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# Freedom as the ends and means of development: an examination of garrison communities and their effects in Kingston, Jamaica

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FREEDOM AS THE ENDS AND MEANS OF DEVELOPMENT: AN  
EXAMINATION OF GARRISON COMMUNITIES AND THEIR EFFECTS IN  
KINGSTON, JAMAICA

A Thesis

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in

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## ABSTRACT

This study applies and expands Sen's concept of development as freedom using Jamaica as a case study. Using quantitative data acquired from the Center for Migration and Development's case study on Urbanization During the Years of Crisis in the Caribbean (1993), this research analyzes the impact of the entrenchment of garrison communities on Jamaica's overall development in terms of the freedoms allotted to individuals within society. The methodology used for testing the hypothesis that garrison entrenchment has constrained individual level freedom presents findings from a quantitative analysis of the relationship between garrison entrenchment at the community level and individual level freedom. The implications of this study contribute to development theory and policy, emphasizing the Jamaican case but also offering comments that may apply more generally.

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen has proposed a powerful new directive for understanding social and economic change: focus on individual freedom as both the means and ends of development (Sen 1999). Sen's arguments resonate with the theoretical literature linking social and economic development to the expansion of civil society (Sen 1999).

This study applies and expands Sen's concept of development as freedom using Jamaica as a case study. The research will explicitly discuss the relationship between a particularly severe form of party dominance, garrison entrenchment, and its effects on individual level freedom. Jamaica is ideal for this research for several reasons. As a newly formed democracy, the country is well positioned for commerce and has a thriving trade and tourist industry. Yet the entrenchment of garrison strongholds, areas where violence is employed as a mechanism for maintaining authority, threatens the freedoms of all those who live within these communities.

Amartya Sen argues that development should be reconceptualized as the enhancing of basic liberties that people enjoy and the elimination of major sources of "unfreedoms", a term he defines as poverty, poor economic opportunities, systematic neglect, or any element that "leaves people with little choice or little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency (Sen 1999, p. xii)." In his research, Sen addresses what he considers the five most essential components of individual instrumental freedom: political freedoms or those opportunities that allow people to determine who should govern them and under what terms, economic facilities or those institutions that provide

the necessary resources for the “purpose of consumption, production or exchange (Sen 1999, p.39)”, social opportunities or those opportunities that are important in enhancing every individual’s quality of life and promote more effective participation in political and economic activities, transparency guarantees, also known as the presumption of trusts that allows every individual to function “under guarantees of lucidity and disclosure (Sen 1999, p.39)”, and finally, protective securities, those institutions in place to help those on those individuals who are adversely affected by changes in their lives (Sen 1999).

Development then, is an ongoing process of negotiating and renegotiating social arrangements to protect and augment instrumental freedoms. In the ideal situation, unfettered institutions of civil society help to promote various individual level freedoms by cooperating with “freedom-enhancing” and opposing “freedom-limiting” state and market arrangements (Sen 1999, p.5).

In the absence of an effective civil society where the government is slow to make good on its economic promises and standard market practices have not yet been established, extralegal institutions such as the Mafia, or in Jamaica’s case the Garrison Dons, are essential to political leaders because of their ability to ensure compliance by providing a “socially valued service in the form of strong-armed enforcement (Sen 1999, p. 268).” Obviously, such establishments constrain the individual freedoms described by Sen and ultimately hinder development (Sen, 1999).

The following study uses quantitative data derived from the Center for Migration and Development’s case study on Urbanization During the Years of Crisis in the Caribbean (1993) to analyze the impact of entrenched garrison communities on Jamaica’s overall development in terms of the freedoms allotted individuals within society.

Chapter 2 focuses on the primacy of individual freedom and the institutional arrangements that protect and enhance them. Chapter 3 examines the emergence and entrenchment of garrison communities in urban Jamaica, with a particular emphasis on the consequences of garrison arrangements and individual freedom. Chapter 4 first describes a methodology for testing the hypothesis that garrison entrenchment has constrained individual level freedom and, thereafter, presents findings from quantitative analysis on the relationship between garrison entrenchment at the community level and individual level freedoms. To conclude, implications for development theory and policy are discussed, emphasizing the case of Jamaica but also offering comments that may apply more generally.



## CHAPTER 2. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL FREEDOM AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Sen's theory of freedom as the ends and means of development challenges the idea of a single measure of development, and links the outcomes of development to those elements individuals have reason to value (Sen 1999). This perspective views development as a process of decision making (implying agency) as well as the attainment of societal outcomes (implying structure). Contrary to the traditional view of development in terms of "out put per head", by describing development in terms of freedom considers the processes involved, the opportunities presented, the intrinsic and the derivative importance of these opportunities as well as their constructive role (Sen 1999, p. 5). Freedom ultimately contributes to the enhancement of human and social capital, which in turn contributes to overall capability expansion (Sen 1999).

All the various components of freedom are inter-related, and none is inherently more important or salient than others. Nonetheless, identifying and defining specifics of individual freedoms has some important advantages. First, some institutional arrangements augment some aspects of individual freedoms while stifling others. Second, some aspects of freedom may be easier to quantify and measure than others and therefore have received more attention than others in the literature (Sen 1999).

Sen's first dimension of individual freedom, political freedom, is perhaps one of the most addressed in sociology. Individuals have extensive political freedoms when they have the freedom to participate in all areas of the political realm. This includes freedom to vote in elections at the national and local level, freedom of speech, of assembly, and all areas of civil liberties. But the concept of political freedom goes

beyond constitutionally defined rights and civil liberties to include perceptions of the social and economic costs associated with political activity. Even where laws exist to protect individual level freedoms, individuals cannot be said to have extensive political freedoms if they fear reprisals for their political opinions, stances and activities.

There are those who would argue that politically, Jamaica's experiences are comparable to those of the former Soviet Republic of Yugoslavia as explained by Anthony Oberschall (1996). Oberschall describes how after its break from the communist Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was faced with the issue of deciding what type of government would thrive after communism (Oberschall 1996). He claims that economic stagnation, and more importantly, political strife contributed to Yugoslavia's eventual collapse:

The Yugoslav state breakup was a series of campaigns and crises in a federal system of interlocked polities, which spread across the republics when federal (all Yugoslav) institutions, leaders and parties did not agree on a constitutional compromise for ethno nationalism and democracy. It was not inevitable ...it took four years of nationalist mobilization and counter mobilization with political leaders, parties and news media, militias and interest groups turning ordinary people against one another and of extremists systematically intimidating and silencing moderates (Oberschall 1996, 355-356).

Sen's second element of individual freedom includes those social opportunities provided to the public. Social opportunities are those facets that enhance the quality of life and promote more effective participation in economic and political activities (Sen 1999). This component of individual freedom involves equitable access to social

opportunities such as education, health transportation and other similar services. To emphasize the importance of social opportunities, Sen contrasts the development of India and China:

The governments of both India and China have been making efforts for some time now to move toward a more open, internationally active, market-oriented economy. While Indian efforts have slowly met with some success, the kind of massive results that China has seen has failed to occur in India. An important factor in this contrast lies in the standpoint of social preparedness; China is a great deal ahead of India in being able to use of the market economy. While pre-reform China was deeply skeptical of markets, it was not skeptical of basic education and widely shared healthcare (Sen 1999, p. 42).

Sen goes on to say that when China turned towards marketization in the late seventies, its citizens were a literate people with good education systems as opposed to the citizens of India who upon entering the realm of marketization had a half-illiterate adult population and unfortunately has not experienced much improvement since improvement since (Sen 1999).

While these privileges are highly beneficial, focusing on the social opportunities alone disregards the importance of such characteristics as economic facilities or those institutional arrangements that allow for economic participation. “The availability and access to finance can be a crucial influence on the economic entitlements that economic agents are practically able to secure (Sen 1999, p. 39).”

Sen’s third freedom includes those economic facilities, which allow individuals to engage in the economic process of consumption, production or exchange (Sen 1999).

These economic indicators are also some of the most widely used measures of

development. Many researchers have attributed the demise of the state to a lack of economic stability. For instance, in his article on political conflict in the world economy, researcher Mansoor Moaddil admits that most of the previous research on political conflict considers “economic inequality as the single most important determinant of various forms of civil unrest (Moaddil 1994, p. 278).” The author goes on to describe two of the most prominent theories that link the economy with development (Moaddil 1994). Modernization theory categorizes societies “along a continuum of economic development (Moaddil 1994, p.179)” while world-systems theory approaches the economy and development as “an international hierarchy of asymmetrical exchange relations that are structurally necessary for the world political, economic and social systems (Moaddil 1994, p.281).” As significant as economic theories are, discussing development in terms of economy alone neglects to address the effects of various social issues and the political freedoms (or lack there of) within each country.

Fourth, protective securities are designed to assist members of society in obtaining the basic necessities for survival. This includes any welfare programs structured to help citizens receive food, medical assistance, or unemployment assistance. To best illustrate the impact of protective securities, Sen uses the example of the communist nation of Kerala, India:

Despite the rather moderate record in economic growth, Kerala seems to have a faster rate of reduction in income poverty than any other state in India. While some states have reduced in income poverty, through high economic growth, Kerala has relied a great deal on expansion of basic human education, health care and equitable land distribution for its success in reducing penury (Sen 1999, p. 91).

In this instance, Sen is able to demonstrate how a lack of social preparedness can prevent countries from reaching their fullest potential. It appears that Kerala has been more successful in rectifying poverty than any other Indian nation because it provides a social safety net for its citizen (Sen 1999). Kerala differs from areas such as Brazil, a nation that continues to grow, but does not promote equality among individuals (Sen 1999). At that time the people of Kerala chose to focus on equality, perhaps sacrificing growth and continues to do so as a democratic, communist state (Sen 1999).

Sen's fifth freedom views development in terms of the transparency guarantees allowed each individual. From this perspective development is being measured according to the level or quality of those freedoms that allow individuals to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity. Transparency guarantees are also a measure of trust; each individual's faith in not only themselves but in the local government's ability to meet their needs. Oberschall mentions that when the authorities in Yugoslavia failed to perform their civic duty to protect the public, the communities began to take sides primarily out of fear until the conflicts escalated and took on a "destructive, revenge and retaliation dynamic (Oberschall 1996, p. 356)" indicating the importance of transparency guarantees. However, such factors as whether or not the economic system is stable enough for the government to make good on its promises or if there are adequate protective securities in place to assist the public should be taken into consideration when measuring development in terms of the transparency guarantees available to individuals within society.

As Sen suggests, each of the freedoms are interrelated and work to reinforce one another (Sen 1999). “The process of development is crucially influenced by [each] interconnections (Sen 1999, p. 53).” Because these freedoms are so intertwined, no one freedom should take precedent over another all contribute to civil society development (Sen 1999).

The argument that freedom is a means and ends of development is admittedly circular. However, individuals do have agency to change the institutional arrangements of society (Sen 1999). However, in order to do so, individuals must better understand the nature of the institutional arrangements, how they came into being and how they constrain freedoms.

### CHAPTER 3: GARRISON COMMUNITY ORIGINS AND ENTRENCHMENT IN URBAN JAMAICA

At this point, it is important to examine the emergence of garrison communities and the freedoms that have been corrupted by these communities over time. Political violence has long been a prevalent factor of Jamaican Party politics and its citizens have suffered because of the injustices caused by this type of unfreedom. Since its establishment as a parliamentary democracy in 1962, Jamaica has held seven general elections all of which have been plagued by systematic violence. By its very nature, the definition of a garrison community implies the restriction of individual freedom.

At one level a garrison community can be described as one in which anyone who seeks to oppose, raise opposition to or organize against a dominant party would be definitely in danger of suffering serious damage to their possessions or person thus making continued residence in this area extremely difficult if not impossible. A garrison, as the name suggests, is a political stronghold, a veritable fortress completely controlled by a party. Any significant social, political, economic or cultural development within the garrison can only take place with the tacit approval of the leadership (whether local or national) of the dominant party (Munroe 1999, p. 23).

Many speculate Jamaica's violent political origins beginning with the election of Michael Manley in 1972 (Moser and Holland 2000, Gunst 1996). The nation gained its independence from Great Britain barely a decade earlier and was struggling to overcome the legacies of slavery and colonialism. Much to the chagrin of the United States, Manley, leader of the Peoples' National Party, guided the new government towards more leftist practices and showed a strong allegiance to Fidel Castro (Stone 1986). The

Jamaican Labor Party lead by Manley's rival, Edward Seaga, adamantly protested against the direction in which the new government was headed. The two political parties sought out the services of local 'dons' to impose party patronage. Both Bernard Headley and Laurie Gunst describe how guns were used not only for protection but also as a means of ensuring safe seats for the political leaders (Gunst 1996, Headley 1996).

The Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism, also known as the Kerr Report conducted by the Jamaican government in 1997 claims that "the allocation of scarce resources by the political party in office and the award of public contracts on the basis of partisan favoritisms have served to create violent divisions in the garrison between potential beneficiaries and the supporters of opposing parties (Kerr Report 1997, p. 14)."

Not only does party conflict contribute to the depletion of state funds, but the violence triggered during the election years has a huge impact on Jamaica's tourist industry (Gunst 1996). Tourism was strongly discouraged by travel agents around the globe and the International Monetary Fund devalued the country's currency (Gunst 1996). The nation soon found itself struggling financially and the government lacked the ability to provide its citizens with basic economic resources. In 1976, the government declared a state of emergency because of the extreme deterioration of the social and political climate and also because of the resulting negative exposure the country received in the financial press (Gunst, 1996). In recent years, the country has reaped the benefits of an expansion of regional tourism, but consistently unfavorable reporting in the press has prevented the tourist industry from reaching its fullest potential (Gunst, 1996). In



recent times, the United States government has even issued statements warning tourists of the potential hazards of visiting the country during its normal tourist season.

The Kerr Report also describes the primary causes and contributory circumstances of garrison communities: patronage, scarce benefits, poverty, lack of skills training and unemployment (Kerr Report 1997). The report also places the blame on improper election practices, questionable behavior of the police and the actions of local politicians (Kerr Report 1997) and identifies the immediate effects of garrisons as “the abandonment of legally owned houses and business premises followed by the capture of some of these illegal occupants and or the destruction of others through vandalism and inappropriate usage (Kerr Report 1997, p. 16)”.

Other larger consequences of garrison communities include the mass migration of citizens to from these high crime areas to other neighborhoods. These communities are then faced with the burden of providing the new residents with “suitable accommodations with the necessary infrastructure and amenities, while the communities they have left remain with abandoned and unoccupied buildings (The Kerr Report, p. 12).” Those who continue to reside in garrison areas often the victims of “area branding” in significant respects, which includes:

1. Retaliation from areas of supposed differing party affiliation
2. Victimization by employer’s averse to violence prone areas or themselves politically biased
3. Political and economic victimization should their party not form the government and an immediate risk of losing projects in progress when their party loses, as well as the general deterioration of market values in real property within these areas (The Kerr Report 1997, p.13).

To summarize these implications, the residents of garrison communities are often stereotyped and are subject to persecution and unfair treatment simply because of where they reside. This form of oppression impedes the development process because as research suggests, citizens are not free to live independently.

Certain existing characteristics within society actually enhance individual freedom while other elements work to destroy them. Instrumental freedoms may be threatened by poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities and social deprivation also known as unfreedoms (Sen 1999). Unfreedoms are caused by either inadequate processes such as the violation of voting privileges or through inadequate opportunities to accomplish even the most basic goals like escaping premature mortality or starvation (Sen 1999, Fisher 1998).

Taking this into consideration, it becomes evident that the most outstanding threats to freedom affect all areas of society. The National Committee Report on Tribalism sites such researchers as Mark Figueroa who contend that the garrison phenomenon is now an intricate part of the practice of electoral manipulation in Jamaica, virtually destroying what political freedoms that may exist (The Kerr Report, 1997). Adding to this situation is the correlation between garrison communities and drug traffickers. The drug dons not only offer protection within the constituency, but they also allocate resources to the needy party (Munroe 1999, Gunst 1996, The Kerr Report 1997). With the ability to wield such power, the local drug dealer is elevated to a level of supremacy within the community. Political leaders are no longer able to exercise control, political upheaval often “mutates into drug violence (Munroe 1999, p.65)” and the lack of public funding forces the political parties to seek donations from private donors-not

excluding the acceptance of drug money (Munroe 1999). The report goes on to describe how the garrisons prohibit individuals from moving freely within the neighborhood and these high crime areas also hinder job attendance and transportation services. Businesses often refuse to enter these violent areas further diminishing customer relations and limiting employment opportunities (Kerr Report 1997). Furthermore, there is increased difficulty in maintaining law and order within these neighborhoods (Kerr Report 1997).

Because development itself is the expansion of the real freedoms people enjoy, society must work to remove any forms of unfreedoms that may exist (Sen 1999). Sen's aforementioned instrumental freedoms supplement and reinforce one another and for that reason, the violation of one freedom can leave a person vulnerable to the violations of other freedoms (Sen 1999). Societies should work to eradicate issues of political corruption, improper social arrangements, economic upheaval and any deprivation that denies citizens the ability to take part in the decision making process or activities governing their lives.

I would like to note that in spite of obvious disparities, there are those who would argue in favor of the constructive effects of garrison communities. Caroline Moser and Jeremy Holland authors of *Urban Poverty and Violence in Jamaica* describe how the local dons are often viewed as local heroes and are an acceptable form of leadership who can guarantee a certain amount of stability, protection and even jobs:

The long term tradition of "paternal dependency on political leaders meant that some people, particularly the elderly, found it difficult to conceive of an alternative institutional structure hanging on to a nostalgic desire for politicians to rediscover the strong relationship traditionally associated with community stability. Thus some

older residents looked favorably on the presence of a strong don. A group of adults in Campbell Town believed that the war in their community started because of a lack of leadership and that a strong don could stop it... (Moser 1997, p. 30).

Amanda Sives describes the dominance of political parties in Jamaica as the hegemonic force driving a form of clientelism sustaining the elite (Sives 2002) meaning that the public has come to accept a type of ideology fueled by the political elite as a form of class control and the author proceeds to illustrate the linkage between economics and clientelist politics claiming “clientelist politics typically form when there is a small elite group with access to material resources and a larger group in need of material relief (Sives 2002, p. 72). Most importantly, Sives goes on to quote Alain Roquie who believes that “as a mechanism of control patronage and clientele relationships ensure a certain social peace. The partial satisfaction of immediate needs serves as a safety valve in situations where the distribution of income is profoundly balanced (Roquie 1978, p. 33, Sives 2002 p.71). In the case of Jamaica, when a decline in material resources and the weakening of the State altered the government’s ability to provide for the less fortunate, garrison dons and local political leaders were able to immediately jump in and provide relief to the vulnerable (Sives 2002). The hegemony accepted by local citizens allows the political parties to maintain control of most levels of civil society including dance hall, community centers, sports fields and other areas within their physical jurisdiction (Moser 1997).

The transformation of Jamaican civil society is comparable to the American labor movement of the early 1900s when an expanding workforce triggered an influx of immigrants. Walter Galenson tells how driven by rapid industrialization, these migrants

flooded into the cities and sought out both social and economic services that the government could not necessarily provide (Galenson 1985). However, as Galenson notes “the unions did perform a social service...and were among the few social institutions in which ethnic groups found a common interest (Galenson 1985, p.41).” Workers came to depend upon the unions to bargain with the business owners and local politicians over the terms and conditions of employment (Galenson 1985).

As more workers began to organize, the unions continued to grow not only in numbers but also in strength (Galenson 1985). More regulations were imposed upon union members and their employers, but not without certain restrictions. Policies implemented by the labor unions prevented employers from infringing upon the freedoms of their workers, but these rules also prevented the employees from benefiting from privileges otherwise available (Galenson 1985). In terms of economics, Galenson goes on to say that the unions of yester year threatened the national income just as cartels and other monopolies do: their existence restricted and misallocated resources, disrupted the flow of production, and limited flexibility (Galenson 1985).

## CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

### 4.1 Sample, Data and Variables

In order to examine the relationship between garrison strongholds and individual freedoms, my research utilizes individual-level survey data from the Center for Migration and Development's study on Caribbean Urbanization in the Years of Crisis. The original data set, collected in 1993, was gathered to gain information on key developments in six different countries and to test general propositions regarding Third World urbanization in the Caribbean. In Jamaica, 785 individuals living in urban neighborhoods were administered face-to-face surveys that included numerous questions about their experiences in their neighborhoods and their perceptions of change.

My analysis examines the effects of garrison communities, the state and other factors on freedom as a means and ends of development. Five perspectives guide this research:

1. Garrison institutional arrangements restrict political freedoms. More specifically, individuals are likely to be much more apprehensive about engaging in political activities than those who live in other urban neighborhoods.
2. Garrison institutional arrangements restrict social opportunities. Individuals are likely to have fewer opportunities that enhance the quality of life than those who live in other urban neighborhoods.
3. Garrison institutional arrangements restrict economic facilities. Or simply put, individuals in garrisons are less likely to have the proper economic facilities to engage the process of consumptions, production and exchange than those who live in other urban communities.
4. Garrison institutional arrangements restrict the protective securities i.e. special programs that assist in obtaining a job, food or medical assistance to ensure the well being of their citizens. Individuals within garrison communities are less likely to have those protective securities in place that protect society from abject misery.
5. Garrison institutional arrangements restrict transparency guarantee. Individuals are more likely to perceive the local government as not having the power or ability to change the problems within the neighborhood.




Figure 1: Theoretical Hypothesis

The first step is to organize the distribution of respondents by community type. The independent variable, garrison, is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the respondents live in a known garrison stronghold. Six neighborhoods, exhibited high levels of garrison activity: Balmage, Seaward Pen, Penwood, New Haven, Braeton and

Newlands. I specified these garrison neighborhoods as those institutional arrangements that support widespread criminal activity, urban poverty and group-based political antagonism.

Table 1: Distribution of Respondents By Community and Community Type

Community Type	Neighborhood	Number of Respondents
Garrison Communities	Balmage	79
	Seaward Pen	20
	Penwood	10
	New Haven	20
	Newlands	40
	Braeton	60
		Subtotal=229
Non Garrison	Washington Gardens	39
	Patrick City	40
	Arlene Gardens	30
	Red Hills	9
	Maverley	61
	Edgewater	20
	Bridgeport	30
	Independence City	20
	Passage Fort	118
	Waterford	30
	Portsmouth	20
	Garveymeade/Westport	29
	Pembroke Hall	30
	Dawkins Pen	10
	Duhaney Park	49
Gregory Park	21	
	Total number of respondents: 785	Subtotal=556



Importantly, I used three separate sources to verify that these six neighborhoods are qualitatively distinct from the others in both the level and intensity of garrison activity:

**National Task Force on Crime in conjunction with the Jamaican Constabulary Force-** the task force commissioned by Prime Minister P.J. Patterson in 1992 to address the violent crime rates of 1991 and 1992. The report discusses the symptoms as well as the root causes of extreme violence in Kingston, Jamaica and its surrounding areas and reviews aggregate crime statistics provided by the Jamaican Constabulary Force (Report of the National Task Force on Crime, 1993).

**National Committee on Political Tribalism-** specifically established by the Jamaican Government in 1997 to address the causes and effects of political violence in Jamaica's urban centers, particularly Kingston (The Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997). It is also known as the Kerr Report. For the purposes of their research, the committee joined forces with the Jamaican Constabulary Force, the Jamaican Information Services Regional Office and the Social Development Commission. The report sites the research of such scholars as Dr. Trevor Munroe and Dr. Barry Chevannes of the University of West Indies at Mona, Carl Stone.

**Mustard Seed Communities-** a nonprofit community development agency formed in 1979 in the outskirts of Kingston, Jamaica whose "objective is to promote the enrichment and empowerment of the spiritually, psychologically and financially poor that live in urban communities, [and] to assist them in leaving the cycles of frustration and

hopelessness that dominate their lives (Mustard Seed Communities 2002, <http://www.mustardseed.com/about/history.html>).

I selected five control variables to account for the influence of certain factors. Those variables are age, gender, marital status, years of education and years having lived in the community. The age of the respondents ranges from 17 to 89 years old with a mean age of 43. Gender is coded as 0 for female and 1 for male and out of the 787 respondents, 408 were men and 379 were women. It should be noted that the original surveyors were asked to strive for an equal number of male and female respondents. Marital status has also been recoded as 0 indicating those without a partner (includes survey responses indicating single, separated/divorced, and widowed respondents) and 1 for those respondents with a partner (includes survey responses living with partner and married). All missing cases were eliminated. The respondent's level of education ranges from 0-25 with a mean of ten years, this would suggest that on average, the respondents have a 10<sup>th</sup> grade education. Lastly, the respondents were asked how long have they lived in their current residence. These responses ranged from 0-60 years with a mean of ten years.

Next, I created a list of all dependent variable means. Political Freedom measures respondents perceptions on how free people are to engage in political activities. The variable is coded 1 for those who think it is safe to engage in politics.

Two variables were constructed to assess the social opportunities available in the local community. Improved schooling is coded 1 for respondents who said local schools are better than they were ten years ago. There is a notable difference between residents who live in garrison as compared to residents living in nongarrison and the variable is

significant. The same hold true for medical services. Similarly, improved health care is coded 1 for those who said that local medical facilities are better than they were ten years ago and there is a noticeable difference between respondents who live in garrison communities and those in nongarrison communities.

Three variables evaluate the individual's economic facilities. The first variable, income measures the total monthly income of the respondents' household in US dollars. There are several missing cases, nonetheless mean income for nongarrison households are nearly double that of garrisons. The second variable compares those respondents who are salaried employees, coded 1, against those who are not. The mean of nongarrison communities is significantly higher than the mean of garrison communities and the variable is significant. The third variable asks the respondent if they perceive their economic situation as better than it has been over the past ten years coded 1 if the answer is yes.

The variable gauging protective securities, special programs, is coded 1 for those who have special programs that enhance the quality of their area. The mean for this variable is extremely significant and the mean of those living in nongarrison communities is triple the mean of those living in garrison communities.

Three variables were created to describe the respondent's transparency guarantees. The first variable gauges the respondent's perception of the city official's ability to solve the problems of the city. The variable is coded 1 if the respondent believes the city officials have the ability to solve the community's problems. The mean for those living in nongarrison areas is higher than the mean for those living in garrison

communities. The respondents' knowledge about organizations existing in their neighborhood is also significant. In this instance, residents in garrison communities still have lower means than those respondents living in nongarrison areas.

Table 2: Dependent Variable Means By Community Type

Dependent Variable	Variable Means		N	Significance Level
	Nongarrison	Garrison		
<i>Political freedom</i> It is safe to engage in politics	43.0	38.9	775	.937
<i>Social Opportunities</i> Schools are better than ten years ago	24.0	19.3	743	.015
<i>Social opportunities</i> Medical Services are better than ten years ago	38.0	31.5	746	.016
<i>Economic Facilities</i> Income	146 (264)	72 (72)	472	.089
<i>Economic Facilities</i> Working or salaried employee	69.8	62.9	775	.231
<i>Economic Facilities</i> Economic situation is better than ten years ago	16.8	9.6	756	.018
<i>Protective Securities</i> Special programs (informal and formal organization) are provided to assist the public	9.70	3.68	767	.004
<i>Transparency Guarantees</i> City officials have the ability to solve the problems of the city	35.6	19.4	773	.000
<i>Transparency Guarantees</i> Knowledge of Neighborhood Organizations	63.8	55.5	775	.358
<i>Transparency Guarantees</i> Organizations can help improve the community	67.1	54.1	775	.032

Finally, the respondent's perception of the organization's ability to improve the neighborhood is coded as 1 if they think the organization can help improve the quality of life. The mean again is much smaller for those living in garrison areas and the variable is significant.

## 4.2 Results

A logistic analysis on the control variables and the garrison dummy variable tested each of the dependent variables. It should be reported that the pseudo  $R^2$  was uncommonly small in the majority of cases. This means that the results of the analysis only applied to a small percentage of the total population. However, because there is a definite change in the  $R^2$  after the independent variable is added to the model, the results are still worth reporting. The section will explain the results of each analysis, which may also be found in the tables located in the appendix section of this paper. The tables present the N, Pseudo  $R^2$  and coefficient (with the standard error in parentheses) of each variable in all of the regression analyses.

The variable created to measure an individual's political freedoms was inconclusive. A logistic regression analysis is conducted on the control variables and the garrison dummy variable in models 1 and 2, respectively and no significant control variables are revealed in either model. There is no change in the pseudo  $R^2$  and the p value cannot be measured at the .05 level. The garrison dummy variable is not significant indicating that living in a garrison community does not influence an individual's perception of the dangers of politics. It should be noted that several variables were created to gauge individuals' political freedom, but none produced significant results.

Table 3: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Logistic Regression of Political Freedom on Explanatory Variables

Dependent variable: Political Freedom		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	.0028 (.0059)	.0025 (.0059)
Male	.3909 (.1542)	.3903 (.1544)
Married	.0111 (.1555)	.0120 (.1560)
Years of Education	.0397 (.0250)	.0394 (.0254)
Years lived in this area	-.0165 (.0082)	-.0163 (.0083)
Newgar	--	-.0134 (.1702)
Logistic Constant	-.8549* (.4457)	-.8465* (.4582)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.0159	0.0159
Number of Cases	775	775

\*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

Both variables measuring the individual's social opportunities produced significant results. The dependent variable for medical services has a p value of .016 and is statistically significant at the .05 level. The pseudo R<sup>2</sup> almost doubles indicating that there is a definite change when the independent variable is added to the model. The regression coefficient suggests that individuals within garrison communities are likely to perceive the medical services as worse than they were ten years ago.

Table 4: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Logistic Regression of Health Care Improved on Explanatory Variables \*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

Dependent variable: Health Care Improved		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-0106 (.0071)	-.0131 (.0072)
Male	.1717 (.1845)	.1537 (.1851)
Married	.0140 (.1863)	.0461 (.1872)
Years of Education	-.0669* (.0311)	-.0805* (.0319)
Years lived in this area	.0192** (.0089)	.0241** (.0092)
Newgar	--	-.5092* (.2121)
Logistic Constant	-.4371 (.5385)	-1300 (.5554)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.0153	.0228
Number of Cases	746	746

\*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

For the variable created to describe the individual's education system there is also a change in the pseudo R<sup>2</sup> indicating that there is a significant change when the variable independent variable is added to the model. Again, the p value is statistically significant at the .05 level meaning that residents of garrison communities believe the education systems are worse than they were ten years ago.

Table 5: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Logistic Regression of Education Improved on Explanatory Variables

Dependent variable: Education Improved		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-.0108* (.0062)	-.0129* (.0063)
Male	.1960 (.1605)	.1851 (.1611)
Married	-.0916 (.1612)	-.0615 (.1622)
Years of Education	-.0654** (.0267)	-.0785** (.0274)
Years lived in this area	.0061 (.0082)	.0101 (.0083)
Newgar	--	-.4411* (.1807)
Logistic Constant	.4337 (.4699)	.7224 (.4866)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.0094	.0156
Number of Cases	743	743

\*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

The results of both analyses suggest that living in a garrison community does indeed constrain an individual's social opportunities and is consistent with the predicted hypothesis.

Three variables were created to gauge the individual's economic facilities. A linear regression analysis was used to measure income, the first variable. Table 6 displays the results of the analysis on the control variables and the garrison dummy in models 1 and 2 respectively. The variables controlling for gender and years of education proved to be significant as did the garrison dummy variable. There is a slight change in the



adjusted  $R^2$ , and a closer examination of the variable means (provided in Table 2) reveals that the difference is highly significant. Individuals in garrison communities have half the income of individuals living in nongarrison communities. This revelation is consistent with the predicted hypothesis.

Table 6: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Linear Regression of Income on Explanatory Variables

Dependent variable: Income		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	1.00 (.8665)	.7722 (.8752)
Male	64.87** (21.99)	62.83** (21.98)
Married	-4.89 (22.22)	-3.1426 (22.19)
Years of Education	15.36** (3.47)	14.05** (3.55)
Years lived in this area	-1.67 (1.11)	-1.39 (1.12)
Newgar	--	-41.86* (24.55)
Constant	-91.87 (62.01)	-60.69 (64.53)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.0664	0.0702
Number of cases	472	472

\* $p < .05$  and \*\* $p < .01$

The second variable gauging the individual's economic facilities did not produce significant results. Here it is discovered that gender and age are both significant control variables. However, the garrison dummy variable is not significant indicating that living in a garrison does not influence the odds of being a salaried employee.

Table 7: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Logistic Regression of Working on Explanatory Variables

Dependent variable: Working		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-.0436** (.0069)	-.0449** (.0070)
Male	1.37** (.1858)	1.359** (.1860)
Married	.1467 (.1788)	.1609 (.1795)
Years of Education	.0626 (.0300)	.0057 (.0305)
Years lived in this area	.0008 (.0088)	.0030 (.0089)
Newgar	--	-2309 (.1926)
Logistic Constant	1.355* (.5200)	1.517* (.5380)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.1508	.1523
Number of cases	775	775

\*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

The third and final variable gauging the individual's perception of their economic situation did produce significant results. Here again the pseudo R<sup>2</sup> doubled indicating and though the analysis produced no significant controls, the garrison dummy variable did prove to be significant; residents of garrison communities are likely to perceive their economic status as worse than respondents living in nongarrison communities.

Table 8: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Logistic Regression of Economic Improvement on Explanatory Variables

Dependent variable: Economic Improvement		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-0082 (.0084)	-.0111 (.0085)
Male	.1634 (.2156)	.1465 (.2161)
Married	.2089 (.2203)	.2533 (.2217)
Years of Education	.0192 (.0341)	.0037 (.0348)
Years lived in this area	-.0105 (.0119)	-.0051 (.0121)
Newgar	--	-.6215* (.2624)
Logistic Constant	-1.680* (.6178)	-1.324* (.6356)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.0106	.0201
Number of Cases	756	756

\*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

A logistic regression is conducted on the control variables and the garrison dummy variables in models 1 and 2 respectively for the dependent variable gauging special programs. Although no control variables proved to be significant, the independent variable has a p value of .004 and indicates that living in garrison communities decreases the respondent's likelihood of having special programs to assist them. This result supports the claim that protective securities are constrained by the existence of garrison communities.

Table 9: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Logistic Regression of Special Programs on Explanatory Variables

Dependent variable: Special Programs		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	.0089 (.0103)	.0051 (.0104)
Male	-.1780 (.2811)	-.2096 (.2819)
Married	-.1333 (.2808)	-.0843 (.2822)
Years of Education	.0019 (.0456)	-.0222 (.0468)
Years lived in this area	.0003 (.0139)	.0085 (.0140)
Newgar	--	-1.136** (.3957)
Logistic Constant	-2.704** (.8078)	-2.168** (.8288)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0043	0.028
Number of Cases	767	767

\*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

Three variables were also created to measure the Sen's fifth and final freedom: the transparency guarantees afforded each individual. The analysis for the variable gauging the city's ability to solve problems within the community is the first transparency guarantee to be measured. The garrison dummy variable is the only significant variable with a p value of .000 indicating that residents of garrison communities are less likely to believe that city officials have the ability to solve their problems. These findings are presented in Table 10.

Table 10: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Logistic Regression of City's Ability to Solve Problems on Explanatory Variables

Dependent variable: City's Ability to Solve Problems		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-.0034 (.0064)	-.0070 (.0063)
Male	.3139 (.1638)	.2948 (.1655)
Married	-.0566 (.1649)	-.0051 (.1671)
Years of Education	.0180 (.0262)	-.0026 (.0269)
Years lived in this area	-.0061 (.0086)	.0013 (.0081)
Newgar	--	-.8352** (.1980)
Logistic Constant	-.8903 (.4692)	-.4184 (.4859)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0069	0.0269
Number of Cases	773	773

\*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

For the analysis describing the respondent's perception of local organizations years of education is the only significant variable. Because the garrison dummy variable is not significant, it cannot be determined if this variable supports the contention that transparency guarantees are constrained by garrison communities.

Table 11: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Logistic Regression of Organizations Ability to Help on Explanatory Variables

Dependent variable: Organization's Ability to Help		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	.0075 (.0059)	.0068 (.0060)
Male	.2040 (.1564)	.1982 (.1567)
Married	.1221 (.1572)	.1323 (.1578)
Years of Education	.0967** (.0267)	.0923** (.0271)
Years lived in this area	-.0141 (.0079)	-.026 (.0081)
Newgar	--	-.1562 (.1698)
Logistic Constant	-.8492 (.4615)	-.7490 (.4743)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.0249	0.0257
Number of Cases	775	775

\*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

The final analysis on the control variables and the garrison dummy variable which measures the respondent's knowledge of local organizations does produce significant controls: age and years of education. The garrison dummy variable is also significant indicating that residents in garrison communities are less likely to have any organizations within their community.

Table 12: Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Logistic Regression of Knowledge of Organizations on Explanatory Variables

Dependent variable: Knowledge of Organizations		
Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Age	.0046 (.0060)	.0029 (.0061)
Male	.2797 (.1585)	.2670 (.1591)
Married	.0128 (.1595)	.0360 (.1604)
Years of Education	.0733* (.0267)	.0632* (.0271)
Years lived in this area	-.02278* (.0080)	-.0192* (.0082)
Newgar	--	-.3658* (.1703)
Logistic Constant	-.2519 (.4636)	-.0143 (.4779)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.0260	.0305
Number of Cases	775	775

\*p<.05 and \*\*p<.01

## CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This paper opened with the proposition that the existence of garrison communities interferes with civil society participation and threatens the essential freedoms that serve as the ends and means of development. While it is inconclusive as to whether or not garrison communities threaten the public's political freedom, it is evident that many of the protective securities, social opportunities and transparency guarantees of citizens living in these areas are greatly affected. There are even indicators that the respondent's economic facilities are jeopardized as well. Overall, the results suggest that garrison communities act as barriers within society, restricting the privileges of local citizens who are not completely free to engage in nor have access to those elements of civil society, which promote development.

The most significant variables in this analysis are those dealing with special programs or privileges available to residents implying that the state's internal structure has a definite impact on the public's perception of growth and decline within the community. To quote Bradshaw and Schafer "nongovernmental organizations and other elements of an increasingly global civil society do make a difference in the development process, even in highly dependent countries (Bradshaw 2000, p.111)." Many critics would argue that garrisons provide an organizational structure that the state is otherwise lacking.

My research affirms that the existence of garrisons communities or any element that poses a threat to civil society only exacerbates the problems of an already struggling state and weakens the development process.



Much of the preexisting sociological research has concentrated on political and economic factors as measures of development. While examining development from this perspective is certainly helpful, my research reaffirms that development is not based upon economic or political capabilities alone. More and more analysts are considering the significance of civil society as it relates to development; Amartya Sen pushes the envelope even further by suggesting that key to development is the freedoms society is allowed to enjoy.

This study of Jamaica is an excellent example of this theory. Possessing enormous potential for growth, Jamaica is still considered an underdeveloped nation and its weak civil society is to blame. Political strongholds also known as garrison communities weaken the country's capabilities by revoking its citizens of the basic freedoms necessary for sustaining economic life and combating poverty (Sen, Fisher).

The most important contribution to be gained by this research is the realization that a sociological study on modern development should examine all indicators of development: including political, economic and civil society theories, as no one factor alone is a thorough indicator. Failure to examine each element would not provide a full understanding of the factors surrounding a country's development or lack thereof. The level of development sustained in a community is relative to the freedoms its citizens are allowed to enjoy. By first examining the state of its civil society and by working to eradicate the unfreedoms caused by garrison communities, Jamaica can begin to take more purposeful steps towards development.

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