The United States Army in the South, 1789-1835. (Volumes I and II).

Tommy Richard Young II
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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THE UNITED STATES ARMY
IN THE SOUTH, 1789-1835
VOLUME I

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
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in
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by
Tommy Richard Young II
B.A., DePauw University, 1964
M.A., University of Arkansas, 1966
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION ..................................... 1

Chapter

I. THE ARMY MOVES SOUTH ......................... 3
II. THE OCCUPATION OF LOUISIANA ............... 67
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE SPANISH AND AARON BURR . 122
IV. FORTIFYING, GUARDING AND EXTENDING THE NATION’S FRONTIERS .......... 194
V. THE ARMY ATTEMPTS TO BRING PEACE TO THE FRONTIER ........... 244
VI. INDIANS, INTRUDERS AND NULLIFIERS ........ 294

VOLUME II

VII. FEEBLE EFFORTS TO REFORM THE ARMY ........ 344
VIII. A CLIMATE REQUIRING ALL THE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE THE LAW ALLOWS .... 391
IX. THE ARMY AND THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY, 1789–1815 .............. 444
X. THE ARMY AND THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY, 1816–1835 ............... 487
EPILOGUE: THE PASSING OF THE ARMY .......................... 523
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................ 530
APPENDIX I: SOUTHERN MILITARY POSTS .................. 552
APPENDIX II: POST STATISTICS ................................. 567
LIST OF MAPS

ALABAMA .............................................. 580
FLORIDA .............................................. 581
GEORGIA .............................................. 582
LOUISIANA ........................................... 583
MISSISSIPPI ........................................ 584
NORTH CAROLINA ................................... 585
SOUTH CAROLINA ................................... 586
LOUISIANA - TEXAS FRONTIER ....................... 587
This study examines the activities of the Army in the South from 1789 to 1835. The United States Army began to move into the South in the mid-1790's to occupy the posts being abandoned by the Spanish according to the provisions of Pinckney's Treaty. From that time until the outbreak of the Second Seminole War in December of 1835, the members of the Army helped to settle the southern frontier. The term "South" as it is used in this study refers to the area contained in the present-day states of North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Within these seven states the Army performed similar functions and encountered the same problems.

The officers and men of the Army performed numerous important duties as well as countless trivial tasks. Their principal duties were to protect America's borders and settlers from attacks by foreign invaders and hostile Indians. When not actively engaged in these operations, the soldiers performed numerous jobs that contributed to the settlement of the frontier. The soldiers built roads,
mapped the country, enforced laws and attempted to bring a semblance of order and authority to the frontier.

Special consideration is given to two factors that complicated the duties of the Army in the South, the climate and the existence of the institution of slavery. The soldiers were plagued by health problems that were directly attributable to the South's weather. Virtually every facet of the men's existence was influenced by the climate. In addition, southern whites assumed that the troops were available to maintain order among their slaves if the occasion arose. This assumption influenced the disposition and duties assigned to the soldiers stationed in the South and required their presence long after the frontier had passed to the Trans-Mississippi West.

Much of the research material used in this study came from War Department records deposited in the National Archives. In addition, numerous printed government documents and personal papers, dealing with military and diplomatic events, were utilized. Also of value were the printed volumes collected by the Secretary of War prior to 1850, which are housed in the Rare Bookroom of the U. S. Military History Research Collection at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
INTRODUCTION

Frederick Jackson Turner's seminal paper, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History", presented in 1893, described the westward movement of the frontier: "Stand at Cumberland Gap and watch the procession of civilization, marching single file - the buffalo following the trail to the salt springs, the Indian, the fur trader and hunter, the cattle-raiser, the pioneer farmer - and the frontier has passed by."¹ According to Turner, this process was repeated again and again as the frontier line moved across the continent. He gave some credit to the Army for its contributions to the westward movement in his study, but the absence of the soldier from his procession was a striking omission.²

Since Turner's address, historians have studied the history of the nation's frontier relentlessly. The


²Ibid., 16-17. William H. Goetzmann, Army Exploration in the American West, 1803-1863 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). Goetzmann argues that the members of the United States Army's Topographical Engineer should be included in Turner's procession.
activities of the numerous groups that helped to tame the wilderness have been minutely examined and recorded. The part played by the Army has not been neglected by historians, except for its activities on the southern frontier. The most logical explanation for this neglect is that the planter class and the institution of slavery have so fascinated historians that they have slighted other topics in the South's history.

The purpose of this study is to examine the activities of the Army in the southern section of the nation from 1789 to 1835. There is a definite lack of information concerning the role of the Army in the South during much of this period. The major episodes involving the Army in the South - the War of 1812, the Indian wars, Jackson's Indian Campaigns, and the Indian removals - have been amply recorded, but other events in the history of the Army in this area have been virtually neglected.

The term "South" as it is used in this study refers to the geographic area encompassed by the present states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. An examination of the duties assigned to the officers and men of the United States Army stationed in this area reveals that they performed similar functions and encountered the same basic problems.
These seven states presented certain common characteristics that influenced the duties assigned to the Army. First, each had an exposed coastline with rivers which allowed easy access to the interior. Second, all seven possessed a large area of unsettled lands with a distinguishable frontier line. Third, a potentially hostile Indian population lived within the states or on their borders. Fourth, the number of slaves living in the states were large enough to worry the whites. Finally, the region's peculiar climate presented the soldiers with a serious health problem.

The exposed coastline with its commercially important harbors and large navigable rivers leading into the interior of the nation prompted first the states and then the Federal government to provide a system of defense. The War Department decided that a system of permanent fortifications, garrisoned by regular troops, was the best method of protecting the coast. The soldiers were assigned not only the task of guarding the maritime frontier, but also of enforcing the Federal revenue laws, and aiding state and local officials in the enforcement of laws when called upon to do so. Thus, the soldiers represented not only Federal power and authority but they also bolster the state and local authorities when the need arose.
In the southern region the primary duty of the Army, as in the rest of the nation, was to guard the frontier. This task was complicated by the fact that the southern frontier often coincided with an ill-defined and disputed international boundary. Until the United States gained control of the provinces of East and West Florida and the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase was definitely fixed, the officers and men of the Army were plagued with diplomatic as well as military problems. The most obvious indication of the importance of its role is that the Federal government deemed it appropriate to station approximately one-half of the nation's military force in the South.

The southern Indians represented the most persistent problem faced by the Army. The Indian tribes were considered to be foreign nations by the United States government, but the Secretary of War was responsible for Indian affairs. Thus the Army bore much of the responsibility for maintaining friendly relations with the tribes. Army officers worked with Indian agents to negotiate a number of treaties with the various tribes. After the treaties were negotiated and ratified, the Army was responsible for seeing that they were observed by both sides. In many instances, the enforcement of the treaties placed the Army in the delicate position of
opposing the wishes of the white population and supporting the rights of the Indians. The Indian problem in the southern states would eventually end when the Indians were removed during the 1830's.

The presence of a large slave population brought persistent requests from southerners for the maintenance of permanent garrisons throughout the South. Their pleas were usually made privately and in carefully guarded terms. Southerners feared slave insurrections, but they did not want the existence of those fears widely known. The War Department issued standing orders to commanders in the southern states to render aid to the local officials, in the event of an insurrection, if it was requested.

Finally, the Army faced a number of serious health problems which were unlike those faced in other sections of the nation. The South's climate directly influenced the duties of the soldiers and in many instances took their lives. The annual sickly season in the South spared no class of individuals, but the members of the Army appear to have been one of the groups most seriously effected. Throughout the period under study, various plans were suggested and tried in an effort to reduce the number of sick at the military posts in the South.

Many of the functions performed by the Army in
the South were similar to those rendered by soldiers in other sections of the nation. The most significant differences were caused by the South's "peculiar institution" and its "peculiar climate." Despite the fact that the routine duties of the Army in the South were similar to those performed in other areas does not preclude their being studied. As on other frontiers, the presence of the Army was extremely important in the development of the South. 3

The officers and men of the Army, during quiet periods, performed valuable functions such as mapping the new territories, building roads, erecting forts, and enforcing treaty obligations with foreign nations and Indian tribes. In addition they executed numerous trivial tasks as a matter of routine. When viewed singly, the countless jobs performed by the soldiers do not appear to have any particular significance. But when taken collectively, the varied services performed by the Army were a significant contribution to the settlement of the southern frontier.

3 The list of works dealing with the activities of the Army on the frontier is almost inexhaustible. Unfortunately the vast majority of these studies deal solely with the Indian campaigns and neglect the other services performed by the Army. Two exceptions to this general rule are by Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1969) and Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987).
as they were on other frontiers.

The Army, with its centralized organization and the authority of the Federal government behind its actions, was able to perform functions beyond the means of the individual settler and his neighbors. In many instances, the Army was the only symbol of the Federal government, or the authority of any kind, on the frontier. The Army's presence and its contributions are important to the settlement of the South and it deserves more than merely passing interest from frontier and military historians.
CHAPTER I

THE ARMY MOVES SOUTH

The history of a nation's army normally recounts the events of the battles and campaigns, with some consideration given to its organization and administration, in which the force was involved. These studies are valuable in determining why certain battles or specific wars are won or lost, but they reveal little about the activities of a particular force when it is not actively engaged in fighting a war. In the period from 1789 to 1835, the soldiers of the Regular Army of the United States participated in ninety-one battles and actions. Seventy-two of these actions occurred during the War of 1812, the remaining nineteen battles and skirmishes took place during the forty-one years when the nation was not formally at war.¹ Although some of the engagements lasted for several days or a few weeks, there were long periods when the soldiers had sufficient time to engage in

activities, other than fighting, that were directly related to the welfare of the nation.

To avoid any appearance of idleness on the part of the troops, the federal government assigned an infinite number of duties to the officers and men of the Regular Army. The primary emphasis was placed upon the task most commonly performed by a standing army, protecting the nation against armed aggression. In order to accomplish this goal, the Army was responsible for three major areas: guarding the nation against foreign invasion; protecting the frontier settlements from attacks by hostile Indians; and quelling domestic insurrections.

A number of secondary tasks were added to these primary duties and became a part of the normal peacetime routine. The soldiers engaged in activities such as: building roads, bridges, and military posts; enforcing the nation's revenue laws; upholding treaty obligations; conducting surveys of the national boundaries; participating in scientific expeditions; enforcing state and local laws; and cultivating crops in order to provide food for the garrison. Since these duties were not confined to a specific section, a soldier transferred from one post to another probably did not notice much change in his daily life.

In the South from 1789 to 1835 the Army usually performed its duties efficiently. The activities were
many and varied, often providing services that could not have been performed by any other group, but normally they received little public notice. Generally the only time public attention focused on the activities of the Army in the southern states was when Indian troubles flared-up or when officers committed acts of questionable legality.

Much of the history of the Army in the South has been obscured by the emphasis placed upon a few prominent officers. The person who attracted the most attention in the period before the War of 1812 was General James Wilkinson. During and after the war, the nation watched the activities of General Andrew Jackson until he resigned from the Army in 1821. From that time until the outbreak of the Second Seminole War in 1835, the regulars were involved in only two activities that prompted much comment, Indian removal and the nullification crisis.

General James Wilkinson's career is an inextricable part of the history of the Army in the South. His reputation was clouded by a number of questions that remain unanswered to this day. From the Conway Cabal during the American Revolution to the Burr Conspiracy, Wilkinson was involved in one controversy after another. His name was associated with conspiracies, intrigues and treason. His actions were reviewed by military courts of inquiry, congressional investigating committees and civil courts. In spite of all of the charges and countercharges, the General
always maintained his position and occasionally managed to improve his situation.

General Wilkinson resigned his position as Clothier General of the Continental Army in 1781, and turned his attention to a variety of commercial ventures. In 1783 he moved his family to Kentucky and quickly established himself as one of the most influential men in the rapidly growing territory. During this period Wilkinson became involved in a series of negotiations with the Spanish officials at New Orleans. Wilkinson initiated the correspondence in 1786 in an effort to obtain permission to use the port of New Orleans as an outlet for the products of the Mississippi Valley.  

Through a series of letters and a personal visit to New Orleans in 1787 he received the privilege of selling his goods at the Spanish port. In exchange for this privilege, he not only declared his allegiance to the Spanish Crown on August 22, but stated that he would work to detach the disaffected western territories from the United States and ally them with Spain.  

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Wilkinson was not the only American suspected of planning to separate the western regions, specifically Kentucky and Tennessee, from the United States. At different times a number of prominent frontiersmen were either actually engaged or were accused of involvement by their political opponents in separatist activities. Before 1800 the names of such men as William Blount, John Sevier, Judge Harry Innes and Aaron Burr were mentioned as participants in different conspiracies. The fact that some of the leading citizens were negotiating with Spanish officials seems to have been well-known among the people of the western territories. Although the men dealing with Spain were charged with treason by their political opponents, their intrigues apparently did not affect their later careers. Whether Wilkinson intended to actively work for


Wilkinson's friend and lawyer, Harry Innes, was made a Federal Judge; his friend John Brown was elected to the United States Senate; his business partner Peyton Short accepted a federal appointment as did his friends Judge Muter, Samuel McDowell and James Brown. Thomas R. Hay and M. R. Werner, The Admirable Trumpeter: A Biography of General James Wilkinson (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1941), 107-108. William Blount was expelled from the United States Senate, but was elected speaker of that body while impeachment proceedings were being carried forward in the U. S. Senate. William H. Masterson, William Blount (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954), 339. Aaron

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the separation of Kentucky is impossible to determine. It is probable that he viewed his agreement only as a means of gaining concessions from the Spanish that would advance his own commercial interests.\(^5\)

For the next four years Wilkinson tried to make his various business ventures pay dividends. Despite hard work, constant maneuvering, and foreign arrangements, he found himself falling further and further into debt. By 1791 Wilkinson was probably thinking of returning to military life, because in that year he took part in two punitive expeditions against the Indians north of the Ohio River.

The Indian tribes living in the Old Northwest presented the new Federal government with one of its most pressing problems. The attention of the Army was focused

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Burr was elected to the office of Vice President after it was rumored that he was involved with Blount. For an interesting discussion of early Kentucky politics see Patricia Watlington, *The Partisan Spirit: Kentucky Politics, 1779-1792* (New York: Athenium, 1972).

\(^5\) Hay and Werner in *Admirable Trumpeter* assessed Wilkinson's activities with Spain in the following way. "In his desire for personal gain Wilkinson had started the Spanish Conspiracy in American History. In fact, he was the Spanish conspiracy; while he was active the conspiracy was very much to the fore, and when he was biding his time or engaged elsewhere the conspiracy languished. At intervals in the years that followed, the Spanish conspiracy had greater or less vitality and importance as Wilkinson's personal necessities were greater or less. The ambitions and desires of his competitors and opponents were also a factor in keeping the "conspiracy alive." 88.
on this area after peace was obtained with the Indians of
the Southwest by a treaty signed August 7, 1790. In an
effort to subdue the Indians north of the Ohio, a force
under the command of General Josiah Harmar marched against
the Indians in October of 1790. Harmar was defeated by
the Indians and withdrew from the Indian country to await
new orders.

Following Harmar's defeat, two small expeditions
consisting of volunteers from Kentucky crossed the Ohio
in an effort to check the Indian outrages. In mid-May
of 1791 a force commanded by Brigadier General Charles
Scott, with James Wilkinson as second in command, crossed
the Ohio River in search of the hostile Indians. The
Kentuckians destroyed crops and villages and returned
home with a few captives at the end of June. The second
Kentucky expedition, commanded by Wilkinson, marched against
the Indians on August 1, 1791, and remained in the field
for twenty days. The expedition burned a village and some
crops and captured some Indians, without producing a full-
scale battle. Harmar's expedition was a total failure.

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6 James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S.
Army, 1783-1812 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

7 The details of Harmar's expedition are in Jacobs,
U. S. Army, 40-65. The two minor expeditions are recounted
in James Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, Major-General
James Wilkinson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938),
whereas the two smaller expeditions were considered completely successful.

On October 22, 1791, President Washington appointed Wilkinson to fill a vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army. The appointment was readily accepted by Wilkinson, who probably saw it as an opportunity to save his failing business career. He wrote to a friend that he accepted the position because of his great need for "Bread and Fame."  

In an effort to explain the appointment of a man with Wilkinson's reputation for participating in questionable ventures, Washington told Alexander Hamilton that the action was one of expediency. The President believed that if Wilkinson held a responsible position it would "feed his ambition, soothe his vanity and by arresting discontent produce a good effect."  

Wilkinson was suspicious of the motives behind the appointment and felt that it might be an attempt to end his correspondence with the Spanish at New Orleans. It is inconceivable that Washington did not know that Wilkinson had been treating with the Spanish as it was

8 Wilkinson to Peyton Short, Dec. 28, 1791 (not sent), Innes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, XXIII.

9 Quoted in Hay and Werner, Admirable Trumpeter, 109.

common knowledge in Kentucky. The President probably saw the appointment as an opportunity to turn the dealings to the advantage of the United States rather than a way to terminate the connection. Certainly the thought of a discontented officer in the Army was a brighter prospect than a discontented James Wilkinson operating on his own without the control of any higher authority.\textsuperscript{11}

Wilkinson accepted the commission on November 5, 1791, and promptly took the oath of allegiance required of all officers:

\begin{quote}
I do solemnly swear to bear true allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully, against all their enemies or opposers whosoever, and to observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States of America, and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the articles of war.\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

Thus James Wilkinson, possibly a subject and definitely a pensioner of Spain, returned to the Army after an absence of ten years.

\textsuperscript{11} The same fear prevailed in 1802 when Wilkinson attempted to obtain the position of Surveyor-General. He requested the support of the Secretary of War, who wrote on the letter "Such a situation would enable him to associate with Spanish agents without suspicion." Wilkinson to Dearborn, May 30, 1802, quoted in Jacobs, \textit{Tarnished Warrior}, 199.

Fortunately for the new Lieutenant Colonel's career, his appointment came late enough that he was not associated with the disaster that befell the second expedition the Federal government dispatched to quiet the Indians in the Old Northwest. In October, 1791, General Arthur St. Clair marched against the Indians with a large force composed of regulars and militia. The force was soundly defeated the next month and the survivors were driven back into Kentucky.\textsuperscript{13} The two major military operations undertaken by the Federal government had suffered humiliating defeats and the two small expeditions composed of Kentucky volunteers had been successful. All four of the expeditions had served Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkinson well.

On January 1, 1792, General Harmar resigned his commission, even though a military court of inquiry had cleared him of any misconduct in the direction of his expedition.\textsuperscript{14} On March 5, 1792, James Wilkinson was appointed to fill the vacancy created by Harmar's resignation and General St. Clair resigned his commission as a result of his defeat by the Indians.\textsuperscript{15} Thus in the span of two days Wilkinson advanced from Lieutenant Colonel to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Jacobs, U. S. Army, 85-123.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Heitman, I, 501.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Heitman, I, 1037, 917; Hay and Werner, Admirable Trumpeter, 113.
\end{itemize}
the position of acting commanding general of the United States Army.

When Congress was informed of St. Clair's defeat, it took steps to provide a larger military force to adequately protect the frontier. The existing regiment of artillery and the two infantry regiments were to be brought up to their authorized strengths. In addition, three new infantry regiments were to be recruited for three years service, to be discharged at an earlier date if peace was concluded with the Indians. Also four troops of light dragoons were to be recruited and if the situation required they might serve dismounted.16

To command the enlarged Army, President Washington reviewed the qualifications of all of the Revolutionary War ranking officers who were still alive. He drew up a roster of officers with his comments on each man's abilities and shortcomings.17

16Callan, The Military Laws of the United States, 92-93.

17The list included the names of Major General Benjamin Lincoln, Major General Frederick Baron De Steuben, Major General William Moultrie, Brigadier (but by Brevet Major) General Lachlan McIntosh, Major General (by Brevet Anthony Wayne, Major General (by Brevet) George Weedon, Major General (by Brevet) Edward Hand, Major General (by Brevet) Charles Scott, Major General (by Brevet) Jedediah Huntington, Brigadier General James Wilkinson, Brigadier General Mordecai Gist, Brigadier General James Irvine, Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, Brigadier General Otho Williams, Brigadier General Rufus Putnam, Brigadier General Charles Pinckney. Washington added that "The above and foregoing closes the list of All the General officers who as has been observed from age - want of health - disinclination,
On March 9 he submitted the list to his cabinet for their consideration. Included were the names of an impressive array of officers, but most of them were either too old, did not desire the appointment, or were too inexperienced for such an important command. The President probably preferred Light Horse Harry Lee for the command, but his name did not appear on the list. The selection of Lee was ruled out for two reasons: (1) he had not held a high rank during the Revolution; and (2) he was from Virginia, which already had its share of high-ranking Federal office holders. The one officer who seemed to meet most of the requirements was Anthony Wayne.

President Washington's opinion of Wayne was not altogether flattering:

... more active and enterprising than Judicious and cautious. No economist it is feared: - open to flattery - vain - easily imposed upon the liable to be drawn into scrapes. Too indulgent (the effect perhaps of some of the causes just mentioned) of his officers and men. - whether sober - or little addicted to the bottle, I know not.

or peculiar circumstances, can be brought into view; from whom to chuse [sic] an officer to command the troops of the U. S." Comments on Officers to succeed A. St. Clair, submitted to Cabinet March 9, 1792, in Worthington C. Ford (ed.), The Writings of George Washington (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1891), XII, 507-14.


The President's comments on the interim commander of the western army, James Wilkinson, were similar, "... as he was but a short time in service, little can be said of his duties as an officer. - He is lively, sensible, pompus and ambitious, but whether sober or not is unknown to me."\textsuperscript{20}

The President could not afford to make a bad appointment. The two costly defeats in the Northwest had been a severe blow to the prestige of the new government and it was essential that it not suffer another. Wayne had his shortcomings, but they could be overcome: the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Treasury could control any reckless spending; and any movement without adequate preparations could be stopped until proper precautions had been taken. Despite his faults, Wayne had one invaluable asset which none of the other officers possessed. He had "a dominating desire to meet and annihilate the enemy."\textsuperscript{21}

Wayne received the appointment on March 5, 1792. He remained in Philadelphia for several months arranging for supplies, enlisting men, and gathering information on the Northwest. The General was not as impetuous as President Washington had feared, and it was only after months of rigorous training that he moved with his force against the Indians.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., 511.
\textsuperscript{21}Jacobs, U. S. Army, 127.
The expanded army was called the Legion and when General "Mad" Anthony Wayne brought it west to fight, it was a different type of force than those that had previously advanced against the Indians. It was not the poorly disciplined collection of regulars and volunteers that Generals Harmar and St. Clair had led against the Indians. The volunteers were still present, but the men of the Legion formed a solid core of well-trained soldiers.

While Wayne gathered supplies at Philadelphia and forged an army from the motley band of recruits at Legionville, Wilkinson remained in command of the regular forces on the frontier. As he waited for the new commander to arrive, Wilkinson supervised the daily routine of the Army and kept a watchful eye on the Indians. His actions attracted the attention of President Washington who requested Secretary of War Henry Knox to convey his approval to the General. Washington wrote: "General Wilkinson has displayed great zeal and ability for the public weal since he came into the service. His conduct carries strong marks of attention, activity, and spirit, and I wish him to know the favorable light in which it is viewed."²²

While managing the routine business of the Army, Wilkinson found ample time to exercise his talents for intrigue. He dispatched a spy into the territory occupied

²²Washington to Knox, Aug. 13, 1792, in Ford (ed.), The Writings of George Washington, XII, 158.
by the hostile Indians and he reopened his correspondence with the Spanish officials at New Orleans. Both of these ventures seriously strained the relations between Wilkinson and Wayne.

General Wilkinson ordered Reuben Reynolds, a soldier disguised as a deserter, into the Indian country to gather information about their movements and intentions. Reynolds emerged from the wilderness and proceeded to Pittsburgh to report his findings to General Wayne. The commanding general considered the report to be virtually worthless and indicated that the venture had been a waste of time and effort. Wilkinson was angered and humiliated by the treatment his agent received from General Wayne. Any possibility that the differences between the two officers might be reconciled was lost as Wayne's suspicions that Wilkinson had resumed his correspondence with the Spanish government grew.23

The commanding general was correct, Wilkinson had revived the correspondence and was playing his new situation for all it was worth. In December of 1791 he wrote to Governor Miro hinting of things to come: "My private interests, the Duty which I owe to the country I live in and the aggrandizement of my family have determined me to accept the appointment, and it is most probable, as soon

as St. Clair is known of that I shall be promoted the Chief command.\textsuperscript{24}

A year later he wrote Governor General the Baron de Carondelet urging him to take advantage of the opportunities offered by his new position. He referred to an "incompetent Secretary of War . . . and ignorant commander in chief . . . a contemptible union."\textsuperscript{25}

The Spanish Crown rewarded Wilkinson for his efforts on their behalf. In 1792 he received $2,600 from New Orleans as a part of his pension from Spain.\textsuperscript{26} In 1794 the Spanish governor sent an additional $12,000 to Wilkinson, $4,000 was a part of his pension. The remaining $8,000 was to be used to defray the expenses incurred in Wilkinson's efforts to breakup an expedition against Spanish territory. This expedition, sponsored by the French, was purported to be led by George Rogers Clark.\textsuperscript{27} Rumors of these dealings spread through the western territories and aroused the suspicions and distrust of General Wayne. The commanding general kept a constant watch on the activities of his subordinate.

\textsuperscript{24}Wilkinson to Miro, Dec. 4, 1791, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.

\textsuperscript{25}Wilkinson to Carondelet, Dec. 15, 1792, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26}Statement of Wilkinson account (undated), Ibid.

\textsuperscript{27}Carondelet to Wilkinson, Aug. 6, 1794, Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid, Estado, leg. 3898.
On August 20, 1794, the Legion broke the strength of the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. However, it was not until August 3, 1795 that the chiefs of the defeated tribes gathered at Greenville and signed the Treaty of Greenville. The treaty brought peace to the settlements of the Old Northwest and freed the members of the Army for duties elsewhere.\(^28\)

For the next year the Army performed the routine duties of a garrison force and occupied the posts that the British evacuated according to the provisions of the recently concluded Jay's Treaty. In the Southwest the Indians were restless and there was growing concern in the state of Georgia for the safety of its frontier settlements. The actions of the Spanish continued to worry the Federal government, despite the signing of Pinckney's Treaty.\(^29\)

Throughout this period the commanding general and his second in command labored to discredit each other. General Wayne hoped to obtain positive proof that Wilkinson was actually working for the Spanish and was unfit to hold his high rank in the Army. Wilkinson tried to prove that

\(^28\) Jacobs, U. S. Army, 153-81.

Wayne's military ability was greatly overestimated and therefore he should not be the commanding general. Both officers traveled to Philadelphia to argue their cases before the administration. Wilkinson informed Baron Carondelet that he was going to the capital in 1796 "to keep down the military establishment, to disgrace my commander and secure myself the command of the Army."  

General Wayne was making his second journey to the capital to counter the actions of Wilkinson, when he died on December 15, 1796. His death left General Wilkinson in command of the Army and his appointment as commanding general was approved by President John Adams when he took office in March of 1797.

Wilkinson was in Philadelphia when General Wayne died and he remained in the capital until the new administration took office in 1797. It can be assumed that he devoted his time to gathering support and trying to quiet the storm that had been raised by his fight with General Wayne. It appears that he was successful in convincing the new President that the rumors were politically motivated.

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30 Wilkinon to Carondelet, Sept. 22, 1796, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2375.
31 Harry E. Wildes, Anthony Wayne, 458-62.
President Adams, no stranger to political rumors and personal abuse, was aware of the stories that were circulating concerning Wilkinson's dealings with Spain. He assured the General that he would have the opportunity to defend himself against the charges if it became necessary. Adams confided to Wilkinson that "nobody escaped accusation" in public life.33

Assured of the President's support, Wilkinson left the capital shortly after the inauguration. He returned to the frontier and assumed the responsibility for distributing the troops to provide for the defense of the frontier settlements. The Army that Wilkinson commanded was no longer organized as the Legion. Congress passed a law abolishing that organization on May 30 and it became effective on October 31, 1796. According to the provisions of the act, the Army was to consist of four regiments of Infantry, two companies of light dragoons and the corps of artillerists and engineers.34 The attention of the commanding general and the activities of the Army would be concentrated on an area with which Wilkinson was very familiar, the Southwest frontier.

Wilkinson's dealings with the Spanish not only

33Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, 154-56.
34Callan, The Military Laws of the United States, 114-17.
kept him informed about the affairs of the southern frontier but paid him handsome dividends. Since 1790 the Spanish officials at New Orleans had sent at least $32,000 up the Mississippi River to pay for the services rendered by Wilkinson. Of this sum the general had personally received at least $26,000. By 1796, however, payments were more difficult to obtain, although Wilkinson would try to use every boundary dispute, possible foreign alliance, and in one final effort, the Burr Conspiracy, to extract more gold and silver from the Spanish officials.

The General apparently wanted his dealings with Spain to lie idle for awhile after he became commanding general. At this time he turned down an extremely attractive offer from the Spanish, a large land grant in the Illinois Country and an annual bounty of $4,000. The General advised the Spanish officials to fulfill their obligations under Pinckney's Treaty and to terminate their correspondence with him for the present. However, he hinted that he might become the governor of Natchez, and this would afford ample opportunity for making new plans.

Wilkinson's reference to Spain's obligations under Pinckney's Treaty concerned the running of a new boundary.

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35 Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, 158.
36 Carondelet to Wilkinson, Apr. 20, 1797, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2375.
line between the United States and Spanish Florida. On September 16, 1796, Andrew Ellicott, the American boundary commissioner, started for Natchez to begin surveying the boundary. Ellicott was a surveyor with an impressive record. He had surveyed the land ceded by Maryland and Virginia to form the nation's capital and was subsequently selected to survey the boundary line between the United States and the Spanish Floridas according to the terms of Pinckney's Treaty. He secured a military escort at Pittsburgh to accompany him to his ultimate destination below Natchez. The party's first indication that things might not proceed smoothly occurred when they arrived at Chickasaw Bluffs. The commandant of the Spanish post was not expecting the party and appeared to be embarrassed by their arrival at his station.

Immediately Ellicott’s suspicions were aroused. He reported to his superiors: "First, the commandant and officers appeared, (or affected,), to be almost wholly unacquainted with the late treaty between the United States and his Catholic Majesty: and Secondly no preparations either had been, or were making to evacuate that post."  

39 Ibid., 34-35. Chickasaw Bluffs was located at present-day Memphis.
The party proceeded down the river from Chickasaw Bluffs and reached the Spanish post at Walnut Hills on February 19, 1797. The Americans were astounded when the Spanish fired a cannon to prevent their boats from passing the fort. The commandant appeared to be totally unaware of the treaty and was only satisfied after Ellicott produced an authenticated copy of the document in Spanish. ⁴⁰

The day after leaving Walnut Hills, Ellicott received a letter from the Spanish Governor Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, describing conditions in the Natchez district. The Governor foresaw no difficulty in running the boundary line. But the Spanish were not yet ready to evacuate their posts because they lacked sufficient boats to transport their men and supplies. The disturbing part of the Governor's letter concerned the party's military escort:

"I find it indispensable to request you to leave the troops about the mouth of Bayou Pierre, where they may be provided with all their necessaries. . . ." Ellicott considered the request improper, but he complied to avoid offending the Spanish officials. On February 24 the surveying party, without its escort of thirty soldiers, landed at Natchez. ⁴¹

On February 29 the Americans camped on a hill about one quarter of a mile from the Spanish fort and

⁴⁰Ibid., 37-38. Walnut Hills was located at present-day Vicksburg.

⁴¹Ibid., 39-40.
two days later they raised the American flag at their camp. In a short time the Governor ordered the flag lowered. Ellicott refused and preparations were made to prevent any attempt that might be made to lower it by force. While the Americans were making camp, information was received from confidential sources that seemed to confirm Ellicott's suspicions of the Spanish actions.

He learned that the Governor General, the Baron de Carondelet, the principal commissioner for Spain, had privately declared that the treaty would not be implemented. In addition Governor Gayoso had written to a friend that the "treaty was not intended to be carried into effect, and that delay on their part would reduce it to a dead letter." Finally, it was rumored that the territory had already been or soon would be ceded to France. As a consequence of these reports, Ellicott tried to determine the attitude of the inhabitants of Natchez. He found that a "large majority" were in favor of becoming citizens of the United States.42

The surveying party was in a precarious position: isolated deep in Spanish-held territory; the Spanish officials apparently in no hurry to execute the terms of the treaty; some of the local inhabitants openly hostile; and the Indians in the vicinity of Natchez threatening the American camp. In order to provide for the security of his party, Ellicott requested permission to move his military

42 Ibid., 44-45.
escort from Bayou Pierre to Natchez. He assured the Spanish that there would be no incidents between the American and Spanish soldiers.\textsuperscript{43}

In answer to Ellicott's request, Governor Gayoso apologized for the activities of the local Indians and suggested that it was probably an outgrowth of the raising of the flag over the American camp. He stated that he alone was responsible for maintaining order in the territory and he would see that the Americans were safe in their present position. Gayoso informed the American commissioner that Governor Carondelet would be unable to fulfill his duties as Spanish commissioner because of the pressing nature of his duties as Governor General. Therefore he would be acting in Carondelet's place as the Spanish commissioner for running the boundary line.

Gayoso stated that the military escort could move from its camp to Lofftus' Cliffs below Natchez, where the marking of the boundary line would begin. The treaty had specified escorts for the commissioners, but in Gayoso's opinion this meant on the line and not at other locations. Consequently, he could not permit the landing of American troops at Natchez.\textsuperscript{44}

Contrary to the wishes of the Governor, Ellicott ordered his military escort to join him at Natchez. Shortly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43}Ellicott to Gayoso, Mar. 11, 1797, \textit{Ibid.}, 46.
\item \textsuperscript{44}Gayoso to Ellicott, Mar. 12, 1797, \textit{Ibid.}, 49-51.
\end{itemize}
before the force arrived, Governor Gayoso reluctantly consented to their being stationed in the vicinity of the town. Within a few days the presence of the troops seriously strained the relations between the Americans and the Spanish. The dispute developed when the Americans arrested a number of deserters from the United States Army who had sought refuge in Spanish territory.\textsuperscript{45}

The Governor virgourously protested these activities and requested that the men be freed. Ellicott informed Gayoso that his conduct would be guided by three considerations: (1) all deserters who entered the country after the date set by the treaty for the evacuation of the posts were liable to arrest; (2) all deserters who had come to the territory before the date set for the Spanish withdrawal would not be bothered; and (3) all persons found in the area considered to belong to the United States against whom there were executive proclamations would be arrested.\textsuperscript{46}

Shortly after the arrival of the military escort, the prospects for a speedy withdrawal of the Spanish seemed to be improving. The Spanish removed the artillery from the fort at Natchez and carried it to the boat landing. But on March 22 the pieces were returned to the fort and re-mounted. Ellicott demanded an explanation from Gayoso.

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, 55.

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Ibid.}, 55-56.
The Governor stated that this was simply a way to store the pieces that were being removed from the fort at Walnut Hills. At the same time other supplies were being shipped from Natchez to the Spanish fort on the Arkansas. He informed Ellicott that the Spanish had been demolishing the fort at Walnut Hills as a part of a treaty concluded with the Indians, but he had suspended these operations and nothing further would be done until the American troops arrived at the post. 47

Ellicott was not convinced by the Governor's explanation. He had watched the strange movements of the artillery pieces from his tent, and had seen no stores brought to Natchez from Walnut Hills. In addition, he knew that instead of demolishing the fort the Spanish were making improvements. Finally, the idea was absurd that supplies would be shipped from Walnut Hills to Natchez and then transported back to the fort on the Arkansas River. 48

On March 25 Governor Gayoso informed Ellicott that he was sending a letter to Lieutenant Piercy Smith Pope who was advancing down the Mississippi River from Fort Massac. The letter ordered the Lieutenant to halt at the point where the letter was received and remain there until permitted to continue by the Governor. Gayoso hoped that

47 Gayoso to Ellicott, Mar. 23, 1797, Ibid., 58-60.
48 Ibid., 60.
Ellicott would sign the letter to give it added authority. Ellicott refused the Governor's request. Instead he sent a letter to Pope informing him of the situation at Natchez. He believed the Governor's order was unwarranted, since enough time had elapsed to allow the Spanish to evacuate their positions. Ellicott no longer felt that the removal would come in a "reasonable length of time." He advised Pope that under the circumstances "the sooner you are here the better."^49

On March 29 Governor Gayoso issued a proclamation to the people of the Natchez district that seemed to confirm Ellicott's fears and aroused the anger of a number of the inhabitants. The proclamation stated that the Spanish would retain possession of the country until the people were assured of their rights to their real property. There would be no interference with religious matters, but there was to be no public worship other than Roman Catholic. The people of the district would not be disturbed in their daily activities because of any debts they might have acquired. The proclamation was designed to draw support from two important groups in the district, property owners and debtors.^50

^49Ellicott to Pope, Mar. 25, 1797, Ibid., 63-64.

^50Ibid., 65-67. Also a copy of Gayoso's proclamation enclosed in Ellicott to Secretary of State, Apr. 14, 1797, Southern Boundary MSS, U. S. and Spain, Andrew Ellicott, 3 vols., correspondence (1796-1804), I, National Archives, Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations. Record Group 76. Hereinafter cited as Southern Boundary MSS.
This proclamation caused a stir among the residents of the district who wanted to become citizens of the United States. Suspicious of the Governor's motives they requested that Ellicott take some action on their behalf. Ellicott informed Gayoso of the feelings of the concerned citizens and closed by saying:

I do not pretend to say that their apprehensions are well founded, it is possible they are not, but your objections to my escort being stationed with me, your hauling back and remounting the cannon at this place, your dispatching Capt. Minor to delay the arrival of the American troops; at this place, added to your proclamation however well meant, have had a contrary effect.\(^{51}\)

Governor Gayoso responded that those who had expressed a desire to live under American rule were not being persecuted by the Spanish as Ellicott had been informed. The sole purpose of the proclamation was to calm the people and outline the "political arrangements between His Majesty and the United States of America." He pointed out that the Governor General of the province found it necessary to consult the King on one important point concerning the evacuation of the military posts. The Spanish officials interpreted the treaty to mean that the posts would be demolished when evacuated. On the other hand the United States expected the posts to be surrendered

\(^{51}\)Ellicott to Gayoso, Mar. 31, 1797, Ibid., 68-69. Also Southern Boundary MSS, I.
intact. This important issue could only be settled by the representatives of the two governments.\textsuperscript{52}

The agitation caused by the governor's proclamation was so great that Ellicott feared that the citizens might take some forcible action against the Spanish government. As a consequence of these fears, the officer in command of the American escort began to enlist recruits from among the local residents. This action brought a strong protest from the Governor. Ellicott replied that he would require additional time to consider the situation before giving his reply.\textsuperscript{53} With this inconclusive reply all discussion of the matter was dropped and the recruits remained in the Army.

Ellicott also tried to locate Lieutenant Pope and his detachment. On April 17 he received a letter from the Lieutenant stating that the soldiers had halted their journey at Walnut Hills upon receiving the letter from Governor Gayoso. Ellicott wrote to Pope telling him to leave Walnut Hills if bloodshed could be avoided:

\begin{quote}
... the proper place for yourself, and detachment to be stationed is at this post - here you can be of more service to the United States than at any other place on the river. Nine tenths of the inhabitants ... are firmly attached to the United States;
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{52}Gayoso to Ellicott, Mar. 31, 1797, \textit{Ibid.}, 70-72.

\textsuperscript{53}Gayoso to Ellicott, Apr. 13, 1797, \textit{Ibid.}, 74-75; Ellicott to Gayoso, Apr. 13, 1797, \textit{Ibid.}, 76.
but until your arrival, have no rallying point, in case of a rupture between the United States and his Catholic Majesty, which the conduct of Governor Gayoso I am under the necessity of concluding cannot be very distant.54

Ellicott informed the Governor that he had requested Pope to move to Natchez and Gayoso reluctantly gave his permission.55 One week later Lieutenant Pope and his command reached the landing at Natchez. The next morning Pope's force and Ellicott's escort joined forces and made their camp on a high hill overlooking the Spanish fort and government house. For a time the tensions eased and there was very little activity on either side.

On May 2 Lieutenant Colonel Guillimard, the surveyor for the Spanish government, arrived at Natchez. Ellicott was informed that the Spanish would be ready to cooperate in the running of the boundary in a few days. Despite these assurances, the next day a large number of laborers went to work repairing the fort and mounting additional pieces of artillery. On May 7 a detachment of approximately forty men arrived to reinforce the garrison. Two days later Guillimard and a number of officers left for Walnut Hills with a boatload of equipment.

54Ellicott to Pope, Apr. 14, 1797, Ibid., 77.

55Jack D. L. Holmes, Gayoso: The Life of a Spanish Governor in the Mississippi Valley 1789-1799 (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1968), 183. Holmes says that Pope commanded the military escort that had accompanied Ellicott at the beginning of his journey.
While Ellicott waited in Natchez to begin running the boundary line and watched the feverish Spanish activity, he did what he could to speed the survey. He protested the numerous delays only to be informed by Gayoso that "both you and the commander General of this province will be informed of the time that the boundaries are to be determined." Gayoso indicated that the survey would not begin until Carondelet received appropriate orders from higher authorities, presumably from the King himself.

At this time Ellicott learned from an informant that Governor General Carondelet planned to take some sort of action against the Americans and their supporters in the Natchez district. Carondelet had told Philip Nolan that the situation at Natchez was becoming serious and "... he was determined to quiet them by giving the Americans lead, and the inhabitants hemp." The informant reported that the Baron had ordered a large camp laid out at Baton Rouge and that a contractor had been engaged to supply provisions for the troops.

Again Ellicott protested the failure of the Spanish to fulfill the terms of Pinckney's Treaty. Gayoso informed him that the pressure of events was so great that

56 Ellicott to Gayoso, May 11, 1797, and Gayoso to Ellicott, May 11, 1797, in Southern Boundary MSS, I.
57 Ellicott, 85.
58 Ellicott to Gayoso, May 16, 1797, Ibid., 86-89.
the running of the line and the evacuation of the posts would have to be postponed. 59

On May 16 a company of grenadiers arrived in Natchez and after resting a day and a half went on to Walnut Hills. 60 Three days later more soldiers en route to Walnut Hills passed Natchez. The inhabitants of the province watched the Spanish military preparations with apprehension. The citizens talked of attacking the Spanish, but were told that such an act might provoke a war between the United States and Spain and consequently do more harm than good.

On May 24 the Spanish Governor General issued a proclamation informing the people of the Natchez district that the provisions of the treaty could not be fulfilled at the present time. The reason given for the delay was the reported activities of the British forces in Canada. It was rumored that the British planned to cross the territory of the United States and attack upper Louisiana. Because of this threat to her territory, Spain was increasing her defenses along the Mississippi. 61 The Governor General's proclamation only served to increase the anger of the people of the Natchez district who were attached to the United States interest.

59 Gayoso to Ellicott, May 17, 1797, Ibid., 90.
60 Ibid., 83-84.
61 Proclamation of Baron de Carondelet, May 24, 1797, Ibid., 94-95.
In order to provide additional troops to occupy the posts that the Spanish were suppose to be evacuating, a detachment of regulars began to descend the Ohio toward the Mississippi. On May 26 two companies of the 3d regiment of Infantry and a handful of artillerists left Fort Washington under the command of Captain Issac Guion. While the troops were resting at Fort Massac on the Ohio River, Captain Guion learned that instead of abandoning their posts, the Spanish were strengthening their position at Walnut Hills and planning to seize Chickasaw Bluffs. These reports were probably a result of the troop movements that Ellicott had observed at Natchez. Upon learning of the Spanish preparations, Guion promptly set his force in motion in an effort to counter the Spanish plans. The Americans reached "the infirnal [sic] bluffs," at present-day Memphis, on July 24 and immediately began to construct a military post.  

As Guion moved south, the situation at Natchez became more explosive each day. The events leading up to the climax centered around the actions of an itinerant Baptist minister named Barton Hannon.  


63Ellicott gives his name as Hannah, 99.
gave the minister permission to preach a sermon, provided he avoided discussing political issues.

On June 4 a large crowd gathered at the American camp to hear his sermon. Hannon was greatly impressed by the success of his sermon and on June 9 he ventured into a "disorderly part" of Natchez in an apparent effort to extend his ministry. His religious zeal, heightened by the influence of liquor, aroused the anger of a number of Irish Roman Catholics, who took offense at the minister's remarks about their religion. After being beaten by the Catholics, Hannon went to Governor Gayoso and demanded justice. In an effort to prevent further trouble, the Governor ordered Hannon confined at the fort in the stocks.64

Many of the citizens of the district were certain that Gayoso had violated the rights of an American citizen and that he was determined to enforce the laws of Spain at any price. By the morning of June 10 the Spanish governor and his family, accompanied by several Spanish officials, had taken refuge in the fort. By nightfall the population was in open opposition to the Spanish government and there were suggestions that the Spanish fort be assaulted.

The actions of the Spanish and the people of Natchez

placed Andrew Ellicott and Lieutenant Pope in an extremely delicate position. On May 31 Governor General Carondelet issued a second proclamation in which he charged that the United States was contemplating military action against Lower Louisiana. As proof, Carondelet cited the American troops gathered on the Ohio River, probably Guion's force, and the presence at Natchez of the boundary commissioner and his military escort. He asserted that if the United States had no hostile intentions, they would leave Natchez and try to stop the British force advancing against Upper Louisiana. Only when this was done would the Spanish surrender the posts and lay down the weapons which the Americans had forced them to take up.65 As additional proof of the intentions of the Americans, Carondelet pointed to the fact that the citizens of the Natchez district were in open revolt against Spanish authority because of the jailing of Hannon.66

Governor Gayoso considered the incident involving Hannon to be what Pope and Ellicott were waiting for to begin the revolt. On June 12 Pope seemed to substantiate this conclusion when he issued a letter of congratulation

65 Proclamation of Carondelet, May 31, 1797, in Ellicott, 101-103; Holmes, Gayoso, 189. For Ellicott's comments see Ellicott to Pickering, June 4, 1797, Southern Boundary MSS, I.

66 For a Spanish account of the revolt see Captain Manuel de Lanzo's diary in Holmes (ed.), Documents de la Luisiana.
and support to the people of Natchez. The Lieutenant def-
initely favored the citizen's position, but militarily he
was in no position to offer support if hostilities began.
The small American force would be greatly outnumbered by
the troops that the Spanish could assemble in the district
in a matter of a few days. In fact Governor Gayoso had
requested additional troops to reinforce the garrison at
Natchez on the day Pope issued his proclamation.

While the military forces of both nations bided
their time and made preparations, the people were discussing
an attack on the fort. On June 17 an incident occurred
which could have resulted in a war between the United States
and Spain if it had not been handled properly. Shots were
exchanged between the members of a Spanish patrol and a
group of men advancing on the hill that overlooked the
Spanish position. No one was wounded during the brief

67 Proclamations of Pope and Ellicott, June 12, 1797,
in Pope Papers, Missouri Historical Society. Ellicott makes
no mention of this proclamation in his journal or the report
on the Southern Boundary, but states that he decided neither
to encourage nor discourage the rebels, Ellicott, 104-105.
In fact Governor General Carondelet had alerted the militia
units of Lower Louisiana. Holmes, Gayoso, 192, cites
certificates of Carondelet, New Orleans, Aug. 5, 1797,
A. G. I., Papeles de Cuba, leg. 23. Lieutenant Pope is
reported to have said that the Spanish would not evacuate
the posts without "being first damnably flogged." Quoted
in D. Clayton James, Ante-bellum Natchez (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1956), 69.

68 Gayoso to Carondelet, June 12, 1797, A. G. I.,
Papeles de Cuba, leg. 43.

69 Holmes (ed.), Documents de la Luisiana, Lanzo's
diary.
encounter, but the situation had reached the stage where it was essential that cooler heads prevail. Ellicott issued orders that no further incidents were to occur between the Regulars and the Spanish garrison.\footnote{Holmes, Gayoso, 193.}

Ellicott and Gayoso held a number of private conferences in an effort to solve the problem peacefully. By the nineteenth the details of a settlement were worked out sufficiently so that Gayoso felt safe in ordering Colonel Guillimard and Sub-Lieutenant Juan Ferrusola, both of whom had just arrived from Nogales, to proceed to New Orleans.\footnote{Ibid., 194.}

On June 20 Ellicott and Gayoso held a secret meeting and reached a tentative agreement for settling the dispute. At this meeting Ellicott protested the landing of any additional Spanish troops on the east side of the Mississippi above the thirty-first degree of latitude, except for the purpose of obtaining provisions.\footnote{Ellicott, 113.}

The day after their secret meeting Ellicott and the Governor met with a committee composed of citizens of the district and negotiated a general settlement. The Spanish Governor agreed to a number of conditions: (1) none of the individuals who had acted as citizens of the United States would be persecuted or prosecuted for their actions; (2) none of the citizens would be called into militia service except...
in the event of Indian attack or internal riot; (3) no one would be taken out of the district for trial; and (4) the neutrality of the people was guaranteed. In turn, the committee, on behalf of the citizens of the district, agreed to live under Spanish law until the Spanish evacuated the province.73

With this agreement the "revolt" at Natchez was over and the district remained under Spanish control until the boundary line was marked and the Spanish garrisons removed. Despite the peaceful solution of the problem of joint Spanish and American occupation of Natchez, friction continued between the supporters of the two powers. The presence of Lieutenant Pope and his detachment seems to have been the major source of trouble.

The specific actions of Pope are unclear but they caused Andrew Ellicott to ask Secretary of State Timothy Pickering an interesting question:

Is it possible to find a Military Gentleman in our army possessed of sobriety, talents, and prudence? I have only to add that for the honor of the United States it will be necessary to send officers to this country who are not

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Apparently Pope suffered from recurring fevers, drank too much and caused considerable trouble and was not the type of man to occupy a position of responsibility in a delicate situation.75

Pope's conduct was such that Governor Gayoso sent a protest to his immediate superior, Captain Guion at Chickasaw Bluffs. The Captain ordered Pope to alter his conduct so as not to give offense to Governor Gayoso or to any of the citizens of Natchez.76 In a letter to Gayoso the Captain stated:

I am sorry to hear that the Officer heretofore commanding the troops of the United States at Natchez, has given either to the inhabitants of that district, or to the subjects of his Catholic Majesty, the smallest just cause of uneasiness or discontent; at all events this will no longer be the case as his orders are to observe a different conduct and his superior officer will I hope shortly be there to command in person.77

74Ellicott to Secretary of State, July 4, 1797, Southern Boundary MSS, I. His reference to Pope's mental condition had apparently been observed by his fellow officers because Pope bore the nickname "Crazy." Holmes in Gayoso, 183n, speculates on the "interesting combination" of "Crazy" Pope being selected by General "Mad" Anthony Wayne to head the movement to Natchez.

75Holmes, Gayoso, 183n; Pope died of fever near Natchez on July 11, 1799 see Cushing to Williamson, July 22, 1799, Letters Sent, Cushing, Record Group 98 (National Archives).

76Guion to Pope, Aug. 24, 1797, and Guion to Gayoso, Aug. 27, 1797, in Guion, 41.

77Guion to Gayoso, Aug. 27, 1797, Ibid., 41.
Captain Guion expressed the hope that the Governor had already issued the necessary orders to begin the evacuation of the Spanish posts.\textsuperscript{78}

The Captain was to be disappointed in his hope of arriving at Natchez in a short time and in his expectation that the Spanish would quickly evacuate their garrisons north of the boundary line. Before the Captain arrived, Governor Gayoso was promoted and removed from the Natchez district. On July 29, 1797, Governor Gayoso relinquished his post to his adjutant, Stephen Minor, and went to New Orleans to assume the duties of Governor General of Louisiana.\textsuperscript{79}

On August 19 Governor General Gayoso informed Captain Guion that the Spanish had not evacuated their posts and the decision to do so would have to be made by the two governments and not by their representatives on the frontier. On October 3 Captain Guion acknowledged the receipt of the Governor's letter and declined to quarter his force at Villa Gayoso, a Spanish fort twenty-five miles from Natchez, until he was fully acquainted with other sites in the district.

In an effort to reassure Gayoso of the peaceful intentions of the Americans, he stated, "As far as it depends on me, and is consistent with the dignity of the

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{79} Holmes, Gayoso, 198-99.
United States and the comfort and safety of the troops, the harmony and tranquility subsisting between the two nations shall not be disturbed."\textsuperscript{80}

Captain Guion and his detachment did not leave Chickasaw Bluffs until November 9. Thirty men remained to occupy Fort Adams and the balance of the detachment moved rapidly down the river toward Natchez. The force did not occupy Walnut Hills because the Spanish still held that position. The troops arrived at the Natchez landing on December 6 and made their camp on the site of Ellicott's first camp, about one thousand yards from the Spanish fort.\textsuperscript{81}

The Captain's duties once he reached Natchez had been outlined in his orders. He was to combine his detachment with the force commanded by Lieutenant Pope. After assuming command of the entire force, he was to see that the Spanish carried out the provisions of Pinckney's

\textsuperscript{80}Guion to Gayoso, Oct. 3, 1797, in Guion, 47. Villa Gayoso had originally been called Cole's Creek when established by Gayoso after 1789. As a result of his efforts in founding the post, the inhabitants requested and received permission to change the name. "Diary of Stephen Minor, 1792," quoted in Manuel Serranoz y Sanz (ed.), Documentos historico de la Florida y Luisiana, siglos XVI al XVIII (Madrid: Libreria General, 1912), 419.

\textsuperscript{81}Guion to Secretary of War, Feb. 25, 1798, in Guion, 68-69. Captain Guion halted at Walnut Hills on Dec. 1 to inquire whether or not the commanding officer, Captain E. Beauregard, was prepared to surrender the post to the United States. Guion to Beauregard, Dec. 1, 1797, ibid., 59.
Treaty and administer the civil law until the Governor of the Mississippi Territory could arrive at Natchez. After the arrival of the Governor, Captain Guion and his men were to assist in marking the boundary line between the United States and the Spanish possessions.

This assignment proved to be more complicated than it appeared. Captain Guion faced the problem of dealing with the Spanish officials and the equally difficult task of dealing with the American Commissioner, Andrew Ellicott.

The first controversy with the Spanish was a result of Guion's efforts to fortify the American camp. The American wrote that the reasons for the precautions were obvious to him even if they were not apparent to the Spanish. He concluded "that you are entirely [sic] ignorant of being in any Danger, I doubt not seeing that you are snug in Garrison, - But I am not so certain that my camp is in perfect security, or that hostility to it is not meditated-" Guion stated that the citizens of the district would be reimbursed for any property damaged by the Americans, but the complaints were a result of Spanish actions. The whole situation could have been avoided if the Spanish had evacuated the garrison according to the provisions of the treaty. 82

The Spanish made an effort to establish cordial relations on three issues effecting the American soldiers

82 Guion to Minor, Jan. 3, 1798, Ibid., 60-61.
by offering to allow Lieutenant Pope to cut timber from the King's Swamp, located on the west side of the Mississippi, to construct buildings for the troops; the buildings at Villa Gayoso to serve as quarters for the Americans; and whatever might add to the comfort of the troops. Now that the Americans were attempting to build an adequate camp, Guion could not understand the Spanish protests. He asked Adjutant Minor why he "so strenuously endeavor to find offense in our making a camp comfortable when your real desire is to contribute all in your power to that comfort? and besides when you tell us that you are very shortly to abandon the country."  

The American officer lamented the fact that he was more versed in the duties of the military than the "intrigues of a court." He implored Gayoso to fix the time of removal so that the relations between the two nations might not be strained by something he might say in his correspondence. On January 28 two boats filled with troops and stores passed Natchez on their way south from Walnut Hills, and Guion speculated that the evacuation had finally begun.  

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84 Guion to Gayoso, Jan. 5, 1798, Ibid., 63-64.  
85 Guion believed that within a month he would be able to report that the posts were completely evacuated and in the hands of the Americans. Guion to Mitchell, Feb. 3, 1798, Ibid., 65-66.
The Captain informed the Secretary of War that he had been assured by Captain Minor that the buildings would be left in the same condition as when occupied by the Spanish. He described the fort at Natchez as poorly planned, with little command of the river, and almost in ruins. He recommended that a new post be established below Natchez, near the new boundary line. Guion stated that because of their critical situation, the citizens were anxious for some type of government to be established by the United States. The Spanish troops were being withdrawn and stationed at a strong new post being constructed at Baton Rouge. The main problem now facing his command was a general shortage of clothing, especially lightweight summer uniforms. He recommended that linen short coats be issued to the troops stationed in the southern section of the nation, because the summer heat was so great that it sickened the soldiers who were required to work in woolen uniforms. To illustrate the situation, he reported that the temperature on February 22 had been 78 degrees.86

The movement of the troops observed at Natchez was indeed the beginning of the long awaited evacuation of the Spanish posts. The Captain wrote to Major William Kersey, who was en route to Walnut Hills, informing him of an arrangement between himself and Captain Minor.

86Guion to Secretary of War, Feb. 25, 1798, Ibid., 68-69.
All the King's or public buildings without the Forts or Redoubts, and exclusive of Block houses which are for defence should be estimated or appraised as well as the Walnut Hills as at this and other places in this district. To this effect one or more persons are to be chosen on each side whose opinion or evaluation will be committed to writing. . .

Guion requested that Kersey make the evaluation, in quadruplicate, and send the information to Natchez in order to speed the evacuation of the territory. 87

On March 23, 1798, the Spanish evacuated the post at Walnut Hills. The fort was occupied by an express rider from Natchez and seven Americans from the neighborhood. The United States troops under Major Kersey had not arrived in time to take formal possession. One week later the Spanish soldiers left Natchez and moved south of the proposed line. The buildings at Natchez were left as they had been when occupied by the Spanish, and Guion placed a small guard in the fort. With the removal of the Spanish garrison, Captain Guion was free to turn his attention to other problems. 88

While engaged in the lengthy negotiations with the Spanish officials, Guion was confronted with the extremely difficult situation of dealing with Andrew Ellicott. The

87Guion to Kersey, Mar. 12, 1798, Ibid., 71-72.

88Guion to Major Constant Freeman, Mar. 27, 1798; Guion to Wilkinson, Mar. 30, 1798, Ibid., 73-74; and Guion to Secretary of War, Apr. 19, 1798, Ibid., 77.
American commissioner had grown jealous of the position he had come to occupy during the year he had been living in Natchez. Ellicott's description of Captain Guion revealed his feelings:

But it unfortunately happened, that the Commandant who superceded Mr. Pope, was much indisposed by an inflammatory complaint on one side of his head, and face, at the time of his arrival, that evidently had an effect upon his understanding, which was naturally very far above mediocrity: in this state, he was immediately surrounded by a number of unworthy characters, who took advantage of his situation, to prejudice his mind against the permanent committee, and other friends of the United States; who were treated by him in the most opprobrious manner.89

The permanent committee Ellicott referred to had been set up during the Natchez revolt and had relied heavily upon the commissioner's advise and directions. After inquiring by whose authority the committee met and terming its meetings "improper and seditious", Captain Guion ordered the committee to dissolve. Ellicott wrote that many of the citizens believed that Guion wanted to establish a military government once the Spanish left the district. Ellicott feared that his arrest was contemplated by Captain Guion, because of his active opposition to the Captain's plans.90

89 Ellicott, 162.
90 Ibid., 163-64.
Guion's letters indicate that he was also dissatisfied with Ellicott's actions concerning the Indians of the Natchez district. On February 3 Guion told Samuel Mitchell, agent to the Choctaw Indians, that Ellicott had been premature in telling the Indians about the supplies to be given them by the United States. The Indians were growing restless and more insistent in their demands for the goods which had not yet arrived at Natchez. The Captain wrote that Ellicott "is so far the cause of Indian impor­tunity, he should bear the trouble when they come in here, but which he is not always willing to do. I have no doubt but that supplies will be sent for the Chocktaws [sic] this spring or summer following, yet much trouble is avoided by not holding anything up to view until within reach." 91

When Gayoso informed Ellicott that the Spanish were ready to begin their evacuation, the American commissioner's suspicions were aroused concerning their intentions. He believed that the letter only concealed the Spanish intentions to continue their delaying tactics. On January 31 his suspicions were confirmed by a letter shown to him by Stephen Minor. 92

The letter from Governor Gayoso to Captain Guion

92Gayoso to Ellicott, Jan. 10, 1798, in Ellicott, 167-68, and Southern Boundary MSS, II. For Ellicott's suspicions see Ellicott, 169.
stated "that he would come up to Natchez, and make the
arrangements with him for furnishing the military escort,
and supplying it with provisions, likewise a plan for
running the boundary." This communication evoked a
sharp response from Ellicott in which he stated that the
letter to Guion was "... wholly unnecessary, as he is
not the person appointed to carry that part of the treaty
into effect. My instructions, and those to the surveyor,
I am fully persuaded will be sufficient guide to us in the
execution of the business, without any foreign or domestic
advice." 

Captain Minor informed Gayoso that he had com-
mitted a diplomatic blunder in addressing the letter to
Captain Guion. The American officer had spread the story
throughout Natchez and had greatly exaggerated his own
importance. The episode greatly embarrassed Ellicott,
since it appeared that an officer of the Army was placed
in a higher position than a special commissioner from the
State Department. Minor reported that Ellicott was ex-
tremely angry over the incident.

Ellicott decided to run the boundary line despite

93 Ellicott, 169.
94 Ellicott to Gayoso, Feb. 1, 1798, Ibid., 170-
71 and also in Southern Boundary MSS, II; and Ellicott
to Pickering, Feb. 10, 1798, Southern Boundary MSS, II.
95 Minor to Gayoso, Jan. 27, 1798, A. G. I.,
Papeles de Cuba, leg. 215-6 as cited in Holmes, Gayoso,
233.

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any attempt by Gayoso to further delay the starting date and the possibility that Guion might withhold his escort. On April 9 Ellicott's party left Natchez for the point on the Mississippi from which the boundary was to be run.

Captain Guion was glad to be rid of the Commissioner. He wrote General Wilkinson that "Ellicott went from here . . . to Willings Bayau [sic] where he now is doing little or nothing; he has very much lessened himself and sullied the commission given him by his conduct before and since his arrival here - I did not believe it 'till I saw it, and supposed it calumny." With the departure of the Spanish and then Ellicott's party, life in the Natchez district took on a fixed routine for the soldiers.

In his report to General Wilkinson, Guion summarized the nature of his civil duties: "I am constantly perplexed with all kinds of business, complaints for abuse, slander, arrest for debts, thefts, and the whole catalogue of vexations, and happy am I to find that a government for this country had been formed by the General Government."

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96 Ellicott to Pickering, Feb. 10, 1798, and Ellicott to Pickering, Feb. 25, 1798, Southern Boundary MSS, II.

97 Guion to Wilkinson, May 5, 1798, in Guion, 80-82 and Ellicott, 177.

98 Guion to Wilkinson, May 5, 1798, in Guion, 81.

99 Ibid., 82. For the new system of government referred to by Guion see "An Act for an amicable settlement of the limits with the State of Georgia, and authorizing the establishment of a government in the Mississippi Territory," in F. N. Thorpe (ed.), The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws.
For a short time Captain Guion contented himself with the duties of a military and a civil administrator. He worried with countless details concerning commerce, the maintenance of law and order, and the settlement of countless claims. He moved troops throughout the district, sought supplies for his men because of the failure of his contractor, pleaded for clothing for his men because they were "naked", and watched the activities of the neighboring Indians.

Guion's major concern was the unrest among the Indians since the departure of the Spanish. The Captain attributed the Indian agitation to Spanish and French agents who were encouraging the tribes to test the firmness of the United States. Because of these problems the Captain urged that a reliable interpreter be sent to him so he could deal more effectively with the tribes.

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100 For example see, Guion to Clark, May 5, 1798, in Guion, 83. Guion to John Wilkins, Quarter Master General, May 9, 1798, Ibid., 86. Guion to the Secretary of War, June 13, 1798, Ibid., 91-92.

101 Guion to Quarter Master Craig, May 9, 1798; Guion to James O'Hara, May 9, 1798; Guion to Kersey, May 10, 1798; Guion to Mitchell, May 15, 1798, Ibid., 83-88.

102 Guion to Mitchell, May 15, 1798, Ibid., 87-88.
He requested that Samuel Mitchell send two men to the Spanish fort on the Tombigbee to determine if the Spanish had left that post and moved below the new boundary line. Guion expressed the belief that the delays caused by Gayoso in marking the line were a part of a Spanish plan to aid French designs against the district. He closed with the assurance that "we will soon have a respectable military force in the Country, and things must then have an Issue."\(^{103}\)

In an effort to provide for the security of Natchez and the surrounding country Guion requested a detachment from Walnut Hills to reinforce his command. He blamed all of the problems of his office on the French:

> The french are beyond doubt meditating a stroke at this country; and the Dons are secretly abetting the business - I would recommend it to you, to have an eye to some of the people left at your Garrison when the Dons left it.\(^{104}\)

To protect the party running the boundary line from possible Indian attacks, Guion dispatched Ensign John McClary with a detachment of soldiers from Natchez to their camp. The troops were not to be employed as laborers or "drudges" unless such work was directly connected with their duties as soldiers. The soldiers were to be drilled regularly and kept in constant readiness

\(^{103}\)Ibid.

\(^{104}\)Guion to Kersey, May 15, 1798, Ibid., 88-89.
to meet any threat that might present itself.\textsuperscript{105}

In fact, the soldiers would not be used in cutting the line because Ellicott and Gayoso had decided that slaves would be used for the heavy work. They made this decision because the summer heat had taken a heavy toll among the members of both parties, and it was believed that the slaves could withstand the heat.\textsuperscript{106} On May 31 Governor Gayoso arrived at the point where the boundary party was working and approved the initial location of the thirty-first parallel.\textsuperscript{107} The commissioners of the two nations continued their work and pushed on to St. Mary's in Spanish East Florida, reaching there on February 26, 1800.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{105}Guion to McClary, May 19, 1798, Ibid., 89-90. The Captain quoted Article 6 of the Standing General Orders of May 22, 1797 to remind the Ensign of his obligation to his men. "To abstract a soldier from his professional duties, and to subject him to the orders of persons not attached to the Army, or to impose upon him menial laborious services is an abuse of authority, a breach of contract, and a deep injury to the service, because it authorizes negligence in the soldier and in effect destroys his arms and his clothing - This practice is therefore positively prohibited."

\textsuperscript{106}Holmes, Gayoso, 234; Ellicott, 180.


\textsuperscript{108}Ellicotts; correspondence with the Secretary of State is contained in Southern Boundary MSS, II, and his account of the operation is contained in Ellicott, 181-279. Ellicott to Dunbar, Apr. 18, 1800, in Eron Rowland, Life, Letters and Papers of William Dunbar (Jackson, Press of the Mississippi Historical Society, 1930), 105-106.
Apprehensions concerning the intentions of the Choctaws increased steadily during June. Governor Gayoso warned the commissioners that the Indians would try to block the running of the line and drive the Americans out of the territory. Ellicott considered this report as merely an attempt by the Spanish to further delay the fulfillment of the treaty obligations. But Governor Gayoso and Captain Guion both felt that there was a definite possibility of an attack upon the small party of men on the boundary line.

Reports came to Natchez from Samuel Mitchell that the unrest was caused by Spanish agents who were telling the Indians that the Americans would take all of the land above the line for their own use and that the Indians should hold out. Captain Guion did not believe that the Choctaws would take such a stand without encouragement from the Spanish.

Many of the Indians who had expressed feelings of hostility toward the United States had moved; either below the new boundary line; or to the Spanish post on the Tombigbee,

109Ellicott, 181.


111Guion to Wilkinson, June 23, 1798, in Guion, 93-95. Guion to Secretary of War, July 9, 1798, Ibid., 98-99.
Fort St. Stephens. The post was well within the territorial limits of the United States but was still garrisoned by about thirteen Spanish soldiers. The fort was only ninety miles from the Spanish town of Mobile but it was a twelve day march from Natchez. The inhabitants of the area were well disposed toward the United States and required some type of protection from the Spanish and Indians. Captain Guion recommended the construction of a post in the area to counteract the activities of the Spanish. 112

While Guion tried to keep the Indians from starting a war, his civil administration, by his own assessment was going smoothly. He informed the Secretary of War:

The people of this district, who when left to the unbiased exercise of their own judgement, are in the majority above the ordinary capacity of like numbers in most of the States, anxiously look for the laws and officers of government for this country. They are, and have been remarkably tranquil, their situation fairly considered; a few turbulent and busy spirits excepted; yet the arrival of the governor, Judges, etc would add much to their satisfaction, and my case. 113


113 Guion to Secretary of War, June 13, 1798, in Guion, 91-92.
Guion's assessment differed greatly from the comments made by Ellicott in his *Journal*. Ellicott attributed the good order at Natchez to the activities of the permanent committee he had helped organize and not to the efforts of Guion. Ellicott wrote that the committee did not listen to the advice of pretended friends nor did it heed the abuse of its opponents. Because of its wise actions the committee was able to maintain order in Natchez despite the fact that: "the shadow of the Spanish jurisdiction, which had remained in the district since the termination of the commotion, was withdrawn in January, 1798, and the inhabitants left without law or government, till September following, I never heard of a single outrage being committed in the territory except by the Commandant, and one or two other officers."\(^{114}\)

As the boundary party moved east, Captain Guion continued to watch the activities of the Indians and the Spanish agents. Many of the chiefs had come to Natchez to talk to Guion and declare their "friendly disposition and intention." Despite these assurances, the Captain feared that some of the Choctaws and the Huwanies, who had long been attached to the Spanish, were contemplating hostilities. One indication of their feelings was that the Huwanies, who lived in the Choctaw territory, had burned their corn and moved south to the border of Lake

\(^{114}\)Ellicott, 167.
On July 29 Guion received information from the Tombigbee region that Colonel Benjamin Hawkins, agent to the Creeks, had left his post because of threats made against him by the Indians. The Captain maintained that the Indian problems were caused by the activities of the Spanish, whose efforts were connected with some French plan to attack the region. Guion suggested that the Indian problems might be eliminated if the tribes were played against one another. To accomplish this the Choctaws should be conciliated and brought under the influence of the United States. Since the Choctaws and the Creeks were enemies, there existed the possibility of using the Choctaws to divert the attention of the Creeks from the Americans. Captain Guion never tried his plan because he was relieved of further responsibility for Indian affairs by the arrival of Governor Winthrop Sargent.

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115 Guion to Secretary of War, July 9, 1798, in Guion, 98-99. Guion's reference to the Huwanies probably referred to the Yowanni people. In addition to these two spellings these Indians were referred to as the Haiowanni, Youone, Hewanni and the Ewany. Their capital was located on the east side of the Chickasahay River and was called Yowanni. H. S. Halbert, "District Divisions of the Choctaw Nation," Report of the Alabama History Commission to the Governor of Alabama, Thomas M. Owen (ed.), 1 (Montgomery, 1901), 380-87.

116 Guion to Samuel Mitchell, Aug. 11, 1798, in Guion, 101-102. The system of government established by Congress made the territorial governor the superintendent of Indian affairs. F. N. Thorpe (ed.), The Federal and State Constitutions, 2026.
By the middle of September Captain Guion was replaced as the commander at Natchez by Colonel John Francis Hamtramck and assumed command of the troops stationed at Loftus Heights. On September 25 General Wilkinson arrived at Natchez and personally assumed the responsibility for directing the activities of the American troops in the area.

Governor Sargent and General Wilkinson quickly turned their attention to organizing the civil and military affairs of the territory. The two officials became involved in a heated controversy concerning the right of the troops to occupy certain buildings received from the Spanish, but not a part of the district's fortifications. The building in question was located in Natchez, and Governor Sargent wanted to use it as a courthouse. General Wilkinson refused to order the troops to turn the buildings over to the civil authorities. The controversy soon spread to include the public buildings at Villa Gayoso occupied by soldiers.

The controversy began in September 1798, and was not resolved until the next spring when the troops were moved out of Villa Gayoso and all but a small guard in


118 Guion to Secretary of War, Jan. 3, 1799, in Guion, 102-103.
the old Spanish fort was removed from Natchez. Sargent had gained control of the public buildings, but only after threatening to send his correspondence with Wilkinson to the proper governmental department.\footnote{Sargent to Pickering, Sept. 29, 1798, in Rowland, MTA, I, 57-58; Sargent to Captain John Heth, Feb. 23, 1799, Ibid., 136; Sargent to Pickering, Mar. 13, 1799, Ibid., 110-111; Sargent to Wilkinson, Apr. 3, 1799, Ibid., 130; Sargent to Wilkinson, Apr. 17, 1799, in Rowland, MTA, I, 138-139; Sargent to Pickering, Apr. 20, 1799, Ibid., 139-44.}

The other controversy arose over the transfer of Lieutenant Andrew Marschalk from Natchez to Walnut Hills. The Lieutenant possessed the only printing press in the territory and had contrived to bring this fact to the attention of Governor Sargent. The Governor arranged the transfer of the officer and his printing press to Natchez so that he could print the laws of the Mississippi Territory.\footnote{Marschalk to L. A. Besancon, Sept. 2, 1837, in Madel J. Morgan, "Andrew Marschalk's Account of Mississippi's First Press," Journal of Mississippi History, VIII, 146-48; Marschalk to Sargent, Sept. 30, 1798, in William B. Hamilton (ed.), "The Printing of the 1799 Laws of the Mississippi Territory," Journal of Mississippi History, II, 92.} Apparently Marschalk's activities while he printed the laws angered his superiors, and he was ordered from Natchez before he finished his printing assignment. By late October, 1799, when he sold his printing press and left Natchez, Marschalk had finished printing the first
thirty-five laws.\textsuperscript{121}

With the exception of the controversy concerning the public buildings and the transfer of Marschalk, Wilkinson and Sargent worked well together. The Governor concurred in Wilkinson's recommendation that Loftus Heights should immediately be fortified. He also tried to help the General eliminate the problem of desertion which according to the Governor was so great as to "hazard the loss of almost all our \textit{Little Army in this Country}." In an effort to make desertion more difficult, Sargent issued a proclamation requiring passports for all foreigners and the registration of newcomers to the area.\textsuperscript{122}

As the eighteenth century drew to a close, the members of the Army remained scattered across the nation's vast frontier. Except for the old Spanish towns on the Mississippi, the small garrisons were located far in advance of the white settlements on the nation's borders. The Army was expected to perform two important functions: guard the international borders; and protect the isolated white settlements from sporadic Indian attacks. Neither of these duties required much military activity on the part of the Army and it did not appear that there would be any purely military activities in the immediate future.


CHAPTER II

THE OCCUPATION OF LOUISIANA

The new century began peacefully for the members of the United States Army and with all indications pointing to a long period of calm. Only a few isolated incidents involving hostile Indians disturbed the routine of Army life. The soldiers continued the monotonous task of building and improving the posts that marked the limits of the nation.

In the preceding decade the Army had advanced far into the wilderness, well beyond the settled areas, in an effort to secure the nation's borders. It would be a number of years before the vast area passed over by the soldiers would be completely settled. Therefore it is not surprising that the military posts were considered to be permanent installations. However, the forts established before 1800 were only the first in a series of works constructed to protect the ever advancing frontier.¹

By December of 1803 the soldiers were once again on the march, pushing the military frontier still further

¹For the names and date of construction of the posts in the South see Appendix I. For other posts see Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789-1895 (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964).
west and ever ahead of the encroaching settlers. The posts constructed in the 1790's were abandoned as they outlived their usefulness, and new posts were established to meet the needs of an ever changing situation. The process of establishing and subsequently abandoning posts in the interior of the nation was repeated time after time as the country increased its territorial holdings and settlers continued to push the settlement line westward.

The only interior posts in the South that remained in existence for any length of time were of two types: (1) those that were established in areas with large numbers of potentially hostile Indians, such as Forts Stoddert, Mitchell, and Hawkins; and (2) those that offered the surrounding population a measure of protection from large concentrations of slaves, such as Baton Rouge.

Initially the military frontier in the South moved in two directions at the same time, west and south. The movement south stopped when the United States acquired the land bounded by the Gulf of Mexico and constructed permanent fortifications to guard the coastline. The movement west did not end until the continent had been crossed.\(^2\)

The first indication that the tranquil period might be broken came when rumors began to circulate that Spain had transferred Louisiana to France. The transfer had been agreed to by the two countries in the Treaty of San Ildefonso,

\(^2\text{Ibid.}\)
signed on October 1, 1800. The treaty was a preliminary agreement and accomplished no transfer of territory. The agreement was secret because Spain was afraid that if news of the treaty reached the United States, the territory might be lost before France could take possession. On March 21, 1801, the representatives of Spain and France signed the treaty of Aranzuez which confirmed the agreement reached at San Ildefonso.

News of the two secret agreements did not reach the United States until early 1802. The reaction was one of anger and dismay. Possession of the mouth of the Mississippi River by weak Spain was one thing, its possession by aggressive France was something that required serious consideration. President Jefferson summarized the situation:

Spain might have retained it quietly for years. Her pacific dispositions, her feeble state, would induce her to increase our facilities there, so that her possession of the place would be hardly felt by us, and it would not perhaps be very long before some circumstance might arise which might make the cession of it to us the price of something of more worth to her. Not so can it ever be in the hands of France.

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The Western settlers were concerned about what might happen if France should gain control of New Orleans. They depended upon the Mississippi River to transport their products to market. If the right to use the river was ever denied, the results would be disastrous. In the much quoted passage by Jefferson, he stressed the importance of the river not only for the western farmers but for the nation:

There is on the globe one single spot the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, through which the produce of three eights of our territory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half of our whole produce and contain more than half our inhabitants. France placing herself in that door assumes to us the attitude of defiance.6

If the attitude of France was defiant, the attitude of the United States Army was relaxed and unconcerned. From 1801 to 1803 the soldiers were occupied with a number of routine jobs, such as: escorting parties through the wilderness; marking the Chickasaw boundary line; assisting Indian agents with projects among the various tribes; cutting roads through the wilderness; constructing buildings for the Indian factory system; cleaning, repairing, and packing arms; protecting postriders and travelers on the Natchez to Nashville road; moving personnel and stores from one post to another; building warehouses at the

6Ibid., 364.
military posts; and cutting timber for the use of the garrisons. 7

While the soldiers labored in the wilderness, the commanding general, James Wilkinson, was negotiating treaties with Southern Indian tribes. Wilkinson's duties as commanding general of a force stationed at widely scattered posts should have completely occupied his attention, but he was given other responsibility. In June of 1801 he was ordered to open negotiations with the Southern Indian tribes. Wilkinson's diplomatic efforts would keep him in the wilderness for almost two years. 8

General Wilkinson and his fellow commissioners, Colonel Benjamin Hawkins and General Andrew Pickens, first attempted to arrange a treaty with the Cherokees when they met at Southwest Point. The proposed treaty provided for

7Sargent to Wilkinson, Apr. 8, 1800, Dunbar Rowland, The Mississippi Territorial Archives, 1793-1803 (Nashville: Brandon Printing Co., 1905), 1, 220; Hereinafter cited as MTA. Secretary of War to Edward Butler, Mar. 10, 1801, In Letters Sent Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107, National Archives Microfilm Publication, M6, Roll 1, 44. Hereinafter cited as SWLS. Secretary of War to Thomas Cushing, Oct. 23, 1801, Ibid., 116; Secretary of War to Thomas Butler, Apr. 16, 1802, Ibid., 192; Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Chickasaw Bluffs, July 20, 1802, Ibid., 252-53; Secretary of War to A. D. Abraham, July 30, 1802, Ibid., 252; Secretary of War to Cushing, July 10, 1803, Ibid., 25; Secretary of War to Abraham, Sept. 9, 1802, Ibid., 281-82; Secretary of War to Abraham, Nov. 11, 1802, Ibid., 319-20; Secretary of War to Abraham, Dec. 14, 1802, Ibid., 332-33.

8Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 15, 1801, Ibid., 87.
the cutting of a road from the Tennessee River to the highlands. But the Indians, reluctant to allow the Americans on their lands, refused to have anything to do with the proposal.9

Failing to reach an agreement with the Cherokees, the commissioners moved on to Chickasaw Bluffs where they conferred with the Chickasaw chiefs. On October 24, 1801, a treaty was signed whereby the Indians received seven hundred dollars in merchandise for allowing a road to be opened across their lands. The road was to be built by details of thirty soldiers working in monthly shifts from the Mero district of Tennessee to the settlements near Natchez. The trail would be fairly typical of the early roads that were cut through the wilderness. The Secretary of War outlined how the trace should be cleared, "not exceeding sixteen feet in width and not more than eight feet of the sixteen to be cut close to the ground, and smoothed for passengers..."10

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9 American State Papers, Indian Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), I, 648-53, 656, 663. Hereinafter cited as ASPIA. General Pickens was named in place of William R. Davie who was named in the original commission. Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 15, 1801, SWLS, Roll 1, 87.

After concluding the successful negotiations at Chickasaw Bluffs, the commissioners proceeded to Fort Adams to meet with the Choctaw chiefs. Wilkinson and his associates persuaded the Indians to allow the construction of a road from Fort Adams to the Yazoo River. In addition, the chiefs agreed to accept the old boundary line between their territory and the United States.¹¹

When the roads provided for in the treaties with the Chickasaws and Choctaws were completed, communications between Nashville and the southwest would be greatly improved. In an effort to protect the postriders and travelers on the road, small detachments of soldiers were stationed along the route. In 1803 the mail was carried from Natchez to Nashville at the rate of fifty miles a day. By 1805 mail was being carried over the route by postriders who were expected to cover 120 miles every twenty-four hours.¹²

The commissioners proceeded from Fort Adams to Fort Wilkinson, near Milledgeville, Georgia, where they opened a conference with the Creeks on May 24, 1802. In exchange for $10,000 in gifts and the promise of annuities, the Creeks ceded their land in the Ockmulgee Forks to the United States. This cession pushed the western boundary

¹¹ The treaty was signed on Dec. 17, 1801, ASPIA, I, 648-53; Kappler, Indian Affairs, II, 42-43.

¹² Postmaster General to Claiborne, Feb. 15, 1803, Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 186; Postmaster General to Pratt, Dec. 9, 1805, in Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 44.
of Georgia further west.\textsuperscript{13}

Upon concluding the treaty with the Creeks, Colonel Hawkins and General Pickens returned to their homes. General Wilkinson moved to Fort Confederation, a frontier post located on the Tombigbee River, where he again met with the Choctaws. By the terms of a second treaty, signed on October 17, 1802, the Indians ceded their lands between the Tombigbee and Chickasawhay rivers. They also agreed to the establishment of a new boundary line and the cutting of a highway through their lands. In return the United States agreed to establish a trading house for their use.\textsuperscript{14}

Following the negotiations with the Choctaws, Wilkinson established a camp at the mouth of the Yazoo River. From this location he personally supervised the work of the soldiers who were marking the boundary line between the territory of the United States and the land held by the Choctaws.\textsuperscript{15} The marking of this line was

\textsuperscript{13} ASPIA, I, 668-69; Kappler, \textit{Indian Affairs}, II, 44-45.


extremely important to the settlers living along the Mississippi River. The new Governor of the Mississippi Territory, W. C. C. Claiborne, stated: "the line embraces a much larger tract of fertile land than was expected and is consequently highly satisfactory to the citizens in this quarter."\textsuperscript{16}

Although the settlers considered the achievements of Wilkinson in the last two years to be important, he was dissatisfied. He did not feel that his talents and energy had been utilized to the best advantage. In September of 1802 he expressed a hope that he would "be able to promote measures, more extensive in their salutary consequences to this territory and the United States."\textsuperscript{17} He estimated that he had traveled sixteen thousand miles on government business during 1802 and 1803.\textsuperscript{18}

The General was probably correct in feeling that his services might have been used to better advantage. The negotiations with the Indians were important, but Colonel Hawkins and General Pickens probably would have been just as successful without Wilkinson's help. Certainly the General found enough to do on arriving at the Yazoo:

\textsuperscript{16}Claiborne to Dearborn, Jan. 17, 1803, Rowland, \textit{MTA}, I, 581.
\textsuperscript{17}Wilkinson to Claiborne, Sept. 18, 1802, \textit{Ibid.}, 515.
"I regret to find here, the road cutting entirely neglected, and to learn that everything Military, is in disorder. . . . I feel for the public service and for the discipline and subordination of the troops."  

The supervision of the road construction had been assigned to Colonel Thomas Butler in April. The Secretary of War had ordered that details of soldiers working for sixty days at a time were to cut the road from Natchez to Tennessee. As compensation for their labor the soldiers were to receive frocks and overalls and ten cents extra pay for each full day of work. Wilkinson reported that work had come to a standstill because Colonel Butler "has arrogated himself unwarrantable consequence, and instead of doing his duty, has in my judgement done unjustifiable acts, and now under the plea of indisposition has gone to the North-ward."  

While supervising the work of the soldiers on the boundary line and restoring a semblance of military order, Wilkinson was faced with a problem involving the nation's foreign relations. The problem concerned the method of transporting supplies to the southern garrisons

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19 Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 11, 1802, Rowland, WCC, I, 232.
20 Secretary of War to Butler, Apr. 16, 1802, SWLS, Roll 1, 191-93.
21 Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 11, 1802, Rowland, WCC, I, 232.
located in the interior. Some of the posts were located on rivers that flowed through Spanish territory before they emptied into the Gulf of Mexico. As a result, it was possible that American goods passing through the territory to the posts might either be subject to duties or prevented from passing entirely by the Spanish officials.

On August 6, 1802, Governor Claiborne touched upon the same problem. He suggested to the Secretary of War that a trading house for the Choctaw Indians be established at some location on the Tombigbee River. He mentioned that trouble might arise because the right to navigate Mobile Bay was not secured to the United States. However, he could foresee no lasting difficulty on this point because of "the present friendly and accommodating disposition of the Governor General of Louisiana towards the U. States. . . ."

The Governor's optimism was a bit premature. On October 28 he received a letter from William E. Huling, American vice-consul at New Orleans, reporting that the American right of deposit had been withdrawn. In addition, permission had been denied for the military stores destined for Fort Stoddert to pass through Spanish territory. Claiborne immediately sent a protest to the Governor General

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22 Claiborne to Dearborn, Aug. 6, 1802, Ibid., 153-54.

23 Huling to Claiborne, Oct. 18, 1802 and Claiborne to Huling, Oct. 28, 1802, Ibid., 207-208.

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of Louisiana and informed James Madison of the closing.\textsuperscript{24}

The letter from Huling was prompted by the issuance of a proclamation by the acting intendent of Louisiana, Juan Ventura Morales, ending the American right of deposit at New Orleans. As far as the western farmers were concerned, the right of deposit was the most important part of Pinckney's Treaty. When the right of deposit was withdrawn the settlers who were most affected threatened to take matters into their own hands if the government could not resolve the problem. The situation was made even worse by the news that on October 15, 1802, Charles IV, King of Spain, had ordered the territory of Louisiana transferred to the properly accredited representatives of Napoleon.\textsuperscript{25}

The outcry from the west was not as great as Jefferson feared it would be and certainly not as loud as the Federalists might have hoped for. A letter from Bourbon County, Kentucky, indicated the mood of at least one frontiersman: "Our country is in a state of perfect tranquility, the confidence the people has in the president and I may add in Congress too, are so firmly fixed that they will not move in any direction but that pointed out by the General Government."\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Claiborne to Don Manuel de Salcedo, Oct. 28, 1802 and Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 29, 1802, \textit{Ibid.}, 209-11.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Whitaker, \textit{Mississippi Question}, 186.
\item \textsuperscript{26} John Allen to John Breckinridge, Feb. 15, 1803, in Breckinridge Papers, Jan. - Sept., 1903, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
\end{itemize}
The government was for the time being doing nothing openly, but behind the scenes it was striving for a satisfactory settlement. The administration's policy of patience had the support of one of the powerful Kentucky papers, The Palladium. The editor wrote on January 27, 1803: "one sentiment only prevails on this subject, a perfect reliance on the justice of the Federal Government, and a determination to support its decision, let it cost what it will." Despite the strong support voiced in favor of the government's dictates, some citizens demanded that it take military action against the Spanish.

One Kentuckian wrote: "... I believe there are few (if one) who would not cheerfully give his aid in bringing Mr. Intendant and his adherents to condine [sic] punishment. ..." Even the Palladium carried an assessment of the state's military strength which might be used if peaceful means failed. The militia returns for 1802 showed that there were 26,605 officers and men enrolled and that they were armed with 11,157 rifles and 2,923 muskets.

In February rumors reached Washington that seemed to verify the reports that the western settlers were prepared to act without the consent of the government. The

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27Palladium, Jan. 27, 1803. Editor's italics.
28Achilles Sneed to Breckinridge, Dec. 20, 1802, Breckinridge Papers, Jan. - Sept., 1803.
29Palladium, Jan. 20, 1803.
reports said that a man named Wilson was raising an expedition in the neighborhood of Pittsburgh. Its purpose was to descend the rivers and take possession of the city of New Orleans. Although the Secretary of War expressed doubts about the validity of the reports, he could not risk the possible consequences if his judgement was incorrect. He issued orders to the commanders of the American posts on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to stop any expeditions that might try to descend the river. The Secretary informed General Wilkinson that the commanders had been ordered "to use all prudent means in their power to prevent the passage of any armed force not authorized by the government which may attempt to pass down either of those rivers." If an expedition was mounted, the Secretary told Wilkinson to "consider it your duty to use all the means in your power to prevent it."

The extent of the dissatisfaction was indicated by the President when he wrote that "remonstrances and memorials" were circulating throughout the western regions and that a great many citizens were signing them. The President accepted the discontent in the West as natural and honest, but the excitement in other areas he attributed

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30 Secretary of War to Thomas Cushing, Feb. 19, 1803, SWLS, Roll 1, 366.
31 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 18, 1803, Ibid., 363-66.
to other motives:

In the seaports it proceeds from a desire for war which increases the mercantile lottery; in the federalists generally, and especially those of Congress, the object is to force us into War if possible in order to damage our finances, or if this cannot be done, to attach the western country to them, as their best friends, and thus get again into power.32

At least one member of the President's own party doubted the wisdom of the policy followed by the administration. Governor Claiborne publicly endorsed the actions of Jefferson, but privately suggested to James Madison that it might be best to seize New Orleans by force. He believed that six hundred well-armed members of the territorial militia could probably take the city if they were opposed only by Spanish troops. He suggested that there were a number of citizens in Orleans and along the coast who would support the Americans if hostilities started.33

The major reason the citizens of the West were dissatisfied was because the government did not appear to be doing anything to regain the right of deposit. Jefferson recognized this factor when he wrote: "The measures we have been pursuing being invisible, do not satisfy their minds. Something sensible therefore was

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become necessary. . . “34

The sensible action that Jefferson proposed to take was the purchase of New Orleans and if possible the Floridas. When James Monroe and Edward Livingston were successful not only in purchasing New Orleans but also the rest of Louisiana, the discontent in the West died quickly. The treaty which ceded Louisiana to the United States was signed on April 30, and finally proclaimed on October 21, 1803.35

While the commissioners were negotiating with the French, a battle was being waged in the United States Congress for the support of the west. The fight was between the Federalists, who were trying to win support in the west, and the Jeffersonians who were working to retain the support of the west. The Federalist Senator from Pittsburgh, James Ross, introduced a series of resolutions designed to win the support of the western settlers. He proposed that the United States assert its right to freely navigate the Mississippi River and its right to deposit on the isle of New Orleans.

In addition to asserting the nation's rights, the


resolutions authorized the President to call into service
50,000 militia men, to be drawn from Georgia, South
Carolina, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee and the Mississippi
Territory. These men along with the regular land and
naval forces were to be used by the President to seize
and hold some place on the isle of New Orleans. The site
seized was to be used as a place of deposit for American
products. In order to finance the other resolutions, Ross
proposed that Congress appropriate five million dollars.\(^{36}\)

Ross's resolutions were defeated by a vote of
15 to 11. Ross was the only Senator even remotely connected
with the interests of the west to vote for the resolutions.
Senator John Breckinridge of Kentucky offered a counter
proposal, which probably represented the administration's
point of view.

Breckinridge's plan authorized the President to
call out 80,000 militia and to enlist volunteers, when and
if he deemed it necessary. The militia levy was to be
apportioned through all of the states not just among the
western states and territories. More importantly, there
was no mention of seizing any portion of Louisiana. The
scheme was adopted by unanimous vote. At the same time it
provided additional troops, Congress provided funds to
construct fifteen gunboats to be used on the Mississippi

\(^{36}\) *Annals of Congress*, 7th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
95–96.
River or in the southern waters of the United States.  

Upon learning of the passage of the Breckinridge resolutions, General Wilkinson expressed the fear that Spain might be angered. He suggested that Spain might transport a force of one thousand men to Louisiana from Cuba. However, he assured the Secretary of War that he would be ready to open an offensive if ordered to do so.  

The Louisiana Purchase was a major coup for the United States and a total vindication of President Jefferson's patient pursuit of a peaceful solution to a problem that might have led to war with both France and Spain. The dire prediction of a resident of New Orleans that, "The Kentucky men have often wished for an opportunity of sacking New Orleans, and the day may not be far distant," was not to be.  

While the turmoil raged over the transfer of Louisiana to France and the closing of the deposit, the Army went about its daily business as if nothing out of the ordinary was happening or even expected. In fact the strength of the force seemed to be melting away. On May 14, 1800, Congress had authorized a force of 4,436 officers and

37 Ibid., 119.


39 Palladium, Jan. 20, 1803, "Extract of a letter from a very intelligent gentleman at New Orleans, dated the third instant."
men. By December 24, 1801, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn reported that there were 4,051 men of all ranks present for duty. The reason the Army was below strength was that vacancies which occurred were not filled as an economy measure.

As an additional economy measure, the Secretary of War issued an order on March 20, 1801, just sixteen days after Jefferson's inauguration, that the two companies of United States Dragoons were to serve on foot. He stated that the order was issued as a result of the President's decision to eliminate an unnecessary expense. The horses belonging to the Dragoons were to be sold and the money deposited in the Treasury and their arms and furniture were to be returned to the public stores.

General Wilkinson was informed of the decision and ordered to arm the men and order them to garrison the posts in Tennessee. This move freed the infantry stationed in Tennessee to move to the mouth of the Ohio to await another

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41 Secretary of War to the Commanding Officer of Dragoons in Georgia, Mar. 20, 1801 and Secretary of War to the Commanding Officer of Dragoons in Tennessee, Mar. 20, 1801, SWLS, Roll 1, 47. The two companies of Dragoons had been authorized in 1796, J. P. Callan, The Military Laws of the United States (Philadelphia: G. W. Childs, 1864), 114-17.
The dismounted dragoons were finally stationed at South West Point.

On March 16, 1802, the authorized strength of the Army was reduced to 3,287, and by the end of the year the actual strength was 2,873. By December, 1803, when the Army was called upon to occupy the Louisiana Territory, its actual strength had dwindled to 2,486.

While Congress and the Administration struggled with the problem of what positive action should be taken with regard to Louisiana, the tempo of the Army's activities increased. On January 19, 1803, Governor Claiborne purchased forty-three acres of land near Washington, Mississippi. The site was to be used for the construction of a new fort to protect the vicinity of Natchez. The people of the Natchez area had been forced to rely on the troops at Port Adams for protection since the troops were withdrawn from the town on March 10, 1800. The new site was occupied by a company of soldiers from Port Adams. The

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42 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Mar. 20, 1801, SWLS, Roll 1, 47-48; Secretary of War to Caleb Swan, Aug. 3, 1802, Ibid., 100.

43 Claiborne to Secretary of War, Jan. 19, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I, 261-62; Claiborne to Secretary of War, Feb. 15, 1803, Ibid., 268-69. For additional information on the location and establishment of Fort Dearborn see Chapter VI. See also Secretary of War to Claiborne, Apr. 8, 1802, Ibid., 110-12 and Claiborne to Dearborn, Mar. 2, 1803, Ibid., 276.

troops started a blockhouse in January and completed the work by May. 45

On February 18, 1803, General Wilkinson wrote to Governor Claiborne from Fort Adams that the marking of the Choctaw boundary line was finished. 46 On the same day Secretary of War Dearborn wrote to inform the General that he could expect to be sent on another mission to the Indians. The Secretary's letter also warned of the reported activities of Wilson and contained the order to stop him if possible. 47 Three days later the Secretary issued an order directing Wilkinson to hold a meeting with the Choctaws. He was to try to arrange the cession of the lands bounded by the Yazoo and the Big Black rivers. 48

Before the Secretary's order arrived at Fort Adams, Wilkinson was able to supervise the various projects being carried out in the area. In addition to the work on the blockhouse at Washington, the works at Fort Adams were being improved. The War Department ordered an engineer to Fort Adams to plan and supervise the work. Two companies


46 Wilkinson to Claiborne, Feb. 18, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I, 271. The cost of marking the line was $2,155.00.

47 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 18, 1803, Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 186-88.

48 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 21, 1803, Ibid., 189.
of soldiers were assigned to aid in the construction of the fortifications. 49

Governor Claiborne was concerned about the safety of the territory. On May 2, 1803, he made several suggestions to General Wilkinson as to how and where the regulars should be deployed. On May 10 Wilkinson informed Claiborne that he would not divide his force into a number of small units and scatter them throughout the territory. He believed that when they were completed, the works at Fort Adams would make it impossible for a large force to pass that point on the river.

The new works were to be constructed of bricks, timber, and earth. The troops were to make the bricks and dry them in the sun and cut the timber in the neighboring swamps. Since it was impossible for the troops to work in the swamps or the hot sun after the end of June, it was essential that those two jobs be completed immediately. To speed the gathering of materials, Wilkinson had ordered the troops who were working on the road to Nashville to return to Fort Adams.

In his effort to consolidate his force, General Wilkinson declined to send troops to reoccupy Walnut Hills, unless it was absolutely necessary. He based his decision on two points: the position offered no military advantages

49 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 16, 1803, Ibid., 212-14.
but several disadvantages; and a great number of soldiers had died when the position was last occupied. Also he refused to send additional troops to occupy the new blockhouse at Washington, preferring instead to leave that task to the local militia force. Wilkinson did retain one small detachment at Bayou Pierre, a force he considered necessary to defend that part of the frontier.50

On April 16 Dearborn issued an order that took Wilkinson away from his efforts to direct the nation's defenses on the Mississippi frontier and sent him back into the wilderness. The Secretary instructed the General to proceed to the Creek Nation, where he would join Colonel Hawkins in a meeting with the Indians. The purpose of the negotiations was to persuade the Creeks to extend their cession of land between the Oconee and Ockmulga rivers so that the latter would be the boundary.51

In addition to arranging a treaty with the Creeks, Wilkinson was to determine the attitude of the Spanish concerning the transportation of supplies through their territory above Mobile. If the Spanish would not permit supplies and men to pass through their territory, the supplies would have to be shipped overland at considerable

51 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 16, 1803, Ibid., 212-14.
expense to the government and the Choctaw factory would become virtually useless.\textsuperscript{52}

The desire of the Secretary of War to obtain some definite statement from the Spanish concerning the use of the Mobile River was understandable. Spanish policy concerning the use of their rivers and ports was continually changing. On March 3, 1803, Governor Claiborne reported that the port of New Orleans was partially open to Americans. But the Governor did not indicate what policy might apply at other places and he did not believe that New Orleans would be completely opened until the Spanish Crown ordered it.\textsuperscript{53}

Before departing for the conference with the Creeks, General Wilkinson received a letter from Intendant Juan Morales concerning the use of the Mobile River by American vessels. Morales had granted the "free passage of Army provisions into the Mobile River." However, the permission was not a continuing grant and in his reply to Morales, Wilkinson requested that the Spanish establish some system to govern the passage of supplies in the future. He suggested that the United States be allowed to send one unarmed boat into the Mobile in the spring and autumn. The vessel was to carry a certificate from the Secretary of War or the Commanding General stating

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid.
that it was employed solely in the public service of the United States.

The General alluded to the fact that: "the public service of the United States is liable to embarrassments, delay and unnecessary expense by the circuitous route which supplies for the support of our establishments on the Mobile and Tombigby [sic] are obliged to take."

Wilkinson also requested that the Americans living above the Spanish territory on the Tombigbee, Alabama and Mobile rivers be granted the privilege of free navigation on those rivers to the Gulf of Mexico.\(^5^4\)

In late July General Wilkinson proceeded to the vicinity of Fort St. Stephens where he met with the Choctaw chiefs at the village of Hoe Buckintoopa. On August 31, 1803, an agreement was reached that provided for the cession of approximately 853,760 acres of land by the Choctaws. In return the United States would pay the overdue bills that the Indians owed the British firm of Panton, Leslie and Company.\(^5^5\) After concluding the

\(^{5^4}\) Wilkinson to Morales, July 6, 1803, Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 219-21. The letter from Morales to Wilkinson has not been found. Peake says: "Goods which ordinarily would be sent to Fort Saint Stephens by the way of Mobile were sent to New Orleans and up the Mississippi or were sent overland from Natchez by pack animals if trouble developed with the Spanish at Mobile." A History of the United States Indian Factory System, 93.

treaty, Wilkinson remained in the Tombigbee region to
direct the retracing and remarking of the boundary line
between the United States and the Choctaw Nation.

On July 18, 1803, President Jefferson wrote to
Governor Claiborne inquiring whether or not he would be
able to proceed to New Orleans and take possession of that
territory for the United States. The President also asked
if three companies of regulars from Fort Adams would be
sufficient to man the fortifications in the neighborhood
of the city.\footnote{Jefferson to Claiborne, July 18, 1803, Clarence
E. Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United
States, IX, The Territory of Orleans, 1803-1812
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), 5.}
On August 12 Governor Claiborne accepted
the appointment as commissioner to receive Louisiana from
the French. In addition, he stated that the three companies
of regulars "should be ample."\footnote{Claiborne to Jefferson, Aug. 12, 1803, Ibid.,
11-12. On Aug. 24 Governor Claiborne again wrote to
the President to express his gratitude for the appoint­
ment and answered a number of questions the President
had posed concerning Louisiana. Ibid., 16-25.}

On July 15 the Secretary
of War had ordered the commanding officer at Fort Adams to
be prepared to transfer four companies of soldiers and a
large supply of stores that were being sent to New Orleans
from Philadelphia.\footnote{Order cited, Ibid., 71n.}

On September 9 Daniel Clark, a resident of New
Orleans, addressed a letter to the Secretary of State that contained some unsettling news. The letter was an answer to a communication from the President requesting information about Louisiana. Clark reported at great length about affairs in the territory, and in the course of the report, he stated that there were 5,440 militia in Louisiana. If the Spanish decided to contest the French surrender of Louisiana to the United States, the militia combined with the regular Spanish troops in the province would constitute a powerful force.

On October 5 the Secretary of War stated that there were rumors that Spain might oppose or try to delay the efforts of the United States to assume control at New Orleans. After the delaying tactics employed by the Spanish at Natchez, there was every reason to believe that the rumors were valid. As a consequence of these fears, General Wilkinson was ordered to have enough boats, provisions, field pieces, and other equipment ready for the use of not only the regulars but for five hundred of the best militia from the Mississippi Territory.

Wilkinson, being absent, could not supervise the activities at Fort Adams. Therefore Governor Claiborne assumed the responsibility for directing the preparations.

Daniel Clark to Secretary of State, Sept. 8, 1803, Ibid., 28-47.
Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 5, 1803, Ibid., 71.
for the trip to New Orleans. The Governor gather information from a variety of sources: from Captain Edward Turner concerning preparations at Port Adams; from Daniel Clark with regard to possible delays on the part of Spain; and from a traveler who said that the fortifications at New Orleans were virtually useless and that the Spanish regulars could not furnish an adequate garrison for the defenses.61

Claiborne realized that he was assuming duties that were not a part of his office, but he justified his military questions on the basis that:

These are enquiries which would come more regularly from General Wilkinson, but he has not yet returned to this territory, and as the utmost dispatch is required by Government in this affair, it is my duty not to lose one moment unnecessarily.62

On October 31 a commission was issued which appointed Governor Claiborne and General Wilkinson as agents on behalf of the United States to receive Louisiana. On the same day lengthy instructions were issued to both men by which they were to govern their conduct before and after the territorial transfer.63

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61 Claiborne to Secretary of State, Nov. 18, 1803, and Claiborne to Clark, Nov. 18, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I, 284–90.

62 Claiborne to Clark, Nov. 18, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I, 288.

63 Commission of W. C. C. Claiborne and James Wilkinson as Agents, Oct. 31, 1803, Territorial Papers, IX, 94; Secretary of State to Claiborne, Oct. 31, 1803.
General Wilkinson was to occupy the military posts in the province as soon as they were transferred to the United States, but those in New Orleans and its vicinity were to be garrisoned first. It was anticipated that Wilkinson would have a force composed of six companies of regulars and a hundred militia, from the Natchez district, with which to work. After the territory was transferred the government of the territory would be in the hands of Governor Claiborne.

The foregoing instructions were based on the assumption that the territory would be surrendered without opposition. However, if Spain should resist American occupation, the General and Governor Claiborne were to decide whether or not to seize the territory. If the use of force was decided upon, Wilkinson was to use the regulars at Fort Adams and as many militia as could be gathered in the neighborhood of Natchez. In issuing these orders the Secretary of War calculated that between six and nine hundred militia could be raised and that the regular force would number between three and four hundred. He considered his force adequate to seize New Orleans.

The Secretary informed Wilkinson that the Governor of Tennessee had been instructed to raise five hundred men and send them to Natchez. These troops were to be used if the General felt they were necessary. If the troops were

Ibid., 91-94; Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 31, 1803, Ibid., 96-98.
not employed in taking New Orleans, the General could use them as he saw fit. As an added precaution, the Governors of Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio had been instructed to have 6,000 men ready to march if necessary.64

Despite the detailed instructions from the Secretary of War, General Wilkinson would not be able to supervise the preparations at Fort Adams for some time. Captain Turner, the commanding officer at Fort Adams, informed Governor Claiborne that a letter from Wilkinson, dated October 27, stated that he would leave Pensacola in three days.65 On November 26 Claiborne reported that he expected the General to arrive at Fort Adams at any time. On November 11 the General left Fort St. Stephens for Mobile. From there he would travel to New Orleans and then up the Mississippi to Fort Adams.66

While he waited for Wilkinson, Governor Claiborne became more concerned about the possibility that the Spanish would resist American occupation of Louisiana. He applauded the decision to order the mounted infantry from Tennessee as "a wise and provident measure, as that

64 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 31, 1803, Ibid., 96-98. Secretary of War to Sevier, Gerard and Tiffin, Oct. 31, 1803, SWLS, Roll 2, 250.
65 Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 18, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I, 295.
66 Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 26, 1803, Ibid., 297-98.
reinforcement will at all events be useful, if they arrive in time as an addition to our little Army... In addition to the militia from Tennessee the Governor arranged for some of the Mississippi Territorial militia to move to New Orleans.

The Governor clearly missed the presence of General Wilkinson. He informed Albert Gallatin that:

The Government having placed (and with great propriety too) their principal reliance on General Wilkinson for the management of a Coup De Main if it should be deemed expedient, I cannot describe to you the painful anxiety which I feel at the absence of this experienced and valuable officer. I indulge however some hope that his speedy arrival will relieve me from my present embarrassment.

The Governor told the militia Captains that he would accept the services of any company, to act as volunteers, to escort the Commissioners to New Orleans. As a safeguard against delays, Claiborne wrote:

I deem it good policy for the American Commissioners not to proceed to New Orleans until our Army is ready to move: with a number of brave men at our command, the negociations [sic]

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67 Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 18, 1803, Ibid., 287.
68 Claiborne to Gallatin, Nov. 18, 1803, Ibid., 293. Claiborne's italics.
69 Claiborne to Clark, Nov. 21, 1803, Ibid., 295-96.
may be considerable [sic] accelerated if delays should be attempted.70

Claiborne continued his preparations for the movement to New Orleans. On November 26 he reported that fourteen boats were ready at Fort Adams and that in a few days the soldiers would complete six more.71 Two days later Claiborne reported that the response from the militia had not been as great as he had hoped, but he anticipated that two hundred men would eventually volunteer. He estimated that when the two hundred men joined the regulars at Fort Adams the force would be about five hundred men.72

On November 29 Daniel Clark sent word to Claiborne and Wilkinson from New Orleans that the French would take possession of the territory the next day.73 The day after the French took possession of Louisiana, Governor Claiborne embarked about one hundred militia at Natchez for Fort Adams. He anticipated that eighty more men, moving by land, would join him at the fort. Claiborne stated that the troops from Tennessee had not arrived but were on the way. He also reported that General Wilkinson had arrived in New Orleans on the twenty-fifth and was expected to

70 Ibid.
71 Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 26, 1803, Ibid., 297-98.
72 Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 29, 1803, Ibid., 299.
73 Clark to Claiborne and Wilkinson, Nov. 29, 1803, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 125.
arrive at Fort Adams at any moment.  

The movement from Fort Adams was delayed until sufficient transportation could be arranged for all of the men and supplies. Claiborne informed the Secretary of State that he had assembled one hundred and sixty volunteers and expected about forty more to join him before the force marched. He estimated that the combined force numbered between four hundred and fifty and five hundred, exclusive of the Tennessee militia which had not yet arrived.

On December 10 the two commissioners and their military escort began the movement down the river on eighteen boats and two barges. By December 15 the Americans reached a point approximately two miles above the city of New Orleans where they prepared their camp. The total strength of the force that Wilkinson commanded was about three hundred and fifty men.

At noon on December 20 Commissioners Claiborne

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74 Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 1, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I, 300-301.
75 Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 5, 6 and 7, 1803, Ibid., 303-305.
and Wilkinson took possession of the province of Louisiana for the United States. The formal transfer was greeted with mixed emotions by the onlookers in the Place d'Armes; some cheered but most watched in silence.  

General Wilkinson reported that the transfer was accomplished peacefully and the town was quiet. He stationed one hundred and seventy men throughout the city to maintain law and order. The General's force numbered four hundred and fifty men, and from that number he proposed to maintain three distinct patrols in the town. The General stationed his men at points where he thought trouble might occur. He cautioned the soldiers to be on their best behavior and to be friendly and considerate to the local residents. Wilkinson soon discovered that the maintenance of discipline was difficult in New Orleans. In his first General Order the General mentioned that most of the men on guard at Fort St. Louis had left their post to explore the city. The few soldiers remaining in the

78 Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 20, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I, 306-307. Governor Claiborne wrote: "The standard of my country was this day unfurled here, amidst the re-interated acclamations of thousands." But some reports indicate that there was little enthusiasm on the part of the crowd, Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (New York: Goupil & Co. of Paris, 1904), II, 234-86.


The celebrating by the American soldiers was probably inevitable, but it could have destroyed the discipline of the small force. As a result, Governor Claiborne issued an order banning the sale of wines, spirits, or other strong liquor to soldiers. The order strictly prohibited sales to non-commissioned officers and privates without the written permission of an officer. The permit was to be addressed by name to the individual who was selling the liquor. Any person who was found guilty of violating the order was subject to a fine not to exceed fifty dollars.

The principal concern of the Commissioners was the continuing presence of the Spanish in New Orleans. Wilkinson and Claiborne filed a joint report on this problem on December 29. The transfer of the province had gone smoothly. However, the Spanish were still in the city and their presence was causing some problems and uneasiness. The Spanish still occupied the barracks, magazines, hospital, and public storehouses. The repeated requests of the Americans for the Spanish to vacate the buildings had gone unheeded. The Americans had occupied only the forts at Plaquemine and the blockhouse at the Balize. The other posts would be occupied as soon as possible.

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82 Order of the Governor, Dec. 24, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I, 311-12.
Wilkinson had determined that the militia from Natchez would be retained a little longer at New Orleans. The General believed that additional troops were necessary since there were still about three hundred Spanish soldiers in the city. If he dismissed the militia, the regulars would be outnumbered by the Spanish, a situation that would make "the possession of the city somewhat precarious." Besides, in addition to the large number of Spanish soldiers present in the city, there were reports that Spain was gathering troops on the Mexican frontier. The military build-up in Mexico was apparently being made with a view to encroaching on the ceded territory.83

The Commissioners reported on January 3, 1804, that orders had been issued for the surrender of the posts of Concordia, Attakapas and Opelousas to the United States. The Americans had obtained the use of only a part of the barracks, "but the more eligible portion of those buildings" was still occupied by the Spanish troops. The French and Spanish still retained possession of the storehouses and magazines. The American supplies were still stored aboard the boats that had transported them from Natchez. Wilkinson rented private storehouses in the city in an effort to save

the provisions from the elements.84

General Wilkinson was preparing to return to the capital as soon as possible, but he was detained by the delays encountered in taking possession of the military facilities. Also he faced the perplexing problem of which officer to place in command when he left New Orleans. Wilkinson's assessment of his subordinate's was dismal at best:

Wadsworth is interdicted the exercise of authority, Turner is the only officer who can be trusted with the distant and delicate command at Natchitoches - Gregg, Cooper & Muhlenburgh remain - the second is at Placquimenes [sic] tho unfit for a separate command - the first is utterly destitute of education, manner, & intelligence, and poor Muhlenburgh's devoted to drink, with good disposition but feeble intellect - Bowyer with his company a fine one, is daily expected from the Mobile, but this officer tho greatly superior to Gregg labours under the same disqualification.85

In another letter of the same date, the General reported that his men occupied the ground floor of the barracks, but the Spanish still possessed the second floor. The building was without heat and the men were falling ill

84 Claiborne and Wilkinson to Madison, Jan. 3, 1804, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 149-50.

85 Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Jan. 3, 1804, Ibid., 150-51. The officers referred to were Aaron Gregg, Henry L. Cooper, Decius Wadsworth, Edward Turner, Henry Muhlenberg, and John Bowyer.
as a result of their exposure to the weather. The hospital, which the Americans desperately needed, was still occupied by the Spanish. The sick list showed that fifty-nine non-commissioned officers and privates were ill, and one man had died the previous night.

The Americans possessed none of the public buildings in New Orleans, although the post of Plaquemine and St. Jean had been occupied. The next day a detachment was to move to Attakapas and Opelousas and take possession of those posts. The French had not ordered the delivery of the Illinois country and it appeared that it would take a few days longer to procure the necessary order. In an effort to curtail expenditures, Wilkinson had dismissed the militia force from Mississippi.

By January 9 the Commissioners reported that the situation had not improved. The French had not issued the necessary orders for the surrender of Natchitoches or the posts in Upper Louisiana. The delay was attributed to the failure of the Spanish Commissioners to order the transfer by their post commanders. They reported, however, that it was likely that the orders would be delivered the next day.

The situation in New Orleans reported in the joint

86 Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Jan. 3, 1804, Ibid., 152-53.
87 Claiborne and Wilkinson to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1804, Ibid., 155-57.
communication to the Secretary of State was different in tone than the one addressed to the Secretary of War by Wilkinson. He stated that he had discharged the militia because of "their importunity, their impatience, the irregularities into which they were running and the expense they occasioned." Three regulars had died since the third of the month, but the number of men on the sick list was declining. Because of the necessity of maintaining a constant guard, many of the men had not spent more than one night in bed. He expected that the men would be afforded some relief by the arrival of the troops from Mobile.

The General said that he would be unable to leave New Orleans until the objects in his commission had been fulfilled and that would require time because conditions in the city were dangerous: the Spanish had more troops than the Americans had; the French Prefect, Mr. Laussat, was involved in a dispute with some of the French officers; the conduct of a group from Bourdeaux, unidentified in the sources, endangered the public safety; and the tensions between the white citizens and the free people of color were growing. All of these factors had convinced the General that a strong garrison was required in the city.

Wilkinson observed that "our puny force has become a subject of ridicule." One example of how inadequate his force was and the rapidity with which events could move was
recorded by the General:

A few nights since some person observed that the Governor or the General had given leave for the demolition of the stockade which surrounded the city, and by 8 o'clock the next morning, before the operation was noticed by our guards, which occupy the center of the city, and the Forts St. Charles and St. Louis near the River, not one stick was left on a line of one and a half miles, and a House in one of the rear redoubts was rased to its foundation and the materials carried off.

Wilkinson related that two of his officers were to be tried by courts martial: Captain Aaron Gregg for allowing a prisoner to escape from confinement; and Captain Henry Mughlenburgh for leaving his post contrary to direct orders. The General apologized for the freedom of his communication and the views it contained but he felt that the Secretary should be aware of the situation that existed in New Orleans. 88

On January 16 General Wilkinson reported that the order for the delivery of the posts in Upper Louisiana had been received. This information had been sent to Captain Amos Stoddard, who was waiting at Fort Massac to occupy the posts when the Spanish evacuated them.

Wilkinson said that the possibility existed that problems might develop with the French. A French ship carrying soldiers and refugees from Santo Domingo had

88 Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, Jan. 11, 1804, Ibid., 159-61.
landed at the Balize. With the approval of Governor Claiborne, the General had ordered the commanding officer at Plaquemine to prevent the ship from ascending the river. The ship was detained for two reasons: (1) there was sickness aboard that might spread to the local population; and (2) it was feared that the arrival of French troops might upset the delicate balance that existed in the province.89

A company of regulars commanded by Lieutenant Henry Hopkins was ordered to occupy the posts at Attakapas and Opelousas. To provide for the continuation of the civil government in the area after the removal of the Spanish Commandant, Governor Claiborne appointed Hopkins to the post of Civil Commandant. The Governor believed that the young officer was well suited to meet the responsibilities of his dual office, because he was a "young man of prudence, good information, and possesses some knowledge of the French language." Thus Lieutenant Hopkins assumed the duties not only of military commander of the district but also civil commandant, a position identical in authority and responsibilities to that occupied by the former Spanish Commandant.90

89Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, Jan. 16, 1804, Ibid., 164-66. See also Claiborne and Wilkinson to Secretary of State, Jan. 17, 1804, Ibid., 166-67.

90Claiborne to Hopkins, Jan. 20, 1804, Rowland, WCC, I, 336-38; Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 24, 1804, Ibid., 344-49.
By the final week of January the situation had not changed appreciably. The Americans were still sharing the barracks with the Spanish troops, and the magazines and storehouses still contained the French and Spanish supplies. There appeared to be no preparations on the part of either group to withdraw. Expenses were high because it was necessary to rent quarters and storehouses and repair the various public buildings. Wilkinson wrote: "everything which could be neglected by the Spaniards after the cession of this province has been neglected, and we find everything out of repair."

The American soldiers were relatively comfortable. Although two men were seriously ill, the sick list was decreasing. The men had built fireplaces and chimneys in the barracks to provide heat against the cold weather. The General reported that there was snow on the ground and that the temperature the previous night had dropped to thirty degrees. The troops were complaining about their pay, which for some was fifteen months in arrears. A detachment had not been sent to Natchitoches because the garrison at New Orleans was too small to furnish an adequate garrison for the new post. The reinforcements from Mobile had not arrived because contrary winds had prevented them from entering the Mississippi.91

91Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Jan. 24, 1804, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 168-70.
On January 23 General Wilkinson ordered Captain Amos Stoddard to take possession of the military posts in Upper Louisiana. The next day Governor Claiborne informed the Captain that he was to act as the Civil Commandant for the district. Claiborne told Stoddard that he would possess "the same powers in civil matters which heretofore were exercised by the first Civil Commandant of the District of Upper Louisiana under the Spanish Government. . . ."92

On February 17 Governor Claiborne informed Secretary of State James Madison that the Spanish and French forces were still in New Orleans. The representatives of the two powers spoke of a speedy evacuation, but the Governor feared that further delays were likely. Ten days later the Commissioners reported that the Spanish had finally begun to remove their cannons from some of the posts in the area. The Spanish Governor of Florida, Vincente Folch, was in New Orleans and he indicated that some of the troops in the city would be embarked for Pensacola in three or four days. He predicted that a complete evacuation would be effected in approximately twenty days.94


94 Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 17, 1804, Ibid., 376-77. Claiborne and Wilkinson to Madison, Feb. 27,
General Wilkinson dispatched Captain Turner and a detachment of regulars to occupy the post at Natchitoches. On February 25 Governor Claiborne appointed Captain Turner as Civil Commandant of the District of Natchitoches on the Red River. Turner's appointment meant that three officers exercised not only military but also civil authority in three districts of Louisiana.  

On March 11, Wilkinson and Claiborne reported that a part of the Spanish troops had departed and arrangements were being made for the removal of the remaining soldiers. Various Spanish officials had assured the Americans that the final evacuation would be accomplished by March 20. While the Spanish were preparing to leave Louisiana, the United States was increasing its military strength. The Secretary of War informed General Wilkinson that two companies of marines and three companies of soldiers were on their way to New Orleans.  

The Spanish forces did not complete their removal by March 20 as Governor Claiborne had been assured.  

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95 Claiborne to Turner, Feb. 25, 1804, Rowland, *WCC*, I, 385-86.


97 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at New Orleans, Mar. 15, 1804, *SWLS*, Roll 2, 197.
April 7 Governor Claiborne expressed his exasperation in a letter to James Madison. He wrote: "the Spanish forces are still here, preparations for an evacuation are making, but with all the sloth peculiar to Spanish operations." Within two days the Governor was able to state that the Spanish troops, numbering about three hundred officers and men, had finally departed for Pensacola. The only Spanish soldiers remaining were a company of dragoons destined for Mexico, and a company of infantry that made up the guard for the Spanish boundary commissioner, the Marquis Casa de Calvo.98

While the Spanish prepared to evacuate Louisiana the members of the Army were actively engaged in a number of duties in the new territory. William Dunbar was preparing to explore the Red and Arkansas rivers at the request of President Jefferson. He was to have an escort of one officer, a sergeant and ten enlisted men. The Secretary of War cautioned that none of the soldiers accompanying Dunbar should be intemperate in their habits.99 The expedition was finally cancelled because Congress failed to appropriate the necessary funds. Instead of exploring the two rivers, Dunbar took a smaller expedition up the Washita


99 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at New Orleans, Mar. 31, 1804, SWLS, Roll 2, 208 and Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at New Orleans, Apr. 19, 1804, Ibid., 226.
River. The expedition was composed of Dunbar, one officer, a sergeant and twelve enlisted men supplied by Colonel Freeman from the garrison at New Orleans.\textsuperscript{100} While Dunbar was preparing his expedition, Wilkinson was conducting a military inspection of Lake Ponchartrain.\textsuperscript{101}

Claiborne availed himself of the opportunity offered by the presence of Governor Folch in New Orleans to try to resolve the problem of transporting goods through Spanish territory to Fort St. Stephens. Claiborne requested permission for goods to pass to and from the factory without paying duties or being stopped by Spanish officials. Folch denied the request but promised to present the American case to the King for his consideration.\textsuperscript{102}

Upon receiving Folch’s reply, Claiborne told the Secretary of War that the problem could be resolved if the United States would occupy the territory east of the Mississippi to the Perdido River. The Governor believed that the United States had a valid claim to this area under the provisions of the treaty that ceded Louisiana to the United States. Upon further consideration, Claiborne advised

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 7, 1804, Rowland, \textit{WCC}, II, 83-84. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 10, 1804, \textit{Ibid.}, 89.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Claiborne to Folch, Mar. 7, 1804, \textit{Ibid.}, 19-20. Folch to Claiborne, Mar. 15, 1804, \textit{Ibid.}, 38.
\end{itemize}
Joseph Chambers, the factor at Fort St. Stephens, to ship his goods through Mobile and if necessary pay the duties demanded. He cautioned Chambers to lodge a formal complaint with the Spanish if he was required to pay duties on government property.  

When he returned from inspecting Lake Ponchartrain, Wilkinson took time to renew his dealings with the Spanish. He approached Governor Folch and requested that his pension be increased to $4,000 a year, and that the $20,000 in arrears be paid in full. In exchange for these payments, Wilkinson would write some reflections on Louisiana that might be helpful to the Spanish. Folch did not have the funds necessary to meet the General's demands, but he sent Wilkinson to Casa Calvo who could use a portion of his boundary commission funds to pay the General. Casa Calvo accepted Wilkinson's offer and paid him $12,000, for which Wilkinson produced his reflections.

Wilkinson's reflections were of little value to the Spanish as they recommended policies which would be virtually impossible for Spain to carry out. At the same time he

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103 Claiborne to Dearborn, Mar. 15, 1804, Ibid., 39-40. Claiborne to Chambers, Mar. 21, 1804, Ibid., 52-53.

104 Folch to Someruelos, Apr. 10, 1804, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1574; I. J. Cox, "General Wilkinson and his Later Intrigues with the Spaniards," American Historical Review, XIX (June, 1914), 794-814.
prepared his reflections for Casa Calvo, Wilkinson prepared another version for President Jefferson. The General was playing both ends against the middle, a game at which he was a master. Before he left New Orleans for Washington the General assured Folch that he would determine the President's views concerning Spain. Wilkinson promised to communicate the views to Folch as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{105}

On April 28, 1804, with his money from Casa Calvo invested in sugar speculations and his report for Jefferson prepared, Wilkinson left New Orleans for Washington.\textsuperscript{106} This trip was the fourth that Wilkinson had made to the capital since 1796. When he returned to the frontier a year later, he would be the Commanding General of the Army as well as the Governor of the Louisiana Territory.

The situation in Louisiana was improving when Wilkinson left New Orleans. Lieutenant James B. Many had occupied the post and the district of the Arkansas and Lieutenant Joseph Bowmar had occupied the district of Ouachitas. The two officers would exercise both civil and military authority until permanent arrangements could

\textsuperscript{105} Folch to Someruelos, Apr. 10, 1804, A. G. I., Seville, \textit{Papeles de Cuba}, leg. 1574.

be made for the government of the districts. The American troops stationed in New Orleans were healthy and well disciplined. On May 4 one hundred marines arrived in the city to bolster the depleted garrison.

The officers and men stationed at the various posts were occupied with the problems of maintaining law and order throughout the territory. Captain William Cooper, commanding officer at Plaquemine, was required to enforce a number of regulations. He stopped a number of armed vessels at his post that were attempting to ascend the river. He also detained vessels that were engaged in transporting slaves into the region, and perhaps most importantly he quarantined a ship with smallpox aboard. The officers commanding in the outlying districts found themselves occupied with few military duties but numerous civil responsibilities.

Governor Claiborne was concerned about the activities of the Spanish. By mid-May there were six former Spanish officials, fifteen army officers, a company of dragoons, and a detachment of infantry still in New Orleans. Spanish supplies, powder, balls, and arms filled the public warehouses and there was a large train of artillery in the park. The dragoons were expected to leave before the end of the month but the remaining Spaniards were expected to remain through the summer.

The Spanish officials at Mobile had detained some of the provisions shipped from New Orleans to Fort Stoddard. The contractor had finally been forced to pay a duty of twelve percent on the supplies before they were released. The furs being shipped from the factory at Fort St. Stephens had been stopped and the same duties exacted upon them. The products being exported by the citizens living above Mobile were subject to the duties, which the citizens were paying reluctantly. In addition, it was reported that the Spanish were fortifying Pensacola and Mobile. When the new works were completed, five or six hundred Spanish troops would be stationed at the former post and a battalion of artillery and a company of dragoons at the latter.

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112 Claiborne to Dearborn, Apr. 20, 1804, Ibid., 108.
During the first week of June Lieutenant Colonel Constant Freeman arrived in New Orleans with three additional companies of infantry, and assumed command of the troops in Louisiana. Governor Claiborne reported that the Colonel was pleased with the discipline of the troops and he predicted that Freeman was an excellent choice for the commander at New Orleans. The Colonel was an experienced officer, he had a good knowledge of the French language, and, a final point in his favor, he was a Catholic.¹¹³

By late June Claiborne wrote:

I cannot too highly approve the general conduct of the Army: the officers act with propriety and the troops are under excellent discipline, Colonel Freeman commands with prudence and dignity and I am, persuaded his conduct will be perfectly satisfactory.¹¹⁴

The Governor realized the difficult position that the officers of the Army occupied when they were assigned to administer the civil government of a district. He told the Commandant of Ouchita, Lieutenant Joseph Bowmar:

It is one of the serious inconveniences of the present state of things in this country that we are under the necessity of being governed as nearly as possible, by a system, in most points incongenial with the principles of our own Government by Laws to which we are almost utter strangers, and forms a practice as intricate as they are new to us. . . .¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Claiborne to Dearborn, June 9, 1804, Ibid., 199.
²¹⁴ Claiborne to Dearborn, June 22, 1804, Ibid., 217-19.
¹¹⁵ Claiborne to Bowmar, June 27, 1804, Ibid., 223-27.
The only advice the Governor could give was to consult him if questions arose that the Lieutenant was unable to answer.

On July 16, 1804, Governor Claiborne requested that an officer and about twenty enlisted men be stationed at the Balize. The detachment was to assist the revenue inspector who was stationed at the Balize. The soldiers were to prevent the entrance into "this province of Negroes whose characters and conduct have given serious alarm to the good inhabitants." The Governor did not expect the detachment to remain at the Balize after October 1, 1804, when the law prohibiting the importation of slaves into Louisiana was to take affect. 116

The Governor instructed the Commanding Officer at Plaquemine, Captain Abimall Y. Nicoll, to inspect all ships ascending the river to determine whether any of the crew had been landed between the Balize and Plaquemine. The Captain was also to inspect all ships descending the river to determine whether or not there were any runaway slaves aboard the ships. All runaways discovered were to be detained until claimed by their owners. The man who discovered the runaway could charge eight dollars for the recovery. The slave was to be furnished with one ration per day while at the fort. All expenses were to

116 Claiborne to Freeman, July 16, 1804, Ibid., 250-51. Claiborne to Freeman, July 17, 1804, and Claiborne to Captain Johnson 1st Pilot at the Balize, July 18, 1804, Ibid., 254-58.
be paid by the slave's owner before he could take the slave away. The Captain was also to inform people ascending the river that they were required to register at the Mayor's office within twenty-four hours after arriving in the city.117

In Orleans Territory the period from June until December of 1804 was spent in consolidating the position of the United States and watching the activities of the Spanish to the east and to the west. Governor Claiborne's solution to all of the problems with Spain was fairly simple. He suggested that: "the marching of a few thousand troops to the western frontier of Louisiana would make Spain tremble for her Mexican possessions, and promptly yield to our just claims."118

For the soldiers stationed in the South who were not actively involved in the occupation of the Louisiana Purchase, the period from November of 1803 until September of 1805 was a period of idleness. The soldiers were occupied with maintaining the military posts and waiting to see how the situation to the west would develop. The one thing that might have required any activity on the part of the officers and men was an order to cooperate with civil authorities in the enforcement of "An act for the more

117 Claiborne to Nicoll, July 25, 1804, Ibid., 262-63.
118 Claiborne to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, 1804, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 312-13.
effectual preservation of peace in the ports and harbors of the United States." The officers were required to give assistance when it was requested by civil officers, but it appears that no requests were made.\textsuperscript{119}

Conditions were so relaxed in the South that apparently the War Department was not in communication with some of the troops. The Secretary of War addressed a letter to the commanding officer at Fort Wilkinson that contained a strange request:

\begin{quote}
Enclosed herewith I send you a communication for the officer commanding the troops on the sea coast of Georgia. Should there be any stationed in that quarter of the state, I will thank you to forward it to the officer.\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

The lull in the Army's activities in the area outside of the Louisiana Purchase was a result of several factors: (1) the Army's limited manpower made more than one large operation virtually impossible; (2) the lack of transportation facilities did not allow rapid movement of men or supplies from one part of the nation to another; and (3) the limited funds available to the War Department meant that only the most important operations could be undertaken.

A letter from the War Department to General Wilkinson revealed the situation confronting the commanding general.

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{119}Secretary of War - Circular, June 19, 1805, \textit{SWLS}, Roll 2, 342.
\textsuperscript{120}Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort Wilkinson, June 22, 1805, \textit{Ibid.}, 345.
\end{quote}
Wilkinson was to adhere to the most rigid economy in all of his actions and to make no unnecessary expenditures. He was to establish no permanent posts or incur any "considerable expense for work or buildings at present."120

For a few months the activities of the Army were virtually at a standstill. Time was required to determine how the Army should be employed on the frontier and what it was expected to accomplish. Before any definite plans could be made, events occurred that required the attention of the Army. The temporary calm was dispelled by reports of growing problems between the United States and Spain.

120Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 19, 1805, Ibid., 319-21.
CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS WITH THE
SPANISH AND AARON BURR

The acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase put a severe strain upon the limited resources of the Army, which had to divert troops to occupy it. Although only a small portion of the territory was initially occupied, new posts were established that required men to garrison them. Within the limits of the present state of Louisiana seven new posts were established between 1803 and 1806; by contrast, in the rest of the nation only eight other posts were founded. While the Army established fifteen posts, it abandoned three and another was washed away by the Atlantic Ocean. The net gain of eleven new posts in only four years meant that the strength of many of the older garrisons were reduced to a bare minimum. Consequently, the pace of the Army's activities slowed, while decisions were made concerning its future assignments.¹

¹See Appendix for posts in the South. Information concerning other forts was taken from Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789-1895 (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964). Fort Greene located on Cockspur Island was washed away by the action of the sea in 1804.
The Army's period of inactivity was brief. But during that time the relations between the civil and military officials in New Orleans were strained to the breaking point. The conflict arose over the question of whose authority was supreme, and where the powers of one official stopped and those of the other one began.

The disagreement resulted from the occupation of certain buildings in the city by the military, specifically the house in which Colonel Freeman and his family were living. On May 14 Governor Claiborne requested that the Colonel vacate the house so that the district court might use it. The Colonel's residence seemed to be the only suitable public building in town and the court could not be denied its use. The Governor closed with a strong statement:

"I sincerely wish it were in my power comfortably to accommodate the civil as well as the military authorities. But as it is not, the civil officers may of right claim a preference in the occupation of public buildings not attached to the Barracks."^{2}

At the time, Freeman was living in a building that had originally been a school, but the Spanish had used it as a hospital and a barracks. After Freeman moved in, the

artificers attached to his command had made numerous
repairs in an effort to make the quarters livable. Since
there were no quarters available in the barracks, Freeman
deprecated to move until the Secretary of War authorized
him to rent other accommodotions. He informed the
Governor, "I shall expect orders from the Head of the
Department to which I belong - to those I will pay the
most implicit obedience."³

Governor Claiborne was not satisfied by Freeman's
response, and his reply contained a threat:

I deem it proper to declare that
your continuance in your present
Quarters is not agreeable to me.
Since by so doing the Federal
Court for this district is sub-
jected to great inconveniences. . . .
I deem it proper further to inform
you that to myself (for the present)
more properly belongs the care and
disposition of the public buildings
not appertaining to the military
establishment, and I am assured
Sir, that your conduct on this
occasion will not be approved by
the President, to whom our corre-
spondence together with Judge Hall's
communication will be submitted.⁴

The next day Claiborne sent a long letter to the
Secretary of State outlining the jurisdictional dispute
over the Colonel's house. In the letter he touched upon

³Freeman to Claiborne, June 2, 1805 and Claiborne
to Freeman, June 3, 1805, Ibid., 62-66; Freeman to
Claiborne, June 5, 1805, Ibid., 72.

⁴Claiborne to Freeman, June 5, 1805, Ibid., 72-73.
the subject that probably bothered him as much as the question of where the court would meet or where Colonel Freeman would live. Colonel Freeman had refused the Governor's request to increase the garrison at Fort St. John until he could determine whether or not the increase was justified. Because of this apparent affront to his authority as Territorial Governor, Claiborne asked the Secretary of State to define his position:

The line of demarkation between my powers, and those of the officers who may command the troops in this quarter be distinctly marked. . . . But while the Army is stationed in the interior of this Territory, I should presume that a requisition from the Governor ought to be viewed as binding on the officer commanding . . . . where a military force is requisite for the protection of society or the support of the Laws. I think the Governor should have authority to command such force and not be dependent upon the will or disposition to oblige of a Colonel, Major or Captain who may happen (often by merit but sometimes by chance) to be the commanding officer.

The Governor's argument was based upon his position as the commander of the territorial militia. Since the coordination of the efforts of the militia and the regulars in the event of an emergency was essential, he felt that he should have the authority to determine the disposition of the troops.  

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5 Claiborne to Madison, June 6, 1805, Ibid., 76-78.
The dispute between Claiborne and Freeman soon expanded to include the New Orleans City Council. The council had ordered property owners to pave the sidewalks and repair the gutters on their property. If the improvements were not made, the council would order it done at the owner's expense. As a result of improvements made to streets adjoining the military barracks, the United States owed the city $642.00. When the bill was presented to Governor Claiborne, he immediately sent it to Colonel Freeman along with a bitter note: "as you appear to suppose that you have particularly, in charge the buildings of the United States in this city, or rather those in which troops have at any time been stationed I presume you will feel no difficulty in adjusting this account as a public agent. . . ."6

The following day, June 13, Claiborne demanded that Freeman acknowledge the receipt of the Governor's letters. He stated, "my communications to you are always official, and therefore an acknowledgement of their receipt will at all times be expected." On the same day Claiborne acknowledged a letter from Freeman by saying, "your last letter is now before me. It is unfortunate that we cannot understand each other." Any hope for a settlement of their differences was rapidly disappearing.7

6 Claiborne to Freeman, June 12, 1805, Ibid., 91-92.
7 Claiborne to Freeman, June 13, 1805, Ibid., 93; Claiborne to Freeman, June 13, 1805, Ibid., 95.
Within a week Governor Claiborne touched a sensitive nerve and evoked a sharp note from Colonel Freeman. Claiborne suggested that the troops destined for Pointe Coupee and Natchitoches be ordered to respect the civil authorities and the rights of the citizens. In light of their previous correspondence the Governor's letter implied much more than it actually said. The letter brought an indignant reply from Colonel Freeman, "I flatter myself that the officers under my command will never require an order to respect the civil authorities, or the rights of their fellow citizens."  

In mid-June Governor Claiborne had inquired if Colonel Freeman planned to move the troops to the country, and if so when the move would be made. Since the sickly season was beginning, the question was probably prompted by a genuine concern for the health of the soldiers. However, by July Claiborne suggested that only one company of regulars was needed in New Orleans since the city was quiet and a regular police was maintained by the civil authorities. He recommended that the troops not needed could be put to work either on the fortifications at Plaquemine or constructing a new fort below New Orleans on the Mississippi. If they were not required at those places, they should be sent to strengthen some of the frontier posts. Claiborne believed that some of the troops should  

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8Claiborne to Freeman, June 20, 1805, Ibid., 100-101; Freeman to Claiborne, June 21, 1805, Ibid., 102.
be stationed at Fort Adams, which was presently garrisoned by only twelve men. At Fort Adams the troops would be in a position to defend New Orleans or move against Florida if trouble developed with the Spanish. He was correct in his assumption that the troops would be useful at other locations. It is equally certain that the Governor would have been glad to see Colonel Freeman and his men out of New Orleans. 9

The controversy between the two men delayed the improvements ordered by the New Orleans City Council. Neither Freeman nor Claiborne considered themselves authorized to pay for the repairs. Claiborne asked that the Federal government pay the bill in full as soon as possible. He requested that the Council suspend any additional repairs on property held by the United States until he received an answer from the government. However, he feared that the delay in the settlement of the account would hinder the completion of the project, which was necessary to maintain the health of the city. 10

While Claiborne and Freeman argued over unpaid


10 Claiborne to Freeman, June 13, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 95; Claiborne to Madison, July 27, 1805, Ibid., 136-38.
bills and the disposition of the public buildings, the Army was fulfilling its assignments. One of the most important jobs was to determine exactly what the United States had purchased from France. To accomplish this task a number of expeditions were sent into the vast new territory to gather information. For the most part the expeditions were composed of officers and men from the Regular Army. In some cases civilians with special scientific skills accompanied the parties, but generally the work was done by the soldiers.

The explorations began as soon as the United States took possession of Louisiana. In 1804 a party under the joint command of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark started on a trip that would take them from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean. In the same year William Dunbar took a small party up the Washita River to collect information. In 1805 Wilkinson sent Lieutenant Zebulon Montgomery Pike up the Mississippi River in an effort to find the source of the river, and he ordered his son, Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson, to establish a post at the mouth of the Platte River.

In the South an expedition was prepared to explore the Red and Arkansas rivers. A similar operation had been suspended the previous year because of a lack of funds. On March 25, 1805, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn wrote to William Dunbar telling him to begin preparations to
explore the two rivers. The Secretary cautioned that if expenditures for the expedition exceeded $2,000 it might be cancelled again. The commanding officer at Fort Adams would furnish an escort for the expedition upon Dunbar's requisition.11

On May 4 Dunbar informed Dearborn that he would begin his preparations immediately. Colonel Freeman at New Orleans would have to supply the men for the escort because the garrison at Fort Adams was too small to allow the detachment of any soldiers. Dunbar suggested that it would be best to investigate only one river at a time, because the passage of the river twice would offer a better opportunity to collect information. After considering Dunbar's recommendation, President Jefferson agreed and requested that the Red River be explored first.12

Dunbar stated that Captain Richard Sparks would be assigned to command the military part of the expedition if the Secretary felt that he was qualified. The Secretary recommended that Sparks should receive $1.50 a day and his expenses, in addition to his normal pay and emoluments if he accepted the appointment.13 On May 25 President Jefferson wrote to Dunbar to suggest that Colonel Freeman assist in

11Dearborn to Dunbar, Mar. 25, 1805, Rowland, William Dunbar, 150-52.

12Dunbar to Dearborn, May 4, 1805, Ibid., 148-50; Dearborn to Dunbar, May 24, 1805, Ibid., 152-53.

13Dearborn to Dunbar, July 10, 1805, Ibid., 156.
the command of the expedition. At the same time the
President stated the principle reason for the trip, "the
work we are now doing is, I trust, done for posterity, in
such a way that they need not repeat it."

The President's letter caused some confusion when
it reached Natchez. Dunbar found that Colonel Constant
Freeman, the only Colonel Freeman he knew, was unaware of
any plans for him to join the party. Dunbar wrote to
Jefferson in an effort to determine who the President
meant. While awaiting an answer from the President,
he proceeded with the arrangements at Natchez.

In December Dunbar was able to report that two
boats were ready to sail and the escort had been gathered.
He recommended that Lieutenant Edmund P. Gaines be appointed
as the second in command, as he possessed the necessary
skills to do the party's geographical work. The year
ended with the expedition's preparations almost completed.

While Dunbar was outfitting his party at Natchez,
Governor Claiborne was completing the necessary arrangements
at New Orleans. Since it was possible that the party would
pass through Spanish territory, it was necessary to secure
a passport. Claiborne requested a passport from Casa Calvo,

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14 Jefferson to Dunbar, May 25, 1805, Ibid., 174-77.
15 Dunbar to Jefferson, Oct. 8, 1805, Ibid., 182-84.
and assured the minister that the purpose of the expedition was purely scientific. One or two Spanish officers would be allowed to accompany the expedition as observers. Casa Calvo replied that he would issue the passport upon Dunbar's request. Whether any Spanish official would join the party would be determined by the Commandant General, to whom the matter had been referred.  

Governor Claiborne was not only successful in obtaining a passport for the Red River expedition, he also obtained permission for the United States mail to pass through Spanish West Florida. The route was established to improve communications between New Orleans and Washington. The mail was always irregular and agonizingly slow and some improvement was necessary to govern the territory properly. In January President Jefferson informed Claiborne that a new mail route was to be laid out between the two cities. It would run from Washington down the eastern side of the mountains to Georgia, then west to New Orleans by way of Fort Stoddert.

Between the Fort and the mouth of the Pearl River the new route passed through about seventy miles of Spanish territory. The proposed line had not yet been authorized by Congress, but the President was certain that legislation

17 Claiborne to Casa Calvo, July 11, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 119-20; Casa Calvo to Claiborne, July 15, 1805, Ibid., 128-29; Claiborne to Dunbar, July 29, 1805, Ibid., 141-42.
would be passed in the coming session. To facilitate the passage of all types of mail it would be necessary to open a road from Georgia to the Pearl River. But before the new road was opened, the President proposed "a mail of letters only" carried by horseback over the existing Indian trails. It was hoped that the distance between the Potomac and the Mississippi could be covered in twelve days. However, before anything could be done, permission to pass through the territory of Spain had to be obtained.\(^\text{18}\)

In June Governor Claiborne received a letter, written in mid-March, from the Postmaster General inquiring about the arrangements for carrying the mail through West Florida. The Governor replied that the Spanish would probably allow the passage of postriders through their territory. To facilitate the crossing of Lake Ponchartrain by the postriders, the Governor had arranged for the operation of a ferry.\(^\text{19}\)

In July Governor Claiborne informed President Jefferson that the Spanish had no objection to the mails crossing their lands. In addition, they had promised to protect the riders to the best of their ability. The

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\(^{19}\) Claiborne to Postmaster General, June 7, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 83-84.
postriders had been in New Orleans twice, but no regular schedule had been established. Claiborne predicted that the mail would soon be carried over the entire distance in twelve or fourteen days. He recommended that bridges be built at all fords where there was the slightest possibility of flooding, so that the road would be open in all types of weather.  

During the next few months Governor Claiborne and the Army officers on the frontier probably wished that the mails ran more frequently and on a regular basis. The officials were called upon to solve problems that required constant communications with Washington. But in most cases the men made their decisions on the basis of orders issued months before and in some instances they operated with virtually no instructions from their superiors.

The problems confronting the civil and military authorities were the result of Spanish activities in Mexico, West Florida, and within Louisiana itself. Several Spanish officials were still living in New Orleans and conducting the duties of their offices. On the western frontier a border dispute was developing that threatened the friendly relations that existed between the two nations.

20 Claiborne to Jefferson, July 14, 1805, Ibid., 124-27; Marquis de Casa Calvo to Claiborne, July 16, 1805, Ibid., 130; Governor Folch's reply is contained in Claiborne to Madison, Aug. 9, 1805, Ibid., 156-57.
To the east the Spanish were charging duties on American goods being shipped to and from the American territory.

On July 15, 1805, Governor Claiborne requested information about the progress of the negotiations at Madrid concerning the western boundary of Louisiana. Claiborne was certain that the Spanish would demand the Mississippi as the dividing line between the two countries. He was certain, however, that Spain would relent in her demands when she realized that the United States was prepared to hold the territory between the Mississippi and the Sabine rivers by force, if it became necessary.\(^{21}\)

The treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States was vague about the western limits of the territory. The first difficulties had developed in the vicinity of Natchitoches, where the border with Mexico presented American slaves with an opportunity to escape. The runaways had sought refuge at Nacogdoches, but after the Americans had protested the activities the slaves had been returned to their owners.\(^{22}\) Yet the indefinite boundary was a continuing source of irritation and worry to both nations. Governor Claiborne said:

\begin{quote}
In receiving possession of the ceded territory, the American Commissioners would have been much relieved, had the limits thereof
\end{quote}

\(^{21}\)Claiborne to Madison, July 15, 1805, Ibid., 127-28.

\(^{22}\)Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 8, 1805, and Casa Calvo to Claiborne, n. d., Ibid., 155-56.
been precisely ascertained, but these being uncertain, the commissioners thought it best to demand Louisiana as described in the Treaty.23

The troops at Natchitoches kept a watchful eye upon the activities of the Spanish along the Sabine River. Since early May reports had been made concerning Spanish activities on the eastern side of the river. On May 1 Doctor John Sibley, a resident of Natchitoches, reported that a Choctaw hunting party had encountered Spanish troops at the Bay of St. Bernard. The troops were constructing two forts, one at the mouth of the Trinity River and the other at Matogordo. The Indians had been told to abandon the Americans and rejoin the Spanish. The officers had said that they would soon be building forts at Opelousas, Attakapas, Natchitoches, and finally New Orleans.24 On May 3 Captain Edward Turner sent a similar report to General Wilkinson.25 At the end of May an informer reported that he had seen Spanish troops at the Orkekesaw


24John Sibley to Secretary of War, May 1, 1805, American State Papers, Foreign Relations (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), II, 690. Hereinafter cited as ASPFR.

and that more troops were expected to join them.\textsuperscript{26}

With reports that five hundred families and a large number of troops had arrived at St. Antonio, concern about the Spanish build-up continued through July.\textsuperscript{27} On September 30 Turner stated that a Spanish colonel and two companies of soldiers were supposed to be coming to Nacogdoches. One of the companies would reinforce the garrison at Oreoquisas and the other was to be divided between Nacogdoches and Adaes. He also had learned that six hundred families were coming from Spain to settle at Matogordo.

The information that the Spanish had erected a fort at the confluence of the Trinity and Snow rivers, about one hundred and twenty miles from the American settlement, had been verified by men employed by the Indian agent at Natchitoches. The disturbing part of Turner's letter was the section that concerned the Spanish occupation of Adaes. This small settlement was about twenty miles from Natchitoches, and the Americans considered it to be within their territorial limits.\textsuperscript{28} Turner's information was confirmed by an American living at Nacogdoches, who said that two companies of soldiers were expected by the Spanish.\textsuperscript{29}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26] Sibley to Secretary of War, May 31, 1805, \textit{Ibid.}
\item[27] Sibley to Secretary of War, July 2, 1805, \textit{Ibid.}
\item[28] Turner to Wilkinson, Sept. 30, 1805, \textit{Ibid.}
\item[29] Johnson to Sibley, Oct. 3, 1805, \textit{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
Governor Claiborne personally protested the occupation of Adaes to Casa Calvo and asked that the soldiers be immediately withdrawn from the village. The Governor argued that the post was an appendage of Natchitoches and should have been surrendered with that post.

Casa Calvo heard the protest with polite attention. In reply, the Spanish Commissioner stated that the Governor's argument concerning Adaes was incorrect. Natchitoches was the furthest post up the Red River considered by the Spanish to be within the Province of Louisiana. Adaes and Bayou Pierre, although close to Natchitoches, were considered to be within the Province of Texas. Casa Calvo promised that if the two settlements were found to be within Louisiana when he traced the boundary, they would be turned over to the United States. The Spanish Commissioner assured the Governor that there were no Spanish troops closer to Natchitoches than those stationed at Nacogdoches.

Despite Claiborne's protest, reports of Spanish activities continued to be made by officers on the frontier. Captain John Bowyer, stationed at Opelousas, stated that Spanish troops, perhaps numbering 800, were on the Calcasieu River on the eastern side of the Sabine. Bowyer seriously

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30 Claiborne to Secretary of War, Aug. 11, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 162-64.
doubted that figure but he knew that there were definitely troops east of the Sabine. The Captain stated that the troops from Nacogdoches maintained a regular patrol along the Sabine River.\textsuperscript{31}

While attempting to determine what the Spanish were doing on the frontier, Claiborne was trying to rid himself of a Spanish official living in New Orleans. The official was Juan Morales, Paymaster General of the Spanish Army and Intendant of East and West Florida, who had issued the order revoking the American right of deposit in 1802. While living in New Orleans, Morales was selling land in East and West Florida, a practice which Claiborne considered a direct insult to the United States. The sales were not only insulting but the ownership of the land being sold was disputed. Both the United States and Spain claimed the area of West Florida and negotiations were in progress at Madrid to settle the dispute. After being informed that Morales intended to continue his activities in New Orleans, Claiborne strongly suggested that Morales move to Spanish Territory.\textsuperscript{32}

The controversy over Morales continued because

\textsuperscript{31}Bowyer to Freeman, Oct. 13, 1805, ASPFR, II, 692.

\textsuperscript{32}Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 3, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 146; Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 9, 1805, and Casa Calvo to Claiborne, Aug. 8, 1805, Ibid., 159-61; Casa Calvo to Claiborne, Aug. 7, 1805 and Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 17, 1805, Ibid., 172-75.
Claiborne was dissatisfied with the answer he received from Casa Calvo. Claiborne finally agreed to allow the Intendant's office to remain open long enough to settle any unfinished business. However, no additional land west of the Perdido River was to be sold. These were the only conditions upon which Morales could be permitted to remain. Morales considered Claiborne's conditions to be unacceptable because they infringed upon the rights of his commission.

The American Governor refused to alter the conditions, and stated that if the Intendant did not abide by them, his departure would be demanded. Claiborne summarized the rights that Morales possessed:

- His Catholic Majesty could not authorize Mr. Morales to exercise any official acts within the territories of the United States, or to open a land office within their limits. If the Paymaster General of the Spanish Army is solicitous that his authority should remain unshackled, why does he not retire to the dominions of His Catholic Majesty, and depart from a territory within which he has no right to continue his residence, much less to exercise official functions.

Claiborne concluded with a statement that indicated that he was serious:

- The customary passports shall be prepared, and I will cheerfully afford your Excellency such conduce to the speedy and comfortable conveyance to some post within the dominions of His Catholic Majesty.33

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33Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 17, 1805, Ibid., 174-75. Claiborne's italics.
The problem surrounding Morales and his activities was resolved on January 11, 1806. Acting upon Presidential orders, Governor Claiborne directed Morales and all individuals attached to his office to leave the territory immediately. The controversy with Morales did not directly effect the men of the United States Army, but indirectly it influenced the lives of the civilians and soldiers who lived above the Spanish Floridas. Morales, as the Intendant for East and West Florida, was the official with whom the Americans dealt concerning the duties charged on products shipped through the Spanish ports.

However, the growing concern about the Spanish military preparations diverted attention from the problem of duties charged on American products. The military activity on the frontier overshadowed the differences between the American military and civil officials, and for a month or two they managed to put aside their differences and work together with a degree of cooperation.

On July 26 the Mayor of New Orleans, Doctor John Watkins, sent three decrees passed by the City Council to Governor Claiborne. The Council wanted: (1) the destruction

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34Claiborne to Morales, Jan. 11, 1806, Ibid., 238-39. The President's order was to apply to all persons holding commissions or retained in the service of Spain; Secretary of State to Claiborne, Nov. 18, 1805, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 533-34; Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Jan. 10, 1806, and Morales to Claiborne, Jan. 11, 1806, Ibid., 563-66.
of the old Custom House; (2) the evacuation and demolition of the forts in the city in order to eliminate the stagnant water that surrounded them and endangered the health of the city; and (3) the withdrawal of Federal troops from the lower rooms of the Hotel de Ville in order to provide space for the city guard.

The Governor answered that the old Custom House was national property and could not be turned over to the city until the Federal commissioners decided the validity of land claims. The forts fell into the same category as the Custom House, but Claiborne agreed that all of them, except Forts Charles and St. Louis, could be levelled. These two forts were occupied by American soldiers, who could not be removed except by the order of the President. However, the Governor had no objection to draining the ditches around the forts, provided it did not damage the fortifications. Regarding the third request, the Governor felt that if a guard was needed during the day, it would be best to use the regular troops. If the quarters were needed for the night watch and the guard at the jail, Claiborne would consent to the removal of the troops.35

Within a few days, the Mayor requested that the old public school building be used for its original purpose. The Governor admitted that the building was no longer under his control. Colonel Freeman still occupied the building

and the Secretary of War had not decided whether or not
the Colonel should relinquish his quarters. The Governor
promised to refer the Mayor's request to the President.\textsuperscript{36}

On August 4 Claiborne referred the requests from
the City Council to the Secretary of State, with one comment
of his own. He suggested that the forts within the city be
evacuated. The works afforded little or no protection to
the city and a better location on the Mississippi River
should be selected and fortified.\textsuperscript{37}

Governor Claiborne's letter to Colonel Freeman was
milder and more conciliatory than his earlier communications.
The Governor requested that Freeman permit the draining of
ditches, but only under his personal supervision. He stated
that because the Hotel de Ville was the property of the
city and the rooms were needed for the night watch, the
troops should be withdrawn and quartered in the barracks.

With regard to Freeman's house, Claiborne wrote:

> When it is convenient for you
> to remove from your present quarters,
> you will much oblige me, if you would
deliver the key to the Honble. Judge
> Hall. But I wish not that you should
> subject yourself to any inconvenience
> by an early removal, since it is not
> expected, that the district court (for
> whose accommodation the building is in-
tended) will be in session for several
> weeks.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} Claiborne to Watkins, Aug. 3, 1805 and Claiborne

\textsuperscript{37} Claiborne to Madison, Aug. 4, 1805, \textit{Ibid.}, 149.

\textsuperscript{38} Claiborne to Freeman, Aug. 6, 1805 and Claiborne
to Watkins, Aug. 8, 1805, \textit{Ibid.}, 176-78.
The barracks should have been large enough to house the troops, as the number of soldiers in the city was barely adequate to meet the demands made upon them. On August 14 Claiborne requested that a non-commissioned officer and four privates accompany him on a trip up the Mississippi. The following day he told Freeman, "Being aware of the weakness of the troops and supposing that you could illy spare even a small detachment, I should not have made the request of yesterday, had I not been compelled to take with me a barge. . . ." The Governor reduced the number of men required for his escort to four. While the soldiers in Louisiana were concerned with the activities of the Spanish, the other troops in the South were occupied with routine duties at their garrisons.

Occasionally the troops were called upon to perform duties other than those associated with their day-to-day existence. On September 4, 1805, the Secretary of War ordered the commanding officer at Fort Wilkinson to remove a number of white settlers occupying land that belonged to the Creek Indians. The Indians had protested to the Federal government and the settlers had been ordered to move. If the officer determined that the order had not been obeyed, he was to use whatever means were necessary to remove them. He was ordered to treat similar incidents in the same manner. Orders such as these would become increasingly common until

39 Claiborne to Freeman, Aug. 14, 1805, Ibid., 165; Claiborne to Freeman, Aug. 15, 1805, Ibid., 168-69.
The Indians were finally removed from the South in the 1830's. The removal of squatters was the one duty that would involve the Army in numerous controversies with the white settlers.  

The activities of the troops across the southern frontier increased as the reports of a Spanish military build-up continued to circulate. In addition to the news received from western Louisiana, information was obtained that additional troops were being moved into the Floridas. In late August Governor Claiborne stated that the Spanish Fort at Baton Rouge had been repaired, but it had few military advantages as it was commanded by high ground, not more than a quarter of a mile away. In addition the fort was poorly constructed and could not be adequately manned by a force of less than a thousand men.

One month later Governor Claiborne informed Madison that he considered the conduct of the Spanish to be hostile. He believed that the Spanish Court was encouraging such attitudes by its officials. The Governor requested the results of the negotiations in Madrid, since "I have not been honored with an official letter from you, for two

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40 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort Wilkinson, Sept. 4, 1805, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 2, 375. Hereinafter cited as SWLS.

41 Claiborne to Madison, Aug. 27, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 183.
months past. . . ." On October 8 Claiborne told Doctor Sibley that the newspapers seemed to indicate the likelihood of a rupture between the United States and Spain. However, he refused to believe the accounts in the press until they were confirmed by the Secretary of State.  

On October 16 Secretary of War Dearborn informed Wilkinson that there was every reason to believe that Pensacola was to be reinforced by five or six hundred men. Officers stationed on the Lower Mississippi and on the Mobile were cautioned to be on the alert for any Spanish activity. At the end of October Claiborne reported the arrival of six hundred soldiers at Pensacola, with more expected to reinforce the posts at Mobile and Baton Rouge. An additional complication was that the mails between New Orleans and Fort Stoddert were frequently delayed. One postrider had been killed and another wounded and the route could no longer be considered safe.

The Spanish continued to halt American vessels and exact a duty of twelve percent on imports and exports at Mobile. The duties were charged on goods belonging to

42 Claiborne to Madison, Sept. 25, 1805, Ibid., 190; Claiborne to Sibley, Oct. 8, 1805, Ibid., 192.
43 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 16, 1805, SWLS, Roll 2, 383-86.
44 Claiborne to Secretary of War, Oct. 30, 1805, ASPFR, II, 692.
45 Claiborne to Gideon Granger, Post Master General, Oct. 17, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 202-204.
civilians and to the United States government. Claiborne issued protests to Intendant Morales and Governor Folch, since he did not know which of the officials had directed that the duties be charged.\(^4^6\)

On October 24 the Governor sent some disturbing news to his superiors in Washington. He had obtained positive proof that four hundred soldiers had arrived in Pensacola and more men were expected to arrive in a few days. He had also learned from a reliable source that three hundred men were to be sent to Baton Rouge and eight hundred men had been stationed on the Texas frontier.

As proof of the Spanish build-up, Claiborne stated that a New Orleans merchant had contracted to deliver 4,000 barrels of flour to Mobile. The same man had also purchased a large quantity of leather in order to fulfill a contract for 4,000 pairs of shoes. Claiborne intended to ask Governor Folch the meaning of the military activity.

Claiborne was certain that peace could be maintained, but in the event war broke out the Governor made several recommendations for the defense of New Orleans. He suggested that Fort St. John commanding the mouth of Bayou St. John, be repaired and strengthened since it was in ruins. If repaired, it could stop the passage of troops.

and ships from Pensacola and Mobile. Colonel Freeman did not agree with the Governor, and even if he had, he did not have the money necessary to repair the works. Claiborne also suggested that Fort St. Philip be strengthened and gunboats be stationed on the Mississippi River and the lakes around New Orleans.47

On October 30 Claiborne dispatched a number of documents, collected by Doctor Sibley, that verified that the Spanish had established a fort on the Trinity River. There were also two depositions from several American citizens recounting outrages committed by Spanish soldiers.48 The depositions stated that on two different occasions Spanish soldiers had stopped Americans and confiscated some of their property. The first incident involved three people who were traveling between Natchitoches and Opelousas. They were stopped within fifteen miles of Opelousas Church by five Spanish soldiers who took one of their horses and then retreated toward Nacogdoches. The second incident involved a group of traders who were transporting furs to New Orleans. They were detained by a detachment of Spanish troops who confiscated eighteen horses and 1,000 deer skins before marching in the direction of Nacogdoches.49

same day Claiborne informed the Secretary of War that six hundred troops had arrived at Pensacola and a new Governor General of the Province of Texas had arrived at St. Antonio.  50

In the midst of the Spanish build-up, the problems between the military and the civil officials in New Orleans erupted again. The troops stationed in the city had interfered with the city guard. The Governor told the Mayor that the incident was probably the result of a misunderstanding on the part of the troops. He hoped that similar events would not occur again in the future. However his closing statement indicated that he and Freeman had not resolved their differences:

I will endeavour to remedy the Inconvenience complained of by the citizens; - But whatever I may do on the occasion, must be by way of Request, for it is not admitted by the officer commanding here, that the Governor has any control over the military.  51

On November 26 Claiborne informed the President that he and Freeman had reached an agreement to end the existing problems. The Governor believed that the troops stationed in New Orleans had behaved as well as any other troops in similar circumstances. He observed that it was virtually impossible for a commander to maintain the discipline of

50 Claiborne to Secretary of War, Oct. 30, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 215-16.
his troops when they were stationed in a city. Claiborne felt that this was especially true in New Orleans where "the temptations to dissipation are so various, and the means of evading the attention of officers so easy." For this reason he recommended that the troops be removed from the town.\footnote{Claiborne to Jefferson, Nov. 6, 1805, \textit{Ibid.}, 227-28.}

The Governor was not only interested in restoring the discipline of the troops and ridding himself of Colonel Freeman, he was also concerned about the safety of the city. Rumors were circulating in New Orleans that the Spanish would soon take some action against the Americans. The Governor believed that the rumors were greatly exaggerated, but he had definite information concerning some of the preparations: (1) Mobile and Pensacola had been strongly fortified and at the latter place barracks were being constructed to accommodate 4,000 soldiers; (2) two hundred troops had been ordered to reinforce the garrison at Baton Rouge; and (3) Doctor Sibley had reported that two hundred and twenty soldiers had recently arrived at Nacogdoches and would soon move to fortify a position only fifteen miles from Natchitoches.

Claiborne thought that the Spanish were definitely planning to attack Louisiana. The number of regular troops available to defend the province were few and the reliability of the local militia was questionable. Claiborne
felt that the Creole portion of the population would support the United States, but the French and Spanish speaking parts of the population were certain to support Spain. To adequately defend the province, especially the city, the Governor made a number of recommendations: (1) that reinforcements be sent as soon as possible; (2) that Fort St. John and Plaquemine be repaired; (3) the troops at Fort Adams be transferred to Pointe Coupee; (4) the soldiers in New Orleans be stationed at Fort St. John and at other positions above and below the city, not to exceed six miles; and (5) that rallying points for the militia be established. He believed that these preparations would allow for a proper defense until more troops could be gathered.53

On November 7 Governor Claiborne reported that he believed that Spanish soldiers were present in the city and that they were being watched. Five days later he wrote, "I have received but one letter from the Department of State for three months past, and in that nothing was said as to our relations with Spain."54

On November 20 the Secretary of War issued instructions to guide the conduct of the commanding officer at Natchitoches. He was to warn the Spanish commander not

53 Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 5, 1805, Ibid., 225-27.

54 Claiborne to Dearborn, Nov. 7, 1805, Ibid., 229; Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 12, 1805, Ibid., 230-31. Claiborne's italics.
to encroach upon American territory east of the Sabine River. The Americans were to maintain patrols in the area east of the river to protect American citizens from Spanish activities. If armed men were found in the area, who were not under the authority of the United States, they were to be arrested. Spanish subjects arrested east of the Sabine were to be turned over to the commander at Nacogdoches, provided he promised to punish them. If such a promise was not made, the individuals were to be placed in the custody of the civil authorities for trial. The officer was to use every means, short of actual force, to see that the Spanish commander restored the confiscated property of the citizens of the United States.55

Six days later the Secretary of War instructed General Wilkinson to determine the meaning of the Spanish activities in Texas. The directive authorized the General to direct the proper officers to obtain reliable information about Spanish movements in progress or already completed in a number of areas: (1) within the boundaries of Louisiana; (2) between the Rio Brazos and the American posts west of the Mississippi River; (3) within the region bounded by the Red River and the Gulf of Mexico, especially at Nacogdoches and the Bay of St. Bernard; (4) and finally, at St. Antonio.

55Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Natchitoches, Nov. 20, 1805, SWLS, Roll 2, 397-99.
The officer or officers assigned to the task were to draw funds from the War Department to meet expenses. The Secretary suggested that the individuals making the reconnaissance might disguise themselves as hunters and traders in order to maintain secrecy and afford the mission a chance of success. Dearborn requested that the coast line of the Bay of St. Bernard, for a distance of forty or fifty miles, be checked carefully to determine if any operations were in progress.56

General Wilkinson must have been delighted to be placed in a position to exercise his talents for intrigue. However, the assignment was ambitious - St. Antonio was approximately 360 miles from Natchitoches and the Bay of St. Bernard was about 300 miles away.

While the troops in Louisiana watched the Spanish and tried to determine their intentions, the soldiers in the east were occupied with routine duties. Some of the soldiers from Port Wilkinson were assisting Colonel Hawkins in running and marking the boundaries of a reserved tract at Ocmulgee Old Fields. After the boundary was marked, the soldiers were to assist in building a temporary building on the tract.57

While the portion of the troops from Port Wilkinson were assigned to cut a line through the wilderness, a

56 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Nov. 26, 1805, Ibid., 399-400.
57 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort Wilkinson, Nov. 27, 1805, Ibid., 404.
number of men from Fort Stoddert were directed to help transport the United States mail. The men were involved in an experiment to determine whether it was better to carry the mail between Fort Stoddert and New Orleans by land or water. A detachment of soldiers, all able to handle small boats, were assigned to the water route while the postriders moved overland. The experiment was to last three months, when a decision would be made as to which method was best. The test was a result of the trouble encountered by the postriders on the land route between the two post offices.

On December 5, 1805, the Secretary of War issued an order to remove the troops from the city. It was hoped that the transfer would eliminate the source of trouble between the military and civil authorities in New Orleans. To facilitate the movement, Colonel Freeman was to find a suitable site for the new post near the city; a distance of not more than four miles was suggested. If possible, the new location was to be opposite the city on the west bank of the Mississippi and include the magazine. The Secretary believed that a tract of land ranging in size from ten to twenty-five acres would be sufficient for the new post. Freeman was also to recommend what should be done with the military buildings within the city. Specifically, should they be torn down and the materials used

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58 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort Stoddert, Nov. 29, 1805, Ibid., 406.
at the new site, or should they be left standing and rented to local residents?\textsuperscript{59}

Four days after the Secretary of War issued the directive to Freeman, Claiborne sent a letter to Madison that contained some disturbing news. His secretary, John Graham, had just returned from Pensacola, where he had presented a protest of the duties charged at Mobile. Governor Folch informed Graham that American trade on the Mobile would be treated in the same way as Spanish trade on the Mississippi. On the surface this answer appeared to be satisfactory, but Claiborne feared that the Spanish might use the pretext that foreign vessels with Negroes on board were not allowed to pass New Orleans as a reason for continuing the regulations at Mobile. If this happened, Claiborne predicted that the settlements on the Tombigbee River would be ruined by the twelve percent duty. More distressing than the duties, was the extent of the military preparations being made by the Spanish. Graham stated that there were eight hundred soldiers in and around Pensacola. Improvements were being made at the fort that

\textsuperscript{59}Secretary of War to Freeman, Dec. 5, 1805, Carter, \textit{Territorial Papers, IX}, 541-42. The military buildings in New Orleans were: (1) the military barracks, a row of brick buildings large enough to house 1,200 to 1,500 men; (2) the military hospital; (3) the cavalry barracks, consisting of two brick buildings; (4) the powder magazine, a brick building on the opposite side of the Mississippi; and (5) the public school house, occupied by Freeman. Claiborne to Jefferson, Oct. 23, 1805, Rowland, \textit{WCC}, III, 207-11.
commanded the entrance to the bay. However, the fortifications near the city were in a state of disrepair. At Mobile there were about one hundred and fifty soldiers, and the fort within the city had recently been repaired. As added protection for the city, a blockhouse was being constructed on Dauphin Island to guard the entrance to Mobile Bay. To improve their communications, the Spanish were building a series of signal towers between Mobile and Pensacola. In addition, more troops were expected at Pensacola to reinforce the Florida garrisons.

The Spanish continued their preparations and the Americans continued to watch and wait. The only incident that caused any trouble was the order for Spanish officials to leave the territory. On February 1, Morales and his party left for Pensacola. However, Claiborne's letter of the tenth of January informing Casa Calvo of the order did not reach the Marquis because he was touring the western part of Louisiana. Consequently, on February 6, two days after the Marquis returned to the city, Claiborne sent a second letter informing him of the President's order. Casa Calvo was not pleased with the order and requested an interview with Claiborne to discuss the subject.

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60 Claiborne to Secretary of State, Dec. 9, 1805, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 542-43.
61 Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 6, 1806, Rowland, WCC, III, 260-61.
62 Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 6, 1806, Ibid., 260-61; Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Jan. 10, 1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 563-64.
The Governor refused to debate the President's order and told the Marquis not to delay his departure for more than a few days. On February 8, the day he refused to discuss Casa Calvo's departure, Claiborne requested a passport for Dunbar's Red River expedition.

The Spaniard considered the order to leave the Province of Louisiana an insult to himself and his King. Again Claiborne refused to debate the issue but stated that the United States had intended no insult. He pointed out that the continued residence of the Spanish officials was a liberal indulgence granted only because of the friendly relations that existed between the two nations. The President believed that the ministers had been allowed sufficient time to conclude the duties of their commissions. The Marquis was to depart on or before the fifteenth of February. On February 12 Claiborne issued a passport to Casa Calvo, who immediately left for East Florida.

On the day he issued the passport to Casa Calvo, Claiborne informed William Dunbar that the Spanish had

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63 Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Feb. 8, 1806, Rowland, WCC, III, 261-62.
64 Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Feb. 8, 1806, Ibid., 262-63.
65 Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Feb. 11, 1806, Ibid., 263-64.
66 Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Feb. 12, 1806 and Claiborne to Secretary of State, Feb. 13, 1806, Ibid., 265-66.
refused to issue his party a passport. Dunbar was told that "under the existing circumstances between the two countries, it remains with you to act on the occasion as you shall think proper." The preparations at Natchez were completed and the leaders of the expedition hoped to be able to take advantage of the spring high water. The expedition finally left Natchez without a passport on the twenty-eighth of April. Colonel Freeman was in command of the expedition, with Captain Sparks as second in command, and Lieutenant Enoch Humphreys was the geographical assistant. The rest of the party consisted of Doctor Curtis, two non-commissioned officers, seventeen privates, and a black servant. The party entered the Red River on the third of May and ascended the river to Natchitoches, approximately one hundred and eighty-five miles from the Mississippi. The expedition reached the post on the nineteenth, where they delayed for a few days, because information had been received that the Spanish would oppose their passage of the river. As a result of the hostile disposition of the Spanish, the strength of the party was increased by twenty soldiers drawn from the garrison. On June 2 the reinforced expedition resumed its journey up the

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[^68]: Dunbar to Jefferson, May 6, 1806, *Ibid.*, 194-95. Lieutenant Gaines who had originally been designated as the geographical officer declined to accompany the expedition at the last minute.

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Red River. Five days later Doctor Sibley warned them that a detachment of Spanish troops had left Nacogdoches to intercept the Americans and force them to return. The party continued to ascend the river until the twenty-ninth of July, when they encountered a large force of Spanish cavalry.

At a long conference between the commanders of the two forces, the Spanish officer announced that he was determined to stop the Americans from moving further up the river. The Americans reluctantly agreed to return to Natchitoches because they were greatly outnumbered by the Spanish. Before turning back, the expedition had traveled six hundred and thirty-five miles from the mouth of the Red River. 69

On March 18 an order was issued by the War Department that was a direct result of the unexplained Spanish movements in Texas. Henry Dearborn informed Wilkinson that Spanish troops were on the move and the post at Natchitoches required reinforcements. The General was to order Colonel Thomas Cushing to proceed directly to the frontier post with two companies of soldiers. 70 On the same day that the order was issued to bolster the garrison at Natchitoches, Claiborne

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70 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Mar. 18, 1806, SWLS, Roll 2, 437.
sent a plea to the President for more troops to defend New Orleans.

Claiborne was concerned primarily about the activities of Vincente Folch, the Spanish Governor of Florida. The Spaniard was supervising the work on the defenses of Mobile and conferring with the local Indian chiefs. According to Claiborne, the defenses at New Orleans were not strong enough to withstand an assault and the gunboats that were supposed to guard the rivers and lakes had not arrived from Kentucky. He insisted that the presence of a strong military force was essential to the safety of the city. 71

In a second letter of the same day to Jefferson, Claiborne reported that an American vessel loaded with supplies for the factory at Fort St. Stephen had been stopped at Mobile. The Governor offered a solution to the problem at Mobile that ran counter to the ideas of President Jefferson. He believed that further discussion of the situation with the officials in Florida was a waste of time. 72 He felt "that to obtain for our fellow citizens a free and uninterrupted use of the waters of the Mobile, we must have recourse to force, and perhaps the sooner the

71 Claiborne to Jefferson, Mar. 18, 1806, Rowland, WCC, III, 271.
72 Claiborne to Secretary of State, Mar. 18, 1806, Ibid., 271-72.
expedient is resorted to, the better."  

One week later the Governor reported that Judge Harry Toulmin had arrived in New Orleans from Mobile with information on conditions in that area. The Judge stated that the garrison at Fort Stoddert was running short of supplies. In addition, Claiborne was convinced that the Spanish at Mobile were trying to arouse the Indians against the Americans and were distributing gunpowder to the tribes.

On April 8 Claiborne stated that he had no recent intelligence from Natchitoches. The last report received from the area asserted that the Spanish troops were camped on the western bank of the Sabine River. Major Moses Porter had ordered a company of infantry stationed west of Natchitoches, within the area claimed as a part of the Province of Texas by the Spanish. Claiborne did not know what orders had been given to the officer in command of this company.

Claiborne informed the Secretary of War that Governor Folch was attempting to acquire a train of artillery left in New Orleans when the French evacuated the town. The

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73 Claiborne to Jefferson, Mar. 18, 1806, Ibid., 273.
74 Claiborne to Secretary of State, Mar. 25, 1806, Ibid., 281.
75 Claiborne to Secretary of State, Apr. 8, 1806, Ibid., 285.
Spanish Governor suggested that the French should turn the artillery over to her ally since it appeared that a war between the United States and Spain was likely. The artillery would then be transported to Mobile to strengthen that location. The French Consul, one Desforgues, informed Folch that he would not deliver the artillery to Spain or the United States without orders from his government.

Claiborne was convinced of the French official's sincerity and felt that he would abide by his decision. The Governor reported that he would not allow the artillery to be moved to any place possessed by the Spanish, unless ordered to do so by the President. Also he would not allow the United States Army to have it unless the territory of Orleans was invaded. The disposition of the train of artillery was settled in December when the United States purchased twenty-four pieces of brass ordnance from France. Dearborn ordered Wilkinson to divide the pieces between New Orleans, Natchitoches and Fort Adams.

On April 26, 1806, the Secretary of War advised Claiborne of the steps that were being taken to provide for the security of Louisiana. The fortifications in and around New Orleans were to be improved and a number of gunboats were to be stationed on the approaches to the

76 Claiborne to Secretary of War, Apr. 8, 1806, Ibid., 286.

77 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Dec. 8, 1806, SWLS, Roll 3, 102.
city. To supplement the existing garrisons, six additional companies had been ordered from St. Louis, and were expected to arrive in early May. In addition to the six companies of artillery, two hundred recruits were on their way to New Orleans to fill the depleted ranks of the companies already stationed in Louisiana. On the same day the Secretary informed Colonel Freeman that an engineer was being ordered to the city to determine how its defenses could be improved. 78

The Secretary outlined a plan to supply the troops at Fort Stoddert and the factory at Fort St. Stephens without passing through Mobile. The details of the project were contained in the orders issued to the commanding officer at Fort Stoddert. An officer with six or eight enlisted men was to find a suitable route, as near the boundary line as possible without being in Spanish territory, from the Fort to the Pascagola River.

Once the road to the river was found, the soldiers were to descend the river to its mouth, eliminating obstructions as they traveled. If large vessels could use the waterway, then supplies would be sent from New Orleans. The scheme called for the supply boat to be escorted from New Orleans and up the river by a gunboat. Such an escort was essential since the Pascagola flowed

78 Secretary of War to Claiborne, Apr. 26, 1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 627-28; Secretary of War to Freeman, Apr. 26, 1806, SWLS, Roll 2, 457-59.
through a part of the Spanish Floridas. If it was determined that this method of transportation was feasible, the officer was to request a shallop load of provisions and a gunboat from Colonel Freeman.

The Secretary authorized the establishment of a temporary storehouse at the landing on the Pascagola if it was considered necessary. He cautioned the officer not to divulge the plan to anyone but the factory agent. The officer commanding the exploring party was to be cautioned not to make any unnecessary communications to anyone he might meet on the river. 79

Many of the residents of Orleans Territory were apprehensive about the possible outcome of the negotiations at Madrid between the United States and Spain. The representatives were trying to determine the limits of the province known as Louisiana. The treaty between the United States and France had incorporated the language of the treaty of San Ildefonso, "the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain and that it had when France possessed." 80

While the diplomats talked in Spain, rumors were rife in Louisiana.

Governor Claiborne's report of July 15 that Spain

79 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort Stoddert, Apr. 26, 1806, SWLS, Roll 2, 455-56; on the 28th Colonel Freeman was informed of the plan, Secretary of War to Freeman, Apr. 28, 1806, Ibid., 459.

80 Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, II, 508-509.
would demand the Mississippi River as the boundary was only the first of a number of statements that the United States might lose that portion of Louisiana lying west of the river. On August 8, 1805, Doctor Sibley reported that certain individuals were spreading a rumor that the United States would not retain Louisiana much longer. On August 23 Governor Claiborne, who was traveling through the country, reported that the citizens were very disturbed by the news that all of the land west of the Mississippi had been ceded to Spain. Despite his repeated assurances that there was no basis for the reports, many of the citizens were not convinced.\(^{81}\)

Three days later Claiborne stated that the news of the retrocession of Louisiana had been circulating in New Orleans before he left. He had conferred with Casa Calvo in an effort to determine if the rumors had any basis in fact. The Spaniard had replied that he did not know the source of the rumors concerning the province. However, he understood that the negotiations at Madrid had failed and James Monroe, the American minister, had left the city. Casa Calvo related that the Spanish Minister of State had told him that Spain wished to make the "Mississippi River the boundary, and in time it was expected that, that object would be attained."

\(^{81}\) Sibley to Secretary of War, Aug. 8, 1805, ASPFR, II, 691; Claiborne to Secretary of State, Aug. 23, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 180-81. Claiborne's italics.
Governor Claiborne attributed the gossip to the Spanish officials still living in New Orleans. He believed that their removal from the territory was necessary in order to lessen the rumors and solidify the citizens in their support of the United States. Claiborne closed with the request that "I should indeed be pleased to have it hinted to me, that in my character as commissioner or Governor, I could on this occasion, take (if necessary) compulsory measures." 82

The request by Governor Claiborne and the failure of Monroe's mission to Madrid caused the Secretary of State to issue the order for all Spanish officials to leave Louisiana. Regarding the presence of Casa Calvo in New Orleans, the Secretary wrote:

As the pretext for the Marquis remaining as a commissioner for delivering possession has ceased, or seems to be exchanged for another arising from his character of commissioner for setting limits, it may be proper to remark that he has never been accredited in any such character and that no arrangement has ever been proposed to us for setting such a commission on foot, that the Marquis and nearly all his attendants are military characters, some of them of considerable rank, and that as long as such a difference of opinion continues respecting the lines to be run, there can be no necessity for the commission." 83

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82 Claiborne to Secretary of State, Aug. 26, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 182-83. Claiborne's italics.
83 Secretary of State to Claiborne, Nov. 18, 1805, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 533-34.
On the basis of this letter, Claiborne ordered Juan Morales and Casa Calvo to leave the Territory.

Exaggerated stories circulated throughout the South that clashes had taken place between the Americans stationed at Natchitoches and the Spanish forces based at Nacogdoches. The Charleston Courier stated that Major Moses Porter had driven a large Spanish force back across the Sabine River after they refused to leave voluntarily. The account also related that Porter had met five hundred Spanish troops marching to reinforce the post east of the Sabine, and after a sharp engagement the Spanish had been routed and driven across the boundary.\(^{84}\)

The published story bore little resemblance to what had actually happened. Major Porter, acting on the orders of the Secretary of War, had requested that a detachment of Spanish soldiers move west of the Sabine River. When an unsatisfactory reply was received, Porter dispatched Captain Turner and sixty men to remove the Spanish. After the intruders were removed, Turner's command was ordered to patrol the area between Natchitoches and the Sabine to prevent further intrusions.\(^{85}\)

On February 6 Turner reported that the Spanish commander had agreed to withdraw his force to the western

\(^{84}\)"Extract of a letter from the town of Washington, M. T. dated Feb. 18," Charleston Courier, Apr. 4, 1806.

\(^{85}\)Porter to Secretary of War, Feb. 3, 1806, ASPFR, II, 798; Porter to Turner, Feb. 1, 1806, Ibid., 798-99.
bank of the river within six days. He had also agreed that no more Spanish patrols would enter the area. Turner stated that he would escort the Spanish to be certain that they actually recrossed the river. After this was accomplished, the Americans would begin their patrol of the disputed territory. 86

Although no armed hostilities had actually occurred along the Sabine, the situation was tense. The presence of someone with more experience in handling delicate diplomatic situations than Major Porter possessed was required. On May 6 the Secretary of War ordered General Wilkinson to leave St. Louis and proceed to the Territory of Orleans "with as little possible delay as practicable." Wilkinson was to assume command of the regulars and all of the militia and volunteers that might assemble in the area. He was to employ "all of the means in your power, repel any invasion, of the territory of the United States, east of the river Sabine: or north, or west of the bounds of what has been called West Florida." If any hostile acts had taken place, Wilkinson was to take steps to counteract the Spanish. He was to keep the War Department informed of his actions and of the activities of the Spanish.

Wilkinson was to do everything in his power to avoid hostilities and his conduct was to be governed by the

86 Turner to Porter, Feb. 6, 1806, ASPFR, II, 799; Statement of Joseph Maria Gonzalez, Feb. 6, 1806, Ibid.
intentions of the Spanish. He was to consider:

Any attempt on the part of his Catholic Majesty’s officers to disturb the existing state of things, by endeavoring to occupy any new posts, east of the Sabine, a westward or northwestward of the former boundaries, of what has been called West Florida, must be considered by the government of the United States, as an actual invasion of our territorial rights and will be resisted as such.\(^7\)

The construction of the defenses at New Orleans was delayed by the lack of a qualified engineer who could be stationed in the city. On June 9 Secretary Dearborn requested that Wilkinson decide upon the best location for two blockhouses to be built on the flanks of the city.\(^8\) Despite the fact that he was urgently needed at Natchitoches and New Orleans, Wilkinson did not arrive at Natchez until the seventh of September.\(^9\)

At Natchitoches Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Cushing, who had superceded Major Porter, ordered Colonel Herrera, the commander of a large Spanish force that had recently crossed the Sabine River, to retire to his own country’s territory. Cushing stated that the reinforcements that had

\(^7\)Secretary of War to Wilkinson, May 6, 1806, SWLS, Roll 3, 4-8. A quote from the Kentucky Gazette in the Charleston Courier of June 16, 1806, reported that Wilkinson had been ordered to Louisiana with all of the troops from St. Louis.

\(^8\)Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 9, 1806 and Secretary of War to Freeman, June 9, 1806, SWLS, Roll 3, 25-28.

recently arrived at Natchitoches were to provide for the defense of the territory actually surrendered to the United States. He assured the Spaniard that the movements were not motivated by any hostile intentions.

Colonel Herrera answered that he had crossed the river in order to prevent the territory that rightfully belonged to Spain from being taken by the United States. He warned that if hostilities resulted, the responsibility would rest with Cushing, because he had no intention of fighting the Americans unless his force was attacked.\(^{90}\)

On August 8 Captain Turner said that Governor Herrera considered the removal of the Spanish troops east of the Sabine River to be a hostile act. The Captain was concerned because a large body of Spanish troops was marching in the direction of Natchitoches. If the force continued to move at the same pace, they would be within twelve miles of the American post by nightfall. As additional proof of the hostile intentions of the Spanish, Turner had recently learned that the Red River expedition had been turned back by a Spanish patrol.\(^{91}\)

The Spanish continued their build-up along the Sabine. On August 16 Governor Claiborne and Cowles Mead, the Acting Governor of the Mississippi Territory, learned

\(^{90}\) Cushing to Herrera, Aug. 5, 1806 and Herrera to Cushing, Aug. 6, 1806, ASPFR, II, 801.

\(^{91}\) Turner to Claiborne, Aug. 8, 1806, Rowland, WCC, III, 382.
that an armed force had crossed the Sabine in order to establish a post at Bayou Pierre. They promptly issued a joint statement that summarized their view of the situation. They resolved on the following measures:
(1) the force should be compelled to move west of the river; (2) the territorial militia should be called into service if more troops were required; (3) the presence of Governor Claiborne at Natchitoches might speed the raising of the militia; (4) the Governor would send as many of the militia from the Mississippi Territory as possible if the Spanish should threaten New Orleans; and (5) the Mississippi Territory would furnish one hundred mounted infantry if hostilities started at Natchitoches.

The two officials expressed their regrets that General Wilkinson had not yet arrived to carry out the military preparations. However, they stated that upon his arrival, they would surrender the direction of the military activities to him. The following day Claiborne stated that the Spanish force was preparing to establish a camp near Natchitoches. The next day he informed the Secretary of War that he feared no danger from Mobile or Pensacola and was proceeding to the frontier to supervise the operations there until Wilkinson arrived.

93 Claiborne to Richard Claiborne, Aug. 17, 1806, Rowland, WCC, III, 378-79.
94 Claiborne to Dearborn, Aug. 18, 1806, Ibid., 381.
Reports that the Governor of Texas was on the march with nine hundred men circulated throughout Louisiana. This large force was supposed to be within fifteen miles of Natchitoches and determined to reoccupy their former position. To meet this threat, a large number of United States troops had been ordered to the western frontier.  

On August 29 Richard Claiborne informed the Secretary of State that he had no knowledge of the location of the Governor of Texas and his force.  

When Governor Claiborne arrived at Natchitoches, he dispatched a letter to Colonel Herrera protesting a number of Spanish actions: (1) the Spanish attack upon Colonel Thomas Freeman and the Red River expedition; (2) the arrest of three American citizens within twelve miles of Natchitoches and their detention at Nacogdoches; (3) the harboring of runaway slaves; and (4) the occupation of United States territory by Spanish troops. The Governor warned that if these activities continued "the sword must be drawn."  

Colonel Herrera answered Claiborne's letter politely but firmly. His troops were on the east side

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95 Two letters published in the Charleston Courier of Sept. 29, 1806. One was from Pinckneyville, dated Aug. 18 and the other was from Fort Adams, dated Aug. 25.  
96 R. Claiborne to Secretary of State, Aug. 29, 1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 681-82.  
97 Claiborne to Herrera, Aug. 26, 1806, ASPFR, II, 801-802.
of the Sabine in order to preserve the territory that had always been and was still Spanish. The Red River expedition had not been attacked but merely ordered to return to American soil. The three citizens who had been arrested had twice been discovered observing Spanish activities and had been sent to Nacogdoches for questioning.\footnote{Herrera to Claiborne, Aug. 28, 1806, \textit{Ibid.}, 802.}

On August 28 Governor Claiborne wrote to Dearborn that no offensive action had been taken by the Americans against the Spanish. Claiborne intimated that he felt that the intruders should be forcibly expelled from their position. However, Colonel Cushing was determined to take no action as long as the Spanish remained in the disputed territory, but if they crossed into the "acknowledged limits of the territory of the United States" he would move against them.\footnote{Claiborne to Dearborn, Aug. 28, 1806, Rowland, \textit{WCC}, III, 386-90.}

Within a week Claiborne reported that there were 1,200 Spanish soldiers stationed at Bayou Pierre and three hundred more were moving to join them. The report was based on a report from Lieutenant John Du Forest who had just returned from the Spanish Camp. He stated that there were eleven companies in camp, each consisting of one hundred and ten men. Claiborne believed that the United
States regulars already at Natchitoches, those ordered from Fort Adams and the local militia could force the Spanish to retire. The Governor based his opinion on the fact that the large Spanish force was composed primarily of militia cavalry.\textsuperscript{100} Despite the optimistic assessment of the situation by Claiborne, the negotiations continued in an effort to resolve the conflict without bloodshed.

On September 18 Captain General Don Menesio Salcedo sent a letter to Claiborne assuring him that the Spanish did not intend their activities to be hostile. The Spanish officers had no plans to establish any new posts in the disputed area, but were only trying to prevent the seizure of the land by the Americans. They would continue to patrol the disputed area in an effort to prevent any settlements being made by the citizens of either side. Salcedo closed with a warning, "I must also repel all aggressions of the American Government, and act conformably to the strictest accomplishment of the first obligation of my station."\textsuperscript{101}

General Wilkinson's arrival at Natchitoches probably prevented the controversy from developing into open

\textsuperscript{100} Claiborne to Dearborn, Sept. 4, 1806, \textit{Ibid.}, 396-99.

\textsuperscript{101} Salcedo to Claiborne, Sept. 18, 1806, \textit{American State Papers, Military Affairs} (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), I, 205-206. Hereinafter cited as \textit{ASPM}. 

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warfare. Governor Claiborne distrusted the Spanish and had suggested on more than one occasion that the problems with Spain could be solved with military force. On the other hand, Wilkinson had the ability to use the right mixture of threats and persuasion to accomplish his goals.

On September 24 Wilkinson addressed a letter to Antonio Cordero in which he outlined the history of the controversy concerning the boundary. He then recited the Secretary of War's instructions of the sixth of May to him. It was on the basis of these orders that he demanded that the Spanish troops withdraw. Wilkinson concluded by saying that his orders were absolute and he would sustain the American claims to the land against any force that might oppose them. Five days later Cordero informed Wilkinson that his letter had been referred to Salcedo for his consideration.

During the first week of October the tense situation seemed to be relaxing. Cordero informed Claiborne that the American slaves would be returned to their owners and that Herrera had been ordered to release the three American citizens. General Wilkinson was able to discharge all of the militia that had been called into service.

102 Wilkinson to Cordero, Sept. 24, 1806, ASPFR, II, 803-804.
103 Cordero to Wilkinson, Sept. 29, 1806, Ibid., 804.
104 Cordero to Claiborne, Oct. 2, 1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 683.
except one hundred dragoons and mounted infantry. He was prompted to take the action for reasons of economy and because the Spanish had recrossed the Sabine. The General retained the dragoons in order to observe the activities of the Spanish. 105

On October 4 Wilkinson told Cordero that he was advancing toward the Sabine River with a force of regulars. The purpose of the advance was to "demonstrate the pretentions of the United States to the territory east of the river." He assured the Spanish official that the movement had no aggressive motives. He observed that the Spanish should not object to the American's presence in the disputed region since they were on the west bank of the Sabine, some sixty miles in advance of their post at Nacogdoches. 106

On October 11 Cordero told Wilkinson that without further instructions from his superiors he was bound to consider the Arroyo Hondo as the eastern boundary of Texas. In addition, he pointed out that even if the American movement to the Sabine was peaceful, his duty required that he oppose any incursion into the area. 107

105Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Oct. 4, 1806, ASPFR, II, 803.
106Wilkinson to Cordero, Oct. 4, 1806, Ibid., 804.
107Cordero to Wilkinson, Oct. 11, 1806, ASPMA, I, 205.
On October 21 Wilkinson revealed his intentions to the Secretary of War. He planned to propose that both sides withdraw their forces from the disputed area, and return to the positions that they had occupied at the time the province was surrendered to the United States. If this scheme was agreed to by both parties, the Americans would return to Natchitoches and the Spanish to Nacogdoches, thereby creating a neutral zone between the two posts. If the Spanish refused to agree to his proposal, Wilkinson would govern his conduct according to existing conditions.  

The Spanish agreed to accept Wilkinson's plan and both sides withdrew from the disputed territory. The location of the western boundary of Louisiana was left to the diplomatic officers of the two countries. The agreement establishing the neutral ground was probably a satisfactory arrangement as far as the officers on both sides were concerned, with the possible exception of Governor Claiborne. War was averted and the officers had maintained the claims of their governments.

The agreement concerning the neutral zone at the Sabine River freed Wilkinson to turn his attention to a problem that was developing in the nation's interior. The troops of the regular Army would soon be called upon to counteract the plans of Aaron Burr, the former Vice-President of the United States. The actual purpose of Burr's scheme

\footnote{108 Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Oct. 21, 1806, ASPFR, II, 804.}
is still open to question, but in all probability it was directed toward seizing Spanish territory in the southwest, and possibly detaching a part of the United States. Whatever he was planning, there is little doubt that General Wilkinson was well informed as to the former Vice President's intentions. As early as May 23, 1804, Wilkinson had addressed a letter to Burr that indicated the two men were holding secret meetings. He wrote, "to save time of which I need much and have but little, I propose to take a bed with you this night, if it may be done without observation or intrusion."¹⁰⁹

Burr had traveled through the western territories during 1805 and had been received with all of the ceremony befitting a former Vice President of the United States. He had traveled as far as New Orleans where he stayed for ten or twelve days before starting back to St. Louis. Upon leaving he intimated that he would return to the city in October.¹¹⁰ After his journey through the West, Burr proceeded with his preparations. By the summer of 1806 he had raised $50,000 and could state that his plans were proceeding rapidly.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Claiborne to Jefferson, July 14, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 124-27.
On July 29 Burr outlined his plan in a coded letter to Wilkinson. His force would descend the Mississippi to its mouth, where it would be joined by English ships and a part of the United States Navy. Burr would leave for the West in August; money was available and boats were being constructed to carry the party South. He predicted that between 500 and 1,000 men would be collected at the Falls of the Ohio. Within a month the force would reach Natchez and from that time on their actions would be determined by existing circumstances. In all of this, Wilkinson was to share. Only Aaron Burr would hold a position above him.\textsuperscript{112}

The letter from Burr did not reach Wilkinson until early October. By that time the General was in his camp at Natchitoches and unable either to forward or hinder Burr's preparations. The extent of the preparation was revealed in a report from Lexington, "Colonel Burr has engaged every shipwright at Marietta, at double time, and high wages, to build 15 gunboats, to row 32 oars, and a schooner of 120 tons, to draw only 5 1/2 feet of water."\textsuperscript{113}

Suspicions concerning Burr's activities were widespread:

Colonel Burr for some cause or other, has during the last 18 months,

\textsuperscript{112}Burr to Wilkinson, July 29, 1806, American State Papers, Miscellaneous (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), I, 471. Hereinafter cited as ASPMis.

\textsuperscript{113}Lexington, Kentucky, Oct. 2, in Charleston Courier, Oct. 28, 1806.
been traversing 'to and fro' in the western country. . . . Colonel Burr is now gone to the westward. It has long ago been intimated, that he is preparing to effect something in that quarter-supposed to be a separation of the western states etc. from the Union.\footnote{114}

Whether or not Wilkinson intended to take an active part with Burr is impossible to determine. It seems likely that he was more than willing to let Burr play his game and see how things worked out before making his decision. The General's standing with the administration was not high and this might be his opportunity to regain the President's favor.\footnote{115} Not only could his position with his own government be improved, but he could possibly renew his dealings with Spain.

Wilkinson wrote to Governor Folch to inform him of the projected attack upon Spanish territory. He stated that Burr first planned to attack Baton Rouge and then the provinces of Mexico. He assured Folch that he would do everything in his power to prevent Burr's attack.\footnote{116} On or about November 18, in an effort to cover all possible alternatives, Wilkinson sent Walter Burling, one of his

\footnote{114}{\textit{Charleston Courier}, Oct. 28, 1806, Editor's italics.}

\footnote{115}{ASPMis, I, 539-56 contains Wilkinson's testimony at Burr's trial. See also \textit{Reports of the Trials of Colonel Aaron Burr: In the Circuit Court of the United States, Summer Term, 1807}, 2 vols. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1969).}

\footnote{116}{Wilkinson to Folch, Dec. 6, 1806, A. G. I., Seville, \textit{Papeles de Cuba}, leg. 2375.}
aides, to Mexico City with a letter to Viceroy Iturrigaray. He described how he had stopped Burr's attack on the coast of Mexico, and requested that the Viceroy reimburse him for the expenses incurred in halting Burr. The General estimated that $111,000 would just about cover the cost of his services.

Iturrigaray had already learned about the proposed attack and he was certain that he had the means at his disposal to repel the Americans. Therefore the Viceroy returned Burling with a letter thanking the General for his efforts on the behalf of Spain. All that Burling had accomplished was to accumulate a bill for expenses amounting to $1,500, which was eventually paid by the United States government.

After warning the Spanish officials, Wilkinson turned his attention to spreading the alarm throughout the United States. He informed the President that he had discovered a plan to attack Vera Cruz. He informed Colonel Freeman at New Orleans to be alert to a possible attack upon that city. The General did not elaborate on the possible assault or by whom it may be made.

118 Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, 234.
120 Wilkinson to Freeman, Oct. 23 and Nov. 7, 1806, Ibid., Appendix XCIX and CI.
told Cushing that the plot was thickening but most people were unconcerned. He closed with "My God. What a situation has our country reached. Let us save it if we can." Wilkinson sent a translation of Burr's letter to the President.

The letter that Wilkinson enclosed to cover Burr's communication was designed to convince Jefferson of the existence of:

A deep, dark, and widespread conspiracy, embracing the young and the old, the democrat and the federalist, the native and the foreigner, the patriot of '76 and the exotic of yesterday, the opulent and the needy, the ins and the outs. Wilkinson to Jefferson, Nov. 12, 1806, Ibid., Appendix C.

The President was not taken in by his commanding general's letter, but he did consult his cabinet to determine what actions should be taken. After the meeting he ordered that armed bands descending the Ohio and Mississippi rivers should be arrested. To accomplish this, the commanders at the various military posts were ordered to watch for and stop any suspicious activities. If it was deemed necessary, the militia could be called out to assist the regulars in suppressing the activities.

121 Wilkinson to Cushing, Nov. 7, 1806, Ibid., Appendix XCIX.
122 Wilkinson to Jefferson, Nov. 12, 1806, Ibid., Appendix C.
123 Cabinet Memoranda, Nov. 25, 1806, cited in McCaleb, Aaron Burr, 195.
On November 27 President Jefferson issued a Proclamation announcing the existence of a conspiracy, it enjoined all citizens and officials to aid in stopping the conspirators and in arresting their designs. Additional orders were issued to the officers stationed along the Mississippi to stop anyone who might be preparing an expedition against the territory of any nation at peace with the United States. Their instructions authorized the officers to call out the militia if additional troops were required.

In addition, Wilkinson was ordered to dispose of the troops in such a way as to prevent any unlawful action against New Orleans or any other location. He was to do everything in his power to protect the territory of the United States and Spain. The Secretary noted that Burr was generally felt to be the leader of the expedition, but the General's name was often associated with the activities.

Wilkinson warned Governor Claiborne of the conspiracy on the same day that he sent Burr's letter to Jefferson.

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125 Secretary of War to Lt. Swearinger, Nov. 26, 1806, SWLS, Roll 3, 105-106; Secretary of War to Freeman and Commanding Officer at Fort Adams, Nov. 28, 1806, Ibid., 109.

126 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Nov. 29, 1806, Ibid., 107-108.
He told Claiborne, "You are surrounded by dangers of which you dream not and the destruction of the American Union is seriously menaced. The storm will probably burst on New Orleans, when I shall meet it and triumph or perish." To ensure that Claiborne was properly impressed with the extent of the conspiracy, Wilkinson wrote that it "implicates thousands and among them some of your particular friends as well as my own."\(^{127}\) The Governor, who was overly suspicious of everyone and everything, was duly aroused and frightened by Wilkinson's letter.

While the instructions passed from the capital to the frontier, Wilkinson was busy. In mid-November Major Porter and forty artificers arrived in New Orleans from Natchitoches to begin repairing the forts and defensive works of the city. It was expected that eight hundred troops would soon arrive from the western frontier. Two companies of soldiers normally stationed in New Orleans returned to the city after spending only five days at Natchitoches.\(^{128}\)

On November 18 it was reported that Cowles Mead had refused General Wilkinson's requisition for five hundred territorial militia.\(^{129}\) Apparently some of the citizens

\(^{127}\) Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 12, 1806, Rowland, WCC, IV, 55-56.


\(^{129}\) Report from Natchez dated Nov. 18 in Charleston Courier, Jan. 14, 1807.
were not overly impressed with the extent of the suspected conspiracy. The comments of one resident of Natchez summarized a portion of popular opinion:

The promoters of all this, are falling fast into contempt, by every description and class of people. Wilkinson is vastly unpopular here, in consequence of his having made a requisition of several hundred men, when not wanted, and lately repeating the farsical act. - The affair is too barefaced and contemptible to be patiently born with. . . . We want not the parade of Wilkinson nor to feel and participate in the perpetual fears of Claiborne. . . .

Despite the opposition of the citizens of the Mississippi Territory, General Wilkinson continued his propaganda campaign about the dangers posed by the party descending the river. He stated that unless "reinforced, New Orleans will certainly fall before Colonel Burr."  

At New Orleans preparations were being made to withstand the anticipated assault upon the city. On December 4 Colonel Freeman was ordered to examine the public buildings in the city to determine the number of troops that could be housed in them. He and the military agent were to determine what repairs were necessary to put the buildings in good condition, the length of time required to make the repairs, and the cost of renovating the

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130 "Extract of a letter from Natchez to a gentlemen in this city, dated Nov. 25, received the last mail" in Charleston Courier, Jan. 16, 1807.  
131 Charleston Courier, Jan. 19, 1807.
structures. The military agent was ordered to provide four hundred entrenching tools, one hundred hatchets, and a supply of timber to be used by the troops in repairing the public buildings and fortifications.

The repairs at Fort Charles were to be supervised by Major Porter and those at Fort Louis by Major Abimall Nicoll. As laborers and workers were hired they were to be assigned to the two officers in equal proportions. The next day additional orders were issued, the lines of the various works were to be laid out and the superintending officers were to be told how they were to be constructed. Freeman was to supervise all of the works and dispose of the workmen and materials in such a way as to speed the construction. The Colonel was to assign men to cut trees to be made into abatises and placed around the redoubts. Not all of the work was being performed by the soldiers as there were a number of Negro workers employed by the Army to work on the fortifications.

On December 6 General Wilkinson wrote to Claiborne:

Under circumstances so imperious extraordinary measures must be resorted to, and ordinary forms of our civil institutions must, for a short period,

\[^{132}\text{Garrison Order, Dec. 4, 1806, in Orders Garrison of New Orleans, 1806; Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives).}\]

\[^{133}\text{General Order, Dec. 5, 1806, \textit{Ibid}.}\]

\[^{134}\text{General Order, Dec. 10, 1806, \textit{Ibid}.}\]
yield to the strong arm of military law... I most earnestly entreat you to proclaim martial law over this city its ports and percints. [sic]135

On December 16, 1806, Governor Claiborne issued a proclamation against unlawful combinations that strongly resembled President Jefferson's proclamation. The following day he declared to the Secretary of State, "but in no event will I take upon myself to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeus corpus and to proclaim martial law."136

The Secretary of War issued orders to the commanding officers at New Orleans and Fort Adams to arrest anyone who appeared at their posts and who were in apparent violation of the nation's laws.137 By the time these orders were issued the entire crisis seemed to be well in hand. On the twenty-seventh of December President Jefferson told Senator William Plummer of New Hampshire: "there was no room to doubt the integrity, firmness and attachment of Wilkinson to our government ... the conspiracy would be crushed, extensive as it was, with little trouble and expense to the United States."138

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135 Wilkinson to Claiborne, Dec. 6, 1806, Rowland, WCC, IV, 46-47.

136 Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 17, 1806, Ibid., 68.

137 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer Fort Adams, Dec. 20, 1806, SWLS, Roll 3, 109-110; Secretary of War to Freeman, Dec. 20, 1806, Ibid., 110.

In New Orleans, however, the situation was becoming unmanageable. For all intents and purposes Wilkinson had suspended the civil authority. During the crisis a number of individuals were arrested because of their suspected association with Burr. When Judge Workman ordered them released on writs, Wilkinson had them arrested again and smuggled out of town. Judge Workman finally resigned in disgust because of the lack of support he received from the civil authorities, and Wilkinson had him arrested. Wilkinson was apparently becoming the victim of his own fears of disaster.

President Jefferson wrote of Wilkinson's conduct:

My general has trodden the law
in the dust, set at naught my courts
to their faces; and swaddled my
governor in his sash, and laid him
to bed, like a great baby... This general felt himself in a most
uncommon predicament, from which
nothing could extricate him but
uncommon measures. I would blame
the general but that I am so glad
to think what a scrap I've got out
of by his means.\(^{139}\)

The high-handed methods employed by Wilkinson
angered a number of New Orleans residents but many others

\(^{139}\) J. H. Daveiss, "View of the President's Conduct
concerning the Conspiracy of 1806," I. J. Cox and H. A.
Swineford (ed.), Quarterly Publication of the Historical
and Philosophical Society of Ohio, XII (Apr. - Sept., 1917),
126. In relation to Wilkinson's actions in New Orleans,
Jefferson wrote: "The defence of Orleans against a land
army can never be provided for according to the principles
of the constitution, till we get a sufficient militia
there." Jefferson to Gallatin, Nov. 22, 1807, Paul L.
Putnam's Sons, 1905), X, 528.
took the threat presented by Burr in the light in which Wilkinson presented it. One citizen wrote in January:

The military means of defense here are in readiness - the regular troops and militia are alert. . . . Wilkinson and his regulars - and the true Americans, are determined to fight and I fear much blood will be spilt. Perhaps this may be my last letter.140

Ten days after the prediction of a full scale armed conflict, Aaron Burr surrendered to the civil authorities of the Mississippi Territory. On February 3 the Grand Jury at Natchez that was hearing Burr's case returned no indictments on any of the charges brought against him. However, the Federal Judge, Thomas Rodney, refused to release Burr from bail and ordered him to appear in court each day. Burr was fearful of being transferred to New Orleans where he would probably be tried before a court martial selected by General Wilkinson. Consequently, he failed to appear in court on the sixth of February. The next day Governor Williams of the Mississippi Territory declared him to be a fugitive.

Burr fled from Natchez in a southeasterly direction, hoping to reach the Gulf and take a ship out of the country. On February 18 he was recognized and his presence was reported to Lieutenant Edmund P. Gaines at Fort Stoddert.

140 "Extract of a letter from a gentleman in office in New Orleans to his correspondent in this city, dated the 7th Instant," Charleston Courier, Jan. 31, 1807.
The next day Gaines, accompanied by a detachment of soldiers, met Burr and his two traveling companions on the road. After ascertaining his identity, Gaines arrested Burr on the authority of the President's proclamation. Burr was taken to Fort Stoddert where he was held until March 5, when he and an escort of nine soldiers left by ship for Washington.¹⁴¹

The entire Burr Conspiracy was blown completely out of proportion by a number of individuals, but the primary offender was James Wilkinson. Fearful that his position as commanding general was in jeopardy, he had taken a situation that was only remotely dangerous and magnified it until even he lost touch with reality. When the actual size of Burr's force became known, Wilkinson seemed to be a fool rather than the savior of the west.

By early January the size of the force was beginning to come to light, Jefferson told Wilkinson that he did not believe the number of men had ever reached five hundred. The President stated that he had never seen any positive proof that indicated more than one hundred men had joined his former Vice President.¹⁴² Late in January


¹⁴² Jefferson to Wilkinson, Jan. 3, 1807, in Albert
the Secretary of War wrote to inform Wilkinson that he had authentic information that Burr's force could not amount to more than six hundred men. On February 3, Dearborn stated that Burr's entire force consisted of ten boats with only six men on each, amounting to the formidable force of sixty men.

To stop this small band of men, Wilkinson had assembled about 1,000 regulars, a naval force, and three or four hundred militia men in the vicinity of New Orleans. The force of approximately 1,000 regulars represented about one-third of the total strength of the United States Army. The remaining troops were stationed along the frontier from Portland to New Orleans and from Michilimackinac to Vincennes. The Secretary of War's letter of the third of February instructed Wilkinson to distribute the troops at the various posts as soon as the turmoil surrounding Burr had subsided. He suggested that six companies be retained at New Orleans, one company at Plaquemines, four at Natchitoches, two on the Mobile and

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143 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Jan. 21, 1807, SWLS, Roll 3, 117-20.

144 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 3, 1807, Ibid., 126-28.

145 Secretary of War to House of Representatives, Jan. 9, 1807, ASPMA, I, 207.
Tombigbee, and the remainder at Fort Adams. Two weeks later Wilkinson was ordered to detach an escort for an expedition being prepared to explore the Arkansas River to its source.

General Wilkinson had played the Burr Conspiracy for all it was worth and had discredited himself in the eyes of many citizens. However, the actions of the officers and men resounded to the credit of the Army. They had responded quickly and efficiently to the President's call to oppose Burr and his expedition. Although the expedition did not materialize on the scale that had been predicted, the potential for gathering such a party did exist.

Aaron Burr was the type of man who could inspire other men to follow him to fame and fortune and there were many men on the frontier willing to follow such a leader. What stopped the frontiersmen from joining Burr is open to speculation. But one thing is certain, the news that Wilkinson was gathering a large force to oppose the expedition was well known across the nation. Even the most adventuresome frontiersman must have hesitated when faced with the prospect of encountering a large well-armed force of regulars.

147 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 13, 1807, Ibid., 132.
On April 10, 1807, the Secretary of War informed Wilkinson that he would be summoned to Richmond, Virginia, to testify against Burr. On May 20, the General left New Orleans for Richmond vowing that he would convict Burr, that “little arch traitor” and “damned and pickled villain.” With the departure of Wilkinson from New Orleans, Colonel Thomas Cushing was left in command of the troops on the southern frontier.

The arrest of Burr, the tentative agreement on the Sabine and the departure of the commanding general, left the situation in the South relatively quiet. The Army was left to untangle itself and try to return to a more or less normal existence. The troops returned to their isolated frontier posts to await some other assignment that would break the monotonous routine of garrison duty.

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148 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 10, 1807, Ibid., 161-62.
149 Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, 237.
150 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 10, 1807, SWLS, Roll 3, 161-62.
CHAPTER IV

FORTIFYING, GUARDING AND
EXTENDING THE NATION'S FRONTIERS

The end of the Burr episode brought the start of a period of peace to the frontier. The problems on the western border of Louisiana had temporarily been resolved, the southern Indians were quiet for the moment, and only the problem of duties at Mobile remained unsettled. From March of 1807 until the outbreak of the War of 1812, the principal activities of the Army would be directed toward improving the nation's fortifications and garrisons. Occasionally the normal routine of garrison life was disrupted by orders to perform duties that were out of the ordinary.

A large-scale building problem was started across the South, with the most ambitious projects at Charleston and New Orleans. Initially the War Department expected that the fortifications would be built by civilian workers, but as costs rose the soldiers were called upon to perform more and more of the construction work. All of the construction, whether by civilians or soldiers, was to be supervised by Army engineers. Captain Alexander Macomb
was the engineer assigned to direct the work planned for Charleston Harbor. However, no engineer had been found to superintend the work at New Orleans.¹

For the works at New Orleans the skilled laborers were hired in other cities, usually at Philadelphia and Washington. The bricklayers, masons and carpenters were sent to begin the works even before an engineer had been assigned to New Orleans. The unskilled workers were hired by the military agent from among the local residents.²

The absence of a qualified engineer delayed the beginning of work at New Orleans, and construction at Charleston could not get started because the state of South Carolina had not ceded a site for the fortifications to the United States. The cession did not take place until August of 1807, and little work, other than acquiring

¹Secretary of War to Jonathan Williams, May 11, 1807 and Secretary of War to J. Williams, May 11, 1807, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 3, 176-79. Hereinafter cited as SWLS. Roll 3 is filled with letters sent by the Secretary of War during 1807-1808 concerning the construction of new fortifications and the improvement of existing garrisons. It is especially valuable for information concerning the purchase of materials.

²Secretary of War to William Linnard, Military agent for the Middle Department, Feb. 7, 1807, Ibid., 131. Directs him to hire a brickmaker, and two to four assistants; a master mason and six or eight assistants to go to New Orleans for one or two years service. Secretary of War to Abraham, Apr. 11, 1807, Ibid., 162-63, encloses a contract for two master masons and three black assistants; three brickmakers and four bricklayers.
materials, was accomplished.\textsuperscript{3} While waiting to begin construction in Charleston, Macomb supervised the building of a Federal arsenal at Rocky Mount, South Carolina.\textsuperscript{4} The workers for the project at Charleston were hired by the military agent, Lieutenant Robert Roberts, from available labor in the city. This force was to be increased by the transfer of workers from Rocky Mount when that project was completed.\textsuperscript{5}

At New Orleans there were problems with the contract workers, the bricklayers refusing to work during the summer of 1807. The Secretary of War directed the military agent, Abraham, to consult the United States District Attorney to determine if their contract required them to work, or whether they could be dismissed without compensation.\textsuperscript{6}

By the spring of 1808 the Secretary of War was complaining about the lack of progress in the fortifications and the mounting expenses. He informed Abraham that the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{4}]Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 20, 1807, SWLS, Roll 3, 169.
\item[\textsuperscript{5}]Secretary of War to Roberts, May 11, 1807, Ibid., 180; Secretary of War to Macomb, June 22, 1807, Ibid., 199.
\item[\textsuperscript{6}]Secretary of War to Abraham, Aug. 14, 1807, Ibid., 216.
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commanding officers at posts where works were being erected would be ordered to assign soldiers to assist the civilian workers. They would receive one extra gill of spirits and an extra ten cents a day as compensation for their work.\textsuperscript{7}

In April the Secretary told Macomb: "Let the workmen complete the buildings and magazine at Rocky Mount. There has been already time and money enough expended at that place to have built a small city."\textsuperscript{8}

Unless they were called upon to work on the fortifications, the building program did not effect the daily routine of the enlisted men. Normally their activities were confined to the tasks of a garrison force: daily drills, guard duty, and policing the post. Occasionally they performed light manual labor not directly associated with the duties of a soldier.

At Natchitoches the men were required to guard the Indian trading post in an effort to prevent robberies. In addition a few of the soldiers were ordered to aid the factor in packing the pelts and furs before they were shipped to New Orleans.\textsuperscript{9} At Port St. Stephens the soldiers assisted the factor in repairing his storehouse so that the

\textsuperscript{7}Secretary of War to Abraham, Mar. 1, 1808, \textit{Ibid.}, 301.

\textsuperscript{8}Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 25, 1808, \textit{Ibid.}, 336.

\textsuperscript{9}Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Natchitoches, Mar. 24, 1807, \textit{Ibid.}, 148.
supplies would be secure. Also, the troops were to construct bridges over the creeks on the road from the Oconee River to the post. The existing road was in such a bad state of repair that during the rainy season supplies could not be moved to Fort St. Stephens. The type of work that the soldiers were expected to perform was indicated by an order to supply the garrisons at Chickasaw Bluffs and on the Arkansas River with a dozen axes and a dozen spades.

However, not all of the assignments called for manual labor on the part of the soldiers; at times they were required to enforce Federal laws and regulations. On July 3, 1807, orders were issued to all officers commanding posts in the nation's ports to assist revenue officers in the enforcement of President Jefferson's Proclamation of July 12. The proclamation ordered all armed British ships to leave the ports of the United States. If the order was not complied with, all communications with the ships were to be stopped and no provisions were to be

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10 Secretary of War to William Boote, June 16, 1807, Ibid., 197.
11 Secretary of War to Swearinger, May 7, 1807, Ibid., 176.
12 Secretary of War to Burbeck, July 3, 1807, Ibid., 201. Order of July 3, 1807, in Order Book for the Garrison at Fort Johnston, N. C., 1795-1811, Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives).
acquired in American ports.\textsuperscript{13} Apparently the soldiers were not needed to enforce the proclamation because there is no indication of such activities.

In late July Captain Edmund P. Gaines was ordered to send a party to explore the area between the Tennessee River, both above and below Muscle Shoals, and the Tombigbee River. The purpose of the expedition was to determine how far up the Tombigbee River boats could navigate and the distance from that point to the Tennessee. The information collected was to be communicated to the War Department as soon as possible. The Secretary requested that Gaines lead the expedition, provided his other duties would not suffer during his absence.\textsuperscript{14}

The summer and fall of 1807 passed with little or no activity on the part of the Army. In late October the Secretary of War tried to correct one of the most persistent complaints of the soldiers by ordering that the troops be paid on a regular basis. The paymaster of the Army was warned that further incidents of late payments would be investigated by the War Department.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{14} Secretary of War to Gaines, July 31, 1807, SWLS, Roll 3, 209.

\textsuperscript{15} Secretary of War to the Paymaster of the Army, Oct. 29, 1807, Ibid., 230-31.
On November 30 orders were issued to the commanding officer at New Orleans to remove a number of settlers who had moved onto land that belonged to the United States. He was to prevent the settlers from returning after they were removed and prohibit any new intrusions.\(^{16}\)

On February 1, 1808, the officers of the Army were ordered to assist the revenue officers in the enforcement of the Embargo Act passed by Congress in December. However, the assistance of the soldiers at the southern posts was not required.\(^{17}\) Instead of helping enforce the Embargo, the soldiers at New Orleans and those at Fort Adams were engaged in cleaning and oiling the muskets that were stored at the posts. All of the weapons that required repairs were to be boxed and prepared for shipment to one of the nation's arsenals.\(^{18}\)

The War Department anticipated that the construction in and around New Orleans would begin in earnest as an engineer had finally been found to supervise the work. The engineer who had agreed to go to New Orleans was Colonel J. Foncin, who was to receive a compensation of five dollars

\(^{16}\) Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at New Orleans, Nov. 30, 1807, \textit{Ibid.}, 238.

\(^{17}\) Secretary of War to Commanding Officers at New Orleans, Fort Johnston, North Carolina, and Fort Johnson, South Carolina, Feb. 1, 1808, \textit{Ibid.}, 288.

\(^{18}\) Secretary of War to Kingsbury, Feb. 8, 1808, \textit{Ibid.}, 289.
a day from the time he left Washington. Poncin’s instructions were to try to complete the important works at Plaquemine and those at the mouth of the Bayou St. John’s before beginning any new projects. He was to obtain building materials from the military agent and was authorized to draw upon Major William MacRea for soldiers as laborers.

Whatever expectations the Department had nourished were disappointed, for Poncin was back in the capital by early June. He had fallen ill shortly after arriving at his station and had decided to return to the North to regain his health. His departure left the works incomplete, and the task of finishing them fell on Major MacRea. The Department directed MacRea to follow the plans already laid out and to seek any assistance that Governor Claiborne might be able to offer him. In the meantime efforts would be made to find another engineer.

To the east, in the Mississippi Territory, the soldiers were engaged in a different type of activity. At Fort St. Stephens there were still problems in transporting supplies to the post. The contractor was to decide

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19 Secretary of War to Poncin, Feb. 16, 1808, Ibid., 292; Secretary of War to Poncin, Feb. 18, 1808, Ibid., 294.
20 Secretary of War to Poncin, May 22, 1808 and Secretary of War to MacRea, May 22, 1808, Ibid., 350-51.
21 Secretary of War to MacRea, June 6, 1808, Ibid., 359.
how to transport the provisions to the fort. The troops nearby Fort Stoddert were ordered to remove a group of intruders from the Cherokee lands on the Georgia frontier. The operation was to begin as soon as the boundary line between the state the Indian lands was marked by Return J. Meigs.

In April 1808, Macomb now a Major, was informed that a site at Five Fathon Hole near Savannah had been obtained for the fortification and the site for the work at Savannah would be acquired soon. The Major was to supervise the construction of the works intended to protect Savannah, with as little delay as possible. He was also to begin the works at Smithville on the Cape Fear River and the battery at Old Topsail Inlet near Beaufort, North Carolina. Macomb was to give his personal attention to the completion of these works. In July Macomb was instructed to procure sufficient materials to build barracks to accommodate four companies at Charleston and three companies in the Savannah area.

22 Secretary of War to William Linnard, Feb. 22, 1808, Ibid., 295.
23 Secretary of War to Boote, Feb. 24, 1808, Ibid., 314.
24 Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 11, 1808, Ibid., 324-25.
25 Secretary of War to Macomb, July 8, 1808, Ibid., 383.
Soon troops were on the move from Highwassee in Tennessee to Savannah. At Highwassee these men had acquired some experience in construction, and they were expected to put their knowledge to work at their new post. Their commander, Captain George Armistead, was told that upon arriving at Savannah he was to do everything in his power to help with the works at that city and at Five Fathom Hole. He was to detach as many men as possible from his command for fatigue duty each day.

For the Army as a whole, the most significant event of 1808 was an increase in size authorized by Congress in April. The authorizing act added five infantry regiments, one regiment of riflemen, one regiment of light artillery, and one regiment of light dragoons to the Army. The authorized strength of the Army was increased from 3,287 to 9,921. In addition, a chaplain was authorized for each brigade. The increase was not as important as it appeared because the units were never fully recruited. For instance, only one company of light artillery was raised, and its horses were sold in 1809 as an economy measure.

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26 Secretary of War to Armistead, June 30, 1809, Ibid., 373.
27 Secretary of War to Shefsall, July 1, 1808, Ibid., 375.
28 Secretary of War to Armistead, Oct. 12, 1808, Ibid., 427.
30 Fairfax Downey, Sound of Guns: The Story of
In late autumn the activity of the Army began to increase as the nation's foreign relations deteriorated. On November 30, 1808, orders were issued to all commanders of permanent fortifications to inspect their cannons and ammunition to be sure that they were ready for service on the shortest notice. The following day all commanding officers were ordered to give amply notice to their contractors so that supplies could be purchased. The next day Wilkinson was ordered to New Orleans to take command of the force being gathered there to defend the city against a possible invasion. On December 6 the Secretary of War ordered that boats be prepared to transport troops from Norfolk to New Orleans.

But for the soldiers not engaged in some sort of activity that broke the monotony of garrison duty, the time passed slowly. The soldiers engaged in a number of diversions, some of which resulted in the establishment of stringent regulations at some of the posts. At Fort


Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Nov. 30, 1808, SWLS, Roll 3, 453.

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Dec. 1, 1808, Ibid.

Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Dec. 2, 1808, Ibid., 456-57. For the results of this build-up see Chapter 8.

Secretary of War to Saunders, Dec. 6, 1808, SWLS, Roll 3, 457.
Johnston, North Carolina, for example, the commanding officer prohibited artificers, musicians, and privates from leaving the area attached to the garrison. The reason for the restriction was apparent from the last paragraph of the order:

The degrading habit of drunkenness is not sufficient to disgrace them, in addition to that crime they must for the amusement of the citizens show which is the greatest black guard and by way of proving and deciding the point turn out in the public place to be found there commence hostilities, the object of which is to bruise, mangle, disfigure and injure each other. . . . these are crimes which would disgrace a vagabond much less the soldier.34

At New Orleans, where discipline was always difficult to maintain, a similar order was issued in February of 1809. The commander ordered that no more than four men from each company would be granted passes on the same day. The men who left the post were to be accompanied by a non-commissioned officer, who was to be held responsible for the conduct of the soldiers. All of the men were to return to the garrison by four o'clock in the afternoon.35

The officers and men stationed at Raleigh, North Carolina, took an active interest in the presidential election of 1808. During the congressional elections the

34Garrison Orders, June 27, 1808, Order Book for the Garrison of Fort Johnston.

35Garrison Orders, Feb. 14, 1809, Orders, Garrison of New Orleans, 1808-1809, Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives).
question had been raised as to whether or not the troops should be allowed to vote. With the approach of the election of the presidential electors, the subject became even more heated because the number of troops had increased. However, it was discovered by the officers that a majority of the men would vote for the Federalist candidate, who was opposed by the officers. When this fact was revealed, the soldiers were assembled and marched out of town, where those soldiers who wished to vote for the Federalist ticket were held until the voting was concluded. The officers returned to town with the soldiers who would vote properly. The citizens were so aroused by this obvious trick that the soldiers were finally withdrawn by their officers. 

There were not many similar incidents to relieve the routine of soldier life. The drudgery of life is illustrated by the garrison orders issued in New Orleans. The companies of artillery and infantry within the city were to be drilled four hours each day, two in the morning and two in the afternoon. One month later another order was issued reminding the officers of the previous order and adding that a commissioned officer should supervise the drill of each company.

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37Garrison Order, Feb. 18, 1809, and Garrison Order, Mar. 8, 1809, Orders, Garrison of New Orleans, 1808-1809.
The construction of the coastal fortifications continued slowly and unevenly. Macomb was instructed to pay attention to all of the works in his district and not just the fortifications at Charleston. He was to see that the works in Georgia were started, and William MacRea was assigned the task of supervising the works.  

On February 17 two new Brigadier Generals, Peter Gansevoort and Wade Hampton, were appointed as a part of the military build-up. The new generals joined Wilkinson as the ranking officers of the Army and were assigned to direct the Army's numerous operations while Wilkinson was occupied at New Orleans.  

The commanding officer at Ocmulgee Oldfields was instructed to remove a number of intruders from the Indian lands on the frontier of Georgia. He was also told not to disturb two of the settlements in the area until he received further orders. In addition to removing intruders from Indian lands, the soldiers at Ocmulgee were constructing their own barracks and building a public sawmill.

At Fort St. Stephens there were still problems

38 Secretary of War to Macomb, Jan. 24, 1809, SWLS, Roll 4, 18; Secretary of War to MacRea, Feb. 11, 1809, and Secretary of War to Bourke, Feb. 11, 1809, Ibid., 28-29.

39 Secretary of War to Gansevoort and Hampton, Feb. 17, 1809, Ibid., 34.

40 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Ocmulgee Oldfields, Feb. 27, 1809, Ibid., 38; Secretary of War to Smith, Mar. 20, 1809, Ibid., 53.
getting the factory's goods through the Spanish port. Captain Gaines was informed that the proper department would take steps to obtain the release of the goods being detained at Mobile. In March Gaines was appointed assistant military agent for Fort Stoddert, and all of the problems of supplying the troops north of the thirty-first parallel rested with the young officer.  

One of the problems that Gaines would encounter in trying to supply the troops at Fort Stoddert was exemplified by his own company. The 1808 clothing allowance for his men had not been delivered. On February 15, 1809, the Secretary of War reported that the clothes were stored at Fort Adams and told Colonel Thomas Cushing: "I will thank you to have it forwarded to him by way of New Orleans as the superintendent of military stores is not allowed to send him clothing to make up for the deficiency of that year." Apparently the men were still wearing the clothes issued to them in 1807.

Gaines had to be extremely careful in his actions so that he did not anger the Spanish officials at Mobile.

41 Secretary of War to Gaines, Mar. 17, 1809, Ibid., 49; Secretary of War to Gaines, Mar. 29, 1809, Ibid., 61.

42 Secretary of War to Cushing, Feb. 15, 1809, Ibid., 33. The clothing allowance per year as established in 1801 was 1 uniform coat, 1 woolen vest, 2 woolen overalls, 4 woolen socks, 1 hat, 4 shirts, 2 linen overalls, 4 pair of shoes, 1 blanket, 1 forage trousers. In 1815 the allowance had been changed only in that the 1 pair of forage trousers were eliminated, ASPMA, I, 802.
On May 4 the Secretary of War cautioned General Wilkinson:

The same disposition continues in the Executive to maintain the friendly relations subsisting between the U. S. and the neighboring colonies. At all times desirable, it is peculiarly [so?] in the present interesting crisis of our foreign relations to preserve a good understanding and to avoid any cause of collision or complaint.  

In June of 1809 the recruiting parties that had been operating in an effort to reach the level authorized by Congress for an "additional military force" were ordered to report to their assigned stations with their recruits. Upon their arrival the recruits were to "labor and assist in erecting, repairing, and preserving the public works, buildings and property as a primary object."  

The work at the various garrisons was increasingly assigned to the soldiers as the War Department tried to eliminate the cost of hiring workers to build the new fortifications. General Hampton was told: "The work which can be done by the troops will not only expedite the completion of the fortifications, but diminish the expense: these are favorite objects to which too much attention cannot be paid."  

43 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, May 4, 1809, SWLS, Roll 4, 98.  
44 Secretary of War to Hampton, June 30, 1809, and Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 30, 1809, Ibid., 155-56.  
45 Secretary of War to Hampton, July 15, 1809, Ibid., 174.
The Secretary expressed the same opinion when he authorized the payment of drafts drawn on the War Department for work done at another garrison: "It is presumed that his expenditures will not be of any considerable amount, as most of the labor ought to be performed by the garrison, and the necessary timber can be obtained for the cutting and hauling nearby." In August the commanding officers were ordered to assist the health officers in enforcing the recent Act of Congress relative to a quarantine. If additional instructions were required, General Hampton was to be consulted.

The approach of cooler weather and the depletion of the appropriations for fortifications caused construction at many of the posts to be suspended or radically curtailed. Even work at the important works in the harbor of Charleston, except at Port Pinckney, were stopped. Major Macomb was informed that expenditures totaling $110,000 had already been made for the works in South Carolina. This sum greatly exceeded the Major's initial

46 Secretary of War to Linnard, Sept. 30, 1809, Ibid., 210.
47 Secretary of War to Armistead, Aug. 12, 1809, Ibid., 196.
48 Secretary of War to Gratiot, Oct. 26, 1809, Ibid., 214, concerns the supervision of work at Port Johnston, North Carolina; Secretary of War to Kelly, Oct. 29, 1809, Ibid., 216, work suspended at Fort Johnson and Oak Island.
estimate of $75,000, and it appeared that more expenditures would be necessary before the works were completed. As a consequence, the hired laborers were to be discharged and the work confined wholly to Fort Pinckney. To replace the civilian workers at the site, he was to make the best possible use of the soldiers.49

On September 10 General Wilkinson was ordered to Washington to face a court of inquiry into the disaster that had befallen his command at New Orleans. General Hampton relieved Wilkinson and assumed command of all of the troops in the Territory of Orleans and the Mississippi Territory.50

At New Orleans, Fort Adams and Columbia Springs the soldiers were occupied with collecting and inspecting muskets, rifles, pistols and swords. The weapons were to be cleaned and those that required repairs were to be boxed for shipment by sea to one of the nation's arsenals.51 At New Orleans the soldiers were to make minor repairs to the hospital until it could be determined whether or not to completely renovate the building. Orders were also given that finally settled the question of where the commander of

49Secretary of War to Macomb, Nov. 1, 1809, Ibid., 220.

50Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Sept. 10, 1809, and Secretary of War to Hampton, Sept. 10, 1809, Ibid., 206.

51Secretary of War to Cushing, Nov. 28, 1809, Ibid., 233; Secretary of War to Pike, Dec. 13, 1809, Ibid., 243.
the troops in New Orleans would live. If a site could be found and bricks purchased at a slight cost, the soldiers were to build the commander a house. At Fort Stoddert the soldiers were assigned the task of either repairing or making new carriages for the six pound cannons at the post.52

Except for those soldiers caught up in the problems at Terre au Boeufs, the year 1809 was quiet, and 1810 held little promise that it would be different. One historian of the Army, William A. Ganoe, wrote of 1810, after skipping the proceeding year completely:

In 1810 little of account happen for the Army. The uniform was radically changed to single breasted coats without facings and with silver lace along the buttonholes. There was also prescribed the silk hat (much like the civilian one at present) with a cockade on the side.

West Point's faculty was increased by teachers of "drawing and of the French language."53

With this statement he moved on to 1811 and a discussion of the United States on the eve of the War of 1812. The Army was not involved in any activities that would bring fame and glory to its officers and men during 1810, but it accomplished more than simply changing the

52Secretary of War to Pike, Dec. 5, 1809, Ibid., 237; Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 30, 1809, Ibid., 253.

design of its uniform. The adoption of the new uniform was probably the least important event of the year for the officers and men who were required to spend most of their time on the frontier engaged in hard manual labor.

The process of building and repairing fortifications and abandoning the posts that had outlived their usefulness continued during the first months of 1810. Instead of building a fort to protect the area of the St. Mary's River, the War Department decided to assign a number of gunboats to patrol the surrounding waters. To supplement the boats, heavy cannons mounted on traveling carriages would be stationed at the mouth of the river. In order to house the guns when they were not being used, an arsenal was to be built. The barracks near Washington, North Carolina, were no longer needed and were to be sold and the money placed in the treasury. The lease was to be surrendered to the owner of the land.

While one site was being sold, the War Department ordered that the land at Old Topsail Inlet, on which the fort at Beaufort, North Carolina, stood, should be purchased. The government's agent, Brian Hellen, was told to purchase the six acres and have the deed made out to the President. He was cautioned not to pay more than two

\[54\] Secretary of War to Bourke, Feb. 6, 1810, SWLS, Roll 4, 275; Secretary of War to Orr, Jan. 30, 1810, Ibid., 282.
hundred dollars for the site, and less if possible.  

At Fort Johnston, Major Joseph G. Swift was ordered to remove all of the government's buildings onto the site recently ceded to the United States by North Carolina. His expenditures for the movement, improvement of existing facilities, and the construction of new buildings was not to exceed $5,000. Swift was to assume command of the troops and garrison until the work was completed in order to speed the work by utilizing the soldiers stationed at Beaufort.  

At Charleston the construction work had been dragging, and in March Macomb was informed that appropriations for construction in South Carolina had been exceeded and all work except the mounting of cannons should be suspended. However, in April he was ordered to complete the barracks and cisterns at Castle Pinckney. By May Macomb was authorized to spend an additional $20,000 to complete Castle Pinckney; the sum was to include the covering of Fort Littleton which required a little additional work to complete it. He was ordered to suspend work on the buildings at Rocky Mount and turn the public property over to the commanding officer. In June the  

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55Secretary of War to Hellen, Mar. 14, 1810, Ibid., 300.  

56Secretary of War to Swift, Apr. 9, 1810 and Secretary of War to Roberts, Apr. 9, 1810, Ibid., 316-17.
Secretary of War again cautioned Macomb not to exceed the $20,000 appropriation.\textsuperscript{57}

In Louisiana the work on the fortifications was not moving much more rapidly than at Charleston. On April 3, 1810, the Secretary of War informed the military agent, William Swan, that it had been expected that the works would have been completed at an earlier date. The Secretary said:

The monies expended in that country for this object, have far exceeded every calculation and unless the works can be finished with a small additional expense, the authority of this department must be interposed to Arrest the progress.\textsuperscript{58}

By mid-May Major MacRea was informed that the funds for the works had been exhausted and that he was to stop construction. The existing works were to be secured and all workers were to be discharged. If any other work was necessary, it should be performed by the troops stationed at the sites. An additional source of labor was made available when corporal punishment was abolished. Instead of death, offenders were sentenced to hard labor or solitary confinement.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{57}Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 6, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 293; Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 14, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 332; Secretary of War to Macomb, May 8, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 340; Secretary of War to Macomb, June 4, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 367.

\textsuperscript{58}Secretary of War to Swan, Apr. 3, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 313.

\textsuperscript{59}Secretary of War to MacRea, May 18, 1810, and Secretary of War to Swan, May 18, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 353; Secretary of War to Cushing, May 16, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 349-50.
In the spring the War Department announced that it was prepared to issue the yearly supply of clothes to the troops, but it could not do so because it had received no recent returns from the various commanding officers stating the quantities required. General Hampton was informed that the present issue would be filled by using the last available returns, which indicated that there were 1,166 men under his command. If the clothing sent on the basis of the old returns was not sufficient, the soldiers would be forced to wear their old uniforms. In addition to the delay of the clothing issue, the pay of the soldiers was in arrears.

The problems concerning the clothing issue and the payment of the soldiers was fairly typical of the administration of the Army. One observer, Lynton Caldwell, has stated: "Jefferson's reluctance to insist upon an energetic, well-organized federal administration system . . . had left a legacy of military incompetence in the Army and administrative ineptitude in the War Department." The War Department was not inept, it was simply too small to meet the countless demands made upon it. In 1812 the Department consisted of only the Secretary and a dozen clerks. These thirteen men were responsible for directing the activities of the Army and managing the nation's

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60 Secretary of War to Smith, Feb. 22, 1810, and Secretary of War to Hampton, Feb. 23, 1810, Ibid., 286-87.

61 Lynton K. Caldwell, The Administrative Theories
Indian affairs. By 1821 the size of the Department had been increased to include twenty clerks.62

Leonard D. White has observed:

The Secretary of War was not only the head of the department, attending as such to the claims of pensioners, the grant of military land warrants, and the supervision of Indian agents, he also had to act in a strictly military capacity as adjutant general, quartermaster general, commissary general, paymaster, and as appellate authority for review of courts martial. . . . 63

The Secretary and his clerks spent most of their time processing hundreds of letters, dealing with countless subjects, that were addressed to the Department. As a result, the small staff had insufficient time to devote to the important task of directing the activities of the Army.64

In 1813 efforts were made to improve the administration of the Army by the creation of a General Staff.

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63 White, The Jeffersonians, 235.

64 Ibid.
But this designation was misleading because the members of the General Staff were the civilian and military officials concerned with the housekeeping functions of the Army. At the same time each military district also had its own staff which duplicated those of the General Staff.65

After the War of 1812 the members of the General Staff remained in Washington and acted as advisors to the Secretary of War. This marked the beginning of a bureau system within the Army and brought a degree of organization and expertise to the administration of the Army. However, the administration still did not operate efficiently and breakdowns were frequent. During the late 1820's the issuance of regulations to govern the various branches of the Army was an effort to improve the administration of the Army. Despite the various feeble attempts to improve the management of the Army, the system continued to function poorly. The soldiers continued to suffer from the effects of a faulty administration until a more efficient system

65The General Staff included: the adjutant and inspector general, and two assistants; the quartermaster general; the commissary general of ordnance, and three assistants; the paymaster of the army; and the assistant topographical engineer. ASPMA, I, 385-392. Included in the district staff were: the district commander; adjutant general and inspector general; assistant quartermaster general; deputy commissary of ordnance; engineers, surgeons; judge advocates; chaplains; paymasters; deputy commissary of purchases; and military storekeepers. "Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States," May 1, 1813, Ibid., 425-ff.
was finally established during the Civil War.

On June 22, 1810, two paymasters were appointed, one for the Territory of Orleans and the other for the Mississippi Territory. The action was prompted by a memorial from the officers in command of the survivors of the Terre au Boeufs episode. The petition stated that the troops had not been paid during the period from June of 1809 to March of 1810. When they had finally been paid, it was only for the period to the end of 1809. The Secretary of War requested that "at least during the summer and autumn months, the troops at this and every other post where it may be practicable may receive their pay monthly as it shall become due." The law required that the payments be made at least every two months if not more frequently.66

By July the Secretary of War felt that the problem of paying the troops was solved, and it was assumed that there would be no further delays. However, there were still problems concerning the clothing issue. Although supplies of clothes were stored at New Orleans, returns had still not been received for some of the garrisons.67

66 Secretary of War to Brent, June 22, 1810, SWLS, Roll 4, 385; Secretary of War to Brent, June 23, 1810, Ibid., 387.

67 Secretary of War to Cushing, June 29, 1810, Ibid., 391-92; Secretary of War to Cushing, July 13, 1810, Ibid., 404; Secretary of War to Irvine, July 19, 1810, and Secretary of War to Coxe, July 19, 1810, Ibid., 407-408; Secretary of War to Irvine, July 27, 1810, Ibid., 411-12.
While many of the soldiers went unpaid and wore their old uniforms, they continued to execute a variety of orders.

On March 2, 1810, General Hampton was instructed to remove his troops from the vicinity of Natchez during the summer months. The Secretary of War suggested that they be moved north into the forests, where they might avoid the sickness so prevalent in the South. The movement could be made without endangering the security of New Orleans. There was no cause to think that the troops would be called upon to descend the river during the coming months.

One week later the Secretary cautioned the General not to mix the new soldiers arriving at his camp with the old soldiers who were still recovering from their experience at Terre au Boeufs. Again he suggested that the troops be removed: "This is the secret of health to every army on earth. None particularly so to that which you command, and in that climate. I should prefer another hundred leagues north to the hazard even of an imaciated camp. ..." 68

In an effort to improve the quality of the rations issued to the men, the Secretary of War authorized the military agents to supply the troops with pulse or some kind of vegetables. They were also to exchange the ration

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68 Secretary of War to Hampton, Mar. 2, 1810, Ibid., 289-90; Secretary of War to Hampton, Mar. 9, 1810, Ibid., 296-97.
of bread for cornmeal, because the flour tended to sour in the summer months. In addition, the occasional substitution of vegetables for other parts of the ration might be permitted if the commanding officer of a specific post agreed. On April 27, 1810, orders were issued to send the summer clothes, medicine and hospital stores to the troops on the Mississippi, if it had not been done already. 69

At Charleston the soldiers were busy not only with construction work but were also employed in the armory. Under the direction of officers, the men inspected the arms, cleaned the muskets, pistols, and swords, and painted the ordnance. Any weapons found to be unserviceable were to be shipped to Springfield for repairs. 70

Many of the tasks performed by the troops were trivial and were undertaken merely to avoid the appearance of idleness. The men spent long hours engaged in boring jobs that accomplished little, other than adding to the drudgery of their daily lives. While many of the soldiers labored on important projects, many others were engaged in

69 Secretary of War to Morrison, Mar. 5, 1810, Ibid., 293; Secretary of War to Morrison, May 15, 1810, Ibid., 347; Secretary of War to Cushing, May 16, 1810, Ibid., 349-50; Secretary of War to Irvine, Apr. 27, 1810, Ibid., 333. Pulse is the edible seeds of peas, beans, lentils, and similar plants having pods; or a pottage made of meal or pulse.

70 Secretary of War to Smith, Mar. 22, 1810 and Secretary of War to Irvine, Mar. 22, 1810, Ibid., 305.
an endless round of frivolous chores.

In the Mississippi Territory the soldiers were engaged in an activity that was becoming increasingly important. They were protecting the white settlers from the Indians and the Indians from the white settlers. In March the Secretary of War informed Governor William Blount that steps had been taken to eliminate the problem of Indian raids upon the people from Tennessee who wished to trade with Mobile. But more importantly, the Army was removing white intruders from lands still held by the Indians. As early as March 4, 1809, Thomas Freeman had informed the Secretary of the Treasury that trouble was developing in Madison County in Mississippi Territory. Settlers had moved onto the Indian lands, and the Indians were threatening to remove them by force if the United States did not take some action. On March 28, 1810, the Secretary of War requested a legal opinion from Caesar Rodney, asking if the United States had the right, under their 1806 treaty with the Cherokee, to eject the whites. He told the Judge: "let me add that an early decision is very desirable, as measures are required to be taken without delay."

71 Secretary of War to Blount, Mar. 6, 1810, Ibid., 293.


73 Secretary of War to Rodney, Mar. 28, 1810, Ibid., 310.

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On May 4 the Secretary sent a letter to General Hampton advising him that the intruders should be removed from the lands in Madison County. He recommended that the troops from the post at Highwassee be moved into the area below the Muscle Shoals in order to be in a position to act against the invaders. These troops would be reinforced by two companies drawn from Natchez. The soldiers were to establish a new post:

The post at the Highwassee ceases, from the settlement of the country to be either important or useful. Occupying a more advanced post in the neighborhood of the public lands most intruded on, will more essentially secure them, at the same time that it will protect the rights of our own citizens, as well as those of the Indians.

Hampton was to arrange the movement and select the site for the post. He was cautioned: "In the present undetermined state of our foreign relations, our object is in all necessary movements, and in preserving generally the present state, to incur as little expense as possible." 74

On May 20, 1810, Governor Holmes of the Mississippi Territory informed James Neelly, agent to the Chickasaws, that the subject of the intruders was before the Secretary of War. The Governor felt that the order to remove them would be given during the course of the summer. 75

74 Secretary of War to Hampton, May 4, 1810, Ibid., 338-39.
75 Holmes to Neelly, May 20, 1810, Clarence E.
On June 15 the necessary orders were given to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Purdy, who commanded the force, to remove the trespassers from the Indian lands. In August Purdy was ordered not to select a permanent site for the new post until he was certain that it was healthy. On September 13 the removal of another group of whites in the same area was authorized. The order came at a critical moment. The Indians, angered by the intrusions, were attacking whites traveling through their lands. These attacks had caused the Indian agent to post notices advising travelers to use only the public trace or their safety could not be guaranteed.

The process of removal was carried out with relative mildness. Colonel Purdy was told that if widows and orphans, who did not possess the means of removing themselves, were found among the intruders, he was to afford them all of the assistance he could. In addition, if their immediate removal meant that they would be forced to leave


76 Secretary of War to Holmes, June 15, 1810, SWLS, Roll 4, 380; Secretary of War to Hampton, June 15, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 70-71; Secretary of War to Purdy, July 7, 1810, SWLS, Roll 4, 396-97; Secretary of War to Purdy, Aug. 20, 1810, Ibid., 421-22.

77 Holmes to Neelly, Aug. 5, 1810, Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 95.
their crops behind they should be allowed a reasonable
time to harvest them. If the troops found others during
the removal process who fell into this category, the
officers were to use their discretion in deciding what
to do, and were ". . . to be governed by considerations
of clemency and humanity as occasion may require."\(^7\)

The soldiers were involved in other removals in
Louisiana. Settlers had moved into the neutral ground
between the Sabine River and the Arroyo Hondo. A force
of an equal number of Spanish and American soldiers were
to cooperate in a joint operation to remove the intruders.
At New Orleans whites had filtered back onto the public
land at the batture and had to be removed by the
soldiers.\(^7\)

In an effort to gather more information about the
means of communication between Mobile and the Tennessee
rivers, two expeditions were dispatched from Fort Stoddert
in the summer of 1810. Captain Gaines, who had made a
similar exploration the previous year, was to proceed by
water and land to Highwassee and return to Fort Stoddert

\(^7\) Secretary of War to Smyth and Purdy, Oct. 18,
1810, SWLS, 449-50; See "Petition to the President and
Congress by Intruders on Chickasaw Lands," Sept. 5, 1810,
in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 106-13. The petition
bears the names of 450 settlers who were occupying the
Indian lands.

\(^7\) Secretary of War to Cushing, May 24, 1810, SWLS,
Roll 4, 358; Secretary of War to Jefferson, June 4, 1810,
Ibid., 367-68.
by water. A second party was to follow the Indian trails overland to Highwassee and return with Gaines by water. The parties were to be no larger than absolutely necessary so as not to alarm the Indians, who were to be informed of the purpose of the expeditions. The Secretary of War ordered:

The commanding officer of each detachment will keep a journal of his proceedings in which are to be stated as correctly as practicable, the daily progress he makes, the distances from points on the route, the quality of the soil, the kind of timber and face of the country, the rapidity of the current and the depth of water, with such other remarks as he may deem useful or necessary to gain a full knowledge of the Country.  

The detachments could not have been made at a worse time, because there was trouble developing around Fort Stoddert that could have endangered the friendly relations between the United States and Spain. On June 20, 1810, Cayetano Perez, commandant of Mobile, informed Maximiliano de St. Maxent, temporary governor of West Florida, that a plot against Mobile was contemplated by some of the residents in the area of Fort Stoddert.  

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80 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort Stoddert, June 23, 1810, Ibid., 386; Secretary of War to Hampton, July 13, 1810, Ibid., 404; Secretary of War to Blount, June 28, 1810, Ibid., 390.

81 Perez to St. Maxent, June 20, 1810, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1568.
Society." Upon receiving this information, St. Maxent requested that Richard Sparks, the commander of Fort Stoddert, stop the expedition if he could. This was apparently the first indication that Sparks had that a plot existed to attack Mobile. He immediately began an investigation to determine if the reports had any validity. 82

Sparks found that the information from St. Maxent was essentially accurate and he informed the Secretary of War of the existence of the plan. The conspirators contemplated disabling the army at Fort Stoddert, seizing the arms stored there, and capturing Mobile. The inhabitants of the area strongly supported the plan because of the continual problem presented by the Spanish possession of Mobile. Sparks stated that he was virtually without troops, since he had sent two detachments to the Tennessee River and "owing to an unaccountable aversion which the soldiery have to this place, they uniformly refuse to re-enlist here. The manner in which the Garrison has suffered from desertsions will appear to you Sir no doubt remarkable." Sparks requested that his force be reinforced as soon as possible by four companies of infantry and one company of artillery. 83

82 St. Maxent to Sparks, June 15, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 77; Sparks to St. Maxent. June 27, 1810, A. G. I., Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1568; Sparks to St. Maxent, June 30, 1810, Ibid.

83 Sparks to Secretary of War, July 12, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 79-82, Sparks' italics.
As a consequence of the letter from Sparks, the Secretary of War ordered General Hampton to send him reinforcements. However, the troops should wait until late autumn before making the move unless it became necessary to send them sooner. In an effort to protect the men from disease, the General was cautioned to send only veteran troops to Fort Stoddert and not recruits. A letter was sent to Sparks informing him that he would be reinforced. The Secretary hoped that the efforts to open the new means of communication by the Tombigbee and the Alabama to the Mobile would eliminate any need for illegal action on the part of the citizens. 84

If immediate reinforcements were required at Fort Stoddert, General Hampton was authorized to detach two companies of riflemen from Highwassee. If such a detachment were made, additional troops could be sent from the camps on the Mississippi River to reinforce the command at Highwassee. 85

The problems around Mobile were soon complicated by a series of events at Baton Rouge. In the fall the

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84 Secretary of War to Hampton, Aug. 22, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 101-102; Secretary of War to Sparks, Aug. 24, 1810, SWLS, Roll 4, 426.

85 Secretary of War to Hampton, Aug. 22, 1810, in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 101-102.
United States troops occupied a portion of Spanish West Florida. The occupation was a direct result of a rebellion by a number of settlers in the Baton Rouge District of West Florida. On October 27 President Madison issued a proclamation authorizing the occupation of the territory below the Mississippi Territory and east of the Mississippi River to the Perdido River. The action was taken because the United States claimed the area was included in the purchase of Louisiana from France and because the settlers had indicated their desire to become a part of the United States. Governor Claiborne was designated to receive the territory from the rebels and incorporate it into Orleans Territory. To support the Governor when he moved into St. Francisville and Baton Rouge, a large military force was assigned to act as his escort.

On October 19 General Hampton was ordered to have all of the effective troops in the vicinity of Washington, Mississippi Territory, held in readiness to descend the river. The troops were to take four pieces of artillery with them when they marched. In addition to the troops, all of the public boats and gunboats on the river were to be held ready to transport the troops. The contractor was

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to be notified so that he could have one month's provisions collected for the force. 87

Governor Claiborne was in Washington, D. C., when his commission was issued and he moved rapidly across the country in order to receive the territory as soon as possible. The officers at the various frontier posts were ordered to offer him every assistance as he journeyed to Mississippi. On October 27 the Secretary of War informed Hampton that Claiborne was to take possession of the "country laying South and East of the Mississippi as a part of the Territory of Orleans." 88 Claiborne could requisition as many of the forces on the Mississippi River as he required to support him. During the operation the troops were not to be allowed to go into any town in whose "vicinity they might be camped." They were to respect the rights and property of the citizens and to be "obedient to the civil authority."

On November 2 orders were issued to the commander at Natchez by which he was to govern his conduct if Governor Claiborne had not arrived by the time the letter reached Natchez. He was to consult Governor Holmes, and if the latter recommended in writing that the territory should

87 Secretary of War to Hampton, Oct. 19, 1810, SWLS, Roll 4, 452.

88 Secretary of War to the Commanding Officers at Posts and Stations on the South West Frontier, Oct. 27, 1810, Ibid., 458; Secretary of War to Hampton or the Commanding Officer on the Mississippi, Oct. 27, 1810, Ibid., 459-60.
be taken without waiting for Claiborne, the officer was to: "proceed with or detach from your command, under a suitable officer, such number of troops as may be deemed necessary, take possession of and occupy the post of Baton Rouge in the name and behalf of the United States."\textsuperscript{89}

On November 5 the Secretary of War sent a copy of the President's proclamation to the commanding officers stationed on the Mississippi.\textsuperscript{90}

While the troops in the western part of the Mississippi Territory were preparing to move into West Florida, the soldiers in the eastern part of the Territory were again ordered to evict the intruders in Madison County. At the same time Colonel Smyth was warned to keep his soldiers from becoming farmers on the frontier. Officers and soldiers were permitted to keep cattle and hogs, but the Secretary of War cautioned that the raising of the stock was to be kept within bounds and should not result in speculation or injury to the service.\textsuperscript{91}

While the troops were being concentrated in and around Washington, some of the posts were woefully under strength. At the post at the English Turn, there were

\textsuperscript{89}Secretary of War to Commanding Officer of the troops on the Mississippi, Nov. 2, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 460-61.

\textsuperscript{90}Secretary of War to Commanding Officer of the troops on the Mississippi, Nov. 5, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 463.

\textsuperscript{91}Secretary of War to Smyth, Nov. 2, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 461; Secretary of War to Smyth, Nov. 9, 1810, \textit{Ibid.}, 463-64.
one sergeant, and four privates; at Chickasaw Bluffs and at the Arkansas, there were a total of two corporals and six privates. At Fort St. Stephens there was only one private, who was apparently attached to the factory at that post. The Secretary of War questioned whether or not these small posts were essential. If they were needed, they should be supplied with provisions for several months at a time in order to reduce expenses.\footnote{Secretary of War to Hampton, Nov. 19, 1810, \textit{SWLS}, Roll 5, 3; Secretary of War to Mason, Aug. 31, 1810, \textit{SWLS}, Roll 4, 428.}

Governor Claiborne arrived at Natchez on December 1 and immediately conferred with Governor Holmes concerning the appropriate actions to be taken. They decided that Claiborne should take possession of the territory as quickly as possible. Therefore, he ordered Colonel John Covington, commanding the troops on the Mississippi, to have two hundred and fifty to three hundred troops ready to march to Pointe Coupee on the west side of the river. The troops were to be held there until ordered to cross into the District of Baton Rouge. The remaining troops were to be prepared to follow the governor and his escort. The next day Claiborne increased his request to include seven to eight hundred men to move "with all possible dispatch." But at "least" two hundred and fifty were to move to Pointe Coupee at once.\footnote{Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 1, 1810, and Claiborne to Covington, Dec. 1, 1810, in Dunbar Rowland (ed.), \textit{\ldots}}
On December 7 Claiborne stated that he had taken possession of St. Francisville without any opposition. If he encountered resistance at Baton Rouge, "the troops of the United States will be commanded to take the fort." Five days later Claiborne reported that he had taken possession of Baton Rouge on the tenth without resorting to force.94

The disturbance at Baton Rouge was the subject of some concern at Fort Stoddert and Mobile. The Spanish officials and Colonel Cushing, who had been sent to command at Stoddert, were afraid that the Mobile Society might seize this opportunity to move against Mobile. Cushing was informed that if the Spanish should voluntarily offer to abandon any of the posts in the area described in the President's proclamation, he was to garrison them with troops from his command.95

In orders of the same date the Secretary stated: "the reinforcement of Fort Stoddert have for its object the security of the post and the preservation of the public

94 Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 7, 1810, Ibid., 46-50; Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 12, 1810, Ibid., 53-56. Claiborne's italics.

95 Secretary of War to Cushing, Dec. 21, 1810, SWLS, Roll 5, 24.
peace but more particularly the prevention and defeat of a military enterprise against the Spanish possessions. . . ."96

On December 21 Colonel Sparks informed Claiborne that he suspected that the people in the vicinity of Fort Stoddert would use the revolt in West Florida as an excuse to attack Mobile. In an effort to stop the citizens from attacking the Spanish, he had sent Captain Gaines to Mobile to guard the fort. However, the Spanish had eighty to one hundred men posted in the fort, a formidable structure mounting thirty-six pieces of heavy artillery, surrounded by a deep ditch and with walls that were eighteen feet thick.97

Claiborne had ordered Colonel Cushing to take possession of Mobile if the Spanish would voluntarily withdraw. But he had also informed Sparks that if the Spanish did not surrender the fort on demand he was to await further orders as to what actions he should take. If Sparks learned that any of the settlers were contemplating an attack upon Pensacola, he was to do everything possible to stop them.98

96 Secretary of War to Hampton, Dec. 21, 1810, Ibid., 25.
97 Sparks to Claiborne, Dec. 21, 1810, Rowland, WCC, V, 73-75.
98 Claiborne to Sparks, Dec. 23, 1810, Ibid., 76-77.
Fortunately for the continued existence of peace, Colonel Cushing arrived at Mobile before the American troops began a war. Colonel Sparks had called out the militia in his district, in addition to sending Captain Gaines with a force of fifty regulars to demand the surrender of Mobile. The Spanish Commandant had refused the demand, and Colonel Sparks had sent a company of mounted riflemen to support the regulars. Also, he was preparing to send the remaining troops, both regulars and militia, from Fort Stoddert to join Gaines at Mobile. This was the situation Colonel Cushing found when he arrived at Mobile. Dismissing the militia, he decided to await instructions. 99

On January 24 the Secretary of War informed General Hampton and Colonel Cushing that plans had been made to take possession of "all or any part of the territory lying east of the River Perdido, and south of the state of Georgia and the Mississippi Territory." This action was to be taken only if the Spanish officials agreed to surrender their control to the United States. General George Matthews had been authorized to negotiate with the Spanish and to supervise the occupation if the occasion presented itself. He was to be supported by the Army and

99 Cushing to Claiborne, Jan. 8, 1811, in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 167-68; Holmes to Secretary of State, Feb. 2, 1811, Ibid., 173-75.
Navy if he requested their help. If such a surrender was offered before Matthews arrived, the two officers were to occupy the territory until General Matthews arrived.\textsuperscript{100}

The Spanish declined to surrender the town and Cushing withdrew his force from Mobile to Fort Stoddert upon orders from General Hampton. Judge Harry Toulmin wrote of the removal: "I regret this step, - as I fear that many of the citizens at Mobile have so far committed themselves with the Spanish officers - that they may now feel their displeasure."\textsuperscript{101}

The occupation of West Florida between the Mississippi and the Perdido rivers removed a situation that had been causing problems since the United States first occupied the Louisiana Purchase. As the new year began, the troops were returned to their garrisons to resume the dreary peacetime routine. There were thirty-nine companies with a strength of approximately 2,300 soldiers stationed in the southern part of the country. For most of these men the rest of the year would be a period of relative inactivity.\textsuperscript{102} The removal of the

\textsuperscript{100}Secretary of War to Hampton and Cushing, Jan. 24, 1811, \textit{SWLS}, Roll 5, 41-42; Secretary of War to Smith, Jan. 28, 1811, \textit{Ibid.}, 54. Both letters were marked confidential.

\textsuperscript{101}Toulmin to the President, Feb. 6, 1811, in Carter, \textit{Territorial Papers}, VI, 175-77. Toulmin's italics.

\textsuperscript{102}Secretary of War to Irvine, Feb. 12, 1811, \textit{SWLS}, Roll 5, 58-61.
intruders in the Mississippi Territory continued. The commanding officer was given discretion to grant indulgences in point of time to the individuals occupying Indian lands. In South Carolina the work on the fortifications continued, but expenditures were to be held to $9,000 and completed as rapidly as possible. General Hampton was instructed not to make any expenditures for fortifications that might be erected in the territory acquired as a result of the President's Proclamation.\textsuperscript{103}

On July 20 General Hampton was ordered to begin the construction of three roads, the only major undertaking of the year. The first road was to begin in the vicinity of Muscle Shoals and run to the Mobile. The object was to provide a means of transportation for the inhabitants of Tennessee to the Gulf. The second road was to run from Fort Stoddert to Colonel Hawkins' station on the Flint River, and the third was to be opened from Fort Stoddert to Baton Rouge. The roads were to be constructed by the troops under the general's command. Primary consideration was to be given to the road from the Tennessee to Fort Stoddert, the others would be built as conditions would admit. The construction of the roads by soldiers was justified because: "The United States must have roads

\textsuperscript{103}Secretary of War to Troup, Feb. 12, 1811, \textit{Ibid.}, 62; Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 9, 1811, \textit{Ibid.}, 77; Secretary of War to Hampton, Mar. 14, 1811, \textit{Ibid.}, 81.
for the purpose of transporting their ordnance and military stores from one military post to another. . . ."

The Secretary of War cautioned Hampton that the Indians should be informed of the reasons for the large number of soldiers moving through their territory so as not to alarm them. The Secretary envisioned a rapid completion of the road from the Tennessee by having the troops from Highwassee work south and those from Fort Stoddert work north. The construction of a transportation system was important, but the condition of the nation's defenses required more than good roads.

As the nation drifted toward war with England, the United States Army was also drifting. The only positive action that had been taken was the construction of a system of coastal fortifications. By 1812 there had been completed twenty-four forts and thirty-two enclosed batteries and masonry works, armed with 750 guns of all calibers. Theoretically this system would have required 12,610 soldiers to man them adequately. In December of 1811 President Madison asked that the military force be strengthened. He requested that the existing regiments be recruited to full strength and that 10,000 men be authorized for new regiments. In addition, he asked that

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104 Secretary of War to Hampton, July 20, 1811, Ibid., 177-78.
he be authorized to accept 50,000 Federal volunteers. To finance the volunteer regiments the President requested an appropriation of $3,000,000.

Congress responded to Madison's requests, but not on the scale that he had wanted. They authorized the President to accept 30,000 Federal volunteers, presumably to come from the existing militia organizations. The regular army was to be increased to 25,000 men, including thirteen new regiments. To finance the volunteer regiments, Congress appropriated $1,000,000.105

While the appropriation was not as large as the President had requested, it represented a substantial sum when considered in the light of past appropriations for the military establishment. In the entire period from March 4, 1789, to December 31, 1809, the disbursements for the whole military establishment had amounted to only $30,941,669.47.106 By the time war was declared, the Regular Army numbered only 6,744 men, not the 25,000 men authorized by law. Most of this force was scattered along the coast and across the frontier, with the largest single concentration reported at Baton Rouge and Pass

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105 Gance, History of the United States Army, 113; Callan, Military Laws of the United States, 212-16, 220-221; Richardson, Messages and Papers, I, 494; Niles Weekly Register, Dec. 7, 1811.

106 Report submitted to the House of Representatives, Apr. 5, 1810, ASPMA, I, 268.
Christian, where there were 1,244 soldiers. The second largest concentration was in the harbor of New York, where 901 men manned the defenses.  

Most of the officers who held high command in the Army before the war were either old veterans from the Revolution or influential politicians. During the War of 1812 the old revolutionary officers were typified by Henry Dearborn and William Hull. In writing of Dearborn a contemporary, Charles Peterson, summarized the weaknesses of most of the old officers:

Age had dampened his ardent ardor, and weakened his energy; instead of being the first to lead, he was content to delegate this task to others. Forty years had completely changed his character. In 1776 he had been distinguished for promptitude and fire; in 1812 he was remarkable only for inactivity.

In 1815 a report on the length of service of some of the officers of the Army illustrated the prospects for

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107 Report of the military force in June, 1812, Ibid., 319-20. The breakdown of the 6,744 men was as follows: St. Mary's River in Georgia, 194; Fort Hawkins, 73; New Orleans and Fort St. John, 143; Pass Christian and Baton Rouge, 1,244; Natchitoches, 89; Fort Hampton and Highwassee, 169; Fort Massac, 36; Belle Fontaine, 134; Fort Osage, 63; Fort Madison, 44; Vincennes, 117; Michillimackinack, 88; Fort Dearborn, 53; Fort Wayne, 85; Detroit, 119; On the march to Detroit, 430; Charleston, 175; New York, 901; Newport, 193; Boston, 131; and Fort Mifflin, 65.

most officers. The number of years of service for the eleven men surveyed ranged from twenty-five years for Major William Beall to thirty-eight years for Colonel Jacob Kingsbury. The age of the officers varied from fifty-three to sixty-four years. The old officers had seen long years of service and most of them were no longer capable of effective leadership. ¹⁰⁹

Most of the appointments from civilian life fared little better than did the old generals with two exceptions, Jacob Brown and Andrew Jackson. Brown was a competent militia general who trained his men rigorously and led them well. Jackson was atypical and fitted no single category. He possessed the same characteristic that President Washington had seen in Anthony Wayne, the "overwhelming desire to meet and annihilate the enemy." Chambers wrote to Jackson: "There never, perhaps, was a warrior of greater resolution than Jackson." ¹¹⁰

Of more importance for the postwar Army was the rise to prominence of a number of young officers, such as Winfield Scott and Edmund P. Gaines, all of whom had

¹⁰⁹ Niles Weekly Register, VII, Feb. 11, 1815; the officers, years of service and age were: General James Wilkinson, 32, 63; General Burbeck, 30, 62; General Cushing, 32, 56; General Porter, 35, 57; General Bissell, 27, 59; Colonel Freeman, 27, 63; Colonel Kingsburg, 38, 57; Colonel Sparks, 27, 53; Major Pike, 32, 64; Major Whistler, 26, 58; Major Beall, 25, 59.

¹¹⁰ Chambers, The Military Heroes of the War of 1812, 197.
been members of the Army prior to the war and had learned their trade well. The young men rose rapidly once the war began and they quickly demonstrated their competence and ability to command. There was no conclusive evidence produced by the War of 1812 as to whether Regulars were superior to militia or vice versa. The question revolved around leadership: If the troops were badly led they performed poorly; if they were well led, they fought well, whether they were Regulars or militia. But the war was not the glorious affair that had been predicted in 1811 and 1812 by the War Hawks. However, the Army gained one thing from the war at the Battle of Chippawa. Henry Adams wrote of this encounter: "Small as the affair was and unimportant in military results, it gave to the United States Army a character and pride it had never before possessed." 111

But pride was of little tangible value, and on March 3, 1815, Congress drastically reduced the wartime Army. The force as outlined by Congress would have an authorized strength of 12,383 officers and enlisted men, and the regiment of dragoons disappeared from the Army's organization. The commissioned officers that were retained must have served in the war, and preference was

given to the graduates of the Military Academy.\footnote{Callan, \textit{Military Laws of the United States}, 266-67.}

During the war the country had been divided into nine military districts in an effort to achieve a more efficient organization of the Army. On May 17, 1815, the wartime districts were abandoned and the country was divided into two divisions, the Northern and Southern. Major General Jacob Brown commanded the former and Major General Andrew Jackson commanded the latter. Within each division there were smaller administrative units, consisting of the old military departments. There were five departments in the North and four in the South, each complete with its own staff system.

With the return of peace, the large concentrations of troops that had been gathered during the war were scattered across the frontier. In 1815 there was every reason to believe that the peace would not be broken, and the War Department expected that the problem of returning the Army to a peacetime status could proceed at a leisurely pace. The new administrative system would be tested to the utmost as the Army was broken up into small units. For the common soldiers the return of peace meant the beginning of another round of thankless tasks to be performed.
CHAPTER V

THE ARMY ATTEMPTS TO BRING PEACE TO THE FRONTIER

The government's expectations of a period of quiet in which to return to a peacetime organization were not realized. Problems with the Indians continued after the war was concluded. On May 22 the Secretary of War ordered General Jackson to furnish an escort for the party that was to survey the boundary outlined in the Treaty of Fort Jackson.\(^1\) The task of maintaining peace along the Florida frontier was assigned to General Edmund P. Gaines. By June Gaines had assembled a force of about 1,000 men along the frontier and was requesting additional troops in an effort to make an impression on the Indians. In September Gaines requested a force of 6,000 men to aid in the work of surveying and marking the new boundary line.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Secretary of War to Jackson, May 22, 1815, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 8, 107-109. Hereinafter cited as SWLS.

The War Department anticipated trouble with the Indians and had authorized Jackson to make requests for militia from the states and territories until reinforcements could be sent from other posts. The Indian opposition to the survey was attributed to the activities of a British agent, Colonel Edmund Nicholls. He had been working to persuade the Creeks to join the Spanish and British, and to denounce the Treaty of Port Jackson. He told the Indians they should demand that the United States abide by the agreements of 1811. He suggested that if the Indians supported the British these would be guaranteed.  

In an effort to conciliate the Indians, General Gaines was allowed to distribute provisions among the Indians who were without food. He was also to determine the Spanish opinion of Nicholl's activities at Appalachicola. As additional assurances to the Indians, Colonel Benjamin Hawkins, the Creek Indian Agent, was ordered to accompany the commissioners when they marked the boundary. The War Department believed that his influence with the Indians might help to remove their objections to the running of the line. In August General Jackson was authorized to draw $40,000 from the War Department, if the hostile attitude of the Creeks make it necessary to extend more protection to the frontier. General Gaines estimated that

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3Secretary of War to Jackson, June 12, 1815, SWLS, Roll 8, 155-56; Augusta Mirror, May 29, 1815.
moving the troops to protect the commissioners would cost
$27,215. By November 1 it was reported that the commis­sioners were running the boundary lines without opposition from the Indians.⁴

Throughout the rest of the South, the period from the end of the War of 1812 to December of 1815 was devoted to the job of returning to a peacetime status. On November 11 the Secretary of War informed the Quarter­master General, Callender Irvine, that the peace establish­ment consisted of 9,980 men, exclusive of non-commissioned officers and musicians.⁵

Early in 1816 the War Department began a survey to determine where new fortifications should be constructed and which of the existing fortifications should be improved and expanded. The Secretary of War requested that the governors of the various states have their legislatures cede the land needed if they had not already done so.⁶ The construction of the new works was a logical result of the War of 1812 when many of the permanent fortifications had been found to be inadequate. By May the sum of

⁴Secretary of War to Gaines, July 5, 1815, SWLS, Roll 8, 196; Secretary of War to Hawkins, July 15, 1815, Ibid., 210-11; Secretary of War to Jackson, Aug. 25, 1815, Ibid., 293-95; Secretary of War to Gaines, Oct. 4, 1815, Ibid., 353-54; Georgia Argus, Nov. 1, 1815.

⁵Secretary of War to Irvine, Nov. 11, 1815, SWLS, Roll 8, 330.

⁶Secretary of War to Governors, Jan. 22, 1816, Ibid., 427.
$838,000 had been appropriated by Congress for the construction of fortifications during 1816. The Secretary of War informed General Joseph G. Swift that it had been decided that the soldiers who worked on the fortifications were to receive an extra fifteen cents a day and an additional ration of spirits. The payments were to be made at the end of each month and would enable the soldiers to almost double their monthly salary. The construction of the works was delayed because Congress had authorized the President to employ a foreign engineer, General Simon Bernard, a French engineer, who was expected to arrive during the late summer or early fall. The work would not begin until he had conferred with Swift. 7

In addition to expanding the nation's fortifications, the Army was also ordered to remove intruders on Indian lands. These settlers had moved onto the land while the troops were occupied elsewhere during the war. On January 27 the Secretary of War informed the various generals that they were responsible for removing the intruders from both the public and Indian lands. All intruders on the public lands were to be removed by military force if they did not obey the officer's proclamation to leave. After the settlers left, their homes and all improvements were to be destroyed by the troops: "and that

7Secretary of War to Swift, May 2, 1816, SWLS, Roll 9, 2; Secretary of War to Jackson, May 30, 1816, Ibid., 23-24.
every attempt to return shall be repressed in the same manner.  

On January 29 Jackson was ordered not to remove the intruders on the public lands in Tennessee until Congress could act upon their petition for relief. In all other cases Jackson was expected to comply with the President's order. In March the Secretary stated that a bill for the relief of the intruders had passed the Senate and was before the House of Representatives. Until a final decision was made, Jackson was to suspend any operations against the settlers on public lands. Congress eventually passed a bill that provided relief for all of those individuals who had settled on public lands before the first of February. All other settlers were still subject to military removal. The relief law was to expire on March 25, 1817.  

In addition to enforcing the nation's laws, the President had determined that the soldiers should be put to work on the frontier. They were to begin cutting a road from the Tennessee River to Mobile and New Orleans. Jackson was to select the best route for the road and

8 Secretary of War to Generals Jackson, Macomb, Gaines, Smith and Brown, Jan. 27, 1816, SWLS, Roll 8, 435.

9 Secretary of War to Jackson, June 29, 1816, SWLS, Roll 8, 436; Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 12, 1816, Ibid., 469-70; Secretary of War to Hall, Sept. 25, 1816, SWLS, Roll 9, 150-51.
assign the troops to the operation. The President believed the work "to be no less necessary to the discipline, health, and preservation of the troops, than useful to the public interest." 10

While some of the troops were building the new road, others were assigned to stop the Indian raids into southern Georgia. The major source of trouble on the Florida border were the Indians living at an old fort located on the Apalachicola River. The fort had been abandoned by the Spanish and had become a refuge for Indians and runaway slaves. The fort was finally destroyed in July by a detachment of regulars under the command of Colonel Duncan Clinch. 11

The destruction of the Negro fort temporarily eliminated the problems along the Georgia-Florida border. The troops spent the rest of 1816 trying to adjust to the new situation of being at peace. By the end of the year the troops had repaired their garrisons and were available for assignment to other duties. On January 14, 1817, the Secretary of War reported that the strength of the Army was 10,024. In the southern division, exclusive of

10 Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 8, 1816, SWLS, Roll 8, 466-57.

11 Gaines to Clinch, May 23, 1816 and Loomis to Patterson, Aug. 13, 1816, in American State Papers, Foreign Relations (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), IV, 558-60. Hereinafter cited as ASPFR. See also the discussion in Chapter X.
the artillery, there were 2,653 infantry men; of this force approximately half were stationed at the posts in Alabama and Georgia.\textsuperscript{12}

While the troops in Georgia and Alabama watched the Indians, the troops at Natchitoches began preparations to move to a new site. The decision was made after a recommendation by the Indian agent and memorials from the citizens of the town that the factory be removed. The post itself was located on private property, for which the government was paying an annual rent equal to the value of the land. Jackson was ordered to select a new site on which to erect a new fort and factory. The post should be near the river and not above the obstructions to navigation. The Secretary cautioned Jackson to be certain that the new site was on public property and healthy. Once the site was selected, the soldiers should start to build the post immediately.\textsuperscript{13}

On August 15 General Jackson was authorized to requisition whatever tools his troops might need for opening the new road from Tennessee to Mobile. In September he was to have other troops begin working on

\textsuperscript{12}American State Papers, Military Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832), I, 561-62. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.

\textsuperscript{13}Secretary of War to Jackson, July 1, 1816, and Secretary of War to Claiborne, July 1, 1816, SWLS, Roll 9, 81-82.
the road from Columbia, Tennessee, to Madisonville, Louisiana. Congress had appropriated $10,000 to repair that road and the road from Georgia to Fort Stoddert. However, the Secretary had decided that all of the funds should be expended on only one of the roads.

It was not until May of the following year that the soldiers began to work on the road. The road from Madisonville to Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River was to be opened by troops under the command of Lieutenant John Tarrant. The route they were to follow had been marked through the wilderness by Captain Hugh Young, an assistant topographical engineer. The assistant adjutant general of the 8th Military Department issued detailed instructions to Tarrant to guide him in the work on the road: (1) the path was marked by a single blaze on the trees on the north and south side; (2) the road was to be thirty-five feet wide; (3) all streams, except the Pearl and Tombigbee rivers, were to be bridged; (4) all bridges were to be above the high water mark and framed; (5) causeways were to be built through swamp grounds and were to be high enough to allow the passage in the wet season; (6) ditches were to be dug on each side of the causeway, four feet wide and three feet deep; (7) the width of the causeways was to be twenty-seven feet; (8) at streams with firm sandy bottoms the road was to be cut down to the water at
the best fording place near the bridge.14

While the troops in the northern part of the Mississippi Territory were building and repairing roads, those in the southern part were watching the Indians. They were also trying to stop the illegal cutting of public timber. A large quantity of cedar and other timber was being cut and floated down the Alabama and the other rivers in the Territory to the Gulf of Mexico. The soldiers were to patrol the public lands and prevent any further thefts. The names of the individuals found cutting the trees and any evidence collected were to be turned over to the District Attorney.15

The year 1817 was to be an active period for the members of the Army as the Indians began to attack the isolated white settlements in southern Georgia. In February the Governor of Georgia, David Mitchell, reported that the Indians were stealing horses and one white man who was pursuing them had been killed. The Governor requested that the troops that had been withdrawn from Forts Crawford and Gaines be returned to the posts. General Gaines informed the Governor that he could not stop the

14 Secretary of War to Jackson, Sept. 24, 1816, Ibid., 148. Kirby to Tarrant, May 31, 1817, in Letters Sent, 8th Military Department, Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LS8MD.

15 Secretary of War to Jackson, Nov. 4, 1816, SWLS, Roll 9, 181.
troops that were already marching to Fort Mitchell from the two forts. However, if it became necessary, he would order two companies of artillery, to serve as infantry, from Charleston. They would be ordered to stop the Indian raids and to remove all of the intruders from the Indian lands. Also the Secretary of War informed the Governor that General Jackson had been instructed to maintain a post on the Georgia–Florida border, either on the Chattahoochee or the St. Marks.  

Throughout the month of February there were numerous reports of Indian raids. One letter stated that the writer had visited Fowltown on the Flint River where he had seen six hundred Negroes on parade. They were well furnished with arms, well disciplined and had elected officers. In addition, an equal number of Indians had joined the blacks. The Indians had expressed a desire to meet either the American soldiers or the Indians of William McIntosh in battle. They predicted that the outcome would be different from their last encounter. At the same time, the people from St. Mary's appealed for a detachment of troops to be stationed in their town to protect them from the Indians. In addition, the soldiers would be able to remove the intruders from the Indian lands.  

16 Mitchell to Gaines, Feb. 5, 1817, and Gaines to Mitchell, Feb. 5, 1817, ASPMA, I, 681; Secretary of War to Mitchell, Feb. 1, 1817, SWLS, Roll 9, 234.  

17 Perryman to Sands, Feb. 24, 1817 and Clarke to Gaines, Feb. 26, 1817, ASPMA, I, 681–82.
In March reports of Indian raids continued to be made to the officers stationed on the frontier. Some of these stated that the reason the Indians were hostile was because of the large number of Americans who were driving the Indians from their land. Because of these intrusions, the Indians believed that the Americans were violating their treaty obligations. There were also rumors that British agents were actively working to arouse the Indians. One report, from a man who had lived in the Indian country for fifty years, stated that the Indians believed that the Americans were afraid of them. The basis for this belief was the fact that Forts Crawford and Gaines had been evacuated. He believed that a moderate force of regulars stationed at Camp Crawford would be sufficient to quiet the Indians. 18

On April 2 the Secretary of War informed the Governor of Georgia that a portion of the troops from Charleston were marching to the frontier. The Secretary was confident that General Jackson's force was large enough to protect the southern frontier from the Indians in Florida. 19

As the soldiers gathered on the frontier, the Indians continued to attack the citizens of the border

18 Arbuthnot to Commander of Fort Gaines, Mar. 3, 1817, Sands to King, Mar. 15, 1817, and Mitchell to Secretary of War, Mar. 30, 1817, Ibid., 682-83.

19 Secretary of War to Rabun, Apr. 2, 1817, SWLS, Roll 9, 266.
region. Those whites who had settled on the public lands acquired by the treaty of Fort Jackson had requested military aid to stop the Indians from stealing their cattle. General Gaines had referred their request to the civil authorities. He advised the settlers not to take any rash actions against the Indians. Gaines told the citizens of Murder Creek, Alabama Territory, that the Indians were willing to abide by the same laws that governed the whites. During the numerous Indian raids on the border, seven settlers had been killed.

In September Major Daniel Twiggs demanded that the Indians surrender the warriors who had killed the white settlers. The Indians replied that they would discuss surrendering their warriors when the whites punished those who had killed Indians. They stated that the Americans still owed them three lives since ten Indians had been killed and only seven whites. The reply attempted to shift the blame for the raids to the runaway slaves living in Florida. The Indians stated that they had nothing to do with the raids or the Negroes, who had been sent by the British. The Indians feared that their lands would be ruined by the passage of the opposing armies over them if the United States attacked the Negroes. Major Twiggs was told by the Chief at Fowltown, located fifteen miles

20 Gaines to Secretary of War, Aug. 25, 1817, includes reply to citizens of Murder Creek, July 12, 1817, ASPMA, I, 684.
above Fort Scott and twenty miles above the border, not to cut any more timber east of the Flint River. The Chief said that the land belonged to the Indians and anyone who attempted to enter the area would be killed.\footnote{21}

On October 30 General Gaines was authorized to move his troops from Fort Montgomery to Fort Scott. However, if the Indians were not impressed by this show of force, he was to take no aggressive action until he received additional instructions from the War Department. He was cautioned not to attack the Indians if they retreated into Florida. While awaiting a settlement with the Indians, the troops were to remove the Indians who remained on the lands ceded by the Treaty of Port Jackson.\footnote{22}

The Indians continued their raids upon the settlers and finally they attacked the American troops. Gaines requested a regiment of infantry and a squadron of cavalry from the Georgia militia.\footnote{23} His requisition drew a prompt reaction from the War Department. He was told to confine his operations to those that could be executed by the regular troops under his command. He was informed that the President did not consider the invasion of Florida to

\footnote{21}{Twiggs to Gaines, Sept. 17, 1817, Twiggs to Gaines, Sept. 18, 1817 and Gaines to Secretary of War, Oct. 1, 1817, \textit{Ibid.}, 684-85.}

\footnote{22}{Secretary of War to Gaines, Oct. 30, 1817, \textit{Ibid.}, 685-86.}

\footnote{23}{Gaines to Secretary of War, Nov. 9, 1817, \textit{Ibid.}, 686.}
be advisable at this particular time. The President feared that such an action would endanger the progress of the negotiations with Spain to settle the border trouble. Gaines tried to determine which of the Indian tribes were hostile and which were friendly. He ordered the hostile Indians to move to the Suwannee River and the friendly Indians to remain on their land.24

In the midst of the trouble on the frontier, a problem developed on the east coast of Florida. A conflict broke out between two groups trying to gain control of Amelia Island. The island was located in Spanish territory at the mouth of the St. Mary's River. Therefore, its disposition caused the American's a considerable amount of concern as it was feared that the island would be used as a base for smugglers. In July the War Department had ordered that an officer with a detachment of troops be sent to Point Petre from Charleston. He was to maintain the peace in the area and to see that the revenue laws of the United States were enforced.25 By November the situation had become serious enough to require more troops. The entire command at Fort Johnston, North Carolina, was ordered to Point Petre to support the troops already

24 Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 2, 1817 and Gaines to Indians, n. d., Ibid., 687-88.

25 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Charleston, July 17, 1817 and Secretary of War to Jackson, July 17, 1817, SWLS, Roll 9, 317.
there. In addition, the War Department requested that the Governor of Georgia have a force of five hundred men ready to march to Point Petre if they were needed. 26

On November 12 General Gaines was ordered to leave the frontier and proceed immediately to Point Petre. 27 On December 16 new orders were sent to Major James Bankhead:

If the establishment on Amelia Island under Aury, is not already dispersed, it is the wish of the President, that the evacuation should take place without the application of actual force, if possible. How to effect this you will be the most competent judge. . . . You are not to understand that if force should be ultimately necessary, that it should not be resorted to.

The major was told that the rebels at Amelia Island might surrender if he threatened to use force against them. 28

On December 26 Gaines was instructed to return to Fort Scott as soon as the situation at Amelia Island would permit. The Secretary suggested that, if the general's

26 Secretary of War to Wilson, Nov. 12, 1817, Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, Nov. 12, 1817, and Secretary of War to Bankhead, Nov. 12, 1817, Ibid., 397-98.

27 Secretary of War to Gaines, Nov. 12, 1817, Ibid., 399.

28 Secretary of War to Bankhead, Dec. 16, 1817, Ibid., 427-28.
force was large enough and if the terrain of the country would permit, he might march through Spanish Florida to cooperate in an attack upon the Indians.²⁹ On the same day General Jackson was ordered to proceed to Fort Scott and assume command of the force gathered there. The regular force numbered about 800 and 1,000 militia from Georgia had been called into service.

The General was told that Gaines would attempt to cross Florida to cooperate with him in an attack on the Indians. The Secretary closed with instructions to:

Concentrate your force, and to adopt the necessary measures to terminate a conflict which it has ever been the desire of the President, from considerations to humanity, to avoid, but which is now made necessary by their settled hostilities.³⁰

The large force being concentrated at Fort Scott, had moved from Fort Montgomery in late November. They had marched over a road that they had constructed as they moved.³¹

An idea of what action Jackson might take when he reached Fort Scott was contained in his recommendation of how to subdue the Indians. He suggested that the Indians be followed into Florida and attacked in their refuge. The idea of pursuing the Indians into Florida was not new.

²⁹ Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 26, 1817, Ibid., 440.

³⁰ Secretary of War to Jackson, Dec. 26, 1817, Ibid., 439-40.

³¹ Mitchell to Secretary of War, Dec. 14, 1817, ASPMA, I, 688-89.
Gaines had been told to “use sound discretion in the propriety of crossing the line and attacking them and breaking up their towns.” On December 16 the Secretary had written to tell Gaines:

On receipt of this letter, should the Seminole Indians still refuse to make reparations for their outrages and depredations on the citizens of the United States, it is the wish of the President that you consider yourself at liberty to march across the Florida line and attack them within its limits, should it be found necessary, unless they should shelter themselves, under a Spanish post. In the last event, you will immediately notify this department.

Jackson’s activities in Spanish Florida during the spring and summer were extremely effective and brought an end to the Indian war. He soundly defeated the Indians in a number of small engagements; executed two Englishmen captured among the Indians; and finally, he captured two Spanish towns, St. Marks and Pensacola. He appointed one of his officers as the civil and military governor of Pensacola and established American revenue laws. The General justified his actions thusly:

The immutable laws of self defense, therefore compelled the American Government to take possession of such parts of the Floridas in which

32 Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 9, 1817, Ibid., 688.

33 Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 16, 1817, Ibid., 689.
the Spanish authority could not be maintained.\textsuperscript{34}

While Jackson was pursuing the Indians through Florida, an incident occurred which tested the relations between the civil and military authority. A part of Jackson's force consisted of about 1,600 Creek warriors, under the leadership of General William McIntosh, a Creek half-breed. While the Creek warriors were assisting Jackson, a company of Georgia militia attacked a Creek village and killed most of the inhabitants, mainly old men, women and children. The entire incident was a regrettable mistake on the part of the militia since they had attacked the wrong village. The incident might have passed almost unnoticed, except that General McIntosh's uncle, Chief Howard, had been killed in the raid. In addition, many of the young men with Jackson's army were from the village and had lost members of their families.\textsuperscript{35}

Upon learning of the attack upon the village, Jackson ordered the arrest of the officer who had commanded the troops, Captain Obed Wright. The General feared that the friendly Indians would leave him and return to their homes to protect their families. Jackson also feared that if Wright were not punished, the Indians might take some punitive action on their own. However, there was a problem

\textsuperscript{34} John S. Bassett (ed.), \textit{Correspondence of Andrew Jackson} (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1927), II, 374-75.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Niles Weekly Register}, June 20, 1818, Vol. XIV.
concerning Jackson's order to arrest Wright since his militia company had not been sworn into Federal service. Therefore, it was responsible to the state rather than the Federal authorities.

Wright was arrested by one of Jackson's officers and confined under military guard. A civil court ordered Wright's release and the Army officer complied with the order. Shortly after his release he was arrested again by order of the Governor of Georgia. The Governor intended to have him tried by a Federal court. Both Jackson and Rabun felt that Wright should be punished, but they could not agree on the question of who should try him.

In their attempt to settle the dispute, the two men lost all ability to communicate with each other. Jackson informed the Governor that no state official had the right to issue military orders while he was in the field with a military force. The Governor considered Jackson's letter to be written in a haughty tone and stated that he would continue to issue orders:

When the liberties of the people of Georgia shall have been prostrated at the feet of military despotism, then, and not till then, will this imperious doctrine be tamely submitted to. You may rest assured, that, if the savages continue their depredations on our unprotected frontier, I shall think and act for myself in that respect.37

36 Jackson to Rabun, May 7, 1818, ASPMA, I, 777.
37 Rabun to Jackson, June 1, 1818, Ibid., 775.
Both men submitted their views to the President for his opinion. On June 2 the Secretary of War informed Jackson that the trial of Wright by a court martial was preferable to a trial in the Federal court. It was believed that a trial by a jury in Federal court would be a mockery. The Secretary also suggested that all officers of the grade of captain who had accompanied Wright should also be arrested and tried. The following day the Governor of Georgia was told that "the defence of the Georgia frontier will be devised by the general commanding in that quarter." 38

In August it was reported that Wright would be tried under an 1802 law against killing Indians. By the end of the month Wright had broken his parole and fled from the United States. The last report concerning Wright said that he was living in Havana. 39

While Jackson and Rabun tested the division of authority between the civil and military authority on a large scale, a young lieutenant tested the same division without attracting much attention. In August the Mobile Gazette reported that Lieutenant Robert Beall had marched his troops through the city, destroyed the city jail, and freed the prisoners. The Lieutenant justified his conduct

38 Secretary of War to Jackson, June 2, 1818 and Secretary of War to Rabun, June 3, 1818, SWLS, Roll 10, 88-89.

39 Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 15, 1818 and Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 22, 1818, Vol. XIV.
on the basis of the fact that the jail was located on the public hospital lot. On August 30 additional information appeared in a story in the New Orleans Gazette. Beall had petitioned the city's governing body to remove the jail on two different occasions, but both pleas had been rejected. In his second note he had stated that he would have to remove the building if it was not moved by the proper authorities. The Lieutenant set the fourteenth of July as the day of the removal. He requested that the prisoners be secured elsewhere, perhaps temporarily in the fort. On the appointed day, the soldiers marched from the fort, without arms, to the jail. During their march the soldiers were threatened by the citizens, and they went back to the post to get their weapons. They returned to the site and removed the jail while the citizens watched.

The officials of Mobile instituted a lawsuit against Beall for his destruction of the jail. The officer was granted a leave so that he could defend himself against the suit. The leave was to have expired on the first of May, 1819, but by the end of September nothing had been heard from him. In November there was still no word on Beall's location or the outcome of his trial. With the November statement of the Adjutant of the Western Department, Beall's name disappears from the official

40 Mobile Gazette, July 17, 1818.
41 New Orleans Gazette, Aug. 20, 1818.
correspondence; he was cashiered on December 4, 1819.  

For the soldiers who were not involved in fighting the Indians with General Jackson, 1818 was a quiet year. Only at Amelia Island were the troops engaged in any activities other than garrison duty. Major Bankhead was ordered to speed the departure of the rebels and place the island in the best possible state of defense. He was to leave an adequate garrison on the island and then employ the rest of his force in defending the frontier settlements. The officer was informed that those individuals who were leaving the island might be planning to attack American vessels in an effort to interrupt the nation's commerce. If he had positive knowledge of such intentions, he was to detain the men and their vessels. He was cautioned not to make any large expenditures when he fortified the position. The troops were to perform the work using the materials at hand.

On May 14 Bankhead was instructed not to allow any

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43 Secretary of War to Bankhead, Jan. 15, 1818, SWLS, Roll 9, 455.

44 Secretary of War to Bankhead, Feb. 12, 1818, SWLS, Roll 10, 8; Secretary of War to Bankhead, Feb. 19, 1818, Ibid., 16.
goods to be landed at Amelia until the proper entry forms had been filled out and bonds given at the custom house at St. Mary's. In July the Major was told that his troops would not be removed from the island during the summer. He was to make the troops as comfortable as possible without building permanent barracks.  

The troops assigned to watch for the illegal cutting and shipping of timber had been having some success. Orders were issued to Lieutenant Colonel William Trimble, commanding the Eighth Military Department, to have a naval officer examine the cedar logs held at Mobile. The logs that were suitable for ship building were to be turned over to the Navy, the others were to be sold at a public sale. The money obtained from the sale was to be deposited in the public account at a New Orleans bank.  

The confiscation of the cedar timber was the subject of some controversy. Captain George Peters, who had seized the raft of logs, had been taken to court by the men who claimed it was their property. The Secretary of War ordered the District Attorney for the area to defend the officer on the behalf of the government. On February 10, 1819, Peters was granted a furlough so that he might appear in court. In July he was granted an extension  

45 Secretary of War to Bankhead, May 14, 1818, Ibid., 78; Secretary of War to Bankhead, July 27, 1818, Ibid., 106.  
46 Secretary of War to Trimble, Mar. 4, 1818, Ibid., 25; Secretary of War to Trimble, Mar. 7, 1818, Ibid., 25.
of his furlough so that he could continue his lawsuit at Mobile.\(^{47}\)

Across the South the work of improving the nation's fortifications resumed after the pause to subdue the Indians. The War Department decided to sell the land attached to Fort Charlotte at Mobile. General Bernard had decided that the fort offered no protection to the city and could be disposed of without damaging the defenses. Captain Gadsden was assigned to supervise the construction of the fortifications in Louisiana, and Nathanael Coxe was appointed as the agent for fortifications in New Orleans and was to follow the directions of the engineer.\(^{48}\)

In addition to the resumption of the work on the fortifications the troops were ordered back to work cutting roads through the wilderness. In August the Secretary of War inquired about the progress of the road from the Tennessee River to New Orleans and Mobile and the prospects of completing the work. He also asked what progress had been made on the road from Fort Hawkins to Fort Stoddert. At Baton Rouge the troops were to begin constructing the new barracks and fortifications at that site.

\(^{47}\) Secretary of War to Crawford, Feb. 11, 1819, \textit{Ibid.}, 246; Glassell to Arbuckle, July 5, 1819, Glassell to Peters, July 5, 1819, and Glassell to Butler, Nov. 2, 1819, \textit{LSED.} Peters died Nov. 28, 1819, Heitman, \textit{Historical Register}, I, 786.

\(^{48}\) Secretary of War to Williams, Mar. 31, 1818, \textit{SWLS}, Roll 10, 44; Secretary of War to Jackson, Apr. 22, 1818 and Secretary of War to Coxe, Apr. 23, 1818, \textit{Ibid.}, 62-63.
as soon as an engineer could be assigned to lay out the work. 49

On August 14 General Gaines was ordered to withdraw the American troops from St. Marks and Pensacola. The posts were to be surrendered to any Spanish official who was authorized by the Governor General at Havana to receive them. The surrender was to be made only if the officer was accompanied by sufficient troops to garrison the post and prevent the activities of the hostile Indians. After the surrender, Gaines was to dispose of his force in such a way as to protect the frontier from further raids by the Indians. Fort Gadsden was suggested as a good location for a large portion of the troops, since it was a strong position that could be easily supplied. The General was told to position his troops so that he could protect the frontier without calling upon the militia. The Secretary of War stated:

It is of great importance if the militia can be dispensed with, not to call them out into actual service as it is harassing to them and exhausting to the Treasury. Protection is the first object and the second is protection by the regular force. 50

49 Secretary of War to Jackson, Aug. 11, 1818 and Secretary of War to Mitchell, Aug. 11, 1818, Ibid., 114; Secretary of War to Ripley, Sept. 4, 1818, Ibid., 136.

50 Secretary of War to Gaines, Aug. 14, 1818, Ibid., 116; Secretary of War to Bibb, July 13, 1818, Ibid., 96-97.
To facilitate the protection of the frontier, the President directed that the boundary line between the United States and Florida be marked. The Secretary of War issued a commission to William Lumpkin, authorizing him to mark the line from the Appalachicola to the head of the St. Mary's River. The Secretary believed that it would be better to delay the marking of the line until the Indians had ceased their raids, thus eliminating the expense of a large military escort. 51

On September 8 the Secretary of War addressed a long letter to Jackson outlining his ideas concerning Florida:

St. Marks will be retained till Spain shall be ready to garrison it with a sufficient force, and Fort Gadsden and any other position in East or West Florida within the Indian country, which maybe deemed eligible, will be retained so long as there is any danger. . . . A war with Spain . . . would in a few years, be an English war. . . . We want time, time to grow, to perfect our fortifications, to enlarge our navy, to replenish our depots, and to pay our debts. 52

On September 11 orders were issued that turned many of the soldiers into farmers. The order directed the commanding officers at all posts and garrison to have the

51 Secretary of War to Lumpkin, Sept. 3, 1818 and Secretary of War to Gaines, Sept. 3, 1818, Ibid., 132-35.

52 Secretary of War to Jackson, Sept. 8, 1818, Ibid., 140-41.
soldiers cultivate gardens. The gardens were to supply the needs of the hospitals and garrisons throughout the year. The vegetables that were grown beyond the amount needed for the use of the garrison could be sold to the commissary at the post. Profits from the sales were to be distributed among the enlisted men at the post on payday.53

The year 1819 brought only one event of any real significance for the members of the Army. The acquisition of the Floridas from Spain meant that the Army's manpower would be spread in an even thinner line across the frontier. Stephen Harriman Long estimated the length of the frontier line in 1818 as 12,885 miles. By the end of the year the Secretary of War reported that there were 8,668 men in the Army. The acquisition of the Floridas caused a pause in the Army's movements on the frontier. As in the case of past territorial occupations, the United States Army was forced to consider carefully the disposition of its limited force.54

The running of the boundary line between the Floridas and Georgia was suspended as it was no longer considered essential. General Gaines was instructed to suspend any new troop assignments on the frontier until

53Adjutant and Inspector Generals Office, Sept. 11, 1818, Adjutant General Division of the South, Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives).

54ASPMA, II, 38.
he could obtain information as to the best locations for new posts. The General had been contemplating the establishment of a post somewhere on the southern frontier of Georgia, west of the Okeefonoke Swamp. Now that post was no longer necessary.  

In Florida itself the evacuation of the Americans had begun with the arrival of the Spanish troops. The Secretary of War regretted this, since it was expected that the Americans would reoccupy the territory by August. Colonel King was ordered to proceed with the evacuation but he was to hold his expenditures to a minimum. A report appeared in the *Niles Weekly Register* that stated that the Americans had left Florida on February 8 and that they were relieved by 450 troops, white and black.  

Across the rest of the South the troops were busy cutting their way through the wilderness. The major project was the road from the Tennessee River to Madisonville, Louisiana. The work was not progressing as rapidly as might have been desired, but the Secretary of War justified

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55 Secretary of War to Lumpkin, Mar. 2, 1819; Secretary of War to Rabun, Mar. 2, 1819; Secretary of War to Gaines, Mar. 4, 1819; Secretary of War to Rabun, Feb. 25, 1819, *SWLS*, Roll 10, 261-65.  
the delays:

The labor of the troops is the only means within the reach of the department, of completing those roads, and, as the troops are so employed only when they are not engaged in active service, it is impossible to state with accuracy when the roads will be completed.57

In a letter written in September of 1818 Jackson had stated that about fifty miles of the lower end of the road had been completed and forty miles at the upper end. The hardest part of the work was believed to be completed, since the terrain covered by the ninety miles that were finished necessitated the building of numerous causeways and bridges. To speed the work, the number of men working south of the Tennessee River had been increased recently, and it was believed that the work would now proceed more rapidly.58

The pace of the work increased during the summer. More troops were dispatched to both ends of the road and additional supplies were sent from Bay St. Louis. The supplying of the troops in itself was a major operation. Wagons and carts were purchased and the supplies were shipped overland to the troops and other supplies were carried up the various rivers. On May 24, 1819, the


58Jackson to Secretary of War, Sept. 19, 1818, as seen in Niles Weekly Register, May 8, 1819, Vol. XVI.
Assistant Deputy Quarter Master, Captain Thomas Hunt, was ordered to ship 30,000 complete rations up the Pearl River to the men working on the road. In July he was ordered to dispatch camp equipment for the 200 men working on the northern section of the road.\(^59\)

By September the troops were working rapidly and there were reports that the road would be completed by November. The upper end of the road was reported to be open already. When it was finished, the route from Nashville to New Orleans would be about three hundred miles shorter than the old route. This report was apparently overly optimistic as the troops working on the northern section of the road went into winter quarters in the vicinity of the Tombigbee River.\(^60\)

The work on the road was essential but it presented definite problems. The men were becoming skilled road builders, but at the expense of their professional training. The troops were working in shifts, some building the road and others drilling and training. Major John McIntosh, the commander of the troops on the north end of the road, was told:

The commanding General is well aware

\(^59\)Head Quarters 8th Military Department to Hunt, May 24, 1819, LSMMD; Head Quarters to Hunt, July 14, 1819, Ibid. The letter book for the 8th Military Department is filled with information concerning the movement of troops and supplies to the road.

\(^60\)Niles Weekly Register, Sept. 25, 1819, Vol. XVII; Head Quarters to McIntosh, Jan. 8, 1820, LSMMD.
of the difficulties you must encounter, in disciplining your regiment under such circumstances, but such, Sir, is the nature of the Service that it is unavoidable. This road must be pushed with all possible diligence.  

While the troops worked through the wilderness of the Mississippi Territory, the topographical engineers were laying out a road from Mobile Bay to Lake Ponchartrain. By December the Secretary of War had decided that the road should be extended from Chef Menteur to New Orleans.  

The Indians of Florida had been quiet for a short time but by the fall of 1819 they were beginning to raid the white settlements again. In December General Gaines decided that a show of force along the Georgia-Florida border was necessary. The Governor of Georgia had requested military aid to protect the surveyors who were laying off a parcel of state land near the Florida line. Orders were issued for a detachment of troops to march through that section of the country: "Under a hope that the savages may at the same time be intimidated and the primary object pursued."  

In December the troops were placed on alert because of the suspected intentions of the Spanish. The

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61 Headquarters to McIntosh, Jan. 11, 1820, LS8MD.
62 Secretary of War to Gadsden, Mar. 25, 1819, SWLS, Roll 10, 286; Secretary of War to Jackson, Dec. 21, 1819, and Secretary of War to Gadsden, Dec. 24, 1819, Ibid., 398.
63 Glassell to Clinch, Dec. 4, 1819 and Glassell to Parker, Dec. 5, 1819, LSED.
troops were ordered to observe the activities of the Spanish at Pensacola. If reinforcements arrived at that garrison, the troops were to counter any offensive operations.64

On January 12, 1820, a confidential circular was issued to all commanding officers:

The General has directed me to say to you that he has cause to expect a rupture with Spain, in which event an immediate attempt will be made to reduce the fortresses in the provinces of East and West Florida.65

But in late January and early February the Secretary of War informed Generals Gaines and Jackson that he did not believe that Congress would authorize the movement of American troops into Florida until November. With the occupation of Florida delayed, Jackson was cautioned not to take any steps that would increase the expenditures of his department.66

As a result of this economy measure the troops were expected to perform even more labor. In addition to the regulars assigned to the various construction projects, military convicts sentenced to hard labor were put to work building fortifications and barracks. At Baton Rouge new

64Glassell to Dinkins, Dec. 26, 1819, Ibid.
65Glassell to Commanders, Jan. 12, 1820, LSED, I.
66Secretary of War to Gaines, Jan. 25, 1820, SWLS, Roll 10, 412; Secretary of War to Jackson, Feb. 5, 1820, Ibid., 416; Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 15, 1820, SWLS, Roll 11, 9-10.
barracks were being constructed, and new fortifications were being erected at Petite Coquille and New Orleans by the troops and convicts. Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Taylor was informed of a few of the duties being performed by the troops in addition to the normal construction work:

The fragments of companies at Mobile Point, and Petite Coquille having to furnish boat crews for the officers of Engineers and a clerk for this office, and that at Fort St. John's exclusive of a guard for the magazine, attendants for the General Hospital at this place, Boatmen, Orderly and Clerk for Major Many, has lately attached to the Engineers Department: He considers that it would be improper to detach men from Baton Rouge, at the very time, when that Post has to be reinforced from your command, and cannot weaken the garrison of Fort St. Philip without absolute necessity.67

On January 31 the troops were ordered to resume working on the road from Tennessee to Mobile. In May Jackson was told that because of a lack of appropriations, work on the road should be suspended unless it could be completed with little additional expense. The road was completed by June 19, and the soldiers were being dispatched to new locations in order to aid in other construction projects.68

67 Sands to Taylor, Dec. 19, 1820, LS8MD. For assignment of troops and convicts see: Headquarters to Whartenby, Jan. 16, 1820; Headquarters to Strong, Jan. 18, 1820; Headquarters to Chase, Jan. 28, 1820; Headquarters to McIntosh, Jan. 19, 1820; Headquarters to Whartenby, Aug. 20, 1820, all in Ibid.

68 Headquarters to Faulk, Jan. 31, 1820, Ibid.; Secretary of War to Jackson, May 16, 1820, SWLS, Roll 11,
There were renewed problems with squatters and intruders on public and Indian lands. General Gaines was ordered to remove the squatters from the reservation surrounding the post at Montpilier. One week later Jackson was instructed to remove the intruders from the Cherokee lands. But those on the Creek lands would be allowed to remain for a short time. The Secretary of War summed up his view of the Indian situation:

I agree with you in opinion that it is high time the treaties with the Indians were executed with good faith and am aware of the evil consequences of the failure to do so upon future negotiations with them, but the nature and character of the population on the frontiers have hitherto rendered it difficult to execute them completely. The government however has constantly felt the strongest solicitude to fulfil satisfactorily all its engagements with the Indians.69

Apparently Jackson was effective in removing the intruders as five men were brought before the district court at Milledgeville, Georgia. Certain officers were to be ordered to appear before the court to testify against the intruders.70

42; Secretary of War to Jackson, June 19, 1820, Ibid., 57; see reports in Niles Weekly Register, Sept. 30, 1820, Vol. XIV.

69 Secretary of War to Gaines, July 13, 1820, SWLS, Roll 11, 73-74; Secretary of War to Jackson, July 20, 1820, Ibid., 76-77.

70 Niles Weekly Register, Sept. 9, 1820, Vol. XIX; Secretary of War to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1820, SWLS, Roll 11, 129.
On the eastern part of the frontier the soldiers were occupied throughout 1820 in preventing the illegal importation of slaves into the United States and apprehending runaways. The runaways were returned to their masters when they were identified and the bills incurred during their detention were paid. The slaves seized in Florida were returned to their owners after the latter paid for the expense of detaining them.\(^7^1\)

In February 1821, the Adams-Onis Treaty was finally ratified by the United States Senate and was proclaimed on February 22. Within a week Congress adopted a new organization for the Army. Despite the recommendation of Secretary of War John C. Calhoun that his plan for an expandible force be adopted, Congress reduced the size of the Army from 12,564 to 6,183 men.\(^7^2\) Twenty days after the reduction of the Army, orders were issued to occupy Florida. The occupation of the Florida posts meant that the other garrisons would be stripped of most of the troops. The troops from Mobile were to occupy Pensacola. Fort Gadsden was to be evacuated, and the troops were to march to St. Marks and the troops from Amelia Island were to go

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\(^7^1\) Secretary of War to Gaines, Jan. 25, 1820, SWLS, Roll 10, 412; Secretary of War to Fanning, Feb. 9, 1820, Ibid., 420; Secretary of War to Gaines, May 19, 1820, SWLS, Roll 11, 45; Secretary of War to Copp, June 9, 1820, Ibid., 51.

to St. Augustine. The ships used to transport the soldiers from Amelia Island were to transport the Spanish troops to Havana. By June the troops had occupied the posts, but Spanish soldiers were still present at St. Augustine.  

The work on the nation's fortifications continued with only a few interruptions. At Mobile construction was suspended until a decision was made concerning the fortifications being built on Dauphin Island. Congress had not made an appropriation for the works and until the problem was resolved all of the work was stopped. The works had been proceeding slowly and there seemed to be little indication that they would proceed with any more speed in the future.

The work at Petite Coquille was virtually at a standstill and military convicts were sent to work on the fortifications. The construction of the public buildings at Baton Rouge was hindered by a lack of painters, glaziers, and carpenters. The commands at New Orleans

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73 Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 22, 1821, SWLS, Roll 11, 167; Secretary of War to J. Q. Adams, Mar. 22, 1821, Ibid., 166; Secretary of War to Butler, June 9, 1821, Ibid., 244.

74 Secretary of War to Gadsden, Mar. 20, 1821, Ibid., 170-71; Secretary of War to DeBussey, June 9, 1821, Ibid., 233-24. The entire question of defending Mobile Bay was considered by the House of Representatives in 1822, see ASPMA, II, 345-49.

and Bay St. Louis were to be searched for men with the necessary talents to speed the completion of the build-
ings. 76

The year 1821 was one of relative inactivity after the troops marched into Florida. As in the past after occupying new territory, the Army slowed its pace in an effort to consolidate its position and determine the course of its future activities. The next year was almost a mirror image of the proceeding year. The only major event that occurred was that the War Department changed its command system. The old southern and northern divi-
sions were eliminated and were replaced by eastern and western departments: "The eastern department comprises all east of a line drawn from the southern most point of Florida to the north-west extremity of Lake Superior - the western, all west of that line, taking in the whole of Kentucky and Tennessee." 77

The strength of the Army during the year had declined because of discharges and desertions and by December it stood at 5,211. During the year only 310 men had enlisted, and the ratio of officers to rank and file had dropped to 1 to 10.25. The average expense for

76 Headquarters to Chase, Apr. 2, 1821 and Head-
quar ters to Sands, Apr. 14, 1821 and Headquar ters to Many, Apr. 24, 1821; Headquarters to Taylor, Apr. 24, 1821, LS8MD.

each officer and soldier stood at $153.11.\textsuperscript{78}

The soldiers continued to work on the posts and construct fortifications through the South. At Baton Rouge the new post was nearing completion. The coastal fortifications across the nation were being pushed to completion as rapidly as possible. The officers of the Topographical Corps were occupied in mapping and examining the Gulf Coast and Florida.\textsuperscript{79}

One problem faced by the officers of the Army was the prospect of civil lawsuits being brought against them because of the execution of their orders. In 1822 Congress passed an act authorizing the President to employ the naval and land forces to stop the cutting of public timber in Florida. This was just the type of order that would bring about lawsuits. The War Department had adopted the policy of defending the officers in court if the officers had been executing their orders.\textsuperscript{80}

Lieutenant Frederick Griffith was sued for his activities for seizing slaves in East Florida in 1819. The Secretary of War wrote:

> At this stage of the prosecution the government is not prepared to state

\textsuperscript{78}Niles Weekly Register, Mar. 16, 1822, Vol. XXII and ASPMA, II, 450-72.

\textsuperscript{79}Secretary of War to Topographical Officer, Feb. 25, 1822, SWLS, Roll 11, 355.

\textsuperscript{80}Niles Weekly Register, June 8, 1822, Vol. XXII.
the degree of responsibility, if any, that it will meet, which would tend to release that of the officers concerned. But in order that they may be properly defended, you will apply to the United States District Attorney at Charleston, if he has not already been employed.81

During the periods of inactivity on the part of the soldiers, discipline became a problem. In 1823 and 1824, for example, two complaints were lodged against officers attached to the command at Baton Rouge. In 1823 a citizen accused a number of officers of breaking into his house on several different occasions. The first time they broke into his house after midnight with a band of musicians and knocked down the door of his bedroom. After forcing his wife to surrender the key to his bar, they stripped it of liquor and wrecked the room. A few months later the same officer broke into his house and searched the house and broke down a number of doors and destroyed his property.82

In the following year complaints were lodged against an officer stationed at Baton Rouge who had assaulted a Catholic priest in the city. The officer had

81 Secretary of War to Bankhead, June 21, 1822, SWLS, Roll 11, 408.

82 Gaines to Taylor, Oct. 15, 1823, Letters Sent, Western Department, Records of United States Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.
been turned over to the civil authorities and a civil suit had been instituted against him. After the arrest of the officer, a number of his fellow officers had marched a Masonic procession into the Catholic church in an effort to intimidate the priest. The Secretary of War ordered an immediate investigation of the incident and told the commanding officer to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future.  

In 1825 the attention of the Army in the South was focused upon Georgia and the possibility of a war with the Creek Indians. The trouble centered around a treaty negotiated by William McIntosh and other Creek chiefs by which more Indian lands were ceded to the United States. The treaty was apparently negotiated by representatives of only a minority of the Indians. In reaction to the treaty, William McIntosh and several other chiefs who had signed the treaty were killed by the members of the opposition party. The supporters of the treaty were said to number about 500, while those who opposed it about 4,000. Governor Troup of Georgia feared that the hostile Indians would attack the frontier settlements of his state and destroy the Indian faction friendly to the United States.  

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83 Secretary of War to DuBourg, July 21, 1824, SWLS, Roll 12, 72.
84 Secretary of War to Troup, May 18, 1825, Ibid., 150-52.
Orders were issued to General Gaines to be prepared to take appropriate actions to protect the citizens of Georgia and the friendly Indians. The General was given specific orders to govern his conduct if hostilities had begun:

You are also authorized to call to your aid such portions of the regular troops convenient to the scene of operations, wherever stationed, as you may deem proper. . . .

If hostilities have been committed by the Creeks on the people of Georgia you will instantly chastise them by pursuing them into their own territory if necessary - and you will pursue offensive operations till you have inflicted a just retaliation or, until by their entire submission they shall be entitled to climency [sic].

After these instructions came a number of items left largely to the discretion of the general. If he determined the Indians had hostile intentions, he was to march into their territory and govern his conduct according to existing circumstances. If he found that the friendly Indians were in danger of being attacked by the hostile party, he was to offer them protection of his force. But he was not to commence hostilities unless attacked. He was to do everything in his power to restore peace between the two parties and the state of Georgia. Gaines was to see that the friendly Indians who had fled from this lands

85 Secretary of War to Gaines, May 18, 1825, Ibid., 152-55.
were given provisions and protection. To aid the General, four companies were ordered to march from Baton Rouge. The reinforcements were to be stationed at such places as Gaines deemed proper. 86

The instructions placed Gaines in a delicate position. He had to maintain peace between the two Indian factions and between the Indians and the Georgia settlers. In June the situation was further complicated by the proposed actions of the Georgia officials. The officials planned to survey the lands ceded by the Indians before the date of removal stipulated in the treaty. The problems with the Indians who were opposed to the treaty had not been solved and the proposed survey would arouse them even more. The Secretary of War informed Troup that if the survey was attempted by Georgia:

> It will be wholly upon its own responsibility, and that the government of the United States will not, in any measure be responsible for any consequences which may result from that measure. 87

On the same day instructions by which he was to govern his conduct were issued to Gaines. He was to hold his troops in readiness for any action that might be required. With respect to the survey and its possible

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86 Secretary of War to Gaines, May 18, 1825 and Secretary of War to Gaines, May 20, 1825, Ibid., 152-56.

87 Secretary of War to Troup, June 15, 1825, Ibid., 162-63.
consequences he was told:

You will give on the part of the United States, no assent or co-operate to that measure whatever, but under any consequences which may result from it, confine your operations to the protection of the people in Georgia, should it be required, within the territory already in their possession and against any possible hostile incursion of the Indians.\textsuperscript{88}

These instructions placed Gaines in the difficult position of trying to resolve a number of complicated questions to the satisfaction of all parties concerned: he had to resolve the differences between the two Indian parties in order to gain an acceptance of the treaty and its provisions; and to prevent Georgia from conducting the survey of the lands until it was agreed to by the Indians. The Army was placed in the middle, opposed to the interests of a state and bound to uphold the treaty obligations of the United States.\textsuperscript{89}

The majority of the Indians refused to accept the treaty on the grounds that it had been obtained through intrigue and treachery. Gaines and Major Timothy Andrews held a conference with the Indians in an effort to eliminate the differences between the two parties. While awaiting the results of this conference, the Secretary of War to Gaines, June 15, 1825, \textit{Ibid.}, 163. \textsuperscript{88}

Secretary of War to Gaines, July 11, 1825, \textit{Ibid.}, 166. \textsuperscript{89}
War communicated the views of the President concerning the survey to the Governor:

The President acting on the treaty as though its validity had not been impeached . . . the faith of the United States solemnly pledged to protect the Creek Indians from any encroachment till their removal in September 1826. He therefore decides that the entering upon and surveying their lands before that period would be an infraction of the treaty, whose interpretation and execution, should it remain uncancelled, are alike confided to him. I am therefore, directed by the President to state distinctly to your Excellency that for the present, he will not permit such entry or survey to be made.90

The extent to which the President was willing to go was revealed in the instructions sent to Gaines. The collision between the federal and state authorities was to be regretted, but the President acted "under a solemn sense of duty." The Secretary of War concluded with specific instructions by which Gaines was to govern his conduct if Governor Troup should send a party onto the Indian lands:

To survey the lands embraced within the Treaty you are authorized to employ the military to prevent their entrance on the Indian Territory, or if they should succeed in entering the country to cause them to be arrested and turn them over to the

90Secretary of War to Troup, July 21, 1825, Ibid., 169-70.
Judicial authority to be dealt with as the law directs.\textsuperscript{91}

As the prospect of a confrontation between the United States and the state of Georgia became more and more likely, Gaines tried desperately to work out a settlement with the Indians. He managed to obtain an agreement whereby the friendly Indians might return to their homes from their exile. Finally he arranged a conference of all the Creek Indians to be held in November.\textsuperscript{92}

On August 14 the Secretary of War told the Governor of Alabama, Andrew Pickens, that the United States would not enter the Indian lands until the period agreed upon by the treaty. By the end of the month the Secretary was able to express his relief that Governor Troup had decided not to proceed with the survey until Gaines had concluded his negotiations in November.\textsuperscript{93}

The instructions issued to Gaines concerning the November meeting was straightforward. He was to obtain the consent of the Creeks to the treaty negotiated in

\textsuperscript{91} Secretary of War to Gaines, July 21, 1825, \textit{Ibid.}, 170-71.

\textsuperscript{92} Secretary of War to Gaines, July 22, 1825, \textit{Ibid.}, 171-72; Secretary of War to Andrews, July 23, 1825, \textit{Ibid.}, 174-75; Secretary of War to Gaines, Aug. 30, 1825, \textit{Ibid.}, 179.

\textsuperscript{93} Secretary of War to Pickens, Aug. 14, 1825, \textit{Ibid.}, 177-78; Secretary of War to Troup, Aug. 31, 1825, \textit{Ibid.}, 180-81.
February. If that effort was unsuccessful, he was to negotiate a new treaty whereby the Indians would cede their lands in the state of Georgia. The President was so desirous of obtaining this treaty that Gaines was authorized to offer them land, acre for acre, and $400,000.94

Although it appeared that the situation in Georgia was about to be resolved, Governor Troup demanded the arrest of General Gaines. The Governor felt that Gaines had violated the Articles of War by publishing his letters to the Governor. The President rejected the Governor's request, but cautioned the General to refrain from anything offensive in his future communications to the Governor.95

The conference between Gaines and the Indians in November was a failure. In January of 1826 the Creeks finally signed a treaty ceding their lands in Georgia. The treaty provided for the payment of $217,600 and a perpetual annuity of $20,000. The treaty allowed the Indians to select the land in the west where they would live after leaving their homes in Georgia.96

94 Secretary of War to Gaines, Sept. 16, 1825 and Secretary of War to Crowell, Sept. 16, 1825, Ibid., 181-82.

95 Secretary of War to Gaines, Sept. 19, 1825 and Secretary of War to Troup, Sept. 19, 1825, Ibid., 183-84.

In 1826 the Army was occupied with the routine duties of a frontier garrison. In Florida there was concern that the Indians would attack Pensacola, an event which the Secretary of War considered to be highly unlikely. In September a company of troops was sent to the mouth of Suwannee to stop the sporadic Indian raids against the white settlements.  

The acquisition of Florida necessitated the establishment of new roads, and the task fell to the men of the Army. As early as 1824 the troops were engaged in opening a road from St. Augustine to Pensacola. Another road was being cut from Camden County Georgia to Jacksonville, Florida. The work was considered to be so important that in October the Quarter Master at Pensacola was authorized to employ civilians to help in the opening of the road to St. Augustine. In December of 1825 the Secretary of War reported that the road would be completed in the course of the following month. The troops had worked on the road from September of 1824 to June of 1825 and had completed one hundred and sixty-five miles of road at a cost of $9,583. The civilian contractor had agreed to open the remaining one hundred and eighty miles in twelve months for $13,500.  

97 Secretary of War to Duvall, Sept. 16, 1826 and Secretary of War to Brown, Sept. 17, 1826, SWLS, Roll 12, 245.  
98 Secretary of War to McLean, July 20, 1824, Ibid., 71; Secretary of War to Call, Oct. 8, 1824 and Secretary of War to Duvall, Oct. 8, 1824, Ibid., 90.
While the troops were cutting the road from Pensacola to St. Augustine, Army officers were surveying other roads through the region. A road from the Suwannee to Cape Sable had been partially surveyed and also a route from St. Augustine to Cape Florida. The troops were also working on a road from Coleraine, Georgia to Tampa.

By 1826 the road from Pensacola to St. Augustine, a distance of four hundred miles, was finished. The road was sixteen feet wide but could easily be increased to twenty-five feet by the troops with little additional expense. The soldiers had completed one hundred and twenty miles of the road from Tampa Bay to Coleraine and were expected to complete another forty-eight miles by January of 1827. The final fifty-six miles were under contract and were expected to be completed by December 1826.

In addition to the surveys of roads in Florida, the engineers were searching for a route for a road from Washington to New Orleans. The engineers were considering three different routes in an effort to determine the best possible line of communication. In addition the Secretary of War recommended that a new road be opened by the soldiers from Natchitoches to Fort Towson and then to Fort Gibson, a distance of three hundred and twenty miles.  

99 ASPMA, III, 117-22.
At Port St. Philip the soldiers were building new barracks and a hospital. At Savannah barracks were being constructed to house two companies and at Suwannee for one company. The Secretary of War recommended the construction of a road from Pensacola to Berkely in Alabama to facilitate the transportation of supplies to the Florida garrisons. 100

In December of 1826 the total strength of the Army was reported as 5,809 officers and enlisted men. Only 1,325 men had been recruited in the last year. The work on the fortifications continued and in March of 1826 it was reported that in the period from 1794 to September 30, 1824 the government had expended $2,884,558.89 on the works. 101

The small Army had been engaged in an extensive construction program for a number of years. The massive brick fortifications that dotted the coastline were of little immediate value to the nation. However, the roads that had been built would be of lasting value to the settlers long after the soldiers left the region. In fact, by 1826 there was only one thing detaining the troops on the southern frontier, and that was the continued presence of the Indians. As long as the contest over the

100 Ibid., 330-38.
101 Ibid., 245-60.
possession of the Indian lands continued, the troops would be called upon to protect the whites from the Indians and the Indians from the whites. The conflict that had developed between the state of Georgia and the Indians living within her borders in 1825 was an indication of things to come. Increasingly the soldiers would be called upon to maintain law and order on the southern frontier.
CHAPTER VI

INDIANS, INTRUDERS AND NULLIFIERS

In 1827 suddenly developing events in Georgia threatened to disturb the peace. In that state the Creek Indians were becoming ominously restive and seemed about to resort to war. Consequently, on January 8 Colonel Clinch was ordered to post approximately five hundred troops in such a way as to protect the settlers along the Georgia-Florida border. Specifically, the Indians were angered by the fact that white men, reputed to be Georgia surveyors, had entered the land to be ceded by the Creeks, and they had complained to the President that this violated the Treaty of 1826.¹

As a consequence of these complaints, a special messenger was dispatched with letters from the War Department to the Governor of Georgia, the Federal Marshall and the District Attorney at Savannah. Governor Troup was

¹Secretary of War to Clinch, Jan. 8, 1827, Secretary of War to Troup, Jan. 8, 1827, and Secretary of War to Duvall, Jan. 8, 1827, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 108, Microcopy 6, Roll 12, 265-68. Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
The treaty of Washington like all other treaties... is among the supreme laws of the land. Charged by the constitution with the execution of the laws, the President will feel himself compelled to employ if necessary all the means under his control to maintain the faith of the nation by carrying this treaty into effect.2

The orders to the Marshall and District Attorney required them to take immediate action to see that the treaty obligations were fulfilled.3

In March the Secretary of War ordered the commanding general to detach groups of soldiers to work on five different roads: (1) from Memphis to Little Rock; (2) from Fort Smith to Fort Towson and then to the northern border of Louisiana; (3) from the Georgia line to New Smyrna by way of St. Augustine; (4) from St. Augustine to Pensacola; and (5) from Halifax to Indian River in Florida. The work was to be supervised by officers of the Quarter Master Department.4

For the next year the frontier was quiet, but the threat of Indian raids always remained. In April of 1828

2Secretary of War to Vinton, Jan. 30, 1827, and Secretary of War to Troup, Jan. 29, 1827, Ibid., 270-71.
3Secretary of War to Morel, Jan. 29, 1827 and Secretary of War to Habersham, Jan. 29, 1829, Ibid.
4Secretary of War to Brown, Mar. 21, 1827 and Secretary of War to Quarter Master General, Mar. 21, 1827, Ibid., 279-80.
the settlers near the headwaters of the St. Mark's River were disturbed by the prospect of the withdrawal of the one company stationed at Camp King. The Commanding General of the Western Department, Winfield Scott, had ordered the camp broken up and the men transferred to New Orleans. The general felt that detachments of less than several companies were detrimental to the efficiency of the troops. Therefore he had decided that a display of force by fifty men, twice a year, from Cantonment Brooke would be sufficient to reassure the residents of the area and hold the Indians in check.\(^5\) Two weeks later the Secretary of War informed Representative Joseph White that the order to evacuate Camp King had been countermanded by the War Department.\(^6\)

In February a problem arose concerning the command of the Army. On the twenty-fourth General Jacob Brown died, leaving the highest post in the Army vacant. The death of Brown placed the President and Secretary of War in a difficult situation since the two Department Commanders, Generals Scott and Gaines, detested each other. If either was named as the commanding general, the other would view it as a personal affront and probably resign.

\(^5\) Scott to Jones, Apr. 5, 1828, Letters Sent, Western Department, Vol. IV, Records of United States Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.

\(^6\) Secretary of War to White, Apr. 18, 1828, SWLS, Roll 12, 345.
from the Army. The controversy between the two men was caused by the question of who outranked whom. Both claimed to be senior to the other. Their commissions as brigadier generals bore the same date, but Gaines claimed that because of his name preceded Scott's alphabetically, he was senior. Scott's brevet as a major general antedated Gaines' brevet, and Scott claimed he was senior.  

The solution which the War Department finally hit on only created another problem. Alexander Macomb, who had been retained as a colonel in 1821, was promoted over both Scott and Gaines. As a result of this action, Scott resigned his commission. He recalled it when the War Department healed his wounded pride with soothing letters, but for a long time Scott had only the most formal relations with Macomb.  

While the decision as to who should be placed in command was being thrashed out, the Army continued its usual activities. Construction continued on the works on  


8 Scott had entered the Army on May 3, 1808, was promoted to Brigadier General, Mar. 9, 1814 and received his brevet on July 2, 1814; Gaines had been commissioned Jan. 10, 1799, promoted to Brig. Genl. on Mar. 9, 1814 and received his brevet on Aug. 15, 1814; Macomb was commissioned on Jan. 24, 1814 and received his brevet on Sept. 11, 1814, retained a Col. and chief engineer, June 1, 1821, Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), 870, 442, 680.
the Savannah River, the Cape Fear River, and the Mississippi River. In addition, works were being erected at Pensacola, Beaufort, and Mobile. In order to improve water transportation, engineers were removing the obstructions from the mouth of the Pascagoula River, eliminating the shoals at Ocracock Inlet, and deepening the harbor of Mobile. An inspection was being made on the Red River to determine how to remove the obstructions to navigation on the river.

On September 20 a company of soldiers was ordered into the Creek Nation, in Alabama, to aid in the removal of those Indians who desired to move west of the Mississippi. Captain Philip Wager was to offer all of the aid in his power to carry the removal policy into effect. The presence of the troops was intended to give confidence to those Creeks who might be inclined to emigrate. The troops were expected to return to Fort Mitchell within five or six weeks to protect the area around the Chattahoochee River.

In December General Macomb recommended that a new post be established at Key West. The recommendation was

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9 Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 9, 1828, Vol. XXXIV; Macomb to Commanding Officer at Cantonment Jessup, Oct. 9, 1828, Letters Sent, Head Quarters of the Army, 1828-46, Records of the Headquarters of the Army, Record Group 108 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSHQA.

10 Macomb to Porter, Sept. 20, 1828 and Macomb to Wager, Sept. 24, 1828, Ibid.; Secretary of War to Forsyth, Sept. 23, 1828 and Secretary of War to Macomb, Sept. 23, 1828, SWLS, Roll 12, 377.
made as a result of requests from the citizens of the island. According to Macomb the presence of troops at that place was necessary "to maintain the sovereignty of the U. S. at that place, as well as to aid in carrying into effect the laws and mandates of the civil courts."

On January 10, 1829, the Secretary of War ordered Colonel Brooke to proceed to Key West to determine why the authorities had requested the troops and what would be expected of them if they were sent to the island. He was to determine if the site would be healthy or could be made so by improvements. Brooke was to be accompanied by a surgeon who was to aid in selecting the site.¹¹

The work of establishing new posts and consolidating the Army's position was a major concern in 1829. In Florida the old post at St. Mark's was abandoned and a new post was begun at St. Rosa Island. At Tampa Bay an area around the post was surveyed and marked out of the public lands. In March the troops were withdrawn from Cantonments Towson and Leavenworth. Those from Towson were stationed at Fort Jesup and those from Leavenworth at Jefferson Barracks. While those garrisons were being pulled back, two companies were to be stationed in a position that would allow them to protect the traders on the Santa Fe trail. The Secretary of War suggested that

¹¹Macomb to Secretary of War, Dec. 17, 1828 and Secretary of War to Brooke, Jan. 10, 1829, LSHQA, Vol. I.
the men camp near where the trail crossed the Neosho River.  

While much of the attention of the War Department was being focused on the area west of the Mississippi, the problems with the Creek Indians flared up again. Some white settlers had been killed on the Georgia frontier, and the troops were ordered to cooperate in trying to bring the Indians to justice. The Secretary of War instructed the commanding officer to demand the immediate surrender of the murders to the civil authorities of Georgia.

The controversy between the Indians and the citizens of Georgia apparently revolved around intruders on the Indian lands. In May the Secretary of War requested that the Governor of Georgia do everything in his power to keep the whites out of the Indian nation. The Secretary stated that the United States was "pledged by treaty stipulations to protect them in the enjoyment of their soil, every solicitude is felt, that the guarantees made may be strictly maintained."

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12 Macomb to Gratiot, Jan. 21, 1829, Ibid.; Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 23, 1829, SWLS, Roll 12, 420-21.

13 Secretary of War to Forsyth, Mar. 24, 1829 and Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 25, 1829, SWLS, Roll 12, 421.

14 Secretary of War to Forsyth, May 14, 1829, Ibid., 433.
By July the situation was such that additional troops were required at the Creek Agency. General Macomb determined that Captain Wager's company, ordered to the agency in March, was to be reinforced by a company of artillery from Augusta. The troops were to prevent rival Indian factions from hindering the removal of the Indians to the west.15

In October Secretary of War John Eaton set forth his views regarding the Indians in a long letter to Governor John Forsyth. He felt that the state of Georgia was justified in trying to extend its authority over all of the land included within its boundaries. The Secretary asked that the state be patient a little longer before trying to assert its authority over the Indians. The Federal government hoped to be able to persuade the Indians to remove west of the Mississippi where collisions between them and whites could be avoided. The Secretary doubted the success of any effort to civilize the Indians:

The years gone by, since the settlement of this country induces an apprehension that the first-original inhabitants of our forests are incapable of self government by any of those rules of right which civilization teaches. In all intercourse with their civilized white brothers, and the various efforts made and expenditures incurred to inspire them with a knowledge of industry and forgetfulness of their erratic habits, as yet success has not been attained.

15 Cooper to Crowell, July 6, 1829 and Macomb to Forsyth, July 7, 1829, LSHQA, Vol. I.
Concerning the removal of the Indians, Eaton observed that it was the best thing for the Indians:

Every day observation shows that the near association of the white and red man is destructive of the latter. The History of our country throughout every quarter teems with evidence establishing the truth of this assertion, and points to the necessity of a removal.

In order to resolve the differences between the Cherokee Indians and the whites, General John Coffee had been requested to visit the Indians. He was to ascertain their views and convey their feelings to the President. To provide for the continued existence of peace during the meeting, all intruders were to be ordered from the Indian lands. All of those who did not leave by the fifteenth of December would be forcibly removed by the soldiers.16

By November the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell was told to wait for additional orders from the War Department before responding to any request from the Indian agent to remove intruders. The time for the whites to be removed might be deferred to a latter date. He was cautioned: "for reasons of policy it is desired that you say nothing as to this order, but keep it entirely to yourself." The reason for delaying the removal was explained to the Indian agent a few days later. General Coffee had not had an

16 Secretary of War to Forsyth, Oct. 14, 1829, SWLS, Roll 12, 454-59.
opportunity to conclude his investigation and until he submitted his report, no action would be taken. The agent was to urge the settlers to remove from the Indian lands as soon as possible, because as soon as the report was received immediate action would be taken against all squatters.  

While the troops watched for trouble between the whites and Indians in Georgia, the soldiers in western Louisiana were ordered to patrol the border between the United States and Texas. The military patrols were to stop the smuggling of goods into the United States. One company was to be detached from Cantonment Jesup and stationed at a suitable site on the Calcasui River. From this camp they were to operate against the smugglers. If it was found that one company was inadequate to meet the situation, a second should be detached to assist in the effort. Revenue officers were to be sent west by the Treasury Department to enforce the laws. Upon their arrival they were to be protected and assisted in their efforts by the soldiers.

On November 30 Colonel Duncan Clinch was ordered to afford the inhabitants of Florida all the protection

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17 Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell, Nov. 3, 1829, Ibid., 461; Secretary of War to Montgomery, Nov. 26, 1829, Ibid., 463.

18 Secretary of War to Many, Nov. 20, 1829, LSHQA, Vol. I.
possible from Indian raids. The Creeks were raiding into Florida from Alabama and it was feared that the Indians living in Florida might join them. Since the Army was already broken up into numerous small detachments, the commanding general felt that it would be inexpedient to establish any new posts in Florida. Therefore Clinch was to do everything in his power to protect the inhabitants without incurring any "extraordinary expense." To maintain peace without additional expense, the Commanding General suggested a plan:

The show of a detachment of one company where there may be disorders, will be sufficient to keep the Indians in order should they manifest any disposition to be mischievous. It is presumed an excursion could be made at any time by a company, lightly armed and equipped for a short tour of service, without any considerable expense, and it is such a movement, which is contemplated as all that will be required to keep peace in the Peninsula and which you are authorized to make.  

In February 1830, the Creeks prevented a mail stage from passing through their lands, and the War Department ordered the Army to arrest the guilty Indians. To help quiet the Indians, General George Brooke, who was commanding at Fort Mitchell, was to order all unauthorized settlers from the Indian nation. Those whites who did not leave within fifteen days were to be arrested and

19 Cooper to Clinch, Nov. 30, 1829, Ibid.
turned over to the civil authorities of Alabama. No sooner was this problem settled than the Army had to turn its attention to another tribe of Indians on another part of the frontier, the Cherokees in Georgia.

The Cherokees were disturbed because the War Department had delayed removing the settlers from their lands. Taking matters into their own hands, the Indians forcibly expelled sixteen families from their lands. The action had been ordered by the head of the nation, John Ross. The expulsion angered the citizens of Georgia, who retaliated against the Cherokees, killing one and capturing three others. To guard against future hostilities on either side, the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell was ordered to send as many troops as possible into the nation to restrain both sides. On February 26 General Brooke was ordered to Washington to receive instructions from the Commanding General on how to deal with the Indians.

In an effort to determine what course of action should be taken concerning the claims of the Indians and the state of Georgia, the opinion of the Attorney General was requested. While awaiting the legal opinion, the

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20 Secretary of War to Macomb, Feb. 19, 1830, SWLS, Roll 12, 473; Macomb to Brooke, Feb. 20, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.

21 Secretary of War to Macomb, Feb. 24, 1830, SWLS, Roll 12, 484; Macomb to Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell, Feb. 25, 1830, and Macomb to Brooke, Feb. 26, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.
garrison at Fort Mitchell was strengthened by two companies from Tampa Bay. It was hoped that this force would be able to maintain order among the Creek and Cherokee Indians.\footnote{Secretary of War to Berrien, Mar. 1, 1830, SWLS, Roll 12, 473-74; Macomb to Clinch, Mar. 6, 1830 and Macomb to Gaines, Mar. 11, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.}

On March 14 the Secretary of War informed the Cherokee agent that the troops from Fort Mitchell had been ordered into the nation to preserve order. Until the troops arrived, the agent was to tell both the whites and Indians to cease their hostile activities. Those who disobeyed would be punished according to existing laws. With regard to the Indians removing the intruders from their lands, the Secretary stated the government's policy:

The Cherokee Indians at the commencement of the present administration were given distinctly to understand, that the right to enforce obedience to the laws of the United States within their confines did not belong to them, and under no circumstances would be conceded to them. They were informed that the government had neither the power nor the disposition to permit one of her citizens to be pronounced guilty of the infraction of her laws by any other tribunal than her own.\footnote{Secretary of War to Montgomery, Mar. 14, 1830, SWLS, Roll 12, 475-77.}

The Secretary stated that General Coffee had determined the boundaries between the Indian lands and the state of Georgia. All of the Indians living outside of the boundaries were to move "within their own undisputed
territorial limits." The whites who were living within the limits of the Indian lands would be ordered to move.

The policy of the Federal government with respect to the Cherokees was still based upon removal:

The object of the government is to persuade, not to coerce their Indian friends to a removal from the lands of their fathers. Beyond all doubt they cannot live peaceable and happily where they are; yet still they will be protected to the extent that right and justice and powers possessed require, beyond this the President has neither the inclination nor the authority to go. It is idle to talk of rights which do not belong to them, and of protection which cannot be extended.24

On March 16 instructions were issued to General Macomb concerning the removal of intruders from the Cherokee lands. The Indian agent was to compile a list of those individuals who were legally entitled to live on Cherokee land and those who were intruders. This list was to guide the officer assigned to remove the whites. The designated officer was to give notice to the settlers to leave. After ample time had passed, he was to expel those who remained and destroyed their houses and fences. After the removal had been completed, he was to place his command in a position to prevent further intrusions.25

24 Ibid.

25 Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 16, 1830 and Secretary of War to Montgomery, Mar. 17, 1830, Ibid., 478-79.
The instructions given to Major Wager, who would supervise the removal, were intended to prevent hostilities. It was hoped that the appearance of the troops would cause the intruders to retire without resorting to force. If all peaceful efforts failed, then the settlers were to be forced to retire by the destruction of their homes and improvements. The Secretary suggested that if force were required:

Operate first upon some small and detached settlement, and having acted, to wait a little while for the information to become effectual. To proceed directly and generally against any numerous and strong settlement might make up an excitement, which would perhaps operate prejudicially.26

During the controversy, General Gaines, one of the staunchest friends the Indians had among the Army officers, came to the defense of the Cherokees who had removed the intruders. The General believed that the actions of the Indians had been justified:

They surely were competent PEACEABLY to put such intruders out of their houses as we should be to thrust Russian or English intruders from our houses or barracks should they see fit forcible to enter them. It is not for us in this the 53rd year of our age, as a nation to deny that the rights of all free men are equal and unchangeable as the justice

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26 Secretary of War to Wager, Mar. 17, 1830, Ibid., 480.
of Heaven. 27

But the General's intervention on behalf of the Indians was unsuccessful. The soldiers faced the prospect of spending the rest of the year in the Cherokee Nation. In May there were two companies in the Cherokee Nation, two at Fort Mitchell and two on the boundary line between the Creek and Cherokee Nations. 28

In late June it appeared likely that trouble was developing in the Cherokee country again. The trouble involved the Indians and the settlers who had been removed. The Indians had taken over the mining operations that the intruders had been forced to abandon. The whites were angry and threatened to attack the Indians in order to prevent them from removing the gold. In addition to the controversy between the Indians and the settlers, the state of Georgia claimed the gold as its own and requested that the mining operations be halted. The Secretary of War ordered General Macomb to have the mining stopped and prevent the removal of the minerals. The order against the mining was to apply equally to whites and Indians. The operations were to be stopped peacefully if possible, "but if these should not succeed, resort to force must be

27 Gaines to Macomb, Mar. 25, 1830, LSWD, V. See also James W. Silver, Edmund Pendleton Gaines, Frontier General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1949).

28 Macomb to Hook, May 21, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.
authorized to accomplish it." 29

Neither the President nor the Secretary of War wanted to resort to violence if it could be avoided. On June 18 the commanding officer in the nation, Captain T. W. Brady, suggested that a display of force might solve the problem. The reply of the Secretary of War indicated that the government wished to avoid armed hostilities:

Your suggestion of spending a few cartridges to enforce obedience to the orders of the government it is hoped was not the result of serious reflection, and that such a resort will, never be had until measures of a more pacific character have failed of the desired effect. The shedding of blood on slight provocation would entail consequences which you would probably be the first to feel and we should all have to lament. 30

In August the situation in the Cherokee mining area was growing more delicate and more explosive. On the sixth of the month Macomb informed Captain Brady that his actions in halting the mining had been correct. If there were further instructions or orders to be executed, he would be informed by the Secretary of War. On the eighteenth the Secretary of War instructed Macomb to

29 Secretary of War to Macomb, June 26, 1830, SWLS, Roll 12, 496-97.
30 Secretary of War to Brady, July 13, 1830, Ibid., 498.
order Captain Wager to assume command of the troops in the Cherokee Nation. The decision to send Wager to the Cherokee Nation resulted from his peaceful removal of the intruders from the Creek lands. The Secretary believed that his discretion was what was needed to avert the possibility of an armed clash between the Indians and intruders, with the Army caught in the middle. 31

On August 24 it was reported that a number of whites had returned to the Cherokee lands to dig for gold. As a result, it was necessary to increase the number of troops in the nation. The commanders at Fort Mitchell, Augusta, and Charleston were to march one company each from their commands to support the troops trying to maintain order. Captain Brady and his men continued to remove the intruders, who, however, returned as soon as the troops moved on to another area. 32

When Wager arrived in the Cherokee Nation, the process of removal began in earnest. The Secretary of War approved of the methods employed by the troops in removing the miners. But he cautioned Wager to avoid any methods that might "make a resort to arms necessary." 33

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31 Macomb to Brady, Aug. 6, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I; Secretary of War to Macomb, Aug. 18, 1830, SWLS, Roll 13, 8; Secretary of War to Wager, Aug. 18, 1830, Ibid.

32 Secretary of War to Macomb, Aug. 24, 1830, Ibid., 9; Cooper to Brady, Sept. 1, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.

33 Secretary of War to Wager, Oct. 4, 1830, SWLS, Roll 13, 11.
The methods employed in the removal of the intruders was described in a story printed in the *Georgia Athenian*:

The policy pursued is to destroy the provisions, camp-equipage, working utensils, or whatever else is found belonging to the diggers; while the diggers themselves are conveyed to the nearest ferry, and put across the river free of charge.

The report stated that in one day at least one hundred whites had been expelled or had voluntarily left the area after seeing others removed by the troops.\(^{34}\)

Understandably, the Indians were not satisfied with the government's decision to halt all digging on their lands. On October 1 an article appeared in the *Cherokee Phoenix*, an Indian newspaper, that revealed the feelings of the Indians. The soldiers had arrested both Indians and whites who were mining. The Indians had been released after being escorted out of the area. The story concluded with the statement that "it now appears plainly, that our great father considers us in light of intruders."\(^{35}\)

In a letter to the officer commanding the troops in the nation the Indians argued their case:

They are laboring in an honest way, upon their own lands, for the support of their families; they intruded upon the possessions of none; they infringe

\(^{34}\) *Georgia Athenian*, Sept. 21, 1830.

\(^{35}\) *Cherokee Phoenix*, Oct. 1, 1830.
The Indians were determined to continue digging gold on their own lands, and if they were arrested they were "resigned to such fate as the consequences of their honest labor upon their own lands may consign them to, under the laws of the United States." 36

The Cherokees were fearful that the state of Georgia might take action against them and requested that the Federal government protect them. Specifically, the Indians feared that Georgia might attempt to enforce two laws passed by the state legislature in 1828 and 1829. The former law declared that the authority of the state was supreme in the Indian nation and that the sovereignty of the Cherokee was null and void. The second act reaffirmed the law of 1828 and provided a term of four years in prison for anyone who violated the state laws. 37

36 "Copy of a letter addressed to the officer commanding the detachment of the United States troops," in Niles Weekly Register, Nov. 6, 1830, Vol. XXXIX.

37 See Cherokee Phoenix for Oct. and Nov. of 1830. William C. Dawson (ed.), A Compilation of the Laws of the State of Georgia, Passed by the General Assembly since the year 1819 to the year 1829, inclusive (Milledgeville, Georgia, 1831), 198-99. The 1828 laws declared: "All laws, usages, and customs made, established, and in force in the said territory, by the said Cherokee Indians, be, and the same are hereby on and after the first of June, 1830, declared null and void."
If the Georgia law was not enough of a problem for the Indians, the discovery of gold on their land in 1828 was the final blow to their hopes of retaining their land. A law passed by the Cherokee government had given them control of all metals found within their borders. It was on the basis of this law that the Cherokees had removed the intruders and requested Federal troops to help them. But the laws of Georgia now declared the Cherokee laws void.

The people of the state of Georgia were angered by the presence of the United States troops and requested that they be withdrawn from the Cherokee lands. On October 29 Governor Gilmer of Georgia addressed a long letter to President Jackson stating that Georgia was capable of enforcing its laws without the aid of Federal troops. The Governor complained that the gold diggers had been mistreated by Major Wager and his men:

In some instances unoffending citizens have been made the subject of punishment, in violation of their rights, and the authority of the state. Complaints have been made to this department, and redress asked for. The removal of the troops is believed to be the most effectual means of preventing the repetition of such injuries.

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38 Laws of the Cherokee Nation (Tahlequah, Cherokee Nation: Cherokee Advocate Office, 1852), 50.

On November 8 Macomb ordered Major Wager to remove his command from the Cherokee Nation for the winter. The troops were to be moved to some location where they could be comfortably accommodated and still be in a position to move back into the nation if they were again needed. The companies of artillery drawn from Augusta, Savannah, and Charleston were to return to their stations. Macomb felt that the "Legislature of Georgia now in session, will undoubtedly take the proper and necessary steps to preserve tranquility along the Indian borders."  

On November 10 the Secretary of War informed Governor Gilmer that the troops had been ordered to leave the Indian nation. He also justified the conduct of Major Wager: "It is much to be regretted that in the execution of his orders, the commanding officer should have found himself constrained to resort to measures which may have operated hardly upon some individuals."  

With the withdrawal of the troops from the Cherokee Nation, the Indians were left to the mercy of the state of Georgia. On December 22, 1830, the Georgia legislature passed an act creating the "Georgia Guard," and assigned it to the Indian territory. The act also provided that no Cherokee governing body could meet for any purpose.

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40 Macomb to Wager, Nov. 8, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.
41 Secretary of War to Gilmer, Nov. 10, 1830, SWLS, Roll 13, 15-16.
other than ceding lands. In addition, Indian officials were liable to four years of hard labor if they held courts of any kind. The law required that by March 1, 1831, all whites residing in the Nation possess a license, which was to be issued only after an oath had been taken to uphold the laws of Georgia.42

While the Cherokees were losing their battle with Georgia, it appeared that the Creeks in Alabama were beginning to lose their struggle with that state. In November the Secretary of War informed Lieutenant P. Newcomb that he had acted correctly when he declined to comply with a request to stop the cutting of the road through Creek territory. The Secretary stated that since the road was within the limits of Alabama and was authorized by an act of the state legislature, "there is no authority in the General Government to interfere."43

In Mississippi the Choctaw Indians were also troubled by intruders on their lands. To remove the whites from the Choctaw lands, two companies of soldiers were ordered from Jefferson Barracks to the Yazoo River. From this position they would be able to remove the settlers and maintain order in the area.44

42 Oliver H. Prince (ed.), A Digest of the Laws of Georgia . . . Previous to . . . December, 1837 (Athens, Georgia, 1837), 279-80.

43 Secretary of War to Newcomb, Nov. 10, 1830, SWLS, Roll 13, 15.

44 Secretary of War to Ward, Nov. 13, 1830, Ibid., 17; MacRea to Jones, Dec. 17, 1830, LSWD, V.
The fact that the frontier was moving beyond the South was clearly indicated by General Macomb's recommendations to consolidate the various regiments and establish a line of defense on the frontier. Cantonment Jesup was the only post mentioned that was located in a southern state. The scheme called for the gathering of full regiments at three posts, Cantonments Leavenworth, Gibson, and Jesup, with smaller detachments at other posts. Some posts that had outlived their usefulness were to be abandoned as soon as possible. The proposed distribution of the troops would allow them to protect not only the white settlers but also the Indians who were expected to remove from the areas east of the Mississippi.45

White expectations of a quick expulsion of the Indians from their lands were increased in May 1825, when Congress enacted an Indian removal bill. The measure authorized the President to begin negotiations with the Indians to cede their lands and appropriated funds to finance their removal. By September 27, 1830, the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek was signed with the Choctaws. The Choctaws ceded all of their land east of the Mississippi and were given three years to remove to the territory assigned to them west of the Arkansas.46

45 Macomb to Eaton, July 20, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.
Dancing Rabbit Creek was only the first in a series of treaties negotiated with the Indians living east of the Mississippi that would eventually result in the removal of most of the Indians.

By January of 1831 the troops were preparing to escort the Indians to the western territory. The troops stationed at the Yazoo River would be the first soldiers to take part in the Indian removal. While the removal process was beginning in Mississippi, preparations were made across the South during 1831 for the removal of the eastern tribes.  

In Alabama Major Wager was still in command at Port Mitchell, but he was being called upon to defend his actions in removing intruders. Wager faced the possibility of being sued by the citizens for destroying their property while executing the orders of the War Department. The possibility that an officer might be called upon to defend his actions in a court of law, undoubtedly influenced the officers in the execution of their duties when civilians were involved. Wager's case was not unusual, in the same year that he faced court action a suit stemming from an officer's actions during the War of 1812 was finally settled. The case was decided in favor of the plaintiff and against Major Massias. The officer had been

47 MacRea to Butts, Jan. 3, 1831, LSWD, V.
assisted in his fifteen-year court fight by government attorneys. Even after the legal question of liability was settled, the officer's problems were not over. To obtain reimbursement for the expenses he had incurred and the cost of the damages, he was required to make an application to Congress to obtain his money. If Congress did not appropriate funds to meet the expenses, the full burden of the judgement fell upon the officer.

During the spring and summer of 1831 the strength of the southern posts was increased as the preparations for the removal continued. During the summer the Army was concerned with the possibility of a slave revolt in Louisiana. But by September the crisis had passed, and attention was once again focused on the task of removing the Indians.

It was hoped that the Cherokees living in Georgia could be induced to move. To speed the process, Benjamin Curry of Tennessee was appointed to direct the operation. He was to determine the Indian's attitudes concerning removal and attempt to eliminate any opposition. Curry was to confine his operations to the Indian lands within the

48 Cooper to Wager, Jan. 25, 1831, Macomb to Thompson, Jan. 27, 1831, Macomb to Wager, Feb. 23, 1831, Cooper to Wager, Apr. 11, 1831, LSHQA, Vol. I; Secretary of War to Moxey, Nov. 10, 1831, SWLS, Roll 13, 92 and Secretary of War to Massias, Nov. 19, 1831, Ibid., 95.

49 DeHart to Jones, Feb. 20, 1831 and DeHart to Jones, Mar. 2, 1831, LSWD, V. See Chapter IX.
state of Georgia. He was to make a report of his findings to the President and no final decision would be made until his report was received. 50

The preparations for the removal of the Choctaws proceeded rapidly. George S. Gaines, brother of General Gaines, had been appointed to supervise the movement of the Choctaws from Mississippi. Major F. W. Armstrong had been appointed as the permanent agent for the Choctaws once they reached their new homes in the west. Gaines had selected the sites where the Choctaws would board the boats that would move them to the west. The southern part of the nation would board steamboats in the vicinity of Vicksburg, and the northern part would board at Memphis. 51

Although events were moving rapidly in Mississippi, in Georgia they were not proceeding quickly enough to satisfy the whites. On September 9 the Secretary of War informed Representative Thomas Foster that the President had not yet decided to extend the emigration system to the Creek Indians. On the same day he told Governor Gilmer to be patient:

So far as it depends upon the actions

50 Secretary of War to Gibson, Sept. 3, 1831, SWLS, Roll 13, 75; Secretary of War to Gilmer, Sept. 7, 1831, Ibid., 77-78.

51 Secretary of War to George Gaines, Sept. 8, 1831 and Secretary of War to Coffee, Sept. 8, 1831, SWLS, Roll 13, 78-79; Clark to Lewis, Oct., 1831, LSWD, VI.
of this department every reasonable facility shall be afforded to carry into effect the plan of emigration. If all the measures which are recommended are not taken, and as speedily taken as you could wish, you must attribute the result not to any indisposition to meet the question in every proper manner, but to its complicated bearing and to the practical difficulties of removing a large body of dependent people. . . .52

The Secretary might have added that the biggest obstacle to a speedy emigration of the Indians was the fact that the Cherokees did not want to leave their lands.53

Despite the Secretary's plea for patience on the part of Georgia, the state legislature began to debate whether or not to survey the Indian lands. This debate once again brought a request from the Secretary that the legislature not authorize a survey of the land:

Every effort in the power of the executive is now making to induce the Cherokees to cede their rights in Georgia, and to migrate to the country west of the Mississippi; I can but hope that this measure not less necessary to their present comfort than their future existence will ere long be accomplished.54

52 Secretary of War to Foster, Sept. 9, 1831 and Secretary of War to Gilmer, Sept. 9, 1831, SWLS, Roll 13, 79-80.


54 Secretary of War to Troup, Dec. 13, 1831, SWLS, Roll 13, 98-99.
The year 1832 began in much the same way as 1831, with complaints against the actions of the officers of the Army engaged in removing intruders. Not only were charges made by whites, but the Indians complained that the troops had destroyed their property while removing the squatters. In an effort to circumvent the regulations concerning mining operations on the Indian lands, one white group applied to the War Department for a license to work the mines. The Secretary declined to issue such a license on the grounds that he lacked the authority and that it was inexpedient at the present time.

The problem of intruders continued to plague the government and spread to include the Creek lands in Alabama and the Cherokee mining areas within North Carolina. Major Wager, still commanding at Fort Mitchell, was instructed to give all assistance required by the United States Marshall to remove the intruders in Alabama.

In North Carolina the problem centered around a large number of whites, who had moved on to the Cherokee lands with a work force of Negroes to work the gold mines. The white force was said to number about 200. The Governor

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55 Secretary of War to Foster, Jan. 14, 1832, Ibid., 112-13; Van Buren to Wager, Feb. 16, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
56 Secretary of War to Carson, Jan. 17, 1832, SWLS, Roll 13, 116.
57 Macomb to Wager, Apr. 5, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
of North Carolina had requested assistance from the War Department to remove the intruders and enforce the treaty obligations with the Indians. To meet this request, two companies of artillery were ordered from Charleston Harbor to the Indian territory. The troops were to cooperate with the Indian agent in the expulsion of the whites.  

By July the Commanding General informed the Governor that the whites had been removed and the troops would remain in the area to prevent their return. If the settlers should move back onto the land, they would be arrested and turned over to the proper civil authorities.

Actually, the troops were not required to expell the intruders in North Carolina. The whites left the Indian country before the two companies had arrived. However, the Indian agent, Hugh Montgomery, and General William Armistead, commanding the troops, had decided that the soldiers should be used to remove the intruders on the Cherokee lands in Tennessee.

On July 14 Macomb informed the Secretary of War that the troops were available for assignment in either

58 Macomb to Armistead, Mar. 21, 1832, Ibid.; Stauton, Virginia, Spectator, June 8, 1832.
59 Macomb to Stokes, July 18, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
60 Macomb to Armistead, July 18, 1832, Ibid.
the Creek or Cherokee nations. There were two companies stationed near Calhoun, Georgia, to prevent intrusions on the Cherokee lands. At Fort Mitchell two companies were available for immediate action in that region. If additional troops were needed in the Indian country, they could be drawn from the garrisons at Augusta and Charleston.61

The reason for the concern about the availability of troops was that a potentially explosive situation was developing in Alabama. The source of the trouble was a treaty signed by the Creeks on March 24, 1832. The treaty did not specifically call for the removal of the Creeks, but set up a system whereby each head of a family would receive an allotment of 320 acres of land within the nation. Presumably the unallotted lands could be occupied by whites. The treaty guaranteed the Indians against intrusions on their lands and forcible removal. The intent of the treaty was one thing, but its actual operation was an entirely different matter.62

The treaty required that whites who occupied Indian lands would be removed. But as in some other instances, those intruders whose improvements did not infringe upon the Indian rights were to be allowed to remain long enough to harvest their crops. These decisions once again placed

61 Macomb to Secretary of War, July 14, 1832, Ibid.
62 Kappler, Indian Affairs, II, 341-43.
the men of the Army in the middle of a potentially dangerous situation.

In July the soldiers, acting in support of the Federal Marshall, evicted a number of white settlers at Irvington and burned their homes. The whites returned with their weapons and the sheriff. When the sheriff attempted to serve writs on the Marshall, the officer commanding the troops, and the Indians who had repossessed their improvements, the commander ordered one of the soldiers to stop him. The soldier bayoneted the sheriff in the arm as he advanced upon the Marshall.63

As a consequence of the influx of settlers hoping to acquire the unallotted lands and the anger aroused by the clash between the United States Marshall and Federal troops on one side, and the sheriff and intruders on the other, the Marshall requested that troops be stationed on the Creek lands to protect the Indian's crops and homes. Major Wager was ordered to prevent encroachments and depredations by the whites. At the same time he was to limit his expenses. The Major was to govern his conduct according to the dictates of the situation and the

suggestions of the Marshall. 64

The situation in which the officers commanding in the Indian territories found themselves was summarized by General Gaines in a letter to Major Francis Belton:

You are placed in a position where important conflicting laws, with adverse authorities and interests—operating powerfully upon the worst of the bad passions of man, white as well as red. Combine to render your command deeply interesting, delicate and difficult.

The only guide the general could offer was contained in his closing statement:

When we recollect that we are solemnly sworn to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against their enemies or opposers whomsoever, and to obey the orders of the President of the United States, and the orders of the Officers appointed over us, according to the Rules and Articles of War; we cannot but perceive the strong outline by which we are to pass through the labyrinths of conflicting legislation and opinion. 65

The problems in the Indian nation were momentarily overshadowed by events in South Carolina. As the nullification movement developed, the commander of the troops in the harbor of Charleston was cautioned to be alert to any attempt to seize the fortifications. On

64 Cooper to Wager, Aug. 10, 1832 and Cooper to Wager, Aug. 13, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.

65 Gaines to Belton, Aug. 23, 1832, LSWD, VI. Gaines' italics.
October 29 orders were issued to Major Julius Heileman to defend the fortifications against attack: "The attempt to surprise the forts and garrisons, it is expected, will be made by the militia, and it must be guarded against by constant vigilance and repelled at every hazard."66

On November 7 two companies of artillery were ordered to Charleston Harbor from Fort Monroe, Virginia. Macomb ordered that if the companies were not at full strength, the ranks should be filled before the troops sailed for Charleston.67 On the same day Macomb informed Heileman that the troops were ordered from Virginia to strengthen this command. He instructed Heileman to inspect the ordnance stores and to have those that might be useful transferred from the arsenal in Charleston to the fort in the harbor.

Heileman was to inspect the fortifications and make all repairs that were possible under the existing circumstances. The Major was to keep the commanding general informed about conditions within the city and the state, specifically whether or not the people actually planned to resist Federal authority. As a last precaution he was to determine if any of the men under his command were inclined to side with those who opposed the authority of the United States. If he found any men who were so

66 Macomb to Heileman, Oct. 29, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
67 Macomb to Eustis, Nov. 7, 1832, Ibid.
inclined, they were to be transferred from Charleston. 68

On November 12 Macomb sent additional instructions to Heileman concerning his conduct at Charleston. If the authorities of South Carolina demanded that Heileman surrender the Citadel and the state weapons stored there, he was to comply with the request. The Citadel belonged to the city but was occupied by a company of artillerists. Heileman was cautioned to conduct all of his negotiations with city and state officials in writing. He was to avoid any commitment about hostilities, "but defend yourself if attacked in conformity with the instructions you have received." 69

On November 18 the Secretary of War ordered General Scott to repair to Charleston. He was to inspect the fortifications and make any repairs that might be necessary. He was also authorized to draw additional troops from any other posts to reinforce the garrisons. The Federal laws were to be enforced by the civil officials until the President decided otherwise:

Till, therefore, you are otherwise instructed, you will act in obedience to the legal requisitions of the proper civil officers of the United States. 70

68 Macomb to Heileman, Nov. 7, 1832, Ibid. This letter marked confidential.

69 Macomb to Heileman, Nov. 12, 1832, Ibid.

70 Secretary of War to Scott, Nov. 18, 1832, as seen in Niles Weekly Register, Feb. 28, 1833, Vol. XLIII.
In late November additional troops were ordered to Fort Mitchell to aid in the removal of white squatters. One week later Macomb informed General Winfield Scott, who was at Savannah supposedly on his annual tour of inspection, that the troops were marching to Fort Mitchell. He had just learned that the troops were no longer needed in Alabama and therefore Scott could use them in South Carolina if he believed it was necessary. Macomb also informed Scott that four additional companies had been ordered to move from Fort Monroe to Fort Moultrie and that all officers were ordered to join their companies at Charleston. The command of the force gathering in Charleston would be assumed by Colonel James Bankhead who had been ordered to the city. On December 7 another company of artillerists was ordered from Fort Monroe to Charleston Harbor.

By mid-January General Scott was in Baltimore on his way back to his headquarters in New York, having left Colonel Bankhead to supervise the activities in Charleston. However, the General was prepared to return to South Carolina at the shortest notice. On January 24 Macomb

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71 Macomb to Anstill, Nov. 26, 1832 and Macomb to Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell, Nov. 27, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II; Macomb to Scott, Dec. 4, 1832 and Macomb to Eustis, Dec. 4, 1832, Ibid.; Cooper to Commanding Officer of Fort Monroe, Dec. 7, 1832, America State Papers, Military Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1836), V, 760. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.

72 Macomb to Scott, Jan. 22, 1833, LSHQA, Vol. II.
informed Scott that the President and the Secretary of War expected him to return to Charleston by the end of the month. Two days later the Secretary of War ordered Scott to proceed to Charleston without delay and assume command of the force that was gathering there. The Secretary's letter contained specific instructions by which Scott was to govern his conduct:

It is the earnest wish of the President that the present unhappy difficulties in South Carolina should be terminated without any forcible collision; and it is his determination that if such collision does occur it shall not be justly imputable to the United States. He is therefore desirous that in all your proceedings, while you execute your duty firmly, you act with as much discretion and moderation as possible. . . .

The troops were to act only in self-defense against the citizens of South Carolina.

The Secretary expressed his concern for the security of the Federal arsenal at Augusta. He felt that Scott had acted wisely in ordering a company of troops from the Indian Country to Augusta to reinforce the garrison. The arsenal was to be defended to the "last extremity" if it was attacked by the citizens. Colonel Daniel Twiggs was to be told to destroy the arms and ammunition rather than allowing them to fall into the hands of the assailants.73

73 Cass to Scott, Jan. 26, 1833, ASPMA, V, 160-61. The company ordered to Augusta had been stationed at Camp Armistead, see Macomb to Scott, Dec. 4, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
While Congress considered what action should be taken regarding the situation in South Carolina, General Scott and his command waited patiently to learn the outcome of the debates. On February 20 Secretary of War Lewis Cass told Scott that the settlement of the dispute by Congress was not certain. Until some definite decision was made "the President relies upon you to pursue the same discrete and firm course you have heretofore taken."74

On March 13 General Macomb informed General Scott that complaints had been received that numerous intruders had moved onto the Indian lands in North Carolina and Tennessee after the troops had been marched to the coast. If Scott believed that the situation in South Carolina had quieted sufficiently to allow the removal of some of the troops, he was to order two companies of artillery to North Carolina. The commander of the detachment was to follow the directions of the Governor of North Carolina in removing the whites. Scott was to order the extra three companies at Augusta Arsenal to return to Fort Mitchell. When they reached Fort Mitchell, they were to follow the direction of the District Attorney of Alabama in removing the intruders on Indian lands in that state and in Georgia. On March 22 the orders were issued sending the three companies back to Fort Mitchell and the two

74 Secretary of War to Scott, Feb. 20, 1833, SWLS, Roll 13, 343-44.
companies back to Fort Armistead. 75

On May 10 Macomb issued specific instructions to
the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell:

You will on the application of Robert
L. Crawford, United States Marshall
for the Southern District of Alabama,
furnish such aid from the force under
your command as he may require to
carry into effect the instructions
he has received from the War Depart­
ment in relation to the removal of
intruders on the Creek lands and if
required will march the whole force
to effect the object. 76

The execution of these orders would involve the
United States Army in a major confrontation with the state
of Alabama. The Alabama legislature in 1832 and 1833 had
extended the jurisdiction of the state over the area in­
cluded in the Creek cession. This action had only served
to increase the number of settlers who had moved onto the
Indian lands. The Indians had been complaining about the
activities of the whites, and the troops had been ordered
to cooperate with the Marshall in removing them. 77

In August one of the intruders was shot and killed
by soldiers who were assisting the United States Marshall.

75 Macomb to Scott, Mar. 13, 1833 and Macomb to
Swain, Mar. 14, 1833, LSHQA, Vol. II; Mercer to Gardiner,
Mar. 22, 1833 and Scott to Twiggs, Mar. 22, 1833, LSED, X.

76 Macomb to Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell,
May 10, 1833, LSHQA, Vol. II.

77 Young, *Redskins, Rufflesirts and Rednecks*,
78, discusses the actions of Alabama.
The events leading up to the fatal shooting are clouded by the partisan feelings aroused by the incident, and it is difficult to establish the sequence of events. But it seems that the intruder, Hardeman Owens, one of the most objectionable and unscrupulous of the invaders, was ordered to leave the Indian nation by the Marshall. Owens refused to obey the order. He attempted to lure the Marshall and his escort into his home, which he had mined with explosives, in an attempt to blow them up. Failing in his attempt to ambush the soldiers and the Marshall, Owens attempted to fire upon the party, whereupon he was shot and killed by the soldiers. 78

The shooting of Owens brought the situation in Alabama to an explosive point. Many citizens of the state asserted that Owens had been murdered by the soldiers who had no legal right to be in Alabama. The Tuscaloosa Expositor stated:

> It does, indeed, appear that the President intends to trample under his feet the constitution of the United States, and the sovereignty of the states. If there is any one thing, which the constitution does not authorize him to do, it

is the sending an Army into a state, to settle disputes between her citizens. 79

Another Alabama paper told the whites:

We would say be calm, but firm. The President is already in the wrong - keep him so. Let his menials dare commit another murder - they will be imprisoned and punished if they do. 80

On August 19 Secretary of War Cass asked the Attorney General for his opinion as to whether or not the government had the right under the provision of the Treaty of 1832 to remove the intruders from the Creek lands. 81 Three days later the Attorney General replied with a long and detailed statement. The important point of the opinion concerned the jurisdiction over the land ceded in 1832 and was contained in the last sentence of the letter:

The lawful possession is still in the United States, and may in my opinion be defended against such trespasses, according to the directions of the act of 1807, by the removal of the intruders by military force. 82

79 As seen in Niles Weekly Register, Oct. 26, 1833, XLV.

80 States Rights Expositor as seen in Niles Weekly Register, Oct. 26, 1833, XLV.

81 Secretary of War to Attorney General, Aug. 19, 1833, SWLS, Roll 13, 406.

82 Attorney General to Secretary of War, Aug. 22, 1833, in Letters Received, Main Series, 1801-70, Record of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107,
Armed with the Attorney General's opinion, Secretary of War Cass informed Governor John Gayle of Alabama that the right to remove intruders from the ceded lands in Alabama belonged to the Federal government and not to the states. He also informed the Governor that the removal of the settlers would continue until the provisions of the treaty with the Indians were implemented. Governor Gayle replied by again asserting that the state of Alabama had jurisdiction over its territory and that the Federal government was acting unconstitutionally. 83

By October the situation in Alabama was reaching a dangerous point. On October 7 Governor Gayle issued a proclamation informing the people of the Federal government's intentions to continue expelling intruders on the Indian lands. The Governor implored the people to put their faith in the "Majesty of the law." His next statement was virtually a call to arms for those people living in the areas effected by the removal policy.

In order, therefore that "the laws may be faithfully executed," and by virtue of the power and authority in me vested, I hereby require all civil officers in the countries aforesaid, to be attentive

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to the complaints of the people, upon whom any crime or crimes may be committed. . . . by issuing all such warrants and other process as may be necessary to bring offenders to justice, particularly such as may be guilty of murder, false imprisonment, house burning, robbery, forcible entries, and all such like heinous offences.

The Russell County Circuit Court indicted the soldiers who were members of the party involved in the shooting of Owens. When the sheriff attempted to serve the court orders at Fort Mitchell, Major James McIntosh refused to admit him to the post. The sheriff made his report to the Court and was ordered to return to the fort and bring the Major before the Court to be cited for contempt. The sheriff was again unsuccessful and his report summarized the situation in Alabama:

I went to the fort and called on defendant. He swore I should not touch him. I am satisfied if I had made the attempt it would have been at the rigue [sic] of my life; that defendant was commanding officer of the fort, and had sworn on yesterday he would not surrender up any one in the fort.85

On October 29 the Secretary of War issued orders to McIntosh not to hinder the officials of the courts in

84 Proclamation of Governor Gayle, Oct. 7, 1833, as seen in Niles Weekly Register, Oct. 26, 1833, Vol. XLV.
85 Statement of Sheriff Crowell, Oct. 16, 1833, reprinted Ibid., Nov. 16, 1833, Vol. XLV.
the execution of their duties:

It is not the intention of the President, that any part of the military force of the United States should be brought into collision with the civil authority. In all questions of jurisdiction, it is the duty of the former to submit to the latter, and no consideration must interfere with that duty.86

Similar instructions not to interfere with the state authorities were issued to Marshall Anstill. At the same time Cass instructed the District Attorney for the Southern District of Alabama to offer all legal assistance possible to the officer and the men charged by the state of Alabama.87 To try to settle the differences between the Federal government and the state, Francis Scott Key was sent to Montgomery. He was to investigate the entire incident but was to exercise due caution:

The Marshall and the military force must be defended against vexatious proceedings; and you will, therefore, without delay, in every instance where these are instituted against them, have the matter brought before a judge of the United States for his determination.88

86 Cass to McIntosh, Oct. 29, 1833, in Letters Sent by Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81, in Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, Microcopy 21, Roll 11, 294-96. Hereinafter cited as LSOIA.

87 Secretary of War to Anstii, Oct. 29, 1833 and Secretary of War to District Attorney, Oct. 29, 1833, Ibid., 296-99.

88 Cass to Key, Oct. 31, 1833, Ibid., 302-305.
On October 25 the Mobile Commercial Advertiser reported that the United States Marshall had indicated that he and the troops would take no action against the intruders before the fifteenth of January. The editor expressed the hope that the differences would be adjusted before that date.89

On November 20 General Macomb ordered eight companies of artillery from Fort Monroe and two companies from the Cherokee country to proceed to Fort Mitchell. When these companies reached Alabama, the full strength of Fort Mitchell would be fourteen companies. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Twiggs was ordered to assume command at Fort Mitchell and hold the troops in readiness to assist the Marshall in his duties. Macomb suggested: "the duties to be performed by the troops is a very peculiar nature, and while you will be firm in the execution of it, let me recommend as little violence and injury to the persons and property of individuals as possible."90

Key managed to arrange a compromise between the two governments. The state of Alabama dropped the prosecution of the soldiers who had "murdered" Owens, and the Federal government agreed not to act against the intruders until the Indian reserves had been located.91

89Mobile Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 25, 1833.
90Macomb to Twiggs, Nov. 20, 1833 and Macomb to Eustis, Nov. 22, 1833, LSHQA, Vol. II.
91Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts and Rednecks, 79.
On January 4, 1834, Macomb informed Twiggs that the Marshall had been ordered to carry out the removal of settlers on the Indian allotments. Twiggs was to assist him in the performance of his duties: "and if you should be opposed by force, you must as a matter of course, put it down, by all the means you possess."  

On March 12 the Secretary of War informed Governor Gayle that the additional troops that had been ordered to Fort Mitchell during the previous year had been withdrawn and that only the regular garrison remained. Cass also expressed his pleasure over an act passed by the Alabama legislature in January. The law provided a fine of from $250 to $1,000 or three months in jail for anyone found guilty of trespassing on an Indian reserve without contracting to buy or lease the land. He believed that this law would mean that the Federal government would no longer be required to enforce the treaty with the Creeks.  

With the settlement of the problems in Alabama, the Army in the South settled back into a peaceful routine. Preparations were being made to remove the various Indian tribes to the west of the Mississippi. By the spring of 1834 all of the southern tribes, except the Cherokees, had

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92 Macomb to Twiggs, Jan. 4, 1834, LSHQA, Vol. II.

93 Secretary of War to Gayle, Mar. 12, 1832, LSOIA, Roll 12, 185. Alabama Laws (1833-34), 42.
signed treaties agreeing to remove. There were scattered incidents of Indian raids on isolated white farms and a few white intrusions on Indian lands that required the attention of the soldiers. However, most of their time was occupied with drilling and policing the various posts. Even the large-scale building program of coastal fortifications was virtually completed, and only general maintenance work was required.

Undoubtedly there were some individuals who could foresee the day not too far distant, when complete peace would reign in the South. The Indians would have been removed and the only soldiers left in the South would be those who garrisoned the coastal fortifications and those areas where a slave insurrection might occur.

The few indications that events might not be proceeding as well as expected were largely ignored by most people. In January of 1835 General Duncan Clinch, who was trying to persuade the Seminole Indians to leave Florida, informed the Adjutant General:

The more I see of this tribe of Indians the more fully am I convinced that they have not the least intention of fulfilling

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94 In addition to the treaties with the Creeks and Choctaws, the United States had signed treaties with the Seminoles on May 9, 1832, although it was not ratified until Apr. 12, 1834. A treaty had been signed with the Chickasaw on Oct. 20, 1832, Kappler, Indian Affairs, II. 344-45, 356-62.
their treaty stipulations, unless compelled to do so by a stronger force than mere words.\textsuperscript{95}

The General continued his efforts to persuade the Indians to remove throughout the summer. By late October instructions were issued by the War Department to remove the Indians:

\begin{quote}
It is very desirable to accomplish the object of removing the Seminole Indians without the application of actual force. . . . You will of course proceed to embark and remove those first who are willing to go, postponing any decisive course with relation to the refractory ones till the others have set out. My impression is that they will then all peaceably follow.
\end{quote}

In the event that the "refractory" Indians did not peaceably "follow," the Secretary had ordered four additional companies to join Clinch. These companies would bring the number of companies at Clinch's disposal to fourteen, with a strength of 700 men.\textsuperscript{96} In his annual report of November 30, Cass stated that he felt the force under Clinch's command was adequate to enforce the treaty obligations. But by December 9 the situation was changing, and Clinch was authorized to call out one hundred mounted troops from the Florida militia to aid him in his efforts

\textsuperscript{95}Clinch to Adjutant General, Jan. 22, 1835, quoted in Rembert W. Patrick, \textit{Aristocrat in Uniform: General Duncan L. Clinch} (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1963), 77.

\textsuperscript{96}Secretary of War to Clinch, Oct. 22, 1835, SWLS, Roll 14, 304-305.
to remove the Indians. 97

On December 28 any prospect of a peaceful removal was shattered when the Indians attacked and killed the Indian agent, Wiley Thompson, and Lieutenant Constantice Smith outside of Fort King. On the same day a detachment of troops under Major Francis L. Dade was ambushed on the Withlacoochee River. Dade's command was slaughtered: of one hundred and eleven officers and enlisted men only three survived. With these two events the Second Seminole War began and would not be officially declared at an end until August 14, 1842. 98

The beginning of the Seminole War marked the end of an era for the United States Army in the South. By the time the war ended in 1842, the attention of the nation and the Army had shifted to the Trans-Mississippi West. During the war many of the southern posts would be stripped of their garrisons, and after the war the frontier posts were not re-garrisoned. With the removal of the Indians, the old posts were no longer necessary. After the war the Army would be assigned to the coastal fortifications and a few posts in areas with large concentrations of slaves. The passage of the frontier removed the need for a large

97 ASPMA, V, 627; Secretary of War to Clinch, Dec. 9, 1835, Ibid., 368-69.

military force in the South, and the soldiers followed the Indians west across the Mississippi River.
THE UNITED STATES ARMY
IN THE SOUTH, 1789-1835

VOLUME II

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by
Tommy Richard Young II
B.A., DePauw University, 1964
M.A., University of Arkansas, 1966
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CHAPTER VII

FEEBLE EFFORTS TO REFORM THE ARMY

The years between 1789 and 1835 were ones of relative calm, consequently little was expected of the men who joined the United States Army. They were required to render steadfast service in the face of countless hardships but could not hope to receive personal fame or material rewards. In these circumstances, men were reluctant to offer their services to the Federal government without the incentive supplied by a national emergency, and many of those who enlisted were not of the highest caliber. This situation had existed since the American Revolution, but it was not until the late 1820's and the early 1830's that a concerted effort was made to improve the type of men who served in the ranks of the Army. The reforms were directed at the enlisted men and had little effect on the officers. The first reform attempted was one designed to make the Army more American.

The enlisted strength of the Army in peaceful periods was drawn largely from the northeastern cities and at times consisted of a large number of foreigners. Until 1825 there were no restrictions placed upon foreigners
who wished to enlist in the Army. The General Regulations of 1820 stated that "all free male persons, above eighteen and under thirty-five" who were physically fit might enlist. From 1821 through 1823 approximately one quarter of the men who entered the Army were foreign-born and this factor probably prompted the provision in the General Regulations of 1825 that "no foreigner shall be enlisted in the Army without special permission from general headquarters." Probably as a result of this regulation, the number of enlistments dropped in 1825 and 1826. The restriction was removed on August 13, 1828, when it was ordered that all citizens could be accepted for service, without regard to their place of birth.\(^1\)

Although the officers complained about the type of recruits that the Army attracted, little or no improvement could be expected as long as no inducements could be offered that were attractive enough to draw better recruits. The term of service was long; the duties performed were arduous; the hazards to life and limb were many; the chance to advance was limited; many Americans viewed the very existence of the Army with suspicion; the pay was low; and the benefits to be derived

from the service were few. Faced with these uninviting prospects, most Americans were reluctant to enlist. In addition, a large proportion of those who did enlist, deserted before their term of service expired.  

As a result of these circumstances, the actual strength of the Army was rarely equal to that authorized by Congress. Even when the paper strength of the Army was increased by Congressional action to meet specific emergencies, such as the War of 1812, the number of men who entered the Army fell short of the figures required to meet the new quotas. In the early years, the disparity between real and authorized strength lay in both the number of officers and enlisted men on duty. After the War of 1812, when many officers chose to remain in the service and new vacancies in the officers corps were filled with graduates from the Military Academy, the deficiency resulted because the number of enlisted men was lower than authorized by law. This small force of enlisted men performed the bulk of the services and labors executed by the Army.

The men who composed the rank and file of the Army left few written records that reveal any details about themselves or their life in the Army.  

2. See Appendix II.

3. One account, written and published anonymously, by an enlisted man is Recollections of the United States Army. A Series of Thrilling Tales and Sketches (Boston:
extensive body of information available concerning these men was left by their officers and by observers from outside the service. In most cases, the picture of the rank and file that can be drawn from these sources is anything but flattering. The prevailing opinion was probably best summarized in a statement by Surgeon Thomas Henderson, who wrote: "The fact of voluntary enlistment is a warning to the Surgeon that, morally or physically, something may be wrong about the recruit. Too many offer for service who are fit for nothing else. . . ." The attitude adopted by most observers who commented on the character of the peacetime volunteers was that a man who volunteered his services to the nation was fit for nothing else. He simply could not make it in civilian life and sought refuge in the Army.

Surgeon Henderson's assessment was too harsh and did not tell the complete story. An English officer traveling through the United States probably came closer to the truth when he observed:

The great extent of territory in the States, with a scanty population,

James Monroe and Co., 1845), according to a statement by the author the work was written "during a period in 'the service' since 1830." The book presented an unfavorable picture of the Army's officers and the life of the enlisted men.

Thomas Henderson, Hints on the Medical Examination of Recruits for the Army; and on the Discharge of Soldiers from the Service on Surgeon's Certificate, Adapted to the Service of the United States (Philadelphia: Haswell, Barrington, and Haswell, 1840), 20.
causes wages to be high, and provisions are cheap. Generally speaking then, the most worthless characters enter the Army, which consists of a melange of English deserters, Dutch, French, Americans, etc. Five dollars is the monthly pay of a private, and many labourers in the States earn a dollar per day so that it is obvious there is no great inducement to belong to an Army which is held in no estimation by the citizens generally, and has no pension-list or asylum for disabled soldiers.\(^5\)

The condition of the American economy influenced the recruiting efforts of the Army. During the periods of prosperity, most men could find some type of employment that would pay them considerably more than they received for their service in the Army. When periods of recession and depression set it, many found that the prospect of military service was more inviting than when jobs were easy to find. As might be expected, a direct relationship existed between the economic condition of the country and the rate of desertion from the Army. Desertions rose during the periods of prosperity and fell during periods of depression. The same type of correlation appears to exist for other categories, such as enlistments.

\(^5\)"Notes on the Army of the United States of America," Military and Naval Magazine of the United States, I, (Apr., 1833), 97-108. In 1807 an order from the War Department had prohibited the enlistment of British deserters, but it would not have been difficult to evade the regulation and it is safe to assume that British deserters did enlist in the United States Army. The order was issued September 15, 1807 as seen in the Order Book for the Garrison at Fort Johnston, N. C., 1795-1811. Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives).
re-enlistments, joined from desertion, resignations, and the number of recruits required at the posts.\(^6\)

Economic conditions also influenced the difference between the actual and the authorized strength of the Army. During the depression that lasted from 1816 through 1820, the number of officers in the Army was higher than the authorized level in four of the five years. In the middle three years of the same period, the enlisted strength was not substantially below the legal limit and fluctuated only slightly. The next eight years were relatively prosperous, with the exception of three recessions: one in the first half of 1822; a second from mid-1825 to mid-1826; and a third in late 1828 leading to the depression of 1829. During these years, with the single exception of 1824, the number of enlisted men declined in prosperous periods and increased in times of recession and depression. The number of officers in the service remained fairly constant throughout the period, but increased noticeably in 1825 and then sharply in 1829. Economic factors alone cannot fully explain why men chose to join or leave the Army, but

\(^6\)Returns from United States Military Posts, 1800-1916, National Archives Microfilm Publication, M617. Fort Johnston, N. C., Roll 558; Fort Petite Coquille, La., Roll 906; New Orleans, La., Roll 343; Charleston Harbor, S. C., Roll 197; Augusta Arsenal, Ga., Roll 55; Baton Rouge, La., Roll 84; Fort Pike, La., Roll 921; Fort Morgan, Ala., Roll 805; Fort Mitchell, Ala., Roll 785. Hereinafter cited as Post Returns.
it appears that they did influence the men who served or might have considered serving in the Army. 7

The recruiting parties faced not only the task of increasing the size of the Army to its legal limit, but also of matching the rate at which men left the ranks, because of discharge, death, or desertion. The yearly losses from the ranks were such that it required a concerted effort to hold the strength at a constant level. In spite of the fact that the enlisted strength of the Army never equalled the authorized strength, the officers and enlisted men assigned to recruiting duty did a remarkable job in obtaining enough recruits to ensure the continued existence of the Army.

The high number of desertions which occurred annually were a constant drain upon the limited manpower of the Army. The War Department and the officers of the Army were generally at a loss to explain why so many of the men who enlisted subsequently decided to desert. Most of the individuals who ventured an opinion on the subject,

attributed the high desertion rate to the prohibition of flogging as a punishment for the crime by an act of Congress in 1812. Commanding General Jacob Brown wrote in 1824 that there was no "... imaginable cause for the prevalence of desertion, but the inadequacy of the punishment annexed to it by law." 8

On January 25, 1830, Adjutant General Roger Jones reported the number of desertions since 1823; he noted that 1,340 recruits had deserted either from the rendezvous or before they joined their company. Another 2,796 had deserted during their first year, most of these during the first six months. The remaining 1,533 men had deserted during the last four years of their terms. 9 Jones estimated that these 5,669 desertions represented a total loss of $471,263 to the government. 10

The magnitude of the desertion problem is clearly illustrated by comparing the number of men who were either killed or wounded to the number of men who deserted. Between 1789 and 1846 the regular Army was engaged in 163

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9 682 men in the 2d year; 400 men in the 3d year; 263 in the 4th year; and 188 in the 5th. American State Papers, Military Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1836), IV, 287. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.

10 Ibid.
actions in which 2,320 officers and men were killed and another 3,750 wounded.\footnote{11} The 6,070 casualties suffered in combat by the Regulars is just slightly higher than the 5,669 desertions reported in the period from 1823 to 1829.\footnote{12}

The officers seldom mentioned the number of men who "joined from desertion" in their reports. The men who filled this category were those who took advantage of Presidential pardons issued to those deserters who surrendered themselves at any one of the nation's military posts.\footnote{13} From 1823 to 1829, 1,853 men were either apprehended or joined from desertion, and it can be assumed that the majority of these men returned voluntarily since the capture of deserters was extremely difficult. An observer at Fort Mitchell noted that, "whenever a man became tired of his duty, off he went, bag and baggage, and pursuit was hopeless."\footnote{14} The size


\footnote{12}Jones to Macomb, Jan. 25, 1830, communicated to the Senate, Feb. 19, 1830, Ibid.


\footnote{14}ASPMA, IV, 287; Thomas Hamilton, Men and Manners in America (Edinburgh, 1833, 2 volumes), II, 269.
of the United States and the location of its military posts afforded the deserter ample opportunity to hide once he left his assigned station.\textsuperscript{15} Despite the apparent ease with which an escape could be made, a number of deserters decided to return to the Army. However, the rate at which men returned from desertion never approached the rate at which they left the Army.\textsuperscript{16}

Adjutant General Jones was unable to explain the desertions, but he made five recommendations designed to reduce the number.

I. The bounty system as now established by law should be abolished, thereby dispensing with any bounty in hand or previous to two years' faithful service.

II. The term of service should be reduced to four years. The pay of the non-commissioned officers should be increased. One dollar should be added to the monthly pay of the private soldier.

\textsuperscript{15}In an effort to aid in the capture of deserters, rewards were offered. A General Order was issued by the Adjutant and Inspector General's Office on August 4, 1818, that authorized a $30 reward and all reasonable expenses incurred during the apprehension and return of a deserter, the amount of the reward and the expenses were to be deducted from the pay of the deserter. On August 10, 1819, the order was amended so that the $30 reward would include all expenses. Orders of the Adjutant 8th Military Department, 1817-1820, Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives).

\textsuperscript{16}The number of desertions in the period from 1823 to 1829 was 5,669 and the number of men who were either apprehended or joined from desertion was 1,853, which left the Army with a deficit of 3,816 men. ASPMA, IV, 287. At the ten posts surveyed by the author there were 1,584 desertions and 359 men joined from desertion during the same period. Post Returns.
III. Establishment by law, a uniform, certain, and adequate punishment for the crime of desertion.

IV. The absence of too many captains from company duty, the frequent changes in company commanders, and the consequent exercise of command by young, inexperienced officers, who, although otherwise qualified, have not acquired the art of commanding or administering to the comfort of the private soldier.

V. To the foregoing causes maybe added the prevalence of intemperance.17

Commanding General Alexander Macomb was also unable to make any positive statement as to why so many men deserted. He suspected that the excessive use of spirits and the low pay received by the troops were the chief reasons. In an attempt to defend the pay received by the privates, Macomb stated that the pay was not just five dollars a month since there were additional benefits included, such as three dollars for subsistence; two and a half dollars for clothing; fifty cents for fuel; and fifty cents for quarters. According to the General's calculations, the monthly pay for a private was actually twelve dollars.18

A letter from General Edmund P. Gaines in which several recommendations were made concerning the punishments awarded by military courts, accompanied the reports of Adjutant General Jones and General Macomb that were

17 Jones to Macomb, Jan. 25, 1830, ASPMA, IV, 288.
18 Macomb to Eaton, Jan. 29, 1830, communicated to the Senate, Feb. 19, 1830, Ibid., 287.
submitted to the Senate. Gaines was glad that "stripes and lashes" had been prohibited by law, but he objected to several forms of punishment still employed by the Army, and felt that they should be abolished.

He specifically mentioned:

I. Branding, marking with durable ink, and all such inflictions as tend durably to cripple or mutilate the offenders.

II. An iron collar, a ball and chain, and with either or these attached to the neck, leg or other part of the offender, for him to perform hard labor in public, or otherwise, except in solitary cells.

III. Shaving the head, putting a straw around the neck of the offender, or requiring him to stand upon a barrel, etc., etc. 19

The General suggested the elimination of these punishments because they did little to improve the discipline of the troops. In lieu of the objectionable practices, he recommended the establishment of a uniform system that stipulated specific punishments for specific crimes. He suggested four types of punishments that might be used as guidelines in drawing up such a system:

I. Punishment of death, or from 39 to 100 lashes, might be prescribed for the crimes of desertion, cowardice, or mutiny.

II. From 10 to 50 lashes for drunkenness or for stealing.

III. From one to 30 days' solitary confinement to hard labor on bread and

water for some two or three of the above crimes, and for the most aggravated of the minor offences.

IV. Fines, not to exceed one half the pay of the offender for one to six months, in part for anyone of the above offences as may in the opinion of the court, require a small fine.20

Gaines hastened to point out that these penalties were to be awarded only by a general court martial and solely for the crimes of desertion, cowardice, mutiny, habitual drunkenness, and stealing. The General stated that these penalties would not be considered any more stringent than the penalty of death or hard labor for crimes, such as piracy, robbery, forgery, or perjury in a society that considered these capital offences. He did not believe that such a system of punishments would hinder the Army's efforts to recruit good men. It would encourage them to join "... as without this kind of punishment the best of men are obliged to watch and labor whilst the worst of them sleep under guard."21

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid. In addition to these recommendations, in an earlier report, Gaines had given other examples of punishments employed at some of the military posts. "Hard labor with ball and chain attached to his leg, to wear around his neck an iron yoke of 10 pounds weight, having two arms extending from the neck 10 inches, to be marked on the hip with the word deserter an inch long. ... To be marked on the right hip with the word Mutiny and on the left with the word Deserter. ... To be marked on the right forearm and right hip with the word "deserter," and on the left forearm and left hip with the word "Fraud," to wear an iron collar with four projecting arms, to have his head shaved, be drummed out of service with straw halter. ... To stand on the head of
General Gaines attributed the high rate of desertion to the intemperate habits of many of the soldiers and recommended that the whiskey ration be abolished. As an additional measure to reduce desertions, he suggested that the pay of the enlisted men be increased, especially of the non-commissioned officers. The General offered the opinion that with a population of twelve million the United States should be able to maintain an Army with the strength of 1,000 men for every million citizens. While maintaining such a force, the nation should be able to pay wages to its soldiers equal to those paid by private individuals to their employees. Finally, he suggested that the period of enlistment be reduced from five to three years.22

In his report to the Senate, Secretary of War John Eaton supported the conclusions of his officers. He added one factor which they had not considered when he suggested that the limited opportunities for advancement open to enlisted men greatly influenced the type of recruits attracted by the Army. Because of established practice, although not by law, the graduates of West Point had the exclusive privilege of becoming officers. The

a barrel, with a 24 pound shot on his back, every alternate two hours for fifteen days from sunrise to sunset. ... " These punishments were awarded in 1829. Inspection Reports, 1825-1829, Serial 1, Vol. 2, 225-28, Inspector General, Record Group 159 (National Archives). Gaines' italics.

22 ASPMA, IV, 290-91.
consequences of this system were that any hope of advancement, based on loyal and meritorious service, was futile. The enlisted man knew that no matter how diligently he worked and how proficient he became, he could not advance beyond the rank of sergeant. Eaton believed that if this practice was altered in some way, better recruits might be enlisted.\(^{23}\)

The Secretary felt that there was an urgent need to place the Army "on a more respectable footing." To accomplish this goal, it was necessary to improve the image of the Army and to remove the "opinion of inferiority attached to this service" by the people. If this was done, the soldiers might regain some of the self-respect that should be attached to their service in the Army. To achieve this object, the enlistment of men with "intemperate habits and of dissolute character" should not be allowed, since association with such men caused men with better characters to lose some of their pride. If higher self-respect and honorable incentive were not produced, the problems would continue to exist in the Army. He cautioned that "partial remedies are mere palliatives and cannot answer any permanent good."\(^{24}\)

To further the reform efforts, Secretary Eaton believed that a new law establishing new penalties for

\(^{23}\)Ibid., 285.

\(^{24}\)Ibid.
desertion was necessary. He warned the members of the Senate that the law must receive the sanction of the people in order to be truly effective:

Popular opinion, in the absence of War, is not with the existing law for the punishment of desertion. In time of peace, public opinion turns with abhorrence from the severity of the penalty, and renders the law a dead letter on the statute book. Milder punishments should be resorted to, carrying with them a more appropriate and certain effect. 25

Secretary of War Eaton, Generals Macomb and Gaines and Colonel Jones all agreed that some type of reform was necessary to improve the Army and they agreed on the essential areas that required attention: something had to be done to reduce the number of desertions that drained the limited strength of the Army; the term of service should be reduced from five years to either three or four years; the punishments awarded by military courts should conform more closely to the nature of the crime committed in order to make them effective; the pay of the enlisted men should be increased to enable the Army to compete more effectively with civilian employers; and most importantly, the ration of whiskey issued to the men should be discontinued, and additional efforts made to curtail the intemperate habits of the soldiers.

25 Ibid.
These reforms, recommended in 1830, were directed toward solving problems that had plagued the Army and hindered its operations since the early days of its existence. Although they agreed in general as to what needed to be done, specific reforms would be difficult to achieve. Some problems could be eliminated simply by an order from the War Department, others required Congressional action, and some virtually defied solution.

The easiest of the recommended reforms to accomplish was the abolition of the daily whiskey ration. Whiskey or some other type of alcoholic beverage had been an integral part of the soldier's ration since the American Revolution. Throughout the period, officers had accused the soldiers of drunkenness, and civilians had criticised the intemperate habits of the men.26

Whether the Army whiskey ration should be continued or not received extensive consideration in 1829

26 It is necessary to read only a few of the garrison and departmental order books, which contain the charges brought against the soldiers and the results of the courts martial conducted at the various posts, to find that most of the trials were the result of too much consumption of alcohol on the part of the soldiers. For example see: Letters Sent 8th Military Department, May, 1817 - May, 1821; Orderly Book for the Garrison at Ft. Johnston, N. C., 1795-1811; General Orders, Southern Department, 1812; Orders Garrison of New Orleans, 1806-1812, all in Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives); Letters Sent Western Department, 1821-1835, Vols. I-VII, Records of the United States Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD. Letters Sent Headquarters of the Army, 1828-1833, Vol. I-II Headquarters of the Army, Record Group 108 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSHQA.
and 1830. During this period a number of reports were submitted to the House of Representatives concerning its beneficial and adverse effects, and various suggestions were advanced to control the use of whiskey by the soldiers.

In late January 1829, Secretary of War Peter B. Porter communicated reports on the effect of the whiskey ration to the House of Representatives from the Commanding General and the Commissary General of Subsistence. Porter summarized the opinions contained in the reports:

1st - That the habitual use of ardent spirits, in moderate quantities, is unfavorable to health; and that the chances for health, vigor, and protracted life, in favor of an individual who finds it convenient wholly to abstain from them, are generally greater than of him who indulges.

2nd - That the use of so small a quantity as one gill a day, taken at proper times, will not seriously impair the constitution or diminish the health of a man who pursues laborious or active employments.

3rd - That a sudden and total abandonment of the practice by one who has been long accustomed to the free use of ardent spirits will diminish his vigor, and possible injure rather than improve his health and constitution; and

4th - That the evils of intemperance in our Army arise not so much from the moderate allowance of spirits made to the soldiers by the government and its officers, as from the excessive quantities procured by other means.  

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27 Porter to Stevenson, Jan. 31, 1829, ASPMA, IV, 93. In 1830 one gill of whiskey a day was allotted to
These four propositions set the tone of the opinions delivered by the officers of the Army who submitted reports on the subject in 1829 and 1830. The amount of the whiskey ration was not considered to be excessive. Porter ventured the opinion that in the United States there was not one man in four, among the laboring class, who did not drink more than one gill a day, and it was from this class that the members of the Army were recruited. In addition, the ration was believed to be beneficial, because it stimulated the digestive process, something the soldiers required because their diet consisted primarily of foods that were dry and solid.

Secretary Porter, and the officers who submitted opinions, laid the blame for drunkenness upon the illegal sale of whiskey to the soldiers by civilians. This

each man and it was usually issued in equal parts twice a day. An additional quantity, either a half or a full gill, was normally issued to those soldiers who were assigned to fatigue duty. It was the individual soldier's choice as to whether or not he drew his daily ration. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to answer several important questions concerning the ration, for instance: how many men drew the whiskey ration for personal consumption; how many men received the ration in order to pass it on to fellow soldiers; what proportion did not draw their ration; and how consistently did each man draw his daily ration? Despite these questions, a number of officers had expressed the opinion that the whiskey given to the men as a part of their ration was not the actual source of the problem. On March 16, 1802, the whiskey ration was increased from one half to a full gill. J. F. Callan, The Military Laws of the United States (Philadelphia: G. W. Childs, 1964), 141-49.

Porter to Stevenson, Jan. 31, 1829, ASPMA, IV, 83.
practice had not been stopped because the civilians who made the sales were not liable to any sort of penalty in most of the states, whereas the soldier who purchased additional whiskey without permission was subject to severe punishment. To correct this situation, Porter suggested that the House of Representatives pass a resolution recommending that the states enact laws that would provide for the punishment of citizens who sold alcoholic beverages to soldiers.29

Porter observed that there was probably a higher proportion of individuals in the Army addicted to the excessive use of liquor than was to be found in other occupations. This fact arose from the Army's practice of enlisting confirmed drunkards. The Secretary defended the whiskey ration for the vast majority of the men in the Army who were not drunkards, but were men who "exhibit examples of as pure integrity, as correct habits, as ardent love of their country and zeal for its defense"

29Ibid., 83-84. In some cases the Army attempted to punish those individuals who were illegally selling liquor to soldiers. For example, in 1798 a Spanish subject, Martias Agustin, was found guilty by a court martial of selling taffia to soldiers without a permit. He was sentenced to receive one hundred lashes and to be drummed out of camp with two bottles suspended from his neck. General Wilkinson approved the sentence and then remitted all punishment, except his removal from camp. He justified his action on the basis of the amicable relations that existed between Spain and the United States. General Order, Nov. 19, 1798, Wilkinson's Book of General Orders, 1797-1808, National Archives Microfilm Publication, M654.
as might be discovered in the best of society. He stated:

To interdict such men the use of that which, if not a necessary, is deemed one of the comforts of life, and which is forbidden to no other persons but convicts, would be stamping them with a mark of degradation more injurious, it is believed, and debasing to their moral sense, than would follow from the most unrestrained license for its use.30

Surgeon General Joseph Lovell stated in his report that more ill effects might result from the abolition of the ration among men who were accustomed to receiving it, than the evils produced by the drinking. He speculated that the men who were inclined to drink too heavily would continue to do so even if the ration were stopped. The gill of whiskey that was issued was only a small quantity and the heavy drinkers would be willing to pay any price in order to obtain an adequate supply from other sources. The ending of the ration would produce great dissatisfaction among the men and would not stop those individuals who drank excessively.

Lovell pointed out that there were only three ways in which a soldier might acquire ardent spirits; from his ration; from the sutler on written permission from his commanding officer; and from the civilians who "infest almost every military post." He felt that if the civilian dealers could be controlled, intemperance would cease to be

30Ibid., 84.
a problem. He stated that only one state provided any penalty whatsoever for illegal liquor sales to soldiers and recommended that the other states be requested to establish similar laws. In his opinion, all of the suggestions for solving the problem of intemperance were useless as long as the Army continued the practice of enlisting new soldiers and re-enlisting others who were known to be drunkards.31

In 1830, at the request of the House Committee on Military Affairs, Secretary of War Eaton, General Macomb and Colonel George Gibson, Commissary General of Subsistence, submitted reports on the influence of alcohol on the members of the Army. Secretary Eaton's report served to reinforce the opinions rendered the previous year by Secretary Porter. Eaton wrote:

> It is not the allowance made by the government to the soldier which produces his intemperance; the quantity is too small. It is occasioned by supplies of ardent spirits obtained from citizens, and which no vigilance heretofore practised at posts, has been sufficient to prevent.32

The resolution prompting the reports from the three officials had directed the Committee on Military Affairs to study the feasibility of a plan to induce the soldiers and sailors to voluntarily relinquish the whiskey

31 Lowell to Porter, Jan. 26, 1829, Ibid., 85.

32 Eaton to Andrew Stevenson, Jan. 12, 1830, House Document #22 (21st Congress, 1st Session), Serial #195.
ration. The inducement to be offered was a cash payment, equal to the value of the ration given up by the men, to be made at the expiration of the term of enlistment. To encourage sober and orderly conduct, it was suggested that the payment of an extra bounty, either in money, clothing, or both, be made to those men who could produce a statement, signed by their commanding officer, attesting to their good conduct and total abstinence during their term of service.

General Macomb felt that nothing had done "so much to degrade the rank and file of the Army, as the excessive use of ardent spirits nor has it been less destructive of their health and discipline." He stated that he would welcome any plan which would eliminate the problem. Macomb suggested that the whiskey ration be stopped, and in its place the soldiers be issued a portion of rice and molasses. The General believed that a bounty paid at the time of discharge would be a valuable incentive to good behavior and abstinence. The bounty should consist of one dollar for each month of service to each non-commissioned officer, musician, artificer, and private who could produce a certificate from his commanding officer attesting to his total abstinence and good conduct during his period of service.\(^\text{33}\)

\(^{33}\)Macomb to Eaton, Jan. 11, 1830, \textit{Ibid.}
George Gibson agreed that something should be done, but he was sceptical of the success that might be achieved by any voluntary system that would pay the soldiers a bounty. His scepticism was a result of the efforts to establish a similar system in 1820. At that time he had sent a circular letter to the fifty-six Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence at all of the military posts informing them that Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and he wished to end the whiskey ration. The plan was to be voluntary and the men would receive a cash compensation, equivalent to the value of the ration. The payments were to be made either monthly or quarterly, at the option of the commanding officer, who was to appoint an officer to make the payments to the troops. The plan was adopted at some posts and completely rejected at others. The new system was continued at the posts where it was adopted until the determination was made that the plan was "entirely of non-effect."

As an alternative to the bounty system, Gibson recommended a plan which he had suggested the previous year when the House had considered the subject of the whiskey ration. He felt that this plan would adequately solve the problem of drinking among the soldiers and he strongly advised the Representatives to consider the proposal.\(^{34}\)

\(^{34}\)Gibson to Eaton, Jan. 6, 1830, Ibid. Also in
On January 26, 1829, Gibson had informed the Secretary of War that he could not think of any beneficial effects of the whiskey issue nor did he feel that any were likely to result. On the other hand, he could not think of any great evil that might arise from the issuance of the small amount of whiskey that made up the ration. He concluded:

The most unhappy and pernicious effects of spirituous liquors to the Army result from its being clandestantly supplied by citizens; nor can this be totally prevented, but might be in a very great measure arrested, by inducing the states to enact laws prohibiting persons selling ardent spirits to soldiers, under the penalty of levying fines, recoverable before a Justice of the Peace, one half of said fines to be applied to the use of the State, and the other half to the person giving the information. . . .

Could this be efficiently done, there

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ASPMA, IV, 86. For the 1820 circular see Gibson to 56 Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence, Aug. 10, 1820, Records of the Office of the Commissary of Subsistence, Letters Sent, 1818-1820, Commissary General of Subsistence, Record Group 192 (National Archives). Calhoun had strongly recommended the abolition of the whiskey ration in 1818. He wrote that "the spirits ought to be placed in depot, and be issued occasionally under the discretion of the Commander. Thus used, its noxious effects would be avoided, and the troops, when great effects were necessary, would, by a judicious use, derive important benefits from it. Molasses, beer, and cider according to circumstances, might be used as substitutes." Calhoun to House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 1818, ASPMA, IV, 781. In 1803 an effort had been made to substitute beer and light wines for whiskey, rum or brandy. If a majority of the troops at a post agreed, the commander could substitute malt liquor for spirits during the period from May to October. The attempt was a dismal failure. Dearborn to Freeman, et. al., June 17, 1803, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
is no doubt that the deleterious effects of the use of spirituous liquors by the Army would cease, as regards the health, morals, and discipline of the soldiers.\textsuperscript{35}

On January 14, 1830, the reports were sent to the House of Representatives and read before that body. After the initial reading they were laid upon the table without any action being taken on any of the recommendations. On February 8, 1830, the Commissary General of Subsistence informed the House of Representatives that any plan to abolish the whiskey ration and substitute a ration of coffee and sugar would require approximately $21,900 a year in additional funds. He based his estimate upon the cost of the rations at all posts, one cent for whiskey and two cents for coffee and sugar.\textsuperscript{36} No further action was taken by Congress on the subject of the whiskey ration after Gibson submitted his report in February. However, in December of 1830 the whiskey ration was abolished in the Army.

\textsuperscript{35}Gibson to Porter, Jan. 26, 1829, House Document #22 (21st Congress, 1st Session), Serial #195.

\textsuperscript{36}Gibson to House of Representatives, Feb. 8, 1830, \textit{ASPMA}, IV, 275-76. Based upon Gibson's figures, the Army had issued 2,190,000 gills of whiskey for the period upon which he had based his estimate, or a total of 68,437 gallons. The reported strength of the Army in 1829 was 5,332 officers and enlisted men, if each man had drawn one ration per day, 2,311,180 gills should have been issued. If some men drew an extra half gill or full gill it is apparent that some men did not draw their ration each day. Gibson's calculations were fairly accurate, Secretary of War Lewis Cass reported that the Army issued 72,537 gallons of whiskey to the soldiers in 1830 at a cost of $22,132. \textit{Ibid.}, 709.
Order Number 72, issued by the Adjutant General's office on December 8, 1830, promulgated a new regulation that prohibited the whiskey ration. Under the new regulation, soldiers would receive cash payments to compensate them for the loss of the ration. The system of payments proved to be unsatisfactory and in November of 1832 a regulation was established by the War Department that abolished it and substituted the issuance of eight pounds of sugar and four pounds of coffee for every one hundred rations. Men who were engaged in activities such as building fortifications, cutting roads, making surveys and other types of manual labor for a period of not less than ten days would still receive one gill of whiskey each day, or at their own option, one cent per ration. The whiskey ration was permanently eliminated by legislative action in 1838. This step was apparently taken to prevent any future President from restoring the ration by executive order.

In abolishing the whiskey portion of the ration,

37 Order Number 72, Dec. 8, 1830, War Department General Orders. Order Number 100, Nov. 5, 1832, War Department General Orders.

38 Regulations for the Subsistence Department of the Army (Washington: Blair and Rivers, 1835), 10.

39 "Classics of Alcohol Literature. Early Medical and Official Views on Rations of Spirits in the Army and Navy of the United States," Quarterly Journal of Studies of Alcohol, IV (Mar., 1944), 606-34. The whiskey ration for seamen was not abolished until 1862.
the War Department was making a feeble effort to solve a serious problem. It was a step that few of the officers believed would actually eliminate any of the drunkenness among the soldiers. The real source of the problem, the sale of spirits to the soldiers by civilians, was ignored by the order. It would be a safe assumption that without strict regulation of the liquor trade in the vicinity of Army posts, those soldiers who were inclined to drink heavily before the whiskey ration was abolished would continue to do so as long as they were able to obtain an adequate supply from other sources.40

Congress had taken no action on the subject of the whiskey ration and it delayed any action on higher pay until 1833. In March "An act to improve the condition of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the Army and Marine Corps of the United States, and to prevent desertion" was passed by Congress and signed by President Jackson. The law incorporated many of the recommendations made in 1829 and 1830. It shortened the term of enlistment to three years and raised the pay of all enlisted men.

40One possible solution to the drinking of the soldiers was to isolate them from the temptation. W. C. C. Claiborne, Governor of the Mississippi Territory, justified the purchase of forty-one acres of land for the site of Fort Dearborn because it would "prevent the citizens from erecting tippling houses immediately in the vicinity of the fort, which invariably produces irregularities among the troops." Claiborne to Dearborn, Feb. 15, 1803, Dunbar Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1806 (Jackson: Mississippi State Department of Archives and History, 1917), I, 268-69.
According to the provisions of the act, musicians and privates would receive six dollars a month, one dollar of which was to be retained by the Army during the first two years of service. The soldiers would receive the retained portion of their pay at the conclusion of the two year period, provided they had served faithfully during that portion of their enlistment. The musicians and privates who decided to re-enlist, either two months before or one month after their term expired, would receive two months extra pay in addition to the pay and allowances due them from the unexpired term. The men who re-enlisted would receive their full six dollars a month without any temporary deductions.

The act also abolished premiums paid to officers for enlisting new men and the bounties paid to new recruits. It further stipulated that no person who had been convicted of a criminal act was to be enlisted by recruiting officers. Finally, the act restored the penalty of whipping for those men who were convicted of desertion by a general court martial.\(^4\)

\[^4\] U. S. Statutes at Large, IV, 647-48. The pay of the other enlisted members was: to each Sergeant Major, quartermaster sergeant, and chief musician, $16; to the 1st Sergeant of a company, $15; to all other Sergeants, $12; to each artificer, $10; to each corporal, $8. It is interesting to note that the pay for a marine was one dollar more than to a member of the Army of equal rank. Also see Regulations of the Army, Mar. 23, 1833, Adjutant General's Office, this regulation explained the new system of enlistments and pay.
Independently of the legislative action of 1833 designed to upgrade the caliber of enlisted men, the War Department issued regulations for the conduct of the Medical Department and the Recruiting Service, in 1832 and 1834 respectively. These two sets of regulations had previously been included in the General Regulations of the Army, and now they were expanded to make them more comprehensive and issued separately to the officers of the two services. 42

42 Regulations for the Medical Department of the Army (Washington: Charles H. Barron, 1832). Regulations for the Recruiting Service of the Army of the United States. (Washington: Francis Preston Blair, 1834). The Checklist of United States Public Documents, 1739-1909 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917), I, lists each of these two publications as the earliest for each of the branches, the recruiting service is surveyed on page 1244 and the medical department on page 1388. The earlier volumes of General Regulations for the Army contain the regulations for the two branches, for example, see Regulations for the years 1808, 1812, 1813, 1814, 1816, 1820, 1825. A discussion of the General Regulations is contained in G. Norman Lieber, Remarks on the Army Regulations and Executive Regulations in General (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895). In addition to the regulations for the Medical Department and the Recruiting Department various other manuals and regulations were published for the guidance of members of the Army between 1827 and 1841. For example: Regulations for the Subsistence Department of the Army (Washington: Blair and Rives, 1833); Abstract of Infantry Tactics; Including Exercises and Maneuvers of Light Infantry and Riflemen; for the Use of the Militia of the United States (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little and Watkins, 1830); Rules and Regulations for the Government of the Mounted Rangers (Washington, 1832); A System of Exercise and Instruction of Field-Artillery Including Manueuvres for Light or Horse Artillery (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little, and Watkins, 1829); System of Accountability for Clothing and Camp Equipage Issued to the Army of the United States (Washington: James C. Dunn, 1827); Regulations for the Government of...
The regulations were designed to ensure the enlistment of healthy men and the continuation of that good health after they entered the Army. Surgeons and assistant surgeons were to eliminate men carried on the muster rolls who were medically unfit for service. They were to inspect the rations issued to the soldiers and the living quarters and sanitary conditions at the military posts with a view to determining whether the General Regulations pertaining to these subjects were being observed by the officers and men. These precautions were to be emphasized so that the health of the men did not suffer from causes that could be corrected.43


43 Regulations for the Medical Department of the Army, passim. Just how effective the regulations were might be seriously questioned, if the letter from the Assistant Adjutant General of the Western Department, A. Miller, is an example of what actually happened. Miller informed Lieutenant Colonel William S. Foster, commanding officer at Baton Rouge, that "Private George Simpson should be examined by the Surgeon, on whose certificate he maybe discharged should his short leg contribute to render him less efficient than he otherwise would be." Miller to Foster, Mar. 15, 1833, LSWD,
The regulations concerning the recruiting service required that each recruit receive four physical examinations before being permanently assigned to a company. It was expected that any individual who was physically unfit would be eliminated at one of the examinations. To avoid any laxity in the examination process, the regulations provided that the expense of any bounty and clothing which the recruit might have received from the government was to be deducted from the pay of any officers and surgeons who had not observed the recruiting regulations.

The regulations provided:

Medical officers, who's duty it maybe to examine recruits, will be particular in causing each recruit to be stripped of all his clothes, and to be made to move about and exercise his limbs in their presence, in order to ascertain whether he has the free use of them; that his hearing and vision are perfect; that he has no tumors, ulcerated legs, rupture, or chronic cutaneous affections, or other infirmity a disorder which may

IV. That such a case should be called to the attention of the Department Commander, in light of the Army Regulations, reveals a decided unwillingness on the part of officers and surgeons to make decisions, even when authorized to do so.

Regulations for the Recruiting Service of the Army of the United States, 12. The recruits were to be examined at the following times: upon being recruited; three days after their arrival at the general depot; before leaving the depot for their assigned stations; and four days after their arrival at their permanent station.
render him unfit for the active duties of a soldier, or be the means of introducing disease into the Army; and it shall be their duty to ascertain, as far as practicable, whether the recruit is an habitual drunkard, or subject to convulsions of any kind, or has received any contusions or wounds in the head which produce occasional insanity. 45

A recruit was to be rejected as unfit if any of the negative conditions were found to exist. The surgeon was to determine if the acceptable men should be vaccinated, and if so, it was to be done as soon as possible.

The overall results of the reform efforts of the War Department and Congress in the early 1830's are difficult to assess. However, on November 28, 1834, Commanding General Macomb was able to state in his annual report:

The character of the soldiery is evidently improving. The law for bettering the condition of the rank and file seems to have already produced the most beneficial results. The vice of drunkenness has diminished, and with it desertion and other crimes, while at the same time better men enlist. 46

In addition to the improvements noted by General Macomb, the Adjutant General reported that enlistments from January 1 to September 20, 1834, numbered 2,111 and that an additional 335 men had re-enlisted and would receive two months extra pay. He estimated that 507 additional recruits

would be needed to fill the ranks by December 31. 47 The reported strength of the Army at the end of 1834 was 7,030 only slightly below the 7,194 men authorized by Congress in 1833. 48 The increase in the number of enlistments was probably only temporary, because in the first three quarters of 1835 the number of recruits dropped to 1,590. 49 The strength of the Army at the end of the year was 7,337, or 143 more than authorized by law. The increase in the size of the Army during the last quarter was in all likelihood unrelated to any policy of the Army, but was a result of the warfare that marked the beginning of the Second Seminole War. 50

The November 1833 issue of The Military and Naval Magazine of the United States carried a letter to the editor which touched off a brief but heated discussion of the monthly pay of privates. From the letters that were published, purported to have been written by privates, it is

47 Ibid., 371-72.

48 The actual strength of the Army is available in U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960). Hereinafter cited as Historical Statistics. The authorized strength is available in Historical Register, II, 560-85, and in the annual reports of the Secretary of War in the ASPMA, I-VII.


50 Historical Statistics, 737.
evident that their authors did not believe that the six dollars a month granted by Congress in March was sufficient to meet the needs of the soldiers. It is impossible to determine if their feelings reflected those of their fellow privates, but if the figures presented had any validity, it is probable that the men were not impressed with the new pay scale.

One critic wrote that there were certain "immediate and indispensible expenses" incurred by the soldiers, in addition to those allowed by the government. The extra expenses included such items as washing; wear and tear on mess furniture; pipe clay, etc.; entertaining visiting soldiers; beer; coffee; contributions for paints, towels; and the making and preservation of a seine. These items cost the soldier five dollars and thirty-five cents each month and when deducted from his monthly salary left him with a cash payment of sixty-five cents. The author calculated that a prudent soldier would be able to retire at the conclusion of ten years of honorable service with savings totaling seventy-two dollars. Given these circumstances, he seriously questioned whether the United States would ever have an efficient Army.  

51 The soldier broke down the monthly expenses as follows: washing, 75¢; wear and tear of mess furniture, 25¢; entertaining visiting soldiers, 25¢; beer from the sutler, $2.50; coffee, 75¢; contribution of making and preservation of seine, 25¢; contribution for paints, purchase of towels and other articles, 25¢; total per month, $5.35. Letter to the editor, The Military and Naval
In his remarks on the soldier's letter, the editor of the magazine stated that "the private soldier is as much entitled to a hearing as the General Officer, and he shall have one." He then proceeded to lower the estimate by eliminating those items he considered unnecessary and those supplied by the government. He disposed of the following items: beer as "a very unnecessary and therefore useless expense"; mess furniture since it was provided either by the government or from a company fund; and coffee because it was a component part of the ration. He agreed that the expense of the seine was not proper, but pointed out that if any fish were caught, the soldier could save his meat ration which was worth more than the cost of the seine. The calculations of the editor revealed that the individual soldier was required to pay only two dollars for his maintenance each month instead of five dollars and thirty-five cents. The editor stated that his estimate was too high and he had been assured by officers "well informed on the subject" that one dollar was sufficient for the soldier to purchase all of the necessary items not supplied by the government. 52

In January the privates' point of view was further expounded upon in a letter signed simply "Wayne". He

52 Ibid.

wrote that the private soldiers were grateful to the magazine for giving them a forum from which to express their opinions, because "there are many little occurrences happening every day, which it is of consequence for the good of the Army that they should be made public; and which are known among the privates, but unknown to the officers." 53

Wayne's calculations yielded a slightly lower sum than the one given in the first letter. Despite the lower total, his list of articles purchased was more inclusive. He estimated that each month he was required to pay four dollars and fifty-six cents, or fifty-four dollars and seventy-two cents a year, for the articles not allowed by the Government. 54 He concluded that after the deductions were made from his pay, he would receive one dollar and forty-four cents a month, or seventeen dollars and twenty-eight cents a year.

Wayne agreed that some of the articles on his  


54 The itemized list included: 3 extra pair of shoes, at $1.50 each, 37¢ a month; 3 extra shirts, at 87¢ each, 21¢ a month; repairing shoes, 29¢; repairing clothes, 18¢; utensils for shaving, 12¢; blacking, brushes, etc. for shoes, 12¢; washing clothes, 50¢; sugar and coffee, 37¢; brooms for company rooms, 6¢; tobacco, 12¢; rotten stone and whiting for belts, 18¢; mess furniture, plates, etc., 6¢; postage on letters (25¢ each letter), 6¢ a month; 2 extra pairs of stockings per year, 6¢ per month; beer, 1 pint per day at 6¢ a pint, $1.80. Ibid.
list, specifically beer, tobacco, sugar and coffee, were considered useless luxuries by some individuals. However, he justified each item on the basis that: a pint of beer after a hard day's work was beneficial to the soldier and perhaps even essential; tobacco, to the soldier who was accustomed to its use might suffer serious injury as a result of not having it; and sugar and coffee were necessary because the amount issued to the soldiers was insufficient to meet their needs. All of the remaining articles were listed at the lowest price and were indispensible to the private soldier. In addition to the items on the list, there were other articles that were necessary to maintain a soldierly appearance that were not included which would have raised the figure still higher.55

In addition to the statements concerning the pay of enlisted men, Wayne illustrated the inequality that existed between the men who had enlisted before and after the provisions of the "Act to improve the condition of the non-commissioned officers and privates" were implemented. He cited the example of two men in his company, one of whom had enlisted on March 1 and the other on March 4. Both men had sworn to serve for five years, but because of the provision in the act that stipulated

55 He specifically mentioned button sticks and clothes brushes. Ibid., 295.
that those who enlisted after March 2 would serve only three years, the second private's turn was shortened by two years. Also, he would receive six dollars a month for the three years, whereas the first soldier would receive five dollars a month for two years and then six dollars a month for the remaining three years.

Wayne stated that many of the soldiers he knew were dissatisfied with the new system because they had already served from twelve to eighteen months of their enlistments and the new recruits who joined the company not only received higher pay but would be discharged before the older soldiers. He declared that if the purpose of the law was to put all of the men on an equal footing, it had failed. The new regulations had served only to arouse considerable discontent among the soldiers. He closed his letter with the plea that "notice will be given of these few facts, and the grievances remedied, so that we poor soldiers may at all events be contented."\(^{56}\)

Two letters appeared in the next issue of the magazine, one supporting and one attacking the position taken by the privates. An officer who claimed to have "grown up with the service" rejoiced that the privates had called public attention to the amount of their pay. He wrote to support the author of the November letter

\(^{56}\)Ibid., 296.
and to refute the editor's remarks that had accompanied that letter. He believed that a careful reading of the letter could not "fail to throw light on the matter, and enable the world to understand in what manner our Government makes provisions for its defenders, and what inducements are held out to her citizens to enroll themselves under her banners."\(^{57}\)

Just as the first two writers had presented lists of items and their costs to justify their arguments, the officer presented a third list which he felt was applicable at most of the garrisons throughout the country. His list of necessary items yielded a total cost of three dollars and thirty cents a month, which left the soldier with a balance of two dollars and seventy cents on payday. He calculated that this would allow the soldier to retire at the end of ten years with savings amounting to $324 and if he did not use beer he could accumulate $547.20.\(^{58}\)

When he justified the articles on his list, the


\(^{58}\)The items and their cost per month were: washing, 50¢; wear and tear of mess furniture, 6 1/4¢; pipe clay, whiting, black varnish, etc., 6 1/4¢; entertaining visiting soldiers, no charge; beer, 1 pint per day at 6 1/4¢, $1.36; coffee, sugar, tea, 50¢; contribution for seine, 25¢; contribution of towels, etc., 6 1/4¢. *Ibid.*
officer made some candid statements about the items supplied by the government. He indicated that mess furniture was not furnished by the government or from a "post fund." Although the Quartermaster Department did furnish mess pans and camp kettles, they were "but seldom, if ever, used for culinary purposes, being unsuitable for it." Such items as knives, forks, plates, glasses and other utensils were normally acquired either by a contribution or from a company fund, if such were available. The soldiers should be furnished with whiting and the other items necessary to keep his arms and accouterments in proper order. The assessment for entertaining visiting soldiers at posts was eliminated by the officer since it was not accepted at any of the garrisons.

With respect to the expense of coffee, sugar, and tea he wrote:

The Army regulations contemplate but two meals, viz; breakfast and dinner. To enable the men to have the third meal, they are permitted to purchase the articles for that purpose. The small rations furnished them, being found inadequate. 59

The officer indicated that since the location of his post provided good fishing, he had assessed each of his men twenty-five cents for the purpose of making and maintaining a seine. In the first year the catch was large enough that the surplus was sold and the men received

59Ibid., 382.
a return on their investment in the seine amounting to approximately 400 per cent. Although the catch earned the soldiers additional money, the fish obtained by using the seine did not save the regular rations as had been implied by the editor. The officer stated:

There are no "surplus provisions and flour saved in serving our rations," or "re-bought by the Government." Rations always fall short of the normal weight and measure. But should there, at any time, be a surplus, it reverts to the Subsistence Department."

The officer believed that neither the pay of the soldiers nor their rations were adequate. The officer's opinions were directly opposed to those of the author of the second letter, who called himself "an old soldier."

The old soldier took upon himself the task of answering some of Wayne's complaints. He attributed Wayne's discontent to the fact that "the government are so illiberal as not to furnish him "beer and tobacco."

The basis of his argument was that while the soldiers did not receive these articles in kind, he was afforded "ample means" of obtaining them without drawing upon his pay proper. The "ample means" provided him was the clothing allotted to him by the government but not drawn by the individual. Drawing upon his own experiences, the old soldier related that when a man's clothing account was

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60 Ibid. Officer's italics.
settled at the expiration of his term of service, he received more money from this source than from his pay. Now that the clothing accounts were settled periodically, he was certain that it would be an "improvident man who did not receive enough money to provide his beer and tobacco, from the liberality of the government in so abundantly clothing him."^61

The old soldier evidently believed that Wayne was fomenting discontent among the members of the Army:

It is to be regretted, that a man who can wield his pen so well as "Wayne", instead of devoting it to the instruction and improvement of his less fortunate comrades, to the repression of discontent and the excitement of emulation, should prostitute it to the making of unfair (at least) statements, calculated to produce uneasiness and dissatisfaction in those not so well informed,

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^61 The clothing allotment was altered when the period of enlistment was changed from five to three years. The allowance for five years was: 3 uniform coats complete; 4 cotton jackets; 4 woolen jackets; 20 pairs of boots; 10 flannel shirts; 10 cotton shirts; 20 pair of stockings; 2 leather stocks; 1 great coat; 3 blankets; 1 forage cap; 10 pair woolen overalls; 15 pair cotton overalls; 6 pair of drawers, and 1 hat complete. The allowance for three years was: 2 uniform coats complete, 3 cotton jackets; 2 woolen jackets; 9 pair of boots; 6 flannel shirts; 6 cotton shirts; 9 pair pair of stockings; 1 leather stock; 1 great coat; 2 blankets; 1 forage cap; 6 pair woolen overalls; 9 pair cotton overalls; 3 pair of drawers; and a hat complete. Report of the Clothing Bureau, Mar. 25, 1833, approved by the Military Board on Mar. 27, 1833. Proceedings of the Military Board, 1832-1835. Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives). This issue hardly represented an abundant clothing allowance for men who were engaged in hard manual labor.
as himself; as for instance, the young recruit, or aspirant for the honorable ranks of the Army. 62

In an effort to relate the details which he felt Wayne had neglected to mention, the irate "old soldier" drew upon his own experiences in the Army. He pointed out that in the many companies with which he had been associated, all of the articles mentioned by Wayne, except postage and button sticks, had been purchased with money from the company fund. This fund consisted of money that had been saved by combining certain parts of the men's rations and the payments received for the whiskey portions of the ration. The fund was normally administered by the company commander, and it was to this source that Wayne should turn for those small items not furnished by the government.

He dismissed Wayne's questions concerning five and three year enlistments by saying that his captain would explain the situation to him if Wayne would "condescend to ask him the favor." The old soldier criticised Wayne for mentioning the discontent among the soldiers caused by the reduction of the term of service. He concluded with these words:

On his intimation, however, that such inequalities promote discontent, and

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will not prevent desertion. I have only to say, that whenever a man seeks for excuses for desertion, he will find them. . . . Much has been said and much written on the subject of desertion, but when Government will adequately punish the cowardly deserter, and not only him, but all aiders and abettors, citizens or soldiers . . . then a check may be given to the disease.63

Wayne's reply to the "old soldier" appeared in the May issue of the magazine. He maintained his original contention that the articles he had mentioned were necessary if the private soldier was to properly present himself for inspections. Contrary to the statements made by his advisory, the items were not furnished by the government nor purchased from the company fund, but were acquired by the individual soldier at his own expense. Wayne pointed out that the clothing allowance could scarcely be considered abundant and that any cash derived from the accumulated surplus should not be denied to the soldier as it arose from "an economy amounting to a self-denial." Having dismissed the idea that the soldier was only required to pay fifty cents a month from his pay, Wayne turned to a different topic:64

63 Ibid.

64 Wayne illustrated the insufficiency of the clothing allowance with one example: "Rationally speaking, our clothing is not more than sufficient for our use, and some articles are not at all sufficient. There are but three pairs of boots allowed to us in a year; and at some shelly posts, where there is much drill, six pairs will not serve us. . . ." The Military and Naval Magazine
I am well pleased with the "old soldier's" idea, in regard to the five years' men and three years' men, he states, that the inequality is apparent. There he agrees with me, but as he has tired himself by his previous effort, he finds himself unable to explain the subject, and refers me to my captain for an explanation.65

The private was quick to point out that it was the "old soldier" who had brought up the question of desertion. He stated that his "... wish was to ameliorate our condition as much as possible, but with that wish the idea of desertion was never associated." He lamented the fact that a soldier was unable to present what he considered to be just grievances without being accused of fomenting discontent and unrest among his fellow soldiers.66

Wayne rested his case with the conclusion that "... every one acquainted at all with such matters will at once pronounce that "an old soldier knows very little about soldier's affairs."67

If "an old soldier" knew very little about the affairs of the common soldier, it is certain that most Americans knew even less. The opinion of the Englishman Thomas Hamilton would appear to have been very near the

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65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
truth. In 1833 he wrote:

\[\text{The people care nothing for a set of invisible being mewed up in some petty forts on the vast frontier, who have no enemy to contend with, and are required to brave nothing but fever and mosquitoes.}\]

Public apathy and the problems of maintaining a peacetime volunteer Army serve to explain the failure of the piece-meal reform efforts of Congress and the War Department. Ten years were sufficient to substantiate Secretary of War Eaton's warning that "partial remedies are mere palliatives and cannot answer any permanent good." All of the old complaints were again being voiced: the rate of desertion was too high; the soldiers drank too much; discipline was lacking; and the men who volunteered were not of the highest caliber. Despite repeated attempts to find lasting solutions to these problems, they persisted throughout the century. As long as the Army remained small and its activities effected only a few Americans, little improvement could be expected. The peacetime Army found itself in the unenviable position of being necessary and at the same time unwanted.


\[\text{69 ASPMA, IV, 285.}\]
CHAPTER VIII

A CLIMATE REQUIRING ALL THE
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE THE LAW ALLOWS

The reforms attempted in the period from 1825 to 1835 were directed toward solving problems over which the officers of the Army and the officials of the War Department could expect to exercise some control. However, there was one problem in the South caused by a factor beyond official control. As the noted historian of the South, Ulrich B. Phillips, said when discussing the factors that made life in the South unique: "Let us begin by discussing the weather. . . ."¹ Since the weather and its effects could not be controlled, all that could be done was to find ways to lessen their impact on the soldiers.

The weather and its influences must have been one of the first things that the soldiers noticed as they moved into the South. The men who enlisted in the Army were usually not native to the southern region and they must have quickly become aware of the warmer temperatures

and the different types of crops and foliage.² These differences became more pronounced and more apparent as spring arrived in the South.

Springtime came early in the year in the southern region, bringing heavy rains, swollen rivers and streams, and swarms of mosquitoes. To soldiers and civilians it was known as the sickly season. It took each year, in some more devastatingly than in others, a heavy toll in human lives. Whether called yellow fever, ague, the "black vomit", the fever, or a variety of other names, the exact description of the malady mattered little, for the end result for many of those stricken was death.

No class or race was spared as sickness spread rapidly across the South in the spring and summer. A few citizens fled to the safety of regions which were known to be generally healthy. However, for the vast majority of the people who could not leave, each summer brought the specter of death in its wake.³

²Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 169. Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press [Bison Books], 1967), 36. Both of these works deal with the source of recruits enlisted into the Army, as does the author in another part of the study.

The majority of the fever victims were the residents of low lying areas and of cities and towns, and in these areas the Army maintained most of its garrisons. In the cities of Charleston, Savannah, Augusta, New Orleans and Baton Rouge, and in the coastal fortifications of the Southern states, the number of sick and dead rose in the spring and summer.  

(GLoucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1970), 7. In History of Medicine in Louisiana it is stated that the figures for the New Orleans epidemic of 1819 do not include many individuals who were buried on plantations, and the members of the lower economic classes who were unceremoniously dumped into the river, I, 359. This comment is undoubtedly valid for all of the available statistics. See Daniel Clark, senior to Capt. Guion, June 4, 1798, in Guion Family Papers, 1789-1906, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Clark writes, "I have just paid my annual tribute to the fever and ague and am beginning to crawl about again. . . ."

The illness and high mortality among the troops profoundly affected the soldiers stationed at the unhealthy posts. A survey of the available monthly returns for eleven southern posts indicates that as the incidence of illness increased, the number of soldiers in arrest or confinement and the number of soldiers who deserted increased.\(^5\)

Reports of sickness and death started coming to the War Department and the Headquarters of the Army as soon as United States troops began to occupy the former Spanish posts and erect new ones throughout the South in 1797. Captain Isaac Guion, commanding the American forces taking possession of the former Spanish posts, reported sickness among his troops at Chickasaw Bluffs.\(^6\) The sickness had prevented the men from completing the construction of the fortifications and new quarters. During one period, three-fourths of the men had been sick.\(^7\)

As Captain Guion moved his force south to Natchez, he found that the situation became worse as he extended

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\(^5\)Post Returns.


\(^7\)Guion to Wilkinson, Sept. 2, 1797, Ibid., 42-44; Guion to Capt. Z. Pike, Sept. 25, 1797, Ibid., 44-46; Guion to Pike, Oct. 24, 1797, Ibid., 56-57.
his lines of communication still further from his supply base. In April of 1798 he wrote that the medicine he had requested the preceding autumn had not arrived and he was forced to buy provisions where he could find them.8

Captain Guion informed the Secretary of War that a physician was indispensable at Walnut Hills as it was "an unhealthy spot." Therefore, he had engaged the services of a doctor until the War Department could provide a surgeon for the soldiers.9 On May 22 his command was reinforced by a detachment of twenty-four men, but they added little to the strength of the garrison because half of them were sick.10 In June Guion reported that he had still not received the hospital stores that his detachment so desperately needed. He had been able to purchase only a small quantity of drugs at a "cost more than would an ample quantity of those articles for a Regiment for the same time, bought in the U. States."11

Upon his arrival at Walnut Hills Lieutenant Colonel John Francis Hamtramck, the new commanding officer at that post, found that the members of the garrison were very sick and without the services of a doctor. In

8 Guion to Kersey, Apr. 12, 1798, Ibid., 75-76.
9 Guion to the Secretary of War, Apr. 19, 1798, Ibid., 77-78.
10 Guion to Kersey, June 7, 1798, Ibid., 90-91.
11 Guion to Wilkinson, June 23, 1798, Ibid., 94.
addition to the absence of a physician, there were no hospital stores or medicine available to issue to the troops. By the end of July more than half of the troops at Walnut Hills were sick and only two officers were fit for duty. At Natchez the situation was only slightly better, from a force of one hundred and seventy enlisted men, fifty-two were sick. In August Guion wrote to Hamtramck and summed up the situation, "I feel for your situation environed with fever and death and sincerely wish it was in my power to alleviate it - as we are not so deadly here, but our prospects are sufficiently gloomy. . . ." The Captain included a recommendation that he believed would safeguard the Colonel's health: "You must not expose yourself to the sun beams from nine to five o'clock, and not at all to the night air; Sleep with your chamber windows shut and continue your bath and all will be right I hope."  

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12 Guion to Secretary of War, July 9, 1798, Ibid., 98-99.
13 Guion to Wilkinson, July 30, 1798, Ibid., 99-100.
14 Guion to Hamtramck, Aug. 6, 1798, Ibid., 100-101.

The practice of avoiding the bright sun from nine to five might have been carried over from the French practice of working during the early morning hours, then taking a long break and finally returning to work in the late afternoon, see Dumont du Montigny, Memoirs Historiques sur la Louisiane (2 vols., Paris, 1753), II, 241-42. A similar system was employed when slaves were working during the summer months, for example see, George J. Kollack, Rosedew Plantation Book (1840). "Plantation Rules." Kollack Plantation Records, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina,
On August 11 Guion wrote that many of his men were sick and some were dying. The new Governor of the Mississippi Territory, Winthrop Sargent, had arrived in Natchez five days earlier, but he had been unable to perform any of his duties because he too was sick. Captain Guion was finally transferred to another post, but his successor, Colonel Thomas Cushing, voiced the same complaints in 1799.

Cushing reported sickness at Loftus Heights and Walnut Hills with some of the men in danger of dying, but sickness was rare at Natchez. He stated that the season was so hot that one of the Kentucky oxen had died from heat exhaustion. Deputy Quartermaster General, William Jones, was sick with "Mississippi fever" and had not been able to perform his duties for three weeks. One officer, Captain Piercy Pope, had died as a result of the fever. In addition to these problems, the command's medical supplies were virtually exhausted at the time when they were most needed.

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16 Cushing to Manuel Gayoso, July 20, 1799, and Cushing to Williamson, July 22, 1799, Letters Sent, Cushing, Records of Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives).
The complaints made by Captain Guion and Colonel Cushing in the late 1790's would be repeated again and again in later years by officers who commanded in the southern states. Combined with the high rate of illness were other conditions that bore directly on the soldier's welfare which were attributable to the South's climate and weather.

The Army's summer uniforms had to be issued earlier to those who served in the warmer section of the nation. Various parts of the rations issued to the soldiers either spoiled quickly in the South or were not available at certain times of the year. The design of the barracks was modified to provide adequate ventilation in an effort to protect the health of the troops. The work performed by the troops was influenced by the weather, since certain types of work were not performed if it was possible to delay them until cool weather returned to the region. The Army sought solutions to all of the problems presented by the South's climate. The solution most urgently required and most diligently sought after was to the problem of the sickly season.

Three plans were suggested that might reduce the number of soldiers stricken by disease during the sickly season. The most logical plan was to remove the troops from the unhealthy permanent stations and assign them temporarily to relatively healthy positions until the
season passed. The second scheme was to recruit native southerners, who were thought to be immune to the diseases, for service at posts in the South. The third plan was to rotate the troops every two years from southern to northern stations.

The practice of moving the troops to healthy locations was only partially effective in reducing the number of sick. If the summer quarters were not carefully chosen, the results could be disastrous. The most glaring example of an improper selection occurred in 1809, when General James Wilkinson lost approximately one-half of his army because of disease. The General was not solely responsible for the fiasco, a part of the blame must rest with the War Department.

After the United States acquired Louisiana, a number of reports sent to the government recounted the hazards which befell newcomers during the warm months of the year. In addition to the normal rigors of the season, New Orleans experienced yellow fever epidemics in 1804, 1807 and 1808, and lesser outbreaks of the disease in almost every year after 1796. Secretary of War Henry


18 John G. Clark, New Orleans, 1718-1812: An
Dearborn, a physician, was aware of all of these facts.  

The series of events which lead to the disaster below New Orleans began when Secretary Dearborn ordered three full regiments of Infantry, the 3rd, 5th, and 7th, and a battalion of a fourth regiment, the 6th along with all Riflemen, Light Dragoons and Light Artillery recruited south of New Jersey to assemble at New Orleans. This force, the largest concentration of troops in the country, was collected to protect the city from an anticipated

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19 Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana: The American Domination (4th Edition, New Orleans: F. F. Hansell and Brothers, Ltd., 1903), IX, 36-37. Reveals that President Jefferson was aware of the unhealthiness of New Orleans as early as 1804. As early as April 23, 1804, Secretary of War Dearborn had told Colonel Freeman "You will as early as possible look out for the most healthy retreat for such part of the troops as can be spared from New Orleans in the sickly season it ought to be as near New Orleans as possible and where the transportation to and from will be as much as possible by water, and where it will not be difficult or very expensive for the contractor to furnish provisions - I trust it will not be found necessary for you to retire from New Orleans, and I hope it will not be found necessary for any part of the garrison to retire for more than two or three months at farthest." Secretary of War to Freeman, Apr. 23, 1804, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 2, 219-20. Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
attack by the British. 20

On December 2, 1808, the Secretary of War ordered General Wilkinson to assume command of the force gathering at New Orleans. 21 The General did not arrive in New Orleans and take command of the force until April 19, 1809. By the time he arrived, the force was already on the verge of disintegration. 22 Experienced officers commanding veteran troops had found the maintenance of discipline difficult when stationed at New Orleans, where prostitution and gambling flourished and liquor was cheap and plentiful. In such surroundings, the training and control of the new recruits that made up the force was virtually impossible for their equally inexperienced officers. 23 The consequent lack of discipline combined with the fact that disease was spreading rapidly through the army served to render the force virtually useless.

The number of sick had increased by twenty-five percent in the six days between the tenth and the sixteenth


21 Ibid.


of April. On the latter date the enlisted strength of the force was 1,733, of this number 553 men were unable to perform any duties due to a variety of complaints. There were two hundred officers present, many of whom were too ill to perform their duties. Only three of the doctors attached to the command were well enough to render any assistance to the men. With the worst part of the summer months rapidly approaching, the hospitals were filled to overflowing and medical supplies were scarce.

General Wilkinson's orders of December 2, 1808, allowed him to move the troops to any location he might choose, as long as they remained in a position to defend New Orleans. On April 30, 1809, Secretary of War William Eustis, who had assumed office on March 9, wrote to Wilkinson stating that the health of the troops should be his primary consideration. Eustis suggested that they be moved up the Mississippi River to the high ground near Natchez and Fort Adams.

On May 29 after considering a number of possible sites, Wilkinson announced that he would move his command

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24 Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, Appendix, CIII.
27 Eustis to Wilkinson, Apr. 30, 1809, Ibid., 273.
to Terre au Boeufs, some twelve miles below New Orleans on the Mississippi River. He reported that the new position was dry and healthy and had been recommended by Governor Claiborne and the people of the neighborhood. Despite the General's claims for the new ground, it proved to be a most unsatisfactory site for a camp.\textsuperscript{28}

On June 9 the troops reached the new cantonment where they would spend the hot summer months. When the summer rains started, the campground, which was three feet below the river level, flooded and turned into a sea of mud. The supply system broke down forcing the men to eat spoiled provisions. Throughout the growing crisis, Wilkinson and the contractor, both of whom remained in New Orleans, argued over the condition of the supplies. The soldiers were unable to help themselves by purchasing fresh supplies because their pay was months in arrears.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28}Wilkinson to Eustis, May 29, 1809, Wilkinson, \textit{Memoirs}, II, 258-61; Wilkinson to Claiborne, July 27, 1809, \textit{ASPMA}, I, 292; Claiborne to Wilkinson, July 28, 1809, \textit{Ibid}. The exchange of letters between Wilkinson and Claiborne was prompted by the criticism directed at Wilkinson and he sought confirmation in July that Claiborne had indeed endorsed the site.

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{ASPMA}, I, 279-99. "From a medical standpoint one of the most astounding aspects of this whole episode was the failure of some of the hospital surgeons to diagnose the nature of the soldiers' trouble. The cause and cure of scurvy were well known by this date. Considering that the paymaster had sat in New Orleans for months, not deigning to journey the twenty-odd miles down the river to Terre au Boeufs while the soldiers
The rate of illness at Terre au Boeufs was staggering and was much higher than at New Orleans. On June 22 Secretary of War Eustis, alarmed by reports he had received from the camp, ordered General Wilkinson to move his command to higher ground. Again he suggested Natchez and the surrounding area. 30

General Wilkinson received the order on July 20 and took steps to implement the movement north. He doubted that the move would help because there had been sickness at Fort Adams when the area was originally occupied by American forces. The General predicted that he would have trouble finding adequate transportation for the entire command. Twenty-four navy gunboats had been assigned to move the troops. But they could only carry 900 men, slightly more than half the force. Wilkinson assured Eustis that if the gunboats were supplied he would adopt other measures to ensure that only the men who were too ill to travel would be left behind. The letter ended with a startling statement:

> Under all circumstances, I must frankly say that, was my discretion permitted, I should stay here and hazard the consequences, but, as

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were dying for want of fresh food which they might have been able to purchase with their pay. . . .” History of Medicine in Louisiana, 472.

30 Eustis to Wilkinson, June 22, 1809, ASPMA, I, 274.
there would be hazard, I am glad for your order to move, not only as it lessens my responsibility, but because the change of place may prove salutary to our men. In all events, you may depend on whatever my judgment, experience, personal exposition, and attention, can effect.31

On August 19 General Wilkinson wrote that he was "progressing rapidly in my arrangements for moving the troops, an object near my heart and which occupies all my attention." He indicated that the movement might be delayed by problems involved in using the naval gunboats. There were not enough men available to properly man the boats since most of the sailors were sick. In addition, the design of the boats made them impractical for transporting troops, but they were being modified in an effort to make them usable. Several barges, lying at Natchez since 1807, had been brought to the camp to supplement the gunboats. The old barges would be repaired and additional boats would be hired in New Orleans if the gunboats were not available. Wilkinson estimated that his makeshift transportation system would enable him to move his command to Natchez in twenty days, the sick going by water and the healthy marching overland.

Wilkinson's letter described the situation in the camp: disease, primarily fever and ague, was prevalent

31 Wilkinson to Eustis, July 23, 1809, Ibid.
throughout the army; and there was a shortage of food, especially meat and flour. In an effort to acquire supplies, he had offered one hundred dollars for a small cow and advertised for one hundred barrels of flour on any terms, but to no avail. He anticipated further complications as the number of men on the sick list approached six hundred, and the medical stores were being rapidly consumed. The General warned that his expenses, already high, would increase if he was forced to replenish his depleted stores on the open market.

Defending the location of his camp, Wilkinson related that sickness had never been so rampant among the local residents as during the present season. He reported that the inhabitants of the neighborhood were all afflicted with the same illnesses that were sweeping through the army. He closed with assurances that he would begin his movement north as soon as all of the necessary arrangements were completed.32

It was not until September 10 that the remnant of Wilkinson's army began to move up the river to Port Adams. Many of the men who survived the trip to reach the high ground at Natchez died from the effects of their ordeal before the end of the year. From January, 1809 to

32Wilkinson to Eustis, Aug. 19, 1809, Ibid., 274-75.
January, 1810, the force under General Wilkinson's command suffered ruinous casualties. In a force of 2,036 enlisted men, there were over 1,000 losses, consisting of 166 desertions and an undetermined number of deaths.  

The disaster which virtually destroyed General Wilkinson's army was unique, but it served as a constant reminder of the fate that awaited any commander who was not extremely careful when selecting a site for quartering his command. The report of the Committee of Congress which investigated the reasons for the high incident of illness among the troops at Terre au Boeufs listed the factors which they felt had caused the high death rate:

1) The detachment consisting of new levies.
2) The insalubrity of the climate - the summer and autumn of the year 1809 being unusually sickly.
3) To the nature of the ground on which the detachment was encamped at Terre au Boeufs, and the detention of it at that place during the whole of the summer, contrary, as the Committee conceive, to the instructions contained in a letter to the Secretary of War, bearing date the 30th of April 1809.
4) To the want of sound and wholesome provisions and of vegetables; the want of an hospital, hospital stores and medicines.
5) The excessive fatigues to which the troops were subjected in clearing, ditching, and draining, the ground on which they were encamped.

6) To the want of repose during the night, owing to the troops not being provided with bars or nets to protect them from the annoyance of musquitoes [sic].

7) The want of cleanliness in the camp, the impracticable to preserve it.

8) The sick and well-being confined to the same tents, which neither protected them sufficiently from the heat of the sun, nor kept them dry from the dews and rains.\textsuperscript{34}

Normally the troops that were moved during the summer fared far better than those under General Wilkinson in 1809. The sites for summer encampments were carefully selected and if they proved to be unhealthy the troops were removed and the locations were not used again.

The troops from the garrisons at New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Savannah were usually moved during the spring and summer months. The troops at Baton Rouge used a variety of summer posts such as, the Pine Woods, near the city, or Barataria Bay. The troops from New Orleans moved to Bay St. Louis or Pass Christian on the Gulf of Mexico. The soldiers from Savannah moved to posts known to be healthy during the summer months. When the troops were withdrawn, the posts were left to the care of small detachments of "seasoned soldiers."\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{ASPMA}, I, 272.

\textsuperscript{35}Post Returns. The returns for the posts from which the troops were removed show that in most instances a small detachment was left at the post to guard the care for it. When all of the troops were removed a civilian caretaker was usually employed to maintain the post.
However, some of the unhealthy posts, usually permanent fortifications, were too important to be abandoned for six or seven months each year. Consequently, the troops remained at these sites, and hoped for a relatively healthy season. Fort St. Philip, situated sixty-five miles below New Orleans on the left bank of the Mississippi River, was such a post. Inaccessible by land, surrounded by swamps, sluggish streams and land which would not support the weight of a man, Fort St. Philip gained a reputation unequalled by any other post in the United States. A survey of eleven permanent garrisons shows that only at Fort St. Philip did the total number of deaths surpass the number of desertions. This startling comparison indicates not only the unhealthiness of the post but also its isolation, there was no place for a deserter to go if he left the post.36

In an article written by a British officer that appeared in The Military and Naval Magazine of the United States, a story was told that graphically illustrated the situation at Fort St. Philip. In 1815 a young artillery officer, a recent graduate of West Point, was assigned to the post along with two senior officers and 150 enlisted men. Within a short time after their arrival, the second in command and fifty of the soldiers had died from

36Ibid. The available returns for Fort St. Philip list 45 men dead and 39 deserted.
sickness. The senior officer, apparently in a fit of despair over the loss of his men, committed suicide by jumping from the parapet into the ditch where he drowned. After nine months at Fort St. Philip the young officer and ten soldiers were ordered to New Orleans, where all of the men, except the officer and his servant, died of yellow fever. The officer, ordered to Fort St. Philip to replace the young artillerist indicated that he would resign his appointment before going to the fort. He returned his orders along with his commission to the War Department.

The editor of the magazine had only one comment about the story, "A solitary case, incident to a post which is perhaps the most unhealthy in the country. The military posts are generally healthy." The episode was probably unique, but at least a part of the story must have been relatively common. The reluctance of officers to report to Fort St. Philip was so widespread that General Edmund Pendleton Gaines suggested that new duty stations not be announced by the Headquarters of the Army. Instead, officers should be ordered to Department Headquarters to receive their assignments in person. The General felt that this method was advisable since officers assigned to certain posts, especially Fort St. Philip,

had countless excuses for not reporting for duty. A situation which did not exist at the better duty stations, such as Boston and New York.\footnote{Gaines to Roger Jones, Adjutant General U. S. Army, Aug. 10, 1826, Letters Sent, Western Department, III. Records of the United States Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.}

Line officers were not the only ones who tried to avoid serving at posts such as Fort St. Philip. The members of the Medical Department also tried to avoid stations that were hazardous or undesirable. The policy of the Medical Department allowed the senior men to select their assignments, a practice that worked against the interests of the soldiers. General Gaines strongly protested the action of the Department in placing "junior and comparatively inexperienced assistant surgeons" in the city of New Orleans and the surrounding area. Gaines argued that the Surgeon General placed the most inexperienced men in the posts that required the most experienced medical officers. He stated:

There is perhaps no military principle better established, than that the post of greatest danger is the post of honor and at which the most experienced veterans should be stationed. And when the enemy to be apprehended is only disease, then this principle will apply more particularly if not exclusively to the medical staff.\footnote{Gaines to Jones, June 20, 1827, LSWD, IV. Gaines' italics.}
On March 16, 1830, an order was issued that rescinded the regulation of December 14, 1825, that allowed surgeons to choose their stations. Following the order of March 16, they would be assigned to their stations by the Secretary of War on "application through the Surgeon General." The order also provided that no surgeon or assistant surgeon should receive a furlough or leave of absence that exceeded thirty days. If an extension beyond the thirty day limit was necessary, an application was to be made through the Surgeon General to the Secretary of War. The application was to be accompanied by the written approval of the commanding officer of his Regiment or post. The tightening of the regulations governing furloughs was an attempt to eliminate the expense of employing private physicians to care for the soldiers during the absence of the post physician. This regulation was intended to correct the situation which General Gaines had complained of three years earlier.  

Fort St. Philip was too important not to be garrisoned at all times. The importance of the fort had been amply demonstrated when a powerful British naval force had been prevented from ascending the Mississippi to support the British land force below New Orleans in

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40 Order No. 10, Adjutant General's Office, Mar. 17, 1830.
December, 1814. General Gaines tried to improve the living conditions at Fort St. Philip by recommending the construction of new barracks for the men. In March of 1826 he said that the building should have been reported as "untenable and uninhabitable" in 1822. But he had been convinced that the repairs contemplated by the commander would provide adequate shelter for the troops until the new fort across the river was completed. Gaines lamented the fact that those repairs had not been made, because:

> With good barracks, I have no doubt that troops would enjoy better health at Fort St. Philip than at any immediate point on the Mississippi River from Thence to St. Louis; but without such as will effectually screen them from rain and stormy weather, it would be a matter of surprise to no one acquainted with the character of the place to learn that in the course of one summer and autumn more than a majority of the troops stationed there had been carried off by disease.

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I think it my duty to report that the barracks at Fort St. Philip are absolutely unfit to be occupied by the troops during the approaching summer, and that it is very questionable whether mere repairs will be sufficient to render them habitable. . . . The fort needs thorough repairs.  

It was not until the following year that the War Department instructed General Gaines to remove the troops from Fort St. Philip during the sickly season. Gaines promptly ordered the troops to move to Pass Christian, a location that had been uniformly healthy for a number of years. Although the removal left the river approach to New Orleans unguarded, the new summer location was close enough to New Orleans to enable the troops to return to defend the city. The General cautioned Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Taylor to select a healthy site at Pass Christian out of the grasp of land speculators.  

By the time General Gaines received authorization to move the troops from Fort St. Philip during the sickly season, the post had lost its standing as the unhealthiest station in the United States to the site at Baton Rouge. The 1st Regiment of United States Infantry had the

42 Gaines to Adjutant General Jones, Mar. 29, 1826, LSWD, III.
misfortune of occupying the post, which one writer called "the grave of the regiment", during most of the period from 1820 to 1828. In the period from 1829 to 1825, the quarterly reports from Baton Rouge reveal that the annual percentage of deaths among the members of the command averaged just over twenty percent. "In the third quarter of 1821, for example, the total of deaths was thirty-five, in a mean strength of 287, being one third of the aggregate of the whole army." At Baton Rouge between 1829 and 1838 there were sixty-five deaths recorded on the medical returns and seventy-one on the Adjutant General's returns.

General Gaines tried to protect the troops at Baton Rouge from the threat of disease during the sickly season. He proposed that the government purchase a tract

44 Samuel Forry, The Climate of the United States and Its Endemic Influences. Based Chiefly on the Records of the Medical Department and Adjutant General's, United States Army (New York, 1842), 201.

45 Ibid., 200. Thomas Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States. Compiled from the Records of the Surgeon General's and Adjutant General's Office - Embracing a Period of Twenty Years, From January, 1819 to January, 1839 (Washington: Jacob Gideon, 1840). The annual percentage of deaths at Baton Rouge were 12.3 in 1819; 22.2 in 1820; 23 in 1821; 25.8 in 1822; 18.5 in 1823; 17.3 in 1824. The strength of the garrison ranged from 123 to 479 and the annual deaths from 29 to 85, 125.

of land outside of the city to be used for summer quarters. His proposal was not enthusiastically received by the War Department and no action was taken. The regulars remained at the post and the policy of removal to the Gulf Coast continued. Despite the glowing description that appeared in 1840, the post remained unhealthy:

The barracks, constructed of brick, with slate roofs, were completed in 1824. The hospital built of the same material, was finished in 1839. These buildings are well constructed and admirably adapted for the purposes intended. The public grounds are well shaded by trees, such as the mulberry, pride of China, et. These trees, planted in 1824 contribute it is believed, very materially towards the healthfulness of the station.

Ibid., 255-56. The illnesses reported were Intermittent Fever, Hemittent Fever, Synochal Fever, Typhus Fever, Diarrhea and Dysentery, Catarrh and Influenza, Pneumonia, Pleuritis, Phthisis Pulmonalis, Rheumation. The number of men reported sick on the quarterly reports for the other posts surveyed are as follows, the number in parenthesis is the number of quarters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post</th>
<th>1st</th>
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<td>456</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>506</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fort Johnston</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>198</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oglethorpe Barracks</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>(5)</td>
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<td>Fort Jesup</td>
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<td>Augusta Arsenal</td>
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<td>327</td>
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<td>213</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fort Mitchell</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Pike</td>
<td>(7)</td>
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<td>(7)</td>
<td>155</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fort Wood</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Jackson</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fort Marion</td>
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<td>(6)</td>
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<td>Fort King</td>
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<td>Fort Brooke</td>
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<td>435</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key West</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
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Adjutant General to Gaines, Apr. 4, 1831, Letters Sent, Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94 (National Archives).
The permanent posts in the South were generally more healthy than Fort St. Philip and Baton Rouge. But at each of the posts the death rate and sick list showed a marked increase during the period from April to October. 49

In certain years other posts were as unhealthy as Fort St. Philip and Baton Rouge. In 1826 for instance, two companies of artillery moved from Fortress Monroe, Virginia, to Savannah, Georgia, within two years nearly one-half of the men had died. On April 1, 1828, an additional 103 men arrived at Savannah to augment the depleted garrison. By December fifty-one of the new men had died and their families had suffered in the same proportion. 50

The effectiveness of the removal policy is difficult to judge because the number of sick and dead at the posts still increased during the summer months. It can only be assumed that the number would have been even higher had removal not been practiced.


50 Post Returns. Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States, 242-43; 254-55; 318-19. Niles Weekly Register, Apr. 4, 1829, XXXVI, 86. The editor cited these figures and recommended that the troops be removed and the garrison abandoned. These deaths do not appear in the totals in Appendix II, as seventeen returns are unavailable out of a possible thirty-six, but sixty-two deaths were recorded.
The second plan for reducing the effect of the sickly season was prompted by the belief that a period of time was necessary in order for individuals to adjust to the South's peculiar climate. This assumption was widely accepted in the South, especially in the city of New Orleans where disease was common. In the areas where sickness was prevalent, the reason usually given for the high mortality rate was the large number of newcomers and transients in the area. During the yellow fever epidemic of 1817, the New Orleans City Council requested that all individuals "who have just arrived and are not yet acclimated" leave the city and reside in the country for a few weeks until the crisis had passed. To aid those individuals who could not afford to leave the city, the council set up a relief camp across the Mississippi River. The camp was located in some old Army barracks which were no longer being used by the Federal government to quarter soldiers.\footnote{Proceedings of the City Council, Book 3, Vol. I, 54-55.}

The observations of Dr. Gerardin, a physician, who served in New Orleans during 1817, seem to confirm the assertion that newcomers were the principle victims of the fever. In 1820 he wrote:

The epidemic did not end, being fed by all the French who arrived at
this time; if the American government had forced them to ascend the river and spread out in the country it would have saved the lives of a great many of these unfortunates. . . . Imbued with this truth, the American went and saved himself, the Frenchman always imprudent and foolhardy, remained and died."52

The doctor's opinion was supported by the editor of the Louisiana Gazette who stated that most of the deaths in 1817 occurred among transients.

Justus Wyman observed in 1819 that in the area around Mobile and Blakely, Alabama, "It is presumed that not more than two-thirds of the emigrants from the Atlantic States who attempt to stay in either of these places through the unhealthy months live; and not more than one-tenth escape the sickness."53

One authority on Louisiana medical history has observed that:

The tragedy of this bland assumption was that it blinded the public authorities and leading citizens to

52Dr. N. V. A. Gerardin, Memoires sur La Fieude Jaune (Paris, 1820), 88-89.

53Louisiana Gazette, Oct. 23, 1817. Justus Wyman, "A Geographical Sketch of the Alabama Territory," in Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society, III, 116. See Letters from Soloman Mordecai to his sister, Ellen Mordecai. Soloman was a physician in Mobile for a number of years and wrote to his sister each week for about ten years. Their letters contain much information about health conditions in Mobile. Their letters are in the Mordecai Family Papers, 1793-1947, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
the fact that the city was the unfortunate possessor of one of the highest death rates in the country. If only the new arrivals were susceptible to the fevers, then it followed logically that there was little need for any sanitary and public health reform measures.54

The health problems at New Orleans were perhaps more prominent than in other cities and areas of the South, but no area was completely free from the threat of disease. Reliable figures on the number of deaths that occurred in the southern countryside are unavailable, but a survey of newspapers and personal letters indicates that "the fever" was an annual fear in most areas of the South. General Gaines, who accepted the assumption that a period of acclimation was beneficial, suggested that the Army recruit native southerners for assignment to southern posts. He argued that since these men were already accustomed to the southern climate, it was likely that the sickly season would not take such a heavy toll among the men.

Governor Claiborne had hinted at such a system in 1811 when he requested Naval commissions for the sons of two prominent New Orleans families. The Governor asked that the two men be stationed in New Orleans because they were already accustomed to the unhealthy climate and were

54History of Medicine in Louisiana, 357.
well suited for service in that area. It remained for General Gaines to strongly recommend the idea to the War Department.

In 1827 General Gaines suggested to Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Taylor that the unhealthy posts in Louisiana should be garrisoned by native-born officers and enlisted men. The plan would be put into operation by removing seven-tenths of the men from the Louisiana posts to Pass Christian on the Gulf Coast. This site was healthy and close enough to New Orleans to allow the men to return by steamboat in six hours. The remaining three-tenths of the troops would garrison the posts during the summer.

He reasoned that:

In times of unusual disease these guards if furnished by regular details would doubtless encounter the risk of a forlorn hope but native born officers and men of Louisiana and of other southern states would cheerfully encounter this risk and ... would be at least as healthy as the native citizens whilst a more numerous body of troops at these posts composed of men from the middle and northern states could not fail to suffer the frequent

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scourge of mortal disease.\textsuperscript{56}

This plan was transitional in nature. It envisioned the construction of large and spacious barracks at Pass Christian to accommodate the troops removed from the other garrisons. The men left at the posts would consist of native southerners and seasoned veterans. Under this system, a force of regulars would maintain the forts and not civilian caretakers.

In the spring of 1832 General Gaines wrote to Adjutant General Jones to suggest his solution to the health problems encountered by the Army in the South. Gaines had first advanced his plan in 1825 but it had not been favorably received. The earlier plan was similar to his recommendation of 1827. The General wrote:

Convinced as I am that no means hitherto employed will preserve from frequent disease and premature death, officers and soldiers born and raised in the middle and northern states and stationed at any of the unhealthy posts or places south of Arkansas, Tennessee or North Carolina and that a remedy for this evil will be found in making selections or accepting as volunteers southern officers and men and sending such as shall have been completely acclimated to Southern stations and recruiting southern men with clear understanding that they shall not, except on extraordinary occasion be ordered from the southern frontier to suffer the consequent risk of a

\textsuperscript{56}Gaines to Taylor, June 8, 1827, LSWD, IV.
When Gaines had first proposed the idea, he was informed that the laws did not authorize such a plan. He argued that the President, as commander in chief, could make changes in the disposition of the troops that were necessary for the good of the service, provided the changes were not contrary to existing laws. The plan could be put into operation by issuing a few orders and transporting approximately twenty companies from southern to northern stations.

Gaines assured the Adjutant General that there were enough southern-born officers in the various corps of the Army, who would welcome an opportunity to serve in the South, to execute the plan. Native southerners stationed at the posts in the South offered two important advantages: (1) these men had a necessary understanding of the institution of slavery; and (2) they were already adjusted to the climate.  

To support his argument that the plan was necessary, Gaines cited the example of Forts Jackson and Wood. During

57 Gaines to Adjutant General Jones, Apr. 30, 1832, Ibid. Also see Adjutant General Patrick Galt, Western Department to Captain Richard Zantzinger, Mar. 26, 1829, Ibid. Captain Zantzinger was given permission on the advice of his medical staff to remove the garrison of Fort Wood to Bay St. Louis.

58 For a discussion of the Army and slavery, see the following two chapters.
the last sickly season, the posts had been manned by a small company of northern men and it had been impossible to muster enough men to remove the ever "accumulating masses of vegetable and animal matter embracing the elements of disease and death, duties in many respects peculiar to the Mississippi and its swamps."

The General believed that the feeble condition of the troops, especially those unaccustomed to the climate "during the season of heat, Musquitoes [sic] and disease", required some type of positive action. He concluded his letter with the recommendation that a force of at least four companies, composed entirely of southern officers and men be stationed at Fort Jackson. 59

In May, George McCall, the Acting Adjutant General of the Western Department informed Captain Nehemiah Baden, the commander of Fort Wood of the recommendation that Fort Jackson be garrisoned by four companies of southerners. This force would enable him to maintain a proper police of the post and still have an efficient disposable force. 60

General Gaines was convinced that most of the men who enlisted, especially those from the great northeastern

59 Gaines to Jones, Apr. 30, 1832, LSWD, VI.
60 McCall to Baden, May 25, 1832, Ibid. In another letter to Major Richard Zantzinger, June 8, 1832, Ibid., McCall repeated the information concerning General Gaines' recommendation.
seaports, would never make good soldiers for the garrisons in Louisiana. The General felt that better recruits were needed, but the type of men required would never be attracted by the existing bounty and pay offered by the Army. 61

The type of recruit attracted by the Army was the principle reason the plan proposed by General Gaines was impractical. The number of men who enlisted from the southern states was not large enough to meet the demands of such a system. It is probable that enough southern born officers were available, but sufficient enlisted men were not. The garrisons in the South continued to be manned largely by men recruited in the great northern cities. 62

In the South several severe sickly seasons in succession meant that the number of non-immunes was reduced. This probably explains the mildness of the yellow fever epidemic in New Orleans in 1820. The city had

61 Albert Miller, Aide de Camp, to Lt. Col. William S. Foster, Mar. 15, 1833, Ibid.

62 For information on the Army's recruiting activities see Adjutant General's Office, Recruiting Service Letter Books, 1825-1849, and Adjutant General's Office, Registers of Enlistment, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94 (National Archives). In all probability Southerners enlisted and volunteered in proportional numbers to Northerners in time of national need, but in peacetime the Army was forced to rely on its recruiting officers in the northern cities to fill the depleted ranks of the Army.
suffered two major epidemics in three years:

Hence, when the yellow fever again became epidemic in 1820, its ravages were limited by a lack of material. A high percentage of the natives must have acquired an immunity through a mild attack while the mortality of the past three years would have thinned the ranks of the newcomers.\[^3\]

A similar thinning process worked at the garrisons in the South and the number of soldiers who gained a degree of immunity to the fevers through mild attacks increased. But the vacancies that occurred were continually filled, usually with men from outside the South who were not immune and who had little or no choice in where they spent the sickly season. If there was any validity to the theory that a period of acclimation was necessary and that newcomers were the most susceptible to the ravages of the season, the policy of the Army simply helped to keep the mortality rate high.

The third plan suggested was the rotation system. It was intended not only to help preserve the health of the troops, but also to add a degree of fairness to the assignment of stations. Under this system, every two years units serving at southern posts would exchange stations with units serving in the north. The system was first tried among artillery units before being

\[^3\]History of Medicine in Louisiana, I, 361.
expanded to include the infantry.

The rotation system was contrary to the idea that acclimation to the South's climate was necessary. It was generally assumed that the period of acclimation lasted two or three years. If the individual managed to survive this period of exposure, his chances of contracting any of the illnesses were greatly reduced. Thus, under the rotation system, men who had gained a degree of immunity after serving two years in the South, would be replaced by men who would have to undergo the same process. Although ignoring the idea of acclimation, the rotation system was implemented because it was believed that the burden of southern service should be shared by all members of the service.

In early 1826 the Secretary of War asked the Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup and Surgeon General Joseph Lovell to estimate the expenses which would be incurred under the rotation system and the possible benefits to the health of the troops. The plan being considered was to replace the troops in the following manner: the First Regiment would replace the troops of the Third; the Third would replace the troops of the First; the Second would replace the troops of the Fourth; and the Fourth would replace the troops of the Second.64

64Secretary of War to Jesup, Jan. 24, 1826, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Letters
The War Department considered the plan for more than a year. On October 12, 1827, orders were issued putting the plan into operation. The system was justified in the first paragraph of the order:

This has been determined on as a measure of equal justice to all; as being called for by the best interests of the service, and by the common rule of equity in military detail. It is therefore to be regarded as the commencement of a system, promising to the artillery, generally, the advantages of a biennial exchange, and to the garrisons of the sickly stations in particular, (on the southern frontiers) the hope of periodical relief.\textsuperscript{65}

Consideration was given to the health of the troops during the move. The surgeons and assistant surgeons of the First and Second Regiments were ordered to "accompany the troops of those regiments to the South, and return with the troops of the Third and Fourth Regiments, who may be relieved from thence."\textsuperscript{66}

The plan broke down rapidly and became the subject of a heated debate between the members of the infantry

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\textsuperscript{65}General Order No. 54, Oct. 12, 1827, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94 (National Archives), also in \textit{Niles Weekly Register}, XXXIII, Oct. 20, 1827, 121-22.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.
\end{flushright}
and the artillery. In addition to the charges of discrimination that were leveled at the new system by the members of the infantry, there were criticisms of the additional expenses entailed by the movement of the troops. In addition, questions were raised as to whether or not the President could order such a movement.

The expenses incurred by moving the four Regiments of Artillery amounted to $15,632. An additional expenditure of forty-eight dollars for medical assistance given the troops brought the final total to $15,680. In response to a resolution from the House of Representatives, inquiring upon what authority the movement had been made, Commanding General Jacob Brown wrote:

The only "regulation" known to the Army, "respecting the removal of troops from one post to another", since the Declaration of Independence as a nation, is to be found in that discretionary power inherent in the president, as commander in chief, or in a general commanding an Army, to make such disposition of the troops as may be demanded by the high interests of the public service, and by that measure of justice and impartiality which may be due to the troops themselves.\(^67\)

The movement was justified on the basis of the powers possessed by the Chief Executive and because the move was necessary for the good of the service.

\(^{67}\)Brown to House of Representatives, Dec. 22, 1827, in Niles Weekly Register, XXXIII, Jan. 26, 1828, 362-63.
As an addition justification, Brown referred to those European powers who possessed West Indian colonies. They relieved their garrisons in sickly regions at regular intervals after short-terms of service. As further proof that such a system was needed, the General cited the case of one of the rotated regiments. The regiment had been stationed on the Gulf frontier since the reorganization of the Army in 1821 and had furnished the troops for most of the "dreary and sickly posts in that quarter." General Brown reported that sixteen officers had died in seven years, four times the average number in the other three regiments. 68

The General was willing to concede that the movement was likely to cause some personal hardships. But individual interests were to be "viewed as secondary" to the more important military considerations involved. 69 The General's letter touched briefly on the issue that would eventually evoke the most controversy. General Brown justified the movement on the grounds of fairness.

68 The General did not specify which of the Regiment's suffered these losses, but in all likelihood it was the Fourth Regiment.

69 On January 9, 1828, the Secretary of War informed Senator Martin Van Buren that the provisions of the order could not be relaxed and that Lieutenant Merchant, on whose behalf the Senator had written, would have to move from his present post to his new assignment on the southern coast. Secretary of War to M. Van Buren, Jan. 9, 1828, SWLS, Roll 12, 332.
in the assignment of stations when he wrote:

    Ever ready to obey the calls of the country, and to devote its last energies in its defense, the Army still looks to its government for justice and impartiality in its dispensations. Neither severity of discipline nor rigor of service will ever be complained of, while its distributions are made with fairness and equality. 70

The assignment of stations might have been fair within the artillery, but the new system brought complaints from the infantry that one branch was favored over another.

The rivalry and jealousy was clearly expressed in a series of letters published in The Military and Naval Magazine of the United States. In August of 1833 a letter appeared which was the first of many in the verbal battle between the two branches. It was addressed to the President of the United States and signed simply "W". The tone of the letter clearly indicated that some members of the infantry resented the apparent favoritism shown to the artillery. The author presented the infantry's argument in concise terms when he wrote:

    In a series of years past the Artillery and Infantry of the Army have been distributed, the former on the seacoast in the several fortifications, and the latter on the Indian frontier, for the most part in temporary cantonments--the

former amidst the enjoyment of luxuries, the pleasures of society, the repose of peace—the latter often remote from comfort far distant from friends, and frequently engaged in warfare with the savage. During the long period of this distribution but one or two changes have been made affecting the Artillery, and these involving no privation, no fatigues; while the Infantry, almost without exception, have been year after year, employed either in constructing cantonments, opening roads, changing posts, or warring with Indians.71

The author might have overstated his case, but there is little doubt that life in the infantry was far different than that in the artillery. The rotation system could only have added to the infantry’s feelings that the artillery received preferential treatment. General Brown’s references to fairness in the assignment of stations and sharing the burden of southern service must have seemed strange to the members of the infantry regiments that had served for long periods at posts in the South; for example, the First Infantry Regiment had been stationed at Baton Rouge since 1821. The controversy soon spilled over into the public press when the New York American published several letters concerning the assignments given to the infantry and artillery.

The assignment of artillery units to permanent duty in coastal fortifications and arsenals was justified by the argument that the forts were primarily armed with artillery pieces and they should be manned by members of artillery. Since the arsenals were designed to produce small arms and artillery pieces, it also seemed only logical that the posts be garrisoned by artillerists. The discussion continued for a year after the first few letters without anything new being added to the debate.

The final shot in the controversy was fired in May of 1834, when a letter written by a private in the Second Regiment of Artillery, appeared in the press. The private's regiment had been ordered South in 1827 and after seven years it was still there. Each year the men felt that they might be returned to the North, but had been disappointed in their expectations. The men hoped to return to the North because:

The 2d Regiment of Artillery is composed, almost entirely, of northern men, the most of them left their relations and friends to come out to the south, when the 2d Regiment came, totally unacclimated, and with the hope that they soon would be relieved. What is it that forms the basis of our small but efficient Army? It is, that all, as far as practicable, may be satisfied; and how is this desirable end to be obtained? It is by placing us all upon an equality. We are all serving our country on the same terms, and if there are bitter and sweets in the
service, let us all, at least, have our share.  

He concluded by citing the first paragraph of Order No. 54, which assured the members of the artillery that they would only serve two years at a time in the South. He requested that the men of the Regiment be removed as soon as possible.

The rotation system was theoretically still in operation when the Second Seminole War erupted and ended any hope of a prompt movement out of the South for the Artillery units. The plan never had a fair test, since only the first move had been made, and no attempt had been made to move the troops after two years. In all likelihood, if the system had been followed, it would not have reduced the amount of sickness among the troops. There is evidence that acclimation to the southern climate was necessary. In two years the troops would just have become acclimated when they would be moved and replaced by troops who would have to undergo the same process.

All three of the suggested plans to protect the health of the troops were temporary measures and not extremely effective. The removal system was costly and inefficient, and required the maintenance of additional

military posts and the expense of transporting the troops to and from the summer camps. The recruitment of native southerners for service in the South was impractical, because an adequate supply of recruits was not available. The rotation system was never properly tested and probably would have been too expensive if extended to both infantry and artillery units. None of the plans was a solution to the real problem, the cause of the high incidence of disease.

Despite the attempts to reduce the number of sick during the summer months, the sickly season would continue to be a problem until the causes of the various illnesses were understood and eliminated. No amount of acclimation or rotation would help as long as the swamps and mosquitoes remained and the improper disposal of filth and waste persisted.  

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Medical science would have to make great progress, not only in the treatment of illness but in the understanding of its causes.

In describing the causes of the unhealthiness at Mobile Justus Wyman wrote, "The natural causes of this unhealthiness must always exist; but the vegetable causes will gradually be removed. The fogs arising from the rivers, and exhalations from the swamps and low lands, together with the quantities of stagnant water always to be found in these swamps, will ever be prevailing causes of sickness. But as the country increases in population, the vast quantities of old logs and other vegetable substance which now lays consuming and which, in a manner corrupts the air, and renders it putrid, will be destroyed. This, however, will be a work of several years." Justus Wyman, "A Geographical Sketch of the Alabama Territory," in Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society, III, 114.
disease but also in the prevention of illness, before the sickly season would vanish. Even when medical science made the necessary advances, there was no assurance that the information would be disseminated rapidly throughout the Medical Department of the Army.

From 1789 to 1835 the Army's Medical Department was neither very large nor extremely efficient. It was adequate to meet the demands of normal conditions, but it normally failed in times of crisis. On September 29, 1789, Congress passed an act which provided for the organization of an Army. The act provided for one surgeon and five surgeon's mates to care for the 836 members of the Army. By 1836 the Medical Department had been increased to include a Surgeon General, fifteen surgeons and sixty assistant surgeons, to care for 7,957 men. 74 In spite of the fact that surgeons and assistant surgeons were available at the permanent posts throughout the country, the presence of a member of the Medical Department did not necessarily ensure the soldiers of proper medical attention.

Much of the blame for the disaster that befell General Wilkinson's command at Terre au Boeufs must rest with three men who were trained as physicians, General

74 United States Statutes at Large, 1st Congress, Session 1 (1789), I, 95-96; United States Statutes at Large, 24th Congress, Session 1 (1836), V, 117.
Wilkinson and Secretaries of War Henry Dearborn and William Eustis. The physicians on the scene were undoubtedly overwhelmed by the number of sick. But there can be no excuse for their failure to recognize the symptoms of scurvy among the troops and to treat it properly. Surgeon Jabez Heustis, who served at Terre au Boeufs in the Second United States Regiment, wrote a vivid description of the medical situation at the camp. The men were first beset by fevers and dysentery and then the situation was complicated by the appearance of scurvy. Heustis described the condition of some of the soldiers:

The patients would pick them [teeth] from their mounts with their fingers. . . . [one patient] taking hold of his tongue, . . . deliberately drew it from his mouth, . . . The jaws of several patients became carious; and in some instances, the lower jaw was detached from its natural connexions by the spreading of the mortification, and fell from the head in a state of putrefaction.  

The attending physicians either did not recognize the symptoms or were simply unable to rectify an extremely bad situation. Heustis stated that the standard treatment for scurvy had been mercury, with the result that:

Its effects were certain and unequivocal to those who would give themselves the trouble of observing.

75 Jabez Wiggins Heustis, Physical Observations on Medical Tracts and Researches, on the Topography and Diseases of Louisiana (New York, 1817), 90-91.
A violent salivation immediately ensued; and every symptom was rapidly and sensibly aggravated. A few doses of this medicine relieved the patient of his misery, and put an end to his earthly sufferings. Death, perhaps, was inevitable; and it is certain that the patients' sufferings were shortened by this mode of treatment. Whether this, therefore, was to be considered as an act of humanity consistent with the duties of a physician, I leave for others to judge.76

The problem at Terre au Boeufs was primarily caused by a lack of fresh fruits, vegetables, meat and a shortage of medicines, compounded by the fact that the troops had not been paid and were unable to purchase fresh provisions on their own. When the troops were paid and able to buy fresh foods, the health of the troops improved rapidly.77

The performance of the surgeons at Terre au Boeufs could not have been worse. According to one authority on medical history, malaria and dysentery were common diseases among the soldiers of the Army in all sections of the country. By 1809 malaria was not common in the New England states, but it was still prevalent in the states south of New York. The standard treatment for malaria and victims of most other types of fevers was cinchona bark. In addition there were medicines which would give relief to those suffering from dysentery. "The excessive

76Heustis, Physical Observation on Medical Tracts, 98; History of Medicine in Louisiana, 473.
77History of Medicine in Louisiana, 472.
use of mercury in treating a large group of men suffering from the combined effects of scurvy, dysentery, and malaria does not speak well for the calibre of army surgeons."  

In 1834 an effort was made to improve the caliber of Army surgeons. On June 30, 1834, Congress passed an act which required that all prospective assistant surgeons be examined by an Army medical board before receiving their appointments. The laxity of the system prior to 1834 had allowed men who were completely unqualified to hold the post of assistant surgeon. These men might have been able to cope with the every day problems that arose, but in periods of stress and urgency the medical system functioned badly.

Many of the men who were appointed to the Medical Department were undoubtedly men of ability and dedication, but the Department was not an extremely important branch of the Army and offered little opportunity for advancement or reward. The pay was low, the life was hard, and chances for advancement were slight. The position of the surgeons and assistant surgeons was ill defined within the framework of the Army, and military rank was not conferred

78 History of Medicine in Louisiana, 473-74.

79 United States Statutes at Large, 23d Congress, Session 1 (1834), IV, 714.
upon Army doctors until 1847.  

Despite their many deficiencies, the members of the Medical Department produced a number of reports and studies concerning various aspects of the health of the soldiers. Despite the valuable information contained in many of the reports, the routine medical problems of the soldiers went without solutions. Until medical science discovered not only the causes of the wide-range of illnesses but also effective preventive measures, soldiers and civilians would continue to suffer during the sickly season. In general, the treatments prescribed for the various diseases were the same in 1835 as they had been in 1739, and there was general disagreement as to which


81 See the Annual Report of the Surgeon General which accompanied the Annual Report of the Secretary of War. Also James Mann, Medical Sketches of the Campaign of 1812, 13, 14, To which are added Surgical Cases: Observations on Military Hospitals; and Flying Hospitals Attached to a Moving Army. Also, An Appendix, Comprising a Dissertation on Dysentery; which obtained the Boylstonian Prize Medal for the Year 1805, and Observations on the Winter Epidemic of 1815-16 Denominated Peripneumonia Notha, As it Appeared at Sharon and Rochester, State of Massachusetts (Dedham: H. Mann and Co., 1816). Report Books 1815-1835, Surgeon Generals Office, Record Group 112 (National Archives).
of the known treatments was most effective.\(^{32}\)

Army physicians and civilian doctors fought the same battles in the South:

In these Army garrisons medical procedures varied little from those used by private practitioners in Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States. In general health conditions among soldiers stationed in Louisiana were far worse than was generally true of other army posts. The semi-tropical climate of New Orleans intensified the malaria and dysenteries and made their ravages among the northern born troops exceedingly severe, while yellow fever exacted an added toll.\(^{33}\)

To the soldiers of the United States Army, medical science could offer little protection from the ravages of the diseases that seemed to flourish in the South's peculiar climate. They could only hope that their constitutions were strong enough to carry them through the


\(^{33}\)History of Medicine in Louisiana, 486.
normal rigors of life in the section and that the summer
months would not be unusually unhealthy during their tour
of duty.

The South's climate had a definite impact on the
life of the Army. From 1789 to 1835 more soldiers died
from disease than from all other causes. At the Battle
of New Orleans, General Jackson's casualties were six
killed; in the first quarter of 1821, an unusually healthy
period, there were eight deaths at Baton Rouge.34 Illness
was common throughout the Army of the United States, but
in the northern section it was not nearly as devastating
as in the southern region. In the first quarter of 1820
there were twenty-six deaths in the northern division and
one hundred and forty-two in the southern, with thirty-
eight at the post of Baton Rouge.35 In the words of the
Secretary of War, the South truly possessed ". . . a
climate requiring all the medical assistance the law
allows."36

As the South's reputation as a burial ground
spread, it seriously effected the men who were assigned

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84 John S. Bassett, Life of Jackson (New York,
1925), 197. Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness
and Mortality in the Army of the United States, 124.
85 Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness and
Mortality in the Army of the United States, 124.
86 Secretary of War to General Pinckney, Nov. 4,
1812, SWLS, Roll 6, 221-22.
to serve there. Officers refused to serve in the section, either resigning or requesting to be assigned to other posts for reasons of health or personal hardship. The only alternative to service in the South open to enlisted men was desertion, and it is certain that many of them took that alternative. The problem could not be avoided because the posts were too important to be abandoned. Therefore new troops were continually dispatched to fill the depleted ranks of the garrisons in the South.

In spite of the earnest efforts of the War Department and the officers of the Army to find a solution to the problems presented by disease, the men faced the very real prospect of dying. Not the death of a warrior, but death in a sick bed, struck down by disease. The soldiers could protect the nation against Indians, foreign enemies and domestic insurrections, but they could not defend themselves against an enemy which was unseen and unknown to them.
The Army's principle function in the South, as in the rest of the nation, was to protect the citizens from foreign invasion and hostile Indians. In the southern states and territories, the citizens assumed that the troops would serve as a protective shield against yet another source of potential danger. Although spoken of only in carefully guarded terms and usually in private communications, Southerners hoped that the United States Army would protect them in the event of slave rebellions.

The fear of slave insurrections was persistent throughout the antebellum period. The actual number of revolts is open to debate. In what he calls a minimal list, historian Herbert Aptheker cites revolts in forty-three of the forty-seven years from 1789 to 1825. In twenty-six of the forty-three years he reports that more than one revolt occurred.¹ The number of revolts recorded

by Aptheker is much too high and includes incidents that should more properly be classified as conspiracies and forms of resistance. If these are carefully defined and counted, it is probable that there were no more than a dozen insurrections between 1691 and 1835.2

For the purposes of this study, the specific number of revolts is not as important as the number of suspected conspiracies and planned rebellions, and the currency given to the reports by white Southerners. Aptheker bases his extensive list of revolts upon the numerous reports and rumors that circulated in the slave states. Even if none of the stories were true, they reveal that white Southerners lived in constant fear of their slaves. Little or no actual proof was necessary to substantiate the reports, they were true because the Southerners believed they were true.

Whether the numerous reports of plots and revolts were real or imagined, they profoundly influenced the

2John Blassingame's definition of a revolt in The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Ante Bellum South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 125, is acceptable to this author. Blassingame defines a revolt "as any concerted action by a group of slaves with the settled purpose of and the actual destruction of the lives and property of local whites. In addition, the activities must have been recognized as an insurrection by public officials who called out the armed forces of the locale to destroy the rebels." Using this criteria he states that there were at least nine revolts between 1691 and 1865. Marion D. de B. Kilson in "Toward Freeman: An analysis of Slave Revolts in the United States," Phylon, XXV (Summer, 1964), 175-87, defines a revolt "as attempts to achieve freedom by groups of slaves." With this liberal definition the number of revolts between 1693 and 1865 is increased to sixty-five.
Southerner's concept of the role the Army should play in the South. The fear of rebellions was most prevalent in those areas where there were heavy concentrations of blacks, or in areas where the number of white residents was reduced during various times of the year. Until 1832 the fear of rebellion seems to have been greatest in Louisiana, followed closely by South Carolina and Georgia. Following the Nat Turner Rebellion, the appeals for protection came from all areas of the South.  

To provide an adequate safeguard against its slave population, the South developed an internal system of

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3Harvey Wish, "American Slave Insurrections before 1861," The Journal of Negro History, XXII (July, 1937), 299, 320. "As might be expected, insurrections tended to occur where King Cotton and his allies were most firmly entrenched and the great plantation system established. Slave unrest seems to have been far greater in Virginia rather than in the states of the Lower South," 311. "Next to Virginia, Louisiana had the greatest difficulty among the Southern states in coping with repeated attempts at insurrection," 313. Kilson found that of the sixty-five revolts studied, 25% were in Virginia, 15% in Louisiana, and 15.5% in South Carolina, "Towards Freedom: An Analysis of Slave Revolts in the United States," 179. The percentage of the slave population to the total population by states from 1790 - 1840.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>State</th>
<th>1790</th>
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</tr>
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<td>43.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>40.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>36.0</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>43.0</td>
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defense. Intended to enforce the slave codes, it consisted of the individual masters on their plantations, the local patrols and finally the state militia. Upon this system of defense the South preferred to rely, rather than admit to the world the possibility that it was unable to maintain order among its bondsmen.  

Despite the elaborate system developed in the section to insure internal security and assurances that it was capable of meeting any situation which might arise, the petitions, memorials and letters addressed to Federal officials reveal that some citizens were not completely convinced that the South could quell uprisings if they should occur. State and local authorities repeatedly requested information concerning the availability of Federal troops should they be needed.

In actual practice, regular troops were rarely used to suppress rebellions with physical force because of the Southerner's preference for using the local militia. Instead, the Army served an important psychological function. It was an ever present force upon which the whites

For one such statement see Anthony Benezet to Robert Pleasants, Apr. 8, 1773, in George S. Brooks, Friend Anthony Benezet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1937), 301. "I know it is the general opinion, that nothing ought to be published whereby the Negroes maybe made acquainted with their own strength and the apprehension of danger the whites are in from them, for this reason in every publication I have made, I have guarded against it..."
could call if the situation was critical enough to warrant such action. In addition, the presence of the regulars was believed to be a powerful deterrent to any group which might be contemplating an insurrection.

The orders issued to commanders stationed in the South indicate that the Secretary of War and the ranking officers of the Army heeded the requests and pleas of the citizens of the South. Officers were instructed to render whatever aid and assistance might be required by state and local authorities. The aid authorized included, arms and munitions for the militia, suggestions for defensive measures, and the employment of military force by the regulars.

In December of 1801 W. C. C. Claiborne, the new governor of the Mississippi Territory, requested Federal aid in his efforts to organize the militia of the Territory. He informed Secretary of State James Madison that except for the small detachment of regular troops at Fort Adams, the Territory was virtually defenseless. He expected the Territorial Legislature to pass a strong militia law before it adjourned, but he feared that arming the force would be difficult since suitable arms were scarce in the district.

Governor Claiborne suggested that four hundred muskets and a similar number of rifles be sent to Natchez.
by the government. These weapons would be sold at a price sufficient to repay the United States their original purchase cost.

The Governor based his conviction that a strong militia was needed on four important points: (1) the Mississippi Territory bordered the territory of a foreign power and a military force might be required to protect that border; (2) the Territory was separated from the nearest state, Tennessee, by six hundred miles of wilderness and must depend on its own resources for immediate protection. Uppermost in the Governor's mind were the last two reasons: (3) the Territory was surrounded by numerous tribes of potentially hostile Indians; and (4) its Negro population was nearly equal to the white population. The prospects for peace under these conditions depended upon the existence of a well armed and trained body of militia.\(^5\)

Governor Claiborne gave careful attention to the establishment of a militia system in the Mississippi Territory and again in the Orleans Territory because of the importance of that organization to the defense of the nation. The militia system as outlined in the Constitution

and later Acts of Congress, placed the responsibility for organizing the state bodies upon the individual states. In the territories the responsibility rested with the Territorial Governor and Legislature. The militia was considered important not only to the security of the nation but also of the states. A reliable force was essential and in the South it was more important than in any other section of the nation, and considerable time and attention was expended to see that it was ready to meet any emergency.

The President is the commander in chief of the militia only when it has been called into the service of the United States by Congress. At all other times, the militia is under the control of the chief executive of the individual states. The power to appoint officers in the militia is denied to the President and is retained by the states. The Constitution makes no mention of who has the authority to appoint the commanding officer when the militia of two states are serving together. Nor are command arrangements specified in the event a militia force is to serve with a regular force.

The President is solely responsible for the conduct of war. His powers as set forth in the Constitution are generally supplemented by statutory grants of authority

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6U. S., Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 2, Clause 16.
from Congress. The first major statutory grants concerning the militia were passed by Congress in May 1792, in an effort to provide an effective defense force. These acts, renewed with slight modifications in 1795, would plague the War Department for over a century.\footnote{A. A. Schiller, Military Law and Defense Legislation (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1941), 27.}

The first act, approved on May 2, 1792, was entitled, "An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."

Section one of the act provided that whenever the United States is invaded or is in danger of invasion by a foreign nation or Indian tribe, the President is authorized to call upon the militia most convenient to the area in danger. The number of men to be called forth was left to the judgement of the President. The orders of the President were to be issued through the officers of the respective militia units. The President was also authorized to call the militia into service to put down insurrections in any state, upon the request of the state legislature.

In the second section of the act, the President was given the authority to call upon the militia to enforce the laws of the Union. If the militia called upon
refused to obey the orders of the President, he was authorized to call out the militia of another state in numbers sufficient to enforce the laws of the Union.

The third section of the law stipulated that when the President shall decide that it is necessary to call out a military force to suppress an insurrection, he shall issue a proclamation commanding the insurgents to disperse and retire to their homes within a specified time. Only when this procedure has been followed could the President use the militia against domestic insurrections.

The fourth section of the law provided that the militia force called into the service of the United States shall be paid and receive the same allowances as troops of the United States, and were to be governed by the same rules and articles of war. The militia called into the service of the nation could not be compelled to serve more than three months in any one year.\(^3\)

A second act approved by Congress on May 8, 1792, provided for the establishment of a uniform militia throughout the United States. All free able-bodied white male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years of age were to be enrolled in the militia of their respective states. Every citizen enrolled was to provide

himself with a good musket or fire lock, a bayonet and belt, two spare flints, a pouch with a box containing not less than twenty-four cartridges within six months.

Certain groups of citizens were exempt from militia duty by the act: the Vice President of the United States; the officers of the judicial and executive branches of the government; the members of both Houses of Congress and their officers; the custom-house officers with their clerks; the post officers and stage drivers who handled the mail; all ferry men employed on ferries or post roads; and all persons who might be exempted by their respective states.

The act also provided an outline for the organization of the militia, the number of men and officers in the various units and the number of units. It specified that the militia was to be governed by the rules set forth by Congress in 1779.9

In the territories of the southern region where frontier conditions combined with the existence of slavery to produce a potentially explosive situation, the militia system was "extremely" important. The function of the militia was to supplement the Federal forces in the event of an invasion or rebellion, and close cooperation between the militia and the regulars was

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necessary. In the territories, where the Governor was appointed by the central government, such cooperation was easier to acquire than when the militia of a state was involved. Governor Claiborne realized the importance of the militia to the defense of the nation and of the close relationship between the function of the regular Army and the territorial force.

While awaiting an answer from Washington, Governor Claiborne turned to General James Wilkinson for assistance in solving the arms problem. He acknowledged that the small body of Federal troops at Fort Adams would afford some protection in the event of trouble. However, the distance of the fort from the populous settlements meant that much slaughter might result before the troops could take the field in the event of a sudden attack. The militia was needed to support and supplement the small body of regulars in the event of attack by Indians or insurrection among the blacks.

To be effective the militia needed arms and the command at Fort Adams had a quantity of extra weapons. The Governor suggested that if these weapons could be stored at some central location and their use subject to his order, it would be to the advantage of the citizens of the region.¹⁰

¹⁰Claiborne to Wilkinson, Jan. 29, 1802, Kowland, WCC, I, 42-43.
On February 5 the Governor informed the Secretary of State of the request he had directed to General Wilkinson. He stated that the peaceful situation which existed was at best precarious due to the presence of Indians and the numerous Negroes. Assurances were given that the erection of new buildings for the proper storage of the weapons would cost the government nothing, since the land, materials, and labor would be donated by the citizens.\footnote{Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 5, 1802, \textit{Ibid.}, 40-42.}

The General's response to the Governor's request was immediate and positive. Wilkinson stated that his superiors considered the "safety and tranquility" of the citizens to be of primary importance in the disposition of the troops. He would issue orders for the establishment of a small post at a site selected by the governor and place 250 or 300 stand of arms there subject to his order. General Wilkinson believed "that our troops were intended for the accommodation of the civil authority, to be used or employed as circumstances should render necessary. . . ."\footnote{Wilkinson to Claiborne, Jan. 29, 1802, \textit{Ibid.}, 43-44.}

Although the General and the Governor agreed upon the establishment of a post, it was a year before construction began. In the intervening months, Claiborne
requested the sanction of the President for the new post, the loan of 1,000 arms, and supplies for the artillery company of Natchez. 13

In March Secretary of War Henry Dearborn informed Claiborne that in response to his requests, the President had ordered five hundred rifles and three hundred muskets shipped to the Governor. These arms were to be sold to the militia in whatever manner the Governor deemed proper to defray the purchase cost of the weapons. 14 In April the Secretary of War stated that the President had authorized the movement of one company of soldiers from Fort Adams to Natchez. The troops were to be used in the manner previously suggested by the Governor. 15

The collaboration between the civil and military authorities resulted in the construction of Fort Dearborn near the city of Washington some six miles east of Natchez. Construction began in 1803, but before the post was completed both Governor Claiborne and General Wilkinson had left the Mississippi Territory to take formal possession

13 Claiborne to Madison, Mar. 6, 1802, Ibid., 53-54; Claiborne to Dearborn, Apr. 8, 1802, Ibid., 71-74. These letters concern sanction of the new post by the government. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 3, 1802, Ibid., 69-70. Request for 1,000 arms. Captain Bartholomew Shamburgh to Claiborne, Apr. 7, 1802, Ibid., 79; Claiborne to Shamburgh, Apr. 12, 1802, Ibid., 80-81.

14 Dearborn to Claiborne, Mar. 10, 1802, Ibid., 104.

15 Dearborn to Claiborne, Apr. 8, 1802, Ibid., 110-12; Claiborne to Dearborn, May 24, 1802, Ibid., 112-13.
of New Orleans for the United States.

Claiborne was appointed Governor of the new province and upon taking possession of New Orleans he turned immediately to the task of organizing the machinery of government. He again faced the problem of using Federal and militia troops to reassure the citizens that they were safe from possible slave insurrections. He found that the normal apprehension of slave rebellion had been increased by the events in Santo Domingo, which were told and retold by refugees who fled to Louisiana from the French Colony.

The military force which had accompanied the American Commissioners to New Orleans was a combination of regulars and volunteers, numbering between four hundred and fifty and five hundred men. Of this force approximately two hundred were volunteers who would remain in service only until General Wilkinson felt that they could be safely discharged. When this force of volunteers was dismissed and returned to their homes, protection of the new territory would depend upon the regulars and militia of the territory.


17 Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 27, 1803, Ibid., 312-16. The volunteers had not been dismissed due to the small number of regular troops in the province.
The situation of the militia in New Orleans was somewhat different than it had been in the Mississippi Territory. The Spanish had maintained an efficient militia organization, and it only remained for Governor Claiborne to recommission the units in order to have a militia force at his disposal. During the reorganization process, Governor Claiborne encountered a problem which went to the very heart of the Southern system and the relationship of the military to the "peculiar institution."

Governor Claiborne was called upon to determine the fate of two large companies of "people of colour", both of which had been a part of the Spanish militia system. The governor promptly recommissioned the white units, but the fate of the two companies of blacks raised two perplexing questions. If they were recommissioned, the action might anger a large segment of the nation's population and destroy some of the principles upon which the safety of the South rested. If they were not recommissioned, the militia members might be angered and possibly become an armed enemy in the heart of the nation. Governor Claiborne chose the diplomatic way out of the dilemma; he requested instruction from Washington before taking any action.  

18 Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 27, 1803, Ibid., 312-16; Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 17, 1804, Ibid., 339-41; Wilkinson to Dearborn, Dec. 21, 1803, Clarence E. Carter
On February 20, 1804, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn wrote to Governor Claiborne informing him that he should renew the Corps of Free Men of Color. The Secretary cautioned that the number of men in the organization should not be increased and if at all possible it should be diminished. The letter was received on March 22, and was answered with assurances that the instructions would be followed.\(^\text{19}\)

In compliance with the instructions from Washington, the subsequent actions of Governor Claiborne indicated that the position of the Battalion of Free Men of Color was changing. On April 19 the Governor requested that the officials of New Orleans conduct a census which would

(\text{ed.}), \text{The Territorial Papers of the United States, IX, The Territory of Orleans, 1803-1812} (Washington, 1940), 139. Hereinafter cited as Carter, \text{Territorial Papers, IX}. Contains a request that 500 regular troops be assigned to New Orleans. The reason for the additional troops was "the formidable aspect of the Armed Blacks and Malattoes [sic] officered and organized," Wilkinson found to be "Painful and Perplexing." Donald Everett, "Emigres and Militiamen: Free Persons of Color in New Orleans, 1803-1815," \text{The Journal of Negro History, XXXVIII} (Oct., 1953), 377-402.

facilitate his reorganization of the militia. The census was to include all free, white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. There was no mention made in the governor's request of free Negroes.20

On June 9 the Governor reported to the War Department that he had appointed two officers to serve in the Battalion. The appointment had aroused some dissatisfaction among the men of the Corps. The men commissioned were white, and the members of the militia unit had expected to be commanded by their own officers.21

The apprehension over the existence of an organized and armed body of blacks in the heart of an area with a large slave population was a natural outgrowth of the existence of the institution of slavery. It was reported that there was a great dislike between the white natives of Louisiana and the free blacks, and it is probable that the whites would have greeted the end of the Corps with approval.22

In 1805 the Territorial Legislature failed to make any mention of the Free Men of Color when they passed

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20 Claiborne to the Mayor and Municipality of New Orleans, Apr. 19, 1804, Rowland, WCC, II, 106.

21 Claiborne to Dearborn, June 9, 1804, Ibid., 199-200. For instructions to Major Fortier, one of the officers in question, see Claiborne to Fortier, June 22, 1804, Ibid., 215-16.

22 Claiborne to Dearborn, June 22, 1804, Ibid., 217-18.
the general militia law on April 5. Claiborne felt that this had been done as much from a fear of the organization as from a desire to injure him personally. The Governor was certain that the men had been "soured" on the American government and that their dependability was no longer a certainty. He was of the opinion that at least the property holders and those of a "fair reputation" could be depended upon to remain loyal. On January 9, 1807, Governor Claiborne ordered a census taken of all free men of color in New Orleans and the surrounding area who had previously held positions in the Corps. The Governor hoped that the Territorial Legislature would pass an act which would make the corps a part of the permanent militia organization. Four days after ordering the census, Claiborne addressed the Legislature and urged them to recognize the Corps. He outlined the loyal service of the Corps under the Spanish regime and stated that they still wished to become a part of the regular militia.

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23 Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 3, 1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 561. James Brown reported that "the free people of color have lost their consequence by being stripped of Arms and are anxious to regain it." Brown to Albert Gallatin, Jan. 7, 1806, Ibid., 559.

24 General Order, Jan. 9, 1807, signed by Colonel Henry Hopkins, Adjutant General, Territorial Militia, Ibid., 717. The number of free men of color in New Orleans in 1806 was 2,312 and increased to 5,727 by 1810. Free Men of Color to Claiborne, Jan., 1808, Ibid., 174.

25 Rowland, WCC, IV, 92-93.
The Territorial Legislature again took no action on the issue when it considered the organization of the militia.

The reason for the concern stemmed logically from the southern concept of the principal functions of the militia. If it was to be the major agency is suppressing slave insurrections, any doubt about its reliability and ability to fulfill its assignments could not be entertained. But the loyalty of the free blacks could always be questioned.²⁶

The anxiety about the loyalty of the Battalion appears to have been unfounded. During the insurrection of 1811, the militia was called out to suppress the rebellion north of the city. One company of free men of color was called into service and won the praise of Governor Claiborne for its conduct in the city of New Orleans during the crisis.²⁷

The Battalion of Free Men of Color still retained its organization in 1815. General Andrew Jackson addressed


²⁷ Claiborne to Du Bourg, Jan. 14, 1811, Rowland, WCC, V, 99. Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 14, 1811, Ibid., 100.
a proclamation to the free colored inhabitants of Louisiana promising them the same privileges and considerations enjoyed by white soldiers if they enlisted. By mid-December of 1814, a second battalion of free men of color had been raised in response to Jackson's proclamation. Both battalions held front line positions during the defense of New Orleans and performed admirably.

The problems of organizing the civil and military affairs of the province were momentarily overshadowed by problems in the western part of the territory. While forcing administrative details into the background, the unrest pointed out the importance of a well organized militia and close cooperation between that body and the Federal troops.

In October of 1804, the first hints of trouble among the slaves in the vicinity of Natchitoches were discovered and promptly reported to the governor. The source of the trouble was attributed to the presence of the readily accessible border between American and Spanish territory. Nine slaves had run away and it was feared

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28 A. Lacarriere Latour, Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-15 (Philadelphia, 1816), Appendix No. XVII, XXXI-XXXII. Charles Gayarre lists two proclamations issued by General Jackson, one on Sept. 21, 1814 and the other on Dec. 13, 1814, in History of Louisiana, IV, 355 and 403.

29 McConnell, Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana, 64-90.
that more would join them. They were pursued in the
direction of the Spanish post at Nacogdoches, where they
apparently expected to receive sanctuary. The inhabitants
of the area feared that if no action was taken to prevent
the crossing of the border, what had begun as a minor
incident might become general.\(^{30}\)

Governor Claiborne addressed two strong protests
to the Spanish representative, the Marquis de Casa Calvo.
The protests were prompted by the agitation among the
slaves, combined with reports that Spanish agents had
been urging certain Indian tribes to attack the Americans.
The letters pointed out that the reported actions by the
Spanish authorities might injure the good understanding
which existed between the two countries.\(^{31}\) On November 3
the Governor reported the situation to Secretary of State
James Madison and informed him that if the Spanish author-
ities were disposed to be unfriendly, trouble might re-
sult.\(^{32}\)

\(^{30}\) Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Oct. 30, 1804, Rowland, WCC, II, 382-83. Turner to Claiborne, Oct. 16, 1804, ibid., 385-86. An 1806 census of the Territory of Orleans gives the following populations: Pointe Coupee, 267 white males of 21 years and up, 258 white males below 21, 443 white females of every age, 115 free men, women, and children of color, and 2,251 slaves; Natchitoches, 407 white males of 21 years and up, 270 white males below 21, 410 white females of every age, 121 free men, women, and children of color, and 1,209 slaves. Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 923.

\(^{31}\) Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Oct. 31, 1804, Rowland, WCC, II, 382-83; Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Oct. 31, 1804, ibid., 383-84.

\(^{32}\) Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 3, 1804, Ibid., 381-32.
While endeavoring to settle the problem through diplomatic channels, Claiborne suggested to Colonel Thomas Butler, commanding the American forces, that reinforcements be sent to the post at Natchitoches owing to the apprehensions over possible Indian attack and the unrest among the slaves. The Governor recommended that a subaltern and twelve or fifteen men might be detached from the troops stationed at Attakapas and Opelousas in an effort to preserve good order.33

Captain Edward Turner, the civil and military commandant at Natchitoches, gave the governor ample reason to worry about the situation in Natchitoches when he reported:

This circumstance has so enraged the Inhabitants against the Spaniards, that I believe they would almost to a man willingly go to Nacogdoches and lay it in waste. In fact they have requested me in case the Negroes are not sent back to permit them to go, observing that is [sic] something is not immediately done, they will not have a slave left in three months. I have tried to quiet them by saying they may depend on protection and justice.34

Turner was obviously a man caught between the desires of the citizens of Natchitoches and the instructions of his government.

33 Claiborne to Butler, Nov. 1, 1804, Ibid., 384.
34 Turner to Claiborne, Oct. 17, 1804, Ibid., 385-86.
By November 3 the crisis had passed, Claiborne was able to inform Captain Turner that the Marquis de Casa Calvo had censured the actions of the Commandant at Nacogdoches and that the fugitives would probably be arrested and returned to their owners. Turner was to continue the night patrols and afford the residents of the district all the protection possible. If these measures did not quiet the citizens, the Commandant was to make every effort to see that they took no aggressive action against the Spanish.  

As the crisis passed at Natchitoches, the Governor informed the Secretary of State that the unrest had spread to Pointe Coupee, where the occurrences in Nacogdoches were known among the slaves. The citizens addressed a petition to the governor requesting a force to protect them in the event of an insurrection. The Governor wrote to Colonel Butler asking him to dispatch a subaltern's command to Pointe Coupee to provide the area an added measure of protection.

Claiborne's report to the Secretary included a statement that would be repeated again and again by officials in the South: "Our troops here are too few in number to admit to detachments to the various posts where they would be serviceable, and I most earnestly

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35 Claiborne to Turner, Nov. 3, 1804, Ibid., 389-90.
advise that the regular force in Louisiana be augmented with all possible dispatch." 36

Colonel Butler dispatched a force of regulars composed of a subaltern and twenty-five or thirty men to Pointe Coupee. The detachment took with it one hundred stand of public arms. These weapons were to be distributed to the militia in an effort to bolster the local defenses. 37

Although Governor Claiborne lamented the necessity of maintaining a standing army, he realized that the unrest within the Territory and the presence of a superior Spanish force on its borders would not permit a reduction but instead required an increase in that force. He stated that this situation would continue to exist at least until the civil authority was strong enough to maintain order. 38

In 1807 the planters of the Mississippi Territory reported to Governor Robert Williams that they suspected that there might be a slave revolt in the region during the summer. As a precaution against such an event, the Governor established a patrol to guard against the slaves.

36 Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 8, 1804, Ibid., 394.
Claiborne to Butler, Nov. 8, 1804, Rowland, WCC, III, 5.

37 Claiborne to Butler, Nov. 8, 1804, Ibid., 5.
Claiborne to Turner, Nov. 8, 1804, Ibid., 6-7.

38 Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 10, 1804, Ibid., 7-3.
In addition to the patrol, a detachment of United States troops was stationed at Fort Dearborn. Either the suspicions of rebellion were unfounded or the presence of the militia and regulars accomplished their desired object for there was no more talk of large-scale rebellion in the Territory for a period of three years.

In 1810 the fear of slave rebellion spread rapidly through the Mississippi Territory and the neighboring province of West Florida. As the men of West Florida rushed to join the revolutionary forces in Baton Rouge, they left their families behind without adequate protection. The families appealed to Colonel Hugh Davis, of Homochitto, for protection. The request was forwarded to Governor David Holmes, who immediately sent a request to Colonel Thomas Cushing for a detachment of regulars to protect the Americans and their property in the vicinity of Pinckneyville, near the border with West Florida. The Governor also put into motion plans for bringing the militia into service. The militia and regulars were to patrol the American side of the border to prevent slaves from crossing in either direction and to maintain order.

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40 Davis to Holmes, Sept. 25, 1810, Mississippi Territorial Archives, M. S., Vol. 9.
along the border. The combined operation was successful in maintaining the peace, and the regulars returned to Fort Adams.41

On January 9, 1811, the citizens of New Orleans and the surrounding area were thrown into a state of panic when word was received that the slaves on the plantation of Colonel Andre had revolted. After wounding the Colonel and killing his son, the slaves started to march toward New Orleans, only thirty-six miles to the south.42

As the slaves proceeded south, they gained strength as they passed plantations which were abandoned by their owners when they learned of the uprising. While the whites mobilized their military strength, the slaves continued their advance, burning three houses and pillaging


42 Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1811, Rowland, ACC, V, 95. Claiborne to Andre, Jan. 13, 1811, Ibid., 97. The 1806 census of Orleans Territory gives the following populations: the German Coast, 555 white males of 21 years and above, 647 white males below 21, 972 white females of every age, 229 free men, women and children of color, and 3,285 slaves; Orleans, 2,108 white males of 21 years and above, 1,422 white males below 21, 2,781 white females of every age, 2,312 free men, women and children of color, and 8,378 slaves. Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 923.
several other plantations. The strength of the force gathered by the slaves was variously reported as being from 180 to 500 men strong.

The insurrection on Louisiana's German Coast provides an excellent example of the speed with which the South could put a military force into action. Governor Claiborne received the news of the revolt at ten in the morning on the ninth and immediately set the defensive machinery in motion. New Orleans was sealed against entrance or exit to the north by blacks when a guard of regulars was placed at the Bayou Bridge. By three in the afternoon Claiborne reported that a detachment of regulars and two companies of volunteer militia had marched to meet the slaves and the remaining members of the militia were on duty in New Orleans. The strength


Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1811, Rowland, *WCC*, V, 95.


of the force that marched north was reported by the Governor to number several hundred men. 48

The picture which Claiborne presented was somewhat different than that painted by Brigadier General Wade Hampton in his report to the Secretary of War. Hampton was informed by Claiborne of the outbreak at noon, and he immediately began to assemble a military force:

The regular force in the city was inconsiderable, and as there was nothing like an organized militia, the confusion was great beyond description.

So soon as two companies of volunteer militia could be paraded, I joined to them 30 regulars and marched at their head, about six o'clock, to meet the Brigands. It was all the force, except a small garrison left in the Fort, which at that time appeared susceptible of command. On our march we overtook a company of seamen, which Commodore [sic] Shaw had sent forward, of which I also took the command. This little force reached the Plantation of Colonel Fortier, six leagues from the city, about half after 4 o'clock on the morning of the 10th through roads half leg deep in mud. 49

48 Claiborne to St. Amand, Jan. 9, 1811, Ibid., 93–94.

49 Hampton to Secretary of War, Jan. 16, 1811, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 917–18. Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 14, 1811, Rowland, WCC, V, 100. In this letter Claiborne states that several hundred sailors had volunteered their services, and that one company of them had marched to aid the planters. The regulars, militia, and sailors hardly represent a force of several hundred men from New Orleans.
From the standpoint of the slaves, the area in which the insurrection began was filled with disadvantages. Bounded on the west by the Mississippi River, to the south by New Orleans, to the north by Baton Rouge, the only possible avenue of escape was to the east into the woods and swamps. There could be little doubt as to the outcome once the whites regained their composure.

General Hampton marched at the head of the combined force from New Orleans and Major Homer Milton, of the United States Army, marched with a detachment of regulars from Baton Rouge. Before the two forces could converge on the scene, the slaves were met and soundly defeated by a local force. About eighty planters, who responded to the "exertions and exhortations" of Colonel Andre, had pursued the fugitives as they moved south. The planters caught and attacked the rebels, and in a brief but furious battle they either killed or captured a large number of the slaves. The slaves who managed to survive the initial attack took refuge in the dense woods that bordered the battlefield.

The planters divided their force and in conjunction with the forces that arrived on the scene after the battle, continued to pursue the slaves in the heavily wooded countryside. During the vigorous pursuit, the remaining slaves were either killed or taken prisoners.\(^5\)

\(^5\)Andry [Andre] to Claiborne, Jan. 11, 1811,
On January 11 the force under General Hampton met Major Milton's command. The Major and his troops were posted in the neighborhood of the rebellion to give aid and assistance to the citizens in their search for the remaining slaves. General Hampton returned the troops from New Orleans to the city, feeling that the planters were now capable of protecting their own property. However, as an added precaution, he ordered a company of light artillery and a company of dragoons to march from Baton Rouge to visit every settlement of any size. This force was intended to crush any rebellions that might have broken out further up the river. General Hampton attributed the outbreak of trouble as being "unquestionably of Spanish origin, and has had an extensive combination." 51

Fifteen of the captured slaves were tried in a court of law for their part in the insurrection. The sentences which they received were considered to be equal to the enormity of their crimes. The fifteen were found guilty and executed. As a deterrent to future rebellions, the heads of the executed slaves were put on tall poles which were placed along the river from New Orleans to the

Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 915-16.

51 Hampton to Claiborne, Jan. 12, 1811, Ibid., 916-17.
plantation where the revolt started.\(^52\)

In commenting on the sentences of the court, Governor Claiborne wrote:

> The example which has been made of the guilty actors in the late insurrection will I hope produce the desired effect. Justice, policy, our future safety required that the guilty should suffer; for the sake of humanity however it is greatly to be desired that the list of the guilty may not be found still greater.\(^53\)

The Governor hoped that the insurrection would have some beneficial effect. The Territorial Legislature had adjourned for two weeks during the insurrection and was soon to return to its deliberations.\(^54\) Claiborne wanted the legislature to pass laws providing for a more energetic

\(^52\)Martin, History of Louisiana, II, 301. Fortier, A History of Louisiana, III, 78-79. These two accounts give the number tried and executed as 16. Gayarre, A History of Louisiana, IV, 267. Aptheker, American Negro Revolts, 250. The correspondence of Governor Claiborne indicates that fifteen slaves were tried, all of them were convicted but that one had been recommended to the mercy of the executive. The Governor indicated that if a jury recommended mercy he would comply and issue a pardon. Claiborne to Judge St. Martin, Jan. 19, 1811, Rowland, ACC, V, 104. The Governor states that six of those captured were ordered to St. Charles Parish for trial; eight had already been tried and condemned in New Orleans, with mercy recommended for one; and Chief Gilbert, one of the leaders had just surrendered. Claiborne to Detrehan, Jan. 19, 1811, Ibid., 107-108. Claiborne to John Ballinger, Jan. 20, 1811, Ibid., 108-109.

\(^53\)Claiborne to Detrehan, Jan. 19, 1811, Ibid., 107.

\(^54\)Proclamation of Claiborne, Ibid., 98.
militia system and to check the "indiscriminate importation of slaves from the southern states."\footnote{Claiborne to John Ballinger, Jan. 20, 1811, \textit{Ibid.}, 108-109. For the Governor's recommendations see Claiborne to both Houses of the Legislative Body of the Territory of Orleans, Jan. 29, 1811, \textit{Ibid.}, 123-24.}

In accessing the role of the United States Army in suppressing the rebellion, General Hampton wrote:

\begin{quote}
The prompt display and exhibition of a regular military force all along the coast (the river) by land and water, has had a most happy effect as well upon the blacks, as the citizens, who by this countenance have been enabled to use and feel their own strength and to rely upon that which the government can at all times from Baton Rouge or this city send to their aid.\footnote{Hampton to the Secretary of War, Jan. 16, 1811, Carter, \textit{Territorial Papers}, IX, 918.}
\end{quote}

In spite of the executions, the hopes of the Governor, and the predictions of General Hampton, the citizens of the German Coast and New Orleans were thrown into turmoil again in December. Although doubting the reports of unrest had any foundation in truth, the Governor made certain that the military forces in the area were prepared to meet any outbreak.\footnote{Claiborne to the Secretary of the Navy, Paul Hamilton, Dec. 26, 1811, Rowland, \textit{CC}, VI, 20.}
German Coast. The Governor ordered the commander of the regular forces in New Orleans to hold his command ready for prompt action. The Governor also requested that Major William MacRae place one hundred and fifty stand of arms and several boxes of cartridges at the disposal of the City Guard, to be used only if they were needed. This supply of weapons was for the use of the militia, which Claiborne observed would be of little use unless they were well supplied with arms and ammunition. The Governor's desire to have a well-armed and effective militia force to combat slave insurrections would be echoed by others as the threat of a foreign war increased.

In the debates that preceded the declaration of war by the United States on Great Britain on June 18, 1812, predictions were made that the Americans would march victoriously into Canada, inflict defeat on the British, and humble Spain if she were foolish enough to join the English. At least one member of Congress voiced an opinion that must have occurred to more than one Southerner as he listened to the orators painting pictures


59 Claiborne to Mackae, N. C., Ibid., 16-17. This letter was either written on the 23d or 24th of December.
of American victories and retrieved national honor. John Randolph, Congressman from Virginia and a slave owner, spoke of the danger arising from the black population of the South: "While talking of taking Canada some of us are shuddering for our safety at home. I speak from facts when I say that the night bell never tolls for fire in Richmond that the mother does not hug the infant more closely to her bosom." 

The vision of its male population marching off to a distant theatre of war must have been unsettling to more Southerners than just Representative Randolph. In August of 1812 the Secretary of War informed General Pinckney that the intention of the President with respect to the militia was to use that force until the regular troops could be raised.

In the northern states where it was found necessary to concentrate the regulars for offensive operations the aid of the militia was relied on, altho the views of the President have not been seconded by the governors of some of the states.

From the southern states there is at this time no probability that the regular troops will be required for distant operations, and as it is desirable that the militia should be spared as much as possible, particularly

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at this season of the year, as our
great reliance in case of strong
emergencies, is in them. . . .

General Pinckney was instructed to reduce the
number of militia in service and to relieve those that
remained as soon as recruits became available from the
regular force. 51

The first serious problems arose in Georgia
where the citizens were aroused to fever pitch by a
guerrilla war on the frontier, waged by Indians and run-
away slaves. The proximity of the border between Georgia
and Spanish East Florida provided a convenient refuge for
the Indians and their black allies. In addition to the
sanctuary it offered the raiders, Spain had employed a
number of Negro soldiers in its efforts to suppress the
abortive insurrection in East Florida, an action that
further frightened the angered American slave owners. 62

51 Secretary of War to Pinckney, Aug. 22, 1812,
in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters
Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1839. Record
Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 6, 91-92. Hereinafter cited
as SWLS. The Secretary's reference to militia having
been refused was in reference to the actions of Mass­
achusetts and Connecticut, both refused their quotas
of militia when requested by the President. No case
has been found where the militia requisitioned from a
southern state was refused.

62 Julius F. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (New
York: Peter Smith, 1949), 192-95, 207-12; T. F. Davis,
"United States Troops in Spanish East Florida, 1812-
1813," The Florida Historical Society Quarterly (1930-
1931), IX, 3-12, 96-109, 133-55, 259-73. Rembert W.
Patrick, Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia -
While the citizens of Georgia worried about the situation on their frontier and meddled in the affairs of East Florida, the fear of rebellion was spreading in the Mississippi Territory. On July 22, 1812, Governor David Holmes wrote to General Wilkinson expressing his concern for the safety of the inhabitants of the Territory. The basis of the Governor's concern was the possibility of trouble with the Choctaw Indians and the equally important prospect of a slave rebellion.

Holmes wanted Wilkinson to send him a large supply of muskets, rifles and a quantity of powder and lead for the use of the territorial militia. The Governor stated that hardly a day passed without some warning reaching him concerning the designs of the slaves. Holmes wrote, "... it is my firm belief that the safety of the citizens here may depend upon my procuring a sufficient number of arms to enable them to defend themselves against the dangers apprehended." 63

As the United States poured its manpower and resources into the conflict on the northwestern frontier,

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63 Holmes to Wilkinson, July 22, 1812, Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 299. For evidence of the discontent among the slaves of the Mississippi Territory see Holmes to David Pannelli, July 23, 1812, Ibid., 301.

General Wilkinson was informed that he must make the most of the means at his disposal. The General had requested reinforcements, but no recruits were available and there was confusion as to who should command the force of marines stationed within the General's Department.\footnote{Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Sept. 11, 1812, SWLS, Roll 6, 136.}

On October 14 General Wilkinson was informed that not only were additional recruits not available, but because the demand for arms was so great in the north, additional arms for his command would be delayed.\footnote{Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 14, 1812, Ibid., 194.} The General, left to his own resources for the moment, turned to his one remaining source of manpower, the militia.

He requested that Governor Holmes send a detachment of militia outside the borders of the Mississippi Territory. The Governor responded by saying that there were apprehensions of Indian and slave troubles in the territory if the militia were ordered to another area. However, Holmes was certain that if the cavalry could be allowed to remain behind and two hundred additional muskets supplied for the use of the militia, the security of the Territory could be maintained. He pointed out several important reasons as to why all of the militia should not be taken: the militia force encamped at

\footnote{Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Sept. 11, 1812, SWLS, Roll 6, 136.}

\footnote{Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 14, 1812, Ibid., 194.}
Washington was one-fourth of the physical force of the Mississippi Territory; the slave population of the district was nearly equal to the white population; and the frontier counties were thinly populated. It was the Governor's hope that Wilkinson would carefully weigh these considerations before taking all of the militia. 66

While Governor Holmes worried about the security of his province, a report was circulating that seemed to reinforce the Southerners' apprehensions. The Tennessee Herald of September 5 carried the news that the British had occupied Pensacola, and a part of that force was composed of black troops. The author reflected the opinion prevalent in the South concerning the use of black troops:

The policy of stationing troops of that description upon our frontier cannot be mistaken. The same hand which has incited against us the scalping knife and the tomahawk of the Indians, will not stop to renew upon the Mobile and Lower Mississippi the tragedy of St. Domingo.

The report pointed out that the alarm this news had produced was not unfounded. The settlements on the Mobile were separated from the settled parts of the United States on the north and northwest by six thousand Creeks and two thousand Choctaws; to the south were the

66 Holmes to Wilkinson, Oct. 19, 1812, Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 328-29.
British and their black and Spanish allies; and in their midst a population that if excited to revolt would require the entire military force to subdue. The states of Georgia and South Carolina were in no position to afford the settlements assistance; the only source of aid was Tennessee, three hundred miles away.67

The Herald's report was bolstered by a letter to the editor of the Niles Weekly Register from Captain James B. Wilkinson, who was stationed at Fort Stoddert. The Captain reported that there were nearly three hundred Negro Troops in the town of Mobile.68

The Georgia Legislature was deliberating over what course of action should be taken with regard to Florida, as the reports of Spanish cooperation with England mounted. The Georgia House of Representatives' Committee on East Florida reported that the state was constitutionally vested with the power to occupy East Florida and maintain its occupation until the national government did something to eliminate the danger that threatened the people of the state.69

Apprehensions of slave insurrections and British—

67Tennessee Herald, Sept. 5, 1812, as reported in Niles Weekly Register, Oct. 17, 1812, III, 107.

68James B. Wilkinson to editor, Oct. 14, 1812, Niles Weekly Register, Nov. 7, 1812, III. Wilkinson states that the black troops were Spanish.

69Niles Weekly Register, Dec. 26, 1812, III.
supported black troops continued throughout the war, and the British played upon these fears. On April 1, 1814, Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Inglis Cochrane assumed command of the Royal Navy's North American Command. The next day he issued a proclamation that was clearly intended to arouse American slaves. The Admiral offered to persons who wished to leave the United States an opportunity to do so. Those who left the United States could either enter the service of the King or become free settlers in an English colony.  

The proclamation was received with consternation and anger in the South. The editors of the Savannah paper refused to print the proclamation, believing it to be "inexpedient" to do so. One editor's comment was, "If this proclamation is what we are led to believe it to be, it caps the climax of dishonor and barbarity and

70 J. MacKay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955), 206-207. The proclamation read as follows:

WHEREAS it has been represented to me, that many persons now resident in the United States, have expressed a desire to withdraw therefrom, with a view to entering into His Majesty's service or being received as free settlers into some of His Majesty's colonies.

This is therefore to give notice
That all those who may be disposed to emigrate from the United States, will with their families, be received on board His Majesty's ships or vessels of war, or at the military posts that may be established upon or near the coast of the United States, when they will have their choice of either entering into His Majesty's sea or land forces, or of being sent as FREE settlers, to the British possessions in North America or the West Indies, where they will meet with all due encouragements.
shall give eternal infamy to the British name, unless disavowed. 71

Further alarm was caused when it was reported that approximately a thousand Creek Indians had gathered at Pensacola to receive arms and other supplies from the British. It was also reported that the British had 17,000 stands of arms in addition to those given to the Indians. It was believed that these arms were for "the 'humane' purpose of enabling the slaves to destroy the white population - men, women and children." 72

As the Americans and British began the series of maneuvers in the South which would eventually bring them to the Battle of New Orleans, the fear of insurrection would hinder and influence the concentration of American troops. Anticipating a possible British thrust at Louisiana through Mobile, the President ordered Governor William Blount of Tennessee to detach five thousand militia to join General Jackson. In addition the Governor of Georgia was ordered to muster five thousand militia, half of this number to be held in reserve until Jackson determined whether he needed them. 73

71 Niles Weekly Register, May 21, 1814, VI.
72 Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 23, 1814, VI.
73 Secretary of War to Blount, Sept. 25, 1814, SWLS, Roll 7, 317-18. Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, Sept. 25, 1814, SWLS, Roll 7, 318-19.
General Jackson had already requested 2,500 militia from Tennessee, making a total requisition of 7,500 from that state. When the War Department learned this, it requested 2,500 militia from Kentucky in order to keep the requisition on Tennessee at 5,000. As the reports of the strength of the British force destined for New Orleans came to the War Department, the orders of October 3 to the Governor of Tennessee were rescinded and the militia from Georgia were ordered to march. Thus a militia force of 12,500 men had been ordered to join General Jackson's command.

General Jackson had at his command all of the regular troops in his Department, the detached militia in Louisiana, the Mississippi Territory, and Tennessee. He also had the authority to engage the warriors of the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and the Creeks to aid the United States. At first this appears to be a large reservoir of men to draw upon, but the Secretary of War added a sentence to the instructions which revealed the true

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74 Secretary of War to Governor of Kentucky, Oct. 3, 1814, SWLS, Roll 7, 334. Secretary of War to Governor of Tennessee, Oct. 3, 1814, SWLS, Roll 7, 337.

75 Secretary of War to Governor of Kentucky, Oct. 10, 1814, SWLS, Roll 7, 342. Secretary of War to Governor of Tennessee, Oct. 10, 1814, Ibid., 342-43. Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, Oct. 10, 1814, Ibid., 344. Secretary of War to Jackson, Oct. 10, 1814, Ibid., 344.
situation. "It is known that the regular troops are distributed into many posts, and that the militia of Louisiana will be less effective for general purposes from the dread of domestic insurrection, so that on the militia of Tennessee your principal reliance must be."\textsuperscript{76}

Thus when Jackson faced the British at the Battle of New Orleans in January of 1815, his Army was composed largely of Tennessee and Kentucky militia, with smaller groups of regulars, pirates, Indians and Louisiana militia from the immediate area.

\textsuperscript{76}Secretary of War to Jackson, Sept. 27, 1814, \textit{Ibid.}, 323-25.
CHAPTER X

THE ARMY AND THE INSTITUTION
OF SLAVERY, 1816-1835

In the twenty years after the War of 1812, white Southerners continued to rely principally upon the local militia for protection against slave insurrections. Although the militia was generally better organized and more effective after the war, Southerners requested that Federal troops be available to afford them additional protection from the black population. However, as the years passed and the agitation against slavery mounted, the leaders of the South became more and more reluctant to openly express their fears. Historian Stanley Elkins writes:

A heavy and cramping tension thus exists in most of the formal writings. The spokesmen did not want it supposed for an instant that the South was unable to control its slave population or that the inferior creatures were anything but pleased with their happy conditions.¹

While the formal writing and public utterances reveal little concern over slave insurrections, the private correspondence of the southern leaders reveal no reluctance to call upon the Federal government in their time of need. As the frontier line was pushed westward and settlers moved into the unsettled regions of the South, military posts and garrisons that might otherwise have been abandoned were maintained in areas that had little to fear from Indian attack or a sudden invasion by a foreign enemy.

In 1816 United States troops took the field in what would result in one of the few actual clashes between regular troops and blacks in the period from 1815 to 1835. The clash arose out of the occupation of a British built fort in East Florida by a large band of runaway slaves and a few Indians. In March the Secretary of War wrote to General Andrew Jackson concerning the fort and warning him that the practices of the force of enticing slaves from the frontier of Georgia might endanger the peace of the nation. He wrote:

The President has therefore directed me to instruct you to call the attention of the governor or military commander of Pensacola to this subject. The principles of good neighborhood require the interferences of the Spanish authority to put an end to an evil of so serious a nature. Should he decline this interference, it will be incumbent on the Executive
to determine what course shall be adopted in relation to this banditti. Should it be determined that the destruction of the fort does not require the sanction of the legislature, measures will be promptly taken for its reduction. 2

Before anything constructive could be accomplished through diplomatic channels, the Savannah Journal pointed out the necessity of some type of action being taken:

"In the course of last winter, several slaves from this neighborhood fled to that fort; others have lately gone from Tennessee and the Mississippi Territory. How long shall this evil requiring immediate remedy be permitted to exist?" 3

On July 17 Colonel Duncan Clinch, accompanied by a force of 116 regulars and 150 Indian allies, left Camp Crawford to march on the Negro fort. Just one month after the publication of the denouncement in the Savannah Journal, a shot fired by an American gunboat struck the main powder magazine of the fort and completely destroyed the structure. In the official report to the War

2 Secretary of War to General Jackson, Mar. 15, 1816, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 8, 471-72. Hereinafter cited as SWLS.

Department, Colonel Clinch reported that out of an estimated three hundred and twenty-five people in the fort, not more than one-sixth escaped instant death.

Although the regulars were not engaged in any heavy fighting, merely capturing the few survivors, the actions taken by Colonel Clinch to reduce the Negro fort on the Apalachicola River did much to ease the minds of the people on the Georgia-Florida border. But the action did little to further the diplomatic negotiations between Spain and the United States.4

The expedition was effective in quieting the trouble on the border for the moment, and the Secretary of War felt that the troops could be safely put to work repairing the road from Fort Hawkins to Fort Stoddert.

As the hostile disposition of the Creeks appears to have in some degree subsided and as the destruction of the Negro fort on the Apalachicola, may have a tendency to intimidate them, it is probable that part of the troops, stationed in the Indian Country may now be safely employed in this work.5

4 Clinch to Butler, Adjutant General, Division of the South, Aug. 2, 1816, Niles Weekly Register, Nov. 20, 1819, XIII; Clinch to Governor Mitchell, Aug. 4, 1816, Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 31, 1816, XI; See Hawkins to Governor Mitchell, May 10, 1816, Niles Weekly Register, June 1, 1816, X; and Sept. 14, 1816, XI.

5 Secretary of War to David Mitchell, Governor of Georgia, Sept. 24, 1816, SWLS, Roll 9, 149-50; Herbert Aptheker, "Maroons within the Present Limits of the United States," The Journal of Negro History, XXIV, (1939), 167-84.
Again in March 1820, slaves who had just recently been brought into Florida (now a part of the United States) from Jamaica rebelled and the citizens of the area called for Federal aid. A detachment of regulars marched to the scene and quickly subdued the rebels. One slave was killed in the process, but other details concerning the insurrection are not available.  

The report of a disturbance on the German Coast again disrupted the quiet of the New Orleans region. A detachment of regulars under the command of Captain William Harney marched from New Orleans with three days rations to the scene of the revolt. The issue was confused a few days later when it was reported that the troops had marched up the Coast merely for the purposes of "drill and exercise", and further mention of the rebellion disappeared from the news.  

The example of a detachment of troops being sent on an exercise into the area of the German Coast marks a transition point in the role of the Army in the South. The activities of the War Department and the Army tended more and more to become that of a reassuring influence

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6 Helen T. Catterall, Judicial Cases Concerning the Negro and American Slavery (5 vols., Washington, 1926-1937), II, 327-28; Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts, 266.

7 New York, Evening Post, Nov. 7 and 9, 1826, as seen in Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts, 278-79.
and a powerful psychological force. The type of services rendered varied from place to place and from time to time, but the Army's role became that of the patient observer, ready to meet any emergency. As Governor Holmes observed in 1812, "In slave countries the danger of insurrection always exists, and the inhabitants should be prepared to meet the event." 8

The city of Savannah affords an excellent example of the continuous concern of citizens for some form of protection from its black population. Fort Jackson had been built during the War of 1812 to protect the city from a possible British attack. With the conclusion of the war, the Federal government took under advisement the question of whether or not the post should be abandoned and the public buildings sold. In an effort to reach a decision, the War Department requested opinions from a number of different individuals and it was not until 1819 that all of the reports were finally submitted. 9


9 Secretary of War to the Honorable William Stevens, Oct. 21, 1816, SWLS, Roll 9, 172; Secretary of War to Colonel James McDonald, Oct. 21, 1816, Ibid., 171; Secretary of War to General Gaines, Feb. 4, 1818, Ibid., 2; Secretary of War to Charles Harris, Feb. 4, 1818, Ibid., 2-3; Secretary of War to General Gaines, July 14, 1818, Ibid., 99; Secretary of War to General Gaines, Feb. 2, 1819, Ibid., 239.
While the fate of the post at Savannah was under consideration, the troops stationed there were removed from the garrison during the summer months in an effort to preserve the health of the soldiers. In 1819 the government decided to continue the post, and the soldiers stationed there suffered heavily from disease during their tour of duty.

The garrison was removed from Fort Jackson in 1824, and the action brought an immediate and sharp response from the citizens of Savannah. In April the Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, informed Representative Edward F. Tatnall that he was "fully sensible of the weight of reasons" that the United States troops should not be removed from the city. The Secretary stated that the decision to remove the troops from Savannah had been made from necessity and for no other reason. The soldiers had become virtually ineffective as a military force due to illness during the period they had been stationed in the town. Secretary Calhoun assured Representative Tatnall that if a more healthy location could be found in the area, the troops would be returned. He also suggested that if the troops returned immediately, they might be quartered in the city, as the season was too far advanced to erect new barracks.
to accommodate the soldiers. The next month Calhoun requested an interview with Tatnall for the purpose of discussing possible locations for quartering the troops in or near Savannah.

In addition, arrangements would be made for erecting suitable buildings in some healthy location near the city. The troops would occupy the new buildings during the sickly season in future years. Major Call and the members of the Council met and decided upon a site near Savannah, and the soldiers returned to the post for the remaining summer months.

The United States started erecting new barracks for the Savannah garrison in the following year. By 1827 the Secretary of War was able to report to the House of Representatives that it would require an additional $14,452.51 to complete the barracks and other buildings at Cantonment Oglethorpe. Despite its new

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10 Secretary of War to the Honorable E. F. Tatnall, Apr. 30, 1824, Ibid., 49-50.
11 Secretary of War to Tatnall, May 11, 1824, Ibid., 53.
12 Secretary of War to the Members of the Common Council of Savannah, May 15, 1824, Ibid., 56.
13 Niles Weekly Register, June 12, 1824, XXVI.
14 American State Papers: Military Affairs (Washington, 1832-1861), III, 588-89. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
location and new quarters, the new site at Savannah remained as unhealthy as the old site. In 1829 General Alexander Macomb authorized Colonel William MacRae to remove the garrison during the sickly season. The General suggested that the troops move to Augusta Arsenal, a post that was only slightly more healthy during the summer months than was Savannah.  

The policy of removing the garrison from the city during the summer months continued in an effort to preserve the health of the soldiers. During the disturbance in the fall of 1831 caused by the Nat Turner Rebellion, the regulars were ordered to return from Augusta to Savannah as soon as a proper regard for the health of the soldiers would permit.

If the practice of previous years was continued, the troops would again be removed with the approach of the 1832 sickly season. The Mayor of Savannah prompted by this prospect wrote to the Secretary of War on January 6, 1832, setting forth his apprehensions. General Macomb responded to the Mayor's letter with assurances

15 Macomb to MacRea, Apr. 26, 1829, Letters Sent, Headquarters of the Army, 1821-1903, II, Record Group 108 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSHQA. See Appendix II.

16 Assistant Adjutant General to Colonel Fanning, Oct. 21, 1831, Letters Sent Eastern Department, VIII, Records of United States Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives), Hereinafter cited as LSED.
that the troops would remain throughout the coming year in consequence of the Mayor's letter. 17

Throughout 1831 the War Department was again considering the abandonment of the barracks outside of Savannah and a movement to quarters within the city, because the new position was found to be no more healthy than the old position. Commanding General Macomb informed the Secretary of War that new barracks in the city might possibly be healthier than those presently occupied by the troops. He cautioned that since the move would be expensive, quarters should be rented within the city in order to determine if the move would produce the desired results. 18

On March 22, 1832, Congress entered the controversy over whether to abandon the post at Savannah. The House Committee on Military Affairs made its report on an application from the citizens of Savannah that barracks be erected and permanently garrisoned in the city. The Committee recommended in favor of the petition after considering the evidence presented. A letter from the Mayor of Savannah to the Committee expressed the reason the people wanted the troops permanently stationed in the

17 Macomb to the Honorable William B. Waring, Feb. 17, 1832, LSHQA, II.

18 Macomb to Secretary of War, Mar. 19, 1832, LSHQA, II. Also in ASPMA, V, 6-7.
city. The Mayor requested that buildings be erected for the quartering of at least one hundred men, "in order that this community might be benefited by the residence of United States Troops among them, and particularly at a time when, from the periodical migration of many of our white population, a military force is most needed." 

The implication of the Mayor's argument is obvious; the people of Savannah wanted the troops to protect them from their slaves, who might choose the season when many whites left the area because of illness to launch an insurrection. On April 7, 1832, the commander of the force at Savannah received orders to keep his troops in the best and most healthy location he could find near Savannah.

Cities other than Savannah called upon the Federal government for aid. In June of 1829 the Intendant of Charleston, South Carolina, requested that a company of artillerists be removed from one of the forts in the harbor and stationed in the town. One company was ordered into the city to cooperate with the local authorities whenever called upon to do so by the Intendant.

19 ASPMA, V, 6-7.

20 Macomb to Brevet Captain C. S. Merchant, Apr. 7, 1832, LSHQA, II. See also Macomb to Judge Wayne, Apr. 25, 1832, Ibid.
or any three of the Wardens of the city.  

Requests could not always be granted, and on rare occasions they were denied. One month after moving a company of soldiers from the harbor, the Secretary of War's office denied another request from the Intendant of Charleston. The City Guard was trying to obtain permission to use some space in the United States Arsenal. After consulting the Ordnance Department, the Secretary of War was forced to deny the request because no part of the Arsenal could be turned over to the city without considerable inconvenience.  

In April 1828 General Winfield Scott wrote to Colonel Roger Jones, the Adjutant General, concerning a letter that had been referred to him by the Secretary of War. The letter was from the Governor of Florida, who requested that a company of regulars be stationed near the head of the St. Mary's River, close to the center of population. The company was to form a "nucleus for the militia" in the event of unrest among the slaves. The Governor based his apprehensions on the fact "that many of the slaves taken to Florida are the very worst in the Union."

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21 Secretary of War to Joseph Johnson, June 30, 1827, SWLS, Roll 12, 297.
22 Secretary of War to Joseph Johnson, July 7, 1827, Ibid., 298.
Scott wrote:

The distribution of regiments into detachments of less than several companies greatly augments the expense of their maintenance [sic] and is highly injurious to their efficiency and finally that I am not aware that we have even established a military post solely on the grounds of the Governor's application.

For these reasons General Scott did not believe that a post should be established on the St. Mary's River.²³

Some of the requests directed to the War Department were relatively easy to comply with since they required only the transmission of information to reassure concerned citizens. On March 24, 1829, in response to a letter from Congressman William Brent of Louisiana, Commanding General Alexander Macomb outlined the disposition of the nation's regular forces. To defend the city of New Orleans and protect the neighboring area against possible insurrection, the Army had ten companies stationed in Louisiana. In the event more troops were required, they could be ordered south into the state from Jefferson Barracks.²⁴

In addition to the assurances given of the ability

²³Scott to Jones, Apr. 5, 1828, Letters Sent Western Department, IV, Records of United States Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.

²⁴Macomb to Eaton, Mar. 24, 1829, LSHQA, I.
of the Army to support the citizens of Louisiana, General Macomb informed the Governor of the orders issued to the officers stationed in the state. Instructions had been given "to cooperate with you in any measures your Excellency may take in suppressing the insurrectionary disposition manifested by the black population. . . ."25

In December the Commanding General gave additional details concerning the plans for protecting the inhabitants of Louisiana. In addition to the ten companies stationed in the state, two companies from Florida, two from Alabama, four of the five companies stationed on the Arkansas River, and four companies from Jefferson Barracks could be moved into the state if the situation were serious enough. Within a period of fourteen or fifteen days after receiving marching orders, these twenty-two companies, with a paper strength of 1,100 men, could be in the state to confront any rebellious force. 26

In December 1830 the attention of the Commanding General shifted from Louisiana to North Carolina. In a letter, marked confidential, to the commanding officer at

25 Macomb to Governor Derbigny, Mar. 27, 1829, Ibid.

26 Macomb to Secretary of War, Dec. 30, 1829, Ibid. The letter gives the total number of companies as 32, but the count from the text of the letter is 22.
Fortress Monroe, the General ordered two companies to be sent to Wilmington, North Carolina. Only the commander of the detachment was to know the nature of the unit's mission, which was to meet any insurrectionary movement which might take place during the Christmas season.\(^{27}\) The order was in response to a letter from Wilmington's Magistrate of Police, who had requested aid from the War Department because of a disposition toward insurrection manifested by the slaves.\(^{28}\)

General Macomb informed Brevet Major Sylvester Churchill, who was stationed at Smithville, North Carolina, that the two companies were on their way from Fortress Monroe. Churchill was to assume command of the troops and march with them to Wilmington. Upon his arrival he was to consult with the local authorities as to what measures should be employed to provide security to the residents of the area. Macomb suggested that it might eliminate confusion if the Major went to Wilmington and arranged for the accommodation of the troops before their arrival. However, the General cautioned him, "... you will see the propriety of not disclosing the object of your visit, lest the blacks anticipating the coming of

\(^{27}\)Macomb to Colonel J. B. Walbach, Dec. 9, 1830, Ibid.

\(^{28}\)Secretary of War to James T. McRee, Dec. 9, 1830, SWLS, Roll 13, 22.
the troops, might attempt to carry into effect their evil intentions more promptly than they otherwise should do."

Late in December the citizens of the Wilmington area were still apprehensive, and additional instructions were sent to Major Churchill. General Macomb believed that a demonstration by a company of troops might have a beneficial effect on the disposition of the blacks. To accomplish the desired object, it was suggested that a show of force be made by marching the company from Wilmington to Newburn. This display of force was intended to overawe and intimidate the blacks while reassuring the white population. The company was to remain at Newburn unless needed elsewhere in the neighborhood or until ordered to return to Fortress Monroe.

Major Churchill and his detachment remained in Wilmington and Newburn until the end of April. As the rumors and fears subsided, the troops were ordered back to their station at Fortress Monroe.

Louisiana was a continuing source of concern to the officials of the War Department. From January to

29 Macomb to Churchill, Dec. 9, 1830, LSHQA, I.
30 Macomb to Churchill, Dec. 28, 1830, Ibid.
31 Macomb to Brigadier General George Gibson, Commissary General of Subsistence, Mar. 29, 1831, Ibid.
Acting Assistant Adjutant General DeHart to Colonel Jones, Apr. 15, 1831, LSED, VIII.

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July of 1831 a number of letters were exchanged by citizens of Louisiana, the War Department, and officers of the Army, all concerned with the protection of the state and its citizens in the event of an insurrection. In January the Commanding General informed a concerned citizen that the commanding officers at New Orleans and Baton Rouge had orders to cooperate with the local authorities in suppressing any insurrectionary movements that might be discovered.\footnote{Macomb to G. Saul, Jan. 21, 1831, LSHQA, I.}

In April the Governor of Louisiana wrote the Secretary of War, John Eaton, expressing his concern for the safety of the citizens and requesting that regular troops be stationed in New Orleans and that arms be supplied for the militia. In answer, the Secretary sent a detailed letter to the Governor outlining measures to be taken for the defense of New Orleans.

Eaton suggested that New Orleans follow the example of the citizens of Charleston, South Carolina, who had constructed a citadel within the limits of the city. The citadel was constantly garrisoned by a company of United States Artillerists and was designed to serve as a rallying point for the city's volunteer corps. If New Orleans built such a citadel, placed a garrison and a few small field pieces in it, the purposes of security and defense would be served. Additional troops could not
be sent to the city at this time because there were no quarters available for them. Colonel Clinch, commanding officer at Baton Rouge, would be ordered to New Orleans to confer with the Governor on additional defensive measures that might be adopted.  

On instructions from the Secretary of War, General Macomb sent orders to Colonel Clinch for the defense of New Orleans. The troops at Baton Rouge and the passes to New Orleans, along with the forces on the Red and Arkansas rivers, were available to defend the state of Louisiana. The commanding officers of the various posts had been instructed to cooperate with the state authorities in the event of an insurrection among the blacks.

The Commanding General lamented the fact that the United States had relinquished the "ancient barracks" in New Orleans to the City Council and that circumstances had prevented the maintenance of a permanent garrison in the city. However, if the city were to build a citadel in which troops could be comfortably quartered, then Colonel Clinch was authorized to order two companies of regulars from Baton Rouge to occupy the position. Colonel Clinch was to visit New Orleans immediately and confer with the Governor and the city authorities concerning additional measures which were necessary to defend the town.

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33 Eaton to Governor of Louisiana, May 16, 1831, Ibid.
In addition, he was to order a supply of arms, not to exceed 1,000 stands, to the city if he deemed it absolutely necessary. The arms were to be stored in some secure location until they were needed by the Governor.

Also, Colonel Clinch was to visit the forts at the Balize, the Rigolets and Chef Menteur and inspect the garrisons to determine their fitness. The commanders were to be especially vigilant to avoid the possibility of surprise as there had been reports that assistance might be furnished from abroad. If these reports were true, it was probable that an attempt might be made to seize the forts that guarded the passes to the sea and to secure the weapons stored in them.\(^{34}\)

Colonel Clinch was to assume a general command if an insurrection or an invasion occurred, but his authority should not exceed its present limits unless either or both of the events occurred. General Macomb apologized for communicating directly with the Colonel instead of going through the Department Commander, but he felt that the urgency of the situation required such action on his part.\(^{35}\)

\(^{34}\)No evidence has been found that would either confirm or deny that foreign aid to a slave insurrection was possible. It is probable that this was another manifestation of the continual fear caused by the successful rebellion in Santo Domingo.

\(^{35}\)Macomb to Clinch, May 17, 1831, LSHQA, I.
General Edmund P. Gaines, commander of the Western Department, who had been bypassed in the chain of command, received a copy of General Macomb's letter to Colonel Clinch and immediately sent a letter to the Secretary of War containing his own suggestions for protecting Louisiana. The answer he received from the Commanding General, if it had been written twenty years earlier, might have evoked a call from Gaines for satisfaction on the field of honor:

The views which you have taken of the subject and the arrangements which you have adopted, in regard to the defense of Louisiana, have been submitted by the Secretary of War to the President of the United States, and I am instructed to say to you that, as the Government is duly advised of the state of things in Louisiana and can conveniently determine what cause it may be expedient to adopt, no movement of the troops will be made, other than those which have been authorized by letter to Colonel Clinch . . . , nor will any requisition be made by you on the State authorities for Militia or Volunteer forces without reference to General Headquarters, that the same may be submitted to the War Department, for the decision of the President. . . . I cannot close this communication to you without reminding you of the propriety of making your official communications connected with military services according to the established rules as pointed out by the General Regulations and subsequent orders.36

36 Macomb to Gaines, July 25, 1831, Ibid.
The reference in Macomb's letter to requisitions on the militia was reinforced by a letter from a number of concerned citizens who wrote to Clinch in August; their document sheds additional light on the possible insurrection. The rumors were that the slaves were planning a simultaneous attack on Baton Rouge and New Orleans. The slaves needed the arms stored in Baton Rouge to facilitate their assault on New Orleans and give it a chance of success. The citizens did not want the local militia called into service: "doing so would in our opinion only show to that class of our population that we feared them and would consequently be the best means that could be devised of letting them know their own strength of which it is our obvious policy to keep them ignorant."  

After the admonishment from Macomb, Clinch forwarded the letter from the citizens to General Gaines with a cover letter describing conditions in the area. An additional detachment of troops had arrived in New Orleans and everything seemed to be tranquil throughout the entire state. Whatever had been the intentions of the slaves, the rebellion never occurred, and events in

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38 Clinch to Gaines, Aug. 22, 1831, Ibid.
Louisiana would soon be overshadowed by those in far-off Virginia.

The Nat Turner Rebellion which erupted on August 21, 1831, brought an avalanche of requests for aid and protection from all areas of the South. Although the Secretary of War was able to inform a group of concerned citizens in Southampton County, Virginia, on September 8, that it was the belief of those in his Department that the insurrection had been completely quelled and no additional troops should be stationed there, it was only the beginning of the scare. 39

On September 23, 1831, General Macomb proposed a disposition of the troops on the Atlantic Coast to Louis McLean, Acting Secretary of War. This disposition was, he felt, the best possible one to afford adequate protection to the citizens of the slave states. Two companies would be removed from Boston harbor, one company from New London, two companies from the harbor of New York, and two companies from New Castle, Delaware. Five of those companies were to be stationed at Fortress Monroe and two were to occupy the Marine Barracks in the city of Washington. The companies stationed in Washington would be in a position to guard Washington, Georgetown, Alexandria and the state of Maryland. The troops at

39 Secretary of War to Jeremiah Cobb, et al Sept. 8, 1831, SWLS, Roll 13, 78.
Fortress Monroe would protect Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Maryland.

The two companies of Infantry stationed at Fort Mitchell, Alabama, would be marched to Augusta Arsenal, where they would be in a position to act in Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina. Should more troops be needed, two battalions of Infantry could be called from the frontier garrisons without endangering the safety of the citizens or posts. If this force was not equal to the task, three companies could be moved quickly from Sackett's Harbor and Fort Niagara. All of these movements would be made with very little expense to the government and would leave no post without a garrison.

General Macomb expressed a special concern for the security and safety of the Arsenal located near Richmond. There was a large and well organized force of black laborers, said to number 1,500, working in the coal mines within gun-shot of the Arsenal. Within a short distance, not exceeding seven miles, were approximately 6,000 able-bodied blacks who were capable of bearing arms. Stored in the Arsenal were 17,000 stand of arms intended for the use of the militia in case of invasion or insurrection. If the blacks could gain possession of the arms they might be able to capture Richmond and spread the insurrection over a wide area.
before they could be checked. To guard against this eventuality, Macomb recommended that one company be dispatched from Fortress Monroe to provide additional protection for the Arsenal.

General Macomb felt that these preparations would enable the government to afford the best possible security against any slave uprising. The movements were never completed because the crisis in Southampton passed. However, requests continued to be sent to Washington from throughout the South.40

From the state of North Carolina, Major Churchill informed the headquarters of the Eastern Department on September 12 that he had detached a part of his command at Fort Johnston to the city of Wilmington. He had taken this action upon the requisition of the magistrates of the city, who felt that additional measures were necessary to defend the city. The Commanding General of the department approved the actions taken by Major Churchill, and immediately sent ten recruits to reinforce his weakened command.41

40Macomb to McLean, Sept. 23, 1831, LSHQA, I.

41Churchill to Headquarters Eastern Department, Sept. 12, 1831, Letters Received, Eastern Department, Records of United States Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives); Bache, Assistant Adjutant General, Eastern Department, to Churchill, Sept. 21, 1831, LSED, VIII.
On October 3, 1831, General Macomb addressed a letter to the Intendant of Police at Beaufort, North Carolina. The letter was in response to a resolution passed by a unanimous vote of the citizens of the town and its vicinity, both of which had been sent to the Secretary of War. The population was concerned because of a threatened insurrection among the blacks, and they requested that a military force be stationed in or near Fort Macon to protect them.

Macomb informed the citizens that a similar request had been received by the Department of War from the citizens of Newburn, North Carolina. In consequence of this request, a company of troops had been ordered to Newburn, and it was presumed by the General that because of the closeness of Newburn and Beaufort, one company would be sufficient to meet the needs of both towns.\(^\text{42}\)

On October 21 General Macomb wrote to a number of citizens in Wilmington, where the fear of an insurrection was still strong, that the company of Artillery stationed at nearby Fort Johnston should be sufficient to protect the citizens. He felt that because of the prompt action by local officials in suppressing the insurrectionary movement and the punishment of the offenders that the need to assemble a military force at Wilmington had

\(^{42}\)Macomb to Conady, Oct. 3, 1831, LSHQA, I.
almost ceased to exist at the time of his writing. The General informed the citizens:

The military means at the disposal of the government you must be aware, are not very extensive. It may be satisfactory to you however to know that additional troops are ordered to Fortress Monroe, with a view to affording aid to the authorities of the States in which the Blacks may attempt any insurrectionary movements, should the authorities of those states desire it. . . . Should the alarm continue in your vicinity, any communication on the subject which you should think proper to make for the information of the Department will receive due attention.43

As the fear engendered by the Turner Rebellion swept through the South, Robert C. Nicholas, a Louisiana planter, wrote that Louisiana needed all of the help it could obtain in order to provide an effective security system. He suggested that the best way to solve the problem of rebellion on the German Coast was to establish a patrol on the Mississippi River. The patrol would be maintained by two steamboats, each with a well armed complement of Federal troops aboard, working up and down

43 Macomb to Citizens of Wilmington, N. C., Oct. 21, 1831, Ibid. Macomb’s last paragraph concerning reinforcements for Fortress Monroe and correspondence with the War Department, was identical to the last paragraph of his letter to Conady at Beaufort, North Carolina, Oct. 3, 1831, Ibid.
the river between New Orleans and St. Francisville.  

General Gaines suggested a similar plan to Governor A. B. Roman of Louisiana, one calling for unscheduled and unannounced tours through the region by large units of United States troops. Gaines believed that this scheme would provide a satisfactory system of defense for the planters of Louisiana.

On October 12 General Macomb once again explained the measures taken by the government to defend Louisiana. The apprehensions of the citizens, which never completely disappeared, had been intensified by rumors that the black population of New Orleans and the German Coast intended to rise against the whites, it was also reported that the slaves had been in correspondence with the blacks in the Islands. On Macomb's orders Colonel Clinch conferred with the Governor, inspected the forts protecting the approaches to the city, stationed two companies in the city, supplied arms to be used by the militia, and reached an understanding with the Governor and city authorities concerning defensive measures to be taken in the event of trouble.

Clinch was certain that the troops at Baton Rouge

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and those in New Orleans were sufficient to suppress any outbreak among the slaves. However, in the event reinforcements were required, Colonel Clinch possessed the authority to call additional troops from the Arkansas and Red rivers. The General closed his letter with a note of caution: "You will of course see the propriety of not allowing the information here given to find its way into the public prints."  

During the first week of November General Gaines, commanding the Western Department, wrote from Mobile that the apprehensions of an insurrection had subsided to a level where he felt it safe to begin his inspection tour. The season had been healthy in Louisiana and Mobile, and most of the white inhabitants had remained in their homes thus enabling them to keep a close watch on the slave population. Gaines adequately summarized the services the regulars performed in Louisiana: "The known habitual vigilance of the few troops stationed in that state, with the precautionary measures taken to increase their efficiency, and whenever necessary their numbers had doubtless contributed to dispel the fears of the inhabitants and to keep in check the evil disposed Blacks."  

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46 Macomb to Nathan Morse, Oct. 12, 1831, LSHQA, I.

47 Gaines to Jones, Nov. 3, 1831, LSWD, IV.
In late November and early December the commanders in Louisiana were reminded of their responsibility to cooperate with local officials and to afford protection to the citizens of Louisiana. When Brevet Major R. A. Zantzinger was assigned to command the Artillery units in the area around New Orleans, he was ordered to cooperate with the Infantry commanders and local officials to avert or suppress any insurrections. 48

General Gaines instructed Colonel Clinch to issue a supply of arms and ammunition to the Governor of Louisiana in response to his requisition. General Gaines had already ordered a supply to be sent from the Baton Rouge Arsenal but any additional arms not required for the immediate use of the Federal troops should be sent to the governor, the total number not to exceed 2,000 stand, along with the equipment and ammunition to correspond with such a supply of arms. Gaines stated, "that measures of prevention constitute the most certain means of security against the apprehended evils of insurrection. . . ." He concluded his letter with an admonishment to Colonel Clinch, "Repeating my desire that you will cooperate with the public functionaries of the state in whatever measures

48 M. L. Clark, Acting Aide de Camp to the Governor of Louisiana, Mayor of New Orleans, and Commanding Officers of Ports Pike, Wood, Jackson and New Orleans, Nov. 20, 1831, and Clark to Mayor of New Orleans and Governor of Louisiana, Nov. 27, 1831, Ibid.
you may deem necessary and proper to ARREST THE APPREHENDED EVIL OR TO ARREST OR CRUSH IT, if it should commence."\(^{49}\)

The requests for detachments continued to come into the War Department throughout December, and for the first time the Commanding General was forced to deny the requests because of a shortage of troops. General Macomb denied the request of the Committee of Vigilance of Raleigh, North Carolina, and one from the Governor of Florida for a detachment of troops to be stationed in the city of Pensacola. These requests were rejected because of the dispersed state of the Army and the belief that further detachments would interfere greatly with the plans of the War Department and the discipline of the troops.\(^{50}\)

General Macomb, in a communication to Representative Thomas R. Mitchell of South Carolina, reiterated the problems posed by a further dispersal of the regular forces. The city of Georgetown, South Carolina, had requested a detachment of troops to protect it in the event of an insurrection in the district. Macomb stated that the dispersed state of the Army and its limited members precluded affording protection to more than the


\(^{50}\)Macomb to Cass, Dec. 8, 1831, LSHQA, I.
maritime frontier and the garrisons on the interior border. Orders were issued to the commander of the three companies in Charleston to watch the events in Georgetown and if there was cause for serious alarm he was to detach a small part of his small force to aid the citizens. Macomb could only express his hope that this arrangement would meet the approval of the citizens of Georgetown.  

On January 17 General Macomb, in answer to the representations of the citizens of Alexandria, Louisiana, could only state that the troops at Fort Jesup would be used if a rebellion broke out, because additional troops could not be ordered into the district. The limited means of the Army had been exhausted by the numerous requests which had been received from the Southern states since the disturbances of the previous year.  

General Gaines, commanding the Western Department, wrote to the Adjutant General of the Army expressing his concern for the safety of the inhabitants of Louisiana. He felt that because of the strength, character and condition of the slave population, Louisiana required twelve
to fifteen additional companies of regular troops to provide adequate protection against insurrections. Gaines wrote:

I should be guilty of an unpardonable omission if I did not solicit the attention of the proper authorities to the mortifying fact that, there is not within or near the Island of Orleans nor at Baton Rouge as Colonel Clinch justly intimates a sufficient force to justify the expectation that in the event of insurrection (to the extent reasonably apprehended, when the Blacks out number the whites as three or four to one) very little if anything could be done by the U. S. troops beyond the immediate defense of the positions which they occupy. Not doubting but that it is the dictate of humanity and justice rather to provide efficient means of prevention and security against the PROBABILITY if not the possibility of insurrection than by withholding these means so completely within our power, suffer a stroke to be struck or a match to be lighted that a few triumphs might not be checked. . . ."

In April and again in May of 1832 General Macomb sought to reassure the citizens in and around Baton Rouge that their safety and security was being considered by the War Department. As soon as additional troops were available they would be stationed at Baton Rouge to provide greater security for the Arsenal and to the citizens of the community.

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53 Gaines to Adjutant General, Apr. 11, 1832, LSWD, VI.
54 Macomb to Philip Hicky, Baton Rouge, Apr. 16,
The eruption of numerous rebellions and reports of rebellions which had culminated in the Turner Rebellion and the subsequent anxiety of the citizens of the South for their safety led to a period of relative calm. It was not until August of 1835 that the fears of an insurrection returned to haunt white southerners. In that month a letter was sent to Lieutenant Colonel William Foster, the commanding officer at Baton Rouge, from the Headquarters of the Western Department. Foster was cautioned to remain alert and vigilant to the disposition of the black population and to the rumors of planned insurrections instigated by white men. It was stated that much good and no evil could result from an increased watchfulness and readiness for action.

The year 1835 ended with the citizens of Louisiana again aroused to a high state of anger. A plot had been discovered in the East Felician district where slaves had been found with arms and other weapons. Armed patrols marched through the countryside and some of the planters fled to the safety of New Orleans.

1832, LSHQA, II; Macomb to Representatives White, Thomas and Ballard, May 30, 1832, Ibid.


56McCall, Aide de Camp, Western Department, to Foster, Aug., 1835, LSWD, II.

In the period from 1789 to 1835 the United States Army performed a function which Southerners viewed as essential to their safety. The elaborate system of controls which the existence of slavery fostered did not afford the whites as much protection as they desired. The United States Army, with the power and resources of the Federal government at its command, seemed to afford the Southerners the extra security that they required.

When viewed against the background of the persistent requests that Federal assistance be given to the local authorities, the assurances given to Southerners by their leaders of their ability to control the slave population have a hollow ring. In actual practice, however, the local system of control appears to have been effective in most cases, with the authorities turning to the employment of regulars against the slaves only on rare occasion.

The regulars possessed one advantage over the local forces and it was invaluable in the event of an insurrection. Unincumbered by personal property and families, the regulars could move rapidly against the rebels without the worries that plagued the white

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Southerner who might be called upon to leave his home and family unprotected if called into service. Southerners were rarely anxious to leave their homes to fulfill their militia obligation if it meant that their families would be unprotected.

The War Department and the individual officers tried to comply whenever possible with the requests they received from Southerners for all types of aid. It is evident that the Federal officials felt that the protection of American citizens from their slaves was as much a part of their duty as protecting them from hostile Indians and foreign invasion. General Gaines suggested that Southern officers might be stationed in the South because:

Their constitutions being adapted to the climate possess the additional advantage of knowing more intimately than Northern or Eastern men, the characters and peculiar habits of the Southern people of all colors, so that in any such emergency that we have reason now to apprehend, the most efficient service might reasonably be expected from the officers and men born and raised upon the spot, or in its immediate vicinity.59

It is difficult to imagine a slave rebellion of such a magnitude that the white Southerners would not have been able to suppress it rapidly. Armed and

59Gaines to Adjutant General Jones, Apr. 30, 1832, LSWD, VI.
organized, the whites actually had little to fear from a
general uprising among the slaves, and this was amply
demonstrated by the end results of all the efforts to
mount rebellions. But the fear was always present and
the picture of Santo Domingo never disappeared from
view. Though reluctant to speak about the need they
felt for Federal troops, many white Southerners pro-
bably rested more comfortably at night than they would
have had the soldiers not been present.
EPILOGUE

THE PASSING OF THE ARMY

The role of the Army in the westward movement has been acclaimed by some historians and questioned by others. Earlier writers generally recognized that the military had played an important part in pushing the frontier across the continent. More recent writers have tended to conclude that the Army's influence has been exaggerated and may even have been harmful. Representative of the views of the new school is a statement by Roger Nichols:

In particular, frontier and military historians have placed increased emphasis upon the contributions of the United States Army to the westward movement. A group of historians, which might be labeled the "imperial school," claims that soldiers more than other frontier agents, explored the west, built roads, pacified Indians, enforced laws, protected settlers, founded cities, and even brought religion, education, and other cultural trappings to the frontier.

Nichols then states that if the performance of the Army in the Missouri River Valley during the first thirty years of the nineteenth century was any indication of their

importance, it has been vastly overestimated:

Their incompetence and bungling caused them to play only a modest role in solving the Indian problem and in promoting expansion and settlement. Instead of serving as the "Sword of the Republic," as one prominent military historian claims, the Army in the Missouri Valley might better be described as the republic's broken lance, or at least its dull one.\(^2\)

Perhaps this assessment is correct for the Missouri Valley frontier. However, on the southern frontier for forty-six years the Army was not only the "Sword of the Republic" but also its shield. During the period from 1789 to 1835 the officers and men of the Army performed virtually every conceivable type of service, civil as well as military. By the time the need for the troops had passed in the South, the Army had left an indelible mark upon the region.

The activities of the Army were essential to the settlement of the southern frontier. The vast wilderness would have been opened and settled eventually had the

\(^2\)Ibid., 152. The reference by Nichols is to the work of Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969). In this work Prucha expands the thesis contained in his earlier work Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1953). Prucha contends that the Army played an important part, perhaps more than any other factor, in bringing civilization to the frontier.
soldiers not been present, but the process would have taken far longer to complete. The Army made an organized attack upon the wilderness and helped to bring some semblance of order to the movement. The Army provided an available source of manpower, men who were able to devote their time and labor to projects not directly connected to their own survival. It is difficult to imagine how the settlers, struggling to carve homes and farms from the wilderness, could have found the time necessary to perform the numerous tasks assigned to the soldiers.

Perhaps the most important function the Army performed was the assertion of Federal authority. For many of the settlers on the frontier, the soldiers were the only representatives of the national government with whom they had any contact. Whether occupying new territory, fighting Indians, or enforcing the national laws, the soldiers represented the United States. There were other Federal officials on the frontier - revenue officers, Indian agents, marshalls - but these individuals lacked the physical power necessary to enforce the law. It was one thing to resist the authority of a marshall or revenue collector; but to defy the orders of Federal officials when they were supported by a detachment of armed soldiers was an entirely different matter. The use of the troops to enforce national laws normally produced the cry of
military despotism from those individuals whose interests the soldiers opposed. The same groups who opposed the use of the soldiers in the enforcement of Federal laws were often the first to call upon the soldiers to enforce state and local laws, especially those intended to prevent slave uprisings.

The officers and men usually performed the varied duties assigned to them competently and on occasion with distinction. This was remarkable in view of the limited training which the officers had received; many of them were scarcely prepared to command troops, much less to perform countless other jobs, both civil and military. It can only be assumed that they relied upon the experience gained from long years of service in subordinate positions to guide their conduct when they found themselves in difficult situations. The officers were also aware that if they overstepped the bounds of their authority, they were responsible to military as well as civil authorities.

The troops occupied the position of being wanted when a crisis arose, but unwanted at other times. The existence of the Army was viewed as a necessary evil. Albert Gallatin probably summarized the sentiments of civilians, at least those of Jeffersonian persuasion, concerning the Army:

The distribution of our little Army
to distant garrisons where hardly any other inhabitant is to be found is the most eligible arrangement of that perhaps necessary evil that can be contrived. But I never want to see the face of one in our cities and intermixed with the people.  

With such attitudes prevailing, efforts to improve the Army were doomed to fail. The military establishment had to be small because a large establishment was not only expensive but dangerous to the liberties of the citizens. An Army that was efficient might be difficult to control. Political leaders did not really consider that the condition of the rank and file might be made more comfortable or bearable. The kind of life lived by soldiers was not a concern of civilians. The Army might protect society but it was not a part of society.

Most civilians held soldiers in low esteem. The men were frequently characterized as crude, tough, and uncivilized. By safe, stay-at-home standards they were. But considering the type of life they led, it would have been surprising if they had been refined individuals. Isolated for long periods, engaged in hard, monotonous work, the soldiers had little inclination and no time to learn the social graces. By and large the characteristics  

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\(^3\) Gallatin to his wife, July 7, 1807, in Henry Adams, *Life of Albert Gallatin* (New York, 1901), 304.
of the soldiers strongly resembled those of other frontiersmen, who led similar lives of isolation and hard work.

The accomplishments of the officers and men of the Army who served in the South were numerous, and although their actions and units were small they added up to a great result. The Army had opened a wilderness to settlement and then had policed and protected it while it was being peopled. But once the Indians had been subdued, the presence of the Army was no longer considered necessary or desirable. After 1835, with the exception of the installations in Florida, most of the military posts in the South were abandoned. The permanent fortifications that protected the nation's maritime frontier were retained, as were the posts at New Orleans and Baton Rouge. From these small garrisons southern whites would be able to draw whatever military assistance they might require in the event of slave insurrections.

The Army in the South had outlived its usefulness once it appeared that the Indian problem was about to be eliminated. The Indians would move west and the soldiers were expected to follow. By 1835 the soldiers in the South were preparing to follow the frontier line west, just as other soldiers before them had done. They left a country that was vastly different than it had been
when the first soldiers had arrived more than forty years before. The soldiers had done much to tame the wilderness, and now they moved on to begin the process anew on a different frontier.
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APPENDIX I
SOUTHERN MILITARY POSTS

ALABAMA

Fort Bowyer. General James Wilkinson began construction of a wooden work called the "Seraf" in 1813, it was located on Mobile Point and guarded the sea approach to Mobile Bay. The name was changed to Fort Bowyer before the end of the War of 1812. The United States began the construction of Fort Morgan on the site in 1819, it was completed in 1834.

Fort Charlotte. The post had been constructed by the Spanish in the city of Mobile. It was surrendered to American troops in April, 1813. The United States maintained a garrison in the works until about 1820.

Fort Claiborne. Established in 1813 on the Alabama River, at the site of the present town of Claiborne, Alabama, the post was not continued after the campaign against the Indians was completed.
Fort Crawford. During Jackson's campaign against the Indians, Fort Crawford was established at the site of the present town of Brewton, Alabama.

Fort Confederation (Fort Tombigbee). The works were originally built by the French in 1735 and called Fort Tombigbee. It was located above the confluence of the Tombigbee and Black Warrior rivers, in Chickasaw and Choctaw Indian country. The British occupied the site following the French and Indian War and changed the name to Fort York. The British abandoned the post after five years. The Spanish occupied the site in 1794, reconstructed the fort and named it Fort Confederation. It was garrisoned by the Spanish until 1797, the next year the fort became a possession of the United States. It was abandoned soon after the United States negotiated a treaty with the Choctaw Indians there in 1802 - 1803.

Fort Deposit. General Andrew Jackson erected the fort on the Tennessee River at the site of the present town of Fort Deposit, Alabama. The post was not continued after the War of 1812.

Fort Gaines. The fort was constructed on the eastern end of Dauphin Island at the entrance to Mobile Bay. Construction began in 1822 but was delayed a number of times while the advisability of the post was considered. It
was designed to compliment Fort Morgan on the opposite side of the Bay. It was not regularly garrisoned.

Fort Hamilton. The fort was constructed in 1810, to the north of the great bend of the Tennessee River, near the present town of Athens, Alabama. The post apparently was not used on a regular basis after 1815, but there was a garrison there in 1817.

Fort Jackson. The post was established in April, 1814, as a post during the Creek War, near the junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers. The post was garrisoned until 1817.

Fort Mims. This was the stockaded farm of Samuel Mims. Located on the eastern bank of Lake Tensaw, twenty miles north of Mobile. The farm was the site of the Fort Mims Massacre in August, 1813.

Fort Mitchell. Located on the west side of the Chattahoochee River, at the present town of Fort Mitchell, Alabama. Originally constructed by the Georgia militia, it was first occupied by United States troops in 1813. It was a part of the factory system beginning in 1817. The post was again occupied by troops in 1828 and the garrison was continued until 1837.
Fort Morgan. The fort was constructed on the site of Fort Bowyer at Mobile Point to protect the entrance to Mobile Bay. The post was first occupied in 1834.

Cantonment Montpelier. Located ten miles from the Alabama River and seven miles northwest of Port Montgomery, Alabama.

Fort Montgomery. Constructed in 1814, ten miles above the junction of the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers.

Fort St. Stephens. Constructed by the Spanish on the Tombigbee River north of Mobile, Alabama. It was transferred to the United States in 1799. The post was not maintained after the United States built Fort Stoddert to the South.

Fort Stoddert. After the area was evacuated by the Spanish, Fort Stoddert was established in 1799. It was located four miles below the junction of the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers.

Fort Strother. Established in 1813 on the Coosa River as a defensive post during the Creek War.

Fort Tombigbee (see Fort Confederation).

Fort Toulouse. Begun in 1717 by the French, it was the eastern outpost of French Louisiana until the end of the
French and Indian War. Located at the junction of the two tributaries of the Alabama River, the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers. The moat was all that remained in 1814 when General Andrew Jackson constructed Fort Jackson on the site after the Battle of Horseshoe Bend.

Fort York (see Fort Confederation).

FLORIDA

Fort Barrancas. Constructed as an addition to the older Spanish fortification to protect the entrance to Pensacola Harbor. It was occupied by American troops in 1820. It served as a naval reserve from 1825 to 1844.

Fort Brooke. Located at the head of Tampa Bay on the Hillsboro River about thirty miles from the Gulf of Mexico. It was originally intended to protect the Seminole Indians in the vicinity. Called Cantonment Brooks from 1824 until 1835 when the name was changed to Fort Brooke.

Fort Clinch. Constructed three miles from Pensacola in 1823, it was abandoned in 1834.

Fort Gadsden. Established by General Andrew Jackson on the east bank of the Apalachicola River in 1818 during his invasion of Florida. It was abandoned in 1821.

Key West Barracks. Established in 1831 on the north shore of Thompson's Island, about sixty miles southwest of Cape
Sable.

Fort King. Constructed in 1827 near the present city of Ocala, about ninety-five miles northeast of the head of Tampa Bay, forty miles due west from the Gulf of Mexico.

Post of St. Augustine. The post was originally constructed by the Spanish and was occupied by the United States troops when the territory was acquired in 1821. The fort was named Fort Marion in 1825 and irregularly garrisoned until 1852. Located about two miles from the ocean.

Fort St. Marks (see San Marcos de Apalache).

Fort San Carlos de Barrancas. Originally constructed in 1787 by the Spanish on a bluff called "Barrancas de Santo Tome" and occupied the same site as Fort San Carlos de Austria, which had been constructed during the first period of Spanish settlement, and had been destroyed by the French in 1719. The British blew up the new post in 1814 when General Jackson captured the city. After the Americans withdrew the Spanish began to rebuild the fort. The fort passed to the control of the United States when the city was again attacked by General Jackson. During the period from 1833 to 1844, the United States strengthened the defenses of Pensacola Bay. In the rear of Fort
San Carlos de Barrancas they constructed Fort Barrancas and 1,000 yards to the north Fort Redoubt.

Fort Marion (see Post of St. Augustine).

Fort Pickens. Construction began in 1828 on the western end of Santa Rosa Island to command the entrance to Pensacola Harbor. The post was first garrisoned in 1834 but not on a regular basis.

Fort Redoubt (see San Carlos de Barrancas).

San Marcos de Apalche. The Spanish constructed three different forts on the site from 1565 to 1763. During the British occupation the name was changed to Fort St. Marks. During the Seminole Campaign in 1818, General Jackson captured the fort and settlement. Control of the fort passed permanently to the United States with the ratification of the Adams-Onis Treaty in 1819.

GEORGIA

Augusta Arsenal. The arsenal occupied two different locations. Originally established in 1817 as an arsenal of deposit on the Savannah River, but because of the unhealthiness of the site the arsenal was moved in 1826. The new site was three miles from the west bank of the Savannah River and about the same distance from the city of Augusta.
Post at Colraine. The post at Colraine, on the St. Mary's River, was first garrisoned in 1793 and continued until about 1796.

Fort Fidius. In its efforts to protect the Georgia frontier, the United States established Fort Fidius in 1793. It was located on the north bank of the Oconee River. The garrison was removed in 1797.

Fort Gaines. The fort was erected on the Chattahoochee River near the Creek boundary line in 1816. A small garrison was stationed there until 1819.

Fort Greene. The fort was constructed on Cockspur Island at the mouth of the Savannah River in 1794. It was destroyed by the action of the ocean in 1804.

Fort Hawkins. The fort was started by Colonel Benjamin Hawkins on a hilltop commanding several miles of the Ocmulgee River, at the site of the present city of Macon, Georgia. It was a combined military post and factory. The troops and factory were moved to Fort Hawkins from Fort Wilkinson in 1806. The factory was moved to Fort Mitchell, Alabama in 1817 and after 1819 the post was not garrisoned by troops.

Fort Jackson. Constructed on the west side of the Savannah River, three miles below the city of Savannah.
Fort Jones. Constructed on the south bank of the Altamaha River in 1797. The post was abandoned in 1802.

Oglethorpe Barracks. The post was located in a number of different positions, within the city of Savannah, the suburbs and beyond the limits of Savannah.

Fort Pulaski. The post was constructed on Cockspur Island on the site of Fort Greene. It was started in 1833 but not garrisoned until the Civil War.

Fort Scott. Constructed on the Flint River near its junction with the Chattahoochee River. It was garrisoned in 1816 and abandoned in 1821.

Fort Telfair. The post was one of those constructed for the defense of the Georgia frontier. Built on the Altamaha River in 1790 it was abandoned about 1795.

Fort Wayne. The post was established near the present day site of Brunswick in 1821. The garrison was removed in 1823.

Fort Wilkinson. The fort was started in 1797 on a site west of the Oconee River near the present-day site of Milledgeville. It was the principal post in that portion of the frontier until it was replaced by Fort Hawkins.
Fort At Atakapas. When the United States occupied the Louisiana Purchase a garrison was stationed at Atakapas. The garrison was maintained from 1804 to 1808 and troops were again stationed at Atakapas in 1818 and 1819.

Camp Atkinson. Established on the Calcasieu River near the present town of Lake Charles. It was established in 1830 and abandoned in 1832.

Baton Rouge Barracks. The Spanish town and fort of Baton Rouge was occupied by United States troops on December 10, 1810 and buildings were constructed for the troops. In 1820 barracks and an arsenal were started on a site purchased the previous year on the east bank of the Mississippi River. An arsenal was established there in 1826.

Fort Jackson. The fort was constructed on the west bank of the Mississippi River about seventy-five miles below New Orleans, directly opposite Fort St. Philip. Construction was started in 1822 and the two posts were thereafter jointly administered.

Fort Jesup. The fort was established on the watershed between the Sabine and Red rivers in 1822. From 1822 until its abandonment in 1845, the post was the most southwesterly military establishment of the United
States. Located about twenty-five miles southwest of Natchitoches.

Fort Macomb. The post was established on the west side of the Chef Menteur Pass on the southern boundary of Petite Coquille Island, about twenty-five miles from New Orleans in 1827. It was originally called Fort Wood but the name was changed to Fort Macomb on June 23, 1851.

Post of New Orleans. New Orleans was first occupied by United States troops in 1803 and the city was garrisoned thereafter as a guard against slave rebellion. In 1834 and 1835 new barracks were constructed on the left bank of the Mississippi River below the city. The new barracks were originally called New Orleans Barracks, after the Civil War the post was known as Jackson Barracks.

Post at Natchitoches. Natchitoches, on the Red River was first occupied by United States troops in 1804. The post was called Fort Claiborne and in 1820 a new post, Fort Selden, was constructed at Natchitoches. After the establishment of Fort Jesup the troops were withdrawn in 1822.

Post at Opelousas. The town of Opelousas was first garrisoned by United States troops in 1804 as a part of the occupation of the Louisiana Purchase. The garrison was withdrawn in 1808.
Post at Ouachita. The town of Ouachita was first garrisoned by United States troops in 1804 as a part of the occupation of the Louisiana Purchase. The garrison was withdrawn in 1808.

Fort Pike. A post was established on the northern margin of Petite Coquille Island at the entrance of Lake Pontchartrain about thirty-five miles northeast of New Orleans in 1816. The post was first called Petite Coquille but in 1827 the name was changed to Fort Pike. The post was abandoned in 1849.

Post at Pointe Coupee. The town of Pointe Coupee was first occupied by United States troops in 1805 as a part of the occupation of the Louisiana Purchase. The garrison was withdrawn in 1808.

Fort St. Philip. Originally a Spanish fort, located on the east bank of the Mississippi River at the mouth of the Plaquemine River about seventy-five miles below New Orleans. The post was first occupied by American troops late in 1803. Located opposite Fort Jackson and administered jointly after the building of Fort Jackson.

Fort Selden. Constructed at Natchitoches in 1820, it was abandoned in 1822 when the troops were moved to Fort Jesup.
Fort Wood (see Fort Macomb).

MISSISSIPPI

Fort Adams. The post was established at Loftus Heights on the east bank of the Mississippi River in 1798. Located at the extreme southwestern corner of United States territory it was to guard the boundary between American and Spanish Territory. In 1807 Cantonment Columbia Spring was established four miles east of the fort. Both the fort and camp were abandoned in 1810.

Fort Dearborn. As a protection against possible Indian attacks and slave rebellions the fort was constructed near Washington in 1803. The post was abandoned in 1809.

Fort McHenry. The post was established in 1798, after the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from the territory, at the town of Vicksburg. The post was not regularly garrisoned.

Fort Rosalie. The fort was a French post established in 1716 at the site of present-day Natchez.

Post at Natchez. The town of Natchez was occupied by United States troops in 1798 and was used by General James Wilkinson as his headquarters. The General designated the post Fort Sargent, but the name was not
regularly used. The post was abandoned in 1808.

Fort Nogales. The Spanish built a post at the present-day site of Vicksburg in 1790. The Spanish evacuated the post in 1797 and the Americans occupied the area.

Post at Pass Christian. United States forces were stationed at Pass Christian to guard the entrance to Lake Borgne in 1812. The post was used by American troops as a summer camp until about 1818.

Fort Sargent (see Post at Natchez).

Cantonment Washington. A cantonment was established at Washington in 1809. The camp was abandoned in 1811.

NORTH CAROLINA

Fort Hampton. Located in the town of Beaufort, North Carolina.

Fort Johnston. Located in the town of Smithville, North Carolina, on the west bank of the Cape Fear River, three miles from its mouth. The site was occupied by United States troops in 1794 and construction of a permanent post began. The post was repeatedly abandoned and re-garrisoned.

Fort Macon. The fort was built between 1826 and 1834 on Bogue Island, near Beaufort, North Carolina. It was
first occupied in 1834.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Fort Moultrie. Located on a sand island in the mouth of Charleston Harbor, Fort Moultrie was constructed on the site of the Revolutionary War Fort Sullivan.

Charleston Harbor. The works in Charleston Harbor were reported together. They included such works as Fort Johnson, Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter. And in the city of Charleston, Fort Mechanic, situated on the point of the city.
APPENDIX II
POST STATISTICS

The material contained in these tables was obtained from the monthly post returns. The first figures given are the total number of men, officers and enlisted, reported present at the post on the available returns, and the average number present each month. As none of the returns are complete, percentages are given for the number of returns available: (I) the percentage available on a yearly basis; (II) the percentage available for the period from April to October; and (III) the percentage available for the period from November to March.

The five categories considered are the number of: (A) enlisted men sick; (B) officers in arrest or confinement; (C) enlisted men in arrest or confinement; (D) desertions; and (E) deaths from all causes, a few of which can be attributed to causes other than sickness, but not in sufficient numbers to materially alter the calculations. Totals are given for three different periods of time: (1) the total number of men reported in each category; (2) the total number of men reported
in each category from April to October; and (3) the total number of men reported in each category from November to March.

In order to make a comparison of the three periods, monthly averages were taken for each of the three categories. These figures show the average number of men reported on the available monthly returns. Not included in the tables are totals obtained by using the percentages and averages to determine the total in each category if the returns were complete and if the rate of occurrence was constant. For example, if the returns were complete for the sickly season at Baton Rouge: on the basis of 216 deaths on 77.1% of the possible returns the projection for 100% of the returns would be 277.5 deaths; and on the basis of 2.66 deaths per month for 105 months, the total is 279.3 deaths.

The figures should be used only for comparing the situation at the ten garrisons, and it should be remembered that they are not complete. If the missing returns were to be included, the totals, averages and percentages would probably be altered, but not the overall picture presented by the figures. For instance, the high incidence of sickness and death reported at Savannah in the period from 1826 to 1828 is shown by 62 deaths on 19 returns. The returns for the entire sickly season of 1827 are missing, when it is to be presumed that additional soldiers
died.

When the monthly averages are compared they show that the death rate was higher during the sickly season at all of the posts, except Fort Morgan. The average number of men reported sick was higher in the period from April to October at all of the posts, except Charleston Harbor. The desertion rate was higher during the sickly season at seven of the ten posts, Baton Rouge, Fort Morgan and Fort Pike the exceptions. The posts of Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and Charleston had the highest monthly death rate and the highest rate of desertion.

These figures present a bleak picture of service in the South. Assuming that the rates remained constant, the War Department could expect to lose a total of 234 men each year, at the ten posts surveyed, from desertion and deaths without the troops ever taking the field for any type of activity.
Augusta Arsenal, Georgia. 1822 - 1825

Total number of men reported present on 166 monthly returns, 8,695, or a monthly average of 52.37.

I. 166/168 = 98.8%
II. 96/98 = 97.9%
III. 70/70 = 100%

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Av. 166 mos. 5.18 0.01 5.35 1.18 0.25
Av. 96 mos. 5.33 0.01 5.72 1.35 0.33
Av. 70 mos. 4.97 0.02 4.84 0.94 0.15
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 1821 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 138 monthly returns, 22,536, or a monthly average of 130.73.

I. 138/180 = 76.6%
II. 81/105 = 77.1%
III. 57/75 = 76%

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<td>Av. 138 mos.</td>
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<td>Av. 81 mos.</td>
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<td>Av. 57 mos.</td>
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<td>19.73</td>
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Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. 1819 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 101 monthly returns, 13,242, or a monthly average of 131.10.

I. \( \frac{101}{204} = 49.5\% \)
II. \( \frac{65}{119} = 54.6\% \)
III. \( \frac{36}{85} = 42.3\% \)

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<td>May</td>
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Av. 101 mos. | 9.67 | 0.04 | 11.28 | 2.16 | 0.56 |
Av. 65 mos.  | 9.29 | 0.07 | 11.29 | 2.49 | 0.69 |
Av. 36 mos.  | 10.36| 0.00 | 11.27 | 1.57 | 0.33 |

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Fort Johnston, North Carolina, 1818 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 185 monthly returns, 9,523, or a monthly average of 51.50.

I. \( \frac{185}{216} = 35.6\% \)
II. \( \frac{100}{126} = 79.3\% \)
III. \( \frac{81}{90} = 90.0\% \)

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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Av. 185 mos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Av. 100 mos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Av. 85 mos.</td>
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Fort Mitchell, Alabama. 1825 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 84 monthly returns, 7,181, or a monthly average of 85.47.

I. \( \frac{84}{113} = 74.3\% \)
II. \( \frac{51}{65} = 78.4\% \)
III. \( \frac{33}{48} = 68.7\% \)

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<td>Total</td>
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<td>314</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Av. 84 mos.</td>
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<td>Av. 51 mos.</td>
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<td>Av. 33 mos.</td>
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Fort Morgan, Alabama. 1822, 1823, 1833, 1834, 1835

Total number of men reported present on 44 monthly returns, 1,594, or a monthly average of 36.22.

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<td>II.</td>
<td>27/35</td>
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<td>77.1%</td>
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<td>III.</td>
<td>17/25</td>
<td>=</td>
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April 5 --- 3 --- ---
May 6 --- 5 2 ---
June 9 --- 9 4 1
July 15 --- 29 2 1
August 10 --- 13 2 2
September 11 --- 17 1 ---
October 6 --- 3 --- 2
Total 62 --- 79 11 6

Total N-M 27 --- 19 12 5

Av. 44 mos. 2.02 --- 2.22 0.52 0.25
Av. 27 mos. 2.29 --- 2.92 0.40 0.22
Av. 17 mos. 1.53 --- 1.11 0.70 0.29
New Orleans, Louisiana. 1821 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 103 monthly returns, 10,866, or a monthly average of 105.49.

I. \( \frac{103}{180} = 57.2\% \)
II. \( \frac{61}{105} = 58\% \)
III. \( \frac{42}{75} = 56\% \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1132</td>
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<td>1025</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>85</td>
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<td>98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>101</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>115</td>
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<td>93</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>222</td>
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<td>105</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>774</td>
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<td>617</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>Total N-M</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>19</td>
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</table>

Av. 103 mos. | 10.99 | 0.01 | 9.95 | 2.36 | 0.82 |
Av. 61 mos.  | 12.68 | 0.03 | 10.11| 3.11 | 1.08 |
Av. 42 mos.  | 8.52  | 0.00 | 9.71 | 2.73 | 0.45 |

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Fort Pike (Petite Coquille) Louisiana. 1821 – 1935

Total number of men reported present on 151 monthly returns, 7,312, or a monthly average of 48.42.

I. 151/180 = 83.8%
II. 90/105 = 85.6%
III. 62/75 = 82.6%

<table>
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<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N-M</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
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</table>

Av. 151 mos. | 2.01 | 0.05 | 1.78 | 0.23 | 0.15 |
Av. 90 mos.  | 2.27 | 0.04 | 1.92 | 0.22 | 0.17 |
Av. 61 mos.  | 1.63 | 0.06 | 1.57 | 0.26 | 0.13 |
Fort St. Philip, Louisiana. 1821 - 1831

Total number of men reported present on 97 monthly returns, 4,502, or a monthly average of 46.30.

I. 97/124 = 78.2%
II. 53/71 = 74.6%
III. 44/53 = 83%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N-M</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Av. 97 mos.</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Av. 53 mos.</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Av. 44 mos.</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
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Savannah, Georgia. 1824 - 1835

Total number of men reported present on 105 monthly returns, 5,833, or a monthly average of 55.55.

<table>
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<th>105/144</th>
<th>55/84</th>
<th>50/60</th>
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<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>130</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>72</td>
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</table>

| Total N-M | 239| --- | 282| 51 | 15 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Av. 105 mos.</th>
<th>Av. 55 mos.</th>
<th>Av. 50 mos.</th>
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<td>7.05</td>
<td>9.12</td>
<td>4.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>5.64</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1. Fort Gaines
2. Fort Morgan
3. Fort Charlotte
4. Fort Montgomery
5. Cantonment Montpelier
6. Fort Stoddert
7. Fort Mims
8. St. Stephens
9. Fort Claiborne
10. Fort Crawford
11. Fort Jackson
12. Fort Strother
13. Fort Deposit
14. Fort Hampton
15. Fort Mitchell
1. Fort Gaines
2. Fort Scott
3. Fowl Town
4. Fort Hawkins
5. Fort Wilkinson
6. Fort Fidius
7. Coleraine
8. Fort Wayne
9. Fort Telfair
10. Fort James
11. Savannah
12. Fort Pulaski
LOUISIANA

1. Camp Atkinson
2. Fort Jesup
3. Natchitoches
4. Ouachita
5. Opelousa
6. St. Francisville
7. Baton Rouge
8. New Orleans
9. Fort Jackson
10. Fort St. Philip
11. Port Macomb
12. Port Pike
1. Fort Adams  
2. Fort Dearborn  
3. Fort McHenry  
4. Bay St. Louis  
5. Pass Christian
1. Charleston Harbor
VITA

Tommy Richard Young II was born in Princeton, Indiana, on August 10, 1941. He attended the public schools of Mount Carmel, Illinois, through the first eight grades and then attended Kentucky Military Institute, Lyndon, Kentucky. Upon completion of high school in 1959, he entered DePauw University and received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in May, 1964. In September, 1964, he began graduate study in the Department of History at the University of Arkansas and received the Master of Arts degree in August, 1966. In September, 1966, he began graduate study in the Department of History at Louisiana State University and is a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in August, 1973.
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Tommy Richard Young II

Major Field: History

Title of Thesis: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE SOUTH, 1789-1835

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination:

May 16, 1973