
Norman Neel Proctor

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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THE SOCIAL JUDGMENT INVOLVEMENT APPROACH:
SELECTED CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS, IMPACT ON
SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

The Louisiana State University and Agricultural
and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1971
Sociology, general

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The Social Judgment Involvement Approach:

Selected Conceptual Problems,

Impact on Sociological Literature.

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Sociology

by
Norman Neel Proctor
B.A. The University of Texas, 1950
M.A. The University of Texas, 1953
December, 1971
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There is implicit in the following dissertation the heavy debt which is owed a variety of scholars and others which are not usually combined in recent literature, this being one of the rationales for its subject matter. It is obvious that the selection of the topic and its concern with problems raised by the use of certain concepts shows a heavy influence of John Dewey. This interest was reinforced by the teaching of C. E. Ayres who combines both John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen in much the same manner this work and others yet to be written may combine the works of Ayres and the Sheriffs.

A major debt is due those persons responsible for making the juncture above possible. Principal among these are Joe E. Brown and William R. Hood. Joe Brown was responsible for establishing the departmental context in which Bob Hood was able to bring the works of Sherif into a supplementary position with Ayres' work. The degree to which Brown, Hood, and others provide a "reference group" instrumental in this work is probably greater than they or the author realizes. Also noted should be early discussions with Edwin H. White and Raymond G. Mitchell.

The debt to Walfrid J. Jokinen who was director of the dissertation until his untimely death in the early fall of 1970 is most difficult to verbalize. His kindness, tolerance, and sense of importances were inspiring to all those who knew him. Perry H. Howard, who succeeded Dr. Jokinen, has been most helpful in pressing
the work to a conclusion. Wendell Hester has been of assistance in reading early drafts.

Vernon Parenton's concern with relations between groups is reflected in our concern with the degree to which the Sherifs' work has bearing on such important areas of inquiry. The interest in the dissertation expressed by Quintin A. L. Jenkins and Edward D. Ott is very much appreciated. Their reactions have not only improved the work, but will be valuable in the future.

The roles which wife and children play in such a work as this is most important. They have contributed more than they realize in the form of constant insight and anchorage in the reality of everyday life without which this work and all production would be impossible. The author's concept of self is so intimately wrapped up with them that it is impossible to separate them. It is hoped that time may justify the absence of those things lost at a time when most families have their father "out of school."

A writer can probably never fully appreciate the full range of debts which he really owes to a variety of others; however, some are clearly delineated. It is easy to specify Dean Jack H. Heysinger, School of Administration, University of Missouri - Kansas City for his continued assistance and encouragement. It is also possible to note the most devoted attention and skill which Martha Gresham gave to the manuscript; no finer work could be expected. It is not easy to delineate the large number of other persons who have helped in many ways, including "putting up with" a colleague engaged in finishing a dissertation.
To none of the above should go the responsibilities for errors.
To all of them go the author's thanks and appreciation.
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The Social Judgment Involvement Approach: 
Selected Conceptual Problems, Impact on Sociological Literature

The literature of the Social Judgment Involvement Approach (SJI) and Own Category Procedure (OCP) and their utilization by the sociological literature is investigated. Selected confounding of concepts occurring in the literature as reported by the SJI and related literature as they might have bearing on the diffusion of the SJI into other related disciplines such as sociology are discussed. A measure of the impact of the writings of Muzaffer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif (chief exponents of the SJI) on a selected sample of the sociological literature was made.

The possibility the SJI and OCP become significant in the study of groups and larger social organizations as well as the validity of the wide variety of studies cited and issues raised are not resolved but related as 'significant if true.'

The degree to which the SJI and OCP avoids many of the dualistic, reification, and reductionistic problems, the possibility that it brings together a wide range of heretofore divergent theoretical-methodological issues, the manner in which the SJI does not require certain major concepts thought to be essential to explain human behavior in the past, and its avoidance of selected paradoxes and polemics involved in them are indicated.

The possibility that the SJI is compatible with evidence being gathered at larger social unit levels (group, organization, etc.) provides leads to the dimensioning of changing judgment processes including
attitudes, values, beliefs, etc., in manners which reflect social unit variables (e.g., norms).

The significance of involvement as a variable in social data gathering is not more fully explored than to indicate the literature which raises these issues.

The methodology used was systematic search of library sources. The SJI search was terminated in 1968. The sociological sample involved a survey of the indexes of volumes for references to the Sherifs. It included all volumes in a university library published 1960-1968 catalogued in sociologically relevant numbers.

Findings show a fairly circumscribed SJI literature, primarily social psychological, but having major roots in the psychology of judgment and sociological theory. Works pursued are the Sherifs, C.I. Hovland, others such as Wm. R. Hood and his students (e.g., K.R. Vaughan, C.A. Woodward, J.H. Peterson, et al), other students of the Sherifs (e.g., L.N. Diab, J.W. Reich, et al), and others.

Results reveal the SJI and OCP not impacting on the sample literature. Six percent of the volumes surveyed referred to the Sherifs. Citations concentrated on early works including the group camp studies and autokinetic studies and concepts such as reference groups. References to dimensioning judgment are primarily to aspects of earlier studies.

No explanation is advanced beyond the possibilities that conceptual confoundings noted above, the short time most of the studies have been in print, proliferation of published material, the increased specialization of research, and 'publish or perish' as academic norms, all may contribute to researchers not encountering and seeing as useful the SJI and OCP.
Citations in the sociological literature were largely positive. Critical analysis is found in the other literature, but the importance and involvement of social variables appears to be beyond question.

Appendices are present elaborating on aspects of the work, e.g., lists of authors citing the Sherifs and topics of citations. Additional appendices are available from the author.

Future research indicated are those pursuing the complexities in judgment processes themselves, especially as they reflect larger social units. Further inquiry as to how the findings of the literature indicated in this search impact on validity of research which has not taken into consideration the possibility of a variety of confounding variables in the interpretation of results from research is also needed.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISSERTATION, GENERAL STATEMENT

This work describes selected conceptual problems of an emerging theoretical-methodological framework in social psychology and aspects of its impact on sociological literature. Any such framework is significant because the existence of scientific knowledge in the social sciences has many consequences, a few of which are the following.

1) It makes possible the awareness of social structures, rules, etc., revealing how they may establish parameters, be oppressive, etc., and thereby contribute to the feeling that man has lost his freedoms. These may be demonstrated in concerns about mass society, alienation, conformity, individual versus society problems, and many others.

2) It makes imperative the individual-group-organizational process of planning and decision-making as a variable in the future, even the decision "not to plan" being seen as a decision. Future members of society may in an increasingly real sense hold that planners, leaders, members of current society are "responsible" for future states of social life.

3) In light of the above it is possible that individuals and groups praise or blame those they think to be "responsible," however accurate or inaccurate that perception might be.

4) Therefore, the clarification of the way(s) in which social units and processes are conceptualized, the tracing of changes at one level (frame of reference) with changes at other levels and the ability of

The breadth of alternative conceptual frameworks in which the social behaviors of persons are studied leads one to some understanding as to the difficulties which students of social psychology and other students of social phenomena have in relating individual behavior to larger social unit theory and research. At the same time, knowledge of diversity makes one aware of the dangers inherent in the naive "dipping" into social psychology and utilizing conceptual frameworks which carry undreamed of difficulties as they are extrapolated into other areas of inquiry. Not only is the above the case, but such diversity in concepts makes for much of the literature being extremely
difficult to read and follow, much of it having to deal with defining of concepts in order to communicate accurately.  

This is an inquiry into one approach and conceptual framework with accompanying methodology at one particular level, that of the individual within the group. The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (SJI) is a framework which might aid in specification of social units-processes as these may be seen from one level of analysis fitted in with other levels consistently in a manner allowing gain in insights, e.g., increase in individual involvement has consequences at an individual level which can be seen as increased intergroup polarization at the intergroup level. This would imply that as group involvement becomes stronger the individual members come to see the issue more clearly in two-category terms, ingroup versus outgroup. Such polarization is conducive to stereotyping upon which the biases and prejudices of intergroup conflict can be generated and perpetuated.

The inquiry is therefore interdisciplinary (cross-disciplinary) in the sense that it attempts to survey data which most directly is psychologically relevant and utilize it to make inferences as to the

---

2For example, as contrasted with other conceptual frameworks, that of the Sherifs' might be termed "simple," even "mechanical," its very simplicity in some degree possibly being a variable in a person's reaction to it, e.g., "human behavior is just not that simple." As will be noted below there are some aspects of such a statement which may apply to the Social Judgment Involvement Approach.

processes of groups and intergroup relationships. The latter are definitely sociological in scope.

The specification of the concepts in such a manner that they may be more readily translatable from one area of inquiry to another is a major purpose of this work. In the process of so doing it is hoped that enough of the significant literature has been gathered together to enable the researcher to quickly locate the current significant issues and findings.

The general patterning of the presentation will be to move from the more general to the more specific. This will take the form of moving from the general concepts of "social," "judgment," and "involvement," to the Own Category Procedure, and finally the summary of the library index search for citations to the Sherifs' work.

---

CONCEPTUAL-THEORETICAL-METHODOLOGICAL RELEVANCE

The ability to specify conceptual frameworks which solve both theoretical and methodological problems without utilizing concepts which in the past have been difficult to specify in operational terms is a step toward greater synthesis of both theory and methodology at a wide range of levels and problems.5

The question of whether there is need for theory and conceptual orientation, or whether what is needed is more down-to-earth research unhampered by theoretical problems of the past, is both futile and wasteful. . . . The uncritical and hasty extrapolation of models from the physical sciences is not different in character from the unbridled and grandiose speculation against which I have just raised a caution.6

Perhaps the greater need in sociology is for more of the modest 'inference chains,' 'explanation sketches,' and embryo


Further examples of these types noted at other points in this discussion in more detail are such as: dualistic, motivational, reification, and nonoperational concepts. Many of these may be placed in either extensive footnotes or in appendices at the end of this work, a policy here established in order to hasten the reader's ability to obtain a major grasp of the totality without becoming bogged down in examples or proliferations and elaborations of points.

theories that aim primarily at organizing selected research findings and suggesting further avenues of inquiry.  

Clarence Schrag says that theory is composed of concepts and their relationships. Some concepts specify units, others specify classification schemes. Concepts used to classify units of observation are variables, most powerful are those that are quantified. This is a major advantage of the SJI and Own Category Procedure.  

If theory is to be adequate, its development must proceed hand in hand with the development of operational tools for research incorporating all the significant variables. Without such tools, no theory can link its concepts together and deal with empirical relationships, no matter how elegant it may sound.  

Concepts not used. Important to an understanding of the contribution of the SJI literature is that it does not fit cleanly into any of the existing theoretical categories of social psychology by virtue of the SJI exploring new frameworks which might be possible, and avoiding the use of others. For instance, the SJI approach defies categorization along many of the traditional lines, e.g., empirical  


C. Schrag, op. cit., p. 225.  

versus theoretical, or cognitive-behavioral-motivational. Such defying of traditional categories may be one of its principle attributes at the current time when tremendous amounts of data are having to be incorporated, data not available only a few years ago. Many of the complexities to be noted in the use of various concepts are results of the way(s) in which the problems are being conceptualized, the experimental situations designed. Another aspect of such complexity is the attempt to bridge gaps between old and new concepts through continuing to use the old or revised meanings, e.g., attitude.

M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1963, eschews separating such categories as theory versus technique, stating, "... development of an integrative theory with direct bearing on actual research data is not


11 Examples of contributions to this are new statistical and computer processes.


proceeding as rapidly as refinements of techniques." Increasing use of models and techniques without accompanying theoretical care is also attacked by him in the Journal of Social Issues, 1968, "If the Scientist is to be more than a mere Technician." M. Sherif suggests that we not follow T. Parsons, such writers merely developing "categorical schemes." While the Sherifs do not pretend to have yet developed a total theory, they do insist that work be in this direction and be grounded in operationally specifiable concepts. Theory dealt with in this work is seen as needing to be complemented and supplemented by a wide variety of differentiated frameworks, not contradictory, but capable of being used to move from one to another.

The differences which the Sherifs appear to have with other writers often take the form of them being accused of being "theoretically fuzzy," e.g., not having a clear "learning theory." The Sherifs may be (or appear to be) fuzzy by virtue of simply not structuring, not seeing the need to structure, many of the theoretical


15 M. Sherif, "If the Scientist is to be more than a Mere Technician," Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (1, 1968), pp. 41-61.


concepts which have been utilized in the past. It is possible such concepts may force examination of the relationship of one concept to another without questioning the assumptions, consequences, implications, or usefulness of the concepts themselves. For example, rational-emotional, cognitive-affective, as these have been used as "factors" in psychological functioning. Other SJI writers take such concepts even less into account than do the Sherifs, e.g., J. W. Reich, L. LaFave, G. A. Woodward, W. R. Hood, L. N. Diab, et al.

The concepts developed by the SJI need not necessarily be seen as substitutes for, or paralleling, others in the established literature. For example, there is in the SJI no equivalent of "emotion" or "rationality." The viability of such omission is not a focus of this

18 Others might be such as theory-practice, laboratory-field, pure-applied, natural-artificial, man-animal, mind-body, empirical-philosophical, motive-cognitive.

19 The relationship(s) between behavior which is rational and that which is emotional is a question no longer asked, being neither proven nor disproven. Such questions are going, have gone, the route of such age old questions as, "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Such questions are simply being ignored, being considered not relevant. They ask, which is more important, which came first, which is dependent or independent, which is more real, etc. While such a point as this is not the focus of this work, the degree to which the works of the Sherifs and other SJI writers enable us to avoid these questions puts us in their debt, though admittedly there are a range of social philosophers going back through J. Dewey who ploughed the row deep against dualistic thinking a number of years ago. It is interesting to note that the SJI writers in general and the Sherifs in particular do not lean heavily on the works of Dewey. Other writers which they might use also are omitted, e.g., Thorstein Veblen, and C. E. Ayres.

The degree to which the Sherifs and others are no longer attempting to wrestle with some of the past conceptual schemes or formulations is the degree to which they appear to be a part of a "straw in the wind of change" which appears to be blowing across the intellectual frontiers during the latter half and closing decades of the twentieth century.
work, though it becomes apparent that their usefulness may be brought into question if alternatives can be shown to be sufficient.

**Historical Relevance.** Major historical relevance lies in the degree to which the SJI combines a variety of diverse theoretical and methodological strands from the past. These are noted at other points and hence need only be mentioned at this point. They range from the psychophysical studies of judgment to the sociological works of E. Durkheim.

More distant from the main thrust of the work, but important in its possible historical relevance is the implication this work might have in relating two otherwise diverse strands of social inquiry, 1) that social philosophy as found in John Dewey and parallel writers such as Thorstein Veblen and C. E. Ayres, and 2) the SJI writers. The relationship of both of these to still others, e.g., the social theorists in the sociological traditions, is still another important theoretical problem. One of the chief difficulties to dualistic concepts noted above and the social philosophies just noted has been the lack of operational experimental evidence. The Sherifs and others are coming increasingly close to such operationalizing, e.g., the unpublished doctoral dissertation of W. R. Hood, 1961, clearly establishing the differential effects of dictum versus experimental learning. 20

The work of C. E. Ayres in combining both T. Veblen and J. Dewey in attacking dualisms is also relevant but is still further from the direct thrust of work here. C. E. Ayres appears to have been saying at a socio-cultural level much of what the Sherifs and others appear to be validating at the social psychological level, Ayres doing so without the advantage of the experimental evidence which is pointing in the direction of breaking down dualistic formulations at a conceptual functioning level.\textsuperscript{21} The exploration of such junctures in social theory cannot be of more than passing concern here.

It is the long range possibility of such mutually reinforcing strands in the theoretical threads of modern social science which make social theory the exciting center of inquiry it can be at the current time.\textsuperscript{22}


\textsuperscript{22}This particular point is intriguing by virtue of the persons involved having both diverse backgrounds and commonalities. Sherif, the Turk, Veblen the Norwegian, Dewey the American; each contributing distinctly new approaches in the diverse fields of social psychology, economics, and philosophy-education; yet all converging in some respects. It may or may not have been "accidental" that while their intellectual backgrounds are diverse, major aspects of their works were done in the "midwest." The same is true of Ayres. The importance to the sociology of knowledge is apparent, but must be rejected as not the main thrust of this work.

This work may in one sense be seen as "setting the stage" for further operationalizing of the many insights coming down through American social theory in the tradition of T. Veblen, G. H. Mead, C. H. Cooley, J. Dewey, W. I. Thomas, C. E. Ayres, C. W. Mills, \textit{et al.}. It is highly probable that the list of names noted in the bibliography at the end of this work contains just such persons, e.g., W. R. Hood, J. L. Roach, L. LaFave, W. Stephenson, J. Jackson, M. Manis, A. O. Elbing, A. Glixman, O. J. Harvey, J. White, C. D. Ward, B. Koslin,
Methodological Relevance. No attempt will be made to separate methodology as a problem in social research apart from theory. However, there is an aspect of the SFI approach which would be classified as clearly methodological insofar as it attempts to dimension social relationships in a manner which has not been thought clearly capable of being measured in the past, e.g. "involvement" and the general area of attitude. If such dimensioning is valid, then implications for its wider use should be explored, and its lack of consideration by present and past research have confounded their findings by such neglect. 23

Method and its Consequences. There is great need for research which will clarify the manners in which earlier research has not proven as effective in solving social problems as might have been expected. At a time when man has been told and in many respects has come to believe, at least would like to believe, that science and technology can provide an or the answer, it becomes increasingly the case where recent


The above are not making the traditional categorizations, not asking the old questions, but developing new categories capable of dimensioning behaviors in ways amenable to more accurate measurement and prediction of social phenomena. It is notable that their work breaks traditions in the same senses that the early social theory greats noted above did. It is hoped that this work furthers theirs and the many others who are asking new questions rather than finding new answers to old questions.

23 For example, positive responses on research items which would be negative if individual had responded according to shared norms of different group(s) in which he is highly involved; inference that judge has a "positive attitude" is therefore erroneous. Another is assumption that because judge is positive at one point on a scale he will be positive toward all items more or less positive on the same scale. Yet another assumption is that extreme stands are necessarily strongly held.
evidence points to the inadequacies of ways in which research has been carried out in the past.

One such inadequacy in the past has been the way(s) in which persons respond to their environment. For instance, for many years one of the most widely used instruments was the Thurstone scale. Another was the sociometric scaling techniques. Both of these clearly involved differential degrees of importance of the issue to respondent, the latter clearly attempting to dimension this, the former making assumptions that involvement not be an issue in its use. 24

Involvement, and to a lesser extent the other confounding factors noted above are a principle focus of this study. One must be careful that such confounding difficulties not be interpreted as saying a moratorium should be declared until perfect instruments are developed, or that the apparent difficulties be used to destroy the confidence in scientific problem solving processes as they continue to be developed and proliferated. This loss of confidence may be an unanticipated consequence of the communities' call upon science to solve community problems, and the acceptance of the scientists' assistance, without either party fully understanding the current limitations which must

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24 L. L. Thurstone, "The Measurement of Social Attitudes," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXVI (1931), pp. 249-269, reprinted in Martin Fishbein (ed.), Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), see especially p. 22. Other points on which research findings are questioning the validity of interpretations given to past findings are such as, "the experimenter effect," the change in "domains" used by respondents, the degree to which a host of "social variables" including specification of reference groups entering as variables in the response (noted above), and the degree to which time perspectives may be functioning as variables in response judgments.
be placed on the existing state of social science, limitations on our understanding of the complexity of the involved social units at all levels. Enough is known to demonstrate that social units are complex, and that the group's inter and intra organizational relations of competition and hostility are sufficiently great that caution must be exercised in staking the reputation of science on solutions to such problems. For example, the consequences of false hopes built up and then not met are legend, the most recent may prove to be the so-called "war on poverty."

The sciences run the danger of being accused of having in the past attempted to solve problems without benefit of new evidence, e.g., 1) the scientist should have known better, and 2) the scientist being pressed to solve current problems with both theoretical and methodologically limited tools, tools which it is known will be outdated before the problems are solved.

After a review of the concepts and related literature on involvement in judgment it becomes imperative to indicate what the parameters of the literature of such a new technique as the Own Category Procedure are, and briefly indicate the ways in which it has and might be used, the specific kinds of information which might be gained from it, as well as the possible ways in which its use might impact on those who are studied. 25

25 The very effectiveness of data gathering processes about individuals and groups makes their use that much more a crucial issue to all concerned, "knowledge of" meaning "power over" in many cases of social knowledge. As will be noted, large amounts of data point in the direction which M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland started back in 1952 and
As with so many significant developments (and it is what makes them significant), what has previously been chaos now appears to be "falling into place," though perhaps in a very complex manner. Such would appear to be the case with the SJI.

The social judgment-involvement approach welcomes the charge of being crude and primitive at this early stage of the game. It welcomes this charge as long as it succeeds in specifying the degree of discrepancy between a communication and the person's own position, in making unequivocal predictions about the direction of attitude change toward or away from a communication, and in predicting susceptibility or resistance to change even before an attempt is made to change the person's attitude. The approach offers operational indicators for degree of ego-involvement in terms of the relative sizes of the person's latitudes of rejection and noncommitment, . . .26

A number of pieces including doctoral dissertations have appeared on the Own Category Procedure in recent years, in each of these the specific aim has been on the procedure itself more than the broader context in which such findings must be placed. For example, the

1953 concerning the importance of involvement as a variable in judgment. The conceptual framework being evolved and elaborated upon clearly appear to be sufficiently valid (taken alone), that their use without adequate systems of checks may have consequences envisioned by those who press the "big brother" issues of 1984. A more careful survey of the literature however reveals that while there is much validity to the possibility of moving in the direction of "manipulation of the masses," the findings also point in the direction of man being more conceptually complex than imagined, and hence there may be more fear of persons who would take scientific results and techniques and misinterpret them than in persons being able to take findings and "manipulate" large numbers of persons through such findings. It is for these reasons, among others noted elsewhere, that this is a survey of the complexities of the issues-concepts involved.

omission of many concepts as internal variables in psychological functioning noted above. A second is the implications of these developments (SJ1) for group theory and methodology literature. Both of the above are directly beyond the scope of this work. In a real sense they are the rationale as to why the start should be begun in this direction.

While the fruitfulness of such measures as the Own Category Procedure may be tremendous, the note of caution entered above must not be overlooked. Such procedures appear to involve "disguised conditions" where the respondent does not know what the nature of the information is that he is giving. Debriefing procedures are being instituted as well as other safeguards to maintain the integrity of the relationship between respondents and others including the experi­menter himself and the "image" of science itself. It is apparent that these are the "ethical" issues which have received so much attention in recent years.27

Interdisciplinary Relevance. Paralleling the approach which is its focus, this work will attempt to cut across academic conceptual frameworks in several dimensions. 1) Its direction is interdisciplinary in the integrative sense, as contrasted to a series-cafeteria style (eclectic) sense. 2) It reflects emphasis on both empirical and theoretical findings, the findings of this study being viewed as "an

empirical study of the literature." 3) The findings, both the SJX literature search and the library volume index search, if valid, are advanced as providing indicators of future trends relating to the rigor of social theory and research in all of the social sciences. 28

The direction is interdisciplinary insofar as the field of social psychology can be construed as independently defined though related to sociology. Muzafber Sherif discussing interdisciplinary research and theory says:

... some systematists take too little stock of empirical results being accumulated in different social sciences on the same problems. ... when we study the roles of individuals in a group, we first have to place the group in its cultural setting. Then, in a definite sequence, we are prepared to study the group as a system, and only then to understand the roles of particular individuals. 29

The particular theoretical framework and research procedure which is the focus of attention here has been found to be outside much of the current sociological literature, the Sherifs not being cited although the subject matter, attitudes, is not outside of sociology. 30

28 Insofar as the SJX has implications for judgment and perception it has implications for the full range of sciences when they are viewed as human activities.


We will not be able to deal with theory in any detailed manner, this being done recently by Boskoff, 1969. It nevertheless may be extremely important that the significance of these SJI research findings for sociological theory and methodology not be overlooked.

The Sheriffs' belief that the Own Category Procedure might be useful in the study of reactions to socio-cultural change has been noted elsewhere. Marie Jahoda and Neil Warren, 1966, say:

No longer can the study of attitudes be said to be an encapsulated sub area of psychology.

A similar point . . . can be made from the sociological point of view. Attitudes are today more firmly integrated, theoretically and empirically, with the concepts of roles and norms, reference groups, and socialization processes than ever before. This is an implementation in terms of modern sociology of what Karl Marx, albeit in different terminology, realized even in the nineteenth century: that a person's social conditions determine his attitudes.31

The above indicates clearly that while the Own Category Procedure has not been utilized in sociology the importance of internal variables such as attitudes are intimately tied in with sociology. Previously the same authors have said, "Attitude is in itself an interdisciplinary term, bridging psychology and sociology; . . . "32 M. Sherif and C. W. Sheriff in their edited volume, 1967, say regarding psychosocial scales,

. . . The yardsticks that can be developed for valid assessment of individual attitudes are derived from the stuff that should be the domain of study for


32Ibid., p. 9.
sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and economists.33

M. W. Riley may be a good example of a sociologist who is vitally interested in the dimensioning of internal variables. 34 Jay Jackson is another who has been prominent in developing procedures by which the internal variables related to interpersonal social relationships are dimensioned. 35 Neither of the above have been found to use the SJI or the Own Category Procedure however. M. Sheriff notes that early in this century some sociologists became concerned with "... problems of individual functioning, notably in the area of motivation."36 A. Cicourel has the following to say about sociologists and internal variables:

The contingencies of differential perception and the actor's knowledge about rules of conduct can be of interest to the sociologist without relying upon the


neurophysiological or psychological states. (latter are of interest to the social scientist only insofar as they can be explained by reference to a common culture . . . ) 37

Sociologists studying formal organizations have found it necessary to ask questions which raised psychological issues according to Sherif, 1961. He cites E. Durkheim, R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd, R. K. Merton, and R. M. Williams, Jr. 38 A further example is A. R. Lindesmith and A. Strauss, 1968, agreeing with N. P Chapanis and A. Chapanis, 1964, and adding additional criticism of cognitive dissonance theory. They note that a sociologist must ask questions which cognitive dissonance theory itself does not answer. 39

A definition of sociology may be an issue, but cannot be undertaken at this point, suffice it to note the statement by M. Sherif, 1966, to the effect that sociology is, " . . . primarily concerned with organization or social systems . . . " 40

The relationship of sociology and social psychology is one of the latter being a sub-unit (major field within) the former, according


to Daniel J. Levenson. He notes that social psychology has been the largest section in the American Sociological Association. 41

GENERAL FINDINGS

Selected samples of the literature searched for this study reveal the conceptualizations of the processes involved in human social behavior are on the one hand becoming increasingly specified in operational terms while on the other hand such specification is pointing toward the whole process as involving more complex interactions of dimensions than have been thought to be the case. A further finding is that a rather clearly defined body of literature arising from psychophysical judgment and incorporating social group and organizational variables is not infiltrating large segments of a major sample of the sociological literature surveyed for this study.

A parallel example to what is referred to in the former point above may be the reformulation of the authoritarian or dogmatism formulations which have been amended so drastically as inquiry continues. The Social Judgment Involvement Approach which is the focus of this study has not received the critical treatment equivalent to that done by R. Christie and M. Jahoda (eds.) on authoritarianism. 42 More recent examples which parallel and may compete with the SJI are such


as the cognitive dissonance and adaptation level conceptualizations of the human social conceptual behavioral process. 43

It will be possible in this work to only briefly indicate the implications of taking one or the other of the above formulations as they relate to the problems dealt with by the SJI. Though these cannot be the central thrust of this work it must be clearly kept in mind that they are ever in the background as alternatives and form much of the rationale for the elaborate documentation and defense in the writing on various aspects of social psychological research at the current time. The summaries of the literature such as those by M. Fishbein (ed.), 1967, and M. Sherif (ed.), 1967, appear to show a convergence of many findings toward the importance of 1) involvement and 2) social variables such as groups both being recognized as major variables in individual psychological functioning. Both of the above are major points in the contribution which the SJI may be making toward the development of a viable and problems solving sociology and social psychology as well as a more valid concept of social science.

Complexity. A synthesis among the wide variety of conceptual frameworks is occurring on major issues. The wide variety itself may explain in part the difficulties encountered by the sociologist who would attempt to relate his work to social psychology. The same variety and accompanying controversy could also explain the caution

which writers use in reporting findings noted above. Examples of the synthesis noted above are: 1) the consideration of involvement (or some synonym), and 2) the social context of psychological functioning, even the concept of the person becoming more socialized.\textsuperscript{44} The person trained in a particular set of psychological assumptions can easily overestimate the degree to which all psychologists share basic

assumptions about the nature of man, and/or the way(s) in which larger social units may be viewed.45

RESEARCH NEEDS

The complexity of the issues has demonstrated the need for further research on a variety of different levels of inquiry ranging from field data gathering to the synthesis of conceptual frameworks developed from and used in such data gathering. The above does not exclude the "problem solving process." Important is the digesting of what is already available. For example, the implications of the findings of the "Oklahoma dissertations," especially that of G. A. Woodward, 1967, regarding domains or meanings with which judges sort items, needs further elaboration. Another is the exploration of differential reference group effects on judgments of parallel or similar stimuli. At still another level of inquiry are the problems involved in devising ways to validate the implications of the findings of the "own category" in actual group behaviors in either laboratory or natural settings.

This study sees itself as focusing on the "digesting" of literature which is already available in order to further the exploration of

the theoretical and methodological issues involved. In so doing it is
not a survey of the literature so much as an exploration of selected
aspects of the concepts and literature, aspects which might be ex-
tremely important in such "digesting." The major function of this
work may be to indicate the need for future or further "digesting."

Group-Organizations. Implications of the SJI approach for
students of groups and organizations may follow from the above. With
its stress on the consequences of involvement for all sorts of social
judgments in social contexts it becomes relevant to a whole range of
issues related to current problems of rapid social changes within and
between persons, between groups, etc. It may be possible to study on
an individual level changes which can also be seen as changes in
group, intergroup, and organizational levels. Some formulations such
as the T group are implying that involvement is basic to many pro-
cesses of change, that heavy stress be placed on the individual and
groups becoming highly involved, and in so doing be able to forge
adaptive changes to meet new problems. Other formulations resulting
from psychoanalytical thought are pressing for individual-personal
freedoms, persons being encouraged to "do their own thing," "letting
it all hang out," being "authentic" and thereby accomplishing accommo-
dation to the rapidly changing scene, and also coincidently placing
severe strain on what may be very basic social processes of coordina-
tion and integration of social phenomena. Still other formulations
would imply that if a change is to be effected there must be an in-
verse relationship between reward and attitude change in the direction
desired. Yet another variant of both of the above is an element of anti-organizational structure, anti authority, anti establishment, which becomes evidenced in the "drop out," "hippie," and other movements. These have aspects of basic assumptions about the nature of man as somehow being in opposition to social structure and organizations, one person's welfare of necessity being counterposed to another person's. F. E. Katz's concern with the autonomy in organizations appears to be directly concerned with this issue, though it must be noted that Katz does not fall into these types of difficulties. He is rather providing an alternative formulation of man in organizations which does not polarize or view dualistically man and organizations. The works of many of the role theorists are also in this direction.


These are of course issues which revolve around conceptual frameworks which are increasingly being recognized as problems solved by considering various "levels" of interaction, and the difficulties encountered when crossing levels of interaction; e.g., individuals interacting with society. These issues are not a part of our work here, but are very important to the total framework which the Sheriffs and
The degree to which the SJI provides a positive perspective to
social organizations and individuals within them must be seen as an
important factor in its acceptability as a viable conception of psy-
chological functioning. The same is its stress on science as an
integral part of man's behavior, as opposed to some which would see
it as a mere adjunct to the "real nature" of man. Writers such as
C. E. Ayres and others, who have stressed technology as an aspect of
human behavior, "fit in perfectly" with the SJI conception of man as
a categorizing, conceptual functioning animal.49

These issues of a "philosophical nature," as so many others,
cannot be the direction of this work, but remain to be tied in at some
later date in some later work. It is sufficient here to point out
that there are significant aspects in the above when placed in the

other SJI writers are using to justify their conceptual frameworks and
their own particular interests, i.e., to put them into perspective
with other thrusts and interests.

The levels approach may be seen as attempting to circumvent the
old individual-group-organizational-society (unit-subunit) types of
errors which have plagued man for many years; questions as to the
relative importance of one or the other, which came first, etc. Many
such problems assume dualistic categories no longer tenable, e.g.,
mind-body, rational-irrational (emotional). Such categories, as noted
elsewhere, are not a part of the SJI, and their omission at a psycho-
logical level is a major point in the usefulness of the SJI as it ties
in with other theoretical frameworks which also do not make such
errors.

49C. E. Ayres, Toward A Reasonable Society: The Values of Indus-
trial Civilization (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1961).
larger context in which social science is functioning at the current time.  

**Method.** We find in the literature two major points relevant to the SJI writers: 1) experimental designs are less and less using the concepts used in the past that refer to dualistic, reified, internal variables which are not amenable to operational specification and have been attacked by writers such as John Dewey in philosophical terms for a number of years, and 2) the experimental designs and conceptual frameworks reinforce the great degree to which man is in fact a social animal, groups and organizations, "Social life is the natural habitat of the human individual. It is not alien to his nature." The methodologies specified in the SJI literature do not reflect those of early social methodologists such as C. H. Cooley or W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki. Though their subject matter is much the same (e.g. attitudes, beliefs, etc.), the actual methodologies of the SJI writers stem more from the crossing of judgmental studies with the concern for social contexts.

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50 It might be noted in passing that the conceptions of science and technology, the degree(s) of involvement in them, especially as they are seen by some persons as contrasting with values, goals, ends, etc., may be of possible research significance as studied by the Own Category Procedure. For example, are persons when judging stimuli presented as technical, means, etc., more involved or less involved than when the same stimuli (issues) are presented as goals, values, or ends in view? It is notable that this injects a time dimension which we have spelled out elsewhere as being a possible difficulty in the Sherifs' conception of the Own Category Procedure.

The ability to dimension involvement is one of the basics of such a trend toward establishing in different terms some of the basic postulates which were inferred through the use of the complex research processes by such writers as the above along with G. H. Mead and others. The concern is with the complexity and subtlety of man's internal psychological functioning in a manner which recognizes the differences and similarities of all men regardless of cultural background.

The methodology of the SJI concentrates on specification of the stimulus situations and the obtaining of responses in such a manner that both are measurable differentially and from which may be inferred the significant internal variables which are functioning and will continue to be functioning in those contexts for which predictions are attempted. The SJI borrows heavily from psychophysical studies but extrapolates from them to social judgment with caution. Time will probably show the more basic principles of judgment apply to both social and non social judgments.

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANCE

The use of the concept social judgment and the operational specification of involvement and other dimensions of judgment is a major focus of library research for this work. The findings appear to have relevance to solving a range of human problems in which differentials in judgment and involvement are significant among men. Since it is "involved and dedicated men" who are killing each other today, it would appear to be an extremely relevant topic for research.
In addition to introducing new concepts, the Social Judgment Involvement Approach (SJI) and Own Category Procedure may not use a wide range of concepts which have traditionally been used to describe internal psychological functioning. This work has been cited as being in some senses each of the following; theoretical, methodological, interdisciplinary, operational, philosophical, critical, synthetic, and controversial.

One assumption is that without careful specification of concepts, what they include, as well as what they do not include, there is danger that the reader erroneously think the SJI, and other approaches found in the literature, are either simplistic, or lost in a mumbo-jumbo of new or changed concepts which only involve a new word game.

This research has appeared to demonstrate that a number of persons are working in the area which is tied to a long history of the study of judgment. When applied to social judgment with appropriate care it may provide a basis for a social psychology which is not only extremely social, but at the same time is increasing those aspects of science which have been typed as "hard," "experimental," "mathematical," etc. Should the SJI provide a convergence of a number of theoretical and methodological frameworks which have been viewed as diametrically opposed it would be significant for sociology.

Though it is not a thrust of this work, the question may be raised as to whether or not the SJI and its findings are consistent with the early classic theorists such as E. Durkheim, Wm. James, G. H. Mead, C. H. Cooley, J. Dewey, T. Veblen, W. I. Thomas and
F. Znaniecki, K. Marx, and more recent theorists such as C. W. Mills, R. Merton, R. Dubin, C. E. Ayres, et al. It might be advanced that they are in many respects the forebears of the SJI. Though the Sherifs utilize them in varying degrees, some of them little or none, it would appear that the work of the Sherifs is attempting to accomplish many of the most important aims of these writers.

A survey of the indexes of a large sample of the sociological literature reveals that while there are numerous indications that the Sherifs are well aware of the sociological literature the reciprocal is not necessarily the case. Certain aspects of the Sherifs' works are much more widely cited than others. It would appear that the own category procedure is one of the lesser cited, in fact very rarely is it cited in the sociological literature sample surveyed for this work.

It is extremely significant that the very "empirical," "experimental," "hard," "mathematical-statistical," methodology which the SJI is introducing is from areas of psychology which range far from the work of those writers noted above. The juncture(s) and confluence of these lines of development are one of what must be many other such combinations which increasingly occur as various different lines of inquiry are brought together through the heterogeneity of backgrounds which those engaged in them bring to it.

Explored here in some detail will be one instrument and approach and their impact on selected samples of the sociological literature. This may lead to further synthesis of the varieties of theoretical systems possible at the current time. It is not meant to be unmindful of the consequences of theoretical and methodological developments on
the ability of men to solve very concrete specific problems such as
those of poverty, intergroup conflict, authoritarian power structures,
etc. However it is impossible in such a work as this to press to
conclusions the ramifications which might be forthcoming. The reader
is referred to such as Muzaf er Sherif, In Common Predicament: The
Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation, 1966, for
some of the implications along important problem solving lines. 52

Outline of the thesis: Chapters II and III, selected concepts
relevant to what the Social Judgment Involvement Approach is (and is
not). Chapter IV, the Own Category Procedure. Chapter V, the
selected sample of the sociological literature survey. Chapter VI,
summary.

Chapters II, III and IV present concepts relevant to the Social
Judgment Involvement Approach and Own Category Procedure literature,
introduce representative literature, and develop findings in
operational and conceptual terms possibly significant for sociological
theory and methodology. An additional end in view has been to test a
confluence of several strands of research in the hope that further
dialogue and research become possible. 53 The degree to which there
has already occurred a confluence of the SJI and sociological

52 Muzaf er Sherif, In Common Predicament: The Social Psychology
of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation (New York: Houghton Mifflin

53 Representative authors publishing in addition to the Sheriffs
might include such as Wm. R. Hood, C. I. Hovland, O. J. Harvey,
J. W. Reich, K. R. Vaughan, L. N. Diab, J. O. Whittaker, L. LaFave,
literature has been tested by a survey of a selected sample of the sociological literature reported in Chapter V.

The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (SJI) is a very limited narrowly circumscribed body of literature, not fully defined as yet. It is hoped that this work itself will aid in establishing the parameters of such a literature and also further the incorporation of its relevant aspects into the wider sociological literature. In so doing it is not intended that this represent a general treatise on the full range of methodological and theoretical-conceptual problems. It is intended that it enable the researcher to pursue the variety of problems which may be indicated both explicitly and implicitly. Where possible it has been made explicit, but in no way(s) can it be construed that this is exhaustive of the way(s) in which the work of the Sherifs and other social psychologists might be related to sociological theory and methodology.

The findings of the survey of a sample of the sociological literature shows approximately six percent of the volumes citing the Sherifs' work. The implications or seriousness of such a finding can only be incompletely raised here. The possibility that there are mutually reinforcing thrusts to the variety of diverse tacks which are being taken will be noted.\footnote{See "General Significance" above and Chapter III below.} No attempt is made to evaluate the SJI
approach except to assess in some degree its consistency with findings in related literature and at other levels of interaction inquiry.\(^{55}\)

Assumptions will be present as to the nature of sociology, conceptions of both theory and methodology as well as of science. Such assumptions will not be made as basic thrusts of the thesis but will be alluded to where possible for purposes of making it clear as to the complexity and significance of the issues involved.

The search for the literature dealing with the SJI and the Own Category Procedure reveals that most of its basic principles are being validated but the specifics of the ways in which the stimuli and resultant effects are to be specified though it is not as simple as might have been indicated by Sherif and Hovland in their two articles in 1952 and 1953.\(^{56}\) Serious problems remain, problems of more accurately specifying the conditions under which patterned "errors" occur in judgment and thereby reflect consistent internal psychological variables.\(^{57}\)

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\(^{55}\) These are using a variety of different concepts to indicate phenomena which may be basically parallel.


Relatively little of this SJI literature is either written by
or found referred to by sociologists or in sociological journals.
The more relevant to sociology studies have most often tried to use
groups which were believed to have known degrees of involvement in
the issues being studied. A variety of techniques have been used to
be sure such group involvements were in fact a part of the judgment
process. The degree to which evidence is clear that such "manipula-
tions" are effective or even considered is not clear in many cases.
The same being the case for the whole involvement variable in many
social research situations of all types where it must obviously have
entered in as a confounding variable.58

The methodological significance of concerns here can be seen in
the degree to which psychological or sociological research has been;
1) omitting such a crucial variable as degrees of involvement, or 2)
not accurately dimensioning involvement if it is considered. However
important this may be, it is not the aim of this work to demonstrate
the extent of such omission by reference to specific studies. It is
noted that the findings which purport to show its importance as a

58 M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1956, note that "strongly approve,"
etc., as used on scales such as Likert may confound direction,
extremity, and intensity. G. A. Woodward, 1967, reports finding that
judges shift domains in judging statements, e.g., judges not only con-
founding extremity and involvement (intensity?), but shift from judg-
ing statements on the basis of "truth" to "approve," "favorable," etc.
Muzaffer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology,
George A. Woodward, "Dimensions of Judgment Characteristics of Dis-
placeable Statements in the Disguised Structured Instrument for the
Assessment of Attitudes toward the Poor," (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1967).
source of response bias throws into question all interpretations of findings which have not taken it into consideration. 59

Chapters II, III, IV, are attempts to introduce a series of conceptual frameworks and representative literature which may be developing findings in operational and conceptual frameworks theoretically significant for sociological theory.

The methodologies used to gather information relative to the SJI and Own Category Procedure have been the usual techniques of library research including the sociological and psychological abstracts. Primary reliance has been placed on references in SJI literature itself. The authors found to be doing work which might closely parallel the SJI have been searched for work which might show influence by the Sherifs or other SJI writers. This library research which was primarily in the social psychological journals was greatly facilitated by the availability of materials in the heavily endowed Linda Hall Library of Science and Technology which has defined social psychology as a science, thus placing it within the acquisition provisions of the library.

59 Wm. J. McGuire, 1968, cites the involvement controversy as being a "lively one;" C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, state, "In most research reports, extremity of stand and degree of involvement are inadequately specified, and it is not possible to determine whether the results are confounded by these variables."

SELECTED CONCEPTS, CHAPTER II.

Here will be presented some of the very basic concepts relating to perspectives of human behavior as they bear closely to the Social Judgment Involvement Approach. For example, it will be seen that man is assumed to be a conceptual functioning-categorizing animal. Using this frame of reference, the study of man is focusing on the ways in which men respond differentially to external stimuli as a result of complex internal psychological functioning processes which cannot be specified in simple stimulus-response terms.

The SJI writers tend to follow Gardner Murphy, 1958, and others in recognizing the arbitrary nature of the decision to use the skin as the boundary of the person, but do so for heuristic descriptive purposes. Such a bounded system appears to operate as if it were categorizing, differentially responding to varieties of stimuli consistently in patterned ways.

Terminologies, categories, concepts, etc., used to discuss and explain the behaviors of persons are the processes and categories by which the observer orders his data and are not properties inherent in

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the objects. These are viewed as attempts to avoid reification of internal variables including the judgment process itself. The use of the concept "conceptual functioning" is not intended as establishing reifications of either entities or processes. Crucial in conceptual functioning is the capacity to react differentially to "purple," "cow," and both combined, e.g., "purple cow." The combined concept must evoke a differential reaction following experience with each separately.

Concepts basic to the subject area will be explored. One example is the concept of social, a basic concept to the Social Judgment Involvement Approach because the approach has as its focus the judgmental processes as they occur in stimulus situations which include relationships with other persons. The basic criterion for differentiating social from psychophysocial judgment will be noted and difficulties as well as the significance in drawing such differentiations and parallels will be briefly explored. It is this melding of the two in some dimensions which appears to be significantly different from other perspectives, some of which make heavy distinctions between the two, i.e., draw inappropriate correlations between the two. For example, differentiate the whole area of judgment inquiry from other psychological functioning inquiry such as attitude studies. While the concept of attitude itself is left to the third chapter, the various concepts paralleling what the SJI calls psychosocial judgments are

explored here. Examples of such concepts are categorization, discrimination, verbal behavior, experience, cognitive behavior, affective behavior, etc. Some of those discussed will be included only by virtue of demonstrating concepts not used by SJI but often thought to be relevant to internal psychological functioning, e.g., experience.

SOCIAL JUDGMENT INVOLVEMENT APPROACH - Chapter III

The following is from the Sherif's "Attitude as the Individual's Own Categories: The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach to Attitude and Attitude Change," in the 1967 volume edited by them.

... the present approach is a cognitive approach. ... it is also a motivational-affective approach, for attitudes are not neutral affairs. ... a behavioral approach, because the only possible data from which attitudes can be inferred are behaviors, verbal or nonverbal. ... Any sharp separation of these is bound to be arbitrary and to distort the nature of the phenomena. ... treatment of these aspects as components typically amounts to using samples of behavior in different tasks or situations assigned at different points in time ... (this is legitimate) (but) ... we should not let our research techniques blind us to the undeniable blending of cognitive-motivational-behavioral in any specific situation or task that arouses an attitude.64

This chapter on the Social Judgment Involvement Approach is primarily positive in developing the approach as yielding new dimensions of internal psychological functioning as these may be utilized

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in studying human behavior and interaction, especially as these may be aspects of larger social units. Close examination of the approach may make imperative a critical examination of other theoretical and methodological frameworks and the studies utilizing such frameworks. Pursuit of such examination is not possible at this point. See below for fuller explanation of some of the rationale for such a critical line of inquiry.

It will be significant to students of the "sociology of knowledge" that the SJI may not only combine with both psychological and sociological approaches, not only represent a combination of those approaches noted above in quotes, but also bring together areas previously seen as discrepant, e.g., psychophysical and psychosocial scaling. It also provides another "merging process" in bringing

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together a range of conflicting evidence between attitude and communication studies. Another example is the bringing together of survey and laboratory findings. 66

Major in the above is the utilization of a whole body of data which has been developing in the area designated as judgment literature. This originated in the concern with judges' responses to physical stimuli, stimuli whose dimensions could be closely designated and responses easily measured, e.g., sound, physical dimensions, weight, time, etc. 67 Some aspects of such psychophysical judgment are still in debate, e.g., whether it follows power or logarithmic patterns. So called "errors" in such judgment were found to be consistent and to reflect many variables, e.g., a person's "own attitude." 68 These "errors," once looked upon as contaminates of the


68 Ibid., pp. 20ff.
situation and preventing measurement of the "real personality" of the individual, have now become valuable ways in which the complexity of the internal conceptual functioning can be dimensioned. The social psychologist and sociologist are of course concerned as to the degree to which such functioning represents memberships in groups and larger social organizations.

The Own Category Procedure is one such stimulus context consisting of judging a number of statements on any of a variety of bases such as their favorability to an issue or group, their probability or accuracy, the judges' own attitude toward them, etc. It is only one of a number of scaling techniques which are emerging concerned with the patterned processes by which judges categorize given stimuli having some specified differential scale (domain) involved. Others might be noted are those with which Upshaw, 1962, is concerned. Also might be noted are C. N. Alexander 1965, L. N. Diab 1965, A. F. Glixman 1965, O. J. Harvey 1961, Wm. R. Hood 1961, J. M. Jackson 1965, J. W. Reich 1966, C. D. Ward, 1966. These are providing variations on a general theme


which is concerned with such psychological functioning without attempting to reify the internal variables.

It will be impossible to spell out the varieties of problems which occasioned the above statement as it is manifested in the present or past psychological literature. Where such problems directly relate to the literature dealing with the Own Category Procedure or the SJI it is hoped these will be explicit. The ramifications of such findings into the field of psychology will be too far afield for this work. Where possible the implications may be cited. This will include references to the possibilities that if the SJI and Own Category Procedure findings are accurate, then a major reconceptualization of social psychological theory and methodology lies close in the future if in fact it has not already begun. The principle problem involved is one of reinterpretation of many findings from data which was gathered under conditions in which controls for such as involvement and the influence of the social context were not considered. A most specific example is the possibility that "extremity" or "strength" of attitudes as dimensioned by scales may have been confounded by meaning

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either, 1) extreme position on the attitude scale, or 2) involvement in the issue with which the scale was concerned. The above does not destroy necessarily the validity of research, but may in many cases make necessary a restatement of the findings in light of the possibility that such confoundings did in fact occur in the research and the inclusion of qualifications where necessary.

OWN CATEGORY PROCEDURE (Instrument), Chapter IV.

The basic problem is one of being able to develop contexts, situations, stimuli which have such clear differentials specifiable in such a manner that they can be controlled, and responses evoked by them differ in patterned ways which reflect differentials in the internal functioning in the behavior of the judges. Such differentials in behavior must also be easily recorded.

The above is basic to moving to the next step which is the developing of such contexts, situations, stimuli as will parallel future states for which prediction of human behavior is desired. 72 For example, prediction as to who will walk out of a classroom when a Black walks in. This will not be predicted nearly so accurately by a pencil-paper instrument as it will by asking the question, "Will all

72 It should be noted that this is actually no different from other specifications as to the aim of sociological data gathering, whether it be from questionnaires, interviews, even "unobtrusive" techniques. In each case inferences are made from data as to what are the social internal variables, assuming that social norms are a basic unit of social structure. Note that the above may not always be the case, exceptions being when no inference is drawn as to the internal variables which are functioning. It is the case however any time the sociologist attempts to dimension the "beliefs" or other dimensions of group structure.
those who would leave the room when a black enters please raise your hand?" The verbal question and the social context in which response occurs in the latter case more closely parallels those variables which will in fact be functioning at the time when the behavior is expected to occur.

The using of statements as part of a stimulus situation and the placement of such statements by judges on a variety of continua have a long history going back through Thurstone, 1929. These have usually been placed into a fixed number of categories. Sherif and Hovland as well as others have found that the number of categories or piles into which judges will sort statements may vary with the degree of involvement of the judge in the issue he sees to be central to the statements. The circumstances and validity as well as the uses to which such techniques have been represented in the literature is one of the foci of this work.


75 It will be shown that there may be confounding variables such as changes in domain which judges use in judgments, differential levels of concrete and abstractness by judges on the issues, a time perspective differential among judges, differentials in levels of discrimination and knowledge, etc. A specific example is cited by M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, an extreme stimulus being so extreme that it be viewed by the judge as in a new domain, a domain not anticipated by the researcher. Muzafar Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 50.
A major thrust of the chapter is the exploration of the specific terminology and confounding variables which have been viewed as being present in various findings. For example, reference scales, latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment, anchors, involvement, concrete-abstract, domain, assimilation-contrast, structure (stimulus). There will also be some attempt to note what the Own Category Procedure is not, how it differs from other instruments, and its limitations.

A SEARCH OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE: A SELECTED SAMPLE CHAPTER V

The intensive search into the literature which most closely follows and reports the SJI and Own Category Procedure materials reported in Chapters II, III, and IV made it apparent that the SJI stressed the social context of judgment. It was not apparent to what degree these materials were finding their way into the sociological literature which studies such contexts. It was unknown as to how much and in what areas the works of the Sheriffs had found their way into the sociological literature. A search of the literature would also assure locating the latest and most complete information relevant to the SJI and Own Category Procedure. The survey undertaken documented citations to the Sheriffs and Wm. Stephenson, their number, source cited, topical content, and positive or negative nature of the citation.  

In order to answer these types of questions a systematic search was made of the holdings of a library (University of Missouri - Kansas City) having a total of 307,384 volumes with approximately 2230

76 Wm. Stephenson was searched in order to establish his impact on the sociological literature because of his work with the Q sort technique which parallels the Own Category Procedure in some respects.
volumes catalogued in the sociologically relevant call numbers, Dewey system (300-370) and Library of Congress numbers (HN-HX) carrying publishing dates from 1960-1968. Call number card files were searched and those published in 1960 or later were noted and volume indexes were searched for citations to the Sherifs and Wm. Stephenson. Subsequently each reference noted was checked for source cited, content, and direction (positive or negative).

The sample was the entire holdings of the University of Missouri - Kansas City library in the numbers indicated above.

To further check the impact of the Sherifs on the sociological literature the main sociological journals, American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Sociometry, and Journal of Social Issues were searched for references. Much of the information gained from this search is to be found in the appendices and bibliographies.

Summaries of the topics cited as well as the positive and negative aspects of such references will be found in Chapter V and the appendices.

Methodological questions in the study of library holdings are noted. Chief among these are the representative character of the University of Missouri - Kansas City holdings and the use of indexes to locate citations.

77 Until 1965 the library had been on the Dewey number system. Since then acquisitions have been numbered with the Library of Congress system. The library is in the process of changing volumes acquired before the above date to the LC system. University of Missouri - Kansas City Bulletin, General Catalog, 1969-1970, p. 13.
The search found very little if any reflection of the Own Category Procedure and only a little of the SJI literature in the index references citing the Sheriffs. This follows expectations from earlier encounters with the sociological literature, e.g., C. M. Bonjean, et al., 1967, and M. E. Shaw and J. M. Wright, 1967. The Own Category Procedure has been used comparatively little to date. The SJI as an approach is found only slightly in the literature, though references to the concept of judgment are numerous. For the most part the latter are limited to earlier studies of the Sheriffs. Approximately six percent of the volumes contained one or more references to the Sheriffs. References to Stephenson were nil.

The following categories of information are developed in addition to those indicated above. An extremely large percentage of the Sherif cites are primarily positive. The authors and editors of volumes citing the Sheriffs were checked against the Guide to Graduate Departments of Sociology 1965, thus giving another index of the Sheriffs' impact on the discipline of sociology.

78 Neither of these summaries of instruments consider the Own Category Procedure as warranting inclusion in these volumes. A major variable in both volumes was the degree to which an instrument had been used. Charles M. Bonjean, Richard J. Hill, and S. Dale McLemore, Sociological Measurement: An Inventory of Scales and Indices (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967); Marvin E. Shaw and Jack M. Wright, Scales for the Measurement of Attitudes (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967).

Major categories of a topical nature were developed and tabulated in order to obtain some index of the relative importance of references to the Own Category Procedure and related procedures in comparison with the total references to the Sherifs' work as well as to different aspects of their work. The degree to which judgment and involvement are found in the literature surveyed are clear from this survey, though as noted above, trends in this direction had become apparent in earlier surveys of the SJI literature.

Summaries of the citations to the Sherifs' work by study cited and topic will be available in the appendix. The appendix will carry a complete bibliographical listing of all volumes citing the Sherifs. It might be noted that apparently large numbers of the volumes are specific social problem related, e.g., youth, gangs, conflict, intergroup relations, etc.

Specific studies of the Sherifs' which appear to have received the largest number of references are noted in Chapter V. The finding of very few highly critical citations will also be noted in Chapter V and the appendix.

Controversies occurring in the "judgment literature" are not reflected in the sociological literature as encountered in the index survey. By the same token the conceptual confounding central to our discussion of those concepts crucial to the SJI and Own Category Procedure are likewise not found in the citations located in the sociological literature. The careful specification of such concepts in the
sociological literature, if it does take place, is not specifying the Sherifs in the indexes at these points in these volumes. 80

There may also be some question as to whether or not there is a selective factor(s) in the sociologists who cite the Sherifs, e.g., are numbers of them his own students or those who have been close to him? To ascertain this references and acknowledgements in print by the Sherifs to others who might be sociologists have been documented. A list of these may also be found in the appendix.

It is hoped that some indication of the relative importance of the Sherifs' work for sociologists may be gleaned from the above. However evidence concerning the confounding, confusing, ambiguous, and number of parallel concepts in the literature make it clear that they themselves may be in some part responsible and make it clear that any conclusions derived might be very tenuous.

SUMMARY, CHAPTER VI

Restatement of the general methodology of both searches and their limitations are presented in this chapter. The relationship of the study to some of the developments in larger theoretical and methodological contexts including interdisciplinary problems have been noted. Potentials for expansion of experimental designs in a variety of

80 Speculation would of course advance that both methodological and theoretical discussions are not specifying the variables entering into response effects as closely and fully as they might be. This can only be advanced as an hypothesis to be established by further inquiry, e.g., a topical subject matter search of Own Category Procedure related concepts as these are found in the sociological literature.
dimensions as indicated from surveyed research, as well as a review of the confounding variables and conceptual problems involved to date are most relevant to the study of groups and larger social units.

The most significant findings of the library searches of both the SJI and library volume index search will be indicated. The broader implications of the dissertation are briefly outlined as are its limitations.
CHAPTER II
SELECTED CONCEPTS

Introduction

There are three concepts widely used in the past which are increasingly being used in conjunction with each other to indicate a central thrust of research, theory, and methodology. The three are "social," "judgment," and "involvement." These three, while old in their usage, have taken on within recent years new meanings which may have significance not only as they individually are conceptualized for use in solving theoretical and methodological problems, but also as they become associated with each other in a conceptual framework which provides a good example of the old saying, "The whole is more than the sum of its parts." While each of the above concepts may be taking on new meaning and significance it is also the case that the usage of these together may be an innovation which provides fresh insights and bypasses a number of the older dilemmas posed by assumptions which no longer need to be assumed.¹

¹See for example the critical treatment of dualistic categories implied in such as C. W. Sherif and M. Sherif, 1967, regarding the Social Judgment Involvement Approach being neither cognitive, motivational, nor behavioristic. See also the works of C. E. Ayres. This issue is not the focus of this work but may remain one of the chief significances of the SJI which is its focus. C. W. Sherif and M. Sherif, "Attitude as the Individual's Own Categories: The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach to Attitude and Attitude Change," in Carolyn W. Sherif and Muzafar Sherif (eds.), Attitude, Ego-Involvement, and Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 113.
The generalizations which are most basic to any current approach to social phenomena of any kind must first face the issues as to the referents of the concepts "social" and "phenomena."  

The below will be only able to touch on selected significant concepts as they function in judgmental contexts which are the focus of this work. This chapter will include some of the more important concepts which are not to be found as central to the SJI because the conceptual framework does not require them, thereby avoiding some of the pitfalls involved in such concepts as verbal attitudes, experience-behavior, cognitive-affective.  

2 The difficulties inherent in the degree to which discussion of any concept (such as "social") involves assumptions and concepts therein which are themselves subject to further inquiry regarding such as the nature of man, communication, interpersonal relationships, the nature of the universe, etc., and the full ranges of philosophical and other issues which may be involved are beyond the scope of this work. Only a few of the ramifications of various concepts will be outlined at points in this work to indicate in some degree their nature and extent. See for example, G. J. DiRenzo (ed.), 1966, with chapters by M. Sherif, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Leslie A. White, Alan R. Ross, and Omar K. Moore, and others. Gordon J. DiRenzo (ed.), Concepts, Theory, and Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Random House, 1967).  

3 It must be noted that it is the "dualistic"-"faculty psychology" aspect of these concepts which are referred to above. Insofar as they are viewed as dimensions of judgment (rather than distinct differentiated processes) they may be acceptable and in fact are used within the SJI framework. See for example, M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1969. While such concepts may be used as aspects of the SJI it is possibly significant that they need not be used; they may not be necessary. Such a thesis cannot be the focus of this work but is implicit in such as C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965; and M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, 1961. Not being designed as texts these last works need not include the more traditional conceptual frameworks. Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969). Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment
By illustrative contrast (and prior to considering the above) several concepts will be noted as consistent with the SJI so that parallels involved may be important in seeing the converging theoretical and methodological trends today. These concepts are social, attitude, discrimination, categorization, and judgment.4

Following an introduction to the concepts social and those noted above a third chapter will be devoted to the concepts directly related to the Social Judgment Involvement Approach. These will include concepts briefly referred to in Chapter II such as reference scales with their latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment, anchors of various kinds such as end and own, internal and external stimuli.

A fourth chapter will summarize the Own Category Procedure as an instrument operationalizing the concepts noted above.

Social

The concept "social" as it may be used to elaborate on and define the areas of concern to social scientists and other concerned with the nature of man ranges widely in a number of dimensions. For instance, it may exclude animal forms other than man. In such instances the differentiating variables involve a more specific type of concept:

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4Judgment will be discussed only briefly in Chapter II, its explication being reserved for Chapter III.
that of the relationship between men being "conceptual" in addition to being "social."^5

Limiting the concept "social" to man raises the question as to how to designate the behaviors of a wide range of animals other than man which appear to have their behavior influenced by others of the same "kind" in ways which are well established in the literature. These animals behave differentially to members of their own species. The usage of the concept "social" to designate such a wide variety of animals, including man, is to indicate as basic to the concept "social" the differentiated interrelationships of a patterned nature existing between physiological organisms of whatever type. ^6

The concept of man as a social animal then can be seen as placing him within a category of animals which influence each other in differentiated though patterned ways. It is necessary to invoke conceptual functioning to differentiate man from other animals, if indeed this is possible on even this dimension. Differentiation, of course,

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The degree to which other animals are social on the basis of conceptual functioning is of course a matter of some current concern among certain scientists engaging in exploring in depth the degree to which such animals as dolphins communicate using concepts. John C. Lilly, Man and Dolphin (New York: Doubleday, 1963).

exists between man and other animal forms on the basis of a wide range
of physiological criteria. A number of these are crucial to con-
ceptual functioning. 7

Categorizing man as a conceptual functioning animal is signifi-
cant to the designation of man as an animal which forms social units
based on relationships made possible by being able to conceptualize.
Such social units and processes themselves are not reducible to the
conceptual functioning of the individual involved any more than the
automobile is to be reduced to the movement of atoms or molecules.
Larger units are "more than the sum of smaller units." Reductionism
must be avoided. 8

7M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1969, op. cit. All animals vary in
the behaviors which may be categorized as "social." See the emerging
field of ethology.

8Ibid.

The ramifications of such an anti-reductionistic position can
only be briefly alluded to here. Its seriousness flows into such as
attempts to attribute characteristics of lower level units to higher
level units (e.g., individual traits to groups or vice versa), or to
establishing causal interactional relationships between two descrip-
tive units at different levels (e.g., individual interacting with
society). Still others might be attempts to establish priority either
in time or importance. These show the importance of delineating care-
fully the conceptual referents (categories and concepts) under con-
sideration in establishing generalizations or hypotheses. M. Sherif
Anthropology, and the Behavioral Sciences," Southwestern Social
Science Quarterly, XL (September, 1959 2), pp. 105-112.

The differential between qualitative and quantitative dimensions
of phenomena may be viewed in a somewhat parallel manner, e.g.,
whether or not changes are categorized as being qualitative or quanti-
tative depends on the way the phenomena are categorized, a change in
size of a unit may be categorized as an expansion of dimensions
currently present. On the other hand, such a change may be seen as
significant enough to now constitute a new category. Examples are
color and liquid-solid continuums. See J. C. McKinney, in H. Becker
The above issue may be seen as crucial in considering individual vs. group (or society) with reference to social change. There are levels of interaction involved here which allow for description of interaction at any one of a variety of units with each required to be consistent with but different from each other. A change at the individual level may be described in terms which indicate a change also at a higher (or lower) level, but a change at one level is not describable as "causing" change at another level. For example, an individual change does not cause a group to change, but certain changes in individuals may cause other individuals to change and these changes may be described at a group level.9

The human social group is the "natural habitat of man" insofar as the evolving physiological species designated "homo sapiens" cannot exist without them. The relationships designated "social" in man are no less natural to man by virtue of necessity than are those of all other animals. Man has evolved as a "grouping" animal. The capability of developing relationships with other men on the basis of conceptual functioning is basic to that grouping just as the grouping is basic


for the continuance of the organism. One is not/cannot be conceived as prior to or more important than the other. 10

The consideration of concepts relevant to man as a social animal might include a number of other concepts which are often confounded with "social" in differentiating man from other animals. For example, "artificial" is often used to designate that which is man-made as opposed to "natural" phenomena. Human relationships involving "planning" and "rationality" are viewed as being less "natural" than are others which are "emotional," irrational, or spontaneously developed. Such natural vs. artificial difficulties may be an aspect of the errors in conceptualizing the nature of man which leads to problems in attempts to dimension human behavior, problems arising from differentiations which may be omitted from such frameworks as the Social Judgment Involvement Approach.

It is evident that man responds differentially to the many varied stimuli which impact upon him. It is also evident that some of these evoke parallel or similar responses. The complexity of such differentiation of responses and the obvious complexity of the processes by which such individual and collective behaviors eventuate provides the chief problem of the psychologist. This does not imply a stimulus-response theory of behavior. The intervening variables functioning within the individual make it extremely hazardous at the current time to make pronouncements as to what is to be included as "stimulus," "response," and the complex cortical functioning which are involved

in behavior relative to these. The functioning of these internal variables is demonstrated by an increasing volume of research which is systematically exploring the varieties of ways in which individuals respond to a wide range of situations. \(^{11}\) Unfortunately in many instances the social aspects of such situations are not as clearly specified as they might be. \(^{12}\)

The Social Judgment Involvement Approach is a small but significant segment of research literature attempting to focus on the social aspects of situations. \(^{13}\)

We will be most directly concerned with that literature having bearing on group and organizational functioning. In so doing we are going to focus on some significant concepts crucial to the SJI's conception of the social nature of man as it may be differentiated from others.

\(^{11}\) For example, see S. B. Sells (ed.), *Stimulus Determinants of Behavior* (New York: Ronald Press, 1963).


The concepts below may be important to placing the SJI in perspective and also a direct or an indirect part of the discussion of the SJI and Own Category Procedure in Chapters III and IV. The concepts discussed in this chapter will be undertaken to give an extremely brief insight into the manners in which these might be in difficulty as they have been conceptualized in the past and to prepare for their possible expiration as they have been used in the past. The first three (attitude, categorization, and discrimination) are more likely to be redefined and continued than are the latter (verbal behavior, experience-behavior, and cognitive-affective). Explication such as the following may also be necessary as a hedge against methodological and theoretical criticisms that the SJI is not concerning itself adequately with some of these conventional conceptual problems.

Concept-Attitude

The concept of attitude has not only been widely debated as to its referent but has also been questioned as to its usefulness at all. The latter has in many cases come from behaviorists, but in recent years an increasing number who are taking into consideration internal variables are finding the concept of attitude adding little to explanations of behavior described using new conceptual frameworks. 14


The degree to which discussion of human behavior in terms of concepts and conceptual functioning displaces discussion in terms of attitudes may be significant. Writers such as O. J. Harvey and D. F. Caldwell, 1959, seem to equate the two. Writers such as E. E. Jones
At the same time that attitude appears to be in difficulty as a concept a number of writers are increasingly using "concept" itself. Writers, for example, such as O. J. Harvey and G. D. Beverly, 1961, see concepts as influenced by a variety of "personality" variables. 15

It would appear that the concept "attitude" is construed to have an evaluative element with disposition to act or behave in certain ways which differentiates attitudes from concepts. If such is the case the issue may be one in which some concepts are seen as involving

and H. B. Gerard, 1967, see concepts or categories as differentiated from both attitudes and beliefs. Though differentiated they see them as related to each other. Debates such as that between M. L. DeFleur and F. R. Westie, 1963, and C. N. Alexander, 1966, on the nature of attitudes are widely found in the literature. Such debates arise from differentials in original assumptions as to the nature of social data which are beyond the scope of this discussion at this point, though further examples might be seen in the following: A. R. Cohen, 1964, cites questioning of the concept "attitude." He would appear to continue to use the concept, "concept." A. F. Glixman, 1965, cites J. S. Bruner, 1956, regarding the conception of attitudes as categories.


evaluations or assessments which are thereby defined as attitudes.

This would place attitudes as a sub-category of concepts. 16

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16 It must be noted that such a conceptualization of the differentiation between attitude and concept plays into the hands of those who would see "attitude" and other strictly "evaluative" concepts as perpetuating dualistic fact-value types of categorizations.

It is the "affective" nature of the concept of attitude which is the issue here. The degree to which the concept is affective can lead to conceptions that there is a category of meaning systems which involve no affective or evaluative dimensions, e.g., "facts."

The above issues will be seen subsequently to be crucial to consideration of reference scales and degrees of involvement as well as implications for dualistic modes of forming categories. The evidence will be noted that individuals must be pro or con and involved on some aspects of all judgments including those about which their stand on the issue might be a "neutral" one, i.e. they may be very concerned about neutral positions on an issue in which they are involved.

It would appear that any stimulus which occasions conceptualization does in fact invoke some degree of evaluation, some degree of involvement. If the stimulus has neither of these, it is not a conceptual stimulus. This follows the much earlier thinking of John Dewey in his insistence that all behaviors involve valuations. John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, International Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences, Vol. II, 4 (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1939).

The difficulty in keeping judges from sorting items on an approval criterion rather than "true" as instructed is further indication of the pervasiveness of evaluative dimensions of judgment. One of the chief points in the Own Category Procedure is the degree to which judges reflect their own attitudes in sorting judgments though instructed to respond only on the basis of judging the "true" nature of the statements. Carolyn W. Sherif, Nuzhafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), p. 140; also George A. Woodward, "Dimensions of Judgment and Characteristics of Displaceable Statements in the Disguised Structured Instrument for the Assessment of Attitudes toward the Poor," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1967).

The possibility might be explored that all concepts involve evaluations and assessments of degrees of relevance or involvement on some dimension in order for the individual to have any significant reaction. Concepts of "neutral" phenomena may not mean that these are evoking no reaction; it may simply not be a differential significant enough to register on the measures used. The usage of concepts by individuals may mean they are evaluating the concept as relevant enough to have it as a part of their conceptual functioning, whether it be positively or negatively. This is the classic argument made by John Dewey in his discussion of evaluation. Even so-called "facts" involve
What seems to be happening is that the dimensions on which the complexity of conceptual functioning are becoming apparent do not involve differentiation between "attitudes" and "concepts." Other dimensions cut across the two in a variety of ways and prevent them from being viewed as separate and distinct categories.\textsuperscript{17}

The above discussion of two concepts used to categorize human conceptual functioning (attitudes and concepts) has attempted to briefly show that any attempt to establish one as being affective-evaluative (attitudes) and the other (concepts) as not being affective may get into difficulties reminiscent of the fact-value dualisms. In evaluation in much the same sense as do "concepts" though possibly not with the same consequences in overt behavior. As noted above one might ask if the concept "attitude" can simply be replaced by "concept." Such a question cannot be undertaken at this point or in this work, but provides another juncture at which the degree to which the SJI does not of necessity use the concept "attitude" may become significant.

\textsuperscript{17} The degree to which concept formation studies and attitude formation studies parallel each other would be worthy of research. The same would be true of attitude and concept change.

Another area where the two overlap might be seen in the area of self, where attitudes toward self are equated with self-concept. O. J. Harvey, D. E. Hunt, and H. M. Schroder, 1961, cites concept of self as "... network of subject object relationships. ..." This translates into attitudes toward objects. Again this does not mean that these objects are equally ranged around a concept of self. The "psychological distance" involved may range widely. O. J. Harvey, David E. Hunt, and Harold M. Schroder, Conceptual Systems and Personality Organization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961), p. 63.

so doing it has become apparent that another concept utilized is that of categorization. A discussion of its relationship to the conceptualizations of man as a social animal follows.

The topic of the above discussion and the following one on categorization is the way(s) in which persons "cut up," "divide," "classify," or "pigeon hole" their environment. L. Berkowitz, 1960, defines category as "... a set of specifications regarding what (stimuli) will be grouped together as equivalent." Note that this would continue to reinforce the argument which states that "concept" and category are very close to being synonymous.

Categorizing

Viewing the internal processes of psychological functioning as one of concept formation and functioning or categorizing may have some advantages related to the avoidance of some of the traditional dilemmas into which other conceptualizations of these processes have fallen. For example, M. Sherif in O. Klineberg and R. Christie, 1965, notes that categorization is a concept which lends itself to by-passing the question as to whether responses are either "rational" or "irrational."  


19Muzafar Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, "Research on Intergroup Relations," in Otto Klineberg and Richard Christie (eds.), Perspectives in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 172. The possibility of not having to make these dualistic types of categories which become difficult to operationalize are not the focus of this work but have been briefly noted elsewhere.
Categories include many relating to group and organizational memberships (shared norms) and can only be given full significance through recognizing this aspect of them. Such categories are not idiosyncratic individualistic categories but are ones which become shared through interaction with other group and organizational members and are categorized differentially as a result of being a part of shared group norms.

The above reveals the importance of the categorization process to sociology. Aaron V. Cicourel, 1964, displays it when he cites Schutz' insistence that the study of categories used by persons be of first importance to sociology. An example of the use of the concept "category" by sociologists is seen when L. A. Coser, 1965, cites poverty as a social category arrived at through social definition. An example of allowing a group to set up categories which it then uses is J. L. Rinn, 1966.

The dimensioning of a variety of different forms of patterning of responses to categorizing tasks has given rise to several dimensions which have the appearance of becoming increasingly crucial in understanding the complexity of such processes as they involve either


physical or social judgment. These will be only briefly indicated below and their significances and difficulties only alluded to in order to indicate such complexity. Each of the below are in need of much more research at the present time in order to establish the parameters under which the generalizations being developed can avoid confounding and establish validity.  

Such investigation and elaboration of research findings have not been a focus of this presentation more than to indicate their existence and indicate very briefly their significance to an understanding of the complexity of the categorization-judgment process in order to place the SJI in perspective. The dimensions noted below may be made clearer in the explication of the Social Judgment Involvement Approach in Chapter III.

The number of categories into which judges categorize phenomena may have some very important relationships with the degree of involvement which the judge has in the issue on which he is making judgments. If this is true it may be extremely useful in dimensioning group membership involvement. For example, the very highly involved group member may have only a two category system, e.g., "ingroup-outgroup," while the lesser involved have a large number of categories.  

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23 The continuing attempts to provide stimulus conditions which provide opportunities for variations and dimensions of categorization to be evidenced in behaviors has been a major thrust of scaling controversy in recent years. S. B. Sells (ed.), Stimulus Determinants of Behavior (New York: Ronald Press, 1963).

Category width (or breadth) as a dimension provides some of the more lively controversy over the relative impact of judges' attitudes on the placement of items.25

The number, width and other dimensions of the categorization process must be viewed as a gestalt. One of the ways in which such patterning is being conceptualized is in terms of the reference scale anchoring process including latitudes of acceptance, noncommitment, and rejection as processes of categorization relating to assessment of stands on issues and involvement in those issues. These are aspects of a process by which differential response effects (differential behaviors in sorting-categorizing) are produced systematically and are correlated with other behaviors we usually call "being involved" with an issue, topic, group, etc.26

In order to find any systematic relationship between categorization and involvement it is necessary to recognize there may be a


The processes involved in the evolving solutions to these problems may be seen in the work of S. Fillenbaum, 1959, who utilized the "Own Category" without considering degrees of involvement, concluding that the process of categorization must be much more complex than he had anticipated. Such groping is indicated throughout the literature in this work, especially that reported in Chapter III. Samuel Fillenbaum, "Some Stylistic Aspects of Categorizing Behavior," Journal of Personality, XXVII (1959), pp. 187-195.
pro-neutral-con scale dimension to judgmental processes (behaviors). Such a scaling dimension is not coincident with all attraction-repulsion (approach-avoidance) behaviors by virtue of the possibility that these behaviors may occur in order to attack or obtain more information rather than assist and support.

The gestalt or contextual aspect of categorization must recognize behavior takes place in contexts in which comparisons are made as they are assumed to be in the same domain, and are assumed to be relevant. It is becoming increasingly recognized that persons do not respond to an object itself but in terms of other related external and internal variables which may be recognized as reference scales.27

Reference scales may be broken down into latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment by the Sherifs and other SJI writers. They are indicative of a class of stimuli designated as "internal variables," i.e. derived from differentiations in behaviors which cannot be explained except by psychological functioning which must occur within the body. The concepts external and internal as well as reference scales will be discussed more fully below.

Location of anchors within the latitudes noted above is another variable which has been considered as influencing response behavior especially the number of categories at various distances from them.  

End or extreme categories have received much attention also. Much of the work of H. S. Upshaw revolves around the significance of such categories. The degree to which extremes also are accompanied by involvement is an important point in the differentiations between the SJI and some of the other conceptual frameworks.

The domain (continuum, scale) used as part of the context may be another differentiating factor. It will be seen below in Chapter III to also be manipulated by experimental design. 

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The range of the stands on an issue which are an aspect in categorizing any particular stand is another dimension in categorizing which will be taken up in Chapter III. 31

Yet another aspect of categorizing is the degree of structure present in external stimulus conditions. This is important to the Own Category Procedure, as it allows the judge to choose his own number of categories. 32 A specific example is the range of structure involved in sorting statements from the highly structured Q sort (forcing judges to use a certain number of categories and place a certain number in each category) to the Own Category Procedure specifying neither number in each category nor number of categories.

Imperativeness (compellingness) may be yet another dimension of categorizing, but is more likely a close synonym for involving.

A specificity-generality dimension is noted by R. M. Helson and H. Cover, 1956. 33


Summarizing dimensions of categorization, there was noted above that a variety of them were viewed as external stimulus categories or as response categories. Those discussed above have been only briefly indicated as being selected dimensions which are currently being explored as possible ones on which to build a theoretical conceptual framework. These are in the process of being investigated by a considerable amount of research, some of which will be indicated in Chapter III.

The dimensional concepts related to categorization included its group membership, gestalt aspects, involvement, reference scales with their domains, anchor locations, numbers of categories, category width, latitudes of acceptance, rejection, noncommitment, range, and degree of structure. Such dimensions were noted as having in most instances large aspects which were representative of group and organizational norms.

No attempt has been made to summarize the literature nor does the above in any way exhaust alternative dimensions for categorizations. The above has been aimed at showing the large degree to which categorization and judgment may parallel each other in many dimensions. This will become more obvious in Chapters III and IV. The complexities of the interactions of these dimensions will become apparent as will also the whole categorization-judgment-conceptual functioning process. At the same time such complexity will become evident it is hoped that there be found a patterning in such complexity which will allow an increased understanding and development of generalizations regarding categorizing-judgment.
Elaboration of the discussion of categorization must involve noting the variety of synonyms for it. Examples for illustrative purposes might be judgment, meaning, judgmental language, coding, scaling, discriminating, differentiating, structuring, domain setting, sorting, classifying, etc. Some of the above (e.g., discriminating) are also dimensions of categorization.

Judgment as a synonym for categorization is most closely related to the Social Judgment Involvement Approach–Own Category Procedure which is the focus of this study. Certain basic concepts often associated with categorization and also found in the SJI have been outlined above with very brief references to some of the literature and the significances of them. The main detailed explanation of them will be found in Chapter III on the SJI itself. 34

Scaling itself may be viewed as a synonym for categorization. 35

34 A major significance of the parallel between judgment and categorization may be the degree of differentiation between psychophysical and psychosocial judgmental processes. While the Sheriffs are wishing to establish strong parallels between the two they are not wishing to establish their identity at lower levels of abstraction. The two may be differentiated by degrees of involvement and structure. However the similarities and differences between them are controversial, e.g. Sidney I. Perloe, 1963. While such differences and parallels are most important to the amounts of generality which might be derived from the findings in the areas here dealt with, they cannot be the focus of this work. Muzafer Sherif, and Carolyn W. Sherif, Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969); Muzafer Sherif, and Carl I. Hovland, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Sidney I. Perloe, "The Relation Between Category-Rating and Magnitude-Estimation Judgments of Occupational Prestige," American Journal of Psychology, LXXVI (1963), pp. 395-403; Frank A. Restle, Psychology of Judgment and Choice (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961), p. 207.

35 The scaling literature contains a differentiation between category and magnitude scaling. The latter is chiefly significant to the
The imputation of meaning may be viewed as a categorizing process. The categorizing process as viewed by A. R. Glixman, 1965, has an aspect which he calls the "meaning domain" which includes the concept that the categories have common (parallel) meanings.

There is also literature which discusses categorizing in terms of its being a "language" process or "judgmental language."

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36 For example, see Frederick D. Sheffield, "The Role of Meaningfulness of Stimulus and Response in Verbal Learning," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, New Haven, Conn: 1964).


The process of coding may also be a synonym for categorization. Another not widely used is the making of "distinctions."^39

The synonyms for categorization noted above are not intended to be exhaustive. Those listed are not treated extensively and are only indicative of the degree to which there is a common process involved. Those noted are judgment, scaling, meaning, language, judgmental language, coding distinctions, displacements, and differences. It may be significant that "conceptual functioning" and concept formation have been omitted. They have been omitted at this point because they do not have as clear external behavioral operational references as do the above.

The variety of types of phenomena which are categorized is bounded only by human experience and the language itself. These might range from broad abstract types such as qualitative-quantitative to much more specific phenomena such as characteristics of persons.^40

Control of the basis for the categorization, the domain (scale, criterion, etc.) used by judges in categorization has been found to be

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extremely difficult to maintain. The Sheriffs note the possibility that in judging statements as true or false the judges are likely to switch to judgments of agree-disagree with neither judge nor experimenter realizing it. 41

It will be seen to be important to the Own Category Procedure that such dimensions as "evaluation" entering into judgments of "truth" provides the opportunity for the "disguised" response effects which are a part of the Own Category Procedure.

The comparisons of results obtained through explicitly studying categorizing behavior with those of more traditional scales such as the authoritarianism and dogmatism scales are exemplified by such as White, Alter, and Rardin, 1965. 42 Another example of comparison is that of Sidney I. Perlooe, 1963, noted above, comparing category-rating and other types of judgment with magnitude estimation. 43 The advantages

41 C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, raises the point that judges may not be able to avoid such shifts, i.e., be unable to avoid using evaluative categories such as favorable-unfavorable even though he is instructed to judge the statements on the basis of their accuracy (true-false). Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafar Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), p. 103. See also George A. Woodward, "Dimensions of Judgment and Characteristics of Displaceable Statements in the Disguised Structured Instrument for the Assessment of Attitudes Toward the Poor," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1967).


found through such comparisons, to a limited extent, will be noted below, particularly as comparisons with the Own Category Procedure.

From the above it might be noted that categorization may be either a noun or a verb. As a verb it refers to an activity which results in the noun. It is also apparent that as a noun categories may be either external to the person or they may be internal. External categories are manipulated by those developing experimental designs, though it must be recognized such categories may not be used by judges in responses. By varying external categories in ways which relate to group membership it may be possible to observe differential categorization attributable to such group membership. For example, time categories (hours and minutes) were used to estimate duration of the "tug of war" in the Robbers Cave Experiment.

In the above section on categorization of Chapter II, it has been shown that there are a variety of ways in which categorization has dimensions and synonyms which will be seen to be consistent with and parallel to that of judgment and conceptual functioning. This will become more evident as judgment is taken up in Chapter III. It is apparent that the literature surveyed on categorizing is developing and making use of such concepts as reference scales, latitudes, anchors, domains, etc., as will be found in the judgment literature. It was noted that some evidence points in the direction that categorization

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cannot avoid having evaluation and involvement dimensions. An important aspect of the discussion of categorization is the degree to which it provides a link between the psychophysical and psychosocial judgment literature, i.e., it being common to both. At several junctures it was apparent that group memberships were considered as variables in categorization. It was also noted that categorization may be considered as either a noun or a verb as well as being not so prone to falling into dualistic bifurcations, as the concepts to follow in this chapter.

The above section on categorization attempted to demonstrate the parallel continuity of the concept "categorization" with conceptual functioning and judgment; but the following sections of this chapter will include other selected concepts in the literature which provide a very different result. The concepts "verbal behavior," "cognitive-affective," and "experience-behavior" become examples of concepts which possibly are more confounding than they are useful.

It may be interesting to note that of the concepts treated below "discrimination" is being confounded by the man in the street while "attitude" and "verbal behavior" may be confounded by research finding dimensions which "cut across" them. The latter may also be true of "experience-behavior" and "cognitive-affective." It may be the case that these two have been in the past more clearly dualistic than those noted above. On such grounds one might expect there to be more difficulty in "cleansing" them of such stigma, therein paralleling the problem with discrimination and its stereotyped meaning noted below. For the above reasons these below are possibly being less used in certain segments of the new literature (such as the SJI) attempting to explain
the social psychological functioning of persons. If experience-behavior and cognitive-affective are not dropped it is apparent their meaning is being changed from mutually exclusive "factors" or components to dimensions not mutually exclusive. They will be noted as not playing crucial roles in the conceptual framework developing by SJI writers.

Discrimination

The concept "discrimination" differs from attitude and verbal behavior in one major dimension, its being judged negatively. It also differs from categorization or judgment in this respect. To many persons it is an activity which should be ceased. It may also be important in the degree to which it may carry with it the chance of perpetuating the conception that it is possible to separate categorizing (judgment which is in terms of comparisons of more-less on any domain or scale) from those which do not make any comparisons, i.e. being only "facts" (non-evaluative). The degree to which discrimination remains a viable concept may be a debatable one which becomes even more complex and confounding as research continues, but can be only lightly explored below.

It is possible that discrimination be viewed as a subdimension or type of categorization, e.g., that it is a necessary prerequisite as a part of the categorization process denoting ability to see and act upon

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Here the fact-value dualistic issue is once again raised. Conceptualizations of discrimination which are differentiated from "categorization" must avoid such imputation of meaning. See below footnote for elaboration. Also see other references throughout this work to dualistic implications of several concepts.
differences in stimuli. To discriminate between stimuli is to be able
to see differences between them. Categorization involves possibly the
larger activity of including responses to that process and equated
with judgment. 46

A number of writers draw a distinction between discrimination and
differentiation. H. Miller and J. Bieri, 1963, is one such example. 47
Discrimination being "... the extent to which a judge can discrimi-
nate within a given stimulus dimension; ... differentiation, the
extent to which a judge can invoke orthogonal dimensions." 48

Following from the above it would appear that discrimination has
been widely used to indicate one aspect being judged more or less than

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The issue above relates to the whole problem of "just noticeable
differences" (JND) which is the center of so much work in psycho-
physics. A big issue as to whether or not the social and psycho-
physical JND's function in the same way is present. For example,
H. Miller and J. Bieri, 1965, found that social stimuli were discrimi-
nated less well than physical stimuli. There is the very strong
probability that the explanation for such findings lies in different-
ial involvement or location on the judges' reference scale rather
than the social-physical differentiation. This point will be elabo-
rated upon in connection with the discussion of judgment in Chapter
III. Henry Miller and James Bieri, "End Anchor Effects in the Dis-
criminability of Physical and Social Phenomena," Psychonomic Science,

47 Henry Miller and James Bieri, "An Informational Analysis of
Clinical Judgment," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXVII

48 Such a distinction may be one paralleling the quantitative-
qualitative one and is probably subject to the same criticisms and
comments if taken dualistically. See comments elsewhere in this work.
the other, for example see anti-semitism scaling. Such a
superordination-subordination (more-less) aspect of the concept of
discrimination follows from the above reference to its being a judg-
ment within one continuum (domain). It may lead to assumptions of
superiority in domains which have no relevancy to the context in which
discrimination occurred.

Discrimination parallels categorization and judgment in having
been considered as having both absolute and relative aspects.

49 For example, Leonard Berkowitz, "Anti-Semitism, Judgmental
Processes, and Displacement of Hostility," Journal of Abnormal and

50 Whether or not discrimination is a basic aspect of conceptual
functioning is an important question which goes beyond what is possible
here; however, there are a range of issues which cannot be gone into
more than to simply indicate their importance and complexity.

Such a characteristic as discrimination involving super-subordi-
nation (more vs. less) on a continuum (domain) is related to discrimi-
nation being viewed as "bad" in certain instances and as "avoidable"
in others. The former stems from assumptions of superiority in domains
which may have no relevancy to the problems faced by different persons,
hence leading to inappropriate discriminations. An example is dis-
rimination which perpetuates social distinctions believed no longer
tenable by some persons. George Eaton Simpson and J. Milton Yinger,
Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimi-

The assumption that discrimination is avoidable might lead one
into the issue as to whether categorizations can avoid such super-
subordination (more-less) on any and all domains (noted above) and thus
allow the fact-value dualistic difficulties and dilemmas to re-emerge.

51 See judgment below for further discussion as to the referent of
"absolute" and "relative." It is of significance to sociologists that
"relational qualities" have been shown by some experimenters to be more
easily remembered. Max Wertheimer, "On Discrimination Experiments:
I. Two Logical Structures," Psychological Review, LXVI (1959), pp. 252-
266; cited by Eva Dreikers Ferguson, "Ego-Involvement: A Critical
Examination of Some Methodological Issues," Journal of Abnormal and
Concern here is with the prospects of whether such a process of "discrimination" correlates with other psychological functioning processes which might be relevant to behavior of individuals in social situations such as groups, e.g. situations of conflict or strong involvement such as might be the case in group membership.

The circumstances under which discrimination is increased or decreased are not clear. Involvement which is central to the SJI is an example of the differences involved in the area. Others which are possibly of lesser importance are such as location of the stimulus with reference to the judge's own anchors in his reference scale, end (or other) anchors of the scale, direction of the stimulus (positive or negative), amounts of knowledge about the domain involved (degree of structure), etc.

Principally because of the above differentials it is impossible to state clearly whether discrimination will vary directly or inversely with involvement in any one of the above contexts taken alone. 52

Elaboration on the variables involved in differentials in discrimination parallel those used in discussing the SJI. The reader is

referred to Chapter III for descriptions of the complexities of variables entering into discrimination in SJI terms. 53

Summarizing the discussion of discrimination requires stressing the necessity that discrimination not be taken in the negative sense and that its implication of evaluation on the basis of more or less in some dimension or domain not be utilized to set up dualistic formulations having some categorizations (judgments) as discrimination, and therefore evaluations, while other categorizations are assumed to be devoid of such discrimination. Evidence is apparently indicating that degrees of discrimination are not to be correlated simply with any of a variety of other dimensions of judgment such as involvement, knowledge, cognitive, affective, references scales involving own anchors (including attitudes), and events in the judges' environment. Earlier assumptions that knowledge and positive evaluation lead to increased or decreased discrimination are being confounded. The implications of such confounding for understanding of persons' involvement

in groups and persons' judgment involving discrimination of others within his group and towards outgroup members were only alluded to but not taken up. These remain to be made more explicit as inquiry in this work continues to narrow down on less abstract concepts leading up to analysis of the SJI and Own Category Procedure themselves.

The following sections will take up "verbal behavior" which represents a more concrete problem in conceptualization than discrimination. This will be followed by attempts to explore selected conceptual problems relating to the concepts of "behavior-experience" and differentiations between "cognitive-affective" as these are found in selected literature related to the SJI.

Verbal Behavior

One of the difficulties encountered in looking at psychological functioning as it related to developing conceptual frameworks by which we may look at and dimension social phenomena lies in the tendency to see some behavior as more indicative of internal variables (attitudes, values, beliefs, etc.) than other behavior. This may be seen in discussions of "verbal" and "attitudinal" behavior as differentiated from other behaviors. It is demonstrated in the common bifurcation between "saying" and "doing" as being completely different activities insofar as they are thought to have different antecedents, mental and physical, respectively. This results in a number of current writers encountering difficulty in their attempts to differentiate and dimension conceptual functioning as a variable in human behavior.

The problem may be reflected in the literature on verbal attitudes, where it may be assumed that either verbal attitudes differ
from other attitudes or that other than verbal behaviors do not
evidence the same kinds of attitudes. In some cases these are recog-
nized for what they are, two different behaviors (e.g. hand behavior-
mouth behavior or doing-saying), but such differences may have no more
differentiated attitudes involved than two "saying" activities or two
"doing" activities. In other instances it may appear that the writer
assumes that verbalizations involve more conceptual functioning than
does other behavior. Yet another example is the "thinking vs. action"
dualism. The dualism is exampled in the current "militants" pleas
for less talking and more action. M. L. DeFleur and F. R. Westie,
while not necessarily falling into the above difficulties, are repre-
sentative of the research problems in this area.

Difficulties arise when it is assumed one activity is more repre-
sentative of attitudes or conceptual functioning than another, when it
is assumed one represents the "real feelings," "real personality,"
etc., more than another, when it is assumed "just thinking" is not an
activity.

While not the focus of this work the SJI avoids such problems as
trying to relate two differentiated types of behavior by taking the
position that both verbal behavior and other behaviors are the results
of a conceptual functioning animal.

Other manifestations of this problem are a wide range of situa-
tions where behavior is assumed to be inconsistent with the internal

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54 Melvin L. DeFleur, and Frank R. Westie, "Verbal Attitudes and
Overt Acts: An Experiment on the Salience of Attitudes," The American
variables which are assumed to accompany them, e.g. some behaviors representing the person's "real attitudes" more than others: private vs. public, pen and pencil vs. social situations, saying (private) vs. doing (public). 55

The relationship between attitude and behavior (which will be more elaborated on elsewhere) is not one where some behaviors reveal more real or personal attitudes than others. All behaviors indicate attitudes, though they may be different. "Public" attitudes are just as much a part of a person's attitudes as are his "private" ones. The problem in predicting future behavior from current behavior is ascertaining parallel attitudes functioning in both cases. The fallacy of many scaling instruments lies in the judge's responding in a context which does not include social variables that will be present in future behaviors. 56

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A related problem which cannot be discussed at this point is the degree to which concerns with loss of self, identity, or such as
The problem of "inconsistency" between attitude and behavior, between what a person "says" and what he "does," is not a case of "inconsistency" between attitudes and behavior but an error on the part of the observer who assumes that the same attitudes will be functioning at some other time. R. T. LaPiere is a classic example. Both behaviors and attitudes involved become perfectly consistent when it is recognized that individual behaviors are functions of context and the judges' categorization of that context. The judges' categorization of the context is of course a part of the context and includes the full range of group membership norms brought into play by the context. This is especially true if the judge for any of a variety of reasons is lead to recognize openly that his own attitudes or the attitudes of those important to him are being recorded. These are further examples of how the variables involved in behaviors may make extrapolation from such behaviors into the future extremely difficult.

Individualism may be related to equating self with "private self" rather than "social self." Persons may see life in modern society becoming more "public" thereby forcing losses of private self. The accuracies of these assumptions are important but not germane to our main thrust. Any consideration along this line would need to establish the degree to which present man is in fact more "social" when compared with the degree to which he was "locked into" social units such as family and tribe. Arguments may go in either direction but the concept of self includes both public and private aspects. Muzafer Sherif, and Carolyn W. Sherif, Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

and provide additional evidence for the assumptions that there are not
inconsistencies between attitude and behavior when all attitudes are
considered. 58

Going to other concepts we find discrimination may be more
closely related to behaviors designated as having cognitive rather
than affective aspects of psychological functioning.

58 Milton Rokeach, 1968a, also Milton Rokeach, 1968b.

The above will be seen below to constitute the basis for using
"disguised" or "projective" tests including situations as the auto-
kinetic studies where the judge is not able to recognize the scope of
the dimensions of his behavior which are being tapped. Such instruments
are not necessarily registering "public" vs. "private" dimensions of
self, the main point of the autokinetic studies being the development
of social norms which "cut across" both in the sense that "public" be­
comes "private," i.e., a part of what happens is that the individual
internalizes reference scales which represent "group norms." M. Sherif,
and C. W. Sherif, 1969, and M. Sherif, 1936. It will be seen that the
"disguised" aspect of the Own Category Procedure may be one of its
advantages.

There are large amounts of social psychological research based
on studying the relationship between inconsistent overt behavior and
attitudes assumed to be functioning in the behavior, e.g. cognitive
dissonance research following L. Festinger, 1957. Such research has
recently begun to incorporate many of the variables defined as "social"
above and indicated as involvement in Chapters III and IV below. For
example, A. R. Cohen, 1964. Such changes are extremely important
because of the volume of research done on cognitive dissonance. These
again are not the focus of this work. Milton Rokeach, "The Nature of
Attitudes," in David B. Sells (ed.), International Encyclopedia of
Rokeach, "A Theory of Organization and Change Within Value Attitude
Systems," Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (1, 1968b), pp. 13-33; Muzafar
Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, Social Psychology (New York: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1969); Muzafar Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms,
Harper and Brothers (1936), Harper Torchbook edition, (1966), "Introduc-
tion by Muzafar Sherif," pp. vii-xx; Leon Festinger, The Theory of
Cognitive Dissonance (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1957);
Arthur R. Cohen, Attitude Change and Social Influence (New York: Basic
For example, A. L. Atkins, 1966, sees the need to relate both discriminatory properties of the judge's cognitive system and his affective involvement. 59

A good example of the way(s) in which discrimination is related to categorization and judgment is illustrated in its interchangeability with them. 60

Sociologists may be more prone to see this difficulty and avoid it. For example, H. Blumer, 1958, is cited by J. M. Fendrich, 1967, as taking the position that inconsistency between verbal attitude and overt behavior lies in the situation only. 61 This would be a most important point if true but cannot be pursued further in this work except insofar as the lack of use of the Own Category Procedure may be evidence in the negative direction, as discussed in Chapter V below. 62

59 Alvin L. Atkins, "Own Attitude and Discriminability in Relation to Anchoring Effects in Judgment," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, IV (5, 1966), pp. 497-507. Dualistic aspects might appear in such attempts to label discrimination either cognitive or affective if they are themselves viewed dualistically. See following discussion.

60 For example, the Q sort literature as exampled in N. H. Livson and T. F. Nichols, 1956, is able to shift from one to the other without changing their concern with the "shape and number" of the response effects which ensue from the Q sort. N. H. Livson and T. F. Nichols, "Discrimination and Reliability in Q Sort Personality Descriptions," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LII (1956), pp. 159-165.


62 A number of authors have suggested the usual testing situation has unique characteristics which influence respondents' role-playing. H. Hyman, 1959, is cited by J. M. Fendrich, 1967, p. 348, as stating the inconsistency between verbal attitudes and overt behavior results
Another manner in which the above difficulties have been evidenced is differentiating between overt behavior and verbal behavior. Examples of writers which get into the above difficulties in varying degrees are such as J. E. Spradlin, and S. Rosenberg, 1964; L. S. Linn, 1965; M. Malof, and A. Lott, 1962; and B. Kutner, C. Wilkins, and P. Yarrow, 1952.

The history of concern with the relationship between verbal and overt behavior goes back at least to R. Bain, 1930, cited by S. M. Cory, 1937, as recognizing that while evidence for some correspondence between the two in most cases was high it had to be validated.

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Summarizing "inconsistency between attitudes and behavior" it is of course possible for the attitudes (or behaviors) at one period of time to be inconsistent with the attitudes at another period of time, or with attitudes other than those which are functioning in the behavior at a given time; but it is inappropriate to speak of the attitudes functioning in behaviors at any given period of time as being inconsistent with that behavior. Not to recognize this is to make possible the overlooking of attitudes which are consistent with the behavior under observation and thereby confound the understanding of the behavior itself. For example, a wide range of the literature for many years did not recognize the importance of the attitudes of the respondent toward the experimenter, science, universities, reference groups, and other aspects of the context. Without considering such differentials, attitudes may very well appear to be "inconsistent" with behavior under different contexts and with the attitudes that are assumed to be involved.

Verbal behavior is presented as another example of confusion in the literature in its attempts to relate internal variables with observable behavior. Verbal behavior may be construed to constitute a different category of behavior on grounds that it is more representative of attitudes (verbal attitudes) than other behaviors (or vice versa), or that one represents a person's real attitudes more than another, or that a person's behavior may be inconsistent with his attitudes relating to that behavior.

Such confusions were shown possibly to be resolved by considering all behavior to be attitudinal, it being a question of obtaining the appropriate attitudes functioning in the behaviors under consideration.
These and related problems are not the focus of this work. They are presented to example very briefly the assumptions which might cause difficulties, assumptions which the SJI discussed in Chapters III and IV does not make regarding verbal behavior being in any way differentiated from other behavior insofar as one involves more conceptual functioning, more the "real self," more attitudinal, or more inconsistent with attitudes involved in the behavior.

Experience-Behavior

A confounding pair of concepts which are relevant to the area here under consideration and also possibly not necessarily utilized in the Social Judgment Involvement Approach are those of "experience" and "behavior."65

It will be seen in the following that there is not only the problem of the relationship between the two (experience and behavior), but also whether a variety of synonyms such as attitude or activity (noted above) are useful in conceptualizing what is often thought to be a very important relationship between the two (experience and behavior).

Experience as well as behavior are concepts which have been used widely in the social-behavioral sciences and have been widely defined and used in relationship to each other. The underlined become important in view of the concept which the SJI develops that that these are a unity, there being no inconsistency between experience (perceiving,

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remembering, etc.), and behavior. In this sense the experience-behavior problem has many of the same aspects as the verbal and attitude behavior difficulty noted above.

A principle issue (but not a topic of inquiry here) is the degree to which writers differentiate between the two (experience-behavior) and within that issue is the degree to which they stress such differentiations as posing inconsistencies. An example of the stress or importance of experience as differentiated from behavior is H. S. Sullivan, 1949, where he sees it as a crucial aspect of any discussion of personality, e.g., the experiencing of tensions and energy transformations. Another example of considering experience combined with other variables (including attitude and judgment) in behavior is M. Segall, 1959. Yet another example may be indicated by the title of O. J. Harvey, 1966.

Not the least of the difficulties involved in the use of experience as a differentiated variable in behavior is the possibility


of it thereby committing one to either a behavioristic or cognitive theoretical framework.

70 See M. Sherif, and C. W. Sherif, 1967, p. 113 quote in this section regarding their framework being neither cognitive nor behavioristic alone.

The concept experience quickly gets one into some of the knottiest difficulties between the behaviorists and others such as the cognitive theorists. These are too far afield to delve into except to point out that the alternatives usually raised in these issues may not be exhaustive of those available if the human individual is considered as a functioning organism having the ability to engage in conceptual functioning. Thus writers such as the Sherifs have the best of both worlds by insisting that while there are internal psychological processes occurring which are not simply additive of the stimuli that are received by the organism also state that the only way such processes can be inferred is from behavior. Brewster Smith, 1965, p. 172, in his review of D. T. Campbell in Koch, 1963, notes that Sherif's contribution to this volume as well as that of Campbell are in the vein of the cognitive theorist yet combine aspects of the behaviorist, thereby forging new frameworks which are neither.

It is important to Sherif that a differentiation be made between experience as internal variables and experience as the processes by which the organism functions in an environment, i.e. "experiences" his environment. See M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1969, p. 35ff. The latter cannot be disassociated from the organism behaving at any point in time. The degree to which internal to the skin psychological functioning might also be viewed as behavior of course further complicates the conceptual differentiation but on a physiological level.

If experience is conceptualized as different from behavior then it becomes possible to consider such variables as antecedent to behavior and therefore consistent or inconsistent with it. It also confounds it with all other internal variables such as ulcers and heartburn. Such a concept then makes it possible to ask what the relationship between experience and behavior is. While such may be in some cases useful it becomes difficult when it is further stated that the psychological processes of experiencing (remembering, perceiving, learning, knowing, etc.) functioning at the time of behavior may be contrary to behavior. It is thereby possible to conceptualize the setting up of cognitive dissonance which becomes a variable in future behaviors, L. Festinger, 1957.

The indiscriminate use of concept experience to cover a wide variety of perceptual phenomena by many psychologists was noted by H. Nelson, 1967, p. 334. In many cases he says experience is not a factor at all.

Behavior also may have a number of different uses-types. Examples are perceptual, conceptual, social, overt, sanctioning.

Such categories of behavior as "perceptual" may encounter the same difficulties as discussed above in "verbal" behavior, i.e. what are the differentiating criterion used to separate "perceptual" from other behavior? In the case of verbal behavior it was noted that the difficulty lay in not being able to say that verbal was more indicative of conceptual functioning or attitudes than other forms of behavior. A parallel case may accompany "perceptual" insofar as all behavior may be "perceptual."  

[Note 71: For example, R. W. Gardner, 1959, is considering "perceptual behavior" as a category of behavior by which he wishes to indicate some behaviors designated by certain stimulus conditions as the focus of his study. Other stimulus conditions than the ones he is studying might also be called "perceptual" by others. One might ask what behavior is not "perceptual"? In the same sense a person might ask what behavior is not "verbal" or "attitudinal"? See for parallel discussion W. L. Hartley, 1967. Is not all behavior perceptual in terms of it being a perceiving organism functioning? Is not all behavior verbal in the sense of it being a conceptual functioning organism which is functioning? Is behavior ever not a function (in some sense) of perception and verbal processes? These are questions beyond the scope of this work.

The number of synonyms for behavior which occur in the literature is another conceptual problem which is confounding. For example, one of the chief synonyms for behavior is performance, action is another, even experience (noted above) might be used.

The degree to which the concepts are interchangeable might be an interesting exercise. For example, D. S. Holmes, 1967, "Amount of experience (behavior) (action) (performance) as a determinant of performance in later experiments."72

but are relevant to some of the ways in which these concepts have been used.

Other categories of behavior which may get into similar situations are such as human conceptual behavior (L. E. Bourne, 1966), and sanctioning behavior (M. E. Shaw, 1967).

Such issues are not the focus of this work but once again it may be noted that "perception" per se is not a concept which is basic to the SJI. We refer again to the basic statement by the Sherifs regarding many of these differentiations merely being differences in stimulus conditions and the recording of differential responses rather than differences in aspects of psychological functioning processes such as perception and verbalizing.


72 Other examples are such as D. W. Tuckman, 1967, "Group composition and group performance (experience) (action) (behavior) of structured tasks."

It is interesting to note in this regard that "performance" as a basis for measuring "attitude," etc. might imply that there are other
A related problem in the conceptualization of behavior is the way it has been related to internal variables involved in conceptual functioning, e.g., attitudes, self-perceptions, beliefs, motivation, skill, involvement, etc.

See a variety of other points in this work discussing attitude, for example early in Chapter II, as well as Chapter III on judgment. Specific conceptual problems are raised by such as S. Moscovici, 1963, as to whether behavior causes attitude change or vice versa. D. J. Bem, 1967, is another author apparently dealing with the same issue. L. Festinger, 1957, and elsewhere maintains that behavior contrary to one's attitudes may cause cognitive dissonance and result in attitude ways of measuring attitude than performance (behavior) of some kind. See S. W. Cook and C. Selltiz, 1964, where they indicate a variety of stimulus conditions including "performance" as indicating attitudes.

The particular dimensions on which the above might differ in the meanings which are utilized by various writers cannot be a topic of investigation in this work. It is notable that the concept "experience" would appear to have a "feedback" principle into the organism which may not be as clear in other concepts such as "behavior," "performance," or "action." The referents are not as clear as one might expect on first encountering them.


change. The Sherifs, 1969, see the issue as one where the two are an entity and is their reason for combining experience-behavior, it being impossible in their framework for behavior to occur without positive internal variables accompanying it.

One common synonym for behavior, "activity," has an important recent use in the social psychological literature which does not have as its referent any form of behavior, but has its referent statements or other stimuli which refer to activity past, present, or future. This is found in the conceptualization of "activity" as one of the components which C. T. Osgood and others have found in their development of the Semantic Differential techniques.

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76 Note that the attitude-behavior relationship referred to above and elsewhere may be viewed as one of inconsistency which parallels the saying-doing, practicing-preaching types of differentiations discussed above. For example action-belief (L. Guttman, 1959), or action-attitude (D. E. Tarter, 1966). One of the criticisms of Sherif by H. D. Saltzstein, 1966, says they do not articulate adequately "... the connection between the attitudes toward and evaluation of an issue and overt action." It is not clear how they would dimension attitudes in ways other than "overt action."


The referent of "activity" in the above, therefore, is not behavior or action, but the internal variables which produce judgment resulting from judges being presented activity related material (statements which are designed to carry meaning that activity or action is the referent). Such activity meaning stimuli bring into relevancy different internal variables than would for instance "belief" statements. 78

The Semantic Differential (from which "activity" has been found to be an important component) is not usually designed to measure involvement or role in reference groups. L. N. Diab, 1965, has combined it with SJI techniques. 79 The implications of the above while again important are noted by way of reference to an example of the SJI not needing to make this type of differentiation (activity).

There are a variety of terms which may be utilized to describe the functioning of the organism as it moves within its environment. Such conceptualizations are not the clear distinct ones we might expect but their specifications are themselves the products of the frames of reference in which the organisms are viewed. We find such writers as the Sheriffs and also Gardner Murphy raising questions as to the


parameters which are most useful in considering the functioning process of man in process. 80

The conceptions of these are changing. The important point for our inquiry is that these be made consistent with evidence at a group and larger organizational level as well as being kept consistent with the conceptual psychological and physiological functioning.

Summarizing experience-behavior is fairly simple because the discussion has focused on only a few issues: 1) the relationship (unity or possibly inconsistency) and the parallel of this with the relationship between attitude and behavior noted above, 2) a variety of synonyms were noted with the difficulties inherent in some special ones such as activity when used by C. T. Osgood in the Semantic Differential, and 3) noting experience as a "catch all" for many internal variables not otherwise more closely specified.

Cognitive-Affective

Another major focus of conceptual categorization, differentiation, and confounding which may be avoided by the Social Judgment Involvement Approach lies in the concepts cognitive and affective. These are central to much current social psychological writing. 81 For example,


some would argue that such a differentiation between cognitive behavior and affective behavior is the very foundation for any kind of fruitful conceptualization of the psychological functioning of individuals, and that the differentials are crucial to an understanding of the apparently often contradictory behaviors of individuals and reflect a basic dualistic character in man's nature, e.g., Freud.

Others seem to not hold to the crucial nature of the differentiation between cognitive-affective, especially in the extreme "faculty" sense implied above. Some as Sherif see approaches possible which look upon such categories as merely registering different approaches using different stimuli, all behaviors reflecting basic judgmental processes.

... any sharp separation of these (cognitive-motivational-behavioral) is bound to be arbitrary and to distort the nature of the phenomena. ... treatment of these aspects as "components" typically amounts to using samples of behavior in different tasks or situations assigned at different points in time. Although this is legitimate research practice, we should not let our research techniques blind us to the undeniable blending of cognitive-motivational-behavioral in any specific situation or task that arouses an attitude. 82 (Emphasis in text.)

Both cognitive and affective may be so confounded in behavior that it may become increasingly less fruitful to separate them except as responses to differentiated stimuli. For example, J. Doby says "...
all observation involves cognition."  

J. Bieri takes the position that "attitude" provides a point of merger between cognitive and affective, "attitude" being both.  

G. Jaeger and P. Selznick say the same thing citing John Dewey.  

Specific aspects of the cognitive literature have not only been prominent in research but have also come in for most heavy criticism, specifically cognitive dissonance, e.g. L. Festinger, J. W. Brehm and A. R. Cohen.  

A classic discussion pointing to limitations of this framework is N. P. Chapanis and A. Chapanis.  

A. R. Lindesmith and A. L. Strauss comment to the effect that in addition to the criticisms made by Chapanis and Chapanis sociologists must raise additional serious questions.  

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The consequences of such critical writing might be to ask whether the differentiation between knowing and feeling which is basic to the cognitive-affective differentiation is a useful descriptive set of categories by which human behavior can be analyzed. The degree to which the literature dealing with various aspects of differentiating cognitive from affective actually perpetuates the dualistic nature of these as they were found in earlier dualisms [as mind-body, fact-value, etc.] cannot be pursued here. See below footnote regarding J. Dewey and W. R. Hood.\(^89\) Discussions such as Wm. J. McGuire appear to have


In literature critical of the cognitive theorists it appears that no return to instincts, behaviorism, or psychoanalysis is intended. One example of a concern with the balance between the two lies in such a conception perpetuating the conception of "two cultures" etc., e.g. science (cognitive) and the humanities (affective, emotive, valuing processes), and thus perpetuating the connotation that the advance of science is at the expense of those phenomena designated as affective, emotive, valuing. When the latter are designated as "human" it may place science as being anti-human.

To be able to verbalize the two in this manner may represent a step forward but does not represent solutions to the problem unless the dualistic source of such a differentiation in the first place is recognized. It is one thing (a step forward) to recognize and verbalize the difference between science and witchcraft; it is quite another to state
moved away from the old faculty psychology to consideration of cognitive as paralleling the process of conceptualization, categorization, or judgment.  

The issue at hand is the degree to which the concept of cognition may produce frameworks which continue to cause problems in operationally specifying the variables which are functioning in any given

that there must be a "balance" between the two once the two are "discovered." The issue is further confounded by the possibility that both have positive aspects with regard to the ongoing life process of man and hence the discovery on these grounds may be less than useless.

Involved of course is the critical inquiry into the assumptions lying behind the original concepts and asking if there are alternative ways in which the categorizations can be made which do not force one into a decision between science and those things which are human. Of course what is involved are the concepts of science and of human.


We reiterate these are important points but beyond the scope of this work. The SJI may provide a "way out" which avoids getting into such dilemmas in the first place, this being the rationale for their notation here.

This point has been made numerous other places in this work.

The degree to which the line of argument and research findings confounding affective-cognitive supports classic writers as J. Dewey is most intriguing. The research findings being reported do not make this connection as a general rule and its significance if true brings together a line of philosophy and current research which may clarify both theoretical and research methodology in manners which appear to be only speculative at this time. The work of W. R. Hood is a most explicit example of this possibility. William R. Hood, "Rigidity of Concept Utilization as a Function of Inductive and Deductive Derivation," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1961).

It will be impossible to trace any of the implications in any detail. The various facets of the complex psychological and philosophical issues involved may be apparent. We can only in broadest strokes etch out the issues involved and leave details for possible consequent elaboration.

situating. The principle offender in such problems appears to be the way(s) in which cognition may be conceived as inconsistent with (opposed to) other concepts such as affective.

A major specific problem inherent in categorizing behavior as either cognitive or affective lies in it thereby becoming difficult to communicate that all behavior is both cognitive and affective and they may not be mutually exclusive. Neither cognitive nor affective can be viewed as the central phenomena in the S-O-R formula. Usually included in affective are a wide range of conceptual constructs such as motives, emotions, physiological and evaluative processes. Attitudes have been also included though increasingly they are seen as being "composed" of both cognitive and affective.91

Another major related problem lies in the manners in which experimental designs attempting to establish the relationships and priorities of cognitive and affective components continue to have difficulty in specification of the two as separate and distinct components.92 It largely being a case of whether the experimenter or judge wishes to


categorize the stimulus and therefore the responses which ensues as being one or the other. 93

For example, one manner in which components are dimensioned is by statements which are assumed to be differentiated on the basis of having one (or more) of the components (cognitive-affective-behavioral) involved in the behavioral response which ensues. While persons react differentially to statements implying "doing" rather than "thinking" this does not imply that the response is to be judged as displaying one more than the other, or that one is dominating over the other, or that one is more predictive of future behavioral events.

Differentiated statements occasion different responses, but such responses may not need to be attributed to different basic psychological processes to the extent that one be called "emotional" (feeling) and the other cognitive. For example the response to a "feeling" statement may be different from a "knowing" statement only because persons see such statements as referring to two different future states or activities, the psychological functioning processes involved may be the same both at the time the statements are judged and in the future activity to which reference is being made. Furthermore, response to a "feeling" statement may not necessarily involve differentials usually associated with affective states, e.g. differentiated

glandular activity. Such issues become extremely complex and cannot be pressed here. 94

94 It must be sufficient here to indicate these and other issues as being the controversial issues which might be "by passed" by not making the cognitive-affective differentiation as one of mutually exclusive components of conceptual functioning. The SJI uses other concepts which "cut across" both cognitive and affective.

Examples of the above are such as S. Schacter, 1964, title "Cognitive and Physiological Determinants of Emotional States," which is dealing with phenomena fraught with the difficulties alluded to here but impossible to explicate here because of the complexity of the issues and their not being the main focus of this work. For illustrative purposes it might be noted however that one problem lies in the conceptualization of an interactional (or correlational?) relationship between cognitive descriptions and physiological descriptions. Involved are the problems of levels of analysis, in this case the biological (physiological) and descriptions at a conceptual functioning level. Stanley Schacter, "The Interaction of Cognitive and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State," in Leonard Berkowitz (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology Volume 1 (1964), pp. 49-80.


It is significant that Schacter's work moves in the direction of showing that "emotional states" do involve cognitive components and thereby displays the breaking down of the dualistic characterizations which would have emotional states as affective only. Again this is another problem which cannot be explored here.

Another example of the difficulties involved are seen when H. Nelson states that how one "thinks" about things determines (is) their cognitive character, whereas how one "feels" indicates the emotional impact with "attitude" usually referring to the latter. Again the assumption that these are usefully differentiated qualitative differences may stem as much from differences in the conceptual functioning process as from other physiological processes, e.g. persons learning to react differentially to those stimuli which are supposed to be "emotional" as compared with those which are reacted to with a "rational" response. The evidence from studies are of course moving to show that both cognitive and affective components are found in attitudinal responses, E. L. Hartley, 1967, J. T. Doby, 1966.

One major issue involved in differentiations between cognitive and affective is that they may be seen to be inconsistent, i.e., the feeling emotional states may somehow be contrary to or inconsistent with the cognitive aspects; that they may be "out of balance."\(^95\)

An example of the confounding of the inconsistency between affective and cognitive behavior may be seen in H. C. Triandis' discussion of a particular item finding.\(^96\) He cites the case where white Americans will be "inconsistent" in considering a Negro as "clean, honest and good" (cognitive) and at the same time "not accept" him in their...

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The above, if accurate, would appear to have implications for a wide range of the literature in which it is not clear whether such dualistic categorizations are present. It is unfortunately impossible to pursue this point further in this work, though literature which has bearing on the SJI and Own Category Procedure will be noted as examples.

\(^95\) Once again we have a series of questions which might ramify from such issues which are themselves beyond the scope of this work, issues with which the SJI may be able to more adequately deal than others or which may never arise using the SJI.

For example, if the cognitive and affective are seen as contrary and inconsistent the question as to which is more important for human survival and/or problem solving may become a very real one for those making such assumptions. The current emphasis on "feeling" and "emotion" as needing to be reintroduced into interpersonal relations may be an example of the consequences of an affective-cognitive bifurcation followed by assuming that the trends of modern society have destroyed "emotion" (affectivity) in the rise of science, technology, rationality, etc.

neighborhood (behavioral). In the above illustration it is difficult to insist that there are no behavioral dimensions involved in responding that Negroes are "clean, honest, and good" (e.g., acting clean, acting honest, and acting good is behavioral). At the same time it is difficult to deny that cognitive and evaluative dimensions are not present in "not accepting."

The imputation of inconsistency attests to the assumption in the experimental design that these responses indicate the respondent is "pro" Negro on the "being clean . . ." and "anti" on the "not accepting." This is an interpretation which is not merited without close investigation, e.g. a shift in judgment domain from "belief" to "true" could find a pro Negro judge saying Negroes are not clean, etc. because their poverty makes them so!!!! At the same time an anti Negro judge could say they were clean by virtue of knowing this was the expected answer, or that they were clean when compared to another minority group which was even dirtier. These shifts in judgment domain and the shifts in judgment due to changes in reference scales are confounding the interpretation of results of such instruments.97

The above responses as they occur might also be in terms of different reference groups, e.g. it is very unlikely that two statements, 1) about Negro cleanliness, and 2) moving into a neighborhood, will

bring into play the same reference groups as the judge makes his response. Such shifts in reference groups are important to the sociologist and confounds tremendously the interpretation of items such as these.98

Because of the above possible explanations for responses (and others also possible) the response which appears on the surface to be "inconsistent" may in fact not be inconsistent at all if the proper variables are taken into consideration.

The possibility of confounding components is apparent in H. C. Triandis when he says that "... in some cases the classic factors of potency and activity are also likely to tap affective rather than denotative (cognitive) dimensions of an attitude object."99

98Of great significance methodologically is the possibility that the validity of any instrument predicting behavior be seriously questioned on the grounds of unintended variables entering in responses. These have been variously called "experimenter demand," "social desirability," etc. These are problems recently "discovered" by psychologists under the term the "social psychology of the experiment." If the judge knows that his values, beliefs, etc. are being measured a host of new variables enters the picture as part of and in addition to those noted above. This problem will be taken up below in discussion of one of the major advantages of the Own Category Procedure. Martin T. Orne, "On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment: with Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and their Implications," American Psychologist XVII (1962), pp. 776-783.


An example of another dimension on which affective has been differentiated from cognitive is that affective has been evaluative whereas cognitive behavior, etc. is not.

As noted elsewhere any conceptualization of affective-cognitive which has these as designating behaviors, which have one of or the other of these exclusively, or which sees them as mutually exclusive so as to have evaluation more associated with one kind of behavior and not another may be suspect.

The consideration of these differentials in the conceptual functioning process as they eventuate in differential behaviors in terms of "components" may be immensely more satisfactory than such differentials in behavior being explained in terms of faculties, mechanisms, or "kinds" of behavior. It is not the purpose of this work to explore the degree to which the literature is so doing. It is not clear that the ambiguities involved in specifying the variables in research design have been anywhere nearly cleared. See Wm. J. McGuire, 1967. It is notable that at the same time some of the literature is reporting cognitive and affective being confounded in their results there arises another framework which appears to not even make such a differentiation between cognitive and affective yet appears to "cover" the same areas of explanation for human behavior both theoretically with conceptual frameworks and with operationally verifiable procedures to accompany such systems of concepts. The cognitive-affective (as well as the experience-behavior, verbal behavior, and attitude noted above) have suffered from the latter "operationality" requirement for satisfactory concepts. William J. McGuire, "The Current Status of Cognitive Consistency Theories," in Martin Fishbein (ed.), Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 401-421.

Other illustrations which may imply confusions noted above are to be found in such as J. Bieri, 1961, where in the chapter title occurs the phrase "... in cognitive and preferential behavior." An ambiguity here could imply 1) cognitive behavior and preferential behavior, and 2) cognitive and preferential components of the same behavior. The former carries the implication that all behaviors are not both, that they are kinds of behavior. The latter as components of behavior carry the possibility that there be balance involved between them whereas as dimensions they may vary independently, e.g. both increasing or both decreasing. The former (preference as a kind of behavior) might imply that behavior is not always preferential in some dimensions or degree. The balance implied assumes that an increase in "valuing" is at the expense of "knowing," assuming the two to be mutually exclusive. James Bieri, "Complexity-Simplicity as a Personality Variable in Cognitive and Referential Behavior," in Donald W.
Dimensions on which the cognitive are discussed or scaled are such as balance, consistency, congruity, complexity, concrete-abstract, clarity, differentiation, distortion, etc. Once again it might be asked whether these are limited to the cognitive, do they differentiate between cognitive and others such as affective?\textsuperscript{101}

The degree to which the uses of cognitive and affective in the literature are moving away from them as factors (components?) dualistically and mutually exclusively related to each other is beyond the scope of this work. The above has attempted to show how very brief

\textsuperscript{101} It would probably be appropriate to speak of cognitive dimensions of interaction and paralleling cognitive dimensions of attitudes. The same would probably apply to a number of the concepts such as communication, experience, impression formation, influencibility, originality, and perception. Another way to phrase the same concept might be to designate them as cognitive aspects of these various phenomena. They all have varying degrees of cognitive aspects.

Several writers, for example R. W. Gardner, use the concept cognitive control as having a variety of relationships with such as "perceptual behavior" (R. W. Gardner, 1959), learning and remembering, and having dimensions such as stability. Once again it could be noted that these could be related to affective or behavioral components just as well. For example, perception involved in affect, learning involved in affect etc., certainly stability would be associated with affect. The same might be done with "behavioral." Of course these are not offered necessarily as differentiating concepts, but the degree to which all three (cognitive-affective-behavioral) might have parallel dimensions would throw into question the viability of their differentiation for some purposes.

samples of the literature might represent problems which might be significant if they could be avoided through different categorizations such as the social judgment involvement approach.

Summarizing the problems in cognitive-affective insofar as they are conceived dualistically or as mutually exclusive is their making qualitative (orthogonal-domain) differences dominant where quantitative (more-less) are more useful. For example, differentiations between cognitive-affective may be a difference in part of more or less structure, affective responses being ones in which the judge is less sure, has less to go on, affective responses may also be ones which are categorized by many judges as being more involving. Both may also be viewed as having dimensions of pro-con. Conceptualizing reference scales as continuums of pro-con enables categorizations to be dimensioned on continuums which recognize that both affective and cognitive have pro-con dimensions. The above have the advantage of allowing categorization to vary on a number of dimensions (three noted above structure, involvement, and stand on pro-con scales). Whereas affective and cognitive were viewed as mutually exclusive (more of one meaning less of the other) the above dimensions (and others) need not be so viewed, conceived as dimensions they may vary independently.

The significance of the breakdown of the clearly dualistic conceptions lies in the ceasing to ask fruitless questions which accompanied them. For example those questions revolving around the science (cognitive)-valuation (affective) issue as to which is more important, how can man have both, etc.? Also important is the degree to which
conceptualizations used in developing experimental designs and reporting findings may be greatly enhanced in simplicity, validity, and clarity through developing concepts which have operational behavioral referents which the discussion above has only very briefly shown to be extremely difficult with cognitive-affective and others in this chapter.

Summary Chapter II

In summarizing this chapter we find the significance of the foregoing discussions of several concepts lies in the degree to which they suggest conceptual difficulties for approaches, frames of reference, categories or meanings used in social research.

The categorization process is a very social process reflecting a person's reference groups. While other animals than man engage in social behavior none (other than possibly such as dolphins) possess the categorizing process typed as "conceptual functioning," and only man has combined this social conceptual functioning with material culture.

This conceptual functioning process is a "natural" process to man in the sense that without it the organism ceases to be man. It is accompanied by the tremendous variation and differentiation seen in human behavior and social organization throughout the earth. It is both biological and social (being neither one alone).

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Both biological and social descriptions are equally sound explanations for the current conceptions of the nature of man (so long as one description does not 1) deny the other, 2) contradict the other, or 3) dominate over the other). Both are equally "natural." The social descriptions of man are just as much descriptive of his nature as those descriptions which might be classified as biological. Such descriptions are each as valid, important, and as complete as the other.

The above would indicate that it may be erroneous to assign the concept "natural" to those sciences which deal with material phenomena and exclude the social sciences from them. Sociology may be viewed as a natural science. "Social life is the natural habitat of the human individual. It is not alien to his nature." 103

It is advanced that biological phenomena must be explained at a biological level, individual conceptual functioning at that level, and social phenomena at a social level, each including a variety of "levels of interaction." Events describable at one level may have aspects which have correlated events describable at other levels but cannot be said to "cause" such events. For example contradictory group roles which a person occupies (social level) do not "cause" ulcers. A series of biological events causes ulcers. The events have aspects at which descriptions at a social level correlate with descriptions at the biological level. 104


104 It is not (except for "shorthand descriptive purposes") an interaction causal relationship between descriptions at the two levels. Another example is the referent of the concept "attitude" at a social
Several concepts and conceptual problems related therein have been explored in Chapter II to demonstrate the degree to which certain kinds of categorizations may compound difficulties in developing social theory-methodology. Those selected for explication briefly have been the concepts social, categorization, discrimination, verbal behavior, experience-behavior, and cognitive-affective. These demonstrate the trends which are emerging from a range of earlier categorizations. It was pointed out that the single concepts and those bifurcated may have dualistic assumptions leading to problems which might be circumvented by either dropping the old or at least restructuring their meaning. In such a process a wide variety of different frameworks could be seen to be converging, e.g. the increasing tendency to view "attitude" studies encompassing both cognitive and affective components, and viewing experience and behavior as a unitary phenomena.

Conceptual functioning level does not have any description (under current biology) as a discrete biological entity, though there may be a series of events describable at a biological level which accompany and are correlated with the social description of an individual displaying behavior indicative of having an "attitude." These are much more complex than are possible to take up here [in this summary or thesis] and are raised only to indicate that these are aspects of the SJI's concern with its own descriptions being placed in perspective consistent with other descriptions of human behavior rather than social descriptions be viewed as the more important, accurate, etc. than biological descriptions.

A specific example of the above is the confusion (and confounding) possible at the current time as to whether psychotherapy is going to be solved by biologists with drugs or social psychologists with changes in social roles. The point made is that there is a sense in which there are social and biological descriptions of both approaches, they are not mutually exclusive, though they may become polemic insofar as individuals and groups come to see particular descriptions as group property. In which case the latter point becomes one at which the student of groups may have some advantage in understanding what is occurring.
It may be that, if an integrated scheme of valid concepts is attained in the field of human relations, the existing dichotomy between science and ethics, between theory and practice, between heart and reason, will evaporate into thin air, and future generations will not be bothered with major problems of concepts vs. values in their educational policies. 105

Though not the focus of this chapter or this work there is the issue of the degree to which the above categorizations have been getting researchers into difficulty because they make assumptions about the nature of human behavior stemming from past conceptions which are no longer viable. For example, man having two basically opposed natures knowing and feeling, rational-irrational, etc. These are now seen to be culturally derived categories and as such therefore subject to questioning as to possible alternatives. Alternatives (such as the SJI) consisting of continua, scales, domains or dimensions for categorizing human behaviors may not force the postulation of oppositional types of categorizations reflected in dualistic formulations.

It has not been possible to explore the extent and dimensions of the confounding complexity of these in the literature, but only to indicate samples, sources, and suggest significances of the problems therein. No attempt has been made to exhaust the concepts and combinations of those which might be in parallel situations. Those discussed briefly have been chosen because they exemplify the sorts of

differentiations between the SJI approach and others. For example, the question as to whether man is rational or irrational, which is dominant, etc. are simply not questions which the SJI writers even ask, let alone attempt to answer.

As has been noted elsewhere, one rationale for such discussions as found in Chapter II lie in possible criticisms leveled at the SJI, e.g. one might ask why certain issues have not been "dealt with." The above may briefly indicate why this is the case. Such concerns are not the focus of this thesis, but are central to the degree to which criticisms of the SJI be couched in terms which are consistent with pressing inquiry forward into questions which stem from the latest social and biological findings rather than questions raised by virtue of categorizations from the past which have found no substantiation in other fields of inquiry and are being confounded by current evidence in social inquiry itself.

Avoiding such dualistic formulations may enable researchers to see continuities rather than orthogonal differences, to see differences in degree rather than differences in kind. The number of these which have plagued man in the past might be infinite, e.g. man-nature, social-natural, fact-values, man and his tools (including science), rationality-irrationality, mind-body, etc. Having once made the assumption of bifurcation the inquiry was forced to place the nature of man in one camp (one more important) or say that man was a "balance" between the two. This becomes embarrassing when it considers such as "good" and "evil," forcing one to accept a "balance." This was particularly true of "emotions" where the construction that science was a
emotional (a evaluational) has meant that in order to keep man emotional and human science must be downgraded, negated, or "placed in its proper place." Such consequences of the categorizations noted in this chapter may be extremely important, but are not the focus of this work. The concepts have been noted so that the absence of a consideration of concepts such as "emotions" in the framework of the SJI may be itself placed in perspective.

The SJI in not making these differentiations may be in line with a long intellectual history which the SJI writers themselves (with few exceptions) do not explicitly recognize in their work. This is probably to be explained by their writing not being concerned with the larger contexts in which their work is to be "fitted." Dramatic exceptions are the Sherifs themselves and a few others such as L. LaFave. 106

A notable exception is the work of W. R. Hood which provides a tie with tremendous potential between the experimental findings of the literature noted in this work and the works of such as John Dewey and C. E. Ayres. 107


With the above in mind it may be possible to see the convergence of works of many persons in quite distant (as usually conceived) fields such as philosophy and economics, e.g. J. Dewey, T. Veblen and C. E. Ayres. These confluences of various frameworks may be indicative of a validity which adds significance to each including the SJI as it may add an "experimental" approach and validity to the hypothesis advanced using other descriptive frameworks. The explication of such confluence is not the focus of this work, and yet it may be one of the reasons for it having significance. The Sheriffs have continued to say that their work is based on the theoretical findings of early social theorists as E. Durkeim, but have not noted the writers noted above. The explanations for these phenomena while also important can only be noted in passing.

The concepts noted in this chapter are examples of important differentiations between the SJI and some other approaches. If and when they are used in the SJI and other literature it must be noted that they may not be carrying some of the same meanings which have been attributed to them in the past. This state of affairs means that care is required in order to ascertain meanings involved. For example, "attitude" as being affective and cognitive, or "facts" as involving evaluative dimensions. As a result some of the more traditional concepts are relatively little used if any, e.g. "emotions" and "rationality" are not even indexed in M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1969.108

Focusing on differences should not obscure the degrees of consistency between the SJI and other approaches. The degrees to which it draws upon other approaches cannot be overlooked. The recent volume of M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1969, demonstrates the continuity at many points between their framework and others.\(^\text{109}\)

With the above in mind it may be possible to see the SJI approach as being an approach which may not need to make the categorizations taken up in this chapter as they may have in the past been defined. Instead alternative concepts are used to dimension behavior in ways which do not assume the same categories but instead deal with continuums (dimensions, scales, domain, etc.) which may be specified both as external stimuli prior to behavior and as response effects. These may be advanced as dimensions of continuums where experimental designs may provide opportunities for replication in ways which contribute to establishment of validity to findings and generalized propositions about human social behavior in social groups, organizations, etc.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL JUDGMENT INVolvement APPROACH

The three basic concepts which make up the Social Judgment Involvement Approach are indicated in its title. Each of these have aspects which include much of what is held in the more traditional meanings of them, but each also has new connotations which are importantly differentiated from the older conceptualizations.

Social

The concept "social" has been discussed to some degree in the opening passages of Chapter II. The concepts of Judgment and Involvement will be treated in some depth in Chapter III. They will be even more explicitly detailed in Chapter IV in discussing the "Own Category Procedure." The procedure itself is an excellent example of the way in which categories or concepts may be used to generate research methodologies. It is hoped from this that the possibility of methodologies more explicitly related to group and larger social organization phenomena may become apparent.¹

¹See Chapter II above and in an appendix, available from the author. Numerous points and materials relating to this chapter have been placed in an appendix where the reader may obtain more information. Where necessary this information is summarized in the following text or footnotes.
It is a basic thesis of the Sherifs and other SJI writers that the injection of "social" as an adjectival category does not in and of itself change the psychological functioning involved in judgment. ²

The approach attempts to unravel the conceptual problems involved in attempts to describe how persons "interact" with larger social units such as complex organizations. In the SJI persons do not "interact" with organizations, only with other persons. Organizations interact with other organizations. Other organizations "cause" changes in organizations. ³

There is currently a great deal of debate as to whether or not it is possible to conceptualize social structures and processes in some

²It may increase tremendously the complexity and content "mix" of the judgments involved, i.e. another individual (having conceptual functioning) may be viewed as much more complex in relationships with the judge than is a dog, but the human conceptual psychological processes of the judge are the same.


Also see appendix, p. 1, available from the author, for brief discussion of "causes of change" in terms of levels of interaction.

The concept social as used above refers to all these levels, from interpersonal and intergroup to inter-societal, or inter-planetary. Each of these levels are social in the sense of involving interpersonal relationships.
type of systematic or systems approach. The problem is not only one
of specifying single concepts, but one of developing concepts of
scales, levels, dimensions, domains, etc., in which it is possible to
establish what is "increasing" as other variables vary differentially.
For example, it is not presently possible to say that a group is more
"social" than a "community," though there are movements toward being
able to scale complexity, size, levels of involvement, etc.

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4 For example of literature see, Llewellyn Cross, "System Con-
N. J. Demerath and R. A. Peterson, System, Change, and Conflict

The problems revolve around the conceptualization of the units
and dimensions by which such systems may be specified. Such systems
of specifications or concepts must be continuously seen as heuristic
devices by which current existing evidence is ordered, patterned,
related and/or explained in manners which are consistent (or at least
not contradictory to) each other. It is important that it be recog-
nized that the units and systems of concepts derived to order such
evidence not necessarily be seen as having to follow the units
developed in the physical sciences.* The physical sciences do not
have parallel units, the units being a function of the problems faced
in relating findings in the areas under consideration.

* Muzafar Sherif, "Theoretical Analysis of the Individual-Group
Relationship in a Social Situation," in Gordon J. DiRenzo (ed.),
Concepts, Theory, and Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences, New York:

The question is the usefulness-validity of categories or concepts
when they are scaled. It has been traditionally held that certain
dimensions of social phenomena cannot be scaled.* E.g., the concept
of color, once thought to be subjective and qualitative now is quan-
titative. Another example is loudness-sound.

* Pitram A. Sorokin, Sociological Theories of Today (New York:
The concept of judgment refers to a process which is psychological and may involve aspects which may be seen as social (see above).

A major issue in the literature surveyed for this study has as its focus the question as to the degree and manner in which a judge's attitudes or characteristics are reflected in his judgment of items and resulting scale values composing attitude dimensioning instruments. The history of these questions goes back further than the classic studies done by C. I. Hovland and M. Sherif, 1952, 1953.  

A second major issue has been over the question as to whether or not judges were necessary at all to select items to be used in developing an attitude scale. This is also a major issue dealt with by A. L. Edwards and K. C. Kenney.

Below is a review of some of the concepts and literature most relevant to "social judgment" so that a better understanding of the significant issues in the Social Judgment Involvement Approach (SJI)

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may be forthcoming as well as its relationship and significance in sociology. 6

The principal characteristic of the Social Judgment Involvement Approach is its insistence on the importance of those processes related to individuals' memberships in groups and the interaction of those groups with other groups. 7 Both judgment and involvement require some amount of restructuring and/or clarification from that in the past. 8

The aim is to discuss these variations in concepts as they might bear upon the problems in dimensioning social norms. The concepts are not to be confused with the reifications of internal variables typical for example of ego-Freudian psychology. Discussion must be consistent with or not contradictory to findings at all other levels, biological, conceptual, social, etc. A major significance of the SJI is the possibility of being able to have a series of theoretical conceptual constructs which will allow and further extrapolation of inquiry from one level to another and vice versa.

One of the most basic issues involved in the welter of issues surrounding judgment is its definition and differentiation from other psychological phenomena. Related is the "relationship" which judgment

6 No attempt here or in the appendix is made to survey exhaustively the literature on the psychology of either social or psychophysical judgment.


8 The concept "social," also crucial, is discussed in Chapter II and as an adjective above.
has with other variables which may be conceptualized as being a part of the processes by which man functions in his relationships with other stimuli, both social and nonsocial.\(^9\)

It appears that the issues that are involved are being resolved by an increasingly elaborate complex of conceptual constructs regarding the processes involved in social judgment. As will be seen below, those who would say that attitudes of judges do not "influence" judgments and scale values of Thurstone scales are correct only for a range of judgment conditions which may omit specification of the judges "involvement."\(^10\)

The social nature of such an explanation as the above is immediately apparent, showing a point at which explanations at social psychological levels must be and are in this case consistent with interpersonal and group findings.

The issue as to the influence of attitudes on judgment has a long history, going back through early concerns following Thurstone's

\(^9\)For example, an issue which has received much attention, and which is apparently being resolved by a restructuring of the concepts involved is the relationship between judgments and conceptualizations of the attitudes, values and other internal variables antecedent to behavior.

\(^10\)For example, a dimension which was thought to be crucial in conditions leading to attitudes influencing judgment has been the extremity of attitudes. The differential effects of extreme stands has been found not to be so much a function of extremity as it is of involvement. Persons taking an extreme stand on an issue need not necessarily be highly involved with such a position.* But extreme attitudes often lead to high levels of involvement when persons holding them are frequently forced to defend their views.

original proposal regarding the scaling techniques. The issue broadly stated was whether or not judges in assigning value to items (statements) in the development of a Thurstone scale were influenced by their own personal stands on the issues involved. It was assumed for a number of years that the judges were not influenced by their own stands, or if they were it was not clear how it might influence the judgment process. Midpoint in the controversy, at a time when it was still assumed by many scholars that attitudes did not influence judgments was A. L. Edwards and K. C. Kenney's note in the concluding footnote to their paper (1946). In this footnote they questioned the relationship between ego-involvement and attitudes of the judge in judgment of items.

The characteristics of the judge as one of the variables has been an issue which is still being clarified and/or dimensioned. The degree and dimensions in which judge characteristics become variables in judgment is a function of the issue and context as well as the characteristics of the judge.  


12 Writers such as H. Helson, 1964, dealing with psychophysical phenomena have in recent years increasingly stressed that judgments are a function of a pooling effect whereby a wide variety of variables may be represented in the processes called judgment. Harry Helson, Adaptation-Level Theory: An Experimental and Systematic Approach (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964).

Another example of the rethinking that is going on in this area is Wm. Stephenson who points out that statements reporting the emotional states of others are in fact indicators more of the individual making such statements than they are indicators of the...
There is little debate at the current time as to whether or not psychophysical judgments are influenced by judge characteristics, e.g., E. D. Hinckley and D. Rethlingshafer, 1951, in their studies of heights of men. Much more debate rages as to the way(s) in which judgments of such social topics as Negro-White relationships parallel psychophysical generalizations. The finding of such a parallel would apparently mean that scale values which judges establish are an artifact of their own attitudes, thus appearing to invalidate the establishment of scale values for use with other subjects.

Further confounding variables might be seen to be such as knowledge, frequency of contact, practice, etc., any of which may produce effects in judgment which parallel (and therefore possibly confound) the interpretation that the judge is involved. For instance, individuals interested in, i.e. involved in, may learn more about a subject and hence have such knowledge as a variable in the judgment of stimuli, though it must be also recognized that persons may be involved without knowledge, and also that they be involved negatively, i.e. be against the particular issue and may have this involvement emotional state of the object person. Wm. Stephenson, "Methodology of Trait Analysis," British Journal of Psychology, XLVII (1956), pp. 5-18.


accompanied by a large amount of knowledge. Further confounding will be seen in findings which will be noted in some more detail below where using the Own Category Procedure apparently has demonstrated that increased interest and knowledge about a subject, e.g., legislative reapportionment, does not necessarily lead to the same sorts of judgments patterns that involvement does. 15

It would appear that the findings and use of Thurstone scales may be considerably re-evaluated if such as the above is the case. 16

The use of judges is only one way of establishing valid methodologies in scaling. Alternative methods noted by D. W. Bray, 1950, are: 1) the selection of discriminating items, 2) comparison of scores by extreme behavior groups, 3) case history material on the judges, and 4) laboratory behavior where observations may be made directly. 17

The Sheriffs have noted the paradoxical nature of the assumption on the one hand that the attitudes of judges will not influence

15 John Reich and Muzaffer Sherif, "Ego-Involvements as a Factor in Attitude Assessment by the Own Categories Technique," (Norman, Oklahoma: Institute of Group Relations, mimeograph, 1963).


Whether or not the findings alluded to above and discussed below in some more detail actually vitiate the use of Thurstone scales completely may not be the significant problem so much as clarification of the dimensioning of the judgment process which seems to be emerging. It certainly cannot be the focus of this work though it provides another basis for the significance of the SJI.

judgment in the process of establishing scale values and at the same time assume that attitudes will be variables in assessment of scale items by subjects. It was assumed in the past that trained "experienced" judges would not have scale values of items influenced by attitudes whereas subjects would.

The finding that under certain conditions differential attitudes of judges influenced their placement of items has appeared on the one hand to invalidate some of the conclusions which may be drawn from a Thurstone scaling judging, but on the other hand it has opened up the possibility of using such conditions to dimension the variables contributing to those judgments. It points to the possibility of using the judgments of the judges themselves to reveal their own attitudes. Instead of judge characteristics being either assumed or not influencing the judgment they may become the unknowns to be found through analysis of the patterns displayed in the process of judging the stimuli presented.\(^\text{18}\)

It will be shown below how it is possible to have group memberships of the judges as variables, either external or internal. Characteristics of the judges including their memberships may become internal variables in the judgment process at the time of judging.\(^\text{19}\)

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\(^{19}\)Ibid., pp. 205ff; Muzafar Sherif, O. J. Harvey, E. Jack White, William R. Hood, and Carolyn W. Sherif, *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment* (Norman, Oklahoma, Institute of Group Relations, The University Book Exchange, 1961), pp. 143ff. Group members clearly differentiated responses resulting from stimuli presented as belonging to their own group and those belonging to the "outgroup."
One example of the way in which such internal variables enter into the judgment process is clearly seen in the case of extreme judges who take a stand which is clear to discern because of the judges' behavior both on scale judgments and others. These appear to be different from those that we find in less extreme cases.  

As noted in Chapter II and more explicitly below in discussions of both extremity and involvement they are conceptually distinct in the SJI. They increasingly appear to be independent variables though in many instances the two are directly correlated. An individual may hold an extreme view with little involvement or a comparatively middle of the road view with a great deal of involvement.

The differentiation between these two dimensions is an extremely important one to the SJI. It allows for a more full explanation or reconciliation of a wide variety of experimental and observational findings.

In brief, the remainder of this discussion of judgment and its accompanying appendix will list a number of synonyms for judgment;


21 The confusion of the concept extreme with other adjectives or adverbs such as "strongly felt," "depth of conviction," "extent to which favored," etc., has no doubt contributed to the conceptual confusion.

Note that the immediate above are also possible synonyms for involvement and further confounding which might result therefrom, e.g., Likert scales phrasing responses in terms of "strength" of feeling.

The full implications and elaborations of the above points in the literature cannot be a focus of this work though they may be seen to follow from the concepts of judgment and involvement as they will be outlined below. These points might also be seen as a basis for the significance of the SJI.
indicate briefly a selected variety of theories and theorists regarding judgment; list a variety of different kinds of judgment; and then attempt to make a brief summary of selected processes involved in judgment. Following the above an attempt will be made to sketch the concepts external, internal, and then show how some phenomena cannot be classified as either by virtue of their referent being basically one which depends on its categorization by the judges in order to be designated.\textsuperscript{22}

Last, we have designated and will discuss a body of concepts which relate to consequences or results of the judgmental process. There are duplications in specific concepts in each of these categories, but it is hoped that it is possible to demonstrate that in each case the referent of the concept is different, or that it may have a dual meaning. It is hoped that out of the discussion come some insights leading in the following directions: clarification of the concepts themselves, better understanding of the area of research which is generating them, and possible partial explanation for the lack of impact of the SJI on the sociological literature. There is the possibility that the ambiguities which may be involved in the use of the concepts may be at the root of some of the conflicting findings at the present time. It is hoped that it be possible to indicate and possibly clarify points which are in need of clarification.

\textsuperscript{22}These latter have been categorized as the external–internal variables. It is necessary to specify that such external–internal differentiations do not return to the S-R model.
Judgment Synonyms

There are a number of synonyms which must be considered in any discussion of judgment as processes. Synonyms which may give some indications of the parameters and meanings of judgment. The following might be considered as synonyms of judgment: estimating, appraising, assessment, evaluation, choosing, categorization, rating, ranking, comparison, sorting, interpretation, response, weighing, etc. Each includes differential responses to objects on the basis of both internal and external variables. 23

A number of writers are expressing concern with the need for increased attention to theoretical aspects of judgment. For example, T. M. Ostrom, 1966, calls for theories to take the unit parameter into consideration. 24

There are a number of basic theoretical models involved as well as issues which illustrate many of these concerns. Parallels and differentials of the SJI with other formulations such as adaptation level and cognitive dissonance theory have been more noted where

23 For elaborations on the variety of judgment see appendix available from the author, p. 2.

appropriate in this work than others such as balance, and consistency theories.  

An example is the issue which H. Helson, 1967, raises in his discussion of theories of perception when he notes that in the past some stimuli have been attributed "real" attributes and others as being judgmental or inferential. He points out that judgmental attributes are no less "real" than any other stimuli as these have been categorized in the past.


It could be shown through elaboration at this point that the past differentiation of stimuli between that which is "real" and that which is judgmental goes back most likely to dualisms of several sorts. H. Helson does not note this dualistic aspect of the differentiation, but does note several examples of how psychophysical judgment involving physical stimuli also influence human organisms through judgmental processes.
The above point is relevant to later discussions of the significance of differentiating between psychophysical and psychosocial phenomena judgments.27

Another major theoretical issue which is related to judgment is the degree to which both evaluation and cognitive discrimination compose the judges' stand on an issue or object. An alternative formulation is that they be viewed as separate psychological processes which

27 SJI writers have stressed the continuity between the two with emphasis on stressing the degree to which there may be differences on continuums of degrees of structure and involvement as well as whether the anchors are external or internal differentiating psychophysical and psychosocial judgments.


interact, e.g., judges discriminate, then evaluate, with judgment or decision being yet another in a series of different processes.28

A general category of theory called "motive theory" is of some relevance, since writers such as C. D. Ward have construed theoretical models which parallel those of Sherif as being motivational models.29 The SJI writers do not appear to utilize the concept of motive as differentiated from "internal variables" apparently construing the concept to imply or run the danger of a return to internalized reified

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28 Evaluation and judgment have been taken up at other points in this work and the basic issue as to the danger of dualisms inherent in establishing any form of evaluation as differentiated from a cognitive "knowing" process have been noted.


Such theories as behaviorism and psychoanalytic or neo-Freudian will receive scant attention, no attempt being made to pursue the issue of judgment into these areas. At appropriate points some reference may be made to writers which bring them in but they are not the major focus of attention.


mechanisms rather than viewing current findings as being extrapolations from behavioral evidence. 30

Another major issue in which the SJI is relevant is its insistence on a range of data gathering processes capable of being interrelated. It thus "by-passes" many of the traditional issues such as "pure vs. applied," "experimental vs. field," "quantitative vs. qualitative," and many other dualistic categories. 31

The above discussion of several very basic "theory" problems has omitted the crucial point that theory is the system of concepts by which they are categorized or ordered. 32 A part of the SJI is that "theory" building is not a differentiated process from research or practice. 33

30 It might be noted that M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1956, outlines much of a social psychology of individuals in groups without wide use of the concept of motive. The concepts "variable" or "stimuli" are used, both external and internal. The index of motives occurs for the most part in the latter pages of the volume. The full implications of the omission of "motives" in the traditional sense may be alluded to throughout this work, are not its focus, but may once again be a major factor in the significance of the SJI. Muzafar Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology: Revised Edition (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1956).

31 All of these have been noted at other points in this work with more amplification.


33 By virtue of the above it is apparent that all of this work is "theory." The reader wishing elaboration may wish to see the appendix which briefly discusses frameworks on two bases; 1) their close relationship to the SJI, and 2) their contrast with the SJI and its widespread impact on psychological research, e.g., cognitive dissonance. See p. 6 of appendix available from the author.
The degree to which other theoretical frameworks attempting to conceptualize internal psychological variables are paralleling the SJI may become more explicit in the following discussions of principles of judgment and the Own Category Procedure itself. The synthesis of these into a more general framework is far beyond this work, but remains a good possibility if current trends continue to show such signs, e.g., increased consideration for social variables and elaboration of dimensions such as involvement rather than in terms of factors.

Kinds of Judgment

The literature reflects a number of different kinds of judgment. Such "kinds of Judgment" of course are related to the variety of different theories and concepts of judgment which are currently being used. The variety of such types of judgment may serve to illustrate the complexity of the referents involved in the concept.

Principles of Judgment

The differentiation between kinds and principles of judgment may be difficult to defend, as might also differentiating between the two and "processes" of judgment.

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34 See appendix available from the author, p. 6.

35 These difficulties may represent a basic characteristic in the English language forcing concepts into either noun or verb forms with both often not imparting clearly that time is also a variable. These in a very real sense run throughout this work.

The usage of the concept "process" in this section is to indicate a definite focus on change and/or time dimensions with an emphasis on the change having continuity over time, i.e. that there be trends which
Examples of principles of judgment which are at issue in research are the additive and the averaging. 36

The judgment process is described by C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, as being increasingly recognized as one which cannot be broken down into attitudes as differentiated from the judgment process itself. 37 They cite this movement to break down the

are observable and make such change predictable rather than random and chaotic.

Under the concept of judgment processes we have included several which are possible to have put under other classifications but which we wish to bring in here to indicate their particular focus on their change or time dimensions.

36 Additivity in judgment refers to the phenomena that is occurring when the effect of two stimuli are added together. An example given by H. Nelson, 1964, is when a man's salary has a bonus added to it the pleasure given him is exactly that which it would have been if he had received the same amount in total salary. The conditions are then said to have had an additive effect. Averaging would have been the case if his satisfactions would have been less than that of both together under additive conditions, but still more than either one alone.


H. Nelson, 1964, seems to maintain that the pooling effect which occurs from a variety of such stimuli has a quantitative effect which parallels the logarithmic mean, but this is controversial.


bifurcation between the study of attitudes and the study of judgment showing signs of developing as far back as A. L. Edwards and K. C. Kenney, 1946.\textsuperscript{38} Attempts to view the process of judgment as a whole, composing more than the sum of its parts, is demonstrated in H. Nelson's concept of the pooling of stimuli which result in judgments by judges which are different from any of the stimuli themselves.\textsuperscript{39}

The judgment process has also been seen to be a prominent one in what has been generalized as personality.\textsuperscript{40} The judgment process is considered by such writers as L. Berkowitz as being only a part of the total phenomenon designated as personality.\textsuperscript{41}

The above appears to contrast with others (such as the SJI) which view the central nature of judgment as the major process in behavior. The dimensioning of various aspects of the judgment process is a major issue. It is this process as it stands with reference to social groups which is here a focus. Attention is directed to the manners

\textsuperscript{38}C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{41}\textit{Ibid.}
in which the conception of social groups may be better understood by virtue of being able to gather data on social norms having the quality of being "shared" with other members of groups and thereby having dimensions which parallel E. Durkheim's social facts.  

An example is the judgmental process of discrimination and/or differentiation which may be extremely crucial to an understanding of the ways in which groups vis-a-vis group members behave.  

The Social Judgment Involvement Approach has as one of its principle assumptions the fruitfulness of conceptualizing the individual

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The above amounts to a caveat that the interest here is not in 'personality per se, but in those processes which become vital to the attempts to conceptualize the nature and functioning of groups. The concept of "personality" is not widely used by the SJI, its use (or lack of it) being a useful area of research beyond this work. While it is necessary to stress the context in which groups function, it is also necessary that techniques of data gathering be developed which will accurately dimension those variables which constitute the group membership-nonmembership and proper role behavior for members of groups. See William R. Hood and Muzafer Sherif, "Appraisal of Personality-Oriented Approaches to Prejudice," Sociology and Social Research, XL (1955), pp. 79-85.


For further elaboration see appendix, p. 9, available from the author.
as part of a process in which the variables and their conceptualization are postulated for purposes of research and/or problem solving. 44

Judgment Variables - External, Internal, External and Internal

The Social Judgment Involvement Approach utilizes a conceptual framework at the individual interpersonal social psychological level. Two categories used are "external" and "internal." It is assumed that there are external situations (variables) which may be viewed as outside the skin of the individual. It would appear that the categorization of internal and external variables runs the danger of being thrown into a variety of polemics. 45

44 In the above research and/or problem solving are not to be construed as polarities in any sense, researchers having problems which they solve as do other persons. The issue is not one of whether research-science solves problems, it is the recognition that both solve problems. The problems are related in very significant ways.


45 For example, any question as to the relative importance of Internal or External Variables misses the whole point that both are necessarily related to each other, each is a function of the other.

While Internal variables are a function of External they are not determined by those external. It is at this point that the SJI writer would also seem to bypass, not even raise, the whole series of questions that become involved in the heredity vs. environment or individual vs. society determinism issues.

It is also necessary to note that the concepts "external" and "internal" do not refer to categories of orientations of control (or fate) of the person as used by such as J. B. Rotter, 1966. The utilization of these concepts as orientations appears to be a concept which may have some correlates with those of involvement as used by the Sheriffs, but there appears to be little cross referencing between the two. N. T. Feather, 1966, notes that "... in future investigations it might be valuable to include the test of internal versus
These external variables have no inherent "properties" in and of themselves. The problems involved in their "reality" are recognized as being a function of the frameworks in which they are conceptualized by man in his analysis of them. Some of these "properties" appear to be more useful, recognized as "valid" over wider ranges of situations than others.

Such variables are not seen as differentiated from internal variables in any sense that one is more a part of "nature" than the other.\textsuperscript{46} This makes the "internal" variables no more nor less "real" than the conceptualization of external variables but it does mean that their conceptualization is much more difficult, much more problematic under given states of the technological arts association with their study. It means that rapid change in their conceptualization can be expected in the future as hypotheses and generalizations are

\textsuperscript{46}Variables which are internal are just as much operating on the basis of the so-called "laws of nature" as are those which are conceptualized as being external. "Naturalness" therefore is not a differentiating characteristic between internal and external variables. At the current time it is probably the case that external variables are more subject to examination and study than are the internal variables. Such internal variables must often be conceptualized as variables which intervene between variables which are categorized as external, i.e. observed behavior.
developed and tested regarding the "nature" of such internal variables. 47

The conception of external and internal variables as pursued below is crucial to understanding the Social Judgment Involvement Approach but is not to be construed to reinforce or reincarnate the earlier concepts of the nature of the individual as a unique entity independent of or superior to "natural" processes. 48

The Social Judgment Involvement Approach would deny any attempt to assess it as reinstating "individualism" and postulating individual man as somehow opposed or in opposition to groups and larger social units. 49 It would also oppose any attempt to see its position as being a mere stimulus response framework. 50 The postulation of

47 It must be recognized that the categorization of the skin as a line of demarcation is one of the conceptualizations which may itself be subject to serious question as a useful criterion for differentiation. G. Murphy, 1956, and numbers of others take the position that the concept of the "individual" for many purposes cannot be limited to that which is within the skin.


48 New differentiations while attempting to get around the difficulties involved in some old conceptions often get caught in being accused of perpetuating still other traditional conceptions. This is the old problem of utilization of old concepts to indicate new referents in situations where there is much of the old content remaining.


internal variables as intervening variables between external variables and which mediate or restructure those external variables usually called behavior places it outside the camp that is usually called behavioristic.\footnote{N. Sherif, 1959, has taken the position that the concept "behavioral science" is a term developed to get around the socialistic implications of the concept "social science." Important to him is the point that social science, including sociology, is not focusing on behaviors of individuals but of larger units, e.g. groups, organizations, communities, as well as other social processes cutting across such units. Reductionism which retreats to the individual level at the expense of socio-cultural levels are to be avoided. Muzafar Sherif, "Social Psychology, Anthropology and the Behavioral Sciences," \textit{Southwestern Social Science Quarterly}, \textbf{XL} (2, 1959), p. 107ff.}

The Social Judgment Involvement Approach sees internal variables of man as being differentiated from other animals in certain dimensions. Such differentiations do not involve supernatural powers or mystical potencies, but are to the SJI writers grounded in conceptual functioning to the extent that man himself must be studied rather than other animal forms if the aim is the understanding of human social organization.

There is a category of concepts which can neither be classified as either external or internal by virtue of their referent being dependent on a relationship between the two; for example, the concept "scale" refers to both 1) what appears to be an ordered series of internal functioning processes which we construe to be operating as individuals order their behavior according to patterns which we categorize as forming a scale, and 2) the external stimuli which may be organized by the experimenter in patterns or gradients of some domain.
as this is judged by others than the judges themselves. Individuals may be confronted with scales in a variety of instruments, or they may produce scales as a result of conceptual functioning, both of these being external. The degree to which such external variables both prior to and following conceptual functioning actually represent some form of internal scale is a major issue involved in current theory. The degree to which such conceptual constructs and evidence accompanying them reflects group and social structure variables is also of major importance to the current discussion.

It should be obvious that groups are external variables for individuals. Individual human organisms are born into social units called groups and become group members through processes which are increasingly specified as coming to share the norms of the group.

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52 In the case of the Own Category Procedure (noted in Chapter IV) the scales are only partially structured by the experimenter, there being ranges of the scales which are ambiguous or unstructured.

53 It is not the purpose of this discussion to go into the differentiation between the social and nonsocial, see above and Chapter II. Sufficient to note that such a differentiation between social and nonsocial can carry many of the same difficulties noted earlier with regard to the heredity-environment issues, natural vs. artificial.

For example, a difficulty is encountered if by making such differentiations one gets into the position of trying to say the social is more important (prior to, etc.) than the nonsocial, i.e. a "social" or "cultural" determinism. As will be noted at many points below, any attempt to specifically categorize external and internal variables as either social or cultural, or nonsocial and physical may get one into a great deal of difficulty. It will be seen that the referents of concepts may be categorized as either social or nonsocial depending on the frame of reference and/or the problems to be solved.

The concepts of external and internal variables are not to be differentiated as to whether one is physiological and the other social, etc.

For further related discussion of variables and frames of reference, see appendix p. 9, available from the author.
The problem in dimensioning internal variables is one of being able to establish varieties of external variables which are themselves differentiated in patterned ways and then be able to make observations of response behaviors which ensue from those differentiated stimuli. The varieties of ways in which the external stimuli have been patterned is of course witnessed in the tremendous number and complexity of conceptual frameworks which have been developed. Examples of these follow briefly to indicate this and to selectively give some indication of the categories which the SJI and Own Category Procedure use.

Major categorizations may be made between cultural and noncultural external stimuli as parts of the frames of reference. Cultural may be again divided into social stimulus situations and those that are material. Social stimulus situations include other persons and include a continuum of complexity of such situations ranging from very simple social situations such as occur on street corners waiting for lights to the highly complex and qualitatively different situation where a group and/or larger social units may be present.

The verification of the presence or absence of the conditions necessary for the above and other classifications of external stimuli are of course sense data which must be a basis for all categorization. The validity of such categorizations is the process of testing and inquiry assumed in the scientific method, which is of course itself a further process involving conceptual functioning. The inherent circularity by which "external characteristics" are assigned through conceptual functioning must be assumed and at the same time recognized as a process of establishing such characteristics which differs from
other conceptual functioning processes in the content of its observing
and checking on those observations. 54

The classic example of the external stimuli and its specification
is the autokinetic studies by M. Sherif, 1936. 55 Its specification in
terms which made clear the internal variables which must have been
functioning in order for the response behaviors to be explained
exemplifies the conceptualization of external and internal variables
in experimental design. External stimuli were narrowed to a pinpoint
of light and the judges' chair and other judges who might be heard.
Internal variables were narrowed by the judges not having any prior
conceived beliefs regarding autokinetic phenomena and the nature of
the autokinetic phenomena itself. The ambiguity of the external
stimuli made resulting responses more an indicator of internal
variables. The extremely simple "social" variables which were intro-
duced in the studies and the simple social norms which resulted are

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54 An example of the establishing of categories of external stimuli
is M. E. Tresselt, 1965, using "material" and "task" stimuli, and find-
ing that the task situation failed to produce significant differential
placement. This is an example of varying two external stimuli. It is
notable however that the tasks are an example of being both external
and internal, though the instructions for performing the tasks are
external.

Margaret E. Tresselt, "Similarity in Stimulus Material and
Stimulus Task on the Formation of a New Scale of Judgment," Journal of

55 Muzafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms, (New York:
Harper and Brothers (1936), Harper Torchbook edition (1966), Intro-
duction by M. Sherif.
only simple examples of what happens in the much more complex social stimulus situations of everyday life. 56

The process of judgment is one which includes a wide spectrum of phenomena present prior to and part of the processes. Such phenomena do not enter into the process of judgment however with equal weight. 57 A variety of concepts have been utilized to designate those external stimuli which carry more weight in the process. 58

There are a variety of dimensions on which external stimuli may be categorized. A few of importance here are structure-ambiguity, structure...

56 Much more complex though still simple are the studies such as the W. R. Hood and M. Sherif, 1962, study where an additional variation on the stimulus was created through judges "overhearing" estimates as to how far the light moved.


58 The Gestalt psychologists for years have been saying the environment of the individual is viewed as a totality but break it down into a variety of subprocesses which continuously function with differential weights in varying conditions with the totality being one of the conditions. This course has close parallels with "psychological structuring" which is used by the Sherifs and the "pooling" as it is used by H. Helson, 1964. It has long been evident that the differential weight given by the organism to certain aspects of the totality of the environment is a function in part of the current state of the organism. As the organism proceeds in behavior it therefore becomes apparent that there is an interactional or transactional process going on.

Differentiations between those phenomena which are given more weight and those less by the organism have variously been defined as background, ground, context, residuals (may note something different in Helson's theory). Those receiving more weight have been termed foci, figure, anchors, etc.

intensity and distinctiveness. Of the above the structure and intensity are of most general importance. For instance, visual judgments may involve judgments of area or hue or colors. Auditory judgments involve dimensions of pitch, volume, etc. Motor sense may make judgments in dimensions of weight, size, etc. Auditory judgments also involve verbal stimuli and judgments. Gradations of structure are important because the more ambiguity in the external stimulus the more internal variables play a role in judgment of that stimulus.⁵⁹

In considering external stimuli the SJI assumes studies of perception are studies of behavior.⁶⁰

It is a mistake to assume some perceptions are less a result of internal processes than others.⁶¹

Judgments of people are excellent examples of an unstructured stimulus in many dimensions, so unstructured that the response is likely to not be structured enough on any single dimension to be


⁶⁰For example, the study of the perception of an explosion in a mining town found those with loved ones below ground reporting they immediately perceived it as a mine explosion.


A number of techniques have been used to present differentially structured situations to individuals, e.g., the autokinetic, tachistoscope, leaving out letters or words, stereoscope presenting different images to either eye, lowered levels of lumination, numbers too large to be counted, and a whole mass of stimuli developed in so-called "projective tests" are all based on the lack of structure principle.
fruitful in dimensioning judgment unless much is known about the judges' group memberships, etc. 62

One way of patterning external stimuli is in terms of scales. Scales are a part of an external stimulus situation which may enter as a variable in judgment. Scales are stimuli which are patterned in some manner such that parts or subunits of them relate to others in a particular way. These relationships are seen as units or weights given the various stimuli which make up the totality designated as a "scale." Scaling of a variety of social psychological dimensions has been under way for a number of years. Within the last few years a number of books devoted entirely to scaling have been published. 63

One way in which external stimuli have been structured is through statements to which a judge is expected to react in more or less

62 "Group membership" in such cases must recognize that categories such as races, color of skin, etc., may be variables in judgment which are not to be equated with shared norm or reference group variables. The above is important in making accurate generalizations from data. For example, findings of M. L. DeFleur and F. R. Westie, 1958, regarding interracial situations are applicable to both.


structured ways. Statements have been designated as being related to a number of dimensions. Items or statements may also be categorized as being controversial. The location of statements on a scale (scale value) is another dimension of them.

External stimuli may take a variety of forms, e.g., questionnaires, graphics, even telegraph keys have been used. Included in external stimuli are all those phenomena used or manipulated by the judges in their response behaviors, even pencil and paper.

For example, attitude statements have been ones which imply directly or indirectly in a clear manifest sense that an attitude is involved. Evaluative statements are those which have a clear dimension of judging the issue in the statement directly, it not being left up to the judge to inject this issue or variable into the judgment processes. "Desirability" statements refer to the issues acceptance or nonacceptance or desirability by the general society or population, as judged by individuals. The degree to which such "social desirability" has entered into judgments of scaling instruments has been of much concern to numbers of writers, stemming from work such as that of A. L. Edwards.


While such disciplines as sociology would welcome such a variable entering into judgment, its meaning these could then be measured; the psychologist has often seen such "social" variables as contaminating the "individual" variables which he is trying to measure.

It must be noted that the amount of controversy does not necessarily cover the same dimension as involvement. A controversial issue simply indicates that a wide variety of stands, position, etc., are available in the given population. Controversial issues may be thought to be "highly controversial," in which case a dual meaning becomes apparent and confounding. Highly controversial issues not only appear to be ones which have widely differentiating stands, but they also designate heavy involvement. It needs to be noted that such a characteristic as controversial may or may not be a property of the stimuli independent of the observer.
There is the possibility that previous responses become external stimuli in subsequent responses.

Different scaling procedures are therefore to be considered as external stimuli.

Social External Stimuli

The consideration of social external stimuli requires recalling discussions above in Chapter II and the beginning of Chapter III regarding the social level of analysis and including social stimulus

66 For example, a response on a prior item may be an external stimulus by virtue of it being seen on the same page.

Some experimenters have controlled the above by not allowing the judge to be able to see how many items have been put in categories previous to the one he is just currently judging. For example, M. H. Segall, 1959. Judgment procedures therefore not only have the usual "experience" variable which is internal but also have the act and process and resulting change in external stimuli which become part of the total judgment process as he continues through the judgment task. Marshall H. Segall, "The Effect of Attitude and Experience on Judgments of Controversial Statements," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LVIII (1959), pp. 61-68.

67 For example, ratio scaling such as S. I. Perloe, 1963, where the judge is engaging in a magnitude estimating process as opposed to a category-rating process where differences between stimuli are involved.

The differences which have been believed to separate the Ratio and Category processes appear to be emerging. For example, F. N. Jones, A. S. Korr, and G. Humphry, 1965, citing numbers of experimenters reporting parallel findings. Basic issues involved here are beyond the scope of this work. Sidney I. Perloe, "The Relation Between Category-Rating and Magnitude-Estimation Judgments of Occupational Prestige," American Journal of Psychology, LXXVI (1963), pp. 395-403; F. Nowell Jones, Anne S. Korr, and Gordon Humphry, "A Direct Scale of Attitudes Toward Church," Perception and Motor Skills, XX (1, 1965), pp. 319-324.
situations along with the specification of the social group as defined by the Sherifs. 68

Levels of various kinds may show the possibility of avoiding ascribing interactional or causal relationships between external stimuli and internal stimuli which are on different levels of analysis, e.g., conflicts in social roles causing ulcers. 69

The levels of analysis approach is not only construed as being one which relates the biological and the social frames of reference but also relates the various traditional social disciplines to each other in ways which may be more amenable to interdisciplinary


In such discussion it was pointed out that social descriptions are different from but not necessarily contradictory to other levels such as biological, that both are complete and accurate within their own levels of descriptions. It was also pointed out that great care must be exerted in moving from description at one level to another to be sure that "causal" assumptions were not made erroneously. Changes at one level it was pointed out may be changes at another level rather than "causing" change, the specification of these being extremely important in keeping clear the descriptions involved. Descriptions possible at a psychological (conceptual functioning) level were also noted. M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1969, op. cit., pp. 18ff.

69The implications and significances of such a position cannot be elaborated at this point except to note that it may parallel the antidualistic implications noted throughout this work in its resolving a number of paradoxes which have plagued social thought for a long period of time. It along with the lack of dualistic categories may explain to a large extent why the SJI does not raise many of the traditional issues in the same way they have been raised in the past. Other examples are the "great man theory of history" vs. "cultural determinism," and the ideological conflict between the "east" and the "west" with one stressing the importance of the society and the other that of the individual.
inquiry. Many of the old dilemmas facing social scientists become resolved.

Social external variables (stimuli) are those which may be categorized as normative, shared norms, social units, social processes,


It is becoming increasingly apparent that individuals do not interact with groups and larger organizations, but rather with other members of the same or outside social organization.


The relationship between the individual and social order has been conceived in causal terms, i.e. the individual "causing" change in large organizations or societies, rather than conceptualizing the relationships as being ones in which individuals relate to other individuals in social units within other units, etc., on up until very large social units such as communities, nations, states, cultures, et al. are reached.

and other such terms. They are the products of interpersonal relationships which range from togetherness situations as persons waiting on street corners for the traffic light to extremely complex organized social interpersonal situations such as represented by members of very large corporations and other social organizations contacting each other and interacting on the basis of norms shared by them with their respective social organizational members as well as between the two members who confront each other.

Relationships consisting of shared norms have behavioral consequences differentiated from the same expectations held by single individuals alone. A person does not have to believe in a shared norm himself to have it as an external social stimuli. The policeman's club impinging on the skull is a case in point. The behaviors of others acting on the basis of shared norms, are external to the individual being clubbed.

Another subject of inquiry which contains such external-internal combinations is that involved in communications. Communication as an external stimulus has all the characteristics of structure, complexity, range, etc., which any stimulus might have.

72 The acceptance, rejection or noncommitment to communication has been one avenue by which the Social Judgment Involvement Approach has been evolved. This has especially been reflected in the work of C. I. Hovland who worked with the Sherifs on a number of projects, the most classic being the ones using the Own Category Procedure in the 1950's. C. I. Hovland and Nuzafet Sherif, "Judgmental Phenomena and Scales of Attitude Measurement: Item Displacement in Thurstone Scales," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVII (1952), pp. 822-832; Nuzafet Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, "Judgmental Phenomena and Scales of Attitude Measurement: Placement of Items with Individual Choice of Number of Categories," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVIII (1953), pp. 135-141.
One individual may agree with a communication on the basis of his religious group membership norms, another on the basis of his political, another on the basis of family group, etc. It is therefore necessary that reference group shared norms be made clear as they are variables in the responses of judges to communications. 74

The definition of a social group is important in specifying it as a social stimulus situation. 75

External stimuli can be seen categorized as social on the basis of, 1) the individual judge and how he perceives it, or it may be so.

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74 This is the "ad hoc" group problem so present in research. The assumption is made that bringing persons together in a room constitutes a "group" situation. Such a situation is obviously different from individuals who are alone, but do not constitute the "group" situation as defined by the Sheriffs. Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), pp. 131ff.

This "ad hoc" group situation is responsible for many of the findings in the literature being suspect insofar as their findings are applicable to group formation and functioning. See for citation of other examples, Karl L. Weick, "Organizations in the Laboratory," in Victor H. Vroom (ed.), Methods of Organizational Research (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 24ff.


The property or characteristic of being "social" may be imputed to objects and thereby take on new effects as a result of judges making such a categorization, but the degree to which the objects, actions, statements, etc., are social is a matter of determination by study or inquiry.

For example note that animals and even inanimate objects may become "members of groups" in the eyes of group members, even the long dead may continue to be considered continuing members also.
categorized on the basis of, 2) the observer being able to establish that the external stimulus is involved in the conceptual functioning processes as they relate to interpersonal and larger social unit organizational structures-processes. Because of the importance of other persons to individual judges there may be consistent differences in judgment of people and things. However, when things become highly involving, when objects become important for individuals, then the same differential patterns in judgment as occurred with people are displayed. This appears to be parallel to such studies as A. K. Glixman, 1965, and J. W. Reich, 1966, M. Irwin, T. Tripodi, J. Bieri, 1967, as well as studies which focused on the judgment of other persons as stimuli.  

76 Alfred R. Glixman, "Categorizing Behavior as a Function of Meaning Domain," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, II (3, 1965), pp. 370-377. John W. Reich, "Preliminary Report: Cognitive Influences on Group Formation," (Unpublished manuscript, Arizona State University, July 1966); Marc Irvin, Tony Tripodi, and James Bieri, "Affective Stimulus Value and Cognitive Complexity," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, LIV (1967), pp. 444-448. It can of course be noted that the differential judgment of objects vs. people may have significance for the whole value-fact, people-tool, human-material, distinctions. There is the possibility of having occupational differentials here, i.e., engineers dealing with physical tools be more involved with these than would, e.g., social workers. Such issues are in need of future research.


An excellent source for the range of stimulus situations relevant to this discussion is to be found in Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, "Varieties of Social Stimulus Situations," in S. B. Sells
The specification of the presence or absence of groups as social stimuli in research studies has been the source of continual difficulty in development of the social psychology of individual functioning within groups, and is one focus of the continual stress in the SJI literature on the definition of a social group.  

Groups have been introduced as stimulus situations in a variety of ways into experimental designs. These range from the most common, e.g., criterion groups, to those group stimulus situations created by verbal instructions calling attention to the group or introduction of the group as a variable through tape recorders. Group stimuli are often introduced into the situation through statements about the behavior, attitudes, etc., of particular groups. The selection of subjects (known or criterion group) is a common way to have group

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variables become a part of the situation. A study of a number of known groups in depth is reported in M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1964. It illustrates the difficulties and care necessary in assessing the complexity of groups studied in the field if they are to be considered as known groups in experimental designs. It is possible also to have the group situation developed within the experimental design itself.

The injection of groups into situations raises the possibility of the judges having differential involvements in groups and the role differentiations within them. The increased complexity of such

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situations involving groups may be one good reason for attempting to avoid their use as stimulus situations.  

The varying of the external situation in order to arrive at what aspects of the situation are functioning as stimuli and anchors in judgment is a key in the Social Judgment Involvement Approach. From the autokinetic situation to the intergroup situations of the camp and "natural" group studies, the pattern has been one of either knowing what the situations were and which aspects of them were to be stimuli or else ruling out aspects of the situation as not being a differentiating variable in the total frame of reference.

Focus here is on external social situations and the aspects in them which function as anchors in the judgment processes. This is done in order to be able to reverse the process and extrapolate from the judgment process some indications as to the characteristics of

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83 Making a rather related point is K. E. Weick, 1967, noting that group variables are not difficult to get into situations. They in fact get into many, many situations where they are not known, not wanted, and/or are not accounted for. They confound experimental results. An example is the early social desirability literature. Karl E. Weick, "Organizations in the Laboratory," in Victor H. Vroom (ed.), Methods of Organizational Research (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), p. 43.

84 For example, toilet training and accompanying norms were a part of the shared norms of the families of each boy, but these were not significant differentiating stimuli in the activities and generalizations which were the foci of these studies. Muzafer Sherif, O. J. Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, and Carolyn W. Sherif, Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment (Norman, Oklahoma: Institute of Group Relations, The University Book Exchange, 1961); Muzafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms, Harper and Brothers (1936), Harper Torchbook Edition (1966), "Introduction," by Muzafer Sherif; Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, Reference Groups: Exploration into Conformity and Deviation of Adolescents (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964).
the external situations as these are found to be groups and other social situations.

Summarizing: "social" to mean interpersonal and all larger systems and processes deriving therefrom, external to mean outside the skin of the individual situation to indicate those phenomena potentially capable of entering as aspects of the social stimulus situation. Aspects of the situation which become stimuli are a function of both the external stimuli and internal psychological functioning, neither being necessarily more important than the other, although some situations provide more differentiated behavior responses than others.  

The dimensioning of social external stimulus situations is a major problem. Its difficulties lie not only in the difficulty in conceptualizing such situations, but also in the methodological problems encountered in obtaining data regarding such situations.  

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85 For example, the call of "fire" by the military squad leader contrasted with the ambiguous instructions on a "projective" test requesting responses without specification of group memberships to be used.

Further confounding is the possibility that reference group norms which may become variables may be those of past groups to which the judges have belonged, thus compounding greatly the complexity of attempts to assess group variables functioning in human behavior in any concrete specific instance.

86 The above is illustrated in the title of E. J. Webb, et al., 1966, Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences. For example, the degree to which unobtrusive measures do or do not invade individual privacy is debatable but lies in the possibility that such measures also "disguise" the degree to which information is in fact revealed about the subjects under observation. These are issues related to the much broader "ethical" aspects of
A basic aspect of the SJI is the possibility that judgments of a variety of non-social stimuli may be used to dimension the presence or absence of external group stimuli. For example, judgments of time, size, number (e.g., of dots), distance of movement (e.g., pinpoints of light in the autokinetic studies), and many others may be used to provide opportunities for differential responses to occur which reflect group membership. Others might be such as sequence (order, serial, ordinal), complexity, pressure (intensity, imperativeness), range, structure (ambiguity) (density). These and others are dimensions of an external stimulus which may be observed, recorded, etc. The development of such dimensions has been a major breakthrough in experimental design in recent years, the use of "number of categories" in the Own Category Procedure being only one such example. Differential judgments which correlate with group memberships may give evidence of such memberships and roles within groups, e.g., differential judgment of actions of leaders and followers.

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Examples of widely differentiated external social stimuli are clinical judgments used by D. T. Campbell, W. A. Hunt, and N. S. Lewis,
The external social stimulus situations which are usually presented individuals do not have variables which differentiate various group memberships. Findings therefore may not be interpreted as reflecting variables which are going to be functioning in future behavior when specific norms of the individuals group memberships do enter the judgment process. Difficulty arises when the question is asked, "What group(s) to which the individual belongs is being used as the dominant one in making the judgment?" Unless such judgments are accurately assessed with regard to the group memberships involved in the judgment, they become difficult to interpret. This is of course the "reference group" problem. 89

Summary


additive (summatting) - averaging, pooling (adaptation level) briefly, and noting in passing such as perception, differentiation, discrimination. There then followed a discussion of concepts by which the SJI categorizes the judgment process; noting the rather arbitrary (but useful) differentiation between external and internal stimuli and the number of concepts which are combinations of both. The concept of frame of reference was noted as useful but not a factor in behavior. Dimensions of stimuli such as structure, scalability, size, number, time, etc., were noted. The various aspects of stimuli which might be categorized as "social" were discussed briefly as one aspect of cultural phenomena. Specific social stimuli situations were cited such as the "social desirability" studies. The degree to which some conceptual categories such as "controversial stimuli" (statements or issues) are a combination of both and the degree to which all categories are both was raised. The difficulties inherent in conceptualizing the group as an "external stimulus" were briefly raised and a "levels" approach briefly used to attempt to clarify the "relationship" between individuals and their "ingroups" and "outgroups" insofar as they are variables in judgment. The problems arising from not using "real groups" was noted as a major problem in interpreting much current research. The problem of development of external stimuli dimensions so as to elicit reference groups as a variable was briefly noted along with recognition of the extensive literature available on reference groups.
Internal Variables

Internal stimuli are not observable in the same sense that are external. They can only be inferred under the current states of technology from behaviors of the organism. The exceptions to the above are those instances where internal states of the organism may be inferred from the instrumentation of such as electrocephlograms, cardiograms, galvanic skin responses, blinking, salivation, pupillary, etc. As the above become correlated with behavioral correlates which are called attitudes, they may be substituted for existing scales.

Internal variables have many synonyms and many subunits or aspects of the larger category which is inclusive of all internal to the skin.

Physiological states not only influence judgment, it must be recognized that at a physiological level judgment is a physiological state or process. The specification of internal states as subject variables is not in error providing the referent is made clear as to whether or not the referent is, 1) the totality in terms of the internal situation or state, 2) or the stimuli variables entering into the process of judgment.

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91 The below must be conceptualized as deriving from the conceptualities and methodologies by which the variables are considered to be dimensioned. It is of course recognized that the demarcation of the parameters of the judgment processes are extremely difficult to establish, hence for current purposes these will not be dealt with except to note the problem. It being a case of neither the judgment
The complexity of the interrelationships of the variables which are involved in judgment have been stressed by many writers, some more than others. The process is also a total one involving all aspects, not isolated bits which are simply added together.92

Several generalized concepts used to describe a wide spectrum of internal variables are such concepts as motivations, needs, 

process nor the internal system of situation variables themselves are in a real sense a "closed system." All "entities" are such in the sense that they are conceptualized as being systems. The concept "attitude" for instance does not indicate an entity existing in the body. The referents of concepts cannot be construed to be reified by giving them a name.

Increasingly it will be possible to note that in place of "attitude" the more descriptive concepts of latitudes of acceptance, rejection, noncommitment, will be used, especially as these come to be conceptualized as processes of judgment. As will be noted below such concepts have advantages in being "process" terminology rather than static concepts.

Other terms which have been used to indicate the above internal variables are such as "characteristics," "traits," "attributes." The latter has some differential advantage as a concept in that it may make more explicit than the others that such terms are not inherent in the object, but are terms used to categorize or describe the object and are a part of the judgment categories of the judge rather than being necessarily characteristics of that which is judged.

92 The gestalt psychologists have been adamant in this, as have also the Q theorists such as Wm. Stephenson, 1953, and his co-workers, e.g., M. J. Rawlins, 1964.

personality, response systems, and cognitions. Such concepts have been arranged in a wide variety of models. 93

Scales

A major way of conceptualizing internal stimulus situations is in terms of scales. Such scales are inferred from behavior and to varying degrees they may be "reified," as having "reality" internal to the individual. Scales of all kinds however whether internal or external are devices (conceptual formulations) as to the continuity of stimuli dimensions (domains).

The problem to which scaling techniques are applied is that of ordering a series of items along a continuum in order to convert a series of qualitative attributes into a quantitative series of some sort. 94

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93 Many of these concepts and models involve categorizations of a dualistic nature which may give those individuals seeing the difficulties inherent in dualistic concepts some concern.

The degree to which traditional dualistic conceptualizations of mind-body, rational-irrational, cognitive-emotional, etc., are carrying over to make up the current differentiations in these concepts is a subject of some importance but may not be of sufficient import in our discussion here to warrant much attention except to make note of the problem.

This is a problem which might be kept in the background as the various concepts are presented in order to help assess their usefulness in establishing concepts dimensioning internal variables. Some of these models are briefly touched upon in the appendix, p. 11, available from the author.

A scale as defined by H. S. Upshaw, 1968, consists of a set of elements in which each consists of an event, a number, and set of rules which links event and number. 95

"Reference Scales" has been one term used. They are a major concept in the SJI approach. 96 The reference scale of course implies comparison, ranking, establishing of relationships in some kind of level or hierarchical arrangement, some system of priorities, all of which connote the basic aspects of judgment.

Reference scales are seen to have a variety of aspects the functioning of which are matters of some debate. Some of the aspects are such as anchors, ranges, units, origins, end, uni or multidimensionality. Reference scales also have stability or time dimensions. N. P. Pollis, 1964, relates these dimensions to social stimulus


While the concept of reference scale is an important one to the SJI its use by the literature has not been a focus of this study.

situations such as individuals' togetherness, or group situations.  

Internal anchors of reference scales are often cited as being attitudes. 

The set of categories used by the individual is his reference scale and they vary in range and widths.


The interplay between the external stimulus situation range and the internal is of prime concern for H. S. Upshaw in holding that judges whose attitudes (stands) fall within the external stimulus range have smaller categories than those judges whose own attitudes fall outside the presented external stimulus situation range, i.e., the latter's positions are more extreme than any presented them in the statements. Harry S. Upshaw, "Own Attitude as an Anchor in Equal- Appearing Intervals," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LIV (2, 1962), pp. 85–96.

Range is considered by the Sherifs as a major variable but is not even listed in the index. 100

Attitude as a major variable in human behavior has a long history in the literature of the social sciences. It has been variously conceptualized, including a wide variety of phenomena. The concept has been widely attacked and just as widely defended. It has most often been conceptualized as an internal variable, but its manifestations have been variedly conceived. 101

The importance of measurement and conceptualization of attitudes is clearly stated by M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1967.

The yardsticks that can be developed for valid assessment of individual attitudes are derived from stuff


that should be the domain of study for sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and economists.102

Regarding the definition of attitude, M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, 1961, say:

Regardless of the definition of 'attitude' preferred by different authors, the data from which attitude is inferred are judgmental reactions by an individual. An attitude implies a characteristic and consistent mode of behavior toward its objects.103

M. Sherif, 1960, points out that:

Confusion in definitions of social attitudes can be reduced by including their motivational and (more or less) lasting properties therein. Transitory or motivationally 'neutral' opinions and sets produced for the performance of laboratory tasks can be designated by concepts other than attitude.104

O. J. Harvey and D. F. Caldwell, 1959, state:

An attitude in its most basic aspects is considered to be the same as a concept. A concept, in turn, is defined as the placement of the experience of an object into relationship with the background of experiences


of other relevant objects along a specifiable dimension (good-bad, hot-cold, etc.) between end-points of varying definitiveness and breadth. 105

G. W. Allport defined attitudes as:

... a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exserting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related. 106

In 1935 G. W. Allport was citing the close relationship between the concept of attitudes and sociology, citing J. Dewey, W. I. Thomas, and F. Znaniecki. 107

The significance of the concept for this study principally lies in the degree to which attitudes are viewed as a variable in judgment. Of major interest to sociologists is the ways in which such internal variables do in fact constitute basic units from which groups and larger social units may be conceptualized.

Since C. I. Hovland and M. Sherif, 1952, and to some extent since A. L. Edwards, 1946, there has been serious question as to the nature

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107 Ibid.
of the role of attitudes in the placement of items and resulting scale values. 108

The establishing that attitudes do influence judges' placement of items now means that judges' placement of items may be itself utilized as an indicator of judges' attitudes.

While there is general consensus about the internal nature of attitude as a variable in behavior there is some debate as to its components, whether and how they are differentiated. 109

108 For example, H. S. Upshaw, 1962, has maintained that origin and unit differences in the individual judges account for differentials in placement rather than differences in attitude. Individual attitudes do not influence placement but are influenced by the range of stimuli to which they are exposed, resulting in changes or variations in scale values when a full range covering the own attitudes of the judge are not present. Harry S. Upshaw, "Own Attitude as an Anchor in Equal-Appearing Intervals," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LIV (2, 1962), pp. 85-96.


The confusion that has arisen is apparently the result of judgment studies in the area known as psychophysics where internal factors such as involvement in judgment of physical stimuli were not accounted for in many studies of a variety of dimensions such as loudness, intensity, temperature, etc. See earlier discussion in this work.

109 For example, such writers as N. Fishbein, 1965, believe it worthwhile to differentiate attitude from belief. N. Fishbein cites C. E. Osgood, C. J. Suci, and P. H. Tannenbaum, 1957, as wishing to limit the concept attitude to the evaluative dimension of "total semantic space." One differentiation common in literature is that which has opinion as being the verbalization or expression of an attitude; it may be other than verbal. See D. Katz, 1960. Martin
Attitudes are conceptualized as the variable which antecedes the patterning of behavior which occurs over time and in situations where matters of priority are at issue, where individuals are faced with choices, comparisons, judgments, forcing them to choose alternatives and priorities.  

Attitude change is a major concern in the literature. Change is reported under some conditions in which a very large discrepancy between the own stand of the judge and the communication, and in other conditions no change occurs. It is possible that the introduction


The difficulties which are involved in the conceptualization of attitudes as having components of evaluative, cognitive and connotative (behavioral) as well as those which deal with the question as to whether or not attitudes are separate or independent from belief systems must be seen as representing concerns with differentiations lying within the basic assumptions which the writers make about the concept of nature or man and the dualisms therein. The degree to which the above is the case cannot be elaborated at this point. See elsewhere in this work.


For further discussion of attitudes, see appendix p. 13, available from the author.

of the dimension of involvement may explain the contradictions which are occurring.

It is of course significant to the sociologist when this involvement is directly related to group memberships; i.e., group membership norms become tremendously important in attitude change as individuals are involved with their groups. Involvement becomes exponentially significant when these become a part of the social situations which accompany group membership, when numbers of individuals, sensing not only their own narrowing of categorization, but that the categories of their group's members are also being narrowed.

Information is an external variable insofar as it is presented to the judge, and is an internal variable insofar as it is the amount of information held by judges. An example of the former (external) is H. Peak and H. Wm. Morrison, 1958, "The Acceptance of Information into Attitude Structure," and J. L. Freedman, 1965. An example of the

\[112\text{M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1969, op. cit., pp. 475ff.}\]

\[113\text{This is of course a thesis which needs exploring, i.e., the degree to which seeing others contracting their categories is not merely a function of these as individuals, but that there is a "multiplier" effect possibly functioning. Group involvement on issues is an aspect of some of the close correlations which have been found between involvement and the extremity of the stand as well as what is often expressed as "strength" of the response. This whole issue will be taken up in more detail as involvement is elaborated.}\]

latter is W. P. Robinson, 1965, where he found that pro judges were better informed on an issue which he dimensioned through having judges write down all they knew about the issue and then scoring them on the basis of number of right and wrong statements. 115

A selected number of conceptual problems revolving around the concept of motives are briefly presented in the appendix as illustrative of those relating motives to the SJI framework. The SJI does not necessarily include the concept of motives though its use is continued. 116

Needs of a variety of kinds have been postulated as variables entering into judgment. One of the most prominent of these is A. H. Maslow's concept of need hierarchy. 117 The chief attack on the concept of needs has come from those such as L. Berkowitz, 1964, who

115 W. P. Robinson, "Own Attitude and Thurstone Scale Judgments," Psychological Reports, XVI (1965), pp. 419-422.

The degree to which amount of structure parallels information is important for findings of the Own Category Procedure insofar as those items which are well structured will not be as subject to displacement. Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafar Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), p. 144.

For further discussion of information, see appendix p. 14, available from the author.

116 The brief discussion in the appendix, p. 14, can only begin to indicate the complexity involved in the problem(s) related to the conceptualization of "motives" as it is found in the literature. This is another area of needed research.

117 For example, see Abraham H. Maslov, Motivation and Personality (Harper and Brothers, 1954).
simply say that needs are not necessarily part of a description of social judgment. 118

Another relatively minor internal variable [from the SJI frame of reference] is that of perspectives and their variability, though this is given great weight by writers such as H. S. Upshaw, 1965, by C. N. Alexander, 1965, and T. Ostrom, 1966, at various points including his thesis done under H. S. Upshaw at North Carolina. 119


The same is noted by A. R. Lindesmith and A. L. Strauss, 1968, saying that needs and tensions conceptualized in this way need not mean that the concept of need is sufficient as a variable, that tensions and needs are not necessarily motivating variables and/or are inaccurate insofar as they are seen as "determining" behavior, the absence of tension and need proving likely to be boring. H. S. Becker, 1964, has pointed out that needs are inferred from behavior which they attempt to explain.


'A brief survey of the more recent works of the Sherifs (since 1956), and a very small sample of representative social psychological literature reveals very, very few index citations to the concept of need.

119 For example, T. Ostrom, 1966, states that reference scale differences between individuals is a factor of his perspectives and that involvement is mediated through his perspective. L. H. Warshay, 1962, not only sees parallels between perspectives and such concepts as frame of reference but relates it to such as learning and experience, especially as these involve a breadth dimension. The main point here is that writers such as C. N. Alexander, 1965, see perspective as the significant variable in determining scale values of items rather than involvement as do the Sherifs.

Personality is a concept little used by the Sherifs; e.g., the only entry for personality in M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1969, is to "Personality and Extremity of Attitudes." One of the principal difficulties in the conceptualization of personality lies in the conceptualization of its relatedness to either other aspects of larger social units, e.g., group social structure, or to subunits, e.g., sex roles. A study which does relate personality to judgment is B. J. White and O. J. Harvey, 1965.


See discussions elsewhere in this work.


The concept "own stand" probably so closely parallels that of "own position," "attitude," and "stand" that it need not be taken up as an independent concept. 123

Levels of aspiration have been cited by O. J. Harvey and M. Sherif, 1951, as being judgmental activity. They also point to its having a strong factor of ego-involvement. 124


Norms

Norm formation and functioning as a dimension of judgment is a most important one in tying the concept and methodology of dimensioning attitudes through Own Category Techniques to strictly socio-logical phenomena, e.g., groups, organizations and their processes.\(^{125}\)

A. V. Cicourel is among those who warn that questioning of individuals (actors in his terms) and/or interaction does not necessarily reveal norms as they might be functions of self-role and perceptions of others.\(^{126}\)

\(^{125}\)The concept of norm has been widely used to link the individual level of integration with that of the group. For example, see F. Schull and Andre Del Beque, 1964, titled "Norms a Feature of Symbolic Culture: A Major Linkage Between the Individual, Small Groups, and Administrative Organization," M. Sherif's classic in 1936 of course is basic and is cited as such by E. L. Horowitz and R. E. Horowitz, 1938. One of the clearest and most widely cited conceptualizations of norms, including a discussion of their dimensions is to be found in J. Jackson. He utilizes a concept of "return potential schema" to illustrate the various dimensions of norms including the concept of them having a range.


The above is an important methodological point which indicates the care needed in generalizing social norms and processes from such methods.  

Another important conceptual aspect of norms is their being substructural units of roles. The above is seen clearly in such writers as F. L. Bates, 1960, and J. Jackson, 1966. Norms are both internal and external stimuli. A normative-informational influence

127 Other alternatives, such as "unobtrusive measures" (see E. J. Webb, et al., 1966), are a form of observing interaction "after the fact," i.e., the products of interaction are a focus of study from which inferences are made as to social norms and other social phenomena. Observation could also include the full range of behavioral responses on such as the Own Category Procedure discussed in the following chapter of this work. There is nothing to observe but the behaviors of individuals or the results of their behaviors in more or less direct or indirect manners. Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures: Non-reactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966).

A major contribution might be made to research if a way can be found to utilize so-called "unobtrusive measures" to validate the findings which parallel those of the Own Category Procedure; e.g., is it possible through "content analysis" to establish the constriction of latitudes of acceptance and decreasing latitudes of noncommitment on judgments in which groups of individuals are highly involved.


129 Internal in the sense that they are internalized as psychological structuring and are variables in behavior as clusters of conceptual categories. They are external in the sense that they are shared between individuals as third persons interact with them. Third parties are continuously encountering such norms which are functioning in any given social stimulus situation. A. V. Cicourel, 1964, points out the parallels of the above with T. Parsons and S. Freud as
differential receives considerable attention in certain aspects of the recent literature. The referent may be the presence or absence of shared norms as stimuli. For example, A. Cohen, 1964, pointed out that a part of the stimulus context in M. Sherif's autokinetic study was normative, whereas in S. Asch, 1951, it was informational. Both involve the same psychological processes, though categorization will be different; i.e., one will be categorized as norms, the other as some other category of stimuli which does not have normative aspects.

Implicit in the above is that normative stimuli are not processed at a psychological level any differently than are other stimuli. There may be a difference in the degree to which one is more involving

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they both are consistent with E. Durkheim in the exteriority of norms and their interiorization.


than the other, though at this point it is not evident necessarily that one be more so than another. 131

131 None of the above should be construed to mean that norms are ever not functioning in the psychological functioning process, especially in the case of the "informational" where internalized norms are undoubtedly functioning, but may not be recognized by the observer or the judge.

The possibility of multiple dimensions is of course a point relevant to item stimuli in the Own Category Procedure to be discussed in the following chapter. Various dimensions of the object as it is perceived by the judge may provide for different latitudes of acceptance, etc.

Attempts to dimension norms are attempts to develop continuities or more or less of something which will be seen by others in replication processes as indicative of shared expectations, i.e., systems of reciprocally shared expectations regarding the behaviors of individuals which are interrelated with others in patterned ways such that boundaries may be established insofar as the expectations under consideration are concerned. The degree to which the Own Category Procedure may provide a source for dimensioning shared norms along a dimension of involvement will be explored in the following chapter.

For discussion of other conceptualizations of other internal variables such as "response system," bias, response error, response style, dimension, etc., see appendix p. 16 available from the author.


The use of the informational-normative differential is perhaps unfortunate in the literature, it providing the opportunity for implication that a fact-value dualism is assumed.

Norms and normative phenomena as these are developed by the Sheriffs and other SJL writers is not to be confused with normative as the concept is used by such writers as A. Zaleznik, where it is differentiating between explanatory and normative theory in interpersonal relations. The latter is to be differentiated by Zaleznik as theory which has change and advocacy, i.e., making value judgments as a basic part of its framework. Abraham Zaleznik, "Interpersonal Relations in Organizations," in James G. March, Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 606.

As noted at numerous other points such dualistic possibilities are important but not the focus of this work.
A discussion of the models relating to judgment might first have to consider the nature and use of models prior to taking up those models in the general area of social psychology and sociology and discussion more specifically of those models which are directly relevant to judgment and the Own Category technique.\textsuperscript{132}

Numerous writers, including M. Sherif, 1966, and H. Cantril, 1965, have opposed much of the model building currently going on because of the lack of isomorphism, the leaving out of variables.\textsuperscript{133} H. Cantril, 1965, is particularly concerned about the latter which he sees as leaving out such things as needs, wants, and valuing processes. His comments are directed toward much of the psychological literature.\textsuperscript{134}

Attitude research in this country proceeded for over thirty years as though its major problem were simply refinement of measurement models based on analogy with the equal-interval scales derived in psycho-physical judgment of neutral stimuli (weights, lengths, and so forth) or, more


134\textit{ibid.}, p. 5.
recently, with the cumulative scales so common in measurement of physical properties of objects. 135

Several models which are of central interest to the dissertation are models of judgment, assimilation and contrast, psychophysical, equal-appearing interval, and perceptual vigilance.

External and Internal

There are a variety of concepts which have taken up as either external or internal which are not clear and are used ambiguously to designate either external or internal variables. This difficulty has been noted at more than one point elsewhere in this work in other connections. They are reiterated here in order to note the problem and to illustrate the possibility such difficulties may be avoided in such approaches as the SJI.

Rather than relate or describe all of the concepts which appear to have both external and internal variable connotations a few will be


In commenting on both models and theory, H. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1963, say that theory of an integrative nature with direct bearing on research has not kept pace with refinement of techniques.

A number of these and related models are to be found in the literature and cannot be dealt with here, but are noted at various points in this work. Some of these are such as the adaptation-level, cognitive dissonance, and other theories based on balance concepts. The above references to the validity and/or isomorphism of models must be kept in mind when these are discussed.

selected which are most relevant to the Own Category Procedure and Social Judgment Involvement Approach. A few of the most significant are such as the following: frame of reference, scale, judgmental unit, continuum, categories, anchors, own position, scale width, and even such concepts as "favorable-unfavorable." More common concepts which have this duality of being both external and internal are such as communication, language, influence. Such a concept as reward and punishment might be a useful one to include for illustrative purposes as to the difficulties involved, like and dislike being another, although it is not used by the SJI.

The frame of reference as a generalized concept is intended to include both the external and internal and therefore is probably the least confounding of the concepts in the literature. 136

One of the principal types of phenomena which are both external and internal is those of categories. This is explicit in the degree to which categories, like norms and social structure, are viewed as external to the person (the interviewer, the questionnaire preparer) imposing or structuring categories to which the respondent must conform. 137

136 There are a number of concepts which might be discussed here. See the appendix, p. 19, available from the author, for examples such as those dealing with relationships, e.g., influence, power, prestige.

137 This is most explicit and relevant to the dissertation in the degree to which persons attempt to set up their own categories rather than those which have been structured by those wishing to gather data. This is one of the chief points of the Own Category Procedure in particular and the Social Judgment Involvement Approach in more general terms; that the person be allowed to develop his own categories, that
C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, cite C. E. Osgood, G. J. Suci and P. H. Tannenbaum, 1957, as providing an example of the conflict which can become evident between the individual establishing his own categories and those presumed by the experimenter.\textsuperscript{138}

Categories of stimuli are external through instructions, questionnaires, conversations with others, etc. They are of course also internal categorizations which the person brings to the situation. It should be obvious that categories might also be conceptualized as factors or as language; the latter not referring only to verbal language but to the categorization process in toto.\textsuperscript{139}

such categories are in fact extremely meaningful in understanding and predicting the behaviors of persons.


\textsuperscript{139} Writers such as B. J. White, 1964, have attempted to study the availability of categories, and its effect on contrast effects. The categorization process itself is elaborated further at other points and need not be taken up in detail here. B. Jack White, "Availability of Categories and Contrast Effects in Judgment," \textit{American Journal of Psychology}, LXII (2, 1964), pp. 231-239.

For further discussion of categories and reference scales, see appendix p. 20, available from the author.
Other concepts make explicit the situation where their referents do not have any locus necessarily "internal" to the skin of the person, but rather refer to a patterning of behaviors to which we may ascribe some internal psychological functioning processes. The referents of these concepts cannot be only the external behavioral events. These refer to internal patterns which must be verified by other behaviors at different points in time under different contexts. Reference is to a process which can be conceptualized as the totality both external and internal.

The situation is further confounded by stimuli which may be perceived by judges as either hostile, threatening, etc., setting up appropriate behavioral approaches toward the stimuli, or they may also be perceived as challenges in which interest is evoked and approach behavior be forthcoming on this basis.

Reward and punishment are major concepts utilized in connection with both external and internal judgmental processes. They are not widely used in the SJI literature.

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140 The point is an important one for the dissertation theoretically and especially for counteracting the naive behaviorism which may be imputed to the SJI writers.

141 For example, the strong attraction "love" cannot be construed by any single act, such as beating a child, but by the totality of the relationship between the parent and child, a totality which represents both internal and external variables by virtue of the nature of interpersonal interaction involving both of these.

142 They are not indexed in much of the Sheriffs' major work and the other literature searched for this work including basic social psychology texts, e.g., Richard Dewey and W. J. Number, An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966); Edwin P.
Research needs in this area are for the specification and dimen-
sioning of scales to control external stimuli and to establish those
stimuli which provide opportunity for behavior to be differentiated
in such a manner as to be subject to dimensioning or measurement so
that records are possible and thereby making possible inferences as
to internal conceptual functioning which can be generalized to other
situations which are parallel.  

Hollander, Principles and Methods of Social Psychology (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967); Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L.
Strauss, Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1968); James O. Whittaker, Introduction to Psychology (Philadelphia:

See appendix p. 21 (available from the author) for elaboration
on the concept of reward and punishment and parallel concepts such as
approach-withdrawal, like-dislike, desire, favorable, preference, and
reference scales in conjunction with anchors, and their psychosocial
as well as psychophysical aspects. Communication and role taking are
also recognized as being both external and internal. Lesser concepts
such as "outcomes" or "consequences" are also discussed.

143 See for discussion S. B. Sells, "Dimensions of Stimulus
Situations Which Account for Behavior Variance," in S. B. Sells (ed.),
Stimulus Determinants of Behavior (New York: The Ronald Press Company,

One of the chief elements of such research is the development of
experimental designs in which the judge is able to respond in differenti-
tated ways on a continuum which has relevance to some domain under
consideration. Random differentiation of results from such as the
open ended questionnaire or interview provides such a vague external
stimulus that it becomes impossible to draw correlations between the
stimulus and differentiated responses which occur. It is obvious that
for certain purposes, i.e., the developing of domains of discourse,
such types of questions are extremely useful, but they do not provide
the external stimulus and response structures necessary to establish
the ranges and directions of stands which are available to individuals
or groups either in general or particular. There is also the problem
of rapport necessary at high levels of involvement in order for the
respondent to feel free to talk on controversial issues, or the issues
are so little ego-involving that the individual's stand is probably
meaningless in the sense of his "really caring" one way or the other.
The degree to which a person "cares" is one way to describe his degree
of "involvement."
Summary

The use of the concept judgment by the SJI has some of the difficulties inherited from the varieties of synonyms and relationships to other concepts described in the above pages. It also has been noted that the use of the concept judgment avoids a number of concepts which have been controversially ambiguous. Some of these have been noted. The concept of judgment (as viewed by the SJI) has an aspect or variable within it a principal variable of involvement which is appropriately included in the name of the approach not only because of its importance but because it has been so little considered by many of the alternative approaches used in conceptualizing the psychological functioning of persons. The importance of involvement for persons in groups is another significant argument for its use which will become apparent as involvement is discussed in the next section of this chapter. The conceptual confoundings surrounding involvement may parallel those of judgment as being possible variables in the relatively small impact of the SJI on the sample of the sociological literature reported in Chapter V.

Involvement

A major aspect of the Social Judgment Involvement Approach revolves around the concept of involvement. As has been noted above, it is important in its providing a referent to the link between individual judgment and the material and non-material stimulus situations in which the person functions. The concept of involvement will be seen as one which ties judgment not only to other aspects of the
internal stimuli which might be conceptualized as "self," but relates directly the phenomenon of self in differential degree to various aspects of the external stimuli.

Man is not only spacially located in his world, but is also locatable in "social space," i.e., some objects and persons are "more important to him than others" in given conditions; i.e., they are closer to him. What they say and other ways they behave are more closely attended and followed.

Involved in such frameworks are a variety of dimensions of such "distance," e.g., specification of its "conditions" or content, i.e., the "roles" which are involved, the complexity, i.e., differentials involved in the content, how diverse are the sub-aspects of the roles involved. Another dimension is the "interrelatedness" or the degree to which the sub-aspects are interrelated with each other or function separately in given conditions. This might be a sort of "distance" or "valence" or "involvement" between sub-aspects of the larger concept of "distance." These, as will also be noted below, have taken many different forms, not the least of which are such concepts as "social distance" and the classic instruments relative to the Bogardus "social distance scales."

Many different issues are of course involved in the study of such involvements, as there are also many different kinds of involvement. The varieties of kinds of involvement have not only been on the basis of issues and kinds, but also on the types of stimuli which have been utilized in evoking the effect many would wish to call "involvement." A variety of clear synonyms (clear in varying degrees) will be noted,
as well as a discussion at some length of the variety of ambiguous concepts which may or may not indicate involvement, depending largely on the context in which they are used.

It should become apparent through elaboration of the above discussion that the literature is quite indefinite and may be leading to confounding of some of the significant issues. Not the least of the areas of confounding is that which relates the two concepts attitude and involvement as they are used together and separately in the literature. It will be briefly shown how the concepts of attitude and involvement become entangled with other concepts such as extremity, approval, acceptance, AL, satisfaction, etc., to make interpretation of findings in the literature difficult.

A major part of the latter portion of this chapter deals with the scaling of involvement, including the difficulties involved in attempting to conceptually differentiate attitude and involvement within some of the frameworks noted above. The discussion will include various dimensions of involvement, experimental designs and stimulus conditions which appear to produce differential involvements, and by the same token produce evidence as to how it is generated in "everyday life."

Two basic approaches, the direct and the indirect, will be discussed as they are found in the literature and variations within each will be taken up. A selected number of the wide variety of stimulus conditions being used to develop or control for involvement will be noted.
It must be emphasized that it is "involvement" effects which are the focus of attention here. The degree to which differential behaviors of persons are capable of being explained only in terms of differential relationship with the stimulus conditions in which the behaviors occur will be explored in the same manner that the high rate of individuals withdrawing from heat leads one to assume there is a "heat" effect in process. Crucial is the degree to which extrapolations can be made from such stimulus conditions to other stimulus conditions useful in the study of social organization.

Elaborated below will be a discussion of some of the stimuli being utilized to evoke differential involvement effects with the explicit end in view that they be capable of being measured in manners which can then be correlated with differential behaviors which are also of such a nature as to be quantifiable.

Following such a major discussion we will summarize by indicating briefly the ways in which various major conceptual models have dealt with the problem of involvement and briefly indicate some of the 1) controversies, 2) inconsistencies, and 3) problematic conceptual difficulties which appear to be plaguing the area of measuring involvement.

The above will of necessity get into writers in the fields of psychology and sociology as they deal with involvement, or do not deal with it, as the case may be.

There are at least four major areas in which the significance of involvement becomes apparent in modern society. These by no means exhaust the significances and it is obvious that there are many
derivatives of each of the below which makes the specification of the significances almost endless and coextensive with the nature of man. The significances may become more apparent as the chapter unfolds.\textsuperscript{144}

Research Needs

Research needs related to involvement and judgment have at least two major aspects, one related to empirical descriptive studies of a host of content areas in which attitudes and involvement would be useful in a variety of planning problem solving areas such as poverty, and intergroup conflicts of all kinds. A second major area lies in the development and sophistication of research categories, theories and methods. Major categories of research such as field versus laboratory are increasingly being viewed as different aspects of a single process of dimensioning relevant variables.

The major research need reflected in this work is that of the measurement of involvement effects as this is related to group and organizational functioning.\textsuperscript{145} Aspects of this relate to such as G. A. Woodward's, 1967, plea for research on the degrees of involvement shifts as persons may shift from one dimension to another, e.g.,

\textsuperscript{144}These are related to controversiality of issues, loss of "identity," the concept of science, and the "objectivity" of the scientists. For further discussion of these points, see the appendix p. 29, available from the author.

truth to favorability. Multidimensional scale research in which multiple stands are assessed has been called for by J. H. Peterson, 1967. The characteristics of items and their placement is an area in need of research. The degree to which "moderates" (or people taking "middle of the road" positions) may be highly involved is another need for research. Many of the conceptualizations discussed in this work as they relate to involvement are in need of research; e.g., the differentiation affect and effect as represented in the literature is in need of clarification to see if it represents a dualistic formulation which can no longer be defended. The differential degree to which involvement influences imposed or own category sorting is another research problem. The relationship between involvement and how much knowledge about the involving object or category is also in need of research, as is a correlate, the frequency


148 G. A. Woodward, op. cit., p. 3.

149 J. H. Peterson, op. cit, p. 53.
of contact, the latter having the possibility of being highly redundant. 150

The importance of involvement research to conflict reduction is indicated by B. L. Koslin's, 1967, statement that conflict reduction modes may change with the centrality (involvement) of the issues to the individual. 151

A most useful area of research is that which might link involvement with creativity. 152

Kinds of Involvement

There are in the literature a number of different conceptualizations of involvement which seem to be unrelated to issues, though

150 A comment by C. Schrag would appear to be most appropriate to this work, "Perhaps the greater need in sociology today is for more of the modest 'inference chains,' explanation sketches, and embryo theories that aim primarily at organizing selected research findings and suggesting further avenues of inquiry." Clarence Schrag, "Elements of Theoretical Analysis in Sociology," in Llewellyn Gross, Sociological Theory: Inquiries and Paradigms (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 244.


Another example of possible research relates to changing involvement effects as collective bargaining time approaches. The above is not only an area of research need, but an example of an aspect of research design. Another example of the above is C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, saying the key to attitude communication discrepancy research is in "systematic variation in personal commitment . . . " Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzaffer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), p. 244.

issue involvement might be one kind. Examples are such as involvements with no stand, spiritual involvements, emotional involvements, intellectual, task, ego, etc. Inventories of different kinds might go on ad infinitum, e.g., organizational, group, "discussional," or ritualistic. It would appear that "kinds of involvement" may be translated into "subject" or "object" of the involvement.

There are a wide range of types of concepts used to denote the situations which are involving, which give rise to evidence that involvement is present. For example, communication involvement, occupational involvement, marital involvement, etc. These are differential in content and might be expanded ad infinitum.

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154 For example, masculine-feminine ego involvement might be interpreted as being the judges' involvement in masculine and feminine roles, and in this case its effect on mirror tracing skill. David Noer and James O. Whittaker, "Effects of Masculine-Feminine Ego-involvements on the Acquisition of a Mirror-Tracing Skill," Journal of Psychology, LVI (1, 1963), pp. 15-17.

The above does not invalidate the usefulness of specifying the different "kinds of involvement" but would make clear the basis of the category. It would make explicit the heuristic nature of the category. It would also point to the heuristic nature of the concepts used to classify such kinds, e.g., "masculine" when so used becomes simply a category to indicate a classification of events, behavior, phenomena which are so classified by the individual doing the classification, and others might classify the same (behavior-events) on the basis of job, emotional, intellectual, family, etc., depending on the frame of reference, the problems with which they were dealing.

Spiritual involvement is a relatively untreated kind in the literature searched for this work. The referent of the concept spiritual gets one far beyond the scope of this work.

For further discussion of the kinds of involvement see the appendix p. 31, available from the author.
Synonyms of Involvement

There are a range of concepts which appear to be very closely related to the concept of involvement as it is being used by SJI writers and there are some others which appear to have some pretty clear ambiguities which may be crucial to the ways in which the literature is dealing with involvement. The clear synonyms are such as centrality, importance, pertinence, salience, relevancy, concern, goal related, and interpersonal distance, the latter including strength of interpersonal attraction and interaction distance.

As an example, in their discussion of the concept of congruity T. M. Newcomb, R. H. Turner, and P. E. Converse, 1965, indicate that what they call "centrality to indifference continuum" is relevant to understanding attitude congruity, its organizing behavior, and the disorganizing impact of incongruity. 155

Incongruity which is not in areas of centrality will be less disruptive. 156


For further discussion of centrality and other synonyms for involvement such as importance, salience, and relevancy, see the appendix p. 32, available from the author.
The ambiguous terms which follow in the next section may be interpreted as being on different continua other than one of degree of involvement, relevancy, etc., to self.

All of the concepts in this section on synonyms are comparative and the crucial point that makes them relevant to involvement is their specification as being relevant, etc., to "self" or its parallel concepts. Without such specification they lose all properties of being synonymous with involvement. Of course even the concept of involvement may lose that noted above unless the adjective ego (self) is added. 157

Concern is another concept which appears to have as its focus the continuum of the person in his involvement with selected aspects of the "environment." 158


It is possible that the concept of concern be used by those writers who are also using the concept of anxiety. For example, S. Millman, 1965, cited by Hollander, 1967. Elaborating on W. J. McGuire, 1966, above, E. P. Hollander, 1967, cites him as saying that high levels of concern on an issue may cause higher anxiety and therefore less change. Susan Millman, "The Relationship between Anxiety, Learning and Opinion Change," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1965); E. P. Hollander, op. cit., p. 162; W. J. McGuire, op. cit., p. 485; Hollander, op. cit., p. 162.

Note that if anxiety is equated with dissonance, then it would appear that greater concern-anxiety would lead to more change. Part
The following will discuss concepts discussed as ambiguous in the degree to which they may refer to situations paralleling involvement. In the following there is much more chance that the referents not include involvement as a variable in the response effects findings. They are anchor, intensity, strong approval, feeling relationship, arousal, commitment, familiarity, feeling, position (strong), knowledge, learning, related, valence, interest, controversial, etc.

The above will be followed by some of the most common confoundings regarding involvement and such as extremity, approval, acceptance, A-L, as well as brief treatment of other variables which have often been associated with involvement such as satisfaction (e.g., job), performance (e.g., job), organization membership, and the amount of information and dimensions of judgment.

The most significant concept to the SJI which may be construed to parallel involvement yet at the same time be confounded in studies for SJI theorists is that of anchor. The concept of anchor stems from psychophysical studies where it has been long considered as a point on a continuum which became a standard for judging other stimuli.

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of what W. J. McGuire, 1966, was trying to reconcile was the finding by L. Berkowitz and D. R. Cottingham, 1960, that on the seat belt issue more fear appeal, hence greater anxiety, produces less change. Wm. J. McGuire, op. cit.; Leonard Berkowitz and Donald R. Cottingham, "The Interest Value and Relevance of Fear Arousing Communications," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LX (1960), pp. 37-43. The above might, of course, be explained in terms of latitudes of acceptance and rejection, e.g., the more involving the appeal the more likely rejection of a discrepant communication.

For further examples and brief discussion of interpersonal attraction as a synonym for involvement, see the appendix, p. 34f, available from the author.
Persons do not pay equal attention to all points on a scale, nor do all participate equally in influencing judgments of other stimuli on the continuum. In some cases these stimuli which are "weighted" are external to the person; e.g., the judge may directly compare two colors, two lengths, etc. Judgments resulting in patterns of errors, differential accuracy, show some to be more influential in the judgment process and are called anchors, having anchoring effects. 159

The ambiguity in meaning with regard to anchoring of concern in this section comes from studies of judgment in which it is not clear, not specified, not controlled as to whether or not anchoring effects reflect involvement effects.

In the literature on anchoring the concept of salience noted above is found and is somewhat confounded as to whether it means salience in terms of being close enough on the scale under


Absolute judgments where the judge decided whether an object was "heavy" or "light" on the basis of an internalized scale and anchor within that scale have been called "absolute" (as opposed to comparative or relative) because there appears to be no comparative judgment being made, "heavy" or "light" being viewed as properties of the objects themselves.

It is apparent that both are "comparative" or relative, the difference being in where the anchors and the anchoring scale are located. It is, of course, also apparent that even in the so-called "comparative" judgments of two external stimuli that there is involved a variable of personal factors entering in, they never being completely "objective," e.g., D. Rethlingshafer and E. D. Hinckley, 1963. D. Rethlingshafer and E. D. Hinckley, "Influence of Judges' Characteristics upon the Adaptation-Level," *American Journal of Psychology*, LXXVI (1963), pp. 116-119.
consideration to be influenced by anchor effects as a result of position, order, time, within range or out of range, information, and/or other effects, and involvement.

The development of a concept of internal anchors and their "anchoring effects" and its incorporation with "own attitude," "own position," "own value," etc., would seem to be moving in the direction of avoiding reification of such internal functioning variables. 160

A judge may have no clear "own position" (anchor) by virtue of the scale not being on an issue in which he is sufficiently involved to develop an "own position." It is of course at this point that the whole categorizing pattern becomes significant; i.e., he spreads his categories over many positions, his own (latitude of acceptance) being very broad.

160 The concept of anchor effects appears to be a descriptive term of possibly some significance in being able to communicate conceptualizations of the area of judgment. It connotes process. Coupled with latitudes of acceptance, etc., it connotes ranges rather than points. It connotes stability, continuity, without at the same time being static. Most important, of course, is the possibility that the concept of "anchor" and "anchor effects," particularly the latter, may avoid the continued reification of internal variables.

Internal anchors would always seem to involve in some degree an involvement dimension by virtue of the conceptual functioning implicit in it; but the degrees to which such conceptual functioning is central to the person's concept of self may vary widely. Some are so distant that writers for all "practical" purposes ignore them, e.g., auto-kinetic studies where persons have no prior "beliefs, values, etc." regarding movement of light.

Note that the above does not exclude the possibility that under certain conditions of judgment of the light ego-involving variables may be made to become significant in the judgment; e.g., persons present may be a group, in which case judgment may be made relevant to some aspect of group norms.
The differential effect of anchors is by definition the key to their being called anchors. A boat stops drifting, it is assumed the anchor has started functioning. Consistent differential placement of items provides grounds for assuming there are points on the continuum which have differential relevance.\footnote{161}

The difficulty which must be faced at this point is that differential effects noted in judgment of scale items may be attributable to anchor involvement or it may be due to other variables such as knowledge, order, discriminability, ends per se, discrepancy per se, etc. The above may confound the concept of anchors.\footnote{162} This is not to say that a behavior may have no "anchors," but that the anchors are difficult to derive from the evidence. All behavior must be "anchored," the difference being its involvement in the ego-self concept structure of the individual and accompanying normative structure of his group memberships.

If the domains are relevant and anchoring effects are found attributable to group membership then a whole new range of considerations enter into any attempt to understand differential effects involved.

\footnote{161}{The various consequences of anchors will be explored in the section below on consequences of involvement.}

\footnote{162}{The utilization of such situations invoking persons "taking the role of others" may or may not be also obtaining variables which are anchored in ego-involvements. Such behaviors may represent behavior which is idiosyncratic to the particular context.}
Another concept which has been confounded with involvement and producing much ambiguity and confusion is intensity. The amount of agreement, feeling, etc., as these have been seen as "intense" have often been viewed as therefore being "involving." The issue is one of what is "intense"? What is it that has increased over less "intense" situations or reactions? If intense refers to the degree to which an individual takes a position at the extreme of a scale, then there need not be involvement involved. For example, on the amount of support for the poor, is a stand advocating $200 per week more "intense" than $100 per week? If on the other hand the degree to which the person considers the issue important to him in relation to other issues, then intensity can be equated with involvement. 163

There may be some question as to how or what is reflected in questionnaires and other instruments simply asking, "how intensely do you believe this?" without having some basis for the individual to comparatively reflect his intensity on the issues. Intensity may be construed to mean "emotionally" or with feeling, etc., and thereby invoke misleading responses from persons insofar as dimensioning involvement hierarchies are concerned.

163 The exception to this is of course the scale which includes levels of involvement itself, e.g., the statements making up the scale themselves are scaled in their indicating differential degrees of involvement. This has been rare in the literature, and would be extremely difficult to control, having to be validated with each population of judges. General categories of statements, such as those referring to self and objects have been found to be differentially involving. Alfred R. Gliksman, "Categorizing Behavior as a Function of Meaning Domain," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, II (3, 1965), pp. 37-377.
Intensity simply indicates degree or amount of the dimension under consideration. High degrees of approval does not necessarily mean centrality or importance of the issue. An individual may express a great amount of approval for an issue, meaning he thinks it to be very correct, truthful, probable, necessary to accomplish certain goals, etc., without at any point indicating how he sees the issue or statement, etc., to be arranged in his own hierarchy of involvements.

The difficulty will be seen below in the issue of "strength" of responses in which for instance the likert scale obtaining responses where the individual "strongly" supports or endorses, etc., the statement, do not tap the person's relative comparisons of comparative significances of such issues as are involved in the statements.\(^\text{164}\)

Intensity when used with scaling may be opposed to neutrality when neutrality may either mean neutral on the scale of stands on an issue, i.e. from the person highly approving to highly disapproving, in which case there might be a body of stands-statements which he neither approves nor disapproves, or it may refer to involvement intensity in the issue itself in which a neutral position is one with which he may agree and support.\(^\text{165}\)

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164 The reader is referred to D. Hartindale's, 1960, cite of G. Tarde who noted that there are significant problems in going beyond mere counting acts to get at "... important problems of intensity." Don Hartindale, The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), p. 347.

165 For additional discussion of "intensity" and related concepts such as "hardness" or "sureness," "commitment," "familiarity," "knowledge," "feel," "learn," "like," and "controversy" as related to involvement in scales see appendix p. 35f., available from the author. Each of the above have been also discussed at other points in this work.
A discussion of the concept of attitude and involvement need only be brief and summarizing following the extensive discussion earlier on attitude and its measurement. 166

There are at least three basic positions or concepts which are involved in attitude-involvement. One which makes no differentiation, another which considers one to be merely a dimension of the other, i.e. involvement as simply a component of attitude, and a third which sees them as distinctly different, as being involved in the variety of dualistic conceptualizations which while not absent from the above are not so apparent as when involvement is seen as completely differentiated. In the former attitude is seen as involvement.

Attitude is involvement. Attitude is an internal anchor and as such has some involvement by virtue of its definition in being a variable in behavior, its only evidence being behavior and in order for behavior to take place there must have been some involvement, some relationship to self. No effort is made to separate them. Such internal variables have dimensions, one of which may be the hierarchical arrangements as they function in specific-general contexts becomes the second. 167

166 The focus of attention here will be on the manners in which the two have been most directly confounded and the implications of this for measures of involvement. It moves in the direction of attitudes not being a useful concept except insofar as the concept of "effect" is added, without which it becomes increasingly the reifying of internal factors.

167 When the hierarchy becomes identified with "emotional," "rational," or "feeling," etc., the bifurcation into various dualistic concepts noted elsewhere in this work becomes possible.
The common tendencies to think of attitude as having two or more components or as to its being differentiated between attitude and belief are indicated here, though the latter is probably more specifically allocated to the third category where attitude and involvement are considered separate and we find the conjunction and being used with involvement. The latter, seeing attitude and involvement, tends to view attitude as not being comparative in relationship to other attitudes in the value-involvement hierarchy. This latter is relegated to an involvement factor in the internal psychological structure. Attitudes have been taken to be directed at objects out of context with the social setting in which individuals function, it being assumed they have attitudes and they also have involvements, these being bifurcated. It could be argued that the "involvement" includes attitudes toward the relative placement of issues in the hierarchy, which would then say that all involvement effects are attitudinal effects.


169 Such however would appear to miss the issue that internal variables effects are what is observed and such differential behaviors need not be confounded by specifying reified internal entities at this point. Parallels may be specified soon enough by the physiologist, in neurological-chemical terms, at the physiological level of analysis. See for levels discussion, Muzaf / Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969).
The individual differences in what appear to be similar external situations are of course the issue.\textsuperscript{170}

Number two is a definite improvement over number three insofar as it recognizes the component nature of the internal, the gestalt nature of the total, but it still has the problem of seeing them as "interacting" and raising the reification problem.

These components result from categorizing the stimuli in terms of the components such that results are obtained; e.g., cognitive, affective, activity, and as many other components might be found if the stimulus conditions were so categorized.

The issues which need to be resolved are whether or not any specification of reified internal variables is necessary in order to develop a conceptual framework within which human behavior can be predicted. Needed is increased specification of the external stimulus and the development of behavioral response contexts which can be of such a nature as to be differentiated with respect to the external stimulus, e.g., ranges presented sufficient to give full play to differentiating factors which may be present internally.\textsuperscript{171}

The problem is to specify the dimensions, ranges, complexities, domains, etc., on which external stimuli can be generated, thereby

\textsuperscript{170}The specification of internal variables and the difficulty therein has been taken up in the discussions of judgment and external and internal variables and therefore need not be taken up here except to note that these three variations on the conceptions of attitude-involvement are not equally adaptable to such judgment conceptualities.

establishing contexts in which the full ranges or selected aspects of internal variables can result in differentiated behavior. Concern here is with behaviors in specified contexts. Needed to study group and other social phenomena is the interjection of group or social variables into the context in which internal variables are functioning.\textsuperscript{172}

There are many concepts which have been utilized as "response concepts" to describe domains of response for persons. Several of these are particularly common and need to be pointed out as most important in recognizing the confounding nature of the instructions or format presented to judges and the interpretations as to what has been dimensioned in the resulting response. Selected ones are extremity, approval, acceptance, and A-L (adaptation level).\textsuperscript{173}

A response may indicate relative stand or position on the reference scale continuum, i.e., that which is most near the one that parallels the judges' own, with the continuum not presenting a scale of involvement but of the variety of alternative solutions to an issue or problem.

A second problem inherent in all three is shifting domains or meanings on the part of the respondent; i.e., he shifts from approval

\textsuperscript{172}It must be cautioned that the above discussion not fall into a naive behavioristic position which eschews the consideration of internal variables as being unamenable to scientific study and avoids as well the reification of them. See elsewhere in this work.

\textsuperscript{173}The latter is usually presented as the neutral, central, indifferent, on the reference scale. A-L is in a sense the opposite of the other three, though involving the same difficulties with regard to the domain of meaning which is associated with it.
to true, hence marking as "approved" items or statements which he does not agree with but recognizes as being correct or true, hence confounding the meaning of a positive response to the item.

Another problem is demonstrated in the inconsistent results found in results relating involvement to extreme stands, it being fairly clearly established that individuals reporting extreme positions on a reference scale do not necessarily have heavy ego-involvements in them.

The role of reference groups and which ones are utilized in the response of the judges as they perceive themselves as members of many groups, whether they can overtly name them or not, they do have differential impact on their behavior. The role of such reference groups on specific kinds of stimulus judgment have been noted, e.g., auto-kinetic, own category, and scores in group contests.  

Without specification or controls as to which reference groups are being used in the judgment process the results are possibly confounded.

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174 Reference above is to real groups where social norms, etc., are functioning (not categories, aggregates, or ad hoc gatherings of persons), and where judgments in which a person's relationships with others, their judgments, his perceptions of their judgments, his perception of his relationships with them, the value hierarchy in which he ranks those relationships, all enter as variables in the response to the stimulus continuum scale presented to him.

175 Approval by an individual cannot mean that he approves in any abstract sense irrespective of his group memberships, it cannot mean one response is his "own real self" or some such phenomena. His concept of "self" rather includes his concepts of memberships in a variety of groups. The consistencies between behaviors in response to instruments and behaviors on related issues elsewhere (they are both behaviors) may occur because issues and contexts are so inconsequential to membership groups that they do not have these variables entering in.
Groups having "extreme stands" have been those most easily isolated and are usually most involved in those issues because they are called upon to defend themselves. Whereas groups not taking stands at the extremes are more difficult to locate and very often are not as heavily under attack by the wider population and less involved in the issue. Hence, though extremity and involvement are often correlated there is no necessary correlation. The use of such groups having "known stands" and involvements is widely found in the literature. 176

The "extremity" of any stimulus presented can only be considered internally extreme with reference to a scale, requiring knowledge about the parameters of the persons engaging in judgment. 177


The relationship between extremity and involvement is an important one because of the many ways in which the two have been confounded in the past. These are primarily studies which attribute constriction of scales, lowered discrimination, narrowed latitudes of acceptance, general contrast-displacement, to extremity rather than to involvement effects. 178

The situation is made more complex by virtue of the wide range of synonyms such as strong, intensity, etc., in which it is not clear whether position on the continuum of stands or involvement in the stands is indicated. 179

"Approval," with adjectives "strong," and "very strong," in front of it has also been interpreted not only as being "extreme" but also


as intensity and involvement. It is apparent that strongly approve gives no indication of the place such an issue has in the person's hierarchy of values in the particular group which is under consider-
ation, let alone the relative value of the group involved to other groups of which the individual may be a member.

The shift of domain from "approval" to "true" as noted above also changes the validity of the response as indicative of the inter-
pretations given it. 180

Parallel problems are those of "out of range" persons and extremes where the statement is so extreme that the judge cannot even consider it in the same domain or scale. 181

There are several main issues regarding the concept of accept ance-acceptability. One is the issue as to the concept of acceptance and its relationship to involvement. Another is the related questions about the dualistic nature of such differentiation as it relates to affectivity as opposed to "favorability" which is "cognitive." 182

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See S. Moscovici, 1963, for statement which attributes to the Guttman technique the consideration of only the content of the
The confounding and specification of the differentiation between acceptance of stands and involvement in the issues is a major aspect of the SJI which has been considered at a variety of points in this work. Crucial is the conception of reference scales with latitudes of acceptance, rejection and noncommitment as these are considered in relation to involvement in the issue with which the reference scale is concerned. It is important that acceptance or rejection of specific stimuli not be viewed as an isolated process but one of comparison with a range of other stands both external and internal. The cautions against shifts in domains of judgment and reference group shifts in judgment are as applicable to the process of acceptance as any of the others described herein. 183

The following is intended to very briefly summarize the nature of scales and a basic tendency to separate as inherently qualitatively different attitudes and involvement along with a discussion of several basic dimensions of scales. This will be followed by a discussion of categories which are accepted or rejected, apparently not considering involvement except as it may be confounded with "intensity" or "strength" of response. Serge Moscovici, "Attitudes and Opinions," in Paul R. Farnsworth (ed.), Annual Review of Psychology, Volume XIV (Palo Alto, California: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1963), p. 236.

183 Harry Helson, Adaptation-Level Theory: An Experimental and Systematic Approach to Behavior (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964); Harry Helson, "Current Trends and Issues in Adaptation-Level Theory," American Psychologist, XIX (1, 1964), pp. 26-38. The variety and complexity of the findings which have been connected with the concept are many and cannot be a matter of discussion here. See the appendix p. 39 (available from the author) and elsewhere this work for further discussion of adaptation level as well as related concepts which may carry connotations of involvement, e.g., "satisfaction," "performance," and "information."
varieties of basic experimental designs as they specifically relate to involvement and noting two basic approaches, the direct and the indirect, with a side discussion of absolute versus relative judgment which we noted earlier, but need to tie in here as it relates to involvement. The experimental design section will be concluded with some general discussion of specific conceptual frameworks relating to measurement of involvement and this will provide a background for the specific discussion of the Own Category Procedure to follow in the next chapter.

Following the discussion of various models that have most directly been seen as paralleling SJI and Own Category Procedures, there will be a brief summary of those writers which have given various amounts of attention to the approach, both pro and con, including some brief introduction to the larger analysis of sociological writers which have been concerned with it.

**Scales**

Measuring scales are attempts to develop external stimuli which are differentiated in ways which not only can be measured, but which can elicit behavior on the part of the judge(s) which can be assumed to produce differential behavior that correlates with the original stimulus in such a way that the systematic patterns of differential behavior are present and correlate with other criterion in meaningful ways.

Attempts to arrive at such patterned differential stimuli have been viewed in the past as encountering certain difficulties, e.g.,
involvement was to be avoided in Thurstone scaling, and "social desirability" was a confounding variable in attempts to arrive at the judges' own concepts of self and other attitudes. Both of these have subsequently proven to be a necessary inclusion in attempts to develop coherent theoretical and methodological approaches to social psychological functioning.

For a number of years it has been apparent that judges can and do arrange responses to statements in continua on the basis of the content and other various aspects of the statement. Such arrangements represent complex behavior patterns which have as antecedents very complex socio-psychological processes which are increasingly recognized as involving experience in groups, organizations, etc. Patterns of such responses have been the basis for setting up the major scales such as Likert, Guttman, Thurstone, and the psychophysical judgment scales.


A body of literature is developing which is focusing on the patterns which judgment of stimuli which are assumed to have continuaums constituting scales display.\textsuperscript{187}

The more useful of the variety of dimensions of phenomena as they relate to involvement are those relating to semantic property, and/or conceptual space, time, hierarchy, and complexity.\textsuperscript{188}


It would appear that there are aspects of each of the above which have some merit, though it is the latter on which the Own Category Procedure is based and is the thrust of this work, it being the only one which has stressed involvement of the judges, the other two either playing it down (A-L) or denying its existence as influencing placement of items. The bifurcation between attitude and involvement research referred to above is noted by C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965. Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, op. cit., p. 66.

\textsuperscript{188} See the appendix p. 41, available from the author, for brief discussion of these.

Experimental designs may be seen by the SJI to have three main categories of variables: external, internal, and response variables. The latter are continuously external in the sense of "feedback" to the organism. The principal kinds of experimental designs involved revolve around several domains, e.g., degree of structure, degree of disguise, direct or indirect.

Whether or not "sorting" is used may be another category of experimental designs. Another might be whether or not judges are placed directly in social contexts consisting of real groups, ad hoc groups, or singly with these types of social stimuli being introduced through some type of simulation such as tapes or the instructions themselves.

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190 Direct and indirect are probably more correctly subsumed under the domain of disguise, the same also being the case for absolute vs. relative experimental designs where it is most likely that degree of structure is at issue, i.e., is the stimulus to be judged more structured such that the judge "compares" two external stimuli, or is it a lesser degree of structure and more "internal" variables, etc., are brought in as differentiating effects variables in the judgment processes.

191 Still another variant of experiment might be considered to be the one which is relatively recent, the introduction of the experimenter himself as a social external stimulus in the experimental situation. Included also might be those utilizing T group or related groups in "natural setting," and being neither clearly "field" or laboratory. Group, intergroup, and organizations are increasingly being considered as legitimate areas for experimental research. For example, Karl E. Weick, "Organizations in the Laboratory," in Victor H. Vroom (ed.),
An adequate definition of experiment might be R. A. Fisher's, "experience carefully planned in advance..." or as "... a process of observation, to be carried out in a situation especially brought about for that purpose." Wm. J. McGuire, 1967, says the experiment should be taken to mean "to test or try." It is apparent that the above might be expanded to include study of a wide range of social phenomena even in "field" situations.


Of particular interest to students of the SJI Own Category Procedure has been the "known group," where by virtue of numerous behavioral indices displayed by group members in group situations it is assumed there are known "norms," roles, etc. present in the group.


194 Wm. J. McGuire, 1967, seems to have this in mind when he cites the computer as contributing to the use of "natural settings" as he cites them for experimental work, enabling the "control" of a wide variety of variables unable to be handled with past techniques. He cites the Sheriffs as being an example of bridging the experimental and "natural" settings. Wm. J. McGuire, 1967, Loc. cit.

It would appear therefore that a major trend is the breaking down of the traditional bifurcation between experimental and field research, recognizing that basic processes of observation, control or record keeping, and methodology in tabulating results, etc. are the same in all whether it be in a single room, or where the physical location is the doorway to the judge's private home as in the case of the survey.

Several writers have recently used the concept "experimental sociology," e.g., A. P. Simpson, Sr., 1966, and concern with experimental designs are found increasingly, e.g. A. V. Cicourel, 1964.

Ansel Patillo Simpson, Sr., "Attitude Change, Social Status, and
Concern here is with experimental or other conditions which produce differential involvement effects. The following discussion will move from the more general conditions and progressively narrow down to the Own Category Procedure which will be taken up in some detail in Chapter IV.

In looking at stimulus conditions which produce differential involvement it must be kept in mind that involvement is a concept which by definition is relationship between 1) judges and 2) objects, concepts, etc. One experimental condition may be that which varies the stimulus material, assuming it has differential involvement for the same judges. Another basic approach is to vary the judges for the same stimulus material. The former is obtained through instructions, other persons, other stimulus conditions, the latter through employing differential persons of some known group or other characteristics.195

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195 Among stimulus conditions noted above might also be communications. Some might wish to call it a general "verbal" category of stimulus and include also the statements which are a part of the Thurstone scale and similar instruments including the Own Category Procedure.
It appears that no judgment is possible independent of internal variables, the issue therefore being whether or not they are to produce differential effects. 196

The dimension of direct vs. indirect is relevant for dimensioning of involvement. In a direct experimental design the judge would be asked to sort on the basis of his involvement in the issue, i.e., asked the direct question, "How involved are you?" 197 Writers such as L. N. Diab, 1967, claim that it does make a difference whether or not

196 This and other points have been covered at other points in this work. A parallel discussion may be made of direct and indirect as categories of experimental designs. Absolute may be viewed as having an anchor in reality from which judgments are made, e.g., M. Segall, 1959, had category four as neutral and called it an "absolute judgment" as compared with the judges who used category four to indicate their own position, the latter he calls "relative." Even as far back as M. Sherif and H. Cantril, 1947, they were pointing to the confusions apparent in terminology used to indicate the different judgments. A further indication is M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, 1961, saying that absolute is without any standard stimuli and thereby confounding the issue unless the statement is further qualified as to the meaning of "standard." Marshall H. Segall, "The Effect of Attitude and Experience on Judgments of Controversial Statements," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LVIII (1959), p. 63; Muzafer Sherif and Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Ego-Involvements: Social Attitudes and Identifications (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1947), p. 39; Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 32.

judges are aware of the fact that their attitudes are the object of a task. 198

Heavy involvement and the controversialness of the issue being discussed are strong variables in whether or not it is possible to use direct types of designs. 199


An example of the significance between direct and indirect may be found in the E. L. Cowan, 1966, suggestion that children may be assessed through a direct method because they have not learned yet to "cover up." Emory L. Cowan, "Social Desirability Responses of Young Children: An Interim Report," *Psychological Reports*, XIX (3, Pt. 2, 1966), pp. 1133-1134.

199 In 1931, L. L. Thurstone was suggesting that his scaling could be used only where the subjects could be expected to "tell the truth" about their convictions or beliefs. L. L. Thurstone, "The Measurement of Attitudes," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXVI (1931), pp. 249-269, reprint in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 22.

It is of course now recognized that the degree judges do not tell the "truth" may in fact be a very useful bit of information from which either involvement or controversialness of the topics concerned may be deduced. Ronald C. Dillehay, "Judgmental Processes in Response to Persuasive Communication," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, I (6, 1965), p. 633.

Where possible the direct approach is much more simple, but as noted above and below the inferences which can be made from it and the validity of them because of the possibility of many confounding variables is much more complex.
A concept which has been related to "indirect" is that of "projective." The classic source on indirect measurement is D. T. Campbell, 1950, as well as S. W. Cook and C. Selltiz, 1964.

Instructions are an important aspect of the instrumentation involved in measuring involvement. A variety of variables relating to the property of instructions are directly relevant.

The most important of these is probably the degree of structure in the instructions. Highly structured instructions may destroy the

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200. In the early literature such instruments were for the most part very "unstructured" in both the stimulus and response effects and involved a great deal of interpreting on the part of the person attempting to make use of the results. K. R. Vaughan, 1961, makes a parallel point, i.e., the disadvantage in the "unstructured" requiring extensive time in training as well as in the administration and interpretation of such instruments. Kathryn R. Vaughan, "A Disguised Instrument for the Assessment of Intergroup Attitudes," (unpublished Master's thesis, Texas College of Arts and Industries, Kingsville, Texas, 1961).


The many types of indirect assessment techniques cannot be explored here.

It might be noted that these are ones which may involve the "ethical" "moral" issues relating to invasion of privacy. This again will be taken up more fully at another point. Suffice to note here that to date the types of techniques discussed have not been refined sufficiently, and it is extremely doubtful if they ever can be applied meaningfully to specific individuals. Their applicability is in their ability to show patterned responses of number of persons-groups on issues which may be of use in a variety of planning procedures.
opportunity for the judges' internal variables to become operative in the judging process.202

Another major variable property of instructions is the degree to which they spell out what is actually measured.203 Basic dimensions of instructions also are their length, the grade level they are written on, whether they are written or read aloud, etc. In addition, instructions may establish the criterion or anchor, standard or domain to be used in judging.204


203 This relates to the direct-indirect dimension of experiments noted above as it is also related to the whole problem of general deception and ethical issues involved. Note they are ethical issues by virtue of them having important consequences to the levels of confidence which persons have in the methodology assuring required levels of "privacy" and parallel consequences.

Of particular interest here is the degree to which instructions may create social contexts and at the same time provide a basic response form which will allow involvement to become a variable in the resulting activity. It is possible for general categories of social situations such as public or private situations to be developed by instructions. Social distance situations may also be developed in the items as in the classic Bogardus scale or included in the instructions.

A wide variety of roles can be introduced through instructions.

205 For example, C. I. Hovland, E. H. Campbell and T. Brock, 1957, created situations where judges expected their opinions would be published in the paper. Such public expectation made judges much less subject to counter propaganda.

206 For example, some judges were instructed to see themselves as judging classmates, or fraternal groups or dormitory roommates. W. W. Rambo and C. E. Smith, "Instruction Wording and the Transitivity of Comparative Judgments," Journal of Applied Psychology, XLIV (1960), pp. 289-290.

Hypothetical and related groups have also been injected into experimental situations through instructions.

It is of course obvious that differential importance and involvement can be introduced with reference to such groups and other issues (objects) as might be wished in the experiment. In relatively "disguised" situations this can be done by being able to establish that certain tasks are more involving for judges than others.

Increasingly "instructions" are being seen as simply another external stimuli in the experimental situation not to be differentiated

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208 Noted above has been K. E. Weick, 1967, stating group variables probably enter more often than the experimenter would like, whether wanted or not. He specifically notes the concept of "reference groups" in this connection. Karl E. Weick, "Organizations in the Laboratory," in Victor H. Vroom (ed.), Methods of Organizational Research (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), p. 434.

209 For example, several writers have utilized instructions which found differential results when judges were given instructions telling them they were engaged in IQ exercises and others told to perform "tasks" not reflecting any such self involving activity.

There is the assumption that the task being one of "intelligence" makes it more involving for the judge than when the judge is told that it is simply a routine classroom exercise. It is of course also noted above that making the task related to the course for a grade also makes the task more involving only providing the judges are involved with the course and grade. J. L. Freedman, 1964, is an example of the above. M. Deutsch, R. M. Krauss, and Norah Rosenau, 1962, make a parallel comment broadening it out to include such as leadership attitude, executive potential, and artistic judgment which could be stimuli involving for the judges when told the tasks were so related. Jonathon L. Freedman, "Involvement, Discrepancy, and Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LXIX (1964), pp. 290-295. Morton Deutsch, Robert M. Krauss, and Norah Rosenau, "Dissonance or Defensiveness?" Journal of Personality, XXX (1962), pp. 16-28.
from others. For example, it is often extremely difficult to differentiate instruction effects from experimenter effects. 210

The most direct methodology is to obtain the information through a question; i.e., "how involved are you in this issue." Direct question methodologies may be very useful in contexts where the issues are less involving for the subjects or where the social contexts can be seen to be parallel as noted above. In the absence of such parallelisms direct questions can be very misleading in predicting future behavior. 211

Another fairly direct way of obtaining involvement which is possibly less obvious is to have the judge be able to witness his performance or at least give him feedback on his performance, particularly as this may involve others being able to see or hear the performance or the report on performance. 212 Another way is the

210 For elaboration of "experimenter effects," see appendix p. 42, available from the author.

211 Direct questions may arouse a range of "evaluation apprehensions," fears, etc., by the judge as to what is going to be done with the data, what is "expected" of him, what is going on, etc., to the extent that responses are confounded beyond interpretation. The same could be said of the above discussion of "intelligence" as a stimulus in the instructions, invoking fear as to "what does this mean to me," even though the judge is not exactly aware what the full dimensions are that are being measured.

212 This could be a quite highly disguised indirect type of situation to obtain involvement if the situation is in the natural flow of social interaction. Karl E. Weick, "Laboratory Experimentation with Organizations," in James G. March (ed.), Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 250.
exchange method by which the judge is involved through payment or reward such as money or some other reward such as grade in the course. 213

Such methods of involvement may under certain contexts be less confounding than others. 214

Experimental designs may have involvement "indirectly." Indirect or disguised methodology is in some aspects much more simple than direct in the sense of avoiding some of the confounding factors. On the other hand it encounters some significant problems in its relationship to judges and the ongoing scientific process, e.g., the traditional question of "ethics." The chief advantage of the indirect lies in the degree to which direct assessment of internal variables may involve the judge being aware that his attitudes are being measured and the many confounding variables therein; e.g., what is it going to be used for, etc. 215

213 Ibid., p. 251.

214 A major issue being of course the degree to which all judges will be parallel in their categorization of the reward.

Further discussion of experimental designs may be found in the appendix, p. 43, available from the author.

The indirect techniques are basic to the whole "projective" techniques. 216

The more common designation for indirect data gathering techniques would be "disguised." The obtaining of information whether it be in interviews or informal conversation seldom is made explicit with regard to its ultimate use—content. 217 In 1933, G. W. Allport cited as difficulties in attitude scaling the fact that judges were

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There are several studies which have compared direct and indirect methods, e.g., G. Ekman and T. Kuennapas, 1962. F. N. Jones, 1965, cites Thurstone's work as being indirect. D. T. Campbell, 1950, cites indirect tests as showing the "attitudinal interference" with tasks of learning, remembering, and evaluating, and cites M. Sherif and K. Cantril, 1947.


217 This parallels the many problems revolving around the current controversy of "authenticity," ethics, etc. It will ultimately throw into base relief the whole issue that science does have implicit in it an ethic of honesty, dependability, responsibility, etc. Without protection from high levels of responsibility the levels of confidence necessary to maintain data gathering techniques such as the indirect and projective tests is not possible. It strongly parallels the "professional" relationships with clients or patients in law, medicine, and other professions which are established.

likely to rationalize, deceive, and be influenced by knowledge of the experimenter's purpose. The disguised techniques provide ways in which such problems may be circumvented. For example, they can be worked into the ongoing process such as Sherif, et al., did in the camp studies. Another example is the use of physiological responses such as GSR or pupillary action. There is some evidence to show that such as the above cannot be manipulated by the judge even if the judge is aware of his reactions being measured.

The purpose of the disguised techniques are not to "avoid" such variables as "evaluation apprehension," "social desirability," or "experimenter effects," but is rather an attempt to be able to


221 An example of the detail which may be involved in design of experiments is that of H. J. Greenwald, 1967. After having judges fill out "self report forms" they were "destroyed" by throwing them into a fake wastebasket next to a file cabinet inside which a confederate sorted new stimulus material on the basis of the self report and other experimental conditions. The experimenter then pulls out of the "file" a "standardized" response schedule. The judge is unaware that he is receiving a schedule based on earlier responses which he made. Anthony G. Greenwald, "Skill and Motivation as Separable Components of Performance," Perception and Motor Skills, XX (1965), pp. 239-246.
accurately specify what such variables are. They may be "manipulated," either in the sense of instructions or other contextual conditions, or they may be documented as part of the ongoing social context in which the "field study" is occurring.  

The above issues are more important as the topics become more controversial and involving for the judges.

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222 There is no attempt through such concern with disguised techniques to place the judge in an isolated position such that no social variables are involved in order to dimension somehow an individual "real self" which is divorced from group memberships, such being impossible.

K. E. Weick makes a case for disguised instruments on the basis of evaluation apprehension. He apparently does the same also in C. W. Sherif and M. Sherif, 1967, especially with regard to judgmental theory of attitude change testing, saying placement of items can be influenced by measurement procedures. Karl E. Weick, "Promise and Limitations of Laboratory Experiments in the Developments of Attitude Change Theory," in Carolyn W. Sherif and Muzaffer Sherif (eds.), Attitude, Ego-Involvement, and Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 68.


There are many examples of uses of instruments which might be seen as having confounding variables which bring findings into question as a result of not being able to specify the degree to which controversial involving issues are present.


C. D. Ward, 1966, is another study by an individual aware of such difficulties and the work of the Sheriffs; yet Ward does not disguise aspects of his design. Charles D. Ward, "Attitude and Involvement in
There are many ways in which an instrument may be "disguised."

One of the most obvious things to avoid is the reference to "attitude" in the instructions. Another way is to imbed the important items or to provide transition items. Another obvious way to disguise is to refrain from use of items which make clear the dimensions which are under measurement.

The examples of need for disguised techniques are inexhaustible, e.g., attitudes toward war on poverty, state aid to private education,

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drugs, birth control, etc. All are areas in which controversiality and involvement may be present. It is possible that there be ways to have the judge's own involvement not be an issue sufficient to invoke the variables noted above, yet at the same time be predictive of behaviors in situations in which involvement is functioning.

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226 Nothing said in this discussion, or throughout this work should be construed to mean that direct undisguised types of inquiry may not be very useful in certain contexts.

Relevant in this connection is the discussion by J. B. Miner, 1969, of the use of indirect measures where he makes the point that projective and disguised measures of employee attitudes are extremely intricate in their use in actual organizations by virtue of the suspicions engendered by them when intergroup conflict as between labor and management exists. J. B. Miner, Personnel and Industrial Relations: A Managerial Approach (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 229.

227 One of these is Norman Miller's, 1965, development of a laboratory situation in which a simulated involvement was attempted. Simulation of "real life situations" in laboratory contexts is one form of indirect or disguised experimental design which has found increasing use. Norman Miller, "Involvement and Dogmatism as Inhibitors of Attitude Change," Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology, VI (1965), pp. 121-133.

T. E. Drabek and J. E. Haas, 1967, are another example. Among several points they note the importance of simulation recognizing the difference between real and ad hoc groups and the subjects feeling that the consequences of their behavior will be over time. The above are aspects of the real situations in which social interaction takes place according to Drabek and Haas. Thomas E. Drabek and J. Eugene Haas, "Realism in Laboratory Simulation: Myth or Method," Social Forces, XLV (3, 1967), pp. 337-346.

A prerequisite to the latter point is that "... subjects be unaware that they are participating in an experiment," Ibid., p. 344.

They discuss at some length the difficulties involved in obtaining the complex social conditions in which real groups function, i.e., difficulty in simulation.

Closely related are computer applications in which connection he cites the work of Robert I. Chapman and John L. Kennedy, 1960, in connection with the RAND Systems research studies. Robert L. Chapman and John L. Kennedy, "The Background and Implications of the RAND Corporation Systems Research Laboratory Studies," in Albert Rubenstein,
An example of the way in which social variables might function relative to "realism" is possibly those studies in which judges "overhear" "accidently" the judgments of others in a laboratory situation.  

One of the principal aspects of structure in experimental design is meaning domain, i.e., that objects be placeable in categories somehow related to each other on the basis of some common characteristic on which categorizations may be "more" (or less) but not so much as to be put in a "completely different category." A. Cicourel, 1964 states that the study of categories employed by the man in the street should be the first task of sociology.

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For example A. F. Glixman, 1965, in categorizing behavior as a function of meaning domain contrasted domains were "objects," "war," and "self." The basis on which the domains were compared or ranked was their relevance to self. Alfred F. Glixman, "Psychology of the Scientist: XXII Effects of Examiner, Examiner-Sex, and Subject Sex upon Categorizing Behavior," *Perceptual and Motor Skills, XIV* (1967), pp. 107-117.

A. Cicourel, 1964, has been one of the sociologists calling for increased consideration of meaning and a model of the actor on which to base sociological theory and methodology. This is included in a critical comment on Talcott Parsons. Aaron V. Cicourel, *Method and Measurement in Sociology* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 184, 398.
A major difficulty presents itself relevant to the discussion of extremes on a continuum when such extremes are viewed by the judge as belonging to different domains or continuums; i.e., they may be viewed as having a "qualitative" difference rather than simply being "more or less" of the same "thing." 231

A major variable in an experimental design measuring involvement of the judge is the degree and kind of structure or ambiguity which is present. The disguised unstructured designs such as the usual projective psychological "personality" instruments, tests, etc., have the difficulties noted in other places in this work with interpretation, especially in the degree of skill which is needed to interpret them.

The clearest ways in which "structure" enters as a variable in our discussion are two. One is in the apparent inverse relationship between degree of external stimulus structure and the degree to which internal variables enter to produce differential behavior, and two,

231 What is at issue in the above is that the continuum no longer "means the same" to all judges but is broken up into two or more meaning continuums or domains. For example, when extreme of crime or deviant behavior becomes a "moral issue," which is construed by the judge to be a different domain from other crimes. Such breaks in scale domains would mean that shifts or displacements in items may represent different placements on continuums which are not clear to the experimenter and will confound the interpretation of results. What may be anchors as well as neutral in one domain may be extreme on another domain; e.g., a relatively unimportant "moral issue" in religious terms may be extreme on the crime domain.

This is, of course, a problem of "validity" and reliability in scales, the two are relatively interchangeable for most problem solving over the long run. See John Gaito, "Relative and Absolute Consistency in Reliability and Validity Procedures," Journal of General Psychology, LXX (1, 1964), pp. 139-141.
the more specific way in which items (or more concretely the number of categories) is a variable in the judging process. The structure of the stimulus may be "high" enough that all persons regardless of their internal variables will respond to it the same way.

Another way in which differential structural stimuli might be illustrated is that of items (statements) in which meaning may be more

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232 A specific illustration of structure is in the quite extensive controversy within the Q sort literature as to the relative merits of structured sorts where the judge is instructed to sort statements into specified numbers of categories and a certain number of statements in each category versus the "free sorts" advocated by some Q sort researchers. N. H. Livson and T. F. Nichols, "Discrimination and Reliability in Q Sort Personality Descriptions," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LII (1956), pp. 159-165.


Simple examples of stimulus designs which would illustrate perceptual structure are letters spaced apart, words omitted, letters omitted, tachistoscope projection, lowered illumination, autokinetic phenomenon, details of instruction, etc. For example of letters omitted see William R. Hood, "Rigidity of Concept Utilization as a Function of Inductive and Deductive Derivation," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1961).

or less ambiguous. In social terms the more information given about the group, organization, person, the more structured does the external stimulus become. Items are a way by which variations in involvement may be reflected in behavior. One of the ways in which items may give rise to behaviors which appear to reflect involvement is through the "content" of the items themselves, i.e. they being self referent or attitude items. Of course other ways are for the order, number, or some other arrangement; e.g., timing (order?) of the items form some pattern to enable the experimenter to infer that involvement was involved. The Own Category Procedure is one example.

The above are also discussed under various direct tasks which may be performed by judges, such as estimating, sorting, ranking, categorization, placement, etc. The content of such items may refer to performance of the content of the item or may be directed toward a variety of "objects" noted above under "direct" such as self, others, reference groups, objects; all of which may be responded to in differential patterns revealing involvement. The significance of the

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234 We shall see that such phenomena as stereotyping, by virtue of being so brief is ambiguous, quite often allowing wide ranges of interpretation. George A. Woodward, "Dimensions of Judgment and Characteristics of Displaceable Statements in the Disguised Structured Instrument for the Assessment of Attitudes toward the Poor," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1967).

235 Such items are likely to make the instrument undisguised, though this might not always be the case if the context is such that it be a "natural" part of the ongoing social context.
item for ego involving issues will also be a function of other aspects of the context such as "instructions." 236

Ambiguity is not just "lack of information" on which to make interpretation, is not just "lack of structure," but is rather a confounded structure which is not clear in its direction, e.g., pro-anti. 237

236 E. T. Prothro, 1957, made the items involving for the judges by simply having instructions which established as an anchor "favorableness to Arabs" and all the items were to be judged in that context. E. Terry Prothro, "Personal Involvement and Item Displacement on Thurstone Scales," Journal of Social Psychology, XLV (1957), pp. 181-196.

237 For example, it is not just "ambiguity" which leads to displacement but also "both sides" of issues being presented in the same item such that judges are able to assimilate one, reject the other or the reverse, thereby providing wide variation resulting from wide range of judges judging the same item. Marisa Zavalloni and S. W. Cook, "Influence of Judges' Attitudes on Ratings of Favorableness of Statements about a Social Group," The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, I (1, 1965), p. 51; William W. Rambo, "A Subjective Estimate Approach to Scaling Attitude Statements," Perception and Motor Skills XXIII (1966), pp. 63, 72.


Excellent examples of the ways in which the concern with items has elaborated in the literature are G. A. Woodward, 1967, and J. W. Peterson, 1967. The latter citing L. H. Nevin, 1964, finding that placing negative and positive clauses in items "determines" the direction of the displacement of the item. George A. Woodward,
Judgments of time periods not only of external stimulus exposure but also time of internal psychological functioning and response may be a variable from which involvement may be inferred.

Consequences of Involvement

The following section will deal with the "consequences" of involvement insofar as they can be observed through specific behavioral tasks, e.g., estimating, sorting, etc., which produce systematic inconsistencies ("errors") between responses given by persons who are known to be involved and those not to be involved.

The presence of persistent patterned displacement of items when presented with a range of alternatives may be indicative of involvement. This involves two basic aspects, 1) the persistence over time, of 2) differentially patterned placement of items (or other tasks),

allowing inferences to be made as to internal variables which are also differentially patterned.238

There appears to be the additional consequence of decreased time used in the judgment process. Involved judges take less time to make decisions, and are more "sure" of their responses. These are in addition to the consequences to be seen in the placement of statements in the Own Category Procedure.

In discussing the relationship between involvement and attitude change as it relates to the judging of verbal stimulus, it is important to question whether or not a basic issue is the stimulus conditions themselves as they relate to the reference scales of the


Lack of flexibility can of course be related to a number of other variables which may confound the interpretation that involvement is responsible for the stability or resistance to change in the patterned behaviors noted at other points in this work. For instance, the differentiation between hope and expectation, the differentials in judge creativity, concept maintenance, as well as others such as those of concrete and abstract differentials in the conceptual functioning of judges.


Involved in the above differentiation is the degree of "plausibility" or "possibility" aspect of judgment which has been pursued in certain aspects of the literature noted elsewhere and provides some confounding basis for differential involvement in issues. Hope is not necessarily less or more involving. For example, warnings regarding seat belt and automobile safety being viewed by judges as on a low level of probability (it has not happened to me) and low level of involvement with the issue (until an accident occurs).
judges. More specific are the conflicting reports which find involvement positively or negatively related with change, no correlation with change, or a curvilinear relationship between involvement and attitude change. Such conflicts may reflect experimental variables being only partially noted. For example, those which find a positive relationship have been testing or dealing with judges whose reference scales were such as to have the communications or items or tasks fall within the latitudes of acceptance, while those who were finding negative relationships were doing so under conditions of the stimulus falling within the latitudes of rejection. Those that were getting no conclusive findings may not have had involved judges, hence no pattern was showing. The Sherifs find the curvilinear description to be the more useful.

In summarizing the above discussions of external, internal, and external-internal concepts it may be useful to note that there appears to be a basic methodology involved in dealing with relationships between them. This might be briefly specified as the looking upon

239 The involvement-attitude change literature is reflected in a wide range of the social psychological literature, including that dealing with communication and the discrepancy issue, the conformity and persuasion literature, and the full range of inquiries as to the relative flexibility of personality and other individual characteristics. Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafar Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), p. 235.
"errors" as reflecting significant differentials in psychological functioning. 240

These "errors" exist between what may be agreed upon by "objective observers" as being external and the reports (responses) which judges give. Concern here is with the degree to which several kinds of regularized systematic "errors" may be indicative of group involvement. 241

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The use of the term "error" here must not be construed to imply the comparison of responses which are in "error" with some type of fixed absolute external reality with the philosophical implications therein. What is indicated is the instrumental or pragmatic conception of "reality" as developed by J. Dewey and followed implicitly (without reference to Dewey) by the Sherifs and others as they describe the criterion for psychophysical scales. See for example Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965).


D. T. Campbell, 1950, states "We are studying systematic errors in the respondents own perceptions, errors of which he himself is not aware." Donald T. Campbell, "The Indirect Assessment of Social Attitudes," *Psychological Bulletin*, XLVII (1950), p. 34.

Several classic examples involving groups are found in the summer camp studies and the autokinetic studies recently discussed in Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, *Social Psychology* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969).

As noted elsewhere there has been a paradox in the attempt by researchers to avoid such "errors" entering into studies rather than systematic recording and study of them, e.g., the attempts to avoid "social desirability" and "evaluation apprehension" noted elsewhere.
Systematic "errors" by members of the same groups may be considered to be indicative of the presence of group phenomena.242

Used in the Social Judgment Involvement Approach are the judging and sorting of statements which result in systematic "errors" which are called in the literature "displacement."243 Discussed above have been concepts relevant to the full range of various judgment consequences discussed earlier with all the myriad techniques developed for correlating external stimuli with response effects in order to arrive at patterns of "error."244

Indirect or disguised experimental designs in which activities are either a part of the ongoing process and/or the purposes for which the experimenter engages the persons in the judgment task are not made apparent to him were discussed.


244For example, there are the differential judgments given on the activities of ingroup members versus outgroup members. See M. Sherif, et al., 1961, for differential judgments by members of conflicting groups. Judgments concerned length of time (tug of war), accuracy of ball throwing, and bean picking. Muzzafer Sherif, O. J. Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, and Carolyn W. Sherif, op. cit.
Item displacement ("error") is the most significant of consequences of involvement here considered. The relationship between latitudes of acceptance, rejection, noncommitment and the relative amounts of displacement of numbers of judges gives some indication of the amounts of involvement, but the greatest and surest indication of involvement appears to be the degree to which displacements are accompanied by a reduction in the number of categories utilized and the size of the latitude of noncommitment.245 There appears to be a narrowing of latitudes of acceptance and increasing of latitudes of rejection with increased involvement as well as decreasing latitudes of noncommitment. The evidence seems to be moving in the direction of the latitudes of noncommitment being the most useful in indicating involvement.246

C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, make the very clear statement that the systematic displacements which they describe


246Noted here must be the confounding complexity of qualifying caveats which must be entered, e.g., such as "discrimination," "differentiation," "leveling-sharpening," etc., which have been touched upon at points above in this work and elsewhere.

It might be said that the involved discriminate more, if by this is meant that they categorize more items at the opposite extreme end of the scale, or at both extremes (latter done by persons heavily involved in the issue which take a stand consistent with the "neutral" or central statements on the scale).
did not occur with the less involved judges even though they may have endorsed similar positions.

There might be several alternative explanations for displacement, e.g., differentials in knowledge with the topics. One of the most common explanations for displacement is to be found in item characteristics. The relative absence of external standards is of course another factor which is commonly recognized, the presence of anchors close to the item being judged meaning that no internal variables are capable of being intervening variables and the placement of the item is compelling.


249 C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, op. cit., p. 24. Note that the above are only of importance at this point in the discussion of involvement and displacement insofar as involvement may be sufficient in certain cases so as to produce differential behavior. Whether such patterns will occur is also contingent upon the degree to which there are external anchors the judge may use, or in the absence of these he use his own. C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, op. cit., p. 241.

Another way of phrasing the placement pattern resulting from involvement is that the involved tend to have a "mode of judgment" which tends to be at the objectionable end of the scale. James H. Peterson, "A Disguised Structured Instrument for the Assessment of Attitudes toward the Poor," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1967), p. 47.
Involved judges using fewer categories are cited by J. H. Peterson, 1967. Fewer categories may derive from other than


involvement, e.g., general low cognitive complexity of the judge or low amounts of knowledge. 251

It is also possible the stimuli not represent the full range of the judges' reference scale, and the problems in interpretation of constricted numbers of categories is confounded by the issue raised by H. S. Upshaw, 1962, regarding the judges' "perspective" being wider than the scale presented. 252

Findings appear to differ with regard to the degree to which latitudes of acceptance and involvement are related, though there appears to be no question but that if there is any relationship it is a negative one; i.e., as involvement increases the latitudes of

251 There may be a general approach differential to stimuli insofar as some persons look for complexity in particular domains or across domains more than others. Another way to phrase the above is that judges may have differential propensities to view differences and similarities in external stimuli of all domains or between domains. O. J. Harvey, David E. Hunt, and Harold H. Schroder, Conceptual Systems and Personality Organization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961).

Note that the concepts of "leveling" and "sharpening" are also possibly relevant here.

acceptance or the number of statements placed in acceptable categories is decreased-restricted. 253


It has become increasingly evident however that the latitudes of noncommitment are most indicative of involvement. Citations to the above effect are found in M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1967, with the comment that the highly involved latitudes of noncommitment may approach zero in size. \(^{254}\) The same sort of note is discussed in C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, citing A. O. Elbing, 1962, as not having as involved subjects (students) and L. LaFave and M. Sherif, 1962, cited by J. W. Reich and M. Sherif, 1965. \(^{255}\) The above would appear to be the difference which


C. I. Hovland, 1959, was getting at with regard to survey and experimental studies, or that others have pointed to with regard to the necessity of establishing what is important to the judges in their own frame of references. There appears in the committed or involved a willingness to judge, to assert a value judgment pro-con.

The last kind of placement of item pattern which reflects involvement to be taken up reflects the above treatment of involvement as related to change, in this case attitude change. The basic thesis here is that the presence of resistance to change may have correlated levels of involvement.

There are numerous studies showing how communications under varying conditions result in more or less attitude change. These are

256 Carl I. Hovland, "Reconciling Conflicting Results Derived from Experimental and Survey Studies of Attitude Change," American Psychologist, XIV (1959), pp. 8-17.


K. E. Weick, 1967, raises the important issue as to whether or not important controversial issues to social researchers are in fact as important to judges and that hence the narrow latitudes of non-commitment may not show in some of the studies. Karl E. Weick, "Promise and Limitations of Laboratory Experiments in the Development of Attitude Change Theory," in Carolyn W. Sherif and Muzafar Sherif (eds.), Attitude, Ego-Involvement, and Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 51-75.

258 There is need to indicate a note of caution in discussing evidence. C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, note that in most studies of attitude change involvement is not specified clearly so that results are not adequately specified. Needed is to note narrowing the discussion to studies of involvement correlated with lack of change as dimensioned through placement of items. Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafar Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), p. 177.
often more complex stimuli than the items used in the Own Category Procedure.

Summarizing the above, it appears internal attitude changes as a result of external stimuli are a function of not only involvement but the relative positions of the individual's own stand, that of the stimuli or the perception of the stimuli, including the "source" and other contextual aspects.

The earliest studies of M. Sherif using the autokinetic phenomena utilized changes in responses to parallel phenomena to establish the presence of norms.

The Q sort has been utilized to measure attitude toward change, 

"... a high score indicating acceptance of change and reliance upon self, while a low score indicates the opposite." 

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260 Examples of difficulties are such as those of C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965 discuss in obtaining change in attitudes over time usually covered in laboratory situations. Ibid., p. 173.


The concept of there being "resistance" to attitude change cannot be taken to mean that there are phenomena which are inherently restrictive, i.e., involvement in and of itself is not necessarily restrictive of change, it depending on the latitudes discussed briefly above, and content of the norms with which the individual is involved, e.g., attitudes toward change itself.


The above and others are part of an apparently futile attempt to find some general "personality trait" (e.g., authoritarianism,
M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1967, cite as one of the most exciting uses of the "Own Category Procedure" being to explore the reactions to socio-cultural change.

There is also the problem of "immunizing" group members against "corrupting" change by "outsiders," i.e., the problem of maintaining group norms. The maintenance of shared group norms is an extremely important aspect of social organization. Nevertheless the degree(s) to which it is possible to effect change in attitudes and involvements is an extremely important problem relating to social problems. The maintenance of shared group norms is an extremely important aspect of social organization. Nevertheless the degree(s) to which it is possible to effect change in attitudes and involvements is an extremely important problem relating to social problems.

The concept of attitude change as differentiated from judgment change is found in the literature, e.g., W. Weiss, 1961 where he finds dogmatism, etc.,) which is related to acceptance of innovation or change. See for example, B. Pyron, 1966, finding that acceptance of avant-garde art was significantly related to (among other things) acceptance of change. Bernard Pyron, "Rejection of Avant-Garde Art and the Need for Simple Order," Journal of Psychology, IXIII (2, 1966), pp. 159-178.


264 The literature relating to "brain washing" and developing resistances against it are relevant but cannot be explored in this work. The literature on "susceptibility" (suggestibility, yielding, etc.) to change (communications, etc.) parallel the above.
attitude to change but not judgment of scales. This raises the general issue as to whether or not this is merely a differential in instruments used, and that each reflects both attitude and judgment in differential contexts. Such issues run through much of the literature of this discussion. The possibility of other measures of involvement such as number of interactions, time (amounts of), and number of close friends are indicated by A. F. Blum, 1964, in connection with his discussion of a paradox where alienation is a function of involvement. Such behavioral indications in addition to placement of items are the kind of indicators used to establish group membership for purposes of "known group" experimental designs.

Summary

The consequences of involvement are those which have been noted at many points in this work. They are the patterned behaviors of judges as they engage in the variety of "tasks" or other contexts in which they are placed. One of the chief indicators of involvement is noted as being consistency over time, thereby indicating its close alliance with concepts of "self." Attitudes as internal variables which have a consistency over time cannot be divorced from dimensions

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of involvement. It was indicated that without consideration of latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment, it was difficult to establish a patterned relationship between discrepancy of communication and involvement. Noted was the importance of consistent "errors" in judgment which may be indicative of involvement, these becoming important in methodological processes in dimensioning involvement in groups, particularly as "ingroup"-"outgroup" involvements may be reflected in judgments. Most specifically it was noted that judgment of statements may have systematic "errors" (displacements). Such judgments involve the psychological functioning processes of categorization, discrimination, etc., which have been noted at numerous other points above. The direction and number of such "errors" and categories was noted to be confounded in important ways by the "domains" which were a part of the total "frame of reference" which is involved in the judgment process. Degrees of structure (ambiguity) of statements and the range of them along a "reference scale" were also noted along with the phenomena of differential importance of some of the points along the scale (anchors).

All of the above and others not noted tend to combine to produce an extremely complex (though patterned) relationship between involvement and judgmental consequences. A primary focus of such consequences must be on differentials in change and the resistance to change. Neither change nor resistance to it carries positive or negative evaluations without further content and circumstances being considered. This is particularly the case with consideration of the consequences of change for social groups, organizations, etc. It being at these
junctures that the Own Category Procedures to be described in Chapter IV become important when combined with the evidence regarding their infiltration of the sociological literature to be reported in Chapter V.

The data gathered in a search for literature relevant to the Social Judgment Involvement Approach and the Own Category Procedure produced a variety of treatments of various concepts which have been noted in this chapter. The degree to which these reflect sociological literature is of some importance since the Sherifs see their work as being both derived from and having significance for other social sciences than social psychology.

One example of the degree to which the literature searched reflects sociologists might be the concept of "involvement." Twelve sociologists appear in the results of the social psychological literature search which deal with the concept of "involvement" as it relates to the Social Judgment Involvement Approach and Own Category Procedure.

Of the twelve only one, M. Manis, had a large number of entries. Only C. N. Alexander and M. Manis may be construed to be directly related to the SJI and Own Category Procedure.

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267 For definition of sociologists see Chapter V. below.
The above substantiates in some degree the concern that such a search for related literature did not lead into the major streams of the sociological literature.268

Chapter III has shown that there are several conceptual differentiations which are confounded enough at the current time to provide the reader attempting to deal with the ways in which individuals function within social contexts with the feeling he is faced with a "briar patch" of thorny conceptual problems, many of them having implicit within them the basic fallacies of reification and reductionism as well as dualistic categories. At numerous points it was indicated that the SJI may avoid such fallacies through either redefining or ignoring established concepts.

Examples of those concepts which are confounding are such as the following: emotional-rational, evaluation, knowing, attitude-judgment, cognitive-motivational-behavioral components of attitude, etc. At the same time that the Sheriffs are disavowing any attempts to reify internal variables their extensive use of the concepts "internal variables" and a host of concepts related to reference scales (latitudes of acceptance, rejection, noncommitment, anchors, etc.) are

268For further brief summary of the search of the literature as it relates to writers dealing with the concept of involvement see the appendix, p. 46, available from the author.

A survey of other concepts important to the SJI and Own Category Procedure may reveal a similar pattern with respect to sociology but such a survey has not been done for this work, it remaining a problem for future research.

The appendix carries a further summary of authors, noting sociologists as they have been cited by the Sheriffs appearing in sociological related journals, as well as lists of sociologists citing aspects of the Sheriffs' works.
likely to be interpreted as simply substituting new reified terms. That such is not the case may be more clearly seen in the discussion of the Own Category Procedure where the concepts are seen to have operationally specified behavioral referents.

Chapter IV will continue the above exposition of concepts, going further into a specific "instrument" developed by the Sherifs utilizing the SJI conceptual framework. Chapters II and III have established the more general concepts which the SJI not only includes but also excludes. Chapter IV will elaborate on this.

The degree to which such confounding noted above has restricted the impact of the SJI on the sociological literature is not answered in this work but the possibility becomes clear as the difficulties within the social psychological literature itself are studied.

Chapter V below will report the degree to which such frameworks have impacted upon the sociological literature in an attempt to see whether or not a conceptual framework which is supposed to be more compatible with a given area will in fact be incorporated into that area. The reported negative findings cannot be explained at this point.
CHAPTER IV

THE OWN CATEGORY PROCEDURE

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly outline the chief characteristics of a structured disguised technique of obtaining response patterns from judges which may be indicative of their latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment as well as indicative of their involvement in the domain at issue in the statements which are sorted. The theoretical and research background as well as the conceptual frameworks for a discussion of the Own Category Procedure has been presented above. Other or alternative theoretical and research approaches to the problems of research involving internal variables as they relate to dimensioning of group interpersonal relationships has been referred to above.

A summary of a search of the literature noting the degree to which the Sherifs' work in general and the Social Judgment Involvement Approach [SJI] and Own Category Procedure in particular are being utilized in recent sociological literature (since 1960) is presented in the following chapter. At specific points in this chapter reference will be made to whole blocks of conceptual frameworks or issues which are avoided by the Own Category and SJI, and discussion of the relevance of such issues to this work will be found at earlier points noted above in this work.

An aspect of the SJI and the accompanying Own Category Procedure is that they do not address themselves to a range of traditional conceptual and research problems. By so doing they raise the possibility
of research which does not need to address itself to some of the ques-
tions which have been raised in the past. It is possible that the
total SJI approach may be couched in conceptual frameworks which omit
traditional motivational categories and avoid many conceptual diffi-
culties such as reifications of internal variables and dualistic cate-
gories which may appear in building theoretical research frameworks
dealing with human behavior in its social organizational context.¹

If issues are controversial and involving for people there is the
problem of getting responses which reflect (in the language of the man
in the street) the "real feelings" of the judges. Requests for atti-
tudes on subjects or for "real feelings" on issues are not responded
to accurately on issues which are controversial and/or involving be-
cause of the individual's not knowing what consequences are going to
ensue from his response, what is to be done with the response, or how
it will influence him or those close to him. It is difficult to assess

¹It will be noted explicitly below (as well as more in detail
above) that such basic concepts as attitude itself are not crucial to
the framework of the Sheriffs and others. For example see the approach
It is in this sense that their work is "behavioristic." Muzafer
Sherif, and Carolyn W. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology: Re-
vised Edition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956); Muzafer Sherif,
and Carolyn W. Sherif, "Attitude as the Individual's Own Categories:
The Social Judgment-Involvement Approach to Attitude and Attitude
Change," in Carolyn W. Sherif, and Muzafer Sherif (eds.), Attitude,
Ego-Involvement, and Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,

It has not been the purpose of this work to explore in depth
either the degree to which the above is the case or to pursue the im-
plications for theory and research if it be accurate. It does attempt
to show that such a possibility exists and that it may deserve more
attention on the part of sociologists than the survey of the sampled
sociological literature would indicate. The further literature search
of such issues remains to be more fully explored.
what are the "real" variables which are operating in reactions on issues which are potentially so highly involving and at the same time have a great deal of ambiguity involved in the issues. For example, with respect to poverty there are the variables involved in "brotherly love" and much of Christianity, while on the other hand there are attitudes reflected in such statements as "the poor are lazy," or "man gets what he deserves in this world." Resulting is a hesitancy to express oneself openly and a difficulty in understanding what are the attitudes which may become variables functioning to promote or retard the accepting or rejecting of ideas, speeches, proposals, education, etc. If involvement is related to change, the degree of involvement as well as the stand will be very important in the acceptance of changes needed to solve problems.²

Some of the advantages in the use of the "Own Category" techniques are stated by the Sherifs as follows:

Individuals . . . who are strongly committed to a stand on a controversial issue tend to use fewer categories and to distribute their judgments differentially than persons who are less concerned with the issue. . . . the way an individual categorizes various positions (items) on a social issue will "indirectly reveal the individual's attitudes more clearly than the answers given to standard attitude scale items when one is conscious of the possible interpretations by others" of his answers.

It is suggested that the "own categories" procedure for judgment in which a sufficient number of middle-of-the-road or ambiguous items are presented may be used as a quantitative "projective" technique in assessing attitudes on controversial issues. The subject is instructed to sort the items in terms of their "pro" and "con" nature. The number of categories used and the degree of concentration of judgments in extreme categories reveals the position that the subject upholds, the neutral items being displaced predominantly toward the extreme opposite to his own stand on the issue. Perhaps the "own categories" procedure may be useful in assessing the rigidity or flexibility of the person in given matters.  

Other claims the Sherifs make for the approach are that it requires no coding by the investigator, that it provides "latitudes of acceptance and rejection" rather than simple categorical "pro" or "anti" on issues, and that it therefore makes possible better understanding


of the dimensions of concepts which may be involved in accepting or rejecting related issues. Last but not least is the possibility of using relatively simple statistical procedures, though it is not clear at this point whether this advantage will hold for some of the problems which may be encountered as domains and experimental designs become more complex.

The Own Category Procedure consists of a series of statements which are categorized by judges, the number of categories being of their own choosing, placing statements according to the degree to which the statement expresses a given stand or meaning on an issue, the issue usually being established through instructions. An instrument may vary from 25 to over 100 items. These statements are usually selected from a wide range of statements gathered from various sources and selected in order to provide a full range (continuum) of statements on the issue(s) involved. Statements to be judged are usually narrowed from a large number of items. It is important that the statements be scaled appropriately to the judges which respond to them. For example, it is significant whether or not the scale includes the full range of stands held by the judges. It is a case where the researchers will have to keep up with the times, standardizing social stimulus values

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An exception is the experimental design which requires "out of range" judges.
contemporaneously and for the population they are studying." The final instrument includes a number of "ambiguous" items which are placed in a wide range of categories by judges. The latter point is one at which the "Own Category Procedure" differs from the usual Thurstone technique.

The range of alternative instruments to dimension or measure some of the internal variables dealt with by the Own Category Procedure are not taken up at this point.

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References to other closely related instruments have been made at other points in this work, but a full summary of them goes beyond its scope.

The principal sources for descriptions of the Own Category Procedure are to be found in the recent works both edited and coauthored

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by the Sherifs' themselves and selected others, e.g., M. Sherif and
C. W. Sherif, 1969, C. W. Sherif and M. Sherif (eds.), 1967, and
M. Fishbein, (ed.), 1967.\textsuperscript{11}

It has been noted above that the Sherifs have used both "tech-
nique" and "procedure" to designate the own category. It is not clear
at this point either what these might signify or how the differentia-
tion might be significant. It is possible that the concept "procedure"
is the broader and more inclusive. The basis of the procedure is the
presentation of statements on cards to a judge with instructions to
sort them into as many categories (piles) as he thinks are necessary
in order to adequately represent the divergencies or differences taken

\textsuperscript{11} The Own Category Procedure has been summarized recently in the
following: Muzaffer Sherif, and Carolyn W. Sherif, Social Psychology
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969); Muzaffer Sherif, and
Carolyn W. Sherif, "The Own Categories Procedure in Attitude Research," in both of the following: Martin Fishbein (ed.), Readings in Attitude
Theory and Measurement (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 190-
198; and M. Sherif (ed.), Social Interaction: Process and Products,
Selected Essays by Muzaffer Sherif, (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company,
1967), pp. 353-366; M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, "Attitude as the Indi-
vidual's Own Categories: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach to
Attitude and Attitude Change," in C. W. Sherif and M. Sherif (eds.),
Attitude, Ego-Involvement, and Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1967), pp. 105-139; James H. Peterson, "A Disguised Structured
Instrument for the Assessment of Attitudes toward the Poor," (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla-
homa, 1967); Samuel S. Shurtleff, "An Extension and Comparison of the
Own Categories Procedure in the Measurement of Attitudes and Per-
sonality Characteristics," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Univer-
sity of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1967); Carolyn W. Sherif,
Muzaffer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change:
The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders
Company, 1965); Muzaffer Sherif, and C. I. Hovland, Social Judgment:
Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change
by the various statements which are on each card. Each card contains one statement. The instructions specify a domain (criterion) on the basis of which the statements should be sorted.

The instructions provide a chief source for differentiated experimental conditions between categories of judges. Any of a variety of experimental variables may be introduced, e.g., items may be judged on the basis of the judge agreeing (disagreeing) with the item, the degree to which others agree with the item, the degree to which the items are true or false, the degree to which they are beneficial or harmful to an object, pro or con on an issue, etc. 12

The procedure involves structured responses insofar as the items presented to the judge are finite and he is not expected to respond verbally. One of the chief merits of the own category is that there are no "verbal" responses which need to be classified or categorized, reducing tremendously the problems involved in training interpreters, scorers, etc.

While the items are structured in total number and content (domain), the format in which responses are to be made are not. The instrument is "unstructured," not a forced sort, neither the number of categories to be used or the numbers to be put into each category are specified in the instructions. This differs from the traditional

Thurstone judges' responses which were to be within a set number of categories, usually eleven.  

The psychological principle behind such "unstructuring" of the response lies in the possibility that with the less external forced structure the judges' responses become more a function of their own internal variables. The basis for this goes back through studies using unstructured situations, e.g., the autokinetic studies.  

M. Sherif, and C. I. Hovland, 1953, appears to be the first "Own Category" study though others allowing "free sorting" are found prior to this time.  


15 That there may be a number of studies utilizing "free sort" of various objects is indicated by D. T. Campbell's 1950 pointing out that R. E. Hartley, 1946, had judges sort photographs into as many or few piles as they wished. The search for this work has revealed no definitive history of either "free sorting" or the more specific card or statement sorting. The search did reveal an extensive Q sort literature which has not been the focus of this work, for example, G. F. Ostrom, 1962, and the works of such as Wm. Stephenson, as well as I. D. Nahinsky. There are a number of works in which it may not be clear how "free" the sorting was, e.g., P. G. Zimbardo, 1960. Even more difficult to ascertain may be the degree to which involvement was considered or specified as a variable in such studies, e.g., S. Fillenbaum, 1959. See A. F. Glixman, 1967, for cites to a number of works included in the literature on the categorizing process per se.  

A considerable literature has arisen contrasting the "imposed" or structured types of sorts, particularly as this is relevant to Q sort techniques as they have been used to dimension "ideal" versus "real" concepts of self.¹⁶

H. R. McGarvey, 1943, and P. J. Frawley, 1948, are cited by G. A. Woodward, 1967, as encountering judges who objected to having to conform to the categories imposed by the research instructions. He cites others also, more recently, e.g., K. R. Vaughan, 1961, and G. E. Parrish, 1964.¹⁷

C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, compare findings of "fixed" number of categories under regular Thurstone procedures


with those of the own categories. 18 The differences lie primarily in the accentuation of the effects of "involvement" as evidenced in the "own category" allowing judges to more explicitly demonstrate this by reducing the number of categories used, i.e. in a fixed number there is a possible tendency for the judge to try to "use all those categories available." 19

The Own Category Procedure as noted above does not depend on any of the traditional psychological conceptual frameworks postulating a variety of internal variables which are given a variety of names, e.g., "motives." It rather relies on specification of the stimulus conditions and the response effects capable of being recorded easily and accurately.

H. Helson, 1964, discussing A-L combining "inner and outer" stimuli states it required "... a shift in thinking in terms of


19 This non specification of the number of categories to be used is also found in the differentiation between "qualitative" and "quantitative" categories though such terminology carries a much wider connotation than just the own versus forced category differentiation noted above, it being used to denote the whole problem of numbering categories of scales versus making them based on qualitative differences. The judgment literature here as cited by H. Helson, 1964, supports the thesis that numbering of the judge's response categories tends to "mask" or structure his judgment to the exclusion of allowing his own internal judgmental processes to function and become differentiating variables in responses. This point parallels the one above about the degree of external structure relative to the amount of internal structure. It is the same principle behind all "projective" testing. Harry Helson, Adaptation-Level Theory: An Experimental and Systematic Approach to Behavior (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 657.
generalized traits, types, or attitudes to thinking in terms of specifiable variables in concrete situations and leads to a taxonomy of traits in situations rather than one of traits in person." The Own Category Procedure is a way to specify those situations. Sociologists will note the parallel in the above with the "definition of the situation" by W. I. Thomas, and F. Znaniecki, et al. As noted at numerous other points in this work the degree to which such situations include real group (not ad hoc) contexts as differentiating variables is extremely important. 21

Of particular importance to sociologists should be the degree to which the stimuli used in the Own Category Procedure may produce results representing differential effects of real groups, categories, or classes, and it is important that these differential results be specified. 22


22 This is not to imply the Own Category Procedure is usable at the individual counseling or therapy level though the Q sort with which it must not be confused has been used in this manner for many years with results which are beyond the scope of this work to assess. The evaluation of the Own Category Procedure is in no wise to be involved in or related to the Q sort literature as these are found in the current literature. There appears to be two completely isolated bodies of literature, one the OCP, and the other the Q sort. The work of I. D. Nahinsky comes as close as any to crossing the two literatures. For example see Irwin D. Nahinsky, "The Self-Ideal Correlations as a Measure of Generalized Self-Satisfaction," Psychological Records, XVI (1, 1966), pp. 55-64.
Of prime concern to sociologists may be the degree to which it is possible to dimension reactions to innovation and sociocultural change through dimensioning involvement as an integral part of the total judgmental context not isolated from social interpersonal variables introduced through instructions, wording of statements, or contexts such as varying group memberships and significant role relationships.23

The concept of self and its social nature has a long illustrious career going back through W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, C. N. Cooley, et al., and is not to be differentiated from group memberships. Group differentials on varying domains may be crucial in understanding and promoting change. For example, a better understanding of the relative involvement of groups in a variety of social problems as compared with other issues is extremely important. For example, are groups more involved with certain social problems than others?

The use of the Own Category Procedure to develop cross-cultural differences is illustrated in the work of L. N. Diab and it is


No attempt has been made in this work to pursue the Own Category Procedure in the literature outside the United States. Such a search would be a most interesting one, however.
undoubtedly no accident that one of the first formal presentations of the Own Category Procedure was to a European meeting.  

Through the presenting of items to judges with instructions to sort them into as many piles as they see necessary to put those belonging together in one pile it may be possible to gain information about internal conceptual functioning of judges in dimensions that have traditionally been called attitudes - values - and more recently anchors or stands on various issues-objects including groups and organizations. The social context in which judges make such sorts may include groups and organizations as variables in the judging process through the use of instructions and a host of other devices including selection of judges themselves. For example, judges from different "known groups" which can be made relevant to the judges as they sort statements.

The responses of judges do not reflect a single point (an attitude) on a reference scale but reflect ranges or latitudes of numerous aspects of reactions to the issues contained in the series of statements which make up the instrument. Following the sorting the judge may be asked to select those piles which represent the stands which he could accept, those which he must reject, and those about which he is neither one. The Sherifs have used the concepts latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment to indicate these three areas on reference scales. Such latitudes are operationally established either through direct asking the judge which categories he accepts or through

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24 M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, op. cit.
deriving the patterns in which judges consistently displace items differentially.\(^{25}\)

Briefly reviewed here such displacement patterns are as follows.\(^{26}\) With heavy involvement in an issue the judge's own (attitude-stand-position) increasingly becomes an anchor and judgment of items close to the position are displace toward it, those which are distant from the own attitude are displaced toward it, those which are distant "accurately."

Among the numerous antecedents to such displacements are the following: 1) concept of self, including reference groups, and reference scales (see Chapter III, internal variables), 2) external stimuli presented, including the range of items, the item characteristics including the degrees of structure and/or stereotyping which occur in them (see Chapter III, external variables), and 3) the relationship between (1) and (2) including the degrees of discrepancy between the judge's own reference scales and those presented to him (see Chapter III, external-internal variables).

Each of the above offer complexities which possibly confound the effects found in placement of items in the "Own Category Procedure." Whether such complexities are confounding or not is relative to the

\(^{25}\)This pattern of displacement has been discussed above in our discussion of judgment and involvement. See also Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzafer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, *Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965).

\(^{26}\)Ibid., p. 239.
degree to which they are understood to have had differentiating effects. As noted elsewhere the complexity of judgment is increasing, but is at the same time (and as a result) becoming better understood.

For example, as noted in above chapters, there is some confusion in the literature as to whether or not extremity and involvement are confounded in many experiments, i.e. endorsement of extreme stands being assumed to also mean involvement in the stands, the latter being the case only when the scale’s domain is one which equates extremity with stands requiring involvement, a stand which requires as part of holding it that the judge also be involved. This may often be the case by virtue of extreme positions often being held by only a few persons who of necessity must defend themselves against the rest of a majority of groups in the community, the result is the minority group member becoming more involved.

There are a variety of such complexities in psychological functioning which may be variables in sorting and which have been more fully noted in other chapters above as well as indicated below but to date their effect on the Own Category Procedures is not clear. 27

Response effects (dependent variables) in the Own Category Procedure consist mainly of what may be "assimilation-contrast effects." "Assimilation" in the above means the placement of an item (judging it) as being closer to the judge's position than it is placed by less

involved judges and "contrast" as placement of an item away from the
own attitude, i.e. further away from one's own position than would
less involved judges. Such effects are seen in differential response
scale size, i.e. the "spread" of the items in categories, again noting
that it has been demonstrated that this bears an inverse relation to
involvement, especially in the size of the latitude of noncommitment.28

The principle response effect of interest to the Own Category
Procedure is the number of items put in each category and the number of
categories. Placement of items are differentially varied,
apparently correlating with other behavior which might be indicative
of internal anchors and involvement. The number of categories varies
inversely with involvement and the amount of displacement varies
directly with involvement. A third major response effect is the con­
sistency that results from involvement. A final response effect in
the Own Category Procedure is the time the judge takes to perform the
sorting task, the relationship with involvement being a negative one.

In establishing experimental designs for the Own Category Pro­
cedure there are the three main categories (discussed briefly above)
to be considered: 1) external stimuli, 2) internal variables (inferred
from other data), and 3) response effects-findings.

28 Some writers such as H. S. Upshaw, 1962, have maintained that
scale unit is an important factor, that other than involvement effects
can account for changes in the scale values of items, i.e. they change
as a result of changes in unit used by the judge, the unit being a
function of the judge's range or perspective. The above controversy
has been taken up elsewhere and is noted here only to indicate unit
effects in response scales. Harry S. Upshaw, "Own Attitude as an
Anchor in Equal-Appearing Intervals," Journal of Abnormal and Social
Principal among external stimuli are instructions, significant other conditions, and items.\(^{29}\)

General problems of content with regard to issue are of major importance. The unidimensionality of the statements is not as crucial as it is in the Thurstone scaling by virtue of the number of statements and the results not claiming the monotonic character of Thurstone scaling, however the selection of items which "bring in" other controversial issues run the severe danger of being judged on the basis of judges' concern with those issues and thereby confounding the scaling of placement on the issue being judged.

It must be noted in connection with the above that the own category is not as closely concerned with establishing the "scale value" of items as are such scales as Thurstone and Likert. General distribution of sorting patterns are the aims rather than scale values. Any confounding which occurs in terms of shifts in either task, domain, or reference scale on which the item(s) are judged may be instructive as to internal judgmental processes of persons, not necessarily

\(^{29}\) These have been elaborated upon in Chapter III as they relate to judgment and involvement.

Item characteristics have received attention in recent years, with considerable attention being given also to other variables as they may be introduced through instructions or through the selection of judges. See G. A. Woodward, 1967, for example of attention to items. C. D. Ward, 1965, is an example of attention to "natural" group membership. G. A. Woodward, "Dimensions of Judgment and Characteristics of Displaceable Statements in the Disguised Structured Instrument for the Assessment of Attitudes toward the Poor," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1967); Charles D. Ward, "Ego Involvement and the Absolute Judgment of Attitude Statements" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, II (2, 1965), pp. 202-208.
"contaminating" but rather "opportunities" for further exploration. Such "opportunities" open up further problems of complexities which in turn require further inquiry, e.g., the G. A. Woodward, 1967, findings regarding shifts in domains used in judgment. 30

It must be noted however that it is possible that the stimulus items be structured in such a way as to reveal through analysis of the content of various items relationships regarding issues as they are conceptually related for the judge. There is the possibility for instance the below be the case. 31

The statements (items) must also be consistent with the dimension judgment being used whether it be pro-con, like-dislike, etc. Such dimensions-domains are usually established in instructions or other format contexts such as booklets, cards, etc. 32


31 Differential placements as occur with new elements added to items may be most useful in establishing relationships between various issues. For example the injection of the issue of federal assistance to the poor as opposed to items which state that local agencies give assistance to the poor may provide clues as to reference scales of the judge on both issues of the poor and government.


32 G. A. Woodward, 1967, indicates a basic equivalency between card sorting procedures and his "adjectival scale procedures" which were administered in booklet form using an 11 point structured response. George A. Woodward, 1967, op. cit., p. 54.
items needed to be considered are such as location in the scale.

Needed are anchor items which are clear in their position at the ends of the scale, others should be intermediate and there should be ranges of items in between with a number in the middle range items being less structured, subject to "misperception," "displacement", "ambiguity," 33

A great deal of work by certain writers has been done with the range of the items especially as to whether or not the extremes of the items are more extreme than the judges' positions, i.e. that all of the judges "own attitudes" fall within the range of items presented to them. 34


Still another and most recent characteristic of items which may play a significant role is that of being stereotyped. Stereotyped items appearing to be very sensitive to displacement. George A. Woodward, "Dimensions of Judgment and Characteristics of Displaceable Statements in the Disguised Structured Instrument for the Assessment of Attitudes toward the Poor," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, 1967), p. 60.

It has been established that clear unambiguous items stating a stand will not be displaced regardless of their position, i.e. a clearly neutral stand will be seen as neutral by even the most involved judge. C. W. Sherif, et al., 1965, op. cit.


The above is the issue raised by H. S. Upshaw, 1962, as he maintains that "displacement" is in fact a function not of assimilation-contrast, but of relationships between perspectives of the judges and
Instructions are relatively "uncomplicated" in the own category, not involving subtleties requiring heavy "acting" or deception on the part of the administrator. The above is another factor in the relative advantage of the own category, its simpleness and its lack of intrigue and overt deception parallels the autokinetic in this respect.

Following is an example of instructions from A. F. Glixman, 1967, following R. W. Gardner, 1953:

First of all, I want you to know that there is no answer to this task. Everyone does it in his own way. I want you to do it in the way that seems most natural, most logical, and most comfortable to you.

The instructions are simply to put together into groups the statements which seem to you to belong together. You may have as many or as few statements in a group as you like, so long as the statements in each group belong together for one particular reason. If, after you have thought about all the statements, a few do not seem to belong with any of the others, you may

put those statements into groups by themselves. Please sort all the statements.  

Another example of instructions is that of K. R. Vaughan, 1961.

You are given a number of statements expressing opinions in regard to the Latin. These cards are to be sorted into different piles.

You will find it easier to sort them if you look over a number of cards, chosen at random, before you begin to sort.

(follows the 11 category sort) . . . .
(the own category condition injects the following instructions):

You may sort the statements into as many categories as you choose, placing those statements which are most unfavorable toward the Latin into your first pile, and those which are most favorable toward the Latin into your last pile, regardless of whether the statements are true or false.

If you choose, you may add an 'unclassifiable' category for statements which do not seem to fit into the categories you choose.  

The chief point about the instructions in the disguised Own Category Procedure is the complete avoidance of any reference to the judges' own attitudes being a variable in the sorting of the items. Such disguised instructions may of course need to be modified if particular involvements are to be injected into the experimental conditions, e.g.,

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particular reference groups or domains of discourse. Variations in
degrees of involvement may be introduced in the instructions, e.g.,
making the task more involving by instructing student judges that it
is part of the course grade.\footnote{For example, see Harold B. Gerard, "Some Effects of Involvement
upon Evaluation," \textit{Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology}, LVII
(1958), pp. 118-120.}

The interrelationships between judges while sorting in the own
category has not been a focus for any of the studies encountered in
this search though many appear to be concerned as to the possibility
that one judge be able to observe another and be influenced by him.
One example of such concern is J. W. Reich, and M. Sherif, 1963, where
"adequate spacing" was provided.\footnote{John W. Reich, and Muzafer Sherif, "Ego-Involvements as a
Factor in Attitude Assessment by the Own Categories Technique,"
(Norman, Oklahoma: Institute of Group Relations, the University of
Oklahoma, mimeographed, 1963), p. 7.}

Internal variables are ones which are the focus of interest in-
sofar as the intent of the instrument is to be able to estimate future
behaviors of individuals-groups. There might be some question as to
whether they are independent or dependent variables, more appropriately
they may be viewed as "intervening" variables. These are not possible
to "observe" but are postulated as being influential both in present
and future behavior if we are correct in assuming continuity in in-
ternal psychological conceptual functioning.\footnote{It cannot be stressed too strongly (as has been stressed at
other points in this work) that such internal variables as noted are
hypothetical constructs (paralleling "force," "gravity," etc.) which
must be consistent with evidence "objectively" obtained and verifiable,
Self concepts are a basic concept that is relevant to the Own Category because of its relationship to two sub concepts, those of relating to the functioning of individuals as viewed behaviorally, and also not inconsistent with findings at physiological levels of analysis. No pretense is made to maintain in this work at any point that referents of such concepts as "anchors," "attitudes," "stands," are to be locateable by physiologists at any specific point in the human body. See Chapters II and III of this work.

A basic philosophical position must be understood in order to correctly interpret the brief discussion here of the internal variables which are construed to be part of the Own Category Procedure because of the large number of "internal variables" which are often used but which are "left out" or omitted from consideration in the Own Category Procedure. Such major ones as feeling, emotion, cognitive, affective, motives, tensions, needs, defenses of various kinds, experience, goals, wants, etc., are all alternative assumptions as to the nature of internal psychological functioning. See earlier chapters in this work as well as the following: Carolyn W. Sherif, Muzaffer Sherif, and Roger E. Nebergall, Attitude and Attitude Change: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1965), p. 130; Eugene L. Hartley, "Attitude Research and the Jangle Fallacy," in Carolyn W. Sherif, and Muzaffer Sherif (eds.), Attitude, Ego-Involvement, and Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 88-105; Muzaffer Sherif, and Carolyn W. Sherif, Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969).

It is implicit in the work of the Sherifs and others that many of the categories noted above are not capable of useful specification without at some point falling into assumptions about the nature of psychological functioning which run counter to either observable behavioral evidence or internal physiological process as we know them from the physiologist. For example the concept of emotion is extremely difficult to utilize as a concept to describe either behavior outwardly or as internal physiological processes and have it differentiated from "non emotional" behavior. It is much the same as the difficulty encountered with the concept of some "weather" being more weather than other weather, yet the man in the street talks about degrees of weather in the same sense that writers often talk about degrees of "emotionality" or "personality."

It is the intention here to show only that there is with the SJI and Own Category Procedure the possibility that psychological functioning be studied without such terminology and without falling into a completely behavioristic position. The preceding chapters have been indicating various aspects of such possibilities and this chapter is outlining a particular procedure by which many of the problems usually covered by such complex terminologies appear to be simplified, re-defined or reconceptualized.
reference scales and involvement. Within the former are several basic concepts also, those of anchors (attitudes-stands), reference groups, both of which also carry involvement dimensions, i.e. the degree they are related to concepts of self in various roles in groups, etc. Self is not in opposition to the group or group membership.

There are a variety of dimensions of psychological functioning which are functions of particular ways in which stimuli and tasks are presented to subjects. A few other newer ones which are not dealt with at this point but elaborated somewhat at other points are cognitive complexity with various aspects such as dimensions of abstract-concrete psychological functioning, differentiation, and possibly an "instrumental-end in itself" continuum.


The latter has not been found directly in the literature to date, it may be implicit in a number of the concepts to date, but it is one which could be important to the Own Category Procedure insofar as judges may view specific issues as only "instrumental" to larger more important issues and hence not view the "instrumental" issue in black-white polarity terms, i.e. not reduce the number of categories on the own category technique because they are interested in the immediate controversial issue only as a means to more important significant broader issues. The differential effects of issues viewed as means or ends and the impact of the degree to which viable alternatives to means are considered may differentially impact on the sorting process and is in need of research. For example, the issues in public education may be viewed as important in themselves, as only one of many possible alternatives to the very involving issue of poverty, or public education might be viewed as the only solution to the problem of poverty. Persons equally involved in the issue of poverty may differentially view the importance of public education to poverty. Differentials in judgment of public education may represent not only involvement in public education but the closeness of education to other involving issues. There is need for research on such consequences of differentiated means-end-time perspectives in the judgment process.

Summarizing: The relationship between short range (means) and long range goals confounds the interpretation of number of categories as a response effect indicating involvement as it may relate to the possibility of social attitudinal change. Not only crucial are time
dimensions, but also critical is the degree to which the judge relates "means to ends" as being subject to alternative substitutions of means to obtain ends. The above is related to the "open and closed mindedness" of M. Rokeach as well as the more generally recognized processes designated as "creativity" and acceptance of change which are as such beyond the scope of this inquiry though related processes have been noted as part of the judgment process in the Own Category Procedure. The degree to which means may be viewed as having more categories than ends is an aspect of the whole problem of item sorting into categories which has not been noted in the literature searched for this work and needs further research. The literature directly dealing with the Own Category Procedure is extremely sparse compared to the totality involved in dimensioning internal conceptual functioning. Recent literature has more than doubled that available in print. The literature


which recognizes it is selective and scattered, e.g., E. L. Hartley, 1967, who says, "I like the own categories technique for attitude study, not because it serves a better definition of attitudes but because it builds toward a more adequate cognitive mapping of the individual's social field."\textsuperscript{45}

There are many questions still to be answered about the Own Category Procedure, ones which are not necessarily highly critical but attempting to elaborate, e.g., in the area of statistics J. W. Reich, 1969, would use the H technique rather than the indices of concentration and constriction which M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, 1953, used based on chi square types of analysis.\textsuperscript{46} Another major area of question regarding the Own Category Procedure lies in the area of items and their characteristics, their being subject to displacement, and the meaning to be attributed to such placement of different kinds of items.


Not to be divorced from the above are the findings of a variety of studies regarding psychological functioning of judges, the variety of stimulus situations on which persons may differ, thereby introducing differential results into the item sorting process, e.g., domains.\textsuperscript{47}

The whole issue of the scalability of domains is another problem, i.e. the degree to which it is possible to 1) develop any scale of items which are either within one domain only, or which 2) reflect a limited number of domains.

The tremendous problems relating to reference groups and their specification in the sorting process is a further confounding process in sorting. Shifts that may take place from one reference group to another in the sorting process could be confounding the sorting in the same way as shifts in domain of judgment found by G. A. Woodward, 1967.\textsuperscript{48} Reference groups will have different involvements for judges, i.e. groups will be arranged in different hierarchies of importance to the judge, as will issues have various degrees of involvement for different groups. The degree to which reference group differentials result in different judgments have been adequately documented in the past so as to be without question (camp studies, etc.).\textsuperscript{49} The utilization of the same judges to sort the same set of items using different


\textsuperscript{48}Ibid.

group memberships of the judges as a variable in the sorting is called for by E. L. Hartley. For example, the same judges sorting on the basis of two different groups: 1) one group which is heavily involved and taking one stand, and 2) another group which is not so involved and taking a different stand. An extremely strong possibility in such an experiment would be the possibility of experimenter bias and the judge's inability to separate the two groups. Without such specification of reference group context it becomes impossible to use the Own Category Procedure in analysis of group norms. Without specification in some way(s) of the judge's hierarchy of reference groups of which he is a member there becomes no way of establishing the contexts in which judges function conceptually in situations which are controversial between the various groups of which persons are members. These are areas indicative of needed research.

Summary

The above has not attempted to fully summarize the mechanics and findings of the several Own Category Procedure studies. These are available in such as Shurtleff, 1967, and M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif,

1967. 51 It has attempted to indicate the parameters in which the procedure may be useful and to indicate in brief some of the problems which may require future research. It has been briefly indicated that the Own Category Procedure utilizes a conceptual framework which does not depend on a range of concepts traditionally found in discussions of individual psychological functioning, e.g., emotion, needs, motives, yet does not fall into the opposite extreme of complete behaviorism. The significance of the Own Category Procedure may lie in its providing an indication of possible alternative methodologies which avoid either the reification of internal conceptual functioning or their complete denial. The possibility of the usefulness of the Own Category Procedure for dimensioning group processes was briefly referred to, in large part this being indicated as a fertile area for future research.

The above relevancies of the SJI and Own Category Procedures to sociological subject matters raise questions as to the degree to which they have impacted upon the sociological literature. The explorations of the literature in Chapters II, III, and IV do not take one into the mainstream of sociological literature, either in journals or volumes. There is the possibility that critical literature have been present in

the sociological literature which rejects the SJI and Own Category Procedure for reasons not uncovered in the surveyed literature noted in the chapters above. Such a possibility not only has implications for the use of the SJI by sociologists but for the viability of the approach itself because the Sherifs see it as being consistent with sociological materials.

The conceptual complexities described in the above chapters raise questions as to the possibility that even if sociologists should encounter the literature noted therein there be possible a series of different interpretations which might be placed on such encounters. For example, the inability to categorize the Sherifs as subscribing to either cognitive, motivational, or behavioral theory. Another example might be the absence of the usual concepts associated with learning theory, motives, and distinctions such as those between rational and emotional behavior. Still another might be use by the Sherifs of such concepts as attitude without clarification of the particular way in which they utilize the concept.

Since much of the SJI literature appears to be an attempt to make such concepts clear and relevant to social inquiry the degree to which the SJI has impacted on the sociological literature is important insofar as sociological inquiry prove to be a "testing ground" for the approach as well as a device by which sociological theory and methodology be pressed forward.

With the above in mind the search of the sociological literature reported in the next chapter (Chapter V) was undertaken.
CHAPTER V

A SEARCH OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE: A SELECTED SAMPLE

This chapter discusses an extensive search of a selected sample of the sociological literature for references to the Sherifs' work and to Wm. Stephenson. The search reported below followed the intensive search of the literature related to the Social Judgment Involvement Approach (SJI) and Own Category Procedure reported in Chapters II, III and IV above. The degree to which the SJI and Own Category Procedure literature search did not appear to lead into the usual more commonly recognized sociological authors and journals appeared to be grounds for exploring the degree to which the sociological literature did use the work of the Sherifs in the areas of the SJI, Own Category Procedure, and coincidentally other aspects of their work. Such a search was undertaken in order to also reveal additional uses of the Own Category Procedure and SJI.

The survey took two major tasks: 1) a search of the indexes in volumes catalogued in sociologically relevant call numbers, and 2) a survey of selected sociological journals. The limitations of methodologies employed insofar as they may be finite must be clearly recognized in drawing any inferences from the findings. The findings

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1The latter has been found to be irrelevant to this work by virtue of Stephenson not being found in the indexes of volumes searched. Wm. Stephenson is a major Q sort theorist. The Q sort parallels in certain respects the Own Category Procedure as a "card sorting" process. See Chapter IV above. This led to including Stephenson in the search of volume indexes.
reported from these searches must be viewed as indicators of the need for more accurate devices by which the impact of new developments may be rapidly surveyed.\(^2\) The survey undertaken documented citations to the Sherifs and Wm. Stephenson, their number, source cited, topical content, and positive or negative nature of the citation.

**Findings**

The findings of this survey are briefly indicated by approximately 6% of the volumes referring to the Sherifs, very few of these being to the SJI approach narrowly conceived, though somewhat more if the general judgment approach is considered. No indication of the Own Category Procedure is found. The references to Wm. Stephenson are extremely few.

Information compiled and placed in the appendices of this work include the following: bibliography lists of those volumes citing the Sherifs, by author or editor, and by the subject matter cited. In edited volumes the author of the article or chapter which cites the Sherifs is indicated.\(^3\) Articles found in sociological journals in bibliographies in major works of the Sherifs along with notations as to the authors listed in the Guide to Graduate Departments of Sociology 1965 are also found in the appendix, p. 391.

In order to establish the representativeness of the library utilized in the above study a correlation check was made between the

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\(^3\)A listing of articles in edited volumes citing the Sherifs is available from the author.
books reviewed in the 1966 volumes of the American Journal of Sociology and American Sociological Review and the listing of books received in the 1966 volumes of American Journal of Sociology with the holdings of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Library. At the time of the survey (1968-69), the UMKC library held 60% of the volumes reviewed in the AJS and 76% of those reviewed by the ASR. Fifty-nine percent of those volumes listed in the 1966 AJS "Books received" listings are found in the UMKC library. Further clarification of the UMKC holdings may be found in the statement by the Director of Libraries, UMKC, in the appendix, p. 386.

It is impossible to either draw conclusions from the representativeness of the sample or the percentages of volumes referring to the Sheriffs at this time. Though the citations in their brief context surveyed were primarily positive, it is impossible at this point to conclude that the broader or total context of each citation was positive. The research does make it possible to state rather clearly that the Own Category Procedure has not infiltrated the sociological literature sampled, and that the complete absence of such findings gives some further assurance as to the completeness of the earlier search for the SJI and Own Category Procedure literature.

Of particular interest has been the degree to which the Sheriffs have been critiqued in the literature. To date there has been no major critique discovered, though lesser ones have been present. For

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4 This is an area needing further research and is beyond the scope of this work.
example, J. F. Short and F. L. Strodbeck, 1965.\textsuperscript{5} It was anticipated that the search might uncover exhaustive studies but to date none has been found which deals with this general problem of locating the Own Procedure and SJI within the sociological literature.

The negative cites offer a somewhat more complex problem than the positive cites. This is the case because of the difficulty in establishing in many cases what is meant by the author. There are also several additional problems, e.g., the possibility of typographical errors, the possibility of communication errors with the possibility that the authors concerned have misinterpreted the Sherifs. There is the additional complexity as to whether or not the author is differing as a result of "going beyond," building onto, or constructively criticizing, or is attacking the entire framework in such a manner that it is not merely "differing" with, but clearly striking at basic postulates in such a way that either one or the other must be "correct."

This search of the library holdings did not reveal such work.\textsuperscript{6} Yet

\textsuperscript{5}\textsuperscript{Such as these will be noted more fully in the brief discussion of authors critical or differing with the works of the Sherifs which follows below in the appendix, p. 368. Those that are less serious will be noted prior to those that are more serious, noting the intermediate might be something paralleling those where comments are directed at the Sherifs simply being inadequate.}

\textsuperscript{6}\textsuperscript{The search of the social psychological literature related to the SJI and Own Category Procedure revealed numerous alternatives to that of the Sherifs. These have been discussed at various points in Chapters II, III and IV of this work.}
another category of authors are those which appear to not refer to Sherif when in fact a case might be made that they could have usefully cited his work. 7

Methodology

A systematic search was made of the holdings of the library at the University of Missouri - Kansas City, having a total of 307,384 volumes with approximately 2,240 catalogued in the sociologically relevant call numbers, Dewey system (300-19, 360-369) and Library of Congress numbers (HM-HX) carrying publishing dates from 1960-1969. 8

Call number card files were searched and those published in 1960 or later were noted and volume indexes searched for citations to the Sherifs and Wm. Stephenson. Subsequently each reference noted was checked for source cited, content, and direction (positive or negative). An intensive effort to locate all volumes was made with the

7 The pursuit of this point is beyond this work though it has been noted at numerous points that such research may need to clarify variables such as involvement and reference groups which are central to the SJI approach.

8 Until 1965 the library had been on the Dewey number system. Since then acquisitions have been numbered with the Library of Congress system. The library was in the process of changing volumes acquired before the above date to the LC system at the time of this survey. In assessing the holdings of the UMKC library it must be considered as supplemented by the Linda Hall Library of Science and Technology holdings of approximately 390,000 volumes which are located within the campus and available to students. The presence of such a library leads to the UMKC holdings being able to concentrate on other than physical science and technology.

cooperation of the library staff. A number (83) have not been able to be located and hence remain unchecked.\(^9\)

The sample was the entire holdings of the UMKC library in the numbers indicated above. Dewey system numbered volumes were 474, the L.C., 1766.

To further check the impact of the Sherifs on the sociological literature the main sociological journals, American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Sociometry, and Journal of Social Issues were searched for references. The information gained from these was a major variable in the decision to undertake the larger literature search described in this chapter.

In appendices will be found lists of volumes in which indexes carried references to the Sherifs. In the case of edited volumes the authors of articles are indicated where the original date of publication was not prior to 1960. Discussion of positive and "other than positive" citations are also found in the appendix. Some insight as to the nature of citations may be gained from the author, date, and topic listing also found in the appendix. It might be noted that many volumes citing the Sherifs are specific social problem oriented, e.g., youth, gangs, conflict, intergroup relations, etc.

Specific studies of the Sherifs' which appear to have received the largest number of references as tabulated are the camp studies and

\(^9\)This number includes an indeterminant number of volumes with call numbers in the Dewey System which were changed to the Library of Congress System during the period of the survey with no record of the transfer. Initial volume lists were made on the basis of call number only, leading to "lost volumes" if they were changed to the LC system prior to being searched for this study. Twenty -five volumes might fall into this category.
the autokinetic studies. Among concepts stressed by the Sheriffs themselves it was found that their work is clearly associated with the concept of group, particularly reference group. The concepts of norm, involvement, judgment, and intergroup relations are also major concepts, especially the latter as it relates to the concept of superordinate goals. The general findings and impact of the autokinetic and camp studies are not the focus of this work though they may be seen to be an integral part of the general thrust of the Sheriffs toward a cohesive network of research evidence which ties together a variety of frameworks ranging from what many would call perceptual phenomena to international relations. There are numerous instances where the autokinetic and camp studies have been designated as classic. 10

The finding that very few highly critical citations were noted in the search is important. The survey of the SJI and Own Category Procedure literature reveals numerous discussions of findings which provide grounds for alternative explanations of findings, for example, H. S. Upshaw, 1962, 1965, 1968 (in Blalock), and the variety of adaptation level and cognitive dissonance experiments. 11 These

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controversies occurring in the "judgment literature" are not reflected in the sociological literature as encountered in our index survey. By the same token the conceptual confounding central to our discussion of those concepts crucial to the SJI and Own Category Procedure (Chapters II, III and IV) are likewise not found in the sociological literature.

The careful specification of such concepts in the sociological literature, if it does take place, is not specifying the Sherifs in the indexes at these points in the volumes.12

There may also be some question as to whether or not there is a selective factor(s) in the sociologists who cite the Sherifs, e.g., are numbers of them his own students or those who have been close to them? To ascertain this, references and acknowledgements by the Sherifs to others in print have been noted.13

A major category of information which also becomes available is the degree to which the literature may be misinterpreting or misunderstanding certain aspects of the SJI approach in general and the Own

12 Speculation would of course advance that both methodological and theoretical discussions are not specifying the variables entering into response effects as closely and fully as they might be. This can only be advanced as an hypothesis to be established by further inquiry, e.g., a topical subject matter search of Own Category Procedure related concepts as these are found in the sociological literature.

13 This is a selected list of persons who have appeared as co-authors and students closely associated with the work of the Sherifs. This list is by no means intended to be exhaustive, nor is it indicative of complete agreement with the work of the Sherifs. See appendix, p. 398.

Comparatively few of the Sherifs' students appear to have become sociologists. The degree to which social psychology may provide sufficient reference group support for such persons is a variable. There is also the possibility that students have chosen other than traditional departments and associations. Certainly their interdisciplinary approach would lead in such a direction.
Category Procedure in particular. The findings in the volume index survey on this point have been extremely limited insofar as negative misinterpretative findings are concerned. The conclusions to be drawn to date however must be tempered by the very limited search into each citation to the Sheriffs. From the immediate context of the citations it appears that the Sheriffs have been positively and accurately cited. A more thorough search of each might reveal many which have used the Sheriffs in ways which are not consistent with their own. This is of course a need for future research.

A relatively minor point of information, but one of interest to persons wishing to establish the Sheriffs' closeness to sociology is the survey of their use of writings in sociological journals. Such information has been developed from a bibliographical survey of their works and noting sociologically relevant journals in which their sources were published. These authors also have been checked against the Guide to Departments of Sociology, 1965. Only a small percent (22%) of the are so listed. This attests to a variety of things, including such as the variety of authors in the journals and the

\[14\] The use of the latter as a source for sociologists may be based on its paralleling the period in time when the major studies in the SJI Own Category Procedure were taking place, though comparatively little of the latter material was published until after that date. The first basic own category study was in 1953 (Hovland and Sherif).

The rather arbitrary criterion for definition as a sociologist ignores the complexities of the definitional problem. Many persons Who might be categorized as sociologists and are using the Sheriffs' work could probably be found in other than academic departments. Our purpose here however has been to bound the inquiry to those who are writing volumes which are classified by library call number as being sociological in character.
appropriateness or completeness of the Guide to Departments of Sociology, 1965.

The degree to which social psychology has developed into a field in itself may be indicated by the degree to which classification of much of the material referring to the Sherifs, the Social Judgment Involvement Approach and the Own Category Procedure may be found in separate classifications in the field of psychology itself. Certainly many of the doctoral dissertations relevant to social psychology are being located in social psychology rather than sociology. Related also is the establishment of separate social psychology departments. The library call numbers covered in this study have included social psychology. For example, social psychology texts are listed as HM 251, e.g., H. C. Lindgren, 1969, E. P. Hollander, 1967, T. M. Newcomb, et al., 1965.15

There are a number of variables operating to bias the sampling of the literature used in this study; hence no pretense can be made as to the representativeness of the sample. Some tentative statements can be made concerning the sample on the basis of: 1) comparing the holdings in the library with the reviews and "books received" listings in major sociological journals, 2) statements from librarians and others

responsible for purchasing in the area of sociology, and 3) statements of library policy. 16

One variable in the assessment of the results of the library index survey must be the element of time. As noted above, the studies which stress the SJI and Own Category Procedure are not only few in number (relative to others), but are comparatively recent, at a time when the proliferation of the literature is taking place at a prodigious rate. Such a time dimension may work in a negative manner, at least one text cites the Sherifs in an earlier edition, but not in a later one. 17

In summarizing it might be noted that the survey of indexes in sociologically relevant volumes has revealed references to the earlier works of the Sherifs as they relate most especially to group and inter-group processes. References to judgmental processes as found in the Sherif and Hovland, 1961 volume are much fewer in the sociologically relevant literature surveyed. The Own Category Procedure is almost totally absent from this literature.

16 For example, a survey of the UMKC holdings (noted above) utilizing the "Current Books" list from the American Journal of Sociology, LXXXI (1966) reveals 617 of a total of 1053. A survey of the "Books Reviewed" for the same volume reveals 316 of a total of 399 reviewed that year. See the appendix, p. 386 for statement covering volume buying by the library.


The search has uncovered no tie between the lack of the SJI and the Own Category Procedure in the sociological literature and the conceptual confoundings discussed in Chapters II, III, and IV. Further research in the sociological literature on a concept basis is needed to establish what parallel concepts sociologists are using, their possible confounding, and explanations for the lack of impact of the Social Judgment Involvement Approach and the Own Category Procedure on the sociological literature.
Chapter VI

Summary

This study has attempted to outline in some detail the conceptual problems which may be providing difficulties in the increasing utilization of the Social Judgment Involvement Approach and the Own Category Procedure as conceptualized by two selected social psychologists, Carolyn W. Sherif and Muzafar Sherif. It has also attempted to show the degree to which the SJI and Own Category Procedure have been incorporated into the sociological literature, the findings showing that earlier studies by the Sherifs received much more attention. No conclusions have been able to be reached as to explanations for the above, these being beyond the scope of this study. The conceptualizing occurring in the literature relating to conceptual functioning may provide a variable in the lack of impact on the sociological literature but this remains a possibility not concluded in this research.\(^\text{1}\) Many, if not all, of the concepts reviewed in Chapter III are in need of further specification and accompanying clarification as to their usefulness in a viable social psychology which is truely social (e.g., judgment, involvement, attitude, psychophysical, psychosocial, scales-scaling).

Some attempt has been made to indicate the potential of the conceptual and methodological frameworks being developed for the study of persons functioning in group and larger social organizational contexts. Much of what has been noted in the above would appear to raise

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\(^{1}\)Such a possibility provided one of the rationales for the volume index search of the sociological literature noted in Chapter V.
questions regarding the interpretations which can be attributed to many of the findings of social research as these have been used to indicate individual judges' conceptual functioning in responding to the wide variety of techniques used to gather data in the past. Indicated is the need for such research directed toward reassessment of the findings of both current and past work as to validity of the extrapolations drawn from the data in light of some of the newer findings reporting the complexity of the judgment process.²

Selected Social Judgment Involvement Approach concepts were taken up in Chapters II and III in a survey of its writers, assumptions, and what it is not. The latter is important in the framework not addressing many of the traditional conceptual problems, e.g., reification, dualistic, and reductionistic concepts. The SJI attempts to avoid such problems by either not using or redefining the concepts.³ Chapter IV explores a particular instrument (the Own Category Procedure) which epitomizes the theoretical and methodological assumptions which lie behind the SJI and indicates some of the more recent findings and their significance for social research and theory. Chapter V gives the

²For example, persons being against a given stand may give no indication as to whether or not the responses assume the stand is too pro or too anti for the judge responding to accept. The response may not give any indication as to the degree of self or ego-involvement in the issue. It may also give no indication of the reference group used by the respondent.

³Examples of materials taken up are those of Chapter III in which the conceptual formulation of the confounding of extremity and involvement as they might relate to extreme group norms are explored. Another example in Chapter III was the discussion of scales and the confounding of attitude and involvement in the interpretation of scales.
results of a study of selected samples of the sociological literature to see how much of the above have infiltrated such literature as it references the chief exponents of the SJI (Carolyn W. Sherif and Muzaf fer Sherif).

The study indicates need for research which attempts to integrate the findings in much of the literature noted in this work with the mass of studies which are being done by sociologists and social psychologists.

The study of the SJI literature revealed a relatively closed circle of persons who have been concerned with the Own Category Procedure and related approaches designated here as the SJI. In the months since this search was completed this may have expanded greatly, e.g., recent literature by J.W. Reich, Wm. R. Hood, et al.

The continued exploring of alternative explanations for the patterns which have been found in the SJI and Own Category Procedure appears to be extremely important. Alternative formulations of psychological functioning abound, most of these being discussed in the psychological literature and not compared to the SJI. In significant cases where comparison is made, where controversy between the SJI and others has been evident, it appears that the basic issues of the SJI appear to be incorporated, e.g., judgment scales, with attitudes as ranges rather than a point, involvement appearing as part of all judgment in varying degrees, and the importance of social contexts. Other consequences have been those such as the differential placement of items, the stability of that placement, and the amount of time that judges take in such placement.

As experimenters continue to give attention to the conditions
under which judges make these sorts, including some of the internal shifts as they are indicated by G. A. Woodward, 1967, the complexity of the judgment process will not only become more clear but also very possibly much more complex. 4

The use of a series of statements sorted by judges coupled with experimental variables which may be introduced through instructions and the internal variables which judges are known to bring to the sorting task provides an additional instrument at the current time to dimension group phenomena. This potential is present by virtue of being able to inject group processes (stimuli) at any of three points. For example, statements may indicate various groups, instructions may introduce groups to the situation, or selection of judges may be used to provide differential judgmental situations.

Continuing pursuit of the SJI as a viable series of conceptual frameworks could also be of some interest in the Sociology of Knowledge, especially as it represents so clearly the juncture of a variety of disciplinary interests.

The study has raised more questions than it has answered. Principle ones answered have been; 1) the degree to which a conceptual respecification of many concepts used in social psychology is in the wind, 2) the degree to which there is a fairly narrowly specified body of literature which is utilizing the conceptual framework as specified by the Sherifs, though there may be an undefined larger

literature paralleling it which has been beyond and not identified
by this study, 3) the impact of the SJI on the sociological literature
appears from the limited sample reported above to be fairly
circumscribed.

With reference to number three above, this study has attempted to
assess the impact of the SJI and Own Category Procedure through the
analysis of the use of two selected social psychologists, C. W. Sherif
and M. Sherif who have been most instrumental in explicating a con-
ceptual framework which they call the Social Judgment Involvement
Approach. The data to be found in Chapter V and the appendices are
from this study of the number and content of references to Carolyn W.
Sherif and Muzafier Sherif in literature catalogued as sociological in
a selected university library. References were located through search
of indexes in the volumes searched. The sample selected included the
years 1960-1968. The finding of only 6% of these volumes referring
to the Sherifs for any subject and almost none of these for either
the SJI or the Own Category Procedure has not been explained in this
work, but remains as a topic for further research.

No attempt has been made to generalize from the brief surveys
made of the indexes in volumes in the library survey. Nor has there
been further pursuit of the specific references "content wise," except
as noted above, where the references were to the SJI or Own Category
Procedure. The main thrust of this aspect of the study has been to
ascertain the general parameters of the degree and content of the use
of the Sherifs' work in sociology, with principle focus on the SJI
approach and the Own Category Procedure. It was hoped that evidence
would be found that these have been used to dimension group processes or intergroup processes, but such studies have not been found other than those located previously in the search of bibliographies in Sherif and other directly related literature. The implications of this for group and intergroup research appears to remain relatively untapped.

The limitations of the sample and the methodology of index search must be recognized and are noted in Chapter V.

The question of the impact (diffusion) of the SJI and Own Category Procedure might be handled in several other ways. 5

There appears to be no pattern in those citing the Sherifs beyond that to be seen in and traced through the use of concepts. This has not been a pursuit of this work but remains to be done. It would appear that the information explosion has inundated the various disciplines to the point where a particular author being cited by 6% of the literature may represent in fact a very worthy contribution. Further work with such emerging sources as the Science Citations

5 Such samples might include a variety of different classifications such as texts, or in specialized areas such as theory, methodology, social thought, social problems, sociology(ies) of various kinds such as religion, occupation, rural, urban, aged, youth, etc. Other specialized areas of sociology used might be those combining various disciplines, e.g., political sociology, economic sociology, and of course, social psychology.

Another way in which this might be done would be to study the works of selected sociologists to find the degree of impact. Any such as the above may also focus on selected concepts.
Index may provide much more information in this direction in the future.6

The dissertation in its broader perspectives is pointing out the degree to which certain types of social psychology are not being indexed in selected volumes categorized as sociological by those assigning Library of Congress and Dewey system call numbers.

The above is important in the degree to which analysis at a sociocultural level must be supplemented by a psychology which considers the importance of such sociocultural phenomena at an individual-interpersonal level of conceptual functioning. The above is not to say that sociologists become psychologists. Quite the contrary, it points in the direction of freeing the sociologist from unnecessary concern as to the degree to which his assumptions at a sociocultural level are consistent with those at a conceptual functioning level.

The inquiry here undertaken does not explore all the alternatives which might be possible in the psychological literature, though it becomes obvious in the discussions of the controversies revolving around the various conceptions and techniques of dimensioning internal variables that there must be a variety of assumptions possible

and that ones no longer able to bear up under scrutiny should be cast aside. 7

The validity of such alternatives, and the varieties on which the sociological literature is based are not the purpose of this discussion. These would be the subject of a much broader study than is possible at this time. It is hoped that the thrust of this work may point in the direction of the necessity for such studies. Findings, for instance, point to the necessity of re-examining the basic assumptions, i.e., the conceptions and frameworks used in sociological research regarding the psychological nature of man. Related to the above are the sources to which sociologists refer as they make references to concepts at individual levels of analysis, e.g., personality, emotions, motives, needs, etc. This survey of the recent literature would indicate that 94% of a sample of the sociological literature is not going to exponents of a conception of psychological conceptual functioning which must include and be consistent with findings at a sociocultural frame of reference and looks to much of the sociological literature as its rationale for being.

Search for major critical work has produced basically a null finding. Search for major works utilizing the Own Category Procedure as an instrument has the same finding. Search for impact on the sociological literature has revealed parallel negative findings. The search has revealed a small though increasing number of workers using various aspects of the approach, attempting to refine or attack various particular problems which appear in it.

A difficulty in locating highly critical literature may be partially explained through methodological limitations of this search, and the limited literature which has been published regarding the SJI and Own Category Procedure. Large amounts of the literature which might be construed to be amending the SJI and Own Category Procedures could also be seen as critical. Examples of highly critical literature are such as H. S. Upshaw, 1962, 1965, 1968. Examples of those which are constructively elaborating on it are J. W. Reich, L. N. Diab, G. A. Woodward, et al.

The relatively few negative citations to the Sherifs' work in the volume index survey may be due to the limited nature of the survey of each volume. The possibility is present that a cite appear positive when in effect the total thrust of the entire discussion be to negate the citation to the Sherifs. Other possibilities are such as the representativeness of the sample, the difficulties in communication inherent in disciplinary frameworks and the tremendous growth of specialization within both psychology and sociology. Such

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8 Reviews of the impact of the Sherifs' work on sociology are by R. H. Turner, 1966, and brief discussions honoring Muzaffer Sherif upon his receiving the Kurt Lewin Award in 1967. See Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (1, 1968).
possibilities invite extreme caution in extrapolating any significance from these findings on a positive-negative dimension. Since the main thrust of the survey was merely the degree to which the SJI and Own Category Procedure are discussed at all, this issue is not crucial to this work at the current time. Of course where the Own Category Procedure or SJI were the object of the citation direction did become a major interest.

The Own Category Procedure and SJI appear at the current time to still be in an embryonic state, drawing some attention, but not enough to be a major thrust in social psychology to date. Its potential appears to be yet untapped. It can be predicted that it or parallel formulations will become widespread over the next few decades by virtue of its grounding in procedures capable of high degrees of rigor in methodology including mathematical treatments, at the same time that thoroughly social variables are being considered. The fact that it appears to circumvent many of the conceptual constructs which have caused difficulty in specification in the past will be another factor in the elaboration of the SJI and parallel approaches. It would be predicted that their impact on the social psychological literature will parallel that of the autokinetic studies from which they derive.

A major factor in the above development may be the degree to which the confounding discussed in Chapters II, III, and IV prevent the Social Judgment Involvement Approach and the Own Category Procedure from being used.
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Reich, John W. "Stimulus Complexity Mediation of Categorization Behavior." Unpublished manuscript, Arizona State University,


Robinson, W. P. "Own Attitude and Thurstone Scale Judgments," Psychological Reports, XVI (1965), 419-422.


Sherif, Muzaffer. "If the Social Scientist is to be more than a mere Technician," Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (1, 1968), 41-61.


See various works of the Sheriffs for discussions of this, especially C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965.


Wieland, George F. "To Judge Items or People: A Note on Instructions to Thurstone-Item Judges," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXX (1966), 429-432.


APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF SHERIF CITATIONS WHICH ARE POSITIVE

Positive citations to the Sherifs primarily revolve around groups and group norm processes, for example the norm formation autokinetic studies. These are explicated in the accompanying indexes. In addition to indicating pro citations these indexes also indicate where appropriate whether or not the authors citing the Sherifs are listed in the Graduate Departments of Sociology, 1965. It will be noted that relatively few of them are so listed. A larger percentage of the pro cites in the library sociological literature come from sociologists than do those writers noted in the general search of the literature related to the SJI and Own Category Procedure. There appears to be no doubt that the autokinetic and the camp studies provide the major thrust of references to the Sherifs in the sociological literature. The principle sources cited for these appear to be the Archives, 1935, the Psychology of Social Norms, 1936, and the Groups in Harmony and Tension, 1953.

The largest number of references are related to the concept of group structure and functioning, the next largest categories are autokinetic, judgment, involvement, and intergroup relationships.

It is significant that some concepts which might have been the subject of citations are conspicuous by their absence, e.g., the concept of motive. This is not surprising since the Sherifs do not use the concept widely themselves. It would appear that none are citing the Sherifs for this in these terms. It might be of some significance that the Sherifs use of the concept motive is usually as an adjective (motivational) rather than as a noun.

Our survey of the positive citations of Sherif's work as found in the selected sample of the sociological literature may take several tacks. For example, 1) the number of references found in the literature, 2) ranking on the basis of significance to various aspects and matters of concern in the Sherifs' work. There are a number of different ways in which the information which has been gathered might be utilized to reveal a variety of different patterns. For example, the following might be suggested. 1) The various studies in which Sherif has taken part and the treatment of them in the literature. 2) The comparative significance which related concepts might have, e.g., for Sherif, for sociology, for social psychology, for the Social Judgment Involvement approach as discussed by Sherif, and for the Own Category Procedure, or special aspects of each, e.g., methodology. Those in which polemics are to be found in the literature might be still other approaches. 3) Still another major area of search might be those concepts which are conspicuous by their absence, e.g., motives noted above.
Regardless of the particular order in which the various topics for which others have cited the Sherifs are taken up, it is necessary to compare these with those other than positive comments from volumes in the selected sample.

For illustrative purposes the following of the Sherifs' studies will be very briefly noted, autokinetic, camp, adolescent group, prohibition, and the two classic studies which relate to Thurstone scale judges.

Most authors who refer to the Sherifs in connection with the autokinetic study refer to it as it is found in all his earlier works, e.g., 1935, 1936, 1937, 1948, and 1956.

Very few references are found to M. Sherif and H. Cantril, 1947. This cannot be explained by lack of treatment of the autokinetic phenomenon in this volume, though it is not widely stressed in the index.

Several comments might be made regarding the autokinetic study. The criticisms of it are nonexistent in this survey of the literature. Sources of other than positive comments are in the direction of either possible misinterpretation or such comments as by A. M. Rose, 1965, where he says that neither S. E. Asch nor M. Sherif are sociological. Among those writers who might have disappointingly interpreted the study are those of A. Zaleznik, 1964, who interprets the results in terms of "need for validation" and cases such as H. D. Arnoult, 1963, who while citing M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1956, on the same page does not cite Sherif for the autokinetic phenomena but does cite S. E. Asch, 1951. This is an example of the phenomena found in numerous cases to which M. Sherif in his introduction to 1966 alludes, e.g., the results of the autokinetic studies are interpreted in individual terms. For example, A. Zaleznik (above) is interpreting the studies in terms of individual psychological motivation rather than the significant group norm demonstration. Another example is J. W. McDavid and H. Harrari, 1968, seeing it as a matter of susceptibility to social influence. In many of these cases the ambiguity of the situation and subsequent "conformity" to other's evaluations, or the reduced variability are seen as the principle results. For examples see S. Verba, 1961, A. Zaleznik, 1964, E. L. Walker and Roger W. Haynes, 1962. In other cases it was seen as an experiment in individual perception, for example, T. Shibutani, 1961.

Those studies which relate the autokinetic studies to "group norms" or group internal functioning processes are relatively few in number also. Most are to be found in a "group influencing individual" category. For example, F. J. Thomas, 1967, S. Verba, 1961, K. Lang and C. E. Lang, 1961.
In the camp studies citations those noted are eight authors with topics ranging from methodology (natural, laboratory, or observer) to superordinate goals and descriptions of the study itself. Ingroup outgroup phenomena including differential loyalty, recall of phenomena and stereotypes are also found in few numbers. There are numerous cites where it is extremely difficult to tell whether the camp studies are the referent. For instance A. W. Green, 1960, refers to M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1953, and it is impossible to tell here whether or not the discussion is from the camp studies. Another example is that of H. W. Polsky, 1962, where he says sociologists have a "firm conviction" regarding "collectivities" and then cites M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1953, p. 192 regarding definition of the group.10

The references to the Sherifs' 1964 work on the adolescent groups have probably received less literature wide attention both because of their recency and because of their more specialized nature. They have been used by writers in the areas of juvenile delinquency and other adolescent problems. For example, J. F. Short, 1967, has an adaptation from M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif (eds.), 1965.11 He has references to the Sherifs' 1965 volume in his introduction. An example of a reference is I. L. Reiss, 1967, who states that the Sherifs', 1965, deals with adolescence sociologically.12 A. M. Lee, 1966, cites M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1964, regarding adolescence as a personal crisis.13 R. Jessar, et al., 1968, cites M. Sherif, 1934, with reference to its differential class, ethnic, and race variables and actually quotes M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, 1964.14


The Thurstone scaling controversy and study has been still less recognized by the sociological literature under consideration. The principle study(s) involved in this are the 1952 and 1953 reruns by M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland of earlier studies by L. L. Thurstone and E. D. Hinckley. These studies (the former) receive extremely little attention in the sociological literature surveyed for this work. Exceptions are social psychology texts such as E. P. Hollander, 1967.16 By contrast the literature surveyed for the SJ1 and Own Category Procedure has many references to this issue.
FOOTNOTES

1It should be noted that the number of readers (anthologies) in the sociological literature sample enabled a number of writers such as D. T. Campbell who are not sociologists to be reflected on these lists.


APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V

OTHER THAN POSITIVE CITES TO THE SHERIFS

Other than positive citations may range in several dimensions: e.g., the degree(s) to which writers include the work of the Sherifs where appropriate, whether positively or negatively; the degrees to which critical comments may be construed to be constructive, i.e. going "beyond" the Sherifs; the degrees to which critical comments strike at the basic assumptions of the Sherifs, i.e. how important is the criticism to the general issues involved.

A number of the sources discussed in the following are not from the sociological literature sample, but represent the types of difficulties encountered when persons refer to works of the Sherifs. Those which are a part of the sociological literature will be so indicated by an "$^*$".

The following does not attempt to indicate all of the negative citations found in this survey of the literature. It only attempts to indicate very briefly their dimensions and significance. In a very real sense Chapters II and III of this work are explications of controversies which are surrounding the complicated system of concepts which must be developed if a viable study of human social behavior and the larger social units is to progress.

Inadequate references to Muzafer Sherif, points at which treatment of his work might have been elaborated upon, form a continuum ranging from no reference at all to those which might stress Sherif to the exclusion of other writers. Into this category could, of course, go a full range of works which do not register the Sherifs' works at all. The library search of the indexes of a selected sample of the sociological literature demonstrated this clearly.

The number of writers specifying his autokinetic and the camp studies would lead one to believe that omission of some reference to these in basic social psychological and sociological work did constitute some error in omission. It is obvious that it is impossible to delineate the points at which any range of persons can be said to have intentionally omitted aspects of a writer's work. The proliferation of publishing at the current time gives any researcher the "out" that it simply be a matter of chance in encountering a particular writer's basic works.

It is not only possible that writers omit the works of an author. Certain aspects of a writer's work may be overlooked. A general case is the overlooking of the SJI and Own Category Procedure by the sociological literature while it notes the Sherifs' contributions to group research. A more specific example is the citing of involvement
without citing Sherif's work in connection with it by A. L. Atkins, 1966. He has omitted consideration of involvement in his experimental design but in the closing paragraphs recognizes involvement as a possible confounding variable yet does not cite Sherif and Hovland in this regard. Atkins does recognize them at other points in a discussion of assimilation and contrast effects.¹

There are other examples of authors who appear to not give sufficient attention to the work of the Sherifs and related authors. One of these is M. E. Shaw and J. M. Wright, 1967. The lack of Sherif's work may be indicative of their attempt to give only the most used measurement instruments, certainly a legitimate reason for omitting the scales developed by Sherif and others.²

Other writers such as J. W. MacDavid and H. Harari, 1968, cite Hovland-Sherif, 1952, but give no indication of the Own Category Procedure. It is interesting to note that MacDavid and Harari do not index either involvement or commitment, but are heavy on attitude.³ Of course one of the most interesting inadequate citations is that of H. S. Upshaw's not seeing the apparent significance of M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, 1953, e.g., its not being cited in his bibliography or references.⁴ Very interesting also is the degree to which J. E. McGrath and Irving Altman, 1966,⁵ in their attempt to summarize small group research cite Sherif, et al., 1961, as a reference but do not cite any of the Sherifs' works in their "variables analysis" and only two of O. J. Harvey's works.⁶

Further down the continuum toward increased differentiation from the Sherifs are those which can be characterized as "not understanding" what it is that the Sherifs are saying and some question develops as to the authors having correctly read or fully read the works of the Sherifs.

A good example is L. F. Carter, et al., where it is implied that "authoritarian" scale instruments measure "attitudes" in terms of a point.⁷ As will be shown in discussions below, it is becoming increasingly evident in the Sherifs' as well as other work that conceptualization of attitudes must be in terms of ranges or latitudes. Another objection to the above might be its assuming "authoritarian" is an "attitude" as opposed to its being conceptualized as a composite of confounding subcomponents or dimensions as appears to be the case.⁸ Another case is the making a clear distinction between extremity and involvement which C. D. Ward, 1966, does not take into consideration.⁹

Other concepts around which there has been misunderstanding are such as norm. For example, H. Helson, 1964, where it is almost spoken of as a statistical average.¹⁰

appears to have oversimplified their position. His findings appear to be confounded in a variety of ways, many of which he himself has analysed in this article.

A classic (and continuing) misunderstanding may be that which is exemplified in J. W. Brehm and A. R. Cohen, 1962, when they say that the Yale tradition has not come to grips with the theoretical problems of relating discrepancy of communication and attitude change, for example, it does not have a learning theory. Other examples of misunderstanding might be noted on the following categories: Assimilation-Contrast (judgment), Dualisms, Autokinetic, Conditioning.

Another example is A. R. Cohen, 1959, (also in Proshansky, esp. p. 194f) citing C. I. Hovland, O. J. Harvey and H. Sherif, 1957, as finding a positive correlation between discrepancy and attitude change.

M. Brewster Smith's 1965 review of Sherif and others in S. Koch (ed.), 1963, appears to say that Sherif has a cognitive position though Sherif would classify himself as using all three approaches, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral. This would explain why Smith commented that the Sherifs' theoretical framework remained "annoyingly fuzzy." Sherif's framework may be fuzzy by virtue of not adhering to, answering, or dealing with many of the traditional psychological questions, e.g., learning theory.

A further example of either misunderstanding or misquoting of Sherif, 1936, is to be found in D. Katz, 1960, which attributes an interpretation of Sherif to be of the "irrational conception of man" school as a result of the Sherifs' finding that individuals are swayed by their assessment of the source, i.e. man becomes irrational.

Another example, critical of M. Sherif and H. Cantril, 1945, is L. S. Doob, 1947, on the issue of attitudes and learning theory which might be needed to accompany them. I. Chein, 1948, defends Sherif and Cantril through pointing to the particular learning theory which the behaviorists such as L. W. Doob must incorporate.

Another case is J. W. Brehm in 1962 raising the point that the whole "Yale" tradition has not been theoretically clear. This would appear to reflect the points above regarding the "fuzziness" of Sherif's theoretical conceptual framework to persons involved in making conceptual distinctions which Sherif does not utilize.

The critical statements of A. M. Rose, 1965, regarding the "superfluous, and actually misleading" nature of such studies as the autokinetic and other studies which do not have "real groups" present is very well taken insofar as such "togetherness" situations are often confounded with group situations. Rose however is not clear at this point in spelling out the differences between the Sherif and S. E. Asch studies insofar as their relevance for group conceptualizations
are concerned. Sherif has vigorously pressed the necessity to specify the exact social context in such situations, making the point as does Rose, 1965, that the "force of tradition behind social norms" must be recognized.18

H. S. Upshaw as a critic of M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland and the assimilation-contrast model of judgment is dealt with more fully at other points in the discussion (above-below).19

Indicative of another problem area in the interpretation of the Sherifs' work is seen in a review by H. D. Saltzstein, 1965, which while generally being very favorable, points to what he sees as them failing to "... adequately articulate the connections between the attitudes toward and evaluation of an issue and overt action."20 This, as a number of the above, is also noted in discussion of these concepts in Chapters II and III above.

A relatively minor point, but one which shows the degree to which studies may be "distorted" is S. Verba, 1961, citing Sherif and saying the boys in the camp studies "... spending the summer" at camp. The camp actually only lasting several weeks.21

The issue in all of the above might be one which is common to many such discussions. When do such additions or critical comments become one of being "anti" or "constructive?" One example of the addition of variables is A. F. Glixman, 1967, in which he introduced the possibility of a sex differential, saying it had been given only casual treatment if at all.22

There are a range of different issues on which various writers have found themselves differing with Sherif, arranged alphabetically they run in part as follows: assimilation-contrast, attitude-judgment of items, discrepancy, domains (instructions), extremity, Freud, group, information-knowledge, involvement, neutral items, operationalizing (of concepts), personality, range, statistical procedures, theory, time-process-technology. Rearranged a little differently the above might be categorized into those which are of central relevance to our discussion of the SJI and Own Category Procedure literature: assimilation-contrast, attitude-judgment, discrepancy, domains (instructions), extremity, involvement, neutral items, operationalizing of concepts. Relevant more to our library search have been the problems relating to the information-knowledge, personality, theory and time-process-technology issues. Freud might also have been related to the selected sociological volumes search, but it is not clear at this time how it or some of the above tie in most directly. We will take the categories by topic alphabetically at this point within categories based on which search of the literature might be most relevant, the SJI or Own Category Procedure first, followed by the general library Sherif search.
There are a number of issues on which debate has continued differing with the Sherifs' position on assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment. For example, G. I. Schulman and C. R. Title, 1968, while having a good description of the general processes involved and not citing Sherif directly, raises the issue as to whether or not positive stands are differential in their effects on judgment from negative stands.\(^23\) It would appear, as the Sherifs have pointed out, that this issue was shown to not be the case with K. R. Vaughan's 1961 study of highly anti (negative) Latin judges in south Texas.\(^24\)

A major conceptual problem relating to the reification problem is the view of attitudinal behavior as present in both (all) behavior, this issue being whether or not the same attitudes involved in behaviors in filling out "attitudinal" tasks attempting to measure them are the same as those which will be variables in the other behaviors which are attempted to be predicted.\(^25\)

An area of differentiation and controversy in the literature which is being rapidly resolved is that of the communication-discrepancy issue. This is most easily illustrated by P. G. Zimbardo, 1960, and other dissonance writers who have maintained that discrepancy of the communication from the position of the recipient is directly related to the amount of change which will take place as a result of listening to the communication.\(^26\)

A point on which various writers have added to and differed with the SJI has been in the consideration of different domains (universes of discourse, dimensions). L. N. Diab, 1965, cites his differing from M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, 1961, insofar as Diab tried to test more than one dimension at the same time, e.g., evaluation and possibility. Note that in his work he uses Osgood's semantic differential in which a host of different dimensions (domains) are used, activity, potential, etc., a variety of stimulus conditions may be used and conceptual "maps" formed of a concept.\(^27\) While domains, dimensions, etc., (levels, property space, meaning, characteristic) have received considerable attention, both J. R. Peterson, 1967, and G. A. Woodward, 1967, state that they have received little or no attention as they relate to "changes in dimensions of judgment."\(^28\)

The extremities of both scales or attitudes have been confounding factors in attempts to dimension the judgment process. See Chapter III above for further discussion.

Negative citations to Sherif also come from those who see in Sherif a lack of concern for some of the categorizations which are dominant in the Freudian Framework. These are not a thrust of this work, though the issues involved in the SJI writers not utilizing the psychoanalytic framework is probably important to an understanding of the significance of the framework which they (the SJI writers) are developing. The framework avoids reification of the wide variety of
internal motivational concepts of needs, drives, etc., substituting carefully phrased operationally defined conceptual constructs and hypotheses which are, it is hoped, testable. The SJI framework does not postulate a conception of man as necessarily a drive reduction, tension reduction anim.

The group is probably one of the more significant areas in which critical comments might be found which are relevant to sociology, and also to this study insofar as consideration is given to group variables in judgment. These take at least two different forms; one is differentiated with regard to definition of groups, e.g., M. W. Klein and L. Y. Crawford, 1968,* differ from the Sherifs in their specification of a gang as a group.29 Another is the way(s) in which different groups are conceptualized as relating to members, especially the relative significance of such membership in more than one group, e.g. J. F. Short and F. L. Strodtebeck, 1965,* saying the peer group has less importance than the Sherifs would imply in 1964.30 Of major interest in the long run is the role of groups in the process of innovation-invention-change-problem solving.

Though there were very few (if any) critical comments regarding Sheriff's concept of group it must not be forgotten that a large number of writers and experimental designs continue to use and confound the terms "group" and category, or group and "ad hoc group," in some cases making them comparative with Sheriff without realizing the difference.

A comparatively minor point but one which can be crucial in the way(s) in which communications or other external stimuli are perceived is that of Information. B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, 1958, in E. Maccoby, et al. are cited by H. C. Kelman and A. H. Eagly, 1965, as finding, "... a negative relationship between the extent to which such distortions occur and the amount of relevant information to which the individual had been exposed."31 The above would appear to be contrary to such findings as C. W. Sherif, M. Sherif, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, report K. R. Vaughan, 1961, judges as saying they had the facts. Reports from those judges in the prohibition study were generally "well informed" on the issues involved.32

Involvement has been a topic on which many studies have confounded with extremity, and about which many writers attempting to explicate the variables related to involvement have arrived at contradictory results only to realize that their experimental controls were probably not functioning as they had assumed. An example of the above is E. T. Prothro, 1957, where his findings appear to show a lack of displacement of items, apparently contradicting C. I. Hovland and M. Sherif, 1952 and 1953, but in actuality too few items or lack of involvement may have been explanatory variables.33

Neutral items, their placement by judges, has been a controversial point insofar as some models such as H. Nelson's Adaptation Level
places heavy emphasis on those points which are construed to be at the center of a scale as perceived by the judge. Such neutral positions are not to be confused with the judge's own position. A judge may (most often does) see his own position as being in either a positive or negative direction from that which he would see as being a "neutral position." Sheriff's SJI does not stress such neutral positions as anchors for judgments necessarily, though a judge may have such positions as his own attitude. For example, C. W. Sheriff, M. Sheriff, and R. E. Nebergall, 1965, point out how a judge may view an ostensibly neutral position on an issue as being very hostile if he is in heated intergroup conflict. Neutral positions being seen as aiding the enemy, if you're not with us then you must be against us. 34 The complexity of the "neutral item" placement is seen when G. A. Woodward, 1967, cites L. LaFave, et al., 1963, as well as M. Zavalloni and S. W. Cook, 1963, as finding that clearly neutral items will not be displaced, that only "ambiguous" items will be assimilated or contrasted. 35

The operationalizing of concepts has been a major thrust of Sheriff's work going back to his attempts to specify norm formation operationally in the autokinetic studies. It is therefore ironical that W. Stephenson, 1953, should comment that M. Sheriff and H. Cantril, 1947, along with others such as K. Lewin and K. Koffka are having no "self operations" which are accompanying the constructs. M. Sheriff and C. W. Sheriff, 1967, in discussing a weakness of balance and dissonance theory note that neither has developed an "operational" measure of self. 36

"Personality" has always been a major concern of psychology and social psychology. D. J. Levenson, 1966, expresses concern that Sheriff's work gives too little concern for personality but he adds that Sheriff personally had assured him otherwise. 37 There may be a question here as to the meaning of the concept "personality" and the degree to which the Sheriffs incorporate personality in other concepts such as "judgment," involvement, self, anchors, latitudes of acceptance, biogenetic and sociogenic factors (variables, motives). There are general problems connected with saying that a person has "a" personality when attempting to deal with group memberships, particularly reference group membership.

The above are only some indications of the areas in which other writers are differing with the Sheriffs. The reader is referred to the main chapters in this work for other discussions. A recent example of extensive further critical discussion of the Sheriffs' work is to be found in C. A. Kesler, D. E. Collins, and N. Miller, 1969. 38
FOOTNOTES


19 There appears also to be some problem in H. S. Upshaw on the one hand attributing the results obtained by Hovland-Sherif, 1952, to the judges being "out of range" and Sherif-Hovland, 1961, stating that each judge was able to "... select one of the piles as representative of their own stand on the issue." It may be notable that Upshaw has paid relatively little attention to the Sherif-Hovland, 1953, to which the above M. Sherif and C. I. Hovland, 1961, were referring, even though the two (1952, 1953) were definitely linked at the time by cross references both ways.


25 See Chapter III.


32 Vaughan, op. cit.


38 For a recent discussion of the SJI and the Sheriffs' contribution which critically summarizes the literature as seen from a cognitive dissonance framework see Charles A. Kiesler, Barry E. Collins, and Norman Miller, Attitude Change: A Critical Analysis of Theoretical Approaches (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969).
AUTHORS, VOLUME DATE, AND TOPIC FOR WHICH THE SHERIFS ARE CITED:

Includes volumes catalogued in Library of Congress numbers HM-HX and
corresponding Dewey System numbers citing the Sherifs in indexes.
Includes articles in edited volumes originally published 1960-1969.
Sample consisted of above in the University of Missouri-Kansas City
library.

Adinarayan, S.P., 1964

Group, Attitude, Judgment, Intergroup Conflict

Allen, V.L., 1964 in Berkowitz, 1964

Autokinetic, Norm, Individual
-Group, Research Design

Amir, M. 1967, in Clinard and
Quinney, 1967

Group

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Judgment, Involvement

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Attitudes

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Group, Norms

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Group, Norm, Judgment, Role

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Judgment, Ego (self), Role
Cognition

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Sherif, 1962

Group (inter), Superordinate
Goals

Blau, P.M., 1964

Group, Camp, Conflict

Bordon, G.A., Gregg, R.B., and
Grove, T.C., 1969

Norm

Bradford, L.P., Gibb, J.R., and
Benne, K.D., 1964

Judgment, Involvement, Intergroup Conflict, Latitudes

Bredemier, H.C., and Stephenson, R.,
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Intergroup Conflict, Research
Design

Autokinetic
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Katz, D., 1960, in Leberger, 1965
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Kleinberg, O., 1962, in Sherif, 1962
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Morrow, A.J., 1962

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North, R.C., 1962, in Sherif, 1962

Ogburn, Wm.F., and Nimkoff, M.F., 1964

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Pettigrew, T.F., 1964, in Hyman, 1968

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Riley, M., 1963


Secord, P.F., and Backman, C.W., 1964

Segerstedt, T. T. 1966

Sellin, J.T., and Wolfgang, M.E., 1964

Individual-Group

Group

Group, Research Design

Norms, Attitudes, Judgment (Thurstone scaling), Camp studies, Communication

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Superordinate Goals

Attitude

Reference Groups

Group

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Group (inter), Intergroup Conflict

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Group, Autokinetic, Attitudes, Latitudes, Superordinate Goals, Communication, Intergroup

Superordinate Goal

Perception
Sheperd, C.R., 1964
Shibutani, T., 1961
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Short, J.F., Jr., 1966 in Hoffman and Hoffman, 1966
Short, J.F., Jr. 1967, in Clinard, and Quinney, 1967
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Tannenbaum, A.S., 1965, in March, 1965
Thomas, E.J., 1967
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Vander Zanden, J.W., 1963
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Warr, P.B., and Knapper, C., 1968
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Williams, R.M., Jr., 1964,

Yinger, J.M., 1965,

Zaleznik, A., and Moment, D., 1964

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Group, Autokinetic, Group (inter), Theory (field)

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COAUTHORS AND EDITORS IN THE MAJOR SHERIFS' WORKS TO DATE.

Cantril, H. and Sherif, M., 1938
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Sherif, M. and Harvey, O.J., 1952
Sherif, M., White, B.J., and Harvey, O.J., 1955
Hovland, C.I., and Sherif, M., 1952
Sherif, M., and Hovland, C.I., 1953
Sherif, M., Taub, D., and Hovland, C.I., 1958
Sherif, M., and Hovland, C.I., 1961
Jackman, N., and Sherif, M., 1959
Jackman, N., Sherif, C.W., and LaFave, L., 1963
Sherif, M., and Koslin, B.L., 1960
LaFave, L., and Sherif, M., 1962
Sherif, C.W., Sherif, M., and Nebergall, R.E., 1965
Reich, J.W., and Sherif, M., 1963
Sherif, M. and Sargent, S.S., 1947
Sherif, M., Taub, D., and Hovland, C.I., 1958
Sherif, M., White, B.J., and Harvey, O.J., 1955

More Prominent Students of the Sherifs (to date as reflected in their writing)

Harvey, O.J. Pollis, N.P. Sampson, S.F.
Hood, W.R. Prado, W. Shurtleff, S.S.
Jackman, N. Pronko, H. Thayer, L.O.
Koslin, K.L. Rand, M.A. Thrasher, J.D.
LaFave, L. Reich, J.W. Tittler, B.
MacNeil, M.K. Whittaker, J.O.
Vita

Norman Neel Proctor

Parents, Downing E. Proctor and Helen Neel Proctor. Born Chicago, Illinois, September 10, 1926. Attended public schools in Louisiana, Tennessee, North Carolina, Ohio, and Michigan, graduating from John Adams High School, Cleveland, Ohio, 1945. One year service in the navy. Entered The University of Texas in 1946 and completed the B.A. under Plan II with a concentration in the social sciences in 1950. Received the M.A. in sociology with minor in economics, 1953, also from The University of Texas. Employed by the Texas Employment Commission, Corpus Christi, Texas, 1953 to fall 1957 as test administrator and technical assistant. Instructor in sociology and economics, Texas College of Arts and Industries, Kingsville, Texas, 1957-1962, with exception of leave of absence, 1960-1961. Teaching assistant and graduate student Louisiana State University, 1960-1961. Assistant professor of organizational behavior and administration, The University of Missouri - Kansas City (previously the University of Kansas City), 1962 to date.

Married K. Eugenia Milton of Austin, Texas, 1949, and has three children, Patricia, Robert Neel, and John Charles.
Candidate: Norman Neel Proctor

Major Field: Sociology

Title of Thesis: The Social Judgment Involvement Approach: Selected Conceptual Problems, Impact on Sociological Literature

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Edward D. Ott

Wendell K. Hester

Quentin Jenkins

Robert F. Smith

Date of Examination: November 5, 1971