1972

The Effect of Initial Antagonistic Attitudes on the Race Prejudice vs. Belief Prejudice Controversy.

Lee Douglas Stokes
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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ON THE RACE PREJUDICE VS. BELIEF PREJUDICE
CONTROVERSY.

The Louisiana State University and
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1972
Psychology, general

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THE EFFECT OF INITIAL ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDES
ON THE RACE PREJUDICE VS. BELIEF PREJUDICE CONTROVERSY

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Psychology

by
Lee Douglas Stokes
B.A., Auburn University, 1968
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1969
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ABSTRACT

Consideration of modern psychology's orientation towards complex bases of behavior implies criticism of M. Rokeach's (1960) relatively simplistic and unidirectional belief theory of prejudice. Research supporting the belief theory is examined with possible deficiencies in experimental methodology noted and proposed as being alternative explanations of the results found. A study was designed with previous methodological inadequacies considered; the study manipulated white subjects' levels of prejudice and "initial antagonistic attitudes" as well as the stimulus person's racial similarity and belief similarity. The effect of these manipulations on the subjects' affiliation decisions, i.e. person perception, anticipated friendliness, social distance, and behavior indicator measures, is examined. The belief main effect results indicate support for Rokeach's belief theory; interaction effects, however, support a mutually-causative approach to prejudice behaviors.
INTRODUCTION

In 1960 Rokeach, Smith, and Evans proposed that "insofar as psychological processes are involved, belief is more important than ethnic or racial membership as a determinant of social discrimination." As a test of their hypothesis, Rokeach et al. asked subjects to respond to stimulus persons who were either similar to or different from the subjects in race and beliefs. The subjects then recorded their responses on a nine point scale (from "I can't see myself being friends with such a person" to "I can very easily see myself being friends with such a person"). The results of this study supported the experimenters' hypotheses that there was a second type of prejudice, belief prejudice, and that belief prejudice was more important than racial prejudice in determining a person's affiliation responses. The subjects preferred people of a different race who agreed with their beliefs over persons of the same race who held beliefs conflicting with the subjects' beliefs.

Triandis (1961), however, criticized the Rokeach et al. (1960) study for dealing with a relationship involving "small" social distance, i.e. friendship. He argued that affiliation responses such as those exhibited by prejudiced
individuals are much more relevant to relationships involving relatively "large" social distance, i.e. acceptance of a person as a room-mate. Triandis tested this position with a study manipulating race similarity-dissimilarity and belief similarity-dissimilarity and measuring the effect of this manipulation on "large" social distance measures. The results of this study supported race dissimilarity as being more important than belief similarity as a determinant of a person's affiliation responses.

Rokeach (1961), however, objected that Triandis had used an inappropriate experimental method due to the fact that belief and race stimuli in his study were not equally salient. He stated that the weak belief stimuli (Morris' "13 Ways to Live", 1956) "pitted against" the extremely salient race variable dictated the race results found in Triandis' (1961) study.

The Rokeach "two types of prejudice" hypothesis has been tested and supported by many studies in the last decade (Byrne and Wong, 1962; Stein, Hardyck, and Smith, 1965; Rokeach and Mezie, 1966; Hendrick, Bixenstein and Hawkins, 1971). Since these studies are all very similar in their general methodologies, the Byrne and Wong study will serve as a representative case.

Byrne and Wong (1962) divided white college students into low and high prejudice groups using the Desegregation Soale (Kelley, Ferson, and Holtzman, 1958). Both groups
took part in a "study of interpersonal prediction" and were asked to carefully read the stimulus person's background information which included the race manipulation. Subjects were then asked to examine information concerning the stimulus person's beliefs which were manipulated to be similar to, or different from, the beliefs held by the subjects. The dependent measures were contained in scales the subject completed; degree of liking for the stimulus person and how much the subject would like to work with the stimulus person in an experiment. The results indicated that belief similarity resulted in positive ratings and belief dissimilarity resulted in negative ratings regardless of the subjects' prejudice levels and regardless of the stimulus person's race similarity. No effect was found due to prejudice or race dissimilarity.

The Byrne and Wong (1962) results, and others like them (Stein, Hardyck and Smith, 1965; Rokeach and Mezie, 1966; Hendrick, Bixenstein and Hawkins, 1971) were interpreted as showing that racial dissimilarity is relatively unimportant in instigating affiliation responses when compared to belief dissimilarity. Prejudice based on race was generally considered the result of "assumed" belief dissimilarity. Many educators now feel, for example, that teaching one race about the similarity of beliefs of another race will inhibit prejudice, regardless of one's initial level of prejudice (Freedman, Carlsmith and Sears, 1970).
PROBLEM

A close scrutiny of the studies most quoted as supporting the Rokeach (1960) belief theory of prejudice reveals reoccurring methodological inadequacies and leads to the same conclusion that Rokeach came to in 1961, the "issue is far from settled." The methodological problems may be grouped into three categories which serve as alternative explanations for the results found: 1. Failure to control the relative strengths of the race and belief stimuli. 2. Failure to control "demand characteristics". 3. Failure to control for "initial antagonistic attitudes" towards the stimulus person.

Failure to Control the Relative Strengths of Stimuli - Although this methodological issue first became apparent during the Triandis (1961) and Rokeach (1961) exchange, it has received little attention until relatively recently (Rokeach and Mezie, 1966; Hendrick, Bixenstein and Hawkins, 1971). While Rokeach described the Triandis (1961) experiment as "playing down" the belief stimuli in favor of extremely salient race stimuli, a similar description might be applied to several of the experiments supporting the Rokeach hypothesis. These studies (Rokeach et al., 1960, Byrne and Wong, 1962; Stein, Hardyck and Smith, 1965)
appear to be "playing down" the race stimuli relative to the belief stimuli. The subjects received relatively minor exposure to race, i.e. the word "Negro" buried in large amounts of background information, when compared to the numerous belief stimulations. The methodology used in these studies would apparently dictate results favoring belief prejudice. This criticism seems less applicable to the studies by Rokeach and Mezlie (1966) and Hendrick et al (1971), however, as they apparently tried to use at least some judgement in what Hendrick et al call "approximately equating ... intuitively" the relative strength of the two independent variables. The race stimuli were real people in both of these studies, not just a single word "Negro" or "White".

Failure to control "demand characteristics" - Orne (1962) argues that subjects treat an experiment as a problem or test and search the procedure for cues about the response the experimenter is "looking for." He also argues that most subjects will try to enact the role of a "good subject" by validating the experimental hypothesis. Subjects do not passively respond to the experimental manipulation; the entire experiment becomes a problem-solving experience in which the subject must discover the hypothesis involved and then act as a "good subject". Orne labels the cues used by the subjects as "demand characteristics". At least two of the studies investigating the race prejudice vs. belief prejudice issue give strong indications of being the victims
of "demand characteristics".

In the Rokeach and Mezlie (1966) study, there appears at first to be very little to criticize. The investigators later point out, however, that many of the subjects in all conditions "... were somehow aware of the basis on which they made their ... (affiliation) choice ... ." Since the study lacked specific techniques to assess mistaken assumptions on the part of the subjects, or their possible suspiciousness of the study's true intent, one could say that the subjects' awareness indicates they discovered the hypothesis involved and had proceeded to become "good subjects."

Although Hendrick, Bixenstein and Hawkins (1971) do not give direct evidence of demand characteristics in their study, their instructions to the subjects lend credence to demand characteristics as an alternative explanation of their results. In their study, subjects' opinions concerning the Vietnam War were established using a questionnaire designed for that purpose. Subjects then viewed a video tape in which one black and one white confederate took stands favorable towards the war and one black and one white confederate stated arguments which were unfavorable towards the war. As the researchers felt that the subjects would be suspicious of the fact that two blacks were present with two whites, their cover story stated that this fact occurred because they were trying to control for any racial variance
that might happen. Perhaps the cover story also "demanded" the subjects to ignore race; this would lead to a prediction of results favoring belief prejudice. The results favoring belief prejudice were obtained, but the reasons for these results remain unclear.

**Failure to Control "Initial Antagonistic Attitudes"**

Two experiments by Freedman, Carlsmith, and Suomi (1969) raise an important question about all of the studies mentioned. The first experiment found that when pairs of subjects met (S's sitting across from each other without talking) either three, six, or twelve times, the more they met with each other, the more they liked each other. In the second experiment, the subjects witnessed either a "pleasant verbal exchange" or "unpleasant verbal exchange" between the experimenter's secretary and the confederate they were about to sit across from in the experiment. Subjects witnessing a "pleasant" interpersonal exchange liked the experimenter's confederate more as they met more, confirming the results found in the first study. The subjects witnessing an "unpleasant" interpersonal exchange were highly negative toward the experimenter's confederate regardless of the number of times they met. The experimenters concluded that these last results were due to the "initial antagonistic attitudes" toward the confederate that developed in the subject while witnessing the "unpleasant exchange." When subjects developed "initial antagonistic attitudes,"
additional favorable information did not affect those attitudes.

Since racial prejudice implies negative, antagonistic attitudes toward a racial group, it follows that a highly prejudiced white person would have an "initial antagonistic attitude" towards a black stranger. Thus, in considering Freedman, Carlsmith and Suomi's (1969) results, one would anticipate that these "initial antagonistic attitudes" would not be readily affected by additional, favorable information concerning the black stranger's beliefs. Acceptance of Rokeach's belief theory of prejudice leads to similar predictions. Subjects learning that the beliefs of a stranger conflict with their own beliefs would experience "initial antagonistic attitudes" that would not be readily affected by similarity of race information. This second situation may have occurred in most of the earlier experiments supporting Rokeach's theory of belief prejudice.

The validity of the existence of belief prejudice is not being questioned in this study. Rather, the hypothesis that race prejudice is nothing more than "assumed belief dissimilarity" is challenged. Consideration of "initial antagonistic attitudes" leads one to anticipate that the order of presentation of race and belief stimuli, as well as the subject's level of prejudice towards blacks, would have to be varied in a study of the relative strengths of race prejudice and belief prejudice. For example, a highly
prejudiced subject may develop the stronger "initial antagonistic attitudes" when race information is presented first than when belief information is presented first.

Only the study by Stein, Hardyck and Smith (1965) directly manipulated the order of presentation of race and belief; belief effects were found regardless of order of stimulus presentation. Unfortunately, the relative strengths of race and belief stimuli were obviously unequal in this study. There was only one race stimulus, the word "Negro" or "white" buried in a large amount of background information. In comparison to the race stimulus, 25 different belief stimuli were used by the experimenters. As previously discussed, the overwhelming strength of the belief stimuli may have effectively overcome any race effects. This would also negate any order of presentation effects.

Since no single study has escaped criticism on grounds of at least one of the alternative explanations, the purpose of this study was to examine the Rokeach (1960) belief theory of prejudice with the aforementioned alternative explanations of supportive results taken into consideration. To be specific, the premise underlying the research is simply that the race and belief variables interact in a complex manner.¹ That is, prejudice has complex causal bases, with

¹Very recent support for the viewpoint that race and belief variables are interactive in a complex manner is supplied in two studies by Dienstbier (1972). The evidence provided in the present study should add to Dienstbier's objective of showing prejudice to be another example of the multiple-causation nature of behavior.
race information and belief information complexly related in mutually-causal relationships.

Specifically, this study attempted to present the race and belief variables realistically while at the same time considering currently known methodology in social psychology research. The attempt was made to exert more "intuitively" adequate controls for the relative strength of race and belief stimuli by using pictorial stimuli for race and by reducing the amount of belief items used in previous studies. There was also an attempt to control for demand characteristics in a cover story. The possibility of mistaken assumptions on the part of the subjects, or their suspiciousness of the experimenter's true intent, was investigated using specific interview techniques (Page, 1971). The possibility of "evaluative apprehension" (Rosenberg, 1965) was minimized by assuring anonymity and by removing the experimenter and his study in time and place from the initial race-belief information assessment. Finally, the possibility that the exhibited relative influence of race and belief information is determined by the dependent measure used (Triandis, 1964) was investigated by using several semantic and behavioral differential scales as well as a behavior indicator.

With the above mentioned controls provided, the study examined the effect of subjects' prejudice levels toward
blacks, race similarity, belief similarity, and order of stimulus presentation ("initial antagonistic attitudes") on the subjects' affiliation responses. It was anticipated that white subjects with lower prejudice levels and higher prejudice white subjects presented with belief information first would display the typical belief prejudice effects. Higher prejudiced white subjects presented with race information first, however, were expected to exhibit strong race effects due to stronger "initial antagonistic racial attitudes."

Further, and perhaps more meaningful, support for the contention that race prejudice is not simply "assumed belief dissimilarity" was anticipated from the behavior indicator measure. It was predicted that higher prejudice whites would not desire to take part in a second part of the experiment which would require them to have dinner with a stimulus person of dissimilar race due to the racial, rather than belief, bases of their prejudice. It was also anticipated that this effect would be stronger when race information, rather than belief information, was the initial stimulus presented to the higher prejudiced white.
METHOD

Subjects. Three introductory level psychology courses at a predominantly white, southern university were used as the subject population. Class points and/or the opportunity for a learning experience were promised in return for the subjects' participation in the study. Sixteen experimental groups containing ten subjects each were formed with sexual constituency of each group controlled by the randomization procedures.

Procedure. Session 1 - Course instructors in each of the three classes gave a professional looking, printed questionnaire labeled the "1972 National DSI" during the first day of class. In actuality, these scales (Appendix A) were composed of the Anti-Negro Scale (Steckler, 1957) and positive and negative items taken from scales measuring beliefs in sex education, institutionalized religion, law and order, war, and divorce (Shaw and Wright, 1967). Subjects were told that the survey was to be anonymous and not to put their names anywhere on the questionnaire. Upon completion of the survey, subjects were told to seal the questionnaire in the "DSI" envelope so it could be mailed to the survey center. Subjects were then asked to write
their student identification numbers on the back of the envelope to aid the instructor in assigning each student course points for the student's participation.

Student numbers were also used to identify subjects in order to place them in appropriate experimental groups. Using the subject population's median score on the Anti-Negro Scale, subjects were divided into a lower prejudice level group (L) and a higher prejudice level group (H).

Recruitment Procedure - Approximately one month later, E was introduced to each class by the course instructors. E delivered a cover story (Appendix F) stating that E needed volunteers from the class to participate in a study investigating the accuracy of non-psychologists' vs. psychologists' person perception under minimal information conditions. Students were told that all of their names had been entered into a computer and the computer had chosen students for the experiment using randomization procedures. E then asked for volunteers by calling out the names of the "computer chosen students" who were actually subjects who had participated in the "1972 National DSI" one month earlier. Over three-fourths of the "DSI" subjects replied with decisions favoring participation in the "new" study.

Session 2 - Approximately one week later, subjects
arrived at the experimental classroom and E delivered a cover story (Appendix F) designed to remind students that the study was investigating person perception. E then called out subjects names from a list and had them step forward to receive folders previously arranged to assign subjects to appropriate experimental conditions.

Each folder contained a stimulus person's picture (Appendix B) used as a race similar vs. race dissimilar manipulation and chosen from a possible picture population of four black males, four white males, four black females, and four white females. All pictures were (5" X 7") "shoulder bust type" with all stimulus persons posed and dressed in the same way, regardless of race. Each subject received a stimulus person similar to him/her in sex and age. Each stimulus person picture was marked "Stimulus Person #___" and the number inserted was used for later identification of the subject.

The folder also contained information concerning the stimulus person's beliefs (Appendix C) concerning sex education, institutionalized religion, law and order, war, and divorce which were manipulated to be similar to, or different from, the subject's beliefs elicited on the "1972 National DSI". The randomization procedures used decided the appropriate manipulation of race, belief, and order of presentation of race and belief for both L and H prejudice subjects' folders. These manipulations resulted in the formation of 16 experimental groups.
informed the subjects to open their folders at the same time, to look at the information on Page 1 before
turning to Page 2 and then to answer all the questions on Page 3. The third page contained dependent measures of person perception (ten 6-point bipolar adjectives, good-bad, trustworthy-untrustworthy, intelligent-stupid, kind-cruel, etc.), anticipated friendliness, and social distance (Appendix D).

When all the subjects had completed the dependent measures contained in the folder, E collected the folders and distributed another questionnaire (Appendix E). This questionnaire contained a 6-point bipolar scale designed to measure the subjects' attitudes toward taking part in another part of the study in which the subject would go alone to dinner with the stimulus person in the subject's folder. Subjects were also required to commit themselves to participation by signing an agreement form found under the bipolar scale. The subjects' answers to this question were interpreted as indicating their desires toward interacting with the stimulus person. Beneath this behavior intent question, subjects found instructions asking them to write in their own words what they felt the experiment was investigating. When the subjects had completed this section of the questionnaire, which was inspected for subject suspiciousness of the experiment's true intent, E excused all subjects.

Debriefing. E revisited the classes the subjects
were drawn from approximately one month later. Subjects were informed of E's interest and dedication to scientific inquiry and about the area of study the experiment was concerned with. Subjects were told why E considered the experiment important and were informed of the deceptions that were necessary. E related his own discomfort in having to deceive the subjects and informed the subjects that the deceptions had apparently been effective with everyone concerned. Subjects were assured that the names of everyone concerned with the study had been destroyed which left the subjects' participation anonymous as E had promised. Subjects were told about the results of the study and then invited to write comments as to how they felt the experiment could be improved and give them to E at the conclusion of the class. E again thanked all the subjects for their participation.
RESULTS

The experimental design was a 2x2x2x2 factorial comparison of prejudice level for subjects by racial similarity and belief similarity for stimulus persons by order of presentation of the race and belief stimuli. The effect of these independent variables on dependent measures of person perception, anticipated friendliness, social distance and behavior indicator was analyzed using the MANOVA Statistical Program (Barr and Goodnight, 1971). Significant univariate orthogonal comparisons were further analyzed for paired comparison significance using Duncan's Multiple Range Test (Bruning and Kintz, 1968).

Examination of the suspiciousness check (Appendix E), which all of the subjects completed, produced no evidence that subjects were suspicious of the true intent of the experiment. It should be noted that nearly all the subjects completing the Dependent Measures Sheet (Appendix D) also completed the Behavior Indicator Measurement Sheet (Appendix E) which they were not required to complete. Only four of the 160 subjects did not complete the behavior indicator measure and no condition trends were discernable.
in the inspection of these results. ²

**MANOVA Results.** Multivariate analysis indicated that both significant main variable effects and significant variable interaction effects were present across all dependent measures. Main effects for prejudice level (p < .0002) indicated that stimulus persons were more favorably received by lower prejudice level subjects than by higher prejudice level subjects. Significant main effects found on racial similarity (p < .003) and belief similarity (p < .0001) indicated that stimulus persons were more favorably received when they were similar in race, or when they were similar in beliefs, to the subjects.

A significant interaction of race and beliefs (p < .0001) indicated support for Rokeach's interpretations of racial prejudice as "assumed belief dissimilarity". However, inspection of the significant four way interaction of prejudice level by racial similarity by belief similarity by order of stimulus presentation indicated that additional information reveals a more complex variable relationship. Apparently, the lower prejudice level subjects behaved as Rokeach would predict; belief effects were exhibited. Subjects with higher prejudice levels, however, revealed belief

²Scores of both 1 and 6 were applied to the four incom- pleted measures in separate MANOVA analyses. No meaningful differences in either multivariate or univariant significance were found to result from these alternative data.
prejudice motivation only when the race of the stimulus person was dissimilar.

**ANOVA Results.** Overall person perception measure - This measure (Table 1) was achieved by averaging subjects' total scores on the ten, 6-point bipolar adjective descriptions (Appendix G) of good-bad, clean-dirty, fair-unfair, trustworthy-untrustworthy, nice-awful, industrious-lazy, honest-dishonest, intelligent-stupid, kind-cruel, and pleasant-unpleasant. The measure was based on the assumption that a subject's responses on the individual attributes may be totaled to result in the subject's overall evaluation of the stimulus person. It should be noted here that the only person perception adjective not exhibiting a significant F-score was the "industrious-lazy" attribute. This result supports similar reported findings (Stokes and Prestholdt, 1972) and may indicate a recent breakdown of the Negro stereotype; apparently the Negro stereotype no longer includes "lazy".

A significant main effect of race (p < .003) indicated that stimulus persons were more favorably perceived when they were of similar racial membership. The main effect for beliefs (p < .0001) indicated that stimulus persons were more favorably perceived when he held similar beliefs. A significant (p < .01) racial similarity by belief similarity interaction (Fig. 1a) indicated a belief effect that was
### TABLE 1

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON OVERALL PERSON PERCEPTION MEASURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
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<th>MS</th>
<th>F Value</th>
<th>Prob. F</th>
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<td>Prejudice level (A)</td>
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<td>102.40</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>NS</td>
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<td>Race (B)</td>
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<td>504.10</td>
<td>504.10</td>
<td>8.95</td>
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Figure 1A

Overall Person Perception Measure

Race Similarity by Belief Similarity

Perceived Very Favorably

Perceived Very Unfavorably

Similar race

Dissimilar race
accentuated by racial dissimilarity and was very similar
to the interaction found in previous studies supporting
Rokeach's belief theory of prejudice. A significant
(p < .002) three-way interaction of prejudice level by racial
similarity by belief similarity (Fig. 1b), however, indicated
that the higher prejudice subjects were affected by belief
dissimilarity only when the race of the stimulus person was
also dissimilar.

Anticipated friendliness measure-

This measure indicated a main effect of beliefs
(p < .0001) with subjects anticipating that they would act
initially more friendly towards stimulus persons with similar
beliefs (Table 2). A significant interaction (p < .002) of
racial similarity with belief similarity (Fig. 2) indicated
that although a dissimilar race person would be greeted in
a more friendly manner than any other stimulus person if
he held similar beliefs, he would be met in a significantly
less friendly manner (p < .01) than any other stimulus person
if he held dissimilar beliefs. Similar race persons would
be greeted in a moderately friendly manner regardless of
belief similarity. Dissimilar race persons with dissimilar
beliefs would also be greeted in a significantly less
friendly manner (p < .01) than a similar race person with
dissimilar beliefs. Apparently, knowledge of dissimilar
OVERALL PERSON PERCEPTION MEASURE

Prejudice Level by Race Similarity by Belief Similarity

High Prejudice

Perceived Very Favorably

Perceived Very Unfavorably

Low Prejudice

Perceived Very Favorably

Perceived Very Unfavorably

Similar race

Dissimilar race
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Race Similarity by Belief Similarity

Similar race

Dissimilar race
beliefs affected the subjects' anticipated friendliness towards stimulus persons only when racial dissimilarity was present. Since this result indicating race prejudice effects was not found on friendliness measures used in the previous studies that had single word race stimuli, it may be that the pictorial stimuli used in the present study were of a necessary salience to elicit racial prejudice responses.

Social distance measure-

This measure indicated a significant main effect of belief similarity (p < .0001) with similar belief persons allowed closer social distance than dissimilar belief persons (Table 3). A significant (p < .01) four-way interaction of prejudice level by racial similarity by belief similarity by order of presentation of stimuli (Fig. 3) indicated a complex relationship between variables. Lower prejudiced subjects presented with belief information first exhibited belief effects favoring similar belief stimulus persons. When lower prejudiced subjects were presented with race information first, they exhibited no significant differences in their acceptance of similar race persons, regardless of beliefs. They did, however, exhibit significantly higher acceptance (p < .01) of dissimilar race persons with similar beliefs than for either dissimilar race persons with dissimilar beliefs or similar race persons, regardless of belief similarity.
TABLE 3

ANALYSIS OF Variance ON THE Measure OF Social distance

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FIGURE 3 - SOCIAL DISTANCE MEASURE

Prejudice Level by Race Similarity by Belief Similarity
by Order of Presentation of Race and Beliefs

Close Social Distance

Far Social Distance

High Prejudice Beliefs 1st

Low Prejudice Beliefs 1st

Similar race

Dissimilar race
Higher prejudiced subjects presented with belief information first exhibited behaviors similar to those exhibited by the lower prejudiced subjects presented with race information first. Similar race persons with dissimilar beliefs, however, were admitted to significantly closer social distance \((p < .01)\) than dissimilar race persons with dissimilar beliefs.

When race information was presented first to higher prejudiced subjects, they again exhibited belief effects. Similar race persons with similar beliefs, however, were admitted to significantly closer social distance \((p < .01)\) than dissimilar race persons with similar beliefs. This behavior was a reversal of behaviors exhibited by higher prejudiced subjects presented with belief information first and lower prejudiced subjects presented with race information first.

Apparently, while all conditions exhibit belief effects, the manipulation of prejudice level, racial similarity, and order of presentation of stimuli leads to changes in the strength of the belief effect. Although the behavior of lower prejudice subjects, regardless of order of stimulus presentation, and higher prejudice subjects presented with belief information first, leads to belief effect conclusions, higher prejudice subjects presented with race information first indicate that race similarity plays a significant role in social distance decisions even when beliefs are similar.
A mutually-causative interpretation of prejudice responses seems more applicable here than either race or belief prejudice explanations alone.

**Behavior indicator measure**

Significant main effects were found due to prejudice level, racial similarity, and belief similarity (Table 4). The prejudice level effect ($p < .0004$) indicated that subjects were more favorable towards "eating out" with the stimulus person when the subject was lower in prejudice level. The racial similarity effect ($p < .03$) indicated that subjects were more favorable towards "eating out" with similar race stimulus persons. The belief similarity effect ($p < .01$) indicated that subjects preferred to "eat out" with similar belief persons. The significant ($p < .01$) prejudice level by racial similarity interaction (Fig. 4) clearly indicated racial decisions by higher prejudiced subjects. Higher prejudice subjects were significantly less willing ($p < .01$) to go to dinner with dissimilar race persons than with similar race persons. Higher prejudice subjects were also significantly less willing ($p < .01$) to go to dinner with dissimilar race persons than were the lower prejudiced subjects. Lower prejudiced subjects were willing to go to dinner with stimulus persons regardless of race.

Perhaps the following unsolicited written comment of one higher prejudice level subject indicates why the
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FIGURE 4

BEHAVIOR INDICATOR MEASURE

Prejudice Level by Race Similarity

Very Much Want To Eat Out

Very Much Not Want To Eat Out

Lower prejudice subjects ———
Higher prejudice subjects — — —
behavior indicator measure interaction so clearly elicits decisions based on racial similarity--"I will talk to blacks, but I don't want to eat with them." Apparently, the belief main effect indicates that the subjects will make behavior commitments based on belief information alone. However, the interaction of prejudice level by race similarity indicates that higher prejudice subjects made their behavior commitment decisions based on racial similarity.
DISCUSSION

The Rokeach (1960) belief theory of prejudice suggests that feelings and behaviors indicative of racial prejudice are the result of "assumed belief dissimilarity". Although it may be true that one's assumptions about another person's belief dissimilarity may result in negative affect for that person, it seems inconsistent with modern psychology's reliance on multiple-causation theories of behavior to theorize belief similarity as the universal predictor of prejudice. Indeed, the results of this study, as well as a recent study by Dienstbier (1972), indicate that race similarity may often be a better predictor of prejudice than belief similarity.

The role of belief similarity as a universal predictor gained support from the strong main effects of belief found across all measures in this study. On the other hand, this role was also weakened by main race effects found across all measures. The fact that racial prejudice may be more complex than "assumed belief dissimilarity" also gained support from the interactions exhibited on all of the measures. For example, the hypothesis that the Behavior Indicator Measure would show the higher prejudice level subjects exhibiting race effects was confirmed. The main
effect of belief similarity indicated that all the subjects were willing to make affiliation commitment decisions based on belief similarity. The prejudice level by race similarity interaction, however, indicated that higher prejudiced whites were more affected by racial similarity information than beliefs in making their affiliation commitment decisions.

That prejudice is more complex than simple belief main effects suggest was indicated by a trend found across all measures excepting the behavior indicator. All of the subjects on the Anticipated Friendliness Measure (Fig. 2) and higher prejudice level subjects on the Overall Person Perception Measure (Fig. 1E) and Social Distance Measure (Fig. 3) exhibited this trend. These subjects indicated significantly more favorable affiliation decisions \( p < .01 \) for blacks with similar beliefs than they did for whites with similar beliefs. They also exhibited significantly less favorable affiliation decisions \( p < .01 \) for blacks with dissimilar beliefs than they did for whites with dissimilar beliefs.

Since the black person with beliefs similar to whites parallels to some extent the "real world" stereotype of an "Uncle Tom", the urge to so name this consistently exhibited interaction is irresistible. The "Uncle Tom Trend" (Fig. 5) indicates that Dienstbier (1972) may be correct in his assertion that Allport's (1954) complex view of prejudice is more deserving of experimental investigation than Rokeach's
FIGURE 5 - "UNCLE TOM EFFECT"

Race Similarity by Belief Similarity

Similar race
Dissimilar race
(1960) relatively simplistic belief theory of prejudice. The "Uncle Tom" may be interpreted as fulfilling the needs of the prejudice whites for "black support" of their prejudice bases; a black person with similar beliefs would, perhaps, be the most valid person to approve of a prejudice white's overt discrimination. On the other hand, a black person with dissimilar beliefs would be threatening to a prejudice white, especially if that black was college educated and could defend dissimilar beliefs.

Although the hypothesis that the "initial antagonistic attitudes" of the higher prejudice level subjects would result in exhibited belief effects when beliefs were the initial stimuli and in race effects when race was the initial stimulus was not confirmed, it is perhaps notable that racial similarity still seemed to play a major role in the interactions. An overview of these results leads to a viewpoint not currently found in the literature, but perhaps commonly considered in more private communications.

When whites are asked to commit themselves to "affiliation type" behaviors, the higher prejudice level white bases his decision to a large extent upon racial similarity information when it is present. When higher prejudiced whites' affiliation decisions did not involve behavior commitment, their decisions were usually strongly and negatively affected by belief dissimilarity only when the race of the stimulus person was dissimilar. This
viewpoint was not supported, however, when prejudice levels were confounded as in the Overall Person Perception Measure's two-way interaction of race by belief (Fig. 1B); belief effects were stronger. Apparently, the Anti-Negro Scale (Steckler, 1957) used in this study elicited some prejudice factor different from that elicited by measures used in previous studies, the Desegregation Scale (Kelly, Person and Holzman, 1958) and the Ethnocentricity Scale (Levingson, 1949). It is notable that few differences due to levels of prejudice were found in previous studies and this may also indicate that prejudice level, heretofore, has not been investigated.

The confounding of prejudice levels in previous studies investigating racial prejudice vs. belief prejudice would also provide an explanation for Triandis' (1964) observation that some dependent measures appeared more sensitive to belief similarity while others appeared more sensitive to racial similarity. It appears from the present study's results that the person perception and friendliness measures were more sensitive to belief similarity when prejudice levels were confounded; the social distance measure was more sensitive to racial similarity when prejudice levels were confounded. The mutually-causative nature of prejudice became apparent on all of these measures only when prejudice levels were distinguished.

In summary, although results of previous investigations
of prejudice have always seemed clearly in support of either belief prejudice alone or racial prejudice alone, the results of the present study indicate a mutually-causative relationship between race and beliefs. This relationship may have been "clouded" in previous studies by methodological considerations such as unequal stimulus salience, possible demand characteristics, and the confounding of prejudice levels. At the very least, this study indicates that although belief similarity is certainly to be taken into consideration, racial similarity must also be considered as a separate and strong associated variable of higher prejudice white's affiliative behaviors. It must be remembered, however, that generalization of this study's results to answers for the "real world" would probably be a less than cautious undertaking. One must consider that young college students are not very representative of the average American. However, the fact that these students, who are usually considered to be more "liberal" than the average American, exhibited such significant differences due to different prejudice levels may lead to expectations of even stronger race effects in American society. One must also consider whether paper and pencil responses, even when they indicate behavior commitment, are very representative of participation in "civil rights sit-ins" or the other behavior extreme of "cross burnings." Such generalizations, therefore, will probably have to wait for ingeniously new field study methods.
In the meantime, however, the attempts of psychological researchers to account for complex human behaviors with relatively simplistic theories seem consistently doomed to failure, even when they meet with temporary "heuristic success". However appealing such "parsimonious" theories may initially appear, it would seem inconsistent for modern psychology to be caught up in such "traps." The results of this study indicate that race and beliefs interact in a mutually-causative manner. Thus, it seems more consistent with multiple-causation behavior theory to insist upon a conceptualization of prejudice that is complex relative to Rokeach's belief theory of prejudice.
APPENDIX "A"

"1972 NATIONAL DSI"
PLEASE ENTER APPROPRIATE INFORMATION—NO NAMES PLEASE.

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<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Sex (M or F)</th>
<th>Education 1-16</th>
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DIRECTIONS: The opinions within this survey regard a number of social issues, about which some people agree and others disagree. Please mark each statement in the left-hand margin according to your agreement or disagreement as follows:

1. Strong support, agree
2. Moderate support, agree
3. Slight support, agree
4. Slight opposition, disagreement
5. Moderate opposition, disagreement
6. Strong opposition, disagreement

Example opinion:

2 1. I believe brushing of teeth to be essential to good health.

If you personally have moderate support, agreement with this opinion, you would enter a 2 in the left-hand margin blank. If, say, you personally have strong opposition, disagreement with this opinion, you would enter a 6 in the left-hand blank.

Please Turn to Opinion 1.
1. Much unhappiness in life is caused by parents failing to give their children adequate sex information.

2. Religious faith is more important than logic for solving life's important problems.

3. Although some people abuse the divorce privilege, it is fundamentally necessary.

4. A large part of the problems faced by blacks today are caused by blacks themselves.

5. The United States should pay high honor to its military leaders.

6. The law is for the poor to obey, and for the rich to ignore.

7. If parents give children sex information, it will encourage them to try premature sex experiments.

8. There were many men in history as great as Jesus.

9. It is better for a couple to stay together, to struggle along together if necessary, than to break up a home by getting a divorce.

10. Whites and blacks can get along on jobs until too many blacks try to push themselves in place of whites.

11. The benefits of war rarely pay for its losses, even for the victor.

12. Most policemen are honest.

13. Children will acquire sex information soon enough without their parents giving it to them.

14. The Bible is the inspired Word of God.

15. Children need both parents, not divorced parents, even though the parents are not especially suited to one another.

16. One big reason why racial prejudice is still so strong is that blacks offend people by being so sensitive about racial matters.

17. Wars should be fought for the liberty of nations such as South Vietnam.

18. Many of the people in prison are actually innocent of the crimes they were convicted for.

19. Parents are the only ones who can give their children the right attitude regarding sex information.

20. There is no life after death.
21. A person should have the right to marry and divorce as often as he chooses.
22. One important reason why blacks are discriminated against in housing is that they don't keep up the property.
23. War should be avoided at any cost.
24. It is difficult to break the law and keep one's self-respect.
25. It is highly undesirable for parents to talk to their children about sex.
26. Science makes me doubt that man has a soul.
27. Divorce lowers the standard of morality.
28. One reason why racial prejudice still exists today is the fact that many blacks are dirty, loud, and generally offensive in their ways.
29. Under some conditions we should regard war as desirable to maintain justice.
30. A hungry man has a right to steal for his family.
31. The risk of giving children sex information is great enough to make it an undesirable practice for parents.
32. Man can solve all his important problems without help from a Supreme Being.
33. Divorce is no real solution to an unhappy marriage.
34. Black people can hardly be expected to gain social equality until many more of them exert some effort to better themselves and live more decently.
35. War breeds disrespect for human life.
36. The individual who refuses to obey the law is a menace to civilization.
37. Parents should take the initiative and give information about sex before the child asks for it.
38. Christ was not divine but his teachings and the examples set by his life are extremely important.
39. If a couple find getting along with each other a real struggle then they should not feel obligated to remain married.
40. With all of the drinking, cutting, and other immoral acts of some blacks, white people are almost justified for being prejudiced.
41. The desirable results of war have not received the attention they deserve.
42. Policemen often carry a grudge against men who get in trouble with the law and treat them cruelly.
43. The home is preferable to the streets as a source of sex information.
44. The Bible in many ways has held back and retarded human progress.
KEY:

1. Strong support, agreement
2. Moderate support, agreement
3. Slight support, agreement
4. Slight opposition, disagreement
5. Moderate opposition, disagreement
6. Strong opposition, disagreement

45. Divorce is a fine social institution since it alleviates much misery and unhappiness.

46. Too many blacks, when they get a little money, spend it all on whiskey, flashy cars, or expensive clothes.

47. It is the duty of the individual to refuse to participate in the Vietnam War.

48. We would have less crimes if our laws were more strict.

49. If parents teach children the right moral principles, sex information is unnecessary.

50. There is a Heaven and/or Hell after death.

51. Divorce is one of our big social evils.

52. A great many blacks become overbearing, and disagreeable when given positions of responsibility and authority.

53. In case of war, those who actively oppose it should be imprisoned.

54. A person should obey only those laws that seem reasonable.

55. Parents should tell their child anything he wants to know about sex.

56. God created men separate and distinct from animals.

57. Divorce is a sensible solution to unhappy marriages.

58. Blacks would solve many of their social problems if so many of them were not irresponsible, lazy, and ignorant.

59. We should honor the heroes of peace as more worthy of recognition than the battlefield heroes.

60. In our courts a poor man will receive as fair treatment as a millionaire.

—END—

DIRECTIONS: PLEASE INSERT SURVEY BOOKLET IN ENVELOPE AND SEAL

DSI Office Use Do Not Write In This Space
APPENDIX "B"

RACE SIMILARITY INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
APPENDIX "C"

BELIEF SIMILARITY INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
Positive Belief Items

Sex education by parents - I feel that parents should give their children correct sex information to protect them from false and harmful teachings.

Religion - I often feel that I couldn't do without my church.

Divorce - Divorce should be permitted as long as the rights of all parties are insured.

War - If the United States declared war in cooperation with, and in defense of, a democratic country, I would report for the draft willingly and give financial aid if I could.

Law and Order - The law is necessarily superior to individual codes of conduct.

Negative Belief Items

Sex education by parents - I feel that parental attempts to give the child sex information only serves to confuse the child.

Religion - I can take religion or leave it.

Divorce - Divorce should be discouraged in order to stabilize society.

War - I would rather be called a coward than go to war for a country outside the United States borders.

Law and Order - The law does not benefit the common man.
EXAMPLE: If the subject was in an experimental group receiving dissimilar beliefs and had been established as being positive toward sex education by parents and divorce, and negative towards religion, war and the law:

In reply to direct questions by this experimenter about social issues of concern to most Americans, stimulus person # made the following statements:

"I feel that parental attempts to give the child sex information only serves to confuse the child."

"I often feel that I couldn't do without my church."

"Divorce should be discouraged in order to stabilize society."

"If the United States declared war in cooperation with, and in defense of, a democratic country, I would report for the draft willingly and give financial aid if I could."

"The law is necessarily superior to individual codes of conduct."
APPENDIX "D"

DEPENDENT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES
Directions: Circle the numbers in the next ten questions to indicate what you feel the qualities of the stimulus person are. This may be hard to do, but just mark the number that most closely fits your feelings toward the stimulus person at this time.

EXAMPLE: If the question was ... "Do you feel the person is ... Happy - Sad?" ... and you felt the stimulus person was a very happy person, you would circle the 1.

Happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sad

If you felt the stimulus person was a very unhappy person, you would have circled the 6.

Please answer the following questions in the same way.

1. Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 Bad
2. Clean 1 2 3 4 5 6 Dirty
3. Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 Unfair
4. Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 Untrustworthy
5. Nice 1 2 3 4 5 6 Awful
6. Industrious 1 2 3 4 5 6 Lazy
7. Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 Dishonest
8. Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 Stupid
9. Kind 1 2 3 4 5 6 Cruel
10. Pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 Unpleasant

11. If you met this person tomorrow, what do you feel your reaction would be? (Mark one answer only with an "X").

______ very much friendly
______ moderately friendly
______ slightly friendly
______ slightly unfriendly
______ moderately unfriendly
______ very much unfriendly

12. Would you want this person to: (Mark all applicable with "X").

______ be a member of my family.
______ be a close friend.
______ be a neighbor.
______ be a worker with you on a job.
______ be a limited speaking acquaintance only.
______ be a visitor only to my state (and/or nation).
APPENDIX "E"

BEHAVIOR INDICATOR MEASURE

AND

SUSPICIOUSNESS CHECK
Directions: Please circle how much you would like to take part in the second section of the study to be held in two weeks at an evening time convenient to you and the person in your folder.

Very much like to take part in 2nd section of study. 1 2 3 4 5 6

Very much not like to take part in 2nd section of study.

Regardless of whether or not you desire to take part in the second section of this study, please write in your own words what the first part of the study was investigating. If you desire to take part in the second part of the study, please sign your statement in the blank provided as evidence that you recognise the second section will take place off campus. Do not sign unless you desire to take part.

Signed ____________________________
APPENDIX "F"

COVER STORIES

AND

INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
APPENDIX "F"

Cover Stories and Instructions to Subjects

Recruitment Cover Story--

"I want to thank Dr. (Mr.) ________________ for allowing me this time, as well as all of you for taking this time, to hear what I have to say. At present I am involved with research on my doctoral dissertation and I would like you to listen briefly about the subject of this research and then volunteer to help me with my dissertation."

"The dissertation concerns the fact that many theorists feel it is possible for anyone, not just graduate psychologists, to judge how a person will act as well as various personality traits of that person by the way the person looks, his facial shape for instance, and by the way a person says he feels about certain facets of life. The problem arises because many other theorists disagree with this viewpoint; they feel that only a graduate psychologist can do these things."

"I think I should make it perfectly clear at this time that I neither agree or disagree with either side of this debate; the evidence for either side is too small. What I do agree with, however, is trying to make the evidence supporting one side or the other available. This is where you may help. None of you present is a graduate psychologist so you can qualify to help examine one side of the problem."

"Actually, I have already placed the names of all the students in several different classes, including yourselves, into a computer and asked it to randomly choose a certain percentage of names from the total group of students. In psychology, it is very important that we use randomization procedures in our studies, thus it is very important that most of the people chosen participate in the study. Some of the class instructors feel that the learning experience gained by participants should be rewarded further with class points, other instructors feel that the learning experience is reward enough. In your class the subjects who participate will (will not) receive class points and (but) the learning experience will, of course, be present."

"At this time, I will call out the names of the people selected in this class. When I call out your name, please tell me either 'No', meaning I can't or won't participate, or tell me the number next to the time and place on the board that is most convenient for you to participate. In all probability, no more than a half hour of your time will
be required. So please call out your choice of time to participate (point to board with time and place written on it) when I call your name and please write that time and place down. It is very important that you be present when you are expected. Thank you."

2nd Session--

Subjects arrived at the experimental classroom and E delivered the following cover story supplement:

"I want to thank you all for coming. To refresh your memories, my name is Lee Stokes and in this study I am interested in finding out whether or not it is possible for anyone, not just certain psychologists, to tell how a person will act, what kind of a person he is, how congenial and likeable he or she is, etc. by the way a person looks and/or the way he or she says they feel about certain facets of life. When I call your name, please come up to the desk and pick up a folder. Do not put your name on the folders anywhere and do not open or look inside the folder until I ask you to. Is that understood? Thank you."

Upon completion of the folder questionnaire, E prepared subjects for their participation in the behavior intent question with the following cover story:

"At this time I will pass out one more questionnaire. You do not have to participate in this part of the experiment if you do not want to, but I would appreciate your assistance. If you decide not to answer the questions on this questionnaire, do not put any name or telephone number on it."

"In a week or two, I will be running another part of this experiment. The subjects who take part in this portion of the experiment will be required to go alone with the stimulus person to eat dinner at one of the Picadilly Restaurants in Baton Rouge. The dinner will be at my expense and you may eat what you like. The people participating will also be required to fill out the same questionnaire that you all just completed in the folder."

E passed out the questionnaire to the subjects and said:
"Now, on the paper in front of you (Appendix E) is a scale similar to the ones you earlier marked. The scale has the numbers 1 to 6 on it. The number one has above it 'very much like to take part in the second part of the experiment'. The number 6 has above it 'very much not like to take part in the second part of the experiment'. At this time, if you desire, please place a mark somewhere on that scale telling me how much you would like to take part in the second part of the experiment. If you fill out the scale, please put your name and telephone number at the top of the paper in the spaces provided."

When subjects had completed the behavior intent question, E delivered instructions concerning the suspiciousness check.

"In the space allotted at the bottom of this paper, please write in your own words what you feel this experiment is investigating. Even if you did not fill out the top of the paper, I still want you to fill out the bottom section."
APPENDIX "G"

PERSON PERCEPTION MEASURES
Prejudice level interacted with similarity of race and similarity of beliefs such that lower prejudice subjects perceived similar race persons as being much less "good" when they had dissimilar beliefs and higher prejudice subjects perceived dissimilar race subjects as being much less "good" when they held dissimilar beliefs also. The general effect is due to belief similarity but the effect is apparently accentuated by the addition of race information.
PREJUDICE LEVEL BY RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY

(p=.01)

High Prejudice

Low Prejudice
Prejudice level interacted with similarity of race and similarity of beliefs such that higher prejudice subjects perceived dissimilar race persons as being less "clean" when they also held dissimilar beliefs; similar race persons were perceived as "very much clean" regardless of the similarity of their beliefs. The general effect is due to similarity of race but the effect is apparently accentuated by the addition of race information.
## Prejudice Level by Race Similarity by Belief Similarity

\( p = .01 \)

### High Prejudice

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**S.Race**
- 1.8
- 1.9

**D.Race**
- 1.7
- 2.9

### Low Prejudice

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**S.Race**
- 1.2
- 1.9

**D.Race**
- 1.7
- 2.1

---

BELIEFS

**S**

- Clean
- Dirty

**D**

- Clean
- Dirty
Prejudice level interacted with similarity of race such that higher prejudice subjects perceived similar race persons as more "fair" than dissimilar race persons. Race similarity also interacted with belief similarity such that dissimilar race persons were perceived as less "fair" when they held dissimilar beliefs. Similarity of beliefs also interacted with order of presentation of race and beliefs such that persons with dissimilar beliefs were perceived as less fair when race information was presented first.
PREJUDICE LEVEL BY RACE SIMILARITY
(p=.04)
Fair

Unfair

RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY
(p=.05)
Fair

Unfair

BELIEF SIMILARITY BY ORDER OF PRESENTATION
(p=.05)
Fair

Unfair
FIG. 9 Trustworthy-Untrustworthy Attribute

Similarity of race interacted with similarity of beliefs such that dissimilar race persons were perceived as less "trustworthy" when they also held dissimilar beliefs. The prejudice level by similarity of race by similarity of beliefs interaction supported a view that the above effect was due, in large part, to the higher prejudice subjects' perceptions of different race-different beliefs persons rather than lower prejudice subjects' perceptions. Lower prejudice subjects exhibited a more "general" belief similarity effect favoring persons of similar beliefs.
RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY
(p = .01)

Trustworthy

Untrustworthy

PREJUDICE LEVEL BY RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY
(p = .005)

Trustworthy

High Prejudice

Untrustworthy

Trustworthy

Low Prejudice

Untrustworthy
Prejudice level interacted with similarity of race and similarity of beliefs such that lower prejudice subjects perceived similar race persons as less "nice" when they held dissimilar beliefs and higher prejudice subjects perceived dissimilar race persons as less "nice" when they held dissimilar beliefs. Race similarity interacted with belief similarity and order of presentation of race and beliefs resulting in similar race persons being perceived as less "nice" when they had dissimilar beliefs which were presented first. When race was presented first, dissimilar race-dissimilar beliefs persons were perceived as less "nice".
PREJUDICE LEVEL BY RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY
(p=.003)

RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY BY ORDER OF PRESENTATION
(p=.02)
Prejudice level interacted with similarity of beliefs such that higher prejudice subjects perceived dissimilar beliefs persons as less "honest". The prejudice level by race similarity by belief similarity interaction was in support of the view that the above effect was due, to a large extent, to higher prejudice subjects perceiving dissimilar race persons as less "honest" when the person held dissimilar beliefs also.
PREJUDICE LEVEL BY BELIEF SIMILARITY
(p=.02)

Honest

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PREJUDICE LEVEL BY RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY
(p=.004)

Honest

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FIG. 12 Intelligent-Stupid Attribute

Race similarity interacted with belief similarity such that dissimilar race persons were perceived as being less "intelligent" when they held dissimilar beliefs.
RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY

\( p = .001 \)
Race similarity interacted with belief similarity such that dissimilar race persons were perceived as less "kind" when they also held dissimilar beliefs. The prejudice level by race similarity by belief similarity interaction supported the view that the above effect was due, to a large extent, to the higher prejudice subjects' perceptions of dissimilar race persons being "kind" when they held similar beliefs and "cruel" when they held dissimilar beliefs.
RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY
(p = .007)

Kind

Cruel

Prejudice Level by Race Similarity by Belief Similarity
(p = .05)

Kind

High Prejudice

Cruel

PREJUDICE LEVEL BY RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY
(p = .05)

Kind

Low Prejudice

Cruel
Race similarity interacted with belief similarity such that dissimilar race persons were perceived as being less "pleasent" when they held dissimilar beliefs. The prejudice level by race similarity by belief similarity interaction supported a view that the above effect was due to the higher prejudice subjects' perceptions of dissimilar race persons being less "pleasent" when they held dissimilar beliefs.
RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY

(p=.001)

Pleasant 1
2 2.2 D. Race 2.6
3 2.3 S. Race 3.7

Unpleasant 6

PREJUDICE LEVEL BY RACE SIMILARITY BY BELIEF SIMILARITY

(p=.03)

Pleasant 1
2 2.0 D. Race 2.6
3 2.4 S. Race 4.2

High Prejudice
4

Unpleasant 6

Pleasant
1

Low Prejudice
2 2.3 D. Race 2.6
3 2.4 S. Race 3.2

Unpleasant
6
REFERENCES


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Rokeach, M., Smith, Patricia W., and Evans, R.I., "Two Kinds of Prejudice or One?" In M. Rokeach (Ed.) The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books, 1960.


VITA

Lee Douglas Stokes was born April 16, 1940 in Rahway, New Jersey. He attended Centre College of Kentucky, the U.S. Army in Korea and Vietnam, and Auburn University of Alabama, receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1968. He entered graduate school at the Louisiana State University in the fall of 1968, received the Master of Arts degree in Psychology in 1969, and he is presently a candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree.

Mr. Stokes is married to Jean Daniel Stokes and has three children: Eddie, Tommy, and Cara Lee.
Candidate: Lee Douglas Stokes

Major Field: Psychology

Title of Thesis: The effect of initial antagonistic attitudes on the race prejudice vs. belief prejudice controversy

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination:

June 20, 1972