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En(Gendering) Policy: Gender Policies in Former Soviet Republics

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(EN)GENDERING POLICY: GENDER POLICIES IN
FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS

A Dissertation
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by
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Abstract

This dissertation examines gender policies in former Soviet republics. Gender policies are depicted as traditional policies (including such policies as child support, spousal support, and inheritance rights), violence against women policies (domestic violence, marital rape, sexual assault, and sexual harassment), and human trafficking policies. It builds upon previous works with a multi-methodological approach (content analysis, logistical regression, and qualitative survey analysis). The focus here is on the factors that influence adoption of formal policies in former Soviet republics from 1993-2008. I explore variance across both countries and policy areas, assessing whether (and why) certain post-Soviet states are more likely to adopt certain policies over others and examining the diversity among former Soviet republics in their adoption and response to particular policies. I pay particular attention to whether the provision of policies in one issue area is related to the provision of policies in another issue area—that is, the degree to which governments can be seen as promoting (or not promoting) these policies in general or whether government action across various issues areas seems unrelated.
Chapter I
Introduction: Bringing Gender In

I. Introduction

Women in post-Soviet countries face a number of social, cultural, and political challenges, including unemployment and poverty, labor force discrimination, political disenfranchisement, prostitution and sex trafficking, and domestic violence. Like women elsewhere, they suffer pay disparities and experience occupational segregation, and often shoulder the “double burden” of full-time work added to care of the home. Gender issues are complicated by the ostensible commitment of the former Soviet government to gender equity and gender neutrality. Even though the Soviets removed formal legal barriers to women’s educational and professional advancement, women remained economically and politically disadvantaged and their issues were rarely placed on the political agenda. Moreover, in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, gender differences and gendered outcomes in social and political life were largely ignored, and this once again reinforced gender inequities. This project bonds the post-Soviet, women and gender studies, and political science literatures. It does so by contributing to scholarship on important questions about comparative public policy and the gendered nature of policy outcomes.

This dissertation examines whether and why post-Soviet governments mainstream gender issues in the context of the political and economic transition of the 1990s. Gender mainstreaming is the process by which issues related to gender become incorporated into all levels of governmental institutional decision-making, policy formulation, policy outcomes, and implementation, in order to promote equality and to challenge prevailing gender subordination. According to the mandate of the Special Adviser on gender mainstreaming (adopted in 1997), UN member states (including most post-Soviet countries) have endorsed mainstreaming as an
important global strategy for promoting gender equity. For several reasons, the degree to which mainstreaming has occurred varies substantially across states. First, there is substantial diversity on how to conceptualize “gender” and what to include among “gender issues.” The UN does not have an ability to enforce mainstreaming; moreover, even when individual policymakers are supportive of mainstreaming, political institutions (both informal and formal) may pose obstacles to gender mainstreaming. And, as noted above, the promotion of gender equity in post-Soviet states faces unique challenges.

This work augments previous research that has been conducted on gender policies in the former Soviet region. The majority of research has been conducted on single countries (or single regions within countries) or on a singular issue (such as domestic violence and sex-trafficking). Though this research has been valuable, it has provided us with only a limited picture of the development of gender policies in these countries. The hope here is to provide a more comprehensive approach as a result of casting wider spatial, temporal, issue, and methodological networks. A mixed-method approach, consisting of both econometric statistical methods (to examine the likelihood across nations and times of adopting policies that promote gender equity and address the disadvantaged position of women) and qualitative methods (to examine the specificities of those policies and the factors that influence them), is used to examine the adoption of gender policies across post-Soviet governments from 1993-2008. In addition, several policy areas identified by past scholarship as gender-related, including traditional (including child support, child custody, and inheritance rights), violence against women (domestic violence, sexual assault, and sexual harassment), and human-trafficking are studied. All of these issues point to the general issue of gender equality. The questions become: (a) what factors have pressed former Soviet countries to implement legislation regarding gender equality?; and (b) are
the same factors that press these countries to adopt policies in one issue area the same factors that press these countries to adopt policies in different issue areas?

The introduction focuses on how legislating gender equality became a priority in the international community and subsequently in the former Soviet republics. The 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing provided an impetus for Eastern European countries to focus attention on critical areas of concern to women that stem from social problems that impact both men and women and that require solutions that address both men and women. This chapter highlights how gender issues have been conceptualized over the past three decades regarding the development process. It begins with a discussion of the 1970s framework of Women in Development (WID) followed by a shift in the 1980s to Gender and Development (GAD). In the 1990s, GAD was institutionalized into gender mainstreaming. In addition, this chapter shows how gender mainstreaming became part of the vernacular in Eastern Europe. The third part involves a brief description of subsequent chapters.

II. Path to Gender Equity

Women in Development

The approach to implementing gender equity has shifted and evolved from earlier debates on the role of women in the economic development of their countries. In 1970 in an international forum in the Second International Development Decade United Nations document, it was noted that women needed to be integrated into the development process. Ester Boserup’s Woman’s Role in Economic Development (1970) noted that modernization had marginalized women in developing countries and discounted their contributions during the development process. Her book inspired research on women’s marginalization in development and calls from women’s

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1 WID challenged the welfare approach which lasted from the postwar period to the 1970s. This approach saw women as beneficiaries of governmental action and emphasized their practical concerns related to healthcare, nutrition, and family planning (Moser 1993).
groups to be included in the development process (Chowdhry 2005, 31). Modernization clearly had a different impact on women and men in developing countries. Boserup suggested that women and men shared equal status in agricultural production, destroying the belief that women were less productive and deserved fewer resources in the development process (Jaquette 1990, 61; Okali 2011). Her works help to form the basis of the WID thesis.

The actual term “Women in Development” (WID) was not coined until a few years later. WID became a prominent theme at the 1975 World Conference of the International Women’s Year at Mexico City and the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985). WID altered both the manner in which women’s issues were addressed and their role in society. Women’s labor was seen as an active contributor to the formal and informal economy (Kramarae and Spender 2006, 367). This new approach treated women as active participants in their own fates and not just as passive victims of governmental actions or beneficiaries of domestic policies. The focus was on improving women’s education and employment opportunities, enhancing equality in the political and social realms, and bolstering health and welfare assistance (United Nations Development Programme 2003, 4). Generally, WID was concerned with promoting social justice and equity for women (Razavi and Miller 1995).

Although WID sought to incorporate women into all aspects of the development process, women were often incorporated in the very late stages after the important decisions on policy implementation, goals, and resource allocation were already made (United Nations 2002). Integrating women often entailed just increasing their participation in development agendas without taking into consideration their input, priorities, knowledge, and needs. WID was seen as failing to address critical issues of power within the dynamics of gender relationships that resulted in women’s subordination. Through the focus on specialized projects aimed at women
(e.g., acquiring greater access to credit and educational opportunities), WID neglected the primary structural reasons for gender inequality. Anderson (1990) stated: “the very act of separating women’s programming from the central, mainstream programming which involved men, resulted in increased marginalization of women and their roles” (32).

Gender and Development

In the 1980s, with the inadequacies of WID, a new approach evolved with a central goal of incorporating gender equality into all facets of the development process. This new approach was called “Gender and Development” (GAD) which was to situate gender discrimination within societal structures and institutions and seek to restructure them completely (Richey 2000, 195). Such a view originated from women who had received foreign assistance in the development process. These women questioned the essentialness of the terms “woman” and “development.” Unlike Western women’s organizations whose main focus was achieving equal status with men, such a goal was not deemed the same for women in developing countries. Men in developing countries also suffered inequities such as unemployment, low wages, and poor working conditions within the existing institutions. Gender equality was therefore inseparable from improving the lives of both women and men. The focus was on the inequalities in social relationships, in power relationships, and in men’s and women’s social roles in relation to development—the social construction of gender and the need to challenge existing gender roles and relations. To achieve full equality, there would need to be a complete reconstruction of societal institutions making gender central rather than tangential (Okali 2011).

The focus of GAD shifted solely from one of women’s strategic interests (as was seen in WID) to one of their practical interests. Women’s practical concerns include providing adequate living conditions for women, such as water provision, employment opportunities, and healthcare.
Such concerns were rooted in the gendered division of labor and did not directly challenge the roots of gender subordination. On the other hand, strategic interests advocate the eradication of gender inequities. These concerns include provisions that establish women’s political equality, reproductive rights, and adopt measures to address violence against women (Moser 1993, 39).

GAD centered on incorporating gender issues into the mainstream of development institutions. Mainstream institutions are gendered in terms of culture, rules, and outcomes. As a result, disadvantaged groups are most likely to be disregarded in decision making, policy analysis, and resource distribution, thereby reproducing gender inequalities and existing hierarchies (March et al. 1999, 9). In order to preclude inequalities, gender should be incorporated into all levels of governmental and institutional decision making, policy formulation, and implementation. Issues related to gender are often seen as falling within the realm of culture—“‘strong advocacy for a rethinking of gender relations’ has often been ruled out as ‘unwarranted “cultural interference,”’” (Rathgeber 1995, 207 quoted in Richey 2000, 196). The challenge becomes how to operationalize gender in development policies that incorporated the local culture and was not Western-imposed.

Gender Mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming was the institutionalization of the GAD paradigm. The term itself was coined by Roanaq Jahan (1995) who identified two mainstreaming strategies—the integrationist approach (addition of gender into the existing spectrum of development sectors) and the agenda-setting approach (where the agenda of women was fully recognized in the mainstream of development and where women reoriented the mainstream) (Richey 2000, 197). The approach adopted by international institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), EU and World Bank leans toward integrationism (True 2010, 193). This
approach negates the revolutionary and transformative force gender mainstreaming could have and treats it as just another strategy for achieving equality (Lombardo 2003).

Gender mainstreaming was a way to place the GAD framework in all existing and future institutions. It was meant to make policymakers contemplate the gendered effects of new policies and the gendered dimension of existing policies. Simply, a gender equality perspective was to be adopted for all policies at all levels and at all stages by those involved in policymaking (Council of Europe 1998, 7). Attention was drawn to recognizing that separating the activities and projects of women does not serve to alter gender inequities and discrimination. Evaluation of the responsibilities and contributions of both women and men and the potential impact of governmental processes and activities on their respective lives was made an essential. The mainstreaming approach does not advocate the abandonment of women-specific policies and programs. Gender inequalities persist for women, ranging from intimate partner violence, poverty, employment discrimination, and human trafficking. “Targeted initiatives focusing specifically on women or the promotion of gender equality are important for reducing existing disparities, serving as a catalyst for promotion of gender equality and creating a constituency for changing the mainstream” (UNDP 2001). Initiatives focused specifically on women provide a source of empowerment which hopefully lead to the cultivation of ideas and strategies than can be transferred to the mainstream. Mainstreaming gives women another tool to place gender on the agenda and bring it to the forefront in policy discussions.

The 1995 UN Beijing Conference centered on achieving gender equality through the mainstreaming process. The Beijing Platform for Action stated, “Women’s empowerment and

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2 One of the 12 critical areas of concern in the Beijing Platform for Action was “violence against women.” The other critical areas outlined in the Platform were women and poverty, education and training of women, women and health, women and armed conflict, women and the economy, women in power and decision-making, institutional
their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society including participation in the decision-making process and access to power are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace.” The UN officially defined gender mainstreaming in 1997.

“The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated” (UNDP 2001).

Subsequently, The EU Commission adopted a gender mainstreaming approach.³

“The integration of the gender perspective into every stage of policy processes – design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation – with a view to promoting equality between women and men. It means assessing how policies impact on the life and position of both women and men – and taking responsibility to re-address them if necessary. This is the way to make gender equality a concrete reality in the lives of women and men creating space for everyone within the organizations as well as in communities – to contribute to the process of articulating a shared vision of sustainable human development and translating it into reality” (Commission of the European Communities 1996, 2).

Gender mainstreaming came with such high expectations. However, a few issues hamper the successfulness of the gender mainstreaming approach. The promotion of gender equality initiatives typically contradicts mainstream agendas. New ideas of gender are often in direct contradiction with institutionalized traditional beliefs. The lack of conceptual clarity and consensus about the term “gender” is seen as another barrier to the smooth implementation of a mainstreaming approach (UNDP 2003, 7-8). The UN does not impose gender mainstreaming on governments. Member states have been involved in the intergovernmental discussions on gender mechanisms for the advancement of women, human rights of women, women and the media, women and the environment, and the girl child.

³ Gender mainstreaming became integral to EU gender equality discourse with the Treaty of Amsterdam. Article 13 of the Treaty gave rise to a number of antidiscrimination measures. In December 2000, the Council adopted a (binding) general Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination. The Framework Directive is binding upon the current member states, while the accession states are required to have completed national implementation of the Directive before joining the EU (Lombardo 2003).
mainstreaming since the mid 1990s and have, in consensus, adopted mainstreaming as an important global strategy for promoting gender equality. In some individual member states, gender mainstreaming processes are not well developed due to inadequacies in financial and skill-based resources and state institutions. “The mechanisms established, from national women’s machineries to the “gender focal point system” in development institutions, face not just capacity but also resource and access constraints and tend to be marginalized” (UNDP 2003, 7). Some states are just simply unwilling to adopt the necessary provisions to implement gender mainstreaming. Another problematic aspect of gender mainstreaming is the debated meaning of gender equality. There is little consensus among academics, state institutions, and civil society organizations about what gender equality means and how best to achieve it (Lombardo 2003).

III. Mainstreaming Gender in the Former Soviet Region

Pursuant to the Beijing platform, Eastern European countries adopted national programs and national machineries to combat gender inequalities. Gender mainstreaming still remains a relatively new concept in the former Soviet region. The term itself is still underused in mainstream discourse (Hankivsky and Salnykova 2010). Concepts such as gender mainstreaming and gender equality are conceived of as Western concepts that are not indigenous to the region. For example, one activist from Ukraine argued that “Gender policy is not natural for Ukraine. We have a different history; we had Princesses Olha and Anna. Women could always take care of themselves. They don’t go to politics today, because their dignity doesn’t fall low enough to engage in it” (Hankivsky and Salnykova 2010, 319).

International institutions and civil society organizations have pressed for greater mainstreaming. Pressures from the UN, the EU, newly formed civil society groups, and the West for greater human rights and democratization efforts have pushed gender mainstreaming more to
the forefront. Gender mainstreaming has been hampered due to limited female presence in political institutions and the fact that gender equality and women’s rights are not high priorities of political parties (Einhorn 2005). Topics such as gender issues and women’s rights are seen as contentious, very much impacted by the Soviet era. Gender equality is often associated with policies of state socialism. While the Soviets removed the formal barriers that hindered women for generations by improving their legal position and removing obstacles to career and educational advancement, but there was never a true dialogue concerning gender equality or implementation of mechanisms necessary to permeate gender equality throughout society. Gender mainstreaming institutions have to navigate embedded patriarchy that lingers due to the legacy of state socialism and the sponsorship of neoliberal reforms (Watson 2000).

Gender mainstreaming can either be implemented one of two ways—as a result of advocacy from women and women’s groups for equality measures (bottom-up) or by state imposition and compliance with international standards (top-down). In the latter scenario, mainstreaming can end up being just mere rhetoric. Pincus (2002) argued for a combination of both approaches. A necessity of this approach would have to be the existence of a strong women’s movement that included state and non-state actors united with a high numbers of women in key decision-making institutions (54-56). Each method comes with complications. The “bottom-up” approach places enormous pressures on nascent organizations and activists who do not have the needed power, influence, or resources. The “top-down” approach places enormous pressure on the state which does not have effective institutions in place. The “combined” method assumes openness in policy making and strong ties between women’s groups and female politicians (Kakučs 2010, 86). There is low awareness of gender mainstreaming among women’s organizations. Women’s groups tend to direct their attention to
tackling specific concerns of women (e.g., domestic violence) and providing specific services (e.g., domestic violence shelters). Such focus prevents seeing how state and societal institutions negatively impact women’s overall situation and status (Galligan, Clavero, and Calloni 2007, 117). Also little to no connection exists between women’s advocacy groups and women politicians (Sloat 2005).

Gender mainstreaming has mostly been studied within the context of the EU accession process for Eastern European countries (e.g., Anderson 2006; Booth 2002; Bretherton 2001; Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000). Those countries were supposed to implement gender mainstreaming as a result of the Beijing Platform and also as part of the EU *acquis communautaire*. Before entrance of the Central and Eastern European countries as member states, the EU members wanted to strengthen policies and regulations related to equality, human rights, and democracy, meaning that violators could be reprimanded for defiance and breaches (van der Vleuten 2007, 161). So at the same time the EU was institutionalizing gender mainstreaming, it was preparing for eastern enlargement (Kakucs 2010, 85).

The most important factor for securing gender equity legislation in Poland, for example was a strong relationship between social movements and political parties (Anderson 2006). Organized interests opposed to the implementation of gender equity laws made it extremely difficult for government officials to adopt EU gender mainstreaming. Moreover, the party in government had a substantial effect when interest groups were cooperative and when political parties were clearly divided on the role of the state in promoting gender equality. For the Czech Republic, state officials passed equity legislation, unnoticed and unrestrained by the wider public.

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4 *Acquis communautaire* refers to primary law consisting of: the Treaty establishing the European Community, the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaty of Nice, and the Treaty of Amsterdam; secondary European law: Council Directives; soft law instruments, which include the European Employment Strategy, European Social Policy, and the Community Framework Strategy; and case law of the European Court of Justice.
because social movements and interest groups were negligible (Anderson 2006). Krizán and Zentai (2006) noted that a crucial prerequisite for implementing gender mainstreaming policies is the existence of a strong feminist movement, state and non-state feminist organizations, and the political participation of women. Hungary has no comprehensive gender equality policy. The number of women’s NGOs had substantially declined since the post-transition period as a result of limited social and financial support. The authors state that the number of NGOs dedicated to gender equality was less than ten with even fewer making significant contribution to the policy process.

Kakucs (2010) mentioned that the concept of gender mainstreaming was brought to Hungary as a result of the EU accession process (88). A number of factors have complicated implementation: gender equality institutions lacking policy access and power to influence policy, a weak women’s movement, and an absence of gender issues training for state officials. Similarly, Pethö (2003) acknowledged that Hungarian legislation has come to correspond with EU directives. Hungarian labor laws provide the guarantees for equal opportunities of men and women. However, in practice the situation remains far from favorable; the pressure and pro-activity of women’s groups, therefore, is vital to the implementation of gender mainstreaming policies. In Latvia, gender mainstreaming became a priority during the 1990s when the country was trying to harmonize its legislation with that of the EU acquis. Politicians treated the implementation of gender mainstreaming and gender equality measures as an “exam” that had to be passed in order to join the EU (Novikova 2006, 107). Though adopting formal requirements, a number of challenges persist—transforming societal mentality, changing elite opinions towards gender issues, the need to strengthen gender equality institutions, and a lack of comprehensive gender training for officials.
Lithuania was prompted to establish gender mainstreaming institutions after the Beijing conference due to pressure from new women’s organizations and new transnational linkages with Nordic women’s groups. As a result of these connections, Lithuania established a commission on women’s issues, the position of Counselor on Women’s Issues, the position of Advisor to the Government on Women and Family Issues, and an Information Center that serves as an intermediary between the government and women’s NGOs. In 1999 Lithuania created the Office of the State Counselor for NGOs and Equal Opportunities as the main gender mainstreaming institution within the Prime Minister’s department showing an instance of transnational policy learning (True and Mintrom 2001).

The UN Beijing Conference and the EU accession process provided the basis for adoption of gender equality policies and governmental equality structures. Problems persist with gender mainstreaming institutions in Eastern Europe—lack of necessary power in state institutions to exert meaningful change, inadequate knowledge of gender issues on the part of institutional representatives, and lack of institutional resources and personnel. Robust gender mainstreaming institutions were not stressed during the accession process for the Central and Eastern European countries (Bretherton 2001). According to Steinhilber (2002), commitment to gender equality was a secondary concern during the enlargement process. At the time it was observed that “The gap between commitment and practical action is clearly visible in the very selective approach to equality that has been employed: gender equality has been limited to equal treatment of women and men in the field of employment and social policy. In all other chapters of the acquis, gender equality has been disregarded” (4). At the same time, some state officials assigned to gender mainstreaming institutions have fostered essential connections with women’s organizations. Such connections allow women’s groups an ability to engage in gender equality
issues and an avenue to exert pressure on policy (Hašková and Křížková 2008, 163). The platform of gender mainstreaming set forth in the UN and the EU allow women’s organizations an instrument to fight for gender equality and gender justice (Steinhilber 2002). True and Mintrom (2001) showed a link between the adoption of mainstreaming policies and the existence of women’s civil society activism.

This section will give a brief introduction into the subsequent chapters of the dissertation. The following chapters will trace the history of gender through the Soviet period, democratic transition, and to current times. Focus will be placed on the factors that influence gender mainstreaming policies beyond that of equal opportunities legislation, most particularly women’s organizations.

IV. Chapter Outlines

Chapter II: “Solving the Woman Question”: Gender Equality during Soviet Times

The Bolsheviks granted women formal equality through numerous revolutionary edicts. Once in power, they set forth to purge women’s economic, political, and sexual inequality. Women’s inequality, it was asserted was noted to be rooted in the inequities of the economic system (Lapidus 1975) and the domestic sphere (Engels 1902). Women’s autonomous status would be strengthened not only through mandate but through the availability of state-sponsored childcare, communal dining halls, and other forms of socialized assistance that would allow for women’s participation in the labor force and educational system (Goldman 1993, 3; Lapidus 1978, 124). With the institutionalization of the Revolution, women “won” their equality and were declared fully equal with their male counterparts. Stalin declared that women had achieved gender equality and no more work needed to be done to strive for gender equity within society.
By the 1940s, women had reached parity with men in terms of education and labor force participation (Kramarae and Spender 2006, 341). However, state socialism strengthened women’s inequality through the reinforcement of gender differences (e.g., sexually-segregated workforces, female-dominated professions, and the absence of women in powerful political institutions) (Albanese 2006, 96; Lapidus 1975) and the double burden placed on women of balancing work and domestic life (Morvant 1995). While women took on new roles of work and education, they were encouraged not to abandon their familial role. Women were to be mothers, workers, and loyal comrades (Racioppi and See 1997). Gorbachev’s perestroika brought new opportunities and challenges for women, and it rekindled the debate over “women’s role” in society. The views of “sending the women back home” and “women as more than mother-workers” would come to shape the debate surrounding women’s issues in the post-Soviet era (Rueschemeyer 1998). This chapter gives an overview of Soviet influence on matters of gender equality in both the public and private spheres and how that continues to impact the question of gender in the former Soviet republics.

Chapter III: “Fighting for Our Cause”: Gender Policies across Former Soviet Republics

Political and economic transition was a difficult process for all the former Soviet republics. State benefits disintegrated, and citizens were left to deal with high rates of unemployment, wage restraints, and high poverty rates. There were also seismic cultural changes as a result of open borders and immigration. For the purpose of this chapter, focus is placed on the gendered consequences of transition. These consequences were largely ignored for the overall sake of political and economic development (Human Rights Watch 2003, 9). Gender stereotypes and traditional mentalities resurfaced as a backlash against state socialism. This new environment exemplified the numerous social, cultural, and political challenges that women face
as a result of decades of ignorance of gender equality and the problems of democratic transition. Some of the issues were high rates of unemployment and labor force discrimination (Fàbiàn 2009, 60), political disenfranchisement (Racioppi and See 1997, 206), violence against women (Fabian 2007; Nikolić-Ristanović 2002, 75), and high rates of poverty and its connection to sex work (Khodyreva 2004, 243).

Some of the former Soviet states have passed formal legislation regarding such gender issues. This chapter focuses on the factors that influence the adoption of three types of gender policies—traditional (spousal support, child support, inheritance rights, and equality of spouses), gender-based violence (domestic violence, sexual assault, marital rape, and sexual harassment), and human trafficking. Through logistic regression, I examine those factors in six countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova) spanning fifteen years from 1993-2008. These countries were chosen because of the ability to acquire a rough count of women’s organizations. While the presence of civil society conceptualized as women’s organizations is the primary dependent variable, other variables are included in the analysis: EU membership, ratification of international conventions, the number of women parliamentarians, and whether a border country passed a human trafficking statute the past year. Some controls are also included: religion, level of democracy, the status of women, and the stage of social and political development. The findings seem to indicate that women’s organizations have a positive significant influence on violence against women and human trafficking policies, and only a negligible effect on traditional policies.

Chapter IV: “What’s in a Policy?”: The Language of Gender-Based Violence and Human Trafficking Policies in Former Soviet Republics

Based on the previous chapter, women’s organizations were shown to have impacted the adoption of violence against women and human trafficking legislation. Past literature has
emphasized the role of women’s movements in getting gender-based violence placed on the political agenda in a variety of countries. Considering the pervasiveness of the problem, the governments that have adopted these policies have made more of an effort to recognize these issues. Women’s organizations have taken an active role in advocating for these issues that were notably absent during the Soviet period. The 1995 UN Women’s Conference in Beijing gave women’s groups one of the first contexts in which to accomplish this task on a much wider scale. Women activists were able to draw from the Beijing platform as a framework for legislation (Mertus 1998, 389) as well as their lived experience. With the aid of international organizations and institutions, women’s groups were able to press state officials for laws that adhered to the language of international conventions (Schatral 2007, 52).

Variation exists between countries in their adoption of violence against women and human trafficking legislation. There is a range in policy from adoption of no policies to an adoption of a significant number of policies regulating gender-based violence. A qualitative content analysis based in grounded theory explores the varied nature of these policies among ten former Soviet republics. The ten former Soviet countries included are the six countries in the quantitative analysis, and the addition of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. The content analysis concentrates on definitions, punishments, victim recourse, state official responses, and the timing of adoption. The policies examined vary yet parallel each other in focus, scope, and specific provisions. The analysis illustrates that international directives, Soviet legacy, and the influence of women’s organizations have an effect on the specifics of the policies. Precise and well-articulated language is vital to assuring women’s equality is upheld and that such equality is for all women.
Chapter V: “Gendering Civil Society”: Women’s Organizations in Former Soviet Republics

Past literature shows a strong link between civil society organizations and democratization. A vibrant civil society can provide an avenue for less privileged groups to assert power and influence the political process (Diamond 1999, 224-225). Despite the numerous issues that women in the former Soviet region face due to democratic transition, it has allowed a space for the development of a plethora of autonomous women’s organizations. International organizations concentrated a significant amount of energy on developing civil society in a region with no real previous history. Women are often involved in democratic and independence movements to find themselves excluded from formal politics after democratic transition (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Rai 1996, 235; Waylen 2007). With women excluded from formal politics, civil society provides women an opportunity to advocate for issues on their behalf (Ishkanian 2007). Despite the positives associated with civil society, it has been a difficult space for women to navigate primarily a result of limited support and funding. To advance initiatives, research shows that women’s groups are highly reliant on Western funding which has impacted relations with the public, unity among groups, and elite support (Ghodsee 2004; Hrycak 2010; Ishkanian 2007; Sloat 2005).

This chapter accesses women’s organizations in the former Soviet republics. An online survey of ten questions was sent to women’s and gender studies academics in selected former Soviet republics. Academics were targeted as the respondent group because of their knowledge of political, economic, and social circumstances of their countries and how these circumstances could impact women’s groups. The respondents were from Estonia, Moldova, Georgia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Russia. By sending the survey to various countries, it allows for a comparative analysis of women’s organizations on a number of questions. Some topics
broached were: (1) the current issues not being addressed in the region; (2) the effectiveness of existing policies; (3) the issues women’s organizations have been most active in underscoring; (4) the tactics used by women’s organizations to highlight these concerns; (5) the relationship between these groups, the mass public, and the state; and (6) the importance of external financial assistance.

Chapter VI: Conclusion: Keeping Gender In

The fifteen years since the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, former Soviet countries have made considerable progress in addressing the issue of gender mainstreaming, especially at the international level with the adoption and ratification of various treaties and partial progress in the implementation of domestic policies. The passage of legislation is the initial stage in the attainment of women’s political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Once legislation is passed, implementation and enforcement of international law and domestic policies can transpire. Understanding the policies and their characteristics allows for a critical analysis of the gaps that remain and the capacity for implementation and enforcement. This dissertation’s main focus will be to examine the factors that influence policy adoption in the former Soviet republics. The main argument is that women’s organizations have a significant positive impact on the adoption of gender violence policies but that influence is mediated by Soviet legacy, democratic transition, and international institutions. With the aid of external forces (e.g., UN conferences and EU), women’s organizations have managed to carve out a space to promote gender-based violence and human trafficking. This chapter reflects on gender policy and women’s organizations and the prospect for greater gender mainstreaming in the region. It also discusses topics for further research and ways to build upon this preliminary analysis.
Chapter II
Solving the Woman Question: Gender Equality during Soviet Times

I. Introduction

Twenty years have passed since the fall of state socialism. The collapse has had a profound effect on women’s status in the former Soviet republics. Gender analysts have produced a wealth of research on the impact of Soviet rule on gender equality and gender relations. The research pertains to the paradox of Soviet gender equality: the legislating of women’s equality and the high numbers of women in the labor force and educational system that far exceeded western societies, on the other hand, women’s political alienation, sex-segregated labor forces, and patriarchal family structures, on the other (Buckley 1989; Corrin 1992; Einhorn 1991; Lapidus 1978; Sacks 1988; Wolchik 1993; Occhipinti 1996). The research articulated the consequence of formal proclamations with a lack of implementation tools on systemic alterations to gender relations. The Communist Party, despite the radicalism of early socialist authors, defined “women’s emancipation” only in terms of labor force participation. “Actually existing feminism” emphasized the domestic role of women and their important position as mothers, while failing to recognize or reorganize domestic production in a way that would facilitate women’s true equality.

The demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 provided the opportunity for former Socialist states to abandon their forced (Soviet) past, to reclaim their past (pre-Soviet) histories, and to move forward to a new (Western and democratic) future. The legacy of state socialism continues to linger and impact societal conceptions and government responses to gender equality. Einhorn (1993) stated that “the problem with total denial of the state socialist legacy is that any attempts to define women’s needs and rights in the newly democratic societies of Central and Eastern
Europe are beginning from scratch, as if, indeed, 1989 marked a hiatus after which history began afresh, without the encumbrance of memory, or of coming to terms with what went before” (48).

Women in the region have unique experiences separate from their Western counterparts partially as a result of state socialism and these lived experiences have to be addressed in order to really assess gender disparities. In terms of issues such as domestic violence, the lack of acknowledgement until after the fall of the Soviet Union and the regulation of gender relations during the Soviet period have had a large influence on defining the problem and how it is recognized by elites and society as a whole.

This chapter gives a historical overview of the impact of Soviet rule on gender equality, ranging from Lenin’s proclamations to Gorbachev’s perestroika. The impact of Soviet governance cannot be removed from an analysis of gender. It will examine Soviet policies on women’s labor force participation, their roles as wives and mothers, political involvement, and violence against women to assess the enduring positives and negatives of advocating and legislating gender equality in a postcommunist world. This chapter will also survey the impact of women’s “double burden” of responsibility for paid labor and domestic labor, women’s lack of political involvement in Soviet institutions’ upper echelons, and the lack of activists on behalf of women’s issues that will be contrasted with the liberalization of such areas as abortion, divorce, and women’s workforce participation, social welfare provisions, the adoption of rape and sexual harassment laws, and the formal proclamations of women’s equality. The formal foundations of equality that were set by the Soviets could have been used to build more substantial equal rights for women; however, the legacy of occupation and the tumultuous times that follow transition have hampered this from happening. The Soviet constitution provided women with equal rights to work and education as well as special protections and support to fulfill these rights; at the
same time by the end of the Soviet period women’s position in the family and in society vis-à-vis men was vastly unequal.

II. The Formal Declaration of Gender Equality

Marxist-Leninist ideology claimed to have solved the woman question. According to the ideology, gender inequality was based on capitalist tenets of class inequalities. True gender equality would only emerge with the elimination of a capitalist society and the subsequent creation of a socialist one where women were integrated into the workforce and received equal access to education. Engels more so than Marx set out the foundation for establishing gender equality. Engels saw the end of private property as solving the problem of marriages of convenience and sexual and economic inequalities between the sexes (Jacobsen 2007, 341). With Engels placing the reasons for women’s oppression on private property and family, he moved it out of the realm of natural and biological components and allowed for a true assessment of women’s situation; most importantly it allowed for that situation to be changed. Engels (1902) noted

“The modern monogamous family is based on the open or disguised domestic slavery of women; and modern society is a mass composed of molecules in the form of monogamous families. In the great majority of cases, the man has to earn a living and to support his family, at least among the possessing classes. He thereby obtains a superior position that has no need of any legal special privilege. In the family, he is the bourgeois; the woman represents the proletariat” (89).

It was not a natural phenomenon that women were inherently unequal in society; it was a result of their exclusion from the means of production and the replacement of household and childcare responsibilities from a communal task to one shared solely by the woman in the private sphere (Macdonald 2003, 5). The woman thereby became a domestic prisoner to the household. In pre-capitalist societies, Engels asserted men’s and women’s different roles within society were equally respected.
When the Bolsheviks took over power in 1917, Lenin used tenets set out by Engels to purge the economic, political, and sexual inequality of women through the eradication of the outdated economic system. It was the construction of the family in capitalist societies and the distribution of labor that propped up women’s second class status. Engels (1902) proclaimed

“With the transformation of the means of production into collective property of the monogamous family ceases to be the economic unit of society. The private household changes to a social industry. The care and education of children becomes a public matter. Society cares equally well for all children, legal or illegal. This removes the care about the “consequences” which now forms the essential social factor—moral and economic—hindering a girl to surrender unconditionally to the beloved man” (91-92).

Gender inequality can be eradicated, and it is to be done through women’s full incorporation into the public sphere and eradication of the private sphere. Gender equality entailed the complete equality of man and woman before the law.

The Bolsheviks were deeply committed to the principles of equality between the sexes. Between 1917 and 1927, the Bolsheviks passed legislation on women’s gender equality in a series of revolutionary edicts (Buckley 1985, 34). The Marriage Code of 1918 allowed marital commitments to be more fluid; entering and exiting marriage was easier for men and women. Marriages became a civil instead of a religious matter. Divorce was easier to obtain and only required the petition of one spouse (Buckley 1989, 35). Married women were no longer forced to live with their husbands. Spouses were considered to be equal partners with equal rights. Ultimately there was a belief that the family under full communism would dissolve, and individuals would enter into free unions with each other separated from economic and moral dependence. However, if marriage was to exist, then it would be based on a voluntary union between a man and woman based on love.
Within marriage, women were endowed with a number of new rights and protections as wives and mothers. Property rights could no longer be restricted, equality in inheritance rights was implemented, and child support and alimony were mandated for women\(^5\), (Macdonald 2003, 7-8; Buckley 1989, 36; Morvant 1995). Further, the double standard set for women of monogamy and the allowance of adultery for men would not be tolerated. Terms such as “out of wedlock” and “illegitimate” were removed from the family code. Women were no longer stigmatized for children born out of wedlock (Bolas 1970). No longer would “men own women as instruments for the production of legitimate offspring to whom their private property can be passed” (Bolas 1970, 34). Abortion was legalized but only as a temporary measure to curb the number of back-alley abortions, high maternal mortality rates, and abandoned infants (Holland and McKevitt 1985, 150). Women were to no longer be subordinate to their husbands; marriage was to be an equal partnership.

The equality formulated for women in the private sphere would aid in establishing equality in the public sphere (Lapidus 1978, 55). Women were granted civil and political rights. Women were supported with a labor law that outlawed gender discrimination in the hiring process, were provided maternity benefits, granted protections from potentially dangerous work situations, prohibited from night work, overtime, and underground work if mothers, and afforded equal pay for equal work (Buckley 1989, 34-35; Noonan 2001, 152). Women were given the right to vote and were to become incorporated into political discussions. Lenin proclaimed

> “Our task is to make politics available to every working woman. Ever since private property in land and factories has been abolished and the power of the landowners and capitalists overthrown, the tasks of politics have become simple, clear and comprehensible to the working people as a whole, and to working

\(^5\) For single mothers, where paternity could not be established, the men named by the woman were forced to pay child support.
women as well. In capitalist society the woman’s position is marked by such inequality that her participation in politics is only an insignificant fraction of man’s participation…Here Soviet power opens up a wide field of activity to working women” (2003, 69).

Women’s independence would come with employment outside the home. The only way to achieve women’s employment was societal sharing of household duties. Housework and childcare oppressed women, it was argued, and forced them into domestic slavery. Lenin noted “…woman continues to be a domestic slave, because petty housework crushes, strangles, stultifies, and degrades her, chains her to the kitchen and to the nursery, and wastes her labour on barbarously unproductive, petty, nerve-racking, stultifying and crushing drudgery. The real emancipation of women, real communism, will begin only when a mass struggle (led by the proletariat which is in power) is started against this petty domestic economy…” (The Woman Question 1975, 56 quoted in Buckley 1989, 26).

For the Bolsheviks, female emancipation was to be found in a concern for the collective. Domestic work would be conducted by communal dining halls, childcare centers, and laundries, allowing women to achieve their full potential (Goldman 1993, 3). In August 1919, the Central Committee of the Communist Party permitted the development of a Women’s department or Zhenotdel to organize the Party’s work among women. The Zhenotdel managed to establish child care centers, communal dining halls, and other services that aided in the emancipation of women (Racioppi and See 1997, 22). Women’s liberation would only come with economic independence.

All these factors allowed the Soviet government to declare full egalitarianism between men and women. Official sources within the Soviet Union stated: “The achievement of the revolution have brought women full equality in economic, political, and social life. By destroying the elitist foundation of bourgeois democracy, socialism has opened the way for the democratization of political life and the full participation of women” (Lapidus 1978, 200). These policies were seen as some of the most progressive and much of this legislation was championed
by the US and Western European women’s movements of the 1960s. Similar policies espoused by the Bolsheviks were adopted decades later in the West, including “relaxing divorce standards, broad legalization of abortion on demand, abolition of legal distinctions relating to children born out-of-wedlock, and devaluation of marriage through increased efforts toward virtual if not fully equal treatment of cohabitation and same-sex partnerships with marriage” (Cardon 2007, 276).

The Bolshevik family policy was based on four tenets: (1) free union, (2) women’s emancipation through wage labor, (3) the socialization of housework, and (4) the withering away of the [traditional] family. In sum, the “liberated woman was inconceivable unless surrounded by an unbroken ring of social circumstance: cooperative housekeeping and public care of children to release her for work at any job for which she was qualified; the performance of any residual family chores by both spouses on an equal basis; educational machinery that would allow her to reach the summit of her natural abilities and to put them to the fullest use; the application of her previously locked-up energies to the tasks of building socialism” (Stites 1978, 393).

Despite the progressiveness of the rhetoric, much of it was very much mere rhetoric. A coherent plan of action was not put into place to fully establish women’s equality and to transform vision into reality (Lapidus 1978). The realities of the economic situation of the Russian economy after WWI and the civil war hampered the “withering away from the family.” It impeded the movement of domestic work into the public sphere. The social instability that resulted from the fluidness of relationships without the institutions in place to support communal childrearing, social welfare for single mothers, and parentless children prevented the full application of the Bolshevik program. There were estimates of millions of fatherless children, many women turning to prostitution to support themselves and their children, and declining birth rates as a result of a liberal abortion policy (Bolas 1970).
The “woman question” was deemed “solved” by the end of the 1920s. Any discussion of how to implement true gender equality ended with Stalin’s reign. Women’s organizations became archaic; socialism had liberated women (Buckley 1985, 38). Stalin abolished the Zhenotdel in 1930, and its activities were allocated to other party organizations. Because women and men were considered equal under a socialist state, the establishment of a separate women’s organization was always controversial. The Bolsheviks rejected the notion of feminism with its bourgeois implications and promotion of individual autonomy. However, Lenin allowed the formation of Zhenotdel as a necessary though short-term solution to invoke working women to the socialist cause. Further, the decade of the 1930s was a period of restrictions on marriage, divorce, and abortion which ushered in a period of traditionalism. There was a need for stability within the family for reasons such as “social change, labor discipline, dislocation, the need for emotional support, reaction against the liberation of the 1920s, birth rates and anxiety about the war” (Buckley 1989, 129). The family unit was to no longer be criticized and childbirth, motherhood was to be revered.

By the 1930s, official Soviet rhetoric had shifted from focus on “family as a bourgeois institution” to one focused on strengthening the family and revering motherhood and childrearing. The great socialist experiment had reverted to a traditional and conservative model of family values and centered on women’s roles as mothers (Hoffman 2003, 88). There was some belief that the Stalinist period was a retreat for the socialist program of restructuring gender and sexual behavior in society. However, issues of the family, sexual behavior, and gender roles were contentious issues even in the 1920. Early Soviet leaders were not in agreement about these new revolutionary policies. At the same time, many of these policies were implemented without any change to the social consciousness of the people. The allowance of de facto marriages left
women with no protections; in the New Economic Policy (NEP) period (1921-1928) women were more economically insecure and the number of abandoned children rose as more men disregarded their responsibility as husbands and fathers (Buckley 1989, 40). To help solve this problem, the Family Code of 1926 provided similar rights and benefits to cohabitating couples as those that are married. It introduced the concept of joint property and allowed spouses to retain their pre-marriage property. Pushback was felt from the masses who felt their entire way of life was being disrupted. Alexandra Kollontai, a Bolshevik feminist and leader of the Zhenotdel, remarked that many women were worried about losing their children and their family as revolutionary reforms continued to be pushed by the Bolsheviks (Bock 2002, 197).

The family became the bulwark of the socialist society (Lapidus 1978). Pravada quoted in Lapidus (1978) summed up the new feeling on the family,

“so-called ‘free love’ and all disorderly sex love are bourgeois through and through, and have nothing to do with either socialist principles or the ethics and standards of conduct of the Soviet citizen…The elite of our country…are as a rule also excellent family men who dearly love their children. And vice versa: the man who does not take marriage seriously…is usually also a bad worker and a poor member of society” (112).

Promoting the family allowed for the stabilization of society and a curb to the declining birthrates resulting from forced collectivization and industrialization. The pronatalist policies of the Stalinist period exalted women’s role as mothers and wives. The new Family Code of 1936 made abortion illegal and divorce difficult, criminalized homosexuality, and sought to rehabilitate the family.

Further, the 1944 amendments to the Family Code erased the last surviving Bolshevik statutes: de-facto relationships were no longer recognized, the category of illegitimacy was restored, and paternity suits were banned (Macdonald 2003, 15). The liberal abortion policy of the 1920s was revoked as a result of the declining birthrates. The policy was no longer
considered necessary, and the changes allowed women to focus on their true roles as mothers. Additionally, women who had multiple children were entitled to government subsidies (Nakachi 2006). Women’s interaction with the state became centered on their reproductive roles and their ability to repopulate the state following the national devastations of collectivization, purges, and world war.

Women maintained property rights, the right to joint property, and the ability to refuse to change residence with their husband. Additional special protections were given to mothers: alimony was not mandated for wives but child support was, a husband could not divorce his pregnant wife or a mother with a child under one year of age without her consent, and pregnancy and motherhood became mitigating factors in criminal sentencing (Lapidus 1978, 240). In a word, women’s identity became synonymous with mother-worker.

III. Women, the Public Sphere, and the Birth of the Double Burden

In a 1959 speech, Nikita Khrushchev stated

“In our country a woman’s repute is determined by her work and not by the surname of her husband, a capitalist businessman, as in the capitalist countries. In our country a woman is an active builder of a new society; she helps to create all the material and spiritual values. She is a mother, and we know how much heart and soul she puts into the upbringing of the rising generation” (Central Statistical Board of the USSR, Council of Ministers 1963, 18).

The declarations of the Bolsheviks allowed women to enter the public sphere. The Soviet constitution was one of the first in the world to declare equal rights for men and women. The constitution afforded women equal opportunities in employment, wages, and job promotion as well as in the educational, political, and cultural realms. Strides for women’s equality was made through increased literacy rates among women (as well as men), increased attendance of women in universities, more women in the labor force and in managerial positions and higher educational establishments, and greater availability of governmental positions for women.
Women in the first decade of Soviet rule increased their economic, labor, and political positions due to legislation, the expansion of childcare centers, and increased educational opportunities for women (Lapidus 1978, 124). Further, pregnant women were encouraged to enter the labor force and were protected from arbitrary dismissal due to their pregnancy, were granted maternity leave with full pay, could be transferred to lighter work in the latter months of pregnancy if so requested, and could remain at home with their children for the first year without lost of seniority. Soviet legislation set to enshrine women’s full equality in legislation that would lead to their equality in the spheres of education, work, and politics. For the Soviets, work and education would continue to strengthen women’s autonomous status.

Soviet women came to have the highest rates of education in the world. While in 1939 only ten percent of women had more than 7 years of schooling, by 1979 this percentage had risen to 80 percent for working women and 60 percent for all women (Ofer and Vinokur 1985). Women were represented strongly in technical schools, universities, and professional schools. The belief was that if women were to contribute to the socialist mission, it was essential for women to be equally educated. In 1929, a 20 percent quota for women in higher education was put in place; this admissions quota was raised to 25 percent in 1930 (Dodge 1966, 112). The introduction of free, universal primary education in the 1930s, quotas, and a reduction in men due to the above factors helped spur a large number of women into Soviet colleges, universities, and professional schools. By 1945, women constituted 77 percent of total university enrollment (Dodge 1966, 113). The percentage of women with secondary and higher degrees exceeded men between 1939 and 1959 (Central Statistical Board of the USSR 1963, 52). Though the above statistic represented the height of women’s presence in higher education, the proportion of working women with university degrees was almost equal to males (though lower for higher
degrees) and with technical and high school degrees higher than the male population (Ofer and Vinokur 1985; Heinen 1990). These women became the forefront of the new Soviet female labor force and were able to move into non-traditional employment much earlier than women in the US and Western Europe (Heinen 1990).

Despite women’s presence in higher education, it did not mean that women’s educational qualities matched the administrative, managerial, and political positions for which they were qualified (Buckley 1981). While 71 percent of teachers were women, 69 percent of secondary school directors were men; women did, however, constitute 83 percent of primary school supervisors. Women were 77 percent of the medical profession but only 52 percent of head doctors (Ofer and Vinokur 1985). When labor shortages were no longer an issue, Soviet women realized the difficulty in finding employment that complemented their education and training. Paraphrasing the words of a Soviet economist at the time, Sonin (1978) noted that by the late 1970s the number of manual industry workers was exclusively women (12, quoted in Buckley 1981).

Despite the repeal of the Bolsheviks’ liberating approach to women’s equality at the end of the 1920s, women’s fulltime work outside the home was still encouraged (Boss and Gurko 1994, 38). Further, the shortage of men, killed by wars and purges, left the country with a shortfall of eligible workers, and in order to continue the expansion of the Soviet economy women were needed as workers (Buckley 1986; Dodge 1966, 2-3). By 1945, women comprised 56 percent of the paid labor force (Lapidus 1975; Lapidus 1978, 166). Low wages in the 1930s and subsequent decades meant that most wives had to work for their families to survive (Hutton

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6 In 1950s, a change in university admission standards resulted in a decline in the percentage of women admitted to higher educational institutions. Similarly to the labor force, women’s productivity was questioned due to their roles as mother and wife (Dodge 1966, 122). Feelings of practicality began to overshadow beliefs of equality.
Thus, Soviet women were pressured to enter the labor force, while at the same time unable to abandon their responsibilities for the home and family (Lapidus 1983, xi). Women were provided with minimum accommodations to support their work outside the home. More focus was placed on increasing economic productivity than providing human welfare. Such was the origin of the “double burden” of Soviet women (Morvant 1995). With industrialization, women came to comprise more than half of the industrial labor force.

After the World Wars, the famine, forced collectivization, the purges, and industrialization, the 1950s and 1960s saw stability within the Soviet state. But at the same time, there was tension between a woman’s role as worker and woman’s role as mother. Resulting problems were a decline in the birthrate and an escalation in abortion rates (Dodge 1966, 31). As a result, some of the initial plans of socializing housework and childcare of the 1920s were revisited with the growth of childcare centers, kindergartens, and summer camps (Dodge 1966, 98). To curb some of the stifling nature of domestic responsibilities for women, Khrushchev set up social service groups, legalized abortion, and made divorce easier to obtain. He created the zhensovety or women’s councils, in order to mobilize women. At the local level, women’s councils carried out such activities, as “organizing the purchase of food at work, exchanges of children’s clothes, social gatherings for young people, and help for pensioners” (Nechemias 1998, 10). Their primary purpose was to aid women in balancing work and home life.

Women continued to be “workers by hand and by womb” (Racioppi and See 1997, 47). However grand Khrushchev’s gestures were, this period continued to reinforce rather than challenge the existing gender order. Though women’s roles continued to be redefined throughout the decades, ultimately being defined as mother-worker, men’s roles were never redefined. No substantive discussion ever existed of restructuring gender roles or the gendered division of
domestic labor. Women continued to be responsible for domestic responsibilities. There was also pressure for women to fulfill a social and political role in the realization of socialism. Women in the Soviet Union “felt thoroughly overstretched and overstressed. The exigencies of this double and often triple burden meant that many East Central European women perceived their right to work rather more as an obligation” (Einhorn 1991, 22).

The late 1960s and 1970s saw inherent contradictions in the socialist system. Women were half of the much-needed labor force, but as a result of falling birth rates (particularly in Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine, and the Baltics) women were expected to produce and rear children. Women remained a high proportion of the socialist economy, all the while being fully responsible for the children and household. The resolution to these problems seemed to be greater state services instead of a fundamental challenge to traditional gender relations. Greater priority was given to production and reproduction (women’s role as mothers and childrearers) instead of women’s limited political and administrative roles, women’s pay inequities, and high abortion rates (Buckley 1989, 179; Lapidus 1975). The Soviet establishment began to realize that “women were having difficulty combining participation in the workforce and in political life with domestic labor” (Sperling 1999, 17). The realization was based not on concern for furthering women’s emancipation but concern for declining birthrates, an economic standstill, and the moral health of the family (Buckley 1986).

Soviet officials turned toward social scientists to alleviate women’s “double burden.” One of the resolutions for this crisis was part time (instead of fulltime) labor for women and greater maternity benefits. “A woman endures a double burden, and so it would be good for her to have fewer hours in the workforce in order to ease this load. Women’s contribution to socialism is to work at home. She receives a financial benefit for this and later will get a pension.
A four-day work week would be a help to her, rather than a five-day week” (Buckley 1986, 16). By the end of the Soviet Union, women’s role in the private sphere was exalted more than her role in the political and economic one. “The unique role of women rests in the family because politics and economics can exist without her, but the family cannot. Her role in the family is therefore her main role because it is unique” (Buckley 1986, 33).

Soviet family policy seems to have been consistently plagued with two contradictions—concern for women’s equality and independence, on the one hand, and concern for a strong and stable family unit, on the other (Lapidus 1978, 236). For the Bolsheviks, there was no contradiction because the family was expected eventually to wither away with the establishment of socialism. By the end of the Soviet period, little contradiction existed between the public or the leadership in the prominent role that women should play within Soviet society. “Sending the women back home” materialized as a popular theme in the Gorbachev years. There was some belief that the cultivation of masculine qualities in Soviet women and their encouragement to enter the labor force hindered their natural roles of mothers and wives. Simultaneously, men were hindered because of women’s entrance in the labor force, leading to lower self esteem, alcoholism, idleness, and demoralization (Attwood 1990, 167). Because men and women’s natural roles were being circumvented, the moral health of the family was in question, leading to such ills as high divorce rates and low birthrates.

“The notion of the ‘right to work’ appears to be elastic, differentiated according to the sex and social role attributed to individuals” (Heinen 1990, 43). Soviet women were considered less stable members of the labor force due to strongly held beliefs of sex differences between men and women and the association of women to the domestic sphere and the care of children and the elderly. Employers were reluctant to promote women because of their failure to meet output
quotas and high rates of absenteeism. In addition, special provisions were made for women to accommodate their motherly instinct; such provisions included elimination of heavy work, limiting work hours, and exclusion from certain employment based on medical reasons and occupational hazards (Lapidus 1978, 125). Harden (2000) noted that the very protective measures that were aimed at aiding women to enter the labor force actually hindered their bid for equality; “by forcing managers to provide childcare facilities, paid maternity leave, time off for sick children, time off for breast feeding, and by restricting the ways in which women could be used within the workforce, the state was not creating a group of privileged workers as they claimed. Rather, this “protection” signified women, in both material and ideological terms, as weaker and as a second class group of workers” (13).

Financial necessity forced many women into the Soviet economy. The loss of men forced many women to become breadwinners and many couples could not afford to live on one salary. The shortage of men forced the Soviet establishment to push for more women to enter the labor force, and Soviet propaganda urged women to enter the labor force, to be productive and contribute to the building of socialism (Bysiewicz and Shelley 1987, 71; Buckley 1981). Women in the workforce jumped from three million in 1928 (24 percent) to 19 million in 1950 (47 percent) to 54 million in 1975 (51 percent) (Buckley 1981; Heitlinger 1979, 97). A higher portion of women, in particular those aged 20 to 50 of which 90 percent are employed, worked in

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7 These measures came under increased scrutiny with greater technological advancements, double standards against men’s health and safety, and arbitrary selection of occupations as injurious (Lapidus 1978, 125).

8 An example taken from McAuley (1981, 37) in Ofer and Vinokur (1985) showed that participation rates of women (calculated as all working divided by working age population) between 1960 and 1970 rose, in the Russian republic, from 66.7 percent to 85.1 percent and in the Baltic republics from 65 percent to 88.4 percent.
the Soviet Union than in most other industrialized countries (Feshbach and Rapawy 1976, 152, in Bysiewicz and Shelley 1987, 70).³

Just like men, women were involved in tough, manual employment such as building bridges, paving roads, casting iron, and constructing railroads. Unlike in the West, there were higher percentages of women that worked as print workers, bus drivers, engineers, librarians, university professors, and medical doctors and personnel.⁴ Between 1959 and 1970, the configuration of the female labor force was comparable to males; women were also seen in most branches of the national economy (with the exception of construction and transport) (Bysiewicz and Shelley 1987, 71). Despite women’s high numbers and presence in multiple sectors of the economy, women were overrepresented in sexually-segregated professions and underrepresented in managerial and senior positions. Gender separation saturated the political culture (Albanese 2006, 96).

Agriculture remained the economic sector where the majority of Soviet women were concentrated (Heitlinger 1979, 99). Similar to patterns found in the West, women were overrepresented in education, health, and welfare professions—typically considered feminine occupations. As a result, these professions were some of the lowest-paid occupations. Women’s labor remained highly concentrated in the unskilled, low-paid areas of agriculture, service, trade, and light industry (Heinen 1990). Gender-segregated employment impacted wage differentials between men and women. The premium placed on heavy industry allowed men to enjoy higher basic wages and higher supplements than workers in light industry, primarily women (Buckley

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³ The number of women in the labor force in the Central Asian and Caucasus republics was notably less than in other Soviet republics.

⁴ As the medical profession became more and more feminized, the Soviet government began to adopt measures to reverse this trend, thereby limiting the number of women entering medical school. Some evidence exist that these measures were at least partially successful. Women composed 80 percent of the medical profession in the 1950s, and by 1980s the percentage had fallen somewhere between 50 to 60 percent (Heinen 1990).
1981). By the end of the Soviet Union women’s wages were estimated to be about 70 percent of men’s hourly wage (Ofer and Vinokur 1985).  

Women’s participation in Soviet politics substantially grew in the first decade after the Revolution. In particular in the urban areas, there was some evidence that the Zhenotdel’s efforts were paying off: there were increased levels of female participation in elections, local soviets, and party membership. The Zhenotdel established delegate assemblies that served the function of both educating and recruiting women into politics. Women workers and peasants were elected on a rotating basis to act as apprentices to party agencies, this experience not only raised women’s political consciousness but served as a way of accumulating into future political roles. Small but increasing numbers of women were being appointed to state and party positions (Lapidus 1975). By 1922, party membership was eight percent female. This number reached its peaks in the post-war period but stabilized at about 25 percent close to the end of the Soviet period (Lapidus 1978, 211). The revolution offered first-time opportunities to lower-class women. The proportion of women in village soviets rose to 11.8 percent by 1927. Female membership in the Communist Party grew to 13.7 percent by 1929. Political participation and mobilization continued to climb throughout the Soviet period.  

By the late 1970s, women constituted 47 percent of deputies to local soviets, 38 percent of deputies to Autonomous Republic Supreme Soviets, 31 percent of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 33 percent of people’s judges, and 52 percent of people’s assessors.

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11 Precise data on male and female wage differentials are not known due to a lack of Soviet statistics.

12 According to Soviet statistics, voting increased from 42.9 percent in 1926 to 89.7 percent in 1934 in urban areas. Voting in the villages rose from 28 percent to 80.3 percent. (Lapidus 1978, 204).
(Heitlinger 1979, 104-105). In the lower Party organizations, the high proportions of women deputies reflected a quota system (Lapidus 1975).\textsuperscript{13}

As the Soviet Union moved from a revolutionary experiment to a bureaucratized society, women’s role in the upper echelons of power became less and less pronounced. The organs of power were the Politburo and Central Committee. Though women’s party membership and presence in the soviets increased during the first years after the Revolution, no woman served on those main power committees from 1918-1924 (Stites 1978, 326). The ratio of women to men serving on the Central Committee was miniscule. Female membership hovered at the three percent mark for decades, increasing to four percent in 1986 (Sperling 1999, 15), and maxing out at eight percent in 1990 (Lentini 1993). Moreover, the women’s contingent on the Central Committee disproportionately contained honored textile workers and collective farmers, rather than high-ranking party or state officials (Clark 1991). According to Lentini, “women in the CC [Central Committee] were mostly ‘tokens’—elected more for their personal traits than their professional abilities” (729). The record of female membership on the Politburo was virtually nonexistent. Ekaterina Furtseva, from 1957 to 1960, was the only woman to serve on the Politburo.\textsuperscript{14} At the national level, it was atypical to have more than one woman minister on the Council of Ministers. The women ministers only represented positions associated with women’s roles, such as health, social security, and culture. At the regional level, women constituted only seven percent of all regional and county level party secretaries in 1988. Between 1959 and 1976, men were five to seven times more likely to be members of the Party than were women (Hough

\textsuperscript{13} Soviet propaganda proudly pointed to the “democratic” character of the Supreme Soviet by noting its high proportion of women, workers, and collective farmers. The Supreme Soviet functioned more as a façade than as a center of lawmaking (Sperling 1999, 17).

\textsuperscript{14} Alexandra Biriukova held candidate or nonvoting status on the Politburo from 1988 until her retirement in 1990. She was also the sole female member of the Council of Ministers. The overhaul of party institutions in July 1990 led to the establishment of a new position within the Party’s Secretariat—secretary for women’s affairs, held by Galina Semenova. She went on to gain Politburo membership (Sperling 1999, 17-18).
and Fainsod 1980, 343). Patriarchy and the stranglehold men had on the prominent positions of power were evident, and that the rhetoric of the revolutionary period was just rhetoric.

IV. Communist Women’s Movement

Lenin noted that “the experience of all liberation movements has shown that the success of a revolution depends on how much the women take part in it” (quoted in Lapidus 1978, 63). Subsequently, the Women’s Department of the Central Committee Secretariat, or the Zhenotdel, was formed in 1919. The Zhenotdel had its roots in the prerevolutionary efforts of such activists as Inessa Armand and Alexandra Kollontai to organize women workers on behalf of revolutionary socialism (Lapidus 1975). Their belief was that women faced special difficulties that could only be solved through women’s only organizations. To the charge of bourgeois feminism, these organizations would be rooted in a socialist state and would serve the purposes of socialism (Buckley 1989, 54-55). The Zhenotdel’s focus was mobilizing working women into public affairs and until its abolition it was central in mobilizing women into the political arena as stated above. Organizations were also formed on the local level, staffed with volunteers, carrying messages of women’s liberation throughout the Soviet Union. To reach women, the organizations used a variety of techniques including journals, literacy campaigns, and delegate assemblies (Goldman 1993, 278). The influence of the Zhenotdel was also evident in more militant forms of self assertion by women, whether in mass demonstrations and conferences or in the quiet utilization of legal institutions to initiate divorce proceedings or to defend newly acquired rights (Lapidus 1975).

The Zhenotdel was plagued from the beginning. It “tended to heighten the consciousness of women as women, to encourage them to take an active part in their own liberation, and to

15 The Zhenotdel was active in organizing women in Muslim areas of the Soviet Union against traditional practices such as the veil and literacy campaigns (Reynolds 1987, 75; Foran 1997, 148).
defend the interests of a female constituency even as it sought to integrate women into the larger political community” (Lapidus 1978, 71). Male and female Bolsheviks asserted that working men’s and women’s concerns were the same, practically rendering separate women’s organizations unnecessary (Buckley 1989, 63). However, clear sex differences did exist at all levels of society, and women were most disadvantaged. Additionally, there were accusations of feminism, suspiciousness from the masses, the consolidation of power under Stalin, a reorganization of the Party apparatus, and changing economic circumstances. While no single cause can be isolated, it was ultimately abolished in 1930.

The Communist Party declared that women had won their equality. The woman question had been solved, and the work of early Bolshevik feminists had been accomplished: women were liberated, fully integrated into all realms of society, and fully knowledgeable of the socialist cause. Despite the positive work of the Zhenotdel, the organization of the First Communist Women’s Conference,\textsuperscript{16} and the formation of the Women’s Congress of 1927,\textsuperscript{17} so ended a potential socialist women’s movement (Moghadam 1997, 149). Women’s concerns were not to compete with workers’ concerns within the Party (Sperling 1999, 16). Work and education would strengthen women’s autonomous status not special and separate organizations.

In 1941, Stalin formed the Soviet Women’s Anti-Fascist Committee, which mobilized women against the Nazis. In 1956, the name was changed to the Soviet Women’s Committee (SWC) and became the state’s chief propagandist on women’s issues. Its purpose was to prove to women that communism had solved women’s problems (Racioppi and See 1997, 74). When the

\textsuperscript{16} To commemorate the Conference, \textit{Theses of the Communist Women's Movement} was prepared which argued that for women’s equality, women would need to be integrated fully in the labor force and that domestic work would need to be socialized (Moghadam 2003, 89).

\textsuperscript{17} The Congress mobilized hundreds of working-class and peasant women to discuss sources of gender oppression (Goldman 2003, 338).
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the only women’s organizations that existed were the Soviet Women’s Committee (SWC)—the face of the Party’s defense of women’s rights—and the zhensovet (women’s councils) that acted as social welfare organizations for women as mothers (Richter 2002, 60). There was no place for feminism or women’s organizations advocating for gender equality within the Soviet Union. Buckley (1989) noted that “given the monolithic political domination of the party, it is quite inconceivable to imagine that autonomous feminism could legally flourish in the Soviet Union today” (64).

V. Violence against Women

The issue of violence against women is notably absent from Soviet discourse and legislation. The only form explicitly discussed was rape. The Bolshevik criminal code of 1922 contained a number of articles concerning rape and sexual assault. Rape was defined as “sex relations by means of physical violence, threat, or by intimidation or making use, through deception, of the helpless condition of the victim” (Rule 1996, 160). The penalty for rape carried with it a substantial prison sentence: five years and then eight years with aggravating circumstances. Rape laws remained relatively constant throughout the Soviet period. The two-tiered rape system remained in place and the definition remained the same. The penalties, however, were increased from 10 to 15 years and from 15 to 20 with aggravating circumstances. The two-tiered system had consequences for the victim. Ordinary rape could not be persecuted without consent of the victim but rape with aggravating circumstances could be prosecuted without the consent of the victim, thereby allowing a woman’s past sexual history to be admissible evidence in court. Unlike many Western countries, husbands could be prosecuted for rape in the Soviet Union (Pagelow and Pagelow 1984, 423). The crime of rape was not based on

18 Aggravating circumstances include such acts as rape of a minor, rape committed by a group, and rape that caused bodily injuries.
marital status. Despite laws on the books, however, rape cases were rarely prosecuted and convictions were rare. In addition, even in the case of actual prosecution, judges rarely gave the maximum sentence (Mamonova 1996, 679). Rape and sexual assault were blamed on the erosion of the traditional family and traditional gender roles that diminished men’s masculinity and left men without much recourse (Attwood 1997, 106).

The 1922 code contained a sexual harassment clause. This clause was essential for women’s protection as they entered the labor force. Many women were for the first time working among men and were especially vulnerable to exploitation. Sexual harassment was defined in the code as “forcing a woman to enter in a sex relationship or [to] satisfy sex passion in some other form by a person on whom said woman was financially dependent or to whom she was in a subordinate position” (Rule 1996, 161). The penalty for sexual harassment was five years imprisonment. Though very few people were documented to have been prosecuted and convicted for this crime, its very presence in the 1920s was unprecedented. In addition, with employment at a high rate in the 1920s, many women opted to remain in their jobs despite being victims (Granik 1997, 151-152).

Other forms of violence against women, in particular domestic violence, were absent from Soviet discourse. Though stories of domestic violence were prevalent, the violence was not noted to be based on the societal patriarchy endemic within the Soviet Union; it was blamed on alcoholism and lingering elements of capitalism (Attwood 1997, 101). Socialism by definition eradicated all forms of human exploitation, including violence against women. Such violence was only seen in bourgeois societies (Hemmet 2007, 96). Soviet social scientists were more concerned with increasing the number of women in the labor force and declining birthrates (Weiler 2004, 62). Such thoughts along with limited statistics made it possible to ignore the
presence of violence against women within society. Domestic violence was handled within trade
unions, party committees, and women’s councils (Zabelina 1996, 178).

It was not until Gorbachev’s reform of perestroika and glasnost in the latter 1980s that
there was an open discussion of sex and sexuality. The denials of sexual violence and violence
against women once held by Soviet officials could no longer be given as data revealed high
incidences. These revealing statistics were interpreted as “a sign of broad societal and sexual
dysfunction, and attributed to Soviet-era ‘perversions’ of gender roles” (Hemmet 2007, 96).
Soviet scholars began to blame the persistence of violence against women, in particular domestic
violence, on female labor force participation. G.G. Moshak stated that

“Drawing women into social production, although on the whole a positive
process, has had the undesired consequence of tearing wives and mothers away
from family matters. The more a woman is occupied with social matters, the less
attention she pays, as a rule, to family needs, and this can have a negative effect
on family relations.” [Further,] “purely female roles include doing the housework,
looking after the children, bringing them up, selflessly creating the conditions for
the husband to perform his functions without hindrance” (Attwood 1997, 107).

Such statements implicitly blamed women for domestic violence. Working outside the home,
lack of full devotion to motherly and wifely duties, and the acquisition of masculine behaviors
(assertiveness and independence) were frequently cited as causes. The only way to solve the
problem was for women to return to the femininity that was eradicated by proclamations of
gender equality and for traditional gender roles to be re-implemented.

Another notable absence in Soviet political discussions was acknowledgement of human
trafficking and exploitation through prostitution. The 1922 criminal code punished individuals
who recruited or forced a woman to engage in prostitution. Pandering and running a brothel were
also criminalized (Engelstein 1995, 165). Prostitution was also considered a relic of the capitalist
system of exploitation. Though it was not acknowledged and the official mantra was that
prostitution did not exist in the Soviet Union, prostitution occurred regularly on the black market throughout the Soviet years. It was only under glasnost that prostitution was officially acknowledged (Katsenelinboigen 1990, 323). There were no punishments for prostitution in the criminal code because it did not officially exist until the 1980s. Violations for prostitution could fall under parasitism laws or a law against spreading venereal diseases (Mamonova 1996, 669). Sex trafficking becomes a major concern for former Soviet countries as subsequent chapters will discuss. During the Soviet period, borders were tightly controlled and movement between countries was limited; as a result human trafficking did not occur as a crime before the collapse. The USSR was bound to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949) through accession in 1954 (Berry 1984, 299).

VI. Conclusion

Gorbachev proved contradictory on the “woman question.” He asserted the importance of women: “…questions directly concerning women’s interests would not be solved without their participation and without their decisive judgment” (Gorbachev 1988, quoted in Buckley 1989, 72). He criticized the stalemating of the women’s movement. But at the same time, he praised the emancipation of women and avowed greater attention to women’s needs regarding their roles of homemaker and childrearer (Buckley 1989, 252). With perestroika and glasnost, the debate over women’s role in society was rekindled. Two distinct views emerged about women. “Sending the women back home” materialized as a popular theme, while the view of women as individuals and citizens, rather than as mother-workers, was a lesser voiced one. New legislative committees were formed to address women’s issues. These included committees on Women’s Affairs, and the Defense of the Family, Motherhood and Childhood in the Supreme Soviet. However, women’s issues were framed on the basis that women were mothers and wives, rather
than individuals. Therefore, women deputies focused on how women’s poor working conditions impacted women’s health, particularly infant and maternal mortality rates. As the chair of the USSR committee of Women, Family, and Children’s Affairs, Valentina Matvienko noted, “it is very difficult to separate out the problems of children, the problems of women and maternity” (Rueschemeyer 1998, 13).

By the end of the Soviet period, women had more formal education than men and represented 51 percent of the work force. Women had achieved a level of formal gender equality that women in the West had to wait for and envied for decades. The Soviets had some of the most groundbreaking legislation: strict penalties for rape, a statute penalizing sexual harassment and added protection for female workers, more liberal divorce and abortion measures, and policies that allowed women to balance their roles as mothers and labor force participants. The Soviets argued for women to be involved in politics as an important component of building a socialist state. Despite women's impressive numbers in education and the labor force, however, women did not attain the upper quadrants of the managerial or political ranks. Women were often forced into low-paid, female-oriented professions which did not match their level of educational and professional training. Women’s importance to the state soon became predicated on their ability to reproduce the nation. As a result, the social ills of society (such as growing levels of alcoholism, illegitimate children, prostitution, and high levels of abortion that came to light) were blamed partially on women’s entrance in the labor force and the push from the state for women to shun their natural reproductive role. As a result of women’s emancipation, Soviet men had lost their standing within the family and within society. Women’s emancipation had eroded the family and the society. Traditional gender roles, it was argued, were needed to solve these problems. These views had a significant impact on the nature of democratic transition in
former Soviet republics and how gender equality would be addressed in the newly independent states.

Post-Soviet transition has proved somewhat perilous. Many of the concerns of Soviet women went largely ignored when the “woman question” was solved. Transition has brought women “under representation in decision-making positions, high rates of unemployment, and a re-emergence of traditional stereotypes concerning gender roles” (van der Gaag 2004, 47). Strongly ingrained stereotypes of men as leaders and breadwinners and women as wives, mothers, and secondary workers have profoundly impacted the development of gender egalitarianism. Unemployment among men has, to an extent, weakened men’s traditional role in society and within the household. As a result, changing gender roles have influenced marriage and fertility rates, resulting in an increased number of female-headed households, alcoholism, suicide and mortality rates among men, and domestic violence. Women’s social, cultural, and political challenges include unemployment and poverty, gender discrimination, political disenfranchisement, gender-based violence, struggles for elderly and rural women, and women’s health.

The next chapter discusses the perilous nature of post-Soviet transition and its many gendered consequences. In particular, the chapter will focus on violence against women, occupational segregation and discrimination, gendered poverty, and human trafficking. It also discusses how this transition has impacted the legislating of gender policies in the former Soviet republics. Factors, most importantly women’s organizations, influencing the adoption of gender legislation (traditional, violence against women, and human trafficking policies) from 1993 to 2008 in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Moldova are analyzed through logistic regression.
Chapter III
Fighting for Our Cause: Adopting Gender Policies across Former Soviet Republics

I. Introduction

The political, social, and economic transitions of the late 1980s and early 1990s constituted a complicated and tumultuous process for former Soviet republics. It entailed three transitions—a political transition from state socialism to democratic pluralism, an economic transition from centrally planned economies to open market economies, and a cultural transition from Soviet hegemony to independent nation-statehood. The nature of transition varied among the republics and would lead to diverse outcomes, ranging from membership in the EU to stints of authoritarianism. For all the countries, however, post-socialist transformation brought both women and men new opportunities to organize, articulate their interests, and establish autonomy from the intrusiveness of the state. But it also brought distress as a result of high rates of unemployment, heightened poverty rates, wage inequalities, decreased living standards, open borders and migration, systemic cultural shifts, heightened minority conflicts, and growing corruption.

These economic, structural, and cultural changes altered the prevailing gender relations. The initial focus of the newly independent republics was on developing political systems with elections and political parties, economic systems with privatization and deregulation, and independent cultural identities separate from the decades of Soviet rule. On the list of initial priorities, legislating and enforcing gender equality was not of paramount concern to state officials. It was either considered not a goal at all or a goal that could only be realized once the transition process was completed (Wolchik 1995, 168). At the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference, such sentiment was stated by H.E. Siiri Oviir, Estonian Minister of Social Affairs,
who conceded that “…for the Estonian society at the present level of development, the nation’s survival and security are more essential issues at this time than the gender equality problem. I suppose that the same problem also exists in other countries.”

Gender researchers were interested in assessing the impact transition had on women in Central and Eastern Europe. Women were often identified to be the main losers of the democratic transition process (e.g. Rueschemeyer 1998, 226; Wolchik 1995, 147; Lafont 2001). Patriarchal thoughts (e.g., men as breadwinners and leaders and women as wives, mothers, and secondary workers) prevailed in the years following the fall of the Soviet Union. Limited employment opportunities, labor inequalities, and increases in single-parent households were associated with rising instances of poverty among women. Women were essentially non-existent in the newly formed parliaments and disregarded in the political sphere; women’s views of the changing political and economic events were largely unaccounted for (David and Skilogianis 1999, 45). The gender differential was further exacerbated by the legacy of compulsory Soviet gender equality. Andris Berzins (Deputy Prime Minister of Latvia) stated during the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on Women:

“The Soviet period with its declarations of ostensible equality between sexes, still has an impact on public opinion. It created the impression that women’s equality was generally exaggerated and altogether unnecessary. During our transition, mention of women’s equality has been received with skepticism, and is seen as a desire to return to the communist past. This regret led to its opposite - the idealization of patriarchal structures and the traditional role of women. Rather than viewing women’s advancement as intrinsic to the development of our society as a whole, women’s advancement is often viewed as a threat to societal stability.”

The last chapter briefly surveyed the formal proclamations of gender equality alongside actual practices within the Soviet Union. The chaotic nature of transition is the stage in which gender policies were first adopted by former Soviet republics. This chapter analyzes the state of gender equality in the region following the collapse of state socialism. Scrutiny is directed at
women in the labor market, women in the political arena, women’s societal role, and women’s issues. Focus shifts to an analysis of how traditional, gender-based violence, and human trafficking policies became associated with women’s issues and have been taken up by international women’s organizations. This chapter culminates in a logistical analysis of the factors, in particular that of the existence of women’s organizations, that influence the adoption of gender policies in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Moldova from 1993-2008. The central argument of the chapter is that the environmental context (such as the level of gender equality) conditions the influence that women’s organizations can have on the adoption of gender policies.

II. Gender Equality during Transition

The post-communist transition impacted the ability of women to advocate for women’s issues. Political and economic transition in these countries had specific gendered consequences. Women’s position in the labor force, in formal politics, and in society was less significant than men. In addition, other concerns were considered more paramount than those of women’s issues. Some of the growing concerns of women became labor force discrimination, political disenfranchisement, the feminization of poverty, gender-based violence, and women’s health.

Women and the Labor Market

During the latter years of the Soviet period, there was a backlash against the emancipation of women. There was push to reduce women’s labor force participation and enhance their familial role (Rueschemeyer 1998, 15). Transition gave women greater autonomy within the labor market. Women had the option to leave the labor force by choice; it was now their choice to decide if they wanted to balance fulltime employment with motherhood. Growth
in the informal economy and more flexible work schedules made it easier for women to balance work and family life (Allison and Ringold 1996, 11).

Despite the option, much of the literature noted that women shouldered a disproportionate amount of the burden of labor market transition. There was a falling demand for labor in all the Central and Eastern European countries. However, there are particular factors that impact female labor supply numbers—wage levels, unemployment levels, the degree of male contribution to the household, the number of children had, state policies to assist women’s labor force participation, and societal attitudes towards women in the labor force (Vaiou and Stratigaki 1997, 130). Declines in wage levels and available employment, continued limited male involvement in household tasks, a decrease in state expenditures on childcare, and the end of state socialism reduced female labor participation rates.

With even fewer jobs available and more competition for those jobs, discrimination against women became more prominent (Allison and Ringold 1996, 11). Despite high numbers of women in higher educational institutions, these numbers did not readily translate to similar levels in the labor force. Job advertisements specifically sought out men, although women with equal qualifications could have performed similar occupational tasks (Fàbiàn 2009, 60). The labor force was stratified with employers targeting women for lower paying positions such as clerical and retail work (Vaiou and Stratigaki 1997, 132). Much of the gender stratification and occupational hierarchy in the workplace continued after the fall of state socialism. Furthermore, reports of sexual harassment in the workplace (e.g., requirements of attractive and suggestive clothing) became more commonplace.

Employers came to see women as both expensive (due to mandated provision of benefits such as parental leave) and unreliable (due absenteeism on account of domestic commitments)
workers. The reduction in social entitlements (e.g., child allowances, maternity benefits, and public childcare) and a decrease in social expenditures added to the dual home- and work-burden for women (Wolchik 1995, 160). And taking advantage of such entitlements such as parental leave could lead to increased risk of discrimination (Einhorn 1993, 67; Pascall and Lewis 2004).

Women and Politics

Multiparty systems developed all across the region in the initial transition years (Tarnauski 2005, 41). Men and women were afforded the opportunity to express political views, organize, run for political office, and vote for those who articulated their interests. Women’s high levels of education and employment rates during the Soviet era well-prepared them for running for political office. How would transforming the political system impact women? Would women take a leading role in voting, participating in political parties, and running for political office? The changing nature of politics had a large impact on the role women could play in the new legislatures: the unstable nature of the international political system, weak political parties, a continuation of personalistic politics, and the difficulties that ensue when it comes with large-scale political and economic reform (Wolchik 1995, 49) all adversely impacted the political role of women.

Though institutionalized in the form of parties and elections, the culture of inclusion had not developed alongside these formal mechanisms. Despite the activeness of women in pro-democracy and nationalist movements, they were predominately excluded from the formal decision-making process during the transition period throughout Eastern Europe. The declining number of women in the newly formed legislatures was seen as a sign of women’s growing marginalization in the region (Matynia 1995, 385; Rueschemeyer 1998, 18; Racioppi and See,
During communism, women’s numbers in parliament were among the highest in the world (largely due to quotas); during transition female representation fell markedly around five to nine percent behind Western Europe countries (Saxonberg 2000).

The lack of women’s political power was just a continuation of women’s limited political influence during the communist era and a resultant lack of organized interests to advocate on the behalf of women. By the same token, some women saw transition as an opportunity to disengage from the political arena, a role forced upon them during the Soviet era (Paxton and Hughes 2007, 226). Some women argued that “politics was too dirty for women or that women had more important tasks than arguing about political issues” (Wolchik 2008, 210). Despite these factors, women’s involvement in politics varies among the Eastern European countries with some women being able to carve out a space despite the existence of traditional beliefs and rise to political prominence.\(^{19}\)

Women’s Social Role

The Soviet government removed the formal barriers in the labor force and education that had hindered women for generations. The Soviet era neither restructured gender roles, nor comprehensively analyzed male and female societal roles, nor gave adequate attention to the mechanisms that resulted in gender subordination. The collapse of state socialism provided the opportunity for relations between men and women to be redefined. The gender order would no longer be determined by the Soviet apparatus but would instead be determined by a multitude of forces—the market, political structures, the media, the church, and new non-governmental organizations. Open discussion of sexuality, the legalization of contraceptives, decriminalization in many states of abortion and homosexuality, and the prevalence of the pornography industry

\(^{19}\) Such examples are Vaira Vike-Freiberga who was two-term president of Latvia from 1999-2007. Yulia Tymoshenko became prime minister of Ukraine in 2004 and ran for president in 2010.
prevailed in the restructured societies (Štulhofer and Sandfort 2005, 13-17). Women used these new economic, political, and social freedoms to redefine their societal roles and to challenge the traditional gender order.

Without truly assessing gender equality, a revivalism of masculine superiority was allowed to dominate national identity. The return to conservative gender roles was also a consequence of rising nationalist sentiment. Women’s role as mother and wife became exalted identities. With declining populations, national leaders began to call for pronatalist policies and renewed debates about contraception and abortion. The entitlement of women to reproductive rights was called into question. The ideal of the wife-mother started to be promulgated from the highest levels by politicians and state elites (Watson 2000). Women are often seen as “mothers of the nation”; hence it is their responsibility for biologically reproducing, culturally reproducing, and symbolically exemplifying the nation (Yuval-Davis and Anthais 1989). Often women’s reproduction becomes an utmost important issue to the national interest as well as becomes the primary mode of women’s interaction with the state during the transition process. Watson (2000) has called this the “masculization” of public life and noted that this “masculization” shrouded the discourse surrounding gender issues. The dissident movement welcomed this masculization as much as the new leaders and elite. Women saw themselves in solidarity with their men rather than struggling against them. Women felt the need to bolster and support their sense of masculinity since it had been seen as being stripped away during the Soviet era (Havelkova 1993; Watson 2000).

Feminization of Poverty

Another consequence was the persistence of high levels of poverty after market transition. With market transition, unemployment was widespread, wages declined, inflation
rose, and living standards decreased as discussed above (Robila 2004, 3). Economic consequences came to have a marked impact on women. The above factors, coupled with higher levels of divorce and rising levels of female-led single-parent households, contributed to a rise in female poverty (Shelley 2002, 208-210). In turn, the feminization of poverty contributed to gender inequality and the challenges that women face, such as human trafficking, gender-based violence, and higher levels of infant and maternal mortality.

Economic stress tends to lend itself to high divorce rates, decline in birthrates, and postponed marriages. Single parenthood among women rose in many Eastern European countries (Zhurzhenko 2004, 196). A reduction in social services diminished the support network for women, in particular single mothers. Women had been accustomed to a social welfare net, consisting of childcare, maternity benefits, food subsidies, and healthcare, which shrunk once the former Soviet states became market economies (Haney 2002, 174). The burden women bear of family and rearing children was compounded during the transition period. Divorce made it much easier for men to breach their responsibilities to their wives and children, “which led to more economic freedom [for men] as well as freedom in the sense of arranging their lives during the hard time of transition” (Payer 2006, 8). Decrease in social welfare and childcare provisions meant that finding employment and participation in political life was made even more difficult (Rueschemeyer 2010, 113).

Impoverishment, lack of job security, and societal upheaval coupled with the reemergence of traditional stereotypes generated a cycle that allowed for greater instances of domestic violence and made it much more difficult for women to leave abusive relationships (Nikolić-Ristanović 2002, 75). Fabian (2007) noted that “violence against women had been accepted, occasionally even glorified, and dismissed in Central and Eastern Europe as a private
affair” (186). Governments, the media, and even citizens have been slow to recognize the
significance of domestic violence due to the persistence of traditional stereotypes and
stigmatization and guilt that surrounds victims (Fabian 2010, 224; Nowakowska 1999). Early on,
the concern of women was not necessarily domestic violence but, as would be expected,
economic concerns such as jobs and social welfare (Fabian 2009). The lack of accurate statistics
and the underreported nature of gender-based violence further explain the slow response of
governments. During the UN Fourth World Conference (1995), the Latvian Deputy Premier
remarked that “the small number of gender-specific statistics…reveals that it is difficult to
accurately assess the situation and try to develop appropriate policies and strategies. The lack of
information facilitates public denial of the very existence of any problems.”

Feminization of poverty has led to women turning to prostitution and becoming victims
of human trafficking (Khodyreva 2005, 243). A number of studies commented on the emerging
problem of trafficking of women from the former Soviet region to Western Europe in the late
1980s and early 1990s (e.g. Zaitch and Staring 2009, 73; Locher 2007, 161; Wichterich 2000,
62). Vocks and Nijboer (2000) observed that the rise in unemployment, change in family
structures, and the status of prostitution are regarded as explanations for the influx of Central and
Eastern European women into the Netherlands. Wichterich (2000) noted that Poland became a
transit countries because “poverty and unemployment there form a disastrous mix with lack of
education and the myth of getting rich quick in the West” (62). The collapse of communism
provided an opportunity for a burgeoning sex industry in Central and Eastern Europe. “Political
and economic liberalization as well as internal and international militarism created new
opportunity structures and daunting economic uncertainties that produced both a demand for and
a supply of sex workers in and from Eastern Europe” (Kligman and Limoncelli 2005, 126).
Kligman and Limoncelli (2005) further added “directors of pornographic films and magazines as well as international sex tourism agencies also flocked to the former socialist states where there was then little threat of institutional regulation and enforcement. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, shorter distances made it easier and cheaper to move women from eastern to western Europe rather than from Africa, South America or Asia” (127).

III. Theoretical Perspectives

Despite the decreasing number of women in formal politics, as evidenced in low numbers of women elected to national parliaments, women were quite active in the civil society sector. The years following the collapse of state socialism saw an exponential increase in non-governmental organizations, especially women’s organizations. Wolchik (1998) noted that this proliferation of NGOs created a space for nontraditional issues to be discussed, and had this continued might have allowed more opportunities for women’s issues to be integrated into the overall political agenda (37). Past research has shown the impact of the international women’s movement in pushing for a variety of gender policies. This chapter specifically looks at traditional, gender-based violence, and human trafficking policies.

Social movements are defined as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 1998, 4). Movements seek to change some aspect of the political and social environment. As a result, there has been interest in assessing movement success and failure. One of the ways is to examine the policy impact of movements (Banaszak 1996; Gelb and Palley 1987; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly, 1999; Giugni 2004; Piven and Cloward 1979). Burstein et al. (1995), elaborating on Schumaker’s (1975) typology distinguished six types of movement outcomes: 1) access: gaining inroads into the political system and with political authorities, 2) agenda: adding a claim to the
government’s agenda, 3) policy: adoption of desired legislation, 4) output: enforcement and implementation of desired legislation, 5) impact: substantial improvement of the existing situation, and 6) structural outcomes: transformation of the social or political arrangements (Giugni 2004, 30).

The successfulness of social movements regarding policy adoption is debatable. On the one hand, movement organizations have been noted to be important facets for social change, while on the other hand, the literature has illustrated that movements’ effectiveness vary based upon the context of their political regimes and social environments (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). A change in the political opportunity structure can determine whether political conditions are favorable enough for the maintenance of social movements. Unstable political conditions, though, can allow groups previously excluded from the political decision-making process under otherwise normal political conditions to find opportunities for collective action (Neidhardt and Rucht 1991, 121).

Traditional Policy

The influence of women’s organizations on family policy is open to debate. Family policy tends to revolve around the reconciliation of motherhood and paid employment (Ferrarini 2006, 23). Family policy tends to highlight a woman’s role as wife and mother. Cobble (2011) noted that most of the legislative support for mothers and children were already in place before the US feminist movement. “Moreover, recent scholarship suggests that many of these policies came not as a result of feminist pressure but in response to conservative forces such as strong pronatalist movements or politically active religious groups that saw children as a social rather than an individual charge” (122). Traditional forces co-opt the ability to determine the language of family policy not women’s organizations (Baker 1995, 345).
In European and Scandinavian countries, family policy is often equated with policies that promote a woman’s ability to work and simultaneously take care of children (e.g. parental leave and daycare). These issues are often equated with employment opportunities and are therefore associated with labor, not feminist, movements. “This may also explain its [childcare] lack of centrality even within the women’s movement and the development of policies with very little feminist input…Evidently feminism has not managed to shift the framework of understanding of childcare in the way that it has with the issues of fertility control and violence against women” (Charles and Campling 2000, 198).

The family is often viewed as a private realm that should not be intruded on by the state. In Spain, Franco’s previous repressive regime was blamed for the lack of a comprehensive family policy. The regime was associated with intrusion from the state and facilitated the burden on women to be both caretakers and workers. So as Spain shifted away from authoritarianism, family policy was ignored and relegated to the private sphere. Many of the measures from the old regime remained very much in place (Flaquer 2002, 89). The author noted that “…the position of the Spanish feminist movement toward family policy is ambiguous” (90).

Gender-Based Violence Policy

Violence against women is pervasive around the world. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and prompted an honest discussion about gender-based violence (UN

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20 Throughout this chapter, I use the terms “gender-based violence” and “gender violence” interchangeably. Violence against women is used in reference to both gender-based violence and human trafficking.

21 Various forms of violence against women have been denoted such as sex-selective abortion, female infanticide, child marriage, female genital mutilation, child prostitution, poor nutrition and lack of immunization and healthcare of infants and young girls, forced marriage, date rape, acid throwing, bride burning, sexual harassment, mass rape during war and civil unrest, forced prostitution, trafficking, domestic violence, marital rape, dowry death, sexual assault, and physical and mental abuse of elderly women.
The second UN World Conference on Women in Copenhagen, held in 1980, openly acknowledged the necessity of implementing health programs that would protect women from various forms of violence (UN 2006, 13). With the Third World Conference in Nairobi in 1985, there was a shift from a focus solely on family violence to shining a spotlight on the pervasiveness of violence against women in all societal contexts and its various manifestations. Wider attention to violence against women emerged primarily in the context of the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985); this attention was in large due to the efforts of women’s organizations which had gained prominence as a result of international and regional women’s conferences and women in development initiative (WID) programs. Through their consistent efforts, women’s organizations aided in bringing to light the issue of gender-based violence and crusaded for the UN to establish international norms and standards (UNIFEM 2003). Then in 1993 the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) which for the first time was an international pronouncement that officially recognized violence against women and its many different manifestations.\(^{22}\)

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\(^{22}\) CEDAW sought de facto and de jure equality between the sexes in such realms as healthcare, education, and employment through the elimination of discriminatory policies and practices directed at women. Though the sentiment of equality implicitly contradicts gender-based violence, there is no explicit reference to violence against women in CEDAW’s articles. The one noted exception is a notation in Article 6 that discusses the suppression of trafficking and prostitution of women.

\(^{23}\) DEVAW conceded that violence against women transcends historical, ethnic, socioeconomic, age, and national boundaries, and that gender-based violence is very much a consequence of historic and pervasive asymmetrical power relations within society that continue to exacerbate and foster women’s subordination. In the Declaration, violence against women was defined as any provocation of physical, sexual, and psychological violence that occurred within the family, in the public sphere, or perpetrated by the State. Such acts include but are not limited to battery, rape and marital rape, sexual harassment, and human trafficking. Article 4 urges national governments to adopt measures that would aid in the elimination of violence against women such as ratifying (or acceding) to CEDAW; investigating and imposing punitive sanctions for violations; developing national legislation that allows for the implementation of mechanisms to address prevention and elimination strategies and that allow women to seek recourse in the justice system; adopting national plans that educate about gender-based violence and promote preventive strategies; cultivating relationships with specialized non-governmental organizations; and providing adequate access to social services for victims. Three important aspects emanate- gender-based violence is solely rooted within the human rights discourse, a realistic portrayal of the consequence of this violence on the everyday lives of women, and underlines the gender-based roots of violence (UNIFEM 1999).
The international women’s movement has been noted in the literature to have had an enormous impact on placing violence against women on the legislative agenda in many countries (Antrobus 2004, 94; Peters and Wolper 1995, 2; Lee 2007, 83). It has done so by framing the issue in terms of human rights. The human rights perspective broadens the understanding of what violence against women is—from one that is narrowly understood as only a physical act perpetuated within a marital domestic unit or a sexual assault by a stranger with force to include a much broader definition that includes rape in times of war, trafficking of women, and sexual harassment. It also removes the regional isolation of the problem to one that afflicts all women in a variety of contexts. And that these acts are not isolated, arbitrary actions, but actions that occur within environments that support gender inequality and are related to other forms of discrimination. By cloaking violence against women within a human rights perspective, it is a standard that holds countries accountable for their implicit toleration of practices that contribute to gender-based violence and overt ignorance of women’s vulnerability to such violence. Moreover, NGOs are provided with the means with which to exert pressure on governments to fulfill the obligations set forth in international agreements and develop comprehensive policies that combat and seek to prevent gender-based violence (UNIFEM 2003).²⁴

Bevacqua’s (2000) analysis showed that the anti-rape movement that grew out of the larger US women’s movement was responsible for major changes not just in the adoption of rape and sexual assault policies but also in changing the overall perception of victims and public consciousness surrounding the issue. Schechter (1983) noted that the movement was responsible

for shattering myths surrounding rape, placing rape in the context of female subordination, and implementing institutional reforms (e.g. a victim’s past sexual behavior was not admissible in court, improving police evidence gathering procedures, changing criminal statutes) (37). The US anti-rape movement addressed antiquated rape legislation in states and institutionalized survivor support via the rape crisis center (Matthews 1995, 291).

“The women’s liberation movement popularized the idea that rape was not a crime of sexual passion. Rather, it was a case of violent assault, perpetrated not only by deranged strangers, but by male relatives, boyfriends, and husbands. In the course of the 1970s, most states rewrote their rape statutes, and in twenty-five of them a complete restructuring of the offense occurred along feminist lines, largely because of the lobbying of women’s groups” (D’Emilio and Freedman 1988, 314).

The battered women’s movement, similar to the anti-rape movement, emerged out of the larger US women’s movement of the 1970s. It pulled from feminist theory to shatter the myths surrounding domestic violence (e.g., men who battered women were mentally ill or alcoholics) and to set the discussion of domestic violence in the context of female subordination and power imbalances within society (Merry 2009, 25). Gelb (2003) noted that the passage of domestic violence policy was a result of women’s groups’ long record of activism on the issue and government officials in the US and Japan working in concert with each other (71). Weldon (2002) seconded this view that women’s movements are responsible for igniting the public consciousness to gender-based violence and the initial government response. However, “a women’s movement alone is not sufficient to produce a government response. Allies inside government are critical…” (163). Violence against women policies comes from an alliance of women’s movements and government officials.

Sexual harassment also grew out of the international women’s movement. Siegel (2004) noted that sexual harassment law was a result of the women’s movement; and the term itself a
result of a consciousness-raising session as a part of a Cornell University course on women and work held in 1974 (8). Baker (2008) showed that after the filing of several early lawsuits grassroots women’s organization, Working Women United was created. This organization subsequently took up the mantle of sexual harassment and inspired the development of several other organizations, ultimately culminating in massive media attention to the problem and the creation of sexual harassment laws. By the 1970s, US women’s groups had defined sexual harassment as major impetus to women’s gender equality (Mazur 1996, 37). The 1980s saw European feminist groups fighting for definitions and subsequent government action to the problem of sexual harassment (Mazur 1996, 37; Baer 2004, 594).

Human Trafficking Policy

Human trafficking has been a matter of concern for over a century. At the end of the eighteenth century, trafficking was publicized throughout Western Europe and the United States as the luring of “white” women into forced prostitution. This was the subject of the Convention for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic” adopted in 1910. The first two articles of this Convention provide the foundation for the still largely-held perception of trafficking (e.g., sexual trafficking) (OHCHR 2002). The Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1949) built upon this and previous conventions. It reinforced the association of trafficking with forced prostitution by adding punishment for exploiting a person for the purpose of prostitution (“procures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution, another person, even with the consent of that person”) and

25 Article 2 delineates “whoever, in order to gratify the passions of another person, has, by fraud, or by means of violence, threats, abuse of authority, or any other method of compulsion, procured, enticed, or led away a woman or girl over age, for immoral purposes, shall also be punished, notwithstanding that the various acts constituting the offence may have been committed in different countries” (OHCHR 1996-2007).

26 Previous agreements include the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children (1921) and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age (1933).
also punishment for maintaining dens of prostitution (“keeps or manages, or knowingly finances or takes part in the financing of a brothel; knowingly lets or rents a building or other place or any part thereof for the purpose of the prostitution of others”) (OHCHR 1996-2007). These early standards reveal that women and girls are the primary victims of forced prostitution and human trafficking. Thus, trafficking has come to be seen as a women’s rights issue and a form of gender-based violence.

In the last two decades, human trafficking has come to be recognized as a consequence of interrelated historical, geographical, economic, social, and political factors and processes. The original picture of forced prostitution was complicated in the last few decades with increasing migration and growing involvement of organized crime (Morehouse 2009). Indeed, trafficking has come to be seen as a high reward-low risk endeavor for organized crime (Obokata 2006, 30). In 2000, the UN drafted the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.

“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”

The Protocol provided an agreed upon international definition of human trafficking that would help to combat the booming billion dollar industry.27

In the 1970s, women’s human rights groups re-highlighted the problem of human trafficking and all of the ills associated with it. Western feminists began to press for recognition

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27 Trafficking is not only international. “Internal trafficking occurs as well, and possibly to an even greater extent in many countries, than transnational trafficking. It is the subsequent exploitation, and not the crossing of international borders, that defines trafficking of human beings” (Aronowitz 2009, 7).
of the problem of trafficking in the 1980s and linked it with women’s overall inequality and violence against women. Subsequently, Asian feminists linked the issue to migration, growth of the sex tourism industry, and women’s subordination (Lee 2007, 144). With renewed interest of the 1990s due to open borders, migration, and organized crime, anti-trafficking NGOs play an important role in research, prevention, advocacy, and awareness-raising. These organizations have been active in lobbying to bring greater awareness to the issue and to have it been seen as a form of violence against women and therefore a human rights violation (Tzvetkova 2002). They have also been active in making recommendations for policy and legislation. But unlike other forms of gender-based violence (e.g., domestic violence and sexual assault),

“Transnational NGO activity shows that no coherent strategy exists to address trafficking in females for sexual exploitation simply because it is such a complex issue. It can be addressed through multiple frames (cultural relativity, violence against women, prostitution, transnational crime, illegal migration), and there is no consensus between women’s groups working on this issue…” (Bertone 2004, 15).

IV. Data and Hypotheses

Dependent Variables

The data in this chapter come from a coded dataset of gender-based policies from 1993-2008 for six former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, and Moldova). Three dependent variables are analyzed—the number of legislative articles dedicated to each of the following types of policies—traditional, gender-based violence, and human trafficking. These policies come from constitutions, criminal codes, labor laws, family laws, civil codes, and stand-alone laws.28 Traditional policy is coded as pieces of legislation in reference to

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28 The laws were taken from English-translated versions in their entirety from the sources of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe, parliaments of the referenced countries, Translation and Terminology Center for Latvia, and Estonian Legal Language Center for Estonia.
spousal support, child support, equality of spouses, and violence against pregnant women.  

Violence against women policy is coded as pieces of legislation in reference to domestic violence, sexual assault, marital rape, and sexual harassment. Human trafficking policy is coded as pieces of legislation in reference to only human trafficking. 

Each dependent variable is coded as a dummy—0 (non-adoption) or 1 (adoption) of a policy from 1993-2008. The scores of all these policies were added and transformed into index variables. Traditional index ranges from 0 (no legislation was passed in a given year) to 4 (each of the measures that compose this index was passed in a given year from 1993-2008). Violence against women index ranges from 0 (no legislation was passed in a given year) to 4 (each of the policies that compose this index was passed in a given year from 1993-2008).  

Human trafficking is just a dummy variable that ranges from 0 (no measure was passed) to 1 (a measure was passed in a given year from 1993-2008). Though these variables could theoretically range to their highest value, most of the countries do not pass more than one of these measures in a given year. The few times that more than one measure is adopted, those instances are collapsed and recoded as 1. Each of the dependent variables becomes a binary variable with 0 if no measure was passed in that year and 1 if a measure was passed in that year. As a result, the data is analyzed with logistic regression. Logistic regression is a statistical procedure commonly used to analyze binary dependent variables.

Independent Variables

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29 Violence against pregnant women policies are coded in the traditional policy because these criminal laws focus on protecting women as mothers.

30 Bertone (2004) noted women’s groups, NGOs, and governments fall into two camps. There are those that conflate voluntary (prostitution) and involuntary prostitution (human trafficking) and consider both to be violence against women. The other distinguishes the massive problem of trafficking of women from women who are voluntary sex workers. As a result, prostitution policies (or any policies that reference prostitution) are not included in this analysis.

31 The specific policies are listed in the appendix.
A. Women’s Organizations (Lagged)

The primary independent variable is the number of women’s NGOs founded per year.\(^{32}\) Though this proxy is problematic, in that it does not take into account membership size and organizational strength, the influence of non-registered organizations, and a host of additional factors; it is the best preliminary measure to examine these questions quantitatively considering the limited amount of data. It needs to be noted that this variable is lagged in order to take into account the impact of women’s groups founded in the previous year on policy adoption.

Hypothesis 1: Due to suspicions of state intervention in the private sphere and the ambiguous capabilities of women’s movements in the literature to influence family policy, I hypothesize that women’s organizations will have minimal influence on the adoption of family policy in former Soviet republics.

Hypothesis 2: Gender violence has become a global issue of concern to women. Women’s organizations have taken on this mantle and have the long-term support of the international community. As a result, I hypothesize that women’s organizations will have a significant positive impact on the adoption of gender-based violence policies.

Hypothesis 3: Due to the inclusion of trafficking as a form of gender-based violence and the success of women’s movements in bringing about change in this realm, I hypothesize that women’s organizations will have a significant positive impact on the adoption of trafficking policies.

B. EU Membership

Membership in the EU is desirable to former Soviet countries. The carrot of EU membership is seen as a compelling tool for policy adoption. Gender mainstreaming, as discussed in the introduction, became a major concern of the EU in the 1990s. Those countries acquiring membership have to show an ability to adopt the *acquis communautaire*. In regard to gender equality, several important articles have been included in the primary and secondary laws

\(^{32}\) The number of registered women NGOs comes from the Center of Registers of Estonia and Latvia, the Gender Informational Network of the South Caucasus (GINSC) for Azerbaijan and Georgia, Professionals for Civil Society for Armenia, and the parliamentary website of Moldova.
to ensure gender equality. The conditional incentive of EU membership has been seen as a key factor in the transfer of EU policies to candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). As mentioned in the introduction, EU membership prompted Eastern European countries such as Poland, Czech Republic, and Latvia to adopt gender equality legislation (e.g. Anderson 2006; Kakucs 2010; Novikova 2006; Pethö 2003). The variable is coded as a dummy variable, 0 (no membership) and 1 (member state).

Hypothesis 4: I hypothesize that EU membership will have a positive impact on the adoption of all policies.

C. Border Country (Gender-based violence and Trafficking only) (Lagged)

Policy diffusion that grew out of the American state politics literature has shifted to international policies (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Dolowitz, Greenwold, and Marsh 1999)—how the probability of policy adoption in one country conditions the adoption of a similar policy in another despite spatial and temporal differences. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) defined policy transfer as “a process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (5). Policy diffusion can result in verbatim replication of policy, adaption of the policy to the circumstances of the particular country, or a weak effect of policy learning. This variable is coded 0 (a bordering country has not passed a trafficking statute in the last year) and 1 (a bordering country has passed a trafficking statute in the last year).

Hypothesis 5: Trafficking is not only an issue adopted by the international women’s movement as a form of gender-based violence (UNIFEM 2003), but has become seen as a transnational crime (Morehouse 2009). Trafficking is still defined largely based on who one asks; it can be seen as a crime against women, transnational crime, migration and border concerns, or a

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33 These directives include issues such as equality with regard to part-time work, self-employment, social security schemes, occupational pensions, the burden of proof in discrimination cases, protection of pregnant workers, and parental leave.
combination of all three. As a result, I hypothesize that neighboring countries’ adoption of human trafficking statutes will have a positive impact on the adoption of gender-based violence and human trafficking policies.

D. International Conventions (lagged)

CEDAW was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979. Countries that adopted and ratified this agreement were obligated to come up with measures that would endow women with certain economic, social, political, and cultural rights and freedoms. In 2000, the UN adopted the CEDAW Optional Protocol (OP) and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. Though all the former Soviet republics have ratified CEDAW, Avdeyeva (2010) commented that “a formal ratification of international human rights treaties, however, does not always generate changes in states’ policy practices” (308).

Ratification can show an intention to adopt policy or at least provides the impetus and rationale for policy adoption. The treaties—CEDAW, CEDAW Optional Protocol, and Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children—were combined into an international convention index. The variables are then combined into an additive index with scores ranging from 0 (ratified none) to 3 (ratified all). 34

Hypothesis 6: I hypothesize that the ratification of UN treaties will have a positive impact on the adoption of all policies.

E. Women in Parliament

Past research has shown that female politicians have the perception that they are accountable for representing women and advocating for their issues as well as influencing their male colleagues to endorse bills advancing gender equity (McAllister and Studlar 1992; Saint-Germain 1989; Tremblay 2003; Wängnerud 2000). It is well-documented that women tend to support social welfare policies—policies aimed at alleviating the suffering of the poor,

34 Specifics of index creation are discussed further in the coding book in the appendix.
minorities, children, and the elderly (Howell and Day 2000). Women also tend to overwhelmingly support legislation once designated to the private sphere (childcare, domestic violence, equal pay, equal rights, family issues, parental leave, rape, reproductive rights, sexual harassment, and women’s health); in other words, those issues that achieve equality for women and address women’s concerns. As a result, increased numbers of women within the legislature are associated with greater levels of feminist legislation as well as legislation traditionally of interest to women (Carroll 2001; Swers 2002; Thomas 1991). The number of women in parliament is taken from the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Hypothesis 7: I hypothesize that increased numbers of women in parliament will have a positive impact on the adoption of all policies.

Control Variables

A. Development

Discussions about reorienting gender and gender roles are often nonexistent in less developed areas. The concerns of these countries tend to be on development (as noted earlier in the introduction). Matland (1998) stated: “Development leads to weakening of traditional values, decreased fertility rates, increased urbanization, greater educational and labor force participation for women, and attitudinal changes in perceptions of the appropriate roles for women” (29).

Most basically, it is presumed that states that are economically, socially, and politically more developed have the capabilities and resources to implement policies favorable to women and to integrate women’s issues more into the legislative agenda. This variable is encapsulated into two different variables: (1) GDP per capita and (2) development index. GDP measures economic development, and the development index measures social and political development.\(^{35}\) GDP is

\(^{35}\) Social development is measured as infant mortality and UNDP human development index. Human development includes life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, gross national income (GNI)
taken from World Bank indicators, and the development index is composed of factors from Polity IV’s state fragility index.

B. Democracy

As noted earlier, the space created by democratic transition allowed movement organizations to push for gender equality to be placed on the legislative agenda and at the same time marginalized those voices with the institutionalization of bureaucratic politics. van Cott (2005) noted that cohesive and well-organized interests that advocate for the oppressed “require a strong legal system to ensure the existence of a democratic public space in which to make claims and to participate in formal and informal politics” (834). The existence of strong democratic institutions has been stressed as important for strong gender mainstreaming institutions. The existence of democratic political institutions, constraints on executive power, and civil rights and liberties provide a more positive environment for women’s NGOs to be influential. Democratic institutions allow multiple avenues of policy advocacy (including more voice for citizens, political parties, and interest groups) which in turn promote greater policy innovation (Weldon 2011, 31). Plus, democratic governments are held more accountable and chastised on the international scene for deplorable conditions concerning women and children. This variable is taken from Polity IV and is coded 0 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy).

C. Religion

Religion is an important aspect of a country’s culture. Kaplan (1992) noted “any religion, as long as it has a stronghold on the state and can wield real power, will be a great stumbling block for substantial change in secular matters” (Weldon 2002, 42). The number of women in parliament in post-industrial societies has been associated with a history of Catholicism with its per capita. Political development is measured as proneness to political violence, level of state repression, and regime/governance stability.
focus on traditional notions of women and family than Protestant religions (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Rule 1987). Protestant countries tend to have higher percentages of women in parliament. Protestantism is often associated with gender equality for men and women with its emphasis on secularism and individualism (Lane and Ersson 2000, 113). The variable is coded 0 (non-Protestant) and 1 (Protestant) and this information comes from the CIA World Factbook.

D. Interaction of women’s organizations (lagged) and status of women

This variable is meant to assess the access women have in the work and political realms, essentially arguing that greater women’s presence in these areas provides the important social context for the adoption of gender equality policies. Labor force participation enhances potential political activism and political consciousness among women (Aviel 1981; Kenworthy and Malami 1999). As stated above, female politicians are important for advocating for gender policy change and influencing their male colleagues to do the same (Saint-Germain 1989; McAllister and Studlar 1992; Wängnerud 2000; Jenson and Sineau 2001; Tremblay 2003). The following variables were used to create an index—the percentage of women in the labor force and the percentage of women in parliament—called status of women. These variables were obtained from the World Bank indicators.

V. Results

Table 1, 2, and 3 present logit models depicting factors that influence the adoption of gender policies. As expected, Hypotheses 1 through 3 are highly supported in the models. Women’s organizations are not significantly influential in the adoption of traditional policies, and in fact women’s groups are negatively associated with policy adoption. Based on past research, women’s organizations often display an ambiguous or non-existent position when it comes to traditional/family policy. On the other hand, women’s organizations are influential in
the adoption of gender-based violence and human trafficking policies in the region (supporting hypothesis 2 and 3). The significance is at the 0.10 level. In other words, the empirical analysis helps to illustrate that gender-based violence has become an issue highly adopted by Eastern European women’s activists (Fabian 2007; 2009). For a one-unit increase in women’s organizations, the odds of a gender-based violence or a human trafficking statute being adopted increase by a factor of 3.23 and 7.09 respectively.

The number of women in parliament only had a significant influence on the adoption of gender violence. As the number of women parliamentarians grows, the odds of gender violence policies increase by a factor of 1.20. Examples from the literature stress the importance of connections between female politicians and women’s groups in combating domestic violence in Eastern European countries (e.g. Hrycak 2010, 55). As women themselves, female representatives are more likely to be cognizant of and share women’s perspectives and preferences based on collective gendered experiences (Sineau 2001; Swers 2002; Wängnerud 2000). This view culminates in a sense of responsibility to female constituents and a subsequent duty to represent their particular interests and concerns (Reingold 1992; Thomas 1994). Unexpected to hypothesis 7, women in parliament was negatively associated with the adoption of the other two policies, though this finding was not statistically significant.

Counter-intuitively, ratifying international conventions is negatively associated with the adoption of each of the gender-based policies. Each of the international conventions—CEDAW, CEDAW OP, and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking—sought to obligate member states to ensure gender equity in all aspects of society. All of the policies tap into basic women’s rights whether it is bringing about equity in marriage and family support, preventing domestic violence and assault, or halting the spread of thousands of women being trafficked in
the world. Ratifying these treaties has a negative, non-significant effect on traditional and human trafficking statutes and a highly significant negative effect (at the .05 level) on gender violence policy. This result illustrates that signing onto an international treaty does not have an impact on legislating gender equity but in fact has a damaging effect on bringing this result into fruition. Once signing a treaty, countries could feel that it alleviates the need to follow through with legislation. Avdeyeva (2010) noted that obligating one’s self to an international convention does not always bring about a change in a state’s policies. It may be the case that ratifying a treaty might make a country believe that it has served its minimum requirement to the international community of pushing a gender equality agenda and this in turn might pacify those advocating for those issues.

Being an EU member state has a positive but non-significant influence on the adoption of gender violence and human trafficking. Though the European Union launched two major initiatives—European Campaign to Raise Awareness of Violence against Women and the Daphne Programme,36 the EU still lacks a comprehensive strategy or policy to combat violence against women. Conversely, EU initiatives could be of assistance to women’s NGOs in member countries to pursue a gender equity agenda and also the carrot of EU membership might compel some countries to adopt some measures to curtail violence against women. Unlike what was hypothesized, the model shows that EU membership does not encourage legislation on traditional issues. In regard to traditional policy, being an EU member actually has a negative (albeit non-significant) effect. This result was unexpected because the EU has directives on such issues as parental leave and protections for pregnant workers.

36 The Daphne Programme is a “community preventive action program to combat violence against children, young people and women. It funds NGO and partnerships projects, networks, and media campaigns, on domestic violence, trafficking, migrant and refugee women” (Johnson, Ollus, and Nevala 2008, 5).
For gender-based violence and human trafficking policies, an additional variable was included—whether a border country passed a trafficking policy in the last year. The variable is positive though not statistically significant. It is possible that countries are learning from their neighbors, being pressured by their neighbors, or working jointly with their neighbors to produce trafficking legislation throughout the region; however further research should examine this claim more closely.

The control variables provide mixed results. The development variables have a positive influence on the adoption of all the policies. As a country becomes more socially developed and politically stable and secure, the legislating of gender equality policies becomes more likely. However, the development variable is marginally significant for human trafficking. Economic development measured as GDP per capita has a strong significant influence on the adoption on all of the policies. Financial stability seems to allow governments a space to entertain legislating gender equality when the concern is not on economic crises. Recall that Matland (1998) argued that “development leads to weakening of traditional values, decreased fertility rates, increased urbanization, greater educational and labor force participation for women, and attitudinal changes in perceptions of the appropriate roles for women” (29).

Religion has the exact opposite impact than what was expected. Protestant countries are less likely to adopt gender violence and trafficking policies but more likely to adopt traditional policies. The coefficient for human trafficking is the only one to have significance at the 0.10 level. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia are coded as non-protestant, and Estonia and Latvia as Protestant.37 When examining the sheer number of gender violence and human

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37 Religious affiliation in the former Soviet republics is a complicated manner. Orthodoxy is strongly represented in Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Russia (as well as Estonia and Latvia with predominant Russian minority populations). Protestantism also has a stronghold with the Baptists in Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova and the Lutherans in Estonia and Latvia. Catholicism is strongly represented in Lithuania which borders Poland and Belarus
trafficking policies passed per country, the two Protestant countries in the sample fall behind the three Orthodox countries in particular. That variable could be tapping into the effect, and not necessarily the aspect of religion.

The level of democracy has a negative, yet not statistically significant, impact on all policies. Democracy is measured in Polity IV as unrestricted, open, and fully competitive political participation, elective executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. This result is surprising because democracy is associated with mechanisms that integrate marginalized groups into the political and social realms. Democratization has led to more rights for women; however democratization has not led to women’s full equality in all sectors of society despite the passionate activeness of women in the process in the region (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Waylen 2007). “While institutionalized politics is not operational, women participate in the public arena. With the institution or return of formal democracy, the public stage is reclaimed by men, the ‘natural’ actors of representative democracy” (Rai 1996, 235). This result may not be surprising because despite democratization women often still face a number of restraints to their effective participation in formal and civil society institutions.

The status of women (as measured by the percentage of women in parliament and the percentage of women in the labor force) influences the impact women’s NGOs can have on the adoption of gender-based policies. Women’s groups are more effective in societies where women have some basic rights and level of independence. As women’s status declines, there is an increase in the number of traditional policies; however while it is positively correlated the coefficient is not significant. An increase in women’s status is significantly correlated with the

with Lithuanian and Polish borders (but also there is a large number of Ukrainian Catholics). Christianity is the prominent religion in Armenia (Armenian Apostolic). Islam and/or Judaism are prominent in all states (in particular Russia). Other religions are also noted, such as Pentecostals, Baha’is, and Seventh-Day Adventists (CIA World Factbook 2010).
influence of women’s groups on the adoption of gender violence policies. Women’s status is positively associated with human trafficking statutes, though it is not reach a significance level.

The status of women measure is significant (at the 0.01 level) for gender violence. Factors such as education, political involvement, and labor participation aid in forming political and active consciousness among women. In turn, this consciousness turns into activism on behalf of women’s issues.

**Table 1. Logistic Regression Models of Traditional Policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women’s organizations (lagged) [+/-]</td>
<td>-.3855497</td>
<td>.6800767</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in parliament [+/+]</td>
<td>-.0235102</td>
<td>.976764</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s organizations (lagged)*</td>
<td>.1370512</td>
<td>1.146887</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of women [+/-]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International conventions [+/+]</td>
<td>-1.084514</td>
<td>.3380661</td>
<td>-1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP [+/+]</td>
<td>.1262313</td>
<td>1.134545</td>
<td>1.84*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (dummy) [-/-]</td>
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<td>1.748973</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<td>Democracy [+/+]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development [+/-]</td>
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<td>.9454034</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>cons</td>
<td>-.8788468</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.39</td>
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</table>

N = 81
Pseudo R² = 0.1015
Log likelihood = -34.872046

P value: ***0.01 or less; ** 0.05 or less; * 0.10 or less

***Directional hypotheses are in brackets

38 Only women’s participation in parliament and the labor force were included because the other additional variables that were going to be included in the index such as percentages of college educated women and women in the non-agricultural sector had to many missing data points. This caused a large number of observations to be dropped from the analyses.
### Table 2. Logistic Regression Models of Gender Violence Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
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<td>3.232001</td>
<td>1.64*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.1785785</td>
<td>1.195179</td>
<td>0.059*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s organizations (lagged)*</td>
<td>-0.3780339</td>
<td>0.6852073</td>
<td>-1.64*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of women [+/-]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International conventions [+/-]</td>
<td>-2.157037</td>
<td>0.1156673</td>
<td>-2.31**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member (dummy) [+/-]</td>
<td>0.6416184</td>
<td>1.899553</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border country (lagged) [+/-]</td>
<td>1.131078</td>
<td>3.098997</td>
<td>1.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP [+/-]</td>
<td>0.1851761</td>
<td>1.20343</td>
<td>2.17**</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development [+/-]</td>
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<td>0.871366</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>cons</td>
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N = 81
Pseudo R² = 0.2264
Log likelihood = -28.845074

P value: ***0.01 or less; ** 0.05 or less; * 0.10 or less
***Directional hypotheses are in brackets
Table 3. Logistic Regression Models of Human Trafficking Policies

<table>
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<th>Model</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>Z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
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<td>Women in parliament [+/-]</td>
<td>-0.0191335</td>
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<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s organizations (lagged)*</td>
<td>-0.581467</td>
<td>0.5590776</td>
<td>-1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of women [+/-]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International conventions [+/-]</td>
<td>-0.7042737</td>
<td>0.4944676</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP [+/-]</td>
<td>0.3298154</td>
<td>1.390711</td>
<td>2.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member (dummy) [+/-]</td>
<td>0.215012</td>
<td>1.239877</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (dummy) [+/-]</td>
<td>-3.452476</td>
<td>0.0316671</td>
<td>-1.64*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy [+/-]</td>
<td>-0.0430238</td>
<td>0.9578886</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development [+/-]</td>
<td>-1.13538</td>
<td>0.3213</td>
<td>-1.62*</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.234505</td>
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<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
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N = 81
Pseudo R² = 0.3098
Log likelihood = -19.502511

P value: ***0.01 or less; ** 0.05 or less; * 0.10 or less
***Directional hypotheses are in brackets

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, I attempted to fill a gap in the literature by quantitatively examining the influence of women’s organizations on the adoption of gender-based policies in former Soviet republics. This chapter attempts to add to previous research by examining three different policies that tap into different aspects of gender equality in six former Soviet countries across a fifteen-year time span. While controlling for a number of factors, I test whether women’s organizations have a strong influence on the adoption of these policies, the argument being that women’s
organizations have the strongest impact on gender violence and human trafficking policies and a minimal impact on traditional policies. The findings support this argument: women’s organizations are influential when it comes to the adoption of gender violence and human trafficking directives.

The other independent variables provided mixed results for the hypotheses. Women legislators are important allies to women’s organizations in the fight against gender violence. The relationship of women’s groups and women politicians is important for the adoption of laws regarding gender-based violence. International conventions have the exact opposite effect that was hypothesized; signing a treaty hampers the adoption of gender policies. As stated above, this could be a result of complacency on the part of the government and the citizenry. EU membership has an influence on the adoption of gender-based violence and human trafficking. Having a neighboring country passing a trafficking policy in the last year seems to have a positive influence (though not significant) on the adoption of violence against women directives. The controls, for the most part, provide mixed results. Development (social, political, and economic) positively impacts the adoption of violence against women policies. Economic development has the most impact, however, on the adoption of all three policies. Democracy has a negative impact, though the result could be based on women’s exclusion from formal politics in the democratization process. Religion does not act in the expected manner, but as stated, above this could be unique to the region’s circumstances.

This chapter set out to present a preliminary multi-country, quantitative examination. It has suggested that the work of women’s NGOs is extremely important to the promotion of gender equality in the region and that their efforts should be supported. Gender violence and human trafficking provide a new space for women’s organizations to exert influence, where
many of the traditional policies were put in place during the Soviet period and continue to promote a woman’s traditional roles of wife and mother. The next chapter seeks to examine the language of these adopted policies that women’s groups have had such an impact on through content analysis. Essentially now that these policies are adopted, is the language contained within clear, concise, and written to actually achieve true gender equality? How have women’s organizations being able to influence the language? The next chapter set out to examine these very questions.
Chapter IV
What’s in a Policy?: the Language of Gender Violence and Human Trafficking Policies in Former Soviet Republics

I. Introduction

Gender-based violence is a serious and pervasive problem all over the world. Women’s activists and women’s movements in the 1970s played a considerable role in raising awareness to the seriousness of the problem. The existence of gender-based violence was publicly ignored during the Soviet era and in the beginning years of the newly formed republics. The problem was coupled with the volatility and uncertainty of the years following the end of the Soviet Union, and the pervasiveness of unemployment, crime, and poverty. During the transitional years, the focus was on political, economic, and defense development. The promotion of gender equity was disregarded in domestic policy. Despite the pervasiveness of gender-based violence for all of the former Soviet republics and the influence of women’s NGOS in placing these issues on the national agenda, the countries exhibit significant variation in their policies. The conceptualization of social policy is based on a multitude of factors, such as how the issue is operationalized, the reasons for the issue’s existence, how the issue is seen, and the best approach seen to handle the issue.

Operationalization of an issue can bring about certain exclusionary or inclusionary boundaries. Domestic violence has been referred to in a number of different ways, such as “family violence,” “intimate partner violence,” “spousal abuse,” “domestic abuse,” and “wife beating.” Each of these terms carries certain convictions. Terms such as “domestic violence” and “family violence” remove a gender dimension, illustrate that women as well as men can be victims of such violence, and place such violence within the context of a family unit. Further, there is no differentiation between violence between intimate partners, siblings, and child and
parent. The phrases “wife battering” or “wife beating” imply that women are the primary victims of violence but exclude those victims that are not in a marital unit (e.g. dating partners, cohabitating couples, gay and lesbian couples) and non-partners (e.g. sibling abuse, child abuse, elder abuse). The use of “intimate partner violence” expands the definition to non-marital relationships and differentiates violence between partners from other forms of family violence (Merry 2008, 27; Nicolaidis and Paranjape 2009, 20). Further the use of the words “violence” or “abuse” has an impact. ‘Violence’ often conjures up images of physical assault whereas “abuse” usually refers to non-violent forms such as stalking, harassment, intimidation, and coercion. The same can be said for terms such as “rape” and “sexual assault,” where “rape” often refers to forced penetration and “sexual assault” referring to forced or coerced sexual acts not involving penetration (Crowell and Burgess 1996).

Violence against women can either be seen as a health issue (influencing the psychological, physical, emotional, and sexual health of victims); a human rights issue (affecting victim’s ability to fulfill their potential as a citizen due to diminution of rights); a criminal issue (involving penalties for perpetrators); or a family issue (focusing on preventing violence within the family, including child abuse). Human trafficking can be viewed similarly as a health issue; a human rights issue; or a criminal issue (either as a focus on organized crime or illegal immigration). As a criminal issue the focus is on reforming existing statutes and laws and forcing the criminal justice system to be more responsive to victims. With this sole focus, it is difficult to prosecute acts that are culturally sanctioned or acts that are injurious but difficult to criminalize (e.g. emotional and psychological abuse). As a public health issue, it allows for the inclusion of acts involving deprivation and neglect. The public health perspective distinguishes between violence by family and intimate partners and that of acquaintances and strangers with more
emphasis placed on the predominant violence—violence perpetrated by intimate partners (Dean 2004 in Tjaden 2005). The human rights perspective recognizes that gender discrimination within society makes women more vulnerable to all types of victimization, that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination against women, and that this violence is impacted by and impacts women’s human rights (Johnson et al. 2008, 4).

This chapter examines the language of violence against women and human trafficking policies that are adopted and codified in criminal codes, labor laws, equality statues, and standalone laws. Does the policy content coincide with the goals of women’s organizations? Little research has been conducted about the content actually contained in current policies. To remedy this situation, I conduct a content analysis of policies dealing with violence against women and human trafficking from ten former Soviet republics. The comparison will assist in determining if similarities or patterns exist between violence against women and trafficking policies. Content analysis can help discover patterns and parallels that exist between similar statutes and dissimilar ones in order to determine relevance. A rubric was developed based on five content categories that emerged during the analysis. The policies were obtained online, analyzed for content, and then compared to the content categories.

II. Literature Review

Gender-based violence has received greater recognition in the region. One prime example is the launching of the first Russian blog on violence against women (ostanovinasilie.org) in Belarus. It contains information on violence against women, in particular domestic violence. The blog is in the framework of the United Nations Secretary General's Campaign “Unite to End Violence against Women.” Data on the prevalence of violence against women in the Caucuses (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) is limited. The limited number of studies that have

39 “Ostanovinasilie” means “stop violence” in Russian.
originated out of the region show the problem is widespread and highly underreported (USAID 2006, 40). For example, in a May 2008 survey conducted by the Armenian Women’s Rights Center, 66 percent of respondents admitted that they were victims of psychological abuse, while 39 percent were victims of moderate to severe physical violence (US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2008).

In the other former Soviet republics, statistics are also limited. Studies indicate that approximately 20 percent of women in the countries of Russia and West Newly Independent States (NIS) have been subjected to domestic abuse. According to a survey organized by the United Nations Office in Belarus, 25 per cent of Belarusian women aged 18-60 experience physical abuse from their spouses or partners (UzReport.com 2011). An assessment conducted by Estonian NGOs noted that one in four Estonian women suffered from physical, sexual, or emotional domestic abuse in their lifetime (US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2007). According to a recent Russian survey, 100 percent of female professionals said they had been subjected to sexual harassment by their bosses, 32 percent said they had had intercourse with them at least once, and another seven percent claimed to have been raped (Telegraph UK 2008). These numbers are only a slight representation of the prevalence of violence against women in former Soviet republics.

Violence against women and human trafficking are relatively new issues of concern in the former communist region. Activism regarding these issues has occurred only within the last fifteen years. Global social policy and transnational alliances forged at international meetings (e.g., 1995 UN Women’s Conference in Beijing) have allowed local activists to draw upon international frameworks and to translate them into the context of their own natural setting to draw awareness to the problem (Mertus 1998, 389). The lack of acknowledgment of violence
against women during the Soviet period left women’s NGOs without a strategy to handle and raise awareness in their countries. Also with newly formalizing governments, no gender mainstreaming machineries were in place for decision-making, policy formulation, and implementation. Women’s groups and their allies have identified various forms of gender-based violence as a primary concern and have been involved in drafting new laws and revising criminal, legal, and family codes (Nikolić-Ristanović 2002, 172).

State officials in Ukraine (through the urging of women’s groups) decided to deal with the issue of domestic violence through the establishment of networks of state officials and women’s NGOs. Policy was to be based on ratified international human rights treaties and suggestions from NGOs (Hrycak 2010, 55). The UNDP’s Gender Bureau, state officials, and local women’s advocates drafted the domestic violence law that was introduced to the Ukrainian Parliament in 1999 and passed in 2001. This law was the first in post-Soviet countries to address domestic violence using a comprehensive approach based on Western models of domestic violence prevention (Hrycak 2010, 59). Further, women’s groups pushed lawmakers to pass amendments that aligned policy more along international treaties and global policy recommendations (Hrycak 2010, 46).

Novikova (2006) notes that the EU accession process influenced Latvia to adopt policies such as parental leave, equal wages, and anti-sex discrimination. The EU soft laws (e.g. European Employment Strategy, European Social Policy, and Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality) were used to define gender equality in the fields of employment and social policy (105). By attempting to harmonize national laws with the acquis, the government introduced terminology such as “gender equality,” “equal treatment,” “equal opportunities,”

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40 One such amendment was the deletion of a clause that indirectly blamed women for provoking their own abuse. Another clause was the creation of state rehabilitative centers for perpetrators of domestic violence.
“gender analysis,” and “sexual rights.” It was further stated that the language in the revised Labor Code (2002) and revisions of the Criminal Code to include human trafficking were influenced by EU directives. “Without pressure from the EU legislation and institutions during the accession process, it is unlikely that local activists and organizations would have been able to have any impact on the inclusion of gender issues within political debates” (Novikova 2006, 106). Women’s organizations are important as well, in particular trying to fill the lack of gender mainstreaming machineries on the local level. However, their influence is hampered as a result of limited resources and support.

The crisis center movement in Russia has been extremely influential in pressing for recognition of all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence and human trafficking (Johnson and Zaynullina 2010, 83). The approach of the women’s movement has been to pressure the government to adhere to the language of international conventions. “Western assistance has enabled the women’s movement to use this lever more effectively by establishing contacts and disseminating information between the Russian women’s movement and women’s organizations around the globe” (Richter 2002, 77). It has lobbied the Duma on behalf of human trafficking legislation. Some members of the movement were involved in the working group under the State Duma’s Legislation Committee to draft anti-trafficking legislation (Schatral 2007, 51). The decision was to couch the concept in terms of “violence against women as a violation of human rights” instead of feminism and equal rights for women. Feminism is still considered foreign and negative, and to gain public support it is best to frame the issue not in terms of equal treatment but human rights (Sundstrom 2002). By framing the issue in terms of international standards and UN recommendations, this makes “their demands more concrete,

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41 The crisis center movement began in Russia in the early 1990s with the formulation of crisis centers in Moscow and St. Petersburg, eventually becoming an umbrella of nongovernmental organizations throughout the country (Johnson and Zaynullina 2010, 82).
exerting pressure on policy-makers and insisting upon compliance with international rules” (Sperling 1999, 220ff in Schatral 2007, 52). However, limited support from society as a whole has resulted in little substantive results for such policies as domestic violence and sexual harassment in Russia. The Women of Russia bloc attempted to introduce a domestic violence law in 1998 but the law became so diluted draft after draft that the movement no longer supported it in the end.

Influenced by a communist past and external pressure, women’s organizations in the region have influenced the language embedded in gender policies. Johnson and Zaynullina (2010) noted that the term “economic violence” that is prevalent in domestic violence legislation in post-communist countries has been fostered by transnational feminist networks (92). The term itself, though, seems to be a result of a shared communist experience and Marxist-influenced thinking. As a result, domestic violence includes not just physical, psychological, and sexual violence in DEVAW, but also “economic dependence” (Israeli and Zabelina 1995, 15 quoted in Johnson and Zaynullina 2010, 90). Richter (2002) remarked that members of the Moscow Center for Gender Studies had given credit to the women’s movement for introducing terms such as gender and domestic abuse to the Russian language (77). Fábián (2007) also noted that incorporating a term such as “domestic violence” into Central and Eastern European terminology was quite difficult. The term itself denotes a number of assumptions and is a Western feminist term. Women’s NGOs moved toward using gender-neutral language instead of “violence against women” in order to garner support from parliamentarians and the general public. They veered away from loaded words such as “wife abuse” and “violence in the family” that seemed to upset certain politicians and the public consciousness (262-264). “Following the uneasy but tangible success of having named domestic violence, domestic NGOs and international pressure have
succeeded in changing the status quo about domestic violence in CEE” (266). An international framework has developed to formulate a singular definition of domestic violence that has been very influential in CEE laws.

Through the efforts of women’s NGOs and their allies, the last ten years in particular has seen the adoption of policies that confront human trafficking, domestic violence, sexual assault, and sexual harassment in some former Soviet countries. Galligan et al. (2007) stated women’s NGOs have been active in lobbying for specific issues such as domestic violence and women’s representation. Women’s groups have helped to influence the adoption and language of gender policies. However, the overall impact has been muted in terms of mainstreaming gender equality legislation. Thus, in many post-socialist countries “gender equality initiatives came as a result of EU and international commitments rather than from pressure from women’s grassroots movements” (Galligan et al. 2007, 118).

A noticeable improvement in legislation has been seen in the former Soviet republics. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of policy development in the ten countries examined. All the countries with the exception of Estonia have human trafficking statutes in their criminal codes.42 Azerbaijan, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, and Russia have stand-alone laws above and beyond what is memorialized in their criminal code articles.43 The violence against women policies include those focusing on sexual assault, marital rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment. These acts are all set forth in UN conventions as acts of gender-based violence. Each country has a

42 Trafficking statutes are article 132 in Armenia; articles 144.1, 316 in Azerbaijan; article 181 in Belarus; article 143.1 in Georgia; articles 154.1, 154.2 in Latvia; article 1313 in Lithuania; article 165 in Moldova; article 127.1 in Russia; and article 149 in Ukraine.

number of criminal provisions which cover a wide range of sexual assault offenses.\textsuperscript{44} Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine make explicit mention of sexual harassment within the context of criminal codes, equality acts, and labor laws.\textsuperscript{45} Only Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have stand-alone laws directed at domestic violence with Belarus defining and offering rehabilitation services in its crime prevention law.\textsuperscript{46}

III. Data and Methods

The particularities of policy can be difficult to disentangle, such particularities being the intentions of the policymakers, the target group of the policy, and the intended consequences or effects of the policy. Qualitative content analysis situated in grounded theory can be used to disentangle patterns that lie within policies. Content analysis has a long history as a valuable methodology in the social sciences and the humanities. Some of the earlier research could be seen in the fields of sociology and political science. Content analysis has been defined as a systematic, replicable technique that reduces large amounts of text into a more manageable number of thematic categories based on specific rules of coding (Krippendorff 1980; Weber 1990). At its foundation, content analysis is the examination of textual data for the presence and frequency of specific terms and concepts. Texts can come from a variety of areas, including statues, legal documents, and policies.

\textsuperscript{44} The rape statutes are articles 138, 139, 140 in Armenia; articles in 108, 108.1, 149, 150, 151 in Azerbaijan, articles 166, 167, 170 in Belarus; articles in 141, 142, 143, 143.1 in Estonia; articles in 137, 138, 139 in Georgia; articles in 159, 160 in Latvia; articles in 149, 150, 151 in Lithuania; articles in 171, 172, 173 in Moldova; articles 131, 132, 133 in Russia; and articles in 152, 153, 154 in Ukraine.

\textsuperscript{45} Sexual harassment statutes are articles 17, 18 in Azerbaijan’s Law on State Guarantees of Equal Rights for Women and Men; articles 3,6 in Estonia’s Gender Equality Act; article 29 in Latvia’s Labor Law; article 152 in Lithuania’s criminal code; articles 2, 12 in Lithuania’s Law of Equal Opportunities for Men and Women; article 152 in Criminal Code, articles 2, 12 in Law of Equal Opportunities for Men and Women, and article 235 in Lithuania’s Labor Code; article 4 in Moldova’s Law of Equal Opportunities for Men and Women; and articles 1, 22, 23 in Law of Ukraine on Ensuring Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities of Women and Men.

\textsuperscript{46} Domestic violence statues are articles 1, 14, 27 in On Fundamental Activities for Crime Prevention in Belarus; Law of Georgia on Elimination of Domestic Violence, Protection of and Support to Its Victims; Moldova’s Law on Preventing and Combating Violence in the Family; and Law of Ukraine “On the Prevention of Domestic Violence”.

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Many of the early twentieth century content analyses were quantitative newspaper analyses such as Wilcox (1900) and Street (1909) or propaganda analyses which were common within the milieu of World War I and World War II (Bernard and Ryan 2009, 287). Explicit in these early content analysis studies was the focus on quantification. Kaplan (1943) stated that content analysis “attempts to characterize the meanings in a given body of discourse in a systematic and quantitative fashion” (230). Berelson (1952) defined content analysis as “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of manifest content of communication” (18) (Marris and Thorham 2000, 202). Kracauer (1952) wrote one of the earliest queries on the limitations of quantitative content analysis. The sole focus on validity and reliability in the form of quantification leads to less accurate results due to the neglect of qualitative exegesis.47

The latter half of the twentieth century saw the growth of qualitative studies that utilized content analysis. It developed as a methodology in such fields as anthropology, qualitative sociology, psychology, literary theory, and feminist theory (Krippendorff 2004, 17). The method has been systematically used to examine meanings, themes, and patterns that may be manifest or latent in a particular text.48 Quantitative content analysis allows for the objective inference of large amounts of data for statistical examination (e.g., counting of particular words); while its qualitative counterpart permits researchers to subjectively (but scientifically) appraise language and underlying messages through the isolation of particular themes that are not easily

47 Kracauer does not assert that quantitative analysis is not useful. On the contrary, he notes that “quantitative analysis includes qualitative aspects, for it both originates and culminates in qualitative considerations. On the other hand, qualitative analysis proper often requires quantification in the interest of exhaustive treatment. Far from being strict alternatives the two approaches actually overlap, and have in fact complemented and interpenetrated each other in several investigations.”

48 Manifest content refers to visible, surface content (e.g. number of terms per page). Latent content refers to the underlying meaning. This requires intensive reading of an entire text or samples of the text in order to make an overall assessment. Manifest and latent are sometimes used to indicate quantitative and qualitative content analysis.
quantifiable (Hsieh and Shannon 2005; Patton 2002; Weber 1990). The focus is on individual themes rather than physical linguistic units (e.g. word, sentence, or paragraph) most often used in quantitative content analysis. Themes can be found in a singular word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, or document. The data are coded and condensed into systematic classifications based on supposition and analysis resulting from careful reading and constant comparison of the chosen texts (Tesch 1990). The classifications develop into themes and descriptions that exemplify the diverse meanings of the units of analyses rather than statistical significance of material components.

Hsieh and Shannon (2005) discussed three approaches to qualitative content analysis. The first approach is conventional qualitative content analysis, often known as grounded theory. Coding themes originate directly from the data itself. The second approach is directed content analysis. Unlike conventional qualitative content analysis, existing theory and prior research direct the coding process. Previous theory and findings create preliminary correlations between chief concepts which provide the foundation of the coding process (Mayring 2000). The third approach is summative content analysis. Initially this method seems quantitative, with focus on manifest content; however, the end objective is to delve into the latent meaning of specific words of the text through the exploration of usage and language. This chapter utilizes the first approach—grounded theory—to analyze policies.

Martin and Turner (1986) defined grounded theory as an “inductive theory discovery methodology that allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of the topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations of data” (141). Grounded theory came into prominence in the 1960s with the work of Glaser and Strauss. It is anchored in a set of fundamental tenets. Different aspects of the data are constantly compared to
each other to explore variations and similarities in order for codes, categories, and properties to emerge from the data. This theory is also based on theoretical sampling. This sampling involves allowing emergent results to direct additions to the sample until theoretical saturation is reached, i.e., “when the complete range of constructs that make up the theory is fully represented by the data” (Starks and BrownTrinidad 2007, 1375). Augmentation to the sample is informed by continued emergence of categorizations from the data. Grounded theory is based on the premise that research is shaped from the data rather than from any preconceived theoretical frameworks and hypotheses formulated in advance of data collection and analysis. “The point made in grounded theory literature is not that a clean slate is necessary or even desirable; the critical point here is that the research does not start with a theory to prove or disprove” (Fernández 2005, 45).

Data collection, analysis, and theorizing perform in close concert with each other. Policies were obtained from labor codes, criminal codes, equality acts, and stand-alone laws of ten former Soviet republics. A coding scheme was designed for violence against women and human trafficking policies. A content analysis was based on several categories, and these categories include: a) defining violence against women (e.g. domestic violence, sexual assault, marital rape, and sexual harassment) and trafficking; b) reporting and responding to violence against women and trafficking; c) penalties and disciplinary actions; d) recourse for victims; and e) gender neutrality of language. It needs to be mentioned that not all countries have each specific policy. For example, many countries lack a domestic violence policy and all the

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49 The laws were taken from English-translated versions in their entirety from the sources of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe, parliaments of the referenced countries, Translation and Terminology Center for Latvia, and Estonian Legal Language Center for Estonia. The examination of laws and policies in their non-native language can be problematic. However, due to the examination of several countries this was not a possible option. For the general purpose of this paper, it is not as problematic because the English translations still provide the fundamental components of the laws and policies that are the cornerstone of the analysis.

50 Further discussion of the coding scheme is in the appendix in Figure 2.
countries lack definitive marital rape statutes. The primary reason for this methodology is to note the similarities and differences in countries’ policy content given the influence women’s organizations have been noted to have on the adoption and language of gender-based policies and to document the provisions that are typical in existing policies. The dependent variable is the text of the statutes. The units of analysis were words and phrases used within sentences that represented the general context of the document.

IV. Analysis

Frame I: Standard Definitions

All the countries utilize standard, uniform terminology in all of the policies. It is clear that the definitions of gender-based violence are based on international guidelines and recommendations. As stated above, these guidelines in concert with women’s NGOs and women’s allies have influenced the definitions of policies.

As members of the UN, the former Soviet republics’ human trafficking statutes follow similar terminology of the 2001 UN Protocol discussed in Chapter II. The definition outlines several key components—the act of human trafficking; the means in which to accomplish the act; and the purpose of the act. The act of human trafficking agreed upon by all 10 countries is that human trafficking is the receiving of another person. In each country’s definition in the criminal codes, the word “receipt” is the only one common to all of them. Eight of the countries (with the exception of Belarus) include the word “harboring” in their definition. The definition that is common amongst most countries is that human trafficking is receiving and

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51 Policy specifics can be found at the end of the chapters of the dissertation.

52 Estonia does not have a human trafficking statute.
concealing a person for purpose of exploitation. The means of accomplishing human trafficking agreed upon by most countries is by the use of force or violence and abuse of power. The use of the words—coercion, fraud, and abduction—are notably absent from the policies. The purpose of human trafficking is agreed upon with the exception of Armenia and Lithuania who define exploitation only in terms of forced prostitution and forced labor. On the other end, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine include additional measures of exploitation— involvement in criminal activity and armed conflicts. The additional purposes referred to in the policies of the above four countries may well be the result of separatist movements in each of the countries since gaining independence—the Nagorno-Karabakh War in Azerbaijan, South Ossetia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, and the Crimea in Ukraine.

Sexual harassment policy has been influenced by international standards as well. In 2000, the European Commission passed both a resolution that defined sexual harassment similar to the definition used in the US (DeSouza and Solberg 2003, 9) and a binding directive that prohibits sexual and gender harassment (Zippel 2006, 2). The definition of sexual harassment is “any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment” (Zippel 2006, 5). The definition

53 Recruitment (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine), transportation (Belarus, Latvia), transfer (Georgia, Lithuania) are all absent from these countries’ definitions.

54 Azerbaijan adds conducting unlawful biomedical research on persons as a form of exploitation.

55 CEDAW defined sexual harassment as “sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined behavior as physical contact and advances, sexually colored remarks, showing pornography and sexual demand, whether by words or actions. Such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety problem; it is discriminatory when the woman has reasonable grounds to believe that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her employment, including recruitment or promotion, or when it creates a hostile working environment” (UN Women’s Watch 2003).
discusses the act, the means, and the purpose of sexual harassment. Estonia, Latvia\textsuperscript{56}, and Moldova use essentially the same definition as set out in the directive. Ukraine and Lithuania do not acknowledge the criminalities of non-verbal actions (e.g., gestures) and focus on the subordination of the victim. A victim of sexual harassment in Ukraine and Lithuania is one of a subordinate or unequal, not one of equals or a person in a higher position as is possible in Estonia, Latvia, and Moldova. Azerbaijan does not really define sexual harassment, but does mention that “an employer may not subject an employee to harassment on the grounds that the employee has \textit{rejected the employer’s sexual advances} or has \textit{reported the employer for sex discrimination}.” Sexual harassment is not considered a criminal offense, with the exception of Lithuania which penalizes sexual harassment in its criminal code. The other bans are mentioned in gender equality acts and labor codes. Unlike human trafficking and sexual assault, sexual harassment is not a phenomenon that is accepted in the majority of former Soviet republics. There is also considerable disagreement about what constitutes sexual harassment.

The rape and sexual assault statutes follow a similar format in all the countries. The standard definition of rape does not seem to be much updated from the Soviet period. Rape under Soviet law was defined as “sexual relations by violence, deception, or because of the helpless condition of the victim” (Stetson 1996, 161). With the exceptions of Estonia, Moldova, and Lithuania, rape is defined verbatim as “sexual intercourse (or sexual relations) combined with violence, threats of violence, or committed by taking advantage of the victim’s helpless condition.” These three countries use other terminology of vulnerability and coercion to assess the helpless state of the victim. Rape is not detailed along the definition as set further by the

\textsuperscript{56} Latvia does not use the term ‘sexual harassment’, but uses the following definition in Section 29. Prohibition of Differential Treatment— \textit{“including actions of a sexual nature if the purpose or result of such actions is the infringement of the person’s dignity and the creation of an intimidatory, hostile, humiliating, degrading or offensive environment.”} Notably absent besides the term is the \textit{“any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct.”}
International Criminal Court\textsuperscript{57} and Western European standards. Current standards acknowledge that rape can be anal and oral penetration and not just vaginal penetration. It seems that former Soviet countries advocated for a more open-ended definition of rape instead of a more detailed definition set forth in Western European standards. Differentiating “violent sexual acts” from “rape” implies that rape is a heterosexual act.\textsuperscript{58} Violent sexual acts include homosexual, lesbian, and other sexual actions (not intercourse). Estonia and Lithuania have similar statutes but move away from the usage of sexual orientation or the implications that a homosexual orientation is unnatural. Lithuania defines sexual assault as “met the sexual passion against the will with anal, oral, or other physical contact.” Estonia defines it as “satisfaction of sexual desire in a manner other than sexual intercourse.” The use of coercion in sexual acts is a part of the statutes in all the countries with the exception of Latvia. Rape and other sexual assaults are held as similar crimes with similar aggravating circumstances and penalties. Despite the open-ended definition of rape, the three-tiered system used by former Soviet countries tries to encompass all versions of sexual abuse.

Domestic violence receives even less attention in former Soviet countries. To acknowledge physical, psychological, sexual, and emotional abuse is to realize that domestic violence is an ongoing continuum and an ultimate display of power and control that threatens the traditional notion of the family as a refuge (Schneider 2002, 66). Schneider (2002) also notes that the expanded version of the concept of domestic violence which encompass other forms not only physical “makes battering legally cognizable. This limits the generality that reflects a more

\textsuperscript{57} ICC defined rape in international law as: “The sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim's free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.”

\textsuperscript{58} Azerbaijan adds two additional sexual assault statutes—sexual violence and compulsory pregnancy.
complex, but more accurate, vision of battering relationships. This generality is often too threatening for society to acknowledge” (67). Three countries have standalone laws directed at domestic violence—Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova with Ukraine being the earliest to adopt in 2001. Belarus defines domestic violence in its 2008 Law “On Fundamental Activities for Crime Prevention.” Fábián (2009) noted that “domestic violence is beginning to acquire a legal definition in Central and Eastern European countries that not only share a similar political past and similar gender regimes but also face nearly identical problems related to gender equity as new members of the European Union” (264).

It was not until May 11, 2011 that the Council of Europe signed a treaty aimed at preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. DEVAW defines violence against women as any provocation of physical, sexual, and psychological violence that occurred within the family, in the public sphere, or perpetrated by the State (UN 1993). As discussed above, many former Soviet countries included economic violence as essential to the definition of domestic violence. Each statute depicts domestic violence as physical, sexual, economic, and/or psychological violence. Moldova’s law provides greater examples of the different manifestations with specific examples of each type of violence while the laws of Georgia and Ukraine give more latitude to authorities to interpret what specific acts count as infringements. Defining sexual violence could point to the illegal nature of marital rape; however, only Moldova includes marital rape in its domestic violence law. In addition, Moldova’s law includes another form of domestic violence—spiritual violence, which essentially violates a person’s religious and cultural freedoms. The exact wording of domestic violence is included in figures III and IV in the appendix. Domestic violence is defined as an act of violence of family members against each other. Unlike the definition considered in the West, domestic
violence is often considered family violence, encompassing elder abuse, child abuse, sibling abuse, and intimate partner abuse. There is also a clear tendency to broaden the scope of family to include cohabitating couples and former spouses.

Unlike, human trafficking and sexual harassment that base definitions on international standards primarily, the statutes of sexual assault and domestic violence seem to be influenced by both international guidelines and the Soviet experience. This could be the result of a lack of shared definitions of the concepts of sexual assault and domestic violence. Policies with vague definitions leave much to interpretation about what does or does not fall under the law. Phrases such as “taking advantage of the woman’s helpless situation” that is in many rape statutes, and “offensive conduct of sexual nature, verbal or physical” in sexual harassment statutes can be very open to interpretation and qualitative descriptions and are difficult to measure, define, and ascertain. On the other hand, a broad and unlimited definition might be useful when formulating policies and strategies to combat such problems that are foreign concepts to the region. The evaluation of the appropriateness of the definitions that exist on the national level therefore depends on the context in which they are used by the government.

Frame II: Separate Policies

The nonexistence of a separate statute could indicate a government response that the law protects everyone the same and that it is unnecessary to have separate laws. The adoption of general laws to combat violence against women however has been shown to be an unsuccessful strategy in a number of national contexts (Weldon 2002, 13). General laws allow authorities too much leeway in determining which acts constitute gender-based violence. Much of the

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59 Each country has a number of laws that can be used to punish individuals who commit gender-based violence, such as torture, infliction of bodily injury, and deprivation of freedom. Since these statues did not specifically denote domestic violence, sexual assault, marital rape, sexual harassment, or human trafficking, these were not included in the analysis.
leeway is a direct result of historical and cultural circumstances that influence the amount of attention each issue gets (Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al. 2007, 79).

Beyond denoting which countries have specific policies for violence against women and human trafficking, this section examines the existence of multiple laws for the same act. Five of the countries have additional standalone policies for human trafficking above the penalization in criminal codes. No other gender-based policy appears in criminal codes and is then accorded its own separate law that concerns social rehabilitation, victim assistance measures, protections from deportation and arrest for victims, temporary shelter for victims, and restitution. There is an attempt in the legislation to penalize, educate, and prevent human trafficking. This threefold effort separates it from the other gender-based policies. There seems to be a concerted effort to combine the criminal justice approach with aid from civil sector. Weldon (2002) notes that the “criminal justice approach can be made more effective through coordination with shelters and other service providers” (14).

The additional attention devoted to human trafficking is based on the belief that this is the only policy that has the most agreed-upon definition. Second, it is explicitly addressed in numerous treaties including CEDAW—Article 6. States parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women. In accordance to the 2000 UN Protocol, all countries are to implement laws and policies that protect and simultaneously provide adequate services for victims with respect to human rights, adopt preventive measures such as educational programs and media campaigns, sufficient punishments for perpetrators, and greater communication and cooperation between states to monitor traveling between borders.60

60 In 2005, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.
Frame III. Gender Neutrality

All of the countries have adopted gender-neutral statutes. No specific reference is made to the existence of only female victims of trafficking. The only law that makes reference to women is the Moldovan law. These fleeting references follow the rhetoric of the UN Protocol: “in order to increase the efficiency of activities to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings, especially in women and children.” Another reference is later mentioned in Article 10 which points to the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports creating educational programs “aimed at eliminating all the causes and conditions that encourage trafficking in human beings, especially in women and children.” The rape statutes of Armenia and Latvia seem not to maintain gender-neutrality but there is a possibility of translation variations. Armenia’s law against rape does not maintain a gender neutral tone: “rape, sexual intercourse of a man with a woman against her will, using violence against the latter or some other person, with threat thereof, or taking advantage of the woman’s helpless situation…” Latvia’s law also does not maintain gender neutrality: “for a person who commits an act of sexual intercourse by means of violence, threats or taking advantage of the state of helplessness of a female victim.”

As mentioned above, maintaining gender neutrality in policies was essential to Central and Eastern European elites. Fábián (2007) mentioned that the shared experience of communism shaped the views of many elites as to who could be victims of gender-based violence and that this experience, different from the West, was a reason not to limit victim status only to women and abuser status only to men (114). Further, women’s organizations were forced to acquiesce to engage the elites and the masses (Fábián 2007, 183). The explicit non-mention of sex implies that men and women are equal victims of violence when all evidence shows that women are the predominant victims. Gender neutral language in the law obscures the highly gendered nature of
these issues. It ultimately fails to acknowledge and actually obscures the fact that gender-based violence is a result of women’s subordinate status in society. On the other hand, it does promote gender equality among the sexes. Gender neutrality in laws enlarges the scope of victims and perpetrators. It erases the need to create separate laws for the elderly, children, and men. Gender neutrality language continues the belief of gender equality (stemming from the Soviet period) which is notably absent in reality. This point will be discussed later in chapter IV.

Frame IV. The Response

Multiple avenues for reform exist, from focusing on victims to punishing perpetrators to education and prevention. Each policy is managed in different ways within the former Soviet region. Human trafficking is the only policy that is handled as a criminal offense but with a standalone policy in many countries that recognizes human trafficking as a human rights violation as well. Rape and sexual assault are handled solely as a criminal matter. Human trafficking and rape/sexual assault seem to center on the discourse of power and control of one individual over another.

Only Lithuania uses criminal sanctions for acts of sexual harassment. Despite the definition of sexual harassment in terms of the discourse of power and control in the above acts, no policies specify penalties. None of the domestic violence laws outline criminal procedure or address sanctions. In addition, marital rape is notably absent from all legislation (with the exception of Moldova’s domestic violence law). Georgian Law is the only one that outlines police procedure for handling a domestic violence incidence. It informs the police to heed to all warnings of domestic violence as serious in nature and to address them on par with other crimes. The focus of domestic violence laws is on prevention, victim assistance, and rehabilitation. The view of domestic violence in the region still seems to be that government intervention could
cause irreparable harm and actually in fact weaken the family. The laws focus not only on the immediate protection of victims but also on creating rehabilitation centers for both victims and abusers. Instead of placing suppression of domestic violence on the criminal justice system, the role is intended for social welfare agencies and counseling centers. While victims of abuse can file complaints and receive restraining orders, with no criminal sanctions in place, this procedure can be viewed as ineffective. For many countries, there is no response to domestic violence, sexual harassment, or marital rape. To implement a criminal response to these issues would require an overhaul of the law enforcement and judicial realms and to change society’s view of the problem (Weldon 2002, 14). Domestic violence, marital rape, and sexual harassment are often considered non-crimes but actually consistent with the norms of society. How elites respond to an issue has an impact on societal perception of the problem and remedies to solve the problem.

Frame V: Timing

The majority of laws were adopted in the 2000s. As discussed in the previous chapter the early 1990s were focused on economic and political reforms and not on policies that attempted to correct societal gender inequalities that were remnants of the Soviet state or caused by democratic transition. Sexual assault was the first policy area addressed by each country in their criminal code. Consistent with their Soviet criminal codes, when each adopted its new code, rape and other forms of sexual assault were penalized. Ukraine and Lithuania were revolutionary in the region for their adoption of domestic violence (Ukraine), human trafficking (both), and sexual harassment (Lithuania) legislation first. Ukraine revised its criminal code and adopted domestic violence and human trafficking statutes in 2001. The policies that have been recognized in the last five years are sexual harassment and domestic violence. Moldova, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan have been the most active in adopting violence against women policies in the last few years.\(^6\) The adoption of policies by the Baltics (with the exception of Latvia’s Law on Residence in Latvia for Victims of Human Trafficking in 2007) occurred before 2004, the year they entered the European Union. The initial focus of each country was the penalization of rape and sexual assault and human trafficking in criminal codes; the last few years the focus has been on the development of standalone policies that focus on victim assistance measures.

V. Conclusion

The last ten years has seen the adoption of policies confronting trafficking, domestic violence, rape and sexual assault, and sexual harassment in some of the former Soviet republics. Based on a coding scheme that examined similarity in definitions, which issues received multiple laws, gender neutrality, response to each policy, and the timing of recognition of each policy, an assessment of each country’s policies allowed for the study of reoccurring themes as well as vast divergences. All but Estonia discuss the illegality of human trafficking in their criminal codes. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, and Russia have standalone laws. Each of the countries analyzed include various sexual assault statutes in their criminal code. Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine define sexual harassment within the confines of equality acts and labor laws. Lithuania is the sole exception in its criminalization of sexual harassment. Domestic violence remains the crime least acknowledged in law, with only Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine recognizing the issue. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have standalone laws addressing the problem. Only Moldova, in the context of its domestic violence law discusses marital rape. Ninety percent and 100 percent of the countries respectively

\(^6\) Azerbaijan adopted a draft law on domestic violence in 2010.
acknowledge human trafficking and rape/sexual assault. Only 60 percent and 40 percent, respectively, acknowledge sexual harassment and domestic violence.

Women’s organizations in the region have been influential at pushing these issues on the agenda. One of the ways that women’s NGOS have managed to do this is by using international guidelines and ratified conventions to pressure elites. UN protocols, EU directives, and Soviet policies have provided frameworks upon which countries have enacted policies oriented towards violence against women. All the policies are treated in a gender neutral fashion. One could make the case that the emphasis on gender neutral laws was based on a revolt against Soviet tenets and not necessarily a pursuit of gender equality in policy language. Aside from rape and sexual assault, human trafficking is the issue that has received the most attention. It is the only other form of violence that is penalized. In addition, a separate law exists in many countries that focuses on victim assistance and rehabilitation for victims. There is a clear divide in the issues that receive attention and those that do not. Human trafficking and rape receive the most attention, while domestic violence and sexual harassment receive far less. In the case of the latter, these issues are not criminalized and little legal remedy for victims is provided. The acceptance of domestic violence and sexual harassment has much to do with their acceptance as norms, the role of women in society, and the privacy label attached to both of these issues. The Baltic States have stalled in adoption of policies since their acceptance into the European Union. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan have been the most productive countries passing the most legislation to combat gender-based violence. The latter three countries have been the most active in the last five years. These are the only four countries that have adopted polices in all four areas. Armenia and Russia seem to be the least engaged in their acknowledgment of gender-based violence. In the next chapter, greater attention will be given to country-specific factors that
might explain the distance between those countries that have passed the most legislation and those that have not passed much.

The adoption of policies is vital to women acquiring gender equality in all realms of society. It is important to understand the characterizations of human trafficking, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and domestic violence as crimes, the penalties attached, the definition of “victim” in each of these instances, and the protections afforded under the law. A vague law with no provisions, with no exact definition of the crime, provides no direct assistance to women who are victims of gender-based violence. Interpretation is then left up to different official authorities, different judges, and different employers to determine if the offense has occurred and how it is to be identified. And in order to combat the overall lack of knowledge of the crime and its seriousness, it is important to keep accurate figures; to do this there needs to be clear definitions. The response of government elites to each issue is vital to understanding societal perception and the manifestation of the problem. Rape is a criminal offense and with it comes significant penalty, while domestic violence is not criminalized with the focus on rehabilitation of the family unit. The victim can be anyone in a society regardless of sex which enhances gender equality but reduces the fact that these crimes predominately affect women. The next chapter addresses gender equality and the roles of women’s organizations in individual former Soviet republics.
Chapter V
Gendering Civil Society: Women’s Organizations in Former Soviet Republics

I. Introduction

Despite the beginnings of a socialist women’s movement in the early stages of the Soviet Union, it was officially dead by the 1930s. The Soviet government co-opted women’s issues and women’s voice. Women’s organizations that remained were organs of Soviet policy and advocated the benefits of state socialism for women’s lives. The Communist Party declared that women had won their equality. The woman question had been solved, and the work of early Bolshevik feminists had been accomplished—women were liberated, fully integrated into all realms of society, and fully knowledgeable of the socialist cause. Despite the positive work of the Zhenotdel, the organization of the First Communist Women’s Conference, and the formation of the Women’s Congress of 1927, so ended a potential socialist women’s movement (Moghadam 1997, 149). Women’s concerns were not to compete with workers’ concerns within the Party (Sperling 1999, 16). Work and education would strengthen women’s autonomous status not special and separate organizations.

The Soviet collapse allowed for an explosion of nongovernmental organizations onto the scene. This turn of events was seen by many in the West as an avenue to advance democratic principles in the newly independent states. Janine Wedel noted “Because the lack of civil society was part of the very essence of the all-pervasive communist state, creating such a society and supporting organizations independent of the state—or NGOs—has been seen by donors as the connective tissue of democratic political culture—an intrinsically positive objective” (1994, 323 quoted in Mandel 2002, 282). Women in the former Soviet republics were involved in independence movements only to find themselves excluded from state institutions. NGOs provided Eastern European women access to the political arena when all other avenues were
closed to them after democratic transition. More so as national politics became seen as the arena for men to assert influence and power (an unbecoming for women), civil society was an arena for women’s political advocacy (Gal and Kligman 2000, 95). Money was poured into nascent organizations, in particular women’s organizations, resulting in their proliferation throughout the region.

Creating civil society from a vacuum has proven a difficult process. Gender and democracy scholars have also noted that democratic transition has varied effects based on internal and external factors such as legacy of authoritarian rule, differences in political and economic systems, the strength of executive and legislative power, and the expansiveness of civil society (Alvarez 1989; Jaquette 1994; Waylen 1994; Waylen 2000). With the exception of the Baltic States, democratic and civil society institutions remain weak in the region as a whole despite the plethora of NGOs, in particular women’s organizations.

This chapter probes the civil society and democratization literature, ultimately linking the growth of women’s advocacy groups with increasing levels of democratization. This chapter assesses the strategies, issues of most concern, mass and elite support, the most influential organizations, and the activeness of women’s organizations in ten former Soviet republics. The primary intent is to examine the similarities and differences among the republics. Though sharing the experience of state socialism and difficulties of democratic transition, the nature of transition has varied among former Soviet republics. An online survey was sent to women’s and gender scholars in ten former Soviet republics and their answers form the basis of subsequent analysis.

II. Literature Review

Nongovernmental organizations have proliferated and in some instances have become major political players in the last three decades. A long history exists between the linkage of
voluntary organizations and democracy. The term civil society has its roots in Greek and Roman philosophy and the European Enlightenment. The concept has been addressed by various political theorists from Hegel and Tocqueville to Locke and Gramsci, equating citizen participation in voluntary associations beyond state control as vital to democracy and democratic culture. The term civil society was revitalized in the 1980s regarding new dissident movements occurring in Eastern Europe and Latin America. As Vaclav Havel put it, “the various political shifts and upheavals within the communist world all have one thing in common: the undying urge to create a genuine civil society” (Wedel 1998, 85 cited in Hemment 2004, 220). These new movements against authoritarian rule sparked growing interest in the ability of civil society to form an alternative to the state and form a basis for democracy in a region of the world that has little to no history in this form of governance.

Civil society has come to encompass non-state and non-market institutions—the realm that lies between the family and the state. Charles Taylor (1995) defined civil society as “a web of autonomous associations, independent of the state, which bound citizens together in matters of common concern, and by their mere existence or action could have an effect on public policy” (204). Larry Diamond (1999) defines civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rule” (221).

Civil society has come to be seen as filling a vacuum that is a result of a crisis of political legitimacy and political accountability (Dibie 2008, 1). Nord (2000) noted that civil society researchers associate an autonomous civil society with the ability to “school its residents in the habits of good citizenship; it acts as a check on the ambitions of the overmighty; and it occupies a place in-between (family and property and political society and the state)” (xiv). Civil society
allows citizens to get a sense of the democratic waters. It allows individuals to be integrated into 
the process and to shed light on issues ignored by the state and influence public policy. 
Therefore, civil society organizations allow citizens to express their interests, exchange 
information, achieve collective goals, make demands on the state for marginalized sectors of 
society, and hold state officials accountable (Diamond 1999, 224-225). Further, they enhance 
democracy by placing checks on state power, providing an alternative avenue in which 
individual citizens can become knowledgeable and participate in the political system, allowing 
previously excluded groups access to power to articulate formal interests, and pressing for 
change and developing an alternative set of perspectives and policies. The dominant view of 
NGOs is that “while NGOs are part of civil society, they also strengthen it through their 
activities, which in turn supports the democratic process” (Mercer 2002, 7). 

Social movement organizations occur and vary based upon the context of their political 
regimes and social environments. The political process model takes this into account by 
emphasizing the interaction between movement groups and the larger sociopolitical environment 
they seek to transform (McAdam 1982). Moreover, movements occur due to political openings 
resulting from changes in the institutional structure and/or informal power relations of the state 
(McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). These unstable political conditions allow groups previously 
excluded from political decision-making process under otherwise normal political conditions to 
find opportunities for collective action. In particular, as Neidhardt and Rucht argued, such 
political factors play a particularly “crucial role for the successful mobilization of movements 
which deliberately enter the arena of public and political debates” (121). 

Gender scholars have questioned this conceptualization of civil society. Civil society as 
discussed above has been defined as a distinction between the state and the family, between the
public and private sphere. In this conceptualization, women are indirectly excluded from civil society because of their association with the private sphere. Birgit Sauer observed “the modern state is thus grounded in a gender compromise in civil society that separated the family from other social institutions, organized the hierarchical sexual division of labor, and normalized and naturalized these social divisions through binary gender roles” (quoted in Hagemann 2008, 24). By conceptualizing civil society as such, it has practical effects on women’s political participation. Considering civil society as a gender-neutral arena, distinct from the gender-based private sphere, does not address the impact that gender bias in the private sphere has on women’s participation in the gender-neutral public sphere. “To the degree that civil society theorists require the creation of autonomous spheres of social activity for democracy, then they must address the role of systemic patriarchy in undermining such autonomy” (Joseph 2000, 26).

Initial research on women, civil society, and democratization focused on Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s. In both regions, women were active participants in oppositional and dissident movements that brought the end of authoritarian regimes (Jaquette 1989, 5; Jaquette and Wolchik 1998, 1). The UN Decade for Women (1975-1985) provided a foundation for the appearance of women’s groups. Women began to mobilize around their practical and strategic interests. Practical gender interests (sometimes referred to as feminine interests) concern women’s position in the sexual division of labor and activism was based on their ability to fulfill their role as mothers and wives. Strategic gender interests (sometimes referred to as feminist interests) seek to change the patriarchal gender order and the rules under which women live (Molyneux 1985). It is typically the case that practical gender interests allow for women to enter the public sphere. Restrictions on women being able to fulfill these roles
have formed the foundation of much of women’s activism in authoritarian regimes as well as providing them with some level of protection from retaliatory state actions.

In Latin America, women’s mobilization was centered on human rights issues that were rooted in their identities as mothers. Women were able to use the state’s valorization of traditional notions of motherhood and family to invert this image by using their motherhood status to agitate for the return of their missing loved ones and the punishment of perpetrators (such as the Madres of the Plaza de Mayo) (Ray and Korteweg 1999). Along with these women, mothers and wives that were struggling with poverty and increases in living costs entered the public sphere along with feminist groups (Del Carmen Feijoó 1998, 33; Valenzuela 1998, 50). Women were allowed more space in the public sphere because military governments were not concerned that women’s activities warranted repression or because women’s activism evoked their maternal role which made it more difficult for governments to repress them (Waylen 1994). “Even when women began organizing campaigns against the rising cost of living or for human rights in Brazil, the military seems to have allowed women’s association greater political leeway than was granted to militant left, student, and labor organizations, which were seen as threatening to national security” (Alvarez 1989, 25-26). Women from disparate backgrounds were drawn together in their commitment of a withdrawal of authoritarian rule and an establishment of democratic government—drawn from human rights groups, feminist groups, poor urban women’s groups (Jaquette 1989, 4).

In Central and Eastern Europe, women did not have separate organizations to push for democracy and human rights, and in turn frame issues in terms of their status as women and their systematic exclusion from political decision making. Unlike in Latin America, no space existed
to provide women the opportunity to articulate their gender interests outside independence movements. The fight against state social socialism drew women into the public sphere.

Women in the former Czechoslovakia were involved in mass demonstrations, the Charter 77 movement, and dissident groups such as the Civic Forum and Public against Violence (Einhorn 1993, 55; Wolchik 1998, 59). Leadership roles for women were limited in these movements, usually consisting of organizational activities (Galligan, Clavero, and Calloni 2007, 74). Women’s role in contributing to the fall of communism was more indirect: either through withdrawing support from regime-sponsored activities or using their role in the family to circumvent the authoritarian state and by also, educating their children in values in opposition to communism such those of democracy (Wolchik 1998, 157).

In Ukraine, women were involved in independence organizations such as Rukh. Rukh created local institutional spaces which allowed for the emergence of women leaders and civic activism. In eastern Ukraine, where male activists were more likely to experience intimidation, it was often women who organized Rukh’s campaigns (Hrycak 2005). Women’s groups also began to form based on maternal activism. Women in these groups held vigils and protested military hazing, the decline of Ukrainian language and culture, and environmental degradation. Other groups began to focus on a more feminist agenda: promoting women’s participation and influence in political institutions and the formation of public policies. Though these are some examples of women’s activism before the collapse, most of women’s activism in Central and Eastern Europe was a result of the collapse of communism.

Poland’s Solidarity movement was comprised of about 50 percent women; however, very few women achieved the upper echelons of the political hierarchy. Those women who were able

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62 Charter 77 was informal petition disseminated by Czechoslovakia intellectuals and dissidents demanding the Communist government to recognize human rights already agreed upon in the Constitution and the Helsinki Accords.
to climb the Solidarity ranks managed to do so by choosing women-appropriate activities and not defying Polish gender standards (Penn 2005, 66). In addition, women were able to use their femaleness to deceive the communist opposition. The private sphere became an arena to fight against state socialism because such spaces would not raise the suspicions of authorities. Penn (2005) noted that the pantry, laundry corner, pickling jars, flowerpots and other such spaces were used to store illicit and conspiratory materials (181). Women were used as couriers and escorts.

“The female stereotype was consciously exploited…all in the service of bring democracy to Poland” (Penn 2005, 181-182).

Feminist scholarship suggests that democratic transition affects men’s and women’s lives differently. The role of women in engendering democratic transitions through active participation in social movements and revolutionary struggles has long been recognized. Women have used these opportunities to advocate for greater democracy and greater extension of women’s rights in a number of countries (Baldez 2003). Women have been active participants in the overthrowing of regimes only to find themselves marginalized both politically and economically in new democracies. Not all governments transitioning to democracy have shown a full commitment to women’s rights. Many scholars have noted that democratization has not led to greater rights for women, despite the activeness of women in the process in particular in Central and Eastern Europe (Jaquette and Wolchik 1998; Waylen 2007). “While institutionalized politics is not operational, women participate in the public arena. With the institution or return of formal democracy, the public stage is reclaimed by men, the ‘natural’ actors of representative democracy” (Rai 1996, 235).

More focus has been placed on civil society as an avenue by which women can bring attention women’s issues. Sauer (2011) noted that “civil society…appears to offer a real chance
for gender democracy, for equal participation of men and women, for responsive of state institutions to women’s movement demands…” (286). State restructuring provides political opportunities for women’s groups and strengthens their subsequent influence on political decision making. The US Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in a 2010 hearing entitled “Women as Agents of Change: Advancing the Role of Women in Politics and Civil Society” illustrated that Western governments still note the importance of increasing women’s presence in civil society and the democratization process. Quoting Chairman Russ Carnahan, “Women bring an important perspective to policy and play instrumental roles in reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. Moreover, equality of gender representation is shown to increase transparent and democratic governance” (6). Further, he stated that, “Everyone benefits when women have equal rights and women have a voice in decision-making at all levels. When women are empowered to engage in the political process, governments are more effective and responsive to their people and nations are more stable, peaceful, and prosperous” (7).

Women’s groups have been considered to be vital civil society organizations. By the same token, civil society has been a difficult space for women to navigate due to a number of factors. Women’s organizations are often expected to compensate for services with growing retrenchment of the state and marketization of social relations. While at the same time, state funding for women’s organizations and their projects is being cut sharply (Sauer 2011, 286-287). In transitioning countries, Western financial assistance has become important to the survival of women’s groups. Mandel (2002) notes that external funding from the West often comes with unrealistic expectations, such that funding is most likely to go to agencies that have already received funding in the past (these NGOs essentially know the language to use to get their
projects funded). If the matter of concern is not one knowledgeable or relatable to Western funders, the NGO is unlikely to receive aid (285-286). Women’s groups have to navigate the various cultural, regional, ethnic, and class differences among women. The next section explores the impact democratic transition has had on women’s organizations in former Soviet republics and the factors that have facilitated and shaped them since.

III. Theoretical Perspectives

Transition to democracy and capitalism has been seen as doing little to improve women’s lot in the former Soviet region. A number of gendered consequences have resulted: marginalization in the labor market, limited political representation, increased poverty and loss of social safety nets, susceptibility to human trafficking, and growing masculization and traditionalism. Women were largely excluded from the political decision-making process and offered little input about their countries’ future development. Women’s organizations provided an avenue for women to assert their concerns and articulate their interests while being excluded from formal state apparatuses. The West, in particular the US, assisted civil society organizations in particular women’s groups to aid in the promotion of democracy in the region. Hunt (1997) noted that “American interests require that we help the region’s women carve out their rightful place in the mainstream of society” (2).

Initially communism provided an impetus to place women’s equality on the agenda and afforded women certain provisions, opportunities, and benefits. These protections were much the result of the early works of the Zhenotdel. With the solving of the “woman question” and the dismantling of the Zhenotdel, many concerns of women during the Soviet period were left unresolved. The Communist government banned feminism and co-opted many of the demands of the socialist women’s movement and placed them on the agenda. No such alternative space for
voice was allowed; all such space was either co-opted or destroyed by the state. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new environment provided women and their associations, an opportunity to flourish.

The discrediting of communism inadvertently meant the discrediting of feminism, providing more difficulty for women’s organizations to mobilize a response to women’s issues. Feminism (in particular Western feminism) remains a rejected view (Einhorn 1993, 71; Funk 1993, 320-321; Occhipinti 1996; Siklova 1998). Feminist goals have become discredited with their real or imaginary association with the policies of state socialism (Molyneaux 1996, 245). Much can be attributed to the legacy of state socialism and the lack of a popular feminist movement, but feminism has also been stereotyped as entailing a “loss of femininity, a hatred of men, lesbianism, and a desire for total independence” (Phillips 2008, 78). Feminism was also attributed to a rejection of family and motherhood. The private sphere was viewed as a retreat and a place of anti-politics from the glare of the state, not a struggle for inclusion as Western feminists had argued for decades (Havelkova 1993). The optimism of Western feminists of a flourishing women’s movement throughout the region was crushed when traditional models of family and women’s roles emerged.

Orr (2008) noted that women’s groups in Latvia, Ukraine, and Poland were extremely weak and faced enormous opposition from a society clinging to tradition and in opposition to gender equality (due to the history of state socialism). However, the situation improved as a result of the 1995 UN Women’s Conference in Beijing. In Ukraine, women had been recruited into activism through Communist party women’s groups and independence organizations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, early activism was associated with maternalism—advocating for social welfare for families and children. It was weak, disunited, and dominated by
conservative voices. In the late 1990s, with rising political prominence of Western-leaning
domestic political parties and international pressure on Ukraine to address human rights, the
political opportunity structure opened for women’s groups to advocate for women’s policies.
Openness to Western influence and pro-Western political advocates allowed women’s groups
voice in the wake of conservatism and patriarchal discourses (Hrycak 2010). The 1995 UN
Conference in Beijing subsequently led to a sharp rise in the number of Armenian women’s
NGOs. This growth has stimulated interest in the role of women in developing and transition
countries in building democracy and civil society (and hence funding) (Ishkanian 2007).

Without a previous existence of a civil society, Western feminism and funding have
provided a foundation for women’s organizations. Much of the literature on Western financial
assistance to women’s groups in Eastern Europe is contradictory. On one hand, financial aid has
been helpful to these organizations’ ability to exert societal influence. The economic conditions
following transition spurred activism but at the same time infrequent activism. Sources of
funding such as state subsidies and membership fees were not feasible in the dire economic
circumstances, so in order to acquire the resources necessary to keep Russian women’s
organizations running Western assistance was crucial (Henderson 2003, 100-101). For
organizations to have influence, resources such as technology (e.g. computers and telephones),
office space, skills training for staff members, are all essential. In order to have this influence,
many organizations requested international organizations to support and promote indigenous
women’s organizations. Despite all of the negatives associated with acquiring external funding, it
is very much necessary because domestic sources of funding are not readily available and to
remain independent from government cooptation and control (Moghadam 2005, 94). Basu
(2010) asserted that international funding “has sustained impoverished activists and enabled
them to increase their expertise, expand their reach, and gain leverage with the state” (7). This assistance permitted women’s groups to remain independent from the state. “The question of getting grants for women’s organizations in the provinces is very important. We consciously do not seek resources from those in the power structure—we don’t want to be dependent on them” (quoting an unfunded group in Henderson 2003, 105).

At the same time, Western funding has been detrimental and has hampered the development of independent women’s organizations in the region. The organizations are highly dependent on Western aid to be self-sustaining which gives Western NGOs the ability to set the agenda and specify policy initiatives to the chagrin of the average woman in the home countries (McMahon 2002, 42). Women’s groups that adopt an agenda deemed acceptable by international donors are more likely to receive funds. Donor-driven NGOs may distort and divert local priorities and the character of their interventions on behalf of women (Silliman 1999). A lack of a relationship has been cultivated between the organizations and the local citizens and between the organizations and the state to advocate on behalf of the local female population. McMahon (2002) noted that women’s groups in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s were not integrated into the local culture and remained largely isolated from the majority of women in the region; thus precluding women’s groups for speaking on behalf of female citizens and hampering the overall status of women (253).

When setting the agenda, Western donors fail to take into consideration the historical legacies of state socialism on feminist ideology and identity alliances. The policy discourse set forth by Western donors typically portrays women as victims of democratic and capitalist transition. However, such a discourse could have possibly alienated support for women’s organizations, in particular from women who either do not perceive themselves as victims or
those who actually prospered during the period (Ghodsee 2004). Western organizations framed Armenian women as helpless victims of repressive culture and oppressive husbands, which essentialized Armenian women’s experiences and negated class, educational, and regional differences among women (Ishkanian 2007). Ishkanian (2007) mentioned that domestic violence became a prominent issue in Armenia for women’s groups because of Western donors and Western feminists. Policy prescriptions provided by Western feminists (based on Western models of domestic violence) failed to take into account local contexts as well as regional reactions at making an issue such as gender-based violence that is considered to be private public. Sloat (2005) reiterated that women’s organizations are plagued by an overreliance on foreign donors and their ability to co-opt and steer the missions of the organizations. The leader of a Romanian women’s NGO lamented, “We are not given money for what we do, but for what they want us to do” (Ghebrea 2004, 10 quoted Sloat 2005, 440). It is as if funding has resulted in a power differential between Western donors and their Eastern recipients.

Some analysts have claimed that Western aid has contributed to growing unity among women’s organizations by placing importance on cooperation in training, establishing informal East-West ties, making cooperation a requirement of winning grants, and by helping to establish centers to coordinate the activities of NGOs in various areas. Women’s organizations have been “working together collaboratively, developing transnational exchanges and relationships with Western alliances, ex-Soviet networks, and the European Union (Galligan et al. 2007, 84). Sloat (2005) has noted growing regional and international collaborative efforts among women’s organizations in the region in terms of training sessions, joint projects on shared interests, and the efforts of umbrella organizations.
At the same time, Western financial assistance has hampered unity among women activists. Others, such as Hrycak (2010), have argued that Western funding has hampered cooperative ties among groups because it has led to greater competition for resources and donors and an ideological split between Western feminist (avocation for women’s rights) and Eastern feminist (avocation for health and social welfare) groups. As foreign donors start to shift their resources to more underdeveloped countries, finances are becoming less and less causing fracturing and competition among women’s NGOs hindering collaborative efforts for a greater political voice (Sloat 2005).

Equating NGOs with civil society can falsely lead to the number of NGOs being taken as the existence of civil society, which can be problematic (Mercer 2002). Hemment (2000) argued that Western aid has not led to the development of a civil society or a third sector in Russia whether an NGOization of Russia. The civil society is not indigenous—“rather than a naturally unfurling organic entity, the civil society of the third sector in Russia is a costly project, externally promoted and installed by international agency design” (234). NGOization, as Hemment called it, has forced activists to compete for limited funding, compete with each other for limited resources. Activists have been managing to work through and manage this space despite its constraining nature. Fragmentation is also a consequence of nationalist, ethnic, regional, and class divisions among women within many of the former Soviet republics.

Hrycak (2010) mentioned a number of factors that pinpoint the continued weaknesses of post-Soviet civil society, citing apathy and cynicism among the general population, “poorly designed” Western aid programs, lack of resources for civil society groups, and weak institutions. The most significant factor that has hindered civil society (and democratic) development is state resistance. NGOs faced some form of state repression in all the former
Soviet republics (with the exception of the Baltic States). For example, Russia and Ukraine have attempted to eliminate, infiltrate, and co-opt NGOs, seeing in them potential competition. A backlash against the Ukrainian Orange Revolution in Russia and Belarus had the consequence of consolidating authoritarianism but also weakening existing civic organizations. Johnson and Saarinen (2011) seemed to echo some of the sentiments of Hyrcak (2010) while examining the crisis center movement in Russia. Russia’s civil society remains weak, exacerbated by the problems of Western funding and the 2006 law cracking down on foreign donations to NGOs and raised bureaucratic hurdles for registration. Though the shift of Russia to authoritarianism has resulted in the reluctance of foreign donors to send funding to organizations, there has been some success for the movements at the local level with growing professionalism (volunteer staff, personnel meetings, training, and provide services).

The negative impression associated with feminism and gender equality has hampered women’s NGOs. Women’s NGOs have had little support from female politicians. A Lithuanian researcher explained that “the patriarchal attitudes towards family problems are a good background for a political career, because it is considered as opposition to [the] totalitarian ‘Soviet’ past. So, if somebody would like to be accepted in this society, he or she cannot speak as pro-feminist” (Taljunaite 2004, 27 quoted in Sloat 2005). However, some countries such as Bulgaria and Slovakia have been more successful at opening a dialogue with female parliamentarians through lobbying efforts. Sloat (2005) argued that despite increased activism, women’s NGOs remain limited in their ability to mobilize public support and influence government policy substantially.

Despite difficulties, women’s involvement in civil society has grown considerably due to local political developments, donor support for women’s NGOs, and global civil society activism
on women’s issues. NGOs permit a space for women who were excluded from formal politics after participation in independence movements and who saw politics as inherently corrupt and the realm of men (Ishkanian 2007). Pressures for market liberalization has meant that women’s NGOs sheltered the burden of providing services to the most vulnerable sectors of society—women, children, and the elderly (Gottlick 1999, 257; Henderson 2003, 96; Ishkanian 2007). Einhorn (2000) cautioned those who automatically equate women’s organizations with empowering elements of civil society for women (e.g. the civil society gap). “This ‘gap’ or ‘trap’ potentially arises precisely in situations where the state sector is shrinking, so that all kinds of public provision disappear, with responsibility for their substitution devolved onto smaller units such as the family” (111). The civil society gap “perpetuates the undervaluing of women’s political involvement, demeaning it as ‘mere’ humanitarian activity conducted within the terms of the nurturing and caring roles often deemed ‘natural’ for women. This devaluation in turns contributes to the persistent relative invisibility of women as citizens in the public sphere of politics” (Einhorn 2000, 118).

IV. Data and Methods

Survey methodology has been used prominently in political science research. Short of field work and ethnographic study, survey research provides one of the best avenues to access real world phenomenon. Mail questionnaires are advantageous due to economic constraints, speediness of results, lack of interviewer bias, and the anonymity allowed for respondents. Some of the noted disadvantages are low response rates and lack of control over who actually answers the responses (Goel 1988, 36). Similar attributes have been associated with online surveys.
This research is based on an online survey disseminated in April 2011 and a follow-up in August 2011. The survey was constructed through the online web survey program, Qualtrics. It was sent to women’s and gender studies academics in the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Lithuania. A total of 83 women’s and gender studies academics were emailed links to the online survey. A total of 22 respondents replied to the survey, resulting in a response rate of 26.5 percent—four respondents from Estonia, three respondents from Moldova, three respondents from Georgia, six respondents from Lithuania, one respondent from Azerbaijan, three respondents from Ukraine, and two respondents from Russia. Academics were targeted as the respondent group because of knowledge of political, economic, and social circumstances of their countries and how these circumstances can impact women’s groups. At the same time, they would be knowledgeable of women’s organizations and would have an impartial view of them. Their expertise makes them most equipped to provide an analysis of the current state of women’s organizations.

Western states, foreign aid agencies, and international NGOs have made civil society construction of primary importance in the former Soviet region. Civil society has been used in the literature as the yardstick by which to measure the successfulness of democratic transition. It is often seen as an essential in shifting the former socialist states to democratic politics. Essentially, former Soviet republics were force to build civil society from scratch; no such space was allowed during state socialism, all such space was both co-opted and destroyed by the state. Women’s groups are seen as significant elements of democracy and civil society building.

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63 Such an electronic approach automatically excludes individuals who do not have email accounts. However, the belief was that academics have more ready access to the internet and as result this issue would not be as much of a concern.

64 The individuals were identified through a survey of major universities’ women’s and gender studies programs and of individuals that write on women- and gender-related issues. The specific number of individuals sent the survey differed for each country: ten in Estonia, six in Armenia, six in Moldova, ten in Georgia, five in Latvia, three in Belarus, ten in Lithuania, 11 in Azerbaijan, 11 in Ukraine, and 11 in Russia.
resulting in extensive financial and technical support for women’s NGOs since the 1990s. In addition, the previous chapters have discussed the role women’s organizations have played in advocating for women’s issues regarding domestic violence and human trafficking. The survey was meant to assess the current state of affairs of women’s organizations in former Soviet countries. Much of the research pertaining to women’s organizations focuses on a particular locale, making it difficult to draw general comparisons across the region.

A cover letter preceded the online survey questionnaire describing to participants the opportunity to remain anonymous, the purpose of the study, and where to turn if there are any questions about the overall research, and the benefits of participation. The survey consisted of ten questions covering a number of different topics: different types of gender equality, the activities of women’s organizations, their effectiveness in drawing attention to pressing women’s problems, bases of support, and the pressing of women’s concerns in their home countries. The questions were a combination of closed-ended and open-ended questions. The addition of open-ended response questions allows for the avoidance of some problems associated with survey research. These questions do not inhibit the number of topics that can be discussed, the background information that researchers can provide, or the intensity and depth of participants’ responses. Open-ended questions allow respondents to give narrative responses whereas closed-ended questions ask respondents to choose from a set of alternatives that they most agree with and represents their views (Goel 1988, 36). The questions were based on past literature on women’s organizations and civil society development. The hope was to keep the questions general in nature as to allow accurate comparisons across all the countries. The survey questions

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65 The survey instrument received Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the Louisiana State University in January 2011.
were translated into both English and Russian. The English and Russian translations are both provided in the appendix.

V. Analysis

A number of issues of concern to women are not currently being addressed in the former Soviet republics. Occupational concerns and women’s right to workplace equality garnered six responses. The focus was on greater career opportunities for women, women’s right to work, unemployment safeguards, protections against sexual harassment, and the gender wage gap. An Estonian professor noted that “The gender pay gap is around 30% in Estonia, the largest in the EU.” Five of the responses pertained to women’s continued underrepresentation in politics and government institutions. Violence against women garnered four responses; some specific provisions regarded protections of victim of violence in pre-trial and court procedures. Three of the responses pertained to women’s health. In Moldova, women’s health concerns disentangled from their roles as mothers (e.g., maternal mortality) are largely ignored. In Ukraine, women’s reproductive rights are discounted—“the efforts of women’s organizations are weak in comparison with religious overtones.” Equality in family responsibilities and within the family garnered two responses. Some acknowledged that certain groups of women and issues of concern to them are being overlooked—older women, rural women, immigrant women, women with disabilities, lesbians, and minority women.66

66 Ala Mindicanu, Associate Professor at the State University of Moldova answered that the three issues of most concern are “national efficient legislation regarding gender equality, mainstreaming; mechanisms of efficient implementation of the existing legislation; and lack of any budgeting for gender equality (law is not covered by any expenses).”

Vasile Cantarji, Researcher for the Center of Sociological Investigations and marketing ‘CBS AXA’ (Moldova) answers “alcoholism, sexism, and rights to work.” The responses seem to echo much of the overtones of the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union—the underrepresentation of women in politics, prominence of domestic violence, labor force discrimination, and the ignorance of large segments of women and their issues.

A Georgian professor mentioned food safety as a concern of women not currently being addressed by the state.
The general consensus is that the state is not effectively implementing and enforcing current women’s policies in all the former Soviet republics. Olga Shnyrova, Director of Gender Studies and Associate Professor at Ivanovo State University noted that “At the state level [in Russia], there are no such policies.” Tamar Zurabishvili, Visiting Professor at Tbilisi State University (Georgia) Center for Social Sciences mentioned that

“Policies [in Georgia] are not being effectively implemented, although there are attempts to make their implementation more efficient. But it is not only problem of policies; this change also needs some time so that the attitudes and mentality change among the general population.”

An Azerbaijani professor emphasized that the implementation of current laws was purely ceremonial and not based on actuality: “No, because the implementation is of a formal character and is not supported by actual state of affairs.” Olena Suslova of the Information and Consultancy Women’s Center stated that much ground has been lost over the last few years in Ukraine. “No. during past 1-6 years the government has lost all previous achievements in this area.” Another Ukrainian respondent expressed a similar sentiment.

“No. Ukraine has achieved a lot in the field of gender equality, but as yet only at the level of laws. Actual enforcement of these laws is virtually nonexistent. As I noted today in Ukraine positive changes in this process have been hampered. In particular, in December 2010 there was an administrative reform of the Ministry of Family, Youth and Sports, which was engaged in the implementation of gender policy in Ukraine. This is alarming gender community representatives, some of whom called the situation very serious. In addition, the state programs on gender equality at the local level often contain contradictions - they are seen as “purely feminine” programs or in general they even contain anti-gendered elements. For example, in one Ukrainian regional program was given a plan of action in educational institutions within the campaign “16 days to combat gender-based violence.” Among these events includes a meeting on “The unborn want to live.” The question arises - how such a topic correlates with the subject matter and cannot be realized if it is within the boundaries of religious discourse. And there are quite a few blunders. In addition I can say - officials, whose duties include the implementation of the gender program "in place" gender issues are often perceived not only inadequate, but also with a certain irritation (I read gender training for such officials, so I can say this with confidence).”
An Estonian Professor followed that “there are many unsolved or deficiently solved problems, declarative and less useful laws and developmental/action plans.”

Two respondents in the Baltic States acknowledge some success. Raili Marling, Professor at Tartu University noted

“The laws [in Estonia] are in place as are some institutions (gender equality and equal treatment commissioner), but the burden of proof is often placed on the weaker party and they lack awareness and confidence to take the case to courts. There could be more active interest from the law enforcement agencies - although I can also think of positive examples, such as the successful campaigns to raise police awareness of domestic violence and violence against children.”

The Gender Studies Center at Vilnius University stated

“Don't know, maybe health policy [in Lithuania], like campaigns against breast cancer make awareness and influence. Other policies are contradictive, like sexual health, in schools sexual health teaching is not implemented because of Catholic Church protests. Education access is fine for women, but after that is not encouraged and women are not very much encouraged to go to male dominant professions.”

Much work still needs to be done in the former Soviet republics to not only get women’s policies on the books but at the same time enforce the policies. As of now, it seems much of gender equality in the region is of only a formal nature.

Women’s organizations have been active in attempting to shine a spotlight on issues of concern to women. The respondents were asked to rank women’s groups’ activity on a variety of subject matters—violence against women, education, reproductive/sexual health, human trafficking, professional associations, minority women, and maternity/family—on a scale ranging from 0 (limited activity) to 10 (very active). They were also able to include additional subject matters.

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67 One Moldovan respondent affirmatively answered that women’s policies are being effectively addressed and implemented.
Women’s organizations are extremely active in drawing attention to the cause of violence against women. The mean score was 7.39. Only three respondents (one from Russia and two from Moldova) ranked women’s groups with a score lower than a five on this issue. The next issue area that women’s groups are active in is human trafficking, with a mean score of 7.33. These issues are new subjects compared to the others (were not discussed during the Soviet period) which have allowed these groups to carve out their own space. Traditionally, these issues are of most concern to Western NGOs and Western feminists and have garnered much international attention. Women’s organizations are somewhat active regarding women’s education (5.22), professional associations (5.33), reproductive/sexual health (5.56), and maternity/family (5.39). Four individuals noted that women’s organizations were active regarding politics and women’s political involvement. Ala Mindicanu and Vasile Cantarji both ranked women’s organizations highly (eight out of ten) regarding women’s political rights. Raili Marling noted “Politics—when the Gender Equality Act was being debated in the parliament, women’s organizations produced an active support campaign that gained considerable visibility. It was, however, a unique burst of activity.” The Azerbaijani respondent also mentioned women in politics as well as women’s human rights. The issue with the least activity regarded minority women with a mean score of 4.12. Such sentiment was echoed earlier when a number of the respondents mentioned that one of the major issues being ignored was that of non-majority women.68

The respondents were asked to list the five most important women’s organizations in their countries as well as their primary focus. Most mentioned violence against women (particularly domestic violence), prostitution and human trafficking, women’s human rights and gender equality, women’s health, and women’s political participation. Fewer mentioned

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68 Responses per country are located in the appendix.
women’s education and employment and academic research pertaining to women’s and gender issues. Women’s organizations that dealt with women’s familial role and balancing family and household duties only garner two responses. These answers seem to fall in line with analyses from previous chapters.

To bring attention to these issues, women’s organizations rarely use protests or demonstrations (mean of 1.11). The method tends to be usage of media outlets and educational campaigns (mean of 1.83). The other methods—conducting academic research on women’s issues (mean 1.61) and political involvement (mean of 1.44)—garnered mixed results. Protests and demonstrations would seemingly alienate potential mass and elite support and would not achieve desired results. The region still holds traditional views concerning women’s roles within society and gender issues. Moreover, women’s groups have to battle against negative stereotypes of feminism and gender equality associated with state socialism. Media and educational campaigns provided an avenue to present the issues in a manner that would not offend sentiment, would garner sympathy, and could change the overall regional mentality.

The overall consensus is that public support for women’s organizations is very limited across the former Soviet republics. Olga Shnyrova remarked that “Unfortunately, the modern women’s movement [in Russia] is limited.” A Georgian respondent answered “I would not say it is very broad since they don’t expect much help from women’s organizations, to a certain extent yes.” Raili Marling noted “Low. There are some good examples of women’s organizations [in Estonia], but they do not have a broad base of support as they are perceived to be too “feminist” and that word is still viewed with considerable suspicion.” Further, an Estonian professor asserted

“I think it is not broad (although it is now much broader than a decade ago). Many women (especially those with lower education) do not perceive the usefulness of"
the work of women’s organizations and effectiveness of larger gender equality for them. This is the matter of deep-rooted traditional gender roles. And now, in the conditions of economic breakdown, women avoid to request the better or more equal conditions (e.g., wage; part-time work for young mother).”

Another Estonian respondent noted “Women’s organizations are not widely known in Estonia among the general public, there is general lack of understanding of and interest in gender equality issues, also among women.” A Russian faculty member stated “If you take the country as a whole - very narrow.” A Ukrainian faculty member noted

“As I mentioned, women’s organizations (in my opinion) are more attractive to members of the academic community. The experience of the failure of the 2002 Ukrainian parliamentary party, “Women for the Future,” pointed out the inconsistency of a “purely feminine face” of politics. Some researchers write that women did not vote for women in elections (although this statement should be checked).”

The Azerbaijani respondent echoed a similar sentiment—“there is not a broad base of support; unification [of citizens and groups] takes place usually during events and activities.” Support for women’s groups is impacted by citizens’ lack of familiarity with gender issues, entrenched patriarchal stances, hostility toward feminism or activity perceived to be feminist in nature, and their isolation from a majority of women.

State support for women’s groups is limited as well. National government accommodation of women’s organizations is a mean of 5.27. Government response differs depending on the government ministry. Along with another Estonian respondent, Raili Marling uttered that state response hinges on the different type of ministry. Raili Marling stated “The gender equality unit of the Ministry of Social Affairs cooperates with the organizations, but it is harder to say that they have an effect on any other units.” The other respondent simply remarked “It varies between ministries.” A Russian professor asserted “They [government officials] practically do not notice, except for some bursts of attention.” This opinion was reiterated by
Olga Shnyrova with the simple word “indifferent.” Similarly, a Georgian instructor asserts that government officials are “sometimes hostile, cynical, ignoring the problems as if their [women’s groups’] solution is not important.” Or perhaps elite attitudes are conditioned by the women’s groups themselves. The Azerbaijani respondent remarked “depending on the political orientation of women’s organizations, which can be traced to whom and how grants are issued from the government for non-governmental organizations.” In general, it seems that national governments as a whole are indifferent to women’s organizations though there are factors that can impact their response.

Women’s groups have been partially effective in bringing attention to pressing women’s issues with a mean score of 5.5. They have been able to put their strategy of media and educational campaigns to good use and in some instances attracted political allies. A Moldovan respondent mentioned, “They are ‘noisy’ and able to attract some media and public attention to ‘women issues’.” Tamar Zurabishvili stated “They are effective because they coordinate their efforts, are good at media campaigning and working with relevant governmental bodies.” Raili Marling noted

“I am giving a range because some campaigns have been very effective - e.g. the public awareness campaign about domestic violence or the support campaign for the Gender Equality Act. Those used the media effectively - active opinion pieces in all widely read papers, poster campaigns on the streets and the successful recruitment of opinion leaders. I consider the latter one of the key ingredients of success - if a campaign gets supporters who are publicly visible and influential - and not from the rather marginalized NGO circles - it is more likely to get heard.”

Women’s organizations have been effective when they have been able to carve out their own special space on an issue. The Azerbaijani respondent stated “Some organizations, for example, against early marriage, domestic violence etc. are relevant to society and are well organized.” Similarly, a Ukrainian respondent noted,
“I commend the work of the international organization “La Strada Ukraine”, which is very actively engaged in human trafficking - it was created in 1998, works very effectively in this area. This organization was actually at the source of articulating the problem and trying to influence the legislative process in this area.”

As a Lithuanian respondent pointed out, the strategy of using the media to draw attention to women’s problems has been an effective, but “their activity makes slow influence to political decisions or doesn’t make any.” One of the strongest barriers to success is the fragmentation of the movement and disunity amongst groups. Ala Mindicanu stated “They [in Moldova] are isolated from other NGOs, do not participate in social life, and work only on the basis of financial support for some project. There is a lack of solidarity with other women organizations.” Vasile Cantarji mentioned the “weakness and disunity of women’s organizations [in Moldova].” Olga Shnyrova noted that women’s organizations [in Russia] are effective “through the utilization of networks resources, participation, and sufficient high levels of professional leaders and active members.” But at the same time she says “keep in mind that in Russia there are women’s organizations of various kinds: independent feminist oriented to Orthodox. They have different goals, different strategies and focus on different outcomes.”

Another obstacle is the stronghold of traditionalism. According to Ala Mindicanu, “Soviet mentality, oriented to be obedient toward the official power and lack of support from state to civil society generally” continues to have a major impact. Likewise Nino Javakhishvili noted “mostly traditional views, mentality, community/society at large is not ready to accept [in Georgia]” which impedes women’s groups. A Russian respondent reiterated “Stability of traditional consciousness, which is not recognized even to representatives of the educated elite.” Along with this critique is the criticalness of feminism and indifference to gender equality as a

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69 Nino Javakhishvili is an associate professor in the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Tbilisi State University.
whole. An Estonian professor stated as a reason, “Lack of political will to deal with gender inequality, prevailing stereotypes; gender inequality is not perceived as a problem among the general public.” A Moldovan respondent noted

“Usually they use ‘belligerence feminism’ approach, which clashes with traditional norms of society, not leading to many constructive outcomes. Due to the approach they often do not take into account gender issues related to men, and thus in public eyes they are seen as very biased. Very often they propose no practical goals or measures; there is an impression of ‘fight in the sake of fight’.”

A Ukrainian faculty member uttered a similar sentiment.

“In my opinion, the activities of women’s organizations in Ukraine are better known in academic circles. Generally speaking, gender issues have been articulated in post-Soviet countries through the efforts of women’s intellectual elite, rather than any women’s movement. Maybe that’s why it is so difficult up to now to talk of gender equality as something alien to us. I cannot mention the infamous Ukrainian organization FEMEN, who in their radicalism are similar to American feminism (in my opinion). Their methods of protest certainly attract attention. The question remains - how to relate to the objectives of the feminist movement (about which Femen writes a lot on the Internet.) So many women’s organizations are based on traditionalist attitudes and appeal to traditional female roles - wives, mothers and housewives. Today, the situation is complicated for women’s organizations in a number of circumstances: 1. the preservation of the role of the traditionalist discourse in relation to gender roles (even in gender programs) 2. significant steps backward in gender democracy in Ukraine, with the arrival of President Yanukovych (no women in the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, the President makes gender-inappropriate public statements, etc.).”

Women’s organizations lack the necessary resources to satisfy their influence potential.

The lack of resources at the disposal of women’s organizations seriously hampers their activities, according to one Georgian faculty member. “Local women’s organizations are not very effective bringing the issues until an international organization gets involved in it.” Further, “Local organizations do not have enough resources, in addition international organizations are more effective.” In terms of external support, women’s organizations are still extremely dependent on foreign assistance and aid. The mean ranking here was 8.42, with eight of the respondents giving scores of nine or ten. Olga Shnyrova rated the importance of external funding “10-
independent organizations of a feminist orientation, because state will never support them.” Ala Mindicanu similarly rated “10—external support is crucial.” An Azerbaijani faculty member noted that external support is “the only way to preserve the independence and objectivity in the work of women’s organizations.” A Georgian instructor proclaimed that external funding is “extremely important because most of the organizations function on the basis of foreign foundations.” A Russian professor simply stated that the situation has not really changed—“10—all hope for Western funds, as it was in the 1990s.”

A respondent gave a complex picture for women’s organizations in Estonia,

“The issue of gender equality is quite new in our society and unfortunately many politicians, employers and authorities have not recognized the importance of this issue yet (or they even reject it). Therefore it is very difficult to stand up for women’s rights. The second reason is that there are few (active) women’s organizations in our country and they have converged into some bigger cities, many districts are not covered. It seems that ‘the voice’ of women’s organizations is not loud enough to influence authorities in order to improve women’s situation and draw effectively attention to gender based violence. The third problem is poor financing of women’s organizations (especially women shelters).”

Raili Marling added

“Although I believe in the need to educate local women’s organizations and other members of the public, those kinds of seminars tend to have low visibility and they usually lack the sheer force to generate meaningful dissemination effect in society at large. Also, academic research has limited access to public awareness, although it has the invaluable effect of gathering data and analyses that can be fed into the political decision-making. There are good examples of academic researchers working with the gender equality unit at the Ministry of Social Affairs and in producing co-authored volumes.”

Another barrier is the state and government officials. The Azerbaijani professor remarked “Many companies belong to political actions, and therefore directly or indirectly, is prohibited by the authorities, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations do not want to conflict with the government, because they fear the consequences.” A combination of regional isolation,

70 An outlier was a Lithuanian respondent that rated the importance of external funding a five.
disunity among groups, state and institutional barriers, the persistence of patriarchal and
traditional discourse among the elites and the public, the newness of gender equality and gender
issues, and the lack of financial resources have impacted the influence women’s organizations
could have.

An argument can be made that another barrier is the amount of gender equality women
have in the region in terms of laws. Each of the respondents was also asked to rank different
types of gender equality in their countries. There seemed to be a consensus that, at least in terms
of laws, the educational realm was one of equality between men and women with average of 9.22
out of ten.⁷¹ Control of own body/person (e.g., reproductive rights) ranks a distant second with a
mean of 7.67. The third type was equality within marriage and relationships with an average of
7.33. In terms of gender equality legislation, the two lowest ranked were equality in the labor
force and women’s political involvement with means of 6.78 and 5.33, respectively. It is
important to note that this question focused on actual policies on the books. I believe the two
responses sum up the current beliefs about gender equality in the former Soviet republics. A
Russian professor remarks “All promised in words. In reality, the ability of women to be equal is
not supported by current public opinion.” Raili Marling further added

“This question is very hard to answer adequately, because it does not provide a
chance to differentiate between the formal laws and the actual life. At the level of
laws, Estonia has full gender equality, protected by a special law. Thus, women
and men have equal access to political decision-making and labor force. Women
are active in politics, but they are underrepresented in the top levels of politics -
not because of discrimination, but gender stereotypes (low number of women in
party leadership, etc.) In the labor force, women and men have equal starting
point, but factors such as child-bearing have a cost on women’s careers - like in
all Western countries, leading to lower pay, harder career trajectories as well as
potential discrimination on the basis of (potential) maternity. This then feeds into
marital and other relationships- partner are equal and basically, equality of
partners is widely accepted. But when the family has a child and, more

⁷¹ There was an outlier of five out of ten from one of the Ukrainian respondents. The other scores were no lower
than an eight.
pronouncedly, after having the second child, the woman inevitably becomes more dependent on the husband and less likely to leave the relationship, even if it becomes difficult or, let’s say violent. There are generous maternity policies (about one year of full pay + right to 3 years at home), but after the first year, the financial side again increases the woman’s dependence on the partner. That is to say, on the basis of laws, things are pretty OK, but when you look at statistics, you will see that the gender pay gap is the widest in Europe. I would reformulate this question to enable the respondents to differentiate between the law and reality.”

VI. Conclusion

Women’s organizations in the former Soviet republics have a major role to play in bringing women’s issues, in particular violence against women and human trafficking, to the forefront. Despite some of the problems that plague women’s organizations in the region, e.g. reliance on Western funding, competitiveness and disunity among women’s organizations, indifference and hostility from national governments, and limited regional support, the gender experts note that women’s organizations have some influence on bringing awareness to gender issues and helping to bring about policy change.

Though the specific numbers may differ among the experts, there is a similar story that is being told from their responses. On the face of it, women in the former Soviet republics have gender equality especially in terms of education but have the least equality in political participation and political involvement. The achievements of the Soviet period in drawing more and more women into secondary and university education and improving women’s literacy rates may be the most prominent reason why the gender experts rate education so highly. The Soviets implemented quotas to incorporate women into politics but women were barred from the upper echelons of power in the Soviet Union. Though women were involved in nationalist and democratic movements and were some important leaders in these movements, once the countries began the long democratic process women were once again barred from the centers of power.
Similar to the quantitative results of chapter three, women’s organizations are most active in the area of violence against women with a close second being human trafficking. Lowest in the rankings among the experts were issues pertaining to minority women. Education, reproductive health, professional associations, and family policy all received similar ratings. Violence against women and human trafficking are the two prime issues that were not addressed during the Soviet period. As a result, an undiluted space (so to speak) is open for women’s organizations to help shape these two policy areas (despite difficulties of patriarchy, traditionalism, and resources). These two issues in particular have dominated the international women’s movement and UN women’s conferences. In addition, women’s organizations dealing with these issues have garnered enormous support from Western feminist NGOs. To press for these issues, women’s organizations depend on the media and educational campaigns and the overwhelming support of the women’s and gender studies academic community in doing organic research on women’s issues in the region.

However, women’s organizations are only partially successful in bringing attention to the most pressing of concerns. The organizations have to contend with traditionalism and conservatism pertaining to women’s roles in society and the pejorative nature of feminism. Also women’s organizations are not part of a unified movement with unified agendas and unified goals, the lack of which do hinder their ability to push for greater gender equality policies. Women’s organizations in the region are still highly dependent on Western funds and assistance as well as Western feminist support. Women’s organizations are often isolated in major cities so the groups and their message are inaccessible to the general public; at the same time there is a lack of support, hostility, and indifference from certain sectors of the national government towards women’s groups.
Civil society can be a strong sign of political change and democratic consolidation. Civil society has not worked in the way Western analysts expected in the region, and it remains primarily fragile without strong regional ties. International aid has had a large influence on the development of civil society in the former Soviet Union. Much of this aid has provided the impetus for growth and development of civil society organizations. However, a case can be made that instead of being a bottom-up process where local organizations cultivate relationships between local citizens and the state and in turn press the state in advocacy of the issues of local citizens, it has been more of a top-down approach where international organizations press local NGOs to push for issues that are Western in nature. McMahon (2002) has stated that “While international involvement has sped up the process of building a nascent women’s lobby and promoted the development of a feminist consciousness, it has simultaneously resulted in the marginalization of women’s NGOs that neither depend on nor seek to maintain the support of local actors or national governments” (29). Only time will tell if this state of affairs continues to reign true.
Chapter VI
Conclusion: Keeping Gender In

I. Summary of Findings

Marxist-Leninist ideology set the foundation for formal gender equality in the Soviet Union. Women would achieve equality through equal participation in educational, labor, and political institutions. This equality would be facilitated through the socialization of the domestic sphere. Women’s liberation was equated with their economic liberation, first and foremost, to break them from the chains of domesticity. The progressiveness of formal egalitarianism remained unrealized without the organizations necessary to advocate on behalf of women and without the mechanisms in place to ensure the achievement of true gender equality. Though women in the Soviet Union managed to rival their Western female counterparts in terms of achieving parity with Soviet men in literacy rates, attendance in universities, participation rates in the labor force, and involvement in governmental positions, such actions masked the truth of Soviet gender equality. Women, though highly educated, found themselves in lesser work positions and not in the upper echelons of governmental power. The problem of gender violence was notably absent from any formal governmental declarations. More so, women were forced to shelter the burden of both work and domestic life. The Soviet regime at times attempted to minimize their burden through the creation of kindergartens, childcare centers, and women’s councils. While Soviet women’s identity was clearly formulated as mother-worker-comrade, Soviet men’s identity and role within society remained vague. A band aid was placed on the many issues that plagued women without an attempt to solve the underlying causes. By the end of the Soviet period, there was an impetus toward pushing women back into the private sphere and blaming their “liberation” for societal ills. Women would come into the post-Soviet world
highly educated, employed, “equal,” facing growing traditionalism, and overloaded with responsibility.

Democratic and market transition brought both numerous opportunities and consequences for the new independent republics. The same is true for their female citizens. The transition process negatively affected women through loss of employment opportunities, wage disparities, political disenfranchisement, rising levels of poverty, and greater exposure to gender violence. Such effects were originally ignored by the new governments whose primary focus was on securing political and economic reforms. By the same token, this period allowed for the growth of autonomous women’s organizations. Civil society allowed women an opportunity to advocate for issues on their behalf and an opportunity to evoke political change. Women’s groups in the region were aided by the actions of the international women’s movement, a movement that has been active in calling attention to and trying to bring about change to a multiplicity of gender issues.

This work in particular examined three policies: traditional, gender violence, and human trafficking. The international women’s movement has been more supportive of issues related to gender violence: domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual harassment, and human trafficking; the movement has played more of an ambiguous role in the area of the traditional women’s roles of wifedom and motherhood. With this basis, an analysis was conducted on whether women’s groups would have a similar impact on these policies in the fifteen-year period since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Based on the limited availability of data, only six countries were examined: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, and Moldova. Caution was taken to get a diversified perspective: two countries from the Caucuses, two from the Baltic region, one traditionally Muslim, and one with traditional Central/Eastern European ties. An array of
independent and control variables: the number of women’s organizations, EU membership, a border country with a trafficking statute, ratification of international treaties, the number of women in parliament, level of economic, political, and social development, level of democracy, and the dominant religion of the citizenry—were included in the analysis to ascertain the prominent factors that affect the adoption of formal gender legislation.

The analysis showed that women’s organizations have the most influence on the adoption of policies confronting gender violence and human trafficking policies and less influence on traditional policies. Economic growth increases the likelihood that state officials will adopt policies related to gender equity. Political and social development is particularly important for human trafficking statutes. The connection between women legislators and women’s groups is vital for gender violence legislation. Ratifying international conventions seems to have a negative effect on gender violence, potentially illustrating satisfaction with a minimal duty fulfilled or complacency. Religion also has a minimal effect, with non-protestant countries adopting more human trafficking statutes, though this result is not fully explainable. Without women’s groups, gender violence and human trafficking would not have received the policy attention that these issues warranted. These groups that exponentially grew after the fall of the Soviet Union were very much influenced by Western feminists and international institutions. Western feminists and international institutions have been touting the pervasive problem of gender violence, including human trafficking, since the 1970s. Resolutions such as CEDAW and DEVAW, UN women’s conferences, and the Protocol against trafficking coupled with Western feminists’ framing of gender violence and human trafficking as human rights violations helped to set the foundation for legislation in the former Soviet republics. Women activists then used this foundation to forge a regional approach.
Western approaches, the EU accession process, the history of state socialism, the current state of affairs, and international norms have all impacted the specificities of polices advocated by women’s organizations. The policies of ten Soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine—were analyzed for commonalities and differences in such items as definition, gender neutrality, response to offenses, and timing of adoption. Human trafficking statutes were influenced by the 2001 UN Protocol but were very much impacted by political and social circumstances of the countries. For most of the countries with sexual harassment statutes, the 2000 European commission resolution was very much a source of inspiration. And most countries continued with the Soviet definition of rape and sexual assault, rejecting more detailed Western terminology. All ten countries criminalized human trafficking, with five counties (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Latvia, Moldova, and Russia) adopting separate stand-alone policies. Six countries defined sexual harassment, but only Lithuania penalizing such action in its criminal code. Only four countries—Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine recognized domestic violence with only the latter three with stand-alone laws. Each of these standalone laws follows the definition set forth in DEVAW but adds economic violence based on the circumstances of women in the region following transition. The language of laws remains primarily gender neutral, illustrating the preference of elites and the rejection of the belief that only women are abused and only men are the abusers; this illustration was a direct result of the shared experience of communism and its impact on both men and women. There is definitely a divide over which issues are considered to be criminal offenses—human trafficking and sexual assault—with sexual harassment, marital rape, and domestic violence not punishable (with the exception of sexual harassment in Lithuania). Domestic violence laws seem to be meant to aid, prevent, and rehabilitate.
As women’s groups continue to press for recognition of these issues, their influence is mediated by a number of factors. One of those factors is the discrediting of state socialism which in turn is the discrediting of feminism. This disrepute hinders women’s groups from forming bonds with female legislators, other state officials, and citizens. Another factor is the inherent weakness of civil society. Women’s groups are very much dependent on Western financial assistance. Financial assistance has provided women’s groups with the necessary resources to exert influence and build coalition ties with other women’s groups, but at the same time has come with negatives. Western NGOs can dictate the agenda of women’s groups and shift the focus to matters of concern to Western groups and not necessarily the regional population. Greater competition for financial resources has constituted growing competition between organizations. Further, state and citizen resistance and/or indifference have hindered the influence women’s groups can exert on policies of concern to women.

Women’s and gender studies experts from Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine responded to an online survey that asked them to access women’s issues and women’s organizations in their particular countries. The two issues women’s groups are most active in sponsoring are domestic violence and human trafficking. This finding corroborates the results in chapter three and chapter four. These two issues were ignored during the Soviet era, providing a canvas for which groups could carve out their own space. Western NGOs also touted these issues as important to women and provided assistance to groups that sought to tackle these issues. Organizations pushing for policy change on violence against women and human trafficking are cited as some of the most influential women’s groups in the region, along with groups promoting women’s human rights, women’s health, and women’s political participation. Media and educational campaigns are the primary method by which
groups draw attention to their causes; protests and demonstrations are the least used method, potentially a result of the negative impression that feminism has in the region and a fear of being labeled belligerent feminists. Plus such methods could further alienate the public and state officials who could be sympathetic to women’s causes. Women’s groups influence still remains somewhat marginalized with a limited support base and a lack of support from state officials. With limited support, primary congregation in larger cities, the disunity in goals and tactics of groups, persistent societal traditionalist mentalities, and a lack of sufficient resources to exert influence, women’s groups can only be partially successful in pursuing and achieving their goals.

II. Policy Implications

It appears that women’s organizations do influence the policy process on certain gender issues. With their efforts, gender issues have been able to be moved to the forefront, especially in the last five to ten years. However, throughout certain factors mediate their overall impact. The analysis seems to suggest certain institutional and organizational changes that could be implemented to make the policy process for women’s groups much more accessible.

Gender mainstreaming became a goal after the 1995 Beijing Conference. Currently, of the ten former Soviet republics examined, most have gender equality offices or gender councils; however each is located within a ministry or governmental department. As a result, gender equality has to contend with other issues related to the family, labor, and/or social affairs.

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Locating women’s issues under such departments relates gender equality to welfarist approaches, labor approaches, and/or family concerns which is in contradiction to the main goal of gender mainstreaming. As such, gender equality could be pushed down the bureaucratic hierarchy. To ascertain greater gender equality, government officials should strive for stronger gender mainstreaming institutions. To achieve this goal, it is important to establish independent gender equality offices separate from government ministries. By having a separate ministry dedicated to gender issues, this ministry would have the administrative authority to implement and formulate policy as well as budgetary status. It would be imperative for this ministry to have a liaison to strengthen the relationship between the government and women activists. Such a liaison would give female activists greater access to the policy process.

It is essential to increase the number of allies for women’s groups in governmental office. In bringing attention to violence against women, the relationship between female legislators and women’s groups was shown to be crucial (as illustrated in chapter three). One way to achieve this goal is increasing the number of women in parliament and high governmental positions. The number of women in parliament has increased, though overall the number remains low in the region. There is no easy way to achieve this objective. Quotas were implemented during the Soviet era, which automatically increased women’s presence in politics, but women still remained in the shadows. Increasing women’s role in government involves improving financial support and party support for female candidates, and changing electoral mechanisms and the masculinist nature of politics. These institutional recommendations should be accommodated by the support of autonomous women’s organizations. Five of the respondents in the online survey mentioned women’s underrepresentation in politics as a major concern not being addressed in their respective countries, and four of the respondents mentioned that women’s groups were
active in promoting women’s political rights. The role of women’s groups in pushing for more inclusion of women in the formal political process is essential.

A disconnect seems to exist between women citizens, women’s NGOs, and women parliamentarians. It seems that cultivating a relationship with local female citizens will give greater credence to women’s NGOs and put greater more pressure on national governments. One way of doing such is by reaching out to marginalized groups of women (e.g. disabled, ethnic and religious minorities, lesbian, and poor women). By giving attention to these groups’ concerns, it could broaden the base and levels of support for women’s organizations. It would be important to establish organizational personnel dedicated to these women’s issues. The survey respondents expressed that these women’s concerns were ignored by the state and women’s groups.

Women’s organizations are hampered by their reliance on external funding which as mentioned above impacts their relationships with other organizations, the general populace, and the state. Shifting from finding assistance in Western NGOs to finding indigenous sources is difficult. With little governmental support and regional support, a potential route is through transnational cooperation between Central and Eastern European groups and through the creation of regional associations. Though Western funding would still be essential, it would bring about greater cooperation within the region and lead to potential pooling of resources and support. Greater unity among women’s groups could achieve increased recognition for issues of concern to women. Fragmentation means a fractured message and fractured outcomes which hampers the overall goal of all of the organizations. One group is not as powerful as multiple groups articulating the same message, same goals, and using the same tactics.

Such institutional and organizational recommendations could improve the ability of women’s organizations to impact and influence governmental policy agenda. From this work, it
is undeniable that other factors, such as limited economic development and the legacy of Soviet occupation, continue to play a major role and mediate the influence of women’s groups and women activists. Such factors are not easily resolved and require a lengthy process of economic, political, and societal change.

**III. Future Research Questions**

This dissertation has inspired new research questions and new paths of analysis. Based on the findings, women’s organizations have an impact on gender violence and human trafficking but not necessarily on other issues of concern to women such as child support, spousal support, and equality within marital relationships. Women’s groups and women’s activists seem to have an impact on policies that seemingly question the traditional role of women within society. It is uncertain if other policies such as parental leave and family benefits or equality within the workplace would garner the same amount of power and attention of women’s groups. But the question is, what other issues of concern to women would women’s organizations have similar influence? Or are violence against women and human trafficking unique?

The “gender question” not only remained unsolved for women in Soviet society but also for sexual minorities. The Soviets decriminalized male homosexuality, but by 1933 homosexuality was once again illegal (Healey 2002). Communists stigmatized homosexuals in their propaganda, portraying them as representatives of a decadent, Western lifestyle. Although, state socialism forced gay life and culture underground, the situation did vary from country to country. The 1990s witnessed a renewed openness toward sexuality (e.g., legality of contraceptives, decriminalization of homosexuality in many states, and the prevalence of pornographic materials) but was later accompanied by a harsh backlash against open displays of sexuality. The result was that homosexuality was marginalized to spaces such as the internet and
bars and clubs (Stroehlein 1999). Homosexuality still remains underground and very much a taboo, something hidden from public view and rarely discussed. Sexuality has been a contested territory claimed as a private space by civil society representatives and a public space by the state and religious denominations. Latent homophobia has been an enduring feature. In 2006, the Latvian Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis maintained that gay rights demonstrations should continue to be banned on the grounds that the Latvian state is based on Christian values (Keen 2006). Despite official bans, Russian activists continue to take to the streets to be met with violent aggression. In 2006, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov stated gay pride parades “may be acceptable for some kind of progressive, in some sense, countries in the West, but it is absolutely unacceptable for Moscow and Russia” (Watt 2006).

Survey respondents agreed that different groups of women (e.g., disabled, lesbian, ethnic) consistently have their issues ignored by most women’s groups and the national government. There has been limited research on minority women. Minority women are most vulnerable to multiple forms of discrimination. Their access to employment, education, and social services has higher rates of exclusion than that experienced by men in their community or majority women. They often face linguistic and cultural barriers that reduce their access in the public sphere and limit their labor, economic, and social opportunities. Minority women are also at higher risks for poverty, gender violence, and human trafficking than women of the native population. Further, there are differences in social status and economic standing between minority women and women of the native population and within minority groups. Stronger levels of traditionalism and religious tradition can be more persistent in some minority communities. Future research could examine such questions as: (1) what are the concerns of these women?, (2) are there women’s organizations advocating for these women?, and (3) how effective are these organizations? The
issue with such research is that it often entails detailed fieldwork because very little data and statistics have been collected which speaks to the limited quantitative and qualitative studies.

This work examined only the first stage of public policy—policy adoption. Policy adoption is important because it sets the agenda and draws initial awareness to particular subject matters. It commences debate on subject relevance, adequate definition, and appropriate procedure and penalty. Policy adoption is only the first step and is almost worthless without the second step—adequate and efficient enforcement. Without this enforcement, there is a major disconnect between law and reality. National statutes are an important dimension of cross-national variation; however, practice does not necessarily mirror laws due to the latitude taken in complying with and implementing laws. The policy impact of gender legislation is difficult to measure. Potential measures of effectiveness could be the number of trial lawyers dedicated to gender violence and human trafficking, the number of court cases tried, and the number of arrests. Besides looking at gauges of enforcement, another question is: do women’s organizations impact policy implementation regarding gender violence and human trafficking similarly as in the policy adoption process? In addition, what other factors affect the process and are they similar or different than the policy adoption process?

Further analysis needs to be conducted on the cross-national similarities and variations within women’s organizations in former Soviet republics. How do variations in characteristics (e.g., organizational type and organizational resources) influence policy adoption of gender policies? It could be the case that particular organizations are driving policy adoption and greater attention should be given to this point. What are the most influential organizations in each particular state? What are the issues of most concern to these organizations? This research question was inspired by the survey responses to the question: “what are the five most influential
organizations in your country?” Though most mentioned violence against women (particularly domestic violence), prostitution and human trafficking, women’s human rights and gender equality, women’s health, and women’s political participation, others also mentioned women’s education and employment and helping women to balance home and family life.

Based on the findings, social movements and social movement organizations do matter. Can the results be extrapolated to other organizations such as those fighting on behalf of communities? Some countries in the region have had to contend with rather large non-native populations and religious minorities. The political integration of minorities is one of the most challenging tasks facing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Will Kymlicka (2001) argued that “countries of post-communist Europe have been pressured to adopt Western standards or models of multiculturalism and minority rights . . .” (80). Minorities have to contend with the legacy of state socialism, the difficulties of the transition process, low presence in national parliaments, and social discrimination. They continuously suffer from various forms of social and political exclusion. This exclusion can further be impacted by socioeconomic status, linguistic factors, sexual orientation, and disability. The protection of minority rights has been cemented in the EU acquis and UN international resolutions. After the fall of the Soviet Union, policies related to minority rights were adopted by a number of countries in the region (Agarin and Brosig 2009, 6). Such policies dealt with citizenship and language laws and access to employment and educational institutions. Future research should examine the concerns of

73 The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in 1992. In 2000, the European Council adopted a general Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, disability, or sexual orientation. The Framework Directive was binding on current member states, and the accession states were required to have completed national implementation of the Directive before joining the EU (Lombardo 2003).
minority communities and whether minority organizations are as influential in the policy adoption process as women’s groups were shown to be in this work?

IV. Conclusion

Two decades after the collapse of state socialism, there remains diversity in national governments’ adoption of gender polices. This dissertation attempted to show the type of gender policies on which women’s organizations had the greatest impact. Women’s organizations have the most influence on gender violence and human trafficking policies. Of course, it is important to note that this influence is mediated by factors such as Soviet legacy and economic development. The language of these policies has the rhetoric of international institutions, international women’s movement, and Central and Eastern European women’s activists. Gender violence and human trafficking organizations are some of the most prominent groups in the region. However, women’s groups face a number of challenges, such as heavy reliance on Western assistance, lack of attachment with the regional population, and state indifference. These factors potentially lessen the overall effect that women’s groups can have.

If this analysis is sound, certain institutional and organizational reforms can be implemented that would strengthen gender equality in the region. Such improvements could be strengthening gender mainstreaming institutions, creating women’s ministries, and increasing the number of female parliamentarians. Regarding women’s organizations, they could potentially reach out to disadvantaged women to broaden their support base, continue to support greater women’s political rights, and work towards greater unity through regional cooperation.

This work was meant to augment the great work that is being done on gender in the Soviet region by adding a multi-country, multi-methodological analysis. This work is still preliminary in nature and provides many avenues for future research regarding social
movements, gender analysis, and public policy. My hope is that this work continues the
discussion of ways to provide support to women’s groups and activists pushing for social change
throughout the region.
References


Appendix A
Coding of Indexes for Quantitative Analysis

International Convention Index

CEDAW
CEDAW Optional Protocol
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children

Each variable is coded 0 for non-ratification and 1 for ratification. The variables are then combined into an additive index with scores ranging from 0 (ratified none) and 3 (ratified all). Since the latter two conventions were not in existent until 2000, they were left out of the years 1993-1999. As a result, the maximum score for those years are 1.

Status of Women Index

Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)
Labor Participation Rate Female (% of female population)

Each variable (per year) was coded as a standard deviation from the mean (for the given year). The following is how the standard deviations were recoded:

0- 1.51 to 3 standard deviations below the mean
1- 0.1 to 1.5 standard deviations below the mean
2- 0 to 1.5 standard deviations above the mean
3- 1.51 to 3 standard deviations above them mean

These standardized score were combined into an additive index. The potential scores can range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 12. For example; if a country scored more than two standard deviations from the mean on the above variables then that country’s score on the index would be a 0. On the other hand, a country that scored more than two standard deviations from the mean on the above variables then that country’s score on the index would be 12.
**State Fragility Index (coding taken from Polity IV)**

**Security Effectiveness**
General security and vulnerability to political violence, 1984-2008 (25 years)
A four-point fragility scale, where: 0 = 0; 1 = 0.1-15; 2 = 15.1-100; and 3 = greater than 100
0-3

**Security Legitimacy**
Measure of state repression, 1994-2007
0 = 1.0-2.0; 1 = 2.1-3.0; 2 = 3.1-4.0; and 3 = greater than 4.0
0-3

**Political Effectiveness**
Regime/Governance Stability, 1994-2008
Three indicators are used to calculate the Regime/Governance Stability score: Regime Durability (Polity IV, 2008); Current Leader’s Years in Office (Leadership Duration, 2008); and Total Number of Coup Events 1994-2008
0-3

**Social Effectiveness**
Summary composite index that measures a country's average achievements in three basic aspects of human development: health, knowledge, and income (life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, gross national income (GNI) per capita)
3 = less than or equal to .500; 2 = greater than .500 and less than or equal to .700; 1 = greater than .700 and less than or equal to .800; and 0 = greater than .800
0-3

**Social Legitimacy**
Infant Mortality Rate, 2008
3 = greater than 75.00; 2 = less than or equal to 75.00 and greater than 45.00; 1 = less than or equal to 45.00 and greater than 20.00; and 0 = less than or equal to 20.00
0-3

These scores were combined into an additive index. As a result, the index was recalculated with the potential scores’ range from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 15.
### Appendix B

#### Timeline of Gender Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Russia sexual assault statutes in criminal code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Latvia sexual assault statutes in criminal code</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1999 | • Lithuania Equal Opportunity Law  
• Azerbaijan sexual assault statutes in criminal code  
• Georgia sexual assault statutes in criminal code |
| 2000 | • Latvia adds 117.7 and 160 to sexual assault statutes  
• Lithuania penalizes human trafficking in criminal code |
| 2001 | • Ukraine DV law  
• Ukraine penalizes human trafficking in criminal code  
• Azerbaijan adds 108.1 to sexual statutes  
• Estonia sexual assault statutes in criminal code  
• Lithuania sexual assault statutes in criminal code  
• Ukraine sexual assault statutes in criminal code |
| 2002 | • Latvia penalizes human trafficking in criminal code  
• Moldova penalizes human trafficking in criminal code  
• Moldova sexual assault statutes in criminal code  
• Belarus sexual assault statutes in criminal code |
| 2003 | • Lithuania defines sexual harassment in labor code  
• Lithuania penalizes sexual harassment in criminal code  
• Armenia penalizes human trafficking in criminal code  
• Georgia penalizes human trafficking in criminal code  
• Russia Human Trafficking Law  
• Armenia sexual assault statutes in criminal code |
| 2004 | • Estonia Gender Equality Act  
• Latvia defines sexual harassment in labor law |
| 2005 | • Ukraine Equal Opportunity Law  
• Azerbaijan penalizes human trafficking in criminal code  
• Azerbaijan Human Trafficking Law  
• Moldova Human Trafficking Law |
| 2006 | • Georgia DV law  
• Moldova Equal Opportunity Law  
• Azerbaijan Equal Opportunity Law  
• Georgia Human Trafficking Law |
| 2007 | • Moldova DV law  
• Latvia Human Trafficking Law |
| 2008 | Belarus defines DV in Crime Prevention Law |
Appendix C
Coding Scheme Questions for Policy Content Analysis

1) Similarity of definitions
   • Is the issue defined?
   • Are similar phrases found in country’s laws?
   • Do international directives inform country’s policies?

2) Separate laws
   • Which policies receive the most attention determined by number of laws oriented towards that policy?
   • Which laws are not recognized?

3) Gender neutrality
   • Do the laws point to the fact that women are the predominant victims of gender-based violence?

4) Response
   • How does the government attempt to handle these different issues?
   • Are all forms of gender-based violence criminalized (criminal justice approach)?
   • What is the discourse?

5) Timing of policies
   • When did countries began passing legislation?
   • Is there a delay?
Appendix D
Definitions of Domestic Violence

Domestic Violence Definitions

“Any intentional act of a physical, sexual, psychological, or economic nature undertaken by a member of a family with respect to another member of the same family, if this act violates constitutional rights and freedoms of such a member and causes him or her moral damage or injury to his or her physical or mental health” (Ukraine’s Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence 2001).

“Violation of constitutional rights and freedoms of one family member by the other, in conjunction with physical, psychological or sexual violence, coercion or threat to undertake such actions” (Georgia’s Law on Elimination of Domestic Violence, Protection of and Support to Its Victims 2006).

“Any deliberate action or inaction, except actions taken in self-defense or in defense of other persons, whether physical or verbal, that is manifested through physical, sexual, psychological, spiritual or economic abuse or by causing material or moral damage, committed by a family member against other family members, including against minors, or against common or personal property” (Moldova’s Law on Preventing and Combating Violence in the Family 2007).

“Intentional acts of physical, psychological, sexual nature of one family member against another family member, violating his rights, freedoms and legitimate interests and causing him physical and (or) mental anguish” (Belarus’ On Fundamental Activities for Crime Prevention 2008).

Forms of Domestic Violence

Physical violence
- Ukraine: “intentional battery…inflicting body injuries that may cause or have caused the death of a victim or hurts his or her honor and dignity”.

- Georgia: “battery, torture, injury, restriction of liberty or any other action that causes physical pain or suffering, restriction of food,…violate his/her personal dignity or lead to his/her death”.

- Moldova: “deliberate infliction of bodily injuries or damage to health by hitting, pushing, tossing, pulling by the hair, stinging, cutting, burning, strangling, biting, in any form and of any intensity; by poisoning, intoxicating, or other similar actions”.

Sexual violence
- Ukraine: “an illegal infringement by a member of a family on the sexual inviolability of another member…”.

- Georgia: “an act that violates sexual liberty and integrity of the person…”.
- Moldova: “any violence of a sexual character or any illegal sexual conduct within the family or within other interpersonal relationships, such as marital rape; prohibiting the use of contraception; sexual harassment; any unwanted, imposed sexual conduct; forced prostitution…”.

Economic violence
- Ukraine: “…intentionally deprives another member of housing, food, clothing, and property or resources, which rightfully belong to this member. Such acts may result in death or physical and mental impairment”.
- Georgia: “restriction of the right to property, right to engage in labor activities, and right to enjoy property in joint possession”.
- Moldova: “the deprivation of economic means, including the deprivation essentials such as food, medicine and living necessities; the abuse of a position of authority such as taking away personal property, prohibiting the possession, use or disposal of common property, unfair control over common property and resources; refusal to support the family; imposing hard or harmful labor or damaging health…or other similar actions”

Psychological violence
- Ukraine: “violent acts…which affect the psyche of another member of the same family through verbal insult, threat, persecution or intimidation, which may cause a lack of emotional confidence or inability to defend oneself; or which may cause psychological damage”.
- Georgia: “offence, blackmail, degrading treatment, threat or any other act that violates pride and dignity of the human being”.
- Moldova: “imposing one’s volition or personal control by causing tension and mental suffering including ridiculing, swearing, insulting, derogatory nicknaming; blackmailing; the intentional destruction of objects; verbal threats; the demonstrative showing of fire arms or hitting domestic animals; neglect; meddling in the personal lives of others; acts of jealousy; imposing isolation by detention, including detention in the family dwelling; isolation from the family, community, friends; prohibiting professional accomplishment, prohibiting attendance at educational institutions; seizure of identity documents; deprivation of access to information; or other similar actions”

Spiritual violence
- Moldova: “the underestimation of, or demeaning the importance of, the need to satisfy moral and spiritual needs by prohibiting, limiting, ridiculing or punishing the aspirations of family members, by prohibiting, ridiculing or punishing access to cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious values; by imposing a system of unacceptable personal values; or by other actions with similar effects or repercussions”.

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Appendix E
IRB Consent Forms

(En)Gendering Policy: Gender Policies in Post-Soviet States

My name is Natasha Bingham, a doctoral student at Louisiana State University. The purpose of this study is to examine women’s organizations in former Soviet republics. This study is part of an overall dissertation project that looks at the influence of women’s organizations on the adoption of gender policies. I am asking you to take part in this study because of your knowledge of women and gender studies in your country. If you agree to be a part of this study, you will be asked to answer a survey of 10 questions. The questions pertain to your opinions on the activities of women’s organizations, the effectiveness of women’s organizations in drawing attention to pressing women’s problems, the bases of support for women’s organizations, and pressing women’s concerns in your country. Your answers will provide valuable information for my dissertation project. If you have questions later, you may contact me at nbingh1@tigers.lsu.edu. I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this survey. Taking part in this survey is completely voluntary, and you may decide at anytime to not participate in the study. Unless you check below that you would like to remain anonymous, your name will appear along with your responses in this work. If you do request anonymity, your name will not appear in this work and will not be connected to any of your responses.

The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigator. If I have questions about subjects’ rights or other concerns, I can contact Robert C. Mathews, Chairman, LSU Institutional Review Board, (225)578-8692, irb@lsu.edu, www.lsu.edu/irb. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the researchers’ obligation to provide me with a copy of this consent form if signed by me.

__I agree to be identified by name in this work.

__I wish to remain anonymous in this work.

Signature: ________________________________ Date: ______________________________
Меня зовут Наташа Бингам, докторант университета штата Луизиана. Целью исследования рассматривать женских организаций в бывших советских республиках. Это исследование рассматривать частью общего диссертации проекта, который смотрит на влияния женских организаций на принятие гендерной политики. Я прошу Вас принять участие в этом исследовании из-за ваших знаний женщин и гендерных исследований в вашей стране. Если вы согласны, чтобы быть частью этого исследования, вам будет предложено ответить на обследование из 10 вопросов. Вопросы относятся к своим мнением о деятельности женских организаций, эффективность женских организаций в обратив внимание на неотложных женские проблемы, базы поддержки женских организаций, и неотложные дело женщин в вашей стране. Ваши ответы будут предоставить ценную информацию для моей диссертации проекта. Если у вас есть вопросы позже, вы можете связаться со мной по nbingh1@tigers.lsu.edu. Я не предвижу каких-либо рисков для вас участие в этом опросе. Принимая участие на добровольной основе, и вы можете решить, в любое время, чтобы не участвовать в обследование. Если вы проверите ниже, что вы хотели бы оставаться анонимными, ваше имя будет выходить вместе со своими ответами в этой труд. Если вы хотели бы анонимности, ваше имя не будет выходить в этой труд и не будет соединять к любому из ваших ответов.

Исследования обсуждались со мной, и все мои вопросы был дан ответ. Я могу направить дополнительные вопросы, касающиеся исследования специфики к следователю. Если у меня есть вопросы о субъектах права или другие дела, я могу связаться Роберт К. Мэтьос, Председатель ЛГУ Институциональные Наблюдательный Совет, (225) 578-8692, irb@lsu.edu, www.lsu.edu /IRB. Я согласен участвовать исследовании описано выше, и отвечать на обязательства исследователей предоставить мне копию этой формы согласия, если подписанного мной.

___ I согласится назать себя в этой труд.

___ I Пожелали остаться анонимными в этой труд.

Подпись: _______________________________      Число: _____________________________
Appendix F
Survey Questions Sent to Women’s and Gender Studies Academics

1. How would you rate the different types of gender equality in (particular country)?  
   Scale from 0-10  
   a. Equal access to education  
   b. Equality in the labor force  
   c. Equality within marriage and relationships  
   d. Equal access to political involvement and representation in government  
   e. Control of own body/person  
      i. Please provide further explanations

2. To what degree are women’s organizations active in the following areas in (particular country)?  
   Scale from 0 (meaning limited activity) to 10 (meaning very active)  
   a. Violence against women  
   b. Education  
   c. Reproductive/Sexual Health  
   d. Human Trafficking  
   e. Professional Associations  
   f. Minority women  
   g. Maternity/Family  
   h. Other: Please List

3. To what degree are the following strategies/tactics used by women’s organizations in (particular country)? Range from rarely to usually  
   a. Protests/demonstrations  
   b. Media/educational campaigns  
   c. Political involvement  
   d. Academic research  
   e. Other: Please List

4. How effective are women’s organizations in bringing attention to the most pressing women’s problems in (particular country)?  
   Scale of 0-10  
   a. Why are they effective?  
   b. If not effective, what are the main barriers to their effectiveness?

5. How broad is the base of support among women in (particular country) for women’s organizations?

6. What has been the response of the national government to women’s organizations in (particular country)?  
   Scale of 0 (meaning hostile) to 10 (meaning accommodating)

7. How important is external support to the continuation of women’s organizations in (particular country)?  
   Scale of 0 (not important at all) to 10 (extremely important)
8. What would you say are the five most influential women’s organizations in (particular country)?
   a. In what particular areas?

9. What three important concerns of women are not currently being addressed in (particular country)?

10. Do you find that current policies aimed at women are being effectively implemented and enforced in (particular country)?
Исследовательные Вопросы:

1. Как бы Вы оценили различные типы гендерного равенства в (конкретной стране)?
   На шкале 0-10
   a. Равный доступ к образованию
   b. Равенство на рабочих местах
   c. Равенство в браке и отношениях
   d. Равный доступ к политической деятельности и представительство в Правительстве
   e. Контроль собственного тела / персоны
      i. Просьба дать более подробное объяснение

2. В какой степени женские организации действуют в следующих областях в (конкретной стране)?
   На шкале от 0 (значит ограничена деятельность) до 10 (значит очень активно)
   a. Насилие в отношении женщин
   b. Образование
   c. Репродуктивное / Сексуальное здоровье
   d. Торговля людьми
   e. Профессиональные ассоциации
   f. Женщины меньшинства
   g. Материнство / Семья
   h. Другие: Пожалуйста перечислите

3. В какой степени следующие стратегии / тактики используются женскими организациями в (конкретной стране)? Диапазон измерения от редко до обычно
   a. Протесты / демонстрации
   b. Медиа/провождение образовательных компаний
   c. Политическое участие
   d. Академические исследования
   e. Другие: Пожалуйста перечислите

4. Насколько эффективны женские организации в привлечении внимания к наиболее актуальным проблемам женщин в (конкретной стране)? На шкале 0-10
   a. Почему они эффективны?
   b. Если не эффективны, каковы основные препятствия?

5. Как широка база поддержки среди женщин в (конкретной стране) для женских организаций?

6. Какова реакция национального правительства к женским организациям в (конкретной стране)?
   На шкале от 0 (значит враждебная) до 10 (значет любезная )

7. Насколько важна внешняя поддержка для продолжения существования женских организаций в (конкретной стране)? На шкале от 0 (не важна) до 10 (очень важна)
8. На Ваш взгляд, назовите пять самых влиятельных женских организаций в (конкретной стране)?
   а. В каких сферах?
9. Какие три важные проблемы женщин в настоящее время не рассматриваются в (конкретной стране)?
10. Считаете ли вы, что нынешние курсы политики по вопросам женщин эффективно внедряются и соблюдаются в (конкретной стране)?
Appendix G
IRB Approval Form

Application for Exemption from Institutional Oversight

Unless qualified as meeting the specific criteria for exemption from Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight, ALL LSU research projects using human subjects as subjects, or samples, or data obtained from humans, directly or indirectly, with or without their consent, must be approved or exempted in advance by the LSU IRB. This Form helps the PI determine if a project may be exempted, and is used to request an exemption.

-- Applicant, please fill out the application in its entirety and include the completed application as well as parts A-E, listed below. When submitting to the IRB, the application is completed, please submit two copies of the completed application to the IRB Office and/or a member of the Human Subjects Screening Committee. Members of this committee can be found at http://www.lsu.edu/screeningmembers.shtml

-- A Complete Application Includes All of the Following:
(A) Two copies of this completed form and two copies of part B thru E.
(B) A brief project description (adequate to evaluate risks to subjects to explain your responses to parts 1&2)
(C) Copies of all instruments to be used.
  * If this proposal is part of a grant proposal, include a copy of the proposal and all recruitment material.
  (D) The consent form that you will use in the study (see part 3 for more information.)
  (E) Certificate of Completion of Human Subjects Protection Training for all personnel involved in the project, including students who are involved with testing or handling data, unless already on file with the IRB. Training link: http://php.minitaining.com/users/login.php
  (F) IRB Security of Data Agreement: (http://www.lsu.edu/irb/irbsecuritydataagreement.pdf)

1) Principal Investigator: Natasha Bingham  
   Dept: Political Science  
   Ph: 225-578-2141  
   E-mail: nbingham1@tigers.lsu.edu  
   Rank: Doctoral Student

2) Co Investigator(s): please include department, rank, phone and e-mail for each
   N/A

3) Project Title:  [En]Gendering Policy: Gender Policies in Post-Soviet States

4) Proposal? (yes or no)  
   If Yes, LSU Proposal Number
   Also, if YES, either
   □ This application completely matches the scope of work in the grant
   □ More IRB Applications will be filed later

5) Subject pool (e.g. Psychology students)  
   "Circle any "vulnerable populations" to be used: (children < 18, the mentally impaired, pregnant women, the elderly, other). Projects with incarcerated persons cannot be exempted.

6) PI Signature  
   Date 11/15/2010  (no per signatures)

** I certify my responses are accurate and complete. If the project scope or design is later changes, I will resubmit for review. I will obtain written approval from the Authorized Representative of all non-LSU institutions in which the study is conducted. I also understand that it is my responsibility to maintain copies of all consent forms at LSU for three years after completion of the study. If I leave LSU before that time the consent forms should be preserved in the Departmental Office.

Screening Committee Action: Exempted __  Not Exempted ___  Category/Paragraph __

Reviewer: Mathews  
Signature:  
Date: 11/18/11

LSU Proposal # __

7) Complete Application
8) Human Subjects Training

Study Exempted By:
Dr. Robert C. Mathews, Chairman  
Institutional Review Board  
Lousiana State University  
203 B-1 David Boyd Hall  
225-578-8692  
www.lsu.edu/irb
Exemption Expires: 11/17/2011
(En)Gendering Policy: Gender Policies in Post-Soviet States

My name is Natasha Bingham, a doctoral student at Louisiana State University. The purpose of this study is to examine women's organizations in former Soviet republics. This study is part of an overall dissertation project that looks at the influence of women's organization on the adoption of gender policies. I am asking you to take part in this study because of your knowledge of women and gender studies in your country. If you agree to be a part of this study, you will be asked to answer a survey of 10 questions. The questions pertain to your opinions on the activities of women's organizations, the effectiveness of women's organizations in drawing attention to pressing women's problems, the bases of support for women's organizations, and pressing women's concerns in your country. Your answers will provide valuable information for my dissertation project. If you have questions later, you may contact me at nbingh1@tigers.lsu.edu. I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this survey. Taking part in this survey is completely voluntary, and you may decide at anytime to not participate in the study. Unless you check below that you would like to remain anonymous, your name will appear along with your responses in this work. If you do request anonymity, your name will not appear in this work and will not be connected to any of your responses.

The study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have questions about subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Robert C. Mathews, Chairman, LSU Institutional Review Board, (225)578-8692, irl@lsu.edu, www.lsu.edu/irl. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the researchers' obligation to provide me with a copy of this consent form if signed by me.

_I agree to be identified by name in this work.

_I wish to remain anonymous in this work.

Subject Signature: ___________________________ Date: ___________________________

Study Exempted By:
Dr. Robert C. Mathews, Chairman
Institutional Review Board
Louisiana State University
203 B-1 David Boyd Hall
225-578-8692 | www.lsu.edu/irl
Exemption Expires: ___/___/2019
# Appendix H
## Results of the Online Survey

### Gender Equality in Former Soviet Republics (0-10)

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### Activity of Women’s Organizations in Former Soviet Republics (0-10)

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<th>Reproductive /Sexual Health</th>
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Strategies and Tactics of Women’s Organizations in Former Soviet Republics (1-2)

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National Government Response to Women’s Organizations in Former Soviet Republics (0-10)

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Importance of External Support to Women’s Organizations in Former Soviet Republics (0-10)

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Vita

In 1999, Natasha Bingham became the first in her family to attend college. Her sole career-focus was being a pediatrician. It was not until her sophomore year that she considered taking a political science course. At the time, she was considering chemistry as a major and decided to enroll in an American government course to fulfill a general education requirement. That initial course sparked her interest in the field, and after taking a few more courses decided to make political science her major. It was not until her last year of college that she enrolled in an Eastern European politics course. This course, to her surprise, came to be one of her favorites.

She graduated from the University of Tennessee in 2004, with Bachelor of Arts in psychology and political science, a minor in philosophy, and a pre-medicine concentration. Still planning to apply to and attend medical school, she took a year off to participate in AmeriCorps in Washington. She had always been active in service work; she had served on the Women’s Coordinating Council and participated in sexual assault advocacy training. It therefore made sense to devote a year to service in between undergraduate coursework and presumed professional training. That year in AmeriCorps was one of the most rewarding. She worked for the Tacoma Housing Authority with low-income residents of various races, ethnicities, and ages. The year provided her with the opportunity to live among low-income residents and experience the poverty that these residents lived with on a daily basis. During this year, she also began to read more and more works on Central and Eastern Europe. Through these two seemingly unrelated experiences, she came to the realization that medical school was not the right course. Though a medical career had long been her dream and her grandmother’s, who had raised her and her sister and was herself a registered nurse, the experiences away from college provided her with both a greater understanding of the connection between gender, ethnicity, and poverty and a
greater interest in Eastern European politics. She decided to pursue a doctorate in political science, and in 2005 enrolled in Louisiana State University.

During the first two years of graduate school, Natasha began to develop a research agenda that reflected her experiences in college, and beyond, and that integrated both her comparative and American politics coursework, as well as her undergraduate and graduate work in philosophy and women’s studies. She began to realize how interconnected her interests were, whether addressing issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and class in both comparative and American politics or addressing social movements in post-Soviet states. The common themes that seem to unite her research are the focus on the richness of diversity within nations and the need to draw attention to issues that disproportionately affect women and minorities. Her research and teaching agendas are very much impacted by her commitment to bringing awareness to the issues of diversity and inclusion. She has taught several courses for the political science and women’s and gender studies departments as well as for LSU in Ireland. In May 2009, she received her master’s degree and will receive the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in August 2012.