A Sociological Study of Changes in Land Tenure Status in Taiwan: a Study of Kwansi Community.

Chung-wu Chang
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1971
Sociology, regional and city planning

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A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CHANGES IN
LAND TENURE STATUS IN TAIWAN:
A STUDY OF KWANSI COMMUNITY

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agriculture and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In
The Department of Sociology

by
Chung-Wu Chang
B.A., Chun kung University, 1961
M.S., Louisiana State University, 1966
December, 1971
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................................... ii

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................. vi

ABSTRACT ................................................................. viii

CHAPTER

I. THE PROBLEM AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............ 1
   Statement of problem ................................................. 1
   Specific purposes of the study .................................. 5
   Conceptual framework .............................................. 5
   Social systems and their structural elements .............. 5
   Structural elements of social systems ..................... 7
   Structural characteristics of Gemeinschaft-like and Gesellschaft-like role relations ..................... 8

II. THE NATURE OF THE LAND TENURE PROBLEM IN TAIWAN ............ 11
   Introduction .......................................................... 11
   Land tenure system before land reform .................... 12
   A high degree of concentration in ownership ............ 12
   Small farm size .................................................... 14
   Insecure farm tenancy ........................................... 18
   Agricultural ladder ............................................... 19
CHAPTER

III. THE TAIWAN LAND REFORM PROGRAM

Introduction ................................................................. 22
Objectives of the Reform .............................................. 23
Rent Reduction Act of 1949 ............................................ 24
Sales of public lands ...................................................... 25
The Land-to-Tiller Program ............................................ 26
Land redistribution ......................................................... 27
Landlords compensation .............................................. 29
Assistance to new landowners ....................................... 30

IV. THE STUDY AREA AND METHODOLOGICAL
PROCEDURE ................................................................. 32
Location and characteristics of
research site ..................................................................... 32
Research procedure .......................................................... 34
The population .................................................................. 34
Sampling procedure ............................................................. 36
The field research ............................................................... 38

Social demographic characteristics of
the interviewees ............................................................... 40
Age and sex composition .................................................. 40
Educational composition .................................................... 41
Tenure status .................................................................... 41
Size of farm ....................................................................... 41
Size of family ..................................................................... 41
### CHAPTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development of hypotheses</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land reform and commercialization</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land reform and democracy</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology and land tenure</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of hypotheses</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General hypothesis I</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General hypothesis II</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General hypothesis III</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### V. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: AN INTERPRETIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of data</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### VITA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Distribution of Landholdings in Taiwan, 1930</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Number of Owner-Farmer, Tenant Farmer, and Farm Hand Families in Taiwan, 1961</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Owner-Cultivated and Tenant-Cultivated Land in Taiwan, 1949-1953</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Distribution of Farmers and Land Tilled in Taiwan, 1930, Size of Farms (In Acres)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Percentage Distribution of Farming Families by Tenure for 1948 and 1959</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>The Increase in Production of Selected Crops Between 1953 and 1962 (In Tons)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>Number of Respondents Chosen by Villages</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>Age Distribution of the Land Reform Farmers Interviewed, 1967</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>Number of Years of Formal Education Completed by the Farmers Interviewed, 1967</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>Size of Farms of Farmers Interviewed, 1967</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI.</td>
<td>Sources of Loans Made by Interviewees by Land Tenure Status</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII.</td>
<td>Percentage Distribution of Sources of Loans Made by Interviewees by Land Tenure Status</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII.</td>
<td>Number of Interviewees Utilizing a Particular Marketing Place</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV.</td>
<td>Percent of Interviewees Utilizing a Particular Marketing Place</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV.</td>
<td>Number of Interviewees Utilizing a Particular Source for Farm Supplies</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI.</td>
<td>Per Cent of Interviewees Utilizing a Particular Source for Farm Supplies</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE

XVII. Interviewees Evaluation of Benefit Received From Land Reform by Tenure Status ............. 66

XVIII. Interviewees Evaluation of the Superiority of Their Present Living Conditions Over Their Former Condition, by Tenure Status ............. 66

XIX. Interviewees Evaluation of Benefits Received From the Land Reform Program by Tenure Status ............. 67

XX. Interviewees Participation in Formal Leadership Positions, by Tenure Status ............. 67

XXI. Interviewees Expressed Voting Behavior Toward a Kinsman With a Different Party Affiliation, by Tenure Status ............. 71
ABSTRACT

Rural sociologists have noted many changes in agrarian society within recent years. One change which has drawn much of their attention is that taking place in land tenure systems. Specifically, rural sociologists have interested themselves in the study of land tenure change within a framework of sociological concepts. A number of models and theories have been developed by prominent sociologists to explain the difference in behavior patterns from one social setting to another. One such conceptual scheme, which has now become classic, is Tonnies' Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft theory. The study reported in this dissertation was an attempt to use Tonnies' conceptual scheme to explain the change in behavioral patterns of farmers in Taiwan from traditional role relations to more rational role relations.

The specific objectives of the study were:

(1) to describe the essential features of the Taiwan land reform program;
(2) to analyze the effects of land reform on former landlords, new landowners, new tenant-owners and tenants.

The research was conducted in a rural area of a Hakka-speaking community, Kwansi chen (Township), Hsinchu Hsien
(County), Taiwan. The methodological procedures followed included interviews of a random sample of 150 land reform farmers from twenty-three li (the administrative unit included within townships). Respondents were classified according to their tenure status: new landowners, new tenant-owner, new tenants, and landowner.

The data collected indicated that farmers tended toward rational behavior in their economic decision making and that there was a positive association between the degree to which farmers benefited from the land reform program and their evaluation of this program. However, the findings failed to show a positive relation between farmer's benefit from land tenure changes and the rationality of their role relations related to participation in community activities. The explanation for the latter lies in the close-knit family structure, which has a continuing effect on individual social values and voting behavior.

It is suggested that the above findings have implications for persons and agencies interested in social planning programs in agrarian societies.
CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

There has been a growing concern over land tenure problems on a world wide basis within recent years.¹ This concern is due to the fact that social and economic development everywhere is dependent upon wise and equitable practices and policies regarding the use of the land.

The problem of this study relates to land tenure. Land tenure relations are social in nature. Several rural sociologists have tried to conceptualize the term in a rather inclusive manner. For instance, Smith defines land tenure as the social relationship between the people and the land.² Bertrand defines land tenure as the customary and codified rights which individuals and groups have to land and the behavior characteristics which directly result from these rights.³ Bertrand further emphasizes that the above


definition notes social relationships of property rights which individuals and groups have in regard to the land. Land tenure can thus be seen as a vital concept in studies of land reform programs.

The problem of land reform has existed in every age and among every people. The tenancy problem as H. C. Taylor aptly states it, is a human problem rather than merely a land problem. It involves mutual adjustment between two groups of people concerning the use of farm land. In an overwhelmingly agricultural country such as Taiwan, success or failure of this adjustment may mean the difference between social stability and unrest. This problem is especially significant when the ratio of rural population to arable land is high, as is the situation in Taiwan. Population pressure in Taiwan was well reflected in statistics relating to the patterns of land reclamation and utilization. Between 1905 and 1938, the quantity of cultivated land in Taiwan increased by only 37 per cent, while the population increased by 89 per cent.

---

4 Ibid., p. 10.


The land tenure system in Taiwan has always been a controlling factor in the lives of the agricultural population. Historically, the position of the tenant was extremely insecure. Tenancy relations were based on traditional paternalism instead of the contractual principle. Land ownership was highly concentrated in the hands of relatively few owners and the leasing of small land strips was the essence of the Taiwanese tenancy system. Under these circumstances the tenant was not a farmer, still less a farm entrepreneur, but rather a mere farm laborer.

"Tenancy itself is socially admissible if the rentals are not exorbitant and if the tenant has a certain amount of security and stability. This especially true if the form of tenancy does not preclude the possibility of acquisition of the land by the farmers."^7

As a result of the discrepancy between amount of land and number of people, malpractices by landowners in Taiwan became even more widespread. One of the most notorious of these abuses was high rent. In recent times, rental charges of more than 50 per cent of the total harvest were not unusual. Conditions such as these inevitably crushed hopes for economic betterment of those who worked the land. It is thus that the proposition that "farm tenancy is

an attempted adaptation of land and other resources to human needs through definite socially sanctioned institutional channels," can be understood. 8

The plight of tenants in Taiwan led to the agrarian reform programs of 1949 and 1953, which were to implement rent reduction. These programs were combined with the land-to-the-tiller program which aimed at improving the farmers' level of living. Together the programs were designed to end the evils of the traditional land tenure system which had hindered agricultural development. 9

The research problem reported here was proposed to investigate some of the social effects of the Taiwan land reform program on local communities and local people.

There has been considerable research concerning the economic effects of the land reform program in Taiwan. 10 However, no sociological assessment of the impact of the program has been made. It is hoped this study will contribute to a greater understanding of both land tenure problems and the social effects of planned programs of change.


9 Land Reform in Taiwan, (Taichung, Taiwan: Taiwan Provincial Land Bureau, 1964), pp. 1-2.

10 Yen-tien Chang, Land Reform in Taiwan, (Taichung, Taiwan: Taiwan Provincial College of Agriculture, 1954.)

Hui-sun Tang, Highlights of Land Reform in Taiwan, (Taipei, Taiwan: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1955.)

Land-to-the-Tiller, (Taipei, Taiwan: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1956.)
II. SPECIFIC PURPOSES OF THE STUDY

In more specific terms, the purpose of this study is:
(1) to describe the essential features of the Taiwan land reform program; (2) to analyze the effects of land reform program on former landlords and new landowners, on the patterns of rural social organization, and on community and kinship solidarity.

III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Research undertakings must be cast in terms of a theoretical framework to be meaningful. This framework includes the concepts which are most relevant to the study and which make up the analytical tools used to understand and measure the relationships which are to be investigated. This is attempted in the discussion which follows.

Social systems and their structural elements:

Society is composed of many social systems which individually encompass a plurality of actors (two or more) directed toward attaining a goal, whose relations to each other are guided by a pattern of structured and shared symbols and expectations.¹¹ The

parts of a system are all interactional in nature and are manifest as processes of action and reaction. Social systems are basic analytical units for understanding social organization. From a social scientific point of view, the model of the social system provides a sound theoretical frame of reference for understanding tenure relations. The research done focused primarily on one type of social system, tenure groups. The conceptual scheme of the rural social system has been developed most intensively by Loomis and Beegle. They place tenure groups under the general designation of social strata systems. They state, "In all agricultural societies there are designation for roles the chief differences among which are tenure variations of the respective rights to the use of and the control over land." Therefore, a tenure-social system applies to the specific actors and their pertinent behavior. Bertrand points out that this definition places no size limitation on either the number of persons or amount of land. For example, tenure systems can range from family farm operations to plantation or hacienda-type operations. One can readily verify that tenure systems are bona fide social systems.


14 Alvin L. Bertrand, Rural Land Tenure in the United States, p. 10.
Structural elements of social systems:

Social systems are seen as made up of three basic structural elements. The first element is the norm. Norm refers to required or acceptable behavior in given situations. Norms are rooted in the cultural structure and are acquired through the process of socialization. Associated with norms are values and attitudes, which can be seen as predispositions to act toward objects, persons, or ideas. Values and attitudes are a part of behavior in that they are developed within the cultural structure and influence interaction. They differ from norms in that they are not specific in nature and not acts as such.15

The second element is a role. Roles are made up of a subset of norms which are dedicated to the same function. A role as a norm is unifunctional.16 Status-positions are the places where one can locate actors in a social system. The status-position is usually made of several roles and thus is multi-functional in nature.

Norms, roles and status-positions may be illustrated in the following manner. In a tenure group, landlord is a status-position that can contain a number of different roles—one for each distinct functional system of norms, such as paternal role, provider role, 


16Alvin L. Bertrand, Basic Sociology, op. cit., p. 25.
instructor role, etc.... Each of these roles is in turn made up of numerous norms. For example, if there were a crop failure, the landlords play a paternalistic role in giving a tenant some sort of rent reduction; the tenant in return feels an obligation toward him.

Structural characteristics of Gemeinschaft-like and Gesellschaft-like role relations:

Most attempts at classification of characteristics of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft type social relations have focused on the content of the relations. The analysis by Bertrand of the structural characteristics of these relations has provided a more fruitful conceptual framework for the analysis of both the source and sequence of social change.

The difference between Gesellschaft-type and Gemeinschaft-type relations is seen in the relationship between the institutional structure and social system structure which occurs in the two settings. In Gemeinschaft-type relations the actors are related to each other through a greater number of role relationships. This is due to the relative lack of division of labor and to the fact

roles are diffuse in structure. The role relationship is broadly inclusive and is not limited to a specific function. The rights and obligations are amorphous rather than explicitly prescribed and delimited. This "role density" has given rise to structural characteristics which account for peculiar interactional properties.

In Gesellschaft-type role relations the relations are viewed as a means to attain objectives. Obligations and duties become specific, role relations are impersonal and contractual, and status-positions tend to be achieved rather than ascribed. Roles are divided among many different actors in the system. This is due to an elaborate division of labor with many actors making contributions to a total product. In such a Gesellschaft-like social structure, actors can be personally independent and yet functionally interdependent in relation to many other actors.

In summary, Gemeinschaft-type roles are proximal, have a greater range of reciprocity, tend to be closely oriented to group boundaries, are relatively active, mandatory, are considered important for group survival, and, are quite clear in meaning. Gesellschaft relations are distal, have short ranges of reciprocity, are extramural, are relatively inactive, more permissive, are considered of lesser importance to group survival, and are less well understood.

Change in land tenure systems tend to upset traditional communities to varying extents by breaking the traditional bond,
within the society, by introducing a new form of social justice, and by disrupting the prevalent system of authority. Whether change comes from outside the system, or from within the system, the course of innovations of the above type are determined by the structural characteristics of the role relations within the system.
CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE LAND TENURE PROBLEM IN TAIWAN

I. INTRODUCTION

The tenancy problem as H. C. Taylor aptly states it, is a human problem rather than merely a land problem. In an overwhelmingly agricultural country, such as Taiwan, success or failure of the social adjustment concerning the use of farm land may mean the difference between social stability and unrest.

Many modern writers have developed themes along these lines. Merle Kling, for example, blames political instability in Latin America on the extreme concentration of economic bases of power in what he terms "colonial economics." Land ownership, he says, is so heavily concentrated that no individual not already possessing great tracts of agricultural land can reasonably hope to achieve wealth through farming.

One prominent sociologist, T. Lynn Smith, states that the size of agricultural holdings, the extent to which the ownership and control is either concentrated in a few hands


or widely distributed among those who live by cultivating soil, is the most important single determinant of the welfare of the people in rural districts.\textsuperscript{20}

It would be a mistake to assert that all of the ills of Taiwan and of other developing countries before land reform programs were instigated were due to the large landholdings of a few landlords. However, there seems to be adequate justification for singling out the concentration of landownership as the one factor that is most responsible for the host of social and economic ills which afflict most of the developing Asian countries. Taiwan is such a country.

For this reason, it seems well to preface this discussion concerning the size of holdings in Taiwan with a brief consideration about some of its related problems. These problems include small-size farm units, insecure farm tenancy and an inoperative agricultural ladder.

\section*{II. LAND TENURE SYSTEM BEFORE LAND REFORM}

\textbf{A High Degree of Concentration in Ownership}

Ownership of land in Taiwan under both the Japanese and the Chinese was concentrated. A review of the statistics in Table I

### TABLE I

**DISTRIBUTION OF LANDHOLDINGS IN TAIWAN, 1930**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Landholding in Acres</th>
<th>Number of Landholders in 1,000</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Acres of Holdings in 1,000</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Average Number of Acres Per Holding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1.2</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.21-2.40</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.41-12</td>
<td>122.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>620.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>862.1</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>405.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1731.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

indicates that some 5.7 per cent of the farm families owned some 49.8 per cent of the land, while some 42.7 per cent of the farm families owned only 5.7 per cent of the land.

As can be seen in Table II, the number of tenant farmer families was about 60.2 per cent of the total number of farm families in 1948. There were only 33 per cent of owner families who had enough land to till, using 12 acres as an arbitrary point of sufficiency.

There were striking internal changes in the land tenure situation in Taiwan after the land reform program which greatly affected the pattern of landownership and tenancy. Owner-cultivated land rose to 75.4 per cent of the total land in farms and tenant-cultivated land decreased to 16.3 per cent in 1953 (see Table III).

Small Farm Size

The average size of a farm in Taiwan in 1930 was 3.9 acres, as can be seen in Table IV. Farms under 2.4 acres represented 53.2 per cent of the total, and had an average size of 1.1 acres. Farms of 2.41 acres to 4.8 acres accounted for 23.7 per cent of the total, and average 3.4 acres. Farms over 4.8 acres amounted to 23.1 per cent of the total, and had an average size of 10.9 acres.

By 1947, when the number of farm families had increased by 44 per cent, the average farm was probably no more than 3.5 acres. Land reform abolished the ownership of land by landlords. However, the structure of Taiwanese agriculture, farming on a very
### TABLE II

NUMBER OF OWNER-FARMER, TENANT FARMER, AND FARM HAND FAMILIES IN TAIWAN, 1961

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Owners Number</th>
<th>Owners Percent</th>
<th>Tenants Number</th>
<th>Tenants Percent</th>
<th>Hands Number</th>
<th>Hands Percent</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Total Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>211,649</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>385,684</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>43,521</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>640,854</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>262,065</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>417,685</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>45,296</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>725,046</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Owner Cultivated Land</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Tenant Cultivated Land</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Land Cultivated By Public Enterprises</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1080,538</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>880,642</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>178,874</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1635,230</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>353,750</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>178,875</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE IV

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMERS AND LAND TILLED IN TAIWAN, 1930
SIZE OF FARMS (In Acres)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farms</th>
<th>Number of Farmers (in 1,000's)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Area of Land Tilled (1,000 Acres)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Average Acres Per Farmer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1.2</td>
<td>128.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.21-2.4</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>167.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.41-4.80</td>
<td>100.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>343.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.81-12.00</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>566.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 +</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>500.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>423.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1569.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

small plot of land, on which the landlord system had depended, remained unchanged. These farms were still too small to permit application of new agricultural techniques. The productivity of agriculture has increased since land reform, but it has been limited by the small size of farms.

**Insecure Farm Tenancy**

Like rural societies elsewhere in Asia, Taiwan rural society has traditionally been subject to a variety of social forces. The most important of these has been an increase in population. The rate of growth was 33.5 per thousand, or more than double the average world growth of 16 per thousand.\(^{21}\) Other forces include the spreading of market pressures into rural life and political change, especially those following the advent of the Nationalist Government in 1945. The effect of these forces resulted in special problems, as follows. First, the rents were above the reasonable level. Usual rents had been 55 per cent to 60 per cent of the crop, but rents as high as 70 per cent became known.\(^{22}\) The tenant also had to pay the landlord a deposit for securing his lease and this deposit was unusually high. It was an amount equivalent to two year's rent. Second, the right of continuous tilling for tenant farmers was not stable. The written

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contract between landlord and tenant was from one to two years, with the yearly lease being the most common. But written or oral, the lease afforded little protection. Landlords had the right to terminate leases and to expel tenants for any reason they considered valid, while the dispossessed tenant rarely received compensation.

**Agricultural Ladder**

In analyzing farm tenancy problems, rural sociologists in the United States have developed a theoretical construct which represents vertical social mobility in agriculture. This construct, known as the agricultural ladder, provides the steps by which one may climb from farm laborer to owner in the course of a lifetime. The aspiration of climbing the agricultural ladder to attain the ideal of the family farm may be reasonably held by many American farmers, but can hardly be the aim of the farmers in Taiwan.

It is not only the small holdings that contribute to the low economic standard of the farmers, but the fact that so much of the land in Taiwan is owned by so few. The amount of land a farmer cultivates has little relation to the amount he owns.

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As indicated earlier, there were only 33 per cent of owner-farmers and 61.7 per cent of tenant-farmers. The tenant is burdened with extremely high rent and what is left to him is so little that he may even have difficulty in covering all of his yearly expenses. For those who do climb from a tenant to an owner's status-position, success in climbing the ladder depends upon the presence of several conditions: (1) the rent is not too high, (2) the land cultivated must be fertile, (3) the size of family must be kept small. If all these factors are favorable, the tenants dream of buying land and becoming a landowner may be realized. However, this is rarely the case.

In conclusion, farm tenancy may be good or bad depending upon what role it plays in the functioning of a society. In the United States farm tenancy is likely to furnish a stepping stone upon which a tenant farmer may climb to become a landowner. In Taiwan, however, it usually serves as an insurmountable barrier stratifying the status-position of landlord and tenant.

For the above reasons, the aspirations inherent in the concept of the agricultural ladder are unfamiliar to Taiwanese farmers. Such aspirations relate to a phenomena which lies largely outside their experience. It is thus that here is a fundamental difference between American farmers and Taiwanese farmers in attitude toward farming. In the United States, agriculture is seen as a kind of industry, and the soil is exploited as effectively as possible.
In Taiwan, farmers do not perceive agriculture as a business venture oriented toward profit, rather they see farming as a way of living involving the soil.
CHAPTER III

THE TAIWAN LAND REFORM PROGRAM

During the past several decades, land reform programs have been responsible for major agricultural changes in Asia. The basic principles of reform are the expropriation of the holdings from landlords and the granting of ownership of land to the persons who are farming it. Most of the Asian countries, with the exception of the communist ones, have advocated land reform measures in order to improve local conditions and encourage the technological development of agriculture.

In a paper presented at the Center of Land Problems in Asia and the Far East, Mr. Thomas F. Carroll made this observation:

Land reform means different things to different people. To some, it means access to land they were previously denied, to others it means putting land to efficient use; still others think of land reform primarily in political terms, like balancing the support and loyalties of various classes of people.*5

Elais T. Tuma in his book, Twenty-six Centuries of Agrarian Reform (1965) compares several important land tenure reform programs from ancient to modern times. One of his major conclusions

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is that such reforms are more likely to serve the political goals of reformers than the social needs of people. In this regard, there is a vast difference between the economic, socio-cultural, and political postures of various reformers. If a reform is oriented toward the benefit of tenant farmers, its specific content, and its enforcement, will differ substantially from a reform attempting to satisfy both landlord and tenant. The study examined here reflects a thoroughly pro-tenant attitude.

The reform in Taiwan emphasized ownership of land for the majority of tenants through rent reduction, security of tenure, the redistribution of land, and a low land ceiling for landlords. This reform involved drastic redistribution of property, political power, and social status, at the expense of the landlords.

OBJECTIVES OF THE REFORM

As a result of a growing concern about land tenure problems, the Taiwan Provincial Government, with the assistance of JCRR personnel, promulgated a land reform program in April 1949. It was proposed to change the system of land-ownership in an attempt to solve or minimize the social problems that confronted

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rural Taiwan. A three stage program was officially instituted by the Government in 1949 and completed in 1953. The three stages were: (1) the Rent Reduction Act of 1949, (2) sales of public lands, and (3) the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953.

**Rent Reduction Act of 1949**

In an effort to combat high rentals, the Taiwan Provincial Government undertook a rent reduction program. The purpose of this program was to reduce the rent from first the previous high of up to 70 per cent of the crops to 37.5 per cent of the crop. A standard contractual form was set up which assured the tenant that his tenure rights to the land would be established for at least three years and that his rentals would not have to be paid in advance. Under the new rate, a tenant pays a maximum rate of 37.5 per cent of the total harvest of the main crop as rent to the landlord. Also, the lease may be renewed upon expiration to protect the tenants' right, and to promote the farmer's interest in land reform. Extra burdens such as security deposits, advance payments of rent, and ironclad rents were all abolished.

The rent reduction program was successful for the following reasons: (1) the tenant received more income because of fixed and low rents; (2) the land was classified according to categories and grades which served as a criterion for yield of the main crop;
(3) the establishment of the Farm Tenancy Committee, composed of eleven members; (4) the government employed 62 inspectors to supervise the rent payment practices; and (5) the farmers' incentive was increased because of the security of tenure and reasonable rents. 27

Sales of Public Land

In June, 1951, the government began the second step of the land reform program—the sale of public farm lands to establish owner-farmers in Taiwan Province. Public lands were to be sold according to the following order of priority: (1) present tenants; (2) farm hands; (3) tenants with insufficient leased land; and (4) non-farmers desiring to become farmers. 28

The sale of public land was to enable farmers who applied for the purchase of public land to terminate their tenant relations with the government and become owner-farmers by acquiring the right of ownership. The government set an example for private landowners by taking the initiative in the sale of public farm land. This paved the way to realization of the land-to-the-tiller program.

The sale of public lands was carried out in several steps from 1948 to 1958. Nearly one-hundred-and-forty thousand families purchased 71,666 chia (171,281 acres) of land. The average

27 Cheng Chen, op. cit., p. 25.
28 Ibid., p. 57.
amount of land cultivated by each of the families which had purchased public land was 1.18 chia (2.83 acres). Forty-three per cent of this land was purchased from the government.\textsuperscript{29}

Each tenant farmer was permitted to purchase one-half to two hectares of paddy field, or one to four hectares of dry land. The purchase price was to be paid in twenty semi-annual installments to the government. Full ownership of the land is not effected until the entire purchase price is paid.\textsuperscript{30} And, as an owner, the purchaser is responsible for all taxes and other changes.

The Land-to-Tiller Program

By 1953 the rent reduction program and the sale of public lands had become firmly established background and was producing very good results. With this background of experience the government decided that all tenancy should be eliminated and the land-to-tiller program implemented. The ability to proceed was the result of a prior general land ownership classification program that had furnished adequate information on land categories, distribution of rights, actual condition of use, and the identity of those who were the resident and non-resident landowners.

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 63.

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 59.
General landownership classification started in January, 1951, and ended in April, 1952, with the assistance and financial support of the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction.

With the completion of the work of general landownership classification, the Taiwan Provincial Government passed the bill of the Land-to-the-Tiller Act. The bill was divided into five chapters of thirty-six articles. Some of the important features of the act will be discussed as follows: land redistribution, the landlord's compensation, and assistance to new landowners.

Land Redistribution: The program constructed in Taiwan is a compulsory one. The immediate problem of reformers was to set up the "ceiling" the landlord is permitted to retain (7.19 acres). All land over that limit was sold to the government.

The low, well-enforced ceiling in Taiwan made it possible to extract a great deal of surplus land for redistribution. Before the reform program, 50.5 per cent of the land was cultivated by owners, after the reform this percentage was 75.4 per cent (see Table III). Before reform, 33.0 per cent of the farm families were owner-cultivators. After the reform numbers increased to 58.53 per cent—a remarkable change in slightly over a decade. (See Table V.)

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TABLE V
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FARMING FAMILIES
BY TENURE FOR 1948 AND 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Owner-Cultivator</th>
<th>Tenant Farmer</th>
<th>Farm-Hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>60.20</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>58.53</td>
<td>36.74</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to The-Land-to-the-Tiller Act, Article 8: Tenant cultivated land of the following categories shall be purchased by the government for resale to the present owner or tillers:

1. Land owned by the landlord in excess of the retention acreage.
2. Land under joint ownership.
3. Private portions of any land owned by private individuals.
4. Land under government trusteeship.
5. Land owned by private individuals or family clans for purposes of ancestral worship and land owned by religious institutions.
6. Land owned by the Shenming Lui (popular religious associations) and land owned by other juristic persons and corporate bodies.
(7) Land which the landlord does not wish to retain and requests the government to purchase.

**Landlords Compensation:** The enactment of a good land reform law is an important task. The land reform groups which the legislation must consider are the persons owning the property prior to the land redistribution, referred to as the former landlords, and the persons whom the property will be sold, referred to as the new landowner or former tenants.

If land reform is properly planned for and conducted effectively it should not arouse violent resistance from landlords. Nonetheless, landlords can hardly be expected to give up voluntarily a major part of their properties, and with it their status-position and social prestige. For the proper implementation of reform, the landlord must be encouraged to participate in other occupations by some form of compensation.

According to the provisions of the Land-to-the-Tiller Act, the government paid the landlord 70 per cent in land bonds and 30 per cent in government enterprise stock shares. Land bonds are divided into rice bonds and sweet potato bonds. For example, compensations for paddy fields are paid with rice bonds. The bonds are paid in twenty semi-annual installments over ten years and have an interest of 4 per cent annually. The 30 per cent compensation in government enterprise stock shares to landlords are paid with stocks from four state corporations: the cement
corporation, the paper corporation, the industrial and mining corporation, and the Agricultural and forestry development corporation.\(^\text{32}\)

Some 106,049 landlords had their land purchased by the government.\(^\text{33}\) The government decided that the landlord would get 2.5 times the annual value of all crops on a given piece of land. The price fixed by the government was based on the productivity record appraised by the government under the farm rent reduction program. Naturally, the price fixed was below the market price, and it was clear that some of these enterprises were less profitable than others.

It was planned and hoped that the transfer of landlords' capital into industrial organization would stimulate industrial development, but facts indicate that this process has not occurred automatically.

Assistance to New Landowners: Land redistribution by itself does not result in material, economic improvements for new landowners. A successful land reform calls for an accompanying rural development which includes the necessary agencies to assist new landowners with farm credit, farm machinery, agricultural extension, and adult education programs.

\(^{32}\)ibid., pp. 75-78.

Prior to reform, farmers secured their credit primarily from kin and landlord. After reform, landlords lost their major income from farm rentals and transferred their economic interests and activities away from the land to new occupations. They are no longer concerned with maintaining their status-position as landlords or their financial role to farmers.

The landowners needed to be aided and subsidized after the reform. Therefore, the government authorized the Land Bank of Taiwan to extend the following loans:

(1) To farmers for the purchase of the landlord's retained land, as provided in Article 12 of the Land-to-the-Tiller Act.

(2) To farmers for the improvement of land use and increase of farm production, as provided in Article 23 of the same act.

(3) To farmer-purchasers for the purchase of public farm land, as provided by the regulations governing the sale of public farm lands to establish owner-farmers in Taiwan Province.

(4) To farmers for the repair and construction of irrigation facilities, and for reclamation of waste land, as provided by the same regulations.\(^{34}\)

\(^{34}\)Cheng Chen, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.
CHAPTER IV

THE STUDY AREA AND METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURE

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the study area and the methodology used in gathering and analyzing the data upon which this study was based. The data was collected, as explained in Chapter I, in an effort to determine the effects of the land reform program in Taiwan on former landlords and new landowners (former tenants).

1. LOCATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF RESEARCH SITE

Taiwan, known as Formosa, is an island off the southern coast of mainland China. With an area of 35,961 square kilometers, Taiwan is the smallest province of China. It is 240 miles long from north to south and about 85 miles wide. Its climate is subtropical and tropical with some chilly winter days and the annual mean temperature is more than 70° F. The population density of Taiwan, 368 persons per square kilometer in 1969, is one of the highest in the world. In 1967 the density was also 368 persons per square kilometer. Farms are small, averaging around three acres.

Taiwan is a primarily agricultural area. Agricultural produce has always represented a high proportion of total exports: from about 90 per cent in 1950 to a little over 60
per cent in the 1960's.  The increase in production of main crops, with the exception of sugar, can be seen in Table VI. Rice, the leading crop, accounts for more than half of Taiwan's total agricultural production.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE INCREASE IN PRODUCTION OF SELECTED CROPS BETWEEN 1953 AND 1962 (IN TONS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>1,805,712</td>
<td>2,324,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>9,233,782</td>
<td>6,756,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pineapple</td>
<td>75,318</td>
<td>101,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>105,711</td>
<td>148,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>13,093</td>
<td>21,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus fruit</td>
<td>32,292</td>
<td>73,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>685,577</td>
<td>925,549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rural Taiwan is politically well organized. The general pattern of political organization, in a general configuration, stems from the Provincial Government, to the prefecture or city, to the township, to the village (li), to the neighborhood (lin), to the head of the household. There are 16 Hsin (counties), 5 cities, and 77 chen (townships).

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The most important administration unit is the township: used for the collection of the various taxes; the carrying out of the land reform program; and the training of local people. Land reform programs in Taiwan have enjoyed considerable success and provide one of the best examples of modern approach to agrarian reform.

II. RESEARCH PROCEDURE

The Population

The sample frame for this research consisted of households in one of Taiwan's communities, Kuansi. It was not intended to be a representative cross section of all rural communities in Taiwan. Kuansi is a township in Hsinchu, in the western side of the Taiwan coastal plain. The physical area is primarily hilly with some valley land. Large compounds of households are located in the valley areas, while scattered households are found in the hills.

Kuansi is a fairly Gemeninschaft-like community. Its inhabitants are highly homogeneous in both ethnic and linguistic background. They are Hakka-descendants of earlier Chinese settlers who came to Taiwan a few generations ago. Traditional aspects of the social structure are reflected not only in ancestor worship but also in five role relationships.

Each member of the family plays his roles according to his status-position in a family. The father of a nuclear family is responsible for most of the outdoor work. The mother plays housewife roles, and takes care of household chores and the care
of hogs, fowls, etc. The children play assistant roles in aiding their parents. The sons look after the cattle and help the father while the daughters help the mother with baby-sitting, preparing meals, sewing, and washing clothes. In an extended family with three generations or more, the grandfather is usually the head of the family and decides what crops to plant in a certain year, what investments to make, and orders assistance from family members who are available for work.

The life of a rural community like Kuansi is characterized by its agrarian economy and the prominent place of kinship relations in its social structure. Traditional values have been fully developed to orient the individual's attitudes and sentiments toward the family. An individual is born and socialized within this web of kinship. The reason for the Gemeinschaft-like patterns of social relations is inherent in the orientation of roles. Roles are structurally rigid and allow few alternatives in activity designed to satisfy societal needs.36

Rice, as mentioned, is the leading crop and accounts for more than half of Kuansi's total agricultural production. Tea, second only to rice, is also an important agricultural product and a great number of the farm families depend on the tea industry for a living. Citrus fruits, sweet potatoes, vegetables and the raising of hogs, cattle, hens and ducks are usually of secondary importance.

The township administration consists of a township chief and his secretary, personnel officer, accountant, a civil affairs section, a financial section, and a draft section. The roles of the chun chang (township head) are multi-lateral because his status-position serves many social institutions. He organizes and conducts the township meetings, organizes the township for its annual work session on local public projects, and stands as the direct intermediary between the townships in Hsinchu county. His administrative powers are limited in some ways. Township offices operate within a framework of policy at the Hsien level (county). Township officials, such as the head and the township representatives, are mostly men of some means (wealthy landholders or, business men). Their positions are linked to almost all other positions in the various institutional networks. Their roles are thus closely related to others in the town.

Thus, Kuansi is representative of the general characteristics of a Taiwan rural community. At the time of this study there were 41,905 persons in 5,965 households in Kuansi, of this number, 911 households were land reform groups. Kuansi community is divided into 24 lis and land reform households are scattered among these lis (villages).

**Sampling Procedure**

This section is concerned with the sampling procedures employed in the study made. A number of points relating to theoretical
issues, the operationalization of variables, and practical considerations entered into the determination of the final sampling procedure.

It was posited that former landlords' evaluations of land reform program were not shared by the former tenants. In order to test this hypothesis, a sample was required that had a sufficiently large number of both tenure groups to enable legitimate analysis. While the proportion of former landlords in the general population is not known, it can be assumed to be small. Thus, if either a simple or stratified random sample of a general population were drawn, an insufficient number of former landlords would probably be obtained.

Two independent factors were taken into account in determining the size of the sample to be drawn. The first consideration was that of the number of former landlords and former tenants in the population. Ideally, there should have been estimates for both former landlords and former tenants. As noted earlier, however, such estimates were not available. Thus, the only population for which an estimate was available was a li (equivalent to village), the administrative unit of a township. Nine-hundred-and-eleven land reform households were scattered among these lis (villages). In order to take this into account, the sample was proportionately stratified to reflect the distribution of lis.
A second consideration was the limitation in resources and time. The researcher had only two months in which to perform the field work. A sample size of one-hundred-fifty was deemed to be optimum, time and other factors being considered. Members of land reform groups in each li were numbered successively and respondents were chosen by reference to a table of random numbers. Table VII lists the number of respondents chosen from each li.

Appendix A contains the survey questionnaire, translated into English. The data were collected during July and August, 1967.

The Field Research

A structured interview type of schedule was used in interviewing the land reform households heads. The schedule used in the interviews was designed in such a way as to yield the following kinds of data: (1) socio-economic characteristics (age, sex, education, tenure-status, size of farm); (2) measures of effects of land reform program on farming operations (sources of farm supplies, sources of loans for marketing crops); (3) attitudes toward the land reform program (whether individuals felt the land reform program had been good for them); (4) changes which the land tenure reform program had on the landowners' political attitudes.

The first task was to make a list of the randomly drawn one-hundred-and-fifty land reform households registered in the Kuansi township records. Next, information not available in official
### TABLE VII

**NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS CHOSEN BY VILLAGES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Total Number of Farms</th>
<th>Number of Farms Chosen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hsiaun</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanshan</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peitou</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungaun</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junho</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinfu</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanhua</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinshan</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shang lin</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nungho</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shikuang</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatung</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nansiung</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peishan</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinaun</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minhu</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungkuang</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinchung</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinshan</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yushan</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsingli</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatung</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taping</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungsing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>911</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
records was collected. Several administrative personnel and local leaders were sought out for information, which they gave most competently and generously.

The actual interviewing was not an easy task, despite the close relationship between the interviewer and the people in the community. Hakka farmers were found to be quite sophisticated, and it was very difficult to get specific answers from them. Erasmus analyzes the concept of fatalism as a major component in a traditional society. However, in this case it was not apathy and unconcern, but rather the pragmatic attitude of the Hakka farmers toward their lives that presented the difficulty. In the beginning, many farmers were ill-at-ease and uncommunicative despite the fact that interviews were carried out in the local dialect. After considerable hesitation the tendency was either to respond to a question in a reluctant manner, or to dismiss the question with a simple "don't know." The interviewer had to adopt probe techniques to overcome this problem.

III. SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERVIEWEES

Age and Sex Composition

The land reform farmers in the sample ranged in age from thirty to seventy-nine years. Some 96 per cent were males and

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4 per cent were females. About 29.7 per cent were under fifty, 66 per cent were between fifty and sixty-nine, and only 0.7 per cent were over seventy. The average age was 54.2 years. (See Table VIII.)

**Educational Composition**

There were ten primary schools, two high schools and a vocational high school in the area. However, 48 per cent of the interviewees had an elementary school education only, and only 5.3 per cent had high school experience. (See Table IX.)

**Tenure Status**

Over two-fifths (43.3 per cent) of the interviewees were landowners. Almost the same number (42.7 per cent) were tenant-owners, and the remainder (14 per cent) were tenants.

**Size of Farm**

The size of the farms of the interviewees studied varied from less-than-one to 20 chias (an chia is equal to 2.39 acres). About 50 per cent of the land reform farmers owned less than 1.9 chias, 28 per cent owned from 2 to 3.9 chias, 18 per cent owned from 4 to 9.9 chias, and 4 per cent owned farms ranging in size from 10 to 20 chias. (See Table X.)

**Size of Family**

Only one family of those interviewed was made of just a married couple and their unmarried children. The other families consisted of a married couple, plus their unmarried sons and daughters, plus their married sons along with their wives and children. The size of families thus varied considerably. About
### TABLE VIII

**AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE LAND REFORM FARMERS INTERVIEWED, 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Number of Farmers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE IX

**NUMBER OF YEARS OF FORMAL EDUCATION COMPLETED BY THE FARMERS INTERVIEWED, 1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Years Completed</th>
<th>Number of Farmers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Completed</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School or Higher</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE X

SIZE OF FARMS OF FARMERS INTERVIEWED, 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farm (in Chias)*</th>
<th>Number of Farm Families</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less Than One</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0-1.9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0-2.9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0-3.9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0-4.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.0-5.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.0-14.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.0-19.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Than 20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*An Chia is equal to 2.39 acres.
7.3 per cent of the families had from five to seven members, 19.3 per cent had eight to ten members, 15.3 per cent had eleven to thirteen members, 27.3 per cent had fourteen to sixteen members, 12 per cent had seventeen to nineteen members, 6.6 per cent had twenty to twenty-two members, 5.3 per cent had twenty-three to twenty-five members, 1.3 per cent had twenty-six to twenty-eight members, and 4.6 per cent had more than 26 members.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES

After World War II, the subject of land reform became one of the prime interests of many people and governments, particularly in Latin America and Asia. This concern stimulated a considerable amount of social research at both the theoretical and empirical level. However, to the writer's knowledge, few adequate conceptualizations have developed along this line. Most theories of land reform are based on an idea that in the natural state, land belongs to everybody. Consequently, landlords take the land by force, fraud, and other means. This necessitates land reform programs, so that peasants may acquire land and have the security and incentive to cultivate it and improve its production.

Land Reform and Commercialization

Gunner Mydral, in his famous work, *Asian Drama*, maintained that as long as Indian agriculture is dominated by the parasitic landlords, the prospects for economic development are slight. But the history of land tenure does not always support Mydral's view. In Japan and England, landlords served as a positive

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innovating force and contributed to the expansion of agricultural productivity. In some countries in Latin America and Asia unpleasant relationships between landlords and tenants are common. However, parasitic landlords are the result of a complex of economic, social, political, and ecological variables. 

Barrington Moore, Jr., in his master work, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, strongly points out that landlords are not necessarily an obstacle to agricultural development. Moore is interested in the routes by which various countries have come into the modern, industrial world. He takes Britain, France, America, and three Asian countries, China, Japan, and India as case studies. And from these he draws a number of theoretical conclusions.

He posits three possible roads to modernization. The first and the most common, is the road followed by England, France, and the United States; all achieved democracy and capitalism after revolution. The second road, followed by Germany and Japan, led to capitalism without revolution, via a Fascist dictatorship of landlords and industrialists. The third road, followed by Russia and China, first runs through a peasant revolution which destroys the landlords, then through a communist dictatorship which destroys the peasant proprietor, and ends with an industrialized but not a democratic society.

In Moore's view, England's peculiar evolution has depended on four things: the early rise to great power, wealth of a formidable bourgeoisie with aristocratic aspirations; the early shift of the landed aristocracy to a commercial (wool trade) rather than a feudal attitude to land ownership, and the fact that the alliance of these two groups and the elimination of the peasantry from English society in the eighteenth century by their transformation into leaseholding tenant farmers. Basically, for modernization to proceed it is necessary that agriculture, as the major economic activity, be reduced to secondary importance and that the peasantry be converted into substantial farmers producing for the market.

Land Reform and Democracy

Clarence Senior in his work, Land Reform and Democracy, studied the question of land reform in its economic, social, and political context in Mexico. He emphasizes that: "agrarian reform will play, for millions of people, a major role in the resolution of the ideological struggle underlying the 'coexistence' of democracy and communism."41 Senior asked questions about the relation between democracy and land reform. The

41Clarence Senior, Land Reform and Democracy (Gainesville: Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1958) p. 5.
first question was, how are those who want the reform going to secure the power to carry it into effect? The second question was, does democracy grow spontaneously after land is distributed or must it be deliberately sought and planned for during and after agrarian reform? The third question was, what technical problems must be solved?

Senior's findings indicated that eleven years of civil war were involved in order to carry out reform. In terms of democracy, land reform does not grow spontaneously. Peasants who have lived under traditional agrarian society cannot become rational and democratically-minded men overnight. They have to learn how to establish their new role relationships with others to enable them to make their own decisions, when certain decisions have to be made. Some of these decisions are: what kinds of crops to plant; the election of public officials; the purchase of machinery; and, the use of loans and credit. Senior concluded that democracy must be deliberately promoted and the new social norms of change must be recognized and must be extended beyond the agrarian institutions to the structure and functions of all major institutions.

R. P. Dore, an English rural sociologist and economist, held the same view as Senior.\(^4\) In his study, *Land Reform in Japan*, Dore was interested in the development of democracy in

Japan among peasants who were emancipated from a feudal system. Dore believes that the drastic redistribution of land to the exploited peasants was successful not only in raising level of living but also in providing a social setting for traditional oriented peasants to become involved in the decision-making process.

Both Senior and Dore show that democratic governments can successfully break feudal social systems and introduce peasants to the modern world.

Some social scientists have held different views on land reform programs. Elias H. Tuma in his Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform compares agrarian reform programs in eight countries. It is notable that his analysis is based on a conceptual scheme of land reform which he developed to evaluate reforms in all eight cases. Despite different starting points in each country, Tuma shows that land reform without associated developmental programs can do little for a people's standard of living. It may, however, have short term stability, delay violent hostilities between tenure groups, and recruit support for the reformer government. Such a reform tends to be of limited impact, because it does not reach to the foundations of the system. Like Senior, he doubts that land reform itself

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43 Elias H. Tuma, op. cit.
can benefit the peasantry, but his method is closer to that of Barrington Moore, Jr. Tuma suggests that if the countries with reform programs desire a fundamental change in the land tenure structure, they should attempt such changes by reorganizing the economic structure, commercializing agriculture (as happened in England or Japan) or, by a political revolution (as happened in China).

Technology and Land Tenure

Up to now, this discussion of reform has been related to political and social pressures. But technology also effectively changes tenure arrangements. T. Lynn Smith contends that the mechanization of agriculture undermined the family farm system in the United States and other countries. He points out that the dependence of the farm family on industry, which resulted from the surrender of agriculture to technological forces, meant less security for the farm family.44

Other rural sociologists and agricultural economists in the United States and Europe have done intensive research on the impact of technology on the land tenure system. In the United States, several trends have been especially noted: the decrease in number of farms and increase in farm size; the increased proportion of land operated by part-owners; the declining number of farms operated by tenants; the movement toward contract farming and vertical integration; the use of

techniques and practices of other industries; and the trend for
capital investment and certain management decisions to be
supplied by persons other than the farmer himself. These
trends have been shown to have important implications for tenure
systems.

Technology has apparently brought about other changes in
agriculture. The problems of economic and social adjustment
associated with technology in agriculture are as significant as
those associated with land tenure reform programs resulting from
political and/or other social forces. Ironically enough, an ever-
increasing technology forces larger holdings, while agrarian
reform movement advocates redistribution of large holdings into
small farm sizes. In the developing countries, the task of
adjusting technological change in agriculture has not reached
its crucial points. Agrarian reform is still of prime interest
in these areas, but it remains to be seen how this interest will
be reconciled to advancing technology.

The above discussion has focused on several theoretical
frameworks developed by social scientists in studying land

45 Alvin L. Bertrand, (ed.), Rural Land Tenure in the United
States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1962), p. 205-
247; Bertrand, et al, Social Implications of Increasing Farm
Technology in Rural Louisiana, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment
Station Bulletin 628 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University,
reform programs. Their views vary from pro-reform to anti-reform. However, they all seem to agree on one point—that land reform is only one aspect of total social and economic development. It seems to this writer that the redistribution of land will not resolve all the problems of poverty because such a move deals with symptoms, rather than causes. The feasible alternative appears to lie in decreasing the ratio of people to land and capital, and providing alternative employment for the surplus population.

V. STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

The primary concern of this study is the change of a land tenure system and its effect on the people involved. The forces set in motion by a program of land reform effectively change social role relations. In studying this phenomena one must be aware that the land reform program in Taiwan was imposed from above and it was not an expression of an organized ideologically directed social movement. Traditional patterns of landlord-tenant role relationships were disrupted, and farmers were forced to make adjustments in their role relations. Out of this change, Gesellschaft-like role relationships were hypothesized to have developed.

In light of the above, the assumption was made that change in land tenure status would serve to break down Gemeinschaft-like role relations and lead to Gesellschaft-like role relations.
The predicted Gesellschaft trend in land tenure social relations is thus the major theme of this study. This trend involves role relations which could be determined to be in the process of becoming increasingly rational, specific, and limited in responsibility.

These broad propositions serve as a guideline for the research hypotheses which follow. They are based on the assumption that the magnitude of change in land tenure status is related to the degree to which farmers benefited from the land reform, which in turn should be positively related to the magnitude of Gesellschaft characteristics. It was further assumed that those who benefited most from land tenure changes would tend to manifest more Gesellschaft-like characteristics than those who benefited less. The classes involved are: New Land-owner; Tenant-owner; Tenant; and Former-landlord. The independent variable of the study done was the degree of benefit; the dependent variable was the degree of rationality (i.e., Gesellschaft-like characteristics). Three general hypotheses were developed from this proposition, and they imply a direction of association.

**General Hypothesis I**

The first general hypothesis is based on the belief that rational role relations were expressed in the decision-making of farmers. In other words, a positive association between the...
degree to which farmers benefited from land tenure change and rational role relations in their decision-making is hypothesized. The following sub-hypotheses were developed from this general statement.

Sub-hypothesis 1: the degree of farmer's benefit from land tenure change is related to his rational role relations in making loans.

Sub-hypothesis 2: the degree of farmer's benefit from land tenure change is related to his rational role relations in the marketing process.

Sub-hypothesis 3: the degree of farmer's benefit from land tenure change is related to his rational role relations in producing and using farm supplies.

The indicators used to test the first sub-hypothesis were derived from answers to the question: "Where do you go to make a loan?" The following answers were received:

1. Money lending.
2. Agricultural Association and Money Lending.
4. Other sources (relatives or friends).
5. Former landlords.
6. No sources.

The indicators used to test the second sub-hypothesis were derived from answers to the question: "Where do you sell your crops and other agricultural products?" Possible answers were:
1. Local market.
2. Agricultural Association and Local market.
3. Former landlords.
4. Other.

The indicators used to test the third sub-hypothesis were derived from answers to the question: "From whom do you acquire your farm supplies?" Answers given were:

2. Agricultural Association and Local market.
3. Local Market.
4. Other sources (relatives or friends).

**General Hypothesis II**

The second general hypothesis predicted that there would be a positive association between the degree to which farmers benefited from land tenure change and their evaluation of change in the land tenure system. The following sub-hypotheses were developed from this general statement.

**Sub-hypothesis 1:** former tenants from Kuansi community will evaluate the effects of the land reform program more favorably than former landlords.

The indicators used to test this sub-hypothesis were derived from answers to these questions:

1. Do you prefer to be as you were before land reform?
   1. No
   2. Yes
2. Was land reform beneficial to your family?
1. No response
2. No
3. Yes

3. If there had been no land reform, how do you feel your present condition would be?
1. Better
2. Same
3. Worse

**General Hypothesis III**

The third general hypothesis is based on the belief that rational role relations were expressed in participating in formal organizations. The following sub-hypotheses were developed from this general statement.

**Sub-hypothesis 1:** former tenants will participate more in public official jobs than former landlords.

**Sub-hypothesis 2:** former tenants will show more interest in local politics than former landlords.

The indicators used to test the first of the above sub-hypotheses were derived from answers to the question: "Are you holding any of the following public offices?"

1. Head of Lin.
2. Head of Li.
3. Township representative.
4. None.
The indicators used to test the second sub-hypothesis listed above were derived from answers to the question: "How would you vote if one of your relatives or friends ran for a local government position, such as a township representative, and his political affiliation was different from yours?"

1. No response.
2. Would support him regardless of political affiliation.
4. Would support the party decision in public while making an effort to support my relative privately.

The above listed hypothesis represents the assumption which inspired the research conducted.
**CHAPTER V**

**ANALYSIS OF THE DATA: AN INTERPRETIVE DISCUSSION**

**I. - INTRODUCTION**

Preceding discussions were designed to set the stage for this chapter, which is devoted to an analysis of the data collected. The reader has been introduced to the problem, the conceptual framework, the hypotheses and the methodological procedures. It is in the context of these discussions that the specific findings are now presented.

**II. ANALYSIS OF DATA**

**General Hypothesis 1**

It will be recalled that the first general hypothesis predicted that there would be a positive association between the degree to which farmers benefited from land tenure change and the extent to which rational role relations were present in their decision making. Three of the sub-hypotheses devised to test this relationship supported the general hypothesis.

The test statistic employed in the analysis of the association between the degree to which farmers benefited from land tenure change and their behavior in seeking loans was
the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. This test statistic was chosen because the level of measurement of the data is ordinal. It is clear, as may be seen in Table XI, that both former tenants and former landlords sources of loans were either money lending agencies or agricultural associations. By contrast, landlords were found to be an important source of loans made to present tenants. Interestingly, it was found that 11.8 per cent of former tenants continued to go to their former landlords, friends or relatives for loans, whereas 28.5 per cent of the interviewers in this group went to money lending agencies or agricultural associations when they wanted to make loans (See Table XII). A scrutiny of the data in Table XI, utilizing the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance, reveals that a significant difference of ranking was found between former tenants (new landowners, new tenant-owners, and new tenants) and former landlords in the rationality of the relationship they established in making loans. Further study of Table XII reveals that when former tenants are combined and contrasted to former landlords in the rationality of their decision making utilizing the Mann-Whitney U test, a significant difference appears. These findings imply that former tenants have higher Gesellschaft-like role relations in making loans than do the former landlords.
TABLE XI

SOURCES OF LOANS MADE BY INTERVIEWEES BY LAND TENURE STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Loan (Rationality Scale)</th>
<th>Tenure Status</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Landowner</td>
<td>Tenant-Owner</td>
<td>Tenant</td>
<td>Landlord</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Lending</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association &amp; Money Lending</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Landlord</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Sources</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H = 31.4458**
The data on farmers' marketing process which appears in Table XII show that 79.2 per cent of former tenants and of former landlords utilize the local market for selling their crops. It thus appears that rationality in market decision-making in this cash agricultural economy carries over to both owners and tenants. However, a further analysis of the data in Table XIII, based on the Kurskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance, indicates a variation between former landlords and former tenants in the marketing process. Further analysis in Table XIV reveals that when all categories of former tenants were combined in contrast to former landlords, a significant difference was observed. The above findings lead to the conclusion that former tenants have higher Gesellschaft-like role relations in their marketing than do former landlords.

The Kurskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance indicates significant variations between former tenants and former landlords in the manner through which they acquire farm supplies, see Table XV. When former tenants groups were combined in contrast to former landlords (Table XVI) a significant difference is observed. The above finding again suggests that former tenants maintain more Gesellschaft-like role relations than former landlords in acquiring their farm supplies.
TABLE XII

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SOURCES OF LOANS MADE BY INTERVIEWEES BY LAND TENURE STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Loan (Rationality Scale)</th>
<th>Tenure Status (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Total (Per Cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tenants (N=126)</td>
<td>Landlords (N=24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Lending</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association &amp; Money Lending</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Landlords</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Sources</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ Z = 6.87^{**} \]
### TABLE XIII
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES UTILIZING A PARTICULAR MARKETING PLACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Rationality</th>
<th>New Landowner (Number)</th>
<th>Tenant-Owner (Number)</th>
<th>Tenant (Number)</th>
<th>Landlord (Number)</th>
<th>Total (Number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Market</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association &amp; Local Market</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Landlord</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ H = 10.2041^{**} \]

### TABLE XIV
PERCENT OF INTERVIEWEES UTILIZING A PARTICULAR MARKETING PLACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status Rationality</th>
<th>Tenant (N=126) (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Landlord (N=24) (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Total (N=150) (Per Cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Market</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association &amp; Local Market</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Landlord</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ Z = 2.19^{*} \]
### TABLE XV

NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES UTILIZING A PARTICULAR SOURCE FOR FARM SUPPLIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Rationality</th>
<th>New Landowner</th>
<th>Tenant Owner</th>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>Landlord</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association</td>
<td>New Landowner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association &amp; Local Market</td>
<td>Tenant Owner</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Market</td>
<td>Tenant Owner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Tenant Owner</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE XVI

PER CENT OF INTERVIEWEES UTILIZING A PARTICULAR SOURCE FOR FARM SUPPLIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Tenant (N=126) (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Landlord (N=24) (Per Cent)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Association &amp; Local Market</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Market</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ Z = 3.62** \]
An explanation of the above findings may be offered as follows. The change of land tenure status broke down landlord-tenant role relations. The paternalistic roles of former landlords, once backed by the economic reality of tenancy relations, no longer exists and tenants must seek assistance elsewhere. This explains why former tenants now have to rely more on impersonal organizations when they need assistance. The change of land tenure status encouraged former tenants to deviate from traditional norms. The forced changed to new ways of obtaining assistance apparently did not come about smoothly for all the new landowners, new tenant-owners, and new tenants. About 50 per cent of the respondents from former tenant groups reported that they had no reliable sources for making loans. Their major difficulty appeared to be the lack of agricultural capital to support a credit rating. In this connection credit became extremely short after the land reform program was inaugurated. The former landlords, who used to do at least a limited amount of money lending to local farmers, no longer were able or inclined to continue this practice. New landowners, new tenant-owners, and new tenants had not had time to develop financial stability and at the same time were not very good credit risks. This phenomenon can be identified as one which is likely to develop after almost any type of land reform program.
General Hypothesis II

The second general hypothesis predicted that there would be a positive association between the degree to which farmers benefited from land tenure change and their evaluation of change in this land tenure status. All of the sub-hypotheses devised to test this assumption (see Chapter IV) supported the general hypothesis.

The indicators utilized included three types of questions designed to determine the individuals evaluation of the land reform program. The first question, posed at the individual level, was as follows: "Do you prefer your former status before land reform to your present status?". The purpose of this question was to measure how an individual farmer evaluated land reform in terms of its benefits to himself and his family. The second question read, "If there had been no land reform, how do you think living conditions would have been now?". This question was employed to measure the individual farmer's evaluation of land reform on the Kwansi community.

The data contained in Tables XVII, XVIII, XIX, indicate that there is a positive association between the degree to which farmers felt they benefited from the land reform program and the farmers' evaluation of land reform. It was predicted that farmers would evaluate the land reform program in terms of the actual
### TABLE XVII
INTERVIEWEES EVALUATION OF BENEFIT RECEIVED FROM LAND REFORM BY TENURE STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>New Landowner</th>
<th>Tenant Owner</th>
<th>Tenant Tenant</th>
<th>Land-Lord</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 47.52** with 3 d.f.

### TABLE XVIII
INTERVIEWEES EVALUATION OF THE SUPERIORITY OF THEIR PRESENT LIVING CONDITIONS OVER THEIR FORMER CONDITION, BY TENURE STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>New Landowner</th>
<th>Tenant Owner</th>
<th>Tenant Tenant</th>
<th>Land-Lord</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square = 62.782** with 6 d.f.
### TABLE XIX

INTERVIEWEES EVALUATION OF BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM BY TENURE STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>New Landowner</th>
<th>Tenant-Owner</th>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>Land-Lord</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 118.55** with 6 d.f.

### TABLE XX

INTERVIEWEES PARTICIPATION IN FORMAL LEADERSHIP POSITIONS, BY TENURE STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>New Landowner</th>
<th>Tenant-Owner</th>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>Land-Lord</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head of Lin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Li</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Township Representative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 12.83 with 9 d.f. N.S.
benefits they themselves derived from the change in their land tenure status. Table XVII indicates that about 75 per cent of former tenants were satisfied with the land tenure change while almost all former landlords were dissatisfied with the program. In this regard almost four out of every five former tenants indicated that the land reform program had been beneficial to their families. By contrast none of the former landlords reported that their families had benefited from the land reform policy (Table XVIII).

The Chi-square analysis of the data appearing in Table XIX reveals that in this instance the former tenants were again found to differ significantly from former landlords in their evaluation of the impact of land reform on the Kwansi community. An inspection of Table XIX reveals that 37 per cent of the former tenants indicated that without the land reform program the Kwansi community would have been worse off today. In sharp contrast, 80 per cent of the former landlords indicated that the Kwansi community would have been better at the present time without the reform program.

On the basis of the Chi-square analysis of the data presented in Table XVII, Table XVIII, and Table XIX, it can be stated that former tenants overwhelmingly evaluated the land reform program more favorably than did former landlords. This finding makes it clear that their change in land tenure status did not appeal to former landlords. Such an attitude
is understandable when one is aware that it was difficult for a number of former landlords to maintain their status and style of life, after the loss of their main source of wealth. Some, in fact, went into business ventures without too much success. Others are living off their capital and have no other means of earning a living. Complaints concerning the government and the land reform program derive from these situations.

**General Hypothesis III**

The third general hypothesis anticipated a positive relationship between the degree to which farmers benefited from a change in their land tenure status and their participation in Kwansi community activities. The association between the degree of farmers' perceived benefit (independent variable) and their participating in community activities (dependent variable) was tested by the use of the *Chi-square* statistic. The computations made indicate (Table XX) that there was no significant association between the degree of farmers' perceived benefits and their participation in public affairs. About 88.6 per cent of both former tenants and former landlords did not participate in any type of community activity. Among the individuals who were former tenants, 27.8 per cent held some type of community position. By contrast, only 20.7 per cent of the former landlords were involved in public positions.
The above finding suggest that the change of land tenure status has not brought about a significant change in the political orientations of farmers. Rational individualism, expressed by participation in community oriented activities, appear to be a pattern of behavior to be developed gradually. It was assumed that a change of land tenure status would lead to a feeling of independence on the part of the former tenant and thus result in a change in his political attitude. This feeling of independence was hypothesized since the authority of the former landlord backed by traditional landlord-tenant role relations, no longer would be in evidence. However, the Chi-square analysis of the data collected and shown in Table XXI reveals that there was no significant association between the degree of farmers' perceived benefit and their change to Gesellschaft-like role relations. Examination of Table XXI shows that 59.3 per cent of all respondents, both former tenants and former landlords, gave no response, while 37.3 per cent indicated they would support their relatives or friends despite differences in political affiliation. This finding implies that the change of land tenure status had little effect on political viewpoints or participation of farmers.

The high proportion of "don't know" responses on voting preference among both former tenants and former landlords is indicative of the traditional Hakka pragmatism in politics. A Hakka family derives its political outlook by placing its
TABLE XXI

INTERVIEWEES EXPRESSED VOTING BEHAVIOR TOWARD A KINSMAN WITH A DIFFERENT PARTY AFFILIATION, BY TENURE STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure Status</th>
<th>New Landowner</th>
<th>Tenant-Owner</th>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>Land-Lord</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would support him re­</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regardless of political</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay neutral</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support the party de­</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cision in public while</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>making an effort to</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support your relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>privately</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 8.088 with 9 d.f. N.S.
members within a network of social and economic relationships. It is thus through the family that the individual Hakka acquires his political attitude. Herbert Hyman, in his book entitled Political Socialization, points out that there is a strong association between the political attitudes and behavior of individuals and those of the individual's parents.

In summary, it may be noted that the changes brought about by the reform program disrupted the Gemeinschaft-like role relations which previously existed in the Kwansi community. However, orientation of individuals, which are deeply embedded in family relations, have not been greatly affected. This finding suggests that the family structure is strong enough to introduce a degree of irrationality, even in the face of change which makes it to one's self-interests to change old ways of behavior.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter contains a summary discussion of the major findings of the study. In addition, some major implications and applications of the findings are presented and the limitations imposed on the study.

I. Summary

The study made and reported in this dissertation represents an exploratory investigation of the change produced by a land reform program in Taiwan. The overall finding of the study indicates that this change can be described as a shift from primarily Gemeinschaft-like to quasi Gesellschaft-like role relations in Taiwan agricultural systems. It will be recalled that Ferdinand Tonnies developed the concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft to refer to special classes of social relations. A system of Gemeinschaft relations is based, in his view, on "natural will" that is personal relations are seen as ends in themselves. They are intimate, spontaneous, traditional. Obligations and duties are diffuse and general, social status is ascribed. In contrast, Gesellschaft relations are those where behavior is marked by "rational will," that is role relations in a Gesellschaft system are a means to attain other objectives. Obligations and duties
become specific, relationships impersonal and contractual, and social status is primarily achieved. According to Tonnies, the primary factors which bring about change from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft social relations are trade and population increase. In this study the indications are that a change in land tenure relations can also bring about a change in overall social relations. Specifically, when traditional landlord-tenant role relations are disrupted by forced reallocation of the land, individual farmers are forced to make an adjustment which involves more outside contacts and change their role relations. Said another way, there is a shift from certain traditional patterns in land tenure relations in Taiwan is the major discovery of this study. Three general hypotheses were formulated and tested to support this conclusion. They may be elaborated as follows. In the first instance, evidence of the more Gesellschaft-like role relations of farmers can be seen in the increasing rationality of their decision making. Specifically, the way they procure loans, the way they market their crops, and the way they acquire their farm supplies has become less personal and more impersonal in orientation since the land reform program. Also, the change in their land tenure status forced former landlords to transfer
their social and economic interests to occupations other than farming. These individuals are no longer concerned with or able to maintain paternalistic relationships with their former tenants. Former tenants have had to develop other more rationalistic approaches to their work and needs. For this new class, borrowing money is especially difficult. The borrower is handicapped by the fact that he does not have a good credit reputation and he has little property to mortgage. Also it is difficult for him to get someone in good standing in the community to serve as a waranter. It can be seen how these problems make it difficult to obtain the capital needed for farming operations. It is of significance that almost half of the former tenants interviewed reported that they had no sources for obtaining a loan. It was found that some of the landowners were able to make loans through the Farmers' Association, but this number was small. It is perhaps understandable that former landlords did not have as much difficulty as new landowners, or tenants in making a loan. It is surmised that former landlords, despite their loss of land, still retained a degree of social and economic influence in their community.

It may be concluded from the above that a shortage of loans, that is of available credit, is one of the shortcomings of the land reform program as it was developed in Taiwan. This finding suggests that the government should consider providing programs for needed financial resources to new landowners, new tenant-owners, and new tenants.
In the second instance, it was discovered that former tenants, by virtue of their present status as owners or part-owners, were required to interact more with urban persons. This was true because of the new roles related to the selling of crops and the acquisition of farm supplies. In addition, as entrepreneurs, they had to become more profit-minded. Generally, the local market was the place where they could engage in the bargaining necessary to achieve the above aim. There were always many merchants and buyers of various types here. The practice was thus to shop around before deciding whom to buy from or sell to. The increase in the above practice since the land reform programs leads to the conclusion that farmers now view farming more as a business than a way of life. High income and the acquisition of material possessions apparently are becoming values for these rural dwellers in much the same way they are for urban dwellers.

The third specific finding of the research done was that former tenants are more favorably impressed with the government-sponsored land reform programs than are former landlords. This is understandable, of course, since former tenants benefited most from the land reform program. Although this finding could be anticipated, one is led to wonder if some attention should not be given to the former landlord. Apparently they will continue to be unhappy with the reform program so long as they see it as hurting them. Possibly educational programs could be devised to help them adjust better.
Certain findings, in addition to those related to specific hypothesis, are worthy of note. It has already been observed that the change in land tenure status disrupted the paternalistic landlord-tenant role relationships in Taiwan. It is therefore most interesting that individual political orientations were determined to have changed little. All questions asked indicated little if any change in political behavior occurred. The explanation for this may be the Hakka's, or local residents, strong ties within his family structure. The strength of family influence obviously tends to confine the Hakka's political attitudes to those supported by his family.

A high proportion of farmers interviewed would not express their views on voting preferences. The explanation for this reluctance presumably lies in the fact that their political behavior is still very much tradition bound. Traditionally, to the Taiwan farmer, politics is not a matter to speak about since everyone knows whom he is going to vote for in an election. His candidate is always the person who has the closest direct or indirect social relations with his family, relatives, or close friends. This finding indicates the strong persistence of family ties in the light of change. It may or may not mean that the land tenure reform program will have an effect in changing the political behavior of farmers. One would suspect some impact but the effect will apparently take much longer and be more indirect than hypothesized.
Additional research findings indicated that about 80 percent of both former landlords and former tenants did not hold public positions. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is the general low participation of ruralites in this sort of role. However, it should be noted that the change in land tenure status had a major effect on the participation of former landlords. Before the reform, former landlords played major leadership roles in the Kwansi community. As an aside, it may be noted that during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, almost all of the township positions were in the hands of the landlords. It was through use of the landlords that the Japanese achieved their governmental policy and administrative objectives. In other words, landlords had a certain influence the Japanese exploited. The status and prestige of landlords was obtained through the contribution of money to community projects. There were, of course, some landlords who did nothing at all in public affairs. On the whole, however, the former landlords appear to have been public oriented.

In light of the above findings, conclusion reached was that the land reform program changed community behavior by introducing landlords of different types. Old landlords either returned to farming as small owners; took an outside occupation; or retired to live off the capital they had accumulated. Since they no longer had large holdings they could not maintain their
status and leadership roles. This conclusion has implications which need further study. It may well be that community overall functioning was adversely affected.

Another conclusion was that the new position of the former tenant laborer was characterized by certain problems. These individuals formerly played subordinate roles in their relations with landlords. They were accustomed to doing whatever the landlord wished as a condition for living on the land. In this type of role they did not care who was in public office, or even who was head of a township. The land reform program brought an awareness of the importance of these public positions. However, few had the experience necessary to participate wisely in public affairs. They, therefore, either did not take positions as public servants or, if they took such a position had a very difficult transformation to make. In other words, the change in their land tenure status did give the former tenant an immediate incentive to achieve a higher social status. However, it is apparent that the socialization process necessary to create the appreciation and understanding of public responsibilities will take much longer than was assumed by the planners of the reform program. To be sure, some norms, values, and attitudes have changed, but the pace of change is obviously gradual, particularly in the realm of political participation.
II. Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research

The chief limitations of this study were inherent in time and cost factors. The writer had to accomplish the field work personally and through his own limited resources. The above were the reasons the study was limited only to farmers who were affected by the land reform program. Other farmers could well have served as a control group for testing in terms of a relatively unbiased population. It was also necessary to limit the study to only one township, the Kwansi community. Consequently, implications derived from the findings can only be generalized with caution.

Many ideas for future research suggested themselves in the course of this study. One thing which became clear was that the views which high government officials and community influentials have on land tenure change should be studied. Future programs will be planned and implemented by these individuals and many of them appear poorly informed on the full implications of land reform. This study did not provide information on land tenure change and the rate of population growth. As leading researchers in social demography have noted, demographic factors play an important role in social planning. One of the crucial problems facing the world today, especially the underdeveloped countries, is the rapid rate of population growth.
A change of land tenure status does not settle population problems. It is, therefore, in order to suggest programs of family planning should be instituted as a corollary to programs of land reform.

The role of part-time farmer has a significant impact on the stratification system of rural communities. This is another type of study which could well be made in Taiwan and elsewhere. Traditionally in rural areas status and privilege have related to landed wealth and income. However, with an increase in the number of part-time farmers a new pattern seems to emerge.

As a final concluding statement, it may be pointed out that this study has determined that land reform programs do affect social relations in detectable ways. It is too early to determine whether or not Taiwanese rural communities will become stronger or weaker as a result of the changes of this nature which have occurred but it is clearly evident that there now exist new forms of social relations.
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B. PERIODICALS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS


1. Tenure status before land reform

(0) No response
(1) Landlord
(2) Tenant

2. Tenure status after land reform

(0) No response
(1) Landowner
(2) Tenant-owner
(3) Still tenant

3. (a) Age

Actual number of years
(00) No response

(b) Sex

(0) No response
(1) Male
(2) Female

(c) Education

(0) No response
(1) No education
(2) Elementary
(3) Completed Elementary
(4) High School or higher education

4. Size of farm before land reform

Actual number of "Chia"
(00) No response

5. Size of farm after land reform

Actual number of "Chia"
(00) No response
6. Size of family before land reform

   Actual number
   (00) No response

7. Size of family after land reform

   Actual number
   (00) No response

8. Did unpaid relatives help in your farming operation?

   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes

9. Did unpaid neighbors help in your farming operation?

   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes

10. Do you use chemical fertilizer on your farm?

    (0) No response
    (1) No
    (2) Yes

11. Sources of farm supplies after land reform

    (1) Agricultural Association
    (2) Agricultural Association and Local Market
    (3) Local Market
    (4) Other sources (relatives or friends)

12. Sources of loans (after land reform)

    (0) No response
    (1) Money lending
    (2) Agricultural Association and Money Lending
    (3) Agricultural Association
    (4) Other sources (relatives or friends)
    (5) Former landlords
    (6) No sources
13. Marketing crops after land reform

(0) No response
(1) Local Market
(2) Agricultural Association and Local Market
(3) Former landlords
(4) Other

14. Where do you and your family go for treatment when sick?

(0) No response
(1) Public Hospital
(2) Private Clinic
(3) Non-professional men
(4) Advice from neighbors
(5) Other places
(6) No place

15. Attitudes toward public hospital

(0) No response
(1) Feeling of security
(2) No particular feeling
(3) Care as well at home
(4) Suspicious of public hospitals
(5) Hostility against public hospitals
(6) Other feelings

16. Do you have a radio set?

(0) No response
(1) No
(2) Yes

17. Do you listen to radio?

(0) No response
(1) No
(2) Yes

18. If yes, what programs do you prefer?

(0) No response
(1) News
(2) Plays and stories
(3) Both 1 and 2
(4) Songs and music
19. Changes that took place in house since the land-reform

(0) No response
(1) No changes
(2) Remodeling
(3) Repairing
(4) Addition of rooms
(5) Other changes

20. Where do you spend leisure time?

(0) No response
(1) At home
(2) At friends home
(3) At local marketing center
(4) Idling
(5) Other

21. Are you in favour of early marriage or late marriages?

(0) No response
(1) Early
(2) Late

22. Are you in favour of extended family or nuclear family

(0) No response
(1) Extended
(2) Nuclear

23. Number of children preferred

(0) No response
(1) One
(2) Two
(3) Three
(4) Four
(5) Five
(6) Six
(7) Seven
(8) More than seven

24. Sex of children preferred

(0) No response
(1) All boys
(2) Mostly boys
(3) Boys and girls
(4) Makes no difference
25. Are you in favor of regarding boys as superior to girls in status?
   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes

26. What do you think of birth control?
   (0) No response
   (1) Disagree
   (2) Agree
   (3) Neutral (don't know, don't care)

27. Are you in favor of having more than one wife?
   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes
   (3) Neutral

28. Are you in favor of giving daughters freedom to choose their husbands?
   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes
   (3) Neutral

29. Are you in favor of giving sons freedom to choose their wives?
   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes
   (3) Neutral

30. Are you in favor of educating girls?
   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes

31. Are you in favor of girls working away from home?
   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes
32. Was land-reform beneficial to your community?

(0) No response
(1) No
(2) Yes

33. Was land-reform beneficial to your family?

(0) No response
(1) No
(2) Yes

34. If there had been no land-reform, how do you think living conditions in your community would have been?

(0) No response
(1) Better
(2) Same
(3) Worse

35. Which of the following do you prefer?

(0) No response
(1) The first step of land-reduction program
(2) The total program
(3) None at all

36. Was the method of determining who was eligible to purchase land appropriate?

(0) No response
(1) No
(2) Yes

37. Was the land you purchased enough for family needs?

(0) No response
(1) No
(2) Yes
(3) Not applicable

38. Do you prefer to be as you were before land-reform?

(0) No response
(1) No
(2) Yes
39. Are you pleased to be an owner under land-reform?
   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes
   (3) Not applicable

40. What use would you make of the money, after you pay off the acquired land under Land-to-the-Tiller program?
   (0) No response
   (1) Buy more land
   (2) Invest in business
   (3) Live much more comfortably
   (4) Saving
   (5) Not applicable

41. What use did you make of the money after you sold your land under Land-to-the-Tiller program?
   (0) No response
   (1) Moved to urban area and ran business
   (2) Lived on the money paid back from land
   (3) Loaned money to farmers
   (4) Devoted to educating children in getting higher education
   (5) Changed to other profession (specify)
   (6) Hopeless
   (7) Saving
   (8) Not applicable

42. Are you still interested in participating public activities?
   (0) No response
   (1) Hold a formal position
   (2) Serve as advisor for your neighborhood
   (3) None
   (4) Not applicable

43. Can evil spirits cause disease?
   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes

44. Have you ever made any sacrifice to prevent sickness?
   (0) No response
   (1) No
   (2) Yes
45. What religion do you prefer most?
   (0) No response
   (1) Taoism
   (2) Budhism
   (3) 1 and 2
   (4) Christian (specify)

46. Do you believe that ancestor worship is
   (0) No response
   (1) An expression of fear that neglected ancestors would impose misfortune to their descendants
   (2) Expression of respectfulness or devoutness to the dead
   (3) Both 1 and 2

47. Do you believe that fate affects or predetermines the over-all direction of life and events
   (0) No response
   (1) NO
   (2) Yes

48. How do you feel about the festival worship like the birthday of the goddess Matsu or Chung Yuan festival and etc.
   (0) No response
   (1) Observed with extravagance
   (2) Observed with simpleness
   (3) Observed just because everybody does

49. Do you belong to the following organization?
   (1) 4-H clubs
   (2) Farmers' Association
   (3) Farm Irrigation Association
   (4) Ho Hui Money-lending Organization
   (5) Small agricultural unit
   (6) Farm tenancy committees
   (7) Kouming Taung
   (8) Others
50. Do you hold the following public job?

(0) No response
(1) Head of Lin
(2) Head of Li
(3) Head of Chun (Township)
(4) Township representative
(5) None

51. How would you decide if one of your relatives runs for a head of township election and his political affiliation is different from yours?

(0) No response
(1) Would support him regardless of political affiliation
(2) Would follow the party decision
(3) Would keep neutral
(4) Would support the party decision in public while making an effort to support your relative privately
The following brief description is designed to provide the reader with additional insight relative to the population group studied. It will be recalled this group was identified as belonging to the Hakka minority. Hakka is a Chinese word meaning, "guest family". The origin of the Hakka is a subject of some controversy. However, it is generally agreed that they are a people who migrated from the northern areas of China about the 13th century. Today, large Hakka groups are found in Mainland China, in northeastern Kwangtung Province, and in western Fukien Province. They are also outside of Mainland China in Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, North Borneo and, in smaller numbers as far away as Latin America, the United States, and South Africa.

Hakkas are characterized as having a strong group solidarity which is maintained through intermarriage within the group. They do not often marry with other Chinese, and in this way are able to retain their sub-culture where they settle. Hakkas are also known as extremely industrious and their occupational successes are well known among the Chinese. It is interesting that Hakka women never bound their feet and always participated in work as much as men.

The Hakkas in Taiwan live almost exclusively in the less fertile plains areas, such as Hsinchu, Maoli and Pintung. Their main occupation is farming and they maintain a strong tie to the land.
VITA

The author was born February 12, 1937, in Kwansi Chun (township), Hsinchu, Taiwan. He was graduated from Yumin High School, Chunli, Taoyuan. From June 1957, to 1961, he attended Chunkung University, Tainan and was graduated from that institution in July 1961, receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree in the Department of Foreign Language and Literature. Following graduation, he served in the Republic of China Army until September, 1962, receiving an Honorable Discharge.

In 1964, he came to the United States and pursued graduate study at Louisiana State University, majoring in Library Science and minoring in Social Work. He received the Master of Science degree in January, 1966. In September, 1966, he began graduate study at Louisiana State University, Department of Sociology and Rural Sociology. In May of 1969, he married Lee-Hwa Tong of Shansi, China.

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EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Chang, Chung-Wu

Major Field: Sociology

Title of Thesis: A Sociological Study of Changes in Land Tenure Status in Taiwan: A Study of Kwansu Community

Approved:  

Major Professor and Chairman  

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

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October 21, 1971