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Whose input counts and which paradigm prevails?: a content analysis of mass-mediated debate on U.S.-China relations in 1990's and a policy critique on republican virtue of the policy tradeoff

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WHOSE INPUT COUNTS AND WHICH PARADIGM PREVAILS? A
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MASS-MEDIATED DEBATE ON U.S.-
CHINA RELATIONS IN 1990s AND A POLICY CRITIQUE ON
REPUBLICAN VIRTUE OF THE POLICY TRADEOFF

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

Theanship School of Mass Communication

By
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Abstract

This dissertation examines the public opinion-public policy nexus with regard to the making of U.S.-China policy during the Clinton administration (1992-2000). The researcher investigates how the mass media discourse on U.S.-China relations relates to the policy tradeoff between economic interdependence and confrontation on human rights. Particularly, the quantitative study of the media discourse is placed within a Communitarian perspective to determine: (1) whether the policy tradeoff can claim to have the support of public opinion; (2) whether the media discourse originated from the active civic participation; and (3) how the policy tradeoff broke its promise. As a result, the researcher concludes that the eclipse of co-operative inquiry of the U.S. public, the ascendancy of issue management of special stakeholders, and the entanglement between newsmaking and policy-making may have jeopardized the republican virtue of U.S. diplomacy.

First, the researcher contextualizes U.S.-China relations and relates it to the dynamics of U.S. foreign policy choices among four national interests: power, prosperity, principle, and peace. Then, the researcher sets the Communitarian theory of the press as a normative theory of media democracy and incorporates other positive theories of political communication to make sense of the dilemma of the current media democracy. Following that, a content analysis of the New York Times and Cable News Network examined: (1) who said what; (2) which perspective prevails; (3) the correlation between newsmaking and policy-making; and (4) the congruence/dissension between policy beltway and other social groups.

The finding suggests a significant correlation between/among the policy proposal, the author of that proposal, and the issue/frame espoused; on the other hand, the conspicuous differences among policy-makers, ordinary citizens (issue public), and

professional communicators in regard to the policy trade-off indicates a low public accountability of the policy tradeoff. To explain the discrepancy, the investigator examined corporate America's issue management of U.S.-China trade and put the policy tradeoff into the perspective of capitalistic globalization theory. Finally, the lack of republican virtue is explained as a result of corporate-driven diplomacy and the media discourse short of civic participation. Henceforward, a Communitarian press becomes recommendable for the rejuvenation of media democracy.

Chapter 1. Introduction

This dissertation research examines the opinion-policy nexus with regard to the making of U.S.-China policy during the Clinton administration (1993-2000). Through content analysis of major media discourse in the U.S., the investigator tries to determine (1) how the news coverage of China and the policy debate on U.S.-China relations in the mainstream media relate to the fundamental tradeoff of U.S.-China relations between trade and human rights in the last decade; (2) how the prevalence of a given foreign policy framework, such as realism vis-à-vis idealism, economic globalization vis-à-vis democratic peace, and dollar diplomacy vis-à-vis human rights diplomacy, relates to the mass-mediated consensus-building; (3) among plural social groups, whose perspective won the mediated competition of ideas and whose policy proposal is more congruent with the actual framework of the Clinton administration's China policy. By doing so, this quantitative study of "who said what" may constitute a firm foundation for policy critique with regard to the republican virtue of U.S.-China policy.

The reason that "who said what" matters in the opinion-policy nexus lies in that "people are policy"¹ and "ideas have consequences."² In examining the connection between opinion manufacturing, or consensus building, and policy-making, "who said what" in the public forum could be a cleft whereby one can break into the opinion-policy nexus. In reviewing the policy zigzag along pragmatism and principle and the policy tradeoff between trade and human rights in U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold War years, it is advisable to analyze the mass-mediated policy debate on China policy and news coverage of Chinese affairs during a given period of time to understand how the climate of opinion has been produced and how the mass-mediated consensus-building interacts with policy formation.

¹ Edwin Feulner, head of the Heritage Foundation, says so. See: www.heritage.org/Press/nr030403a.cfm

² This is title of Richard Weaver's book: "Ideas Have Consequences" (1948), University of Chicago Press.

The investigator chooses the Clinton administration to examine the opinion-policy nexus because the Clinton years may have seen the most tumultuous change of policy framework of U.S.–China relations. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Congress and other political factors and social groups regained more assertiveness in policy formulation, and thus could have engaged in more robust policy debate in the public forum. On the other hand, conducting diplomacy with the Chinese Communist government – in the wake of communism bankruptcy in Soviet and East Europe and in the face of the Chinese government remaining unrepentant toward the Tiananmen crackdown on democratic demonstration – provide sufficient ammunition for public debate on controversies. The U.S.–China strategic engagement in 1990s in spite of, or because of, conspicuous confrontation on democratic principle may render a compelling case for studying the republican virtue of the U.S. foreign policy.

The republican virtue of U.S. foreign policy includes democratic debate on foreign policy and democratic value orientation in foreign affairs, i.e., the public accountability and democratic morality of foreign relations. As to the public accountability of foreign policy, the founders of this nation cautioned that foreign affairs, such as entangling alliance and warfare in foreign lands, tend to cause domestic tyranny, impoverishment, “and the destruction of the necessary physical foundations of republican virtue” (Alterman, 1998, p. 43). Therefore, foreign policy ought to be subjected to the scrutiny of democratic polity; without it a new republic like the United States could be “tempted to the gun smoke of an old empire” (Kennan, 1951). As to the democratic value orientation of foreign affairs, the theory of democratic peace argues that U.S. foreign affairs should support the spread of democratic principle and the enlargement of democratic community around the world in the hope that democratic polity will reduce the risk of war. To fellow democracies around the world, the best strategy to insure

security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.

Ironically, the two dimensions of the republican virtue are sometimes at odds. President Franklin Roosevelt expressed his desperate need to “escape foreign policy handcuffs,” i.e., democratic polity at home, to confront Nazi threat to democracy abroad (Alterman, 1998, p. 72). So, public accountability of foreign policy and democratic value orientation of foreign policy are not always quite square with each other. Nevertheless, over time, democratic participation in the making of foreign policy, though minimal, tend to guard democratic morality of the United States’ foreign affairs (Alterman, 1998).

In supporting policy critique of the republican virtue of the U.S.-China policy, the content analysis of the media discourse places an emphasis on (1) whether the U.S. public, represented by ordinary citizens and other social groups, has participated in the democratic conversation with regard to the China issue to the extent that it may hold the elite policymakers accountable in framing the U.S.–China policy; (2) whether public opinion, represented by media discourse, has a clear insistence on the democratic morality of the U.S.–China relations.

This dissertation research also is conducted in the context of policy rethinking undertaken both in the United States and the People’s Republic of China. In China, there is a lamentation that globalization-oriented U.S.–China relations converted the Chinese economy into an inessential assemble line of the world factory rather than a world factory in itself, and that the Washington Consensus conceived by the neoliberal economists directed Chinese economy toward “a race to the bottom” – winning global economic competition through cheap labor, low environmental standards, and

authoritarian polity.³ Multinational corporations have discouraged independent R&D of Chinese enterprises, and thus rendered the Chinese industry a rudimentary supplier in the world economy system. In political aspect, the pragmatic diplomacy with the United States made China an auxiliary of the U.S. rather than an independent voice in the “multipolar politics,” which the Chinese government has advocated to balance the U.S.-led “unipolar politics.”

In the United States, the policy rethinking is that the tradeoff of U.S.-China relations between economic cooperation and human rights is a dramatic turnabout of policy framework in the post-Cold War years. Its long-term effect remains to be observed. The short-term effect is that, enmeshed into economic interdependence between China and the U.S., the human rights diplomacy becomes increasingly toothless. Economic and trade issues between the U.S. and China overwhelms other issues by which a democracy sets itself apart from a non-democratic government. The most worrisome result is that the international community is losing leverage to hold the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) accountable to human rights values⁴. Therefore, it is worthwhile to look into the opinion-policy nexus to see how such a policy tradeoff took place in conceptual world and who is the major shaper behind the policy turnabout.

The research could claim some originality in that (1) rare empirical research has been conducted to examine the republican virtue of the U.S.-China policy in the post-Cold War years; (2) the project tries to relate a critique of U.S.-China policy to the critique of the China policy-making process.

In summary, this research looks into how policy-makers, opinion leaders, elite groups, stakeholders, and active social groups, participated in the mediated-debate on

3. Yu, Yan: Big country bewildered in globalization age: Is China really benefiting from globalization? *Utopia Thinking*. Available at: <http://www.wyxsx.com/Article/Class17/200605/6758.html>

4. Agence France-Presse (AFP) “Washington’s China policy a ‘total failure’: top US lawmaker.” Thursday, May 19th 2005 at 7:13 pm ET. Text available at <http://www.political-news.org/breaking/10814/washingtons-china-policy-a-total-failure-top-us-lawmaker.html>.

U.S.-China policy during 1993-2000. Particularly, the investigator tries to find out: (1) How does the media discourse relate to the paradigmatic shift of U.S. foreign policy – from consensus of outrage and indignation to a consensus of engagement – in the post-Tiananmen years, and thus, enlist public support for, or opposition to, a pragmatic, globalization-oriented China policy? (2) To what extent are the mainstream media's coverage of China and the mediated debate on U.S. – China policy relevant to the actual policy framework during the Clinton years? (3) Whose opinion on the mainstream media is more congruous with the actual China policy framework?

Chapter 2. Background

This chapter examines the pedigree of the U.S. foreign policy and the geopolitical-ideopolitical context of the U.S.-China relations in the past decades. As to the U.S. foreign policy tradition, the investigator puts it into McDougall's perspective.

McDougall (1997) observes that the United States encounters the world with an "American exceptionalism" by which the United States is destined to spread republicanism, freedom, and democracy around the world and "to be a light to lighten the world" (p.20). As to the geopolitical-ideopolitical context of the U.S.-China relations, the investigator adopts Jentleson's 4Ps policy tradeoffs framework. Jentleson (2000) theorizes that U.S. foreign policy is basically a "dynamics of choice" among four national interests – power (realism), peace (liberal internationalism), prosperity (international political economy), and principle (democratic idealism) (p.10-24). Applying Jentleson's 4Ps theories to the dynamics of U.S.-China policy choice in the past decade, the researcher assumes that, among many policy tradeoffs, such as balance-of-power versus global meliorism, realpolitik of superpowers vs. idealism, international law vs. *raison d'état*, and so forth, the fundamental policy tradeoff of U.S.-China relations is between prosperity and principle, i.e., between U.S.-China trade relations and China's human rights record.

In the post-Cold War years, democracy is increasingly recognized as the sole origin of political legitimacy. Political democracy and economic development are increasingly becoming siblings in both wealthy Asian countries, where authoritarian regimes crumpled one by one, and democratic East European countries, where economies recovered after the earlier chaos and malaise. However, as A. M. Rosenthal, the most prolific columnist of *The New York Times* during 1990s in regard to commenting on U.S.-China diplomacy, pointed out, the CCP excused itself from political reform. The

CCP government argued that the Western powers have brutalized China and thwarted China's economic development and social progress in the 19th century; now that economic development has tremendous importance to China, it must be free of Western interference or pressure, namely, the teaching of human rights and the pressure for democratic polity. Based on that dubious argument, which manifested fear of a democratic future rather than grievance against past injustices, the CCP government flat-out "determined not to allow the Chinese people to take part in the historic movement spreading worldwide: the simultaneous development of prosperity and political freedoms" (Rosenthal, 1995, p.27).

On the other hand, the CCP government learned a lesson from the quick meltdown of the Soviet Union and East European communist regimes that economic success can fend off arguments for political liberalization and westernization. In the meantime, U.S. society, after nearly a half century of Cold War with the Soviet Union, needs to recover from battle fatigue, restructure its military industry, and reaffirm its economic ascendancy. The Chinese market of 1.2 billion people just cannot be ignored for too long. Consequently, both the U.S. and China were enmeshed in the need to develop trade relations in spite of, or perhaps because of, conspicuous difference in political beliefs, values, and traditions.

1. Republican Virtue of the U.S. Foreign Policy

Before examining the republican virtue of the U.S. foreign policy, it is necessary to look into civic republicanism as one pillar of the American institutional civilization. According to Honohan (2002), civic republicanism, rather than traditional liberalism which emphasizes individual rights and excludes substantive questions of values and the good life from politics, has been a more or less continuous and coherent republican tradition in the Western politics. Civic republicanism maintains that freedom, political

and personal, can be better realized “through membership of a political community in which those who are mutually vulnerable and share a common fate may jointly be able to exercise some collective direction over their lives” (Honohan, 2002, p.1).

Furthermore, civic republicanism maintains that “freedom depends crucially on the virtue of the political classes, and their pursuing the interests of the whole” (p. 33). The thinkers of civic republicanism, such as Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Harrington, Jefferson, and Madison, connected political freedom with political participation and active citizenship, and stressed that civic virtues – active concerning for the common good and participation in deliberation on self-rule – are as important as law in sustaining a civilized society. To civic republican thinkers, individual virtue is, although crucial, a fragile basis for a republic (Honohan, 2002, p. 79).

In Pericles-era, civic virtue is valued more highly than freedom, just the way that political life is valued more highly than private life. Machiavelli, in commenting on the decay and corruption of the Roman republic, argued that people who put their own particular or sectional interests before the common good cannot remain self-governing and independent of domination by an autocratic ruler or external force. Montesquieu argued, in “*The Spirit of the Law*,” that while a tyranny and a monarchy necessitate cultivation of composition for fear and composition for honor respectively among the governed, the republic necessitates the cultivation of the public virtue among the governed.⁵

Later on, civic republican thinkers worried that the rise of commerce was incompatible with republics and warned that “while commerce leads to increasing material interdependence, it distracts people from political concerns,” reduces feelings of solidarity, and weakens their commitment to the common good (Honohan, 2002, p.

⁵ Daniel N. Robinson: *American Ideals: Founding a “Republic of Virtue.”* An audio book published by The Teaching Company. Available at: www.teach12.com/ttc/assets/coursedescriptions/4855.asp

78-81). Actually, in commerce society, the eclipse of the civic virtue results in a redefinition of political liberty: It “is no longer understood as active participation in government but as *security* from arbitrary attack or punishment” (Honohan, 2002, p. 82); It is ensured “not because people act virtuously for the common good, but because institutions and laws channel and limit self-interested actions” (p. 82). As Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* illustrated, in a highly commercialized society, deep-level divisions of labors, socialized machine production, and international trade tend to necessitate a highly regimented lifestyle and a totalitarian polity.

Overall, civic republicanism emphasizes responsibility for common good and demands interdependent citizens to recognize their membership in a political community, to share a common fate for jointly determining some collective direction over their lives, and “to deliberate on, and realize, the common good of an historically evolving political community” (Honohan, 2002, p. 1).

Civic republicanism has deep roots in American political tradition. In the very early years of the thirteen colonies, John Winthrop beseeched civic participation in government with a communitarian pitch: “We must delight in each other, make others’ conditions our own, rejoice together, always having before our eyes our community as member of the same body.”⁶ In the early nineteenth century, Tocqueville observed that democracy in America was founded on “the equality of conditions,” which, in turn, cultivated the propensity among citizens to form civic associations and to read newspapers. Various civic associations facilitated political association for exercising power. To Tocqueville, a citizen standing alone, while independent, lacks political power, including the power to protect his or her independence; civic/political associations, which stem from equality, serve to protect the gains in equality by setting

⁶ Cited by Robert Putnam in *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 87

against one another groups with special interests, and keeping any one of them from becoming dominant. As a result, voluntary civic/political associations of citizens not only arise from but also sustain democracy and protect community from “tyranny and license” (Tocqueville, 1969, p. 9).

The architects of the American republic were tremendously influenced by the works of Harrington and Montesquieu. Viewing particular interests or factions as one of the main threats to the peace and freedom of citizens, the founders of this nation wanted to preserve both individual freedom and public virtue in the new republic through a strong federation against external enemies, and through the *Bill of Rights* which guarantees a participatory citizenry. Henceforward, civic republicanism has two strings of thinking: One is popular democracy, the other is representative democracy.

On one hand, Thomas Jefferson demanded that power of a frugal and virtuous republic of yeoman and independent artisan should be decentralized below the parish to the ward level to facilitate grassroots democracy. He suggested that “the ward government be in charge of everything from running schools to caring for the poor to operating police and military forces to maintaining public roads” (Putnam, 2000, p. 336). He believed that “making every citizen an acting member of the government, and in the offices nearest and most interesting to him, will attach him by his strongest feelings to the independence of his country, and its republican constitution.”⁷

On the other hand, appalled at the Terror of the French Revolution which significantly discredited the participatory strand of republicanism, Madison’s republicanism theory maintained that the civic participation and common good be sustained by election of virtuous representatives. According to George F. Will, a conservative commentator who sympathizes with communitarian politics, Madison

⁷ Cited by Robert D. Putnam (2000) in Bowling Alone, p. 336

envisaged that the deliberative body – Congress – “would filter the public’s unformed sentiments and give them shape and the weight of reasonableness” (Will, 1994, p. 286). Also, Madison believed that the numerous special interests or factions within a large republic would cancel one another out to the minimum ill effect on the common good. Accordingly, the exercise of civic virtue relies more on political elite than on the general citizenry or “popular leader” – demagogue, although Madison himself did not abandon citizen virtue overall. Nevertheless, Madison maintained that the representative government is designed mainly to refine and enlarge the citizenry’s viewpoints about public affairs, which may best discern the true interest of their country, rather than to reflect assorted interest of a commerce society. Enjoying at least equal status with the presidency, the deliberative body was expected to preempt presidential appeal to, and manipulation of, public opinion (Will, 1994, p. 286).

Over all, in the formative years of the American republic, it was a truism that democratic self-government requires an actively engaged citizenry, a lack of which may result in the decadence of the republic. Benjamin Franklin cringed at the vicissitudes of history of humankind teeming with despotism based on blood relations or bureaucratic rules and sorely lacking in republicanism founded on civic ties. He admonished the new republic at the end of the Constitutional Convention: “We have a government, a republic, if you can keep it.”⁸

Based on the review of the civic republicanism of the U.S. democracy, the investigator assumes that the U.S. foreign policy tradition is inevitably tinged with the civic republicanism tradition. Henceforward, the investigator looks into the republican virtue of the U.S. foreign policy.

To be specific, the republican virtue includes two dimensions: (1) America’s

⁸ Cited by James Carey (1991) in “‘A republic, if you can keep it’: Liberty and public life in the age of Glasnost.” In James Carey: A Critical Reader, edited by Eve Stryker Munson and Catherine A. Warren. p. 207.

external relations have been required to be consistent with the sacred principles of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution (Kennan, 1951, 15-16); America's foreign affairs should be an agent for good or for American values, not just for its effect on the balance of power and influence. Foreign policy will lack legitimacy if disconnected from the ideals and aspirations of the American people (Niebuhr 1932). (2) The formulation and implementation of American foreign policy should undergo the scrutiny of public opinion lest it undermine popular sovereignty and self-governance in the name of executive privilege to conduct diplomacy.

Since its founding, the United States has perceived itself as an exceptional national entity in that its foreign policy is driven more by domestic virtue than by the vagaries of international politics; the objectives of foreign policy were but a means to the end of promoting the goals of domestic society, i.e., democracy, liberty, equality, prosperity, and peace. Therefore, when the United States government annexed the Philippines from the Spaniards at the end of the 19th century, many American publics worried that imperial policy might be contrary to their domestic democratic institutions and moral ethos.⁹ "Kings can have subjects; it is a question whether a republic can" (Kennan, 1951).

In the country's earlier years, America's founding fathers saw their nation as "a distillation of virtues latent in the civilization they left behind, but susceptible of realization only in America" (McDougall, 1997, p. 17). They imagined that the new republic had a global mission to spread republicanism and was "destined to prosper and grow into what Jefferson called an 'Empire for Liberty'" (McDougall, 1997, p. 18-19). The providential character of the American experiment requires the American people to cultivate virtue and exercise self-discipline lest liberty perish. Therefore, the new nation

⁹ Gookin, F. W. (1899). A literary catechism. Cited by Kennan, G. F., in American Diplomacy, p. 18.

on the new continent pledged to make no alliance, fight no wars, and spurn all intrigue. The melioristic and messianic diplomacy of the new nation would “reject power politics, balance of power, and intrigue in favor of pacifism, idealism, and reliance on moral persuasion” (McDougall, 1997, p. 20). “American people were not to do anything special in foreign affairs, but to be a light to lighten the world” (McDougall, 1997, p. 20). “America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”¹⁰ Based on this democratic idealism, the United States tried to avoid any sort of paternalistic responsibility to any other country (Kennan, 1951, p. 19).

Later on, the republican virtue of American diplomacy took the form of democratic peace theory, i.e., the United States should support the spread of democracy, not just because it is the right thing to do, but also because history demonstrates that democracies do not fight wars against fellow democracies. Thus, it is in the United State’s interest to support democratization to reduce the risk of war. President Woodrow Wilson made it a solemn or even tragic destiny of the U.S. to fight not “for revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of the right, of human rights, of which [we] are only a single champion... to fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts – for democracy, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.”¹¹ Thus, America’s international commitment and conduct should reflect the nation’s democratic value orientation.

The second aspect of the republican virtue of U.S. diplomacy, public accountability of the foreign policy-making process, requires that American diplomacy be straight

¹⁰ John Quincy Adams, July Fourth Address of 1821. Cited by McDougall, W. (1997). Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, p. 36

¹¹ Cited by McDougall, W. (1997). Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, pp. 23-24

with American citizens. As John Adams put it, “where European diplomacy was secret, bellicose, and riddled with intrigue, American policy would be open, peaceful, and honest”¹² The dignity of America does not consist in diplomatic ceremonials or etiquette; “it consists solely in reason, justice, truth, [and] the rights of mankind.”¹³ American foreign policy must reflect democratic ideals in both style and substance. It must be formulated through democratic means (Alterman, 1998).

However, the republican virtue of U.S. foreign policy is an ideal to follow instead of a rule to be enforced. Although foreign policy will lack legitimacy if disconnected from the ideals and aspirations of the American people, it is inherently a fault to formulate foreign policy solely on the basis of legalistic-moralistic principles in spite of “contingent necessity” (Kennan, 1951, p. 95, p. 16). The doctrine of turning the other cheek runs against the national interest or *raison d’etat* because, as Niebuhr notes, national interest is itself a moral proposition (Sherrill, 1999; Rosenthal, 1995). The republican virtue of American diplomacy needs to have a shield and a sword. Kennan (1951) elaborates that pursuit of national interest, “unsullied by arrogance or hostility toward other people or delusions of superiority,” is itself a decent undertaking and “can never fail to be conducive to a better world” (p. 103).

Therefore, besides republican virtue, American diplomacy has another characteristic which is above ethical scrutiny. That is the basis for which Niebuhr commended President Kennedy during the Cuba missile crisis: “Moral men had to play hardball.” America will not take up the cause of freedom everywhere. Following this realism as its foreign policy framework, America will not choose its friends solely on the basis of republican principles (McDougall, 1997, p. 37). Even the founding

¹² Cited by McDougall, W. (1997). Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, pp. 23-24

¹³ *ibid.* p. 24

fathers did not expect that the United States would behave so saintly by virtue of being a republic as to put their new nation into jeopardy by inviting foreign powers to impose humiliation or even war on America (McDougall, 1997, p. 27).

Based on this hardball theory, the goal of U.S. foreign policy is to maintain balance of power. Some realists argued that democratic peace theorists confuse correlation with causality, mistakenly emphasizing the nature of the domestic political system as the cause of peaceful relations. Realists lamented that the tendency to achieve foreign policy objectives by inducing other governments to practice the same high moral and legal principle is “of the questionable applicability” (Kennan, 1951). To realists, the balance-of-powers and power politics are still the rules of the world; “international relations is a struggle for power,” and statesman should “think and act in terms of interest defined as power” (Morgenthau, 1948, p. 5); alliance against a mutual enemy is a key component of realistic diplomacy; coercive and covert statecraft is justifiable “to defend the American national interest in the gray areas where military operations are not suitable and diplomacy cannot operate.”¹⁴ The U.S. should abandon the pompous, self-righteous, holier-than-thou moralizing and reject the crusader mentality, and recognize that the national interest, reasonably conceived, is legitimate motivation for a large portion of the nation’s behavior, and thus be prepared “to pursue that interest without either moral pretension or apology” (Kennan, 1953, p. 166). The U.S. should “see virtue in our minding our own business wherever there is not some overwhelming reason for minding the business of others” (Kennan, 1953, p. 176).

Consequently, realists do not reject detachment of the foreign policy establishment from the citizenry. To realists, public support is not a necessary precondition to the republican virtue of U.S. foreign policy. On the contrary, American foreign policy at its

¹⁴ Cited in Loch K. Johnson, America as a World Power: Foreign Policy in a Constitutional Framework, p. 239. New York: McGraw Hill, 1991.

most principled moments owed its idealism less to democratic means than to democratic aims. Those aims are derived, moreover, not from popular whims but from the ideas of a specific political system (Kaplan, 1999). A democratic means for formulating foreign policy may result in an anti-democratic agenda, such as unilateral action as a rejection of a global issues agenda. The disposition of populist statecraft could just as easily be nationalistic, even mean-spirited (Kaplan, 1999). Some occasions arise in which popular opinion on international matters fell short and elites got things right – most notably, regarding the threat posed by Nazi Germany and the U.S. public's reluctance to react toward that threat during the early years of the FDR administration.

Therefore, it is arguable that the making of foreign policy might be insulated from public pressure. Kennan (1951) suggests that in the short term public opinion “can be easily led astray into areas of emotionalism and subjectivity which make it a poor and inadequate guide for national action” (p. 93). For instance, he relates the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1900 to fantastic warmongering conducted by a section of the American press. He also relates the outbreak of the Korean War to anti-communist hysteria – McCarthyism – and the China Lobby fueled by the Chiang Kai-shek regime (Kennan, 1951). He saw the U.S. media exaggerated America's security in 1900 the same way it exaggerated America's insecurity in 1951 (Kennan, 1951, p. 1). In both cases, public orators, newspaper reporters and columnists, and television announcers reduced complexities to crude stereotype and frames, which prevailed over sophisticated analysis and detailed study, and, to make things worse, “lent itself to domestic exploitation” (Kennan, 1951, p. 167).

Even the staunchest defenders of modern Liberalism, from Locke to Madison to Tocqueville, specifically questioned the wisdom of allowing for democratic

participation in matters of foreign affairs (Kaplan, 1999). In the early nineteenth century, Tocqueville found the dilemma, or “the Tocqueville problem in American history,” that in conducting foreign affairs, “democratic government do appear decidedly inferior to others” because diplomacy requires none of the good qualities peculiar to democracy but demands cultivation of those sorely lacking (Tocqueville, 1969, p. 228-229). Democracy found it difficult to coordinate the details of a great undertaking and to fix on a plan and carry it through with determination. In addition, it had little capacity for combining measures in secret and waiting patiently for the result. (Tocqueville, 1969, 228-229). Locke, Rousseau, and Madison excluded foreign affairs from their respective litanies of a citizen’s right (Kaplan, 1999).

In some extreme occasions, realist diplomats see American democracy as “one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as a room and brain the size of a pin, either lying in his comfortable primeval mud and paying little attention to his environment, or, being disturbed, exhibiting blind determination to destroy not only his adversary but largely his native habitat (Kennan, 1951, 66). Lippmann (1955) notes that the prevailing public has been destructively wrong at critical junctures of foreign affairs. He lamented that the people have imposed a veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials: “They have compelled the governments, which usually knew what would have been wiser, or was necessary, or more expedient, to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too intransigent” (Lippmann, 1955, p. 20). Therefore, the executive branch of government often justifies insularity of foreign policy-making from public opinion on the basis of national interest. Foreign policy debate has been deliberately shielded from the effects of democratic debate, with virtually no institutionalized democratic participation (Alterman, 1998, p. 4). In 1989,

the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs conducted a survey, asking foreign policy establishment, i.e., government officials, congressional staffs, inside academics, think-tank scholars, lawyers, and bankers: “whether there should be democracy in foreign policy making?” Nearly 50 percent of those questioned disagreed with the statement that the general public is qualified to participate in framing U.S. foreign policy.

However, many other arguments are apologetic for public accountability of U.S. foreign policy. Basically, the U.S. could not claim to be a functional democracy when its foreign policy-making process is shielded from the effects of democratic debate and civic participation (Alterman, 1998, p. 4-5). The public life is the fundamental concept of the entire liberal tradition. “The press justifies itself in the name of the public” (Carey, 1995, p. 236). Liberal society is formed around the notion of a virtuous public whose members, to justify their membership, are always willing and prepared to accept a calling to take part in rational and critical discourse. This public discourse is conducted in public space where a member of the public are expected to converse like a stranger, to welcome fellow disputants or conversationalists as stranger too, to be willing to answer questions, to be forthright, to disclose hidden motives, to transcend private interest, “to avoid intimacy, to wear a public mask, to shun the personal, to clamp some control on affect, and in general to achieve some psychological distant from the self” (Carey, 1995, p. 237).

Actually, the U.S. public has over time demonstrated an impressive consistency in supporting liberal republican values articulated by the country’s founding fathers, one that is easily obscured by polling data that focus on immediate reactions to various crises (Alterman, 1998, p. 6). The public may have a more sound grasp of the basic principles governing foreign policy than those of the establishment that professes to

represent them (Alterman, 1998). A popularly conceived foreign policy would no longer sustain repressive regimes, blindly pursue open markets, and more generally, compromise democratic values (Alterman, 1998). The problem is not that the public's preferences in foreign affairs are imprudent or impracticable, but "how to force the government to respond to its preference" (p. 6).

Foreign policy-making is an important part of public affairs. How can the United States claim to be a functioning democracy when one of the most crucial aspects of public policy allows for almost no democratic participation? Given the increasing intertwinement of domestic issues and foreign-policy issues in the form of "issue networks" or "intermestic politics,"¹⁵ it is increasingly urgent to reinforce the civic engagement in foreign policy making. The public's disengagement in, ignorance of, and apathy toward foreign affairs could contribute to the general public cynicism toward democratic institution and the long-term civic malaise in the representative democracy (Norris, 2000, p. 4). To remedy the civic malaise, Norris suggests that news media reinforce their three basic roles as (1) a civic forum or public sphere encouraging pluralistic debate on public policy choices, (2) a watchdog against the abuse of power, and (3) a mobilizing agent encouraging public learning and participation in the policy-making process (p. 12).

This dissertation research looks into the media-policy nexus and elite/non-elite inputting in the mediated debate on the policy tradeoff between the U.S.-China trade and human rights to find out to what extent the making of U.S.-China policy affirms or disregards the republican virtue of American foreign policy.

Besides the aforementioned analysis of American foreign policy tradition in terms of power (realism) and principle (democratic idealism), the investigator pays special

¹⁵ See in Jentlesen B. W. (2004). American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. p. 33

attention to “prosperity” (international political economy), the third P of Jentlesen’s 4Ps framework with regard to dynamics of American foreign policy choices. The investigator chooses to conduct a descriptive overview of corporate America’s China lobby in 1990s to illustrate political economy of the American foreign policy. The investigator assumes that analysis of corporate America’s China lobby could be an important supplement for reexamination of the policy-making process in addition to the media-policy framework. Furthermore, a reasonable critique of the policy tradeoff between economic cooperation and human rights should include analysis of the corporate force behind the engineering of a non-judgmental U.S.-China relations in the post-Cold War years.

2. U.S.-China Relations in the 1990s

President Nixon’s historic visit to China was probably the most important and intelligent American foreign policy maneuver since the Truman administration’s Marshall Plan. While the Marshall Plan was initiated in support of American ideals, the U.S.-China diplomacy was conceived largely in spite of American ideals. By 1971, the publication of a report authored by a U.S. Senate subcommittee made the nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) known to the U.S. public – under Mao Tse-Tong’s rule, 64 million of Chinese people died of either starvation which resulted from reckless economic policy or ruthless political purgation.¹⁶

When President Nixon proposed to Mao Tse-Tong in February 1972 that U.S.-China diplomatic relations be established, he acknowledged that what brought the two ideological adversaries together was a common recognition of a new situation in the world. On America’s part, the new consensus was that “what is important is not a nation’s internal political philosophy,” but “its policy toward the rest of the world and

¹⁶ Human Cost Of Communism In China, Report issued by Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Ninety-Second Congress, 1971. Cited by John F. McManus (1992) in his book, The Insiders.

toward us” (Richelson, 1999). Starting from this geopolitical insight and diplomatic pragmatism, the U.S. and China engaged in a bizarre “marriage of convenience” (Gertz, 2000). The ulterior intention of Nixon administration’s China diplomacy was to incite confrontation between communist China and the Soviet Union, hoping that the two communist powers would cancel each other out and the United States would obtain the decisive weight (Waldron, 1999). To do so, however, the U.S. has had to show a drooping eyelid toward China’s human rights abuses in the 1970s and 1980s (Mufson, 1999) and “gave China virtually a blanket exemption from the human right standards that they so ardently applied elsewhere” (Mann, 1999).

However, with victory in the Cold War, the U.S. was released from the moral ambiguities and hypocrisy with regard to human rights. The 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown of the democratic movement in China provided an opportunity for the U.S. government to rebuild a new consensus for U.S.-China relations, i.e., a consensus of outrage toward an oppressive communist dictatorship. In the new context of the post-Cold War geopolitics, a sudden proliferation of issues emerged between the U.S. and China. China suddenly became the last bastion of communism, a huge new strain on global energy supplies, a next big source of global warming and acid rain, a potential supplier of missile technology to rogue countries, a new world factory to idle American production and drain American jobs, a brutal pagan nation, and a potential fascist country that shared the same wound of pride like the German’s before the Second World War (Kristof, 1993).

In 1992, presidential candidate Clinton accused the Bush administration of coddling the oppressive Chinese government with a kid-glove policy (Bernstein and Munro, 1997, p. 96). He declared that Bush’s policies toward China had been weak and that his would be tougher. He vowed that his administration would ruthlessly punish all those

tyrants from Baghdad to Beijing (Bernstein and Munro, 1997, p. 97). He won the presidential election largely because he differentiated himself from his predecessor on the basis of indignation toward tyrants abroad and resolve for fixing economy at home.

In 1993, the U.S. Congress led a campaign to pressure members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to vote against China's bid for hosting the 2000 Olympic Games. The U.S. Senate's resolution insinuated that the 2000 Olympiad held in Beijing would be the same as 1936 Berlin Olympiad, just legitimizing the political oppression. In 1993, from July 23 to August 29, the U.S. Navy fleets, based on intelligence that China was shipping chemical weapon precursors to Iran, detained China's "*Yin He*" (Galaxy) cargo ship for 33 days on the high seas to conduct an exhaustive and offensive inspection. While nothing suspicious was detected, the U.S. government refused to apologize for its indiscretion.¹⁷ In 1995 and 1996, the U.S. government sent two battle groups around the carriers Independence and Nimitz near Taiwan Strait in response to Chinese People Liberation Army's (PLA) missile drill aimed at deterring and preventing Taiwan's independence movement. Both the U.S. and China called home their Ambassadors to signal their resolve to downgrade bilateral diplomatic relations. In May 1999, a U.S. B-52 bombed China's Embassy in Yugoslavia with cruise missiles and killed three Chinese journalists in the building. The U.S. government's explanation of the bombing was that the target has been selected by the CIA based on an outdated map of Belgrade, which mistook Chinese embassy as Yugoslavia military stronghold.

All these confrontations notwithstanding, the Clinton administration's China policy was soon characterized by conservative commentators as relentless flip-flops (Safire, 2000) and outrageous "betrayal" of the U.S. national interests (Gertz, 1999). Liberal democrats decried that President Clinton allowed the Chinese government, at the behest

¹⁷ Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China on "*Yin He*" (Galaxy) Incident, dated September 4, 1993. Available at: www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ynhe0993.htm

of the U.S. China lobby, to write American foreign policy regardless of the egregious violation of human rights by the CCP government. According to some commentators, by removing the link between China's human rights improvements and the annual renewal of China's "Most Favored Nations"(MFN) status, by turning blind eyes to China's selling of missile technology around the world (Gertz, 1999, p. 81), by allowing U.S. companies to transfer space technology and atomic warfare material to China (Smith, 2003), and by conferring the strategic partnership on U.S.-China relations, "the candidate who in 1992 rejected the coddling of Beijing has become the Coddler-in-Chief"(Waldron, 1999), and thus constituted a "Clinton-China Axis" (Nguyen, 1999).

Indeed, according to Zalmay Khalilzad, a think-tank scholar of the Rand Corporation and Project for New America Century (PNAC) in 1990s and currently U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, behind the flip-flops of the Clinton administration's China policy grows a fundamental turnabout of bipartisan consensus with regard to U.S.-China policy. Throughout the 1990s, the consensus of outrage in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre gradually gave way to a new China policy consensus: "congagement"¹⁸ – a bizarre combination of two competing policy orientations: engagement and containment (Khalilzad, 1999).

Bill Gertz, a national security reporter of *The Washington Times*, a conservative commentator, and a perennial China critic, commented that, once in office, President Clinton formed an unusual alliance with American high-technology industrialists and "treated China with kid gloves" (Gertz, 1999, p. 81). Broadly speaking, after 40 years of battle fatigue of the Cold War, the United States' foreign policy began to revert to

¹⁸ According to Rand Paper, "congagement" is a combination of containment and engagement, by which the U.S. can "continue to try to bring China into the current international system while giving equal attention to deterrence and preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to this system while seeking to convince the Chinese leadership that a challenge would be difficult to prepare and extremely risky to pursue." Available at: www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP187/IP187.html

dollar diplomacy (Dreyfuss, 1997). The rationale was: “Now that the Cold War is over, it’s economic policy that’s most important. We won the war, let’s reap the benefits” (Dreyfuss, 1997). Besides, President Clinton found that to fix American economy, he simply cannot resist the attraction of the huge Chinese market. With the rise of globalization, the U.S. and China became increasingly economically interdependent; the needs of doing business increasingly took precedence over all other concerns, such as political freedom. “Nobody wants to prevent Americans from getting richer” (Sontag, 2000).

Besides the economic agenda, to conduct post-Cold War diplomacy, the Clinton administration also espoused a “peace” (international liberalism) strategy, the second P of Jentlesen’s 4P framework with regard to the dynamics of policy choice. The Clinton administration tended more to use international regimes, collective actions and coordination to solve international problems in the hope that problems of world politics would be managed, regulated, and tempered, rather than being eliminated, which is the key point of realism diplomacy (Jentlesen, 2000, p. 13-14).

Eventually, President Clinton, who threatened in 1993 that he would not renew China’s MFN status without seeing significant progress in human rights, declared on May 26, 1994, that he would extend the MFN regardless of human rights record (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 108). In granting MFN, the Clinton administration theorized that economic interaction, and the ensuing interplay of trade, free enterprise, people-to-people contacts, and ideas, can do more to advance freedom and the rule of law in China (Weissman, 1997).

Actually, beginning in the mid 1990s, a new bipartisan consensus of engagement with regard to U.S.-China relations replaced the consensus of outrage. The new consensus theorized that (1) over time, growing interdependence will have a

liberalizing effect on China, and ultimately, universal values will prevail in China; (2) the new engagement policy “would not let China off the hook for human rights abuses”; and (3) the U.S. government “knows clearly where to build a bridge when possible and where to draw a red line when necessary” (Friedman, 2001).

On China’s part, the global bankruptcy of communism threw the CCP into a deep anxiety because “for the vast majority of the world, democracy is the sole surviving source of political legitimacy” (Zakaria, 2003, p. 13). In this new world order, it is no wonder the CCP government was treated as an international pariah in the early 1990s (Crampton, 2001).

Facing such a crisis of legitimacy, the CCP government needed to keep a prosperous economy to justify its political legitimacy. CCP elders nailed down a new party line: prosperity-for-stability, i.e., to survive the global setback of communism, the CCP must strive to maintain a long-term economic prosperity. Segal (1994) notes that, in the post-Tiananmen era, the CCP has embarked on a risky strategy that ties the legitimacy of its authoritarian ruling in China to its ability to produce prosperity there (p. 43). To legitimize its ruling authority, the CCP struck a bargain with the Chinese people: “You let us continue to rule, even though communist ideology is no longer functional, and we will guarantee rising living standards” (Friedman, 2001, p. A21). To fulfill its promise, the CCP government needed a steady inflow of U.S. investment, technology to China, and a smooth outflow of China goods to the U.S. market. Therefore, maintaining a non-confrontational China-U.S. relationship, at least at the economic level, became the lifeline of the CCP (Yan, 2002).

Ironically, both the U.S. and China have been enmeshed in the global economy of the post-Cold War world (Friedman, 2001). Neither could afford to alienate each other too far and too long. The CCP knew well that the U.S. businessmen need a stable China

and a non-confrontational U.S.-China relation for making profit there. Shortly before the Tiananmen incident, Deng Xiaoping envisioned, “China cannot allow people to demonstrate whenever they please.... Tightening our control in this area will not deter foreign businessmen from investing in China; on the contrary, it will reassure them.”¹⁹ Indeed, in the post-Tiananmen era, U.S. companies have become the largest foreign investors in China and have been instrumental in China’s economic takeoff (Friedman, 2001). Both corporate America and the CCP government have strong incentives to conduct an issue management of U.S.-China policy to make it remain non-judgmental in spite of, or exactly because of, the ideological confrontation.

In summary, the U.S.-China “friendship” was structured in the context of the Cold War but lingered in a post-Cold War, post-Tiananmen, and increasingly democratic, world, to an extent that “a president as capable as Clinton has been unable to change it” (Waldron, 1999). From Reagan to Clinton, every president attempted to break out of the mold of the 1970s’ China policy, but ended up practicing that policy more vigorously than its originators (Mann, 1999; Waldron, 1999). In the meantime, the CCP government maintained a poor human rights record, remained unrepentant about the Tiananmen crackdown, and thus, clung to “the wrong side of history.”²⁰ Seventeen years after the Tiananmen Massacre, Chinese economy has grown six times and became the third largest trading power in the world; personal freedom, in terms of migration, electronic communication, and investment, has significantly improved. However, Chinese society has made remarkably little progress in political liberalization. The topic of political reform is a taboo while it was openly discussed and well-planned in 1980s by two purged General Secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Yaobang (1980-1986) and Zhao Ziyang (1986-1989).

¹⁹ Deng Xiaoping: “China will tolerate no disturbances.” *People’s Daily* March 4, 1989.

²⁰ President Clinton confronted China President Jiang Zemin in 1997 during joint press conference by saying that, by abusing human rights, the Chinese government is always “on the wrong side of history.”

How could a non-judgmental U.S.-China relation engineered in the Cold War times continue to function in the post-Cold War years? Besides geopolitical considerations, i.e., balance of power and international melioration, one needs to factor prosperity into the dynamics of U.S.-China policy. The investigator conducts a content analysis of mass-mediated policy debate and a case study of corporate America's issue management of the U.S.-China relations to determine how the policy tradeoff, and hence the undermining of republic virtue of the U.S. foreign policy, has been accomplished.

Chapter 3. Literature Review

The theoretical foundation of this research is the Communitarian construct of the new media as a venue for citizens' "co-operative inquiry," citizens' pursuit of "common values and mutual responsibility," and finally, citizens' empowerment in the democratic decision-making process (Tam, 1998, p. 12-18). Communitarians maintain that those three undertakings, and henceforward, the resuscitation of the public life and the communal discourse, could be accomplished only with the leadership of the news media, particularly, Communitarian journalism (Christians et al, 1993). Unless Communitarian norms are integrated into media institutions, journalism cannot reorient its mission toward civic transformation and citizen empowerment (Christians, et al, 1993). Furthermore, public journalism, a rejuvenation of public life and civic dialogue via journalism, could not be viable until it is synchronized with Communitarian theory of the press and treat Communitarian philosophy as its ethical bedrock (Coleman, 2000, p.42). Given Communitarian journalism's enthusiastic championing of the public participation in the democratic politics and given the close relation between Communitarian journalism and civic participation in public affairs, it is advisable to investigate the republican virtue of the U.S.-China policy from a communitarian perspective in the hope that this investigation is not merely about "what it is," but also about "what ought to be."

Aristotle is often cited as a major source of communitarian thinking. He rejected the assertion by his tutor, Plato, of a higher knowledge beyond the reach of ordinary people and maintained that all knowledge about this world and our position in it must begin with the empirical world as we experience it. Henceforward, knowledge about political life is to be obtained through co-operative inquiries. In the eighteenth century, communitarian thinking is typically expressed by Voltaire and Diderot who challenged

knowledge establishment – the Church and the state guardian – by forming communities of co-operative inquirers. Later on, Communitarianism was articulated by naïve socialists such as Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, and Pierre Joseph Proudhon, who advocated gradualist and community-based transformation of society. The modern Communitarian thinking was developed by Oxford philosophers Thomas Hill Green and Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, and the American educationalist John Dewey. They combated “the distortion of liberal ideals into free market slogans in praise of the ‘everyone for themselves’ brand of individualism” (Tam, 1998, pp. 21-22) and insisted that “liberty is a mode of power relationship which must be progressively extended to all citizens if society is to attain the status of a truly inclusive community” (p. 23).

Contemporary Communitarianism is a social philosophy championed by Amitai Etzioni, Alasdair MacIntyre, Philip Selznick, Robert Bellah, and Michael Sandel, among others. As a social movement, Communitarianism started in the aftermath of the 1989 anti-Communist revolutions. Tam (1998) notes that the emergence of the Communitarian movement is actually an endeavor to re-map the ideological battleground in the wake of “suspicions about authoritarian approaches to government coupled with disillusionment with the individualism that pervades free market thinking” (pp. 23-24). It is a political reform movement striving to surpass the superficial divide between the “Left” and the “Right,” and henceforward, to realize the long-term vision of liberty. Overall, Communitarians try to sublate the weakness of both market individualism and authoritarianism in defining the power relationship in a democratic society.

As a political reform program, Communitarianism is endorsed by both liberal and conservative political leaders such as U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, U.K. Liberal

Democrats leader Paddy Ashdown, Germany Chancellor Helmut Kohl, U.S. former Vice President Al Gore, former Republican Vice President nominee Jack Kemp, and former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev. It transcends the traditional Left-Right dichotomy, particularly, looking beyond the hegemony of market individualism for a sustainable alternative that avoids authoritarian pitfalls (Tam, 1998, p. 203).

“Communitarians see themselves not as a midpoint between but as an alternative to the individualism-authoritarian and liberal-conservative polarities” (Myers, 2000, p. 190); they see their “third way” political ideals an excellent synthesis of some of the best ideas from both camps. For communitarians, “if we don’t balance concern for individual right with concern for the commons, we risk chaos and a new fascism” (Myers, 2000, p. 191).

In the United States, Communitarianism is lauded as a remedy for the eclipse of public life, the increase of public debt, and the deepening of civic disengagement, among other social malaises. “Communitarian platform,” signed by William Galston, President Clinton’s domestic policy adviser, John Gardner, Common Cause founder, Betty Freidan, Feminist Rights activist, among others, holds “that the preservation of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of the institutions of civil society” and that communities and body politics, in turn, have duty to foster their members’ participation and deliberation in social and political life (“The Responsive Communitarian Platform,” 1998).

This dissertation research adopts Communitarianism as a normative framework because the Communitarian model of the news media – i.e., the news media as an arena for “co-operative enquiry” and a device for democratizing power relations – provides a theoretical justification for examination of the republican virtue of the opinion-policy process in regard to U.S. – China relations. Besides, the investigator looks into other

normative theories about media democracy, public opinion, and newsmaking vis-à-vis policy-making to describe and analyze the mass-mediated debate on U.S.-China policy from real-world perspectives, a perspective that is less aspiring in terms of rejuvenating democratic conversation and public life in a post-industry society.

1. What is Communitarianism?

Basically, Communitarianism is an alternative to both individualism and authoritarianism as social practice and political ideology. However, it does not merely synthesize atomism and collectivism, but “restructures the discourse around the nature of humanity” and fundamentally reconceptualizes the issues and conclusions of democratic politics (Christians et al, 1993, p. 13, p. 45). It recognizes the revolutionary character of libertarian individualism against tyrants who determine the power relations in the name of divine prerogatives; it acknowledges that libertarian autonomy is critically important for enlightening citizenry in the sense that people’s actual exercise of independent rational judgment against paternalism must be built in at the outset; it acknowledges that individualism supports democracy by stimulating initiative, creativity, and equal rights for all individuals. On the other hand, it articulates a normative social ethics that is visionary in character without being merely a variant of classical socialism.

According to Henry Tam’s (1998) summary, Communitarianism has three central principles developed at the epistemological level, the moral level, and the political level respectively:

(1) Co-operative inquiry: “Any claims to truth may be judged to be valid only if informed participants deliberating together under conditions of co-operative inquiry would accept that claim” (p. 13); “questions about what collective action is to be taken for the common good are not to be left either to political elites who are rarely

answerable to their fellow citizens (perhaps once every four or five years), or to individuals in the marketplace, but are considered through informed community discussions” (p. 7). Based on this principle, the provisional consensus reached by one section of society must be open to possible revision resulting from input by other sections or groups (p. 13). Public-policy making should be openly discussed to survive the critical deliberations of ever-expanding circles of co-operative inquirers who keep learning from their common experience.

(2) Common value and mutual responsibility: “All members of any community take responsibility for enabling each other to pursue common values” (p. 14); “questions about values are not allowed to be hijacked by authoritarians who want to impose their views on others, or to be ignored in the name of liberal neutrality, but are dealt with by citizens themselves deliberating over what values and responsibilities they share” (p. 7). As a result of such co-operative learning and discussion, certain types of common values, such as love, wisdom, justice, and fulfillment, are distilled and well established across communities and serve as a clear basis for defining mutual responsibilities. No community on Earth can pretend that what other communities believe and do will have no bearing on its own well-being or on the well-being of common values. Every community belongs to a larger public or citizenry. Etzioni (1996) sums up the communitarian ideal as a “new golden rule: respect and uphold society’s moral order as you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy”

(3) Communitarianism-based power relations: Power relations are not to be determined for the exclusive benefit of any particular religious, racial, gender, or socioeconomic group, but “to be continuously revised to approximate the conditions wherein all citizens can play a constructive part in applying collective power in pursuit of common values” (Tam, 1998, p.7). Whereas libertarian liberals defend the private

economy and egalitarian liberals defend the welfare state, communitarians worry about the concentration of power in both the corporate economy and the bureaucratic state (Sandel, 1984, p.17). Communitarianism-based power relations are more democratic, not only in terms of periodic election, but also in terms of citizens' ever-expanding mutual enrichment of political knowledge, their collaboration in discovering truth and establishing justice, their endeavor for expanding opportunities for genuine fulfillment, and their perennial participation in the decision-making of various social institutions. Communitarian power relations ask for the removal of those structural barriers which prevent people from acquiring political acumen, performing critical deliberation, and putting forward their suggestions. Communitarian power structure requires an inclusive community – which itself belongs to a larger public – enabling all the members to participate in collective processes and to share the overall power for determining collective actions. Communitarians see the inclusive community as the only context in which true freedom can be realized through, at minimum, tolerance, and, at the maximum, love (Berry, 1990, p. 200).

To Communitarians, community is a public forum in which people discover the truth and good life together rather than a neutral arena in which self-interested individuals pursue incompatible mercenary goods. In a sense, the public forum and the community advocated by Communitarians are approximately the same political idea as the “public sphere” and “civil society” theoretically mapped out by Jurgen Habermas. According to Habermas (1989), civil society includes all those components of life that classic liberals sought to protect from state control. The bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century were among the undertakings to build a wall of separation between state and civil society, of which the self-seeking activities in the marketplace is one part. Habermas (1989) defined the public sphere as a virtual or imaginary community

which does not necessarily exist in any identifiable space. In its ideal form, the public sphere is “made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state” (Habermas, 1989, p. 176). Through acts of assembly and dialogue, the public sphere generates opinions and attitudes which serve to affirm or challenge – therefore, to guide – the affairs of state. In ideal terms, the public sphere is the source of public opinion needed to “legitimate authority in any functioning democracy” (Rutherford, 2000, p. 18).

In addition, public sphere is a hypothetical space between civil society and the state in which citizens could address state affairs while leaving their individual interest behind. To be specific, public sphere is more like a circumstance in which individual citizens hide their personal interests behind veils of ignorance, i.e., they are absolutely equal and free in public sphere although they were altogether unequal in terms of wealth, status, class, religion, etc. while framing and inputting their argument with regard to state affairs. Besides that, their argument and discussions are observable and accessible to everyone in the public sphere. Therefore, “with private considerations hidden behind a veil and with the powerful under the virtual scrutiny of the entire citizenry, public discussion would necessarily be rational and public deliberations would necessarily be directed toward the common good” (Nerone, 1995, p. 155).

While public-sphere theorists try to restore the golden time of bourgeois society, Communitarians find some structural weakness of the bourgeois society, both in its revolutionary years and in its atrophied years. First, Communitarians observe that the market individualism’s cancerous effects on community life lie in negative freedom – “freedom understood as an end in itself”, and thus, the estrangement of freedom from moral order by equating liberty with freedom from external and arbitrary restraint and by “stridently insisting on individual autonomy as nonnegotiable” (Christians et al,

1993, p. 13). In the early nineteenth century, Tocqueville observed that “radical individualism corrodes the public spirit” and feared that “a society of radical individualist would be vulnerable to despotism” (Myers, 2000, p.163). To be specific, Tocqueville worried that people, “alike and equal, constantly [are] circling around in pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their souls. Each one of them, withdrawn into himself, is almost unaware of the fate of the rest” (p. 692). As a result, they delegate what should, and could, have been accomplished through family, churches, and communal organizations to big and arbitrary bureaucracies, and thus, lose their freedom.

To market individualism, “collective life is little more than the voluntary association of free agents, a way for individuals to pursue their self-interests with minimal interference from others” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 70). Life together is not a struggle for social change but for self-realization. Society is highlighted by the fundamental separateness of persons; the gaps between them are bridged voluntarily and rationally, never out of the recognition that humans must live with and for other person (Christians et al, 1993, p. 71). The individual and society stand in natural opposition. Society is an aggregate of the self-seeking automatons; government is an artifice instituted by mutual agreement for protecting individual liberty, life and property. All the social institutions are instruments, even expedients, created by the fiat of self-contained individuals, and thus could be employed or discarded without fundamentally altering one’s humanity (Girvetz, 1950, p. 23). As a result, accountability to self becomes the operating norm, and protecting the legitimate boundary lines of other selves the only social axiom (Christians, 1993, p. 13).

To communitarians, “human beings are not autonomous mental substances linked only by contract to protect person and property. Differences are deep, but

commonalities, ambiguous perhaps and distinguished by language and tradition, are more profound still” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 7). Communitarians hold that the central feature of human being is community. The true understanding of individuals is anchored on the knowledge of the communal. “Community is axiologically and ontologically prior to persons” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 14). “The individual is not discrete. He cannot find his fulfillment outside of the community; but he also cannot find fulfillment completely within society. In-so-far as he finds fulfillment within society he must abate his individual ambitions” (Niebuhr, 1952, Chapter 3). Atomism’s failure is its profound lack of appreciation for the wholeness of reality. It fundamentally rejects the notion of interrelatedness.

Second, Communitarians find the deficiencies of negative liberty lie in that it “refuses to identify freedom with conditions for fulfillment” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 28), and thus take democracy “not as an end in itself but only a utilitarian device to safeguard the highest political end: liberty” (p. 31). To Communitarians, community, basically a public forum in which the dialogic self discovers and pursues the common good together, is the only context in which true freedom can be realized. Human beings are social, though independent; they exist spatiotemporally as persons in community. “We appear to think and decide and act with a large degree of independence. Yet we are every bit communal” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 62). For Macmurray (1978), one’s whole being cannot experience uniqueness except in openness to the uniqueness of others (p. 17-18). Action, to be meaningful, must be for community building and for the sake of fellowship; the bonding of persons is the epicenter of cultural formation (p. 18). “[U]nless I use my freedom to help others flourish, I deny my own well-being. Because fulfillment as persons is never achieved in isolation, but only in relation, our encounter inheres in our beingness” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 65).

Communitarians admit that not all community life is good life and enables their members to attain human fulfillment. There are times and occasions when community is formed for destroying or diminishing human life and property and for exploiting either members or outsiders. Actually, “community life is tragic... because it involves unremittingly the need to survive mortality, partiality, and evil No community can survive that cannot survive the worst” (Berry, 1990, p. 154-158). Yet, human society needs to build a wider and wider community as shared domain of cooperative experience and identity formation. A moral community is a condition for personhood. Community is no guarantee of happiness, but could be human society’s only best chance at being able to endure unhappiness (Berry, 1990, p. 154).

The third weakness of market individualism is that market individualism is geared to benefit those good at the economic game of market transactions (Tam, 1998, p. 5). Political liberalism actually privileges a particular social order and insures the perpetuation of systematic disadvantages. Forces as competitive individualism concealed the real character of capitalist exploitation and “thwart human cooperation and fraternity” (Wright, 1996, p. 22). They elevate greed and ignore public need. Under the reign of market individualism, most individuals, when freed from the community-defined power relations, do not thereby come to inhabit a pure realm of self-government and self-fulfillment, but live in a world in which private power of assorted kinds holds sway to the extent that it becomes more, not less, difficult for individuals to advance their own agenda (Wright, 1996, p. 146).

Overall, Communitarianism requires that society not be understood as merely a maelstrom of atomized individuals but as a moral community embedded in a dense fabric of social relationships and mutual responsibilities and capable of framing common purpose and pursuing public interests.

In summary, Communitarian politics requires the development of inclusive community where people can (1) “take part in co-operative enquiries determining a wide arrange of issues;” (2) “recognize that they share a respect for common values and accept the responsibilities these values imply;” and (3) “actively support the transformation of power relations for the common good” (Tam, 1998, p. 8). To realize those political ideals, communitarian journalism might be a practical endeavor. Communitarian theorists actually maintain that communitarian journalism is a narrative construct that “enables cultural beings to fulfill their civic tasks” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 14). To communitarians, news is a semiotic agent of community formation (Christians et al, 1993, p. 89).

2. What Is the Communitarian Journalism?

The communitarian analysis of media communication is an innovation of both libertarian theory of the media and the social responsibility theory of the media (Nerone, 1995). According to communitarian’s reconstruction of American journalism history, “the press” in the text of the First Amendment is a “town meeting” model of the mediated public sphere (Nerone, 1995, p. 49). The press was meant to bring community to the forefront and to create and sustain community, fellowship, and democracy (Christians et al, 1993; Dewey, 1954). Therefore, freedom of the press actually should be something that belongs to all citizens. Freedom of the press was situated in “a context of a healthy community of intelligent, independent, and therefore virtuous citizens.” Henceforward, freedom of the press has more to do with the republican life-style, virtuous community, and conversational public, and has least to do with the partisan printer, commercial broadcasters, professional communicators, and even watchdog journalism (Carey, 1995, pp. 228-256; Carey, 1986, pp. 144-188).

Communitarian journalism emphasizes developing citizens’ abilities in formulating

co-operative solutions to common problems rather than informing the public to facilitate buying into some specific options floated by elites and pundits.

“Communitarian journalists would view the public as a partner in setting the agenda at the same time that they would not merely offer an unreflective representation of public opinion” (Borden, 2005, p. 40). In Communitarian media, news should be driven, not by public opinion or prejudices, but by transnational human norms – such as love, truthfulness, wisdom, justice, and empowerment – that fosters good communities (Christians, et al, 1993).

Communitarian theory of journalism asks the news media to make a decisive break with individualistic capitalism or, in more cultural terms, with power pragmatism. The classical liberalism theory of free expression anchored in individual rights cannot resolve certain fundamental disagreement (Christians et al, 1993, p. 42). “Driven by the absence of restraint, libertarianism does not set a comprehensive framework but merely endorses the individual interests of media owners” (p. 43).

Classical liberalism views the press as “the Fourth Estate” of the state and the watchdog of public affairs. Accordingly, it assumes that reporters are independent agents whose social contract, the First Amendment, grants them professional freedom in exchange for the exposure of misdeeds in government and business. However, to Communitarians, the most conspicuous scandal of today’s journalism lies in that the news media actually participates in policymaking, and the journalists themselves work for business. A built-in conflict of interest exists in today’s mass communication system which is supposed to be an impartial provider of information. Actually, as Christians et al (1993) observes, “the line between news reporters and publicists is sometimes as unclear as a foul line in minor-league ballpark the day after the thunderstorm” (p. 9). When the story itself is known to carry – intentionally and with

predictable consequences – the specific commercial or political interests of the source, how can we call it “news” while it is stark propaganda for manipulation and control (Christians et al, 1993, p. 10)? To Communitarians, “the Fourth Estate” status of the news media and watchdog journalism may be the cause of the public’s disenchantment with the mass communication system.

In a democratic society, it is the public who should govern; democratic media then should let people talk to each other rather than just listen to experts and elites (Nerone, 1995, p. 100). “Rather than drowning audiences with data and fattening company coffers, communitarian journalism engenders a like-minded world view among a public still inclined toward individual autonomy” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 14).

Communitarian journalism is to amplify “public” conversation rather than the talking points of those “snarling pundits or bland professionals we see on political talk shows” (Rosen, 1997, p. 203). When “the press sees its role as limited to informing whomever happens to turn up at the end of the communication channel, it explicitly abandons its role as an agency for carrying on the conversation of the culture” (Carey, 1997, p. 220).

According to the Communitarian theory of journalism, mass media discourse only makes sense in relation to the public and public life. The fundamental problem in journalism is to reconstitute the public, to bring it into existence (Carey, 1995, pp. 228-256). Contrary to classic liberalism’s condescending viewpoint, Communitarians maintain that the news media does not “inform” the public; it is “the public” that ought to inform the news media (Rosen, 1997, p. 191). “Journalism at its best arises from and feeds into public life” (Rosen, 1997, p. 192). The true subject matter of journalism is the conversation the public is having with itself. If this conversation does not happen or falls apart, then journalism doesn’t work – for us – although it may work well for journalists seeking to further their professional status (Rosen, 1997, p. 191). “The

public will only begin to reawaken when they are addressed as a conversational partner and are encouraged to join the talk rather than sit passively as spectators before a discussion conducted by journalists and experts” (Carey, 1987, p. 14).

Communitarians advocate that social institutions such as universities and the news media should empower the public sphere by breathing air into the collapsed lungs of public life, nurturing worldview, celebrating human solidarity, enabling co-operative inquiry, encouraging conversation and discussion, and fostering a conception of the common good, rather than being preoccupied with governmental business, professionalism expertise, and careerism-driven scholarship. To Communitarians, information atrophies unless it vivifies human needs and revitalizes civic dialogue (Nerone, 1995, p. 70). The true influence of the education system and the mass communication system lies in their “direct engagement in popular political controversy” and their preoccupation with “the stirring and poignant events of the times” (Bender, 1993, p. 56). News should be an agent of civic transformation rather than a device for social control. Facilitating a thorough understanding of public life is the news media’s beacon. “The press has a bigger fish to fry than merely improve technology and streamlining performance, important as those advances may be. The issue is whether reporting serves to activate the polis” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 87).

According to communitarian’s reading of American journalism history, from the moment the U.S. Constitution was ratified, newspapers never really developed into the public-spirited vehicles envisioned by men like Thomas Jefferson. Just like “the republican forms of government were and still are odd and aberrant occurrences in history” (Carey, 1997, p. 207), political communities founded on civic ties rather than on domination-submission pattern are rare creatures in history (p. 207). The sole meaning of the First Amendment for most people today is merely the “rights” of rugged

individuals, rebellious individuals, and sometimes, predator individuals. People act as if democracy will perpetuate itself automatically if they only pay due regard to the law and rights.

Nevertheless, the Bill of Rights was framed as a foundation “through which people constitute themselves as a political community” (Carey, 1997, p. 209). The First Amendment “is an injunction as to how we might live together as a people, peacefully and argumentatively but civilly and progressively” (p. 209). It embodies a civic and republican culture “that cuts across and modifies all our vast and individual difference” (p. 209); it embodies hope and aspiration for a republican way of life – give and take of ideas, facts, and experiences in a daily basis.

Under this reading of the history of American journalism, merely legal rights guarantee little if the civic culture is actually “aborted by isolation, mutual suspicion, abuse, fear, and hatred” (Carey, 1997, p. 209). The Constitution and the Bill of Rights actually assume a set of personal disposition and the existence of certain social conditions: the thriving of public discourse, argument, conversation, disputation, and debate, inclusive community, participation of members of society in political decision-making. Therefore, the First Amendment is an injunction for creating a conversational society while the news media “is merely a recording device, is largely an extension and amplification, an ‘outering’ of conversation” (Carey, 1997, p. 217-218). A news media independent of the conversational public, or existing in the absence of such a conversation, “is likely to be a menace to public life and an effective politics” (Carey, 1997, p. 218).

Communitarians find that the conversational public has been largely evaporated with the emergence of the public opinion industry and the apparatus of polling. Professional communicators and journalists have colonized “the press” in its original meaning in the

First Amendment. The public was replaced by the interest groups as the key political actors “whose relationship to public life is essentially propagandistic and manipulative” (Carey, 1997, p. 218). Public opinion polling has prevented authentic public opinion from forming (Carey, 1997, p. 218). Overall, “while the word public continues in our language as an ancient memory and a pious hope, the public as a feature and factor of real politics disappears” (p. 219).

In summary, the media content supplied by Communitarian journalism is generated only by public conversation. Unlike conventional journalism which disarms people, treats them as client seer from afar, and narcotizes them to participate in the media fares that help to govern their lives, Communitarian journalism fulfills the prerequisite of the First Amendment by encouraging public conversation, engaging the talking public, extending the circle of debate, and cultivating the virtues of clarity of thought, of eloquence, and sound judgment (Carey, 1997, p. 219-210). Overall, Communitarian journalism is an endeavor to recreate the public realm, to encourage the public conversation, and, thus, to secure a republic which, as Benjamin Franklin has worried during the Constitution Convention, may fall to the mercy of all the vicissitudes of history (Carey, 1991, p. 207).

3. Media Democracy in America

As the previous literature shows, the success of the democratic government rests upon and requires the exercise of a well-informed and sensible opinion by the great bulk of the citizens. Democracy requires a healthy public debate and a free press to serve that purpose. Journalism and democracy should be names for the same thing – “a discoursing public” (Carey, 1997, p. 192). Tocqueville (1969) observed that, to be excellent, democracy needs some prerequisites such as minimum equality of condition among citizens, ubiquity of civic/political associations, greater newspaper readership,

the habit to discourse on public affairs coherently and impartially, and hence the maturation of the public sphere. Apparently, the mass media system is an indispensable part for a workable and legitimate democracy. Whenever the formation of public opinion is artfully manipulated, the integrity of democracy is in question.

Mass communication media are central to the dynamics of the relationship between governors and the governed in all types of political regimes (Mughan & Gunther, 2000, p. 3). This is because mass media are basically a social institution playing an important political role (Cook, 1998, p. 3). In some sense, news media are a political institution because news reports often are key participants in decision-making and policy-making (Cook, 1998, p. 3-8).

Since the beginning of the print era, political advocacy has been a central function of news media. “Even where journalist may be sincerely committed to a professional ideology of ‘objectivity,’ news incorporates political values” (Halling & Mancini, 2004a, p. 26). News media are producers of meaning, creators of social consciousness (Halling, 1985, p. 141). Although journalistic professionalization and journalistic autonomy beginning at commercial press era could overshadow the interlocking between media and political parties, the media system largely reflects the major political divisions in society. No serious media research would argue that journalism anywhere in the world is literally neutral (Halling and Mancini, 2004a, p. 21-26). Stuart Hall argues that communication is always linked to power and that the media discourses appear to reflect reality while in fact they construct it.²¹ “The media... tend, faithfully and impartially, to reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in society's institutional order.”²² Particularly, when it comes to foreign affairs, media content largely are political (Cook, 1998, p. 7-11).

²¹ Daniel Chandler, *Marxism Media Theory*. See: <http://media.ankara.edu.tr/~erdogan/marxism.htm>

²² Cited in Daniel Chandler, *Notes on the construction of reality in TV news programs*. Available at: www.aber.ac.uk/media/Modules/TF33120/news.html

Yet, being political and partisan doesn't necessarily prevent the mass media system from serving the working of democracy in real world. "Mass media are the connective tissue, or oxygen" of democracy ever since its existence (Mughan & Gunther, 2000, p. 1). Thomas Jefferson visualized an ideal newspaper functioning like a vast town hall meeting, which would make government unnecessary (Nerone, 1995, p. 48-49). The ideal newspaper should operate as an avenue through which people can "deliberate rationally on public affairs, not just as passive readers but as active citizens, participating at all times, not just at election time" (Nerone, 1995, p. 48). Under that condition, Jefferson chooses newspapers over government because newspapers – the "town meeting" model of the mediated public forum – guarantee self-government and democracy more effectively than any other social institutions. Yet, Jefferson acknowledged that freedom of the press is good and workable "only in the context of a healthy community of intelligent, independent, and therefore virtuous citizens" (Nerone, 1995, p. 49). Therefore, the critical question is: Should the community/society blame itself for being not so virtuous to make a town meeting-like newspaper workable, or should the media blame themselves for failure of leadership in empowering or activating public conversation?

To make things worse, when it comes to the electronic media, mass media are increasingly not accessible to all who wish to use them, and thus, more problematic in serving democracy. On one hand, freedom of speech is limited in corporate broadcast media because of government-imposed "civic" programming or because of "Fairness Doctrine." On the other hand, the heavy exposure to television programming and commercials may result in people's low level of civic participation.

Justice White redefined an ideal broadcasting medium in a working democracy as "a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are

representative of [his] community.”²³ After all, he said, “it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”²⁴ A media system can be equivalent to a working democracy only when it is free, independent, and accessible to all. In another word, a media system can reflect American public’s deep commitment to self-governance only when the debate on public issues is “uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”²⁵

Again, even in the electronic time, it is widely acknowledged that the value of media freedom lies in creating community and sustaining civic dialogue. “The meaning of the First Amendment should not concentrate solely on legal ‘rights’ of rebellious individual, but should concentrate more on its securing participation of members of society in political decision making, and defining the nature of public life” (Carey, 1991). “Communication best fulfills its functions not as messages flashing across space for purpose of control, but as rituals of fellowship and democracy” (Carey, 1995). The press is the foundation of the public realm. “The ‘public’ is the God term of the press, the term without which the press does not make any sense” (Carey, 1995). The legitimate content of news media should be that generated by public conversation. “We devalue the press to the degree it seeks to inform us and turns us into silent spectators” (Carey, 1995).

Democracy does not need to be the most efficient form of government, but it definitely should be the most educational one which “extends the circle of debate as widely as possible and thus asks us all to articulate our views, to put them at risk, and to cultivate the virtues of clarity of thought, of eloquence and sound judgment” (Lasch, 1996). Democratic media should facilitate the “co-operative inquiry” among the public rather than make itself a colony of various eloquent pundits. The free press protects the

²³ *Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.* (1969). 395 U.S. at 394.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *New York Times v. Sullivan*

means of democracy as well as the ends of democracy – a republic of full participation of members of society in political decision-making.

Although falling short of an empowerment of public life, the mass media system in today's democratic societies basically works to accomplish self-government and human development through the information they convey to the public, since "a broadly and equitably informed citizenry helps assure a democracy that is both responsive and responsible" (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 1). Based on that standard, the American democracy has been called "media democracy" (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995, p. 77). Although commercialization and conglomeratization of the American media system in the past decades is corrosive to the health of democracy, American media democracy remains the role model for the development of political communication in Western democracies.

In American media democracy, media have significantly displaced "churches, parties, trade unions, and other traditional organizations of civil society as the central means by which individuals are connected to the wider social and political world" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 33-34). Journalistic discourse, perceived as representative of a generalized public opinion cutting across the lines of political parties and social groups, has significant influence on the actions of policy makers, public debate on social and political issues, and policies made by public institutions (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b, p. 37; Djerff-Pierre, 2000, p. 254). Mutz & Martin (2001) note that the American public is "exposed to far more dissimilar political views via news media than through interpersonal political discussions" (p. 97). The mediated exposure to cross-cutting viewpoints with regard to public policy ensures that "no one could see the end result as arbitrary rather than reasonable and justifiable, even if not what he or she happened to see as most justifiable" (Fearon 1998, p. 62). Furthermore, this media-

based exposure to conflicting viewpoints is deemed a central element needed in political dialogue to maintain a democratic citizenry (Barber 1984; Habermas 1989).

Yet, mass communication media failed American democracy in various ways. The media system is increasingly becoming an apparatus of political parties' top-down political communication aimed at electoral success. Issues and topics of critical importance are ignored by political communication (Swanson, 2004, p. 51). Journalism becomes more entertaining and less informative (Swanson, 2004, p. 52). Government is closely bound with public relations (Swanson, 2004, p. 52), and "government by publicity" (Cook, 1998, p. 117) has serious effects on the independence of the news media as a public forum and contributes to the growing public cynicism and mistrust of political actors and institutions.

Behind this failure of the media system as democratic institution is the fading popular sovereignty. The routine operation of American government has relied on large-scale mobilization of the public to a far greater extent than it does today. As government has learned to manage the public business without public participation and involvement, it also has diminished the occasions for the kind of popular mobilization that demands reshaping of public policy or changing of political institutions. "Today, American politics is no longer exceptional for its feats of grass-root mobilization," and a wide disparity exists between mass immobility and elite agitation (Crenson & Ginsberg, 2002, p. 1-3). Strategic political communication becomes more crucial for political success than popular support. The idea that the public sphere and public opinion become increasingly important for policy-making is met with skepticism on the part of public-policy analysts. Von Beyme (1994) suggests that we should not overrate even the relevance of mediated debate on public policy because the routine political process remains largely separate from the public sphere. Overall, "the vitality of the

public as a force in American politics is crumbling, and the time may soon arrive when the most pressing and yet disturbing question in American politics is ‘Who cares?’” (Crenson & Ginsberg, 2000, p. 244).

This dissertation looks into the U.S. public’s participation in formation of the U.S.-China policy by the way of the mainstream media to find out to what extent the actual policy reorientation could claim popular support or public accountability and how the differences of opinions among various social groups relate to the actual policy orientation.

4. News Media Are Major Representation of Public Opinion

The assessment of public opinion, the fundamental dynamics of working democracy, has been “one of the most frustrating and challenging of democratic practice” (Herbst, 1998, p. 1). “Conceptions of public opinion are tethered to models of democracy” (p. 16). “The processes of constructing public opinion have vital implication for democratic theory and practice” (p. 2). To understand the fundamental dynamics of working democracy, one needs to look into how the various players in the democratic enterprise conceptualize public opinion and the public sphere.

Generally speaking, public opinion is the perceived will of the people. Conventional conception of public opinion is a mixture of media content, expressive action (rallies), constituent mail, phone calls, opinion polling, election returns, town hall meetings, coffeehouse dialogue, and so forth. However, it is difficult to gauge the public’s will. Therefore, Lippmann (1922) characterized public opinion as a “phantom.” He argued that a concrete and measurable public opinion was empirically absent from the policy process, and that it should be. He saw an extraordinarily close connection between public opinion and media and held that “public opinion and mass media are largely conflated” (Herbst, 1998, p. 5).

Public opinion can be constructed as popular sentiment expressed in opinion polling, the aggregation of individual opinions solicited and recorded by trained, objective survey researchers and interviewers. “Contemporary scholars have moved away from the group-oriented model, thinking about public opinion as mass opinion” (Herbst, 1998, p. 6). However, some limitations exist with regard to the reliability and accountability of mass opinion polling. Mass opinion research methods – survey research, experimentation, and simulation of public opinion – often diminish or omit contextual factors of opinion formation which are critical to argumentation of political life (Herbst, 1998, p. 7). Sometimes, poll data cannot be taken as public opinion because the questionnaire forms employed most certainly determine what public opinion looks like. Public opinion in this form of polling data can easily be manipulated by pollsters and other political operatives. Berinsky (1999) finds that the misrepresentation of individual opinion in the survey interview is largely because of bias affected by social environment factors and/or by the complex and idiosyncratic cultural forces of the survey interview. Therefore, “aggregate opinion polls may provide an inaccurate picture of true public sentiment on sensitive issues” (Berinsky, 1999, p. 1230). Thus, it is problematic for policy formation and evaluation to use polls to serve as barometers of public sentiment on policy controversies. Actually, in national politics, polls play a far less important role in executive and congressional decision-making than we think (Herbst, 1998, p. 10).

Public opinion also could be constructed as group opinion. Tocqueville, James Bryce, Arthur Bentley, David Truman, Herbert Blumer, and other nineteenth- and early twentieth-century observers of American politics believed that group opinion and public opinion were one and the same. Herbst (1998) observes that it is common in today’s political science that pluralistic groups represent public opinion: “Groups

funnel nebulous opinions into the entity we recognize as public opinion.” To some policy makers, public opinion is interest groups and lobbyists who represent public opinion.

Overall, the public is vague in its feelings and can be manipulated easily during opinion polling. In addition, “the public is better at making ‘big picture’ decision with limited information than evaluating specific policy decision requiring greater attentiveness and involvement” (Chambers & Goidel, 2005, p. 28). Therefore, it is efficient to look to the sources of persuasion – interest groups or issue advocates and media – if one is to understand the nature of public opinion. Herbst’s (1998) study on reading of public opinion finds that policy experts usually believe mass media content and/or the expression of interest groups are public opinion. (p. 64-74). The policy elites see an extraordinarily close connection between public opinion and media. Policy experts in federal and state governments tend to see that “media content and interest groups are excellent crystallizers of a nebulous public opinion” (Herbst, 1998, p. 75).

Public opinion has largely been constructed by the mass media. Many mass communication researchers find that exposure to the news media and public opinion formation are closely linked. Newspaper, television, or radio content is not simply a conduit for public opinion expression; it is the very essence of public opinion. Lippmann (1922) directly equated public opinion to journalistic opinion. He asserted that if media content did not appeal to attitudinal currents already flowing through the social world, the readers would not find such texts attractive or relevant to their lives.

News media’s shaping of public opinion is accomplished by journalists who are trying to report as best as they can on public affairs (Herbst, 1998, p. 18). Journalist may report on popular sentiments in a variety of ways that legitimate or condemn particular meanings of public opinions. Journalists often take the statements or

narratives of individuals featured in episodic stories to be representations of public opinion (Herbst, 1998, p. 18). Bennett (1990) finds that media can construct public opinion by broadcasting the comments of individuals claiming a distinct insight into public opinion. In some extreme cases, public opinion is the spin of the moment on different issues presented by major newspapers. Overall, news media are, at least, the key forces shaping our conception of public opinion (Herbst, 1998).

Although Dewey challenged Lippmann's skepticism toward the public's competence to judge foreign affairs by asserting that true learning takes place through communication and participation, he did not elaborate on how to inspire the culture of communication and citizen inquiry (Alterman, 1998, p. 69). In an ideal republic, citizens would have perfect access to their official representatives, perfect information about their actions, and perfect understanding of the issues involved (Alterman, 1998, p. 152). But the population is too large and the government is too complex for even Ralph Nader to keep track of everything. Journalists provide the metaphorical bridge between the representatives and the represented. Almost by definition, any attempt to improve the system's accountability requires the cooperation of the media as its messengers (Alterman, 1998, 152).

In summary, media opinion and public opinion are largely conflated (Herbst, 1998, p. 65). This dissertation research takes the major foreign policy newspapers' "international news" and Op/Ed pages and major TV network's foreign report as typical representations of public opinion to attest the public accountability of U.S.-China policy.

5. Newsmaking and Policy-Making

Paradigmatic change in political life usually necessitates mass communication campaign aims at manufacturing the desired climate of public opinion. Mass persuasion

in political life is similar to scientific development in that paradigm change in both sciences and politics occurs when a sense of malfunction that can lead to crisis is widely accepted by the research community as well as by political actors (Kuhn, 1962, p. 92-93). In both, so long as a given paradigm is in dominance, “both fact collection and theory articulation became highly directed activities” within the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962, p. 18). As to political life, whenever a crisis happens, “the society is divided into competing camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, the others seeking to institute some new one” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 93). The parties to a revolutionary conflict could resort to the techniques of mass persuasion (Kuhn, 1962, p. 93). The mass persuasion, by way of highly directed “fact collection and theory articulation,” could be a promising device employed by policymakers as well as by stakeholders, such as issue advocacy groups, governmental institutions, and corporate community, to enlist public support, to produce a specific climate of opinion, and finally, to facilitate policy reorientation in favor of their specific advantage. Consequently, mass media, legislative bodies, and other public forums, the major carriers of mass persuasion, could be the battleground where competing political camps struggle to defend or institute their favorite political paradigm.

Whenever paradigmatic change in public policy is needed, news coverage and the mediated debate on public affairs could become highly directed fact collection and theory articulation. These political communications actually influence the way in which citizens structure their attitudinal and behavioral orientation toward politics. Therefore, political elites widely, if not universally, believe that “the media are of paramount importance in shaping these orientations” (Mughan & Gunther, 2000, p. 3). In 1928, Edward Bernays acutely perceived a new mechanism of governance – “the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinion of the masses” by

relatively small number of people “who understand the mental processes” and “pull the wires which control the public mind” (Bernays, 1928, p. 9-10).

Cook (1998) notes that “the news media should be thought of not only as an institution but as political; in other words, journalists are political actors” (p. 85). In the United States, news media have become part of government (Cook, 1998, p. 86). The political role of news media lies in “augmenting the reaches of those who are already political powerful, ... in buttressing official authority” (p. 86).

According to Marxism analysis, the news media are part of the state-apparatus and assist in the process of political hegemony. News media are more inclined to create certain kinds of stories with particular values than others. Those news stories “reveal not only journalists’ understanding of how the world works but suggests a conception of how the world should work” (Cook, 1998, p. 88). The search for newsworthy stories and newsworthy events does not equally favor all political actors and all issues (p. 89). The political actors can and do anticipate what is likely to attract journalists when planning their actions and words (p. 89). The results of these negotiations between source and newspaper are “a political coloration to the news that consistently favors only certain approaches and outcomes” (Cook, 1998, p. 89). Most ordinary citizens lack the authoritative resources to attract journalists; therefore, American newsmaking process is dominated by officialdom (Cook, 1998, p. 95). The news media don’t completely shut out unofficial activities, but their access is narrow in time and limited in scope (Cook, 1998, p. 109). As a result, political news largely “is a constant if rarely conscious coproduction of officials and journalist” (Cook, 1998, p. 109).

Bennett (1990) observes that the routine professional decision on what is news usually results in news being “indexed” implicitly to the range and dynamics of governmental debate but has little relation to expressed public opinion (p. 103).

Journalists usually select the sources through whose eyes the public views the world,” and those eyes are predominantly official (Graber, 1993a). Fishman (1982) finds that the way the media determine the newsworthiness of occurrences is based on schemes of interpretation originating from and used by authorities and officials, which usually are staple sources of new media. Therefore, what the news media excluded from public view usually are those that might challenge the legitimacy of the institutions reporters depend on for news. By participant observation, he finds that there is an implicit agreement between journalists and officials with regard to the scheme by which a news event is spotted and properly interpreted. “Journalists simply do not regularly expose themselves to ‘unofficial’ interpretative schemes” (Fishman, 1982, p. 216).

Public officials are granted a monopoly of news by which they can restrict diversity in the politically volatile marketplace of ideas. Lawrence’s (2000) “official dominance” model of news suggests that officials usually are primary definers of events and issues in the news. To many journalists, institutionally positioned officials are “authorized knowers” and the most legitimate source of news (Lawrence, 2000, p. 5; Bennett 2003; Cook, 1998; Tuchman, 1978). In addition, Bagdikian (1985) finds that this routine newsroom decision-making with regard to newsworthiness can safeguard the business culture of media conglomerate, and thus, facilitate the corporate values and the central aims of media owners to be imbedded in the news (p. 97-109) and leave unreported large areas of genuine relevance that authorities choose not to talk about (174-192).

Spitzer’s (1993) “media-policy linkage” suggests that the mass media possesses a distinctive capacity to shape public policy (p. 5). “Yet, whatever the mass media’s influence on policy, it is no more a part of the government than, say, interest groups” (p. 6). Media cannot make policy, but they can play a pivotal role in influencing policy because they are “the conduit, the pipeline, the funnel regulating the flow of

communication between policymakers and others in the political system who might seek any different policy” (Spitzer, 1993, p. 9). News media directly influence political elites by helping to highlight particular issues, influence perceptions of public mood, and shape the context of legislation (Cook, 1998. p. 11).

Cook (1998) notes that “making news can be making policy in and of itself” (p. 124) because “the publicity provided by the news media can offer key assistance to officials” (p. 126). To public officials, “the savvy use of publicity can elevate a particular policy response” (p. 128). “Media strategies are useful for persuading others to act” (p. 126). “Media persuasion is a more attractive and efficient use of resources” (p. 125). All the three branches of the U.S. government invest so much time and resources to going public and to media relations that news media can be called the fourth branch of the government and that “individual journalist are mere cogs in a huge news producing machine” of the government (Cook, 1998, p. 15).

Being media-minded, public officials tend to address those high-salience and low-conflict issues. They also plan massive news events to manage the news and communicate with the public and to assert the importance and factual status of “their” occurrences (Lawrence, 2000, p. 7). Similarly, being so intertwined with government officials, the perception of journalistic autonomy simply means that journalists have internalized the demands on them from superiors, sources, and audiences, and obtain satisfaction by creatively crafting a commissioned news product (Sigelman, 1973, p. 132-151).

Media coverage of issues influences policy debate by defining not only what the issues are “really all about” but also what “the” two sides of the issue are (Cook, 1998, p. 127). News reporting can influence or even create an opinion climate that may or may not be favorable to a certain issue or policy proposal, “giving a sense of

favorability, even inevitability, to some sort of resolution of the newly publicized problem” (Cook, 1998, p. 129). By highlighting certain aspects or particular facts of a problem, news media can influence the policy deliberation and the result of policy bargaining (Cook, 1998, p. 129). Graber (1993b) finds that journalists can “provide the raw materials and the tools for creating and sustaining cognitive, emotional, and moral beliefs that undergird our society’s political structures and policies” (p. 22).

6. Opinion-Policy Nexus

The opinion-policy process is a theoretical framework in which what people think is related to what government does (Hennessy, 1965, p. 11). To have a better understanding of the process, one should look into *who* thinks *what* and *whose* opinion counts.

Public opinion in its conventional form is more like a popular pressure to conform than a controversial exchange of conflicting ideas among citizens and between citizens and responsive political elites (Hennessy, 1965, p. 10 -11). The populist theory of democracy holds that democracy is workable only when government responds directly and immediately to the wishes of the citizenry (Downs, 1957). However, democracy based solely on popular pressure to conform is workable only in a sociopolitical situation in which the impartial, truth-seeking, and rational individual was the basic unit of the body politics (Hennessy, 1965, p. 11). In today’s pluralistic society, the basic unit of body politics is various sociological groups. Every individual is a sum of rich and complex group relations. Thus, “public opinion is filtered, colored, and transformed in countless ways by individual and group subjectivization of fact and other opinion” (Hennessy, 1965, p.19). Generalized public opinion, in the form of opinion polls, is not a matter of the highest priority in governmental decision-making. The public opinion that counts in policy-making is a complex of views, either of group

or of individual, that are shared by members of publics. The declared public policy virtually is “the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment” (Hennessy, 1965, p. 20).

Page and Barabas (2000) observed persistent gaps in policy preferences between elites and citizens. For example, in foreign policy, citizens generally put a higher priority than elites on expanding progressive social programs worldwide. Compared to elites, citizens are more willing to bomb and more reluctant to commit ground troops. Many of the gaps reflect different values and interests between leaders and citizens and suggest a failure of elites to enlighten and educate the public, to convey the relevant information and reasoning, and to engineer a well-informed and deliberative public (p. 339-340).

Page and Shapiro (1983) cautioned that while “public opinion is often a proximate cause of policy, affecting policy more than policy influences opinion,” one should not rush to a conclusion that “democratic responsiveness pervades American politics” (p. 175). Governments, no matter authoritarian or democratic, have massive resources to create, strengthen, and guide popular pressure to conform by employing information manipulation and opinion mobilization. Popular pressure to conform is more like a majority tyranny, and thus, an inhibitor of full citizen involvement in an uninhibited public discussion of controversial issues. Faultless public communication and “omnicompetent citizen” are just unavailable in a modern, industrialized, urbanized, and specialized society (Lippman, 1922). Thus, modern public opinion tends to take the form of a “complex of preferences expressed by a significant number of people on an issue of general importance” (Lippman, 1922, p. 11).

Actually, as the framers of the Constitution envisioned, a well-functioning democracy always tries to insulate government decision-making from popular pressure

(Lowi et al, 2002, p. 402). Page and Barabas (2000) also note that realists and some international relations theorist have argued that foreign policymakers should “act as Burkean trustees rather than democratically instructed delegates, and must simply defy the public’s wishes” to defend the national interest (p. 341).

Beginning in the twentieth century, the “expert advisory” in the form of impartial, non-judgmental, and scientific research products was more sought after by representative government agencies. When it comes to diplomatic affairs, “the unhappy truth is that the prevailing public has been destructively wrong at critical junctures” (Lippmann, 1922). Most ordinary citizens cannot grasp the complex realities of foreign affairs. Public opinion usually is based on incomplete, poorly comprehended media reports when people respond to their own “maps” or “images” of the world rather than to the real world itself. Therefore, Lippmann (1922) cautioned that when mass opinion dominates the government, the result is a morbid derangement of the true functions of power. Representative government (participatory democracy or deliberative democracy) cannot be workable in the absence of an independent, expert organization which can make the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions (Lippmann, 1922). Consequently, as Abelson (1995) notes, policy makers rely increasingly on scholars from policy research institutions to identify, develop, shape, and at times implement, policy ideas (p. 1).

Overall, modern democracy’s opinion-policy process is more dominated by “competing elites” than by generalized public opinion (in the manner of Gallup’s national polls) and more dominated by group bargain than by the electorate process. The public’s concerns often are shaped by powerful political forces (Lowi et al, 2002, p. 400). Opinion-policy process in the U.S. does not guarantee that popular majorities will control policies. On the contrary, a substantial stratum of educated persons with

strong beliefs and skill in the democratic processes – such as media relations, issues advocacy, and pressure politics – “can normally ensure that democratic values are reasonably well respected” (Christenson, 1973, p. 42). An issue becomes important because it attains great visibility among political leaders and in the mass media rather than because of a groundswell of public interest in the issue (Christenson, 1973, p. 40). Callahan (1999) notes that the more significant change in American politics today may not lie in voting results, “but rather in the rise and fall of different ideas and their attendant policy agendas.” Therefore, more attention needs to be directed to the issue raising, issue framing, and issue suppression process in American politics today.

This dissertation research conducts a content analysis of foreign affairs reporting and foreign policy debate in foreign policy papers and the network news with regard to U.S.-China relations. Particularly, the investigator pays more attention to elite groups, professional communicators, policy-makers, and ordinary citizen’s framing of issue and their policy deliberation.

Chapter 4. Research Questions and Hypotheses

Based on the literature review, this dissertation looks into the news coverage of China and mediated debate on the U.S.-China policy to determine:

- (1) How do pluralistic social groups – political activists, legislators, journalists, think-tank scholars, administration officials, members of congress, and foreign public relations – participate in U.S.-China policy debates and how their opinions relate to the republican virtue of the U.S.-China policy?
- (2) How do the media democracy and newsmaking-policymaking process in the U.S. contrast to the communitarian journalism as a rejuvenation of public life, and hence, the sustenance of democracy?

Specifically, the investigator conducts a content analysis of newspaper articles and television news transcripts to investigate the following three research questions and three hypotheses with regard to the republican virtue of U.S.-China policy.

Q1: Who participated the policy debate and whose policy perspective has the highest congruence with the actual policy, i.e., the tradeoff between human rights and trade?

Q2: Among various political actors and social groups involved in the mediated debate on U.S.-China relations, whose input with regard to the U.S.-China policy is the most salient in terms of opinion manufacturing and media citation?

Q3: Which foreign policy ideology – realism (power) vs. liberal internationalism (peace) and international political economy (prosperity) vs. principle (human rights) – is most prominent in media discourse with regard to U.S.-China policy? Who is arguing for those perspectives?

H1. Given the high relevance between newsmaking and policymaking, the foreign policy-making community, by authoring opinion and supplying quotation in the national media, generally supports the policy tradeoff between trade and human rights

and has the most prominent presence in the media.

H2. A significant discrepancy exists between government officials and ordinary citizens in terms of media visibility and policy proposals.

H3. Compared to ordinary citizens' perspective with regard to U.S.-China policy, the perspective of news people, such as pundits, columnists, commentators, anchors, and reporters, is more congruent with government's actual policy framework.

Chapter 5. Method

To examine the republican virtue of U.S.-China policy, i.e., the public accountability and the democratic morality of U.S.-China policy, the investigator chose major media discourses as the representation of public opinion. This is because, as the literature review has illustrated, policy-makers and policy-shapers tend to hold that public opinion and media content are interchangeable and that “mass media content and interest groups are excellent crystallizers of a nebulous public opinion” (Herbst 1998, p. 75). Therefore, to understand the true nature of public opinion, “it is most efficient to look to the source of persuasion – interest groups and media” (p.75). In some situations, “even if public opinion is not activated yet with regard to a given issue, policy makers respond differently to it when the issue becomes a more salient one in the media” (Cook, 1998, p.126).

Based on that realization, various political actors resort to publicity to communicate across institutional divides, to direct attention to certain issues, to activate and reinforce latent attitudes among the public, and subsequently, to form a perceived consensus about those issues. Media visibility is an especially important priority for various political actors and social groups whose principal missions are to promote their policy agenda among policy makers (Rich and Weaver, 2000, p. 81). To them, “the savvy use of publicity can elevate a particular policy response” (Cook, 1998, p. 128) and securing salient presence in the national media, such as the NYT and CNN, is an important goal in making a difference in public policy choices (Cigler & Loomis, 1995, p. 393).

1. Content Selection and Data Gathering

The conflation of media’s narrative/judgmental content and public opinion and the fact that various institutions and political actors go about their business in a completely media-saturated environment enables the investigator to choose news reporting articles

and editorial/opinion pieces of the New York Times (NYT) and Cable News Network (CNN) as the representation of mass-mediated debate on U.S.-China policy.

Furthermore, based on reviewing the methodology of mass communication research, the investigator finds that NYT and CNN were the dominant sources of information and major representation of public opinion against which many other media outlets and political actors make their viewpoints with regard to public affairs.

NYT is probably the most prominent daily newspaper in the U.S. It has been referred to as America's "newspaper of record" in the past century, or "representing American news reporting at its best," or the elite newspaper. It often prints full transcripts of major speeches and debates on major public policy. Particularly, NYT is the No.1 foreign-policy newspaper in the U.S. It is credited as the most influential and authoritative newspaper in international reporting. Its "Foreign Desk" news reporting and "Editorial Desk" opinion pieces with regard to foreign affairs have enormous influence in the foreign policy-making community (Page, 1996, p. 17). Particularly, its Op/Ed pages are among the most important public forums for foreign policy deliberation (Page, 1996, p. 17) and have enormous and disproportionate significance in shaping public perception about the propriety of possible foreign policy actions. Overall, NYT's international reporting in the "Foreign Desk" and the opinion pieces in the "Editorial Desk" have the most conspicuous agenda-setting effects on various public forums such as local/national newspapers, magazines, talk radio, TV news, political weblogs, academic research, public lectures, university courses, and so forth. Therefore, the quality of deliberation on public affairs in NYT could affect the quality of public-policy debate generally (Page, 1996. p. 17).

CNN reached the peak of its reputation during the 1991 Gulf War and remains the most renowned international news channel in the world. According to Nielsen ratings

in terms of TV news's cumulative effect on viewers, CNN was America's No. 1 cable news channel in the 1990s. It was available to 88 million U.S. households by the end of 2004, and globally available to 1.5 billion viewers in more than 212 countries and territories. Besides, the real-time, 24-hour CNN news broadcasting has immediate and substantial agenda-setting effects on the foreign policy-making process because of the "CNN Effect," i.e., the making of U.S. foreign policy is increasingly subject to the images flickering across television screen 24/7. In one sense, CNN is the most effective agenda-setting agent in the foreign policy community; the extent, depth, and speed of CNN's agenda-setting effects are qualitatively different from those that preceded it. The saturation coverage of CNN was viewed as being strongly influential in bringing images and issues to the immediate forefront of American political consciousness. Other research suggests that the "CNN Effect" also includes "an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals" and "an accelerant to policy decision-making."²⁶ This "CNN Effect" is also framed as "CNN factor" by which it is meant that the media agenda influences a broad range of policy initiatives and that, by extension, lack of media coverage contributes to lack of policy (Hawkins, 2002, p.225).

Besides prominence, the investigator chooses NYT and CNN because both news outlets have espoused a centrist, if not slightly liberal-leaning, editorial ideology in recent years (Grosseclose, 2004). NYT has been criticized for being either too liberal or too conservative. However, based on media outlet's citation of various think tanks and policy groups and by comparing media's citation pattern to U.S. senator's citation patterns and their voting scores, Grosseclose (2004) finds that NYT is basically a newspaper of centrist ideology. Furthermore, based on the Lexis-Nexis search, both NYT and CNN generate the largest number of news relevant to China in both print and

²⁶ "The CNN Effect: How 24-Hour News Coverage Affects Government Decisions and Public Opinion." Brookings Institute/Harvard University Forum Transcript. 2002. www.brookings.edu/comm/transcripts/

broadcast media. Based on the searching of “Lexis-Nexis Academics,” from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2000, roughly the presidential term of President Bill Clinton, NYT published 14,454 news and opinion items significantly related as well as negligibly related to “China,” and the CNN Transcript in Lexis-Nexis has 5,496 items significantly as well as negligibly related to “China.”

Overall, by searching “Lexis-Nexis,” the investigator harvested 19,950 articles from NYT archives and CNN New Transcripts. These 19,950 articles constitute the gross media content for the quantitative study. As to the articles in the NYT, the investigator assumes that articles in some sections, such as “National Desk,” “Business/Financial Desk,” “Metropolitan Desk,” “Arts/Cultural Desk,” “City Weekly Desk,” “Week in Review Desk,” “Performing Arts/Weekend Desk,” and “Leisure/Weekend Desk,” are basically irrelevant to the policy debate with regard to the U.S.-China relations, and thus could be deleted from the media content without damaging the overall validity of the content analysis. Therefore, by choosing only “Foreign Desk” and “Editorial Desk” items for content analysis, the investigator gathered 4,963 items as the gross population of the NYT articles to be sampled and quantitatively analyzed.

Among those 4,963 articles, the investigator deleted some confounding or highly irrelevant cases which (1) repeat themselves in the “news brief” and in the “Desks;” (2) identify “China” as porcelain wares; (3) mention “China” in stories dealing with Chinese Americans or life in “Chinatowns” of the U.S.; (4) mention “China” in stories dealing with illegal immigration in the U.S.; (5) mention “China” as a neighboring country of Japan or other Asian countries which are the major subject of the news story; (6) mention “China” as a very minor factor of the U.S.’s bilateral relations with other countries such as Haiti, Bosnia, Peru, among others; (7) mention “China” as a very minor factor of the U.S. domestic politics, for example, an opinion item dealing

mainly with partisan hassle with regard to campaign finance reform, but refers to China's campaign donation in a rather insignificant way. This resulted in 3,853 items as the legitimate population of the NYT content to be sampled and coded. All the 3,853 items are lined up in the "Foreign Desk" category and "Op/Ed Desk" category according to publication date, for example, from 010193_a, 010193_b, 011193_a, ... to 123100_a. Whenever there is more than one article in one day, those articles in the same day are sub-labeled. For example, the collected five articles in March 30, 1997, are sub-labeled, randomly, as 033097_a, 033097_b, 033097_c, 033097_d, and 033097_e.

In collecting and sifting the 5,496 items generated from "CNN News Transcript" of "Lexis-Nexis," the investigator adopted the same procedure as used in determining legitimate NYT items for content analysis. Besides, the investigator deleted those confounding or highly irrelevant cases which (1) repeat themselves in different episodes of CNN shows; (2) refers to "China" in "South China Sea" where some news took place but the news subjects are not China; (3) refer to "China" as the name of a heroin called "China Cat;" (4) mention "China" in stories dealing with the airline crash of Chinese Airline of Taiwan; (5) mention China in stories dealing with Chinese grand panda in American zoo. (6) mention "China" in stories dealing mainly with "sports," "entertainment," "show biz," "travel and adventure"; (7) mention China in news stories dealing with "herbs," "acupuncture," "Chinese cuisine," "feng shui" "Qigong," "kung fu," "traditional Chinese fashion" such as three-inch-lotus-shoes, and "folk arts and music"; (8) mention China in "immigrant smuggling," or "illegal immigration"; and (9) mention China in news dealing with "stock market index" or "monetary exchange rate." As a result, the investigator determines that 2,714 CNN items constitute the legitimate population of the broadcast media content to be quantitatively analyzed. All

the 2,714 items are lined up according to airing time the same way as NYT articles are lined up according to publication time.

Finally, this resulted in the 6,567 items (2,714 CNN transcript items + 3,853 NYT articles) as legitimate content population of NYT and CNN to be sampled and quantitatively analyzed (See **Table 1**).

Table 1: The population of NYT/CNN items (3853+2714) to be sampled and coded

Year	CNN transcript (gross)	CNN transcript (legitimate)	NYT articles (gross)	NYT articles (legitimate)	NYT Foreign (gross)	NYT Foreign (legitimate)	NYT Editorial (gross)	NYT Editorial (legitimate)
1993	337	142	1378	322	334	240	132	82
1994	435	201	1413	301	297	220	131	81
1995	344	181	1595	408	378	275	187	133
1996	461	288	1851	420	373	273	223	147
1997	1121	610	2030	609	501	381	302	228
1998	664	402	1918	522	490	377	223	145
1999	1027	578	2224	699	679	520	262	179
2000	1107	312	2045	572	551	434	200	138
Total	5496	2714	14454	3853	3603	2720	1660	1133

Given the time constraint and the objective of the research – supporting or refuting research hypotheses, the investigator uses a probability sample of the content population to perform the content analysis. Given all the items in the content population are regularly lined up according to publication or broadcasting date, it is appropriate to use proportionate stratified sampling to get adequate and unbiased representation of the data set. To be specific, the investigator selected every fifth article in the population category of (1). CNN Transcript, (2). NYT’s “Foreign Desk,” and (3). NYT’s “Editorial Desk.” This stratified sampling generated 1,313 sample items – one-fifth of

the data population (6,567) – to be content analyzed. To be specific, 543 CNN items and 771 NYT items (550 international news items + 221 Op/Ed pieces) are sampled and quantitatively analyzed.

The investigator uses a common coding protocol to analyze both the newspaper items and the television news transcripts. Each individual news or opinion article is the basic coding unit. Eleven variables are measured and recorded using common coding protocol (See Appendix 1). Most of the variables are nominal in terms of measurement.

The investigator chose one-tenth of the sample articles, i.e., 65 NYT samples and 65 CNN transcript samples to conduct inter-coder reliability test. The investigator and an American senior undergraduate student majoring in mass communication conducted the inter-coder reliability test. If any disagreements arose, the coders discussed the point of contradiction until a suitable frame could be distinguished. After three times of reliability check, the two coders' average inter-coder reliability of all the 11 nominal variables, derived from Holsti's percent agreement formula for two coders, achieved 81%, a passable reliability result for categorical variables.

2. Coding and Measurement Protocol

The 11 variables of this content analysis basically focus on “who said what.” To be specific, “who” refers to media visibility of various participants of political communication; “what” refers to policy framework and policy orientation proposed, or suggested by those participants. Therefore, media visibility and perspective are two basic categories of the content analysis.

Media visibility is usually measured in terms of:

1. Authorship of a given policy proposal, argument, or perspective either published in Op/Ed pages of mainstream newspapers or aired on television debate/monologue.

2. The positive citations or references of a political actor, such as government official, scholars, or ordinary citizen, in support of a given frame of the story, or in support of the viewpoint of the opinion piece.

Perspective is measured in terms of:

1. Topic or issue covered in the articles.
2. Importance level designated to various issues, such as human rights, military rivalry, and trade, in support of issue tradeoff
3. Paradigms or mega-policy-frameworks against which a given topic or issue is discussed and weighed.

To interpret those 11 variables in details (See **Appendix 1**):

V1. All the articles are categorized as belonging either to print media (NYT) or to broadcasting media (CNN).

V2. All the articles are classified as either news items or opinion items.

V3. Authors of news items could be reporters, correspondents, writers, and anchorpersons of NYT or CNN, or wire service writers such as AP or Reuter reporters, or personnel from other agencies.

V4. Authors of opinion items includes 25 categories: editorial board of NYT, CNN news people, NYT columnists, commentators, editors, writers, political analyst, strategist, pollsters, administration officials, U.S. senators, U.S. representatives, university faculty, experts, scholars, public intellectuals, scientist, economists, think tank scholars, former administration officials, business people, lawyers, issue advocates, activists, NGO, spokesman for interest groups, public figures, ordinary citizens, Chinese dissidents, officials and ordinary citizens of People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan (ROC), and Hong Kong Special Administration Region (SAR) of PRC, Tibetans, international officials, and others; authors of NYT Op/Ed articles –

editorial essays authored by editorial board, letter-to-editor authored by a wide range of political participants, regular column articles authored by NYT columnists, and essays or comics authored by other writers and political actors - could easily be identified through byline information; authors of opinion pieces on CNN are identified and thus designated as those who uttered the major argument in congruence with the headline information of the item.

V5. As to the citation and reference, the investigator counts only those positive citations and references, meaning:

- a)** The citation counted must have “substantive content” (Rich and Weaver, 2000, p. 89), not just mentioning the name of a given source without presenting its relevant policy proposal;
- b)** The citation counted must be the viewpoints favorably cited or referred in support of the main idea of the opinion piece (Mundy, 1996, p. 18).
- c)** Whenever multiple citations support the main idea, only the first one is counted.

V6. The authorship of the citation is identified and designated with the same 25 categories as those used in identifying authorship of opinion pieces (See **V4**).

V7. The topics/issues of the news/opinion items are broken down to 30 categories.

V8. All those 30 issues or topics could be grouped into four national-interest frameworks (4Ps) determining the “dynamics of choice” of the U.S. foreign policy: principle, power, prosperity, and peace (see definition of the 4Ps in Technical Appendix 1). For example, the issues or topics such as Chinese military threat to American primacy, Chinese espionage in the U.S., China’s geopolitical activities, the U.S.-China military confrontation and strife; and Chinese nuclear proliferation and

weapon testing could be grouped together as relating to “power” framework of the U.S. national interest; issues or topics such as China’s environment and energy problem, AIDS and other disease, disarmament effort, China’s effort to join transnational organizations, and China’s conflict with regional or global powers could be grouped together as relating to peace framework of the U.S. national interest. Apparently, China’s human rights, corruption, oppressive polity, arbitrary family planning, and campaign donation to Democratic party could be grouped as relating to principle framework of the U.S. national interest; and U.S.-China trade relations, WTO entry, China’s piracy on U.S. products, and the trade imbalance, strife, and irregularities could be grouped as relating to prosperity framework of the U.S. national interest. In the end, nearly all the 30 issues covered in the U.S. mainstream media fall into the 4P national-interest frameworks of the U.S. foreign policy.

Jentleson (2000) argued that the foreign policy strategies of the United States are basically tradeoffs among those four national interests - principle, power, prosperity, and peace – in a given context of an international system. The core goal of American foreign policy is to make sound judgments of actions according to choice of national interest. The different degree of stress directed to the four national-interest goals corresponds to the four major schools of foreign policy theory (See **Table 2**).

Table 2: American foreign policy: Goals and theories

National interest goal	Corresponding foreign policy theory
Principles	Democratic Idealism
Power	Realism
Prosperity	International Political Economy
Peace	Liberal Internationalism

By measuring the four frameworks of national interest, the investigator may find

which foreign policy theory (and theorist) won out in the competition of ideas and thus occupied the commanding height to direct “fact collection and theory articulation” (Kuhn, 1962, p.18) during political communication.

Given that the 4Ps framework can direct “fact collection and theory articulation,” the investigator finds that the 4Ps policy frame could be related to the media frame of the coverage of the U.S.-China relations. As Gitlin (1980) observed, media frames “are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse” (p. 7).

Significant similarities exist between the policy frame and the media frame. Therefore, the investigator takes the 4Ps frame as the four news frames of the coverage of the U.S.-China relations:

- a). Ideopolitical struggle (principle);
- b). Darwinian struggle for geopolitical predominance or the so-called American primacy in the new world order (power);
- c). Business interdependence (prosperity);
- d). Common value and coexistence of all human race (peace).

The prevalence of one news frame could result in the prevalence of the corresponding policy frame, and vice versa.

V9-V10. In measuring the policy proposal with regard to the fundamental tradeoff between trade (prosperity) and human rights (principle), the investigator detects and infers those major opinion-framers’ attitude toward human rights and U.S.-China trade in terms of the importance level of the issue designated by them during their policy deliberation. For example, from a given article authored by a given political actor, the investigator can detect the policy proposal by identifying whether the opinion-framer designated 0 – “no mention of the issue,” or 1 – “not important,” or 2 – “important,” or

3 – “critically important” to a given issue, such as human rights or trade.

To be specific, when a human rights issue is “critically important,” it means that the U.S. should hold the Chinese Communist government accountable to human rights abuse and link the renewal of China’s trade status to the significant improvement in human rights; when human rights is “important,” it means that U.S. should pursue human rights by way of dialogue, trade, personnel exchange, economic interaction, and principled engagement with China; when human rights is “not important at all,” it means the U.S. should brush aside the human rights issue and single-mindedly pursue other national interests, or accommodate the Chinese government’s definition of human rights as, first and foremost, “the right to survive” with food and shelter.

On the other hand, when trade is “critically important,” it means the U.S. should normalize the U.S.-China trade relations, deepen the economic cooperation regardless of China’s human rights issue, and stay in the huge Chinese market to compete with other countries; when trade is “important,” it means the U.S. should do business with China in the hope that trade may liberalize Chinese political system, and in doing so, U.S. businesses should keep distance from controversial or unethical trade practice, such as importing China’s prison labor products, disregarding China’s infringement of intellectual property, investing in environment-unfriendly project, yielding to Chinese government’s press censorship, exporting sensitive technology, corrupting Chinese official for contract, and so forth; when trade is “not important at all,” it implies that the U.S. should not do business with Communist China because business transaction with China may strengthen America’s next enemy in the future.

V11. In the end, the investigator measures the overall policy stance in terms of engagement, containment, and conengagement. The Clinton administration advocated “engagement with China” by which it meant that the U.S. should maintain dialogue

with China in regard to human rights, trade, and Taiwan independence issue, expand economic interaction with China in the hope that a chain reaction could be detonated in the following pattern: U.S.-China trade relations leads to liberalization of China's economy which, in turn, necessitates political liberalization of China. Also, engagement stance is based on realization that China is an indispensable partner for the U.S. to rein in global warming, transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, epidemic disease, and regional conflict. "Contain China" is a policy stance espoused by anti-China, anti-communist lawmakers and government officials, advocating ruthless pursuit of the human rights agenda and single-minded isolation of China as a strategic competitor against the U.S. primacy. "Congagement with China," according to Khalilzad (1999), is a bizarre combination of engagement and containment by which by which it means that the U.S. should preserve the hope inherent in engagement policy while deterring China from becoming hostile and hedging against the possibility that a strong China might challenge U.S. interests; to be specific, the U.S. can "continue to try to bring China into the current international system while giving equal attention to deterrence and preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to this system while seeking to convince the Chinese leadership that a challenge would be difficult to prepare and extremely risky to pursue" (Khalilzard, 1999).

Overall, the investigator tries to determine whether the mass-mediated policy debate on the U.S.-China relations support the actual policy tradeoff, and if so, who tipped the balance?

3. Conceptualization of "Ordinary Citizen"

In this research, all the opinion makers/quotation suppliers could be broken down into 15 categories. Basically, those 15 groups of political actors in the mass-mediated policy debate are government officials, professional communicators, pundits, academics,

corporate representatives, interest groups, and people who cannot be identified as belonging to each of the aforementioned groups.

The researcher has tried to use “Google” and other reference books to identify these opinion makers/quotation suppliers, especially those who authored “letters-to-the-editor” without indicating their institutional or organizational affiliation. The results is that 52 opinion makers and 5 quotation suppliers cannot be identified in any way as belonging to any of the aforementioned social groups. Therefore, the researcher identified the 57 authors as “ordinary citizen” although they aren’t literally “ordinary” citizens because they are so involved in public affairs, so knowledgeable with issues, and so capable of coherent deliberation of public policy issue that they can have their opinion pieces or statements published/broadcasted by national media.

Actually, the researcher tends to deem these obscure and unaffiliated opinion makers the real public in its canonical sense. They are real public because they are independent of obvious “pressure groups.” Their everyday interpersonal dialogue in regard to public affairs composes the lifeblood of civic space. News media only serve as a springboard for their conversation. Their relationship with the news media is natural and spontaneous. The news media are valuable only because they help to initiate the conversation among citizens and to sense the shifting directions of the conversation.

While admitting that those 57 opinion makers are in no ways ordinary citizens, the investigator can not simply label them as “issue advocates” or “issue public” because issue advocates, when pretended to be representative of the grassroots and often reluctant to disclose their affiliation, actually belong to “interest groups.” Their relationship with the news media is often manipulative. On the other hand, the investigator cannot simply label those 57 opinion makers as mobs howling in the street. Their opinion is in no way the facile, shallow, and popular sentiment of the moment.

Rather, their opinion are mature “social judgment reached after experiences have been recounted, hopes and fears expressed and results weighed.”²⁷

In this research, the opinion of ordinary citizens is the most valuable for two reasons: (1) As the normative theory of media democracy indicates, the conversation of ordinary citizens, especially those who have higher political awareness with issues but choose to hide behind “the veil of ignorance,”²⁸ is the true origination of public opinion and real tissue of media democracy. (2) By contrasting their opinion with opinions of professional communicators, interest groups, and policy-makers, the investigator may generate meaningful finding in regard to the public accountability of the policy tradeoff between U.S.-China trade and human rights issues.

²⁷ Clyde Lyndon King, “Public Opinion as Viewed by Eminent Political Theorists.” Cited by Susan Herbst in *Reading public opinion*, p. 108

²⁸ According to philosopher John Rawls, “the veil of ignorance” implies that people make decisions based on what is good for their community as a whole, and without regard to their own self-interest (since they operate behind a veil of ignorance and don't know enough about what would benefit them) although they could never actually eliminate all of their personal biases and prejudices. By hiding behind the veil of ignorance, they endeavor to minimize those personal bias and prejudices. “Behind such a veil of ignorance all individuals are simply specified as rational, free, and morally equal beings.” Available at <http://gs.fanshawec.ca/pjedicke/Rawls.htm> and <http://onphilosophy.wordpress.com/2006/05/05/beyond-the-veil-of-ignorance/>

Chapter 6. Results and Discussion

Overall, the news coverage (916 items) of Chinese affairs and the opinions (396 items) on U.S.-China relations increased dramatically during President Clinton's second term (See **Figure 1**). During that time, the paradoxical aspect of U.S.-China policy – “strategic partnership” and “constructive engagement” on one hand, the ever increasing drumbeat about the coming conflict between the U.S. and the PRC on the other hand – were reflected by intensive news events. These included mutual visits of the national leaders, surge in trade volume, bickering with regard to Hong Kong handover and Taiwan's “two states” initiative, U.S. B-52's bombing of Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, allegations of Chinese military espionage and campaign donations to the Democratic Party, and China's WTO entry. The perennial question obsessed by policy-makers is: Will economic cooperation with China, and hence, China's economic growth, lead to an easing of the repression in China and the emergence of an open and democratic society? Or will it simply prop up the hard-liners, subsidize a potential strategic competitor, and help to keep the Communists in power? Reflecting those hopes and anxieties, this news coverage and the concurrent mass-mediated policy debate might be a perfect occasion to reexamine the opinion-policy nexus.

1. Answers to Research Questions

To answer the first research question – Who participated in the policy debate and whose policy perspective has the highest congruence with the actual policy tradeoff between human rights and trade? – the investigator finds that professional communicators at NYT/CNN authored one third of the 396 opinion pieces. Those professional communicators are the in-residence reporters, correspondents, anchors, columnists, and members of editorial board of NYT/CNN. Ordinary U.S. citizens constitute the second largest group of opinion-framers. They authored 15.4% (or 61) of




Figure 1: The volume of news/opinion items with regard to China by NYT/CNN during the Clinton years (1993-2000)

the 396 opinion pieces, most as letters-to-the-editor. The other major opinion-makers are university faculty (6.6%), members of Congress (6.3%), think-tank scholars (4.8%), incumbent administration officials (4.3%), business community (4.3%), former government officials (4.1%), media pundits (3.8%), issue advocates and NGO (3.3%), Chinese dissidents (2.5%), and public intellectuals (2.3%).

However, by combining the citations in news/opinion and authoring of opinion pieces, the investigator finds that incumbent administration officials have the most conspicuous presence (22.8%), surpassing ordinary citizens' media presence (16.3%) (See **Table 3**). The overwhelming presence of administration officials in news coverage through citations (18.5%) may confer significant leeway to policy-makers for framing issues and setting the agenda.

Other major participants of the mass-mediated policy debate are members of Congress (15.9%), NYT columnists (14.6%), NYT editorial board (11.8%), CNN reporters/anchors (11.1%)), issue advocates, interest groups and NGO (12.4%), business community (10.5%), think-tank scholars (10.3%), Chinese dissidents (9.8%), Chinese citizens (9.6%), former U.S. government officials (8.9%), and university faculty (8.9%) (See **Table 3**).

The results suggest that incumbent administration officials have predominant presence in the policy debate by having their perspective transmitted by professional communicators and by having their perspective resonated among other social groups. The reason administration officials are more likely to be cited by mass media than authoring opinion pieces themselves may lie in that citations can confer more authority to incumbent officials in framing news stories. Perhaps administration officials are more likely to direct the fact-collection than to articulate foreign policy theories. The fact that ordinary U.S. citizen are very rarely cited or referred to in the news coverage

Table 3: The ten most prominent political actors in the mass-mediated debate*

Citation/authorship Author-type	Frequency of citation in news/opinion	% of total citations	frequency of Op/Ed	% of total opinion makers	Combined (%)
Administration officials	104	18.5	17	4.3	22.8
Ordinary citizen (issue public)	5	.9	61	15.4	16.3
Members of Congress	54	9.6	25	6.3	15.9
NYT columnist	2	.4	56	14.2	14.6
Issue advocates, interest groups, and NGO	51	9.1	13	3.3	12.4
Editorial board of NYT	2	.4	45	11.4	11.8
CNN reporter/anchor	0	0	44	11.1	11.1
Business community	35	6.2	17	4.3	10.5
Think tank scholars	31	5.5	19	4.8	10.3
Total of frequency	561	100	395	100	200

* To be concise, the table leaves out some political actors whose combined media salience is no more than 5% (10/200).

with regard to the U.S.-China policy (.9%) may suggest that they have very negligible influence on the direction of “fact collection” of the mass media. On the other hand, members of Congress (9.6%), issue advocates (9.1%), Chinese citizens (9.3%), Chinese dissidents (7.3%), the U.S. business community (6.2%), and think tanks (5.5%) have more frequently been cited or solicited for opinions by the media. The inessential citation of ordinary citizens, even in terms of opinion polls, in the news stories may suggest their inconsequential influence on the direction of “fact-collection” of the mass media. Also, compared to citations of other social groups and administration officials, citations of the Congress (9.6%) is not impressive given that the Congress should have reclaimed more foreign policy-making authority in the post-Cold War years and given that the U.S. Congress, the deliberative body of the republic, was envisaged by Founders as a refined representation of popular sentiment and a major mechanism for civic participation.

As to whose perspective is more congruent with the actual policy tradeoff between trade and human rights, the investigator finds that generally print media are more concerned with principle issues than are broadcast media. In terms of policy stance – containment (value = 1), or engagement (value = 3), or conengagement (value = 2) – the NYT (2.10) leans more to conengagement than CNN (2.37). The NYT tends more to argue for disciplined engagement ($\text{human rights/trade} = 2.58/2.11 = 1.22$) than CNN ($\text{human rights/trade} = 2.51/2.59 = .97$) (See **Table 4**). In addition, compared to opinion items, the news items slightly leans to supporting the policy tradeoff and engagement policy, showing that the intensive citations of administration officials may have some sway over the policy debate in support of the actual policy tradeoff (See **Table 4**).

While NYT distributed one quarter of its China coverage to oppressive polity and human rights violations in China and has half of its China coverage framed as the

Table 4: Difference between NYT & CNN and between News & Op/Ed in regard to policy stance, human rights and trade, issue, and 4P frames

Policy Media	Average policy stance 1=contain 2=congrate 3=engage	Average importance of human rights 1= not important 2= important 3= very important	Average importance of trade 1= not important 2= important 3= very important	Rank of the six issues most intensively covered by the NYT/CNN and by news/opinion	4P foreign policy frames espoused during the coverage
NYT	2.10 95% CI: 2.03 ~ 2.17	2.58 95% CI: 2.54 ~ 2.63	2.11 95% CI: 2.01 ~ 2.22	1. Oppressive polity (14.0%) 2. Human rights (11.9%) 3. Taiwan independence (7.1%) 4. China's foreign affairs (7.0%) 5. U.S.-China diplomacy (6.3%) 6. Overall relations (5.9%)	Principle (50.7%) Power (17.7%) Peace (11.4%) Prosperity (11.1%) Other (8.9%)
CNN	2.37 95% CI: 2.29 ~ 2.44	2.51 95% CI: 2.44- 2.59	2.59 95% CI: 2.50 ~ 2.68	1. U.S.-China trade (12.2%) 2. U.S.-China diplomacy (11.5%) 3. Hong Kong handover (7.7%) 4. Oppressive polity (7.0%) 5. Military strife (6.3%) 6. Human rights (5.7%)	Principle (37.9%) Prosperity (23.1%) Power (19.9%) Peace (12.5%) Other (6.5%)
News	2.25 95% CI: 2.18 ~ 2.31	2.55 95% CI: 2.50 ~ 2.60	2.47 95% CI: 2.38 ~ 2.55	1. Human rights (10.5%) 2. Oppressive polity (10.2%) 3. China's foreign affairs (8.3%) 4. U.S.-China diplomacy (8.1%) 5. Hong Kong handover (7.4%) 6. U.S.-China trade (7.3%)	Principle (43.4%) Power (18.8%) Prosperity (16.4%) Peace (11.4%) Other (9.9%)
Op/Ed	2.17 95% CI: 2.08 ~ 2.26	2.57 95% CI: 2.49 ~ 2.64	2.17 95% CI: 2.05 ~ 2.29	1. Oppressive polity (13.4%) 2. Overall relations (10.8%) 3. U.S.-China trade (10.6%) 4. U.S.-China diplomacy (9.3%) 5. Taiwan independence (8.1%) 6. Human rights (6.8%)	Principle (50.0%) Power (18.4%) Prosperity (15.4%) Peace (12.9%) Other (3.3%)

principle issue of the U.S. foreign policy, CNN distributed only 12.7% of China coverage to oppressive policy and human rights abuses in China and has 37.9% of its China coverage framed as principle issue of U.S. foreign policy. Overall, it seems that CNN leans more to a sympathetic “engagement with China” policy.

However, comparing news items and opinion items in terms of the importance level of human rights, the investigator finds no significant difference between CNN and NYT ($F = 2.295, p = .13$) and between news and opinion ($F = .133, p = .716$) (See **Table 5**). As to the importance level of the U.S.-China trade, the investigator finds significant difference between CNN and NYT ($F = 45.689, p < .05$) and between news and opinion ($F = 16.194, p < .05$) (See **Table 6**). As to the policy stance, significance difference exists between CNN and NYT ($F = 26.478, p < .05$) and no significant difference exists between news and opinion ($F = 2.115, p = .146$) (See **Table 7**).

As to whose perspective is more congruent with the actual “engagement” policy, the investigator finds that among various opinion-framers, the business community, university faculty, incumbent administration officials, and former government officials are most eager to propose “engagement with China.” Comparing citations of various political participants, again it is the business community, university faculty, incumbent administration officials, and former government officials who are most likely to propose the “engagement” policy. The business community spearheaded the engagement policy, administration officials and university faculty backed the initiative (See **Table 8**).

To answer the second research question – Among various political actors and social groups involved in the mediated debate on U.S.-China relations, whose input with regard to the U.S.-China policy is most salient in terms of opinion manufacturing and media citation? – the investigator finds that, among the 25 political actor groups that

Table 5: ANOVA of importance level of human rights between NYT & CNN and between News & Op/Ed

		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
NYT - CNN	Between Groups	.736	1	.736	2.295	.130
	Within Groups	233.264	727	.321		
	Total	234.000	728			
News – Op/Ed	Between Groups	.043	1	.043	.133	.716
	Within Groups	233.957	727	.322		
	Total	234.000	728			

Table 6: ANOVA of importance level of U.S.-China trade between NYT & CNN and between News & Op/Ed

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
NYT - CNN	Between Groups	24.357	1	24.357	45.689	.000
	Within Groups	227.634	427	.533		
	Total	251.991	428			
News – Op/Ed	Between Groups	9.208	1	9.208	16.194	.000
	Within Groups	242.783	427	.569		
	Total	251.991	428			

Table 7: ANOVA of policy stance between NYT & CNN and between News & Op/Ed

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
NYT - CNN	Between Groups	13.172	1	13.172	26.478	.000
	Within Groups	372.120	748	.497		
	Total	385.292	749			
News – Op/Ed	Between Groups	1.086	1	1.086	2.115	.146
	Within Groups	384.206	748	.514		
	Total	385.292	749			

Table 8: Mean value of policy stance (contain/congace/engage) among political actors

Opinion/citations Authorship	Mean based on opinion- framing	Number of opinion items published in the mass media	Mean value based on citations	Number of citation in the mass media
Editorial board of NYT	1.81	37	n/a	n/a
CNN reporter, correspondent and news anchor person	2.42	33	n/a	n/a
NYT columnist	1.63	54	1,00	1
Administration officials	<u>2.47</u>	17	<u>2.42</u>	100
Members of Congress	2.04	23	1.94	49
Former government officials	<u>2.47</u>	15	<u>2.41</u>	27
Think tank scholars	<u>2.43</u>	14	2.25	28
Business community	<u>2.80</u>	15	<u>2.79</u>	29
Issue advocates, interest groups, and NGO	2.10	10	1.93	29
University faculty	<u>2.75</u>	20	<u>2.50</u>	10
Ordinary citizen having no apparent affiliation	2.08	52	2.20	5
Chinese dissident	2.33	6	1.86	22
Tibetan	2.00	1	<u>2.36</u>	22
Average of total	2.17	331	2.27	398*

* To be concise, the table leaves out several categories of authors due to inessential amount of either opinion authoring or being cited in the mass-mediated debate or both.

participated through authorship and citations to the mass-mediated policy debate on the U.S.-China relations, the top ten most prominent participants are:

- (1) Incumbent administration official (22.8%),
- (2) Ordinary U.S. citizen (16.3%),
- (3) Member of Congress (15.9%),
- (4) NYT columnist (14.6%),
- (5) Issue advocate, interest group, and NGO (12.4%),
- (6) NYT editorial board (11.8%),
- (7) CNN correspondent/anchor (11.1%),
- (8) Business community (10.5%),
- (9) Think tank scholar (10.3%),
- (10) Chinese dissident (9.8%).

By combining administration officials and members of Congress and labeling it as “government officials,” the top five policy-shapers are government officials (22.8%+15.9% = 38.7%), media people (CNN+NYT) (14.6%+11.8%+11.1% = 37.5%), issue advocates (interest groups + think tank scholars) (12.4%+10.3% = 22.7%), ordinary citizens (16.3%), and business community (10.5%) (See **Table 9**).

Nearly half ($98.9\% \div 200\% = 49.5\%$) of the media content with regard to the China policy debate is occupied by the big three – government officials (38.7%), media people (37.5%), and issue advocates (22.7%). Of the 60 Op/Ed items arguing for American prosperity, the business community (25%), CNN (17%), and administration officials (10%) are top three advocates (See **Table 10**). Of the 110 citations in support of American prosperity, the business community (26.4%), administration officials (17.3%), and members of Congress (13.6%) are the top three defenders (See **Table 11**).

Given the predominant presence of government officials in the mass-mediated

Table 9: Top five policy shapers based on opinion-authoring and citation

The top five policy shapers	Combination	Intensity of participation
Government	Administration official + members of congress	38.7%
Media	NYT columnist + NYT editorial board + CNN reporter	37.5%
Issue advocates	Issue advocates + Interest groups + NGO + think tank	22.7%
Citizens		16.3%
Business		10.5%
Total		125.7% (a)
<p>(a) <i>The result is a combination of opinion authorship and citation authorship. So, the true weight of participation of each individual group should be divided by 200%. For example, comparing to other social groups, the true weight of government's participation in the policy debate should be $38.7\% \div 200\% = 19.3\%$</i></p>		

Table 10. Crosstabulation of Op/Ed's Authorship vs. 4P foreign policy theories

<div> <div>Authorship</div> <div>Frame</div> </div>		Editorial board	Members of Congress	CNN reporter	Think tank scholars	NYT columnist	Pundit	Administration officials	Former gov't officials	University faculty	Public intellectuals	Business community	Issue advocates	Ordinary citizen	Chinese dissident	Total
Principle	Count	29	12	20	7	32	8	6	3	13	2	1	10	36	10	199
	% within 4P	15	6	10	4	16	4	3	2	7	1	1	5	18	5	100
	% within author	64	48	45	37	57	53	35	19	50	22	6	77	59	100	50
Power	Count	11	8	9	4	11	4	4	6	3	1	0	1	7	0	72
	% within 4P	15	11	13	6	15	6	6	8	4	1	0	1	10	0	100
	% within author	24	32	20	21	20	27	24	38	12	11	0	8	11	0	18
Prosperity	Count	3	4	10	1	5	1	6	3	1	5	15	0	3	0	60
	% within 4P	5	7	17	2	8	2	10	5	2	8	25	0	5	0	100
	% within author	7	16	23	5	9	7	35	19	4	56	88	0	5	0	15
Peace	Count	2	0	4	5	6	2	1	4	8	0	1	2	12	0	51
	% within 4P	4	0	8	10	12	4	2	8	16	0	2	4	24	0	100
	% within author	4	0	9	26	11	13	6	25	31	0	6	15	20	0	13
Total	Count	45	25	44	19	56	15	17	16	26	9	17	13	61	10	395*

* To be concise, this table leaves out 13 items adopting "other frames."

Table 11. Crosstabulation of citations' authorship vs. 4P foreign policy theories

4P frameworks Authorship of citations		Principle	Power	Prosperity	Peace	Total
Administration officials	Count	51	26	19	7	104
	Expected Count	53.0	20.0	20.4	9.5	104.0
	% within 4p frames	17.8%	24.1%	17.3%	13.7%	18.5%
Member of Congress	Count	23	15	15	0	54
	Expected Count	27.5	10.4	10.6	4.9	54.0
	% within 4p frames	8.0%	13.9%	13.6%	.0%	9.6%
Fmr govn't officials	Count	6	9	6	6	27
	Expected Count	13.8	5.2	5.3	2.5	27.0
	% within 4p frames	2.1%	8.3%	5.5%	11.8%	4.8%
Think tankers	Count	9	11	4	6	31
	Expected Count	15.8	6.0	6.1	2.8	31.0
	% within 4p frames	3.1%	10.2%	3.6%	11.8%	5.5%
Business community	Count	4	2	29	0	35
	Expected Count	17.8	6.7	6.9	3.2	35.0
	% within 4p frames	1.4%	1.9%	26.4%	.0%	6.2%
Issue advocates, NGO	Count	39	5	4	3	51
	Expected Count	26.0	9.8	10.0	4.6	51.0
	% within 4p frames	13.6%	4.6%	3.6%	5.9%	9.1%
Chinese dissident	Count	40	0	0	1	41
	Expected Count	20.9	7.9	8.0	3.7	41.0
	% within 4p frames	14.0%	.0%	.0%	2.0%	7.3%
Chinese govn't officials	Count	12	7	6	6	31
	Expected Count	15.8	6.0	6.1	2.8	31.0
	% within 4p frames	4.2%	6.5%	5.5%	11.8%	5.5%
Hong Kong people	Count	19	3	2	2	26
	Expected Count	13.3	5.0	5.1	2.4	26.0
	% within 4p frames	6.6%	2.8%	1.8%	3.9%	4.6%
Int'l officials	Count	11	13	3	4	31
	Expected Count	15.8	6.0	6.1	2.8	31.0
	% within 4p frames	3.8%	12.0%	2.7%	7.8%	5.5%
Chinese citizen	Count	30	4	10	7	52
	Expected Count	26.5	10.0	10.2	4.7	52.0
	% within 4p frames	10.5%	3.7%	9.1%	13.7%	9.3%
Total	Count	286	108	110	51	561*

* To be concise, this table leaves out 6 items adopting the "other frames."

debate on the U.S.-China policy and given that governmental officials are more supportive of the American prosperity agenda than other social groups (except for the business community and CNN people), it is understandable that the American prosperity agenda and the support for policy tradeoff can occupy certain time-space in the overall mass-mediated policy debate.

However, it is noticeable that among the 4P (power, principle, prosperity, and peace) policy frames, government officials (administration officials and members of Congress) give major support to the principle issue of the U.S.-China relations either by way of opinion authoring or by way of citations. There is no way to project that policy tradeoff has won the support of public opinion in terms of media discourse of which government official occupied a big chunk. Therefore, it is safe to say that policy tradeoff between U.S.-China trade and human rights has not won the support of public opinion.

To answer the third research question – Which foreign policy ideology – realism (power) vs. liberal internationalism (peace) and international political economy (prosperity) vs. principle (human rights) – is the most prominent one in media discourse with regard to U.S.-China policy and who is arguing for those perspectives? – the investigator finds that realism (power) (18.7%) narrowly prevails over liberal internationalism (peace) (11.9%) and that democratic idealism (principle) (45.4%) overwhelmingly prevails over international political economy (prosperity) (16.1%) (See **Figure 2**).

By crosstabulating authorship of the 395 opinion pieces with adoption of the 4P framework, the investigator finds that the ordinary U.S. citizens (18%), NYT columnists (16%), and the editorial board of the NYT (15%) are the first three categories of authors most likely to espouse democratic idealism (principle) theory to




Figure 2: Distribution of 4P foreign policy theories in the mass-mediated debate

do their analyses; NYT columnists (15%), the NYT editorial board (15%), and CNN reporters/correspondents/anchors (13%) are the first three categories of authors most likely to espouse realism (power) theory for their analyses; business community (25%), CNN reporters/correspondents/anchors (17%), and administration officials (10%) are the first three categories of authors more likely to espouse international political economy (prosperity) theory in their analyses; ordinary U.S. citizens (24%), university faculty (16%), and the NYT columnists (12%) are the first three categories of opinion-framers who are most eager to put the U.S.-China relations in the perspective of liberal internationalism (peace) (See **Table 10**).

In addition, the Chi-square test of the correlation between the authorship and the incorporation of a specific foreign policy theory into their analysis indicates a strong association between the two ($\Phi=.759$, $p<.05$) (See **Table 12**). To apply the result of the test, it is highly unlikely for the ordinary U.S. citizens to discuss the U.S.-China policy with an American prosperity perspective, and similarly, it is highly unlikely for the business community to discuss the U.S.-China policy with an American principle perspective.

The data indicate that, among 561 citations, the top ten most cited political actors are predominantly administration officials (President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright, Former Ambassador and American Enterprise Institute (AEI) scholar James Lilly) and members of Congress (Representatives from California: Republican Christopher Cox and Democrat Nancy Pelosi) (See **Table 13**).

By crosstabulating the 561 citations' authorship with the 4P framework, the investigator finds that administration officials (17.8%), Chinese dissidents (14%), and issue advocates (13.6%) are the top three most cited in the principle-oriented policy debate; administration officials (24.1%), members of Congress (13.9%), and

Table 12. Chi-Square test of the correlation between authorship and 4P frames

		Value	Df	Approx. Sig. (two sided)
Pearson Chi-Square		227.279(a)	88	.000
Likelihood Ratio		186.186	88	.000
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.759		.000
	Cramer's V	.379		.000
N of Valid Cases		395		
<i>a. 90 cells (78.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .03.</i>				

Table 13. Top ten most cited political actors in NYT/CNN

Name	Affiliation or association with	Cited
Bill Clinton	The President of the U.S.	28
Madeleine Albright	Former U.S. Representative to U.N. and lately Secretary of State	9
James Lilly	Former U.S. ambassador to China and lately AEI scholar	8
Wei Jingsheng	Veteran Chinese dissident	7
Robin Munro	The chief spokesman for "Human Rights Watch."	7
Christopher Cox	Representative (R-CA), author of "Cox Report" on China espionage	7
Chris Patten	The last Governor of Hong Kong	7
Nancy Pelosi	Representative (D-CA)	6
Charlene Barshefsky	US Trade Representative	6
Warren Christopher	Secretary of State during Clinton's first term	6

Table 14. Chi-Square test of the correlation between citation and 4P frames

		Value	Df	Approx. Sig. (two sided)
Pearson Chi-Square		269.111(a)	92	.000
Likelihood Ratio		251.504	92	.000
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.693		.000
	Cramer's V	.342		.000
N of Valid Cases			561	
<i>a. 83 cells (69.2%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.</i>				

international officials (12.0%) are the top three most cited for the power-related policy debate; business community (26.4%), administration officials (20.4%), and members of Congress (13.6%) are the top three most cited for defending American prosperity; Chinese citizens (13.7%), administration officials (13.7%), Chinese government officials (11.8%), former U.S. government officials (11.8%), and think-tank scholars (11.8%) are the most cited in arguing for peaceful coexistence of the U.S. and China (See **Table 11**). In addition, the Chi-Square test indicates a strong association between the authorship of the citation and a specific policy framework espoused in the mass-mediated debate ($\Phi = .693, p < .05$) (See **Table 14**).

Democratic idealism (principle) prevails over international political economy (prosperity); realism (power) prevails over liberal internationalism (peace) (See **Table 15** and **Table 16**). Democratic idealism is the most prominent foreign policy theory espoused by various opinion makers, especially by ordinary U.S. citizens, NYT columnists, and NYT editorial board (See **Table 15**). Administration officials, Chinese dissidents, and issue advocates are top three most cited in support of democratic idealism theory (See **Table 16**). As to realism theory, NYT columnists, NYT editorial board, and CNN reporters/anchors are top three opinion-makers supporting a realism (power) framework of the U.S.-China relations. Administration officials, members of Congress and international officials are the top three most cited in supporting power rivalry between the U.S. and China.

Overall, based on the number of opinion-framers arguing for a given foreign policy framework, the 4P framework could be prioritized as:

- 1) Principle (109)
- 2) Power (72)
- 3) Prosperity (60)

Table 15: Authorship of opinion vs. prioritization of the 4P framework

Policy framework Author of opinion	Principle	Power	Prosperity	Peace	Other frames	Total
Ordinary citizens	36	7	3	12	3	61
NYT columnist	32	11	5	6	2	56
Editorial board	29	11	3	2	0	45
CNN reporter/anchors	20	9	10	4	1	44
University faculty	13	3	1	8	1	26
Members of Congress	12	8	4	0	1	25
Think tank scholars	7	4	1	5	2	19
Business community	1	0	15	1	0	17
Administration officials	6	4	6	1	0	17
Former government officials	3	6	3	4	0	16
Pundit	8	4	1	2	0	15
Issue advocates, interest groups, and NGO	10	1	0	2	0	13
Chinese dissident	10	0	0	0	0	10
Public intellectuals	2	1	5	0	1	9
Total	199	72	60	51	13	395*

* To be concise, this table leaves out those political actors who have authored no more than 6 opinion articles.

Table 16. Authorship of citations vs. prioritization of the 4P framework

Policy frames Author of Citations	Principle	Power	Prosperity	Peace	Total
Administration officials	51	26	19	7	104
Members of Congress	23	15	15	0	54
Chinese citizen	30	4	10	7	52
Issue advocates, interest groups, and NGO	39	5	4	3	51
Chinese dissident	40	0	0	1	41
Business community	4	2	29	0	35
Think tank scholars	9	11	4	6	31
Chinese government officials	12	7	6	6	31
International officials	11	13	3	4	31
Former government officials	6	9	6	6	27
Hong Kong people	19	3	2	2	26
Hong Kong officials	10	0	2	4	16
Taiwan officials	3	4	0	2	10
University faculty	8	2	2	1	13
Pundits	5	3	1	0	9
Public intellectuals	2	3	3	0	8
Taiwan people	4	0	1	1	6
Ordinary citizens	1	1	2	1	5
Total	286	108	110	51	561*

* To be concise, this table leaves out those political actors who are seldom cited by the mass media.

4) Peace (51)

Based on number of citations, the 4P framework could be prioritized as:

1) Principle (286)

2) Prosperity (110)

3) Power (108)

4) Peace (51)

It is noteworthy that, in their opinion-framing, ordinary U.S. citizens prioritize the 4Ps as (See **Table 10**):

1) Principle (36)

2) Peace (12),

3) Power (7),

4) Prosperity (3)

Noticeably, the business community prioritized prosperity over principle as the top framework of the U.S.-China policy, both in opinion authoring and in citations (See **Table 10** and **Table 11**). Administration officials prioritized prosperity as the top framework of the U.S.-China policy in opinion authoring (See **Table 10**). However, based on citations, ordinary citizens, though the rarest cited (0.9% of the 561 citations), prioritized prosperity over principle (See **Table 11**).

Overall, democratic idealism (American principle) is the mainstream voice of media discourse as a representation of public opinion. Therefore, the public accountability of the policy tradeoff is in serious question.

2. Test of Hypotheses

To test the first hypothesis – Given the high relevance between newsmaking and policymaking, the foreign policy making community generally will support the policy

tradeoff between trade and human rights and have the most prominent presence in the media – the investigator finds that by combining the opinion authorship and citation authorship, administration officials (the chief foreign policy-makers) have the most conspicuous presence in the media. Also, as **Table 13** indicates, the President of the U.S., Secretary of State, and other officials in charge of Chinese affairs have the most conspicuous citations in the media. When members of Congress and think-tank scholars are incorporated into the foreign policy-making community, the foreign policy-making community has the most intensive input into media content ($[22.8\%+15.9\%+10.3\%] \div 200\% = 24.5\%$) (See **Table 3**). Nearly one quarter of media content is comprised of foreign policy-makers' perspectives. No other social groups can surpass the policy-maker community in saturating media. Even professional communicators in residence of NYT and CNN ($37.5\% \div 200\% = 18.75\%$) can not surpass policy makers in saturating the media with their perspectives and opinions (See **Table 9**).

Of the 561 citations, 67 citations deal with U.S.-China trade issue. Actually, those news/opinion items dealing with economic aspect of the U.S.-China relations, such as overall trade relations (109), trade irregularities (17), China's WTO entry (20), Chinese piracy (11), and Chinese prosperity (34), are the most citation-saturated (See **Table 17**). News/opinion articles dealing with political aspect of the U.S.-China relations (human rights violation and oppressive polity) are the second citation saturated (See **Table 17**). Of the 1,312 items to be content analyzed, 269 items deal with political issues of the U.S.-China relations, and 191 items deal with economy/business issue of the U.S.-China relations. The issue distribution and citation saturation – the amount of citations in all the articles dealing with a given issue – indicate that economic/trade issues have significant influence on the overall policy debate on the U.S.-China relations. For example, U.S.-China trade relations are the fourth most intensively covered issue

Table 17: Distribution of issue among all the news/opinion articles

Issues	Distribution	Frequ -ency	Valid percent	Saturation of citation in regard to the issue
Trade imbalance, strife, and irregularities		17	1.3	11/17=.64
Chinese piracy		11	.8	7/11=.63
U.S.-China trade relations		109	8.3	67/109=.61
Overall U.S.-China relations		74	5.6	41/74=.55
Hong Kong / Marco handover		88	6.7	47/88=.53
Human rights violation in China		123	9.4	64/123=.52
U.S.-Taiwan weapon deal		6	.5	3/6=.50
Chinese military threat		29	2.2	14/29=.48
U.S.-China diplomatic activities		111	8.5	53/111=.47
Taiwan independence		76	5.8	36/76=.47
U.S.-China military strife and confrontation		55	4.2	24/55=.44
China's Olympic bidding		7	.5	3/7=.43
Incompetence of Chinese bureaucracy		14	1.1	6/14=.42
Oppressive polity in China		146	11.1	60/146=.42
Chinese espionage		54	4.1	22/54=.41
Chinese prosperity and development		34	2.6	13/34=.38
China's environmental problem		21	1.6	8/21=.38
Animal rights abuse		8	.6	3/8=.375
Tibet separation		41	3.1	14/41=.34
Arbitrary family planning		6	.5	2/6=.33
Chinese donation to Democratic campaign		31	2.4	9/31=.29
Chinese nuclear proliferation		25	1.9	7/25=.28
Chinese leaders		26	2.0	7/26=.27
Corruption and crime in China		16	1.2	4/16=.25
China's foreign affairs with other countries		83	6.3	20/83=.24
AIDS and other disease in China		9	.7	2/9=.22
Chinese WTO (GATT) entry		20	1.5	8/20=.4
Other		41	3.1	0/41=0
Natural disaster, accident, and crash		29	2.2	0/29=0
American propaganda toward China		2	.2	0/2=0
Total		1312	100.0	561/1312=.43

among the China reporting; in the meantime, new reports of U.S.-China trade relations are the third most citation-saturated among the China reporting. While China's human rights and oppressive polity are most intensively covered, the reporting dealing with those issues are less citation-saturated than reporting dealing with trade issues. Given that policy-making community is the most heavily cited, it is reasonable to project that policy-making community confer more authority to economic/trade issue than to political issue.

Actually, of those 67 citations dealing with U.S.-China trade issue, administration officials (20), members of Congress (17), and the business community (11) are the top three sources of citation ($48/67=.71$). Of those 124 citations dealing with human rights and oppressive polity in China, administration officials ($8+6=14$), members of Congress ($4+1=5$), and the business community ($0+0=0$) have a rather light concentration ($19/124=.15$) (See **Table 18**). Apparently, based on the distribution of citations among various social groups, the chief foreign policy-makers (administration officials and members of Congress) are likely to stand by trade issue and are more likely to highlight trade issues than human rights issues.

Of the 395 opinion items, 80 deal with issues of principle, such as human rights violation and oppressive polity in China, and most of those 80 articles are authored by ordinary citizens (15), NYT editorial board (15), NYT columnists (14), and Chinese dissidents (8). Of those 42 items dealing with U.S.-China trade relations, the top four opinion makers are ordinary citizens (8), the business community (7), members of Congress (6), and administration officials (5) (See **Table 19**). Again, the policy-making community is the major supporter of the U.S.-China trade relations in the mass-mediated policy debate.

Based on surveying the distribution of authorship/citation across 30 issues of the

Table 18: Crosstabulation of issue vs. citations' authorship

Issues Authorship of Citation	U.S.-China relations	Human rights	Oppressive polity	Incompetence	U.S.-China diplomacy	U.S.-China trade	Trade irregularities	Chinese piracy	Chinese WTO entry	Chinese prosperity	Chinese military threat	Nuclear proliferation	Chinese espionage	Campaign donation	military strife	Taiwan independence	Tibet separation	Hong Kong handover	China's foreign affairs	Environmental problem	Chinese leaders	other	Total
Administration	15	8	6	0	16	20	2	5	2	0	5	1	3	0	7	5	4	1	2	0	2	0	104
Congress	4	4	1	0	8	17	3	0	1	0	3	0	6	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	54
Chinese citizen	4	5	15	0	4	1	0	1	1	6	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	1	4	52
Issue advocates	1	15	9	1	3	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	5	5	1	1	0	0	0	51
Chinese dissident	0	24	12	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	41
Business community	2	0	0	1	5	11	4	1	2	2	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	35
Think tank scholars	4	1	4	0	3	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	2	4	0	0	2	1	0	1	31
Chinese gov'n't	0	0	2	3	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	1	3	1	1	1	0	3	3	2	1	0	31
Int'l officials	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	2	0	0	1	3	0	6	9	0	0	0	31
Ex-gov'n't officials	8	0	2	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	5	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	27
Hong Kong people	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	20	1	1	0	0	26
Hong Kong officials	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	1	0	0	16
Faculty	0	1	2	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	13
Taiwan officials	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Total	41	64	60	6	53	67	11	7	8	13	14	7	22	9	24	36	14	47	20	8	7	6	561*

* To be concise, some issues are deleted due to low coverage (less than five articles); some political actors are deleted due to low citation (less than 10).

Table 19: Crosstabulation of issue vs. Op/Ed's authorship

Issues Authorship of opinion	Oppressive polity	Overall relations	U.S.-China trade	U.S.-China diplomacy	Taiwan independence	Human rights	Chinese espionage	Hong Kong handover	Military strife	Campaign donation	Chinese prosperity	Military threat	Chinese leaders	Tibet separation	Other	Chinese WTO entry	China's foreign affairs	Total
Ordinary citizen	12	5	8	4	7	3	1	1	1	3	2	2	0	4	1	1	2	61
NYT columnist	10	15	4	1	4	4	4	1	1	1	1	2	0	3	1	1	1	56
Editorial board	7	3	3	6	1	8	4	2	2	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	45
CNN reporter	2	4	4	7	1	0	2	6	4	2	4	1	3	0	0	2	1	44
University faculty	5	3	1	1	4	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	3	0	3	0	0	26
Members of Congress	1	2	6	6	0	0	3	0	1	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	25
Think tank scholars	4	2	1	1	5	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	19
Business community	0	2	7	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	17
Administration officials	0	1	5	1	1	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	17
Fmr gov'n't officials	0	4	1	1	1	0	3	0	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	16
Pundit	3	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	15
Issue advocates	5	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13
Chinese dissident	2	0	0	2	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Total	53	42	42	38	32	27	21	20	19	16	11	10	10	9	8	7	7	395*

* To be concise, some issues and political actors are left out due to small case numbers

U.S.-China relations, the investigator finds foreign policy-makers (administration officials, members of Congress, and think-tank scholars) are more likely to be associated with trade issues with regard to U.S.-China policy. Chi-Square test also shows that this kind of association is statistically significant (Chi-Square: authorship of opinion = 418.268, $p < .05$; Chi-Square: authorship of citations = 593.610, $p < .05$) (See **Table 20**). Therefore, the first hypothesis, that the foreign policy-makers have the most salient presence in the mass-mediated debate and are major supporters of the tradeoff between human rights and trade, is supported. That is to say, foreign policy-makers spoke in the mass media exactly for what they have practiced in the real world. Overall, there is no significant discrepancy between government officials' news-making and policy-making. **Table 15** also reaffirmed the hypothesis by showing that chief foreign policy makers (administration officials), by authoring opinion piece in national media, prioritize the 4P frameworks as:

- 1) Principle (6)
- 2) Prosperity (6)
- 3) Power (4)
- 4) Peace (1)

This ranking indicates that foreign policy-makers apparently are caught up in a tough choice: American principle or American prosperity?

To test the second hypothesis – There is significant discrepancy between government official and ordinary citizens in regard to media visibility and policy orientation. The investigator, by crosstabulating authorship/citation with (1) importance of human rights, (2) importance of trade, and (3) containment/ congagement/engagement, finds that: (1) in both opinion making and citations, ordinary citizens (2.51/2.67) give a slightly higher score to the importance of human rights (mean score = 2.57

Table 20: Chi-Square test of opinion author/citation and issue coverage

	Authorship of opinion	Issue covered		Authorship of citations	Issue covered
Chi-Square(a,b)	418.268	1041.079	Chi-Square(c,d)	593.610	1041.079
Df	22	29	df	23	29
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000	Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000
<p>a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 17.2.</p> <p>b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 43.7.</p> <p>c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 43.7.</p> <p>d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 23.4.</p>					

(opinion) /2.60 (citations), with 1 = marginal, 2 = important, 3 = crucial) than administration officials (2.33/2.65) (See **Table 21**). (2) In both opinion framing and citations, administration officials (2.80/2.72) designate a higher score to the importance of trade (mean score = 2.17 (opinion) / 2.48 (citations), with 1 = marginal, 2 = important, 3 = crucial) than the ordinary U.S. citizens (1.60/2.65). (3) In both opinion-making and citations, ordinary citizens (2.08/2.20) advocate a “disciplined engagement” with China, while administration officials (2.47/2.42) lean more to “engagement” policy (mean score = 2.17/2.27, with 1 = containment, 2 = conengagement, 3 = engagement). (4) Chi-Square test (See **Table 22**) indicate a high degree of correlation between authorship of citation/opinion and the importance level designated to human rights (Chi-Square = 342.000, $p < .05$), trade (Chi-Square = 75.874, $p < .05$). (5) Chi-Square test indicates a high degree of association between authorship of citation/opinion and adoption of a specific China policy stance: containment, conengagement, or engagement (Chi-Square = 89.928, $p < .05$).

In summary, significant differences exist between administration officials and ordinary U.S. citizens in regard to the importance level of human rights, the importance level of the U.S.-China trade, and the advocate of a specific policy stance – containment, or conengagement, or engagement. In addition this difference is statistically significant because of the high degree of association between authorship and policy stance. Therefore, the second hypothesis – There is significant discrepancy between administration officials and ordinary U.S. citizens in terms of media visibility and policy stance – is supported. That is to say, the tradeoff of the U.S.-China policy between human rights and trade is not accountable to the ordinary citizens’ will expressed in the mass-mediated debate.

Indeed, according to some typical opinion polls, the U.S. public largely holds a

Table 21: Policy stance (human rights, trade, contain-engage) across groups

Policy proposal in Authorship	Opinion-framing			Citations		
	importance of human rights	importance of trade	Contain /congage/ engage	importance of human rights	importance of trade	Contain/co ngage/eng age
Transcript	2.80	3.00	2.83	3.00	n/a	n/a
Editorial board	2.88	1.96	1.81	3.00	n/a	n/a
CNN reporter	2.53	2.55	2.42	n/a	n/a	n/a
NYT columnist	2.75	1.61	1.63	3.00	2.00	1.00
Pundit	2.50	2.67	2.10	3.00	3.00	2.14
Administration officials	2.33	2.80	2.47	2.65	2.72	2.42
Members of Congress	2.76	2.05	2.04	2.74	2.13	1.94
Fmr. Govn't officials	2.14	2.60	2.47	2.23	2.38	2.41
University faculty	2.38	2.86	2.75	2.56	3.00	2.50
Public intellectuals	2.00	3.00	2.43	2.50	3.00	2.20
Think tank scholars	2.40	2.33	2.43	2.47	2.33	2.25
Business community	1.67	2.88	2.80	2.06	2.79	2.79
Issue advocates	2.87	n/a	2.10	2.85	1.56	1.93
Public figures	n/a	n/a	n/a	3.00	n/a	2.00
Ordinary citizen	2.51	1.60	2.08	2.67	2.50	2.20
Chinese dissident	2.70	2.33	2.33	2.83	1.78	1.86
Chinese govn't officials	n/a	3.00	3.00	1.75	2.56	2.69
Hong Kong officials	2.67	3.00	2.00	2.83	2.50	2.20
Hong Kong people	n/a	3.00	3.00	2.55	2.80	1.92
Taiwan officials	3.00	2.00	1.67	2.75	n/a	1.50
Taiwan people	n/a	n/a	n/a	2.80	3.00	2.20
Int'l officials	2.33	n/a	2.50	2.50	2.88	2.36
Tibetan	3.00	n/a	2.00	2.50	n/a	n/a
Chinese citizen	2.00	n/a	3.00	2.39	2.56	2.53
Others	2.00	n/a	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00
Total	2.57	2.17	2.17	2.60	2.48	2.27

Table 22: Chi-Square test of association between authorship and policy stance

	Citation				Opinion-framing			
	Authorship of Citation	Importance of human rights	Importance of trade	Contain/ Congage/ engage	Authorship of opinion	Importance of human rights	Importance of trade	Contain/ congage/ engage
Chi-Square	593.61	342.000 (a,b)	75.874 (c,d)	89.928 (e,f)	418.268	342.000 (g,h)	75.874 (i, j)	89.928 (k,l)
Df	23	2	2	2	22	2	2	2
Asymp. Sig.	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
<p>a 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 23.4.</p> <p>b 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 243.0.</p> <p>c 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 23.4.</p> <p>d 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 143.0.</p> <p>e 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 23.4.</p> <p>f 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 250.0.</p> <p>g 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 17.2.</p> <p>h 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 243.0.</p> <p>i 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 17.2.</p> <p>j 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 143.0.</p> <p>k 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 17.2.</p> <p>l 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 250.0.</p>								

different point of view in regard to the policy tradeoff from the policy-makers:

- (1) CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted in September 1995 and May 1996 showed that, when being asked whether the U.S. should maintain good trade relations with China, despite disagreements the U.S. might have with the Chinese government's human rights policies, or whether the U.S. should demand that China improve its human rights policies if it wants to continue to enjoy current trade status with the U.S., sixty percent of the respondents in both polls insisted that the U.S. demand improvement in human right as condition for good U.S.-China trade relations; only 30-33% of the respondents in both polls thinks that the U.S. can maintain good relations with China despite disagreements in human rights policies.²⁹
- (2) CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted in July-November 2005 indicates that the U.S. public largely maintains the aforementioned policy stance even in the post-9/11 years when China was deemed a valuable ally of the U.S. in its war against terrorism. When being asked the same question aforementioned, fifty-three percent of the respondents insisted that the U.S. demand improvements in human rights as a condition for good U.S.-China trade relations.³⁰
- (3) Another three opinion polls conducted by CNN/Time in May 1996, February 1997, and May 1999 showed that, when being asked whether the U.S. should take a strong stand on human rights even if this might jeopardize its diplomatic and trade relations with China, or should the U.S. establish strong diplomatic and trade relations with China, even if

²⁹ Available at www.pollingreport.com/china.htm

³⁰ Ibid.

that requires overlooking some of China's human rights violations, fifty-four to fifty-seven percent of the respondents in the three polls think that the U.S. should take a strong stand on human rights even if this might jeopardize U.S.-China trade relations; only 28-32% of the respondents in the three polls agrees that the U.S. can overlook human rights violations while keeping a strong economic ties with China³¹.

- (4) In March 1999, Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll shows that, when being asked whether the Clinton administration, in maintaining a constructive working relationship with China "has acted appropriately or gone too far" in trying to maintain this kind of relationship with China, forty-seven percent of the respondents answered "gone too far" while 46% of the respondents answered "acted appropriately."³²
- (5) In January 1999, an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll showed that, when being asked whether the U.S. government, in an effort to stop Chinese government's crackdown on political debate and its detaining dissidents and human rights advocates, can be more effective with China by using quiet diplomacy or by taking public actions such as cutting back on economic ties, forty-two percent of the respondents answered "taking public actions" while 41% of the respondents answered "using quiet diplomacy."³³

To summarize those opinion polls, the majority, if not overwhelmingly, of the U.S. public, while acknowledging the importance of U.S.-China trade relations and the wisdom of reconciliation, decried the moral ambiguity of the policy tradeoff. Tien and Nathan (2001) note that, depending on the wording of poll questions – from

³¹ Available at: www.pollingreport.com/china.htm

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

juxtaposing human rights issue with economic benefits of the U.S.-China trade to juxtaposing human rights with overall U.S.-China relations – the U.S. public showed an increased support to principle issue. Overall, by summarizing all the opinion polls during 1997-1999, they observed that “between 39 and 67 percent of respondents believe that human rights issues should receive priority when the U.S. makes foreign policy toward China” (p. 129).

To test the third hypothesis – The viewpoints of the professional communicators and media pundits are congruent with the viewpoints of government officials – the investigator finds that given the high degree of association between authorship and policy stance established during testing the second hypothesis, it is highly unlikely that professional communicators and government officials hold the same viewpoints.

Also, **Table 21** shows a significant gap between NYT columnist/editorial board and administration officials in regard to human rights, trade, and overall policy stance. To be specific, in opinion-making, the NYT editorial board (2.88) and NYT columnist (2.75) give a high score to the importance of human rights, while government officials (2.33) scored below the average (2.57). As to the importance of U.S.-China trade, NYT editorial board (1.96) and NYT columnist (1.61) give a low score, while administration officials (2.80) scored far above the average (2.17). When it comes to the overall policy stance toward China, the average score is 2.17, roughly representing “guarded engagement,” or “disciplined engagement.” Administration officials scored 2.47, leaning optimistically to “engagement,” while NYT editorial board scored 1.81, and NYT columnists scored 1.63, roughly representing “guarded containment,” or “restrained engagement.” CNN news people and media pundits are very different from NYT news people in all those three categories, falling in the midway between administration officials’ optimistic viewpoint and NYT news people’s pessimistic

viewpoint in regard to the U.S.-China relations.

Therefore, the third hypothesis is rejected. That is to say, when a high degree of relevance exists between newsmaking and policy-making, the news people's news-making can still be independent from administration officials' news-making. Media people, especially the NYT, do not simply index the government's viewpoints.

3. Major Findings

In summary, the quantitative study finds that:

(1) Among various social groups, policy makers, especially government officials, have the highest saturation of the mass media content.

(2) Professional communicators roughly represented the average policy orientation of the public.

(3) A significant correlation exists between a given social group and a given policy stance.

(4) Government officials, although giving major attention to principle issues, are more likely to stand by American prosperity and to ally with business group in support of the U.S.-China trade relations.

(5) Ordinary citizens are among the staunchest supporter groups arguing for “disciplined engagement” and principled relationship with non-democratic countries.

(6) The policy tradeoff between human rights and trade cannot claim the support of public opinion represented by major mass media discourse, and thus, cannot pass the test of public accountability.

Chapter 7. Conclusion and Policy Critique

Based on the results enumerated in Chapter 6, it is reasonable to conclude that the paradigmatic shift of U.S.-China policy – from indignation to engagement and from democratic idealism to the international political economy – cannot claim to have the support of public opinion in general. To be specific, a significant discrepancy exists among various social groups, especially between the foreign policy-making community and ordinary U.S. citizens and among professional communicators, policy-makers, and policy-shapers, with regard to the policy tradeoff between human rights and U.S.-China trade relations. On the other hand, some degree of agreement exists between administration officials and the business community with regard to the policy tradeoff.

Beginning in 1994, the policy tradeoff between human rights and U.S.-China trade broke through the overwhelming concern about and protest against human rights violations in China. How could a public policy without the mandate of public opinion be executed for years in the face of the ever-increasing consolidation of authoritarian rule in China? What does it mean to media democracy in the U.S.? In this chapter, the investigator tries to put the results into the Communitarian perspective - the “co-operative inquiry” and “empowerment in the democratic decision-making process” – to conduct a policy critique. To be specific, the policy critique breaks down to three parts: (1) the Communitarian critique of the public opinion-public policy process with regard to U.S.-China relations; (2) a case study of the public relations-public policy process: Corporate America’s issue management of U.S.-China relations; (3) contextualizing globalization to examine its true nature: an enlargement of capitalism rather than a spreading of democratic peace.

1. Public Accountability of the Policy Making Process

As the results suggest, among various social groups, policy makers, especially

government officials, have the highest saturation of mass media content; the news/opinion articles dealing with economic aspect of the U.S.-China relations have the highest concentration of citations. The disproportionately intensive citation of policy makers in news stories, and with it, their dual support of both principle and prosperity, may confer legitimacy of national interest to the policy tradeoff. It is unreasonable to require the news media, which have a symbiotic relationship with the government apparatus, to give equal authority to both the governor and the governed. Most ordinary citizens lack the authoritative resources to attract journalists. Therefore, the media democracy in the United States may have some inherent inadequacy to represent the will of the public whenever a significant difference of viewpoints exists between the government and ordinary citizens.

As the literature review in Chapter 4 indicates, although the policy-making community thinks that mass media content is typical representation of public opinion, and although normative theory of media democracy acknowledges that mass media content and public opinion are largely conflated, it is dangerous to jump to the conclusion that a given public policy can claim to have public accountability whenever it is in congruence with media content, especially when the mass media content is short of civic participation in terms of opinion authoring, issue raising, and citation supplying. As to the mass-mediated debate on China policy, the significant lack in the citation of ordinary citizens and the disproportionately intensive citation of the policy-making community might have rendered a biased media discourse and a watered-down concern with the principle issue vis-à-vis the prosperity issue.

As to the mass-mediated debate on U.S.-China relations, the battle of ideas is significantly influenced by the intensive barrage of the policy-making community, namely, administration officials, members of Congress, and think tanks. The result is

that the prosperity agenda won some legitimacy in the public forum, and consequently, foreshadowed the policy tradeoff. On the other hand, ordinary U.S. citizens insist on holding a non-democratic government accountable to the universal value of human rights and democratic ideals. They are more likely than other social groups to propose “disciplined engagement” with a non-democratic government than other social groups. They are less likely to buy into a policy that bends principle for maintaining American competitiveness and profitability. The fact that ordinary citizens are more likely to show a clear moral compass than government officials when it comes to policy tradeoff between issues of principle and issues of bread and butter may vindicate the urgency to implement Communitarian program – empowerment of citizens in the democratic decision-making process.

Based on Communitarian theory of the press, reporting of public affairs should be driven by community norms, not by markets or mechanical efficiency which means the good relationship with the advertisers and easy access to the authoritative sources; the media should be a network of vernacular discussion – journalism of conversation, not primarily as a vehicle of expert transmission (Carey, 1987, p. 14). The result of the policy debate may have been significantly changed, and hence, the actual exercising of the policy tradeoff may have been slowed down if ordinary citizens were given more media time to voice their judgment. “Markets or instrumental wizardry often impose criteria that an ethics of community would not condone” (Christians et al, 1993, p. 87). Public affairs reporting depleted of the public’s judgment makes no sense and results in the demise of journalism. The lack of civic participation in the policy debate and the neglect of the public’s judgment in public affairs reporting may contribute to the capability of a dubious policy framework staying afloat in the public forum.

As this quantitative research indicates, government officials are the major

participants in the mass-mediated debate on U.S.-China relations, and the overall climate of opinion has been significantly altered to the advantage of policymakers. As a result, public accountability of the policy-making process has been discounted because public opinion itself, represented by media discourse, is significantly colonized by the policy-makers through their opinion authoring, information/quotation supplying, and news-making.

The Communitarian theory of the press requires that the mass media be an avenue of liberal education by which free citizens perform co-operative enquiry. Mass media have a sacred task “to create wise citizens of free community,” and, through combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness, “to enable men to give to human life that splendor which some few have shown that it can achieve” (Russell, 1938, p. 305). Mass media should be a research infrastructure and dialogic platform by which citizens cultivate reciprocal relationship in their self-education, their discovering truth, their deliberating moral value, and their determining common good. The community, by way of internal democracy and consensus building, should be arbiter of value and accountability. On the other hand, to overcome community-based relativism and community-based particularism or provincialism, Communitarianism requires that co-operative citizens embrace the basic societal values and incorporate cross-societal and cross-cultural moral dialogue into their seeking of common good. By involving the diverse and broad communities into the cooperative inquiry and open discussion, Communitarian press could be a societal institution through which citizens “do not spend time and passion defending unjust privileges of their class or nation, but they aim at making the world as a whole happier, less cruel, less full of conflict between rival greeds” (Russell, 1919, p. 187).

That mass-mediated policy debate is disproportionately dominated by professional

communicators, especially the in-residence writers and columnists, indicates a shortcut for cooperative inquiry. Although professional communicators are more in congruence with the average attitude of all the social groups than any other individual social group when it comes to the U.S.-China policy, their deliberation cannot be substitute for citizen's cooperative inquiry. The most effective and the most solid way to consolidate public accountability of public policy is to have more ordinary citizens contributing to the mass-mediated policy debate rather than pitting one elite group against another elite group. Ordinary citizens, having had the most potential to transcend their personal interests when contributing to the public forum, are more likely to frame a rational and morally sound verdict with regard to policy tradeoffs.

According to the content analysis, authorship of opinion pieces and media citation matter a lot to the results of "the battle of ideas." The data indicate a rather high degree of correlation between authorship and policy stance, analytical frameworks (theory articulation), issue coverage (fact collection), and balance of emphasis on specific choices, among others. Therefore, to change the climate of public opinion represented by mass media content, all the relevant social groups should strive to strengthen their presence in the national media lest one group's voice is marginalized to the advantage of other group. Especially the public, who has the greatest potential to address the state while leaving individual interests behind, should be the major conversationalists of the mass-mediated open discussion. Mass media should be the gatekeeper of the public sphere. The professional autonomy of journalists cannot guarantee media democracy. Media democracy is realized only when democratic media "let the people talk to each other rather than just listen to experts" (Nerone, 1995, p. 100). The real accountability of the mass media, and with the accountability of the opinion-policy process, lies in that the mass media find their mission in activating the polis, nurturing the civic

transformation, facilitating a thorough understanding of public life, and bring the public back into existence (Christians, et al, 1993, p. 87).

Based on this quantitative research, government officials, although giving sufficient attention to the principle issues, are more likely to stand by American prosperity and to ally with business groups in support of the U.S.-China trade relations. Putting this finding into Streeter's (1996) perspective with regard to America's corporate liberalism, it becomes more urgent to practice Communitarian's political program – empowerment of citizens in the democratic decision-making process.

According to Streeter (1996), beginning in the 1880s, corporate liberalism was introduced into American socio-economic system. Corporate liberalism is an upgraded version of traditional liberalism. Corporate liberalists demand that state bureaucracy and government intervention be incorporated into corporate management to save capitalistic production from cutthroat atomistic individualism and from self-destructive laissez faire competition. The reason corporate liberalists don't refuse institutional intervention and administrative control of individual endeavor lies in a new way of thinking with regard to freedom and individualism: To corporate liberalism, freedom means to be a good piston of an engine working tunefully with other parts of the machine; public interest means the smooth operation of capitalistic production and a collective security of corporate community (Streeter, 1996). Along this train of thinking, the public interest is reified in the form of big government whose intervention can preempt chaos, economic cycle, and some radical alternatives. For example, government intervention has been introduced by corporate broadcasters to marginalize amateur broadcasters, to commoditize the public spectrum, to facilitate private broadcasters' speculation on the public spectrum, and to legitimize monopolistic control of the public spectrum in the end (Streeter, 1996).

As a result, corporate liberalism may expatriate the real public, the god term of democracy, from democratic decision-making process and form a government-corporate rapport to ensure the collective security of the corporate community. Actually, in the last century, corporate liberalism, either in the form of “regulation,” or “deregulation,” or “re-regulation,” represented an inherent conflict between capitalism and democracy because corporate liberalism is an effort to keep the public outside the beltway of policymakers. While corporate America has a huge stake in the well-being of U.S.-China relations, it is no wonder that the U.S. government’s policymaking and newsmaking with regard to the U.S.-China relations could be stretched to the point that actually there are no presidents seriously enforcing the human rights standard in dealing with Chinese Communist government. The high association of government and the corporate community in the making of China policy not only damages the integrity of the democratic decision-making process, but also possibly damages the public’s interest by outsourcing American jobs and by corrupting Chinese civil servants.

Therefore, Communitarian’s empowerment agenda is highly valuable in that civic participation in the deliberation of public policy can help to build a wall between government and business to restore the public to the beltway of policymaking, especially when it comes to the making of important foreign policy.

Based on reviewing the zigzag of the Clinton administration’s China policy in the 1990s, the investigator concludes that the average policy stance expressed by the national media – 2.17 for opinion-framing and 2.27 for citations (1=containment, 2=conengagement, 3=engagement) – may have had some impact on the implementation of the engagement policy (value = 3). That the media discourse has argued strongly for “guarded engagement” or “disciplined engagement” may have encouraged the serious investigation of Chinese Communist Party’s political donations and the serious

reexamination of the dubious “strategic partnership” between the U.S. and China in the late 1990s. Unfortunately, some of the reexaminations were initiated through concerns about “balance of power” between the U.S. and China rather than through concerns about placing democratic peace in jeopardy when strengthening a strong Chinese economy coupled with oppressive polity.

In summary, the results could relate to Communitarian theory of the press in that the sound judgment of public policy really necessitates the deepening of public participation in the policy debate and the expansion of the public sphere, in this case, the mass-mediated debate, to counterbalance the predominance of establishment voice. Given that university faculty and policy research institutes have significant influence on the result of policy debate, Communitarian politics should take education as one important battleground of their empowerment agenda. To be specific, universities and policy research institutes should be more associated with inclusive communities rather than affiliating with the dominant classes such as big government and big business. Scholars’ knowledge-claim should have more give and take with communities and ordinary citizens. The academic and research community should restore its civic foundation by which it means the merging into each other of the intellectual life and the public life, the centrality of city (urban) and civic culture in producing accomplishment in art, science, and literature, and the prosperity of democratic culture through intellectual’s rebuilding of the “we” relationship with the U.S. public (Bender, 1993, p.144).

In spite of the strong skepticism expressed by the mass media toward the policy tradeoff, the delinkage of trade from China’s human rights, the “strategic partnership” between the U.S. and China, and the faith in the political benefit of economic liberalization in China becomes actual policy framework during the Clinton

administration. How could a public policy – the policy tradeoff – lacking in public accountability waltz through a country which elected a president in 1992 to stop moral equivocation of which President Nixon, President Carter, President Reagan, and President Bush each has been accused by their successor? To understand the conspicuous discrepancy between public opinion represented by the mass media and the actual policy, it is necessary to look into one important source of public opinion, the interest groups; in this case, it is the corporate America's China lobbying.

2. Corporate America's Issue Management of U.S.-China Relations

The building of new consensus of U.S.-China relations in the post-Tiananmen times is a paradigmatic change of U.S. foreign policy tradeoff from “power vis-à-vis principle” to “prosperity vis-à-vis principle.” Besides the mass-mediated battle of ideas, various social institutions' lobbying, public relations, and grass-root campaigns are other forms of mass persuasion that aim at consensus rebuilding. In the case of U.S.-China policy in the post-Cold War years, it is worthwhile to investigate corporate America's issue management of the policy tradeoff because corporate America is one of the major stakeholders of the policy tradeoff between human rights and the U.S.-China trade relations. The other stakeholder is the CCP government. In engineering the policy tradeoff, corporate America and the CCP are co-workers.

Issue management is strategic planning of public relations to engineer building of political consensus. Coates et al (1986) define issue management as “the orchestrating of a positive plan for dealing with issues, rather than merely reacting to them” (p. 15); “It can make an organization an active participant in shaping its future, rather than a reactive victim of inadequately considered legislative and regulatory responses to problems” (Coates et al, 1986, p. 15). In the long term, both corporations and government institutions tend to employ issue management programs – a creative fusion

of journalism, advertising, and public relations – to “predict problems,” “anticipate threats,” “minimize surprise,” “resolve issues,” and “prevent crises” (Wilcox et al, 2001, p.136). Miller (1999) notes issue management constitutes a link between organization reality and public perception, a lack of which results in failure of an organization “to effectively address the concerns of the public on whose support the success of the organization depends” (p.10).

Harrison (1984) notes that the corporate community “has the moral and legal right to participate in the formation of public policy and not submit to and commit suicide before the whims and pressures of bureaucrats and activists” (p. 9). Issue management assists corporations and institutions to anticipate emerging issues, define or frame the issues in their own terms, and respond to them before they get out of hand. It is proactive because it tries to identify issues and influence decisions before they have a detrimental effect on an organization (Gaunt and Ollenburger, 1995, p.199). Through issue management, large corporations, which are increasingly becoming social and political institutions as well as economic institutions, could influence the framing of issues, sway interested publics’ viewpoints, and achieve more effective participation in the shaping of public policy (Jones, 1980, p. 27).

The end of the Cold War altered the environment of the making of U.S. foreign policy. Gates and Skidmore (1997) note that “[A]bsent a single, unifying external threat, the foreign policy agenda becomes more diffuse, domestic cleavages intensify and proliferate, and deference to the executive branch recedes” (p. 514). As a result, a more pluralistic policymaking environment may weaken presidential authority in favor of Congress and contending societal groups. Particularly, the policymaking environment is more accessible and answerable to various organizations’ issue management of a given policy issue.

Both corporate America and the CCP government employed issue management to secure non-judgmental U.S.-China relations in the tumultuous post-Cold War world. The American China lobbying has been an outreach of CCP's issue management of U.S.-China relations. The CCP government has artfully motivated and orchestrated, though quietly, corporate America's issue management of U.S.-China relations.

Knowing that "people who trade do not fight," the CCP government utilized the economic interdependence between the U.S. and China to weather the tumultuous U.S.-China relations, and thus, maintained a booming economy to justify its political legitimacy (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 106; Friedman, 2001). Throughout the 1990s, the CCP government tried very hard to practice Deng Xiaoping's instruction on Sino-U.S. diplomacy: "seeking cooperation and avoiding confrontation." In the meantime, corporate America has done a good job of representing unofficially the CCP government in Washington (Dreyfuss, 1997). Several giant U.S. corporations which do business in China have their own in-house or retained public relations consultants who help the CCP on a case-by-case basis (Crowell & Hsieh, 2000).

In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. Congress has shown an assertive posture in China policy-making (Tan, 1992, p. xii) and thus constituted a recurrent irritant for China's desire to make secret deals with the executive branch of the U.S. government (Lim, 1996). To cope with the new environment of China policy-making in the U.S., the CCP formed in 1995 a "Central Committee Task Force on the U.S. Congress" with Jiang Zemin as its head. At least a dozen U.S. senators and representatives of both parties were invited to visit China in 1996 with all expenses paid by the CCP government and were treated like heads of state (Fritz, 1997c). In the beginning of 1997 when U.S.-China relations began to warm up, the CCP government fêted the U.S. press and advised U.S. journalists to "write something positive about China" so that their request

for access to news could be approved more quickly. Chinese officials asked the U.S. journalists in Beijing to “seize the opportunity” and “take an active part” to improve China’s press clippings in the U.S. now that President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin have agreed to play host to each other with state visits in 1997 and 1998 (Tyler, 1997, p. 9).

As an unpopular dictatorship in the post-Tiananmen era, CCP leaders are wistful of U.S. endorsement. The red-carpet reception in the South Lawn, the 21-gun salute, and the summit meeting in the White House are all what Jiang Zemin has long coveted to consolidate his authority. Many American friends of the CCP government lobbied hard to work out Jiang’s state visit to the U.S. in 1997 (Wehrfritz & Liu, 1997, p.44). The state visit and Jiang’s showy charisma were intensively covered by CCP propaganda and were hailed as Jiang’s political legacy.

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), China is not one of the top 10 countries lobbying in Washington. While occasionally hiring professional lobbyists, such as Hill & Knowlton, to take care of annual renewal of the “most favored nation” status (MFN) and to whitewash its human rights record (Silverstein, 1997; Silverstein, 1998), the CCP government wisely kept a low-key strategy given its unpopularity among the American public. However, behind the scenes, the CCP government actively used the *stick* of trade retaliation and the *carrot* of access to the Chinese market to mobilize U.S. companies to do its bidding (Fritz, 1997b).

Tyson (1998) notes that, the poor human rights record notwithstanding, the CCP government has not bothered to take care of the MFN issue because it knew “Beijing’s interests would be better served by allowing the U.S. business group to speak for themselves” (Tyson, 1998). Therefore, different from the “old China lobby” conducted by Taiwanese, the “new China lobby” is indeed the “U.S.–China lobby” (Dreyfuss,

1997). It is a Chinese public relations operation, but carried out by corporate America.

In the post-Tiananmen years, the CCP government accurately discerned “a split in the Clinton administration between the human rights promoters at the State Department and the business-industry elements elsewhere in the government” (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p.107), and thus, skillfully and quietly, orchestrated American China lobbying for delinking the MFN renewal from the human rights record (p.108). Step by step, the CCP government had figured out a way, by the end of 1990s, to stop the U.S. human-rights campaign “with an economic offensive aimed at enlisting American corporate support on behalf of China” (p. 105).

For most American corporations, it had never been easy to make quick money in China. However, beginning in 1994, a cascade of lucrative contracts and windfalls came to them. In January 1994, the CCP government “floated a total of \$1 billion in bonds in American financial markets” (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 105). In February, Ford China Operations kicked off. In April, China held “trade and investment fairs” in Los Angeles and New York, drawing 700 businessmen and women from 300 U.S. corporations to foray billions of dollars’ worth of deals. At the fair, Wu Yi, Chinese foreign trade minister, tantalized 200 businessmen with prospects of huge profits for investing in capital-and-technology-intensive projects in China (p. 108). In the end, China signed contracts and agreements worth \$11.1 billion with U.S. companies (p. 106). In the meantime, Microsoft’s Bill Gates met with Jiang Zemin to boost Microsoft’s sales in China and publicly criticized any American “interference in China’s internal affairs” (Kagan, 1997); Shanghai officials hosted guests from Time Warner and IBM to discuss joint ventures; China vice premier Zou Jiahua journeyed to AT&T’s office in New Jersey to sign contracts worth \$500 million. According to CNN reports, in one situation, business leaders assembled by a conservative think tank urged the

Clinton administration “to let them tap into the surging Chinese market full steam ahead” (Chapman, 1994). In May, Boeing was about to complete a \$5 billion sale of jetliners to China. The time coincided with the remarks of Tom Foley, the then speaker of the House, that “Clinton shouldn’t link trade with human rights” (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 106). Foley spoke on behalf of the Spokane area of Washington state, the home of Boeing. Indeed, there are no China critics among the legislators coming from the state of Washington (p. 107).

On June 2, 1994, President Clinton announced his administration would extend MFN for another year despite continued human rights abuses in China. In the meantime, the Clinton administration drafted a "voluntary code of conduct" for U.S. businesses operating in China where human rights violations are a regular occurrence (*PR Watch*, 1997) and where markets usually have a “morally disorientation effect on American businessmen” (Kagan, 1997).

By delinking human rights and economic investment, President Clinton removed uncertainty from corporate America’s China business. More important, by delinking human rights improvements and trade status renewal, the CCP government established a precedent that human rights could be excluded from bilateral discussion and that “American pressure could not possibly succeed in curbing Chinese behavior on any issue” (Kagan, 1997).

To accomplish the delinkage, the CCP government used to great effect the threat of economic punishment to enlist behind it one of the broadest business lobbying efforts to influence U.S.–China policy (Bernstein & Munro, p. 109). For example, in 1996, China’s Premier Li Peng punished Boeing by buying \$1.5 billion worth of Airbus jets because European leaders “do not attach political strings to cooperation with China, unlike the Americans who arbitrarily resort to the threat of sanctions or the use of

sanction” (Kagan, 1997). Boeing responded by redoubling its China lobbying in Washington and by being willing to do almost anything for the CCP government to hold its share of China’s huge jetliner market. Although Boeing’s spokeswoman said the Chinese government was in no way directing, financing, or influencing Boeing’s lobbying effort, she admitted that Boeing could feel that the Chinese government was paying close attention to Boeing’s lobbying efforts. CCP officials never asked Boeing to lobby for them, but Boeing knew very well that the CCP government would be comfortable with Boeing’s lobbying efforts (Fritz, 1997b).

China’s economic “carrot-and-stick” are accurately channeled to Washington by corporate America in an anguished tone: thirty billion dollars worth of telecommunications could be sold in the next five years in China; during the next three years, American auto parts sellers have extraordinary opportunities in China’s market valued at more than \$29 billion; vigorous pursuit of China’s huge emerging market is the U.S.’s national imperative; if the U.S. lets the business opportunity in China slip away, American industries may suffer a long-term disability relative to their foreign competitors... and so forth (Kagan, 1997).

Consequently, the CCP government effectively used overt promises of economic benefits or implicit threats of economic punishment as means of exerting influence on the U.S. business community, and ultimately, on U.S.-China policy (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 109). By doing so, the CCP government has successfully administered its issue management of U.S.-China trade relations.

The primary focus of the American China lobbying has been the annual Congressional vote on MFN (Dreyfuss, 1997). Human rights groups urged revocation of MFN. But they were overridden by a business-driven bipartisan consensus. Anti-communists, religious groups, AFL-CIO, and human rights groups for a time appeared

so strong that the House might revoke MFN. In the end, however, the American China lobby proved far too influential, and the House voted to reject withdrawal of MFN (Weissman, 1997). AFL-CIO's Mark Anderson deplored that "the most ardent defenders of Chinese communism are U.S. capitalists" (*PR Watch*, 1997).

The principal vehicle of the American China lobby is the U.S.-China Business Council, a group of more than 300 member firms, including Boeing, Philip Morris, and AT&T. A host of public relations firms, lobby shops, think tanks, and consulting firms supplemented the lobbying efforts of the council (Weissman, 1997). Members of the council donated money to the major parties and to members of Congress, pressing strenuously for MFN renewal and ratification of "Permanent Normal Trade Relation" (PNTR) with China (Weissman, 1997). More impressively, they orchestrated multi-layered, synergistic grassroots lobbying and small business lobbying for U.S.-China trade, with leading corporations taking responsibility for delivering different states (Weissman, 1997).

In 1996, the election year, China's MFN became a hot-button issue again. In Washington, a coalition of labor, consumer, environmentalist, and human rights groups joined in alliance with the dwindling remnants of the "old China lobby," i.e., the Taiwanese lobby, raised an uprising against China and had the possibility of winning a congressional vote revoking MFN (Dreyfuss, 1997; Fritz, 1997b). Terrified by the situation, several U.S. corporations launched a covert public relations blitz to convince the public that "Chinese leadership is deserving of greater sympathy" (Silverstein, 1996).

To coordinate the public relations campaign budgeted at millions of dollars, these companies hired Hill & Knowlton to put company representatives in touch with members of Congress and to rent scholars to draft op-ed articles for major newspapers

or to speak at media events (Silverstein, 1996). These “third party” advocates, as they are dubbed by industry, are well paid but do not need to reveal their affiliations to the public (Silverstein, 1996).

The success of the American China lobby lies in mobilizing small-business suppliers (Fritz, 1997b). According to a news story in *The Seattle Times*, Boeing has requested one small business, which supplies Boeing with appliances, to assist itself in a drive to urge Congress to renew MFN. The small company’s executive agreed gladly to contact her congressmen and arranged for local business leaders to attend a luncheon with a speaker recommended by Boeing. She did it because she realized that the bright future of her company depends on Boeing’s \$124 billion in orders, i.e., 1,900 airplane sales to China, in the next two decades (Silverstein, 1996). By enlisting small business to pressure Congress for MFN renewal, the big companies created a false appearance of “grass-roots” support for MFN (Fritz, 1997a). The ability of major U.S. corporations to enlist their suppliers as lobbyists was seen as the magic to their winning the vote on MFN extension in 1996. The truth lies in that, in an election year, “members of Congress respond more readily to the concerns of small-business owners in their own districts than to high-pressure pitches from big business lobbyists” (Fritz, 1997a). Under “grass-roots” campaign initiatives, each big company in the “Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade” was assigned one or several states where it was expected to recruit small business to press for China trade (Fritz, 1997a). For example, Boeing acted as “state captain” responsible for winning over congressional delegations in Washington state and Kansas state; Motorola took Illinois state and Texas state. The “state captains” rallied small business to promote trade with China by writing op-ed pieces, staging forums, and holding meetings with visiting lawmakers (Tyson, 1998, p.3).

The “Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade” was coordinated by the Emergency Committee for American Trade, the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the U.S.-China Business Council. It consisted of more than 1,200 leading corporations and trade associations that supported granting MFN and PNTR to China (Urbina, 2000). In the 1996 campaign for MFN, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce devoted six months of intensive work contacting more than 200 local and state chambers and 6,800 member companies to gear up support for MFN. Its task force and congressional lobbying team worked strenuously to provide educational and public relations materials to grass-root companies. They developed a list of 103 House members who were undecided but who might be convinced to support MFN. Next, they mobilized thousands of smaller companies to contact members of Congress, especially those 103 House members. Eventually, they convinced 101 to vote for MFN extension (Dreyfuss, 1997).

In the fall of 2000, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was at stake before the congressional ratification of PNTR with China. On behalf of the Business Roundtable, Goddard Claussen Porter Novelli (GCPN), a political consulting firm, managed a \$4 million integrated campaign, including strategic counseling, message development, advertising, media relations, and grassroots communications to win Congress’ ratification of PNTR. GCPN’s PNTR campaign developed dozens of specifically tailored print and radio ads aimed at more than 100 congressional districts, as well as television advocacy spots aired nationally. For example, GCPN arranged TV advertisement series to be broadcast on ABC’s “*World News Tonight*” to counterattack AFL-CIO’s commercial against PNTR. One spot, “*Working Americans*,” argued that working Americans – figureheaded by six men and women of ethnic backgrounds – need a “new frontiers” in China’s open market to build a brighter future in the 21st

century (Fenoglio, 2000, p.1304). With the congressional vote on PNTR fast approaching, GCPN tailored ads targeting specific districts, such as TV ads conveying tales of the vast Chinese wheat market to Northwest farmers, or ads briefing Floridians about the yet untapped Chinese colossal demand for citrus (Urbina, 2000).

Besides ads, GCPN assisted the Business Roundtable in arranging dozens of local press conferences, placing op-ed items and “letters-to-the-editor,” and releasing 120 reports demonstrating the value of China trade to local economies (GCPN). The media efforts first identified key stakeholders in China trade from across America’s business and agricultural sectors, then “provided texture and key arguments in support of the legislation as the debate evolved,” demonstrating, district-by-district, why it was in America’s best interest to pass PNTR (GCPN).

The American China lobby also enlisted support from many U.S. consultants who advised corporate America about investing in China. Among these consultants are many former administration officials, including former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, George Shultz, James Baker III, and Lawrence Eagleburger (Silverstein, 1996; Urbina, 2000). Most of them had considerable financial interest in MFN extension. They wrote favorable Op-Ed pieces, pleaded China’s case in important U.S. public forums, called congressmen, and appeared on TV programs presenting the positive aspects of MFN or PNTR with China (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 77). Kissinger is the central adviser for the Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade. He represented numerous companies doing business in China and has been paid multi-million dollars for advising the U.S. government against imposing economic sanctions on China or “arguing that no government in the world should be expected to tolerate protesters’ occupation of a public square,” such as Tiananmen (Urbina, 2000). Haig, though not a registered lobbyist, has effectively represented several U.S. companies

doing business in China. In one occasion, human rights advocates complained that Haig “is a guy we worry about because every time we try to put together a piece of legislation (critical of China) Haig gets on the phone to Republican members and we suddenly find that we’ve got less votes than we thought we did” (Urbina, 2000).

The American China lobby has manufactured numerous opinion pieces, briefing papers, and reports, and saturated the press with these public relations products pleading for a human rights-blind U.S.-China trade (Weissman, 1997; Urbina, 2000). The main talking point is: Economic interaction, and the ensuing interplay of trade, free enterprise, people-to-people contacts, and transaction of ideas, can do a better job to advance freedom and the rule of law than unilateral trade sanctions, which have only backfired with crippling effects on U.S.-China policy. Therefore, U.S. trade and investment are the best tools for supporting long-term progress on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in China (Weissman, 1997).

In summary, the American China lobby has argued hard for the well-being of U.S.-China trade without an explicit request from the CCP government. “China seems to command more loyalty from U.S. business than do other foreign countries” (Fritz, 1997b). On the other hand, “American business executives in China took the side of the Chinese Government against the U.S., berating U.S. Secretary [of State] for jeopardizing their profits with this silly business about democracy” (Safire, 1994, p.). No lobbying campaign has had greater influence over any other aspects of American foreign policy than the American China lobbying about U.S.-China policy (Bernstein & Munro, 1997, p. 124). That is why a policy tradeoff running starkly against public opinion represented by mass media could finally be carried out without scandalizing American democracy. Public opinion represented by interest groups – China lobby – will more easily have a sympathetic ear in the government than public opinion

represented by mass media which are still available to ordinary citizen who argue while ignorant of their personal interest.

3. Policy Critique on the Democratic Principle of U.S.-China Relations

U.S.-China policy in the post-Tiananmen years has been founded on a fragile rationale that U.S.-China trade relations would bring democracy to China. The fallacy of the rationale could be illustrated by analyzing both the transitional Chinese society in 1990s and the globalization movement worldwide.

The fallacy of the premise is that capitalism is not a precondition of democracy and political liberty. On the contrary, capitalism has some anti-democratic nature. Capitalism, like authoritarianism, has some moral disorientation effects and tends to cultivate conspiracies among the rich and the powerful. Keller (1990) notes that, although the law of the marketplace is a natural friend of democracy, a structural conflict exists between capitalism and democracy. “It is central to the American experience that democracy is subordinate to capitalism and dysfunctional in the current commercial media structure” (p. 93).

Similar to the fact that democratic institutions are subordinate to capitalism in the U.S., the private sectors of business in China are subordinate to the authoritarian regime to the extent that it cannot be a bold friend of democracy. Economic prosperity does not necessarily cultivate a democracy-loving middle class in China. On the one hand, economic development raises people’s expectations of more affluence, “making ‘how to make more money’ a central social concern. As a result, popular enthusiasm for political democratization may give way to the sole pursuit of financial gain” (Jian, 1998). On the other hand, China’s economic reform contains ingredients that hinder – and were consciously devised to hinder – political reform. In China, “an emerging entrepreneurial class too weak to govern on its own allies – economically and, more

importantly, politically – with a reactionary government and against threats to the established order” (Kaplan, 2001, p. 517).

Pei (2006) finds that in the past decade, despite the sustained economic growth, the CCP government has made remarkably little progress in political liberalization and consolidated significantly its authoritarian rule. “China’s authoritarian ruling elite is not only determined to hold on to power, but it also has been smart enough to take adaptive measures aimed at countering the liberalizing effects of economic development” (Pei, 2006). To strengthen the one-party regime, the CCP has been pursuing a two-pronged strategy: selective repression of oppositional organization and co-optation of new social elites (the intelligentsia, professionals, and private entrepreneurs). On the one hand, thousands of People’s Armed Police (PAP), a large anti-riot paramilitary force, are quickly maneuvered to nip social discontent in the bud. A special 30,000 Net police patrol the Internet traffic day and night to track political dissent and block “hostile or harmful” website, both domestic and Western (Pei, 2006). On the other hand, urban intelligentsia, civil servants, and professionals are pampered with material perks and political recognition to the extent that the once most liberal social groups and the backbone of the pro-democracy movement are no longer lethal threats to party rule.

As to the CCP’s co-optation of Chinese intelligentsia, Barmè (1999) observed that, beginning in the 1990s, the CCP’s control of the idea industry enters the phase of soft technocratic socialism or “progressive censorship” – “an iron fist in a velvet glove” (p. 7-20). Leveraging “market force” and changing their managerial manner, Chinese communist technocrats reformulated the social contract by which “consensus replaces coercion and complicity subverts criticism” (p. 7). Living in this “closed system,” or “velvet Bastille,” and under the duress of “invisible violence,” Chinese intelligentsia finds that, to prosper, each of them “must learn to be a cultural politician and executive

in the streamlined corporate structure” (p. 8). “Artists are jealous of the considerable fringe benefits accorded them – better-than-average incomes, fame at home, trips overseas, and, best of all, the sense of mission and importance allotted to them by the party” (p. 9). By introducing market force (bourgeois liberalism) into progressive censorship (communism), the CCP is happy to find that “ideological laxity and moral turpitude went hand in hand.” As a result, “state artists become board members in the corporation of the state, partaking of the wealth as shareholders in the cultural enterprise” (Barmè, 1999, p. 17). Maverick artists are tolerated not only to help the state farms of art to have a new hybrid cultural species, but also for propaganda purpose – international public relations. “Angry young man of letters who rails against the impotence of official culture and the sellout of serious writers is merely a pose that fits snugly into a certain market niche”(p. 17). Even many of the dissidents of Tiananmen were waiting for pacification from the CCP so that they can go back to China to make a fortune in the booming culture industry. Using market forces, the CCP has successfully commissioned state artist to produce a “totalitarian nostalgia” – seeking Mao Tsetong frenzy – throughout China.

To enlarge its power base, the CCP allowed new private entrepreneurs to join the Party. These communist private entrepreneurs, the *bourgeois nouveau riche* according to CCP’s canonical textbook, enjoy financial privileges and political prestige by supporting authoritarian rule. This preemptive political decapitation of the entrepreneur class expelled the worry that political rivalry may stem from economic liberalization in China. In the meantime, the newly-built rapport between the CCP and business class generates brutal corruption in the economic arena. China’s nepotism-ridden capitalism still operates within the confines of an arbitrary legal order and a party-controlled court system. Capital, licenses and contracts flow to those with connections to the communist

officialdom, which, in turn, remains beholden to the communist autocracy. “Whereas in the U.S. the private sector wields enormous influence over the political class, in China, the reverse is true” (Kaplan, 2001, p. 516). In China, the bourgeoisie, whose economic fortune is dependent on the political fortune of the communist state, is unlikely to challenge the authority of the official bureaucracy; instead, it is more likely to be agents of the state than to be potential antagonist (Kaplan, 2001).

Thinking globally, Western capitalism and economic globalization do not necessarily usher democracy into China. Three reasons challenge the simple equation of capitalistic globalization with democratic expansion worldwide. First, Western capitalists may enjoy the moral disorientation effect of the authoritarian system in China when doing their business. Actually, just as the Clinton administration anticipated when sanctifying the delinkage of trade from human rights, the bizarre socialist market economy – characterized by brutal abuse of authority, wild bribery, and ubiquitous cronyism – did have some morally disorienting effects on American business. In the past decade, sixty-four percent of all the half million business corruption cases in China have involved foreign investors and traders.³⁴

Second, multinationals are eager to help the CCP to maintain political stability, economic deregulation, and privatization of public property in favor of private sectors doing their business in China. Some reports show that while the CCP wants to tighten control of all access to the Internet through links to Chinese Internet service providers (ISP), Western investors in China’s information networks, such as Microsoft and Cisco, have eagerly pitched in. Cisco’s firewall has been a big assistance in the CCP’s effort to censor the Internet and to track dissidents (Gutmann, 2002). Overall, as Viacom’s CEO admitted, corporate America is very conscious of the tastes of the CCP government,

³⁴ Wei, Changchun, Xiao, Nanfang, and Wu, Yanlin: Foreign corporations bribe Chinese Telecom, *Asia-Pacific Economic Times*, July, 23, 2004. Available at: http://biz.163.com/2004w07/12622/2004w07_1090547360398.html

and therefore, “do[ing] the things we think will endear us ultimately to China,” and “don’t produce material that invites criticism from China” (Zawadzinski, 2004).

Another example, when the CCP conducted a foreign propaganda event – “2000 Experience – Chinese Culture in the United States” – from August 24 to September 18, 2000, in nine metropolitan American cities to enhance China’s image in the U.S., the \$7 million cost of the foreign public relations operation was reportedly underwritten by U.S. companies active in the China market (Crowell & Hsieh, 2000). Warner Brothers, IDG, Citigroup, and New York Life Insurance Company were among the American sponsors of the cultural festival.³⁵ Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation hosted the Chinese Information Officers’ stop in San Francisco to address the Asia Society. Murdoch had been coveting China’s media market for a long time. However, in 1993, shortly after he initiated StarTV, he irritated the CCP government with an offensive remark that “StarTV will be proved to be a stark threat to all the tyrannies in the world.” The CCP government sought revenge quickly by banning all privately owned satellite receivers in China. StarTV suffered a huge loss in advertisement revenue. After that conflict, Murdoch began to mend the breach by deleting the BBC News program from StarTV’s program menu (Gittings & Borger, 2001). He also dropped a publishing contract with Chris Patten, Hong Kong’s last British governor who had confronted China with his democracy agenda (Gittings & Borger, 2001). Murdoch made a shrewd calculation when dumping Chris Patten’s book: “some flak in Britain was worth suffering when there are many millions of dollars to be made in China” (MacLeod, 1998).

Foreign direct investment in China, while providing a much-needed blood transfusion for the CCP rulers, has a built-in interest in maintaining China’s status quo.

³⁵ News reports are available at: www.filmsea.com/focus/200310080007.htm, and www.scoba.org/hunan/famous.htm

“Western captains of industry routinely parade through Beijing singing the praise of the Communist regime (and often inveighing against its detractors), while they admonish America’s leaders to take no action that might upset the exquisite sensibilities of China’s politburo” (Kaplan, 1999).

Ironically, whereas the human rights-blind U.S.-China relations make the world safer for American business, it is not so promising for the democratic enterprise. Business prosperity in China only consolidates the legitimacy of the CCP dictatorship and strengthens its repressive party line, i.e., “stability-trumps-all.” Economic liberalization does not entail political reform; rather, it empowers the current system of brutal inequity and wild corruption. The CCP always uses plausible economic accomplishments, at the expense of social equality though, to justify its political high-handedness. “The Chinese government can expand freedom in economic life without losing controls in society and politics” (Bernstein and Munro, 1997, p. 60). The U.S. State Department’s annual report on human rights concluded that increased trade made little difference to political freedom “in the absence of a willingness by political authorities to abide by the fundamental international norms” (Silverstein, 1996).

Third, globalization, as Karl Marx predicted in *The Communist Manifesto*, is the inevitable outcome of the worldwide expansion of the basic confrontation of capitalist society, i.e., the subordinating of democracy to the monopolistic or oligopolistic capitalism. Capitalism was born in the process of creating a world market. Its growth in the past two centuries in the major capitalistic countries, such as the U.K., the U.S., Germany, France, and Japan, has been associated with conquest, primitive accumulation characterized by “undisguised looting, enslavement and murder,” splitting of the world market among powers, economic penetration, and the spread of the self-regulating market to every niche and cranny of the globe in spite of the

difference in social institutions (Foster, 2000). Globalization, in essence, is the formation of the unified world market and the spread of capitalistic mode of production all over the world (Foster, 2002). Globalization is not necessarily democratization of the world. It is libertarian fantasy that free trade and economic liberalization create political liberty and democratic institutions. On the contrary, as Lionel Jospin, France's most recent Socialist prime minister, indicated, globalization is a "modern aristocracy placing economic efficiency above all other values."³⁶ Globalization has been promoted in the past decade by "financiers, industrialists, top civil servants and privileged journalists" in the name of global competitiveness and at the expense of ordinary workers. Indeed, it is a new capitalistic ideology by which economic rationality trumps all, by which "one cannot touch profits, increase capital taxes or limit extravagant salaries without discouraging initiative and paralyzing creative energies, without provoking disinvestment or relocation of enterprises or without driving away brains and talents."³⁷

As to the globalization in China, the architects of the U.S.-China policy in the 1990s have sought mainly to achieve the narrow aims of the corporate sector rather than to spread democracy in China. Capitalists usually are more eager to spread the gospel of laissez-flair than the gospel of democracy over the whole surface of the globe. Even Nixon's 1972 visit of China was partly motivated by multinationals' desire to sell products to populous China.

In summary, by putting the policy tradeoff into the perspective of capitalistic expansion, it is a false prophecy that economic globalization, with multinational corporations at its center, is an enlargement of democracy. Rather, we may see a

³⁶ John Thornhill, France's former Socialist leader hits at backers of globalization. *Financial Times*, October 21 2005 Available at: <http://news.ft.com/cms/s/34b0ec78-41cf-11da-a45d-00000e2511c8.html>

³⁷ John Thomhill quote Lionel Jospin's word from his book, *The World as I See It*. Available at: <http://news.ft.com/cms/s/34b0ec78-41cf-11da-a45d-00000e2511c8.html>

globalization of monopolistic capitalism, far-reaching exploitation of the working class worldwide, and the ever-increasing rapport between the corporate and the state, both democratic and authoritarian.

4. Empowering Citizens in Opinion-Policy Process: Communitarian Recommendations

Democracy is hard work: “It requires considerable commitment on the part of citizens above and beyond that of their daily work and daily lives; it requires healthy mediating institutions where people can meet and exchange views and information” (Alterman, 1998, p. 125). Otherwise, the making of public policy, especially the foreign policies dealing with non-democratic countries, could easily be hijacked by special interests who are very capable of exploiting American people’s ignorance to bend the nation’s policies to their own benefits” (Alterman, 1998, p. 125). Actually, the U.S. public, while uneasy with the new rules of the global capitalism which threatened their job security, health, and working safety, finds no effective allies within the policy-making community in challenging this nation’s “official fealty to the twin values of free trade and economic efficiency,” and in fighting “to retain a measure of democratic control over their lives and communities” (Alterman, 1998, pp. 101-102).

The problem is: Can ordinary citizens make reasonable policy choices? Blais et al (2006), based on their research on “British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform,” find that “it is possible for ordinary citizens to become involved participants making reasoned choices rooted in their underlying value preferences” (p. 1). The citizen assembly was composed of ordinary citizens sampled randomly from the voters’ list. Before generating verdict with regard to election reform, these ordinary citizens have gone through three phases – learning, public hearings, and deliberation. The final results indicates that, in spite of difference in assembly members’ initial levels of

political awareness, there was no systematic difference in the viewpoints and evaluation between the most and least politically sophisticated. Their conclusion is that ordinary citizens can make an intelligent, coherent, and reasonable choice in regard to policy issue (Blais, et al, 2006, p. 11).

Therefore, to maintain the accountability and the incorruptibility of the republican democracy, it is the most urgent task (1) to rejuvenate the deliberative model of politics through which ordinary citizens could be public policy jurors reviewing and discussing policy issues on a daily basis; (2) to restore the national “public sphere” in which “all citizens may confer in an unrestricted fashion about matters of general interest, with specific means for transmitting information” (Habermas, 1989, p. 47); and (3) to create the Deweyite “Great Community” through which the public can perform co-operative inquiry and self-education, regain the lost art of public conversation, and finally, acknowledge that “self-government is not a drab necessity but a joy to be treasured” (Dionne, 1991, p. 354).

Particularly, this dissertation research recommends a Communitarian transformation of American media democracy:

(1) The mass media system should be structured to be an apparatus of citizens’ co-operative inquiry of issue and a public forum for their self-enlightenment at both local level and national level, in both traditional media and digital media. As a result, the mass media system should constitute an enlargement of civil society and public sphere and a limitation on elite influence in the democratic decision-making process.

(2) Communitarian journalism – contextualized in community and standing in accord with common good – should be incorporated into the routine operation of newsrooms where journalist “address members of the public as fellow citizens capable of civic action, rather than as passive spectators” and “view the public as a partner in

setting the agenda” rather than as an unreflective representation of public opinion (Borden, 2005, p. 40).

(3) The integrity and accountability of the public opinion-public policy process should be judged only by the extent at which ordinary citizens are empowered to exercise their self-government based on republic virtue, such as civic participation, genuine dialogue, democratic conversation, patriotism, and pursuing of common good.

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Appendix 1. Coding Protocol

1. Date

_ _ / _ _ / _ _ (mm/dd/yy)

All the items - NYT news/editorial and CNN transcript - are lined up in accordance to the publication or broadcasting time identified by "Lexis-Nexis" archives.

2. Print/Broadcast

1 = NYT

2 = CNN

NYT Articles are print journalism, CNN transcript are broadcast journalism.

3. Item type

1 = news reporting

2 = opinion pieces

As to NYT articles, those appeared in "Foreign Desk" are news reporting and those in the "Editorial Desk" are opinion pieces. As to CNN transcript, the episode proceeding between CNN news anchor and CNN correspondents for reporting significant change of China-related affairs are news reporting; the episodes proceeding between/among news anchors and CNN correspondents, commentators, scholars, experts, government officials, legislators, issue advocates, activists, and ordinary U.S. citizens for discussing, commenting on, or debating with regard to episodic news events or thematic issues are opinion pieces; some special programs are classified as opinion pieces.

4. Author type of News items(according to byline)

1 = NYT reporters, correspondent, and staff writers, CNN

reporters, correspondent

2 = reporters of AP, Reuters, or other wire service

3 = other news agencies or personnel

The news people affiliated with or in-residence at NYT and CNN are coded as "1;" those affiliated with or in-residence at Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, Xinhua News Agency, Interfax News Agency, and other major news syndicate are coded as "2;" the rest are coded as "3."

5. Author type of opinion pieces

1 = transcript of speech or authentic text of document, treaties, announcement.

Verbatim documenting on public speech of national leaders and policy-makers; transcript of judicial/legislative proceeding; archival text of official document and treaty; transcript of news conference, joint press conference; authentic or live broadcasting of official announcement; and policy papers.

2 = editorial articles by editorial board of NYT

The editorials of the NYT usually appear in the far left side of the NYT's opinion page and are authored by the NYT's editorial board. The newest list of the board members includes:

Gail Collins, Editor;

Andrew Rosenthal, Deputy Editor;

Helene, Cooper, Assistant Editor;

Robert B. Semple Jr. | Associate Editor;

David C. Unger | Senior Foreign Affairs Writer;

Philip M. Boffey | Science;

Francis X. Clines | National Politics, Congress & Campaign Finance;

Adam Cohen | Law & Technology;

Carolyn Curiel | Local Government, Social Issues, National Trends & Environment;

Lawrence Downes | Suburban Issues;

Verlyn Klinkenborg | Agriculture, Environment & Culture;

Nicholas Kulish | Business;

Elenor Randolph | New York City & State, Media, Politics & Russia;

Tina Rosenberg | Human Rights & Foreign Policy;

Dorothy Samuels | Law, Civil Rights & National Affairs;

Brent Staples | Education, Race & Culture;

Teresa Tritch | Economic Issues & Tax Policy.

3 = CNN reporters, correspondent, and anchors.

The affiliation of CNN people is clearly identified by the "Lexis-Nexis" transcript as "CNN correspondent," "CNN anchor," "CNN reporter," and so forth.

4 = NYT columnist.

The NYT columnists are in-residence columnists whose opinion pieces published in the NYT's OP/Ed pages in a regular basis. Usually, they produce column article weekly. Their opinion piece appears on a constant weekday edition or weekend edition. The composition of the NYT columnists roughly reflects an ideological balance between the conservative and the liberal. Usually the column articles appear in weekday editions are deemed as more influential than those appears in weekend editions. Currently, Op/Ed columnists of The New York Times includes: David Brooks, Nicholas D. Kristof, Maureen Dowd, Paul Krugman, Thomas L. Friedman, Frank Rich, Bob Herbert, William Safire, and John Tierney.

5 = commentator, editor, journalist, writer, and political analyst/strategist

Commentators are those "who discusses social, political or cultural issues or events, typically in a public context." They are usually referred to as pundit; editor, journalist, and writers are those coming from authoring community who have shown expertise in interpreting issues. Political analysts and political strategists are political scientists with a strong agendas to influence public policy and electorate result. Those people in category "5" usually have clear party affiliation or ideological leaning. For example, Rush Limbough, Ariana Huffington,

6 = Administration officials

Administration officials are those incumbent federal/state government

officials such as the President of the U.S., cabinet officials, government agency, state government officials, etc.

7 = Member of Congress

Incumbent federal legislators: House Representatives and Senators

8 = retired government officials

The former President of the U.S., such as President Nixon and President Jimmy Carter; the former government officials such as Henry Kissinger, secretary of state in the Nixon administration, and ex-ambassador to China.

9 = university faculty

Scholars currently affiliated with or associated with a given department or research institute within a university.

10 = public intellectuals (expert, scholar, scientist, economist)

Nationally acknowledged public intellectuals who, though associated with a particular discipline within universities or research institutions, write and comment on universal public policy issues to a large audience rather than their professional colleagues in a regular basis, such as linguist Noam Chomsky, economist Milton Friedman, Palestinian American literary theorist Edward Said, historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and writer Susan Sontag.

11 = think tank scholars

Scholars associated with "idea industry." Unlike university professors--who are often engaged in esoteric research with little relation to public policy--think tank scholars are in the business of providing policy-relevant expertise to elected officials and to the public. Some think tank scholars, especially those with ideology-driven policy agendas, can offer intellectual reinforcement and indeed promote the political platforms of aspiring office holders and elected officials. Several prominent think tanks can be talent pool for incoming administrations to draw on, and can also serve as retirement homes for high-level policy makers after they leave public office.

12 = business community

The business community is composed of people in charge of corporations, bankers, lawyers, lobbyist, and other professionals in a for-profit

organization, or people representing those institutions.

13 = issue advocates, interest groups, NGO

In "*Federalist Paper #10*," James Madison identified group pressures as "factions" by which it means "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passions, or of interest." The most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. "A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interest, grows up of necessity in civilized nations, and divided them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views."

There is no significant difference among issue advocates, interest groups, and NGO. Overall, these groups are mobilized and active citizen groups set up for influencing public policy through grass-root campaign. The goals of their political campaign or operation usually are not so broad as political parties'.

To be specific:

- (1) Issue advocates are those civic groups specifically set up to engage in single-issue politics on one issue only. The typical issue advocate is like Anti-War Mom, Tibet Justice Center, Million Man March, or Citizen for a Free Kuwait.
- (2) Interest group (also called advocacy group, lobbying group, pressure group or special interest) is a group, however loosely or tightly organized, doing advocacy. They are determined to encourage or prevent changes in public policy without trying to be elected." James Carey defines interest groups as those who work for private sectors, usually behind the scenes, and "uses the state political parties, the press - indeed, any apparatus available - to control the distribution of economic rewards and social privilege."¹ "[T]heir relation to public life is essentially propagandistic and manipulative."² The typical interest groups are like the National Rifle Association and Common Cause.

¹ James Carey (1995): "The press, public opinion, and public discourse" in James Carey: A critical reader. pp. 244.

² *ibid.*

(3) NGO is an organization that is not part of a government and was not founded by states. Therefore it is typically independent of governments. Although the definition can technically include for-profit corporations, the term is generally restricted to social, cultural, legal, and environmental issue advocacy groups having goals that are primarily noncommercial. Principles of altruism and voluntarism remain key defining characteristics of NGO. While NGOs could be operational NGO or advocacy NGO, they are typically value-based. The typical NGOs are like Green Peace, Amnesty International, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, etc.

This dissertation research excludes corporate lobbyist from interest groups and classifies it as belong to "the business community" category.

14 = public figures (celebrities)

Public figures are those who secured their fame by being famous in politics, business, and performance. In this research, public figures exclusively are celebrity performers.

15 = ordinary citizen have no apparent affiliation

Ordinary citizens come from every walk of life and participates in public life with their affiliation, wealth, status left behind. They are activated into a social relation, an expression of their opinion with regard to public life, by the news. In this research, ordinary citizens are those who cannot be identified as belonging to the aforementioned 14 categories.

16 = Chinese dissident

Chinese dissident are those Chinese citizens or newly naturalized Chinese American citizens who held a very different viewpoint from the CPP as to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist government. Their basic political stance is to overthrow the Chinese Communist government and to build a westernized multiparty ruling, representative, and three-branch "checks and balance" system in China. They either stay in jail in China or are exiled to the U.S. upon the request of the U.S. government.

17 = Chinese official

Officials of the Chinese government, or scholars from official establishment organizations. For example, a Chinese scholar from the Chinese

Academy of Social Sciences or from the Chinese Communist Party Academy are anything but ordinary Chinese citizens.

18 = Hong Kong/ Marco official

Hong Kong people affiliated with three branches of the Hong Kong government. After the handover, the Hong Kong government is called the government of Hong Kong Special Administration Region of People's Republic of China.

19 = Hong Kong or Marco people

Ordinary Hong Kong people who are not associated to the Hong Kong government apparatus.

20 = Taiwan officials

Taiwanese come from the three branches of the government of Republic of China.

21 = Taiwan people.

Ordinary Taiwan people who are not associated to the Taiwan government apparatus.

22 = international officials

People work at the U.N. or political leaders/ government officials from other countries except for China and the U.S.

23 = Tibetan

Tibetan people live in Tibet or in exile in India or the U.S.. Dalai Lama is their political leader. They ask for either maximum autonomy or, as its radical division insists, total independence from the Chinese government.

24 = Chinese citizen

Ordinary Chinese citizens who can not be identified to be belonging to establishment or bureaucratic institutions of China

25 = others.

Anybody who cannot be identified to belong to the aforementioned 24 categories.

6. Issues dealt with

01 = Overall U.S.-China relations

Reviewing the overall wellbeing or irregularities of the U.S.-China diplomacy. Usually the review is conducted at the end of year or at anniversary day of "the U.S.-China marriage," discussing very broad issues between the two countries

02 = human rights abuses in China

It is very easy to confuse "human right abuse" with "oppressive polity." The researcher admits that the two categories indeed are very similar in character. To differentiate the two term, the first thing is to know that human rights abuses is the noticeable symptoms of oppressive polity in which (1) one party hold monopoly on power; (2) the ruling party make it an open belief that political power comes from gun barrel. (3) the head of the Military Committee of the party is the real puppeteer of the political drama. (4) the ruling party is the last arbitrator of moral integrity and political correctness; (5) civic initiatives are greatly suppressed in the favor of societal stability; (6) the authority or legitimacy of one-party state cannot be challenged without being severely persecuted. (7) The central-command system of the government has tremendous effect on the economic destiny of both natural man and legal man. (8) all the government officials are handpicked by party apparatus beyond any public scrutiny. (9) All the printers and airwaves belong to state and are strictly licensed or registered to do government's business. (10) party membership can be traded as punishment for breaking law while non-party members of the society have no way to attenuate their sin. (11) propaganda is an open belief with regard to the function of journalism. (12) the propaganda department of the party spares no pain to oversee the flow of information. (13) the propaganda department distribute "reporting advice" to all the editor-in-chiefs on a regular basis. (14) education is a privilege to sons and daughters born in metropolitan cities like Beijing and Shanghai due to the significant discount of exam scores conferred to them during matriculation procession. (15) all the land belong to state in the extent that personal estate right expires 70 years later after purchase of residence, etc...

All those phenomenon are related to oppressive polity. In contrast, human rights abuse referred to actual damage on personal freedom which could be enumerated as: (1) unjustified and unwarranted search and arrest due to

expressing unofficial political point of view. (2) arbitrary confiscation of personal property by the state; (3) unwarranted confinement imposed by police; (4) unwarranted trade of bodily organ after execution. (5) state-sponsored boycott against a person's publication or job opportunity due to difference in opinion. (6) denial of due process of law to the convicted. (7) infringement of right to privacy by aggressive patrolling, etc.

03 = oppressive polity (authoritarianism, dictatorship, tyranny) in China.

It is a broad and theoretical discussion of the CCP's totalitarian ruling in China. It concerns more about the lack of democracy and political reform in China rather the enumerated person rights case by case. The point is that human rights abuses occur in every corner of the world in various degree, but oppressive polity grow only in those countries who have a strong belief in oppression and dictatorship, even in the name of "people's democratic dictatorship."

04 = corruption and crime in China

The brutal corruption in China in the 1990 are resulted from the unchecked power the culture of corruption embedded in feudalism tradition. The staple corruption involve the bartering between political power, such as administrative regulation, personnel promotion/demotion, bank lending, and public project bidding, and cash/prostitute. Other corruption involves nepotism, insider trading, embezzlement of public property among small faction, etc.

As to crime, this dissertation designates it as the stories dealing with criminal activities harming public safety in terms of life and property.

05 = incompetence and inefficiency of Chinese bureaucracy and Chinese economy

These are stories dealing with the setbacks and failures of Chinese economy and administrative function resulted either from the ineptitude or ignorance of public officials, or from the institutional dysfunction due to incongruence between ideas and reality.

06 = China's family planning

The arbitrariness of the "one child per household" policy and the aggressive execution of the policy at the expense of abusing human rights, destroying gender balance, and being insensitive to religious sentiment.

07 = U.S.- China diplomatic activities

The mutual visits by supreme leaders, officials, military units of the two countries. For example, Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit of the U.S. in 1997 and President Clinton's visit of China in 1998, the annual meeting of Jiang and Clinton during APEC since 1995, the Chinese military fleet's visit of U.S. ports.

08 = U.S.-China trade relations

The overall trade volume between the two countries, the treaties and meetings between the U.S. and China in regard to trade or commerce issue, the MFN renewal and PNTR passage in Congress, and the U.S. business activities in China.

09 = Trade imbalance, strife, and irregularities.

The bickering and threatening with trade war between the U.S. and China result from the trade surplus in one side and trade deficit in another side. The fighting between the two countries due to trade protection, subsidized export, export of labor product, unjustified tariffs, unfair trade quota, and so forth.

10 = Chinese pirate on U.S. product

The infringement of copyright, trademark, and patent of American product by Chinese companies. The negotiation between the two countries for strike hard on bootleggers; American's complain about Chinese government's leniency to the perpetrators or Chinese State-Owned-Enterprise's (SOE) involvement in piracy.

11 = Chinese WTO (GATT) entry

China's 15 years of effort for restoring its membership in GATT, lately the WTO. The trade negotiation between the U.S. and China for facilitating the WTO entry. The political ramification of China's WTO entry.

12 = China's Olympic bidding

Beginning at early 1990s, China bid for hosting Olympic in Beijing. The first bid was defeated in September 1993 by American led demonizing campaign.

The grievance of the Chinese toward the harsh boycott of the western world which reminded them of the partition of China by western powers in the end of the 19th century. Three years later, China decided to bid again. While the U.S. government still can't get over China's human rights violations, some officials argued that hosting of Olympic Games may encourage the Chinese government to open its society and conform to the international protocol in safeguarding human freedoms.

13 = Chinese prosperity and economy in general

Though dubious and false data-laden, the success of the Chinese economy was widely hailed by international community. The huge market attract American business to forget about the barbarous nature of the Communist dictatorship in China. Articles praising China's economic success, exciting with China's huge market demand, and show skepticism toward the sustainability of the Chinese economy belong to this category.

14 = Chinese military threat

This category designates to the news/opinion dealing China's military clout. Usually it is about American military's worrying about China's military build-up, weapon upgrading, and China's spying of U.S. military secret.

15 = Chinese nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapon testing

News and Op/Ed items dealing with the China's export of nuclear technology to Iran and China's military cooperation with Pakistan, China's unwillingness to stop nuclear weapon testing.

16 = Chinese espionage

The news media's frenzy about Chinese espionage was trigger during Clinton's second term. The most significant events are allegation of Lee Wen Hoo's stealing of nuclear secret from national weaponry lab and Cox's sensation report about China's perennial stealing of U.S. missile technology. Also, the U.S.-China cooperation in launching U.S.-made satellite was considered by Cox report to be dangerous to the U.S. national security.

17 = Chinese donation to Democratic party.

News stories and opinion pieces dealing with allegations of China's

campaign donation, by way of a businessman from southeastern Asia, to Clinton's re-election campaign. Also included are discussions about the dubious U.S.-China strategic partnership purchased by Chinese military.

18 = U.S.-China military strife and confrontation

Two big events designated to the U.S.-China military confrontation: One is the PLA's war game and missile testing near Taiwan Strait which triggered U.S.S. Nimitz's "patrolling" of the Taiwan Strait; the other is U.S. B52's bombing of China embassy in Yugoslavia in May 8, 1999. All the news stories and discussions with regard to the two events are categorized as U.S.-China military strife and confrontation.

19 = Taiwan independence

Taiwan president Lee Tenghui's "two states" theory, Taiwan presidential election, Lee Tenghui's visit of Cornell in 1995, Lee Tenghui's re-election as Taiwan's President, pro-Independent candidate Chen Shuibian's being elected as the president of Taiwan. Taiwan's returning back to the U.N.

20 = U.S. weapon deal with Taiwan

News about U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation, America's selling of F-15, Patriot Pac-3 antimissile systems, and other sophisticated weaponry system which may embolden Taiwan's independence movement.

21 = Tibet separation

Tibet's being occupied by CCP government in the 1950s and Dalai Lama's exile government in the U.S. ever since. The integrity of Tibet culture jeopardized by arbitrary ruling of the CCP government. The controversial selection of new live Buddha, Banchan XI, by the Chinese central government.

22 = Hong Kong and Marco handover

The negotiation between the Chinese government and the British government with regard to handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Hong Kong governor Chris Patten's legislative reform which triggered nasty strife between China and the U.K. The final handover of Hong Kong to China in July 1, 1997, The U.S. government's skepticism in regard to China's commitment to keeping Hong Kong's legal system intact and to respecting Hong Kong's political and economic freedom.

23 = China's foreign affairs with other countries

China's geopolitical diplomacy with Russian, Japan, India, Iran, Korea, Israel. China-Europe cooperation, the possibility of China-Russia military alliance, and China's vigorous diplomacy in Asia minor, South America, and Africa.

24 = China's environment and energy problem

The deterioration of environment in China due to single-minded economic development. The Three Gorge Dam Project and its negative effect on environment. The air pollution due to low exhaustion standard; The shortage of water, food, fuel due to the sudden economic takeoff.

25 = AIDS and other disease

The scandalous expansion of AIDS in China due to profit-driven blood gathering practice of local government which spread unsafe blood with astonishing speed.

26 = Chinese leaders

Profiling a Chinese leader upon his death or ascent to power.

27 = natural disaster, accident, and crash

Neutral reporting of earthquake, hurricane, derailling, forest fire, airplane crash, and other disasters in China.

28 = animal rights abuse and animal conservation

Chinese cuisine featuring Dog! Cat! and other endangered animals!

29 = others

30 = the U.S. government's propaganda against the Chinese government.

The failure or success of U.S. government's effort for peaceful revolution in China by way of VOA, Asia Liberty Satellite, etc.

7. 4P Frames on which the news and opinion items are based

01 = ideopolitical conflict - human rights, political

freedom (**principle**)

02 = geopolitical conflict - military rivalry,
proliferation, regional influence, etc. (**power**)

03 = economy and business - economic cooperation,
opportunity (**prosperity**)

04 = common interest - environment, energy, disease,
population, reconciliation (**peace**)

05 = can not be attributed to the 4Ps frame

According to Jentleson (2000), the U.S. foreign policy is usually made in the name of the national interest, which could be broken down to four goals or four frameworks of foreign policy theory: principle, power, prosperity, peace.³

Principle:⁴

Principle involves values, ideals, and beliefs for which the U.S. has claimed to stand in the world. Generally, the principle could be called democratic idealism. It has two central tenets: (1) "When tradeoffs have to be made, 'right' is to be chosen over 'might,'" i.e., the U.S. should "stand up for principles on which it was founded and not be just another player in global power politics" and struggle to be "the only monument of human rights... the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions shall ever become susceptible to its benign influence." (2) "In the long run 'right' makes for 'might,'" and "in the end interests like peace and power are well served by principles." By promoting democracies, the U.S. actually promote peace. Principle is where the "soft power" of the U.S. lies. The value, belief, reputation, and cultural attractiveness of the U.S. can have quite practical value as source of influence. Overall, democratic idealism has an implicit optimism about human nature.

Based on the "principle" framework, those items which highlight the ideopolitical conflict between the U.S. and China are principle-minded.

³ Bruce W. Jentleson: American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century, p. 10-24.

⁴ ibid, p. 16-18

Power:⁵

Power theory is hardheaded and a realistic view of foreign affairs involves self-defense and preservation of national independence and territory. It also includes the might which would enable a country to prevent, deflect, and defeat threats to its security, to assert itself, to advance its own interest and to be aggressive. Its basic rationale is that international relations are struggles for power. Conflict and competition are the basic reality of international politics. International relations are not a constant state of war, but a state of relentless security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background. Genuine peace, or a world in which states do not compete for power, is not likely. States thus ultimately can rely on themselves for security. Power is the ability to overcome obstacles and prevail in conflicts. It is the general capacity of a state to control the behavior of others. Power-based foreign policy pursues a strong defense and a credible deterrence (being perceived by others in the international system as having the will to use its capacities). Power-based foreign policy strategies include coercive intervention and military alliance against a mutual enemy. Power-based diplomacy also tolerates covert action, the secret operation.

Prosperity:⁶

Prosperity theory requires that foreign policy be motivated by pursuit of prosperity and places the economic national interest above other concerns. Most generally, prosperity-driven policy involves efforts to strengthen global capitalism as the structure of the international economy.

There are two versions of prosperity theory. One is international political economy, a benign view of prosperity theory as pursuing a favorable balance of trade, strong economic growth, a healthy macro-economy. The other is a critical view of prosperity as imperialism – foreign policy is dominated by and serving the interest of the capitalist class and other elites, such as multinational corporations and major banks. The prosperity that is sought is more for the private benefit of special interests, and the ways in which it is sought are highly exploitative of other countries.

Peace:⁷

⁵ Bruce W. Jentleson: American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century, pp. 10-13

⁶ *ibid*, pp. 14-16.

Peace theory also is called liberal internationalism. This views world politics as a cultivable garden in contrast to the realist view of a global jungle. Although they stop well short of world government, these theories emphasize the possibility and the value of reducing the chances of war and of achieving common interests sufficiently for the international system to be one of world order. Conflict and tensions do exist, but cooperation among nations is possible and beneficial. Pursuing cooperation this is neither naïve nor dangerous, but rather a rational way to reduce risk and make gains that even the most powerful state could not achieve solely on its own. International institutions can manage problems lest they get out of control. Collective action, coordination, and international institution provide the structure and the commitment to facilitate, and in some instances require, the fulfillment of commitments to collective action and coordination.

8. Major citation in supporting the main point

Name _____

The name of the people being cited in support of the main point in the article

Author type of the people being cited _____

Use the same coding protocol as defined in "5 Author type of opinion pieces."

Affiliation or association _____

Record his/her title, job position, and organizations he/she works for.

9. The importance level of human rights in U.S.-China relation argued in this article

⁷ Bruce W. Jentleson: American foreign policy: The dynamics of choice in the 21st century, p. 14-16.

0 1 2 3

0 ===== N/A

1 ===== Marginal

2 ===== Important

3 ===== Crucial

Level 0 designates no mention of the issue.

Level 1 designates the lowest level of importance by which it means that the U.S. should accommodate China's definition of human rights as "right to live," allow economic survival rights to take precedence over the political liberty, and thus, drop human rights issue from U.S.-China relationships.

Level 2 designates the moderate level of importance by which it means that the U.S. could implement human rights agenda via economic transaction, dialogue, and engagemental diplomacy.

Level 3 designates the highest level of importance by which it means that the U.S. should enforce human rights standards strictly and straightforwardly link human rights issues with other issues of U.S.-China relation.

**10. The article argue for the importance level of U.S.-
China trade as**

— — — —
0 1 2 3

0 ===== N/A

1 ===== Marginal

2 ===== Important

3 ===== Crucial

Level 0 designates no mention of the issue

Level 1 designates the lowest level of importance by which it means that the U.S. should enforce economic sanction against China if China fails to meet

human right standards.

Level 2 designates the moderate level of importance by which it means that the U.S. should do business with China in the hope that business relation and economic liberty could bring about political liberty in China. Also the U.S. business should enforce ethical code when do business in China. For example, U.S. business should stay aside from China's controversial Three Gorge Dam project which is believed to endanger ecological balance.

Level 3 designates the highest level of importance by which it means that the U.S. should not stay aside China's huge market, and should develop normal trade with China regardless of China's human rights record.

11. The article argues that the United States should pursue a U.S.-China policy as

—	—	—	—
0	1	2	3

0 ===== N/A

1 ===== Containment

2 ===== Congagement

3 ===== Engagement

"0" designates no mention of the issue.

"1" designates **containment** policy stance by which it means that the U.S. should contain communist China by isolating China, sanctioning China, stopping U.S.-China economic relation, enforcing human rights standard ruthlessly, and supporting Taiwan's independence, etc.

"2" designate **congagement** policy stance by which it means that the U.S. should preserve the hope inherent in engagement policy while deterring China from becoming hostile and hedging against the possibility that a strong China might challenge U.S. interests. According to Khalilzad (1999), one of the three most important neoconservative thinkers, "**congagement**" is a combination of **containment and engagement** by which the U.S. can "continue to try to bring

China into the current international system while giving equal attention to deterrence and preparing for a possible Chinese challenge to this system while seeking to convince the Chinese leadership that a challenge would be difficult to prepare and extremely risky to pursue." (Rand Paper)

"3" represents **engagement**, i.e., keeping dialogue with China with regard to human rights and trade issue, expanding economic relations with China in the hope that liberalization of economy could bring about liberalization of Chinese society, acknowledging China's strategic role to reduce global warming, nuclear proliferation, and regional conflicts in the post-Cold War era, etc.)

ID	Date	Print TV	Item Type	News Author	Op-Ed Author	Issue	4P	Major Citation	Author Type	Affiliation	Imp Human	Imp Trade	Cont- Enga
1	01/01/93	2	2		5	3	1	Jack Germond	5	Baltimore Sun	3	0	0
2	01/06/93	1	1	1		2	1	Robin Munro	13	Asia Watch	3	0	0
3	01/11/93	1	2		11	3	1		11		3	2	0
4	01/15/93	1	1	1		1	3				3	2	2
5	01/19/93	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
6	02/14/93	1	1	1		13	3	Lawrence H. Summers,	10	the former World Bank chief economist	3	3	3
7	02/15/93	1	1	1		9	3	Ronnie Y. Cheong	12		0	2	0
8	02/21/93	2	1	1		3	1	Wong Dong	16	Chinese dissident	3	0	0
9	02/27/93	1	1	1		1	1	Bill Clinton	6	President of the United States	3	2	2
10	03/10/93	1	2		9	9	3		9		0	3	3
11	03/11/93	1	1	1		12	1				3	2	0
12	03/16/93	2	1	1		3	1	Lee Peng	17	China's Prime Minister	1	3	0
13	03/16/93	1	1	1		22	2	Li Peng	17	China's Prime Minister	0	0	0
14	03/26/93	1	1	1		5	3				2	0	0
15	03/29/93	2	2		3	14	2	KIM KYUNG WON	22	Korean Institute of Defense Analysis	0	0	1
16	03/31/93	2	2		10	13	3	Mr. C. H. Kwan	10	Nomura Research Inst	0	3	3
17	04/01/93	1	1	1		26	1	Li Peng	17	China's Prime Minister	1	3	0
18	04/02/93	2	2		3	22	1	MARIA TAM	17	Advisor to Chinese government	3	0	3
19	04/09/93	1	2		4	1	1				3	1	1
20	04/13/93	2	1	1		8	3	LEONARD WOODCOSK	8	Fmr. U.S. Ambassador to China	0	3	3
21	04/13/93	1	1	1		22	1				3	3	0
22	04/19/93	1	1	1		21	1		13	International Campaign for Tibet	2	0	0
23	04/20/93	2	2		12	1	1	Sidney Rittenberg	12	consultant to Americans doing business in China	1	3	3
24	04/26/93	1	1	1		3	1				3	2	0
25	04/27/93	1	2		4	21	1				3	1	1
26	04/30/93	1	1	1		19	4				0	3	0
27	05/09/93	1	1	1		23	1				3	0	0
28	05/13/93	1	1	1		1	1		6		3	2	2
29	05/16/93	2	2		7	8	3	Sen. GEORGE MITCHELL	7		2	2	3
30	05/16/93	1	1	1		4	1				2	0	0
31	05/19/93	1	2		15	8	3				2	3	3
32	05/22/93	2	1	1		8	3	Jiang Zemin	17	Chinese President	2	3	3
33	05/23/93	1	1	1		23	1				2	0	0
34	05/26/93	1	2		2	2	1				3	0	0
35	05/26/93	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
36	05/28/93	2	2		7	8	1	RICHARD BRECHER	12	U.S. China Business Council	3	3	3
37	05/30/93	1	1	1		8	1				3	3	0
38	06/06/93	1	1	1		28	4	Amy S. M. Lau,	18		2	0	3
39	06/11/93	2	1	1		6	1	JOHN WU	26	Immigration Attorney	2	0	0

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40	06/11/93	1	2		25	6	4				2	0	3
41	06/20/93	2	1	1		23	3				0	3	0
42	06/20/93	1	1	1		29	4				1	0	0
43	06/25/93	1	2		12	7	4				0	0	3
44	06/29/93	2	1	1		28	1	RICHARD MOORE	13	International Fund for Animal Welfare	3	0	0
45	07/04/93	1	1	1		3	1		24	a young entrepreneur	3	2	0
46	07/06/93	2	1	1		8	3	Bill Clinton	6	President of the United States	0	3	0
47	07/17/93	1	1	1		23	4		17		0	2	0
48	07/19/93	1	1	2		22	3		18		0	2	0
49	07/22/93	1	2		16	2	1				3	2	1
50	07/24/93	1	1	1		14	2		22	a senior Asian diplomat	0	0	1
51	07/26/93	2	1	1		12	1	Sen. BILL BRADLEY	7		3	0	0
52	07/30/93	1	1	1		3	1	Robin Munro	13	Asia Watch	3	0	0
53	08/06/93	1	1	2		27	4				0	0	0
54	08/09/93	1	2		15	12	4				0	0	3
55	08/11/93	1	1	2		29	4		24	The hijacker, identified as Shi Yuebo	3	0	0
56	08/20/93	1	1	1		2	1	Han Dongfang	16		3	0	1
57	08/25/93	2	1	1		15	2				0	2	2
58	08/31/93	1	2		9	26	4				0	0	0
59	09/03/93	1	1	1		18	2				0	0	1
60	09/08/93	2	1	3		28	4	JOHNNY ROBERTS	13	Save the Rhino Intl	0	0	0
61	09/09/93	1	1	2		22	1				3	0	0
62	09/17/93	2	1	1		15	2	BRENT SCOWCROFT	8	Fmr. Natl. Security Adviser	0	0	3
63	09/17/93	1	1	2		15	2		11	Natural Resources Defense Council	0	0	2
64	09/23/93	2	1	1		12	1	HE SHENLIANG	17		1	0	0
65	09/24/93	2	2		3	12	1	CHINOY	1	CNN correspondent	3	0	0
66	09/24/93	1	2		2	12	1				3	2	2
67	09/26/93	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
68	09/28/93	1	2		9	3	1				3	2	0
69	10/05/93	2	1	1		15	2				0	0	1
70	10/06/93	1	1	1		15	2	Bill Clinton	6	President of the United States	2	2	2
71	10/13/93	1	1	1		14	2		6	CIA	0	0	1
72	10/14/93	2	2		26	3	1				2	0	0
73	10/21/93	2	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
74	10/23/93	1	2		2	1	1				3	2	2
75	10/28/93	1	1	1		1	3	Alexander M. Haig Jr.	8	former Secretary of State	1	3	3
76	11/04/93	2	1	3		27	4				0	0	0
77	11/05/93	1	1	1		27	5				0	0	0
78	11/10/93	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	2

ID	Date	Print TV	Item Type	News Author	Op-Ed Author	Issue	4P	Major Citation	Author Type	Affiliation	Imp Human	Imp Trade	Cont- Enga
79	11/14/93	1	1	1		22	5				2	0	0
80	11/17/93	1	2		9	26	4				0	0	0
81	11/18/93	2	1	1		2	1				3	2	3
82	11/19/93	1	2		8	19	2				0	0	1
83	11/19/93	1	1	1		8	2				2	2	2
84	11/22/93	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
85	11/25/93	1	1	2		27	5				0	0	0
86	11/28/93	2	2		3	13	3				1	3	0
87	12/05/93	1	1	2		15	2				0	0	0
88	12/08/93	1	2		4	24	4				0	0	3
89	12/17/93	2	1	1		3	1	LODI GYARI	13	Intl. Campaign for Tibet	3	0	0
90	12/22/93	1	1	1		13	3		12	Shanghai Volkswagen	2	3	3
91	12/27/93	1	1	2		3	1				0	0	0
92	12/28/93	2	1	1		22	3	HOWARD GORGES	12	South China Securities	0	3	0
93	01/05/94	2	1	1		30	5				0	0	0
94	01/13/94	1	1	1		23	3		22	France Foreign Minister	0	3	3
95	01/17/94	2	1	1		8	1	Stapleton Roy	6	U.S. Ambassador	2	3	3
96	01/21/94	1	1	1		7	1		6	anonymous	3	2	3
97	01/24/94	2	2		16	3	1	Wei Jingsheng	16	Chinese Democracy Advocate	3	3	2
98	01/27/94	1	1	1		8	3	Senator Max Baucus	7		2	3	3
99	01/28/94	1	1	1		27	5				0	0	0
100	02/04/94	2	1	1		2	1				3	2	0
101	02/05/94	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
102	02/15/94	1	2		11	21	1				3	0	0
103	02/24/94	2	1	1		22	1		18		3	0	0
104	02/25/94	1	1	1		22	1				3	0	0
105	03/03/94	1	1	1		3	1	John Shattuck	6	the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights	2	2	3
106	03/07/94	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
107	03/10/94	2	1	1		3	1				3	2	0
108	03/11/94	1	1	1		3	1	Xu Liangying	24	historian of the Academy of Sciences	3	0	0
109	03/12/94	2	1	1		7	1				3	2	0
110	03/13/94	1	1	1		7	1				3	1	2
111	03/14/94	2	1	1		7	3	PHILLIP CARMICHAEL	12	American Chamber of Commerce	3	3	3
112	03/14/94	1	1	1		26	5				0	0	0
113	03/16/94	1	2		2	1	1				3	1	2
114	03/20/94	2	2		12	8	3	WILLARD WORKMAN	12	International, U.S. Chamber of Commerce	2	3	3
115	03/21/94	2	1	1		23	4				0	0	0
116	03/21/94	1	1	1		23	3				2	3	3
117	03/23/94	2	1	1		23	2	WARREN CHRISTOPHER	6	Secretary of State	0	0	3

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118	03/24/94	1	2		4	2	1				3	1	1
119	03/25/94	1	1	1		1	1	Bill Clinton	6	President of the United States	3	2	2
120	03/29/94	2	1	1		8	3	WINSTON LORD	6	Asst. Secretary of State for East Asia	2	3	2
121	03/30/94	1	1	1		8	3				3	2	2
122	04/02/94	1	1	1		2	1	Wei Jingsheng	16		3	2	2
123	04/04/94	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
124	04/05/94	2	1	1		9	3	ANN BROWN	13	Consumer Product Safety Commission	0	2	2
125	04/07/94	1	2		2	2	1				3	2	2
126	04/10/94	1	1	1		4	1		19		3	0	0
127	04/19/94	1	1	1		4	5	Lee Teng-hui	20	Taiwan's President	3	0	0
128	04/23/94	2	1	1		1	4		24	anonymous	1	0	3
129	04/23/94	2	2		3	1	4	DAVID GERGEN	8	Counselor to Clinton & Fmr Nixon Speechwriter	2	0	3
130	04/29/94	1	2		9	29	1	Xu Liangying	9		3	0	3
131	04/30/94	1	1	1		21	1				3	2	0
132	05/05/94	2	1	2		3	1	ANCHI LUE	21	CTS, Taiwan	3	0	1
133	05/05/94	1	1	1		5	3		17		0	0	0
134	05/10/94	2	1	1		8	3	Rep. LEE HAMILTON	7		2	3	3
135	05/11/94	1	1	1		8	3	Lee Hamilton	7	representative	2	3	3
136	05/13/94	2	1	1		22	3	Mr. TANG	19		1	3	3
137	05/15/94	1	1	1		2	1		24		3	0	0
138	05/17/94	2	1	1		11	1	RON BROWN	6	Commerce Secretary	3	3	2
139	05/20/94	1	2		4	3	1	Nancy Pelosi	7		3	1	1
140	05/21/94	2	2		3	8	1	RON BROWN	6	Commerce Secretary	3	3	3
141	05/24/94	1	1	1		5	2		22		0	0	3
142	05/25/94	2	1	1		8	1	SIDNEY JONES	13	Asia Watch	3	1	1
143	05/25/94	2	1	1		8	3				3	3	0
144	05/26/94	2	2		3	8	3				3	3	3
145	05/26/94	2	2		3	8	3				2	3	3
146	05/26/94	2	1	1		8	3	MICHAEL OKSENBERG	11	East-West Center	3	3	3
147	05/26/94	2	1	1		8	1				3	2	2
148	05/27/94	2	2		6	8	3	PAUL BEGALA	6	Clinton Political Adviser	2	3	3
149	05/27/94	1	1	1		8	3	Bill Clinton	6	President of the United States	2	3	3
150	05/27/94	1	2		4	3	1				3	1	1
151	05/28/94	2	1	1		8	1	Senator MAX BAUCUS	7		3	3	3
152	05/28/94	1	1	1		8	3		22	anonymous	2	3	3
153	06/02/94	2	1	1		5	1	ROBIN MUNRO	13	Asia Watch	3	0	0
154	06/03/94	2	1	1		23	4	JAMES LILLEY	11	American Enterprise Institute	0	0	3
155	06/05/94	1	1	1		2	1		24		2	0	0
156	06/09/94	2	1	1		23	4				0	0	3

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157	06/11/94	2	1	1		23	4				0	0	0
158	06/11/94	1	1	1		15	2				0	0	0
159	06/27/94	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	3
160	07/07/94	1	2		11	19	2				0	0	0
161	07/19/94	1	1	1		24	4				0	0	0
162	07/24/94	1	1	1		2	1		22	anonymous	3	0	0
163	07/25/94	2	1	1		8	3	RICHARD BRECHER	12	U.S.-China Business Council	1	3	3
164	08/07/94	1	1	1		15	5				0	0	0
165	08/16/94	1	1	2		29	5				0	0	0
166	08/22/94	1	2		2	6	1				3	0	0
167	08/26/94	1	2		10	6	3				2	0	3
168	08/29/94	2	2		3	8	3				2	3	3
169	08/29/94	1	1	1		2	1		22	anonymous	3	0	2
170	09/02/94	1	2		15	28	4				2	0	3
171	09/04/94	1	1	1		23	2	Yeltsin	22	Russian President	0	3	0
172	09/10/94	1	1	1		24	5				2	2	0
173	09/20/94	2	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
174	09/20/94	1	1	2		22	1				3	0	0
175	09/21/94	1	2		15	28	1				3	0	2
176	09/27/94	1	1	1		15	2		22	anonymous	2	3	3
177	10/03/94	1	1	1		26	1				3	0	0
178	10/12/94	1	1	2		2	1				2	0	0
179	10/20/94	2	1	1		22	5				0	0	0
180	11/05/94	1	1	2		22	1				2	0	0
181	11/07/94	1	2		2	8	3				2	3	0
182	11/13/94	2	1	1		1	1	Bill Clinton	6	President of the United States	3	0	0
183	11/14/94	2	1	1		2	1				3	1	0
184	11/14/94	1	1	1		15	2				2	3	3
185	11/22/94	1	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
186	12/09/94	2	1	1		27	5				0	0	0
187	12/09/94	1	1	2		27	5				0	0	0
188	12/16/94	1	1	1		5	1	Xiao	17	Governor of Sichuan Province	2	3	0
189	12/20/94	1	2		2	3	1				3	2	2
190	12/27/94	1	1	1		24	1	Guo	17		0	2	0
191	12/28/94	2	1	1		21	1				3	0	0
192	12/31/94	2	2		7	3	1	Richard Nixon		Former President of The United States	3	3	3
193	01/01/95	1	1	2		9	3				0	2	1
194	01/09/95	1	1	1		3	1		24		2	0	0
195	01/14/95	1	1	2		14	2	Perry, Secretary of Defense	6		0	0	3

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196	01/17/95	1	2		5	3	4		24		1	0	3
197	01/28/95	1	2		15	23	5				0	0	0
198	02/04/95	2	1	1		10	3	MICKEY KANTOR	6	U.S. Trade Representative	0	3	2
199	02/05/95	1	1	1		9	3	Representative Philip M. Crane	7		0	2	2
200	02/07/95	1	2		4	2	1	Harry Wu	16		3	1	1
201	02/10/95	2	2		3	1	2	JAMES LILLEY	11	American Enterprise Institute	3	2	1
202	02/19/95	1	2		13	3	1				3	0	0
203	02/19/95	1	1	1		14	2		22		0	0	2
204	02/25/95	2	1	1		10	3				0	3	2
205	02/26/95	1	1	1		9	3				0	3	2
206	03/02/95	1	1	1		2	1	State Dept. Winston Lord	6		3	0	1
207	03/10/95	1	1	2		21	1	Dalai Lama	23		2	0	0
208	03/18/95	2	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
209	03/24/95	1	2		2	23	1				0	0	0
210	03/29/95	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
211	04/11/95	1	1	1		26	1				2	0	0
212	04/16/95	1	2		9	3	1		2		3	0	0
213	04/18/95	1	1	1		1	1	Mr. Christopher	6	Secretary of State	3	0	2
214	04/18/95	2	1	1		15	2				0	0	0
215	04/24/95	1	1	1		4	1				2	0	0
216	05/06/95	1	2		13	2	1				3	0	0
217	05/08/95	1	1	1		4	1		24		2	0	0
218	05/15/95	1	1	2		21	5	Dalai Lama	23		2	0	0
219	05/18/95	1	1	2		21	5				0	0	0
220	05/20/95	1	2		2	3	1		16		3	0	0
221	05/22/95	1	1	2		2	5				2	0	0
222	05/22/95	2	1	1		23	2				0	0	2
223	05/25/95	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
224	05/26/95	1	2		4	21	4	Secretary of State Christopher	6		0	0	3
225	05/31/95	1	1	2		15	2	Kozo Igarashi	22	Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan	0	0	2
226	06/05/95	1	1	2		3	1				3	0	0
227	06/12/95	1	2		4	3	1		24		3	0	2
228	06/13/95	1	1	2		19	2	Lee Teng-hui	20	Taiwan's President	0	0	2
229	06/19/95	1	1	2		2	5				2	0	0
230	06/29/95	1	1	1		2	1	WINSTON LORD	6		3	0	3
231	07/02/95	1	2		2	1	2				3	2	1
232	07/03/95	2	2	2		1	3				2	3	2
233	07/06/95	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
234	07/09/95	2	1	1		1	2	Prof. JOHN FRANKENSTEIN	19	Hong Kong University	0	0	1

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235	07/10/95	1	1	1		2	1		16		3	1	1
236	07/11/95	1	2		2	2	1				3	0	1
237	07/11/95	1	1	1		19	3				0	3	2
238	07/12/95	2	2		7	1	1	Rep. NANCY PELOSI	7		3	2	2
239	07/13/95	1	1	1		23	1	the Green Party	22		3	3	0
240	07/17/95	1	1	1		2	1	ROBIN MUNRO	13	Asia Watch	3	0	2
241	07/20/95	2	1	1		8	3	Rep. RICHARD GEPHARDT	7		3	3	2
242	07/23/95	1	1	2		19	2		20		0	0	0
243	07/27/95	1	1	1		19	5				0	0	0
244	07/27/95	2	1	1		3	1	Harry Wu	16		2	0	2
245	07/30/95	1	2		2	2	1				3	1	1
246	07/31/95	1	1	1		2	1	Mr. Christopher	6	Secretary of State	3	1	1
247	08/03/95	1	1	1		18	2	Mr. Baum	9		0	0	1
248	08/10/95	1	1	2		2	1				2	0	0
249	08/10/95	2	2		7	1	1				3	0	1
250	08/11/95	1	2		2	3	1				3	0	1
251	08/16/95	1	1	2		2	1				2	0	0
252	08/19/95	2	2		12	13	3				1	3	3
253	08/20/95	1	2		4	1	2	Henry Kissinger	8		3	1	1
254	08/21/95	1	1	1		2	1	Bob Dole	7		3	2	1
255	08/23/95	2	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
256	08/24/95	1	1	1		7	1				3	0	1
257	08/24/95	2	2		9	2	2				3	0	3
258	08/24/95	2	1	1		2	1				3	0	2
259	08/24/95	2	1	1		2	2				3	0	2
260	08/25/95	2	1	1		2	1	Harry Wu	16		3	0	2
261	08/26/95	1	2		20	19	5				0	0	1
262	08/26/95	1	1	1		7	1		6	anonymous	3	0	3
263	08/26/95	2	2		15	2	1				1	3	3
264	08/27/95	2	2		5	2	1	ARIANNA HUFFINGTON	5		3	0	1
265	08/29/95	1	1	1		19	1	Jimmy Lin	21		3	0	1
266	08/29/95	2	2		12	1	3	ROBERT KAPP	12	President, U.S.-China Business Council	2	3	3
267	09/02/95	1	1	1		3	1		22		3	0	2
268	09/03/95	2	1	1		23	1				3	0	2
269	09/04/95	2	1	1		23	1				2	0	0
270	09/05/95	1	2		22	3	1				2	0	0
271	09/05/95	2	2		3	3	1				2	0	3
272	09/06/95	1	1	1		7	1		6	anonymous	3	0	2
273	09/06/95	2	2		6	23	1				3	0	1

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274	09/08/95	2	2		5	23	1				3	0	1
275	09/10/95	1	1	1		2	1				0	0	0
276	09/10/95	2	1	1		23	4				0	0	0
277	09/13/95	1	2		5	3	1				2	0	0
278	09/13/95	2	1	1		6	1	XIE XIDE	17		2	0	3
279	09/14/95	2	1	1		23	3	CHEN SHU YUN	17		1	0	0
280	09/17/95	1	2		9	29	5				2	0	3
281	09/18/95	1	1	1		22	1	Gov. Christopher Patten	22		3	0	2
282	09/18/95	2	1	1		22	1	EMILY LAU	19		3	0	1
283	09/23/95	1	1	2		7	4				0	0	2
284	09/27/95	1	2		13	19	1		22		0	0	0
285	09/27/95	2	1	1		3	1		24		2	0	0
286	09/30/95	1	1	1		15	2				0	0	2
287	10/03/95	1	1	1		7	2		6		0	0	2
288	10/14/95	1	1	1		15	1				0	0	2
289	10/14/95	2	1	1		21	1				3	0	0
290	10/23/95	2	1	1		2	1		16		3	2	1
291	10/24/95	1	2		2	2	1				3	2	2
292	10/24/95	1	1	1		7	1		15		3	0	2
293	10/25/95	2	2		3	7	1	NICHOLAS LARDY	11	Brookings Institute	2	2	2
294	11/08/95	1	1	2		21	1		23		3	0	0
295	11/13/95	1	1	1		21	1		6		3	0	2
296	11/17/95	1	1	1		18	2				0	0	2
297	11/19/95	1	2		4	3	1				3	1	2
298	11/22/95	1	1	1		2	1		6		3	0	2
299	11/28/95	1	2		4	19	1				3	1	1
300	12/01/95	1	1	1		23	1				2	0	2
301	12/05/95	1	2		15	19	1	A. M. Rosenthal	4		3	1	1
302	12/10/95	1	1	1		23	1				0	0	0
303	12/12/95	1	2		4	3	1				3	1	1
304	12/12/95	2	1	1		2	1	Wei Jingsheng	16		3	0	2
305	12/14/95	1	1	1		2	1	Wei Jingsheng	16		3	0	1
306	12/18/95	1	1	1		2	1	Madeleine K. Albright	6	Chief American Representative in the U.N.	3	0	1
307	12/22/95	1	2		10	19	2	HK's South China Morning Post	19		0	0	1
308	12/26/95	2	1	1		5	3				0	0	0
309	12/29/95	1	1	1		23	2				2	2	2
310	01/04/96	2	1	1		19	2	ANDREW YANG	11	Council for Advanced Policy Studies	0	0	2
311	01/06/96	1	1	1		2	1	Robin Munro	13	Human Rights Watch	3	0	1
312	01/09/96	1	2		4	2	1	Human Rights Watch	13		3	1	1

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313	01/14/96	2	2		15	2	1	ROBIN MUNRO	13	Human Rights Watch	3	0	2
314	01/15/96	1	1	1		24	1		24		2	0	0
315	01/15/96	1	2		9	29	1				0	0	3
316	01/19/96	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
317	01/21/96	1	2		10	24	3				0	3	3
318	01/31/96	2	2		7	14	1	Nancy Pelosi	7	Representative of The United States	3	1	1
319	02/01/96	1	1	1		1	2		24		0	0	2
320	02/02/96	1	2		4	19	2				2	1	1
321	02/04/96	1	1	1		10	2	MICKEY KANTOR	6	Trade Representative of The United States	2	2	2
322	02/05/96	1	1	1		3	1				2	2	0
323	02/05/96	2	1	1		27	4				0	0	0
324	02/06/96	1	2		15	8	1				3	1	1
325	02/09/96	1	2		6	8	3				0	2	3
326	02/10/96	2	1	1		9	2		12		0	2	2
327	02/11/96	1	1	2		19	4	Lee Teng-hui	20	Taiwan's President	0	0	2
328	02/15/96	1	2		11	19	4				2	3	3
329	02/20/96	1	1	1		10	3	Wang Binyan	24	Cai Ling Audio and Video Company	0	2	2
330	02/20/96	2	1	1		19	2	DAVID LAMPTON	13	President, U.S. Committee on China Relations	0	0	2
331	02/25/96	1	2		9	3	4				2	0	3
332	03/01/96	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	3
333	03/05/96	2	2		12	19	3	BRAD WHITWORTH	12	Hewlett Packard	0	3	3
334	03/06/96	1	1	1		21	1		13	Amnesty International	3	0	2
335	03/07/96	1	2		9	19	4				0	0	3
336	03/07/96	2	1	1		19	2				0	0	2
337	03/09/96	1	1	1		19	2		20		0	0	2
338	03/09/96	2	1	1		18	2	Mr. Christopher	6	Secretary of State	0	0	1
339	03/10/96	2	1	1		18	2				0	0	2
340	03/11/96	2	1	1		18	2	WILLIAM PERRY	6	Defense Secretary	0	0	2
341	03/11/96	2	2		3	18	2	WILLIAM PERRY	6	Defense Secretary	0	0	2
342	03/11/96	2	1	1		18	2	PATRICK BUCHANAN	8	Presidential Candidate	0	0	1
343	03/12/96	1	2		4	14	2				0	0	1
344	03/12/96	2	2		12	18	3	ROBERT HORMATS	12	Goldman Sachs International	0	3	2
345	03/12/96	2	1	1		19	3				0	2	0
346	03/15/96	1	2		9	1	4				1	3	3
347	03/15/96	2	1	1		18	2				0	0	2
348	03/16/96	2	2		7	18	1	Sen. JESSE HELMS	7	Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	3	0	2
349	03/18/96	1	1	2		18	2	Lee Teng-hui	20	Taiwan's President	0	0	1
350	03/18/96	2	2		11	19	4	STANLEY ROTH	11	U.S. Institute of Peace	0	0	3
351	03/18/96	2	1	1		19	2				0	0	0

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352	03/19/96	1	1	1		19	2	Adm. James O. Ellis	6	the commander of the naval group	0	0	2
353	03/20/96	1	1	2		18	2				0	0	2
354	03/21/96	2	1	1		19	1		24		0	0	3
355	03/21/96	2	1	1		18	3	SIMON LIN	21	President, Acer, Inc.	0	3	3
356	03/22/96	1	1	1		18	2	Defense Secretary William Perry	6		0	0	1
357	03/22/96	2	1	1		18	3	DAVID HANDRIX	12	Global Consumer Banking, Citibank	0	3	3
358	03/23/96	2	2		5	18	2	Dr. MARY BROWN BULLOCK		China Analyst	0	0	2
359	03/23/96	2	1	1		19	1				0	0	2
360	03/24/96	1	1	1		19	1		20		3	0	1
361	03/24/96	1	2		4	19	4		22		2	0	3
362	03/25/96	2	1	1		19	2	DAVID LAMPTON	13	Pres. Natl. Cmte. on U.S. China Relations	0	0	2
363	03/26/96	1	1	1		21	1		13	Tibet Info Network & Human Rights Watch	3	0	1
364	03/27/96	1	2		9	19	4				0	0	3
365	03/28/96	2	2		12	8	3				1	3	2
366	04/01/96	1	1	1		22	1		19		3	0	1
367	04/01/96	1	2		4	29	5				0	0	3
368	04/10/96	1	1	1		3	1	Geremie R. Barme	10	a China scholar	3	0	0
369	04/14/96	2	1	1		13	3				0	0	0
370	04/15/96	1	1	1		20	2				0	0	2
371	04/17/96	1	2		4	1	4	Secretary Shultz	8		2	0	3
372	04/23/96	1	1	1		1	2	Zhu Chengshan	24		1	3	2
373	04/27/96	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	2
374	05/02/96	1	2		4	3	1				3	2	1
375	05/04/96	1	1	1		2	1		6		2	0	3
376	05/08/96	2	2		18	22	3	CHRIS PATTEN	18	Gov. of Hong Kong	3	3	2
377	05/10/96	1	1	1		1	3	Bob Dole	7		2	3	1
378	05/10/96	2	1	1		8	2				0	3	3
379	05/15/96	1	2		9	8	1				2	3	3
380	05/15/96	2	2		6	10	3	Ms. Barshefsky	6	Trade Representative of The United States	0	3	2
381	05/15/96	2	1	1		10	1	Ms. Barshefsky	6	Trade Representative of The United States	0	3	2
382	05/16/96	2	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
383	05/18/96	1	1	1		1	2	Secretary of State Christopher	6		2	3	2
384	05/18/96	2	1	1		10	3				0	3	1
385	05/20/96	2	1	1		1	3		6		0	3	3
386	05/20/96	2	2		3	1	1				3	2	1
387	05/22/96	1	1	1		13	3		24		0	0	0
388	05/23/96	2	1	1		9	5				0	0	0
389	05/28/96	1	1	1		3	1		24		3	0	0
390	06/03/96	1	1	2		23	3				0	0	0

ID	Date	Print TV	Item Type	News Author	Op-Ed Author	Issue	4P	Major Citation	Author Type	Affiliation	Imp Human	Imp Trade	Cont- Enga
391	06/04/96	2	1	1		3	1		16		3	0	0
392	06/07/96	1	1	1		15	4				0	0	2
393	06/10/96	1	1	2		2	1				3	0	0
394	06/12/96	1	2		13	3	1		18		3	0	2
395	06/17/96	2	1	1		10	3		12		0	3	3
396	06/17/96	2	1	1		10	3				0	3	0
397	06/18/96	1	1	1		10	3	Ms. Barshefsky	6	Trade Representative of The United States	0	3	3
398	06/28/96	1	1	1		8	3	Representative Sam M. Gibbons	7		3	3	2
399	06/29/96	2	1	1		13	3		24		1	3	0
400	07/04/96	1	1	2		2	1	Amnesty International	13		3	0	0
401	07/11/96	1	1	1		2	1		24		3	0	0
402	07/23/96	1	2		9	1	2				0	0	3
403	07/25/96	1	1	1		1	4		6	anonymous	2	2	3
404	07/29/96	1	1	2		15	2				0	0	2
405	08/05/96	2	1	1		27	5				0	0	0
406	08/13/96	1	1	2		19	5				0	0	0
407	08/26/96	1	1	1		15	2				0	3	3
408	08/30/96	1	2		4	15	2				0	0	1
409	09/01/96	2	1	1		22	1		19		2	0	0
410	09/10/96	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
411	09/15/96	2	2		7	9	3		7		2	2	2
412	09/19/96	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
413	10/06/96	1	1	1		24	1		24		0	0	0
414	10/10/96	1	1	1		2	1	Human Rights Watch	13		3	0	0
415	10/11/96	1	2		2	2	1				0	2	2
416	10/15/96	2	2		9	3	1		9		2	0	0
417	10/16/96	1	1	1		23	2		22		0	0	3
418	10/21/96	1	2		4	3	1				3	1	2
419	10/25/96	1	1	1		25	1				2	0	0
420	10/29/96	1	2		4	17	1				3	1	1
421	10/31/96	1	1	1		2	1		6		3	0	2
422	11/05/96	1	2		17	13	3				0	3	3
423	11/07/96	2	1	1		24	4				0	2	3
424	11/08/96	1	1	2		2	1				3	0	0
425	11/15/96	1	2		13	25	4				0	0	3
426	11/17/96	2	1	1		13	3				1	3	0
427	11/19/96	1	1	2		23	4				0	0	0
428	11/19/96	2	1	1		25	4		17		0	0	0
429	11/20/96	2	1	1		9	3	LAWRENCE SUMMERS	6	DEPUTY TREASURY SECRETARY	0	3	3

ID	Date	Print TV	Item Type	News Author	Op-Ed Author	Issue	4P	Major Citation	Author Type	Affiliation	Imp Human	Imp Trade	Cont- Enga
430	11/20/96	2	1	1		7	3	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	0	3	3
431	11/24/96	2	2		11	7	4	JAMES LILLEY	11	Fmr U.S. AMBASSADOR TO China	1	3	3
432	11/24/96	2	1	1		7	3				1	0	3
433	11/25/96	1	1	1		7	1	Human Rights Watch	13		3	3	2
434	11/26/96	2	1	1		13	3		24		0	3	0
435	11/27/96	1	2		2	3	1				3	1	1
436	11/30/96	1	1	1		23	2		22		0	0	2
437	11/30/96	2	1	1		9	1	JAMES MCGREGOR	12	AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE	2	3	3
438	12/03/96	1	2		18	22	1				0	0	2
439	12/05/96	1	1	1		23	1	Human Rights Watch	13		2	0	0
440	12/05/96	2	1	1		13	3		24		2	3	0
441	12/07/96	2	2		7	7	1	LIEBERMAN	7		2	3	3
442	12/08/96	1	1	1		24	4				0	0	0
443	12/10/96	2	1	1		22	1		18		0	3	2
444	12/12/96	1	1	1		23	4				0	0	0
445	12/13/96	1	2		4	3	1				3	1	1
446	12/14/96	2	1	1		28	4				0	0	0
447	12/18/96	1	1	1		22	3	Lee Kuan-yew	22	Singapore's leader	2	3	0
448	12/23/96	1	2		9	2	1				3	0	0
449	12/27/96	1	1	1		3	1		6		2	0	3
450	12/27/96	2	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
451	12/28/96	1	2		2	22	1				3	3	2
452	12/30/96	1	1	2		21	1				2	0	0
453	01/01/97	1	2		8	30	3				0	0	0
454	01/02/97	2	1	1		13	3		17		0	0	0
455	01/06/97	1	1	2		25	4				0	0	0
456	01/08/97	1	2		15	21	1				3	0	1
457	01/11/97	2	1	3		13	3		24		0	0	0
458	01/14/97	1	1	1		9	1				2	0	0
459	01/17/97	1	2		11	29	5				0	0	3
460	01/20/97	2	2		8	1	4	DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI	8	FMR. NATL. SECURITY ADVISER	0	0	3
461	01/20/97	1	1	1		3	1	Anthony Lake	6	National Security Adviser	2	0	2
462	01/23/97	1	2		2	3	1				3	2	1
463	01/26/97	2	2	1		23	2				0	0	0
464	01/26/97	1	1	1		3	1		24		3	0	0
465	01/30/97	2	1	1		2	3				2	3	3
466	01/30/97	1	1	1		2	1				3	1	2
467	02/02/97	2	1	1		8	3				0	0	0
468	02/06/97	1	1	1		3	1	Tong Yi	16		3	0	0

ID	Date	Print TV	Item Type	News Author	Op-Ed Author	Issue	4P	Major Citation	Author Type	Affiliation	Imp Human	Imp Trade	Cont- Enga
469	02/11/97	2	1	1		22	1	EMILY LAU, HK LEGISLATOR	18		3	0	1
470	02/13/97	2	2		5	17	2				0	0	0
471	02/14/97	1	1	1		23	1				0	0	0
472	02/15/97	2	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
473	02/16/97	1	2		13	3	1				2	0	3
474	02/18/97	2	1	1		17	5				0	0	0
475	02/19/97	2	2		3	26	3				3	3	0
476	02/19/97	2	2		2	26	2	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	0	0	3
477	02/19/97	2	2		8	26	3	RICHARD HOLBROOKE		Fmr. ASST. SECRETARY OF STATE	2	3	3
478	02/19/97	2	2		3	26	3				0	0	0
479	02/19/97	2	1	1		26	3				0	0	0
480	02/19/97	2	1	1		26	3				0	0	0
481	02/20/97	2	1	1		26	1				0	0	0
482	02/20/97	2	2		3	26	1				3	0	0
483	02/20/97	2	1	1		26	1				0	0	0
484	02/20/97	1	1	1		22	1	Andrew Nathan		prof. of Chinese politics at Columbia University	3	0	0
485	02/20/97	1	1	2		26	5				0	0	0
486	02/21/97	1	2		13	3	1				3	0	1
487	02/21/97	1	1	1		26	1		24		2	0	0
488	02/22/97	2	2		10	26	3	MARY BROWN BULLOCK	10	PRESIDENT, AGNES SCOTT COLLEGE	2	0	0
489	02/23/97	2	2		6	26	1	Nat'l Security Adviser Berger	6		2	3	3
490	02/23/97	2	1	3		26	1				3	0	0
491	02/23/97	1	1	1		3	1	Michael D. Swaine	13	Rand	3	0	2
492	02/24/97	1	2		15	21	1				3	0	0
493	02/25/97	2	1	1		26	1				0	0	0
494	02/25/97	1	1	1		7	1	MADELEINE ALBRIGHT	6	Secretary of State	3	0	3
495	02/26/97	1	2		10	3	1				3	0	2
496	02/26/97	1	1	1		4	5				0	0	0
497	02/28/97	2	1	1		17	1	Ross Munro	13	Human Rights Watch	0	0	2
498	02/28/97	1	2		4	22	1				3	0	1
499	03/01/97	1	1	1		1	1	Gary Bauer		president of the Family Research Council	3	1	1
500	03/03/97	2	2		5	17	2	Ross Munro	5	Human Rights Watch	0	0	2
501	03/03/97	1	2		4	1	3	Jonathan Hecht	11	consultant to Lawyers Cmt For Human Rights	2	2	3
502	03/05/97	1	1	1		1	1	Nicholas Burns	6	State Dept.' Spokesman	3	0	2
503	03/08/97	2	1	1		27	5				0	0	0
504	03/09/97	2	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
505	03/10/97	2	2		5	17	1				2	0	2
506	03/10/97	1	2		4	1	1		18		3	2	2
507	03/11/97	2	2		5	17	2	Ross Munro	5		0	0	2

ID	Date	Print TV	Item Type	News Author	Op-Ed Author	Issue	4P	Major Citation	Author Type	Affiliation	Imp Human	Imp Trade	Cont- Enga
508	03/11/97	2	1	1		17	5				0	0	2
509	03/12/97	2	1	1		17	5				0	0	0
510	03/13/97	1	2		2	17	2				0	0	2
511	03/16/97	2	1	1		1	4		24		0	0	0
512	03/16/97	1	1	2		23	0				0	0	0
513	03/17/97	2	2		8	17	1	JAMES LILLEY	8		0	0	2
514	03/21/97	1	2		2	3	1				3	0	2
515	03/21/97	1	1	1		23	3				0	0	0
516	03/22/97	2	1	1		7	4				0	0	0
517	03/24/97	2	1	1		7	1	Al Gore	6	vice President of The United States	2	0	0
518	03/28/97	2	1	1		3	1	JAMES LILLEY	8		0	0	2
519	03/28/97	1	2		9	3	1				2	0	2
520	03/28/97	1	1	2		23	2				0	0	0
521	03/30/97	2	2		3	1	1				2	0	2
522	03/30/97	1	2		15	3	1				2	1	2
523	03/31/97	1	1	1		19	2	NEWT GINGRICH	6	Speaker of House	3	0	2
524	04/02/97	2	1	1		7	3	NEWT GINGRICH	8	HOUSE SPEAKER	0	2	2
525	04/02/97	1	2		4	1	1				3	1	1
526	04/03/97	2	1	1		9	3	BOB ODUM	12	LOUISIANA AGRICULTURE COMMISSION	0	2	2
527	04/03/97	1	1	2		3	1				3	0	0
528	04/08/97	2	2		18	22	1	CHRIS PATTEN	18	Gov. of Hong Kong	3	0	0
529	04/09/97	1	1	2		23	2				3	0	2
530	04/10/97	2	1	1		22	1	MARTIN LEE	19	HONG KONG LEGISLATOR	3	0	2
531	04/11/97	1	2		15	3	1				2	0	0
532	04/13/97	1	1	1		22	4				0	0	0
533	04/16/97	1	1	1		23	1	MADELEINE ALBRIGHT	6	Secretary of State	3	0	2
534	04/18/97	1	2		2	22	1				3	1	1
535	04/18/97	1	1	2		4	1				0	0	0
536	04/22/97	2	2		23	21	1	Richard Gere	14	the actor and Buddhist	3	0	2
537	04/22/97	1	1	1		22	1	MARTIN LEE	19		2	0	0
538	04/23/97	1	2		13	22	1				3	0	1
539	04/24/97	1	1	1		21	1	Bill Clinton	6	President of the United States	3	0	2
540	04/27/97	1	1	2		4	5				0	0	0
541	04/29/97	2	1	1		17	1		17		0	0	3
542	04/29/97	1	2		4	3	1				3	1	1
543	04/30/97	1	1	2		27	5				0	0	0
544	05/06/97	1	1	1		22	1				2	0	0
545	05/09/97	2	2		3	22	1	PATRICK LEE	19	BUSINESSMAN	3	0	2
546	05/13/97	2	1	1		8	3	JOHN CHAFEE	7	(R) SENATOR, RHODE ISLAND	0	3	3

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547	05/16/97	1	1	1		22	1	Yueng Sum	19	a leader of the Democratic Party	2	0	0
548	05/18/97	2	1	3		23	4				0	3	0
549	05/19/97	2	1	1		8	3	Bill Clinton	6	President of the United States	2	3	3
550	05/20/97	2	1	1		22	4				0	0	0
551	05/21/97	2	2		6	9	3	ROBERT RUBIN	6	TREASURY SECRETARY	0	3	3
552	05/22/97	1	2		15	3	1				3	0	1
553	05/23/97	1	1	1		22	4				0	0	0
554	05/25/97	2	1	1		13	3	WEI JUN, CORRESPONDENT	17	SHANGHAI TV CHINA	0	0	0
555	05/28/97	1	2		4	1	1				3	1	1
556	05/30/97	1	1	2		3	1				0	0	0
557	06/03/97	2	2		16	3	1	Dai Qing	16		2	0	0
558	06/03/97	1	2		4	1	1				3	1	1
559	06/05/97	2	1	1		22	1		19		3	0	0
560	06/12/97	2	1	1		22	1	CHRIS PATTEN	18		3	0	2
561	06/12/97	1	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
562	06/17/97	1	2		15	3	1				3	0	0
563	06/19/97	2	1	1		22	1				3	3	2
564	06/19/97	1	1	2		1	1				3	1	2
565	06/20/97	1	1	1		1	1	Representative Dick Armey	6	majority leader in the House	3	2	2
566	06/22/97	2	1	1		22	1				2	0	0
567	06/23/97	2	1	1		22	1	CHRIS PATTEN	18		3	0	0
568	06/24/97	2	2		22	22	4	MAJ. GEN. BYRAN DUTTON	22	COMMANDER, BRITISH FORCES	2	0	3
569	06/24/97	2	1	1		22	4				0	0	0
570	06/25/97	1	1	1		22	1	Sister Betty Ann Maheu	19	editor	3	3	2
571	06/26/97	2	1	1		22	1		19		3	0	2
572	06/26/97	2	1	1		22	3				0	2	0
573	06/26/97	1	1	1		22	1	CHRIS PATTEN	18	Gov. of Hong Kong	3	0	2
574	06/27/97	2	2		19	22	3	JOSEPH CHENG,	19	CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG	0	3	3
575	06/27/97	2	2		18	22	1				2	0	0
576	06/27/97	2	1	1		22	1	CHIK KI-WAI	19	POLICE INSPECTOR	3	0	0
577	06/28/97	2	1	1		22	1				2	0	0
578	06/28/97	1	2		4	8	1				2	2	2
579	06/29/97	2	2		22	22	1	Margaret Thatcher	22	Fmr. British prime minister	3	0	2
580	06/29/97	2	1	1		19	1	TRONG CHAI	21	DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY	3	0	0
581	06/29/97	2	1	3		22	1				3	0	2
582	06/29/97	2	1	1		22	1	MADELEINE ALBRIGHT	6	U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE	3	0	2
583	06/29/97	1	1	1		1	1				3	0	2
584	06/30/97	2	2		3	22	1		19		3	3	3
585	06/30/97	2	1	1		22	4	Jiang Zemin	17	China President	0	0	3

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586	06/30/97	2	2		3	22	1				2	0	2
587	06/30/97	2	2		3	22	3				2	3	3
588	06/30/97	2	1	1		22	4	CHRIS PATTEN	18	Gov. of Hong Kong	0	3	0
589	06/30/97	2	1	1		22	4		19		0	0	0
590	06/30/97	1	1	1		22	5				0	0	0
591	07/01/97	2	2		12	22	3	Mark Mobius	12	director of Templeton Asset Management	0	3	3
592	07/01/97	2	1	1		22	3				0	3	3
593	07/01/97	1	2		15	8	1				2	3	3
594	07/01/97	1	1	1		22	4	Chinese Americans	15		0	0	3
595	07/01/97	1	1	1		8	2				0	1	2
596	07/02/97	1	1	1		9	2	Senator Thad Cochran	7		0	1	2
597	07/03/97	1	1	1		15	2				0	0	2
598	07/05/97	2	2		3	22	1				3	0	0
599	07/05/97	1	2		9	22	4				0	0	3
600	07/07/97	1	2		4	21	5				0	0	3
601	07/08/97	2	1	1		17	2				0	0	2
602	07/08/97	2	1	1		17	2	SEN. JOHN GLENN	7		0	0	0
603	07/09/97	1	2		2	17	1				0	0	2
604	07/13/97	2	1	3		25	5				0	0	0
605	07/15/97	2	1	1		17	2	JOSEPH LIEBERMAN	7		0	0	0
606	07/16/97	2	1	1		17	5				0	0	0
607	07/16/97	1	1	1		26	3				2	3	0
608	07/20/97	1	1	2		19	2				0	0	0
609	07/21/97	1	2		4	1	2	Juwono Sudarsono	22	Indonesia's leading strategic analyst	0	2	1
610	07/22/97	2	1	1		2	1				3	0	2
611	07/26/97	1	2		15	3	1				2	0	2
612	07/28/97	2	1	1		22	1	Rubin Monro	13	Asia Watch	3	0	0
613	07/30/97	1	1	1		21	2	Lodi Gyari		president of the Int'l Campaign for Tibet	3	0	2
614	08/02/97	2	1	1		29	4		24		0	0	0
615	08/07/97	2	2		10	13	3				2	3	2
616	08/10/97	1	2		8	1	4	Jimmy Carter	8		2	0	3
617	08/13/97	1	1	1		7	1				2	3	3
618	08/14/97	1	2		15	3	1				3	0	0
619	08/17/97	2	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
620	08/21/97	1	1	2		22	1				3	0	0
621	08/25/97	1	2		4	8	3				2	2	2
622	08/25/97	1	1	1		21	1				2	0	0
623	09/02/97	1	1	1		29	1				2	3	3
624	09/08/97	2	1	1		29	5				0	0	0

ID	Date	Print TV	Item Type	News Author	Op-Ed Author	Issue	4P	Major Citation	Author Type	Affiliation	Imp Human	Imp Trade	Cont- Enga
625	09/10/97	1	1	1		22	1				2	3	0
626	09/12/97	1	2		15	17	1				0	0	2
627	09/13/97	1	1	1		26	1				2	0	0
628	09/15/97	2	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
629	09/17/97	1	1	2		2	1				3	0	0
630	09/19/97	2	2		11	3	3	Jonathan Pollack	11	senior adviser for int'l policy at Rand Corp.	0	2	0
631	09/21/97	1	1	1		1	1				3	2	2
632	09/28/97	2	1	3		23	5		24		0	0	0
633	09/30/97	1	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
634	10/01/97	1	2		15	22	5				2	0	3
635	10/06/97	1	1	1		23	1	Mary Robinson	22	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights	2	3	3
636	10/10/97	2	1	1		21	1				2	0	0
637	10/18/97	2	1	1		7	3	BOB BROADFOOT	12	Political & Economic RISK CONSULTANCY	0	3	0
638	10/18/97	1	1	1		15	2	Robert Kagan	11	The Carnegie Endowment	2	2	2
639	10/20/97	1	2		4	13	1	Jeffrey E. Garten	9	dean of the Yale School of Management.	2	3	2
640	10/21/97	2	1	1		13	3		24		0	0	0
641	10/24/97	2	1	1		7	1	MIKE JENDRZEJCZYK	13	Human Rights Watch Asia	3	3	2
642	10/24/97	2	1	1		7	3	IAN BUTTERFIELD	12	Director, Int'l Affairs, Westinghouse Electric	0	3	2
643	10/25/97	2	1	1		7	1	Jiang Zemin	17	China President	3	0	2
644	10/25/97	1	2		11	2	1	PEDRO C. MORENO	11	Rutherford Institute	3	0	1
645	10/25/97	1	1	1		7	5				2	0	2
646	10/26/97	2	2		7	7	1				3	2	2
647	10/26/97	2	1	1		7	1				3	0	2
648	10/26/97	1	1	1		7	1				3	0	2
649	10/27/97	2	1	1		7	1	REP. NANCY PELOSI	7		3	2	1
650	10/27/97	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	2
651	10/28/97	2	1	1		7	1	MADELEINE ALBRIGHT	6	Secretary of State	3	2	2
652	10/28/97	2	1	1		7	1				3	0	0
653	10/28/97	1	1	1		7	1				2	0	2
654	10/29/97	2	2		7	7	1	REP. NANCY PELOSI	7		3	2	2
655	10/29/97	2	1	1		19	1				2	0	0
656	10/29/97	2	1	1		8	2	DAN HORNER	11	NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE	0	3	2
657	10/29/97	2	1	1		8	3				0	3	0
658	10/29/97	1	1	1		7	5				2	0	2
659	10/30/97	2	1	1		8	3	GREG MASTEL	11	ECONOMIC STRATEGY INST.	0	2	2
660	10/30/97	2	1	1		29	4				2	0	3
661	10/30/97	2	1	1		7	3				0	3	3
662	10/30/97	2	2		6	8	1	MADELEINE ALBRIGHT	6	Secretary of State	3	3	2
663	10/30/97	1	2		2	7	1				3	1	1

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664	10/30/97	1	1	1		7	1				3	2	2
665	10/31/97	1	1	1		7	2	Leslie H. Gelb	11	President of the Council on Foreign Relations	3	0	1
666	11/01/97	2	2		3	7	1				3	0	0
667	11/01/97	2	1	1		7	3	STEVE DORTMAN	12	VICE CHAIRMAN HUGHES	2	3	3
668	11/01/97	1	1	1		21	1				2	0	2
669	11/02/97	2	2		3	7	1				3	1	1
670	11/02/97	1	2		4	1	1				3	1	1
671	11/02/97	1	2		15	7	1				3	0	1
672	11/02/97	1	1	2		7	1				3	0	0
673	11/03/97	2	1	1		8	3				2	2	2
674	11/03/97	1	2		4	7	1				3	0	1
675	11/03/97	1	1	1		7	1				3	0	0
676	11/05/97	1	2		15	1	1				3	2	1
677	11/09/97	2	1	3		29	4				0	0	0
678	11/09/97	1	1	2		27	5				0	0	0
679	11/16/97	2	1	1		2	1				3	0	2
680	11/17/97	1	1	1		2	1				3	1	2
681	11/18/97	1	2		2	2	1				3	0	1
682	11/18/97	1	1	1		2	1				0	0	0
683	11/21/97	2	1	1		2	1	Wei Jingsheng	16		3	0	1
684	11/22/97	1	1	1		2	1	Wei Jingsheng	16		3	1	1
685	11/23/97	2	2		16	2	1	Wei Jingsheng	16		3	0	0
686	11/27/97	2	1	1		5	3				0	2	0
687	11/28/97	1	2		15	3	1				3	0	1
688	11/28/97	1	1	1		24	4				0	0	0
689	12/06/97	1	1	1		22	2		19		0	0	2
690	12/09/97	2	1	1		29	1				2	0	0
691	12/17/97	1	1	1		25	5				0	0	0
692	12/21/97	2	1	1		23	4	CHEN JUNSHI	19	HONG KONG ENTREPRENEUR	0	0	0
693	12/24/97	1	2		2	9	3				0	3	0
694	12/26/97	1	1	2		23	2				0	0	0
695	12/30/97	2	1	1		25	2				3	0	0
696	01/01/98	1	1	2		29	4				0	0	0
697	01/05/98	2	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
698	01/11/98	2	1	1		27	1				2	0	0
699	01/12/98	2	1	1		27	4				0	0	0
700	01/15/98	2	1	1		27	4				0	0	0
701	01/15/98	1	1	1		2	1	Qin Yongmin	16		3	0	3
702	01/22/98	1	1	2		23	1				2	0	0

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703	02/02/98	1	2		13	19	4			Formosan Association for Public Affairs	0	0	2
704	02/04/98	2	1	1		23	4				0	0	0
705	02/04/98	1	1	1		23	4				0	0	0
706	02/09/98	1	1	2		2	1				3	0	0
707	02/15/98	1	1	1		24	4		18		0	0	3
708	02/16/98	1	2		4	16	2				0	0	2
709	02/17/98	2	2		3	13	3				0	3	3
710	02/17/98	1	1	2		3	1				3	0	0
711	03/01/98	1	1	1		24	4				0	1	0
712	03/02/98	1	2		2	3	1				3	0	2
713	03/04/98	2	1	1		17	5				0	0	0
714	03/06/98	2	1	1		17	5				0	0	0
715	03/07/98	1	1	1		2	1		25		3	1	2
716	03/13/98	1	1	2		2	1	Amnesty International	13		3	0	2
717	03/13/98	1	2		4	2	1				3	0	1
718	03/16/98	1	1	1		26	3				0	3	3
719	03/19/98	1	1	1		26	5				0	0	0
720	03/22/98	1	2		13	19	1		13	Director, International Campaign for Tibet	3	0	2
721	03/24/98	2	2		12	7	3	GEORGE FISHER		CHAIRMAN & CEO, EASTMAN KODAK	0	3	0
722	03/28/98	1	1	2		29	5				0	0	0
723	04/02/98	1	1	1		2	1	Mike Jendrzeczyk	13	Director for Human Rights Watch Asia	3	0	2
724	04/08/98	1	1	2		2	1				2	0	0
725	04/09/98	1	2		13	3	1		13	human rights watch	3	0	2
726	04/15/98	1	2		15	8	2				0	1	1
727	04/16/98	2	1	1		3	1	Xu Wenli	16		3	0	2
728	04/16/98	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
729	04/19/98	2	1	1		2	1				3	0	2
730	04/20/98	1	1	1		2	1	Wang Dan	16		2	0	0
731	04/21/98	2	1	1		2	1		16		3	0	0
732	04/24/98	1	1	1		2	1	Andrew Nathan	9	Prof. of Chinese politics at Columbia Univ.	2	0	3
733	04/24/98	1	2		4	1	1				3	1	1
734	04/28/98	2	1	1		7	4	SHEN JIRU		CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES	1	3	3
735	04/28/98	1	1	1		2	1	Wang Dan			2	0	0
736	05/03/98	1	1	2		3	1	Mathias Duan Yinming	24	A Chinese bishop	3	0	0
737	05/07/98	2	1	1		24	4	PROF. LIANG CONGJIE	16	FRIENDS OF NATURE	0	0	0
738	05/10/98	1	1	1		3	1	Ambassador Sasser	6		3	0	2
739	05/12/98	2	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
740	05/17/98	1	2		2	17	2				0	0	2
741	05/18/98	2	2		7	17	2				0	0	2

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742	05/19/98	2	1	1		17	2				0	0	2
743	05/20/98	2	1	1		17	1	Rep. Dan Burton (R), INDIANA	7		0	1	1
744	05/20/98	2	1	1		1	2				0	0	3
745	05/21/98	2	1	1		17	5				0	0	0
746	05/21/98	1	1	1		15	2		17		0	0	3
747	05/22/98	1	2		15	17	1				0	0	2
748	05/23/98	2	2		3	17	2				0	1	1
749	05/24/98	1	2		15	17	4				0	3	3
750	05/26/98	2	2		7	17	2	NEWT GINGRICH	7	Speaker of House	0	1	1
751	05/26/98	1	2		15	7	1				3	0	2
752	05/27/98	2	2	2		14	2				3	0	2
753	05/27/98	1	1	1		22	1	Martin Lee	19	the chairman of the Democratic Party	3	0	2
754	05/30/98	2	2		3	7	2				0	0	3
755	06/01/98	1	1	1		15	2				0	0	0
756	06/03/98	2	2		3	7	4				0	0	3
757	06/03/98	1	2		15	14	2				0	0	2
758	06/04/98	2	2		12	8	3	GREG MASTEL	12	ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE	2	3	3
759	06/06/98	2	2		12	8	3	LARRY LAU	9	STANFORD UNIVERSITY	0	3	3
760	06/07/98	1	1	2		3	1				2	0	0
761	06/07/98	1	2		2	7	1				3	1	2
762	06/09/98	2	2		3	7	4	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	2		3
763	06/10/98	2	1	1		7	1	SEN. TIM HUTCHINSON	7		3	1	1
764	06/11/98	2	1	1		7	1	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	3	2
765	06/11/98	2	1	1		7	1	Harry Wu	16	Chinese Dissident	3	1	1
766	06/11/98	1	1	1		7	1				2	0	0
767	06/13/98	2	1	1		21	5				2	0	0
768	06/14/98	1	1	1		18	2				0	0	2
769	06/15/98	2	1	1		21	1				2	0	0
770	06/17/98	1	2		8	14	2				0	0	1
771	06/18/98	1	1	1		23	2	Mr. Fernandes	22	India's Defense Minister	0	0	2
772	06/19/98	2	2		7	14	2	REP. CHRISTOPHER COX			0	0	2
773	06/20/98	2	1	1		15	2				0	0	2
774	06/20/98	1	1	1		7	4	Robert A. Kapp	24	president of the U.S.-China Business Council	2	0	3
775	06/21/98	2	1	1		7	1	SEN. TIM HUTCHINSON	7		3	0	2
776	06/22/98	2	2		5	7	1	Jay Carney, correspondent	5	Time magazine	3	3	3
777	06/22/98	1	1	1		13	3				0	3	3
778	06/22/98	1	2		15	19	2				0	0	1
779	06/23/98	2	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
780	06/24/98	2	2		8	7	1	Winston Lord	8	former U.S. ambassador to China,	3	0	2

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781	06/24/98	2	1	1		7	4	ROBERT RADTKE	13	ASIA SOCIETY	2	0	3
782	06/24/98	1	1	1		10	3				0	2	2
783	06/25/98	2	2		3	7	4				3	0	3
784	06/25/98	2	2		7	7	1	SEN. PAUL WELLSTONE	7	(D), MINNESOTA	3	1	2
785	06/25/98	2	1	1		7	1		24	anonymous	2	0	3
786	06/25/98	1	1	1		7	4				2	3	3
787	06/25/98	1	1	1		7	1		24		2	0	0
788	06/25/98	1	2		2	7	1				3	0	2
789	06/26/98	2	1	1		9	3				0	2	0
790	06/26/98	2	1	1		2	1				3	0	2
791	06/26/98	2	1	1		7	1				2	0	0
792	06/26/98	1	1	1		7	1	Michael D. McCurry	6	White House spokesman	3	0	2
793	06/26/98	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	2
794	06/27/98	2	2		1	7	1	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	3	2
795	06/27/98	2	1	1		7	1				3	0	3
796	06/27/98	2	1	1		7	1				3	0	2
797	06/27/98	2	2		7	7	2	U.S. Senator Edward Kenndy	7		3	3	2
798	06/27/98	1	1	1		21	1	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	0	2
799	06/27/98	1	2		2	7	1				3	0	2
800	06/28/98	2	1	1		7	1				3	0	0
801	06/28/98	2	2		16	7	1	CHAI LING			2	0	3
802	06/28/98	1	1	1		7	4				2	0	3
803	06/29/98	2	2		16	7	1	Wang Dan			2	0	3
804	06/29/98	2	1	1		7	3				2	2	3
805	06/29/98	2	2		24	7	1	Liu Yanxi			2	0	3
806	06/29/98	2	2		5	7	1	Karen Grigsby Bates, journalist	5	LA Times	3	0	2
807	06/29/98	1	1	1		7	1	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	0	3
808	06/29/98	1	1	1		7	1		24		2	0	3
809	06/29/98	1	2		2	7	1				3	1	2
810	06/30/98	2	1	1		7	3				0	3	3
811	06/30/98	2	1	1		13	3				0	3	3
812	06/30/98	1	1	1		8	3	Marta Newhart		a spokeswoman for Boeing in Beijing	0	3	3
813	07/01/98	2	1	1		7	1	MARTIN LEE	19	HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY	3	0	0
814	07/01/98	1	1	1		8	1	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	2	3
815	07/01/98	1	1	1		21	1				3	0	0
816	07/02/98	2	1	1		7	4				2	0	3
817	07/02/98	1	1	1		2	1	Bao Tong	16		3	0	0
818	07/02/98	1	2		15	7	1				3	1	1
819	07/03/98	2	2		1	7	1	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	3	3

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820	07/03/98	2	1	1		1	4				0	2	3
821	07/03/98	1	1	1		7	4				0	0	3
822	07/03/98	1	2		15	7	4				0	0	3
823	07/04/98	2	2		7	7	1	SEN. PAUL WELLSTONE		(D), MINNESOTA	3	1	2
824	07/04/98	1	1	2		23	4				0	0	0
825	07/05/98	2	1	3		29	1				1	0	0
826	07/05/98	1	2		15	19	1				3	0	2
827	07/06/98	2	2		6	7	1	MADELEINE ALBRIGHT	6	Secretary of State	2	0	3
828	07/07/98	1	1	1		14	2				0	0	0
829	07/09/98	1	2		9	1	1				2	0	3
830	07/11/98	1	1	1		22	3				0	0	0
831	07/13/98	2	1	1		2	1				3	0	2
832	07/14/98	2	1	3		14	2				0	0	3
833	07/14/98	1	2		15	2	1				3	1	0
834	07/19/98	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
835	07/20/98	1	2		10	7	1				1	0	3
836	07/21/98	2	1	1		2	1				3	0	2
837	07/26/98	2	1	3		13	4				0	0	0
838	07/28/98	1	1	1		14	3				0	0	0
839	07/31/98	1	1	1		1	3	Representative Lee H. Hamilton	7		0	3	3
840	08/05/98	1	1	1		27	5				0	0	0
841	08/09/98	2	1	1		3	1				2	0	3
842	08/13/98	2	1	1		27	4				0	0	0
843	08/14/98	1	1	2		27	1				0	0	0
844	08/19/98	2	1	1		27	4				0	0	0
845	08/22/98	1	1	1		22	1		19		2	0	0
846	08/24/98	2	1	1		27	4				0	0	0
847	08/26/98	1	2		11	24	1	LESTER R. BROWN	11	Worldwatch Institute	0	1	2
848	08/31/98	1	1	1		27	4				0	0	0
849	09/04/98	1	1	1		2	1	John Kamm	13	a SF businessman and human rights activist	2	0	3
850	09/14/98	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
851	09/15/98	2	1	1		23	1	Mary Robinson	22	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights	3	0	3
852	09/18/98	1	1	1		2	1		16		3	0	0
853	09/27/98	1	1	1		22	1		22		2	0	0
854	10/04/98	1	1	1		5	3				0	0	0
855	10/11/98	2	1	3		27	4				0	0	0
856	10/12/98	1	1	1		22	4	Tung Chee-hwa		Hong Kong's chief executive	2	2	3
857	10/14/98	1	2		15	29	1				2	0	3
858	10/19/98	1	1	1		19	1	Koo Chen-fu		Straits Exchange Foundation in Taiwan	3	0	0

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859	10/25/98	2	1	1		1	4				0	0	3
860	10/29/98	1	1	1		3	1				0	0	0
861	11/03/98	1	1	1		24	4				0	0	0
862	11/04/98	2	1	1		21	1				2	0	0
863	11/06/98	1	2		15	8	1				0	1	0
864	11/11/98	1	1	1		21	1				3	0	0
865	11/15/98	1	1	1		13	3	Yukon Huang	12	Beijing representative of the World Bank	0	2	3
866	11/16/98	1	2		15	3	1				2	0	0
867	11/19/98	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
868	11/26/98	1	1	1		12	1				2	0	3
869	11/28/98	2	1	1		23	1	Jiang Zemin	17	China President	0	0	0
870	12/01/98	1	1	2		2	1				3	0	0
871	12/05/98	1	1	1		19	2				0	0	0
872	12/07/98	1	1	2		4	5				0	0	0
873	12/10/98	1	1	1		2	1	Beatrice Laroche	13	liaison at the UN for Human Rights in China	3	0	0
874	12/15/98	1	1	1		2	1	Lu Siqing		Info Ctr of Human Rights Mvmt in China	3	0	2
875	12/20/98	1	1	2		2	1				2	0	0
876	12/21/98	2	1	1		3	1	PENG MING, ACTIVIST	16		3	0	0
877	12/22/98	2	1	1		23	4				0	0	0
878	12/22/98	1	1	1		2	1	Liu Nianchun			3	0	2
879	12/24/98	1	1	2		21	1				0	0	0
880	12/24/98	1	2		2	2	1				3	2	2
881	12/30/98	1	1	1		2	1				2	0	0
882	01/01/99	1	1	1		28	4				2	0	0
883	01/01/99	1	2		2	16	2				0	0	1
884	01/03/99	2	2		8	1	2				0	0	3
885	01/09/99	1	1	1		28	4				2	0	0
886	01/19/99	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
887	01/21/99	1	2		15	14	2				0	2	2
888	01/24/99	1	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
889	01/27/99	2	1	1		13	3				0	2	0
890	01/30/99	1	1	2		27	5				0	0	0
891	02/04/99	1	1	1		21	1	Kate Saunders	13	the Tibet Information Network	3	0	0
892	02/10/99	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	2
893	02/12/99	1	1	1		24	1	Prof. William Barron,	19	University of Hong Kong	2	2	0
894	02/16/99	1	1	1		6	4				0	0	0
895	02/21/99	1	1	1		22	4				2	0	3
896	02/22/99	1	2		4	3	1				3	2	1
897	02/25/99	1	1	1		27	3				0	0	0

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898	02/26/99	2	1	1		2	1	SEN. PAUL WELLSTONE	7	(D), MINNESOTA	3	0	2
899	02/27/99	1	1	1		2	1	Senator Paul Wellstone	7	Democrat of Minnesota	3	1	1
900	03/01/99	1	1	1		16	2				0	0	2
901	03/02/99	2	1	1		7	1	MADELEINE ALBRIGHT	6	Secretary of State	3	2	3
902	03/05/99	1	1	1		8	3	Charlene Barshefsky	6	U.S. Trade Representative	2	3	3
903	03/07/99	1	1	1		16	2		6		0	0	2
904	03/08/99	1	2		4	16	2				0	0	1
905	03/09/99	2	1	1		16	2	BILL RICHARDSON	6	SECRETARY OF ENERGY	0	3	3
906	03/09/99	2	2		8	16	3	Henry Kissinger	8	fmr Secretary of State	0	2	2
907	03/09/99	2	1	1		16	2				0	0	0
908	03/10/99	1	1	1		25	3		24		0	0	0
909	03/10/99	2	2		7	16	2	Sen. Fred Thompson (R-TN)	8	chairman of the Senate Govt Affairs Cmt	0	2	2
910	03/10/99	2	1	1		16	2				0	0	1
911	03/11/99	1	1	1		4	1				3	0	0
912	03/13/99	2	2		6	16	2	KEN DEGRAFFENREID	8	FORMER REAGAN NSC STAFF	0	0	1
913	03/14/99	2	2		10	29	5				0	0	0
914	03/14/99	1	2		8	16	2	Robert M. Gates	8	Director of CIA under President George Bush	2	2	2
915	03/15/99	1	1	1		14	2	William J. Perry	8	the former Defense Secretary	0	0	2
916	03/16/99	1	1	1		1	2	Senator Hollings	7	the ranking Democrat on the Commerce Cmt	3	0	1
917	03/16/99	2	2		7	16	2	REP. PORTER GOSS (R-FL)		Chairman, PMT selecte Cmt on Intelligence	0	2	2
918	03/17/99	2	2		7	14	2				0	0	0
919	03/17/99	1	2		15	16	4				0	0	3
920	03/18/99	2	1	1		18	2	XUE MOUHONG	17	QINGHUA UNIVERSITY	0	0	2
921	03/18/99	2	1	1		16	2	China/"USA Today" poll	15		0	0	2
922	03/19/99	1	1	1		29	4	Arthur Doak Barnett		a leading scholar & gov't adviser on China	2	3	2
923	03/19/99	2	2		3	16	5				0	0	0
924	03/20/99	1	1	2		23	1				2	0	0
925	03/22/99	1	2		4	16	2				0	0	1
926	03/23/99	1	1	2		23	3				0	0	0
927	03/26/99	1	1	1		5	3	Zhu Rongji	17	Chinese Prime Minister	0	0	0
928	03/29/99	1	2		15	3	1				2	3	3
929	03/30/99	1	1	1		4	1				2	0	0
930	04/04/99	2	1		3	23	2		24		0	0	2
931	04/05/99	1	1	1		14	2	Kanatjan Alibekov	22	defector from Soviet germ warfare program	0	0	0
932	04/05/99	1	2		2	7	1				3	2	2
933	04/07/99	2	1	1		1	3	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	0	3	3
934	04/08/99	1	1	1		11	3				0	3	2
935	04/08/99	2	1	1		7	3				0	2	0
936	04/08/99	2	1	1		7	2				2	3	3

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937	04/09/99	1	1	1		7	4				0	3	2
938	04/09/99	2	1	1		7	1				3	3	2
939	04/09/99	1	2		2	16	2				3	2	2
940	04/10/99	1	1	1		16	2	Zhu Rongji	17	Chinese Prime Minister	0	0	2
941	04/13/99	1	1	1		16	5				0	0	2
942	04/13/99	2	1	1		16	2	Zhu Rongji	17	Chinese Prime Minister	0	0	3
943	04/15/99	1	1	1		11	3	ROBERT KAPP		the president of the U.S.-China Business Council	0	3	3
944	04/15/99	2	2		6	8	3	Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin	6		0	3	3
945	04/15/99	1	2		4	1	2	Governor George W. Bush	6	Presidential Candidate	2	3	2
946	04/19/99	1	1	1		16	5				0	0	0
947	04/23/99	1	1	1		16	5				0	0	0
948	04/27/99	1	1	1		11	3				0	2	0
949	04/28/99	2	1	1		16	5				0	0	2
950	04/29/99	1	2		4	16	2	Representative Chris Cox	7	chairman of the select committee	0	0	1
951	04/30/99	1	1	1		20	2	Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman	7	House International Affairs Committee	0	0	2
952	04/30/99	2	1	1		16	2		10		0	0	1
953	05/03/99	1	1	1		3	5				2	0	0
954	05/06/99	2	1	1		24	4				0	0	0
955	05/07/99	2	1	1		18	5				0	0	0
956	05/08/99	1	1	1		18	4		24		0	0	2
957	05/08/99	1	1	1		18	4				0	0	0
958	05/08/99	2	2		6	18	2	Jim Sasser	6	the United States ambassador to China	0	0	3
959	05/08/99	2	1	1		18	2				0	0	0
960	05/08/99	2	2		11	18	2	Dimitri Simes	11	The president of The Nixon Center	0	0	3
961	05/08/99	2	1	1		18	4	JAVIER SOLANA	22	NATO SECRETARY-GENERAL	0	0	3
962	05/09/99	1	1	1		18	5				0	0	0
963	05/09/99	2	1	1		18	4				2	0	0
964	05/09/99	2	1	1		18	2				0	0	0
965	05/10/99	1	1	1		16	2				0	0	0
966	05/10/99	1	1	1		18	2				0	0	0
967	05/10/99	2	2		6	18	1	Jim Sasser	6	the United States ambassador to China	2	0	3
968	05/10/99	2	2		13	18	1	JAN BERRIS	13	NAT'L CMT ON U.S. CHINA RELATIONS	0	0	3
969	05/10/99	2	1	1		18	2				0	0	0
970	05/10/99	2	2		3	18	1				2	0	0
971	05/10/99	2	1	1		18	1				2	0	0
972	05/10/99	2	2		11	16	2	Greg Valliere	11	Charles Schwab Washington Research Group	0	0	2
973	05/10/99	2	2		1	18	2	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	0	3
974	05/10/99	1	2		2	18	2				0	0	3
975	05/11/99	1	1	1		14	2				0	0	2

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976	05/11/99	1	1	1		18	4				0	0	0
977	05/11/99	2	2		3	17	2				2	0	2
978	05/11/99	2	1	1		18	2				0	0	2
979	05/11/99	2	1	1		17	1				0	0	0
980	05/11/99	2	1	1		18	2				2	0	3
981	05/12/99	1	1	1		16	5				0	0	0
982	05/12/99	2	2		8	18	2	JAMES LILLEY	8	FMR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO CHINA	2	0	3
983	05/12/99	1	2		8	18	4	Robert M. Gates	8	Director of CIA under President George Bush	0	0	3
984	05/13/99	2	2		1	1	2	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	0	0	3
985	05/14/99	1	1	1		16	2				0	0	1
986	05/14/99	2	2		4	8	3	Thomas Friedman	4	The New York Times	0	3	0
987	05/14/99	1	2		5	18	1				3	0	0
988	05/15/99	2	2		3	18	1				2	0	3
989	05/16/99	1	1	1		18	5				0	0	3
990	05/16/99	2	1	1		16	2				0	0	1
991	05/18/99	1	1	1		24	4				0	0	0
992	05/18/99	1	2		4	18	1	Larry Diamond	11	democracy specialist at the Hoover Institution	2	3	3
993	05/21/99	1	1	1		18	2				0	0	0
994	05/23/99	2	1	1		18	2				0	0	2
995	05/24/99	2	1	1		16	2	REP. Christopher Cox (R-CA)		SELECT CHINA COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN	0	0	2
996	05/24/99	2	2		8	1	4	JAMES LILLEY	8	fmr ambassador to China	2	3	3
997	05/24/99	2	1	1		16	2	REP. Christopher Cox (R-CA)	7	SELECT CHINA COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN	0	0	2
998	05/24/99	2	1	1		16	2				0	0	2
999	05/24/99	2	1	1		16	2				0	0	2
1000	05/25/99	1	1	1		16	2				0	0	1
1001	05/25/99	2	1	1		16	2	REP. Christopher Cox (R-CA)		SELECT CHINA COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN	0	1	1
1002	05/25/99	2	2		3	16	2				0	3	2
1003	05/25/99	2	1	1		16	2	JAMES MULVENON		RAND CORPORATION	0	0	3
1004	05/25/99	2	1	1		16	2				0	0	2
1005	05/25/99	2	1	1		16	2	ZHU BANGZAO	17	CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN	0	0	2
1006	05/25/99	2	2		6	16	2	BILL RICHARDSON		U.S. SECRETARY OF ENERGY	0	0	2
1007	05/25/99	2	1	1		11	3				0	2	3
1008	05/26/99	1	1	2		23	2				0	0	0
1009	05/26/99	1	1	1		16	2				0	0	2
1010	05/26/99	2	2		7	16	2				0	2	2
1011	05/26/99	2	2		5	11	3	Adam Zagorin		"Time" Washington correspondent	0	3	3
1012	05/26/99	2	1	1		16	2	REP. Christopher Cox (R-CA)	7	SELECT CHINA COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN	0	0	1
1013	05/29/99	2	2		11	1	2	David Shambaugh	11	Brookings Institution	0	1	1
1014	05/30/99	2	2		8	16	2	Henry Kissinger	8	fmr Secretary of State	0	0	3

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1015	05/30/99	1	2		2	16	2				2	3	2
1016	06/01/99	1	1	1		2	1	Ding Zilin, a retired professor	24		3	0	0
1017	06/01/99	2	1	1		1	2				0	0	0
1018	06/02/99	2	1	1		8	1	Charlene Barshefsky	6	Trade Representative of The United States	3	3	3
1019	06/03/99	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
1020	06/03/99	2	1	1		8	3	ROBERT KAPP	12	U.S.-China Business Council	2	3	3
1021	06/03/99	1	2		9	16	1				2	3	3
1022	06/04/99	1	1	1		2	1	Sophia Woodman	13	Human Rights in China	3	0	0
1023	06/04/99	2	2		11	3	1	JAMES LILLEY	11	Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute	3	3	2
1024	06/04/99	2	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
1025	06/06/99	1	1	1		2	1	Bao Tong	13		3	0	0
1026	06/08/99	2	1	1		18	2				0	0	2
1027	06/10/99	1	1	1		14	2	Dan Hoydysh	12	the director of trade policy for Unisys Corp.	0	2	2
1028	06/10/99	2	1	1		23	4				0	0	0
1029	06/15/99	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1030	06/17/99	2	2		3	18	2				0	0	3
1031	06/19/99	1	1	1		21	5				0	0	0
1032	06/21/99	1	2		15	18	2				0	0	1
1033	06/24/99	1	1	2		16	2				0	0	2
1034	06/25/99	1	1	1		22	3				0	2	2
1035	06/28/99	2	1	1		3	3				2	3	3
1036	06/29/99	1	1	1		3	1		24		3	0	0
1037	06/29/99	1	2		4	1	3				2	3	3
1038	07/09/99	1	1	1		21	1		23		3	0	0
1039	07/10/99	2	1	1		29	4				0	0	3
1040	07/11/99	2	1	1		29	4				0	0	3
1041	07/13/99	2	1	1		8	5				0	0	0
1042	07/14/99	1	1	2		22	1				2	0	0
1043	07/15/99	1	2		2	19	2				0	0	2
1044	07/17/99	1	1	1		29	3				0	0	0
1045	07/19/99	1	2		15	19	1				2	0	1
1046	07/20/99	1	1	2		7	3				0	0	3
1047	07/20/99	1	2		9	19	1				3	0	1
1048	07/22/99	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1049	07/22/99	2	1	1		3	1		17		2	0	0
1050	07/23/99	1	1	1		18	5				0	0	0
1051	07/25/99	1	1	2		19	2		22		0	0	3
1052	07/26/99	2	1	1		8	1	REP. DAVID DREIER		(R), CALIFORNIA	3	3	3
1053	07/27/99	1	1	1		3	1	Amnesty International	13		3	0	0

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1054	07/27/99	1	2		4	19	1				3	2	2
1055	07/29/99	2	2		16	2	1	Erping Zhang	16	spokesman for Falun Gong in The United States	3	0	0
1056	07/30/99	1	1	1		3	1		24		3	0	2
1057	07/30/99	1	2		15	3	3				1	3	3
1058	08/01/99	1	1	1		16	2	George A. Keyworth	10	a senior scientist from Los Alamos Nat'l Lab	0	0	2
1059	08/02/99	2	1	1		2	1	XU LIANGYING, SCIENTIST	24		3	0	0
1060	08/02/99	1	2		11	19	4	Chas. W. Freeman Jr.		co-chairman of the U.S.-China Policy Foundation	2	0	3
1061	08/03/99	1	1	1		15	2				0	0	2
1062	08/06/99	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1063	08/08/99	1	2		15	20	5				0	0	0
1064	08/10/99	1	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
1065	08/14/99	1	1	2		5	4				0	0	0
1066	08/15/99	2	1	3		21	1				2	0	0
1067	08/20/99	1	2		20	19	5				3	0	1
1068	08/24/99	1	1	1		21	5				0	0	0
1069	08/26/99	2	2		16	2	1	Han Dongfang	16	Fmr. Tiananmen Square Labor Activist	3	0	0
1070	08/31/99	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
1071	09/04/99	1	1	2		29	5				0	0	0
1072	09/07/99	2	1	1		19	3				0	3	3
1073	09/08/99	1	2		4	23	4				0	0	0
1074	09/10/99	1	1	1		14	2	CIA	6		0	0	2
1075	09/11/99	2	1	1		11	3				0	3	0
1076	09/15/99	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1077	09/20/99	1	2		15	13	4				1	1	3
1078	09/22/99	2	1	1		16	5				0	0	0
1079	09/23/99	1	1	1		5	3				0	0	0
1080	09/26/99	2	1	1		24	4				0	0	0
1081	09/28/99	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1082	09/28/99	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
1083	09/28/99	2	1	1		8	3				2	2	3
1084	09/29/99	2	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1085	10/01/99	1	1	1		3	1	Wang Ruoshui	16		3	0	0
1086	10/01/99	2	2		5	29	4				2	2	0
1087	10/01/99	2	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
1088	10/01/99	1	2		15	13	4				1	1	3
1089	10/03/99	2	2		3	3	1				3	2	0
1090	10/14/99	1	1	2		4	5				0	0	0
1091	10/17/99	2	1	3		13	1				2	0	0
1092	10/19/99	2	1	1		14	2				0	0	2

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1093	10/22/99	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
1094	10/23/99	1	2		9	14	2				0	0	2
1095	10/28/99	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1096	10/29/99	2	1	1		3	1	THOMAS PICKERING		U.S. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE	3	0	2
1097	10/30/99	1	1	1		22	4				0	0	0
1098	11/01/99	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
1099	11/04/99	1	1	1		3	1	NYT Editorial board	2		3	0	0
1100	11/09/99	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
1101	11/11/99	1	1	1		11	3				0	3	3
1102	11/11/99	2	1	1		14	2				0	0	2
1103	11/14/99	1	1	1		11	3				0	2	3
1104	11/15/99	2	2		12	11	3	Robert Hormats		vice chairman of Goldman Sachs International	2	3	3
1105	11/15/99	2	2		3	11	3				0	3	3
1106	11/15/99	2	1	1		11	3				0	3	0
1107	11/15/99	1	2		12	5	3	Gordon G. Chang		a lawyer based in Beijing for an American firm	2	2	2
1108	11/16/99	1	1	1		11	1				0	3	3
1109	11/16/99	1	1	1		11	1	Charlene Barshefsky	6	Trade Representative of The United States	0	3	3
1110	11/17/99	1	1	1		3	1	He Qinglian	16	a Shenzhen author and economist	3	3	2
1111	11/18/99	1	1	1		29	1				0	3	2
1112	11/18/99	2	1	1		8	3				0	2	0
1113	11/21/99	2	1	1		13	2				0	0	0
1114	11/22/99	1	2		4	1	1	Governor George W. Bush	6	Presidential Candidate	3	3	2
1115	11/24/99	1	1	1		29	1	Gladys Yang	24		3	0	0
1116	11/25/99	2	1	1		27	5				0	0	0
1117	11/26/99	1	1	2		22	5				0	0	0
1118	11/27/99	2	1	1		27	3				0	0	0
1119	11/29/99	2	2		6	1	3	GENE SPERLING	6	DIR., NATL. ECONOMIC COUNCIL	2	3	3
1120	11/30/99	2	2		3	11	1				3	3	3
1121	12/02/99	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1122	12/05/99	2	2		25	11	2				0	0	0
1123	12/07/99	1	1	2		3	1	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	0	2
1124	12/10/99	1	1	1		23	2				2	0	0
1125	12/11/99	2	1	1		24	4				0	0	0
1126	12/11/99	1	2		15	23	1				3	0	1
1127	12/13/99	2	1	1		22	5				0	0	0
1128	12/16/99	1	1	1		7	2				0	0	3
1129	12/16/99	2	1	1		18	4				0	0	3
1130	12/19/99	2	1	3		22	4				0	0	0
1131	12/20/99	1	1	1		22	4	President Jorge Sampaio	22	President of Portugal	2	0	0

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1132	12/20/99	2	1	1		16	5				0	0	0
1133	12/24/99	1	2		15	21	1				0	0	1
1134	12/25/99	1	1	2		3	1		13	Info Ctr of Human Rights Mvnt in China	3	0	0
1135	12/31/99	1	1	1		3	1	Neil Weissman	9	academic dean at Dickinson College	3	0	0
1136	12/31/99	2	2		3	13	1				0	0	3
1137	01/01/00	1	1	1		13	5				0	0	0
1138	01/01/00	1	2		15	8	1				3	1	2
1139	01/02/00	2	2		11	19		LARRY WORTZEL	11	HERITAGE FOUNDATION	0	0	2
1140	01/06/00	1	1	1		3	1	Liu Jian	24	a lawyer	3	0	0
1141	01/09/00	2	1	1		21	1				2	0	0
1142	01/11/00	1	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
1143	01/12/00	2	1	1		5	3				0	0	0
1144	01/18/00	1	1	1		21	1				2	0	0
1145	01/19/00	2	1	1		23	2				0	0	2
1146	01/21/00	1	1	1		4	1	Dai Xianglong	17	Head of the People's Bank of China	2	0	0
1147	01/26/00	1	1	1		2	1	Jerome Cohen	10	an expert on Chinese law	3	0	0
1148	01/27/00	2	1	1		1	4				0	0	3
1149	01/30/00	1	1	1		2	1	Song Yongyi	16	An American-based Chinese scholar	3	0	0
1150	01/31/00	1	2		15	3	1				3	1	2
1151	02/03/00	1	1	1		20	2	Steven M. Goldstein	10	a China specialist at Smith College	0	0	2
1152	02/05/00	2	1	1		13	4				0	0	0
1153	02/10/00	1	1	1		2	1	Senator William V. Roth Jr.	7	the Delaware Republican	3	2	2
1154	02/15/00	2	2		16	2	1	HARRY WU	16	FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER	3	2	3
1155	02/16/00	1	2		16	2	1				3	0	2
1156	02/18/00	1	1	1		23	5				0	0	0
1157	02/20/00	1	1	1		22	1		19		2	0	0
1158	02/22/00	2	1	1		19	2				0	2	3
1159	02/24/00	1	1	1		11	3	Senator William V. Roth Jr.	7	the Delaware Republican	0	3	3
1160	02/26/00	1	1	1		7	2				0	0	3
1161	02/27/00	1	2		15	19	4				0	0	3
1162	02/28/00	2	2		6	19	4	James Prueher	6	The U.S. ambassador to China	0	2	3
1163	03/02/00	1	1	2		21	1				2	0	0
1164	03/05/00	2	2		9	26	1	RICHARD DROBNICK	9	UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA	0	3	3
1165	03/06/00	1	1	1		4	3				2	2	0
1166	03/08/00	2	1	1		19	2				0	0	2
1167	03/09/00	1	1	1		8	1	Nicholas Lardy	11	a China expert at the Brookings Institution	3	2	2
1168	03/10/00	1	1	1		3	1	Mr. Mao	13	chairman of the Unirule Institute for Economics	3	0	0
1169	03/10/00	1	2		2	8	2				2	3	3
1170	03/12/00	1	2		15	19	2				0	0	2

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1171	03/14/00	2	2		13	20	2	ANDREW YANG	13	TAIPEI INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES	0	0	2
1172	03/14/00	1	1	1		19	3				0	2	0
1173	03/16/00	1	1	1		19	2	Zhu Rongji	17	Chinese Prime Minister	0	2	0
1174	03/17/00	2	2		3	19	1				0	2	2
1175	03/18/00	2	1	1		19	4	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	0	3
1176	03/19/00	2	1	1		19	1		24	anonymous	3	0	0
1177	03/19/00	1	1	1		19	4	Chu Yun-han	21	a political scientist at National Taiwan University	2	0	3
1178	03/20/00	2	1	1		19	2				2	0	3
1179	03/20/00	1	1	1		19	4	a senior administration official	6		2	0	3
1180	03/21/00	1	1	1		19	1				3	0	2
1181	03/21/00	1	2		15	19	2				3	0	2
1182	03/22/00	1	1	1		19	1		21		3	0	3
1183	03/26/00	1	1	1		29	5				0	0	0
1184	03/31/00	2	1	1		29	3	Feng Xiaogang	24		0	2	0
1185	03/31/00	1	1	1		7	4				0	0	2
1186	04/04/00	1	1	1		14	2	William S. Cohen	6	Defense Secretary	0	0	2
1187	04/05/00	2	1	1		2	1	LOIS WHEELER SNOW	5	WIDOW OF EDGAR SNOW	3	0	0
1188	04/06/00	1	1	1		8	3				0	3	3
1189	04/06/00	1	2		4	14	2	Cohen	6	Secretary of Defense	0	0	2
1190	04/11/00	1	2		2	18	4				0	0	0
1191	04/12/00	2	1	1		8	3	BRET CALDWELL	13	TEAMSTERS' SPOKESMAN	3	1	2
1192	04/12/00	2	1	1		8	3				0	1	0
1193	04/12/00	1	1	1		8	3	George Becker	13	president of the United Steelworkers of America	0	1	2
1194	04/14/00	1	1	1		7	3				0	3	3
1195	04/16/00	1	1	1		5	3				0	3	0
1196	04/19/00	1	1	1		2	1	Ken Roth	13	executive director of Human Rights Watch	3	0	2
1197	04/20/00	1	1	1		29	5				2	0	0
1198	04/20/00	1	2		2	20	2				0	0	1
1199	04/26/00	1	1	1		2	1	Fa Lun Gong Sect	16		3	0	0
1200	04/28/00	2	1	1		8	3				2	3	3
1201	04/29/00	1	1	2		23	4				0	0	0
1202	05/03/00	1	1	1		3	1	Committee to Protect Journalists	13		2	0	0
1203	05/06/00	2	2		11	8	1	NICHOLAS LARDY	11	BROOKINGS INSTITUTIONS	2	3	3
1204	05/08/00	2	1	1		18	2		24	anonymous	2	0	3
1205	05/08/00	1	1	1		3	1		24		3	0	0
1206	05/09/00	2	2		8	8	1	Jimmy Carter	8	Fmr President of the United States	2	3	3
1207	05/09/00	1	2		4	8	3	Prof. Robert Reich	8	former Labor Secretary	0	3	3
1208	05/11/00	1	1	1		3	1				0	0	0
1209	05/12/00	2	1	1		8	5	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	0	3	0

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1210	05/13/00	2	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
1211	05/13/00	1	1	1		8	3	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	0	3	3
1212	05/14/00	1	2		15	3	1				3	1	1
1213	05/17/00	2	2		6	8	2	Governor George W. Bush	6	Presidential Candidate	2	3	2
1214	05/17/00	1	1	1		8	3		15		2	2	2
1215	05/18/00	2	2		1	8	1	Alan Greenspan	6	Federal Reserve Chairman	2	3	3
1216	05/18/00	2	2		6	2	1	MADELEINE ALBRIGHT	6	Secretary of State	3	0	2
1217	05/18/00	2	1	1		8	2	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	3	3
1218	05/18/00	1	1	1		8	3	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	0	3	3
1219	05/18/00	1	2		4	1	1	Richard Nixon	8	Former President of The United States	3	1	1
1220	05/19/00	2	1	1		8	5				0	3	0
1221	05/19/00	1	1	1		19	1	Annette Lu	20	Vice President-elect of Taiwan	2	0	1
1222	05/20/00	2	1	1		8	1	REP. ASA HUTCHINSON	7	(R), ARKANSAS	3	3	0
1223	05/20/00	1	2		15	1	1				3	1	2
1224	05/21/00	2	2		12	8	3	MICHAEL MAILBACH	12	INTEL CORPORATION	2	3	3
1225	05/21/00	1	1	1		8	1	Zhou Daichun	24	a commercial lawyer in Beijing	2	3	3
1226	05/21/00	1	2		2	8	3				2	3	3
1227	05/22/00	2	2		7	8	1	REP. NANCY PELOSI	7	(D), CALIFORNIA	3	1	1
1228	05/22/00	2	1	1		8	1	JAMES HOFFA	13	Int'l BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS	2	1	0
1229	05/23/00	2	2		7	8	3	Gallup poll	15		3	3	2
1230	05/23/00	2	1	1		8	3				2	3	3
1231	05/23/00	2	1	1		8	3				3	3	0
1232	05/23/00	1	1	1		11	3		24		0	2	0
1233	05/24/00	2	1	1		8	3	REP. DAVID BONIOR	7	(D-MI), MINORITY WHIP	3	3	2
1234	05/24/00	2	1	1		8	3				0	3	0
1235	05/24/00	2	2		7	8	5	REP. CHAKA FATTAH		(D), PENNSYLVANIA	0	0	0
1236	05/24/00	1	1	1		8	3	Representatives Barney Frank	7	a liberal Democrat from the Boston	3	1	2
1237	05/24/00	1	2		12	8	3	MICHAEL N. BAZIGOS	12	globalization strategic consulting	0	3	3
1238	05/25/00	2	1	1		8	3	TERRY MCGRAW	12	MCGRAW-HILL COMPANIES	3	3	3
1239	05/25/00	2	1	1		8	3	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	3	2
1240	05/25/00	1	1	1		8	1	Rep. Richard Gephardt, (D) MI	7	THE MINORITY LEADER,	3	2	2
1241	05/25/00	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1242	05/26/00	1	2		7	8	3	George R. Nethercutt Jr.	7	a Republican Congressman from WA	2	3	3
1243	05/27/00	2	2		3	13	3				3	3	0
1244	05/29/00	1	1	1		19	1				3	0	0
1245	05/30/00	1	2		15	8	3				0	1	2
1246	06/01/00	2	2		12	8	3	BARRY HYMAN	12	EHRENKRANZ KING NUSSBAUM	0	2	0
1247	06/01/00	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
1248	06/04/00	2	1	1		2	1	JOHN KAMM	13	HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATE	3	0	0

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1249	06/08/00	2	1	1		23	1				0	0	0
1250	06/09/00	1	1	1		7	2				0	0	0
1251	06/12/00	1	2		15	11	1				3	1	2
1252	06/13/00	1	1	1		29	0				0	0	0
1253	06/19/00	1	1	1		27	1				2	0	0
1254	06/24/00	2	1	1		1	1				0	0	2
1255	06/24/00	1	1	1		14	2	Representative Christopher Cox	7	a California Republican	0	0	2
1256	06/28/00	1	2		15	8	1				0	2	3
1257	06/29/00	1	1	2		16	2				0	0	2
1258	06/30/00	2	1	1		3	3	KRISTEN GUIDA	13	FREEDOM HOUSE	3	0	0
1259	07/02/00	1	1	1		3	1	Zhang Jingcai	24	retired Communist party cadre	3	0	0
1260	07/05/00	2	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
1261	07/08/00	1	1	1		23	1				2	0	0
1262	07/12/00	2	1	1		14	2				0	0	2
1263	07/13/00	1	1	1		14	2				0	0	2
1264	07/15/00	1	2		15	1	4				0	0	3
1265	07/18/00	1	1	1		23	2	David Shambaugh	11	China specialist at Brookings Institution	0	0	2
1266	07/27/00	1	1	2		8	3				0	3	3
1267	08/01/00	1	1	1		19	4	Chen Shui bian	20	Taiwan President	0	0	0
1268	08/03/00	1	1	1		19	1				2	0	0
1269	08/06/00	2	1	3		24	4	LI RUOFAN		VICE DIR., QINGHAI LAKE STATE	0	0	0
1270	08/07/00	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
1271	08/14/00	1	1	1		13	5				0	0	0
1272	08/15/00	1	2		15	1	4				0	0	3
1273	08/19/00	1	1	1		2	1				2	0	0
1274	08/24/00	2	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
1275	08/25/00	1	1	1		2	1				3	0	0
1276	08/28/00	2	1	1		23	1	Bishop Desmond Tutu	22		3	0	0
1277	08/30/00	1	2		15	21	4				3	1	2
1278	09/01/00	1	1	1		7	1	Bob Berring	9	law prof. at UC Berkeley	3	0	2
1279	09/05/00	2	1	1		7	2	EDWARD FRIEDMAN	9	UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN	3	0	2
1280	09/06/00	1	1	1		8	1	Senator William V. Roth Jr.	7	a Delaware Republican	2	3	2
1281	09/07/00	1	1	1		22	1	Michael DeGolyer	18	head of the Hong Kong Transition Project	3	0	0
1282	09/08/00	2	1	1		7	4				2	2	2
1283	09/09/00	1	1	1		22	1				0	0	0
1284	09/12/00	1	2		2	16	4				0	0	0
1285	09/13/00	1	1	1		8	3	Thomas J. Donohue	12	president of the US Chamber of Commerce	0	3	3
1286	09/17/00	1	1	1		3	1		24		2	0	0
1287	09/19/00	2	2		1	8	4	Bill Clinton	6	The President of the United States	3	3	3

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1288	09/19/00	2	1	1		8	4				3	3	3
1289	09/20/00	1	1	2		8	5				0	3	0
1290	09/23/00	1	2		15	1	4				0	0	3
1291	09/27/00	1	2		20	19	4				0	2	3
1292	09/29/00	1	1	2		27	5				0	0	0
1293	10/01/00	2	1	1		3	1	Fa Lun Gong Sect	16		3	0	0
1294	10/02/00	1	1	1		23	4				0	0	0
1295	10/08/00	2	2		11	1	4	WINSTON LORD	11	CHINA SPECIALIST	3	3	3
1296	10/09/00	1	1	1		3	3				0	0	0
1297	10/14/00	1	1	1		3	1				2	0	0
1298	10/17/00	1	1	1		19	2				0	0	0
1299	10/23/00	1	1	1		23	2				0	0	0
1300	10/24/00	1	2		4	11	4	Qian Qichen	17	China's deputy prime minister	0	2	3
1301	11/05/00	1	1	1		13	5				0	0	0
1302	11/10/00	1	1	1		3	1	Edward L. Shaughnessy	10	a historian at the University of Chicago	2	0	0
1303	11/17/00	1	1	1		22	1	Willy Wo-Lap Lam	19	columnist & editor of South China Morning Post	2	0	0
1304	11/22/00	1	1	1		15	2				0	0	3
1305	11/26/00	1	1	3		23	3				0	0	0
1306	12/06/00	1	1	1		19	2	Parris H. Chang		a legislator of Democratic Progressive Party	0	0	2
1307	12/12/00	1	2		9	19	4	VINCENT WEI-CHENG WANG	9	assistant prof. of POLI, University of Richmond	2	0	3
1308	12/13/00	1	1	1		3	1				3	0	0
1309	12/17/00	1	1	1		25	1				2	0	0
1310	12/23/00	1	1	1		4	1				0	0	0
1311	12/26/00	2	1	1		27	5				0	0	0
1312	12/27/00	1	1	1		4	5				0	0	0

Vita

Xiaowei Chen joined the graduate program of theanship School of Mass Communication at Louisiana State University in spring 2002. His dissertation reexamined republican virtue of U.S.-China relations in 1990s through a communitarian perspective. Dr. Ralph IZard directed the dissertation research.

Since 1994, he worked as reporter, editor, and designer of *SINOPEC NEWS* for seven years, focused on energy-chemical news. During that time, he also took part in several public relations campaigns of SINOPEC, Corp (China Petrol-Chemical Corporation). Before practicing print journalism/public relations, he was an instructor at SINOPEC Economic College during 1987-1991, teaching business communication, public speaking, journalism/public relations, and Chinese literature.

He was born in Feng Xiang (*Phoenix*) County, Shaanxi Province, China. In 1987, he graduated with Bachelor of Arts in Chinese language and literature from Northwest University (Xi'an). In 1994, he graduated with Master of Arts in journalism from Sichuan University (Chengdu). He is expecting to receive Doctor of Philosophy in Mass Communication in December 2006.