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Thesis

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Evangelical Christians and the Presidential Election of 1992

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In recent years, the nature of evangelical Christian involvement in American politics has been the subject of intensive inquiry and debate, both in scholarly journals and in the media at large. During the 1980's, evangelicals seemingly emerged as a vital, stable component of the Republican electoral coalition, one that produced sweeping victories in the presidential races of 1980, 1984, and 1988 (Kellstedt 1989). Republicans were able to capitalize on themes of religious faith, anti-communism, and "family values," attracting evangelicals with a comprehensive social agenda. Republicans framed the electoral choices for Christian conservatives in very clear, dichotomous terms: the Republican party represented the traditional, Christian values of middle-America, while the Democratic party was controlled by a secular, urban elite and various social deviants (Jelen 1993). By decisive margins, evangelicals gave their support to the GOP.

In the presidential election of 1992, however, the choice for Christian conservatives seemed less clear-cut. Republicans had held the presidency for twelve years, but had made little tangible progress on abortion, school prayer, and other issues vital to evangelicals. The resultant evangelical frustration was compounded by the fact that George Bush showed markedly less fervor for evangelical causes than his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. Moreover, Democratic nominees Clinton and Gore were both Southern Baptists, a denomination heavily represented among evangelical ranks. With the additional complicating factors of a nation-wide recession and a major third-party candidacy, sufficient reasons clearly existed

to give evangelicals doubts about their allegiance to the Republican party. If there was going to be a drop-off in evangelical Christian support for GOP presidential candidates, 1992 was the year.

This paper will examine the presidential voting of evangelical Christians in the 1992 election, in an effort to understand the nature and scope of their support for the top of the Republican ticket. It seeks to determine if the evangelical vote remained a bloc constituency of the GOP, or if the various factors at work in 1992 muted its partisan character. Additionally, it will examine evangelical attitudes regarding several major social issues of the campaign, attempting to ascertain whether evangelicals remained committed to the same moral agenda which drove their political activity in the 1980s. In essence, the paper poses, and seeks to answer, two major questions. First and foremost, was identification with evangelical Christianity a significant predictor of Republican presidential vote choice in 1992? Secondly, does social conservatism remain a major distinguishing characteristic of evangelical voters?

Historical Background

In order to understand the role of evangelical Christians in the election of 1992, it is useful to review the history of evangelical involvement in American politics over the course of the twentieth century. It is only in this century that evangelicalism has emerged as a distinct, cohesive, institutionally driven force

in American politics. While evangelicalism was certainly very powerful in American culture during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, movements such as the Great Awakening and religious revivalism were largely apolitical in character. Evangelical Christians were vigorously involved in the slavery debate, with its accompanying partisan divisions, but they (like the rest of the nation) were sharply divided along regional lines (Hammond 1992). Once the slavery issue was settled with the Civil War, evangelical leaders and adherents were very reluctant to sully their spirituality with sustained involvement in the political process (Wilcox 1988). With the turn of the twentieth century, however, came selective but important evangelical involvement in major political questions of the day, heralding a new era in the relationship between religion and politics among evangelical Christians.

In the first two decades of this century, evangelical involvement in politics focused primarily on the issue of prohibition (Wilcox 1988). When victory in that arena was apparently won with the passage of the eighteenth amendment in 1919, evangelicals turned their attention toward a more serious threat: the teaching of evolution in American classrooms. Numerous evangelical organizations, including the Bible Crusaders of America and the Defenders of the Christian Faith, were organized to combat the "scientific secularism" pervading American education (Furniss 1963). Their efforts enjoyed only limited success, as national opinion generally supported academic freedom (Marsden 1980).

By the end of the 1920s, opposition to evolution was waning, and evangelicalism itself had clearly split into "fundamentalist" and "modernist" camps. Many of the more liberal denominations and congregations moved away from evangelicalism altogether, giving what had been a mainstream, theologically diverse movement a definite conservative doctrinal lean (Marsden 1980). Yet the increasingly orthodox evangelical organizations were undaunted, and sought to redefine their focus by flirting with anti-communist and anti-Catholic themes. Evangelical Christians even showed some electoral clout in the presidential election of 1928, as the heavily evangelical South broke its tradition of voting solidly Democratic in a repudiation of Catholic candidate Al Smith. Yet it is important to note that evangelical involvement in politics in the 1920s was very limited and almost completely non-partisan; Christian conservatives took coherent stands on only a few issues, none of which were clearly identified with either major party. Both Democrats and Republicans counted "drys" and "wets" among their ranks, and neither party openly opposed the teaching of evolution, particularly after the embarrassing anti-intellectualism of the Scopes trial (Speer 1982). Thus, while evangelical Christianity had flexed its muscles in the 1920s, it had yet to exert a significant, sustained influence on American electoral politics.

During the 1930s and 1940s, evangelical Christians exerted little distinctive influence on American politics. Like the population at large, conservative Christians generally supported

Roosevelt's New Deal, as the evangelical community exhibited a strong populist strain (Wilcox 1988). But with the coming of the Cold War in the 1950s, organized evangelical political activity resumed in earnest. The motive force in this case was opposition to Communism, both at home and abroad. The Christian Anti-Communism Crusade spearheaded evangelical involvement in issues such as sex education and school prayer under a broad paradigm of opposition to communist infiltration of America's school system (Claubaugh 1974). Yet the evangelical community was by no means monolithically conservative. While overwhelmingly anti-communist, evangelicals displayed mixed issue positions and partisan preferences (Wilcox 1988). Though most supported Goldwater in 1964, his crushing defeat (and the independent candidacy of George Wallace in 1968) stymied any permanent large-scale migration of evangelicals into the Republican camp. Clearly, evangelicalism in the 1960's was a potential political force, but remained ambivalent and unfocused in the electoral context.

The presidential candidacy of Jimmy Carter in 1976 was thus a watershed in the history of evangelical involvement in politics. Galvanized in large part by the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, evangelical Christians were ready to express their views in the electoral arena (Hammond 1992). Himself a professed evangelical, Carter appealed to conservative Christians and brought national attention to evangelical Christianity. For the first time, the evangelical Christian community was energized to support a single presidential candidate, and many previously

apolitical evangelicals began to participate in the electoral process (Wilcox 1988). The evangelical vote proved decisive, as Carter narrowly won the election with a sweep of his native (and largely evangelical) South. Thus, the Carter candidacy united and brought to national prominence a cohesive and manifestly powerful bloc of evangelical voters and delivered them, at least temporarily, to the Democratic party.

The Democratic voting of evangelical Christians, however, was very short-lived. By 1980, evangelical leaders had begun to emphasize conservative issue positions on a broad range of economic, social, and foreign policy questions, and many Christian conservatives were disillusioned by Carter's failure to translate his personal faith into governmental policy. As a result, the presidential election of 1980 saw a move of evangelicals into the Republican camp that was greatly accelerated in 1984 (Lopatto 1985). Over the course of the decade, evangelical involvement in politics took on an unprecedented sustained partisan dimension, as the GOP actively and successfully courted Christian conservatives in three successive presidential elections. Republicans largely succeeded in simplifying the political landscape into a "dualistic cognitive organization" of the moral right and the immoral left (Jelen 1993). By the end of the decade, then, it appeared that evangelicals were becoming a fixture in the Republican presidential column. This notion, however, would be put to a strong test in the election of 1992.

Data and Method

The data used in this analysis are drawn from the 1992 National Election Study, compiled at the University of Michigan. While it does not offer the highly detailed information of in-depth local interviews, a large-scale national survey like the NES is attractive in that it yields a high level of external validity (Guth et al. 1988). Additionally, the NES affords a large sample size and broad geographic and social scope not available in many other data sources. The data set includes ample items for examining and operationalizing the two key concepts of this study: evangelicalism and presidential vote choice.

In analyzing evangelical involvement in electoral politics, the central methodological question is how best to operationalize evangelicalism. Previous studies have revealed three major elements that can be useful in the identification and categorizing of evangelical Christians. One method of classification is doctrinally based, identifying evangelicals according to their views on theological questions, particularly the sanctity and primacy of the Bible (Guth et al. 1988). Other studies have suggested the usefulness of a denominational categorization, emphasizing the social aspects of evangelicalism and its essentially Protestant character (Lopatto 1985, Smidt 1987). Finally, religious self-identification as "evangelical" or "fundamentalist" has also been shown to yield meaningful distinctions in an analysis of religion and politics (Beatty and Walter 1988).

Consequently, the definition of "evangelical" used in this analysis is a composite one. Survey respondents were classified as evangelicals if they met three criteria: belief in the Bible as the inspired word of God, identification with a Protestant denomination (excluding Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Christian Scientists), and self-identification as either "evangelical," "fundamentalist," or "charismatic." This method of classification identifies approximately 24% of respondents as evangelicals, a proportion consistent with estimates in other sources (Hammond 1992, Wald 1992).

The second major methodological problem in this analysis, as in any study of vote choice in the 1992 election, is the question of how to treat Ross Perot voters. Perot's support seemed to come from both traditionally Democratic and traditionally Republican ranks, muting its impact on the partisan nature of the electorate. His candidacy, however, complicates the formulation and testing of directional vote choice hypotheses, in that he cannot really be placed as some sort of partisan midpoint between Clinton and Bush. In this respect, it is tempting to leave out Ross Perot voters entirely, particularly in this study which seeks to evaluate a particular group's position on the Democratic-Republican allegiance spectrum. Yet the Perot voters are a sizeable segment of the electorate (nearly 20%), and seem to share certain important ideological predispositions which would be greatly under-represented if they were excluded completely. Thus, a compromise seems in order. In this study, Perot voters are included in all of

the frequency and difference of means data, and in the models of relative candidate preference and party identification. They are excluded only from the models of vote choice itself. This solution seeks to retain their influence on measures of issue attitudes, while still allowing a clear, directional analysis of partisan vote choice.

A variety of variables are included in the analysis of evangelical voting in the 1992 presidential election. Party identification and liberal-conservative placement are employed as measures of partisanship and ideology, respectively. Feeling thermometer scores gauge support for the candidates, and a feeling thermometer difference (Bush score minus Clinton score) measures relative candidate preference. Evangelical attitudes on a variety of campaign issues are examined, including abortion, gay rights, school prayer, "family values," and the perceived morality of the two major candidates. Finally, standard demographic variables of race, gender, region, age, income, and education are also measured.

Modeling Procedures

The vote choice models in this study employ logistic regression, due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable (presidential vote). This statistical technique has been shown to be appropriate in such a circumstance (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). The models include controls for ideology, race, gender, region, age, and income; one model includes a control variable for partisanship, while one is constructed without such a control. In

both vote choice models, the effects of evangelicalism are measured through a dichotomous independent variable.

The analysis of relative candidate preference is done using two ordinary least squares regression models. As in the vote choice analysis, the only difference between the two models is the absence of an independent variable partisanship measure in the second. Both include standard demographic controls and a dichotomous measure of evangelicalism. The dependent variable in both cases is the difference in feeling thermometer ratings for Bush and Clinton, a measure which has been shown to be highly correlated with vote choice. These models are based on a larger sample size than the voting models, due to the inclusion of Perot supporters and some respondents who did not actually vote in the presidential election.

The final model presented here is one for partisanship, seeking to determine the impact of evangelicalism on party identification. It is an ordinary least squares regression model including demographic controls, an independent variable for ideology, and the same measure of evangelicalism employed in the other models. The dependent variable measure of partisanship is respondent self-placement on a seven-point scale from strong Democrat to strong Republican.

Characteristics of Evangelicals

An analysis of the frequency data presented in Table 2 reveals several interesting characteristics of evangelicals. First and

foremost, their conservative ideological orientation is quite apparent. Fully 57% place themselves on the right side of the seven point liberal-conservative spectrum, as opposed to only 16.4% on the left (26.8% identify themselves as true moderates). Additionally, evangelicals exhibit conservative attitudes on several major social issues. In terms of abortion rights, 74.6% of evangelicals express support for some form of limitation, with the largest group favoring abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the mother's life. Regarding homosexuals, most oppose allowing gays to serve in the military, and an overwhelming 85.7% oppose allowing gay couples to adopt children (with 78.5% expressing strong opposition). Clearly, evangelical Christians exhibit a broad-based social conservatism.

Another interesting evangelical trait revealed by the frequency data is a tendency toward relatively strong partisanship. Third-party candidate Ross Perot garnered only 13.5% of the evangelical Christian vote, a much lower proportion than he won among the rest of the electorate. Moreover, when evangelicals are asked about their partisan attachments, the two largest groups of respondents are those calling themselves "strong Democrats" (18.9%) and "strong Republicans" (16.3%). True independents form the smallest category (7.7%). Evangelical Christians, therefore, seem less affected than the rest of the population by declining political partisanship and the appeal of a third-party candidacy.

A final interesting aspect of the frequency table is the demographic data. The evangelical population in this survey

contains a higher proportion of blacks than does the rest of the nation (although blacks in general seem to be somewhat under-represented in the NES). A majority of evangelicals (57.9%) are female, a finding consistent with the traditionally heavy active involvement of American women in conservative Christian denominations. As expected, evangelicalism is more common in the South than in the rest of the nation, with Southerners forming nearly half (46.6%) of national evangelical ranks. Finally, evangelical Christians are generally not a wealthy bunch. The majority (51.2%) come from homes with family incomes of less than \$25,000, and only a very small minority (4.1%) live in circumstances approaching affluence (family incomes of over \$75,000). Thus, Table 2 demonstrates that evangelical Christians have distinctive group traits in terms of ideology, partisanship, and general demographic characteristics.

Bivariate Relationships

The difference of means data (Table 3) quantifies many interesting distinctions between evangelical Christians and non-evangelicals. In demographic terms, evangelicals as a group exhibit characteristics typically associated with Democratic affiliation and vote choice. As discussed previously, they are more heavily black (11.9% vs. 5.7%) and female (57.9% vs. 51.9%) than the population at large, are older, and have substantially lower average levels of education and income. Despite these factors, however, evangelicalism remains highly correlated with

conservative ideology, Republican identification, and voting for George Bush. Thus, the data suggest that in the case of evangelicals, religious motivation significantly counterbalances demographic factors in political decision-making.

Regarding specific social issues of the campaign, evangelicals (as discussed above) exhibit substantially more conservative attitudes on abortion, gay rights, school prayer, and "family values" than does the population at large. On the "character issue," evangelicals hold a slightly higher opinion of George Bush's personal morality but, somewhat surprisingly, do not differ significantly from the rest of voters in their appraisal of Clinton's moral character. Additionally, it would appear that even for evangelicals, personal moral character did not play a paramount role in assessment of the presidential candidates. Despite having a sharply higher view of Bush's morality than of Clinton's (2.12 vs. 1.37, with 3 as a maximum), evangelicals actually gave Clinton a slightly higher average feeling thermometer score (61.04 to 60.29). This mild apparent preference for Clinton was not, however, translated into vote choice, as Bush won a plurality of the evangelical vote. It seems that, for evangelicals, agreement with Bush on issue positions proved more important than personal warmth of feeling toward Bill Clinton.

In terms of this study's central concern, the effect of evangelicalism on Republican presidential vote choice, a difference of means analysis reveals a strong, positive directional relationship. Bush won 51.5% of votes among evangelicals, as

opposed to only 38.2% of non-evangelical votes (excluding Perot voters in both cases). In the related variable of feeling thermometer difference, evangelicalism accounted for an 8.5 point swing in favor of Bush. Non-evangelicals show a marked feeling thermometer preference for Clinton, while the two candidates are roughly equal in the estimation of evangelicals. Thus, in a bivariate analysis, evangelicalism is clearly linked with Republican presidential voting.

Multivariate Analysis

In a multivariate context, the relationship between evangelicalism and vote choice becomes somewhat more complex. Table 4 represents a logistic vote choice model including partisanship, ideology, demographic controls, and evangelicalism. The model serves relatively well as a predictor of vote choice, correctly predicting nearly 90% of cases (with a pseudo- r^2 of 0.6596). As expected, vote choice is heavily influenced by party identification, liberal-conservative placement, and race. In this model, evangelicalism appears not to have a major systematic impact on vote choice, once one controls for other factors. The data reflect a positive relationship, but it is not statistically significant. Thus, the initial inclination is to reject evangelicalism as a major independent motivator of Republican presidential voting.

Such a conclusion, however, is quite surprising in light of the difference of means data presented in Table 3, and is called

into question by the analysis reflected in Table 5. The model in Table 5 is identical to that in Table 4, except that it omits the control for party identification. Once again, ideology and race are found to be significant determinants of vote choice, but in this case they are joined by family income and evangelicalism. Moreover, the model remains a reasonably accurate voting predictor. When partisanship is excluded, the pseudo- r^2 drops to 0.3948, but nearly 80% of cases are still predicted correctly. The data, therefore, seem to suggest that evangelicalism does indeed contribute to Republican vote choice, but that a good portion of its impact may be through the intervening variable of party identification.

The same general relationship is reflected in Tables 6 and 7, which represent the OLS regression models of relative candidate preference (measured by feeling thermometer difference). In these models, however, the impact of evangelicalism is felt somewhat more strongly. Table 6 describes the model with a control for partisanship; here, party identification, ideology, race, region, income, and evangelicalism are found to significantly influence relative candidate preference. Even controlling for all of these other factors, evangelicalism produces a swing of more than five points in favor of George Bush. Once again, removing the partisanship variable from the model substantially increases the importance of evangelicalism, as illustrated in Table 7. In this case, the effect nearly doubles, to just under ten points, and acquires a higher degree of statistical significance. Thus, the

relative candidate preference models suggest the same conclusion as those for vote choice: that evangelicalism contributes to, and exerts electoral influence through, the medium of Republican party identification.

The testing of this inference is shown a Table 8, an OLS model of party identification. The model includes independent variables for ideology, demographics, and evangelicalism. As the previous models would suggest, evangelicalism exerts a fairly sizeable influence on party identification in the Republican direction, with a high degree of statistical significance. Only ideology, race, and income have a greater impact. The party identification model thus provides further support for the idea that evangelicalism effects presidential vote choice, in large part through its contribution to Republican party identification.

Conclusions

The analysis presented in this study suggests that evangelicalism was a significant predictor of Republican presidential vote choice in the election of 1992. Evangelicals are shown to support George Bush at significantly higher rates than the general public, in both bivariate and multivariate analyses. The pattern of evangelical preference for the GOP, while perhaps not as dramatic as in 1984 or 1988, continued to manifest itself in the most recent presidential election.

The data also reveal interesting aspects of the nature of evangelical support for Republican presidential candidates. It

appears that long-term ideological orientation has become more important than individual candidate characteristics in determining evangelical vote choice, a significant development given the quixotic history of evangelical involvement in partisan politics. Moreover, evangelicals seem to support the Republican party despite all demographic inclinations. They are, on average, older, poorer, and less well-educated than the general population, and their ranks contain significantly higher proportions of blacks and women. Their support for the GOP is thus strong testament to the influence of their religious beliefs on their political orientation.

As discussed previously, evangelicals (not surprisingly) exhibited views substantially more conservative than those of other voters. They were less in favor of abortion and gay rights, and more supportive of school prayer and "family values," all by large margins. Positions on these issues thus remain a major identifying characteristic of evangelical Christians. Republican appeals to socially conservative themes, so prominent in the last three elections, may be expected to have continued resonance with evangelicals in future campaigns.

Placed within the historical context of twentieth-century evangelical involvement in American electoral politics, the results of this study suggest or provide support for several interesting trends. First and foremost is the continued partisan dimension of evangelical political activity. The election of 1992 marks the fourth straight campaign in which evangelicals have aligned themselves with the same political party for largely religious

reasons, a phenomenon unprecedented in this century. Moreover, the era of short-term evangelical partisanship based on single issues (prohibition, anti-Communism, anti-Catholicism, etc.) seems to be over. Evangelical Christians in 1992 showed agreement with the Republican party on a range of issues, and largely identified themselves as conservatives; this stands in sharp contrast to the mixed ideologies and issue positions among evangelicals in the 1950's and 1960's. Finally, it is interesting to note that Bill Clinton, despite being in many respects remarkably similar to Jimmy Carter (including in denominational affiliation), got a very different reception from evangelical voters. While Carter in 1976 benefitted from evangelical support, Clinton actually did substantially worse among evangelicals than he did among the electorate at large. The difference between the two candidacies says much about the evolution of evangelical partisanship over the past sixteen years.

In the final analysis, this study confirms in the most recent election much of what has been written and speculated in the past ten years: that a substantial alignment of evangelical Christians with the Republican party has taken place at the presidential level, driven largely by shared positions on social issues. Based on the analysis and data presented here, evangelicals are and should continue to be a major component of the Republican electoral coalition.

Table 1: Description of Variables Used
in Analysis of Evangelical Voting in the
1992 American Presidential Elections

Variable	Description
Presidential vote (1992)	0 = respondent voted for Bill Clinton; 1 = respondent voted for George Bush; all others (including Perot voters) coded as missing
Liberal-conservative placement	Respondent's ideological self-placement on a seven-point scale, ranging from 0 (most liberal) to 6 (most conservative)
Party identification	Respondent's partisan self-identification on a seven-point scale, ranging from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican)
Bush feeling thermometer	Measure of respondent's warmth of feeling toward George Bush, ranging from 0 (least favorable rating) to 100 (most favorable rating)
Clinton feeling thermometer	Measure of respondent's warmth of feeling toward Bill Clinton, ranging from 0 (least favorable rating) to 100 (most favorable rating)
Perot feeling thermometer	Measure of respondent's warmth of feeling toward Ross Perot, ranging from 0 (least favorable rating) to 100 (most favorable rating)
Feeling thermometer difference	Measure of respondent's ratings of George Bush and Bill Clinton relative to each other; derived by subtracting the Clinton feeling thermometer score from the Bush feeling thermometer score; ranges from -100 (strongest possible preference for Clinton) to +100 (strongest possible preference for Bush)
Bush's perceived morality	Respondent's stated perception of how well the term "moral" describes George Bush; 0 = "not well at all"; 1 = "not too well"; 2 = "quite well"; 3 = "extremely well"
Clinton's perceived morality	Respondent's stated perception of how well the term "moral" describes Bill Clinton; 0 = "not well at all"; 1 = "not too well"; 2 = "quite well"; 3 = "extremely well"
Support for abortion	Respondent's stated position on the question of legalized abortion; 1 = abortion should never be legal; 2 = abortion should be legal only in case of rape, incest, or danger to the mother; 3 = abortion should be permitted in any case in which the need has been "clearly established"; 4 = abortion should always be legal; all other responses coded as missing
Support for government abortion funding	Respondent's stated position on a hypothetical state law that would allow government funding of abortions for women who cannot afford them; -2 = strongly oppose; -1 = oppose, not strongly; 1 = favor, not strongly; 2 = strongly favor
Support for gays in the military	Respondent's stated position on the question of homosexual right to serve in the United States Armed Forces; -2 = strongly oppose; -1 = oppose, not strongly; 1 = support, not strongly; 2 = strongly support
Support for gays' right to adopt	Respondent's stated position on the question of homosexual couples' right to adopt children; -2 = strongly oppose; -1 = oppose, not strongly; 1 = support, not strongly; 2 = strongly support
Support for school prayer	Respondent's attitude toward the legality of prayer in public schools; 1 = school prayer should be completely illegal; 2 = the law should allow a moment of silence for private prayer; 3 = the law should allow a general, non-sectarian group prayer; 4 = the law should mandate a group Christian prayer; all other responses coded as missing

Table 1 (continued)

Variable	Description
Emphasis on "family values"	Measure of respondent's perception of the importance of "family values" to society; Based on level of agreement with the statement: "This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties." -2 = strongly disagree; -1 = disagree somewhat; 0 = neither agree nor disagree; 1 = agree somewhat; 2 = agree strongly
Race	1 = respondent is black; 0 = all other respondents
Gender	1 = respondent is female; 0 = respondent is male
Region	1 = respondent lives in the South (MD, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, AL, FL, MS, TN, KY, AR, LA, TX, OK); 0 = all other respondents
Age	Respondent's age (in years)
Family income	Respondent's report of total annual income for all members of his or her household, grouped in twenty-four categories ranging from under \$2,999 (category 1) to over \$105,000 (category 24)
Education	Respondent's self-reported formal schooling, measured in years
Evangelicalism	Dichotomous classification of the respondent as either an evangelical Christian or a non-evangelical, based on denominational affiliation, attitude toward the Bible, and self-description as "fundamentalist," "evangelical," or "charismatic"; 1 = evangelical, 0 = non-evangelical

Table 2: Characteristics of Evangelicals

Variable	Evangelicals
Presidential vote (1992)	
Bush	0.445
Clinton	0.420
Perot	0.135
Liberal-conservative placement	
0 Most liberal	0.034
1	0.046
2	0.084
3	0.268
4	0.211
5	0.318
6 Most conservative	0.041
Party identification	
Strong Democrat	0.189
Weak Democrat	0.157
Independent-Leaning Democrat	0.122
Pure Independent	0.077
Independent-Leaning Republican	0.143
Weak Republican	0.150
Strong Republican	0.163
Bush feeling thermometer	
0-25	0.103
26-50	0.276
51-75	0.324
76-100	0.288
Clinton feeling thermometer	
0-25	0.118
26-50	0.265
51-75	0.293
76-100	0.324
Perot feeling thermometer	
0-25	0.178
26-50	0.397
51-75	0.290
76-100	0.135
Feeling thermometer difference	
-100 to -61	0.087
-60 to -21	0.223
-20 to +20	0.367
+21 to +60	0.240
+61 to +100	0.081
Bush's perceived morality	
0 Lowest	0.031
1	0.129
2	0.528
3 Highest	0.312

Table 2 (continued)

Variable	Evangelicals
Clinton's perceived morality	
0 Lowest	0.139
1	0.412
2	0.390
3 Highest	0.059
Support for abortion	
Never legal	0.174
Only legal if rape, incest, or danger to mother	0.421
Legal if "need is established"	0.151
Always legal	0.254
Support for government abortion funding	
Favor strongly	0.213
Favor, not strongly	0.150
Oppose, not strongly	0.131
Oppose strongly	0.507
Support for gays in the military	
Strongly support	0.224
Support, not strongly	0.199
Oppose, not strongly	0.104
Strongly oppose	0.473
Support for gays' right to adopt	
Strongly support	0.057
Support, not strongly	0.086
Oppose, not strongly	0.072
Strongly oppose	0.785
Support for school prayer	
Oppose any form of school prayer	0.054
Support "moment of silence" for private prayer	0.488
Support non-sectarian group prayer	0.295
Support mandatory Christian group prayer	0.162
Emphasis on "family values"	
0 Least emphasis	0.009
1	0.046
2	0.064
3	0.290
4 Most emphasis	0.591
Race	
Black	0.119
White and other	0.881
Gender	
Male	0.421
Female	0.579
Region	
South	0.466
Non-South	0.534

Table 2 (continued)

Variable	Evangelicals
Age	
Under 30	0.170
30-45	0.357
46-55	0.148
56-65	0.134
Over 65	0.191
Family income	
Under \$10,000	0.189
\$10,000 - \$24,999	0.323
\$25,000 - \$49,999	0.307
\$50,000 - \$74,999	0.140
Over \$75,000	0.041
Education	
0-8 years	0.094
9-12 years	0.471
13-16 years	0.361
17 or more years	0.074

Table 3: Difference in Means for Evangelicals
and Non-Evangelicals on Selected
Independent Variables

Variable	Means		Difference	t-ratio	prob.
	Evangelicals	Others			
Presidential vote (1992)	0.515	0.382	0.133	4.308***	0.0001
Liberal-conservative placement	3.694	3.060	0.634	8.171***	0.0001
Party identification	2.930	2.633	0.297	3.101***	0.0020
Bush feeling thermometer	60.294	54.207	6.087	4.906***	0.0001
Clinton feeling thermometer	61.039	63.498	-2.459	-2.046**	0.0409
Perot feeling thermometer	49.369	52.893	-3.524	-2.958***	0.0031
Feeling thermometer difference	-0.889	-9.347	8.458	4.151***	0.0001
Bush's perceived morality	2.120	1.988	0.132	3.646***	0.0003
Clinton's perceived morality	1.368	1.428	-0.060	-1.563	0.1183
Support for abortion	2.486	3.124	-0.638	-12.758***	0.0001
Support for government abortion funding	-0.569	0.104	-0.673	-8.379***	0.0001
Support for gays in the military	-0.403	0.354	-0.757	-8.945***	0.0001
Support for gays' right to adopt	-1.442	-0.781	-0.661	-8.769***	0.0001
Support for school prayer	2.566	2.297	0.269	6.476***	0.0001
Emphasis on "family values"	1.407	1.092	0.315	6.435***	0.0001
Race: black	0.119	0.057	0.062	5.133***	0.0001
Gender: female	0.579	0.519	0.060	1.935*	0.0532
Region: South	0.466	0.286	0.180	8.278***	0.0001
Age	47.055	45.328	1.727	2.078**	0.0378
Family Income	12.989	14.528	-1.539	-4.958***	0.0001
Education	12.535	13.002	-0.467	-3.497***	0.0005

*** prob < 0.01, two-tailed test

** prob < 0.05, two-tailed test

* prob < 0.10, two-tailed test

Table 4: Parameter Values (LOGIT Coefficients)
for Model of Voting in the 1992
American Presidential Election

Variable	b	t	prob.
Dependent Variable:			
Presidential vote (1992)			
Intercept	-6.336	-7.764***	0.0001
Party identification	0.985	11.937***	0.0001
Liberal-conservative placement	0.737	6.408***	0.0001
Race: black	-2.194	-3.492***	0.0005
Gender: female	0.303	1.083	0.2789
Region: South	0.461	1.467	0.1423
Age	0.005	0.653	0.5140
Family income	0.021	0.822	0.4112
Evangelicalism	0.336	0.960	0.3369

Pseudo- $R^2 = 0.6596$

Proportion predicted correctly: 0.890

Predicted probabilities: Y = 0: 0.145
Y = 1: 0.808

T-statistic for difference: 35.569 (prob < 0.0001)

N = 655

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.

Table 5: Parameter Values (LOGIT Coefficients)
for Model of Voting in the 1992
American Presidential Election,
without Control for Party Identification

Variable	b	t	prob.
Dependent Variable:			
Presidential Vote (1992)			
Intercept	-4.447	-7.330***	0.0001
Liberal-conservative placement	1.013	11.327***	0.0001
Race: black	-2.844	-5.307***	0.0001
Gender: female	-0.131	-0.643	0.5199
Region: South	0.116	0.495	0.6207
Age	-0.002	-0.282	0.7778
Family income	0.060	3.030***	0.0024
Evangelicalism	0.708	2.795***	0.0052

Pseudo- R^2 = 0.3948

Proportion predicted correctly: 0.791

Predicted probabilities: Y = 0: 0.262
Y = 1: 0.654

T-statistic for difference: 20.640 (prob < 0.0001)

N = 655

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test

Table 6: Parameter Values (OLS Regression)
for Model of Relative Candidate Preference
in the 1992 American Presidential Election

Variable	b	t	prob.
Dependent Variable:			
Feeling thermometer difference			
Intercept	-63.041	-13.843***	0.0001
Party identification	10.263	19.076***	0.0001
Liberal-conservative placement	5.552	7.250***	0.0001
Race: black	-14.832	-4.397***	0.0001
Gender: female	1.682	0.872	0.3835
Region: South	4.475	2.045**	0.0411
Age	0.029	0.487	0.6266
Family income	0.427	2.582***	0.0100
Evangelicalism	5.399	2.288**	0.0224

$R^2 = 0.4612$

N = 1004

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.

** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test.

Table 7: Parameter Values (OLS Regression)
for Model of Relative Candidate Preference in the 1992
American Presidential Elections, without Control
for Party Identification

Variable	b	t	prob.
Dependent Variable:			
Feeling thermometer difference			
Intercept	-51.596	-9.808***	0.0001
Liberal-conservative placement	11.485	14.105***	0.0001
Race: black	-28.472	-7.442***	0.0001
Gender: female	-1.288	-0.575	0.5653
Region: South	2.876	1.131	0.2585
Age	-0.072	-1.047	0.2954
Family income	0.797	4.175***	0.0001
Evangelicalism	9.980	3.649***	0.0003

$R^2 = 0.2648$

N = 1007

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test.

Table 8: Parameter Values (OLS Regression)
for Model of Party Identification

Variable	b	t	prob.
Dependent Variable:			
Party identification			
Intercept	1.104	4.153***	0.0001
Liberal-conservative placement	0.576	14.027***	0.0001
Race: black	-1.344	-6.927***	0.0001
Gender: female	-0.277	-2.449**	0.0145
Region: South	-0.169	-1.318	0.1879
Age	-0.010	-2.776***	0.0056
Family income	0.036	3.726***	0.0002
Evangelicalism	0.458	3.315***	0.0009

$R^2 = 0.2597$

N = 1008

*** prob < 0.01, one-tailed test

** prob < 0.05, one-tailed test

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