Amos Pinchot and Atomistic Capitalism: a Study in Reform Ideas.

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AMOS PINCHOT AND ATOMISTIC CAPITALISM:
A STUDY IN REFORM IDEAS

A Dissertation

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ABSTRACT

The political career of Amos Pinchot spanned from 1909 to 1942. As a self-professed reformer, Pinchot involved himself in a wide variety of causes. At the same time, a few fundamental principles dominated his commitment to reform. Throughout his long political life, Pinchot maintained a remarkably consistent ideological perspective.

Pinchot began his public career as a participant in the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, and he ended it as a virulent critic of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In the intervening years, he immersed himself in reform politics. Along with his older brother Gifford, he helped found the Progressive party in 1912. Two years later, the younger Pinchot left the Bull Moose fold. In 1916, he campaigned for the re-election of President Woodrow Wilson. Pinchot opposed American entry into World War I. Once the United States had intervened, however, he struggled to make the war a crusade for democracy. He argued for democratic war aims abroad and the protection of civil liberties at home. With the return of peacetime politics, Pinchot looked forward to a revival of the prewar reform movement. In 1920, as a member of the Committee of Forty Right, he played a major role in efforts to establish a new political party devoted
to reform. When the third party coalition failed to materialize, Pinchot moved on to other projects. In 1924, he supported Senator Robert M. LaFollette for President. Later in the 1920's, he began work on a history of the Progressive party. He also stayed active as a magazine writer and newspaper columnist. In 1932, Pinchot welcomed the election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he later supported the early steps in the New Deal. Yet he soon came to distrust the Chief Executive. By 1935, Pinchot counted himself among the foes of the Roosevelt regime. In the closing years of his public life, he repeatedly spoke out in opposition to the President and the New Dealers.

Despite the diversity of his endeavors, Pinchot maintained a fixed ideological perspective for most of his long career. In 1913, he established close ties with New Jersey insurgent George L. Record. Under Record's tutelage, Pinchot learned to regard competitive capitalism as a reform ideology. The two men subsequently devoted themselves to the advancement of a reform program intended to equalize entrepreneurial opportunities. In 1914, an effort to impose the narrow program on the Progressive party ended in failure. After World War I, Pinchot and Record joined the Committee of Forty Eight in another attempt to promote their shared ideals. After breaking with the Committee late in 1920, the two men continued to fight for their political and economic beliefs. During the 1930's, Pinchot held tenaciously to his
long established views on reform. He clashed with the New Dealers because he questioned their devotion to democracy and to free enterprise.

Pinchot's ideological proclivities dictated his political fate. While the American ruling class accepted mass production industries and the beginnings of the welfare state, Pinchot espoused an increasingly anachronistic ideology based on economic competition and individualism. As a result, he remained a quixotic figure on the periphery of American politics.
Chapter 1

THE HERITAGE OF A GENTLEMAN

At his birth in Paris on February 3, 1873, Amos Richards Eno Pinchot entered a secure and cultured world. The wealth and social status of his parents assured him a comfortable upbringing. As a matter of course, he received the benefits of travel and education. America's genteel society, appreciative of his background, granted him immediate acceptance. Among his contemporaries, young Pinchot enjoyed an inordinately privileged existence.

The Pinchots owed their affluence to the skills of two successful capitalists. James W. Pinchot in 1850 left rural Pennsylvania for New York City where he soon prospered as a dry goods merchant. An opportune marriage further improved his financial standing. In 1864, he married Mary P. Eno, a daughter of Amos R. Eno, the owner of New York's opulent Fifth Avenue Hotel and other real estate throughout Manhattan.\(^1\) Just eleven years later, while still in his

\(^1\)At the time of his death, Amos Eno held real estate valued at approximately twenty million dollars. See *New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1898, 1. On the lavishness of the Fifth Avenue Hotel, see Ivan D. Steen, "Palaces For Travelers: New York City's Hotels in the 1850's as Viewed by British Visitors," *New York History*, LI, No. 3 (April, 1970), 282-84. Amos Pinchot once confided to a friend that the family
forties, James Pinchot abandoned the realm of commerce for a leisurely retirement with his wife and their children Gifford, Antoinette, and Amos.  

The closely knit family of five lived in a manner appropriate to its station. As a group, they traveled extensively in Europe. A long stay in France accounted for Amos's exotic birthplace. At home in New York, the quintet established residence in exclusive Gramercy Park. In 1886, James Pinchot completed "Gray Towers," a baronial country house near Milford, Pennsylvania. The secluded mansion and adjacent land served as a family retreat for years to come.

fortune stemmed from the "unearned increment" on New York City land. See Amos Pinchot to James R. Garfield, Feb. 13, 1913, Box 14, Amos Pinchot Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

2For material on James W. Pinchot, see the biographical sketch in Box 1, Pinchot MSS.


4On Gramercy Park see Moses King, King's Handbook of New York City (Boston: Moses King, 1893), 170.

5Designed by the celebrated architect Richard Morris Hunt, the house features three large stone towers with conical roofs. The interior contains twenty-three fireplaces. See the description in Pennsylvania: A Guide to the Keystone State Compiled by Workers of the Writers' Program of the Works Projects Administration in the State of Pennsylvania (New York: Oxford University Press, 1940), 356.

6For additional family background, see Helene Maxwell Hooker, "Biographical Introduction" in Amos R. E. Pinchot, History of the Progressive Party, 1912-1916, ed. by Helene Maxwell Hooker (Washington Square: New York University Press, 1958), 8-14; the biographical essay hereinafter cited as Hooker, "Introduction"; while the main text appears as
A private school education came naturally to the scions of such a well-endowed household. By the age of sixteen, Amos Pinchot had enrolled at Westminster School in Dobbs Ferry, New York. Later, like uncles, cousins, and his brother before him, he went on to Yale. A member of the Class of 1897, he matriculated during the height of William Graham Sumner's intellectual influence. Sports, eating clubs, and campus society dominated Pinchot's undergraduate years, but long after his departure from New Haven, he retained a strong Sumnerian faith in the efficacy of capitalistic competition. Brief service in the Spanish-


7W. L. Cushing to James W. Pinchot, Dec. 10, 1889, Box 1, Pinchot MSS. In honor of its distinguished alumnus, the school subsequently awarded an annual Pinchot Cup for athletic excellence. See W. L. Cushing to Amos Pinchot, March 1, 1917, Box 28, Pinchot MSS; and W. L. Cushing to Amos Pinchot, June 2, 1920, Box 41, Pinchot MSS.

8See the entries for Eno and Pinchot in Directory of Living Graduates of Yale University, 1910 (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse, and Taylor Company, 1910).


10On the extracurricular side of Pinchot's university education, see Amos Pinchot to James W. Pinchot, Nov. 26, 1893, Box 1, Pinchot MSS; and Hooker, "Introduction," 11. See also Henry E. Howland, "Undergraduate Life at Yale," Scribner's Magazine, XXII, No. 1 (July, 1897), 3-29; and Lewis Sheldon Welch and Walter Camp, Yale: Her Campus, Class-Rooms, and Athletics (Boston: L. C. Page and Company, 1898), passim.
American War followed graduation. Upon his return home, the cavalry veteran capped his formal studies with preparations for the bar at New York Law School.11

Yet Pinchot showed no sustained interest in a legal career. He accepted a minor post in the office of the District Attorney for New York County but soon resigned it.12 Social life held far greater attractions. Within a few years, he could list memberships in the University, Boone and Crockett, Yale, and Racquet clubs.13 Pinchot also engaged in what he later termed "mild civic dissipations." As a manager or trustee, he dutifully served as a patron of the University Settlement, the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, the Manhattan State Hospital for the Insane, and the Orthopedic Hospital.14

Along with his social ties, the young aristocrat had connections among the politically powerful. His older brother Gifford won renown as Chief Forester of the United States and as an adviser to President Theodore Roosevelt.15


12Amos Pinchot to Frank Harris, Oct. 18, 1917, Box 29, Pinchot MSS; and Hooker, "Introduction," 13.

13Typescript dated 1912 in Box 2, Pinchot MSS.

14Both the quote and the list of positions appear in an autobiographical article for the Paterson Sunday Chronicle, Jan. 14, 1917. Copy in Box 152, ibid.

The junior Pinchot, as a result, had access to the White House. On one occasion he attended a wrestling match between the Chief Executive and a visiting Japanese jujitsu expert. At another time and in a more serious vein, the President offered him a sinecure in the Federal bureaucracy. After conducting a brief investigation, young Pinchot declined the position.16

Well before middle age, Amos Pinchot had accumulated all of the credentials proper to a gentleman of his day. His wealth, family ties, and education entitled him to a place among the socially elite. As befitted a man of his rank, he compiled a record of involvement in community affairs. His political connections extended to the highest levels. Graced with intelligence, wit, and a strong sense of noblesse oblige, Pinchot seemed destined for a career in the upper reaches of the American ruling class.

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16See the fragmentary and undated reminiscence of Roosevelt in Box 76, Pinchot MSS.
Chapter 2

LESSONS IN NATIONAL POLITICS

Entry into national politics came easily to Pinchot. In 1908, he went to the aid of his embattled brother and wound up in the midst of a major political controversy. An insurgent from the start, the younger Pinchot adapted quickly to the ambiance of reform then at work in the country. In making the adjustment, he learned to relish life near the center of power. Amos Pinchot, between 1909 and 1912, completed a political apprenticeship and discovered an avocation of enduring interest.

A zealot by temperament, Gifford Pinchot gave unstinted devotion to the cause of natural resource preservation. He regarded the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt as a high point in government supervision of the public domain. Accordingly, he had reservations about the change of administrations in March, 1909. He feared that incoming President William Howard Taft would fail to safeguard natural resources with Rooseveltian vigor. More important, the Forester distrusted Taft's Secretary of Interior Richard A. Ballinger. Pinchot deemed the cabinet officer an enemy of conservation, and he was soon listening sympathetically to reports that
implicated Ballinger in a plot to defraud the government of coal lands in Alaska. The alleged conspiracy linked the Secretary directly with the Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate, one of the most powerful monopoly groups in the Far West.

Differences between Pinchot and Ballinger surfaced repeatedly during the latter half of 1909. A legislative investigation, once Congress met in December, seemed inevitable.1 Faced with the likelihood of an inquiry, Pinchot sought help near at hand. In a later review of the situation, he wrote: 
"... I would need counsel, and counsel of the very best. The man to whom I naturally turned first was my brother Amos."2

The younger Pinchot responded to the call with alacrity. When Congress authorized an investigation, he busied himself with problems of legal strategy.3 He wanted to make certain that his brother remained in the best possible light while Ballinger appeared as a tool of

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2Pinchot, New Ground, 442.

3For the material compiled by the inquiry, see U. S., Investigation of the Department of Interior and of the Bureau of Forestry, Senate Doc. 719, 61 Cong., 3 Sess., 1910-1911.
rapacious monopolists. The goal, he explained to Gifford, was "to win without a scratch and hands down." To guarantee victory, Amos carried his partisanship beyond the hearing room. In an article published anonymously, he charged the Secretary of Interior with corruption and subservience to the trusts. He also helped prepare an elaborate summary of the evidence against Ballinger for submission to President Taft.

His involvement in the controversy had a profound impact on the political neophyte. He observed in retrospect:

It is easy to write of America—but hard to write of it discerningly. . . . I came a little into the light, or perhaps we should call it the darkness, when, in the winter of 1909 and 1910, in a great congressional investigation, I saw the inside of the American cup.

The fundamental conflict, as Pinchot perceived it, matched

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4See Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 20, 1910; Amos Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, March 15, 1910; Amos Pinchot to George W. Pepper, May 3, 1910; and Amos Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, May 23, 1910, all in Box 8, Pinchot MSS.

5Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Feb. 15, 1910, Box 22, Gifford Pinchot Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

6Amos Pinchot to Livy Richard, June 11, 1910, Box 8, Pinchot MSS; and [Amos Pinchot], "The Case Against Ballinger," Boston Common: A Weekly Newspaper, June 18, 1910, 15-18.

7See Nathan A. Symth and Amos Pinchot, Brief on the Cunningham Coal Entries in Alaska Submitted to the President in Behalf of Mr. Gifford Pinchot. Copy in Box 116, Pinchot MSS.

8See Words and Phrases notebook in Box 171, ibid.
reformers against corruptionists, selfless men like his brother against agents of corporate greed like Ballinger. In such an alignment, Pinchot counted himself an insurgent.\(^9\)

The return of Theodore Roosevelt to the United States from an international tour made the reform cause all the more attractive. On June 17, 1910, when the Colonel sailed into New York harbor after fifteen months abroad, Gifford Pinchot met him at the shoreline.\(^10\) Both Pinchots soon enlisted as Roosevelt speech writers, and their efforts produced a quick harvest.\(^11\) At Osawatomie, Kansas, on August 31, the ex-President, in words supplied by his onetime Chief Forester, called for a sweeping new program of national change.\(^12\) The address delighted the junior Pinchot.

\(^9\) See especially the summary of the Ballinger case in Amos Pinchot to John Callan O'Loughlin, Aug. 15, 1912, Box 12, ibid.

\(^10\) *New York Times*, June 18, 1910, 2.

\(^11\) See Gifford Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, June 29, 1910, Box 126, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Aug. 16, 1910, Box 8, Pinchot MSS. With pardonable myopia, Amos Pinchot saw his brother as the driving force behind the Rough Rider's progressivism. After a day spent with the former Chief Executive, he noted in his diary: "I feel TR is in a very unsatisfactory frame of mind. Gifford is his political conscience & when Gifford's influence is absent TR slumps." See entry for Aug. 19, *Diary, 1910*, Box 171, Pinchot MSS.

He immediately sent congratulations to his brother. In another letter, he described the political scene as "vitaly and almost thrillingly interesting."  

Pinchot channeled much of his excitement into intellectual pursuits. In September, 1910, he published an essay on the contemporary reform movement and one of its antecedents. After comparing modern insurgents with antebellum abolitionists, he concluded that both deserved praise as opponents of incumbent oligarchies. An enlivened concern for reading went with the burdens of authorship. Seeking guidance from an old friend, Pinchot asked William Kent: "Will you tell me where I can get the complete works of Miss Jane Adams [sic]? I want to get her ideas into my brain as fast as I can." By way of further explanation, he added: "I have just begun to think about the situation in this country..."  

Although a Republican by upbringing, Pinchot, full of enthusiasm for reform, now gave his primary allegiance to insurgency. He disapproved heartily when Roosevelt tried to reunite the G.O.P. for Congressional elections in

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13 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 1, 1910, Box 8, Pinchot MSS.  
14 Amos Pinchot to W. Kirkpatrick Brice, ibid.  
16 Amos Pinchot to William Kent, Oct. 10, 1910, Box 8, Pinchot MSS.
1910. The Colonel, he fretted, might speak for Old Guard regulars such as Warren G. Harding in Ohio. In an acrid letter to his brother, he warned, that the ex-President would shift from reformer to reactionary in order to emerge a winner. Widespread Republican losses in November further convinced Pinchot of the futility of attempts at reconciliation. Roosevelt, he hoped, had learned the same lesson. With regard to the Rough Rider's future, he told Henry L. Stimson: "The role of a great moral teacher is . . . inconsistent with the compromises and maneuvers of a great politician. It seems to me that the Colonel has got to make a definite choice [sic]."

Early in 1911, the Pinchots temporarily parted company with Roosevelt and joined a more militant reform circle. On January 21, they helped establish the National Progressive Republican League. Fathered by Wisconsin's Senator Robert M. LaFollette, the new organization sought to

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18 See Amos Pinchot to James R. Garfield, Oct. 27, 1910, Box 8, Pinchot MSS.

19 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, *ibid*.

20 Amos Pinchot to Henry L. Stimson, Nov. 11, 1910, *ibid*.
democratize American politics. Its declaration of principles included demands for popular election of United States Senators, direct primary nominations for all elective offices, and State constitutional amendments to foster initiative, referendum, and recall. As founding members, both Pinchots signed the statement of principles. Gifford accepted a position on the newly formed Executive Committee.

Amos, on the other hand, concentrated on the unit's financial problems. He sent League Secretary Frederic C. Howe a list of prospective contributors from New York. As an alternative means of fund raising, he favored a LaFollette rally in Manhattan and offered to rent Carnegie Hall for the occasion. He subsequently donated ten


22 For the declaration of principles, a list of the founders, and the first slate of officers, see Robert M. LaFollette, "The Beginning of a Great Movement: Address Before the Wisconsin Legislature Announcing the Formation of the National Progressive Republican League," LaFollette's Weekly Magazine, III, No. 5 (Feb. 4, 1911), 7-8, 12.

23 See Frederic C. Howe to Amos Pinchot, Jan. 31, 1911; and Amos Pinchot to Frederic C. Howe, March 3, 1911, both in Box 9, Pinchot MSS.
thousand dollars to the Senator's cause. 24

For Pinchot, work on behalf of the League evolved into support for LaFollette's Presidential aspirations. In March, 1911, he conferred with the Senator about plans to make the 1912 Republican nominee a progressive. 25 Other strategy meetings followed. 26 Finally, on May 26, 1911, the New Yorker jotted in his diary: "I believe that Taft can be defeated for renomination. The people do not trust him. I believe LaFollette can be nominated." 27 The euphoric spell lasted through the summer months. In a late September note to his brother, Pinchot rated LaFollette as "gaining steadily" while Taft was "failing--failing pathetically. . . . " 28

The autumn brought a special opportunity to promote the Senator's candidacy. On October 16, Pinchot attended a gathering of two hundred progressive Republicans in Chicago.

24Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, March 29, 1911, ibid.; Amos Pinchot to John J. Hannan, undated, Box 13, ibid.; and John J. Hannan to Amos Pinchot, July 15, 1911, ibid.

25Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, March 21, 1911, Box 9, ibid.

26Entries for March 24, and May 19, Diary, 1911, Box 171, ibid.

27Entry for May 26, ibid.

28Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 29, 1911, Box 146, Gifford Pinchot MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to Mrs. James W. Pinchot, July 31, 1911; and Amos Pinchot to Norman Hapgood, Aug. 4, 1911, both in Box 9, ibid.
As a member of the Resolutions Committee for the session, he helped write a forceful endorsement of LaFollette for President. An air of optimism prevailed among the delegates. Pinchot emerged from talks with George L. Record of New Jersey and other insurgents in high spirits. To a skeptical friend, he declared: "The meeting at Chicago was a tremendous success. It is my very distinct opinion that we are going to win out."

In the afterglow of the conference, Pinchot seemed to be the perfect LaFollette loyalist. He joined a finance committee set up at Chicago to aid the Senator. Even his ties with Roosevelt showed signs of atrophy. When Walter Hines Page of World's Work asked for the name of someone to do a story favoring the Colonel's renomination, Pinchot replied that he knew no one well suited for the job.

Still, the Rough Rider's popularity could not be denied. James R. Garfield, Roosevelt's former Secretary of Interior, assured Gifford Pinchot that in the key state of

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30 See Amos Pinchot to William Kent, Oct. 19, 1911; and Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, Oct. 20, 1911, both in Box 10, Pinchot MSS.

31 Amos Pinchot to Thomas R. Shipp, Oct. 18, 1911, ibid.

32 Amos Pinchot to Gilbert E. Roe, Nov. 3, 1911, ibid.

33 Walter Hines Page to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 19, 1911; and Amos Pinchot to Walter Hines Page, Dec. 23, 1911, both in ibid.
Ohio Roosevelt far surpassed LaFollette in voter appeal. Garfield further claimed that Ohio insurgent Republicans would never unite behind the Wisconsin Senator. Accordingly, he urged a bipartisan reform coalition of anti-Taft forces. When G.O.P. progressives met in Columbus on January 1, 1912, Garfield, the older Pinchot, and even LaFollette's manager Walter L. Houser were on hand to plead for unity. The assemblage responded positively with a vote "to work in harmony and unison to nominate a Progressive Republican for President." The declaration went on to mention both Roosevelt and LaFollette, but neither man won a clear endorsement.

The portents of a full-scale Roosevelt drive placed Amos Pinchot in awkward straits. At a meeting of LaFollette advisers on January 19, he voted with the majority against his brother to disavow fusion tactics such as those

34See James R. Garfield to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 23, 1911; James R. Garfield to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 28, 1911; and James R. Garfield to Gifford Pinchot, Dec. 2, 1911, all in Box 142, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

35Houser had evidently decided that LaFollette would have to give way to Roosevelt as the progressive standard-bearer. See the entry for Dec. 26, Diary, 1911, Box 3315, ibid.

36For the declaration and a general account of the Columbus meeting, see Belle Case LaFollette and Fola LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette, June 14, 1855—June 18, 1925 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), I, 372-75; hereinafter cited as Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette.
used in Ohio. Just three days later, however, he encountered Roosevelt, Gifford, and a small coterie at the University Club in New York. The Colonel invited him into the conversation, and he soon learned of the ex-President's amenability to a draft for the Republican nomination. Pinchot resolved his dilemma with small qualms. Scheduled to consult with Roosevelt again on January 24, he wrote in his diary on the previous day: "See TR in morning. Must stick up for LaFollette & make TR see that if he . . . is to take the flag RML must be honorably treated & must have good excuse for quitting race." The inevitable break with LaFollette came shortly thereafter. During a stormy confrontation on January 29, Gifford reminded the Senator of an earlier warning to count him out if it reached the point of a fight with Roosevelt. The brothers stood on common ground. In recounting the episode, Gifford noted laconically: "Amos strong with me this time."

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38Entry for Jan. 22, Diary, 1912, Box 171, Pinchot MSS; and entry for Jan. 22, Diary, 1912, Box 3315, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

39Entry for Jan. 23, Diary, 1912, Box 171, Pinchot MSS.

40For the quotation and an account of the meeting, see entry for Jan. 29, Diary, 1912, Box 3315, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
A dramatic turn of events furnished the Pinchots with a pretext for their exit from the LaFollette camp. Speaking at Philadelphia on the night of February 2, the Senator faltered badly during his address and appeared to be seriously ill.41 He left for Washington immediately after the speech, and on February 5, Walter Houser announced that the candidate planned to rest for a few weeks.42 In the furor that ensued, both Pinchots made haste to desert the Wisconsinite. On February 6, Amos told the press: "With LaFollette out of the race, his followers are free to get behind Roosevelt and continue the fight with a new leader." He cited growing popular demand for the Colonel and the state of the Senator's health as reasons for his shift.43 A few days later, Gifford informed progressives in Minnesota that in his judgment LaFollette was too sick to go on with the campaign.44


42The New York Times carried the announcement under the headline "LaFollette Now Out of the Race." The Senator, on the other hand, never, considered his candidacy terminated by the statement. See New York Times, Feb. 6, 1912, 1; and Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette, I, 405-21.

43New York Tribune, Feb. 7, 1912, 9. Gilbert E. Roe, a long time LaFollette associate, met Pinchot together with George L. Record on February 7. Reporting back to the Senator, Roe affirmed that both men "had gone over," and that he "saw no use of talking with them." See Gilbert E. Roe to Robert M. LaFollette, Feb. 7, 1912, Series B, Box 72, LaFollette Family MSS.

44New York Times, Feb. 12, 1912, 2. See also Gifford Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, Feb. 17, 1912, Box 154, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
Soon after their apostasy, the brothers made contact with Roosevelt. On February 14, the three men met at the Rough Rider's office to discuss drafts of a speech that he intended to give a week later in Columbus, Ohio. The conference produced an exchange of letters reflecting strong differences of opinion. The younger Pinchot, distressed by the conservative tenor of the proposed address, wanted a statement more sharply critical of big business. In rebuttal, the former President declared his preference for complex "whole truths" over "a string of easy well-sounding, and rather cheap, half truths." The speech, as finally delivered, contained a full measure of calculated ambiguity. Even so, Pinchot knew his duty. In a burst of campaign hyperbole, he told reporters: "... Mr. Roosevelt has struck a great blow for the people of this country. He had thrown down the glove to the whole reactionary army. ..."48

Once securely tied to the Colonel's staff, the new aide undertook a variety of political tasks. When the New

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45 Entry for Feb. 14, Diary, 1912, Box 171, Pinchot MSS; and entry for Feb. 14, Diary, 1912, Box 3315, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

46 See Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Feb. 14, 1912, Series 1, Microfilm Reel 129, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; and Theodore Roosevelt to Amos Pinchot, Feb. 15, 1912, Box 14, Pinchot MSS.

47 For the text, see Roosevelt, Social Justice, 119-48.

York Evening Post launched an editorial attack on both Roosevelt and himself, Pinchot responded with a lengthy note of protest. More ambitiously, he sought election as a delegate to the Republican national convention but lost when Taft swept the New York primary. Later in the intraparty battle, he published a magazine article that rehashed the Ballinger affair and openly questioned the integrity of the President.

The bitter fight over the nomination strained Pinchot's Republican loyalties to the breaking point. Two weeks before the G.O.P. convention, he confided to another Roosevelt partisan: "I can not look forward to a new party with dread, for it will perhaps mean a tremendous step in advance. . . ." The last strands of his fealty were subsequently snapped by the heavy-handedness of the Old Guard. Using their control of the National Committee and the convention hierarchy, the regulars brushed aside charges of improperly seated delegations and pushed Taft through to

49 (New York) Evening Post, March 16, 1912, 6; and Amos Pinchot to Editor, New York Evening Post, March 20, 1912, Box 11, Pinchot MSS.

50 See Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, Feb. 24, 1912, Box 11, Pinchot MSS; and New York Tribune, March 27, 1912, 2.

51 See Amos Pinchot, "President Taft--Candidate For Re-election," Pearson's Magazine, XXVII, No. 5 (May, 1912), 533-44.

52 Amos Pinchot to Mrs. James R. Garfield, June 6, 1912, Box 12, Pinchot MSS.
renomination. Roosevelt, stung by defeat, took the only course that allowed him to remain in the race. On the night of June 22, 1912, he announced his intention to seek the Presidency on an independent reform ticket. The Republican breakup caused Pinchot no grief. In the aftermath of the debacle, he described his brother and himself as "greatly pleased," even "elated" over the prospect of a new party.

Zealously committed to a reform crusade, Pinchot wanted an insurgent coalition free of conservative taint. He complained forcefully when Progressive party ranks grew to include trust executive George W. Perkins, wealthy publisher Frank A. Munsey, and a host of veteran political bosses. Half of the Bull Moose recruits in New York, he


55 Amos Pinchot to Albert B. Kerr, June 25, 1912; and Amos Pinchot to W. J. McGee, June 25, 1912, both in Box 12, Pinchot MSS.

56 See Amos Pinchot to James R. Garfield, July 8, 1912, Box 117, James R. Garfield Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; and Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, July 12, 1912, ibid. Both Perkins and Munsey were heavy financial contributors to Roosevelt's drive for the Republican nomination. When that goal proved unattainable, they promised to underwrite the third party effort. See Pinchot, History, 165; George Britt, Forty Years--Forty Millions: The Career of Frank A. Munsey (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1935), 158-84; and John A. Garraty, Right-Hand Man: The
grumbled, were "band wagon reactionaries." In hopes of reversing the trend toward political eclecticism, he urged California's Hiram W. Johnson to rally militant reformers and force Roosevelt "to see the necessity of making the progressive fight on progressive lines..." The influx of the unanointed left Pinchot gloomy. After less than a month of new party watching, he confessed to Norman Hapgood: "Confidentially, I do not feel so good over the Bull Moose movement as I did..."  

Much of Pinchot's disillusionment stemmed from the prominence of George Perkins in the Progressive high command. A former partner of J. P. Morgan and a director of both the United States Steel Corporation and the International Harvester Company, Perkins articulated a corporate approach to reform. He particularly favored the regulation of


58 Among the militants, Pinchot specified his brother, James R. Garfield, George L. Record, Francis J. Heney, and William Allen White. See Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, July 18, 1912, Box 12, Pinchot MSS.

59 Amos Pinchot to Norman Hapgood, July 20, 1912, ibid.
industry through close business-government cooperation. Conversely, Pinchot believed that such an intimate relationship led to corruption as evidenced by the Ballinger embroilment. He regarded Perkins's position as the very antithesis of reform.

When the Progressives convened at Chicago in August, 1912, the two men quickly clashed. First, Pinchot tried unsuccessfully to keep Perkins off the National Committee. A conflict of opinions over the platform widened the rift. Working with the Resolutions Committee, Pinchot helped draft a plank that called for a stronger version of the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Perkins and Roosevelt, as members of an informal review board, later refashioned the draft into a declaration that accepted the trusts as inevitable and proposed their regulation by a government commission. An error in convention procedure brought the contrasting views of economic concentration to light. On the final day

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of the party meeting, the anti-trust plank prepared by the Resolutions Committee was read by mistake to the assembled delegates. Perkins, realizing the blunder immediately, had the errant words struck from the record and replaced in the press accounts by the proposal that he had co-authored.63

Despite the troubles at Chicago, Pinchot took an active part in the autumn campaign. In the role of pamphleteer, he attempted to trace the historical roots of the Progressive party. His sweeping survey included the Renaissance, John Calvin, William Shakespeare, the American Revolution, and the Civil War. Significantly, the tract ended with a blast at contemporary monopolies in general and United States Steel in particular.64 In a less cerebral vein, Pinchot tried his luck as a candidate. He ran for Congress in New York City's heavily Democratic Eighteenth District. Although he collected an endorsement from Roosevelt and waged an aggressive canvass, the effort proved

63Oscar King Davis, Secretary of the Progressive National Committee, witnessed the mistake in presentation of the platform and negotiated the alteration of the press reports. See Oscar King Davis, Released For Publication: Some Inside Political History of Theodore Roosevelt and His Times, 1898-1918 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925), 331-34. See also Pinchot, History, 177.

64See Amos Pinchot, What's the Matter with America: The Meaning of the Progressive Movement and the Rise of the New Party ([New York?], 1912), passim. Pinchot admitted that his essay might be "too highbrow for the average public," but he insisted that "it could be used effectively among independent thinkers." See Amos Pinchot to George L. Record, Oct. 8, 1912, Box 113, Pinchot MSS.
In the final voting, he outpolled the Republican but finished well behind the Democrat.

Meanwhile, the pre-eminence of Perkins and other malefactors within the Bull Moose camp continued to bother Pinchot. With the financier serving as Chairman of the National Executive Committee and campaign chief of staff, Pinchot found abundant reason to complain. Halfway through the race, he lamented to Democratic braintrusteer Louis D. Brandeis:

I regret more than I can tell you that George Perkins and Frank Munsey are taking so prominent a place in our party. Munsey is painting us ... as the party of protection, while Perkins is giving people an opportunity to assume that we help the defenders of the trusts.

Only Roosevelt, Pinchot finally decided, could avert an election disaster. In letters to his brother and Hiram

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65 See Theodore Roosevelt to Stanley Isaacs, Oct. 12, 1912, Box 121, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, Oct. 5, 1912, Box 13, Pinchot MSS.

66 The vote among major candidates was: Thomas G. Patten (Democrat), 13,704; Amos Pinchot (National Progressive), 6,644; S. Walter Kaufman (Republican), 4,943; and Algernon Lee (Socialist), 2,085. See State of New York, Manual For the Use of the Legislature of the State of New York, 1913 (Albany: J. B. Lyon Company Printers, 1913), 698.

67 On Perkins's campaign activities, see Garraty, Perkins, 273-284. Chicago lawyer Harold L. Ickes later told Pinchot that the party organization in New York had "consisted of George W. Perkins and a push button." See Harold L. Ickes to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 2, 1912, Box 13, Pinchot MSS.

68 Amos Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, Oct. 8, 1912, Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
Johnson, he outlined a plan to have the Colonel take over direction of the campaign from Perkins, summon an elite guard of reformers to his side, and lead a last minute charge to victory. Convinced of the merit of his scheme, Pinchot even revealed it to Perkins. The Chairman, however, dismissed it as impractical.

When the election ended in defeat, both Pinchots vented their wrath on Perkins. In separate screeds to Roosevelt, they insisted on the need to minimize the financier's future political activities. Gifford wanted Progressive National Headquarters moved from New York to Washington and Perkins assigned to non-controversial duties. Amos, along the same line, argued that the party would never gain credibility as a vehicle for reform so long as a trust magnate remained at its head. Perkins, he con­ cluded, needed to "identify himself with progressive social and industrial work," so that his name would bring to mind "other organizations than ... J. P. Morgan & Co., the United States Steel Corporation, and the International

69 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Oct. 15, 1912; and Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, Oct. 14, 1912, both in ibid.

70 Amos Pinchot to George W. Perkins, Oct. 17, 1912; and George W. Perkins to Amos Pinchot, Oct. 19, 1912, both in ibid.

71 Gifford Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Nov. 9, 1912, Box 157, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
Roosevelt responded with a stout defense of his chief lieutenant. Writing to Gifford, he expressed doubt that any other man had done as much as Perkins in the campaign. He also cautioned that any move to unseat the Chairman would be interpreted as an attack on the forces of "sane radicalism" within the party. The Colonel followed the same tack with the younger Pinchot. He refused to consider dropping Perkins. The trust issue, he added, was far more complicated than Amos thought. In closing, the ex-President recalled that the Pinchots had already broken with Taft and LaFollette. Involvement in another quarrel, he warned, might permanently impair the brothers' usefulness to the reform cause.

If Perkins needed additional support, he soon received it. On December 10, 1912, Bull Moose leaders returned to Chicago for a post-election conference. Roosevelt, in his remarks to the first session, paid special tribute to Perkins and other major financial backers of the party. Speaking directly to a few heavy contributors, he said: "I not only want to thank you but to say that I have

72 Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Dec. 3, 1912, Box 13, Pinchot MSS.

73 Roosevelt supplied the emphasis. See Theodore Roosevelt to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 13, 1912, Box 157, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

74 Theodore Roosevelt to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 5, 1912, Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
been happy to be associated with you . . . there have been no more disinterested Progressives than yourselves." The Chairman won still another vote of confidence from the National Committee. When presented with a proposal to move headquarters from New York to Washington, the unit vetoed the transfer by a vote of thirty-two to twelve. According to one authority, Perkins emerged from the Chicago meeting "second only to Roosevelt in command of the party." The conference marked the end of Amos Pinchot's political apprenticeship. Drawn into the Ballinger affair by family ties, the young socialite became a committed insurgent. He immersed himself in the actions and assumptions of the reform movement. In practical terms, his experiences as a speech writer, polemicist, fund raiser, and candidate constituted an excellent introduction to the mechanics of national politics. In the realm of reform ideas, Pinchot adopted a simple anti-monopoly point of view.


76 In an effort to placate the Pinchots and other dissidents, Roosevelt had the original Resolutions Committee anti-trust plank restored to the platform. On that action and for the vote in the National Committee, see Garraty, Perkins, 288.

77 Mowry, Roosevelt, 296.
The fight with Ballinger aroused his suspicions about the political machinations of the trusts. His encounters with George Perkins suggested far more sinister possibilities. From his contacts with the financier, Pinchot learned that an agent of the trusts could infiltrate and even decisively influence a movement ostensibly devoted to reform.
With George Perkins securely lodged near the top of the Bull Moose hierarchy, Amos Pinchot faced a cloudy political future. His opposition to the trusts conflicted sharply with the assumptions of Progressive leaders such as Perkins and Theodore Roosevelt. Yet Pinchot neither retreated from politics nor compromised his beliefs. Instead, he merged his anti-monopoly views with a more systematic critique of economic concentration. His reform endeavors, as a result, took on a narrow and dogmatic quality.

Early in 1913, Pinchot established regular contact with long time New Jersey insurgent George L. Record. The two men had worked together in the LaFollette and Roosevelt campaigns, but now they became close friends.\(^1\) Pinchot

\(^1\)Record's reform activities extended back into the 1890's. He first rose to prominence as Jersey City's corporation counsel in the administration of Mayor Mark Fagan between 1901 and 1905. For biographical information on Record, see New York Times, Sept. 28, 1933, 24; "Obituary of George L. Record," New Jersey Law Journal, LVI, No. 10 (Oct., 1933), 264-66; and William M. Barr, "George L. Record" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1936), 1–64; the last title hereinafter cited as Barr, "Record." On Record's political career through 1912, see Ransome E. Noble, Jr., New Jersey Progressivism Before Wilson (Princeton:
particularly admired the Jerseyman's taste for heated debate and clear presentation of ideas. He quickly concluded that Record deserved a greater voice in Progressive affairs. Accordingly, he invited party luminaries such as George Perkins and Jane Addams to join him for evenings of discussion with the loquacious New Jersey reformer.  

Record, by 1913, had reduced his notions of political economy to a concise formula. An ardent believer in capitalism and a disciple of Henry George, he envisioned an economic order based on widespread competition among commercial equals. The vital prerequisite for such a system, Record maintained, was equality of opportunity. Therefore, he advocated a five-point program designed to strip away the special privileges already enjoyed by the giants of American industry. His master plan called for: government ownership of railroads, other utilities, and natural resources; prohibitive taxation on large landholdings; an end to patent restrictions; abolition of the tariff; and decentralization of banking. These steps, according to Record, would open up


2See Amos Pinchot, "George Record," New Republic, LXXVI, No. 987 (Nov. 1, 1933), 329-31; hereinafter cited as Pinchot, "Record."

3Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 23, 1913; and Amos Pinchot to Jane Addams, Jan. 28, 1913, both in Box 14, Pinchot MSS.
new possibilities in the economy and allow all business competitors to begin from an equal start. By attacking monopolistic capitalism, the wily reformer hoped to save free enterprise. He fervently believed that only atomistic competition could provide the foundation for economic justice and ward off the threat of socialism to America. A small band of New Jersey Progressives shared his staunchly pro-capitalist point of view.

Pinchot soon gave evidence of Record's impact on his political thinking. In a speech at Yonkers, New York, on January 20, 1913, he urged Progressives to wage war on the trusts. His specific recommendations included government ownership of railroads and other "natural monopolies" along

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4 Record first formulated his program as a newspaper columnist for the Jersey Journal in 1910-1911. For an excellent discussion of the position developed in that column, see Ransome E. Noble, Jr., "Henry George and the Progressive Movement," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, VIII, No. 3 (April, 1949), 259-69. For additional material on Record's ideas, see Ransome E. Noble, Jr., "George L. Record's Struggle for Economic Democracy," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, X, No. 1 (Oct., 1950), 71-83; and George L. Record, How to Abolish Poverty (Jersey City: George L. Record Memorial Association, 1936), passim.

5 See especially, George L. Record, A Complete Program of Fundamental Reform. The Only Answer to Socialism, memorandum attached to George L. Record to Robert M. LaFollette, May 5, 1911, Series B, Box 69, LaFollette Family MSS.

with passage of a stronger version of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. At the close of his remarks, he also endorsed prohibitive taxes on landed estates.7

In the months that followed, Pinchot continued to assimilate the Record credo. Writing to William Kent in April, 1913, he praised the anti-trust policy of President Woodrow Wilson. At the same time, he declared:

What I am working for here in New York is to get a little bunch to stand for some of the big things . . . for municipal ownership, for Wilson's trust ideas, and above all for the gradual breaking down of the land monopoly.

The brief list reflected the new concerns that increasingly came to dominate Pinchot's outlook on reform.8

From his newly attained perspective, Pinchot saw the economic aims of Progressive leaders in an even more critical light. He particularly opposed the concept of trust regulation by a government commission, an idea favored by both Theodore Roosevelt and George Perkins.9 In a paper for the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Pinchot argued that no Federal bureau could successfully control the industrial giants. He pointed to competition as

7(Yonkers) Sunday Record, Jan. 26, 1913. Clipping in Box 225, Pinchot MSS. A typescript of the speech appears in Box 1985, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

8Amos Pinchot to William Kent, April 21, 1913, Box 14, Pinchot MSS.

9For insight into Roosevelt's economic views, see the report of his remarks on competition and regulation in New York Times, July 3, 1913, 9.
the only definitive solution to the trust problem.\textsuperscript{10} In a subsequent letter to Hiram Johnson, the New Yorker labeled the commission method of regulation "legalized monopoly."\textsuperscript{11} He insisted that big business would ultimately gain control of any regulatory agency.\textsuperscript{12}

With help from George Record, Pinchot soon devised a plan to make the trust issue central to a realignment of Progressive forces. The scheme called for Gifford Pinchot to lead an attack on the Perkins wing of the party and win Roosevelt back to the side of reform. In a series of magazine articles, the Forester was to expose the failure of the party's platform to deal effectively with the monopoly menace. At the same time, he would offer a program designed to break up the trusts and establish the preconditions for economic competition. Naturally, Record and the junior Pinchot expected to draft the essays intended for magazine publication. On July 23, Record sketched the scenario for Gifford.\textsuperscript{13} In a follow-up letter written on the next day,


\textsuperscript{11}Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, July 8, 1913, Box 15, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{12}See Amos Pinchot to Francis W. Bird, July 15, 1913, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{13}Record explained that he and Amos had hit upon the plan during a conversation on the previous day. He went on to outline the plot in detail. See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, July 23, 1913, Box 167, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
Amos Pinchot urged his brother to comply with the plan.\textsuperscript{14}

The older Pinchot responded in a cautious but receptive manner. He concurred on the need for the series of articles. He suggested to his brother that the circle of draftsmen be enlarged to include George W. Woodruff, one of his closest friends. Woodruff, he told Amos, was "far less apt to run wild than Record. . . ."\textsuperscript{15} Still, Gifford appeared willing to cooperate with the Jerseyman. On August 2, he confided to Record: "I think you and Amos are more radical than I am, but I also think that I am plenty radical enough for the present purpose."\textsuperscript{16}

Despite the semblance of unity, work on the project lagged from the start. Record hoped to have the articles drafted and approved within a few weeks.\textsuperscript{17} Yet November found him still instructing Gifford in the intricacies of land value taxation and associated reforms.\textsuperscript{18} As Christmas neared, Amos tried his hand at doctrinal exegesis. He told his brother:

\textsuperscript{14}Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, July 24, 1913, Box 166, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{15}Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, July 30, 1913, \textit{ibid}. On the ties between Gifford Pinchot and Woodruff, see McGeary, Gifford Pinchot, 46.

\textsuperscript{16}Gifford Pinchot to George L. Record, Aug. 2, 1913, Box 167, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{17}See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Aug. 11, 1913; and George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 19, 1913, both in \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{18}See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 14, 1913, \textit{ibid}.
Now what I propose is this. That the Progressive Party, through means which we have already discussed, shall be dedicated to the destruction of private monopoly in the United States; that it shall divide all monopolies into natural and unnatural monopolies; that it shall advocate government ownership of the former and destruction, not regulation of the latter.

He closed by reminding Gifford that the breakup of the trusts would mean increased competition and greater efficiency for industry.19

In the early weeks of 1914, Record and Amos kept the pressure on their reluctant colleague. Record bombarded Gifford with requests for conferences and epistolary lessons in political economy.20 When the Forester reached a decision to run for the United States Senate in Pennsylvania, his two single-minded allies tried to fit the move into their own political design.21 Record noted that the anti-monopoly credo could be written up as a Pinchot campaign document and restated later for the magazine series.22 Amos Pinchot argued along the same lines. He called upon his brother to make the Senate race as a champion of government

19 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Dec. 8, 1913, Box 15, Pinchot MSS.

20 See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 7, 1914; George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 19, 1914; George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 21, 1914; George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 27, 1914; and George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 28, 1914, all in Box 180, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

21 On Gifford's Senatorial bid, see McGeary, Gifford Pinchot, 242-59; and Fausold, Gifford Pinchot, 151-93.

22 George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 12, 1914, Box 180, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
ownership of the railroads and equal commercial opportuni-
ties for all.23

The Senatorial candidate, however, chose to back away
from the anti-monopoly dogma. He counted heavily on campaign
help from Theodore Roosevelt and could ill-afford to take a
stand that might alienate the Colonel.24 Moreover, some of
Gifford's friends and advisers considered Record a political
liability. Overton Price, a long time Pinchot associate,
recommended that the Jerseyman be silenced with chloro-
form.25

Unable to control Gifford, Record and Amos finally
had to abandon their original scheme. Yet an alternate
possibility appeared almost immediately. On March 13, 1914,
Norman Hapgood, editor of Harper's Weekly, asked the younger
Pinchot for an article on George Perkins and divisions with-
in the Progressive party.26 The New Yorker, in his own
words, "seized the opportunity with fear and trembling." He
envisioned an essay on the political machinations of the
trusts with the link between Perkins and United States Steel

23Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Feb. 3, 1914,
Box 16, Pinchot MSS.

24See especially Gifford Pinchot to Theodore Roose-
velt, Dec. 10, 1913, Box 167, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

25Fausold, Gifford Pinchot, 154.

26Norman Hapgood to Amos Pinchot, March 13, 1914,
Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
as his prime example. 27

The proposed article, even in preliminary form, created a small furor. Gifford Pinchot feared that an attack on Perkins and big business would anger Roosevelt. 28 He preferred to delay any confrontation with Perkins until after the November elections. 29 Similar pleas for caution came from Gifford's supporters and campaign intimates. 30

Amos, at least initially, tried to override the wave of criticism. He insisted that a public disclosure of Perkins's activities would force Roosevelt to drop the trust magnate. 31 On advice from Record, the younger Pinchot even considered entering the Bull Moose primary for United States Senator in New York. A Senatorial bid of his own, he contended, would gain publicity for his article and allow him

27 Amos Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, March 18, 1914, ibid.

28 See Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, March 29, 1914, ibid.

29 Entry for March 30, Diary, 1914, Box 3315, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, April 4, 1914, Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

30 Gilson Gardner to Amos Pinchot, March 30, 1914; Overton Price to Amos Pinchot, April 4, 1914, Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, April 6, 1914; and Edwin A. Van Valkenburg to Amos Pinchot, April 9, 1914, all in Box 16, Pinchot MSS. See also entry for April 1, Diary, 1914, Box 3315, ibid.

31 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, March 30, 1914, Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, April 7, 1914, Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
to extend his attack on Perkins. No such opportunities materialized. A letter from his ailing mother convinced Amos not to make the Senate race.

Faced with strong objections to any public arraignment of Perkins, the junior Pinchot finally decided to present his case in private. On May 23, 1914, he summarized his arguments against the trust magnate in a long letter to the members of the Progressive National Committee. After reviewing the former Morgan partner's involvement in the Bull Moose crusade, Pinchot charged:

... Mr. Perkins has conducted an extensive pro-trust propaganda calculated to convince the party and the public that the trusts are useful and sacred institutions; that those who attack them are bent upon the destruction of all healthy industry on a large scale, and finally, that the Progressive Party fully agrees with him in these views. The result is that we have been placed in a false and fatal position. ... Mr. Perkins' pro-trust activity within the Progressive Party began soon after the party's formation. It has continued to the present time.

The letter closed with a demand that Perkins resign as
Chairman of the Bull Moose National Executive Committee.\textsuperscript{34}

His ringing indictment brought results that Pinchot did not anticipate. Reporting to his brother, he described the early replies to his letter as "rather guarded in tone."\textsuperscript{35} Later correspondents showed less reticence. Most of those who wrote expressed agreement with Perkins on the need for consolidation in industry.\textsuperscript{36} Two prominent Bull Moose supporters bluntly told Pinchot that his penchant for competitive capitalism was anachronistic.\textsuperscript{37} Theodore Roosevelt, meanwhile, moved to reassure his chief lieutenant. Writing Perkins on June 2, the Colonel took note of Pinchot's letter and dismissed it as inconsequential.\textsuperscript{38}

The negative responses to his views did not dissuade Pinchot. He simply shifted his anti-monopoly endeavors to a

\textsuperscript{34}Amos Pinchot to Senator Joseph M. Dixon and the Members of the Progressive National Committee, May 23, 1914, Box 122, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{35}Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, May 28, 1914, Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{36}See Amos Pinchot to Henry N. Rickey, June 4, 1914, Questionable Materials Box, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{37}See Inez Milholland Boissevain to Amos Pinchot, May 29, 1914; and Charles Sumner Bird to Amos Pinchot, June 1, 1914, both in ibid.

different front. As a new target, he selected the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. Long a dominant force in the coal fields of the Rockies, the Company, throughout 1913 and 1914, waged a small war with striking miners. Pinchot, at a rally in New York on July 17, 1914, focused his attention on the struggle in Colorado. Lashing out at the Rockefellers, he blamed them for "a system of absentee landlordism ... as ruthless, and as coldly cruel as anything ... in Russia or Mexico." In order to break the grip of the trusts in Colorado and elsewhere, he urged government ownership of coal deposits and other natural resources. These essential raw materials, he asserted, should be made available to all competitors on an equal basis.

Political developments related to the Colorado situation served to re-enforce Pinchot's hostility toward the Bull Moose national leadership. As an observer of Rocky mountain politics, the New Yorker favored the election of Edward P. Costigan, a Rockefeller foe and the Progressive

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40For the text of the speech in pamphlet form, see: Speech of Amos Pinchot At a Mass Meeting Held at Webster Hall, in New York City, on Friday Evening, July 17, 1914, to Discuss the Colorado Strike. Copy in Box 95, Pinchot MSS.
candidate for governor of Colorado.\textsuperscript{41} During the 1914 gubernatorial race, he provided Costigan with a one thousand dollar campaign contribution. He also sought additional help for the candidate from influential friends.\textsuperscript{42} Meanwhile, the Progressive National Committee, according to Pinchot, did not make commensurate efforts on the Coloradan's behalf.\textsuperscript{43} Predictably, Pinchot interpreted the supposed lack of support for his favorite as proof that the trusts controlled the Bull Moose high command. In a letter to Francis J. Heney, he fumed: "... Costigan is fighting the Rockefellers and all they stand for, and the crowd in charge of headquarters is backing up what the Rockefellers stand for."\textsuperscript{44}

When the elections ended in defeat for Costigan and most other Bull Moose hopefuls, Pinchot publicly castigated

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\textsuperscript{42}See Amos Pinchot to Edward P. Costigan, Sept. 25, 1914; Amos Pinchot to Franklin K. Lane, Sept. 11, 1914; and Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, Sept. 11, 1914, all in Box 18, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{43}See Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 11, 1914, Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Alice Carpenter, Oct. 5, 1914, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{44}Amos Pinchot to Francis J. Heney, Nov. 2, 1914, Box 18, Pinchot MSS.
\end{flushright}
the leaders of his party. Writing for the socialist journal *The Masses*, he noted that the Progressive platform contained "something of everything . . . from the care of babies to the building of a birch bark canoe." As a result, he said, the document never went beyond generalities and offered no solutions to major national problems. Pinchot placed the blame for the dearth of serious reform proposals squarely on the shoulders of George Perkins. Progressive policymakers, he concluded, were too much entwined with big business to mount a real challenge to the status quo.

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45 The Progressives suffered a string of disastrous losses in 1914. Among the defeated Bull Moose candidates were Costigan, Gifford Pinchot, Francis J. Heney, Albert J. Beveridge, and James R. Garfield. On the election results, see *New York Tribune*, Nov. 5, 1914, 1, 6; and Mowry, *Roosevelt*, 302-303.

46 Pinchot contributed both articles and money to *The Masses*, but he showed no inclination to embrace socialism as an ideology. On one occasion, he wrote Max Eastman, editor of *The Masses*, a letter filled with praise for the anti-monopoly capitalism of Henry George. Eastman, in turn, stated a preference for the works of Karl Marx. For Pinchot, at least, the views expressed represented a permanent ideological commitment. His friendships with Eastman and other socialists did not alter the fact that he remained a steadfast believer in the ethics and institutions of competitive capitalism. For the exchange of letters, see Amos Pinchot to Max Eastman, Nov. 11, 1913; and Max Eastman to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 1, 1913, both in Box 15, Pinchot MSS. On Pinchot’s financial contributions to *The Masses*, see Max Eastman, *Enjoyment of Living* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 455-56.

47 Amos Pinchot, "The Failure of the Progressive Party," *The Masses*, VI, No. 3 (Dec., 1914), 9-10. Pinchot’s verbal assault enraged Theodore Roosevelt. Reacting in part to publication of the essay, the Colonel told an ally: Amos has not enough capacity for coherent thought to
Among blueprints for reform, Pinchot had complete confidence only in the anti-monopoly creed that he shared with George Record. He drew heavily on that body of ideas in testimony before the United States Industrial Relations Commission early in 1915. Speaking as a proponent of atomistic competition, he assured Commission members that free enterprise, where a condition of equality of entrepreneurial opportunity prevailed, could outproduce either socialism or private monopoly. As the first steps toward equal competitive opportunities, he urged government ownership of railroads and natural resources.48

Pinchot, in the months that followed, sought a wider audience for his views. In May, 1915, he accused the editors of the New Republic of timidity in their presentation of reform ideas. He wanted to see the magazine confront questions like nationalization of railroads and taxation on landed estates. These were the issues where he saw "economic privilege and democracy . . . lining up for a

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48 For the complete testimony, see U. S., Industrial Relations: Final Report and Testimony Submitted to Congress by the Commission on Industrial Relations Created by the Act of August 23, 1912, Senate Doc. 415, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1916, IX, 8041-52.


make him a Socialist; he is a kind of parlor anarchist or amateur I.W.W. follower... He is utterly impotent as a foe and the only damage he can do is as a treacherous friend and he should never be allowed inside the ranks again.
real and not a sham fight. A few weeks later, Pinchot carried a similar message into the bailiwick of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. Addressing a labor rally in Denver on July 31, he implored his listeners to work for government ownership of railroads and natural resources. Finally, in the September issue of Pearson's Magazine, the anti-monopoly crusader summarized his objections to the trusts. Unfair advantages in access to raw materials and availability of transportation, he explained, allowed the industrial giants to dominate their respective markets with no regard for greater efficiency or lower prices. His article closed with the now familiar demands for government control of rail facilities and natural resources.

While he preached the anti-monopoly creed, Pinchot maintained close ties with George Record. He backed the Jerseyman when the latter broke with the Progressive party and returned to the Republican fold. Record's devotion to


52 Record and his New Jersey followers hoped to capture the G.O.P. at the state level. Their strategy called for a series of victories in Republican primary elections. The Record slate, however, suffered an overwhelming defeat in the
change, he explained, make the question of party labels immaterial. In December, 1915, Pinchot was invited to move across the Hudson River and work directly with the Record faction in New Jersey. He declined the offer due to family obligations, but his loyalties remained with the small band of Garden State insurgents. In the last days of 1915, an editorial gibe from the New York World led Pinchot to enumerate his reform goals. His list duplicated the Record credo. He endorsed: government ownership of railroads and natural resources, heavy taxation of idle land, abolition of the tariff, and other steps to foster equal competition within the economy.

National politics offered no precise analogue to the anti-monopoly program, but Pinchot looked with sympathy on the accomplishments of President Woodrow Wilson. Writing to E. W. Scrippps in November, 1915, the New Yorker described intraparty balloting in 1915. Record himself lost a bid for the G.O.P. gubernatorial nomination in 1916. Even so, the anti-monopolist and his sympathizers held fast to their narrow program. See Mahoney, "New Jersey Politics," 250-321; and Barr, "Record," 78.

53See Amos Pinchot to Herbert M. Bailey, Aug. 14, 1915, Box 21, Pinchot MSS.

54Edmund Osborne, a close associate of Record's in New Jersey, tendered the invitation. For the exchange of letters, see Edmund Osborne to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 1, 1915; and Amos Pinchot to Edmund Osborne, Dec. 3, 1915, both in Box 23, ibid.

55In a derisive tone, the editorial linked Pinchot with a group of self-proclaimed Social Revolutionaries in New York. See New York World, Dec. 14, 1915, 10; and Amos Pinchot to Editor, New York World, undated, Box 13, ibid.
himself as "pretty strong for Wilson." Even so, he went on to complain about the President's failure to make "anybody think or talk about economics, the distribution of wealth, government ownership, etc."56 A dramatic White House appointment soon convinced Pinchot to put aside his criticisms. On January 28, 1916, the Chief Executive nominated lawyer and anti-trust expert Louis D. Brandeis for a seat on the United States Supreme Court.57 Pinchot rejoiced at the news of the nomination. In a statement to reporters, he termed the selection the best thing to happen to America in the scope of his memory.58

The partisan opposition that subsequently challenged President Wilson's bid for re-election only strengthened Pinchot in his resolve to vote for the incumbent. Theodore Roosevelt, in June, 1916, rejected a second Bull Moose Presidential nomination and threw his support to Republican standard-bearer Charles Evans Hughes.59 Pinchot viewed the

56 Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, Nov. 3, 1915, Box 22, Pinchot MSS.


58 Typescript dated Jan. 29, 1916, Box 224, Pinchot MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, Jan. 27, 1916, Box 25, Pinchot MSS.

59 See Mowry, Roosevelt, 345-366; and Garraty, Perkins, 327-372. See also Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party?" American Historical Review, XLVI, No. 2 (Jan., 1941), 306-37.
Colonel's actions with disdain. Referring to the patriarch of Oyster Bay, he wrote William Kent:

He is now just where he has ... wanted to be all along--back in the stronghold of respectable, benevolent plutocracy. Nothing could be more desirable for the oyster man. Having eaten his oysters, he is now resting comfortably with a full belly.

Hughes, a former Governor of New York and more recently an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, stood only slightly higher in Pinchot's estimation. The reformer judged the Republican nominee "quite crystalized in his views and impossible to educate..." He came away from a July meeting with the aloof and magisterial Hughes convinced that a midwinter suit should have been worn for the occasion.

During the autumn campaign, Pinchot worked to insure Wilson a second term. He headed a group of volunteers that toured throughout New York State on behalf of the President. In order to reach a more distant audience, Pinchot

60 Amos Pinchot to William Kent, July 6, 1916, Box 25, Pinchot MSS.

61 For Pinchot's comments on Hughes, see Amos Pinchot to W. S. Rainsford, July 20, 1915, ibid. Gifford Pinchot subsequently decided to support the former New York Governor, and he strongly urged Amos not to vote for Wilson. See Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, Sept. 4, 1916, ibid.

fell back on his journalistic skills. Writing for the Chicago Daily Tribune, he detailed for Midwestern readers the fate of the anti-trust plank at the 1912 Bull Moose convention. Suppression of the plank, he contended, was the price that Roosevelt had "paid for the support of those captains of finance who . . . became the monitors of the [Progressive] party's policies."\(^{63}\) On the eve of the election, Pinchot dared to challenge the Rough Rider directly. In an open letter addressed to the Colonel and released by the Democratic National Committee, he charged that Roosevelt, in 1912, had conspired with Perkins to kill the anti-trust plank in the Bull Moose platform.\(^{64}\) The ex-President replied in kind. He wrote his former aide: "When I spoke of the Progressive party as having a lunatic fringe, I specifically had you in mind."\(^{65}\)

The Presidential race embroiled Pinchot in controversy, but it did not sway him from more important goals. Shortly after the election, Matthew Hale, a Bull Moose diehard from Massachusetts, contacted Pinchot about a possible revival of the Progressive party.\(^{66}\) In response, the


\(^{64}\) Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Nov. 1, 1916, Box 24, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, Nov. 2, 1916, 6.

\(^{65}\) Theodore Roosevelt to Amos Pinchot, Nov. 3, 1916, Series 3A, Microfilm Reel 386, Roosevelt MSS.

\(^{66}\) Matthew Hale to Amos Pinchot, Nov. 24, 1916, Box
New Yorker disclaimed any desire to rebuild on the old foundations, but he hastened to advise Hale on the best site for a new structure. He explained in brief compass the relationship between monopoly power and special transportation advantages. Government ownership of the railroads, he contended, offered the only hope for destruction of the trusts and the beginning of an economy based on competition. He urged Hale to work for a reform coalition devoted to nationalization of the rail network. Such a movement, he said in conclusion, would command his own deepest interest.  

The letter to Hale provided added proof of the metamorphosis that had occurred in Amos Pinchot's reform commitment. Beginning in 1913, Pinchot, under the tutelage of George Record, mastered a new perspective on questions of domestic political economy. His inchoate opposition to the trusts fused with a more systematic anti-monopoly creed. As a result, he became an ardent exponent of atomistic competitive capitalism. Along with Record, he tried to rally support for that body of ideas within the Progressive party. When those efforts failed, Pinchot drifted away from the Bull Moose camp and worked at freelance exposition of his views. His devotion to dogma proved costly. He lost the

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24, Pinchot MSS. Hale stayed on with the Progressive party until its amalgamation with the Prohibitionists in 1917. See Mowry, *Roosevelt*, 367n.

67Amos Pinchot to Matthew Hale, Nov. 28, 1916, Box 24, Pinchot MSS.
friendship of Theodore Roosevelt, and relations with his brother Gifford grew strained. In 1916, Amos Pinchot severed his last ties with the Progressive party and supported the Democratic national ticket. Yet the decisive shift in his political allegiance came earlier and at a different level. Long before 1916, Pinchot, under George Record's spell, had become a political sectarian, an ideologue with a narrow and unchanging message.
Amos Pinchot did not pursue the study of political economy in a vacuum. While he mastered George Record's anti-monopoly creed, the nations of Europe, beginning in August, 1914, engaged in a genocidal civil war. For the United States, the European holocaust meant three years of troubled neutrality followed by active involvement in the conflict. Pinchot, once caught in the flow of events, increasingly turned his own attention to problems of international significance. From 1916 through 1919, he tried repeatedly to shape American policies with regard to peace and war.

Soon after the outbreak of fighting in Europe, military preparedness emerged as a major issue in the United States.¹ Such apostles of strenuous living as Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood stepped forward as advocates of a more militaristic national posture. Roosevelt threw himself into the preparedness movement with

evangelical fervor. General Wood, meanwhile, arranged a series of training camps to acquaint civilians with the rudiments of military life. Initially, President Wilson eyed the upsurge of martial spirit with misgivings, but as the international crisis deepened, he too joined the parade. In July, 1915, the President asked his advisers for recommendations on an American arms buildup. Four months later, he unveiled plans for a rapid expansion of the armed services. In December, 1915, Wilson presented Congress with an annual message that bristled with references to military hardware and defense spending.

Pinchot took up the preparedness issue in the

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6U. S., Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress December 7, 1915, House Doc. 1, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1915, 4-7.
aftermath of the Presidential message. His first pronounce- 
ments clearly reflected his attachment to anti-monopoly 
capitalism. Before a New York audience on January 22, 1916, 
he condemned as half measures proposals that called for 
nothing more than a stronger military establishment. Full-

scale readiness, he said, would require economic mobiliza-
tion including government ownership of railroads and 
natural resources. A few weeks later, he again tried to 
link preparedness with his own reform aspirations. American 
patriotism, he told the Washington Irving Labor Forum, would 
flourish only if the nation's people could "free themselves 
from grinding economic privilege, and gain an economic 
democracy. . . ."

Despite his allusions to maximum readiness and 
patriotism, Pinchot distrusted the preparedness movement, 
and he quickly came out against it. Early in 1916, he joined 
the Anti-Preparedness Committee. Soon to be renamed the 
American Union Against Militarism, the unit, under the 
leadership of social worker Lillian D. Wald, had established 
a long record of opposition to aggrandizement of the

7Amos Pinchot, "Preparedness: An Address of Amos 
Pinchot at Dinner of the Society of the Genesee, Hotel 
Knickerbocker, New York, January 22," The Public, XIX 

8Typescript dated March 5, 1916, Box 24, Pinchot MSS. 
For the speech in article form, see Amos Pinchot, "Upon 
military. Just after Pinchot entered its ranks, the Union embarked upon a "Truth About Preparedness" campaign. With Pinchot in the forefront, a team of A.U.A.M. speakers toured eleven cities over a ten-day span. A papier-mâché dinosaur christened "Jingo" accompanied the troupe and helped draw large crowds. While the dinosaur offered a silent reminder of the limits of brute force, the A.U.A.M. orators sermonized on the dangers of overreliance on armed might.

The round of speech making opened the doors to the White House. On May 8, 1916, Lillian Wald, Pinchot, and three other A.U.A.M. spokesmen conferred with President Wilson. The anti-militarists presented a strongly worded


10 For an itinerary, see Crystal Eastman to Amos Pinchot, March 16, 1917 [sic], Box 30, Pinchot MSS.


memorial against the preparedness movement. Wilson, in reply, made a distinction between necessary precautions and bellicose militarism. He endorsed the former and promised to oppose the latter vigorously. The visitors left with mixed emotions. Although appreciative of an opportunity to express their views, they went away convinced that Wilson seriously underestimated the malevolent forces at work behind the preparedness movement.

Pinchot had very definite ideas about who controlled the militaristic agitation. Writing to newspaperman Roy Howard on May 23, he declared:

I think there is going to be hell to pay with this military question. Already the preparedness crows who are by and large the big employers and monopolists have succeeded in getting what they want most a big National Guard to take care of industrial troubles when the war is over and times become hard again.

When Howard, in rebuttal, argued that tighter discipline might lift the nation out of its "sordid, pot-bellied, fat-joweled state," Pinchot repeated his gloomy prophecy. The

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13 For a copy of the memorial, see Cabinet 1, Drawer 1, Lillian D. Wald Papers, Manuscript Division, New York Public Library, New York, New York.

14 A printed version of the President's remarks appears in Box 189, Pinchot MSS.

15 See the undated memorandum in Cabinet 1, Drawer 1, Wald MSS. For printed accounts of the meeting between Wilson and the anti-militarists, see Kerney, Wilson, 363-67; and "The President on Militarism," Survey, XXXVI, No. 8 (May 20, 1916), 198-99.

16 Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, May 23, 1916, Box 24, Pinchot MSS.
"exploiting class," he insisted, wanted a strong military ready to quell postwar industrial strife.\textsuperscript{17}

In terms of immediate realities, however, Pinchot and his anti-preparedness colleagues faced a challenge from a different quarter. On June 21, 1916, a United States Cavalry detachment on patrol in Mexico clashed with Mexican troops near the village of Carrizal.\textsuperscript{18} The skirmish provoked a war scare and brought the American Union Against Militarism into action. Within a few days of the fighting, the A.U.A.M. made public a letter written from the battlefield by Captain Lewis S. Morey, one of the men wounded in the fray. In a report intended for his military superiors, Morey blamed the violence at Carrizal on the recklessness of a fellow American officer.\textsuperscript{19} Along with its reprint of the Morey letter, the A.U.A.M. raised the question: "Is There A

\textsuperscript{17}See Roy Howard to Amos Pinchot, May 24, 1916; and Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, May 25, 1916, both in \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{18}The American soldiers were part of an expedition sent into Mexico in pursuit of the Mexican revolutionary leader Francisco Villa. For an authoritative discussion of the military aspects of the Carrizal incident, see Robert S. Thomas and Inez V. Allen, \textit{The Mexican Punitive Expedition Under Brigadier General John J. Pershing United States Army 1916-1917} (Washington: Department of the Army, War Histories Division, 1954), Part IV, 18-29.

Just Cause for War?"20 Pinchot, on June 30, answered with a resounding "No!" In an open letter carried by the *New York Times*, he argued that no legitimate cause for war with Mexico existed. Pressure for intervention, he claimed, came primarily from Americans with business interests south of the Rio Grande.21 The A.U.A.M. peace offensive produced fast results. President Wilson, flooded with letters and telegrams inspired by the anti-war group, quickly announced that no retaliatory steps would be taken against the Mexicans.22

The President's announcement heartened the anti-militarists. Accordingly, when A.U.A.M. leaders discovered a clause that authorized a military draft in the 1916 National Defense Act, they contacted the White House.23 In a letter to Wilson on August 9, Pinchot pointed out the


23 Authored by Arizona's Democratic Congressman Carl T. Hayden, the draft provision became known among the anti-militarists as the "Hayden Joker." For the authorization as it appears in the National Defense Act, see *U. S., Statutes at Large*, XXXIX, Part 1, 202-203. See also "A Federal Conscription Act?" *Survey*, XXXVI, No. 25 (Sept. 16, 1916), 596-97.
obscure provision and urged its immediate repeal.\footnote{Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, Aug. 9, 1916, Series 4, Box 419, File 3016, Wilson MSS.} Wilson, in reply, offered the view that the draft authorization would go into effect only if the United States entered a war.\footnote{Woodrow Wilson to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 11, 1916, Box 24, Pinchot MSS.} The Chief Executive's interpretation failed to mollify Pinchot. In a telegram to Wilson on August 18, the New Yorker reiterated the case for repeal.\footnote{Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, August 18, 1916, Series 4, Box 419, File 3016, Wilson MSS.} On the same day, Charles T. Hallinan, Editorial Director of the A.U.A.M., fired off a brief against the conscription measure to Presidential Secretary Joseph P. Tumulty.\footnote{Charles T. Hallinan to Joseph P. Tumulty, ibid.} When these efforts proved fruitless, Lillian Wald tried to reach Wilson through a different channel. In September, 1916, United States Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau forwarded the President a letter in which Wald addressed herself to the draft issue.\footnote{Henry Morgenthau to Woodrow Wilson, Sept. 20, 1916, ibid.} The indirect approach appeared to be successful. In an answer to Morgenthau on September 22, Wilson expressed complete sympathy with Wald's objections to conscription. The draft provision, he promised, would "be altered upon the
first suitable occasion by action of Congress."\textsuperscript{29}

The letter from Wilson to Morgenthau served as a temporary opiate. Wald, Pinchot, and other key figures in the A.U.A.M. worked actively to re-elect the President in 1916.\textsuperscript{30} Almost as soon as the votes were counted, however, Lillian Wald refocused on the draft issue. On November 23, she reminded Wilson of his pre-election pledge with regard to conscription.\textsuperscript{31} In response to Wald's letter, Wilson reaffirmed his vow to oversee repeal of the draft proviso.\textsuperscript{32} Yet the President, with a second term won, found it easy to renege on his promise. When next contacted by Wald about conscription, the Chief Executive admitted that he had taken no action toward repeal. "Just at present," he said, "I am caught in a drift which carries me very rapidly in other directions."\textsuperscript{33}

Despite the President's equivocation on the draft question, the anti-militarists continued to find reasons to


\textsuperscript{31}Lillian D. Wald to Woodrow Wilson, Nov. 23, 1916, Series 4, Box 419, File 3016, Wilson MSS.

\textsuperscript{32}Woodrow Wilson to Lillian D. Wald, Nov. 27, 1916, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{33}Woodrow Wilson to Lillian D. Wald, Dec. 5, 1916, \textit{ibid}.
support him. On January 24, 1917, just two days after Wilson had issued an appeal for peace in Europe, an A.U.A.M. delegation arrived at the White House.34 Led by Pinchot and Wald, the group assured the President that his plea for amity would be remembered proudly by "Liberals of every faith and clime . . . as long as men speak and write of these times. . . ."35 A few days later, the anti-militarists again rallied to the Wilsonian banner. When the German government announced its resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, the anti-war group publicly expressed the belief that Wilson would keep the United States "clear of any ignominious eleventh-hour participation" in the European conflict.36

Even so, fear of the international maelstrom soon led Pinchot to re-emphasize his opposition to any form of American belligerency. In February, 1917, along with Max

34 The President made his appeal for peace in an address to the United States Senate. For the text of his speech, see Cong. Rec., 64 Cong., 2 Sess. (Jan. 22, 1917), 1741-48.

35 See Lillian D. Wald, Oswald Garrison Villard, Owen R. Lovejoy, Paul U. Kellogg, and Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, Jan. 24, 1917, Cabinet 1, Drawer 1, Wald MSS.

Eastman and Randolph S. Bourne, he formed the Committee For Democratic Control. With Pinchot as Chairman, the new organization advanced armed neutrality as the best way to keep the United States out of war. In articles and advertisements, the Committee developed a parallel between conditions in 1917 and the diplomatic situation in the 1790's. Armed neutrality, according to the group's argument, had saved the United States from war in the earlier instance, and a similar stand, the Committee men declared, would yield the same results in the current crisis.

Pinchot, meanwhile, opened fire on domestic proponents of compulsory military training. On February 19, he warned a friend: "Make a machine of a man for one purpose and you have a machine for all purposes. The man who unthinkingly obeys the epaulet, will unthinkingly obey the employer." Shortly thereafter, Pinchot tried to convey the same message to Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor. In an open letter, the New Yorker called upon


39Amos Pinchot to J. A. H. Hopkins, Feb. 19, 1917, Box 28, Pinchot MSS.
Gompers to throw the weight of organized labor into the fight against schemes for mandatory service. Pinchot's plea fell on deaf ears. Early in March, 1917, Gompers compelled the A. F. of L. Executive Council to adopt a declaration that pledged "to defend, safeguard and preserve the Republic of the United States of America against its enemies." Pinchot, along with some of his anti-war colleagues, regarded Gompers and like-minded men as dupes of Wall Street propaganda. On March 3, 1917, the Committee For Democratic Control warned readers of the New Republic that only big business favored American involvement in the war. Pinchot maintained the same point of view in his private correspondence. Writing to financial expert John Moody on March 12, he asserted that "Nine-tenths of the Wall Street men" in his circle of acquaintances wanted war. A few days later, he ruefully predicted that "the old war horses of Wall Street" would ultimately drag the United States into armed combat.

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40 Amos Pinchot to Samuel Gompers, March 10, 1917, Box 30, ibid. See also New York Times, March 13, 1917, 4.


43 Amos Pinchot to John Moody, March 12, 1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS.

44 Amos Pinchot to William P. Harvey, March 21, 1917, Box 32, ibid.
As sentiment for intervention continued to build, Pinchot and other A.U.A.M. leaders again turned to President Wilson. On March 16, Lillian Wald urged the Chief Executive to stand by his policy of neutrality. Four days later, Wald, Pinchot, and other A.U.A.M. members sent Wilson assurances that his neutral stance had broad popular support. Finally, on March 27, Pinchot wired the President:

The war excitement is an upper-class hysteria. It is at its height. It will pass, and there will be a strong reaction. The people themselves are calm and do not want war. They will bless you if you ask for a vigorous policy without a war declaration.

The telegram went unheeded. On April 2, Wilson called upon Congress for a declaration of war against Imperial Germany and her allies. Within a few days, the United States officially entered the Great War.

Even before the President's address to Congress, Pinchot had turned to the problem of financing the war

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45 Lillian D. Wald to Woodrow Wilson, March 16, 1917, Cabinet 1, Drawer 1, Wald MSS.

46 Lillian D. Wald, Amos Pinchot, Paul U. Kellogg, and John Haynes Holmes to Woodrow Wilson, March 20, 1917, Box 90, Pinchot MSS.

47 Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, March 27, 1917, Box 30, ibid.

48 For the President's request, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (April 2, 1917), 118-20.

effort. On March 30, he helped found the American Committee on War Finance, a New York based group with definite ideas about taxation in wartime. The Committee, with Pinchot as Chairman, moved quickly to publicize its views. In newspaper advertisements across the country, the unit urged a pay-as-you-go war with heavy taxes on large incomes. The public, Pinchot told reporters on April 1, needed to know that pro-war business elements would not profit unduly from intervention.

The Committee's tax proposals attracted broad popular support, and the group soon carried its arguments to Washington. The unit provided members of Congress with

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50 For background material on the Committee, see the memorandum entitled Statement of the Activities of the American Committee on War Finance and the Results Obtained Thereby in Box 204, Pinchot MSS.

51 An example of the Committee's literature appears in New York Times, April 1, 1917, 17.

52 See ibid., April 2, 1917, 3.

53 Pledges of support came to the Committee from across the nation. For an indication of the popular response, see Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, April 9, 1917, Box 27, Pinchot MSS; Amos Pinchot to Stephen S. Wise, April 10, 1917, Box 32, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, April 19, 1917, Box 34, Pinchot MSS.
specific recommendations on proposed income tax rates. Pinchot, on May 15, appeared before the Senate Finance Committee to outline his ideas on revenue policy. A day later, Representative Edward Keating, a Democrat from Colorado, introduced legislation that embodied Pinchot's views.

Although the proposal by Keating failed to pass, Pinchot could later look with pleasure on the revenue measure finally enacted into law. Led by North Carolina

54 In a memorandum prepared for distribution among Congressmen, the Committee recommended the following schedule of income tax rates:
- 10% per annum on income from $10,000 to $20,000
- 15% per annum on income from $20,000 to $40,000
- 20% per annum on income from $40,000 to $60,000
- 30% per annum on income from $60,000 to $80,000
- 40% per annum on income from $80,000 to $100,000
- 50% per annum on income from $100,000 to $150,000
- 98% per annum on income from $150,000+

For a copy of the memorandum, see Box 31, ibid.

55 See Amos Pinchot, Statement of Amos Pinchot Before Senate Finance Committee on May 15, 1917, Representing American Committee on War Finance. Printed copy in Box 196, ibid.

Due to his public activities, Pinchot achieved a special kind of notoriety. In the midst of the revenue debate, the Douglas Fairbanks Film Corporation released In Again, Out Again, a cinematic melodrama of sabotage on the homefront. Fairbanks, as the film's protagonist "Theodore Rutherford," uncovers the villainy of "Pinchit," a German spy disguised as a mincing pacifist. On the motion picture and its characters, see Owen R. Lovejoy to Amos Pinchot, May 17, 1917, Box 29, ibid.; and Alistair Cooke, Douglas Fairbanks: The Making of a Screen Character (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1940), 17.

56 In offering the measure, Keating made specific reference to Pinchot and his views on taxation. See Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May 16, 1917), 2403-2404.

57 Keating's proposal never got beyond the House. For the vote, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May 17, 1917), 2483.
Democrat Claude Kitchin, Congressional proponents of heavy taxes on high incomes kept a tight reign on the 1917 Revenue bill. In its final form, the legislation called for a sharp increase in levies on incomes in the higher brackets. The tax rates did not match those favored by the American Committee on War Finance, but Pinchot viewed the Revenue Act as an acceptable compromise. Even before the money bill had cleared the Senate, the New Yorker pronounced the work of his lobbying group successfully done. By July, 1917, the Committee had disbanded.

Pinchot's sense of accomplishment proved ephemeral. Wartime restrictions on civil liberties soon propelled him into another fight. In June, 1917, during a Flag Day Address, President Wilson lashed out at domestic critics of


59 The maximum rate imposed by the Revenue Act was a tax of 67% on the portion of annual income in excess of two million dollars. For the text of the Act, see U. S., Statutes at Large, XL, Part 1, 300-38. For the schedule of rates in tabular form, see Ernest Ludlow Bogart, War Costs and Their Financing: A Study of the Financing of the War and the After-War Problems of Debt and Taxation (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1921), 476.

60 Amos Pinchot to John E. Lander, June 7, 1917, Box 29, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to James F. Minturn, June 15, 1917, Box 28, Pinchot MSS.

61 Amos Pinchot to Charles J. Rhoads, July 9, 1917, Box 29, ibid.
the war effort. Stung by the attack, Pinchot reacted angrily. The Chief Executive, he told a friend, had "flourished the knout" over all those who opposed "the temporary little fatherhood" that Wilson was fast establishing. Shortly thereafter, Pinchot joined with Max Eastman and John Reed to protest another manifestation of the martial spirit. Acting as spokesmen for The Masses and other radical journals, the trio sent Wilson a list of socialist periodicals recently banned from the mails by the United States Post Office Department. After making an appeal to the President's devotion to the "Anglo-Saxon tradition of intellectual freedom," the petitioners asked for a reversal of Post Office policy.

The entreaty to Wilson produced minimal results. The President forwarded the incoming letter to Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson. With reference to the three authors, he told Burleson: "These are very sincere men and


Amos Pinchot to Crystal Eastman, June 15, 1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS.

Max Eastman, John Reed, and Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, July 12, 1917, Series 4, Box 465, File 4122, Wilson MSS. For additional material on the exclusion of The Masses from the mails, see Max Eastman, Love and Revolution: My Journey Through an Epoch (New York: Random House, 1964), 58-63; hereinafter cited as Eastman, Love and Revolution.
I should like to please them." The Postmaster, however, had a mind of his own. He bluntly informed the President that the periodicals in question had been banned due to clear violations of the Espionage Act. Wilson made no effort to challenge his acerbic cabinet officer. On July 17, he sent Pinchot a copy of Burleson's letter. In terms of supplementary comment, Wilson limited himself to a request that the letter receive Pinchot's "most friendly consideration." Burleson subsequently continued his crusade against literature that failed to meet Post Office standards for patriotism.

Although he battled against infringement of civil liberties, Pinchot accepted United States involvement in the Great War as an irreversible reality. In fact his criticisms of Burleson stemmed partly from a belief that the Postmaster's activities compromised the idealism that needed to be made paramount in waging the war. In a letter to Wilson

65 Woodrow Wilson to Albert S. Burleson, July 13, 1917, Series 4, Box 465, File 4122, Wilson MSS.

66 Albert S. Burleson to Woodrow Wilson, July 16, 1917, ibid.

67 Woodrow Wilson to Amos Pinchot, July 17, 1917, Box 29, Pinchot MSS.

on July 25, Pinchot attempted to explain his point of view. American intervention in Europe, he contended, could be justified only if it contributed to the spread of democracy throughout the world. Accordingly, he argued that the Wilson administration ought to commit itself to the advancement of democratic institutions both at home and abroad. In conclusion, he urged the President to adopt policy goals that would make the American war effort a clear-cut fight for international democracy.69

Among allies of the United States, Pinchot regarded Great Britain as the archenemy of democratic war aims.70 Writing to a former Bull Moose colleague on July 26, he lamented "British insistence upon a land grabbing program."71 The subsequent growth of interallied cooperation did nothing to allay Pinchot's suspicions. In October, 1917, he wrote pessimistically:

It will be a terrible thing for our people to have to make the sacrifices of war not for justice, not for democracy, not for permanent peace, but for the

69Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, July 25, 1917, Box 27, Pinchot MSS.


71Amos Pinchot to Bainbridge Colby, July 26, 1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS.
exploitation of the world by Anglo-American banking and business interests—an exploitation which should logically result in another conflict.\textsuperscript{72}

The specter of an aggressive alliance between big business forces in Great Britain and the United States continued to haunt Pinchot as the war dragged on.

The protection of civil liberties provided another focus for the New Yorker's concern. In October, 1917, after the dismissal of two Columbia University professors for anti-war endeavors, Pinchot sent letters of condolence to both men.\textsuperscript{73} "The first thing that a nation at war attacks," he told one of the academicians, "is its own intellectual honesty."\textsuperscript{74} Naturally, Pinchot saw the activities of Postal authorities as a pre-eminent threat to freedom of thought. He took vindictive delight in an expose of Postmaster Burleson authored by journalist George P. West.\textsuperscript{75} Writing to congratulate West on October 15, he exclaimed: "Good Lord! How can Woodrow Wilson keep that elderly

\textsuperscript{72}\textsuperscript{Amos Pinchot to Arthur LeSueur, Oct. 2, 1917, Box 34, ibid.}

\textsuperscript{73}\textsuperscript{The faculty members in question were James McKeen Cattell and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana. On their difficulties with Columbia, see "Columbia's Dismissed Professors," \textit{Literary Digest}, LV, No. 16 (Oct. 20, 1917), 24; and Horace C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, \textit{Opponents of War, 1917-1918} (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), 103-104.}

\textsuperscript{74}\textsuperscript{Amos Pinchot to James McKeen Cattell, October 4, 1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana, Oct. 4, 1917, Box 27 Pinchot MSS.}

\textsuperscript{75}\textsuperscript{See George P. West, "A Talk with Mr. Burleson," \textit{The Public}, XX (Oct. 12, 1917, 985-87.}
Late in 1917, Pinchot found a forum for expression of his discontent over conduct of the war. The race for Mayor of New York City pitted pro-war nationalists against advocates of peace abroad and restored civil liberties at home. As spokesman for the former group, incumbent Mayor John Purroy Mitchel offered himself to the voters as the embodiment of militant patriotism. His campaign posters pictured him in a doughboy uniform with bayonet at the ready. The youthful Mayor's chief opposition came from Judge John F. Hylan, a Tammany Hall Democrat, and Morris Hillquit, a veteran Socialist party functionary. Hillquit proved to be the surprise of the campaign. While Hylan stood discreetly aside, the Socialist called for an end to the European war and for the complete restoration of domestic civil rights. Hillquit's platform stirred the popular imagination, and the third party candidate soon found himself with a large and vocal following.

76 Amos Pinchot to George P. West, Oct. 15, 1917, Box 29, Pinchot MSS.


Pinchot threw himself into the Hillquit campaign. In an open letter of endorsement, he praised the Socialist candidate's stand on civil liberties. He went on to place Hillquit on the side of a European peace that would be "American in spirit, democratic in terms . . . and at one with the aspirations of liberal elements in all countries." Pinchot subsequently presided over a Hillquit rally at Madison Square Garden. Late in the campaign, he joined a "flying squadron" of pro-Hillquit speakers that canvassed New York by automobile. The expenditure of time and energy led to welcomed results. Hillquit finished third in the race, but he won enough votes to ensure Hylan's victory over Mitchel. In a post-election statement, Pinchot termed the outcome "a slam at the wave of Prussianism" that had swept the country since American intervention in Europe.

With the election decided, Pinchot shifted his attention to the problem of war aims. His primary concern was

79 Amos Pinchot to Morris Hillquit, undated, Box 102, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, Oct. 29, 1917, 1.


81 New York American, Nov. 4, 1917, 12; and New York Call, Nov. 6, 1917, 3.


83 New York Call, Nov. 8, 1917, 2.
"the danger of having to fight for British imperialism." On November 14, 1917, in a long letter to Presidential adviser George Creel, Pinchot gave vent to some of his anxieties about the diplomatic situation. His involvement in the Hillquit campaign, he explained, had stemmed from the belief "that a big Socialist vote would ... offset ... British ... propaganda for war aims that the [American] people would not stand behind." With an eye to more inspiring goals, Pinchot urged Creel to keep the President ever mindful of the need to make the war a crusade for democracy. In the weeks that followed, Pinchot continued to worry that reactionaries at home and abroad would outmaneuver Wilson and convert the war into a struggle for economic advantages.

Pinchot soon saw documentary evidence that confirmed his worst suspicions about international politics. By means of an extraordinary chain of events, he became aware of the secret agreements that tied the Entente coalition together. In November, 1917, the Russian Bolsheviks revealed the confidential treaties found in the Tsarist archives. The

84Amos Pinchot to A. M. Todd, Nov. 8, 1917, Box 32, Pinchot MSS.

85Amos Pinchot to George Creel, Nov. 14, 1917, Box 34, ibid.

86See Amos Pinchot to Arthur Brisbane, Nov. 20, 1917; and Amos Pinchot to Joseph D. Cannon, Nov. 20, 1917, both in Box 30, ibid. See also Amos Pinchot, "War Aims," Forward: Organ of the League For Democratic Control, I, No. 6 (Dec., 1917), 65-66.
documents, with their provisions for crippling indemnities and territorial adjustments, appeared in the Soviet press. Subsequently, a Russian seaman arrived in New York with a Vladivostok newspaper that reprinted the texts of the treaties. The seaman and his valuable cargo passed quickly from a Russian émigré doctor, to Pinchot's cousin, and on to Pinchot himself. The latter sent the newspaper and its bearer to Oswald Garrison Villard, publisher of the New York Evening Post. A short time later, Villard's paper carried complete translations of the once secret documents.

Pinchot deplored the tenor of the confidential pacts, and he assumed that President Wilson shared his point of view. In January, 1918, he raised the question of war aims in a letter to Colonel Edward M. House, the President's closest foreign policy adviser. Pinchot called the Colonel's attention to a recent declaration in which members of the British Labour party had endorsed a peace settlement.

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88 On Pinchot's role in the episode, see the memorandum dated Nov. 25, 1941, in Box 140, Pinchot MSS.

with no annexations or indemnities. The time had come, Pinchot asserted, for "liberal groups in the United States" to take the same stand. While he noted that the President had so far failed to occupy such advanced ground, Pinchot expressed confidence that the Chief Executive had a "no-annexations program . . . at heart."

Reports from House and another Presidential intimate re-enforced Pinchot's favorable view of Wilson. In February, 1918, he told George Foster Peabody: "Colonel House assures me that the President is on to the imperialists and will keep pressing them back . . . until he has them where they belong." A later conversation with an unidentified friend of the President left Pinchot even more confident. In recounting the talk to his wife, he explained:

Wilson's idea is to call a halt to land-grabbing and all its modifications. . . . Give everybody or as many people as possible self-determination. Build up a public opinion to the effect that war, or rather conquest is simply larceny. Establish free trade. . . . Of course, all this . . . has not been stated in so many words by the President, but the man I spoke of believes he is working toward it. At all events, I am going on the principle that he is.

Pinchot termed the program which he attributed to Wilson

90 For the text of the declaration, see New York Times, Jan. 16, 1918, 1, 3.

91 Amos Pinchot to Edward M. House, Jan. 28, 1918, Box 37, Pinchot MSS.

92 Amos Pinchot to George Foster Peabody, Feb. 19, 1918, Box 35, ibid.
"the biggest thing that any statesman" had ever attempted. 93

The stubborn problem of infringements on civil liberties soon brought Pinchot back to the less exalted side of the war effort. In April 1918, Max Eastman, John Reed, and other staff members of The Masses went to trial for violations of the Espionage Act. The charges stemmed from the dispute with Postmaster Burleson nearly a year before. 94 Pinchot, incensed by the prolonged harassment of his friends, protested directly to the President. In a letter to Wilson on May 24, he vigorously defended the journalists and urged that the indictments against them be dropped. 95 The court battle continued, however, and it ended only after two juries had failed to reach a verdict. 96 Meanwhile, Pinchot waited in vain for word from the White House. After almost a month, he admitted that Wilson, for the first time, had neglected to answer one of his letters. 97

Following the trials of The Masses staff, Pinchot continued to support Wilson, but his allegiance stopped short

93 Amos Pinchot to Gertrude M. Pinchot, March 4, 1918, ibid.

94 For an enumeration of the charges against the journalists, see Louis Untermeyer, From Another World (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1939), 66-77.

95 Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, May 24, 1918, Box 37, Pinchot MSS.

96 On the two appearances in court, see Eastman, Love and Revolution, 82-99, and 118-23.

97 Amos Pinchot to Owen R. Lovejoy, June 19, 1918, Box 37, Pinchot MSS.
of blind faith. In October, 1918, the President asked for a popular mandate in the form of Democratic victories in the upcoming Congressional races. Pinchot, within a few days, endorsed candidates on the Socialist party ticket as the true proponents of "Wilson's program for a just peace..." When the Republicans swept the subsequent elections, Pinchot offered a quick analysis of the cause for the Democrats' downfall. The electorate, he argued, had registered its opposition to repressive steps taken by the administration on the homefront. As for international affairs, Pinchot remained certain that Wilson, if he could engineer a fair peace, would be remembered as "a very great man."

For Pinchot, the end of the war in Europe set the stage for Wilson's acid test. On November 18, just a week after an armistice had quieted the battlefronts, the President announced that he would lead an American delegation to France in order to participate in the peace negotiations. A few days later, Pinchot publicly assessed the challenge that faced the Chief Executive. If the treaty

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99 *New York Call*, Nov. 2, 1918, 7.

100 See Amos Pinchot, *Peace or Armed Peace? An Open Letter From Amos Pinchot to the American Representatives of the Coming International Peace Conference*, pamphlet in Box 37, Pinchot MSS.

101 The international conclave was scheduled to begin in January, 1919. For the President's announcement, see *New York Times*, Nov. 19, 1918, 1-2.
talks ended in a "burglar's peace" dictated by Britain and France, Wilson, the New Yorker predicted, would "go down in history as a pretty tragic failure." On the other hand, if the President won a just settlement, he might, according to Pinchot, be recognized as "America's greatest man."\textsuperscript{102}

In his own sphere, Pinchot worked to publicize the secret treaties that already obligated the Entente powers. Early in 1919, he composed a series of five short articles on the once confidential agreements.\textsuperscript{103} His accounts emphasized the selfish balance of power motives that characterized the pacts. At the same time, he pictured Wilson as the harbinger of a new diplomacy based on open discussion and democratic institutions. In their final form, Pinchot's essays went to the United Press news service.\textsuperscript{104} They subsequently appeared in newspapers throughout the West and Midwest.\textsuperscript{105}

With his writing chore done, Pinchot kept a close watch on preparations for the peace conference at Versailles. News from across the Atlantic soon took an ominous turn. On

\textsuperscript{102}See Pinchot's letter to the editor in (Baltimore) Sun, Dec. 1, 1918, 10.

\textsuperscript{103}See Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, Jan. 10, 1919, Box 38, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{104}For the complete set of five articles, see United Press Red Letter, VII, No. 5 (Jan. 29-Feb. 4, 1919). Copy in Box 140, ibid.

\textsuperscript{105}Amos Pinchot to Mrs. Arthur Minturn Scott, Feb. 10, 1919, Box 39, Pinchot MSS.
January 15, 1919, spokesmen for the victorious powers announced that treaty negotiations would be conducted in secret sessions. Pinchot greeted the announcement with anger and dismay. The peace, he concluded glumly, would now "be arranged by a little bunch of old school profiteer diplomats, closeted behind the closed doors of a palace." A few days later, he wrote to Roy Howard:

I fear our friend Woodrow is going to have a worse time than I expected. . . . He has gotten himself into a position [from] which it is . . . utterly impossible for him to make a real fight for open diplomacy and a liberal peace. He is therefore not going to make such a fight, but he is going to make believe make it and make himself think he is making it, and he [is] going to come home claiming that he has made it, and more than that, that he has won it.

In Pinchot's estimation, the closed negotiating sessions meant that Wilson had failed even before the peace conference began.

Predictably, Pinchot could see no merit in the settlement that finally emerged from the Versailles meetings. He branded the finished compact "a rehash of the Secret


107 Amos Pinchot to W. Forbes Morgan, Jan. 16, 1919, Box 39, Pinchot MSS.

108 Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, Jan. 23, 1919, Box 38, ibid.
Treaties . . . a glorified Rivers and Harbors bill.\textsuperscript{109} Likewise, he dismissed the League of Nations Covenant as "the last trump card of the governmental reactionaries and the financial groups. . . ."\textsuperscript{110} He feared that the new international organization would be used by conservatives to suppress future democratic upheavals around the world.\textsuperscript{111}

Along with his opposition to the treaty, Pinchot voiced his disillusionment with Wilson. In June, 1919, he told George Sylvester Viereck: "I am . . . utterly disgusted with Wilson's performances at Versailles. He comes out of the episode dishonored and discredited. . . ."\textsuperscript{112}

Publicly, Pinchot argued that the Chief Executive, through either naïveté or insufficient preparation, had wasted the world's one chance for a durable peace.\textsuperscript{113} At Versailles, he later contended, Wilson had been "gulled, hoodwinked, outwitted, outvoted, made ridiculous and finally sent home

\textsuperscript{109}See Amos Pinchot, "Amos Pinchot Calls For a Separate Peace," \textit{The World Tomorrow}, II, No. 6 (June, 1919), 172.

\textsuperscript{110}Amos Pinchot to Albert Jay Nock, April 21, 1919, Box 39, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{111}See Amos Pinchot to Peter Golden, June 9, 1919, Box 38, \textit{ibid.}; and Amos Pinchot, "League of Nations Covenant Analyzed By One Who Regards It As a Great Peril," \textit{Reconstruction}, I, No. 6 (June, 1919), 172-75.

\textsuperscript{112}Amos Pinchot to George Sylvester Viereck, June 10, 1919, Box 38, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{113}For the argument in pamphlet form, see Amos Pinchot, \textit{Why America Was Beaten at the Peace Conference}. Copy in Box 178, \textit{ibid.}. 
defeated at every point."  

In deriding the President, Pinchot gave evidence of his own political frustration. He had once regarded Wilson as an ally in the fight to keep America out of the European war. When the United States entered the conflict, he looked to the White House for a clarion call that would make the war a crusade for democracy. Meanwhile, Pinchot maintained a direct line of communication with the President, and on a few occasions he seemed to be in tune with Wilson and other key policymakers. At least while in league with the American Union Against Militarism and the American Committee on War Finance, the New Yorker appeared to exert a modicum of political influence. Yet Pinchot, in the last analysis, proved to be politically powerless. On the crucial issues of protection for civil liberties and advancement of democratic war aims, his preachments had no discernible impact on administration policies. When faced with a peace treaty that he deplored, Pinchot could only rail at a President who had seldom listened to him even in better days.

Chapter 5
THE COMMITTEE OF FORTY EIGHT

As World War I drew to a close, Amos Pinchot renewed his interest in American domestic politics. He looked forward to a revival of the reform spirit that had marked the prewar years. In particular, he hoped to see the enactment of the anti-monopoly creed that he shared with George Record. With an eye to that goal, Pinchot joined forces with other dissidents who dreamed of a new political party devoted to reform. Involvement in the third-party movement kept the New Yorker hard at work throughout 1919 and 1920.

Within Pinchot's circle of friends talk about a new party centered around retired insurance executive J. A. H. Hopkins. A veteran of Bull Moose politics in New Jersey, Hopkins, during World War I, had retained an interest in third party action. Early in 1919, he began to meet

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regularly with Pinchot and a few other political independents. Out of the meetings came the Committee of Forty Eight, a reform minded group with Hopkins in the role of chairman. As its name indicated, the Committee hoped eventually to build support in every State of the Union. From the beginning, however, a small clique of Eastern urbanites controlled the organization. The Committee served primarily as a vehicle for the advancement of the political ideals of gentlemen reformers such as Hopkins and Pinchot.³

Once banded together, the Committeemen moved to gain public attention. In March, 1919, spokesmen for the group proposed that the leaders of American "liberal thought" meet in a national conference and formulate a common program. The Committee's representatives, at the same time, clearly registered their opposition to any form of political extremism. As an alternative to the polar forces of "Reaction and Revolution," they called for a moderate program "Reconstruction."⁴


⁴For the text of the conference proposal, see "Revolution or Reconstruction? A Call to Americans," Survey, XLI, No. 25 (March 22, 1919), n.p. For an evaluation of the call, see "A New Political Alignment," Nation, CVIII, No. 2804 (March 29, 1919), 460-61.
From the start, Pinchot saw the Committee of Forty Eight as a tool that he and George Record could use. Writing to the Jerseyman in May, 1919, he noted that the Committee's proposed national conference would make an excellent forum for the presentation of the reform ideas that he and Record held in common. Record, always ready to advance his doctrinal cause, reacted favorably to the suggestion. The two veteran activists soon emerged as the chief political strategists in the Forty Eighter camp.

The first major task before the Committeemen was the recruitment of a constituency. Potential members received the organization's literature by mail, and they were

5 Amos Pinchot to George L. Record, May 6, 1919, Box 39, Pinchot MSS.

6 During and after the war, Record continued to advocate government ownership of railroads, other public utilities, and natural resources as a way to equalize economic competition. In 1918, when he campaigned for the Republican nomination for United States Senator in New Jersey, his platform included demands for limited nationalization. See Barr, "Record," 84-86. Record, in March, 1919, called for President Wilson to lead a reform crusade on behalf of competitive capitalism. In a long letter sent to Wilson in Paris, the Jerseyman outlined an economic program designed to equalize competitive opportunities. As a first step, Record proposed government ownership of railroads and natural resources. Wilson, after a long delay, answered in polite but non-committal terms. The text of Record's letter to Wilson appears in Kerney, Wilson, 437-46. For the Chief Executive's reply, see Woodrow Wilson to George L. Record, Aug. 15, 1919, Series 3, Letterbook 57, Wilson MSS.

7 See Hays, City Lawyer, 250-51.
encouraged to hand it on to other possible enlistees. In a special effort to stir public interest, the group sent out thousands of copies of a questionnaire on key political issues of the day. Finally, in September, 1919, a spokesman for the Committee announced plans for a national conference to meet in St. Louis, December 9-12.

Even before it opened, the St. Louis meeting became an object of controversy. The trouble started when an American Legion post in Kansas City complained about the proposed gathering to St. Louis Mayor Henry W. Kiel. In St. Louis itself, local men, who also claimed to be Legionnaires, pushed the protest a step further. They threatened to break up the meeting if Federal officials allowed it to open. With tension at a peak, the manager of the headquarters hotel for the conference cancelled the reservations.

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8On the Committee's recruiting tactics, see Committee of Forty Eight, Bulletin Number One, August 15, 1919, copy in Box 39, Pinchot MSS; and New York Times, June 15, 1920, 1.

9A printed copy of the questionnaire appears in the papers of Mercer G. Johnston, a prominent Committee member from Maryland. See Box 67, Mercer G. Johnston Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. The Forty Eighters later claimed to have sent out ten thousand copies of the questionnaire. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 7, 1919, 14B.

10For the text of the announcement in pamphlet form, see The Call to a National Conference of American Men and Women by the Committee of 48. Copy in Box 67, Johnston MSS. See also New York Times, Sept. 22, 1919, 7.

held by the Forty Eighters. Only a court order reversed the cancellation and allowed the sessions to begin on schedule. Once under way, the conference discussions were carefully monitored by agents from the United States Department of Justice.

As participants in the meeting, Pinchot and Record played active and prominent roles. Both men sat on the all important Platform Committee, the body charged with drawing up a program that would unite the delegates. While Record presided over the platform sessions, Pinchot worked to shape the contents of specific planks. He insisted that first priority go to a plank calling for government ownership of natural resources and transportation facilities.

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12 Ibid., Dec. 8, 1919, 1; St. Louis Star, Dec. 8, 1919, 1; and St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Dec. 9, 1919, 1-2.

13 St. Louis Star, Dec. 9, 1919, 1.

14 See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 8, 1919, 1; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 10, 1919, 1; and St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Dec. 11, 1919, 13.

15 According to one estimate, the conference attracted approximately two hundred and fifty delegates from thirty-eight States. See New York Times, Dec. 11, 1919, 2. For a feature article on Pinchot, Record, and other major figures at the meeting, see St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 10, 1919, 1-2.

16 The Forty Eighters acknowledged the importance of the Platform Committee and its members in their own newspaper. See Facts, Dec. 10, 1919, 3. See also St. Louis Star, Dec. 10, 1919, 1-2.

17 Facts, Dec. 11, 1919, 1.
The platform, in its final form, contained some of the notions that Pinchot and Record held dear. The document opened with a strong endorsement of government ownership of natural resources, public utilities, and the means of transportation. It went on to condemn large landholdings, and to urge taxes designed to break up the land monopoly. In terms of civil liberties, the platform called for the extension of full rights to all citizens. The statement closed with an expression of support for labor's efforts "to share in the management of industry and . . . to organize and bargain collectively. . . ."

The sop to labor suggested the kind of coalition strategy that the Forty Eighters hoped to follow. On the eve of the St. Louis meeting, J. A. H. Hopkins had attended the first national convention of the American Labor party.19

18For the text of the platform, see ibid., Dec. 12, 1919, 1-2. See also New York Times, Dec. 22, 1919, 5.

In an address to the Labor delegates, he had declared:

We members of the Committee of 48 look forward to cooperating with you members of the Labor party. . . . Your duty and ours is to frame such a program that the workers, the farmers, and the liberals of the country can work hand in hand at the next election.20

The Laborites seemed amenable to Hopkins's offer of an alliance. By the close of the Forty Eighters' own national conference, an eventual merger of the Committee and the Labor party appeared to be a likely possibility.21

Early in 1920, the Committee's leaders took additional steps toward building a coalition. On January 19, the Forty Eighter Executive Committee created a Committee on Procedure and authorized it to negotiate with other reform oriented groups.22 Pinchot and Record promptly claimed two of the seats on the five-man panel.23 In February, 1920, Hopkins, Record, and Pinchot traveled to Chicago for nearly a week of talks with officials from the Labor party and the Non-

20New York Call, Nov. 25, 1919, 2.

21In an address to the closing session of the conference, Duncan McDonald of the Labor party offered assurances that an agreement "on some definite, common program" would allow Laborites and Forty Eighters to "unite solidly together. . . ." See Facts, Dec. 12, 1919, 1, 2.

22Minutes of the Committee of Forty Eight Executive Committee meeting, Jan. 19, 1920. Copy in Box 84, Pinchot MSS.

23Pinchot and Record were named to the Procedure Committee on January 26. See Minutes of the Committee of Forty Eight Executive Committee meeting, Jan. 26, 1920. Copy in ibid.
Partisan League. Pinchot emerged from the discussions in an optimistic frame of mind. Writing to a friend on February 17, he predicted that the Committee of Forty Eight and the Labor party would soon hold simultaneous conventions in Chicago and fuse into a single unit.25

Meanwhile, Pinchot used his talents as a polemicist to advance the third party cause. In an essay published in January, 1920, he flayed both the Republican and Democratic political machines. The two major parties, he argued, were equally subservient to an economic elite that controlled America's natural resources and transportation system.26 In a later article, the New Yorker offered the St. Louis platform of the Committee of Forty Eight as an answer to the injustices of the established industrial order. The Forty Eighter program, he contended, would strip "the privileged minority of its monopoly of economic power. . . ."27

Pinchot, in private correspondence, was even more insistent about the primacy of the St. Louis platform. He maintained that any divergence from that statement would


25 Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, Feb. 17, 1920, Box 41, ibid.


27 Amos Pinchot, "Mr. Pinchot Cites the Wrongs That the '48-ers' Would Right," Reconstruction, II, No. 2 (Feb., 1920), 56.
bring disunity and disaster. On February 21, he told an ally:

Now we only have one asset, just exactly one. It is a definite economic program. If we get ahead it will be because we have got other people to think the way we do, adopt the same platform and unite with us for the political carrying out of our economic purposes. If we don't do this, we will be a flash in the pan like the Progressive Party, and we will deservedly cease to exist.

The Committee of Forty Eight, Pinchot concluded, needed to keep its programmatic goals in the forefront "first, last and all the time."^9

The New Yorker soon realized, however, that some Labor party members did not share his enthusiasm for the Forty Eighter's pro-capitalist program. In March, 1920, he complained about Laborite "hotheads" who favored appeals to blue-collar class consciousness. A few weeks later, he bemoaned the fact that labor wanted "to think as labor and function as labor..."^31 In a subsequent letter to Edward Nockels of the Labor party, Pinchot called for moderation on the part of the Laborites. He reminded Nockels that the reform movement would need support from

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28 See Amos Pinchot to James H. Maurer, Feb. 4, 1920; Amos Pinchot to J. W. McConaughy, Feb. 5, 1920; and Amos Pinchot to W. J. McDonald, Feb. 5, 1920, all in Box 41, Pinchot MSS.

29 Amos Pinchot to A. W. Ricker, Feb. 21, 1920, ibid.

30 Amos Pinchot to James H. Maurer, March 23, 1920, ibid.

31 Amos Pinchot to Francis J. Heney, April 26, 1920, Box 40, ibid.
Despite Pinchot's wariness, the Committee of Forty Eight appeared to be gaining ground. On April 26, a spokesman for the group announced plans for a national convention to meet in Chicago, July 10-13. The Labor party, just three days later, declared its intention to convene in Chicago, July 11-13. With hopes for fusion running high, the Forty Eighters talked excitedly about a name for the still unborn third party. By the middle of June, Committee leaders had sought and obtained assurances that Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin would consider a third party Presidential nomination.

The Laborites, on the other hand, were far more pessimistic about the chances for fusion. On June 19, an editorial in the Labor party's newspaper openly questioned the wisdom of an alliance with the Committee of Forty Eight. Emissaries from the Committee, according to the journal, had

32Amos Pinchot to Edward Nockels, May 21, 1920, ibid.


34Ibid., April 30, 1920, 2.

35The name "Lincoln party" was a favorite among Committee leaders. See the Minutes of the Committee of Forty Eight Executive Committee meeting, May 27, 1920. Copy in Box 84, Pinchot MSS. See also Robert Anderson Pope to Mercer G. Johnston, June 15, 1920, Box 45, Johnston MSS.

36See Gilson Gardner to Amos Pinchot, June 15, 1920, Box 40, Pinchot MSS.
already been told that the Labor party expected to retain both its name and its working class orientation. In a later issue, the Laborite editor suggested that the Forty Eighters join the Labor party as white-collar auxiliaries.

Meanwhile, Pinchot continued to insist that the St. Louis platform offered the only solid foundation for a reform coalition. Writing to Senator LaFollette on June 25, he cited the need for a crusade against the root causes of economic privilege. "We must," he told the Senator, "deprive the privileged class of its present control over transportation and the great natural resources. . . ." Shortly thereafter, Pinchot presented the same argument in the pages of The Freeman. In a two-part essay, he explained that the Committee of Forty Eight favored a program that would end the economic reign of the privileged few and initiate an era of genuine competition. He contrasted the Committee's belief in free enterprise with what he saw as a Labor party commitment to European style socialism.

As the Forty Eighter and Laborite conventions drew near, Pinchot remained in the forefront of political activity. Arriving in Chicago on July 7, he offered

37 See New Majority, June 19, 1920, 4.
38 Ibid., June 26, 1920, 4.
39 Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, June 25, 1920, Box 41, Pinchot MSS.
40 See Amos Pinchot, "The Case For a Third Party," The Freeman, I, Nos. 16 and 17 (June 30, and July 7, 1920), 364-65 and 394-96.
reporters an assessment of the recently closed major party conventions. He told the newsmen:

The Democratic convention, like the Republican convention, was highly satisfactory to the men and women of America who want a new party. . . . Mr. Cox, like Mr. Harding . . . was chosen because he is a mediocre man, who the financial world can trust. . . .41

A few hours later, Pinchot, accompanied by Record, left for Madison, Wisconsin, and a round of talks with Senator LaFollette.42 The two travelers soon returned to Chicago. On the evening of July 9, Pinchot, Record, and other leaders of the Committee of Forty Eight met with Labor party representatives to begin final discussions on the matter of fusion.43

For the founders of the Committee, the negotiations brought unanticipated difficulties. A night of wrangling with the Laborites produced no signs of a unity agreement. On the next morning, the Forty Eighther national convention opened on a second discordant note. When informed of the deadlock in negotiations, rank and file members of the Committee openly expressed their disappointment. Delegates from the Western States complained bitterly about the predominance of Easterners within the Committee's hierarchy.

41 Chicago Daily Tribune, July 8, 1920, 2.

42 LaFollette told his visitors that he would decide about a third party nomination after the Committee of Forty Eight and the Labor party had proved their ability to work together. See Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette, II, 999-1000. See also New York Times, July 9, 1920, 3.

In an effort to quiet the unrest, Committee leaders quickly agreed to double the size of the group responsible for talks with the Laborites. Ten Western delegates soon joined the ten Eastern incumbents on the negotiating team.44

The increase in the number of negotiators did nothing to break the deadlock. When Forty Eighter and Laborite conferees met on Saturday night, July 10, they agreed to recommend fusion to their respective conventions only if prior accords could be reached on a party name and a common program. The subsequent exchange of views produced no such agreements. In a move designed to keep the talks alive, the negotiators finally decided to divide into subgroups on platform and organizational problems. Meetings of the two smaller bodies were set for Monday, July 12.45

Hopes for fusion hinged on the outcome of discussion in the subgroup on platform. The meeting, as a result, attracted its full share of luminaries. Pinchot and Record headed the Forty Eighter delegation, while Labor party leaders John Fitzpatrick and Robert M. Buck led the rival Laborite contingent. Dudley Field Malone and Gilbert E. Roe attended the session as spokesmen for Senator

44For accounts of the first day of the Forty Eighter convention, see ibid., July 11, 1920, 2; and Chicago Sunday Tribune, July 11, 1920, 1-2.

45J. A. H. Hopkins later summarized the events of the Saturday night conference in a printed letter sent to members of the Committee of Forty Eight. See J. A. H. Hopkins, Facts About the Chicago Convention. Copy in Box 86, Pinchot MSS.
LaFollette. The bargaining got under way shortly after midnight on July 13, and it continued on well into the daylight hours. Despite efforts at compromise, the participants could not resolve their differences. The meeting ended without producing an agreement on a common program.

Failure at the negotiating table spelled disaster for the founders of the Committee of Forty Eight. Restless rank and file delegates listened impatiently to the report of another night spent on fruitless talk. Their discontent soon flared into open rebellion. Early in the afternoon on July 13, Max Hayes of the Labor party appeared before the Forty Eighter convention. He assured the unhappy delegates that they would be welcomed at the Laborite convention with

\[46\text{For a complete list of the participants, see Shapiro, "Hand and Brain," 199, 199n.}\]

\[47\text{For a detailed account of the meeting, see Gilbert E. Roe, The Third Party Convention. Why Senator LaFollette Declined the Nomination, undated typescript in Series B, Box 86, LaFollette Family MSS. See also the column by William Hard in Chicago Daily News, July 13, 1920, 4.}\]

\[48\text{New York delegate Swinburne Hale expressed the dissatisfaction felt by many of his colleagues. In a thinly veiled attack on Pinchot and Record, Hale told reporters: America's people learned during the war that open covenants of peace cannot be arrived at behind closed doors. We 48ers have also learned that during 48 hours of turmoil, I don't imply any dereliction of duty, but a certain combination of forces has existed to prevent getting together... Certain persons from New York and New Jersey haven't enough faith in the essential principles of democracy. Hale specified that his accusation did not apply to J. A. H. Hopkins. See New York Call, July 14, 1920, 2.}\]
The invitation created an uproar. A host of Forty-Eighter delegates bolted their own convention and marched on the Labor party's meeting place. The jubilant Laborites greeted their guests with the strains of "Hail! Hail! The Gang's All Here."^®

In the midst of the tumult, Pinchot and Record continued to argue for their point of view. Just after the spontaneous merger of the two conventions, Pinchot appeared before the mixed body of delegates. In an impassioned speech, he warned his audience: "There is no place in this country for a purely labor party. . . . Don't make the mistake of representing any one class."^1 Record, meanwhile, tried to rally delegate support for a platform that would be acceptable to Senator LaFollette.^2

The vote on the platform proved to be the decisive test of strength. Pinchot and Record made a last-minute effort to clarify their position. In a statement co-authored with journalist Gilson Gardner, they told fellow members of the Committee of Forty-Eight:

The negotiations between the platform subcommittee of your Convention and a similar committee of the Labor Party have reached a stage where we feel that the

^49 Shapiro, "Hand and Brain," 201.


^51 Chicago Daily Tribune, July 14, 1920, 2.

members of both conventions, and the public generally, are entitled to a full and frank statement of the inside facts.

After prolonged conferences, we are unable to agree. The underlying cause of the difference is that the Labor Party representatives think that the new party should be a class conscious radical party, standing upon the principles of British Guild socialism expressed in Trade Union language.

We believe that the new party should have a short definite platform aimed at the destruction of economic privileges, and the winning back of the historic political liberties lost during the war.

We offered the substance of our St. Louis platform.

A form of platform drawn by friends of Senator LaFollette ... was also presented to the Conference Committee, with the assurance that the Senator would be willing to accept our joint nomination of this platform.

We agreed to accept this platform and the Labor representatives refused flatly to accept them [sic]. Senator LaFollette's friends then informed us that in their judgment the Senator would not be willing to become the candidate of the new party.

The situation, therefore, now is this ... if the platform submitted by Senator LaFollette's friends is adopted we can probably have him as our candidate. If the Labor Party platform is adopted, the Senator will not run as our candidate, and in our judgment no other public man having any considerable following can be induced to take the nomination.

In this event the new Party will enter the field with a socialist platform, headed by a radical Labor leader. Such a campaign, in our judgment, would be a contest between the candidate of the new party and Eugene Debs, for the negligible socialist vote of the country.

We are unable to join a new party established upon such lines.53

The declaration had no discernible impact. Laborite and Forty Eighter delegates routinely endorsed the platform

53 See Amos Pinchot, George L. Record, and Gilson Gardner, To the Convention of the Committee of Forty Eight, undated typescript, Box 86, Pinchot MSS. See also ibid., July 15, 1920, 3.
planks introduced by Labor party leaders.\textsuperscript{54} After the vote, Record, Gardner, and Pinchot led a small group of secessionists out of the joint convention.\textsuperscript{55}

The walkout caused no major shock waves among the remaining delegates.\textsuperscript{56} The conventioneers adopted the name "Farmer-Labor party" and turned to the selection of a national ticket.\textsuperscript{57} The proceedings were disrupted only momentarily when Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., appeared on the rostrum. In a brief statement, the younger LaFollette announced that his father had decided not to accept the third party's still untendered Presidential nomination.\textsuperscript{58} Unshaken, the delegates went on to designate Parley Parker Christensen, a Salt Lake City lawyer, as their choice for President.\textsuperscript{59} Although a political unknown, Christensen had credentials that suited the immediate situation. He had been an officer in the Forty Eighter convention, and as an


\textsuperscript{56}According to subsequent reports in the Farmer-Laborite newspaper, nine-tenths of the Forty Eighter delegates stayed at the convention. See \textit{New Majority}, July 24, 1920, 1, 2, and 4.

\textsuperscript{57}On adoption of the party name, see \textit{New York Times}, July 15, 1920, 1.

\textsuperscript{58}Belle and Fola LaFollette, \textit{LaFollette, II}, 1007.

attorney he had shown strong sympathy for the cause of organized labor. Max Hayes, a long time socialist from Cleveland, joined Christensen on the ticket.60

The Farmer-Laborites were more than satisfied with the outcome of their Chicago meeting. On July 18, Christensen publicly condemned Pinchot and other dissident Forty Eighters as "coupon-clipping intellectuals . . . [who] got lost in a convention of the plain people."61 Two days later, Frank P. Walsh, a lawyer with close ties to the Farmer-Laborite hierarchy, quietly praised the work of party leaders John Fitzpatrick, Robert M. Buck, and Edward Nockels. In a letter to Nockels, Walsh wrote:

Yourself, good old John, and Buck seem to have got what you have been driving at for all these months . . . a real third party movement inside of labor. . . . Really and seriously, I think that you pulled off a great thing in Chicago, which never could have been accomplished . . . except for the clarity of purpose and persitency of yourself, John and Buck. Had you not hung on the way you did, the other side would have swallowed you surely.62

Buck soon added his own voice to the congratulatory chorus. In a widely circulated article, he argued that the Farmer-Labor party represented the real interests of ninety per

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60 For biographical material on Christensen, see ibid., July 16, 1920, 17. For brief sketches of both Christensen and Hays, see New Majority, July 24, 1920, 2.


Pinchot, on the other hand, looked back on the happenings in Chicago with dismay. Upon his return to New York, he told reporters that the Committee of Forty Eight had been "infiltrated by a lot of honest, well meaning mushheads." In a subsequent essay for *The Freeman*, Pinchot explained the differences in economic philosophy that kept the founders of the Committee of Forty Eight out of the Farmer-Labor party. The original Forty Eighters, he contended, had favored a program of limited nationalization in order to foster equality of opportunity among industrial competitors. On the opposite side, the Farmer-Laborites, according to Pinchot, wanted to institute full-fledged socialism in the United States.

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64 A copy of Pinchot's statement to the press, dated July 16, 1920, appears in Series B, Box 180, LaFollette Family MSS.

After the debacle in Chicago, Pinchot and other charter members of the Committee of Forty Eight tried to regroup. In August, 1920, the Forty Eighter Executive Committee authorized a revision of the once sacrosanct St. Louis platform. Record, in particular, wanted a new statement that would cleanse the Committee of any socialist tinge. Yet the task of revision proved to be too difficult. Weeks dragged by without any sign of an agreement on a new platform.

The lack of a consensus within the Committee ultimately led Pinchot and Record to break with the organi-

intent, Gardner traced Crusoe's rise from castaway, to entrepreneur, to robber baron. The benefits of competition and the dangers of economic concentration are pointed out repeatedly throughout the book. See Gilson Gardner, A New Robinson Crusoe: A New Version of His Life and Adventures With an Explanatory Note (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920), passim.

Both Pinchot and Record greeted Gardner's slim volume enthusiastically. Pinchot termed it "a perfect corker!" In a letter to Pinchot, Record noted that Gardner had "very cleverly set up our philosophy." See Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, Aug. 13, 1920, Box 41, Pinchot MSS; and George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 25, 1920, Box 40, Pinchot MSc.


George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 27, 1920, Box 40, Pinchot MSS.


For complaints about the delay, see J. A. H. Hopkins to Amos Pinchot, Sept. 24, 1920; and J. A. H. Hopkins to Amos Pinchot, Oct. 19, 1920, both in ibid.
On November 26, 1920, Pinchot submitted his formal resignation from the group. In a separate personal letter to J. A. H. Hopkins, the New Yorker tried to justify his action. The majority of the Executive Committee, he argued, no longer shared the principles that he and Record believed should be paramount. Most of the Committeemen, he added, had "neither the brains nor the capacity" to participate in the kind of political and economic movement that he and Record wanted to build. Shortly thereafter, Record also resigned from the Committee.

In leaving the Committee, Pinchot remained loyal to his own narrow political purposes. From the start, he saw the Committee as a vehicle for the advancement of the ideas that he held in common with Record. When the organization incorporated those views into its St. Louis platform, Pinchot responded enthusiastically. In published articles and in private correspondence, he insisted that the St. Louis program offered the only feasible basis for a third party coalition. When a reform minded party was built on a different foundation, Pinchot refused to join the movement. He condemned the Farmer-Laborites as socialistic enemies of

69 Amos Pinchot to J. A. H. Hopkins, Nov. 26, 1920, ibid.
70 Amos Pinchot to J. A. H. Hopkins, Nov. 26, 1920, ibid.
71 See J. A. H. Hopkins to George L. Record, Nov. 20, 1920; and George L. Record to J. A. H. Hopkins, Dec. 2, 1920, both in ibid.
free enterprise. Subsequently, Pinchot even questioned the ideological soundness of the founding members of the Committee of Forty Eight. He broke with the Committee when it became apparent to him that many of the members did not subscribe to the politico-economic ideals that he and George Record embraced. Pinchot had no use for an organization that did not share his unbending commitment to atomistic competitive capitalism.
Chapter 6

KEEPING THE FAITH

After leaving the Committee of Forty Eight, Amos Pinchot continued to cling to his political and economic views. He remained convinced that big business controlled American industry and politics. Periodically, he spoke out against the power of the financial elite. His intermittent activities testified to the durability of his ideological commitment.

George Record helped Pinchot stay alert to political developments. In March, 1922, Record announced his intention to seek the Republican nomination for United States Senator in New Jersey. During the summer months, he waged a vigorous campaign in the G.O.P. primary. His platform statements had a familiar ring. He castigated the trusts and offered economic competition as the surest solution to America's industrial problems. As the first steps toward equalizing the competitive race, he advocated government

1See Barr, "Record," 103-104.

2Record used a large tent in order to conduct an outdoor, evangelical style campaign. See Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, Aug. 2, 1922, Box 78, Pinchot MSS.
ownership of railroads and natural resources. 3

Pinchot took an active part in the primary campaign. He urged Senator LaFollette and other friends to endorse Record's cause. 4 In public, he served the Jerseyman as a stump speaker and pamphleteer. 5 He also contributed heavily to the campaign war chest. 6 The expenditure of time, energy, and money brought meager results. Record finished a distant second at the polls. 7

Undaunted, Pinchot and Record soon embarked on another project. Along with Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of Nation, they drew up plans for a discussion group that would meet regularly at Pinchot's house and exchange ideas about reform. The ultimate goal, according to Pinchot, was

3 For Record's arguments in pamphlet form, see George L. Record, Break Up the Senate Millionaires' Club. Copy in Box 77, ibid.

4 Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, April 4, 1922; Amos Pinchot to Frederic C. Howe, May 29, 1922; and Amos Pinchot to Charles R. Crane, June 10, 1922, all in Box 43, ibid.

5 On Pinchot's efforts as an orator, see the typed reports of campaign speeches in Box 79, ibid. For two samples of his work as a pamphleteer, see Amos Pinchot, George Record: 'Servant of the People'; and Amos Pinchot, The Man Who Could Not Be Bought. Copies of both pamphlets appear in Box 82, ibid.

6 With a gift of four thousand dollars, Pinchot was a major contributor to the campaign fund. For a report on Record's financial backers, see Hudson Observer, Sept. 25, 1922. Clipping in Box 78, ibid.

7 Republican incumbent Joseph S. Frelinghuysen received 191,903 votes to 93,693 for Record. See Barr, "Record," 107.
general agreement on a platform that could be offered to the public. Early in 1923, Pinchot's secretary informed Record that "the liberal group" would meet for the first time on January 8.

From its start, the discussion group included talented and well-connected individuals. Pinchot, Record, and Villard attended the sessions with strict regularity. United States Senator-elect Royal S. Copeland of New York also appeared for most of the meetings. Other regulars included journalists Charles Merz, Gilson Gardner, Robert W. Bruère, and Charles W. Ervin.

Talk within the circle centered on government ownership of railroads. Proposals to nationalize the rail network dominated conversation on the evening of January 25. Five days later, Pinchot argued for a return to the system of government operated railroads used during World War I. At a subsequent meeting, the group debated the feasibility of calling a national conference on

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8 Amos Pinchot to P. H. Callahan, Dec. 23, 1922, Box 43, Pinchot MSS.

9 Eleanor Lash to George L. Record, Jan. 3, 1923, Box 45, ibid.

10 A list of the participants usually appears in the minutes of each group meeting. For copies of the minutes of several meetings held between Jan. 25, and May 21, 1923, see Box 148, ibid.

11 Discussion group minutes, Jan. 25, 1923, ibid.

12 Discussion group minutes, Jan. 30, 1923, ibid.
transportation problems.\textsuperscript{13}

The loquacious reformers were quick to seek the company of established political figures. In February, 1923, Villard invited United States Senators William E. Borah of Idaho and Smith W. Brookhart of Iowa to a dinner meeting of the discussion group.\textsuperscript{14} On the night of March 9, Borah and Brookhart joined the regular members for a colloquy on government ownership of railroads.\textsuperscript{15}

Pinchot found the views expressed by the two Senators entirely too conservative. Reporting to a friend, he wrote sarcastically:

We had a marvelous dinner . . . at which we entertained Senators Brookhart and Borah, and found to our vast astonishment, that these statesmen (if that is the right term) were not quite ready to throw down the gauntlet to privilege, sound a clear clarion note in favor of government ownership and risk [sic] all on the issue. We discovered, to our amazement, that they considered the issue premature . . . and toward midnight these tribunes of the people left us with the comforting assurance that they were ready to fight to preserve the union, and were heartily in favor of all things in the public interest, especially their own candidacy [sic] for the presidency of the United States, if Providence should stack the cards that way.

From the encounter, Pinchot concluded that the discussion

\textsuperscript{13}Discussion group minutes, Feb. 21, 1923, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{14}See Oswald Garrison Villard to William E. Borah, Feb. 23, 1923, Folder 304, Oswald Garrison Villard Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Oswald Garrison Villard to Smith W. Brookhart, Feb. 23, 1923, Folder 376, Villard MSS.

\textsuperscript{15}Discussion group minutes, March 9, 1923, Box 148, Pinchot MSS.
group could not look to men in office for decisive leadership. 16

The New Yorker and his friends soon formulated an alternative course of political action. At meetings in late April and early May, 1923, they discussed sponsoring a national conference on government ownership of railroads. 17 By May 14, a list of potential signers for a conference call had been drawn up. 18 Members of the discussion group agreed that a conclave on railroads, if properly publicized, would "be an event of national importance." 19 During the summer months, Charles Ervin and a small staff worked on arrangements for a gathering tentatively set for Chicago, November 21-22. 20

As the conference date neared, Pinchot spoke out in support of government ownership of railroads. On September 11, he told members of the Public Ownership League of

16 Amos Pinchot to P. H. Callahan, April 10, 1923, Box 45, ibid.

17 Discussion group minutes, April 23, 1923; and May 4, 1923, both in Box 148, ibid.

18 Discussion group minutes, May 14, 1923, ibid.

19 Discussion group minutes, May 21, 1923, ibid.

20 Pinchot spent the summer on vacation in Hawaii, but he donated office space and secretarial help to the effort to organize the conference. See Amos Pinchot to Grenville S. McFarland, June 8, 1923, Box 45, ibid. On arrangements for the conference, see Amos Pinchot to William Allen White, June 16, 1923, Box 45, ibid.; Charles W. Ervin to Gilson Gardner, July 18, 1923; Box 44, ibid.; and Oswald Garrison Villard to Smith W. Brookhart, Aug. 30, 1923, Folder 376, Villard MSS.
America that nationalization of the rail system would help equalize entrepreneurial opportunities in the United States.\textsuperscript{21} Three weeks later, he delivered a similar message to the Civic Club of Utica, New York.\textsuperscript{22} With help from Villard, Pinchot was soon able to reach a far larger audience. Beginning on October 17, in the pages of Nation, he published a three-part plea for government ownership of rail facilities.\textsuperscript{23}

Despite Pinchot's spadework, the Chicago conference failed to materialize. On October 11, the New Yorker reminded a friend of the upcoming meeting.\textsuperscript{24} Less than a fortnight later, he told the same acquaintance that the meeting had been rescheduled for January, 1924.\textsuperscript{25} The delay proved to be of no avail. On January 17, Pinchot wrote dejectedly: "We have put off our conference. The general concensus [sic] of opinion among the group around New York

\textsuperscript{21}For the text of the speech in typescript, see Address by Amos Pinchot to Public Ownership Conference, Toronto, September 11, 1923, Box 152, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{22}See the typescript dated Oct. 4, 1923, in \textit{ibid}.


\textsuperscript{24}Amos Pinchot to Carl D. Thompson, Oct. 11, 1923, Box 44, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{25}Amos Pinchot to Carl D. Thompson, Oct. 22, 1923, \textit{ibid}.
is that nothing can be done at this time. 26

Although disappointed, Pinchot continued to argue publicly for his point of view. In February, 1924, he published another essay on government ownership of railroads. With an air of confidence, he told readers of Forum that nationalization of the rail network was imminent. He went on to explain:

The reason is that short of government ownership, no way has been or can be found of preventing our great industro-financial interests from using the railroad system as an effective weapon with which to destroy free competitive industry. . . .

Pinchot closed with a prediction that the railroad issue would soon be the dominant question in American politics. 27

The Presidential race in 1924 gave Pinchot new opportunities for political involvement. Writing to Senator LaFollette on June 28, he lauded the aging reformer's decision to seek the Presidency on an independent ticket. 28 He urged LaFollette to show the voters "how we can take the power-giving things away from plutocracy and restore power

26 Amos Pinchot to Edwin J. Gross, Jan. 17, 1924, Box 47, ibid.
27 For the quotation, see Amos Pinchot, "A Square Deal For the Public," Forum, LXXI, No. 2 (Feb., 1924), 202-203.
to the public. . . ."29 As his own contribution to popular political awareness, Pinchot authored still another set of articles on government ownership of railroads.30 On July 20, he publicly endorsed LaFollette for President.31

Many veterans of the prewar reform movement did not share Pinchot's enthusiasm for LaFollette.32 In August, 1924, Raymond Robins, a onetime Progressive party stalwart, initiated an anti-LaFollette drive among his former Bull Moose colleagues.33 Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, publisher of the Philadelphia North American, and Chester H. Rowell, a California journalist, joined Robins in the effort.34 The

29Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, June 28, 1924, Box 46, Pinchot MSS.

30See Amos Pinchot, "The Railroads: A People's Problem," Railway Clerk, XXXIII, No. 7 (July, 1924), 245- and Amos Pinchot, "The Real Issue," Railway Clerk, XXXIII, No. 9 (Sept., 1924), 326-27, 343..

31Pinchot and a host of other reform minded New Yorkers signed a telegram in support of LaFollette's candidacy. See Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette, II, 1116-17, and 1224n-25n.

32For an overview of the activities of 1912 Progressives in the 1924 Presidential campaign, see Alan R. Havig, "A Disputed Legacy: Roosevelt Progressives and the LaFollette Campaign of 1924," Mid-America, LIII, No. 1 (Jan., 1971), 44-64.


34Like Robins, both Van Valkenburg and Rowell had supported Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. With reference to the two newspapermen and the anti-LaFollette drive, see Edwin A. Van Valkenburg to Raymond Robins, Aug. 11, 1924, Folder 432, ibid, and Raymond Robins to Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, Aug. 24, 1924, Folder 252, ibid.
Pinchot attruck back at the anti-LaFollette contingent. In an open letter to LaFollette's running mate, United States Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, he declared:

Only a small minority of the signers of this shabby letter were on the firing line of the old Progressive movement. Most of them came in after Roosevelt was no longer active and the party had fallen under the influence of George W. Perkins and become a sort of asylum for well meaning . . . men and women who had vague righteous aspirations for which they wanted a label that would make them feel Progressive but not get them in wrong at the bank.

Pinchot concluded that the declaration's signers had now decided "to make peace with plutocracy and live comfortably in its protecting shadow."36

Edwin A. Van Valkenburg replied to Pinchot in kind. In an editorial for the North American, he attacked Pinchot as "an amateur Socialist and radical agitator . . . a follower of the teachings of Marx and Lenine and Debs and LaFollette." He warned his readers that Pinchot subscribed to an economic and political philosophy that would destroy


36 Amos Pinchot to Burton K. Wheeler, Sept. 27, 1924, Box 79, Pinchot MSS. See also ibid., Sept. 30, 1924, 2.
capitalism, marriage, the family, and Christianity. 37

Pinchot vehemently denied Van Valkenburg's charges. In an open letter to the publisher, he asserted:

As to your statements about my believing in socialism, my alleged desire to destroy . . . the capitalistic system, marriage, the family and the Christian church—these are the kind of things that your intelligence, if not your conscience, should prevent you from putting in type. For over ten years, I have constantly spoken against socialism, whose [sic] basic doctrine—the abolition of competitive effort in industry—I disbelieve in, disbelieve in as thoroughly as I believe in maintaining the capitalistic system. . . .

Continuing his rebuttal, Pinchot argued that the reforms he favored would stimulate competitive free enterprise. 38

Along with letter writing, Pinchot found time for other campaign activities. In September, 1924, George Record entered the United States Senate race in New Jersey as an independent candidate. 39 Pinchot subsequently stumped the Garden State on behalf of Record and LaFollette. 40 He also joined Record and forty other former Bull Moose partisans in an open declaration of support for LaFollette. 41 Neither of Pinchot's favorites fared well with the


38 Amos Pinchot to Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, Oct. 25, 1924, Box 46, Pinchot MSS.


40 See Amos Pinchot to Arthur Garfield Hays, Oct. 4, 1924; and Gilbert E. Roe to Amos Pinchot, Oct. 22, 1924, both in Box 46, Pinchot MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, Oct. 10, 1924, Box 79, Pinchot MSS.

voters. La Follette finished a poor third in the nationwide race, and Record did no better in New Jersey.\footnote{42}

Pinchot blamed La Follette for the disaster at the polls. In a post-election appraisal, he contended that the Senator had failed to advance a clear and concise program of economic reform. Like Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, La Follette, according to Pinchot, had offered the voters too many vague generalities.\footnote{43} In a second assessment, the New Yorker claimed that reformers would now have to renounce expediency and begin serious study of "the American problem. . . ." As for the La Follette movement, he pronounced it smashed to pieces "on the rock of political ambition and selfishness. . . ."\footnote{44}

Pinchot, after a lengthy respite, focused on his own notion of "the American problem." By June 1926, he was collecting information on past ties between big business and national politics in the United States.\footnote{45} From his material, Pinchot planned to write two books about recent American

\footnote{42}{For the Presidential vote, see Scammon, America at the Polls, 4. For the Senate returns in New Jersey, see Trenton Evening Times, Nov. 7, 1924, 1.}

\footnote{43}{Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, Nov. 26, 1924, Box 46, Pinchot MSS.}

\footnote{44}{Amos Pinchot to Mrs. Laurence Todd, Jan. 13, 1925, Box 48, ibid.}

\footnote{45}{See Amos Pinchot to Harry A. Slattery, June 3, 1926; Harry A. Slattery to Amos Pinchot, June 22, 1926; and Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, June 22, 1926, all in Box 49, ibid.}
history. In the first work, he intended to survey the influence of the business elite on politics since the administration of President William McKinley. The second volume would recount the history of the Progressive party and discuss the ties between Theodore Roosevelt and George W. Perkins. Pinchot never managed to complete either book. Still, he spent long hours with the projects, and the tasks of research and writing kept his attention riveted on the political machinations of the business community.46

Meanwhile, George Record supplied Pinchot with an opportunity for a foray into journalism. In September, 1926, Record arranged for the publication of a daily column in the Hudson Dispatch, a county newspaper that circulated throughout northern New Jersey. From the start, the aging reformer planned to share the workload with other writers who would contribute on a rotating basis.47 Pinchot readily agreed to become one of the columnists.48 James G. Blauvelt and Herman B. Walker, two other long time Record associates, also volunteered for duty.49 A fifth place went to Everett

46 In 1958, Helene Maxwell Hooker published an edited version of Pinchot's manuscript history of the Progressive party. For an insightful commentary on Pinchot's two historical projects and their ultimate fate, see Helene Maxwell Hooker, "Editorial Note," in Pinchot, History, 3-6.

47 The newspaper was published daily except Sundays. On Record's plans for the column, see George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Sept. 13, 1926, Box 49, Pinchot MSS.

48 Amos Pinchot to George L. Record, Sept. 30, 1926, ibid.

49 For biographical material on Blauvelt and Walker, respectively, see New York Times, May 11, 1946, 27; and New York Times, Jan. 12, 1959, 39. On their ties with Record, see Barr, "Record," 70.
Colby, once the leader of Progressive party forces in New Jersey. Henry T. Hunt, formerly the Mayor of Cincinnati and more recently a New York attorney, rounded out the list of regular contributors.

Pinchot filled the column with his standard arguments. He railed against the political and economic hegemony of big business. The main task before reformers, he contended, was to take away "the special unfair advantages" that gave "the monopoly group its power." In specific terms, he called for government ownership of railroads and natural resources as steps toward equalization of commercial opportunities.

Pinchot also attacked the financial elite in his comments on foreign policy. After Everett Colby had endorsed American participation in the League of Nations and the World Court, Pinchot spoke out against membership in

50 On Colby's career, see New York Times, June 20, 1943, 35.


52 Hudson Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1926, 6; and Hudson Dispatch, Nov. 16, 1926, 6.

53 Ibid., Nov. 26, 1926, 6.

54 Ibid., Dec. 4, 1926, 6; ibid., Dec. 11, 1926, 6; and ibid., Dec. 18, 1926, 6.
either body. He reminded readers that any American delegate to the multinational forums would be chosen by a "Harding closeted with a Daugherty or a Fall . . . or by Calvin Coolidge with the advice and consent of J. P. Morgan & Co. . . ." Pinchot's objections went beyond the problem of selecting a spokesman for the United States. He argued that "Leagues and Courts," located in foreign capitals and closed to public view, were "likely to tighten the hold of plutocracy on international affairs. . . ."56

Differences over domestic issues caused an even wider rift among the columnists. The trouble began when Henry Hunt authored a series of columns in which he praised organized labor and questioned the wisdom of unfettered economic competition.57 Both Pinchot and Record deplored the tenor of Hunt's remarks. In private, they concluded that he had become a socialist.58 Record, in an attempt to combat the ideological contagion, published three successive installments on the fallacies of socialism.59

55 For Colby's recommendations, see ibid., Oct. 21, 1926, 6; and ibid., Oct. 28, 1926, 6.
57 Ibid., Oct. 19, 1926, 6; ibid., Oct. 27, 1926, 6; ibid., Nov. 2, 1926, 6; ibid., Nov. 9, 1926, 6; and ibid., Nov. 23, 1926, 6.
58 George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Nov. 27, 1926; and Amos Pinchot to George L. Record, Nov. 30, 1926, both in Box 49, Pinchot MSS.
59 Hudson Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1926, 6; Hudson Dispatch, Dec. 6, 1926, 6; and Hudson Dispatch, Dec. 13, 1926, 6.
in rebuttal, but the debate died prematurely. In January, 1927, a new editor took charge of the Hudson Dispatch, and the rotating column came to an abrupt end.

With the collapse of the newspaper venture, Pinchot turned to more leisurely pursuits. He met occasionally with reform minded politicians. For the most part, however, he developed his ideas in unpublished writings. During the summer of 1927, his manuscript output included a paean to the wisdom of William Graham Sumner. He argued that the Yale sociologist had understood the vital need for competitive struggle within society.

Pinchot returned to active politics in 1928. In the Presidential race for that year, he favored Alfred E. Smith, the Democratic nominee, over Herbert Hoover, the Republican standard-bearer. On October 4, Pinchot explained his preference in an open letter to John J. Raskob, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee. He told Raskob that Smith had candidly faced the issues of the campaign while Hoover had equivocated. In the same letter, Pinchot attacked

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60 For Hunt's arguments, see ibid., Dec. 7, 1926, 6; and ibid., Dec. 14, 1926, 6.

61 Ibid., Jan. 8, 1927, 1; and George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Jan. 13, 1926 [sic], Box 49, Pinchot MSS.

62 See Robert F. Wagner to George L. Record, May 5, 1927; and Amos Pinchot to George L. Record, July 3, 1927, both in Box 50, Pinchot MSS.

63 See Amos Pinchot, What Sumner Saw, typescript dated July 22, 1927, Box 213, ibid.
Hoover as a lackey of big business in general and the public utility's trust in particular.\(^{64}\)

Hoover's subsequent election victory left Pinchot in a truculent mood. He lashed out at the President-elect even before 1928 came to an end. In an article for Nation, he predicted that Hoover would soon scuttle the Sherman Antitrust Act. The power of monopolies, he added, would then grow to new heights "beneath the warming rays of Presidential approval. . . ." In closing, Pinchot looked four years hence and saw Hoover being re-elected by "a nation gone serenely Babbitt."\(^{65}\)

Pinchot continued to goad Hoover after the onset of the Great Depression. In April, 1930, Pinchot was part of a delegation that went to the White House in order to confer with the President about rising unemployment. Hoover, according to the New Yorker, treated his visitors imperiously and informed them that the job crisis had nearly passed.\(^{66}\) In an article almost a year later, Pinchot recalled the meeting and asked tauntingly: "Has the magic of the Great Engineer lost some of its power and cunning? Or are

\(^{64}\) Amos Pinchot to John J. Raskob, Oct. 4, 1928, Box 51, ibid. Pinchot contributed a thousand dollars to help circulate his letter to Raskob in pamphlet form. See Amos Pinchot to Frederic C. Howe, Oct. 10, 1928, Box 51, ibid.

\(^{65}\) See Amos Pinchot, "Hoover and the 'Big Lift,'" Nation, CXXVII, No. 3312 (Dec. 26, 1926), 706-708.

\(^{66}\) Amos Pinchot to G. B. Parker, Nov. 25, 1930, Box 52, Pinchot MSS.
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5,000,000 men and women looking for work . . . but another illusion of the untrained lay mind?" In a subsequent essay, Pinchot branded the Chief Executive as a tool of the public utilities trust. Early in 1932, he publicly censured the President and both major parties for subservience to America's business elite.

Ultimately, Pinchot went beyond the bounds of journalism in his condemnation of the Hoover government. During the summer of 1932, a ragged army of unemployed World War I veterans assembled in Washington. The ex-soldiers hoped to encourage early payment of a cash bonus due most of them in 1945. The presence of the unkempt lobbyists unnerved Hoover, and he called in the armed forces. In July, 1932, Federal troops routed the Bonus Army from its encampment along Washington's Anacostia River. Pinchot turned playwright in order to express his disdain for the President's use of military might. In General Goober at the Battle of Anacostia, a mordant satire in two acts, he pictured the President as a blustering incompetent who swaggered about

67 Amos Pinchot, "We Met Mr. Hoover," Nation, CXXXII, No. 3419 (Jan. 14, 1931), 44.


the Executive Mansion with saber in hand. Secretary of State "Blimson," Secretary of War "Whirely," and other "cabinet officers" helped make up the rest of the seriocomic cast.71

Pinchot's effort as a playwright typified the diversity of his political involvements in the years after 1920. Over the long travail, he assumed a variety of political roles. As a writer, organizer, and campaigner, he stayed active in politics. At the same time, his economic and political beliefs remained unchanged. In public pronouncements, he inveighed against big business and urged reforms intended to promote competitive free enterprise. Pinchot preached the gospel of atomistic capitalism at the cost of his own political isolation. His arguments were increasingly remote from the realities of politics and economics in America.

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71 Amos Pinchot, General Goober at the Battle of Anacostia. Printed copy in Box 130, Pinchot MSS.
Chapter 7

THE LAST DECADE

For Amos Pinchot, American politics from 1932 onward revolved around Franklin D. Roosevelt. Pinchot welcomed the elevation of his fellow New Yorker to the White House, and he hailed the early steps in the New Deal. Yet he soon grew to distrust the President. He became convinced that Roosevelt and the New Dealers wanted to make drastic changes in American institutions. Ultimately, Pinchot emerged as a virulent critic of the Chief Executive.

In 1932, Pinchot eagerly supported Roosevelt's drive for the Presidency. During the campaign season, he sent letters of advice and encouragement to the New York Governor.¹ On election night, he sat with Roosevelt while news of victory poured in from across the country.² Shortly

¹Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Aug. 11, 1932; and Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Nov. 5, 1932, both in Box 53, Pinchot MSS.

²Nearly eight years later, Pinchot recalled the election night celebration. Writing to Senator Hiram Johnson in October, 1940, he said:

As you know there was a time when I believed in Franklin Roosevelt. I was with him on the evening of his first election. And as he sat with the telephone receiver in his right hand, he was kind
thereafter, Pinchot reaffirmed his faith in the President-elect. In a speech delivered on November 13, he praised Roosevelt as a reform leader who could steer the United States between the extremes of socialism and fascism. 3

Pinchot knew the exact direction in which he wanted the new administration to move. In January, 1933, he outlined a reform program for an audience at Forest Hills, New York. He recommended government ownership of railroads and natural resources as steps toward the revitalization of capitalism. He also endorsed controlled inflation as a stimulant for free enterprise. 4

Despite his preconceptions, Pinchot reacted favorably to the improvisations of the early New Deal. Just two weeks after Roosevelt's inaugural, he exclaimed: "... its a wonderful and encouraging thing to see how the country responds to a brave and honest spirit in the White House." 5

The rapid acceleration of governmental activity caused enough to put his left arm around me and say: 'Pinchot, we're going to have a truly liberal administration.'  
Pinchot supplied the emphasis. See Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, Oct. 2, 1940, Box 68, ibid.

3 A printed copy of the speech appears in Box 175, ibid. For the same text in article form, see Amos Pinchot, "The American Liberal and His Program," Churchman, CXLVII, No. 10 (April, 1933), 14-15.

4 See Amos Pinchot, For Positive Policies, typescript dated Jan., 1933, in Box 233, Pinchot MSS.

5 Amos Pinchot to William P. Eno, March 18, 1933, Box 5, ibid.
Pinchot few qualms. Writing to Allen McCurdy on May 6, he lauded the "wartime . . . form of government" adopted by the New Dealers. At the same time, he described Roosevelt's "spiritual and mental energy" as "astounding and wholly admirable."  

Personal tragedy soon interrupted Pinchot's celebration of the New Deal. In August, 1933, George Record suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. At first, the venerable reformer appeared to be capable of a recovery. By August 27, he was well enough to warn Pinchot that "the Roosevelt experiment" amounted to "pure socialism." Yet the signs of improvement in the Jerseyman's condition proved to be deceptive. On September 27, he died at the age of seventy-four. 

Following Record's death, Pinchot eulogized his old friend. In an article for the New Republic, he compared Record favorably to William Graham Sumner. Both the reformer and the sociologist, he contended, had believed wholeheartedly in individualism. He went on to praise Record as a tireless opponent of plutocracy and socialism. With reference to his long time colleague, Pinchot concluded:
"He was a devoted friend, and I think the only great man I have known." 10

The death of his comrade resharpened Pinchot's ideological consciousness. When the New Yorker returned to the political arena, he saw the Roosevelt administration in a critical light that contrasted vividly with his earlier optimism. On October 11, he complained about the potential for dictatorship that he perceived in the New Deal's National Recovery Administration. 11 Less than two weeks later, he remarked that Roosevelt seemed to be floundering in a manner reminiscent of Hoover. 12 Still, Pinchot showed no immediate inclination to desert the President. In November, 1933, he declared: "My personal opinion of the Roosevelt administration is that it is trying to make ... reforms that are absolutely necessary to the continuance of capitalism." 13

Pinchot fully expected the capitalist system to rescue the United States from the Great Depression. In January, 1934, he sketched a reform agenda that included nationalization of banks, natural resources, and public

11 Amos Pinchot to Charles W. Ervin, Oct. 11, 1933, Box 54, Pinchot MSS.
12 Amos Pinchot to Ernest Gruening, Oct. 23, 1933, ibid.
13 Amos Pinchot to Dr. Lewis Frissell, Nov. 23, 1933, ibid.
Predictably, he saw government ownership as a way to stimulate competitive enterprise. On April 11, he wrote with reference to the rail network: "I am one of the old breed of individualists. I don't want to see the railroads taken over as a step to socialism, but as a means of keeping equal opportunity, Billy Sumner's 'equal chance' alive."  

Short of a program of limited nationalization, Pinchot looked to monetary inflation as a stimulant for the somnolent economy. In June, 1934, he urged President Roosevelt to adopt clear-cut inflationary measures. When no answer came from the White House, Pinchot tried a different tack. On August 8, he sent an open letter to the editors of two hundred American newspapers. In his lengthy epistle, he argued that the time had come for Roosevelt to "reinflate" the dollar to its pre-Depression size.  

Pinchot soon joined forces with other advocates of planned inflation. In September, 1934, he helped establish the Sound Money League. As its primary demand, the

14Amos Pinchot to Paul U. Kellogg, Jan. 29, 1934, Box 55, ibid.
15Amos Pinchot to Joseph B. Eastman, April 11, 1934, ibid.
16Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 28, 1934, ibid.
17See Amos Pinchot, Copy of Letter Sent to 200 Editors For Publication, typescript dated Aug. 8, 1934, ibid. See also New York Times, Aug. 10, 1934, 6.
deceptively named League called for the creation of a Federal Monetary Authority. The proposed agency would be an independent government bureau with control over supplies of credit and currency. League members generally assumed that such a body would attack the Depression by increasing the amount of money in circulation. Pinchot readily endorsed the concept of an independent Monetary Authority. Later in 1934, he recommended the establishment of such an office to both Henry Ford and United States Senator William E. Borah. In January, 1935, he advanced the same idea in a radio speech over station WEVD in New York.

The Roosevelt administration showed no enthusiasm for the creation of an independent bureau with power over the money supply. Marriner S. Eccles, an ardent New Dealer and the Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, insisted that his own agency, if given the resources, could solve the full range of monetary problems. In February, 1935, New Deal supporters in Congress introduced legislation designed to strengthen the hand of the Federal Reserve in monetary


20Amos Pinchot to Henry Ford, Oct. 9, 1934; and Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, Nov. 13, 1934, both in Box 15, Pinchot MSS.

21For the text of the radio address, see Amos Pinchot, Shall We Have a Central Bank? Printed copy in Box 130, ibid.

The proposed measure received a strong endorsement from Board Governor Eccles.  

Pinchot objected strenuously to the New Dealers' approach to fiscal policy matters. He considered the Federal Reserve an all too pliant tool in the hands of the Chief Executive. In an open letter issued on March 15, he warned of a growing concentration of economic power in the Executive Branch. The legislation under review, he argued, would give the President the ability to manipulate the economy for political purposes. As an alternative to a stronger Federal Reserve, he urged the creation of "a permanent, non-partisan, and non-political Monetary Authority. . . ."  

While Congress debated the banking question, Pinchot found himself at odds with other aspects of the New Deal.  


25 Pinchot told a close friend that copies of the letter went to "all members of Congress, [the] Cabinet, Administration advisers, Presidents of principal banks, and Editors throughout the country." See Amos Pinchot to Sumner Gerard, March 14, 1935, Box 57, Pinchot MSS.  


He continued to believe that capitalism could lift the United States out of the Depression.\(^\text{28}\) In terms of reform, he remained committed to a program of limited nationalization intended to equalize entrepreneurial opportunities.\(^\text{29}\) The Roosevelt government, he reluctantly concluded, did not share his politico-economic goals. On June 19, the New Yorker complained that he was "fast losing confidence in the President."\(^\text{30}\) A week later, he groused: "I'm not so darn sure that Roosevelt and the brain trust aren't sliding us into a dictatorship. . . ."\(^\text{31}\)

Shortly thereafter, Pinchot broke publicly with the New Deal. On July 15, he announced his change of allegiance in an open letter to Felix Frankfurter, a key Roosevelt adviser. Pinchot told Frankfurter that the President had prolonged the Depression by failing to restore business

\(^\text{28}\)Amos Pinchot to Rev. Charles E. Coughlin, April 19, 1935; and Amos Pinchot to Mrs. Thomas K. Finletter, May 14, 1935, both in Box 56, Pinchot MSS.

\(^\text{29}\)In May, 1935, Pinchot delineated a reform program for United States Senator Homer T. Bone of Washington. Pinchot told the Senator:

What we really need, as a start, is to get out natural resources . . . and also our transportation system and utilities, out of the hands, so to speak, of Mr. Morgan and Mr. Mellon. Then there will be some chance for industrial equality of opportunity, but not till then.

See Amos Pinchot to Homer T. Bone, May 8, 1935, Box 57, ibid.

\(^\text{30}\)Amos Pinchot to Kenneth B. Walton, June 19, 1935, ibid.

\(^\text{31}\)Amos Pinchot to Kenneth B. Walton, June 16, 1935, ibid.
In search of an alternative to Roosevelt, Pinchot turned to the Republican party. His attention soon focused on Idaho's Senator William E. Borah. An aging veteran of reform politics, Borah had a strong aversion to the New Deal, a nationally known reputation as a progressive, and a viable interest in running for President. On August 16, Pinchot described the Senator as the perfect G.O.P. Presidential candidate for 1936. A few weeks later, he expressed the belief that Borah could outpoll Roosevelt in a national race.

Pinchot subsequently emerged as an active supporter of Borah's bid for the White House. On February 4, 1936, the Senator announced his intention to seek the Presidency.

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34 Amos Pinchot to J. S. Cullinan, Aug. 16, 1935, Box 56, Pinchot MSS.

35 Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Sept. 26, 1935, Box 57, ibid.

Within a few days, Pinchot sent Borah a letter of advice on campaign issues. He then offered Senator policy recommendations and words of encouragement. He also publicly endorsed the Idaho politician as a Presidential aspirant. Pinchot expended his energy in vain. Borah never seriously threatened Kansas Governor Alfred M. Landon in the fight for the G.O.P. nomination.

During the autumn election race, Pinchot backed Landon in preference to Roosevelt. As his major contribution to the campaign, Pinchot dispatched an open letter to Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt's irascible Secretary of Interior. Writing to Ickes on October 14, he charged that the New Dealers wanted to impose a socialist regime on the United States. In contrast to the administration's key figures, Landon, he said, offered the voters "character and common-sense." With reference to the Kansas Governor, Pinchot concluded: "He is not as advanced in his views as I am. But he is liberal and open-minded... I see more chance for

37Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, Feb. 14, 1936, Box 58, Pinchot MSS.
38See Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, March 3, 1936; and Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, April 17, 1936, both in ibid.
39Hartford Courant, March 6, 1936. Clipping in Box 231, ibid. See also Amos Pinchot to Chairman of the Borah Meeting, May 8, 1936, Box 59, ibid.
40Landon won an easy first ballot victory. Borah received only nineteen votes from convention delegates. See New York Times, June 19, 1936, 1.
progress in an administration headed by him than by Mr. Roosevelt."\(^4^1\)

When the President won re-election by a landslide margin, Pinchot cast a doleful eye over the returns. He assured Landon that the results stemmed from Roosevelt's "matchless skill in arousing class hatred and class hopes. . . ."\(^4^2\) In a second assessment, he denied that the votes reflected an "outpouring of popular sentiment." He attributed the Democratic victory to the efforts of relief recipients, subsidized farmers, and others who feared that "their semi-annual cheques would cease if the Little White Father were not returned to power."\(^4^3\)

Post-election developments soon brought Pinchot back into conflict with the New Dealers. On February 5, 1937, President Roosevelt asked Congress for an increase in the size of the Federal Judiciary. The Chief Executive's primary goal was to enlarge the United States Supreme Court and thereby make the tribunal more amenable to his reform program.\(^4^4\) Pinchot viewed Roosevelt's scheme with alarm. On

\(^4^1\)Amos Pinchot to Harold L. Ickes, Oct. 14, 1936, Box 59, Pinchot MSS. See also \textit{ibid.}, Oct. 19, 1936, 2.

\(^4^2\)Amos Pinchot to Alfred M. Landon, Nov. 4, 1936, Box 58, Pinchot MSS.

\(^4^3\)Amos Pinchot to Alfred Hawes, Nov. 6, 1936, \textit{ibid.}

the evening of February 5, he wrote Roy Howard: "... this is a tremendous occasion. Unless Congress defeats this bill, we are in fascism."45

Pinchot's sense of urgency propelled him into action. During a telephone conversation on February 6, he asked newspaper publisher Frank Gannett, a former colleague from the Borah campaign, to lead the fight against the President’s plan to reorganize the Judiciary. Gannett accepted the challenge. On February 14, the publishing magnate announced the formation of the National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government. Founders of the new organization included Gannett, Pinchot, journalist Lincoln Colcord, and historian James Truslow Adams. In the months that followed, the committee fought tenaciously against Roosevelt’s "Court packing" plan and other New Deal innovations.46

The furor over Judicial reorganization gave Pinchot ample opportunity to use his polemical skills. On February 14, he sent a caustically worded letter to all members of Congress. The President’s Court plan, he told the legislators, constituted "a long and perhaps irrevocable step

45 Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, Feb. 5, 1937, Box 61, Pinchot MSS.

into dictatorship.\(^{47}\) A few weeks later, Pinchot addressed himself directly to the Chief Executive. In an open letter on April 26, he told Roosevelt: "... I have watched your steady and unrelenting drive for more and more power ... [and] I am forced to conclude that ... you want the power of a dictator without the liability of the name."\(^{48}\)

While Congress continued debate on the Court question, Pinchot scrutinized other New Deal measures.\(^{49}\) Along with Judicial reorganization, Roosevelt had previously gone on record in favor of restructuring the Executive Branch.\(^{50}\) Pinchot regarded Executive reorganization as another scheme


\(^{48}\)Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 26, 1937, Box 234, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, April 26, 1937, 7.

\(^{49}\)Congress struggled with the Court question until August, 1937. The legislators finally enacted a compromise measure that made no change in the size of the Supreme Court. For the text of the Act, see U. S., Statutes at Large, L, Part 1, 751-53. For material on the fight in Congress, see William E. Leuchtenburg, "Franklin D. Roosevelt's Supreme Court 'Packing' Plan," in Harold W. Hollingsworth and William F. Holmes (eds.), Essays on the New Deal (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), 69-115.

\(^{50}\)For Roosevelt's stand on Executive reorganization, see U. S., Reorganization of the Executive Departments: Message From the President of the United States Transmitting a Report on Reorganization of the Executive Departments of the Government, Senate Doc. 8, 75 Cong., 1 Sess., 1937, 1-84. See also Louis Brownlow, A Passion For Anonymity: The Autobiography of Louis Brownlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 371-403.
to increase Presidential power. He detected the same sinister motive behind a minimum wage proposal introduced in Congress by Senator Hugo L. Black of Alabama. Pinchot, in short, saw Roosevelt grasping for additional power at every turn. On July 26, the New Yorker renewed his open letter campaign against the President. In an angry screed, he once again charged the Chief Executive with attempting to establish a dictatorship.

Pinchot kept up his one-sided correspondence with Roosevelt during the first half of 1938. In an open letter dated January 29, he urged the President to abandon the cause of Executive reorganization. At the same time, he repeated his contention that Roosevelt wanted dictatorial power. In May, 1938, Pinchot challenged the President

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51 Amos Pinchot to F. M. Huntington Wilson, May 4, 1937, Box 62, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to William Hard, May 27, 1937, Box 60, Pinchot MSS. See also Polenburg, *Roosevelt's Government*, 66-68.

52 For a discussion of Senator Black's 1937 proposal, see Paul H. Douglas and Joseph Hackman, "The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938," *Political Science Quarterly*, LIII, No. 4 (Dec., 1938), 493-94. For Pinchot's reaction to the bill, see Amos Pinchot to Robert P. Scripps, June 28, 1937, Box 62, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, July 2, 1937, Box 61, Pinchot MSS.

53 Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 26, 1937, Box 60, Pinchot MSS. See also *New York Times*, July 26, 1937, 6.

54 Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jan. 29, 1938, Box 64, Pinchot MSS. See also *New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1938, 3. Congress rejected Executive reorganization in April, 1938. A year later, however, Roosevelt won approval to make sweeping changes in his governmental household. See Polenburg, *Roosevelt's Government*, 162-68.
along a different front. On May 12, the House of Representatives approved an appropriations bill that called for the expenditure of three billion dollars on relief and public works projects. The proposed legislation gave the Chief Executive discretionary authority over disbursement of the money. Pinchot objected vehemently to the power tentatively granted to the President. In an open letter on May 17, he accused Roosevelt of trying to "Tammanyize" the United States. The appropriations measure, he fumed, was a "plan to buy America on the hoof."56

As an alternative to increased government spending, Pinchot argued for reliance on free enterprise. On June 9, he wrote: "Depressions cannot be cured by governments. . . Capital and labor will pull us out . . . if we can be pulled out."57 Later in the year, Pinchot offered a similar argument to labor leader John L. Lewis. In an open letter intended for publication on Labor Day, 1938, the New Yorker assured Lewis that capitalism was "the most productive form


56Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 17, 1938, Box 65, Pinchot MSS. See also ibid., May 18, 1938, 10. The money bill subsequently passed in the Senate with the President's authority intact. For the text of the Act, see U. S., Statutes at Large, LII, 809-20. For an assessment of the legislation, see James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 233-42.

57Amos Pinchot to Charles R. Eckert, June 9, 1938, Box 64, Pinchot MSS.
of economic organization" yet devised.\textsuperscript{58}

Early in 1939, war clouds in Europe and Asia intensified Pinchot's hostility toward the New Dealers. On February 27, the old reformer wrote:

The present administration is being guided by radicals who . . . don't believe in either capitalism or democracy, and who will never change their political point of view. Nor, I think, will Roosevelt himself. . . . And he will try to keep in power by every means . . . even if he has to throw the country into war. . . .\textsuperscript{59}

A few weeks later, Pinchot made the same accusation in public. In an open letter on April 18, he charged Roosevelt with systematically plotting to involve the United States in another world war.\textsuperscript{60}

After fighting broke out in Europe in September, 1939, Pinchot anxiously looked forward to the Presidential sweepstakes for 1940. He hoped for the nomination of a Republican candidate who could drive Roosevelt out of the White House. His first choice was Frank Gannett, but the publisher lacked the necessary popular appeal.\textsuperscript{61} Among the other G.O.P. hopefuls, Pinchot preferred business executive


\textsuperscript{59}Amos Pinchot to John O'Connor, Feb. 27, 1939, Box 66, Pinchot MSS.

\textsuperscript{60}Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 18, 1939, Box 67, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{61}See Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Dec. 28, 1939, Box 66, \textit{ibid}.; and Amos Pinchot to Randolph Walker, Jan. 26, 1940, \textit{ibid}.
Wendell L. Willkie to New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey. Still, his immediate concern remained the selection of a Republican who could defeat Roosevelt. In June, 1940, he declared: "... I would back Judas Iscariot against our peerless leader in the White House."63

When the Presidential race narrowed to a battle between Roosevelt and Willkie, Pinchot eagerly embraced the latter candidate. In August, 1940, he urged Willkie to challenge the New Deal's "deadly record of failure and inefficiency. . . ."64 Less than two weeks later, he advised the G.O.P. contender to offer "vigorous and uncompromising opposition to the President's war drive. . . ."65 The tenor of the Willkie campaign pleased Pinchot immensely. On October 15, he remarked to Senator Burton K. Wheeler of

62 With reference to the New York Governor, Pinchot complained:
Today I tried in vain, as I sat watching Dewey from the side view, to call to mind someone who could better fit the description of a bright, smug, scrappy, smalltown squirt. . . . And I wondered what had happened to American public life that a man of his kind and calibre should be thought eligible for the presidency of the United States.
See Amos Pinchot to Geoffrey Parsons, March 14, 1940, Box 67, ibid. In sharp contrast to his description of Dewey, Pinchot called Willkie a man of "resonant personality . . . simplicity and sincerity. . . ." See Amos Pinchot to John P. Sinclair, June 13, 1940, Box 68, ibid.

63 Amos Pinchot to Lincoln Colcord, June 24, 1940, Box 67, ibid.

64 Amos Pinchot to Wendell L. Willkie, Aug. 14, 1940, ibid.

65 Amos Pinchot to Wendell L. Willkie, Sept. 4, 1940, ibid.
"Willkie's speeches seem to me the most powerful and convincing political speeches I've heard in my time."

He went on to predict a triumph for Willkie that would be "the most significant political victory since Lincoln's." 66

The re-election of Roosevelt to an unprecedented third term left Pinchot in a dour mood. He attributed the Democratic victory to the work of machine politicians and relief recipients. 67 In a post-election letter to his son, he insisted that "a great majority of the informed free minded people" had voted for Willkie. 68

With the election over, Pinchot concentrated his attention on the problems of American foreign policy. He adamantly opposed United States involvement in the war going on in Europe. On December 13, he wrote:

I feel that we can be kept out of war. But it is going to be a hard fight. . . . The country is in an hysterical condition. . . . The idea has been spread, and accepted by many, that it is our business to go far afield righting the wrongs of the whole world, fighting other nations' battles . . . and doing all sorts of things which are as much beyond our strength as beyond our duty. . . . 69

In a concurrent letter to Frank Gannett, Pinchot asserted:

67 Amos Pinchot to John Sloane, Nov. 7, 1940, ibid.; and Amos Pinchot to Douglas Johnson, Nov. 7, 1940, Box 68, ibid.
68 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, II, Nov. 11, 1940, Box 5, ibid.
69 Amos Pinchot to R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., Dec. 13, 1940, Box 68, ibid.
"... we must all use our best and most devoted efforts to keep this country from getting into the European conflict."  

Pinchot's anti-war stand soon caused him to clash with President Roosevelt. On December 29, the Chief Executive proposed an ambitious program of Lend-Lease aid to nations engaged in fighting Nazi Germany.71 Pinchot forcefully opposed the President's plan. In January, 1941, he attacked Lend-Lease in a statement read to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.72 In an open letter to Roosevelt on February 9, he termed the aid proposal "hysterical madness."73 

After Congress approved Lend-Lease, Pinchot complained bitterly about Roosevelt's political machinations.74 On April 2, he wrote Lincoln Colcord: "It is extraordinary, 

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70 Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Dec. 13, 1940, Box 67, ibid.  
72 Pinchot became ill before he could address the Committee. John Burke of the American Defense Society read the New Yorker's statement into the record. For the text of the statement, see U. S., Lend-Lease Bill: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy Seventh Congress, First Session on H. R. 1776 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), 556-58.  
73 Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Feb. 9, 1941, Box 69, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, Feb. 10, 1941, 10.  
74 Congress passed the Lend-Lease program in March, 1941. For the text of the legislation, see U. S., Statutes at Large, LV, Part 1, 31-33.
it is incredible, that the people shouldn't have . . . sensed the duplicity, the broken pledges, and the foxy manoeuvring of the President. . . ."75 In a later report to his son, Pinchot charged that Roosevelt and a coterie of "Marxian intellectuals" planned to impose a socialist dictatorship on America.76

When the United States finally went to war in December, 1941, Pinchot prepared to defend his most cherished political and economic values. Paradoxically, he expected the decisive battles of the war years to take place on the homefront. He foresaw a clash of rival ideologies on the domestic scene that would determine the future of American politics. On December 29, Pinchot declared his intention to take an active part in the fight "to preserve private enterprise and rehabilitate the capitalist system in the eyes of the people."77 A few weeks later, he told Frank Gannett: "We should still be able to save the capitalist system if we can explain what it means clearly enough and often enough to the country."78

75Amos Pinchot to Lincoln Colcord, April 2, 1941, Box 69, Pinchot MSS.

76Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, II, Sept. 30, 1941, Box 5, ibid. For the same accusation in magazine article form, see Amos Pinchot, "The Roosevelt-Laski Scheme," Scribner's Commentator, X, No. 6 (Oct., 1941), 62-68.

77Amos Pinchot to H. Dudley Swim, Dec. 29, 1941, Box 70, Pinchot MSS.

78Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Jan. 29, 1942, Box 72, ibid.
Pinchot did not endure to wage the battles that he anticipated. In June, 1942, he complained of "severe insomnia and attendant exhaustion." Shortly thereafter, he tried to commit suicide. The attempt failed, but Pinchot never again took part in public life. He died on February 18, 1944.

In the last years of his political career, Amos Pinchot fought with new enemies on behalf of old values. Initially, the New Yorker supported President Roosevelt and the New Deal, but he soon grew disenchanted. By 1935, he counted himself among the foes of the administration. As the 1930's wore on, Pinchot's anti-Roosevelt pronouncements became increasingly indiscriminate. In a long series of open letters, he warned the public that the President wanted dictatorial power. At the same time, Pinchot held tenaciously to the values that had long dominated his commitment to reform. He continued to believe in the efficacy of competitive capitalism and the need for equal entrepreneurial opportunities. With dogged persistence, he advanced atomistic competition as a reform alternative to the New Deal. Through the last days of his public life, Pinchot embraced capitalism as a reform ideology.

79Amos Pinchot to E. S. Webster, June 24, 1942, ibid.


Ostensibly, Amos Pinchot met all the prerequisites for membership in the American ruling class. His family background, education, and political connections afforded him easy access to public life. Once involved in politics, he became fascinated with the struggle for power. Yet Pinchot never occupied a position of significant political influence. At an early date, he assumed an ideological stance that barred him from effective participation in the governmental elite.

Pinchot formulated his political values during the years before World War I. As a Yale undergraduate in the 1890's, he came to appreciate the arguments of William Graham Sumner on behalf of capitalism and Social Darwinism. His subsequent experiences with the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy and the Progressive party awakened his interest in reform politics. In 1913, Pinchot found the capstone for his political education. The anti-monopoly credo of George Record allowed the New Yorker to reconcile his sympathy for Sumnerian principles with his commitment to reform. From Record, Pinchot learned to see atomistic competitive
capitalism as a reform ideology.

Pinchot's acceptance of the anti-monopoly creed brought important changes in the tenor of his political career. He soon emerged as a doctrinaire proponent of Record's reform ideas. At the same time, he found it increasingly difficult to work with the men who had formerly commanded his political allegiance. In governmental affairs, he gradually drifted away from his brother Gifford. During the 1916 Presidential campaign, he broke publicly with Theodore Roosevelt. In 1916, Pinchot supported President Woodrow Wilson, but he did not owe his first loyalty to the Chief Executive. Instead, he looked to George Record for political leadership and ideological instruction.

With American entry into World War I, Pinchot temporarily reordered his reform priorities. He put aside the anti-monopoly creed and pursued goals directly related to the war effort. Still very much a reformer, he wanted the United States to champion the cause of democracy throughout the world. Concomitantly, he insisted that democratic institutions had to be protected on the homefront. The policies actually implemented by the Wilson administration left Pinchot frustrated and embittered. He watched in dismay while government authorities suppressed domestic criticism of the war. When the postwar negotiations at Versailles failed to produce a flowering of democracy, he turned against President Wilson. Still, the New Yorker remained in the camp of reform. He emerged from the war
years convinced of the need for change in the established order.

For Pinchot, the return to peacetime politics meant revival of the anti-monopoly creed. Along with Record, he labored to impose the narrow reform program on the Committee of Forty Eight. The two zealots were largely successful, but their efforts helped sabotage plans for a broad third party coalition. Unrepentant, Pinchot and Record held tenaciously to their politico-economic ideas. As political organizers and activists, they continued to advance the anti-monopoly credo. Working in tandem, they kept their vision of reform alive throughout the postwar decade.

After the onset of the Great Depression, Pinchot used his reform ideas as a standard of measure for the New Deal. Except for a brief period of infatuation, he consistently opposed the Roosevelt administration. He deplored the centralization of power and the air of economic experimentation that characterized the Roosevelt regime. His own remedy for the economic crisis centered on the anti-monopoly creed and its promise of rejuvenated free enterprise. Pinchot's bitter attacks on the New Dealers clearly revealed the sharp contrast between his views on reform and their commitments to change.

For more than thirty years, Pinchot stayed on the periphery of American politics. His family name, native abilities, and wide range of activities assured him a place near the center of power. Still, he never exerted
significant influence. Instead, he devoted his best energies to the advocacy of an increasingly anachronistic ideology. While the American ruling class accepted mass production industries and the beginnings of the welfare state, Pinchot argued for economic competition and individualism. Over the years, his atavistic preachments grew more and more remote from the realities of American political and economic life. Throughout most of his career as a reformer, Pinchot remained a quixotic figure, an ardent crusader for outworn shibboleths and antiquated ideas.
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Candidate: Rex Oliver Mooney

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