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Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1971
Political Science, international law and relations

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HUNGARIANS IN RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF COMMUNIST NATIONALITY POLICIES

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by

Andrew Ludanyi
B.A., Elmhurst College, 1963
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1966
August, 1971
PLEASE NOTE:

Some Pages have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

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ABSTRACT

Nationality conflicts frequently contribute to political confrontations. Communists claim that these confrontations are merely reflections of class conflict. Yet, nationality conflicts have also taken place in communist systems. The dissertation examines the nationality policies of two communist states, to determine whether or not ideological commitments can prevent such conflicts.

Focusing on the treatment of the Hungarian minorities in Transylvania and the Vojvodina, the dissertation seeks answers to a number of key questions concerning nationality relations. Is the communist workers' class solidarity a "solution" of the Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality problems? Why or why not? To what extent? What considerations guide the nationality policies of these states? How are the policies of these states similar? How are they different? Why are they different?

The dissertation probes for answers by comparing statements of policy and ideology with actual political practices in both Transylvania and the Vojvodina. The comparison is carried out, first, by putting the problem into historical and ideological perspective. Second, attention is focused on the constitutional and ideological "solutions" which were adopted with the advent of Communist control. This is followed by the examination of the political position of the Hungarians in both the party and governmental organizations of the two
political systems and by the examination of the actual economic, social and cultural policies affecting the Hungarians. The analysis concludes by tying together the intra-national and international implications of the Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality policies.

The dissertation depends, in large part, on a content analysis of the Hungarian minority publications of Rumania and Yugoslavia. It relates observations gained through such content analysis to long-range trends which are discernible from an examination of aggregate data concerning demographic, social, economic and cultural existence. These trends are in turn related to domestic and international developments which impinge on the problem in any way. In relation to the latter, the dissertation has also drawn extensively on the studies of Western observers.

The findings of the dissertation indicate that political considerations rather than communist ideology guides the nationality policies of the two states. Ideology guides nationality policies only when its demands do not conflict with assumed national interests. In the Vojvodina the Hungarians are treated with tolerance because both the internal and external political needs of Yugoslavia are well served by such treatment. It enables Yugoslavia to act as a unified state in spite of its multi-national composition. In Transylvania, on the other hand, the Hungarians suffer outright discrimination. Rumania can afford such intolerant policies only because its political unity is already ensured by the party's successful appeal to the nationalism of the dominant Rumanian nationality.

As nationalism grows unabated in the polycentric setting of
East-Central Europe, the outlook remains bleak for the Hungarians in Transylvania. However, Yugoslavia's more humane policies provide a standard for minority treatment from which all the peoples of East-Central Europe could learn and benefit.
PROLOGUE

Little attention has been paid to the ethnic minorities in the Balkans and Eastern Europe since the end of World War II. This neglect can be explained by the area's communization and the limited newsworthiness--until recently--of ethnic discord in that part of the world. These two reasons have complemented one another insofar as the area's incorporation into the Communist "camp" has also cut it off from easy access. In this way, East Europe's nationality conflicts have been concealed behind an "iron curtain" of ideological platitudes and Soviet hegemony.

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to go behind the iron curtain of ideology and hegemony, to examine the solution of the nationality question claimed by Communist Rumanians in Transylvania and Communist Yugoslavs in the Vojvodina. The solution, according to these Communists, is based on class solidarity and the concomitant relegation of national animosities to the "trash heap of history." In view of

---

1In this study reference to Transylvania includes the territories of the eastern half of the Banat, all of the Crisana (the Pártium, composed of Arad and Bihar), all of Maramures (Máramaros) as well as "historical Transylvania," since in the popular mind all three were grouped together; by the Hungarians as the territory lost to Rumania through the Treaty of Trianon following World War I; by the Rumanians as the new areas acquired on the "other" (i.e., western and northern) side of the Carpathian mountain range.

The Vojvodina includes the western half of the Banat, all of the Bačka (Bácska), and most of Baranya (the Dárda triangle).

1
this claim, this study will examine the actual position of the Hungarian
inhabitants in Transylvania and the Vojvodina to determine to what
extent such claims have been realized in Rumania and Yugoslavia.

More specifically, it will attempt to isolate the factors which
have determined the nature of Rumanian and Yugoslavian nationalities
policies. To this end, particular attention will be given to ideo-
logical and power relationships.²

Rumania and Yugoslavia are ideal subjects because both contain
large Hungarian minorities whose treatment provides opportunities for
comparison and contrast. In Yugoslavia there are about one-half

²Under ideological relationships I am thinking mainly of
Communism. But, nationalism is also an "ideology." It is an ideology
according to A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free
Press, 1964), p. 455, when it seeks "to justify the nation-state as
the ideal form of political organization." When it does this,
nationalism like Communism, becomes a pattern of beliefs and concepts
which gives its adherents guide-lines for behavior. Of course,
Communism is a much more complex and intellectualized ideology, but
as a consequence, it is also less appealing to the masses.

In the present context, I will view both Communism and
nationalism as non-physical political "forces" which are at the dis­
posal of ruling elites in Rumania and Yugoslavia. Unlike George W.
Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism (New
York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 5, I do not believe that
Communism "uses" nationalism or that nationalism "uses" Communism.
Rather, I think that the new ruling elites in Rumania and Yugoslavia--
those that run the Party organizations--use both Communism and
nationalism, where one or the other of these "forces" best serves
their political standing. These organization men of the Party, are
after all, not only Communists but also nationals of their respective
countries. They are, therefore, a product of both Communist and
national traditions, and borrow freely from both to undergird their
own positions of power. A very informative discussion of the conflict
between nationalism and communism is provided by Ferenc Váli, Rift and
Revolt in Hungary (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961)
pp. 493-513.
million Hungarians in the Vojvodina, while in Rumania there are nearly two million in Transylvania.

The selection of these two countries is also desirable because both have had some latitude in determining their "own" (i.e., national) policies vis-à-vis their respective ethnic minorities. The elimination of Soviet interference in Yugoslavia in 1948, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, have allowed both countries to map out their own solutions to their nationality problems. Both of them have done just that, with somewhat different consequences. While both Rumania and Yugoslavia pay homage to the same ideological authorities (i.e., Marx, Lenin) both countries have ended up with different, even conflicting nationality policies.

The purpose of this study is to examine these differences and similarities. In this way the status of minorities in Communist states will be better understood. It will be possible on the basis of such a comparison to determine whether Communism has or has not been able to overcome nationalism in these areas. Furthermore, it will also provide an indication of the conditions needed for a tolerant nationality policy as opposed to a repressive one.

II. SCOPE

The differences and similarities between Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality policies will be examined within specific topical, geographical and historical limitations.

Topically we will be concerned with Communist nationality
policies in Rumania and Yugoslavia as they relate to the Hungarian inhabitants of these two countries. Furthermore, we shall treat this subject in terms of post-World War II developments. References to pre-war aspects of the problem will be made only to provide a necessary background for understanding the present and more recent developments. In other words, references to pre-war ethnic relations will be made only to throw light on the problem's present state, and to emphasize the ideological and political rather than the historical implications of Yugoslav and Rumanian nationality policies.

The scope of our study will be further limited geographically to the areas known as Transylvania in Rumania and the Vojvodina in Yugoslavia. Transylvania includes the territory that lies east of present-day Hungary and Yugoslavia and west and north of the former province of Moldavia and Wallachia (the latter is divided into Muntenia and Oltenia today) which had composed the "old" kingdom of Rumania prior to World War I. (Figures I and II illustrate the geographic location and limits of Transylvania.) The Vojvodina, on the other hand, lies directly south of present-day Hungary and west of Rumania. It occupies the area of the great Hungarian plain which now makes up the north-central part of Yugoslavia. (Figures I and III

Transylvania means "land beyond the forest." This is the name by which the area is known internationally, but the Hungarians call it "Erdély" (wooded land) and the Rumanians call it "Ardeal." In the future, when reference is made to specific areas in Transylvania, the present Rumanian name will be given first, followed by the enclosed Hungarian name.
illustrate the geographic location and limits of the Vojvodina.)

This limitation in scope does not mean that Transylvania and the Vojvodina will be studied in isolation from the surrounding areas. Rather, the limitation means only that the role of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary or the Soviet Union (or any other state or area) will be considered only insofar as that role relates to nationality problems in the two areas which provide the focus for the present analysis.

III. PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The nature and extent of ethnic discord, and the Communist efforts made to solve them, have received insufficient attention even in serious treatments of East-Central Europe. However, the study of such discord in Transylvania and the Vojvodina has a voluminous literature. Of the two areas Transylvania fares somewhat better. Lamentably, most of this material relates to the period up to the Peace Treaties following World War II. After that, there exist only fragments and a few scattered articles that touch on the subject in general.

The pre-Peace Treaty material, which composes the bulk of studies and other writings on the fate of ethnic minorities in

\[4\text{Vojvodina means "duchy" in Serbian. In Hungarian the same name would be Vajdaság. As in the case of Rumania, when reference is made to any area in the Vojvodina, its present Serbo-Croatian name will be given first with its former Hungarian name following enclosed.}

\[5\text{Pre-Peace Treaty source-material includes studies written after 1947, as long as the subject matter or the area of concern in such studies relates to pre-1947 affairs and developments.}
Transylvania and the Vojvodina, can be divided into three main groups: (1) non-partisan studies, (2) partisan studies, and (3) propaganda works. The first group includes the investigations of such scholars as C. A. Macartney, A. W. Palmer, L. S. Stavrianos, John Cabot Moors, Zoltán M. Száz and Hugh Seton-Watson. Objectivity and thoroughness characterize these sources. The second group contains no less valuable studies, but studies that are to some degree partisan. These include such investigations as those of Louis Craig Cornish, Joseph S. Roucek, R. H. Markham, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and Charles Upson Clark. The third and last group is composed primarily of propaganda material.

Such writers on the problem as Andrew Fall, Hewlett Johnson, Sylvius Dragomir and Pavel Pavel fall into this category. Here objectivity is subordinated to propaganda objectives, thereby making these works of questionable value for a serious study of the problem. Nonetheless, such works are of interest as indications of the times, as well as the explosive nature of the subject matter.6

6The three categories provide some basis for criticism regarding available sources. However, it should be kept in mind that the categories do not reflect differences that exist between works put into the same group nor do they draw sharp lines of demarcation between the groups. For example, in the third or propaganda category, the books written by Andrew Fall are relatively more moderate and historically sound than the absolutely race-baiting pamphlets of Pavel Pavel, which often resort to outright historical distortions. Or in the first category, the studies of C. A. Macartney by far outweigh in depth of insight and thoroughness the book written by John Cabot Moors. Both investigators provide objective studies, but these are qualitatively different. The differences noted for the first and third categories also find similar counterparts in the second category which includes partisan studies. Clark, for example, writes a more skillful partisan study than does Cornish, who at times veers from the cold facts and appeals to emotions. The above presentation is far from a complete analysis of available pre-1947 sources, but it does give a general outline.
IV. SOURCES OF DATA

It has been noted above that most scholarly studies pertain to the years preceding 1947. The lack of any serious investigations since that date, particularly in English, necessitates the examination of other sources for the period from World War II to the present (1970). As we have seen, the absence of such investigations is due, in large part, to the limitations imposed by an "iron curtain" upon the possibilities and opportunities of analysis and investigation. The limitation affects Communist scholars, Western scholars and also emigré scholars.

Among Communist scholars, Yugoslavs, Rumanians and Hungarians, the question of national minorities is ideologically determined. Accordingly, they treat the question as one that is no longer of major concern in Socialist countries since presumably it has been "solved." They usually refer to it only to demonstrate the "contrast" between the socialist and the capitalist approaches to the nationality question and the oppression of colonies. However, there are some recent indications of change. While Rumanian scholars—and to a lesser extent Yugoslavian scholars—understandably want to gloss over the problem, the revival of nationalism as reflected by polycentrism and "separate roads to socialism" will, to some extent, make even Communist Hungarian scholars more restless and less willing to "hold their

tongues" regarding the fate of their fellow nationals under Rumanian and Yugoslavian jurisdiction—particularly if that jurisdiction happens to take on revisionist and "bourgeois nationalist" overtones.8

Western scholars are affected differently. The lack of cooperation of the governments concerned and the difficulty of learning Rumanian, Serbo-Croatian and Hungarian (Magyar) make the problem seem more remote than it really is. Furthermore, the problem has not been considered "timely" until very recently, and therefore has aroused little interest. In fact, the only recent studies from a Western source were written after the problem was "revived" by the press during the spring and summer of 1963.9

The effects on emigre scholars are again of a different nature. Rumanian and Serbian emigre scholars, due to their status quo territorial perspectives, have more or less ignored the subject and have usually taken the view that the question of nationalities is now

8 One indication of the growth of such restlessness is the sending of complete bibliographies, on the Transylvanian ethnic discord, to Western universities and libraries. This would seem to show that some Hungarian scholars favor someone else speaking out on the issue even if they themselves cannot.

9 J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The World Today, XIX (Nov., 1963), 498-506, is one of the articles being referred to. It appeared just a few months after Edward Crankshaw's reports concerning the ethnic minorities of Transylvania, as well as some articles by David Binder and Paul Underwood. Two more studies along this line are: Paul Shoup's "Yugoslavia's National Minorities under Communism," Slavic Review, XXII (March, 1963), 64-81, and Ferenc A. Vai's "Transylvania and the Hungarian Minority," Journal of International Affairs, XX (No. 1, 1966), 32-44.
Hungarian and Croatian emigre scholars, on the other hand, have hammered away at the problem under unfavorable conditions. Financial limitations as well as the lack of adequate information have, in general, kept many of their studies more in the nature of partisan polemics than of scholarly treatises. At any rate, Yugoslav, Rumanian and Hungarian emigré scholars, while unhindered by language difficulties, are handicapped by emotional involvement by the lack of sources of information and data, and by the lack of financial means to carry out investigations.

Apparently, the limitations in this area of scholarly research are great, but they are not insurmountable. There is a great deal of source material that can be utilized for a better understanding of Communist nationality policies in Yugoslavia and Rumania. Six main source areas come immediately to mind.

(1) The Hungarian language Rumanian and Yugoslav periodicals which are published for Transylvanian and Vojvodinian consumption. These include such journals and periodicals as Korunk, Utunk, Igaz Szó, and Előre for Rumania and Híd, Magyar Szó, Dolgozók, and Képes Újság for Yugoslavia. English language periodicals meant for Western consumption also reflect the official attitudes of the two countries regarding the nationalities question. These include periodicals like

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Rumania Today, News from Rumania, Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, Yugoslav Survey, Socialist Thought and Practice, and Review of International Affairs. These Hungarian and English language periodicals reflect the Communist Rumanian and Yugoslav positions on the issues of the day in the realm of art, literature, education, politics, economics, etc.

(2) The second source is provided by Communist Hungarian periodicals and papers appearing in Magyar and English. These include Szabad Nép, Társadalmi Szemle, Földrajzi Közlemények, and The New Hungarian Quarterly. They all reflect the Communist Hungarian view, or lack of view, on the issues of the day.

(3) A third source is provided by the Yugoslav and Rumanian constitutions, their revisions and any such other laws as deal with the problem of ethnic minorities. These legal documents, together with Party pronouncements and statements on the nationality issue, directly mirror the "official" attitudes of the governments concerned.

(4) The fourth source includes Rumanian, Serbian, Croatian and Hungarian exile periodicals and newspapers. Besides the distinctively Vojvodinian and Transylvanian exile publications like Lármafa and Transsylvánia, consideration must be given to periodicals like Uj Látohatár, Nemzetőr, Irodalmi Ujság, Magyar Szabadság, Katolikusok Vasárnapja, and Vješnik Ujedinjenih Američkih Hrvata.

(5) Western studies, press translations and newspaper reports compose the fifth source. These include recent books dealing with Rumania and Yugoslavia, some scattered studies in social science.
journals, and some news reports. Some scholarly journals that are particularly helpful include Central Europe Journal, Slavic Review, Balkania, East Europe, Survey, Journal of Central European Affairs, Problems of Communism, Balkan Studies, and Der Europäische Osten. However, this is also supplemented by information that can be obtained from the United States Department of State, Radio Free Europe, and some private church groups, particularly the Unitarians and the Roman Catholics.

(6) Government publications of Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary which in any way touch upon the nationality problem are the last and most limited source. They are mainly White Books, statistical compilations, the texts of treaties and agreements between two or more Communist states, and also some propaganda pamphlets. Here again care must be used in the analysis of the given material.

V. METHOD OF PROCEDURE

The preceding brief survey indicates the variety of sources available. Working with this type of source material, it is imperative that the problem be examined from all sides. Attention must be focused on the voices of Communist Yugoslavs, Rumanians and Hungarians as well as the voices of the exiles from the respective countries. The views of minority and majority nationalities must also be evaluated and compared with the commentary of "aloof" Westerners who have taken an interest in the problem.

Objective examination of all facets of the issue, is merely a
first step toward an analysis of our problem. It must be followed by an attempt at systematic reconstruction relating the points of national contention to their ideological implications. Only the relation of the actual situation of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina to the promises of Communist ideology can provide comparative and analytical opportunities.

This study will be concerned with the examination of the nationality policies of the two countries always in relation to some specific aspect of the Hungarian ethnic group's existence. For example, the employment or educational policies of the two countries will be compared in relation to their Hungarian inhabitants. First, the Yugoslav and Rumanian employment or educational policies will be described independently and only then will similarities and differences be pointed out. Therefore, each chapter will begin with a general statement of the problem being dealt with. After such a statement, the Yugoslav and the Rumanian approaches and solutions will be treated separately, while the concluding portions will sum up the points of divergence and convergence. This will be followed by an evaluation of the respective policies and their implications for all concerned.

Comparing actual practices with Communist theoretical interpretations, as they affect the Hungarians living under Rumanian and Yugoslavian jurisdiction, leads the analysis along a horizontal as well as a vertical plane. It will proceed vertically when ideological demands are compared with existential realities in the respective countries. It will proceed horizontally when the policies of the two countries are compared to one another.
The comparison on the lowest levels, where specific policies (e.g., educational, employment, etc.) are analyzed, will depend primarily on aggregate data, content analyses and informal investigations of a personal nature. The conclusions and observations drawn from these sources will be checked against and supplemented by studies discussing Yugoslav and Rumanian nationality policies.

Aggregate data is readily available in the standard statistical enumerations of Rumania and Yugoslavia. These include census data and a variety of other governmental statistics. They provide a great deal of the supporting data indicating trends in economic or cultural policies. The correlation of these statistical trends with specific political events (e.g., Tito-Stalin split 1948, Hungarian Revolt 1956, Rumanian "rebellion" within Comecon 1963, invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968) provides one of the means of uncovering the "connections" between nationality policies and political developments.

The shifts in these policies will be followed also through a content analysis of a variety of sources. Content analysis of printed materials will be resorted to most frequently. Unlike the electronic news media, films and other instruments of communication, the printed sources (i.e., newspapers, periodicals, books) are more easily accessible. Thus, textbooks will be examined to see whether or not "de-nationalization" or "assimilation" is aimed at. Periodicals and newspapers will be examined for their cultural content. Through such content analysis it will be possible to isolate the dominant cultural and political symbols of the particular society in question. The
frequency and the intensity of the use of such symbols will provide additional insights into the prevailing nationality policies.

Finally, personal observations of the student and other investigators who have visited the areas of concern, provide yet another means of making evaluations. Personal visits to libraries, schools, cultural centers and economic enterprises compose the basis for these observations. These, together with studies extant on this problem, provide a check and a supplement to the use of aggregate data and content analyses.

VII. DEFINITION OF TERMS RELEVANT TO THE DISSERTATION

To begin, it will be necessary to define certain key terms, relating to the confrontation of nationalism and Communism in Transylvania and the Vojvodina. Included are those tenets of Communist ideology which pertain to questions of internationality cooperation. Thus, clarification is required for the concepts of "proletarian internationalism," "socialist patriotism" and "bourgeois nationalism."

Nationalism is the first concept that demands attention. According to Hans Kohn it is, above anything else, "a state of mind, an act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has become more and more common to mankind."\(^{11}\) This "state of mind" is determined by objective factors like common descent, a common language, common

customs and traditions, common religion and a common territory. For Kohn, the last mentioned is the most important objective factor; for Elie Kedourie, however, language plays this role. Nonetheless, both agree that "the most essential element is a living and active corporate will." Because, as Kedourie points out, nationalism is "largely a doctrine of national self-determination," and this is, "in the final analysis, a determination of the will." Thus defined, nationalism is an idea, an "idée-force." The character of this idée-force is Janus-faced insofar as it promotes greater cooperation, homogeneity, and social solidarity intranationally, but leads to indifference, dissention or even conflict internationally. Vested interests are in large part responsible for this dual character of nationalism—vested interests not only of a political or economic nature, but of an emotional and intellectual

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12 Ibid., pp. 14-15; Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* trans. A. Fineberg, Ed. I. Tovstukha (New York: International Publishers [n.d.]), pp. 6-9, presents a very similar listing. However, he is much more dogmatic than Kohn in that he maintains: "It is only when all these characteristics are present that we have a nation."


17 Ibid., p. 81.


19 Ibid., p. 20.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that attempts to re-make the world along national lines have not increased the prospects of peace and cooperation. As Kedourie points out, the history of Europe since 1919 testifies to the "inherent" disruptive power of nationalism. Transylvania, and to a lesser extent the Vojvodina, are just two outstanding examples of the above observation, for they have become festering sores of political discontent since just about that time.

The Communist definition of nationalism is somewhat different, permitting Communists to claim—even in contradiction to existing conditions—that no festering sore of national discontent exists in Transylvania today. Just what is the Communist (or as they prefer, Marxist-Leninist) interpretation of nationalism? The answer to this question can be found, in part, in the definition of some key terms used by Communists.

"Bourgeois nationalism" is used by Communists when they refer to the phenomenon described by Kohn as an idée-force. While they do not disagree with Kohn about the formation of nationalism through "the growth of social and intellectual factors at a certain stage of history,"

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20 Ibid., pp. 21-22.

21 Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 138; Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, p. 90, presents a similar conclusion.

22 To avoid doctrinal embarrassment and to maintain a sound ideological footing Communists can always blame national discontent on manifestations of the class struggle.

they see this development as a reflection of the productive forces of society, as the specific reflection of the capitalist "stage" of history. According to the Marxist-Leninist definition, "bourgeois nationalism" is nothing more than the oppression of national minorities, encroachment on the territories of neighboring states, and the financial, economic, and military subjection of the smaller to the larger imperialist powers. As Stalin sums it up, "private property and capital inevitably disunite people, inflame national enmity and intensify national oppression."

The development of capitalism, which produced nationalism, is, however, also responsible for the demise of this phenomenon. At the dawn of capitalism the nation-state and nationalism emerged; but with the internationalization of capitalism, the nation-state has become an anachronism. While capitalism "unified" the world from the economic standpoint, this unity was politically negated by antagonistic nationalisms which dissected the world into innumerable quarreling political fragments.

Only "Communist" or "proletarian internationalism" can resolve this contradiction. For "proletarian internationalism" is the exact

24 Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, pp. 13, 88.

25 Ibid., p. 90.

26 Ibid., p. 91.

27 Ibid., pp. 100-101.
opposite of "bourgeois nationalism" in the political arena. As such, it eliminates national enmity, oppression, and exploitation. Instead of dividing the masses according to their national origin, it unifies them through their class consciousness--through international proletarian solidarity. According to Stalin and his present successors, this international unification has already been achieved in the Soviet Union and in the Communist bloc (The Tito-Stalin split, the Sino-Soviet rift and the Czech-Soviet crisis, however, have played havoc with this interpretation).

The proponents of "proletarian internationalism" are not so blind, however, as to ignore the dynamic nature of nationalism. In order to take this dynamism into account a double standard has evolved regarding the manifestations of nationalism. In certain areas national revolutions (i.e., "wars of liberation") are considered progressive, while in other cases (i.e., wars among capitalists) they are regarded as the epitome of "black reaction." This double standard reflects the extent of flexibility in the interpretation of Communist ideology. It indicates that ideology can be used to rationalize political acts, even when such rationalizations seem contradictory. Yet, this double standard has solid ideological foundations, since the

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development of nations toward Socialism is seen in stages. Thus, a national revolution in a colonial domain like Algeria or Vietnam is considered a "progressive" revolution, while the Hungarian revolt of 1956 is characterized as a counter-revolutionary imperialist plot. According to this standard, the world must view all national revolts against the Western "imperialist" powers as "progressive," while forcing it to view national discontent in the Communist bloc as "bourgeois reaction."

To forestall any such "bourgeois reaction" citizens of Communist bloc countries are exhorted to be "socialist patriots." "Socialist patriotism" describes the loyalty and pride which should prevail among inhabitants of Communist countries. Evidently, it is supposed to be different from patriotism which exists in non-Communist states. Patriotism in this latter sense is nothing more than "bourgeois chauvinism" according to the Communists. "Socialist patriotism," on the other hand, is not tied to nationality, it is supposed to transcend nationality for the greater good of the World Socialist movement. Above all, it is

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32 "Text of C.P.S.U. Draft Program 1961," *Ideology in Conflict*, ed. Dieter Dux (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1963), p. 175, contains a typical harangue against the dangers of nationalism in the bloc, and advises that, "Nationalism can gain the upper hand only where it is not consistently combated."

33 "Statement issued by the Conference of Representatives of Communist Parties: Moscow—November, 1960," *Ideology in Conflict*, p. 141, states this obligation thus: "The common interests of the peoples of the socialist countries and the interests of peace and socialism demand the proper combination of the principles of socialist
loyalty and solidarity which motivates all peoples under the banner of "proletarian internationalism" to heed the admonition, "proletarians of the world unite!"  

"Socialist patriotism" and "proletarian internationalism" have been invoked on numerous occasions in Communist Rumania and Yugoslavia to describe the obligations of citizens in multi-national Transylvania and Vojvodina. The invective of "bourgeois nationalism" has also been invoked to circumscribe the rights of certain citizens in these areas. What is disturbing about the use of these terms is that they can be interpreted to mean the exact opposite of their "official" definitions by the Rumanian or Yugoslav ruling elites. This great internationalism and social patriotism in politics. Every Communist party which has become the ruling party in the state, bears historical responsibility for the destinies of both its country and the entire socialist camp."

34Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The U.S.S.R.: Monolithic Controls at Home and Abroad," Modern Political Parties, ed. Sigmund Neumann (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 233, 238, shows that nationalities which had been found lagging in their support of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat during World War II, as the Volga Germans and Crimean Tartars had been, found themselves deported to the more remote areas of Siberia. A more thorough consideration of this side of Soviet nationalities policy can be found in Nikolai K. Deker and Andrei Lebed (eds.) Genocide in the USSR (New York: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1958), Chs. II-III. This aspect of Soviet nationalities is taboo to scholars in the Communist bloc. See for example, István Dolmánynos, A Nemzetiségi Politika Története A Szovjetunióban (Budapest; Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1964).


36It must be pointed out, however, that the Yugoslav leadership is in this respect much more circumspect. For the classic Yugoslav statement on the nationalities question see Edvard Kardelj-Sperans, A Slovén Nemzeti Kérdés Fejlődése trans. into Hungarian by István Bodrits, et al. (Novi Sad, Jugoslavija: Forum Könyvkiadó, 1961).
flexibility of definitions has become possible not because of the evolution of the meanings, but because of the evolution of the leadership in the Soviet Union and the changed nature of the Communist bloc.

While the Soviet Union was the sole Socialist state, the interpretation of these terms was relatively stable. However, with the expansion of the Communist camp the interpretations became more varied. For one thing, the right to interpretation now came into dispute. The demise of Stalin and the emergence of "polycentrism" brought about the possibility of numerous interpretations. Yet, there is still a surface obeisance to the meanings as presented above—even when local conditions "demand" alterations.

So it is in Transylvania and the Vojvodina! Now that "national" Communism has been strengthened by the policies of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej—and more recently by Nicolae Ceausescu—in Rumania, the question

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37. Through the Comintern and Cominform the Soviet Union set the pace which the parties in other countries had to follow. This way, these other parties often became nothing more than the willing tools of "Great Russian" nationalism. This was particularly the case as Russia was confronted by the possibilities of war with Hitler. Some revealing facets of this problem are examined by Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution, pp. 226-227, 230, 256, 262, 264, and Borkenau, World Communism, pp. 386-388.


39. Ibid., p. 16.

that remains to be answered is whether their policies are motivated by "socialist patriotism" and "proletarian internationalism," or whether they have reverted to time tested "bourgeois nationalism" under the guise of ideological platitudes? The answer to this question can be found in the treatment of Transylvania's Hungarian inhabitants and in the comparison of their treatment to that of the Hungarians living in Yugoslavia under totally different conditions but accounted for by the same platitudes.
CHAPTER I

TRANSYLVANIA AND THE VOJVODINA IN THE PRE-COMMUNIST SETTING

The treatment of ethnic minorities in Transylvania and the Vojvodina has a long and varied history. To understand the present Communist Rumanian and Yugoslavian approaches to this problem, it will be necessary to examine this background. We will do just that by tracing the development of nationality conflicts to the eve of Communist ascendancy in the two areas.

I. Political Nature of the Disputes

The nationality conflicts center around areas which, although inhabited by various nationalities often at odds with one another,\(^1\) are--and were in the past--of great importance economically, geographically, strategically and industrially.\(^2\) They provide the possessor states with tangible sources of power, including natural resources, geographic

\(^1\) The fact that these nationalities are at odds now (this is denied by most Communists) and in the recent past does not mean that this has always been the case. On the contrary, prior to the rise of modern nationalism, harmony rather than discord characterized relations among the peoples of Transylvania and the Vojvodina. Indeed, both areas encourage harmony and cooperation because of their interdependent geography within the Carpathian Basin. For some consideration of this question see: Paul Teleki, "Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in Europe," in Louis Craig Cornish, Transylvania, The Land Beyond the Forest (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company, Inc., 1947), Appendix V, p. 244; C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 7-9.

\(^2\) This is less true for the Vojvodina than for Transylvania. More will be said about these differences in the following description of the respective areas.
advantages, some industrial potential and additional population.³ Since both Transylvania and the Vojvodina can provide the possessor states with some of these power sources, Rumania and Hungary vie for Transylvania, and Yugoslavia and Hungary vie for the Vojvodina.⁴

These sources of power make both areas, but particularly Transylvania, of utmost importance in the power relationships of Central Europe and the Balkans.⁵ In the case of Transylvania, both contenders have viewed it as necessary to their national survival vis-à-vis each other as well as pan-German and pan-Slav expansion.⁶ This is why it is almost impossible to find a "compromise" solution which would satisfy both of them.⁷ On the other hand, in the case of the Vojvodina, competition between Hungary and Yugoslavia never attained such intensity, since survival was not in the balance. Here, it was more a question of gaining or losing an area which had desirable attributes and added to the economic wealth of the possessor state.

³Philip E. Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," Foreign Affairs, XIX (Oct., 1940), pp. 237, 241-242, discusses these factors in relation to the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute. His observations could also be applied to the Vojvodinian dispute, with qualifications.

⁴In the Banat, territorial disputes also arose between Yugoslavia and Rumania. For this controversy see: Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 279, 355; Joseph S. Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problem (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1932), p. 141.


⁷This unwillingness to compromise was also accentuated by the fact that the two countries often received backing from great powers opposed to one another (e.g., Italy versus France).
Yet, in the dispute over both areas, the concerned countries have put forward arguments which ignore power and stress other motives such as historical ties, justice, economic and geographic realism, or the desire to liberate fellow countrymen. While these considerations may also have been important in motivating the respective countries to compete for these areas, it has been considerations of power that have determined the outcome between the disputants. This is demonstrated in the way Transylvania and the Vojvodina have changed hands among the nations competing for their possession.

Transylvania's destiny was guided by Hungary from 895 to 1541 and 1867 to 1918. During these periods preponderant power was on the side of Hungary. However, when Turkish (1541-1594, 1610-1698) and Habsburg (1594-1610, 1699-1867) power invaded the Carpathian Basin, Transylvania led a more or less independent existence, under Hungarian leaders, who acknowledged the "guardianship" at one time of the Ottoman Empire, at another time that of the Habsburgs. In 1918 the Rumanians obtained preponderant power in the form of Entente support. With this backing they gained control of Transylvania and ruled it until 1940. Then Hungary gained power (Italian support) and the

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8 The dates given here are not above dispute. However, they do provide a simplified chronology of the power shifts in the Carpathian Basin. The nature of Hungarian influence in these periods is skillfully summarized by Eugene Horvath, Transylvania and the History of the Roumanians (Budapest: The Sarkány Printing Company Ltd., 1935), pp. 30-64. Charles Upson Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania's Case [n.p.; n.n., 1941], p. 12, disagrees with Horvath's presentation.

northern two-fifths of Transylvania was returned. After the collapse of Hungary's basis of power, Rumania gained possession of Transylvania through Allied intercession.

In the case of the Vojvodina's ownership, the decisive role of power is also apparent. Hungary controlled the destiny of this area from 895 (when the Magyars entered the Carpathian Basin) until 1526, when the Turks defeated the Hungarians at the Battle of Mohács. Hungary also controlled the area from 1867 (after reaching the Ausgleich with Austria) until 1918, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed under the weight of defeat in World War I. From 1526 to 1698 the Turks ruled the area. They in turn, were replaced as overlords by the Habsburgs, who converted the area into a "military frontier" zone, and disclose the great interest of France in an alliance system which outflanks German power. This is also evident in the description of the Treaty of Trianon preparations in Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, VI (April, 1928), 434.


ruled it directly from 1698 to 1867. In 1918, the birth of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and the intercession of the Entente, placed the Vojvodina under "Yugoslav" jurisdiction. In 1941 Hungary again regained some of the Vojvodina after Yugoslavia suffered defeat at the hands of the Axis. However, Hungary had to relinquish these gains after Russian armies defeated her in turn, in 1945.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that appeals to justice, freedom, etc., have been of little consequence in determining the fate of Transylvania and the Vojvodina. Power, and power alone, will decide in the future—as it has in the past—to whom Transylvania and the Vojvodina will belong. At present, power is obviously on the side of Rumania and Yugoslavia.

II. The Two Disputed Areas

Underlying the changes in ownership which are reflected in the history—particularly the recent history—of Transylvania and the

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13Actually the military "zone" was not completely dissolved until 1881. However, after 1867, Hungary dominated the area politically. See Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Military Border of Croatia 1740-1881 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 167-196.

14Although officially Yugoslavia was called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 1929, in this study "Yugoslavia" will also designate the pre-1929 Kingdom.

Vojvodina, are their geographic location, their economic potential and their constantly changing ethnic make-up. Before proceeding to the discussion of pre-Communist nationalities policies in these areas, a brief examination devoted to their material and human composition is in order.

Both Transylvania and the Vojvodina are integral parts of the Carpathian Basin. As such, they were outside the Balkans, strictly speaking, until World War I. Then, they were both attached to two Balkan states, thereby also extending the "Balkans" farther northward, into the Carpathian Basin. Or, to put it more simply, geographically both areas still remain outside the Balkans. Politically, on the other hand, their destinies, since the end of World War I, have been tied to that of Rumania and Yugoslavia—two Balkan states. This, of course, does not change the geographic fact, that both Transylvania and the Vojvodina are really already part of Central Europe.\(^{16}\) Nor does it change the consideration, that as part of Central Europe, their history and culture has been under different influences from those which molded the countries of which they have now become extensions.

\(^{16}\) As with other designations like "Central Europe," or "Northern Europe," there is little agreement over the exact limits of the "Balkans." Possibly the best way to define its northern limits is to take into account the designation's historical usage, the approximate boundary between Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic predominance, and the major geographic features which correspond to these other considerations. This would place the Balkans south of the Sava and Danube rivers (moving eastward from the Adriatic Sea) as far as the Iron Gates. From this point eastward, the Transylvanian Alps provide the dividing line. For a discussion of this question also see Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 7-24.
Transylvania

As Figure I indicates in the Prologue Transylvania occupies the eastern end of the Carpathian Basin. Both Rumanians and Hungarians maintain that Transylvania is a geographic entity—a natural fortress—which played an important part in their respective histories. The Rumanians, basing their arguments on the "Daco-Roman" presupposition maintain, that Transylvania was the cradle where the Rumanian people came into existence and where they were able to grow strong. The

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17 Teleki, "Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in Europe," pp. 244-45.

18 Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 251, gives a good description of Transylvania's physical and topographic features.

19 The "Daco-Roman" presupposition provides the basis for the Rumanian claim to prior settlement of Transylvania. Briefly, the Rumanians claim that they are the descendants of Romans and Dacians who came into contact with one another in the third century after Christ. At this time Emperor Trajan had successfully subjugated the Dacians. A hundred years of Roman rule followed, which according to the Rumanians, also entailed intermixture with the Dacians. Consequently, when the Roman legions were withdrawn from the area to defend the Empire against Barbarian invasions, they left behind many of their progeny. The consideration that makes this thesis doubtful—or hypothetical at least—is that there are no historical records of "Rumanians" (i.e., Wallachians) living in Transylvania until almost a thousand years later, when they appear in Hungarian documents. Even the name "Rumanian" is only a 19th century designation for them. Prior to the union of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859, they were known as Wallachs or Wallachians. For the Rumanian side of this controversy see Roucek, Contemporary Rumania and Her Problems, pp. 3-6; Walter Hoffmann, Rumänien Von Heute (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1942), pp. 32-35; and the Communist Rumanian reassertion of this claim by Constantin Daicoviciu and others, Rumania (Bucharest: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), pp. 92ff. For the Hungarian side see Eugene Horvath, Transylvania and the History of the Roumanians, pp. 5-16. For more detached opinions consult Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 256ff; Robert Strausz-Hupé, "Rumanian Nationalism," The Annals, No. 232 (March, 1944), pp. 86-87.

20 Sylvius Dragomir, The Ethnical Minorities in Transylvania (Geneva: Sonor Printing Co., 1927), p. 18, maintains this also. The Hungarians deny that Transylvania was occupied by the "Rumanians" when
Hungarians maintain that Transylvania has been the keystone of their own nation's thousand year existence in the Carpathian Basin. Take away Transylvania, the Magyars contend, and you destroy the unity and strength of the Carpathian Basin as a defensive system.\textsuperscript{21}

In the past, considerations of defense and strategy were, perhaps, most important in the struggle for Transylvania.\textsuperscript{22} More recently, considerations of the area's topography, its hydrographic network, its size and its natural resources have become just as important.

Transylvania (including the Crisana, Maramures and part of the Banat) is 39,903 square miles (102,787 square kilometres) in size.\textsuperscript{23} Since this area varies in its topography, historical Transylvania will be described separately from the other three areas now attached to it.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{21}Teleki, "Transylvania's situation in Hungary and in Europe," pp. 244-45; Stefan T. Possony, "Political and Military Geography of Central, Balkan, and Eastern Europe," The Annals, No. 232 (March, 1944), p. 5.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{22}John H. Herz, \textit{International Politics in the Atomic Age} (Paperback ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 96ff., indicates some of the reasons for the decline of strategic considerations. In his chapter entitled "The Decline of the Territorial State," he maintains that geographic boundaries are no longer as significant as in the past because they can be bypassed or made useless through air war, atomic war, ideological-political penetration and economic blockade. The Territorial state, to use his word, has become "permeable."}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{23}Kallay, \textit{Hungarian Premier}, p. 44.}
While Transylvania is in many ways a "natural fortress" on its own (this gave it the ability to preserve a certain amount of local autonomy in the past), it is still an integral part of the whole Carpathian system. This is particularly evident in the watershed line on the crest of the Carpathians and in the resultant hydrographic network of the whole area. Thus, the Eastern Carpathians separate Transylvania from Moldavia and the Bukovina, while toward the south, the Transylvanian Alps separate it from Wallachia (today divided into Muntenia and Oltenia). Toward the west, its boundary is the less imposing "Island Mountain District," which separates it from the Crisana (Pártium) and the Hungarian Puszta (lowlands or plains).24 Within this mountain enclosed area is the scenic Transylvanian Plateau.25

Located between Hungary and the "Island Mountain District" are the areas of the Banat to the southwest (from Transylvania), Crisana to the west and Maramures to the north. The Banat and the Crisana are extensions of the Hungarian Puszta which slowly merge with the mountains toward the east. The Maramures is a somewhat more mountainous area which gives rise to the important river Tisza flowing into Hungary. Consequently, both the direction of rivers flowing through them and


25 Some good descriptions of Transylvania can be found in Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 92ff., and J. Theodore Marriner, "Transylvania and Its Seven Castles," The National Geographic Magazine, XLIX (Mar., 1926), 319-52. However, both these sources are biased, and the latter is also misinformed in the discussion of political questions as well as the history of the area.
the absence of impenetrable mountains, gives all three of these areas easy access westward.\textsuperscript{26}

The direction of the rivers demonstrates even more forcefully than the area's mountain ranges why Transylvania has oriented westward in past history, rather than eastward or southward. The entire hydrographic network of Transylvania, with the exception of only one river (the Olt), is directed toward the west, where they empty into the Tisza in Hungary or the Danube in present-day Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{27} Only the Olt crosses the Carpathians southward to join the Danube in Muntenia. This has great consequences for any system of communications. For while it is relatively easy to reach the Hungarian Puszta from Transylvania, it is more difficult to reach Moldavia or Wallachia because of the immense geographic barrier of the Carpathians.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{26}Teleki, "Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in Europe," pp. 248-49.

\textsuperscript{27}Jean Gottmann, "Geography and International Relations," in Politics and Geographic Relationships, Ed. W. A. Douglas Jackson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 24-25, indicates the conflict causing potential of shared hydrographic networks. He shows how the conflicting interests of up- versus down-stream possessors can lead to constant friction. He observes on p. 25, that: "The unity of hydrographic basins seems to have been emphasized more recently in politics. This emphasis may be linked to the greater use which modern civilization makes of rivers—pumping up more water for urban and industrial needs and harnessing streams for power production."

\textsuperscript{28}This statement should be qualified, however, by the fact that the distance between south-eastern Transylvania and Bucharest is shorter than the distance between Budapest and the same area. Thus, if the communications systems improve (roads and railroads particularly) this factor will no longer be of great importance for south-eastern Transylvania. For western and north-western Transylvania it will still present a great obstacle.
Rumania is determined to overcome these geographic obstacles, since ownership of Transylvania provides it with great economic wealth. The area is rich in natural resources of all kinds. It has extensive timberlands and fine farm-lands for corn and other cereals, as well as for orchards and vineyards. It is also rich in grazing lands. Furthermore, it is blessed with a wealth of mineral deposits of all sorts, including coal, iron, gold, silver, salt and natural gasses. These minerals plus the potential power of Transylvania's rivers enable the possessor state to develop a substantial industry. Both Rumania and Hungary have, therefore, a great interest in the area, as its ownership confers security, wealth and power.

Until very recently, Transylvania's economic features were more stable than its ethnic composition. The latter has always been at the mercy of historical circumstances. During Transylvania's long and colorful past, its demography has undergone great changes. As had been mentioned earlier, the Turkish occupation of Hungary, followed by Austrian hegemony, drastically altered its ethnic composition. While at the end of the 15th century the area was overwhelmingly Magyar


31 Stefan T. Possony, "Political and Military Geography of Central, Balkan and Eastern Europe," pp. 3-4, states that: "Differential birth rates have been of extreme importance during the whole course of central and eastern European history, as they are the fundamental cause of the incessant change in the power position of nations. We know little about vital statistics of former times, but it is certain that some eastern European peoples, such as the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians, once had a 'larger' population than today, comparatively speaking."
(75-80%) by the end of the 18th, the Magyars composed less than 50% of the population.\textsuperscript{32} This radical change was a result of the phenomenal decimation of the Magyar population in the struggle against the Turks, as well as of the subsequent Habsburg policy of colonizing the depopulated and war devastated areas with non-Magyars.\textsuperscript{33} The non-Magyar composition of certain areas of the country was also enhanced by a less systematic and artificial process, the great influx of refugees from Turkish oppression. Most of these refugees settled in Transylvania and Southern Hungary (i.e., the present Vojvodina).

Following the Turkish retreat from Central Europe, the most far-reaching changes in demographic structure were to be found in Transylvania and the Vojvodina.\textsuperscript{34} In Transylvania the Rumanians now composed a greater sector of the population than all three of the historic

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{34}Macartney, \textit{Hungary and Her Successors}, pp. 9-12, indicates these changes. On p. 9, he states: "The Turks not only made havoc of Hungary's civilization; but the brunt of their attack and subsequent occupation fell full upon the unprotected central plains which were the stronghold of the Magyar population, the German, Slavonic, and Roumanian areas of the periphery escaping far more lightly. They thus altered the balance of the population . . . to the disadvantage of the Magyars."
\end{footnotes}
"nationalities" combined. To this day the Rumanians have maintained their numerical majority in the area. However, this is only part of the story. For even if Rumanians compose the over-all majority, many geographic subdivisions of Transylvania are in turn overwhelmingly Magyar or German. This is the case in the border strip adjacent to present-day Hungary and the Székely districts in the eastern corner of the province.

For the evaluation of the recent ethnic composition of Transylvania, three important—and a number of lesser—census results are available. The three most frequently cited census results are those of 1910, 1930 and 1956. The first was taken while Transylvania was still under Hungarian jurisdiction, the second was taken under Romanian jurisdiction in the interwar period, and the last was taken under the present Communist Romanian regime. While each one of these statistical sources is biased in one way or another, it is possible to get a fairly good idea of the present ethnic composition of Transylvania by referring to all three of them. Table I presents the population of Romania and Transylvania according to these, as well as some less often cited, census results.

35The historic "nationalities" of Transylvania were the Magyars, Saxons, and Székelys (a people akin to the Magyars who occupy the eastern corner of the area).

36Macartney, National States and National Minorities, pp. 521-26; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 353-54.

37Each of these census returns has limitations; that of 1910 because it was carried out under the auspices of a Magyarizing government; that of 1930 because it was carried out under the auspices of a Romanianizing government; that of 1956 because it was carried out under a Communist government.
### TABLE I

**THE POPULATION OF RUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY (IN THOUSANDS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transylvania</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td>2,930</td>
<td>3,208</td>
<td>3,752</td>
<td>4,081</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,260</td>
<td>5,112</td>
<td>5,549</td>
<td>5,792</td>
<td>6,232</td>
<td>6,737*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>10,524</td>
<td>13,186</td>
<td>11,360</td>
<td>13,598</td>
<td>15,081</td>
<td>16,781*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>1,823</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>1,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>43*</td>
<td>29*</td>
<td>35*</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks &amp; Czechs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,723</td>
<td>17,641</td>
<td>14,281</td>
<td>15,873</td>
<td>17,489</td>
<td>19,105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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aThis Table has been compiled on the basis of data obtained from Anuarul Statistic Al R.P.R. 1963, Tables 16 and 17, pp. 88-89; Recensământul Populației Din Zi Februarie 1956: Rezultate Generale, Tables 10, 11, and 12, pp. XIX-XX; The Mid-European Research Institute (ed.), "Statistical Studies on the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe: 1867-1967," [unpublished manuscript]; and Andras Ronai, "România Néprajzi Viszonyai," Földrajzi Közlemények, LXVIII (1940), 86-109.

bIn this Table "nationality" means either the declared nationality or the mother tongue of the respondent. The two have not been separated, since some of the censuses were based solely on declared nationality, while others have been based solely on mother tongue, and still others on both. The census data for 1910, 1930, 1948, and 1956, used in this Table are based on mother tongue.

cIncluding Maramures, Crisana, and the eastern half of the Banat.

dThe statistics for 1910 and 1920 refer to the area of Rumania.
What the data of Table I fails to show is the distribution of the various nationalities geographically. To find out where the Magyars or Germans are strongest it is necessary to examine the area's population statistics on the regional, or county level. An examination of this sort reveals that the western parts of the Crisana, Banat, and Maramures have a heavy Magyar population. As has already been noted, this makes the Rumanian border strip adjacent to Hungary, predominantly Magyar in population.\(^{38}\) 

\(^{38}\)Pro-Rumanian writers try to blur this fact by using only absolute figures for entire regions. They almost never break down the statistics to the "plasa" level (interwar administrative equivalent of the "judet" or county). See for example Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems, pp. 186-97; Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania's Case, p. 19; Pavel Pavel, Transylvania at the Peace Conference of Paris (London: Love and Malcomson Ltd., 1945), pp. 5-6; Alfred Malaschofsky, Rumänien (Berlin: Junker and Dunnhaupt Verlag, 1943), pp. 35-39. Only in Roumania at the Peace Conference: Paris 1946 (Switzerland: Rumanian Government Publication, 1946), pp. 76-78, are the statistics broken down to the "plasa" level. However, in this case two misleading factors are emphasized: (1) that the Magyars only have a relative majority (plurality) in the border strip, and (2) that the other nationality groups living there would not favor Magyar rule. The latter contention ignores the fact that many of these "nationalities" are Magyarized Swabians and Jews who consider themselves to be Magyars regardless of how the Rumanians classify them.
Other areas where the non-Rumanian elements are strong are the cities, the old "Saxon" and the more recent Swabian settlements, and the compact Magyar-Székely area in the eastern corner of Transylvania. Until recently, the Jewish settlements in the Maramures were not incon siderable. But there are innumerable other settlements of Jews, Germans and Hungarians scattered throughout the whole of Transylvania. In the western Banat, besides Germans and Hungarians there are also many Serbs. In general, the Hungarians and Germans inhabit the river valleys and the lowlands, while the Rumanians compose the bulk of the population in the mountainous areas, and the Jews form an important segment of some city populations. 

Since World War II, some changes have taken place in the ranks of the non-Rumanian ethnic groups, particularly among the Germans and the Jews. These changes were due to the dislocations of the war, including deportations, territorial transfers and exterminations. The net result of these changes has been to leave only the Hungarians as a strong minority (although they too have been weakened), and to accentuate the predominant role of the Rumanians.

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40 Regarding the classification of Jews in the census of 1910, 1930, and 1956, it must be noted that the latter two place them in an ethnic category. This was not the case in the census of 1910. According to this early census a Jew could designate--on the basis of preference--what nationality he belonged to; only on religious grounds was he differentiated in statistics. The Rumanians have placed the Jews in a separate category in order to weaken the statistics of the Magyars, for in the past the Jews have on most occasions opted for that nationality.

The Jewish ethnic group suffered greatly during the war years. At this time the Iron Guardists and the Antonescu dictatorship carried to fulfillment the Nazi "solution" of the Jewish problem. Besides outright extermination, the Jews also diminished in proportion to the other minorities as a result of the cession of Bessarabia and Bukovina to the U.S.S.R. and Dobruja to Bulgaria. More recently their numbers have been further reduced by emigration to Israel.

In terms of percentages, the Germans were the greatest losers. Their losses came mostly during the closing phase of World War II and during the early post-war years. These losses were of various kinds. War losses took their toll among the male population. Deportations to Russia were responsible for a further reduction of the Germans. But, perhaps, the greatest reductions came when Hitler transferred Rumanian Germans to newly conquered areas in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

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as colonists. Later, these "colonists" suffered immense losses when the Poles and Czechs re-asserted their rule following the German collapse.

Other ethnic minorities like the Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Tatars and Turks were also reduced in significance. These reductions came with the cessions of Bukovina, Bessarabia and Dobruja. Unlike the Germans and the Jews, however, these other minority reductions did not greatly affect the minority situation in Transylvania. But it did eliminate the problem posed by these lesser minorities. Consequently, it left the Rumanian regime more time to concentrate attention on its greatest minority problem--the Magyars of Transylvania.

The Vojvodina

Directly west, south-west, of Transylvania lies the Vojvodina. The border between these two areas runs from north to south, dividing into two unequal parts the former Banat. This is why both Transylvania and the Vojvodina possess parts which are called the Banat. In

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46 Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, 347; Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from Hungary and Rumania, III, 49-50, 54-55. In this same source also see Annex 6 and 7, pp. 136-47.

47 Ibid., pp. 55, 96.

48 Leszek Kosinski, "Changes in the Ethnic Structure in Countries of East-Central Europe," A Paper Presented at Louisiana State University, Feb. 29, 1968, as the first in a series of lectures devoted to East-Central Europe, sponsored by the Department of Geography and Anthropology. In this paper Kosinski indicated that not only in Rumania, but in all of East-Central Europe, the Hungarians remain as the largest minority ethnic group.
Transylvania the Banat refers to its westernmost territories, while in the Vojvodina it refers to its easternmost territories. 49

Geographically the Vojvodina is an extension of the great Hungarian _puszta_ (lowlands) which lies at the center of the Carpathian Basin. More precisely, it is the southernmost extension of these lowlands. Because it is part of this greater plain, its history has usually been determined directly by the people who controlled the Carpathian Basin as a whole. Unlike Transylvania, it does not possess mountain barriers for frontiers. Both toward Rumania and Hungary it is an open plain. It possesses natural frontiers only in the south and the west, where the Danube performs this role. 50 Because the Vojvodina is such an exposed area, it has never had any autonomy that would be comparable to the past autonomy of Transylvania. 51

In every respect, the Vojvodina is characterized more by accessibility than by isolation or seclusion. It is "a region of wide valley basins, alluvial plains, sandy dune areas and crystalline hills covered with fertile loess." 52 The entire region is dominated by the large rivers which are the most conspicuous features of the landscape. These

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49 See maps in Prologue, pp. 5-7.

50 For a good discussion of this area from a geographic perspective see _Jugoslavia: Physical Geography_ (B. R. 493, Geographical Handbook Series; Great Britain: Naval Intelligence Division, 1944), I, 35-42; Macartney, _Hungary and Her Successors_, pp. 380-81.


rivers divide the Vojvodina into its three component parts. Farthest to the west, the Dárda triangle (Baranya) is wedged in between the Drave and the Danube. In the center, the Bačka (Bácska) has the Danube as its western and southern boundary and the Tisza as its eastern boundary. In the east, across the Tisza, is the Banat.

The Vojvodina is predominantly an agricultural area. In the Banat a great deal of land has been re-claimed through re-forestation during the past 150 years. In the Bačka a great deal has been reclaimed by draining the marshes and by building canals. As a whole, the area possesses only limited resources for industrial growth. Consequently, the industry that exists is geared to the processing of agricultural goods. This includes mills, distilleries and processing plants, which are concerned primarily with canning, sugar refining, alcohol making and flour milling. Maize and wheat are the principal cereals of the

53 Although the present-day administrative area of the Vojvodina includes the Srem and excludes the Baranya, in the present context the Baranya will be considered as part of it. Historical, ethnic and geographic considerations support such an inclusion. Furthermore, most past studies of the Vojvodina have included the Baranya in it. Thus, continuity of scholarship also supports its inclusion. As opposed to this, past studies have not always considered the Srem as part of the Vojvodina. See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 380-81; Jugoslavia: History, Peoples and Administration, pp. 70-77.

54 Ibid.; Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 16-17.

55 Minerals in the strict sense are almost completely non-existent. In the Fruska Gora mountains there is some low grade coal and also some quarz sand for glass manufacturing, but aside from some very limited oil deposits in the Banat near the Rumanian border, there is nothing else. Ibid., p. 17.
area, but sunflower and beets are also important crops. Animal husbandry and fishing is also wide-spread. In short, the Vojvodina has become Yugoslavia's chief food-producing region, just as it had been Hungary's prior to World War I.\textsuperscript{56}

Ethnically the Vojvodina has been, and is, even more diverse than Transylvanian, although it is a much smaller area with a much smaller population. Table II indicates the ethnic composition of both Yugoslavia and the Vojvodina. The diversity presented by this table does not give a complete picture of the entangled nature of the area's ethnic settlement. As Macartney notes:

No words can, unfortunately, do justice to the distribution of the population. The Rumanians are mostly to be found in the east, the Magyars are strongest in the north, the Serbs in the south; but the three intermingle hopelessly, a wedge of Serbian settlements pushing in one place far northward, while Magyar advanced posts run to its right and left well to the south, and outlying Magyar islets are found, even in the countryside, in the extreme south, as well as in all the towns. The Sokac and Bunyevac settlements are near the northern frontier, islands in a non-Slavonic sea, the Slovaks and Ruthenes are rather farther south. The Germans are everywhere. The distribution can be appreciated, if at all, only from the map, and the reason for it can be learnt only from history.\textsuperscript{57}

Stefan Possony points out that the demographic make-up of East-Central Europe has reflected the political rise and decline of certain


\textsuperscript{57}Macartney, \textit{Hungary and Her Successors}, p. 381. This quote is now dated, since the German minority has been almost completely eliminated. Still, it provides some insight into the ethnic mixture of the area.
### TABLE II

**THE POPULATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE VOJVODINA ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY (IN THOUSANDS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1910***</th>
<th>1921***</th>
<th>1931***</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1961</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunjevci &amp; Sokci</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified Yugoslavs</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>443</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>58d</td>
<td>65d</td>
<td>71d</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
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<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>1,663</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>1,855</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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This Table has been compiled on the basis of data obtained from *Jugoslavia: History, Peoples and Administration*, p. 76; Schieder (ed.), *Das Schicksal Der Deutschen in Jugoslawien in Dokumentation*.
nationalities. This is especially true for the present northern parts of Yugoslavia, where vast demographic changes have signalled the rise and fall of peoples. It can be said that the Vojvodina's present ethnic composition is the consequence of the dominant role played there by

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In this Table "nationality" means either the declared nationality or the mother tongue of the respondent. The two have not been separated, since some of the censuses were based solely on declared nationality, while others have been based solely on mother tongue.

The 1910, 1921, 1931 statistics of the Vojvodina pertain to the Bačka, Banat and Baranya, whereas the post-war statistics of 1948, 1953, 1961, pertain to the Bačka, Banat and the Srem. This different territorial basis of the pre- and post-war statistics, accounts, in part, for the doubling of the Serbian population.

In the 1910, 1921, and 1931 statistics for the Vojvodina, Czechs and Slovaks were enumerated together. All "unspecified" Slavs were enumerated together with the Serbs, Croats or the Slovaks. Under "Other," the present Table includes mainly Gypsies.

Since Yugoslavia is only a post-World War I creation, it has not been possible to ascertain its ethnic composition for 1910. The data for 1921 and 1931 refer to its inter-war area, while the 1948, 1953, 1961, statistics refer to the enlarged area of present-day Yugoslavia.

In the 1921 and 1931 censuses for Yugoslavia, Rumanians and Vlachs were enumerated together. Post-World War II censuses have enumerated them separately.

See footnote 31 above.
Magyars, Turks, Serbs and Austrians during the past three hundred years.  

Until the Battle of Mohács in 1526, the area's population was predominantly Magyar. Even Belgrade (called Nándorfehérvár by the Magyars) was for a long time a Hungarian fortress. But the Turkish victory over the Hungarians at Mohács led to a drastic ethnic change in what was then southern Hungary. Turkish depredations completely depopulated and devastated the area. Only after the ascendancy of Habsburg Austria did the area regain some of its population. However, the ethnic make-up of this new population was no longer predominantly Magyar. It had become mainly Serbian and German.  

The Habsburg policy for this area was motivated by considerations of defense as well as empire. It involved a re-colonization scheme that would provide an effective defense against the Turks, while at the same time it would strengthen Austrian hegemony within the empire. Habsburg policy favored Serbian and German colonists rather than Hungarians due to the potentially disruptive capacity of the

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59 *Jugoslavia: History, Peoples and Administration*, pp. 70-77. Of all the peoples that have made history in this area, only the Turks failed to leave behind a minority of their own.


latter. Consequently, the population of the present-day Vojvodina became a patchwork of different nationalities, with the Serbs and Germans becoming particularly important. However, by the end of the 18th century the Magyars again began to re-populate the area. Magyars filled up especially those areas which had recently been re-claimed through the drainage of swamps. Thus, when the Treaty of Trianon dis-membered Hungary, the Vojvodina reflected a rough parity in population of South Slavs, Germans and Hungarians. This three-way ethnic balance was upset by World War II. In the closing year of the war and immediately after the close of hostilities, about 445,000 Volksdeutsche were expelled from Yugoslavia. The majority of these Germans had been living in the Vojvodina. About 40,000 Magyars were also exchanged at this time for an equal number of Serbs and Croats living in Hungary. The expulsion of these minorities opened the way for a new emigration of South Slavs to the Vojvodina. These changes have led to a completely new ethnic set-up in the area.

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62 For a time the Magyars were even officially banned from settling in the Vojvodina. See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 384.

63 See Table II.

64 Actually the ethnic balance was already eroded by Serbian inter-war policies which encouraged more South Slavs to move to the Vojvodina. This earlier shift can be seen in Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 435-37.


66 Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 42.
Now the Magyars and the Germans no longer outnumber the Croats and the Serbs. The latter now outnumber the Magyars by more than three to one. However, as in the case of Transylvania, so in the Vojvodina, there are areas and towns where the Magyars outnumber the South Slavs. This is the case in the northern half of the Bâcka and in a part of the Dârda triangle.

Other ethnic changes have also taken place, but these had less bearing on the Vojvodina. Almost 150,000 Italians emigrated to Italy after the Julian March was transferred to Yugoslavia. The few Jews (about 8,000) who survived the war emigrated to Israel, and between 1950 and 1959 over 100,000 Turks left for Turkey.67

III. Development of the Disputes

The rise of nationalism among these different nationalities became evident in the early part of the 19th century. The Hungarians were now resolved to make the character of the Vojvodina and Transylvania even more "Magyar." The South Slavs and the Rumanians reacted violently to this policy. When the Hungarians sought to throw off the yoke of Habsburg absolutism in 1848-49, most Serbs, Croats and Rumanians sided with the latter. This confirmed the Magyarizers in their belief that Vienna had been successful in playing the game of divide and conquer.68 It only inspired them to exert even more time and effort to win

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67Ibid., p. 41.

over the national minorities. What many of these individuals failed to realize was that the minorities had by this time also tasted of the nationalism inspired by the French Revolution. This was particularly true for the Serbs of southern Hungary and the Rumanians of Transylvania.

Since Hungary was unsuccessful in its war for independence, it was placed under direct Austrian administration. This temporarily ended Magyarization efforts. However, in 1867 Austria and Hungary buried their differences and the nationalities had to seek a modus vivendi with the Magyars. The price of this was a renewal and intensification of Magyarization. Among some nationality groups it met with little or no resistance. But among the Rumanians, Serbs and Croats, this policy provoked resistance. The national consciousness of these ethnic groups had already "crossed the Rubicon." Many of them

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69Ibid., pp. 289, 307, 309.


72Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 18ff.

73Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 8.
could no longer look on themselves as "Hungarians of Rumanian or Slavic ancestry." At any rate, the First World War interfered with the realization of the Magyar nation-state within historic boundaries. The Austro-Hungarian defeat brought about the collapse and disintegration of the empire. The disintegration, supposedly based on the principles of self-determination, culminated in the emergence of a totally fragmented Central Europe. The Treaty of Trianon legalized the subsequent political chaos. The fragments, the new nation-states, provided the setting for the next twenty years of Europe's confused and heated political history.

The Inter-War Years

Transylvania and the Vojvodina became the objects of dispute between Rumanians, Yugoslavs and Hungarians. This phase of European and Rumanian-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Hungarian history reflects best the "bourgeois nationalism" so frequently denounced by the Communist ideologues of today. According to them, this was the age when nationalism pushed into the background all ideas of "social reform" and diverted the attention of all, to "narrow and nationalist aims."

The ensuing twenty years did, indeed, see the no-holds-barred


75 Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 4, 5, 21, provides a brief but concise summary of the losses suffered by Hungary as a result of this treaty.
struggle of nationalisms. The foreign policy of Hungary was carried on in direct reference to the "injustice" of the Treaty of Trianon.\textsuperscript{76} All Hungarians hoped for the day when this detested treaty would be revised. Revisionism became, in effect, the outlook and faith of the total nation.\textsuperscript{77} This was opposed by the equally fervently held Rumanian and Serbian policies, which had as their guiding star the rigid preservation of the "sacred" status quo.\textsuperscript{78} The formation of the Little and the Balkan Entente are but two manifestations that reflect the approach of Rumania, Yugoslavia and other "satisfied" powers to perpetuate the existing state of affairs.\textsuperscript{79}


\textsuperscript{77}Grigore Gafencu, \textit{Last Days of Europe}, trans. E. Fletcher-Alien (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 156, 163, 167-68, and John O. Crane, \textit{The Little Entente} (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 6, describe this from a pro-Rumanian perspective. Robert Gower, \textit{The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States} (London: Richards, 1937), p. 21, defends the Hungarians. He maintains that the "... difference between the situation of the Hungarian minorities and that of other minorities is this: the Hungarian minorities are firmly convinced that their present situation is due to the errors of a misguided and ill-conducted Peace Conference, whereas the other minorities owe their existence to circumstances such as neither human foresight can avoid nor human skill control."


\textsuperscript{79}Gower, \textit{The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States}, p. 18; Crane, \textit{The Little Entente}, pp. 6-7; Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," p. 434.
In the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and the greatly enlarged post-World War I Rumania, the position of the Magyars underwent a drastic change. From a position of most favored they were pushed into the position of least favored. Their treatment was, of course, tied directly to both domestic and foreign policy developments.

As part of France's defense structure of the status quo, the new South Slav kingdom and the enlarged Rumania were placed in direct opposition to Hungary and Bulgaria. This opposition did not have to be encouraged since Rumania and Yugoslavia had gained territories at the expense of both Hungary and Bulgaria. The latter countries desired a revision of these gains. In the face of such desires Rumania and Yugoslavia looked to France and other satisfied countries, like Czechoslovakia, for assistance. In this conflict the Magyars of the Vojvodina and Transylvania—as well as the Bulgars of Dobruja and the pro-Bulgar Macedonians—became mere driftwood tossed hither and thither in the uncertain stream of East European politics.

World War II and Its Aftermath

Events in both Transylvania and the Vojvodina became entangled with world events as Europe moved into World War II. As power relationships altered, political changes gained momentum in Eastern Europe. Hungary saw in these changes the opportunity to regain Transylvania and the Vojvodina. As Yugoslavia disintegrated in the wake of Axis aggression, the dissatisfied powers of Europe had their chance to partake of the spoils. The country broke into two major parts. The western part
became the independent state of Croatia under Italian hegemony, while the eastern part was German occupied Serbia. The remainder of the country was divided among Italy, Italian Albania, Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary. Hungary did not regain all of the Vojvodina. It did regain the Medjumurje and the Prekomurje, as well as the Dárdia triangle and the Bačka regions. The rest of the Vojvodina came under German and Croatian jurisdiction. Germany occupied the Banat while the Croatians took the Srem (the region between the Danube and Sava rivers south of Novi Sad [Ujvidék]).

With the collapse of the Little Entente, Rumania found itself isolated between unfriendly Bulgaria, Hungary and the U.S.S.R. From each of these countries it had gained extensive territories after World War I. These countries demanded a restoration of their territories by Rumania. Following the outbreak of World War II the U.S.S.R. confronted it with a demand for the Bukovina and Bessarabia, while Bulgaria demanded Dobruja, and Hungary the province of Transylvania. The cessions of Bukovina, Bessarabia and Dobruja went relatively smoothly. The cession of the former two to the U.S.S.R., however,

80 *Jugoslavia: History, Peoples and Administration*, I, 244.


drove Rumania into the arms of Germany.\textsuperscript{83} It sought German support against the demands for Transylvania. By 1940, war was threatening between Hungary and Rumania over this question.\textsuperscript{84} This, Hitler wanted to prevent at all cost, since he was just preparing to launch the attack on the U.S.S.R. Moreover, for this attack he needed access to the Rumanian oil fields as well as peace between his lesser allies.\textsuperscript{85} He asked Rumania and Hungary to solve their problems peacefully by negotiating their differences.\textsuperscript{86} When these talks broke down, Hungary threatened military action in spite of Hitler. At this point, King Carol II of Rumania asked for an arbitral decision from the Axis powers.\textsuperscript{87} The result of that decision was the Second Vienna Award.

Although this Award was a compromise, neither Rumania nor Hungary was completely satisfied. Hitler used these dissatisfactions to urge the two countries on to greater efforts in the war against the U.S.S.R. He dangled before their eyes the prospects of the loss or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{85}Ibid., pp. 421-22; Waldeck, \textit{Athene Palace}, p. 39; Kallay, \textit{Hungarian Premier}, p. 59.
\item \textsuperscript{86}Waldeck, \textit{Athene Palace}, p. 131.
\item \textsuperscript{87}Macartney, \textit{October Fifteenth}, II, 351; Leiss, \textit{European Peace Treaties After World War II}, p. 102.
\end{itemize}
gain of more territory according to their performance in the war. This tactic was by no means only confined to Hitler. Stalin, in particular, had approached the Hungarians on more than one occasion before and during the war, to convince them that cooperation would mean territorial gains later. The Allies, too, were aware of the bargaining importance of Transylvania's future. They succeeded in approaching Rumania with the promise of this territory.

Rumania did, in fact, switch sides as the armies of Germany were pressed back on every front. The defection came on August 23, 1944. This came after the Allies promised to give Transylvania "or

As it has been demonstrated, the purpose of the Second Vienna Award was not to divide and conquer, but to bring about peace in the rear of Hitler's armies. On the other hand, this does not mean that Transylvania did not remain a potential reward to the state which performed its wartime duties better. See Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, 253, 319; Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 64. For a Communist Hungarian interpretation see Miklós Horváth, A. 2. Magyar Hadsereg Megsemmisülése A Donnál (Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 1959), pp. 9-10. For a Rumanian view see Pavel, Transylvania at the Peace Conference of Paris, p. 37. That war achievements were considered important is also illuminated from another angle by Waldeck, Athene Palace, pp. 355-56. Compensation given on the eastern front (Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transnistria) is here regarded as partial payment from Hitler for losses sustained in the West (Northern Transylvania and Dobruja). For a thorough discussion of the Second Vienna Award see Appendix B.

Kallay, Hungarian Premier, footnote 27, p. 58; Macartney October Fifteenth, II, 405. However, Stalin did not forget the Rumanians either. For his approaches in this direction, see Alexander Cretzianu, "The Rumanian Armistice Negotiations: Cairo, 1944," Journal of Central European Affairs, XI (Oct., 1951), 251.

the greater part thereof" to the Rumanians. However, this also required that they join the Allies in the expansion of the war against the German and Hungarian forces still fighting. This, too, was done. Thus, Rumania gained the Allied support which was to mean so much at the Conference table following World War II.

A great deal of juggling and diplomatic intrigue took place as the Peace Treaty was being drawn up. The Rumanians pressed their claims and backed them up with their prior defection. Hungary, too, attempted to save the unsavable. It carried on negotiations which had as their goal the preservation of as much of Transylvania as possible. The negotiators were especially concerned over the 30-mile Magyar-inhabited border strip which had been under Rumanian jurisdiction in the interwar period. But these efforts failed to sway the Allies, who re-established the Trianon borders of Hungary.

In the meantime, vast changes were taking place in Yugoslavia. After the front against the Axis had collapsed in 1941, the underground began its operations. Here, there is no room, nor need, to go


92Roumania at the Peace Conference, pp. 35-41, and Annex I, pp. 49-78.


94Leiss, European Peace Treaties After World War II, p. 94.

95Schieder, Das Schicksal Der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, V, 59E-64E.
into the details of the controversy concerning the role of Mihailović led Četniks and Tito led Partisans. What must be mentioned, however, is that the success of the Partisans and the failure of the Četniks was in large part due to their respective positions on the nationalities question.96

The Četniks were, in effect, a continuation of the Serb ideal of Yugoslavia. This being the case, they favored a South Slav state dominated by the Serbs. They were motivated by a narrow ethnic nationalism not unlike that which inspired the Croatian Ustaša. As a consequence, their influence was limited both from an ethnic and a territorial perspective.97

The Partisans followed a different course. They attempted to appeal to all the nationalities of Yugoslavia.98 They saw in national unity the key to successful resistance against the Germans. Such unity could be attained only if the program and objectives of the Partisans was divorced from the narrow ethnic squabbles of the past. Since Tito and the Yugoslav Communists dominated the Partisans, the ideological


orientation of the leaders enabled the movement as a whole to transcend the ethnic nationalisms of the past. Liberation from the foreign German yoke provided the unifying ideal. Thus, Partisan groups came into existence in all parts of the country—even the Vojvodina—\textsuperscript{99} which fought for the common cause of national liberation.

For both Communist Rumania and Yugoslavia, the experiences of World War II have provided the legitimizing "myths"\textsuperscript{100} on which they base their present rule. More will be said about these "myths" in

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{99}Ibid. The terrain of the Vojvodina is, for the most part, unsuitable for guerrilla warfare. During the war the Partisans in this area were much less successful than in other areas of the country.

\textsuperscript{100}In the present context "myth" designates a "world picture" held by a particular group. It performs the indispensable role of expressing and codifying or stereotyping, the major characteristics of a particular group's culture by reference to specific formative historical events, developments and traditions. This involves the group's entire value system, including safeguards and enforcements of standards of social morality, certain rituals and practical rules of guidance. Myth is less precise and intellectual than an ideology, but as a consequence is almost more pervasive. It is based on traditions, customs, folk-lore and mores, many of which have a mystical rather than a rational foundation. For a more precise definition see Arden R. King, "Myth," \textit{A Dictionary of the Social Sciences} (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 450. The definition of myth is very similar to the definition of legend (King, "Legend," \textit{Ibid.}, p. 384). Funk and Wagnalls New "Standard" Dictionary differentiates them by stating that: "Myth is the creation of a fact out of an idea," while legend is "the seeing of an idea in a fact." Thus, "myth is purely the work of imagination," while "legend has a nucleus of fact." According to this dichotomy, in the Yugoslavian "Partisan Myth" and in the "August 23 Myth" and "Daco-Roman Myth" of the Rumanians, elements of both myth and legend are present. Consequently, in the present context myth will be given a broader meaning, as a belief including elements of both fact and imagination. Myth in this sense is what Webster's \textit{Third New International Dictionary} calls, "a belief given uncritical acceptance by the members of a group esp. in support of existing or traditional practices and institutions (e.g., of racial superiority used to justify discrimination)."
succeeding chapters. At present it is enough to note that in Yugoslav the Partisan tradition has never been the monopoly of any one ethnic group. While both myths have sought their roots in "national" traditions, the Yugoslav variant has enabled the national minorities to partake of it. This has not been possible for the minorities in Rumania, particularly not for the Hungarians of Transylvania. Thus, the Rumanian myth has, from the beginning, developed along exclusivist lines, while its Yugoslavian counterpart has been inclusivist— at least from an ethnic standpoint.

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101 This needs some qualification. Before his imprisonment Milovan Djilas had for a long time maintained that the burden of liberation rested on the shoulders of the Slavic peoples. See his "A Szláv Népek Harca A Békéért És A Demokráciáért," Hid, XI (Jan., 1947), 12-20, and "Jugoszlávia Népeinek Harca És A Marxizmus-Leninizmus," Hid, XI (Dec., 1947), 873-83.

102 Red Army participation in making the coup a success is also grudgingly admitted. See "The Great Anniversary," Rumania Today, No. 116 (1964), p. 1. August 23rd was the day when Antonescu was toppled from power and the Rumanians switched sides. Since the switch was against the Germans and the Hungarians, the latter immediately became the villains in the mythology surrounding the event. The switch was seen as a purely Rumanian achievement, eliminating thereby the possibility of giving the other nationalities a share in the credit for liberation.

103 The Germans were the only ethnic group that were excluded from the Partisan myth. They replaced the Magyars as the scapegoat minority. The entire success of the Partisan myth has depended on the unity of all the peoples of Yugoslavia against the threat of a German political revival.
IV. The Changed Nature of the Disputes Under Soviet Military Occupation

The myths touched on above have been important in the long run. From a short-term perspective the actual process of liberation was much more important. In Yugoslavia this was in all respects—excepting only parts of Serbia, Belgrade and the Vojvodina—a national achievement. In Rumania, on the other hand, "liberation" was the result more of the advancing Red Army than of the belated coup d'etat which toppled Antonescu. Thus, Yugoslavia escaped the burden of Red Army occupation. In fact, Yugoslavia was viewed by all the Allies as part of the anti-fascist coalition. This was not the case with Rumania. It fell under Red Army occupation and was considered and treated as a former enemy state. Thus, the end of World War II in Eastern Europe left Rumania and Hungary under Soviet military occupation and Yugoslavia under the rule of a government which was then considered the staunchest supporter of Soviet policies.\(^4\)

In these early years Tito's Yugoslavia did not need the Red Army either to guarantee for itself a Communist government, or to eradicate the remnants of fascist and collaborationist forces in the country. For both tasks the CPY was superbly qualified.\(^5\) In good Stalinist fashion, its secret police (UBD) "tried" and exterminated or imprisoned all "war-criminals." These included about 150,000

\(^4\) Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 75-80, 81-85, 100-102.

\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 91-95.
Volksdeutsche and 40,000 Hungarians.\textsuperscript{106} It also deported the bulk of the country's German population and some of its Hungarians.\textsuperscript{107} But all other ethnic groups suffered as well. It can be said that these liquidations were--with the exception of the Germans, and possibly the Hungarians--\textsuperscript{108} motivated more by considerations of ideology and power, than by ethnic animosity. Whatever the motivation, in the case of the Hungarian liquidations, the result was the minority's decapitation. It deprived the Vojvodinian Magyars of their leaders.

To some extent, the Hungarians in Transylvania fared much better, at least in this immediate post-war period. This was due, in large part, to Soviet post-war policies. To be more specific, the Soviet occupation had different consequences for the various countries falling within the expanded empire. Two factors, in particular, determined the nature of the Soviet occupation. These were the former enemy status of conquered Hungary and occupied Rumania, and their non-Slavic ethnic composition. Being ex-enemy states, both Hungary and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{106}Hungáricus, "Az Elrabolt Horvát Vezér Nyugaton Maradt Bizonyítékaik Leleplezik Tőméggyilkosságait," Amerikai Magyar Élet, Feb. 9, 1968, p. 2. On the basis of personal interviews with a number of witnesses of some of these massacres, the extent of the exterminations quoted above seem not unlikely.
\item \textsuperscript{107}Hoffman, \textit{Yugoslavia and the New Communism}, pp. 40-41.
\item \textsuperscript{108}The excesses committed against the Hungarians did not have "official" sanction. They were carried out mainly by bands of Partisans which may have committed them out of ethnic animosity. They were not reprimanded, because these liquidations also eliminated the potentially most anti-Communist elements within the Hungarian community.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Rumania were under obligation to pay reparations to the Soviet Union (Hungary also had to pay reparations to Yugoslavia). Being non-Slavic states, both Hungary and Rumania lacked the sympathy of the U.S.S.R. in any claims they might have had against Slavic states. This left the two countries only the right to make claims against each other. This they did by presenting their respective claims to Transylvania.

The Peace Treaties, as we have seen, transferred Transylvania in toto to Rumania. This was, in the main, due to Soviet support. However, the Soviet Union did not give something for nothing. Besides the reward for past defection, which was now past history and useless to the Soviets, Stalin seemed to have seen the transfer of northern Transylvania as the avenue to the rapid communization of Rumania. In fact, the country was by this time well on its way to becoming a satellite, while Hungary was still ruled by a "bourgeois" regime. Thus, Transylvania was a reward for Communization. At the same time, it conferred popularity to the new Rumanian Communist regime and reduced the prestige of a still existing bourgeois government in Hungary.

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109 Hungary, for example, had some very legitimate claims to the purely Hungarian-inhabited Csaloköz Island and some other areas just north of the Hungarian border. Yet, because of its defeated and non-Slavic status, and because its gains would be at the expense of Slavic Czecho-Slovakia, the Hungarian claims were rejected outright. See Leiss, European Peace Treaties After World War II, pp. 93-94.

110 Ibid., pp. 101-102.

111 Ibid.

National Minorities and Communist Power Consolidation

The attitude of Soviet occupation authorities in Transylvania seems to support the contention that the transfer was more than mere gratitude for Rumania's defection. For one thing, the Red Army held on to northern Transylvania and administered it until the spring of 1945, when the Groza government came to power.\textsuperscript{113} This lessened the number of atrocities that took place, since the Soviet troops defended the Magyar inhabitants of the area against the revenge-seeking Rumanians. This was done less out of compassion than out of Soviet design to utilize the Magyar ethnic element as a lever to bring about the more rapid incorporation of Rumania into the Soviet sphere.\textsuperscript{114} The Magyars had little choice but to acquiesce to such Soviet pressures.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid.; Schieder, \textit{The Expulsion of the German Population from Hungary and Rumania}, III, 85.

\textsuperscript{114}Hugh Seton-Watson, \textit{From Lenin to Khrushchev} (Paperback Edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), pp. 256-57, gives a brief discussion of Czech versus Slovak animosities which were utilized by the Soviet Union and the local Communists. In a similar way, the Soviets also used Rumanian-Hungarian discord in Transylvania.

\textsuperscript{115}Markham, \textit{Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke}, pp. 215-17, blames the Hungarians for the success of Communism in Rumania. He fails to mention, however, that the Hungarians had acquiesced to Soviet pressures only because the bourgeois Rumanian leaders (i.e., Juliu Maniu, Ilie Lazar and their "democratic" followers) were bent on revenge against the "disloyal" national minorities who had turned toward Hungary during 1941-1944. The Hungarians had no alternative left but to support the Soviet-backed Petru Groza, who had promised tolerance and respect for the national minorities. See Seton-Watson, "The Danubian Satellites," p. 247; Schieder, \textit{The Expulsion of the German Population from Hungary and Rumania}, III, 84-85.
Thus, the national minorities were skillfully utilized by Stalin to weaken the anti-Communist forces in Rumania and to enable his puppets to seize power.\textsuperscript{116} Using the policy of \textit{divide et impera}, playing nationality against nationality, Stalin attained his aim. His success was due in no small measure to the near-sighted and narrow revenge-seeking attitude of some democratic Rumanian leaders. It was their hate and intolerance that drove the Magyars in desperation to support Groza. By supporting him, they believed that his "proletarian internationalism" would defend them against the excesses of "bourgeois nationalism."

In the Vojvodina there was no similar utilization of the minorities. The Partisans in this area relied mainly on the Serbian population. For the most part, both the Germans and the Magyars were distrusted. Their capacity for any resistance was immediately broken after the Partisans replaced the Soviet troops. As has already been stated, this involved deportations, as well as mass executions and terror.

V. Similarities and Differences in the Two Cases

Certain similarities and differences are evident in the pre-Communist nationalities policies of Rumania and Yugoslavia. These can be summarized briefly in relation to three pivotal shifts in the international political positions of the two countries. The first was the cession of Transylvania and the Vojvodina to Rumania and Yugoslavia respectively, following World War I. This made both countries part of the East European alliance system constructed by France. The second

\textsuperscript{116}Ibid.; Markham, \textit{Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke}, pp. 230, 249.
major shift came with the break-up of the Little Entente and the political re-alignment of Eastern Europe in the late 1930's and the early part of World War II. The last shift was a consequence of the involvement of these countries in World War II and the politics of the immediate post-war years.

In the first phase, which is the longest, both Rumania and Yugoslavia subscribed to nationalities policies which were motivated by the desire to assimilate the minority ethnic groups. These were, simply, policies of "Serbianization" and "Rumanization." In both cases the Hungarian minorities were subjected to a process which attempted to deprive them of their own nationality, while substituting for it a "Serbian" or "Rumanian" allegiance. The distinctive characteristic of these policies—as of the dominant form of Magyarization, which they replaced—was that they were based on a narrow ethnic or "racial" nationalism.

Serbianization was often more brutal, direct and simple than its Rumanian counterpart. But it was also a less pretentious expression of national feeling. Rumanization, on the other hand, was based on the believed lofty affiliations of Rumanians with the Roman Empire. While their repression of the Magyars was never as overt as that of the Serbs, its expression was more prone to irritate and build resentment. The saving feature in Rumania was the corrupt officialdom, which, when bribed, would allow some laxity in the application of certain repressive

measures. Under Serbian jurisdiction such laxity was much less possible or probable.

With the break-up of the Little Entente and the growth of German and Italian power in the Balkans, a shift took place in the nationalities policies of both Rumania and Yugoslavia. To placate Germany, both countries extended the privileges of the German minorities living within their frontiers. Toward the Magyar minorities, on the other hand, the two countries adopted unlike policies.

In Yugoslavia, the government relaxed its repressive policies and an actual rapprochement was in the making with Hungary, when the German attack on the former shattered this emerging accord. In Rumania, ethnic policies took a different turn. As Hitler's pet satellite, Rumania was intolerant and repressive toward all but its German minorities. Its persecution of the Jews and Magyars increased in severity. Much "unofficial" persecution, perpetrated by the Iron Guardists also flourished. This did not cease until Rumania actually switched sides in August, 1944. Only in northern Transylvania, Bessarabia, Bukovina and Dobruja did the Magyars and Jews gain some relief when these areas were removed from Rumanian jurisdiction at the beginning of World War II.

The last year of this war again led to drastic changes in the nationalities policies of both countries. In Yugoslavia, the now politically dominant CPY inspired most of these changes. In Rumania,

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118 The most objective discussion of this attempted Yugoslav-Hungarian accord is to be found in Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 151, 159, 197, 199-200, 318-33, 385-86, 446-50, 470.

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the changes were imposed by the Red Army of occupation. Both countries made a complete about-face as far as their formerly favored German minorities were concerned. Yugoslavia expelled almost all of its German inhabitants. Rumania began a similar course, but did not carry it out as extensively as Tito's Partisans had. The latter also made an extensive purge among the Magyars of the Vojvodina. They went from town to town exterminating or imprisoning the leaders and potential leaders of this minority. In contrast to this, in Transylvania, the Red Army kept the Rumanians from following a similar course of vengeance.

It is these war-time experiences, as well as the growing role of the Communist parties, that have determined the foundations of the nationalities policies in the "new" post-war Rumania and Yugoslavia.
CHAPTER II

THE IDEOLOGICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION
OF THE HUNGARIANS

Communist ascendancy in Rumania and Yugoslavia resulted in a complete re-formulation of the "nationalities question" on the basis of Marxist-Leninist nationalities theory. This changed ideological context provided Rumania and Yugoslavia with new guidelines for the treatment of their Hungarian and other minorities. Henceforth, the ethnic minorities of both countries were guaranteed an existence which was "national in form," but "socialist in content." In this chapter, we will examine the ideological and constitutional considerations involved in this formula and its application.

I. The Ideological Position of the National Minorities

The ideological position of Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina has undergone vast changes since the Communists first came to power. These changes have been a consequence of altered power relationships within the Communist bloc, as well as certain developments within the Communist parties of the respective countries.

1 The "nationalities theory" and "policy" which has been taken over from the practice and experience of the Soviet Union, has been variously designated. Recently, the designation "Marxist-Leninist" has become more and more popular. In Yugoslavia this is the most commonly used. In Rumania, on the other hand, the designation is simply "Leninist." Prior to de-Stalinization, in Rumania this policy was always referred to as "Leninist-Stalinist." In Yugoslavia this was also the designation until the Tito-Stalin split of 1948.
Within the bloc the tendency toward "polycentrism" has provided the opportunities for differing policies. Polycentrism designates the numerous centers of ideological authority which emerged following the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. This process of ideological fragmentation followed the expansion of Communist rule into East-Central Europe and Asia. It was a consequence of political developments within the expanded empire as well as changes within Soviet leadership.  

Within the expanded Communist orbit the events most responsible were the Tito-Stalin split, the death of Stalin in 1953, the riots in Poland and revolt in Hungary in 1956, the rift between Communist China and the U.S.S.R., and the more recent Rumanian opposition to economic integration into COMECON. These events were closely tied to changes in the Party leadership of the U.S.S.R. Stalin's death was followed by an acceleration of these tendencies. His successors initiated policies which allowed more freedom of action to party leaders in the satellite states.  

Until Stalin's demise, satellite leaders simply mimicked Soviet nationalities policies as well as constitutional forms. Even

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3 The over-all impact of these events will be considered in more detail in later chapters.

in Yugoslavia, the Soviet pattern was assiduously followed until 1949.\(^5\)

However, as de-Stalinization unfolded within the bloc, the Soviet pattern was re-moulded to fit the national peculiarities within each state. This process affected both the ideological and the constitutional context of nationality policies in Rumania and Yugoslavia.

**Soviet Nationalities Policies**

Before we examine the application of Soviet nationalities policies in Eastern Europe, a number of its major characteristics will be noted. Flexibility is, perhaps, its most obvious feature. It has been able to adapt itself to all sorts of political situations, among various ethnic groups and nationalities, in drastically different economic and geographic settings.\(^6\) But this adaptability was always guided by the political interests of the Soviet Union. As a result, "proletarian internationalism" meant the subordination of all local and ethnic "nationalisms" to the interests of Soviet Russia as a whole.\(^7\)

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\(^7\)For a more precise definition of "proletarian internationalism" and related terms see the Prologue of this study and consult the Soviet political dictionary *Politicheskii Slovar'* (Russian Series No. 5; Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1948), "bourgeois nationalists," p. 70; "internationalism," p. 219; "patriotism," p. 410; "proletariat," pp. 451-52; "socialism," pp. 528-29.
The theoretical right to "secession" and "self-determination" or the right to local "autonomy" within a federal constitutional context, were always contingent on the intra- and international political needs of the Soviet Union. This was also the case for the Eastern European Communist states until Stalin's death.

Since Marx had written very little on the "nationalities question," Soviet policies in this regard were formulated mainly by Lenin and Stalin to meet the needs of power seizure and power consolidation. As such, Soviet nationalities theory incorporated the lessons learned by the Bolsheviks in the turbulent two decades which followed the 1905 Revolution. These lessons reflected the particular characteristics and problems of the multi-national Russian Empire, as seen by revolutionaries who desired to utilize existing contradictions (i.e., national conflicts) to further their own quest for power.

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8 For some reflections on the opportunism of Soviet nationalities policies, see Alfred D. Low, "Soviet Nationality Policy and the New Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," The Russian Review, XXII (Jan., 1963), 12.


11 Dolmanyos, A Nemzeti Politika Története A Szovjetunióban, pp. 5-36, gives a good summary of these early years of development. However, it is strictly a communist interpretation.
This utilitarian and even opportunistic development of Soviet nationalities policy, allowed for theoretical as well as practical inconsistencies and contradictions. As a consequence, the same ideological precepts were used to justify such vastly different events as the Soviet acquiescence to Finnish independence and the bloody reincorporation of the Caucasian republics. Although present-day ideologues blame some of these admitted contradictions on the distortions caused by the "Stalinist personality cult," in actuality the inconsistencies were already manifest before Lenin's death in 1924. Stalin only exaggerated these contradictions by enabling Russian nationalism to re-surface in the 1930's, after an ineffective war of words against "great Russian chauvinism" and "local bourgeois nationalisms."
Both Rumania and Yugoslavia adopted Soviet nationalities theory to solve the problems of their own multi-national existence. In the case of Rumania this adoption was really Soviet imposed. But in Yugoslavia the adoption was a matter of international Communist solidarity as well as national necessity.\(^\text{15}\) In both cases, however, the nationalities policy so adopted, was fashioned after the prevailing theory in Stalin's Soviet Russia. While the Communist parties of both these countries had paid lip-service to this policy in the interwar years, their rise to power following W.W. II gave them the opportunity to practice that which they had been preaching.\(^\text{16}\)

**Rumania**

In Rumania the Communists immediately applied the "national form" and "socialist content" of Soviet nationality policy. As in the Soviet Union, so in Rumania, the reason for adopting this policy was closely tied to considerations of power seizure and power consolidation. The policy attempted to popularize the Communist Party among the country's national minorities.\(^\text{17}\) It entailed guaranteeing

\(^{15}\)The reasons for these national differences are discussed in Ch. I. Also see Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time*, pp. 267-74, 278-92.

\(^{16}\)As Hoffman, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*, p. 155, points out: "Communists ... [Yugoslavs, Rumanians, and others] are essentially theoretical beings. No greater mistake could be made than to assume that Communists do not believe their theories. This does not mean that Communist theories have not originated as little more than rationalizations. It does mean, however, that ideology provides a binding orientation for the direction of society, a view of both tactical and strategic goals and a guide to the thinking of at least the leadership."

\(^{17}\)Chapter I discusses this motive in more detail.
to them the right to use their language in public discourse, in education and in their relations with the government. It also guaranteed for them equality with the Rumanians in political, social and economic relations. In fact, in the Sacuesc (Szekely) districts it even provided for "autonomy" in line with the Soviet example.18

In the Stalinist years, the ideological justification for these enlightened policies were simple and straightforward. "Proletarian internationalism" (i.e., Soviet foreign policy) demanded such enlightenment.19 In the writings of Rumanians dealing with the question of nationalities policies, this was definitely the central concept. The concept of "patriotism" or "socialist patriotism," on the other hand, was treated only as an afterthought. It was viewed merely as an appendage of "proletarian internationalism." Consequently, pro-Soviet attitudes, expressions, and actions were both internationalist and patriotic, while any anti-Soviet manifestation was considered to be ipso facto "bourgeois nationalism" and "chauvinism."n20

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18Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," p. 18, enumerates these rights. Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationality (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958), pp. 30-35, points out, however, that for Lenin (and Stalin, we may add) such "rights" were really secondary. Lenin was ",... cool, indifferent, even hostile to the national state and to nationality. But, in general, the proletariat and the Party have the solemn obligation to support the national liberation movement because democracy and socialism demand it."


20Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," p. 18.
For this reason inter-war Rumania was condemned for its "monstrous antipatriotic, antinational struggle against the Soviet Union." It was also described as a cruel oppressor of nationalities which inflamed "chauvinism and racial hatred" by its "brutal exploitation," wherein:

Workers belonging to national minorities were deprived of political and civil rights. Their native languages were prohibited in government institutions. There were no government schools in the native languages. The culture of national minorities was persecuted and suppressed. The bourgeois-landlord government promulgated no fewer than 400 laws and decrees against the national minorities.

For all these inequities, the "bourgeois-landlord" class basis of interwar Rumania was held responsible.

In the late 1950's the ideological discussion of the nationalities question began to take on added dimensions. It began first as a change of emphasis, but ended in making Rumania a new dissident center within the polycentric Communist camp. Besides the policies of de-Stalinization in the CPSU, the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, provided the opportunity for asserting more ideological independence. It is ironic

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21Ibid.
22Ibid.
that more ideological independence for Rumanian Communists has led to less ideological and political freedom for the country's ethnic minorities.

Recent Rumanian formulations of "proletarian internationalism" have stressed its inter-state rather than intra-state role. Thus, very little is said about the rights of national minorities. Even when the rights of minorities are mentioned, it is only to show that their treatment has "cemented the unity of the nation," by "strengthening friendship and brotherhood between the Romanian working people and those belonging to the co-inhabiting nationalities." In this way, the intra-state considerations of proletarian internationalism are all subsumed under the concept of socialist patriotism. The latter has now moved to the center of the Rumanian ideological stage. Nationalism, defined as the selfish prejudice which leads to imperialism and discord, is still decried. But, it is contrasted against the positive force of "patriotism" which is the "intimate union of the


ideas of socialism and national consciousness."\(^{27}\)

In recent ideological formulations "socialist patriotism" is definitely viewed as the constructive national force which animates Rumanians who follow the leadership of the CPR.\(^{28}\) It is the element necessary for achieving an inseparable unity and cohesion within Rumania. Such national unity is in turn a prerequisite for unity within the international communist movement, because concrete "socialist construction" goes on within national boundaries.\(^{29}\) It is a "national creation--because socialist revolution can neither be the object of import or export, a transplanted hybrid . . . [but] can only be an outcome of the struggle of each people."\(^{30}\)

By making unity within the international communist movement dependent on unity within each national communist party, the Rumanians have ventured so far as to say "that there is no national communism or international communism--but there is a unitary national . . . and . . . international [task] . . . of carrying through socialist construction in good conditions."\(^{31}\) Such conditions are available

\(^{27}\)Ibid.


\(^{29}\)Farkas, "Állam, Nemzet És Szuverenitás A Szocializmusban," pp. 22-24.

\(^{30}\)Corbu, "Development of the Socialist Nation and Proletarian Internationalism," p. 16.

\(^{31}\)Ibid.
only— if all parties within the international communist movement "resolutely defend [their] . . . autonomy." This calls for an "internationalist solidarity" which is based on "the principles of independence, equal rights, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for the right of each party to decide by itself its policy and practical activity." In short, "there cannot be parties 'standing above others' (parties)." On the international plane the principle of democratic centralism is "absolutely inapplicable." It is only meant for "the inner [national] party plane."

For the Hungarians living in Transylvania this means that they have no alternative but to struggle "shoulder to shoulder" together with other "coinhabiting nationals" for the "freedom and prosperity of Romania." They cannot look for assistance from the international communist movement, since their problems of existence are considered ideologically to be strictly an internal Rumanian national matter. If fact, they are not supposed to have interests which conflict with "the most sacred national interests" of Rumania. Such a conflict is theoretically inconceivable, since the unity, cohesion and solidarity of the entire people is "welded" by "the community of


33 Ibid.


political and economic interests" of the developing socialist system of Rumania.\textsuperscript{36}

Yugoslavia

The Yugoslavian re-interpretation of Soviet nationality policies began much earlier than the Rumanian development outlined above, but it has provided the national minorities of the country somewhat more tangible safe-guards for their rights. Like the Rumanian re-interpretation, it has been developed to provide guidance in both intra- and inter-state relations. However, unlike the Rumanian nationality policy, the Yugoslavian has not become repressive as a consequence of the country's greater ideological independence.

The major point of difference between the ideological stance of these two countries is that the Yugoslavs believe that unity in both intra- and inter-state relations is best served by a policy of tolerance for local variations and ethnic differences.\textsuperscript{37} The

\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 14. This exaggerated stress on unity, indivisibility and sovereignty, is carried one step further by Farkas, "Állám, Nemzet És Szuverenitás A Szocializmusban," p. 23, when he states that: "Szocialista Államunk Egységes Nemzeti Állam. Területén, Egyetlen Nemzet Él: A Román Szocialista Nemzet, Amely A Nemzetiségekkel Testvéri Egységben Fejlődik És Épiti A Szocialista Társadalmat." (Our socialist state is a unitary national state. It is inhabited by one nation: the Rumanian socialist nation, which develops and builds a socialist society in brotherly unity with the coinhabiting nationalities.)

Rumanians, on the other hand, only believe in such tolerance on the international front. In intra-state affairs they definitely demand unity through uniformity.38

The ideological position of both these countries is very similar on the international level.39 This similarity blurs the fact that in intra-state relations Yugoslavia and Rumania have vastly different interpretations of "proletarian internationalism." Because both of them now stress that "independent paths to socialism" are possible, they have changed the meaning of internationalism from a solidarity based on the leadership of the Soviet Union, to an ideological solidarity with equality among all socialist states and "progressive movements" in the world.40 While, both these states describe this relationship with similar formulas (e.g., equal rights, independence, non-interference in internal affairs, etc.), even in the international field there are some important differences. The Yugoslavs stress that their national minorities perform the role of


"bridges." They link Yugoslavia with neighboring countries. They promote cooperation rather than discord between the countries of the area.

Rumanian theorists have also discussed this possibility— but only rarely in recent years.

In Yugoslavia the discussion of nationalities problems is frequent and candid. The same is not true of Rumania. In the latter, it is assumed that the nationalities question has been solved. The Yugoslavs, on the other hand, openly admit that there are many problems in this area that require special attention and a great deal of effort.

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42 Ibid.

43 In Rumania this ideal was chiefly espoused by Petru Groza. Since his death in 1958, only some writers have paid lip-service to it. An example of this is Veronica Porumbacu, "Aranyhid," Igaz Szó, VII (Oct., 1959), 641.


and understanding.\footnote{Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetiségi Kérdésekben," p. 3.} So they discuss these problems frequently and in detail. There is usually no attempt made to hide existing conflicts behind a facade of slogans. Instead, it is stressed that words are worthless even if written into the constitution, if they are not backed up with action. An every-day effort must be made to transform ideals into reality.\footnote{Ibid.}

According to the Yugoslavs this effort must be guided by national unity based on the free development of each and every nationality living in the country. Real unity is unachievable unless the "individuality" of each nationality within the country is safe-guarded. "Yugoslavism" pre-supposes a diversity of national languages and cultures.\footnote{Yugoslavia's Way: The Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia trans. Stoyan Pribechevich (New York: All Nations Press, 1958), p. 193.} In present-day Rumania there is little talk of individual national developments. Instead, emphasis is always placed on common struggles and a "unitary" Rumanian national development.\footnote{Farkas, "Állam, Nemzet És Szuverenitás A Szocializmusban," p. 23.} In the latter context there is no room for the type of statement, made by a Hungarian recently, in a Yugoslavian publication, that the Yugoslavian Hungarians support the present regime, because of its humane nationality policy. In fact, that support of the government is contingent
on its correct treatment of such national groups.50

The Yugoslav nationality policy, like its Rumanian counterpart, has as its goal greater unity within the country. In both cases, nationalism is viewed as the greatest threat to such unity.51 However, the two countries have adopted different policies to combat this threat. In Yugoslavia the government sees nationalism as basically of two sorts. One is local or ethnic nationalism while the other is the nationalism of "bureaucratic centralism and hegemony."52 Both these forms are considered detrimental to the development of a truly unified Yugoslavia. "Bureaucratic centralism" or "superstate hegemony" harks back to the Serbian dominated Yugoslavia of inter-war days. Local nationalism, on the other hand, represents the disintegrative force which destroyed Yugoslavia on the eve of World War II. These two forms of nationalism feed upon one another. Consequently, the Communist League of Yugoslavia combats both.53

In Rumania no such distinction is made. Majority and minority nationalisms are not combatted equally, because "nationalism" per se is the enemy.54 Thus, while theoretically nationalism is always

50Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetiségi Kérdésekben," p. 3.
53Ibid.
decried, the socialist patriotism of the majority is never viewed as nationalism. Any sign of localism or "isolationism" among ethnic minorities, on the other hand, is immediately labelled as nationalistic. Thus, the Rumanians lack the theoretical safe-guard of the Yugoslavs, which condemns both minority and majority nationalism, rather than just nationalism in the abstract.

Yugoslav and Rumanian Self-Images

Theoretical differences between communist states often do not indicate the actual nature of their policies. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the "self-image" of the respective communist states to ascertain what is and what is not "nationalistic." These self-images are a consequence of the national setting, the party developments, and the ideological heritage.

We have already examined the ideological development of both Yugoslavian and Rumanian nationalities policies. Parallel to this, the "national image" in both these societies also underwent change. In the immediate post-war years both countries drew on the experiences of the war and the process of "liberation" as their source of historical self-interpretation and legitimacy. The Yugoslavs still

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56 It is, of course, impossible to say which came first. However, it was the power seizure by the respective Communist parties that made such a cultural-ideological transformation possible. For a general consideration of this East European development, see: Francis S. Wagner, *Cultural Revolution in East Europe* (New York: Danubian Research Service, 1955), pp. III-XII.
use this event as their point of reference in defining their historical role. The Rumanians, on the other hand, have recently reinterpreted their own role in World War II and have drawn on pre-communist historical events to define their present self-image.

Yugoslavia's self-image is based on what we have described in the preceding chapter as the "Partisan Myth." Its purpose is two-fold. First, to ensure the leading role of the Communists in the country. Secondly, it provides the country's numerous nationalities with a sense of common destiny. The "Partisan Myth" pervades their everyday existence. It is the criterion of both leadership and "Yugoslavism."

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59 See Chapter I.

The myth is based on the national liberation struggles of World War II. This concrete historical experience consecrates the Partisan leaders of the time as the saviors of national independence and honor. It provides, at the same time, a common enemy, a common danger, against which all Yugoslavs must unite. This outside threat is German imperialism. Even in present-day Yugoslavia it is viewed as the foremost outside threat to the independence of the country. It is played up in the press and in formal government foreign policy pronouncements. The persistence of anti-German sentiment, is one of the most effective means of uniting the country internally.

After the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, the danger of Comiformist intervention was also utilized in a similar way. But, the "German threat" is more effective because it is based on a bloodier historical experience and at the same time is more easily fitted into the

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63Smiljević, A Legújabb Kor Története, pp. 244-48; Hoffman, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, pp. 128-51; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 352-77.
ideological prerequisites of Yugoslavia.64

The "Partisan Myth" is not just based on antagonism to Germany, but also contains a sense of mission, which gives the myth its supranational appeal. The Partisans in World War II had been fighting not just against Germany, but also against world reaction and racism.65 The legacy of fighting both these retrograde tendencies, has given the present-day leaders of the country the reputation of being true internationalists. As leaders of the "progressive forces" of history, they have depended on the unity and solidarity of all nationalities within the country. Partisans were not just Serbs, Croatians, or Macedonians, but primarily Yugoslavs. They wanted to rid the whole country of German occupation and not just certain parts of it.66

One has to be in Yugoslavia only a few days to see and feel the everyday role of the Partisan myth. This distinctly Communist Yugoslavian "political culture" is manifest everywhere. One encounters this supra-ethnic glue not only in the Partisan dominance of the Government, but also in the everyday existence of the people. Radio programs devote a great deal of attention to it. For example, programs

64"Proletarian internationalism" as such demands more understanding of Soviet errors than of the errors of "capitalist" West Germany. See Yugoslavia's Way, pp. 65-67, 72-74, 76-79.


66Ibid., pp. 71-77.
called "Partisan Songs" are a part of the weekly schedule of most Yugoslav radio stations. 67 Besides radio and television, the myth is propagated in the history books, schools, journals, and periodicals of Yugoslavia. 68

In Rumania, the country's political-cultural self-image is similarly disseminated by the ruling elite. However, the self-image of Rumania lacks the supra-national appeal of the "Partisan Myth." It is much more ethnocentric in its emphasis. However, even if it is more narrowly "socialist patriotic," it does not possess the coherence of its Yugoslavian counterpart. In Rumania, we encounter two, rather than just one, self-image myth. For the sake of brevity, we have called them the "August 23rd Myth" and the "Daco-Roman Myth" respectively. 69

As we had occasion to indicate in Chapter I, the "August 23rd Myth" is based on the Rumanian switch from the Axis to the Allied camp. 70 To the early 1960's this "heroic act" of the Rumanian people--led by the Communist Party--was not used to belittle the role of other


69 For a definition of these myths, see Chapter I.

70 Ibid.
national groups in the country. But, it always had the potential of becoming the "progressive tradition" only of ethnic Rumanians. The reason for this was twofold. First, Rumania had been an active, and in some ways the most enthusiastic, supporter of the Nazi onslaught against the U.S.S.R. Thus, the Germans were never looked upon as "the enemy." In this way, the overthrow of Antonescu and the desertion of the German cause, became an indication of repentence rather than the unfolding of a great "national liberation struggle" as was the case in Yugoslavia. This made a scapegoat of Rumania's past rather than of German imperialism. The "August 23rd Myth" was, therefore, rooted in an intra-national purgation, a national "desire" for repentence. This made it a distinctly Rumanian experience, since the nationalities in Transylvania did not partake of this historic event.

The second reason why the August event was more narrowly Rumanian, was its motivation. The realization that Germany was losing the war and that the Red Army was already on the country's eastern borders, made it evident that only a switch would give Rumania the opportunity to diminish its territorial losses. As we pointed out in

An example of this "guilt complex" is Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," p. 18.

While the switch as a whole was primarily a Rumanian undertaking the nationalities were strongly represented in the Rumanian Communist Party. The latter, in turn, played an important role in engineering Antonescu's overthrow. See Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 278-92. For an overstatement of this role also consult "Celebration of August 23," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, XVIII (Sept. 5, 1967), 1.
the preceding chapter, the ownership of Transylvania hung in the balance. The switch, therefore, became symbolic of the Rumanian campaign to make territorial gains in Transylvania. This campaign was, of course, the exact opposite of what the Hungarians in Northern Transylvania desired.

The only consideration that kept the "August 23rd Myth" from becoming a purely Rumanian tradition, was the role of the Red Army. Its advance was the most direct reason for the overthrow of Antonescu and the re-deployment of the Rumanian army against the Germans and Hungarians in Transylvania. Furthermore, the Red Army carried the brunt of the fighting against both the Germans and the Hungarians. It also kept the Rumanians from carrying out atrocities against the nationalities of Transylvania. Thus, the process of "liberation" was not a purely Rumanian achievement, but more a consequence of Soviet military might.

More recent Rumanian interpretations of this event bear this out. While in the past the assistance of the Red Army was always

73See Chapter I.

74This fear of Rumanian rule led many to welcome the Soviet occupation of the area, as well as to support the Communists. See Theodor Schieder (ed.), The Expulsion of the German Population from Hungary and Rumania (A selection and translation from Dokumentation Der Vertreibung Der Deutschen Aus Ost-Mittel-Europa; Bonn: The Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961), III, 85; Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1949), pp. 215-17.

75Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from Hungary and Rumania, III, 63-68, 77-78; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 239-42.
acknowledged, recent statements on the significance of this event have de-emphasized the Soviet role. They have attempted to judge the event as a great national act of emancipation.76

Apparently this "myth" has not been enough to provide present-day Rumania with an adequate historical foundation. To make up for its deficiencies, it has been supplemented with the "Daco-Roman Myth."77 The latter had provided the foundations for the pre-Communist Rumanian self-image. This does not seem to disturb the present leaders of the country. While the re-adoption of this national myth was gradual, it is at present at least as important as the "August 23rd Myth." Already in the middle of the 1950's there were indications that this myth would be re-suscitated, but it was only in the early 1960's that its re-adoption was complete.78 Ever since, it has been incorporated

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77For a definition, see Chapter I.

into Party statements, university studies, historical education, and every other phase of Rumanian life where self-consciousness is developed and inculcated.79 This has gone so far that Party leaders talking about agricultural development, for example, will refer to the "flourishing agriculture" of "our ancestors, the Dacians."80

The growing importance of the "Daco-Roman" myth is particularly menacing for the non-Rumanian inhabitants of Transylvania, because it is based on purely ethnic Rumanian beliefs and traditions. At least in the case of the "August 23rd" myth, the role of Communist solidarity was not completely lost from sight. This, however, is completely missing from the "Daco-Roman" myth. Thus, the non-Rumanians become, in effect, "foreigners" in the land.81

National self-images in both Rumania and Yugoslavia, provide the citizens with a simplified and symbolic definition of their origins, their present state of development, and their glorious

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79 As an example see "Culture, Art, Science: Premiere of the Film 'The Dacians,'" Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, XVIII (Feb. 20, 1967), 8-9.

80 "Speech by Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, XVII (March 15, 1966), 2.

81 Officially they are designated as "co-inhabiting nationalities." While this designation is neutral enough in meaning, the context in which it is frequently used gives the impression that these non-Rumanians were late-comers in Transylvania. In actuality both the Magyars and Saxons have a longer recorded history in the area than the Rumanians. This "mistake" is inadvertently picked up and perpetuated by some Western reports. See for example Kenneth Ames, "Rumania is Home for 15 Different 'Nationalities,'" The Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1967, p. H5.
future. These self-images are less precise than the ideological basis of the two countries. But, at the same time these "myths" orient the everyday behavior of the man in the street. This has far-reaching implications for the national minorities of both countries. In Yugoslavia, the "Partisan" myth guarantees for the Vojvodinian Hungarians a part of the past, present, and future of the country. In Rumania, on the other hand, both the "Daco-Roman" and the "August 23rd" myths deny them a part of the past. This means, in effect, that they will have a present and a future only insofar as they assimilate themselves into the traditions of the "indivisible" and "unitary" Rumanian nation-state.

Up to this point we have pointed out some of the major differences in the ideological and political-cultural self-images of both Rumania and Yugoslavia. Similarities have also been indicated. But, perhaps, the most important similarity has not been adequately stressed. This is, the dependence of both countries on an ideology, which when translated into practice, always demands centralization; a centralization, which is based on the respective Communist parties'

82To be fair, the nationalities are given a place in Rumania's history. Whenever "class unity" is stressed, the role of the nationalities--"fighting shoulder to shoulder" with their Rumanian brothers—is always mentioned in peasant uprisings as well as in the revolutions of 1848. Along this line see Pál Binder, "Ávram Lancu Levelezése," Korunk, XXIII (Mar., 1964), 425-27; Tibor Oláh, "Moldva És Havasalföld Egyesülésének Centenárium," Igaz Szé, VII (Jan., 1959), 7; "Party and State Leaders' Visit to the Mures Magyar Autonomous Region," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, XVII (Sept. 6, 1966), 13.
monopolies of interpretation regarding the "true faith."\(^{83}\)

II. The Constitutional Position of the National Minorities

In the case of both Yugoslavia and Rumania, the constitutions concretely reflect these ideological, political-cultural similarities and differences. For the Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina it is these overt constitutional statements, that define both their obligations and rights.

In Rumania

As changes have taken place in the interpretation of "proletarian internationalism" and "bourgeois nationalism," the government has been quick to register these changes in its policies.\(^{84}\) This is, perhaps, best illustrated by the constitutional evolution of Rumania since World War II. All three postwar constitutions (1948, 1952, 1965) and their major revisions, demonstrate how political re-interpretations

\(^{83}\)For this ideological centralization see Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, pp. 339-40.

\(^{84}\)In examining the "legal" basis of modern Rumania one should keep in mind Randolph L. Braham's statement in "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," Journal of Central European Affairs, XVIII (July, 1958), 178, that the Rumanian state "like the Soviet state, is not a juridical state in the true sense of the word. Its government is not based upon a compromise of rules of law to which all citizens, irrespective of their ideological conceptions or political affiliations, are equally submitted. In Marxist terminology the Soviet state, like the state of People's Democracy, is a 'class state,' a state of class dictatorship. Since in such a state, the people as a whole are identified with the Party, if not with its leading hierarchy, the constitution of the People's Republic must be considered primarily from its political and propaganda aspect rather than from a strictly formalistic or legalistic point of view."
have altered the legal obligations and rights of the Hungarians in Transylvania. 85

Two major kinds of rights have been guaranteed to the inhabitants of Rumania by their constitutions.86 These have been individual and group rights.87 The guarantees provided for individuals, affect all inhabitants of Rumania. These include certain civil, social and political rights.

All three constitutions provide Rumanian citizens, "irrespective of nationality or race, . . . equal rights in all fields of


87 Since special privileges are not to be tolerated for any group, "group rights" are not specifically designated in the Constitution.
economic, political and cultural activity.\textsuperscript{88} This includes the right to work, "that is, the right to guaranteed employment and payment for their work in accordance with the quantity and quality."\textsuperscript{89} It also includes the right "to rest and leisure"; "... the right to maintenance in old age and also in case of sickness or disability"; "... the right to education"; and the right of "freedom of conscience."\textsuperscript{90}

Besides these social and economic rights, citizens are also guaranteed certain civil rights which are familiar in Western democracies. These include: freedom of speech, press, and assembly.\textsuperscript{91} Not only are they guaranteed, but they are also "ensured by placing at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations, printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets

\textsuperscript{88}"Constitution of 1952," Art. 81, p. 249; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 17, p. 7. (Note: In the discussion that follows, most citations will be based on the Constitutions of 1952 and 1965 respectively. Reference to the Constitution of 1948 or the Constitution as amended to 1958, will be made only when there are important or interesting changes to be taken into account.)

\textsuperscript{89}\textit{Ibid.}, Art. 18, pp. 7-8; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 77, p. 249.

\textsuperscript{90}For these rights see: \textit{Ibid.}, Arts. 78, 79 and 84, pp. 249-50; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Arts. 19, 20, 21 and 30, pp. 8, 11; \textit{Short Document on Rumania}, p. 15.

communications facilities and other material requisites . . . "92 In this way, Rumanians are able to organize; they have "the right to unite in public organizations, trade unions, cooperative societies, women and youth organizations, sports organizations and cultural, technical and scientific societies." Furthermore, they are guaranteed inviolability of person; and their homes and "privacy of correspondence are protected by law."93 Closely related are their right to the ballot, their right to public trial and equality before the law.94

In practice these rights are more illusory than real. Their existence extends only a paper guarantee to the Rumanians of the Regat and nationalities of Transylvania. Their constant violation weighs heavily on majority and minority nationalities alike. However, while both suffer, the minorities usually bear the brunt of these violations. Not only are these paper guarantees frequently violated, but they are qualified and hedged in by de jure stipulations as well. These we will consider later.

92"Constitution of 1952," Art. 85, p. 250. This is missing from later documents. As Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 174, points out, "Freedom of the press, of speech, and the like, is consequently conceived no longer as a right of the citizen, but as a purveyance of the state. The right and freedom of the citizen to write, to publish, or otherwise express his views--as conceived in the classical theory--has now been reduced to the right to express views that are in line with the propaganda, or tactical needs of the Party."


Group rights, as such, supposedly do not exist in Communist Rumania. Theoretically, there are no privileged elements; and all are, therefore, under the auspices of the same socialist legality. Yet in spite of this contention, many of the laws and constitutional guarantees are aimed at the enhancement or restriction of certain groups. One need only refer to the special position of the CPR to appreciate this point.

Besides the CPR and its satellite organizations, the post-war constitutions have all recognized the existence of churches and "cults." However, this recognition has involved less rights and more restrictions. The only concrete guarantees are two. We have already mentioned one, the "freedom of conscience" statement, which is listed among social rights. The only further concession in this area, relates to the right of churches to "special schools for training the personnel of the cult." While these "rights" are meager,


96Ibid., Art. 26, p. 10, states that: "The Rumanian Communist Party expresses and loyally serves the aspirations and vital interests of the people, implements the role of leader in all fields of socialist construction, and directs the activity of the mass and public organizations and of the state bodies." "Constitution of 1952," Art. 86, p. 251, stated almost exactly the same thing.

97The guarantees to women may also be viewed as "group" rights, although in this case, as in the case of the nationalities, the rights are given not to set them off with special privileges, but to equalize their position with that of the rest of the population. Ibid., Art. 83, p. 250; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 23, p. 9

by defining the position of the churches they indirectly also define the restrictions placed on the spiritual life of the nationalities in Transylvania. Aside from religious services in their own language, the Hungarians can no longer rely on their churches for the protection of their national culture.

The development of the national cultures of the respective minorities is, however, guaranteed. This "right" of nationality groups is sanctioned as long as it is provided with a "socialist content." To this end, the constitution provides the national minorities with the guarantee of "the free use of their own language, tuition of all categories in their own language, and books, newspapers, and theatres in their own language." It also obligates the Rumanian state to ensure "the development of the culture of the Rumanian people and of . . . the national minorities . . ." While these guarantees are supposed to apply throughout Transylvania (throughout Rumania for that matter), they have been applied in practice mainly in the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region (prior to 1960 called Magyar Autonomous Region and since January 1968 called

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99Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 550, 559-63, describes briefly the significance of the interrelationships between church membership and nationality, and their affect on Communist anti-religious campaigns.


Hargita and Covasna Counties.  

Parallel to these cultural rights, the Hungarians are also guaranteed equal treatment before the law irrespective of "nationality or race." This is underscored by the stipulation that judicial procedure "in the regions and districts inhabited by a population of another nationality than Rumanian, the use of the mother tongue of that population is assured." Those unfamiliar with the language of the judicial proceedings are guaranteed an interpretation and a summary in their own language.

In the former Magyar Autonomous Region, these rights were for a time put into practice. The special character and unique constitutional position of this area, made the practical application of these rights possible. The Rumanian Constitution of 1952, attempted to make this region the model of Leninist-Stalinist "proletarian

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internationalism,"106 It stipulated that: "In the Rumanian People's Republic, administrative territorial autonomy is ensured to the Magyar population of the Székely districts, where it forms a compact mass."107 Herein, the "compact Magyar Székely population . . . has its autonomous administrative body elected by the population of the Autonomous Region."108 This had ensured the local population "self-government," at least to the extent that they were governed by individuals of their own nationality, or individuals who could speak their language.109

This, of course, is no longer the case today. The administrative "reforms" of 1960 and 1968, as well as the Constitution of 1965, have ended all local "autonomy" in the area. The administrative reorganization of 1960, re-drew the boundaries of this compact Magyar settled area in such a way that it became ethnically more diverse.110 Its new name--Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region--signified this as well. The crowning blow to Magyar "self-rule" came with the adoption of the Constitution of 1965. This document no longer even mentions the


107 "Constitution of 1952," Preamble, p. 239.


109 Ibid., Art. 82, p. 250.

existence of an "autonomous" or a "Magyar inhabited" region. Yet, the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region continued to exist for three more years, when the administrative re-organization of January 1968, swept it out of existence.

In reality, this abolition of "Magyar autonomy," was more important symbolically than in terms of practice. From its beginnings the "autonomy" of the area had meant very little aside from propaganda value. The very idea of "autonomy" within the "unitary" and "indivisible" Rumanian People's Republic, seemed a contradiction. Had Rumania been a federal state (even a pseudo federal state like the U.S.S.R.), the "autonomous" label would have caused much less misunderstanding. But, in the context of the country's avowed unitary organization, it was no more than a label which did confuse and mislead.

111 Only Art. 15 admits, that one of the regions composing the territory of the Socialist Republic of Rumania is called the "Mures-Magyar Autonomous" region. See "Draft Constitution of 1965," p. 7. Aside from this one mention nothing else is said about this region, its powers, or its purpose. As opposed to this, the 1952 document devoted Arts. 18-21 and 57-58, to an elaborate, even propagandistic, description of this region. See "Constitution of 1952," pp. 242, 247.


114 Daicoviciu, Ibid., p. 860, reflects this confusion of terms when he states that: "The special feature of the Magyar Autonomous
The deceiving nature of the autonomy was evident from the Region's powers and from its relations with the central authority. Like its Soviet counterparts, it was completely dependent on the central authority. The autonomous region's position was the same vis-a-vis Bucharest as that of any other region. Its only claim to distinction was that both Rumanian and Hungarian were official languages. In the other regions Rumanian was the only official language. Otherwise, the autonomous region's grant of powers and form of government was identical with the other regions of the country. Its People's Council was responsible for the local administration of economic and cultural matters and it ensured "the maintenance of public order, the observance of the law and the protection of the rights of citizens." It also drew up the local budget and

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Region--which is an integral part of the Rumanian People's Republic--is its autonomous administration, whose official languages are the Hungarian and the Rumanian and which is elected by the people of the region." But this description is only as misleading as the constitutional provisions for its existence. As the article "Erdey-Transylvania IX," Szabad Magyarság, IV (Aug. 16, 1959), 1, maintains: "The so-called 'Hungarian Autonomous Territory . . . (is) but a misleading name designed for foreign consumption."


organized "the active participation of the working people in the management of state and public affairs, and in the building of Socialism."\textsuperscript{117}

While these powers seem to be far-reaching, it should not be forgotten that the People's Councils have never had an independent basis of power. They are merely the organs of state power in the regions.\textsuperscript{118} Furthermore, the Rumanian Constitution states that decisions and orders of the People's Councils are limited by the rights vested in them by it and the central government.\textsuperscript{119} In the case of the autonomous region, this restriction was carried even further by the demand that statutes, "drawn up by the People's Council of the Autonomous Region," must be submitted to and approved by the Grand National Assembly of the R.P.R.\textsuperscript{120} It was also stated that: "The

\textsuperscript{117}\textit{Ibid.}, Arts. 53, 54, p. 247. According to Endre Istvánfy, "Asszimilálódás Erdélyben," \textit{Lármafa}, III (Oct.-Dec., 1956), 11, "building socialism" was (and is), the major function of the "autonomy" of the Magyar region and of the educational-cultural concessions to the minorities.

\textsuperscript{118}Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 170, seems to imply in his reference to Soviet constitutional theory, that the People's Councils have directive power. While Braham does not clarify the nature of this "directive power," it is clear that all such power is derived from the central authority, the Party, rather than the local constituency.


\textsuperscript{120}"Constitution of 1952," Art. 21, p. 242, presents a significantly different wording from the newer version of Art. 21 to be found in \textit{Constitution of 1952 as Amended to 1958}, p. 22. The latter document presents the wording above, using the word "statutes" to designate legislative enactments of the local People's Council. The old version, as presented in the former document, refers to "Statute"
laws of the R.P.R. and the decisions and orders of the central organs of the state are compulsory on the territory of the Magyar Autonomous Region."^{121}

The extent of the region's "autonomy" was, perhaps, most dramatically demonstrated by the recent alterations (December, 1960 and January, 1968) of its borders and composition.^{122} Unlike the States of the federal United States system, the Magyar Autonomous Region had no right to any specific border. The boundaries of all regions are determined in Bucharest. The Constitution states, that the Grand National Assembly (which is the supreme organ of state power)^{123} has direct competence "to amend the division into regions in capital letters, implying that the Magyar Autonomous Region had a sort of "constitution" which was to be drawn-up locally and to be approved later by the Grand National Assembly. As the amended version indicates, however, by 1958, any such plan for a separate "Statute" had been abandoned.


^{123}"Constitution of 1952," Art. 22, p. 243; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Arts. 42, 43, pp. 13-15; Short Document on Rumania, p. 15. This "supremacy," however, should be accepted with a grain of salt, for as Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 167, points out, the Party alone is supreme. This is demonstrated by the Party's complete control over the nomination of candidates to the Grand National Assembly. As Braham states, "... in spite of the constitutional primacy of the Assembly in legislative matters, its main function, like that of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., is the ratification of governmental decrees. It is also the forum through which governmental policies are publicized and rubber-stamped for public approval."
of the territory of the Rumanian People's Republic." This leaves very little substance either to autonomy or to self-government.

The powers of the Presidium (now called State Council) of the Grand National Assembly and those of the Prosecutor-General, also circumscribe local rule. The powers of the Presidium or State Council, "to proclaim a state of emergency in certain localities or throughout the country in order to maintain public order and state security," certainly indicates the insignificance of the former regional autonomy. The provisions which delineate the powers of the Prosecutor-General, do likewise. As Art. 76 of the amended 1952 Constitution stated: "The organs of the Prosecutor's Office carry out their functions independently of any local body and are subordinate only to the Prosecutor-General of the Rumanian People's Republic."

Besides these de jure restrictions on regional governments, there are also constitutional restrictions on individuals, private groups and religious institutions. Individual rights are circumscribed by obligations as well as outright restrictions. The obligation to obey the laws passed by the Grand National Assembly, or decreed by the Presidium (State Council), or by the Council of Ministers--is


125 Ibid., Art. 64, paragraph g, p. 21; "Constitution of 1952," Art. 37, p. 245. Emphasis not in original.

126 Constitution of 1952 as Amended to 1958, p. 52. More recent statements of these powers are less specific. See "Draft Constitution of 1965," Arts. 106-109, pp. 31-32. Emphasis not in original.
compulsory for everyone throughout the country. Military obligations and loyalty to the state are also stated unequivocally. But even the guaranteed rights of free organization, assembly, speech and press are qualified. Breaches of socialist legality through the abuse of these rights are provided for. An example of this is the restriction regarding membership in "any association of a fascist or antidemocratic character." Party interpretation determines when such a breach of socialist legality has taken place.

Individual rights are inadequately defended by the Rumanian constitutional order for a number of reasons. One is that the judiciary is not independent. Furthermore, an individual can be easily arrested "upon the decision of [any] Court or Prosecutor." Decisions to arrest or to try individuals are based on "the Courts'...


129 Ibid., Art. 86, p. 251; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 29, p. 11; Short Document on Rumania, p. 15, points out that the advocacy of war is also punishable by law.

130 "Constitution of 1952," Art. 87, p. 251; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 31, p. 11; Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 177, maintains that: "The constitutional provisions regarding the inviolability of the person are rendered meaningless by virtue of two legal stipulations. They are the exclusive privilege of the Communist Party or its affiliated organizations to nominate candidates in the election of judges, and the extra-judicial power of the Prosecutor-General to order arrests. Since there can be no writ of habeas corpus against the Prosecutor-General--always a loyal servant of the Party--it evidently follows that the arrest of any individual is left to the Prosecutor's discretion.
role as defender of the people's democratic system and the conquests of the working people." In the case of the rights of individuals belonging to minority nationalities, such a base for interpretation means that any guarantee of rights is at the same time also a restriction. For example, one constitutional provision states that any discrimination on the basis of "race or national membership, as well as any demonstration of chauvinism, race hatred, national hatred or nationalist chauvinist propaganda is punishable by laws." This provision has a double edge. But, since Rumania no longer combats majority nationalism with the same vigor as minority nationalism, the provision acts adversely only on the latter. Thus, a provision originally intended for the defense of minorities, has now become a tool for their oppression.

On the group level a similar use has been made of the restriction against associating with a group that is "fascist or anti-democratic." This has placed the churches of the Hungarians into

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133 Another limitation affecting both groups (e.g., German minority) and individuals, is the one placed on voting rights. See Ibid., Art. 94, pp. 251-52; "Draft Constitution of 1965," Art. 25, pp. 9-10; Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952," p. 165, footnote 28.

a particularly adverse position, since their contacts are mainly with
the "reactionary and imperialist anti-democratic" West. The churches
have, therefore, become the object of persecution. They have been
denied any role in education as well as in social work. Only in
the training of their own "religious staff," may the churches partici­
pate in education. Their remaining denominational organizations and
functions are also strictly regulated. This spells the end of the
churches as effective breaks on the totalitarian nature of the regime.
This also destroys them as independent sources of cultural support
for the nationalities of Transylvania.

Rumania's legal definition of the place of minorities is any­
thing but clear. Nonetheless, certain tendencies are apparent in its
constitutional development. They parallel the ideological and cul­
tural-political evolution of the country's self-image. In the legal
position, too, it is possible to discern the drive toward a more
unitary and centralized conception of Rumanian statehood. This more
integral conception, leaves less opportunities to the nationalities of
Transylvania to develop their respective cultures unhindered.

Communist Rumanians contend that each one of their post-war

30, p. 11.


137 To project a better image of Rumania, some of the pressure
has been removed from the churches. For a limited indication of this,
see "State Council President Nicolae Ceausescu Receives Chiefs of
Cults of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania,
XIX (Mar. 15, 1968), 6-10.
constitutions reflects a higher stage of development on the road to a communist society. Thus, the constitution of April 13, 1948, is viewed as corresponding to the needs of the nation in "the stage of formation . . . of the socialist system."

It, in effect, laid the foundations for the new Rumania. However, the growth of socialist state property and the "consciousness of the working people" made it necessary to adopt in September 24, 1952, "the second constitution of people's power." This document reflected the stage of the expanding "building of socialism."

The latest Rumanian constitution goes even further. It is a socialist constitution. While its two predecessors had made the country into a people's-democratic state, it has gone one giant step forward to "establish . . . a higher stage, of the process of completing the building of socialism . . . the preparation of the prerequisites for the transition to communism." It has transformed Rumania from a People's Republic into a Socialist Republic.

For the Hungarians of Transylvania this constitutional

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metamorphosis represents a more thorough integration of their existence into the life of the country as a whole. It also represents a diminution of their ability to defend their cultural heritage by referring to constitutional guarantees. The Socialist Constitution of 1965, provides them with no "autonomy" and negligible "self-government." It places them within the framework of a "unitary" and "indivisible" state, which provides them with some generalized guarantees of nationality rights. These rights, in turn, are counterbalanced with restrictions and obligations that make the original guarantees almost meaningless.

In Yugoslavia

A comparison of the constitutional developments of the two countries presents an interesting contrast. While both countries claim that their successive constitutions indicate higher and higher levels of socialist development toward communism, they are heading for this goal in opposed directions. In Rumania each successive constitution has led to more and more centralization. In Yugoslavia it has led to more and more de-centralization.

The Yugoslavian constitution has stressed decentralization, in large part, as a means of minimizing the recurrence of "super-state hegemony" and "bureaucratic centralism." In this, it represents a reaction against both inter-war nationalism and post-war Stalinism. While the Constitution of 1946 laid the foundations for a Stalinist-type state, its two successors, have been uniquely Yugoslavian. The

\[142\] *Yugoslavia's Way*, pp. 193, 195.
document of 1946, made of Yugoslavia a People's Republic not unlike the emerging people's republics of satellite Eastern Europe. The one important difference was that it was a federal, rather than a unitary state system.\textsuperscript{143}

The 1953 Constitutional Law, although officially only a modification of the earlier document, was in actuality a completely new constitution. It aimed to create a "socialist democracy."\textsuperscript{144} Its interesting deviation from the 1946 constitution was that it did not guarantee either "sovereignty" or the "right of secession" to any of the Republic governments of the federation.\textsuperscript{145} At the same time, it increased the importance of the lowest levels of government (i.e., the commune level). For all the nationalities of the country this


\textsuperscript{144} Hoffman, \textit{Yugoslavia and the New Communism}, p. 213.

meant more self-government on the local level, yet less self-government as corporate entities, or as distinct nationalities.\textsuperscript{146}

The Constitution of 1963, has continued to extend decentralization. It, too, provides more "self-government" on the local level, while restricting the possibility of ethnic groups acting in concert against the interests of the federation as a whole.\textsuperscript{147} This makes the new document a "unifying" instrument, without making a "unitary" solution necessary.

According to Yugoslav legal experts, the Constitution of 1963, "is the expression of a \textit{socialist} society which is a \textit{humane democratic community}."\textsuperscript{148} It has transformed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{149} The meaning of this change is considered as part of "the withering away of statehood."\textsuperscript{150} The two earlier constitutions had been merely "state


\textsuperscript{147}"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Arts. 1, 6-9, 71-112, pp. 12-14, 32-45. The result of this excessive decentralization has been to reduce the importance of Republican and Provincial governments. These levels had given the nationalities (i.e., the Slavic "majority" nationalities) the possibility to act as corporate entities within the federation. For the non-Slavic nationalities this possibility had never really existed.


\textsuperscript{150}Djordjević, "Preface," p. IV.
Law." The new constitution, on the other hand, reduces the contradic-
tions existing between state and society. It "establishes a society"
which is not separated according to social and political functions,
but is instead founded on "the whole social-political system of the
country."\textsuperscript{151}

For the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, these changes indicate
increased opportunities to participate in the social and political life
of the country. However, such participation is open to them as indi-
viduals rather than as a group. This is born out by the specific
parts of the present Constitution which discuss nationality rights.
Unlike the Rumanian constitution of 1965, the Yugoslav document goes
into a great deal of detail in its discussion of purpose, rights and
governmental institutions in general, as well as in relation to
nationality rights and obligations.

Already in the introductory part of the document, certain
"Basic Principles" are enumerated.\textsuperscript{152} Incorporating the Partisan
tradition and some of Yugoslavia's own ideological innovations, the
first such "principle" states:

The peoples of Yugoslavia, on the basis of the right of
every people to self-determination, including the right to
cession, on the basis of their common struggle and their will
freely declared in the People's Liberation War and Socialist
Revolution, and in accord with their historical aspirations
... have united in a federal republic of free and equal

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{152} "Socialist Constitution of 1963," pp. 3-11.
The substance of this statement goes far beyond anything in the present Rumanian constitution. To be fair, it goes beyond anything that the Yugoslavs themselves consider feasible or desirable. For this reason, both the right to secession and the right to self-determination, are avoided in the body of the constitution.\textsuperscript{154} Still, their propagandistic use in the introduction, indicates confidence in the durability of Yugoslavia's unity. This type of confidence is nowhere evident in Rumania, where "indivisability" is tirelessly inveighed.

Article 1, stresses that the federation is based on the \textit{votuntary unity} of "equal peoples."\textsuperscript{155} This unity involves the socialist republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.\textsuperscript{156} While no mention is made, at this point, of the Vojvodina, Chapter V, Article III, states that: "A republic may found autonomous provinces in accordance with the constitution in areas with distinctive national characteristics or in areas with other distinguishing features, on the basis of the express will of the population of these areas."\textsuperscript{157}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{153}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 3-4.
\item \textsuperscript{154}See footnote 145 above.
\item \textsuperscript{155}"Socialist Constitution of 1963," p. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{156}\textit{Ibid.}, Art. 2, p. 12.
\end{itemize}
The Republic of Serbia has founded two such autonomous provinces. Both the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija were established in 1945. The existence of these "autonomous" provinces does not mean that either the Albanians or the Hungarians possess self-government as national groups. It means merely, that in the areas in which they live as compact groups, the Serbian republican government has seen fit to meet local peculiarities and needs through the delegation of some of its administrative powers. This delegation or sharing of powers is not a federal, but a republican matter. The autonomous provinces are not parts of the federation, but only of one of its republics. It is the republican constitution that determines the "rights and duties and the basic principles of organization in the autonomous provinces ...".

The rights of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina are, therefore, more explicitly spelled out in the Constitution of the Serbian Socialist Republic and the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. These two documents were adopted only a few days after the federal constitution went into effect. In Articles 41, 42, and 43, the

161Ibid.
federal constitution guarantees citizens "the freedom to express [their] . . . nationality and culture . . ." through their own languages and scripts, and to develop them in schools where instruction is carried on in their own language.\textsuperscript{163} The Serbian republican constitution elaborates on these rights in Article 82, emphasizing the equality of all nationalities in regard to rights as well as obligations.\textsuperscript{164} The statute of the autonomous Vojvodina, goes even further by naming explicitly the Hungarians, Slovaks, Rumanians and Ruthenians. These nationalities, according to Article 32 of the statute, are guaranteed the right to use all modern means of communication to express their thoughts and desires in their own languages.\textsuperscript{165}

Article 83 of the republican constitution also guarantees that in areas where any nationality is represented in substantial numbers, instruction in elementary schools will be carried on in the language of that nationality. Where two nationalities live together in substantial numbers instruction is to be bi-lingual.\textsuperscript{166} While the Statute of the Autonomous Province fails to mention this right, it does direct the provincial administrative organs to support and develop institutions of learning among the nationalities (Article 37).\textsuperscript{167}


\textsuperscript{165}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{166}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{167}Ibid., pp. 573-74.
One of the most interesting innovations on the federal level, which has had far-reaching repercussions on the republic and local level, has been a change in constitutional terminology. The ethnic minorities are no longer officially called "national minorities," but are designated simply "nationalities." This change represents a symbolic elimination of inequality. There are officially no longer any "minorities" or "majorities," all nationalities are now equal.\textsuperscript{168}

In concrete terms, this equality means that in the Vojvodina government agencies and administrators must be able to communicate in the languages of the nationalities.\textsuperscript{169} It also means that in workers' councils and other self-governing bodies the language of the minority ethnic groups is to be used in deliberations when they are represented in substantial numbers.\textsuperscript{170} Furthermore, translations, in the languages of the nationalities, are to be provided of such deliberations, as well as of all important government directives which affect the Vojvodina.\textsuperscript{171} These guarantees are incorporated in Articles 84, 85, and 86, of the Serb Socialist Republican Constitution and Articles 33, 34, 35, and 36, of the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.\textsuperscript{172}

\begin{flushright}
168\textit{Ibid.}, p. 571; Kis, "Uj Szempontok A Nemzetiségi Kérdésekben," p. 3.


170\textit{Ibid.}, p. 575.

171\textit{Ibid.}

172\textit{Ibid.}
\end{flushright}
Up to this point, we have discussed "group" rights enjoyed by ethnic minorities. However, as in the case of Rumania, so in Yugoslavia, these rights have been conferred not to make of the minorities a privileged part of the population, but in order to give them equal opportunities and rights with the rest of the inhabitants. This is reflected in the statement that all nationalities are guaranteed the same rights and obligations, regardless of their place of domicile.173 In other words, they need not reside in an "autonomous" province in order to develop and live their own cultures. The nature of Yugoslavian federalism, as well as the rights and duties of individuals as "humans" and "citizens," places all people on an equal footing "regardless of differences in nationality, race, religion, sex, language, education or social position."174

This equality is in reality undercut by the fact that some nationalities are "more equal" than others. While the "minority-majority" dichotomy no longer accentuates this inequality, the constituent republics of the federation reflect it. The Yugoslav (i.e., South Slav) nationalities, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, etc., are each allotted a republic of their own.175 The non-South

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174Ibid., Art. 33, p. 22.

175Ibid., Art. 2, p. 12.
Slav nationalities, Turks, Albanians, Hungarians, etc., are at the same time lucky if they fall within the borders of one or other of the autonomous provinces. Thus, while the half-million Montenegrins of the country have a republic of their own, the half-million Hungarians and the one-million Albanians must be content with "autonomous" provinces within the Republic of Serbia. The meaning of this difference is forcefully expressed by Articles 108, 109, 111, and 112, which define the basis of republican and provincial governments.176

Article 108 states that: "The rights and duties of the republic shall be determined by the republican constitution in accordance with the principles of . . . [the federal] Constitution."177 Furthermore, the "... territory of a republic shall not be altered without the consent of the republic concerned."178 This leaves the largest political subdivisions of the country, with some sovereignty. Like the states of the United States, and unlike the regions (or counties) of Rumania, the republics of Yugoslavia are members of a real federation.

The autonomous provinces of the Serbian republic, lack such features of sovereignty. The Constitution of Yugoslavia makes their existence an optional matter that is totally within the powers of the republics, to grant or to deny. As Article III states a "... republic

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176 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
177 Ibid., p. 44.
178 Ibid.
may found autonomous provinces."\textsuperscript{179} It is not obligated to do so. If it deigns to do so, the republic still controls every aspect of the province's autonomy. Article 112 defines autonomous provinces as "social-political communities within the republic." As such, their rights and duties, as well as "the basic principles of organization in the autonomous provinces shall be determined by republican constitution."\textsuperscript{180} This consideration determines that the basic law of the Vojvodina is only a "Statute," while for the Republic of Serbia it is a "Constitution."

In the area of "human" and "citizen" rights and obligations, the Yugoslavian Constitution differs from the Rumanian in a number of ways. The former devotes thirty-nine Articles on ten pages to the enumeration of such rights, while the latter accomplishes the same task with twenty-five Articles on six pages.\textsuperscript{181} The lengthier Yugoslavian treatment, differs from the Rumanian guarantees in at least two ways. First, it puts a great deal of emphasis on the "right of citizens to social self-government."\textsuperscript{182} Second, it is less equivocal in the statement of rights. The adjectives "inalienable" and "inviolable" are frequently appended to such rights. In the Rumanian Constitution this is not the case.

\textsuperscript{179}Ibid., p. 45. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{180}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182}"Socialist Constitution of 1963," Arts. 34, 73-76, 96, pp. 22, 32, 41.
In most other respects, the listing of rights and duties is very much alike in both documents. Like its Rumanian counterpart, the Yugoslavian Constitution lists economic and social rights as well as political ones. This encompasses such traditionally democratic rights as freedom of speech, association and assembly, as well as the "right and freedom . . . to work," "freedom of movement," "protection of health," "protection of mother and child," "protection of the family," and "the right of inheritance."\(^{183}\) It also includes certain guarantees against arbitrary treatment in the courts and excessive interference in people's personal lives.\(^ {184}\) Accordingly, "religious confession shall not be restricted," while scientific and artistic creativity are encouraged.\(^ {185}\)

Equality before the law and the right to vote, are two guarantees which the constitution also contains.\(^ {186}\) The right to suffrage enables the voters of the Vojvodina, as those of all Yugoslavia, to send representatives of their own nationality to the Chamber of Nationalities.\(^ {187}\) This right ensures them of the representation of their interests and needs in the Federal Assembly.\(^ {188}\) Since this body is

\(^{183}\)Ibid., Arts. 36, 51, 55-58, pp. 23, 29-30.

\(^{184}\)Ibid., Arts. 47-50, 52-53, 66-69, pp. 27-29, 31-32.

\(^{185}\)Ibid., Arts. 45-46, p. 26.

\(^{186}\)Ibid., Arts. 35, 67, 157, pp. 23, 31, 56-57.


\(^{188}\)Ibid., Arts. 190-191, pp. 68-69.
considered "the supreme organ of power . . . and social self-govern-
ment,"\textsuperscript{189} the respective nationalities theoretically have a voice in
the policy-making of the country.

Their rights to participate in government, as well as all
their other rights, are counter-balanced by certain obligations and
restrictions. Not only are they commended to "abide by the Constitu-
tion and law,"\textsuperscript{190} but they must also participate in the defense of
their country.\textsuperscript{191} Numerous other such obligations exist in the Yugo-
slav Constitution. In this respect as well, it is very similar to
the Rumanian Constitution. Another similarity can be found in the
paragraph of Article 40 which states that:

These freedoms and rights shall not be used by anyone to
overthrow the foundations of the socialist democratic order
determined by the Constitution, to endanger the peace, inter-
national cooperation on terms of equality, or the independence
of the country, to disseminate national, racial, or religious
hatred or intolerance, or to incite to crime, or in any manner
that offends public decency.\textsuperscript{192}

This statement delineates the limits of "rights" and "free-
doms." At the same time, it contains an admonition against ethnic
strife and national hatreds. While such admonitions also appear in
the Rumanian Constitution, they seem to serve somewhat different
purposes from their Yugoslavian counterparts. In Rumania the

\textsuperscript{189}\textsuperscript{}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, Art. 163, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{190}\textsuperscript{}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, Arts. 61-63, pp. 30-31.
\textsuperscript{191}\textsuperscript{}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, Arts. 60, 252-253, pp. 30, 88-89.
\textsuperscript{192}\textsuperscript{}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, pp. 24-25.
de-emphasis of diversity is the end, while in Yugoslavia it is the
toleration of such diversity.

*   *   *

The divergent purposes of these two constitutions is much more
apparent in their application than in their wording. Yet, in the
foregoing comparison even the wording of the two documents pointed to
differences in the treatment of their respective national minorities.
In conclusion, the comparison can be carried one step further by
quoting Article 1 of the respective constitutions. The Rumanian
Constitution states:

The Socialist Republic of Rumania is a sovereign, independent and unitary state of the working people of the towns and villages. Its territory is inalienable and indivisible.193

In the Yugoslavian Constitution, the corresponding Article maintains:

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state of voluntarily united and equal peoples and a socialist democratic community based on the powers of the working people and on self-government.194

True, these self-definitions are to a great degree propaganda. But, not completely so. They are also statements of certain ideals toward which the two countries are striving. Considered in this light, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina possess greater constitutional defense of their national culture than the Hungarians of Transylvania.


Although neither Yugoslavia nor Rumania give their Hungarian inhabitants "group" or "corporate" recognition and rights, the tendency toward decentralization and self-government in Yugoslavia provides those of the Vojvodina with more opportunities and less restrictions than those of Transylvania. The following chapters will discuss how these theoretical and legal differences correspond to the everyday practical existence and treatment of the Hungarians in both countries.

Before turning to these practical considerations, some additional observations are in order. As in the case of ideology, so in the constitutions of the two countries, it is possible to discern distinctive and different approaches to the nationality question. While both documents are based on the understanding that nationalism is the greatest threat to the cohesion and unity of the country, they have developed in different directions to meet this threat. These different directions are a consequence of three major changes in the constitutional structure of both countries. These changes, in turn, reflect changes in the political balances within and without the two countries.

In Yugoslavia, the intra-national heterogeneity makes no one nationality a majority of the population. Consequently, the interests and needs of all nationalities have been balanced against one another. This has been achieved by granting self-government on the local level, without tying it to "national self-government."

In Rumania, the exact opposite has happened. While the 1948 and 1953 constitutions had guaranteed many Hungarians self-government
as a group in the "Autonomous Magyar Region," the 1965 constitution has taken from them all such self-government. It has placed them directly under the central government of the unitary Rumanian state. Thus, the inbalance of Rumania's ethnic make-up, has led to the subjugation of the minority to the majority. The balance of nationalities in Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has tried to keep them from becoming subject to one another--at least in theory.
CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THE HUNGARIANS

The most direct way to examine the position of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia and Romania is to consider their respective "power positions" within the two countries. This requires an evaluation of their potential power (economic strength, social prestige, etc.), their access to positions of power (Party and Government leaders), and their actual policy-making influence. This is the main concern of the present chapter.

I

In both Rumania and Yugoslavia the Communist Party is the core of the power structure. By examining these respective centers of power, it will be possible to ascertain the relative strength of the Hungarians vis-à-vis the majority nationalities of the two political systems. The major assumption underlying this approach is that the distribution of political influence within these Communist parties reflects, in part, the treatment of ethnic minorities. By examining the evolution, organization and membership of both the Rumanian and Yugoslavian Communist parties it will be possible to confirm the above assumption and to shed light on the treatment of the Hungarian minorities.
In Rumania and Transylvania

Background and Evolution

From its beginnings the Rumanian Communist Party has had the problem of adapting to and overcoming both material and mental obstacles. The material obstacles are tied directly to the political, economic and social structure of the country. As a political entity Rumania can be described as a "new" nation. It received statehood only because some of the great powers---particularly Russia---saw it to their advantage to weaken an already disintegrating Ottoman Empire.\(^1\)

Thus, the Treaty of St. Stefano in 1877 and the following Congress of Berlin, enabled Rumania to take its place among the "independent" nation-states of Europe.

The political legacy of the country was, however, reflected in both its economic and social development. Turkish subjugation, Phanariot exploitation, and the Boyar dominated feudal structure of former Wallachia and Moldavia, bequeathed to the new kingdom serious social and economic, as well as political problems.\(^2\)

At first glance this would indicate that the precursors of Communism would have a fertile field to exploit in Rumania. This,

\(^1\)As opposed to Russia, Great Britain attempted to bolster the Ottoman Empire. The English saw more danger in the aggressive Russian attempts to expand toward the Mediterranean, than in the tottering empire of the Turks which was hard-pressed even to maintain the status quo as the nationalism of its subject peoples grew in intensity.

however, is misleading. The stark fact that they had to face, was Rumania's backward and overwhelmingly agricultural make-up, which was weighed down by a semi-feudal social structure. The country lacked industry and an "industrial proletariat" from which the Party could recruit adherents. Thus, most Rumanian problems were agrarian and the Party or its forerunners had to take this into account in the face of Marxist orthodoxy.

Though these material obstacles were great in themselves for early "left" political movements, the political and social attitudes of the land were no more hospitable. In this realm, Socialist and other radical-left elements had to contend with the country's dual intellectual development, i.e., an Eastern versus a Western orientation.

The agrarian setting of Rumania has been described in numerous ways. Dobrogea-Gherea termed it "neo-serfdom," while Virgil Madgearu, the theoretician of the National Peasant Party, described the country as "a semi-capitalist state with a peasant economic structure." Even with the annexation of the more industrialized provinces (e.g., Transylvania, Banat) in 1919, workers represented only 10% of the total population. See Ghita Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania 1944-1962* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 3, 29.

By dividing intellectual development into two major schools (i.e., Western and Eastern) the study engenders some over-simplification. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that these major schools contain within themselves lesser "schools" and intellectual groupings. The Eastern outlook may be said to have been predominant until the nineteenth century. Since then it has had to contend with influences which have their origins in Western Europe. The Eastern orientation was determined by the Balkan location of Wallachia and Moldavia in close proximity to the Byzantine world. These principalities were, furthermore, subject either to Russian or Turkish hegemony throughout most of their existence. In addition, the religious ties of the people were either with Greece or Russia due to their allegiance to the Eastern (Rumanian) Orthodox Church. The Eastern orientation was also reinforced by two political events; (1) the country's liberation from Turkish rule by Russia (rather than a Western Power) and (2) Rumanian annexation of Bessarabia following World War I. For a discussion of the development
This factor entailed problems of approach vis-à-vis the populace, as well as problems of internal organizational cohesion. Since two major intellectual tendencies prevailed in the country, these divisions were also mirrored in the development of early left-radical movements.

Pre-World War I Beginnings

Early "left-democratic," Socialist and Communist groups reflected this dual intellectual orientation. The "old" kingdom, also known as the Regat, developed separately its subversive "left" groups from similar organizations in Transylvania or Bessarabia. Socialist and Communist groups in the latter two areas were directly tied to the earlier "left" developments in Hungary and Russia respectively. The origins of the Rumanian or Regat wing of Communism can be traced back to 1875 and the activities of Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea (alias Nathan Katz of Cass), who had fled to Rumania from Bessarabia to avoid the Czarist police.

Dobrogeanu-Gherea provided the precursors of Rumanian Communism with its first leadership. He was soon joined in this undertaking by another ethnically non-Rumanian, the Bulgarian Christian Rakovsky.

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of these differing schools of thought see Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 3-10, and D. A. Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," Slavic Review, XX (October, 1961), 477.

5Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 4-10.


7Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 2-5.
Under the direction of these two as well as some lesser "socialist lights," the Social Democratic Party was formed in 1893. From the beginning this party suffered dissentions and factions which were based on social, geographic and ideological differences. There evolved for example, such factions as "the maximalists," "the generous" and the Odessa group under Rakovsky. The Odessa group and "the maximalists" were to provide the organizational core for the Communist Party following World War I.

In the pre-war setting, however, the dissention within the Social Democratic Party and its lack of appeal for the population in general, kept it impotent and uninfluential. The reasons for this weakness can be attributed to external as well as internal factors. Internally the Party was made up of "foreigners" and ethnic minorities rather than "native" Rumanians. Furthermore, the internationalist doctrines of the Party were in complete disharmony with the rise of a fanatical Rumanian nationalism which accompanied the independence of Rumania in 1877. In addition, the country's social setting was in no way conducive to such a "left-radical" movement based on the "proletariat" and the "progressive intellectuals."

World War I, the Comintern and the Inter-War Years

The world conflagration that broke out in 1914 in no way

8 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
9 Ibid., pp. 2-10; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, p. 1.
11 Ibid.
enhanced the political position of the Rumanian Social Democratic Party. Throughout the war the Party was torn asunder by disagreements over participation in this "imperialist" struggle.\textsuperscript{12} The Party's equivocal stance regarding participation widened even further the gulf between it and the population in general. Thus, the war and the outbreak of the cataclysmic Soviet Revolution only strengthened the Rumanian Social Democratic party's sense of urgency for action, but not its power to act.

In the closing years of World War I and the immediate post-war reordering, the Party too underwent portentous changes. The events that make these changes inevitable were the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the Communist Revolution of Bela Kun in Hungary, the creation of the Comintern, the annexation of Bessarabia and Transylvania by Rumania and the popularization of the dictum of "self-determination of peoples." These events not only caused the further fragmentation of the Rumanian Social Democratic Party, but they were in large part responsible for the birth and early development of the Rumanian Communist Party which rules Rumania today.

Lenin's Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 inspired the "maximalist" faction to exert every effort to seize control of the Rumanian Social Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{13} Its inability to attain this end was in large part due to the Bolshevik interpretation of the principle of "self-determination" and the faction's failure to gain the support

\textsuperscript{12}Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 4-9.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., pp. 12-18; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, pp. 1-2.
of the workers.\textsuperscript{14} These two reasons are inter-related insofar that the policy demanded by the Bolsheviks through "self-determination" offended the nationalist pride of most segments of the Rumanian population, including the workers.

The two specific developments which point out the faction's alienation from the population were directly tied to the question of Rumanian expansionism and its conflict with Bolshevik interests in Bessarabia and the Communist International's interests in Transylvania. The Comintern—which had come into existence shortly after the Soviet October Revolution—demanded that the Rumanian Communists oppose the annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania.\textsuperscript{15} It also demanded that they oppose and sabotage in every possible manner the Rumanian military moves of General Averescu that were being directed against Bela Kun and the Communist regime in Budapest.\textsuperscript{16} Since both these moves would have demanded the denial of the greatest of nationalist gratifications in an era of rampant nationalism, the "maximalists" lost all touch with the Rumanian ethnic element.

The formalization of the successful annexations and the fulfillment of "Great Rumanian" expansionism, released an even more fervent and fanatical nationalism among the "successors of the Roman

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14}Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 478; Ionescu, Communist in Rumania, pp. 24-25.
\item \textsuperscript{15}Ibid., pp. 12, 22-25.
\item \textsuperscript{16}Ibid., pp. 14-17.
\end{itemize}
Empire." This attitude among the populace left the "maximalists" out in the cold. However, the Comintern gave its "Rumanian" lackeys no respite and demanded a purge of unreliable members in the ranks, reorganization and strict discipline, as well as unflinching allegiance to the International. To further these ends, the "maximalists" brought into existence the CPR in 1921. But a second Party Congress in 1922 was required in order to breathe life into the organization. In spite of this, the CPR remained weak and ineffective in the inhospitable atmosphere of Rumanian chauvinism.

Comintern directives contributed to this continued weakness of the CPR. They demanded the utilization of the "self-determination" principle in the newly acquired areas of Rumania and the exploitation of ethnic and economic discord to the fullest. These demands were carried out with some success in Bessarabia during 1924. However, the only real result of these efforts was to put the CPR under government

17 The Rumanians claim to be the descendants of Trajan's Roman legions which conquered Dacia in the second century after Christ. While this claim has often been called into question, the present-day Rumanians do speak a Romance language—although somewhat Slavicized. However, it must be emphasized that the name "Rumanian" is only of recent vintage. No state or people existed under that name prior to 1859 when the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were united to form the country of "Rumania."

18 Fischer-Calati, Romania, p. 68; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 18-19.

19 Ibid., p. 19.

20 Ibid., pp. 24-25. It should be noted, however, that "self-determination" was never considered an end in itself. During these early years as the real answer to the problem of ethnic minorities. See Evangelos Kofos, "Balkan Minorities under Communist Regimes," Balkan Studies, II (1961), 29.
ban in that same year.\textsuperscript{21} Henceforth, the Party had to resort to more subtle tactics, dividing its activities between an underground as well as "legal" apparatus.

Succeeding years of Party activity revealed its weakness and inability to reach the masses. Only among the national minorities did the Party register some "successes," but here too the depth and significance of these successes could be called into question.\textsuperscript{22} Nevertheless, the relative successes among the minorities and the Party's failure among the ethnic Rumanians, determined the policies which it was to follow. The "legal" and "front" organizations of the party became particularly active among the nationality groups, while the "underground" or "illegal" apparatus tried to infiltrate the labor movement and to foster economic discontent.\textsuperscript{23} This dual tactical approach of the CPR reflected also the dual ethnic make-up of the Party.

The "legal" and "front" organizations of the Party prospered

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21}Fischer-Galati, \textit{Romania}, p. 68; Ionescu, \textit{Communism in Rumania}, p. 23.
\item \textsuperscript{22}The major reason why these Communist "successes" among the minority nationalities--particularly among the Hungarians--should be viewed with skepticism, is that the Rumanian "bourgeois" government of the inter-war years maintained a double-standard regarding Communist activity. While it severely repressed Communist activity among ethnic Rumanians, it allowed the Party a great deal of freedom among the ethnic minorities. The reason for this was that the "bourgeois" government wanted to destroy the national unity and solidarity of the respective minorities through class antagonism--which was fostered by the CPR--thereby to make them more susceptible to "Rumanization" and assimilation.
\item \textsuperscript{23}The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, pp. 3-5; Ionescu, \textit{Communism in Rumania}, pp. 24-25, 44-45.
\end{itemize}

These recruits came to play important roles in the early inter-war years and remained an important force in the Party at least until 1952. They were in fact the dominant segment of the CPR until the Fifth Party Congress of 1932. Through front organizations like Madosz and periodicals like Korunk, they provided the CPR with its "legal" apparatus.\footnote{Korunk was a left-wing Marxist oriented Hungarian-language periodical which opposed the efforts of minority nationality publications and organizations, calling for boundary revisions. The latter included such publications as Hitel, Zord Idők, Napkelet Pásztortúz, and such cultural societies and publishers as Erdélyi Helikon, Minerva, and Erdélyi Szépmives Céh. In contrast to this latter group, the intellectuals who supported Korunk asked for no revisions in frontiers. They took the view that social, rather than national solutions, were needed. They emphasized the solidarity of Rumanians and Hungarians alike, along class rather than national lines.}

On the "underground" level, Party work took on a more conspiratorial character than the "propaganda" activities among the minority nationalities. In the "underground" the stress was on action rather than on "recruitment." The labor field was the major target of this action. The Grivita Railroad Strike of 1933 was its greatest success.\footnote{Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 45-46; Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 480.}
However, the Party's range of activities also included sabotage and during the Second World War, even guerrilla warfare. In these activities, it is interesting to note that the ethnic Rumanian "worker" elements were more active than the ethnic minority "intellectuals."

The Party Congress of 1932 was in many ways a watershed in the history of the CPR. It switched the emphasis from "self-determination" to social problems and the need to exploit economic unrest. This switch in emphasis laid the foundations for strengthening the ethnic Rumanian wing of the Party. Yet, growth in the Party did not take place at this time. The Rumanian population in general, turned with more enthusiasm to the extreme nationalist anti-Hungarian, anti-Jewish, anti-Russian "Iron Guard" movement of Cornelius Zelea Codreanu. In the face of this development, all the Party could do was to cooperate with other "left" elements to forestall a fascist regime. In this the CPR followed the general directive of the Comintern to abandon the "social fascist" outlook vis-à-vis the Social Democrats and thereby to join the "Popular Front" tactics of other Communist parties in Europe.

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27 One of the major reasons for this switch was of course the growing power of fascist movements in Central Europe, which were also emphasizing the need for territorial revisions and readjustments. In order to better cope with this threat from the "right" the CPR now toned down its "self-determination" doctrines and stressed that the problems of the area demanded economic and social solutions along the Soviet pattern.


29 Ibid., pp. 50-51; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, p. 5.
The outbreak of World War II saw the disruption of this tactic as Germany and the Soviet Union signed a Non-Aggression Pact. This move caused great confusion within Party ranks and added to the disunity which characterized the organization until April 1944.\(^30\) Disarray and complete impotence best characterize the CPR during these early war years. The most militant and talented Party members were either in prison or in exile.\(^31\) The remaining members of the Party lacked cohesion and their leadership was completely shaken and shattered by the fast flow of events and the contrary and mutually exclusive demands placed on them.

With the assistance of the Soviet Union, however, the Party was able to purge and re-build its shattered organization. The ex-Comintern agent, Emil Bodnaras, was instrumental in this Party re-organization.\(^32\) Holding a secret Party purge in April 1944, he, Parvulescu and some other Rumanian Communists prepared the CPR for the important role it was to take in the Soviet War effort. Unity and cohesion were attained, plans coordinated, and the Party was made ready for its part in the overthrow of the Antonescu regime.\(^33\)

As the Red Army advanced into Rumania the Coup d'etat of

\(^{30}\)Ibid., p. 6; Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 58-66.

\(^{31}\)The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, p. 6.

\(^{32}\)Ibid., pp. 6, 18-21; Fischer-Galati, *Romania*, pp. 344-345; Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 78-81, 351.

August 23, 1944 toppled from power the Antonescu dictatorship. This move—carried out by a "democratic Front" composed of Liberals, National Peasants, Social Democrats, Communists and other "left" elements—paved the way for the Rumanian switch. It made inevitable the Rumanian participation along-side the "Glorious Soviet Armies" in the "liberation" of Transylvania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.  

As the leading force in the "Democratic Front" the Party moved to seize the reins of power. Throughout the countryside it agitated the people against the "democratic Bourgeois" parties and everywhere provoked unrest, discontent and disorder. This policy—supported by the Red Army—enabled the CPR to topple two Sanatescu governments, the Radescu government, and then to install its own puppet regime under Petru Groza on March 5, 1945.

Organization and Membership

The Nature of Party Growth

The most dramatic development having long-range effects on the position of the country's ethnic minorities and on the resurgence of nationalism, was the rapid growth of the CPR following the seizure of power. Figure 4 shows the nature of this Party growth from April 1944

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36 Ibid., pp. 278-283.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Party Head</th>
<th>Government Head</th>
<th>Crucial Party Developments</th>
<th>Crucial Bloc Developments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1944</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Gheorghiu-Dej</td>
<td>Gen.Antonescu</td>
<td>Purge of Foris and Koffler</td>
<td>Soviet advance into Rumania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Gen.Sanatescu)</td>
<td>Dej freed from prison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Gen.Radescu)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Petru Groza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1945</td>
<td>217,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Seizure of power</td>
<td>Aug.23,1944 Coup D'Etat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1947</td>
<td>710,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Absorption of Soc.Dems.</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1948</td>
<td>937,846</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Purge of Patrascanu--1948</td>
<td>King Michael forced to abdicate--Dec.31,1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peoples'Rep.established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1950</td>
<td>720,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Purge of Pauker-Luka-Georgescu--1952</td>
<td>Stalinization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1955</td>
<td>595,398</td>
<td>Gheorghiu-Dej</td>
<td>Stoica</td>
<td>Malenkov Purged</td>
<td>Stalin dies--1953</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1956</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>Gheorghiu-Dej</td>
<td>Stoica</td>
<td>Chisinevschi and Constantinescu Purge--1957</td>
<td>Revolt in Hungary--1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unrest in Transylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1960</td>
<td>834,600</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Emergence of Econ.Nationalism</td>
<td>Khrushchev and Bloc &quot;Integration&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1963</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Maurer</td>
<td>Revived Cultural and Pol. Nationalism--Rumanization</td>
<td>Khrushchev Purged--1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 1965</td>
<td>1,518,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Death of Dej--March,1965</td>
<td>Brezhnev and Kosygin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1967</td>
<td>1,676,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1968</td>
<td>1,761,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Patrascanu--1968</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia invaded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1969</td>
<td>1,924,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td>by USSR--Aug., 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1971</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 4**

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY FROM 1944 TO 1971
The rapid growth of the Party, particularly in the years up to 1948 drastically altered its ethnic make-up. This growth relegated the ethnic minority Party members—who in the past composed the bulk of the CPR—into a secondary position, as Party ranks were swelled by ethnic Rumanians who had seen "the handwriting on the wall." This rapid post-war growth of the Party was the first major step toward its "nationalization." After 1948, however, the CPR stabilized its membership and carried out purges among elements which it regarded as "unhealthy." Even these purges, however, caused greatest damage not in the ranks of the newly recruited ethnic Rumanians, but in the ranks of the veteran ethnic minority Communists. Thus, both the growth and the purges of the Party contributed to the strengthening of the ethnic Rumanian sectors of the CPR. The most recent increases in Party membership have even further accentuated this trend.

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38 Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 69-71; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 204-208.

39 This is verified by the fact that in December, 1955, 79.2% of the members were ethnic Rumanians in the CPR. By 1968, 88.43% were ethnic Rumanians. Compare Ibid., p. 243, with "Report by Nicolae Ceausescu on Organizational Measures for the Steady Strengthening of the Moral-Political Unity of the Working People," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 27 (Oct. 28, 1968), p. 30.

40 Braham, "Rumania: Onto the Separate Path," footnote 5, pp. 16-17.
present, the regime's search for popularity among the masses has allowed it to lower its standards for membership. This has enabled many to join who are ignorant of, if not hostile to the tenets of "proletarian internationalism" and the traditional policies of "minority tolerance" which had prevailed prior to this growth in Party membership.

The CPR Before August 1944

The resurgence of nationalism can be explained partly by the decimation of the de-nationalized elements which had composed the bulk of the CPR before 1944. Membership in the Party prior to the seizure of power was predominantly "internationalist," composed of individuals who were for the most part non-Rumanians ethnically. Historical reasons determined this adhesion of minorities to the CPR, some of which have already been touched on above. We will examine briefly the composition of the CPR prior to the seizure of power, as well as after its "nationalization."

Before the seizure of power the growth and composition of the Party can be divided by the historic Fifth Party Congress of 1932. Up to this Congress, the national minorities dominated the CPR. Jews and Ukrainians from Bessarabia, Bulgarians from Dobrogea and Jews and Hungarians from Transylvania outnumbered at this stage the ethnic

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42The importance of this Fifth Party Congress on the future development of the CPR cannot be over-emphasized. See: Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 40-46; The Rumanian Workers' Party on the Eve, pp. 3-4.
Rumanians in the positions of leadership as well as in the number of Party members. From 1932 onwards, however, the ethnic Rumanians began to play a prominent part in the Party's leadership although they were still not the dominant sector of the Party membership.

The Party of the inter-war years was made up of roughly two groups. One group was composed of national minority intellectuals. The other group was composed of ethnic Rumanian laborers. Of the two groups the former seems to have been more important until the Party Congress of 1932. They were a heterogeneous lot made up of a variety of nationalities drawn from all classes and practically all professions. As opposed to this, the ethnic Rumanian sector of the Party was in all ways more homogeneous. Not only were they similar in national origin, but their class and labor background gave them more social solidarity and political cohesion. Their role became more important following the Fifth Party Congress, the Grivita Strike of 1933 and the emergence of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej as secretary-general of the CPR.

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43 Even the Secretary-Generalship of the Party was held by the non-Rumanian Elek Koblos (alias Badulescu) between 1924-1928. Prior to that, the non-Rumanians C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea and Christian Rakovsky had played pre-eminent Party roles. For more on the role of Koblos, see: Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 25-28.


45 Another similarity to be noted among the ethnic Rumanian "workers" of the Party is their "religious" background--Eastern (Rumanian) Orthodox. *Ibid.*, pp. 480-485. Though this factor is not decisive in a Communist setting, it should be mentioned because it points out that these leaders had similar childhood experiences and education.
The CPR Since the Seizure of Power

Since August 1944 the CPR has undergone a vast change in composition. This change took place on all levels of the Party hierarchy from the Politburo down to the local cell organizations. This change has brought about a real "nationalization" of the Party along ethnic Rumanian lines. To understand this "nationalization" it will be necessary to examine not only all levels of the Party hierarchy, but also the fragmentation of the Party leadership following the seizure of power. This fragmentation of the leadership followed the general pattern of other East European satellites, and reflects the division of the Party into "Muscovites," "westerners" and "home" Communists.

The "Muscovites" composed perhaps the most "alien" (i.e., non-Rumanian) segment of the CPR not only because of their heterogeneous national background, but also because their first loyalty was always to the Kremlin center and the International at the expense of Rumanian needs or capabilities. This group was represented by such well-known individuals as Ana Pauker, Leonte Rautu, Vasile Luka, Dumitru Coliu and Emil Bodnaras. They were a "rootless" group who were often at odds with one another as well as with the "home" and "western" Communists. What gave them their uniting label was that they had spent most of

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World War II, as well as some of the inter-war years, in the Soviet Union under the tutorship of Stalin. They returned to Rumania on the coat-tails of the Red Army to assist and carry to fulfillment the Communization of the country.48

The "westerners" were the smallest of the three above groups and also the least significant. They resembled the "Muscovites" in a number of ways, yet they were distrusted by Stalin. Like the "Muscovites" they were also recruited predominantly from among the national minorities. Such individuals as Gheorghe Gaston-Marin and Petre Borila represent this group.49 Their major--perhaps only--unifying characteristic is that they had spent the war years or part of the 1930's in the West, taking part in the Spanish Civil War or in the later resistance movement in France. Like the "Muscovites" they too returned to Rumania at the close of hostilities to take part in the Communization of the country.

Unlike the above two groups, the "home" Communists in Rumania were predominantly (on the leadership level) of Rumanian ethnic stock. They had spent the war years as well as most of the inter-war years in Rumanian prisons. Although they were relatively a more homogeneous lot than the former two groups, they were by no means united in outlook. Individuals like Gheorghiu-Dej, Apostol, Patrascanu, Ceausescu, Maurer,

48Ibid., pp. 64-67; Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 78-79, 94-106.

Dalea, Moghioros and Draghici made up this group.\textsuperscript{50} While most of them had similar social origins and "religious" backgrounds, their unifying characteristic was that they had spent the inhospitable inter-war years, as well as World War II, in the country.\textsuperscript{51} They were, in this sense, the group which was welded together most through a common past of travail and persecution at the hands of the "bourgeois" and "fascist" authorities.

From these various elements--"Muscovites," "westerners," and "home"--the leadership of the CPR was forged in the immediate post-war years. However, the amalgamation of such diverse elements was bound not to last. Even during Stalin's lifetime--who had imposed unity on these elements in the first place--\textsuperscript{52} the instability of the Party's composition demanded internal alterations. These alterations were provided by a number of purges, of which the Patrascanu purge of 1948 and the Pauker-Luka-Georgescu purge of 1952, stand out as the most important.\textsuperscript{53} These early purges were later (1957) augmented by the Constantinescu-Chisinevschi purge which followed close on the de-Stalinization policies of the bloc, though ideologically not directly related to them.\textsuperscript{54}


\textsuperscript{51}Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, pp. 78-79.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., pp. 117-118.

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., pp. 151-156, 208-215.

\textsuperscript{54}Ibid., pp. 284-287.
The present composition of the CPR reflects the change wrought by these past purges. The change has "Rumanized" the Party in the true sense of the word on the top levels of power. It has eliminated the most "foreign" members from the Party power-structure. Thus, the "aliens" Pauker, Luka, Georgescu, Chisinevschi, Foris, Koffler and numerous lesser figures received the ax together with a few "natives" like Patrascanu and Constantinescu. The net result has been to consolidate within the Politburo and the Secretariat the position of the ethnic Rumanian Party leaders who had grouped themselves around Gheorghiu-Dej.\textsuperscript{55} This does not mean, however, that all ethnically non-Rumanians have been eliminated from the top levels of the Party. It merely means that they have been relegated to fringe positions and reduced in numbers, while the Gheorghiu-Dej--today, Ceausescu--faction of ethnic Rumanians has come to occupy all the centers of significant Party power.

The present power "core" of the CPR is thus built around the former followers of Gheorghiu-Dej, which included Apostol, Stoica, Ceausescu, Draghici, Dalea and Maurer.\textsuperscript{56} Around this ethnic Rumanian "core" two less significant groups may be distinguished. One group has been described as the Party leaders with military backgrounds and close personal ties to the Kremlin. Some have referred to them as the "generals" or as the "Kremlin watch-dogs." The group included Bodnaras, Tomasic, "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," p. 482.\textsuperscript{55} Of these leaders two have since died and Draghici has been purged by Ceausescu and his followers.\textsuperscript{56}
Borila, Salajan and Coliu.57 Following this grouping, the outer fringe of the Party power core is composed of such men as Rautu, Gaston-Marin, Voitec, Fazekas and Moghioros.58 Those in this last named group, though individually influential, are in many ways subject to the cohesive ethnic Rumanian "core" of the Party leadership.

As the above shows, the ethnic Rumanian segment has become the axle of the Party wheel which determines the policies of Communism in the country. The formerly dominant ethnic minorities, (Ukranians, Jews, Hungarians, Bulgarians, etc.) have in this way been pushed to secondary positions. This pattern has been even more extensively followed in the middle levels of the Party structure. The Party officials of ethnic minority background have been reduced in such areas as the Party Central Committee and among the Regiune Secretaries.59 This reduction has often paralleled the purges at the top levels of power (i.e., Politburo, Secretariat and Party Control Commission), but more recently have also been carried out independently of general Party purges and related more closely to local "demands" for Rumanization.60


60The "Rumanization" of the top Party and administrative leadership of the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region in 1962 may be viewed as such an "independent" purge. As a consequence of this "re-shuffling" the predominantly Hungarian area is now "blessed" with a Rumanian, Dimitru Puni, as chairman of the regional people's council. See: George Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," The Reporter, XXXI (November

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The reduction of minority representation in Party affairs has also taken place at the base of the Party hierarchy. However, at this level it is much harder to ascertain the extent and nature of the reductions. Yet, there are certain indications on the Regiune, commune, factory and collective farm level, that there exists a similar trend regarding the "Rumanization" of the Party.\textsuperscript{61} Aside from some limited data, it is possible to conjecture on the basis of the rapid growth of the Party—immediately after power seizure as well as in the early 1960's—\textsuperscript{62}—that the rank and file as well as the leadership is now predominantly ethnic Rumanian.

As Table III indicates, the over-all composition of the Party has become more and more Rumanian. Just in the three years between 1965 and 1968, the percentage of Hungarian Party members has been reduced from 9.5% to 8.67%, while the representation of the Germans and other nationalities from 3.5% to 2.9%. This trend is, perhaps, not so much due to a reduction in the actual number of Hungarian members as to the rapid growth of the Rumanian membership during the 1960's (See Figure 4).

Hungarian influence in the Party is of a limited nature for yet another reason. While in the highest level in the Party there are

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62}See Figure 4.
TABLE III

MEMBERSHIP IN THE CPR ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY
1965-1968 (IN PERCENTAGES)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rumanian</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Other Nationalities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>--**</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>88.16</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>88.43</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**For 1965 the percentage of German Party members is included under "other nationalities."
still some Hungarians, they are denationalized representatives of their people. In other words, they are Hungarians in name and language only, but not in their values and in their concern for their fellow nationals. Four outstanding examples are Alexandru Moghioros, Josif Banc, Janos Fazekas, and Mihai Gere. These four individuals have succeeded in making it into the highest Party offices, yet none of them count as significant policy-makers. Their role seems to serve two purposes: first, to convince the Hungarians that they are not completely without "representatives," and second, to make outside observers believe that Rumanian nationality policy is a sweeping success.

In Rumania today this "window dressing role" can be seen in that almost every important organ of the Party has on it a Hungarian representative. However, what the superficial observer fails to note is that this representative is invariably one of the four repeaters (Moghioros, Banc, Fazekas, or Gere). Thus, while it is true that in 1965 one Hungarian actually became one of the fifteen members of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the R.C.P. and one made it into the nine man secretariat, the one man was on both occasions Alexandru Moghioros. It is also true that ten Hungarians made it into the 121 member Central Committee of the R.C.P. and three became alternate

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63 Along this line, see the text of the speech at Odorhei (Szekelyudvarhely) in "Party and State Leaders Visit Brasov, Covasna and Harghita Counties," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 13 (August 27, 1968), pp. 36-38.

members of the Executive Committee, but again, these included the four
denationalized Party leaders mentioned above.  

The Party's "Rumanization" is evident in yet one more develop­
ment, the rehabilitation of Lucretiu Patrascanu. Following the direc­tives of the Ninth Party Congress an investigation was begun in November 1965 into the activities of the security forces (Internal Affairs Ministry), particularly in reference to the Patrascanu case. While the investigation had a very personal and political reason (i.e., the purge of Alexandru Draghici), the result was the rehabilitation of Patrascanu in April 1968. As we had occasion to note earlier, Patrascanu had been one of the few ethnic Rumanians who had been purged. In fact, he had been accused of wrong attitudes on the nationality problem. It seems that his stance had been too nationalistic for the Party in 1948. At any rate, the rehabilitation of this national Communist in 1968 indicates that the Party no longer considers his type of "nationalism" unreconcilable with the Party's nationality policy. Thus, we can see that not only in its organization, but also in its ideological stance, the Party has become "Rumanized."

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66 "On the Rehabilitation of Some Party Activists," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 8 (April 26, 1968), 9-25.

Party Control and "Democratic Centralism"

The factor that has inadvertently facilitated the "nationalization" or "Rumanization" of the CPR has been its organizational structure and its adherence to the principle of "democratic centralism." This factor has played a part in both government and Party since the overlapping and intermeshing of the two hierarchies is ever present. The centralization of the Party-State and the Party's monopoly over the coercive powers of the state, has enabled the "Rumanization" process to proceed unobstructed.

Party organization, through its centralization has enabled the majority nationality to assert its pre-eminence. The numbers of the Rumanian ethnic element have enabled it to utilize the centripetal force of the Party organization to submerge the less numerous ethnic minority Communists. The latter, since their numerical eclipse following World War II, have been relegated to the fringes of the Party power-structure by the ethnic Rumanians. Only the completely de-nationalized or Rumanized national minority Communists have been able to remain on top in the face of this process.

In Yugoslavia and the Vojvodina

Background and Evolution

Unlike its Rumanian counterpart, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) has always been able to secure some support at the grass roots level. However, in tracing its origins we are confronted by an even more confusing and fragmented organizational background. The Party's roots go back to the Social Democratic movements of the 1870's. However, those early roots of Yugoslav "Socialism" developed in the shadow of the Italian, Austrian-German and Hungarian Social Democratic movements as well as the influence of the 19th century Russian narodniki. Thus, until December 1918, one cannot really speak of a unified South Slav Socialism.

When in the aftermath of World War I the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was established, it became possible for the

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69 Since the Sixth Congress of the CPY (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) in 1952, the official name of the Party has been changed to League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). This change was supposed to indicate the Party's development parallel to the policy of decentralization and self-government in the economy. It was to differentiate it from other Communist Parties, demonstrating that it had attained a higher stage of development. In the subsequent discussion of the Yugoslav Communist Party, this study will refer to it as CPY when the party of the pre-Sixth Congress period is considered. It will refer to it as the LCY when the period after 1952 is being discussed.


disparate Socialist movements to attempt unification. However, unification was attained only with great difficulty. The regional and ethnic basis of existing socialist groups and labor unions made an over-all South Slav Socialist organization difficult to attain. Ideological and personal differences among the leaders of these groups conspired to thwart the creation of a "national" organization.\textsuperscript{72}

The differences between labor unions and socialist parties were further accentuated by the different national affiliation of local organizations. In the Vojvodina this was particularly vexing because the region's majority population was not South Slav but predominantly Hungarian and German (see Column I, Table II in Chapter I).

In spite of all these obstacles, the Yugoslav Communists were successful in producing a viable "national" political organization by the end of the 1930's.

The reason why they succeeded was in large part due to the character of the South Slav Socialist movements prior to and during World War I. Unlike their Rumanian counterparts, they developed in settings which were—for the most part—under "foreign" dominion. The rule of the Turks in Macedonia and the rule of Austria-Hungary in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Vojvodina forced the Socialist movements to become also nationalist movements.\textsuperscript{73} Since


\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., pp. 29-36.
in Rumania national independence was already a reality when the socialist movements began to organize, they did not feel the need to be "independence" movements as well. In the lands that were to become Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the national independence movement was from the beginning closely allied to the socialist movements. The ideals of a "Balkan Federation" were always closely related to social reform. This was in large part the consequence of a close correlation between "foreign" dominance and "social exploitation." In other words, the struggles for social reform were unimaginable without a struggle for South Slavic independence and federation.

The close alliance between "national" and "socialist" aspirations provided a much firmer foundation for organization than was the case in Rumania where the Social Democrats were only (or primarily) concerned with "social reform." Thus, while in Rumania most Social Democrats were not ethnically members of the majority population, in Croatia, Slovenia, and the other South Slav areas, the major nationality usually contributed the majority of the members for the local socialist organizations. Thus, in the South Slavic lands--unlike

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74 Ibid., p. 34, presents an excellent example of this convergence of "foreign" and "Social" exploitation in Bosnia. He points out that: "In Bosnia and Hercegovina, the medieval agrarian relations remained unchanged. The Austro-Hungarian administration relied on the Moslem feudal lords, begs and agas, against Christian rajas. Moslem agas and begs possessed all the land, although the Christian agricultural laborers comprised the majority of the population. The problem of solving the agrarian question in Bosnia and Hercegovina was never even raised by the Austro-Hungarian regime."

75 While no data has been compiled to show this, a name analysis of the leaders of the early Socialist movements supports this generalization. See Ibid., pp. 23-43; Colaković, et al., A Jugosláv Kommunista Szövetség Rövid Története, pp. 31-66.
Rumania--Socialism (later Communism) could not be accused of being an "alien" growth. It was rooted in both the national and social aspirations of many South Slavs.

It should be remembered, however, that this national appeal of these socialist movements also had a divisive consequence as far as the Vojvodina was concerned. In this area, the predominantly non-Slavic population did not sympathize with the "national" goals of these movements, although a large section of the impoverished Hungarian peasantry probably favored the social reform side of their programs. Until World War I, however, this question was not really consequential for the Vojvodina since its Social Democratic Party as well as its general political existence, was integrally tied to the Hungarian state.76 Only the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the dismemberment of Hungary in the fall of 1918, shifts the fate of the area into the sphere of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes.

In the Interwar Period

The Social Democrats of the Vojvodina, as of all Yugoslavia, underwent numerous external and internal struggles before they finally united into one nationwide party. This was followed by innumerable internal conflicts until the Party eliminated from its ranks the Socialists to become a Communist Party like its Soviet ideal. Josip Broz Tito contended (1940) that this process of Party unification and purification required a four-stage development. Accordingly, the first

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76 Ibid., p. 22.
stage followed immediately after the First World War and lasted until
the Party's prohibition in 1921. The second stage lasted from the
prohibition to the Party's Fourth Congress in 1928. This was followed
by the third stage which lasted to the Comintern's purge of the Party
in 1937. Finally, the fourth stage began with the purge and lasted
until the Fifth Conference of the Party in 1940. 77

In the present context it is not necessary to dwell on the
intricacies of these separate stages of development. However, these
stages of Party growth indicate some of the major shifts in both its
internal organization and its policies concerning the national minori­
ties. These latter considerations call for more attention.

Following World War I the Social Democratic Parties of the
South Slavic areas were immediately confronted by the nationality
question. At their unification meeting in Belgrade (April 1919), the
old Social Democratic parties united with the new Communist groups to
form the Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia (Communist). 78 This
unification was possible only by avoiding the nationality question. The
program adopted by the new unified party avoided all mention of the
national question. 79 However, this refusal to come to grips with the
major problem of the land only delayed the inevitable rift between
"left" and "right" factions of the Party.

77 Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 51.
78 Ibid., p. 36-37; Colaković, et al., A Jugosláv Kommunista
Szövetség Rövid Története, pp. 43-47.
79 Ibid., p. 46.
The Second Congress of the Party held at Vukovar (June 20-25, 1920) faced this same dilemma. However, at this gathering the adoption of a more explicit program—declaring among other goals the creation of a Soviet federation of the Balkan and Danubian countries—led to even more discord between "left" and "right" factions. At the same time, the adoption—on this occasion—of the name Communist Party of Yugoslavia also indicated that the Socialists ("Social patriots") were being squeezed out of the Party. Yet, the Socialists' formal ouster in December 1920 did not end factionalism in the Party.

Factional strife continued, even in the face of governmental persecution. The Prohibition of Party activities and propaganda by the OBZNANA (Notification) of December 29, 1920, and the divesting of the mandates of Communist deputies to the Narodna Skupshina (August 2, 1921) weakened and furthered the internal dissention within the Party. The first, second and third Party Conferences (1922 July, 1923 May and December) as well as the III and IV Party Congresses (1926 and 1928) continued to reflect conflict between "left" and "right" factions. In fact, this internal strife was so detrimental to the Party's cohesion and effectiveness, that the Comintern felt compelled to interfere with the Yugoslav Party's organization and policies.

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81 Ibid., pp. 76-77.

As Zalar points out: "The major point of disagreement among the factions was the national problem."\(^\text{83}\) The "right" faction led by Sima Markovic contended that the "national question" was basically a constitutional problem. The "left" faction, on the other hand, rejected this position. It maintained that "self-determination," even to the extent of secession, must be part of the Party's revolutionary program.\(^\text{84}\) At the first and second Party Congress and the first Party Conference the "right" faction prevailed. This is evident in the selection of Party leaders and the omission of the national question from the Party programs. However, the intervention of the Comintern in 1924-25 and 1928, turned the tide in favor of the "left" factions. Stalin himself dictated the policy to be followed by the CPY. He said the following:

If you are drawing up a national programme for the Yugoslavian Party (and this is precisely what we are now dealing with), you must remember that his programme must be based not only on what exists at present, but also on what will inevitably occur by virtue of international relations. That is why I think that the question of the right of nations to self-determination should be regarded as an immediate and burning question. . . .

The postulate of a revolution must be the starting point of the national programme.

Further, it is imperative to include in the national programme a special point on the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secession. . . .

Finally, the programme should include a special point providing for these nationalities in Yugoslavia which do not find it necessary to secede from that country. . . . It is therefore . . . necessary to . . . have in the programme a point on autonomy, with a view to the transformation of the state of Yugoslavia into a federation of autonomous national states based on the Soviet system.\(^\text{85}\)

\(^{83}\)Ibid., p. 40. \(^{84}\)Ibid., p. 41.

\(^{85}\)As quoted by Zalar, Ibid., p. 41. The original passage is in Stalin's *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*. 

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This policy remained the Party's program until August 1935 when the Seventh Congress of the Comintern called for the creation of Communist led People's Fronts to ward off the rising danger of fascism and naziism. At this time, the CPY—like its Rumanian counterpart—made a tactical volte-face. It began to stress the need for national unity and de-emphasized "self-determination." This changed policy lasted to the beginning of World War II.86

Tracing the evolution of the nationality policy of the CPY reveals a great deal about the composition of the Party as a whole. In its early years, the dominance of Marković and the "right" faction indicates the South Slavic dominance in Party leadership. Unlike its Rumanian counterpart, the CPY was not a predominantly "ethnic minority" organization. As late as the Third Conference of the Party held in 1923, only the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were recognized as having "national individuality."87 It was not until the Fifth Conference of October 1940 that the "national identity" of the Macedonian and Montenegrin peoples were recognized. It was also only at this latter Conference that "the right to freedom and equality" was stated for "German, Hungarian, Rumanian and other minorities in (the) Vojvodina."88

Throughout the interwar years the CPY remained a South Slav


87Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 51.

dominated Party.\textsuperscript{89} The efforts of the Comintern to mitigate some of the adverse effects of this dominance proved effective only in the second half of the 1930's when Josip Broz Tito became secretary general of the Central Committee of the CPY. Tito's leadership did not terminate South Slav dominance. It did, however, bring to an end much of the factionalism and it allowed the other nationalities (besides the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) to participate more actively in Party affairs.\textsuperscript{90}

In the Vojvodina it is just around this time (1934-1937) that Communists achieve organizational successes among the Hungarians. The Hungarian language journal \textit{HID} (Bridge), which was founded in 1934, is infiltrated by the Communists and taken over by them in 1936.\textsuperscript{91}

This journal provides the intellectual leadership for Hungarian Communists in the Vojvodina. As its title indicates, the journal saw (and

\textsuperscript{89}This is indicated most clearly by the program and internal organization of the Party. Both the Slovenes and the Croatians had separate Party organizations which affiliated with the nationwide Yugoslav organization. None of the other nationalities were given such privileges. In all the interwar period, the Party Secretary—with one outstanding exception—was always a South Slav. The exception was Milan Gorkic who became Party head in 1934 as a result of Comintern intervention. Gorkic (original name Josip Cizinski) was Ruthenian in background. See \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 203-207, 238-246; Zalar, \textit{Yugoslav Communism}, pp. 43-44. For an exposition of this Slavic dominance also see Milován Gyilas, "A Szláv Népek Harca a Békéért és a Demokráciáért," \textit{Hid}, No. 1 (January, 1947), pp. 12-20.

\textsuperscript{90}Colaković, \textit{et al.}, \textit{A Jugoszláv Kommunista Szövetség Rövid Története}, pp. 253-255, 261-269.

sees even today) as its major task the construction of "bridges"
between the Hungarians and the other nationalities of the Vojvodina
and all Yugoslavia. The editors and staff of this journal were well
qualified for this task. They were Serbs, Croats, Jews and Hungarians
who used the Hungarian language to further Party policies.92

As the foregoing shows, the Hungarians had a much more limited
role in the national Party leadership of Yugoslavia during the inter­
war years than their fellow nationals had in Rumania. However, on the
local level in the Vojvodina, they did wield some influence in Party
matters.

The involvement of Yugoslavia in World War II, reduced this
influence considerably. This was a consequence of two developments:
the re-annexation of the Vojvodina by Hungary and the imprisonment and
execution of many Vojvodina Communists (Hungarians, Serbs and Jews)
by the occupying forces. The re-annexation of the Vojvodina to Hungary
convinced many Party leaders that many Hungarian Communists were Party
members only to demonstrate their opposition to the Yugoslav Govern­
ment. Once that government had been replaced, they lost their ardour
for the Party. Furthermore, many of those who had remained loyal to
the Party—including Mayer Ottmar, the editor of Hid—were either
imprisoned or executed.93 Thus, the CPY's leadership tended to view

92"Szerzők Betűrendes Jegyzéke," Ibid., pp. 478-481, provides
a listing of the former staff of the periodical. The names of this
listing indicate that at least four nationalities were represented on
its staff.

93Laták, "Utolsó: A Szervező és Harcra Mozgósító Hid,"
the Hungarians in the Vojvodina with suspicion.

Organization and Membership

Hungarians continued to be relegated to an insignificant position in the Yugoslav Communist (or even Serbian) Party throughout World War II and the immediate postwar period. This was due to the contradiction they posed to the CPY theory of "national-revolutionary war." As first stated in 1928, the theory maintains that:

The problem of national-revolutionary war in Yugoslavia, where a number of oppressed nationalities and national minorities exist, will play an important role, particularly in the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war. The Party has therefore the duty to aid the liberation movements of the oppressed nationalities and national minorities, to lead their fight against imperialism, and to defend without any reserve their right of self-determination, even to secession. Adopting this policy, the Party has consequently the duty to prepare itself and the oppressed masses for the organization of the insurrection against the oppressing bourgeoisie.  

As opposed to this theory, the oppressed Hungarian minority—like the Bulgarian, German and Albanian minorities—turned for assistance to their fellow nationals outside Yugoslavia rather than to the CPY. Only when that outside help had failed did they try to make amends with the CPY.

By seeking outside help for their disadvantaged position, the Hungarians found themselves aligned with the Axis forces bent on


95As quoted by Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 43.
destroying Yugoslavia. Thus, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina actually became an obstacle to the unfolding of the CPY's "national-revolutionary war." In other words, the Hungarians remained outside the "nation-making process" that has produced modern Yugoslavia and its ruling Communist Party.96

It was the military and political struggle of World War II that moulded the CPY and its affiliation with all the nationalities of the country, including the Vojvodina's Hungarians. Unlike the Rumanian Communist Party, the CPY did not attain power on the coat-tails of the Soviet Red Army. The CPY was the major organizer of efforts to liberate the country from foreign control. It provided the leadership for the Partisan struggle against the Axis armies.97

The CPY's World War II experience as a national liberation movement, put its imprint on the evolution of both its organization and membership. The struggle against the Axis was a "national" effort on the part of the South Slav peoples.98 As such, the liberation


98The adjective "national" means in this case Yugoslav. Many, perhaps most, Croats would have found themselves more in sympathy with the Ustaše than with the Partisans. The Serbs, in turn, probably felt themselves closer to the Četnici than to the Partisans. But the Četnici and the Ustaše were never able to transcend their narrow Serb and Croatian appeals. Thus, only the CPY led Partisans can claim to be the national liberation movement of all the South Slavs. Ibid., pp. 69-77; George Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), pp. 44-46.
movement was composed mainly of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Montenegrins. The Partisans drew their recruits from these peoples. Only toward the end of the war were they able to "enlist" the support of non-Slavic groups. Thus, with the exception of one or two outstanding individuals—e.g., Moshe Pijade—the CPY leadership was drawn almost entirely from the South Slavic nationalities. The national background of the most important Party leaders of this period reflects closely the over-all makeup of the Party. Tito is of Croatian and Slovenian background, Ranković is Serbian, Kardelj is Slovenian and Djilas is Montenegrin.

The CPY's leadership of the Partisan struggle also ensured it of reliable members and leaders. The war tested the loyalty and revealed the organizational ability of Party members. It also provided the Party with the opportunity to expand membership without risking the adhesion of opportunists. As Figure 5 indicates, the CPY's most dramatic growth took place in the years between 1937 and 1945, when the most risk and the most sacrifice was demanded of Party members.

This is exactly the opposite of the Rumanian Party's growth. As Figure 4 indicates, the CPR had its most phenomenal growth between 1944 and 1947, after the Communist fate of Rumania had already been decided


100 Figure 5 is based on Neal, Titoism in Action, p. 55; Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 50-51; "Communist Party Rolls Increase Around World," The Blade (Toledo), June 10, 1970, p. 7; Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 197.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Party Head</th>
<th>Government Head</th>
<th>Crucial Party Developments</th>
<th>Crucial Bloc Developments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fall 1937</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Tito</td>
<td>Regent Prince</td>
<td>1937-Stalin's purge</td>
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<td>May 1939</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<td>Paul &amp; Prime Min. of Yugo. Party</td>
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<td>Oct. 1940</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stojadinović</td>
<td>Tito becomes Party head</td>
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<td>Spring 1941</td>
<td>12,000</td>
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<td>1939-M.Cvetković</td>
<td>1940-V. Conference</td>
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<td>June 1945</td>
<td>141,066</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia under Nedić of CPY</td>
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<td>1941-Mar.27 coup d'état</td>
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<td>July 1948</td>
<td>468,175</td>
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<td>Croatia under Pavlelić &amp; Axis occupation</td>
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<td>1941-Summer, Partisan Resistance unfolds</td>
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<td>Dec. 1950</td>
<td>607,443</td>
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<td>Tito-Stalin Split</td>
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<td>Dec. 1951</td>
<td>704,617</td>
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<td>June 1952</td>
<td>779,382</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1952-VI. Congress of CPY. Change name to League of Comms.(LCY)</td>
<td>1953-Mar. Stalin dies</td>
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<td>Jan. 1954</td>
<td>700,030</td>
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<td>1956-Feb. XX Congress of CPSU</td>
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<td>June 1956</td>
<td>635,984</td>
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<td>1956-Oct. Revolt in Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 1957</td>
<td>755,066</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Khrushchev and Bloc &quot;Integration&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 1958</td>
<td>823,460</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 1959</td>
<td>857,537</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1966-Summer, Purge of Ranković</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 1962</td>
<td>1,018,331</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1964-Khrushchev purged</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 1969</td>
<td>1,146,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**FIGURE 5**

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA FROM 1937 TO 1969
(i.e., when under the protective wings of the Red Army it was no longer "risky" to be a Communist).

Both the growth of the Party under wartime circumstances and its role as the guiding element of Partisan resistance, enabled it to become the dominant force in the chaotic setting of Yugoslavia. Unlike all the other Communist Parties of East Central Europe--including the Rumanian--the Yugoslav Communists came to power without the outside assistance of the Red Army. This meant that the CPY was never in a dependent status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It also meant, that the leaders of the Party were not mere puppets of Moscow but leaders who ruled in their own right. Thus, the CPY was never really fragmented into three identifiable factions (i.e., Muscovites, Westerners and "home" Communists) as was the case with most of the other Communist parties of East-Central Europe.

This is not to say that there was no diversity in the CPY. Many of its leaders had been in the Soviet Union for extended periods of time. Many others had been in the West--participating actively in the Spanish Civil War. But very few of them came back to Yugoslavia with a "Muscovite" or "Western" orientation. Or, at any rate, the guerrilla struggle in Yugoslavia re-nationalized them. In this way

101 The Red Army assisted only in the liberation of Belgrade and the Vojvodina. For the liberation of the major part of Yugoslavia the Partisans deserve credit. See Colaković, et al., A Jugosláv Kommunista Szövetség Rövid Története, pp. 427-430 and Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, p. 79.

we can conclude that the CPY was composed predominantly of "home" Communists, both on the membership and leadership levels. Furthermore, the Party was predominantly South Slav in composition. In the latter respect, we can say that all of the major Slavic groups were represented, with no one group having a dominant position. With slight qualification this characterization of the CPY is still applicable at the present time (1970).

Since the end of the Second World War the Hungarians have gained some access into the CPY. This access is limited mainly to the Party's organization in the Vojvodina. On the Federation level, they have only token representation, i.e., one Hungarian in the Central Committee. Even in the Vojvodina they are somewhat underrepresented. In the area as a whole the Hungarians make-up about 25% of the population, yet they only composed about 8.4% of the Party membership in 1958. Supposedly, their percentage of membership has increased since 1958. As yet, however, none of the statistics indicating this change have been made available.

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103 Croats frequently charge--particularly in emigre circles--that the LCY/CPY is Serb dominated. Serbs, on the other hand, say that the Croatians and Slovenes dominate the Party. These charges and counter-charges hold no water in actual practice. No one nationality has a majority of the Party membership. For the South Slavs proportionality in membership prevails. The representative nature of the Party is reflected in the data provided by Neal, Titoism in Action p. 55.

104 The Hungarians also have five representatives in the Central Committee of the Serbian party. See Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," p. 76, footnote 50.

105 Ibid.
Access to Party membership has been hindered by reciprocal suspicion. The Hungarians have shied away from Party membership because they have equated the CPY with the national aspirations of only the South Slavs, perhaps with reason. The CPY leadership on the other hand, has distrusted the Hungarians and considered them not completely Yugoslavs, perhaps with reason. At any rate, the Hungarians for the most part have not been anxious to join the Party and the dominant nationalities "have not been eager to promote Communists from the minorities (including the Hungarians) to positions of real responsibility."106

Unlike the Rumanian Communist Party, the CPY has not had to undertake numerous purges to gain a national identity. From the beginning it has been the national Party of the South Slavs. In fact, a good case could be made for the observation that each major purge that has swept through the CPY has democratized the Party internally, and thereby also increased the role of the Communists of minority background. Perhaps only the purge of Djilas in 1954 can be considered a setback to democratization.107 This purge, however, was not really detrimental to the position of the non-Slavic Party members, since Djilas had been one of their major critics in the immediate postwar period.108

106Ibid., p. 76.
Besides the Djilas purge of 1954, two others have had far-reaching consequences for the Party and its relationship to the "nationalities." One swept the Party in the wake of the Comintern dispute of 1948, while the other came as late as 1966 with the removal of Ranković. The purge of 1948 removed at the top levels Andriya Hebrang (Croatian), Sreten Zujovic-Tsrni (Serb), and Arso Jovanović (Serb). All three were Stalinists. Although this purge also eliminated two Hungarian Communists in the Vojvodina, its overall impact— from a long-range perspective— was to strengthen the "pluralistic" nature of the CPY. An indication of this was that Hebrang was accused of maintaining an "incorrect attitude toward the Serbs in Croatia." An even more important indication was that all the non-Slavic nationalities and their Communist leaders remained loyal to Tito. This eliminated some of the suspicion that had carried over from World War II experience.

Like the purge of 1948, that of 1966 was not primarily concerned with nationality policy. Still, its consequences increased, rather than diminished the opportunities of all nationalities to participate in the policy-making process of the country. The purge eliminated Alexander, Ranković and Svetislav Stefanović from the League of


111 Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 354.

Both men stood for the "hard line." As responsible for internal security, they opposed the processes of decentralization and "democratization" which were taking place in the Party, the economy and administration in general. Their conservatism, plus their Serbian background, made them also less sympathetic toward "self-management" in the area of nationality policy. At least, this is one of the points on which they were accused of maintaining incorrect attitudes.

Ranković and his followers resisted the changes which were redefining the role of the Party and its internal organization. They saw the Party, very much like Party leaders in other East European states, as the director of national affairs, highly disciplined, centralized, and directly involved in decision-making for society.

As opposed to this position, the official self-definition of the Party, given one year after the Ranković purge was that:

... the League of Communists is not a kind of general representative of society which decides on matters on behalf of the working people, or rather it is less and less this. On the contrary, the League is and must increasingly become the inner motive force of self-management by the working people, that is, the organizer and initiator of the working class and working masses in their efforts to get organized, develop and work as a socialist society based on self-management, and to mobilize in


this struggle for progressive aims and interests the entire social labour and creative potential—from material production to science and culture.\textsuperscript{116}

As the above quote indicates, the League of Communists is still the directing force in Yugoslavia. For those who doubt this, the Mihailov case is a sobering antidote.\textsuperscript{117} Yet, as Kardelj points out, the League wants to achieve its leadership through more indirect methods than previously. Among others, it allows its front organization, the Socialist Alliance of Working People, to take a more active part in decision making.\textsuperscript{118} This loosened framework, this general decentralization even in the core of the power structure, gives the nationalities—among them the Hungarians in the Vojvodina—more opportunity to participate in the political life of the country. This, as everything else in Yugoslavia, is guaranteed only while Tito remains at the helm.

II

While ultimate decision-making power in both Rumania and Yugoslavia resides within the Communist Parties, the governmental apparatus of both states also perform important policy-making, administrative and control functions. This pervasive role of the governments is, of course, guided by the Communist parties. None the less, the scope of government involvement is so vast, that it has more direct and more


\textsuperscript{117}Buranus, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Revolution," pp. 126-128.

frequent contact with the population than does the Party. Consequently, the nature of access to government at all levels and the actual participation in governmental activities by Hungarians, also provides an indication of their treatment. This treatment will be evaluated by examining the governmental organization and personnel of Yugoslavia and Rumania.

In Rumania

As the analysis of Rumania's constitutional set-up indicated, the government is unitary and also highly centralized. As the examination of the membership and organization of the CPR indicated, the non-Rumanian elements are much less influential in policy making. These considerations might lead us to the conclusion, that in the government the non-Rumanian inhabitants have only a very limited role. This conclusion is valid as far as actual policy-making is concerned. However, such a conclusion does not take into account the symbolic and the administrative role of government. In both these latter areas, the Hungarians and the other minorities have a highly visible even if not a very influential role.

The Grand National Assembly and the National Council of the Socialist Unity Front are two "institutions" of the modern Rumanian political scene which perform mainly symbolic roles. In both, the minorities are proportionally represented. In the Grand National Assembly--the supreme legislative body, which (theoretically) has vast powers, but in reality is merely a rubber stamp for CPR policies--the
Hungarian inhabitants have had their fair share of representatives.119 While the Rumanians have not issued exact statistics on the ethnic composition of their national legislature, as the Yugoslavs have done, they have pointed out on numerous occasions that in the Grand National Assembly the minority nationalities are represented in proportion to their percentage of the population. Thus, in 1964, out of 465 deputies 61 belonged to the various national minorities.120 In 1969, out of 465 deputies 67 belonged to the various national minorities.121 While the complete name listings for these latter two assemblies have not been available for examination, the name analysis of the members of the 1957 Grand National Assembly shows that the Hungarians, at that time, had representation in proportion to their number of the population.122 All available data seems to indicate that this is also the case today (1970).

In the Socialist Unity Front a similar situation prevails. This organization is a link between the government and the people according to a Party theory. In actuality it is the Party's vehicle for activating the masses in elections for the Grand National Assembly.123 As

119 For the powers of the Grand National Assembly see Chapter II.
123 "Founding of the National Council of the Socialist Unity Front," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 22-23 (December 5, 1968), p. 1.
a mass organization it has really become a successor to the National Democratic Front, which had played an important role in the Communist seizure of power following World War II and the People's Democratic Front which came into existence after the Communists came to power.

The Socialist Unity Front was brought into existence only very recently in November 1968. For the Hungarians and the other nationalities it has been significant, because it has been one of the few nation-wide organizations to which they could affiliate as "national" groups. In the fifteen counties of Transylvania where Hungarians reside in large numbers, they have been allowed to elect councils of Magyar working people. These county councils, in turn, send representatives to a central "Council of the working people of Magyar nationality of the Socialist Republic of Romania." The latter in turn, exists solely to affiliate with the Socialist Unity Front. The same holds true for the German, Serbian and other nationality councils which have come into existence since October 1968.

The leadership, or the "National Council," of the Socialist Unity Front is firmly in the hands of the Rumanian Communist Party. It is, at the same time, a nationally representative body, including prominent individuals from the labor field, from women's, youth and student unions, cultural and artistic societies, professional associations and the inclusive councils of working people of the nationalities.

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124 Ibid.
125 Banyai, "Councils of Working People Belonging to the Coinhabiting Nationalities of Romania," p. 5.
126 Ibid.
Thus, of the seven Vice-Chairmen of the National Council one is Hungarian. Of the remaining twenty-eight members, three are also Hungarian. This would indicate that, if anything, the Hungarians are over-represented on the National Council. However, it would be naive to consider this as a sign of actual decision-making power. Rather, the Hungarian representation in the Grand National Assembly as well as in the Socialist Unity Front is window-dressing for both "home" and "foreign" consumption. It visibly demonstrates the nationality policy of the CPR. For example, in the Grand National Assembly, according to Nicolae Ceausescu, in February 1968, 86.1% of the deputies were Rumanian, 8.6% were Magyars, 2.1% were Germans and 3.2% were people of other nationalities. The deceptive nature of this policy is revealed by the relationship and the functions of both the Grand National Assembly and the Socialist Unity Front. The main task of the latter was to organize the March 2, 1969 (and all subsequent) elections to the Grand National Assembly, "under the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party." The results of that election--99.75% for the candidates of the Socialist Unity Front and 0.23% against--bear further testimony to the merely legitimizing, or symbolic, nature of participation in


129"Founding of the National Council . . .," p. 1.
either of these two "political" institutions.\textsuperscript{130}

Of a somewhat more meaningful nature is the role of Hungarians in the governmental administration of the country. On the highest levels, this entails membership in the "State Council" and the "Council of Ministers" of the Socialist Republic of Romania. In the State Council in 1969 three members out of 28 were Hungarians. Included among these was one of the four Vice-Presidents of the State Council. Among the members of the Council of Ministers a less encouraging situation prevailed. There were only two Hungarians among the 43 members of this body and to make matters worse, they were not ministers to specific departments. They were both Vice-Chairmen (two out of eight) of the Council of Ministers.\textsuperscript{131} While these latter posts are more prestigious, they have less impact on actual administration. The general result is that the Hungarians are placed into highly visible positions, which have little influence on actual administration.

The limited nature of Hungarian influence is conditioned by yet two other factors. One is that their representatives on both these bodies are individuals who have little sympathy for their fellow nationals. They are frequently the same individuals who also hold prominent Party posts, such as János Fazekas and Josif Banc.\textsuperscript{132}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{130}]Significance of the March 2 Ballot," Documents, Articles, and Information on Romania, No. 4-5 (March 10, 1969), pp. 1-5.
\item[\textsuperscript{131}]After the March 2 Elections," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 6 (March 31, 1969), pp. 4-6.
\item[\textsuperscript{132}]Compare Ibid. and "The Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 24 (December 25, 1967), pp. 3-4.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
second reason is that the actual role of Hungarians in state administration is being reduced. This can be ascertained by comparing the national composition of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of 1969 with the composition of the same bodies in 1967. The proportion of Hungarians in the State Council --the more symbolic agency-- has remained about the same. In 1967 among its 19 members two were Hungarian. In 1969 this changed to three Hungarians out of 28 members. In the Council of Ministers--the more administrative agency--on the other hand, the number of four Hungarians out of 42 members in 1967, has been reduced to only two Hungarians out of 43 members in 1969.133

On lower levels of administration this cut-back in Hungarian influence can be examined over a longer period of time. As Chapter II indicated, the Rumanian Constitutional system initially granted the Hungarians a certain amount of self-administration in those areas of the country in which they composed the majority of the population.134 Thus, in the Eastern-most part of Transylvania the Hungarians were given the Magyar-Autonomous Region in 1952. For some years the Hungarians--or at least those in the "autonomous" region--enjoyed limited self-administration in relation to local needs and problems. However, the revolt in Hungary in 1956, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, and the general revival of Rumanian nationalism, enabled Party leaders to re-consider their grant of self-administration

133 Ibid., pp. 2-4; "After the March 2 Elections," pp. 4-6.
134 See part II of Chapter II.
in the Magyar-Autonomous Region.

In 1960, in the course of an over-all administrative reorganization of Rumania, the "autonomous region" was drastically altered. The redistricting of that year--more correctly, gerrymandering--replaced the Magyar Autonomous Region with the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region. The maps of Figure 6 indicate the extent of the territorial changes. What the maps fail to show, however, is that the areas taken away from the region were predominantly Magyar in population, while the areas received in exchange were inhabited predominantly by Rumanians. Table IV provides a breakdown of the changed proportions of the region's ethnic make-up. As this shows, and as the revised name of the region indicates, the region has been diluted and robbed of its former "compact" Magyar character. The region's formerly 78% Hungarian population was thus reduced to 65%. This has naturally

\[\text{[Footnote]}\]

\[\text{[Footnote]}\]

\[\text{[Footnote]}\]
FIGURE 6

ROMANIA BEFORE AND AFTER THE ADMINISTRATIVE REDISTRICTING OF DECEMBER 1960, WITH EMPHASIS ON TRANSYLVANIA AND THE MAGYAR AUTONOMOUS REGION
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>Magyars</td>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>Magyars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region</td>
<td>146,830</td>
<td>565,510</td>
<td>266,403</td>
<td>473,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasov Region</td>
<td>616,220</td>
<td>108,751</td>
<td>587,628</td>
<td>222,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluj Region</td>
<td>963,748</td>
<td>257,974</td>
<td>883,172</td>
<td>236,858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This Table has been adopted with minor changes from J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," *The World Today*, XIX (November, 1963), 506.*
resulted in reducing the political influence of the Hungarians as well.\textsuperscript{138}

Since 1960, self-administration no longer necessarily means that Hungarians rule Hungarians. It is hard to substantiate this while the Rumanians do not follow the Yugoslav example of releasing statistics on the composition of local governments. Occasionally, it is true, the Rumanian government releases some data that sheds light on the governmental involvement of the nationalities. However, these are figures for the country as a whole and thereby fail to show the correlation between the nationality of the local official elected and the national composition of the area for which he is elected. For example, it was pointed out by Rumanian authorities in 1968 that: "Among the over 155,000 deputies (elected) to the local organs of power more than 11,800 are Magyar, almost 2,800 are German, and over 2,400 are people of other nationalities."\textsuperscript{139} Yet a name analysis of the prominent local officials of predominantly Hungarian areas, turns up just as many or more Rumanians than Hungarians. An example of this was the leadership of the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region in 1963. While the


\textsuperscript{139} Nicolae Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 2 (February 17, 1968), p. 14.
region's population was predominantly Magyar, its leadership was at least 50% Rumanian.\textsuperscript{140}

In the present Rumanian administrative set-up, such a distortion of self-government is even more possible and probable. Since 1965 Rumania has eliminated from its Constitution any reference to autonomy and self-government for the Hungarians or any of the other nationalities.\textsuperscript{141} In 1968, it followed its theoretical commitment of 1965, with an extensive administrative-territorial re-organization of Rumania. The latter eliminated the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region. It divided Rumania into 39 countries, replacing the 17 regions which had been the major subdivision of the country previously. This re-organization divided the "Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region" into the counties of Covasna, Harghita and Mures.\textsuperscript{142} See Figure 7 for these changes. The names of the three counties are all geographically derived, with no hint as to their dominant Hungarian composition.

Both the administrative set-up on the local level and the national composition of leadership at the highest levels indicate that Hungarian involvement is more for show than anything else. However, in the everyday lives of Transylvanian Hungarians, the attitudes and behavior of the civil servants and the local police officials is direct,

\textsuperscript{140}Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27; Deaky and Radulescu, "Fighters of the Socialist Struggle," pp. 2-8.

\textsuperscript{141}Románia Szocialista Köztársaság Alkotmánya (Magyar Nyelvű Fordítás; Bukarest: Politikai Könyvkiadó, 1968), Art. 22, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{142}"New Administrative-Territorial Organization of Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 4 (February 24, 1968), pp. 3-4; Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania," pp. 1-30.
it is not meant for show. The national background of civil servants and of the police is, therefore, a more pressing question. However, no statistics are available to show either that Hungarians are active participants in these occupations, or that the Rumanian police and civil servants treat the Hungarians and other nationalities with tolerance. The only data we have is the impression of travelers and newspaper men who have had the opportunity to visit Transylvania in the course of the past fifteen or twenty years.\textsuperscript{143}

The general impression of such observers has been that public officials and police are overwhelmingly Rumanian even in predominantly Hungarian areas. Perhaps, this impression is a result of an unwillingness on the part of some officials to speak Hungarian when asked for assistance. At any rate, in spite of constitutional guarantees to the contrary, the exclusive use of Rumanian by civil servants and police, indicates an overwhelming Rumanian membership in these occupational areas. Or, it can also indicate widespread pressure against the use of Hungarian by public officials.\textsuperscript{144} In either case, the end result is the same—a general abuse of nationality rights.

In Yugoslavia

The examination of the governmental order and the part of


\textsuperscript{144}Ibid.; Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27. This point is also stressed by many travelers who have tried to use Hungarian. A number of these individuals have disclosed this impression personally to the present student of this problem.
Hungarians in it, is both easier and harder than was the case with Rumania. It is easier, because the Yugoslavs have made available much more information concerning this question. It is harder, because the nationality problem in Yugoslavia is much more involved generally. Furthermore, Yugoslavia has experimented more extensively with new administrative forms. This means that less administrative continuity has prevailed.

In Yugoslavia, as in Rumania, it is also necessary to distinguish the symbolic role and the actual administrative role of the national minorities. On the highest level, in the Federal government, their role is mainly symbolic, with very limited influence on administration. The Federal People's Assembly and the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia are the two nation-wide organizations that are most suited for this task.\textsuperscript{145} As far as the Socialist Alliance is concerned, like its Rumanian counterpart the Socialist Unity Front, it is an enthusiasm building mass agency. It too, is concerned mainly with elections to the national legislature, in this case, the Federal People's Assembly. In this role it tries to be representative of all sectors of Yugoslav life, including all the nationalities. As a consequence, its nationwide ruling council is made up of the presidents of the Provincial and Republican councils of the Socialist

\textsuperscript{145}The Socialist Alliance is not a governmental organ. However, since it roughly corresponds--from a symbolic perspective--to the electoral agencies of Western democracies, it can be considered together with governmental agencies, rather than with the other mass or front organizations of the LCY.
Alliance. In 1963, Pál Sóti a Hungarian, was the President of the Provincial Council in the Vojvodina. This automatically made him one of the nine members of the national leadership of the Socialist Alliance.\textsuperscript{146}

Representation in the Federal People's Assembly is also primarily symbolic. As Table V indicates, Hungarians have been represented by anywhere from 11 to 16 of their fellow countrymen, in a legislature that has a total membership of 670. This is not proportional to their numbers in the population. However, proportionality is not even attempted. As the above table also shows, the Montenegrins have usually had at least twice as many representatives as the Hungarians. Yet their actual proportion of the population is the same as that of the Hungarians. Still another indication of this disparity in representation, is the number of the Albanian representatives. Although there are almost twice as many Albanians as Montenegrins, the latter have always had at least five more representatives in the Federal People's Assembly.\textsuperscript{147}

This distortion in ethnic representation is in some ways less hypocritical than Rumania's exact proportionality. In Yugoslavia, the representation in the Federal People's Assembly actually reflects at the same time the degree of influence, which each one of the


\textsuperscript{147}For the population statistics of these nationality groups see Chapter I, Table II.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Croats</th>
<th>Slovenes</th>
<th>Macedonians</th>
<th>Montenegrins</th>
<th>Unspecified Yugoslavs</th>
<th>Albanians</th>
<th>Hungarians</th>
<th>Other Nationalities **</th>
<th>Did not indicate Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1958***</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958***</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1963 Governmental Re-organization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This Table is based on Statistički Godisnjak F N R J 1958, Table 1-5, p. 36; Statistički Godisnjak F N R J 1960, Table 1-3, p. 26; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1964, Table 101-2, p. 62; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1965, Table 101-4, p. 67; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 101-5, p. 66.

**Includes representatives of the Turks, Bulgarians, Slovaks and Rumanians. For 1965 it also includes a representative of the "Moslems."

***Prior to the governmental re-organization of 1963, the Skupština was composed of two chambers, the "Federal-Republic Council" and the "Council of Producers." In this Table the composition of these chambers has been combined to facilitate the comparison of the pre- and post-1963 Skupština in terms of its ethnic make-up.
nationalities exerts on the national level—without regard to their percentage of the population. This is even more conclusively mirrored in the make-up of the leadership of the Federal Assembly (10 members) of which none are Hungarian. A similar situation prevails in the Federal Executive Council and the Federal Administration. In 1963, neither among the 37 members of the Council nor among the 23 Federal Administrators (Department heads) could one encounter a Hungarian.

This ethnically unrepresentative national leadership should not lead us to the easy conclusion that the Hungarians enjoy less influence in the Yugoslav than in the Rumanian government. Quite the opposite is the case. It seems that the Rumanians feel that they have done everything, by putting a few Hungarians into highly visible governmental positions. By doing this they feel they have done what is required of them by the Leninist nationality policy. In a sense, they have delegated authority to look out for the interests of the Hungarians—as of the other nationalities—to individuals who are the most unlikely to make a stand for their fellow nationals. The Yugoslavs have not chosen this easy way out. They have not placed representatives of the Hungarians in high governmental posts. Thus, they cannot delegate their responsibility to anyone. They must consider themselves personally responsible for the correct application of the Yugoslav version of the Leninist nationality policy. Judging from the actual consequences of nationality policies, the Yugoslav system seems

149. Ibid., pp. 63-64.
to have favored the position of the nationalities more.

On the lower governmental levels, the Yugoslav system also delegates authority to the representatives of the Hungarians. On the Republic level they have had anywhere from 18 to 24 representatives in the Serbian Republic Assembly. Table VI provides some data on this subject. As this Table indicates, the Hungarians have always had a considerable number of representatives in the Provincial Assembly of Vojvodina. It should be noted that while they compose about 24% of the population in the Vojvodina, the number of their representation has declined from 23.1% in 1958 to a little over 20% in 1964. Whether this trend has continued is uncertain, since no more recent statistics have been released concerning this question. What is certain, however, is that the Serbs have preserved their dominance.\footnote{As Table VI indicates, in the Serbian Republican Assembly, the Serbs have always overshadowed the other nationalities. In 1965 they had 328 representatives to 102 for all the other nationalities. In 1967, they again retained their dominance 328 to 102.}

On the lowest possible levels of representation a somewhat different pattern of representation emerged. Initially, on the commune level—in both the district and the commune committees and the district and communal workers’ councils—Hungarians had a higher percentage of representatives than did the Albanians. For example, in 1957 Hungarians had 233 district committee memberships while the Albanians had 241. The Hungarians also had 167 members in the district producers’ councils against 175 for the Albanians. In commune committee memberships the representation was somewhat more in line with
TABLE VI
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC SKUPŠTINA AND THE AUTONOMOUS
VOJvodINIAN PROVINcIAL SKUPŠTINA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year and Area</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Serbs</th>
<th>Croats</th>
<th>Slo­venes</th>
<th>Monte­negrians</th>
<th>Unspeci­fied Yugoslavs</th>
<th>Alban­ians</th>
<th>Hunga­rians</th>
<th>Other Na­tion­alities **</th>
<th>Did Not Indicate Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1958
Serbia       | 310   | 252   | 6      | --       | 7              | 2                      | 18         | 18          | 7                    | --                          |
Vojvodina     | 190   | 112   | 12     | 2        | 4              | 3                      | --         | 44          | 13                   | --                          |
|               |       |       |        |          |                |                        |            |             | (1963 Governmental Re-Organization) |
| 1964
Serbia       | 440   | 319   | 9      | --       | 8              | 34                     | 35         | 23          | 12                   | --                          |
Vojvodina     | 349   | 156   | 13     | 1        | 7              | 27                     | --         | 70          | 28                   | 47                          |
| 1965***       |       |       |        |          |                |                        |            |             | (1963 Governmental Re-Organization) |
Serbia        | 440   | 328   | 15     | 1        | 7              | 17                     | 38         | 24          | 10                   | --                          |
| 1967**       |       |       |        |          |                |                        |            |             | (1963 Governmental Re-Organization) |
Serbia        | 440   | 338   | 15     | 2        | 9              | 5                      | 36         | 23          | 12                   | --                          |

*This Table is based on Statistički Godisnjak F N R J 1959, Table 1-3, p. 24; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1964, Table 101-2, p. 62; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1965, Table 101-4, p. 67; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 101-5, p. 66.

**Includes mainly the representatives of Slovaks and Rumanians.

***No statistics are available for 1965 and 1967 on the ethnic composition of the Vojvodinian Skupština.
population statistics. In the latter, Albanians had 1,704 memberships as against 1,075 Hungarian memberships. In the Commune producers' councils it was 1,201 to 719 in favor of the Albanians.\textsuperscript{151} A comparison with the number of Serbs on these local councils also reflects favorably on the proportional representation of the Hungarians.\textsuperscript{152}

The Governmental re-organization of 1963, led to a more proportional (in respect to the population) representation of nationalities on the commune level. There still existed some distortion in favor of the South Slavic peoples, but was somewhat more in line with the actual populations of various groups. In 1963 on the commune level Hungarians held 937 seats, Albanians held 1,934 seats, and the Montenegrins held 1,643 seats.\textsuperscript{153} In 1965, for these same nationalities, the numbers were 898, 1,748, and 1,107 respectively.\textsuperscript{154} As these statistics indicate, the Montenegrins have fared better than either the Hungarians or Albanians. However, the latter two nationalities have gained membership on commune committees, generally in proportion to their percentage of the population.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{151}Statistički Godisnjak FNRJ 1959, Tables 1-4 and 1-5, pp. 25-26; Statistički Godisnjak FNRJ 1962, Tables 101-4 and 101-5, pp. 25-26.

\textsuperscript{152}Ibid. Refer to both sources of footnote 151.

\textsuperscript{153}Statistički Godisnjak SFRJ 1964, Table 101-2, pp. 63-64.

\textsuperscript{154}Statistički Godisnjak SFRJ 1966, Table 101-3, p. 65.

\textsuperscript{155}For the population statistics of these nationality groups see Chapter I, Table II.
The active membership of so many Hungarians in the lower levels of government does not mean that Hungarians necessarily rule themselves. As in the case of Rumania, this is not revealed by the statistics. In the Vojvodina as a whole, as well as on all lower levels of government (i.e., self-management), the Hungarians are usually in a minority (although a strong minority) on committees. But, this is part of the Yugoslav nationality policy. It allows the nationalities to be represented in government, but never as a corporate unit.

The whole organization of the Vojvodina as a special province reflects this idea. It is not a "self-governing" area run by Hungarians like the Magyar Autonomous Region had been in Rumania. Rather, the Vojvodina is a multi-national area, that allows for Hungarian participation, but not for Hungarian control. This is, in part, revealed by the post-war changes in its frontiers. While the new Communist Yugoslavia definitely rejected the centralist banovinas instituted by King Alexander in 1929, it also failed to re-establish the boundaries of the historic Vojvodina. In its place it drew the

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156 Milentije Pesković, "Autonomous Provinces in Yugoslavia," Studies, No. 5 (Beograd: Medunarodna Politika, 1954), p. 31, indicates that in ten communes (out of the 48 located in the Vojvodina) the Hungarians often have a majority position on the local community and working organizations.

157 As part II of Chapter II has pointed out, the Magyar Autonomous Region was "self-governing" only in theory. In practice the CPR and its predominantly Rumanian leadership exerted full control over it.

158 See Chapter II, part II.

159 See footnote 55 in Chapter II.
boundaries of the Vojvodina by leaving the Baranya region (which had a heavy Hungarian population) outside the province, while it added the Srem region (with a heavy Serb and Croat population). Compare Figure 8 with Figure 3 in the Prologue for these changes.

In this way, the Vojvodina was never really looked on as the "home-rule" area of the Hungarians. Rather, it is considered a multi-national area in which the Hungarians compose the major national minority. Within this area additional precautions are taken that they will not be discriminated against because of their nationality. But, these precautions do not constitute exemptions or special treatment. As the Yugoslavs constantly point out, the existence of the Vojvodina as an "autonomous province" is to ensure equality of treatment rather than special treatment. As far as political influence is concerned, this ideal is never really attained. Perhaps only on the lowest level, in the communes, can the Hungarians safe-guard their own interests. On this level, however, their influence is decisive in only 10 or 11 of the 48 communes of the Vojvodina.  

In Yugoslavia—as in the case of Rumania—it is evident from what has been said in the foregoing, that the Hungarian participation in the government on all levels (except in about 11 of the communes) is mostly symbolic in nature. The limited nature of their governmental influence has some adverse consequences. These are evident in the

161 Ibid., p. 31, footnote 8.
national composition of the police force and of the civil servants of
the Vojvodina. Both the police and the civil servants are overwhelmingly
Serbs. Even in smaller villages like Telečka (Telecska) and Ruskoe
Selo (Kis Orosz)—both of which are predominantly Hungarian—the village
officials are Serbs. In larger towns, like Kikinda and Zombor the
same pattern prevails. Frequently, the only person who speaks Hun-
garian in governmental offices is the janitor. He frequently performs
an indispensable role as translator and as "information" center.

The police force is also almost completely Serb. What is worse
is that very few of them know any Hungarian. Here again, the unoffi-
cial go-betweens—the janitors—are indispensable for communication.

Where there are no go-betweens, a person is lost who does not know
Serbo-Croatian. As far as the police are concerned, the ethnic
imbalance is not completely due to governmental preference for Serbs.
It is, in part, due to Hungarian disdain toward this organization.

162 Based on personal observations of the student writing this
study. In the summer of 1966, he toured the Hungarian inhabited areas
of the Vojvodina by bicycle for two weeks. On his tour, he visited
Ruscoe Selo (Kis Orosz) in the Banat. This village was typical of many
others. Although it was predominantly Hungarian in population, of the
three "officials" running the village only the least influential—the
recording secretary—was Hungarian.

163 Based on personal observations of the student in the summer
of 1966, in the towns of Kikinda and Sombor (Zombor).

164 Ibid.

165 In numerous discussions with Hungarians when the student
mentioned the lack of Hungarian police officials, he was met by
surprised stares. These conversations usually revealed that Hun-
garians viewed the security service as an undesirable type of occupa-
tion. In fact, in one case in the Banat it was known that a Hungarian
has actually become a police officer. However, he was feared and
despised by his fellow nationals more than the Serb officers.

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But a similar excuse could not be made for the ethnic imbalance in other governmental offices.\footnote{166}{The student met innumerable well trained and highly qualified young Hungarians who were unable to find employment in Vojvodina. Many could have become excellent civil servants.}

The ethnic imbalance in the police force and among civil servants would not, by itself, lead to discriminatory practices. Discrimination results from the arrogant attitude of the civil servants and the police. Even those who know Hungarian, simply refuse to speak it.\footnote{167}{The student had a number of experiences in the Vojvodina that indicated this. In one instance, he went to the Putnik (Yugoslav travel agency) office in Subotica (Szabadka) to purchase a railway ticket to Zagreb. He stood in line behind an old Hungarian woman who tried to ask for information in Hungarian. She was rebuffed in icy tones in Serb: "Ne govorim Magyar!" ("I do not speak Hungarian!"). Then the student pushed his American passport before the forbidding official and asked for information and a ticket in Hungarian. The Putnik official changed her tone drastically and answered politely in Hungarian.} The nationalism of the Serbs over-rides governmental guarantees. But, the national (federal) government is in part responsible for this state of affairs. It does not try hard enough to recruit Hungarians for government work and it fails to set an example for the use of minority languages. An example of this are post office forms, which appear only in Serbo-Croatian.\footnote{168}{In Kikinda, the student actually helped a local Hungarian fill out a postal form which was all in Serbo-Croatian. Spanish-Americans do not have this problem in New York State, in spite of the fact that New York does not have a highly proclaimed "nationality policy."}
and the Republic Assembly of Serbia, the Serbs have an unchallenged majority. This is clear even from a cursory examination of Table VII. As this table indicates, the Serbs have the same type of sweeping dominance over Republican and Provincial matters as the Rumanians have over national matters in the Rumanian Grand National Assembly and the Rumanian Communist Party. This complete dominance of the Serbs and the concomitant ethnic abuses are checked only by the League of Communists and the Federal Government of Yugoslavia. In the latter, the Serbs are less powerful due to the combined strength of the other South Slav peoples. Table V shows how the Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and other South Slavs can, by combining their voting strength in the Federal Assembly check the Serbs in policy making for the country as a whole. As we have had occasion to see, a similar situation prevails in the League of Communists. All this leads us to conclude, that the political position of the Hungarian is quite precarious, it depends on the continued process of ethnic checks and balances on the all-Yugoslav level.

III

Closely tied to the pervasive role of government in both Rumania and Yugoslavia, is the control exerted over the economic and social existence of the Hungarians. While the Party and governmental

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structures revealed to what extent the Hungarians can actually participate in the political life of Rumania and Yugoslavia, their economic and social existence reveals to what extent even their "potential" power is circumscribed. Therefore, the examination and comparison of certain agricultural, industrial, and social policies in these two states will add to our understanding of the similarities and differences between Rumanian and Yugoslavian nationality policies.

Before turning directly to agricultural and industrial problems it is important to keep three factors in mind. First, that the Party-State administers, oversees and develops all agricultural, industrial and social programs which are carried out in Rumania and Yugoslavia. 170 Second, because planning is centralized all programs are inter-related, making progress in one area (e.g. agriculture) directly dependent on the developments in another area (e.g. industry). 171 Third, because of their inter-relationship it is difficult to separate, isolate and describe any one area without reference to another.


In Rumania and Transylvania

The CPR from the very beginning of its ascendancy worked assiduously to transform the economic and social relationships within the country. This transformation required a far-reaching regulation of the existence and activities of the country's population, particularly of the Hungarians of Transylvania. It also required the replacement of existing social and economic "institutions" with agencies and organizations that were subservient to the Party. Private property and ownership in agriculture and industry were drastically reduced, as was the social leadership of the existing churches.

Agriculture and Collectivization

Administrative re-arrangements in Transylvania--as in Rumania as a whole--have, from the inception of the People's Republic, been designed to bring the rural areas into closer contact with the industrial centers of the country. In Transylvania this has meant that the strongholds of the nationalities have been integrated more closely with the Rumanian areas of dominance. As such, urban-rural integration was not at that time motivated by a desire to curb the nationalities. Rather, it was one facet of the CPR's policy aimed at the rapid industrialization of the country. However, when the administrative


173 ibid., p. 309.
rearrangements are related to the policies carried out in the agricultural and industrial area, it becomes apparent that they have worked to the detriment of the nationalities in the long-run. Immediate post-war agricultural policies also demonstrate this.

Since Rumania was (and still is in 1970) a predominantly agricultural country, the nature of land ownership has always been of primary importance. While Rumania—including Transylvania—has had a relatively well balanced distribution of land among the peasantry since the 1920's, the Communists and their sympathizers were still able to utilize the slogan of "land reform" as a means of ingratiating themselves with some segments of the have-nots. Soon after the Groza government came to power a land reform was carried out affecting the whole country, but above all the national minorities.

Like the previous inter-war land reforms, those carried out by the Groza administration also affected adversely the position of the


national minorities. However, the Communist inspired distributions struck a particularly strong blow at the German minority.\textsuperscript{177} Both the "Transylvanian Saxons" and the "Banat Swabians" suffered dispossession.\textsuperscript{178} In this way the strong independent peasant class, which had once been the backbone of the German minority, was broken. The fact that the "land reform" very closely followed national lines was rationalized as punishment of "disloyal elements."\textsuperscript{179} However, the fact that the recipients of the confiscated land were almost all Rumanian demonstrates that the motive was not free of nationalist coloration. The new landowners were, in the main, local poor Rumanian farm laborers, or Bessarabian Rumanians transplanted to Transylvania as a consequence of the Russian occupation of their homeland.\textsuperscript{180}

Two factors indicate the "Rumanization" result of these agrarian reforms, regardless of whether they were intentional or unintentional. The first is the dispossession and economic destruction of the German minority. The nature and extent of this intentional and systematic "reform" is indicated by the figures in Table VII.\textsuperscript{181} A second indication of the "Rumanization" result is provided by a comparison of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{177}Spulber, \textit{The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe}, p. 237; Schieder, \textit{The Fate of the Germans in Rumania}, pp. 86-87 and Documents Nos. 64 and 65, pp. 299-305.
  \item \textsuperscript{178}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 90-91.
  \item \textsuperscript{179}For example, of these rationalizations see "The Land Reform Law of 1945" and "Regulations for the Agrarian Reform" in \textit{Ibid.}, Annex 10 and 11, pp. 156-164.
  \item \textsuperscript{180}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 90.
  \item \textsuperscript{181}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 91.
\end{itemize}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judet*</th>
<th>Nature of Ethnic Composition</th>
<th>Number of Expropriated Owners</th>
<th>Extent of Expropriated Land in Hectares***</th>
<th>Average Size of Expropriated Holdings in Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transylvania Proper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibiu</td>
<td></td>
<td>16,809</td>
<td>42,223</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnava-Mare Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td>15,468</td>
<td>80,070</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnava-Mica Having</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,578</td>
<td>36,229</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasov</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>24,443</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fagaras</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>7,594</td>
<td>38,127</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alba</td>
<td>Inhabitant-tants</td>
<td>1,711</td>
<td>8,045</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassaud</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,544</td>
<td>36,469</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mures</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>28,213</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eight Judets</td>
<td>Areas with few Germans</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>48,779</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>62,157</td>
<td>345,598</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tisza Plain (Banat and Satu Mare)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timis Torontal Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td>54,612</td>
<td>205,607</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arad</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>15,654</td>
<td>45,182</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Five Judets</td>
<td>Areas with few Germans</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>111,971</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>73,381</td>
<td>362,760</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania Proper</td>
<td>Predominantly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total area</td>
<td>Rumanian</td>
<td>7,681</td>
<td>735,553</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Judet was the largest administrative unit of Rumania prior to the Communist redistricting of 1950, which changed the appellation to regiune.

**As footnote 1 in the Prologue indicates, the designation "Transylvania" has a wide and a narrow reference. The wider reference includes the areas of the Tisza Plain.

***One hectare is 2.47 acres.

****"Rumania Proper" refers to the areas of the "Old Kingdom" (i.e., Moldavia and Wallachia).

*****This TABLE has been compiled on the basis of the data provided by Theodore Schieder and others (eds.), The Expulsion of the German Population From Hungary and Rumania, a selection and translation from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bonn: Published by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961), III, 91.
population statistics in the German areas, prior to and after the "land reforms." The phenomenal growth of the Rumanian population and the parallel decrease of the German population, shown by Table VIII, leaves little doubt as to the policy's net result.\textsuperscript{182}

This twofold policy--the economic destruction of the German minority and the colonization of Rumanians in formerly solid German areas--has had especially important consequences on the position of the Transylvanian nationalities in general.\textsuperscript{183} The most obvious has been the isolation of the Hungarian minority as the only one which was as yet dominant in important areas of Transylvania. Although in the agricultural realm the Hungarian minority had already been greatly weakened in the inter-war years, in terms of population it is still the majority nationality in areas like the Western Rumanian border strip and the Szekely counties. But the destruction of the German minority's position has accentuated the fact that only the Hungarian minority--the largest--remains to be subjugated and broken.

Collectivization of agriculture was the first step which showed

\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p. 93.

\textsuperscript{183} The extent of the havoc wrought by these "reforms" is best described by Schieder in relation to the German minority. He states on p. 112; "An ethnic German economic life exists no longer in present-day Rumania. The close community of the German peasant village, as a living and economic organism, had already been destroyed by the agrarian reform; subsequent measures of Bolshevisation had also destroyed the traditional foundations of the German urban population, and at the same time the German character of the towns they inhabited." This quote could also be used to describe the position of the other ethnic minorities of Transylvania, with the only qualification that the Germans were subjugated the earliest.
TABLE VIII
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF SELECTED PARISHES IN THE BANAT BEFORE AND AFTER THE LAND REFORM OF 1945-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Rumanians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lenauheim</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,421</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1,717</td>
<td>1,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grabatz</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Grabat)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>1,527</td>
<td>1,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biled</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3,008</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>2,791</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zovrin</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3,013</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>2,448</td>
<td>4,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatzfeld</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>7,245</td>
<td>859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Jimbolia)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>5,489</td>
<td>3,422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This table is taken from Theodore Schieder and others (eds.), The Expulsion of the German Population From Hungary and Rumania, a selection and translation from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa (Bonn: Published by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, 1961), III, 93, footnote 65.*

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indications of infringing on the position of the Hungarian population. However, this policy got off to a slow start because of the lack of farm machinery. Only in more recent years has the collectivization drive really "arrived." Thus, until the very recent past the Hungarian minority still had some economic base in agriculture. In fact, according to reliable sources, collectivization proceeded slowest in the areas with the highest proportion of Hungarian inhabitants. This may be taken as an indication of Hungarian resistance

184 It must be pointed out, that the "land reforms" were merely a transition stage in the process of subjugation which preceded total collectivization. For a discussion of the land reform as a tactic see Bossy, "Agriculture," pp. 201, 207; Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, pp. 244-247.

185 Norman, "'New Course' in Rumanian Agriculture," pp. 35, 38-39, 42. This lack of farm machinery is also admitted by the article "Harmonious, Balanced Development of Rumanian Economy," p. 10. The author of this article admits that until 1959, there was only "one tractor for an average of 270 hectares /of land/ while in 1963 for 150 hectares."

186 Until 1957, collectivization was extremely slow. After that date the momentum increased and by 1962, collectivization of agriculture was "completed." For a thorough breakdown of this process consult the Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 (Rumanian People's Republic: Central Statistical Board, 1964), pp. 112-114. It is also of interest to compare the collectivization process in Rumania to that of Hungary. In both countries completion took place at about the same time, but in Rumania the "transformation" was more consistent and gradual while in Hungary it was more static and irregular. A good comparison may be had from Samuel Baum's The Labor Force of Rumania (U.S. Bureau of the Census; International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 14. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., 1961), pp. 18-20 and the same author's The Labor Force of Hungary, pp. 20-22, published by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1962 as Series P-90, No. 18.

against moves which threatened one of its last areas of economic strength.

Land collectivization, on the other hand, has provided the R.P.R. with a powerful weapon in the drive to "integrate" the Hungarian population with the Rumanian. Since collectives are drawn up in disregard of national preferences, the Hungarian peasant is forced to take part in collective state enterprises, which are controlled by Rumanians or are overwhelmingly Rumanian in composition. Instead of "integration" this has resulted in the dispersion of the Hungarian peasantry among the Rumanian. What the regime hopes is that such dispersion will result in increased intermarriage, assimilation and eventually complete absorption of the Hungarian minority.\(^{188}\)

Collectivization, in this way, resulted not only in the destruction of the independent farmer, but also in infringements on the Transylvanian peasantry—Rumanians and non-Rumanians—in their right to choose their own social life among fellow nationals. Collectivization and the consequent "integration" of the peasantry's economic life have brought also social "integration." This process, however, is all one-sided. Equality is attainable in this social setting if the Hungarian is willing to be "Rumanized," if he is willing to desert his

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\(^{188}\)Ibid., reveals that assimilation and inter-marriage is the end sought by the regime of the R.P.R. The confirmation of this is made by Endre Bodor who was in 1957 deputy chairman of the regional council of the Magyar Autonomous Region. This is also indicated by Paul Underwood "Rumanians Spur Magyar Culture," *New York Times* (June 19, 1959), 5.
national culture and language. At present this does not seem to be the case with the Hungarian peasantry. Two probable reasons are their strong national consciousness and the natural human reaction against coercive tactics.

The one-sided nature of this process of collectivization was demonstrated by yet one other policy. This involved the government's efforts to keep peasants from moving to the cities to avoid collectivization. As land collectivizing began, many peasants of all national backgrounds tried to avoid its adverse consequences by moving to the cities. The new economic opportunities in the growing industries threatened to upset collectivization. The CPR moved swiftly to put a stop to this unplanned escape from the farm. It had the government promulgate a law which forbade rural inhabitants settling in the cities without special permission. However, beginning around 1953, this legal restriction applied only to the Hungarians. Thus, the vast urban growth that has taken place since 1953 has been almost solely Rumanian. This has included both Rumanians moving from the Regat areas into Transylvanian cities and Transylvanian Rumanians

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189 A Correspondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest . . . A Conversation Piece," p. 20, points out that: "Ambitious youngsters, eager to get on in life have to 'Rumanize' their names, and speak and write perfect Rumanian. Those who are not willing to do so are told to join their 'capitalist' connections in the West or their 'revisionist' co-nationals in Hungary or Bulgaria."


191 Ibid.
moving to the cities. A consequence of this policy has been the Rumanization of the cities and the erosion of Hungarian economic strength.

Industry and the Nationalities

Industrialization has led to similar adverse results for the Hungarians. As the discussion of the Country's administrative reorganization revealed, one of the major concerns of the CPR is to integrate urban and rural areas more closely. Stalin's pressure, however, had forced the Rumanians to heed "proletarian internationalism" at the expense of integration, in the redistricting of 1952. Until 1960, local autonomy was therefore constitutionally guaranteed for the Hungarians living in the Secuesc (Székely) counties. With Stalin out of the way, the redistricting of 1960 returned to integration and "non-political" factors as determining criteria for boundary revisions. The re-organization of 1968 further emphasized that the integration of urban and rural areas is a major consideration of CPR

192 Ibid.


194 Miklós, "A Román Népköztársaságban 1950 Óta Végrehajtott Közigazgatási-Gazdasági Körzetbeosztások Néhány Tapasztalata," pp. 317-319, maintains that social and economic factors were responsible for the "realistic" redistricting of 1960. However, the dilution of the region's Magyar composition points to political motivation.
economic and social policies.\textsuperscript{\textit{195}} Thus, Hungarian local self-administration was eliminated to integrate more fully the country's rural and urban areas in keeping with the actual extent of economic-social development.\textsuperscript{\textit{196}}

As has been pointed out, the population of urban areas in Transylvania had always been predominantly Hungarian and German rather than Rumanian. The rapid industrialization and urbanization of the country, therefore, directly affected the nationalities. Transylvania's important wealth of natural resources made it imperative that urbanization and the expansion of industry play a particularly significant role in the area. While the desire to provide efficiency in the utilization of resources (i.e., by taking industry to the sources of raw materials)\textsuperscript{\textit{197}} was primary, it does not mean that the national implications were lost from sight. The nature of the overall process of industrialization and urbanization and their respective impact on job opportunities and housing make this all the more apparent.\textsuperscript{\textit{198}}


Communist Rumanian officials are proud to point out that they have reversed the process of the inter-war years when the "bourgeois" government neglected the industrialization of many Transylvanian areas because of their heavy non-Rumanian populations. They pride themselves in having helped "drag out of backwardness" such non-Rumanian areas as the Szekely counties, which had composed the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region, and today include the counties of Mures, Covasna and Harghita. These same officials neglect to mention, however, that what they mean by "drag out of backwardness" also entails national assimilation. The "Rumanization" of such traditionally Hungarian cities as Oradea (Nagyvárad), Cluj (Kolozsvár), Arad, Satu-Mare (Szatmárnémeti) and Tîrgu-Mureș (Marosvásárhely) demonstrates that assimilation is a purpose of this policy and that it is a definite "side-effect" of industrialization.

Table IX indicates the growth and ethnic composition of these cities throughout the past hundred years. As the population of these cities reveals, the major shifts in favor of the Rumanians has occurred in the last fifty years. However, the changes wrought during the last twenty years have been even more dramatic. These more recent changes have reduced the percentage of the Hungarian population in every instance and in some cases have even pushed them into a minority status.


200 Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 450.
**Table IX**

**NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF FOUR SELECTED TRANSYLVANIAN CITIES (1869-1964)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Pop.</th>
<th>Percentage of:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name of town: Cluj (Kolozsvár)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>26,638</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>29,923</td>
<td>22,761</td>
<td>3,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>32,736</td>
<td>27,514</td>
<td>3,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>49,295</td>
<td>40,845</td>
<td>6,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>60,808</td>
<td>50,704</td>
<td>7,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDER RUMANIAN RULE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>83,542</td>
<td>41,583</td>
<td>28,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>100,844</td>
<td>54,776</td>
<td>34,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941**</td>
<td>110,956</td>
<td>97,698</td>
<td>10,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDER RUMANIAN RULE (CPR)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956***</td>
<td>154,723</td>
<td>77,839</td>
<td>74,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964****</td>
<td>167,011</td>
<td>80,300</td>
<td>80,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name of town: Arad (Arad)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>32,725</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>35,556</td>
<td>19,896</td>
<td>6,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>42,052</td>
<td>25,901</td>
<td>7,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>56,260</td>
<td>38,929</td>
<td>9,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>63,166</td>
<td>46,085</td>
<td>10,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDER RUMANIAN RULE</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>62,490</td>
<td>39,399</td>
<td>12,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>77,181</td>
<td>41,161</td>
<td>28,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941**</td>
<td>86,764</td>
<td>26,798</td>
<td>40,677</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNDER RUMANIAN RULE (CPR)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956***</td>
<td>106,460</td>
<td>37,633</td>
<td>59,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964****</td>
<td>115,294</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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TABLE IX* (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Total pop.</th>
<th>Number of:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hung.**</td>
<td>Rum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Name of town: **Oradea Mare (Nagyvárad)**

**UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE**

| 1869 | 28,698 | 26,675 | 2,009 | 1,148 | 85.2 | 6.4 | 3.7 |
| 1880 | 31,324 | 26,679 | 2,009 | 1,148 | 88.9 | 6.4 | 2.6 |
| 1890 | 38,557 | 34,239 | 2,527 | 1,014 | 85.2 | 6.4 | 2.6 |
| 1900 | 50,177 | 44,750 | 3,335 | 1,404 | 89.2 | 6.6 | 2.8 |
| 1910 | 64,169 | 58,421 | 3,604 | 1,416 | 91.1 | 5.6 | 3.3 |

**UNDER RUMANIAN RULE**

| 1920 | 68,081 | 40,744 | 8,441 | 598 | 88.8 | 6.6 | 2.6 |
| 1930 | 82,687 | 55,039 | 20,914 | 1,118 | 89.2 | 6.6 | 2.8 |

**UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE**

| 1941*** | 92,942 | 85,466 | 4,873 | 863 | 92.0 | 5.2 | 0.9 |

**UNDER RUMANIAN RULE (CPR)**

| 1956**** | 98,950 | 62,804 | 34,301 | 373 | 63.5 | 34.9 | 0.3 |
| 1964 | 110,296 | 65,000 | 40,000 | 400 | 58.9 | 36.3 | 0.3 |

Name of town: **Tirgu Mures (Marosvásárhely)**

**UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE**

| 1869 | 13,018 | 11,028 | 508 | 657 | 83.6 | 3.8 | 5.0 |
| 1880 | 13,192 | 12,785 | 669 | 447 | 89.9 | 3.1 | 4.7 |
| 1890 | 14,412 | 12,785 | 669 | 447 | 89.9 | 3.1 | 4.7 |
| 1900 | 19,522 | 16,705 | 1,864 | 686 | 85.6 | 9.5 | 3.5 |
| 1910 | 25,527 | 22,790 | 1,717 | 606 | 89.4 | 6.7 | 2.4 |

**UNDER RUMANIAN RULE**

| 1920 | 30,988 | 23,178 | 3,947 | 446 | 74.9 | 12.7 | 1.4 |
| 1930 | 38,517 | 25,359 | 9,493 | 735 | 65.9 | 24.6 | 1.9 |

**UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE**

| 1941*** | 44,933 | 42,435 | 1,720 | 436 | 94.4 | 3.8 | 1.0 |

**UNDER RUMANIAN RULE (CPR)**

| 1956**** | 65,194 | 50,174 | 14,315 | 277 | 77.0 | 22.0 | 0.4 |
| 1964 | 74,004 | 53,000 | 18,000 | 280 | 71.6 | 24.3 | 0.4 |

*This Table is based on the unpublished "Statistical Studies on the Last Hundred Years in Central Europe" compiled by the Mid-European Center in New York in 1968.

**Only the Rumanian, Hungarian and German populations are compared for lack of space. However, in Arad and in Oradea Mare (Nagyvárad) the Jewish population was also significant prior to World War II.

***The data for 1941 reflect the territorial and national transfers which were a consequence of the Vienna Award. This agreement returned the northern third of Transylvania to Hungary.

****The data for 1964 are estimates.
The last twenty years have been the years of major industrial development. These years have, therefore, been responsible for the rapid growth of the country's urban centers. Tables IX, X and XI indicate this growth. This industrialization has favored the Rumanians rather than the Hungarians, because while the latter have been restricted to certain regions and occupations, the Rumanians have been imported from the Regat and rural areas of Transylvania to supply the growing industries with a labor force. 201

The expansion of industrialization demanded a great increase in the labor supply. 202 Since much of this post-war industrialization has been in predominantly Hungarian and German areas, it would have been natural to draw on these inhabitants for the needed labor. Instead, the CPR imported Rumanians from the Regat as well as from the surrounding countryside to man the newly established factories. 203 While the relatively dispersed German minority received an important share in this expansion, the share of the Hungarian communities seems to have been less. Particularly in more recent years, employment in


TABLE X
RUMANIA'S POPULATION BY MOTHER TONGUE IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS OF 1956

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mother tongue</th>
<th>Total urban and rural areas</th>
<th>Urban areas</th>
<th>Rural areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>17,489,450</td>
<td>5,474,264</td>
<td>12,015,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanian</td>
<td>15,080,686</td>
<td>4,453,426</td>
<td>10,627,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>1,653,700</td>
<td>699,612</td>
<td>954,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>895,374</td>
<td>203,884</td>
<td>191,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukranian, Ruthenian, Hutzan</td>
<td>68,252</td>
<td>7,092</td>
<td>61,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gipsy</td>
<td>66,882</td>
<td>13,699</td>
<td>53,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>45,029</td>
<td>16,509</td>
<td>28,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian</td>
<td>43,057</td>
<td>6,287</td>
<td>36,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiddish</td>
<td>34,337</td>
<td>30,962</td>
<td>3,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartar</td>
<td>20,574</td>
<td>5,624</td>
<td>14,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakian</td>
<td>18,935</td>
<td>2,928</td>
<td>16,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>14,228</td>
<td>8,860</td>
<td>5,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>13,189</td>
<td>1,527</td>
<td>11,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>6,196</td>
<td>1,967</td>
<td>4,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other languages and non-stated</td>
<td>29,011</td>
<td>21,887</td>
<td>7,124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This Table is taken from Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 (Rumanian People's Republic: Central Statistical Board, 1964), p. 23.

1 Including population of localities listed as urban.
TABLE XI*
RUMANIAN AND TRANSYLVANIAN POPULATION GROWTH
IN RURAL AND URBAN AREAS
(1930-1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rumania (Including Transylvania)</td>
<td>14,280,729</td>
<td>15,872,624</td>
<td>17,489,450</td>
<td>19,105,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>3,051,253</td>
<td>3,713,139</td>
<td>5,474,264</td>
<td>7,305,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>11,229,476</td>
<td>12,159,485</td>
<td>12,015,186</td>
<td>11,799,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transylvanian regions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banat</td>
<td>1,178,976</td>
<td>1,189,646</td>
<td>1,195,871</td>
<td>1,285,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>244,670</td>
<td>289,412</td>
<td>485,656</td>
<td>587,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>934,306</td>
<td>900,234</td>
<td>710,215</td>
<td>697,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasov (Brassó)</td>
<td>776,092</td>
<td>851,397</td>
<td>981,913</td>
<td>1,106,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>169,566</td>
<td>235,116</td>
<td>463,632</td>
<td>646,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>606,526</td>
<td>616,281</td>
<td>518,281</td>
<td>460,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluj (Kolozs)</td>
<td>990,423</td>
<td>1,060,699</td>
<td>1,153,076</td>
<td>1,207,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>185,912</td>
<td>213,658</td>
<td>323,732</td>
<td>434,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>804,511</td>
<td>847,041</td>
<td>829,344</td>
<td>772,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisana (Krisana)</td>
<td>801,487</td>
<td>807,247</td>
<td>848,272</td>
<td>852,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>109,725</td>
<td>110,467</td>
<td>236,937</td>
<td>310,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>691,762</td>
<td>696,780</td>
<td>611,335</td>
<td>541,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunedoara (Runyad)</td>
<td>503,111</td>
<td>495,003</td>
<td>572,963</td>
<td>670,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>62,653</td>
<td>76,852</td>
<td>273,146</td>
<td>391,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>440,458</td>
<td>418,151</td>
<td>299,817</td>
<td>278,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maramures (Máramaros)</td>
<td>625,273</td>
<td>641,127</td>
<td>712,567</td>
<td>796,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>112,838</td>
<td>105,200</td>
<td>200,426</td>
<td>297,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>512,435</td>
<td>535,927</td>
<td>512,141</td>
<td>498,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mures (Maros)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magyar Autonomous</td>
<td>659,251</td>
<td>703,401</td>
<td>767,650</td>
<td>818,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>78,054</td>
<td>90,767</td>
<td>181,524</td>
<td>244,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural areas</td>
<td>581,197</td>
<td>612,634</td>
<td>586,126</td>
<td>574,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This Table is based on "Communique on the Preliminary Results of the Population and Housing Census of March 15, 1966," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 18 (Oct. 15, 1966), p. 15.

**The population for 1930 is calculated for the post-World War II area of Rumania.
Transylvanian enterprises is hard to come by for those of Hungarian ethnic background.\textsuperscript{204}

Members of the Hungarian minority are urged to find work in areas outside Transylvania, in the "Old" kingdom (i.e., Moldavia and Wallachia).\textsuperscript{205} This is particularly the case if the individual Hungarian is highly trained or educated, and therefore would occupy a leading position. For such individuals employment opportunities are closed in areas where Hungarian workers still make up an important segment of the labor force.\textsuperscript{206} The purpose of this restriction seems to be twofold: first to disperse the Hungarian minority as much as possible, and second to deprive those Hungarians still concentrated in specific areas of their leaders. Even in the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region, this policy had been practiced.\textsuperscript{207} However, dispersion has reached its most

\textsuperscript{204}Ashbrook, "Ethnic and Political Persecution in Rumania," p. 18073; "Az Erdélyi Magyarság Helyzete," News From Hungary, X (Radio Free Europe, July 24, 1964), 2; F.K., "Románia Szüntesse Meg az Erdélyi Magyarak Üldözését!" Katolikus Magyarak Vasárnapja, June 21, 1964, pp. 1,5. Some of the tactics used to discourage Hungarians from seeking work in Transylvania include--according to some of the above sources--pay discrimination and the outright rejection of Hungarian applicants to firms which already have 50% Hungarian employees.


\textsuperscript{206}Ashbrook, "Ethnic and Political Persecution in Rumania," p. 18073; Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," p. 4.

\textsuperscript{207}Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27. This is also indicated by a name analysis of the Conference of Intellectuals of the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region held during the Spring of 1964. Such a name analysis--carried out with due care--can verify this trend toward "Rumanization" of the leading cadres of the autonomous region. One article open to such analysis is provided by L. Deaky and N. Radulescu, "Fighters of the Socialist Struggle," Scanteia (March 3, 1964) translated in Rumanian Press Survey, No. 426 (Radio Free Europe, March 18, 1964), pp. 2-8.
advanced stage in the border strip area in cities like Oradea (Nagyvárad) and Satu-Mare (Szatmárnémeti).  

Urbanization, artificially accelerated by industrialization, has brought with it the vexing problem of housing. Since the building industry lagged behind the others, it was evident that housing for the increased labor population had to be solved by means other than the construction of new buildings. Since the existing facilities were far from adequate, even with the total utilization of all living space, the CPR undertook a policy of "deportations." All who were "useless" (i.e., unproductive) because of old-age, chronic illness, or other causes, were to be moved out of the cities to make room for the workers which were brought in from other areas. As the city populations have been traditionally Hungarian, German and Jewish, the deportation of anyone was bound to affect the minorities adversely. This was particularly so for the Hungarians who composed the largest segment

\[\text{\footnotesize \cite{208,209,210,211}}\]


\[\text{\footnotesize George H. Bossy, "Industry," in Romania ed. Fischer-Calati, pp. 306-307. This lag in the building industry is also admitted inadvertently by the propaganda pamphlet A Glorious Anniversary: The Rumanian People's Republic on the Road of Building Socialism (Bucharest, Rumania: Agerpres, 1964), p. 22, where the unknown author boasts that: "From State funds alone, nearly 162,000 flats were built in the first few years of the Six-Year Plan, compared with 125,000 in the 1951-1959 period."}\]


\[\text{\footnotesize Ibíd., pp. 461-462; Schieder, The Fate of the Germans in Rumania, pp. 115-116, 119.}\]
of Transylvania's urban inhabitants.

The replacements for these deportees were inevitably Rumanians. In this way the Hungarian population of the cities has been greatly reduced in proportion to the Rumanian inhabitants. This trend has also been accentuated by tying smaller towns and communes into the administrative jurisdiction of certain cities. Table IX demonstrates the tremendous growth of the major Transylvanian cities since the end of World War II. These figures plus those of Tables X and XI indicate that the rapid increase in the Rumanian urban population has reduced, and in some instances destroyed, the Hungarian character of most Transylvanian cities.

The foregoing demonstrates that the industrialization of Transylvania has brought with it "Rumanization" as well. While it may be argued that this was merely a side-effect of the process, the methods used to attain this result indicate that the CPR planners were aware of the impact that these policies would have on the nationalities. It is possible that in the early years of industrialization this "side-effect" was indeed unintended, but the more recent restrictions on employment of Hungarians and their purposeful dispersal throughout the country testify that this is no longer the case. The fact that


213 According to Ashbrook, "Ehenic and Political Persecution in Rumania," p. 18073, the extent of the dispersal of Hungarians by the year 1964, is estimated to have affected 35 to 50 per cent of the Transylvanian Hungarians. This means that Hungarians not living in their own areas is now possibly as high as 850,000.
Rumania (in defiance of Comecon) plans to accelerate its industrialization program, makes the position of the Hungarian minority all the more precarious. If industrialization has already caused great damage to the Hungarian minority position with the country still devoted mainly to agriculture, it is evident that they can expect only more of the same as the CPR pushes to reach complete industrialization by 1975.214 This all the more so, since Transylvania provides the major possibilities for the further expansion of industry.

Social Organization

The inter-relation between rural and urban growth is stressed time after time by Party leaders. They also stress that these developments in the economy have immediate effects on social relationships and nationality problems.215 Because they see social and economic problems so closely intertwined, they are constantly involved in the regulation of social relations. At the present time, the Party carries on this regulation directly through government action and also indirectly through numerous front organizations. Among these the Socialist Unity Front plays a part in generating mass support for Party


policies. However, the labor unions, youth and student associations and women's organizations, are more specialized and therefore also more effective in guiding social behavior.216

At the same time, the Party has tried to eliminate all competing groups and associations in society which have made claims on the guidance of human behavior. The churches of the various religious denominations have been the major victims of the Party's drive to establish its control-monopoly over society. The elimination of the churches deserves more in-depth analysis, since their fate was--and is today, in a less sweeping way--tied to the existence of the national groups in Transylvania.

The position of the churches and religions of Transylvania is unique in two ways. First, they are subject to suppression, both as institutions and as advocates of doctrines by a regime that is determined to control both the realms of organization and thought. Second, the religions of Transylvania and their respective churches composed the last possible organizational area where national "particularism" and "isolationism" (the first stages of "bourgeois nationalism") were able to find sanctuary. Consequently, the Communist Rumanian regime endeavored to destroy the churches--while other institutions like the

schools, it desired "only" to control. For the purposes of this study, the position of the churches as the last bulwark of "national particularism" is of primary importance.

In Transylvania, national divisions closely parallel religious divisions. While the Hungarian and German inhabitants are, almost to a man, either Roman Catholic or Protestant, the Rumanians are, almost to a man, either Rumanian Orthodox or Uniate (Greek) Catholic. This division reflects the Western historical orientation of the Germans and Hungarians, and the Eastern and Balkan (Byzantine) historical orientation of the Rumanians. As a result, the two

217 It would be more correct to state that the CPR wished to destroy the respective churches and then to gain control of the remaining vestiges. Raoul Bossy, "Religious Persecutions in Captive Rumania," Journal of Central European Affairs, XV (July, 1955), 162, makes this clear when he states that "The first concern of the Communist government was to secure the compliance of the entire Orthodox clergy, from the highest prelate to the most humble village curate. It was hoped that the prestige of the Church might thus be used on behalf of the government's aims without resorting, if possible, to spectacular legislative measures that could not fail to dismay public opinion." Emil Ciurea, "Religious Life," in Captive Rumania ed. Alexandre Cretzianu (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), p. 167 and Persecution of Religion in Rumania (Washington, D.C.: Rumanian National Committee, 1949), p. 30, present a similar viewpoint.


220 Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 72-73, 560, indicates that the Uniate (Greek) Catholic Church came into existence at the end of the seventeenth century as a result of "pressure from the Hungarian and Austrian Catholic churches" which caused Transylvanian Rumanians to abandon the Orthodox faith and to recognize the Pope's supremacy. As they point out, however, the Transylvanian Uniate Church finally enabled the Rumanians to foster a more Western orientation. In fact, it was these Transylvanian Rumanians who led Rumanian orientation toward France, rather than the Balkans or Russia. With their "re-incorporation" into the Orthodox fold, the Rumanians have even lost this link with the West.
million Rumanian Orthodox and the 1,600,000 Uniate (Greek) Catholics of Transylvania see their national existence as dependent on the fate of Rumanians south and east of the Carpathians in the Regat. The 1,050,000 Roman Catholics and 1,150,000 Protestants, on the other hand, find their destiny to be more closely tied to the West, particularly to Hungary.\(^{221}\) (See Table XII.)

The influence of the respective churches in molding these orientations was determined by the role of the churches as preservers and defenders of national cultures. All the churches, without exception, provided the inhabitants of Transylvania not only with spiritual solace, but also with social, cultural and educational opportunities, as well as charitable and welfare institutions.\(^{222}\) They played an important part in the daily lives of the people and provided the guidance which the Communist state monopolizes at the present.\(^{223}\) Thus,

\(^{221}\) The religious statistics are based on a comparison and evaluation of data taken from: Veto, "Kremlin and Vatican," p. 164; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 559-561; Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 132-137; and Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 166. The numbers arrived at above are only rough estimates. Because Communist census takers ignore religious affiliation, it is impossible to obtain more exact figures.

\(^{222}\) Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 136-137, presents some of this. However, his conclusion differs from that presented in this study insofar that he considered the role of the churches to be "essentially spiritual and certainly apolitical." While this may have held true for the religious life of "historic" Rumania (i.e., the Regat), this was not the case in Transylvania. This is demonstrated by C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 299-306.

\(^{223}\) Even in the realm of "folk" art, the influence of the churches is quite perceptible. A good example of this is the combination of "folk" motifs and more formal art in the decoration of some churches in Wallachia and Moldavia. See for example, Monuments of Religious Art in Rumania (Bucharest, Rumania: "Carpati" National Travel Office, /n.d./).
### TABLE XII

RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF RUMANIA AND TRANSYLVANIA
1930-1955 (IN THOUSANDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Transylvania(^b) 1930</th>
<th>Rumania(^c) 1930</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>1,932</td>
<td>13,108</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>13,700(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic (Uniate)</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvinist</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitarian</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armeno-Gregorian</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Day Adventist</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians of the Old Rite</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>---e</td>
<td>---e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,548</td>
<td>18,057</td>
<td>17,940f</td>
<td>16,315f</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)For data concerning the religious composition of Rumania and Transylvania in 1930, this Table is based on *Recensamintul Populatiei Rominiei Din 29 Decembrie 1930*, pp. 70-73. For the 1938 and 1955 data, this Table is based on the estimates provided in Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Religion" in *Romania*, pp. 132, 135-37.

\(^b\)Including the areas of Crisana, Maramures and the Banat.

\(^c\)1930 and 1938 statistics pertain to the expanded area of interwar Rumania. 1955 statistics pertain to the present-day area of the country.

\(^d\)The estimates of the number of Orthodox and Greek Catholic believers have been provided in spite of the "official" Communist sponsored merger of the two religions in 1949. In that year, the number of adherents of the "united" Rumanian Orthodox Church was estimated at 13,900,000.

\(^e\)Unfortunately, the estimates for 1938 and 1955, do not include the number of non-believers, individuals without religion, and assorted "others." However, it is probably safe to say that around 500,000 people would have fallen under the "other" listing in 1955--mainly Communist Party members.

\(^f\)These totals are merely the sum of the listed religious adherents. They are not an accurate reflection of the country's total population either for 1938 or 1955.

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the churches were not merely religious institutions, but they also
provided social, national and even political identification for the
inhabitants of Transylvania.

The importance of the national-cultural position of the
churches became evident in the inter-war years, when the Roman Catholic,
Calvinist and Unitarian Churches strove to further Hungarian learning
and culture in Transylvania in spite of the Rumanian government's re-
strictions.224 Recollecting this inter-war role of the Churches, the
Communists were quick to attack them following Groza's successful
seizure of power. The churches were not to be tolerated as refuges
for "national particularism" and "isolationism." Furthermore, they
would not be allowed to share with the CPR the right to educate the
inhabitants of Transylvania. The Party could not bear or afford the
competition of the churches in the struggle for the minds of men;
thus, they had to be destroyed.

Determined to seize complete control of all phases of life, the
Party set out to deprive the churches of their role in education,
charity, welfare and social intercourse.225 This was done through a
dual process which utilized "legal" as well as extra-legal methods.

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224Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 299-306.

225Fischer-Galati, Romania, p. 138, maintains that only after
the establishment of the R.P.R. in December 1947, did the regime begin
the "systematic" subjugation of the churches. He also maintains (p.
146) that religious persecution had "generally been unnecessary,"
except for recalcitrant Uniates and Catholics. However, other sources
point to the persecution of all religions. See Persecution of Religion
in Rumania, p. 35.
All religions suffered from these Communist tactics, regardless of the nationality of their adherents. However, there were tactical differences in the treatment of the respective religions which, in the long-run, worked to the detriment of the churches of the national minorities, while they enhanced the position of the Rumanian Orthodox Church relative to the others.

Although religious persecution was supposedly not directed against the national minorities, its results definitely affected them adversely. The Party attacked all religions and its persecution spared none, yet it still caused the greatest damage to the position of the Transylvanian minority churches. In the long-run, this means that the "proletarian internationalist" government of Groza and Gheorghiu-Dej achieved, perhaps inadvertently, a greater stroke for the cause of "Rumanization" than all the efforts of the bourgeois nationalist administrations of the inter-war years. They destroyed a bulwark of ethnic minority strength, which in the past provided the cultural and educational possibilities and the social opportunities needed for national survival.

\[\text{Ibid.}; \text{Ciurea, "Religious Life," p. 166; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 550.}\]

\[\text{Regardless of what the motive was that brought about the above delineated religious persecutions, it has not brought better understanding in its wake between Rumanians and Hungarians. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1951), p. 342, points out that: "Even if Hungarian peasants are no longer to be persecuted for being Hungarians, they are liable to be persecuted for being kulaks, or for being Catholics, or for being 'reactionary.' Will the average man distinguish the motives for which he is maltreated, or prefer one form to another?"}\]
Rumanian society, has in this way achieved centralized direction over human behavior. The Party lays down the standards and its front organizations have the task of inculcating and enforcing them. The organizations perform this task with just as much ritualism and rigidity as some of the churches were guilty of in the past. However, they are organizations with a Rumanian national character. None of them can be accused of providing one or the other national minorities with preferred treatment. Certainly all of them stress that the Rumanian Socialist Republic is the home and guardian of all the peoples who reside within its borders. These front organizations, on the other hand, are all predominantly Rumanian in membership and leadership. Thus, unlike the churches which they have replaced, they do not look after the preservation of the cultural heritage of the Hungarians or other nationalities. They serve only the CPR, and more recently, this also means that they serve Rumanian nationalist interests as well.

In Yugoslavia and the Vojvodina

The league of Communists of Yugoslavia, like its Rumanian counterpart, also desired to transform drastically the existing social and economic relations. Its control of this transformation had far-reaching consequences for the Hungarians living in the Vojvodina.

Agriculture and Collectivization

Long before the Communist seizure of power, it was a central tenet of the Party's nationality policy, that the uneven rate of economic development throughout the country was the major cause for
national antagonisms. Two means of eradicating these antagonisms were the more equitable distribution of land and collectivization. These policies are contradictory, yet the CPY resorted to both. First it initiated a vast program of land reform, which it later negated—at least temporarily—with an ambitious program of collectivization.

Land reform and collectivization were not undertaken merely to augment the CPY's nationality policy. Collectivization was an end in itself, necessary for transforming Yugoslavia into a Communist state. Land reform, on the other hand, was a means of consolidating the political position of the CPY. It enabled the Party to punish its enemies, reward its friends and gain support from the landless peasantry. In other words, the agricultural policies of the LCY/CPY were from the beginning molded by ideological and pragmatic considerations, besides concern for an effective nationality policy.

However, the Party's agricultural policies faced immense obstacles. The country had suffered extensively from World War II. According to Zalar, 40.2% of the plows, 66.5% of the tractors, and 69.7% of the threshing machines had been destroyed in the course of the war. Furthermore, livestock had decreased by 55 to 60%. Added to this was the fact that the vast majority of the population depended

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229Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 137-139.

230Ibid., p. 142; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 323.
on agriculture for a livelihood. To make things even more difficult, this livelihood was based—for the most part—on land holdings that were too small to permit the application of modern agricultural methods. According to Zalar "the average holding was slightly more than five hectares or about 12.5 acres." 231

At first, the Party turned to land reform as the solution. But from the beginning it considered land reform mainly as a tactical move. In this respect the redistribution of land in the immediate post-war years, parallels closely the Rumanian land reforms undertaken about this time. In Yugoslavia, as in Rumania, the major loser in the "reforms" was the German minority. 232 While this redistribution had nationwide implications, its impact was most sweeping in the Vojvodina. There, the richest farmlands were to be had and they were in the possession of non-Slavic nationalities.

On August 23, 1945 the Provisional People's Assembly enacted the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization. 233 As the title of this piece of legislation indicates, more was intended than the expropriation of estates exceeding a certain size. 234 The "reform" had as its

231 Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 138.


234 Ibid.
aim also the outright confiscation of the lands of "enemies of the people," "collaborators" and expelled Germans (Volksdeutsche). Since most of Yugoslavia's German population was concentrated in the Vojvodina, it became the major setting for both land confiscation and land distribution. The Vojvodina's German population—which had composed about one-third of the area's total population—was forced to give up all its land holdings. These covered some of the most fertile parts of the country. Out of a total reform "land pool" of 1,611,867 hectares, more than half—876,692 hectares—had been confiscated from the Germans and "other enemies of the people." 235

The lands confiscated from the Germans, together with the expropriations of large estates, 236 were then either distributed among landless peasants or turned into vast state farms. Of the total, 791,755 hectares were distributed among 330,250 families, while 820,029 hectares were kept by the state to build up its socialist sector in agriculture through the creation of collective farms and state farms. 237 Both of these consequences had long-range adverse effects on the position of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina. The ill effects stemmed from the pro-Slavic distribution of the confiscated lands. Since priority was given to those who had taken part in the

235 *Ibid.*; Schieder, Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, Band V.

236 As Zalar, *Yugoslav Communism*, p. 138, points out, only 11,000 estates were larger than 50 hectares.

partisan struggle against the Germans, few Hungarians obtained any land. Most of the German lands were taken over by landless South Slavs, who were brought in from great distances to replace the expelled Germans. Just from the poverty-stricken areas of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Montenegro, sixty thousand families were resettled in the Vojvodina.  

This vast shift in population meant not only that the Vojvodina's national composition became almost three-fourths South Slav, but also that in the newly created state farms and collective farms the South Slavs were given a dominant position. This became evident particularly when the process of collectivization got underway in earnest.

Unlike the East-Central European satellites of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia began this process almost immediately with the termination of hostilities. In record time, the Yugoslavs hoped to achieve the same degree of collectivization (relatively speaking) as the Soviet Union had achieved over a period of two or three decades. However, at the very outset they encountered a great deal of resistance. The land-hungry peasantry was not easily convinced that collective and state

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238 This policy of colonization closely parallels the less ambitious inter-war policies of settling dobrovoljci along the northern frontiers of the Vojvodina. See Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 401-403, 426-428 and compare with Colaković, et al., A Jugoszlav Kommunista Szövetség Rövid Története, pp. 456-457; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 164. One very telling example of the extensiveness of this colonization can be found in the little village of Ruskoe Selo (Kis Orosz) in the Banat. Prior to World War II, it had one street called "német utca" (German Street) because Germans lived on it. After the war it was renamed "bosznyák utca" (Bosnian Street) for the new occupants who have replaced the Germans. The village—excepting the above named street—is overwhelmingly Hungarian.
farms were in the best interest of all concerned.\textsuperscript{239} Much coercion and a great deal of economic pressure had to be used to reach 39% collectivization of all the land surface by 1950-1951,\textsuperscript{240} and 22\% of the arable land by 1952.\textsuperscript{241}

The drive to collectivization hit the Vojvodina hardest, with Macedonia a close second. Together, these two areas by 1958 had 58\% of their arable land collectivized, which was almost three times the highest rate of collectivization reached by the nation as a whole one year later.\textsuperscript{242} This by itself does not mean that collectivization was used to subjugate some of the lesser nationalities of Yugoslavia, but it does indicate that the Hungarians among others in the Vojvodina--through design or coincidence--again suffered the most from governmental policies.

Fortunately, in the instance of these policies the government itself realized that it had undertaken a self-defeating policy. In subsequent years it eased the pressure to collectivize, and this enabled many peasants to leave the collectives into which they had been forced. This re-evaluation of agricultural policies, came only after the droughts of 1950 and 1952, and the alarming drop in livestock, showed the weaknesses of collective agriculture. Party leaders, have ever

\textsuperscript{239}Zalar, \textit{Yugoslav Communism}, pp. 139-140.
\textsuperscript{240}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{241}Wolff, \textit{The Balkans in Our Time}, p. 435.
\textsuperscript{242}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 430, footnote 21.
since blamed these early errors on over-centralized decision making and bureaucratism. The solution, more recently, has been left to Republican level planning. While this has by no means terminated the Yugoslav desire to socialize agricultural relations, it has reduced the socialist sector as well as the efforts made to expand it.

At the present writing (1970) agriculture in Yugoslavia is based on a wide variety of land ownership. State farms, numerous types of collectives and private farms all indicate that a more pragmatic approach prevails. It is true that the Party encourages the expansion of the socialist sector, but it no longer resorts to outright coercive tactics and forced deliveries. Preference for the socialist sector is evident mainly in taxing policies.

For the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, as for all the other peoples of Yugoslavia, this means a more tolerable relationship with the government and also higher living standards. Hungarian farmers who have been able to remain independent are allowed to own 17 hectares of land. If more hands are available in the family it is possible to own twice as much.

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246 Based on a personal conversation with a Hungarian peasant in the Banat during the summer of 1966.
socialist sector than in any other part of the country, membership in those collectives has affected Serbs and other nationalities just as negatively, or just as positively, as the Hungarians. Only in the drawing of the collective farm boundaries across nationality lines, have the results been unfavorable for the Hungarians. This practice has been responsible for some erosion of their ethnic solidarity. But, this is still negligible. Most of the assimilation takes place in the urban areas rather than on the farm.247

In summary, we can conclude that agricultural policies have not been detrimental to the Hungarians in recent years. Aside from the inevitable integrative force of collective agricultural enterprises, no policy in this area threatens them with assimilation. The immediate post-World War II policies did most of the damage, especially the "land-reform." In a real sense, these policies led to a recolonization of the Vojvodina which placed South Slavs onto the rich lands vacated by the Germans.

Industry and the Nationalities

Since the Vojvodina is predominantly an agricultural area of Yugoslavia, very little can be said about the impact of its industrialization.248 On the other hand, the industrialization which is taking

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247 Information based on personal observations and numerous conversations with Hungarians in Novi Sad, Subotica, Sombor, Senta, Srbobran, and Kikinda.

place throughout Yugoslavia has important consequences for the nationality policy of the LCY. As Koca Jončić, a deputy to the Yugoslav Federal Chamber of Nationalities, pointed out:

In view both of overcoming certain adverse heritages and providing optimum prospects for the development of the Yugoslav community, it is to be remembered that economic relations form the essence of inter-national relations. The basic instrument of Yugoslavia's economic development is income distribution according to working results—a distribution practised in the basic production units—which enables the producers to take an active part not only in production but also in distribution. Parallelly, a process of economic, voluntary, conscious integration evolves as a form of concentration of production. Jončić is saying among other things, that the right type of economic and productive relations will lead to the right nationality policies. Effective integration of the economy will produce internationality solidarity.

Industrialization, unlike agriculture, has been more easily dominated, directed and controlled by the state. Thus, it has been used even more effectively by the state to guide both social and nationality relations. The LCY has on numerous occasions stressed that economic development of backward areas of the country must take place if nationality conflicts are to be reduced. To this end, the Yugoslav government has made special efforts to industrialize and modernize the undeveloped republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, as well as the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia.

\[249\]

Jončić, "The Relations Between Nationalities in Yugoslavia," p. 36.

\[250\]

Tbid., p. 30, footnote 5.
To achieve such industrialization, it has had to depend on the assistance and contributions of the already developed parts of the country, including the Vojvodina. However, this policy of "taking from the rich to help the poor," has not been popular with the developed areas of the country. Some contend that it has created more discord than solidarity.\footnote{Most of the present economic policies--by allowing for decentralized decision-making--seem to be based partly on this assumption. See Rusinow, "A Note on Yugoslavia," pp. 19-25 and Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, pp. 114-135.}

The leaders of modern Yugoslavia believe that this policy will ultimately solve the country's nationality problems. Thus, to obtain machinery for their new industrial enterprises in Montenegro and Macedonia, they have had to trade on the international market the raw materials and foodstuffs coming from the Vojvodina, Croatia or Slovenia. At least in the Vojvodina this has had some adverse effects. It has kept the area predominantly agricultural.\footnote{Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multinational State, p. 109.} This, in turn, with the extensive mechanization of agriculture in the latter part of the 1950's and the 1960's, has led to unemployment--or excess labor--in the Vojvodina. Only by moving to other parts of Yugoslavia can these unemployed find jobs. Lately, the solution has been to go to the West to seek employment, mainly in German factories.\footnote{Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia, p. 159, maintains that 250,000 Yugoslavs now hold temporary jobs in Western European countries.} Both these
alternatives are less than ideal from the perspective of the retention of Hungarian ethnicity. Employment in Yugoslavia outside the boundaries of the Vojvodina puts excessive pressure on the individual to Slavicize. Employment in Western Europe reduces the size, and thereby the influence of the Hungarian population of the Vojvodina.

The limited economic opportunities in the Hungarian areas are indicated in part, by the difficulty the state has in finding employment for those who end their schooling after the eighth grade. In the town of Senta (Zenta) in 1965, out of a graduating class of 400, one hundred students did not continue their studies. These 100 students also failed to find employment in Senta.254 In the following year it was expected that 500 students would be graduating, and about half of them would not continue their studies and would be unable to find jobs in the town.255 A similar situation prevails in Subotica (Szabadka) where students leaving school also find themselves among the unemployed.256 Circumstances of this kind would indicate that industrialization in Slavic parts of Yugoslavia has been possible at the expense of economic stagnation in some others, among them the Hungarian towns of the Vojvodina.257

255Ibid.
257This is particularly true for the largest Hungarian city, Subotica (Szabadka). During the interwar years it was the third largest city of Yugoslavia after Belgrade and Zagreb. In the post-war period its population declined. Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multinational State, pp. 107-109.
The lack of major industrial expansion in the Vojvodina has meant that very little urban growth has taken place. With the exception of Novi Sad (Ujvidiş), the seat of the Provincial government, no other municipality has a population of 100,000 or over. In part, this can be explained by the unique nature of Yugoslav industrialization. As Dragoljub Milivojević points out, in Yugoslavia "industrialization, which has been developing intensively since the war, did not have a substantive influence on urbanization. The new factories were often located far from the city sections."²⁵⁸ Often, they were located in such out of the way places as Montenegro, which has no urban center to speak of.²⁵⁹

Social Organization

That urbanization has not taken place in the Vojvodina—with the limited exception of Novi Sad—is indicated by Table XIII, which reviews the evolution of the population in some of the larger municipalities of the Vojvodina. These population figures also reveal something else. They show that while urbanization has not taken place, Serbianization has. It is true that Serbianization has been most dramatic in Novi Sad, the largest city, but it is also apparent that the cities which have not been touched with urbanization have also


undergone changes in their national composition in favor of the South Slavs. For example, the Serb population of Zrenjanin (Nagybecskerek) has risen from 45% to 54.2%. A similar trend can be found in most of the other municipalities of the Vojvodina, not excluding small villages.

The change in the ethnic composition of these towns is due mostly to colonization, although intermarriage and assimilation has also taken its toll. A close look at the statistics provided by Table XIII will show that the rise of South Slav percentages, particularly that of the Serbs, is closely related to the drastic post-war decline of the German population. This is even the case in Novi Sad. In the latter instance, however, a substantial shift in population has taken place since 1948. As Table XIII shows, the percentage of Hungarians has dropped from 27.9 to 20.8, while the Serbs have increased from 59.5 to 66.6 percent of the population. In the latter instance urbanization and assimilation can be used to explain the shift.

While assimilation of one nationality by another is officially

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260 This Serbianization is also born out in a negative way by religious data concerning some of these cities. It is known, for example, that Novi Sad's Catholic population dropped from 50,280 in 1941 to 43,436 in 1961, that Apatin's Catholics diminished from 34,689 in 1941 to 19,892 in 1961. See Schematismus Cleri Apostolicae Baciensis Administraturae (Subotica: Procudebat Typographia Panonia, 1961), p. 37.

261 See footnote 238 above.

262 Fischer, Yugoslavia - A Multinational State, p. 107-109, 121.
TABLE XIII *

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF FOUR SELECTED CITIES OF THE VOJVODINA
(1880-1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Total pop.</th>
<th>Number of:</th>
<th>Percentage of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>19,119</td>
<td>5,159</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>21,325</td>
<td>8,790</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>24,717</td>
<td>9,608</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>29,296</td>
<td>9,889</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>33,590</td>
<td>11,594</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>39,122</td>
<td>16,071</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>63,985</td>
<td>23,137</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>75,158</td>
<td>36,520</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>83,180</td>
<td>42,205</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>80,000***</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Name of town: Novi Sad (Ujvidék)

UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE

Name of town: Zrenjanin (Nagybecskerek)

UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE

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TABLE XIII (Continued)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Name of town: Senta (Zenta)</th>
<th>UNDER HUNGARIAN RULE</th>
<th>UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE</th>
<th>UNDER YUGOSLAV RULE (LCY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>19,938</td>
<td>17,877</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>21,200</td>
<td>23,013</td>
<td>2,228</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>28,588</td>
<td>2,379</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>29,666</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Only the Serb, Croat, Hungarian and German populations are compared for lack of space. However, in Novi Sad and Senta the Jewish population was also significant prior to World War II. The Croats and Serbs are listed separately in the columns designating their numerical share of the population. Under the column for percentages the two peoples have been listed under the "South-Slav" designation.

***The 1966 statistics for Novi Sad are based on György Gömör, Irodalmi Ujság of November 1, 1966.

considered undesirable, in actual practice an undetermined number of Hungarians become Serbs every year. The reverse process is not as likely to occur at present, although it has taken place in years past. Social pressure, rather than governmental pressure, is responsible for this. Mixed marriages inevitably lead to a Serbian rather than a Hungarian upbringing, since the setting is dominated--at least in the Vojvodina--by Serb society. If a child of such a mixed marriage does not want to designate himself either as a Serb or a Hungarian, he will call himself a Yugoslav. The latter designation, however, still diminishes the number of Hungarians while it increases the number of South Slavs. Population figures for all of Yugoslavia indicate that there are about 317,125 inhabitants that view themselves in this way. Although most are Serbs and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at least 20,000 are inhabitants of Serbia proper. The latter, or many in the latter group, are probably individuals who have had parents of two different nationalities.

Assimilation in this biological sense is not yet--as the above statistics indicate--the major threat to the Hungarians. Much more pernicious is the social pressure to use Serbo-Croatian instead of Hungarian in public discourse. Even in cities with a large Hungarian population like Subotica (Szabadka), more likely than not, a stranger

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264 Ibid., p. 56.
265 Ibid., pp. 56-57.
will be spoken to in Serbo-Croatian rather than Hungarian.\textsuperscript{266} This social pressure to use the language of the South Slavs, erodes Hungarian cultural development. Hungarian ethnicity, in other words, becomes a liability, particularly if one would like to make it to the top in Yugoslav society.

Hungarian culture also faced this threat in the inter-war period. At this time, the Catholic churches provided the Hungarians with a final defense of their cultural traditions. In Yugoslavia, such an extra-governmental defense of "national particularism" is no longer possible. Like its Rumanian counterpart, the Yugoslav CP eliminated at the outset the social and behavioral influence of the churches in the country. This process of elimination was in no respect less sweeping or final than the Rumanian subjugation. However, due to Yugoslavia's greater "visibility" before the West, particularly the U.S., the subjugation was relatively less brutal.\textsuperscript{267}

As Table XIV indicates, in 1953 Yugoslavia had 5,383,000 Roman Catholics. Of these 565,000 reside in the Vojvodina. In the Vojvodina, as was the case in Translyvania, religious affiliation has been closely related to nationality. All Roman Catholics are either Hungarian, German or Croatian. Since in the Vojvodina there are few Croats, most of the Catholic population is now accounted for by the Hungarians.\textsuperscript{268} However, the center of their Church organization is

\textsuperscript{266}See footnote 167 above.

\textsuperscript{267}Wolff, \textit{The Balkans in Our Time}, p. 559.

\textsuperscript{268}Schematismus Cleri Apostolicae Baciensis Administraturae, pp. 13-24.
TABLE XIV

RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE VOJVODINA 1921-1953 (IN THOUSANDS)\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>1921 Yugoslavia(^b)</th>
<th>1931 Yugoslavia(^b)</th>
<th>1953 Yugoslavia(^b)</th>
<th>1953 Vojvodina(^c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>5,593</td>
<td>6,786</td>
<td>7,011</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>4,709</td>
<td>5,218</td>
<td></td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvinist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moslem</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>2,083</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>139(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,985</td>
<td>13,917</td>
<td>16,937</td>
<td>1,714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)For 1921 and 1931 statistics this Table is based on Jugoslavia: History, Peoples and Administration, pp. 155, 219, and Stephen Cissold (ed.), A Short History of Yugoslavia, p. 165. For 1953 statistics it is based on Hoffman, Jugoslavia and the New Communism, Tables 3-2 and 3-3, pp. 33, 35, and Eterovich and Spalatin (eds.), Croatia: Land, People, Culture, p. 17.

\(^b\)1921 and 1931 data pertain to the inter-war territory of Yugoslavia, while the 1953 statistics pertain to the enlarged area of present-day Yugoslavia.

\(^c\)Data pertains to the post-World War II territory of the Vojvodina. It includes the Srem but excludes the Baranya.

\(^d\)Lutherans diminished greatly as a consequence of the elimination (i.e., deportation, evacuation, etc.) of the formerly important German minority. Most of the remaining Protestants are enumerated under "other religions" in this Table. Most of the Calvinists are Hungarian.
located outside the Vojvodina.269 Already in the interwar years the Yugoslav government tried to limit the Church's national role, by making Hungarian Catholics subject to a non-Hungarian Church hierarchy. This policy was continued by the Communist Government following the Second World War.270

The Tito government actually followed the interwar policies of Yugoslavia also in at least two other respects. It continued to restrict the educational role of the Churches and it continued to subsidize them. The first policy ensured the Party's monopoly of decision over the content and objectives of education. The second policy kept the churches in a dependent status. Their right to existence became a question of constant review by the CPY.271 This eliminated the churches as possible competitors in the area of social control and ensured that they would not hinder the Party in carrying out its nationality policy.

The CPY was able to do this not only because it wielded the power of the state, but also because the churches had greatly discredited themselves during World War II. This was particularly true of some of the Croatian clergy that had supported the Ustasha imposed conversions of Orthodox Serbs, but also was the case in the

269 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
271 Ibid., pp. 551-553, 557-559; Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 243-249.

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instance of some Hungarian clergymen who had greeted the invading Hungarian army as a force of national liberation. In the immediate post-war years many of these Croatian and Hungarian clergymen were thrown into prisons or even executed. In subsequent years, a continued propaganda campaign against the Roman Catholic Church in particular, diminished its influence among the young.

This heavy-handed policy has been eased with the years. Imprisonments have become less frequent and some clergymen formerly imprisoned were released. By 1960 the Yugoslav government showed a definite desire to restore relations with the Vatican. By the summer of 1966 this was done. However, in the area of social policy, the Party has continued to bar church involvement. The churches have been—as in the case of Rumania—left only a purely religious role. That is, they have been allowed to retain certain buildings to administer to the "spiritual" needs of those who explicitly want it. To this end, the churches—including those of the Hungarians—have been allowed seminaries to educate the personnel of

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272 Ibid.

273 Churchgoing is one of the few concrete indications of this process of alienation between the youth and the Churches. In 1966 this student attended at least a dozen Catholic church services. These services were attended mainly by women, old men and young children with their grandmothers. Very few people between 12 and 40 attended these services.

274 Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, p. 247.

the cult. They have also allowed the Churches to publish religious material. In 1966, for example, the Catholic seminary in Subotica had about 90 Hungarian students.\textsuperscript{276} The Catholics also publish the Hungarian language monthly periodical, \textit{Hitélet}.\textsuperscript{277} In return for these concessions, the Church plays a passive political role. At times, certain "peace priests" actually support government policies. The periodical \textit{Hitélet} sometimes contains writings from some of these "peace priests."\textsuperscript{278} As this material testifies, the Catholic Church in the Vojvodina is not capable of defending the national heritage of the Hungarians. It has reduced itself to providing Christianized Hungarian language arguments for "peace," "international understanding" and obedience of state authorities.\textsuperscript{279}

The Church has become tolerated because it is no longer a threat to the Party's control of society. Its guiding role in setting standards for the community has now been replaced by the Party and its numerous mass organizations. None of the latter can be accused of being overly concerned with the national cultures of the country's

\textsuperscript{276} Based on personal conversations with certain staff members of the seminary.

\textsuperscript{277} This publication is edited in Novi Sad and printed in Subotica. Its editor in 1966 was Huzsvár László.


\textsuperscript{279} Ibid.
minorities. They are all the creatures of the LCY and their sole
purpose for existence is to implement the policies of the Party on
a day-to-day basis. Their composition in membership and leadership
is predominantly South Slav, although each of them have at least a
token representation of the national minorities.

The brief look at the Socialist Alliance earlier in this
chapter, revealed that the Hungarians have their share in the leader­
ship of the Party's most general purpose mass organization. Such
proportional representation—as was the case in Rumania also—seems
to occur less frequently in the more specialized mass organizations.
In the CTUY (Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia), the youth
organizations (SKOJ, Union of Pioneers, Ciciban, etc.) the Union of
Women's Societies of Yugoslavia, the Veteran's Union of Yugoslavia
and other mass organizations, the leadership is overwhelmingly South
Slav. The eclipse of the churches by these mass organizations has
left the Hungarians without a mass organization that would concern
itself with their national survival. For the latter, they have to
depend directly on the LCY. However, in Yugoslavia, these mass


\[281\] While no statistical data is available concerning the na­
tionality background of the membership and leaders of these mass
organizations, a name analysis of the top leadership invariably shows
South Slav dominance. As an example, see P.R. "A Munka Eredménye Legyen

\[282\] For the nature of LCY control of the mass organizations, see
Zalar, Yugoslav Communism, pp. 230-238.
organizations—unlike their Rumanian counterparts—are not dominated by any one of the nationalities. Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians all have an important voice in their policy making. This results in a general tolerance for minority views, even if those views are not proportionately represented in the organization.

IV

From what has been said in the foregoing, we can conclude that the actual and potential power position of Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina have certain similarities and differences. In terms of their relations with the Communist Parties concerned, their situation is drastically different. In Yugoslavia, the CPY (LCY) has always been a South Slav national movement in which the Hungarians have never felt completely at home. As a consequence they have not joined the Party in large numbers and are at present not proportionally represented in it. However, this Party has expanded rather than restricted their opportunities to enter its power structure. Until the present writing (1970) this has led to some influence, particularly on the Provincial level of the Party. The exact opposite situation has prevailed in Rumania. In its origins, the CPR was to a large extent a cosmopolitan Party representing all the nationalities of the country. It was able to be this, because it was never really a "national" movement like its Yugoslavian counterpart. However, once the Party seized power it began to nationalize itself through a series of purges and a rapid expansion of Party membership. By the late 1950's the CPR became an ethnic Rumanian Party inspite of the fact that
all nationalities are still "proportionally represented" in it. As such, it is becoming less responsive to nationality needs and to their representatives.

In the governmental set-up, yet another difference in nationality relations is revealed. The Yugoslavs seem to care much less for window-dressing than the Rumanians. In their major governmental and quasi-governmental bodies they are not concerned with giving proportional representation to the nationalities. On the top levels, Hungarians hold very few important posts aside from their share in the Chamber of Nationalities of the Federal Assembly. This does not mean that the Hungarians do not have a share in government. It only means that their share reflects more closely the extent of their importance in policy-making.

In Rumania, the Hungarians have a proportional role visibly, but only a very limited role in actuality. On all the major governmental organs Hungarians are given positions which are merely symbolic in nature. This policy is also evident on the lower governmental levels. While Yugoslavia has constantly expanded self-government on this lower level, the Rumanians have stressed centralization. The elimination of the Hungarian Autonomous region is testimony to this.

Two additional differences emerge. First, that the Yugoslavs have provided decentralization and limited self-rule according to regional and economic criteria rather than according to nationality. This has denied the Hungarians autonomy as a group, but it has enabled them as individuals to further their "group" culture. In Rumania the
Hungarians gained group autonomy for a time, but this never allowed for real self-government. It remained, until its eclipse, a symbolic right without substance. Second, the Rumanians have always delegated their responsibilities for the treatment of the Hungarians to the de-nationalized "representatives" of the Hungarians. The Yugoslav government, on the other hand, because it did not delegate this responsibility, was more involved and concerned over the correct application of its nationality policy.

Finally, in the economic and social area, there are perhaps more similarities than differences. Both the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs have eliminated the churches as possible competitors for control over society. Under both systems, the Hungarians have thereby lost one of the best means of defending their cultural heritage. Together with this loss, the Hungarians have also been disadvantaged by the post-war land reforms in both countries. Land collectivization and the nationalization of enterprises affected them adversely also, but not more so than those of the majority nationalities. In this area the only difference between the two countries has been in the application of the policies, and the extent of success achieved. The more flexible and pragmatic approach of the Yugoslavs— at least since 1952— has provided a more bearable setting for all peoples (regardless of nationality) than has Rumanian dogmatism.

On the other hand, industrialization and urbanization have a less erosive effect on the durability of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina than on those in Transylvania. The reason for this has been
twofold. First, very little industrialization has taken place in the Vojvodina. The major shifts in the ethnic composition of the area have been due to outright colonization. Second, in Transylvania extensive industrial and urban development has taken place. Furthermore, these developments have been used to strengthen the Rumanian population of Transylvania. The application of the law concerning rural mobility into urban areas, as well as the law encouraging a higher birth rate, indicate that purposeful Rumanization is taking place.

These similarities and differences indicate that the Hungarians in the Vojvodina have much more potential as well as actual powers than do those of Transylvania. This also means that they are usually better treated as a national group. The irony of this is that in Transylvania there are three times as many Hungarians as in all Yugoslavia.

This great disparity in the power positions of the two minorities is due to the nature of the political balance of power within the respective countries and the role of the Hungarians in these respective balances. In Yugoslavia the Hungarians have taken a limited share in Party and governmental activities. While they have not yet gained proportionality (in comparison to the Montenegrins, for example), their political position has improved appreciably in the last ten years. Parallel to this improvement there has also been an improvement of their economic position and their social opportunities. At the same time, no one nationality has been able to dominate the political setting, thereby putting numerically lesser nationalities at a disadvantage.
In Rumania, on the other hand, the exact opposite has happened. The Party purges of the 1950's hurt primarily the representatives of the ethnic minorities, particularly the Jews and the Hungarians. Similar purges also swept through all levels of government. While there are still many Hungarians in the Party and government for propaganda purposes, they lack influence or have lost their national consciousness. Furthermore, one nationality, the majority nationality, now dominates all major positions of power. This unchecked dominance has led to disadvantages for the Hungarians, as for other minorities, in both their economic and social existence.
CHAPTER IV
THE EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL POSITION
OF THE HUNGARIANS

The political existence of the Hungarians in Rumania and Yugoslavia has demonstrated that the internal political balance among the nationalities has increased the likelihood of a more humane or tolerant treatment for them. We shall now try to ascertain if this is also the case in relation to their educational and cultural opportunities.

In the past, non-governmental institutions like the churches, played an important role in providing such opportunities. As the preceding chapter stressed, in both Transylvania and the Vojvodina the treatment of the churches was not officially considered to be a part of nationality policy. However, since religious affiliation in both areas was closely related to particular ethnic groups, the treatment of church groups has had a direct bearing on the treatment of the nationalities. In both Transylvania and the Vojvodina Communist policies toward the churches reduced the churches as effective defenders of the nationalities. While the policies differed in their methods and severity, their results were alike in that the churches lost their former roles in the social and educational life of the peoples of both countries. They underwent a period of repression and persecution which left them active only in the spiritual field. Briefly, the
churches were eliminated as competing centers of influence to the party-state.¹

I

This drastic reduction of the influence and activities of the churches had a direct consequence on educational policies in both Rumania and Yugoslavia. In both, education became the monopoly of the state. Unlike the state policies dealing with religion, education was from the beginning considered a testing ground for nationality policies. It was contended that the state would guarantee the nationalities the preservation and development of their cultural and linguistic peculiarities.²

In Transylvania

For the purposes of this study the Rumanian educational system will be examined only as it relates to the nationalities of Transylvania. The educational opportunities ("socialist in content and national in form") of the Hungarian inhabitants will provide a basis for evaluating the practical application of "proletarian internationalism."

¹See Chapter III above for a more extensive treatment of this problem.

Nationality Schools Past and Present

A superficial examination of school statistics leads to the impression that the R.P.R. has followed the tenets of "proletarian internationalism." The comparison of educational establishments for the national minorities under the inter-war "bourgeois nationalist" regime with the establishments provided by the R.P.R. presents a hopeful picture. While the inter-war regime allowed the Hungarian minority 819 confessional educational establishments and 217 state schools plus 232 sections, the R.P.R. provides this same minority with 1,632 state school units, an increase of 364 school units. Table XV presents a

3 C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 308 presents the statistics cited above. Joseph S. Roucek, *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems* (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1932), pp.209-210, presents the number of state maintained minority schools as 1,525. This number is not broken down by Roucek, and therefore it is impossible to evaluate the number of the Hungarian Schools supported by Rumania. Nonetheless, Macartney (p. 311) sheds more light on the real state of Rumanian supported minority schools. He relates that: "An inquiry conducted in 1934-35 by the Magyar minority leaders resulted in the conclusions that instead of 271 State schools and 218 sections with Magyar language of instruction (as shown by the Ministry of Education for 1933), there were, in reality, only 55 such schools and 57 sections. The remainder did not function, had been closed, or were staffed entirely by Rumanian teachers."

### TABLE XV
THE EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE THREE MAJOR NATIONALITY GROUPS IN TRANSYLVANIA 1914-1957

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Schools</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1957</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>School Units</td>
<td>School Sections</td>
<td>School Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R U M A N I A N</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>4,100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Schools</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Schools</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Colleges</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-----**</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H U N G A R I A N</strong></td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Schools</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Schools</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Colleges</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G E R M A N</strong></td>
<td>254</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Schools</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Schools</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Schools</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Colleges</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This Table has been compiled on the basis of data in Joseph S. Roucek, *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1932), p. 209; C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 264, 306-315; *Anuarul Statistic al R.P.R. 1958* (Bucharest: Directia Centrale de Statistica, 1958), Tables 138 and 139, pp. 236-241. However, it should be kept in mind that school units can be compared fairly only when conditions are alike. This is not the case with the times and the school systems which are presented here. Thus these figures are more valuable for reference than for comparison.

**Data concerning the Rumanian educational institutions in Transylvania have not been available, since Rumanian school statistics are presented only in relation to the country as a whole.

***The 11 refers only to "Faculties" (i.e., Departments), not to independent minority universities.*
general breakdown and comparison of educational establishments for the major minorities in the years 1914, 1932 and 1957. This would seem to indicate a decided improvement in the educational position of the minorities.

What the statistics in the above table do not show is that this favored position of the minorities was merely a passing phase. As early as 1956-1957, there were significant reductions in this favorable minority educational situation. They took their toll particularly in the Hungarian sector, but the trend in this direction affected the other nationality groups as well. In fact, Braham points out that decreases of this nature had been going on ever since 1952-1953. However, these earlier reductions were not systematic and planned like those which occur after 1956. By 1958 the position of the Hungarian minority grew even more depressing, particularly on the higher levels of education.

It seems that the R.P.R. followed a truly "proletarian

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5"Transitional phase" may, perhaps, better describe this past favored treatment of minorities. It may bring to mind a similar "transitional phase" in the existence of the Soviet Union's national minorities, just before the re-assertion of Great Russian nationalism in the 1930's.

6"The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," Bulletin of the International Commission of Jurists, No. 17 (December, 1963), p. 76, indicates—together with some other studies—that 1958 was the critical year in Rumanian nationality policies. However, Table XVI presents statistics which indicate that a shift in policy was already in existence in the 1955-56 school year.

7Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 74.
internationalist" educational policy from 1948 to about the autumn of 1956. With the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1956, this policy of "enlightenment" underwent a drastic change which became apparent by 1958. Several aspects of government-educational policy indicate this change. The reduction in the number of nationality schools, the complete amalgamation of high level minority educational facilities with the Rumanian, the decrease of minority language instruction and the concomitant increase of Rumanian language instruction in minority schools, all point to this unmistakable trend which looks more and more like the "Rumanization" policies of the inter-war years.

Recent Educational Policies

Using the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the parallel disturbances in Transylvania as the pretext, the Rumanian Ministry of Education has initiated and is now pursuing educational policies designed to reduce and eventually to eradicate all forms of national

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8 "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," pp. 76.

9 Skilling, "Two Orthodox Satellites," International Journal, XVII (Autumn, 1962), 388, seems unable to see this change. While he is aware of the moves against the Hungarian institutions in Transylvania, he does not draw the logical conclusions warranted by the evidence. This is probably due to his unfamiliarity with the general Transylvanian situation, which he reveals in the discussion of the "merger" of the Babes and Bolyai Universities.

"particularism" and "isolationism." These policies are to achieve their goal by stressing the "socialist content" rather than the "national form" in education. While the "national form" was hedged in and carefully limited, the new designs to de-emphasize the "national form" entails such steps as restrictions on presentation as well as content of curricula. In content, more emphasis is to fall on Rumanian subjects and less stress on those which are of more particular relevance to national minorities. In presentation as well, Rumanian instructors teaching in the Rumanian language are given precedence in educating the minorities.

The most outstanding feature of minority education in Transylvania has been the appearance of "parallelization." Though "parallelization" has always played a part, it has become particularly important in the last few years. "Parallelization" means the setting-up of Rumanian language classes parallel with the existing


minority language classes. This is done even in areas where there are no Rumanian students to attend them. The primary purpose is to induce minority students to leave their own schools and classes to attend the schools and classes of the majority nationality. This policy reduces, in the long-run, the existence of the nationality schools. What happens is that one minority school after another is closed because there are supposedly not enough pupils to attend them.\textsuperscript{14} The real reason, however, is that the parallel schools and sections exist to absorb the students of the minority schools, after they have been pressured into deserting the latter.\textsuperscript{15}

As the national minority school loses students to the parallel Rumanian institution, the government closes the former and replaces it by a nationality section, which is then attached to the formerly "parallel" Rumanian institution. In this way the "parallel" Rumanian school becomes the sole school for the community.

\textsuperscript{14}In contradiction to the above contention it is possible to show that the total number of minority students in 4-year schools increased to 131,773 in 1956-57 from 127,634 in 1955-56. Yet in this same space of time the number of minority schools decreased from 1,416 to 1,343 in these same 4-year schools. This pattern is also apparent on the higher levels of education. See Braham, \textit{Education in the Rumanian People's Republic}, p. 75, Table 13. While the decreases of the years prior to the above seem more natural, the decrease in later years certainly does not. Now the decrease of minority schools is followed by the decrease of minority students rather than the other way around.

\textsuperscript{15}These pressures are of various kinds, some direct and some indirect. See in this regard "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76; Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbség Helyzete Romániában." F. K., "Románia Szüntesse Meg az Erdélyi Magyarak Üldözését," \textit{Katolikus Magyarak Vasárnapja}, 71 (June 21, 1964), 1.
This policy has steadily reduced the number of "independent" educational institutions of the nationalities—increasing the nationality sections attached to the Rumanian institutions. Table XVI indicates this trend until 1958. "Parallelization" is then followed by the progressive curtailment and reduction of the nationality section, until it becomes indistinguishable from the rest of the new parent school either in curriculum or in staff.

Parallelization has affected all levels of education, not excepting universities and higher institutions. In fact, it is on the level of higher education that this policy most clearly reveals the attempt to "Rumanize" and to assimilate. While proletarian...


17 Unfortunately there are no statistics available which would shed light on the position of the nationality schools since 1958. The R.P.R. has omitted any reference to nationality educational facilities since that date. Apparently the data was too incriminating to be published. Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 74, footnote 70, also makes note of this "omission."

18 "Levél Erdélyből," Irodalmi Ujság; Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbség Helyzete Romániában"; F. K., "Románia Szántesse Meg Az Erdélyi Magyarak Üldözését?"

19 Higher education demonstrates this trend best because (1) it has been totally "Rumanized," (2) it has affected the leading strata (i.e., intelligentsia) of the Transylvanian Hungarians, and (3) it has been least possible to camouflage or hide from world scrutiny the absorption of these important institutions. In this regard see Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," pp. 26-27; David Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," New York Times (July 14, 1964), p. 4; J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The World Today, XIX (Nov., 1963), 503-504.
## TABLE XVI

NATIONALITY SCHOOLS AND SECTIONS IN RUMANIA 1948-1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Schools of General Education, Grades 1-10(11)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>2,115</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>2,273</td>
<td>2,333</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>2,209</td>
<td>2,203</td>
<td>2,153</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>2,023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sections</td>
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<td>108</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Students</td>
<td>220,337</td>
<td>236,650</td>
<td>241,627</td>
<td>244,649</td>
<td>235,563</td>
<td>231,259</td>
<td>217,150</td>
<td>208,658</td>
<td>214,785</td>
<td>219,612</td>
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<td>Teacher Training**</td>
<td>-----</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
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<td>-----</td>
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<td>No. of Students</td>
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<td>No. of Students</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>8,566</td>
<td>8,151</td>
<td>6,974</td>
<td>5,425</td>
<td>6,061</td>
<td>7,029</td>
<td>5,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculties</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sections</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Students</td>
<td>2,835</td>
<td>2,887</td>
<td>3,512</td>
<td>3,304</td>
<td>3,253</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>3,515</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>3,692</td>
<td>4,082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**For the minority teacher-training program in Rumania see Table XVI in this chapter.
internationalism lasted,²⁰ the Hungarian minority had its own independent Bolyai University at Cluj (Kolozsvár), its Medical and Pharmaceutical Institute in Tirgu-Mures (Marosvásárhely), and a Hungarian section in the Petru Groza Agricultural Institute and at the Gh. Dima Conservatory also at Cluj.²¹ All four have been "parallelized." The Bolyai University was the first to meet this fate, when in 1959, it was merged with the "parallel" Rumanian Babes University.²² This was followed by the reduction (i.e., absorption) of the Hungarian section of both the Petru Groza Agricultural Institute and the Hungarian Medical-Pharmaceutical Institute at Tirgu Mures in 1962.²³ Since that date all higher education for Hungarians is restricted to Rumanian

²⁰ Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951), p. 341, notes that this early policy was by no means wholeheartedly and enthusiastically supported. He maintains that: "This liberal nationality policy was not carried through without strong opposition, not only from the Rumanian nationalist followers of Maniu but also from a part of the Rumanian Party itself, led by the former Minister of Justice Lucretiu Patrascanu. The removal of Patrascanu from his office and his disgrace within the party were certainly to some extent due to his 'incorrect' attitude on the national question."


²² Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania"; Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, pp. 78-79; Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," pp. 26-27. It was in connection with this "parallelization" that three Hungarian professors committed suicide. One of them, Szabédi László, was a famous Communist poet and intellectual of the Hungarian minority. See in this regard "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.

²³ Ibid.; Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27; F. K. "Románia Szüntesse Meg Az Erdélyi Magyarok Üldözését;"
institutions, and to the few remaining Hungarian sections, which still maintain a precarious existence within such Rumanian facilities.24

The Rumanizing effects of parallelization on the highest levels can be seen in the academic publishing activity of the Babes-Bolyai University. While Nikolai Ceausescu and lesser party leaders have denied that Rumanization exists,25 a brief analysis of the official academic journals of the Babes-Bolyai University indicates just the opposite.

Before the Babes and the Bolyai Universities were merged, in 1958 their learned journals were published in Rumanian and Hungarian respectively.26 After the merger, the academic publications still appeared in both languages, but now the Rumanian and Hungarian studies

24 Besides this formal pattern of "integration" there is also an informal trend along similar lines which is stressed and fostered by the Rumanian regime. The most recent example of this policy has been the sharing of rooms in student hostels and dormitories by Rumanians and Hungarians. The pretext for this is that the Hungarian students will more easily learn Rumanian if they share rooms with Rumanian students. See "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania." This policy received its inception soon after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A. Rosca, "The Party Organizations and the Patriotic Education of the Youth," Lupta de Clasa (Nov., 1957), pp. 87-96 in Selected Translations from East European Political Journals and Papers (JPRS/Washington, D.C. - Feb. 28, 1958), p. 126.


appeared together rather than in separate journals. In most cases each of these studies was followed by a brief summary of its contents in the other language. However, with the passage of time (less than seven years) the Hungarian language studies were almost completely eliminated.

As a perusal of these studies indicates, Hungarian scholars now publish their studies mainly in Rumanian. This tendency is not a "natural process." It is a consequence of both faculty and editorial pressure.

Perhaps an even more telling indicator is the "format" of these

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28 In 1956-57 it was still possible to find scholarly works in Hungarian. In V. Babes és Bolyai Egyetemek Közleményei, I ev., 1-2 sz., (1956), there are fourteen Hungarian language studies and five Rumanian language studies followed by the Hungarian summaries of seven Rumanian studies. By 1960 it is evident that Hungarian language studies decline in numbers. In Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai Series 1, Fasciculus 2, Anul 5 (1960), there are 26 items, articles and studies of which only one appears in Hungarian, while 21 of the contributors are Hungarian. By 1965 the situation is even worse. Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai (Series Philosophia et Oeconomica, Anul X, 1965), contains seventeen items, articles and studies of which none appear in Hungarian in spite of the fact that five of the contributors are Hungarian.

29 Ibid.

30 That such faculty and editorial pressure exists is hard to substantiate. This contention is based on the observations of two scholars, a Pole and an American, who spent extended periods of time doing research at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj (Kolozsvár) during 1967 and 1968 respectively. Both maintained, in personal conversations with this student, that the pressure was evident in the language used by the Hungarian faculty members. They never speak to one another in Hungarian, if even one Rumanian faculty member is present.
academic journals. In the years immediately after the merger, the journals were truly bi-lingual in appearance as well as content. The "table of contents" in each journal listed the articles according to the language in which they were written. The Hungarian article listings were even followed by Rumanian translations.\textsuperscript{31} Titles, such as "contents," appeared in both languages. At first even the name of the place (Cluj-Kolozsvár) of publication, was provided in both languages. But, this was not to last. By 1959, the place of publication was listed only in Rumanian.\textsuperscript{32} In some journals even the bilingual designation for "contents" (Sumar-Tartalom) was replaced with the Rumanian "Sumar."\textsuperscript{33} While this may seem trivial, it indicates that the "national form" is being eliminated in the University life of the Transylvanian Hungarians.

A substantive analysis of these articles also indicates that the "socialist content" of higher learning, is falling more and more within a national Rumanian, rather than an international Communist mold. This, of course, is discernable only in studies which fall within the Social Sciences. A comparison of the pre-merger academic


\textsuperscript{32}Compare \textit{Ibid.}, and \textit{Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai}, Series 1, Fasciculus 1, Anul 4 (1959).

journal, appearing in Hungarian, with its post-1958 successors, reveals that the earlier studies were often concerned with local Transylvanian problems and Hungarian cultural matters. The later studies, on the other hand, have been concerned more with the problems, culture and history of Rumania as a whole.

This examination of the academic publication of the Babes-Bolyai University has shown one facet of Rumanization in higher education. Another, even more menacing feature of Rumanian educational policy has been the steady decrease in the training of minority nationality teachers. While reliable data on this trend are available only to about 1957, some later sources indicate that this process has since been accelerated; so that today the minority teachers' program is negligible or non-existent. Table XVII indicates the

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36 Pál Nagy, "Huszonnyolc Új Tanító," Ípaz Szó, VIII (Aug., 1960), 243, mentions that 28 students graduated from the Józsa Béla Pedagogic Institute in 1960. Nagy seems to imply that there are many throughout the country who would like to attend the institute. But the results seem meager indeed. Five of the graduates were from Stalin (Brassó) Regiune, three from Baia-Mare (Nagybánya), two from Oradea.
TABLE XVII
NATIONALITY TEACHER TRAINING PROGRAM IN RUMANIA FROM 1948 TO 1958
INDICATING THE HUNGARIAN SHARE FOR THE YEARS 1955-1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Number of Teacher Training School Units</th>
<th>Number of Pupils</th>
<th>Hungarian Share of School Units</th>
<th>Number of Hungarian Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>Schools: 15</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>---***</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>Schools: 22</td>
<td>4,275</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>Schools: 23</td>
<td>5,617</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>Schools: 24</td>
<td>6,217</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-53</td>
<td>Schools: 26</td>
<td>5,728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>Schools: 25</td>
<td>5,671</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>Schools: 17</td>
<td>2,638</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>Schools: 10</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 14</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>Schools: 0</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 12</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-58***</td>
<td>Schools: 1</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sections: 11</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**No data is available for the share of the respective minorities prior to and including the academic year 1954-55.

***The last year that any data has been released by the R.P.R. regarding the state of minority education is 1958.
drastic nature of this policy until 1958. It shows, among other things, that while in the 1948-1949 school year 3,327 students were in the teacher-training program (for the nationalities) and 2,835 were in institutions of higher education, by the 1956-1957 school year the respective realms had 503 and 3,692 students each. In a country where everything follows a state plan this systematic elimination of a minority teaching program cannot be explained by reference to "lack of interest," particularly not among nationality groups which have been determined to preserve their national identity.

More recent sources indicate that the reason for this drastic curtailment in nationality education opportunities is due to the regime's policy toward the graduates of higher institutions. The regime fosters a policy of dispersing the minority intelligentsia throughout Rumania, particularly the Regat, in order to leave the

(Nagytársaság), two from Timișoara (Temesvár), one from Cluj (Kolozsvár), and the rest from the Magyar Autonomous Region. Since 1960 no other reliable evidence is available that would shed light on the nationality teachers-training program. Also see "White Paper" on the Liquidation of the Hungarian Minority's Educational Facilities in Rumania (New York: Association of Hungarian Students in North America, 1966), Table II, p. 12. The only evidence that can be found is negative. For example, the fact that propaganda brochures no longer boast of the "great opportunities" for minority national cultural facilities. The Short Document on Rumania (Bucharest: Agerpres, 1964), pp. 5-6, conspicuously avoids reference to Hungarian educational facilities in cities like Cluj, which in earlier brochures were always mentioned. More recent sources also avoid mention of Hungarian educational opportunities. See "Start of School-Year in Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 17 (Sept. 15, 1970), pp. 23-24.

37Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 75, Table 13.
respective minorities without leaders of their own. Since specialized qualifications for the instruction of minority nationalities is incompatible with such dispersal, the program has been eliminated as useless. All those who enter the teaching program must now be ready to teach anywhere in Rumania and cannot "specialize" in minority nationality instruction. In this way not only is the back of minority education broken, but the respective minorities are deprived of intellectual leadership.

In content the minority educational program is, of course, "socialist." This means that the minorities have had the same material presented to them as the rest of the population, with the exception only that they were able to have it presented in their own language.

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38 F. K., "Románia Szüntesse Meg Az Erdélyi Magyarok Üldözősét." Nagy, "Huszonnyolc Uj Tanító," also indicates this trend when he inadvertently reveals that almost all the graduates of the Józsa Béla Pedagogic Institute would like to return to their respective regions to teach. The implication is that this may not be possible. A Correspondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest . . . A Conversation Piece," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), 20, also throws weight behind this observation when he states that: "Ambitious youngsters, . . . have to . . . speak and write perfect Romanian." This policy is also evident in the recruitment of skilled workers. See the advertizement "A Balanbányai Szakiskola Szakmunkásokat Képez Ki," Élőre, June 20, 1970, p. 2.

39 As far as could be ascertained no specific restriction exists. The Ministry of Education merely leaves out the minority teachers-training program and nothing is again said about it.

The difference between the education of the Rumanian and the non-Rumanian sector of society was thus reduced to language. Otherwise both majority and minority are equally subject to Communist indoctrination.

In spite of the "socialist content" of education for all sectors of society, the differences granted in presentation by "proletarian internationalism" enabled the minorities to foster their respective cultures. As Braham points out, the "national form" of presentation entailed giving the minorities at least the opportunity of furthering the national language and the study of the national literature. However, soon after 1956 the authorities began to clamp down even in this area. The R.P.R. set out to "Rumanize" even the "national form" of the educational system. First, as the foregoing demonstrated, the regime began to limit the educational facilities for minorities by eliminating their schools (where possible) and replacing them with sections which were later also to be absorbed. Then it encroached on the remaining institutions by limiting the hours devoted to the study of the nationality language and literature. This was followed by a policy of discouraging students from attending nationality schools.

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41 Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 74, Table 12, presents the number of hours devoted to the study of the respective mother tongues. A Correspondent, "Nationalism in Bucharest ... A Conversation Piece," points out that "the minority languages ... have again been abolished as media of teaching in the former 'minority' schools; they have now been granted the position of 'first foreign language' taught."

42 Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbség Helyzete Romániaiban."
According to reliable sources, the restriction has gone so far as to limit "nationality" education in the Hungarian communities to the eldest son in each family.\(^43\)

There is no doubt that the R.P.R. has reduced, through these methods, the opportunities of the nationalities to foster their respective cultures. In this way the R.P.R. has reverted to a policy similar to the inter-war Rumanization policies of the bourgeois nationalists. Yet, it has done this under the pretext of eliminating national particularism and isolationism, two handmaidens of "nationalist reaction." Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and others have deemed this to be a real struggle for the furtherance of proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism.\(^44\) But through it all, the pattern of nationalism begins to emerge as the emphasis is placed increasingly on "socialist patriotism," rather than on "proletarian internationalism."\(^45\) The educational policies of the R.P.R. have in fact not only Rumanized the

\(^{43}\text{Ibid.; "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.}\)

\(^{44}\text{V. A. Varga, "The Fundamental Laws and Characteristics of the Great October Socialist Revolution," Probleme Economice, (Oct., 1957), pp. 8-10, in Selected Translations from East European Political Journals and Newspapers (JPRS/Washington, D.C. - March 7, 1958), pp. 138-139, states that "proletarian internationalism is inseparable from the socialist patriotism; they are interlaced, representing the unity between the national and international interests of the workers." This definition is very revealing, for it shows that the "inseparable unity" of the workers is in danger only if their national and international interests conflict.}\)

"national form" of minority education, but they have, to some extent, even put their Rumanian imprint on the "socialist content."

The net result of these Rumanian educational policies has been to make the minorities more aware of their obligations under "proletarian internationalism," while the Rumanian majority has been able to revel in old-fashioned nationalism under the guise of "socialist patriotism." This has been translated into general educational policies. Some indications of this are discernable in the statements of leading Party members, educational officials, and youth and student leaders.  

In the Vojvodina

In this area of education, Yugoslavia's treatment of her Hungarians is quite unlike Rumania's prevailing policies. Generally, there has been an expansion rather than a reduction of educational opportunities. Due in large part to this difference, the Yugoslavs

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have released much more data concerning their nationality educational programs.47

Nationality Schools Past and Present

From the Yugoslav educational data we can discern that its policies were not always more permissive than those of Rumania. In the immediate post-World War II period, the Hungarians actually fared better in Rumania than in Yugoslavia. As the Statistical Yearbook of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia for 1954 shows the number of Hungarian schools increased to only 212 in the 1950-51 academic year from the woefully inadequate 186 of 1938-39.48 It was only with the 1951-52 school year that serious efforts were made to expand the educational opportunities of the Hungarians.49 As we have seen, in the case of Rumania the opposite trend prevailed. It was the late 1940's and early 1950's that enabled the Hungarians to have their own schools, while more recently--particularly since 1956--the Rumanians have tried to limit Hungarian educational opportunities.

It is true, however, that in the case of both these countries

47Yugoslavia has been less reluctant to release such data because it has more to be proud of. With the exception of only the German minority--which has only limited educational opportunities--Yugoslavia has released data on the educational opportunities of all ethnic groups. See Jugoslavia 1945-1964: Statistički Pregled (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1965), Table 19-3, pp. 295-296.


49Ibid.
minority educational opportunities increased after the second World War. In the Vojvodina the contrast between pre- and post-war conditions was even greater than in Transylvania. The reason for this was that in Yugoslavia the Church was already eliminated from education in the interwar years. In Rumania this elimination took place only after World War II. At any rate, for the Magyars of the Vojvodina this interwar elimination meant the loss of education in their own language. The state schools controlled by the Serb dominated Ministry of Education in Belgrade, had very little sympathy for national minorities. They allowed the Hungarians instruction in their own language only in the first four elementary grades. In all education above that level, instruction was given exclusively in Serbian. But even the number of elementary schools allowed the Magyars was well below that which their numbers would have warranted. In 1934 they possessed only 157 school units. This is meager indeed, when compared with the 693 school units which they had prior to World War I. By the 1938-39 academic year the number of their school units increased to 186, which was still completely inadequate. Furthermore, the content of education in these schools was often little above the level of indoctrination in "Yugoslav nationalism," taught by a staff that was at least

50 Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 156; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 420-421.

51 It should be pointed out, on the other hand, that many of these 693 school units teaching in Hungarian prior to World War I, were merely instruments of "Magyarization." Thus, the comparison is not altogether fair.
one-third Slav even in the Magyar school units.52

Recent Educational Policies

Yugoslavia's current policies are a healthy corrective for these previous shortcomings. As Table XVIII reveals, the number of ethnic minority school units has remained relatively stable since the early 1950's. However, the number of classes, students and teachers has constantly increased. In the case of the Hungarians of the Vojvodina, a similar trend is revealed by Table XIX. As the latter indicates, however, the Hungarian growth has been somewhat less dramatic. This can be explained, in part, by the limited growth of the Hungarian population of the country.53

It is somewhat harder to explain the steady decline of the number of Hungarian students in primary schools. As Table XIX demonstrates, beginning with the 1956-57 academic year, the number of Hungarian grade-school children has fallen from 49,844 to 45,311 by the 1965-66 academic year.54 This has taken place in the face of expanded educational opportunities.55 A simple explanation is again demographic.

52Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 420-421.


54See Table XIX. It is not possible to trace this trend past 1966 since the latest available source on this question was published only in 1967. See Statistički Godisnjak SFRJ 1967 (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1967), Table 126-4, p. 286.

55Note particularly the increase in the number of Hungarian teachers in primary, vocational and secondary schools. See Table XIX.
### TABLE XVIII

ETHNIC MINORITY LOWER EDUCATION IN YUGOSLAVIA 1938-1966*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Primary Schools</th>
<th>Vocational &amp; Other Schools</th>
<th>Secondary Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. Schools</td>
<td>No. Classes</td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938/39**</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>80,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949/50***</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>172,708</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951/52</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>3,991</td>
<td>167,349</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952/53</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>4,349</td>
<td>166,625</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953/54</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>4,509</td>
<td>163,313</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954/55</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>4,589</td>
<td>161,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955/56</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>4,507</td>
<td>157,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/57****</td>
<td>1,463</td>
<td>5,939</td>
<td>201,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957/58</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>6,019</td>
<td>201,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958/59</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>6,173</td>
<td>201,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>6,412</td>
<td>209,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>6,787</td>
<td>218,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961/62</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>7,005</td>
<td>225,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962/63</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>7,342</td>
<td>238,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963/64</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>7,582</td>
<td>244,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964/65</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>7,830</td>
<td>248,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/66</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>8,054</td>
<td>253,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This Table is based on Jugoslavija 1945-1964: Statistički Pregled, Table 19-3, pp. 295-96; Statistički Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1963, Table 125-2, p. 299; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 126-4, p. 286.

**For the 1938-39 school year the above sources provide conflicting data. The data in this Table for 1938-39 is based on Statistički Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378, because this is the only source which provides data on all the minorities, including the Germans.

***The data for the 1949-50 school year are based solely on Statistički Pregled.

****The classification of types of schools between 1951-56 differs slightly from the classifications of other years. This accounts for the important changes in the statistics of the "Vocational & Other Schools" category in the 1956-57 school year. Another reason for variations in data is the inclusion of the German minority's educational data in the 1951-56 sources. The latter are left out of all subsequent Yugoslavian statistical sources.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Slovak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational &amp; Other Schools</td>
<td>Secondary Schools</td>
<td>Vocational &amp; Other Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-</td>
<td># Schools</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Classes</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Students</td>
<td>27,915</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Teachers</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-</td>
<td># Schools</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Classes</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Students</td>
<td>36,533</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Teachers</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-</td>
<td># Schools</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Classes</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Students</td>
<td>35,512</td>
<td>15,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Teachers</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-</td>
<td># Schools</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Classes</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Students</td>
<td>49,844</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Teachers</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-</td>
<td># Schools</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Classes</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Students</td>
<td>48,382</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Teachers</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-</td>
<td># Schools</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Classes</td>
<td>1,573</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Students</td>
<td>48,228</td>
<td>3,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Teachers</td>
<td>1,797</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-</td>
<td># Schools</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Classes</td>
<td>1,551</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Students</td>
<td>45,311</td>
<td>4,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># Teachers</td>
<td>2,079</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Year</td>
<td>Rumanian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vocational &amp; Other Schools</td>
<td>Secondary Schools</td>
<td>Vocational &amp; Other Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>4,742</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>765</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-59</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-63</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-66</td>
<td>476</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>233</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This Table is based on Jugoslavija 1945-1964: Statistički Pregled, Table 19-3, pp. 295-296; Statistički Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1963, Table 125-2, p. 299; Statistički Godisnjak S F R J 1967, Table 126-4, p. 286.

**Data for the 1938-39 school year includes Czech as well as Slovak educational institutions. Post-World War II data separates the two. In the present Table only the Slovak statistics are indicated for the years between 1949 and 1966.

***Educational data concerning the German minority in Yugoslavia is available only for the period between 1938-56. See Statistički Godisnjak F N R J 1957, Table 24-8, p. 378; Statistički Godisnjak F N R J 1954, Table 257, p. 331.
It relates to the aging of the East-European populations, particularly that of the Hungarians. Accordingly, school age children compose a smaller percentage of the Hungarian population than previously.\(^56\)

This explanation is far from satisfactory. It fails to account for the growing numbers of Hungarian students in the Vojvodina who attend the Serbo-Croatian schools. Unlike their counterparts in Transylvania, they are not under overt pressure to attend the schools of the majority nationalities. This is brought out by the lively debate which has grown up concerning the future of Hungarian educational opportunities in Yugoslavia.\(^57\) Most of the analysis coming from the Vojvodina, indicate that it is "parental opportunism" that is mainly responsible for the defection of Hungarian students.\(^58\) Educators, newspapermen and community leaders all point out that the burden of guilt rests with the parents of the pupils.\(^59\) They send their children to the schools taught in Serbo-Croatian in order to provide them with a better understanding of the country's major language. These parents feel that only education in a non-minority school will provide their


children with an adequate command of Serbo-Croatian for continued studies on the university level or equal opportunities in social-economic advancement.60

To combat this drain on the Hungarian language schools, educators and community leaders have proposed "dual language" schools on the primary and high school levels. These schools have instruction in both Hungarian and Serbo-Croatian. Their advantage is that both the minority and the majority languages are used and learned simultaneously. This educational approach results—under ideal circumstances—in minority students learning the language of the majority without losing their own. At the same time, it educates the majority nationality students in the language of the minority people with whom they live side by side.61

So far no data has been made available which would indicate that the "dual-language" schools have put an end to the erosion of Hungarian education in the Vojvodina.62 However, their existence and constant expansion demonstrates that Yugoslavia is much more generous in its nationality policies than Rumania. The difference between the policies of the two countries is summarized in the contrast between


62The effectiveness of bilingual education has been evaluated in a number of articles. Of these the thoroughest analysis is provided by Varga, "Kétnyelvű Oktatás Vajdaságban," pp. 157-165.
the Rumanian policy of "parallelization" and the Yugoslav policy of "dual-language" instruction. As we have had occasion to see, "parallelization" eliminates Hungarian language instruction. Its purpose is linguistic assimilation. The "dual-language" system on the other hand, has as its goal the preservation of the minority languages of Yugoslavia.63

The content of the curriculum, as in Transylvania, is "socialist." However, a perusal of social science textbooks—particularly history textbooks—indicates that a great deal of attention is given to the history of the individual national groups that make up Yugoslavia. For example, in the Hungarian language world history text for high-school students, a great deal of attention is devoted to the development of Communism in both Yugoslavia and Hungary.64 No similar attention is paid to Hungarian Party developments in Rumania. In the latter case, the role of Hungarians is examined only as it relates to Rumanian Party and national history.65 The difference between the two educational systems is that in the Yugoslav case a trans-ethnic "national" consciousness is inculcated, while in Rumania it is a more


narrow ethnic Rumanian national consciousness. This difference will be examined more closely in relation to the over-all cultural policies of the two states.

The contrast between Rumanian and Yugoslav policies is also evident in the teacher-training programs of the two countries. Unlike Rumania, Yugoslavia has constantly expanded its teacher-training program for the Hungarians. Table XIX shows that from the academic year 1949-50 to the academic year 1965-66, the number of Hungarian teachers has grown from 588 to 2,079 in primary schools and 32 to 434 in vocational and specialized schools.\(^6^6\) Very recently, the Yugoslavs have expanded this program even further by establishing a teacher-training center in Subotica (Szabadka) which will be concerned mainly with the education of "dual-language" instructors.\(^6^7\)

Only in the area of University instruction do the Hungarians of the Vojvodina seem to lag behind their fellow nationals of Transylvania. They possess only one "faculty" (i.e., department) in the Hungarian language. This is the Hungarian Literature and Language Faculty at the University of Novi Sad (Ujvidék).\(^6^8\) However, it should

\(^{66}\) On the other hand, Table XIX also indicates that the number of secondary school teachers has declined from 333 in 1949-50, to 141 in 1965-66. This discrepancy is difficult to explain. It is probably due to two factors: the parental opportunism mentioned earlier and the states relocation of many high-school teachers in the expanding vocational institutions.

\(^{67}\) Varga, "Petőfi Hitét . . .," p. 23.

\(^{68}\) Ibid.
be noted that this department came into existence only ten years ago, and that there is talk of adding more Hungarian language departments at the University of Novi Sad.\textsuperscript{69} As opposed to this, Rumania possesses more instruction in Hungarian at the Babes-Bolyai University. But, this instruction is being reduced rather than expanded. Thus, a statistical comparison of Hungarian instruction in the two countries is bound to be misleading unless the long-range developments are also considered.

In the area of academic publications a similar situation prevails. Seemingly, the Hungarian scholars are better off in Rumania, where some of them may get a Hungarian language article or study published in the Babes-Bolyai Studia.\textsuperscript{70} In Yugoslavia no such dual-language publication exists for Hungarian scholars. They publish everything in the journals and language of the majority nationalities or they send their studies to scholarly publications in Hungary. The latter alternative is less available to Hungarian scholars in Transylvania. Thus, it would not be fair to say that in this area opportunities for Hungarians are less in Yugoslavia than in Rumania. Rather, the inequalities of treatment are a product of different academic developments. Transylvania was always an intellectual center and it had many Hungarian scholarly publications before being incorporated into Rumania. The Vojvodina, on the other hand, was never a


\textsuperscript{70}See footnote 28 above concerning the extent of these opportunities.
major intellectual center, due to the geographic proximity of the Hungarian universities of Pécs and Szeged. When the Vojvodina came under Yugoslav rule, it had no Hungarian higher educational institutions. Only in the latter half of the 1960's have such institutions begun to make their appearance.\textsuperscript{71}

Many Hungarians attend the universities of Belgrade and Zagreb. More recently, they are an important part of the student body at the University of Novi Sad (Ujvidék).\textsuperscript{72} As the Hungarian instruction expands at the latter, even more Hungarians will continue their studies there rather than at the more distant educational centers of Zagreb and Belgrade. Unlike their Rumanian counterparts, this will enable Hungarian intellectuals in Yugoslavia to take a more active role as leaders of their people. It will bring them closer to their people geographically, socially and in their professional concerns of research and education.\textsuperscript{73}

The above analysis indicates that the educational policies of Rumania and Yugoslavia contained certain disadvantages for their


\textsuperscript{72}According to "Hírek," \textit{News from Hungary}, p. 6, during the 1969-70 academic year only 1,376 Hungarians were enrolled at the University of Novi Sad (Ujvidék). This made up 11.8 per cent of the University's total enrollment in an area where the Hungarian share of the population is 24.2 per cent. It is contended by Hungarian student leaders, that "dual-language" (bilingual) instruction in the University would eliminate this imbalance.

Hungarian inhabitants at one time or another. In Yugoslavia the educational deprivation was most acute in the immediate post World War II years. In Rumania, on the other hand, it became detrimental only after the internal and external checks were removed from the rule of the Rumanian ethnic majority in the years between 1956-58. By and large, the analysis reveals an increase in the educational opportunities for Hungarians in the Vojvodina and a drastic reduction of the educational opportunities of their fellow nationals in Transylvania.

II

A similar picture emerges from the comparison of Rumanian and Yugoslav policies in the area of mass communication. While in both states the news media--and all other means of disseminating information--came under close governmental supervision and control, their policies differed in the impact they had on minority--particularly Hungarian--cultural developments.

In Transylvania

The Party considered the news media instruments of education, second only to the schools in effectiveness. From the beginning, the CPR made extensive use of these media to gain the support of the non-Rumanian nationalities.74 It appealed to them in their respective languages through the daily press, radio broadcasts and assorted other

printed and electronic media. Ever since, the media continue to perform such a propaganda or control role among the Hungarians and other nationalities. At the same time, the media also serve as channels of cultural expression and development. The dual nature of the media—i.e., as control instruments of the state and servants of nationality culture—will be examined in two parts. The role of the printed media (newspapers, periodicals, etc.) will be examined first and then compared to the role of such electronic media as radio and television.

Newspapers, Periodicals and Magazines

As in the case of the schools, "proletarian internationalism" was a real working factor in the realm of the written word prior to 1956. National groups could have and, in fact, were encouraged to have their own periodicals and newspapers in order to better disseminate the directives of the Party. The volume of these publications compared favorably with the inter-war period, even if their number and quality did not. (Table XX presents a comparison of minority

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75 Hajdu Győző, "Forum: A Pártos Szellem Erősítéséért Irodalmunkban," Igaz Szó, IV (June, 1956), 871-74, presents this "educational" role and at the same time provides a good example for the evaluation of this function of the printed news media, even if his concern is primarily with literature.

### TABLE XX

**RUMANIAN AND NATIONAL MINORITY PUBLICATIONS IN THE INTER-WAR AND POST-WAR PERIODS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Type of Publication</th>
<th>Inter-War (1929)</th>
<th>Post-War (1963)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rumanian</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>107**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Periodicals</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>279**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Periodicals</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Periodicals</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964, op. cit.**

***Catalogue 1963, op. cit.***

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publications in inter-war and post-war Rumania). When the CPR aban­
donned "proletarian internationalism" it still continued to utilize the
mass media in its relations with the Hungarians. Thus, to the present
there are numerous Hungarian language publications and broadcasts in
the country. These, however, serve the minority cultures less and less
and the Communist control apparatus more and more.

One outstanding feature of the minority publications world,
until very recently, has been its relative stability. According to the
Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 the total number of minority
publications rose from 29 in 1950, to 38 in 1963. 77 This figure is
misleading, however, insofar as it does not designate the gain in
relation to specific minorities. Such round numbers only indicate that
publications for all nationality groups increased, it does not show
that certain nationalities lost some publications while others gained
some. To find out to what degree any such gains or losses affected the
nationalities of Transylvania, it is necessary to examine those Rumanian
catalogues which list the number and nature of the publications origi­
nating in the country. 78

77 Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 (Rumanian People's
Republic: Central Statistical Board, 1964), pp. 266-268, Tables 138 and
139. It is interesting to note how I. Nistor inflated the number of
these periodicals to a total of 48 when he wrote a propaganda article
for Izvestia (Dec. 27, 1953). For this article consult under "Rumania"
the "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," The Current Digest

78 The catalogues which are most useful included: Newspapers and
Periodicals from Rumania (Bucharest, Rumania: Cartimex, 1962); Cata-
logue 1963: Rumanian Periodical Publications (Centrului National de
Schimb; Bucharest, Rumania: Biblioteca Centrala de Stata R.P.R., 1963);
and Catalog 1962 (Academia Republicii Populare Romine; Bucharest,
According to the most recent catalogue which could be obtained, there are 28 Hungarian, 13 German and 2 Serbian minority publications listed. The discrepancy between this number and that presented in the Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 above, is explainable only by the latter's attempt to distinguish between "foreign" and "domestic" publications. The Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964 presents a smaller number of minority entries, probably because it divides the German publications into two categories: one for domestic and one for foreign consumption. With this discrepancy explained, it is possible to evaluate the catalogue entries in more detail. Of the 355 entries, 258 are Rumanian, 28 Hungarian, 13 German, 2 Serbian, 12 English, 10 Russian, 19 French, 1 Chinese, 7 Spanish and 2 Latin. Of the 258 Rumanian entries, 70 contain German extracts and summaries, 76 contain English extracts and summaries, 197 contain Russian extracts and summaries, 189 contain French extracts and summaries, and 2 contain Italian extracts and summaries.

It is then apparent that the minorities are relatively well provided with publications in their own language, with the exception of Yiddish. However, this evaluation must be qualified by the fact

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80 Some of these publications contain summaries and extracts in more than one language, of which the Russian and French appear most frequently. None of them have summaries in Hungarian!

81 Boila, "Press and Radio," p. 269, points out, however, that the Jews were not worse off than any of the other groups in this category. Though they only had two Yiddish publications, they also had two in Rumanian and one in Hungarian: The Germans had four; the Yugoslavs two; the Ukrainians two; the Armenians two; the Greeks one;
that in the last two years significant reductions have taken place in some areas, affecting particularly circulation (number of copies) rather than the number of the publications.\textsuperscript{82} However, in the realm of publications it may be premature to state that a systematic policy is being undertaken to reduce minority papers and periodicals. At present, such a policy would be a disadvantage to the CPR because these publications provide it with the best means for disseminating its propaganda among the nationalities. At the same time the Party seems magnanimous toward the minorities by allowing "their" journals to exist.\textsuperscript{83}

The reduction of "proletarian internationalism" in the publication world has, therefore, taken a different path. This different approach is successful because the written word is more pliable and controllable than the school system. Censorship enables the government to have more control over each and every periodical, than

\textsuperscript{82}"Levél Erdélyből," \textit{Irodalmi Ujság}, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{83}It would be a disadvantage to the CPR at present because a large segment of the minority populations still only understand their own languages, or very little Rumanian. However, this situation is being altered by the great emphasis which has been put on the study of Rumanian among the national minorities. In a few years it may be possible for the Rumanians to take away all minority publications. By then only the old people will be unacquainted with Rumanian, but they are the ones for whom the Party cares least anyway.
is the case with individual teachers. Thus, it is unlikely that the Party will destroy one of its most effective means of control over the nationalities by using the same elimination methods as against the schools. Rather than eliminating the minority periodicals, the CPR utilizes them as avenues of propaganda in the offensive against "particularism" and "bourgeois nationalism." CPR publications have had a long tradition as champions of "proletarian internationalism" and as uncompromising fighters against manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism." Even before the seizure of power, such journals as Korunk were early Communist centers of Rumanian-Hungarian co-operation. However, as was demonstrated in relation to Party-nationality relations, those early years of co-operation were possible only because of the truly "internationalist" composition of the CPR. Today, when the CPR has lost this "internationalist" character, it is no longer possible to expect that Előre,

84These periodicals and publications are easily controlled by the CPR, because they are few in number (38 in 1964), they are all printed in government publishing houses, and the contributing writers are not only Party members but also front-line fighters for the cause of Rumanian "socialist patriotism." See in this regard, H. F., "A Mai Erdély II," Nemzetőr, June 1, 1960.


Korunk, Igaz Szó and other Party journals keep reflecting that spirit. The spirit of "proletarian internationalism" has been slowly replaced by the spirit of "socialist patriotism."\(^{87}\)

Transylvanian nationality publications can be divided mainly into two groups: technical-professional and economic-political-social-cultural publications.\(^{88}\) The second group of the two is, by far, the more important in the life of the minorities, not only as regards the number of the reading audience, but also as regards their effectiveness as channels of propaganda. This is not the case with the first group, which contains periodicals likely to suffer elimination (i.e., absorption) in the near future. The prospects for elimination are indicated by the fact that all important such journals appear only in Rumanian.\(^{89}\) Anyone who wishes to enter these coveted professional-technical circles must, therefore, be well acquainted with the Rumanian

\(^{87}\)See footnote 44 above.

\(^{88}\)The above division can be justified because the primary function of the technical-professional periodicals is not indoctrination (though they sometimes contain such articles), as it is for the economic-political-social-cultural publications. Furthermore, the above division facilitates a clearer analysis.

\(^{89}\)This is based on the examination of Catalog 1962, which deals with technical, scientific, medical and other professional publications. The catalogue is published by the Institute of Rumanian-Soviet studies of the Academy of the R.P.R. The striking feature of this catalogue is that not one of the works listed therein appears in Hungarian. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 573 maintains, on the other hand, that "the less elaborate works were printed in Magyar and German, as well as Rumanian." Catalogua 1963: Rumanian Periodical Publications, lists five such publications in the Hungarian language (Orvosi Szemle, p. 53; Méhész, p. 75; Matematikai és Fizikai Lapok, p. 41; Tanügyi Újság, p. 29; and Könyvtárosok Tájékoztatója, p. 12) and also studies of the Babes-Bolyai University which still appear in Hungarian and Rumanian in 1963.
language.

The economic-political-cultural-social journals, on the other hand, have become the most convenient channels of CPR efforts to instill socialist patriotism into the national minorities. While formerly these journals were important avenues for the expression of class solidarity and the common struggle of all nationalities for the socialist fatherland, now these same journals have become Rumanizing instruments of the majority nationality. This can be easily ascertained by an examination of the development of any of these periodicals since the Communist seizure of power. While earlier articles stressed the equality theme, the more recent ones stress the need for closer identification with the majority nationality. Articles before 1958 glorified the R.P.R. for enabling the minority nationalities to develop their own national cultures on the basis of proletarian internationalism and brotherhood. Since then, the stress has been on becoming better acquainted with the culture and language of the majority nationality. The constant emphasis on learning the Rumanian language and reading Rumanian literature has become more insistent in

90 See footnote 83 above.


these periodicals with each passing year.  

At present the periodicals and publications printed in the languages of the national minorities serve only one purpose—the subjugation of the nationalities to the CPR. Their subjugation, unlike that of the Rumanian masses, is in this way twofold—ideological and national. Thus, it seems meaningless to quote statistics regarding the number of publications allowed the national minorities, since each of those publications serves the CPR and its Rumanizing goals.


94 This is best indicated by the uniformity of all such publications. Boila, "Press and Radio," pp. 268, 270, points out this feature of the Rumanian news media. He states: "Every editorial of every paper might have been written by the same person, for all the differences to be observed. Even the makeup of newspapers is similar . . . aside from insignificant details, all newspapers nowadays are but specialized editions of Scanteia."


96 Some light is shed on this by László Sándor, "Ukrajnai Üzenet" in "Olvasók Foruma," Igaz Szó, VI (May, 1958), 794-795, when he complains that the periodical (Igaz Szó) is very deficient in the works of Hungarian writers from anywhere but Rumania.
The Air Waves: Radio and Television

Much of what applies to the printed news media also applies to the electronic media. However, in this realm there are no data available which would make it possible to compare the inter-war period and the present. While this makes it almost impossible to provide an adequate treatment of the electronic news media, it does not mean that some of their general characteristics cannot be presented to indicate the nature of their contribution to minority opportunities. One such characteristic is that broadcasting resembles publishing as an easily controlled and manipulated means of news dissemination.

Available sources also indicate that radio transmission is a growing and important channel of news dissemination for the CPR. The rapid expansion of radio broadcasting indicates this. While in 1938 Rumania only had two broadcasting stations, by 1963 their number had grown to twenty-two. However, to assess the share of the national

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97 George H. Bossy, "Transportation and Communications" in Rumania, ed. Fischer-Galati, pp. 331, 342, presents some figures which enable a general comparison of pre-war and post-war broadcasting facilities and capabilities. However, these shed little light on the share (if any) which the national minorities may have had in this area. A further complication in any such comparison is the role of television, which was non-existent in pre-war Rumania.

98 Boila, "Press and Radio," pp. 272-273, presents this malleable feature of the written and electronic news media. However, in one respect the latter faced an obstacle which the written media did not have to confront, namely broadcasts from abroad. Jammings did not always successfully eliminate the outside intruders (e.g., Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, etc.). But for the Rumanians this also entails competition in the broadcasting field with the Communist Hungarian stations.

99 Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964, pp. 262-263, Table 134.
minorities in this growth is difficult. The nearest estimate possible has to be based on regional divisions, which of course cross linguistic and national lines. A comparison based on regions cannot provide conclusive evidence because of the very limited data available. While it is true that the predominantly Hungarian Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region had a low rate of radio subscriptions, so did the predominantly Rumanian regions of Iasi, Suceava and Dobrogea. While it is also true that Rumanian areas (Ploesti and Bucharest city and region) had the highest subscription rates, Brasov, a region with a heavy Hungarian population, was not far behind. Rather than revealing national discrimination, all the available data indicate that subscriptions run higher in the industrially more developed regions than in the more backward ones.

Since the texts of radio and television broadcasts are also unavailable, it is impossible to assess the content of the programs maintained for the nationalities of Transylvania. But, since the electronic news media are as well controlled and censored as the written ones, it is probably safe to assume that, rather than decrease nationality programs the CPR just shifts the emphasis of the propaganda

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100 About all that can be stated with certainty is that broadcasts in the language of the national minorities exist and have in fact been expanded. See along this line "Erdélyi Hírek," Lármáf, V (April-June, 1958), 33; Constantin Daicoviciu and others, Kumania (Bucharest: Foreign Language Pub. House, 1959), p. 516.

101 Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964, p. 264, Table 135.
toward more 'socialist patriotism" as was the case with the nationality publications.

The only concrete source that is available for an evaluation of the Hungarian share of broadcasts in Rumania is the listing of radio and television programs in the daily papers. A perusal of this listing for the past two years (1969-1970) indicates that separate generalizations must be made in discussing the two media.

Television seems to have been an overwhelmingly ethnic Rumanian media until November 1969. Until then, there were no distinct Hungarian language programs. This does not mean that Hungarian subjects, personalities or films were barred from television, it means only that there were no regular Hungarian language programs. Programs dealing with a Hungarian subject were most frequently presented in Rumanian. Only in the course of the present broadcasting season has the Rumanian Television network allowed for a "Hungarian Hour." In actuality, this involves a one-hour Sunday afternoon program (beginning at 12:30 or 1:15 p.m.) and a half-hour program on Thursdays (beginning usually at 5:30 p.m.). The German minority also has a one-hour program on Saturdays.

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103 Ibid., and all "radio and television guide" sections in the Saturday issues of Előre prior to Nov. 22, 1969.

104 See all "radio and television guide sections in the Saturday issues of Előre from Nov. 22, 1969 to the present.
The opening of television to such regularized minority programs—even on such a limited scale—is a complete reversal of the Rumanian allocations of television time. The drastic nature of this change for the Hungarians—is evident from the content of the television programs preceding the Fall of 1969. The discriminatory nature of broadcasting is to be found more in what had been omitted than in what was included. Aside from the inclusion of political programs and programs taken over from Western Television—like "Bonanza"—the Rumanian programs were for the most part educational in nature. For example, the television carried regular language instructional programs. It had regular weekly language programs devoted to Rumanian, Russian, German, French, Spanish and English. However, it did not have any Hungarian language instruction programs.105

The motives for the change in Rumanian attitudes seems to stem from their more exposed political posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Rumanian leaders are much more uncertain of their position since the Czecho-slovakian events of August 1968. As a consequence, they have become more concerned with mending their political fences at home. Thus, they have granted a number of opportunities for cultural development to the national minorities, such as the "Hungarian Hour" on television.

In the area of Radio broadcasting, the Hungarians have had a

more proportional share of broadcasting than in the case of television. This has been particularly true since the addition of the broadcasting center at Tirgu-Mures (Marosvásárhely) in March 1957. This center had for a long time the second most powerful transmitter after the one at Bucharest. At Tirgu-Mures and at Cluj (Kolozsvár) the Hungarians have always had daily programs. The number of hours transmitted in Hungarian has always varied, but it has been substantial. At both these broadcasting centers the Hungarians can listen to about one-third of the programs in their own language.

This does not mean that everything is well in this area. In terms of program content, the Hungarians are more frequently objects of propaganda than not. In this their fate does not differ greatly from that of the other inhabitants of Rumania. It does, however, limit the role of the media as instruments of cultural preservation. On the all-national level, this is apparent also in the limited use of Hungarian in the programs of the broadcasting center at Bucharest. Only one half-hour of news is provided on weekdays and twenty minutes on Sundays. The broadcasts transmitted for abroad from Bucharest also show a bias against the Hungarians. Thirteen languages are used

107 Ibid.
108 See any "Mősorkalauz," in the Saturday issues of Előre from March 1957 to the present.
to transmit to areas outside of Rumania, but Hungarian is not one of them.  

In The Vojvodina

As in the case of Rumania, so in Yugoslavia, from the end of the Second World War to the present, the mass media have played a significant role both as instruments of Party control and as vehicles for the preservation of nationality cultures. To evaluate the media in terms of this dual role the study will—as in the case of Transylvania—separate the analysis into two parts. The printed media will be considered first and radio and television second.

Newspapers, Periodicals and Magazines

In Yugoslavia, the right to publish newspapers and periodicals in the language of the minority nationalities has been considered an indication of the correct application of nationality policies. While no data has been obtained to indicate nationality publishing activity prior to 1953, we do know that the post-war period saw a vast expansion of nationality publications. In the inter-war period the Hungarians suffered a great lack in this respect. Their two major publications Kalángya and Hid were continuously ready to fold. Thus,


the period after the Second World War has been in this respect a great improvement over the past. By 1953 the Hungarians had seven periodicals and ten newspapers that appeared regularly.\textsuperscript{113}

This expansion in nationality publishing is a source of pride to the Yugoslav authorities. Consequently they have been assiduously collecting and publishing all data related to minority newspapers and periodicals. Tables XXI and XXII summarize the results of their efforts. As Table XXI shows, the number of Hungarian newspapers has remained relatively stable in the 1950's and 1960's. It has varied between eight and twelve in number, but in the number of issues published there has been a steady increase from 7,615,000 in 1953 to 15,687,000 in 1964.\textsuperscript{114} Since 1964 a slight decline has taken place, so that in 1966 there were 13,912,000 issues published.\textsuperscript{115}

In periodical publication a slightly different picture emerges. The number of periodicals has increased, while the number of issues has slightly decreased. Thus, Hungarian periodicals have increased from seven in 1953 to eleven in 1966. At the same time the number of their issues has decreased from 670,000 in 1955 to 508,000 in 1966.\textsuperscript{116} In general, the periodicals have had a somewhat more erratic development than the newspapers. However, as both Table XXI and Table XXII indicate, among all the non-Yugoslav nationalities, the Hungarians

\textsuperscript{113} Jugoslavija 1945-1964: Statistički Pregled, Table 20-13, p. 331.  
\textsuperscript{114} See Table XXI.  
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{116} See Table XXII.
TABLE XXI

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*This Table is based on data provided in the Yugoslavian statistical yearbooks which have been published since 1954. Consult Statistički Godisnjak FNRJ (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1954-1962), and Statistički Godisnjak SFRJ (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1963-1967).

**Data for the German language newspapers is available only for 1955, 1956, 1957 and 1958.
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TABLE XXII
NATIONAL MINORITY PERIODICALS IN YUGOSLAVIA*

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*This Table is based on data provided in the Yugoslavian statistical yearbooks which have been published since 1954. Consult Statistički Godisnjak FNRJ (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1954-1962), and Statistički Godisnjak SFRJ (Beograd: Savezni Zavod Za Statistiku, 1963-1967).

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have the most publications and the most issues. This is due not so much to their numbers as to the high rate of literacy among them.

The number of publications and the number of their issues, by itself, does not reveal whether the minority is under pressure from the majority. The fate of the Hungarians in Rumania attests to this. So, the examination of the contents of these publications is necessary. After all, these Hungarian language newspapers and periodicals could be used merely to facilitate the Party's control of the Hungarians, without any regard for Hungarian cultural survival.

A content analysis of Hid (the most influential periodical in the Vojvodina) and Magyar Szó (the largest Hungarian language daily newspaper of Yugoslavia) indicates that while the lip-service paid to "proletarian internationalism" is not much more pervasive than in Rumanian publications, the Hungarians have greater opportunity to use the media to further their own cultural development. One of the most outstanding indications of this is the constant concern for the expansion of cultural opportunities. Articles also abound in the discussion of Hungarian cultural development on a wider scale, throughout all the Hungarian inhabited areas of East-Central Europe.

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Furthermore, the writings of Hungarians from other countries frequently appear on the pages of periodicals like Hid. It is true that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia uses those publications to control the Hungarians, but the publications are in turn made to serve cultural needs also.

The above is not valid for Yugoslav publications in general. As in the case of Rumania, only the social, economic, political and cultural printed media appear in the languages of the minority nationalities. The technical and professional journals appear almost exclusively in Serbo-Croatian or Slovenian. Thus, as in the case of Rumania if anyone wishes to become accepted in professional circles, he (or she) must be proficient in the language(s) of the majority nationalities. In Yugoslavia the problem is mitigated somewhat by access to such professional journals published in Hungary. In Rumania, the latter are for the most part difficult to come by. Another mitigating factor is that in Yugoslavia books are published in Hungarian relating to technical and professional fields. In Rumania, this is not the case.

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120 This was the case in the summer of 1966. At that time, a personal effort to find such technical-professional journals failed to locate any in the Hungarian book and periodical stores of Novi Sad and Subotica.

The cultural-social-political publications in Yugoslavia do not propagate an ethnic nationalism under the guise of "socialist patriotism." They cannot do this, since no ethnic group can monopolize the designation of being Yugoslav. To be Yugoslav, one has to transcend narrow ethnic categories. Thus, the articles and editorials which refer to "socialist patriotism," always do so in reference to trans-ethnic goals. In Yugoslavia, "socialist patriotism" is truly unimaginable without "proletarian internationalism." The connection between the two is usually illustrated by the common Partisan struggles of all the people of Yugoslavia against the German occupiers. This tendency to equate "patriotism" with the trans-ethnic Partisan traditions of World War II ensures that none of the nationalities remain outside the Yugoslav political "mainstream." As was shown, a quite different situation prevails in Rumania.

The Airwaves: Radio and Television

In Yugoslavia too, much of what applies to the printed news

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media also applies to the electronic media. Government regulation is unchallenged. Both radio and television are first and foremost the channels of communication of the Party. As such, these media have been modernized and vastly expanded. In 1939 there were only 155,000 radio licenses in the country. By 1962 there were 2,040,000.\textsuperscript{124} For television, growth and expansion began only in the second half of the 1950's. The first television program was broadcast from Zagreb on May 15, 1956. Presently, three television studios operate in Yugoslavia, in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana.\textsuperscript{125}

It would be unfair to compare the post-war share of minority broadcasts to the pre-war situation. For one reason, the electronic news media have only become mass media in the post-war period. For another reason, in the pre-war period there were no ethnic minority broadcasting opportunities. In this respect, both Rumania and Yugoslavia improved conditions greatly after the war came to an end.

Radio broadcasting has been influenced much more than television by post-war efforts to increase programs in the language of the national minorities. While no exact data has been made available on this question, a perusal of the weekly listings of radio programs indicates that at least in the Vojvodina, Hungarians have the opportunity to listen to broadcasts in their own language. Of Yugoslavia's


\textsuperscript{125}\textit{Ibid.}
ten major broadcasting centers, two have Hungarian language programs on a regular basis. These are located in Novi Sad (Ujvidék) and Osijek (Eszék). The station at Novi Sad broadcasts 15 minutes of news daily in Hungarian. The station at Osijek provides one hour and fifteen minutes of news daily in Hungarian. Aside from these regular programs, both stations dedicate at least one or two hours per week to Hungarian popular and/or folk music.126

Yugoslav television does not offer the Hungarians a special program in their own language. In this respect Rumanian broadcasting is one step ahead. However, the Hungarians of the Vojvodina are geographically close enough to Budapest to pick up the programs of the major Hungarian television network. In fact, all the Hungarian language newspapers of Yugoslavia carry a complete listing of all television programs beamed from Budapest.127 This is a service that the Hungarian language papers in Rumania fail to provide. In this respect, Yugoslav policies are more favorable to the Hungarians.

This discrepancy in the Rumanian and Yugoslav policies can be explained, in part, by different views toward the relation of the Hungarian government to Hungarians living in areas outside its present

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127 Ibid.
borders. The Rumanians try to limit contacts between Hungary and the Hungarians of Transylvania.\textsuperscript{128} As a consequence, Rumanian broadcasting is in constant competition with Budapest.\textsuperscript{129} The recent addition of two weekly television programs in Hungarian may be indicative of this. The policy of silently ignoring Hungarian broadcasts coming from Budapest, makes this even clearer. Thus, the expansion of Hungarian language broadcasting in Rumania seems to be more a response to growing competition with Hungary than a policy of strengthening nationality opportunities.

The Yugoslav experience lends further support to the above observation. In recent years, relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia have been better than at any time either before or after World War II. However, the prevalence of cordial relations between the two states has not been followed by an expansion of Hungarian-language broadcasting in the Vojvodina. Instead, more cooperation has prevailed in the mutual publication of broadcasting programs.\textsuperscript{130} This is in contrast to policies of the past, particularly the time of the Tito-Stalin split, when relations were poorest between Hungary and Yugoslavia. At that time there were actually more Hungarian language broadcasts in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{128}Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28.
\item \textsuperscript{129}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{130}For example: "Jugoszláv Televízió-Magyar Televízió," \textit{Nap}, July 22, 1966, between pp. 18-19.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Vojvodina to counter the broadcasts of Rákosi's Hungary. This points out again that broadcasting time by itself is not an adequate indicator of nationality policies. Much more revealing is the content of the programs.

As the above description and comparison of Rumanian and Yugoslavian policies indicates, the Hungarian population in both is closely circumscribed in its access to the mass media. However, while in both countries there is close supervision of Hungarian use of the mass media, in Yugoslavia more leeway is allowed for publications and programs of a non-political nature. In Rumania, on the other hand, Hungarian language publications and broadcasts are primarily and overwhelmingly political in content. Thus, in Yugoslavia the mass media is a means of transmitting material and information which can at times contribute to the development and preservation of national cultures. In Rumania this is less frequently the case. Here, the news media are more prominent as instruments of Rumanization, or in the very least of denationalization.

III

To this point, we have only considered specific institutions and instruments for the transmission of ideas, values and culture. While we have also considered the content of the transmitted ideas and values, this was done from a rather narrow perspective (i.e., in

\[131\] This was pointed out to this student in a personal conversation, by a secretary for one of the Hungarian-language periodicals in the Vojvodina during the summer of 1966.
relation to specific means of transmission, such as schools, radio programs or newspapers). Now we will turn to an examination of the question of "content" from a more general perspective by considering those elements of Rumanian and Yugoslavian historical self-interpretation, literature and art, which reflect on the place of the minority nationalities in the respective societies.

In Rumania

Historical Self-Interpretations

Rumanian historical self-interpretations reveal a great deal about the treatment of the Hungarians of Transylvania. The national mythologies of the post-World War II period have placed them into an interesting relationship with the Rumanian majority. These mythologies see the Hungarians as one of the "co-inhabiting" nationalities that has had a share in the formation of modern Rumanian history. At the same time, the Hungarians are presented as sharing only in the "Socialist" traditions of the past. They are considered outsiders as far as the "national" history of Rumania is concerned.

This ambivalent relation of the Hungarians to the Rumanians is a consequence of two streams of recent historical interpretations. One emphasizes socialist traditions and "proletarian internationalism" while the other stresses national development and "socialist patriotism." The first stream of interpretation dominated Rumanian historical writings from 1945 until about 1956-58, while the more "national" orientation has become prominent since that time.
The interpretation and presentation of history has always had political significance for the inhabitants of Transylvania. Chapter I touched on the utilization of historical arguments by Hungarians and Rumanians in presenting their respective claims to Transylvania. With the advent of "proletarian internationalism" these arguments were dismissed by the Communist governments of Rumania and Hungary as mere devices of the past bourgeois regimes to divide the working classes along national lines in order to exploit them more easily. The Communist regimes turned historical study away from these divisive claims to "studies" which demonstrated the common destiny of all workers, regardless of nationality.

132 Michael J. Rura, Reinterpretation of History as a Method of Furthering Communism in Rumania (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1961), pp. 1-2, also demonstrates the predominant national strain in pre-World War II Rumanian historiography.

133 Bányai, "Forum: Irodalomtanítás és Hazafias Nevelés," p. 239, states: "The teaching of history was a special tool of the former Hungarian and Rumanian capitalist-landowner regimes for the furtherance and extension of chauvinistic and nationalistic prejudices. The teaching of literature had a similar role. As opposed to this, socialist history and literature teaching strengthens the brotherly unity of our nation's workers in the spirit of proletarian internationalism."

134 While these divisive claims were not debated (prior to the summer of 1964) this does not mean they had ever been completely abandoned. For example, Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 92f., restates many of the claims (e.g., origins, colonization, etc.) which had been first presented by pre-Communist historians. However, the emphasis in these works is rather on unifying factors. In fact, some events are completely ignored and insignificant occurrences stressed in order to drive home the idea of class unity regardless of nationality. Some examples of this can be found in the treatment of historical events by Tibor Oláh, "Moldva és Havasalföld Egyesülésének Centenárium," Igaz Szó, VII (Jan., 1959), 7; Endre Kákássy, "Anyag és Adat: Moldva és Havasalföld Egyesülése a Korabeli Kírakok Tökrében," Igaz Szó, VII (Jan., 1959), 116-117, 120; György Adorján and Victoria Marinescu, "A Nemzetségi
Rumanian historical interpretations were permeated in the early post-war years with the general spirit of "proletarian internationalism," fostered by both the CPR and the Soviet Union. This historiography was dominated by the precepts of Communist ideology and the influence of Soviet historiography. Two main threads of thought thus became ingrained in the Rumanian post-war interpretations of history. The first stressed the importance of class struggle and class solidarity throughout Rumania's past. The second emphasized the importance of Russian and Slavic influence on the cultural and political development of Rumania.

The interest of the nationalities was relatively well served by


The tactical purpose of this favorable "proletarian internationalist" setting has already been examined in Chapters I and II. Wolff, "Rumania," in The Fate of East Central Europe ed. Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), p. 261, maintains that one of the motives for this early policy was the Russian desire to reduce Rumanian nationalism. Whatever the motive, Rura, Reinterpretation of History, pp. 8-9, 17, presents the strong influence of Soviet historians on early postwar Rumanian attempts in this field.


Ibid., also shows the great importance of the emphasis in Communist Rumanian historiography on the debt of the country to Slavic and particularly Russian influence and culture. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 459, 575.
this historiography as it reduced the nationalism and the extremist assertions of the majority nationality, which in the past had presented the minorities as mere interlopers. Now, instead of presenting them as second-rate citizens and interlopers, the history of the R.P.R. was revised to show them as equals on the basis of class struggle and solidarity. Past events, like the "Revolutions" of Dózsa György and that of 1848, were reinterpreted to show that, regardless of nationality, the oppressed segments of society all had a common destiny which was class-bound.

More recent trends in Rumanian historiography seem to point in a different direction, which has become apparent particularly in the past ten years. The new direction is evident in Rumanian histories discussing Transylvania and its nationalities, and Rumania's relations with the Soviet Union. References to Russian or Slavic influence on

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140 It is, of course, difficult to compare the earlier works with the more recent ones. A number of obstacles stand in the way of such a comparison. First, the language barrier; second, the fact that earlier sources are relatively scarce; and third, the similarity of methodological procedure (e.g., collective scholarship) in the studies often blurs their dissimilarities. Due to these difficulties the analysis of historiography has been mainly carried out through the examination of secondary sources. Two revealing sources have been book reviews and the news concerning historical conferences. In both areas since 1964 there has been a strong turn toward Rumanian nationalism. See C. Daicoviciu, "Debates of Historians," *Contemporanul* (May 29, 1964) trans. in

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Rumania are now toned down. Where previously the U.S.S.R. had received lavish praise from Rumanian historians, it now receives little credit. Rumanian "nationalism," in spite of ideological hindrance has reasserted itself, and is belittling the role of the Russians and the Slavs while enhancing the role of the Rumanians.

Rumanian writings concerning the ethnic minorities of Transylvania reveal a similar "nationalist" tendency. This latter trend affects the nationalities directly. As in inter-war Rumania, so in the R.P.R. the question of origins and continuity is again becoming a

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142 Ibid., pp. 25, 27. However, the relatively recent historical writings do not show this process too clearly. The emphasis on Slavic influence is still important in Short Document on Rumania, p. 8, and this seems also the case according to Keith Hitchins, "Book Review: Istoria Romniei, Vol. 1," Balkan Studies, IV (1963), 183. Yet, these latter sources are already dated to a certain degree, since the new "nationalist" trend in historiography vis-à-vis the Slavs begins only in the spring of 1964.
dominant area of historical research.\textsuperscript{143} But, more alarming than this is the "re-re-interpretation" of the role of nationalities in such events as the Revolution of 1848. New historical treatments present what has been termed "double-subjugation."\textsuperscript{144} Rumanian historians in their writings have abandoned a solely class-determined explanation and have combined it with a national one. In this way, Rumanian historians can claim that the role of the nationality groups (particularly the role of Germans and Hungarians) in the past, was to subjugate the Rumanians and the Slavs under their rule regardless of class.\textsuperscript{145} This inversion of former interpretations puts the nationalities back into the position of former "oppressors," who are now ruled

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{144} This concept of "double-subjugation" is a recent (spring of 1964) interpretation of Rumanian-Hungarian relations of the past. Short Document on Rumania, pp. 8-11, and Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 129, still stress the class subjugation of Rumanians and Hungarians alike. The new "double-subjugation" thesis is presented in Daicoviciu, "Debates of Historians"; Unc, "Book Review: . . ."; Lungu, "Book Review: . . ."; Bailey, p. 27; Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive." Also indicative of this trend is the erection of a bust in the honor of Stephan Ludvig Roth in Medias (Megyes) in the spring of 1964. Roth had been a "Saxon" leader who, together with the Rumanians, opposed the Hungarian insurrection of 1848. He was shot in 1849, by the Hungarians as a traitor and the enemy of Hungarian freedom and independence. The celebration of Roth clearly shows the nationalist reassertion of the Rumanians vis-a-vis the Hungarians. The above event was noted in the May 16 issue of Előre according to "Hirek: Údvorolnak a Szászoknak," Transylvánia, VI (June, 1964), 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{145} Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania"; Daicoviciu, "Debates of Historians," p. 3.
\end{itemize}
by the formerly "oppressed."

The historical self-interpretations of the past ten or fifteen years de-emphasize Hungarian-Rumanian relations in all but the "socialist" traditions of the country. In the writings concerning both the Rumanian acquisition of Transylvania and the development of the Rumanian people, the Hungarians are either left out or they are given a negative role. Thus, the old national myths of the inter-war years have been revived to prove Rumanian prior occupation of Transylvania. This is done by concentrating studies on the Dacian kingdom of the third century A.D. It is also done by stressing only the Rumanian traditions of Transylvania. This Rumanian nationalist

146 One of the foremost indications of this is the "rehabilitation" of the anti-Hungarian Rumanian historian, Nicolae Iorga. His works provide the foundation for most of the arguments for continuity of "Romanian" history from Decebal (2nd century A.D.) to the present. See: "25th Anniversary of Assassination of Scientist Nicolae Iorga," Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, no. 22 (Dec. 1, 1965), pp. 12-13.

147 The recent celebration of the 50th anniversary (Dec. 1, 1968) of Transylvania's incorporation into Rumania, provided the opportunity for the writing of some of these historical self-interpretations. See: "Jubilee of Transylvania's Union with Romania," Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, Nos. 22-23 (Dec. 5, 1968), pp. 6-9; "New Books: Review of C.C. Giurescu's 'Transylvania in the History of the Romanian People,'" Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, No. 12 (June 30, 1968), pp. 14-15; Constantin Daicoviciu, "The Achievement of the Unitary State--an Age-Old Aspiration of the Romanian People," Documents, Articles and Information on Rumania, No. 21 (Nov. 15, 1968), pp. 8-9.


149 Along this line see particularly Daicoviciu, "The Achievement of the Unitary State . . .," pp. 8-9. He summarizes two-thousand years in the history of Transylvania without once mentioning Hungarians. This is quite an achievement since from 895 to 1918 the area's history was primarily Hungarian in content.
interpretation of history has two consequences. It cuts off the Hungarians from the history of Rumania and it exaggerates the importance of the Rumanians in the history of Transylvania and the Balkans. This type of historical interpretation fans nationalistic claims and also relegates the Hungarians into the position of "late-comers" or "foreigners."

Literature, Publishing and Libraries

While these "nationalist" tendencies are relatively easy to trace in historical self-interpretations, they are more difficult to trace in literature. It is, nevertheless, possible to discern the pattern of Rumanian nationalism here also. The perusal of the Rumanian, Hungarian language literary periodicals Igaz Szó, Korunk and Utunk have proved fruitful. In fact, the pattern that emerges is not unlike that produced by the analysis of Rumanian historical writings.

As in the case of Rumanian historical studies, the literary creations up until the autumn of 1956, also reflected the spirit

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150 In spite of this, the underlying similarities of Party control vis-à-vis literature and historiography enable any investigation to confront literature, like historiography, as part of the repertoire available to the Party-State control-system. The differences of Party control are mainly due to tactical demands. The role of the respective fields is, however, the same. See Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 576-577; "Literature and the Arts," Romania, ed. Fischer-Galati, pp. 172-173, 174.

of "proletarian internationalism." By 1958, there are indications that some literary works began to experiment with the treatment of more "national" Rumanian topics. Yet, these were few and rather the exception than the rule. What indicated to a greater extent the "turn" toward more national interests was the revival of many of Rumania's past literary greats. Writers like I. L. Caragiale, Vasile Alecsandri, Mihail Eminescu, Alexandru Davila and some others were again presented on stage and their works were republished. Classical Rumanian literature was revived and again made available to the Rumanian public.

For the minority nationalities the revival of Rumanian national literature meant a further encroachment on the development of their respective "national forms" in literature. Instead of being allowed

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152 Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 178, notes that: "The national minorities also have a flourishing literature. This is something typical of the new conditions and of the equality enjoyed by the national minorities and guaranteed by the people's democratic regime. So among many others we have the poetry of Imre Horváth and László Szabó and the prose writings of István Nagy, István Asztalos ..." It is ironic that the poet Szabó, mentioned by Daicoviciu, committed suicide in protest to infringements on Hungarian cultural institutions (i.e., Bolyai University) in the same year when Daicoviciu's book went to the press.


154 It is in the field of literature that perhaps the earliest return to national forms took place. "Literature and the Arts," Romania, pp. 175-176, already presents this trend as in full swing prior to 1956.
to revive their own great literary classics, to the Hungarian, German and other nationalities were encouraged to adopt the Rumanian classics as their own. The articles in Igaz Szó reflect this policy of literary Rumanization. In the issues of this periodical appearing after 1956, articles translated from Rumanian appear in ever increasing numbers. These contributions present a good cross-section of classical and contemporary Rumanian writers.

Besides the increasing number of Rumanian contemporary and classical works, the Hungarian minority is permitted to read the works of its "own" contemporary writers and selected writings of

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155 In fact, limitations have even been placed on their reading of contemporary Communist Hungarian literature, from areas outside Rumania (e.g., Hungary, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Carpatho-Ukraine) as is indicated by "Olvasók Forum," Igaz Szó, pp. 794-795; Tibor Dénes, "Az Erdélyi Magyar Kultura 1970-ben," Irodalmi Ujság (July-Aug., 1970), p. 7.

156 Fischer-Galati, "Rumania," pp. 164-165, in his discussion of the regime's efforts to stem the tide of "unhealthy"activities and "national isolation" does not specifically refer to the adoption of Rumanian classics for the minorities. However, to reduce "nationalism" and "isolationism," it is apparent from other sources (see below) that the regime has fostered the reading of Rumanian classical and contemporary literature among the Hungarian minority.

"left-democratic" writers of the past like Ady Endre and József Attila. These latter works are all in the spirit of "proletarian internationalism," unlike the enumerated Rumanian works which call for "socialist patriotism" and pride in the achievements of the R.P.R. Thus, the Hungarians are robbed of their own national consciousness, while at the same time they are extolled to become better Rumanians. In this way the minorities find that their right to use the mother tongue does not include the right to read the literature that goes with the mother tongue. Instead, they have to be satisfied with translations of Rumanian authors and the stilted, artificial products of the minority authors who write in the Hungarian, German or Yiddish language but who think in the Rumanian.

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158Pányai, "Forum: Irodalom Tanítás és Hazafias Nevelés," pp. 238-241, presents the rigid qualifications that must be met by the writers of the past before their works are ideologically accepted as reading material for the Hungarian minority. Some examples of the type of reading material having origins outside Rumania include: the official Hungarian Communist Party stand regarding "reactionary" writers, "Forum: A 'Népi' Irokról," A MSZMP Központi Bizottsága Mellett Működő Kulturális Elméleti Munkaközösség Állásfogaláása" (condensed, appeared originally in Társadalmi Szemle No. 6, 1958) Igaz Szó, VI (Oct., 1958), 452-479; the castigation of evidences of "revisionism" in the writings of George Lukács by József Szigeti, "Művész Alkotás és Pártosság Lukács György Esztétikájában," (taken from Társadalmi Szemle No. 9, 1958) Igaz Szó, VI (Sept., 1959), 283-297; the preachments of past writers like József Attila and Ady Endre against nationalism or for collaboration with the Rumanians. Even in this case, usually someone writes about what these individuals said rather than presenting the original works of the authors concerned. Along this line see Endre Bustya, "Szemle: Ady Endre, Vallomás a Patriotizmusrol," Igaz Szó, VI (June, 1958), 924; Veronica Porumbacu, "A Szocializmus Kortársa," Igaz Szó, XI (Jan., 1963), 102, 104.

The pressure on Hungarian literary publications is indicated by yet another consideration. This is their isolation from worldwide Hungarian literary developments. Little or no contact seems to take place with Hungarian writers in Yugoslavia, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Hungary. At any rate, references are rarely made to Hungarian literary productions outside Rumania. Only ideological works from "foreign" authors are given certain consideration. In a real sense this means that the Transylvanian Hungarians are closed off from the major literary trends of their people. This stifles their own literary development to a considerable degree.

This policy in literature carries over to the government's attitude toward book publishing and libraries. Besides censoring the writings which are in conflict with Communist ideology, recent censorship also has been extended to those works which conflict with the Rumanian nationalism expressed in "socialist patriotism." The result has been a two front campaign designed to undermine the cultural "national form" of the Transylvanian minorities. The first is the "positive" tactic of publishing more and more Rumanian works in the language of the national minorities. The second consists of

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162 See: Domonkos, A Román Irodalom Magyar Bibliográfíája.
disbanding many old libraries, which are overwhelmingly minority libraries, and scattering their contents throughout the country.\textsuperscript{163} Since these libraries contain works mainly from pre-Communist days, many works are consigned to trashheaps as unfit for the furtherance of Rumanian "socialist patriotism."\textsuperscript{164}

This does not mean, however, that book publishing in the Hungarian language is being reduced. As with everything else, opportunities in this area are closely tied to domestic and international political developments. As Table XXIII indicates, publishing activity in the language of the ethnic minorities has been reduced to some extent since the Hungarians revolted in 1956. From 917 titles in 1957 the number of ethnic minority books has been reduced to 519 titles in 1964. This reduction does not show the Hungarian share of titles. However, in the same period that the number of minority titles were being reduced the number of books published in the country rose from 2,469 in 1959 to 3,268 in 1963.\textsuperscript{165} This indicates, that

\textsuperscript{163}"The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76. It is also interesting and ironic to note in this connection the impounding of the old Hungarian Library at Aiud (Nagyenyed). Just a few years ago (1959) Daicoviciu, \textit{Rumania}, p. 507, could still boast of Rumania's benevolent treatment of the Hungarian minority by referring to the famous many centuries old (six centuries to be exact) College and Library of Aiud; which showed to the world "the common struggle waged by Rumanians and Magyars against the tyrants."

\textsuperscript{164}Of course this purge of "unfit" books affected Rumanian works as well as those of the minorities, as Rura, pp. viii-ix points out. However, the later impoundings and confiscations have affected mainly the Hungarian libraries.

\textsuperscript{165}See Table XXIII and \textit{Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964}, Table 137, p. 265.
TABLE XXIII

BOOKS AND BOOKLETS PUBLISHED IN THE LANGUAGES OF THE NATIONAL MINORITIES IN RUMANIA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Titles</th>
<th>Editorial Sheets</th>
<th>Average Volume of One Title in Editorial Sheets</th>
<th>Number of Copies in Thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>4,322</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>3,855</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>7,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>3,673</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>5,001</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>5,920</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>5,832</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955**</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>4,736</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarian Share</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>3,139</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German Share</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956**</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>5,617</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>3,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hungarian Share</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>3,740</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German Share</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>6,319</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>6,830</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>2,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>5,291</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>2,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>5,517</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>3,895</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>3,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>5,665</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>3,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>5,357</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>3,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>4,951</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3,153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This Table is based on Anuarul Statistic Al R.P.R. 1965 (Bucuresti: Directia Centrara De Statistica, 1965), Table 256, p. 532; Anuarul Statistic Al R.P.R. 1957 (Directiunea Centrara DeStatistica; Bucuresti: Editura Stiintifica, 1957), Table 138, p. 222.

**Aside from 1955-1956, Rumanian statistics are not available indicating the share of the respective minorities.
minority publishing--of which the Hungarian language books are the most numerous--has stagnated while Rumanian publishing has been expanded.

It is, perhaps, due to this stagnation--as well as international developments (the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968)--that efforts have been expanded recently to encourage nationality publications. A new publishing house was established in the early part of 1970 which is to deal strictly with nationality titles. The "Kriterion" publishing house (this is its official name) has already published a number of Hungarian works.\textsuperscript{166} It remains to be seen whether or not such a separate publishing house will actually raise the number of works published in minority languages. It also remains to be seen whether or not this new set-up eliminates the great gaps in the content of nationality titles. This is particularly relevant for Hungarian titles, which have rarely included technical and professional works, or works which would make the Transylvanians more conscious of their linguistic affiliations and their national history.\textsuperscript{167}

The Fine Arts

In the area of music, drama and the plastic arts a great deal more leeway is allowed individual representatives of the national minorities. The Rumanian government encourages cultural development by providing certain opportunities (e.g., folklore festivals, exhibitions,

\textsuperscript{166}Varga, "A Megmaradás Irodalma," p. 84.

\textsuperscript{167}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 84-86.
musical contests, etc.) and facilities (e.g., opera houses, theatres, museums, etc.). At the same time, this development must not conflict with the Communist order in Rumania. The latter consideration is the major limitation on the creative urge among both Hungarians and Rumanians.

In Transylvania there are some indications that besides Party restrictions, there may also be certain Rumanian "national" restrictions on Hungarian artists. While the government fosters development in the fine arts and attempts to involve all segments of the population in cultural activities, it seems to do this on the basis of a double-standard. It encourages the "revival" of all Rumanian national art forms, while it allows the Hungarians only the "folk" forms of their national culture.

This Rumanian cultural policy is discernable from even a superficial examination of Rumanian tourist pamphlets designed for Western

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168 "Literature and the Arts," Romania, pp. 180-181; Burillianu, "Cultural Life in Captive Rumania," pp. 129, 134, 149, 155-157. Two areas, which play an important role for cultural development in general but are less concerned with the position of the minorities per se, are the Rumanian-Soviet Institute (recently curtailed in activity) and the motion-picture industry of the R.P.R. Burillianu discusses this on pp. 158 and 162. Also see Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 578-580.

169 Daicoviciu, Rumania, p. 189, presents some of the "opportunities." József Faragó, "Anyag és Adat: Háromszéki Magyar Miorita," Igaz Szó, VII (Oct., 1959), 689-695, indicates that "folk" culture can also demonstrate not only the interdependence of Hungarian and Rumanian people's culture, but that the Hungarians "owe" a great deal to the Rumanians in this area.
consumption. Such propaganda brochures present with great skill the art treasures of Rumania, regardless of their origin—whether they were products of medieval, bourgeois, or proletarian culture. But there is little or no mention of the great art treasures of Transylvania of past ages which point to the Hungarian and German cultural life of the area. In fact, this policy of erasing nationality cultural accomplishments has taken particularly objectionable forms recently. These include the demolition of the ruins of non-Rumanian castles, which provide historical links for the Transylvanians with their Hungarian past. One of the recent examples of this policy has been the regime's attempt to demolish the Church of St. László in Orodea (Nagyvárad), which is a church of great interest for medievalists both in art and architecture.

Nationalist cultural policies, however, are blurred by the great strides made by the regime in spreading cultural facilities to

170 See in this regard issues of Rumania for Tourists, Rumania Today, or such specific brochures as Monuments of Religious Art in Rumania, and Livres Anciens en Roumanie (Bucharest: Commission Nationale de la R. P. Romaine Pour L'Unesco, 1962).

171 Daicoviciu, Rumania, pp. 507, 511, sometimes violates the above generalization by acknowledging the contribution of Hungarians or Germans in one or two special cases. But then he proceeds to belittle the role of these same nationalities in other cases (pp. 197-198, 523).


all areas of the country. The national minorities have been given a proportional share in these institutions. Thus, of the 37 state supported theatres 6 belong to the Hungarians, 2 to the Germans and 2 to the Jews. A similar policy is followed in relation to opera houses, orchestra halls, museums, houses of culture and folk-culture study centers. But even while the facilities are distributed proportionally to all nationalities, it must be remembered that the productions, exhibitions, etc., which appear in these centers of culture, are controlled and censored by a government which is becoming more nationalistic and more intolerant toward non-Rumanian art forms.

The extent of this intolerance is reflected in the themes of recent cultural productions. In the movie-making industry the Rumanians have stressed nationalist themes, which place the Hungarians particularly in a disadvantageous light. Two examples are "Dacians" and "The Column." Both these films portray the ancestors of

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174 This should be qualified, however, by the fact that recently a similar process like that of "parallelization" in the educational system has been evident in the theatrical world. See Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 27.

175 The Theatre in the Rumanian People's Republic (Bucharest: Meridians - "Scinteia House," 1961), pp. 7-8, 12-13. However, these figures should be taken with a grain of salt. It is probably more correct to assume that about half of these minority theatres are "sections" of Rumanian establishments rather than "independent" ones. Some further statistics regarding theaters in the R.P.R. may be found in Rumanian Statistical Pocket Book 1964, pp. 260-263, Table 133. Also See Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, pp. 456-457, and Daicoviciu, Rumania, pp. 189, 288, 684-685, 759-762, 818-819.

176 A brief description of these films is provided in: "A New Romanian Film: The Column," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, Nos. 22-23 (Dec. 5, 1968), p. 19.
present-day Rumanians as defenders of Western Civilization against the incursions of barbarian horsemen from the East (Huns, Avars, Bulgars, Hungarians?). The film-industry supports in this way a national mythology that is exclusivist. Films stressing the solidarity of all peoples in Transylvania seem no longer to be in vogue. The only such film that has been produced recently, dealt with the Dózsa György peasant uprising. However, this was mainly a Budapest production.177

In theatre, a similar one-sided situation prevails. While the Rumanian language theatres frequently present plays written by Rumanians covering Rumanian themes, the Hungarian language theatres rarely have the chance to present the plays of Hungarian authors or plays which have Hungarian themes. A perusal of theatre productions during the years 1965-1970, indicates that the dramas of Rumanian and non-Hungarian writers completely dominate the Hungarian language stage of Transylvania.178 Furthermore, when theatre groups from Hungary tour Rumania, they can perform only in Bucharest and other cities which fall far from Hungarian inhabited Transylvania.179

In the world of music and the plastic arts less restrictions prevail. From available information concerning music, painting and sculpture, it is possible to conclude that Hungarians are given more

177 Excerpts of the text of this film are reproduced under "Láncosok" in Előre, June 22, 1969, p. 4.

178 A slightly more favorable situation prevails in relation to musical productions. See along this line Ferenc László's, "Profil és Arnyék," in Előre, May 4, 1969, p. 4.

extensive opportunities than either in the world of motion-pictures or theatre. In fact, many of the foremost artists of Rumania are of Hungarian extraction. Thus, it is possible to conclude that less national persecution takes place in Rumania's policies toward individuals who excel in music, painting or sculpture.

In Yugoslavia

Historical Self-Interpretations

Like its Rumanian counterpart, Yugoslavia's historical self-interpretation reveals a great deal about the country's policies toward its minorities, particularly the Hungarians. The nature of Yugoslavia's self-interpretation has undergone a number of significant changes. These can be considered in three phases: the post-war period, the era of Soviet-Yugoslav discord and the period following the East-Central European upheavals of 1956.

The experience of World War II provided Yugoslavia with its major source of self-definition. This experience produced the "Partizan myth" discussed earlier. It also provided the definition of the proper historical roles and relationships of the Yugoslav peoples and the national minorities in the expansion of Communism.

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181 See Chapters I and II.
In the immediate post-war period the historical works tended to stress the themes of war guilt, progressive versus reactionary nations, and the major role of the South Slavic nationalities in the liberation of Yugoslavia. These themes usually appeared together. They not only provided an interpretation of the war, but also a rationalization for the post-war treatment of the German, Albanian, Italian and Hungarian minorities.

World War II is presented in these writings as the great world conflict in which the progressive forces led by the Soviet Union, destroy the forces of reaction led by Nazi Germany. Closely tied to this world conflict is the Yugoslav struggle for national independence and social transformation. The partizan conflict against the foreign occupation is portrayed as the South Slav peoples' struggle leading to the country's liberation and communization. In this struggle, the role of the ethnic minorities was originally considered either minimal or negative. The Germans of the Vojvodina were presented as the outright collaborators of the Nazis. The other non-Slav nationalities--including the Hungarians--were less sweepingly condemned. In the case of the Hungarians the condemnation was directed mainly at their "ruling classes."  

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After the "enemies of Yugoslav independence and social transformation" were liquidated, a re-evaluation of their role took place in historical writings. This re-evaluation corresponds roughly to the political ideological dispute with the U.S.S.R. In the years 1948-49, as outside political pressure mounts and as the threat of Soviet intervention grows, the emphasis in Yugoslavia falls on solidarity among all the peoples. This stress on a common destiny and unity in the face of adversity, puts the Hungarians and the other non-Slavic nationalities back into Yugoslav history. The historical writings which emerge at this time, "prove" that the Hungarians and other nationalities fought "shoulder to shoulder" with the South Slavs against the foreign invader during World War II.

From the Tito-Stalin rift to the present (1970), this line of argument dominates. In reference to the Hungarians, it exaggerates their partisan role by stressing the Petőfi Brigade and the interwar Communist movements of the Vojvodina. The Petőfi Brigade, in particular, has been embellished greatly to give the impression of popular support for the "national liberation war."


of the struggle became much more than South-Slav liberation. It has become the event which has ended national and social exploitation of all peoples. This latter interpretation means that all nationalities--except the Germans--find that they are no longer considered "outsiders" in Yugoslav history books.

In general, the Yugoslav self-interpretations--historical self-definitions--have been broadened and made more tolerant over the years. This has meant that the "national destiny" of Yugoslavia has been much freer of ethnic exclusivism than is the case in Rumania. In the latter instance, both the war experience and the revival of "Daco-Roman" myths, has emphasized the ethnic Rumanian destiny of the country. On this score the Hungarians of Transylvania have much less opportunity to identify with Rumanian national self-interpretations, than their fellow nationals have in the Vojvodina to identify with Yugoslavia's.

Literature, Publishing and Libraries

Yugoslavia's historical self-interpretation and its consequences are also reflected in the literary and publishing activities of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina. The major trends and opportunities of a literary nature are indicated by the periodicals published in Hungarian. The periodical Hid and the experimental publication Uj Symposion,

provide two of the most important sources in this area. The development of these two publications—as of Magyar Szó—mirrors the evolution of the cultural life of Hungarians in the Vojvodina.

As the perusal of Hid reveals, until about 1949-50, there was very little in the way of Hungarian literature in Yugoslavia. The articles in Hid and many other publications appeared in Hungarian, but were concerned primarily with CPY propaganda rather than Hungarian culture. As a Hungarian writer of this period admits, much that went by the name of literature was for the most part "directed" writing serving socialism as the new political order. It was a period when "revolutionary slogans" composed much of the content of Hid. Only in 1950 is there a shift away from such strictly politically oriented writings.

The Hungarian writers of this transition period found it difficult to adjust to the new Yugoslavia. Many continued to write from a particularist, regionalist perspective. Although they were all champions of the "new order," their literary contributions manifested a certain isolation from literary developments throughout the rest of Yugoslavia. To remedy this situation, the government fostered a policy of translation of Hungarian literary works into Serbo-Croatian. This policy immediately broadened the perspectives of the Hungarian writers.

190 Ibid.
191 Ibid., pp. 294-295.
192 Ibid., p. 295.
Their audience had been expanded to include others besides their own people. Thus, they could no longer remain just regional and just ethnic writers of the Vojvodina. At any rate, the new generation of writers, seems to have become more cosmopolitan in orientation and at the same time also less ideological.\(^{193}\)

While Hungarian writers have abandoned their narrowed perspective, they have not been hindered in the publication of Hungarian language works. Unlike their Rumanian counterparts, they have not been deluged by translations of the works of the majority nationality. Although many Serbo-Croatian works have been translated into Hungarian it seems that reciprocity prevails in this area. Many Hungarian works are translated into Serbo-Croatian, although not quite as many as Serbo-Croatian works into Hungarian.\(^{194}\) This contrasts favorably with the situation in Rumania, where the predominant trend is all one-sided in favor of Rumanian works, which are translated into Hungarian.\(^{195}\)

A content analysis of the literary productions also favors the Yugoslav setting as against the Rumanian. Hungarian writers—both classical and modern—are generally more favorably received by the publishers. In large part this is due to the "Forum" publisher of Novi Sad, which concentrates on the publication of Hungarian

\(^{193}\)Ibid.


\(^{195}\)Domonkos, A Román Irodalom Magyar Bibliográfiaja.
works. In Rumania, such an "independent" Hungarian publisher is inconceivable. Only very recently, have the nationalities obtained the "Kriterion" publisher. However, the latter is a publisher for all non-Rumanian works. None of the nationalities have exclusively their own publisher.

Also indicative of Yugoslavia's more tolerant view toward its nationalities is the content of nationality publications. The Hungarian publication Hid, contains much more material that is cultural than its Rumanian counterparts Igaz Szó and Korunk. While these Rumanian periodicals concentrate much of their attention on translations of Rumanian works and propaganda articles, Hid is primarily concerned with literary and cultural problems. This is not to say that Hid is free of translated materials or propaganda, it is merely to say that it is less dominated by them. Furthermore, the political propaganda which appears--particularly recently--in Hid, reflects a more tolerant atmosphere than that which appears in Korunk or Igaz Szó. Unlike the Rumanian stress on "socialist patriotism" and "Daco-Roman" antecedents, the writings in Hid have continued to reflect "proletarian internationalist" ideals, particularly in discussions of World War II and the struggle against Nazi occupation.197

Book publishing reflects this atmosphere also. Over the years the publishing opportunities of the Hungarians have been constantly

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197See footnote 186 above.
expanded. This is particularly true since 1964. As Table XXIV reveals, from 1953 to 1963 a yearly average of 51 Hungarian books were published in Yugoslavia. In 1964 and 1965 respectively, more than twice that number were published. By 1966 the number of such books had increased to 152.\(^{198}\) Parallel to this development there has also been an increase in the overall volume of the number of books published.

This expansion of Hungarian publishing activity in Yugoslavia contrasts favorably with the dwindling publishing activities of the minorities in Rumania.\(^{199}\) However, the Yugoslav policies are more responsive to minority needs in yet another way. Unlike Rumanian policies, they do not try to isolate their Hungarian minority from the literary and cultural publications of Hungarians in Hungary or other "socialist" lands. This is shown both by international debates which take place on the pages of Hid among Hungarians and also by the content of books published for them in Yugoslavia. In the case of Rumania, the Hungarians suffer a great lack by being deprived of such international contacts.\(^{200}\)

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\(^{198}\)Between 1951 and 1954 the situation was even more favorable for the Hungarians. In 1951 they had 120 titles, in 1952, 83 titles, and in 1953, 65 titles. It seems that in response to international political pressure, (Tito-Stalin Conflict) the Hungarians were given more opportunities to publish. As this pressure diminished with the death of Stalin, the number of Hungarian titles also declined. For this data see Statistički Godisnjak FNRJ 1954 (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku i Evidenciju, 1954), Table 278, p. 349.

\(^{199}\)Compare the data of Tables XXIII and XXIV. The favorable position of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia does not mean that they do not have some problems in this area. See János Horváth, "Hiányoznak a Magyar Könyvek" Magyar Szó, May 16, 1970, as quoted in Nemzetőr, July-Aug., 1970, p. 12.

TABLE XXIV*

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS PUBLISHED IN THE LANGUAGES OF THREE SELECTED NATIONAL MINORITIES IN YUGOSLAVIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>German**</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Albanian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of titles</td>
<td>No. of copies</td>
<td>No. of titles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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*This Table is based on Statistički Godisnjak SFRJ 1967 (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1967), Table 127-19, p. 301; Statistički Godisnjak SFRJ 1964 (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1964), Table 126-15, p. 328; Jugoslavia 1945-1964: Statistički Pregled (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1965), Table 20-14, p. 332; Statistički Godisnjak FNRJ 1959 (Beograd: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1959), Table 2-310, p. 267.

**Most of the books published in German are intended for East and West Germany rather than the few Germans left in Yugoslavia.
The Fine Arts

Music, drama and the plastic arts among the Hungarians of the Vojvodina seem to receive ample state support. This support involves controls. However, the cultural policies of Yugoslavia allow the Hungarians more leeway to develop their "national forms" than Rumania's policies. This difference between the two countries is due primarily to Yugoslavia's internal "liberalization" following the Tito-Stalin split and also the country's heterogeneous ethnic make-up.

Since no single nationality has a dominant majority position in Yugoslavia, it is impossible to find agreement as to what composes the "national" culture of the land. It is generally contended that the South Slavic cultures together, provide the country with its major sources of cultural identification. However, the diversity of these cultures makes the exclusivist claims or privileged treatment of any one of them highly unlikely. Thus, the cultural diversity of the non-Slavic nationalities is tolerated and preserved by the cultural diversity of the majority nationalities.

The rift which developed between Yugoslavia and the "socialist camp" in the late 1940's also increased nationality cultural opportunities in the long-run. In terms of immediate consequences the

Tito-Stalin split actually worsened nationality relations. But the general liberalization which followed on the domestic scene, eventually contributed to increased national opportunities in the area of music and art. The conflict with Stalin led to the isolation of Yugoslavia in the cultural as well as the political and economic area. Consequently, the Yugoslavs turned to the West to break out of their isolation. In the cultural area this involved, among other things, an extensive film exchange program. This and other exchanges with the West, worked to make Yugoslav cultural policies more flexible than that of the other East-Central European states.

This flexibility meant--after Rákosi was eclipsed temporarily by Nagy--that Hungarians in the Vojvodina were able to gain access to films produced in Hungary. However, the number of films rarely exceeded three per year prior to 1964. This number compares unfavorably with the number of films allowed in from other countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Italy, France and the U.S.S.R., none of which have substantial fellow-nationals living in Yugoslavia. It also seems one-sided, when one considers that Hungary imported 21 and 10 Yugoslav


204 Ibid.
films in 1963 and 1964 respectively. Hungary has a very small Serbian population which does not even come near in size to the half-million Hungarians in the Vojvodina. However, this lack of imported Hungarian films in the Vojvodina is still better than the film policies of Rumania. In the rare instance when a Hungarian film finds its way to Transylvania, it ends up with a deliberately unsynchronized soundtrack.205

The films available to the Hungarians in the Vojvodina are primarily non-Hungarian. However, the content of these films is not anti-Hungarian. Western films are all of the light variety, with emphasis on entertainment. Yugoslav films, on the other hand, are set to perpetuate attitudes which tone down ethnic animosities. Thus, World War II and the Partisan struggles provide one of the major sources for the themes of Yugoslav films.206 The latter stresses common struggle against foreign oppression. It propagates solidarity among the nationalities and minorities of the country by emphasizing proletarian internationalism. As opposed to this, Rumanian film policies have begun to emphasize the strictly "national" heroic-historical themes. Thus, they have produced "The Column," "Dacians" and "Decebal"--films which delegate all the country's national minorities into the "foreign" category.

205 Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28.

In the area of theatre, the Hungarians in the Vojvodina have less opportunities than those of Transylvania. As was shown the Hungarians in Transylvania possess six theatres. In the Vojvodina, they have access to theatres in Novi Sad and Subotica. But, both of these theatres are predominantly Serbian. The only consolation to this great lack is that Yugoslav Hungarians can cross the border and attend the open-air theatre in Szeged. The latter is just across the Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier and is frequented by many Vojvodinians during the summer. Another consolation is that Hungarian actors and theatre groups from Hungary have more opportunities to perform in Yugoslavia.

Theatre life in the Vojvodina is a rare luxury for Hungarians. However, it is only fair to point out that opportunities in this area are more extensive than at any previous time in Yugoslavia's history. In the interwar years, only the most primitive types of theatre productions seem to have been tolerated or encouraged. In the immediate post-war period, the Stalinist atmosphere also stifled creativity. Only in the second half of the 1950's and the 1960's has it been


\[\text{208}^\text{Károly Erdélyi, "Utlevélel a Szegedi Szabadtéri Játékokra?" Magyar Szó, July 16, 1966, pp. 1, 3.}\]

\[\text{209}^\text{For example: Sz. M., "Nevess Velünk--Ha Tudsz," Dolgozók, July 8, 1966, p. 9.}\]

\[\text{210}^\text{István Laták, "A Vojvodinai Magyar Színjátszás Kér déséhez," in Hid 1934-1941, pp. 298-303.}\]
possible to discern certain improvements in theatre production. However, only a very limited number have been performed in the Hungarian language.  

In the musical life of the Hungarians a similar situation seems to prevail. Aside from folk and popular music, very few Hungarian renditions are available of serious or classical music. This lack is unfortunate from a broader cultural perspective, but it does not involve national discrimination. Numerous radio programs devote time to Hungarian music of the folk and popular variety. Furthermore, broadcasts from Budapest fill the classical gaps which exist. These broadcasts are followed religiously by many Hungarians in the Vojvodina.

In the plastic arts the Hungarians seem to enjoy just as many opportunities as the other peoples of Yugoslavia. They hold frequent exhibitions which seem to be well attended. Both painters and sculptors gain extensive recognition of their works. Many of the major towns of the Vojvodina have artist's associations. Their works have been taken on international tours, mainly in "socialist countries." A

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favorite route of these exhibits is Hungary, where they are usually well-received.

The architectural development and the upkeep of historical sites has been less discriminatory than in Rumania. Reminders of the area's Hungarian past are not being systematically eliminated or "re-possessed." This may be due, in part, to the less obvious nature of the Hungarian monuments in the Vojvodina, but also to the generally more tolerant attitude of the Yugoslavs toward symbols of cultural diversity. Thus, old Hungarian churches and castles, instead of being demolished receive some state assistance for their upkeep. The latter is motivated less by nationality policies than by considerations affecting tourism. Still, the net result is a type of co-existence for the historical reminders and symbols of the inhabitants of the Vojvodina.

Yugoslav policies toward the museums and libraries also mirror tolerance. Unlike the case of Rumania, there does not seem to be a policy aimed at dispersing minority nationality books or historical artifacts. While the number of libraries and museums has constantly expanded, so has the share of the Hungarians increased in both areas. Village libraries and houses of folk culture have been some of the major gainers of this expansion.

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215 A good example of this is Petrovaradin (Pétervárad) across the Danube from Novi Sad. Ivo Frol (ed.) Petrovaradin (Novi Sad: Izdavac Matica SRPSKA, 1963), presents a good description of this historical landmark and the efforts made by the government to preserve it.

IV

The general cultural setting of the Hungarians in Transylvania is much more restrictive than that of their fellow nationals in the Vojvodina. As the preceding discussion of education, the mass media and cultural life demonstrated, Rumania is also more restrictive from an institutional perspective. However, this generalization is valid only from the late 1950's to the present. The Yugoslav policy of relative tolerance is also historically circumscribed. It is a consequence of the post-war challenge to create internal unity in order to ward off external threats to national security.

This difference in the cultural and educational policies of the two states reflects the erosion of the ethnic balance of power in Rumania and the relative stabilization of the ethnic balance of power in Yugoslavia. In Rumania the shift toward more repressive policies is evident following the Party purge of some of the major representatives of the Hungarians and the other minorities. This shift in the balance of power within the Party took place between 1952 and 1957. Parallel to these shifts, the educational policies reflected some restrictions on the Hungarians already in the 1955-56 school year. These became much more pronounced by 1958 and all-pervasive in the late 1960's, when the ethnic Rumanian dominance of Party leadership is no longer challenged. As the analysis shows, cultural policies also followed this pattern.

In Yugoslavia a somewhat different trend has prevailed. Until about the middle of the 1950's Hungarian opportunities were closely limited. Since then educational and cultural policies try to satisfy
the needs of the Hungarians as well as most of the other nationalities. In the past few years even more effort has been exerted to remove any disadvantages that may have prevailed in this area. This effort parallels the solidification of the balance of power between ethnic groups in the leadership of the Yugoslav League of Communists. Since the majority nationality cannot dominate the Party leadership, it is also unable to carry out repressive policies as it had done in the interwar years. While the possibility does exist that the Yugoslav nationalities together may turn to oppress non-Slavic nationalities, this has not happened lately due to the unofficial alliances between certain Slavic and certain non-Slavic nationalities.

The close relationship between internal political changes and ethnic policies has been demonstrated. However, the shifts in the internal balance of power do not give a complete picture. Many changes in ethnic policies are understandable only if we examine the international relations of the states which are most concerned with the future of Transylvania and the Vojvodina. This concern and the relations of these states provides the focus for the next chapter.
CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS
OF NATIONALITY POLICIES

The fate of the Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina is closely intertwined with the peace of East-Central Europe. Ethnic animosities in this area have been the cause of a number of major conflicts. Since the Hungarians compose the largest minority population in the area, their treatment affects the international relations of most states in Eastern Europe, but particularly that of the U.S.S.R., Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary.¹

This chapter will examine how the treatment of the Hungarians influences relations between these states. At the same time, it will consider how relations among these states affect nationality policies in Transylvania and the Vojvodina. By examining the problem from both directions, it may be possible to avoid the fruitless debate as to what came first. Furthermore, the examination of the problem's international ramifications will demonstrate to what extent international power relations influence the intra-national balance of power among the ethnic groups of Rumania and Yugoslavia.

¹Czechoslovakia also deserves to be on this list since it has more than 517,000 Hungarian inhabitants. It has been omitted from the above listing only because the present study is concerned solely with Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina.
In both Transylvania and the Vojvodina the Soviet Union has, at times, influenced the treatment of the Hungarians. In Transylvania this influence has frequently been directly responsible for certain policies or policy shifts. In the Vojvodina such influence has been more indirect, but at times also decisive. This influence has been exerted politically and ideologically.

The political influence of the Soviet Union is a consequence of its expanded role in East-Central European affairs since World War II. Its ideological influence is even older, going back to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. These two sources (political and ideological) of its policy-making encounter in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary the national aspirations, political interests and ideological commitments of small states trying to maintain their independence and security. To rephrase Philip E. Mosely, is it ideological or political considerations that guide the relations among these "Socialist" states?2

The answer to this question has already been provided in the discussion of the domestic policies of Rumania and Yugoslavia with respect to their Hungarian inhabitants. Now we will examine what the relations among these states, the U.S.S.R. and Hungary reveal about the fate of national minorities under Communist rule. This will help determine the role of ideology and power in the international relations

of these states. First, we will concentrate on the Soviet Union's attempt to keep these nation-states within its hegemonial orbit.

Second, we will examine how the conflicting interests of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary—as reflected by their nationality policies—thwarts, or limits the Soviet efforts to solidify the "socialist camp."3

The Impact of Soviet Hegemony and Ideological Solidarity

One of the outstanding developments of the post-World War II era has been the dominant role played by the Soviet Union in the affairs (internal and external) of East-Central European states. The incorporation of these countries into the Soviet bloc, with the exception of Yugoslavia, has made the U.S.S.R. not only "guide" but also "arbiter" of affairs generally.4 Thus, the problem of Transylvania and its large Hungarian population also became subject to Soviet supervision. Only Yugoslavia has been able to maintain its political independence. However, ideological "solidarity" has even affected it and its policies in the Vojvodina.

In Rumania

In the immediate post-war years Stalin's grip on East-Central

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3Yugoslavia's leaders dislike the idea of "Socialist camp." It indicates cold war alignments. In public statements and in their policies as well, they have indicated their independence from this "camp."

4Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Revised paperback edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), p. 51, notes the three main reasons for this state of affairs as: (1) "overwhelming Soviet strength" (the Red Army of occupation); (2) "weakness of the non-Communist forces in East Europe"; and (3) "the rapid demobilization and disengagement of the West."
Europe enabled him to determine the fate of the Hungarian and other nationalities of Transylvania. As earlier chapters have already indicated, he utilized the discord in the area to further his own end—the rapid Communization of Rumania. Stalin used Transylvania as a means to control the newly acquired Rumanian and Hungarian satellites. To say, however, that this was just an extension of the policy of divide et impera would be to over-simplify. Undoubtedly, use of this disputed area for such purposes was not neglected by Stalin. Yet, stability and conformity were more important to him at this stage, and it does not seem likely that he would have encouraged dissension between

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5 The utilization of Rumanian-Hungarian discord by Stalin to facilitate the Communist seizure of power in the former country has already been treated in foregoing chapters. However, besides the sources mentioned previously regarding this tactic, an interesting sidelight is provided for it by Hungáricus, "Románia Uj Politikája és Erdély Kérdése," Nemzetőr, IX (Sept., 1964), 1. In this article it is related that the September 1945 election in Hungary giving the Communists only 17% of the vote, and the election of May 1946 in Rumania giving the Communist dominated National Democratic Front 70.5% of the vote, convinced Stalin that Rumania should receive all of Transylvania. Petru Groza did in fact quote the election results as "proof" that Rumania was more dependable. His argument seems to have carried weight since the Peace Treaty of 1947 confirmed the annexation of Transylvania to Rumania.

6 The fact that Stalin did not even attempt a compromise—he annexed Transylvania in toto to Rumania—adds credence to this contention.

7 Along this line see Nicholas Halasz, In The Shadow of Russia (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1959), pp. 185-186. Yet, Stalin was also searching for a viable and stable order in East-Central Europe—under Soviet control. He at one time even toyed with the idea of incorporating the satellites directly into the U.S.S.R. This he wanted to achieve by first amalgamating Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, then by federating Rumania and Hungary, and also Poland and Czechoslovakia. See Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962), p. 177.
two satellites which he already controlled. The fact that he pro-
tected the Hungarian minority against Rumanian terror and oppression
shows, however, that he saw tactical utility for the Soviet Union in
keeping a strong minority (dependent on Soviet protection) within
Rumania. His support for establishment of the Magyar Autonomous
Region is yet further indication of this.

Stalin's death in 1953 ended the position of the Autonomous
Region as a possible counter-weight to Rumanian ambitions. The
old dictator's successors turned to utilize more formal means of con-
trol. While this does not necessarily mean that minorities were
relieved of this role, it does mean that their importance diminished
considerably in the eyes of Soviet policy makers. In fact, the Hun-
garian Revolt of 1956, and the parallel disturbances among the Hun-
garian population of Transylvania ended Soviet expectations of
minority support for the U.S.S.R. in Rumania.

Halasz, In the Shadow of Russia, p. 82; Robert Lee Wolff,
"Rumania," The Fate of East Central Europe ed. Stephen D. Kertesz
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), pp. 256-
257, 261.

Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass.: Harva

But it was not the death of Stalin, as much as the with-
drawal of Soviet troops from Rumania in 1958, that eliminated com-
pletely the "counter-weight" idea of the Hungarian minority. For the
importance of this troop removal on Rumania's re-assertion of more
independence see John Michael Montias, "Communist Rule in Eastern
Europe," Foreign Affairs, 43 (January, 1965), 332.

Károly Illyés, "A Kreml Keserű Családdása Az Erdélyi Magyarok-
ban," Lármafa, III (October-December, 1956), 21; J. F. Brown, "The
Age-Old Question of Transylvania," The World Today, XIX (November,
1963), 502.
The Khrushchev policies of the latter 1950's and early 1960's reflect this Soviet "apathy" toward the Transylvanian nationalities. Just prior to, during, and after the disturbances of 1956, Khrushchev was already in the process of providing the "bloc" with a more formal organizational structure.\(^1\) This structure was built on the foundation of Soviet sponsored cooperation among East European satellites in matters of defense and economy. The Warsaw Pact and COMECON (CEMA) were to provide the central core for this system of coordinated planning and control.\(^2\) The position of Rumania's Hungarian minority was greatly affected by these changes, positively as well as negatively.

The "negative" impact has already been noted above as the decrease of the political importance of ethnic groups. The "positive" result was that closer relations were fostered between individual satellites. This meant that relations between Rumania and Hungary would also involve more cooperation. In the economic sphere this was to entail more trade agreements, and the continuation of such projects as Romagchim, which had been brought into existence under the watchful eye of Stalin.\(^3\) This latter "joint company" enabled Hungary as well


as Rumania to use the natural gas deposits of Transylvania for their respective industrial undertakings.\textsuperscript{15}

In spite of such formalization of relations, the relations between Rumania and Hungary deteriorated rather than improved.\textsuperscript{16} Soviet overlordship ensured that their differences would not be paraded publicly before the world, but disagreements were nonetheless real. Soviet hegemony acted as a break on these differences. More recently, particularly since 1963, the Soviet system of satellite control has loosened just enough to allow outsiders to verify the existence of these differences.\textsuperscript{17} The root of contention between the two satellites has remained the question of Transylvania and minority rights.

In the summer of 1963, rumors were wide-spread that Transylvania or a part of it would be returned to Hungary.\textsuperscript{18} It was contended that the Soviet Union was using this as a threat toward Rumania in order to force the latter to submit to Comecon policies and coordination. Since

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16}This deterioration of Rumanian-Hungarian contacts must not be blamed on the formalization of relations. Rather, the deterioration was a consequence of the greater "independence" of the respective satellites; an "independence which developed parallel to, but not in direct conjunction with the formalization of relations.


nothing came of this, it can be assumed that the rumor was either false or just the "news" of a Russian bluff never carried out. At any rate, the Soviet Union avoided such a step--the re-partitioning of Transylvania--for fear of further unrest and instability in the satellite empire.

The re-partitioning of Transylvania is undesirable from a Soviet perspective primarily for two reasons. These reasons are in some ways related, since both affect the position of Soviet authority in the area. The first is that the redrawing of boundaries would re-open the whole question of borders, ceded territories, and annexations. Since the Soviet Union had gained the most territory in the last war, the re-opening of this question would undoubtedly affect it adversely. This is also underlined by the fact that Transylvania in Rumanian hands provides the Soviet Union with less military headaches. The present set-up impairs the strength of Hungary and at the same time leaves the strategically important area of Transylvania in the possession of a satellite which is more open to direct Soviet military pressure.

Another factor, perhaps not as important as the above two, is

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19 The Rumanian elation following the replacement of Khrushchev would indicate that such a bluff may have been made. Rumanians viewed him as a personal enemy of their country. The CPSU criticism of Khrushchev after the take-over by Brezhnev and Kosygin lend additional weight to this view. See particularly points 5 and 6 enumerated by Henry Tanner in "29 'Errors' Laid to Khrushchev," New York Times, Oct. 30, 1964, pp. 1, 13. Also see David Binder, "Rumania Retains Independent Line," New York Times, Nov. 16, 1964, pp. 1, 5. It still remains to be seen, however, whether the policies of Brezhnev and Kosygin can really take a more "conciliatory" stance toward Rumanian nationalism than had Khrushchev's.

that Rumania proved to be a "loyal" satellite while Hungary had revolted. \footnote{George Bailey, "Trouble over Transylvania," The Reporter, XXXI (Nov. 19, 1964), 26, demonstrates how the Rumanians have played up this "loyalty" theme to enhance their own position in the bloc.} This loyalty was not only demonstrated by allowing the Soviet Union to use Transylvania as the base of operations against the Hungarian freedom fighters, but also by Rumania's subsequent role in helping to eradicate all vestiges of the opposition. \footnote{It should be noted that Imre Nagy, Pál Maléter and other Hungarian leaders of the Revolt of 1956, were sent to Rumania after their capture, both for their trial and execution. See, \textit{Ibid.}; Elie Abel, "Nagy is Abducted by Soviet Police: Sent to Rumania," New York Times, Nov. 24, 1956, pp. 1-2.} Thus, Rumania emerged from the traumatic events of October-November 1956, as an exponent of "stability" and "loyalty," while the Hungarians--in Hungary and in Transylvania--were labeled as "reactionaries" and enemies of the U.S.S.R. \footnote{Along this line see Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania," \textit{East Central Europe and the World} ed. Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), p. 165.} Since the Kremlin center wanted to preserve the post-war East-Central European gains and the Communist status quo at all costs, it naturally backed the "stability" of the Rumanians rather than the "turbulence" of the Hungarians.

Only the events of August 1968, seem to have made Soviet policy makers re-evaluate Rumania's "dependability." In the Soviet military campaign to stamp out national Communism in Czechoslovakia, the Rumanians were excluded. Rumania was the only Warsaw Pact nation which did not send (or was not asked to send?) troops to help crush the Dubček regime. Instead, Rumania itself faced the prospect of a
Soviet invasion due to its maverick international posture. This again raised the possibility of territorial revisions in Transylvania. However, the Soviet policy-makers considered their show of force in Czechoslovakia as indication enough of their determination to intervene when any member of the Socialist "camp" became too vociferous in proclaiming its independence. Rumania, therefore, has taken some steps backward from its exposed international stance.

The bond of ideology is less evident but no less important than the bond provided by Soviet hegemony. While the two are closely related, it is still possible to discern the distinct impact of ideology on Transylvania's inhabitants—Rumanians and Hungarians alike. This "common" factor of ideology involves more than "just" the fate of Transylvania; it directly affects the destiny of Communist Rumania and Hungary, as well as the Soviet Bloc as a whole.

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25 This powerful bond of ideology can be discerned from Kádár's report to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party on Nov. 30, 1959. At this time the Rumanian Communists were already openly carrying out policies which undercut the position of the Hungarians in Transylvania. Yet, in the face of this, Kádár still could say that the interests of all socialist countries were identical. He still maintained that: "The solid and everlasting foundation of the unity of the socialist camp lies in the common socio-political system, the common road of building socialism, a common ideology and joint efforts to safeguard peace. Our cooperation within the camp is regulated not only by full equality . . . but . . . by the principles of mutual assistance. . . . Loyal service to the vital interests of our people requires that one of the main tasks of our foreign policy continue to strengthen the power and unity of the socialist camp and to repel decisively all attempts against it . . . to strive to establish good relations with all neighboring countries. . . . In addition to the
In the case of minority nationalities, the concept of "class solidarity" has been most important. It was this concept that was to end the ethnic strife that had existed between Rumanians and Hungarians in the past. It was easily "achieved" in the monolithic structure of the Soviet Bloc under Stalin.\textsuperscript{26} With the older dictator's death, however, enforcement of "proletarian internationalism" or class solidarity became more complicated. The formalization of bloc relations—mentioned above—added to these complications; but so did the fact that first Tito, then Mao and Hoxha, and then Gheorghiu-Dej and now Ceausescu have come to play roles as interpreters as well as followers of Communist ideology.

The loosening grip of one authoritative ideological center and the subsequent "polycentrism" of the bloc has greatly affected the place of Transylvania in the relations of Rumania and Hungary. Yet,

\textsuperscript{26}At this point it should be noted that some students of the bloc reject that, even under Stalin, "monolithic" was a correct adjective for the "Socialist camp." Brzezinski, \textit{The Soviet Bloc}, maintains that the bloc has in reality oscillated between diversity and uniformity. He stresses that diversity reigned supreme until 1947. However, Paul Kecskemeti, "Diversity and Uniformity in Communist Bloc Politics," \textit{World Politics}, XIII (Jan., 1961), 317, points out that this early post-war "diversity" described by Brzezinski was imposed rather than spontaneous. Still, it is good to ponder Montias' contention that the differences between "monolithic" Stalinism and the following "thaw" is overdrawn. See Montias, "Communist Rule in Eastern Europe," pp. 333-337, and Morton A. Kaplan, "Old Realities and New Myths," \textit{World Politics}, XVII (Jan., 1965), 335-343.

Soviet Union . . . the fraternal Czechoslovak Republic and the Rumanian People's Republic are direct neighbors of ours . . . our steadily flourishing friendship with these two people's states is firmly based upon the most intimate understanding and proletarian internationalism." See János Kádár, \textit{Socialist Construction in Hungary: Selected Speeches and Articles, 1957-1961} (Budapest: Corvina Press, 1962), pp. 207-208.
the uniting force of ideology still remains. This is due to the common ideological heritage of most Central and East European Communist Parties and the fact that leading positions of interpretation are occupied in both Rumania and Hungary by men of relatively similar backgrounds. Furthermore, since Communism must also view the possibilities of spreading and exporting the ideology to new areas, it is necessary to stress the "traditional" class solidarity of peoples and their right to "national self-determination" from Western colonial powers.

While recent developments have strongly shaken the effectiveness of ideology as a uniting force, it must be remembered that ideology has been effective when the "interests" of Rumania and Hungary, the hegemonial power, and the bloc in general coincided with its demands. The "ideological" struggles against nationalism bear this out. First, the struggle against Titoist deviations and the Yugoslav heresy of "National Communism." Second, the constant ideological struggle against Western and non-Communist international influences, whether these be in the form of "black Vatican reaction," "capitalist imperialism," or "rootless Zionist cosmopolitanism." Third and last—but not least—the concerted drive to fight nationalism among the

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27 By "similarity" of backgrounds not social-class composition, but developmental pattern is meant. Both in Rumania and Hungary the "centrists" are now predominantly at the helm. In both countries the "left" and "right" elements have been kept from exercising influence within or without the Party.

Hungarians of Transylvania as well as Budapest and the surrounding lowlands.²⁹

The struggle against Titoism united Rumania and Hungary in the Stalinist campaign against "National Communism." This campaign, however, was also inspired by Stalin's political desire to subjugate Yugoslavia completely to his own absolute authority. Stalin utilized ideology mainly as a tool to rally his satellites against the deviator. Thus, Rumania and Hungary joined hands in the castigation of "Titoist traitors" and "National Communists."³⁰ These tactics were applied with equal effectiveness and even more brutality against those who had connections and ties with the non-Communist world. Both the Bucharest and Budapest regimes unleashed attacks against the Roman Catholic Church and its "international conspiratorial network."³¹ A similar campaign was also carried out against "the machinations of rootless cosmopolitans" who divided their loyalties between Rumania and Israel.³²

²⁹ In relation to Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, this ideological unity completely disintegrated in August, 1968.


³² In the anti-Zionist campaign, Rumania for a long time took a more aggressive part than did Hungary. The reason for this may be attributed in large part to Rumania's possession of the largest Jewish minority among the satellites. See F. F., "Jews in the People's Democracies," The World Today, XIV (March, 1958), 119-121; Jacob K. Javits, "The Persecution of Jews in Rumania by the Soviet Puppet Communist Regime," Congressional-Record-Appendix (House of Representatives, June
Ideological solidarity was even more evident when Communist Hungarians and their Rumanian counterparts moved to crush the "bourgeois nationalist" manifestations among Hungarians at the time of the 1956 Revolt. The cooperation between the two governments was close and brutally similar.\textsuperscript{33} This cooperation was couched in ideological terminology, but evidently was based on political expediency. Nonetheless, the major ideological argument called for the destruction of "reactionary" and "bourgeois nationalist" elements which were attempting "to turn back the clock" to the national hatreds and animosities of the past.\textsuperscript{34}

Ideological unity between the two regions was so close at this time that Party solidarity—but not class solidarity—bridged national divisions. The Communist leadership of both satellites followed concerted and systematic strategies which were to eradicate the "nationalist germ" for good.\textsuperscript{35} Party leaders from Rumania visited Kádár twice during the three months after the Soviet Union crushed the Revolt in November 1956.\textsuperscript{36} At this time agreement between the Party leaders of

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\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.} \hfill \textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{36}Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania," pp. 502-503.
\end{flushright}
the two satellites seems to have been complete. However, the very weak position of the Kádár regime was, in part, responsible for this unity of purpose.

Ironic as it may seem, this unity of the two satellites in fighting "nationalist reaction" also sowed the first seeds of dissension which were to develop between them later. The seeds of this dissension were to be found in the over-enthusiasm of the Rumanian Communist Party in eradicating the "nationalist isolation" and "backwardness" of the Transylvanian Hungarians. This enthusiasm has not slackened in pace since 1956; in fact it has become more systematic in its expressions vis-à-vis the Hungarian minority. In Hungary the anti-nationalist campaign had been completed more or less by 1961. In fact, its most brutal manifestations were already history by the close of 1958, when the Rumanians were still executing "secessionist" or "separatist" conspirators.

The Rumanians have rationalized their repressive tactics by

37"Joint Communiqué on Rumanian-Hungarian Talks," p. 19.


39Senator Pell, "Negotiations with Rumania," Congressional Record (Senate, May 11, 1964), p. 10532, states: "What lends particular irony to the Rumanian situation is the fact that in Hungary, where the 1956 revolutions all began, there has been a general amnesty so that vast numbers of persons who participated in the uprising in that nation are now free. We in the West can only ask why Rumania has not seen fit to do the same." For this contrast also see "Magyarellenes Hajszára Iztál a Román Sajtó, Megszigorították a Határátlépést Nehogy Külföldre Szívárogjának Az Írto Rendelkezések Részletei," Katolikus Magyarok Vasárnapja, June 14, 1964, p. 1.

stressing that "national sovereignty" and "socialist patriotism" demand the complete subjugation of elements which conspire against the interests of the R.P.R. The fact that Rumania asserted its independent nationhood in the Soviet bloc has made it possible for her to interpret ideology regarding the Transylvanian minorities from this purely national perspective.

The Hungarian Communists, on the other hand, have been handicapped in opposing these innovations in Communist ideology. They were, and still are, more dependent on the Soviet Union than the Rumanians. Interference with Rumanian nationalities policy would be construed as a violation of "national sovereignty," thereby leaving the Hungarian regime open to the charge of "bourgeois nationalism." Consequently, the present stance of the two satellites toward each other is one of muffled discord, generated by the plight of the Transylvanian Hungarians. Recent Rumanian-Hungarian talks have shed some light on the extent of this dissension. This discord, however,

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43Overt manifestations of this discord can be found in the recent restrictions against Hungarians who wish to visit relatives in Transylvania. Often they are subjected to intensive searches at the border crossing points in order to determine that they have no Hungarian books and periodicals in their possession. See "Hirek," Transsylvánia, VI (July, 1964), 11.

is cloaked and hidden from world view by the surface homage paid in both Bucharest and Budapest to "proletarian internationalism."

In Yugoslavia

Soviet political and ideological guidance of Yugoslavia came to an early end in 1948-49. Yet, while Yugoslavia is no longer considered part of the Soviet "bloc," it cannot avoid being influenced—at least indirectly—by Soviet political moves and ideological interpretations. However, unlike any of the other East-Central European states, Yugoslavia is not in a dependent status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

In the political relations of the two states, from the beginning, Yugoslavia's "self-liberation" and "self-communization" enabled Tito and his followers to make their own policies. They were able to do this because they had a popular power base: the Partizan movement. This did not mean that they opposed Soviet policies in the area. They were, in many respects the most circumspect supporters of the Soviet Union. But the fact that they did not owe their liberation or their power to the Soviet Union, made them automatically more prone to stand on their own. The Communists in the rest of East-Central Europe, on the other hand, were the mere creatures of Soviet policy. This difference ultimately undermined the Soviet Union's efforts to extend its hegemony to the Adriatic.

The Soviet Union's policies vis-à-vis Yugoslavia did not reveal frustration prior to 1948. After all, Soviet forces did help liberate parts of Serbia, Belgrade and the Vojvodina. This wartime cooperation carried over into the immediate post-war period. Soviet foreign policy supported Yugoslavian claims not only against the territorial claims of Bulgarians and Hungarians, but also in the West, concerning Carinthia and Trieste. This support faltered only when Stalin became convinced that he could not control the Yugoslav leadership, like he controlled all the other Communist parties in the area.

Once this was realized, Stalin attempted to impose hegemony on the Yugoslavs from outside. This attempt led to the familiar Communist Information Bureau dispute, which ended by expelling the leaders of the Communist Yugoslav Party from the "socialist camp." This expulsion was followed by a concerted effort to have the Yugoslav leadership replaced.

Stalin tried to isolate and quarantine the Yugoslavs and their

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48 For two thorough discussions of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict see: Hoffman and Neal, Yugoslavia and the New Communism, Chapters 8-10, pp. 113-151; and Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, Chapter 11, pp. 352-390.
pernicious doctrine of "Titoism" which threatened Soviet hegemony.\textsuperscript{49} The Soviet Union proceeded to foment national animosities between Yugoslavia and her neighbors as well as between the peoples of Yugoslavia. Stalin was well aware of Yugoslavia's Achilles' heel. Thus, his puppets in Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary began to make old territorial claims on Yugoslavia. They also tried to arouse national antagonisms between the peoples of Yugoslavia by claiming that the Rumanian, Bulgarian, Albanian and Hungarian minorities were being oppressed.\textsuperscript{50}

Stalin's campaign failed! The national minorities did not take the bait and the peoples of Yugoslavia supported their leaders' defiance of the new external threat.\textsuperscript{51} However, this did not end Soviet efforts to gain political control over Yugoslavia. Although Stalin's death in March 1953 put an end to crude and overt efforts like the above, the new leaders of the Soviet Union tried a number of times to regain Yugoslavia for the socialist camp. After Stalin's death they immediately set to mend their relations with Tito. They reduced their propaganda barrages and called on their satellites to stop creating frontier incidents. This was followed by diplomatic


\textsuperscript{51}Ibid.
exchanges at the highest level, with Khrushchev making his "trip to Canossa" to Belgrade in 1955.\(^{52}\)

This trip re-established Soviet-Yugoslav relations for a brief period, but not Soviet hegemony. In fact, the Belgrade Declaration which resulted from this meeting of reconciliation, confirmed that Tito had been in the right and Stalin in the wrong. Furthermore, it also enshrined a number of principles which indicated Soviet acceptance of Titoism. These included "respect for the sovereignty, independence, integrity and . . . equality among states in their mutual relations and in their relations with other states," and "mutual respect for, and non-interference in, internal affairs for any reason whatsoever, whether of an economic, political or ideological nature, because questions of internal organization, or differences in social systems and of different forms of Socialist development, are solely the concern of individual countries."\(^{53}\)

The Soviet effort to regain influence in Yugoslavia was short-lived. Events in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 disrupted the Soviet-Yugoslav detente. Tito's speech at Pula on November 11, 1956, angered the Soviet leaders because of its criticism of Soviet intervention in Hungary.\(^{54}\) The charge of "revisionist" again became

\(^{52}\)Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road*, pp. 31-35.


\(^{54}\)The thoroughest discussion of Yugoslav-Hungarian, and Yugoslav-Soviet relations for this period can be found in Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), particularly pp. 343-352, 472-473.
popular in *Pravda* as an adjective for Yugoslavia. Relations between the two states reverted to open antagonism, although somewhat less vociferous in nature than during Stalin's lifetime.

Events in the "socialist camp" forced Soviet policy makers to heal this second rift. The growing dispute with China, particularly by 1960, and Albanian defection in 1962, made Tito appear ideologically less dangerous and Yugoslavia geo-politically more attractive. Thus, Tito received an invitation to Moscow, which he honored in December 1962. On this occasion Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union again became reconciled. This was supported by Yugoslavia's more active relations (economic, cultural, etc.) with members of the Soviet bloc. By 1965, Yugoslavia began to participate in certain of the commissions of CEMA.\(^{55}\)

Soviet efforts to pull Yugoslavia even closer to the bloc failed to materialize as conflict in the Middle East and disputes within the bloc revealed the aggressive nature of Soviet foreign policy. The Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 gave the Soviet fleet the opportunity to move into the Mediterranean en masse. This eliminated the previous naval weakness of the Soviet Union in this area. Furthermore, it thereby gained the military potential to exert pressure on Yugoslavia from the West.\(^{56}\)

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\(^{56}\)Yugoslav policies concerning the Middle-East crisis of 1967 and after reveal certain inner contradictions. While Yugoslavia has consistently supported the Arab states against Israel, it has also feared the expansion of Soviet influence in the area. For this
Just one year later, in August 1968, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies over-ran Czechoslovakia and forced the abdication of the reform-minded Dubček regime. This intervention in the internal affairs of another socialist state—one that was a full-fledged member of the bloc—made Yugoslav leaders more uncertain and more cautious about their relations with the Soviet Union.\(^57\) They have condemned the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and have become less enthusiastic about expanding their relations with the Soviet Union.\(^58\) Instead, they have concentrated on strengthening their relations with Rumania and some other smaller states in the socialist camp.

Yugoslavia's post-war relations with the Soviet Union indicate a series of Soviet foreign policy blunders. Stalin's coercive tactics, and subsequent diplomatic efforts, have failed to bring Yugoslavia back into the socialist camp. This has led the Brezhnev-Kosygin team to try a totally new approach. It has bypassed the necessity of making Yugoslavia part of the "camp" by moving past it—with its naval forces—into the Mediterranean. This solution has made Yugoslavia less important from a political perspective, but it has still not neutralized its ideological impact on socialists the world over.

All these attempts to re-incorporate Yugoslavia into the


\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 217.
Socialist camp reveals very little about the national minorities and their treatment. Unlike Transylvania, the Vojvodina has not been used by the U.S.S.R. as a lever to influence the Yugoslav government's behavior. Only Stalin had attempted to use national animosities to force Yugoslavia to its knees. His failure has probably kept Stalin's successors from resorting to this tactic. This does not mean, however, that in the future such a Soviet tactic would fail. It is quite conceivable, that the strained relations between Croats and Serbians and other nationalities, could be used to disrupt Yugoslavia once Tito is no longer on the scene.\textsuperscript{59} Without Tito's presence the tactics of 1948-1952 might succeed in destroying Yugoslavia.

It would seem, however, that the U.S.S.R. would prefer to gain Yugoslavia's support on the basis of ideological affinity. This has not been possible since 1948, and is less likely to be the case in the future as well. The reason is that Yugoslavia's independence from the bloc has enabled it to become an interpreter of ideology in its own right.

Until the Cominform dispute Yugoslavia conformed to Soviet leadership in this area. However, once the Soviet shackles had been removed, the Yugoslavs set out to let their unique national problems

guide their ideological interpretations. So it was in the area of nationality policy also. While the Yugoslavs took over "Leninist" principles on this question, it has been the unique experiences of their own country that has molded their national policy. Experience, plus Yugoslav reaction to Stalinist abuses, were the guides. In looking at the Soviet example they saw a great deal that was acceptable in theory, but contradicted by Soviet practice. The Yugoslavs reacted against this hypocrisy. They also responded to the needs of the multi-national make-up of their country. Thus, they put into practice a nationality policy which rejected Soviet over-centralization and has instead expanded self-government opportunities for all the peoples of Yugoslavia.

As in the case of the nationality problem, so in the question of "worker's councils," economic decentralization, relations among socialist states, and numerous other areas, the Yugoslavs have come up with their own ideological justifications and interpretations. This has made them competitors of the Soviet Union and China. As a consequence, each dispute between Yugoslavia and the major Communist states has at the same time also carried ideological undertones. It is due to this ideological role of Yugoslavia, that it has been attacked most frequently.

60 Neal, Titoism in Action, pp. 29-30.
61 Shoup, "Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism," pp. 69-72, points out that in the immediate post-war period even some of these contradictions were copied.
62 Neal, Titoism in Action, pp. 18-33.
While the variety in ideological interpretations has undermined socialist solidarity, this does not mean that "socialist solidarity" is dead. It is sacrificed only when national interests come into conflict (e.g., Czechoslovakia 1968, Rumania 1964, etc.). In instances where no national conflict prevails it still enables the socialist states to take a united stand (e.g., Vietnam). A good example in Yugoslavia was Tito's reaction to the writings of Mihajlo Mihajlov. Tito was incensed not only because Mihajlov criticized his domestic policies, but also because the writings offended Moscow and thereby strained Tito's relations with the Party of the first Socialist state. 63

This last point, however, also tells us that in the international relations of the socialist states, the respective definitions of "national interest" will tell more about the treatment of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia and Rumania than the examination of Soviet efforts to guide these states politically and ideologically.

II

For a time both Soviet hegemony and Communist ideology performed a conflict reducing role in Eastern Europe. They contributed to the stifling of national animosities. However, both had been imposed on the area. Consequently, their effectiveness was tied to the Soviet monopoly of both ideological and political leadership. As this leadership was challenged, the former nationality conflicts again cropped up.

63 Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, pp. 146-147.
The re-emerging nationalisms of Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary have become the most important consideration in the nationality policies of these states. In each case, the national interests of the country has a direct bearing on the treatment of the Hungarians in the two areas under study. We will examine how these national interests are defined and how they affect international relations. Conversely, attention will be paid to the impact of these international relations on domestic policies.

The Impact of Nationalism and Separate Roads to Socialism

The political interests, as well as the disagreements between Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary, are an inheritance from the inter-war years. The friction was suppressed in the Stalinist era by the demands of the hegemonial power for stability and ideological unity. However, this imposed stability could last only so long as the leadership of the bloc remained unquestionably the Soviet Union in all matters. In Yugoslavia this was no longer the case after 1948. In Rumania this was the case during Stalin's lifetime and even under his successors until the events of 1956.64 But by the end of that

64 Imre Nagy, "Nationalism and Proletarian Internationalism" in Imre Nagy on Communism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), pp. 238-239, presents an opposed view. He stresses that relations between socialist countries were far from being ideal. Some verification can be found for Nagy's contention in a Hungarian-Rumanian convention announced in early 1950. According to this convention, Magyars could opt for Hungarian citizenship and move to Hungary. This reflects in a way, an early subtle attempt to reduce the Hungarian minority numerically. However, it seems that very few people took advantage of this "opportunity."
year, the monolithic character of the bloc was irreparably destroyed as Gomulka led Poland toward more "independence" within the Socialist camp. In the succeeding years other satellites also contributed to the loosening of the bloc, though in differing ways. Yugoslavia's national communism was being copied by others. Hungary and Rumania were also affected by this "thawing" process. As a result, their former national claims again became prominent in their relations.

Rumania

The re-assertion of political interests between Rumania and Hungary took place in spite of an elaborate network of treaties and agreements which were to safe-guard the unity and stability of the bloc. Economic, military, cultural, "friendship," and other treaties and agreements obligated both satellites to look at the well-being of the bloc as a whole rather than their respective "narrow and selfish" national needs. But this re-assertion was possible only

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65 For this "network" see Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, pp. 106-111, 395-400. However, in some instances the formal framework of agreements actually undergirded Rumania's ability to subjugate its Hungarian minority. Legal conventions and agreements particularly would fall into this category. According to Paragraphs 115, 204, or 120 of the new Hungarian penal code, Hungarians may be punished and even extradited to other satellites for speaking, acting, or inciting against the "social or economic order of another country." Thus, "criticism of the rights (or of their absence) of the Hungarian minority in Rumania or Czechoslovakia, for instance, could make its author liable to be tried under the Hungarian conspiracy Act, if so requested by either of these two countries." See G. R. Urban, "Hungary: The Balance Sheet," Survey, No. 40 (Jan., 1962), 86.

66 For a list of treaties and agreements that are to insure Rumania's participation in bloc affairs see "Appendix-Principal Treaties 1945-1956" in Fischer-Galati, Romania, pp. 362-367.
because the Soviet Union sustained set-backs as the leading authority on questions of ideology and policy, thereby leaving the satellites more room for maneuvering within the bloc. Thus, they could raise questions (e.g., the position of Transylvania and the national minorities) which had never been really settled or solved.\(^6^7\) The Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960's accentuated this tendency. It was in part responsible for Rumania's ability to stress its own sovereignty and "unquestionable" right to Transylvania.\(^6^8\)

Developments in the economic field provide, perhaps, the clearest example of the re-assertion of Rumanian nationalism and the concomitant revival of Hungarian minority problems. Only one example of these relations will be examined here: That is the sharing of Transylvania's natural gas by Rumania and Hungary through the joint company Romagchim.

Romagchim was set-up in the early 1950's. It was to enable Hungary to utilize some of Transylvania's natural wealth in cooperation with Rumania. This was just one of the many joint projects between satellite countries.\(^6^9\) The case of Romagchim is significant


\(^{6^8}\) Rumania has even gone so far in its national "claims" as to present her bill for Bessarabia to the Soviet Union according to Freidin, "East Europe Wants Land Soviet Took." Yet in the question of other boundaries (particularly the Rumanian-Hungarian border) the Rumanians have rejected any considerations for revision. See: "Hírek: A Határok Békés Reviziója," Transsylvánia, VI (July, 1964), 12.

\(^{6^9}\) Bossy, "Mining," p. 244; Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 516.
for this study because it was an experiment in the exploitation of the natural wealth of an area which was claimed by both satellites. In many ways Romagchim was the perfect example of economic integration within the bloc—which was being emphasized more and more by COMECON (CEMA). However, it also contained the roots of potential discontent insofar as this agreement enabled Hungary to obtain raw materials from Transylvania, while providing Rumania in return mainly with finished goods.

Rumania's rebellion against Comecon planning and the development of "economic nationalism" also complicated the existence of Romagchim. Since Rumania was no longer subject to the Soviet joint companies, the same charges, which had previously been leveled against them, were now leveled against Hungary. Discontent with Comecon and past Soviet economic exploitation was thus transferred to Rumanian-Hungarian common utilization of Transylvania's natural wealth. As some available sources indicate, Romagchim is to be disbanded so that Rumania can better utilize her "own" industrial

70 Korbonski, "Comecon," pp. 40-44.


potential and raw materials.73

The economic disharmony of Communist Rumania and Hungary is also evident in the positions taken by the two satellites over the question of Comecon planning and bloc integration and specialization.74 As opposed to Rumania's independent stance, the Communist Hungarians have supported the economic integration of the bloc,75 and have frequently commented on the evil effects of "economic nationalism."76 The reason is quite clear: Hungary without Transylvania is very poor in natural resources and therefore more dependent on sharing and cooperation. Rumania with Transylvania, on the other hand, is more able to preach a policy of economic sovereignty. The fate of Romagchim makes this all the more apparent.

The United States and the Western "camp" are the outside sources of support for independence among the satellites. Trade is the major

73 The investigator has no direct statement to the effect that Romagchim is or will be disbanded. The above conclusion is based on the correlation of reports that imply that this was the next "logical" step. See: Montias, "Background and Origins of the Rumanian Dispute with Comecon," pp. 126-127; "Lévél Erdélyből," Irodalmi Ujság, Aug. 1, 1964, p. 1; "Rumania and Comecon," Background Report (Radio Free Europe, May 6, 1964), pp. 1-3; "Rumanian Edition of 'World Marxist Review' Omits Article on Joint Planning," Rumania (Radio Free Europe, Sept. 3, 1964), p. 6.


incentive that is offered to Rumania and the other satellites to encourage them to drift away from the Soviet sphere. Both Rumania and Hungary have taken the bait. It remains to be seen to what extent the West can really reel them away from the Soviet "camp" before the line snaps.

The Rumanian attempt to gain more Western trade has affected the fate of Transylvanian Hungarians in two contradictory ways. First, it has moved Rumania toward a more independent and nationalist course, thereby putting the minorities in a less favorable position. Second, it has forced the Rumanian government to provide the West with some evidence of good faith toward its citizens irrespective of nationality. At present the first result of the road to "independence" is more prominent. However, since the summer of 1968 the second consideration is also evident.

Another area that has felt the impact of revived Rumanian nationalism (i.e., "socialist patriotism") has been the realm of Rumanian-Hungarian cultural relations. The two satellites have had cultural agreements going back to the early post-war years. Both

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77 Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," p. 27. The Western assumption is, of course, that such trade agreements also lead to other agreements. A reflection of this is the recent U.S.-Rumanian cultural exchange agreement. See "U.S. and Rumania Sign Cultural Exchange Agreement for 1965-66," The Department of State Bulletin, LII (Jan. 18, 1965), 87-90.

78 Victor Zorza, "Mr. Johnson Provokes Moscow's Anger," Manchester Guardian Weekly, Jan. 14, 1965, p. 7, indicates that the U.S.S.R. policy makers see this as a hopeless venture on the part of the West.


countries were to send a certain number of exhibitions, folk-dance groups, theater productions, films, etc. to the other country. Since Hungary has no numerically significant Rumanian minority, it is apparent that the value of this cultural exchange was appreciated most by the Hungarian minority of Transylvania. Not only did this provide the Transylvanian Hungarians with a connection with their fellow ethnic nationals, but it enabled them—at least in the folk realm—to reinforce their cultural identity, an identity which was definitely Hungarian in "form" even if socialist in "content."

As Rumanian socialist patriotism gained prominence, a campaign was initiated against the "particularism" of the Hungarian minority. However, this was not immediately evident after 1956. The shortcomings of the Rumanian-Hungarian cultural exchange program, became apparent only after 1962. The Western press picked up indications of it first

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81 In 1956, Rumanians composed only 0.1 per cent of the population according to Facts About Hungary: The Fight for Freedom (ed.) The Hungarian Committee (New York: Waldon Press, 1966) p. 349. As P. T., "A Mi Nemzetiségeink," Magyar Hírek, XXI (Dec. 10, 1968), p. 3, points out, the Kádár regime is exerting its utmost to make its minorities the best treated in East-Central Europe. It is hoped by the regime that the power of example may rub off on the Rumanian policy makers as well. The Kádár regime has carried out numerous such manifestations of "proletarian internationalism." One such futile effort has been the erection of a monument honoring "the heroic Rumanian soldiers who . . . participated in the liberation of Hungary." See the news of this event in the Jan. 3, 1958, issue of Esti Hírlap translated in "Review of the Hungarian Central Press, March 11, 1958," p. 8, in Selected Translations from East European Political Journals and Newspapers (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1958).

in Soviet-Rumanian relations. Nonetheless, the change was not limited to the discontinuation of Soviet Cultural penetrations—correctly diagnosed by the Rumanians as attempted "Russification." The Rumanians extended their campaign of "de-Russification" or "Rumanization," as has been seen, to include the Hungarians of Transylvania.

Cultural relations between Rumania and Hungary deteriorated. The cultural agreements signed in the past were not abrogated; they were, in fact, carried out to the letter. The spirit of these agreements, however, was now sabotaged in the way they were carried out.

George Bailey describes this in reference to the Rumanian-Hungarian film exchange program. He maintains that films sent by the Hungarian government to Rumania—particularly Transylvania—were provided with Rumanian sound-tracks and Hungarian sub-titles. When this was protested by the Hungarian regime, the Rumanians left the Hungarian sound-track but desynchronized it with the film. As Bailey indicates, these tactics are not limited merely to the film exchange program, but encompass the whole gamut of recent Rumanian-Hungarian cultural relations.


86 "Trouble over Transylvania," p. 28.
As in the cultural and economic realm, the impact of Rumanian nationalism has also affected the military role of Transylvania in the bloc relations of Rumania and Hungary. However, since in the military relations of the bloc Soviet hegemony is the "all-knowing" planning, and controlling factor, it is of little consequence what one satellite would prefer as opposed to the wishes of another. Furthermore, the strategic position of Transylvania places it into the center of Soviet military planning. Yet, because of Transylvania's position between Rumania proper and Hungary, the area is a definite asset to the possessor state from a military or strategic point of view.

Under Soviet control, the relative military advantage does not constitute a danger to Communist Hungary at present. The only really significant danger is aimed at the position of the Transylvanian Hungarians. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania, they are

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87 For all practical purposes the armies of the respective satellites are merely units of the Soviet army. This is ensured by the numerous controls exercised from the Moscow center over training, strategy, indoctrination, etc. See Serge H. Aronovici, "National Security," Romania ed. Fischer-Galati, pp. 124-130; Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, pp. 78-80. While in the military area there is little opportunity for independence, Rumania has gotten by with minimum participation in the past few years. It did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it has successfully declined use of its territory (as of 1970) to Warsaw Pact maneuvers, and it participated in the vast East-German Warsaw Pact maneuvers with only a token force of 300 men. See: "Helyzetkép 1970 Végén," Lérmata, p. 1; Kurt L. London, "The U.S.S.R., East Europe and the Socialist Commonwealth," Current History, Vol. 56 (April, 1969), pp. 198-199.

88 This, of course, presupposes conventional military tactics. Otherwise nuclear and missile warfare has made obsolete both Rumania and Hungary as military factors. For a treatment of this problem see John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (Paperback edition; New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).
left defenseless vis-à-vis any deprivations the Rumanian army might engage in. Such a contingency should not be ruled out as unlikely in view of past atrocity campaigns against the Hungarians (e.g., the terror of the Maniu Guardists after World War II and the Iron Guardists before that) and the ever mounting resurgent nationalism of the Rumanians. While the restraints of the Warsaw and "Friendship and non-Aggression" Pacts are, at present, all important, some recent Rumanian statements indicate that these too might be only relatively "all-important." 

The opportunities provided by Sino-Soviet rift, have enabled the Rumanians to map out a foreign policy which is very similar to that of Yugoslavia. It is based on "the principles of sovereignty, national independence and noninterference in internal affairs." Rumania's actual ability to follow such an independent course is, however, more circumscribed. Rumania is a member of the Warsaw Pact, even if a reluctant one. It has also been compelled to sign a new

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91 On the occasion of the signing of the Soviet-Rumanian "friendship" treaty, Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer toasted Premier Alexei Kosygin by reminding him that: "The treaty we will sign seals the principles underlying these relations, namely fraternal assistance, mutual advantage, observance of national sovereignty and independence, equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs." See "Romania Signs Russian Pact: Bucharest Insists on Sovereignty," The (Toledo) Blade, July 7, 1970, p. 2.
Soviet-Rumanian friendship treaty on July 8, 1970, which has committed
the Rumanians to support the Soviet Union in the event it is attacked
by any other power. This last point commits the Rumanians to support
the Soviet Union even against a Chinese attack.

For the Rumanians this involves a step away from their previous
"neutral" position between the U.S.S.R. and China. However, the events
of the past two years have forced Rumania to be less vocal in
asserting its independence from the Soviet Union. The prospects of a
Czechoslovak type intervention have moderated the Rumanians. So, they
have signed the friendship treaty and they have publicly emphasized
their good relations with the U.S.S.R. At the same time, they have
tried to continue their own policies by strengthening their contacts
with other Balkan states as well as some non-Communist states, includ­
ing the United States.

In the course of the 1960's the Rumanians have been particu­
larly active in the United Nations. They have used their position in

92 "Sovereignty, Mutual Aid Stressed in Delayed Soviet-Romanian
Treaty," The (Toledo) Blade, July 8, 1970, p. 2; "Aláírták a Román-
Szovjet Barátsági Szerződést," Előre, July 9, 1970, pp. 2-3; "An
Important Event in the Development of Romanian-Soviet Cooperation,
Alliance and Friendship," Documents, Articles and Information on

93 Ibid.; "Aláírták a Román-Szovjet Barátsági Szerződést," Előre,
pp. 2-3. At the same time they have also stressed their con­
tinued good relations with Communist China. "Debate Among Communists
Urged by Romania President," The (Toledo) Blade, July 10, 1970, p. 3.

94 "Nicolae Ceausescu Elnök Franciaországi Látogatása," Előre,
June 20, 1970, p. 1; "Richard Nixonnak, Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok
this international body to further the ideals of "non-interference" in the affairs of states.\textsuperscript{95} They have stated their opposition to military blocs and other manifestations of cold war conflict. At the same time they have supported efforts which would provide for European security.\textsuperscript{96} All these efforts point to a Rumanian desire to loosen the ties binding them to the Soviet bloc and thereby enable them more flexibility in both internal and external policies.

Until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the most important part of Rumania's policy was to solidify its relations with Yugoslavia. Their joint construction of the hydroelectric dam on the Danube is the most outstanding example of this policy. While the events of 1968 have not hindered the further strengthening of these relations, they have kept Rumania from expanding such ambitious bilateral contacts with other socialist states. Until 1968, it seemed as if Rumania were trying to re-create the Little Entente of the inter-war years--but in a socialist context. Besides extensive and ever-expanding contacts with Belgrade, the Rumanians also tried to draw Dubček's Czechoslovakia closer to themselves.\textsuperscript{97} At the same time Ceausescu cold-shouldered the

\textsuperscript{95}See for example their attempt to provide the United Nations with a "workable" definition of aggression. Gheorghe Badescu, "Concern for Defining Aggression: Romania's Contribution," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, Nos. 15-16 (Aug. 15, 1970), p. 22.

\textsuperscript{96}"Speech by President Nicolae Ceausescu in the Moroccan House of Representatives," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 40 (Dec. 14, 1970), pp. 9-12.

Hungarians and the Bulgarians.

This attempted re-creation of the inter-war political alignment in East-Central Europe, had a very ominous implication for the Hungarians. It would have united the policies of those three states which had the largest Hungarian minorities (Rumania 1,603,000, Czechoslovakia 517,000, Yugoslavia 503,000). Dubcek's reluctance and Soviet intervention, kept this plan from unfolding. Thus, since 1968, Rumania has been more intent on strengthening its relations in the Balkans. Besides Yugoslavia, it has expanded its relations with Bulgaria, Turkey and even Albania.98

These Rumanian international policies indicate a great deal of flexibility. At the same time they indicate certain continuities. The most obvious has been the continued poor relations with Hungary. Although numerous contacts have taken place between the two states, these have not altered the cool atmosphere between the two states.99

Rumania's international posture toward Hungary reflects its less than ideal treatment of the Transylvanian Hungarians. Yet, since 1968, the Rumanian nationalist pressure has been eased a little. This can be accounted for by the Rumanian realization that better relations with the Hungarians may actually be a wiser policy in the long-run.


It may enable Rumania to become stronger internally and also more respected internationally. It remains to be seen, whether such a more tolerant policy can continue to prevail after overt Soviet pressure is again relaxed.

In conclusion, we can say that Rumania's more independent position within the bloc has had a dual consequence. It has been disruptive on the international level. Within the Socialist camp it has contributed to disharmony, particularly in relation to the U.S.S.R. and Hungary. The fate of ROMAGCHTM, Hungarian-Rumanian cultural exchange programs, and the break-down of COMECON integration testifies to this. On the other hand, intra-nationally it has led to more cohesion by unleashing a new wave of Rumanian nationalism. This has provided the Rumanian Communist Party with a stronger base of popular support. Yet, this support has been gained at the expense of alienating the Hungarian population of Transylvania. The latter, in turn, has kept Rumania and Hungary from drawing closer to each other, thereby also perpetuating East-Central European "Balkanization."

Yugoslavia

Tito's Yugoslavia initiated the process known as polycentrism in the Socialist camp. The Cominform dispute in 1948 enabled the Yugoslavs to go their own way, to follow their specifically Yugoslav road to Socialism. This independence—unlike Rumania's more recent efforts to assert national goals apart from the interests of the Soviet bloc—has not led to more strife among the nationalities of the Vojvodina. Exactly the reverse has been the case. The Hungarian and
other non-South Slav minorities were under most pressure while Yugoslavia was still in the Socialist camp. With each passing year since the break with Stalin, Yugoslavia has improved its relations with these minorities and also the neighboring countries of which these minorities are representatives. There are some exceptions to this rule. The Albanian minority has been under more pressure than the others.  

This is in large part due to the poor relations that have existed between Yugoslavia and Albania throughout the post-World War II period. The Hungarians of the Vojvodina, on the other hand, have been treated much better in the late 1960's than at anytime in Yugoslavia's turbulent past. As we have seen in the examination of the country's domestic policies, this improvement is a consequence of the political system's internal need for stability and peace. On the other hand, it is also due to Yugoslavia's improved relations with Hungary. During Stalin's lifetime, Rákosi's Hungary was one of the most vociferous opponents of Yugoslavia. This is indicated, among other things, by Tito's desire to have Rákosi replaced as head of the Hungarian Workers' Party in 1955.  

Soviet intervention achieved just that. Rákosi's successor, Ernő Gerő, tried to improve relations with Tito. However, his overtures were unsuccessful because his Stalinist background and the Hungarian Revolt of October 1956, intervened. 

During the early days of the Hungarian revolt, Tito sympathized

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100 At the end of 1968, they were promised certain reforms— including greater autonomy and expanded economic opportunities. Anderson, "Yugoslavia: The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 213.

with Imre Nagy and the goals of the freedom fighters. However, as the revolt became more anti-Communist in nature, Tito called for its suppression. His role simultaneously as supporter of Nagy, critic of the revolt and then critic of Soviet intervention left a deep rift in Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. János Kádár's government was able to bridge this rift only in the early 1960's. Since about 1962, the relations between these two states have steadily improved. Delegations of the two countries exchanged visits and these were followed by economic and cultural agreements. Only the invasion of Czechoslovakia marred these relations briefly in 1968. Since then, the two states are again on friendly terms.

Yugoslavia has followed a consistent policy toward the other socialist states of East-Central Europe. As Stephen S. Anderson points out:

Although emphatically not a member of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia has nonetheless maintained a lively interest in its affairs, not only seeking normalization of relations with all Communist nations, but also trying to promote trends within the bloc which make it less likely and less able to threaten her. Again and again, this has placed Yugoslavia on the side of Communist leaders attempting to liberalize domestic policies and loosen their bonds to the Soviet Union. This has made Tito expand Yugoslavia's relations with Rumania,

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102 Ibid., pp. 229-235; Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, pp. 40-41.

103 Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, presents the best discussion of Yugoslav-Hungarian discord following the events of 1956. He indicates that one of the major reasons for conflict was the Kádár government's inability to keep its pledge to Tito that Imre Nagy would not be executed.

Hungary and Poland, while he has been more hesitant with Bulgaria and the post-Dubček Czechoslovakia.¹⁰⁵

Yugoslavia's relations with the bloc countries are an important part of its over-all foreign policy to maintain domestic tranquility and international independence. In its broader international policies Yugoslavia has tried to retain its non-aligned position between East and West. In part, it has achieved this by taking a leading role in the organization and policy-making of the "Third World" countries. To appeal to these states, Yugoslavia has been doubly sensitive about its internal policies, whether they involve economics or relations among the different nationalities of its population.

A related over-all goal of Yugoslav foreign policy is to safeguard its non-alignment by avoiding becoming too dependent on any one state or group of states. The lessons of 1948 are a bitter reminder of the dangers involved in such dependence. Thus, Yugoslavia has tried "to put its eggs in more than one basket" both politically and economically. Tito's trips around the world, Yugoslavia's stands at the United Nations, and her economic policies as well, point this out. For example, its trade policies--unlike other socialist states--are not dependent primarily on other socialist states. Instead, about 60 per

¹⁰⁵ Of all these countries, however, the relations with Rumania have been the most extensive. See: Ibid., p. 217; "Joint Communiqué on the Iron Gates Meeting Between Nicolae Ceausescu and Josip Broz Tito," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 18 (Sept. 30, 1969), pp. 1-2; "Interview Granted by Nicolae Ceausescu to the Journal 'Komunist' of Yugoslavia," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, No. 16 (Nov. 21, 1969), pp. 10-12; "Tito Aid in Romania," The (Toledo) Blade, Dec. 26, 1970, p. 3.
cent of its trade is with the Western democracies, 10 per cent with the underdeveloped world, and only 30 per cent with the socialist camp.  

Its trade with both Hungary and Rumania has been growing. But Poland, East Germany and the U.S.S.R. are Yugoslavia's most important trade partners in the bloc. However, of these states only the U.S.S.R. can compete with the volume of trade carried on with West Germany, Italy and the United States. Because of this diverse source of its trade, Yugoslavia has been intent on receiving at least observer status at the meetings of trade associations and economic organizations like CEMA and the E.E.C. Yet, it has hesitated joining any of these groupings, for fear of losing its non-aligned position.  

Yugoslavia's trade with Hungary is about equal in volume to that carried on with Rumania. Its most important export to Hungary is timber, while it imports foodstuffs and certain finished goods. This trade furthers good relations between the two states. Its

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107 Ibid. In the case of Hungary, Yugoslavia's trade has been increased, but it has declined in terms of its proportional share of Hungary's total trade. See Vardy, History of the Hungarian Nation, Table XIV, p. 409.


expansion would sustain Yugoslavia's continued tolerant nationality policy, but its existence is not the primary reason for such tolerance.

In the cultural relations between the two states, the needs of Hungarians in the Vojvodina are rarely neglected. A number of agreements have been negotiated between the two states which cover cultural exchange programs of all types. Yugoslav films are sent to Hungary, while Hungarian films are taken into Yugoslavia. Artist groups, theater groups and various other cultural organizations and associations carry on extensive tours in the respective countries. The Hungarian groups tour mostly in the Vojvodina, while the Yugoslav groups tour mainly Budapest. These exchanges are also supplemented by agreements which concern cooperation in book publishing and subscription opportunities across national boundaries.

The only area where very little cooperation has taken place is military affairs. Hungary's membership in the Warsaw Pact keeps the Yugoslavs from attempting extensive military relations or security agreements.


112 The extensiveness of these exchanges is also indicated by cultural, economic, etc. programs carried on by individual cities across the borders. For example see "Szoros Kapcsolat Zombor és Baja Között: Hazatért a Zomboriak Küldöttőse Magyarországról," Magyar Szó, July 28, 1966, p. 2.

discussions with Hungary on a bilateral basis. Although some discus-
sions have taken place between the two states concerning military
matters, these have been of a very limited nature. Where the two
states have had opportunity to cooperate, has been in relation to
recent efforts to strengthen European security. Both states, plus
Rumania and some Western states have been pushing for discussions with
the aim of establishing a secure Europe free of military blocs.

Hungary’s membership in the Warsaw Pact has at times made the
existence of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina more difficult. This was
the case in August 1968, when Warsaw Pact armies crushed Czechoslovak
independence. In this latter instance, Warsaw Pact military units
also exerted pressure on Yugoslavia and Rumania. Soviet, Bulgarian
and Hungarian troops were drawn up along the borders of both these
states. In Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito’s government reacted with exten-
sive, well publicized, military preparations of its own. Among these
preparations, its deployment of troops deserves closer attention.

As in the old Austro-Hungarian empire, so in Yugoslavia, troops
of a particular nationality are usually not quartered or trained in
regions populated by their fellow nationals. In practice this means
that Hungarians from the Vojvodina spend their military duty in far-off

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114 See reports in News From Hungary-Magyarországi Hírek XVI

115 “Interview Granted by Nicolae Ceausescu to the Journal
‘Komunist’ of Yugoslavia,” pp. 5-6; Campbell, Tito’s Separate Road,
pp. 156-157; "A Katonai Tőmbök Feloszlattássával Csökkenné a Fesz-
Macedonia or Bosnia-Hertegovina. Macedonians or Albanians, on the other hand, serve the military in Slovenia, Croatia or the Vojvodina. In 1968, however, the Yugoslav strategists altered this usual practice in response to the Warsaw Pact pressure. They moved their Hungarian troops back to the Vojvodina to face their fellow nationals across the border. If hostilities were to commence, it would mean—at least initially—Hungarians fighting Hungarians and Bulgarians fighting Bulgarians.\textsuperscript{117}

In conclusion, we can say that Yugoslavia's "secession" from the bloc has had both constructive and disruptive consequences. Internally, it has led to more cohesion and harmony. The peoples of Yugoslavia became more united in the face of outside Soviet pressure which attempted to make them conform. The memory of German occupation in World War II and the more recent Soviet threat of 1968, reinforced this inner unity. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's defection has also had disruptive consequences for the Socialist camp. It has, through its stress on independent roads to socialism, contributed to the continued fragmentation of East-Central Europe. From the perspective of limiting Soviet hegemony this is a positive development, but as the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[116]Anderson, "Yugoslavia: The Diplomacy of Balance," p. 217, maintains that: "All military leaves were cancelled and a partial mobilization began . . . /this was/ reinforced by announcement of an 8.2 per cent increase in the 1969 military budget, by extension of draft obligations (including women in time of emergency), and by re-activation of the civil defense and partisan command structure."

\item[117]Based on personal observations of a high school teacher who was in the Vojvodina during the Czechoslovak crisis of August 1968.
\end{footnotes}
case of Rumania illustrates, it can also become a negative development by pitting one nationality against another.

Hungary

As the above discussion shows, Hungary is much more circumscribed in its international relations than either Yugoslavia or Rumania. The more restricted international posture is due primarily to Hungary's traumatic reincorporation into the bloc after the revolt of 1956.\textsuperscript{118} This event not only inundated the country with Soviet troops, but it made the country's leaders dependent on these troops for their exercise of power. As opposed to this, neither Rumania nor Yugoslavia are presently occupied by Soviet Troops. Furthermore in both these latter instances the leaders have created their own control-systems independent of the Soviet Union.

Hungarian dependence on the U.S.S.R. is evident not only in its political statements in the United Nations and its role in the Warsaw Pact, but also in its economic relations. Its foreign trade is dominated completely by the U.S.S.R. In fact, in the 1960's Hungary's dependence on the U.S.S.R. has been increased rather than reduced. In

\textsuperscript{118}Campbell, Tito's Separate Road, p. 112, defines this dependent status in the following way: "Hungary . . . has perhaps more national claims and grievances than any other nation of the region. Yet the Hungarian government handles these questions in the most gingerly way. Despite considerable provocation, it is very careful not to stir up the Hungarian people over the treatment of the Magyar minority in Rumania. The Hungarian press is full of warnings against 'bourgeois nationalism' . . . Undoubtedly the Hungarian leaders have in mind the outburst of nationalism in 1956 . . . /which/ sought to liberate Hungary not only from Soviet control but from the Communist system as well."
1960, 31 per cent of its imports and 29.3 per cent of its exports were tied to the Soviet Union. In 1965 this figure rose to 36.4 per cent and 34.8 per cent respectively. By 1970, it was estimated at 40 per cent and 42 per cent respectively. In the case of both Yugoslavia and Rumania, the opposite trend is observable, although Rumania is also heavily dependent on its trade with the U.S.S.R.

In spite of Hungary's excessive dependence on the U.S.S.R., it too has attempted to undertake policies motivated by national interest. In relation to Yugoslavia and Rumania this is evident in Hungary's increased concern for the Hungarians of the Vojvodina and Transylvania respectively. The increased concern is demonstrated by Hungary's policies toward its own minority nationalities, by its commitment to expand tourism with Yugoslavia and Rumania, and the growing popularity in Hungary of federalist schemes for re-ordering East-Central Europe.

Since the beginning of the 1960's Hungary has been interested in expanding tourism. In general, this concerns mainly increasing the attractiveness of Hungary to tourists from other lands. But in the

119 Vardy, History of the Hungarian Nation, Part Two, Table XIV, p. 409.


case of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia this interest is also motivated by the desire to increase the opportunities of Hungarians in each of these countries to visit their relatives in Hungary or vice-versa. With Czechoslovakia an extensive tourist exchange has been possible. In the case of Yugoslavia, such exchange has been restricted—primarily by the Hungarian government. However, since the early 1960's the number of tourists in both directions has been on the increase. Many of these tourists are Hungarians visiting their relatives.

Only in the case of Rumania has the question of tourism been a source of friction in recent years. While in 1962 as much as 15.7% of Hungary's tourists went to Rumania, in 1964 their percentage dropped to 5.3%. This decline was due to Rumania's unwillingness to liberalize its visa requirements vis-à-vis Hungarian citizens. Hungary was able to get such liberalized treatment from Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia leads all other countries as the destination of Hungarian "tourists." In 1964, 71.9 per cent of the Hungarians traveling abroad went to Czechoslovakia.

Throughout the 1950's fear of ideological "contamination" was responsible for the Hungarian government's strict limitations.

No exact statistics are available which indicate the percentage of the tourists that visit with relatives. However, the fact that many choose the Vojvodina rather than the scenic Adriatic as their destination, indicates that their motives include more than vacationing. Based on personal observations, during the summer of 1966.

122 As the Table on "Destination of Hungarians Traveling Abroad" in Facts About Hungary: The Fight for Freedom, p. 359, indicates, Czechoslovakia leads all other countries as the destination of Hungarian "tourists." In 1964, 71.9 per cent of the Hungarians traveling abroad went to Czechoslovakia.

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Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (in the form of no visa requirement) while Rumania was even hesitant in allowing an increase in the number of Hungarian tourists under stringent visa requirements. Finally in September 1967, a Rumanian-Hungarian agreement was signed relative to tourism which would raise to 100,000 the number of visitors allowed in both directions. However, this agreement referred primarily to increasing the number of tourist groups and omitted any reference to facilitating trips by individuals between the two countries. Thus, as late as August 1968 (before the Czechoslovak tragedy), the Hungarians were still one of the most restricted source of tourists for Rumania. However, policy makers in Budapest continue to exert pressure to have the existing restrictions removed.

Another area where the Hungarian government wants less restriction is in the opportunities for cultural exchange. As we have had occasion to see in relation to Rumanian and Yugoslavian domestic policies, in the latter country more opportunities exist for the Hungarians. To support its arguments for more cultural exchange and opportunities the Hungarian government has held up its own "nationality policy" as an example.

Hungary's national minorities composed only 1.8 per cent of

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127 Ibid.
its population in 1960. That is, only 175,000 individuals declared themselves as having a non-Hungarian mother-language. For the more numerous of these nationalities the state upholds an extensive system of public schools and cultural opportunities which ensure the preservation of their national heritage. The German, Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, Rumanian and Slovak minorities all have primary and secondary schools, teacher-training institutions and cultural organizations and periodicals. They even have certain television and radio programs in their own language or devoted to their folk culture.

In giving these politically insignificant minorities—they are geographically scattered and few in number—extensive cultural opportunities, Hungary is trying to set an example for its neighbors which have large and geographically concentrated minorities living within their borders. That this is not without its effects is demonstrated by Tito's visit to Hungary in 1967. On this occasion, both he and his wife visited Hungarian educational institutions near Budapest for the Serbian minority. As the fate of the Hungarians in Transylvania shows, reciprocity in such policies does not always follow. However,

131Márton, "A Mi Nemzetiségeink," Magyar Hírek, p. 3.
the impeccable nature of Budapest's policies makes it more difficult for neighboring states to rationalize intolerance and discrimination.

The Soviet Union can find nothing—or very little—in these relatively passive policies, that would endanger its control over East-Central Europe. The policies do not incite national antagonisms in the area. Probably, the U.S.S.R.'s tight control over Hungary keeps the latter's policies passive vis-à-vis Rumania and Yugoslavia. Only in one area is it possible to discern potential conflict between Soviet and Hungarian policies. This involves the Hungarian desire for a more integrated East-Central Europe as an independent entity. Hungarian thinking concerning East-Central Europe's "federation" has not gone past the speculative stage, although it is a very popular theme in the writings of many prominent Hungarians. Imre Kovacs, "The Establishment in Hungary," East Europe, XIV (May, 1965), p. 7; Vardy, History of the Hungarian Nation, Part Two, pp. 355-360.

They concur, that only a multi-national unified and socialist East-Central Europe can resolve the national antagonisms that still prevail in areas like Transylvania. However, in practice the Hungarian government continues to be one of the firmest pillars in Soviet integration efforts within the bloc. It actively supports both the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, which envision an East-Central Europe dependent on the U.S.S.R. News From Hungary - Magyarországi Hírek XVI (Radio Free Europe), July 17, 1970, p. 1.
III

The political conflicts which have arisen in East-Central Europe since the end of World War II have affected and in turn have been affected by the nationality policies which have been adhered to. In conclusion, we will reflect on some of the foregoing observations related to these policies.

In the case of Rumania's treatment of the Hungarians, the country's international involvement has had ambivalent consequences. While Rumania was totally dependent on the U.S.S.R., it treated the Hungarians much more liberally than after it began to undertake a more "independent" international posture. This independent posture developed parallel to the internal shift of power which strengthened the ethnic Rumanian dominance of the CPR. The dual nature of these developments should caution us not to impute the repressive nationality policies to only one or the other of these causes. Rather, it would be more accurate to conclude that the more permissive "polycentric" setting has enabled the Rumanians to follow a policy that is now more in accord with what they believe to be their national interest.

The above observation is supported by the sequence of developments in the Party power structure, in the shifts in nationality policies and in the political changes which led Rumania to a more independent posture internationally. It will be remembered that the power shift (favoring the dominant nationality) within the CPR took place between 1952 and 1957. The earliest overtly disadvantageous policies toward the Hungarians became evident already in the 1956-57
academic year, when many nationality educational facilities were "integrated" with the schools of the majority nationality. However, the major repressive policies against the Hungarians took place only after the Hungarian Revolt of 1956. This event shifted Soviet favor away from Hungary and in favor of Rumania. It led, in 1958, to the evacuation of the Red Army from Rumania. This removed the last major restraint against repressive nationality policies. Only in 1968 does this repression slacken somewhat, when in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a similar fate becomes feasible for Rumania as well.

That external and internal political developments both have a bearing on nationality policy is also born out by the treatment of the Hungarians in the Vojvodina. As previous chapters have pointed out, the Hungarians were considered undependable until about 1955. This was the case because they were identified with the disintegrative forces which destroyed Yugoslavia in 1941, and also because in the Yugoslav struggle against the Cominform, the Communist Hungarian Rákosi regime tried to sow discontent among the population of the Vojvodina.

The Yugoslav treatment of Hungarians in the period between 1945 and 1955 was consequently more repressive than Rumania's treatment of the Transylvanian Hungarians during that time. However, the Yugoslavs have, since about 1955, extended rather than restricted the opportunities of the Hungarians to further their national development. This shift reflected the growing influence of Hungarian and other minority
representatives within the Yugoslav League of Communists, and also the
decisive role of the Yugoslav League of Communists. Both these
developments required more cooperation among the various
countries of the country. And, since no nationality was
strong enough to dominate the Party by itself, the rights of all na-
tionalities received protection. In Rumania no similar situation ever
had the chance to develop because by 1958 the artificial balance which
had been imposed by a direct Soviet military presence was eroded.

The different policies pursued by Yugoslavia and Rumania also
indicate Hungary's relative political impotence. Due to its excessive
dependence on the U.S.S.R., it has had to follow a cautious policy
toward its neighbors. It has been compelled to follow a passive
policy which does not stir up national antagonisms. Hungary has,
therefore, succeeded in getting better treatment for Hungarian
minorities only in Yugoslavia, where domestic politics had already
decreed that they should be treated well. In Rumania, on the other
hand, where nationalism came into conflict with the rights of the
Hungarians, the government in Budapest has not been able to influence
nationality policies. Only the prospects of a Czechoslovak-type
Soviet intervention has eased the Rumanian policies toward the Trans-
sylvanian Hungarians.
CHAPTER VI

NATIONALITIES WITHOUT NATION-STATES

UNDER COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS

In the assimilationist settings which have produced both the American and Soviet man, there is very little sympathy for the cultural uniqueness and developmental distinctiveness of any East-Central European national group. In considering the oppression or systematic de-nationalization of certain ethnic groups, the response of many is to say "so what?" These individuals usually consider nationalities a negative, or at least an anachronistic phenomenon. In part, this is due to the belief that the conflicts among these nationalities have produced the major political confrontations of our century.

This study has not tried to disprove the above view. However, it does point out that policies of forced de-nationalization lead directly to nationality conflicts which could mushroom into political confrontations as well. This is born out by the observations of the present study in relation to Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality policies. It would seem, therefore, that an awareness of nationality problems, rather than an escapist "so what," is more likely to produce constructive thought concerning the peace and the future of East-Central Europe.

I

We have attempted to reflect on these problems by asking a
number of questions. Is the Communist workers' class solidarity a "solution" of the Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality problems? Why or why not? Or to what extent? If it is not, then what considerations guide the nationality policies of these states? How are the policies of these states similar? How are they different? Why are they different?

The answers to these questions are summarized and discussed in the following pages. Before turning to them directly, some general preliminary observations are in order. These concern the second reason why many representatives of a "melting-pot" setting refuse to consider the question of minority nationalities with any other than a negative attitude. It involves the belief that nationalities as such, especially minorities, are fated to become absorbed. Furthermore, absorption is considered not only "natural" but also "desirable."

This view is understandable in the United States and the Soviet Union where assimilation of some sort is needed to produce the American or the Soviet man. However, it should be noted, that neither the Soviet nor the American man is devoid of nationality or of

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1 In the present chapter "assimilation" is given a narrower meaning than in the preceding ones. Assimilation will be defined as absorption, a process whereby one nationality or culture is dissolved and completely mixed into another nationality or culture. It is a process similar to the dissolution of aspirin in water. "Integration," on the other hand, is defined as the uniting of two or more nationalities or cultures without destroying the identity of the components making up the mixture. To use a physical analogy, it is very much like a grafted tree or a mosaic in a church window. For the American mind this difference is not foreign. White Americans rarely talk of assimilating the black Americans, they think rather of integrating them.
a national language. So, nations are perpetuated even by the melting-pot environments. But, in the American case, at least, the assimilation is usually a voluntary process, not one that is forced onto the inhabitants. In this sense it is a "natural" process. Whether or not it is a "desirable" process depends totally on the perspective of the viewer. It is good or desirable if it can be proved that the nationality which absorbs is superior to the nationality that is being absorbed and that the product is a more peace-loving, more humane and more rational being.

This study has not tried to prove any of the above. On the other hand, it has pointed out that the process of assimilation which is being fostered in Transylvania is neither "natural" nor "desirable." It is not natural because it is being forced. It is not desirable because it enhances the possibility for further conflict. Furthermore, these policies are based on the questionable assumption that the more powerful, or the more numerous nationality is superior to the less numerous nationalities.

The East-European setting is not like the American melting-pot. It is composed of culturally compact areas, where nationalities living side by side speak different languages, follow different customs and enjoy different types of food and wine. The tolerance and understanding of these differences, rather than the systematic destruction of them, provides the only sane and humane solution to existing nationality conflicts. A pluralistic conception allowing for divers cultural developments does not rule out the possibility of political unity in
the area. Quite the contrary, such a conception presupposes political unification whether that be "Carpathian," "Danubian," or "Central-European" in scope.

II

The comparison of Rumanian and Yugoslav policies indicates that a minority can be treated in one of three ways. It can be excluded or isolated from the general life of the national community as a whole (e.g., Jewish ghettos). A second alternative is to try to assimilate or absorb the minority into the national community in such a way that it will abandon its own identity for the national identity of the majority nationality (e.g., Russification, Magyarization, Rumanization). Finally, the third alternative is to integrate or fuse the minority with the majority to create a union that is more than its component parts. In the latter case both minority and majority retain their own identities, but also identify with each other through the realization of certain common interests (e.g., Yugoslav policies in the 1960's, policies in Switzerland). Rumanian and Yugoslav policies can be identified with the second and third alternatives respectively--although both countries have resorted to all of these policy alternatives since the close of World War II.

In Transylvania

Rumanian policies toward the Hungarians were initially guided by the spirit of proletarian internationalism imposed by Stalin. It envisaged a relationship between Rumanians and Hungarians which would
not necessitate the abandonment of their respective national cultures. It demanded only that the two peoples live together within one state as "co-inhabiting nationalities" striving "shoulder to shoulder" to defeat the "forces of reaction" and inaugurate the new socialist millenium. This definition of the place of the Transylvanian Hungarians transformed them into partners of the majority nationality. They were given every opportunity to preserve their cultural identity, as long as they supported the process of Socialist transformation and the Soviet Union's hegemonial interests. These opportunities were spelled out both in the country's ideological commitments and its constitutional objectives. Until October 1956, these opportunities were also put into practice. Schools, publications, even some "national autonomy" in the Magyar Autonomous Region reflected this "integrationist" approach.

Changes in Rumania's internal and external political relations have turned it away from the "integrationist" solution. In the years between 1952-1957 the CPR lost its cosmopolitan character and became primarily an ethnic Rumanian organization, both in membership and leadership. This ethnic Rumanian nationalization of the Party paralleled the period of de-Stalinization in the bloc, which loosened Soviet hegemonial controls. The Hungarian Revolt of 1956 led to unrest among the Hungarians in Transylvania. This made the Hungarians suspect in

2 That Stalin was thinking along these lines is also indicated by his abortive plan to have Rumania and Hungary federated. See Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), pp. 177-178.
the eyes of both Rumanian and Soviet policy-makers. Rumanian efforts to help quell this unrest as well as the Hungarian revolt, increased Soviet confidence in Rumania's dependability to such an extent that in 1958 all Soviet troops were removed from the country. This military withdrawal gave Rumanian leaders more control over their internal policies. By the beginning of the 1960's they also gained more control over their foreign relations as the Soviet Union became more and more embroiled in its ideological and political dispute with China.

By 1963, Rumanian policies began to reflect openly the country's more nationalist orientation both internally and in the international arena. Defiance of COMECON integration efforts reflected this new Rumanian nationalism on the international front. Internally, the shift to an assimilationist nationality policy became its most concrete expression. The reduction of Hungarian educational and cultural opportunities, as well as their symbolic self-government in the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region, reflected the new Rumanian "socialist patriotism" on the domestic front. Only at the end of 1968, following the Czechoslovak crisis, did Rumanian assimilationist policies slacken in momentum. Thus, Rumanian nationality policy can be summarized as integrationist from 1945 to 1958. Since the withdrawal of Soviet troops it has become assimilationist. In light of the 1968 events, it remains to be seen whether or not the

3 In the area of education, the turn toward assimilationist policies was evident already in the 1956-57 academic year. Along this line see Chapter IV above.
assimilationist policies will be continued. As of 1970, they have been toned down.

In the Vojvodina

The Yugoslav policies were at first "exclusivist" in nature. The Hungarians— as well as some other non-South Slav nationalities— were treated as former enemies. They were held responsible for Yugoslavia's dismemberment during the war. In the years immediately after the War they were openly persecuted, thereby signifying that they were excluded from the national community. As Communist rule became more firmly established this separation was slowly replaced by tolerance for Hungarian cultural development. As in the case of Rumania, internal and external political pressures provided the impetus for alterations in Yugoslavia's nationality policy. The external threat of Stalinist intervention was, perhaps, the most important catalyst. It signified to the Yugoslav leaders that they had to win the support of all the peoples of the country if they were to ward off successfully the Stalinist threat. The CPY, therefore, began to put into practice in the years 1948-1950 the nationality policy which the country's constitution and the Party's ideology demanded. Expansion of cultural and educational opportunities, as well as local self-government, has characterized this policy. It has become an "integrationist" policy, uniting all the peoples of the land, by granting them the opportunity to preserve their diversity.

Internal political factors have reinforced this trend. The traditional antagonism which existed between Serbs and Croats, the
conflicting economic interests of northern and southern Yugoslavia, and the divided emotional loyalty of border nationalities, automatically ruled out an assimilationist policy. (Which nationality would or could provide the standards for assimilation? Since Yugoslavia does not have one majority nationality no such standard is available.) Furthermore, the fear of the revival of ethnic nationalisms made Tito and the other leaders of the CPY/LYC extremely sensitive about the correct application of their nationality policy. They want to perpetuate the trans-ethnic Yugoslav character of the state. They have been able to do this only by giving all nationalities a certain representation in the Party (League) without any one gaining a predominant position. Parallel to this, all nationalities have also been guaranteed opportunities for their own cultural development. Thus, Yugoslavia has followed since about 1948, but more consistently since 1955, an "integrationist" nationality policy.\footnote{This generalization is true only for Yugoslavia as a whole. On the Republic level there are standards of assimilation. In Serbia one can become Serbianized and in Croatia it is possible to be Croatianized. But mixed marriages usually tend to produce individuals who claim to be Yugoslavs rather than Croats or Serbs. For non-South Slav nationalities Yugoslavianization in this sense is assimilationist rather than integrationist. As of the present, however, this trend is not widespread.}

The major reason for the different treatment of nationalities \footnote{Integrationist policies were already evident during World War II in the relations of the South Slav peoples. However, these integrationist policies were not practiced vis-à-vis the Hungarians (and other non-South Slav nationalities) until 1948. Until that time the Hungarians were "excluded" from full membership in Yugoslavism.}
in the two areas is that the setting and the problems faced by Yugos-
slav ia and Rumania have been unique. In both countries the Hungarian
inhabitants have posed similar yet different domestic and international
problems. While in both the internal unity of the country has guided
nationality policies, the different internal political situations and
the unlike international posture of the two countries, produced differ-
ent results. Consequently, in Rumania the Hungarians have lost many
of their former national-cultural institutions and opportunities.
They have been suffering real repression. In Yugoslavia the opposite
has happened. Over the years nationality policies have become more
permissive.

III

The above observations lead us to a number of conclusions.
First and foremost, that it is national needs and developmental pecu-
liarities rather than ideology and class solidarity that guide both
Rumanian and Yugoslav nationality policies. In other words, nation-
alism has been more important than Communist ideology and its claim
that class solidarity unites peoples regardless of their national
backgrounds. Power relations and the demands of "national interest"
have guided the formulation of nationality policies in practice. This
is reflected both by Rumania's contradiction of Communist nationality
theory and Yugoslavia's adherence to it.6 In Rumania, Communist

6 Both states claim that they follow Communist nationality
policy based on proletarian internationalism. Only the difference in
the actual policies of the two states indicates that Rumania is merely
paying lip-service to these ideals.
nationality theory does not adequately serve the leaders of the country, so they ignore it in practice. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, it does serve the leaders of the country in furthering unity. Thus, in the latter country theory is followed.

The observation that power relations rather than ideology now guide the treatment of the Hungarians in both areas, leads to the further conclusion that the problem is a political one requiring a political solution. However, political solutions may be both far-sighted and near-sighted. (In the present context, by "far-sighted" we mean a policy that contributes to the well being of the greatest number of people--across national lines--and to the peace and security of all the peoples living in the area. By "near-sighted" we mean a policy that contributes to the well-being of only one nationality at the expense of other nationalities. In the latter case unity is always imposed rather than accepted.)\(^7\) We have indicated that Yugoslavia has a more far-sighted nationality policy than Rumania. In recent years Yugoslavia has made a real effort to balance the interests of all its nationalities. In this way it has ensured that the citizens of all nationalities will be able to live in peace with one another. In Rumania the opposite now prevails. The latter become more conscious of their disadvantaged position and tend to view the state as their enemy. Cooperative and peaceful co-existence is almost

\(^7\)"Near-sighted" policies are also distinguishable by their definition of national interest in terms of the interests of the dominant ethnic group. This means that national interest becomes merely race interest.
impossible in this setting. Furthermore, it leads to the exact opposite of what was intended. Instead of increasing unity in the country it encourages conflict and weakens the country both internally and internationally.\textsuperscript{8}

The above difference in ethnic policies leads to yet another conclusion, that far-sighted policies take into account a balancing of the interests of all nationalities. Furthermore, such a balancing of interests is a result of an existing balance of power. Where a balance of power prevails among nationalities, as in Yugoslavia, there can also be found a balancing of interests. Where no such political balance exists, there will also fail to be a balance of interests. The above conclusions hold true as long as there is no external interference in either the political or the interest balances (e.g., Soviet troops on Rumanian soil prior to 1958), or if the role of an individual leader (or a group of leaders) does not intervene in spite of the existing imbalance of power to create a balance of interests. (In the latter category the role of Petru Groza in Rumania and the role of Tito in Yugoslavia are particularly noteworthy, i.e., their roles as "balancers."\textsuperscript{9})

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\textsuperscript{8}Rumanian realization of the weakening impact of such policies was indicated by the numerous pacifying speeches made to Hungarian audiences in Transylvania in the wake of the Czechoslovakian crisis. See as examples the speeches of Ceaucescu, Maurer, Fazekas and Patilinet in "Party and State Leaders Visit Brasov, Covasna and Harghita Counties," \textit{Documents, Articles and Information on Romania,} No. 21 (Aug. 27, 1968), pp. 2-38.
The future prospects for both the Transylvanian and the Vojvodinian Hungarians depend as much on international as on intra-national developments. However, while no major shifts take place in the international alignment of states, it is safe to say that the condition of those in both Rumania and Yugoslavia will remain as at present. That is, in Rumania continued repression will prevail while in Yugoslavia more opportunities in national-cultural matters may be expected. But even here changes are apt to take place, particularly after Tito is no longer on the scene. So it is really impossible to say more than that if things remain as they are, nationality policies will remain as they are. But since change is the only certainty in the world, it is not out of place to consider how the ethnic relations of Eastern Europe could be placed into a far-sighted policy perspective.

As we have shown, an integrationist rather than an assimilationist nationality policy can prevail only where a balance of power favors it. The solution is to foster the ability of all nationalities to defend themselves. Only in this way will interests be considered by the majority nationality or nationalities. However, the creation of such a balance is extremely difficult (without external intervention) when one nationality numerically overshadows its minorities, as is the case in Rumania. In the latter instance other solutions should be considered as a check on the unrest and national animosities which are being produced.

A complete re-thinking is required to solve the problem. As the
preceding discussion indicates, ideological commitment to better nationality policies is considered seriously only when such policies correspond to the interests of the state concerned. Thus, tolerant nationality policies are only possible in a state which is multi-national. Unfortunately, the trend in East-Central Europe has been to strengthen the new nation-states rather than to attempt a larger multi-national state based on both economic and political realism. The emotional sunk cost in petty ethnic nationalisms has been too strong. As a consequence, the post-World War II re-ordering has perpetuated the political fragmentation of the area.

Political developments supported the strengthening of this fragmentation. Two in particular deserve mention: the expansion of Soviet hegemonial control over the area and the drastic reduction of minority populations through deportations, territorial transfers, population exchanges and exterminations. Soviet hegemonial control led to a freezing of the fragmented nation-state system inherited from the interwar years. This was reinforced by the drastic reduction of the minority populations of East-Central Europe. As Professor Leszek Kosinski has pointed out, in 1930 out of about 94 million people living

\[ \text{9A multi-national composition is by itself no guarantee of tolerant nationality policies. Policies in the U.S.S.R. and some other states (including Czechoslovakia until the second half of the 1960's) testify to this fact. However, where no one nationality has a majority, as in the case of Yugoslavia, the chances for tolerance seem to improve immeasurably.} \]

\[ \text{10See Chapter I above for a discussion of some of these developments.} \]
in East-Central Europe (he included seven countries under this designation: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania) 24 million (26%) were members of minority groups. World War II and its consequences altered this picture completely. Due to deportations, territorial transfers, etc., the minority population of the same seven countries was reduced to 7.1 million or 7.2% of the 99 million inhabitants in 1960.

Most of the changes in this ethnic picture took place in the northern areas of East-Central Europe, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The German and Jewish minorities were reduced most drastically. While in the interwar period they represented 5,878,000 and 4,096,000 of the minority population respectively, in the postwar period they have become an insignificant part of the population in all states except Rumania. Only the minorities of the southern areas of East-Central Europe remain in significant numbers. Of these, the Hungarians are the most numerous, with 1,604,000 in Rumania, 504,000 in Yugoslavia, 517,000 in Czechoslovakia and about 200,000 in the U.S.S.R. (Carpatho-Ukraine). Aside from the Hungarians, only the Albanians have a numerous representation. There are 915,000 Albanians in the Kosmet of Yugoslavia.

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11"Changes in the Ethnic Structure in Countries of East-Central Europe," Lecture delivered at Louisiana State University on February 29, 1968, under the auspices of the Geography and Anthropology and the History Departments. Taken from a copy of the speech's text, p. 7.

12Ibid., pp. 7, 11.

13Ibid., Tables 3 and 4, between pp. 11 and 12.
The revised ethnic make-up of the area has a number of noteworthy consequences. The German minorities are no longer an effective lever of German foreign policy in the area. The Jews have lost their important—even dominant—position in the commercial and intellectual life of these countries. As a consequence, only the Hungarians remain as a significant "link" between the various nation-states of East-Central Europe. They, on the other hand, are less cosmopolitan in their perspective, but also more directly tied to the destiny of the area than either the Germans or the Jews.\footnote{14}

The continued existence of the Hungarian minorities, however, is viewed by nationalists with frustration. Hungarian nationalists would prefer to solve the problem by re-annexing the areas where these fellow nationals reside. Rumanian and Slovak nationalities, on the other hand, would like to eliminate their existence by assimilation or expulsion. They cannot conceive of these minorities as "links" between the various peoples, playing a mediating role between them.

\footnote{14}{Germans envisioned East-Central Europe as part of their sphere of influence. They were concerned only in extending their power over it so as to increase the wealth and power of Germany generally. The Jews, on the other hand, were (relatively) newcomers in the area. Most (although by no means all) moved into the area in the last two centuries. Many of them stayed briefly, continuing their journey further West. The persecutions imposed in these countries were at times just more of what had been their fate in Czarist Russia. Furthermore, even recent Soviet policies (due to the Arab-Israeli conflict) have made them less than enthusiastic about their stay in East-Central Europe. The existence of Israel, moreover, has provided them with an alternative homeland that is more hospitable. Unlike the Jews and the Germans, the Hungarians cannot move to areas outside East-Central Europe if conditions do not favor them. Nor do they want to, since their national fate is directly tied to this area.}
Only the Yugoslavs have come to accept this latter view.

Expulsion fortunately is now less likely than in the period right after World War II. Population exchange, however, must certainly have crossed the mind of policy makers in the area. In the case of the Transylvanian Hungarians this is not a rational option. First of all there are only a handful of Rumanians in Hungary. This means that a fair trade would be impossible. Second, present-day Hungary could not absorb an influx of almost two million additional inhabitants. Together with Czechoslovakia, Hungary has the greatest population density in East-Central Europe. Its population density of 282 per square mile compares unfavorably with Rumania's 208 per square mile and Yugoslavia's 188 per square mile.

Such an exchange of populations would be possible only if it were tied to some sort of territorial exchange. Here the experience of the Second Vienna Award would be instructive. However, partition is a "solution" geared to a nation-state system. As such it is already an anachronism. Yet, if the peoples of East-Central Europe continue to think emotionally as ethnic nationalists, then this may become the only feasible solution. It is not resorted to at present, since the Soviet Union does not want to re-open the question of ceded and annexed

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15 In this study East Germany is not considered part of East-Central Europe. It, of course, has even a greater population density than Hungary and Czechoslovakia.


17 See Chapter I, above.
The European Common Market, Nato, Comecon and the Warsaw Pact indicate that new and larger units are needed to meet modern problems in the political as well as economic field. Regarding the fate of the
Hungarians in Transylvania, the solution of their plight also seems to lie in such a greater unit which can end the conflicts among member nationalities. To the present writing, however, Comecon and the Warsaw Pact have not proved up to this task in the question of Transylvania. The reason for this is probably that they are more instruments of hegemonial control than of a community of nations welded together by common interests.

V

A more imaginative alternative to partitions is the political unification of all, or of parts, of East-Central Europe. No matter how utopian this may seem at first glance, it is probably the only solution that could bring an end to ethnic repression as it exists in Rumania today. The artificial attempt to create nation-states in this area, has from its inception led only to conflict. East-Central Europe is multi-national and most nation-states within it (excepting only present-day Hungary, Poland and Albania) are likewise multi-national.18 As the preceding discussion has shown, even the most judicious partitions and boundary rectifications can only hope to even out the number of minorities that will fall under the rule of other nationalities. The unification of the area under a multi-national government, however, would make all peoples minorities, as in

18Poland will become even more homogeneous ethnically as a consequence of the Bonn-Warsaw treaty signed recently. See "Poland Reportedly to Let 90,000 Germans Depart," The (Toledo) Blade, Dec. 6, 1970, p. 3.
present-day Yugoslavia. This would allow for a balance of power among nationalities which would ensure a balance of interests among them as well.

The peoples of East-Central Europe have innumerable common interests. Politically they are in the shatter-belt region of Europe, hemmed in by the German (today Western powers) and the Russian (today Soviet) power blocs. Their disunity and weakness make them subject to the imperialism of both. By becoming a united independent federation, neutral of both blocs, they could serve the interests of themselves as well as world peace. Of course, their present position within the Soviet sphere of influence makes such a union highly unlikely if not impossible.

In spite of the fact that such a union is faced by seemingly unsurmountable obstacles, it has fascinated and occupied the attention of numerous outstanding individuals of almost all East-Central European peoples. From the middle of the 19th century to the present, these individuals have attempted to demonstrate not only the need for such a unification, but also its feasibility. Even the Communist leaders of the area have toyed with the idea. In their formulations a central consideration was always the final resolution of nationality problems.

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While obstacles to such a multi-national federation seem great, the emergence of a distinctively East-Central European culture, the apparent common interests of these people versus German and Soviet encroachments, and the technological unification of the area, have drawn most of them closer to one another than at any time in their past history. What remains now is a concerted process of bridge-building among the respective nationalities. In this role the minorities of the present have a particularly significant role. They provide the area with the people that are bilingual or multilingual, the people who live within two or more cultures.

The area is also closer to such unity for yet two other reasons. First, the elimination of the vast German minorities has meant that German political influence has been trimmed. It is still important, but it can no longer use large sections of the local populations to further its foreign policy goals. In other words, the unification of the East-Central Europeans could proceed independently of German aspirations. Second, the imperialism of the U.S.S.R. in 1948, 1956 and 1968, has demonstrated dramatically the conflict of political interests between Moscow and the states of East-Central Europe. The two developments taken together mean that Germany is unable to impose its authority and Soviet assistance has become less desirable to ward off German influence. In other words, there is a new realization of the need for independence from both Eastern and Western power centers.

Under Soviet hegemony the peoples of East-Central Europe have only limited opportunities to work for political unification among
themselves. However, much of their cooperation through COMECON and other Soviet sponsored agencies has provided them with invaluable experience in working together. Eventually, these lessons in cooperation could be utilized to establish a federal republic along the Yugoslav pattern—a republic which would provide for economic and political unity while it preserved cultural diversity.

The artificiality of existing nation-states would be replaced with a multi-national state which could guarantee cultural autonomy to all nationalities, while providing them with common political leadership. This alternative to partition is at present merely a utopian delineation of what would be the best solution for the peace and security of East-Central Europe. But it realistically points out that if a political re-arranging takes place in the area, to last, it would have to safeguard cultural diversity. For the Hungarians in Transylvania and the Vojvodina, as for all the peoples of the area, this is the solution that holds the most promise.
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APPENDIX A

SERBO-CROATIAN, RUMANIAN, HUNGARIAN AND GERMAN GEOGRAPHIC AND HISTORIC PLACE NAMES IN TRANSYLVANIA AND THE VOJVODINA

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II. Cities and Towns of Transylvania

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IV. Cities and Towns of the Vojvodina and Vicinity

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APPENDIX B

The Second Vienna Award: Some Reflections on an Attempted Compromise

The Second Vienna Award has been maligned not only in the West, but also in Rumania and Hungary. It was a compromise agreement and by its nature was unable to satisfy everyone. Yet, a second look at this agreement is in order. It represents the first concrete attempt to find some way to an equitable Transylvanian adjustment.

Through this award the Rumanians returned to Hungary an area of 19,300 square miles with a population of 2,385,987. This area

1Western reaction to the Second Vienna Award was mainly anti-Hungarian. First, because many Westerners were unaware of the issues involved; second, because the Rumanians had a better outlet to the Western press. See R. C. Waldeck, Athene Palace (New York: Robert M. McBride & Co., 1942), p. 141; C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth (Edinburgh, England: The Edinburgh University Press, 1961), I, 375, II, 179.

2Charles Upson Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania's Case /n.p.: n.n., 1941/, p. 16.

3Many Western observers saw the Second Vienna Award as a manifestation of Hitler's policy of divide et impera. That this was not the case is convincingly argued by both Waldeck and Macartney. Waldeck, Athene Palace, p. 296, states that "...as Hungary and Rumania could not do anything to Germany even if united, this argument did not hold. What Hitler needed in his Southeastern Grossraum was not the tension which goes with a policy of divide and rule, but a measure of quiet and peace." Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 444, also maintains that the motive was not divide and rule, but the desire to find a settlement that would keep Rumania and Hungary from fighting each other, at least until the end of the war.

4Nicholas Kallay, Hungarian Premier (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), footnote 28, p. 59. Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania's Case, p. 1, gives slightly different figures. He estimates the territory as 17,000 square miles, and the population as 2,400,000. For a thorough analysis see András Rónai, "Erdély Tájai és az Uj Határ," Földrajzi Közlemények, LXVIII (1940), 240.
covered the northern two-fifths of Transylvania. Its population was mixed, but it did contain a relative majority (plurality) of Magyars. The exact figures according to the census of 1910, 1930 and 1941 gives the breakdown presented by Table Ia. The statistics indicate that the award left with Hungary approximately one million Rumanians. This compares favorably with the Trianon "solution" which left 1,704,000-1,356,675 Magyars under Rumania. The Vienna Award saw both countries on more or less equal terms, while at Trianon Hungary was the defeated state that had to accept the diktat of the Entente. The Vienna Award could, therefore, bring about a real compromise which was not all

5 Waldeck, Athene Palace, p. 150, refers to Hungary receiving the "lion's share" of Transylvania. This was a widely held misconception in the West, but it is discouraging to see that even someone so close to the events should make such a mistake. Not only in population and area, but also in natural wealth and industrial capacity, Hungary received far less than what was left to Rumania. See Rönai, "Erdély Tájai és az uj Határ," pp. 239-50.

6 See Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 59, and Table Ia. Philip E. Mosely, "Transylvania Partitioned," Foreign Affairs, XIX (Oct., 1940), p. 241, and Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania's Case, pp. 16-20, disagree with this statement and with Kallay. The dependability of the latter two is questionable, however, since both are guilty of using figures too loosely. Mosely, for example (pp. 242-43), alternates carelessly between 1910 and 1930 statistics.

7 Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 423; Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 59.

8 Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 143. The figures are those of the 1910 and 1930 census respectively.

9 Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, VI (April, 1928), p. 435, admits as much in spite of the status quo bias of his article.
TABLE Ia
THE NATIONALITY PORTRAIT OF THE TRANSYLVANIAN PARTITION OF 1940*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Nationality**</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1941</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magyars</td>
<td>1,125,732</td>
<td>911,550</td>
<td>1,380,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>926,268</td>
<td>1,176,433</td>
<td>1,029,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>90,195</td>
<td>68,694</td>
<td>44,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews (Yiddish)***</td>
<td>90,195</td>
<td>138,885</td>
<td>47,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenes</td>
<td>16,284</td>
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<td>19,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>12,807</td>
<td>99,585</td>
<td>19,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>22,968</td>
<td></td>
<td>36,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,194,254</td>
<td>2,395,147</td>
<td>2,577,260</td>
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</table>

Area re-ceded to Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality**</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magyars</td>
<td>533,004</td>
<td>441,720</td>
<td>363,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>1,895,505</td>
<td>2,031,447</td>
<td>2,274,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews (Yiddish)***</td>
<td>465,814</td>
<td>475,158</td>
<td>490,640</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>152,820</td>
<td>150,934</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,047,143</td>
<td>3,099,259</td>
<td>3,332,898</td>
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</table>

Area left with Rumania

*This Table is based on C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945 (Second Edition; Edinburgh: At the University Press, 1961), I, 423; Recensamantul General Al Romaniei Din 1941 6 Aprilie: Date Sumare Provizorii (Bucuresti: Institutul Central De Statistica, 1944), Table 1, p. IX; "Rezultatele Recensamantului Maghiar 1941," Comunicari Statistice, No. 1 (Jan. 15, 1945), Table 18, pp. 14-15.

**Nationality is determined by census takers either on the basis of mother language or according to declared nationality. The Hungarian census of 1910 was based on mother-language, while the Rumanian censuses of 1930 and 1941 were based on declared nationality. The Hungarian census of 1941 was based on both mother-language and declared nationality, but for the sake of simplicity only the declared nationality statistics are used in this Table.

***See footnote 42 in this chapter.
one-sided. This can be seen in the gains and losses of the respective states.

In terms of population, Hungary's Rumanian minority grew from 25,000 to one million. As opposed to this, Rumania's Magyar minority of 1,704,000-1,353,675 was reduced to 533,004-441,720. Territorial changes make the compromise even clearer. In this category, Hungary received the poorer half not only in terms of area, but also in regard to natural resources and industrial capacity. Thus, the compromise was a real one, although neither side saw it in this light; both alleged that the other received the "better end of the deal."

This decision has been presented to indicate that under unique circumstances, the existing balance of power makes real compromises possible. In short, it reveals that not all "bourgeois" solutions have been dictates of victor to victim.

However, it was short lived. The Vienna Award did not survive the war. It was annulled by the Allies, who transferred the Hungarian share of the Award to Rumania as a reward for her prior defection from the Axis.

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10 Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 56.

11 Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 423. The figures are those of the 1910 and 1930 census respectively.


13 By August 23, 1944 when Rumania switched sides, the Axis no longer existed since Italy had already surrendered.
Vita

Andrew Ludányi was born in Szikszó, Hungary, February 12, 1940. He began his education in the little town of Hohburg in Upper Austria. For a time he also attended school in a refugee camp near Linz. In 1949 he emigrated to the United States and settled near Victoria, later near Amelia, Virginia. He continued his schooling in the public schools of these respective communities. In 1951 his family moved to New York City, where he finished grammar school in P.S. 122 in Queens. He attended Long Island City High School and graduated in June 1958. For two years he worked in various occupations, primarily as a laboratory technician at N.Y.U. Downstate Medical Center. In February 1960 he started his studies at Elmhurst, Illinois, and graduated with a B.A. degree in May 1963. In September 1963 he began his studies on the graduate level at Louisiana State University majoring in Government. He received the M.A. degree in 1966. In 1968 he completed his course work for the Ph.D. Since September 1968 he has been an instructor of Political Science at Ohio Northern University.
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Andrew Ludanyi

Major Field: Political Science

Title of Thesis: Hungarians in Rumania and Yugoslavia: A Comparative Study of Communist Nationality Policies

Approved:

[Signatures]

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

[Signatures]

Date of Examination:

April 23, 1971