1973


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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF
ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE
1895-1970

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech

by
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ABSTRACT

In 1895, George Pierce Baker published The Principles of Argumentation, the first modern textbook on argument. The major contributions of that work were: a commitment to a "practical" argumentation independent of the strictures imposed by law, Formal Logic, and rhetoric; a comprehensive system of analysis; and an unparalleled method of brief-drawing. Subsequent texts applied Baker's systems of analysis and brief-drawing to the "spoken debate." These works, however, reemphasized relationships between argumentation and its parent disciplines, appropriating rules of evidence, concepts of burden of proof and presumption, and procedures for arguing a "case" from law; rules for arrangement, style, and delivery from rhetoric; and the deductive syllogism, Mill's canons of induction, and fallacies from Formal Logic.

Two works published in 1917 firmly entrenched the "standard tradition." Baker's most famous student, William Trufant Foster, revised an earlier edition of Argumentation and Debating which set out traditional principles in a comprehensive, teachable fashion. James M. O'Neill, meanwhile, incorporated detailed original source materials
and advocated a "game" approach to debating in his revision of Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales's *Argumentation and Debate*. The ramifications of that legacy are immeasurable.

Attacks on the "standard tradition" were not long in coming. Influenced by developments in sociology, psychology, educational philosophy, and, to a lesser extent, logic, argumentation and debate writers began to re-examine the philosophical bases, the subject matter, and the structural forms of their discipline. Debating, the most persistent form of the forensic, came under fire. At issue were format, standards of judging, and ethical questions.

In response to criticisms arising from these reassessments, writers updated bibliographies, incorporated revised treatments of the proposition (particularly its classification), introduced stock issues analyses, and expanded the scope of argumentation to include discussion, attention to audiences, and balanced rhetorical constructs which emphasized persuasion. Such notions of a broad philosophical base for argumentation persisted until c. 1955, after which treatments of discussion reverted almost solely to separate texts, attention to audiences waned, and persuasion was more often considered subsidiary rather than integral to argumentation.

Though contemporary writers have retained much traditional theory--specific modifications occurring primarily in the area of proof--their texts reflect diverse
philosophical predispositions toward the nature and end of argumentation. The inquiry-advocacy distinction, introduced by Richard Whately and popularized by Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, provided terminology for, and represents the polarity of, these approaches. One branch of theory perceives argumentation to be a form of inquiry, its aim being critical decision-making. The other determines advocacy—with a view toward the proof of one's case—to be the appropriate end of argumentation. Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede occupy one end of the continuum; Arthur Kruger is at the other. These philosophical approaches have influenced specific treatments of the analysis, structure, and proof of propositions. Though such writers as Glen Mills and Austin Freeley have attempted to minimize or perhaps resolve these differences, synthesizing ideas from both points of view, the critical underlying issue, the "proper" end of argumentation and/or debate, is still very much in contention.

Much contemporary argumentation and debate theory bears little resemblance to that "practical argumentation for everyday life" envisioned by George Pierce Baker seventy-five years ago. Baker perceived no "academic" debate geared to the demands of intercollegiate tournament competition. His commitment, rather, was to the discovery, selection, and structuring of arguments for the everyday affairs of men. This study traces the developments which
resulted in, and the specific theoretical modifications reflected by, that philosophical shift.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Man has engaged in oral argumentation probably since he learned to communicate verbally. Man's contentiousness gradually became more refined as he pursued excellence, or in more practical terms, victory. He developed guidelines and set forth rules for arguing more effectively. "Precepts" dealing with eloquence, addressed to various Egyptian kings, have come down to us from as early as 2900 B.C. And rules for arguing one's case were systematized by Corax and Tisias in the fifth century B.C. The sophists profiteered, while Aristotle labored to discover "the available means of persuasion." Man has attended to theory as well as practice in argumentation; to knowledge as well as application; to academics as well as performance.

Academic debating traditionally has been a part of higher education in America. By 1642, debating was an established part of the curriculum at Harvard

College.² David Potter has suggested that from 1642 to 1900, four main currents in debating existed in the colonial chartered colleges, which stemmed from the syllogistic disputation, the forensic disputation, the literary and debating societies, and intercollegiate debating. He summarized these currents as follows:

The first major form of debating in the American colleges was the Latin Syllogistic Disputation. Imported along with most other early academic ideas from the parent European centers of learning, this medieval hold-over flourished in our colleges until the middle of the 18th century. Emphasizing formal logic as its method of proof, Latin as its medium of expression, the prescribed curriculum as its source of subject matter, and the Bible as interpreted by the reverend president or tutor as its standard of truth, the Syllogistics served as teaching, testing, and exhibiting devices, and in the later years, according to the students, as a means of academic punishment.

Influenced largely by student and public interest in a form of debate which could handle the vital questions of an awakening age, the written English Forensic Disputation made its appearance in the American Colleges toward the middle of the 18th century. At first subservient to the Latin exercise, it gradually displaced it both as a prescribed classroom and as an exhibition device. Less formal in nature, and with a relatively flexible methodology, it allowed eloquent—if "canned"—treatises on the pros and cons of divergent topics. . . .

Although the forensic disputation lingered on in some college curricula as an exercise in composition, its popularity as a form of debate declined seriously after the early decades of the 19th century. . . .

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Even before the forensic disputation was accepted by the college administrations, it was a featured exercise in the literary and debating societies which sprang up early in the 18th century. . . .

An important contribution to debate history was the society introduction of extempore Disputes in the second half of the 18th century. . . .

By 1829 the societies were also experimenting in still other types of debate. Parliamentary debates . . . were commonplace. . . .

The societies were also changing the methods of awarding decisions. . . .

By the time the Civil War broke out, however, the majority of the societies were no longer in a flourishing condition. . . . [They] did not yield without a struggle. To enliven the Halls, inter-society debates were initiated. . . . It was not, however, until Harvard and Yale engaged in their much publicized debate on January 14, 1892 that this new addition to the intercollegiate craze took root. . . .

As the contests gained in importance, they were supplemented, as in the very beginning of debating in the colonial colleges, by curricular offerings in argumentation and debate. The cycle was almost complete.\(^3\)

Historically, then, modern argumentation and debate is the product of an evolutionary process, a logical extension of our educational system; i.e., it has been "influenced and directed by the same forces which shaped the contemporary course of higher education and cultural growth in America."\(^4\) Modern argumentation and debate has operated both within the framework of the academic curriculum and outside it. And, since 1895, writers in the field have developed a relevant body of knowledge for the discipline.


\(^4\)Potter, Debating in the Colonial Chartered Colleges, p. 120.
Though certainly "breaking new ground," early argumentation and debate theorists did not proceed without direction. They turned to rhetoric, philosophy, and law both for rationale and for methodology. These disciplines shared similar aims both with argumentation and among themselves, though in varying degrees. The discovery and/or demonstration of truth was their universal aim. They questioned and sought answers about the proper relationship of subject matter to form. Language was their common vehicle. And, with the possible exception of philosophy, their effectiveness depended on a practical application of theoretical principles. Argumentation appropriated specific rules and strategies from these disciplines. Rhetoric provided a system of invention, rules of arrangement, style, and delivery. Philosophical writings yielded a theory of knowledge and a system of logical structure. Law


6 Even philosophy was dependent. See Aristotle's moods of the syllogism.

7 The elocutionary movement had appropriated delivery from rhetoric and had set it up as a separate discipline during the "early period" of this study, teaching it in schools of elocution or oratory. Classical rhetoric, however, had considered delivery as a part of its body of theory, a notion which regained favor during the "middle period."
furnished not only specific rules of evidence, but it also set out practical procedures for the carrying on of oral argument.

The purpose of the immediate study is to trace the development of argumentation and debate theory from 1895 to 1970. Central to this task is an identification, description, and analysis of specific principles or hypotheses. To this end the writer has examined argumentation and debate textbooks and relevant journal articles, particularly those published by the national speech association. These materials provided the basis for identifying the crucial theoretical issues and determining consequential modifications; i.e., important additions, deletions, and/or extensions.

This study is descriptive, historical, and analytic in that it reports specific findings, treats theoretical developments in terms of chronological periods, and synthesizes trends in the development of argumentation and debate theory. It can serve, however, neither as a checklist nor as an annotated bibliography of the available literature in argumentation and debate, specific sources being cited to introduce new developments in theory or to substantiate trends. This study investigates debating practices, moreover, only as they affect or reflect theoretical predispositions. Though the research for this
study was inductive, the writing is, of necessity, largely deductive.

A review of the literature indicates that heretofore no study has attempted to trace in detail the development of argumentation and debate theory. Certain theses and dissertations have isolated segments of the problem, and some textbooks have attempted a synthesis of theory, Glen Mills's *Reason in Controversy*, second edition, being the most comprehensive. In general, those scholars who have investigated argumentation and debating (theory and/or practice) have approached it either from the historical-critical perspective or in terms of quantitative research. Paul J. Dovre and Kenneth Andersen reported on the status of these studies in separate journal articles in 1965 and 1966. Mills summarized the Dovre-Andersen conclusions as follows:

Research which is historical-critical describes, explains, and evaluates the phenomena. There have been histories of debate, studies of various theoretical

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8Franklin H. Knower has compiled an index of graduate work in the field of speech from 1902 to current date, which has been published in *Speech Monographs*, beginning with Vol. II, October, 1935, and in subsequent volumes.

9Mills, *Reason in Controversy*.

10Ibid., p. 25.

constructs . . . , evolutionary studies in concepts . . . , investigations of landmark theorists . . . , textual criticisms . . . , studies of debaters . . . , and critical analyses of debates . . . .

Quantitative research, including the descriptive and the experimental, has been in the minority in this field, but it is growing. Descriptive studies have included surveys of current practices in school debating, tabulations of evidence used in tournament debates, and content analyses of transcribed debates. Experimental studies have been concerned with the effectiveness of evidence, the influence of arrangement upon impact, factors in debate judging, effects of debating upon critical thinking ability, and other phenomena which can be controlled, manipulated, and measured. 12

In an article designed to "supplement Dovre's article by focusing on historical research relating to debate and forensic activities in American schools and colleges," 13 Lee R. Polk found that:

Research to date has taken the form of one of the following three types of studies: (1) chronologies of forensic programs at a specific school or college, (2) chronologies of state, regional, or national forensic organizations, and (3) surveys of the use of evidence in interscholastic and intercollegiate debate tournaments. 14

Two works have been particularly valuable to this study. Arthur Kruger's A Classified Bibliography of

12Mills, Reason in Controversy, p. 25.
14Ibid.
Argumentation and Debate\textsuperscript{15} is a comprehensive, though incomplete source book. It provided a springboard for the research and organization of this effort. Also, a series of articles published in the Quarterly Journal of Speech by Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation,"\textsuperscript{16} helped to place this study in perspective and to confirm certain of its early, tentative conclusions, particularly concerning the early period.

The plan of this study is as follows: Chapter II traces the evolution of argumentation theory from 1895-1917 in terms of the nature of argumentation, analysis, proof, and the forensic itself. This chapter incorporates, insofar as possible, the sources of that theory. Chapter III synthesizes developments in the theory of the "middle period," 1917-c. 1955, examining the same problem areas. Chapter IV, using the same criteria, attempts to identify and analyze trends in contemporary theory--after c. 1955. Chapter V includes a summary and conclusions drawn from the study.


\textsuperscript{16}Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, April, June, and November, 1932).
CHAPTER II

THE STANDARD TRADITION--1895-1917

It has been established that the practice of argumentation is not a modern phenomenon. Neither, in a strict sense, is its theory. The essential thrust of classical invention was the proof of one's case.¹ British classical rhetoricians, moreover, re-emphasized the close relationship between rhetoric and logic.² Archbishop Richard Whately, "the first modern to treat argumentation as a separate discipline,"³ wrote Elements of Logic and Elements of Rhetoric⁴ which, numerous cross-references suggest, were to be used as companion works. Whately


⁴Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Boston: J. Munroe Company, 1854); Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (Louisville, Ky.: John P. Morton and Company, 1846).
wished to treat rhetoric of "argumentative composition generally and exclusively." 

Clarence W. Edney concluded that "Whately is largely responsible for initiating that trend of theory which moved rapidly in the direction of a rhetoric of argumentation and debate." 

Aware of Whately's treatment of rhetoric as "argumentative composition," and granting his "landmark contributions to the theory of the subject," Glen Mills nevertheless contended that "it would be inaccurate to say that the academic subject of argumentation dates from his work." 

Mills cited Rowton's How to Conduct a Debate (c. 1840), Holyoake's Public Speaking and Debate (1853), and McElligott's The American Debater (1855) as "among the earliest specialized textbooks or manuals."

In addition to these prescriptive texts on oral argument, English and American rhetorics appeared which treated


6Edney, "English Sources of Rhetorical Theory in Nineteenth-Century America," p. 84.

argumentation as one of the four processes of composition.

Marie Hochmuth and Richard Murphy noted that:

Books such as those of Quackenbos' Advanced Course in Composition and Rhetoric and John Franklin Genung's The Practical Elements of Rhetoric, and Adams Sherman Hill's The Principles of Rhetoric helped to establish new categories of rhetoric: narration, description, exposition, and argumentation.9

In 1895, Ginn and Company published George Pierce Baker's The Principles of Argumentation,10 "the first modern textbook on the subject."11 First not only in date of publication, but also in prestige, Principles set forth a practical approach for the argumentation of everyday life. The influence of the book was profound. Edward Z. Rowell observed in 1932 that "traditionally, the teaching of argumentation in our colleges has followed essentially the system developed in his classroom by Professor George P. Baker in his first years at Harvard."12 Former students

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12 Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation: Part I. The Problem, Its Nature and Significance," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, 1932), 2. Though agreeing that Baker was interested in demonstrating "how to go about satisfying the demands of an argumentative
Raymond Alden (The Art of Debate, 1900), and William T. Foster (Argumentation and Debating, 1908), acknowledged an indebtedness to Baker. And, though Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales neglected to mention their Harvard colleague or his work, their own text (Argumentation and Debate, 1904), "consisted chiefly of restatement and fresh illustration of the principles which Baker had laid down." It has been suggested that their "oversight" was "more regrettable . . . inasmuch as Laycock and Scales had used Baker's book for the Dartmouth argument course during the year previous to the publication of their own book."

Such popular texts as J. H. Gardiner's The Making of Arguments and George Pattee's Practical Argumentation situation," Harry P. Kerr held that Baker's specific methodology developed in response to certain philosophical predispositions. "The problem for him was to shift the student's attention from style to substance and structure."


15Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation, p. 123. He further noted that: "One of their students . . . either in 1903-04 when Baker's book was the text, or in 1904-05 when their own book was used was James M. O'Neill."
also followed in the Baker tradition.\textsuperscript{16} These works contributed little to the "development" of argumentation theory, however, serving largely as restatements and/or refinements of existing approaches. Exceptions, of course, will be duly noted.

Since the influence of Baker's work was so pervasive, it seems appropriate to examine the standard tradition of argumentation and debate theory within the structural framework of The Principles of Argumentation, specifically the 1895 edition and the 1905 revision with Henry Barrett Huntington.\textsuperscript{17} The nature of argumentation, analysis, briefing, and evidence occupied separate chapters in both editions. Baker was less certain about organizing other topics. In the first edition he included sections on preparatory reading, the forensic itself, and persuasion. The revision with Huntington incorporated preparatory reading into the chapters on analysis and evidence, and substituted the term presentation for forensic, broadening


\textsuperscript{17}George P. Baker and Henry B. Huntington, The Principles of Argumentation (rev. ed.; Boston: Ginn and Company, 1905). The third edition (1925), written exclusively by Huntington, is more properly considered in Ch. III.
the concept to include persuasion. It is useful for this study to lump these notions regarding presentation into one category, the forensic, to use Baker's original label.

The Nature of Argumentation

Discontented with contemporary treatments of argumentation as a form of composition, and unwilling to accept argumentation simply as an "off-shoot of logic," or as an oral discourse limited by rules of evidence and legal procedure, Baker sought "to expound simply and interestingly" the principles involved in "the argumentation of everyday life." He examined the nature of the discipline primarily through defining it, assessing its ends, and through determining its relation to other subjects.

18See Kerr, "Baker's Principles of Argumentation," for a discussion of "shortcomings Baker found in contemporary rhetorics and his search for an acceptable alternative." This is not to imply that Baker rejected contemporary rhetorics totally. Rather, citations in Principles indicate that he leaned heavily on such works as John F. Genung, The Practical Elements of Rhetoric (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1887), and J. B. Fletcher and G. R. Carpenter, Introduction to Theme-Writing (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1893).


Though Baker believed that practical argumentation, "fundamental to all others . . . exists independent of the rules which have been formulated to govern the handling of evidence in courts, independent of legal procedure, and . . . can be understood without any study of books of Formal Logic," he investigated, nevertheless, the relation of argumentation both to methods of arguing in law courts and to Formal Logic. Baker also claimed that argumentation includes persuasive and rhetorical methods as well as rules of evidence. He detailed the relationship of these divisions as follows:

Clearly, then, knowledge how to distinguish good from bad reasoning, Logic, . . . is but the warp which runs through the cloth of argumentation; and knowledge of the rules of Persuasion, of Rhetoric, and of Evidence are the threads of the woof. Even as the warp mingles with the woof, so it is by careful reasoning that each of these special sets of rules is applied to the case in hand.

Conviction and Persuasion

In the 1895 edition of Principles, Baker defined argumentation as "the art of producing in the mind of some one else a belief in the ideas which the speaker or writer

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22 Ibid., p. 20. In the preface to the 1905 revision of Principles, Baker and Huntington disclaimed the need to include the "large amount of justificatory and explanatory material" found in the first edition. Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. v.
wishes the hearer or reader to accept."23 Such a result, he claimed, might be obtained either by convincing the hearer or reader, through his intellect, by the cogency of the reasoning advanced; or . . . by bringing out forcibly that in the ideas which will stir the emotions of the hearer or reader sufficiently to make him act as the speaker or writer desires.24

Baker failed to acknowledge the influence of the prevailing faculty psychology on his work.25 Neither did other "early period" writers, though they treated conviction and persuasion separately both as ends and methods appropriate to argumentation.26


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24 Ibid.
25 The influence of faculty psychology on Baker's approach is evidenced by the following distinctions: "He who uses . . . only the appeal to the intellect . . . employs the method of Conviction only. . . . He who depends entirely on finding in his material what will excite the emotions of his hearer or reader uses only the method of Persuasion." Ibid.
26 The Baker-Huntington revision added the phrase "and of inducing the other person, if necessary, to act in consequence of his acquired belief."
with perfection of persuasive power,"\textsuperscript{27} though he did not clarify the inherent relationship between these elements. The Baker-Huntington revision, on the other hand, unconvinced of the validity of a dichotomy, emphasized that "conviction and persuasion are not independent but complementary" processes.\textsuperscript{28} The authors explained as follows:

For purposes of instruction it will, however, be convenient to treat first the principles which underlie successful conviction and then those which make for effective persuasion; but a reader should never forget that this separation is artificial and made wholly for pedagogic reasons.\textsuperscript{29}

Alden called conviction and persuasion "the two great divisions of argument."\textsuperscript{30} Laycock and Scales and Foster agreed that argumentation should include both processes.\textsuperscript{31} Evidence does not indicate, however, that these authors viewed a separation of the functions as "artificial." As Alden said:

These two elements, then, the power of reaching the reason, and the power of winning the disposition and moving the will, belong side by side in all successful debate. It is not that one part of a speech is given up to the one, and another part to the other; but

\textsuperscript{27}Baker, \textit{Principles}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{28}Baker and Huntington, \textit{Principles}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{30}Alden, \textit{Art of Debate}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{31}Laycock and Scales, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}, p. 4; Foster, \textit{Argumentation and Debating}, 1908 ed., p. 262.

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that the whole, both in matter and manner, is to be made to serve the ends of each.  

Agreement on conviction and persuasion as essential elements of argumentation was not universal. Though Baker, Alden, Laycock and Scales, and Foster called for a broad philosophical base for the discipline, the tendency persisted to restrict argumentation to matters of logic. In his text, The Essentials of Argumentation, Elias MacEwan, for example, viewed argumentation as "the process of proving or disproving a proposition." And in another early work, A Course in Argumentative Writing, Gertrude Buck examined the logical bases of argumentation in terms of the prevailing S-R psychological theory. Buck objected that "the means to attain the end remains unspecified" in

32 Alden, Art of Debate, p. 6. Alden also discussed the special characteristics of debate: "If argumentation is the art of convincing others of the truth or falsity of a disputed matter, debate may be said to be the art of doing this under conditions such that both sides of the case can be heard and that the advocates of each side can reply directly to those of the other," p. 1.

33 Their definitions of argumentation paralleled those found in the first edition of Baker's Principles. See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 6; Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 1; Foster's discussion followed that found in the Baker and Huntington revision. See Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 85.

both the Baker and MacEwan definitions, and he preferred to delineate argumentation as

the act of establishing in the mind of another person a conclusion which has become fixed in his own, by means of setting up in the other person's mind the train of thought which has previously led you to this conclusion.35

Formal and Applied Logic

In differentiating "Formal Logic" (logic treated as a science) from "Applied Logic" (the reasoning of "everyday" affairs), and in determining to "study Logic only in its practical application in controversy of whatever kind,"36 Baker relied on the pronouncements of the British philosopher Alfred Sidgwick. In the preface to The Process of Argument, Sidgwick had aimed for:

the extension of a knowledge of the more useful parts of Logic. It is written for those who are interested rather in the war against fallacy than in the grammatical inquiries which form so large a part of the Logic taught in the text-books.37

Baker quoted Sidgwick extensively to substantiate his own position that a knowledge of Formal Logic is not essential to careful study of argumentation.38 Two objections seemed particularly important to Baker: that the

37 Sidgwick, Process of Argument, preface.
38 Baker, Principles, pp. 21-25.
technical terms of Formal Logic are of little practical use; and that the discipline gives little help in distinguishing between sound and unsound inference. Baker also cited the work of W. Stanley Jevons, another philosopher intrigued with how man "commonly" reasons. Jevons' specific methodology, more traditional than Sidgwick's, found greater favor with Baker's followers, however, than with Baker.

Legal Procedure

Though Baker contended that to assume argumentation to be simply a legal method was to "mistake a species for the genus," he, nevertheless, admitted a close relationship between the disciplines. His belief that "the special knowledge necessary for a lawyer, depends upon, is surrounded by, knowledge of the universal methods of reasoning" harkened back to W. C. Robinson's distinctions:

Every issue in a cause [in law] presents two questions, either or both of which may be disputed. (1) What were the facts in which the controversy originated? (2) What are the

---

42 Ibid., p. 11.
rules of law by which, in view of these facts, the issue is to be determined. Baker further believed that

A complete treatise on Argumentation must . . . include a chapter on rules of law, . . . but it would be but a part of, and secondary to, a treatment of those principles upon which Argumentation universally depends.

Though aware of argumentation's debt to other disciplines, writers who followed Baker did not belabour the point. It was not, in fact, until the publication in 1917, of James M. O'Neill's revision of Laycock and Scales' *Argumentation and Debate*, that a full-fledged attempt at comparisons appeared. O'Neill not only discussed specific sources of theory in an introductory chapter to his work, but he also cited many "direct quotations from recognized authorities" throughout the text. His summary chart follows:

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Having detailed the nature of argumentation both by definition and by examining it in its habitat, Baker listed three conditions necessary for successful argument: "(1) What the question means; (2) What you believe about it, and why; (3) How you are to state your case so that (a) you shall convince, and (b) persuade." Corresponding to these three questions were Baker's three divisions of argumentative composition: analysis; study of the rules of evidence; and rhetorical structure and persuasion, the two parts of the third division. It is with these topics that the remainder of this chapter will be concerned.

Analysis

One of the most significant contributions of Principles was its exposition of argumentative analysis. For Baker, it was analysis which defined the question in dispute and set out the work to be done. Ten years after Principles first appeared, Baker and Huntington revised extensively Baker's original treatment of analysis. As a result of this "restating for greater accuracy and simplicity," Edward Z. Rowell observed that "this feature became one of the most valuable of the new discipline." The 1905 edition clarified the scope of analysis and, though reducing the number, developed more fully its specific "steps." While the Alden, and Laycock and Scales texts followed Baker's first probings, Foster benefited from the clarifications and extensions, as well as from the perspective, of the Baker and Huntington revision.

Baker delineated the nature of analysis in his first edition as follows:

To find out what the real point in dispute is, we must carefully examine the material we can collect in regard to the subject, and by placing on one side all the ideas upon which our opponent admits his readiness to agree with us; by excluding bit by bit all ideas that must be admitted to be irrelevant; by subordinating what is less important to what

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Baker set out "five important steps" in analysis in the first edition of Principles: finding propositions; defining them; determining a question's origin; discovering the "special issue"; and relating the central idea to ideas essential to a case. Baker and Huntington refined and revised the categories in their 1905 edition and included: phrasing the proposition; defining the terms; finding the special issues; and constructing the case.

The Proposition

For Baker, "the first work of analysis is to find out what is the real point at issue, on what it is that the basal difference of opinion rests." Distinguishing a term from a proposition, he counselled that one should

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51 Ibid., pp. 33-77.
53 Baker, Principles, p. 32.
54 Relying on Jevons' idea that, "A logical term may consist of any number of nouns, substantive or objective, with the articles, prepositions, and conjunctions
"seek first of all to find whether what he or his opponent wishes to treat argumentatively can be phrased as a proposition." 55

Though Laycock and Scales talked about "formulating a proposition," 56 and Baker and Huntington substituted the term phrasing for finding the proposition, neither discussion differed appreciably from Baker's earlier pronouncements. 57 It was, rather, Alden's treatment of the required to join them together," and following the reasoning that, "When we join terms together we make a proposition; when we join propositions together, we make argument, or piece of reasoning," Baker contended that "when we join the arguments, or pieces of reasoning together, we have Argumentation." W. S. Jevons, Primer of Logic (New York: Appleton and Company, 1878), pp. 12-15, cited in Baker, Principles, p. 33.

55Baker, Principles, p. 39. Baker defined a proposition as "an assertion in regard to a term or terms," p. 33. Laycock and Scales made a similar distinction, defining a proposition as "a statement that something is or is not." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 13. Whereas Baker was interested in both the analysis for and of a proposition, most writers who followed him treated the phrasing of a proposition as a step preliminary to analysis. Though Baker and Huntington's approach moved toward "phrasing," they, nevertheless, retained the organizational scheme of the first edition which placed finding the proposition as the first step in analysis.

56They set out specific methodology which corresponded to Baker's "steps" for analysis: finding out what is the real question at issue; "formulating the question in words"; and "comparing the meaning of the statement so expressed with the meaning of the real question in issue." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 17-27.

57They made some practical suggestions for choosing a topic which they relegated to a footnote. Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 19-20. They also suggested a conference to determine agreement on the meaning of the proposition, p. 404.
debate proposition that presaged new developments in theory.

Alden believed that the "subject for debate . . . must be such that it can be reduced to the form of a proposition; for a proposition is the only form of words which has two distinct sides, an affirmative and a negative."\(^5^8\) He further suggested that, "where accuracy is demanded, or where a decision . . . is to be rendered," a stated proposition "is almost necessary."\(^5^9\) Alden's influence lay, however, not in any original theoretical construct, but rather in the application of the concept of the proposition (as developed by logic and rhetoric) to debating. His specific prescriptions for stating or phrasing a proposition for debate, moreover, provided a rationale for subsequent systems of classifying propositions as well as criteria for "good" propositions.

**Classifying Propositions**

Though Alden had suggested the impossibility of classifying debatable questions "in any thoroughly systematic way," his own discussion of phrasing propositions

\(^{5^8}\)Alden, interested in practical debating, took "legal argument . . . as the basis for the general subject of debate." Alden, Art of Debate, pp. vi, 10.

\(^{5^9}\)Ibid., p. 11. Laycock and Scales determined that: "The proposition may be expressed or not as circumstances seem to require." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 15.
for debate foreshadowed later classification systems. He said:

The principal verb of the proposition will state the affirmative; if a negative word is added, it will state the negative. If the question is one of pure fact, the verb will commonly be the verb to be; if it is one of theory or policy, the verb will frequently be ought or some similar auxiliary.

James M. O'Neill recognized in 1917, that certain writers in argumentation had begun to classify propositions. He cited specifically the works of J. H. Gardiner and George K. Pattee. Gardiner had distinguished propositions of fact and propositions of policy practically, in terms of "the different form and degree of certitude to which they lead." He had anticipated, moreover, a third classification, questions of taste or value, when he observed: "Finally, there are the arguments of

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61 Alden, Art of Debate, p. 10.

62 O'Neill's observation that "A proposition of fact aims at belief, a proposition of policy aims at action," harkened back to questions of the philosophical bases of argumentation; i.e., the inclusion of action (persuasion) as an appropriate end of argumentation. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 19.

policy which deal with matters of taste and aesthetic preference."\(^{64}\)

Pattee made similar distinctions:

A common and convenient method of classification divides propositions into two groups: propositions of policy, and propositions of fact. The first class consists of those propositions that aim to prove the truth of a theory, that indicate a preference for a certain policy, for a certain method of action. The second class comprises those propositions that affirm or deny the occurrence of an event, or the existence of a fact. Propositions of policy usually, but not always, contain the word should or ought; propositions of fact usually contain some form of the word to be.\(^{65}\)

O'Neill stated his own position as follows:

But since most arguments of policy rest upon questions of fact, since many questions can be so phrased as to fit either type without altering materially the nature of the case, and since the work to be done in finding, phrasing, supporting, or attacking, is practically the same for both kinds of propositions, it is hardly worthwhile to try to make much of this classification. It is wise,

\(^{64}\)Ibid., p. 23. Aware of the interrelationship of the various kinds of propositions, Gardiner said: "In practice these three kinds of arguments, which turn on moral, practical, and aesthetic considerations, tend to be much mingled. . . . Furthermore, one must never forget that an argument of policy which does not involve and react on subsidiary questions of fact is rare; and the questions of fact must be settled before we can go on with the argument of policy. . . . On the other hand, there are some cases of questions of fact in which our practical interests deeply affect the view which we take of the facts. . . . Yet the distinction between the two main classes is a real one, and if one has never thought it out, one may go at an argument with a blurred notion of what he is attempting to do," pp. 24-25.

however, to decide, among other things, whether we are arguing facts (as such) or policies, before planning our argument.\textsuperscript{66}

**Characteristics of "Good" Propositions**

Alden had recommended avoiding propositions which are obvious, which depend on ambiguous terminology, and which are difficult to demonstrate or involve more than one issue.\textsuperscript{67} These suggestions, along with the following prescriptions for wording a proposition, appeared in later works as "characteristics" or "qualities" of "good" propositions. Alden advised that:

Propositions for debate should be worded so that the affirmative will be under the first responsibility of proof, should be as brief as may be consistent with exactness, should make the issues involved as distinct as possible, and should avoid every appearance of partiality.\textsuperscript{68}

Foster's "requirements" of a proposition suggest similar standards:

1. The proposition should be debatable.
2. The proposition should not employ ambiguous terms.
3. The proposition should not be too broad.


\textsuperscript{67}Alden, *Art of Debate*, pp. 11-17. Alden noted that some propositions have little interest for an audience. See also Baker and Huntington, *Principles*, pp. 398-401.

\textsuperscript{68}Alden, *Art of Debate*, p. 22.
4. The proposition should embody one central idea.
5. The proposition should give to the affirmative the burden of proof.
6. The proposition should be interesting.
7. The proposition for first practice should cover familiar ground.
8. The proposition should be phrased briefly and simply.  

O'Neill's "desirable characteristics or qualities of a good proposition," admittedly similar to Foster's and Ketcham's criteria, follow: propositions for debate are stated as an assertion; are single, unambiguous, unprejudiced, brief, simple, concrete, and specific; place burden of proof on affirmative; and are debatable and interesting.  

Definition

Baker believed that central to determining whether a proposition "phrased the matter really in dispute," is an investigation of:

(1) What the terms in each proposition mean, and hence the proposition as a whole; and

69 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 3-12; 1917 rev. ed., pp. 3-11.
whether this meaning of the whole proposition states the question calling for debate. . . . When, then, the meaning of the terms of a proposition, or of a proposition as a whole, is not self-evident, definition is the second important step in analysis.\textsuperscript{72}

Baker relied on traditional rhetorical distinctions in discussing this "step," his criteria for a "good" definition\textsuperscript{73} not differing significantly from those included in contemporary composition texts.\textsuperscript{74} Baker believed that:

In defining we shall be forced very often to turn aside from the dictionaries and by search in essays, books by specialists, in our own experience, by careful examination of the words, and by thought upon them, to reach through analogy, exemplification, analysis of the word, detailed description, iteration, antithesis, their real meaning.\textsuperscript{75}

Agreeing that "definitions should have reference not to theoretical meanings, but to the meaning of the words under the circumstances," Alden suggested turning to "the sources, surroundings, and present conditions of the subject discussed."\textsuperscript{76} Meanwhile, Laycock and Scales

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{72}Baker, Principles, p. 40.
  \item \textsuperscript{73}Baker included clarity, convincingness, brevity and "should not . . . define in a circle, . . . beg the question." Ibid., pp. 44-49. See Henry N. Day, Elements of the Art of Rhetoric (New York: Barnes and Burr, 1850); Adams Sherman Hill, The Principles of Rhetoric (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1878).
  \item \textsuperscript{74}Baker specifically acknowledged an indebtedness to Genung's system of classification. Baker, Principles, p. viii.
  \item \textsuperscript{75}Ibid., p. 59.
  \item \textsuperscript{76}Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 33-34.
\end{itemize}
devised specific methodology for "testing the meaning of the proposition." They advised:

First, find its ordinary acceptation. Second, determine whether it may have any meaning that is technical or in any way peculiar. . . . Third, even after the definition is obtained from a good authority, consider the questions: Are the terms of this definition that I have found exact? Are there any exceptions to the general statement?  

"Defining the terms" received increased attention in the 1905 revision of Principles of Argumentation. Casting around for an alternative to dictionary meanings, Baker and Huntington suggested defining from the history of the question and incorporated a study of the origin of the question, 78 the immediate cause for discussion, and clash of opinion into this "safer method." 79 Though

77 Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 25.

78 In his first edition, Baker had contended that "some study of the origin of the question" is involved in defining the terms of a proposition, and called it the "third, if subordinate, step in analysis." He elaborated: "In accepting the definitions as not merely clear but as satisfactory for our purposes, we test them, by examining the origin of the question, to see whether the definitions give to the proposition as a whole a meaning that phrases the general question we wish to discuss." Baker, Principles, pp. 67, 70. This distinction was dropped as a separate "step" in the 1905 revision. Foster, however, treated the history of a question and its origin as separate steps in analysis, comparable to definition. Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 18-24. He added "the immediate cause for discussion" in his revision, 1917 rev. ed., p. 22.

79 Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 26-40. They noted two other classes of topics, those on which there is not much printed matter and questions not
reiterating the criteria of the first edition, Baker and Huntington clarified the relationship of definition to argumentation as follows:

It is advisable to remember the essentials of any good definition: clearness, convincingness, and as much brevity as the other two qualities permit. The definition must be clear and convincing, not merely to the writer but to his audience; for the aim in any discussion is, of course, to make the interpretation of the question by opponent or audience coincide with that of the writer.\(^{80}\)

Baker and Huntington also suggested that a preliminary definition of terms helps rid the discussion of vagueness and of technical terms and avoids confusion from ambiguousness.

Foster agreed that clearness\(^ {81}\) and convincingness are essential in formal debate. Believing, moreover, that "a dictionary definition is at best but a nucleus or discussed before. In the first instance, they pointed out that if men known to hold opposing views on the questions are interrogated, "immediate cause, origin, and clash will promptly develop, and, as a consequence, the needed definition." In the other case, Baker and Huntington pointed out that "the chief difference between this kind of question and the other two classes is that in it the definitions used may not arise from the question itself," p. 37.

\(^{80}\)Ibid., pp. 37-38. Alden had earlier suggested that "words should never be allowed to obscure the real question." Alden, Art of Debate, p. 34.

\(^{81}\)Foster listed six requisites of clearness in definition: cover all cases included; exclude all cases excluded; be simple; not employ terms to be defined; stated positively; be as brief as possible. Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 26. Foster deleted the last two of these criteria in his revision, 1917 rev. ed., p. 29.
core, which must be supplemented and amplified and explained," he offered the following "special methods of definition": etymology; authority; negation; exemplification; and explication. O'Neill isolated two purposes of definition in argumentation:

It serves, first, to enable the writer, in the beginning of his work in preparation, to find out the real meaning of the question. Secondly, it serves to make the meaning clear to the reader or hearer.

Satisfied with the sufficiency of Laycock and Scales's distinctions for the first purpose, O'Neill nevertheless advised additional methods of definition for the second. He included authority, etymological derivation, context, analogy, illustration, exclusion, and analysis.

Issues

Discovering Issues

Baker identified the fourth step of analysis,


84O'Neil, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 300.

85O'Neil included examples from speeches to demonstrate the various approaches to definition. See O'Neil, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 300-307.
finding the special issue in a case, as follows:

In every case . . . there is one central idea, or group of ideas, about which the others centre. To prove this central idea, or group of ideas, to be true or false, is to win the case for the affirmative or the negative . . . . That is the special issue in the case. As we answer it affirmatively or negatively, the case is settled for one side or the other; on this question the debate turns. 86

One discovers issues, Baker further suggested, by settling what facts are admitted by both sides, and by cutting out extraneous ideas. 87 Both Alden, and Laycock and Scales 88 built on that analysis. Insisting that "the work of analysis clearly presupposes a full understanding of the question on both sides," 89 Alden enlarged the scope of analysis to include

not only the questions, Just what does the proposition maintain? and, What must chiefly be shown in order to prove the truth of

86 Baker, Principles, p. 70.
87 Ibid., pp. 74-77.
88 Alden defined the "main issue" as "that which it is chiefly necessary to prove, in order to prove the whole proposition." He suggested that "it is found by discarding all minor matters connected with the question, and fixing the attention upon that which properly forms the central portion of the argument." Alden, Art of Debate, p. 35. Laycock and Scales suggested that "the issues are the ideas or matters of fact upon the establishment of which depends the establishment of the proposition." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 28.

it? but also, What objections are made to it? and, How far are the objections significant? Laycock and Scales, moreover, added to Baker's distinctions those of certain other contemporary writers. Their discussion of "stress of the controversy," for example, reflected the influence of John Ward's System of Oratory, while their treatment of "primary" and "subordinate" issues came chiefly from Robinson's Forensic Oratory. From these sources, Laycock and Scales derived a clear statement

90 Alden, Art of Debate, p. 43.

91 Laycock and Scales said: "In any discussion the 'stress of the controversy' inevitably falls upon the proving or disproving of a few points, which are the centre and soul of the question; whichever side wins in the struggle over these points wins the whole contest. These points are always the same in the same question: they exist independently of the wills of the disputants; they are to be discovered, not invented. These facts are the issues." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 29-30.

92 Laycock and Scales cited John Ward's distinctions: "But in all disputes it is of greatest consequence to observe where the stress of the controversy lies. For, without attending to this, persons may cavil about different matters, without understanding each other or deciding anything." John Ward, System of Oratory (London: J. Ward, 1759), cited in Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 29.

93 For the influence of Robinson see Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 30. Laycock and Scales also investigated the relationship of subordinate to primary issues ("issues are related directly to the proposition; the subordinate issues, indirectly") and concluded: "In selecting the issues, then, points should be chosen which are nearly equal in value to one another, and which are of such a nature that all the evidence and arguments that it is desirable to use in the case can be logically grouped around them," pp. 39-40.
of methodology for determining the issues which emphasized the "direct clash of opinion."\textsuperscript{94}

In their 1905 revision of \textit{Principles}, Baker and Huntington appropriated the term "clash in opinion" to describe "the most essential part of analysis," that which provides the special issues.\textsuperscript{95}

\textit{By . . . exclusion from the clash in opinion, of all extraneous, admitted, waived, and granted matter, the investigator reaches a set of statements all of which directly or indirectly are essential to the discussion of the question.}\textsuperscript{96}

From the clash, they reasoned, one "will find at least part of the definition of terms; from it he will draw first, the ideas essential in the case, and finally, the special issues themselves."\textsuperscript{97} Foster's discussion followed suit:

\textit{After the meaning of the proposition has thus been set forth with clearness and precision, and with satisfaction to the audience, and after the extraneous matters have been ruled out and the admitted matters stated, the

\textsuperscript{94}To summarize, in finding the issues: (1) put aside all matters that are not related directly to the proposition; (2) but be sure to understand the question in all its phases and all its details; (3) know both sides of the question thoroughly; (4) exclude all irrelevant matter and all matter that each side can admit without damaging its cause; (5) select the points on which there is a direct clash of opinion between the opposing sides or which cannot be admitted by the one side or the other; (6) discriminate between the issues and the subordinate issues; (7) study the origin and history of the question." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{95}Baker and Huntington, \textit{Principles}, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{96}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{97}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 58.
next step is the terse, impartial, and complete enumeration of the arguments which may be held on the affirmative and those which may be held on the negative. The Clash of Opinion thus presented will reveal . . . the issues of the proposition. The main issues are the controversial points which, if proved, directly support the proposition. The subordinate issues are the controversial points which, if proved, indirectly support the proposition by directly supporting the main issues.  

O'Neill's revision of Laycock and Scales's theory of issues, though subtle, was significant. The issues, O'Neill said, 

are not simply "important main points," or "points on which there is a clash of opinion." They are the smallest possible divisions of crucial points, each one of which the affirmative must establish in order to establish the proposition.  

O'Neill minimized "clash" as a method for determining issues but continued to advise excluding unimportant and indirect matter.  

Stock Issues

Though the application of common questions to propositions is not a new phenomenon, to suggest that 

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100 For O'Neill's system of finding issues, see ibid., pp. 58-66.

101 See historical background in Lenore Evans, "The Development of the Concept of Analysis by Modern Writers on
stasis in classical rhetorical theory is the same as stock issues of modern argumentation and debate theory probably is to overstate the case. Modern stock issues have operated in many cases not as a method for discovering issues but, rather, as the issues or at least the major points in partition. One of the earliest argumentation writers to advocate applying stock issues to debate propositions, J. R. Pelsma, implied such a position when he suggested that analysis can be lessened by using a special formula of standard issues. He and Henry Bainbridge Gough published separate, though similar, such "formulae" in the November, 1917, issue of the Public Speaking Review. Pelsma said:

When a proposition is up for debate, it usually, if not always, rises from an attempt to remedy some manifest evil; ... It is obvious, therefore, that those in favor of the measure must establish two points, namely:
1. That there are such defects or evils, and
2. That the proposed measure will remedy the defects or cure the evils. If these two points can be established beyond a reasonable doubt, he has gained his purpose; for pray, what else is there to prove?


102 For a discussion of the relation of the issues to the partition, see section on Brief-Drawing.


To some questions a third point is manifest—the practicability. However, it may be plainly seen that this point would logically be included under our second division; but at times it is advisable, especially when there are three debaters on a side, to make it a separate issue.  

Pelsma outlined as follows:

The affirmative proves:
1. Cause for action, or
   Evils in present system, or
   Necessity for change.
2. Method of action, or
   Remedy for evils, or
   Feasibility of plan.
3. Best plan.
   Practicability of method, and

The negative proves:
1. No adequate cause for action, or
   Evils do not exist, or
   No necessity for changes proposed.
2. Method not adequate, or
   Evils incurable, or
   Plan not adequate.
3. Method not practicable, or
   Better plan.

Gough's listing was similar:

A. Formula for the Affirmative
1. Is it (the proposed policy or solution) necessary?
2. Will it be efficient (practical)?
3. Will it prove superior?

B. Formula for the Negative
1. Is the existing policy or condition

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106 Ibid., p. 3. Pelsma recognized, however, the following limitations: "The issues enumerated above do not carry equal weight in every question. The amount of time placed on the various issues will depend on the nature of the question. But if the proposition be a good debatable one and be stated affirmatively, the outline suggested can, with very little modification, be adopted in nineteen out of twenty cases, and all minor points will fall logically under one of the six special issues," pp. 3-4.
inherently evil?
2. Could the evil be removed and the present plan thus perfected?
3. Would the present policy or method of treatment thus perfected be superior to the one proposed by the affirmative? 107

O'Neill was among the first to include stock issues in a textbook on argumentation. Recognizing the impossibility of finding formulae "that can be applied to all different kinds of questions," 108 he, nevertheless, suggested that stock issues might provide a "start" in analyzing propositions of policy. 109 O'Neill further considered it "unsafe" to accept stock issues as "the exact issues."

Why?

First, because analysis may show a more specific and concrete wording for these general questions. . . . Second, and principally, because on accurate analysis it may be found that one of these questions . . . will break up into say three questions, each of which must be proved by the affirmative. 110


109 O'Neill listed two stock issues: "(1) Is the present unsatisfactory? Are there evils in the existing situation? Is there a cause for action? Is there a disease? Do we need a change? etc. (2) Is the proposed action an improvement? Will it cure the evils? Is this the action we should take? Is this the proper remedy? Is the proposed change the right one?" O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 56-57.

110 Ibid., p. 57. The essential test of an issue was, for O'Neill, that it be vital. He also distinguished issues from points of partition.
Case

In the first edition of Principles, Baker labeled the fifth step of analysis "to find the relation to the central idea of ideas essential in the case." 111

Or, to put it differently, we must decide what ideas are to be proved true, and in what order, if the special issue is to be settled as we wish. 112

Baker used an historical example to show the relation of the issues in a given case, but he gave no specific methods for determining the structure of the material in a proposition.

In their 1905 revision, though Baker and Huntington continued to treat "constructing the case" as a step in analysis, they devoted less than a page to its discussion, simply saying:

Even, however, as a student takes the three steps in analysis,—phrasing the proposition, defining the terms, and finding the special issues,—he acquires material which may be used to support his views or to combat his opponent's ideas. He must next learn how to value all this correctly, and how to mass it about his special issues so as to give it the strongest presentation. In this construction of a case a knowledge of evidence and a knowledge of brief-drawing are essential. 113

Many "early period" writers treated case in terms of brief-drawing. Though most outlined the work of

111 Baker, Principles, p. 77.
112 Ibid.
113 Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 60.
individual speakers in a debate, they did not call it case. These prescriptions appear, therefore, in a later section of this chapter which examines the forensic.

O’Neill included one of the first modern treatments of case in his 1917 revision of the Laycock-Scales text. He laid out, though sketchily, the work of the affirmative and examined negative alternatives. Regarding the affirmative "case" he said:

The work of the affirmative in a debate differs somewhat from that of the negative. The affirmative has the burden of proof in all properly worded questions. The affirmative case then must establish the affirmative of all issues—all potential issues not admitted by the negative. The question should be analyzed to find the issues... Then a partition should be decided upon that will back up the affirmative of all issues on which there is a fight.114

O’Neill also outlined four "types" of negative case:

1. Pure refutation. The first, and weakest, negative is a case of pure refutation. The negative simply attacks what the affirmative offers and seeks to destroy it without taking any responsibility for "the situation."... It is simple denial. It is simply resting on their presumption and trying by pure refutation to prevent the affirmative from establishing a prima facie case... This type should never be used when there is any good or truth at all in the affirmative contentions. It is practically never found in contest debating.

2. Defense of the present. The second type of negative is a positive "defense of the present" (in addition to refutation of

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course). The affirmative is wrong because no change is needed at all. . . . This is little better than pure refutation of the affirmative, but does have the added element of actually defending the negative presumptions. . . .

3. Adjustment. The third case is one of adjustment, repairs, some changes, but not an adoption of the affirmative case. It is a liberal view of the situation, ready to make what changes are necessary. Admitting the present is not perfect, but still denying that the affirmative is right, it substantially defends the present. This is a very common type of negative in contest debating and everywhere else. This case is also cumulative, adding "repairs" to "defense" and "refutation."

4. Counter proposition. The most radical case possible for a negative is that of a counter proposition. This is admitting that there is a situation which demands remedy, admitting a cause for action, but advocating a different remedy. . . . There are two principles that must always be lived up to in this case: (a) The counter proposition must be stated with perfect clearness. The negative has to take the burden of proof on this proposition, and for safety and clearness the proposition must be carefully worded and stated. (b) A counter proposition must be counter. It must be inconsistent with the proposition of the affirmative. 115

The Brief

The Nature of the Brief

Argumentation and debate writers appropriated the term, brief, 116 from law to distinguish "a particular kind

115 Ibid., pp. 377-78.

116 Warren C. Shaw felt that claims for the brief were over-estimated insofar as providing systematic analysis of debating problems. Shaw said: "As a means for
of plan or summary that shall have the greatest possible
clearness of exposition with the least number of words." 117

Baker viewed the brief as an outgrowth of analysis. He said:

Study of analysis has shown that the process of finding what is the question to be discussed and what the work to be done gradually develops in our minds a rough diagram of the field we are to cover. We learn that there is one essential idea, or one essential group of ideas, to prove true or false, and that a variable number of other ideas bear certain relations to the special issue and to one another, and must be taken up with some regard for this fact. It is evident that to put this inherent structure on paper must help us in gathering evidence, for we shall know what proof will be needed first, and shall have pockets, so to speak, into which we may put evidence bearing on the idea with which each pocket is labeled. 118

For Baker, this plan "must . . . be something that will make a person who has not given any special thought to the securing system in the arrangement of arguments, the brief, of course, is invaluable; but as a means for securing systematic analysis of the problem that is to be briefed, it does scarcely more than to emphasize the necessity of finding what we are looking for. To be sure, it makes all-important the discovery of the issues; and it requires that all material shall be tested by its relevancy to these issues; but it does not really help us in the practical operations of analysis, because it does not tell us how to find the issues. The brief really presupposes that the work of analysis has been done, and it is in itself the means of preserving in crystallized form the thought that has been analyzed." Warren C. Shaw, "Systematic Analysis of Debating Problems," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, II (October, 1916), 344.

118 Ibid., p. 83.
case in question see exactly what is to be discussed and
effectively what the student wishes to do with it."\textsuperscript{119}

It must tell the examiner what the question
is: must, that is, state the proposition;
make clear in what sense important terms are
used; show him the origin of the question;
by making him understand what is generally
admitted in regard to the subject and what
matter usually associated with it is really
extraneous, put the special issue before him;
and make him see clearly what relations the
other ideas bear to the main idea and to one
another. That is, it must convey to another
person just the information that the writer of
the plan found it necessary to gain before he
could treat his topic intelligently. Moreover,
this outline must convey to a reader an
idea of the general treatment the writer
intends to give the structure just mapped
out, an idea, that is, of the nature of his
evidence.\textsuperscript{120}

Most early writers accepted Baker's rationale of
brief-drawing.\textsuperscript{121} They agreed, moreover, that the forensic
was "really but an expansion of the brief itself."\textsuperscript{122} It
was not until 1917 with the revision of Laycock and
Scales's earlier work that O'Neill clearly separated the
brief from the outline of a given speech.\textsuperscript{123} The major
developments which culminated in this split follow.

\textsuperscript{119}Ibid., p. 84.
\textsuperscript{120}Ibid., pp. 84-85.
\textsuperscript{121}See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 52; Laycock and
Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 141; Foster, Argumenta-
\textsuperscript{122}Baker, Principles, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{123}O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 211.
Alden believed that the outline or brief "will put into visible form the results of analysis"; i.e., "the one or two principle points to be proved," these points providing "the main headings of the outline." He suggested three reasons why an outline is important: it maps the argument; it frees the faculties "for the perfecting of phraseology"; it helps make the structure of the argument clear to an audience.

Recognizing that "it is all too easy to confuse the issues with . . . a partition," Laycock and Scales made the following distinction:

A partition . . . is a statement of the points the arguer intends to prove; the issues are the points he must prove in order to prove his case. If the points of the partition are well chosen, they will usually correspond closely with the issues; but they may be entirely different, and they are not in any case necessarily identical.

Foster perceived the brief to be "an outline guide" with the following functions:

With one good look at his brief, a writer sees his whole work in its broad aspects; he understands the relation of parts; he perceives the right arrangement of the main divisions, and he is able to develop them one by one. He is

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124 Alden did not distinguish between the terms brief and outline though he used both when discussing a plan for argument. Alden, Art of Debate, p. 52.

125 Ibid., pp. 50-51.

126 Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 43-44.
constantly guided by his brief in the selection and rejection of material. It warns him when he is in danger of inserting evidence out of its place, or of omitting evidence necessary to the proof. Finally, the brief serves as a test of the firmness and logical sequence of the finished structure.127

In a chapter entitled "Developing the Argument from the Brief: Relation of the Brief to the Complete Argument," Foster suggested that "the relation of the brief to the complete written argument may best be seen by observing them side by side."128 From his "specimen," it is clear that Foster perceived "the argument" to be merely a development of the headings in a brief.129

Though relying on Laycock and Scales's earlier distinctions that "the completed brief should contain nearly all the proof of the whole case,"130 and though recognizing that "it sometimes happens that . . . the brief itself may be the presentation of our argument,"131 O'Neill nevertheless viewed the brief as "impersonal" and

127 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 192.
128 Ibid., p. 219. Foster recommended an exchange of briefs between opposing teams.
129 Ibid., pp. 220-42. In his 1917 revision, Foster limited his discussion of developing the argument from the brief to "principles and qualities of style," 1917 rev. ed., pp. 243-56.
advocated making an outline for a given speech. He said:

In drawing up the outline the speaker should always keep his particular audience in mind, and adapt his speech carefully to the audience which he must meet. In preparing an argumentative speech one may differ from the order of the brief as much as is desirable. It is a mistake to suppose that a brief is always a good outline for a speech. As a matter of fact it is rarely if ever so. An outline of almost any great argument will not coincide with a brief of the material in the argument. This is as it should be.

**Formulae for Brief-Drawing**

Baker's specific method of brief-drawing was based on the system "developed during the last five years of the work in forensics at Harvard College." The essential tenets of this system are enunciated in the following discussion.

For Baker, a good brief ordinarily had three divisions: the introduction; the brief proper; and the conclusion. In the 1895 edition of *Principles*, he outlined the functions of those divisions:

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132 "The brief is determined by the nature of the impersonal case which it is possible to build up on our side of the proposition; the speech outline (or the speech) is determined by the kind of presentation (both in substance and order) which it is most desirable to make to a particular audience or set of judges." *Ibid.*, p. 213.


The Introduction should state as concisely as possible, by suggestive phrases of a line or two, the facts necessary to an understanding of the discussion: namely, how the question arose; what are the facts admitted by both sides; and, by definition and exposition, what is the exact point at issue. It should clear away all extraneous matter and should place the essential idea, or group of ideas, clearly before the reader. 136

The Brief Proper should, by a series of headings and sub-headings, very concisely make clear . . . the development of the argument by which the writer expects to prove the affirmative or the negative of the question he has clearly stated in the Introduction. The writer should first select the main ideas that prove his conclusion. These he should arrange so that his plan shall show the relations they naturally bear to one another and to the essential idea or group of ideas. In arranging the material he should as far as possible regard climax . . . All the main headings and sub-headings should read as reasons for the conclusion. The correlation of all the parts should be distinctly marked by letters and numbers.137

136 Baker suggested that "the test of an introduction to a brief is that it shall supply a reader with whatever information must be needed by him, if he is to read the brief proper understandingly." Ibid., p. 92. He also insisted that the brief includes "only what both sides must admit to be true," p. 108.

137 Summarizing his discussion of the brief proper, Baker set forth the basic principles and procedures followed by later writers. He said: "In the brief proper, then, a student should state clearly and very succinctly the ideas by which he hopes to prove the correctness of his opinion. Separating direct proof from general refutation, . . . he should phrase his ideas as reasons and connect them by for and because. Vagueness in phrasing and in transitions from idea to idea he must carefully avoid. He must so correlate his ideas that their correct relationships one to another will be clear at a glance. He should remember that one letter or number is enough for one idea. He should break up and correlate crowded headings. As far as possible he should aim at climax in arranging his material." Ibid., p. 150.
The Conclusion simply sums up briefly the argument, showing clearly how it has led to a decision in the case. This decision—unless it is given at the beginning of the Brief Proper as the proposition—should always be stated.138

Laycock and Scales systematically enumerated rules for brief-drawing.139 In their revision, Baker and Huntington also tabulated criteria which "should be memorized and in the class room may be referred to by number." That listing follows:

GENERAL

I. A brief should be divided into three parts, marked "Introduction," "Brief Proper," and "Conclusion."

II. Ideas should be phrased in complete statements, arranged in headings and subheadings.

III. The relation of each idea to every other should be indicated by means of numbers, letters, or other symbols.

IV. A change of symbol should always denote a change of relation.

V. Headings or subheadings should never be marked twice.

INTRODUCTION

VI. The Introduction should contain all the information necessary for an intelligent reading of the Brief Proper.

VII. The Introduction should always contain a statement of the Special Issues.

VIII. In the Introduction ideas bearing upon the truth or the falsity of the proposition in dispute should be so phrased as not to produce immediate discussion.

IX. In the Introduction the connectives "for" and "because" should be avoided.

138 Ibid., p. 86.

139 Laycock and Scales listed general rules for brief-drawing along with specialized ones for the introduction, brief proper, and conclusion. See Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 142-80.
BRIEF PROPER

X. In the Brief Proper every main heading should read as proof of the truth of the proposition, and every subheading as proof of the truth of the heading to which it is subordinate, never as mere explanation.

XI. The relation between subheadings or series of subheadings and their headings is never expressed by "hence" or "therefore," but by "for" or "because."

XII. Subheadings should be arranged in the order of climax, unless this order violates the logical order.

XIII. Each heading or subheading should contain but a single proposition.

XIV. Refutation should be so phrased as to make the objection perfectly clear.

XV. Refutation of objections, not to the proposition, but to details of proof, should meet such objections where they arise.

CONCLUSION

XVI. The Conclusion should state concisely the steps by which the decision is reached.

XVII. The Conclusion should never contain new evidence.

XVIII. The decision should never qualify the proposition but should be an affirmation or denial of it in its original form.140

Early period writers failed to depart significantly from Baker's system of brief-drawing. Some substitutions of terms occurred.141 Various rules were qualified, rephrased, or shifted from one section to another,142 and a few new criteria appeared. In his 1917 revision, Foster

140 Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 256-57.

141 Laycock and Scales called the "brief proper" discussion, while Foster termed it proof.

prescribed: "When two or more statements do not stand in
the relation of proposition and proof, but as coordinate
parts of one piece of evidence, this relationship should
be shown by symbols."\(^{143}\) And, under "general rules,"
O'Neill added:

> Every coordinate series of statements should
> be arranged in order of climax, unless this
> violates time order in expository matter or
> logical order in argumentative matter.\(^{144}\)

O'Neill also suggested that "all references and sources of
information should be accurately stated in the brief, on
the same page on which the information is given."\(^{145}\)

**Proof**

**Burden of Proof**

Though rhetoricians had applied the legal phrases
"burden of proof" and "presumption" to argumentation at
least since the time of Whatley,\(^{146}\) Baker largely ignored
the concepts, simply distinguishing presumption from
assumption in a footnote in a section on residues.\(^{147}\)


\(^{144}\) O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, *Argumentation and
Debate*, p. 213.

\(^{145}\) *Ibid.* O'Neill introduced the "parallel column"
brief which set out affirmative and negative issues,


\(^{147}\) Baker relied, moreover, on the definition of
Adams S. Hill who defined presumption as occurring when a
proposition "is assumed to be true in the absence of proof
was rather Raymond Alden who gave the terms currency in
the new discipline and identified them with debating.
Believing that legal definitions "are perfectly applicable.
. . . to the question of 'burden of proof' in the debate
of ordinary life," Alden turned to legal opinions and legal
treatises. 148 He relied particularly on the distinctions
of J. B. Thayer who suggested:

In legal discussion, this phrase, "the
burden of proof" is used in several ways. It
marks (1) the peculiar duty of him who has the
risk of any given proposition on which parties
are at issue,—who will lose the case if he
does not make that proposition out, when all
has been said and done. . . . (2) It stands
for the duty . . . of going forward in argu­
ment or in producing evidence; whether at the
beginning of a case or at any later moment
throughout the trial or the discussion.
(3) There is an undiscriminated use of the
phrase, perhaps more common than either of the
other two, in which it may mean either or both
of the others. 149

Alden tended to equivocate on the controversial
issue of whether burden of proof shifts. Though pointing
out that "in one sense of the term, the disputant on whom
rests the burden of proof must cheerfully accept it, and
never forget or attempt to evade the responsibility," 150

149 James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1896-1898), cited in Alden, Art of Debate,
150 Alden, Art of Debate, p. 67.
he recognized that "on the other hand, as in law, there is a sense in which the burden of proof may shift back and forth."\(^{151}\) Alden summarized his position as follows:

Briefly to recapitulate: the burden of proof is, in the first place, the obligation resting upon the affirmative to prove the proposition it lays down at the outset,—an obligation which it never escapes; and, in the second place, the obligation of either disputant to produce proof at any moment when, in the absence of such proof, the other side would be judged to be in the right. In a word, it is simply the demand of the audience: Show your proof, if we are to believe!\(^{152}\)

Alden's approach had much influence.\(^{153}\) Baker and Huntington, for example, followed his distinctions, even citing his authorities, in their 1905 revision of *Principles*.\(^{154}\) Foster, moreover, stated that "the proposition should be so phrased as to place the burden of

\(^{151}\)Ibid. Alden went on to point out that "at the close of his argument, then, a *prima facie* case will have to be made for his [affirmative's] side, and the burden will be upon the negative to show why his claim cannot be maintained," p. 67. He further suggested that: "In a sense, of course, any proof offered by the affirmative at the opening of a debate, is a means of shifting the burden of proof; but very commonly the most convenient method of doing so is to establish a presumption in favor of the proposition by showing that it is more reasonable, on the face of it, than the opponents have supposed," pp. 69-70.

\(^{152}\)Ibid., pp. 75-76.

\(^{153}\)Laycock and Scales avoided the whole issue of "shift." They simply advised that "the burden of establishing the truth of any statement rests upon the person who originally makes the assertion." Laycock and Scales, *Argumentation and Debate*, pp. 62-63.

proof upon the affirmative and make the presumption in favor of the negative" though he recognized that "the burden of proof and presumption vary with time and place."¹⁵⁵ Foster agreed that "all argument is intended to shift the actual burden of proof,"¹⁵⁶ but decried the use of technicalities to accomplish this end. He believed that much too much had been made of burden of proof and presumption in debating.¹⁵⁷ Hugh Wells did not agree, arguing rather that burden of proof should be the most significant factor in determining the outcome of a debate. Wells queried:

Why is it impossible to see who wins a debate? Why is it difficult for a judge who is experienced in weighing evidence to follow the shifting burden of the issue and to determine whether the burden of proof has been carried successfully?

The difficulty arises from the fact that these burdens are not clearly defined.

The "burden of proof" is the duty resting upon the affirmative to establish a prima facie case in respect of the main proposition, by a preponderance of the evidence and rests upon the affirmative throughout. It does not shift. This burden is not onerous, for it only requires the establishing of a prima facie case, and the maintenance of that case to the end of the debate. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

"The burden of the issue" is the duty resting intermittently upon both the affirmative and the negative to produce evidence in respect of the subsidiary questions arising out of the main proposition. Issues are the

¹⁵⁵Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 282.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., p. 283.

¹⁵⁷Ibid.
subsidiary questions which arise out of and are inherent in the main proposition. As is said by Professor Ketcham, on page 29 of his work upon Argumentation and Debate:

"The burden of proof never 'shifts'; it is duty of producing evidence which 'shifts.'" 158

Though O'Neill recognized the two legal denotations of the term "burden of proof," he limited its meaning in argumentation to the "risk of the proposition." 159 As such, he precluded the shifting of the burden of proof, introducing, rather, into argumentation the phrase "burden of rebuttal" 160 invented by Dean H. W. Ballentine, a legal writer. 161 O'Neill summarized as follows:

1. The burden of proof, then, always rests upon the actual affirmative.
2. The affirmative is the party who will lose if no evidence or argument is offered— if nothing is done. The affirmative is the dissatisfied party, the one who wants a change, the attacking party.
3. Care must be taken that propositions be so phrased that the actual affirmative and nominal affirmative coincide, that the affirmation of the proposition is actually

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159 O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 35.
160 Ibid. O'Neill contended that: "The duty of going forward with evidence or argument at any given time, of course, may shift from time to time in the course of the trial or discussion. But the proper term to apply to this shifting burden is neither 'burden of proof' nor 'duty of going forward,' but 'burden of rebuttal.' This 'burden of rebuttal' may shift."
taken by the one upholding the burden of the controversy. . . .

4. When the affirmative has carried its burden of proof sufficiently to establish a prima facie case, it has created for the negative a burden of rebuttal.

5. The burden of rebuttal (a more accurate term than "the duty of going forward with argument or evidence") may shift from side to side during the conduct of the debate.\textsuperscript{162}

The Nature of Proof

Law, logic, and rhetoric provided the concepts of evidence and reasoning inherent in most modern approaches to argumentative proof. Difficulties arose early, however, over the "proper" relationship of the elements of proof. In the first edition of \textit{Principles}, Baker relied on the definition of a contemporary legal writer, William Best, who determined proof to be "anything which serves, either immediately or mediately, to convince the mind of the truth or the falsehood of a fact or proposition."\textsuperscript{163} Baker reflected briefly on the relation of evidence to proof and then turned to a discussion of evidence. In his chapter on "Evidence," he contended:

\begin{quote}
Whatever, then, a writer or speaker offers in support of his statements--quotations, logical deductions, skillful analysis, illustrations, figures, etc., etc.--is, taken as a whole, his proof of their truth. Each portion of his
\end{quote}


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proof is evidence, for the latter is "that which generates proof. Any matter of fact, the effect, tendency, or design of which is to produce in the mind a persuasion affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence of some other matter of fact. 164

Recognizing that "the attempt to classify processes of proof has always been the bugbear of students of argumentation," Alden postulated that "reduced to its lowest terms, all our processes of reasoning, great and small are simply inferences based on experience." He identified three classes of proof for legal argument--facts, authority, and reasoning--and discussed them in relation to argumentation. 165

Laycock and Scales divided proof into evidence and arguments, differentiating the terms as follows:

1. Evidence consists of all matters of fact that may be used in the generating of proof. It is the raw material from which the finished product, proof, is to be manufactured.

2. Argument, in its restricted meaning, is the name used to designate the process by which, from knowing the existence of one fact, or a certain number of facts, we infer the existence of other facts. This meaning of the word "argument" must not be confused with other meanings. The word may be used to refer to a finished discourse as a whole; it may refer to an entire debate or discussion; or, as here, it may mean simply a single process of reasoning. There is, perhaps, no better definition of an argument, in this sense, than Cardinal Newman's definition of reason, as "any process or act of the mind

164 Ibid.
165 Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 77-86.
by which, from knowing one thing, it advances on to know another!" . . . An argument is the machinery by which the raw material, evidence, is turned into the finished product, proof.166

In the 1905 edition of Principles, Baker and Huntington recognized the need to revise "the difficult subject of evidence, especially refutation."167 Though defining evidence and proof in essentially the same terms as the first edition,168 Baker and Huntington included the notion of evidence as the material of proof in their revision.

Foster held steadfastly to Baker's delineation of reasoning as a kind of evidence.169 Yet, his own treatment

166 Laycock and Scales defined proof essentially as had Baker. See Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 59.

167 Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. v.

168 Baker and Huntington continued to delineate reasoning as a form of evidence, defining the "broad field of evidence" to include "facts, reasoning, and authoritative opinions." Ibid., p. 72. Baker and Huntington examined causes for disagreement and concluded that "since all evidence--the material of proof--consists of inferences from experience and is open to disagreement, it is important that students train themselves in selecting and presenting evidence." They listed the three following causes of disagreement: "(1) because one man's experience is different from that of another; (2) because he draws his opinions from a different authority; (3) because the inferences drawn from the same experience differ," pp. 78-82.

169 "The first kind of evidence--testimony of authorities as to facts--we shall consider at once. The second kind of evidence--reasoning about facts--we shall consider in the three succeeding chapters." Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 56; 1917 rev. ed., p. 97.
of proof balanced the two elements. Citing a contemporary legal treatise, Wharton's *Criminal Evidence*, which defined proof as "the sufficient reason for assenting to a proposition as true,"170 Foster concluded that:

The material of Proof is Evidence. Evidence is everything which ought to bring or tend to bring the mind to the conviction of the truth or falsity of a proposition. The finding and employing of Evidence is the business of argumentation.171

O'Neill recognized that the term *proof* is used to refer to the "effect of evidence" as well as to the "medium by which truth is established."172 He followed, nevertheless, Laycock and Scales in determining evidence and argument to be "subdivisions" of proof.

Finding the Material of Proof

Most early period writers at least mentioned the gathering, selection, and tabulation of the materials of proof. Baker summarized his chapter on the preparatory reading for argumentation as follows:


In brief, then, in preparing for the discussion of a proposition a student should (1) examine the content of his own mind on the subject and clear it for action; (2) strive to understand the case for his opponent as well as he does his own; (3) read (a) widely, (b) with careful, critical consideration of the material for and against him; and (4) by passing all the material through his own thought transmute it into new shapes, give it a new significance, impart to it something of himself,—in a word, make it his own.\(^{173}\)

Baker also cited specific "rules" for quoting and paraphrasing the writings of others.\(^{174}\) Alden specified procedures for tabulating materials in addition to general comments on the gathering of material.\(^{175}\) Laycock and Scales advised using a notebook when reading; suggested an "effective method" for reading from general to specific; recommended reading on both sides of a question; and discussed what to look for in reading, assimilation being their ultimate aim.\(^{176}\) Baker and Huntington omitted Baker's entire chapter on materials. Foster limited his discussion to the selection, use, and recording of evidence.\(^{177}\) O'Neill, on the other hand, expanded Laycock and Scales's original treatment of gathering material and


\(^{174}\) Ibid., p. 172.


\(^{176}\) Laycock and Scales, *Argumentation and Debate*, pp. 47-57.

included a systematic plan for reading, recording, and assimilating materials.\textsuperscript{178}

Kinds of Proof

Disagreeing on the nature of proof and the relation of evidence to reasoning, early writers in argumentation also failed to concur on systems of classification. They did, however, follow Baker in precluding assertion as proof. Pointing out that unsupported assertion is "safe" only in argument from authority, Baker had said:

There are men and books which are regarded as authorities on the subjects they treat, and their testimony as to facts and inferences from facts is accepted unquestioningly. . . . These men give, not a careful statement of the reasons for a belief held by them, but merely an unsupported statement of another; that is, they use the so-called Argument from Authority. When it is proper to use this, then, and then only, is an unqualified affirmation of something as true permissible.\textsuperscript{179}

Baker cited numerous examples illustrating the proper support of assertion. Having observed in his first edition that evidence in argumentation is bound by none of the rules of evidence in the law courts, he, nevertheless, borrowed from law and rhetoric the following classifications of evidence: testimonial and circumstantial; direct and indirect; and argument from antecedent probability,

\textsuperscript{178}O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}, pp. 68-80.

\textsuperscript{179}Baker, \textit{Principles}, p. 177.
sign and example.\textsuperscript{180} Dissatisfied with these distinctions, Baker proposed a complicated fourth possible division of evidence which attempted to classify arguments according to resemblance.\textsuperscript{181} He summarized this system in a detailed chart\textsuperscript{182} and explained its significance as follows:

This chart shows, then, that it is possible to divide the field of evidence on the basis of completeness of resemblance between two phenomena, and that in so doing a student moves by graduated steps from a resemblance that has no probative value to complete resemblance. It must make clear, too, that this method of division but renames what has already been considered as Direct and Indirect (or Circumstantial) Evidence; or as the Argument from Antecedent Probability, the Argument from Sign, and the Argument from Example. The chart shows, also, that all Evidence must be

\textsuperscript{180}Ibid. Baker distinguished the rhetorical classification as follows: "The argument from Antecedent Probability tries to account for something that is assumed to be true,—to find a motive for it," p. 202. The Argument from Sign, as defined by Whately, "is an inference, from a part of a process, object, or fact, of the presence of another part, or of the whole,—is an argument from an effect to a condition," p. 203. Cited from Richard Whately, \textit{Elements of Logic} (New York: Sheldon and Company, 1869). "The Argument from Example rests on the idea that objects which resemble each other in two or more respects, connected with the point in discussion, will resemble each other in this particular point." Baker, \textit{Principles}, p. 204.

\textsuperscript{181}This scheme included "argument from a resemblance which, if it be found that the result really occurred, may have produced this result; argument from a resemblance known in a past case to be an essential part of a process leading to the result in question; argument from a series of such resemblances; and argument from complete resemblance," p. 206. Baker's system was strongly influenced by Fletcher and Carpenter, \textit{Introduction to Theme-Writing}.

(a) Argument from a resemblance, the possible connection of which with the point in question needs demonstration.

If the resemblance is shown (1) not to be connected with the point in question, it has no value as proof in the case under discussion; if (2) it is shown to have connection with it, then it becomes the Argument from Antecedent Probability, from Sign, or from Example.

(b) Argument from a resemblance to something seen in a past case to have been a or the cause of a result like that in question, and, if the occurrence of the result in this case is proved, probably a or the cause of the result in question.

A. 

Resemblance to something that in a past case was an essential part of a process leading to the result in question that the same result must occur in this case.

Indirect Evidence. 

Judgment before Experience. 

A. Resemblance seen by me (the speaker or writer).

B. Resemblance seen by others.

Argument from Analogy.

Argument from Antecedent Probability.

Argument from Example.

Indirect Evidence. 

Judgment after Partial Experience. 

A. Resemblance seen by me (the speaker or writer.)

or 

B. By other men.

(a) Living.

(b) Dead.

Argument from Completeness.

Argument from Example.

Direct Evidence. 

Judgment after Experience. 

(a) Complete resemblance. 

Seen by others.

1. Living witnesses.

2. Dead witnesses.

(b) Complete resemblance. 

Seen by me.
from a man's own experience or from that of other men.\textsuperscript{183}

The 1905 revision of \textit{Principles} abandoned Baker's chart and detailed prescriptions but not his conviction of the value of arguing from resemblances. It revealed, moreover, a clearer and more coherent view of evidence:

Evidence . . . consisting of facts, the opinions of authorities, and reasoning (inferences from the facts or opinions) can be classified as testimonial and circumstantial, facts and opinions being testimonial and inferences being circumstantial. Testimonial evidence needs no subdivision beyond the natural division into facts and the opinions of authorities, since the same tests are applicable to all witnesses and to all authorities. Circumstantial evidence, however, can be more surely tested if we subdivide it into deductive and inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning, moreover, for our purposes may be tested without considering the subdivision which formal logic applies to it. Inductive reasoning, on the other hand, it is helpful to separate somewhat arbitrarily into generalizations, arguments based on a causal relationship and arguments based on resemblance.\textsuperscript{184}

Most of the early writers at least mentioned the common classifications of evidence to which Baker had referred.\textsuperscript{185} They also agreed that evidence includes both

\textsuperscript{183}Ibid., p. 214.


\textsuperscript{185}O'Neill added real evidence to his classification. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 90-92. He cited Best's definition: "By real evidence is meant evidence of which any object belonging to the class of things is the source, persons also being included, in respect to such qualities as belong to them in common with things." Best, \textit{On Evidence}, p. 16.
facts and authoritative opinions. The rub came with reasoning. In an attempt to minimize Formal Logic in argument, Baker had treated reasoning as subsidiary to evidence. Though he did not reject the logical substratum of argument, Baker did not detail its processes. He simply took them for granted. At least two early writers took a different tack. Both Elias MacEwan, writing in 1898, and Gertrude Buck, writing in 1899, viewed logical reasoning as the core of proof, and their respective texts emphasized Formal Logic as central to a study of argumentation.

Though many early writers applied Baker's label of "practical argumentation" to their own systems, relatively few were content to reject the rigid super-structure of Formal Logic. Pedagogically, Formal Logic provided the security of a concrete and time-honored subject matter; its terminology made possible precise differentiation; and, its historical roots gave its result the aura of "truth." Baker's notion that such a system bears little relation to the "argumentation of everyday life" seems to have gotten lost in the jargon. Baker, moreover, was able to offer no concrete, teachable alternative. In his most precise description of this "practical application" of logic, he said:

186 See Baker, *Principles*, Ch. I.


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When we argue, we try to make a listener or reader believe that this or that is true, because for the reasons, \(a, b, c\), it seems to us true, and because the special exciting interest, \(d\), that the idea has for him, must stir him to act on the belief that we are seeking to inculcate. . . . These reasons with which we support our belief are but thoughts, and all argumentation is an aggregation of reasonings, or varied processes of thought. Even, however, in the simplest reasoning some structure is involved, for we do not think at random, and it is evident that it may have been possible to examine these processes of thinking, to study their structure, and to derive rules of correct thinking therefrom.

This has been possible, and the result is called Logic, "the science of the laws of thought," or that which teaches us to know how to think correctly.\(^{188}\)

Those writers who followed Baker approached reasoning in varying ways, though in general they moved collectively toward a greater dependence on Formal Logic. Alden opted for a rhetorical approach. Believing that the induction-deduction distinction "is only a matter of the point of view taken,"\(^ {189}\) he examined "processes of reasoning," "according as they are based on matters before the fact in dispute" (antecedent probability and analogy or example), and "on matters after the fact" (a posteriori).\(^ {190}\)

Laycock and Scales differentiated argumentation


\(^{189}\)Alden, Art of Debate, p. 78.

\(^{190}\)Ibid., pp. 86-98.
from Formal Logic both in method and purpose. They ignored the induction-deduction distinctions altogether and suggested that the classification of arguments should "make clear, as far as possible, on what the strength of the various kinds of arguments depends." Insisting that "in nearly every argument the validity of one inference depends upon a connection of cause and effect between the facts from which we infer and the facts to which we infer," they determined that "this connection is, . . . in most cases, the source of strength or weakness in the reasoning." Laycock and Scales's own particular system of classification, however, which divided arguments into antecedent probability, sign, and example, paralleled that of "nearly all writers on the subject of rhetoric."

191 "Logic aims merely to investigate and explain 'the operations and processes of thought,,'" while argumentation purposes "to make practical rules and suggestions which will facilitate correct reasoning and the producing of beliefs in the minds of others." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 84. They explained, moreover, that "Logic explains the different ways in which the mind may work in making an inference or reasoning," while argumentation wishes "to make clear the rules that must be followed in order to make arguments that will be valuable for the purpose of convincing and persuading others," pp. 84-85.

192 Ibid., p. 86.

193 Ibid.

194 Ibid., p. 85. Laycock and Scales divided argument from sign into arguments from effect to cause, effect to effect, and association of phenomena in the past. They treated generalization and analogy as types of argument from example, pp. 95-113.
Foster examined the relation of argumentation and logic similarly to, though more precisely than, Laycock and Scales.\textsuperscript{195} Though insisting that "an extensive study of Formal Logic is not necessary,"\textsuperscript{196} Foster, nevertheless, detailed the rules and structure of the syllogism, "the usual form in which logic presents reasoning."\textsuperscript{197} He advised, moreover, "any one who does not understand the nature of the false inferences resulting from a violation of these rules . . . to study . . . some elementary treatise," and recommended W. S. Jevons' \textit{Primer of Logic}.\textsuperscript{198}

Recognizing deficiencies in the methods of Formal Logic as applied to argumentation, Foster relied on the rationale of probability in argument:

Whereas syllogistic logic sets forth the conditions under which a conclusion is necessarily true, argumentation, on the other hand,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{195}See Foster, \textit{Argumentation and Debating}, 1908 ed., pp. 85-86.
\item \textsuperscript{196}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 88. He went so far as to suggest that "an extensive study of syllogistic logic is not only of little help to a student of argumentation and debating, but . . . may actually prove a hindrance," pp. 89-90. Referring to the danger of overlooking "attendant circumstances," he substantiated his view by citing the logicians Alfred Sidgwick and Bernard Bosanquet. Sidgwick, \textit{Process of Argument}, p. 74; Bernard Bosanquet, \textit{Essentials of Logic} (London: Macmillan Company, 1895), p. 99.
\item \textsuperscript{197}Foster, \textit{Argumentation and Debating}, 1908 ed., p. 86. He also defined the enthymeme as "a syllogism with one or more of its propositions suppressed."
\item \textsuperscript{198}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 87. Jevons, \textit{Primer of Logic}.
\end{itemize}
is concerned mainly with attempts to show merely that the chances are in favor of the truth of a given conclusion, under conditions which demand action at the same time that they preclude the possibility of adequate tests of truth.\(^{199}\)

In his own discussion of proof, Foster utilized "a classification provided by the science of logic," inductive and deductive argument. He defined the processes as follows:

The process of reasoning by which we arrive at a general law through the observation of particulars is called inductive reasoning. . . . The opposite process, by which from a general law we draw a conclusion with regard to a particular case, is called deductive reasoning. . . . Inductive argument is inference from the specific to the general; deductive argument is inference from the general to the specific.\(^{200}\)

Within this framework, Foster set forth a representative and detailed analysis of the "typical forms of inductive and deductive reasoning," argument from example and argument from causal relation. Though his treatment of these "kinds" of reasoning was clearer in the 1917 revision, it did not differ appreciably in content from his 1908 pronouncements.

Foster divided argument from example into two parts: generalization and analogy. By generalization, he meant imperfect induction. Analogy gave him more trouble. Having cited the wide disagreement among writers

\(^{199}\)Ibid., p. 89; 1917 rev. ed., p. 126.

\(^{200}\)Ibid., 1908 ed., pp. 91-92.
over the meaning of the term, Foster incorporated the logician William Minto's definition into his own treatise:

In the argument from analogy the ground of inference is the resemblance between two individual objects in a certain number of points; and the inference is that they resemble one another in some other point, known to belong to the one, but not known to belong to the other.

By 1917, Foster had crystallized his own thinking and described the argument from analogy as

201 Foster pointed out in footnotes in both editions that Baker followed Whately in confining the term analogy to resemblances "not so much in the things themselves as in the relations in which things stand to other things. . . . 'Thus an egg and a seed are not in themselves alike, but bear a like relation to the parent bird and to her young nestling, on the one hand, and to the old and young plant on the other, respectively.' Genung regards an argument from analogy as one which takes 'relations that exist in one sphere of life or experience, as indications of what may be regarded as true of another sphere whose relations are similar.' But whether the argument is based on similarity between objects in the same sphere of life or in different spheres of life, and whether the argument is based on similarity in the objects or in relations, the force of the argument depends on precisely the same conditions; we should apply the same tests, and expose its insufficiency by the same methods. For practical purposes, therefore, the distinctions would hardly be worth insisting upon, even if there were any agreement among writers. In this chapter, the term Argument from Analogy is used in the wider sense to include all arguments from example which do not amount to an induction, that is to say, all arguments from resemblance in which the operating principle is suppressed. Anyone who prefers the term Argument from Resemblance for the whole class, with the Argument from Analogy as a sub-class, can readily make the distinction." Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 150. See also 1908 ed., pp. 109-110.

the inference that if two objects resemble one another in certain points, they also resemble one another in some other point, known to belong to the one, but not known to belong to the other. . . . An argument from analogy is, therefore, that kind of argument from example which steps from one particular case to another particular case. It does not amount to a complete or even attempted generalization.203

In his first edition, Foster had insisted that analogy "may create an exceedingly high degree of probability, but never conclusive proof."204 In the 1917 revision, he noted that argument from analogy "taken alone should rarely be regarded as conclusive proof."205

Believing that the ultimate justification of all argumentation is causation, Foster concluded that:

We may derive considerable help in our own reasoning by studying arguments which direct attention to causal connections. All such arguments proceed from effect to cause, from cause to effect, or from effect to effect. All rest on the universal belief in causation: nothing happens without sufficient cause.206

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204 Ibid., 1908 ed., p. 112.
206 Ibid., 1908 ed., p. 124; 1917 rev. ed., p. 170. Foster equated effect to cause argument with a posteriori reasoning and cause to effect with a priori reasoning. He suggested, moreover, that the latter "is sometimes called argument from antecedent probability." He concluded, however, that "the use of the latter term is so much confused that we have thought best to get along without it; though the argument itself is illustrated under various topics," 1908 ed., pp. 125, 132.
Foster attempted to bring "the so-called 'argument from sign'" within the framework of causation. Pointing out that most writers, though using the classification "argument from sign" disagree on definition, he said:

If we made no mistake when we asserted . . . that all arguments rest on generalization, stated or implied, and that no argument, not even a generalization itself can commend itself to a rational mind, except on the assumption that a causal relation exists, we ought to be able to explain all so-called arguments from sign by reference to generalization or causation, or both.\(^{207}\)

O'Neill recognized that forms of arguments are classified and studied mainly from two points of view—logic and rhetoric. He examined the "kinds" of arguments applicable to rhetoric using the traditional outline employed by Laycock and Scales: antecedent probability, sign, and example. His section on logic, however, was new.

O'Neill differentiated Formal Logic from argumentation much as had his predecessors. He went further, however, to suggest that "anyone who is trained in argumentation should be familiar with the vocabulary of argument whether he ever makes practical use of it or not."\(^{208}\)

O'Neill synthesized the views of certain contemporary logicians toward deduction, induction, and the syllogism, admitting that his own discussion was "taken almost

\(^{207}\)Ibid., pp. 137-38.

entirely from the standard text-books of recognized authorities on logic (Jevons, Creighton, Bode, Hibben, Hyslop, Sidgwick)."\textsuperscript{209} O'Neill included the notion that the real process of inference is the same in induction and deduction, the object being a "necessary connection of facts according to some general principle,"\textsuperscript{210} and he reasserted the "mutual dependence" of the processes.\textsuperscript{211}

O'Neill included Hyslop's detailed description of the kinds of induction: perfect; imperfect; and the inductive method.\textsuperscript{212} He also expanded Laycock and Scales's original discussion of John Stuart Mill's methods of induction which had appeared in their section of fallacies.\textsuperscript{213} Both texts, however, quoted from Jevons' analysis rather than directly from Mill's work.\textsuperscript{214} Jevons, as Mill, began with causation. Wishing to "supplement" rather than "supercede" the old logic, Mill had isolated certain methods for discovering causal connections and had arrived at four variants of induction by elimination:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{209} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{210} Ibid., p. 119.
  \item \textsuperscript{211} Ibid., p. 120.
  \item \textsuperscript{212} Hyslop, Elements of Logic, pp. 295-98.
  \item \textsuperscript{213} Baker and Huntington also included certain of Mill's distinctions in their discussion of fallacies. Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 144-46.
  \item \textsuperscript{214} See Jevons, Lessons in Logic, pp. 239-53.
\end{itemize}
agreement; difference; residues; and concomitant variations. O'Neill included these as methods appropriate for argumentation.

O'Neill examined deductive reasoning through exploring the syllogism, sorites, inferences in quantitative relations, and enthymemes. He agreed, moreover, with Sidgwick's analysis of the weaknesses of the syllogism for assessing the strength of inferences.

Tests of Proof

Whereas the early writers in argumentation had clashed on the nature and kinds of proof, they largely agreed on its tests. Disparities arose primarily with regard to terminology and emphasis, differences which

reflected the various authors' predispositions regarding the nature and kinds of proof. The same general principles, however, pervaded most of the early works. Representative methods of detailing these tests follow.

In the first edition of Principles of Argumentation, Baker set forth "the place of rules of evidence in argumentation." "We must learn," he said, "not only how to attack incorrect drawing of conclusions from data given, but how to test whether the data are correctly reported." Baker included external tests which corresponded to traditional tests of evidence and internal tests which essentially evaluated reasoning. Tests which examine evidence externally, he said,

consider the man who gives the testimony, the conditions under which it was given, whether the evidence as a whole coincides with other testimony known to be true, whether it is self-contradictory; they do not say: "Is there anything faulty in the process of thought, the logic that has produced the opinion?" If they did, they would not be external, but internal tests.

The external tests ask: "Is there good reason to think that the evidence, if internally examined, will be found to be logically unsound?" The internal tests ask rather: "Just what is the logical unsoundness of the argument?"

The examination of evidence for internal weaknesses is a search for fallacies. By a fallacy is meant any unsound mode of arguing which appears to demand our conviction, and to be decisive of the question in hand, when in fairness it is not.  

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221 Ibid., pp. 242-43. Baker used Whately's
Baker's list of tests may be catalogued as follows:

I. External Tests:

A. Testing the Statement

1. Evidence should be consistent with ordinary experience.
2. Evidence should be consistent with the other known facts of the case.
3. Evidence should be consistent with itself.

B. Testing the Conditions Under Which the Statement Was Made

1. Is the witness willing or reluctant?
2. Was the testimony given under compulsion?

C. Examining the Witness Himself

1. Is the evidence prejudicial, does it show personal interest?
2. Is the witness intellectually strong?
3. Are the physical powers of the witness sound?
4. What is the moral character of the witness? Is he naturally truthful?

definition of a fallacy. See Whately, Elements of Logic, 1869, p. 168. Baker included three kinds of evidence which he believed were trustworthy in themselves and which, therefore, needed no testing. He labeled them as follows: undesigned testimony; negative testimony; and hurtful admissions or concessions. Baker, Principles, p. 238. Here Baker is indebted to Genung. Baker contended, however, that "of these three kinds of evidence, although all three are self-commendatory, only hurtful admissions are convincing without the successful application of one of the other tests of evidence already considered," p. 241.
II. Internal Tests of Evidence:

A. Fallacies Arising from Lack of Definition

1. Words with two common meanings left undefined.

2. Using at will different meanings of the same word.

3. Words used as identical because they look alike.

4. Confusion of the etymological and the common meanings of a word.

5. Unexplained words used with meanings which do not belong to them.

B. The Fallacy, Begging the Question, Petitio Principii

1. Assuming the truth of an unsupported assumption which is equivalent to the conclusion or results from it.

2. Undue assumption of a premise as true.
   a. Stating without support what should be proved true.
   b. Two fallacies arising from an attempt to find a cause for an effect.
      1) Mistaking a sign for a cause
      2) Post hoc ergo propter hoc
   c. Arguing from a false assumption.
   d. Referring to ambiguous evidence as if it could have but one interpretation.

C. The Fallacy, Ignoring the Question, Ignoration Elenchi

1. Direct ignoring of the question.

2. The fallacious use of the argumentum ad hominem.
3. Shifting ground.

4. The fallacy of objections.

5. Proving something true of a part only, not of the whole.\textsuperscript{222}

In addition to labeling fallacies, Baker pointed out that a conclusion is not necessarily true or false because a premise is. Neither is a premise necessarily true or false because a conclusion is. He included in this discussion the \textit{non sequitur} argument, "the name applied to an argument whenever the conclusion does not logically follow from the two statements from which it is drawn."\textsuperscript{223}

The 1905 revision of \textit{Principles} incorporated Baker's original listings and terminology relative to external tests of evidence. The discussion of internal tests (fallacies), however, differed from the first edition in arrangement, emphasis, and, to a lesser extent, in content. Here Baker and Huntington examined three sources of fallacies: lack of definition; errors of observation; and errors in reasoning. The section on definition closely followed Baker's earlier edition. The second division, fallacies arising from errors of observation, was entirely new. Relying on John Stuart Mill's analysis, Baker and Huntington contended that "non-observation and erroneous observation result in errors due to inattention or to

\textsuperscript{222}Ibid., pp. 220-68, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{223}Ibid., p. 245.

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preconceived theory, in the neglect of significant circumstances, and in the confusion of an incorrect inference with a direct sense impression. Their discussion of the third major source of fallacies, those arising from erroneous reasoning, combined two major divisions of fallacies labeled in the 1895 edition of Principles (begging the question and ignoring the question) with hasty generalization and non sequitur arguments. A subdivision of these areas resulted in a representative, if not comprehensive, check list of fallacious argument.

Most writers who followed Baker related fallacies to refutation. Alden's only discussion of tests of proof came in a chapter entitled "Methods of Refutation" where he suggested:

In general, one may refute the argument of an opponent either (1) by showing that the facts in the case are not true as alleged; or (2) that the fact being admittedly as alleged, the inferences drawn from them are incorrect; or (3) that the alleged facts are not true, and that even if they were true, the inferences are unwarranted.

Alden's particulars incorporated tests of facts, opinions, and

224 Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 166.

225 Baker felt no further classification of fallacies was necessary for the student of argumentation. Rather, within this broad framework, he recognized fallacies when he confronted them. For other detailed treatments of fallacies see Buck, Argumentative Writing, p. 94, and MacEwan, Essentials of Argumentation, pp. 97-108.

226 Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 128-29.
examples, and causal reasoning.\textsuperscript{227} He treated fallacies as "gaps" in the reasoning process\textsuperscript{228} and labeled the \textit{reductio ad absurdum} and the \textit{dilemma} as "particular" methods of refutation.

Laycock and Scales examined tests of proof from several different perspectives. They included specific "methods of refuting" arguments from antecedent probability, sign, and example,\textsuperscript{229} devoted an entire chapter to

\textsuperscript{227}Ibid., pp. 107-117.
\textsuperscript{228}Alden's listing of fallacies was similar to Baker's.
\textsuperscript{229}These "methods" may be outlined as follows:

I. Antecedent Probability
   A. Is the connection of the cause and effect complete?
   B. Is the cause adequate to produce the effect in question?
   C. The operation of other causes in the case in question may prevent the action of the assumed cause.
   D. Might not the fact in question be accounted for by the action of some other cause?

II. Arguments from Sign
   A. Argument from effect to cause.
      1. May not the known effect be due to some other cause than the one alleged?
      2. Is the alleged cause capable of being the real cause of the effect in question?
   B. Argument from effect to effect.
   C. Arguments from the association of phenomena in the past.
      1. Point out that the cases are too few to establish a law of occurrence.
      2. Produce definite examples where the one phenomenon has occurred without the other.

III. Argument from Example
   A. Argument by generalization
      1. The resemblance between the cases given as examples must be such as to justify the making of a general law concerning them.
fallacies,\textsuperscript{230} and in a later section advised "exploring fallacies" as one of "certain peculiar methods of arranging and presenting the material of destructive proof.\textsuperscript{231}

Foster presented tests of evidence and arguments, fallacies, and special methods of refutation in a well-organized, teachable form in his 1908 edition of \textit{Argumentation and Debating}. His delineation of specific tests of proof, which remained essentially intact in the 1917 revision, was particularly influential.\textsuperscript{232}

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2. The case in question must be such that the general law is applicable to it.
3. The resemblances must be such as to have a direct bearing on the argument.

B. Argument by analogy
1. The case or cases given as examples must resemble the case in question, in the relations which they respectively bear to surrounding facts or circumstances.
2. The resemblances must be such as to have a direct bearing on the argument.

\textit{Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate}, pp. 87-113.

\textsuperscript{230} They examined false cause (including Jevons' discussion of Mill's canons of induction), ambiguous terms, composition, and division, ignoring the question or arguing beside the point and begging the question, "the more important [material fallacies] for purposes of argumentation." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{231} They suggested the following: (1) State clearly the argument to be answered, (2) Exploring any fallacy, (3) \textit{Reductio ad absurdum}, (4) Dilemma, (5) Residues, (6) Showing an opponent's proof to be a proof of your own side of the case, and (7) Refutation should be followed by positive proof. \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 254-70.

\textsuperscript{232} Foster's tests of evidence from authority in the 1917 revision deleted the "hearsay" requirements of the 1908 edition. Rules for evaluating argument from generalization were identical, while those testing argument from

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Foster suggested the following criteria for evaluating evidence from authority.

1. Is the reference to authority definite?
2. Is the authority capable of giving expert testimony?
3. Has the authority had sufficient opportunity to know the facts?
4. Is the authority prejudiced?
5. Is the authority reluctant?
6. Is the authority aware of the significance of his testimony?
7. Is too great reliance placed on one authority?
8. Is the authority used by opponents?  

He also set out specific tests of inductive and deductive argument, argument from example, and argument from causal relations. Advocating reducing a deductive argument to the syllogistic form, Foster believed that one can "readily test its validity by inquiring whether the conclusion inevitably follows from the premises." He suggested:

"A deductive argument has the fundamental requisites of effectiveness if it satisfies these conditions: First, if the generalization on which it is based is proved true or accepted without proof; second, if the term about which something is affirmed in the conclusion is brought unmistakably within the analogy simply dropped obvious or repetitive phrases. Foster did not specifically list tests of causal reasoning in his 1917 revision, but his discussion included the essential criteria set out in the 1908 edition. See Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., pp. 51-141; 1917 rev. ed., pp. 92-184."

233Ibid., 1917 ed., pp. 99-111. It is interesting to note that Foster ignored the test, consistency, which appeared in most of the contemporary literature.

234Ibid., p. 131.
class about which the generalization asserts a truth; third, if the conclusion inevitably follows from the two propositions thus established. In other words, a deductive argument has the primary requisites of conviction if the two premises are true, and if the inference from them violates none of the rules of logic.235

Foster devised the following system to test induction; i.e., to test arguments from generalization and analogy, the two categories of argument from example:236

I. Argument from Generalization

A. Is the relative size of the unobserved part of the class so small as to warrant the generalization?

B. Are the observed members fair examples of the class?

C. Are we reasonably sure that there are no exceptions?

D. Is it highly probable that such a general rule or statement is true?237

II. Argument from Analogy

A. Are the points of similarity outweighed by points of difference?

B. Is the fact known to be true of the analogous case even more likely to be true of the case in question?

C. Are the alleged facts on which the analogy is based really true?238

235Ibid., p. 129.

236He was influenced here by Baker. See Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 109.


238Ibid., pp. 153-63.
Foster also set out tests for causal reasoning:

I. Argument from Effect to Cause

A. Could any other cause have produced the observed effect?

B. Is the assumed cause sufficient to produce the observed effect?

C. Was the operation of the assumed cause prevented by other forces?

II. Argument from Cause to Effect

A. Is the known cause adequate to produce the cause in question?

B. Are there other causes sufficient to prevent the known cause from producing the effect in question?

C. Is there any positive evidence tending to verify or refute the presumptions furnished by the argument from cause to effect?239

Interested in refuting opposing arguments,240 as well as in testing one's own proof, Foster included a detailed section on fallacies. His outline follows.

I. Fallacies of the Argument from Example

A. Hasty Generalization

B. False Analogy

II. Fallacies of Mistaken Causal Relation

A. Mistaking the Cause

B. Mistaking the Effect

239 Foster included effect to effect reasoning and "the so-called" argument from sign, but did not list separate tests for them. Ibid., 1908 ed., pp. 125-41.

240 Foster defined refutation as "argument which weakens or destroys the contentions of the other side." Ibid., p. 142.
III. Fallacies of Ignoring the Question

IV. Fallacies of Begging the Question
A. To argue in a circle.
B. To assume the point at issue directly under cover of confused language.
C. To assume a more general truth which involves the point at issue.
D. To assume a particular truth which the proposition involves.
E. To employ "question-begging" words.
F. To assume a point at issue in defining the terms.

Foster discussed six "special methods" of refutation: reductio ad absurdum; residues; dilemma; syllogism; exposing inconsistencies; and turning the tables. 241

O'Neill amplified and clarified Laycock and Scales's tests of proof in his "rewriting" of that work in 1917. Following Laycock and Scales in examining the quality and source of evidence and in citing specific "methods of attack" for arguments from antecedent

241 Ibid., pp. 146-72. Foster's 1917 revision refined his discussion of fallacies, but included essentially the same concepts, 1917 rev. ed., pp. 192-216.

242 Ibid., 1908 ed., pp. 177-89. In the 1917 edition he shifted the syllogism to the chapter on inductive and deductive argument and treated the dilemma as a form of the fallacy, ignoring the question.

243 His specific tests did not differ significantly from those of the earlier work. O'Neill did add the "hearsay" test. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 101-112.
probability, sign, and example, O'Neill departed from his mentors in his treatment of fallacies. Whereas Laycock and Scales had limited their discussion to material logical fallacies, O'Neill explored the rhetorical (error in interpretation) and formal logical (violations of rules of the syllogism) varieties. He reorganized the discussion of material fallacies, moreover, as follows:

I. Equivocation (ambiguity)
   A. In quantity
      1. Composition
      2. Division
   B. In quality
      1. Ambiguous middle (specific accident)
      2. Simple accident
      3. Converse accident

244 O'Neill's major contribution here was a clarification of tests of the example. Regarding generalization, he asked: Fair specimens? Large enough part of field? He applied the tests of generalization to the literal analogy and advised attacking a figurative analogy as "false." Ibid., pp. 155-69.

245 He included incorrect obversion (changing a proposition from affirmative to negative or vice versa without changing its meaning); incorrect conversion (transposing subject and predicate without changing meaning); amphibology (ambiguous grammatical structure which produces misconception); and accent (ambiguity arising from misplaced accent or emphasis). Ibid., pp. 172-76.

246 Gertrude Buck had earlier brought formal logical fallacies within the scope of argumentation. See Buck, Argumentative Writing, p. 94. For O'Neill's specific tests, see O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 176-82.
II. Presumption

A. Begging the Question

1. Assumption of an unproved premise
2. Arguing in a circle

B. Irrelevant Conclusion--Ignoring the Question

1. Argumentum ad hominem
2. Argumentum ad populum
3. Argumentum ad ignorantiam
4. Argumentum ad verecundiam
5. Argumentum ad judicium

C. Complex Question

D. Non sequitur

1. Simple
2. False cause

O'Neill's contribution to the testing of proof lay primarily in his perspective rather than in the development of original rules. His discussion of "methods of refutation" brought under one umbrella the various evaluative criteria included in most argumentation and debate texts: tests of evidence; attacks on forms of arguments; exposing fallacies; and special rhetorical devices (reductio ad absurdum, dilemma, residues and turning the tables).\(^{247}\)

The 1917 revisions of both O'Neill and Foster thus provided

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\(^{247}\)See ibid., pp. 182-96.

\(^{248}\)Ibid., pp. 355-65.
the essential framework for "middle period" approaches to proof.

**The Forensic**

George Pierce Baker defined the forensic as

a written argument resulting from careful analysis that has taken form in a good brief, careful selection of evidence, and literary skill that knows how, placing the carefully selected evidence at the places where the brief proper calls for it, to expand the brief into the complete argument.\(^{249}\)

This predisposition toward a written argumentative essay was not, however, necessarily the majority view. Intercollegiate debating, though on less than a grand scale, was already a fact of life.\(^{250}\) During a relatively short period of time, the forensic, as it was called, expanded beyond sectional contests to become a national affair. Not only did individual schools meet, but debating leagues were formed, debating contests were organized on statewide

\(^{249}\)Baker, *Principles*, pp. 269-70. In the preface to his 1895 edition of *Principles*, Baker, the English professor, justified his position as follows: "It is because I believe that for the speaker as well as the writer the principles which lead to convincingness merely—not to persuasion—are practically the same; and, most important of all, because I am convinced that the easiest, the most rapid method for a speaker to acquire good form, and ability to handle evidence well, is for him to write out his work until he has mastered the principles in this book which lead to convincingness merely," p. vii.

\(^{250}\)For an account of the various claims of which was the first intercollegiate debate, see Ralph C. Ringwalt, "Intercollegiate Debating," *Forum*, XXII (January, 1897), 633-40; Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, *Discussion and Debate* (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1941), pp. 395-400.
bases, and debate trips were instituted. This rapid expansion of intercollegiate debating resulted in highly structured, fairly sophisticated debate programs.

Early textbooks in argumentation reflected this emphasis on debating. Alden, for example, called his work _The Art of Debate_, while Laycock and Scales, and Foster...

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252 In 1916, J. R. Pelsma sent a detailed questionnaire on debating to "about fifty of the most prominent colleges and universities." From Pelsma's comprehensive survey one may conclude that debate continued to operate both within the academic curriculum and outside it. The debate coach, moreover, emerged. For controversy over the "proper role" of the coach, see Rollo L. V. Lyman, "Some Suggested Reforms in Intercollegiate Debating," _Public Speaking Review_, III (January, 1914), 144-54; Frank H. Lane, "Faculty Help in Intercollegiate Contests," _Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking_, I (April, 1915), 9-16; Thomas C. Trueblood, "Coaching a Debate Team," _Public Speaking Review_, I (November, 1911), 84-85. Finances, derived from university appropriations, student appropriations, admission fees, blanket taxes, and alumni gifts influenced the size of debate programs, the number of men on a team, and the number of debates in which a team participated. See J. R. Pelsma, "Questionnaire on Debating," _Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking_, II (April, 1916), 130-40.
respectively included the terms *debate* and *debating* in the titles of their texts. Though proclaiming debating to be "for the most part, but oral application of the principles of analysis, structure, evidence, and presentation," and though believing it "a pity that in many instances study of argument is regarded only as a stepping stone to successful debating," Baker and Huntington succumbed to the prevailing trend and included a short chapter entitled "Debating" in their 1905 revision.

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**254** Baker and Huntington treated--though perfunctorily--such problems as choice of subject, burden of proof, and attitude toward colleagues. They believed that "topics, whether for intercollegiate contests or class debates, should be chosen much more carefully than they often are." That their list of prescriptions contained an inordinate number of "do nots" probably reflects some of the prevailing excesses. They suggested that: "The desideratum is not any debatable question, nor one which gives the affirmative or the negative an advantage, and least of all is it a question which involves some trap for opponents. The last is unpardonable, for what is wanted is a two-sided question which will give each group of speakers a chance under approximately equal conditions to show what it can do evidentially and persuasively with a definite case. Avoid, then, those questions on which it is practically impossible to reach any final decision. In choosing a question, then, consider carefully the probability that evidence is accessible, in print, through interviews, or from one's own thinking. Avoid also topics that produce little except haggling over definitions. Again, avoid topics which in the last resort can be made conclusive only for certain temperaments, that is, which rest more on persuasion than on conviction. Select, too, topics which can be treated in the time allowed for the debate. Many questions of the day are hydra-headed. As a rule, reasonably fresh topics, the really current questions of the day on which public opinion is still forming, are the best training. Use the negative
Probings into the nature of the forensic varied in the identification as well as treatment of relevant and/or appropriate material. The very early writers emphasized the construction of the forensic, while later ones attended more to the presentation, ethics, and evaluation of contest debating.

Constructing the Forensic

Though early period writers perceived the forensic, at its core, to be the issues derived from analysis buttressed by proof and laid out in a quasi-legal brief, they did not discredit the importance of "rhetoric" or "composition" in argumentation. Conversely, early texts included sections on arrangement and style.

Arrangement

Baker divided the forensic into three parts—introduction, argument, and peroration—and discussed each phrasing with caution. . . . Usually this phrasing, turning affirmative into negative and negative into affirmative, leads before the end of the debate to double negatives and to confusion in the minds of the audience. . . . One tendency in phrasing, much fostered by intercollegiate debating, to select questions in which the negative need only show that the proposition of the affirmative does not hold good, but need itself support no case of its own, is not productive of the best training in argument. This leads to overestimating the value of rebuttal in debate, with the result that often speakers skillful in rebuttal fail utterly when forced to support a constructive case. Would it not be much better, both in class and intercollegiate debates, to find questions which oblige both sides to work both destructively and constructively? Any comparative question does this." Ibid., pp. 398-402.
in terms of conviction and persuasion. Agreeing that "the structure of the brief should be the basis of the structure of the finished argument," both Alden and Laycock and Scales applied Baker's divisions of the written forensic to debating. These texts emphasized particularly the work of the introduction, anticipating later discussions of division of labor among speakers in a

255Baker believed that the work of conviction in an introduction "is to develop, always with as much clear­ness and force as possible, and with degrees of elegance varying according to circumstances, the outline of the well-planned brief introduction." Baker, Principles, p. 279. An introduction may "endeavor to persuade" under the following circumstances: a technical or otherwise difficult subject; unknown speaker; hostile audience. Conviction in the argument results from "giving in a literary form the evidence for which the carefully constructed brief proper calls," pp. 279-93. "Persuasive value may be given to arguments either by a direct appeal, suggested by them, to the emotions, or by pointing out or suggesting that significance of the ideas advanced which, for any reason, is likely to stir the audience to action," (italics omitted), p. 322. The work of conviction in the peroration was, for Baker, two-fold: recapitulation of the argument; and amplification and diminishing the importance and con­clusiveness "to take advantage of the last opportunity offered the writer to win the sympathy of his audience for himself or his subject"; and "to stir the passions of his hearers," p. 329.

256Alden, Art of Debate, p. 152. See also Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 342-43.

257Laycock and Scales also included the need for "strategy" as a distinguishing characteristic of debate; i.e., "How to open the battle, when to use light cavalry and when to use artillery, when to attack, when to give way, how to plan an ambuscade, how to retreat." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 274. They observed, moreover, that preparation for argumentation varies according to the form of the finished product.
debate. Their treatments of the argument proper and of the peroration differed little, moreover, from most contemporary rhetorics. It is noteworthy, however, that Alden also stressed the structuring of proofs.

By Baker and Huntington's revision, and certainly by Foster's first edition, one could perceive a clear shift in emphasis regarding the structure of a forensic. Baker and Huntington relegated the divisions of introduction, argument, and conclusion so prominent in the first edition of Principles to a short section on form in which they included the classical dictum: "Let a speech

258 Alden suggested that the introduction should set out the nature and origin of the question; state fundamental facts in the case; admit if side has the burden of proof or presumption; show how side proposes to shift the burden; and set out issues. Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 138-39. Laycock and Scales listed similar duties for the "first speaker on the affirmative." They included: "to win sympathy for himself or his view of the subject, and so to present the question as to persuade his audience that his method of treating this question is just and sensible." Laycock and Scales included "explain the origin and history of the question, and ... present the issues." Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 280. They also suggested the importance of definition of terms in the introduction, p. 293. Laycock and Scales also included specific prescriptions for the "first speaker on the negative": "he must ... overthrow the influence of his opponent who has introduced the debate," p. 281. Laycock and Scales also examined such strategies as argumentum ad hominem and questioning, pp. 315-23.

259 Alden labeled Baker's "argument," the "body of proof." He also believed that "the nature of the proof must determine the best order for its presentation," and offered some special rules for ordering proofs. See Alden, Art of Debate, p. 141.
have a beginning, a middle, and an end."  

Interested, moreover, in the unity in each side of a case and in progression as well as unity in the whole debate, they outlined in more detail than had their predecessors the work of individual speakers, setting out this work in terms of "class debates" rather than a contest format.  

Foster ignored the introduction, argument, conclusion distinctions except in discussing the brief. He clarified, moreover, Baker and Huntington's suggestions for the work of individual speakers and presented the following concise, usable rules. The first speech for the affirmative, Foster said, "should present all the steps in analysis which are necessary for an understanding of the debate and no more."  

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261 See ibid., pp. 415-21. The mechanics of debating were only beginning to become crystallized during the early period. Since "practically all the early debates were conducted on the basis of the single debate 'contract' arrangement," which set its own rules and format, there was little continuity. For a summary of prevailing procedures, see Cowperthwaite and Baird, "Intercollegiate Debating," pp. 260-62; Pelsma, "Questionnaire on Debating," p. 135.  
262 Baker and Huntington's "class debate" used the following format: "there are usually two persons on each side, allowed, for instance, ten minutes in which to open the discussion, fourteen minutes for the main speech, and six minutes for final rebuttal, with some five or six speeches from the floor of four minutes each." Baker and Huntington, Principles, pp. 415-16.  
263 Foster contended that this introduction should be "unprejudiced." Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 288.
After presenting such introductory matters as the proposition demands, the opening speaker should take up the first issue and endeavor to make definite progress with the case of the affirmative. He should show the relation of his work to the work of the other speakers on his side; and he should make clear just what he understands to be the bearing of his argument on the negative side, and what, consequently, his opponents must do to meet the contentions of the affirmative. 264

Foster believed that "the first requisite of the opening speech for the negative is adaptation to the preceding speech." 265 He further suggested that:

The speaker must make clear to what extent he accepts the work in analysis presented by the affirmative.

If the affirmative speaker has failed to analyze the proposition and set forth the issues, the negative speaker must supply the deficiency. . . . Furthermore, the first negative speaker must either refute the arguments just advanced or show good reason for postponing the refutation.

At the close of his speech, the first speaker for the negative should summarize his own argument, show its bearing on the argument of the other side, and point out just what work, in view of these facts, the affirmative still has to perform. 266

As for the other main speeches, Foster counselled:

For the other speakers, the first requisite is adaptation. They must adapt their work to that of the other side, as the debate proceeds, and they must adapt their work to that of their colleagues. . . . It is

264 Ibid., p. 296.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid., pp. 296-302.
the duty of each speaker to summarize, not only what he has said, but all that has been said on his side up to that point.\textsuperscript{267}

\textsuperscript{267}Ibid., p. 302. Pattee took a different view, approaching what speakers must do largely in terms of affirmative and negative prerogatives. Pattee said: "The first speaker for the affirmative--Upon the first speaker falls the duty of interpreting the proposition. . . . Since the burden of proof always rests on the affirmative, the first speaker in the argument proper, as a rule, points out the weaknesses in existing conditions, leaving to his colleague the task of presenting the advantages of a change. In handling his proof he must be sure so to correlate his work with the work of his colleague that, in the minds of the audience, it will all hang together as a united whole. To accomplish this object, he may, as he finishes with his partition, state what points he will discuss himself, and what points will be handled by the affirmative speakers that are to succeed him; and he must, without fail, when he nears the end of his allotted time, hastily summarize the proof he has given, and outline the proof to follow. . . . It rests with the first speaker for the negative to determine whether the introduction as presented by the affirmative has erred in any respect, it is the duty of the first negative debater to supply the deficiency or make the correction; otherwise he errs equally with the affirmative. . . . Two courses are open to him; he may at once refute his predecessors' arguments, or he may proceed to take up his constructive proof, giving reason for postponing the refutation. . . . About the only practical suggestion that can be made to the other speakers is that they adapt their constructive work to that of their colleagues, and deploy their refutation so as to hammer the principle positions of their opponent. . . . Good speeches of refutation deal largely with main ideas . . . and the offer [of] some opposition to every main heading used by his opponents. . . . The work of the last speaker on each side differs somewhat from the work of his colleagues. All the speakers try to overthrow the opposing arguments, and by means of summaries keep their case as a whole before the audience. The last speaker devotes far less time to pure refutation, gives a more detailed summary, and in addition, compares and contrasts the arguments of his side with the arguments of the opposition. This last process is called amplifying and diminishing." Pattee, \textit{Practical Argumentation}, 1915 rev. ed., pp. 241-50, passim.
Foster insisted on thorough preparation for rebuttal.

The debater must decide at once what is the bearing on the question, and what is the relation to his own case of the argument advanced against him. He must decide whether it is worth answering; if so, when and by what method.

The first function of the closing rebuttal speech was, for Foster, "to make clear what has been done by both sides."

He advised the following procedure:

To make this clear, the speaker must take up the issues, one by one, in a logical order, which is usually the order determined at the outset. His purpose is to show, by contrasting the arguments which the course of the debate has left standing on each side of each issue, that his side has the weight of proof in its favor. He thus emphasizes his own arguments at the expense of his opponent's arguments. . . . He must subordinate the insignificant odds and ends, which are more or less confused in the minds of the hearers, to the main issues. His task is to muster the whole forces of his side for an orderly, unified, final attack.

Agreeing that "the debate should be one—should have absolute unity," and insisting that "it should be fundamentally the same if delivered by one or two or three speakers," O'Neill returned to the framework of introduction, discussion, and conclusion for examining the main

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268 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 305.

269 Ibid., p. 306. Foster was also concerned with the organization of rebuttal material and gave specific prescriptions for writing specimen rebuttal cards.
speeches in a debate, treating the divisions similarly to Laycock and Scales. O'Neill progressed beyond the scope of the earlier work, however, at least in two major areas: outlining duties for the first affirmative speaker; and differentiating rebuttal from refutation. The first affirmative, according to O'Neill, should "explain the case, set forth the issues, accept the burden of proof, outline your case as far as seems advisable, and then start the argument." In a detailed section on rebuttal of speeches, O'Neill made the following critical distinctions:

Refutation is the broader term ... and rebuttal is the refutation that is given in a special speech which has properly no (or very little) constructive material in it.

Style

Most early writers integrated discussions of style into their treatments of structure. Baker, for example, labeled clearness, force, and elegance as characteristics

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271 Ibid., p. 394.
272 As had Foster, O'Neill advocated detailed preparation for rebuttal but advised against memorized rebuttal speeches. He suggested that a speaker must know the other side and "be ready for surprises." For O'Neill, as for Laycock and Scales, "the great fundamental principle which should guide the preparation of all rebuttal speeches is: Answer the whole case of the other side." Ibid., p. 425.
273 Ibid., p. 421.
of a good introduction; unity, clearness, and force "the
great essentials in the argument proper, . . . both from
the argumentative and from the literary point of view"; 274
and an element of surprise, avoidance of statements not
in the argument proper, brevity, clearness, and elegance
as "the requisites of a good peroration." 275

Sensing a close relationship between structure
and style, 276 Alden examined paragraph structure, tran­
sitions, and distinguished the compact from diffuse
styles. 277 Recognizing that "it is common for rhetoricians
to classify the qualities of a good style under the three
heads of Clearness, Force, and Elegance," he added to

274 Baker believed that "whether elegance is
desirable will . . . depend on the nature of the public
address." Baker, Principles, p. 293.

275 With the exception of an element of surprise,
Baker followed the requisites given by Phelps, Theory
of Preaching, pp. 520-22, cited in Baker, Principles,
p. 335.

276 Laycock and Scales posed several questions
which indicated a similar awareness. They asked: Is
the introduction phrased so as to arouse interest? Is
the connection between the main points of the proposition
made perfectly apparent? Is the arrangement in any way
defective? Are there well managed transitions? They
suggested, moreover, that transitions, summaries, and
partitions are valuable aids to unity in the proof itself.
Laycock and Scales, Argumentation and Debating, pp. 232,
356.

277 He advised a compromise between the compact
and diffuse style. See Alden, Art of Debate.
these qualities\textsuperscript{278} unity, proportion, continuity, and an element of general truth.\textsuperscript{279}

For Baker and Huntington, "clearness, force, and movement are not, however, everything needed in argument." They believed that "style depends . . . primarily on thought; secondly on imagination . . . ; and finally on an accurate, copious, and responsive vocabulary."\textsuperscript{280} Baker and Huntington did not offer specific suggestions, however, for oral style.\textsuperscript{281}

Foster gleaned from contemporary rhetorics\textsuperscript{282} certain "principles" and "qualities" of style, and suggested that "observance of these principles of Unity, Emphasis, and Coherence tends to secure the qualities of Clearness, Ease and Force."\textsuperscript{283} For Foster, these "principles" and "qualities" were of value, however, only

\textsuperscript{278}Ibid., p. 164. Alden also discussed figures of speech in relation to the force of an argument, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{279}Ibid., p. 184.
\textsuperscript{280}Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 385.
\textsuperscript{281}Neither did most writers who followed them.
\textsuperscript{282}Foster recommended particularly two works: Barrett Wendell, English Composition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891); Hammond Lamont, English Composition (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907). His treatment is essentially the same in the 1917 revision.
\textsuperscript{283}Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 250. His treatment is essentially the same in the 1917 revision.
inasmuch as they helped to secure the "paramount quality of Force."\(^{284}\)

Though O'Neill contended that "a 'speech style' or 'oral style' is always preferable in argumentation and is practically always used in good argumentation,"\(^{285}\) his own treatment was traditional. He discussed style primarily in relation to the introduction, discussion, and conclusion of a speech, much as had Laycock and Scales.

**Presentation**

Raymond Alden was among the first to treat extensively "the spoken debate."\(^{286}\) Not only did he explore the relation of written and spoken speech,\(^{287}\) but he also examined in detail kinds and qualities of delivery. Alden recommended the writing out of an argumentative speech, but warned against memorizing\(^{288}\) or reading\(^{289}\) the document. He preferred an extemporaneous delivery using

\(^{284}\)"For this purpose," he said, "Clearness and Ease are invaluable; and to them we should add the rhetorical aids of Brevity, Concreteness, and Illustration." \(\text{Ibid.}, \) p. 250.


\(^{288}\)\text{Ibid.}, p. 194.

\(^{289}\)\text{Ibid.}, pp. 191-92.
notes. Alden also included "characteristics of a good delivery" which he "stated in the same words as the qualities of a good style":

- clearness (enunciation and purity of tone);
- force (vigor and variety of pitch);
- and elegance (posture and gesture). He believed, however, that:

  All these matters of delivery can, from one point of view, be reduced to a single principle. The successful speaker is one who is able to reach and move his audience. To do this he must . . . talk to them.

Baker and Huntington included a short section on "external form" in their chapter on debating in which they stated: "Debaters should remember that their appearance before an audience may have a large persuasive effect for or against them." They advised that "any beginner in debate will save himself much if he will take as preliminary a good course in voice-training, pose, and gesture."

Though Foster believed that "matter is more important than form," he, nevertheless, recognized the importance of a speaker's delivery. Of the five "methods" which he labeled, Foster precluded both writing out a

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290 Ibid., p. 205.
291 Ibid., pp. 205-214; Alden believed that little should be said about posture, and little gesture is needed in debate.
292 Ibid., p. 205.
293 Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 413.
294 Ibid.
speech and reading it, and memorizing it. He recognized problems in transition with the third method, "memorizing important parts and adapting the rest to the occasion," and suggested that the use of an outline or brief might even "detract . . . from the effectiveness of delivery." He argued rather that "most successful of all--other things being equal--is the speaker who extemorizes his whole address, without even a scrap of paper between himself and his hearers." Foster also recognized the importance of voice, enunciation, position, and gestures, and referred his readers to several contemporary texts which stressed delivery.

In addition to rules of good delivery, early period argumentation texts offered advice on manners in debating. Baker and Huntington, for example, talked about attitudes

295 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917 rev. ed., pp. 299-300. Foster agreed that a direct quotation that is read may be quite effective "provided that the speaker knows how to read," p. 303.

296 Ibid., p. 300.

297 Ibid. Foster suggested, nevertheless, that "even a speaker who has followed the extemore method with some success feels more confidence if he has adequate notes in his pocket. They have been compared to life-preservers under the berth, ready for use if the ship is sinking," p. 300.

toward colleagues. Though viewing debating as a "kind of
game," Foster stressed that it should not be mere
"contentiousness." He advised caution in the use of
ridicule, satire, invective, and epithet, and decried the
tendency in debating to "quibble." In a section entitled
"attitude toward opponents," Foster said:

No speaker can carry conviction who
imagines all truth to be on his side and all
who differ from him to be in obstinate error.
Such an attitude arouses antagonism.

O'Neill also emphasized "personal attitude and
bearing." Though agreeing that sarcasm, ridicule, and
personality attacks "are undoubtedly admissible and
helpful, under certain circumstances and when properly
handled, in discrediting an opponent," he warned of dangers
in using such techniques inadvisedly.

Ethics

Most early period writers made some mention of the
ethics of debating. Baker and Huntington, for example,
labeled "fairness" as one of "the special characteristics
of good debate," while Foster included sections on

299 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed.,
pp. 280-81.

300 Ibid., p. 309.

301 O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and
Debate, p. 379. O'Neill also warned against personal
inconsistency and wished for self control among debaters.

302 Baker and Huntington, Principles, p. 421.
"honor" in both the 1908 and 1917 editions of his text. It was, however, the issue of debating both sides of a question that provoked most conflict. Baker, who sanctioned such a procedure, purportedly suggested that "few college students have any deep convictions on public questions." Even so august a figure as former President Theodore Roosevelt felt compelled to comment:

> What we need is to turn out of our colleges young men with ardent convictions on the side of the right; not young men who can make a good argument for either right or wrong as their interest bids them. Our present method of carrying on debates . . . encourages precisely the wrong attitude among those who take part in them. There is no effort to instill sincerity and intensity of conviction. On the contrary the net result is to make the contestants feel that their convictions have nothing to do with their arguments.304

Criticism came, moreover, from within the ranks. Foster urged students "to refuse--even for the sake of practice, even for the supposed honor of the college--to speak against their convictions."305 He argued:


305 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1908 ed., p. 326; 1917 rev. ed., pp. 307-308. "At once the objection arises that it is good training for a person to study both sides of a question. Certainly it is. By all means let a debater earnestly study the side of the question in which he does not believe; let him be honest and diligent in his efforts to find all that can be urged against his own beliefs, in his efforts to get the point of view of 'the other fellow'; but let him decline to stand before an

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A speaker who, even in a formal contest, endeavors to convince an audience of the truth of what he believes to be false engages in an undertaking of doubtful morality. Here is the dilemma. If he simulates sincerity and earnestness, he is deceiving his hearers, emulating the most contemptible speakers in public life, preparing to swell their ranks. If he does not even appear to be sincere and earnest, he lacks the primary requisites of a persuasive speaker, and becomes the lifeless kind of debater of whom we hear complaint.\textsuperscript{306}

O'Neill offered one of the better defenses:

It certainly is the duty of the colleges to turn out "young men who can make a good argument" on either side of such questions without regard to their convictions. Whether a man will argue against his convictions in actual life, where the "merits of the question" are really to be decided, is a very different thing. Surely he must be mentally capable of doing it. . . . Argument that is worth while has an intellectual basis. It is built upon facts and logical inference rather than on ardent convictions. Skill in the use of the facts and inferences available may be gained on either side of a question without regard to convictions. Instruction and practice in debate should give young men this skill. And where these matters are properly handled, stress is not laid on getting the speaker to think rightly in regard to the audience and attempt to convince them of the truth of statements which he believes to be false. It is said, further, that the prevailing methods in classroom and intercollegiate debates offer practical difficulties in the attainment of this ideal. If so, let the methods go. Let us not sacrifice the ends for the sake of the means. If the rules of the game prevent the attainment of its supreme objects, let us discard the rules. The supreme objects of argumentation and debating are to train citizens who shall be, first, keen and sound and enthusiastic thinkers, second, leaders of men, fearless, able, devoted, but, above all, honest," 1917 rev. ed., p. 308.

\textsuperscript{306}Ibid., 1917 rev. ed., p. 308.
merits of either side of these questions--but to think \textit{accurately} on both sides.\textsuperscript{307}

Judging

Attitudes toward judging reflected philosophical divergencies regarding the "proper" end of contest debating.\textsuperscript{308} William H. Davis set out the nature of the dispute as follows:

If my analysis is correct, two fairly distinct conceptions of debating are recognizable. According to the first of these conceptions, debating is a game; the contests in debating exist in and for themselves and are conducted accordingly.

The opposite conception of debating . . . is that of training for the wise disposition of important matters in legislatures, public gatherings, club and society meetings--wherever men collect, as they must constantly be doing, at least in a democracy, for counsel and effective action. Debating, according to this conception, is an approximation of actual conditions, of "real life." The "contest" feature, the "sport" element, while still present, becomes secondary; and superiority, skill, becomes inconceivable apart from the total persuasive effect secured by the contestants.\textsuperscript{309}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{307}O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}, pp. 374-75.

\textsuperscript{308}Pelsma, "Questionnaire on Debating," p. 136. Almost one-third of those responding to Pelsma's questionnaire did not consider judges essential for intercollegiate debates. And of those who answered, many considered them to be a "necessary evil."

\textsuperscript{309}William H. Davis, "Is Debating Primarily a Game?" \textit{Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking}, II (April, 1916), 172-73. Davis noted, however, that these conceptions do not exist "absolutely." Rather, he was concerned with "the emphasis, the chief tendency, the predominating element."
\end{footnotesize}
The battle over the issue of "game" versus "tool" was largely fought in the pages of the Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking. Its editor, James M. O'Neill, advanced time and again in articles, editorials, and book reviews, his conviction that "the object of any particular team is to demonstrate its superiority over its opponent in debating." Debating should be judged "like other sport on the skill shown, by experts who are qualified to pass on the quality of that skill." In rendering decisions, O'Neill contended,

The proper question to be answered by the award is, "Which university has the better debating team?" It is not right either to expect judges to have no opinions on the questions debated or to expect the debaters to change the opinions of the judges. Each judge should know enough about debating (regardless of his knowledge or opinions in economics, politics, theology, etc.) to give an expert opinion on the comparative skill of the opposing teams, entirely aside from his private opinion on the question debated, either before or after the debate.

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

Unless we accept this as the proper basis of judgment we must either assume that the debater is actually supposed to change the opinions of the judges on these great civic questions, or we must be content with an opinion which could as well be obtained by mail weeks before the debate.  


311 Ibid.

312 O'Neill agreed, however, that "judges should be chosen who know enough about real debating to know that
O'Neill's pronouncements did not go unchallenged.
The first volley of magnitude came from William H. Davis who, "impressed by the reality involved in the debating contest," argued that "frankly accepted as a game, debating becomes a monstrous affair." Davis' predictions were dire:

The erection of specious structures of argument can hardly be ruled out; the more cunningly specious they are, the more commendable, as the fruit of brilliancy and industry, they become. As participants in a game, debaters may devise artfully misleading arguments or wordings, affirmatives may postpone answerable refutation until negatives have no opportunity to answer, negatives may withhold treatment of an "alternative plan" in order to diminish their opponents' opportunity for refutation, and no one can sensibly find fault; it is all in fun. It is hard to see why minor fabrications may not be regarded as venial. Surely the whole nauseating machinery of "colleagues," "opponents," "previous speaker," "we of the negative," "the gentlemen of the affirmative," becomes justified and essential and each debate will be a wordy quarrel between individuals restricted only by their having to speak within time limits and but one at a time.

O'Neill countered in an editorial entitled "Game or Counterfeit Presentment," and by the time Hugh Neal

skill does not consist in glibness of tongue, trickery of phraseology, nor superficiality of thought." Ibid., pp. 81-82.

313 Davis, "Is Debating a Game?" p. 177.
314 Ibid., p. 175.
315 Ibid.
Wells entered the fray in October, 1917, debate ensued on a full scale.

Wells argued that the only valid basis for judging a debate is to assess "the respective merits of the case or argument presented by the opposing teams." "Skill in 'reasoning, research, and speaking' should be judged by results," he said.

Debate decisions must be rendered upon the merits of the argument presented by the debaters, irrespective of the personal opinions of the judges concerning the merits of the resolution.

The judges must pass upon the arguments presented as though they were exhaustive of the subject. The task of the judge, therefore, is to place himself in the position of one who has no opinions or knowledge of the subject, other than what has been presented, and to make the decision which any reasonable and intelligent person would predicate upon the premises.

Meanwhile, Howard S. Woodward was experimenting with decisionless debates. Lew Sarett constructed one of the more popular paradigms, a "Board of Judges" composed of "one expert judge," which he explained as follows:

318 Ibid., p. 338.
319 Ibid., pp. 340-41.
The system rests upon the idea that a single expert judge who has reached a high degree of efficiency through much experience as a debater and as a judge, can give a more fair and helpful decision than can a board of from three to five judges, in part, or in whole, incompetent and inexpert. To secure the highest type of judge it is customary to pay a fee, and to require in addition to his formal decision, a detailed analysis of the debate with a statement of the basis of his conclusion. At once the question arises: who shall be deemed an "expert judge?" His qualifications should include most, if not all of the following: a thorough knowledge of the ins and outs of debate secured through (1) actual participation in intercollegiate debate, (2) experience as a coach of intercollegiate debate, (3) experience in serving as a judge. It is desirable in addition that he possess by virtue of his training or profession, a fair knowledge and a proper perspective of the fields of economics, sociology, and political science, in which most of our debate questions lie. 322

322 Ibid. Sarett required that a judge substantiate his decision by reading a brief analysis of the debate. The form he advocated is as follows: "1. Which team was superior in the clear, coherent, and effective organization of its material? . . . 2. Which team better supported its contentions with sound proof? . . . 3. Which team established and maintained the most crucial issues? . . . 4. Which team was superior in destroying its opponents' crucial issue? . . . 5. Which team, through greater freedom in departing from prepared speeches, and through superior extempero speaking and resourcefulness, more readily adapted its arguments to the arguments actually made by its opponents upon the platform? . . . 6. Which team in its constructive argument manifested a superior analysis of the question? . . . 7. Which team manifested a superior analysis of the debate as it actually progressed on the platform, i.e. which team was superior in discovering and following the strategic issues rather than the minor or irrelevant points? . . . 8. Which team was superior in team work? . . . 9. Which team was superior in delivery, aside from effective delivery presumed in other questions? . . . 10. Which team in general--aside from the rebuttal work presumed in other questions--was superior in rebuttal? . . . 11. Which team was superior
Other writers continued to explore various other alternatives to judging. R. O. T. Hollister advocated faculty judging, while Raymond Pease believed the audience to be the most desirable "jury." Pease contended that:

College audiences should function as nearly as possible as audiences in the world at large; that there should be the largest possible influence of and appeal to the audience; that we cannot otherwise expect the greatest good either to the audience or to the speakers; that to secure these ends the audience must have a part in the "game."

Criteria for judging appeared, Pattee's listing being representative:

I. Which side has the better analysis?
II. Which side has the stronger proof?
   A. Consider the preponderance of the evidence.
   B. Consider the quality of the evidence.
   C. Consider the skill used in reasoning.
III. Which side offers the better refutation?
   A. See which side has more main points left standing after the refutation has been given.

In debate strategy? On the basis of the above analysis, it is my judgment that the most effective debating was done by the . . . team," pp. 137-38.


IV. Which side has the better delivery?
   A. Consider general bearing, voice, and language.325

Summary

George Pierce Baker had envisioned a "practical argumentation for everyday life" when he first published The Principles of Argumentation in 1895. It was his task to formulate its theoretical bases. Relying primarily on legal and philosophical writings, Baker developed precise systems of analysis and of briefing. His approach to proof, moreover, sidestepped the strictures imposed by Formal Logic. Baker's interest in the discovery of arguments and in their relation to a proposition was particularly influential. His approach to proof has less impact. Most writers simply were not prepared to reject the relative security of formal validity in favor of some vague "practical argumentation."

Several notable texts published during the "early period" followed in the Baker tradition. By 1917, with the revisions of Foster's Argumentation and Debating and O'Neill's "rewriting" of Laycock and Scales's Argumentation and Debate, traditional theory had crystallized. Not that total agreement prevailed in all areas, but a consensus had been reached on major theoretical issues. Discussions of the nature of argumentation accommodated debating, that

kind of argumentation which was gaining great currency, if not necessarily great respectability around the turn of the century. Baker's system of analysis assimilated stock issues as well as expanded treatments of the proposition. The concept of proof as revised by Foster and O'Neill set the standard not only for argumentation and debate texts, but for general works in public speaking. Differences arose largely out of a philosophical split over the end of contest debating. The ramifications of this "game" versus "tool" debate, as hotly argued as any contest proposition, reached into and influenced the "middle period" as well as contemporary debate theory.
CHAPTER III

THE MIDDLE PERIOD--1917-c. 1955

By 1917, argumentation and debate had established a tradition in the academic world. Many college curricula included courses in the discipline. Intercollegiate debating had become a "big-time" activity, rivaling athletics in certain eastern universities. Traditional theory, moreover, encompassed a solidified and comprehensive body of knowledge, many of the early problems and controversies having been resolved. There were rumblings and dissatisfactions, of course, particularly regarding the "proper" end of intercollegiate debating, but the theoretical bases of the discipline remained largely unquestioned. The attack on the standard tradition was not long in coming, however. Mary Yost of Vassar fired the first volley, but Charles H. Woolbert largely assumed the bombardment.¹ The Yost-Woolbert criticisms prompted a

reassessment of argumentation and debate theory, particularly its philosophical underpinnings, and resulted in an interest in new argumentative forms. This chapter outlines the developments spawned by this reevaluation.

The period from 1918 to 1955, though long chronologically, exhibited homogeneity in writers, in textual materials, and in philosophy. Though certain isolated texts attempted to revamp the whole of argumentation and debate theory in terms of the Yost-Woolbert approaches, and though others ignored the attacks altogether, most "middle period" writers sought to broaden the philosophical base of the discipline to accommodate contemporary findings in psychology, sociology, and


Such important writers as Baird and O'Neill spanned the entire period.

See, for example, George R. Collins and John S. Morris, Persuasion and Debate (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927).

educational philosophy. The Baker tradition not only survived, it prospered as it accommodated new drifts in contemporary thought.

The 1917 Foster and O'Neill revisions set the standard for traditional theory during the "middle period." Nor were these works discarded early. Foster's text commanded wide usage during the early part of the period and was revised as late as 1932. O'Neill, meanwhile, expanded the scope of his writing, venturing into discussion, and co-authoring books on argumentation with McBurney, Cortright, and a revision with McBurney and Mills. Such thoughtful works as W. C. Shaw's The Art of Debate, A. Craig Baird's Public Discussion and Debate, and Russell Wagner's Handbook of Argumentation were at core traditional, as were the vast majority of texts which appeared during the period. These texts refined and/or restated traditional principles of analysis. They recognized, even belaboured, the inadequacies of a logic-oriented system of

5 In a review of that revision, Raymond Howes commented: "It has lost nothing of the authority which has made it, for many years, the massive rock on which lesser men have reared their little spires toward the light of fame." Raymond F. Howes, "New Books: Argumentation and Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIX (February, 1933), 92.

argument; yet their own lists of prescriptions from Formal Logic increased. The forensic, moreover, drew fire from those writers, particularly in the journals, who wished to bring contemporary debate practices into line with revised notions about the nature of argumentation. The long-range results of these efforts, however, threatened neither the primacy nor the prestige of intercollegiate debating. The major changes in argumentation and debate theory during the "middle period" involved, rather, the nature of argumentation and resulted in, as well as from, a broadening of its scope.

**The Nature of Argumentation**

"Middle period" writers defined argumentation essentially as had their predecessors. Their theory, moreover, continued to draw heavily from law and Formal Logic. An increased interest in persuasion, however, along with a call for a "total" organic theoretical construct, brought psychology and rhetoric to the forefront. In a 1938 journal article, Baird examined "the

7See section on the forensic.

educational philosophy of the teacher of speech" and concluded that "the conflicting attitudes of the educational world are mirrored in our own field." Baird's analysis helps to clarify the differing views on the nature of argumentation as well as the specific principles and procedures advocated. "We are by turns humanists, realists, scientists, and much else," said Baird. \footnote{9 A. Craig Baird, "The Educational Philosophy of the Teacher of Speech," \textit{Quarterly Journal of Speech}, XXIV (December, 1938), 546.}

Speech humanists, \footnote{10\textit{Ibid.}} are among us aplenty. We humanists usually have a strong English background, a predilection for Aristotle, a faith in the seven liberal arts (or at least the first three), and we insist upon course content.

Among our speech fraternity are also the disciples of reason, followers of John Locke and Adam Smith. We Lockeians specialize in contemporary history and economics; and we are not averse to statistics. We rationalists constitute the robust progeny who direct debate teams and encourage business and professional speaking.

A third group of philosophers are the speech aesthetes. We who fall into this category believe in beauty of vocal diction and correctness of posture. We talk much of standard pronunciation as the central problem and of linguistics for all.

Still another group of us have fallen heir to scientific determinism. We follow Lord Bacon, Herbert Spencer, and modern science; we interest ourselves chiefly in physical and physiological aspects of speech science. Yet another branch of us have, especially

\footnote{11\textit{Ibid.}}

\footnote{See A. Craig Baird, "Argumentation as a Humanistic Subject," \textit{Quarterly Journal of Speech Education}, X (June, 1924), 258-64.}
since 1920, adopted the ways of behavioristic and other varieties of psychology. We have given new and more exact names to speech attributes. We have, no doubt, contributed to a new insight into our speech discipline.

Finally, a few of us have attempted to adjust our teaching and thinking to the ways of the social experimentalists, the progressive educators. With these progressives we have hoped to reconstruct the social order, provide freedom for pupil and teacher, guidance rather than discipline, life rather than school.\textsuperscript{12}

Conviction and Persuasion

Probably the most critical theoretical issue of the "middle period" involved the "proper" relationship between conviction and persuasion and their respective roles in argumentation and debate. Early argumentation and debate writers, influenced by the prevailing faculty psychology, had introduced the conviction-persuasion dichotomy into their theory of the nature of argument. Though Baker and Huntington had advised against considering conviction and persuasion to be independent processes, subsequent writers failed to heed their counsel. In 1917, Mary Yost observed that "all of the usual textbooks . . . approach the subject of argument from the point-of-view of logic."\textsuperscript{13} Likewise rejecting "outmoded psychological principles" as valid basis of argument, Yost preferred the "conception of the mind as an organic unit performing a

\textsuperscript{12}Baird, "Educational Philosophy of Teacher of Speech," p. 546.

\textsuperscript{13}Yost, "Argument from View of Sociology," p. 112.
particular function—reasoning, feeling, willing—as may be demanded by the situation the individual is meeting."\textsuperscript{14} Though Yost wished her own analysis to be consistent with current psychology, it was "the situation the individual is meeting" that interested her most. Accordingly, and as the title of her article suggests, she viewed argument within the social context and approached it from the point of view of sociology.

Yost's thesis that argumentation must begin with a view of the social situation in which the argument appears, rather than with subject matter, presented three problems:

First, there is the search for characteristics of the typical social group in which argument arises, which will distinguish it, as a species is differentiated from its genus, from social groups in which any act of discourse may arise; second, the search for characteristic effects which argument as an act of communication has on both members of the social group, speaker as well as audience; and third, the search for characteristic stages in the process of the act of communication by which these effects are produced.\textsuperscript{15}

Yost judged, and rightly so, that "the most important bearing the discussion of argument in this paper has upon the teaching of argument is in regard to the treatment of the audience."\textsuperscript{16} She said:

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 111.
\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 113.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 121.
The question of how to attract the audience's attention and eventually to focus this on the subject, of how to present the idea so that there is no chance of being misunderstood, of the choosing from the evidence found trustworthy just that which will touch the audience's experience most closely, of the translation of the subject in terms of the audience's interests, of making specific suggestions as to how the ideas finally dominating the audience's attention can express themselves in action which will further the interests of the group, all these problems must be faced by the student as problems of a real situation.17

"Such a study does not deny the value of the logical analysis of argument," Yost added. "Rather its results should be in harmony with the sound logical principles underlying argument."18

Professor Charles H. Woolbert agreed that "any division of appeal and speech into conviction and persuasion is unsound from the point of view of psychology and unnecessary from the point of view of rhetorical theory."19 Contending that "mental processes can be described and explained only in terms of psychology," he turned to that "one concept that describes what happens when an organism is stimulated in any and all possible

17Ibid., p. 123.

18Ibid., p. 113. For Yost, it was a matter of emphasis. She treated the brief, therefore, as a preliminary test of thinking rather than an outline guide for the presentation of arguments.

ways, . . . and which is expressed in the term action." Woolbert concluded that "as a matter of the theory of public address and appeal, all dualistic attitudes separating response into action and non-action are untenable and misleading." One tends to delineate "not in terms of what the responder actually does," he said, "but in terms of what the observer perceives him doing." To phrase it differently, Woolbert believed the conviction-persuasion duality to be simply a means of distinguishing between overt and covert response. Recognizing that "if one aim, response, covers all attempts to get results, then either there is no place for logic in a system of persuasion in its broader sense, or logic must be shown to run throughout the whole process." Woolbert opted for the latter alternative and called for a rewriting of "the whole theory of argumentation, conviction, persuasion, the rhetoric of public address . . . to fit the facts of mind as accepted today." Such an attempt, "tantamount to restating them in terms of stimulus-response, object-subject, and

\[\text{Ibid., p. 253. Woolbert used the terms response and action interchangeably.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 264.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p. 258.}\]

\[\text{Woolbert, "Logic in a System of Persuasion," p. 20.}\]
environment-attitude,\textsuperscript{24} should, according to Woolbert, follow certain standards:

It will be one that will recognize the monism of action; that will not concern itself with any division of the mind into intellect, emotions, and will; that will take the woof and warp figure of Baker and Huntington at its full value and hold to it; that will perceive that if attention is the key of persuasion we must not tolerate a dualism which prevents us from showing how it unlocks all possible processes; that will make the hearer the basis of all divisions and not the subject-matter; . . . that will reveal the full influence that social relations play in securing response; and finally, that will state the accepted principles of composition and rhetoric in terms of stimulus-response, stimulation-action.\textsuperscript{25}

In 1919, Woolbert attempted a restatement of rhetorical theory. Whether it met all the standards he had set is outside the scope of this study. What he said, however, is vital, for it represented a new departure in argumentation and debate theory. Woolbert set out his statement of principles and methods of persuasion in a series of three articles in the Quarterly Journal of Speech Education.\textsuperscript{26} The first article, dealing with "Principles," specifically involved the nature of argumentation.\textsuperscript{27} Though Edward Z. Rowell was, for the most part, an unsympathetic reviewer, he summarized fairly

\textsuperscript{24}Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion," p. 264.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 263.
\textsuperscript{26}Woolbert, "Persuasion: Principles and Methods."
\textsuperscript{27}The second and third articles will be included in appropriate later sections of this chapter.
and concisely Woolbert's first essay. "In handling the subject of 'Underlying Principles,'" Rowell said, "Woolbert argues, in general, as follows:

All verbal communication involves one fundamental aim, and that is response. All responses have in common the element of acceptance. In every act of acceptance propositions are involved. When we come upon these propositions we treat them as truths. Responding to stimulation, therefore, is the same as responding to truth, which, in turn, is the same as accepting propositions as true. All persuasion, accordingly, must have for its one fundamental aim the acceptance as true of some one or several propositions. This implies (1) that sufficiency to gain acceptance must be the ultimate standard for all rhetoric even as regards the logical principles of truth; (2) that the basis of this sufficiency must be sought in the occasion; and (3) that since each occasion is dominated by such variable factors as the speaker, the audience, and the ideas used to secure the response desired, any sound system of persuasion must possess the principle of flexibility.28

The Critics' Influence

Stimulated by the ideas of Yost and Woolbert, textbooks in argumentation and debate based on a reformulation or revision of persuasion theory began to appear. Rowell cited four: Persuasion and Debate by George Collins and John Morris; Public Discussion and Debate by A. Craig Baird; Argumentation by James A. Winans and William E. Utterback; and The Method of Argument by Charles Fritz.29

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29Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate; Baird,
Collins and Morris' *Persuasion and Debate*, perhaps the most radical work, both in point of view and in methodology, rested largely on the hypotheses of Woolbert. The authors proposed "to provide a thoroughly modern exposition of the basic logical and psychological principles and practical methods of oral and written persuasion," and "to present a brief but comprehensive discussion of that specialized form of persuasion commonly known as debate." Collins and Morris extended Woolbert's system of persuasion envisioned in his journal articles, incorporating both his organizational scheme and his terminology. They rejected the conviction-persuasion dichotomy along with the traditional divisions and terminology of logic. Subsequent texts, however, incorporated few of Collins and Morris' innovations.


31 Ibid. This will be considered in a later section of this chapter.

32 Ibid., p. ix. Of Woolbert's influence, they said: "The authors owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Professor Charles Henry Woolbert of the University of Iowa, who read the manuscript minutely and offered invaluable criticism and advice," p. xi.
Baird also wished to "restate familiar argumentative principles in terms of present-day speech, logic, and psychology."\(^{33}\) Preferring to "update" and "restate" rather than "rewrite" traditional theory, Baird incorporated ideas of the New Logic as represented by Bernard Bosanquet, Alfred Sidgwick, and John Dewey, as well as psychological principles advocated by William James, Carl E. Seashore, E. B. Tichener, R. S. Woodworth, and Floyd H. Allport. He acknowledged, moreover, a "great debt to Professors G. P. Baker, H. B. Huntington, W. T. Foster, J. M. O'Neill, Craven Laycock, and W. C. Shaw."\(^{34}\) Wishing to refine traditional theory, to modify it where it was inconsistent with contemporary scientific and philosophical findings, and, most of all, to incorporate these new developments within the standard tradition, Baird enunciated principles and worked out "accommodations," both in his textbooks and in his teaching.\(^{35}\) His legacy to subsequent discussion and debate works is immeasurable.\(^{36}\)


\(^{36}\) A later section on discussion indicates that though the Ewbank-Auer texts cite Baird's works but
The fact that Winans and Utterback wrote from the psychological-sociological perspective does not necessarily demonstrate the influence of Yost or Woolbert on their text, Argumentation. Winans, one of the earliest speech scholars to apply modern psychological findings to communication, had investigated attention as early as 1911,\textsuperscript{37} six years before Yost's article, and by 1914, he had extended his theory to include "the modern theory of volition or will."\textsuperscript{38} Winans and Woolbert, moreover, advocated different brands of psychology. Woolbert was a confirmed behaviorist; Winans an empiricist. Woolbert redefined logic as a pervasive influence in the total process of persuasion. The Winans-Utterback text viewed argumentation as "the art of influencing thought and conduct by an appeal addressed primarily to the sparingly, their theory does follow, or at least is consistent with, much of Baird's early probings. See Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer, Discussion and Debate: Tools of a Democracy (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1941); (rev. ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951). For other works indebted to Baird, see William A. Behl, Discussion and Debate: An Introduction to Argument (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1953); Waldo W. Braden and Earnest Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making: Principles of Discussion and Debate (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955).

\textsuperscript{37}James A. Winans, "The Attention of the Speaker," Public Speaking Review, I (October, 1911), 41-47.

understanding," and treated logic traditionally. Whereas Woolbert wished to reconcile logic and persuasion, Winans and Utterback saw no conflict between the two.

Though Yost's article did not seriously damage, nor Woolbert's "rewriting" supplant, traditional argumentation and debate theory, most "middle period" writers did not discredit the validity of their criticisms. Winans, for example, thought the charges long overdue. Most "new" texts, however, finding Woolbert's alternative equally unacceptable, simply revised traditional philosophies and methodologies to accommodate new drifts in theory. These early probings resulted in the following modifications in "middle period" theory: an expanded treatment of audience; an emphasis on argumentation as a

39Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 3.

40Edward Z. Rowell recognized the tendency toward "accommodation" in his review of James M. O'Neill and James H. McBurney, The Working Principles of Argument (New York: Macmillan Company, 1932). "In general, the reader will find in this work a serious attempt to pay heed to the criticisms which have been leveled at our traditional course in argumentation in the last fifteen years. He will find here a clear recognition of all the newly-emphasized consideration due the audience, and he will meet here a frank attempt to mend and amend the principles and techniques which we have been teaching." Edward Z. Rowell, "New Books: Working Principles of Argument," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIX (June, 1933), 429. Rowell objected, however, that the mending and the amending are conspicuous," and concluded: "Thus our very anxiety to give adequate recognition to the newer conceptions of our discipline robs our books of the directness and simplicity which we like to find in college textbooks," p. 430.
balanced rhetorical effort; and a broadening of its scope to include discussion. Baird's analysis of argumentation as a humanistic subject presaged these new directions. His "admittedly fragmentary" proposal stated:

Argument shall be taught as a systematic attempt to discover and present the truth, whereas debating, although also having this purpose, shall continue to aim first of all at gaining a decision on definite issues by means of exact technique. Argument must continue to base its procedure on the sure foundation of logic and evidence. But a more just proportion is to be observed between Thought, Composition, and Delivery. Discussion will be substituted for formal debating; figures and citation of authorities will not submerge vital thought; individual expression will have freer scope than is usually the case in debate. . . . This shifting of emphasis from the legal to the rhetorical and philosophical will logically lead to an enlargement of the field of discussion. . . . Argument, . . . will include the whole field of philosophy, science, literature and ethics.41

The Audience

Though Aristotle had insisted on the audience-centered nature of persuasion in the fourth century B.C.,42 it was an interest in twentieth century developments in the social sciences that catapulted the audience into a central place in argumentation and debate theory.43 Whereas "early

41 Baird, "Argumentation as a Humanistic Subject," p. 262.


43 See Woolbert's view of response; Yost's insistence on a sociological context.
"period" writers had examined the audience in chapters on persuasion, many "middle period" texts included separate chapters on the audience in which they emphasized "persuasion"; i.e., emotion appeals. Various footnotes and bibliographies indicate, moreover, that writers appropriated their ideas about the audience primarily from contemporary public speaking, psychology, and sociology texts.

In 1932, O'Neill and McBurney examined "five psychological states which must be experienced by the audience before effective communication takes place in argument: attention; perception; reasoning; judgment; and overt action." In his 1937 revision of Public Discussion and Debate, Baird, relying on the analysis of the psychologist H. L. Hollingsworth, discussed five general aims in influencing the audience: catch the attention of the potential hearer; hold his interest through the

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45 Audience-decision debating also gained a measure of popularity during the period. See forensic section of this chapter.


selection and arrangement of ideas; convince him through logical argument and evidence; persuade him through proper motivating materials; and secure from him definite action. Most "middle period" argumentation and debate writers perceived their discipline to be thus multifaceted, differences in textual treatments being primarily a matter of emphasis. Of particular interest, however, was the role of attention in argumentation.

James A. Winans, probably the first public speaking writer to discuss attention in light of modern psychological theory, relied primarily on William James's hypothesis that "what holds attention determines action." Agreeing that "arguing well means holding the attention of an audience," Baird also investigated the nature of attention.

48Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 rev. ed., p. 240. Baird retained these distinctions in his Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 214. Ewbank and Auer also cited the Hollingsworth analysis, pointing out that "in terms of these five tasks . . . as well as in terms of the degree to which the audience is polarized or oriented toward the speaker, Hollingsworth has classified five chief types of audiences": pedestrian; passive; selected audience; concerted audience; and organized audience. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., pp. 223-24; 1951 rev. ed., pp. 208-209.


attention, observing that it occurs in varying degrees; that it may be voluntary or involuntary; and that certain "conditions of attention" may be isolated. These "conditions" (intensity, movement, surprise, the familiar, the concrete, suspense, and struggle) appear in certain other works as stylistic devices for amplification.

Winans and Utterback held that "if the argument itself is not sufficiently interesting to hold attention, no matter how it is arranged, the speaker must employ special methods to make it so." They suggested "two ways to make a dull argument interesting: relating it to a topic or an activity in which the audience is already holding attention, but they did not apply the James theory. Robert W. Babcock and John H. Powell, How to Debate (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1923), pp. 50-51.

51 Baird cited psychologists Stevenson Smith and E. R. Guthrie who averred that degrees of attention result from "differences in relative intensity of the various stimuli, because of the particular orientation of our sense organs at any moment, because of the variation of conductivity in neutral arcs, the result of habit and reënforcement, and because of fatigue." Stevenson Smith and E. R. Guthrie, General Psychology in Terms of Behavior (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1921), p. 204, cited in Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 273.


54 Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 231.
interested,\textsuperscript{55} and expressing it in language that arouses interest.\textsuperscript{56} Winans and Utterback perceived the "permanent interests" of audiences to be fundamental interests, human interest, interest in personages, and interest in conflict. They outlined, moreover, the following methods of arousing interest: illustration; description and narration; concrete expression; wit and humor; and the rhetorical question.\textsuperscript{57}

Ewbank and Auer treated attention in a section called "Basic Facts about Listening." They concluded:

1. Listeners cannot give continuous attention. . . .
2. To hold attention, the style of the speech must be varied. . . .
3. We attach meanings to concrete and specific symbols more easily than to general and abstract ones. . . .\textsuperscript{58}

Though including "effective rhetorical devices for gaining attention," Ewbank and Auer dropped, as did subsequent texts, the rationale provided by the James theory.\textsuperscript{59}


\textsuperscript{56}Winans and Utterback, \textit{Argumentation}, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 232-41.

\textsuperscript{58}Ewbank and Auer, \textit{Discussion and Debate}, 1941 ed., pp. 452-57, \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 457-58. They included questions, illustrations, examples, figurative language, loaded words, and humor.
"Middle period" texts also offered specific prescriptions for analyzing audiences. Though differing systems (i.e., lists of questions) appeared, most writers sought to determine an audience's knowledge and beliefs about a speaker, his subject, and to a lesser extent, the occasion. Collins and Morris wished simply to determine the probable acceptance-attitudes of an audience. The

O'Neill summarized "the whole theory of handling an audience" as follows: "Know your audience and adapt your speech to your audience." O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, p. 283. Baird labeled discussion and debate "a problem of influencing the audience." Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 272. The Winans-Utterback text agreed, asserting that "the hearer's knowledge of the subject, his interest in it, and his beliefs and bias on it so largely determine his reaction that an analysis of his attitude is essential to the construction of effective argument." Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 189.

See particularly Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate, pp. 58-65; Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, pp. 172-209; Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951 rev. ed., pp. 232-35; Behl, Discussion and Debate, pp. 165-79. O'Neill and McBurney's representative list of factors in audience analysis follows: "1. The existing status or needs of the audience in relation to the proposition. 2. The environmental background of the audience. 3. The personality type of the audience. 4. The acceptance attitude toward the proposition. 5. Familiarity with the proposition. 6. Emotional attitude toward the proposition. 7. Attitude toward the arguer." O'Neill and McBurney, Working Principles of Argument, pp. 73-80.

These will be examined in detail in the section on emotional proof.

See Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate, p. 62.
development of discussion theory probably influenced treatments of the larger audience. Ewbank and Auer, for example, included chapters on "How Individuals in Groups Think" and "Characteristics of the Average Audience" which drew heavily from contemporary sociological and psychological research. Behl's later list of "characteristics which are virtually universal to any audience situation" (that is, the tendencies to believe what one wishes to believe, to rationalize, and to respond to persuasive appeals) emphasized a continued interest in pathos as a primary tool of audience adaptation. These and similar lists of principles governing motivation are considered in a subsequent section on emotional proof.

**Balanced Rhetorical Approach**

The rejection of the conviction-persuasion dichotomy by most "middle period" writers along with an

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64 Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 165.

65 Foster, one exception, was criticized for retaining the conviction-persuasion dichotomy in his 1917 revision of Argumentation and Debating. See William Hawley Davis, "New Books: Argumentation and Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IV (January, 1918), 128-31. Disappointed, moreover, with his failure to emphasize persuasion in the 1932 edition, Raymond F. Howes observed: "Dr. Foster still thinks of argument and persuasion as separate processes." Howes, "New Books: Argumentation and Debating," p. 93. Howes editorialized: "The abandonment of that concept in recent years is in one sense new, since psychologists and rhetoricians have learned something about the human mind since ancient times, and in another sense fundamental, because it necessitates pervasive changes in the discussion of argument itself. Thus the analysis of

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increased interest in the audience resulted in a search—in the classical sense—for "all the available means of persuasion," the practical effect of which elevated the status of emotional and ethical appeals in argumentation and debate theory and emphasized style and delivery as integral to a "total" process. Though many "early period" writers had embraced, at least philosophically, Baker's "woof" of argumentation, and though argumentative "composition" had called for chapters on style and arrangement, early texts treated these elements as subsidiary to the audience is not something that the speaker does after he has prepared his brief, merely for the purpose of discovering the best way to present contentions already selected. The knowledge and beliefs of the audience form a standard of relevance for the contentions themselves. Donald Ecroyd leveled a similar criticism at the McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills revision. He said: "The chapters dealing with the actual seeking of audience agreement, however, seem to have been written as re-definitions and defenses of such older notions as the conviction-persuasion dichotomy, and a classification of motive appeals." Donald Ecroyd, "New Books: Argumentation and Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVII (December, 1951), 503.

Considerations regarding arrangement appeared in sections on briefing or case construction.

logical proof. The sociological-psychological perspective, on the other hand, encouraged viewing style, delivery, and motivational and ethical proofs as integral to an organic theory of argumentation.

Emotional Proof

Emotional proof, reserved by certain writers for gaining attention in an introduction and perhaps amplifying the appeal in a conclusion, assumed a more central role in "middle period" argumentation and debate theory. Not only did it achieve status equal to conviction, but modern psychology argued that there was no division between the two. Most texts continued, nevertheless, to examine the processes separately, the main divergence from traditional theory being simply a greater emphasis on emotional proof. That emphasis, derived primarily from a renewed interest in the audience and from the reevaluation of the

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68See Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 5-7.


70Baker and Huntington had earlier reasoned that "for purposes of instruction" it is convenient to treat the processes separately. Baker and Huntington, Principles, 1905 ed., p. 11.

71Collins and Morris did not label separate processes. Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate.
place of persuasion in argumentation, centered on analyses of audience beliefs, classifications of emotions, and restatements of principles of motivation in terms of contemporary psychology.

Though Baird paraphrased Shaw's definition of belief (the "certainty or assurance with respect to the alleged truth of an idea"), he recognized that "belief . . . is (according to modern psychology) a form of behavior." Later developments in the social sciences gave even greater insights into the nature of belief. In their revision of Discussion and Debate, Ewbank and Auer, for example, cited the findings of social psychologists David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield who contended that "as soon as we experience any facts, they will be perceived as organized into some sort of meaningful whole." From this "universal characteristic of the cognitive process," Ewbank and Auer concluded:


When analyzing an audience perhaps the most important observation to make about belief is that all men tend to formulate some kind of belief about situations they encounter. That is, men perceive with meaning and interpretation, even though they do not have all the evidence.  

A general agreement with Winans' position that "to convince or to persuade a man is largely a matter of identifying the opinion or cause of action which you wish him to adopt with one or more of his fixed opinions or customary courses of action" prompted an interest in the existing beliefs of an audience. Winans and Utterback went so far as to suggest that the beliefs of an audience should become 

77 See Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate, pp. 4-6, 57. Defining persuasion as "that form of instrumental composition which is used by a writer or speaker to influence a particular audience to shape its conduct (whether thought or action) in conformity with his desire," Collins and Morris believed that "persuading a single individual or a group is largely a matter of connecting, or identifying a desired belief or action to or with one or more established beliefs or customary courses of action." (Author's italics omitted.) J. Walter Reeves and Hoyt H. Hudson had considered "the principles for choosing persuasive material" to be: "Do not disturb any more than necessary the fixed beliefs of your hearers, but rather show, if possible, that your views are in accord with their fixed beliefs." J. Walter Reeves and Hoyt H. Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1941), p. 116. Ewbank and Auer had defined persuasion as "the process of securing acceptance of an idea, or an action, by connecting it favorably with the listeners' (or readers') attitudes, beliefs, and desires." Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 261; 1951 rev. ed., p. 241.
the speaker's basic premises. Regarding the relative strengths of beliefs, they said:

Certain conditions are conducive to the formation of strong beliefs. With these conditions in mind, the speaker can infer from the background and experience of his hearers what many of their strongest beliefs are. Those beliefs are likely to be strongest (1) which are based upon habitual modes of action, (2) which are closely bound up with the hearer's personal interests and feelings, (3) which are an integral part of a system of beliefs felt to be mutually dependent, or (4) which are held by all, or nearly all, of those in the hearer's social group. 78

Ewbank and Auer also emphasized the importance of isolating the chief factors which determine the relative strength of beliefs. They cited numerous experimental studies in both editions of Discussion and Debate which demonstrated the following factors to be determinants of belief strength: length of time held; influence of group and expert opinion; ability to influence beliefs of others; personal, social, or economic status (degree of involvement); 79 and desirability of belief. 80

Baird averred that "to the extent that the emotions which stimulate approval are aroused will the speech be successful." 81 He cited contemporary treatments of emotion

78 Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, p. 142.
79 This was added to the revised edition. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951 rev. ed., pp. 228-30.
which perceived it as "a consciousness, or awareness, of bodily changes, these bodily changes resulting from some stimulus which is communicated to the higher centers of the nervous system." Allport put it this way: "This fused complex of sensory experience is what we call an emotion."  

The tradition of classifying emotions gave way during the "middle period" to the classification of motives. Writers disputed, moreover, over the difference in the terms. Winans cited the positions of John Dewey, William McDougall, and Edward Lee Thorndike. Dewey had


contended that the most evident way in which we arouse emotion to fix attention is by awakening desire for the end sought, an effective desire being called a motive.\(^8^7\) Thorndike suggested that an emotion which moves to action is a motive, though he did not consider all motives to be emotions.\(^8^8\) Baird, on the other hand, insisted that "all emotions are motives."\(^8^9\)

Later writers paid little attention to individual emotions and motives, investigating, rather, bases or principles which govern motivation. Winans had set out three such principles in *Public Speaking*: "in dealing with those practical issues that directly affect human conduct, the very basis of argument is emotion; or . . . the major premise of such an argument is the expression of an emotion"; the "strong tendency of men to believe what they wish to believe"; and, "emotions not properly belonging to


the argument itself, affect decisions." Ewbank and Auer discussed six bases of persuasion in the first edition of *Discussion and Debate* and called them "the main-springs of human motivations." They expanded their list in the revised edition to include the following:

1. We tend to believe what we want to believe.
2. We tend to believe, and to do, as we are told.
3. We tend to act in accordance with our dominant attitudes.
4. We tend to make stereotyped responses to stereotyped stimuli.
5. We tend to respond to the emotional connotations of words.
6. We tend to yield to the repetition of stimuli.
7. We tend to accept ideas from those we like.
8. We tend to conform.
9. We tend, when persuaded, to act immediately.
10. We tend to regard our actions as logical.

Baird attempted to isolate the same phenomena in his analysis of the audience as individuals and as a group. He concluded:

1. The individual and the audience as a group are

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affected by basic emotional responses and desires.

2. The individual and the audience as a group tend to believe what satisfies their primary and secondary needs and wants.

3. The individual and the audience as a group tend to respond to connotative language.

4. The individual and the crowd tend to be suggestible.

5. The individual and the crowd tend to rationalize.

6. The individual and the crowd tend to think and act from prejudice.

7. The individual and the audience tend to accept fallacious arguments.93

McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills included a comprehensive approach to motivation based on data provided by contemporary psychological and sociological studies.94 Though Mills defined motivation "generally as the process of stimulating inner urges and desires which prompt persons to action,"95 he suggested for practical purposes Robert H. 


95 Ibid., p. 143.
Seashore's "operational definition": "Motivation is the selective reinforcement or inhibition of stimuli or sets (preparatory responses) evoking any given type of response in competition with stimuli or sets leading to other behavior." Mills's discussion in the McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills revision integrated traditional notions of motivation into treatments of "persuasive values of motivation" (utilizes reaction tendencies and commands attention) and methods to "associate motive appeals with" the proposition (suggestion, rationalization, and forthright statement). He also included "some typical lists of appeals." Though most writers of the "middle period" had

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98 Behl added suggestion as a factor in persuasion. Relying on the definition of Emory S. Bogardus (Emory S. Bogardus, Fundamentals of Social Psychology [4th ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950], p. 275) that "suggestion is the process of sending out specific stimuli to which uncritical responses are made," Behl postulated that "persons react favorably to certain stimuli whether or not those stimuli present a logical pattern or configuration." Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 167. He then identified three factors influencing suggestibility--knowledge, fatigue, and the existence of a crowd--a knowledge of which would be helpful to a speaker, pp. 167-78.

99 Hayworth and Capel offered a novel approach to persuasive appeals. Having distinguished the academics "those who live largely in a world of facts, who get their
included considerations of motivation in their texts, some believed emotional proof to be outside the scope of—if not argumentation—then at least their particular studies. Pellegrini and Stirling, for example, in a "note to instructors" said:

We have not dealt with the psychological implications of speech and argumentation. We have felt, in the first place, that a treatment of this phase of the speech discipline would not fall within the scope of our work. The problems of motivation, persuasion, etc., are properly considerations for advanced courses in speech and argumentation. We have designed this text primarily for a beginning course in argumentation.\textsuperscript{100}

Such pronouncements occurred, however, early in the period.

Ethical Appeals

Baker and Huntington had recognized that "the means by which a speaker aims to produce action is by winning sympathy for himself or his subject—usually both."\textsuperscript{101}

Foster had listed "the man" as one of the three sources of

\begin{verbatim}
knowledge of life chiefly from reading, and who are definitely introspective" from the "warm 'human' people who, without bothering to think things out for themselves, take their beliefs from their most immediate desires and from those who happen to be near them," the authors turned to "the fundamental appeals of academic debating." Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, pp. 271, 284. They listed four: the social good; the rights of man; straight thinking; and good fellowship, p. 284.
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{100} Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, p. ix. See also Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, p. 214.

persuasion, and had isolated the following characteristics: sincerity; earnestness; simplicity; fairness; self-control; humor; sympathy; and personal magnetism. O'Neill added that a speaker must "know human nature." Most "middle period" texts simply reiterated various combinations of these characteristics, the primary development in theory being an increased emphasis on the value of ethos for argumentation and debate. Some authors discussed the intelligence, character, and goodwill characteristics of classical invention. Ewbank and Auer equated ethical proof with prestige. Winans and Utterback presented one of the more comprehensive treatments of ethical proof. They averred that an audience's estimate of a speaker "determines to what extent the speaker may rely upon his own unsupported assertion for the acceptance of his premises," and "a speaker who enjoys their [the audience's]

102 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1932 rev. ed., p. 233. Foster included the "good man" concept in discussing personal magnetism, p. 238.


104 O'Neill and Cortright, for example, included vigorous, sincere, earnest, fair, just, and reasonable. O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 166. Reeves and Hudson mentioned modest, fair, and sincere. Reeves and Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate, p. 114.

105 See Behl, Discussion and Debate, pp. 174-75; Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, p. 474.

confidence often exerts an influence all out of proportion to its logical value."  

Style

Interested primarily in oral argumentation, "middle period" writers distinguished the variables of oral and written communication in more detail than had their predecessors. Russell Wagner set out these differences clearly:

Speech must be almost instantaneously apprehended. Connections must be plain. The structure, relationships, and emphases must be much more plain and effective. Most of all, speaking must be more concrete and vivid than writing.

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108 Alden, *Art of Debate*. Certain "middle period" stylistic theorists did not, however, reflect this purely oral approach.

109 Wagner, *Handbook on Argumentation*, pp. 88-89. Wagner suggested that: "Oral composition differs from written also in that it is more direct and personal, more informal, more communicative. It is the discourse of one person speaking to another, face to face, and therefore resembles, in structure and style, conversation at its best. The exigencies and conventions of the platform require it to be good English, the continuity of the discourse requires attention to unity and coherence, but at all points it must be direct, oral speech. The speaker uses the passive voice less often than the writer. . . . He amplifies more, supplies more details; he uses more appositional and parenthetical expressions, since he must dwell on each idea until it is clear. Many sentences are therefore longer than they would be in written composition. But the alternation of long and very short sentences is more noticeable in oral than in written speech."
Though considerations of style appeared in chapters on persuasion, composition, language, semantics, and construction, most texts simply enumerated traditional characteristics of "good style" and/or stylistic devices for elaboration or amplification.

Some writers turned to the popular field of semantics for insights into the nature and components of style. Alan Nichols, for example, believed instruction in semantics to be an essential part of "the principles and techniques which assist the investigation and presentation

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110 O'Neill and Cortright, for example, added "originality" to O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales's "brevity, simplicity, vividness and variety." O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 150; O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 273-82. Some other representative methods of classification follow: Ewbank and Auer referred to "clear" language. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 445; 1951 rev. ed., p. 423. Reeves and Hudson included interest, along with clarity, as the qualities of style "that debaters should mainly cultivate." Reeves and Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate, pp. 129-33. Wagner discussed clearness, coherence, interest, and emphasis or force, "the qualities desired in good argumentative style." Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 89-102. Behl labeled "the three significant principles of style" as: clarity (adaptation to listener, accuracy of words, simplicity of sentences); forcefulness (variety of words, repetition, connotative words, simple words, an economy of words, variety of sentence structure, variety of sentence types); and spontaneity. Behl, Discussion and Debate, pp. 192-96.

111 Pellegrini and Stirling, for example, included restatement, repetition, general illustration, the probative example, the rhetorical question, negation, the illustrative analogy, contrast, and comparison. Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, pp. 134-42. See also Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, pp. 303-308.
of a subject of controversy." In the conclusion to a chapter labeled "Semantics," he summarized as follows:

The chief office of semantics is to make the student eternally aware of the inherent ambiguity of words. The word is not the object described. The object may, therefore, be something entirely different from the words used to describe it, or there may be no object whatever. We never can express all there is to say about an object; therefore, our description must always be imperfect. Words may be spoken and written in a multitude of senses, and may be heard, read, and understood in a multitude of other senses. We must, therefore, be constantly on the alert to apprehend the correct meaning and to achieve the truth.  

Baird's Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate also began with "principles of language usage." Having cited twelve semantic principles relevant to argumentation, discussion, and debate, Baird offered the following suggestions for concrete application.

1. Adapt your language to the audience.
2. Use accurate language.
3. Use objective language.
4. Be concrete.
5. Be concise.
6. Use unhackneyed language.
7. Use illustrative or figurative language.

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114 See Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 203-204.
8. Use oral language in speech composition.

9. Use variety in language.\textsuperscript{115}

Baird also discussed sentence structure and types of sentence forms and counselled that one might improve his oral style\textsuperscript{116} by reading, writing, and listening. He also advised that one acquire a knowledge of logic and semantics, and that he study language.

Delivery

"Middle period" writers followed their predecessors in examining methods of delivery,\textsuperscript{117} the most common listing being manuscript, memorized, impromptu, and extemporaneous speaking. The tendency to "can" rebuttal speeches\textsuperscript{118} probably prompted the vociferous defense of and insistence upon extemporaneous delivery in debating evident in some quarters.\textsuperscript{119} A general commitment to the extempore

\textsuperscript{115}Ibid., pp. 204-210.
\textsuperscript{116}Ibid., pp. 211-12.
\textsuperscript{117}See Alden, Art of Debate, pp. 187-98.
\textsuperscript{118}See Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917 rev. ed., p. 306.

\textsuperscript{119}Not everyone, however, espoused pure extemporaneous delivery. O'Neill and Cortright, for example, examined both its advantages (flexibility, allows adaptation to mood of audience, physical and nervous advantages, finer convincingness, inspiration of the audience) and its disadvantages (inaccurate, repetitious, monotonous, poor judgment), and preferred the "mixed method" of memorizing parts of the speech and extemporizing the rest. O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, pp. 217-23.
method for debating continued, moreover, throughout the period.\textsuperscript{120}  

Probably at least partially as a result of the excesses of elocution, most "early period" texts did not emphasize principles of delivery. In 1918, C. F. Lindsley observed that

average debating is not good public speaking. . . . There is nothing of the human quality, no conversational style, no sincere personality. . . . \textsuperscript{121}

Aware of these and similar indictments, Baird included a chapter in Public Discussion and Debate on delivery in which he stressed voice and bodily action.\textsuperscript{122} In reviewing the text, Charles A. Marsh questioned "the wisdom of including in a work on argumentation these technical subjects [action and voice]."\textsuperscript{123} By the end of the "middle period," however, a comprehensive treatment of delivery

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\textsuperscript{120} See, for example, Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 114-16; Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 246. Behl suggested, on the other hand, that "the type of delivery that the speaker elects to use in any one argumentative situation will vary according to the circumstances." Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 207.

\textsuperscript{121} C. F. Lindsley, "Delivery in Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IV (January, 1918), 117.


was the rule, rather than the exception. Baird's text marks a shift toward including these elements as integral to a total theory of argumentation and debate.

Relying heavily on Woolbert's treatment of delivery in *Fundamentals of Speech*, Baird suggested that:

- Good speaking is emotional speaking; and emotion . . . is a general bodily activity.
- Good speaking requires activity of both the voice and the body.

Baird proffered practical advice to the debater, moreover, regarding "the aspects of action, posture, movement, and gesture." He summarized, "the elements of vocalization" (quality, force or intensity, pitch, and duration or time) and discussed pronunciation, pointing out its

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126 *Ibid.*, pp. 342-45. Baird's discussion included specific advice regarding platform manners. Crocker's listing was more pedantic: "See that your clothes are pressed. Wear your best suit when you go on the platform. . . . Keep your shoes shined and do not let your socks fall down around your ankles. . . . Wear suspenders. . . . Go into the washroom before the debate to be sure your hair is all right, and then leave it alone." He also included lists of visual and auditory "don'ts." The following is a sampling: "Don't button and unbotton [sic] your coat. . . . Don't pick your nose. Don't rub your beard. . . . Don't smoke your fountain pen. . . . Don't consume gallons of water. . . . Don't cough. . . . Don't tear paper." Lionel Crocker, *Argumentation and Debate* (New York: American Book Company, 1944), pp. 247, 256-57. See also Winans, *Public Speaking*, 1917 ed., pp. 492-96.

importance, offering suggestions for its improvement, and examining the concept of "standard pronunciation." 128

Writers of the "middle period" also incorporated Winans' criterion of "conversational" delivery into their texts. Winans had talked about "conversational speech" in Public Speaking, 129 and in Argumentation, written with Utterback, he declared:

As regards delivery, public speaking is best thought of as a conversation between the speaker and his audience. It is not a one-man activity, but involves a process of give-and-take in which the audience plays an active and important part . . . .

Not only should the speaker conceive of his speaking as an enlarged conversation, but he should, while on the platform, have the feeling that it is conversation. He should not feel that he is talking at his audience or over their heads, but that he is talking with them. His delivery will not be effective unless he feels that he has entered into a direct, personal relation with his hearers. 130

Winans and Utterback held that "delivery is conversational when, and only when, two conditions exist: . . . a full realization of the content of one's words as one utters them"; and "a lively sense of communication." 131

128 Ibid., pp. 348-50.
130 Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, pp. 300-301.
Though many writers appropriated the phrase, "lively sense of communication," they tended to ignore, or perhaps assume, the "first condition of conversational delivery." Babcock and Powell's treatment, an exception, did insist on "an idea worth communicating." Winans and Utterback admitted, nevertheless, that "conversational quality alone does not insure good delivery," for it "may also have all of the faults of the speaker's private conversation, perhaps in an exaggerated degree." Egbert R. Nichols and Joseph H. Baccus argued that "public speaking is not conversation despite the fact that it is based upon it to a certain extent." Though granting


133 They added "earnestness," "directness," and "spontaneity." Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 252-55.


135 Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, p. 300. "One does not speak to an audience or to a composite mind as he speaks to a companion in conversation. There is a psychological difference. In conversation speech and reply are a mutual affair. In public speaking speech is one-sided except for the subtle, silent, psychological emanations from individuals in an audience. Conversation often
the concept of public speaking as "enlarged conversation" to have "a measure of truth," they believed "improved conversation" to be an equally appropriate criterion.\textsuperscript{136}

A cursory examination of texts co-authored by O'Neill demonstrates the "middle period" trend toward incorporating principles of delivery into argumentation and debate theory. In his revision of the Laycock and Scales text, O'Neill organized his treatment of delivery around the four methods of presentation. He included, moreover, a few specific suggestions regarding use of notes, outlines, and charts.\textsuperscript{137} Suggesting that "it is impossible in this book to discuss platform speaking at any length," O'Neill advised students to take courses in speaking, and to practice before real audiences.\textsuperscript{138} In Debate and Oral Discussion, O'Neill and Cortright added "desirable qualities"\textsuperscript{139} of delivery and recommended "reality"\textsuperscript{140} in presentation. O'Neill and McBurney expanded the treatment of delivery in Working Principles lacks the dignity that public speaking demands, but it does furnish the basis for directness, intimacy of communication, and earnest sincerity needed in public speaking."

\begin{itemize}
 \item \textsuperscript{136}Ibid., pp. 300-301.
 \item \textsuperscript{137}O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 441-43.
 \item \textsuperscript{138}Ibid., p. 443.
 \item \textsuperscript{139}O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, pp. 223-24.
 \item \textsuperscript{140}Ibid., pp. 224-25.
\end{itemize}
of Argument to two chapters in which they included methods of presentation, the conversational basis of delivery, emotion, and personal and persuasive qualities in delivery. They introduced, moreover, a detailed discussion of platform decorum, voice, and action.\textsuperscript{141} McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, on the other hand, compacted these notions of delivery into a section of a chapter called "The Advocate as Speaker."\textsuperscript{142}

Discussion

The incorporation of discussion into argumentation and debate theory, a "middle period" development, also helped to answer some of the criticisms leveled at the discipline. Not only did the addition of discussion broaden argumentation's theoretical base by incorporating modern psychological and sociological thought, but it also provided a practical methodology for meeting social problems.

Public discussion, certainly not a new phenomenon, had assumed many different forms in America\textsuperscript{143}—town

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}. Mills was primarily responsible for the above chapter, p. vi.
\end{itemize}
meetings, open forums such as Cooper Union, to mention some of the more popular. It functioned within these contexts variously as a political vehicle, a method of socialization, and as an educational tool for the dissemination of ideas. Committee or group discussion also flourished and a relevant body of theory developed.

In a study of "The Inquiry," a small group of conference experts who began in 1922 a comprehensive though not too systematic development of discussion principles, techniques, and instructions," Richard Douthit traced the philosophical origins of the discussion movement to "the major thought currents of the nineteenth and twentieth

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148 Later developments such as the symposium will be detailed in a later section of this chapter on the forensic.

149 Baird suggested that "the applications of discussion, especially during and after the Second World War, have been more and more extensive--in communities, in labor and other economic areas, and in schools and colleges." Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. vi.
centuries." Of its more immediate roots, he concluded:

Along with Bagehot, Wallas, and Wilson, Dewey had seen the promise of public discussion as early as the turn of the century. Probably he more than any other American was responsible for establishing a new intellectual climate which demanded a rigorous examination of methodology. Historians seem agreed that John Dewey . . . became the symbol for those who would approach social problems scientifically. Both the practical effects and the theoretical aspects of the discussion movement influenced the practice as well as theory of argumentation. Baird noted in 1928 that:

In recent years the pendulum in student public speaking has swung from interest in formal argument and, perhaps, contest debate to the study and practice of discussion in its broader application, including public discussion, committee conference, persuasive business talk, and open-forum debating.


Ibid., p. 291.


meanwhile, wishing to strengthen and update traditional argumentation theory and to bring it into line with current practices, treated discussion, debate, and persuasion as "types" of argumentation and contended that "the general principles of argumentation . . . may be applied effectively" regardless of their ultimate use. Baird's specific "principles for the mastery of argumentation, public discussion, and debate" followed closely the standard tradition, his particular innovation being an updating of the underlying theory. Though some later writers (Behl, Braden and Brandenburg) followed Baird's tripartite scheme, most texts omitted persuasion as a specialized form of argumentation, investigating rather the functions and processes of discussion and debate.

154 Baird had essentially the same aim in his 1937 revision of Public Discussion and Debate and in his later work, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate.

155 Baird said: "The conquest of the art requires long application and training. These include, first, frank self-analysis of your shortcomings and needs; secondly, ability to frame and analyze a subject for debate; thirdly, habits and methods of accumulating knowledge and thinking on that material; fourthly, ability to synthesize your ideas in the form of a brief; fifthly, power to analyze a special audience and to adapt your material effectively; sixthly, practice in stating the arguments persuasively; seventhly, ability to criticize your own work; and finally, a will to persist and master the art of persuasion." Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., p. 14.

156 Behl, Discussion and Debate; Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making.

157 See O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 3; Nichols, Discussion and Debate, p. 4; Luther A. Courtney and Glenn R. Capp, Practical Debating (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1949).
Baird had characterized discussion and debate as "especially useful in working out ... immediate problems and in training for citizenship." The political context as well as the rapid intellectual development of the early twentieth century created a very real "felt difficulty." Pellegrini and Stirling pointed up the "social utility of public discussion" when they said:

Today more than ever before we are aware of an urgent need for clear thinking on social, political, and economic matters. We


159 William Utterback perceived a direct relationship between the form which public discussion assumes and the political context within which it operates. Utterback concluded: "The modes of public discussion through which a nation effects collective decision in any era are determined by the nature of the governmental process at the time, and this in turn depends upon the comparative stability of equilibrium between those conflicting interest groups whose activities underlie political phenomena. If the equilibrium has been stable long enough to generate a political tradition, debate will be the predominant form of public discussion. When a sudden and radical shift in the balance of power renders much of the tradition obsolete, propaganda and conference supplant debate until such time as the new equilibrium has found expression in a new political tradition." William E. Utterback, "Patterns of Public Discussion in School and in Life," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXIV (December, 1938), 588. That the experience of one war—and then two—upset any equilibrium which might have existed is obvious. Moreover, the need persisted for an alternative to violence for the solving of problems. See J. T. Salter, The Pattern of Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1940).

160 New theories in sociology and educational philosophy emphasized the need and provided new methodology for "skill in working through the complexities of a given social question." See Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, p. ix.
are constantly warned by the more critical historians that the institutions by which we have lived for the past two centuries have run their span, and that the alternative to chaos is a formulation of new values. Whether the new generation is capable of meeting sanely an uncertain future will depend largely upon the clear-headedness with which it confronts the problems which are its legacy. It is for the members of this generation to acquaint themselves with the problems which soon they will be called on to resolve. Let us teach them to approach these problems with a clear, analytical mind.161

Auer agreed and emphasized "an exchange of information and ideas, in a cooperative process for the resolving of these common problems."162 The title of the Ewbank-Auer text,

161 Ibid., p. vii. Braden and Brandenburg demonstrated the persistence of the need almost twenty years later: "We live at a time when vigilance is demanded of those who wish to govern themselves. In addition to the necessity for finding protection from physical destruction, citizens of today need a staunch intellectual and moral stature, a fortitude to resist and overcome subversive forces, and a constant watchful guard against complacency. How can these needs be met? . . . The authors of this book believe that . . . protection comes from equipping citizens with means and techniques which will enable and encourage them to recognize, to understand, to analyze, and to answer unwise counsel or dangerous programs. We believe that the need of today is a citizenry who can measure up to the responsibilities and obligations imposed by self-government, and who can work creatively and cooperatively in solving the problems of the group." Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, p. ix.

162 J. Jeffery Auer, "Tools of Social Inquiry: Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXV (December, 1939), 533. Yost had also envisioned argumentation as a cooperative affair. So had John Dewey. In the foreword to Pellegrini and Stirling's Argumentation and Public Discussion, he said: "Argumentation is reasoning but it is reasoning together; it is a process of cooperative search." Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, p. iii. Traditional debating fit neither the Yost nor Dewey model.
Discussion and Debate: Tools of a Democracy, represents the importance those authors attached to "training for citizenship." Such subsequent works as Baird's Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate; Braden and Brandenburg's Oral Decision-Making, and McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills's Argumentation and Debate: Techniques of a Free Society reflect a similar philosophy.

"Middle period" writers further maintained discussion and debate to be instruments "for tempering the judgments of students"; for the promotion of open-mindedness; for the "working out" of problems. Toward the end of the period, Baird summarized various such rationales. Argumentation, discussion, and debate, he said, will:

1. Educate you for active responsible participation in democratic government.

163 Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., pp. 3-6.
164 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate; Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making; McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate.
167 Ibid., 1928 ed., p. 10.
2. Assure you more efficiency in your occupation or profession.¹⁶⁸

3. Strengthen your self-confidence and enable you to make more satisfactory social adjustments.

4. Provide you with defenses against "bad" propaganda.

5. Widen your general influence in social movements.¹⁶⁹

These justifications paralleled and/or complemented much of the philosophy of the discussion movement.¹⁷⁰ As Douthit¹⁷¹ suggested, members of "The Inquiry" believed they were developing the methodology for democracy.¹⁷²

The commitment of the discussion movement to a scientific methodology for the working out of problems in the real world influenced the development of argumentation.

¹⁶⁸Behl also included a section on the importance of argument in business and the professions. Behl, Discussion and Debate, pp. 3-4.

¹⁶⁹Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 4-7.

¹⁷⁰Wishing to determine a situational approach to discussion relevant to life, "The Inquiry" adopted a social creed grounded in the social gospel and practical politics. Their intellectual godfather, John Dewey, provided a scientific instrument for approaching social problems.


and debate theory. Though the pattern of reflective thinking appeared in discussion texts at least as early as 1928, Fritz was probably the first argumentation writer to include Dewey's analysis. Baird's revision of Public Discussion and Debate appended the concept as "a guide for group discussion," and Harold F. Graves, and James H. McBurney and Kenneth Hance followed suit. Nichols' text, published in the same year as Ewbank and Auer's Discussion and Debate, contained "a Manual of Discussion, a concise, up-to-the-minute survey of

173 John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1910), p. 72. Reflective thinking involved the following steps: (1) a felt difficulty; (2) its location and definition; (3) suggestion of possible solution; (4) development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion; and (5) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection.


175 Fritz, Method of Argument, p. 295.

176 Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1937 rev. ed., p. 362. That Baird had been thinking in this direction is evidenced by his short section in the first edition of Public Discussion of Debate called "the technique of discussion." He said: "The chairman of the group calls the meeting to order, states the problem, and calls for further interpretation and solution," 1928 ed., p. 34.


178 James H. McBurney and Kenneth G. Hance, The Principles and Methods of Discussion (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 162. The authors called their five steps "the logical pattern of discussion."
discussion methodology which reduced Dewey's steps in reflection to three.180

Contrary to discussions which perceived reflective thinking to be merely the "logical method of discussion," Ewbank and Auer applied Dewey's paradigm to the total process of discussion and debate. Though Auer had espoused this idea first in a journal article,181 his text with Ewbank refined, expanded, and popularized the concept. Discussion and debate viewed as interrelated parts of one process was not, however, a new idea. Baird implied such a position when he characterized discussion as "a stage immediately preceding argument proper."182 Thonssen, moreover, saw discussion and debate as "correlative aspects

179 Nichols, Discussion and Debate, p. vii.

180 Ibid., pp. 51-52. Nichols included the following "problem-solving" outline:

I. The Presented Problem
II. Analyzing the Problem
   A. Its definition and exact scope, including the historical background.
   B. The causes of the problem, or the evils to be corrected.
   C. The interests, or stake groups, which must be reconciled.
III. Determining the Solution
   A. Presentation of each solution, with a brief description.
   B. Evaluation of each solution.
   C. The selection of the best.


of one process." But it was Auer who perceived that process to be reflective thinking.

In his early probings, Auer had concluded that cooperative problem-solving can occur only "when . . . the citizen is able to use intelligently adequate tools of social inquiry, tools which may be used in the continuum of inquiry and judgment which is the process of reflective thinking." Recognizing that "the scientific method cannot be applied, in toto, in the solution of public problems," Ewbank and Auer suggested: "Rather, it is the discussion and debate technique based upon scientific procedures which should be applied to the democratic processes of social inquiry and judgment." Adapting the inquiry-judgment continuum of the Auer article, the Ewbank-Auer text added the dimension of investigation and decision and suggested that "it is along this continuum . . . that discussion and debate is ranged." Their diagram follows:


185 Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 20.

186 Ibid., p. 5.
<table>
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<tr>
<td>locating and defining the problem</td>
<td>exploring the problem</td>
<td>examining suggested solutions</td>
<td>choosing the best solution</td>
<td>securing acceptance of the selected solution</td>
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Treating discussion and debate as parts of a total process persisted in certain later works. Baird, for example, referred to "the correlative character of discussion and debate" in his 1950 text, while Braden and Brandenburg presented "discussion and debate as related..."  

187 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. vi.
counterparts of a larger process . . . called oral decision-making."188 Writers did not agree totally, however, on the relation of those elements and the appropriate logical method to be applied to them.189 Controversy centered particularly on the role of reflective thinking in discussion and debate.

Baird held that argumentation "whether general argument or specialized discussion or debate, is primarily logical."190 His suggestion that the logical structure of problem-solution (examination of facts and making of inferences) parallels the reflective thought pattern implied that both discussion and debate are reflective.191

188 Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, p. ix.

189 Many texts viewed discussion as preparatory to debate. See McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, p. 68. See also William M. Sattler, "Some Values of Discussion in the Investigation and Analysis Phases of Debate," Gavel, XXV (March, 1943), 3-4; (May, 1943), 54-55.

190 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 38.

In fact, however, Baird specifically applied Dewey's analysis only to the process of discussion, setting forth different steps for fact and policy questions.¹⁹²

Baird included the following "pattern of a discussion of policy": define terms; expound goals or aims to be considered in solution; analyze immediate and background causes and results; weigh representative solutions; weigh each solution evaluating evidence and argument; present diagnosis and verification of preferred solution; frame and justify a program to carry out conclusions. The following constituted his "pattern of a discussion of fact": explain terms; set up goals (criteria); examine relevant data, arguments, evidence; classify, synthesize, interpret and evaluate, and make judgment. Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 265-66.


¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 11.
Three Routes to Decision and Action

Problem → Discussion → Decision → Action

Debate
Persuasive speaking

Route one
Route two
Route three

Those argumentation and debate writers who first included treatments of discussion in their texts emphasized "public discussion." Gradually group discussion replaced that emphasis. Such concepts as group leadership, agenda, interpersonal relations, even role-playing became a part of the theory of argumentation. These concepts, developed more comprehensively in discussion texts, reverted almost solely to those works after c. 1955.

Analysis

Though "middle period" notions of analysis

196 See Baird, Public Discussion and Debate; O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion.

197 Braden and Brandenburg treated discussion probably more comprehensively than any other dual text. After their work, discussion moved almost exclusively to separate texts.
corresponded to Baker's "investigation for a central idea or group of ideas,"\textsuperscript{198} Edward Z. Rowell probably overstated the case when he asserted that "Baker's exposition of argumentative analysis our tradition has continued without significant change."\textsuperscript{199} Even by 1932, the date of Rowell's statement, several important modifications had begun: a general use of "stock" methods for determining issues; more thorough explorations of the proposition; expanded chapters on research methods and sources; and well-developed and highly sophisticated treatments of case. Since these modifications continued throughout the period, it is probably more accurate to suggest that Baker's "steps in analysis" provided the framework for succeeding treatments.

The Proposition

Though most "middle period" writers defined the proposition traditionally,\textsuperscript{200} they failed to agree on a

\textsuperscript{198}Russell Wagner viewed the nature and scope of analysis in a fashion representative of most writers of the "middle period." He said: "Analysis . . . is that study of the subject matter of the argument which sifts the ideas discovered, reduces them to lowest terms, determines the essential controversy and the chief differences of opinion, and ascertains what one must do to effect a sound demonstration of proof to others." Wagner, \textit{Handbook of Argumentation}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{199}Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation," Part III, p. 247.

\textsuperscript{200}Pellegrini and Stirling viewed the proposition in the traditional sense as "that which is stated or
single, consistent approach for its formulation. Those authors who treated discussion and debate as a total process saw the proposition as the result of reflective thinking. Others, relying on traditional theory and methodology, began with subject matter. Still another affirmed for the purpose of discussion. It is a provisional statement, usually stated affirmatively, the truth or falsity of which must be demonstrated in the argument. Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, p. 7. Hayworth and Capel defined the proposition simply as "the concise statement of a difference in belief." Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, p. 14. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills treated propositions in terms of the fields of knowledge from which they emanate. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, p. 18. They said: "Rhetorically . . . it [a proposition] is a judgment expressed in a declarative sentence . . . consisting of two terms and a copula. The subject of the sentence is one term, the verb is the copula or connecting link, and the object of the verb or some other predicative expression is the other term. A judgment so stated is a proposition." Collins and Morris, on the other hand, suggested a "purpose-proposition." "Such a sentence or epigram concisely and compactly constructed will tell the members of the audience just what the persuader wishes them to do and why he wants them to do it," they said. "Repeated often, it will give unity and definite direction to the entire speech or article." Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate, p. 27. Collins and Morris made other pronouncements about the purpose-proposition: it keeps the speaker on a "straight course"; repetition of the purpose-proposition impresses audiences; the purpose-proposition should express question of policy; and, time and occasion are limiting factors, pp. 28-32.


202 See, for example, Shaw, Art of Debate, pp. 8-12; Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, pp. 43-51. See Braden and Brandenburg for "criteria of good subjects for either discussion or debate." Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, pp. 39-52.
group viewed the proposition primarily in terms of desired response. 203 Most, however, skipped such preliminary consider­ations and proceeded directly to an examination of the characteristics and types of propositions.

Characteristics of "Good" Propositions

"Middle period" texts stressed various criteria essential for the formulation of "good" propositions. Few, however, went beyond O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales's 1917 standards: propositions should be unambiguous; unprejudiced; concrete and specific; place the burden of proof on the affirmative; be brief and simple, debatable, and interesting.204 Essentially the same criteria also appeared as "characteristics of a good proposition,"205 "rules for phrasing a proposition,"206 "requirements of the proposition,"207 "rules for constructing a

203 This audience-centered approach, suggested by Woolbert, was most fully developed by Collins and Morris.

204 O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 28-31; see also Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917 rev. ed., p. 11.

205 O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, pp. 42-49.

206 See Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, pp. 29-30. They required that propositions be free from ambiguity, be expressed in a simple sentence, contain no words or phrases that beg the question, and place the burden of proof on the affirmative.

207 See Shaw, Art of Debate, p. 12; Pellegrini and
proposition,"\textsuperscript{208} and "tests of a proposition."\textsuperscript{209} Crocker offered a slightly different twist. He framed his characteristics as propositions, indicating that they should: fit the speakers; fit the audience; be debatable; be clear; be phrased affirmatively; be timely; not be too broad; state one central idea; and, be free from question-begging terms.\textsuperscript{210}

O'Neill and McBurney separated the functions of propositions from the rules for selecting and phrasing them. They listed four functions: to serve as the basis of the argument; to name the affirmative and the negative; to state the action demanded of the audience; to place the burden of proof.\textsuperscript{211} McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills added two "functions" and restated and expanded two. Their listing reads:

1. To express a conclusion from study and reflection.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, pp. 8-11. The proposition must state a definite problem, be free of ambiguous terms, be controversial, and be worthy of argument.
\item Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 10-19.
\item Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 21-26.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
2. To express the meaning and intent of an advocate.
3. To serve as the basis of the argument.
4. To name the affirmative and the negative.
5. To state the desired audience reaction.
6. To place the presumption and the burden of proof.

**Types of Propositions**

Though classifying propositions is not technically a development of the "middle period," the procedure became widely accepted as an integral part of argumentation and debate theory during that time.\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^3\) Despite O'Neill's conviction that "it is hardly worthwhile we try to make much of this classification,"\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^4\) the fact-policy divisions appeared, nevertheless, in his texts with Cortright and

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\(^2\)\(^1\)\(^3\) Beginning with Baker, argumentation and debate writers had used the conviction-persuasion distinction as a basis for division. Though Walter F. Terris' treatment is incomplete, his conclusions have some validity. See Walter F. Terris, "The Classification of the Argumentative Proposition," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XLIX (October, 1963), 266-73. Moreover, Gardiner had used the terms fact and policy and had anticipated a third category as early as 1912. See J. H. Gardiner, *The Making of Arguments* (New York: Ginn and Company, 1912), pp. 14-25.

McBurney, along with the value distinction in the McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills revision. Even Foster, who had ignored classification in his 1908 and 1917 texts, included "propositions of fact and propositions of policy or principle" in his 1932 revision. These and other "middle period" writers divided, defined, and discussed "kinds" of propositions. W. C. Shaw's influential distinctions follow:

A proposition of fact consists of any statement that affirms or denies: (1) the existence of things; (2) the occurrence of acts; (3) the classification of objects; or (4) the connection of events.

A proposition of policy consists of any statement that affirms or denies that a specified course of action, in preference to other possible courses of action, should be adopted.

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216 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 22-23. This chapter, however, was Mills's.

217 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, 1917 rev. ed.


219 See Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, p. 41; Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, p. 17.

220 Shaw, Art of Debate, pp. 20-21. Shaw believed further that propositions of policy are best suited for debate, p. 21. For similar positions, see Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate, pp. 30, 33-34; Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, p. 11.
Disagreements regarding the classification of propositions surfaced early, both fact and policy categories being dissected. Baird differentiated propositions of policy as: those dealing with proposals advocated as theoretically sound and those dealing with matters of practical policy. Though subsequent texts did not readily adopt this division, and though Baird himself dropped the classification in 1950, the distinction between theoretic and practical policy did not disappear. It reemerged rather over the issue of the meaning of the word should in propositions of policy. In 1942, F. W. Lambertson concluded:

Obviously we are dealing with a problem and a solution. Any debate question which presented an evil for which there was no remedy would be of little value in debate. We may rest assured that our planning committee will not make such a mistake. Therefore we may conclude that the word "should" includes the word "could." Whether or not Congress or the people "would" adopt a particular reform at the present time is beside the point. The merit of a measure is not necessarily shown by popular disapproval. A plan "should" be adopted if it is wise, good, desirable, and practicable; if, of all the alternate courses of action, it will most adequately remedy the existing or threatened evils.


222 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate.

Meanwhile, propositions of fact came under close scrutiny. In 1934, Hayworth and Capel recognized four classes of argument covered by the term proposition of fact: whether or not an entity exists or has existed; whether or not an action has taken place; whether or not a relationship exists or has existed; whether or not stated characteristics may be attributed to a given class or individual. They further observed that:

Academic debates on questions described in the first two of these four classes are almost never held, and seldom on questions covered by the last two, although these are more possible. Propositions may be built on questions as to the existence of a relationship of comparative desirability. . . . This type of proposition is excellent for debate and doubtless merits further use.

More frequently debates are held on propositions concerned with whether or not stated characteristics may be attributed to a given class or individual.

Nichols and Baccus, two years later, offered a tripartite

\[^{225}\] Ibid., pp. 17-18.
\[^{226}\] Nichols and Baccus suggested the following tests for their propositions: "Fact—Is this true? Theory—Is this sound? Is it acceptable as a belief? Is it reasonable postulation? Policy—Is this the thing to do? Is it expedient, wise, practicable?" Nichols and Baccus, *Modern Debating*, pp. 103-104. They preferred propositions of policy for debating. They said: "Debates on fact and theory are often unsatisfactory because it is hard to establish what the burden of proof of the affirmative is and when the negative has performed its duty. It is almost impossible to set the limitations which circumscribe sufficient or insufficient proof in matters of fact and theory. In questions of policy, however, it is easier to

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scheme which included "judgment as to a theory or postulation" along with fact and policy. The same year, Wagner introduced the term "proposition of value" into argumentation and debate theory. This division provided the basis for most subsequent systems of classification.

Wagner differentiated the three kinds of propositions as follows:

Propositions of fact are those which are concerned only with the truth or falsity of assertions. They involve the existence of things, the occurrence or classification or causation of acts or events. They depend wholly upon the establishing of fact for proof.

Propositions of value are those which assess the worth of the subjects in dispute. They assert that something is or is not beneficial; they call for approval or disapproval of a belief or an idea.... Propositions of value attempt to declare that to be true which can never be accepted as a fact, but which may be accepted as probable, if made to conform to certain approved applicable standards of judgment, of taste, or of weight.

Propositions of policy are those which propose a change of policy, which call for action. They involve the proof of questions of fact, they require the assessing of value, but extend into the realm of practicality and expediency, and unlike the others, propose that something shall be done.\textsuperscript{227}

Those writers who attempted to subdivide fact or policy categories were seeking to isolate the evaluative

\textsuperscript{227} Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 15-16.
dimension in controversial questions. Baird, and Gardiner before him, had looked for it in policy questions. Hayworth and Capel, Nichols and Baccus, and Wagner saw it as a factual problem. A consensus agreed, nevertheless, that propositions of theory or value, whether derived from past or present fact or from future policy, were less suited for debating than practical policy questions.228

Investigating the Proposition

"Middle period" prescriptions for investigating a proposition did not differ appreciably from 1917 Foster or O'Neill.229 Treatments of preliminary analysis230 and briefing,231 though similar to their earlier counterparts, 


229 Though Collins and Morris' text emphasized new terminology, its specific principles of analysis were, for the most part, traditional. Discussion centered around the "two-fold character of analysis": discovery and judgment, the results of which appear on an analysis chart (sheet of paper, index cards), and in the brief. Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate, pp. 34-35.

230 "Middle period" writers agreed on the necessity of a broad view of the subject; a knowledge of the origin and history of the question; a definition of terms. They concurred, moreover, that dictionary definitions are insufficient. They defined, as had their predecessors, by explication, example, authority, negation, derivation, function, and context. For a comprehensive approach to definition, see Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 56-59.

231 Though "middle period" texts adapted traditional methods and rules of constructing a brief almost without question (for rules and examples included by writers of the
received less emphasis than in "early period" texts. Chapters on research, on the other hand, retained suggestions for research procedure and recording materials and included detailed information on source materials. Shaw constructed a well-ordered procedure for assembling proof which he claimed "has been called by hundreds of students and college debaters the most valuable contribution for one's life work that a training in debate can give." Shaw set out this "Phase-System" of analysis as follows:

1. A Definition of Terms Involved in the Proposition;
2. The Construction of a Bibliography;
3. The Establishment of Guides to Direct Research;
4. The Adoption of a Systematic Method of Note-taking;
5. A Study of Both Sides of the Question;

period, see Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 80-88; Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 235-44), some differences of opinion arose concerning the philosophy behind briefing. For Reeves and Hudson, "a brief is a complete plan for an argument" which "shows where the different parts belong and their relative importance." Reeves and Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate, p. 41. Wagner, on the other hand, viewed the brief in terms of proof. Authors continued, moreover, to distinguish the brief from the rhetorical outline. See Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, 1928 ed., pp. 95-142; Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 71, 84.


233 Shaw, Art of Debate, p. vi.
6. The Arrangement of Proof in Chains of Reasoning;
7. A Trial of Proof in a Preliminary Discussion; and
8. A Repetition of the Foregoing Process for Every Subhead in the Various Chains of Reasoning. 234

Issues

Continuing to view issues as "the essential points or subpoints of controversy that evolve in the consideration of a given proposition," 235 "middle period" writers also insisted that the essential work of analysis is to "discover" these issues. Traditional argumentation and debate theory had held that "clash of opinion" provided the issues of a controversy. Certain "middle period" writers agreed. 236 Though some attempts at alternative

234 Ibid., p. 24.
235 Behl, Discussion and Debate, p. 57. Most writers also differentiated "kinds" of issues as had their predecessors. Toward the end of the period, Behl summarized the various types: Potential issues, "all possible issues that might arise in the investigation of a given topic," in terms of problems of fact, value, and policy; main issues, "those essential points of difference which must be considered in any given situation if we are to find a satisfactory solution to the problem"; ultimate issues, the issues around which the final argument centers; and sub issues, questions concerning the main issue, pp. 59-64. See also Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, p. 47; Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 17-19. Crocker added "issue-of-the debate" to the list and characterized it as follows: "In an hour it is impossible to debate the entire case. The Negative may single out the issue it wants to debate." Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, p. 42.

236 See, for example, Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 56-61. Wagner, moreover, agreed with the "clash of opinion" analysis, but insisted that "a survey of
systems of analysis appeared,\textsuperscript{237} most "middle period" writers relied simply on "stock issues" to analyze debate propositions.\textsuperscript{238}

the proof requirements" be included. Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 17-23. Wagner also advised the writing of an argumentative precis "as an aid to the discovery of ideas and the accurate analysis of argumentative material," and also included in his discussion the epitome, "a very brief statement of the pith of an argument" which "usually consists of stating the proposition and main arguments, and the proof of the more important main heads," pp. 23-24.

\textsuperscript{237}See particularly Shaw's complicated diagram which demonstrates his "phase" system of analysis. Shaw, Art of Debate, p. 181.

\textsuperscript{238}Toward the end of the period, Baird compiled a comprehensive list of ways of discovering issues, and discussed them in some detail. An outline of these "methods" follows: (1) Read, think, discuss as means of discovering issues. (2) Set up the general problem as an over-all impartial question. (3) Ask questions related to the explanation of terms involved in the question as framed. (4) Ask questions related to the goals assumed or set forth by the debaters or discussants. (5) Ask questions related to a problem of policy. For policy-determining issues you are to consider both the \textbf{problem} and its \textbf{solution}, the latter phase to be regarded as a \textbf{program of action}. (6) Ask questions related to a problem of fact. Such questions usually suggest a division by the classification of materials, according to economic, social, political and similar considerations. Where the question is primarily not one of social or political judgment but rather one where the facts can be rather accurately discovered, the method of analysis and statement of issues is usually one of classifying the types of argument and evidence. Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 63-72. In a review of that work, Joseph F. O'Brien asserted that Baird's "comprehensive formula for breaking down of a proposition of policy is, in the reviewer's opinion, without equal as a stock analytical instrument." Joseph F. O'Brien, "New Books: Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVI (October, 1950), 431.
Certain "early period" writers had sought common questions or issues for propositions of fact and policy. From an analysis of the historical development of stock methods, Terris concluded:

The classification of propositions according to the nature of the matter in dispute gave rise to stock patterns for analyzing virtually any argumentative proposition. The proposition of fact, because it was structurally similar to the argumentative propositions used in legal pleadings, was ripe for the application of Quintilian's doctrine of status.

Probably by analogy with the proposition of fact, the proposition of policy was linked with a system of stock issues. There seemed no possibility of using Quintilian's pattern of three statuses (the conjectural, the definitive, and the qualitative) for the analysis of propositions of policy or principle. However Foster developed an analogous system of five stock issues which attempted to do for policy what status did for fact.

Though Terris was incorrect in assuming Foster to be the first to develop a system of stock issues for policy questions, his analysis is, nevertheless, relevant. The

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increasing tendency to classify propositions did, in fact, influence methods of analysis. Most "middle period" writers\(^{242}\) included standard questions for propositions of policy in their texts. Some added common questions for fact and value.

Whereas stock issues provided the primary method for analyzing debate propositions for "middle period" writers, Dewey's pattern of reflective thinking became the tool for dissecting questions for discussion. An earlier section of this chapter suggested the impact of Dewey's system on the discussion movement in general and on later lists differed in number and phraseology of questions, they did not stray far from the Pelsma-Gough inquiries.

specific argumentation texts. It is sufficient at this point to recognize that only Ewbank and Auer unequivocally applied the specific steps of reflective thinking to the total process of problem-solving (discussion and debate). Baird represented the more general view when he observed:

The logical method of division is that of stating the cause and the results of a proposal. The method is illustrated by (1) problem and (2) solution patterns of the typical discussion and by the (1) need, (2) practicability, and (3) desirability divisions of the conventional debate.243

Case

Though case had been discussed cursorily as early as Baker's first edition of Principles,244 "middle period" texts gave the concept a central place in argumentation and debate theory. Whereas Baker had considered case to be one of four steps in analysis, most "middle period" writers treated it as a result of analysis. They redefined case, moreover, not in terms of the traditional brief, but rather, in terms of a rhetorical outline. They also determined separate case requirements for the affirmative and negative. O'Neill's 1917 revision of Argumentation and Debate presaged these new directions. O'Neill distinguished the rhetorical outline from the brief, perceiving separate

243 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 65.
244 Baker, Principles, p. 77.
functions for the two.\textsuperscript{245} He described the affirmative case in terms of discharging the burden of proof and set out four negative alternatives (pure refutation, defense of the present, adjustment, and counter proposition) which became the standard for discussing the negative case.\textsuperscript{246}

The traditional procedure of treating the brief as the outline for a forensic or as the case met with objections both from the point of view of literary composition and from logic. Baird summarized the major literary criticisms as follows:

Elaborate briefing often makes for dull, uninspired, speech-making, filled with mechanical summaries, repetition of words and phrases that make up the brief, many terms of enumeration, and other earmarks of a mechanical rather than a literary foundation.\textsuperscript{247}

Gladys Murphy Graham, one of the most vocal critics of the deductive framework of the brief, objected that such a system "does not fit all kinds of arguments."\textsuperscript{248} Her alternative, implicative wholes, assumed an expository or narrative rather than a traditional argumentative form.

\textsuperscript{245}O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}, pp. 211-13.
\textsuperscript{246}Ibid., pp. 376-78.
\textsuperscript{248}Graham, "Logic and Argumentation," pp. 350-63. Graham believed that the implicative system persuades eventually since it points to an inevitable "this-or-nothing" conclusion. See Graham, "Natural Procedure in Argument," pp. 319-37.
Yost also had commented on the deductive character of briefing but did not advise any major change in procedure. Why students made briefs, and what they did with them, concerned her more. Yost insisted that one should make briefs "in order to test his own thinking, and not use them as outline guides to his arguments, written or oral."\(^249\)

To the criticisms regarding the logical basis of the brief, Baird responded:

> There is no reason why the rigid brief should not form the material out of which the inferential whole could be built up, to the practical satisfaction both of the debater and of the logician who sees all argument and thinking as unitary.

> The mature student of briefing need not be a slave to his rigid document. It becomes a means to a practical end. Its construction has sharpened the mental processes, given the facts, and created a mental alertness which means a continuation of creative thinking. In the writing of the argument the elaborate outline may be put away.\(^250\)

On the other hand, "to meet the need for the inclusion of the expository or other compositional elements that do not find a place in the formal brief," Baird advised "the construction of the rhetorical outline."\(^251\) He set out its nature and characteristics as follows:

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\(^249\)Yost, "Argument from the Point of View of Sociology," p. 122.


\(^251\)Ibid., p. 136.
This rhetorical outline . . . is in reality a combination of the analytical or expository outline, the argumentative brief, and the speaker's outline for delivery.

The rules for the construction of a brief will, in general, apply to this other method. Complete sentences will be used; proper symbols and indentations will be observed, one symbol being used for each statement; in argumentative outlining each subordinate heading will explain the more general topic or be a division of it; the material will be arranged according to the order for delivery or printing; and the outline may or may not include the personal elements, including "we" and "you." 252

Subsequent texts tended also to follow the rhetorical outline. 253

In addition to differentiating an outline for the presentation of arguments from the brief, "middle period" writers also isolated certain variables relevant to constructing a case. Three characteristics appeared in most works: a case should be drafted for a particular audience; it should develop the main issues determined by analysis; and it should be capable of proof. 254 Some writers set

252 Ibid., pp. 136-37.
253 See Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, pp. 71-72.
254 Winans and Utterback included one of the more comprehensive listings. They suggested proof requirements, types of arguments to be employed, selection and use of premises, citation of authority, audience attitude toward speaker, and proposition, interest, and refutation. Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, pp. 293-94. The audience seemed to be particularly important. See O'Neill, Manual of Debate and Oral Discussion, p. 125; Collins and Morris, Persuasion and Debate, pp. 86-87; Hayworth and Capel, Oral Argument, pp. 77-92. Braden and Brandenburg included a
out specific prescriptions for structuring a case. Ewbank and Auer included a comprehensive list: the statements should be arranged to show a progression of ideas; the main points should be few in number; the relations between statements should be clearly indicated; the phrasing of the statements should have "Headline Value"; and the case should not attempt to prove too much.\(^{255}\)

It has been suggested that O'Neill's description of negative alternatives provided the basis for most subsequent discussions of negative case.\(^{256}\) The affirmative case, on the other hand, much modified during the "middle period," evolved, for the most part, into an explication of stock issues, particularly in propositions of policy. Summers and Whan, for example, argued that the affirmative has little choice, being obliged to include two or three elements: "arguments showing need for a change, arguments showing benefits to be secured, and possibly defensive arguments."\(^{257}\) Most writers were more subtle. McBurney, speaker's social responsibility to an audience, along with a consistency with facts, and the best possible presentation of a given side of a case. Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, pp. 433-34.


\(^{256}\) See Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, p. 29; McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 166-68. For a different listing, see Summers and Whan, How to Debate, pp. 125-30.

\(^{257}\) Summers and Whan, How to Debate, p. 124.
O'Neill, and Mills, for example, noted that except in "special situations . . . the affirmative case is required to discharge the burden of proof by affirming the issues in a logically adequate fashion." Their "steps in developing a case," however, turned on issues of need and desirability.

Along with discussions of case, many "middle period" writers set out specific work for individual speakers in a debate. Though not differing appreciably from "early period" treatments, most "middle period" formats reduced team members from three to two and gave each speaker one constructive and one rebuttal speech.

"Middle period" discussions of refutation and rebuttal, the terms often being used synonymously, generally followed those of the "early period." Courtney and Capp, however, made the following distinction:

Refutation consists of the destruction of opposing arguments; it is a tearing-down process. Rebuttal includes both constructive

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258 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, p. 165.
259 Ibid., pp. 163-64.
260 For a comprehensive discussion of the work of the first affirmative and first negative, see Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, pp. 435-46.
261 Some formats, however, following legal procedures, gave the affirmative and the negative a single period of rebuttal.
and destructive work; in it one attacks his opponents' arguments and rebuilds his own.\textsuperscript{262}

Regardless of philosophical point of view, writers generally agreed on methodology for refutation; i.e., testing of evidence and reasoning; locating fallacies; and "special" methods (\textit{reductio ad absurdum}, dilemma, residues, turning the tables).\textsuperscript{263} McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, moreover, isolated one "basic rule for all refutation": "\textbf{Always make perfectly clear to the audience or reader just what is the point that is to be attacked, and the nature of the attack to be made.}"\textsuperscript{264} Most writers agreed, moreover, that rebuttal speeches should contain no new constructive arguments.

Constructing a case involved, for some writers, the use of "strategy." Though Laycock and Scales had included the term \textit{strategy} in their text, Shaw was probably the first to advocate openly its use in debating. And, his "contribution" met with praise, at least in some quarters. In reviewing \textit{The Art of Debate}, G. R. Crecraft commented:

\begin{quote}
The chapter on Strategy is undoubtedly a helpful and welcome addition to the treatment of debate. It does indeed "make every reader wonder why this subject has been neglected so long by teachers and writers on debate;\
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{262}Courtney and Capp, \textit{Practical Debating}, p. 183.

\textsuperscript{263}McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}, pp. 243-49. These "special methods" varied from text to text.

\textsuperscript{264}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 240.
inasmuch as strategy is one of the most important means by which a debater demonstrates his skill. 265

Shaw continued to defend the use of strategy in debating, claiming:

There is no mystery, . . . connected with the real strategy of debate, and likewise I believe that there is no foundation for the criticism that debate strategy is altogether an art to be practiced by sophists and charlatans. The truth of the matter is that there never was a debate in which time limits for discussion were wholly absent, and the existence of these time limitations always makes necessary . . . the very best use of all his skill in debate. He must employ devices to get at truth quickly or to raise doubts quickly and postpone decisions. This means then simply one thing—the honest man, as well as the charlatan, must employ some arts of strategy. 266

Strategy quickly fell into disrepute, however, developing numerous negative connotations. Wilbur E. Gilman, for example, objected to Collins and Morris' inclusion of the concept "because it presents ideas which might better be left unsaid." 267 John Pelsma went so far as to recommend the use of such slogans as "Rum, Romanism


and Rebellion."268 A reviewer "commended" Courtney and Capp "for omitting a treatment of strategy."269 Some writers believed in the value of strategy in debating but "watered" it down. Raymond Howes commented that in Harrison Summers' *Contest Debating,*

strategy has lost most of its fangs. Although debating is still a game, it is a polite game, played by gentlemen with at least one eye constantly on the audience.270

Strategy, for some, became synonymous with techniques for winning. James H. Holms and Robert L. Kent entitled their book *The Strategy of Argument* and included the claim "satisfaction guaranteed."271 And, in his codification of rules for competitive debate, Musgrave characterized the strategy of winning as follows:

Strategy . . . is the art of placing one's opponents at a disadvantage through a case or an angle of approach that he does not expect. . . . Intelligent debaters like strategy and use it more than their less brilliant colleagues. In strategic debating the emphasis is on out-witting one's opponents rather than


outplodding them in library work. The natural result, of course, is that teams employing good strategy win the tournaments and league championships, leaving their more conventional opponents behind.

The alternative to strategic debating is conventional debating. Teams using this approach often lose to strong opponents; the only way they ever win is by presenting expected cases supported by so much evidence, such logical reasoning, and with such organization of thought, that the opposing team is unable to tear down the line of argument.272

Though few authors admitted such emphasis on strategy, numerous "practical" or "how to" books on argumentation and debating appeared during the "middle period."273 In his review of Hayworth and Capel's *Oral Argument*, Arleigh Williamson voiced some widespread doubts about such texts. He said:

*Oral Argument*, as a presentation solely from the angle of debate, will be recognized as a departure from the usual treatment of argumentation. Baker and Huntington, and the greater number of authors who have followed, seem to have looked upon argumentation as a


discipline in straight thinking, as a safeguard against error in the building of a case for an audience, and as a method of rendering an intellectually honest personal conviction convincing to others. Considered in the light of these ideals of liberal arts education, a course based on such traditional instruction in argumentation is unassailable. However, it must be recognized that another widespread academic attitude towards argumentation exists—though most certainly not viewed sympathetically by all debate teams or teachers— that primarily of preparing debaters and debates to demonstrate the superiority of the team debating, rather than the superiority of the affirmative or the negative of the social question at issue.  

Convinced that argumentation had social and educational obligations, Williamson posed certain criteria and challenges. He asked:

Will the text be influential in cultivating in students, in relation to their speaking, a sense of social responsibility? Is its discipline conducive to intellectual integrity? Will it stimulate in students such a high regard for truth, as essential in furthering the social good, that they will prefer to see truth triumph, even when advanced by an opponent, rather than win against it? Does it attempt to stimulate in speakers that sense of honor and fair play which scorns winning over an opponent by tricks of strategy or by appeals to commonly-held false premises? Are the social and intellectual standards it sets for students in keeping with the standards of liberal education?

Proof

"Middle period" writers who insisted on a balanced

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275 Ibid., p. 107.
rhetorical approach viewed ethos and pathos as well as logos as legitimate forms of proof. An earlier discussion of the conviction-persuasion dichotomy demonstrated the nature and extent of the controversies surrounding the "proper" relation between emotional and logical proof. Accordingly, this section will deal exclusively with evidence and reasoning.

Though Baker, Alden, and Foster had viewed reasoning as a form of evidence, most "middle period" texts followed Laycock and Scales's analysis which differentiated evidence (the material) from argument (the machinery). Some differences arose, however, over the meaning of the terms reasoning and argument and the relationship between them. Crocker, for example, declared that

> evidence and argument together provide the proof of the case. . . . The materials used in the proof of the case make up the evidence; the reasons we advance to prove the case constitute the argument.\(^{277}\)

Ewbank and Auer, on the other hand, defined the terms evidence, reasoning, and argument as follows:

> Evidence is the body of facts and opinions bearing on the problem under consideration. Reasoning is the process of drawing conclusions from evidence. When an individual uses

\(^{276}\)See Ch. II of this study.

\(^{277}\)Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, p. 60.
reasoning to get others to accept his conclusions we have argument.\textsuperscript{278}

Braden and Brandenburg indicated that the process of drawing conclusions basically is referred to as argument, reasoning, or inference.\textsuperscript{279}

Regardless of terms or precise definitions, most "middle period" writers perceived proof to be a process of drawing conclusions from evidence (usually according to the rules of Formal Logic) to substantiate a position. Their texts, moreover, continued to rely on legal treatises for discussions of evidence\textsuperscript{280} and on Formal Logic for processes of reasoning.

Evidence

Definition

Though "middle period" writers failed to develop a consistent definition of evidence,\textsuperscript{281} an examination

\textsuperscript{278}Ewbank and Auer, \textit{Discussion and Debate}, 1951 rev. ed., p. 104.


\textsuperscript{281}For a discussion of definitions in terms of

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of their works indicates that they viewed it similarly to their predecessors. Differing terminologies and constituents simply represented attempts to clarify the concept.

Best had included components of evidence in his definition, along with its ultimate use or result. Most argumentation texts took essentially the same approach, the major difference in "middle period" definitions involving the constituents of the "material of proof." Though those texts written in the first fifteen years of the period limited their definitions to "facts," they implied and/or stated the inclusion of "opinions." O'Neill, for example, had used Best's designation, "any matter of fact," in his revision of the Laycock and Scales text. His subsequent discussion in that work suggests opinion, however, to be a kind of fact. O'Neill retained the same distinction in Debate and Oral Discussion, but in Working Principles of Argument with McBurney, he defined as follows:


282 See Ch. II of this study.
283 O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 82-83.
"Evidence consists of those matters of fact and opinion which are used as a basis of argument." 285

Many texts, after 1932, clearly labeled two separate categories, evidence of fact and evidence of opinion. 286 Several, however, retained the primacy of facts. Baird's revision of Public Discussion and Debate, for example, continued to cite Best's and Shaw's distinctions. 287 Wagner, moreover, suggested:

What are the means of proof? First, there is evidence—the establishing of facts by the testimony of witnesses, the citation of authorities, or the presentation of physical objects. Then there is reasoning about the facts. 288

Braden and Brandenburg treated "statements from authority" as a kind of fact. 289 A few writers, moreover, subdivided the "kinds" of evidence in their definitions. Nichols and Baccus, for example, averred that "evidence consists of

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286 See Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 117. Ewbank and Auer contended, nevertheless, that "all evidence is based upon matters of fact." See also Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, p. 84.
288 Wagner, Handbook of Argumentation, p. 27. Wagner, however, considered fact and opinion to be the two kinds of expert testimony.
289 Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, p. 89.
facts, data, statistics, happenings, and the personal experiences and comments of persons qualified to testify and to make judgments."^{290}

Classification

Most "middle period" writers continued to include legal classifications of evidence in their texts. In 1923, Ralph C. Ringwalt^{291} suggested three broad general categories: form; source; and the relation which facts bear to the conclusion. Baird incorporated these same distinctions into his *Public Discussion and Debate*.^{292} This analysis provides a comprehensive outline for labeling the various methods used by "middle period" writers to divide evidence.^{293}

I. Form
   A. Spoken or written
   B. Positive or real
   C. Real or personal
   D. General or specific

^{290}Nichols and Baccus, *Modern Debating*, p. 111.


^{293}The subdivisions are not Baird's. This outline includes a comprehensive list of ways of classifying.
II. Source

A. Expert or ordinary (expert or lay)

B. Original or hearsay

C. Primary or secondary

D. Reluctant or voluntary

E. Deliberate or casual

III. Relation to Conclusion

A. Direct and indirect (testimonial and circumstantial)

The preceding list of ways of classifying propositions demonstrates that "middle period" writers progressed, at least in this area, little beyond 1917 O'Neill, adding only two categories: general or specific; and reluctant or voluntary. David C. Ralph probably introduced the general-specific category in the 1954 Tau Kappa Alpha sponsored text. He explained by the following illustration its applicability to debating:

We may say that recent political conventions tend to suggest that we need to discover a better way of determining our national party


candidates. This is a very general use of evidence. On the other hand, we may argue that the widely televised Democratic and Republican national conventions of 1952 are examples to prove the need for an improved method of selecting candidates for the office of President of the United States. This is a more specific, direct use of evidence.296

Ralph also included the categories reluctant and voluntary to refer to the willingness with which testimony is given.297 Most other texts included this distinction, however, under tests of evidence.

Most writers of the "middle period" viewed evidence from a more limited perspective than these classifications suggest. Some, for example, merely listed kinds of evidence.298 Others outlined divisions of evidence, subordinating certain classes.299 Ewbank and Auer distinguished evidence as proof from evidence as vehicle. They listed two kinds of evidence—fact and opinion—which could be presented through examples and statistics.300 Crocker differentiated areas of classification from types of evidence.


297 Ibid., p. 96. See also Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 131.

298 Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 105-108.


evidence—examples, statistics, and testimony. And Nichols and Baccus divided evidence into fact, data, statistics, and authoritative writings.

Tests

Texts of the "middle period" included divergent, and at times contradictory, tests of evidence. Methods of evaluation ranged from the reduction of testing to the determinant, consistency, by Nichols to Baird's twenty-five criteria. Regardless of which listing and/or terminology was used, it is important to note that "middle period" writers treated similar evaluative concepts. Courtney and Capp advised: "The tests of evidence are many. In general they may be summed up under three heads--

301 Crocker, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 65-71.
302 Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, p. 105.
303 Nichols, Discussion and Debate, p. 309.
304 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 112-13.
305 Some writers organized their tests of evidence in terms of the "kind" of evidence to be evaluated. Pellegrini and Stirling, for example, outlined tests of evidence pertinent to expert testimony and statistical evidence. Pellegrini and Stirling, Argumentation and Public Discussion, pp. 14-24. Ewbank and Auer discussed evidence evaluation under the headings, testing facts and testing opinions. Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1951 rev. ed., pp. 109-117. Braden and Brandenburg included specific tests for statements from authority, example, and statistics. Their evaluative criteria drew from contemporary writings in statistics as well as from traditional sources. Braden and Brandenburg, Oral Decision-Making, pp. 89-103.
source, quality, and quantity." An examination of various methods of testing evidence corroborates this conclusion.

"Middle period" writers retained traditional tests of source, of quality, and of quantity. In examining the validity of a source, they attended to prejudice, qualifications (physical, moral, mental, training), veracity, and opportunity to know the facts. The criterion "can evidence pass the hearsay test" kept surfacing, moreover. Posed first by Laycock and Scales in 1904, and retained in 1917 by O'Neill, the question appeared in the O'Neill-Cortright text phrased as follows:

First we must ask, is the evidence itself of such a nature that it is probable that it can be handed about from person to person without undergoing considerable change? ...

The second part of the hearsay test requires that the hearsay evidence in order to be good evidence must come through satisfactory channels.

Foster sharply criticized the use of hearsay evidence in argumentation in his 1932 revision of Argumentation and Debate.

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306 Courtney and Capp, Practical Debating, p. 99.
307 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, however, insisted that "legal tests of evidence are not . . . tests of logical relevancy, but tests of legal admissibility." McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 74-75.
309 O'Neill and Cortright, Debate and Oral Discussion, pp. 118-19.
Debating, setting out two objections: "(1) the variations from truth liable to occur during its passage through such fallible media as human minds and language; and (2) its irresponsibility."\(^{310}\) O'Neill and McBurney realized that "in general argumentation, however, much reliance must be placed on the experiences and observations of others as they are told to you, or as they are printed in books and magazines."\(^{311}\) And Nichols concluded that "if hearsay evidence were rigidly excluded, discussion and debate would be practically impossible."\(^{312}\) Eventually, however, most texts dropped the distinction.

"Middle period" writers also generally agreed on the constituents of "quality." For example, tests of the consistency of evidence (with itself, with other evidence, with human experience, with the laws of logical argument, with common sense, and with known fact) came largely from "early period" texts.\(^{313}\) The probability of evidence\(^{314}\)

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\(^{312}\) Nichols, *Discussion and Debate*, pp. 275-76.


(evaluated in terms of general knowledge or human experience, specific or unusual existing conditions, or subsequent or prior known facts) emerged. And, the timeliness of evidence became an important method of verifying quality for some writers. Sufficiency, on the other hand, lent itself less easily to specific tests. Courtney and Capp pointed out:

There can be no "one and only" answer to how much evidence is necessary to prove an argument. Much depends upon the nature of the argument itself and upon the beliefs of the audience relative to each argument.

Quantity is determined by the nature of the argument, audience beliefs, and by the corroboration of evidence.\textsuperscript{315}

In addition to these tests for reliability,\textsuperscript{316} appropriated largely from "early period" texts, certain "middle period" writers examined audience acceptability of evidence. Though Winans and Utterback, for example, omitted a treatment of evidence as such, they, nevertheless, averred that "to be convincing an argument must rest upon basic premises which are acceptable to the hearer."\textsuperscript{317}


\textsuperscript{316}"Middle period" tests of reliability paralleled early period tests. See Ch. II of this study. In evaluating competency of source, questions evolved concerning opportunity to know facts, capability of understanding facts, and ability to interpret them, along with physical, mental, moral, and experience qualifications.

\textsuperscript{317}Winans and Utterback, \textit{Argumentation}, p. 140.
O'Neill and McBurney agreed that both audience acceptability and logical adequacy are appropriate tests of evidence. "In some cases, it is advisable to be guided by one test, and in other cases, primarily by the other test."318 They asked:

Is the evidence already a belief of the audience? . . . Has the evidence been attributed to an authority which the audience is willing to accept?319

Though O'Neill retained audience acceptability as a test of evidence in his text with McBurney and Mills, he gave it less emphasis.320

Reasoning

Traditional applications of logic to argumentation and debate faced attack from two divergent viewpoints.321 Baker, relying heavily on Sidgwick, had questioned the value of a study of "Formal Logic" for practical argumentation. Gladys Murphy Graham, on the other hand, indicted "current" treatments of logic in argumentation texts as insufficient and fragmentary.322 Believing that the new

319 Ibid., pp. 113-16.
320 See McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, p. 95.
321 See Ch. II of this study.
logics could provide both new principles and a clarification of certain currently used, muddled concepts, Graham wished to adapt Bosanquet's analysis of argument from implicative wholes to argumentation and debate theory.

Woolbert, meanwhile, having reassessed the place of logic (the process of inferring) in a system of persuasion, concluded that the making of inferences occurs at three general levels of consciousness (the subconscious, partly conscious, and conscious). The nature of the process is the same for all three levels, being ultimately reducible to neuromuscular activity. Woolbert theorized that past experience operating as opinions, attitudes, et cetera, are influential at the subconscious level. Ethical appeals and testimony are operative at the partly conscious level; reason at the conscious level. He categorized the three levels, therefore, in terms of logical formulae to be used. Rules of rhetoric are applicable at the first level. Few rules have been formulated for the partly conscious level. Rules of logic are appropriate for the third or conscious level. Woolbert extended the levels of consciousness concept when he interpreted logical fallacies in terms of the Freudian wish theory; i.e., faulty reasoning results from the clash of our subconscious and conscious wishes.\footnote{Woolbert, "Logic in a System of Persuasion," pp. 19-39.}
John Dewey also examined thought as a logical form, or product, and as a psychological process. He contended that logical forms apply not to reaching conclusions, not to arriving at beliefs and knowledge, but to the most effective way in which to set forth what has already been concluded, so as to convince others (or oneself if one wishes to recall to mind its grounds) of the soundness of the result.

Dewey argued, nevertheless, that "actual thinking has its own logic; it is orderly, reasonable, reflective." What of the influence of these critics? Following Baker, "middle period" texts paid homage to a "practical" approach to argumentation. Practical, however, usually meant simplified prescriptive texts for contest debating with a smattering of traditional Formal Logic thrown in for good measure. Graham's insistence on applying reasoning from implicative wholes to argumentation, though largely rejected, helped to stimulate interest in new approaches to logic.

The Woolbertian disciples, Collins and Morris, presented a radical--though not particularly influential--treatment of argument. Attempting "to present helpful

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324 Dewey, How We Think, p. 74.
325 Ibid., p. 75.
326 See, however, discussion of explanation as argument in McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 130-42; see also Nichols, Discussion and Debate, pp. 347-48.
principles from logic and from psychology without drawing upon the systematic treatment of either," Collins and Morris ignored both the syllogism and formal induction. Preferring the "more easily understandable and practical synthetical methods," they examined "the three essential argumentative materials of reasoning": propositions expressing old beliefs of the audience; propositions expressing new beliefs which the persuader hopes the audience will accept; and propositions expressing mental connections between the old beliefs and the new. They also included "the four essential implicit or impressive materials of objective reasoning": propositions expressing illustrative imagery (presented by use of figure, analogy, exemplification); rhetorical questions which image and suggest responses; bodily-action images (the action of the speaker); and vocal images (the voice of the speaker). Collins and Morris held that the acceptance-attitudes of the audience determined the use of these methods. 

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327 Collins and Morris, *Persuasion and Debate*, p. ix.
331 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills incorporated the analysis-synthesis terminology into their definition of explanation as argument: "Explanation is that form of support in which belief and action are sought by explaining
Most writers, perceiving John Dewey's paradigm to be analysis, not proof, or even a process of proof, examined the elements of reflective thought in chapters on analysis or in sections on organizational patterns of discussion. Nichols and Baccus' "types of induction," however, an atypical approach, combined some of Dewey's steps with certain of John Stuart Mills's experimental methods. Nichols and Baccus labeled three "positive processes of induction," inquiry or investigation, generalizing, and analyzing, and one "negative process," elimination.  

Most "middle period" writers, rather than adapting one of the preceding alternatives, retained edited versions of "Formal Logic," similar to that found in O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales's Argumentation and Debate. Their texts simply updated traditional treatments in terms of certain contemporary logics.  

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332 Nichols and Baccus, Modern Debating, pp. 179-81.  
333 Nichols and Baccus presented a representative view of the relation of logic to argumentation and debate: "Debate depends so much upon logic that some people have considered it a game of logic. Debate, however, is not logic any more than biology is logic. It is not a game of
were the writings of Max Black and Monroe Beardsley.\textsuperscript{334} Black's \textit{Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method}\textsuperscript{335} combined "a cursory introduction to symbolic logic with the traditional Aristotelian nomenclature"\textsuperscript{336} in examining deduction which, incidentally, Black determined to relativistic.\textsuperscript{337} Beardsley's \textit{Practical Logic} and \textit{Thinking Straight}\textsuperscript{338} included principles of logic any more than military tactics are a game of logic. Debate depends so closely upon logic for the rules of its thinking, the tests of its reasoning, that it is impossible to separate the two, but the same thing may be said of the dependence of all sciences upon logic. From the logical methods of thought the debater gets the constructive argument needed to develop his case in proper arrangement. From the methods of testing thought, he learns what to use and what not to use in constructing a case. From the maxim of logic he learns the formulas of refutation and rebuttal." \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 177-78.

\textsuperscript{334}The influence of Black and Beardsley is evidenced both by journal reviews and by direct citations of their works in numerous argumentation texts of the "middle period."

\textsuperscript{335}Max Black, \textit{Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method} (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946).


\textsuperscript{337}Black's innovative division of fallacies included general fallacies, "those whose persuasiveness is connected with some intrinsic defect of the argument" (formal, linguistic, and material types) and fallacies of circumstance, "those whose appeal arises from some features of the context in which the argument is used." Black, \textit{Critical Thinking}, pp. 210-11.

application as well as theoretical distinctions between fact and opinion, exposition and argument, reasons and conclusions. Beardsley described syllogisms, emphasized statistical data, and discussed style. James I. Brown suggested that the "particular contribution" of Beardsley's two works "lies in bringing into closer relationship, logic and life—that portion of life centering in communication, in writing and reading, in speaking and listening."  

It was suggested in Chapter II of this study that the 1917 revisions of O'Neill and Foster provided the essential framework for "middle period" approaches to proof. A summary chart of their positions is shown on page 219. An examination of the diagram indicates that though Foster and O'Neill essentially agreed on the components of proof, they perceived the relationships between these elements differently. The same was true for "middle period" writers. Some followed O'Neill in distinguishing rhetorical and logical classes of


340 Shaw felt that "the basis of classifying all argument rests upon the nature of the inference between the premises and the conclusion." He included analogy, along with deduction and induction. Shaw, Art of Debate, p. 74. See also McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate.
FOSTER

Classes of Argument provided by Logic

Induction
  - Example (typical form)
    - Analogy
    - Generalization (imperfect induction)

Deduction (logical syllogism)
  - Causal Relation (typical form)
    - Cause to Effect
    - Effect to Effect
    - Effect to Cause

O'NEILL

Rhetorical Classes of Argument

Antecedent Probability
  - Sign
    - Cause to Effect
    - Effect to Cause
    - Effect to Effect

Example
  - Generalization
    - Association of phenomena in past
  - Analogy

Logical Classes of Argument

Deduction (process of inference same)
  - Kinds
    - Perfect
    - Imperfect
  - Method
    - Agreement
    - Difference
    - Joint
    - Residues
    - Concomitant
    - Variations

syllogism
quantitative relations
sorites
enthymeme
argument. Others attempted, as had Foster, to incorporate the rhetorical categories as "kinds" of induction and deduction. Baird treated specific instances, argument from authority, argument from causal relation, and analogy as forms of induction. Winans and Utterback labeled three types of reasoning: deductive (syllogistic, but included a forteriori); generalization (included causal); and analogy. O'Neill and Cortright followed the O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales distinctions, while O'Neill and McBurney examined generalization and analogy as forms of induction; antecedent probability and sign as kinds of deduction. O'Neill and McBurney suggested, moreover, "two important thought relationships involved in induction and deduction": cause-effect relationships and substance-attribute relationships. Nichols picked

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Babcock and Powell listed as the major divisions of reasoning, deduction, induction, and estimates of probability in regard to particular questions, treating analogy and circumstantial evidence as parts of the third classification. Moreover, they evaluated effect to cause, cause to effect, and effect to effect reasoning as kinds of circumstantial evidence. Babcock and Powell, How to Debate, pp. 134-64.

Baird, Public Discussion and Debate, pp. 187-204.

Winans and Utterback, Argumentation, pp. 64-136.


up these distinctions and included them along with nonsyllogistic types of argument, and implication or implicative wholes in his discussion of proof.\(^{346}\) Whereas Shaw had treated analogy as comparable to induction and deduction, Wagner suggested causal reasoning to be a third major division of argument.\(^{347}\) Wagner also included certain other aspects of proof: accepted premises or topics; a *forteirori* reasoning; and the dilemma.\(^{348}\)

Some "middle period" writers simply listed types of arguments and did not specifically detail their relationships. Ewbank and Auer included deduction, induction, analogy, and causal argument. Baird (1950) treated generalization (from specific instances, statistics, and circumstantial details), analogy, causal reasoning,


\(^{348}\)Wagner, *Handbook of Argumentation*, p. 44. Wagner suggested that in form, the *forteirori* argument, a "mode of heightening the argument by analogy . . . resembles the hypothetical syllogism." O'Neill relied on Genung's description of a *forteirori* argument which said: "A favorite use of the argument from example, especially in oratory, is the argument technically called a *forteirori*, which reasons that if a certain principle is true in a given case, much more will it be true in a supposed case, wherein the conditions are more favorable." John F. Genung, *The Practical Elements of Rhetoric* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1886), pp. 421-22. O'Neill believed a *forteirori* argument to be applicable to either generalization or analogy. O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, *Argumentation and Debate*, p. 159.
authority, and deduction. Braden and Brandenburg listed arguments from specific instances, circumstantial detail, causal relations, analogy, and authority. Though recognizing that one usually identifies these as inductive arguments, they observed that:

Actually, however, the debater or public speaker almost always uses a deductive order with these forms. He presents his general belief or conclusion and then attempts to prove it by utilizing various kinds of argument in support of it.

Though most definitions and tests of the various forms of reasoning closely followed "early period" distinctions, argument from sign continued to generate controversy. Both Foster and O'Neill had included sign in their revisions. Foster believed that "we ought to be able to explain all so-called arguments from sign by reference to generalization, or causation, or both." O'Neill used the rhetorical classification and divided sign into arguments from effect to cause, effect to effect, and association of phenomena in the past. Though Shaw, 

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349 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, pp. 115-60.
351 Ibid., p. 133.
352 Foster, Argumentation and Debating, p. 181.
Ewbank and Auer, and Nichols included argument from sign in their texts, it was in the O'Neill co-authored texts that the concept received most attention. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills's *Argumentation and Debate* prescribed the argument as

one which gives an indication that the proposition is true without attempting to explain why it is true. It is a *ratio cognoscendi* or reason for acknowledging or recognizing the truth of a proposition as distinguished from a *ratio essendi* or reason why the proposition is true.\(^{354}\)

Ehninger disagreed. "As a *ratio cognoscendi* [method of knowing], argument from sign is concerned with the *what* of a thing," he said, "rather than with the *why*."\(^{355}\)

"Unfortunately," Ehninger continued, "the difference

\(^{354}\) McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, *Argumentation and Debate*, p. 96. "All arguments from sign are based on the assumption (stated or implied) that two or more variables are related in such a way that the presence or absence of one may be taken as an indication of the presence or absence of the other. Such relationships are *reciprocal* when either variable may be taken as the sign of the other. . . . Sign relationships are *nonreciprocal* when one variable serves as a sign of the second, but this second *cannot* be reliably deduced from the first. . . . These sign relations are sometimes referred to as substance-attribute relations. Since every substance (object, thing, person, event, item, etc.) has certain distinguishing attributes or characteristics (size, shape, color, speed, number, etc.) the attributes may be taken as signs of the substance or the substance as a sign of the attributes. All arguments from sign are based on generalizations either stated or implied," p. 97.

between sign and cause is not always easy to grasp," the reasons being as follows:

The first is that at one point sign and cause coincide, since among the reasons for our knowing a thing is an awareness of its cause. Thus, triangular ripples in the water are both a sign that a boat has passed and are also the effect resulting from its having agitated the water. Second, in English we commonly employ "because," "hence," and similar words to express both relationships. 356

McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills expanded traditional tests of argument from sign. Believing that "the basic test of any argument from sign lies in the reliability of the generalization upon which it is based,"357 they included, nevertheless, specific tests for "constructing and appraising" these arguments.

1. Is the sign relationship accidental or coincidental?
2. Is the sign relationship reciprocal?
3. Have special factors intervened which alter normal relations?
4. Is the sign reliable without the collaboration or concurrence of other signs?358

Ehninger, on the other hand, suggested the following "three basic considerations":

1. That which is alleged to be a sign of a particular state or condition must bear a necessary and essential relation to that state or condition.

356 Ibid.
357 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, p. 98.
358 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
2. That which at one time and under one set of circumstances may be a valid sign of some state or condition is not necessarily a valid sign of that state or condition at another time or under altered circumstances.

3. While in some instances a single sign may be sufficient to establish the presence of a particular state or condition, generally the corroboration of several signs is necessary in order to establish its presence.\textsuperscript{359}

Though "middle period" writers retained traditional tests for formal validity (rules for categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms),\textsuperscript{360} they recognized that:

The essential rhetorical problem in the syllogism is in the fact that its rules and regulations contemplate a degree of certainty which can rarely be achieved in a rhetorical demonstration. The crucial test of the syllogism is that the middle term be distributed in at least one of the premises. The point here is that the middle terms in rhetorical syllogisms can rarely be distributed perfectly and completely. The things we talk about in most public and private debates are variable rather than discrete and categorical. . . . A series of syllogisms whose middle terms are qualified . . . [as usually, frequently, et cetera] might very well establish an exceedingly high degree of probability; and yet, logically, . . . they amount to exactly zero, because the middle terms are not distributed. . . . In order . . . to accommodate his syllogistic doctrine to the kinds of proofs which speakers and writers must ordinarily use, he [Aristotle] . . .


\textsuperscript{360} See O'Neill, Laycock, and Scales, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 176-82.
invented the "rhetorical syllogism" or the enthymeme. \footnote{McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}, pp. 118-19.}

Particularly instrumental in giving the concept a more central place in argumentation theory, \footnote{See James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," \textit{Speech Monographs}, III (September, 1936), 49-74.} McBurney said:

The syllogism and the enthymeme explain the structure of argument as it is exhibited in a properly drawn brief or logical outline and provide the structural basis, through such outlines, for the composition of the finished discourse. They also make it clear that all (deductive) reasoning proceeds by relating generalizations to particular cases through the mediation of middle terms which are common to both and provide tests which can be used to check the validity of deductive inferences. \footnote{McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}, p. 122.}

Consistent with an interest in empiricism and pragmatism, "middle period" texts also investigated material validity, primarily in terms of traditional fallacies. McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills pointed up the importance of such a study when they said:

So far as it is possible, the speaker should attempt to make his arguments both formally valid and materially true. This amounts to saying that the deductions from his premises should be carefully drawn and his premises should be inductively sound. The rules of the syllogism are designed to give formal validity and the rules of inductive reasoning are designed to secure material truth. In dealing...
with probabilities, we approximate these conditions as closely as possible.\textsuperscript{364}

Some writers included other "obstacles to clear thinking." Baird listed eleven major problems.\textsuperscript{365} Behl reduced Baird's categories to six general divisions (inaccurate use of language, inaccurate use of definition, inaccurate analysis, misuse of evidence, fallacies in logic, and special fallacies) and added substitution of speaking techniques for argument.\textsuperscript{366}

The Forensic

Whereas Baker\textsuperscript{367} had perceived the forensic to be either a written or oral presentation, "middle period" writers restricted its meaning to the "spoken debate"\textsuperscript{368} and to certain forms of public discussion. In their essay on "Intercollegiate Debating," Cowperthwaite and Baird suggested that "by 1923 college debating had seen most of its major developments."\textsuperscript{369} Of its subsequent evolution, they said:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{364}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 126.
\item \textsuperscript{365}Baird, \textit{Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate}, pp. 163–65.
\item \textsuperscript{366}Behl, \textit{Discussion and Debate}, p. 135.
\item \textsuperscript{367}Baker, \textit{Principles}, p. vii.
\item \textsuperscript{368}See Alden, \textit{Art of Debate}, p. 187.
\end{itemize}
The forces which established intercollegiate debate have been vigorous enough to keep it in good health. International debating continued to expand. New adaptations were introduced . . . and radio enabled the debater to reach larger audiences. The most important new direction was the debate tournament, which allowed debaters to meet several colleges at one location with minimum expense. Colleges experimented also with legislative assemblies as a realistic setting for the student speaker.\(^{370}\)

Tournament Debating

The advent of tournament debating,\(^{371}\) for Baird and Cowperthwaite the most significant development of the period, resulted in textbook attention to, as well as journal literature on, organizing forensic programs,\(^{372}\)

\(^{370}\) Ibid. Women also were allowed to enter the fray during the "middle period."


forensic leagues, and debate tournaments. It also influenced and in many ways dictated the structure of the forensic. Cowperthwaite and Baird observed further that:

In order to hold several "rounds" of debate in one or two days, the length of speeches was reduced to ten minutes for constructive and five minutes for rebuttal speeches. Although early tournaments made use of the traditional three-speaker team, tournament efficiency was in large measure responsible for the advent of the two-speaker system. With the national tournament came the necessity for selecting a national debate question. Finally, the tournament brought a renewed emphasis on contest debating, even though many non-decision or "practice" tournaments were held. Tournament debating also meant speaking almost entirely without popular audiences; indeed, the real audience was often the critic judge.


Forms and Formats

Debate coaches and tournament directors experimented widely with format during the "middle period." Though recommending open forum, split teams, heckling, dialectic, and even "mail order" forms of debating, writers more often emphasized the cross-examination, congressional, and direct

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376 For an excellent summary of the forms of debating, see Lahman, Debate Coaching, 1936 rev. ed., pp. 33-40.

377 Nichols attributed the new debate forms to criticisms being hurled at the discipline. E. R. Nichols, "Boil and Bubble, Toil and Trouble," Debaters' Magazine, II (September, 1946), 189-90.


382 See Eric Julber and Warren Christopher, "'Mail Order' Debating," Rostrum, XVII (September, 1942), 5.

383 This was also called the "Oregon Plan." See J. Stanley Gray, "The Oregon Plan of Debating," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, XII (April, 1926), 178-79. See also D. R. Parker, "The Use of Cross-Examination in Debate," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, 1932), 97-102. Gray outlined the advantages of the
clash styles. In addition to modifications of the traditional forensic form, "middle period" writers devised numerous methods for presenting several sides of an issue, convention debating being particularly popular. Intercollegiate contests included parliamentary sessions, symposia, and, in some instances, discussion.

Oregon Plan. "We have no judge prejudice; no overemphasis of winning; no refusal of a debater to admit a fact because it may cause him to lose a judge's vote; no sacrificing of the welfare of the student for the sake of winning a debate; no dry academic and technical speeches; and finally, no shirking in preparation. The period of cross-questioning is sufficient stimulus for thorough preparation. Aside from the first two speeches, memorized speaking is impossible. The debater must learn to adjust himself and his ideas to the new situations which every debate presents." Gray, "The Oregon Plan of Debating," p. 179.


See Ray Cowell, "The Problem Solving Debate," Rostrum, XI (September, 1936), 6-7; Joseph F. O'Brien, "Group Discussion as a Substitute for the Conventional
Pi Kappa Delta sponsored a student legislative assembly as a regular feature of its national conventions and Delta Sigma Rho inaugurated a continuing series of biennial National Student Congresses.

The advent of no-decision debate led to an investigation of still other formats. There was agitation, for example, for debating on neutral floors. Radio debating gained popularity. Students participated in limited proposition or impromptu clashes and some tried the British system. Interest, moreover, generated by a few


Sherod J. Collins, "The Student Assembly," Forensic, XXVII (May, 1942), 126-27, 162.


isolated debates with British teams resulted in the establishment of an international debating program sponsored by the Institute of International Education.

Old Issues and New Directions

appropriate end of debating, i.e., skill in argumentation versus discovery of truth. 397 The O'Neill-Wells controversy, though far from resolved, approached a stalemate in 1918, with the publication of a joint article in the Quarterly Journal of Speech Education. Wells restated his earlier position that debate must emphasize reasoning with truth as the end. "Art is always dynamic, moving to definite purposes," he said. 398 O'Neill, equally unyielding, countered: "I want precisely what we get in other kinds of contests, an intelligent decision on the work done, the ability shown." 399 Though directed initially towards differing philosophical ends of debating, the continuing dispute had deteriorated into a hassel over judging. In 1918, an article appeared in the Quarterly Journal entitled "Juryman or Critic; Three Rebuttal Arguments and a Decision." 400 Sarett, the "judge," set out the issues as follows, his analysis being incisive.


399 Ibid., p. 83.

400 Hugh N. Wells, James M. O'Neill, and Lew R. Sarett, "Juryman or Critic; Three Rebuttal Arguments and a Decision," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IV (October, 1918), 398-433.
The gist of the whole argument is this. Judge Wells wishes the debate to be judged primarily on the "weight of evidence" or "the case"--as I said I infer that by this he means the fullness and the logical coherence of the brief, and the preponderance of points; and secondarily (although nowhere does he make the definite statement) on skill in debate, and then only in so far as that skill serves to make the "weight of evidence" more clear, etc. Professor O'Neill wishes debate to be judged primarily on skill in debate as such, in and of itself, and secondarily on the evidence,--thus if one side is inherently weaker in evidence or "case" this misfortune will be no bar to the possibility of winning the debate if it is superior as a team of debaters, more skillful. The ultimate and conclusive answer to the question that is raised by these conflicting positions can be found only if we can agree on an answer to another question which is in turn created, and which lies at the root of the discussion, namely, What is the end of debate? What is its function? What is its purpose? Neither Professor O'Neill nor Judge Wells makes a definite statement on this point; each bases his argument on a different assumption. I infer from Judge Wells' attitude--this is merely an inference--that he believes that the end of debate is the revelation of "truth." (I use quotation marks because I believe that "truth" as it lies in all big public questions is more or less relative, varying with the temperaments, prejudices, experiences, and observations of judges; moreover "truth" is not always truth.) Professor O'Neill on the other hand believes that debate is an intellectual combat, a contest in skill in forensics. Obviously the gentlemen disagree in their basic conceptions concerning the end or purpose of debate. It is and always will be difficult to reconcile arguments concerning judges, standards, and so on, if we cannot agree on this conception of the function of debate; and our conclusions concerning all other questions of debate policy must vary with it. If the debate is a game, an intellectual combat, a contest in forensic skill, then the judge should be a critic who knows the game, who understands the art and the arts of debate; and the standard by which he should judge contests should be the
standard of skill in the use of that art,—skill in debate, skill as such. 401

If nothing else, the Wells-O'Neill discussions pointed up the relativity of standards of judgment. Writers drafted ballots with varying criteria. Some espoused voting by percentages. No-decision and audience-decision debates gained popularity and a single arbiter replaced the three-judge panel. Henry C. Klingbeil graphically demonstrated the problem when he said: "The greatest need of the American brand of debating to-day is some definite, visible scoring scheme." 402 Several such "schemes" appeared, one of the most interesting being the "shift of opinion" ballot by Woodward and Millson. 403 Designed to replace the formal decision of a judge, this approach sought rather to assess the effect of debating in terms of a change in audience response. Recognizing that "audience opinion is an elusive thing," 404 Woodward attempted to

401 Ibid., pp. 432-33.
402 Henry C. Klingbeil, "Debate or Politics?" Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV (April, 1928), 222.
construct a scientific, statistical approach to judging.\textsuperscript{405}

His scheme\textsuperscript{406} follows:

\textbf{TO THE AUDIENCE}

The debaters will appreciate your interest and help if you will, both before and after the debate, indicate on this sheet your personal opinion on the idea proposed for debate.

Soon as the debate is finished, opportunity will be given you to question the debaters on any matters that pertain to the question

\textbf{BEFORE THE DEBATE}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \square I believe in the affirmative of the resolution to be debated
  \item \square I am undecided
  \item \square I believe in the negative of the resolution to be debated
\end{itemize}

\textbf{THE REASONS FOR MY OPINION ARE:}

\textbf{AFTER THE DEBATE}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \square I believe more strongly in the affirmative of the resolution than I did.
  \item \square I believe in the affirmative of the resolution.
  \item \square I am undecided.
  \item \square I believe in the negative of the resolution.
  \item \square I believe more strongly in the negative of the resolution than I did.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{THE REASONS FOR MY OPINION ARE:}

\textsuperscript{405}He designed his form, moreover, "to require a minimum of oral persuasion by the management and of activity by the audience." \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 95-96. The audience gets all its information about the debate from a distributed program.

\textsuperscript{406}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 109.
Summary

"Middle period" writers developed a fairly consistent and generally acceptable approach to and theory of argumentation and debate. Philosophically, argumentation questioned the conviction-persuasion dichotomy and relied on a total rhetorical approach which emphasized the audience. It treated discussion, moreover, as a part of problem-solving and stressed the importance of discussion and debate to a democratic society.

The analysis of a proposition closely followed the system set forth by traditional theory. Stock issues, however, came to the forefront; chapters on research became more prominent; and case appeared as a construct clearly separated from the brief.

Though proof generally followed "early period" prescriptions, attention shifted to the relation of evidence to reasoning, with detailed listings of kinds, characteristics, and tests of evidence. Reasoning in terms of logical validity continued to rely on the classical syllogism and Mills's system of induction.

The forensic itself also generated a degree of controversy during the "middle period." Though justifying debating in terms of educational values, writers failed to agree on its immediate goals; i.e., the discovery of truth versus the development of skills. That "epidemic" of debating, the debate tournament, with its emphasis on
winning a decision (whether audience, juryman, or critic) intensified the problem. Numerous "plans" for academic debating appeared with format determined or at least influenced by one's predispositions about criteria for judgment. Underlying these issues lay broad, philosophical questions which harkened back to one's view of the nature and end of debate. The Wells-O'Neill discussions represented that controversy at its peak.
CHAPTER IV

CONTEMPORARY THEORY--c. 1955-1970

Building on traditional concepts, "middle period" writers had amassed a well-developed and widely accepted body of argumentation and debate theory.\(^1\) Their influence, moreover, did not terminate with the advent of more contemporary works. On the contrary, many texts written during the immediate period, though updating examples and psychology, have simply extended "middle period" generalizations.\(^2\) During the decade of the 1950's, however, some writers began to propose new directions for argumentation and debate theory. It is with these developments that this chapter is primarily concerned.

Though demanding a re-examination of philosophical bases and offering some new prescriptions, particularly in the area of proof, contemporary works have not rejected

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\(^1\)A cursory examination of basic public speaking texts indicates that many theoretical innovations appeared first in argumentation and debate texts and then were transferred to general rhetorical theory.

much traditional theory. Neither have they belaboured it. Assuming rather its value, many have shifted (or perhaps reverted) in emphasis to a redefinition of argumentation primarily in terms of proving a proposition, usually for a critic judge in a tournament situation.\(^3\) Arthur Kruger's *Modern Debate* represented the advance guard of such a position.\(^4\) Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede's innovative text, *Decision by Debate*, took, however, an opposite tack.\(^5\) Much splintering of theory has occurred in critical essays published in books of readings in argumentation and debate,\(^6\) differences serving to reopen certain philosophical questions critical to "early period" writers.

The O'Neill tradition, true to form, has analyzed, synthesized, and attempted to bring a degree of order into contemporary theory. Much as O'Neill's 1917 revision of *Argumentation and Debate* had crystallized traditional concepts and presaged new developments in theory, James H. McBurney, James M. O'Neill, and Glen E. Mills's


\(^5\)Ehninger and Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*.

Argumentation and Debate linked the "middle" and "contemporary" periods. McBurney and Mills's 1964 revision marked the end of that transition, Mills's subsequent works venturing further from the relative security of traditional constructs. Mills set out clearly his predispositions toward argumentation in Reason in Controversy, published the same year as the revision of Argumentation and Debate with McBurney. Though Mills's second edition rejected certain of the assumptions of the earlier work, it included more tightly structured, well-reasoned defenses of the author's theoretical positions and brought under one cover what is probably the most comprehensive and precise analysis of contemporary argumentation and debate theory available.

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In 1964, in a critical review of three new works in argumentation and debate, Forbes I. Hill summarized contemporary textbook approaches as follows:

Any argumentation book that is going to have a market is plagued with finding some relationship to the highly structured advocacy of intercollegiate debate. There are three possible approaches to this relationship: one may write a book for the intercollegiate contestant which attempts to generalize its precepts of debating to significant real-life situations, or one may write a book about advocacy in real-life situations which works in just enough commentary about school debate to be usable to teach contestants, or one may write a book that is frankly a handbook for school debaters and leave it largely to trust that they will later transfer what they have learned to real-life situations.\(^{11}\)

The Nature of Argumentation

Contemporary theorists have been no more successful than their predecessors in determining a universally acceptable view of the nature of argumentation.\(^{12}\) James H. McBath's analysis pointed up, and Mills's discussion clarified, the diversity of modern approaches. Whereas McBath topically treated critical deliberation, persuasive argumentation, argumentation as a means of achieving assent, the social responsibility of the inquirer-advocate,


and argumentation as an instrument of inquiry, Mills examined argumentation as: a form of discourse (examining its rhetorical roots, i.e., grammatical composition); a critical apparatus (involving concepts of probability, presumption, burden of proof, burden of rebuttal, analysis, evidence, et cetera); an academic discipline ("a branch of communication theory which deals with the analysis, synthesis, and criticism of primarily reasoned discourse about controversial ideas"). Mills's second edition gave "more attention . . . to definitions of basic concepts such as argumentation, debate, and proof."  

Despite a lack of continuity in contemporary texts, a common interest has persisted in the methods and ends appropriate to argumentation and/or debate and, secondarily, in the relation of argumentation to other subjects, much less emphasis being attached to "definitions." Many writers, moreover, have precisely set out their assumptions and premises. An examination

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14 Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1964 ed., pp. 3-4. Mills suggested further that "the principles of this subject are applied in order to discover the proof requirements of an assertion or to make a case for or against an assertion," p. 6.

of certain of these bases reveals much about contemporary perceptions of the nature of argument.

Assumptions and Premises

As the Baker, Collins and Morris, Baird, and Ewbank and Auer texts\textsuperscript{16} attest, proponents of "new" approaches often have taken great pains to develop and/or explicate justificatory rationale.\textsuperscript{17} The contemporary period represents an intensification of that trend, particularly in terms of the humanistic tradition.\textsuperscript{18} Its writers have built on "middle period" generalizations regarding the role of reasoned discourse in a democratic society. They have also emphasized the worth of argumentation in individual decision-making.

\begin{enumerate}
  \item \textsuperscript{17}The preceding chapter pointed out that Collins and Morris followed closely Woolbert's hypotheses, while Baird and Auer worked out in journal articles basic philosophical distinctions.
  \item \textsuperscript{18}Mills suggested that: "Argumentation qualifies as humanistic for four reasons: Man in general is an arguing creature; as a means of social control, argumentation provides a freedom of choice which commands, threats, and brainwashing do not; nonargumentative procedures bypass the individual; a completely closed mind shuts one off from the human race." Mills, \textit{Reason in Controversy}, 1968 rev. ed., p. 7.
\end{enumerate}
McBurney suggested in the 1951 revision of *Argumentation and Debate* that "the study and practice of argumentation and debate involve four basic assumptions which merit careful consideration": propositions can be proved; truth, justice, and wisdom are more powerful than their opposites; rational decisions are preferred; and emotional reactions are more easily enlisted in intellectually defensible causes.\(^{19}\) He reiterated these positions in 1964.\(^{20}\) Mills's *Reason in Controversy* modified McBurney's notions and called them assumptions relevant to the social context of argumentation. Mills's listing follows: a case can be made for either side of a controversial judgment; "truth and justice are by nature more powerful than their opposites"; deliberative decisions are preferable to emotional reactions, impulsive snap judgments, and trial-and-error procedures; and affective appeals work best when they supplement logical ones.\(^{21}\) Mills went further to distinguish "some essential attitudes and beliefs" relevant to argumentation in general education: free competition among ideas facilitating an honest search for wise conclusions; tolerance and objectivity

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19 McBurney, O'Neill, and Mills, *Argumentation and Debate*, pp. 10-11. McBurney was responsible for this chapter.


toward opposing ideas; the constructive value of disagree-
ment; and a "reasonable confidence" in one's ability to
think. Mills retained these categories in his 1968
revision.

McBath, editor of the 1963 revision of the Tau
Kappa Alpha sponsored Argumentation and Debate, similarly
had suggested that "underpinning argumentation and debate
are four cardinal assumptions or premises that give direc-
tion to our study": that choices are inevitable in group
and individual life; that responsible group and personal
decisions will be respected; that citizens must enjoy
freedom to test and verify their ideas; and that belief
has intellectual-emotional bases. Within the framework
of these expressed assumptions as well as those implied
elsewhere, contemporary writers have identified specific
methods and goals for argumentation.

The Methods and Ends of Argument

Central to an understanding of contemporary notions
about the ends and methods of argumentation is a recogni-
tion of two diverse, though not always mutually exclusive,

22Ibid., pp. 17-18.

pp. 7-10. Mills added Ehninger's limitations of contro-
versy. See Douglas Ehninger, "Debate as Method: Limita-
tions and Values," Speech Teacher, XV (September, 1966),
180-85.

24McBath, Argumentation and Debate, pp. 4-6.
viewpoints from which texts have approached the subject. One branch of theory perceives debate to be a vehicle for the making of rational choices; the other holds that it is a process by which one defends or advocates a point of view. The first circumscribes a broad context for practical argumentation. The second attends to one species, academic debate. The terms inquiry and decision are keys to an understanding of the first approach; advocacy, logic, and strategy are keys to the second.

The roots of the inquiry-advocacy contradistinction go back at least as far as Whately's Elements of Rhetoric. The Archbishop had written:

Reasoning may be considered as applicable to two purposes ... the ascertainment of the truth by investigation [inquiry] and the establishment of it to the satisfaction of another [proof]. ... The process of investigation must be supposed completed, and certain conclusions arrived at by that process, before he [the advocate] begins to prove the justness of those conclusions.  

The introduction of discussion theory into argumentation during the "middle period" reinforced that assessment.  

Contemporary texts have retained Whately's correlation of method with purpose. While the advocacy-proof

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26 See particularly Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate.
relationship has remained substantially the same, writers have tended to define the end of inquiry in terms of "decision" rather than "truth." Though Mills, among others, does not believe inquiry and advocacy to be "strictly dichotomous," the tendency has persisted in some quarters to treat them as such. Maurice Natanson carried the differences probably as far as anyone when he suggested that philosophical argumentation is a form of inquiry, while rhetorical argumentation is a form of persuasion.

**Inquiry—Decision-Making**

Ewbank and Auer were probably the first to apply the term *decision* in terms of goal unquestionably and


> 28 Mills, *Reason in Controversy*, 1968 rev. ed., p. 31. Mills recognized "four conceptions of the relationships among debate, inquiry, and advocacy . . . in the literature: (1) Debate is investigation (inquiry), not propagation. (2) Debate is both inquiry and advocacy. (3) Advocacy, including debate, is essentially unlike inquiry. (4) Debate and discussion (a form of inquiry) are complementary processes whose differences can be visualized on several continua," p. 29. Such positions indicate a vast "middle ground" between the polar positions.


emphatically to debate.\textsuperscript{31} The association gained currency, moreover, with the publication in 1955 of \textit{Oral Decision-Making} by Braden and Brandenburg.\textsuperscript{32} Ehninger used the phrase, "decision by debate," in a 1959 journal article\textsuperscript{33} and carried it into the title of his text co-authored with Brockriede four years later.

Whereas Braden and Brandenburg had related inquiry to discussion and advocacy to debate,\textsuperscript{34} Ehninger and Brockriede viewed debate primarily as a critical instrument of inquiry applicable to everyday life.\textsuperscript{35} Both determined

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ewbank and Auer, \textit{Discussion and Debate}, 1941 ed., pp. 4-5.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Braden and Brandenburg, \textit{Oral Decision-Making}, p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{35} The first three of the "ten principles" reflected in \textit{Decision by Debate} substantiate the pervasiveness of this view: 1. Debate as a method of decision provides for the rigorous examination and testing of pertinent data and inferences through the give-and-take of informed controversy. Hence, properly employed, it is a means for arriving at judgments that are reflective and decisions that are critical. 2. A debater is not a propagator who seeks to win unqualified acceptance for a predetermined point of view while defeating an opposing view. Rather, when he places himself in the highest tradition of debate, he is an investigator who co-operates with fellow investigators in searching out the truth or in selecting that course of common action which seems best for all concerned, debaters and public alike. 3. Debate is not limited to a
\end{itemize}
inquiry to be a method of decision-making, Ehninger and Brockriede's assessment harkening back to earlier positions. In "Decision by Debate: A Re-Examination," Ehninger had contended:

If we will examine its [debate's] rationale afresh, and without predisposition or prejudice, we will see (1) that the end and method of debate are critical, (2) that debate is of the genre of investigation rather than persuasion, and (3) that debate is a cooperative rather than a competitive enterprise.36

Though certain other writers have recognized that argumentation does involve inquiry, none have determined for it as pervasive a role as Ehninger and Brockriede. Mills, for example, differentiated academic debate from debate as an analytical-critical instrument but preferred to view the discipline within the former context. Freeley included the term, rational decision-making, in the title of his text, but his own approach leaned more toward "educational" than "substantive" debate.37 That species of argumentation,38 academic debate, employing the method of

particular mode of discourse. It is a generic species of deliberation, the principles and procedures of which are applicable to informed, responsible controversy however and wherever it may take place." Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. vii.


38In his first edition of Reason in Controversy, Mills suggested that "it is a mistake to treat argumentation and debate as synonyms, because the former is the
advocacy with a view toward "proving" a "case," became for many authors the primary, if not sole, concern.

Advocacy—>Proof of One's Case

Kruger's publication of Modern Debate: Its Logic and Strategy in 1960, one of the first texts dedicated to the primacy of advocacy in argumentation, raised an immediate furor. Rejecting as essential the total rhetorical construct demanded by "middle period" writers, Kruger emphasized analysis, case construction, proof, attack and defense.

Though many contemporary writers have agreed with Kruger's predisposition favoring academic debate, few--

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39 See, for example, the inherency argument discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.

40 Kruger contended: "Perhaps the most common misconception of academic debate is that it is primarily training in mass persuasion by means of effective delivery." Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 4. He also rejected the notion that debate should be taught as "effective public speaking," pp. 3-4.

41 Many "practical" texts offering realistic formulae for the winning of tournament decisions have appeared. This kind of "practical" book had also appeared during the "middle period." See, for example, George McCoy Musgrave, Competitive Debate: Rules and Strategy (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945). The point is
Mills being representative—have been willing to discount traditional concepts. Though pointing to "the newer emphasis upon a less specialized treatment of the subject" in his second edition of *Reason in Controversy*, Mills's own definitions and prescriptions suggested less diversity in the scope of argumentation. He recognized, for example, such topics as "explanation, ethos, motivation, composition, and delivery . . . as secondary rather than main concepts" and preferred to view argumentation as "an academic discipline which deals with the analysis, synthesis, and criticism of predominantly reasoned discourse on controversial ideas."^42^ He did not, however, reject the "secondary" concepts as irrelevant. Consistent with Mills's definition was his delineation of the "core concepts of argumentation: proof requirements of a thesis, that contemporary books stressing such a view have found a greater degree of acceptability than certain of their predecessors'.

^42^Mills, *Reason in Controversy*, 1968 rev. ed., p. 26. This definition did not clarify the end of advocacy as had the McBurney-Mills statement: "A method of analysis and reasoning designed to provide acceptable bases for belief and action." McBurney and Mills, *Argumentation and Debate*, p. 82. They had suggested that "the basic principles of argumentation have a wide application in both discussion and debate," pp. 79-83. Ehninger and Brockriede were forced to admit that "while the ultimate goal of the philosopher may be to exhibit relationships among ideas per se, the ultimate goal of the debater is to use ideas as proofs for influencing the beliefs of listeners or readers." A commitment to a total view of persuasion led them to insist that "a knowledge of how belief functions is . . . an essential part of the debater's study." Ehninger and Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*, p. viii.
propositions, analysis, investigation, evidence, reasoning, cases, attack and defense, cross-examination, and evaluation. Such a departure from the persuasion dominated approach imposed by writers of the "middle period" marked almost a full circle return to the primacy of reason, if not logic, in argumentation theory.

Persuasion and Argumentation

The renewed emphasis on "logic and strategy" as the appropriate methods for establishing a proposition had the practical effect of reviving, or perhaps extending, the conviction-persuasion controversy. Observing various contemporary views toward this "vexed" question, Mills suggested that "the answers span a continuum including separateness, part-to-whole relationships, and overlapping." Mills's distinctions constitute the basis for the following discussion.

Mills contended that the conviction-persuasion "dichotomizers have not been vanquished," citing the thesis that:

To convince . . . implies no risk of the self; it is manipulation without commitment. To persuade, however, does risk the self and does imply commitment.

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44 Ibid., pp. 18-21.
45 Ibid., p. 20. See Maurice Natanson and Henry V. Johnstone, Jr., eds., Philosophy, Rhetoric, and...
Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings' position appeared to be similar. "Argumentation," they said, "does not seek to persuade anybody of anything." Though suggesting that it "functions to discover and formulate the requirements of proof for a proposition or a conclusion," the authors recognized, nonetheless, that the advocate uses the results of his investigation, along with psychological proofs, to persuade. In light of the latter distinction, Mills contended that "viewed in a broader context than a single page, it [the Windes-Hastings position] comes close to saying that argumentation is the logos . . . of persuasion." Mills placed the Huber and the Freeley texts near Windes and Hastings on his continuum.

Mills further observed a trend toward treating argumentation and persuasion as "coordinate terms," citing particularly Walter R. Fisher and Edward M. Sayles who concluded:


47Ibid. See also pp. 207, 235.


Taken in its whole scope, the study of argumentation aids one in the discovery of the most reasonable position to take in regard to controversial problems, and it enables one reasonably to attack, to defend, or to extend his beliefs among men.\(^{50}\)

Mills summarized Gary Cronkhite's explanation, moreover, which initially set out a coordinate relationship but ultimately resorted to a part-to-whole approach as follows:

According to this theory, persuasion involves relating a proposition ("object concept") to a stable attitude ("motivational concept") by means of a logical argument ("concept association"), and this linkage "must be evaluated from the point of view of the audience rather than from that of the critic."\(^{51}\)

In Mills's view, "it is but a short step, so to speak, to the implication that argumentation is mainly concerned with persuasion."\(^{52}\) As a subsequent section suggests,


\[^{52}\text{Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., p. 19. Here Mills cited Ehninger and Brockriede's contention that "the concept of proof is meaningless when divorced from the person to whom the proof is offered," proof being "the process of securing belief in one statement by relating it to another statement already believed." Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, pp. 99, 201-203.}\]
Gerald R. Miller approached this position with his behavioral perspective of evidence. 53

Mills preferred a third, "overlapping," approach and applied that label to his own system. 54 He cited McBath's analysis in the revised edition of Tau Kappa Alpha's Argumentation and Debate 55 and pointed to the drift between the 1951 McBurney, O'Neil, and Mills 56 and the 1964 McBurney and Mills 57 editions of Argumentation and Debate. In his first edition of Reason in Controversy, Mills had made this distinction:

Debate, which is an applied form of argumentation, differs from persuasion in at least one important respect; it requires competition between rival ideas, while persuasion may mean one-sided advocacy which typically avoids deliberative thinking by the listeners or readers. Thus persuasion can become propaganda, but debate cannot. 58

In the 1968 revision, he said:

57 McBurney and Mills, Argumentation and Debate, p. 1.
Our professional usage has for academic purposes narrowed the concept of argumentation to that part of persuasive communication in which reasoned discourse is the principal form of support. This definition in no way denies or deplores the occurrence of emotional and personal proofs in advocacy, but it does imply the existence of a method for placing such proofs in a logical framework to give them some semblance of rigor. Thus we explain that argumentation is the form of discourse used in solving problems with a deliberative method.59

Reason in Controversy "treats popular persuasion as a peripheral matter . . . but it reinstates to a central position some principles of dialectic, the long-neglected method of argument."60

Mills summarized the theoretical implications "of the most familiar definitions" as follows:

Since argumentation serves analytical and critical functions which are not used to effect persuasion, and since . . . argumentation has derived its principles from dialectic and logic as well as rhetoric, it seems proper to conclude that the process called argumentation is more than a logical part of persuasion. In fact, if argumentation were defined as persuasion, its so-called logic would have to be judged in terms of its persuasive effect instead of some external standard of reasonableness. But when argumentation is taken to be a kind of science of proof, it can be used to test the reasoning in a persuasive communication, because . . . it embodies more or less objective standards of critical analysis.61

Mills's analysis pointed up, moreover, widely disputed

60 Ibid., p. 22.
61 Ibid., p. 21.
issues of the contemporary period, answers to which determined one's view of the nature of argumentation.

**Analysis**

In their introduction to a section on analysis in *Readings in Argumentation*, Jerry Anderson and Paul Dovre editorialized:

The quality of a controversy is contingent upon how well the disputants understand, or analyze, the propositions in question. Analysis of a proposition requires knowledge about the causes of the controversy, the history of the dispute, the specific meaning of the proposition, and the areas of agreement and difference between the disputants. The process of analysis involves all of these matters, but it culminates in discovery of the issues which are crucial in resolving the dispute. 62

Though Ehninger and Brockriede and Mills have detailed the traditional elements outlined by Anderson and Dovre, for most writers, the critical questions of analysis have been defining terms and isolating issues. 63 Ronald F. Reid put it this way:

Even if a debate proposition is well phrased and contains only one central idea,

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63 Ehninger and Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*, p. 211; Mills, *Reason in Controversy*, 1968 rev. ed., pp. 91-95. Many writers, moreover, have not neglected sources, functions, wording, selection, and nature of propositions, the main areas of interest being kinds of propositions. With the exception of the latter category—which is examined elsewhere—most treatments of the proposition follow "early" and "middle period" texts. For an interesting exception, see D. W. Shepard, "Logical Propositions and Debate Resolutions," *Central States Speech Journal*, XI (Spring, 1960), 186-90.
the inherently ambiguous nature of language
and the general nature of debate propositions
require that analysis of debate resolutions
consist of (1) analysis of the language of
the proposition and (2) analysis of the
relevant subordinate propositions.64

Definition

"Analysis of the language of a proposition," for
Reid, involved "finding definitions for the words and
phrases within the proposition."65 Reid considered a
"reasonable definition," moreover, to be "not only spe­
cific and clear-cut but also . . . commonly accepted in
light of the present social context of a debate proposi­
tion."66 Kruger added the "complete context--social,
political, economic, and historical as well as verbal,"67
along with the criterion, equivalence, meaning "that a

64Ronald F. Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," in Argumentation and Debate, ed. by James H. McBath

65Ibid. Recognizing the problems raised by faulty
definitions, several writers examined the handling of an
opponent's definition. According to Freeley, "Two methods
are available to the advocates confronted with an unusual
definition: (1) They may demonstrate, by using the methods
of defining terms already discussed, that their definition
of terms is a more reasonable one than that of their
opponents. (2) They may accept the definition of terms
offered by their opposition and proceed to attack the case
presented by their opposition." Freeley, Argumentation and
Debate, 1961 ed., p. 29. Freeley noted, moreover, several
problems of the stipulated definition.


logical definition must be neither too broad nor too narrow."\(^6^8\)

Most contemporary texts include specific methods and sources of definition similar to lists compiled by "early" and "middle period" writers.\(^6^9\) Ehninger and Brockriede introduced probably the most distinctive method which they set out as follows:

To select the best method of definition for any given term, the debater will do well to consider how that term may be most clearly, authoritatively, and objectively defined within the context of the proposition. Although no formula exists, definition by classification may best set the scope of the proposition, definition by necessary conditions may best establish criteria, and definition by operational description may best define the proposal embodied in the proposition.\(^7^0\)

\(^6^8\)Ibid., p. 25. Kruger presented the following outline for obtaining logical definitions: "1. What is the new policy? 2. What type of policy is it? How does it relate to the status quo? 3. What is the key term, or essential feature, of the new policy? What is lacking at present? 4. What does the key term mean? a. What are the common objectives of the new and present policies? b. How does the essential feature of the status quo compare with that of the new policy? c. How has the key term been interpreted by professors, textbooks, debate handbooks, publicists, public officials, special dictionaries, and other assorted experts? What is the underlying context of the question? 5. Do any other terms require clarification? 6. How should the definitions be expressed?" p. 28.

\(^6^9\)See, for example, Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed., pp. 27-29; Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," p. 56. An interest also continued in the use of the word should in propositions of policy. See Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 27; Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1961 ed., p. 32.

\(^7^0\)Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. 217 (italics mine).
Issues

The second major step in analyzing a debate proposition involved, for most writers, the "analysis of the subordinate propositions which must be demonstrated in order to demonstrate the truth of the general proposition." 71 Whereas "early period" analyses had depended on the clash in opinion provided by the brief, 72 most contemporary writers have mimed "middle period" stock issues approaches. Walter F. Terris pointed out that early writers had divided propositions according to the motive of the speaker, whereas later writers classified according to the nature of the dispute, a procedure which gave rise to stock issues analyses. 73 Terris suggested a further relationship between issues and the classification of propositions when he said: "After we have classified a proposition we ought to be able to predict what sort of

71 Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," p. 54.

72 Though most contemporary texts include material on research and several include the brief, most do not emphasize the critical relationship of these elements to analysis as did most "middle period" texts. For a discussion of differing philosophies of briefing, see William A. Behl, "A New Look at the Debate Brief," Speech Teacher, X (September, 1961), 189-93.


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treatment will best develop its argumentative potential."\(^4\)

A general, though not total, acceptance of this view suggests a need for attention to contemporary modes of classifying propositions.

**Classification of Propositions**

Writing in 1963, Terris observed that "the tripartite scheme of classification of fact, value and policy has held stable though not unchallenged for the last twenty-five years."\(^5\) This is not to say that writers have not modified these traditional categories. Ehninger and Brockriede, for example, added a fourth classification, the proposition of definition.\(^6\) Kruger included propositions of explanation, value, and policy and distinguished between propositions of past, present, and future fact.\(^7\)

In addition to expanding existing categories, a trend toward combining fact and value distinctions developed. Citing Freeley's handling of propositions of

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\(^6\)Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. 219. Ehninger and Brockriede applied the following terms both to issues and to claims: definitive (definition); designative (fact); evaluative (value); and actuative (policy), pp. 218-28.

\(^7\)Kruger, Modern Debate, pp. 15-16.
value and fact "similarly," Terris questioned the "justification for calling them by different names or distinguishing each of them from a proposition of policy."78 Concluding that "the fact-value distinction depends . . . not on the wording or form of the proposition but rather on the type of evidence that must be used to prove it,"79 Terris proposed that propositions of fact and value be classified as "propositions of judgment."80 He retained "propositions of policy" as a separate class.

In the first edition of Reason in Controversy, Mills, like Terris, kept the policy classification and put the remaining "kinds" into a single category which he called "propositions of definition and classification."81 The latter division included as subtypes legal fact, past fact, present fact, prediction, and value. Mills justified "grouping factual claims and evaluative claims under one heading because of their similarity in relation to analysis" and because "we can sometimes, but not always,  


79 Ibid., p. 273.

80 For a refutation of Terris' analysis, see Cronkhite, "Proposition of Past and Future Fact and Value," p. 12.

distinguish between statements of fact and statements of evaluation."82

Though Windes and Hastings also subsumed under one heading fact and value propositions, their rationale for and labeling of classes suggests a position reminiscent of "early period" concerns with speaker motives. Though recognizing a relationship between classification and the determination of issues inherent in a proposition, Windes and Hastings categorized propositions for advocacy according to "the behavioral response desired by an affirmative."83 Accordingly, they isolated propositions of belief (description, establishing existence, and value judgments) and propositions of action,84 describing the "close relationship" between the classes as follows:

As a rule, belief represents readiness for action, and almost always, except in irrational situations, action is based on belief. The advocate must pass through propositions of belief so that he may reach propositions of action.85

In addition to the preceding positions—an expanding of the tripartite system of classification on the one hand and a merging of the fact-value classes on the other—one other contemporary approach toward classification may

82 Ibid., p. 44.
83 Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy, p. 53. See, however, pp. 24-25.
84 Ibid., pp. 53-55, 218-26.
85 Ibid., p. 55.
be identified; that is, an interest in fact and value propositions to the exclusion of policy questions. As early as 1962, Gerald R. Miller, starting with the premises of Horace G. Rahskopf, set out a definitive rationale for debating propositions of fact and value. By 1966, he dismissed the proposition of policy as having no distinguishing characteristics which set it apart from fact and value propositions; that is, I believe that if any meaningful argument is to occur, a policy proposition must be disputed as either a proposition of fact or a proposition of value.

For Miller, "the key to the choice of a factual or value orientation lies in the definition of the term should." If should is defined in terms of means-ends interests . . . then the issue becomes one of fact, revolving around considerations of whether or not the stipulated ends would occur. If should is defined in terms of intrinsic ethical considerations . . . then the issue becomes one of value, revolving around the goodness or badness of these moral precepts. Miller relied primarily on Gustav Bergman's philosophical distinctions between the kinds of

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88 Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 36.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
propositions. Bergmann defined a statement of fact as one which "says something about the object or objects it mentions; and depending only on the properties of these objects, . . . is either true or false." Bergmann suggested further that:

A value judgment is misunderstood if it is taken to ascribe a property to the object, act, or situation it mentions in the same sense in which a statement of fact is such an ascription; it is, therefore, literally neither true nor false. What it involves and misleadingly states as the property of an object, act, or situation alone is the fact that this object, act, or situation causes in the one who makes the judgment a certain state of mind, say, for instance, of positive aesthetic appreciation or of moral approval.

As Terris, Miller perceived a direct relation between kinds of propositions and evidential data. Gary Cronkhite, on the other hand, rejected the notion that proofs for different kinds of propositions "necessarily demand different types of evidence." Neither did he agree that one distinguishes propositions of fact and value for purposes of analysis, arguing rather that "the choice of a given type of proposition is a rhetorical device

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91 Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," Ethics, LXI (April, 1951), 206.
92 Ibid.
designed to prepare the audience for a particular type of argument."\textsuperscript{95}

Cronkhite's system of classification, called by one writer "the most noticeable deviation from the norm,"\textsuperscript{96} divided propositions into past and future fact and value. Cronkhite believed that his scheme "seems to allow more freedom in moving from one type of proposition to another and seems to yield at least two dimensions on which propositions may be narrowed."\textsuperscript{97} Though the first claim is open to question, within the second lies the distinctiveness of his approach. Cronkhite began with the judgmental dimension of classification. Interested primarily in listener agreement or disagreement, he differentiated objective (based on present sensory stimuli) and subjective (based on previous experience) judgments, dividing the latter category into beliefs (fact judgments) and attitudes (value judgments).\textsuperscript{98} Rephrasing Wagner's definitions in terms of this analysis, "a 'belief' is a feeling about 'existence' or relationships of objects or events, while an 'attitude' is a feeling

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97}Cronkhite, "Propositions of Past and Future Fact and Value," p. 11.
\textsuperscript{98}Ibid., pp. 12-13.
regarding the value of an object or an event," Cronkhite suggested that:

Propositions of fact and value are related . . . in that the proposition of value may be validly (and effectively) supported by proof of the propositions of fact upon which it rests. A proposition of fact, however, may not be given valid support by proof of propositions of value, although a speaker may be forced to deal with audience values which prevent its acceptance.

The second dimension, temporal, allowed Cronkhite to integrate within the fact-value categories other approaches to classification. Traditional fact-value distinctions became past or present fact or value; policy propositions, future value; Mills's "prediction," future fact. Cronkhite believed that Ehninger and Brockriede's "propositions of definition" "can be resolved into either a proposition of fact or a proposition of policy."

Stock Issues

Though some contemporary writers have labeled "stock issues" for propositions of fact and value, most have limited them to policy questions. And, though the number of stock issues for propositions of policy varies from text to text, most writers have preferred a three-part

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99 Ibid., p. 13.
100 Ibid., p. 14.
101 Ibid., p. 11.
approach, including need-plan-advantages, need-practicability-advantages, or a similar approach.\textsuperscript{103}

One of the most original systems in contemporary theory, that set out by Lee S. Hultzén, isolates four "stock issues" (ill, blame, cure, and cost) and three "sub-issues" (conjecture, definition, and quality).\textsuperscript{104}

Hultzén's much quoted analysis influenced argumentation and debate theory through such writers as Ehninger and Brockriede.

Though differences in systems of stock issues have not caused particular problems, the rationale for using standardized questions for various propositions has raised questions. One of the more severe critics, Robert P. Newman, attacked this "artificial and unwholesome burden" on three grounds: stock issues are based on a scientific model inappropriate to the historical data of rhetoric; they confuse issues with procedure; and they de-emphasize the integrity of the subject-matter which one


uses, encouraging the charge of "sophistry." Newman concluded:

This is indeed analysis purchased cheaply, a "quickie" procedure for dissecting thorny and intractable problems. But the real issues, the building blocks of argument, are discovered only by digging hard . . . and the more skilled the rhetorician, the less willing he will be to rest content with issues provided by a formula.

Inherency

Though the notion of an integral relationship between the issues and a proposition underlay "early period" systems of analysis, and though the term inherent has appeared in argumentation and debate literature since Baker's first edition of Principles of Argumentation, the consideration of inherency as an important theoretical

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107 Having examined the central issue and the relation of the other issues to the main one, Baker contended: "This analysis . . . gives us the primary inherent structure in our material." Baker, Principles of Argumentation, p. 79. Subsequent authors related inherency to the need issue. Ewbank and Auer, for example, asked: "Are these weaknesses [those in the present system] inherent in the system?" Ewbank and Auer, Discussion and Debate, 1941 ed., p. 430. See also Lionel Crocker, Argumentation and Debate (New York: American Book Company, 1944), pp. 48-49; Luther W. Courtney and Glenn R. Capp, Practical Debating (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1949), p. 30; Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 314; William A. Behl, Discussion and Debate (New York: Ronald Press, 1953), p. 60.
construct is a fairly recent phenomenon. Its most vociferous advocate, Kruger, held in Modern Debate that "proving that the status quo is inherently defective or defective beyond practical repair constitutes the affirmative need."\(^{108}\) Though recognizing that "an affirmative need not contend that it is the entire cause but rather an important part of the cause or an insurmountable obstacle to solving the problem," Kruger, nevertheless, believed that "equating the essential characteristic of the status quo with the cause of existing or potential evils . . . is probably the most important phase of the affirmative case."\(^{109}\) In a journal article three years later, Kruger restated his position:

Thus, it seems clear that the affirmative must first of all show that a serious problem exists. . . . Second, to avoid the fallacy of post hoc reasoning, it must demonstrate that the problem inheres in, or is caused by the existing policy. In other words, to demonstrate inherency is simply to demonstrate a causal relationship.\(^{110}\)

From Kruger's definitions, one might conclude that inherency involves the need issue in propositions of policy, that it demonstrates causality, and that it implies a restrictive view of the prima facie case, excluding, for example, the comparative advantage alternative.

\(^{108}\) Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 41.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., pp. 46-47.

Inherency and Need Issue

Contemporary writers have discussed inherency primarily in terms of the need issue in propositions of policy. Many, moreover, have linked inherency with the "essential" characteristic of the status quo. Kruger, for example, insisted that "in most debates the key point of the need should be that of equating the cause of existing evils with the essential characteristic of the status quo."111 Despite this predisposition toward the need issue, Kruger, nevertheless, admitted that inherency "may also be considered in the area of impracticability."112

Freeley suggested that "the need portion of the case consists of arguments to establish the need for changing the status quo because of its inherent disadvantages or weaknesses."113 Baird had implied a similar position when he advised an affirmative to "show that . . .

111 Ibid., p. 47.
112 "When a debater argues . . . that there are insurmountable obstacles which would block the affirmative plan, the affirmative should endeavor to show that such obstacles are not inherently insurmountable and can thus be overcome." Ibid., p. 51. Kruger labeled the following "misconceptions" of the need issue: the "comparative advantage" need and the equating of need with unrelated existing evils. He found confusions, moreover, of the need with "need for affirmative plan," common objectives or goals, and the "not necessary" argument. Kruger, Modern Debate, pp. 41-44.
the defects are inherent in the system." Ehninger and Brockriede defined inherency similarly to Kruger. "An affirmative debater must show that serious problems, inherent in the present policy require a fundamental change of policy," they said. Reid's less stringent approach suggested that "inherency involves the question of whether the failure of a policy is related to the particular phase of the status quo which the debate resolution proposes to change." Reid described the analytical process to be "(1) determining precisely which phase(s) of the status quo the debate proposition proposes to change and (2) determining whether the existing problems are caused by, or at least related to, those specific phases of the status quo." Such writers as Patrick O. Marsh, on the other hand, believed that "no mention need be made of the evils in the status quo." Marsh held that:

114 Baird, Argumentation, Discussion, and Debate, p. 314.
115 Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. 241. They believed that the task of the debater "is to 'locate' rather than 'invent' them [issues], because they inhere in the proposition itself and are there to be found," p. 218.
117 Ibid.
All that can logically be demanded in demonstrating a proposition of policy . . . are the following contentions:
1. We should adopt the best available policy (judicial notice).
2. These are the proper criteria for determining which policy is best.
3. The affirmative policy best meets these criteria.\textsuperscript{119}

Inherency and Causality

Warren C. Shaw tied inherency inextricably to causality in 1922 when he suggested "that, if existing or threatened evils . . . are to be removed, they must be traced to their root causes in the present policy."\textsuperscript{120} Kruger emphasized this relationship when he concluded that "inherency in a policy debate is synonymous with causality."\textsuperscript{121} Ehninger and Brockriede implied a causal relationship when they contended: "If the present policy is not to blame for the problem, that problem is not inherent in the present policy, and accordingly there is no need to change that policy."\textsuperscript{122} Such a position did not, however, meet with unqualified approbation.\textsuperscript{123}

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Kruger, "Meaning of Inherency," p. 51.
\textsuperscript{122} Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. 225.
\textsuperscript{123} See Reid, "Analysis of the Proposition," p. 61.
The first major challenge came from Patrick O. Marsh who argued:

To demand that the debater show causal relationships in every affirmative debate . . . cannot help but lead to superficial treatment of causality. This seems unwise especially since isolation of the cause is usually unnecessary. If a cause be defined as an event which either completes or breaks the chain of "necessary conditions" to bring about an affect (and this appears to me to be the most defensible definition), then it is unnecessary for the debater to isolate the one condition which completes or breaks the chain.124 Marsh relied, moreover, on Barzun and Graff's distinctions between "causation that occurs in a chain of events of various kinds and causation within a closed system."125 Marsh was not alone in his rejection of causal inherency. However, it was he who initially assumed the presumption or burden of proof (depending on one's point of view) in the controversy.

124 Marsh, "Is Debating a Game," p. 50. "In 'comparative advantage' debating the criteria set forth by the affirmative should include the necessary conditions for achieving the desired end. The available policies will either meet the conditions or they will not, and some will meet them more advantageously than others. If this is what Kruger means by showing causal relationships, then he can have no quarrel with the comparative advantage case, for it is so contained. But if he demands showing the reason for the absence of certain necessary conditions, then he is asking debaters to concern themselves with non-essentials which may easily lead to irrelevancies if not absurdities," p. 51.

Inherency and the Prima Facie Case\textsuperscript{126}

The most vocal antagonists of causal inherency, proponents of the comparative advantage case,\textsuperscript{127} saw "essential causality" as an unwarranted restriction\textsuperscript{128} of the affirmative's alternatives.\textsuperscript{129} After the publication


\textsuperscript{128}Donald R. Terry went so far as to label inherency one of the three requirements for a prima facie case! Terry, "Workability, Topicality, Inherency, and Prima Facie," p. 14.

\textsuperscript{129}James W. Cheseboro distinguished the two approaches as follows: "The inherency affirmative must
of Kruger's *Modern Debate*, Marsh had asked, "If the proposed plan has significant advantages, even where 'serious weaknesses' are not 'inherent' in the system could not one logically demonstrate that the system should be adopted?" Kruger denied such a prerogative, replying: "To suggest that no problem exists, as in the 'comparative advantages' approach, is even worse than contending that a minor problem exists." Marsh's response, a *Speaker and Gavel* article entitled "Is Debate Merely a Game for Conservative Players?" questioned the validity of four assumptions basic to the "inerency argument": (1) that a presumption favors the status quo; (2) that "evils" in the status quo must be demonstrated; (3) that these evils must be shown to be "causally" related to the status quo; and (4) that the removal of these evils must contribute a "major change" from the status quo. The two preceding sections outlined Marsh's position regarding demonstrate the existence of an evil, indicate the cause of this evil, propose a plan to correct the evil by removing the cause, and finally demonstrate how the plan corrects the problem. . . . On the other hand, the advantages case does not devote its attention to either an evil or the causes of that evil." James W. Cheseboro, "The Comparative Advantage Case," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, V (Spring, 1968), 60-61. See James L. Robinson, "Are We 'Overlegalizing' School Debate?" *Speech Teacher*, IX (March, 1960), 109-115.


the second and third assumptions. The fourth will be treated in relation to the comparative advantage case.

Marsh rejected the first assumption, moreover, that a presumption favors the status quo on the following grounds:

Since the traditional presumptions are inferential, societal, and arbitrary, they remain debatable and should be incorporated into the debate—not merely assumed. Thus, the judge-critic may base his decision upon the relative strength of the opposing arguments rather than to allow the legitimate issues to be prejudged. 133

In a series of rebuttal articles, 134 Kruger defended the four assumptions outlined by Marsh, though he admitted a "minority view of presumption." 135


135 Kruger, "Presumption and Burden of Proof," p. 14. Kruger pointed out that Reeves and Hudson had assumed a similar position. J. Walter Reeves and Hoyt Hudson, Principles of Argument and Debate (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1941), pp. 11-12. Kruger said, "In a word this interpretation entails not just a description but a favorable evaluation of the status quo in relation to any proposed extreme change."
responding at the midpoint of the series,\textsuperscript{136} it, nevertheless, was in his final reply to Kruger that Marsh clarified his philosophical position.

This controversy began with my effort to resolve some of the contradictions in the lists of stock issues found in various textbooks on argumentation. Now, I take an "issue" to be an essential question in a controversy which must be answered "yes" by the affirmative if the affirmative is to demonstrate a \textit{prima facie} case. The "stock issues," accordingly, would be the minimum essential requirements for demonstrating a proposition. The stock issues will, therefore, be the same for all propositions of a given kind. For example, the minimum essentials for demonstrating a proposition of fact . . . are: (1) an issue of definition and (2) an issue of compliance. Likewise, in proposition [sic] of value the stock issues appear to be: (1) an issue of criteria and (2) an issue of compliance. Certainly we can build \textit{prima facie} cases for these two kinds of propositions. In each instance there is burden of proof on the affirmative to support these minimum essentials. But notice that the \textit{prima facie} cases are developed without reference to a presumption, and also without reference to how the proposition must be worded. The question then arises as to why is it essential in a proposition of policy to introduce elements that were not essential in the other two kinds of propositions. . . . These questions become more pressing when we consider that a proposition of policy is essentially a proposition of value.\textsuperscript{137}

Marsh recognized some justification in according the four assumptive premises discussed if one chose to view

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{136}] Patrick O. Marsh, "Terminological Tangle: A Reply to Professor Kruger," \textit{Speaker and Gavel}, II (January, 1965), 54-59.
\item[\textsuperscript{137}] Patrick O. Marsh, "The Terminal Tangle: A Final Reply to Professor Kruger," \textit{Speaker and Gavel}, II (May, 1965), 137.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
debate operationally (i.e., as a "mental game" concerned with "abstract certainty"). If one chose, however, to define argumentation conceptually, with a concern for "training students to use their critical capacities to the greatest advantage in problems resulting from the world of human affairs," then Marsh was "unwilling to restrict their freedom by imposing unnecessary limitations upon their practices of case construction."\textsuperscript{138} Accordingly, Marsh opposed "setting down a hard and fast rule which requires every affirmative policy debate to begin by showing the inherent inadequacy of the status quo."\textsuperscript{139} Though not denying that "some very effective debating results from such a line of argument, and often encourages its use," he did, nevertheless, "deny that an inherency argument is an essential part of every affirmative case."\textsuperscript{140} Robert Newman called the requirement that an advocate show "an inherent and compelling need for a change" "artificial and unreasonable,"\textsuperscript{141} while Bernard L. Brock argued that "the affirmative should not be judged according to the standards designed for traditional . . . cases, but according to how well it fulfills the obligations which are appropriate to

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid., p. 138.
\textsuperscript{139}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140}Ibid.
the unique characteristics of the advantages analysis."142

Interestingly, toward the end of the journal debate, Kruger explained:

So when I advocate that an affirmative team "must," or should, carefully analyze the cause of the problem which it is presenting, and that it should present only those evils which are caused by, or are inherent in, the present policy, I say this not because this is the only way of presenting a prima facie case but because I am thinking of the negative attack which will come and which will puncture the affirmative case if this analysis has not been undertaken and heeded.143

This is not to suggest that Kruger ultimately embraced the comparative advantage case. Conversely, he referred in the same article to the abandonment of "the principles of logical analysis," and in a subsequent discussion he treated "The 'Comparative Advantage' Case: A Disadvantage," conceding merely that:

The comparative advantage approach is suitable for a proposition not worth debating, or not debatable in the sense that a significant change is at issue.... When an affirmative has to support what is basically a negative position (minor change of the status quo), of


course it has no cause to demonstrate a compelling need for a change. 144

Meanwhile, on the debate circuit, as well as in the professional literature, various alternatives to causal inherency appeared. Newman, for example, agreed with Marsh that:

The true burden of proof carried by every affirmative . . . is this: he who asserts must prove. His proof may be causal reasoning or it may not. He may show a substantial evil in the status quo, or he may merely show that the status quo fails to meet its designated goal. . . . His prima facie case can consist of any good reason why his proposition should be adopted, and then he must defend that case. 145

Accordingly, Newman favored a "functional" approach to inherency in which affirmative teams could present more realistic solutions. David Zarefsky defined this alternative as follows: "To argue functional inherency," he said, "is not to claim that certain structures are organically deficient, but rather that, in their functioning, they prevent the achievement of the desired objective." 146

Debaters, moreover, argued "structural" and "attitudinal" inherency. 147 Thomas Mader, proceeding in another

144 Kruger, "'Comparative Advantage' Case," p. 106.
147 Conversation with Annabel Dunham Hagood, Director of Forensics, The University of Alabama, July, 1972. Attitudinal inherency referred to predispositions

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direction, advocated *stasis* as a point of departure.\textsuperscript{148} Recognizing that *status in time* (i.e., that dealing with conditions that exist) is but one of many possible positions, Mader pointed out that propositions also call for extending or continuing. He concluded, therefore, that the affirmative must demonstrate an inherent need only when the status quo is the "fixed point"; otherwise, the affirmative must show need only in principle.\textsuperscript{149}

Whether viewed as causal, functional, structural, or attitudinal, whether a necessary requisite or simply one affirmative alternative, inherency has become a critical concept in contemporary argumentation and debate theory. As a tool of analysis, it has influenced case construction and criteria for judgment. As a theoretical construct, it has prompted a reassessment of such underlying assumptions of argumentation as burden of proof and presumption. It has inquired into the defining of propositions\textsuperscript{150} and into the main issues essential to the proof of a case. The suggestion that "those theorists who 


\textsuperscript{149}Ibid., p. 13.

\textsuperscript{150}Most of the controversy over presumption centered on defining the term *should* in propositions of policy.
propose that inherency be present in all debates are, in effect, proposing that inherency be made another 'stock issue' in analysis," is probably a valid assessment.\(^{151}\)

Reassessments of *prima facie* case and presumption, accompanying contemporary concerns with inherency and comparative advantages analyses, directly relate to—if they do not grow out of—a renewed interest in strategy in debating. Though "special methods of refutation" appeared in "early period" texts, and though Shaw popularized the constructive as well as destructive value of strategy in the "middle period," "strategy" and "attack and defense" have become battlecries for those contemporary writers committed to advocacy in debating. Kruger investigated logic and strategy in the development of a debate case as early as 1954.\(^{152}\) In 1960, he carried those concepts into the subtitle of his text,\(^{153}\) *Modern Debate: Its Logic and Strategy*. By no means alone in his commitment to "the most logical way to construct or answer arguments, and to organize many arguments into a unified whole, called the 'case,'" he represents the vanguard of such a position.\(^{154}\)

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\(^{153}\)Kruger, *Modern Debate*.

\(^{154}\)Ibid., p. 114.
Proof

By far, the greatest number of contemporary argumentation and debate theorists, viewing proof traditionally as evidence plus reasoning,\textsuperscript{155} have continued to rely on the canons of legal evidence and on syllogistic and/or rhetorical inferential constructs.\textsuperscript{156} Nevertheless, during the immediate period, at least three identifiable developments in the theory of proof have emerged: a behavioral approach to evidence; the introduction of Toulmin's structural model into argumentation and debate theory; and a renewed interest by certain authors in motivation and in \textit{ethos}\textsuperscript{157} as "proof." That the long-range effects of these "minority interpretations" cannot now be determined does not deny that they are extensions, perhaps even "significant" contributions, to argumentation and debate theory.

\textsuperscript{155}See, for example, Capp and Capp, Argumentation and Debate, p. 135; Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 1966 rev. ed., pp. 52-118; Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 132. See Mills's analysis of approaches to proof as need-fulfillment; as consonant with a climate of opinion; as empirical verifiability; as logical demonstration; and as a combination of substantive and structural factors to satisfy disinterested, intelligently critical listeners or readers. Mills, Reason in Controversy, 1968 rev. ed., pp. 38-45.

\textsuperscript{156}Contemporary works, however, have begun to inquire into historiography and social psychology for new alternatives. See particularly Robert P. Newman and Dale R. Newman, Evidence (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1969); Miller and Nilsen, Perspectives on Argumentation.

\textsuperscript{157}Writers discussed this concept primarily in terms of evidence--i.e., "authority-based assertion."
Evidence

In both editions of *Principles of Argumentation*, Baker had treated evidence as the focal point or unifying factor of proof. Transmitted to the "middle period" largely by Foster, this notion has survived in contemporary argumentation and debate theory. Paul D. Brandes, for example, held that:

Evidence is useful in building ethical persuasion with hostile audiences, skeptical audiences, and critical audiences, that it is useful in enforcing legitimate emotions, and that it can furnish both inductive and deductive elements in reasoning.  

Mills agreed. "In rhetorical theory," he said, "there are three main reasons given for the use of evidence in argumentative discourse: it adds probative force; it tends to increase the credibility of the communicator; it may add emotional impact." Various definitions of evidence suggest, however, that it has been the "probative" dimension which has commanded most attention.

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159 Mills, *Reason in Controversy*, 1964 ed., p. 98. The "probative force" of the evidence was most frequently investigated. Freeley, for example, suggesting that "evidence may only partially substantiate a matter at issue, or it may be strong to prove the matter conclusively," examined partial proof, indispensable proof, and conclusive proof. Freeley, *Argumentation and Debate*, 1961 ed., pp. 65-67.
Some contemporary writers have continued to define evidence as "any factual material or opinion used to prove a contention." Both Mills and Freeley included "objects" in their definitions. Brandes was moving toward a behavioral perspective when he insisted that "evidence is not any fact or opinion, but those facts and opinions which the audience divorces from speaker bias." Ehninger and Capp and Capp, Argumentation and Debate, p. 103.

Some preferred new or different labels. Kruger, for example, used the terms "empirical" and "authoritative" to differentiate types of evidence. Kruger, Modern Debate, p. 132. Kruger believed that "whenever possible, a debater should give not only the authority's conclusion but also the proof used in arriving at it," p. 133.


Brockriede made the break with a purely "logical" perspective more complete by examining the dimension of audience belief. Rejecting the fact-opinion dichotomy, Ehninger and Brockriede observed that "if evidence is considered from the point of view of the listeners or readers to whom it is addressed, the 'factual' character of any information ultimately depends on the 'opinion' of the audience." They defined evidence accordingly as "an informative statement believed by the listener or reader and employed by an arguer to secure belief in another statement." Miller objected that in the Ehninger-Brockriede text "the primary focus still appears to be on the value aspects of its [evidence's] use." Assuming that the


165 Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. 100.

166 Ibid. Ehninger and Brockriede believed that in order to function in a "unit of proof," evidence must be both germane and believable. They contended, moreover, that "authoritative proofs made good only certain kinds of claims. . . . The critical listener or reader does not accept an authoritative proof designed to establish the ultimate claim of a controversy. The decision in a debate is not critically determined merely by acquiescing to the opinion of an expert, no matter how qualified he may be. Authoritative proofs are best in establishing intermediate claims in a chain of argument," pp. 161-63. "Proof by authority," moreover, "is also limited to establishing critically designative and definitive claims," p. 162.

"primary objective" of using evidence is the "development of a sense of belief," Miller "offered as a useful, tentative definition" the following:

Evidence consists of those data that are intended to induce a sense of belief in the proposition which the data purportedly support. Thus, the term evidence embraces a large body of diverse and varied materials; the common defining characteristic of these materials is to be found in the function they perform.

The three major implications of that definition follow:

Questions regarding the nature and uses of evidence are essentially psychological and involve considerations of the bases for people's beliefs and of the kinds of material most likely to induce a sense of belief.

The function of evidence in argument is to induce belief "a certain kind of state of body or mind or both", not necessarily to aid in communicating truth or establishing fact [empirically ascertainable phenomena that exist as part of the physical world].

What conclusions may be validly drawn from certain items of evidence is a question associated

\[\text{italics mine.}\]

\[\text{Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 25. Miller believed that "direct experience is seldom involved in instances that we would consider argumentation." He limited his discussion of types of evidence therefore to testimony, designating two varieties: testimony composed of statistical data and testimony composed of authority-based assertion, p. 37.}\]

\[\text{Miller believed, however, that "the logical and the psychological aspects of evidence cannot be separated into discrete categories." Ibid., p. 29. He wished "to combine the salient elements of both approaches," p. 26.}\]

with the logical rules of inference and with the empirical status of certain related propositions.\(^{172}\)

Though Robert Huber, Ernest Bormann, Ehninger and Brockriede,\(^{173}\) and, indirectly, Dale Newman and Robert Newman\(^{174}\) agreed that belief is an appropriate end of evidence, none minimized—as did Miller—the communicating of truth or the establishing of fact.\(^{175}\) Conversely, most contemporary writers appear committed to conclusions logically or empirically warranted by evidence. Or, to put it differently, whereas Miller defined the function of evidence as belief, most other writers perceived it to be proof.

**Classification**

Those contemporary writers who defined evidence traditionally tended also to rely on legal classifications.\(^{176}\) Though a few new categories appeared

\(^{172}\)Ibid., pp. 25-29.


\(^{174}\)They said: "We also share with historians a commonsense and non-philosophical definition of truth: truth is what the evidence, correctly interpreted, obliges us to believe." Newman and Newman, *Evidence*, p. viii.

\(^{175}\)Miller, "Evidence and Argument," p. 27.

\(^{176}\)Ehninger and Brockriede presented a representative listing. They described evidence as real or personal,
most lists paralleled those of the "early" or "middle" periods. More original were the compilations of "sources" of evidence. Freeley, for example, included judicial notice, public records, public writings, testimony of witnesses, and personal inspection. Brandes labeled "functional forms," i.e., that evidence furnished by witnesses, documents, recordings, pictorializations and relics. Mills essentially concurred, though his terminology differed slightly. Newman and Newman talked about sources of evidence in terms of government, the press, pressure groups, and professional scholars.

original or hearsay, direct or circumstantial, pre-appointed or casual, written or unwritten, positive or negative, eager or reluctant. Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. 110.


The preceding discussion on definition hints at the fire to which the traditional fact-opinion categories were subjected.

In some instances these lists of "sources" superceded lengthy discussions of research. See particularly Newman and Newman, Evidence.


They also included a separate section on statistical evidence.\textsuperscript{183}

Perhaps the most important contemporary development in classification has been an interest in categorizing evidence in terms of its relation to different kinds of propositions, issues, or claims. Terris perceived that "the fact-value distinction depends . . . not on the wording or form of the proposition but rather on the type of evidence that must be used to prove it."\textsuperscript{184} This notion has surfaced in at least four other contemporary works.\textsuperscript{185} Ehninger and Brockriede, for example, limited "proof by authority" to \textit{designative} and \textit{definitive} claims.\textsuperscript{186} Erwin Bettinghaus contended that "the type of evidence available depends on the nature of the question to be asked and the relation of the communicator to the necessary evidence."\textsuperscript{187} Newman and Newman related evidential forms to directional, positional, and predicative statements. A summary of their analysis follows:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{183} Newman and Newman, \textit{Evidence}, pp. 91-181, 205-225.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Terris, "Classification of the Argumentative Proposition," pp. 266-73.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Cronkhite, however, rejected this position. See Cronkhite, "Propositions of Past and Future Fact and Value," p. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Ehninger and Brockriede, \textit{Decision by Debate}, p. 162.
\end{itemize}
The first step in policy deliberation is analysis and criticism of goals. This is not an entirely subjective matter; facts impinge on policy goals in many ways. (1) Most goals incorporate a number of factual assumptions which must be inspected carefully. . . . 
(2) Some goals can be challenged because we cannot uphold them consistently. . . . 
(3) Most goals cannot be achieved without extracting a "cost" of some sort. . . .

Positional statements are judgments about the present; they locate us in relation to a certain goal. The reasoning necessary to establish them is inductive or evidential. Such positional statements can never be certain, and they frequently involve considerable inferential risk.

There are three important ways of supporting positional statements. The first is descriptive generalization, where specific historical instances of a phenomenon are assembled without any claim to know why the phenomena function as they do. . . . A second way of supporting a positional statement is with a causal explanation, where one claims to know why things happen as they do. . . . The third way is by historical analogy, where two phenomena are alleged to be comparable in one unknown variable since they are comparable in several known variables.

Predictions represent the payoff stage of deliberation; we approve or disapprove a specific policy because of its anticipated consequences. . . . Descriptive generalizations, causal explanations, and historical analogies are vehicles by which evidence can be brought to bear on the future. . . . According to the epistemological doctrine of Helmer and Rescher, policy predictions usually involve inarticulable evidence and imprecise generalization which call for intuitive evaluation, and this only an expert can do. How one evaluates

\[189\] Ibid., pp. 30-31.
expertise therefore becomes a major concern of the student of evidence.\textsuperscript{190} Miller also related goals to propositions, but from a belief rather than probative perspective. Concluding that both testimony composed of statistical data and testimony composed of authority-based assertion are applicable to fact and value questions, Miller determined statistical data to have "greater limitations when utilized to induce belief in propositions of fact," while "testimony composed of authority-based assertion . . . often has its greatest psychological impact in the realm of value disputes."\textsuperscript{191}

A final approach which fails to fit into the preceding categories suggests that the three modes of proof (personal, emotional, and logical) may be brought within a common critical framework.\textsuperscript{192} Accordingly, Ehninger and Brockriede examined authoritative proof within a modified Toulmin pattern.\textsuperscript{193} Those authors speak best for themselves:

\textsuperscript{190}Ibid., pp. 49-50.
\textsuperscript{191}Miller, "Evidence and Argument," pp. 43, 46.
\textsuperscript{192}See Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, Ch. 11.
\textsuperscript{193}The Toulmin Model is explained in a subsequent section on reasoning.
The evidence of an authoritative proof is a factual report or a statement of an opinion, together with an identification of the source of the data. . . . The warrant states that the source of the evidence is credible. The claim then reiterates the statement appearing in the evidence as now certified by the warrant. . . . The support for the warrant evaluates the source of the evidence by applying three well-established criteria and by investigating the past reliability of the witness's statements on the same subject covered in the evidence.

1. Is the witness an expert in the field? . . .

2. Did the witness have an opportunity to get at the facts? . . .

3. Is the witness reasonably unbiased? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reservations may be needed in an authoritative proof for two reasons. In the first place, even if the general reliability of a source is accepted, the idea may be rejected if a more respected authority presents a counterclaim. . . . Second, a reservation is required if a substantive proof of greater probative force yields a counterclaim. . . . Claims derived from authoritative proofs almost always require some sort of qualifier. As with substantive proofs, claims may need qualifiers for any or all of three reasons: (a) If the evidence is in any way qualified, the claim must also be qualified. . . . (b) If the warrant is qualified, the claim must also be qualified. . . . (c) If reservations are present, the claim may have to be set aside or qualified. 194

Tests

Contemporary argumentation and debate texts have included essentially the same criteria for testing evidence found in earlier works. Some new terminology has appeared, as have new organizational patterns for discussing specific

194Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, pp. 159-61.
standards. These tendencies, however, only reinforce earlier predispositions. Historically, one might find as many ways of structuring tests of proof and systems of labeling these tests as he would find argumentation texts. Of particular interest is the inclination of some contemporary writers to include a behavioral dimension for the testing of evidence, the standard of audience acceptability being applied to source and substance alike.

Not a contemporary construct, the test of audience acceptability has appeared in argumentation and debate texts at least since the publication, in 1932, of O'Neil and McBury's *Working Principles of Argument*. Subsequent texts in that line of authors have included the concept, though Mills called it a "lesser" class "except in popular persuasion, where it is the major test." Yet, Newman and Newman's criticism that "rhetoric and journalism tend to use credibility and acceptability synonymously" does not seem to apply.

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Rather, those writers\textsuperscript{199} who have favored evaluating an audience's acceptance of a proposition have also insisted on the tests of logical adequacy, or, as Newman and Newman put it, that evidence be "'worthy of belief,' hence probably true."\textsuperscript{200} Such standards as reliability,\textsuperscript{201} accuracy, verifiability, recency, and representativeness of evidence, along with questions to determine the competency of sources, have continued to dominate lists of tests.\textsuperscript{202} Even Miller recognized certain of these dimensions, concluding that assertions not routinely expected and unanimity of authorities are tests for testimony composed of authority-based assertion, while testimony composed of statistical data should describe accurately the existing empirical state of affairs and should supply operational definitions of key concepts.\textsuperscript{203}

Though audience acceptability is a common criterion in contemporary argumentation and debate texts, it is not a universal one. Conversely, many writers, seeming to


\textsuperscript{200}Newman and Newman, \textit{Evidence}, p. viii.


\textsuperscript{202}See Capp and Capp, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}, pp. 114-20. Brandes had suggested that "evidence's only inherent property is its initial set of freedom from the bias of the speaker." Brandes, "Evidence," p. 146.

\textsuperscript{203}Miller, "Evidence and Argument," pp. 37-47.
agree with an historiographical perspective, express "no concern as to whether any specific audience or reader will in fact believe it [evidence]." Strong adherents of such an approach, Newman and Newman have investigated credibility primarily in terms of affect of perceptual capacities, perceptual distortion, willful distortion, and authenticity. They have, moreover, restructured traditional tests of evidence into the following indices of credibility:

SITUATIONAL TESTS
1. Tension. The lower the tension associated with an event, the higher the credibility of reports about it.
2. Accessibility. The more accessible the situation being reported on, both to the reporters and their audience, the more credible the reports.
3. Freedom to report—absence of gag rule. The more freedom a witness has to report things as he sees them, the greater his credibility.

DOCUMENTARY TESTS
4. Authenticity. The greater the presumption of authenticity, the higher the credibility of a document.
5. Internal consistency. The higher the internal consistency of an author, the more credible his testimony.
6. Carefulness of generalization. The more careful the generalizations of a writer, the higher the credibility of his testimony.
7. Reluctance. The greater the damage of his own testimony to a witness, the more credible it is.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WRITER
8. Expertise. The greater the relevant

\[204\] Newman and Newman, Evidence, p. viii.

\[205\] See ibid., Ch. IV.
expertise of an author, the higher his credibility.

9. **Objectivity.** The greater the objectivity of an author, the more credible his testimony.

10. **Accuracy record.** The more accurate the description and prediction record of a source, the higher the credibility of his testimony in general.

**TESTS OF PRIMARY AUTHORITIES**

11. **Eyewitness principle.** The greater a witness' observation of a matter to which he testifies, the higher his credibility.

12. **Contemporaneity.** The more contemporaneous the report of a witness the more credible his testimony.

**TESTS OF SECONDARY SOURCES**

13. **Selection of primary sources.** The more discerning a writer's selection of primary sources, the more credible his testimony.

14. **Accuracy of citation.** The more accurate the citations of a writer, the more credible his testimony.

Though Newman and Newman contended that "there are no specific tests of credible statistics," they isolated three questions helpful in an evaluation of statistical evidence: (1) Who wants to prove what? (2) What do the figures really represent? (3) What conclusions do the figures support?

One final position deserves mention at this point. Though Ehninger and Brockriede advocated evaluating authoritative proof in terms of a modified Toulmin structural model, their specific tests did not differ appreciably.

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from those included in other works. More noteworthy was the authors' conviction that evidence must "also be fairly and effectively presented to those persons with whom the decision rests." Though other writers had included standards aimed at an "ethic of evidence," none juxtaposed more forcibly than did Ehninger and Brockriede a "rhetoric of evidence." "Underlying all rules for the presentation of evidence in critical deliberation," they argued, "is this basic test: Is the evidence set forth in such a way that the reader or listener is able to assign it exactly the weight it deserves—no more and no less?" "An ethic of rhetoric," they contended, "aims to insure that the evidence entered into argument will be given no more weight than it deserves." "A rhetoric of evidence seeks to guarantee that it will not be undervalued."

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208 Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, p. 160.

209 Ibid., p. 116.

210 Ibid.

211 Ibid., p. 118. They explained the "ethic of evidence" as follows: "Deliberate attempts to manipulate data, so as to give them greater weight than they deserve, violate what may be termed an ethic of evidence. Such violations fall into two major classes: selective reporting and altered or colored reporting," p. 116.

212 The underlying principle of a "rhetoric of evidence" follows: "1. An effective argument is more than a string of quotations and statistics. 2. The evidence used in debate often requires explanation. Readers or listeners must be told how it applies and, sometimes, what it means. 3. Facts and figures must undergird each unit
Believing that these dimensions of evidence "coincide,"
Ehninger and Brockriede said:

If one seeks to write and speak persuasively, he should write and speak truthfully and give to each fact or value exactly the weight it deserves. Only when one is more concerned with truth than with victory are his chances for victory at their best. To be persuasive be truthful; be truthful to be persuasive.213

Reasoning

In his 1968 revision of Reason in Controversy, Mills recognized great diversity in recent discussions of inference. Having surveyed treatments of reasoning in approximately a dozen contemporary texts, he concluded:

Many writers have felt obligated to cite the categorical syllogism on the mortality of Socrates, to say a little about J. S. Mill's canons of induction, and to urge students to avoid an assortment of fallacies. Some have been more discerning in explaining how logic may serve in the analysis and criticism of argument. The most extreme position in this direction holds that debating is mainly an exercise in logic... At the opposite extreme is the view that formal logic and probability have little to do with logical proof as we think of it, and that we are left with style and plausibility as our legitimate concerns.214

of proof presented. 4. Special care must be taken to present statistics clearly. 5. Evidence must be entered into argument in specific and concrete terms." Ibid., pp. 118-21.

Ibid., p. 121.

Logic and Argumentation

Mills's analysis took into account the continuing controversy surrounding the "proper" role of logic in argumentation and debate. William S. Smith's 1962 "preliminary investigation into the place of formal logic in the theory of debate" pointed up the "unequal treatment of formal logic by various debate textbook authors," a phenomenon which Smith contended "suggests that formal logic continues as a part of debate theory out of tradition only." However, the notion that "debate . . . tends to be judged in keeping with the philosophy of inductive logic" rather than the "formal," deductive variety did not negate for Smith the value of reason and thought in argumentation. Rather, his plea for "less concentration on the formal validity of our logic, and . . . more stress on the testing of the conclusions that we reach through logic and reasoning" anticipated resulting extensions of logic useful for argumentation.

215 William S. Smith, "Formal Logic in Debate," Southern Speech Journal, XXVII (Summer, 1962), 334. Smith's investigations showed a lack of completeness of tenets of formal logic in representative texts, a lack of consistency in degree of completeness, and a lack of agreement on which tenets of formal logic need to be presented, p. 331.

216 Ibid., p. 334.
217 Ibid., p. 336.
218 Ibid., pp. 337-38. Smith believed that such extensions might take place in at least two ways: "First,
Contending that philosopher and logician alike deem neither formal logic nor probability to be applicable to rhetorical argument, David W. Shepard concluded that the role of formal logic in argument is one of style and plausibility. Shepard said:

Formal argument makes sense as an element of style. . . . Well-composed deductive arguments, like polished sentences, are an ornament to the debater and a blessing to the audience, for both enable the audience to tell where the speaker is going. Correct logic and correct grammar are alike in that both are independent of the facts; neither will guarantee the factual truth or falsity of what the speaker asserts. As elements of style, grammar and logic either clarify or obscure what the speaker is asserting to be true.

Another non-logical function of formal argument emerges which also holds for probability. By virtue of style, formal argument creates plausibility. No proof, no genuine probability, but credible argument, one that seems worthy of acceptance.

teachers of reasoning, argument, and debate, might study the development of scientific thought to discover methods of thought which might be helpful to our field. . . . A second way might be to do as the scientist did: begin with the problem of explaining what actually happens in debate and other speaking situations and develop our own methods of thought necessary to explain the phenomena that we observe," p. 338.

Shepard put it this way: "When the philosophers and logicians dismiss formal argument from having any bearing on the facts, when they discuss probability and kick rhetoric out the door, and when they compound the insult by not applying their probability systems to the subject-matter of rhetorical argument, where are we?" David W. Shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," Western Speech (Fall, 1966), 247.

Ibid.
Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortensen, writing for "the critic wishing to apply logic to argumentative discourse," observed an almost exclusive attention to "legitimate inferential principles and argumentative forms" in many argumentation texts with "only scant attention, if any, to the infinite ways in which intricate syntactical relations may undermine or even rule out any possibility of a public logic for reasoned claims."\textsuperscript{221} Suggesting that "the significant problem becomes one of analyzing the kinds of connectives and hence the type(s) of logic which can best explicate the relationships among propositional statements of rhetorical argument"\textsuperscript{222} and pointing up problems with both "context-invariant" (as in Formal Logic) and "context-variant" (as in the Hastings descriptive classification and the Toulmin structural model)\textsuperscript{223} connectives,\textsuperscript{224} Anderson and Mortensen concluded that "the critic assessing evaluative arguments should expand his conception of context."\textsuperscript{225}


\textsuperscript{222}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 144.

\textsuperscript{223}Both the Hastings classification and the Toulmin model are discussed in a subsequent section.

\textsuperscript{224}Anderson and Mortensen, "Logic and Marketplace Argumentation," p. 144.

\textsuperscript{225}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 151.
Hence to understand the contextual meanings of connective terms within rhetorical argument, the critic, for example, sometimes will find it useful to study matters of style or, say, overall structure of discourse. On other occasions the critic may even explore the value system of the speaker as a framework for an analysis of meaning consistency of value-laden propositions.\footnote{Ibid.}

In a rejoinder to the Shepard, and Anderson and Mortensen articles, Glen Mills and Hugh Petrie sought "to restate the relevance of logic to verbal communication and thereby to prevent the debasement of rhetoric into sophistry."\footnote{Glen E. Mills and Hugh G. Petrie, "The Role of Logic in Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIV (October, 1968), 267.} Granting that "logic may stimulate belief through external or 'accidental' features of formal argument such as style or emotional involvement, irrespective of its formal correctness," Mills and Petrie, nevertheless, maintained that "logic may effect persuasion through its own 'proper' nature of providing logically compelling reasons for belief and the concomitant recognition of the rationality of such belief by the audience."\footnote{Ibid., p. 260.} It was in support of that position that their refutative effort was addressed.

Patterns of Inference

A cursory survey of contemporary approaches to
reasoning reveals a continuing interest both in traditional logical forms (induction and deduction) and in rhetorical patterns of inference (generalizations, analogy, causal reasoning), though particular systems differ from text to text.\textsuperscript{229} Some writers have sought to integrate old constructs;\textsuperscript{230} others have wished to devise new methods of structuring and labeling arguments.\textsuperscript{231} These efforts have resulted in an investigation of the bases of classification, reformulations of inferential processes, and in argumentative structures alternative to the logical syllogism.\textsuperscript{232}

Reformulations: Bases and Classifications

In an early attempt to "reformulate" the modes of reasoning in argumentation, Arthur C. Hastings identified three differentiating criteria. Observing argument in more than 250 contexts, Hastings derived nine "major processes" or "modes" of reasoning, the first three of

\textsuperscript{229} For a summary of a cross-section of these approaches, see Mills, \textit{Reason in Controversy}, 1968 rev. ed., pp. 187-89.

\textsuperscript{230} See, for example, McBurney and Mills who label sign and cause as deductive arguments; example and analogy as inductive. McBurney and Mills, \textit{Argumentation and Debate}, Ch. VIII.

\textsuperscript{231} See, for example, the following discussion of Hastings' "reformulation."

\textsuperscript{232} For a discussion of "special logics, set out to rationalize and systematize advice-giving," see Gronbeck, "Alternative Strategies," p. 38.
which he claimed to have a semantic base; the second three being based on causal generalization; and the last three supporting either semantic or causal conclusions.

Hastings' "reformulation" follows:

1. Argument from example to a descriptive generalization, in which factual information or one or more examples leads to the conclusion of a general characteristic or pattern. The typicality of the examples is important, rather than their number.

2. Argument from criteria to a verbal classification, in which characteristics of an event are presented to prove that it fits into a verbal category or that it should be labeled in a certain way. The semantic criteria for the meaning of the conclusion are included in the premises. This process of reasoning has not been previously described.

3. Argument from definition to characteristics, in which an event or principle is defined and the logical consequences of the definition are applied.

4. Argument from sign to an unobserved event, in which the existence of one event is taken as an indication that another event or condition exists. A high correlation exists between the two events.

5. Argument from cause to effect. This is a prediction of the consequences of an event: if A occurs, B will result. The cause may be hypothetical or real.

6. Argument from circumstantial evidence to hypothesis, in which a fact or facts are explained or accounted for by a pattern, event, or other fact. A low correlation exists between the individual facts in the premises and the conclusion.

7. Argument from comparison, in which conclusions drawn about one event are asserted to apply to a similar event. This has

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233 Hastings determined that in these cases the warrants were semantic or linguistic rules of meaning or usage. Arthur C. Hastings, "A Reformulation of the Modes of Reasoning in Argumentation" (unpublished dissertation, Northwestern University, 1962).
been called literary analogy, but the two types of analogy are so discrete that it is unwise to classify them together under the same term.

8. Argument from analogy, in which abstract relationships of one event are compared to another event, and conclusions about the first event are asserted to apply to the second.

9. Argument from authority or testimony, in which the conclusion is justified because a person or institution other than the speaker asserts its truth.

In his chapter on argument in Mills's first edition of *Reason in Controversy*, Hastings dropped the "semantic-causal" rationale, classifying rather according to the frequency of usage and the usefulness of arguments.

Windes and Hastings offered a similar explanation for their division of arguments which modified Hastings' original "reformulation." Windes and Hastings' inclusion of "other

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235 Arthur C. Hastings, "Reasoning Processes," in Glen E. Mills, *Reason in Controversy: An Introduction to General Argumentation* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), pp. 128-47. Hastings' earlier "reformulation" remained essentially intact though he allowed for the "demands of persuasion." Concerned with the "proof in advocacy," Hastings had dealt "exclusively" with "rhetorical reasoning." He described its characteristics in the Mills text as follows: "The first characteristic is that rhetorical proof is less demanding than scientific proof or the proof of formal logic. . . . Secondly, most rhetorical reasoning leads to probable rather than certain conclusions as in logic. . . . A third aspect of rhetorical reasoning is that, if persuasion is intended, the premises or assumptions in the proof must be drawn from the beliefs of the audience, pp. 125-26.
processes" indicated a less pedantic assessment of forms of reasoning.236

Beginning with a differentiation between symbolic logic and place or topical logic,237 Jack Ray and Harry Zavos also attempted to sort the "bases" for classifying patterns of inference. Interested primarily in place logic, the authors concluded:

Arguments can be classified in many ways. . . . One way is to classify them as deductive or inductive. Arguments can also be classified according to the form or the substance of the argument, according to the type of proposition involved, according to the kind of relationship involved (such as class inclusion, correlation, cause, more and less, similarity, etc.).238

Ray and Zavos' own classification which they determined to be "more complex" and "more useful" than traditional listings included at least two dimensions of differentiation: a logical-rhetorical distinction and a marshalling of

236 Windes and Hastings modified the original "modes" as follows: they retained categories 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; redefined categories 2 and 3 to read "reasoning from characteristics to a description (by criteria of definition)" and "reasoning from characteristics to a value judgment" replaced category 9; and added a category called "other processes." Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy, pp. 159-85.


238 Ibid., p. 94. The authors noted that these "distinctions for classifying arguments are not always clear and distinct."

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arguments according to logical force. That system\textsuperscript{239} follows:

Classification of Arguments

1. Analytic proofs
   a. Mathematical proofs
   b. Arguments from definition
   c. Other arguments with analytic reasons
   d. Arguments about consistency (reduction to absurdity, sense 2)

2. Substantive deduction
   a. Deductive arguments
   b. Probability deductions

3. Deductive explanations

4. Reduction to absurdity, sense 3

5. A fortiori arguments

6. Inductive arguments
   a. By enumeration
   b. By elimination

7. Rhetorical arguments
   a. Argument from circumstance
   b. Argument from example
   c. Argument from authority
   d. Analogy (used as argument)
   e. Nonanalytic arguments to definition

8. Rhetorical explanations
   a. Teleological explanation
   b. Series of events explanation

9. Rhetorical clarification
   a. Example
   b. Stipulative definition
   c. Analogy

10. Motivational arguments

\textsuperscript{239}Ibid., pp. 106-107.
Mills's six "bases" of classification, similar to those proposed by Ray and Zavos, included: traditional (symbolic) and topical; deductive and non-deductive; acceptance or rejection of conclusion; cause and sign; main and justificatory arguments; and classifying according to the intent of the communicator. His three-level outline, "an eclectic system of classifying arguments," included "the deductive and non-deductive distinction and the truth-value distinction, together with some lesser bases which serve to identify the specific subtypes of arguments." That system follows:

I. Deductive Arguments
   A. Truth conclusions
      1. Class-inclusion, exclusion
      2. Category to traits
      3. Apply hypothesis to cases
      4. Apply causal principle to cases
   B. Value conclusions
      1. Characteristics to evaluation
      2. Principle to application

II. Nondeductive arguments
   A. Truth conclusions
      1. Circumstances to hypothesis
      2. Analogy
      3. Induction to generalization
      4. To causal explanation

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241 Ibid., p. 191.
242 Ibid., pp. 191-92. Bettinghaus discussed "functional" and "genetic" patterns of inference along with the more traditional "deductive" and "probabilistic" ones. However, his discussion is probably outside the scope of argumentation and debate theory. See Bettinghaus, Message Preparation, Ch. V.
B. Value conclusions
   1. Evaluative prediction for one case
   2. Evaluative analogy
   3. Evaluative generalization
   4. Agreement and difference

Mills also distinguished argument from nonargument. He said:

Conditional statements, which typically include "if" or "if-then" clauses, often appear as the first part of hypothetical syllogisms. The complete syllogism is an argument, but anything less than a conclusion and a reason is not. . . .

Simple causal explanation . . . is not an argument. . . . Giving a reason for an occurrence is not the same as presenting a reason for the acceptance of a belief or a causal principle. . . .

Constructive reasoning . . . is a mental activity which is used to reach a conclusion on the basis of reasons. It is quite unlike argument, which starts with a conclusion or claim and supports it with reasons for its acceptance. 243

Structural Alternatives

It has been suggested that the rhetorical syllogism, practically taught in most cases as the logical syllogism with the qualifier "probably" added to the major premise and conclusion, or as an elided syllogism only "probably" true, raised critical questions--as did distinctions between material and logical validity. 244


Many contemporary writers have tried to answer, or at least avoid, certain of the problems by advocating various alternative strategies. Some have turned to modern rhetorical interpretations of the enthymeme. Others have looked for other structural approaches. Mills named four: the line diagram; the logical outline; the Venn diagram; and the Toulmin layout, the Toulmin model being the most influential contemporary construct.

See Miller and Fausti who argued that the enthymeme is often neglected. Relying on Bitzer's notion that the enthymeme is a cooperative affair between speaker and audience, Miller and Fausti said: "In his deductions, the skillful debater will advance his arguments so as to elicit the participation of the listener in constructing the chain of deduction. This cooperative deduction, regardless of whether to a probable or a necessary conclusion, is called an enthymeme." Arthur B. Miller and Remo P. Fausti, Elements of Deliberative Debating (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1969), p. 28; see Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XIV (December, 1959), 399-408.

In their journal article, Brockriede and Ehninger labeled "seven claims" for the superiority of the Toulmin model over the traditional syllogism. Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," Quarterly Journal of Speech (February, 1960), 46-47. In Decision by Debate, they reduced the claims to four: "(1) In the Toulmin model, proofs are displayed in a spatial pattern to help debaters see a dynamic relationship between evidence and claim as certified by principles of reasoning actually used by debaters; in the syllogism, proof consists of a series of statements that reflect the relatively static relationship of compartmentalization. (2) The Toulmin model provides explicitly for the material support of warrants; the major premises of syllogisms are supportable only by a sort of extralogical operation. (3) The Toulmin model emphasizes the factual analysis of a unit of proof and material
In 1958, the British logician Stephen Toulmin published *The Uses of Argument*, a collection of essays designed to investigate that "everyday" argumentation which had concerned George Pierce Baker one-half century earlier. Perceiving a relationship between meaning and function in argument, Toulmin sought to devise a standard of judgment by evaluating argumentation in "everyday use." He based his spatial model, therefore, on the jurisprudential analogy rather than on the mathematical logic of the syllogism.

Toulmin isolated six components of an argument and assigned the following labels: data (the facts appealed to as a foundation for the claim); claim (the assertion);

validity by investigating a proof within the context of all related information; the syllogism, more concerned with class relationships, emphasizes formal validity and achieves a sort of factual analysis only through a complex series of syllogisms. (4) The Toulmin model provides explicitly for ways of qualifying and limiting the force of a claim; the conclusion of a syllogism can often be properly qualified or limited only through tortuous and involved propositions. Ehninger and Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*, p. 98.

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249 Ibid., p. 16. Toulmin wished in his work to emphasize "the contrast between the standards and values of practical reasoning . . . and the abstract and formal criteria relied on in mathematical logic and much of twentieth century epistemology," Preface to the paperback edition. For a criticism of the approach, see Peter T. Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution to Logic and Argumentation," *Journal of the American Forensic Association*, III (September, 1966), 83-94.

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warrant (a general proposition which "authorizes the step from data to claim"); backing (statements of fact which justify the warrant's authority); qualifier (that element which modifies the force with which the warrant justifies the conclusion); and rebuttal (circumstances in which the authority of the warrant would not be acceptable).

Toulmin examined field-dependent and field-invariant elements in argument, labeling data, backing, rebuttal and criteria for the qualifier, specific and field-dependent. He designated the warrant and the force of the qualifier, field-invariant. He also differentiated the meaning or force of modal terms and set out criteria for their use.250

Toulmin arranged the components of an argument in the following way:251

\[
D \rightarrow \text{So, } Q, \quad C
\]

\[
\text{Sir. c} \quad \text{Unless} \quad \text{R}
\]

\[
\text{On account of} \quad B
\]

250 Argumentation and debate writers, however, generally ignored these latter distinctions.

251 Toulmin, Uses of Argument, p. 104.
He applied the structural model, moreover, to a sample argument as follows:  

Harry was born in Bermuda  
So, presumably, Harry is a British subject  
Since A man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject  
Unless Both his parents were aliens/he has become a naturalized American/...  
On account of The following statutes and other legal provisions:

Having described the function of the terms of his model, Toulmin rejected the induction-deduction categories in favor of a new system of classification: warrant-using (only D-W-C required as the warrant is accepted without question); warrant-establishing (data and conclusion are already verified and warrant's authority is established by applying it to a series of such conclusions), substantial (backing does not contain information in conclusion);

252 Ibid., p. 105.  
253 Ibid., p. 121.
and analytic (backing does contain information conveyed in conclusion).  

In 1958, Wayne Brockriede introduced the Toulmin analysis at the Speech Association of America's annual convention. Two years later, a more specific adaptation of that model to argumentation and debate theory appeared in a joint publication by Brockriede and Ehninger entitled "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application." Three years later in Decision by Debate, those authors extended Toulmin's construct beyond its logical role and used it as an analytical tool for exploring authoritative and motivational proof. In an unpublished Master's thesis, Rita Alvis summarized Ehninger and Brockriede's modifications and extensions of Toulmin's theory and structural model as follows:

Ehninger and Brockriede extended Toulmin's definition of data to include materials of opinion as well as fact, and changed the term data to the term evidence in Decision by Debate. Describing the warrant essentially as Toulmin had, they distinguished between an inference (a relationship between evidence and claim) and the warrant (which certified that relationship). Backing became support for the

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254 Ibid., p. 125.
256 Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument."
257 Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate.
warrant in *Decision by Debate* and could be an entire argument, standards or principles, as well as Toulmin's statements of fact. The backing was not differentiated from the warrant on any basis other than function. This change in the concept of backing represented the greatest difference between the interpretation of the elements of argument by Ehninger and Brockriede, and Toulmin. Ehninger and Brockriede agreed with Toulmin's definition of the qualifier, but added the possibility that the qualifier could be a statement of probability or a refutation, as well as a single term. They placed rebuttal in a relationship to the claim based on the force of the warrant. They substituted the term reservation for rebuttal, moreover, and described three kinds of reservations.

In the physical layout, Ehninger and Brockriede added a line which connected the warrant to the reservation. They also included the qualifier in the claim statement.258

Various other adaptations of the Toulmin model have appeared in argumentation and debate texts,259 most being modifications of Ehninger and Brockriede's modifications.260 That Ehninger and Brockriede's pronouncements were influential is demonstrated by the widespread agreement on definition and function of terms, the imitation of revisions in terminology, and the popularity of their physical layout of arguments. Writers who followed did not, of course, accept all these vicissitudes. Freeley, 


260See Alvis, "A Study of the Toulmin Model," for changes in terminology and structural model.
for example, kept Toulmin's terminology, though he defined similarly to Ehninger and Brockriede and followed the physical construct set out in their journal article. Hastings, on the other hand, equivocal in his definitions, followed Toulmin in defining data and claim and Ehninger and Brockriede in delineating qualifier and rebuttal. Hastings viewed the warrant as the reasoning process and agreed with Ehninger and Brockriede in defining backing as evidence or reasoning which explained the truth of the warrant. He altered slightly the physical model. Mills's second edition of Reason in Controversy, on the other hand, seemed to reflect a preference for the model as an analytical rather than critical instrument.

Not all contemporary texts have accepted enthusiastically Toulmin's model. Some writers have included it in their texts as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, syllogistic patterns. Certain others have ignored and/or rejected the paradigm. In one of the more comprehensive analyses published in argumentation

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literature, Peter T. Manicas systematically refuted the construct both philosophically and structurally. Though Manicas thought Toulmin "mistaken in the way in which he wishes to bring logic into practice," he, nevertheless, granted that "he [Toulmin] is clearly right in insisting that logic must be brought into practice." Manicas encouraged more attention to modern logics and "more sophisticated treatments of the features of non-deductive arguments."

**Testing Inferences**

In contemporary theory, as elsewhere, one's view of the nature of the inferential process and the patterns of reasoning involved determine the tests he chooses. Those who have included syllogistic reasoning as the common

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266 Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution," p. 94.

267 Mills and Petrie had also criticized a lack of attention to works in modern logic. Mills and Petrie, "Role of Logic," p. 204.

268 Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution," p. 93. Manicas suggested that "of recently published texts on argumentation and debate, the only one which shows any real sophistication in its grasp of logic and its application to debate is Arthur N. Kruger's Modern Debate," p. 93.
deductive form have also cited its traditional tests. The same is true for rhetorical forms. These writers, moreover, have detailed numerous fallacies in reasoning. The introduction of the Toulmin model into argumentation and debate theory has occasioned some new criteria (or at least new terminology) for the testing of proof. Ehninger and Brockriede set out specific, though largely traditional, standards for the "patterns" of proof: cause; sign; generalization; parallel case; analogy; classification; and statistics. More original was their testing of deficient evidence, unwarranted claims, deficient warrants, ignored reservations, and overstated claims, though the specific questions asked appear largely traditional.

Windes and Hastings advised the following procedure:

In testing arguments the first step is to isolate the argument from the surrounding discourse and to explicitly formulate [sic] the evidence, warrant, and conclusion. Once the entire argument is made explicit it may be identified as one of the types described in this chapter [9 "modes" plus "others" category], in which case it should be evaluated according to the particular requirements of that type of reasoning. If it is not a process explained here, then the advocate must determine what process it involves and what its requirements of proof are.

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269 Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, Ch. X.

270 Ibid., Ch. XII. For a summary of these tests, see pp. 186-88.

271 Windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy, pp. 185-86.
The Forensic

Though it is too simplistic to suggest that contemporary controversies regarding the nature of the forensic merely repeat those arguments of earlier years, certainly many issues have been the same. Of particular importance is the perennial conflict over the "proper" end or goal of debate. Ehninger pointed up the centrality of this controversy in 1952 when he observed:

Apparently a few teachers of speech still believe that the success of a school's forensics program may be measured merely by counting the number of cups in its trophy case. Fortunately, however, the majority are now more interested in the contribution which that program makes toward the intellectual, social, and moral development of the students who participate in it.

But while the total growth of the student has generally come to be recognized as the broad aim of all forensic activities, there is considerable disagreement as to how this aim may best be achieved.272

Whereas the classic Wells-O'Neill discussions had focused primarily on criteria of judgment and dealt with ethical questions but peripherally, contemporary writers began with the ethical implications of the "game" approach to debate. The widespread practice of debating both sides of a question caused particular concern. Called by Robert M. O'Neill "the single feature of intercollegiate debate which has probably provoked more criticism and

misunderstanding from the outside than any other," the "debating both sides" controversy—rekindled by Brooks Quimby in 1953 and fueled by articles by Kruger and James McGregor Burns—reached bonfire proportions with the publication in 1957 of Richard Murphy's "The Ethics of Debating Both Sides." Insisting that "a public utterance is a public commitment" and implying that to speak against one's convictions is an unethical act, Murphy concluded that:

Debate would be in a stronger position if it were freed from the anachronistic practice of multiple positions. And those who believe in the essential processes of democratic debate, and wish to extend them, would no longer be held liable for a dubious practice, if the debate-both-sides policy were abandoned.

In a review and analysis of Murphy's and rebuttal positions, Ehninger pointed out that "the argumentation


276 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

277 Ibid., p. 9.

278 See ibid., pp. 1-9; Nicholas M. Cripe, "Debating
of neither party will always bear the test of close scrutiny." Ehninger saw the "change-sides" question as a "dubious offspring" of the larger, more crucial issue, "Is school debating a mode of public address or a pedagogical device—a creature of the platform or of the classroom?" He concluded, moreover, that "the game concept of school debating not only embraces serious pedagogical evils, but it is unacceptable socially and morally." He said:

The plain fact of the matter, it seems to me, is that anything that can be taught by playing debating as a game can be taught, and taught better, by practicing it as a mode of "real life" oral discourse; and, in addition, practicing it in this way will make a far greater contribution to the total development of the students who participate in it and to the salvation of the society in which they live.

Ehninger's statement reflected the philosophy set forth in 1952 that "the general development of the student is best promoted by a program in which the fundamental


280 Ibid., p. 136.

281 Ibid., p. 131.

282 Ibid., p. 135.

283 Ibid., p. 136.
intellectual, social, and moral values are regarded as paramount." He and Brockriede predicated Decision by Debate, moreover, on that commitment.

Ehninger's position was not a particularly popular one. As the Klopf-McCroskey survey indicated, directors of debate were unwilling to reject that "offshoot" of the contest approach, switch-sides debating. Rather, renewed efforts appeared to reinforce O'Neill's original thesis. Windes, for example, two years after the Ehninger analysis averred that:

> Academic debating is gamesmanship applied to argumentation. . . . If we set academic debating in this context, we can then properly assign to it certain goals and objectives well within our reach. We can also reject and refute criticism of academic debating which stems from a misunderstanding of what this type of debating actually is.

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284 Ehninger, "Six Earmarks of a Sound Forensics Program," p. 241. Ehninger believed such a program would be integrated with curriculum instruction in public speaking and fundamentals of speech; student centered; dependent on educationally defensible principles regarding participation; a vehicle for teaching social responsibility; progressive; respected in school, community, and region of the country where it is carried on, pp. 237-41.

285 Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision by Debate, preface.


On the other hand, John E. Gow agreed with Ehninger that a "contest" perspective limits debate's potential contribution both to the participants and to society. An emphasis on skills "has the detrimental side effect of stimulating strategy and tactics that will 'win the trophy,'" he said. Gow found the "most unsettling revelation" to be unethical practices in tournament debating, particularly in the use of evidence,\(^\text{288}\) though he cited "other weaknesses that vitiate the efficacy of argument under tournament conditions." He complained:

> The language of the average debater runs stale with debate jargon—status quo, prima facie case, "we find" this and "we find" that; it is frequently laced with exorbitant overstatement as well. Further, one wonders about the instructive value of debate ballots.\(^\text{289}\)

Various other similarly negative charges have been leveled at tournament debating during the contemporary period. In a symposium, published in the *Speech Teacher* in 1960,\(^\text{290}\) James L. Robinson noted "an increasing trend


\(^{289}\) Gow, "Tournament Debating," p. 108.

\(^{290}\) The diverse topics considered in that symposium represent some of the more critical issues surrounding the contemporary forensic. "A Symposium on Discussion and
toward artificiality and . . . 'shysteristic' practices."\(^{291}\) Recognizing that lack of audiences, desire to add hardware to trophy cases, and the hierarchy of tournaments leading to the National Championship are probably contributing factors, Robinson laid much of the blame for such practices on the "overlegalism" of debate.\(^{292}\) Merrill Christopherson, in that same series of discussions, labeled tournament debating "mere exercises in technique, instead of attempts at meaningful argument."\(^{293}\) For Christopherson,

> A great debater seems to speak from a wisdom larger than himself, yet in a style wholly his own. He fills the mind of his listeners with his subject in a manner peculiar to him.\(^{294}\)

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\(^{292}\) Ibid., pp. 109-110.

\(^{293}\) Christopherson, Part IV in "A Symposium," p. 120.

\(^{294}\) Ibid., p. 116.
Not hesitant to indict certain tournament debate practices, contemporary writers have been no less determined to find remedies for them. Suggesting reforms both within and outside the framework of tournament competition, writers have revised formats, devised new methods of judging, and advanced techniques for insuring more ethical uses of evidence. Certain representative prescriptions follow.

To meet the criticisms of artificiality, Walter Murrish—among others—proposed that persuasion in debate would be enhanced by new approaches to judging. Accordingly, he advocated an increased use of lay judges, "terminal" ballots, and ballots cast by debaters. A purely statistical alternative to traditional methods of judging also emerged. Robert E. Litke devised a method

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296 This would require a judge to give a tentative decision after each speech in the debate.


for selecting winning debate teams in tournament competition based on matrix algebra. Litke believed that "the method may be superior to win-loss and team-point methods because (1) the number of ties is reduced and (2) 'luck of the draw' is reduced." The American Forensic Association ballot represented another attempt at increasing reliability in judging.

Contemporary concerns with ethics gave rise to various codes of debating. Robert B. Capel and George Cariker published a code in the Forensic of Pi Kappa Delta; Robert P. Newman drafted The Pittsburgh Code for Academic Debate in 1962, and the American Forensic Association approved a code in December, 1967, which it amended in 1969 to include enforcement provisions.

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300 Ibid., p. 298.

301 See Journal of the American Forensic Association, I (May, 1964), 74-75.


Documented fabrications and misquotations of evidence\textsuperscript{305} called for further reforms. Keith Sanders suggested three: a requirement for the documentation of all evidence; better informed coaches, since the responsibility for error rests with them; and an increased number of tape-recorded debates.\textsuperscript{306} Ehninger and Brockriede included an "ethic of evidence" as well as "a rhetoric" in \textit{Decision by Debate}.\textsuperscript{307} Gow recommended the adoption of an examination and penalty system and felt that "experimentation in potential avenues of control and enrichment should be constant."\textsuperscript{308} He encouraged a formal "challenge of the evidence" at the end of a debate and advocated including "an item on the ballot which calls for the judge to assess the overall ethical practices of the competitors."\textsuperscript{309}

Believing that weaknesses in college debating often result from the nature of the forensic itself, some

\textsuperscript{305}See Newman and Sanders, "Integrity of Evidence," pp. 7-13.


\textsuperscript{307}Ehninger and Brockriede, \textit{Decision by Debate}, pp. 116-21. See also earlier discussion of evidence in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{308}Gow, "Tournament Debating," pp. 110-11.

\textsuperscript{309}Ibid., p. 111.
writers have investigated audience debating, forums, parliamentary, and problem-solving debating as well as contest discussion as supplements and/or alternatives to traditional tournament debate competition. Audience debating has been of particular interest. Questioning the "seriousness of the charges brought against tournament debating" and "the values of the intended reforms," Mills, however, challenged "the wisdom of substituting one kind of over-emphasis for another." W. Scott Nobles and Herman Cohen objected, moreover, to "the disjunctive premise about forensics," i.e., "the assumption that a forensic program must be based either upon tournament activities or upon non-tournament, public debating." Though aware of problems such as budget, administration, number and capacity of students, Nobles and Cohen concluded that:

Every forensic director must tailor the program he plans and sponsors to his own local situation. . . . Whatever the details of his program, however, it must aim at the fullest possible training of his students in all facets of rhetoric. The attainment of this goal demands, not that he make the proper decision about whether to emphasize tournament speaking or the public forum, but rather that he make the fullest possible use of these two valuable and complementary methods of speech training.316

Gow agreed. "In addition to encouraging forensic directors to increase the number of non-decision, audience-centered experiences wherever possible," he said, "a wider variety of tournament or conference offerings should be stimulated."317 Otto F. Bauer and C. William Colburn proposed a challenge debate tournament.318 Gerald Phillips suggested that town meetings, festivals, legislative assemblies, problem-solving tournaments, and student forums be run in conjunction with tournament debating.319

Not all the criticisms leveled at debating could be ameliorated by revisions in judging procedures or in formats or by a greater concern with ethics. Rather, some of the more incisive, more fundamental, barbs grew out of

316Ibid., p. 320.
what Ehninger called "a failure to recognize important limitations of debate as a generic mode of argumentative deliberation." Ehninger recognized that debate is by nature indecisive, bilateral, verbal, and can deal only with means, not ends. Yet, he did not find these limitations debilitating. His commitment to the superiority of the debate process rested on a belief in the reliability and humaneness of debate. Ehninger said:

Besides being self-corrective and hence reliable in a way that authority and intuition are not, debate also is more humane in the sense that it elevates and dignifies man while the alternative methods minimize or degrade him.

Summary

Contemporary argumentation and debate writers have derived no consistent way of approaching their discipline. Despite a lack of continuity in treatments, a continuing interest has persisted in the methods and ends appropriate to argumentation and in the relation of argumentation to other subjects. Much justificatory rationale for debating

321 Ibid.
322 Ibid., p. 184.
within the humanistic tradition has been stimulated by a renewed interest in debate as advocacy. The inquiry-advocacy dichotomy has pervaded notions about the analysis of propositions, their proof, and the judgment as well as the nature of the forensic.

Most contemporary writers have continued to include definition and stock issues as the major components of analysis. Also of interest have been developments in the classification of propositions: an expanding of the tripartite system; a trend toward combining fact and value propositions; and the exclusion in some quarters of policy questions. Cronkhite presented what has been called the most radical approach which isolated both judgmental and temporal dimensions.

Inherency emerged as one of the more controversial constructs of the contemporary period. Involving the need issue in propositions of policy, demonstrating causality, and implying a restrictive view of the _prima facie_ case, inherency forced reassessments of burden of proof and presumption. Its most vocal antagonists, advocates of the comparative advantage alternative, rejected its assumptions.

Most contemporary texts have depended on traditional notions of proof as evidence plus reasoning. They have continued to rely, moreover, on the logical syllogism, Mill's canons of induction, and fallacies. Some writers,
however, have investigated other alternatives. Of particular interest has been reclassification of arguments in terms of common bases. Three other developments are noteworthy: a behavioral approach to evidence in certain works; the introduction of the Toulmin structural model into argumentation and debate theory; and a renewed interest by some writers in motivation and ethos as proof.

The strategy of attack and defense has forced reevaluations of the "appropriate" ends of argumentation and debating with controversy centering on the ethics of debating both sides of an issue, unethical practices in intercollegiate debating, and standards for judgment. Predispositions and premises regarding these issues have tended to follow the inquiry-advocacy dilemma.
In 1895, George Pierce Baker of Harvard College published *The Principles of Argumentation*, the first modern textbook on argument. It has been the purpose of this study to trace the development of argumentation and debate theory from that work. Neither a checklist nor an annotated bibliography, the immediate study has identified, described, and analyzed important extensions, deletions, and modifications of theory. Central to its organizational pattern is the assumption that developments in theory may be isolated within prescribed chronological bounds; i.e., "early" (1895-1917), "middle" (1917-c. 1955), and "contemporary" (c. 1955-1970) periods. An examination of over 1,500 textbooks and journal articles confirms that these divisions are not wholly arbitrary.

Though, in a strict sense, Baker's *Principles* launched neither the practice nor the theory of argumentation, his commitment to a "practical" application "for everyday life" gave the discipline new direction and impetus. Baker's rejection of a total dependency on Formal Logic, rhetoric, and rules of law, moreover, and his
emphasis on the analysis of the argumentative proposition ran counter to Richard Whately's view of argumentation as the logical demonstration of a priori truth. Though Baker's students Raymond Alden, George Pattee, and William Trufant Foster professed a philosophical interest in a broad scope for argumentation, they emphasized the spoken debate. And though their texts retained Baker's exposition of analysis, these writers also included more traditional approaches to proof, derived from Formal Logic. Less concerned with "practical" argumentation than with the reality of school debating, Craven Laycock and Robert L. Scales made no pretense at minimizing formal distinctions drawn from other disciplines. In the rewriting of their text, James M. O'Neill reemphasized the interrelationships.

The year 1917 may be established as a watershed in the development of argumentation and debate theory. The publication of two landmark works, Foster's second edition of *Argumentation and Debating* and O'Neill's revision of Laycock and Scales's *Argumentation and Debate*, entrenched the standard tradition. That same year, however, grave dissatisfactions surfaced in the journals. Mary Yost's protests for a sociological context for argumentation gave way to Charles H. Woolbert's restructuring of the discipline from the behavioral psychological perspective. Gladys Murphy Graham, on the other hand, objected to the narrow confines of the traditional logics embodied in most
works. The Wells-O'Neill controversy emphasized the prevailing philosophical rift over the "proper" end of debate, that form of argumentation which had gained ascendancy.

"Middle period" writers responded to the Yost-Woolbert-Graham criticisms variously and consistently with their philosophical predispositions. Whereas George Collins and John Morris rewrote the theory of argumentation in terms of persuasion and debate, James A. Winans and William E. Utterback, A. Craig Baird, and Charles Fritz updated traditional theory in terms of modern sociological and psychological principles with some attention to modern logics. Efforts, moreover, to restate argumentation's ends in terms of social goals, reminiscent of Baker's plea for a practical argumentation, resulted in a broadening of argumentation's scope to include discussion, an emphasis on a balanced rhetorical effort including persuasion as well as conviction as appropriate ends of argument, and expanded treatments of audience. Baird, who was instrumental in all these developments, spanned the entire period, both in his works and influence. Henry Lee Ewbank and J. Jeffery Auer's widely used text reflected Baird's philosophy of discussion. Waldo W. Braden and Earnest Brandenburg's Oral Decision-Making and William Behl's Discussion and Debate built on both works.
The standard tradition not only survived, but it prospered during the "middle period." Foster's *Argumentation and Debating* continued to be among the most popular works, going through numerous printings and a "second revised edition" as late as 1945. O'Neill, meanwhile, began to co-author works with Andrew T. Weaver and James M. McBurney. These texts retained traditional notions of argumentation and emphasized the "game" approach to debating. W. C. Shaw's open advocacy of strategy reinforced O'Neill's position.

The philosophical split over the appropriate end of debate, anticipated by the shift from Whately to Baker but most clearly exemplified by the Wells-O-Neill controversy, had influenced "early" and "middle" period discussions of the forensic itself. During the late 1950's and early 1960's, in large measure, it also determined one's view of analysis and proof. The terms *advocacy* and *inquiry* denote the polarity of the controversy. Disciples of Baker and reared in the Baird, Ewbank-Auer tradition, Ehninger and Brockriede occupy that end of the continuum which perceives argumentation to be a form of inquiry, an instrument of decision-making. At the other end, one finds Kruger, heir to the O'Neill-Shaw philosophy, proponent of advocacy, logic, strategy, attack and defense. Freeley and Mills, among others, have attempted to bridge the intermediate chasm. Though probably most influential in
contemporary textbook treatments of the principles and procedures of argumentation, the critical underlying issue, the appropriate end or goal of debate, has pervaded most of the significant controversies and prompted many of the developments in argumentation and debate theory in all periods. A summary of the major areas of investigation of this study confirms this conclusion.

The Nature of Argumentation

Despite Baker's insistence on a "practical" argumentation independent of the strictures imposed by other disciplines, most "early period" writers continued to rely on prescriptions from Formal Logic, law, and rhetorical composition. Rhetoric provided principles of arrangement, style, and delivery and emphasized persuasion. Law included rules of evidence, a method of analysis (briefing) and a highly structured procedural system (including the concepts of prima facie case, burden of proof, and presumption) for the carrying on of argumentation. Formal Logic, moreover, provided the concept of the proposition and set out specific rules and structures for its proof.

At one time or another, most of the preceding elements have been declared inappropriate or unnecessary for argumentation. Witness: Baker's contention that rules of arguing in law courts are not essential for "practical" argumentation; a reviewer's astonishment at
Baird's inclusion of a chapter on delivery; the decreased emphasis on brief-drawing; Kruger's conviction that academic debate is not primarily an exercise in public speaking; a contemporary interest in "deliberative" as opposed to "forensic" debating; a behavioral approach to evidence which rejects the quasi-legal perspective. The role of Formal Logic in argumentation and the relationship—if any—of conviction to persuasion has created, however, most controversy.

Though Baker had rejected Formal Logic as essential for "practical" argumentation—preferring "applied logic" such as that set out by Alfred Sidgwick—most subsequent writers included detailed sections on the logical syllogism, John Stuart Mill's canons of induction, and fallacies. "Middle period" writers attempted to update traditional treatments, moreover, by sandwiching Bernard Bosanquet and John Dewey between Mill and Aristotle. Certain contemporary texts included the Toulmin analysis.

Traditional theory came under attack not only from those who wished to update its logic, but severe indictments came from those who perceived persuasion to be within the scope of argumentation. Though Baker suggested that argumentation may be accomplished by either reasoning or the emotions, and although his revision with Huntington called the processes "complementary," evidence does not suggest that most "early period" writers thought a
separation between conviction and persuasion to be "artificial." Rather, their treatments reflected the prevailing faculty psychology. Woolbert, a behaviorist, rejected the conviction-persuasion dichotomy and insisted that the mind must be viewed as "an organic unit." His reformulations—buttressed by "middle period" interests both in social context and in public discussion, i.e., audiences—prompted a reshuffling of priorities, the result being a more central role for persuasion in argumentation and debate theory. The writings of such contemporary psychologists as William James, Carl Seashore, E. B. Tichener, R. S. Woodworth, and Floyd Allport added new dimensions and, in some instances, new "respectability" to that theory. Not all "middle period" writers, however, accepted such an expanded role for argumentation. Foster, for example, continued to treat the processes separately and emphasized conviction in his 1932 revision of Argumentation and Debating.

Persuasion's "place" in contemporary theories of argumentation has been determined largely by one's view of the nature and end of debate. Whereas Ehninger and Brockriede, for example, emphasized motivational proof in their text, Kruger dismissed such proof as inappropriate for academic debate. Contemporary writers have subjected the role of Formal Logic in argumentation to the same criterion. Those who deem advocacy to be the appropriate
end of argument have returned reason, if not logic, to a position of primacy in the discipline, though at least one writer has suggested that such treatments continue out of tradition only. At the other extreme is the position that Formal Logic's role in argumentation is one simply of style and plausibility. The contemporary search for alternate logical structures—most clearly demonstrated by the interest in bases of classification and the introduction of the Toulmin model into argumentation and debate theory—suggests a continuing commitment to an "applied logic" for practical argumentation.

**Analysis**

Baker's discussion of analysis, considered by many his most influential contribution to argumentation and debate theory, included four major steps in its revised form—phrasing the proposition, defining the terms, finding the special issue, and case. Alden expanded the concept to include objections to affirmative propositions, thereby opening the way for a clash on issues.

The concept of the proposition, rooted in Formal Logic, had been applied to argumentation at least since the time of Whately. Alden, among the first writers to discuss the debate proposition, set out characteristics of a "good" proposition which other writers expanded. "Good propositions," typical texts averred, place the burden of proof on the affirmative, contain an assertion
about one central idea, and are unambiguous, interesting, clear, and unbiased. The comprehensive standards set out in the Foster and O'Neill texts provided the framework for most subsequent treatments.

Early period writers began to classify propositions according to subject matter--i.e., propositions of fact and policy. Though O'Neill thought such a procedure "hardly worthwhile," most "middle period" texts did include fact and policy classifications. Some writers attempted further subdivisions. Baird, for example, separated theoretically sound policy questions from those involving practical policy. Various divisions of propositions of fact, meanwhile, resulted from attempts to isolate the evaluative dimension. Wagner provided the most lasting label, propositions of value, which he treated as a separate class. Though most contemporary writers have followed the fact-value-policy distinctions, further attempts to classify propositions have resulted in an expanding of the tripartite structure, the combining of fact and value propositions, and the exclusion of policy questions as a separate category.

Baker examined definition as a second step in analysis. Rejecting dictionary definitions as insufficient, he discussed one's own experience and a careful examination of the words themselves as sources of the meaning of propositions. Alden added the notion "under the
circumstances." The Baker-Huntington revision included a study of the history of the question and labeled clearness, convincingness, and brevity as essentials of a good definition. Foster advised defining from etymology, authority, negation, exemplification, and explication. Subsequent writers, following these general distinctions, added other "methods": continuum; comparison-contrast; function; example; context. Ehninger and Brockriede's approach—definition by classification, necessary conditions, and operational description—is probably the most distinctive available in contemporary literature.

Discovering the issues was, for Baker, the third major step in analysis. He devised a method of residues (excluding unimportant, irrelevant, and admitted matter) for finding the "special" issue, that central idea or group of ideas around which the controversy centers. Laycock and Scales located the "stress of the controversy" by "clash of opinion" and examined primary and subordinate issues. O'Neill, furthermore, insisted that issues are not simply main points or points on which there is a clash of opinion, but they are the smallest possible division of crucial points, each one of which the affirmative must establish to establish the proposition.

Whereas the "clash of opinion" provided the issues for most early period writers, and though such alternatives as Shaw's "phase system" of analysis appeared, most "middle
period" texts tended to rely on stock issues. Rooted in the classical doctrine of *stasis* and discussed in argumentation literature at least as early as J. R. Pelsma and Harry B. Gough, stock issues provided not only a method of analysis but also an outline of points in partition. Though O'Neill thought it "unsafe" to accept stock issues as "the exact issues," most middle period writers did just that. Dewey's reflective thinking model, meanwhile, became the primary tool for dissecting discussion questions. Most contemporary writers have continued to rely on standardized methodology for determining issues. Lee Hultzen introduced what is probably the most unique modern system. He included four stock issues (ill, blame, cure, cost) and three sub-issues (conjecture, definition, quality).

Though Baker considered case to be a step in analysis, most writers who followed him treated it as a result of analysis. Whereas the brief, moreover, constituted the points in partition for Baker, most subsequent writers redefined case in terms of the rhetorical outline. O'Neill's early comprehensive treatment of case set out both affirmative and negative prerogatives. An affirmative must establish a *prima facie* case which discharges the burden of proof and overcomes the negative presumption, O'Neill averred. The negative has four alternatives: pure refutation; defense of the present; adjustment; and counter proposition.
Writers had applied the terms burden of proof and presumption to argumentation at least since the time of Whately. Though Baker largely ignored the concepts, Alden gave them currency and identified them with debating. Early the question arose as to whether the burden of proof shifts. O'Neill introduced the legal term burden of rebuttal to denote that part of the responsibility which does shift. Wells suggested that it is the burden to produce evidence which shifts, the burden of the issue. The contemporary concept of inherency forced reassessments of traditional notions of burden of proof, presumption, and the prima facie case.

Though "early period" writers clearly separated the rhetorical outline, points in partition, or case from the brief, they continued to rely on brief-drawing both to provide the issues through the clash in opinion and to demonstrate the logical relationships between these issues. During the "middle period," however, the affirmative case evolved largely into an explication of stock issues, particularly in propositions of policy. The most radical departure from this traditional system was the comparative advantage affirmative which ignored the traditional need analysis. Proponents of inherency challenged the validity of the comparative advantages case, arguing that the alternative does not discharge the burden of proof, traditionally an affirmative responsibility.
Although the use of the term is not new in argumentation and debate theory, inherency as an important theoretical construct is a phenomenon of the contemporary period. As discussed by its most avid proponents, inherency involves the need issue in propositions of policy, being linked with "the essential characteristic of the status quo." It demonstrates causality and implies a restrictive view of the *prima facie* case. Inherency has inquired into the defining of propositions and into the main issues essential to proving one's case.

"Middle period," and particularly "contemporary," writers have attended more carefully to refutation and rebuttal than did their "early period" counterparts. Clarifications of negative alternatives, particularly the counter-plan, have appeared. Specific work for rebuttal speeches has been outlined and techniques of attack and defense have been detailed. Much praised and much maligned, the concept of strategy has served to focus much of the controversy. Associated with winning, with placing an opponent at a disadvantage, with what Musgrave called "outwitting" not "outplodding in the library," strategy pervaded the numerous "how to" books of the "middle period." Both during that time and in more contemporary works, strategy has reflected a shift from the traditional structuring and proof of arguments to the preparing of debaters for intercollegiate competition. The contemporary period includes a fair share of both approaches.
Proof

Though Best's definition of proof as "anything which serves . . . to convince the mind of the truth or the falsehood of a fact or proposition"\(^1\) left the way clear for the accommodation of *ethos* and *pathos*, traditionally most writers have restricted the concept of proof to logical appeals. Woolbert's insistence on the totality of response and Ehninger and Brockriede's application of Toulmin's structural model of argument to both motivational and authoritative proofs, however, are notable exceptions.

In an effort to minimize the role of Formal Logic in argumentation, Baker perceived evidence to be the integrating factor of proof, reasoning being a kind of evidence. Laycock and Scales, on the other hand, set out evidence and reasoning as the two major components of proof. Most subsequent works—Foster notwithstanding—followed the latter alternative and differentiated evidence (the material of proof) from argument (the machinery). The Toulmin structural model represents a contemporary attempt at integration.

Argumentation and debate texts, regardless of period, have relied almost solely on legal definitions and classifications of evidence. Whereas "early period"

writers limited their definitions to fact, opinion being a kind of fact, later writers presented fact and opinion as two correlative parts of evidence. Some texts defined evidence, moreover, in terms of its "constituents" (facts, statistics, objects, et cetera). More significant, however, has been the contemporary development of assessing the function of proof as belief, not proof. The ramifications of this behavioral perspective relate, moreover, to one's view of the nature and end of debate.

Some contemporary writers have examined the relation of evidence to kinds of propositions, issues, or claims. Terris, for example, suggested that the fact-value distinction depends on the type of evidence used to prove it. Ehninger and Brockriede limited authoritative proof to designative and definitive claims. Robert Newman and Dale Newman correlated evidential forms with directional, positional, and predicative statements. Gerald R. Miller related goals to propositions from a belief, rather than probative perspective.

Treatments of evidence as the material of proof stimulated an early interest in research and in the recording and tabulating of materials. Contemporary texts demonstrate no such continuity. Whereas some writers have emphasized research materials, others omit them completely.

It has been suggested that traditional applications of Formal Logic to argumentation and debate theory faced fire from several directions. Baker dismissed Formal
Logic's usefulness for a "practical argumentation for everyday life." Woolbert attacked Formal Logic's psychological bases. Graham indicted contemporary treatments of logic as "insufficient" and "fragmentary." Dewey argued that logical forms are essentially rhetorical and proposed a "scientific method" for the solution of problems. Most writers, however, unwilling to reject the methodology and security of Formal Logic, unable to accept the Collins and Morris analysis inspired by Woolbert, and uncertain about the application of Dewey's method of reflective thinking to argumentation, simply updated their bibliographies and followed the systems set out by Foster and O'Neill in 1917.

Foster perceived the induction-deduction distinction to be critical. Within that framework, he examined the "typical forms" of reasoning—example, analogy, generalization, and argument from causal relation. O'Neill, on the other hand, believed that the real process of inference is the same in both induction and deduction. Accordingly, he separated rhetorical classes (antecedent probability, sign, and example) from logical classes of argument (induction and deduction). Both Foster and O'Neill detailed rules for the syllogism, discussed Mill's canons of induction (via Jevons' explanations), and set out fallacies.

In addition to following preceding analyses, some writers sought to integrate old concepts. Others developed
new methods for structuring and labeling arguments. Of particular interest in the contemporary period has been a reformulation of the modes of argument in terms of common bases of classification and the introduction of the Toulmin structural model into argumentation and debate theory. Interpreted initially by Brockriede, the Toulmin model has been transmitted to subsequent argumentation and debate texts primarily through the modified constructs set out by Ehninger and Brockriede. Various other adaptations and extensions have appeared, serving both as supplements to syllogistic reasoning and as a substitute for Formal Logic. The Toulmin analysis has not been without its detractors, however, Peter Manicas constructing one of the more incisive negative cases in argumentation and debate literature.

Traditionally one's view of the nature of proof has influenced his methodology for its evaluation. Baker, for example, differentiated external tests of evidence from internal tests of reasoning. Writers have appropriated legal tests of evidence to assess reliability, accuracy, verifiability, recency, representativeness, and competency of source. Audience acceptability has surfaced as a contemporary test of evidence in some works, though it is not a universally accepted criterion. Argumentation and debate writers have tested reasoning, moreover, by applying tests of the logical syllogism and by questioning
the "representativeness" of induction. Some writers who included enthymematic reasoning or the Toulmin structural model have set out appropriate evaluative standards. Consistent with an emphasis on empiricism and pragmatism, an interest in material validity has also persisted with detailed sections on fallacies continuing into contemporary works.

The Forensic

Whereas Baker had approached the forensic as a written composition, believing that common principles apply to both oral and written discourse, most subsequent writers—disciples and critics alike—emphasized the spoken debate. The resulting descriptions and treatments reflect differing notions about the forensic and its relation to argumentation. Some writers perceived debating to be a form of argumentation. Others used the terms synonymously. Another, less influential, group treated argumentation and debating as kinds of persuasion.

Baker's view of the forensic stressed argumentative composition and demanded attention to rules of arrangement and style. Alden emphasized delivery and platform decorum. Most succeeding texts included discussions of these rhetorical elements, though certain contemporary theorists have accorded them less importance.

The carrying on of the spoken debate prompted dissension among "early period" writers, rules and formats
differing from one debate to another. Though the debate tournament helped to standardize procedures, it did not dispel anxiety over format. Conversely, it increased the concern in some quarters. The "middle period" emphasis on social context, moreover, prompted a demand for audiences. An interest in public discussion stressed cooperation and minimized the "competition" fostered by tournament debating. Reassessments of traditional forms of debating resulted in revised tournament formats (cross-examination, direct clash, congressional debating) and in methods for discussing multi-sided questions (convention debating, discussion contests). The advent of no-decision debating led to still other possibilities, radio debating being particularly popular. Coaches and tournament directors experimented with heckling, dialectic, forums, and British forms, to mention some of the more obvious. Concerned with an overemphasis on "academic" debating and anxious to discourage unethical practices in tournament competition, contemporary writers have offered similar alternatives. Of particular interest have been non-tournament formats. Underlying these various alternatives to the forensic have been varying philosophical predispositions about the nature and end of argumentation and, more specifically, of debating.

What is the "proper" or "appropriate" end of debating? Should debating be a true to life venture or is it merely an academic contest, a game? Is a public
utterance a public commitment? Is debating primarily a pedagogical device? The Wells-O'Neill discussions brought this pervasive theoretical issue into sharp focus while the contemporary inquiry-advocacy split has given it currency. The divisiveness engendered by differing views of the "proper" end of debating has influenced not only format, but it has reached into such issues as judging and ethics.

The O'Neill-Wells controversy evolved into a discussion of standards of judgment. Wells advocated a "juryman" who would judge on the merits of competing cases. O'Neill insisted on a "critic judge" who would decide on the merit of the debating. This clash underscored the relativity of standards of judgment. Woodward, in an attempt to place judging on a scientific basis, proposed the shift-of-opinion ballot. Other standardized criteria appeared, the contemporary American Forensic Association ballot being among the more influential.

Whereas the Wells-O'Neill articles emphasized judging and dealt with ethical questions but peripherally, contemporary writers began with the "ethical" implications of the "game" approach to debating. The primary issue, the common tournament practice of debating both sides of a question, was not new, Foster having raised objections to the practice as early as 1908. The Murphy-Cripe-Ehninger
articles emphasized the broader implications of that controversy.

The preponderance of argumentation and debate theory, 1970, bears little resemblance to that "practical argumentation for everyday life" envisioned by George Pierce Baker seventy-five years ago. Baker perceived no "academic" debate geared to the demands of intercollegiate tournament competition. His commitment, rather, was to the discovery, selection, and structuring of arguments for the everyday affairs of men. This study has traced the developments which resulted in that philosophical shift.

Various indictments and/or justifications for argumentation and debate have appeared since 1895 and numerous alternatives to the structure and evaluation of argumentation's most persistent form have been advanced. Ehninger, however, probably expressed the consensus of writers since Alden when he suggested debating to be "superior to any alternative method for achieving the end at which it aims." The critical question, of course, has been: Toward what end does debate--or to raise another problem--should debate aim? That question remains unresolved.

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