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The War of Candia, 1645-1669.

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THE WAR OF CANDIA, 1645-1669

A Dissertation

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in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
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in

The Department of History

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Norman David Mason
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The War of Candia, 1645-69, is one of the most important events which occurred in the East during the seventeenth century. As a war between the Republic of Venice and the resurgent Ottoman empire, the war provides an excellent opportunity to study the general history of the Mediterranean area, and also to examine one of the important factors involved in the seemingly inexorable decline of the once renowned Venetian state. The study attempts to analyze the war not merely from the perspective of military history, but also tries to assess the economic, commercial, and social repercussions of the struggle.

Since the war itself oscillated between periods of extremely intensive fighting and those of general quiescence, an effort has been made to divide the twenty-four year conflict into its three major stages: 1645-50, 1650-66, and 1667-69. Moreover, there is included an examination of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in an effort to analyze the state of the Venetian empire and its numerous imperial possessions prior to 1645.

Finally, in order to place the war in its proper perspective with respect to international relations in Europe, considerable time has been devoted to examining the effects of the conflict on seventeenth-century European politics. In this way it is hoped that a broader and deeper understanding of French, Italian, Spanish, and Imperial diplomacy might be developed.
PREFACE

The Candian war is a largely forgotten episode in European history. Like so much of the history of seventeenth-century Venice, the struggle for Crete either has been lost in the shadow of the Venetian Renaissance or has been glibly pushed aside as just another example of the later Republic's decay. Recent histories concerning the war have generally focused on certain specific events or years of the war without making any effort to deal with the struggle in its totality. Consequently this work is designed to do precisely what has been attempted only in part. This study deals with the war in its entirety, treating it not only as one aspect of the general decline of Venice during the century but also trying to fuse into a discernible whole the many social, economic, and political strands of the conflict.

In a certain sense the Candian war was late in coming. By 1645 Venetian greatness in the eastern Mediterranean was a fading glory of the past. In terms Toynbee might use, the stage was set for a clash between a state in ascendancy and one in a condition of spiraling decay. As in any such struggle, the outcome remained only a question of time.

The troubles which continued to plague the commercial and military hegemony of the Venetian state since the first voyages of Vasco da Gama in the late fifteenth century are well-known to historians of early modern Europe. Economically, the wealth Venice garnered by monopolizing the trade of the East dwindled over the course of a century in the wake of the energetic competition of Portuguese, Dutch, and English traders. This commercial decline was accompanied by all the social repercussions
which inevitably seem to follow periods of economic contraction. With respect to population, Venice found it increasingly difficult to attract or retain the numbers of people who had once made the Queen of the Adriatic one of Europe's most populous cities. In terms of leadership, the energetic and resourceful members of the Venetian aristocracy fled to the mainland leaving behind an enfeebled and enervated ruling class. Europe's most powerful state in 1500 had, within a century and a half, receded in prominence and had rapidly assumed the status of another one of Italy's relatively unimportant petty kingdoms.

It was just such a Venice together with her empire of distant, tenuously-held islands and enclaves which was confronted in the seventeenth century by the challenge of a resurgent and vigorous Ottoman state. During the half-century after the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Ottoman empire remained largely paralyzed by internal disintegration. Corruption tainted the highest circles of government, and a lack of intelligent and determined leadership caused the military and financial might of the Turkish empire to flounder in a state of perpetual confusion. The advent of Sultan Murad IV in 1623 and the rise of the Kuprili family several decades later tended to reverse this decline. As a result a weakened Venetian state was forced into battle with a Turkish empire which was, by mid-century, stronger than it had been for nearly sixty years.

To some observers in 1645, the defeat of Venice might have seemed inevitable. That defeat did eventually come, but it required nearly twenty-five years of intermittent warfare and was accomplished only after
many Venetians had met their fate with an overriding sense of dignity and fortitude. Inevitable though the loss of Candia may have seemed to many then and must seem to many now, the history of Venetian resistance nevertheless reflects in numerous ways a genuine perseverance and nobility of spirit.

History is perhaps most fascinating and instructive when it centers on a period of relatively extensive change. A study of the Candian war allows one to view in greater depth the response of a weakened state to a persistent and generally superior force. But the Candian war encompasses much more than the history of Venice alone, for it provides, in part, a comprehensive view of East-West relations during the middle of the seventeenth century. The long and complex diplomatic vicissitudes of the war present a broader view of international relations than that which frequently emerges when attention is solely fixed on the France of Louis XIV. Indeed, the Candian war plays a vital historical role in the gradual disentanglement of western Europe from the affairs of the East. To a large extent it was the frustration and tragedy of the Candian war as well as the conflict which followed in the Morea which discouraged all Europe and France in particular from remaining involved in the troubles of the Ottoman empire. Consequently, it is hoped that this history of the Candian struggle will provide not only a deeper glimpse into the entire problem of the seventeenth-century crisis but also a broader understanding of seventeenth-century Europe as a whole.
CHAPTER I

ON THE EVE OF WAR

By the seventeenth century the Republic of Venice had ceased to be a dominant power in the Mediterranean. Although eclipsed in might and wealth by the nation-states of northern Europe, the Republic nevertheless retained the vestiges of her former greatness. Moreover, the institutions and administrative structure by which Venice had regulated domestic and colonial affairs for several centuries remained essentially intact. Of all the various councils within the Venetian state the Senate continued to be the principal organ of government.* It was in the Senate, a body of over three hundred Venetian nobles, that matters of foreign policy and colonial administration were discussed and finally resolved. The vast multitude of magistrates, provveditors, and military officers owed their first allegiance to the Senate. It was this august body, with all of its auxiliary councils, which was soon to be faced with the task of preserving an empire against an aggressive and determined Turkish challenge.

The empire of the Venetian Republic was still a relatively vast complex of diverse islands and coastal enclaves. Stretching from Istria to the shores of Candia, the empire encompassed the Ionian islands of

*Of the other important councils in the Venetian government there was the Collegio, a type of executive body which helped prepare material to be discussed in the Senate; the Council of Ten, a frequently very powerful body mainly concerned with domestic affairs; the Quarantia or chief judiciary body; and the innumerable magistracies which were the administrative agencies through which governmental policies and decrees were carried through. The doge by the seventeenth century had become little more than the ceremonial head of state.
Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante as well as the city-fortresses scattered along the entire length of the Dalmatian coast. At the easternmost limit of the empire, just southeast of the Morea and nearly a thousand miles from Venice, lay the island of Candia. This island, known to the modern world as Crete, was one of the most important colonies within the Venetian colonial system. Over 150 miles in length and twenty to forty in width, Candia remained a geographic landmark in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean.

At the outbreak of the war it seemed to most Venetians that the island was an integral part of the Venetian empire. Candia had become a possession of Venice over four centuries earlier when it was purchased from the Marquis of Monferrato in the year 1204. Venetian colonization had begun almost immediately and had continued into the following century. For a period of over two hundred years, from the middle of the thirteenth century to the end of the fifteenth, no attempt was made to initiate a policy of active imperial control. During this period the kingdom was plagued with considerable unrest and rebellion, Venetian control being effectively limited to the garrisoned urban centers.

It was not until the latter part of the fifteenth century when Venetian commercial activities began significantly to prosper that any attempt was made to subjugate the island and bring it under complete domination. Nobles who persisted in conspiring against Venetian rule were summarily stripped of their patrimonies; arable land on the island was divided into fiefs and those working it were reduced to servile status. Venice retained direct control over all of the island's major
urban centers but all other peripheral areas were placed under the jurisdic-
tion of individual churches, monasteries, or individual aristocratic families.

This relatively stringent policy had to be considerably relaxed, however, since it became increasingly necessary to cede powers to the locally entrenched feudality. In such a distant and truculent kingdom conciliation and compromise understandably came to replace a policy of open and determined coercion.\(^4\) The Venetian republic did attempt, however, to maintain at least a modicum of judicial and administrative control. Two provveditors\(^5\) appointed every five years were sent to the island to investigate complaints, punish the over-mighty, and, in general, act as inquisitors and viceroys.

The ability of these provveditors to act against rural offenders or to engage in military movements was, however, considerably inhibited by the mountainous terrain of the island. This geographic factor, combined with the great distance between the kingdom and Venice itself, encouraged many Candian nobles to ignore the strictures which the Venetians tried to impose. Vast sectors of the island were consequently under the effective dominion of independent feudal tyrants. As a result the oppressed peasantry not only suffered under the inequities of feudal justice but also found itself laboring under traditional feudal burdens which the unrestrained nobility commonly exploited. The 'tertiria' or third of the harvest demanded by many lords impoverished large numbers of peasants and forced many to abandon the land. The 'angaria' or local form of corvee, although theoretically a nominal service, caused

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the 'Angari' or servile inhabitants of the island to become little more than the miserable pawns of the kingdom's privileged class. To the average islander Venetian rule and justice had therefore become little more than an inconsequential and ephemeral formality.

Venetian rule on the island had become so ineffective by the seventeenth century that public acts of disorder and violence were fairly common. Earlier in the century a Venetian inquisitor had complained of the bitter feuding which had "held all divided with such hatred, and rancor...." By 1644 the problem of blood feuds and vendettas had come to plague the peace of the kingdom like a menacing hydra. The Provveditor-General reported that many nobles had demanded the right to appear armed in public places and that the members of a certain Zancaroli family had even gathered in the city square and had scorned publicly a Venetian official, not only refusing to salute him, "but even scandalously turning their shoulder to him."^8

Efforts to reform the island were frequently hindered by the hostility of the island's entrenched nobility and by the lethargy of its bureaucracy. In the 1570's Jacopo Foscarini had tried to bring order by reorganizing the militia, eliminating the practice of 'dead-pay' to inactive soldiers, regulating more equitably the tax structure and reordering the treasury; unfortunately his reforms were temporary since his successors did not continue his reforming policies.\(^9\)

Pietro Zane, a seventeenth-century eyewitness to the conditions prevailing on Candia, had little complimentary to say. The cameras or treasuries were drained of funds, officials and military officers
received exorbitant salaries, corrupt judges commonly accepted bribes, and even the higher clergy of the island did little to bring credit and honor to Venetian rule. One case noted by Zane involved a general, a provveditore of the cavalry, and a captain who together had received more than twelve thousand ducats, a sum far in excess of what their ordinary remuneration should have been.\textsuperscript{10} Thus the conditions which prevailed on Candia at the time of the Turkish assault in many ways explain the Turkish successes during the initial phase of the war.\textsuperscript{11}

Despite this financial and military stagnation, the island continued to be considered by both Venetians and Europeans alike as a vital and indispensable bulwark of security and economic stability. An anonymous author of the early seventeenth century referred to the kingdom as the very "defense, security, and greatness of the Republic..."; other manuscripts of the time frequently allude to Candia as the "sea wall of Christianity" against the dangers of militant Islam.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, the very intensity of the long war for possession of the island stands as irrefutable evidence of the high esteem in which the distant kingdom was held.

In spite of its many liabilities, the island of Candia still had certain notable advantages. Geographically it lay central to most of the important trade centers of the eastern Mediterranean; it was relatively close not only to the Cyclades and Dodecanese islands, but was also only a short sailing distance from the Morea, Negroponte, and the Dardinelles. The Venetian ambassador at Constantinople, commonly referred to as the bailo,\textsuperscript{13} wrote in 1641 that the island was an object
of envy not merely for the wealth it was presumed to have but also "for the site, which looks over the mouth of the archipelago and extends commodiously...into the Mediterranean." 14 Indeed, as an entrepot for the commercial traffic of the Aegean, Adriatic, and Mediterranean, Candia could hardly have been more ideally located.

Moreover, in an age when the sea offered the best means of transportation, Candia was blessed with numerous large ports, harbors, and beaching areas. Many of these ports, moreover, could provide shelter for sizable armadas ranging from thirty to fifty galleys. Francesco Basilicata's account 15 offers a fairly extensive description of the island as it appeared to a seventeenth-century observer. Among the many capacious ports of which he takes note many, such as Porto della Suda, Spinalonga, and Paleocastro di Sittia, were of considerable strategic importance; others such as Sittia and Grabusa, situated respectively at the eastern and western extremities of the island, could be easily defended but were of more limited commercial and military use. In addition, all of the major cities of the kingdom—Candia, Canea, and Rettimo—naturally were possessed of fine harbor facilities capable of servicing a sizable fleet. For the disembarking of reinforcements or emergency contingents there were scattered along the island's coasts countless beaches ideal for infantry or cavalry maneuvers. Finally, fresh water for man and beast was in generally plentiful supply for all of the kingdom's fortresses and principal castelli or watch-towers.

Such natural assets had, however, won for Candia a reputation in many ways undeserved. Bernardin Surius, a pilgrim who visited Candia
in the mid-1640's, enthusiastically cited the abundance which he found everywhere on the island; he wrote of the sumptuousness of Candia, of its fertility in all things necessary for life, "especially of wines of Malvoisie and Muscadel which, for their excellence, are transported in all parts of the world. It is abundant in wheat, buckwheats (bleds), oil, wax, sugar, honey,...olive trees, palm trees, fig trees, and vineyards...(as well as) quantities of beautiful woods...and medicinal herbs." Even the observant historian Valiero, writing several years after the outbreak of the Candian war, could write of the prosperity of the island, albeit with some reservation. "This kingdom, sterile by nature, had become, by the arts used so many years by the Republic, very fertile and populated...." 

The abundance and luxury of which these men spoke unfortunately existed more in imagination than in reality. There was on the island an abundance of olives, wines, fruits, herbs, and cypress wood, but Candia suffered perennially from a shortage of basic grain staples. In order to supplement Candia's lagging grain production, supplies of this indispensable commodity often had to be imported from various Turkish ports. The bailo, Contarini, wrote in 1641 that in negotiating with the Turk for grain shipments to Candia it would be necessary "to proceed with caution, in order not to show that the kingdom is not, without such aid, able to sustain itself." Only three years later the Provveditore-General of Candia was confronted with a desperate situation when the bailo at Constantinople informed him that, due to increased anti-Christian sentiment, there would be little hope of procuring any further
supplementary grain shipments from Turkish ports. Since Cadian officials frequently resorted to the purchase of grain in Turkish ports to ease poor harvests on the island, any policy restricting such trade would have considerable effect in CANDIA. The shortages which occurred in 1644, when combined with Turkish unwillingness to sell Venetian merchants grain, proved so severe that the peasants were forced to use as food the seed reserves customarily set aside for the fall planting. To compensate for the poor harvest that year the Provveditor-General sent urgent requests to Cephalonia and Zante, two islands which generally were blessed with abundant grain surpluses. A sterner warning came from the hard-pressed city of Canea where the Provveditor there warned that without considerable assistance many in his area would perish of famine; he furthermore noted that the primary cause for the continual grain shortages on the island resulted from the fact that "the territory does not yield but a third of the need."

Another difficulty faced by Cadian authorities, one almost as predictable as the kingdom's recurring famine, was that of piracy. Throughout the century the destructive exploits of Mediterranean corsairs had been dangerously on the increase; those states such as Venice which continued to rely on the swift but lightly armed galley were particularly affected by this increased piratical activity. Attacks by the Usocch pirates of the Dalmatian coast, the Barbary corsairs of North Africa, and the "pontentine" vessels of Malta and Tuscany not only disrupted the regular flow of commerce but subsequently brought about a precipitous rise in Venetian insurance rates. Indirectly this
rise in insurance costs threatened to diminish significantly the ability of Venetian shipping to remain competitive in the Mediterranean transportation market.

The effects of this increased piracy were felt both directly and indirectly on Candia. The dispatches of the inquisitors in the earlier part of the century comment frequently on the 'great prejudice' which had come to the commerce of the island as a result of Barbary and Maltese attacks. With an extensive shoreline to patrol and many convenient and secluded harbors to guard, it was virtually impossible for Venetian authorities to prevent corsairs either from harassing commercial ships which plied Candian waters or from landing in the island's anchorages to careen their vessels and replenish their supplies. In the 1640's the Provveditor-General had written that Maltese and Barbary pirates commonly infested Candian waters, the Maltese themselves ravaging fellow Christian merchantmen with almost complete religious indifference. The problem of piracy and its many annoying and damaging ramifications was one from which Venetian officials at Candia seldom enjoyed a respite.

Famine and piracy were two problems not uncommon to many European states of the seventeenth century, especially those of the Mediterranean area. But the financial and military disorder which characterized the Kingdom of Candia in the 1640's is more difficult to explain or excuse; its origins were more directly related to "human failing" than to "unavoidable natural disasters." Even a cursory examination of provveditor's reports reveals a plethora of financial ills; some of these
were understandably generated by commercial factors beyond the immediate control of Venice, but others were a result of simple malfeasance and personal carelessness. Such mismanagement, when combined with famine, piracy, and general economic contraction decreased even further the value of Candia as a colonial asset. Subsidies from Venice to boost the Candian resources had become more or less regular practice. In the year 1638, for example, the Bilanci Generale reveals that the revenues for Candia amounted to some 196,610 ducats while expenses soared to 326,909 ducats, the deficit being hidden within a combined budgetary statement for Candia and the entire Ionian archipelago. Since Cephalonia and Zante both registered a considerable surplus, the final combined budget showed a 12,000 ducat excess. Yet in reality Candia was heavily in debt, burdening the revenues of the islands of the Levant by a sum exceeding 130,000 ducats. Even allowing for a particularly poor year, the reduction of such a deficit as that of the island of Candia would have required fundamental financial and administrative changes.

Admittedly, much of the economic depression reflected in these statistics must have been directly related to the more general decline of the entire Mediterranean basin. Nevertheless, it is impossible in the case of Candia to dismiss completely the purely 'human' factor of mismanagement and, to some degree, flagrant corruption. For one reason or another, Candia was burdened more than with its share of those seeking to circumvent the law. Returning from Candia in the 1620's, Nicolo da Ponte complained openly of "frauds, rapacity, and proven tyrants,"
who remain till now unpunished..."29 Officials frequently found it impossible to collect debts owed to the government. Clever manipulators successfully eluded Venetian treasury agents; others indebted to the government had such depleted assets that there remained essentially nothing for the agents to confiscate.30 Other government losses were incurred with the public sale of the 'datio,'31 a custom duty levied on numerous items leaving and entering the island. The datio—Candia's chief source of revenue—was auctioned by bids in a fashion very similar to the farming of taxes in seventeenth-century France. Unfortunately, the sale of the tax contracts was often not supervised as rigidly as the financial distress of the kingdom would have merited and consequently additional needed money was lost to the treasury.

By 1644 economic and financial conditions on the island were nothing less than dismal. On his arrival at Candia that year the Provveditor-General, Andrea Corner, found "all the provisions consumed, the camera without money, the militia greatly indebted, and even the workmen and fontegi (factory) exhausted...."33 The shortage of as basic a commodity as salt on the island was merely one example of poor management. There apparently was no necessity for this shortage since salt had been for many years past abundantly produced at Porto della Suda; according to one official the meager 20,000 measures then being produced could easily have been increased eightfold (166,000) by properly managing the operations at Suda.34 It thus is beyond doubt that, in addition to the general economic decline of the entire Mediterranean area, Candia was suffering from excessive administrative laxity, care-
lessness, and malfeasance. The disastrous effects of such laxness would become even more obvious under the strain created by the challenge of a newly rejuvenated and militant Ottoman state.

During the seventeenth century, when states relied heavily upon mercenaries, financial ills were often tantamount to military weakness. Without a full treasury there was no money to hire infantry or cavalry, nor to arm and provision those already hired. Consequently, the fiscal weakness of Candia undermined the island's capacity to resist attack. Not administering what diminished financial resources the island did possess consequently weakened the kingdom's entire military posture.

Not even constant harassment by corsairs and the belligerence of the Turks in 1638 proved sufficient to create a sense of urgency and military alertness on the island. The local militia was, for example, plagued by indifference and dissension. Local laws requiring the island's nobility to levy for defense prescribed numbers of soldiers were seldom honored. The condescension of the urban recruits toward the peasant recruits of the militia tended to undermine the esprit de corps of the regiments. To compensate for the weaknesses within these local units, the Venetian Senate did attempt to maintain sizable contingents of European, Greek, and Dalmatian infantry and cavalry on the island. These 'foreign' units were ideally to number four thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; as late as the 1640's, however, the provveditor could account for only 1995 infantry and 217 horsemen. Even when the actual number of active recruits approached satisfactory levels, the recruits often included men of little experience and

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discipline, "vile and inexpert peasants...incapable of learning discipline...."

For example, one of the major defensive positions on the island, the fortress of Canea, could muster in 1644 no more than six hundred infantry, a number estimated to be half those necessary to mount a proper and stout defense. The bombardiers stationed at Canea were frequently no more than inexperienced Greeks who "promised little"; depleted infantry ranks were routinely supplemented with scolari and cernide (local recruits) drawn from the peasantry of the countryside. Estimates given for the entire island were no more promising. Pietro estimated that 25,000 paid infantry plus militia and cavalry were necessary for a proper defense of the kingdom; on the eve of the Turkish assault in 1645, however, no more than 13,843 foot-soldiers could be found on the entire island.

The island's defenses by sea were equally depleted. The naval squadron of light galleys permanently stationed at Candia, the Guardia di Candia, was inadequate even to control corsair activities; to repel a major Turkish assault it would obviously be of little service. Only three in number, the galleys of the Guardia were allotted less money per ship than were the galleys of the regular armada in the budget of 1641. In 1644, after a six-month tour of the island, Provveditor-General Corner ordered the number of armed galleys increased by ten. Unfortunately, for either economic or diplomatic reasons this order was later rescinded; it would not be re instituted until the threat of an
Ottoman invasion had become imminent. Few in number and lacking in men and supplies, the Guardia di Candia seldom proved of any effective use beyond the immediate periphery of the island's major urban centers.

In assessing the defensive capacity of the island, one should not neglect what most strategists of the period considered the most important military factor, namely the fortresses of the kingdom. By and large, those of Candia offered little reason for optimism. The kingdom's central fortress and capital city, Candia, was perhaps in better condition than most of the others, or so at least thought Pietro Zane. By his account the capital city possessed sufficient artillery (858 pieces); moreover, work was in progress on several of Candia's main ravelins, especially the bulwarks known as Baluardo Vitturi. Zane himself had witnessed the recent completion of this particular bulwark and deemed it "one of the most beautiful piazzas one can see...." But much more needed to be done, and even during Zane's long tenure of eight years the fortress had come nowhere near to being perfected.

Sections of wall had continued to fall into ruin, housing remained limited and generally of poor quality, and the port of the fortress needed dredging and modification.

The second principal fortress-city, Canea, was in far poorer condition. Ditches, counterscarpments, and roadways were either unfinished or in disrepair. Dilapidated civilian housing crowded the areas between city walls and the escarpments, inhibiting the free movement of troops and provisions. So few watchtowers and parapets had been erected that the provveditor of the fortress complained he was unable to
station sentinels in critical areas. As the threat of a Turkish invasion mounted in the spring of 1645, he wrote that his spirit was greatly tormented "because of the lack of provisions... (and) of things very necessary for a long, and valid resistance against a very powerful invasion." Two companies of reinforcements had recently been sent to Canea, but still, the provveditor noted, the "presidio does not have five hundred soldiers, where the orders of Your Serenity were that, in time of peace, there ought to be maintained there (at Canea) 600 and..., for the fortress to resist a powerful army, it must not be provided with less than four thousand combatants."

Beside the island's larger city-fortresses there were also scattered throughout the kingdom many smaller citadels and castelli (garrisoned watchtowers). Like the more notable fortresses, these lesser strongholds differed substantially in quality. Some were too isolated or undermanned to be of any use, while others proved of vital importance. The fort of Suda, for example, was of enormous strategic importance. This was a relatively small fortress which commanded entrance to the harbor of the same name and to sections of the coast bordering the harbor; fortunately for the defense of this vital port facility and the territory in the immediate vicinity of Canea which lay only five miles to the west, Suda remained one of the least vulnerable of all the fortresses of the island. Despite its strategic position, Suda urgently needed modifications and improvements on a jetty extending from the fortress which prevented the passage of enemy vessels. Provveditor-General Corner could find complimentary words for Porto della Suda; but
the fortress of Grabussa at the western tip of the island evoked from
the observant officer nothing but criticism. At Grabussa he found
lacking everything from grain and biscuits to munitions and artillery. At a watchtower just east of Grabussa known as Chissamo, Corner found
the garrison depleted and the countryside seething with "violence,
usury, homicide, oppression, extortion, and other excesses." According to his estimate, the castelli of the kingdom were operating with
garrisons at least 5-15 percent understaffed; shortages of weaponry,
shot, powder, and general provisions were to be found everywhere.

The kingdom was thus generally unprepared to defend itself. Part of the failure to maintain adequate forces was perhaps indirectly re-
lated to the 'prolonged peace' which the island had enjoyed, a peace
which generated a climate of unconcern. But more directly one could
probably trace the military weakness which characterized the kingdom to
the general lack of funds both at Candia and at home in Venice. By the
middle of the century the Venetian Senate, faced with dangers on the
European continent and with the reality of declining commercial reve-
nues, had every difficulty in maintaining an extensive and distant
empire, one which had once been supported by much greater economic might.

II

The other insular possessions of the empire had not yet reached
the distressing state of Candia, but they too showed signs of the neglect
which so often accompanies prolonged peace. Fortresses throughout the empire were in need of attention, and garrisons sufficient for policing duties were unprepared to meet the challenge of a professional army. Militiamen, disorderly as partially trained soldiers sometimes prove to be, disturbed the tranquility of the towns almost as frequently as bandits did the peace of the countryside. The financial situation on many of the other Venetian islands, while frequently much sounder than which was found at Candia, was seldom free of glaring irregularities. Inquisitors in the early decades of the century complained of the "infinite disorders" which plagued the local treasuries; years later similar complaints were voiced by the Provveditor of Corfu who wrote that owing to the multiplicity of needs, the treasury of his island was "almost always exhausted." Even where there was reason to be pleased as at Cephalonia, dangerous signs began to appear by 1640; a prosperous grain trade, which the fertility of Cephalonia had earlier made possible, seemed in danger as a result of increased competition from aggressive English wholesalers who tried to "tyrannize the sellers (of grain) in order to reduce (it) to a very low price...."

Despite intermittent complaints and local problems, the islands of the Ionian archipelago nevertheless proved more prosperous than the larger and more famous kingdom of Candia. Like Candia, they offered the advantage of convenient and protected harbors; certain fortresses likewise were of continued military value. As late as 1641 the Venetian bailo at Constantinople made reference to the fortress at Corfu as one of the reasons why the island was looked upon with envy by the Turks;
the fortress was one, the bailo commented, which could "defend against the spirits which rise up against Christianity...."58

One of the most important assets of these Ionian islands was their relative wealth and financial stability. For example, while the Kingdom of Candia was burdening Venice with a debt of over 133,000 ducats, Cephalonia alone was contributing a surplus of almost as much revenue.59 It was to Cephalonia, Zante, and Corfu that frustrated Candian provveditors generally addressed their appeals for grain or emergency cash reserves. Indeed, the grain surplus customary in the Ionian archipelago was so substantial that it itself had generated considerable jealousy at Constantinople.60 Understandably, being further from the heartlands of the Ottoman empire, these fertile islands were better able to minimize the expenses involved in military and defensive operations. Nevertheless, the relative prosperity witnessed in these three islands, and especially at Cephalonia and Zante, had no parallel in any other sector of the Venetian empire.

The last major stretch of Venetian colonial territory was found across the Adriatic from Venice itself, along the Istrian and Dalmatian coasts. From the Istrian peninsula to the ancient towns of Zara and Spalato, this forbidding and barren coastland reached four hundred miles from north to south. A land of villages and small towns, of nomadic herdsmen and coastal traders, Dalmatia formed an extensive frontier with the western limits of the Ottoman empire; only Venetian military strength and the desolation of the Dinaric Alps and Pindus mountain chain lay between the coastal towns and the armies of the Sultan. The

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one geographic asset of the region, namely its innumerable waterways and harbors, facilitated the use of Venice's superior naval power and thus made the region militarily defensible.

Considering the primitive nature of most Dalmatian fortresses it was fortunate that Venice enjoyed these topographical advantages. The majority of the fortresses of the region were, in fact, more suited to the warfare of an earlier age, an age when artillery had not yet become the indisputable master of the siege. Small, crude, and of rectangular design they lacked escarpments and the stellar bulwarks usually associated with seventeenth-century fortifications. In addition, their artillery was limited in quantity and caliber. Spalato, for instance, was equipped with approximately two dozen small caliber weapons—excluding muskets—and perhaps five or six of a somewhat larger bore. Zara, the capital city of the province and a town boasting a population larger than any of the principal towns of Candia, had had thirty to forty large caliber artillery with an equal number of smaller ones. Compared to such cities as those on Candia (Canea, Rettimo, Candia) which numbered their artillery in the hundreds, the Dalmatian arsenals were better prepared for police action than for open warfare. These smaller arsenals in Dalmatia were partially justified by the ease with which reinforcements and material could be sent by water from Venice, but any invasion by a determined enemy would certainly have taxed the capacity of these largely antiquated defenses.

Similar to Candia, this infertile land likewise labored under an almost continual fiscal deficit. Dalmatian revenues, stifled by the
commercial stagnation of the Mediterranean, were annually dwarfed by costly military expenditures. Whatever deficits there were had necessarily to be absorbed by Venice. Thus one can understand the terse comment emended to a financial document from Dalmatia: "Of so much remains defective the province that the office of the treasury in Venice will have to account for the above said expenses and payments." In this particular case the deficient sum amounted to nearly 850,000 lire, a figure greater than the entire revenue for the island of Candia in 1638. This revenue deficit was indicative of the entire Venetian and Mediterranean economy, but in Dalmatia increased Turkish competition aggravated the situation even more than usual. For example, the coastal town of Spalato, the ancient site of Diocletian's imperial residence, reflected the impact of this rejuvenated Turkish trading activity; it was here in the late 1630's that Turkish competition apparently resulted in a 30 percent decrease in fur trading and a 20 percent decrease in the export of wool. Moreover, while the outbreak of hostilities in 1645 did not witness a complete cessation of Turco-Venetian trading activity, the war certainly inhibited and restricted commercial activities along the Dalmatian coast. For a land which had never known great wealth or prosperity, dependence on Venice became an accepted necessity after 1645.

By 1645 the Venetian empire had become something of an anachronism. This relatively vast coastal and insular empire, once firmly based on a prospering Mediterranean commercial economy, had for nearly a half-century fallen into a state of inexorable decline. An object of envy
more by reason of habit than by reason of any sound economic impulse, the empire had developed into essentially an economic albatross. There were isolated exceptions to this judgment, exceptions of which we have already taken note. But whenever there were one or two encouraging factors to cite in some places, there were elsewhere many others which only dimmed the picture.

Nowhere was this bitter paradox more evident than on the island of Candia. Although the most coveted of Venetian overseas domains, the Kingdom of Candia notwithstanding remained one of the most costly and least defensible colonies of the Republic. Far from the direct intervention of Venice and burdened with a seemingly irreversible fiscal deficit, the island kingdom stood forth as a potentially ideal victim of a determined and relentless aggressor. The war naturally involved the entire empire, for the other islands and coastal enclaves served as supply depots and points of rendezvous and refuge. But basically it was a war which was concentrated on Candia itself. Like most seventeenth-century conflicts, the Candian war centered on specific and fairly circumscribed goals; Turkish strategy might envision peripheral attacks in other parts of the empire, but the primary aim of Constantinople remained throughout the conflict the complete and irreversible seizure of the entire Kingdom of Candia.
Prior to the outbreak of open hostilities, the primary concern of Venice was to prevent completely (or at least to forestall as long as possible) war with the Turks by some means of diplomatic accommodation. For Venice, a state which relied primarily upon commerce and trade, war was always to be avoided; military expenditures drained the treasury, and war itself reduced revenues by disrupting the free flow of commercial traffic on the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Moreover, as an important Italian state with possessions on the Terraferma to guard, Venice had to maintain a constant watch on the development of European politics per se. Caught in the vise of declining economic strength and increasing military dangers, the Venetian republic had to seek some compromise position between the restless Turks to the east and the madness of the Thirty Years War to the west. The days of the League of Cambrai, when Venice alone could defy all the powers of Europe, had passed forever. By the seventeenth century the Republic had to make every effort to avoid straining the state's ability to defend itself and its domains. As a result, the Venetian state felt obligated to remain as conciliatory as possible so as to avoid any open and costly confrontation with a major power.

Up to 1645 Venetian diplomacy had had considerable success in maintaining peace. In the West, Venice had managed to elude military involvement in the Thirty Years War. The neutrality she steadfastly maintained during this general European conflagration won for her few
close diplomatic friends on the Continent, but likewise saved her from gaining the implacable hatred of any of Europe's major powers. In terms of Venetian territorial security such a policy of neutrality proved a wise course of action; in a conflict which involved France, Spain, and the Empire no amount of prestige or territorial gain could possibly outweighed the certainty of incurring the lasting wrath of any one of these three major powers. Likewise, involvement in the Mantuan conflict of 1628 was avoided with equal finesse. Since the war was essentially a dispute between Spain and France, Venice had little to profit from becoming involved in Mantuan affairs; wisely she played the role of a sympathetic but aloof spectator.

When matters touched more directly her own security or well-being, Venice could not and naturally did not remain completely indifferent. She resorted to compromise when the price of resistance or involvement proved too high. But when the issue at hand involved her vital economic or political interests, she displayed considerable obstinancy and resolve. For example, when Spain made an attempt to control the invaluable Valtellina pass through the Alps, Venice stood determined and ready, if necessary, to resort to force. Since the Valtellina was the only Venetian-controlled land route to the markets of northern Europe, the republic could in no way face the possibility of losing it. Recognizing in the case of the Valtellina pass her vital economic interests, Venice stood firm against Spanish coercion and won her point. In still another incident involving the Italian peninsula itself, Venice proved a difficult negotiator with which to deal. Relations between two of
the peninsula's most important states—the Venetian republic and the Papacy—understandably proved trying on occasion. In the first decade of the century such had been the case when the Pope, the Republic, and the fiery republican priest, Paolo Sarpi, had met head-on. An interdict lasting five years resulted from this encounter, an interdict which left scars and unresolved tensions between Venice and the Holy See. Over thirty years later another pope, Urban VIII, sought—despite Venetian opposition—to snatch the lands of the Duchy of Castro; aligned with France and Tuscany, the Venetians made a show of force and consequently preserved the equilibrium of the Italian peninsula. Although this Venetian refusal to allow the pope to absorb the duchy proved only temporarily successful, it was another example of how firm the Republic could be when it felt its direct interests were threatened.

In questions involving the balance of power in Italy, Venetian diplomacy had scored several significant victories. In handling matters greatly distant from Italy itself and ones which concerned the irascible and often unpredictable Turk, Venetian diplomats found the situation considerably different. The cultural and religious traits which divided the East from the West as well as the frequently capricious temperaments of the Sultan and Grand Vizier necessarily demanded a more cautious and sensitive policy. Moreover, while carefully manipulated diplomacy might have its effects in a Europe preoccupied with war, Venetian diplomats found in the East no other major powers to counterbalance against the Turks. Without the capacity to neutralize Turkish threats by shuffling diplomatic arrangements, Venice was
compelled to concede to the demands of the Porte more frequently than she would have under better circumstances.

Thus in the East, Venice was forced to meet the Turkish threat from a position of weakness. Experience had warned the Republic that one could indeed expect little assistance from Europe's major Christian powers. Engaged in an almost suicidal struggle with themselves, France and Spain had little time to concern themselves with Venice's problems in the East; both powers, in addition, had devoted considerable energy toward cultivating friendly commercial and diplomatic relations with Constantinople, relations neither power was intent upon abandoning in the interest of the Venetian state. A diplomatic situation such as this in itself required a policy of caution, but there was other reasons as well which seemed to support a policy of conciliation. Did not the long period of peace which had characterized Turco-Venetian relations since the days of Lepanto in the sixteenth century seem to offer irrefutable evidence of the peaceful intentions of the Porte? So at least many thought, and, as long as a judicious blend of conciliation and overt bribery—euphemistically referred to as tribute or reparations—prevented open hostility, no one could convince Venice her action should be otherwise.

The might of the Sultan, moreover, was something always to be respected. War in the East frequently demanded operations on a vast scale. Had not all Europe witnessed in horror the hordes of Islam before the gates of Vienna and had it not required the combined naval might of Christendom to win a victory at Lepanto? The bailo noted in
1641 that the Sultan was, by feudal right, capable of raising without any burden to his treasury several hundred thousand foot soldiers and cavalry. With such a foe it was understandable why appeasement seemed to many Venetians as the only sane alternative to disaster.

Unfortunately, this policy of conciliation failed precisely because it generated at Constantinople an attitude of scorn. When once confronted by complaints that the peace with Venice should not be casually broken, the Grand Vizier snapped back that it was not necessary "to use so much caution in order to awaken one who sleeps." Perhaps the peace would have been broken under any circumstances, a question no one can answer with certainty. But considering the frequent tendency for a militant power to interpret conciliation as a sign of weakness, one can not completely dismiss the effect Venetian diplomacy must have had in encouraging bolder and increasingly reckless action on the part of the Ottoman ministers.

In 1638 the war had indeed almost begun. In that year Algerian pirates, for many decades elusive predators of Venetian commerce, failed in an attempt to sack the Italian coastal town of Loreto. The fleeing corsairs took refuge in the Turkish port of Vallona where they were blockaded for thirty-eight days by the Venetian Provveditor dell' Armada, Antonio Cappello. For fear of repercussions in Constantinople, Cappello had hoped to avoid open battle by forcing the pirate fleet into capitulation. As time passed, the fear that the Algerians would receive reinforcements forced Cappello to move in on the enemy. The ensuing battle left all but one of the pirate vessels at the bottom of
the bay, the one hapless survivor being escorted to Venice as a prize ship. This incident infuriated the Sultan, Murad IV, who immediately ordered the arrest of the bailo, the blockade of Spalato, and an end to all commercial relations with Venice. The Sultan's ire soon cooled and his attention turned to more pressing internal matters, but Venice had had a sample of what might happen should there be a future confrontation. A peace agreement was eventually concluded resolving the Vallona incident, but the price of peace was quite high. Venice found herself paying in reparations 650,000 realis, 150,000 of which had had to be distributed in the form of bribes to influential Turkish officials. No mention was made by the Sultan of an earlier treaty signed between Venice and the Porte which had explicitly granted to the Republic the right to attack the very same type of marauders which had attempted to raid Loreto.

The ascension of the imbecilic Ibrahim as Sultan in 1639 was viewed with optimism by many Venetian councilors, reasoning rather prematurely that such a weak-willed character would be less inclined to war than was his bellicose predecessor. These hopes were frustrated, for Ibrahim soon came to be dominated by ministers intent on casting Christians from the eastern reaches of the Mediterranean. In September of 1644, an event occurred which provided these militants with an ideal pretext for war. In that month, Zambul, a wealthy and very favored royal eunuch, sailed from Alexandria in possession of considerable treasure and accompanied by pilgrims from Mecca. Among those in Zambul's convoy was the Sultan's sister and one of his sons, whose name...
was Mohammed Effendi. Near the island of Scarpanto, 130 miles southwest of Rhodes, six Maltese corsairs attacked the Turkish convoy; the attack left Zambul himself dead, as well as several agas and 150 Turkish defenders. Mohammed was captured alive and taken as hostage to Malta.

The victorious Maltese withdrew to the safety of the port of Kalis-mene on the island of Candia and there remained twenty days replenishing their supplies and dealing in stolen merchandise with the local inhabitants. The Provveditor-General of Candia later informed the Senate that he had learned of the Maltese landing. According to his testimony, they had landed at some remote beach on the island, had disembarked several Greeks held by the Turkish convoy as slaves, and had immediately thereafter departed for home. After leaving Kalismene and subsequently being turned away from several other Venetian ports the Maltese sought refuge in a remote bay at Cephalonia; once contrary winds had subsided they sailed for Malta. Although the Provveditor-General made an honest effort to ascertain the true facts of the incident, his report to the Senate naturally depended upon the testimony of many varied sources, some of which may have been unreliable.

The appearance of corsairs on the island of Candia or indeed on any island in the Mediterranean which had secluded and navigable harbors was certainly no reason for frenzied alarm or protest. The centrality of Candia as well as its commodious harbor facilities made the kingdom a tempting lure for every miscreant of the seas. The only reasonable recourse the provveditors of Candia had was to disclaim any responsi-

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inhabitants any contact with them; naturally had military action been feasible or even possible, steps in this direction would have been taken. Only a few months prior to the Maltese attack the Provveditore-General had informed the Venetian Senate of another similar assault on Turkish shipping followed by a landing at a rock island within Candian waters, an act which prompted the issuing of orders not to have any contact with the pirates.72 Despite such attempts to discourage action of this nature by the Maltese, there was—as long as the Guardia di Candia remained so limited in size and capacity—little any Venetian official could do to prevent clandestine landings on remote beaches or to restrict the sale of pirated goods to islanders lured by the glitter of a quick profit. And since not only Turkish vessels but Venetian as well often fell victim to these Mediterranean corsairs, Venice could hardly be considered an accomplice of such raids. To the Venetians the problem was a universal one and one which the Republic itself was trying to control to the best of its ability.

Understandably, the plunderous activities of the Maltese proved irritating to Constantinople, especially since the Maltese were professedly Christian. This fact naturally complicated the dispute adding to it a potential anti-Christian crusading element as far as the Turks were concerned. The bailo, Contarini, resident at Constantinople and consequently somewhat more sensitive to Turkish opinion, prophetically observed what would be the long-term effect of such attacks on Turco-Venetian relations. He reasoned that the Maltese, Florentine, and papal pirates, while not bringing any immediate damage or disorder would,
in the end, be "cause to draw some ruin on Christianity. These corsairs," Contarini continued,"many times in my Bailaggio have come even to the Dardanelles, and in view of them have made many prey and have carried away many Moslem slaves; much...is attributed to the comfort they receive in the islands of Candia and Tine, where although they know that they have not been formally received, they do not ignore however that many open ports and many unguarded islets serve them to make water, to caulk, and similar things..." The bailo made every attempt to explain to the Sultan and his ministers that these Christian raiders received similar shelter and supplies in the ports of the Ottoman empire, and, in some cases, were treated better since at least Venetian waters were partially patrolled. Such arguments had little effect, for those at Constantinople intent on war had found what they considered an ideal pretext for action. Even Venetian protests sent to the Pope in regard to the action of his holy Maltese knights and the subsequent confiscation of all Maltese properties within the boundaries of the Venetian state did nothing to alter the course of events.

The winter of 1644 and the spring of the following year were characterized by a pathetic melange of hope, fear, and indecision. A paralytic lethargy seemed to grip the Republic. There were many who argued for caution and patience, and not without basis. Had not the Sultan's fiery harangues been quieted before by kind words and Venetian gold! Had not Grillo, the faithful Venetian dragoman at Constantinople, heard from the Cadileschier himself that the Sultan would never attack a friend like Venice! Perhaps, many could argue, the furious tirades
of the Grand Vizier were nothing more than a cleverly designed ruse by which to bleed Venice of larger and larger bribes. 76

The sense of false optimism was reinforced by the failure of the Republic to assess properly the full military preparedness of the Turkish forces. Everyone respected the might of the Sultan, but misleading reports concerning the Janissaries and the Ottoman navy tended to create a sense of false confidence. In 1641 the bailo had written from Constantinople that the once dreaded Janissary elite was, in fact, no elite at all. Although at one time the Janissaries were a select corps of twelve thousand armed and disciplined men, they now numbered close to thirty or forty thousand, but were "decadent in condition, no longer Janissaries, but... Janissarized Turks, no longer ferocious but almost all domestic, not prepared for war but corrupted...." Such was the report sent to Venice only a few years before the war. 77 In addition, the vast naval resources of the Sultan likewise were more formidable in numbers than in quality. Besides being scattered throughout many ports in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea the individual units were often of a poor quality and "quite weak" as the bailo termed them; 78 even the Ottoman ministers themselves seemed convinced that, from a naval viewpoint, Venice enjoyed a significant advantage. So hampered were the Turkish naval contingents by a shortage of skilled mariners and navigators that fully equipped galleys had been forced to remain at anchor for the lack of trained personnel. 80 Furthermore, as late as the summer of 1644 the Provveditor-General of Candia had reported to the Senate that no unusual military preparations had been
observed at Constantinople; so confident was the Provveditor-General
at this time that he ordered a cut back in the galleys attached to the
Guardia di Candia and ordered disbanded a company of foot soldiers re-
cently recruited to reinforce the defenses of Zara on the Dalmatian
coast. 81

Yet by the spring of 1645 matters had become more critical, indef-
inite and nebulous. Efforts to assuage the anger of the Grand Vizier
had met with no success. In January of 1645 the bailo, Soranzo, had
met with Vizier Jussuf in the hope of providing the basis for a diplo-
matic accommodation in regard to the Maltese incident. But the vizier
remained unshakeable, and it became by then more and more obvious that
he was seeking to resolve the difference by means of war. He curtly
informed Soranzo that the time for diplomatic parleys had passed, espe-
cially since he had recently learned that the Maltese pirates had
landed at Candia for some twenty days and had disposed of much of their
stolen treasure by selling it to the island's inhabitants. 82 In addi-
tion, he presented Soranzo with another charge that Venice had refused
to lend assistance to a Moslem vessel listing in the waters of Cape
Salamone on the southwestern tip of Candia; the islanders, so the Turk-
ish claimed, not only refused to help but subjected the distressed
vessel to considerable ill-treatment. This charge was undoubtedly
without substance, but it served the immediate purpose of lending fur-
ther support to Turkish cries of righteous indignation.

By the spring of 1645 the atmosphere of optimism at Venice began
to pass and specific steps were taken to prepare the empire for a
spirited defense. Following an unprovoked attack on a Venetian convoy early in 1645, the Senate had appointed several new military commanders to key positions. In the spring an order was issued to augment by twenty galleys the Guardia di Candia; preparations for the construction of thirty galleys and two galeasses at the arsenal in Venice were also undertaken. The twenty galleys ordered for the Guardia did eventually reach Candian waters, but, primarily as a result of inefficient management at the Venetian arsenal, the galleys and galeasses to be constructed there never were completed. Despite these belated efforts the size of the Venetian fleet remained dangerously small, scattered as it was into small ineffective units throughout the Mediterranean and Aegean. As for the defenses of Candia itself, preparations continued in a desultory and faltering manner. Some efforts were made in the way of adding several contingents of Oltremontani and Oltremarini foot soldiers as rapidly as supplies and funds would permit; modifications and repairs on the respective fortresses of the island likewise moved apace.

What the intentions of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier were with respect to the peace no one yet clearly understood. In March the Porte had officially declared war on the Maltese Knights of St. John but one could not be certain whether a similar declaration against the Republic would likewise follow. Rumors and conjecture continued to circulate among the diplomats and statesmen of Europe. In April a Turkish armada left Constantinople, sailed to Scio, and from there to Negroponte for provisions. From Negroponte the armada moved southward to the port of

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Malvasia on the southeastern tip of the Morea, finally resting anchor to the west at Navarino in order to await further Barbary reinforcements. Although a powerful Turkish armada now lay anchored only a short distance from the shores of Candia, many continued to believe that its target was Malta and not the Venetian island.

The stops at Malvasia and then at Navarino, both of which were to the west of Candia, seemed a favorable indication that perhaps Venice would escape from war. The provveditor of Canea wrote the Senate that since the Turkish armada had passed westward of the kingdom the island would in all probability be spared from attack. Matters at Malta were similarly confused by this recent action of the enemy armada. The papal inquisitor at Malta, Giovanbattista Gori Pannelini, felt certain that the Moslem fleet would soon be heading his way. "And here (Malta) it is held for certain," Pannelini wrote, "that the said arms (of the Turks) are destined against this island because of the new letters come from Constantinople, even from the French ambassador, and because of the reports of spies who have been sent from there...." There were those such as the Maltese Grand Master himself who disagreed with Pannelini's apprehension, but it must have seemed to many throughout Europe that the Sultan did indeed mean to have his revenge against this tiny island of Christian privateers. Turkish commanders naturally did everything possible to confuse and deceive the Christian world. A Greek spy aboard the enemy armada reported secretly that an aga, when asked the destination of the fleet, answered positively that it was headed toward Malta. Moreover, wherever the Turkish fleet passed a
Venetian port of call all due courtesy and circumspection was shown the Venetian officials by the Moslem officers.  

The rumored size of the enemy armada inspired fear and awe among even the most valiant. Unfortunately, estimates of the size of the Turkish fleet varied enormously. Writing from the tense atmosphere of Malta the papal inquisitor reported that the Turkish fleet had grown to as many as seven hundred sail, a figure undoubtedly exaggerated by rumors and fear. Most other reports were more conservative. The entire armada probably numbered about three hundred ships in all, nearly two hundred of which were small cargo and troop carriers known as saiches and caramussels. On the 23rd of May, one day prior to the assault on Canea, a Greek spy had reported that the armada consisted of seventy galleys, two maone, eight Barbary galleys, one sultane, thirty vessels of between fifteen and twenty cannon each, 120 saiches and numerous smaller provision and munition ships. The informant estimated the number of men aboard to be approximately sixty thousand.

These figures for both the number of ships and men involved provide us with a fairly accurate description of the force which now menaced Candia. Naturally, the mere size of this awe-inspiring flotilla deserved respect, but numbers alone were not a completely satisfactory criterion by which to estimate the capacity of the Sultan to wage war. There were reports that large portions of this armada were in poor condition. Several weeks before the initial Turkish assault on the Candian islet of San Teodoro, the Provveditor-General wrote to the Senate describing much of the Ottoman armada in an "imperfect condition...the
men demoralized and despairing...." Many of the Turkish vessels were apparently poorly armed and several were no more than British and Flemish merchantmen impressed into service; many of the other units, according to the Provveditor-General's report, were "vessels of little esteem...." Such weaknesses, perhaps to be expected in an armada so hastily assembled, gave the endangered Venetians some guarded reason for hope.

On the 20th of June the Turkish fleet left Navarino and had, within three days, landed on the Candian beach of Gogna, a beach just fifteen miles from the fortress of Canea. The following day the Turks led an assault against the tiny island and fortress of San Teodoro which lay only a few miles west of Canea. The fortress commander, an Istrian by the name of Biagio Guiliana, realized there was no chance of escape or defense for his garrison of several dozen men; rather than fall captive to the infidel he ordered the fortress mined, the subsequent explosion destroying the fortress itself, nearly all the Venetian garrison, and approximately 150 of the enemy. The clouds of mystery had suddenly vanished in this rather tragic scenario of heroism. The war of Candia had indeed begun, a war long and bitter in which there would be many other heroic deeds and many other mounds of rubble as the prize of victory.
CHAPTER I: FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 332-333.


4. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

5. The provveditor was a Venetian administrative and judicial official whose responsibilities and powers varied considerably. There were provveditori appointed to administer the various islands under Venetian control, to command important cities such as Canea and Spalato, and to hold important positions in the army and navy of the Republic. The simple title of 'provveditor' was frequently qualified by the addition of 'generale' or 'straordinario'; in such cases the provveditor then enjoyed special and often more extensive powers. The closest English equivalent to the word would be 'superintendent' or 'supervisor'. For a more complete explanation of the title, see Andrea da Mosto, L'Archivio di Stato di Venezia, indice generale storico, descrittivo ed analitico (Venice, 1957), I & II, passim.


9. Samuele Romania, Storia documentata di Venezia, (Venice, 1853-61), VII, pp. 356-357. (Hereinafter referred to as Storia.)

10. B.N.M., VII (214), Relazione dell'isola di Candia, Pietro Zane. The average pay for a captain of a gallesse or a provveditor during the war was a little more than twelve hundred ducats a year.

11. Boschettò, "Come fu aperto," Part I, p. 40. Luigi Boschettò has written that an "examination of a few particulars of the condition of the population and of the island (Candia) in the first half of the seventeenth century will aid us very much in explaining the rapid successes of the Turks in the first year of the war."

13. The 'bailo' was the term applied to the Venetian ambassador at Constantinople. He fulfilled all of the duties of an ambassador but had other powers relating to Venetian commercial activity in the Ottoman empire. For a complete explanation of the office and its duties, see da Mosta, L'Archivio di Stato di Venezia (Venice, 1957), I & II, passim.


15. B.N.M., VII (657), Descrizione delle spiagge..., Francesco Basilicata, 1625. See also, B.N.M., VII (214), Descrizione dell'isola di Candia, Leonardo Querini; B.N.M., VII (214), Relazione dell'isola di Candia, Pietro Zane. Zane noted that there were two logical ways to defend the Kingdom, one to prevent the enemy from disembarking, the other to allow him to land but then concentrate one's forces in defending the fortresses. Although the first plan was the best, Zane noted that the many commodious landing areas on the island made such a strategy almost impossible. Several of the beaches on the island were as many as five or ten miles long, like the nine-mile beach at Gogna where the first Turkish forces landed in 1645.


17. Andrea Valiero, Historia della guerra di Candia (Venice, 1679), p. 20. (Hereinafter referred to as Historia.)


22. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 83, Provveditoro di Canea, Marco Giustinian, May 27, 1644.


24. See Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1530-1615, trans. by Janet and Brian Pullan (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1967), passim. This is an excellent study of the effects of piracy on the trade and commerce of Venice during the end of the sixteenth
century and the beginning of the seventeenth. Also included in this volume is a valuable discussion of the various types of commercial and naval vessels which were part of the Venetian fleets and armadas of the period.


27. Ibid.

28. The figures given in the Bilanci generali della Repubblica di Venezia, Vol. III, for 1638 and 1641 are the same. It is interesting to note that without a subsidy of 124,000 ducats from the islands of Cephalonia and Zante, the expenditures for Candia far exceeded the revenues of the island, some 196,610 ducats revenue to 326,909 ducats in expenditures. Both Cephalonia and Zante (but excluding Corfu) registered revenue surpluses of considerable importance thus enabling Venice to shift some extra revenues to debt-ridden Candia. Although one must take into account the greater military burden that Candia had to absorb in defense of the entire Mediterranean area, the budgetary shortages of the kingdom could not be easily dismissed. For instance, the total expenditures of Candia represented almost as much as the combined revenues of two of the Terraferma’s most important cities, Padova and Verona. Indeed, the 326,909 ducats listed as expenditures for Candia represented approximately 12.4 percent of the total expenditures listed for the entire Venetian state in 1638 (2,635,901 ducats). For the total expenditures listed in 1641, a sum of 2,770,951 ducats, the expenses for Candia represented about 12 percent. The following figures were found in the Reale Commissione dei documenti finanziari della Repubblica di Venezia, Bilanci generali della Repubblica di Venezia (Venice, 1903-12), Vol. III, pp. 538-540.

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<tr>
<th>REVENUE (ENTRADA)</th>
<th>EXPENSES (SPESA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candia .......... 89,439 ducats</td>
<td>Candia .......... 70,684 ducats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canea .......... 70,583 &quot;</td>
<td>Canea .......... 25,945 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rettimo .......... 32,961 &quot;</td>
<td>Rettimo .......... 6,992 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sittia .......... 3,201 &quot;</td>
<td>Sittia .......... 2,524 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cerigo .......... 426 &quot;</td>
<td>Cerigo .......... 2,777 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL .......... 196,610 ducats</td>
<td>TOTAL .......... 108,922 ducats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REVENUE SUPPLEMENTS*</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL EXPENSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cephalonia ...108,000 ducats</td>
<td>Captain of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zante .......... 16,000 &quot;</td>
<td>Guard .......... 23,517 ducats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest .......... 19,289 &quot;</td>
<td>Militia .......... 187,415 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL REVENUE 339,899 ducats</td>
<td>Interest .......... 7,055 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N.B.: Without these supplementary revenues contributed by the islands of Cephalonia and Zante the expense of Candia would have far exceeded the yearly revenues.
Expenses and revenues for the islands of Cephalonia, Zante and Corfu for 1638:

**REVENUE (ENTRADA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cephalonia</td>
<td>133,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zante</td>
<td>59,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corfu</td>
<td>30,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>222,918</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPENSES (SPESA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cephalonia</td>
<td>25,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zante</td>
<td>18,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corfu</td>
<td>53,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>96,603</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the exception of Corfu, which had a deficit of slightly over 23,000 ducats, the other two islands of the Ionian archipelago showed a surplus of revenues over expenditures. Cephalonia had a revenue surplus of 108,221 ducats and Zante had one of 11,096 ducats. When all the revenues of the Ionian islands and those of Candia were combined we achieve an accounting as follows:

**REVENUE (ENTRADA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candia</td>
<td>196,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cephalonia</td>
<td>133,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zante</td>
<td>59,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corfu</td>
<td>30,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>419,528</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPENSES (SPESA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candia</td>
<td>326,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cephalonia</td>
<td>25,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zante</td>
<td>18,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corfu</td>
<td>53,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>423,512</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When all other revenues or expenses (e.g., interest charges, etc.) are added to or subtracted from these total one arrives at the following figures for the three islands of Ionia and the Kingdom of Candia:

**TOTAL ACCOUNTING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenues</td>
<td>365,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses</td>
<td>352,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surplus</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,754</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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30. A.S.V., P.T.M. (795), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditore-Generale di Candia, November 10, 1644. See also, A.S.V., P.T.M. (873), Dispacci inquisitori in Candia, Marco Loredan, Giovanni Pasqualigo, et al., 1611-1615. A letter of 1612 written by the inquisitors noted that the finances of the island were in poor condition, one reason being that the camera or treasury in many of the island was "creditor of a considerable sum of money."

31. The 'datio' (plural, datii) is a form of the modern Italian word which means a toll or customs duty. The datio (dazio, in modern Italian) was the primary source of revenue for both the imperial domains of Venice as well as the Terraferma. All goods entering or departing from Venetian ports were required to pay a tax equivalent to a certain percentage of the value of the goods. The duty levied on goods entering was known as the datio d'entrata, and that which was levied on goods leaving a Venetian port was called the datio d'uscita. Numerous heated debates revolved around the issue of these custom tolls concerning whether or not they should be either eliminated completely or seriously modified. Yet it was for only a short period during the seventeenth century that the datii were ever revised or altered. See A.S.V., Cinque savi alla mercanzia, Old & New series, passim.; da Mosto, L'Archivio di Stato di Venezia (Venice, 1957), I & II, passim.

32. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 83, Marco Giustinian, Provveditore di Canea, May 27, 1644. Giustinian wrote that "in the sale of the datio,... I have increased by fourteen thousand two hundred and seventy-six ducats the public sale,... in all (the datio) raising the sum of seventy-two thousand two hundred and ninety-two ducats...."


34. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 83, Marco Giustinian, Provveditore di Canea, May 27, 1644.

35. B.N.M., VII (302), Relazione del Signor Nicolo Suriano, Provveditor dell'Armata, 1583.

36. See below, the Vallona incident, p. 29-30.


39. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 81, Provveditore della cavalleria in Candia, Pisani. The figures given by Pisani,
the Provveditore of the Cavalry, were somewhat higher than those
noted by the Provveditore-Generale, Cornaro. Pisani claimed that
the island could muster 120 Venetian cavalry, 221 Cretense, 274
feudal contingents, and 475 'scudieri'; these 'scudieri' were
the vile peasants incapable of discipline to which Pisani refers, but
he noted that "even from the others one can hope for little."

40. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 83,
Provveditore di Canea, Marco Giustinian, May 27, 1644. From the
figures quoted by Giustinian over one thousand civilians could be
mustered into the ranks of the militia thus making, in absolute
numbers, a fairly large force; unfortunately these 'carnide' or
'scolari' were often just as inexperienced as Giustinian's sarcasm
implied and often had either poor or insufficient equipment.

41. B.N.M., VII (214), Pietro Zane, Relazione dell'isola
di Candia. Zane gives the following figures: 900 soldiers at Canea,
3,527 at Rettimo, and 3,895 at Candia.

42. Approximately 9,124 ducats were allotted for each of the
sottile galleys in operation in the year 1641; more, of course,
was spent on the galleasses and the respective vessels of the Provved-
itor dell'Armata, the Capitano in Golfo, etc. For the three galleys
of the Guardia di Candia in the same year, a total of 23,517 ducats
was allotted, excluding the interest charges. This figure would
average out to 7,839 ducats per vessel, or 1,285 ducats less per
average Candian galley. Of the total naval budget the expenditures
for the Guardia di Candia represented just slightly more than
6.1 percent. See Reale Commissione, Bilanci generali (Venice,
1903-12), III, pp. 570-71.

43. A.S.V., P.T.M. (795), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditore-
Generale di Candia, March 29, 1644.

44. B.N.M., VII(214), Relazione dell'isola di Candia, Pietro
Zane. Zane went as far as to claim that the island's defenses, especially
its fortifications, were probably in satisfactory condition to withstand
an attack if only munitions and provisions were sent to the island.

45. Ibid. Zane gives the figure of 858 cannon, but many of these
were undoubtedly unserviceable.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 83, Provveditore
di Canea, Marco Giustinian, May 27, 1644.

49. A.S.V., P.T.M. (820), Provveditore di Canea, Antonio Navagiero,
March 18, 1645.
50. Ibid.


52. A.S.V., P.T.M. (795), Senator, Andrea Cornaro, Provveditor Generale di Candia, November 20, 1644.


54. A.S.V., P.T.M. (795), Senator, Andrea Cornaro, Provveditor Generale di Candia, n.d. The Provveditore Generale requested 6,000 muskets, 600,000 musket balls, 500,000 pounds (libbres) of powder, and 20,000 assorted caliber artillery shot.

55. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 85, Vendramin, Corfu, August 7, 1640.


57. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 83, Giacomo Donado, Provveditore di Cephalonia, September 17, 1640.


59. Cephalonia, an island not nearly so large as Candia but relatively rich and populous, was approximately 170 miles (miglia) in circumference and had a population of approximately sixty thousand persons. Its entrada or revenues were second in the empire only to Candia, but with much fewer expenses; as a result, the island provided Venice with a comfortable revenue surplus. According to a report of Giacomo Donado, Provveditore di Cephalonia, we learn something about the state of the island in the year 1640. That year the rent from the datio dell'entreda and the datio d'uscita amounted to about 33,000 ducats, although much of this sum was apparently still actually uncollected. Nearly twenty thousand ducats annually went for ordinary expenses, official's salaries, and the costs of the militia. This alone would have provided a small but satisfactory surplus, but other revenue was derived from the datio on new imports. The amount collected from this custom charge was 74,090 ducats. Moreover, Donado added, there were 34,671 ducats left in the treasury by his predecessor. In short, revenues for that year exceeded expenses by a sum of approximately 87,000 ducats. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 83, Giacomo Donado, Provveditore di Cephalonia,
September 17, 1640. See also, Reale Commissione, Bilanci generali (Venice, 1903-12), III, chap. i, n. 28. From these figures we arrive at a surplus for the year of 1638 of approximately 108,000 ducats for the revenues collected at Cephalonia.


61. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 66, Provveditor di Spalato, 1642. I have used the somewhat arbitrary standard of considering only those caliber artillery between fourteen and fifty caliber 'large artillery'. Any weapon with a smaller caliber than this range has been considered 'smaller artillery'. Most Dalmatian towns had no large artillery piece and many merely relied on musket shot or the support of small artillery in the range of one to three caliber (these were frequently known as 'sacri' or 'falconi').

62. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 66, Dalmatia et Albania, 1642. The revenues and expenses for the various towns and cities of the province in 1642 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Revenue (Entrada)</th>
<th>Expenses (Spese)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudua</td>
<td>9,840 Lire</td>
<td>4,638 Lire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattaro</td>
<td>38,955</td>
<td>39,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corcola</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td>1,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spalato</td>
<td>22,181</td>
<td>16,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trau</td>
<td>34,390</td>
<td>30,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibenico</td>
<td>90,195</td>
<td>67,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zara</td>
<td>56,890</td>
<td>87,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pago</td>
<td>4,416</td>
<td>5,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbe</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>6,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veglia</td>
<td>15,116</td>
<td>14,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherso &amp; Ossero</td>
<td>6,642</td>
<td>6,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unlisted</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>282,857 Lire</td>
<td>280,097 Lire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MILITARY EXPENSES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Retained in Treasury</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattaro</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>123,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spalato</td>
<td>60,177</td>
<td>58,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trau</td>
<td>5,709</td>
<td>10,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibenico</td>
<td>8,101</td>
<td>42,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zara (and towns in its jurisdiction)</td>
<td>31,011</td>
<td>171,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>110,398 Lire</td>
<td>407,061 Lire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CAVALRY

Total Revenue set aside for cavalry...................... 19,819 Lire
Total Expenses for the cavalry............................571,836 Lire

Sum of all the expenses of the province:  1,258,994 Lire
Sum of all the revenues of the province:     413,074

Total Deficit...................... 845,920 Lire

See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 66, Dalmatia et Albania, 1642.

Note on the numbers of men, women, and children as well as the total numbers of horses, cattle, and other smaller animals in the Province of Dalmatia and Albania, Busta 66.

POPULATION FIGURES (1642)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women &amp; Childern</th>
<th>Other Children</th>
<th>Cernide</th>
<th>Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budua</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattaro</td>
<td>1,837</td>
<td>3,078</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spalato</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trau</td>
<td>1,839</td>
<td>3,576</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibenico</td>
<td>2,895</td>
<td>3,309</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zara</td>
<td>3,866</td>
<td>7,360</td>
<td>2,736</td>
<td>1,462</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novegrad</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS  12,111  20,636  8,190  4,269

Totals given for the entire province:

21,607  36,436  16,837  9,249

See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 66, Dalmatia et Albania, 1642.

* The cernide were those upon whom the city or fortress could call in order to supplement the ranks of the regular militia or regiments.
63. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 72, Bassadonna, Spalato, 1638.


69. Ibid., p. 5.

70. Ibid., pp. 18-19.


73. Tine was a Venetian island situated north of Candia in the Aegean Sea.


75. Mario Nani Mocenigo, Le marina Veneziana da Lepanto alla caduto della Repubblica (Rome, 1935), p. 133. (Hereinafter referred to as Marina Veneziana.)


78. The Turkish navy, although generally less renown than the Venetian, had not been completely neglected by Sultan Murad IV; he had eliminated many abuses and had attracted into Turkish service skilled Greeks, Genoese, and, on occasion, even Venetians. Turkish arsenals dotted the banks of the Black Sea, while raiding parties into neighboring Tartar territories furnished an abundant supply of galley slaves. Boschetto, "Come fu aperto," Part I, p. 6. The Inquisitor of Malta also noted the enormous productive capacity of the Turkish arsenals but questioned the quality of the Turkish fleet. "Correspondenza Malta, 1645-69," Archivio Storico Italiano, XLI, p. 122.

80. Ibid., p. 356.

81. A.S.V., P.T.M. (795), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditor-Generale di Candia, May 7, 1644 and May 18, 1644.

82. Romanin, Storia, VII, p. 353. The Grand Vizier also accused the Venetians of having refused to assist a Turkish vessel listing in the waters of Candia near Cape Salomone. The islanders were supposed to have subjected the distressed vessel to considerable abuse. Andrea Valiero, *Historia*, p. 8.


85. Ibid., p. 35.

86. The "oltremontani" was the Venetian name for those soldiers who were recruited "beyond the mountains", namely the Alps; these were, in short, the Germans, French, and the other northern European soldiers who fought at Candia. The 'oltremarini' referred to those "beyond the sea", namely those who came from the Greek islands, and the coasts of Dalmatia and Albania.

87. A.S.V., P.T.M. (796), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditor-Generale di Candia, June 10, 1645. See also, B.N.M., VII (310), Lettere e scrittore, Nicolo Zeno.


89. A.S.V., P.T.M. (796), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditor-Generale di Candia, May 11, 1645.

90. B.N.M., VII (211) Lettere, Provveditor di Canea, Navagiero, May 17, 1645.


94. Estimates of the size of the 1645 armada vary considerably. Captain Giovanni Battista Maurizzi, sent to observe the movement of the armada, reported that there were ninety-two galleys, two maone, one great galleon, fifteen square-riggers, and dozens of saiche, carac-mussels, and supply ships; the total number in the armada by this estimate was 280 vessels. "Correspondenza Malta, 1645-69," XLI, pp. 48-49. Boschetti gives the figure of eighty-two vessels with approximately 250 legni or saiche. He also cites Soranzo's figure of fifty thousand.
CHAPTER II
THE WAR BEGINS, 1646

The seizure of the tiny fortress of San Teodore marked the beginning of the war of Candia. This Turkish challenge presented the island's defenders with enormous problems. The Proveditor-General, Andrea Corner, and other officers on Candia had for months warned the Senate of the need for greater preparation, but their advice had had little effect. With the outbreak of open hostilities existing deficiencies were aggravated even further. The very appearance of such a formidable armada as that of the Sultan cast a shadow of fear over the island. Many of the islanders sought refuge in the mountainous terrain of the interior thereby exacerbating the existing manpower shortages.\(^1\)

With such a critical lack of men and vital supplies, the prospects for a successful defense were exceedingly dim.

By August the situation had become critical. As the Turks were besieging the city of Canea, warnings were sent by the Venetian commander of Canea that without further assistance he would be unable to repel a major enemy assault.\(^2\) Although Corner promised the beleaguered city immediate assistance, he soon discovered that it was nearly impossible to break through the Turkish cordon which surrounded it; galleys reported that they almost always found the city "encircled by the Turks...".\(^3\)

With the exception of a small relief column of infantry and three galleys which slipped in by cover of darkness, the city of Canea was left to its own resources.\(^4\)
Corner informed the Senate of the desperate condition of the besieged fortress; incapable of being reached by either land or sea, the doomed city lay "tormented and broken in all parts...". The determined enemy continued its relentless assault; Turkish mines, too numerous to count, widened the breaches blown in the city's walls. Morale at Canea touched a new low when the defenders learned that no attempt was being made by the galleys of Porto della Suda to relieve the exhausted garrison. As August came to a close, even the officers at Canea began to protest that further resistance was futile, circulating among themselves a signed petition to that effect.

The failure to devise a unified command also hampered the Venetian defensive effort. Efficient operations were thwarted on various occasions by masked insubordination and genuine cowardice. One plan to send a relief column of twelve hundred soldiers to Canea ended in failure when officers led the contingent to the wrong rendezvous. A more serious problem resulted from the timidity and ineptitude of Antonio Cappello, Captain of the Navi and commander of the Guard of Candia. For one reason or another Cappello, who had at his command a significant flotilla of over twenty galleys, did everything in his power to avoid contact with the enemy. During the siege of Canea he anchored his vessels at Porto della Suda, ostensibly to protect this vital fortress and port facility. With the protection of Suda as an excuse, he adamantly refused to risk engagement with the enemy. Yet when Canea fell and the Turkish fleet gained the opportunity to move against Suda, Cappello again withdrew in haste and sought refuge in the port at Sittia at the eastern
end of the island. His action during these first crucial days of the war negated the value of the galleys under his command and hastened the fall of the city of Canea. In rather strong language the Rettori of Canea expressed the hope that Signor Cappello would soon come to "recognize his duty for the service of his country...".  

After nearly two months of desperate defense the provveditor of Canea was forced to sue for terms of surrender. On the twentieth of August all firing ceased, and within two days the details of the capitulation had been agreed upon. The terms proved generous, for the Turkish commander undoubtedly hoped to encourage the other fortresses of the kingdom to surrender without a struggle. He permitted all persons, goods, and religious treasure to leave the fallen city with their banners in full display; furthermore, he fully guaranteed the rights and privileges of all those citizens who decided to stay and live under the new Turkish regime. The wisdom of this policy was proven when only the five hundred surviving soldiers chose to depart; almost to a man the civilian populace elected to remain in the city and chance their fate under the new Turkish rule. Almost immediately workers and engineers were dispatched by the pasha to begin repair and extension of the city's defensive network. Canea was now, without a doubt, a Turkish city and an enemy stronghold in the midst of the Candians.

The price of Venetian negligence came high, for the capture of Canea provided the Sultan with a secure fortress which could serve as a base of future operations. Following a strategy similar to that in the war of 1570, the Turkish commanders had directed their initial assault
against a lesser target in the hope that a later and broader offensive could be directed from a secure and well-provisioned base. During the winter months when turbulent seas disrupted communications with Constantinople and when rain and cold combined to make the life of the foot soldier an endless misery, the Turkish army could now seek refuge and shelter within the walls of a secure fortress.

The fall of Canea also complicated strategy and operations. Any attempt to recover the lost fortress would necessarily involve severing the life-line of supplies and reinforcement which stretched from Constantinople to Canea. With Turkish commanders stockpiling reserves at Canea a blockade, to be successful, would have to be maintained for months on end. What had once been essentially a defensive war for Venice now had to be expanded into a war involving a complicated offensive strategy.

The capture of Canea stunned Venice and intimidated the entire archipelago with the might of the Turkish military. But the shock was apparently not so great as to inspire feverish activity on the part of the Venetians. A month after the fall of Canea Corner himself, either from personal preference or necessity, urged the Senate not to hazard any serious engagements with the enemy for fear of losing the few remaining Venetian forces. An initiative taken by the defenders at this time, before the enemy could become firmly entrenched, might well have proved worthy of the risks involved; caution, however, ruled the day. Certainly the situation on the island was indeed unpromising; confusion, disorder, and death had undermined the readiness of the other
fortresses of the kingdom. Sanitary conditions, undoubtedly aggravated by famine, threatened the island and generated a general panic; so little organization existed in many parts that not even the most rudimentary precautions had been taken to separate the diseased cadavers from the healthy survivors, and decaying corpses defiled the streets of the cities.12

The task of maintaining a blockade at the port of Canea made the existence of an armed and ready fleet essential. Unfortunately, the once renowned Venetian navy had fallen into a state of advanced decay. Action taken prior to the war had done little to improve appreciably the condition of the naval defenses of the archipelago and the island of Candia. By September of 1645 the Venetians had in service approximately twenty-five sottille galleys, the standard light galley so widely employed in the Mediterranean.13 Despite periodic flirtations with other designs, it was basically this light galley which remained the mainstay of the Venetian as well as the Turkish fleets. The Venetian fleet in 1645 was in size and strength merely a shadow of the formidable armadas the Republic had launched in the century before.

Considering the nature of the Turkish fleet, however, the galley actually proved an asset to the Republic, especially considering the type of offensive warfare which now had to be undertaken against Turkish supply convoys. Such operations necessitated pursuit, and a vessel of bertoni construction would have found it difficult to have maintained the speed and maneuverability demanded to hunt the elusive Turk. As long as the Venetian vessels did not have to confront vessels enjoying superior fire-
power, they could use to marked advantage the maneuverable galley and the heritage of Venetian seamanship.

Undoubtedly the Venetian navy limited its effectiveness as an instrument of destruction by not proving more flexible and receptive to the newer bertoni designs. Even a supplementary squadron of such warships would have proved invaluable in conjunction with the main fleet of nimble galleys. The galleys could have been used to chase the enemy's galleys and to delay them until a contingent of heavily armed bertoni would have had time to have joined the fray. In addition, the bertoni could have been used to advantage during the harsh winter months when rough seas forced the more fragile galleys to seek shelter in port. But whatever the arguments against the bertoni, whether they were founded on financial considerations or those of pride and tradition, the Venetian fleet remained essentially a flotta of galleys. It was the Candian war which proved to be the last major conflict in the western world which involved almost exclusively the traditional Mediterranean galley.

To increase the destructive capacity of the fleet the Venetians did maintain several larger and more heavily armed galleys known as galeasses. Taller, longer, and possessed of more formidable armament, these galeasses were nevertheless costly to construct and costly to maintain; as a result they seldom were on duty more than three or four months of every year. Psychologically the galeasses were also an advantage, their considerable size inspiring fear and respect; a seventeenth-century writer observed that the Venetian galeasses "are of prodigious
construction...one alone capable of resisting and scorning twenty galleys...". Our author concludes, that the Venetians almost always have the advantage at sea since they are the "only ones who have this type of galeasse on the Mediterranean."14

The only Venetian vessels left unmentioned so far were the cargo or supply ships, known simply as 'navi', which invariably accompanied the fleet of galleys. The navi were indeed very similar in construction to the northern bertoni, but their use was almost exclusively reserved for transportation of goods and men, either to the fortresses on Candia or to the galleys at sea. The navi remained a mobile quartermaster corps and generally remained aloof from the heat of battle.15

The condition of this mixed fleet was generally poor, in a state of "misery" as Francesco Molin termed it. Mistreatment of crews and the misuse of funds undermined the esprit de corps of the fleet's personnel; few experienced and reliable mariners were to be found to man the available ships. To make matters worse, what galleys there were were usually scattered too far apart in the archipelago and the Dalmatian coast to be of any effectiveness. Molin attributed this decadence to the prolonged peace between Venice and the Turks; complacency certainly was part of the entire scenario of Venetian decadence in all spheres during the seventeenth century.16

But there were real problems facing the Republic in mid-century which had undoubtedly become more acute as she continued to retreat from the circles of the great powers. The use of free men at the oars of the galleys, for instance, had become impossible due to the inability of the
Republic to attract men to such arduous and now poor-paying labor. By mid-century it was difficult to recruit even a handful of skilled free men to serve aboard the galleys in order to instruct the others in the arts of the sea. To fill this void, the Republic hastened to issue decrees pardoning criminals in return for service in the galleys;\textsuperscript{17} men of such caliber, however, failed to display in service the dedication and seamanship for which free Venetian citizens had once been renowned.

The productivity of the arsenal in Venice also proved disappointing. As early as the turn of the century the arsenal had fallen far short of projected levels of production; purchase of vessels made in the shipyards of northern Europe could have compensated for the lag yet a combination of pride and limited finances led the Venetians to shun such measures. The principal cause of the diminished productivity at the arsenal was the decline in skilled labor needed for construction. Futile decrees were issued requiring all sons and nephews of shipwrights to work in the arsenal; such fiats seldom had any significant effect in increasing the labor supply. When workers could be hired for the arsenal, rates of absenteeism were high even though the law required only one hundred and fifty days of service a year.\textsuperscript{18}

This dismal condition, this "misery" in which the once indomitable Venetian navy found itself was understandably the result of many factors; the "length of the peace" and consequent complacency which invariably accompanies good times, the movement of capital and investment to the Terraferma, the general lack of public funds for construction costs and competitive salaries to the oarsmen of the galleys, and the inflexibility
and lack of innovative planning all contributed in significant ways to the Venetian problem. It was upon such a fleet, scattered as it was throughout the archipelago and the Mediterranean and directed by indecisive and overly cautious officers, that there fell the burden of defending the vast imperial interests of the Venetian Republic.

II

Venice was aware of the fact that alone she could never in her present circumstances defend her empire against the onslaught of an invigorated Turkish state; this very realistic appraisal naturally led the Republic to seek support from other parts of Christendom. The war for Candia was certainly in the main her war; but since the struggle pitted a Christian power against a Turkish infidel, the war became, by the standards of that martial century, something of a holy war for the faith. There existed sufficient precedent for concerted Christian efforts; had not the Pope and other Christian powers hastened to send relief to the Maltese when it had first seemed that the Turkish armada was in fact heading toward Malta in 1645. It was only natural to expect similar displays of common concern when it was now the Venetian Republic which was threatened. For Venetian diplomats the difficult task lay ahead of converting well-intentioned promises into material contributions and of exhorting substantial commitments from economy-minded ministers. To accomplish these ends in a Europe prostrate under the demands of the
Thirty Years War would tax the skills of even Venetian diplomats. The neutrality maintained by Venice during the clash between Habsburg and Bourbon merely complicated matters; a once rigidly neutral Republic now had the difficult task of convincing the ministers of Spain and France that neutrality in Turco-Christian confrontations was akin to immorality.

Ideologically and strategically the European power most directly concerned with the Venetian problem was the Papacy. As head of an Italian state close to the Mediterranean theater of war, the Pope had to consider the imminent possibility that a victorious Sultan might lay eyes upon the Italian peninsula itself. One papal nuncio could recall that when he was resident in Constantinople "the Turk hoped to dominate all Italy, and...since the true Emperor of Christianity was the Pontiff, found it necessary to go to Rome." A similar letter from Constantinople warned that if the Kingdom of Candia fell, Italy itself would soon be "inundated by Turkish barbarians...even to the very gates of Rome...." Ideologically there likewise always remained the overriding moral argument that the Pope, as the shepherd of Christendom, had always to be seriously concerned whenever one of his flock was attacked by the Moslem infidel.

Such were some of the general arguments which would urge Rome to become directly involved; the pressing realities of the European war then raging on the Continent supported a more cautious approach. Although the new pope, Innocent X, seemed sympathetic toward the Venetians, the septuagenarian pontiff unfortunately inherited the disastrous problems of the Thirty Years War. He was forced by circumstances as well as
personality to oscillate between the hostile camps of Bourbon and Habsburg; in such a situation the pressing needs of the Papal States had to receive first consideration.

Moreover, in the eyes of the Holy See, Catholic Venice had been something of a churlish and prodigal son. In Venice disobedience to the dictates of Rome was not uncommon. In the opinion of the papal nuncio to the Republic, Monsignor Francesco Pannocchiesche, the Venetians were certainly a pious people but one which viewed the papal authority with resentment and suspicion. This ambivalence toward Rome Pannocchiesche attributed to the Interdict issued against the city in 1605 in the dispute raging between Paolo Sarpi and Paul V. Another source of friction was the question of the Santo Officio or Inquisition; the Venetians officially recognized it within the borders of the Republic but relegated it to a position of insignificance. The Monsignor complained that heretics of very breed found Venice accommodating; many even gained burial in the Catholic cemeteries of the city's churches without difficulty. Whatever the truth of such charges, there remained the more recent strains between Venice and Rome generated by the squabbles over the territories of the Duchy of Castro.

Despite the bitterness arising from such tensions, there was always hope that the memory of past confrontations would be blurred in the exigencies of the immediate crisis over Candia. It was this mood which caused Venice to receive the news of Innocent's election with marked optimism; Venice and perhaps the greater part of Italy were hardly displeased to see the truculent Urban pass on to his heavenly reward.
Unlike Urban, Innocent was a cautious and reserved man whose life was dominated by the principle of moderation. Unfortunately, the reservation so characteristic of the new pontiff often manifested itself in the extreme; wariness frequently deteriorated into irresolution and frugality into mean parsimony. Character traits such as these, which might have sufficed in a more peaceful century, proved utterly inadequate to create a spirit of unity and determination within a divided Christendom.²⁴

If Innocent failed to provide the catalyst necessary for the situation, he was not completely derelict in his responsibilities as spiritual head of the Catholic world. By March of 1645 he had already sent several thousand infantry to Malta and Dalmatia and in May ordered the papal squadron prepared for action under the command of his nephew, Niccolo Ludovisi.²⁵ The Pope even suggested the formation of an Italian league for the defense of Italy and the Mediterranean, but Venetian skepticism concerning the motives of the pontiff led the Republic to reject the proposal.²⁶

Direct military aid to Venice from the Pope amounted to the five papal galleys, a contingent of two thousand troops, and permission to levy another eight thousand men within the territories of the papal states. Although these additional levies were to be hired and paid by the Venetians themselves, the concession was of value since the manpower demands of the Thirty Years War had made it increasingly difficult to find able-bodied recruits anywhere in Europe. The Pope lent to the Venetian effort what influence he had by calling upon all the princes of Europe for assistance.

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in the war; he appealed particularly to the Polish king, who, it was hoped, might mount a diversionary attack on the northern flanks of the Ottoman empire. 27

The allied force which eventually gathered assumed the appearance of a Christian fleet en route to a crusade; among the ships were the five galleys of the Pope, five from Tuscany, five from the Kingdom of Naples, and six from Malta, a total of only twenty-one vessels. Although officially united in common cause, the allied force was continually rent with dissension and disorganization. Loan of the vessels was strictly contingent upon the policies of their respective contributors, and as a result only the papal and Maltese squadrons consistently participated in naval maneuvers throughout the duration of the war.

The Tuscan galleys, while useful during the first years of the war, fell victim to the economizing moves of Grand Duke Ferdinand II; by 1647 their service with the allied fleet was terminated. Venice protested this withdrawal from active service but had no success in forestalling the sale of three of the vessels and the permanent recall of the other two. 28 Eventually the galleys from Naples and Sicily were also recalled as the result of princely politics. The relatively numerous warships stationed in the ports of this kingdom were jealously reserved for the defense of southern Italy. When not so engaged, they were requisitioned in order to convoy troops and supplies to Spanish ports. In 1645, for instance, the nuncio reported to Venice that many vessels stood ready for service in Naples and Sicily but that they had been ordered to Spain for other military duties. 29
In absolute numbers the auxiliary fleet represented an increase in the total size of the allied flotilla of about 30 percent. Although this was a significant increase in size, the arrival of these additional units had numerous disadvantages. The divisiveness and petulance which characterized these auxiliaries frequently prevented unity of command. Disputes concerning protocol, departure dates, and maneuvers brought only confusion; petty rancor was often the only reason lying behind critical delays and mistaken courses of action. Bickering between the Maltese and the Florentines in the spring of 1645 delayed the departure of the auxiliary fleet and indirectly contributed to the subsequent fall of Canea. Efforts to reconcile differences between quarreling factions usually proved futile. Even more serious was the excessive deference which Venetian commanders paid to the wishes and demands of the allied forces, the result being an even greater lack of coordination and more indecisiveness within the high command.

Besides damaging the unity of command, the auxiliaries also disrupted naval operations by refusing to remain in Candian waters longer than five or six months a year. During the fall and winter months, the papal and Maltese squadrons regularly returned to their respective home ports. Since the military effectiveness of the fragile galleys was seriously impaired by the turbulent seas of fall and winter, it was thought best to recall them in order to protect them from shipwreck and in order to reduce the costs of operation and maintenance. Although the auxiliary units usually returned the following spring, their services were missed for nearly half the year.
To spare the galleymen the rigors of a winter campaign and to operate within stringent naval budgets, the Venetians also operated on a restricted schedule during the three or four months of winter. But Venetian galleys did maintain patrols throughout the better part of the fall, not infrequently on a regular schedule into the month of November. The departure of the auxiliaries, sometimes as early as late August or early September, tended to hamper Venetian efforts to maintain such patrols successfully. For several crucial months the Venetians were forced to operate with considerably diminished forces. It was not unusual for the auxiliary commanders to resort to an early withdrawal not so much for sound military reasons but in order to avoid prolonging the period of open contact with the enemy. With the booty collected from a summer's patrol, the allied fleet was understandably anxious to hurry homeward rather than risk battle for no distinct gain. Venice consequently found herself in league with forces upon whom she became more and more psychologically and militarily dependent but upon whom she frequently could not rely.

No substantial military or financial assistance could be expected from the Genoese. As the commercial rivals of Venice, the Genoese had everything to gain from a prolonged struggle between the Venetians and the Ottoman empire. Moreover, as far as European politics were concerned, the Genoese found themselves in a highly vulnerable position; squeezed between the French to the north and the Spanish to the south, Genoa was compelled to act in international matters with considerable caution.
In 1645 the Venetian diplomat, Alvise Molin, was dispatched to Genoa in order to discuss her position in the war. The reply was generous in intention but highly qualified. The Genoese Republic promised twelve fully equipped galleys and several contingents of soldiers for the Candian war if, in return, Venice would encourage the Pope to grant Genoa entrance into the Sala Regia and the exalted title of "Serenissima," a title which the papacy had already granted to Venice.\(^{32}\) Reasoning that the Genoese were trying to extort as much as possible from tempting but unfulfilled promises, neither Venice nor the Pope would concede on these two issues of honor and protocol.\(^{33}\) Ludovisi, the papal commander, sarcastically remarked that the pretentious Genoese were acting more like merchants than like princes.\(^{34}\) On the other hand, the Genoese argued that only the obstinacy of the Venetians and Pope stood in the way of receiving the desired privileges and honors. In the midst of charges and recriminations Genoese support of Venice naturally failed to materialize.

Venice also looked to Piedmont as a possible source of support only to encounter the same type of problem as had developed with Genoa. In this instance the dispute about honor centered on the Moslem-held island of Cyprus. Venice had granted the Piedmontese dynasty the inheritable title of "Altezza" and "Serenissima" for its assistance at the battle of Lepanto. Apparently not satisfied with these exalted honors the Piedmont princes of the seventeenth century sought to extend to themselves also the title of "Kings of Cyprus"; insane as it seems, the title of "king" to an island lost to the Sultan some three quarters
of a century earlier became a point of contention between the Venetians and the Savoyards. For nearly fifteen years the Piedmontese princes obstinately refused assistance to Venice because of this dispute. Undoubtedly the Savoyards used the Cyprian question as a pretext to avoid entanglement in a serious Mediterranean war. As in the case of Genoa, the real reasons behind the Savoyard action lay elsewhere. Bound to Spain through ties of commerce and finance and forced to weigh carefully the attitudes of their French neighbor, the Piedmontese necessarily found it expedient to follow a cautious foreign policy. In no way did Savoy wish to become entangled in an eastern war which might disrupt commercial ties with the Turks or weaken the military position of Savoy vis-à-vis France.

As useful as these small Italian states might have been, it was natural that for substantial and sustained military support Venice would have to turn to the French and to the Spanish. Pleas to France held more promise since the Republic had usually maintained a cordial relationship with the French, a relationship which, on some occasions such as the Mantuan war of 1628, blossomed into a full-scale alliance.

With the Italian Mazarin presently in power at Paris, prospects for substantial assistance seemed brighter. It was certainly inconceivable that an Italian cardinal could passively witness the inundation of Rome and perhaps the entire peninsula by a heathen Moslem horde. In addition, France in 1645 had good reason for wishing to strengthen her diplomatic ties with Venice; in light of the French quarrels with the Pope over the extravagancies of the Barberini family, the support of Italy’s single most important state might prove a valuable asset to Paris.
Despite factors favoring direct French intervention, there were other equally compelling ones which demanded a more cautious approach. Open support of Venice would risk an open rupture of relations between France and the Porte and would consequently place in jeopardy French commercial interests in the Levant. No matter how sympathetic the French might be toward the Venetian cause, direct aid might cancel in one move several decades of carefully nurtured relations with the Turks; cordial official relations with the Porte remained of the utmost importance to the continued development of French interest in the eastern Mediterranean.

In order to avoid completely alienating the Venetians, French diplomats were forced to camouflage their crown’s true intentions behind a barrage of kindly but highly qualified rhetoric. Apparently such methods had some immediate success. In October of 1645 Battista Nani, the Venetian representative at Paris, wrote that the war was "totally alien from the resolutions of this (French) government...." Yet only two weeks later Nani had apparently been convinced by several Parisian officials of France’s good intentions; he wrote with optimism that for the first time the ministerial council in Paris had expressed a clear and definite resolve not to abandon the Venetian Republic. Mazarin himself had apparently assured the ambassador that French assistance would be forthcoming as soon as the Spanish effort to dominate the Italian peninsula could be successfully thwarted; Nani was further consoled by the thought that once French naval patrols in the Mediterranean could thereby be curtailed that France would be in a position to lend both men and
armaments to the Venetian cause. Nani's hopes were consequently revived by skillful French diplomats.

French military assistance during this first year of the war was in actuality inconsequential, most of the French support being in the form of moral and diplomatic sympathy. For instance, the French ambassador at Constantinople, M. de la Haye, joined in protest against the Sultan's arrest of the Venetian Bailo and generally lent his services freely as an unofficial mediator between Venice and the Porte. Lion, the French Foreign Minister, assured Nani at Paris that the French ambassador to the Porte would be recalled should the Turks prove resistant to diplomatic pressures. Paris even dispatched a special envoy whose task it was to express directly to the Sultan France's distress over the recent eruption of war, explaining to the Porte that Louis was Europe's Most Christian King and therefore obliged to shelter all Christendom from attack.

Of the greatest concern for Venice was the possibility that within the near future peace between France and Spain might be restored and that Christian Europe's most powerful nations might then direct their energies against the Turkish menace. Nani ceaselessly pressured Paris to move in the direction of an accord with Spain; Mazarin and Lion in turn nurtured Venetian hopes by alluding to the possibility of a peace settlement "this winter."

The French proposed a naval truce in the Mediterranean for the course of one year; the truce would free the galleys of both major powers to devote their attention to Candia. This proposal, considered as early
as the summer of 1645, encountered the determined opposition of Madrid, an opposition which was in many ways reasonably justified. The Spanish argued that with such a naval truce the French would merely "disarm the vessels and galleys and make use of the men on the ground..."; they further contended that disarming the superior Spanish navy would offer the French a decided military advantage. Moreover, to demobilize the Spanish Armada would have understandably proved costly and wasteful. Under such circumstances, the French proposal, as the Venetian ambassador to Spain rightly predicted, came to nothing.  

There was slight hope that Venice might benefit by exploiting as fully as possible French influence in Poland; the object under consider-
ation was the "Polish diversion", a Polish attack along the northern frontiers of the Ottoman empire. In a century of intense religious fervor it was not unreasonable to expect such action from the fervently Catholic King of Poland and his Cossack vassals in the south. Nani was thus certainly not alone in his belief that Poland might "render to all Christianity a service so great..." But as in similar situations on the war-torn European continent domestic concerns demanded first atten-
tion and troubled King Casimir found himself in no position to hazard a rupture in relations with the Porte. The elusive "Polish diversion" consequently remained one of the many schemes which fired the minds of Venetian patriots but which remained in reality little more than a diplomatic chimera.

The total material contribution of France during the first year of the war remained relatively limited. The one concession of any
significance was the right granted Venice to levy soldiers within the boundaries of France. Since the Venetians relied almost exclusively on mercenaries, it was absolutely imperative that some source of manpower be found. The drain of the Thirty Years War made finding such a supply of able-bodied men increasingly difficult. The real or threatened strain which such concessions placed upon France's own manpower reservoir generated hostile reaction within the French ministerial councils. In addition, it was argued by some French ministers hostile to the war that levies granted to the Venetians would hazard in a very direct way relations between the Porte and Paris. From Paris Nani reported increased opposition to the Venetian levies; among the French ministers, Nani wrote, a cloud was "being formed by the quarrel of all against the levies of Your Serenity (Venice)...."

Despite the opposition, the levies were sanctioned throughout 1645. It was, however, the growing cost involved in such levies that proved most annoying. Nani ruefully noted that he was still able to hire a thousand soldiers as well as two ships but at a price several times higher than what he had expected. Moreover, there were endless numbers of contracts which were negotiated but which never were fulfilled, a disappointing and frustrating situation for the Venetian republic.

Beyond France, there lay hope in finding support for the Republic in Spain. But for numerous economic and political reasons Venetian pleas were received with indifference by the court at Madrid. Rather than finding herself allied with Spain as she had on occasion with France, Venice had during the past decades frequently found herself attempting
to thwart Spanish and Habsburg designs in the Italian peninsula. Still, Spain was very much of a Catholic nation and one which held vital interests in Sicily and Naples and consequently had good reason to be definitely concerned with the progress of the Candian war. The initial flurry of activity witnessed in Naples and Sicily seemed certainly to suggest a paramount concern on the part of Spanish authorities.

The Venetian ambassador to Madrid quickly clarified the situation. Ambassador Giustinian informed the Signory that Spain's first concern in the Candian crisis would be to her own interests and defenses; as for Spain's forces in Italy, the Venetians "would no longer be able to obtain aid of galleys nor of militia from Naples because of the jealousy and suspicion of invasion by the Turks, (for) they (the galleys) would be every year obligated to assist to the defense of that same kingdom..." Venetian requests for use of the galleys in Naples and Sicily were constantly evaded in a clever game of cat and mouse; whatever the Spanish ministers promised the Spanish viceroys of Italy requisitioned for some other imperative use. In the summer of 1645 Giustinian won a promise for as much assistance as the defenses of Spain would allow, perhaps as many as nine warships acquired from the arsenals of Sicily, Naples and Sardinia; almost as soon as the promise had been made, however, those same galleys were requisitioned by the Viceroy of Naples for other duties.

Since the dangers of the Thirty Years War and the challenge of France on the European continent were of paramount importance, the Spanish diplomats issued several proposals of their own which might help to bring peace to Christendom's two major powers. As an alternative to the French
Armistice proposal the Spanish suggested a truce of three to four years on both land and sea. In light of the setbacks suffered by the Spanish in Catalonia, Portugal, and at the Battle of Rocroi, a full military alliance would undoubtedly have been welcomed by the Spanish crown. But in the eyes of the French such a prolonged cessation of hostilities would be equivalent to relinquishing their advantage, a fact not completely untrue by 1645. The French rejection in turn was naturally interpreted as substantial proof that France had no peaceful intentions and that their own proposal for a Mediterranean naval truce had been offered in bad faith. By August the possibility of effecting a temporary suspension of arms by the France-Spanish forces was rapidly fading; Giustinian ominously informed the Signory that the Spanish king had not so much as mentioned an armistice.

From the two major European powers Venice received little more than fine words and unfilled promises. The Senate, moreover, had to remain alert for the possibility of diplomatic treachery. There always remained the fear that there was substance behind the rumors purporting clandestine negotiations between the Turkish ministers and the representatives of France and Spain. One rumor fostered by the Spanish court suggested that France and the Turks had planned a joint pincer attack on Italy itself, French troops moving against Spanish Milan while Turkish galleys and infantry inundated the southern coasts of the peninsula. Other rumors circulated concerning Spain possibly negotiating a separate treaty with the Porte so as to protect Sicily and Naples from attack. There was, in fact, no substance to either rumor. The inescapable problem
remained, however, that Venice lay dependent upon Europe's two super-powers, one which was traditionally friendly to Constantinople and which had extensive commercial holdings to protect and the other, with vested interests in Milan, Naples, and Sicily and therefore naturally cautious about too strongly supporting the imperial holdings of the Venetian republic.

From a military perspective, events during 1645 proved as unpromising as those in the diplomatic realm. The capitulation of Canea in August did much to shock the allied commanders but concerted and determined effort on the part of the Christian forces was still slow in developing. Over the objections of the papal commander Ludovisi, it was finally decided in consulta to move the allied fleet from the shelter of Zante to the port of Candia. As the fleet sailed toward Candia, no attempt was made to attack the Turkish fleet stationed at Canea. When the fleet had secured port at Candia, Ludovisi again complained that the allies should not embark on any perilous missions before they had awaited the arrival of the twenty galleys of the Guardia di Candia; even when these galleys had finally arrived, Ludovisi found other pretexts for inaction. Apparently, the orders of the papal commander specifically implied that the galleys of the Pope should avoid engagement with the enemy fleet as long as possible.

Definite plans for action were finally agreed upon by the allied consulta. A fleet of nearly sixty galleys, four galeasses, and thirty-six assorted vessels departed from Port della Suda on the sixteenth of September with the intention of assaulting the Turkish armada then
sheltered in the captured port of Canea; an adverse wind, however, thwarted this operation and the allies were forced to withdraw once again to Suda. A second attempt was made nearly twelve days later, but this was likewise foiled by adverse winds. A third and final assault met the combined fury of rough seas and determined Turkish shore batteries and was given up as a failure. Two days after this final attempt against the port of Canea the disgruntled auxiliary commanders agreed to return to their respective home ports.\textsuperscript{57}

The opportunity provided by the withdrawal of the allied forces was immediately seized by the Turkish commander, Pasha Jussuf. Approximately fifty-five vessels together with seven thousand men were conveyed from Malvasia to Canea, an operation which encountered no opposition whatsoever.\textsuperscript{58} By the fall of 1645 the Turkish commanders had accomplished essentially the basic aims of their strategy.\textsuperscript{59} By avoiding direct naval confrontation, by strengthening the defenses of Canea, and by taking advantage of the indecisiveness of the allied command, the Turkish forces had established for themselves a formidable and relatively secure base of operations.

The subsequent military developments on land for the remainder of 1645 achieved little of importance. Toward the end of 1645 an embarrassingly inept attempt to recapture Canea ended in a general fiasco. General della Valletta with seven thousand men marched against Canea but at the first appearance of the enemy his troops broke and fled. Many of these unseasoned and undisciplined troops were mercenaries unfamiliar with the terrain of the island and consequently fled.

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directly toward the sea; as a result many of them drowned, ignominiously weighed down by their battle armor.

The Senate moved hesitantly toward reinforcing the mercenary contingent on the island; several new commanders were appointed to assist in the defense of the kingdom, among them Camillo Gonzaga, the island's new Governor-General. Galleys were being armed while proposals to construct still others were hurried through the Senate. Aid, relatively substantial for their respective size, trickled in from Parma, Tuscany, and Modena; there was even hope that financial contributions might prove of some significance. And if the fleet remained in a state of 'misery' as Molino had noted, the same Molino reported to the Collegio in September of 1645 that there was enough money in the naval treasury to keep the fleet 'for some time well-enough provided'. The overall picture remained depressing but at least for the optimistic there were glimmers of hope that the Republic would do its best to meet the Turkish challenge, if needs be, alone. And indeed there was room for optimism, a guarded optimism which would have to take into consideration the disastrous deficiencies and failures which had marred the administration of the Venetian armada and empire for over a half-century. There would be a fight but one not untouched by a sense of desperation.
CHAPTER II: FOOTNOTES

1. A.S.V., P.T.M. (796), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditore-Generale di Candia, June 27, 1645; B.N.M., VII (9158), Provveditore di Canea, July 8, 1645.

2. B.N.M., VII (211), Rettori, Andrea Corner, 1645.

3. B.N.M., VII (211), Risposta di Sig. General alla Rettore di Canea, August 10, 1645, Suda.

4. In July of 1645 some three hundred paid infantry and five hundred cerdime (local recruits) plus a small cache of money was smuggled into the fortress; on the 4th a contingent of cavalry and three hundred cerdime also arrived. These cerdime were local recruits who, unfortunately, "demonstrated good will, but... (could) not be reduced to military discipline." B.N.M., VII (9158), Relazione di quanto fu operato nel Regno di Candia dopo l'attacco della Canea sino alla resa. Although the estimates concerning the number of active soldiers at Canea vary considerably, the figures given by the provveditore of the city seem reliable. He noted that in all the time of its siege, the city had never had more than eight hundred paid infantry, two hundred guastadores, seventeen bombardiers, and three galleys in the port.

A.S.V., P.T.M. (820), Antonio Navagiero, Provveditore di Canea, August 14, 1645 (Julian calendar).

5. A.S.V., P.T.M. (796), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditore-Generale di Candia, August 12, 1645.

6. A.S.V., P.T.M. (820), Antonio Navagiero, Provveditore di Canea, August 14, 1645 (Julian calendar). The officers of the garrison complained that further resistance was useless, and "adhered to the resolution...swearing to it with their own signatures." A.S.V., P.T.M. (796), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditore-Generale di Candia, August 21, 1645.

7. Andrea Valiero, Historia della guerra di Candia (Venice, 1679), p. 139. (Hereinafter referred to as Historia.)

8. Although Cappello's actions may not have been 'cowardly,' they certainly were irresolute and overly cautious. For his failure to act during these first crucial days of the war he was recalled to Venice; there he was censured for not having used the galleys under his command to better use. Whatever the particular details of this case, the exchange of letters between Cappello and the provveditore of Canea, Antonio Navagiero, provide us with interesting insight into the squabbles and disputes which hampered the Venetian effort in the first days of the war. Cappello informed Navagiero that if he (Cappello) were to leave Suda in order to defend Canea, the entire port would be endangered; if the port fell to the enemy, Cappello reasoned, "the rest of the Kingdom would fall...." Navagiero responded to Cappello expressing the hope
that the Captain of the Navi (Cappello) would reach "better reflection", and prophetically noted that if "one loses Canea never more will it be possible to recuperate (the city) even when one defeated and destroyed the enemy armada." Despite his original arguments about the need to defend Porto della Suda at all costs, the moment Cappello learned of the fall of Canea he departed with his galleys to the safety of a more distant port; this action thus left Porto della Suda and its fortress open to direct attack by the enemy armada. See Valiero, Historia, p. 47; B.N.M., VII (21); A.S.V., P.T.M. (796), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditore Generale di Candia, August 30, 1645.

9. Luigi Boschetto, "Come fu aperto la guerra di Candia," Ateneo Veneto, Part II, XIII (1912), pp. 147-48. Included in the terms of surrender was the right to withdraw unharmed the four Venetian galleys sequestered in the port of Canea. For those Venetian subjects who chose to remain under their new Moslem rulers, there would be elected by them their own magistrate whose decisions concerning them would be, in most cases, binding. Although Turkish troops may have engaged in some vandalism and destruction, it seems that the city was spared the horrors of full-scale pillage. A.S.V., P.T.M. (796), Senato, Andrea Corner, Provveditore Generale di Candia, August 30, 1645.


13. The Mediterranean fleets naturally varied considerably in composition but those of the Italian states and the Turkish empire were almost exclusively comprised of light galleys. The northern nations, namely the English and the Dutch, needed sturdier vessels in order to ply the trade routes of the Atlantic ocean; consequently, these nations had almost all converted to the square-rigger vessel with rounded hulls, commonly known in seventeenth-century Italy as 'bertoni'. Not only were these bertoni better able to withstand rougher seas, but they also were capable of carrying heavier armament and thus were less vulnerable to the attacks of Mediterranean pirates. As far as the Candia war was concerned, the bertoni construction played almost no role at all in naval strategy; the only ships of this design in either the Venetian or Turkish navies were the so-called navi which were, in essence, only supply vessels. The sea battles fought during the war were almost invariably battles between opposing fleets of galleys and galleasses. For an interesting and informative study of the various ships which sailed the Mediterranean during the early seventeenth century, see Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580-1615, trans. by Janet and Brian Pullan (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1967), passim.

15. The 'navi' occasionally became involved in armed clashes with the enemy, but they were never systematically used as an offensive weapon by Venetian commanders.

16. According to Molin, there were in service approximately twenty-five sottile galleys, but these were scattered throughout the archipelago. He noted that the "length of the peace" was responsible for the poor condition of the fleet; everywhere there was a general shortage of volunteers for duty on the galleys and the treatment of crews was frequently below standard. In comparison to the fleets of the auxiliaries, the Venetian fleet was, according to Molin, in many ways inferior; "our galleys in comparison to the auxiliaries,... will perhaps be judged in many respects inferior." A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazioni, Busta 75, Francesco Molino, Provveditore-Generale da Mar, September 21, 1645.

17. During the war years there were numerous decrees issued concerning the pardoning of criminals in return for service at the oars on the galleys. For an example of such a decree, see A.S.V., Capitolar II, Registro I, Provveditore all'Armar. Later one can read further decrees concerning this matter relating to the extension of the maximum age for those wishing to serve at sea; in 1655 the maximum age was extended five years, from forty to forty-five. See various Decreti Arsenal contained in the Querini Stampalia. The problem of recruiting men for service at sea on the galleys is an interesting problem of the Candian war. According to the historian Valiero, the earlier practice of regimenting the entire city of Venice into various sections for the purpose of mustering certain required numbers of men from each sector, had fallen into desuetude and neglect. Valiero noted that the movement to the mainland (Terraferma) was largely responsible for the state of affairs; the aristocratic landowners had no desire to see their workers and peasantry drawn away for service at sea ("benche si suo acquisti di terraferma, non vedendo volontieri i lor villici obligati ad un'aggravio personale, che potere pregiudicare alle loro possessioni.") Moreover, the Senate, perhaps unable to do otherwise, allowed those who wished to purchase freedom from their obligation to serve; the figure quoted by Valiero was some 130 ducats. See Andrea Valiero, *Historia della guerra di Candia* (Venice, 1679), p. 137. This problem of recruitment fostered some interesting arguments. In 1639 it was debated whether or not it would be better to levy a tax on the city and the Terraferma in order to hire oarsmen rather than conscript them directly from the populace. Many argued that direct conscription would merely cause a massive flight from the city or would cause a hardship on those drawn away from their shops; moreover, every closed shop would mean a decrease in the revenues of the city. In addition, the original laws which had established a deposit of twenty-five ducats to be set aside in order to hire oarsmen, was by the 1630's and 1640's completely antiquated; inflation had made twenty-five ducats by that time a very small sum indeed ("pochissimo solievo") in light of the fact that it would now require 150 ducats per man. It
was proposed that a yearly tax be instituted and a fund established which would enable the Republic to man fifty galleys. The figure demanded for such a project would be approximately 1,500,000 ducats, a sum which could be attained within twenty years (52,190 ducats to be collected each year). This proposal was apparently voted on and accepted, but what actual impact it had on the war which erupted just six years later is difficult to estimate. See Reale Commissione, Bilanci generali della Repubblica di Venezia (Venice, 1903-12), III, pp. 542-547. (Hereinafter referred to as Bilanci generali.) In the meantime, however, less scrupulous methods were apparently sometimes used, and much violence seems to have resulted from various types of impressment. Valiero tersely notes that "in this merchandising in human flesh, the deceptions, the violence, and all the evil arts have been infinite...." Valiero, Historia, p. 138.

18. The problems encountered at the arsenal of Venice were numerous including the lack of skilled and even unskilled workers, the departure of galleys improperly manned, and the failure of arsenal workers to report regularly for duty. Many of these problems may well have been solved had there been more money available for the arsenal. Querini Stampilia, Decreto(Arsenale), Bernardo Lodoli, Cod. CXXX, Classe G4, pp. 309-313.


22. Ibid., p. 219. These charges might reflect only the rumors and prejudices of the time. Venice, however, had had for some time a reputation for tolerance and 'merchant-like' attitudes towards those elsewhere in Europe considered pariahs. As for the burial policies of the city, there existed a Hebrew cemetery on the Lido where Jews had been interred for centuries.

23. Urban VIII had so coveted the Duchy of Castro that he aroused the fear and anger of the Republic of Venice. The Republic allied itself with the threatened Duke of Modena as well as with the Florentines; this alliance temporarily prevented the Pope from seizing the duchy, although the coveted land was eventually absorbed into papal territories in 1648 when the Venetians were more than occupied with the war for Candia.

24. Even as sympathetic an author as Pastor has written that Innocent X was "irresolute and exceedingly parsimonious...." Ludwig von Pastor, History of the Popes, trans. by Dom Ernest Graf (London, 1940), XXX, p. 358.

26. Eugenio Bacchione, "Venezia e Genova durante la guerra di Candia," Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Venezia, VI (1943), 16. Gremonville, the French ambassador to Venice, informed his government that there had been some negotiations concerning the possibility of the formation of a defensive league of Italian states against the Turkish aggression. The Venetian ambassador to Rome, Contarini, was closer to the situation and he reported to Venice that the Pope was proposing such a league only to save appearances and would use such a league to further his own interests. Contarini consequently did not encourage the Pope in this matter. Moreover, it was felt that the formation of such a league would merely tend to confuse the issue and would result in a delay of assistance to the Republic.

27. Pastor, History of the Popes, XXX, pp.355-356, 359. At first the Pope hesitated to allow more than eight thousand troops to be recruited within his territories for fear that such large levies would deplete the population of the Papal States; later he partially lifted this ban.


30. Figures concerning the actual number of serviceable galleys available to the Venetian Republic vary considerably, but according to Guglielmotti, there were twenty-five galleys at Zante, twenty-three at Suda, and four galleasses in all; in addition there were eighteen vessels (vascelli) at Suda and another eighteen at Zante. Using these figures, the additional twenty-one galleys of the auxiliary forces would represent an overall increase in total ships of approximately 24 percent; if one considers only the galleys and galleasses, then the auxiliary forces represented an increase of nearly 40 percent.

31. The galleys of the Pope were apparently prepared to depart for Candia in early summer, but the squabbles over matters of protocol by the other units of the auxiliaries delayed the final departure until late summer. This delay of nearly two months was of crucial importance in the fall of Candia. Guglielmotti, Marina Pontificia, VIII, p. 19. Reference is made to the incessant bickering which undermined the relations of the auxiliary units in the Registro of the Collegio: "The Genoese have competed for precedence with the Grand Duke (of Tuscany) and he also does not wish to concede, while even the Maltese have similar thoughts..., but still it is believed that one can find some compromise as has been made other times." A.S.V., Esposizione Roma, Collegio, Reg-
The auxiliaries finally joined the Venetian fleet at Corfu on the 29th of August. Pastor, History of the Popes, XXX, p. 355.


33. In an age when honorific titles were of the greatest importance, the granting of the Genoese requests by Venice and the papacy would have perhaps encouraged the other allied powers to demand the same. On the other hand, Spain, England, and Poland had all agreed to the Genoese demands and the refusal of Venice to do so could easily have been interpreted as nothing less than obstinate arrogance. The fall of Candia compelled the Venetians to "accommodate themselves to reasonable things" but renewed discussion on the matter still failed to produce any positive results. Most certainly the dispute hinged, as Bacchione clearly suggests, not on the simple matter of honorific titles, but rather on questions of European politics; as long as the Genoese Republic remained trapped between the French to the north and the Spanish in Italy no definite assistance could be promised to Venice. See Bacchione, "Venezia e Genova," pp. 20-22; O. Pastore, "La politica di Genova nella lotta Veneto-Turca della guerra di Candia alla pace di Passarowitz," Atti della Deputazione di Storia Patria per la Liguria, LXVII (1938-39), 36-51.


35. Ibid., passim.

36. Shielded by the power of the French crown, the Barberini family proved a serious irritation to the pontiff. The family served as a nucleus about which gathered a pro-French party in Rome. The Barberini were eventually expelled from Rome and were permitted to return only after considerable pressure had been exerted in their behalf by French representatives.

37. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 103, Battista Nani, October-February, 1645. Nani wrote concerning French intentions in Candia "that the rupture of this crown (France) with the Turk... is totally alien to the resolutions of this government, and since Signor Cardinal (Mazarin) has so expressed himself, I know it from good source." Written in a letter dated October 3, 1645.


39. Ibid., November 21, 1645. Nani wrote that "Signor Cardinal (Mazarin) has not given me formal reply, but Brienne and Lion have told me that the King, ceasing the need of naval forces, would be able ...to give (ships) to V.V.E.E. (Venice), or if not arming (more French vessels) to send new aid to Venice with the saving of that money...."
40. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 103, Battista Nani, October-February, 1645, Letter of January 7, 1646. The French suggested to the somewhat naive Nani that should formal French protests fail that France would take extreme measures and withdraw "the ambassadors and ministers in order to break openly with the Ottoman Porte."

41. Nani reported that Cardinal Mazarin had spoken to him concerning the possibility of a rapid peace settlement between Spain and France; Nani noted that "he (Mazarin) has said to me...that this winter peace would be made...." A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 103, Battista Nani, October-February, 1645, Letter of November 21, 1645.

42. M. Lion read to Nani a report from Mazarin concerning the proposal of a naval truce between France and Spain in the Mediterranean. The ostensible purpose of such a truce was to enable these two powers to lend greater assistance to the Venetian Republic. Moreover, it would permit a more secure defense of Spanish possessions in the Kingdom of Sicily. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 103, Battista Nani, October-February, 1645, n.d. From the Spanish viewpoint, the proposed naval truce was little more than a clever ruse by which France hoped to immobilize the Spanish armada and thus deprive the Spanish crown of the advantage which the Spanish fleet enjoyed over the weaker French navy. The Venetian ambassador to Spain, undoubtedly sympathetic to the interests of Spain, wrote that "the object of the French...was very obvious: It is to preserve their (French) maritime armada, for a long time inferior to the Spanish, and to deprive the Catholic King (Spanish) the use of those forces in which he prevailed." Giustiniani added that since the French warships had already retired to port the sea was open to the action of the Spanish fleet, a fleet which had already cost the Spanish crown a million and a half in gold (presumably ducats). A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Spagna, Filza 80, 1644-46, Letter 57, n.d. Giustiniani urged the Venetian Signoria to encourage the French "to the general suspension...." which would end warfare on land as well as at sea. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Spagna, Filza 80, 1644-46, October 11, 1645. Zulian argues that the French proposal for a naval truce was probably offered in earnest. He notes the general discontent in France generated as a result of the Thirty Years War and the resulting increases in taxation. See Zulian, "Le prime relazione," pp. 85-87.

43. Nani's optimism tended to exaggerate the possibility of a future Polish diversionary attack along the northern borders of the Ottoman empire. As early as February 20, 1646, Nani was speaking of how "Poland is able to render to all Christianity a service so great...." A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 103, Battista Nani, October-February, 1645, Letter of February 20, 1646.

44. Mazarin offered 400,000 scudi for the acquisition of twelve vessels to be purchased in the Netherlands; he also permitted the levy of four thousand men within the borders of France including mariners and such specialists as bombardiers and engineers. Four 'fire-ships' were apparently contributed to assist in the defense of Candia. Such 'fire-ships' or brulotti were used in the armada to set afire the vessels of the enemy. See Zulian, "Le prime relazione," p. 77; Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, p. 137.
45. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 103, Battista Nani, October-February, 1645, Letter 283, n.d. Nani wrote to the Signoria concerning the complaints in the French council that the armies of France in Catalonia and Italy were being depleted by the levies made by Venice within the borders of France.

46. Ibid. Nani made reference to a 'cloud' which was forming in the French ministerial councils concerning the levies and the fear that future levies might be limited. He noted, however, that matters had been straightened out. "The shadow (nembo) which was forming about the quarrel of all against the levies of Your Serenissima in this kingdom, finally flared up (scoccat0), and all had been on the point of remaining without effect, and confused, when God granted me (the power) to straighten matters out for the most part."

47. Nani complains frequently of the high cost of raising troops and mariners. One instance occurred when he raised a contingent of approximately one thousand soldiers to be shipped off to Corfu along with two ships. These men were hired at Marseilles for a price "exceeding by two and threefold per head..." the customary charge. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 103, Battista Nani, October-February, 1645, Letter 234, October 24, 1645. By hiring French mercenaries the Venetians did gain the experience which many of these men had from years and years of warfare. Foreign mercenaries (as opposed to those men hired within the territories of the Terraferma) were also paid smaller salaries than Venetian citizens, thus saving sizable sums of money for the Republic. For example, the salaries listed for the hiring of French mercenaries was as follows: for a captain in the infantry, 60 ducats; a lieutenant, 32 ducats. The respective salaries for a captain and lieutenant hired within the borders of the Terraferma or in Venice per se were 100 ducats and 50 ducats per month respectively. Similar disparities existed in the pay for other ranks. See A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 103, Battista Nani, October-February, 1645, Capitoli accordati, et conclusi tra...Battista Nani...et Il Signor Collonello Sidney Atkins, January 10, 1645. This disparity may have resulted from the reasoning that Venetian mercenaries would be more likely to spend their pay within the borders of the Republic.


49. The nine vessels included five from Naples, two from Sicily, and two from Sardinia; the promise of these vessels often never materialized since local authorities frequently requisitioned the ships for specific local duties. In this case the Viceroy complained that the vessels from Naples could not be spared due to the French threat in the Mediterranean. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Spagna, Filza 80, Giustinian, Letter 69, n.d.

50. For the French proposal, see above, p. 69-70.
51. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Spagna, Filza 80, Giustinian, Letters 69 and 82, n.d. Giustinian wrote that the Spanish were willing to agree to a general three or four year suspension of all arms. The ambassador also informed the Signoria that the Spanish monarch, as soon as he had his hands free of France, would lend the greater part of his armada.


53. In reference to this rumored pincer attack by joint Franco-Turkish forces, the Spanish Secretary of State noted to Giustinian that France was probably pleased by the Turkish attack on Candia; with such a diversion France would be in a much better position "to divide the world with the Turk." A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Spagna, Filza 80, 1644-46, Letter 88, November 8, 1645.

54. Because of the threat of a Turkish attack on southern Italy it was rumored that Spain might make a separate accord with the Ottoman empire. There seems to have been no substance whatsoever in such rumors. See A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Spagna, Filza 80, Giustinian, 1644-46, passim.

55. The 'consulta' was the Venetian term for a meeting of all the allied commanders; at these meetings general strategy and other military matters were discussed.

56. Ludovisi tried everything possible to delay taking decisive steps. On the 30th of August news reached Zante that Canea had fallen; despite the objections of Ludovisi, the consulta decided that definite action had to be taken immediately. On the voyage to the port of Candia, the Venetian commander, Antonio Bernardo (Capitano del Golfo) and the Tuscan commander, Lodovico Verazzano, urged that the allies attack the enemy fleet then anchored at Canea. This plan came to nothing when the papal commander refused to participate and withdrew to the safety of the Port of Suda, there to await the arrival of reinforcements under Cappello. Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, p. 140-141. It might be noted that even before the allied fleet had arrived at Zante, Morosini had suggested that the Venetian fleet already there be sent to attack the enemy at Canea. Even though there were twenty-five galleys and four galleasses at Zante at that time, no action was taken on this suggestion. As a result another five days passed before the allies arrived at Zante. By that date, the 25th of August, any element of surprise was obviously lost. See Samuele Romanin, Storia documentata di Venezia (Venice, 1853-61), VII, pp. 362-363. (Hereinafter referred to as Storia.)

57. Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, p. 142.

58. Ibid., p. 143.
59. Ibid., pp. 146-147. The Venetians naturally hoped to concentrate on the war at sea, while the Turkish commanders sought to turn the war into a struggle on land.

60. Valiero, Historia, p. 50

61. Cappello was finally replaced by the Senate as Capitano della Navi; he was succeeded by Giovanni Battista Basadonna who was himself too old and infirm to assume such arduous duties. Basadonna was thus shortly thereafter replaced himself by Tomaso Morosini. Camillo Gonzaga was sent to Candia in the winter as Governor-General of the island. See Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, p. 144.

62. Girolama Cavazza, then in Malta, was ordered to procure new warships as well as numerous fire-ships. Alvise Contarini, the Venetian ambassador extraordinary to the Congress of Munster, was likewise ordered to hire some twelve vessels and four thousand infantry. Giovanni Tiepolo was sent on a similar mission to the Kingdom of Poland. See Valiero, Historia, pp. 38-39.

63. The Duke of Parma sent two thousand armed infantry, all of whom accompanied the duke himself. The Duke of Modena ordered the Marquis Tassoni to lend his military expertise to the Venetian cause. The Republic of Lucca raised one thousand infantry. See Valiero, Historia, p. 42.

64. Although Molin had termed the Venetian fleet in a state of 'miseria', he seems to have had sufficient funds for the immediate needs of the fleet; some 136,958 ducats were distributed to General Morosini and Commissioner Mocenigo, Molin concluded that the armada would be "for some time well-enough provided," A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 75, Francesco Molin, Provveditor-Generale da Mar, September 21, 1645.
CHAPTER III

THE WAR BECOMES GENERAL, 1646-1650

Although the first year of the war had been filled with disappointment and frustration, the situation was still far from hopeless. Canea was lost but the rest of the island and its fortresses remained in the control of the Republic. The actions of the allied armada proved uninspiring and lethargic, but the Turkish fleet itself had scored no spectacular victories. If the armies of the Sultan had won the initiative on Candia, it was the galleys of Venice which now were on the offensive at sea. Certainly in the winter of 1645-46 the fate of Candia remained still very much in question.

The next three years of warfare proved the most intensive and widespread of the entire conflict. During this period the war was expanded on all fronts and the capacity of its belligerents tested in the extreme. When this three-year period came to an end the war evolved slowly into a conflict which more and more centered on the principle of simple attrition. In this sense the first few years set the pattern of the entire twenty-four year-long struggle.

The collapse of Rettimo in 1646 in many ways symbolized the new intensity and seriousness which had come to characterize the war. Although Rettimo was the island's third most important citadel, its defenses were inadequate to withstand a long and intensive siege. The city lacked satisfactory port facilities by which reinforcements might be sent to relieve a siege. The walls were in need of considerable repair and renovation, and the entire city was
dangerously surrounded by cliffs and mountains from which an enemy attack might be launched. To further complicate matters, the bulwarks had become encircled by a nest of ramshackle dwellings which provided the city's inhabitants with housing but which also offered an enemy assault force excellent protective cover. Saved from demolition by the outcries of its residents, this 'burg' eventually did serve as shelter for attacking Turkish troops and thereby facilitated the capture of the city. Even the garrison at Rettimo was so weakened that as late as August of 1646 it was recommended that no sorties into the countryside be made for want of men to defend the fortress itself.

The Turkish assault came in September. On the 20th a Turkish fleet of thirty galleys and four thousand infantry safely arrived at Canea, and within nine days a formidable Turkish army, estimated by one observer to be eight thousand infantry and two thousand sappers, appeared before the walls of Rettimo. Reinforcements were sent to the besieged city, but within only ten days certain sections of the fortress had already fallen into enemy hands, and the ability of the garrison to repel future attacks seemed very much in doubt. On the 20th of October Rettimo was subjected to a furious assault. During this assault a barrel of powder accidentally exploded causing the defenders to panic and flee in a general rout; all attempts to rally the defending forces failed, and the survivors were forced to withdraw to the safety of the inner bastion. All that remained to the Venetians was this tower and its twelve hundred defenders. Despite such a reverse, it was thought that the fortress was still capable of further resistance, especially when minor
reinforcements reached the defenders in early November. But fear and fatigue were too great to be overcome, and on the 13th of November the fortress was surrendered to the Turkish commander.

The loss of Rettimo was a serious military and psychological blow. With Rettimo in their hands, the Turkish armies could now move against the capital city of Candia without fear of Venetian attacks from the rear. The possession of Rettimo also insured the safety of the lines of communication and supply running from Canea to the Turkish armies encamped at the walls of Candia. Psychologically, the surrender of Rettimo stunned the Republic because, unlike Canea, this defeat could not in any way be rationalized by arguing that the assault came as a surprise. Moreover, with exception of the capital of Candia and half a dozen small castelli scattered throughout the kingdom, Turkish troops could lay claim to almost total possession of the island. Now only the fortress of Candia stood between the inexorable march of the Ottoman armies and a complete surrender of the island.

It therefore came as no surprise that the enemy now began to concentrate his forces at Candia and began to tighten significantly the siege of the city. The Venetians, however, were also able to concentrate their efforts on the defense of the capital now that they had no need to disperse their forces in an attempt to defend several positions. Although the number of active soldiers available at Candia varied with each new assault and each new outbreak of the plague, there usually were during these first years about ten thousand men in the garrison. The fortifications of the city were also in better condition than those of the other fortresses. In May of 1646 Captain of the Gulf Bernardo
had kind words for the ability of the Proveditor-General of the city to organize its defenses; Bernardo noted how the Proveditor-General had "made the fortifications of the city so marvelously provided for with all necessary things...."

Obviously not everything at Candia gave reason for such optimism. Of the ten thousand or more soldiers stationed at Candia many were barely provided for. Plague, always the seventeenth-century soldier's worst enemy, continued regularly to deplete the ranks. Control of this dread disease proved particularly difficult under wartime conditions. The transit of so many military ships to and from the city made spread of the contagion an ever-present danger. Houses had to be sequestered, suspected goods confiscated and destroyed, and the infected removed from the city. Such measures understandably created much bitterness among those involved and heightened tensions in the city. With Turkish troops surrounding the city it proved even hazardous and difficult to remove the diseased to the hospitals which were located on an island some distance from the city itself. By August of 1646 many officers and over five hundred infantrymen had fallen victim to the disease.

Dissensions among the commanding officers also continued to hamper the defensive effort. Such bickering was, in part, encouraged by the Venetian Senate which hoped thereby to eliminate the possibility of too much power being concentrated into the hands of any one military administrator. Not only did subordinate officers appeal directly to the government at Venice, but the Senate itself seemed in no great hurry to create an unmistakably distinct line of command which might have served
to eliminate confusion in the upper ranks. During times of peace such a 'policy' might very well have strengthened the control of the Senate, but during times of war it could only threaten to weaken the entire military effort. As one general observed at Candia in 1646, the real enemy lay in the "pernicious disputes" which marred the Venetian command; it was just such disputes which 'continuously divided the spirit of the army... (and) made simple endeavors impossible..." Specific officers, often as high as the rank of colonel, were cited by name for neglect or incompetence, and requests for their removal had to be sent to Venice. Staff officers who felt themselves undeservedly slighted, fired off to the Signoria letters filled with caustic allusions and bitter criticisms of their fellow officers. The frequently volatile temperament of these noble officers was thus honed to an even sharper edge.

At Candia military operations during the first few years of the war followed a fairly predictable pattern. The main line of Turkish attack was directed against various 'baluardo' or bulwarks with certain ones receiving several major assaults repeatedly. These assault waves came at all times of the year, although less frequently during the rainy winter months when life in the trenches became almost impossible. The repulsion of these assaults demanded the utmost in courage and perseverance on the part of individual units and individual commanders.

By June of 1647 the city of Candia was completely invested by Turkish forces. Thousands of Turkish troops were amassed in the hills which lay only a few miles distant from the city. The relentless siege continued In 1648, perhaps encouraged by news of a disastrous Venetian shipwreck

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on the coasts of Asia Minor, new assault waves battered the city while
enemy engineers continued to set underground mines in a vain attempt
to collapse the walls of the fortress. Attacks in that year came along
the entire section of the fortifications stretching from southeast to
southwest, from the fort of San Dimitri to the bulwarks of Gesu, Santa
Maria and Martinengo.

By 1649 the continuous and unrelenting attack of the enemy had
begun to show effect. To the south the Turks had erected several
batteries which trained their fire on the whole southern periphery while
still another closer to the coast harassed movement within the port of
the city. Because of shortages in Venetian cavalry enemy soldiers had
been able to advance dangerously close to the main bastions with the aid
of only light artillery. Grain was lacking for the Venetian cavalry,
sickness had cut into the ranks of the garrison, and the number of
functioning cannon had been reduced to little over one hundred. The
five galleys contained within the city's port were in need of repair
and were of no military use. Even when sizable sums of money reached
the fortress from Venice there never seemed to be enough silver for all
the needs. When in one instance 70,000 ducats arrived at Candia, one of
the officers sadly noted that it required at least 50,000 ducats every
month alone to pay salaries and to acquire the necessary supplies of war;
the cost of repairs itself involved still thousands of additional ducats
every month of the year.

Although most of the military activity focused on Candia, Turkish
attacks also increased against the island-fortress situated in Porto della
Suda. Numerous attempts to force the capitulation of this tiny citadel
all ended in failure. Nevertheless, the attacks continued, and with Turkish troops in command of almost all of the coastal territory encircling the bay of Suda bombardment of the fortress became virtually a daily event. The fortress of Suda was of particular interest to the Turks because of the central position it held within the bay and because it offered a place of refuge for Venetian galleys relatively close to enemy lines. In addition, control of the fortress facilitated control of the coastal fortresses which, in turn, might threaten the Turkish line of communications from Canea to Candia.

As a result of the strategic location of these relatively minor coastal fortresses, there occurred during the late 1640's constant skirmishes and battles for their possession. Since many of these fortresses and entrenched batteries were situated on mountain tops, their value as potential outposts and depots became even greater. Such places as Bicorno, Culatta, Porto Nuovo, and the church and batteries of Caloiri drew special attention from both Venetians and Turks alike. Unfortunately, as long as Canea remained in the hands of the Turks, Venetian commanders could never hope to hold these largely isolated outposts for any length of time. Venetian forces succeeded in capturing several of these positions for short periods of time but the major sites remained firmly in Turkish control. With relatively limited land forces and frequently inadequate naval support, the Venetian armies could hope for little more. On the other hand, as long as Venetian naval superiority could dominate the seas, the fear of losing Suda to a Turkish attack likewise remained extremely remote. There thus developed in this
peripheral theater of the war a virtual military stalemate, a stalemate so firmly based on the realities of Venetian naval strength and Turkish land superiority that it would remain throughout the entire twenty-four years of the war.

Naturally, military activity was largely restricted to the areas of Candia, Rettimo, and Porto della Suda. Operations directed against the smaller fortresses were generally of minor military significance. Chissamo, a bastion located to the west near Garabusa, was assaulted by fifteen hundred Turkish infantry and, partially as a result of treachery from within, fell to the enemy in the early part of 1646. A year later the Venetians scored a minor triumph when they successfully captured and destroyed the fortress of Millopotami just east of Rettimo.

With nearly all of their energies directed toward either the capture or defense of the capital of Candia, neither adversary showed much concern for minor fortresses of this nature. Both sides fully recognized that it was possession of Candia which would inevitably determine who would control the kingdom.

Hope remained, however, that perhaps the Republic would be able to recapture Canea and thus deny the enemy the advantages of that city's port facilities. Canea was especially important since it was essentially through this fortress and port that the Turkish siege forces at Candia remained supplied. Moreover, there were rumors that the Turks had failed to utilize the fortress to its fullest capacity and had failed to maintain its fortifications in optimum condition. News reported from Constantinople claimed that the fortress was in dire need of assistance without which it might fall to the Venetians.
Such distress when combined with the trouble the Sultan was having in Babylonia found "all the enemy...employed continuously in praying to Mohamet for aid...."

Whatever substance there was to such rumors, Canea remained firmly in Turkish hands; so inept were several attempts to recapture the fortress that they proved more embarrassing to the Venetians than threatening to the Turks. Similarly, Turkish control of Rettimo and the vast majority of the island's other fortresses remained unchanged. For Venice the best that could be said was that Candia continued to withstand the siege. Each year the demanding task of raising men and money seemed to grow more difficult without any realistic hope that matters would ease in the future. In almost every important respect the land war belonged to the enemy. At best Venetian armies had won a tenuously held stalemate.

As a maritime and commercial power the true strength of Venice lay at sea. Moreover, it was at sea that the Venetians scored their greatest successes and proved themselves the most daring and courageous. But this was not always the case for apathy and laxity sometimes seemed to enshroud the movements of the armada. If the navy frequently remained the only glimmer of hope and victory, it also at times proved a source of disappointment and failure.

Much was certainly expected from the new command and the reinforcements gathered together for the campaign of 1646. Unfortunately, the new Venetian commander, Giovanni Cappello*, was a man advanced in years

*This was Giovanni Cappello, not to be confused with Antonio Maria Cappello who was recalled to Venice for his failure to support Canea in 1645.
and more inclined toward vacillation than aggressive action. The armada he brought, when joined with the auxiliary fleets of Malta and the papacy, consisted of 62 galleys, 6 galleasses, 40 vessels of various types, and 20 barques; there were aboard 12,000 oarsmen, 10,000 mariners, and 15,000 soldiers. The allied consulti was divided in its opinion whether to initiate a diversionary attack or to keep the armada intact and move to blockade the Dardanelles. Cappello, it seemed, hesitated to undertake any bold maneuvers, so the fleet divided in two with part remaining at Suda and the other moving to Cape Spada near the westernmost tip of the island. This indecisiveness and subsequent delay was costly, for it permitted the Turkish armada time to conduct to safety more reinforcements and supplies from Constantinople to the port of Canea. Such was the obliquity and public outrage over this poor performance that Cappello was replaced by Giovanni Battista Grimani as Captain General da Mar. Despite the newly strengthened armada of the allies, the Turkish fleet was not once encountered throughout this year; all the effort to reinvigorate the fleet seemed by early fall to have been in vain. The departure of the auxiliaries in September made certain that no decisive campaign against the enemy would be undertaken in 1646.

The only naval activities of any merit in 1646 took place a long distance from Candia and were concerned primarily with an attempt to blockade the Dardanelles. It was here at the Dardanelles that Venetian galleys generally remained on the offensive making every

*The Venetian Giovanni Cappello, the Maltese Villaroel, and the papal commander Zambeccari.
effort to sever the line of communication between Constantinople and Candia. The Dardanelles also remained a central rendezvous where Venetian armadas would meet and from which patrolling squadrons would be sent to scour the Aegean for Turkish merchantmen and ships-of-war.

In the shadow of the Dardanelles many nobles continued to display the seamanship and daring which had been for so long a part of the tradition of the Venetian nobility. It was here that one member of the illustrious Morosini family displayed the kind of courage and aggressiveness which stirred the waters of the Aegean in the late 1640's. Throughout 1646 Tommaso Morosini as Capitano delle Navi harassed Turkish shipping and enemy convoys in the seas adjacent to or immediately south of Constantinople. He even led a daring but futile assault against the Turkish island of Tenedo in 1646, an attempt which, if successful, would have given Venice control of a position located only a few miles from the entrance to the Dardanelles.

Despite minor setbacks, the Venetian fleet under Morosini continued to patrol the northern Aegean during the winter of 1646-47. An event occurred in January 1647 which dramatically reflected the kind of courage and pluck of which Venetian naval commanders were frequently capable. It was in that month that Morosini's own galley was driven by northeastern winds toward the island of Negroponte. Here he encountered a fleet of forty-five Turkish galleys. With courage bordering on the reckless he ordered his ship to attack in spite of the numerical superiority of the enemy. The ensuing battle claimed the life of Morosini, and his galley was only barely saved by the timely arrival of reinforcements under Proveditor-General Grimani. Although the futility of Morosini's
action was obvious, it showed the aggressive daring which often characterized Venetian seamanship.

This second winter of the war thus ended on a note of tragic heroism. In terms of military accomplishment the war remained still deadlocked in a discouraging stalemate. Notwithstanding occasional moments of glory, the Venetians still lacked the determination and unity needed to dislodge the Turkish forces at Candia.

Besides the vessels under Morosini, there was another fleet under a new commander, G. B. Grimani. Grimani had been appointed to replace the spiritless Giovanni Cappello and his arrival brought the hope that a more forceful campaign would now be waged. This change of command did bring to the armada new and vigorous leadership but there were still few events of any note in 1647. Scattered bombardments such as that which took place at the island of Scio (Chios) and blockades maintained at Turkish ports such as that at Nauplia did little to restrict the enemy's military capacity. Thousands of Turkish troops continued to land safely at Canea with the Venetian patrols seldom capable of doing more than delaying the arrival of these reinforcements or intercepting one or two isolated enemy convoy vessels.

The following year witnessed the same series of patrols, blockades, and harassment maneuvers. The only event of any note occurred in March of 1648. On the 18th of that month Grimani's fleet of 24 galleys, 5 galleasses, and 27 vessels encountered a furious storm near the island of Psara close to Scio; many ships were battered into a "million pieces" and the more fortunate were thrown upon the beach. Others were shattered on the rocky crags of the coast. Fortunately, the wind blew most of
the ships toward land which enabled many of the men aboard to escape to the safety of the beach. One galley, that of Grimani, was "the most maltreated" and sank with the loss of eight hundred men; in addition, 24,000 ducats went down with the Captain-General's flagship. The total loss resulting from the storm was estimated to be eighteen to nineteen galleys and nine vessels.

Undaunted by this loss, the Venetian squadron, now reduced to a handful of galleys and the five original galeasses, assembled itself and sailed northward in order to reinforce the blockade of the Dardanelles. When news reached Constantinople of the disastrous shipwreck of the Venetian fleet, the Turkish commander decided to attempt to force his way past the crippled allies. His optimism proved unfounded, and he and his galleys were forced back into the safety of the Dardanelles. The inability of the Turkish fleet to escape the blockade infuriated the Sultan as much as it encouraged the Venetians. The March tragedy naturally placed an additional burden on the resources of the Republic but it also served to show the enemy that no matter what misfortunes might befall Venice, her galleys would still remain masters of the seas; in this sense the March shipwreck could be viewed as a psychological victory for the Venetians.

The remainder of 1648 saw a minimum of naval activity and it was not until May of 1649 that Venice could finally claim a true military victory at sea. The battle came when Turkish ships blockaded in the Dardanelles tried to escape with help from a favorable wind; this Turkish fleet managed to reach the safety of the port of Focchies where the pursuing Venetians under Giacomo Riva established another blockade.
Although outnumbered, Riva decided to attack the Turkish convoy despite the dangers of cannon fire from the Turkish fortresses within the port. The subsequent engagement was an unreserved triumph for Venice; at a minimal sacrifice Riva's galleys sunk or destroyed three of those of the enemy as well as three maone and nine transport vessels.

Venice was justly proud of Riva's success and thus granted him the honorific title of Cavalier of San Marco. Unfortunately, the victory was somewhat hollow, for despite the damage which Riva had inflicted on the enemy, the Turkish convoy at Focchies remained largely intact and later managed to escape from the harbor and sail safely to Candia. A victory had been won, but the main strategic aim of the allies had not been achieved. In fact, after depositing its reinforcements and supplies at Canea, this same convoy of Turkish ships managed to return unscathed to the safety of the Dardanelles. Once again the victory would prove more damaging to the enemy psychologically than it would militarily. Perhaps with this in mind several senators at Venice proposed that the Venetian fleet not only maintain a passive blockade at the Dardanelles but that it should also pursue and harass enemy ships even to the walls of Constantinople itself; this suggestion was considered at the time too radical and the passive blockade continued.

And despite isolated victories such as Focchies, the Venetians were unable to strike a fatal or crippling blow against the enemy shipping capacity and remained unable to sever the Turkish line of supply to Candia.

The battle at Focchies was unfortunately typical of the type of naval victory won by the galleys of the Republic, not only during the
initial period but throughout the entire war. Whenever possible Turkish admirals preferred to avoid open confrontation with the superior Venetian navy, and whenever possible allied commanders attempted to force the enemy to accept their challenge. These two naval strategies, the one offensive and other defensive, were both tied to the land operations at Candia. Victory was not to be weighed in terms of the number of enemy galleys destroyed but rather in the men and material which did or did not reach the Turkish armies encamped on the island. Consequently, from a strategist's viewpoint, the first years of the war were filled with bitter failure for the Republic. Galley for galley the Venetian navy was undoubtedly superior to that of the Turks, but either for lack of large enough fleets or sufficiently aggressive commanders, the blockades and patrols were not achieving the desired results. By 1649 the tempo of the war had without question increased, but the position of the respective armies remained essentially unchanged.

II

The war in Dalmatia came as a result of widening the conflict which had begun in Candia. Although the warfare waged in this desolate region always remained secondary to the main theater of operations, the triumphs and defeats witnessed here nevertheless had considerable impact on the entire war effort. Because of its contiguity with the territory of the Ottoman empire and its relative proximity to the mainland of Venice, this mountainous wasteland assumed a strategic importance far greater than its
intrinsic economic or demographic value. Consequently, for a brief period of three years stretching from 1645 until 1648, the entire Dalmatian strip became the focus of a serious military effort by both adversaries.

Venetian control of the coasts of Dalmatia originated as far back as the Fourth Crusade (1202-1204) when crusading knights were persuaded to attack Zara and Durazzo in return for passage to the Holy Lands. From this time forward the Republic gradually extended its rule along four hundred miles of coastal domains. By the seventeenth century the Venetian empire included in this area the capital, Zara, as well as the towns of Spalato, Trau, Sebenico, Scardona, Novegradi and Pago. Included in this empire were also the coastal islands and the Istrian peninsula to the north. Protected as it was by bleak and forbidding mountains separating the coastal areas from the Turkish-held interior and surrounded by navigable waterways and channels, Dalmatia remained one of Venice's most easily protected overseas territories.

Besides being geographically close to Venice, this region also presented few 'social' problems. The towns and rural sectors were in no way troubled by an unruly nobility as Candia had been, and most of the inhabitants were peasant tribesmen and small town merchants who had strong bonds of loyalty to Venice. Many of the tribesmen who lived in the mountain regions bordering Ottoman lands were Christian by faith and thus had natural sympathies with the Venetian state. These Morlacchi, as they were known in Venice, proved invaluable as monitors of Turkish troop movements and as a source of numberless reserves needed to fill the ranks of the Venetian armies. Francesco Molino wrote with confidence of
their loyalty and sense of dedication: "In all the cities of Dalmatia," Molino wrote, "I have heard estimates of their devotion...(and desire) to expend their blood in the defense and service of this Very Serene Republic."

Since many of these tribesmen were nomadic, they sometimes shifted their allegiance to one side or the other in an effort to choose the winner. In certain areas, such as in the south near modern-day Albania and Montenegro, there was reason to suspect even open collusion with the Turks. At Ragusa, for example, foreign merchants, especially the Spanish, tried to cause unrest among the maritime peoples of the coasts in order to exacerbate Turco-Venetian commercial relations; their goal was naturally to increase Spanish commercial influence in the region. Fortunately for Venice, attempts of this nature generally failed and a harmonious rapport between the Republic and these nomadic and maritime peoples was preserved. Many of the Morlacchi and their subsidiary tribes actively sought allegiance to Venice by sending special ambassadors to the Venetian commanders requesting to be made subjects of the Republic. Throughout the long Candian war peace and friendship between these Dalmatian tribes and the Venetian state was seldom broken by any internal discord or treachery.

The threat of war erupting in Dalmatia as well as Candia increased in 1645 when a series of minor incidents erupted along the Turco-Venetian border. Minor police actions were initiated by the Turks against various tribes loyal to Venice which inhabited the mountains of Montenegro. In April, caravans were forbidden by orders from Constantinople to continue trading at the Venetian port of Spalato; this effectively cut off the supply of 'Pogliassane', warriors who normally accompanied the caravans.
and who were regularly recruited by Venetian officials to serve as guards and sentries. Turkish troops were also being concentrated at Buda by order of the Grand Vizier. By April the Provveditor-General of Dalmatia, Andrea Vendramin, clearly foresaw an imminent Turkish attack directed against his province. His fears were confirmed, for in June the Venetian bailo learned at Constantinople that an order had been given "to the Pasha of Buda to invade Dalmatia in the area of Spalato."

Dalmatia was a province prized by the Venetian government but one where matters were frequently approached with a sense of insouciance. In the spring of 1645, with a major invasion threatening, there could be found in all Dalmatia no more than 1,958 active soldiers; even by August, several months after war had officially been declared, these forces still only numbered 3,688 infantry and 426 cavalry. The naval force available in Dalmatia remained limited to numerous swift and lightly armed barques useful in patrolling the serpentine coastline but obviously of questionable value in terms of fire power.

Fortunately, these forces were gradually increased so that by January of 1646 over five thousand infantry and cavalry were available for the entire province. Zara, the capital, became the province's main stronghold from which supplies and reinforcements could be dispatched to the other fortresses scattered throughout the interior and along the coast. The funds allocated for the defense of the region likewise grew; in September and November of 1645 over 36,000 and 28,000 ducats respectively were sent to Dalmatia, both figures of which represent as much as 50 to 60 percent of that which was sent to Candia itself. Over 25,000 ducats per month were set aside for the province throughout the following year,
and in 1647, during a four-month long period of unusually intense fighting there were dispensed from the Venetian treasury almost 760,000 ducats. To supplement her own resources, Venice received from the Pope 100,000 gold scudi to be raised by the clergy of Dalmatia and 2,000 paid infantry for a period of six months. These rising costs reflect to a large extent the expansion of the Dalmatian war; unfortunately, they also reflect the ruinous influence which inflation and speculation, two evils invariably present in a war-time situation, had had on the Dalmatian economy. Without question the first three years of the Candian war demanded extraordinary financial sacrifices in all parts of the empire, including Dalmatia.

The Turkish invasion did not begin, in fact, until September of 1645 when several Venetian outposts near Spalato were subjected to bombardment and musket fire. These relatively harmless probes were apparently designed to test the perimeters of the Venetian defenses since no major assault followed until December, many months after the advantages of surprise had forever been lost.

Although Turkish movement in the province had been cautious and reserved, two of the lesser fortresses under Venetian control fell before the end of 1645. Novegradi, a fortress of no particular military importance beyond the fact that it was situated only twenty to thirty miles distant from Zara, fell in the summer to a sizable Turkish army; the surrender of Novegradi was a bitter psychological defeat for the armies of the Republic. Its loss also reflected the characteristically sluggish start which marred the defensive effort of Venice in 1645. Before the fortress had fallen, many advisors including the local commander...
had urged its abandonment and destruction since it was judged too difficult to defend under any circumstances; no such action was ever taken, thus presenting the Turkish general with a ready-made bastion dangerously close to Venetians supply lines. In addition, there were munitions and reinforcements available within the general vicinity of Novegradi none of which were, for one reason or another, sent to the besieged fortress. Considering the acknowledged vulnerability of this fortress, it seems logical that Novegradi should have either been reinforced or, as the experts had urged, demolished.

To the south about five to ten miles from Sebenico and nearly midway between Spalato and Zara was the Venetian river-fortress of Scardonia. This likewise was lost during the first Turkish campaign in Dalmatia and futile attempts to recapture it only enboldened the enemy. Consequently the successful strike against Scardonia was followed by a Turkish assault against Sebenico, an assault which failed because of the greater strength of this particular fortress and Venetian mastery of the waterways leading to it. By the end of this fall-winter campaign Turkish forces controlled an area comprising several thousand square miles between Novegradi and the Canal of Sebenico.

Despite the seizure of Novegradi and Scardonia the Turkish drive had fallen far short of its military potential. Excessive caution and poor strategic planning caused the Turkish commanders to leave men in reserve for future attacks rather than concentrating their vastly superior forces against a few select bastions of vital importance. Had Zara or Sebenico been captured, the Venetians would have been deprived of bases absolutely necessary for a successful defense of the entire province.
The Turkish armies had also failed to secure vital lines of communication and thus left themselves vulnerable to serious counterattacks.

The time inadvertently gained by the Venetian defenders afforded them invaluable opportunity to reinforce the defensive network of the province and to coordinate the upper levels of command. By the end of the summer of 1646, Venetian troop strength had reached nine thousand regulars and six hundred cavalry in addition to the local units of Morlacchi and Primoriani. Moreover, with the appointment of Leonardo Foscolo as Provveditor-General of Dalmatia, the Venetian forces were unified under a determined and astute commander; further unity was accomplished by placing the naval forces attached to Dalmatia under Gabriel Zorzi who was, in turn, subordinate to the Provveditor-General. Much squabbling and uncertainty was thus eliminated by this simple administrative decision. During the remainder of the struggle in Dalmatia, every effort was made in Venice to keep to a minimum any difficulty which might result from friction within the military hierarchy. Much of the new spirit characteristic of 1646, 1647, and 1648 was spontaneously generated by the highly successful defensive and offensive campaigns initiated under Foscolo's brilliant leadership. By the end of 1646 the Venetian policy in Dalmatia had dramatically shifted from one basically defensive in nature to one which carried the war to the enemy and which sought to retain the advantage by forcing the enemy off-balance.

Beyond specifically military problems, there were also serious economic and demographic troubles which threatened to weaken Venetian control of the province. The population had begun to decline as a result of the
tragedies of warfare and the need to relocate many of the peasantry. An interruption in the smooth flow of commercial traffic increased the scarcity of certain commodities and deprived the government of desperately needed custom revenues. In order to alleviate this fiscal crisis, public goods and sections of public lands were sold to raise money. This policy afforded immediate gains but also depleted the base for future government revenues. Even increasing the money sent to the province from Venice failed to narrow the deficiency in any significant way.

To the good fortune of Venice, 1646 proved to be another year of relative quiet in Dalmatia. During this year military preparations continued without serious interruption. There were the typical shortages of money and supplies, but generally by the fall of 1646 several of the fortresses in Dalmatia could be termed in satisfactory condition. Spalato was in need of more extensive bulwarks and trenches but Sebenico, Zara, Almissa, and Trau seemed prepared to repel even a major assault. Furthermore, the horsemanship, courage, and loyalty of the local Albanian and Croatian recruits was proving a greater military asset than originally had been expected.

Military action in 1646 was largely limited to feints, maneuvers, and occasional sieges. Novegrad changed hands twice in 1646, and both Zaravecchia and Sebenico were successfully defended by reinforced Venetian garrisons in conjunction with Venetian galleys which provided invaluable support by way of logistics and fire-power. After a second year of fighting the situation in Dalmatia had hardly changed; Venice remained master of the coastal regions, the rivers, and the four or five major cities of the province while Turkish troops continued to control a
quadrilateral section running from Novegradi and Zemonico in the north to Scardonia and Dernis in the south. From their respective positions each side endeavored to harass and psychologically unnerve as much as possible the opposition. The war would have to wait another year before the aggressive generalship of Foscolo brought to an end this unofficial stalemate.

For the next two years the Dalmatian campaigns under Leonardo Foscolo assumed an entirely new appearance. During this relatively short period Foscolo's armies managed to expel the Turks from Novegradi, Zemonico, Clissa, Scardona, Vrana, Dernis, and Chnin. In less than two years not a single fortress within a distance of twenty to thirty miles distance from the coast remained in the hands of Turkish forces.

Favored by a relatively harsh winter in Dalmatia which hindered the swift movement of Turkish supplies overland, General Foscolo moved early in 1647 toward Novegradi where he hoped to take this fortress from the enemy. Utilizing Venetian naval superiority with considerable expertise, Foscolo had an army of three thousand infantry and one hundred cavalry transported to the walls of Novegradi with relative ease and speed; simultaneously another Venetian force left Zara and traveled by land to the ancient Turkish fortress of Zemonico. Zemonico surrendered on the 19th of March and Novegradi on the 31st. This skillfully executed pincer prevented the Turkish commander from shifting his forces to help neutralize the Venetian attack. The seizure of these two fortresses reversed the Turkish momentum of 1645-46 and seriously endangered and weakened the enemy position in the north. Two other subsidiary Turkish fortresses, Vrana and Nadin, were captured by Foscolo's victorious armies.
making complete the Republic's victory in the north; by April enemy lines of communication to the northernmost areas had been totally disrupted.

These successes encouraged Foscolo to direct his attention to the south and the Turkish-held fortresses of Scardona and Dernis along the Canal of Sebenico. The subsequent attack on Scardona brought immediate triumph and within a few days the fortress was once more a Venetian possession. Only Dernis and Clissa, to the southeast and southwest respectively, were still Turkish. The Turkish forces now concentrated in the south were, however, to be respected and a serious counterattack came against Sebenico. In attacking Sebenico the Turkish commanders undertook a difficult task but one which, if successful, would have ruptured Venetian communications from the coast all the way to Scardona. Loss of Sebenico would have entailed loss of control of the Canal of Sebenico and would have denied Venetian galleys access to the interior by way of that same canal. In addition, the apparently excellent defensive position of Sebenico tended to encourage in Foscolo and other Venetian generals a sense of complacency and overconfidence.

The anticipated attack was expected to come from the east, where the Turks still held the fortresses of Dernis and Chnin (Knin) and through which a constant supply of goods and reinforcements might be maintained. As for preparing the fortress and its defenses, matters had completely changed since 1645; triumphant in the north and having at his command an army considerably larger than that which had been garrisoned in the province two years prior, Foscolo was now able to shift by sea many of the troops stationed in the north. In this fashion nearly 3,500
infantry and cavalry were amassed at Sebenico by August of 1647. In the event that this garrison should prove insufficient, even more reinforcements could be transported to Sebenico by the galleys and nav of the Republic.

Tensions mounted as money ran short and the fear of an imminent Turkish attack increased. Units of 'oltremontani' and French troops rebelled in August while dissension between the Venetian and papal commanders endangered morale. The assault finally came in August, and despite previous preparations, the attack proved difficult to repulse. Turkish trenches approached the walls of the fortress and Turkish batteries battered its walls. As sections of the outer defensive perimeter were being breached, additional Turkish reinforcements arrived from the east. The situation seemed grim until Foscolo managed to assemble reinforcements himself and have them transported along the coasts of the Adriatic and disembarked at Sebenico. This ability to shift forces from one point to another without expense of delay once again brought victory and, in this case, saved Sebenico.

The arrival of additional Venetian units forced the enemy to lift the siege of Sebenico and flee eastward in the direction of Dernis and Chnin. These retreating Turkish troops were harassed for the next two months by Morlacchi, Albanian, and Croatian cavalry, who destroyed several outposts and pursued the enemy to the perimeters of Dernis and Chnin. Although nearly 6,000 Turkish troops were hastily assembled at these two eastern strongholds, they were apparently exhausted and demoralized; a Venetian attack came in February of 1648 and both Dernis and Chnin fell a short time later. Retention of Chnin would have
been of use to the Venetian armies in better protecting the native Molacchi tribesmen of that area, but its vulnerability to Turkish attack and its distance from Sebenico led to its demolition.

By the spring of 1648 there remained only one fortress of any major importance which remained controlled by the Turkish armies. Important because of its proximity to the coast and to the commercial town of Spalato, the fortress of Clissa now found itself an isolated Turkish outpost along the Venetian dominated coast. The Turkish garrison there was relatively small, numbering only about 170 men, but because Clissa was located on top of a steep mountain top it was considered by nearly all military experts of the day to be 'invulnerable'. The Venetians began their siege of this 'invulnerable' citadel on the 16th of March, and despite the small Turkish garrison, it required over two weeks to bring about its surrender. Even then, it could have taken longer had not harsh weather and the difficult position of the fortress prevented Turkish relief columns from reaching the defenders. One bloody tragedy marred this last great Venetian victory in Dalmatia. The trouble came when many of the Morlacchi and Polissani tribesmen who had taken part in the siege broke out into an hysterical display of brutality and cruelty against the survivors of the Turkish garrison. The bitterness generated by three years of warfare with the Turks erupted into an uncontrollable massacre of many hapless victims who came into the way of the victors. Regardless of attempts to end the carnage, they continued to ravish and murder with concern neither "for sex, nor for age... (Turks) some in order to escape such a fury threw themselves from the windows and from the walls."

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Because Clissa had been considered invulnerable even by the Turks, the booty and provisions found there were considerable, especially in terms of money, muskets, and artillery. In terms of morale and prestige the capture of the 'invulnerable' Clissa also proved a worthy climax to Foscolo's brilliant and triumphant campaigning in Dalmatia. Whether or not to retain and refortify this fortress was a question submitted to the Senate in Venice. Although some advocates of its destruction argued that Clissa was too costly and too difficult to maintain, it was decided that the citadel should be garrisoned and added to the growing arsenal of Venetian fortresses in Dalmatia. By summer of 1648 that arsenal was without question impressive and complete, incorporating a military empire stretching from Clissa and Spalato in the south to Zara and Novegradi in the north.

The fall of Clissa signaled the end of this Dalmatian episode. With not a single fortress within forty or fifty miles of the coast in Turkish hands, the Senate could rest assured that the Dalmatian empire had been safely secured. Deprived even of bastions such as Zemonico and Dernis, which were Turkish long before 1645, it would be considerably more difficult for the armies of the Sultan to mount a massive drive into this arid and mountainous terrain. And despite minor reverses such as the Turkish recapture of Chnin, this Dalmatian empire would remain firmly controlled by the Venetians even to the close of the war. With its newly organized army and the decisive and unquestioned leadership provided by Foscolo, the Venetian Republic had swept the enemy from the field and had scored a triumph perhaps unequalled in the entire war.
In retrospect it is relatively easy to understand the factors underlying the Venetian victories in Dalmatia. Besides the dynamic generalship of Foscolo and his assistants, the principal cause of the victories was the Venetian control of the sea. This superiority provided the Venetian armies with a flexibility not enjoyed by their adversary. It also provided invaluable firepower, for the galleys were frequently able to support the infantry by raking enemy positions with their muskets and cannon. In addition, the ready availability of native Dalmatian recruits enabled Venetian commanders to replenish their depleted cavalry and infantry ranks with comparative ease. Moreover, these fierce native tribesmen brought to the campaigns an unmatched hatred for the Turks. It was not uncommon for these Morlacchi and Albanian recruits to celebrate their victories by dancing "on the remains of the Turks, throwing into the air various limbs... and cutting up others, especially their heads which they carry in triumph on their swords...." But perhaps equal in importance to the skill and courage of the Venetian armies were the disadvantages with which the Turkish forces had to struggle. Not only did the Dalmatian operation receive secondary consideration in relation to the demands of Candia, but the transportation of supplies and munitions into this mountainous and barren region by the Ottoman armies required almost superhuman effort. One case, for example, involved the shipment of one large artillery piece from Belgrade to the Dalmatian coast; to move this single cannon across the mountains, the use of nearly sixty buffaloes and forty oxen was necessary. Such logistical problems obviously limited the number of artillery pieces which could be used in Dalmatia and also hampered
military maneuvers because of the interminable delays involved. Without the advantage of naval support, Turkish maneuvers became cumbersome and inflexible.

As we have noted, Dalmatia was generally considered peripheral to the concerns of Candia. During the three-year period from 1645 to 1648, priorities shifted somewhat, especially as the campaigns in this region began to assume the stature of something greater than mere diversions. For these few brief years the war in Dalmatia in terms of men and material developed into a serious military contest. The proximity of the Dalmatian empire to the Venetian mainland demanded that this region be kept free from Turkish influence. The victories of Foscolo's armies insured that this would indeed be the case. Furthermore, they simultaneously served to brighten those first few years, which otherwise would have proved so dismal. Although the military history of the province ended essentially with the fall of Clissa, the glory of Dalmatia would provide all Venetians with a memory whose aura would last long after the campaign of 1648 had concluded.

III

Winning the war in Dalmatia was one thing, expelling the Turks from Candia still another. The victory in Dalmatia belonged almost totally to Venice, but it seemed that before Candia could be freed the Christian powers of Europe would first have to become involved.
Although Europe's concern continued to center on the fratricidal madness of the Thirty Years War, there seemed hope that peace would once again find Christendom united against the challenges of the infidel. Despite the paucity of the initial contributions, many in Venice continued to hope for massive assistance more in conformity with the great wealth and power of France and Spain.

The decade of the 1640's was a time during which the friendship of France and Venice seemed more than ever to offer promise. As the hegemony of Europe continued to shift to the Bourbons of France, the possibility and the hope that Venice might benefit from this rise in French power also increased. To many the defense of Candia would have seemed a simple matter had the Republic enjoyed the unreserved support of so great a power as France. But French support was reserved and French assistance slow in coming. The French ministers including Mazarin were completely aware of the desperate situation facing Venice, but still their replies concerning future aid were "customarily ambiguous, and restrained...." Despite the gradual eclipse of Spain, the demands of war in France were still too pressing to allow French ministers to contemplate severing ties with Constantinople. Although there was a faction within the government which advocated more direct involvement in the Candian war, the majority opinion urged caution and restraint. The government of France continued to honor in form its existing treaties with the Porte and agreed to assist Venice and Poland only in an unofficial manner.

Even the assistance which was offered seemed to involve one problem or another. For example, the French ships placed at the
service of Venice in the summer of 1646 had to be recalled in the
fall because they had been hired for only six months; pleas by Nani
in Paris to retain the services of these vessels was to no avail.
In addition, many of the levies recruited on French soil proved less
than reliable. Nani and the Senate would have preferred instead
direct loans or grants of money which could then have been used
without such complications. But when specific grants were promised,
even those encountered difficulties. One case involved a loan of
200,000 scudi authorized by Mazarin. The money was authorized, how-
ever, in the form of levies on future revenues since there were not
sufficient funds then in the state treasury. This meant that no funds
would be disbursed until they were collected sometime in the future
or until someone purchased in advance ownership of the specified
revenues. Nani observed how the French treasury was "indebted to the
extreme...." and how the government spent in 1647 the revenues in-
tended for 1648. The solvency of the crown was so in doubt that only
specific collateral and the word of the king would suffice to encour-
age individuals to loan the government money.

Intimately connected with the ability of France to lend assis-
tance to Venice was the question of the war raging in Europe. The
defeated condition of Spain and the weakening position of the Emperor
encouraged many to look for a rapid settlement of the Thirty Years War.
It was hoped that France and the Empire might be able to negotiate a
separate peace agreement. If such an arrangement could come about, then
France would be free to force a treaty on Spain thus ending the war
in Europe. Even if war continued between France and Spain, peace in
Germany would relieve the French treasury of a major burden and would permit Mazarin to release more money for use at Candia. But the hopes of Venice and of Nani, in particular, for a rapid settlement of the war in Europe were without substance and reality. Nani admitted to the Signoria in November of 1646 that France would only follow the peace offers made by others but would initiate none of her own. Although everyone spoke confidently of peace, he noted bitterly, "in the cabinet among the more trusted one speaks of arms, and of the future campaign in Italy...." The question of peace would have to wait. France would continue to preoccupy herself with European matters and the concerns of her own Realpolitik. No peace would be made with the Emperor until 1648 and none with Spain until eleven years after that, in 1659. With increased tension in Italy, the interminable war with Spain, a fiscal crisis in the treasury, and threatened civil upheaval at home, French assistance to the Venetian republic would necessarily be restricted to few concessions and many kind words.

At Madrid Venetian diplomats likewise met with continual vacillation and vagueness. The fiscal crisis in Spain was every bit as desperate as that met with in France. "These ministers," wrote the Venetian ambassador Giustinian from Madrid, "have expressed it to be absolutely impossible to do more. Spain is so exhausted of everything that it can not supply its own essentials. The president of the Council of the Indies and those of the agency for the provision of money meet with insuperable difficulties." Rumors concerning Spanish money being sent to Poland in order to instigate a 'Polish diversion' proved unfounded. All the important ministers spoke only in very
general terms and the chief minister of state, Don Luigi d'Arros, reminded Guistinian that the fiscal crisis was so pervasive that the Spanish armada itself "remained immobilized...solely for the lack of money." Furthermore, everything seemed to bog down in endless delays at the Spanish court; "at times I lose patience," Guistinian wrote, "for I am not able to stomach the tedium of these delays." The only assistance forthcoming from Spain was in the form of concessions to raise recruits and to contract the manufacture of biscuits and other war materiel.

So impoverished was the Spanish crown that by 1649 the Queen of Spain was forced to delay her journey from Milan due to the simple lack of sufficient funds for travel. Occasionally the treasury would be boosted by the arrival of the flotta from the New World and the quinto of silver which it carried to the king, but almost invariably this royal 'fifth' had already been spent in advance.

It was understandable then that all Venetian requests to have the Spanish armada sent to Candia were politely refused; Guistinian's argument that the Spanish ships could safely be sent in late summer or early fall after their campaigns in Europe, were equally dismissed by the crown. Even when peace came to the Empire in 1648, it was imperative that Spain solve first her own problems before becoming entangled with a war against the Sultan. And if an agreement could be reached between Spain and France the Spanish similarly would have to turn their attention toward the uprising in Portugal.

Since little positive assistance could be reasonably expected from Madrid, the paramount objective of Venetian diplomats to the

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court of Spain remained essentially negative. What Venetian representatives in Spain hoped above all to prevent was the signing of any agreement between Madrid and Constantinople which might prove disadvantageous to the interests of the Republic and the progress of the war. Venice was aware of the friendly relations which the Spanish nourished with the Turks, but in 1648 several events occurred which generated even greater fears. One of these 'incidents' concerned the proposal of certain Spanish ministers to extend to Turkish ships the privilege of trading and anchoring at the ports of Messina and Naples. Fearing that Venice would soon sign a peace agreement with the Sultan, several 'principal ministers' felt it wiser for the safety of Spain's Italian possessions to make such friendly gestures to Turkish commercial traffic; because of the king's religious integrity and 'zeal', however, the matter was left unresolved and thus temporarily suspended.

Another 'shock' was caused only one year later, in 1649, when there was sent from Constantinople to Madrid a certain Acmet Aga who carried with him warm wishes from the Sultan and several serious proposals. Besides proposing the marriage of Don Juan of Austria to a Turkish princess, Acmet suggested the possibility that a joint operation of Turkish and Spanish forces might be undertaken against the Italian territories of Venice. The plan was supposed to involve amassing a sizable Turkish armada in the Adriatic while Spanish troops launched an attack from Milan. Nothing developed from this suggestion, but contemplation of its implications for the safety of the Venetian Terraferma must have busied many members of the Senate. Moreover, the warm welcome accorded Acmet on his arrival at Madrid, and the arrival of a special Spanish emissary later in Constantinople must
have been considered by many Venetians as far beyond the requirements of diplomatic courtesy.

As far as resolving the war by means of direct diplomatic negotiations with Constantinople, there were few signs that offered any reason about which to be optimistic. Most of the reports from Constantinople were similar to that sent by bailo Soranzo in the spring of 1646 in which he warned the Senate that there was little chance for peace, especially since the Sultan and his ministers were so swollen with pride and conceit over their continual victories. The French minister likewise confirmed the fact that the Sultan and his ministers were in no way interested in discussing the question of peace. Grillo, the Venetian dragoman at Constantinople, warned Soranzo that it would probably be impossible to begin peace negotiations as long as Venice insisted on the restitution of Canea. In a conversation with Grillo, the Grand Vizier had even demanded the immediate cession of the entire kingdom and as well the payment of tribute! Such was the intransigence which Venetian diplomatic efforts encountered at Constantinople.

Beyond his immediate capacity as the representative of Venice, Soranzo also tried to keep informed of the diplomatic situation in the East especially concerning Turkish relations with Poland and the Empire. Occasionally it seemed as if there was a real possibility that Poland or Muscovy might declare war on the eastern frontier, but the Sultan remained intent on preserving the friendship of the Poles and the Tartars. It seemed even less likely that the Cossacks under Bogdan Khmelnitsky would break with the Sultan since the Cossack
leader planned to sever completely his relations with Poland.

Soranzo had less reason to be concerned with the affairs of Poland than he did with the negotiations which had been undertaken between Constantinople and the Holy Roman Emperor. Reason for his concern lay with the traditional tribute which the Emperor paid annually to the Sultan in return for Suzerainty over the lands of Hungary. The negotiations underway were in connection with the Sultan's demand that his tribute be increased. Since the wars in Europe had drained the Emperor's treasury, it was rumored that the Sultan had offered to modify his demands for increased tribute in return for imperial permission for Turkish troops to pass through Hungary and the Duchy of Carniola. If Turkish troops were permitted to pass through these areas, all Venetian territory in the Istrian peninsula and in the Terraferma north of the Piave might be subjected to the ravages of warfare. Although it was unthinkable for the German Emperor to sign such a pact with the Sultan, there was reason for concern, as long as the possibility existed. No one on the Terraferma wanted a relatively 'comfortable' colonial war turned into a struggle for life and death. The Emperor himself made very attempt to avoid such an agreement, but, as Soranzo ominously warned, there were still those at court who "would have embraced the proposition...." Fortunately, Soranzo observed, the German nobility remained unalterably opposed to the designs of the Moslem infidel.

Throughout the late 1640's Venice also continued to importune the larger Italian states for assistance in the war. Although the Papacy
represented the most important of these states, Innocent X had his own problems. The pro-Spanish posture of Innocent and the frictions resulting from the dispute with France over the machinations of the Barberinis cast an ominous Bourbon shadow over Rome. The Pope was consequently hesitant to part with his fleet and his treasury in the interests of a distant war in the Levant. In addition to the dangers posed by French restlessness, the pontiff found himself further constrained by the depleted condition of his treasury; Innocent inherited not only the debts of the ambitious Urban VIII but acquired some of his own in the seizure of Castro and the revolt of Masaniello in Naples in the late 1640's.

Venice felt displeased with the performance of the Pope and especially with the failure of the pontifical galleys to appear at Candia during three of the first six years of the war.* Many Venetians undoubtedly argued that the few papal galleys would be of no use in preventing a French invasion of the peninsula but could serve a worthy purpose by joining the other auxiliary units in the waters of Candia. To further complicate matters, there were residues of distrust connected with such questions as ecclesiastical patronage, legal jurisdiction, and censorship which tended to exacerbate Papal-Venetian relations. This residual antagonism was rooted in many decades of mutual antipathy and misunderstanding. The papal nuncio in Venice during the war, Archbishop Scipio Pannochieschi, pointed out several areas in which the Venetian state had encroached on the

*The pontifical fleet remained in Italian waters in 1646 and 1649 as a result of the French threat to the peninsula; in 1650 it again failed to join the auxiliaries in order to protect the Christian pilgrims traveling to Rome for the Jubilee.
prerogatives of His Holiness. Undoubtedly there were many at Rome who shared this view. When the tactless Venetian ambassador to Rome, Giovanni Guistinian, depicted to the Pope the misfortunes of the Republic, Innocent replied that perhaps God was merely punishing Venice for having disregarded the rights of His church. An atmosphere of this nature was hardly conducive to a spirit of complete cooperation.

Venice similarly persisted in its effort to eliminate the differences which continued to alienate her from her sister republic of Genoa. But the Genoese found it increasingly necessary to preserve in Europe a delicate balance between rival French and Spanish factions. As a result, Genoa made every effort to remain aloof from the problems of Venice and did so by feigning indignation over relatively insignificant matters of protocol and diplomacy. In 1647, for example, the Genoese resident at Vicenza presented himself before the Signoria where he swore that his government had issued orders to equip ten galleys and two galleons for service at Candia. To receive this generous offer, the Venetian Senate had only to request the aid and to grant Genoa the official title of 'Serenissima' or "Most Serene", an honorary title which had already been awarded to Venice. On March 9, 1647, the Senate complied with this request by affixing on a formal note to the Genoese Doge and dukes the title of 'Serenissima'. Instead of fulfilling the terms of their offer, the Genoese demanded in addition to 'Serenissima' the title of 'Eccellanza' and also precedence over the Maltese galleys in the formation of the allied armada; every attempt to resolve this question of precedence between the Maltese and Genoese
failed. Fearful that in an effort to please the Genoese Venice might lose the very tangible support of the Maltese, Venetian diplomats left the matter unresolved. And angered by what seemed to be obvious duplicity, the Venetian Senate decided to erase the references it made in its March letter to 'Serenissima' when addressing the Genoese Republic.

Assistance from other sources remained extremely limited. The belligerent attitude assumed by France in the late 1640's tended to create an atmosphere of wariness especially in the smaller pro-Habsburg Italian states of Parma, Tuscany, and Modena. Beyond minor contributions such as the Duke of Modena's gift of thirteen condemned men for use in the galleys and permission to levy troops or purchase sacks of grain, these states had to preoccupy themselves first and foremost with their own defense. These gestures had no real military significance as far as the war was concerned and are best seen as kindly acts designed to retain the diplomatic goodwill of the Venetian state.

During this period there was one diplomatic development concerning a peace offer made by Venice which is worthy of attention. After more than two years of war and countless unsuccessful attempts to gain the united support of Christendom, in the winter of 1647 several senators proposed a peace offer to be presented to Constantinople for consideration. The first votes on the peace offer were defeated, but the proposal finally passed on the 31st of January, 1648. With the victories in Dalmatia to use as pawns and with increased civil turmoil rumored within the Ottoman empire, many senators felt it a propitious time to begin bargaining with the enemy. The Venetian
offer included the return of all Turkish territories won by Foscolo in Dalmatia and the transfer to Turkish control of the two Adriatic islands of Tine and Parga. If necessary, Venice would also agree to raze the Candian fortresses of Rettimo and Canea, and would make a reparation payment of 500,000 realies. In return Venice demanded the restoration of the entire island of Candia. Nothing came from this proposal, for the Grand Vizier seemed more intransigent and determined than ever. Only one year after this agreement had been proposed the vizier, in a fit of rage, had strangled the Venetian dragoman, Grillo, and imprisoned and humiliated the Republic's ambassador, Soranzo.

The mid-century was approached without any noticeable change in the diplomatic situation. The Candian war was still very much a Venetian war and what external assistance the Republic received was not sufficient to neutralize the Sultan's military superiority. The prospect for future relief from the powers of Europe seemed equally dim. Despite the settlement at Westphalia, France and Spain remained locked in war, while civil rebellions ranging from the French Fronde to the revolt in Catalonia turned Europe's attention inward. And with almost no reason at all to hope that the Sultan would accept anything short of total surrender of Candia, the beleaguered Venetian Republic adapted itself to the possibility of many more years of warfare.
CHAPTER III: FOOTNOTES

1. Andrea Valiéro, Historia della guerra di Candia (Venice, 1679), p. 19. (Hereinafter referred to as Historia.)

2. Ibid., pp. 94-95.

3. A.S.V., P.T.M. (797), Camillo Gonzaga, August 3, 1646. It is extremely difficult to estimate exactly the number of troops stationed at Rettimo before the Turkish assault in September. The Provveditore-Generale listed for July, 1646, 349 infantry plus 200 reinforcements making a total of 549. This particular number must have been augmented considerably by September or during the siege itself since it was reported later that there were 1,200 men alone who remained hold up in the inner bastion after the rout of October 20th. There may have been several thousand men in the garrison at the time of the initial attack. See A.S.V., P.T.M. (797), Corner to Senate, Letter 215, July 19, 1646.

4. B.N.M., VII (9156), Relazione delle operazione de Turchi sotto Rettimo l'anno 1646 in lettere dell'Zaccaria Balbo, Sopra Provveditore de Rettimo, October 18, 1646, pp. 236-41.

5. A.S.V., P.T.M. (797), Letter 238, September 30, 1646, Corner to Senate, (Rettimo). Corner wrote from Rettimo that he found there "a fortress...full of frightened inhabitants and fugitives, and...I can not promise...to be able with benefit of the exterior fortifications to make similar resistance (to another Turkish assault)." See also A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 81, Camillo Gonzaga, Rettimo. An earlier attempt to prevent the arrival of Turkish reinforcements at Rettimo failed when the troops under Gonzaga encountered no enemy soldiers at the pass at Almiro.

6. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 81, Camillo Gonzaga, Rettimo. Once panic set in even the cavalry refused to enter combat, many preferring to scatter their horses rather than have to join the fight. "Having seen every remedy in vain," Gonzaga wrote, "and the soldiers rather inclined to throw themselves into the sea than to show themselves to the enemy again, I ordered the gates (of the inner bastion) opened and allowed the men to enter into the fortress in order to end so unfortunate a thing."


8. B.N.M., VII (9158), p. 300. This source estimated the number of paid soldiers at Candia in April 1646 at over 9,000 men.

10. Ibid.

11. A.S.V., P.T.M. (797), Letter 229, August 30, 1646, (Corner to Senate), Rettimo; B.N.M., VII (9158), pp. 301-302. Camillo Gonzaga recorded his observations of Candia: "I entered the city, where...(I passed) over cadavers, the streets and public squares and even the Port of the Arsenal being full of them. I saw at the same time a continuous transport of goods to the jetty, as if they had wished to abandon the city...(and) I stopped this exodus not without serious complaint by some public representatives...." A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 81, Camillo Gonzaga.


13. Ibid., See also A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 81, Relazione delle cose di Candia fatto in Senato dall'Don Camillo Gonzaga, 1646.


17. For some of the operations during 1646 at Porto della Suda and the fortifications which marked the coast of the bay, see A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 81, Camillo Gonzaga; Relazione di Sig. Dalla Valletta, 1646: B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, p. 89, map 41.

18. A.S.V., P.T.M. (797), March 14, 1646, Corner to Senate, Candia.

19. B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, 1647.


21. Many Venetians had hoped that the end of the Thirty Years War in Europe would make it easier to hire new infantry recruits; instead, unfortunately, the lack of funds greatly disappointed these hopes. Moreover, there were occasionally restrictions placed on the use of troops hired in various countries such as Switzerland. Here the governments of Zurich and Bern refused permission to allow their men to be employed outside of Italy. See Valiero, Historia, pp. 174-177.
22. Antonio Guglielmotti, Storia della marina pontificia. La squadra ausiliara della marina Romana a Candia e alla Morea. Storia del 1644 al 1669 (Rome, 1883), VIII, pp. 46-68. (Hereinafter referred to as Marina Pontificia.)

23. Samuele Romanin, Storia documentata di Venezia (Venice, 1853-61), VII, p. 375. (Hereinafter referred to as Storia.)


26. A sympathetic author of the history of the Venetian navy has written: "Even this second year of war had not been put to good use by the Venetian Armada and ...it is necessary to agree that in the Armada there was still not formed the combative spirit necessary and there was not generalized reciprocal trust...." Mario Mani Mocenigo, Le marina Veneziana da Lepanto alla caduta della Repubblica (Rome, 1930), pp. 151-152. (Hereinafter referred to as Marina Veneziana.)

27. Grimani maintained a brief blockade of Turkish vessels at Nauplia, but was forced to withdraw from this port by the approaching winter and the departure of the auxiliaries. Mocenigo also had some success in blockading Scio and in sinking two enemy galleys; Mocenigo's blockade was ended when he was ordered to join in the blockade at Nauplia. In both instances, however, the Turks managed to escape relatively unharmed and later were able to join a convoy which safely arrived at Canea with 9,000 troops and many provisions. See Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 153-155.

28. For several of the numerous accounts of this shipwreck of 1648, see B.N.M., VII (211), Letter of April 8, 1648; Valiero, Historia, pp. 147-152; Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 156-158; B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, p. 75, map 34.


30. The Venetians were generally outnumbered at sea though not nearly in so great disproportion as some writers would like to have thought. For example, in 1646 the Turkish fleet which left the Dardanelles consisted of seventy galleys, five maone, and thirty-five vessels with two hundred smaller saiches. The Venetians had at Suda a force consisting of fifty-two galleys, six galleasses, and twenty armed barques. See B.N.M., VII (9158), p. 298. Generally, however, the difference in fleet sizes was greater than this, and the Venetian and allied commanders had to rely more heavily on superior seamanship or fire-power to counterbalance the numerical disadvantages. Moreover, the Venetians were not always able to count on the support of the auxiliaries who, as in the years

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1649 and 1650, found matters at home more pressing than the war against the infidel; it was in these two years that the papal squadron remained in Italian waters because of the troubles with the Farnese and the Duchy of Castro and also because of the Jubilee pilgrims of 1650. See Nani-Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 161-162, n. 1; Valiero, Historia, pp. 208-210.

31. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 75, Relazione de Francesco Molino, Provveditor-General da Mar, September 21, 1645. One contemporary historian noted that the Morlacchi and Albanians were the "Iroquois" of that region; moreover, they knew the terrain explicitly and showed themselves brave in battle. They also proved much more durable in the harsh climate of Dalmatia, much more so than the European troops. Sometimes, however, their ardor led them to follow their own emotions, thus limiting the orderliness they had in battle. Antoine de la Haye, La poltique civile et militaire des Venitiens (Cologne, 1669), pp. 103-104, 135, 138.

32. Frederico Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia durante la guerra di Candia, 1645-1648," Archivio Veneto, XX (1937), 5th Series, pp. 212-213. Ragusa was considered by many contemporaries of the war as a "true center of intrigue...."

33. B.N.M., Miscellanea 269, Relazione de felici progressi... nelle Dalmatia, pp. 31-32; Valiero, Historia, p. 124.

34. Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia," XX, pp. 219-221.


37. Ibid., pp. 230-231.

38. Ibid., pp. 61-62; Sertonaco Anticanò, Frammenti istorici in Dalmazia (Venice, 1649), pp. 13-15.


40. For a design of Novigradi and almost all the other fortresses of Dalmatia see B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, passim.

41. For the complete account of the preparations at Novigradi and its eventual fall in 1645 see Anticanò, Frammenti istorici in Dalmazia, pp. 49-59.

42. Ibid., pp. 75-79.

44. Venetian troop strength in Dalmatia by the end of the summer of 1646 was as follows: Zara - 4,786 infantry, 546 cavalry; Sebenico - 1,060 infantry, 30 cavalry; Spalato - 1,083 infantry, 12 cavalry; Cattaro - 838 infantry. In total there were some 8,936 infantry and 606 cavalry scattered throughout the province. Turkish troops numbered approximately twenty thousand infantry and cavalry combined and these were accompanied by eight large artillery pieces from Belgrade. This artillery was apparently often antiquated, one of the pieces tracing its history back to the era of Charles V. Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia," XX, pp. 232, 242-244.

45. Ibid., pp. 239-240

46. Ibid., pp. 236-238.

47. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 66, Dalmatia 1646, Relazione di Andrea Vendramin, May 23, 1646. As the Provveditore Estraordinario of Spalato noted, during times of peace, wine and oil were in abundance, but now that war had erupted, these commodities (which had been originally acquired from the Turks) were in great demand and had to be brought in by sea. Moreover, the treasury itself was completely drained. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 72, Spalato, Alvise Cocco, Provveditore Estraordinario di Spalato, December 30, 1648. The interruption of commerce and trade was obviously not total, but revenues did decline and the neutral Ragusians tended to profit from the disorders of war. Naturally, merchants who hoped to avoid seizures and penalties were inclined to trade at Ragusa and Ancona rather than risk the hazards of war by trading with Venetian ports and ships. In addition, the Ragusians themselves supplied the Turks with galleys and other small vessels and profited by this trade as well. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 66, Vendramin, Dalmatia, May 23, 1646.

48. A.S.V., P.T.M. (373), Rubrica di lettere del Provveditore-Generale in Dalmatia et Albania, 1646-51, Sebenico, Letter of October 1646 and Letter of October 30, 1646, Almissa; A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 72, Antonio Lippomano, Provveditore Estraordinario di Spalato et Trau, Letter of November 9, 1646; A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 66, Relazione di Andrea Vendramin ritorno di Provveditore-Generale in Dalmatia, Letter of May 23, 1646. Many of the lesser fortresses such as Trau and Spalato had at their command thirty to forty large and small artillery pieces, a number generally in excess of what the Turkish armies had to use. The costs of the war, though less than that in Candia, nevertheless did represent a sizable burden to the public treasury. For example, at Spalato, Lippomano reported a public revenue of 6,093 ducats, but an outlay for infantry and cavalry for Spalato and Almissa of 45,000 ducats; at Trau, the Captain reported an income of 21,384 ducats for 1645, but expenditure amounting to 49,447 ducats.
49. Valiero, Historia, p. 66; B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, pp. 14, 22 and maps 4, 9 respectively. After the abortive attempt to capture Sebenico in August of 1646, the Turkish forces were turned against the southern parts of Bosnia in the hope that the tribesmen of this area, the Primorians, might be swayed from their allegiance to Venice. Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia," XX, pp. 248-49.

50. A.S.V., P.T.M. (373), Provveditore-Generale in Dalmatia et Albania, Foscolo, 1647-51, Letter of January 21, 1647, Rubrica 365; Angelo de Benvenuti, "Il castello di Zemonico e la torre di Vercuvo," La Rivista Dalmatica, Part I, XVI (Dec., 1937), pp. 27-28, 46-47; Valiero, Historia, pp. 101-104; B.N.M., Miscellanea 169, Relazione di felici progressi dell'armi della Serenissima Repubblica di Venezia nella Dalmatia, pp. 3-23. It is interesting to note that Turkish soldiers frequently displayed extraordinary courage such as those soldiers who defended Zemonico against the Venetian assault. When the fortress was finally taken over, two hundred Turkish defenders refused to surrender from their underground hiding place and preferred instead to die fighting.

51. Vrana, a fortress approximately two days distant from Novegradi, was "ringed by walls with four small strong towers but not very well provisioned with munitions and soldiers." When the Venetians began to besiege Vrana, the Turks sent reinforcements from Cissa. The siege lasted eleven days and nights, but when news arrived that the Venetians had taken Nadin, all hope for a successful defense vanished and the Turkish survivors at Vrana surrendered. See B.N.M., VII (211), Lettera che avvisava la vittoria di Novi Gradi, Letter of April 28, 1647 from Vrana, pp. 103-107. See also B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, p. 51, map 23 and p. 53, map 24.


53. One of the basic reasons why Sebenico was considered relatively safe was the poor condition of the roads leading to it. With roads in such a condition, there was little chance for a surprise attack to occur. Moreover, the fortifications at Sebenico were considered by Foscolo himself to be "near perfection." A.S.V., P.T.M., (373), Provveditore-Generale in Dalmatia et Albania, Foscolo, 1646-51, Letter 280, July 29, 1647, Zara. Also see Sassi, "le campagne di Dalmazia," XX, passim. Sassi considered Foscolo's miscalculation concerning Turkish intentions to attack Sebenico the only serious mistake the general made while in command in Dalmatia.


55. The Pasha of Bosnia had reputedly about sixteen thousand men, but many of these were only poorly armed; only three thousand of these were Janissaries. Foscolo had at his command approximately nine thousand men in addition to several hundred Morlacchi and local recruits. Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 76-77.

57. B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, p. 61, map 28; Valiero, Historia, pp. 118-122; Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 84-85.

58. Anticano, Frammenti istorici di Dalmatia, pp. 244-245; B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, p. 63, map 29, and p. 65 and map 30. Demis fell to Venetian armies on February 25, 1648, and Cfanin (also Khin or Chinin) nearly forty miles from Sebenico, fell two days later on the 27th.

59. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 72, Lippomano Provveditore Estraordinario di Spalato e Trau, Letter of November 23, 1646.

60. Anticano, Frammenti istorici di Dalmatia, pp. 274-75. Apparently the Venetians did not hesitate to offer the native tribesmen bounties for every Turkish head they acquired. These tribesmen had so many heads with them that they were like "sequins of beads." See De La Haye, La politique civile et militaire des Venitiens, pp. 136-137.


62. Ibid., pp. 282-288. For further information on the siege of Clissa and the slaughter which followed the surrender, see B.N.M., Miscellanea 169, Presa di Clissa, Continuatione de felici progressi dell'Armi della Serenissima Repubblica di Venezia nella Dalmatia, 1648, pp. 2-16; B.N.M., VII (211), Relazione della presa di Clissa, Letter April 5, 1648, Zara, pp. 125-132; Alessandro Vernino, Della storia della guerra di Dalmatia sotto il generalato di Leonardo Foscolo (Venice, 1648), pp. 152-154; B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, pp. 67-69, 71, 73 and maps 31-34 respectively; Valiero, Historia, pp. 159-160; Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia," XXI, p. 85.


64. The Venetian armies were reorganized so that specialized units came to play a more important role. There were special infantry and cavalry units, reorganized so that they would function more smoothly in action. Moreover, there was considerable mixing of nationalities within units in order to minimize rivalries and competition which sometimes developed among isolated nationalities. Ibid., pp. 98-99.

65. The Venetian galleys stationed on the Dalmatian coast generally accomplished their tasks with relative ease. Even though there were only six galleys and one galleass, all with depleted crews and a chronic shortage of money, these six proved sufficient to patrol the essentially compact area of Dalmatia. When winds were favorable, the area they had to patrol could usually be covered entirely in a matter of a few days. When Dalmatia was considered "secure" in 1648, the galleys

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of Dalmatia were almost all ordered to the Levant for service at Candia and the eastern Mediterranean Sea. A.S.V., P.T.M. (373), Provveditore-General in Dalmatia et Albania, 1647-51, Foscolo, Letter of April 30, 1648, Zara, Rubrica 404; Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 85-86.

66. It often proved a difficult task maintaining the permanent loyalty of some independent tribes. One case involved the Iacinizza who had been promised the protection of Venice and who were later attacked by several members of the Possidariani; the Iacinizza then looked to the Turks for protection. But despite such isolated incidents, these natives proved invaluable to the Venetian cause, so much so that certain tribes like the Morlacchi were formally outlawed by the Sultan. Sometimes the ferocious vehemence of these Morlacchi was so intense that they preferred to cut to pieces their Turkish captives rather than take prisoners; Foscolo ironically once complained that this practice was causing a serious shortage of galley slaves. See A.S.V., P.T.M. (373), Provveditore-General in Dalmatia et Albania, Foscolo, Letter of May 27, 1648, Rubrica 416 and Letter of January 10, 1648, Rubrica 360; Anticano, Frammenti istorici di Dalmatia, pp. 35-36, 66-68, 282; Sassi, "Le campagne di Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 74, 89-90. To insure the continued loyalty and support of these local tribes, the Venetian government and army frequently went to great pains to protect their safety. When individual tribes were situated in dangerous areas, the members would be transferred to a relatively secure region or to an area such as the Istrian peninsula or the island of Pago where the tribes would help to populate a desolate area and strengthen the region as a "buffer zone" for the future. These relocation operations frequently involved many thousands of men, women, children, and animals. See A.S.V., P.T.M. (373), Provveditore-General in Dalmatia et Albania, Foscolo, Letter of July 25, 1647, Rubrica 277 and Letter of August 6, 1647, Rubrica 283.


68. A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Francia, Filza 104, Letter 387, August 14, 1646, Battista Nani; A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Francia, Filza 105, Letter 433, November 13, 1646, Battista Nani. Nani noted how well informed the French ministers and Mazzarin were, finding these ministers "with particulars more distinct, and much fuller...than I was able to say myself."


71. A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Francia, Filza 105, Letter 458, January 1, 1647, Battista Nani, Paris. Nani reported that many of the men recruited in France for service at Candia were men who had often fled from duty in the Spanish armies and were thus unreliable as soldiers.

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73. A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Francia, Filza 104, Letter 325, April 17, 1646, Letter 359, June 26, 1646, Battista Nani, Paris. Nani noted that even if war continued between France and Spain, peace in the Empire would bring much money to Venice, perhaps as much a year as "nine millions of franchi...."


75. The Venetians were permitted to continue raising levies on French soil and also to purchase grain and munitions for levies on the war. See A.S.V., Esposizioni Principi, Collegio, 1648, Registri 57, passim.


79. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Spagna, Filza 80, Letter translated from the Spanish sent by d'Haros to the Viceroy of Naples about December, 1646. These levies and material acquired in Spanish territories were purchased by Venice.


84. A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Spagna, Filza 81, Letter 303, June 10, 1648, Guistinian, Madrid, and Letter 313, July 18, 1648, Guistinian, Madrid, (coded), and Letter 9, November 4, 1648, Francesco Bianchi, Madrid, (coded). Perhaps the Spanish, like the Imperial ambassadors, were still irritated over the Venetian refusal to permit the passage of a Spanish convoy from Trieste to Naples in 1648. Venice offered to escort a ship carrying the
queen, but would not, as was traditionally her claimed prerogative, permit the passage of ships of any major power through the waters of her "gulf", namely, the "Venetian Gulf" or upper Adriatic. See A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Spagna, Filza 81, Letter 273, (coded), February 6, 1648, Guistinian, Madrid.


86. The vanity and pride of the Turkish ministers seemed in no way diminished by Venetian military efforts. In the summer of 1646, Soranzo learned that the Grand Vizier had marvelled at the small numbers of galleys attached to the Venetian armada, interpreting so few as an indication of the weakness of the Republic and of all Christianity. Rumors circulating in Constantinople also misled the Turks; one rumor suggested that the Venetians were having to spend nearly 600,000 reais a month on the war and that at such a rate the Republic could not hope to hold out very long. A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Constantinopoli, Filza 129, Letter 246, August 26, 1646, Giovanni Soranzo.

87. A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Constantinopoli, Letter 227, (coded), March 10, 1646, Giovanni Soranzo. Soranzo did his best to avoid complete dependence on the French ambassador for his contact with the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, but his efforts had limited effect.


90. A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Constantinopoli, Letter containing the contents of another letter dated November 30, 1646, and Letter 262, January 4, 1647 (1646), Soranzo, Vigne di Pera. The Sultan demanded that the 30,000 reais tribute paid by the Emperor be raised to as much as 200,000 reais; in this way the Sultan could maintain pressure on the Empire by a masked threat of having a war on two fronts, one with the Turks and the one in Europe.

91. A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Francia, Filza 104, Letter 359, June 26, 1646, and Letter 323, April 10, 1646, Battista Nani, Paris. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Disparci, Spagna, Filza 80, Letter 115, February 21, 1646, Guistinian, Madrid. On the character of Innocent X, Giovanni Guistinian the Venetian ambassador to Rome wrote: "There is currently the opinion... not only among the French but for a good part of the other nations, that the Pope is of Spanish genius (sic) and therefore much inclined to favor the interests of that crown. I do not deny that the temperament of His Holiness is more Spanish in manner, being in his nature very slow in
movement, grave in speaking,...but as for the rest he does not do more for them (the Spanish) than for another nation...." Guistinian also noted how the "French lament of having a Pop. badly inclined toward another nation and another's interests...." Nicolò Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet (eds.), Le Relazioni degli stati Europei lette al Senato degli ambasciatori Veneziani nel secolo decimottomo (Venice, 1856-78), II, Series III, Roma, pp. 131-134. (Hereinafter referred to as Barozzi and Berchet, Relazioni Ambasciatori.)

92. As Battista Nani, the Venetian ambassador in Paris facetiously remarked, if France wished to invade Italy she would not be stopped from doing so by "the ridiculous armament of the Pope, nor the six galleys...(of) the Grand Duke of Tuscany...."; rather, Nani, concludes, the Pope "does not wish to spend money." See A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Francia, Filza 104, Letter 304, March 8, 1646, Battista Nani, Paris.

93. Ludwig von Pastor, History of the Popes, trans. by Dom Ernest Graf (London, 1940), XXX, pp. 360-366. The Pope did grant to Venice 100,000 scudi in the form of ecclesiastical revenues in July, 1649, and the fleet of the pontiff served in the war in 1645, 1647, and 1648.


95. Ibid., pp. 31-37. Venice even tried resolving the dispute about precedence in the armada by offering to place the entire fleet under the command of the Pope; this ploy did not work however. Also, many people were of the opinion that Spanish pressure and influence in Genoa helped bring about the stalemate in this dispute since Spain did not want a strong Venice in the territories of the Terraferma. A weakened Venice in the peninsula gave Spain more leverage in the Duchy of Milan.

96. See for example the Esposizioni Principi, Collegio, 1648, Registri 57; passim.

97. Romanin, Storia, pp. 404-407. The first ballot on the proposal to elect 24 nobles to treat for peace with the Turkish representatives failed on November 19, 1647 by a vote of 37 to 74 with 24 abstaining. (Romanin, Storia, p. 405, n.1). There was only one extremely "dovish" proposal made which advocated peace at any price, including the surrender of the island; this was made by two Savii of the Council, Giovanni Emo and Nicolò Delsino. This proposal received few votes, many of the senators feeling that Delsino had proposed it only because his son remained a prisoner of the Turks. Valiero, Historia, pp. 145-146.

98. Romanin, Storia, p. 408; Valiero, Historia, pp. 211-213, 217-219. The troubles which apparently paralyzed much of the Ottoman empire in 1648-1649 seem to have been resolved by the fall of 1649, for at this time the Turks renewed with vigor their assault on Candia. Part of the Turkish trouble had stemmed from a pay demand by the Janissaries which was finally settled.
CHAPTER IV
YEARS OF QUIET, 1650-1666

From approximately 1650 until 1667 the war at Candia entered a semi-dormant stage. By mid-century the tone, intensity, and general scope of the war had become fairly well delineated. With only a few exceptions the war dragged on into a state of costly and exhausting attrition, a war where basic strategies changed little and where the battles won and lost seemed to have only ephemeral impact. The war seemed more a test of perseverance and tenacity rather than a trial of courage or cunning.

Symbolic of the enemy's intention to remain entrenched on Candia was the construction in 1650 of the fortress of Nuova Candia or New Candia. From a military viewpoint Nuova Candia presented no significant threat. Though built only a mile or so from Candia itself, the Turkish fortress had no adequate water supply, its walls were highly vulnerable to surprise attack, and it was cut off from the sea. Still there were garrisoned behind its walls four thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry which could be used to prevent any Venetian attempt to relieve Candia, and no matter how feeble the new fortress' defenses it was a much better place to pass a winter than the rain-drenched and unprotected trenches. And despite its military limitations, Nuova Candia was a visible and constant reminder that the armies of the Sultan were not about to end the siege of Candia in the very near future.¹

Judging the condition of Candia the Venetian defenders also seemed

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intent on resisting the Turkish siege. The fortress was a large complex measuring between three and four miles in circumference. In line with the architectural tradition of the military in the seventeenth century, the towers and bulwarks were arranged and designed in the shape of an arrow so that the walls would be better able to withstand the impact of the improved artillery and so that each section of the fortress could be protected by flanking fire from another. A fortress of this pattern demanded constant attention and continual outlays of money. Yet after more than five years of relentless Turkish attacks, General Tomaso Pompeo could write confidently in 1651 that the fortifications at Candia were in a state of "total perfection." Another observer, a certain Father Roberto Solaro from Malta, confirmed this opinion, noting how the fortifications of Candia were in optimum condition and how repair and construction continued apace. Construction of new bulwarks and escarpments and the repair of old ones was a constant chore but one upon which the salvation of the city ultimately rested.

The race to save Candia was frequently reduced to a frustrating contest aimed only at seeing how quickly a breach made by the enemy could be sealed or how rapidly money needed to purchase construction supplies could be raised. From the apparent condition of Candia at mid-century it would seem the Venetians were at least holding their own.

Entrenched behind this array of stone, concrete, and earthenworks was the mongrel mercenary army of the Venetian Republic. The size of this mercenary garrison of Italian, Greeks, and Germans varied considerably with each new season, but generally there were in the 1650's
between four and six thousand men in all. By one estimate, for example, there were in 1651 about 5,300 active infantry stationed in the city; seven years later another estimate placed the number of effectives at 4,400.\textsuperscript{4} Exactly how many additional men should have been assigned to the fortress so as to insure its defense or to enable the commanders to initiate a counterattack it is impossible to say, but generally the consensus seems to have been that there should have been at least two or three thousand more paid infantry at all times.\textsuperscript{5} Yet just maintaining a minimal level must have been a difficult task. The island's harsh climate and the army's irregular pay made desertions frequent. With men often forced to sleep in the open in cold and rain, it was not surprising to learn of sentinels fleeing to the countryside in order to escape the rigors of such a life. Occasionally fugitives became so numerous that it was necessary to inflict the severest of penalties including execution on deserters so as to stem the exodus.\textsuperscript{6}

The severity of duty at Candia also generated discontent within the officer ranks as well. Frequently a Venetian noble found serving his country a long-term proposition. Years and years had to be spent at sea or entrenched behind the walls of Candia, all with few personal rewards for the sacrifices involved. Moreover, it was not unusual to find a request for leave or transfer denied or passed over in silence. Luca Francesco Barbaro petitioned the Signoria in the spring of 1659 for leave to return to Venice and look after the affairs of his headless household; one year later he still had not received an affirmative reply to his not unreasonable request.\textsuperscript{7}
The most exasperating complaint of the men at Candia, enlisted men and officers alike, was the irregularity of the pay. Stranded as they were within the desolate confines of a besieged city, the only pleasures and amenities open to the men were those which demanded money. Unless a soldier were allotted his pay at regular intervals he more often than not would find himself completely impoverished; in such a state he would either find himself unable to purchase the goods he wanted from the city's civilian population or would be forced to rely on the services of disreputable credit agents. By the time the soldier's pay arrived, he had spent so much in advance and for interest charges that he was virtually enslaved in a perpetual cycle of indebtedness. Others who were fortunate enough to avoid the grasps of the loan sharks frequently found themselves on pay-day in possession of large quantities of money and, like the proverbial drunken sailor, wound up spending lavish sums without caution or restraint. So chaotic was the pay system that it affected even the officers. In 1659 the Provveditor-General made reference to the bitterness and dissatisfaction among the junior officers; many of these were men with families, he warned, and unless more money was forwarded immediately there would be trouble ahead.

Equally essential to the survival of Candia was the maintenance of a continuous supply of grain and fodder. Grain was needed for the manufacture of the army's basic staple, biscuits, and fodder to sustain the horses of the cavalry. One of the major logistical problems confronting any provveditor of the island was to maintain or increase the supply of these 'biscuits'; at times the reserves of this life-
sustaining commodity became dangerously low. In addition wine, meats, 
munitions, and clothing had to be imported to Candia from Venice or 
various parts of the archipelago. Even wood, vital for the construc-
tion of cannon carriages and for use in repair of the fortress, had to 
be brought in by sea. There was such short supply of timber on certain 
occasions that the masts of useless galleys had to serve. Opinion 
varied as to the cheapest and most efficient method by which the needs 
of Candia could be supplied, some officials arguing that it was more 
economical to buy directly from the sources of supply in the archipelago 
with others maintaining that it would be wiser to avoid hiring charges 
by trading as much as possible at Venice. No matter how the supplies 
were obtained, it was obvious that Candia was an extremely sterile is-
land from which it was impossible to furnish even the simplest and most 
essential of an army's needs. With Turkish forces firmly in control 
of the countryside, even the meager quantities of forage and foods 
generally available at Candia were denied to the Venetian defenders.

Compounding the difficulty of satisfying the needs of the Vene-
tian army at Candia was the existence of a large civilian population 
which inhabited the city. In 1655 after ten years of warfare there 
were estimated to be about ten to eleven thousand civilian inhabitants 
within the walls of the city, six to seven thousand of which were 
women, children, and aged. Besides consuming sizable quantities of 
food and clothing, these civilians, at least potentially, represented 
a possible threat to the security of the fortress. One provveditor 
in the mid-1650's feared that the misery of their lives might drive 
them to open rebellion or to conspiracy with the enemy. Furthermore,
there were many of these civilians who had relatives in the countryside through whom information might inadvertently be leaked.13 What worsened matters was that most of the productive citizenry who were possessed of a trade or talent had already fled the city in order to seek a new life somewhere else in the archipelago or in the cities of the Terraferma. The loss of skilled artisans from Candia proved so harmful in the eyes of Provveditor-General Barbaro that he issued in 1658 a decree forbidding departure from the city without first procuring an official license to do so.14

Finally, to appreciate completely the logistical problems facing Venetian commanders, one must keep in mind that the Turkish siege of Candia was almost constant and one from which little respite was enjoyed. The constancy of the siege all but precluded the possibility of recouping losses or accumulating a respectable reserve of vital supplies. The number of Turkish troops maintained at Candia in the 1650's varied by as much as five or ten thousand men, but usually there were somewhere between fifteen and twenty thousand enemy soldiers at all times, excluding several thousand more Turkish servants, merchants, and general factotums. Of these, 65-75 percent were customarily stationed at Candia while the remainder were scattered throughout the kingdom at Rettimo and at Canea.15 Although attrition resulting from disease and combat casualties was enormous, it was not uncommon for six or seven thousand reinforcements to be sent in order to replenish the Turkish army. Such seemingly endless supplies of manpower provided terrifying evidence of the enemy's capacity to absorb almost limitless
casualties. Not even the disastrous consequences of a plague seemed able to restrict the manpower reserves available to the Sultan. When plague struck the Ottoman empire in 1647, bailo Soranzo warned the Senate not to become less vigilant since there was no one thing which the Turks could "more abundantly supply than to the providing of men ...." 16

II

As we have witnessed, once the initial shock of the first few years of the war had subsided, the struggle for Candia developed into a test of logistical skill and perseverance rather than a test of momentary military genius or courage. The land war on Candia and in Dalmatia reflected this posture. Month after month and year after year the siege continued. Operations of a massive nature became a rarity as the psychology of limited objectives and limited warfare came to dominate more and more the thinking of the military strategists. The 1650's and the early 1660's are consequently best represented by the individual incident and not the crushing defeat, by the fall of isolated outposts and castelli and not the capture of Candia or the total annihilation of the enemy's fleet. Given the limited capacity of both powers on land as well as at sea, the possibility that either opponent might score an overwhelming victory was reduced to a minimum.

The policy of defensive action forced on the weaker Venetian armies
at Candia nevertheless included certain offensive tactics. Any pro-
longed defense which proved successful necessarily demanded occasional
offensive thrusts in order to force the besieging enemy forces off
balance. By directing timely assaults against Canea and other Turkish
positions, the Venetians forced the enemy to disperse its troops over
a much wider area and prevented a total concentration of Turkish troops
against Candia itself.

One such 'diversionary' attack came in 1650 when a Venetian task
force was sent against the island-fortress of San Todoro; the fortress
situated on this tiny rock island was the spot where the first Turkish
assault had begun in 1645. The Venetian raid came in the dawn of July
14, 1650. With the support of several galleys the beachhead was secur-
ed, and, after two unsuccessful attempts, Albanian infantry forced the
enemy from the island. The victory was, however, purely psychological.
Since San Todoro lay only a few miles offshore from the beaches adja-
cent to Canea, the island should have been strategically invaluable in
harassing Turkish shipping in the area. In fact, the limited size and
dilapidated condition of the fortress on San Todoro made it militarily
unsuited for such a responsibility. Likewise, the lack of fresh water
at San Todoro prohibited the stationing of more than a handful of
Venetian galleys there. Now that the Turkish commanders at Canea had
been alerted by the surprise attack on San Todoro, they would undoubt-
edly watch any allied movements in the area more carefully. Under such
circumstances, it was hardly surprising that within a year the Venetians
demolished the fortress and abandoned the island itself. The abando-
ment of San Todoro and the loss in 1650 of Sittia at the eastern end of
Candia were without question disappointing failures. They did tend to
confirm, however, the belief that Venice would only weaken her defensive
position if she continued to maintain such distant and highly vulnerable
sites. 17

No major Venetian land offensive was again undertaken until 1654,
when Lorenzo Delfino led an assault against the Turkish-held fortress
of Chnin in Dalmatia. This was a daring operation considering the dis-
tance of Chnin from the coast and its relative proximity to Turkish
lines of communication in the interior. This raid failed when several
thousand Turkish reinforcements arrived to rout the besiegers. 18 Not
for another six years would an operation of even this modest proportion
be initiated; whether in Dalmatia or on Candia, the sortie against
Chnin remained the exception to a military philosophy now more than
ever concerned with the maintenance of the status quo. 19

Despite the weakened state of Turkish forces during the late 1650's
nothing of importance occurred until the year 1660. At this time
France, recently freed from European war by the Peace of the Pyrenees
in 1659, sent a French expeditionary force to Candia to help participate
in a siege of Canea. 20 There were only about 2,500 Turkish soldiers at
Canea and it was hoped that the French, in conjunction with Venetian
naval support, might be able to sweep the Turks from Canea and the
surrounding fortresses on the Bay of Suda and perhaps eventually from
Candia itself. The combined task force of four thousand infantry, two
hundred cavalry, and fifteen ships sent from France under the command

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of Prince Amerigo d'Este succeeded only in capturing several of the Turkish positions encircling the Bay of Suda, but failed to force the capitulation of Canea. As much had been expected of Prince Amerigo's expedition, the failures of 1660 appeared even more ignominious and demoralizing. When Turkish reinforcements arrived to ensure the continued defense of Canea, the allied force rapidly disintegrated; the auxiliaries departed Candia in September, the Venetian Captain-General requested permission to relinquish his command, and the disconsolate Prince Amerigo died mysteriously a few months later on the island of Paros.

While the armies of Venice continued to concentrate their efforts on maintaining the military status quo of the late 1640's, the Venetian navy with its marines waged a more vigorous campaign against the enemy. But in spite of the republic's intention to press the Turks at sea and in the islands and coasts of the Aegean and Adriatic, the early 1650's seemed a somewhat disappointing sequel to the successes of men like Giacomo da Riva. For one reason or another, from 1649 until 1651 attempts to blockade the transit of supplies from Constantinople to Canea ended in failure. Neither Riva's reckless daring at Fochies in 1649 nor the Venetian victory over the Turkish fleet in the Cyclades in 1651 resulted in a decisive military triumph. No irreplaceable portion of the enemy's armada had been captured or destroyed, and no success had been reached in severing the lifeline of Turkish supplies flowing into Canea.

The next two years were equally frustrating. The armada, now
under the command of Leonardo Foscolo, the hero of Dalmatia, persisted
in its policy of search and destroy missions, but failed to engage the
enemy in any major confrontations. Unable to force the enemy to battle,
Foscolo concentrated his attention on minor ports and fortresses in the
hope that gradually the Sultan would lose either the will or the capac­
ity to continue. Foscolo's strategy led to occasional success, such as
the capture of the fortified island of Schiro north of Negroponte.
Against vital Turkish ports and depots such as Malvasia, the Venetian
galleys were seldom sufficient; Foscolo tried himself in 1653 to seize
Malvasia but Turkish resistance was too great.23 Even catastrophes
unrelated to the war, such as the revolt on Cyprus and the accidental
burning of large sections of Constantinople in 1653, failed to weaken
the capacity of the enemy to continue the war.24

Although the fact that the principal naval strategem of the Vene­
tian armada had been to blockade the entrance of the Dardanelles as
tightly as possible, no major engagements took place in this area until
nearly a decade after the war had begun. Then for four consecutive
years everything seemed to revolve about what happened there. From
1654 until 1657 there occurred at the Dardanelles a series of furious
clashes which superficially appeared destined to have some unalterable
effect on the military inertia. At no time throughout the entire war
did Venetian commanders seem so intent on retaining the blockade and
Turkish commanders so intent on escaping its grip as they did during
this intense period.

By the spring of 1654 there were in blockade at the Dardanelles
eight sottile galleys, two galleasses, and fifteen to sixteen navi all
under the command of Giuseppe Delfino. Between the 26th–27th of May, a
hastily assembled Turkish fleet consisting of more than forty galleys,
six maone, and twenty or so navi attempted to skirt the blockade and
escape to the safety of a port further south and closer to Candia. An
error on the part of several Venetian commanders caused eight Venetian
navi to be carried accidentally by a swift current beyond the immediate
area of the battle. Nevertheless, the remainder of the Venetian fleet
joined the chase. The action which ensued cost the Turkish commander
three or four vessels and the Venetians two. Losses of such minimal
proportions warranted no special acclaim, but many viewed the engagement
as an undeniable Venetian victory because the Turkish fleet had been
scattered and forced to flee. In addition, the 'victory' had been won
by a Venetian armada of vastly smaller size. Perhaps an explanation
for this exuberance can best be found in the enervating and colorless
inactivity of the past ten years of naval warfare. Unfortunately, the
prematurity of the Venetian satisfaction was bitterly revealed when
the scattered Turkish fleet managed to regather at the port of Troy and,
after about a month, proceed safely to Canea. Heroic and dramatic as
the battle of 1654 appeared to be, it still had failed to interrupt the
flow of supplies and reinforcements to the Turkish armies at Candia.

Venetian and Turkish fleets met again at the Dardanelles in June
of 1655. Since it was thought that the Turks were preparing a large
convoy at Malvasia, many of the galleys ordinarily assigned to the
Dardanelles were away from their post. Consequently, when the Turkish
armada of sixty galleys moved to break the blockade, it was confronted with a Venetian force no more than one third to one half its size. The battle which followed witnessed the capture of three Turkish sultans and the destruction of perhaps a dozen other Turkish vessels; the Venetians lost one ship, the Golia, which had exploded during the fight. As had happened so frequently in the past, the crippled Turkish fleet succeeded in reassembling its survivors in the safety of one of the Turkish ports to the south, this time at Focchies. Here the enemy armada made its repairs and waited until the temporary Venetian blockade had to be lifted a month later so that all Venetian forces could be concentrated in an attack on Malvasia. That same year twelve Turkish galleys eventually did arrive at Canea and the other enemy ships at sea managed to return safely to Constantinople. The campaigns of 1655 again revealed the lack of depth in the Venetian navy. Had there been sufficient numbers of galleys to maintain both the blockade of Focchies and the Dardanelles and at the same time to carry through the assault on Malvasia the enemy might have been seriously weakened.

The only other naval action by the Venetian armada in 1655 which deserves attention came with the sweep of several islands in the Aegean archipelago. During the summer prior to the unsuccessful siege of Malvasia, one squadron of the armada under Captain-General Morosini captured the Turkish fortress of Volo situated in the Gulf of Volo just north of Negroponte, and also subjugated the Greek island of Aegina where Turkish agents had attempted to subvert the loyalty of the island's citizenry. This later success not only avoided the danger of having a
Turkish depot established in the southern part of the archipelago, but it also tended to confirm and reinforce Venetian control over the other islands in the area. In this particular case, the punitive action taken on Aegina led the neighboring islands to pay obedience and tribute to Venice without question. The action taken at Aegina was, like similar action taken at Samos in 1651, designed primarily to remind the inhabitants of the archipelago of the continued military might of the Republic and to insure that in no way would the islands' loyalty to Venetian rule be undermined or challenged.  

By far the most dramatic of all the engagements at the Dardanelles came in 1656 and 1657. In these two confrontations the Venetian fleet displayed the seamanship and daring which had given it dominion in the eastern Mediterranean. Gathered at the Dardanelles in the summer of 1656 were over thirty allied galleys, seven galleasses and twenty-five vessels under the command of Lorenzo Marcello, Captain-General of the Sea. Amassed within the security of the straits was a Turkish armada larger than the allied fleet by some thirty additional galleys. To assist the Turkish fleet in its escape from the blockade, between ten and twenty thousand men were positioned with artillery along the shores of the Sea of Marmara with orders to impede the movement of the Venetian galleys. Recently erected fortresses at critical junctures provided additional land support for the Turkish vessels. The conformation which the Venetian blockade had to assume was consequently half-moon in shape with the interior of the half-moon arc moving arrow-like toward the middle of the strait. Besides the main element comprising the
half-moon, a secondary squadron of Venetian galleys hugged the Turkish coasts toward Anatolia; their responsibility was to prevent Turkish vessels from escaping southward by skirting the battery-protected shore.

The weather, of course, remained unpredictable, and Turkish commandants had the advantage of merely waiting for favorable winds which would drive the Venetian galleys southwestwardly away from the narrow entrance to the straits. The Turks had one other 'natural' advantage in the treacherous sea currents of the Dardanelles. Elevation differentials between the level of the Black Sea and that of the Aegean created a rush of water through the narrow straits and made delicate naval maneuvers a mariner's nightmare.

At noon on the 26th of June the Turkish admiral, Captain Pasha Sinau, ordered his fleet to move with great caution along the Asiatic coast past Ponta de Barbieri and hopefully beyond the blockade into the open sea; a favorable wind and current combined with the artillery of the shore batteries were intended to hinder any Venetian attempt to block the route to the south. As the Turkish vessels slipped along the eastern coastline under protection of the coastal installations, the furthermost Venetian galleys veered eastward in an effort to close in on the flank and rearguard of the enemy. A fortuitous shift in the wind aided this advance unit to execute the maneuver with perfection. This maneuver, in conjunction with the original configuration of the Venetian armada, effectively entrapped the enemy fleet between their own coast and the allied positions. All attempts by Turkish artillery fire from the shore to shatter the Venetian encirclement failed. Slowly the
trap tightened. The battle which followed lasted fourteen hours. Cadavers and burned hulls littered the water; of those entrapped only a fortunate few escaped the pincer and fatal grasp.

Venetian losses during the fourteen hours were substantial; three warships were burned beyond salvage and over three hundred were among the dead and wounded, including the armada's Captain-General, Lorenzo Marcello. But even these sacrifices were insignificant in relation to the victory won. Approximately thirteen galleys, six navi, and five maone fell into Venetian hands; hundreds of prisoners were taken and thousands of Christian slaves compelled to serve on Turkish galleys gained their freedom. Dozens of Turkish vessels were either damaged or destroyed and others found their only escape in abandoning their ships on the beaches and reefs of the eastern shore. Disagreement between the Maltese and the Venetian units concerning division of the spoils of war generated a touch of bitterness among the victors, but little could dispel the air of exultation which came in the wake of this unquestioned triumph at the Dardanelles.31

The Sultan was furious upon learning of the catastrophic destruction of his fleet, and consternation spread throughout Constantinople for fear that the victorious Christians would soon be at the gates of the city itself. The death of Marcello had, however, left command of the allied armada in question, and the booty-laden Maltese strained to return home with their prizes.32 Furthermore, it was argued by some that the wisest strategy now was to proceed directly to Candia and expel the Turkish in this moment of their weakness. Even though this
course of action had been the plan of Captain-General Marcello, it was decided in council to test first the Turkish defenses on the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos near the entrance to the Dardanelles. The psychological advantage of seizing two islands so threateningly close to the very entrance of the Dardanelles was obvious to all. But retention of two islands hundreds of miles distant from the nearest major Venetian base and almost within cannon shot of Constantinople was another matter, one perhaps too taxing for the sparse resources of the Republic. Albeit, the decision was made, and the victorious allied armada sailed toward Tenedos.33

Tenedos was the smaller of the two islands and lay a little more than ten miles from the mouth of the Dardanelles. A Venetian force under the command of the Provveditor dell'Armada Barbaro Badoer, established a foothold on the island and after six days of intense combat forced the surrender of the fortress. Similar success accompanied the assault on Lemnos, a much larger island twenty-five to thirty miles directly west of Tenedos and about fifty miles from the entrance of the Dardanelles. This fertile and centrally located island fell before the indefatigable offensive of the jubilant Venetians. Haunting the successes which followed these recent endeavors was, however, the undeniable strain which these fresh campaigns had placed on the depleted reserves of men and supplies. Badoer was still able to forward to Candia several shiploads of biscuits and reinforcements, but much attention had to be devoted to the repair and reprovisioning of his own fleet.34
The Venetian armada assembled in 1657 was under the command of Lazzaro Mocenigo, a man whose heroism and temperament would seem to have indicated that the Senate was intent on pushing the war à outrance. Mocenigo reconnoitered the general area around the island of Scio (Chios) just south of Lesbos in the hope that he might surprise a Turkish armada hugging the coast on its way to or from Constantinople; besides the nineteen galleys and seven galeasses with the Captain-General, another twelve navi were ordered to enforce a blockade of the Dardanelles. Mocenigo's hopes were realized on the 3rd of May when the Venetian squadron spotted a convoy of fifteen Algerian vessels. In the ensuing chase and battle seven of the Algerians were either burnt or captured. This was a relatively unimportant encounter. The importance of this particular engagement lay not with its momentary military significance but with its rather unique historical distinction. This battle at Scio represented one of the few times in naval history when a squadron comprised solely of galleys and galeasses singlehandedly defeated an enemy force consisting only of square-rigged navi. It was the conquest of mass and fire-power by superior seamanship and maneuverability.

Several months more were passed harassing the enemy before Mocenigo joined the Venetian, papal, and Maltese galleys already stationed at the Dardanelles. When Mocenigo's galleys had to leave the blockade a few weeks later in order to replenish their supply of fresh water, the Turkish armada tried to slip by the remaining allied ships. On the morning of the 17th of July, while adverse winds prevented the return
of Mocenigo's contingent, the Turkish armada of thirty galleys, eighteen navi, ten galeasses and numerous saiches set sail. Attacking without the support of Mocenigo's galleys, the allied fleet surrounded the enemy and inflicted such severe losses that the disordered Turkish armada was forced to retire within the safety of the straits.

The wind blew so furiously on the 18th that neither fleet was able to conduct maneuvers or maintain its formations with any exactitude. On the 19th the winds subsided and several Turkish galleys tried to escape the blockade. Having inadvertently missed the action of the 17th, Mocenigo was understandably anxious to engage the enemy at this moment. Consequently he forced his galley close to the Turkish shore in an effort to close the path of escape to the encircled enemy ships. This hazardous maneuver succeeded in completing the investment of the enemy and resulted in the loss of several other Turkish galleys and navi. The audacity of Mocenigo also exposed his flagship to the dangers of Turkish shore fire, and, subsequently cost him his own life. Mocenigo's body was recovered but the loss left the allied armada leaderless. Barbaro Badoer temporarily assumed the responsibilities of Captain-General, but Badoer had considerable difficulty in winning the unqualified support of the auxiliary units. Count Giovanni Bichi, commander of the papal galleys, offered only minimal cooperation and the Maltese, under Gregorio Carafa, sailed for home within five days of the Captain-General's death. Badoer ordered the remnants of the fleet to withdraw to Tenedos for repairs and refurbishment. It was at Tenedos where Badoer himself died on the 16th of August, less than one month after having
assumed Mocenigo's post. With Badoer's death the command passed to the inexperienced Lorenzo Renier.

Hoping to profit from the apparent disintegration and disorientation of the Venetian fleet, the Turks amassed an attack force and moved against Tenedos. As we have noted, Tenedos and Lemnos were at the very doorstep of Constantinople, and due to their proximity to the Dardanelles it was absolutely imperative that the Turkish military recapture them. Not only was Venetian control of them a challenge to the Sultan's hegemony of the northern Aegean, but their loss had also forced a rerouting of Turkish commercial traffic by way of Smyrna and camel caravans. A large Turkish force was sent against the fortress of Tenedos and captured it without a fight; in November after two months of siege Lemnos likewise was surrendered by the Venetian unit stationed there.37

The glorious aura of the victories of July 17-19th were thus somewhat overshadowed by the ignominious sequel which had followed. Tenedos and Lemnos were lost, the blockade at the Dardanelles had disintegrated in the wake of allied disunity, and no substantial improvement in the situation at Candia had been effected. The two encounters at the Dardanelles of 1656 and 1657 were unquestionably the most dramatic naval victories of the entire war. Yet in all of this heroic destructiveness neither the will nor the capacity of the enemy to continue the war had been in any way permanently or irreparably diminished. The timely recovery of Tenedos and Lemnos and the seemingly endless flow of reinforcements to Candia were ample evidence of the depth and resilience of the Turkish military. Had Mocenigo lived to carry the battle to the
gates of Constantinople itself, perhaps the victories won would have had greater import. Or had the blockades established at the Dardanelles been enforced year round instead of seasonally, perhaps the Turkish will to resist could have been slowly undermined by economic strangu-
lation. But as the situation stood, the strategy of blockade was, even at its most effective, still only a partial answer.

Ironically, the Dardanelles encounters of 1656 and 1657 represent the military apex of the war at sea. After two glorious victories, the kind of which Venetian commanders had for so long been hoping, the naval war entered a quiescent and almost paralytic phase. Most of the operations undertaken at sea during the period stretching from 1657 until 1667 were limited in purpose, concerned primarily with harassing enemy shipping or maintaining at satisfactory levels the reinforcements and supplies reserved at Candia. On occasion help arrived from unex-
pected quarters such as the four galleys loaned by the Duke of Tuscany in 1658. But generally an air of indifference characterized Europe's attitude toward the war; even the Pope considered the war in the East of less concern than his own internal problems and thus ordered his papal squadron to remain in home waters from 1662 until 1667. This attitude of increasing disinterest deepened after 1660 when the atten-
tion of Europe and Christendom turned toward the Austro-Turkish war on the borders of Hungary.

Besides this shift in European interest, the general naval strat-
egies of both adversaries were modified. Zorzi Morosini observed how the Turks, previously little inclined toward maritime matters, had be-
come recently quite skilled in "avoiding the hazardous contest, and in
directing themselves in navigational matters with very exact caution."
By restricting the number of galleys in any one flotilla and by relying
more and more on the services of various beys throughout the Ottoman
empire, the Turkish commanders hoped to minimize their losses; any op-
erations they undertook at sea were generally "within very narrow limits,
and often under the protection of their own fortresses." In addition,
the strategy of the Venetian armada shifted away from a massive block-
ade of the Dardanelles to a policy oriented toward the more limited
'search and destroy' mission. The Venetian strategy which became char-
acteristic of the later years of the war called for a division of the
fleet into separate squadrons whose prime objective was to scour the
archipelago and the Mediterranean in search of relatively small enemy
convoys of navi and saiches. Consequently, after 1657 no major encounter
between large fleets of Venetian and Turkish warships occurred at the
Dardanelles. 41

The 1658-59 campaigns under Francesco Morosini were energetic but
unfruitful. Most of Morosini's efforts were concentrated on punitive
raids against several islands in the Aegean archipelago and also against
specific targets in the Morea. One ambitious project involved an attempt
to seize Canea from the Turks. Unfortunately, differences between
French and papal officers delayed the assault long enough for the Turk-
ish commander to learn of the plan and to bolster his garrison with
additional reinforcements. The enterprise against Canea consequently
came to nothing. 42 To compound the failure of this abortive plan
against Canea, reports arrived in August that the Grand Vizier had reached the port of Canea with thirty-two well-provisioned and reinforced galleys. The subjugation of minor Aegean islands, and Morean fortresses was feeble compensation in return for the enemy's having received such bountiful supplies.

The decade of the 1660's opened on a note of optimism. Spain and France had finally agreed on peace, war seemed imminent between the Emperor and the Sultan, and rumors spread that the Ottoman empire itself was threatened by civil war in the Middle East. Yet despite these propitious circumstances, the Venetian offensive continued to lack initiative and vigor. One contemporary characterized the action of the early 1660's as a "war of corsair against corsair...which satisfied the lust for booty and fed the spirit of adventure, (but) did not advance one step the most important need." Several times during the first years of the decade sizable Turkish fleets were massed at the Dardanelles, but for one reason or another no confrontation with the Venetian armada resulted. Occasionally Venetian patrols fell upon Turkish convoys from Egypt, Rhodes, Constantinople, or some other Ottoman port-of-call and seized or destroyed them, but such attacks had little long-term effect. Now that the enemy no longer attempted to transport goods by way of large flotillas but preferred more and more to rely on small convoys dispatched from many areas of the empire, it proved nearly impossible to maintain any absolute embargo on goods shipped to Candia.

Consequently, the naval warfare between 1657 and 1666 was tinged
with lassitude and misdirection. The Turkish ministers became under-
standably preoccupied with events in Hungary while Venetian leaders
grew less bellicose as chances improved that the war might yet be re-
solved by diplomacy. Each side sought to preserve the status quo. The
relaxed atmosphere of the early 1660's sometimes created an air of in-
souciance. Such was the case in 1666 when the Venetian navy made no
serious effort to intercept a Turkish armada of fifty ships gathered in
the Morea; the result of this folly was later confirmed when this armada
safely landed men and supplies at Canea. In that same year Venice made
no attempt to establish even the semblance of a blockade at the Darda-
nelles, the result being an almost unimpaired free flow of supplies from
Constantinople to the Turkish armies at Candia. 48 Retrenchment and
cautions almost imperceptibly come to replace the aggressive naval
operations of the first ten years of the war. The furious Turkish offen-
sive against Candia between 1667 and 1669 leaves the wisdom of such
inaction and neglect open to question.

III

While military affairs during this period gradually receded in im-
portance, matters of international diplomacy became more crucial than
ever. Unlike the first years of the war, it was a period during which
the very real possibility existed that Venice might finally receive sub-
stantial support from the great powers of Europe. Venetian aspirations
were to be fulfilled, but only in a limited fashion.

In 1648 the main diplomatic concern of the Venetian state lay in

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trying to effect some kind of peaceful resolution of the Thirty Years War. For three long years Venetian diplomats endeavored to rush through a peace settlement at the Congress of Munster; as long as the Christian princes of Europe remained at war with each other, the infidel would be encouraged "to continue with obstinacy and pertinacious appetite against Christianity."¹⁹ Such was the opinion of the Venetian ambassador to Spain and undoubtedly an opinion shared by most patriotic Venetians. The war at Candia was viewed by them as much a religious crusade as a defense of Venetian commercial and political interests. Many looked optimistically forward to the day when a united Europe might come to the support of Venice.

For three years rumors circulated concerning the possibilities for peace, but it was not until 1648 that any concrete agreement was reached. That year witnessed the signing of the Peace of Westphalia and the withdrawal of the German states from the war in Europe. But the Treaty of Westphalia brought peace only to part of Europe. The war between France and Spain, the two powers from whom Venice had expected the most in financial and military support, continued unabated. From a Venetian viewpoint, the Treaty of Westphalia was a disheartening failure.

Venetian diplomatic efforts suffered further disappointment in 1648, the year of the Fronde in France. Many had suspected that Mazarin's primary concern with peace in Europe was his desire to be free to prosecute more forcefully the war against Spain.⁵⁰ But the eruption of the Fronde, a destructive civil war complicated by conspiratorial negotiations between French frondeurs and Spanish agents, made any immediate
assistance from France a distant possibility.

Furthermore, the Fronde tended to impose additional demands on an already difficult diplomatic situation. As factions developed within France supporting or denouncing first the Mazarin government and then the Spanish, it became increasingly difficult for Venetian diplomats to tread a delicate and unoffensive path. In no way could Venice hazard public support for any one faction without risking the alienation of a clique which one day might hold the reins of power in France.

The retention of one as sympathetic to the Venetian plight as Mazarin was naturally a line of action favored by Venice. It was with this in mind that the Venetians negotiated directly with Mazarin even in 1650-51 when his position seemed tenuous. Rumors claiming that Spain was negotiating directly with Constantinople, rumors fortunately later proved to be untrue, made the preservation of Mazarin's power in France even more necessary. Nevertheless, great caution was employed for fear that the Republic might find itself completely estranged from those who might eventually gain power. 51

Mazarin subsequently regained his position in France, and the furor of the Fronde quieted; but no immediate assistance flowed toward Venice. This was partially because many things still remained unsettled in France, 52 but French indifference could also be traced to the bitter reality that Venice failed to fit well into the schemes of Cardinal Mazarin. Mazarin's primary interest in Italy centered about reviving French influence there, and for this role he considered Venice, in her present dilemma, too weak to be of real importance. 53 Many in France
were convinced that the Sultan would never negotiate a peace without the cession of Candia; under such circumstances one could thus expect Venetian influence in Italy per se to remain minimal. As for religious or humanitarian altruism bringing France into the war, there seemed little hope. "In the end," the Venetian ambassador wrote in 1653, "the nature of the French (is) that they have more concern for the smallest of their interests than of all the world." Venetian efforts to win support at the court of Spain had similar results. Tortured by the war with France and the civil uprisings in Catalonia and Portugal, and exhausted by the fiscal and military disasters of half a century, Spain lay prostrate and near the point of collapse. The Spanish had difficulty maintaining their own equilibrium without having to become embroiled in the troubles of the East. The Venetian ambassador at Madrid was nevertheless noticeably dismayed at the vacillation and inaction which frustrated his efforts at the Spanish court. The ministers he met were filled with sympathy and fine words, words which had, however, "a false sound...." An anonymous letter of December 1652, a letter the ambassador partially discounted and one many would personally liked to have disbelieved, probably touched close to the truth. The letter, shown secretly to ambassador Querini by a member of the Spanish court, claimed Spain had no intention of rupturing relations with the Ottoman empire and that any assistance lent Venice would come only in quantities sufficient to keep the Republic preoccupied with the war. The motive behind such actions, the letter claimed, was to keep Venice paralyzed by the war thus freeing Spain to

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Querini tried to disregard the letter and its judgments but, in the light of Spanish interests in the Italian peninsula, it nevertheless contained arguments no serious Venetian minister could lightly dismiss.

Compounding the disappointment in Europe was the continued inability to improve diplomatic relations between Constantinople and Venice. In 1649 the Grand Vizier expelled the Venetian bailo, Soranzo, and had Soranzo's faithful dragoman, Grillo, strangled; for the subsequent three years the only official representing Venetian interests in Constantinople was the French ambassador, M. de la Haye. The Porte relented in 1652 and permitted residence to a new bailo, Giovanni Cappello, who was himself instructed by the Senate to offer the destruction of Canea and Rettimo, restoration of all Turkish domains lost in Dalmatia, a war indemnity and tribute in return for Venetian control of Candia. When the Grand Vizier learned that Cappello had come without permission to cede Candia, the new bailo himself was forced to withdraw to the relative safety of Adrianople. Two years later the Turkish representatives made it quite clear that they were not interested in other islands in exchange for Candia or in tribute or an indemnity, "only the cession of the kingdom." And a vast majority of Venetian senators held firmly to their belief that Candia had to be defended at all costs. Even the proposal to divide Candia into two parts was vehemently rejected because it was felt that such a situation would merely perpetuate bitterness between Christians and Moslems and would also leave the city of Candia extremely vulnerable to future assaults.
In 1655 Cappello's former secretary, Giovanni Battista Ballarino, was entrusted with the duties of bailo. Although Ballarino found life in the Turkish capital an almost constant danger, the first few years of his tenure seemed to offer more hope that diplomatic efforts might yet bring peace to the East. The improved diplomatic rapport during the later 1650's came as a result of a combination of events. Not only had the greatest military triumphs of the Venetian armada come in the mid-1650's, but relations between France and the Ottoman empire also seemed to worsen at this time. One incident involving the imprisonment of the French ambassador, M. de la Haye, for refusing to decipher an intercepted Venetian letter, raised considerable criticism in France. The arrest of ambassador de la Haye in May of 1658 placed Mazarin in a delicate position, for France at that moment was crucially involved in the Spanish war and could ill afford alienating the Sultan. Attempts to resolve the dispute through a special emissary failed, and by 1660 Franco-Turkish friendship had seemingly vanished. In fact, M. de la Haye, who temporarily had been released, was rearrested in 1660 and all French ships in Turkish ports were confiscated. The growing tensions between Paris and Constantinople and the advent of total peace in Europe with the signing of the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659 offered encouragement that France might yet sever completely her relations with the Turks.

During the late 1650's several incidents also occurred which indicated an increased warmth in Mazarin's attitude toward Venice. Part of this increased cordiality resulted from Mazarin's desire to use the

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diplomatic services and goodwill of Venice in bringing Savoy and the Republic of Genoa further into the French sphere of influence in Italy. Moreover, Mazarin hoped that Venetian pressure might help prevent the Duke of Mantua from supporting the Spanish faction. Undoubtedly, the victories won at the Dardanelles had increased the prestige of Venice and her importance as an Italian power. And as long as Venetian influence might be of significance in the chess game of Italian politics, Mazarin would remain sympathetic and concerned. Mazarin showed more than verbal sympathy in 1658, when he granted the Republic several ships and 100,000 scudi. Unfortunately, the money was indirectly entrusted to a French banker by the name of Bertrand Arson, who bankrupted shortly thereafter; Mazarin lent what support he could in forcing Arsen to pay the money to Venice, but collection was complicated in the courts and became a trying and difficult matter.

Finally, Venice stood to profit from the internal disorders which plagued the Ottoman empire during the last years of the 1650's. The disasters suffered at the Dardanelles and the threatened war in Hungary kept Constantinople in turmoil. Disturbances between Greeks and Moslems in the Morea increased, and Constantinople was stricken with pestilence in the summer of 1659. In addition, the empire was touched by the ravages of civil war in the winter of 1658-59. A rebellion of serious proportions was instigated by the pashas of Aleppo, Damascus, and Safed, who succeeded in gathering an army of 80,000 men, an army which at one time during the rebellion threatened to seize Constantinople itself. It is little wonder that under such circumstances the ministry at
Constantinople proved more conciliatory and receptive to diplomatic parleys. 66

Without question the most pressing concern on the mind of the Grand Vizier related to the tensions which had developed in Hungary. Along the Hungarian lands which bordered the Ottoman empire political matters remained in a state of almost constant flux. Although Ottoman influence in this area was of considerable importance, the power of the vizier in local matters was frequently challenged by the important and often meddlesome Racokzy family. To the Ottoman ministry, the Racokzy had become a disruptive element acting against the preservation of Turkish influence in these Hungarian borderlands. As a result, it had become extremely uncertain whether or not the vizier would attempt to have the Racokzy eliminated from Transylvanian affairs and replaced with nobles more receptive to the dictates of Constantinople. At first it appeared as if the Racokzy might escape the wrath of the vizier, but by the fall of 1657 all had changed and the Transylvanian lands of the Racokzy family seemed very much in danger from a Turkish attack. 67

Giovanni Battista Nani, the Venetian ambassador to the Emperor, noted the imprisonment of Racokzy's representative to Constantinople and the massing of Turkish troops along the Turco-Transylvanian border. As Racokzy hastened to return from Poland, fears increased that even the independence of Hungary itself might be threatened. 68 Nani also reported that while the Emperor would be unable to support openly the Racokzy, the importance of the Transylvania borderlands precluded complete noninvolvement by the Empire. 69

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Turkish threats continued throughout 1658, and there was much conjecture as to whether the attack would come first in Transylvania or in Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{70} Even the faintest possibility that Turkish troops might be passing through German lands and perhaps then into Friuli was enough to create grave concern in Venice. Nani constantly importuned the Emperor to defend with all effort the mountain passes of the Duchy of Carniola. According to Nani's reports, the Emperor was, in fact, intent on preventing Turkish passage through Carniola and had ordered a reinforcement of the fortresses of that region.\textsuperscript{71}

Despite his receiving the sympathetic support of the Emperor, Racokzy was officially deposed by the Grand Vizier in 1659 in favor of someone more willing to pay tribute.\textsuperscript{72} Although the Porte attempted to minimize the antipathy caused by its actions and to reassure the Emperor that the Sultan wished only peace with the Empire, the fear of war lingered. That fear had intensified by 1660 not merely because of the friction in Transylvania but also because the disorders in Asia which had so far distracted the vizier had by then come to an end.

War between the Emperor and the Turks appeared inevitable but what direct profit Venice would derive from such an event was uncertain. The desperate financial and military position of the Empire in 1659–60 seemed to preclude the possibility that the Emperor would be inclined to lend the Republic substantial assistance of any kind.\textsuperscript{73} Furthermore, Imperial representatives remained elusive and spoke only in vague terms, avoiding definite military commitments as much as possible. When Venetian negotiators broached the subject of a future Imperial-Venetian
alliance, ministers in Vienna evaded the subject and spoke only of the need for caution and the dangers of internal rebellion within the states of the German Empire. Vienna would commit itself only to defend the passes of Carniola and Styria. 74

Open warfare eventually erupted in Hungary between the Empire and the Turks. The war unfortunately lasted only a year, from 1663 until 1664, when it was ended by the brilliant victory of Montecuculli at St. Gotthard's Pass and the subsequent Treaty of Vasvar. The war was consequently too brief and limited in scope to compel Constantinople to reach some accord over the question of Candia. By forcing the Sultan to engage in warfare on two fronts, the Hungarian interlude of 1663-64 certainly provided some respite at Candia; the inertia of the war at Candia in the early 1660's was undeniable evidence of this fact. But the war nevertheless continued and it continued despite St. Gotthards, and, one might say, in spite of the Treaty of Vasvar.

In Italy the Venetians faced the same grim disappointment which they had found in the capitals of Europe. Throughout the 1650's and 1660's Franco-Spanish politics dominated the concern of the Italian states. Occasionally a contingent of troops or a cash grant might find its way to Venice from one of Italy's numerous states, but generally everyone's attention was inexorably shifted to the art of self-interest and self-preservation. There was little to spare for the trials of an endless war with the Turks.

To the detriment of Venetian interests in Candia, the entire Italian peninsula was gradually turned into a complex diplomatic labyrinth
with Spain and France feverishly vying for the loyalty of Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Genoa, and the Papacy. The diplomatic madness which consequently ensued resembled a strange pastiche of vagueness and confusion. The Genoese, who favored their French neighbors, found themselves at odds with the Spanish while the pro-Spanish Pope frequently encountered the acerbic criticism of the French. Since the Venetians were especially determined to maintain a neutral position in Italy, they were frequently called upon to act as mediators for one cause or another. When the Duke of Modena angered Spain by leaning too emphatically toward the French, he asked Venice to mollify the ministers at Madrid. Genoa, in particular, endeavored to benefit from the diplomatic influence and reputation of Venice by having Venetian representatives assuage the ire of the Spanish and the Maltese. It was quite obvious that in such situation Venice had little to gain and, in many ways, risked alienating any number of potential allies in the war against the Turks.

The Genoese Republic, for example, represented a potential ally of considerable significance. Venice's sister republic in Italy had invaluable commercial and banking wealth as well as a powerful fleet which could easily augment by ten or twenty galleys the allied armada patrolling in the East. But the Genoese found themselves trapped between the French hammer and the Spanish anvil. The true basis of the long-standing Venetian-Genoese dispute over honorific titles and entrance into the papal Sala Regio could be found in the necessity of Genoa to ply a delicate path between squabbling leviathans of Europe. As the Venetian ambassador Querini ruefully noted, "The Republic of Genoa will
always live in the honorable servitude of two crowns." Consequently, the exaggerated Genoese offers of assistance in the Candian war had to be assessed in light of the dangers which confronted Genoa. "All this mass of wild promises..." Giacomo Querini caustically noted, was not aimed at helping Venice but was "for their own interests..." Papal support of the Venetian war effort was likewise elusive and antiphonic, the Pope and his representatives always sympathetic to the dilemma which faced Venice but determining their course of action by reason of Italian or European politics.

The interests of France and Spain had to be weighed carefully, but the papacy had also its own wishes to consider especially in ecclesiastical matters. The issue in question during the 1650's centered about the readmittance of the Jesuits into Venetian territory. As the most militant representatives of papal supremacy, the Jesuits had been expelled from Venice and its territories during the Paolo Sarpi controversy of the beginning of the century. Mindful of the support his galleys lent in the war against the Turk, the Pope felt it opportune to pressure the Senate to consider the return of the Jesuits to Venice. A proposal to this effect was presented to the Venetian Senate and, with minor reservation, was accepted. In addition, Venice was forced to recognize papal demands for more independence in ecclesiastical appointment. With papal prestige and military support in question, these concessions became unpleasant but absolute necessities.

Beyond France, Spain, and the Italian states there remained a panoply of assorted European nations from whom potential aid might be
derived. These nations for one reason or another had a peripheral interest in the affairs of the East and the progress of the war at Candia. Poland and the Polish diversion against the Ottoman empire remained the elusive chimera which it had always been. The project suffered perhaps a fatal reverse when Bogdan Khmelnitski, the cossack leader designated to lead the invasion, quarreled with the Poles and found in return friendly support at Constantinople. The Polish king was in no position to make enemies of both the Turks and the cossacks of Khmelnitsky as well. Furthermore, whatever influence the French enjoyed in Poland would not be used to encourage a 'Polish diversion' against the Ottoman empire; Mazarin hoped to use Poland not in the interest of Venice but rather as a lever against the power of the Habsburgs of Austria. 79

To the English and the Dutch the war in the East was even more peripheral. The Dutch had enormous difficulty meeting the challenges of English commercial expansion, the Thirty Years War, and finally the megalomania of France's Louis XIV without assuming the additional burden of a war against the Turks. As for the role that England might play, especially under the active maritime policies of the Cromwellian government, there was reason for greater optimism. Unfortunately, Cromwell's new activism at sea was directed not against the Moslem Turk but against Catholic Spain. Occasionally English amoure propre would be inflamed over maritime incidents involving Moslem pirates but never to the point of war. The passing of Cromwell brought no noticeable shift in this posture during the 1660's. Since English naval and
commercial power lay firmly rooted in northern Europe, England had little incentive to become involved in a war with the 'infidel' in order to defend Catholic Venice.

From a diplomatic viewpoint the 1650's and the 1660's represented two completely different periods. The decade of the 1650's offered little promise that Venice would receive assistance from abroad in any substantial quantity. Spain and France, like England and the Dutch provinces, were inextricably bound up in the problem of their own wars. Poland, the cossacks, and the Ottoman empire had apparently reached an acceptable modus vivendi along the borders of Hungary and Transylvania. And as long as France and Spain continued to view Italy and its people as pawns in a private chess game, Venice could expect only minimal assistance from the states of the Italian peninsula.

But the decade of the 1660's brought a radical change in this situation and the future, after so many years of warfare, finally seemed bright with promise. The Peace of the Pyrenees, signed in 1659, ended nearly a half century of war between France and Spain. To Venetian observers, peace between France and Spain offered these important Catholic powers their first opportunity to support without hesitation the Candian war. Despite its failure, the expedition of Prince Amerigo d'Este in 1660 from France was indicative of the type of the military potential Venice hoped to see turned against the Turks at Candia. In addition, the tensions which had developed along the Transylvanian borders provided a chance that Constantinople might in the near future be confronted with a war on two fronts. There was even encouraging
news from Italy for the long-standing dispute between Venice and Piedmont had been satisfactorily resolved and military assistance from the Piedmontese had already been received for the war at Candia. As a result of this fortuitous shift in international affairs, a sense of euphoria tended to dominate the first few years of the 1660's. As the war subsided during the late 1650's and the political situation in Europe turned favorable, many Venetians became hopeful that an agreeable solution might yet be found to the war. Another decade of fighting, some of the most bitter of the war, would shatter irrevocably those pleasant dreams.

IV

Despite every diplomatic effort to gain financial assistance from the powers of Europe, the enormous burden of this frustrating and costly war fell directly upon Venice. How costly the war was in financial terms remains impossible to tell. One mid-century observer was amazed at how little life in Venice reflected a state of war; opulence, gambling, and fests were everywhere present in the city. But, he noted, few continued to live such lives of public luxury without eventually being forced to make private sacrifices. To finance the long Candian war public as well as private concessions had certainly to be made. This was especially true since the war touched Venice at a time when the Republic was in a state of inexorable financial and commercial
stagnation. Yet as undeniable as this economic decadence was, one must nevertheless remember that the very ability of Venice to continue such a war for nearly a quarter-century attests to a certain amount of financial ingenuity, flexibility, and vitality.

The war was financed in a variety of ways ranging from taxes and more rigorous collection of public debts to lotteries and forced loans. There existed no one systematic method but rather a vast panoply of financial devices all designed in one way or another to increase the revenues of the state. Most of the methods had been used before but now were employed with increased vigor and extensiveness. Certainly the most novel and socially repercussive of all the financial techniques was the sale of honors and government offices. An examination of this financial device will reveal the financial pressures which were felt in Venice during the first years of the war.

As is well known, the Venetian patriarchy was a closed caste of noble families whose nobility had been duly registered in the famous Libro d'oro or Golden Books. Only those inscribed in the Golden Books could claim nobility, and only those of the nobility were entitled to hold high office in the state. With only rare exception the ennobled families had remained the same for nearly two and one-half centuries, fixed at approximately 1,100 to 1,300 persons. For more than two centuries of formative and tumultuous history the Venetian nobility continued as a fixed caste into which only an honored handful were able to enter. Yet under the pressures of the Candia war the Venetian nobility, in 1646, proposed the very thing which it had so assiduously

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avoided for so long, namely the expansion of its ranks.

The proposal presented in 1646 to expand the nobility was designed purely to raise substantial sums for the war. Although defeated in the Great Council, the spirit of the measure survived. Certain families were, in fact, admitted to the nobility in 1646 upon payment of the required sum, and throughout the entire length of the war still others were accepted on an individual basis. For example, various families were accepted in the spring of 1646 upon payment of 60,000 ducats outright and 40,000 ducats placed in deposit at the treasury for 7 percent annual interest; the families were admitted in this particular by an overwhelming majority of votes. In this fashion nearly eighty families were ennobled during the Candian war while others were to be admitted during the war in Morea later in the century. Although sale of nobility was accepted as a wartime exigency, there were nevertheless many who opposed it. It was a practice which was never considered lightly; nearly two decades after the first proposal had been presented it still required for an affirmative vote approval of "four-fifth's of the Senate and two-third's of the Major Council."

If we accept Professor Davis' figure of eighty families admitted sometime between 1646 and 1669 and apply it to the 100,000 ducats required as payment, we arrive at a sum of 8,000,000 ducats raised in this fashion, an amount of money representing twice the expenditures made during the intense year of 1668. But the ennoblement of wealthy families was not the only honor pandered by the Republic in its desperate quest for money. The Procuratorship of St. Marks, once a highly
prized title reserved to a select few who had served the state in some extraordinary capacity, was also opened for sale. Sums ranging from 21,000 to 22,000 ducats outright to 2,000 ducats per year for the duration of the war were accepted from several nobles for this honor. Money payments were likewise accepted for early admittance into the Major Council. For 150 ducats a youth of eighteen could be admitted with voting privileges to the Major Council, and for 200 ducats would be extended these same privileges even five years sooner; for only a money payment youths could now enter the Council when they had "hardly left tutelage and school...." Parallel to this sale of honors was the sale of governmental offices, a practice common to all European states of the seventeenth century, especially so in France and Spain. Venality was a customary procedure in Venetian territory, but none of the extreme excesses linked to the French model were associated with it. In Venice only the lesser governmental offices, the ministero, could be acquired through sale; these ministero were, in turn, subordinate to the control and directives of appointed magistrates. These lesser positions included posts as secretary, controller, notary, all of which carried modest salaries and limited power; magistracies and more important offices of state were, however, generally reserved solely for Venetian nobles. In addition, the lesser offices which were sold publicly carried with them no perpetual claim of ownership as did venal offices sold in France. Although the Republic attempted to retain relatively strict control over this practice, venality naturally increased when the demands of war required

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a substantial expansion of public revenues. \textsuperscript{91}

The revenue derived from the sale of these offices, when collected, represented a respectable sum of money. A note of June, 1651 refers to the sale of public goods and offices which returned for the offices alone 300,000 ducats; still another report alludes to the sale of 114 public offices yielding a still uncollected 52,924 ducats or an average of 464 ducats per office. \textsuperscript{92} Numerous difficulties arose concerning the sale of offices, the most serious resulting from the failure to report vacancies. Frequently, when an office fell vacant for one reason or another it was not immediately reported to government authorities, or replacements filled the office without the knowledge of the appropriate magistracy. Other offices which had been voided by the government at Venice were fraudulently reopened by assigning the same individual but with a false name. Such devious machinations were almost all designed to defraud the government of legitimate revenues from the sale of these offices. As a result, the government repeatedly issued decrees in an effort to minimize the loss of revenue, decrees requiring, for example, official proof from office holders of their titles, salaries, obligations, and payments. \textsuperscript{93} Every abuse naturally resulted in some loss of revenue.

Ironically, as the Republic labored to cover its war expenses by an increase in venality, the sale of offices was conducted with less scrutiny, and cases of fraudulent behavior consequently grew more frequent. Since office holders reimbursed themselves for the original purchase price by subtracting a certain percentage annually from the
total revenues of their office, there was considerable temptation to extract excessive percentages and to increase the remunerative value of the office. Innumerable cases flooded the magistracies of attempts to extract too great a return from an office; anything in excess of 20 percent per annum of the original purchase price was considered exorbitant, and certain offices were annulled as a result of such practices. It was even suggested that a return of $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 percent from certain lucrative posts should be considered sufficient although on most less lucrative offices 20 percent per annum seems to have been acceptable. 94

Besides the extension of venality, the magistrates also tried to increase revenues by more rigorously collecting debts owed to the government. There were elected, in January of 1645, three special Avogadori Fiscali or financial officers, whose task it was to assist in the collection of outstanding debts and, where necessary, to impose fines. 95 Magistrates were urged to collect all that was possible and to punish debtors who, "with various subterfuges" attempted to delay the penalties and exactions of the law; all were encouraged to "cut the ways and cavils of the litigants, and with all promptness prevent any extensions of the delays." 96 There were even months of 'amnesty' declared during which time those who came forth and paid their debts would suffer no additional financial penalty. 97 For those who proved especially recalcitrant, however, there was always the possibility that their goods might be auctioned publicly or they themselves cast into debtors prison. Indeed, there were apparently a few nobles among those so indebted, for in 1656 it was proposed that a list of all debtors be officially
published and that anyone on that list be formally prohibited from entering the Senate chambers.\textsuperscript{98}

How much was actually collected by such methods it is impossible to estimate with any accuracy. Undoubtedly the increased rigor produced some increase since the potential of such a source was indeed great. There were debts on properties owned by the state, on rentals, on the sale of public lands and goods, and on the purchase of government offices. Even though certain debts had to be discounted as lost because of the death of the debtor or his incapacity to pay, others were, in fact, successfully and profitably collected. Occasionally we read of sizable sums being added to the state treasury as a result of the government's efforts; such was the sum of 400,000 ducats collected between 1650 and 1658.\textsuperscript{99}

Another lucrative fund-raising effort lay in the sale of public properties such as lands, houses, buildings, and shops which were owned by the state. Throughout the war, permission was granted to various magistrates to sell or auction specific properties, properties not only in Venice per se, but also in the cities and territories of the Terraferma.\textsuperscript{100} The zeal of the government at times generated much criticism when officials attempted to sell lands purposely set aside for communal use as pasturage; some land of this nature was, in fact, sold, but greater caution was exercised for fear of public outcries.\textsuperscript{101} The sums collected from the sale of public properties represented a sizable contribution to the state treasury. One report of 1649 made reference to 576,000 ducats collected from public sales and another of 1651...
notes a sum of 700,000 ducats. Whether the receipts from these public sales were collected in full or only in part was, however, left unmentioned.

Donations and contributions were still another source of revenue although one not nearly as productive as other less voluntary or more rewarding means. There were, nevertheless, numerous instances when the populace and the nobility responded to the financial needs of the state. Priests would on occasion solicit contributions from parishioners, and individual nobles at various times would voluntarily offer one thousand ducats or so. In one instance the houses of Venice were solicited for donations and a sum of sixty thousand ducats was raised.

Paralleling the drive to increase state revenues was a coordinate effort to reduce or eliminate unnecessary expenditures. The efforts ranged from the elimination of the coronation of the Dogaressa, a step designed to save money, to the establishment of a supervisory magistrate in 1651 whose task it was to carefully scrutinize all government expenditures. In addition, anyone possessed of knowledge concerning how revenues might be increased or useless expenses eliminated was rewarded by a percentage of the money subsequently collected. All 'denunciations', many of which were concerned with frauds or uncollected debts, were kept secret and investigations made into the charges. Although receiving these 'denunciations' sometimes proved tedious, the practice was not discouraged by the government. Many of the 'denunciations' were without basis and many of the schemes by which money was to be raised were vague and without promise. But others, such as the proposal to
place a tax on the sale of all shoes and boots sold in the territories of Venice, must have been more seriously considered by the magistrates. Even if such methods were clandestine and inquisitorial, they may well have served to have encouraged some delinquents to honor their obligations to the state. Certainly such careful scrutiny of the wealth of the state helped to eliminate some abuses and also enable the magistrates to assess more judiciously taxes levied on the people.

Exclusive of the budgetary difficulties posed by the war, there remained the serious problem of monetary reliability and inflation. The enormous quantities of silver and gold consumed by war expenses tended to deplete the specie reserves of the government, threatening Venice with potentially dangerous inflation. Foreign currency as well as Venetian coins of gold and silver circulated at prices considerably higher than official values. The shortage of silver coinage at Venice placed an additional burden on the available supply of smaller currency made of base metals. To satisfy the demand for such daily currency, Venice was forced to accelerate the coinage of ever larger numbers of copper coins known as 'bezzi'; throughout the twenty-four years of the war literally thousands of ducats worth of these 'bezzi' were in fact minted. One tangential problem involved in the coinage of so many of these copper coins was the exorbitant cost of mintage in the seventeenth century. For example, it cost the Venetian Republic in 1647, 7,566 ducats to mint 24,000 ducats worth of small coins and, two years later, 5,412 ducats to coin the equivalent of 10,000 ducats.

So acute was the shortage of silver and gold currency that it be-
came almost impossible to prevent a flood of inferior foreign coins onto the Venetian commercial market. Counterfeiters and hoarders presented a nearly constant threat despite severe penalties against them. Money forbidden for public use could voluntarily be taken to the mint where it would be exchanged, at no loss to the owner, for acceptable coins; unfortunately, this practice controlled the flow of illegitimate specie at still another cost to the state. 110

By 1655 the shortage of unminted silver specie was so severe that silver scudi had to be melted down in order to have commemorative coins with the new Doge's bust reminted. 111 To alleviate such shortages it was a common practice for the magistrates to requisition silverplate, figurines, and valuable objects d'art from schools, religious orders, and private persons; the metal derived from these confiscations was minted into coins and credited to their former owner's account in the form of a loan to the state. Sometimes coercive threats had to be used to encourage individuals and institutions to bring their wealth to the mint but generally the attractive prices offered for the metals and the enticing interest rates 112 for the money subsequently minted were sufficient reward for many. All of these measures were, however, only temporary remedies for an evil which was rooted in commercial stagnation and the terrible financial pressures of the war. 113

The primary cause for the specie shortage was, of course, the war. No sooner were new coins minted at Venice than they were shipped abroad to satisfy the needs of Candia or Dalmatia. This was particularly the case at Candia where large numbers of troops had to be paid regularly,
and, for the most part, in small coinage. Although the financial situation on Candia was dismal even at the beginning of the century,\textsuperscript{114} the war with the Turks greatly aggravated matters. The military government on the island was generally so far in arrears that as soon as a shipment of ducats arrived from Venice it was almost immediately dispensed, often to repurchase the paper money and inferior coins which had been issued to the soldiers as temporary substitutes. A vicious cycle of self-sustaining indebtedness and poverty became the normal course of affairs. Inflation caused by excessive reliance on copper coinage had become so rampant by 1653 that Jacopo da Riva ordered an immediate recall of all such coins and had them returned to Venice. Unfortunately, under his successors when the supply of silver coins was exhausted, the military at Candia had again to resort to extensive use of copper coins.\textsuperscript{115}

V

Financing the war was the direct responsibility of the government of Venice, but the commercial and economic effects of the war were felt throughout the cities and territories of the Terraferma. It is understandably difficult to assess what influence the war at Candia had on the Terraferma. Certainly extraordinary sacrifices of a financial nature had to be made in order to assist in raising funds for the war. Likewise, the very existence of a state of war interrupted the smooth
flow of commercial traffic and goods to and from the industrial centers of the Venetian mainland. The difficulty arises in attempting to determine the direct influence of the war vis-à-vis the state of general economic decadence which had been witnessed in the Mediterranean long before the beginning of the conflict at Candia.

In terms of direct tax revenues, the pressures of the war undoubtedly had an effect felt in the Terraferma. During any normal year, it must be remembered, a significant proportion of the total revenues of the Republic derived from the taxes levied in the Terraferma; in 1641, for example, one-third of the entire yearly revenue originated in the Terraferma. Taxes were levied on the import and export of goods of all kinds including salt, meats, wine, and bread, as well as industrial commodities as silk and wool. A tax was levied on all inns and hostelleries and a certain percentage of all local fines and penalties was also collected. Such taxes were levied throughout the possessions of Venice although exemptions as a result of local customs were more frequently recognized in Dalmatia and the islands of the Levant than they were on the Terraferma. On occasion special levies would be imposed by Venice in order to raise revenue for the war. In 1650, for instance, several notable senators from Venice were elected to travel throughout the lands of the Terraferma so that they could assess specific sums from the various mainland cities. Despite intermittent complaints, these additional assessments were generally greeted with a minimum of hostility and some communities were even known to offer voluntarily a special wartime contribution.
Some major cities of the Terraferma seem to have suffered no direct effects from the war at Candia. Fraud, bandits, and public debtors were daily complaints which continued to plague the city of Padua, but there are seldom any specific references to ills caused directly by the war. The most permanent and frustrating problem facing the administrators of Padua was that of general economic decadence; once Padua was "in a state of opulence," the Captains of the city complained, but now poverty was commonplace and only the woolen industry had witnessed any prosperity in recent years. But such complaints had been commonly heard before the war had begun and the ills of Padua, like many cities of Italy, were as much related to the general decadence of the entire Mediterranean as they were to specific factors connected with the Turkish war.

Verona suffered from similar economic decadence and depression. And, like Padua, complaints about Verona's economy were not reserved solely for the years of the war. In 1644 the Podesta of the city noted that by the time of his tenure in office the riches of the silk and woolen industries were a glory of the past; by his time woolen production had fallen from 60,000 pieces of 'pani' to about one hundred, and the production of silk was not "very far from its total ruin." The disruption of trading routes as a result of the Thirty Years War had also disastrously affected the silk trade with Germany, decreasing Veronese revenues in this industry from as much as 700,000 ducats to 50-60,000 ducats annually.

There were several economically related problems which were in an indirect way tied to the pressures of the war. Population decreases at
Verona were probably further aggravated by the practice of levying
galleotti or oarsmen for service in the armadas of Venice. Another
more basic problem, and one which may possibly have been related to the
Republic's desperate need for wartime revenues, was connected with the
Venetian tax levied on all goods entering and leaving Verona. This
'datio della stradella' was a customs duty of approximately 4 percent
levied even on goods merely passing through Verona. Such a tax was
undoubtedly a lucrative source of revenue and one which a state at war
might be more inclined to retain. But a tax of this nature greatly
discouraged commerce and many petitions were sent to Venice urging its
repeal. The continued flight of foreign goods to other cities in order
to avoid the datio compelled Venice to grant a partial removal of the
tax on certain goods, but since it was retained on other goods, the
effect of this concession was probably minimal.121

How then did the war at Candia effect the economic status of
Verona? The evidence available suggests that the pressures of the war
and the inhibitions on the flow of maritime commercial traffic, which
that war must have had, did, in fact, further depress the economy of
the Terraferma, including Verona. Although we can not relate causally
certain factors as population and revenues to the Candian war, those
social indicators which do exist suggest unquestionably that the war
years were a time of continued economic decline. The population of
Verona, for example, seems to have either declined or remained unchanged
during a ten-year period of the war; there were within the city in 1645
approximately 25,793 persons and ten years later a population of 25,340.
Allowing for reasonable error, such figures suggest at best no demographic increase in the city of Verona for an entire decade. Moreover, one reads throughout the war years frequent references to the 'current distress' resulting from the war and to the need to reduce expenditures. During the first ten years of the war, total Veronese revenues also declined; in 1645 total revenues amounted to 211,669 ducats and by the mid-1650's the camera reported only 167,996 ducats.

Economic ills were reported in some of the other smaller cities of the Terraferma. In 1645 Vicenza granted as a voluntary war contribution 30,000 ducats. But eleven years later Tomaso Pisani, the Podesta of Vicenza, lamented the 'confusion' in the city's cloth trades and the inexorable encroachment of foreign goods manufactured in the north. At Treviso complaints centered about the inability of the government to collect debts and the ever increasing danger of banditry. Captains and Podestas of both cities complained of excessive taxation and a decline in the revenues derived from the custom duties.

Perhaps the most direct effect the Turkish war had on the Terraferma could be seen in the status of military life on the mainland. Contingents of local militia from the Terraferma sent to Dalmatia and elsewhere weakened Venetian military strength in Italy. There were reports claiming a decline in cavalry and militia training and a lack of adequate artillery and munitions, a state of affairs perhaps attributable to the obvious concentration of funds and resources at Candia. News had even reached Spain, where the Venetian ambassador learned from Spanish sources that the fortresses of Bergamo and Brescia were in
particularly weakened condition as a result of the needs of the war in the East. 125

Intimately connected with the economic life of Venice and the Terraferma was the state of Venetian commerce and shipbuilding, the very foundations upon which Venetian greatness had been established. Yet one witnesses a stagnation and decay in the maritime industries of the Republic similar to the economic decadence which was found in most cities of the Terraferma. A report issued a year before the outbreak of the war by the Cinque Savii alla Mercanza could not have been more discouraging. Skilled mariners and Venetian-built ships were in desperate shortage, and foreigners assumed more and more of the shipping of the city; attempts as early as 1602 and 1627 to lend money to Venetian firms in order to construct or purchase more commercial vessels had had no appreciable effect. Equally unsuccessful in encouraging commercial activity were such temporary measures as permitting vessels of smaller tonnage to trade in the Levant. If so few vessels were available for commerce during times of peace, the Savii questioned, then how great will the shortage be during times of turbulence and war? 126

Many of these same problems cited by the magistrates in 1644 would continue to plague Venetian commercial activity throughout the Candian war, and, in certain cases, were aggravated by the disruptions brought on by the war itself. Ten years after the beginning of the war the Cinque Savii continued to lament a lack of commercial vessels despite every attempt to have new ones constructed or foreign ones purchased.
To fulfill the demand more and more Flemish and Dutch vessels had to be granted permission to sail under the flag of the Republic.  

In addition to this stagnation of the ship-building industry, Venetian commerce was further hampered by the traditional taxation policies of the Republic. Venetian wealth during the past two centuries had firmly rested upon the concept of monopoly and a tax system which levied a tax on all goods passing through that monopoly. Regulations known as the Dominante required that all goods sent to or from the cities of the Terraferma pass through the customs office at Venice. Navigation laws similar to the Navigation Acts of England necessitated the use of Venetian seamen and Venetian-built ships. The combination of these various commercial regulations made Venetian maritime activity extremely monopolistic and restrictive.  

When Venice's commercial and maritime hegemony remained unchallenged a century or more earlier, such custom duties represented a lucrative source of state revenues. But as the northern European nations began to develop their commercial potentials and as the maritime center of Europe shifted away from the Mediterranean, the traditional custom duties of Venice became increasingly unacceptable and annoying. More and more merchant vessels circumvented the Venetian datii by frequenting other ports where duties were either lower or nonexistent. Trade with the nations of the north and with the cities of Germany diminished noticeably, and many contemporaries attributed this decline to the refusal of Venetian authorities to lower or dispense with the custom barriers.
Debate over these custom duties was not new. During certain emergencies such as in 1571, the duties had been lifted so as to encourage a greater flow of commercial traffic. But since the datii were considered an indispensable source of revenue, they were generally re instituted once the emergency had passed. During the Candian war those merchants who shipped by way of Venice or who hired Venetian vessels paid not only the irritating datii but also bore the additional risk of being attacked or seized by Turkish patrols. As commercial traffic was increasingly routed through Livorno or Ancona and then on to Ragusa in order to avoid such dangers, the amount of shipping at Venice decreased. Some effort was made to adjust the custom duties during the difficult years of the Candian struggle. Foreign merchants were granted permission to trade directly with the ports of the Levant and were even extended the privilege of purchasing and selling in these ports without having to use Venetian facilities. Specific exceptions were made in certain cases like the transport of wool; since such a dearth of Spanish wool existed in Venice, merchants were permitted to transport wool by land from the western coasts of Italy, and even, if necessary, from Livorno and Genoa. Even though certain items such as tobacco were still required to pass through customs at Venice and other goods were granted exemptions for only a few years at a time, a serious effort was made to accommodate and facilitate the flow of commercial traffic at Venice during the war years.

In addition to a partial relaxation of the custom duties, Venice
also devoted special attention to maintain, in spite of the war, existing trade relations with Moslem ports. Persian, Armenian, Turkish, and other eastern merchants were generally treated with considerable courtesy. Turkish merchants living in Venice at first met with considerable hostility, but even they were eventually tolerated and allowed to continue activities within the walls of their fondaco or warehouse.

Maintaining a firm hold on Turkish markets proved exceptionally difficult for Venetian merchants as a result of several factors totally unrelated to the Candian war. Extensive civil war, especially the long Persian wars of 1623–38, had disrupted the Turkish economy and had forced a devaluation of Turkish currency. Consequently, cheaper materials were now being used by Turkish manufacturers, and to reduce expenses either Turkish-made items or inexpensive substitutes were being used. For example, Venetian manufacturers who refused to shift to the production of the cheaper 'new draperies' now found their high quality woolen-goods too expensive to compete in Turkish markets with any success. During the war Turkish buyers increasingly came to rely on Dutch and English merchants who, as the war dragged on, became more and more entrenched in the markets of the East. In this sense, the war did, in fact, act as a catalyst in accelerating a tendency established earlier in the century.

Despite all efforts to reconcile commerce and warfare, Venetian trade in the East suffered from the disruptions of the Candian war. Merchants continued to trade at Venice and Venetian ports, but more and more commercial traffic shifted either to neutral Italian ports or to
Ragusa in order to avoid the additional hazards of war.\textsuperscript{138} English and Dutch merchantmen not only tended to replace Venetians as the predominant traders in the East, but they also profited by supplying the Turkish armies with the supplies they needed.\textsuperscript{139} Confronted by the pressures and uncertainties of war, Venetian trade in the East continued to dwindle; not long after the end of the Candian war the consuls at Aleppo and Smyrna were closed for lack of commercial activity. Cotton and silk markets in Syria and Anatolia similarly suffered a decline.\textsuperscript{140}

Not everything was quite so catastrophic, for some commercial regeneration did occur during the post-war years. Efforts continued to simplify and regularize the custom duties although with limited success.\textsuperscript{141} Instead of traditional spices and cloth-goods, new products such as flax, carbonate of soda, and sugar were carried by Venetian merchants. Moreover, Venetian luxuries such as glass, quality fabrics, and jewelry continued in demand throughout different parts of the world. Even the Dalmatian trade, though stifled by the war, recovered and retained a definite spark of vitality once peace had returned.\textsuperscript{142}

Unfortunately, the recovery was only partial and the economic decadence which had been characteristic before the war continued unabated. Venice suffered increased unemployment and depopulation as the inexorable shift toward the Terraferma of men and capital proceeded at a deadly pace.\textsuperscript{143} The decline of Venice as a world economic power belongs to the history of two centuries. The war of Candia as a factor in that decline was in this sense not unique. But it was a catastrophe of undeniable magnitude, one which weighed heavily among the many burdens of the century.
CHAPTER IV: FOOTNOTES

1. "Correspondenza Malta, 1645-69," Archivio Storico Italiano, XLI (1908), p. 111. Fra Roberto Solaro noted that the Turks named the fortress of Nuova Candia, 'Dispetto', which in Italian referred to an annoying or spiteful action.

2. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 81, Relazione di Tomeo Pompeo, Generale, January 27, 1651, Candia. In a report of 1650, Fra Roberto Solaro wrote the following concerning the state of the fortifications at Candia: "The city of Candia is excellently fortified (e ridota in otima fortificatione), well counter-mined, inside as well as out; at the military complex known as 'Mocenigo' (l'opera Monseniga) they have made a true lunette, faced with stone; the city is furnished to perfection with powder, fireworks (fochi artificiali), artillery, arms, biscuits, and grain." See "Correspondenza Malta, 1645-69," XLI (1908), p. 112.

3. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Gaetano da Riva, Provveditore-Generale dell'Armi nel Regno di Candia, 1653. Riva noted in this report that he had carried out numerous repairs including some on the port attached to the fortress. Another observer, Provveditore dal Regno, Giulio Gabriel, wrote similarly complimentary statements on the condition of Candia's defenses: "The walls of the city are in optimum condition, and the defense is secure...." Certain weak sections had apparently been repaired including numerous 'low places' which were now in "very good condition." The artillery and cannon were, according to Gabriel, in less than satisfactory condition. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Provveditore dal Regno, Giulio Gabriel. There were several other isolated Venetian fortresses on the island. Suda had so far proved impregnable to Turkish assaults. Garabusa, located on a rocky cliff, was likewise free from fear of Turkish attack. Spinalonga was located in an advantageous site, but the walls of this fortress were in need of renovation. The fortress on the island of Cerigo, although in need of some repair, was fortunately constructed on a summit. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Andrea Corner, Provveditore-Generale del Regno.

4. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 81, January 27, 1651, Tomeo Pompeo. Included in one of Gabriel's reports is a roll call of troops at Candia. There were 5,347 troops including the cavalry units (222), an additional 1,200 cernide or local reserves, and 215 bombardiers. Of these, apparently only 4,400 men had "passed the bank", that is, who were among the paid soldiers. Moreover, of that 5,347 figure, 414 men were feudati or local nobles resident on Candia, but these were of questionable military value. Among all the troops, there were approximately 1,602 Germans (Oltremontani), 1,495 Italians, and 1,005 Greeks, all of whom were judged worthy and brave soldiers. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Relazione di Giulio Gabriel, Provveditore dal Regno, 1651. As for the number of troops needed to improve defenses or initiate
offensive action, no concensus exists. Pompeo argued that from 6,000 to 10,000 men in all were needed to defend Candia; Gabriel cited the need for at least 300 regular cavalry (100 heavy, 200 light). See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Giacomo da Riva, Provveditor-General dell'Armi nel Regno di Candia, 1653. According to Provveditor-General Barbaro, in 1658, there were 1,633 Greeks, 557 Germans (Oltremontani), 1,019 Italians, 124 cavalry, and 203 bombardiers; the total force amounted to 4,440 men in all. Those ceremic which were considered of possible use numbered 631 men. In these figures it is interesting to note the shifting composition of the garrison and the much greater number of Greeks in 1658 than in 1651. There were so many Greeks (many of those listed as 'Oltremarini' were, in fact, Greek in origin) that Barbaro remarked that "the fortress (Candia) is all or in a major part from the same nation (Greece)." It is possible to conjecture that the number of Germans (Oltremontani) had probably diminished due to the declining number of unemployed German soldiers; earlier in the 1650's, there were undoubtedly many more 'demobilized' German soldiers who had recently become unemployed when the Peace of Westphalia was signed. It is also possible that the Venetians came to find it difficult to convince German soldiers to fight at Candia where the climate was harsh and the pay frequently poor. Consequently, Venetian recruiters had to rely more and more on soldiers from the islands of the archipelago and from Greece.

5. Giacomo da Riva estimated that in peace time 4,000 paid infantry and 2,000 local recruits would be satisfactory to defend Candia. He recommended another 1,500 infantrymen be continually maintained at Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante, each; in the event of an attack, each island could send 1,000 troops to reinforce the city. At the other fortresses of the kingdom, Riva recommended that 500 infantry be stationed at Porto della Suda, 150 at Garabusa, and 400 at Spinalonga. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Provveditor-General dell'Armi nel Regno di Candia, Giacomo da Riva, 1653.

6. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 81, Tomeo Pompeo, January 27, 1651. Pompeo wrote how the men were often forced to sleep "in the rain, and in the wind on the bare ground, especially in the current season (winter)... and the men sickened, passing from health to infirmity, from vigor to exhaustion, and from an attitude of service to one of despair...." See also, A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Relazione di Giulio Gabriel, Provveditor del Regno di Candia, 1651; A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Giacomo da Riva, Provveditor-General dell'Armi nel Regno di Candia, 1653.


8. When pay arrived, the soldiers were paid one-third of their monthly salary every ten days, part in silver and part in copper coin. The feudati and servants were usually paid only in copper currency.
Moreover, when money was short at Candia, work on the fortifications sometimes had to be neglected. Money was frequently spent far in advance and account books were often 'juggled' in order to maintain at least the impression of orderliness. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Giulio Cabrèl, Provveditor-General dell'Armi nel Regno di Candia, 1652, passim.; A.S.V., P.T.M. (715), Rubrica delle lettere, Provveditor-General dell'Armi, Morosini, April, 1650, Candia. Reporting on the conditions at Candia, Fra Roberto Solaro wrote the following in November of 1650: "In the beginning of the campaign, the Venetians had approximately 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, all chosen men; at present, there are not 4,000, the remainder being dead of suffering, and, in particular, from famine. The Venetians do not give more than a graminia a day per soldier, and at the end of the month, twenty graminia, which does not make a scudo a month, that not being enough for them to buy a salad, since everything in this fortress is very costly. Those poor soldiers are so exhausted from hunger that they have not the force to shoot a musket, and I have never seen so many, while shooting, fall down from weakness; this is the reason why more flee to the Turks than any other." "Correspondenza Malta," XII (1908), p. 112.


11. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Giacomo da Riva, Provveditore generale dell'Armi nel Regno di Candia, 1653, and Relazione di Giulio Cabrèl, Provveditore dal Regno, 1651.


13. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Giacomo da Riva, Provveditore generale dell'Armi nel Regno di Candia, 1653.


15. Figures given in 1650 by a renegade Turk on the estimated number of Turkish troops at Candia were as follows:
In this cavalry estimate were also a number of bombardiers, guastadors (sappers), etc., but the vast majority were probably cavalry. See B.N.M., VII (211), pp. 154-55. Provveditor dal Regno, Giulio Cabriel, reported there were, in 1651, approximately 27,000 to 28,000 enemy troops including 1,000 cavalry. This figure apparently included some 12,000 men stationed at Nuova Candia and in the mountains in the immediate vicinity of Candia; of these 12,000, perhaps only 5,000 were men-at-arms, the remaining being servants, merchants, and other civilians. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Provveditor dal Regno, Giulio Cabriel, 1651. Tomeo Pompeo gave the figure of between 25,000 and 30,000 Turkish troops that same year (1651), but this figure had been reduced by disease and combat to about 12,000 to 15,000 effectives. This estimate apparently included only those soldiers stationed in or near Nuova Candia and not the entire island. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Busta 81, Tomeo Pompeo, January 27, 1651.

16. A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Costantinopoli, Filza 130, Lettera 265, Soranzo, January-March, 1647. Soranzo added that there were many pressures felt as a result of the plague which had swept the Ottoman empire; some 50,000 estimated dead had made, Soranzo claimed, the Sultan "more enthusiastic (to peace) than ever...."

17. See B.N.M., VII (211), passim; Valiero, Historia, pp. 241-45, 257, 260-62; B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, 1650, Fortezza di San Todoro. Besides Candia and Porto della Suda, the only other major fortress on the island still in Venetian hands was that of Garabusa. Garabusa was apparently situated on such difficult terrain that the enemy had never even made an attempt to capture it; the Turks "not only did not try an assault, but did not even visit it...for the height of the eminence on which it was built." A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Busta 80, Giulio Cabriel, Provveditor dal Regno, 1651.


19. See Angelo di Benvenuti, "Il diversivo in Dalmatia della guerra di Candia," La Rivista Dalmatica, Part II, XXV (April, 1954), pp. 29-34. There exists some interesting financial and military data on Dalmatia relevant to the years after Foscolo's early triumphs. For example, see A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 67, Dalmatia, 1660, Relazione di Antonio Bernardo, Provveditore-General in Dalmatia et Albania, May 20, 1660, and June 29, 1660. Bernardo's letter to the Senate was in many ways highly critical of the state of Dalmatian and Albanian fortifications in 1660. Few of the fortresses he had inspected had satisfactory numbers of men and supplies, and the armaments of the galleys had been weakened by disease and internal bickering. Cattaro needed 50,000 to...
60,000 ducats in order to strengthen the defenses of the province; Almissa had weak exterior fortifications and a poor trench system, and certain aspects of Sebenico needed considerable modification. In all of the major fortresses of the province, there were not more than 3,498 infantry. Bernardo complained that inexperienced men were often sent to Dalmatia where they stayed for a few months and then requested license to return to Venice. The local inhabitants suffered greatly from poverty, and the Morlacchi cavalry deserved to be disbanded since the Republic had failed to pay them their allotment. Bernardo apparently was able to maintain these Dalmatian forces for as little as 12,000 ducats a month, but this figure may not have included several military-related expenses. The difference in pay between the European troops and those recruited in the province or in the islands of the archipelago may also have enabled him to minimize expenses. For example, an Oltremontani or European mercenary hired as a Captain received sixty ducats a month, but a Greek in the same rank received only ten ducats a month, this was true even though the Greek troops frequently proved more reliable than the Europeans. Bernardo also listed all the troops stationed at various fortresses throughout the province:

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Despite the ability of the Republic to shift troops from one area to another, the figures given by Bernardo obviously fall short of those estimated necessary for a secure defense of the province. Bernardo estimated that 3,500 troops would be needed for Zara, 6,000 for Sebenico, 1,500 for Trau, 4,000 for Spalato, and 3,000 for Cattaro.

20. A.S.V., P.T.M. (808), Luca Francesco Barbaro, Provveditor-Generale di Candia, September 12, 1658, Candia. Barbaro estimated the Turkish forces at this time to be about 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry; there were many others in 'reserve', but since these were 'renegades' their loyalty to the Turks could be doubted. Venetian forces were also in a weakened state at this time.


It was thought that a large Turkish convoy was being assembled at Malvasia in order to transport reinforcements and supplies to Canea. As a result, Morosini initiated a general position to assail because it was situated on a rock island connected to the mainland by a bridge two hundred meters long. Morosini cut the bridge to the mainland and then tried to force the submission of the fortress. An unfortunate shot during the first few days of the assault struck the flagship of the Maltese resulting in a withdrawal of the Maltese ships from the battle. Despite four months of siege the Turks were able to bring in reinforcements, and Morosini was forced to abandon the siege. See Guglielotti, Marina Pontificia, p. 138; Valiero, Historia, pp. 358-364; B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, p. 144, map 43; Guglielotti, Marina Pontificia, pp. 103-110.

30. Included in the allied fleet were seven galleys from Malta. Although it seems probably that the papal galleys did not join the allied fleet in 1656 because of Venetian-Papal squabbles concerning the readmittance of the Jesuits into the territories of the Republic, Guglielotti suggests that the papal galleys were unable to sail to the Dardanelles because of an outbreak of plague at Civitavecchia and the need to quarantine them. See Guglielotti, Marina Pontificia, pp. 142-149.
31. The best single account of the 1656 battle at the Dardanelles can be found in that of Col. Frederico Ferrari, "Le battaglie dei Dardanelli nel 1656-57," Memorie Storiche Militari, IX (1913), pp. 27-54. See also, Nani-Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 183-187; Valiero, Historia, pp. 380-381; B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, p. 153, map 73; Enrico Celani, "Di una carta a penna raffigurante la battaglia navale dei Dardanelli," Nuovo Archivio Veneto, Part II, IX (1895), pp. 453-467; Celani provides a complete list of all those nobles who participated in the battle on pp. 460-462 of his article.

32. The Maltese took with them as prizes of battle eight galleys and three galleasses.


36. There were five galleys belonging to the papal squadron, and seven to the Maltese fleet.

37. Once the Venetians had been expelled from Lemnos and Tenedos, the Turkish commanders apparently ordered considerable reinforcing of these two islands and their fortresses. See Querini Stampalia, M.S., Cod. LXXVIII, H4, Lettere da Constantinopoli di Sebastiano Molin (1648-1673); see also Ferrari, "Le battaglie dei Dardanelli nel 1656-57," , pp. 94-129; Nani-Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 189-205; Guglielotti, Marina Pontificia, pp. 176-193; B.N.M., VII 9211, Diversi Lettere, pp. 204-206; B.N.M., VII (9158), Successi nell'attacco e resa de Lemno, 1657, pp. 262-263; Valiero, Historia, p. 409.


39. Heinrich Kretschmayr has written that there was "from 1661 until 1666 no important war year for Venice..." Heinrich Kretschmayr, Geschichte Von Venedig (Stuttgart, 1934), III, p. 334.

40. The Turkish policy of limited maneuvers was perhaps a product of necessity. Morosini reported that the Turkish fleet had by this time diminished to about forty galleys, a figure almost equal to that of the Venetians. According to Morosini, the Venetians then had about six galleasses and twenty-four galleasses and twenty-four galleys. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 75, Relazione of Zorzi Morosini, Capitano-Generale de Mar, 1664.
41. Many ills continued to plague the operations of the armada. There was a chronic need for skilled officers and a need to extend and increase the training of nobles for posts on the galleys. Moreover, there was also a shortage of oarsmen or galleotti. Many of these galleotti were Greek and thus returned, in the winter, to their homes; this left the armada without sufficient manpower. So much in demand were oarsmen that criminals who had already served out their sentences at the oars were not granted permission to leave their posts as they should have been. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 75, Capitano-Generale da Mar, Zorzi Morosini, 1664.


44. For the various attacks, see B.N.M., VII (200), Mossa dell'Armi, p. 183, map 88, p. 187, map 90, p. 191, map 92, p. 195.


47. One favorite ploy of the enemy was to ship goods by way of Egypt in small convoys which then landed on the less patrolled southern shores of Candia.


51. Ibid., pp. 357-359.

52. Ambassador Giovanni Sagredo wrote from Paris in early 1653 that matters were so unsettled in France that he still had not "found a minister...at this court who was contented and satisfied". A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 115, Letter 78, February 18, 1653, Sagredo, Paris.


54. In a French gazette dated December 30, 1652, we read news stating that the French had no longer need to assist the Venetians in the Candian struggle since the Turks were determined not to accept...
anything less than the surrender of the island. B.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 115, n.d.


60. Ibid., pp. 360-361.

61. Zulian, "Le prime relazione," pp. 344-350. The threats against the bailo continued despite some conciliatory gestures on the part of the Grand Vizier. In February of 1657 the vizier seized the house of Ballerino, and murdered the bailo's servants. In addition, messages sent to the bailo were frequently intercepted and thus had to be sent secretly.


64. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Francia, Filza 121, January 28, 1659, Francesco Guistinian, Paris; Zulian, "Le prime relazione," pp. 332-334. The ambassadorial letters from Paris in 1658 and 1659 are literally filled with references to this M. Arson who owed a sizeable loan to Venice which Mazarin had given the Republic. Apparently Arson was able to receive reprieves of payment from the Parlement of Paris granting him more time to collect the money for Venice.


66. Peace terms were again offered in 1658, but were not acceptable to the Venetians because again they included the surrender of Candia. Romanin, Storia, pp. 437-440.

67. As late as the summer of 1657 it seemed to many observers that no Turkish attack against the lands of the Bacokzy would be forthcoming. Within months, however, matters had changed completely. Alfred
Francis Pribram, Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe (Vienna, 1901), I, pp. 33-34, 49-50. (Hereinafter referred to as Venetianische Depeschen.)

68. Ibid., pp. 61-63.

69. Ibid., pp. 67.

70. The Turks apparently even threatened that they could, with only "three words", bring an immediate accord with Venice over the Candian struggle, a covert threat that they then would have a free hand to move against Transylvania and Dalmatia. "On this same point...in order to frighten the Rákóczi even more, the Turks made it known that they (Turks) have peace with the Republic in their hands...." Ibid., pp. 103-104, 141.

71. Ibid., pp. 3-4, 105-106.

72. Romanin, Storia, p. 442.

73. Pribram, Venetianische Depeschen, pp. 265-266.

74. Ibid., pp. 402-403, 468, 470, 492-493. Spanish pressure may have had something to do with encouraging the Emperor to be "cautious"; the Spanish ambassador, Molin reasoned, hoped to gain financial and military levies from the Empire and thus had no desire to see such potential resources tied up in a war with the Turks. Ibid., p. 479.


76. Several incidents generated considerable bitterness between the Genoese and the Spanish. There were clashes over maritime incidents and also over the Spanish intentions to sell Pontremoli to Tuscany instead of the Republic of Genoa. When France recovered from the Fronde, the Genoese were better able to retain a tenuous neutrality between Spain and France. Bacchione, "Venezia e Genova," pp. 42-63, 51-61. The Spanish likewise frowned upon any Genoese involvement in the Candian war because of the drain it would have had on resources which Spain hoped to employ. Moreover, a Keystone of the Spanish diplomacy in Italy was to maintain among the respective Italian states a delicately balanced equilibrium; any union of the Genoese and Venetian republics would have threatened that balance and diminished the power of Spain in northern Italy. Ibid., p. 94-95. It is interesting to note that Bacchione discounts Amy Bernardy's contention that the Genoese were more interested in profiting from Venice's commercial decline as a result of the war, and thus refused to assist in the defense of Candia. He also rejects Onoratio Pastine's interpretation which placed heavy emphasis on the pride and arrogance of Venice in relation to the honorific title demanded by Genoa. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
77. The absence of the pontifical fleet at the Dardanelles in 1656 may have been connected with an attempt by the Pope to coerce Venice into readmitting the Jesuits.


81. The total cost of the war is nearly impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy. Military costs obviously increased over normal outlays, and certain decreases in customary revenues derived from commerce likewise occurred. Consequently, any attempt to estimate the true costs of the war would entail separating these two factors. Contemporaries felt that the war expenditures were considerable. In 1649, a certain Vincenzo Gussoni spoke in the Collegio noting that the war cost as much in one year as the Cyprus conflict of the 1570's had cost in three years; this may have been more a reflection of Gussoni's attitude toward the war, but it may have been a good indicator of inflation. See Heinrich Kretschmayr, Geschichte von Venedig (Stuttgart, 1934), p. 326. A modern student of Venetian history notes that the war in 1668 alone cost an estimated 4,322,000 ducats. Even allowing for the special military activities of 1668, one can easily see that the costs were often in the millions. See Roberto Cassi, Storia della Repubblica di Venezia (Milan, rev. ed. 1968), II, p. 188.


84. B.N.M., VII (9158), pp. 298-301. Numerous family names are listed here such as Tasca, Labia, Zaguri, Martinelli, Coraggi, etc., all of whom received affirmative notes for acceptance into the nobility. Most of the votes 'for' were in excess of seven or eight hundred, with usually less than one hundred opposed.

85. Davis, "Decline of the Venetian Nobility," p. 110. Davis notes that the payment was some 100,000 ducats, a sum in excess of even the incomes of the richest merchants, and nearly double that of the richest noble families. As he notes, the originally proposed figure of 60,000 ducats was raised to 100,000, a fact which may have encouraged some of the nobility to agree to the measure. However, it should be noted as well that the 100,000 ducats included 40,000 ducats which were to be placed in the treasury and were to receive annual interest. In this sense, the additional 40,000 was perhaps not so burdensome as
as originally would seem since it may have been viewed as an investment. (The 60,000 ducats was a sum which was expected to pay for 1,000 infantry for one year.) B.N.M., VII (9158), p. 287.


87. Quoted in Romanin, Storia, pp. 372, n. 2.

88. For the four million figure for 1668 see Romanin, Storia, pp. 369-370.

89. B.N.M., VII (9158), pp. 282, 287.


91. See Roland Mousnier, "Le trafic des offices a Venise," Revue Historique de Droit Francais et Etranger, 4th Series, No. 1, XXX (1952), pp. 552-565. Mousnier notes how in times of emergency offices were sold more frequently. Of the total number of offices sold between 1660-1680, they were still only about 2 percent of the total population (there were 2,500 offices for a population of 125,000; when the population of the Terraferma is included, an additional 1,800,000 persons, then the percentage of sold offices drops to between .13 and .14 percent. Ibid., p. 555.

92. A.S.V., Deputati-Aggiunti Registro 1, Decreti-Ministri (1604-1669), Letters of June 10, 1651 and June 1653.


94. See A.S.V., Deputati-Aggiunti Registro 1, Decreti-Ministri (1604-1669), passim. The charges of 'lesione' which meant literally damage or injury to property right, seems to increase in the late 1650's and the 1660's over the earlier part of the century. In the earlier cases there seems to be more cases of delayed payment rather than 'lesione'. Of those found guilty of extracting an excessive amount from their office (over 20 percent) there were some who were forced to reimburse the public. One case found a man who had purchased an office for 250 ducats and who had derived from that office an annual salary of 72 ducats; the sale of this office was thus duly annulled. Ibid., Letter of June, 1663.

95. B.N.M., VII (9158), pp. 281-282. In 1658 the Senate elected a body of three deputies, for a period of one year, to examine the incomes and expenses of various magistrates, and to find means to cut expenses or increase revenues; on November 29, 1664, four more magistrates were added to the board. See Bilanci Generali della Repubblica di Venezia (Venice, 1903-1902), III, p.117. (Hereinafter referred to as Bilanci Generali.)
96. A.S.V., Deputati-Aggiunti Registro 1, Decret-Ministri (1604-1669), Letter of December 13, 1646. Apparently some office holders were inclined to do favors for special 'clients' such as suspending judgments against them or allowing the client to avoid paying his debt; anyone found doing so was to be deprived of his office or punished in some other fashion. A.S.V., Gov. delle Pub. Entrate, Busta 17, June, 21, 1659.


98. A.S.V., Gov. delle Pub. Entrate, Busta 17, Vari, 1651-1700, Letters of December 12, 1654, January 10, 1656, and October 29, 1658. One case in the letter of October 29, 1658, relates the misfortunes of a certain Lorenzo Fanelli who had been cast into debtor prison for three years and had been released on his own recognizance; he agreed to pay 80 ducats of a 2,620 ducat debt immediately and an additional 40 ducats per year until it was liquidated. Fanelli had apparently contracted the debt while in possession of the Datio delle nova imposta delle marina di Chioggia, and the magistrates recommended that he be so released. That he would be released after paying only 40 ducats a year (after fifty years his debt still would not have been completely liquidated) was an indication of the magistrates humanitarian sentiment or a recognition of a bitter reality and a willingness to accept whatever the debtor could pay.


102. A.S.V., Deputati-Aggiunti, Registro 1, Decreti-Ministri (1604-1667), November 20, 1649 and June 10, 1651.

105. Valiero notes that in this house-to-house soliciting there were collected, in this particular case, "hardly sixty thousand ducats...." Valiero, Historia, p. 61. In the records of the magistrates in charge of financial problems one can read numerous requests for 'voluntary contributions' for the war effort from schools and religious foundations. ("to induce them to a copious voluntary contribution....") Some of the
requests were ignored, others answered with 'contributions'; frequently, such requests were followed by more 'requests'. See A.S.V., Deputati-


107. A.S.V., Gov. delle Pub. Entrate, Busta 17, Leg.-Varia, 1651-700, October 9, 1658, Orders frequently were issued requiring all persons with any property or goods of value to report them to the government officials so that tabulations could be kept, presumably for taxation purposes.

108. Occasionally new taxes were levied so as to increase government revenues. One such tax was recorded in 1658 when there was decreed a levy on all types of land in Venice and the Terraferma. Realizing that this was prejudicial to landowners, an additional tax was placed on all other types of income including commercial and manufacturing. A similar tax of this nature was again levied in 1662. A.S.V., Gov. delle Pub. Entrate, Busta 17, Leg.-Varia, 1651-700, April 16, 1658 and December 28, 1662.


110. Ibid., pp. 324-325, 362-363, 380-381.

111. Ibid., pp. 299-300.

112. The interest rates offered for such conversions of plate and valuables into specie for coinage often was as high as 7 percent annually.


114. Aldobrandini notes that the financial situation on the island was always somewhat chaotic, and that there was, in 1608, a desperate shortage of sound coinage; prices soared as a result, and the provveditore warned that the situation would not be noticeably altered without some increase in new money. See the report of General Gerolamo Capello, October 18, 1608, form Candia, parts of which were quoted by Aldobrandini, Le monete di Venezia, pp. 945-946.
115. Aldobrandini notes how the inflation of the early 1650's was so rampant that good silver currency was greatly in demand and inflated in value; a silver scudi, for example was worth, in 1649, officially about 12.5 lire but, in fact, brought 27 lire and by 1650 brought 45 lire per scudi. See Aldobrandini, Le monete di Venezia, pp. 955-956.

116. Bilanci Generali, I, p. 150. Listed for 1641 were 1,145,949 ducats from the Terraferma and from Venice 1,814,132 ducats.

117. Ibid., p. 183


119. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 43, Padova, Girolamo Dilfin, Capitano, June 23, 1644 and November 28, 1645; Alvise Foscarini, Podesta, February 20, 1646; Alvise Mocenigo, Podesta, November 17, 1648; Michiele Morosini, Podesta, April 1, 1664.

120. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Busta 50, Verona, Alvise Valier, Capitano, September 16, 1639; L. Michiel, Podesta, October 18, 1644.

121. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 31, Capitular, 1625-1685, October 20, 1656; A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Busta 50, Alvise Foscarini, Capitano di Verona, 1658-59. Apparently even the Datio della Stradella as a source of public revenue was in question. One can read a reference made to the 'Datii della Stradella' which had once rented for 75,000 ducats in 1618, but which now brought only 34,110 ducats; likewise the datio on silk once rented for 46,000 ducats in 1619 but now, in the mid-1650's it brought only 9,500 ducats.

122. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Busta 50, Relazione di Giacomo Corner, Capitano di Verona, September 20, 1645. Corner notes that in Verona proper that were about 25,793 persons and 58,635 in the surrounding territories. In 1654 the population was apparently some 25,340 in Verona per se. As for expenses in 1645, Corner noted that expenses exceeded revenues by 173 ducats that year although much money must have been sent directly to Venice for war costs.

123. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Busta 50, Verona, 1656.

124. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 51, Vicenza, 1658; A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 48, Treviso, 1655.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 155, Risporti, 1652-62, April 24, 1654 and February 2, 1654. It is difficult to assess the influence of the war on the amount of shipping and ships in service. Domenico Sella notes that in 1637 there were about 39 units belonging to Venetians and 27 others in service, and in 1671 there were 112 altogether; even with adjustments for tonnage, the unit count would have been 32 units for 1637, and 77 for 1671. This increase Sella attributes to the regularization of relations between Venice and the Porte, the resumption of protective legislation after the war, and the availability of large numbers of ships in the years immediately after the war. Sella also remarks that although little data has been found for the period of the war years, "various elements indicate that the long period of hostility was unfavorable to the Venetian industry and maritime transportation." See Domenico Sella, Commerci e industrie a Venezia nel secolo XVII (Venice-Rome, 1961), pp. 107-109. (Herein-after referred to as Commerci e industrie.)


129. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 31, Capitular, 1625-85, September 11, 1655. In this particular reference the savii argue that it is necessary to "diminish in some parts the Datio...in order to make the business transactions, which have for many years been interrupted, flourish again...."

130. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 57, Datio d'uscita, Letter of November 12, 1636. The savii wrote that the datio on goods leaving Venice would be retained because of the "considerable incomes" derived from it. Note also that foreign merchants were often granted the same datio rates as those for Venetians during the war. At Alexandria we read in 1646 of foreign merchants being granted equal rates as those of Venetians for all the ports of the Levant; reference was made to the same action having been taken in 1571 during another crisis period. See A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Cottimo della Alexandria, Busta 946, May 14, 1647.


132. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 153, Risposti, 1641-44. There is one interesting case of two merchants whose complaints were heard by the savii in 1647. These two merchants, according to the report of the savii, "for the misfortunes of the current disturbances have been able in the past two years to make only two voyages (presumably to the Levant) where in peaceful times they used to make seven or eight voyages in the same amount of time with great profit...." See A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 154, Risposti, 1645-52, March 29, 1647.

133. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 154, Risposti, 1645-52, May 27, 1651. Sella lists the number of pieces of woollen cloth which passed
through Venetian customs and there seems to be a noticeable decline in the number during the war years. Moreover, the number after the war remained low, indicating that the war may have not only disrupted the market on a temporary basis but may have resulted in the permanent loss of valuable markets. Sella, Commerci e Industrie, p. 110.

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134. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 31, Capitular, 1625-1685, August 13, 1657 and September 26, 1657. One reads that in 1634 the datio on raw materials used in the manufacturing of soap was removed (the datio d'entrata or importation) but that fifteen years later, in the midst of the Candia war, the datio was reinstated. This was a serious blow to the production of soap at Venice, the production of which throughout the seventeenth century continued to drop regularly. See Sella, Commerci e Industrie, p. 134.

135. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 31, Capitular, 1625-1685, March 8, 1646 and January, 1648. Recognizing that much trade was being diverted to the ports of Ancona and Ragusa, the Savii recommended that Moslem or 'Turkish' merchants be treated "still as merchants" so as not to damage and further Venetian commerce. When 'Turkish' merchants were occasionally arrested, the savii sometimes urged restitution of their goods so as not "to prejudice the commerce of Venice...." See A.S.V., Cinques Savii, Busta 155, Risposti, 1652-62, August 3, 1655 and February 18, 1655.

136. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 31, Capitular, 1625-85,1645, passim. In 1645 the fontico or Turkish warehouse was searched for war matériel, and the community of Jews was forbidden to trade in arms with the Turks.

138. The Republic of Ragusa, situated as it was on the Adriatic and near the Mediterranean, continued to profit from the Candian war at the expense of Venice. The Ragusians tried to tread a middle course between loyalty to Venice and loyalty to the Turks; they paid tribute to the Sultan of 12,000 zecchini and respect to the Doge. Despite Ragusa's seeming duplicity in the eyes of Venice, Venetian trade with Ragusa in meat and leather supplies was so valuable that every effort was made to continue friendly relations. See A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 141, Ragusi, Letter of September 28, 1647; Nicolo Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet (eds.), *Le relazioni degli stati Europei lette al Senato degli ambasciatori Veneziani nel secolo decisettimo* (Venice, 1856-78), I, Series I, p. 394.

139. A.S.V., Senato Corta, 1648, Registro 22, March 6, 1648.

140. Sella, *Commerci e Industrie*, pp. 50-51.

141. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 57, Dazio d'Uscita, November 20, 1670. To compensate for the loss of some markets, there was trade after the war and in the 18th century in new commodities such as flax carbonate of soda, and Egyptian sugar (this later was unfortunately soon replaced by American sugar). See Sella, *Commerci e Industrie*, p. 78.

142. Sella, *Commerci e Industrie*, pp. 55-56, 66-68. The decline of Luccan and Florentine silk manufacturing brought some increase to the Venetian silk industry.

The last three violent years of the Candian war came after nearly a decade of relative military and political calm. Like the earthquake which devastated Ragusa in 1667, the violent eruption of the war was sudden, intense, and vastly destructive; it ended with a true sense of finality any hope that the war might be resolved amicably. Despite civil disorders in Egypt, Mecca, and Basra, the Grand Vizier still ordered to Candia in 1667 tens of thousands of men to reinforce and re-invigorate the siege. The forces gathered by the vizier that year at Candia were in all probability greater than any Turkish army previously assembled on the island.

This challenge was partially neutralized by an increase in the Venetian forces stationed at Candia. In addition to the numerous infantry contingents contributed by various European states during the early and mid-1660's, there continued to arrive throughout the summer hundreds of Venetian mercenaries drawn from Dalmatia, the archipelago islands and Europe. By fall of 1667 the garrison numbered nearly eleven thousand men of varied talents and military training. These soldiers were not all of professional capacity, but they did represent one of the largest garrisons ever collected within the walls of the fortress.

In conjunction with this expansion of the garrison, the fortress itself was in a state of nearly constant repair and modification. Aided by the crews of the armada as well as the city's vagrant hordes of
women, children, and aged, the laborious task of reconstruction continued apace. Everywhere could be witnessed construction on walls, trenches, housing, and port facilities. Artillery, munitions, and skilled technicians who could direct the military and mining operations were always in demand. As far as the actual physical condition of the fortress was concerned, with exception of those bastions closest to the sea, the city of Candia remained in relatively sound condition at the start of the enemy's new offensive.

The Turkish assault for which the Grand Vizier had amassed such a formidable array came during the summer months of 1667. So determined was the vizier to force the capitulation of Candia that at the Turkish fortresses of Rettimo and Canea "even the churches were full..." of supplies; to compensate for the lack of artillery a Turkish foundry had been newly established at Nuova Candia where cannon and shot were cast daily. Determination of this nature was undoubtedly a reflection of the frustration felt at Constantinople with the prolonged siege of Candia. Now that the Treaty of Vasvar had brought peace with the Austrian Emperor and peace negotiations had faltered with the Venetians, Grand Vizier Ahmed Kiupril placed himself at the head of his armies and initiated the campaign of 1667.

In May the first Turkish assault waves struck the bastions of Panegra, Betlem, and the southwestern portions of Martinengo. So many soldiers had apparently been mobilized for this new offensive that only a handful of defenders were left to garrison the fortresses of Rettimo and Canea. Turkish commanders chose the southwestern flanks
because the city's other bastions had to be approached without camouflage protection or were considered too dangerous for a frontal assault. Even the two most vulnerable positions along the western and eastern coastlines, the bastions of Sant'Andrea and Sabionera, were considered at the time too formidable for direct attack.\textsuperscript{7}

Day after day and night after night the assaults continued along with constant diversionary maneuvers at other positions. Much of the contest centered about the use of mines, a delicate but devastating method by which one could breach the walls of the fortress or throw the defending garrison into complete confusion. Mines were used by the Venetians either directly to repel an enemy assault or as countermines designed to destroy Turkish tunnels or ignite prematurely the enemy's powder. On this matter a chronicle of the siege during the month of July proves frightenngly repetitious: "Wednesday the 13th passed very quietly during the day...but in the evening toward the hour of eight (20:00) the enemy exploded a mine.... On the 16th one hour before dawn a Turkish mine on the right of Moceniga caused some damage to five of our soldiers...(and) toward the hour of eight (in the evening) the Turks...attacked from Panegra exploding a mine...and almost at the same time there appeared to explode another...."\textsuperscript{8} Mines were detonated at all hours of the day and night, designed as much to cause confusion and fear as they were to inflict casualties on the enemy. Mines were often exploded in the darkness of the night so as to terrorize the defenders and erode by fatigue the morale of the garrison.\textsuperscript{9}

The construction of these mines was always a delicate and arduous
task. Some were relatively small while others would consist of dozens of barrels of powder, the ignition of which might weaken or destroy a defensive position; stones and other debris scattered by the explosion frequently inflicted extensive casualties on any defenders in the area. Likewise, guastadori or sappers whose responsibility it was to construct the tunnels used in the mines worked under the most hazardous of conditions; not infrequently they suffered death or injury from suffocation and accidental explosions. With the constant mining and counter-mining which took place beneath and near the walls of Candia, the war must have seemed to many a feverish contest of giant moles. Beyond the dozens of assaults and sorties executed by both sides, literally hundreds of mines were constructed and detonated during the five months of active warfare in 1667. In the month of July alone there were estimated at least eighty such mine explosions.

Despite all this effort, the Grand Vizier was forced to limit the siege due to the autumnal rains which regularly flooded the trenches and mine tunnels. The advent of plague in the Turkish camp in 1667 necessitated an almost complete retreat of the vizir's forces to the safety of Nuova Candia; only a skeletal army was left to maintain the siege at Candia. Despite a valiant effort to dislodge this skeleton army from some of the trenches close to the southern bastions of Candia, the enemy managed to retain the forward positions it had won in the campaign of 1667. With the exception of these few advanced positions, however, nearly a half year of bitterly intense warfare had done little to change the relative position of the two opposing armies. The Vene-
tian defenders had witnessed extensive devastation and destruction but had still managed to survive one of the most determined campaigns of the entire war.13

Venice was fortunate in this moment of crisis to enjoy the benefit of relatively generous allied contributions. The military and financial assistance from which Venice profited came at a more regular pace and in greater quantities than at any time during the previous years of the struggle. Without question, the spirit which infused this fresh concern for the fate of Candia and Christian prestige in the Mediterranean came from Rome and Christendom's new pontiff, Clement IX. Moreover, with France and Spain no longer competing for the domination of Italy and matters in the German empire in a state of relative quiescence, Europe could more easily spare soldiers for service against the Turkish infidel. But it was in the final analysis Clement and the religious fervor he generated which created the aura of a crusade about the Candian war. As a result material assistance poured forth from the Catholic princes of Germany, such as the Electors of Mainz and Cologne and the Bishops of Strasbourg and Paderborn. Other princes in Germany and Italy were somewhat less generous but nevertheless also promised troop levies and money grants.14

Giulio Rospigliosi's ascension in 1667 to the pontificate as Clement IX was a boon to Venice of inestimable value. His predecessor, Alexander VII, had been forced to contend almost continuously with the megalomania of France and Spain; in addition, he had suffered from poor health and had shown "occasional slowness and lack of decision."15
Alexander had contributed to the defense of Candia, but in comparison to that of his successor his pontificate seemed marred by lethargy and near indifference. Clement, on the other hand, assumed as his own personal sanbenito the burden of the war and sought with every power at his command to bring victory to Christendom in the East.  

Although Papal finances were usually in arrears Clement labored assiduously to bring substantial assistance to the Christian forces at Candia. Throughout 1667 his generosity continued unabated, from money grants and permission to levy troops within papal territories to a paid regiment of 500 men and 100,000 pounds of powder. Although there were some minor disagreements between Venice and the papacy, Clement's pontificate represents unquestionably one of the most harmonious periods in the history of Venetian-Roman relations. 

The Pope also endeavored to use his influence as the leader of Christendom in order to generate greater support in Europe for the struggle at Candia. To Louis XIV of France and Maria Anna, the Queen-Regent of Spain, Clement addressed letters supplicating them for a peaceful conclusion to their war in the Netherlands. This War of Devolution was eventually ended in May of 1668 although in actuality its conclusion had little to do with the intervention of Clement; when confronted with the Triple Alliance formed by Holland, Sweden, and England, Louis quickly found peace a wiser course than total war. Unfortunately, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle which ended this Franco-Spanish war brought no subsequent benefit to the Venetian struggle in the East. The French in particular proved clearly hostile to any

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implication or demand that they become involved in the Venetian war with the Turks and made every effort to delay sending assistance to Venice. 22

Clement had hoped to encourage more Spanish interest in the war but there too he met with similar failure. All of Spain seemed paralyzed by disorder and confusion; the government of Spain had two bodies, the Venetian ambassador noted, "one weak with an infirm head, that being the queen, the other strong without a head, that being the counselors..." 23 So distressed was the Spanish regency of feeble Charles II that the Queen-Regent notified the Venetian Senate in 1667 that Spain would be unable to lend its Neapolitan galleys for service in the East. 24

When the cold and rain of the winter passed, the war resumed in full fury. Some Turkish artillery batteries had continued to harass the fortress throughout the winter but the main enemy thrust of 1668 did not come until the summer of that year. 25 Yet in spite of such feverish efforts on the part of Grand Vizier Amhet Kiuprili the fortress of Candia seemed in about the same condition in which it was found in 1667. Repair work and modification was constantly in progress, and, with special attention, even the relatively vulnerable eastern flank at Sabionera had been suitably strengthened. As usual there were shortages of powder and food but the number of small caliber artillery was apparently adequate. Somewhat diminished by normal attrition and the departure of allied troops for the winter, the garrison numbered between five and six thousand available men. 26 The defenders also seemed
favored by the fact that fewer Turkish soldiers were assembled at Candia than had been in the previous year; the vizier's army contained in 1668 between five and six thousand Janissaries together with perhaps another ten thousand sappers. Although some observers were excessively optimistic about the possibility of expelling the Turkish forces from the island, the year of 1668 was less enshrouded with the foreboding gloom of past years.

Despite the diminished Turkish forces at Candia the city enjoyed little respite from its siege. Monsignor Bichi wrote from Malta in 1668 that "the enemy pressed so vehemently...that every day there remained dead fifty or sixty Christians..." Candia soon gained the reputation as a fortress from which few ever returned; consequently recruitment became increasingly difficult. In spite of foreign assistance, the Republic was more and more forced to rely on the services of ex-prisoners, bandits, and reprieved criminals in order to maintain satisfactory troop levels; most of those forced to serve at Candia departed once their term of obligation had expired.

Until almost the end of the summer, military activity at Candia was in a state of relative quiescence. In August, however, the new Provveditor-General Francesco Morosini was greeted by a furious pincer assault concentrating on the two coastal bastions of Sant'Andrea and Sabionera. Military maneuvers as well as mine and trench construction were somewhat restricted in the area of Sant'Andrea because of the difficult terrain between the bastion and the Gioffiro River to the west. Sections of this area were little more than bog-like marshes.
which severely inhibited the construction of sound trenches; in addition, the soil in the immediate vicinity of the bastion itself was generally rocky thus increasing the difficulty of mining the foundations of the fortress. The Turks with their myriad of sappers and general laborers nevertheless persisted in their efforts at Sant'Andrea, and by August had managed to threaten the security of the entire western bastion. Provveditor-General Morosini ordered modifications in the defenses of Sant'Andrea and eventually succeeded in driving the enemy from advanced positions by means of a costly cavalry sortie. The attack on Sant'Andrea continued into September but eventually failed largely as a result of the artillery and musket support from the flanking bastions of San Spirito and Panegra.

At the bastion of Sabionera on the eastern coast, a simultaneous enemy assault was initiated. Sabionera, as its name suggests, was constructed essentially on foundations of sand and was thus highly vulnerable to underground mine explosions. Turkish assault waves in conjunction with the work of their engineers and sappers were consequently more successful at Sabionera. The arsenal battery along the coast was silenced by Turkish cannon and a breach of sixty paces (passi) was opened in the bastion's main wall; major disaster was avoided only by the existence of a newly constructed inner bulwark. The defenses of Sabionera stood firm despite the efforts of over ten thousand Turkish soldiers who attempted to force its collapse. 31

The cost of the war in 1668 in terms of men and material was staggering. By the end of the year few companies numbered more than thirty

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or forty men, officers and men alike suffering enormous casualties. Over nine hundred officers of junior rank and above perished that year together with nearly six thousand men in the infantry and cavalry; over three thousand were listed among the wounded, most of these being sappers and laborers who constructed the trenches and mine tunnels. Turkish losses were estimated to be five times as many fatalities and twice as many wounded, figures perhaps somewhat exaggerated but nevertheless reflecting the definite intensification of the war. Of interest is the disproportionate number of fatalities among both the Venetian and Turkish armies, a fact undoubtedly resulting from the poor medical conditions and the consequent danger of infection. As one observer noted, any "who were wounded even lightly in any part whatever of the body and even only on a finger lost his life as a result of that insignificant wound...."\(^{32}\) In terms of material there were consumed millions of pounds (libbre) of powder, hundreds of thousands of bushels of grain, and thousands of pounds of lead, wood, metal, and other goods necessary for war. To maintain Candia for just one year Venice spent in 1668 nearly 4,392,000 ducats.\(^ {33}\) Such was the magnitude of the war in its last but most violent phase.

Since both Venice and Constantinople remained adamant concerning possession of Candia, no realistic hope existed that the war would be ended by diplomatic negotiations. Luigi Molini had specifically been sent to discuss peace terms and to offer not only tribute and compensation but also complete restoration of all formerly Turkish lands in Dalmatia. The Turkish response was unaltered, the vizier demanding
above all the surrender of the entire island; Molini was advised that without cession of the kingdom and its capital city, peace negotiations would be a fruitless waste of time. The Turkish ministers informed Molini that the war was a mere diversion for the Sultan and that the Ottoman empire had endless resources of men and money should the siege of Candia so require.34

Venetian diplomats in Rome could be more sanguine, for Clement's desire to preserve Candia seemed in no way to waiver. The Pope's contributions in 1668 equalled those of the previous year including loan of the pontifical squadron, permission to levy troops, a paid regiment of 250 men for service in Dalmatia, 500 infantry sent to Candia, 100,000 pounds of powder, and a gift of 50,000 scudi. Clement also permitted the suppression of three regular orders within Venetian territory the proceeds of which were to be applied to the costs of the war; in this fashion approximately one million ducats were raised. Moreover, the Pope contributed money from his own private family fortune and endeavored to persuade other European princes and states to be as generous in the defense of Christendom.35 To this end, the pontiff had at least been able to win from Louis of France a promise that for the duration of one year French forces would refrain from in any way attacking Spain.36 Whether Venice stood to profit from Clement's diplomatic efforts no one could yet tell.

France's international position in 1668 was in many ways extremely delicate. The French government naturally wished to remain on friendly terms with His Holiness, even if he seemed as committed to the defense

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of Candia as Venice herself, but at the same time feared any rupture in commercial relations with the Moslem nations of the Levant. Caught as it was in this dilemma, French diplomacy consequently floundered. There was increasing alarm in Constantinople over the growing numbers of French mercenaries and French troops finding service at Candia. As a result French custom charges in the Levant had been raised to 5 percent as compared to the preferential rate of 3 percent levied on English and Dutch merchandise. The French were also importuned to lend commercial vessels in order to transport goods to Candia, a request which was not always evaded with success. Franco-Turkish relations had reached a nadir by the summer of 1668. As a result, the French ambassador Denis de la Haye was recalled to Paris; this action was not taken, however, as a prelude to a complete diplomatic break between Paris and Constantinople—as Venice had hoped—but was triggered by the French ministry's anger over de la Haye's apparent inability to effect a rapprochement at the Porte. In every sense, the French government remained extremely sensitive toward any action which might endanger French power and prestige in the Levant.

On the other hand, Louis and his ministers were keenly aware of France's position in Europe and labored in every way to preserve at least the appearance of interest in the affairs of Christendom in the East. Some of the interest which the French king began to express in the fate of Candia was undoubtedly, in part, related to Louis' desire to 'accommodate' the Pope; it was hoped that in return the pontiff might help heal the widening schism in the French church over the
question of Jansenism. Consequently, 1668 witnessed a flood of French promises to bring assistance to the beleagured defenders of Candia. 38

Clement grew increasingly optimistic when, in May of that year, word was received that Louis seemed ready to send from six to eight thousand men to Candia at his own expense. By winter no French soldiers had yet been sent even though Louis and his foreign minister Lione continued to encourage optimism whenever they could. With the exception of one hundred thousand scudi and permission to raise recruits on French soil nothing materialized that year in the way of substantial military assistance. Popular religious enthusiasm for the defense of Candia was unquestionably widespread among the citizenry of France, but for those in whose hands the power of the nation rested, raison d'etat was the foremost concern. 39

Pope Clement's effort to win French support for the Candian struggle was partially frustrated by the lack of friendly relations between Venice and France. For a period of three years, from 1665 until 1668, France had had no official ambassador at Venice. In 1667 Louis had become involved in the War of Devolution in the Netherlands and, hoping to profit from the resumption of formal relations with Venice, had appointed a certain M. de Saint-Andre as his ambassador to the Republic. It was M. de Saint-Andre's task to express to the Venetian Senate King Louis' overwhelming desire to assist in the defense of Candia. But it was also M. de Saint-Andre's responsibility to explain that France and Venice would have to accept the conditions imposed on them by "necessity," presumably meaning the necessity of first pursuing King Louis' military
and political in Europe.

Even after cordial diplomatic relations had once again been re-established between France and Venice, there existed several practical problems as far as French military assistance was concerned. The difficulty confronting Venetian military commanders at Candia lay in the somewhat questionable value of the French infantry and French cavaliers who volunteered their services. Many French knights sent to Candia were filled with youthful zeal and ambition, characteristics which these sometimes intractable cavaliers expressed in acts of reckless daring. The history of French involvement in the Candian siege stands as irrefutable evidence of this Gallican madness, a type of mysterious and incurable military fever which combined in its essence perverse obstinancy with a masochistic desire for glory. Venetian commanders, accustomed to the less heroic tasks of a year-round siege, understandably looked askance at these reckless cavaliers who sought to sweep away the infidel in one grandiose Wagnerian charge. Despite their apparent potential, French expeditionary forces, such as the one sent in 1660 under the Duke d'Este, seemed inevitably to end in disappointment and to lack the perseverance so vital to a prolonged siege.

In 1668 assistance from a variety of European states other than France and the papacy arrived at Candia in relative abundance. The Italian states of Tuscany, Modena, Genoa, and Lucca all contributed in one form or another, some barrels of invaluable gunpowder and others contingents of infantry. The Emperor sent three thousand soldiers while the princes of the Empire, such as the Elector of Cologne, the
Archbishop of Salzburg, the Duke of Brunswick, and the Bishop of Strasbourg, together contributed an additional thousand men. Even the reluctant Spanish agreed to apply funds collected from a dime (originally intended for the Hungarian struggle earlier in the decade) to the costs of the Candian war and to send the galleys of Naples to join the allied fleet. Collectively, this European support represented a significant addition to the Candian garrison and one without which the Republic would have found the siege incomparably more difficult. With Europe in a state of relative calm and the papacy lending its unreserved support and encouragement to the Venetian war, the prospects for a successful defense of Candia seemed to become a real possibility.

III

After so many years of brutal and exhausting warfare, the Venetian Senate had become increasingly inclined toward seeking some kind of compromise settlement with respect to Candia. In 1668 the Senate had sent a representative to Constantinople to negotiate a settlement based on a division of the island; if Venice could retain the city of Candia and its immediate environs in a sixty-mile radius, the remainder of the kingdom would belong to the Sultan. The Signoria seemed on the verge of concluding such an agreement when suddenly negotiations were suspended. This abrupt suspension was probably due to the lack of sincerity on the part of the Grand Vizier and also to the Pope's request that...
Venice not conclude a separate peace with Constantinople. In a sense the Pope's request had further 'internationalized' the war and had, from a moral viewpoint, increasingly committed the Republic to position which precluded the possibility of a separate peace with the Turks.

The Venetian decision to suspend peace negotiation in the spring of 1669 was at least in part related to the willingness of the French to agree not to wage war on Spain for the duration of the Candian war. Although Louis had only reluctantly agreed to this joint Franco-Spanish pact of non-aggression, the Pope was especially optimistic that it would have a beneficial effect on the defense of Candia. Not only would French military might be brought to bear on the war, but the Spanish had also promised that with peace in Europe the elite troops of Flanders would be ordered to help defend the city. For Clement the agreement represented a major diplomatic triumph in his passionate quest to bring the united strength of Christendom into the war.

In June of 1669 an allied expeditionary force comprised of papal, Maltese, and French vessels sailed from Toulon and headed toward the waters of Candia. The French squadron consisted of thirteen galleys under the Count de Vivonne and eighteen galleys and seventeen troop ships under the command of the Duke de Beaufort. This was one of the largest armadas ever assembled to bring aid to Candia and one which, in terms of sheer magnitude, had not been matched since the mid-1650's and the days of Marcello and Mocenigo.

Just the size of the armada of 1669 was sufficient to make it of singular importance. Although between 1667 and 1669 the land war had
increased considerably in intensity and ferocity, the role of the navy had diminished to the point where its chief responsibility was limited essentially to scattered patrols and largely ineffectual maneuvers. The auxiliaries had only intermittently joined the Venetians, and from 1664 until 1667 even the pontifical galleys had remained restricted to Italian waters.

Moreover, a general lethargy seemed to dampen the spirit of the Venetian navy during the second half of the decade. At most, the Venetian fleet attempted to impose intermittent blockades on the port of Canea and to patrol, in a somewhat desultory fashion, the waters near Malvasia and Cerigo. Even when the armada represented a sizable flotilla of warships, the number of encounters with the enemy remained few. Turkish commanders continued to avoid open confrontation with the superior Venetians, and the lighter and swifter Turkish vessels proved difficult to chase with any success. "Experience therefore persuades me to state," wrote Corner in 1667, "that it is very difficult to chase fruitfully the galleys of the Bey, as long as these same prefer not to want in any fashion to offer nor to receive invitation to combat...." Nor was Venetian naval strategy the same as it had been in the early years of the conflict. No longer was there a policy of actively and systematically blockading the Dardanelles or, indeed, any of the other major ports. The earlier strategy had now been replaced by one concentrating on a scattered and sporadic patrols largely restricted to the waters in the immediate vicinity of Candia itself. Such a strategy was too desultory to have resulted in any serious long-term military effect,
and when it was combined with disinterest on the part of the auxiliaries and inertia within the Venetian admiralty it marked what Provveditor-General Barbaro called "a beginning of the abandonment of the sea..."\footnote{48}

In addition to this lack of spirited leadership and enthusiasm, the armada continued to suffer from customary ills. Shortages of mariners, oarsmen, provisions, and money were daily concerns. Healthy and experienced galeotti or oarsmen were in constant demand; many who were infirm or whose sentences at the oars had expired were obliged to continue at their posts for lack of adequate replacements.\footnote{49} The great length of the war had, moreover, depleted the resources of the archipelago islands, the traditional reserve where the armada found supplies and tax money by which to nourish and pay the crews. By the last years of the war, little more than barley, wine, and limited amounts of money were to be found in these relatively rich and prosperous Venetian domains.\footnote{50}

The role of the navy consequently deteriorated during the last years of the war until it became, in fact, a fairly insignificant factor in the total defense of Candia. There occurred only one major encounter between 1667 and 1669. In March of 1668 a Turkish fleet attempted to intercept a Venetian convoy under the command of Lorenzo Cornaro; apprised of the Turkish designs, the Venetian convoy was secretly reinforced and subsequently managed to turn the surprise attack into a complete triumph. Successful as this engagement was, it nevertheless proved to be the last major naval encounter of the war.\footnote{51} There were
several minor land-and-sea operations such as the successful Venetian assault on the fortress at San Todoro, and, on several occasions, galleys were used to harass Turkish shore batteries. But generally during these last few desperate years the armada became almost totally subordinate to the demands of the garrison at Candia. In numerous instances mariners were disembarked and directly employed in the defense of Candia itself, an act which clearly underscored the shift in the war from the sea to the land.  

Although this was the twenty-fifth summer of the conflict, the campaign of 1669 offered more realistic hope for a successful defense than had any in recent years. Not only were there rumors that the Ottoman empire was itself in a state of considerable internal disorder, but the relatively abundant assistance which flowed into Candia that year seemed to promise some relief for the tormented city. The arrival of allied reinforcements in May led the Provveditor dell'Armada, Lorenzo Corner, to estimate that Candia was no longer in a desperate situation, especially since no Turkish troops had yet arrived to bolster the winter forces. Some twenty-four hundred German troops from Brunswick-Luneburg under Count Josias di Waldeck and sixteen hundred from the Elector of Bavaria arrived in May and June respectively; in addition there was the customary support of men and material contributed by the pope, the Emperor, the Maltese, and the Italian princes.  

The newest addition to the garrison was the French expeditionary force consisting of over six thousand infantry and cavalry with months of supplies and munitions. These troops were under the command of three
French officers, the most notable of whom were the Duc de Beaufort, commander of the troops stationed on the fleet, and the Duke de Navailles who assumed command of all land forces once the soldiers had disembarked. Attired in varied dress with only the scarves of their units to distinguish them, these six thousand French soldiers landed under cover of night on the 19th of June. Only the Musketeers of the King refused such an 'ignoble' entrance and requested permission to disembark in full view of the enemy during the following day; the result of this initial touch of French 'chivalry' was the loss of several musketeers to Turkish artillery and rifle fire.

No sooner had the French troops disembarked when their commander, de Navailles, demanded an immediate sortie against the Turkish positions. Despite Provveditor-General Morosini's advice that the sortie should at least await the arrival of the allied galleys, de Navailles insisted that immediate action be taken. French troops were thus assembled on the night of June 24th along the eastern defenses of San Demetri. The subsequent charge, which came in the dark of the following morning, initially routed the enemy from their position; the positions were, however, quickly recovered by the Turks when the elated French troops fell into disorder and were dispersed in panic after a barrel of gunpowder accidentally exploded in their midst. The lives lost in this senseless and futile sortie were in the hundreds, including the Duc de Beaufort, who had become separated from his unit during the battle and was never heard from again. The tragic results of de Navailles' sortie were the logical outcome of a series of serious
strategic mistakes on part of the French command. Not only were the French commanders unfamiliar with the terrain and the enemy's tactics, but the size of their sortie was in itself too small to have even accomplished the task they had decided upon. Moreover, French hauteur in regard to the Venetian and German troops stationed at Candia tended to generate an atmosphere of mutual disaffection, a fact which may, in part, have accounted for Morosini's unwillingness to commit more of the troops under his command to support the French attack. As one contemporary complained, the French wanted "for themselves only the honor of liberating from the enemy that city (Candia)..."; what they accomplished in their short stay on the island was something considerably less.

The allied armada consisting of seven pontifical, seven Maltese, five Venetian and thirteen French galleys finally arrived at Candia on the 3rd of July. A week later a consulta of all the allied commanders decided, against the warning of Provveditor-General Morosini, that the galleys and land forces would undertake a joint assault in the vicinity of Sant'Andrea. Two more weeks passed while favorable weather conditions were awaited; on the 24th of July at 7:00 A.M. the galleys began the bombardment of the Turkish batteries. The barrages continued for nearly three hours at which time a French vessel by the name of Theresa suffered an enemy shot in the magazine; the ship exploded and all but seven of her 293 man crew perished. The panic spread by the explosion and loss of the Theresa disrupted the entire allied operation, and the galleys were forced to withdraw after having suffered extensive casual-
ties. The simultaneously launched land sorties likewise ended in failure primarily due to a lack of cooperation among the allied soldiers and to the arrival of Janissaries who reinforced the enemy positions.  

The bitterness and dejection which swept the garrison in the wake of this grandiose failure caused many of the French to criticize and slander Provveditor-General Morosini and the entire defensive system at Candia. They complained unfairly that Morosini had misled them into thinking that Candia was defendable. As a result, the French openly refused to assist in the construction of new fortifications, and Admiral Vivonne dispersed his galleys in different ports throughout the kingdom because, he claimed, the air about the city was foul. As a stifling heat wave struck the city, French troops were clandestinely removed to their galleys on the pretext of illness.  

Vicenzo Rospigliosi, papal commander and theoretic commander-in-chief for all the Christian forces, was finally compelled to convene a general consulta of all the allied leaders. The consulta produced, however, no tangible results and tended rather to exacerbate the differences among the allies. The Duc de Navailles was especially obstinate, claiming that losses within his ranks had been so numerous that he would be unable to lend French soldiers for any further duty than their original assignments. The only consensus among the commanders was to delay any future action until an expected two thousand additional mercenaries under the Duke della Mirandola had arrived safely in Candia.  

Weeks of continued rancor and bitterness followed this consulta.
until finally the Duc de Navailles announced his intention to withdraw the vast majority of his French troops by the 21st of August. On the night of the 21st, another consulta met at the house of de Navailles, but the only point agreed upon by all was the inevitability of the fall of Candia once French support had been withdrawn. Unaffected by the pleas and supplications of the Maltese and Venetian commanders as well as those of numerous Candian priests and notables, the French duke with all but five hundred of his soldiers withdrew from the city that night. All had tried to instill in de Navailles a sense of duty to "the service of God, the honor of religion, the reputation of Christianity, and in particular of their king (Louis XIV),... (but) there was no way to force him to condescend to a single thing." 62

Although the historical evidence is confusing, it seems that the responsibility for this precipitous French withdrawal must lie largely with the Duke. Despite the flexibility of his instructions, de Navailles unquestionably exceeded the intent, if not the express wording, of his orders from Louis. Moreover, in terms of Louis' foreign policy, de Navailles' action would have made little sense. The French retreat from Candia left French influence and prestige in Rome abysmally weakened just at a time when Louis was trying to gain more support for a French candidate as the next Pope. In addition, de Navailles could in no way excuse his decision by arguing that his troops were decimated or weakened, since the vast majority of them returned safely to the shores of France. The full story will never be known, but from existing evidence the Duke stands indicted for exceeding his instructions and
consequently for hastening the surrender of Candia.

In the wake of the French departure came a general collapse of morale within the garrison. Knowledge of the French exodus caused the Turkish commander to initiate a massive assault on the 23rd of August, an attack which Morosini and his men courageously and successfully repulsed. But even the vigor and bravery displayed that day by the Venetian contingents proved useless in encouraging the other foreign commanders to remain at Candia. The Duke della Mirandola had no sooner arrived with his reinforcements on the 25th of that month when he informed Morosini he had no intention of participating in the surrender of the city and would soon depart without ever having landed his troops. Quickly following suit were the Maltese and Savoyards who requested immediate withdrawal from what they had come to view as a doomed city; only the German troops, already severely decimated by disease and battle, agreed to remain at their posts.

Now faced with the imminent departure of the Maltese, Savoyard, and papal units, Morosini called a general consulta on the 27th of the month during which he made one last plea that Rospigliosi and the other allies remain at the defense of Candia. Morosini's plea had little effect, and under cover of darkness on the night of August 31st the papal, Maltese and remaining French units sailed from Candia. Even with an additional six hundred reinforcements brought from Standia the departure of Rospigliosi's troops left Candia with fewer than four thousand men. In such a state further defense beyond the immediate future seemed all but impossible.
Confronted with impending disaster, Morosini had selected, even before the auxiliary squadrons and units had departed, a peace delegation in order to negotiate the surrender of Candia to the enemy. But the Turkish negotiators remained adamant, demanding that before peace could be discussed Candia would first have to be ceded. With the departure of the auxiliaries at the end of August, Turkish demands increased, the vizier's representatives now refusing to discuss the retention or exchange of various Candian and Dalmatian fortresses; they questioned how the Venetians could in any way make demands in exchange for Candia when the Grand Vizier's forces could successfully storm the city within a matter of days. So confident had the Turks become by this date that they had the temerity to suggest that Venice pay a reparation for the cost of the war and tribute for any Turkish fortresses taken in Dalmatia. After the Venetians bravely and successfully repulsed a major Turkish assault in early September, however, Turkish negotiators seemed less insolent and more amenable to sensible peace negotiations.

At the time of its surrender Candia "seemed like a pile of stone," especially at Sant'Andrea and Sabionera with only the innermost portions of the city still in recognizable condition. Considering its state, Morosini gained relatively advantageous terms, perhaps because he negotiated the surrender as part of a general peace settlement between Venice and Constantinople. Moreover, the Provveditor-General had taken considerable care in concealing from the enemy the true condition of the fortress; the Grand Vizier, anxious himself to conclude the war.
and faced with what seemed to be a still resolute garrison, undoubtedly found compromise an increasingly sensible course of action.

In the peace terms no mention was made of an indemnity nor even of Zante's customary annual 'tribute.' Venice retained all of the artillery contained within Candia, and all the city's inhabitants and military personnel were guaranteed safe conduct from the island. The fortresses of Suda, Garabusa, and Spinalonga were also to remain in Venetian control although without adequate harbor facilities these secondary fortresses were of limited value. There was some dispute over the boundaries to be established in Dalmatia, a dispute which lingered well beyond the cessation of hostilities. The old and cantankerous pasha of Bosnia even threatened a resumption of the war in Dalmatia, but with his death an agreement was eventually concluded; Venetian dominion over Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, Cattaro as well as the territories in the immediate vicinity of Clissa and Spalato was assured. It was not until October of 1671, however, that this treaty agreement was officially ratified for the Dalmatian coast.

After more than twenty-four years of continuous warfare on land and at sea, the great struggle for possession of the Kingdom of Candia had come to an end. Countless assaults, sorties, and mine explosions marked the long course of the war. The combined fatalities for the war stagger the imagination, one author estimating nearly 30,000 Christians and over 100,000 Turks had lost their lives in the struggle. At the time of the evacuation there were counted 3,754 soldiers and approximately 4,000 civilians of which only a handful chose to remain under
the domination of their new master; the rest sought new residence in
the islands of the archipelago, in the Istrian peninsula, or on the
mainland of Venice. 73

News of the surrender was received with mixed feelings by some
in Venice. One senator, Antonio Correr, demanded that there be a full
investigation and inquiry into Morosini's action, but others rushed
to defend the Provveditor-General's conduct and the honorable peace he
had gained in the face of such adversity. 74 Deeply shocked and stunned
by the capitulation of Candia was the pontiff, Clement IX, a man whose
energies and resources had so selflessly been consumed in defense of
the island; it seems probable that his death in December of 1669 was
immeasurably hastened by this victory of the Moslems in the East. 75

Even Louis XIV, France's great Sun King, must have felt a sense of
chagrin over the loss of Candia and the responsibility French action
had to share in its surrender. 76 But certainly throughout Europe,
among even the most religious of Christendom's princes, there must have
been mixed with the remorse a sense of genuine relief. Victory would
have been sweeter but in a struggle which seemed endless and one from
which no sincere Catholic could with ease escape involvement, much of
Europe must certainly have savored with joy the coming of peace. For a
while, at least, the troublesome affairs of the East could once again
be laid to rest.

2. Estimates for the number of Turkish troops stationed at Candia vary considerably. Both Hammer and Terlinden cite the figure of 70,000 men for the year 1667. Hammer, Histoire, p. 122 and Charles H. Terlinden, Le Pape Clement IX et la guerre di Candia, 1667-69 (Louvain-Paris, 1904), p. 38. (Hereinafter referred to as Clement IX et Candie.) According to several contemporaries, however, there were fewer enemy soldiers. Provveditore-Generale dell'Armi in Candia, Antonio Priuli, estimated, in 1667, there were about 30,000 enemy soldiers. According to Provveditore-Generale dell'Armi in Regno di Candia, Barbaro, there were only 20,000, but reports received from Constantinople noted another 35,000 were on their way. The number of reinforcements found at Candia at any one time consequently increases the difficulty of estimating the troop strength of the enemy. Both the Turks and the Venetians generally increased the number of reinforcements considerably during the summer and fall months when the fighting was at its worst. Both men agreed, however, that the Turkish army was lacking in certain vital supplies and skilled engineers, deficiencies not uncommon in the Venetian camp also. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Relazione del Provveditore-Generale dell'Armi in Candia, Antonio Priuli, March 30, 1667 and Provveditore-Generale dell'Armi in Regno di Candia, Luca Francesco Barbaro, 1667.

3. For Barbaro's figures on troop strengths, and for an analysis of the various contingents and their capacity, see A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Luca Francesco Barbaro, Provveditore-Generale dell'Armi in Regno di Candia, 1667. In this particular report, Barbaro, who assumed command some time in the late spring or summer, remarked that "I have assembled under my eye 8,310 soldiers...." See also B.N.M., VII (2182), Siege of Candia; Andrea Valiero, Historia della guerra di Candia (Venice, 1679), pp. 627-651, 673,675. (Hereinafter referred to as Historia.)

4. A report drawn up by Cavalier Filippo Verneda, Superintendent of Fortifications and Artillery, gives us a fairly clear picture of the enormous amount of activity and labor which was required to maintain the security of Candia. For example, Verneda's report mentions the resurfacing and heightening of the ravelin of San Spirito, the enlargement of the ravelin at Panigra, adjustment of numerous counter-escarpments, restoration of much of Sablonera, completion of various parapets, construction of numerous countermines for future defense, and the erection of a new 'frecia' or arrow and 'mezzaluna' or lunette. The report mentions in passing that there was a continued shortage of sappers for work.
on the fortifications, and a suggestion that more could be procured from the islands of the archipelago; in desperate cases, the men from the armada (the report suggests) might also be so employed. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Relazione di Provveditor-General dell'Armi in Candia, Antonio Priuli, March 30, 1667; See also B.N.M., VII (2182), 1667-68, p. 13.

5. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Luca Francesco Barbaro, Provveditor-General dell'Armi in Regno di Candia, 1667, and Relazione di Provveditor-General dell'Armi in Candia, Antonio Priuli, March 30, 1667.

6. See Hammer, Histoire, III, pp. 106-107; Andrea Valiero, Historia della guerra di Candia (Venice, 1679), pp. 627, 651, 673, 675. (Hereinafter referred to as Historia.) The Senate proposed to the Turks through the Venetian representative, Giovanni Battista Padavino, that there could be a "division of the island"; likewise the fortress at Suda would be destroyed if Nuova Candia were razed and Venice would pay a 'gift' of 300,000 reals and as well annual tribute of 25,000 reals. This suggestion had no tangible result. According to Hammer, Kiuprili made an offer of peace

7. Turkish forces in front of Panigra and the western bastions were led by the Grand Vizier himself, and were accompanied by a "multitude of workers, wizened mercenary soldiers and peasants,...and engineers, the great part of whom were Christians...."; most of these latter were put to work on the tranches and the construction of underground mines. See A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Luca Francesco Barbaro, Provveditor-General dell'Armi in Regno di Candia, 1667; Hammer, Histoire, III, p. 123.


9. Ibid., p. 2.

10. Ibid., passim.

11. The exact number of mines exploded varies considerably, although there is a consensus that this year saw the explosion of at least several hundred. One source notes that from July 1, 1667 until July 29, 1667 there were exploded at least eighty mines. B.N.M., VII (2182), pp. 15-29. Relying primarily on Nani, Bigge and others place the number of sorties at about seventeen for the year, the number of Turkish assaults at thirty-two, and the total number of Turkish and Venetian mines exploded at between six and seven hundred. Wilhelm Bigge, La guerra di Candia negli anni 1667-69 (Turin, 1901), p. 15 (Hereinafter referred to as Guerra.) See also Romanin, Storia, pp. 451-452.

13. "The city of Candia presently has been battered day and night by the Turks with eight batteries of forty pieces so great that for the most part they are of 120 pound (libbre) caliber. There have been destroyed, however, in many parts buildings very worthy of respect, as the church of San Francesco, San Salvatore, San Paolo, and of the Capuchines, and there have remained uninhabitable all the houses of the quarter of Sant'Andrea and of Sabionera; whence most of the families of the inhabitants have withdrawn themselves in certain huts under the wall, where the enemy cannon does not reach. The Grand Vizier has ordered demolished all the houses of the country-side, leaving standing only the one he occupies. He has opened the trenches...and there does not pass a single day when they (Turks) do not explode some mine....Our cannon can no longer damage them because of the height and thickness of their earthen ramparts." "Correspondenza Malta, 1645-69," Archivio Storico Italiano, Part III, XLIX (1912), p. 77. There were estimated to be in Candia in 1667 about seven thousand civilian inhabitants, many of whom were still dependent upon the city for subsistence. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 80, Luca Francesco Barbaro, Provveditor-Generale dell'Armi in regno di Candia, 1667.

14. Bigge, Guerra, pp. 15-18. For example, in 1667, the Electors of Mainz and Cologne and the Bishops of Paderborn and Strassbourg sent four hundred infantry each; the Elector of Bavaria promised two thousand men who never arrived although Bavarian troops had served in Candia since 1665. Emperor Leopold I allowed recruiting in his territories, sent 500,000 lira, and promised several thousand troops. In 1667 the Duke of Savoy sent money for a battalion of five hundred men and later reinforced it. Moreover, the skilled Savoyard general, the Marquis de Villa, was sent to serve in Candia in the mid-1660's and stayed until his recall in 1667. See Luigi Dalmazzo, "I Piemontesi nella guerra di Candia (1644-69)," Miscellanea di Storia Italiana, XIII (1909), pp. 35-52.


16. Venice made every effort to cultivate the friendship and support of the pontiff; in accord with this policy, the family of the Pope, the Rospigliosi, was inscribed in the Golden Books of Venetian nobility. To add to this new warmth between Rome and Venice were the many years of friendly relations the Republic had had with Clement when he was Alexander VII's Secretary of State. See Terlinden, Clement IX et Candia, p. 65.

17. The Venetian ambassador to Rome, Sagredo, wrote in 1661 that the Papal States were indebted by some 39,000,000 scudi owed to about ten different banks. Despite this debt, however, papal credit remained sound for the shares in these banks were often sold at premium prices. Nicolo Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet (eds.), Le relazioni degli

19. Apparently there arose some disagreement over the borders of Ferrara over which the Republic proved, in Pastor's opinion, less than agreeable to the new Pope. The 'ingratitude' with which Pastor charges Venice apparently did not seriously impair Venetian relations with Clement. *Pastor, History of the Popes*, XXXI, pp. 413-414, 418-420.

20. The Pope also tried to use his influence to urge other Christian princes in western and eastern Europe to support the war, especially Poland in the East. *Pastor, History of the Popes*, XXXI, pp. 413-414, 418-420.


22. The French even refused to assist the desperate Ragusians who suffered the devastating earthquake of 1667 because, Terlindden suggests, the French learned that the Ragusian port of Saint-Croix would be of no particular maritime or military use to them against Spanish Naples. *Terlindden, Clement IX et Candie*, pp. 38-40, 67-68.


25. Several Turkish batteries harassed the fortress at Sabionera as early as February of 1668. B.N.M., VII (200) Mossa Arma, p. 229, map 11. In March if 1668, the Turks also attempted a surprise attack on Standia, but the Venetians learned of the maneuver and managed to thwart it. A.S.V., Provveditor di Armada (1224), Lunardo Moro, Provveditore dell'Arm, March 16, 1668.

26. B.N.M., VII (2183), Relazione del Stato nel quale s'attrovavano la Piazza di Candia...21 Aprile 1668. According to this report there were about 4,700 combatants including officers but excluding the sick and wounded (also excluding 400 soldiers of the Pope, 300 from Savoy, and 350 in the cavalry); with the laborers, galettii, and guastadors or sappers counted there may well have been about 11,000 persons in all. This number was later increased by the addition of dozens of companies brought into the city, eventually bringing the number to 15,792 of which 11,134 were considered 'effectives'. See also B.N.M., VII (211), Relazione di Antonio Barbaro in retorno di Provveditor-Generale dell'Arm in Candia.

27. B.N.M., VII (211), Relazione di Antonio Barbaro ritorno
di Provveditore-Generale dell'Armi in Candia. Mons. Bichi wrote to Cardinal Roespiglisi in September of 1668 saying that the Turkish army was very weak and numbered no more than about 15,000 men. See "Correspondenza Malta, 1645-69," XLIX (1912), p. 323.

28. Antonio Barbaro, Provveditore-Generale of the fortress, estimated that several Turkish-held fortresses could have been captured with the assistance of several thousand more men and cavalry and with the aid of several more galleys. He noted the weakness of the enemy position at Canea and Rettimo as well as at lesser fortresses on the island. A surprise attack on Canea, he estimated, would require about four thousand infantry and, in the open, about eight thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry. See B.N.M. VII (211), Relazione di Antonio Barbaro ritorno di Provveditore-Generale dell'Armi in Candia, 1668, pp. 322-323.

29. "Correspondenza Malta, 1645-69," XLIX (1912), p. 79. In appraising the state of Candia's defenses, the Marquis da Villa noted that the fortifications were generally "in good condition" with ramparts, palisades, cannon, and underground fortifications all in reputable condition. See B.N.M. (657), Relazione del Marchese (Francesco Villa) del stato della piazza di Candia attacata da Turchi come si trovana al tempo di sua partenza, 1668.

30. Bigge, Guerra, p. 44
31. Ibid., pp. 47-50.
32. Quoted in Bigge, Guerra, pp. 55-56.
34. Hammer, Histoire, III, p. 117.
35. Barozzi and Berchet, Relazioni, II, Series III, pp. 85-86, 339-340. See also Terlinden, Clement IX et Candie, pp. 76-77. Terlinden notes that Clement granted anyone volunteering for service in Candia a plenary indulgence and also agreed to maintain two hundred paid infantry throughout the winter at Candia. See also Bigge, Guerra, p. 18 Bigge accepts the traditional figure of one million scudi and 800,000 scudi as the proceeds derived from the suppression of the three orders and the sale of the Church of San Marco.

36. Terlinden, Clement IV et Candie, p. 140; Pastor, History of the Popes, XXXI, pp. 423-424.
37. Terlinden, Clement IX et Candie, pp. 103-107.
38. Ibid., pp. 106-107.
Diplomatic rapport between France and Venice was also improved when the Venetian ambassador, Giustinian, was replaced by Jean Morosini. Morosini joined with the new papal nuncio, Bargellini, to produce an atmosphere which was more conducive to encouraging open French support for the war at Candia.

The French contingent present at Candia in 1668 was under the command of the Duke de la Feuillade; like those French who were to follow, they demanded to be placed at the most dangerous position and also to make dangerous and often foolish sorties, the results of which were often tragic.

The French continued to remain extremely cautious, making every effort to preserve cordial relations with Constantinople. French troops and ships sent to Candia were to sail under the pontifical flag, and French commanders were ordered not to attempt to prevent the passage of any Turkish ships through the Dardanelles. As for the Pope, Louis needed his assistance in helping to quell dissension within the clergy. Moreover, Louis hoped to gain support for a French nominee to the pontificate. A sign of improving relations was the appointment of Duke Frederic Maurice de Bouillon to the Cardinalate in August of 1669. Terlinden, *Clement IX et Candie*, pp. 143-144, 152, 156, 169, 200-201.

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A.S.V., *Collegio V (Secreta)*, Relazione, Busta 75, Relazione di Andrea Corner, Capitano-General da Mar, 1667.

A.S.V., *Collegio V (Secreta)*, Relazione, Busta 80, Luca Francesco Barbaro, Provveditore-General dell'Armi, 1667.


A.S.V., *Collegio V (Secreta)*, Relazione, Busta 75, Andrea Corner, Capitano-General da Mar, 1667.
51. B.N.M., VII (211), pp. 341-344; Romanin, Storia, p. 453-454; Bigge, Guerra, pp. 30-31. In this battle, the Battle of Fodella, over four hundred Turkish prisoners were taken and one thousand Christian slaves freed.

52. Bigge, Guerra, pp. 38-40.

53. "Correspondenza Malta, 1645-69," XLIX (1912), pp. 338-339. Apparently the Janissaries rose in revolt over the order to execute the Sultan's two other brothers. Moreover, the Janissaries demanded that the Sultan reach a peace agreement with the Venetians within forty days or be replaced by his second brother, Suleiman. As a result, Turkish forces at Candia in the spring of 1669 were in something less than optimum condition, a fact about which the weakened Venetians could do little.

54. A.S.V., Provveditor alla Armara (1224), Lorenzo Corner, Provveditor dall'Armar, May 18, 1669, Candia.

55. Bigge, Guerra, pp. 57-58.

56. None of the French commanders, according to Terlinden, were without flaw; the Duc de Navaille, himself, was characterized by Terlinden as a man with 'intractible pride'. Terlinden, Clement IX et Candie, pp. 198-199. The exact number of French troops were as follows:

- Infantry: 5,290
- Royal guard: 535
- Officers: 232
- Musketeers of the king (horse): 223
- Cavalry: 328

Total: 6,608

Bigge, Guerra, p. 61.

57. Quoted in Bigge, Guerra, pp. 70-71, n.2. For a complete description of that unfortunate French charge of June 24-25, see Bigge, Guerra, pp. 64-71. See also a letter of Card. Rospigliosi to Nuncio Bargellini in Rome written on August 27, 1669, cited in Terlinden, Clement IX et Candie, pp. 344-345.

58. Morosini urged an attack on Sabionera, not Sant'Andrea where the position of the allies on land and sea would be less secure. See Terlinden, Clement IX et Candie, p. 229-230.

59. Bigge, Clement IX et Candie, pp. 74-80.

60. A.S.V., Provveditor alla Armada (1224), Lorenzo Corner, Provveditor alla Armar, August 10, 1669, Candia. Corner reports how the French insisted on departing despite the supplications of Rospigliosi.

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He also notes how French troops were clandestinely removed at night to their ships: "Every night, a few at a time, they take them (their men) aboard their ships, producing with enormous effect a great loss to this defense and inducing in the remaining men a great loss of spirit...." Corner gives Rospigliosi credit for trying to persuade the French to remain; Rospigliosi, "with tremendous zeal applied himself to this urgent emergency...." See also Bigge, Guerra, p. 80; and Terlinden, Clement IX et Candia, pp. 233-234.

61. Bigge, Guerra, pp. 82-85.

62. A.S.V., Provveditor alla Armada (1224), Lorenzo Corner, Provveditor dell'Armada, Candia, August 25, 1669; Bigge, Guerra, pp. 89-90.


64. B.N.M., VII (1566), Relazione (anonymous), pp. 201-202; A.S.V., Provveditor alla Armada (1224), Lorenzo Corner, Provveditor dell'Armada, August 25, 1669, Candia; Bigge, Guerra, pp. 90-91.

65. Bigge, Guerra, pp. 92-94.

66. B.N.M., VII (1556), Relazione (anonymous), pp. 204-205. There were suggestions that the fortress be mined and destroyed in one great explosion, but this was considered too dangerous for the evacuation of the survivors. Others suggested that the crews of the galleys be employed in the construction of new battlements, but this also was rejected because it would have exposed the armada to capture, an event which would have condemned for certain the fortress. See Romanin, Storia, pp. 462.

67. Peace negotiations had been underway almost continuously even though it proved increasingly difficult to find a prominent Venetian willing to suffer the humiliations and harassments encountered in Constantinople. In August, 1669, Alvise Molin, the Venetian representative, received the last proposal concerning a division of the island. He was permitted to cede even the fortress at Suda, an offer which the Grand Vizier rejected. See Romanin, Storia, pp. 461-462.

68. B.N.M., VII (1566), Relazione (anonymous, pp. 208-211.

69. Ibid., pp. 212.

70. Description of the city by J. M. Scheither (a contemporary military historian) as quoted in Bigge, Guerra, p. 97, n.l.
71. A.S.V., Provveditor alla Armada (1224), Lorenzo Corner, Provveditor dell'Armada, September 10, 1669, Candia. A copy of the peace terms can be found in B.N.M., VII (1566), Relazione degli ultimi successi di Candia (Anonymous), 1669, pp. 213-214.


75. Terlinden, Clement IX et Candie, p. 307; Pastor, History of the Popes, XXXI, pp. 429-430.

76. Terlinden states that while Louis' interest in the war was not totally disinterested, his zeal "was none the less truly sincere." Terlinden, Clement IX et Candie, p. 244. Moreover, the Duke de Navailles was exiled from court upon his return to France for a period of three years, and the count di Vivonne suffered the anger of the king. Bigge, Guerra, p. 94.
CONCLUSION

In view of the general decline of Venice during the seventeenth century, it would appear relatively simple to dismiss the collapse of Candia as the product of inevitable forces. In doing so, however, we would commit a serious historical error. The more closely we examine the 'decline of Venice' in the seventeenth century, the more we are made to realize the importance of taking into consideration the many exceptions which an historical generalization frequently ignores. The same caution must be applied to any study of the Candian war. By ignoring the many military, political, and economic particulars of this frustrating and dramatic episode, we run the risk of sacrificing the war's historical importance to the vanity of glibness.

As tempting as it may be to reduce all military factors in the Candian war to a matter of attrition, we should keep in mind that the war was very much a struggle of human courage and resourcefulness. Without question, the armies of the Sultan remained superior on land while the Venetian armadas usually went unchallenged at sea. But in order to understand why this generality was essentially true, one must first direct closer attention to the many subtleties of military history.

First, one must appreciate the quality of the Turkish foe with which the Venetian defenders were confronted. Friar Roberto Solaro wrote in 1650 that the Turkish army at Candia was "the flower of Turkey, not being, as many believe, that 100 Christians can subdue 2,000 Turks; here it is the contrary, that 1,000 Turks have more and more times
subdued 2,000 of ours.¹ Turkish soldiers in general displayed considerable courage and persistence; attacking a Turkish position by sortie often proved costly and as well futile, for their soldiers and laborers usually quickly repaired the damage.² The Turkish as well as the Venetian army frequently had men whose courage, discipline, and aggressiveness was unquestioned.³

Furthermore, the Turks at Candia seemed adept at learning from experience and from the tactics of their adversary. Renegade Venetians and other western Europeans frequently instructed the Turkish troops in the arts of warfare, from the construction of mines and the handling of artillery to the defensive weaknesses of the fortress of Candia itself. As the war dragged on, Turkish officers became especially experienced in the use of parallel trenches, a technique later made famous in Europe by Vauban. The most profitable experience gained by the Turkish engineers was in the construction of mines and mine tunnels, a military device so extensively and usefully employed at Candia.⁴

In addition to the military qualities of the Turkish army, the Venetians themselves committed several strategic errors during the course of the war which facilitated the capture of Candia. One of the basic weaknesses of the Venetian military command was the chronic lack of unity. This not only affected the immediate chain of command, but it also tended to limit the value of joint land-and-sea operations, so much so that the armada and the land forces often seemed to function as separate units. One analyst of the war has gone as far as to conclude that "without doubt one must consider as the principle cause of
the fall of Candia...the lack of a strong unity of command on the sea and land."\(^5\)

Another fatal error of strategy was the failure to embark on a systematic policy of blockading the enemy's ports. After the great triumphs of the mid-1650's and the inactivity of the war during the years that followed, the policy of maintaining yearly blockades at the main Turkish ports fell into desuetude.\(^6\) More and more the armada became a mere appendage of the army stationed at Candia, losing the initiative and aggressiveness which had characterized its days under Giacomo da Riva, Lorenzo Marcello, and Lazzaro Mocenigo. Understandably the naval resources of the Republic were limited and the task confronting it enormous. As Andrea Corner noted in 1667, with a "sea so vast it would not be possible to prevent the arrival of all aid to the Turkish armies at Candia."\(^7\) Moreover, the number of ships upon which the Grand Vizier was able to draw seemed nearly inexhaustible, whether they came from French, Dutch, or English merchants or from the squadrons of his beys and pashas.\(^8\) Yet all these factors can in no way excuse or explain the inability of the once renowned Venetian navy to maintain a determined and specific strategic policy at sea during the last years of the conflict. No policy in this case was in many ways worse than one which might have been in some ways unsatisfactory.\(^9\) Beyond the ever-present question of resources and manpower, there also lay at issue very 'human' factors relating to military tactics and questions of strategy.

Socially and financially as well, the Candian war has its own
history, one which involves the direct effects of the war on changing Venetian society. The war cannot be singled out as the catastrophic event which insured the decline of Venice in the seventeenth century, but it certainly was a major burden and frustration for a Republic already in a state of decay. Unquestionably the war accelerated a commercial erosion which had already been underway and removed even further any chance that Venice might reverse what seemed to be an inexorable decline. The wartime conditions diminished and in certain cases completely ruined many of the Levantine markets which Venetian merchants had tried to preserve.

In a purely financial sense the Venetian state was able to withstand the additional pressures of the Candian war with relative ease, for within a short time of its conclusion the public debt contracted as a result of war had been reduced to a manageable sum. Even in certain areas of traditional economic strength, the Venetian economy remained largely unaffected by the war; luxury items, fish, and such invisible exports as banking services continued to be vital elements in the post-war economic structure. The real damage wrought by the war was in the dislocation of trade brought on by nearly twenty-five years of conflict. It was this general disruption of trade which forced Venetian merchants from a competitive market and also enabled the aggressive merchants of the northern European countries to become more solidly entrenched in the commercial life of the East than they had ever been. When coupled with the antiquated commercial practices and custom duties so frequently encountered at Venice and with the
ever increasing competition of the cities of the Terraferma, the additional burdens brought on by the war placed Venetian commerce in a delicate and tenuous position. Venice remained throughout the century a popular clearing house for the commerce of Dalmatia and certain ports of the Adriatic, but, like Portugal of the sixteenth century, she more and more assumed the role of the passive merchant who handled and transported merchandise but in whose hands the commercial and manufacturing initiative no longer remained.

The direct effect of the war on the social life of Venice is difficult to determine. Monsignor Pannocchieschi, a contemporary observer, saw few obvious public effects on the city's populace brought on by the war, and a noted modern historian of Venice has argued that the moral and political climate present at the end of the century was substantially no worse than it had been at the beginning. Although generally it seems that most of Venice was only peripherally touched by the pressures of the war, the relatively few indices of social behavior available to the historian present something of a mixed picture.

For example, if one examines the number of opera libretti written and published between 1637 and 1699, one will find none for 1646 and only one for 1647. Since 1646 is the only year for which at least one libretto has not yet been found, it may be that in this particularly difficult war year there was very little money for such "cultural" and "non-military" ventures as opera. After the late 1640's, however, the number of published libretti remains fairly constant throughout the century, a fact perhaps reflecting the incidental effects of the sub-
sequent years of the war. It is also interesting to note that there was apparently money available, albeit from private sources, for the remodeling or reconstruction of Venetian theaters; such renovation occurred at three different theaters during the course of the war in 1654, 1655 and again in 1661. 18

There exist also some demographic figures for seventeenth-century Venice which, though applicable to the century at large, also offer some clues as to the social effects of the Candian struggle. The number of marriages recorded in Venice, for instance, drops slightly during the first few years of the Candian war; from 1646 to 1650 inclusive there was a decline of about 8 percent in the number listed for the previous five years, from 5,831 to 5,356 in all. In the ten-year period from 1641 to 1651 there were an average of 1,119 marriages a year, but for the three-year period between 1645 and 1647 there were a total of 306 fewer marriages than the average. 19 These figures would seem to imply that the pessimism generated during the first years of the war may have had a depressive effect on the total number of marriages.

Likewise, there was an overall population decrease in Venice which, in part, may reflect the arduous warfare with the Turks during the last half of the century. In 1624 there were 141,625 persons in Venice, and after the plague of 1630 about 102,143 in 1633. For the next nine years the population recovered rapidly until in 1642 there were recorded some 120,307 persons, an increase of 17-1/2 percent. After 1642, however, the rate of growth subsided considerably so that in 1696 there were only 138,067 persons living in Venice, a rate of increase of only

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1 1/2 percent and an absolute increase smaller than that gained in only the nine years from 1633 until 1642. Undoubtedly, much of this demographic decline can be related to the economic decay of Venice and the general shift to the mainland; nevertheless, these statistics may partially reflect the effects that twenty-five years of warfare had on Venetian society at large.

Such then are a few of the relatively limited indices offered the social and economic historian of the Candian war. Certainly no war is lacking in complex issues and the net result of a conflict as prolonged as that fought at Candia cannot be easily reduced to simple terms. Byron referred to Candia as Venice's Troy, and in some ways the war was just such a burden. In retrospect, the war must be viewed less poetically. It was a conflict which in many ways was dramatic and trying but one which, in the context of seventeenth-century Venice, was neither totally unique nor completely catastrophic.
CONCLUSION: FOOTNOTES


2. Wilhelm Bigge, La guerra di Candia negli anni, 1667-69 (Turin, 1901), pp. 48-49. (Hereinafter referred to as Guerra.)

3. Apparently some of the Venetian mercenaries, fresh from the less disciplined warfare of the Thirty Years War, proved difficult to handle; in general, however, they were, despite their diverse nationalities and religious backgrounds, a well-respected army of fighters. See Bigge, Guerra, pp. 100-101, 117, n.3. For the Turkish soldiers, the name of Candia also became one associated with duress and suffering; in "all Turkey, Candia was considered as a malediction, so much so that when one desired to wish exile on a person, one thought of Candia...." Quoted in Bigge, Guerra, p. 45.

4. Giovanni Pavanello, "Il tradimento nella caduta di Candia," Atenee Veneto, XXVII, n.1 (March-April, 1904), pp. 205-207; Bigge, Guerra, pp. 12-13. Especially important for the siege was the skill and expertise learned by the Turkish engineers in the construction and detonation of underground mines.


6. Even when the Venetian armadas maintained regular blockades at the Dardanelles during the early years of the war, they were frequently only during the spring, summer and early winter. As a result the blockades were not total and some shipping, even during the harsh winter months, naturally escaped to Candia or other ports. In commenting on this failure to maintain a systematic blockade or develop a systematic naval strategy, Roberto Cessi has written: "From this dispersed and tumultuous action there resulted a single advantage, of prolonging the agony of the island and of the unhappy city...." Roberto Cessi, Storia della repubblica di Venezia (Rev.ed.; Milan-Messina, 1968), II, p. 157. (Hereinafter referred to as Storia.)

7. A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 75, Andrea Corner, Capitano-Generale da Mar, 1667.

8. French and other European vessels were frequently used or forcefully requisitioned to bring assistance to the Turkish army in Candia. For examples, see A.S.V., P.T.M. (715), Rubrica di lettere delle Provveditor-General dell'Armi in Regno di Candia, 1647-52, Rubrica 60, January 28, 1652, from Candia. The Turkish navy apparently had difficulties in finding skilled workers for their arsenals and

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shipyards. In order to transport goods and munitions to Candia they had to rely on ships constructed in the Black Sea area or on the vast numbers of smaller saiches or caramusels obtained in various areas of the empire. See A.S.V., Dip. Rel., Filza 131, Constantinopoli, Letter 270, Bailo Soranzo, Vigne di Pera, April 2, 1647. This policy apparently continued throughout the war for we read a report in the late 1660's speaking of the numerous saiches "abundantly provisioned..." bringing aid to the Turkish forces at Candia. See B.N.M., VII (697), Relazione del Marchese (Villa) del stato della piazza di Candia attacata da Turchi come si trovava al tempo di sua partenza, 1668, p. 18.

9. Soranzo, the Bailo, wrote that even with "the confession of the Turks themselves...the armada of V.V.E.E. (Venice) was twice as strong as the Turkish...." A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Filza 130, Constantinopoli, January 28, 1647, Letter 264, Bailo Soranzo. See also A.S.V., Collegio V (Secreta), Relazione, Busta 75, Capitano-Generale da Mar, Zorzi Morosini, 1664.

10. Some of the commercial disruptions brought on by the war were eliminated once peace had been achieved. The Turks proved obliging in removing any restrictions on commerce set during the war; as a result commerce revived so thoroughly — in the eyes of the Cinque Savii — that it was restored to its "ancient form", a vague and often inaccurate phrase. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 31, Capitolari (1625-85), January 4, 1670. In addition, the number of complaints concerning the disruption of commerce as well as the number of public debtors seems to have diminished during the years immediately following the conclusion of peace. See, for example, A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 32, Capitolari (1419-1685), passim; A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 33, Capitolari (1625-85), passim, especially the period 1671-74; A.S.V., Gov. delle Pub. Entrada, Busta 17, Leg.-Vari, 1651-1700, passim. Some effort was made to regularize Venetian trade relations with Turkish and Spanish merchants, especially by the way of systematizing and equalizing the custom duties. A.S.V., Cinque Savii, Busta 156, Risposti (1669-1671), passim.

11. Cessi, Storia, pp. 190-191. Cessi notes, "The financial recuperation was quicker and more prompt than was the economic."

12. Domenico Sella, Commerci e industrie a Venezia nel secolo XVII (Venice-Rome, 1961), pp. 77, 82-86, 91-92. (Hereinafter referred to as Commerci e industrie.)


17. The information concerning the number of published libretti during the period 1637-1699 was kindly provided me by a Mr. Thomas Walker, a student of Ventian musical history of the period.


20. *Ibid.*, p. 38. The percentage calculations are mine as are suggested causal relationships between the shifts in population and the war.
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ABBREVIATIONS

A.S.V.: Archivio di Stato di Venezia
B.N.M.: Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana
Dip. Rel.: Diplomatico Relazione
Leg.-Varia.: Legislazione Varia
P.T.M.: Provveditor da Terra e Mar

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Almost all of the unpublished materials used in this work have been drawn from two of Venice's five depositories, the Archivio di Stato di Venezia and the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana. Occasionally, manuscript material found in the Querini Stampalia, the Georgia Cini Foundation, and the Museo Correr have also proved of some use.

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Classe VII, CC: "Mossa dell'Armi"
Classe VII, COXI: "Diverse Lettere"
Classe CCCX: Lettere, Niccolo Zeno"
Classe VII, COCLXIII: "Opuscoli. Descrizione dell'isola di Candia"
Classe VII, CCCXCI: "Relazione di Francia, Giovanni Morosini, 1668"
Classe VII, DLXXX: "Relazione del fatto dell'armata Turchesca ai Dardanelli negli anni 1656-57 con la morte del Generale Veneto"
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Classe VII, MMCCVI: "Opere militare a Candia, 1645-46"

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Ms. Cod. XCCII, Classe D4, Lettere ducali alle Andrea Lippomano

Ms. Cod. LXXVIII, Classe H4, Lettere di Costantinopoli di Sebastiano Molin. c. 1652-1670, 1648-1671

Ms. Cod. LXXIX, Classe H4, Lettere Di Sebastiano Molin (con’t)

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tutto fu dalla sua volontà, ma sottrarsi da pene che non si ricorda di essere mai successe, e se non con questa garanzia, come avrebbe potuto farne un esempio se fosse }

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THE BATTLE OF THE DARDANELLES, 1656
VITA

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