is mostly devoted to delineating the factors which make some people support trade liberalization and others oppose it as well as the mechanisms behind this preference formation. The significance of these findings is usually perceived through the broader picture of economic voting. Mansfield and Mutz (2009, 426) suggest that "if these individuals form a politically potent constituency, they may be able to pressure policymakers to increase trade barriers even if doing so is economically counterproductive for the country as a whole."

Such interpretation of the role of public opinion on free trade, however, rests on the assumption that a substantial number of voters have an opinion about trade liberalization. The actual picture of individuals' attitudes toward free trade appears to be relatively different. Egan (2015) and Powers and Pevehouse (2015) note that a considerable share of respondents simply do not have an opinion on this issue. This tendency persists overtime and across countries.

Thus, in the International Social Survey Programme - National Identity II (2003), more than 23% of respondents in 36 countries and territories in different parts of the world answered that they "don't know" or "neither agree nor disagree" when they were asked "should [the government] limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy." ASES (2001) demonstrates similar results. These estimations have a downward bias given that respondents are usually wary of indeterminate or "do not know" answers since they do not want to appear incompetent or incurious. A rather careful design of this question in ANES (2012) where respondents had an option "haven't though much about it" show that more than 40% of Americans do not have an opinion about limits on foreign imports. The peculiarity of this survey

13

is that it was conducted just before and after the U.S. Presidential Election of 2012 when public interest in politics and economics should have risen substantially.

Generally, scholars either treat the "don't know" category as missing data and put responses "neither agree nor disagree" between agree and disagree when constructing an ordered dependent variable (see Mayda and Rodrik 2005); merge these categories and treat them as middle ground position in ordered dependent variables (see Mansfield and Mutz 2009); or treat responses that do not show clear preferences as missing data (see Scheve and Slaughter 1999; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006).[5] To map these type of answers in one line with "agree" and "disagree" responses, one has to assume that (1) the same set of factors determines the probability of a randomly chosen person having an opinion versus not having an opinion about free trade, on the one hand, and, the probability of supporting or opposing trade liberalization, on the other hand; and (2) that these factors work with the same strength and in the same direction for all categories of responses in case of ordered dependent variables. These assumptions do not necessary hold true. For instance, a variable that captures respondents' age may be a good predictor of whether this person has an opinion about trade since older people on average have more stable and mature views on different aspects of life, meaning that the probability that this group of individuals have an opinion about trade should be high. However, age can fail to improve predictions about a specific position that individuals hold regarding trade policies since it should be determined by personal attributes such as skill level, employment, etc. Similarly, the knowledge of economics should have no influence on the probability that individuals have an opinion about trade liberalization if the question is formulated in a simple and conventional way (like most surveys do), but it can have an effect on what people think about free trade even

---

[5] Occasionally, the way how such categories as "don't know," "haven't thought about it" are treat is not reflected in literature at all.

14

outside the scope of the interaction effect proposed in this paper. Since economists mostly agree about a positive impact of trade liberalization on countries' economies, greater familiarity with economics may encourage people to share these views more readily. In essence, questions about individuals' preferences toward a particular view that allow such answer options as "don't know" and "haven't thought about it much" reflect distinct characteristics of individuals.

Therefore, when scholars analyze support for free trade, they already narrow their inquiry to a group of people who have an opinion about trade policies, and this may not be a random selection. Factors that make them think about trade liberalization can be different from those that make them support or oppose such trade policies. To avoid a biased estimation of trade preferences, I will use a probit model with sample selection that allows the evaluation of the probability of supporting trade liberalization conditional on the fact that we solely consider respondents with a clear opinion about trade. Thus, this type of models consists of two separate estimations: the selection model and the main model, both of which use probit estimation. The first model estimates the probability of observing a dependent variable of interest, and the second estimates the probability of this dependent variable taking a particular value accounting for the probability of observing this value (Heckman 1979; Van de Ven and Van Pragg 1981). It allows one to control for the fact that we observe a particular preference only when individuals do have an opinion about trade which, in turn, is predicted by a set of distinct factors.

I will construct two dummy dependent variables, one for the selection model and the other for the main model. The former dependent variable will reflect whether a given individual has an opinion about trade liberalization and the latter will distinguish supporters and opponents of trade liberalization among those who were coded as having an opinion in the selection model.

15

Selection Model

To account for the factors that influence the probability that a given respondent has an opinion about trade, I will draw on the literature about political participation and voter turnout. That political attitudes are directly related to political participation has been known for quite a while (Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Powel 1986). In a democratic country like the U.S., elections serve as the ultimate mechanism of government accountability by allowing citizens to reward politicians with their support for satisfactory performance and punish for disappointing results (Key 1996). What it means is that by casting their ballot, voters express their position relative to one or another issue. With respect to economic voting, Arceneaux (2003) demonstrates that unfavorable economic circumstances increase the turnout rate among those voters who are able to attribute responsibility for economic conditions, which supports the mobilization hypothesis suggesting that adverse circumstances stimulate voters for political participation (Rosenstone 1982). Elections for these voters serve as a mechanism to demonstrate their position regarding economic policies. Formation of the decision to vote is inherently linked to the process of emergence and consolidation of beliefs and opinions about political and economic issues since it is an intermediate step between causal factors and the turnout.

The most widely cited factor that affects political participation is the socio-economic status of voters (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Powel 1986). I anticipate that respondents with higher levels of socioeconomic status, approximated through the level of education and income, will have a high probability of expressing an opinion regarding free trade.

Furthermore, political participation and, consequently, the probability that a given individual has an opinion about one or the other issue is related to party identification (Powel 1986). The degree of one's polarization on the liberal-conservative scale may contribute to

16

having a clear opinion about the question of interest. It means that the stronger a respondent's party identification and ideological polarization, the higher the probability that she will have an opinion about trade liberalization.

Exposure to the news media is directly related to the degree of awareness of political and economic questions and may influence the probability that individuals have thought about the effect of trade liberalization (Mutz 1992; Goidel and Langley 1995). Likewise, an individual's knowledge about economic issues itself may affect his propensity to have an opinion about trade policies. Additionally, I will control for union membership, employment status and include a set of demographic control variables.

Main Model

Key explanatory concepts in the main model will be sophistication, nationalism\patriotism and the level of education (as a proxy for the level of factor endowment). Drawing on the literature of economic voting, I expect that interactions between sophistication and human capital, on the one hand, and sophistication and nationalism\patriotism, on the other, will change the significance level and magnitude of the effect of both human capital and nationalism\patriotism on individuals' preferences toward free trade.

To account for the potential effect of conservatism on individuals' worldviews determined by moral, cultural or religious values, I will construct a variable that represents the degree of moral traditionalism among respondents that should resemble the effect of Margalit's (2012) "cultural threat." While this approximation is debatable, the dataset that I will use does not contain any questions that would capture respondents' attitudes toward the influence of foreign cultures directly, which limits my ability to replicate the "cultural threat" concept with desired precision.

17

I will also control for union membership assuming that those with membership should demonstrate resentment to trade liberalization. The main model will also include a set of variables that represent different employment status and demographics.

Data and Measurement

To test my hypotheses, I use the ANES individual-level dataset (2012). This survey was conducted among US citizens over 18 years old in two waves before and after the U.S. presidential elections of 2012 with the same respondents. The time lapse between survey waves is about one month on average. The question about trade preferences was asked during the second wave so I will use data from the second wave whenever possible.

Respondents were questioned in face-to-face interviews and on the Internet, amounting to 5,916 units of observation in total. I will restrict my analysis to face-to-face interviews due to the discrepancy of the measurement of economic knowledge between face-to-face and online components of the survey. The Internet format of the survey gives respondents more time and freedom to find an answer to a given question. On average, respondents took more time to answer questions that measure their knowledge of the subject in the Internet survey compared to those who take part in face-to-face surveys, and they gave correct answers more frequently as well. One of the possible explanations for this difference is that Internet surveys measure the ability to search information rather than the level of knowledge itself (Prior and Lupia 2008). The difference in the average level of knowledge between Internet and face-to-face samples is about 12.5%. In this study, I am primarily interested in what respondents know about economics based on a relatively small set of specific economic questions that they answer rather than how easily they can find answer to these questions.

The post-election face-to-face survey contains 1,929 observations. The response rate for face-to-face interviews is 38%, while the sample clustering for face-to-face section is address-based, stratified and multi-staged. The face-two-face sample consists of a main national-representative subsample and two additional subsamples for racial minorities that require using weighted estimates in order to make inferences about population.

The main question of interest in ANES (2012) is formulated in the following way:

"Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought much about this?"

Respondents were offered four answer options, "Favor," "Oppose," "Haven't thought much about this," and "Don't know." The selection model utilizes a binary dependent variable, where "1" means that respondents have an opinion about trade so that that those who favor and oppose limits on foreign imports were merged in one category; and "0" represents those who "haven't thought about it" or those who answered "don't know".[6] The dummy variable for the main probit model codes those who disagree (meaning that they support trade liberalization) as a "1", while "0" represents respondents who are against free trade and support limits on foreign goods. Respondents that do not have an opinion about trade liberalization are coded as missing data in the main probit model.

The first independent variable reflects the level of human capital. In the literature on attitudes toward free trade, the most frequently used variable for the level of factor endowment is

---

[6] Wherever possible, I try to keep "don't know" observations merging them with similar categories. When this category does not seem to fit into ordered set of answer options, I code it as missing data.

educational attainment (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Beaulieu, Benarroch and Gaisford 2004; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Margalit 2012). The variable measuring education ranges from 1 to 16, where "1" denotes an education level that is less than 1st grade and "16" denotes a doctoral degree.

Following Mayda and Rodrik (2005), I construct a variable that reflects respondents' nationalism/patriotism level by running a principal-component analysis of four questions related to this concept (Table 1). This analysis demonstrates that answers to these questions are driven to a substantial degree by a single factor. The generated variable is transformed into a random normal variable $N(0,1)$, and I reverse its sign so that high values of this variable means that respondents exhibit a high level of nationalism/patriotism.

Smith and Jarkko (1998) suggest that scholars should distinguish patriotism as a form of national pride distinct from nationalism. The former is defined as a manifestation of love and devotion to one's own country whereas the latter is considered a feeling of supremacy and disdain to other countries. Unfortunately, ANES (2012) does not clearly differentiate either of these concepts. In this case, the present set of questions captures patriotic feelings in the form of national pride rather than pure nationalism. However, there is no reason to expect that these two concepts would affect individuals' preferences about trade in opposite directions since both patriotic individuals and nationalistic individuals desire what is best for their own country. Both groups would assess the effect of trade policies relying on their knowledge, so that strong comprehension of economics would preclude either of them from perceiving the effect of globalization negatively equally well.

The independent variable that represents the level of sophistication is based on a set of four questions that are related to different aspects of the economy. In particular, respondents

20

Table 1. Principal component Analysis of Items Dealing with Nationalism and Patriotism

Survey Questions	Factor Loading	Uniqueness
When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel [response options from "extremely good" to "not good at all"	0.80	0.35
How do you feel about this country? Do you [response options from "hate it" to "love it"]	-0.73	0.46
How important is being an American to you personally? [response options from "extremely important" to "not at all important"]	0.86	0.26
How important is being American to your identity? [response options from "extremely important" to "not at all important"][7]	0.81	0.34

were asked about (1) the change in the size of the federal deficit for the last 10 years; (2) the name of the Secretary of the Treasury; (3) the name of the least expensive government program; and (4) the level of unemployment. Each response was coded "1" if respondents answered correctly and "0" otherwise.[8] After that I summed all these items so that the final variable measures the level of sophistication on a 5-point scale ranging from "0" (all answers are incorrect) to "4" (all answers are correct).

Looking at the data, one can clearly see that respondents who emphasize traditional family values are also wary of newer lifestyles, are less tolerant to different moral standards, and are not ready to adjust their moral standards to changes in the world. A principal component analysis of four related questions (Table 2) shows that a single underlying factor determines the answers to these questions. This factor is moral traditionalism that should also make respondents

---

[7] This question was asked in a different part of survey than the previous three.

[8] In case of the level of unemployment, respondents could answer with a different level of precision. To keep the relative weight of each question about economic knowledge equal, I coded "1" responses that vary in a 2% range as correct and "0" otherwise.

Table 2. Principal Component Analysis of Items Dealing with Moral Traditionalism

Survey Questions	Factor Loading	Uniqueness
This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. [response options from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree"]	0.73	0.46
The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society [response options from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree"]	0.72	0.47
We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own [response options from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree"]	-0.68	0.53
The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.' Do you [response options from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree"]	-0.61	0.62

favor protectionism since trade liberalization is one of the manifestations of globalization that, in turn, is considered one of the primary causes of changing family values, the spread of new lifestyles, and divergent moral standards. The generated variable is also transformed into a random normal variable N(0,1).

The level of income is reflected in a 28-point scale where "1" represents respondents with annual incomes lower than $5000 and "28" reflects responses of individuals whose annual income is higher than $250,000. Traditionally, scholars use logged estimates of respondents' income to reduce the effect of outliers on the distribution since income distributions are typically skewed. However, my measure groups all outliers in one category mitigating their effect on the overall distribution. Further, the range of each category of is scaled to resemble a logarithmic operation such that the range of the first category is $5000 whereas the range of the 27th category is $75,000. Thus, the skewness of the distribution of income is -0.07, which means that it is relatively normally distributed.

The variable that accounts for exposure to the news media is constructed from a panel of questions about the frequency with which individuals use one or another media source to obtain news information. The typical question has the form, "During a typical week, how many days do you watch, read, or listen to news on [source of information], not including sports?" and respondents could answer from "0" to "7." This panel of questions includes sources of media information including the Internet, TV, printed newspapers, and radio. The variable of interest sums the answers to all these questions so that respondents who use news sources more frequently score higher than those who use less sources and less frequently.

To account for the possible effect of partisanship, I use a variable that represents the party identification of respondents. Initially, the measure was a 7-point scale ranging from "Strong Democrat" to "Strong Republican." This variable will be used only to predict the probability of having an opinion assuming that the stronger the partisanship, the higher the probability that a person has thought about trade policies from the position of his or her party. I construct this variable in such a way that "0" means that an individual does not identify with either the Democratic or the Republican Party, and the maximum value of "3" represents strong partisanship with either party.

Another possible factor which may predispose individuals to have an opinion about trade policies is polarization of their views along the liberal-conservative scale. Similar to party identification, I fold the 7-point scale variable so that it ranges from "0" (neither liberal nor conservative) to "3" (extremely liberal or conservative). A substantial fraction of about 20% of respondents answered that they "haven't thought much about it." Such an answer means that they do not identify their worldviews with either liberal or conservative positions. Therefore, to

avoid losing these observations, I coded it as "0" assuming that they do not associate themselves with either liberals or conservatives.

Employment status is represented as a set of dummy variables that reflect whether respondents are employed, temporarily laid off, unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, or work at home.[9] A dummy variable also captures union membership, coded "1" for those who hold a membership in a labor union and "0" otherwise. I also control for gender with a dummy variable where "1" is assigned for male respondents and "2" for female respondents. Respondents' age is grouped in 13 relatively equally spaced categories.

The pairwise correlation analysis shows that the highest covariation level of 0.59 is observed between the age variable and the dummy variable that shows whether respondents are retired or not. The second largest covariation value of 0.37 is observed between sophistication and level of education.

---

[9] I intentionally omit the group of students because of the dependency between these variable and all other variable that represent respondents' employment status

Hypothesis Tests and Results

The results of statistical tests are presented in Table 3 below. The overall Wald $\chi2$ is equal to 109.63; the probability of obtaining this $\chi2$ by chance is less than 0.01. It means that I can safely reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients of this model are equal to 0. Further, ρ-value is approximately -0.17 and the probability of obtaining this value by random chance when it is stabilized as an inverse hyperbolic tangent is 0.63. It means that the null hypothesis that there is no covariation between selection and main models cannot be rejected. It follows that the probability of having an opinion about trade preference may not influence the probability of supporting or opposing restrictions on foreign trade.

Selection Model

Of the two variables that represent socio-economic status, only education appears to be statistically significant with z-score equal to 2.11 and β-coefficient equal to 0.03. It means that higher levels of education are associated with a higher probability that a randomly chosen individual has an opinion about trade liberalization. Further, coefficients of exposure to the news media ($\beta = 0.03$; $z = 4.60$), ideological polarization ($\beta = 0.13$; $z = 3.49$), gender ($\beta = -0.19$; $z = -2.66$), and age ($\beta = 0.05$; $z = 3.84$) are also statistically significant and in the right direction. Therefore, male individuals of older age groups that read, listen to, or watch news more often and possess more polarized views in a liberal-conservative scale are more likely to have an opinion about trade policies. Union membership ($\beta = -0.20$; $z = -1.69$) and the dummy variable representing the temporary unemployed group of respondents ($\beta = -0.67$; $z = -2.02$) are also statistically significant, meaning that union members and temporarily laid off workers are less

Table 3. Estimates for probit model with sample selection of respondents' preferences toward trade liberalization[10]

	Selection Model DV: opinion about free trade		Main Model DV: support free trade	
	b	z	b	z
Education	0.03**	2.11	-0.06	-1.26
Nationalism	–	–	0.16	1.04
Sophistication	0.04	1.08	-0.58***	-2.82
Educ*Soph	–	–	0.08***	4.29
Nation*Soph	–	–	-0.13**	-2.27
Moral traditionalism	–	–	0.04	0.78
Income	0.01	1.24	0.00	0.43
Union Member	-0.20*	-1.69	0.19	1.18
Partisanship	-0.04	-1.10	–	–
Liberal-Conservative	0.13***	3.49	–	–
Media Exposure	0.03***	4.60	–	–
Employed (>20 hrs)	-0.21	-0.88	0.15	0.56
Temporarily Unemployed	-0.67**	-2.02	0.81	1.32
Gender	-0.19***	-2.66	-0.48***	-4.03
Age	0.05***	3.51	-0.03	-1.29
Cut points	-0.27	-0.81	-0.04	-0.05
N	1473			
Rho	-0.17			
Wald $\chi 2$	109.63			
Prob (X^2)	.0000			
*p < .10 **p < .05 ***p < .01				

---

[10] I include only two out of six categories of employed status since omitted categories are not statistically significant and of little interest to the research question

likely to have an opinion about trade. None of the remaining variables is statistically significant. Holding all other variables constant at their means, the effect of a one-unit increase in education rises the z-score of the cumulative standard normal distribution function of the probability that a randomly chosen individual will have an opinion about trade policies by approximately 0.01 ($z = 2.11$).

Given that the range of this independent variable is 15 points, the difference between individuals with less than a 1st grade level of education and those with a doctoral degree would be a 0.21 change in the variable's z-score. The effect of a one-unit change in the news media variable is 0.1 ($z = 4.60$) when all other variables are held constant at their means, but the overall impact of this variable is relatively larger (0.31) as this variable ranges along a 28-point scale. Education has the largest observed effect among independent variables, and moving from the lowest level to the highest level is equivalent to an 11% change in the probability of having an opinion around the mean of the probability distribution. The marginal effect of ideological polarization is 0.05 ($z = 3.49$) and the maximum effect of this variable would be 0.15. The difference between male and female respondents when all other variables are held constant at their means is 0.08 ($z = -2.66$). The marginal effect of age is 0.02 ($z = 3.84$).

To sum up, the selection model works according to initial predictions for the most part, and in accordance with the political participation literature. At the same time, the impact of all explanatory variables on the dependent variable is relatively weak with the highest possible result of 11%.

Main Model

It appears that the primary explanatory variables, i.e. the level of education ($\beta = -0.06$; $z = -1.26$) and nationalism/patriotism ($\beta = 0.15$; $z = 1.04$) are not statistically significant,

although in this case I am more interested in their marginal effects on the dependent variable along different values of sophistication. The variable measuring sophistication as well as both interaction terms are statistically significant. Thus, the former has β-coefficient equal to -0.60 and a z-score of -2.90, while the coefficient of interaction between education and sophistication is β = 0.08 and is significant on the level of $z = 4.29$. The interaction coefficient between nationalism/patriotism is also statistically significant with β = 0.12 and $z = 2.27$. Besides the main explanatory variables, only gender appears to be statistically significant (β = - 0.60; $z = - 2.90$) and it performs according to predictions established by the literature on individuals' attitudes toward trade liberalization (Scheve and Slaughter 1999; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Drope and Chowdhury 2014). Thus, female respondents are substantially more averse to trade liberalization on average. When all other variables held constant on their means, it appears that men support trade liberalization 6% more often than women do.

The marginal effects of the main explanatory variables can be observed in Table 4. With respect to a level of human capital approximated through educational attainment, one can see that education has no effect on individuals' preferences toward trade liberalization among respondents with low sophistication scores. However, asindividuals sophistication increases, the significance and the strength of the effect of education increases. The direction of the effect of human capital also matches initial expectations. For the most sophisticated individuals, a one point increase in education attainment raises the value of its z-score by more than 0.1 points, which means that the difference between the least educated and the most educated respondents is about 1.5 points in a cumulative standard normal probability distribution of individuals' preferences toward free trade. It is the equivalent of an increase in the probability that a randomly selected individual would support trade liberalization by more 54% measured around

Table 4. The marginal effect of education and nationalism/patriotism on different levels of sophistication

	Sophistication				
	0	1	2	3	4
Education (dy/dx)	-0.01 (-1.21)	0.01 (0.65)	0.03*** (3.91)	0.06*** (6.43)	0.10*** (6.41)
Nationalism (dy/dx)	0.03 (1.05)	0.01 (0.25)	-0.03 (-1.58)	-0.08*** (-3.27)	-0.13*** (-3.27)

*p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01

the mean of the distribution. Consequently, H1 is supported by these results.

At the same time, the strength and magnitude of nationalism/patriotism increase as sophistication increases, contrary to expectations. That is, for respondents with low sophistication scores the coefficient of nationalism/patriotism is not statistically significant. However, with an increase in the level of respondents' knowledge about economics, the β-coefficient becomes negative and statistically significant, meaning that, among highly sophisticated individuals, the more nationalistic/patriotic this individual is the less likely he or she would favor trade liberalization. The difference between the top and bottom1% with respect to nationalism/patriotism is about 0.54, which is equivalent to a 21% change in the probability of supporting trade liberalization when measured around the mean of the probability distribution. Therefore, H2 is not supported by these results, although it should be noted that the nationalism/patriotism variable performs in accordance with the existing literature (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Mayda, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2007; Mansfield and Mutz 2009).

Table 5 contains predicted probabilities of supporting trade liberalization generated for the highest and lowest values of education and sophistication holding all other independent

Table 5. Predicted values for different values of the level of education and nationalism/patriotism for highly and poorly sophisticated individuals

		Sophistication						
		Low				High		
		Education					Education	
		High	Low				High	Low
Nationalism	High	0.09	0.31		Nationalism	High	0.80	0.00
	Low	0.04	0.19			Low	0.97	0.03

variables at their mean values. Since nationalism/patriotism is a continuous variable, I used 5% and 95% cutoff points of the distribution of its values. The table of predicted probabilities clearly demonstrates that for individuals with high sophistication scores, the effect of education predominates. Thus, the difference between the most and the least educated individuals among individuals with strong nationalistic/patriotic views is about 80%. For respondents that do not share nationalistic/patriotic values this gap is even larger with 94%. At the same time, the role of nationalism/patriotism remains relatively weak for highly sophisticated individuals. That is, highly educated respondents are 17% less likely to support trade liberalization if they were also highly nationalistic/patriotic compared to respondents who did not share these values. This difference is even smaller for poorly educated respondents with just 3% change.

The effect of both of these variables among respondents with a low level of sophistication appears to be controversial. Thus, an increase in the level of education shows a decline of the probability of support for free trade while an increase in the level of nationalism/patriotism makes individuals more pro-trade. However, as was shown earlier, the coefficients of both of

these explanatory variables for low levels of sophistication are not statistically significant, so the observed values could be generated by random chance.

Conclusion

One of the most unquestionable and widely studied postulates in political science is that what people think about economics has a substantial impact on politics. Public stances regarding one or another political, social, or economic problem, especially in democratic countries, restricts available options for policymakers and occasionally predetermines their decisions. Although the intensity of debates about the impact of trade liberalization on our lives fluctuates over time, in advamce of a new trade deal it may even overshadow such unquestionable "leaders" of public attention as inflation, unemployment, and government debt. Despite the fact that some noticeable progress has been achieved in determining the factors that influence individuals' preferences toward trade liberalization, political scientists and economists continue to argue about the principles and mechanisms that form people's perception of free trade.

A variety of theories have been proposed in an attempt to explain this phenomenon. All of them can be roughly classified into two categories, namely, theories that explain individuals' attitudes about trade liberalization employing economic and non-economic variables. For the most part, these theories rest on the assumption that the population is homogenous with respect to their knowledge about economics.

In this paper, I relaxed this assumption suggesting that individuals may differ substantially in their degree of economic sophistication and that this variation may play a crucial role in determining what people think about free trade and factors they take into account when they assess a potential impact of trade liberalization on their well-being. Specifically, I argued that more sophisticated individuals use their knowledge of economics to estimate the impact of trade regulations so that their preferences toward trade liberalization should be determined for the most part by economic factors complying with the framework of existing trade theories.

Individuals with a low level of sophistication, on the other hand, compensate for their lack of economic knowledge by drawing on other aspects of their worldview when they face a question about free trade.

Statistical analysis demonstrates that indeed the strength and magnitude of the effect of human capital increases with an increase of the level of sophistication, which supports the first hypothesis. However, so does the strength and significance of nationalism/patriotism, which contradicts the second hypothesis. One of the possible explanations of this observation is related to the validity of the measurement of this concept that is far from perfection. This variable is based on four questions that capture patriotic feelings rather than nationalism. All these questions touch a very narrow aspect of this concept, namely, individuals' perception of their own country. In order to explore this phenomenon in depth, additional tests are needed on the dataset that contains a more versatile set of questions about nationalism and patriotism.

References

Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1989. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. SAGE.

Arceneaux, Kevin. 2003. "The Conditional Impact of Blame Attribution on the Relationship between Economic Adversity and Turnout." *Political Research Quarterly* 56(1): 67–75.

Baker, Peter. 2015. "Obama Scolds Democrats on Trade Pact Stance." *The New York Times*. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/business/nike-to-create-jobs-if-trans-pacific-partnership-is-approved.html (May 30, 2015).

Beaulieu, Eugene, Michael Benarroch, and James Gaisford. 2004. "Intra-Industry Trade Liberalization, Wage Inequality and Trade Policy Preferences."

Conover, Pamela Johnston, Stanley Feldman, and Kathleen Knight. 1986. "Judging Inflation and Unemployment: The Origins of Retrospective Evaluations." *The Journal of Politics* 48(3): 565–88.

Converse, Philip E. 2006. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (1964)." *Critical Review* 18(1-3): 1–74.

DeBonis, Mike, and Steven Mufson. 2015. "Senate Democrats Vote to Block Obama on Trade." *The Washington Post*. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-threaten-to-stall-trade-legislation-in-the-senate/2015/05/12/08f71d66-f8c0-11e4-9ef4-1bb7ce3b3fb7_story.html?hpid=z1 (June 1, 2015).

Drope, Jeffrey, and Abdur Chowdhury. 2014. *Economic (In)Security and Gender Differences in Trade Policy Attitudes*. William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan. William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series. https://ideas.repec.org/p/wdi/papers/2014-1067.html (August 12, 2015).

Duch, Raymond M., Harvey D. Palmer, and Christopher J. Anderson. 2000. "Heterogeneity in Perceptions of National Economic Conditions." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(4): 635–52.

Egan, Patrick J. 2015. "What Do Americans Think about Free Trade? Not Much." *The Washington Post*. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/11/what-do-americans-think-about-free-trade-not-much/ (May 30, 2015).

Gibson, Rachel K. et al. 2012. "International Social Survey Programme: National Identity II - ISSP 2003." http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.11449 (August 13, 2015).

Goidel, Robert K., and Ronald E. Langley. 1995. "Media Coverage of the Economy and Aggregate Economic Evaluations: Uncovering Evidence of Indirect Media Effects." *Political Research Quarterly* 48(2): 313–28.

Gomez, Brad T., and J. Matthew Wilson. 2001. "Political Sophistication and Economic Voting in the American Electorate: A Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 899–914.

———. 2003. "Causal Attribution and Economic Voting in American Congressional Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 56(3): 271–82.

———. 2006. "Cognitive Heterogeneity and Economic Voting: A Comparative Analysis of Four Democratic Electorates." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1): 127–45.

Green, Donald, and Ian Shapiro. 1996. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade." *International Organization* 60(2): 469–98.

Hansford, Thomas G., and Brad T. Gomez. 2015. "Reevaluating the Sociotropic Economic Voting Hypothesis." *Electoral Studies* 39: 15–25.

Heckman, James J. 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error." *Econometrica* 47(1): 153–61.

Helpman, Elhanan, Marc J. Melitz, and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2004. "Export versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms." *The American Economic Review* 94(1): 300–316.

Holbrook, Thomas, and James C. Garand. 1996. "Homo Economus? Economic Information and Economic Voting." *Political Research Quarterly* 49(2): 351–75.

Inoguchi, Takashi. 2001. *Asia Europe Survey (ASES): A Multinational Comparative Study in 18 Countries, 2001*. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. 22324. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR22324.v1.

"Intra-Industry Trade Liberalization, Wage Inequality and Trade Policy Preferences."

Irwin, Douglas A. 1995. *Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy? Evidence from the BritishGeneral Election of 1923*. National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper.

Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. 2015. "Globalization's Concentrated Costs (and Benefits): Import Competition, Globally Engaged Firms, and U.S. Presidential Voting." In Georgetown University. http://www.cis.ethz.ch/news-and-events/CISEvents/CISEvents/event-detail.html (August 13, 2015).

Key, Valdimer Orlando Jr. 1966. *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960*. First Edition edition. Belknap Press.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1983. "The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting." *The American Political Science Review* 77(1): 92–111.

Krause, George A. 1997. "Voters, Information Heterogeneity, and the Dynamics of Aggregate Economic Expectations." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(4): 1170–1200.

Krugman, Paul. "Suspicious Nonsense on Trade Agreements." *Paul Krugman Blog*. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/suspicious-nonsense-on-trade-agreements/ (June 1, 2015).

Luskin, Robert C. 1987. "Measuring Political Sophistication." *American Journal of Political Science* 31(4): 856–99.

Mansfield, Edward, and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63(3): 425–57.

Mayda, Anna Maria, Kevin H. O'Rourke, and Richard Sinnott. 2007. *Risk, Government and Globalization: International Survey Evidence*. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper. http://www.nber.org/papers/w13037 (August 13, 2015).

Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?" *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393–1430.

McGuire, William J. 1960. "A Syllogistic Analysis of Cognitive Relationships." In *Attitude Organization and Change*, New Haven: Greenwood Press Reprint, 65–111.

Melitz, Marc J. 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity." *Econometrica* 71(6): 1695–1725.

Mutz, Diana C. 1992. "Mass Media and the Depoliticization of Personal Experience." *American Journal of Political Science* 36(2): 483–508.

O'Rourke, Kevin H., and Richard Sinnott. 2001. *The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence*. Brookings Trade Policy Forum. http://www.tcd.ie/Economics/TEP/2001_papers/TEPNo10KO21.pdf.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective." *The American Political Science Review* 80(1): 17–43.

Powers, Ryan, and Jon Pevehouse. 2015. "Do Americans Think Strategically When They Think about Trade?" *The Washington Post*. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/15/do-americans-think-strategically-when-they-think-about-trade/ (August 13, 2015).

Prior, Markus, and Arthur Lupia. 2008. "Money, Time, and Political Knowledge: Distinguishing Quick Recall and Political Learning Skills." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(1): 169–83.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1990. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. 1. Princeton paperback print. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.

Rosenstone, Steven J. 1982. "Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout." *American Journal of Political Science* 26(1): 25–46.

Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36(2): 379–415.

Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54(2): 267–92.

Smith, Tom W., and Lars Jarkko. 1998. *National Pride: A Cross-National Analysis*. National Opinion Research Center/ University of Chicago.

Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, Philip E. Tetlock, and Henry E. Brady. 1999. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. Reprint. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Stanford University and the University of Michigan. 2012. "The American National Election Studies: The Time Series Study." www.electionstudies.org.

Stolper, Wolfgang F., and Paul A. Samuelson. 1941. "Protection and Real Wages." *The Review of Economic Studies* 9(1): 58–73.

Tetlock, Philip E. 1986. "A Value Pluralism Model of Ideological Reasoning." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50(4): 819–27.

Van de Ven, Wynand P. M. M., and Bernard M. S. Van Praag. 1981. "The Demand for Deductibles in Private Health Insurance: A Probit Model with Sample Selection." *Journal of Econometrics* 17(2): 229–52.

Verba, Sidney, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim. 1987. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Vita

Igor Kuznetsov, a native of Russia, received his bachelor's and master's degrees in law at the Institute of Management, Business and Law in 2009. After graduation, he worked as an assistant prosecutor in different transportation prosecutors' offices in Russia. After three years of practicing law, he decided to change his career to the academic path and opted for a graduate degree in political science at Louisiana State University. He will receive his master's degree in December 2015 and will continue his studies by pursuing a master's degree in economics at the University of British Columbia, Canada.