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## Old Europe versus New Europe: cultural similarity tolerance, religion and anti-Americanism in a divided European Union

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OLD EUROPE VERSUS NEW EUROPE: CULTURAL SIMILARITY, TOLERANCE,  
RELIGION AND ANTI-AMERICANISM IN A DIVIDED EUROPEAN UNION

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the  
Louisiana State University and  
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by  
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## **ABSTRACT**

This research focuses on anti-Americanism in Europe. Old Europe, including countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium, is significantly more anti-American than New Europe, which includes countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary. In this project, however, I have made a number of observations that go beyond this simple conclusion. I examined factors that could be behind these different levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe, and one key answer that emerged was “cultural similarity.” There are, of course, other factors that impact attitudes towards the United States and Americans, such as the frequent travels to and from the U.S., a country’s trade ties with the American government, and people’s views on U.S. policies in the Middle East and towards the environment. But even when we take all these elements into account, cultural similarity still plays a significant role in why Old Europe is more anti-American than is New Europe. The United States and New Europe resemble each other more culturally than Old Europe and the U.S. do, particularly in their levels of religiosity. Secularism never took root in New Europe and the United States with the force that it has in Old Europe. As the two case studies have shown, Romanians and Americans go to church more often, pray more frequently, and place more importance on religion in their lives than do the French.

The second element of cultural similarity investigated in this dissertation is tolerance. There is a significant relationship between levels of anti-Americanism and tolerance towards women, immigrants/foreign workers and immigrants in Old Europe versus New Europe. New Europe and the United States are, in general, more intolerant than Old Europe.

The results presented in this dissertation provide a better understanding of European anti-Americanism than was previously the case in the already extensive literature on this topic. There is a clear cultural divide in the European Union between Old Europe and New Europe that parallels their respective attitudes towards the United States and the American people.

# CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 THE WHAT AND THE WHY

In 2003, with the war in Iraq looming over the United States and its EU allies, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made a comment that reverberated in all European capitals. Addressing the foreign media in Washington, he was asked: “Sir, a question about the mood among European allies. If you look at, for example, France, Germany, also a lot of people in my own country -- I'm from Dutch public TV, by the way -- it seems that a lot of Europeans rather give the benefit of the doubt to Saddam Hussein than President George Bush. These are U.S. allies. What do you make of that?” Rumsfeld’s answer was:

Now, you're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently -- what is it? Twenty-six, something like that? -- You’re right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with France and Germany on this; they're with the United States. (Rumsfeld 2003)

The reaction to these comments was swift. Coomarasmy (2003) describes German and French leaders as being “profoundly vexed” by Rumsfeld’s comments. He notices that they were also quick to dismiss the distinction made by Secretary Rumsfeld as a mere attempt to pitch Eastern and Western European countries against each other in order to maintain American world supremacy against the increased influence of the European Union – “divide et impera” (Coomarasamy 2003).

This project tests the validity of Rumsfeld’s supposition that there are two divided “Europes.” This is the “*what*” of my dissertation – what I am substantially interested in. There are two levels of inquiry employed toward this end. The first level deals with the possibility that there are different degrees of anti-Americanism in different parts of Europe. If Rumsfeld is right, then I should find that countries within “New Europe” (the Polish or the Romanians) are friendlier toward the United States than are those within “Old Europe” (the French or Germans). Table 1.1.1 contains the list of all European countries part of this analysis and the Old Europe – New Europe division.

**TABLE 1.1.1: OLD EUROPE – NEW EUROPE COUNTRIES**

<b>OLD EUROPE</b>	<b>NEW EUROPE</b>
Austria	Bulgaria
Belgium	Cyprus
Denmark	Czech Republic
Finland	Estonia
France	Hungary
Germany	Latvia
Greece	Lithuania
Ireland	Poland




Table continued.

OLD EUROPE	NEW EUROPE
Italy	Romania
Luxembourg	Slovakia
Malta	Slovenia
Netherlands	
Portugal	
Spain	
Sweden	
United Kingdom	

Assuming that distinctions in feelings towards the United States do exist in Old versus New Europe, the second level of inquiry will investigate the reasons behind these divergent degrees of anti-Americanism. I have chosen to focus on two sets of explanatory variables, both related to cultural differences between Old Europe, New Europe, and the United States – one set of variables is focused on religion and the other is focused on tolerance (see below Chart 1.1.1). I have also added to my analysis several alternative, non-cultural, explanatory variables: strength of economic ties, as measured by the trade to GDP ratio, numbers of times a person had traveled to the U.S., as well as views on American involvement in Iraq, the Palestinian problem and environmental protection around the world.

**Chart 1.1.1: Cultural Similarity and Anti-Americanism in Old versus New Europe**



The reason - the “*why*” - of my research is that I am keenly interested in the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe for the last twenty years, and wish to better understand the real causes of these changes. I am originally from Romania (part of Rumsfeld’s New Europe), and grew up during Communism with older people telling me stories about how “the Americans” have betrayed us after World War II and “sold us” to the Soviets. However, almost as soon as the Ceausescu regime fell in December 1989, the democratic Romania became wholeheartedly pro-American. At the same time, it remained a profoundly francophone country, the only one in Central and Eastern Europe where the majority of the population speaks a Latin-language. Then, following the United States withdrawal from the International Criminal Court treaty, Romania was the first country to follow the U.S.’s lead by also withdrawing. Later, when the war in Iraq started, Romania again broke from its bigger sibling in France, by clearly and unequivocally siding with the Bush Administration. Why did Romania choose the Americans over the French? Is it because Romania truly is part of Rumsfeld’s “New Europe,” and is now more sympathetic to the U.S. than to the French from an international political perspective? If that is the case, what are the values that make the Romanians prefer the United States more than the France? These are the types of questions that contributed to the development of this project.

## **1.2 THE HOW**

I describe in the next section the methods and data – the *how* – I use to examine the questions discussed above. Toward this end, I employ two forms of methodological inquiry for this purpose: 1) statistical analysis (independent samples t-test, chi-square test and multivariate regression) using public opinion data (from the Eurobarometer, the World Values Survey and other similar databases) as well as trade/economic data, and 2) qualitative (case study) analysis using archival data, mass media information, etc. This empirical analysis component of this dissertation begins with a series of quantitative tests of my primary research questions using public opinion poll data. This is followed by a qualitative analysis of the relationships uncovered by the earlier, quantitative analysis.

### **1.2.1 QUANTITATIVE METHODS**

One of the three quantitative methods used in this research is the independent-samples t-test comparing means between populations of respondents from Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. This method was used in those cases in which the independent variable was a dummy variable (coded 0 and 1) and the dependent variable had more than two values. The second quantitative method utilized in this dissertation is the Chi-Square test for independence. I used this method in those cases in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable, classifying the respondents in two distinct categories (agree/disagree, mentioned/not mentioned). The third statistical tool used in this research was a multivariate regression with several independent variables and anti-Americanism as the dependent variable.

### **1.2.2. QUALITATIVE METHODS**

The qualitative method used in this analysis is the case study. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines a case study as “an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary n.d.). George and Bennett define a case as an “instance of a class of events such as revolutions, or various categories of governmental regimes, economic systems or

personality types that the researcher chooses to study with the goals of discovering the causes of similarities or differences among instances of that class of events.” (George and Bennett 2005, 17). In Gerring’s description, a case is “a spatially delimited phenomenon (unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time” (Gerring 2007, 19). For the purpose of this project, I draw from each of these definitions in examining the differences in levels of anti-Americanism in France and Romania by limiting the analysis to two political units, over a ten years period and one class of societal elements – anti-American attitudes.

One aspect of case study methodology often criticized is the case selection process. George and Bennett (2005) argued that the problem with case selection bias for case studies is different from the case selection bias in statistical research, and this discrepancy stems from their distinct epistemologies: “the goal of statistical analysis is to acquire enough knowledge about as many units of interest in the population as possible, to be able to make general claims about the group under study. The goal of case studies is to acquire as much knowledge as possible about one unit, such as a country, or a specific historical event, and then use this information to devise new theoretical questions” (George and Bennett 2005, 21) As these epistemological differences are reflected in methodological ones, the two authors argue that in a statistical analysis, if the researcher does not select his cases randomly (unless you can include the entire population in your analysis, which is not feasible in most instances) then the results of a statistical analysis could be biased, possibly showing either a relationship between variable when none exists, or no relationship when in reality there is one. A case study subject (country, historical event, politician, etc.) cannot be selected randomly. It must be a special case, standing out from the crowd in a way that makes the causal connections between independent and dependent variables more visible to the researcher.

The “most similar case” case study methodology, focusing on Romania and France, is used in this research. These are “cases that are comparable in all respects except for the independent variable, whose variance may account for the cases having different outcomes on the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 81). George and Bennett also advise the researchers to select their cases for theoretical reasons, and not just because the cases are interesting, while Yin suggests that it is good to “use your own, prior expert knowledge in your case study” (Yin 2003, 137). I believe that my cases meet all these requirements. I have theoretical and personal knowledge of those two cases, and they are both relevant to my overall research question: Romania is part of “New Europe,” France is “Old Europe,” and these countries’ levels of anti-Americanism appear to be notably different despite the fact that their strong cultural, political, and economic ties with each other might have suggested otherwise.

The case studies in this research project are largely used for descriptive purposes, and are attempts at providing a snapshot of the bigger picture of cultural similarity and anti-Americanism across Old and New Europe, seeing if there is a relationship between these two phenomena. Two European countries, one from Old Europe (France) and one from New Europe (Romania) were chosen for this purpose.

### **1.2.3. EMPIRICAL DATA**

There are six main sources of data used in the statistical analysis part of my dissertation. Five of these are public opinion polls/ surveys: the Eurobarometers, World Values Survey, Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, Voice of the People and the United States

Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy surveys. The sixth database contains economic/trade data (trade to GDP ratio) and was created specifically for this project by combining information from the U.S. government's trade data and EU's national budgets data. These databases are presented in detail below, starting with the Eurobarometer surveys.

## **I. The Eurobarometer Surveys**

The Eurobarometer Surveys are “the products of a unique program of cross-national and cross-temporal social science research” (Center 2007). This program moved under the management of the Commission of the European Community (CEC) in early 1970, when simultaneous surveys were conducted in the member countries of the European Union. Initially, the Commission's goal was to find out how much the Europeans knew and/or cared about the Common Market and other communitarian institutions, as well as what the major national goals were for each member state in the eyes of its own citizens. The areas of interest later expanded to include not only people's attitudes toward the European Union, its institutions, and other international actors (such as the United States, UN or NATO), but also their views on other topics such as the quality of their lives, happiness, religion or hopes for a better future (European Commission n.d.). The official launch of the Eurobarometer surveys took place in 1974, and they have been conducted since then every spring and fall. I use two Eurobarometer surveys for my dissertation: Eurobarometer 62 (2004) and Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005).

Eurobarometers 62 (2004) and 63.4 (2005) were conducted in 29 European nations, but only information from the following countries has been kept in my databases: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. The variables from these two surveys used in this research measure anti-American feelings in Old and New Europe, as well as levels of religiosity. Eurobarometer 62 (2004) database used for this analysis contains 51 variables and 29,334 respondents. Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005) database contains 61 variables and 29,328 respondents. Codebooks for these two databases, containing the wording of the questions as well as the coding for each answer, can be found in Appendices 6 and 7.

## **II. The World Values Survey**

The World Values Survey (WVS) organization is a “worldwide network of social scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life” (World Values Survey 2008). The WVS in collaboration with EVS (European Values Study) conducted national surveys in 97 societies, where they discovered the existence of profound changes that have taken place over time in what people believe it is important in their lives. European Values Study is “a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values [...] and a unique research project on how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics and society” (European Values Study 2007). In order to measure these beliefs and values, five waves of surveys were carried out, from 1981 to 2007, in 97 nations. For the purpose of this analysis I am using only information collected since the 1998 survey.

The WVS argues that peoples' beliefs and values play a key role in a country's economic and democratic development. While the WVS network analyzes the causal link between global cultural changes and economic development, quality of life, and democracy, my interest is to

examine whether the tolerance and religiosity levels measured by WVS can explain different levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe. My database contains responses from the following countries: Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Spain, Great Britain and the United States (62 variables and 19,897 respondents). The codebook for this database, containing the wording for each question as well as the coding for each answer, can be found in Appendix 1.

### **III. Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project**

The Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project conducts "public opinion surveys around the world on a broad array of subjects ranging from people's assessments of their own lives to their views about the current state of the world and important issues of the day" (Pew Research Center 2011). It is directed by Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center, and co-author (along with Bruce Strokes) of *America against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked*. The project was initiated in 2001 and for my dissertation I am using the surveys conducted in 2002 and 2007, as they not only contain questions/variables pertinent to my own research, but they also cover the geographical areas I analyze (New Europe, Old Europe and the United States).

The 2002 Pew Global Attitudes survey (referred to henceforth as Pew 2002) was conducted in 44 nations. I focused on the following countries for the purpose of my research: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Slovak Republic and the United States. The variables from this survey that I use in my analysis are those concerning levels of tolerance towards women, homosexuals, and foreigners/immigrants, levels of religiosity, and levels of anti-Americanism in Europe. The restricted PEW 2002 database I created for this analysis contains 38 variables and 6,031 respondents. The codebook for this database, containing the wording for each question as well as the coding for each answer, can be found in Appendix 3.

The 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey (referred to henceforth as Pew 2007) was conducted in 47 nations. The modified database I use for this project contains information from the following countries: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and the United States. This data is used in testing hypotheses regarding levels of anti-Americanism, religiosity, as well as tolerance towards women and foreigners/immigrants. The restricted PEW 2007 database used in this dissertation contains 38 variables and 9,837 respondents. The codebook for this database, with the wording for each question and the coding/value for each answer, can be found in Appendix 5.

### **IV. Voice of the People**

Voice of the People Survey is conducted annually under the auspices of Gallup International Association. The edition used in my analysis is the "Millennium Survey" conducted in over 50 countries between August and October 1999, with the results published in 2000 (ICPSR n.d.). The countries included of my database are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. Answers from this survey are used to test my hypotheses regarding levels of tolerance towards women, homosexuals and foreigners/immigrants, and

levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe as well as the United States. The restricted database I use contains 42 variables from 21,736 respondents, and the codebook for it can be found in Appendix 4.

## **V. United States Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy Survey**

“United States Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy” CID Survey Project (U.S. CID) was conducted in 2006 for the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University by International Communications Research (Howard, Gibson and Stolle 2005). It represented a partnership with the European Social Survey (ESS), which has been carried out twice a year since 2002. As a result of including several questions from the ESS survey in the U.S. CID survey, the United States information was compatible and could be included in a sole database (which I use for my dissertation) containing U.S. data alongside data from 11 European countries surveyed in 2002: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Sweden. This active database contains 22 variables and 43,360 respondents and its codebook (with the wording for each question and the coding/value of each answer) can be found in Appendix 4.

## **VI. “Trade to GDP Ratio” Database**

I created the “**trade to GDP ratio**” database by combining information from two different sources: United States’ government trade data and the European Union’s budget data. The steps I took in order to build a database containing “trade to GDP ratio” for individual EU countries and the U.S. are described below:

1. I collected trade data (yearly imports and export) in millions of dollars from the U.S. census website: <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/index.html> .
2. I then collected national GDP data in millions of Euros from the EUROSTAT website: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search\\_database](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database)
3. I converted the millions of Euros from the EUROSTAT website into the millions of dollars from the census website. I converted these currencies by first moving the information regarding the U.S. GDP in millions of Euros from the EUROSTAT website in separate excel files.
4. Then, I took the information regarding the U.S. GDP for the same years from the website: <http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp> . Because it was in billions of dollars, I had to multiply these numbers by 1000 to get to millions of dollars.
5. The currency information converted into millions of dollars in the same excel file as the information in millions of Euros, and divided the dollars by Euros, which gave me the parity for the conversion.
6. I then went back to step 2 listed above (GDP in millions of Euros from EUROSTAT) and using the parity from step 5, I changed the millions of Euros into millions of dollars.

7. I then used the trade data from the census website and the final GDP data from step 6 to find the “trade to GDP” ratio from 1998 to 2010 for bilateral trade relations between individual EU member states and the U.S.

## **VII. Case Studies Data**

The richest sources of data for my dissertation are previous studies done on the topics of tolerance, religiosity, and anti-Americanism in France and Romania, as well as empirical data from the surveys used in the quantitative analysis chapters. World Values Survey information will be used to present the cultural similarities between France, Romania and the United States, while the 2005 Eurobarometer data will gauge levels of anti-Americanism. I will also examine data from archival records (i.e. survey data not used in the statistical analysis as well as organizational records, such as governmental agencies reports), and relay my personal experiences from both countries as they are relevant to my research.

## **CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS BUILDING**

### **2.1 ANTI-AMERICANISM IN A DIVIDED EUROPEAN UNION – A CULTURAL EXPLANATION**

**Anti-Americanism** in Europe is not new. It has come and gone in waves, usually exacerbated by specific U.S. foreign policies such as the war in Vietnam, the Iran-Contra scandal, and more recently, George W. Bush's war in Iraq. Even during times of relative "good will", such as the period of the Clinton Presidency, the trans-Atlantic relationship has been marred by tensions. Clinton, one of the most popular American Presidents as far as the Europe is concerned, has been accused by Europeans of trying to undermine their economy during the famous beef hormone dispute (EU trying to prevent meat from American cattle injected with growth hormones from entering its markets, and the U.S. taking the matter to the World Trade Organization) (World Trade Organization 2009). With George W. Bush's "war on terror", anti-Americanism in some parts of Europe has reached new all-time heights. Younger generations of Western Europeans, born after the end of the Cold War, have come to see the United States not as their protector against the threat of the Soviet Union (as some of their parents and grandparent did) but rather as "the country . . . in European eyes -- of arrogance" (Moisi 2003).

For this dissertation, when I use the term anti-Americanism in Europe, I am referring to the negative attitudes of some Europeans toward the U.S. and the American people. Surely, certain policies of the U.S. government (the war in Iraq, support for the state of Israel, etc.), as well as a number of politicians such as George W. Bush or Donald Rumsfeld, figure prominently among the targets of European anti-Americanism. But Europe's hostility is not limited to these narrow targets. Harnden (2009) quotes President Obama as saying that America as a whole is blamed at times for "much of what is bad in the world" because of its haughtiness and unwillingness to cooperate with others, especially with the European Union: "Instead of celebrating your dynamic union and seeking to partner with you to meet common challenges, there have been times where America has shown arrogance and been dismissive, even derisive." I use data from the Eurobarometer as well as from the World Values Surveys to measure how citizens of the European Union view the United States' role in fighting poverty in the world, dealing with terrorism, helping the international economy, and promoting world peace; these questions tap into a pool of public opinion feelings toward the United States in both Old and New Europe.

### **2.2 CULTURAL SIMILARITY, TOLERANCE AND RELIGION**

This section covers two of the primary aspects of cultural similarity: tolerance and religiosity. The core argument of this research is that there is a relationship between these two elements of cultural similarity and anti-Americanism: the more culturally similar a country is to the United States, the lower its levels of anti-Americanism. I begin with an overall definition of cultural similarity.

#### **2.2.1. CULTURAL SIMILARITY**

Cultural similarity is the concept used in this dissertation to describe the closeness in cultural values between countries/regions. The goal is to show that anti-Americanism levels are lower in New Europe than in Old Europe because the newest members of the European Union



have more in common, culturally, with their American counterparts than Old Europeans do. The central argument of this research is that countries/populations who share similar cultural values are inclined to feel closer to each other than countries/populations divided by cultural differences. This is a fairly 'common sense' suggestion: we like people who we perceive to be similar to us. This promotes balance in an individual's values system and prevents cognitive dissonance, which has been described as the existence of strong contradictions between a person's various beliefs and opinions about herself and her environment (Festinger 1957) . When we like people who are like us, we indirectly validate our own opinions and behaviors through them.

In the international studies literature, the concept of cultural similarity has typically been associated with research pertaining to the either the democratic peace theory, or to Huntington's famous "clash of civilizations" argument. For example, some studies based on the democratic peace theory have looked at how cultural similarity between governments and political structures strengthens or weakens the impact of democratic dyads on inter-state wars – the more culturally similar two democracies are the less likely they are to fight against each other (Henderson 1998). Others have investigated the impact of perceived cultural similarity between two states on their respective publics, and in turn, the impact of public opinion on governmental foreign policies – the more two nationalities perceive each other as culturally alike, the more they would pressure their governments to establish bi-lateral friendly/cooperative relations (Geva and Hanson 1999).

The research in this dissertation differs from those mentioned above in that it is not looking at the impact of public opinion on specific governmental policies. Its focus instead reflects Nincic and Russett's arguments regarding the origin of levels of American public hostility or friendliness towards a given country: "the American public will strive to achieve a measure of congruity between its level of approval for a foreign nation and the extent to which the foreign nation is perceived as similar to the United States in terms of certain salient attributes" (Nincic and Russett 1979, 69). My theory is that the public in New Europe will do the same thing. "New Europeans" will look at the United States and see the Americans as having cultural values similar to their own, especially when it comes to tolerance and religion; this perceived cultural similarity will affect their overall feelings towards the U.S.

### **2.2.2. RELIGIOSITY AND TOLERANCE**

Religiosity is here understood as the way an individual interprets the world through the perceptual lens of his faith, as well as how strictly he observes its rites/rituals. As it pertains to this research, I argue that there is a negative relationship between religiosity and anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe. I expect to find that New Europe and the United States share similar (higher) levels of religiosity, compared to a more secular Old Europe.

There is a vast literature on how America's religious beliefs are seen by the rest of the world. Using data from the PEW surveys, Kohut and Stokes argue that "To Europeans, Americans' religiosity skews what should be secular policy decisions, such as on teaching creationism in schools, and the death penalty, abortion and gay marriage" (Kohut and Stokes 2006, 93). This negative view of how faith and governmental affairs intermingle in the United States was particularly accentuated in the first decade of the 2000s following the election of George W. Bush as America's 43<sup>rd</sup> President.

Those Europeans already worried about his openly-proclaimed faith and wide support among evangelical Christians became even more concerned about the influence of religion in George Bush's foreign policies when he began framing the war on terrorism as a war against "evil." In his 2002 State of Union address, President Bush made several references to the "good vs. evil" battles awaiting a post-9/11 United States: "States like [Iran, Iraq and North Korea], and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world"; "Our enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil"; "Those of us who have lived through these challenging times have been changed by them. We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be opposed"; and "This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity -- a moment we must seize to change our culture. Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good" (Bush 2002). Much of the world had a negative reaction to this rhetoric. The Muslim world saw it as an attack on Islam and non-Christians in general, while Europeans were mostly concerned about the blurring of lines separating Church and State, especially after Bush's successful 2004 reelection campaign:

"He's convinced he's right, and he's almost got this feeling he has a quasi-divine mission to fill as the president of the United States," said the Rev. Michel Kubler, executive religion editor for *La Croix*, a Roman Catholic newspaper in France. "His reelection will only reinforce these convictions, and he'll feel infallible, which of course will only increase European disquiet. A transatlantic divide has existed for years between increasingly secular Europe and religious America, shaping perceptions on issues ranging from abortion and stem cell research to the death penalty, same-sex marriage and conflicts in the Middle East. As the results of the U.S. election sink in, the early consensus among European religious and political thinkers is that the religion gap is likely to widen" (Bryant 2004).

This research aims to uncover and examine a "religion gap" like the one Bryant mentions above not only between Europe as a whole and the United States, but inside the European Union as well—between Old Europe and New Europe. European political scientists have started to notice a weakening of continental religious ties with the integration of newer, more Eastern countries into the broader economic and political systems of Europe. Schlesinger and Foret (2006), for example, analyzed how the impact of new religious groups in European society manifested itself in the debate over the inclusion of references to Christian values and beliefs in the European Constitution. They argue that New Europe "flexing" its newly found political muscle within the EU made the intensity of the debate over religion and the European Union Constitution much more pronounced than the secular Old Europe expected. Grace Davie (2006) not only agrees with them, but also suggests that these kinds of clashes will probably intensify in the future, with secularism under pressure not only from former communist countries that are now members of the EU, but from within Old Europe itself, where growing numbers of immigrant populations are using religion to maintain their identities and to create a niche for themselves in otherwise homogeneous societies (Davie 2006).

Tolerance, as discussed in the political science literature, comes in two forms. One represents the baseline for being tolerant, which means that even if you object to something, you still agree to live with it. The second form reflects a higher standard of tolerance that asks a

person not only to agree to live with people, beliefs and behaviors one disapproves of, but to also recognize them as having equal rights in society (King 1976). The focus of this analysis is on the latter variety of tolerance, and for this purpose I have selected three groups that at various points in time have been the target of intolerance in Europe and the United States: 1) *homosexuals*, 2) *women*, and 3) *foreigners/immigrants* – people who speak a different language, have a different nationality, or who “look” different than the majority of the population. Survey questions regarding people’s views on these three groups are used as measures of tolerance. They cover a diverse array of societal beliefs about women as mothers, wives, educated individuals, and political leaders, about homosexuals as neighbors (and the acceptance of homosexual life style), and about immigrants as neighbors and a positive influence on a society.

This look at tolerance exclusively focused on attitudes falls in line with distinctions between tolerance and toleration made by Andrew Murphy and Philip Brooks. Brooks defines tolerance as “a disposition: toleration is the behavior in which the disposition finds expression” (Brooks 1887, 6). A century later, Murphy builds on this distinction and suggests that we should use the term toleration “...to refer to social or political practice” and tolerance “... to refer to attitudes” (Murphy 1997). He argues that although toleration is an intrinsic part of a liberal democracy, tolerance is not. A democracy can survive with intolerance, but not without toleration, and the danger begins the moment that a negative attitude towards a group (i.e. women or homosexuals) changes into actively denying that particular group equal rights in the society (i.e., not allowing women to vote, drive or work outside the home, or denying gays and lesbian couples same civil rights granted to heterosexual households). The entire group of variables used in this dissertation looks at tolerance - attitudes towards homosexuals, women, and foreigners/immigrants.

In the 1980s, several authors focused their attention on changes in intolerance levels in American society during the Cold War. What they found was not that the public was more intolerant in the 1982 than thirty years prior, but rather that they had shifted the targets for their existing intolerant dispositions. As Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) note, “attitudes towards Communists, socialists, and atheists are now more favorable [because] citizens are now able to point to other political groups towards whom they feel more hostility” (69). Homosexuals, immigrants and women are three groups that have figured prominently in the minds of 21<sup>st</sup> century Americans as “new outlets” for their intolerant attitudes.

As early as July 2011, major U.S. media outlets were discussing the passage of a law in New York allowing gay marriage, the end of military’s policy of “don’t ask don’t tell,” and Presidential hopeful Michelle Bachman’s views on homosexuality as “personal bondage, personal despair and personal enslavement” (Stolberg 2011). In 2010, PEW Center survey findings demonstrated that nearly half (48%) of the American population were opposed to same-sex marriage, while 60% of respondents supported gays and lesbians serving openly in the military, demonstrating that there were still notable segments of U.S. society holding intolerant views toward these groups (Pew Research Center 2010).

Immigration debates are equally heated in the U.S. as of this writing. Samuel Huntington wrote that “the single most immediate and most serious challenge to America’s traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico, and the fertility rates of these immigrants compared to black and white American natives” (Huntington 2004, 32). Huntington perceives the Latino immigration as so dangerous to

the fabric of America's "melting pot" precisely because these new immigrants refused to fully assimilate, or "melt," into the existing U.S. culture. Huntington's perspective has been echoed in discussions over English as the official language of the United States, but also more recently in attempts to reduce or eliminate tax-subsidized medical services for uninsured illegal immigrants, and plans by high ranking Republican legislators to end birthright citizenship (Preston 2011).

These high-profile policy initiatives reflect fairly widespread concern within the American citizenry about the impact immigrants have on the American society as a whole. According to a Pew 2011 survey, 61 percent of Americans approve of Arizona's newest and toughest immigration laws (which require, among other things, for foreigners to carry their immigration papers with them at all times, and for police officers to ask to see these documents if they have any reasons to suspect someone might be an illegal immigrant). Further, 39 percent of respondents support a constitutional change that would deny automatic citizenship rights for children of illegal immigrants (Pew Research Center 2011).

Women are the third minority groups analyzed here as a target of intolerant attitudes. While gender equality issues such as equal pay for equal work, or equal access to jobs and education are met with general societal approval in America and the European Union, there are still at least two very controversial issues remaining: abortion, and, to a lesser degree, divorce. In the United States, abortion "has inspired marches and murder, and spawned a set of competing interest groups that have mobilized tens of millions of dollars a year to influence public opinion and voting behavior" (Jelen and Wilcox 2003, 489). And these "pro-life" and "pro-choice" campaigns seem to have worked as their proponents hoped. As of this writing, abortion is one of the few issues capable of changing a person's long time affiliation with a party. For example, as Abramowitz (1995) observed during the 1990s elections, some very religious Democrats voted for the Republican Party because of their own party's stance on the abortion issue. Overall, America remains deeply divided over the issues of abortion. A 2011 Pew Survey found that a majority of Americans (54 percent) believes that abortion should be legal, which represents an increase in support from the 46 percent in 2009. When it comes to the political affiliation of pro-choice supporters, these divisions are clearer – 34 percent of Republicans versus 65 percent of Democrats and 58 percent of Independents (Pew Research Center 2011).

Homosexuality, immigration, and gender equality/abortion issues are much less controversial in the European Union than in the United States. However, with the newest waves of EU expansion including a growing number of formerly Communist countries, the general tone of public debates on these issues has been slowly changing. There are stronger voices now within the European Union from New European countries – like Poland and Romania – speaking out against gay rights and against abortion, than was the case in the past. And this creates tensions between Old and New Europe. For example, in June 2011 the Wall Street Journal (2011) covered a dispute between EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding and the Hungarian Government concerning the use of EU money for an anti-abortion campaign in lieu of gender equality projects (such as training women for in-demand jobs in sectors traditionally reserved for men). Reding officially requested that the Hungarian government remove all posters printed for this anti-abortion campaign paid with EU money, while the Hungarian officials blamed the whole incident on a misinterpretation of the EU Progress Program.

To reiterate, the central argument of this project is that there is a relationship between how tolerant a European society is and its levels of anti-Americanism. Similar levels of tolerance

create a cultural “likeness” between countries and the United States, while dissimilar levels of tolerance create a form of cultural “enmity.” Combined with the arguments presented in the previous section, the cultural similarity – anti-Americanism theory can be summarized as follows: **New Europe and the United States are more similar in terms of their levels of tolerance and religiosity than Old Europe and the U.S. are, and this rapport explains much of the difference in levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe.**

## **2.3 TRADE, TRAVEL, THE MIDDLE EAST POLICIES, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ANTI-AMERICANISM – ALTERNATIVE THEORIES**

This section presents the relationship between anti-Americanism and four factors not explicitly related to cultural similarity: strength of trade ties between a country and the U.S. (more trade with the U.S. equals more pro-Americanism), travels to America (more travels to the U.S. equal stronger pro-American), position on Middle East policies (the more pro-Israel and supporting the war in Iraq, the more pro-American) and the environment (the more you support protecting the environment, the more anti-American you are likely to be).

### **2.3.1. TRADE AND TRAVEL**

Discovering what lies behind anti and pro-Americanism has been a long time interest of American scholars, who were surprised by the speed at which the high level of support and sympathy expressed around the world immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks transformed into hostility and opposition to America’s handling of its “war on terror.” In 2005, amid a wave of anti-Americanism studies, Anne Applebaum (2005) set out to identify the pro-Americans still out there in the world. She found them and they looked something like this: “the British small businessman who [...] has been on Florida on holiday. Or the Indian stockbroker, the South Korean investment banker, and the Philippines manufacturer, all of whom have excellent relations with their American clients and all of whom support a U.S. military presence in their parts of the world” (40). Pro-American feelings in post 9/11 Europe seem to have been damaged not only by unpopular policies such as the invasion of Iraq, but also by America’s economic, cultural and political disengagement from the European Union, while focusing its attention on the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, China and Russia. Gienow-Hecht (2006) summed this up the following way:

Between the late 1940s and the end of the Cold War, political criticism remained consistently embedded in the critique of cultural imperialism, and it also became increasingly academic. While the 1990s witnessed a temporary retreat of political anti-Americanism, the events following 9/11 re-created a scenario reminiscent of the 1950s—***but without the European sympathy generated by years of foreign investment, cultural exchange, and political goodwill on the part of the United States*** (1089, emphasis added).

These discussions of sources of pro-Americanism mirror arguments from studies done in the tradition of modernization theories, according to which “the more two societies interact and have economic and cultural ties, the more they develop a sense of “fellow-feeling” between individuals in those societies” (Dore 1984, 412). Applying these theories to the present research, we should observe lower levels of anti-Americanism in countries that have strong trade ties with

the United States (as measured by a “trade to GDP ratio” variable), where the citizenry support free markets/capitalism, and where its citizens have traveled to the U.S.

In a similar analytical approach, Chiozza (2009) investigates the impact of several, related factors such as the number of student visas granted by the United States to the citizens of a certain country, trade dependence, and American direct investments on anti-Americanism. He finds that “military, economic, and cultural engagement with the United States is not by itself sufficient to create a political context immune to anti-Americanism” (Chiozza 2009, 151). While he uses the 44 countries surveyed in 2002 by the PEW Research Center, it would be interesting to see if his findings are reflected in an exclusively European sample, five years later.

### **2.3.2. THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ENVIRONMENT**

The reason “Middle East” and “the Environment” are lumped together in this section is because they both represent policy issue areas that have attracted the world’s attention and antipathy towards the United States over the years. The war in Iraq, America’s support for the state of Israel, and its perceived biases regarding the Palestinian problem have generated widespread condemnation and fueled anti-Americanism from Paris to Riyadh and from Berlin to Tehran. President Bush’s failure to promote environmentally-friendly policies has triggered criticism from the more ecologically-minded Europeans, as well as from environmentalists within the U.S. Goldengerg (2009), for example, quotes Josh Borner, a spokesman for the Sierra Club as saying “[Bush] has undone decades if not a century of progress on the environment.”

One of the favorite explanations for anti-Americanism inside the Bush 43 administration was “They hate . . . a democratically elected government. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (CNN 2001). However, as many opinion polls conducted all around the world have shown, most people actually approve of democratic ideas and believe that democracy is the best performing governmental system possible right now (Norris and Inglehart 2002). The 2011 upheavals in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen have also demonstrated that the young Arab men and women who might have been burning the American flag a year ago were now willing to sacrifice their lives to bring democracy in their countries and oust from power dictators like Hosni Mubarak or Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, long-time allies of the United States.

So, if it is not American ideals of freedom and democracy, then why do others in the world “hate” Americans? Part of this answer comes from the polls referenced earlier. When asked what upsets them about the United States, Europeans have pointed their finger, among other issues, at the 2003 Iraq war, America’s unwavering and lopsided support for the state of Israel, and George W. Bush’s environmentally-unfriendly policies such as unilaterally withdrawing in January 2010 from the Kyoto Treaty (Pew Research Center 2007).

Chapter 9 of this dissertation presents a test of the relationship between anti-Americanism and the views of respondents from Old and New Europe on U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East, including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as on environmental issues such as global warming. I expect to find that high levels of anti-Americanism are positively correlated with an individual’s interest in ecological causes, his/her support for the Palestinians, and his/her desire to see a quick withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.


## 2.4 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The core hypothesis at the basis of this research, as well as an alternative hypothesis and list of all the more specific hypotheses to be tested in the following chapters, is presented below.

**Overall hypothesis: Citizens of New Europe are more pro-American than are citizens of Old Europe because New Europe and the United States are more culturally similar than are Old Europe and the U.S.**

**Alternative hypothesis: Citizens of New Europe are more pro-American than citizens of Old Europe because they travel to the U.S. more often, because they approve of American foreign policies in the Middle East and on the environment, because their countries have stronger economic ties with the U.S. economy, and because they support a market economy.**

**Graph 1 – Tolerance, Religiosity, Trade and Anti-Americanism**



The following six chapters cover the quantitative analysis used to test the hypothesis at the foundation of this research, which examines the relationship between anti-Americanism and levels of religiosity and tolerance towards women, homosexuals and immigrants/foreigners. These tests are conducted in three distinct geographic regions: Old Europe (Western Europe), New Europe (Eastern Europe) and the United States. Alternative explanatory factors (trade

levels, frequency of travels to the U.S., attitudes towards America's policies in the Middle East and the environment) are also examined in Chapter 9. The following annotations were used through the rest of the dissertation:  $p < .05^*$ ,  $p < .01^{**}$  and  $p < .001^{***}$ . A list of sub-hypotheses can be seen below. "No answer" responses were deleted from all the databases used in this empirical analysis. "Don't know" answers were kept in an analysis when a judgment was made that they were the equivalent of a "middle-of-the road" or moderate response, especially in the case of otherwise dichotomous variables where the respondents had only two options (yes or no). "Don't know" answers were deleted in the cases on questions giving the respondents either a large number of choices (for example scales from 0 to 10, 1 to 5, etc.), or the possibility of choosing a clear "moderate" answer (for example "favorable", "neither favorable nor unfavorable" and "unfavorable").

The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in Chapters 4 – 8 that measured differences in cultural indicators (tolerance towards women, immigrants and homosexuals, and levels of religiosity) for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the United States are presented in the text only when they contradict the main hypothesis, according to which we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of tolerance and religiosity between Old Europe and New Europe (culturally divided Europe), as well as between Old Europe and the United States (lower cultural similarity), but no statistically significant differences between New Europe and the United States (higher cultural similarity).

The wording of each dependent variable, as well as its value/coding are presented in Chapters 3-7 in tables containing their respective crosstabulation results. In some cases, when these variables are coded on a scale from 1 to 10, only the two extreme as well as the middle values are presented in the above mentioned tables.

A list of detailed hypotheses can be seen below:

**Hypothesis 1:** There **is** a statistically significant difference between levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe ( $OE > NE$ ).

**Hypothesis 2:** There **is** a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards **women** in **Old Europe vs. New Europe** ( $OE > NE$ ), and in **Old Europe vs. the United States** ( $OE > US$ ).

**Hypothesis 3:** There **is no** statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards **women** in **New Europe vs. the United States**.

**Hypothesis 4:** There **is** a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards **immigrants/foreigners** in **Old Europe vs. New Europe** ( $OE > NE$ ) and in **Old Europe vs. the United States** ( $OE > NE$ ).



**Hypothesis 5:** There **is no** statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards **immigrants/foreigners** in **New Europe vs. the United States**.

**Hypothesis 6:** There **is** a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards **homosexuals** in **Old Europe vs. New Europe** ( $OE > NE$ ) and in **Old Europe vs. the United States** ( $OE > US$ ).

**Hypothesis 7:** There **is no** statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards **homosexuals** in **New Europe vs. the United States**.

**Hypothesis 8:** There **is** a statistically significant difference between levels of **religiosity** in **Old Europe and New Europe** ( $OE < NE$ ) and in **Old Europe and the United States** ( $OE < US$ ).

**Hypothesis 9:** There **is no** statistically significant difference between levels of **religiosity** in **New Europe and the United States**.

**Hypothesis 10 (alternative theories):** High anti-Americanism levels are positively correlated with weak trade ties with the U.S., infrequent travels to the America, as well as strong support for the Palestinians, the environment and for a quick withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.

## CHAPTER 3 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: ANTI-AMERICANISM IN A DIVIDED EUROPEAN UNION

**My first hypothesis states that there is a statistically significant difference between levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe (higher levels in Old Europe than in New Europe).** To test this hypothesis, mean averages of anti-Americanism were compared across respondents from Old and New Europe using independent-samples t-tests and chi-square methods. Answers to direct questions about overall feelings towards the United States and the American people, as well as responses regarding the perceived role United States plays on world stage, are used in this analysis to measure anti-Americanism,. The overall results, presented below individually and chronologically (per database used) **indicated support** for this hypothesis.

### 3.1 . PEW 2002

Six variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference in means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. The results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 3.1.7 and they are preceded by a detailed description of each test.

All six are ordinal variables, and for all six of them the statistical test used was an independent-samples t-test. The results of this test, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe, and 1 for New Europe. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.

Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, starting with the “U.S. world politics” variable.

- i. The crosstabulation results for the dependent variable “**U.S. world politics**” can be seen below in Table 3.1.1.

**TABLE 3.1.1: In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country?**

	<b>In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country?</b>			
	<i>Great deal</i> 1	<i>Fair amount</i> 2	<i>Not too much</i> 3	<i>Not at all</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	8.0%	34.6%	40.9%	16.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	2.8%	25.1%	47.0%	25.1%

An independent groups t-test revealed that opinions about the United States in Old Europe (M = 2.66, SD =.84) **significantly differed** from those in New Europe (M = 2.94, SD = .78), as predicted,  $t(4305) = -11.50, p < .001^{***}$ . However, the direction of the hypothesis was not confirmed by this test. It appears that while the average citizen from Old Europe believes that the United States takes into account the interests of his country “a fair amount” in making international policy decision, the average citizen of New Europe sees the interests of his country taken into account by the U.S. “not too much.” One possible explanation for these results would

be that the public in both regions has realistic expectations of U.S. views of the European Union – it would be expected for the American government to be more concerned about the interests of their economically strong and militarily powerful, longtime allies like United Kingdom or Germany, then they would be of countries, like Bulgaria or Slovenia, which are, relatively speaking, less significant in the international arena.

- ii. The results of the crosstabulation for the second dependent variable, “U.S. world poverty” can be seen below in Table 3.1.2.

**TABLE 3.1.2: In your opinion, do United States' policies increase the gap between rich and poor countries, lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do United States policies have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?**

	<b>In your opinion, do United States' policies increase the gap between rich and poor countries, lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do United States policies have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?</b>		
	<i>Increase gap between rich and poor</i> 1	<i>No effect</i> 2	<i>Lessen the gap between rich and poor</i> 3
<b>Old Europe</b>	69.5%	20.9%	9.6%
<b>New Europe</b>	60.9%	24.6%	14.5%

An independent groups t-test showed that views of the United States policies regarding world poverty in Old Europe (M = 1.40, SD = .65) **are significantly different** from those in New Europe (M = 1.54, SD = .73), as predicted,  $t(4085) = -6.10, p < .001^{***}$ . The direction of the hypothesis is also confirmed, with Old Europe holding a more negative view of how American policies affect the gap between the rich and poor countries.

- iii. The results of the crosstabulation for a third variable, “U.S. world problems,” are presented below in Table 3.1.3.

**TABLE 3.1.3: In terms of solving world problems, does the United States do too much, too little, or the right amount in helping solve world problems?**

	<b>In terms of solving world problems, does the United States do too much, too little, or the right amount in helping solve world problems?</b>			
	<i>United States does too much</i> 1	<i>United States does right amount</i> 2	<i>United States does too little</i> 3	<i>United States does nothing</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	21.7%	36.3%	33.2%	2.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	24.7%	43.9%	17.8%	3.4%

An independent groups t-test showed that views of the United States policies vis-à-vis world problems in Old Europe (M = 2.18, SD = .82) **are significantly different** from those in New Europe (M = 2.00, SD = .79), as predicted,  $t(4174) = 7.37, p < .001^{***}$ . The direction of the hypothesis is also confirmed, with more people in Old Europe believing that the United

States should do more to solve world problems, while almost half of the people interviewed in New Europe see America as doing its part in helping solve world problems.

- iv. Crosstabulation results for the fourth dependent variable, “**U.S. culture**,” are presented below in Table 3.1.4. “Don’t know” answers were re-coded to fit the middle of the scale, as equivalent to a “neither, nor” classification.

**TABLE 3.1.4: Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here.**

	<b>Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view? It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here.</b>		
	<i>It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here</i> 1	<i>It's neither good, nor bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here (Don't know)</i> 2	<i>It's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here</i> 3
<b>Old Europe</b>	30.0%	6.8%	63.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	34.1%	13.5%	52.4%

An independent groups t-test revealed that opinions on Americanization in Old Europe ( $M = 2.33$ ,  $SD = .90$ ) are **significantly different** from those in New Europe ( $M = 2.18$ ,  $SD = .91$ ), as measured,  $t(4473) = 5.51$ ,  $p < .001^{***}$ . In both regions, the majority of people believe that it is bad that American ideas and customs are spreading in their countries. However Old Europeans are more concerned than their New Europe counterparts about the effects of Americanization on their societies and cultures. 63 percent of people interviewed in OE answered that it was bad that American ideas and customs were spreading in their countries, while almost 53 percent of those interviewed in NE argued the opposite. It is also interesting to notice the fairly large number of Europeans (7 percent in Old Europe and 14 percent in New Europe) who either do not have enough information or who do not care enough about the topic to formulate an opinion about the impact of American ideas and customs might have on their societies.

- v. The crosstabulation for my fifth dependent variable, “**opinion on U.S.**,” is presented below in Table 3.1.5.

**TABLE 3.1.5: What is your opinion of the United States?**

	<b>What is your opinion of the United States?</b>			
	<i>Very favorable</i> 1	<i>Somewhat favorable</i> 2	<i>Somewhat unfavorable</i> 3	<i>Very unfavorable</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	14.1%	55.4%	25.1%	5.4%
<b>New Europe</b>	15.8%	59.2%	20.6%	4.5%

An independent groups t-test showed that opinions regarding the United States in Old Europe (M = 2.22, SD = .74) are **significantly different** from those in New Europe (M = 2.14, SD = .72), as predicated,  $t(4263) = 3.54, p < .001^{***}$ . Although the majority of Europeans have a fairly positive attitude towards the United States, Old Europeans hold more “somewhat unfavorable” views of their transatlantic partner.

- vi. Crosstabulation results for the dependent variables measuring European views of Americans can be found below in Table 3.1.6.

**TABLE 3.1.6: What is your opinion of Americans?**

	What is your opinion of Americans?			
	<i>Very favorable</i> 1	<i>Somewhat favorable</i> 2	<i>Somewhat unfavorable</i> 3	<i>Very unfavorable</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	15.2%	63.2%	17.8%	3.8%
<b>New Europe</b>	13.8%	63.5%	19.2%	3.4%

An independent t- test of the “**opinion on Americans**” dependent variable revealed **no significant differences** in opinions on Americans between Old Europe (M = 2.10, SD = .68) and New Europe (M = 2.12, SD = .67), as measured,  $t(4226) = -1.01, p = .31\ ns$ .

- vii. Conclusion

The results of above findings are summarized below in Table 3.1.7.

**TABLE 3.1.7: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables from the PEW 2002 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 3)**

<b>Region</b>	<b>U.S. world politics</b>	<b>U.S. world poverty</b>	<b>U.S. world problems</b>	<b>U.S. culture</b>	<b>Opinion on the U.S.</b>	<b>Opinion on Americans</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.66*** (0.84)	1.51*** (0.81)	2.39*** (1.05)	1.68*** (.46)	2.33*** (.90)	2.10 <i>ns</i> (.68)
<b>New Europe</b>	2.94*** (0.78)	1.64*** (0.85)	2.58*** (1.21)	1.61*** (.48)	2.18*** (.91)	2.12 <i>ns</i> (.67)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at  $p \leq .05$ .

b)  $p \leq .01^*$ ,  $p \leq .05^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ , *ns* = not significant

These results indicate that while in Old Europe, the population makes a clear distinction between the American people and the American government, in New Europe pro-Americanism manifest itself at both levels. For example, when it comes to OE, 55 percent of the people surveyed have a “somewhat favorable” view of the United States. The percentage increases to 63 percent when asked the same question about Americans. This is matched by the percentages of those who see the United States in a “somewhat unfavorable” light (25 percent) versus those who see the Americans in the same way (17 percent).

At the same time, these results also show that people in Old Europe believe more than their counterparts in New Europe that the United States takes into account their countries’

interests when making foreign policy decisions. They are also more inclined to be critical of these decisions, and they would like to see the United States playing a more positive and proactive role in solving the world's biggest problem, such as the increasing gap between rich and poor countries. OE is also more concerned with the impact of globalization / Americanization on their societies. Overall, **these results confirm my initial hypothesis: Old Europe is more anti-American than New Europe, with the caveat that this anti-Americanism seems to be directed more towards the U.S. government and not the American people.**

### 3.2 . EUROBAROMETER 62 – 2004

Six variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference in means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. The results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 3.2.7 and they are preceded by a detailed description of each test.

All six are ordinal variables, and for the first one examined, a chi-square test was used, while for the other five, an independent-samples t-test was employed. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe, and 1 for New Europe. “Don’t know” and “neither nor” answers were re-coded to represent a middle value for all the dependent variables that did not already have such a value. For example, the majority of the answers were coded 1 = positive, 2 = negative, and 3 = neither nor. They were re-coded as 1 = positive, 2 = neither nor and 3 = negative. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, starting with the “EU foreign policy independent of U.S.” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “EU foreign policy independent of U.S.” dependent variable are presented below in Table 3.2.1.

**TABLE 3.2.1: European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy**

	<b>European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy</b>	
	<i>Tend to agree 1</i>	<i>Tend to disagree 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	89.8%	10.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	90.7%	9.3%

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the country where the interview was conducted (Old Europe vs. New Europe) and the respondents' views on a European Union foreign policy more independent of the United States. The relationship between these variables **was fairly weak**,  $X^2 (1, N = 23014) = 4.72, p < .05^*$ , *although not in the direction predicted by my hypothesis*. Despite the small difference in the overall percentages, respondents in Old Europe are less likely than their New Europe counterparts to advocate a European Union foreign policy more independent of United States.

- ii. Crosstabulation results for “U.S. Role in World Peace” dependent variable are presented below, in Table 3.2.2.

**TABLE 3.2.2: U.S. Role in World Peace**

	<b>In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding peace in the world?</b>		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	21.1%	14.9%	64.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	32.2%	21.0%	46.8%

An independent groups t-test showed that opinions regarding the role U.S. plays in promoting world peace in Old Europe ( $M = 2.43$ ,  $SD = .81$ ) are **significantly different** from those in New Europe ( $M = 2.15$ ,  $SD = .87$ ), as predicated,  $t(24316) = 25.49$ ,  $p < .001^{***}$ . A sizably larger percentage of those interviewed in Old Europe (64 percent) than New Europe (46 percent) believe that the United States policies have a negative impact on peace in the world.

- iii. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism” dependent variable are presented below in Table 3.2.3.

**TABLE 3.2.3: U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism**

	<b>In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding fighting terrorism?</b>		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	37.1%	14.4%	48.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	52.6%	16.8%	30.7%

Results from an independent-samples t-test ( $t(24273) = 28.40$ ,  $p < .001^{***}$ ) revealed that Old Europe ( $M = 2.11$ ,  $SD = .91$ ) is **significantly** more likely than New Europe ( $M = 1.78$ ,  $SD = .88$ ) to see the United States foreign policies as having a negative impact on trying to eradicate terrorism in the world. A year after the Iraqi invasion and the beginning of the war in Afghanistan (both policies labeled by the American government as part of the war on terror), almost half of those interviewed in Old Europe answered that in their opinion, the U.S. plays a negative role in fighting terrorism. At the same time, over 50 percent of respondents in New Europe (where several national governments expressed official support for the war in Iraq, sending troops there) see the impact of the United States in the struggle to eliminate terrorism as a positive one.

- iv. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Economic Growth Worldwide” are presented below in Table 3.2.4.

**TABLE 3.2.4: U.S. Role in Economic Growth Worldwide**

	In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding economic growth worldwide?		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	37.5%	19.9%	42.6%
<b>New Europe</b>	50.0%	25.1%	25.0%

An independent-groups t-test showed that there **are statistically significant differences** between opinions on the America’s role in promoting economic growth worldwide between respondents in Old Europe (M =2.05, SD = .89) and New Europe (M = 1.75, SD = .82), as predicted,  $t(23086) = 26.23, p < .001^{***}$ . While only one in four respondents in New Europe believe that the United States plays a negative role regarding world economic growth, almost half of those interviewed in Old Europe agrees with this view.

- v. Crosstabulations for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide” dependent variable are presented in Table 3.2.5.

**TABLE 3.2.5: U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide**

	In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding fighting poverty worldwide?		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	16.8%	21.3%	62.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	33.8%	31.7%	34.5%

Results from an independent-samples t-test ( $t(23497) = 41.76, p < .001^{***}$ ) showed that Old Europe (M = 2.45, SD = .76) is **significantly more likely** than New Europe (M = 2.01, SD = .82) to view the United States’ role in fighting world poverty as a negative one. While over 60 percent of those interviewed in Old Europe believe that the America’s impact on fighting world poverty is a negative one (and only little over 16 percent choosing the “positive role” answer), opinions in New Europe are more evenly distributed along the three possible answers (positive, negative and neither/nor).

- vi. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Protecting the Environment” are shown below in Table 3.2.6.



**TABLE 3.2.6: U.S. Role in Protecting the Environment**

	<b>In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding environment protection?</b>		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	14.5%	16.1%	69.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	36.8%	27.3%	35.9%

An independent-groups t-test results ( $t(22977) = 51.48, p < .001^{***}$ ) revealed that **there are significant differences** between opinions on America's role in protecting the environment in Old Europe ( $M = 2.55, SD = .73$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 1.99, SD = .85$ ). While views on the impact U.S. has on environmental protection are fairly evenly distributed in New Europe between "positive", "negative" and "neither/nor", a significant majority (almost 70 percent) of those interviewed in Old Europe see the United States as playing a negative role.

## vii. Conclusions

The results of the statistical analysis based on variables from the Eurobarometer 62 – 2004 survey/database are summarized below in Table 3.2.7.

**TABLE 3.2.7: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables from the Eurobarometer 62 -2004 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 6)**

<b>Region</b>	<b>EU foreign policy independent of USA</b>	<b>U.S. role in world peace</b>	<b>U.S. role in fighting terrorism</b>	<b>U.S. role in economic growth worldwide</b>	<b>U.S. role in fighting poverty worldwide</b>	<b>U.S. role in protecting the environment</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	1.10* (.30)	2.43*** (.81)	2.11*** (.91)	2.05*** (.89)	2.45*** (.76)	2.55 *** (.73)
<b>New Europe</b>	1.09* (.29)	2.15*** (.87)	1.78*** (.88)	1.75*** (.82)	2.01*** (.82)	1.99 *** (.85)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at  $p \leq .05$ .

b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

Western Europe, comprising the initial EU members, is more inclined to see the American policies as having a **negative impact** on five major areas of current international relations: peace in the world, fighting terrorism, promoting economic growth and trying to alleviate poverty worldwide, as well as protecting the environment. New Europe nations – formerly Communist countries recently admitted into the European Union – have much **more positive views** of the role played by the United States in world affairs. Considering that the study was conducted shortly after the 2003 Iraq invasion, we could safely speculate that this war, extremely unpopular at the time in Europe, seems to have fueled a radicalization of anti-Americanism in Old European countries, where, for example, more than half of the respondents believe that the U.S. is actually hurting the chances of eliminating terrorism in the world.

It is interesting to note that the “Old vs. New Europe” divide maintains its statistical significance when it comes to views not only on America’s role in the world, but on the EU’s impact on international politics as well. You can see below in Table 3.2.8 the results of crosstabulations in which the independent variables stayed the same (Old Europe = 0, New Europe = 1), and the dependent variable examines opinions regarding the EU’s role in the world.

**TABLE 3.2.8: Views on European Union’s role in world politics in Old Europe vs. New Europe, as measured by variables from the Eurobarometer 62 -2004 survey /database**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>EU tends to play a __role regarding X?</b>	<b>EU tends to play a __role regarding X?</b>	<b>EU tends to play a __role regarding X?</b>
		<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>WORLD PEACE</b>	Old Europe	63.2%	25.3%	11.5%
	New Europe	77.7%	17.4%	4.9%
<b>FIGHTING TERRORISM</b>	Old Europe	61.2%	27.1%	11.8%
	New Europe	75.5%	19.5%	5.0%
<b>ECONOMIC GROWTH</b>	Old Europe	56.2%	29.3%	14.5%
	New Europe	71.6%	22.2%	6.2%
<b>FIGHTING POVERTY</b>	Old Europe	49.3%	32.2%	18.4%
	New Europe	62.2%	30.1%	7.6%
<b>ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION</b>	Old Europe	61.0%	23%	16.0%
	New Europe	77.1%	17.9%	5.0%

An independent samples t-test was used for comparing the means between Old and New Europe in all five cases, and the results were statistically significant ( $p < .001^{***}$ ). Those interviewed in New Europe countries are not only more pro-American, but they are also more pro-EU than their counterparts in Old Europe. They also believe that the EU has a more positive impact in world politics than the United States. In almost every instance, three out of four respondents see the impact of the European Union on the world as a positive one, percentages both higher than in Western Europe, and also higher than in the case of the previous questions, regarding America’s role in the world.

**Overall, the results of the statistical analysis using variables from the 2004 Eurobarometer confirmed that two years after the PEW 2002 survey, signs of a “divided” anti-Americanism in the European Union appeared again, with Europeans feelings towards the United States clearly falling along the lines of “Old” vs. “New” Europe.**

### 3.3 . EUROBAROMETER 63.4 – 2005

Six main variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference in means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. These variables operationalize answers to questions regarding the America's role in world politics, as well as the future of European Union's foreign and defense policy. The results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 3.3.14 and they are preceded by a detailed description of each test.

All six are ordinal variables, and for the first a statistical tool was used in the form of a chi-square test, while for the other five, an independent-samples t-test was employed. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe. "Don't know" and "neither nor" answers were re-coded to represent a middle value for all the dependent variables that did not already have such a value. For example, the majority of the answers were coded 1 = positive, 2 = negative, and 3 = neither nor. They were re-coded as 1 = positive, 2 = neither nor and 3 = negative. An alpha level of .05 was used as the threshold in all statistical analyses.

I have added to these initial six dependent variables a battery of 12 variables asking Europeans to compare the United States and the European Union on several dimensions, such as medical and scientific research, fighting discrimination, innovation technology, etc. Independent-groups t-tests were used to measure the means between Old and New Europe, and the results are presented at the end of this section. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, starting with the "EU foreign policy independent of U.S. – 2005" variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for "EU foreign policy independent of U.S. – 2005" dependent variable are presented below in Table 3.3.1.

**TABLE 3.3.1: EU foreign policy should be independent of U.S. foreign policy**

	<b>Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with the following statement? EU foreign policy should be independent of U.S. foreign policy</b>		
	<i>Tend to agree</i> 1	<i>Neither nor (don't know)</i> 2	<i>Tend to disagree</i> 3
<b>Old Europe</b>	82.3%	8.5%	9.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	81.9%	10.4%	7.7%

A t- test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the region where the interview was conducted (Old Europe (M = 1.27, SD = .61) vs. New Europe (M = 1.26, SD = .58) and the respondents' views on a European Union foreign policy more independent of the United States. The relationship between these variables **was not significant**,  $t(25816) = 1.59$ ,  $p = .11$  ns, which does not support the idea of a divided anti-Americanism in the European Union, even if respondents in Old Europe are slightly less likely than their New Europe counterparts to advocate a European Union foreign policy more independent of United States.

- ii. Table 3.3.2 contains crosstabulation results for the “U.S. role in world peace – 2005” dependent variable.

**TABLE 3.3.2: U.S. Role in World Peace - 2005**

	<b>United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding peace in the world?</b>		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	23.4%	15.9%	60.8%
<b>New Europe</b>	36.3%	19.5%	44.2%

The results of an independent-samples t-test confirmed that the differences in means between groups of respondents from Old Europe (M = 2.3, SD = .83) and New Europe (M = 2.08, SD = .89) are **statistically significant** ( $t(24482) = 26.06, p < .001^{***}$ ). Although the percentage of those seeing the role of the U.S. in world peace as a negative one has decreased compared to the 2004 Eurobarometer responses the difference between Old and New Europe remains significant. More than half the respondents from Western Europe are still pessimistic about America’s impact on international peace.

- iii. Crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism – 2005” dependent variable are presented below in Table 3.3.3.

**TABLE 3.3.3: U.S. Role in Fighting Terrorism - 2005**

	<b>United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding fighting terrorism?</b>		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	39.9%	14.6%	45.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	55.9%	15.3%	28.8%

An independent-groups t-test showed that views of the United States policies toward fighting terrorism in Old Europe (M = 2.06, SD = .92) are **significantly different** from those in New Europe (M = 1.73, SD = .88), as predicted,  $t(24350) = 27.95, p < .001^{***}$ . The direction of the hypothesis is also confirmed, with Old Europe holding a more negative view of how American policies affect efforts to eradicate world terrorism.

- iv. Table 3.3.4 presents crosstabulation results for the “U.S. Role in Economic Growth – 2005” dependent variable.

**TABLE 3.3.4: U.S. Role in Economic Growth Worldwide - 2005**

	<b>United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding economic growth worldwide?</b>		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	39.3%	19.7%	41.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	56.0%	23.8%	20.2%

Results of an independent-samples t-test showed that opinions on the United States' role in economic growth worldwide in Old Europe (M = 2.02, SD = .89) and New Europe (M = 1.64, SD = .79) are **significantly different** ( $t(23234) = 33.46, p < .001^{***}$ ). Twice as many respondents in Old Europe as in New Europe believe that America has a negative impact on economic growth worldwide.

- v. Crosstabulation results for the “**U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide – 2005**” dependent variable are shown below in Table 3.3.5.

**TABLE 3.3.5: U.S. Role in Fighting Poverty Worldwide - 2005**

	<b>In your opinion, would you say that the United States tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding fighting poverty worldwide?</b>		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	18.2%	20.9%	60.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	37.9%	30.9%	31.2%

An independent-groups t-test revealed that the role played by the United States in fighting poverty worldwide is seen as being **significantly more negative** ( $t(23732) = 46.78, p < .001^{***}$ ) in Old Europe (M = 2.43, SD = .78) than in New Europe (M = 1.93, SD = .82). More than half of respondents in Old Europe believe that America's impact on the fight to alleviate world poverty is a negative one, while opinions in New Europe are divided between the positive, the negative and the “no impact” views.

- vi. Table 3.3.6 presents crosstabulation results for the “**U.S. Role in Environment Protection – 2005**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 3.3.6: U.S. Role in Environment Protection**

	<b>United States role regarding environment protection</b>		
	<i>Positive 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 2</i>	<i>Negative 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	13.5%	15.4%	71.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	39.2%	25.1%	35.7%

Results of an independent-samples t-test confirmed that the differences in means between groups of respondents from Old Europe (M = 2.57, SD = .71) and New Europe (M = 1.96, SD = .86) are **statistically significant** ( $t(23391) = 56.74, p < .001^{***}$ ). The percentage of those seeing the role of the U.S. in environmental protection as a negative one has slightly increased in Old Europe compared to the 2004 Eurobarometer responses, which widens the gap between the two regions even further. In 2005, over 70 percent of the respondents from Western Europe were pessimistic about America's impact on the environment, while only one in three of those interviewed in countries from New Europe agreed with them.

- vii. The next 12 dependent variables are helpful in understanding how Europeans see themselves compared to the United States. As pertaining to my analysis, I argue that levels of anti-Americanism can be estimated from feelings of superiority towards the United States. **Old Europe respondents will perceive that the EU is ahead of the U.S. in several or most of the societal dimensions measured by the 2005 Eurobarometer, while New Europe will see the EU behind or at the same level as the U.S.**

Tables 3.3.7 and 3.3.8 present crosstabulation results for two dependent variables measuring views on how United States and the European Union compare to each other when it comes to overall economic performance and life quality.

**TABLE 3.3.7: European Economy Compared to U.S.**

	<b>Would you say that the European economy is performing better, performing worse or performing as well as the American economy?</b>		
	<i>Performing better 1</i>	<i>Performing as well as 2</i>	<i>Performing worse 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	31.0%	31.2%	37.8%
<b>New Europe</b>	20.0%	33.0%	46.9%

**TABLE 3.3.8: European Quality of Life Compared to U.S.**

	<b>In general, would you say that the standard of the quality of life in Europe at the moment is better or less good than in the United States?</b>			
	<i>Much better 1</i>	<i>Somewhat better 2</i>	<i>Somewhat less good 3</i>	<i>Definitely less good 4</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	13.5%	44.0%	18.4%	3.8%
<b>New Europe</b>	5.7%	23.3%	35.2%	9.4%

T-test results for these two dependent variables, presented below in Table 3.3.9, confirm the initial argument, that **Old Europe will perceive the EU as being ahead of the U.S., while New Europe will see the EU behind or at the same level as the U.S.** on overall economic performance as well as general quality of life. Twice as many respondents in Old Europe as new Europe believe that the quality of life in the European Union is either “much better” or “somewhat better” than in the United States. The relationship holds in the case of the perceived economic performance comparison, although the difference in raw numbers between Old and New Europe is smaller than in the previous case.

**TABLE 3.3.9: T-Test Results for Variables Measuring Perceived Differences between EU and U.S. Economy and Life Quality**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>T-Test</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Overall Economic Performance</b>	-18.36***	21749	Old Europe	2.07	.82
			New Europe	2.27	.77
<b>Overall Standard of the Quality of Life</b>	-30.90***	25816	Old Europe	2.84	1.53
			New Europe	3.44	1.49

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at  $p \leq .05$ . b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant.

Crosstabulation results for 10 dependent variables comparing perceived differences between EU and U.S. are presented below in Table 3.3.10.

**TABLE 3.3.10: Crosstabulation Results for Variables Measuring Perceived Differences between EU and U.S.**

For each of the following, please tell me whether in your opinion the EU is ahead, behind or at the same level as the U.S.	Region	Answer (%) <i>Ahead</i> 1	Answer (%) <i>At the same level</i> 2	Answer (%) <i>Behind</i> 3
<b>Scientific Research</b>	Old Europe	14.5	26.8	58.7
	New Europe	16.1	34.1	49.8
<b>Medical Research</b>	Old Europe	18.4	28.3	53.3
	New Europe	18.6	35.2	46.2
<b>Protection of the Environment</b>	Old Europe	68.8	17.2	14.0
	New Europe	46.5	32.4	21.1
<b>Innovation Technology</b>	Old Europe	19.8	28.5	51.7
	New Europe	16.9	31.4	48.9
<b>The Healthcare System</b>	Old Europe	62.9	15.9	21.2
	New Europe	30.9	33.6	35.6
<b>Education</b>	Old Europe	48.2	28.3	23.5
	New Europe	43.5	32.2	24.3
<b>Fighting Social Disparities</b>	Old Europe	67.6	18.2	14.2
	New Europe	39.5	35.0	25.4
<b>Fighting Unemployment</b>	Old Europe	47.6	27.6	24.8
	New Europe	29.6	39.1	32.3
<b>Fighting Discrimination</b>	<b>Old Europe</b>	<b>57.1</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>17.8</b>
	<b>New Europe</b>	<b>37.1</b>	<b>36.3</b>	<b>26.6</b>
<b>Creation of Companies</b>	Old Europe	19.9	26.6	53.3
	New Europe	19.1	36.0	44.9

Independent-samples T-test results (presented below in Table 3.3.11) comparing means between respondents in Old Europe and New Europe reveal that **there are statistically significant differences** between these two groups when it comes to the way they perceive the differences between the European Union and the United States. The picture we get is a more nuanced one than my initial hypothesis suggested. Old Europe's levels of self-satisfaction with the state of the European Union when compared to the United States in general – but not in every case – are higher than in New Europe. Exceptions are questions related to the field of scientific and technological development (levels of scientific and medical research, as well as innovation and technology). Old Europe more than New Europe sees the United States as being ahead of the European Union when it comes to these areas, and in the case of innovation/technology, the differences between the two regions are statistically insignificant. At the same time, **more than half of the respondents from Western Europe perceive the EU as being ahead of the U.S. in**

**fighting against discrimination**, promoting environmental protection measures, developing a better healthcare system and trying to alleviate social disparities. Twice as many of those interviewed in Old Europe as in New Europe see America lagging behind Europe in fighting unemployment, but better at creating private companies (which might represent a reflection of a more social-democratic outlook on the labor-government-private section relationship).

**TABLE 3.3.11: T-Test Results for Variables Measuring Perceived Differences between EU and U.S.**

<b>For each of the following, please tell me whether in your opinion the EU is ahead, behind or at the same level as the U.S.</b>	<b>T-Test</b>	<b>Degrees of Freedom</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Scientific Research</b>	10.47***	22514	Old Europe	2.44	.73
			New Europe	2.34	.73
<b>Medical Research</b>	7.71***	22630	Old Europe	2.35	.77
			New Europe	2.28	.75
<b>Protection of the Environment</b>	-28.22***	22419	Old Europe	1.45	.72
			New Europe	1.75	.78
<b>Innovation Technology</b>	-.10 ns	21550	Old Europe	2.32	.78
			New Europe	2.32	.74
<b>The Healthcare System</b>	-41.37**	22232	Old Europe	1.58	.81
			New Europe	2.05	.81
<b>Education</b>	-4.93***	22070	Old Europe	1.75	.81
			New Europe	1.81	.80



Table continued.

<b>For each of the following, please tell me whether in your opinion the EU is ahead, behind or at the same level as the U.S.</b>	<b>T-Test</b>	<b>Degrees of Freedom</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Fighting Social Disparities</b>	-36.69***	21643	Old Europe	1.47	.73
			New Europe	1.86	.79
<b>Fighting Unemployment</b>	-23.88***	21402	Old Europe	1.77	.82
			New Europe	2.04	.78
<b>Fighting Discrimination</b>	-26.40***	21633	<b>Old Europe</b>	<b>1.61</b>	<b>.77</b>
			<b>New Europe</b>	<b>1.89</b>	<b>.79</b>
<b>Creation of Companies</b>	6.99***	20251	Old Europe	2.34	.78
			New Europe	2.26	.75

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at  $p \leq .05$ . b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

Staying in the realm of perceived differences between Europe and America, it is interesting to see how the role of the European Union in world politics is seen in comparison to the United States. Independent-samples t-tests were conducted for five dependent variables looking at the role the EU plays on the international stage and the results show that there are significant differences between Old Europe and New Europe not only when it comes to anti-Americanism, but also pro-European Union feelings (results in Table 3.3.12). Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 3.3.13 alongside results for the main 5 dependent variables used at the beginning of this section to measure anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe.

**TABLE 3.3.12: T-Test Results for Variables Measuring Perceptions of EU's Role in World Politics**

<b>In your opinion, does the European Union tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither positive nor negative role regarding...?</b>	<b>T-Test</b>	<b>Degrees of Freedom</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Peace in the world</b>	24.95***	24423	Old Europe	1.43	.65
			New Europe	1.25	.51

Table continued.

<b>In your opinion, does the European Union tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither positive nor negative role regarding...?</b>	<b>T-Test</b>	<b>Degrees of Freedom</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>The fight against terrorism</b>	25.82***	24156	Old Europe	1.48	.68
			New Europe	1.28	.53
<b>The growth of world economy</b>	29.78***	23390	Old Europe	1.59	.72
			New Europe	1.33	.57
<b>The fight against poverty in the world</b>	22.93**	23787	Old Europe	1.66	.76
			New Europe	1.45	.64
<b>The Protection of the environment</b>	32.32**	23979	Old Europe	1.51	.73
			New Europe	1.25	.52

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at  $p \leq .05$ .

b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

**TABLE 3.3.13: How Europeans Perceive the International Role Played by the European Union and the United States – crosstabulation results**

<b>The EU / US tend to play a __ role regarding __?</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Answer EU (%)</b> <i>Positive</i>	<b>Answer U.S. (%)</b> <i>Positive</i>	<b>Answer EU (%)</b> <i>Neither positive nor negative</i>	<b>Answer U.S. (%)</b> <i>Neither positive nor negative</i>	<b>Answer EU (%)</b> <i>Negative</i>	<b>Answer U.S. (%)</b> <i>Negative</i>
<b>Peace in the world</b>	Old Europe	65.9	23.4	24.7	15.9	9.4	60.8
	New Europe	79.0	36.3	17.3	19.5	3.8	44.2
<b>The fight against terrorism</b>	Old Europe	62.2	39.9	27.0	14.6	10.7	45.5
	New Europe	76.1	55.9	19.7	15.3	4.3	28.8

Table continued.

<b>The EU / US tend to play a __ role regarding __?</b>	<b>Region</b>	<b>Answer EU (%) <i>Positive</i></b>	<b>Answer U.S. (%) <i>Positive</i></b>	<b>Answer EU (%) <i>Neither positive nor negative</i></b>	<b>Answer U.S. (%) <i>Neither positive nor negative</i></b>	<b>Answer EU (%) <i>Negative</i></b>	<b>Answer U.S. (%) <i>Negative</i></b>
<b>The growth of world economy</b>	Old Europe	55.4	39.3	30.4	19.7	14.2	41.0
	New Europe	72.2	56.0	22.3	23.8	5.6	20.2
<b>The fight against poverty in the world</b>	Old Europe	52.2	18.2	29.7	20.9	18.1	60.9
	New Europe	63.5	37.9	28.2	30.9	8.3	32.1
<b>The Protection of the environment</b>	Old Europe	63.7	13.5	21.6	15.4	14.8	71.0
	New Europe	79.8	39.2	15.7	25.1	4.5	35.7

The picture emerging from these results is one of a European Union that perceives its role on the international stage as more positive than the one played by the United States. At the same time, it is interesting to notice that significantly more respondents from New Europe than Old Europe share this point of view.

#### viii. Conclusions

T-test results for five main dependent variables are summarized below in Table 3.3.14.

**TABLE 3.3.14: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables from the Eurobarometer 63 -2005 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 7)**

<b>Region</b>	<b>EU foreign policy independent of USA</b>	<b>U.S. role in world peace</b>	<b>U.S. role in fighting terrorism</b>	<b>U.S. role in economic growth worldwide</b>	<b>U.S. role in fighting poverty worldwide</b>	<b>U.S. role in protecting the environment</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	1.27 ns (.61)	2.37*** (.83)	2.06*** (.92)	1.80*** (.89)	2.02*** (.78)	2.43 *** (.71)
<b>New Europe</b>	1.26 ns (.58)	2.08*** (.89)	1.73*** (.88)	1.68*** (.79)	1.64*** (.82)	1.93*** (.86)

Measures of anti-Americanism from the 2005 Eurobarometer show a divided European Union, along the Old Europe – New Europe line. Respondents from Western Europe are significantly more likely to see the United States as playing a negative role in promoting international peace and economic growth, fighting terrorism, trying to eradicate world poverty and protecting the environment. In the last two cases, twice as many of those interviewed in Old Europe as in New Europe perceive America as having a negative impact on efforts to alleviate

poverty worldwide and protecting the environment. Thanks to the battery of questions presented in the previous section, we can also get a more nuanced picture of European anti-Americanism, directed mostly at areas of social and economic equality, as well as foreign policies. While America is still admired for its technological prowess, it is also criticized for its conduct on the international stage, as well as for its domestic policies regarding the healthcare system, the environment and unemployment. Directly related to the focus of this dissertation on tolerance, it is worth pointing out that Old Europe is especially critical of the way United States deal with discrimination at home and abroad (only 17 percent of respondents believe that the U.S. is ahead of the EU on this dimension).

**Overall, the results of the statistical analysis using variables from the 2005 Eurobarometer confirmed the findings from both the 2002 PEW and 2004 Eurobarometer surveys: a “divided” anti-Americanism in the European Union, with Europeans feelings towards the United States falling along the lines of “Old” vs. “New” Europe. Old Europe is significantly more anti-American than in New Europe.**

### 3.4 . PEW 2007

Seven variables from this database were used as dependent variables to test the difference in means between levels of anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe. These variables provide answers to questions regarding feelings towards the United States, President George W. Bush, and the American people and culture broadly defined. The results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 3.4.10 and are preceded by a detailed description of each test.

All nine are ordinal variables, and the statistical tool used for four of them was a chi-square test, while for the other five, I used an independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. The independent variable, Old Europe vs. New Europe, was coded 0 for Old Europe, and 1 for New Europe. “No answer” and “don’t know” answers were eliminated when they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, starting with the “Opinion of United States - 2007” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Opinion of United States - 2007**” are presented below in Table 3.4.1.

**TABLE 3.4.1: Opinion of the United States - 2007**

	<b>Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?</b>			
	<i>Very favorable</i> 1	<i>Somewhat favorable</i> 2	<i>Somewhat unfavorable</i> 3	<i>Very unfavorable</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	6.1%	38.0%	39.3%	16.7%
<b>New Europe</b>	7.7%	43.2%	35.5%	13.6%

Results from an independent-samples t-test showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(7393) = 5.82, p < .001^{***}$ ) between opinions of the United States in Old Europe

( $M = 2.67$ ,  $SD = .82$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 3.55$ ,  $SD = .82$ ). Western European respondents are more likely have “somewhat unfavorable” and “very unfavorable” views of the United States than those interviewed in New Europe.

- ii. Table 3.4.2 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Opinion of Americans – 2007**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 3.4.2: Opinion of Americans - 2007**

	<b>Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Americans?</b>			
	<i>Very favorable</i> 1	<i>Somewhat favorable</i> 2	<i>Somewhat unfavorable</i> 3	<i>Very unfavorable</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	12.7%	56.1%	24.0%	7.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	8.2%	54.8%	28.7%	8.3%

An independent-groups t-test confirmed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(7181) = -6.12$ ,  $p < .001^{***}$ ) between opinions of the United States in Old Europe ( $M = 2.26$ ,  $SD = .76$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.37$ ,  $SD = .75$ ), although *not in the direction predicted by my hypothesis*. Although they have a mostly negative view of the United States, over half of the respondents from Old Europe (more than New Europe, which goes against my hypothesis about higher levels of anti-Americanism in OE compared to NE) perceive the American people in a positive light. Europeans seem to be able to differentiate between the U.S. government and the U.S. citizens when it comes to the target of their antipathy.

- iii. Crosstabulation results for the “**U.S. World Politics – 2007**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 3.4.3.

**TABLE 3.4.3: U.S. World Politics - 2007**

	<b>In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country – a great deal, a fair amount, not too much, or not at all?</b>			
	<i>Great deal</i> 1	<i>Fair amount</i> 2	<i>Not too much</i> 3	<i>Not at all</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	3.0%	18.1%	46.2%	32.7%
<b>New Europe</b>	2.1%	18.9%	46.8%	32.2%

Results from an independent-samples t-test showed that **there are no significant differences** ( $t(4664) = -.19$ ,  $p = .84$  *ns*) between Old Europe and New Europe when it comes to the beliefs about the amount of attention paid by the United States to other countries when it makes its foreign policy decision. One in five of the respondents in both regions believe that the U.S. doesn’t take into account the interests of their countries “at all”, or if it does, it is “not too much.”

- iv. Table 3.4.4 presents crosstabulation results for the “**U.S. World Poverty – 2007**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 3.4.4: U.S. World Poverty - 2007**

	<b>Do United States policies increase or lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do United States policies have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?</b>		
	<i>Increase gap between rich and poor</i> 1	<i>No effect</i> 2	<i>Lessen gap between rich and poor</i> 3
<b>Old Europe</b>	71.7%	16.8%	11.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	57.1%	28.6%	14.4%

An independent-samples t-test revealed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(4417) = -7.64, p < .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 1.40, SD = .68$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 1.57, SD = .73$ ) regarding the role played by the United States on the gap between rich and poor countries. Over 70 percent of respondents in Western Europe and 57 percent in New Europe believe that the impact America has on alleviating world poverty is a negative one.

- v. Crosstabulation results and question wording for the “**U.S. Culture – 2007**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 3.4.5.

**TABLE 3.4.5: U.S. Culture - 2007**

	<b>Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view?</b>	
	<i>It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here</i> 1	<i>It's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here</i> 2
<b>Old Europe</b>	23.0%	77.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	25.6%	74.4%

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship between the country where the interview was conducted (Old Europe vs. New Europe) and the respondents' views on the Americanization of their national culture. The relationship between these variables **was significant, but weak**,  $X^2(1, N = 5440) = 3.82, p < .01^{**}$ . Despite the small difference in the overall percentages (77 vs. 74 percent), respondents in Old Europe are more likely than their New Europe counterparts to argue that it is bad that American ideas and customs are spreading in their countries.

- vi. Table 3.4.6 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Trust in President George W. Bush**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 3.4.6: Trust in President George W. Bush**

	<b>How much confidence you have in U.S. President George W. to do the right thing regarding world affairs?</b>			
	<i>A lot of confidence</i> 1	<i>Some confidence</i> 2	<i>Not too much confidence</i> 3	<i>No confidence at all</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.4%	17.9%	30.5%	49.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	4.6%	26.0%	36.8%	32.6%

Results from an independent-samples t-test showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(4617) = 11.14, p < .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 3.27, SD = .83$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.97, SD = .87$ ) when it comes to their feelings towards American leader George W. Bush. Almost 80 percent of respondents in Old Europe have little or no confidence at all in President Bush's involvement in international politics. It seems that President Bush is more distrusted and disliked by the Europeans than the American government or the American people as a whole.

- vii. Crosstabulation results for the “**U.S. Promotes Democracy**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 3.4.7.

**TABLE 3.4.7: U.S. Promotes Democracy**

	<b>Which statement comes closer to describing your view?</b>	
	<i>The United States promotes democracy wherever it can</i> 1	<i>The United States promotes democracy mostly where it serves its interests</i> 2
<b>Old Europe</b>	7.7%	92.3%
<b>New Europe</b>	13.2%	86.8%

A chi-square test of independence showed that **there are significant differences** -  $X^2(1, N = 5330) = 35.66, p < .001^{***}$  - between Old and New Europe's views on America's democratization efforts. Most Europeans believe that the U.S. promotes democracy only when it serves its interests, but more respondents from Old Europe than New Europe share this point of view.

- viii. Conclusions

Table 3.4.8 summarizes the results of the analysis comparing anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe using variables from the PEW 2007 database/survey.

**TABLE 3.4.8: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables from the PEW 2007 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 5)**

<b>Region</b>	<b>U.S. world politics</b>	<b>U.S. world poverty</b>	<b>Trust in Pres Bush</b>	<b>U.S. culture</b>	<b>U.S. and democracy</b>	<b>Opinion of U.S.</b>	<b>Opinion of Americans</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	3.09 <i>ns</i> (.78)	1.40*** (.68)	3.27*** (.83)	$X^2=3.82^{**}$	$X^2=35.66^{**}$ *	2.67** * (.82)	2.26 *** (.76)
<b>New Europe</b>	3.09 <i>ns</i> (.76)	1.57*** (.73)	2.58*** (.87)	$X^2=3.82^{**}$	$X^2=35.66^{**}$ *	2.55** * (.82)	2.37 *** (.75)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe difference is significant at  $p \leq .05$ . b)  $p \leq .01$  \*,  $p \leq .05^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ , *ns* = not significant

**Data from the PEW 2007 survey confirms the existence of a divided anti-Americanism in the European Union, along the Old Europe – New Europe lines.** Old Europe is more anti-American than New Europe. Respondents from Western Europe (more than their New Europe counterparts) hold unfavorable views of the United States government and President George W. Bush, believe that the U.S. has a negative impact on efforts to alleviate world poverty and that the spread of American culture is bad for their own countries. They deem America’s efforts to spread democracy in the world as self-serving, but they also make a clear distinction between the American people (70 percent positive responses) and the American government (40 percent positive responses).

### **3.5 . CONCLUSIONS – DIVIDED ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION**

The results of the statistical analyses presented above are summarized in Tables 3.5.1 to 3.5.4 and they confirm the initial theory: **there is a relationship between the Old Europe – New Europe divide and levels of anti-Americanism.**

**TABLE 3.5.1: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables from the PEW 2002 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 3)**

<b>Region</b>	<b>U.S. world politics</b>	<b>U.S. world poverty</b>	<b>U.S. world problems</b>	<b>U.S. culture</b>	<b>Opinion on the U.S.</b>	<b>Opinion on Americans</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.66*** (0.84)	1.51*** (0.81)	2.39*** (1.05)	1.68*** (.46)	2.33*** (.90)	2.10 <i>ns</i> (.68)
<b>New Europe</b>	2.94*** (0.78)	1.64*** (0.85)	2.58*** (1.21)	1.61*** (.48)	2.18*** (.91)	2.12 <i>ns</i> (.67)

**TABLE 3.5.2: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables from the Eurobarometer 62 -2004 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 6)**

<b>Region</b>	<b>EU foreign policy independent of USA</b>	<b>U.S. role in world peace</b>	<b>U.S. role in fighting terrorism</b>	<b>U.S. role in economic growth worldwide</b>	<b>U.S. role in fighting poverty worldwide</b>	<b>U.S. role in protecting the environment</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	1.10* (.30)	2.43*** (.81)	2.11*** (.91)	2.05*** (.89)	2.45*** (.76)	2.55 *** (.73)
<b>New Europe</b>	1.09* (.29)	2.15*** (.87)	1.78*** (.88)	1.75*** (.82)	2.01*** (.82)	1.99 *** (.85)

**TABLE 3.5.3: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables from the Eurobarometer 63 -2005 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 7)**

<b>Region</b>	<b>EU foreign policy independent of USA</b>	<b>U.S. role in world peace</b>	<b>U.S. role in fighting terrorism</b>	<b>U.S. role in economic growth worldwide</b>	<b>U.S. role in fighting poverty worldwide</b>	<b>U.S. role in protecting the environment</b>



Table continued.

Region	EU foreign policy independent of USA	U.S. role in world peace	U.S. role in fighting terrorism	U.S. role in economic growth worldwide	U.S. role in fighting poverty worldwide	U.S. role in protecting the environment
<b>Old Europe</b>	1.27 ns (.61)	2.37*** (.83)	2.06*** (.92)	1.80*** (.89)	2.02*** (.78)	2.43 *** (.71)
<b>New Europe</b>	1.26 ns (.58)	2.08*** (.89)	1.73*** (.88)	1.68*** (.79)	1.64*** (.82)	1.93*** (.86)

**TABLE 3.5.4: Anti-Americanism in Old Europe vs. New Europe as measured by variables from the PEW 2007 survey/database (codebook in Appendix 5)**

Region	U.S. world politics	U.S. world poverty	Trust in Pres Bush	U.S. culture	U.S. and democracy	Opinion of U.S.	Opinion of Americans
<b>Old Europe</b>	3.09 ns (.78)	1.40*** (.68)	3.27*** (.83)	X <sup>2</sup> =3.82**	X <sup>2</sup> =35.66** *	2.67** * (.82)	2.26 *** (.76)
<b>New Europe</b>	3.09 ns (.76)	1.57*** (.73)	2.58*** (.87)	X <sup>2</sup> =3.82**	X <sup>2</sup> =35.66** *	2.55** * (.82)	2.37 *** (.75)

Old Europe is more anti-American than New Europe, more inclined to see the American government, President Bush and the overall international politics involvement of the United States in a negative light. Respondents from Western Europe are more likely than those in New Europe to disapprove of America's social and environmental policies, admiring at the same time its technological and scientific prowess. They are also more critical of the Americanization of their societies and of the war on terrorism. It is interesting to notice that Europeans in general make a distinction between the U.S. government and the American people, the former being the actual target of more virulent anti-American feelings, while the latter seems to be merely disliked.

## CHAPTER 4 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TOLERANCE TOWARDS WOMEN IN OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

My second and third theories predict levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in Chapter 4, measuring differences in cultural indicators (tolerance towards women, immigrants and homosexuals, and levels of religiosity) for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the United States are presented in the text only when they show no significant differences between the two regions, as such contradicting the main hypothesis of this research, according to which we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of tolerance towards women between Old Europe and New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural similarity), but no such differences between New Europe and the United States due to their higher cultural similarity.

**Hypothesis 2:** There **is** a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE > NE) and in Old Europe vs. the United States.

**Hypothesis 3:** There **is no** statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards women in New Europe vs. the United States.

To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards women rights, as well as the overall status of women in a society, were compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the United States, using independent-samples t-tests and chi-square tests of independence. The results of this analysis are presented below individually per database used.

### 4.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY

Eight dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to measure levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding views on the role and position of women in the society (women as political leaders, women without children), as well as certain social/economic issues (marriage, abortion, divorce). The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 4.1.7 which is preceded by a detailed description of each test.

All eight are ordinal variables, and the statistical tool used for one of them was a chi-square test, while for the other seven, I used an independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New**

**Europe vs. United States**", was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States). Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named **"Region"** and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. "No answer" and "don't know" answers were eliminated when they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.

Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, beginning with the "Women Right to a Job" variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for **"Women Right to a Job"** dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.1.1.

**TABLE 4.1.1: Women's equal right to a job even when jobs are scarce**

	<b>Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women</b>		
	<i>Agree 1</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree 2</i>	<i>Disagree 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	13.8%	9.8%	76.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	27.1%	20.2%	52.7%
<b>U.S.</b>	8.2%	17.1%	74.6%

The first independent-samples t-test conducted for this dependent variable revealed that for respondents in Old Europe ( $M = 2.63$ ,  $SD = .71$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.26$ ,  $SD = .85$ ) there was a **strong relationship** ( $t(17084) = 26.32$ ,  $p < .01^{**}$ ) between the region where the interview was conducted and the answers regarding the equal rights for women to a job, even when jobs are scarce.

The second t-test showed **significant differences** ( $t(7051) = -22.89$ ,  $p < .001^{***}$ ) between New Europe ( $M = 2.26$ ,  $SD = .62$ ) and United States ( $M = 2.66$ ,  $SD = .62$ ) regarding the equal right of women to have a job even when jobs are scarce. A third t-test showed weaker dissimilarities ( $t(14881) = -2.59$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ) in gender equality opinions between Old Europe and the United States.

To summarize, hypothesis 2 was confirmed: levels of tolerance in Old Europe are significantly higher than those in New Europe. They are however much closer than expected to those in the United States, which does not support the assumption behind hypothesis #3. Levels of tolerance towards women are significantly higher in the United States than in New Europe. Overall, America and Old Europe are more culturally similar in this respect than New Europe and the U.S. 76 percent of respondents from Old Europe and 74 percent from the United States disagreed with the statement that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce, while only 52 percent of those interviewed in New Europe agreed with this point of view.


- ii. Crosstabulation results for the **"Marriage out-dated"** dependent variable are presented in Table 4.1.2.

**TABLE 4.1.2: Marriage out-dated**

	<b>Marriage is an out-dated institution</b>	
	<i>Disagree 1</i>	<i>Agree 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	77.7%	22.3%
<b>New Europe</b>	82.2%	17.8%
<b>U.S.</b>	88.9%	11.1%

Two chi-square tests of independence showed that **there are significant differences** between views on marriage as an out-dated institution in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2(1, N = 13564) = 36.24, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2(1, N = 6887) = 54.37, p < .001^{***}$ ). Hypothesis 2 is confirmed by these results, while hypothesis 3 is not. However, because Old Europe has a larger percentage of respondents who believe that marriage is an out-dated institution (22 percent) than New Europe (17 percent) and United States (11 percent), a valid argument can be made that in the case of the institution of marriage, there is a higher degree of cultural similarity between U.S. and NE than between U.S. and Old Europe (see Chart 4.1.1).

**Chart 4.1.1 – Is Marriage an Out-Dated Institution? Cultural Similarity between Old Europe, New Europe and the United States**



Crosstabulation results for the **“Woman as single parent”** dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.2.3.

**TABLE 4.2.3: Woman as single parent**

	<b>Woman as a single parent</b>		
	<i>Disapprove 0</i>	<i>Depends 1</i>	<i>Approve 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	30.0%	20.2%	49.8%
<b>New Europe</b>	33.5%	23.8%	42.7%
<b>U.S.</b>	46.9%	6.7%	46.4%

A first independent-samples t-test showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(16791) = 7.00, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between views on women as single parents in Old Europe ( $M = 1.20, SD = .87$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 1.09, SD = .86$ ). Results from a second t-test revealed that **there is a strong relationship** ( $t(6972) = 4.11, p < .001^{***}$ ) between where the interview was conducted - New Europe ( $M = 1.09, SD = .86$ ) vs. the United States ( $M = 1.00, SD = .96$ ) - and what the respondent's opinion was on single mothers. **These results show that there is actually more cultural similarity between Old and New Europe, than between New Europe and the United States when it comes to the issue of women as single parents.** As shown above in Table 3, over 46 percent of Americans disapprove of single mothers, compared to the 30 percent in Old Europe and 33 percent in New Europe. It is interesting also to notice the much larger percentages of Europeans who answer "depends" to this question, which suggest a willingness to evaluate individual situations that is not shared by the American respondents.


- iii. Crosstabulation results for the "**Men better leaders than women**" dependent variable are presented in Table 4.1.4.

**TABLE 4.1.4: Men better political leaders than women**

	<b>Men make better political leaders than women do</b>			
	<i>Agree strongly 1</i>	<i>Agree 2</i>	<i>Disagree 3</i>	<i>Strongly disagree 4</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	3.7%	14.5%	43.3%	38.6%
<b>New Europe</b>	12.2%	33.6%	38.4%	15.8%
<b>U.S.</b>	4.7%	19.9%	56.3%	19.0%

Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(16413) = 38.22, p < .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 3.17, SD = .80$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.58, SD = .89$ ), and between New Europe ( $M = 2.58, SD = .89$ ) and United States ( $M = 2.90, SD = .75$ ) when it comes to views on women as political leaders ( $t(6757) = -15.26, p < .001^{***}$ ). Three times more respondents from New Europe than Old Europe and the United States agree or strongly agree that men make better political leaders than women. There is no cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States that might explain in future analyses the former's lower levels of anti-Americanism as compared to Old Europe (see below Chart 4.1.2).

**CHART 4.1.2: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement – men make better political leaders than women do**




Crosstabulation results for the “University more important for boys than girls” dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.1.5.

**TABLE 4.1.5: University more important for boys than girls**

	University is more important for a boy than for a girl			
	<i>Agree strongly</i> 1	<i>Agree</i> 2	<i>Disagree</i> 3	<i>Strongly disagree</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.2%	6.5%	38.3%	53.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	4.0%	11.0%	45.3%	39.7%
<b>U.S.</b>	1.9%	6.0%	55.1%	37.0%

Two independent-samples t-tests showed that there is a **strong relationship** –  $t_1 (16799) = 15.93, p < .001^{***}$  and  $t_2 (6883) = -3.60, p < .001^{***}$  - between the region where the interview was conducted – Old Europe ( $M = 3.42, SD = .71$ ), New Europe ( $M = 3.21, SD = .79$ ) and the United States ( $M = 3.27, SD = .65$ ) - and the respondents' views on higher education for boys and girls. While the majority of Europeans and Americans disagree or strongly disagree with the idea that university education is more important for boys than girls, the percentages are higher in Old Europe and United States than in New Europe. These results show there is more cultural similarity on this issue between the United States and Western Europe than between the U.S. and New Europe (see Chart 4.1.3).

**CHART 4.1.3: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement – university education is more important for boys than girls**

- iv. This section starts with crosstabulation results for the last three dependent variables from the WVS database (“**Prostitution justifiable**”, “**Abortion Justifiable**” and “**Divorce Justifiable**”). The question wording for all three dependent variables was: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never is justified, or something in between, using this card.” These dependent variables are coded

on a scale from 1 (Never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable); the two extreme values are presented below in Table 4.1.6.

**TABLE 4.1.6: Prostitution, Abortion and Divorce: Justifiable or Not?**

	Justifiable: prostitution		Justifiable: abortion		Justifiable: divorce	
	<i>Never justifiable</i> 1	<i>Always justifiable</i> 10	<i>Never justifiable</i> 1	<i>Always justifiable</i> 10	<i>Never justifiable</i> 1	<i>Always justifiable</i> 10
<b>Old Europe</b>	31.2%	6.2%	16.4%	15.8%	7.1%	24.1%
<b>New Europe</b>	53.9%	3.3%	35.3%	10.5%	22.0%	15.9%
<b>United States</b>	46.1%	3.0%	28.0%	7.5%	6.6%	12.1%

Results of four independent-samples t-tests revealed that **there is a strong relationship** between the regions where the interview was conducted – Old Europe, New Europe and the United States – and the respondents’ opinions on the *justifiability of prostitution* ( $t_1 (15630) = 23.86, p < .001^{***}$  and  $t_2 (6833) = -3.75, p < .001^{***}$ ) and *divorce* ( $t_1 (16826) = 26.47, p < .001^{***}$  and  $t_2 (6882) = -7.09, p < .001^{***}$ ). A larger percentage of those interviewed in New Europe ( $M = 2.86, SD = 2.59$ ) and United States ( $M = 3.10, SD = 2.51$ ) than Old Europe ( $M = 3.98, SD = 2.80$ ) believe that prostitution is never justifiable.

Results of the analysis on *divorce* are more mixed. At one of the extremes, New Europe ( $M = 5.37, SD = 3.19$ ) has a significantly larger percentage of respondents who argue that divorce is *never justifiable* than Old Europe ( $M = 6.79, SD = 2.73$ ) and the United States ( $M = 5.87, SD = 2.48$ ). At the other end of the spectrum, “*divorce is always justifiable*”, New Europe (20 percent) is positioned between Old Europe (24 percent) and the United States (12 percent).

An independent-samples t-test comparing means between groups of respondents in Old Europe ( $M = 5.68, SD = 3.04$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 4.35, SD = 3.21$ ) confirmed the existence of **significant differences** ( $t (16707) = 24.00, p < .001^{***}$ ) in their views on the *justifiability of abortion*. When New Europe is compared to the United States ( $M = 4.41, SD = .291$ ), these differences become insignificant ( $t (6847) = -.81, p = .41 ns$ ). Overall, opinions on abortion confirm both hypothesis 2 (OE has more tolerant views than NE) and hypothesis 3 (there are no significant differences in levels of tolerance between NE and the U.S.).

#### v. Conclusions

Results of the statistical analysis of variables from the World Values Survey database are summarized below in Table 4.1.7.

**TABLE 4.1.7: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the World Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)**

	Women right to job	Marriage out-dated	Single mothers	Women political leaders	University education for girls	Prostitution justifiable	Abortion justifiable	Divorce justifiable
<b>Old Europe</b>	1.96** (.48)	$X^2=36.24^{**}$ (OE – NE)	1.20*** (.87)	3.17*** (.80)	3.42*** (.71)	3.98*** (2.80)	5.68*** (3.04)	6.79*** (2.73)



Table continued.

	Women right to job	Marriage out-dated	Single mothers	Women political leaders	University education for girls	Prostitution justifiable	Abortion justifiable	Divorce justifiable
<b>New Europe</b>	1.93**/* * (.68)	X <sup>2</sup> =54.37* ** (NE – US)	1.09*** (.86)	2.58*** (.89)	3.21*** (.79)	2.86*** (2.59)	4.35***/ <i>ns</i> (3.21)	5.37*** (3.19)
<b>United States</b>	2.09*** (.49)	X <sup>2</sup> =54.37* ** (NE – US)	1.00*** (.96)	2.90*** (.75)	3.27*** (.65)	3.10*** (2.51)	4.41 <i>ns</i> (2.91)	5.87*** (2.48)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For “New Europe” entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE relationship, second one to NE-U.S, for the cases in which they are different. b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

Analysis based on data from the World Values Survey has produced a nuanced picture of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. In general, there is a relationship between the region where the interview was conducted and the answers given by the respondents. Old Europe and the United States share similar views on: 1) the right of women to have a job even when jobs are scarce, 2) importance of higher education for girls, 3) women as political leaders and 4) divorce. There is a stronger cultural similarity between New Europe and the U.S. when the respondents were asked to express their views on marriage as an out-dated institution, prostitution and abortion, and between Old Europe and New Europe on single motherhood. To summarize, although there are certain areas in which more intolerant views on women and their role in the society are matched by lower levels of anti-Americanism (in New Europe), data from the World Values Survey **does not support the argument that there is an overall stronger cultural similarity** between New Europe and the United States than between Old Europe and the United States

## 4.2 . VOICE OF THE PEOPLE – MILLENNIUM EDITION

Six dependent variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition database were used to measure levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding views on the role and position of women in the society (women as political leaders, women without children), as well as certain social/economic issues (household income, education for girls, marriage, rape, etc.). The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 4.2.7 which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core argument at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on women than Old Europe and the U.S.

All six are ordinal variables, and the statistical tool used for all of them was a chi-square test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States). Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. “No answer” and “don’t

know” answers were eliminated when they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, starting with the “Education for girls” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Education for girls**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.2.1.

**TABLE 4.2.1: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the World Values Survey database**

	<b>Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Education is more important for boys than for girls?</b>	
	<i>Agree 1</i>	<i>Disagree 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	7.3%	92.7%
<b>New Europe</b>	19.0%	81.0%
<b>U.S.</b>	6.8%	93.2%

Two chi-square tests of independence showed that **there are significant differences** between views the importance of education for boys and girls in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 19629) = 605.21, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 8544) = 91.33, p < .001^{***}$ ). A third chi-square also revealed that there are no statistically significant differences in gender equality opinions between Old Europe and the United States, regarding the importance of education for both genders ( $X^2 (1, N = 13091) = .439, p = .566 ns$ ). These results confirmed the existence of a divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, more respondents from New Europe than Old Europe and United States combined believe that education is more important for boys than girls, which shows that gender equality issues related to education are viewed more positively in Old Europe and the United States than in New Europe. Overall, there is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding this particular aspect of tolerance towards women.

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Equal contributions to household income**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.2.2.

**TABLE 4.2.2: Equal contributions to household income**

	<b>Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income?</b>	
	<i>Agree 1</i>	<i>Disagree 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	85.9%	14.1%
<b>New Europe</b>	89.6%	10.4%
<b>U.S.</b>	76.9%	23.1%

Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that **there are significant differences** between opinions on equal contributions to household income by both spouses in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 19375) = 57.53, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 8616) = 133.40, p < .001^{***}$ ). These results confirmed the existence of a split between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New

Europe and the United States. Almost 90 percent of respondents from New Europe agree that both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income, compared to lower percentages in Old Europe (86 percent) and United States (77 percent). In conclusion, for this second variable, there is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the New Europe than between United States and New Europe regarding this economic/social aspect of tolerance towards women.

- iii. Table 4.2.3 presents crosstabulation results for the “**Men better political leaders**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 4.2.3: Men better political leaders**

	<b>Do you agree or disagree with the statement: On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do?</b>	
	<i>Agree 1</i>	<i>Disagree 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	17.0%	83.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	52.8%	47.2%
<b>U.S.</b>	21.6%	78.4%

Two chi-square tests of independence showed that **there are significant distinctions** between views the women as political leaders in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 18609) = 2647.30, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 8028) = 332.80, p < .001^{***}$ ). These results confirmed the existence of a schism between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, a significantly larger percentage of respondents from New Europe than from Old Europe and United States combined believe that men make better political leaders than women. Overall, there is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding women’s involvement in politics and their role as political leaders.

- iv. Crosstabulation results for “**Women right to a job when jobs scarce**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.2.4.

**TABLE 4.2.4: Women right to a job when jobs scarce**

	<b>Do you agree or disagree with the statement: When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women?</b>	
	<i>Agree 1</i>	<i>Disagree 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	22.8%	77.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	40.0%	60.0%
<b>U.S.</b>	16.2%	83.8%

Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that **there are significant differences** between views the women as political leaders in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 19100) = 644.93, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 8293) = 209.84, p < .001^{***}$ ). These results confirmed the existence of a division between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United

States. Moreover, a larger percentage of respondents from New Europe than from Old Europe and United States combined believe that when jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women. There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United States and New Europe on the issue of women's right to a job even when jobs are scarce.

- v. Table 4.2.5 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Women without children**” variable.

**TABLE 4.2.5: Women without children**

	<b>Do you agree or disagree with the statement: A woman needs to have children in order to be really fulfilled?</b>	
	<i>Agree 1</i>	<i>Disagree 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	29.2%	70.8%
<b>New Europe</b>	73.2%	26.8%
<b>U.S.</b>	15.0%	85.0%

Two chi-square tests of independence revealed that **there are significant distinctions** between opinions on women as mothers in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 18230) = 3389.96, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 8178) = 1273.20, p < .001^{***}$ ). These results confirmed the existence of a rift between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, a significantly larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (73 percent) than from Old Europe (29 percent) and United States (15 percent) consider a woman without children to be unfulfilled. There is much more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding motherhood and what that means in a woman's life.

- vi. Crosstabulation results for the “**Woman says no to sex**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.2.6.

**TABLE 4.2.6: Woman says no to sex**

	<b>Do you agree or disagree with the statement: Sometimes when a woman says no to sex, she doesn't always mean it?</b>	
	<i>Agree 1</i>	<i>Disagree 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	38.0%	62.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	63.1%	36.9%
<b>U.S.</b>	30.2%	69.8%

Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that **there are significant differences** between views women saying no to sex in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 15902) = 933.45, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 6700) = 361.25, p < .001^{***}$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, a larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (63 percent) than from Old Europe (38 percent) and United States (30 percent) believe that sometimes when a woman says

no to sex, she doesn't always mean it. There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding a woman's right to say no to sex. On a personal note, I believe that all these numbers are extremely high and very disturbing.

## vii. Conclusions

Table 4.2.7 summarizes the results of the statistical analyses measuring levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States based on variables from the Voice of the People survey – Millennium Edition database.

**TABLE 4.2.7: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition survey database (codebook in Appendix 2)**

	<i>University education for girls</i>	<i>Women and household income</i>	<i>Women political leaders</i>	<i>Women right to a job when jobs scarce</i>	<i>Women without children - fulfilled?</i>	<i>Women say no to sex</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =605.21*** OE - NE	X <sup>2</sup> =57.33*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =2647*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =644.93*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =3389*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =933.4*** OE-NE
<b>New Europe</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =91.33*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =133.40*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =332*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =209.84*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =1273*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =361.2*** NE-US
<b>United States</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =.439 ns US-OE	X <sup>2</sup> =133.40*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =332*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =209.84*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =1273*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =361.2*** NE-US

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant.

**Results of the chi-square tests on variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition measuring levels of tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States have shown that levels of tolerance towards women are much more similar in Old Europe and United States than in United States and the pro-American and apparently quite intolerant New Europe.**

In every instance, a significantly higher percentage of respondents from New Europe than from Old Europe and the U.S. think that women need children to be fulfilled and that they don't always mean it when they say no to sex, education is more important for boys than girls, men make better political leaders than women and they also should be given preference over women in hiring when jobs are scarce. Data from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition did not support the existence of a connection between cultural similarity and levels of tolerance.

## 4.3 . PEW 2007

Two dependent variables from the PEW 2007 Survey database were used to measure views on women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding the importance of education for boys and girls, and women as political leaders. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 4.3.3 which is preceded by a detailed description of each test.

The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their

views on women than Old Europe and the U.S. These two variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used in both cases was an independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, **“Old Europe vs. New Europe”**, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, **“New Europe vs. United States”**, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.

Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named **“Region”** and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. “No answer” and “don’t know” answers were eliminated when they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, beginning with the **“Education for boys and girls”** variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the **“Education for boys and girls”** dependent variable are presented below in Table 4.3.1.

**TABLE 4.3.1: Education for boys and girls**

	<b>Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion about educating children?</b>		
	<i>It is more important for boys than for girls</i> 1	<i>It is equally important for girls and for boys</i> 2	<i>It is more important for girls than for boys</i> 3
<b>Old Europe</b>	1.4%	98.0%	.6%
<b>New Europe</b>	2.5%	96.7%	.8%
<b>United States</b>	.7%	98.7%	.6%

A first t-test revealed the existence of only slightly significant differences in views on the importance of education for boys and girls ( $t(7778) = 2.34, p \leq .05^*$ ) between respondents in Old Europe ( $M = 1.99, SD = .14$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 1.98, SD = .18$ ). A second t-test showed more significant distinctions ( $t(4812) = -4.06, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding gender equality and education between New Europe and the United States ( $M = 2.00, SD = .11$ ).

While the majority of Europeans and Americans believe that education is equally important for boys and girls, the percentages are slightly higher in Old Europe and United States than in New Europe. As such, **these results do not support the core theory of this research:** there is more cultural similarity (and more tolerant attitudes) on this gender-equality issue (education for men and women) between the United States and Western Europe than between the U.S. and New Europe.

- ii. Table 4.3.2 contains crosstabulation results for the **“Women political leaders”** variable.

**TABLE 4.3.2: Women political leaders**

	<b>Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion about men and women as political leaders?</b>		
	<i>Men generally make better political leaders than women</i> 1	<i>In general, women and men make equally good political leaders</i> 2	<i>Women generally make better political leaders than men</i> 3
<b>Old Europe</b>	9.3%	83.8%	6.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	19.2%	70.8%	10.0%
<b>United States</b>	16.2%	77.9%	6.0%

Results from a first t-test showed that there are significant differences ( $t(7652) = 5.75, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 1.98, SD = .40$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 1.91, SD = .53$ ) regarding views on women as political leaders. A second t-test revealed no statistically significant distinctions ( $t(4683) = .70, p = .48 \text{ ns}$ ) between New Europe and the United States ( $M = 1.90, SD = .46$ ). While over 70 percent of Europeans and Americans believe that in general, women and men make equally good political leaders, percentages of respondents who consider men as better political leaders than women are higher in the United States and New Europe than Old Europe. As such, **these results do support my theory**: there is more cultural similarity on this issue between the United States and New Europe than between the U.S. and Old Europe.

### iii. Conclusions

Results of the statistical analysis of views on women based on variables from the PEW 2007 survey database are summarized below in Table 4.3.3.

**TABLE 4.3.3: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the PEW 2007 Survey database (codebook in Appendix 5)**

	<i>Education for boys and girls</i>	<i>Women political leaders</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.97*** (.24)	1.98*** (.40)
<b>New Europe</b>	2.94*** (.32)	1.91***/ ns (.53)
<b>United States</b>	2.98*** (.180)	1.90 ns (.46)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . When the levels of significance for two t-tests conducted using the same dependent variable are different, the first one presented in the table refers to the Old Europe – New Europe comparison, while the second one to the differences between New Europe and the United States. b)  $p \leq .05^*$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ , *ns* = not significant

The existence of a relationship between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism **was confirmed** by the second dependent variable from the PEW 2007 survey database used in this section, measuring views on women as political leaders –New Europe and the United States share similar opinions about men as better political leaders than women. The first dependent

variable, looking at the importance of education for boys and girls, **did not confirm my theory**: Old Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar than New Europe and the United States.

#### 4.4 . CONCLUSIONS

The overall results comparing differences between tolerance towards women in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States are summarized below in Tables 4.4.1 to 4.4.3. They have offered moderate support for the cultural similarity – anti-Americanism connection theory.

**TABLE 4.4.1: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the World Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)**

	Women right to job	Marriage out-dated	Single mothers	Women political leaders	University education for girls	Prostitution justifiable	Abortion justifiable	Divorce justifiable
<b>Old Europe</b>	1.96** (.48)	N=9095** *	.90 <i>ns</i> (.70)	3.17*** (.80)	3.42*** (.71)	3.98*** (2.80)	5.68*** (3.04)	6.79*** (2.73)
<b>New Europe</b>	1.93**/** * (.68)	N=4469** *	.90 <i>ns</i> /** (.75)	2.58*** (.89)	3.21*** (.79)	2.86*** (2.59)	4.35***/ <i>n</i> <i>s</i> (3.21)	5.37*** (3.19)
<b>United States</b>	2.09*** (.49)	N=2418** *	.60*** (.61)	2.90*** (.75)	3.27*** (.65)	3.10*** (2.51)	4.41 <i>ns</i> (2.91)	5.87*** (2.48)

**TABLE 4.4.2: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition survey database (codebook in Appendix 2)**

	University education for girls	Women and household income	Women political leaders	Women right to a job when jobs scarce	Women without children - fulfilled?	Women say no to sex
<b>Old Europe</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =605.21*** OE - NE	X <sup>2</sup> =57.33*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =2647*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =644.93*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =3389*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =933.4*** OE-NE
<b>New Europe</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =91.33*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =133.40*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =332*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =209.84*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =1273*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =361.2*** NE-US
<b>United States</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =,439 <i>ns</i> US-OE	X <sup>2</sup> =133.40*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =332*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =209.84*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =1273*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =361.2*** NE-US

**TABLE 4.4.3: Tolerance towards women as measured by variables from the PEW 2007 Survey database (codebook in Appendix 5)**

	Education for boys and girls	Women political leaders
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.97*** (.24)	1.98*** (.40)
<b>New Europe</b>	2.94*** (.32)	1.91***/ <i>ns</i> (.53)
<b>United States</b>	2.98*** (.180)	1.90 <i>ns</i> (.46)



**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

Old Europe and the United States have shown higher levels of tolerance towards women on issues such as the right of women to jobs even when jobs are scarce, the importance of education for boys and girls, the equal potential of men and women to become good political leaders. They also share similar views on a woman's right to say no to sex and to have a fully fulfilled life even without children. Europeans in general approve of single mothers and believe that both the wife and the husband should contribute to the household income. The topics where there was a clear connection between similar levels of tolerance towards women – cultural similarity – and anti-Americanism were marriage as an out-dated institution, prostitution, divorce and abortion. **United States and New Europe judged abortion, prostitution and abortion to never be justifiable and the institution of marriage as not out-dated.** What is interesting about these results is that cultural similarity between New Europe and the U.S. is strongest when it comes to topics heavily influenced by religious views, while in the cases of secular issues, such as education or jobs, there are more similarities between Old Europe and the Americans than between New Europe and the United States.

## **CHAPTER 5 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TOLERANCE TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS AND FOREIGN WORKERS IN OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES**

My fourth and fifth hypotheses predict levels of tolerance towards foreigners/immigrants in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in Chapter 5, measuring differences in cultural indicators for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the United States are presented in the text only when they show no significant differences between the two regions, as such contradicting the main hypothesis of this research, according to which we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers between Old Europe and New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural similarity), but no such differences between New Europe and the United States due to their higher cultural similarity.

**Hypothesis 4:** There **is** a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe vs. New Europe ( $OE > NE$ ), and in Old Europe vs. the United States ( $OE > US$ ).

**Hypothesis 5:** There **is no** statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreigners in New Europe vs. the United States.

To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards foreigners/ immigrants were compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the United States, using independent-samples t-tests and chi-square tests of independence. The results of this analysis, presented below individually per database used, **have offered moderate support for the cultural similarity – anti-Americanism theory.**

### **5.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY**

Three dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to measure views on immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people's views on having immigrants/foreign workers in their neighborhoods, how a good immigration policy should look like and the right of immigrants/foreign workers to a job when jobs are scarce. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 5.1.4 which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..

These three variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for the first one was a chi-square test of independence, while for the other two, I used an independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests or two chi-square tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.

Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, beginning with the “**Neighbors immigrants**” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Neighbors immigrants**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 5.1.1.

**TABLE 5.1.1: Neighbors immigrants**

	<b>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?</b> <b>Immigrants/foreign workers</b>	
	<i>Not mentioned</i> <i>1</i>	<i>Mentioned</i> <i>2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	87.7%	12.3%
<b>New Europe</b>	83.5%	16.5%
<b>U.S.</b>	88.0%	12.0%

Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that **there are significant differences** between views on having immigrants/foreign workers as neighbors in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 17177) = 53.15, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 7190) = 26.08, p < .001^{***}$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a divide in attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States.

A third chi-square test comparing views on immigrants as neighbors in Old Europe and the United States showed that there are no significant differences between these two regions regarding this particular aspect of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers ( $X^2 (1, N = 14867) = .16, p = .708 \text{ ns}$ ). A slightly higher percentage of respondents from New Europe (17 percent) than from Old Europe and United States (both at 12 percent) mentioned immigrants among those groups unwelcome in their neighborhoods. There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively higher than in New Europe) and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers.

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Jobs for immigrants**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 5.1.2.

**TABLE 5.1.2: Jobs for immigrants when jobs are scarce**

	<b>Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants</b>		
	<i>Agree 1</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree 2</i>	<i>Disagree 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	45.3%	12.3%	42.3%
<b>New Europe</b>	72.8%	13.8%	13.5%
<b>U.S.</b>	54.1%	16.8%	29.1%

Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed **that there are significant dissimilarities** –  $t_1 (16937) = 41.82, p < .001^{***}$  and  $t_2 (7043) = -16.57, p < .001^{***}$  - between Old Europe ( $M = 1.97, SD = .93$ ), New Europe ( $M = 1.41, SD = .71$ ) and the United States ( $M = 1.75, SD = .87$ ) regarding hiring immigrants/foreign workers when jobs are scarce. While over 70 percent of respondents from New Europe believe that when jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to their nation's citizens instead of immigrants, only 54 percent of Americans and 45 percent of respondents from Old Europe agree with this view. As such, **these results do not support my theory**: there is more cultural similarity on this issue between the United States and Old Europe than between the U.S. and New Europe.

- iii. Table 5.1.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Immigration policy**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 5.1.3: Immigration policy**

	<b>How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?</b>			
	<i>Let anyone come 1</i>	<i>As long as jobs available 2</i>	<i>Strict limits 3</i>	<i>Prohibit people from coming 4</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	10.3%	49.3%	37.2%	3.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	15.5%	46.5%	29.5%	8.6%
<b>U.S.</b>	9.4%	39.9%	45.6%	5.1%

Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed **that there are no significant differences** –  $t_1 (13663) = 1.48, p = .13 \text{ ns}$  – between Old Europe ( $M = 2.33, SD = .70$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.31, SD = .83$ ) regarding the nature of a good immigration policy in their respective regions. There are however **important distinctions** ( $t (6840) = -7.81, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between New Europe and the United States ( $M = 2.49, SD = .73$ ) on the same issue. Larger percentages of respondents from United States (47 percent) than from Old Europe (37 percent) and New Europe (29 percent) would like to see a stricter immigration policy. There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and New Europe, than between New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively higher than those in Old Europe) and the United States regarding the influx of foreign workers on their domestic job markets.

#### iv. Conclusions

Results of the statistical analysis of attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the World Values Survey database are summarized below in Table 5.1.4.

**TABLE 5.1.3: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the World Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)**

	<b>Immigrants neighbors</b>	<b>Jobs for immigrants</b>	<b>Immigration policy</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =53.15*** OE - NE	1.61*** (.68)	2.33 <i>ns</i> (.70)
<b>New Europe</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =26.08*** NE - US	1.41*** (.71)	2.31 <i>ns</i> / *** (.83)
<b>United States</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =.16 <i>ns</i> US - OE	1.63*** (.75)	2.46*** (.73)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For “New Europe” entry, when we have two different significance levels for an analysis using the same dependent variable, the first significance level refers to OE-NE relationships while the second one to NE-U.S comparison. b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

Overall, **these results do not support a cultural explanation for anti-Americanism based on levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers.** United States and Old Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively stronger than in New Europe) share similar, more tolerant, views on having immigrants as neighbors and on the hiring of foreign vis-à-vis domestic workers when jobs are scarce. In the case of stricter immigration policies, there are strong cultural similarities between Old and New Europe, while the United States stands alone in its desire to place stricter limits on who is allowed to enter its territory.

#### 5.2 . PEW 2002

Four dependent variables from the PEW 2002 database were used to measure levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people’s views on the overall influence of immigrants in a society, their impact on the domestic way of life and culture, and on stricter immigration policies. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 5.2.5, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than to Old Europe and the United States are.

These four variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all four was independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based

on variable named “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. “No answer” responses were eliminated because they did not provide any information.” Don’t know” answers were kept in the database, but they were re-coded to fit the middle of the answer scale. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Results of the statistical analysis for each dependent variable are presented below, beginning with the “**Immigrants influence**” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Immigrants influence**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 5.2.1.

**TABLE 5.2.1: Immigrants influence**

	<b>Is the influence of immigrants very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in our country?</b>				
	<i>Very good</i> 1	<i>Somewhat good</i> 2	<i>Don't know</i> 3	<i>Somewhat bad</i> 4	<i>Very bad</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	3.1%	33.1%	5.6%	43.8%	14.4%
<b>New Europe</b>	1.4%	25.7%	18.5%	45.2%	9.1%
<b>United States</b>	7.9%	41.7%	6.7%	31.4%	12.3%

Results from a first independent-samples t-test revealed **that there are no significant differences** ( $t(480) = -.53, p = .59 ns$ ) **between Old Europe** ( $M = 3.33, SD = 1.16$ ) **and New Europe** ( $M = 3.35, SD = 1.00$ ) regarding views on the influence of immigrants on the way things are going in their countries. A second t-test showed that **there are important distinctions** on the same topic ( $t(3490) = 9.30, p \leq .001***$ ) **between New Europe and the United States** ( $M = 2.98, SD = 1.24$ ). Lower percentages of respondents from the United States (31 percent) see the influence of immigrants as somewhat bad, compared to the Europeans (45 percent in New Europe and 44 percent in Old Europe). It is also interesting to notice the fairly large percentage of respondents from New Europe, 18.5%, answering “don’t know” to this question, suggesting both lack of knowledge and lack of interest in the issue of immigrant influence in their societies. New Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively stronger than in Old Europe) shows stronger cultural parallels with Old Europe than with the United States.

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Superior national culture**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 5.2.2.

**TABLE 5.2.2: Superior national culture**

	<b>Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.</b>				
	<i>Completely agree</i> 1	<i>Mostly agree</i> 2	<i>Don't know</i> 3	<i>Mostly disagree</i> 4	<i>Completely disagree</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	10.0%	31.3%	2.2%	30.9%	25.6%
<b>New Europe</b>	19.1%	39.8%	6.1%	26.5%	8.5%
<b>United States</b>	22.7%	37.5%	2.9%	23.5%	13.4%

An independent-samples t-test measuring views on a country's national culture in Old Europe (M = 3.31, SD = 1.39) and New Europe (M = 2.65, SD = 1.28) revealed the **existence of significant differences** ( $t(4492) = 16.32, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). A second t-test on the same issue in New Europe and the United States (M = 2.67, SD = 1.39) showed that **there are no important distinctions** ( $t(3489) = -.40, p = .68 ns$ ) when respondents from these two areas were asked if their national cultures were superior to others.

Almost 60 percent of those interviewed in New Europe and the U.S. (compared to only 40 percent in Old Europe) “agree” or “mostly agree” with the fact that their cultures are superior to others. United States and the New Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively weaker compared to Old Europe) share the same nationalistic views of their own national cultures compared to Old Europe, where most people tend to see all world cultures as equal.

- iii. Table 5.2.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Protecting domestic way of life against foreign influences**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 5.2.3: Protecting domestic way of life against foreign influences**

	<p><b>Here is a list of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree.</b></p> <p><b>Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence.</b></p>				
	<i>Completely agree</i> 1	<i>Mostly agree</i> 2	<i>Don't know</i> 3	<i>Mostly disagree</i> 4	<i>Completely disagree</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	21.0%	33.5%	1.8%	26.7%	16.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	25.8%	40.0%	4.2%	23.1%	6.8%
<b>United States</b>	29.7%	34.5%	2.9%	24.6%	8.4%

An initial independent-samples t-test measuring attitudes towards foreign influences on domestic way of life in Old Europe (M = 2.85, SD = 1.44) and New Europe (M = 2.45, SD = 1.27) revealed the **existence of significant dissimilarities** ( $t(4509) = 9.81, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). A second t-test using the same dependent variable compared New Europe and the United States (M = 2.47, SD = 1.35) showed that **there are no important distinctions** ( $t(3491) = -.52, p = .60 ns$ ) when respondents from these two areas were asked about the need to protect their domestic way of life against foreign influences.

Almost 70 percent of those interviewed in New Europe and the U.S. (compared to a little over 50 percent in Old Europe) “agree” or “mostly agree” with the fact that their national way of life must be protected against external influences. United States and New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively lower than those in Old Europe) share the same nationalistic views of domestic way of life compared to Old Europe, where more people tend to perceive the outside influences as innocuous for their national customs and traditions.

- iv. Crosstabulation results for the “**Stricter immigration laws**” dependent variable are listed below in Table 5.2.4.

**TABLE 5.2.4: Stricter immigration laws**

	Here is a list of statements. For each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree. We should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we do now.				
	<i>Completely agree</i> 1	<i>Mostly agree</i> 2	<i>Don't know</i> 3	<i>Mostly disagree</i> 4	<i>Completely disagree</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	38.6%	35.3%	1.8%	15.4%	8.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	28.8%	37.0%	7.7%	19.3%	7.1%
<b>United States</b>	46.1%	34.8%	2.3%	12.5%	4.3%

Two independent-samples t-test revealed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(4512) = -4.59, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding stricter immigration laws between Old Europe ( $M = 2.21, SD = 1.33$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.39, SD = 1.27$ ) as well as between United States ( $M = 1.94, SD = 1.17$ ) and New Europe ( $t(3504) = 10.76, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). A smaller percentage of respondents from New Europe (29 percent) than from Old Europe (39 percent) and the United States (46 percent) completely agree with the idea that their governments should control and restrict the entry of people in their countries more than they currently do. United States shares more cultural parallels with Old Europe than with New Europe (where anti-Americanism is comparatively weaker than in OE).

#### v. Conclusions

Results of the statistical analysis of attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the PEW 2002 survey database are summarized below in Table 5.2.5.

**TABLE 5.2.5: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3)**

	<b>Immigrants influence</b>	<b>National culture superior</b>	<b>Foreign influences on domestic way of life</b>	<b>Stricter immigration laws</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	3.33 ns (1.16)	3.31*** (1.39)	2.85*** (1.44)	2.21*** (1.33)
<b>New Europe</b>	3.35 ns / *** (1.00)	2.65***/ns (1.28)	2.45***/ns (1.27)	2.39*** (1.27)
<b>United States</b>	2.98*** (1.24)	2.67 ns (1.39)	2.47 ns (1.35)	1.94*** (1.17)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For “New Europe” entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE relationship, second one to NE-U.S, when they are different. b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ , *ns* = not significant

Overall, **these results offered mixed support a cultural explanation for anti-Americanism based on levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers.** United States and Old Europe share similar, more intolerant, views on restricting the access of immigrants/ foreign workers to their economies. In the case of the immigrants who are already



here and their influence on their host countries, there are stronger cultural similarities between Old and New Europe (more positive views on this issue), then between New Europe and the U.S. When the questions turn to **nationalistic beliefs** (national culture is superior to others) and **xenophobic attitudes** (domestic way of life is threatened by foreign influences), results of statistical analyses based on dependent variables from the PEW 2002 survey database showed that **there are strong cultural similarities between New Europe and the United States**, while Old Europe displays lower levels of nationalism and xenophobia.

### 5.3 . U.S. 2006 CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SURVEY

Nine dependent variables from the U.S. 2006 Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy/2002 ESS surveys were used to determine levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people’s opinions on qualifications for immigration, the impact immigrants have on a country’s cultural life, crime problems and tax system, as well as the pros and cons of cultural homogeneity. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 5.3.10, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core argument at the foundation of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the United States are.

These nine variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all of them was independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.

Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all nine dependent variables are presented below, starting with the “**Education – qualification for immigration**” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Education – qualification for immigration**” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.1.

**TABLE 5.3.1: Education – qualification for immigration**

	<b>Qualification for immigration: good educational qualifications</b>		
	<i>Extremely unimportant 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 5</i>	<i>Extremely important 10</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	5.2%	16.0%	11.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	5.7%	16.4%	16.3%
<b>United States</b>	1.7%	13.2%	18.3%

Two independent-samples t-tests showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(41352) = -6.64, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 6.22, SD = 2.75$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 6.47, SD = 2.78$ ), and between United States ( $M = 6.92, SD = 2.44$ ) and the New Europe ( $t(7417) = -5.22, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding the importance of good education as a qualification for immigration. New Europe is more culturally similar to United States than Old Europe is (the mean response from NE is positioned between the means of OE – the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more intolerant value).

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Family living in host country – qualification for immigration**” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.2.

**TABLE 5.3.2: Close family living in host country – qualification for immigration**

	<b>Qualification for immigration: close family living here</b>		
	<i>Extremely unimportant 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 5</i>	<i>Extremely important 10</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	9.2%	15.5%	6.7%
<b>New Europe</b>	8.6%	14.7%	13.0%
<b>United States</b>	2.4%	15.1%	11.3%

A first independent-samples t-test measuring differences between Old Europe ( $M = 5.35, SD = 2.94$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 5.91, SD = 3.03$ ) regarding views on close family living in the host country as a qualification for immigration has produced statistically **significant results** ( $t(41274) = -13.67, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). A second t-test showed that there are **no important distinctions** ( $t(7424) = -1.69, p = .09$  ns) between New Europe and the United States ( $M = 6.06, SD = 2.58$ ). Respondents from the more pro-American New Europe and the United States view the presence of close family living in the host country as a more important qualification for immigration than Old Europe.

- iii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Speak national language – qualification for immigration**” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.2.

**TABLE 5.3.3: Speak national language – qualification for immigration**

	<b>Qualification for immigration: speak country's official language</b>		
	<i>Extremely unimportant 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 5</i>	<i>Extremely important 10</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	5.6%	9.6%	21.7%
<b>New Europe</b>	4.1%	12.3%	26.9%
<b>United States</b>	1.5%	8.8%	34.2%

Two independent-samples t-tests showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(41666) = -10.59, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 6.67, SD = 3.02$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 7.08, SD = 2.81$ ), and between United States ( $M = 7.69, SD = 2.45$ ) and the New Europe ( $t(7505) = -7.15, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding the importance of speaking the official language of the host country as a qualification for immigration. New Europe is more culturally similar to United States than Old Europe is (the mean response from NE is positioned between the means of OE – the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more intolerant value). For example, 22 percent of

respondents from Old Europe, 27 percent from New Europe and 34 percent from United States believe that it is extremely important for an individual to speak the official language of his/her host country before he/she is granted the right to immigrate to that country.

- iv. Crosstabulation results for the “**Christian – qualification for immigration**” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.4.

**TABLE 5.3.4: Christian – immigrant qualification**

	<b>Qualification for immigration: Christian background</b>		
	<i>Extremely unimportant 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 5</i>	<i>Extremely important 10</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	30.1%	13.5%	4.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	22.1%	15.8%	9.2%
<b>United States</b>	13.5%	20.2%	6.4%

A first independent-samples t-test measuring differences between Old Europe (M = 3.60, SD = 3.28) and New Europe (M = 4.25, SD = 3.36) regarding views on having a Christian background as a qualification for immigration has produced statistically **significant results** ( $t(41320) = -14.17, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). A second t-test showed that there are **no important distinctions** ( $t(7398) = 1.08, p = .27\ ns$ ) between New Europe and the United States (M = 4.14, SD = 2.93). Respondents from New Europe and the United States view a religious element – having a Christian background - as a more important qualification for immigration than Old Europe.

- v. Crosstabulation results for the “**Race – qualification for immigration**” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.5.

**TABLE 5.3.5: Race – qualification for immigration**

	<b>Qualification for immigration: be white</b>		
	<i>Extremely unimportant 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 5</i>	<i>Extremely important 10</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	46.1%	10.2%	2.1%
<b>New Europe</b>	34.4%	14.0%	7.4%
<b>United States</b>	29.8%	12.0%	1.7%

Two independent-samples t-tests showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(41447) = -26.31, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe (M = 2.17, SD = 2.76) and New Europe (M = 3.34, SD = 3.36), and between United States (M = 2.45, SD = 2.48) and the New Europe ( $t(7409) = 9.99, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding the importance of being white as a qualification for immigration. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is slightly more culturally similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from U.S. is positioned closer to the means of OE – the lowest value - than NE – the highest and more intolerant value). At the same time, for one particular answer, a higher percentage of respondents from Old Europe (46 percent) than New Europe (34 percent) and United States (30 percent) stated that being white was extremely unimportant as a qualification for immigration, which would suggest a closer cultural similarity on this particular issue between NE and U.S. than between OE and U.S.

- vi. Crosstabulation results for the “**Immigrants and taxes**” dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.6.

**TABLE 5.3.6: Immigrants and taxes**

	<b>Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less</b>		
	<i>Generally take out more 1</i>	<i>Generally they take out just as much as they put in 5</i>	<i>Generally put in more 10</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	7.0%	29.3%	1.6%
<b>New Europe</b>	7.0%	34.6%	.8%
<b>United States</b>	5.3%	19.6%	2.0%

Results from the two independent-samples t-tests showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(39549) = 10.78, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 4.23, SD = 2.28$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 3.91, SD = 2.05$ ), and between United States ( $M = 4.36, SD = 2.50$ ) and New Europe ( $t(6866) = -5.24, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding the relationship between immigrants and the taxation system in their host countries. A third t-test revealed that **there are no statistically significant differences between Old Europe and the United States** regarding the economic impact of immigrants on a country’s tax system ( $t(32283) = -1.71, p = .087 ns$ ). Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than New Europe. Respondents from Old Europe and the United States are more inclined than those from New Europe are to see immigrants as putting more into the taxes and services system than they take out.

- vii. Crosstabulation results for the “**National cultural life and immigrants**” -dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3.7.

**TABLE 5.3.7: National cultural life and immigrants**

	<b>Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants</b>		
	<i>Cultural life undermined 1</i>	<i>Neither nor 5</i>	<i>Cultural life enriched 10</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	3.5%	20.7%	6.4%
<b>New Europe</b>	3.3%	30.7%	4.3%
<b>United States</b>	1.7%	18.0%	8.7%

Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(39967) = 13.73, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 5.83, SD = 2.49$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 5.38, SD = 2.29$ ), and between United States ( $M = 6.16, SD = 2.41$ ) and New Europe ( $t(6980) = -9.35, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding the relationship between immigrants and the cultural life in the countries where they currently reside. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the means of NE – the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more tolerant value). Respondents from Old Europe and the United States are more inclined is to believe that their national cultural lives are enriched by the presence of immigrants in their societies, while those interviewed in New Europe are more worried that their countries’ cultural lives are undermined by immigrants.

- viii. Table 5.3.8 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Immigrants and crime problems**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 5.3.8: Immigrants and crime problems**

	<b>Immigrants make country's crime problems worse or better</b>		
	<i>Crime problems made worse 1</i>	<i>Neither worse, nor better 5</i>	<i>Crime problems made better 10</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	13.2%	19.9%	.4%
<b>New Europe</b>	12.8%	18.4%	.4%
<b>United States</b>	4.1%	32.4%	1.6%

Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(40714) = 2.91, p \leq .01^{**}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 3.11, SD = 2.05$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 3.02, SD = 2.04$ ), and between United States ( $M = 4.26, SD = 2.07$ ) and New Europe ( $t(7251) = -17.33, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding the impact immigrants have on crime problems in their host countries. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the means of NE – the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more tolerant value). At the same time, Europeans from both sides of the “anti-Americanism divide” are more inclined than the Americans to see immigrants as contributing to the worsening of crime problems in their new countries. It is also interesting to notice the extremely low percentage of respondents (less than .5 percent in Old Europe and New Europe and only 1.6 percent in the U.S.) who believe that immigrants have a positive impact on crime levels in the countries where they currently reside.

- ix. Table 5.3.9 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Immigrants and cultural homogeneity**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 5.3.9: Immigrants and cultural homogeneity**

	<b>Better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions</b>				
	<i>Agree strongly 1</i>	<i>Agree 2</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree 3</i>	<i>Disagree 4</i>	<i>Disagree strongly 5</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	14.5%	34.8%	21.0%	25.4%	4.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	20.7%	45.9%	19.0%	13.0%	1.4%
<b>United States</b>	3.7%	26.9%	8.1%	53.2%	8.1%

Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that **there are significant distinctions** ( $t(41636) = 29.62, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 2.69, SD = 1.12$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.29, SD = .98$ ), and between United States ( $M = 3.35, SD = 1.07$ ) and New Europe ( $t(7520) = -29.48, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding the benefits for a country of having everyone sharing same customs and traditions.

Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the means of NE – the lowest value - and U.S. – the highest and more tolerant value). Data also shows Old Europe and New Europe sharing similar high levels of cultural nationalism. While over half of the respondents

from United States – the original “melting pot” - disagree with the statement that it is better for a country if everyone shared the same customs and traditions, the opposite is true for Europe, where cultural homogeneity is seen as more beneficial for a society than a diversity of customs and traditions.

## x. Conclusions

Results for the statistical analysis of attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy survey database are summarized below in Tables 5.3.10 (Qualifications for immigration batch of questions) and 5.3.11 (the rest of the dependent variables).

**TABLE 5.3.10: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Qualifications for immigration dependent variables batch**

	<i>Qualification for immigration Education</i>	<i>Qualification for immigration Family ties</i>	<i>Qualification for immigration Language</i>	<i>Qualification for immigration Christian</i>	<i>Qualification for immigration Race</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	6.22*** (2.75)	5.35*** (2.94)	6.67*** (3.02)	3.60*** (3.28)	2.17*** (2.76)
<b>New Europe</b>	6.47*** (2.78)	5.91*** / <i>ns</i> (3.03)	7.08*** (2.81)	4.25*** / <i>ns</i> (3.36)	3.34*** (3.36)
<b>United States</b>	6.92*** (2.44)	6.06 <i>ns</i> (2.58)	7.69*** (2.45)	4.14 <i>ns</i> (2.93)	2.45*** (2.48)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For “New Europe” entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE relationship, second one to NE-U.S. b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

**Statistical analysis results presented above confirmed that New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are in general lower than those in Old Europe) and the United States are more culturally similar than Old Europe and the U.S. are, on matters of tolerance towards immigrants.** As a side note, none of the survey data I use in this research makes a distinction between legal and illegal immigration. It would be interesting, for future research, to investigate if there are any significant differences in attitudes towards these two categories of immigrants.

In 2006 U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy Survey (as well as the 2002 – 2006 European Social Survey data incorporated in this database), people were asked about certain characteristics that they would consider important in potential immigrants, from race, religion to the knowledge of the national language in the country where they intent to relocate and work. On average, New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are lower compared to Old Europe) and United States respondents showed to have more similar opinions on the issue of qualification for immigration than Old Europe and the U.S. They are more likely than Western Europeans to argue in favor of an immigrant’s need to learn the official language of their host countries, to have a good education and close family already living in the country where they intend to immigrate. When it comes to race, 46 percent of those interviewed in Old Europe, compared to 30 percent in the U.S. and 34 percent in New Europe believe that being white is extremely unimportant as a qualification for immigration, which does suggest that NE and U.S.

tend to share a comparable cultural – and preferential - outlook on white vs. non-white immigrants. The results of the t-test for the last four of the dependent variables from the U.S. 2006 CID database used to measure attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers are presented below in Table 5.3.11.

**TABLE 5.3.11: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Taxes, cultural life, crime problem and immigration**

	<i>Immigration and taxes</i>	<i>Immigrants and domestic cultural life</i>	<i>Immigrants and crime problems</i>	<i>Immigrants and cultural homogeneity</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	4.23*** (2.28)	5.83*** (2.49)	3.11*** (2.05)	2.69*** (2.76)
<b>New Europe</b>	3.91*** (2.05)	5.38*** (2.29)	3.02** /*** (2.04)	2.29*** (.98)
<b>United States</b>	4.36*** (2.50)	6.16*** (2.41)	4.26 *** (2.07)	3.35*** (1.07)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

The core theory of this research states that there is a relationship between cultural similarity – as manifested in tolerance and attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers – and levels of anti-Americanism. **Results of the statistical analysis presented above in Table 5.3.11 do not support this theory.** There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and United States, than between New Europe and the U.S. Respondents from Western Europe and the United States are more likely than those from New Europe to argue that in general, immigrants take out just about as much or little less than they put in a country's tax and services system, that the presence of immigrants does not undermine a country's cultural life nor does it negatively impact its crime problems. Americans more than Europeans also disagree with the idea that cultural homogeneity is a positive thing (53 percent compared to Old Europe's 25 percent and New Europe's 13 percent).

**Overall, data from U.S. CID database offers indirect support for the existence of a connection between cultural similarity and levels of anti-Americanism in Europe. United States and New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are comparatively lower than in Old Europe) share similar views on what qualifications are important for a potential immigrant, while Old Europe and the U.S. have comparable opinions on the impact of immigrants on the countries they now call "home."**

#### 5.4 . PEW 2007

Two dependent variables from PEW 2007 survey database were used to determine levels of tolerance towards immigrants/foreigners in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people's opinions on the influence of immigrants on their receiving countries. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers (more intolerant) than to Old Europe and the United States are. These two variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for both was independent-samples t-test. The results of these

tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for both dependent variables are presented below, starting with the “**Immigration problem**” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Immigration problem**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 5.4.1.

**TABLE 5.4.1: Immigration problem**

	<b>Please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem or not a problem at all. Immigration.</b>			
	<i>Very big problem 1</i>	<i>Moderately big problem 2</i>	<i>Small problem 3</i>	<i>Not a problem at all 4</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	37.0%	32.8%	20.7%	9.6%
<b>New Europe</b>	13.2%	28.9%	38.1%	19.8%
<b>United States</b>	40.2%	33.8%	19.1%	6.9%

Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that **there are significant distinctions** ( $t(4753) = -21.39, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 2.03, SD = .97$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.65, SD = .94$ ), and between United States ( $M = 1.93, SD = .93$ ) and New Europe ( $t(2777) = 19.35, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding the magnitude of the immigration problem in their countries. Overall, the anti-American Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the means of U.S. – the lowest value - and NE – the highest and more tolerant value). While two out of three respondents in Old Europe and United States view immigration as a very big or moderately big problem, less than half of those interviewed in New Europe agree with this assessment.

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Immigrants influence – 2007**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 5.4.2.

**TABLE 5.4.2: Immigrants influence - 2007**

	<b>Is the influence of immigrants very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in our country?</b>				
	<i>Very good 1</i>	<i>Somewhat good 2</i>	<i>Don't know 3</i>	<i>Somewhat bad 4</i>	<i>Very bad 5</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	5.4%	40.5%	5.0%	35.2%	14.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	1.9%	27.9%	17.4%	42.0%	10.8%
<b>United States</b>	6.7%	44.2%	7.0%	25.5%	16.7%



Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(4836) = -5.97, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 3.12, SD = 1.23$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 3.32, SD = 1.05$ ), and between United States ( $M = 3.01, SD = 1.27$ ) and New Europe ( $t(2882) = 6.46, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) regarding the influence of immigrants on their countries. Old Europe is more culturally similar to United States than New Europe is (the mean response from OE is located between the means of U.S. – the lowest value - and NE – the highest and more intolerant value). Almost half of the respondents from Old Europe and the United States tend to see the influence of immigrants on their countries as “very good” or “somewhat good”, compared to less than 30 percent in New Europe. Again, it is interesting to notice the relatively large percentage of those interviewed in New Europe – 17 percent – who “don’t know” if immigrants have a positive or a negative impact on their societies.

### iii. Conclusions

**The PEW 2007 survey data showed that** Old Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar (they believe that even with immigration being a serious problem, the influence of immigrants in their societies is actually a positive one) than New Europe and the United States. Respondents from New Europe seems also less informed and/or less interested in the problem of immigration than their European and American counterparts, as shown by the large percentage of “don’t know” answers.

## 5.5 . CONCLUSIONS

**Information from the World Values Survey, Pew 2002 and 2007 surveys, as well as 2006 U.S. CID databases, is summarized below in Table 5.5.1 to 5.5.4.**

**TABLE 5.5.1: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the World Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)**

	<b>Immigrants neighbors</b>	<b>Jobs for immigrants</b>	<b>Immigration policy</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	$X^2=53.15^{***}$ OE - NE	1.61*** (.68)	2.33 <i>ns</i> (.70)
<b>New Europe</b>	$X^2=26.08^{***}$ NE - US	1.41*** (.71)	2.31 <i>ns</i> / *** (.83)
<b>United States</b>	$X^2=.16$ <i>ns</i> US - OE	1.63*** (.75)	2.46*** (.73)

**TABLE 5.5.2: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3)**

	<i>Immigrants influence</i>	<i>National culture superior</i>	<i>Foreign influences on domestic way of life</i>	<i>Stricter immigration laws</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	3.33 <i>ns</i> (1.16)	3.31*** (1.39)	2.85*** (1.44)	2.21*** (1.33)
<b>New Europe</b>	3.35 <i>ns</i> / *** (1.00)	2.65***/ <i>ns</i> (1.28)	2.45***/ <i>ns</i> (1.27)	2.39*** (1.27)
<b>United States</b>	2.98*** (1.24)	2.67 <i>ns</i> (1.39)	2.47 <i>ns</i> (1.35)	1.94*** (1.17)

**TABLE 5.5.3: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Qualifications for immigration dependent variables batch**

	<i>Qualification for immigration Education</i>	<i>Qualification for immigration Family ties</i>	<i>Qualification for immigration Language</i>	<i>Qualification for immigration Christian</i>	<i>Qualification for immigration Race</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	6.22*** (2.75)	5.35*** (2.94)	6.67*** (3.02)	3.60*** (3.28)	2.17*** (2.76)
<b>New Europe</b>	6.47*** (2.78)	5.91*** / <i>ns</i> (3.03)	7.08*** (2.81)	4.25*** / <i>ns</i> (3.36)	3.34*** (3.36)
<b>United States</b>	6.92*** (2.44)	6.06 <i>ns</i> (2.58)	7.69*** (2.45)	4.14 <i>ns</i> (2.93)	2.45*** (2.48)

**TABLE 5.5.4: Attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers based on variables from the U.S. 2006 CID survey database – Taxes, cultural life, crime problem and immigration (codebook in Appendix 4)**

	<i>Immigration and taxes</i>	<i>Immigrants and domestic cultural life</i>	<i>Immigrants and crime problems</i>	<i>Immigrants and cultural homogeneity</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	4.23*** (2.28)	5.83*** (2.49)	3.11*** (2.05)	2.69*** (2.76)
<b>New Europe</b>	3.91*** (2.05)	5.38*** (2.29)	3.02** / *** (2.04)	2.29*** (.98)
<b>United States</b>	4.36*** (2.50)	6.16*** (2.41)	4.26 *** (2.07)	3.35*** (1.07)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

Old Europe (where anti-American feelings are stronger than in New Europe) and the United States share similar views on several (but not all) issues regarding immigration. Those interviewed in OE and the U.S. are more likely than those in New Europe to see the influence of immigrants as positive even if immigration is believed to be a relatively big problem in their societies. They also advocate equal rights for immigrants and domestic workers to have a job even when jobs are scarce, but they would also like stricter immigration policies than those currently in place.

Strong cultural similarities between New Europe and the United States appear in the analysis of nationalistic (i.e. “our culture is superior to others”) and slightly xenophobic (i.e. “our national way of life is under attack by foreign influences”) negative attitudes towards immigrants/foreign workers. Data regarding beliefs on what characteristics of potential immigrants are important and which ones are not showed that respondents from New Europe (compared to Old Europe) and the U.S. are more likely to see race, religion and the knowledge of the national language as important issues when evaluating prospective immigrants. Two interesting aspects of this analysis that could be explored in the future are: 1) the relatively large number of those interviewed in New Europe not knowing if the influence of immigrants in their

societies was a positive or a negative thing, and 2) the fact that no distinction was made between legal and illegal immigration.

## CHAPTER 6 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: TOLERANCE TOWARDS HOMOSEXUALS IN OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

My sixth and seventh hypotheses predict levels of tolerance towards homosexuals in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in Chapter 6, measuring differences in cultural indicators for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. Unfortunately, due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the United States are presented in the text only when they show no significant differences between the two regions, as such contradicting the main hypothesis of this research, according to which we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of tolerance towards homosexuals between Old Europe and New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural similarity), but no such differences between New Europe and the United States due to their higher cultural similarity.

**Hypothesis 6:** There **is** a statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards homosexuals in Old Europe vs. New Europe (OE > NE) and in Old Europe vs. the United States (OE > US).

**Hypothesis 7:** There **is no** statistically significant difference between levels of tolerance towards homosexuals in New Europe vs. the United States.

To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards homosexuals were compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the United States, using t-test and chi-square tests. The results of this analysis, presented below individually per database used, **have offered a nuanced support for the theory on cultural similarity and anti-Americanism.**

### 6.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY

Three dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to measure views on homosexuals in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding the overall importance of teaching children tolerance and respect for others, the justifiability of homosexuality and people's views on having homosexuals as neighbors. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 6.1.4 which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S. These three variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for the first two cases was a chi-square test of independence, while for the third one, I used an independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the

wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests or two chi-square tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Tolerance in children**” variable are presented below in Table 6.1.1.

**TABLE 6.1.1: Tolerance and respect for other people in children**

	<b>Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people</b>	
	<i>Not mentioned 1</i>	<i>Important 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	17.7%	82.3%
<b>New Europe</b>	33.7%	66.3%
<b>U.S.</b>	20.6%	79.4%

Results from two chi-square tests of independence showed that **there are significant differences** between views on teaching children tolerance in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 17448) = 514.18, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 7263) = 133.95, p < .001^{***}$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Moreover, a smaller percentage of respondents from New Europe (66 percent) than from Old Europe (82 percent) and United States (79 percent) mentioned tolerance and respect for others as an important quality in a child. There is more cultural similarity between Old Europe and the United States than between United States and New Europe regarding tolerance in children.

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Homosexuals as neighbors**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 6.1.2.

**TABLE 6.1.2: Homosexuals as neighbors**

	<b>On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?</b>	
	<b>Homosexuals.</b>	
	<i>Not mentioned 1</i>	<i>Mentioned 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	86.3%	13.7%
<b>New Europe</b>	49.0%	51.0%
<b>U.S.</b>	75.4%	24.6%

Two chi-square tests of independence showed that **there are significant distinctions** between attitudes towards homosexuals in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 17190) = 2620.04, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 7195) = 460.06, p < .001^{***}$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide

between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (51 percent) and United States (25 percent) than from Old Europe (14 percent) named homosexuals as one of the groups they would not like to have as neighbors. There is slightly more cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States than between United States and Old Europe regarding attitudes towards homosexuals.

- iii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Homosexuality justifiable**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 6.1.3.

**TABLE 6.1.3: Homosexuality justifiable**

	<b>Homosexuality can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between?</b>		
	<i>Never justifiable 1</i>	<i>Something in between 5</i>	<i>Always justifiable 10</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	15.5%	13.5%	31.8%
<b>New Europe</b>	50.4%	9.4%	8.9%
<b>U.S.</b>	32.4%	19.8%	14.2%

A first independent-samples t-test revealed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(16356) = 54.15, p < .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 6.49, SD = 3.30$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 3.45, SD = 3.11$ ) in opinions on the justifiability of homosexuality. A second t-test showed that **there are also significant distinctions** ( $t(6661) = -14.53, p < .001^{***}$ ) between New Europe ( $M = 3.45, SD = 3.11$ ) and United States ( $M = 4.64, SD = 3.24$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, and also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentage of respondents from New Europe (50 percent) and United States (32 percent) than from Old Europe (115 percent) believe that homosexuality is never justifiable. There is more cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States than between United States and Old Europe when tolerance towards homosexuality is taken into account.

- iv. Conclusions

Table 6.1.4 summarizes the results of the statistical analysis of tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by variables from the World Values Survey database.

**TABLE 6.1.4: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by variables from the World Values Survey database (codebook in Appendix 1)**

	<b>Teaching children tolerance</b>	<b>Homosexuals as neighbors</b>	<b>Homosexuality justifiable</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	$X^2=514.18^{***}$ OE-NE	$X^2=2620.04^{***}$ OE-NE	$6.49^{***}$ (3.30)
<b>New Europe</b>	$X^2=133.95^{***}$ NE-US	$X^2=460.06^{***}$ NE-US	$3.45^{***}$ (3.11)
<b>United States</b>	$X^2=133.95^{***}$ NE-US	$X^2=460.06^{***}$ NE-US	$4.64^{***}$ (3.24)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

United States and New Europe share similar – fairly intolerant – views on homosexuality compared to Old Europe, especially in the case of the justifiability of homosexuality (a lot of the opposition to homosexuality comes from viewing it as a choice individuals make).

## 6.2 . PEW 2002

One dependent variable from the PEW 2002 survey database was used to measure views on homosexual life style in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..

This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 1 and they are based on variable labeled “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two chi-square tests of independence were also conducted for each independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results for the “**Homosexuality way of life**” dependent variable can be seen below in Table 6.2.1, followed by a description of the chi-square test results.

**TABLE 6.2.1: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of life” from the PEW 2002 database**

	<b>Which one of these statements about homosexuality comes closer to your opinion?</b>	
	<i>Homosexuality-way of life society should accept</i> 1	<i>Homosexuality-way of life society should not accept</i> 2
<b>Old Europe</b>	81.0%	19.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	63.6%	36.4%
<b>United States</b>	54.4%	45.6%

Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are **significant differences** between attitudes towards homosexuals in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 4224) = 160.38, p < .001$  \*\*\*) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 3196) = 27.59, p < .001$  \*\*\*). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that significantly smaller percentages of respondents from New Europe (63 percent) and United States (54 percent) than from Old Europe (81 percent) believe homosexuality is a way of life society should accept. There is significantly more cultural similarity between the pro-American New Europe and the United States than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding attitudes towards homosexuals.

### 6.3 . U.S. 2006 CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SURVEY

One dependent variable from the U.S. 2006 Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy Survey database was used to measure views on homosexuality in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..

This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 1 and they are based on variable labeled “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two independent-samples t-test were also conducted for each independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.

Crosstabulation results for the “**Homosexuals free to live as they wish**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 6.3.1, followed by a description of the t- test results.

**TABLE 6.3.1: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Gays and lesbians free to live as they wish” from the U.S. 2006 CID database**

	<b>Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish</b>				
	<i>Agree strongly 1</i>	<i>Agree 2</i>	<i>Neither agree nor disagree 3</i>	<i>Disagree 4</i>	<i>Disagree strongly 5</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	31.6%	43.9%	12.7%	7.3%	4.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	15.2%	35.2%	23.2%	15.6%	10.8%
<b>United States</b>	18.4%	47.5%	6.5%	18.4%	9.2%

A first independent-samples t-test revealed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(40688) = -36.27, p < .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 2.12, SD = 1.08$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.72, SD = 1.21$ ) in opinions on the justifiability of homosexuality. A second t-test showed that there are also significant distinctions ( $t(7116) = 4.53, p < .001^{***}$ ) between New Europe ( $M = 2.72, SD = 1.21$ ) and United States ( $M = 2.52, SD = 1.24$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, and also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (28 percent) and United States (27 percent) than from Old Europe (11 percent) do not think that gays and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish. There is more cultural similarity between the pro-American (and more intolerant) New Europe and the United States than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding tolerance towards homosexuals.

### 6.4 . PEW 2007

One dependent variable from the PEW 2007 survey database was used to measure views on homosexual life style in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core theory at the basis of this section states that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because



New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar when it comes to their views on homosexuals (more intolerant) than Old Europe and the U.S..

This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented below in Table 1 and they are based on variable labeled “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two chi-square tests of independence were also conducted for each independent variable, measuring the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and New Europe and United States. “No answer” and “don’t know” answers were eliminated when they did not provide any relevant information. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.

Crosstabulation results for the “**Homosexuality way of life – 2007**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 6.4.1, followed by a description of the chi-square test results.

**TABLE 6.4.1: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of life - 2007” from the PEW 2007 database**

	<b>And which one of these comes closer to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?</b>	
	<i>Number 1 – Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society 1</i>	<i>Number 2 – Homosexuality is a way of life that should not be accepted by society 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	82.9%	17.1%
<b>New Europe</b>	64.5%	35.5%
<b>United States</b>	54.2%	45.8%

Two chi-square tests of independence showed that there are **significant differences** between attitudes towards homosexual way of life in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 4523) = 196.61, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 2615) = 26.75, p < .001^{***}$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a tolerance divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that significantly larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (36 percent) and United States (46 percent) than from Old Europe (17 percent) do not believe homosexuality is a way of life society should accept. There is significantly more cultural similarity between the pro-American (and more intolerant) New Europe and the United States than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding attitudes towards homosexuals.

## 6.5 . CONCLUSIONS

**Statistical results of analyses (independent-samples t-tests as well as chi-square tests of independence) using dependent variables measuring levels of tolerance towards homosexuals in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States are presented below in Tables 6.5.1 to 6.5.4.**

**TABLE 6.5.1: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by variables from the World Values Survey database**

	Teaching children tolerance	Homosexuals as neighbors	Homosexuality justifiable
<b>Old Europe</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =160.38*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =196.61*** OE-NE	6.49*** (3.30)
<b>New Europe</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =27.59*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =26.75*** NE-US	3.45*** (3.11)
<b>United States</b>	X <sup>2</sup> =27.59*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =26.75*** NE-US	4.64*** (3.24)

**TABLE 6.5.2: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of life” variable from the PEW 2002 database**

	Which one of these statements about homosexuality comes closer to your opinion?	
	<i>Homosexuality-way of life society should accept</i> 1	<i>Homosexuality-way of life society should not accept</i> 2
<b>Old Europe</b>	81.0%	19.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	63.6%	36.4%
<b>United States</b>	54.4%	45.6%

**TABLE 6.5.3: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Gays and lesbians free to live as they wish” variable from the U.S. 2006 CID database**

	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish				
	<i>Agree strongly</i> 1	<i>Agree</i> 2	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i> 3	<i>Disagree</i> 4	<i>Disagree strongly</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	31.6%	43.9%	12.7%	7.3%	4.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	15.2%	35.2%	23.2%	15.6%	10.8%
<b>United States</b>	18.4%	47.5%	6.5%	18.4%	9.2%

**TABLE 6.5.4: Tolerance towards homosexuals as measured by the “Homosexuality way of life - 2007” variable from the PEW 2007 database**

	<b>And which one of these comes closer to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?</b>	
	<i>Number 1 – Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society 1</i>	<i>Number 2 – Homosexuality is a way of life that should not be accepted by society 2</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	82.9%	17.1%
<b>New Europe</b>	64.5%	35.5%
<b>United States</b>	54.2%	45.8%

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

New Europe and the United States share similar negative and quite intolerant attitudes towards homosexual way of life, while on all measurements Old Europe appears fairly tolerant and open-minded on the matter of homosexuality.

## CHAPTER 7 – EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: LEVELS OF RELIGIOSITY IN OLD EUROPE, NEW EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

My eighth and ninth hypotheses predict levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. The core argument of this research is that Old Europe and the United States are less culturally similar than New Europe and the US, which explains why Old Europe experiences relatively higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe. In order to test this theory, three dummy variables were created for each of the databases presented below in Chapter 7, measuring differences in cultural indicators for three regional pairings: Old Europe and New Europe, New Europe and the United States, and Old Europe and the United States. Due to time and space restrictions, only the results of the statistical tests involving the Old Europe/New Europe, and New Europe/United States comparisons are presented below in detail. Details of statistical analysis involving an independent variable coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for the United States are presented in the text only when they show no significant differences between the two regions, as such contradicting the main hypothesis of this research, according to which we expect to find statistically significant differences in levels of religiosity between a more secular Old Europe and a more religious New Europe, as well as between Old Europe and the United States (reflecting their comparably lower cultural similarity), but no such differences between New Europe and the United States due to their higher cultural similarity.

**Hypothesis 8:** There **is** a statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity in Old Europe and New Europe ( $OE < NE$ ) and in Old Europe and the United States ( $OE < US$ ).

**Hypothesis 9:** There **is no** statistically significant difference between levels of religiosity in New Europe and the United States.

To test these two hypotheses, mean averages of attitudes towards faith, as well as the role of religion in a society, were compared across nations from Old Europe, New Europe and the United States, using independent-samples t-tests and chi-square tests of independence.

### 7.1 . WORLD VALUES SURVEY

Seven dependent variables from the World Values Survey database were used to determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people's views on church and social problems, the importance of teaching children about religion, separation of church and state, as well as personal religious rituals (such as the frequency of attending religious services). The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 7.1.8, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their faith (more religious) than to the secular Old Europe.

These seven variables are ordinal, and the statistical tools used were independent-samples t-tests (for five of them) and chi-square tests of independence (for two of them). The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, "**Old Europe vs. New Europe**", was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, "**New Europe vs. United States**", was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States.

Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests or chi-square tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all eight dependent variables are presented below, starting with the “**Confidence in churches**” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Confidence in churches**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.1.1.

**TABLE 7.1.1: Confidence in churches**

	<b>I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?</b> <b>The churches</b>			
	<i>A great deal</i> 1	<i>Quite a lot</i> 2	<i>Not very much</i> 3	<i>None at all</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	11.6%	35.2%	35.4%	17.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	35.2%	32.4%	22.4%	9.9%
<b>U.S.</b>	31.7%	39.4%	22.4%	6.4%

A first independent-samples t-test showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(16929) = 32.82, p \leq .001^{**}$ ) in levels of confidence in churches *between Old Europe* ( $M = 2.60, SD = .91$ ) *and New Europe* ( $M = 2.07, SD = .98$ ). A second t-test revealed that **there are no statistically significant distinctions** ( $t(7126) = 1.51, p = .13$  ns) on this topic *between New Europe and the United States* ( $M = 2.04, SD = .89$ ). **New Europe (where anti-Americanism is weaker than in Old Europe) and the United States share similar high levels of religiosity.** Almost 70 percent of respondents from New Europe and the United States (compared to less than half of those interviewed in Old Europe) trust their churches “a great deal” or “quite a lot.”

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Religious services attendance**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.1.2.

**TABLE 7.1.2: Religious services attendance**

	<b>How often do you attend religious services?</b>						
	<i>More than once a week</i> 1	<i>Once a week</i> 2	<i>Once a month</i> 3	<i>Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days</i> 4	<i>Once a year</i> 5	<i>Less often</i> 6	<i>Never practically never</i> 7
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.9%	9.3%	8.6%	15.3%	9.9%	12.4%	41.6%
<b>New Europe</b>	4.2%	23.2%	14.6%	28.7%	4.8%	10.4%	14.1%
<b>U.S.</b>	14.5%	27.0%	12.9%	9.7%	5.6%	9.8%	20.5%

Results from an independent-samples t-test, comparing religious services attendance in *Old Europe* (M = 5.88, SD = 2.31) and *New Europe* (M = 4.24, SD = 2.18) revealed that these two groups are rather **dissimilar** in their church-going habits ( $t(17205) = 43.30, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). A second t-test showed that on the same issue, there **were no significant differences** ( $t(7148) = 1.81, p = .07 \text{ ns}$ ) **between New Europe and the United States** (M = 4.12, SD = 2.62). New Europe (where antipathy towards Americans is comparatively weak) and the United States are more culturally similar on the issue on church attendance than the United States and the secular and anti-American Old Europe. For example, over 40 percent of respondents from Old Europe never go to church, compared to 14 percent of those interviewed in New Europe and 20 percent in the U.S.

- iii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Religious person**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.1.3.

**TABLE 7.1.3: Religious person**

	<b>Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are...</b>		
	<i>A religious person</i> 1	<i>Not a religious person</i> 2	<i>A convinced atheist</i> 3
<b>Old Europe</b>	51.0%	39.0%	10.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	83.4%	13.0%	3.6%
<b>U.S.</b>	78.9%	19.0%	2.1%

An independent-samples t-test revealed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(16670) = 41.33, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) in the way people qualify themselves as religious or not in Old Europe (M = 1.59, SD = .66) and New Europe (M = 1.20, SD = .48). A second t-test, comparing New Europe and the United States (M = 1.23, SD = .46) on the same dimension showed a **weaker relationship** ( $t(6901) = -2.48, p \leq .05^*$ ) between the region where the interview was conducted and the respondent’s religiosity levels. Overall, these results confirm the existence of a connection between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism. The more anti-American and secular Old Europe and the United States are less culturally similar on the issue of religiosity than New Europe and the U.S. Almost half of the respondents from Old Europe are either “atheists” or “not a religious person”, compared to only 17 percent in New Europe and 20 percent in the United States.

- iv. Table 7.1.4 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Church answers social problems**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 7.1.4: Church answers social problems**

	<b>Generally speaking, do you think that the churches in your country are giving adequate answers to the social problems facing our country today?</b>	
	<i>No (1)</i>	<i>Yes (2)</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	72.0%	28.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	63.3%	36.7%
<b>U.S.</b>	56.1%	43.9%

Two chi-square tests of independence showed that **there are significant differences** between views of the involvement of churches in social problems in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 12326) = 96.01, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 6287) = 31.23, p < .001^{***}$ ).

The analysis confirmed the existence of a religiosity divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (37 percent) and United States (44 percent) than from Old Europe (28 percent) believe that Churches are giving adequate answers to the social problems facing their countries (instead of the secular authorities).

There is significantly more cultural similarity between the pro-American (and more religious) New Europe and the United States, than between United States and Old Europe regarding the involvement of organized religions in a country's social problems.

- v. Crosstabulation results for the “**Religious faith in children**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.1.5.

**TABLE 7.1.5: Religious faith in children**

	<b>Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.</b> <b>Religious faith.</b>	
	<i>Not mentioned</i> 1	<i>Important</i> 2
<b>Old Europe</b>	87.1%	12.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	60.1%	39.9%
<b>U.S.</b>	48.0%	52.0%

Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that **there are significant distinctions** between views of the importance of children learning religious doctrines and rites in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2 (1, N = 17448) = 1576.30, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2 (1, N = 7623) = 95.74, p < .001^{***}$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a religiosity divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States.

Crosstabulation results show that significantly larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (40 percent) and United States (52 percent) than from Old Europe (13 percent) believe that having a strong religious education is important for children starting at an early age, at home with their parents. There is significantly more cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States, than between United States and Old Europe regarding the importance to teach children about faith, religious ideas, beliefs and rites.

- vi. Table 7.1.6 presents crosstabulation results for the “**Secular politicians**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 7.1.6: Secular politicians**

	<b>Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office</b>				
	<i>Agree strongly</i> 1	<i>Agree</i> 2	<i>Neither agree or disagree</i> 3	<i>Disagree</i> 4	<i>Strongly disagree</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.2%	6.7%	16.4%	33.9%	40.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	14.3%	15.3%	24.5%	28.1%	17.8%
<b>U.S.</b>	17.0%	18.6%	13.0%	36.7%	14.8%

Two independent-samples t-test showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(13573) = 38.08, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) in their opinions on secular politicians **between Old Europe** ( $M = 4.05, SD = 1.01$ ) **and New Europe** ( $M = 3.20, SD = 1.28$ ), **but not between United States** ( $M = 3.14, SD = 1.34$ ) **and New Europe** ( $t(6781) = 1.83, p = .06$ ). New Europe (where anti-Americanism levels are comparatively lower than in Old Europe) and the United States share more cultural similarities regarding views on secular politicians than Old Europe and the U.S. A larger percentage of respondents from more pro-American New Europe (30 percent) and United States (35 percent) than from Old Europe (9 percent) “agree” or “strongly agree” that politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office.

- vii. Table 7.1.7 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Separation church and state**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 7.1.7: Separation church and state**

	<b>Religious leaders should not influence government</b>				
	<i>Agree strongly</i> 1	<i>Agree</i> 2	<i>Neither agree or disagree</i> 3	<i>Disagree</i> 4	<i>Strongly disagree</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	37.3%	30.7%	16.6%	11.7%	3.7%
<b>New Europe</b>	42.6%	32.8%	14.0%	7.1%	3.6%
<b>U.S.</b>	22.1%	28.6%	10.1%	29.1%	10.1%

Results from two independent-samples t-tests showed **that there are significant differences** ( $t(13585) = 8.65, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between opinions on the separation of Church and State in **Old Europe** ( $M = 2.14, SD = 1.15$ ) **and New Europe** ( $M = 1.96, SD = 1.08$ ), as well as **between United States** ( $M = 2.77, SD = 1.34$ ) **and New Europe** ( $t(6795) = -25.07, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). Old Europe (where anti-American feelings are comparatively stronger than in New Europe) and the United States are more culturally similar than New Europe and the United States, when cultural similarity is measured by views on the relationship between national governments and religious leaders. The mean response from OE is situated between the mean responses from NE (lowest on the scale, which means the most inclined to agree that religious leaders should not influence the government) and U.S. (highest on the scale). There is also a clear distinction on this issue between Europe as a whole and the United States, where the former is advocating a stricter separation of Church and States than the latter. Over 75 percent of Europeans, compared to 50 percent of Americans “agree” or “strongly agree” that religious leaders should not try to influence the government.



## viii. Conclusions

Results of the empirical analysis of levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as measured by variables from the World Values Survey are summarized below in Table 7.1.8.

**TABLE 7.1.8: Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as measured by variables from the World Values Survey (codebook in Appendix 1)**

	Confidence in churches	Religious services attendance	Church answers social problems	Religious faith in children	Secular politicians	Religious person	Church and State separation
Old Europe	2.60*** (.91)	5.88*** (2.31)	X <sup>2</sup> =96.01*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =1576*** OE-NE	4.05*** (1.01)	1.59*** (.66)	2.14*** (1.15)
New Europe	2.07***/ <i>ns</i> (.98)	4.24***/ <i>ns</i> (2.18)	X <sup>2</sup> =31.23*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =95.74*** NE-US	3.20***/ <i>ns</i> (1.29)	1.20***/* (.48)	1.96*** (1.08)
United States	2.04 <i>ns</i> (.89)	4.12 <i>ns</i> (2.62)	X <sup>2</sup> =31.23*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =95.74*** NE-US	3.14 <i>ns</i> (1.34)	1.23* (.46)	2.77*** (1.34)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For “New Europe” entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE relationship, second one to NE-U.S comparison when the two are different. b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are relatively lower than in Old Europe) and the United States share similar, high levels of religiosity, while Western Europe is much more secular. Americans and New Europeans are more inclined than Old Europeans to see themselves as religious people, trust their churches and ask them for answers to social problems, attend religious services fairly often and offer their children a religious education. It is also interesting to notice that although those interviewed in New Europe tend to agree with the Americans that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office, they parallel their fellow Western European when it comes to views on the separation between Church and State. A significantly larger percentage of European than American respondents agrees that religious leaders should not try to influence the national government’s policies.

## 7.2 . VOICE OF THE PEOPLE – MILLENNIUM EDITION

Four dependent variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition database were used to determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people’s faith (importance of God in personal life, the existence of one true religion and one true God) and religious behaviors (moments of prayers and church attendance). The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 7.2.5, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their levels of religiosity (more religious) than to a secular Old Europe.

These four variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all of them was independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “Old Europe vs. New Europe”, was coded 0 for Old

Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all four dependent variables are presented below, starting with the “**Moments of prayer**” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Moments of prayer**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.2.1.

**TABLE 7.2.1: Moments of prayer**

	<b>Do you take some moments of prayer, meditation or something like that?</b>		
	<i>Yes 1</i>	<i>Don't know 2</i>	<i>No 3</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	55.4%	2.1%	42.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	60.4%	3.3%	36.3%
<b>U.S.</b>	86.9%	.2%	12.9%

Two independent-samples t-test revealed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(19725) = -7.72, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) in how much people pray between Old Europe ( $M = 1.50, SD = .61$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 1.59, SD = .82$ ), as well as between United States ( $M = 1.14, SD = .37$ ) and New Europe ( $t(8919) = 29.61, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). The t-test results showed New Europe and the United States to be culturally less similar than Old Europe and the United States (the mean value for the OE population is placed between the NE and the US ones). There are also a significantly larger percentage of respondents from United States (87 percent) than from Old Europe (55 percent) and New Europe (60 percent) take moments during their regular day-to-day lives to pray or meditate, which suggest the existence of a “prayer divide” between Europe and the United States.

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Religious beliefs**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.2.2.

**TABLE 7.2.2: Religious beliefs**

	<b>Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs?</b>			
	<i>There is a personal God 1</i>	<i>There is some sort of spirit or life force 2</i>	<i>I don't know what to think 3</i>	<i>I don't really think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force 4</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	34.2%	37.5%	14.2%	14.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	41.6%	34.1%	14.7%	9.7%
<b>U.S.</b>	64.6%	28.0%	5.4%	2.0%

Results from two independent-samples t-test confirmed the existence of significant differences ( $t(19036) = 10.64, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) in religious beliefs between Old Europe ( $M = 2.08, SD = 1.02$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 1.92, SD = .97$ ), as well as between United States ( $M = 1.45,$

SD = .69) and New Europe ( $t(8557) = 19.37, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). The t-test results show that New Europe and the United States to be culturally more similar than Old Europe and the United States. At the same time, over 90 percent of American respondents (compared to a little over 70 percent of Europeans) believe that there is a personal God or some sort of spirit or life force, which suggests an overall closer similarity of religiosity levels between Old Europe and New Europe, than between New Europe and the United States.

- iii. Table 7.2.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “**One true religion**” dependent variable. “Don’t know” answers were re-coded to express an opinion close to the middle of the scale.

**TABLE 7.2.3: One true religion**

	<b>Would you say that there exists one and only one true religion, that there is truth in many religions or that there is no essential truth in any religion?</b>			
	<i>One and only one true religion</i> 1	<i>Many true religions</i> 2	<i>Don't know</i> 3	<i>No true religion</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	17.0%	56.6%	9.1%	17.3%
<b>New Europe</b>	36.2%	39.0%	13.4%	11.5%
<b>U.S.</b>	21.1%	72.2%	1.6%	5.1%

Two independent-samples t-test showed that there are significant differences ( $t(18768) = 18.43, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) in opinions about one true religion between respondents in Old Europe ( $M = 2.27, SD = .93$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.00, SD = .97$ ), as well as between those in the U.S. ( $M = 1.91, SD = .65$ ) and New Europe ( $t(8311) = 3.96, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). There are stronger similarities in levels of religiosity between United States and New Europe (where anti-Americanism is relatively weak) than between U.S. and Old Europe (where anti-American feelings are comparatively more intense). The picture emerging is more complicated than this though. Americans, by a larger percentage (72 percent) than both New Europe (39 percent) and Old Europe (57 percent) believe that there is truth in many religions, which is a direct reflection of the diversity of religious beliefs in the American society and the religious homogeneity in Europe. In 2008, the largest religious denomination in the U.S. was “Catholic” with 25 percent of the respondents, followed by “Baptist” with 16 percent and “Methodist” with 5 percent (Kosmin and Keysar 2009). By contrast, the majority of Romanians – 86 percent of the population – identified themselves as Eastern Orthodox, followed by Roman Catholicism with 4.7 percent and Greek Catholicism, with less than one percent (Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturala 2002). In France, an officially secular country, 51 percent of the population identified themselves as Catholics, 4 percent as Muslims, 3 percent as Protestant, and 31 percent as agnostics or atheists (Tager Djenane 2004).

It is also interesting to note that almost 10 percent of respondents in Old Europe and 13 percent in New Europe “didn’t know” what to think about the existence of a one true religion, or of multiple true religions, or no true religion, which could indicate both a lack of knowledge and a lack of interest in spiritual matters.

- iv. Crosstabulation results for the “**Religious services attendance**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.2.4.

**TABLE 7.2.4: Religious services attendance**

	<b>Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?</b>						
	<i>More than once a week 1</i>	<i>Once a week 2</i>	<i>Once a month 3</i>	<i>Only on special holy days 4</i>	<i>Once a year 5</i>	<i>Less often 6</i>	<i>Never, practically never 7</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	3.3%	15.4%	8.7%	14.0%	8.6%	9.7%	40.3%
<b>New Europe</b>	5.1%	17.2%	11.9%	26.2%	6.9%	10.3%	22.3%
<b>U.S.</b>	14.5%	36.4%	13.0%	11.0%	6.9%	9.1%	9.1%

Two independent-samples t-test revealed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(19414) = 23.21, p \leq .001$ ) in religious services attendance between Old Europe ( $M = 4.99, SD = 2.02$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 4.33, SD = 1.91$ ), as well as between United States ( $M = 3.23, SD = 1.88$ ) and New Europe ( $t(8635) = 15.93, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). New Europe and the United States are more culturally similar than Old Europe and the United States. These results also show that in general Americans attend church services much more frequently than Europeans do. Over 50 percent of U.S. respondents go church at least once a week, apart from weddings, christenings and funerals, while 40 percent of those interviewed in Old Europe and 22 percent in New Europe practically never go to church.

**v. Conclusions**

Empirical analysis results measuring levels of religiosity with data from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition survey are summarized below in Table 7.2.5.

**TABLE 7.2.5: Levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition (codebook in Appendix 2)**

	<b>Moments of prayer</b>	<b>Religious beliefs</b>	<b>One true religion</b>	<b>Religious services attendance</b>
<b>Old Europe</b>	1.47*** (.53)	2.08*** (1.02)	2.18*** (.81)	4.99*** (2.02)
<b>New Europe</b>	1.43*** (.55)	1.92*** (.97)	2.02*** (1.00)	4.33*** (1.91)
<b>United States</b>	1.13*** (.34)	1.45*** (.69)	1.87*** (.55)	3.23*** (1.88)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For “New Europe” entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

**Results of the empirical analysis of levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States revealed the existence of a “faith Grand Canyon” between Europe and America, and of a smaller “religion divide” within Europe itself. Old Europe is by far the most secular of the three regions under investigation, with highest percentage of respondents**

who do not go to church, do not take time in their days to pray and do not believe in the existence of one true religion or one personal God. United States is at the opposite end of the spectrum as the most devout of the three. Americans pray a lot, attend religious services regularly, believe in the existence of a personal God and identify themselves with a large array of religious beliefs. New Europe falls somewhere in between these two extremes; this could provide an explanation for why its levels of anti-Americanism are lower than those in Old Europe.

### 7.3 . PEW 2002

Four dependent variables from the PEW 2002 survey database were used to determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding people's opinions on the separation between Church and State, relationship between religion and morality, God's place in their own lives and other religious rites and customs. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 7.3.5, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their levels of religiosity (more religious) than Old Europe and the United States are.

These four variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for three of them was independent-samples t-test, while for the fourth one, I used a chi-square test of independence. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, **“Old Europe vs. New Europe”**, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, **“New Europe vs. United States”**, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named **“Region”** and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests or two chi-square test were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.

Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all five dependent variables are presented below, starting with the **“Religion and morality”** variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the **“Religion and morality”** dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.3.1.

**TABLE 7.3.1: Religion and morality**

	<b>Which one of these statements about belief in God comes closest to your opinion?</b>	
	<i>Not necessary to believe in God to be moral/have good values</i> 1	<i>Necessary to believe in God to be moral/have good values</i> 2
<b>Old Europe</b>	73.5%	26.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	66.5%	33.5%
<b>United States</b>	41.2%	58.8%

Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that **there are significant distinctions** between opinions on religion and morality in Old Europe compared to New Europe

( $X^2(1, N = 4429) = 26.07, p < .001^{***}$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2(1, N = 3418) = 217.40, p < .001^{***}$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a religiosity divide between Old Europe and New Europe, but also between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (34 percent) and United States (59 percent) than from Old Europe (27 percent) believe that it is necessary to believe in God to have good, moral values. There is significantly more cultural similarity between the pro-American (and more religious) New Europe and the United States, than between United States and anti-American Old Europe regarding the relationship between faith and morality.

- ii. Table 7.3.2 presents crosstabulation results for the “**Importance of religion**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 7.3.2: Importance of religion**

	<b>How important is religion in your life?</b>			
	<i>Very important 1</i>	<i>Somewhat important 2</i>	<i>Not too important 3</i>	<i>Not at all important 4</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	21.6%	32.3%	25.2%	20.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	22.2%	35.9%	22.8%	19.2%
<b>United States</b>	59.9%	25.8%	8.0%	6.3%

An independent-samples t-test discovered a **significant, but weak, connection** between the region where the interview was conducted – Old Europe ( $M = 2.45, SD = 1.04$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.39, SD = 1.03$ ) – and the how important religion was in respondent’s personal life ( $t(4218) = 2.02, p \leq .05^*$ ). A **much stronger relationship** between these two variables was revealed by a t-test comparing United States ( $M = 1.61, SD = .88$ ) and New Europe ( $t(3433) = 23.94, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). Levels of religiosity in the United States are more similar to New Europe’s than to those in Old Europe. It should also be pointed out that in general, Americans are much more inclined to see religion as very important in their lives (60 percent) as compared to their European counterparts (22 percent in both Old Europe and New Europe).

- iii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Separation between Church and State**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.3.3.

**TABLE 7.3.3: Separation between Church and State**

	<b>Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy</b>			
	<i>Completely agree 1</i>	<i>Mostly agree 2</i>	<i>Mostly disagree 3</i>	<i>Completely disagree 4</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	69.6%	22.8%	4.9%	2.7%
<b>New Europe</b>	67.8%	25.9%	4.1%	2.3%
<b>United States</b>	57.0%	25.3%	9.7%	7.9%

Findings from two independent-samples t-test showed **no significant differences** ( $t(4442) = .08, p = .99$  ns) between Old Europe ( $M = 1.41, SD = .70$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 1.41, SD = .67$ ) regarding people’s opinion on keeping religion and governmental policies separated.

There is however a much stronger divide on this matter between United States ( $M = 1.69$ ,  $SD = .94$ ) and New Europe ( $t(3408) = -9.61$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ). **Old Europe and New Europe are practically indistinguishable from each other on this issue.** 70 percent of respondents from Old Europe and 68 percent of those from New Europe (compared to 57 percent of Americans) completely agree that religion is a matter of personal faith and as such it should be kept separate from governmental policies.

- iv. Crosstabulation results for the “**Influence of religious leaders**” dependent variable are summarized below in Table 7.3.4.

**TABLE 7.3.4: Influence of religious leaders**

	<b>Is the influence of religious leaders very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in our country?</b>			
	<i>Very good</i> 1	<i>Somewhat good</i> 2	<i>Somewhat bad</i> 3	<i>Very bad</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	6.8%	42.3%	39.2%	11.6%
<b>New Europe</b>	7.5%	42.4%	37.0%	13.0%
<b>United States</b>	12.8%	52.8%	25.9%	8.4%

Results from two independent-samples t-test showed **no significant differences** ( $t(4009) = .07$ ,  $p = .94$  ns) between Old Europe ( $M = 2.56$ ,  $SD = .78$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.55$ ,  $SD = .81$ ) regarding people’s opinion on what kind of influence religious leaders play in their countries. There is however a much stronger distinction on this topic between United States ( $M = 2.30$ ,  $SD = .79$ ) and New Europe ( $t(3054) = 8.74$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ). Old Europe and New Europe are practically impossible to differentiate from each other on this issue. Over 50 percent of Europeans (compared to 33 percent of Americans) believe that religious leaders have a negative or a very negative influence in their countries.

- v. Conclusions

Table 7.3.5 summarizes the results of the analysis comparing levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States using variables from the PEW 2002 survey database.

**TABLE 7.3.5: Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as measured by variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3)**

	<i>Religion and morality</i>	<i>Importance of religion in life</i>	<i>Church and State separation</i>	<i>Religious leaders influence</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	$X^2=26.07^{***}$ OE-NE	2.45* (1.04)	1.41 ns (.70)	2.56 ns (.78)
<b>New Europe</b>	$X^2=217.40^{***}$ NE-US	2.39*/*** (1.03)	1.41 ns/*** (.67)	2.55 ns/*** (.81)
<b>United States</b>	$X^2=217.40^{***}$ NE-US	1.61*** (.88)	1.69*** (.94)	2.30*** (.79)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For “New Europe” entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE

relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

**Overall, findings from the analysis measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States using variables from the PEW 2002 survey have shown that Old Europe and New Europe have almost identical levels of religiosity, even if the intensity of anti-American feelings in those two regions is very different.** Europe is more secular, and would like to keep religion out of the political and governmental realm as much as possible, while for Americans faith plays a major role in their personal lives, and they feel it should do the same in their public lives.

#### 7.4 . U.S. 2006 CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY

Three dependent variables from the U.S. 2006 Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy database were used to determine levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding religious homogeneity, church attendance and the importance of religion in a person's life. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 7.4.4, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their levels of religiosity (more religious) than the secular Old Europe and the United States.

These three variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for all of them was independent-samples t-test. The results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, “**Old Europe vs. New Europe**”, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, “**New Europe vs. United States**”, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named “**Region**” and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses. Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test results for all three dependent variables are presented below, starting with the “**Personal levels of religiosity**” variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the “**Personal level of religiosity**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.4.1.

**TABLE 7.4.1: Personal levels of religiosity**

	How religious are you?		
	<i>Not at all religious</i> 1	<i>Moderately religious</i> 5	<i>Very religious</i> 10
<b>Old Europe</b>	11.5%	17.3%	6.1%
<b>New Europe</b>	12.8%	19.6%	7.9%
<b>United States</b>	3.9%	17.4%	9.9%



A first independent-samples t-test showed that there **are no significant differences** ( $t(46065) = .17, p = .86$  ns) between how religious people are *in Old Europe* ( $M = 4.95, SD = 2.93$ ) and *New Europe* ( $M = 4.94, SD = 3.04$ ). A second t-test revealed **the existence of significant distinctions** ( $t(7578) = -12.59, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) in levels of individual religiosity *between United States* ( $M = 6.09, SD = 2.59$ ) and *New Europe*. **These results showed that Old Europe and New Europe have almost identical (low) levels of religiosity, compared to the United States.** On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is “not religious at all” and 10 is “extremely religious”, there is an almost 2 points difference between the more secular Europeans and the more faith-oriented Americans.

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Religious services attendance**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.4.2.

**TABLE 7.4.2: Religious services attendance**

	How often do you attend religious services, apart from special occasions?						
	<i>Every day</i> 1	<i>More than once a week</i> 2	<i>Once a week</i> 3	<i>At least once a month</i> 4	<i>Only on special holy days</i> 5	<i>Less often</i> 6	<i>Never</i> 7
<b>Old Europe</b>	.9%	3.0%	12.1%	10.9%	18.7%	21.5%	32.9%
<b>New Europe</b>	.5%	3.5%	22.7%	11.2%	21.3%	12.9%	27.8%
<b>United States</b>	.5%	8.6%	25.6%	15.5%	15.2%	20.0%	14.7%

Two independent-samples t-tests revealed that **there are significant differences** in religious services attendance ( $t(42179) = 17.81, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between Old Europe ( $M = 5.38, SD = 1.55$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 4.99, SD = 1.63$ ), as well as between United States ( $M = 4.55, SD = 1.61$ ) and New Europe ( $t(7642) = 8.13, p \leq .001^{***}$ ).

Comparatively, respondents from New Europe and the United States share more similar church attendance habits than those from Old Europe and the U.S. While almost half of Americans and New Europeans go to church at least once a month, less than 25 percent of Old Europeans do so.

- iii. Table 7.4.3 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Religious homogeneity**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 7.4.3: Religious homogeneity**

	Better for a country if a variety of different religions				
	<i>Agree strongly</i> 1	<i>Agree</i> 2	<i>Neither agree nor disagree</i> 3	<i>Disagree</i> 4	<i>Disagree strongly</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	6.0%	33.2%	28.4%	25.2%	7.2%
<b>New Europe</b>	4.9%	24.1%	31.7%	31.3%	7.9%
<b>United States</b>	8.4%	67.5%	10.1%	12.2%	1.7%

Results from two independent-samples t-test showed that **there are significant distinctions** ( $t(40913) = -13.19, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between people's views on religious homogeneity in Old Europe ( $M = 2.95, SD = 1.06$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 3.13, SD = 1.02$ ), and between United States ( $M = 2.31, SD = .85$ ) and New Europe ( $t(7275) = 27.27, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). The mean answer from Old Europe is positioned between that from New Europe (highest on the scale and the most negative towards religious diversity) and the United States (the lowest on the scale and the most negative towards religious homogeneity). The overall numbers also show that United States is much more in favor of accepting a multitude of religious beliefs in their society (75 percent of respondents "agree" or "strongly agree" with this idea) than Europe (less than 40 percent).

#### iv. Conclusions

Results of the analysis of levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the 2006 U.S. CID database are summarized below in Table 7.4.4.

**TABLE 7.4.4: Analysis results for levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the 2006 U.S. CID database (codebook in Appendix 4)**

	<i>Personal religiosity</i>	<i>Religious services attendance</i>	<i>Religious homogeneity</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	4.95 ns (2.93)	5.38*** (1.55)	2.95*** (1.06)
<b>New Europe</b>	4.94 ns/*** (3.04)	4.99*** (1.63)	3.13*** (1.02)
<b>United States</b>	6.09*** (2.59)	4.55*** (1.61)	2.31*** (.85)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For "New Europe" entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b)  $p \leq .05^*$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ , *ns* = not significant

Statistical analysis results measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States using variables from the 2006 U.S. New Europe is more similar to United States than Old Europe is on only one of the three dimensions investigated in this section - religious service attendance. On the other two – attitudes towards religious homogeneity and self-reported levels of religiosity, data does not back up the core theory of this research. Europeans see themselves as more secular, independent of which region of the continent they inhabit, than the Americans. Respondents from Old Europe are closer than those in New Europe, in their views of religious homogeneity, to the Americans.

## 7.5 . PEW 2007

Five dependent variables from the PEW 2007 survey database were used to measure levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States. These variables were based on answers to questions regarding morality and religion, separation between Church and State, and matters of personal faith. The overall results of the statistical analysis are summarized in Table 7.5.6, which is preceded by a detailed description of each test. The core theory at the basis of this section argues that New Europe is less anti-American than Old Europe because New

Europe and the U.S. are more culturally similar to each other when it comes to their attitudes towards faith-related issues than Old Europe and the United States are.

These five variables are ordinal, and the statistical tool used for four of them was the independent-samples t-test, while for the fifth one I used a chi-square test of independence. Results of these tests, as well as the crosstabulation and the wording of the questions in each case, are presented below. This analysis contains two main independent variables. The first one, **“Old Europe vs. New Europe”**, was coded 0 for Old Europe and 1 for New Europe, while the second one, **“New Europe vs. United States”**, was coded 0 for New Europe and 1 for the United States. Crosstabulation results are presented based on variable named **“Region”** and coded 0 for Old Europe, 1 for New Europe and 2 for United States. Two t-tests were conducted for each independent variable, measuring first the difference in means between Old and New Europe, and then between New Europe and United States. An alpha level of .05 was used in all statistical analyses.

Crosstabulation results, as well as the t-test and chi-square results for all five dependent variables are presented below, starting with the **“Religious leaders influence”** variable.

- i. Crosstabulation results for the **“Religious leaders influence”** dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.5.1.

**TABLE 7.5.1: Religious leaders influence**

	<b>Is the influence of religious leaders very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad for our country?</b>			
	<i>Very good 1</i>	<i>Somewhat good 2</i>	<i>Somewhat bad 3</i>	<i>Very bad 4</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	6.0%	37.9%	39.0%	17.1%
<b>New Europe</b>	5.8%	35.5%	40.3%	18.4%
<b>United States</b>	12.4%	52.2%	23.5%	11.9%

A first independent-samples t-test showed that there **are no significant distinctions** ( $t(4359) = -1.57, p = .11$  ns) **between Old Europe** ( $M = 2.67, SD = .82$ ) **and New Europe** ( $M = 2.71, SD = .83$ ) regarding views on the influence played by religious leaders in these societies. A second t-test revealed that on the same issue there were important differences ( $t(2546) = 10.55, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) between New Europe and the United States ( $M = 2.35, SD = .84$ ).

Dissimilar levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe are not mirrored in their religiosity, as expressed in attitudes toward the impact spiritual leaders have on their societies. While almost 60 percent of Europeans believe that the influence of religious leaders has been “bad” or “very bad” for their countries, only 35 percent of Americans agree with this point of view.

- ii. Crosstabulation results for the **“Religion kept separate from government policy”** dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.5.2.

**TABLE 7.5.2: Religion kept separate from government policy**

	Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with it. Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy.				
	<i>Completely agree</i> 1	<i>Mostly agree</i> 2	<i>Neither agree, nor disagree</i> 3	<i>Mostly disagree</i> 4	<i>Completely disagree</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	64.1%	25.3%	1.9%	5.7%	3.0%
<b>New Europe</b>	67%	23.9%	3.1%	4.1%	1.9%
<b>United States</b>	55%	24.9%	1.6%	9.2%	9.3%

An initial independent-samples t-test showed that there **is a moderately strong** relationship ( $t(4895) = 2.99, p \leq .01^{**}$ ) between the region where the interview was conducted – Old Europe ( $M = 1.58, SD = .99$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 1.50, SD = .88$ ) – and the respondent's view on keeping religion out of governmental affairs. Region, as independent variable, gains **more explanatory power** ( $t(2899) = -9.18, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) when the interviews are conducted in New Europe and the United States ( $M = 1.93, SD = 1.32$ ). Old Europe and United States are closer in their views on the separation between Church/religious beliefs and State/governmental business. However, these differences are very small, with almost 90 percent of Europeans and 80 percent of Americans “completely” or “mostly” agreeing that religion is a matter of personal faith and as such it should be kept separate from governmental policies.

- iii. Crosstabulation results for the “**Religion and morality**” dependent variable are presented below in Table 7.5.3.

**TABLE 7.5.3: Religion and morality**

	Which one of these comes closest to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?	
	<i>Number 1 – It is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values</i> 1	<i>Number 2 – It is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values</i> 2
<b>Old Europe</b>	76.5%	23.5%
<b>New Europe</b>	73.5%	26.5%
<b>United States</b>	41.8%	58.2%

Results from two chi-square tests of independence revealed that **there are significant distinctions** between opinions on religion and morality in Old Europe compared to New Europe ( $X^2(1, N = 4759) = 5.47, p \leq .05^*$ ) and in New Europe compared to the United States ( $X^2(1, N = 2847) = 278.92, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). The analysis confirmed the existence of a fairly weak religiosity divide between Old Europe and New Europe, and of a stronger one between New Europe and the United States. Crosstabulation results show that larger percentages of respondents from New Europe (27 percent) and United States (58 percent) than from Old Europe (24 percent) believe that it is necessary to believe in God to have good, moral values. There is more cultural similarity between New Europe and the United States, than between United States and Old Europe regarding the relationship between faith and morality. It is also interesting to

notice that compared to the PEW 2002 data, New Europe actually moved closer to Old Europe than to the United States on this issue, with more respondents supporting the view that morality can exist independent of religiosity.

- iv. Table 7.5.4 contains crosstabulation results for the “**Prayer times**” dependent variable.

**TABLE 7.5.4: Prayer times**

	<b>People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, do you pray several times a day, once a day, a few times a week, once a week or less, or never?</b>				
	<i>Several times a day</i> 1	<i>Once a day</i> 2	<i>A few times a week</i> 3	<i>Once a week or less</i> 4	<i>Never</i> 5
<b>Old Europe</b>	6.1%	11.4%	9.1%	23.7%	49.8%
<b>New Europe</b>	8.7%	15.3%	7.5%	25.0%	43.6%
<b>United States</b>	36.6%	21.2%	15.1%	15.7%	11.4%

Two independent-samples t-test showed **that there are significant differences** ( $t(7589) = 6.26, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) in how often people pray in Old Europe ( $M = 3.99, SD = 1.26$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 3.79, SD = 1.36$ ), as well as between United States ( $M = 2.44, SD = 1.40$ ) and New Europe ( $t(4648) = 32.84, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). United States and New Europe are closer in their praying habits than Old Europe and the U.S. are. However, it should also be noted that outside religious services, Europeans pray a lot less than the Americans. 50 percent of respondents from Old Europe and 47 percent from New Europe, compared to only 11 percent from United States, never pray outside religious services.

- v. Crosstabulation results for the “**Importance of religion**” dependent variable are presented below on Table 7.5.5.

**TABLE 7.5.5: Importance of religion**

	<b>How important is religion in your life – very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?</b>			
	<i>Very important</i> 1	<i>Somewhat important</i> 2	<i>Not too important</i> 3	<i>Not at all important</i> 4
<b>Old Europe</b>	16.8%	26.9%	24.0%	32.4%
<b>New Europe</b>	20.9%	28.8%	25.1%	25.2%
<b>United States</b>	56.4%	26.2%	9.0%	8.3%

Two independent-samples t-test showed that **there are significant differences** ( $t(7725) = 6.69, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) in the importance of religion for people in Old Europe ( $M = 2.72, SD = 1.08$ ) and New Europe ( $M = 2.55, SD = 1.08$ ), as well as between United States ( $M = 1.69, SD = .94$ ) and New Europe ( $t(4770) = 28.95, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). New Europe and United States are closer to each other in the how important religion is in people’s lives than Old Europe and the U.S. are. However, just like in the previous cases, Europeans in general are more secular than the Americans. For example, over 50 percent of respondents from both Old and New Europe believe that religion is “not really important” or “not important at all” in their lives, compared to less than 20 percent of those from the United States.

vi. Conclusions

Analysis results measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States using variables from the PEW 2007 survey database are summarized below in Table 7.5.6.

**TABLE 7.5.6: Levels of religiosity measured by variables from the PEW 2007 survey database (codebook in Appendix 5)**

	<i>Religious leaders influence</i>	<i>Religion and government kept separate</i>	<i>Religion and morality</i>	<i>Prayer times</i>	<i>Importance of religion</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.67 <i>ns</i> (.82)	1.58** (.99)	X <sup>2</sup> =5.47* OE-NE	3.99*** (1.26)	2.72*** (1.08)
<b>New Europe</b>	2.71 <i>ns</i> /*** (.83)	1.50**/*** (.88)	X <sup>2</sup> =278.92*** NE-US	3.79*** (1.36)	2.55*** (1.08)
<b>United States</b>	2.35 *** (.84)	1.93*** (1.32)	X <sup>2</sup> =278.92*** NE-US	2.44*** (1.40)	1.69*** (.94)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For “New Europe” entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

In general, Europeans are more secular than the Americans. New Europe and the United States have closer levels of religiosity than Old Europe and the U.S. do when we measure the importance of religion in people’s lives, the number of times individuals pray outside religious service and the relationship between morality and religion (although the differences between Old and New Europe in the latter case are not extremely significant from a statistical point of view). For 80 percent of Americans and less than 50 percent of Europeans religion is very important in their lives. 37 percent of Americans compared to 6 percent of respondents from Old Europe and 9 percent from New Europe pray several times a day. 24 percent of those interviewed in Old Europe, 27 from New Europe and 58 percent from the U.S. believe that it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values.

There are no significant distinctions between Old Europe and New Europe regarding people’s views on the influence of religious leaders in their societies, and in the case of the separation between religion as a matter of personal faith and governmental policies, Old Europe is actually closer to the U.S. than New Europe is. Less than 45 percent of Europeans compared to 65 percent of Americans see the influence of religious leaders in their societies as very good or somewhat good. 67 percent of respondents from New Europe, 64 percent from Old Europe and 55 percent from the United States believe that religion is a matter of personal faith, and as such, it should be kept separate from governmental policies.

## 7.6 . CONCLUSIONS

Findings from several statistical tests comparing means of religiosity levels in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States are summarized below in Tables 7.6.1 to 7.6.5.

**TABLE 7.6.1: Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as measured by variables from the World Values Survey (codebook in Appendix 1)**

	Confidence in churches	Religious services attendance	Church answers social problems	Religious faith in children	Secular politicians	Religious person	Church and State separation
Old Europe	2.60*** (.91)	5.88*** (2.31)	X <sup>2</sup> =96.01*** OE-NE	X <sup>2</sup> =1576*** OE-NE	4.05*** (1.01)	1.59*** (.66)	2.14*** (1.15)
New Europe	2.07***/ <i>ns</i> (.98)	4.24***/ <i>ns</i> (2.18)	X <sup>2</sup> =31.23*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =95.74*** NE-US	3.20***/ <i>ns</i> (1.29)	1.20***/* (.48)	1.96*** (1.08)
United States	2.04 <i>ns</i> (.89)	4.12 <i>ns</i> (2.62)	X <sup>2</sup> =31.23*** NE-US	X <sup>2</sup> =95.74*** NE-US	3.14 <i>ns</i> (1.34)	1.23* (.46)	2.77*** (1.34)

**TABLE 7.6.2: Levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the Voice of the People – Millennium Edition (codebook in Appendix 2)**

	Moments of prayer	Religious beliefs	One true religion	Religious services attendance
Old Europe	1.47*** (.53)	2.08*** (1.02)	2.18*** (.81)	4.99*** (2.02)
New Europe	1.43*** (.55)	1.92*** (.97)	2.02*** (1.00)	4.33*** (1.91)
United States	1.13*** (.34)	1.45*** (.69)	1.87*** (.55)	3.23*** (1.88)

**TABLE 7.6.3: Levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States as measured by variables from the PEW 2002 survey database (codebook in Appendix 3)**

	<i>Religion and morality</i>	<i>Importance of religion in life</i>	<i>Church and State separation</i>	<i>Religious leaders influence</i>
Old Europe	X <sup>2</sup> =26.07*** OE-NE	2.45* (1.04)	1.41 <i>ns</i> (.70)	2.56 <i>ns</i> (.78)
New Europe	X <sup>2</sup> =217.40*** NE-US	2.39*/*** (1.03)	1.41 <i>ns</i> /**/ (.67)	2.55 <i>ns</i> /**/ (.81)
United States	X <sup>2</sup> =217.40*** NE-US	1.61*** (.88)	1.69*** (.94)	2.30*** (.79)

**TABLE 7.6.4: Analysis results for levels of religiosity as measured by variables from the 2006 U.S. CID database (codebook in Appendix 4)**

	<i>Personal religiosity</i>	<i>Religious services attendance</i>	<i>Religious homogeneity</i>
Old Europe	4.95 <i>ns</i> (2.93)	5.38*** (1.55)	2.95*** (1.06)
New Europe	4.94 <i>ns</i> /**/ (3.04)	4.99*** (1.63)	3.13*** (1.02)
United States	6.09*** (2.59)	4.55*** (1.61)	2.31*** (.85)

**TABLE 7.6.5: Levels of religiosity measured by variables from the PEW 2007 survey database (codebook in Appendix 5)**

	<i>Religious leaders influence</i>	<i>Religion and government kept separate</i>	<i>Religion and morality</i>	<i>Prayer times</i>	<i>Importance of religion</i>
<b>Old Europe</b>	2.67 <i>ns</i> (.82)	1.58** (.99)	X <sup>2</sup> =5.47* OE-NE	3.99*** (1.26)	2.72*** (1.08)
<b>New Europe</b>	2.71 <i>ns</i> /*** (.83)	1.50**/*** (.88)	X <sup>2</sup> =278.92*** NE-US	3.79*** (1.36)	2.55*** (1.08)
<b>United States</b>	2.35 *** (.84)	1.93*** (1.32)	X <sup>2</sup> =278.92*** NE-US	2.44*** (1.40)	1.69*** (.94)

**Notes:** a) Old Europe – New Europe, and New Europe – United States differences are significant at  $p \leq .05$ . For “New Europe” entry, first significance level refers to OE-NE relationship, second one to NE-U.S. (when those two are different). b)  $p \leq .05$  \*,  $p \leq .01$  \*\*,  $p \leq .001$  \*\*\*, *ns* = not significant

Overall, Europeans are more secular than the Americans, and Old Europe is less devout than New Europe. New Europe and the United States share several characteristics in matters of faith and spirituality, especially when it comes to the importance of religion in people’s lives, how many times a person prays and/or attends church services and the role of religion and religious leaders in governmental/political affairs.

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, New Europe (where levels of anti-Americanism are relatively lower than in Old Europe) and the United States share similar, high levels of religiosity, while Western Europe is much more secular. Americans and New Europeans are more inclined than Old Europeans to see themselves as religious people, trust their churches and ask them for answers to social problems, attend religious services fairly often and offer their children a religious education. Respondents from New Europe tend to agree with the Americans that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office, but they also parallel their Western European counterparts when it comes to views on the separation between Church and State. A significantly larger percentage of European than American respondents agree that religious leaders should not try to influence the national government’s policies.

In 2000, a “Voice of the People” survey finds Old Europe to be the most secular of the three regions under investigation, with the highest percentage of respondents who do not go to church, do not take time in their days to pray and do not believe in the existence of one true religion or one personal God. United States is at the opposite end of the spectrum as the most devout of the three. Americans pray a lot, attend religious services regularly, believe in the existence of a personal God and identify themselves with a large array of religious beliefs. New Europe falls somewhere in between these two extremes; this could provide an explanation for why its levels of anti-Americanism are lower than those in Old Europe. Two years later, the PEW survey discovers that Old Europe and New Europe have almost identical levels of religiosity, even if the intensity of anti-American feelings in those two regions is very different. Europe is more secular, and would like to keep religion out of the political and governmental realm as much as possible, while for Americans faith plays a major role in their personal lives, and they feel it should do the same in their public lives.



In the second half of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, statistical analysis results measuring levels of religiosity in Old Europe, New Europe and the United States show that New Europe is more similar to United States than Old Europe is terms of religious service attendance. In other aspects of religiosity Europeans see themselves as more secular, independent of which region of the continent they inhabit, than the Americans. Respondents from Old Europe are closer than those in New Europe, in their positive views of religious homogeneity, to the Americans. In 2007, another PEW surveys finds Europeans to be still more secular than the Americans. New Europe and the United States have closer levels of religiosity than Old Europe and the U.S. do regarding importance of religion in people's lives, the number of times individuals pray outside religious service and the relationship between morality and religion. There are however no significant distinctions between Old Europe and New Europe on the subject of the influence of religious leaders in their societies, and in the case of the separation between religion as a matter of personal faith and governmental policies, Old Europe is actually closer to the U.S. than New Europe is.

## **CHAPTER 8 – TRADE, TRAVEL, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ALTERNATIVE THEORIES AND A MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS**

This chapter covers the empirical analysis of the relationship between several variables other than tolerance and religiosity variables, and anti-Americanism. My tenth hypothesis states that besides cultural values, there are several other factors that might play a role in levels of anti-Americanism: the strength of economic ties between country X and the United States, an individual's support for the Palestinians, the frequency of his/her travels to the U.S., interest in environmental issues as well as a desire to see American troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan as soon as possible.

**Hypothesis 10 (alternative economic explanation):** There is a positive correlation between high levels of anti-Americanism and weak trade ties, low number of travels to the U.S., positive support for the Palestinians, interest in environmentally-friendly policies and desire to see American troops leaving Iraq as soon as possible.

### **8.1 . MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: DATA AND METHODS**

PEW 2002 and PEW 2007 are the two databases used for the multivariate regression analysis, as they contain almost all the elements used in this empirical analysis: trade, travel, U.S. foreign policies towards Israel and towards the environment, cultural similarity (tolerance towards women, immigrants/foreign workers and homosexuals), religiosity and anti-Americanism. The 2002 survey was conducted in 44 countries, 8 of which are part of the final database used here: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovak Republic and Great Britain.

The 2007 survey was conducted in over 50 countries, including several from Old and New Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. In Britain, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovakia, and Sweden, the questionnaire was split into two forms, each of which was administered to approximately one-half of the sample. In these countries, most questions were assigned to one form or another. Two separate databases were created for each of these two forms, to minimize the risk of having information lost during the regression analysis.

According to Hypothesis 10, the more a respondent believes U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East favor the state of Israel, the higher his/her levels of anti-Americanism. Variables from the PEW 2002 database used to measure Europe's views of America's involvement in the Palestinian problem were re-coded so they would reflect a scale of pro-Palestinian feelings. For example, one of the questions asked: "What's your opinion of U.S. policies in the Middle East – would you say they are fair or do they favor Israel too much or do they favor the Palestinians too much?" Initially, the answers were coded: 1 (Fair), 2 (Favor Israel) and 3 (Favor Palestinians). I re-coded them as follows: 1 (Favor Israel), 2 (Fair) and 3 (Favor Palestinians), so they would reflect an incremental positive attitude towards the Palestinians.

## 8.2 . CULTURAL SIMILARITY, RELIGION, TRADE, TRAVEL, THE MIDDLE EAST, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ANTI-AMERICANISM: A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS RESULTS

### 8.2.1. PEW 2002

Two standard linear regression analyses were conducted using “Opinion of United States” and “Opinion of Americans” as dependent variables. Table 8.2.1.1 presents the wording and the coding of each of the 13 independent variables from the PEW 2002 database used in these two regression analyses, as well as the two dependent variables.

**TABLE 8.2.1.1: PEW 2002 variables – wording and measurement scales**

	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>
<i>Variable</i>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<i>Immigration problem</i>	Very big problem	Moderately big problem	Small problem	Not a problem at all	
<i>Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.</i>	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree	
<i>Religious leaders influence</i>	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	
<i>Immigrants influence</i>	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	
<i>Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy?</i>	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree	
<i>We should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we do now.</i>	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree	

Table continued.

	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>
<i>Variable</i>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<i>What kind of marriage do you think is the more satisfying way of life?</i>	Husband provides for family, wife cares for house and kids	Both have jobs & take care of house and children			
<i>Which one of these statements about belief in God comes closest to your opinion?</i>	Not necessary to believe in God to be moral/have good values	Necessary to believe in God to be moral/have good values			
<i>Which one of these statements about homosexuality comes closer to your opinion?</i>	Homosexuality-way of life society should accept	Homosexuality-way of life society should not accept			
<i>What is your opinion of the United States?</i>	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	
<i>What is your opinion of Americans?</i>	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	
<i>Have you ever traveled to the U.S.?</i>	Yes	No			
<i>Outside of attending religious services, do you pray several times a day, once a day, a few times a week, once a week or less, or never?</i>	Several times a day	Once a day	A few times a week	Once a week or less	Never
<i>How important is religion in your life?</i>	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	
<i>Region</i>	Old Europe	New Europe			

Table 8.2.1.2 shows the results of the linear regression analyzing the relationship between anti-Americanism, as expressed in opinions of the United States, and cultural similarity, trade, travel, and support for free market. Anti-Americanism is measured by looking at opinions of the United States, a variable coded on a scale from 1 (very favorable) to 4 (very unfavorable).

**TABLE 8.2.1.2: PEW 2002 database regression results with “Opinion of United States” as dependent variable (F (14, 2834) = 8.45, R<sup>2</sup> = .040)**

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Old Europe vs. New Europe</i>	-.185	.061	-.109	-3.007	.003**
<i>Immigration problem</i>	-.010	.019	-.012	-.552	.581 ns
<i>Stricter immigration laws</i>	.008	.018	.010	.467	.641 ns
<i>Immigrants influence</i>	.030	.021	.029	1.393	.164 ns
<i>Religious leaders influence</i>	.049	.020	.051	2.435	.015*
<i>Religion separate from state</i>	.019	.019	.018	.960	.337 ns
<i>God and Morality</i>	.005	.038	.003	.134	.894 ns
<i>Times of prayer</i>	-.053	.016	-.094	-3.414	.001***
<i>Religion importance in life</i>	.115	.022	.148	5.127	.000***
<i>Marriage</i>	.013	.038	.007	.350	.726 ns
<i>Homosexuality</i>	.026	.038	.014	.677	.498 ns
<i>Trade</i>	-.009	.024	-.014	-.397	.692 ns
<i>Travel</i>	.143	.045	.063	3.172	.002**
<i>Free Market</i>	.079	.017	.087	4.665	.000***

**Note:**  $p \leq .05^*$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ,  $p > .05$  not significant (ns).

Regression analysis revealed that the overall model significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism in Europe,  $F(14, 2834) = 8.45$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ .  $R^2$  for the model was .040 and adjusted  $R^2$  was .036. Table 8.2.1.2 displays the un-standardized regression coefficients (B) and

standard error (Std. Error), the standardized coefficient Beta, as well as the t value and the level of significance p. In terms of individual relationships between the independent variables and anti-Americanism, influence of religious leaders ( $t = 2.43$ ,  $p \leq .05^*$ ), times of prayer ( $t = -3.41$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ), importance of religion ( $t = 5.12$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) are the only three variables pertaining to cultural similarity that have significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism. Two additional control variables –travel ( $t = 3.17$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ) and attitudes towards free markets ( $t = 4.66$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) are also significantly related to anti-American attitudes, while no significant relationship was discovered between attitudes towards immigrants, women and homosexuals and feelings towards the United States. The Old Europe – New Europe regional divide maintains its significant impact on levels of anti-Americanism ( $t = -3.00$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ).

“**Opinion of Americans**” is used as a dependent variable in a second multiple regression, with the same 13 variable presented above selected as independent variables. Analysis results are presented in Table 8.2.1.3.

**TABLE 8.2.1.3: PEW 2002 database regression results with “Opinion of Americans” as dependent variable ( $F(14, 2810) = 7.32$ ,  $R^2 = .035$ )**

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Old Europe vs. New Europe</i>	-.203	.057	-.129	-3.539	.000***
<i>Immigration problem</i>	-.013	.018	-.016	-.722	.470 ns
<i>Stricter immigration laws</i>	-.006	.017	-.008	-.354	.723 ns
<i>Immigrants influence</i>	.015	.020	.016	.760	.447 ns
<i>Religious leaders influence</i>	.076	.019	.085	4.072	.000***
<i>Religion separate from state</i>	.012	.018	.013	.659	.510 ns
<i>God and Morality</i>	-.021	.036	-.013	-.594	.553 ns
<i>Times of prayer</i>	-.059	.015	-.111	-3.988	.000***
<i>Religion importance in life</i>	.101	.021	.141	4.819	.000***
<i>Marriage</i>	.029	.035	.016	.818	.413 ns
<i>Homosexuality</i>	.067	.035	.040	1.902	.057 ns

Table continued.

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Trade</i>	-.054	.022	-.089	-2.454	.014*
<i>Travel</i>	.111	.042	.052	2.620	.009**
<i>Free Market</i>	.050	.016	.059	3.128	.002**

**Note:** a)  $p \leq .05^*$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ,  $p > .05$  not significant (ns).

b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above.

This second regression analysis revealed that the overall model significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism in Europe,  $F(14, 2810) = 7.32$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ .  $R^2$  for the model was .035 and adjusted  $R^2$  was .031 (smaller values than in the previous case). Table 8.2.1.3 displays the un-standardized regression coefficients (*B*) and standard error (*Std. Error*), the standardized coefficient *Beta*, as well as the *t* value and the level of significance *p*. In terms of individual relationships between the independent variables and anti-Americanism, influence of religious leaders is still statistically significant ( $t = 4.07$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ). Frequency of prayer times ( $t = -3.98$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) and the importance of religion ( $t = 4.81$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) also maintain their strong explanatory power. Three of the additional control variables – trade ( $t = -2.45$ ,  $p \leq .05^*$ ), travel ( $t = 2.62$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ) and attitudes towards free markets ( $t = 3.12$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ) have been found to be significantly related to anti-American attitudes, while no significant relationship was discovered between attitudes towards immigrants, women and homosexuals and feelings towards the American people. The Old Europe – New Europe regional divide is also shown to have a significant impact on levels of anti-Americanism ( $t = 3.53$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ).

To summarize these findings, there is a slight difference in the factors influencing Europe's views on the United States and the American government, compared to feelings towards the American people, although in both cases stronger anti-Americans are correlated with lower levels of religiosity, support for free markets and not having travelled to the United States. The main difference comes from the “religious leaders influence” independent variable. Europeans who believe that religious leaders have too much influence in their countries (an issue related to the separation between Church and State) are more likely to dislike the United States government, but not the American people in general. This suggests that these respondents, while unhappy with how the U.S. government responds to pressures from the faith-based community, believe that this intermingling of secular and religious affairs does not negatively reflect upon the majority of the American people. **These results have also shown that there is a strong correlation between the regions where the interview was conducted (Old Europe vs. New Europe) and opinions of the United States and of Americans, with Old Europe having higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe.**

## 8.2.2. PEW 2007 – FORM A

Two standard multiple regression analyses were conducted using “Opinion of United States” and “Opinion of Americans” as dependent variables for the PEW 2007 Form A. Table

8.2.2.1 presents the wording and the coding of each of the independent variables from the PEW 2007 database used in these regression analyses, as well as the two dependent variables. A and B next to the variable tell the reader in which of the two PEW 2007 questionnaires that information can be found.

**TABLE 8.2.2.1: PEW 2007 (Form A) variables – wording and measurement scales**

	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>
<i>Variable</i>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<i>Religious leaders influence</i>	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	
<i>Which one of these statements about belief in God comes closest to your opinion?</i>	Not necessary to believe in God to be moral/have good values	Necessary to believe in God to be moral/have good values			
<i>How often do you pray outside religious services?</i>	Several times a day	Once a day	A few times a week	Once a week or less	Never
<i>How important is religion in your life?</i>	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	
<i>Immigrants influence</i>	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	
<i>Opinion on women as political leaders</i>	Men generally make better political leaders than women	In general, women and men make equally good political leaders	Women generally make better political leaders than men		
<i>Which one of these statements about homosexuality comes closer to your opinion?</i>	Homosexuality-way of life society should accept	Homosexuality-way of life society should not accept			



Table continued.

	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>
<i>Variable</i>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<i>Do you think the U.S. should keep military troops in Iraq until the situation has stabilized, or do you think the U.S. should remove its troops as soon as possible?</i>	Keep troops in Iraq	Remove its troops			
<i>What's your opinion of U.S. policies in the Middle East?</i>	Favor Israel	Fair	Favor Palestinians		
<i>What is your opinion of the United States?</i>	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	
<i>What is your opinion of Americans?</i>	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	
<i>Have you ever traveled to the U.S.?</i>	Yes	No			
<i>Region</i>	Old Europe	New Europe			

The first regression analysis for the PEW 2007 – Form A database revealed that the overall model significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism in Europe,  $F(12, 2507) = 30.56$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ .  $R^2$  for the model was .128 and adjusted  $R^2$  was .124. Table 8.2.2.1 presents the un-standardized regression coefficients (B) and standard error (Std. Error), the standardized coefficient Beta, as well as the t value and the alpha level of significance.

**TABLE 8.2.2.2: PEW 2007 Form A database regression results with “Opinion of United States” as dependent variable ( $F(12, 2507) = 30.56$ ,  $R^2 = .128$ )**

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Old Europe vs. New Europe</i>	-.139	.040	-.076	-3.510	.000***
<i>Religious leaders influence</i>	.142	.021	.140	6.839	.000***

Table continued.

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>God and Morality</i>	-.054	.042	-.027	-1.287	.198 ns
<i>Prayer</i>	-.019	.017	-.029	-1.113	.266 ns
<i>Importance of religion</i>	.047	.021	.061	2.216	.027*
<i>Immigrants influence</i>	-.020	.021	-.018	-.950	.342 ns
<i>Women as political leaders</i>	.102	.034	.057	3.022	.003**
<i>Homosexuality</i>	-.077	.040	-.038	-1.919	.055 ns
<i>U.S. troops in Iraq</i>	.395	.034	.222	11.722	.000***
<i>U.S. Middle East policies</i>	-.127	.027	-.092	-4.789	.000***
<i>Travel</i>	.284	.042	.137	6.827	.000**
<i>Trade</i>	.027	.019	.031	1.402	.161 ns

**Note:** a)  $p \leq .05^*$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ,  $p > .05$  not significant (ns).

b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above.

In terms of individual relationships between the independent variables and anti-Americanism, the only variables pertaining to the cultural similarity theory (as described in the previous chapters) that have significantly predicted levels of anti-Americanism are: 1) influence of religious leaders ( $t = 6.83$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ), 2) importance of religion ( $t = 2.21$ ,  $p \leq .05^*$ ), and 3) opinions on women as political leaders ( $t = 3.02$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ). The three additional control variables - travel ( $t = 6.82$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ) and attitudes towards U.S. policies in the Middle East - both on the topics of Iraq ( $t = 11.72$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) and Israel ( $t = -4.78$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) - are also related to anti-American attitudes, while no significant relationship was discovered between attitudes towards homosexuals and immigrants, beliefs regarding the relationship between faith and morality, frequency of prayers, and feelings towards the United States. ***The Old Europe – New Europe geographical divide is, in this model, significantly related to levels of anti-Americanism ( $t = -3.51$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ).***

A second multiple regression was conducted to analyze the relationship between the same independent variables mentioned above, and anti-Americanism as measured by opinions on Americans. Results have shown that this model also holds significant overall explanatory

strength ( $F(12, 2458) = 15.76, p \leq .001^{***}$ ), with an  $R^2$  value of .072 and adjusted  $R^2$  of .067. The coefficients for the individual relationships between the dependent variable – **opinion of Americans** – and each of the 11 independent variables is presented below in Table 8.2.2.3.

**TABLE 8.2.2.3: PEW 2007 Form A database regression results with “Opinion of Americans” as dependent variable ( $F(12, 2458) = 15.76, R^2 = .070$ )**

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Old Europe vs. New Europe</i>	-.081	.037	-.049	-2.161	.031*
<i>Religious leaders influence</i>	.098	.020	.107	5.008	.000**
<i>God and Morality</i>	.033	.039	.018	.831	.406 ns
<i>Prayer</i>	-.007	.016	-.012	-.449	.653 ns
<i>Importance of religion</i>	.039	.020	.056	1.978	.048*
<i>Immigrants influence</i>	.067	.020	.069	3.396	.001***
<i>Women as political leaders</i>	.005	.032	.003	.145	.885 ns
<i>Homosexuality</i>	-.022	.038	-.012	-.585	.559 ns
<i>U.S. troops in Iraq</i>	.232	.032	.144	7.326	.000***
<i>U.S. Middle East policies</i>	-.036	.025	-.029	-1.447	.148 ns
<i>Travel</i>	.228	.039	.121	5.808	.000***
<i>Trade</i>	-.058	.018	-.074	-3.190	.001***

**Note:** a)  $p \leq .05^*$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ,  $p > .05$  not significant (ns).

b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above.

These results revealed that, unlike the previous model, there is no significant correlation between levels of anti-Americanism as measured by opinions of the American people, and views on women in a position of political leadership, homosexuals and the U.S. involvement in the Palestinian problem. There is also no noticeable relationship between anti-Americanism, the frequency of prayer times and the belief that faith and morality. This model uncovered an interesting difference in the strength of the correlation between attitudes towards immigrants and

anti-Americanism when the targets of this anti-Americanism are the U.S. government and the American people. If in the former case, there is no correlation, while in the latter, we can notice a statistically significant relationship ( $t = 3.39, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). Two other elements of the cultural similarity theory, the influence of religious leaders ( $t = 5.00, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) and the importance of religion in a person's life ( $t = 1.97, p \leq .05^*$ ) are both predicting levels of anti-Americanism, as do three of the control variables: trade ( $t = -3.19, p \leq .001^{***}$ ), travel to the U.S. ( $t = 5.80, p \leq .001^{***}$ ) and views on the war in Iraq ( $t = 7.32, p \leq .001^{***}$ ). *The Old Europe – New Europe distinction also maintained its explanatory power, although the correlation between this variable and opinions of Americans is weaker than in the case of feelings towards the United States ( $t = -2.16, p \leq .05^*$ ).*

### 8.2.3. PEW 2007 – FORM B

“Opinion of the United States” and “opinion of Americans” were used as dependent variables for two sets of multiple regressions analyzing the correlation between anti-Americanism in Europe and seven independent variables that were not captured by Form A of the PEW 2007 questionnaire: aspects of cultural similarity (tolerance towards women and immigrants, and the separation between Church and States), as well as opinions on American President George W. Bush, the necessity of protecting the environment and the benefits of free market. Table 8.2.3.1 presents the wording and the coding for each of these nine variables.

**TABLE 8.2.3.1: PEW 2007 (Form B) variables – wording and measurement scales**

	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>
<i>Variable</i>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<i>Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.</i>	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree
<i>Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.</i>	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree
<i>Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy?</i>	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree

Table continued.

	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Scale</i>
<i>Variable</i>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<i>We should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we do now.</i>	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree
<i>Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion about educating children?</i>	It is more important for boys than for girls	It is equally important for girls and boys	It is more important for girls than for boys	
<i>How much confidence you have in U.S. President George W. Bush to do the right thing regarding world affairs?</i>	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not too much confidence	No confidence at all
<i>In your view, is global warming a very serious problem, somewhat serious, not too serious, or not a problem?</i>	Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not a problem
<i>What is your opinion of the United States?</i>	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable
<i>What is your opinion of Americans?</i>	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable
<i>Region</i>	Old Europe	New Europe		

Overall, these eight predictors from Form B of the PEW 2007 survey questionnaires explain a sizable proportion of variance ( $R^2 = .261$ ,  $F(8, 4030) = 177.50$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) in levels of anti-Americanism as measured by **attitudes towards the United States**. Table 8.2.3.2 displays the standardized and unstandardized coefficients for the individual relationships between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable.

**TABLE 8.2.3.2: PEW 2007 Form B database regression results with “Opinion of United States” as dependent variable (F (8, 4030) = 177.50, R<sup>2</sup> = .261)**

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Old Europe vs. New Europe</i>	-.001	.024	-.001	-.049	.961 ns
<i>Free market</i>	.075	.013	.080	5.743	.000***
<i>Protecting the environment</i>	-.006	.014	-.007	-.466	.641 ns
<i>Religion as a personal matter</i>	-.006	.016	-.005	-.347	.729 ns
<i>Stricter immigration laws</i>	-.002	.012	-.002	-.169	.866 ns
<i>Education for boys and girls</i>	.037	.071	.007	.527	.598 ns
<i>Opinions on George W. Bush</i>	.464	.013	.488	34.592	.000***
<i>Global warming - problem</i>	-.039	.017	-.032	-2.255	.024*

**Note:** a)  $p \leq .05^*$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ,  $p > .05$  not significant (ns).

b) An ordered probit analysis was also conducted using the same independent and dependent variables and its results supported the findings in the table above.

The only three independent variables having a significant predictor strength are views on the benefits of free market ( $t = 5.74$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ), on George W. Bush’s capacity to handle world affairs ( $t = 34.59$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) and on the seriousness of the global warming problem ( $t = -2.25$ ,  $p \leq .05^*$ ). More negative views of the United States are correlated with negative views of former President George W. Bush, negative views of the benefits of free markets and belief in the seriousness of the global warming problem. The other factors, including beliefs about the separation between State and Church and the importance of education for boys and girls, or the Old Europe – New Europe divide, do not appear to have a strong relationship with a respondent’s opinions on the United States.

The results from a second regression using “**opinions on Americans**” as the dependent variable are presented below in Table 8.2.3.3.

**TABLE 8.2.3.3: PEW 2007 Form B database regression results with “Opinion of Americans” as dependent variable (F (8, 3962) = 64.57, R<sup>2</sup> = .116)**

	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>Old Europe vs. New Europe</i>	.147	.024	.092	5.999	.000***
<i>Free market</i>	.039	.013	.045	2.895	.004**
<i>Protecting the environment</i>	.035	.014	.038	2.443	.015*
<i>Religion as a personal matter</i>	.035	.016	.033	2.169	.030*
<i>Stricter immigration laws</i>	-.056	.012	-.071	-4.696	.000***
<i>Education for boys and girls</i>	-.031	.072	-.006	-.427	.670 ns
<i>Opinions on George W. Bush</i>	.291	.014	.330	21.145	.000***
<i>Global warming - problem</i>	-.008	.018	-.007	-.457	.647 ns

**Note:**  $p \leq .05^*$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ,  $p > .05$  not significant (ns).

The explanatory strength of this second regression model is slightly weaker than the one using opinions of the United States as dependent variable ( $R^2 = .116$ , and the adjusted  $R^2 = .114$ ). It would seem that Europeans interviewed using Form B of the PEW 2007 questionnaire saw a clearer relationship between these eight independent variables and the American people, than in the previous example. Trust in the benefits of free market ( $t = 2.89$ ,  $p \leq .01^{**}$ ) and opinions on American President George W. Bush’s ability to handle international affairs ( $t = 21.14$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) maintained their strong explanatory power, when the focus of anti-Americanism changes from the U.S. government to the American people. The two variables looking at environmental attitudes are changing places compared to the previous model: views on the seriousness of global warming problems are not significantly related to attitudes towards the Americans, while those on protecting the environment even if it means job loss are ( $t = 2.44$ ,  $p \leq .05^*$ ). Two aspect of cultural similarity, tolerance towards immigrants ( $t = -4.69$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ) and the separation between Church and State ( $t = 2.16$ ,  $p \leq .05^*$ ) are significantly related to opinions on Americans even if they do not appear to have a relevant impact on anti-Americanism as measured by views of the United States. The Old Europe – New Europe divide also shows a strong effect on opinions of the Americans, although not in the direction previously observed ( $t = 5.99$ ,  $p \leq .001^{***}$ ). A second regression analysis showed that once we remove the “George W. Bush” variable, the European divide in anti-Americanism returns to its original characteristic,

with Old Europe exhibiting higher levels of anti-Americanism than New Europe (see Appendix 9 for complete results). This suggests that when they focus their anti-Americanism on just one person (George W. Bush), Old Europeans might be more inclined to see the rest of the Americans in a positive light.

### **8.3 . CONCLUSIONS**

Multiple regression results from the PEW 2002 and PEW 2007 have offered moderate support for the cultural similarity theory which argues that there is a relationship between cultural similarity (tolerance and religiosity levels) and anti-Americanism, even when we control for additional factors such as direct contact with the American society through trade and travel, views on American President George W. Bush and his government's policies towards Israel, Iraq and the environment. In general, factors significantly correlated with anti-Americanism maintained their explanatory strength for both its facets: opinions on the United States (the government) and opinions on the American people.

Each of the databases containing the trade per GDP ratio showed a significant correlation between trade dependence and anti-Americanism. In each case, an increase in the strength of a respondent's trade ties with the United States was matched by an increase in levels of anti-Americanism, which contradicts the modernization theory assumption that increased economic contact between society breeds friendship. On the other hand, more direct contact with the American society through travel to the United States is negatively correlated with anti-Americanism: respondents who have traveled to the U.S. are less anti-American than those who haven't.

Results have also shown that America's image in Europe is positively correlated with support for a free market economy. In both 2002 and 2007 databases, those respondents who believe that most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are poor and some are rich are also more like to exhibit friendlier attitudes towards the U.S. government and the American people. Positive views on how capable American President George W. Bush is to handle international affairs, as well as his policies towards Israel and the deployment of troops in Iraq are all correlated with negative feelings towards the U.S. government. Europeans who have a lot of confidence in George W. Bush to do the right thing regarding world affair and who also think that the U.S. should keep military troops in Iraq until the situation has stabilized are more likely to have favorable views of the United States government, as well as of the American people. Those respondents who perceive U.S. policies in the Middle East conflict to favor Israel are more inclined to have negative opinions only of the United States and not the American people.

One of the two PEW 2007 questionnaires also asked several questions about environmental issues. The two selected for this analysis are about the benefits of environmental protection even when it hurts the economy, and the seriousness of global warming problems. The results of the two multiple regression analyses are somewhat puzzling: Europeans who believe that global warming is a serious problem are slightly more likely to harbor negative feelings towards the U.S. government, but not the American people, which would suggest that they do not agree with the way the Bush government was dealing at the time with the issues of global warming. On the other hand, the variable measuring a respondent's willingness to support environmental protective measures even if they negatively affect their economies is positively



correlated with just opinions of the Americans, and not with opinions of the U.S. More support for the environment, in this case, translates into more favorable views of the American people, which would suggest that although Europeans disagree with the U.S. government's handling of environmental affairs, they also believe in the pro-environment propensities of the general public in America.

Returning to the cultural similarity theory, we notice a strong correlation between two of the independent variables measuring various aspects of religiosity and levels of anti-Americanism. In both PEW 2002 and PEW 2007 surveys, respondents who see the influence of religious leaders in their societies as a positive one and for whom religions is very important in their lives are more likely to have favorable opinions of the U.S. government and the American people. Views on the relationship between faith and morality are not a significant predictor of anti-Americanism in any of the databases used in this chapter, while the frequency of prayer times is significantly correlated with anti-Americanism only in the 2002 survey (the more you pray the more pro-American you are). The belief that religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy has a strong influence on opinions of the American people only in the PEW 2007 which would suggest that five years prior, Europeans did not see the Americans as trying to bring faith into politics as much as in 2007.

Tolerance towards immigrants and views on women as political leaders are correlated with anti-Americanism only in the 2007 survey, which comes as no surprise if we think about the heightened tensions regarding these issues in the United States towards the end of George W. Bush's second term in office. While at the beginning of his Presidency Americans were mostly concerned about the response to the 9/11 attacks, the debates regarding illegal immigration, gay marriage, abortion and a woman's place in the political realm (topic made visible by Hillary Clinton's much publicized Presidential campaign) became much more heated the closer we got to the 2008 general elections. In general, Europeans who believe that men and women make equally good political leaders are slightly more likely to have negative opinions of the United States government, but not of the American people. The opposite is true for tolerance towards immigrants: respondents who argued that the influence of immigrants in their societies is either very good or somewhat good were more likely to have favorable and somewhat favorable opinions of the American people (without any significant impact on levels of anti-Americanism as measured by attitudes towards the American government), which would again suggest that in certain cases Europeans dislike for certain policies of the Bush administration did not extend to the Americans in general.

The Old Europe – New Europe geographical divide maintained its explanatory strength even when we control for all the factors mentioned above. New Europe has more positive views on the United States and on the American people than does Old Europe. Chapter IX looks at two countries, one from Old Europe – France, and one from New Europe – Romania, and the reasons behind their very different levels of anti-Americanism. This concludes the general empirical analysis of various aspects of Europe's attitudes towards America, including elements of cultural similarity, policy-driven feelings directed at the U.S., as well as direct economic and personal contact with the United States and with the American people.

## **CHAPTER 9 – FRANCE AND ROMANIA: A TALE OF TWO ANTI-AMERICANISMS**

### **9.1. FRANCE AND ROMANIA – A SIX-HUNDRED YEARS OLD FRIENDSHIP**

Romania was recognized in 2006 by France as one of the most francophone countries in the world, when it became the first “New European” country to host the 11th Francophone World Summit. There is a special department in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dedicated to the country’s francophone connections. France was Romania’s strongest supporter in its bid for EU membership. During Romania’s Communist years, the two foreign languages taught in Romanian schools were Russian and French. Taking all these things into account, one might expect Romania to follow France’s lead in European anti-Americanism. And one would be wrong. Romania is one of the most pro-American countries in Europe, while France is one of the most anti-American. This chapter explores the reasons behind these different levels of anti-Americanism, using information from the World Values Survey, as well as the 2005 Eurobarometer. This data paints a picture that reflects the general Old Europe – New Europe findings from the previous chapters: Romania is more culturally similar to the U.S. than France is in terms of their levels of religiosity and tolerance towards women, homosexuals and immigrant/foreign workers. This section will present a short historical background of the relationship between France and its francophone little sister, Romania.

Romanian children have learned for at least the last twenty years that one of the first interactions between France and Romania dates back to 1300s, when Burgundy knights under the command of Jean de Nevers came and fought against the Turks alongside famous Romanian prince Mircea cel Batran. A century later, the French-Romanian anti-Ottoman alliance was renewed by Moldavian princes from the Movilesti family (Berindei 1967). For the next three hundred years, these interactions intensified, as the French kings had begun to see Romania’s geostrategic value as a first defense bastion for Christian Europe in the face of the increased power of the Ottoman Empire. French emissaries were sent to all three Romanian princely courts, and young Romanian boyars started to journey to Paris, in what turns out to be the beginning of a long cultural friendship between the two countries. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as well as after World War I, the cream of the Romanian intelligentsia traveled to Paris and was heavily influenced by French culture. Mihai Eminescu (Romania’s national poet), Brancusi (one of the world’s most illustrious sculptors), philosophers Eliade and Cioran, as well as one of the most influential play writers of the Theatre of the Absurd and Member of the French Academy Eugen Ionescu, are just a few of those who have strengthened Romania’s francophone character (Eliade 1982). Romania’s penal code was fashioned from the French Napoleonic code, and there are currently French cultural centers all across Romania run by the French embassy to support of their francophone ties. The Francophone International Organization has an office in Bucharest that supervises francophone activities in all Eastern and Central European countries. The Francophone Office of Higher Education has been operating in a similar fashion since 1994 and there are over 25 Romanian universities that have dual-degrees programs with French colleges (Ambassade de France en Roumanie n.d.).

It is also true that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the relationships between these two countries have experienced several tense moments. After President Jacques Chirac’s strong support for Romania’s EU membership and the opening of Europe’s borders to Romanians in search for

better economic opportunities, tensions arose when a massive influx of Roma settled in France. Perceived as criminal elements in some circles of French politics, Roma became the target of a government-supported deportation campaign initiated in 2010 by then French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Although this attempt to send the Roma back to Romanian (and Bulgaria) has so far been fairly unsuccessful, it has temporarily strained the otherwise amicable relationship between the two countries.

But Roma are not the only source of tension in this six-hundred years old friendship. Romania's support for the war in Iraq has caused former French President Jacques Chirac (quoted here by Graff (2003)) to call it "not very well behaved and rather reckless." He continued by telling Romanians that they "missed a good opportunity to keep quiet" and that "if they wanted to reduce their chances of joining Europe, they could not have found a better way" (Graff 2003). Romania's pro-Americanism has been over the years a constant source of irritation for the French government, and the next section presents a short overview on France's own complicated relationship with the United States over the last two hundred years.

## **9.2. FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES – "ARE AMERICAN DOGS REALLY BARKING?"**

France and the United States have never been at war with each other, at least not officially. Which is part of the reason why, on a trip to Paris in 1999 (during the American bombing of Belgrade), I was very surprised to engage in a rather animated conversation with one of the guides at the War Museum - Musée de l'Armée – about French-American military relations. The reason this conversation started was because at the time I was translating from French to English to one my American friends. Our guide took exception to that, and asked me first if my friend was American. He then decided to stop the tour, to ask me if I was not ashamed to be friends with one of these "imperialists keeling innocent people." I blame the rest of the incident on my temper: I retorted that he, of all people, should be grateful for America's help during World War II, or he would be speaking German now. It turns out that was not the right thing to say, as I was told in English by this guide at the French National Military Museum that France was doing just fine during WW II, and that it didn't really need any help from a country that "never won a war in its history." Instead of just dropping the conversation (and to my friend's despair) I proceeded to point out that at least the Americans didn't build a 50 kilometer long wall to protect a 500 kilometer long border. At which point we were not so politely asked to leave the museum: "You and your American friend can leave this museum now!" On our way out, I asked my friend why he wasn't upset about how people talked about the United States, right in front of him. His answer was "Oh, this was not that bad. I've seen worse. You should have just told them I'm from Canada."

Coming from a country with strong pro-American inclinations, I was shocked by the French hostility towards the United States. Having lived in Louisiana for the last eight years, I am even more surprised, because of the strong ties this southern American state has with France. So some of the questions I have been asking myself since the 1999 visit to the "Musée de l'Armée" are: how did it all start? Were the French always anti-Americans? If not, when did this change occur and why?

Franco-American relations have not always been as tense as they have been over the last ten years. The French played a significant supporting role in the birth of the United States as an

independent nation, providing military, economic and diplomatic backing for the New Republic, even if it was not exactly for selfless reasons. In the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, France and Great Britain were trying to tilt the European balance of power in their favor, and the French saw the American Revolution as an opportunity to reach this goal. The French monarchy however did not expect for the American political model to become a shining example for the intellectuals in Paris of how the “ancien régime” could be reformed. Benjamin Franklin’s visits to Paris were touted as proof that democracy, science and culture can coexist, and that “the Americans were important contributing members of an international community of enlightened citizens” (Strauss 1978, 17).

This marks the beginning of a trend in French anti-Americanism. It seems that any time the French perceive the Americans as truly being in their debt, or as being weaker and non-threatening, levels of anti-Americanism are low. When America prospers, does not act according to French plans, or seems to replace France as the leading force in international politics, economics or culture, however, anti-American feelings catch fire again. Anti-Americanism in France is inseparable from French insecurities and self-doubt about their country’s place in the world.

No sooner had the United States started to emerge from the ashes of the American Revolution, then had anti-American rhetoric started to spread in France. It was initially directed not at the American government, nor the American people, but at the weather, flora, and fauna of the New Republic. This rhetoric came primarily from two “scientific” sources: Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (*Oeuvres Completes* 1859) and Cornelius De Paw (De Pauw 1806). The portrait they painted of North America was a grim one, characterized by a degeneration of plants, animals and ultimately humans, all of whom were not only smaller and weaker than the European ones, but also without any prospects of bettering themselves in the future. Chickens did not lay eggs, American pigs were smaller than European cats, men were cowards and not interested in women and the women were manly and driven by lust for European-born males. Crops were anemic, the weather was harsh, the land was covered in salt, and the dogs did not bark. There were political reasons behind these and other similar attacks against the United States. Europeans monarchs, while supporting the American anti-colonial struggles as a way to weaken the British Empire, wanted to ensure that the European citizens did not become so enamored with the New Republic that they would decide either to immigrate there (therefore putting a strain on Europe’s economics), or worse, to emulate the American political model and replace hereditary monarchies with democratic systems.

Franklin, the American representative in Paris, and later Jefferson, tried to improve this image in the eyes of the Europeans as they feared that it would translate into political isolationism at a time when America needed all the support it could gather in Europe’s capitals. Unfortunately, the seeds of anti-Americanism were planted, and there was little the Americans could do to change the views of people who have never traveled to the New Continent or met an American dog. With the onset of the French Revolution, diplomatic relations between France and the United States took a turn for the worse. Fearing that the instability and violence in Paris might spread across the ocean, U.S. signed a secret treaty with Great Britain, which further angered the French. Roger (2005) writes:

French privateers started attacking American ships. Twenty years after the “trade, friendship, and alliance” treaty, France and the United States were in a state of

belligerence [which] makes for a strange epilogue to a century of Enlightenment in which, even before the birth of the American nation had taken place, the French anti-American image war had begun (25).

19<sup>th</sup> century Franco-American relations did little to silence the anti-American voices in France. The first half of the century saw the naturalist criticism of the United States replaced by a cultural one. French travelers to the New Republic, as well as literary giants like Balzac or Baudelaire have nothing good to say about America's cultural endeavors. This period sees the birth of another long lasting anti-American stereotype: the U.S. as the land where civilization is trumped by mercantilism and where people are more interested in making money than intelligent conversation. Tocqueville's "Democracy in America" (De Tocqueville 1966) does nothing to change the negative views of French intelligentsia of America and Americans. Au contraire! Being perceived as unapologetically pro-American, Tocqueville and his travel companions are met with a wave of criticism for their views on American democracy, and we see another stereotype being born: Americans are not as democratic as they like to pretend, because they have only two parties, they killed the Native Americans and they had slaves (Roger 2005).

The second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century witnesses a change in French anti-Americanism, and it was exemplified by the whole "Statue of Liberty" debacle. Following the 1870 defeat of the French armies at the hands of the Prussian Empire, and the birth of the French Republic, the American model became popular again in a small circle of conservative republicans led by Laboulaye. It was his desire to rekindle the friendly relationship France and the United States shared a hundred years ago around the ideals of the French Revolution – Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité! However, the results of his endeavors were completely opposite: it took a long time for the statue's pedestal to be built, and in France, this was publicized as just another sign of America's lack of civilization and gratitude towards France. Philippe Roger places the "official" birth date of French anti-Americanism as the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Upset about the lack of respect shown by the Americans to their larger-than-life present, worried about the economic and military progresses made by the United States (including the successful 1898 Spanish War) and in internal turmoil following the Dreyfuss Affair, the French turned to the one topic on which could all agree - anti-Americanism: "At the high point of civil discord in a divided France, anti-Americanism was the only 'French passion' that calmed the other passions, curbed antagonisms, and reconciled the staunchest adversaries" (Roger 2005, 141). For the first time, a new element of anti-Americanism emerges, an element that has resurfaced at various times including the recent American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan – the United States as an imperialist power. American dogs were maybe mute, but American cannons were not, and the echoes of the Spanish War were heard all over the Old Continent.

By the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Europe in general, and France in particular, were forced to begrudgingly acknowledge that the nation of rude, violent and profit-oriented Americans they ridiculed for more than a century has risen to challenge Europe for world domination. WWI made it even clearer that the French were losing this contest, so it is no surprise that the interwar years are marked by new developments in anti-Americanism, the effects of which can be seen in contemporary polls not only in France, but all over Europe. First, we can see the seeds of the pan-European project emerging as an alternative to the inexorable American take-over. Second, it became fashionable to condemn American cultural values – movies, music, and literature – as poisonous to Europe's civilization. But more important, the

first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the United States coming to the rescue of the French nation not once, but twice. Instead of gratitude, the Americans were met with disdain and condescension in Paris. De Gaulle's decision to pull out of the NATO military command, although remaining a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, as well as France's pursuit of nuclear weapons, were a reflection of a general feeling among the French people that they did not really owe anything to the Americans, that they did not need the Americanism to protect them from the Soviets, and that they were on the verge of winning WWII even without America's help.

During the Cold War, Franco-American relations remained friendly, yet strained at governmental levels. Opposition to the war in Vietnam, France's pursuit of secularism and comparative economic and military weakness, and the strength of the political Left all contributed to the survival of French anti-Americanism over the last sixty years. Americans are still seen as rude, greedy, uncivilized, and as too religious and selfishly imperialistic. Given that French views of the United States and its people still have the power to unite a divided country, and given that these enmities help France to forget its own faults and weaknesses, this may continue to be a key component of the French ethos for the foreseeable future. It seems unlikely that the Americans could do anything to make the French like them more. Two hundred years after Buffon, dogs in America are definitely barking, but there is nobody in France interested in hearing them.

The next section of this chapter describes a very different relationship between a European country and the United States – Romania's pro-Americanism.

### **9.3. ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES – “GOD SMILES UPON US!”**

In 2002, massive crowds enthusiastically welcomed President George W. Bush in his first visit to Romania, and the feelings were apparently mutual. During his speech, held in a steady, cold November rain, a rainbow appeared in the sky, prompting President Bush to exclaim “God is smiling on us!” For the rest of his presidency, George W. Bush would mention this “magical” moment every time he would meet Romanian artists, athletes, or politicians. At the time, he was not as enthusiastic about the French who mounted, alongside the Germans, the strongest opposition to the war in Iraq:

There is a sense of frustration and disappointment amongst the American people toward the French decision [because] they didn't understand the decisions by the French leadership to thwart the American desire, and the desire of others, to work on security and freedom — security for our countries and freedom in Iraq (Associated Press 2003).

This section offers a short overview of Romanian pro-Americanism, and its somewhat paradoxical character. To understand better the paradox of Romanian pro-Americanism, I start with a brief personal story. Growing up, I heard numerous stories about World War II from my maternal grandmother, who lived as a child in the Ploesti region, where Romania's oil fields are located. Her war memories were notably marked by the terror they felt any time American planes were dropping bombs not only on the oil fields and refineries (supplying fuel for the Nazi army) but also on the town where she lived. She and her family eventually escaped the bombings by taking refuge in the countryside, but she never forgot the stars and stripes on the planes bombing her house and her school. Apparently, the American planes were flying extremely closely to the

ground to avoid the air defenses around Ploiesti and I found confirmation of her war recollections on the U.S Air Force's website (U.S. Air Force n.d.).

So, imagine my surprise when, upon receiving my acceptance letter from Indiana State University's Political Science Department, I saw tears in my grandmother's eyes. I thought she was upset, but it turns out there were tears of joy. She told me that her dream was always to get to see the White House, because she wanted to thank President Reagan for helping us get rid of Communism (being accustomed to Ceausescu's lifelong hold on Romania, it was hard for her to understand that American Presidents leave power after 4 or 8 years, so she assumed Reagan was still living in the White House in 1999).

No matter what the historical reality about the end of the Cold War might be, her feelings for the United States were not uncommon among older Romanians –“Yes, the U.S. bombed us during WW II. And yes, Roosevelt sold us to the Soviets at Malta, but Reagan came and saved us from Communism.” And with that, the previous fifty years of tepid Romanian-American relations are put behind us, and we start the friendship anew. The remainder of this section will present a brief historical overview of this friendship, using as main sources the United States Department of State (US Department of State 2011) and media reports.

In 1968, U.S.–Romanian relations warmed following President Ceausescu's show of distancing himself from the Soviets during the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 1969, as part of his “détente” policy, Nixon visits Romania, and ten years later, the Romanian dictator and his wife are received at the White House by President Carter. Prior to this visit, a trade agreement signed in April 1975 granted most favored nation (MFN) status to Romania under Section 402 of the Trade Reform Act of 1974 (US Department of State 2011). This status was renewed yearly by Congress following a Presidential evaluation of Romania's progress toward freedom of emigration, and it was put to good use by the Communist propaganda machine in Romania. Every year, after the renewal of the MNF status, the state-owned TV station showed a proud Ceausescu talking, usually for about two hours, about the American support for his regime.

Year after year, Romanians were left to wonder which one was the real America: the one backing the dictator, or the one we heard about on our radios through the “Voice of America” and “Radio Free Europe” stations. Those two news agencies, funded by the U.S. Congress through the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), a bipartisan federal agency overseeing all U.S international broadcasting services, were the only sources of reasonably independent news in Romania before 1989, and I remember being taught very early on, as soon as I learn how to speak, not to tell anyone about our illegal “radio sessions.” Despite the Ceausescu regime's attempts to jam their signal, these stations succeeded in spreading the word all over the country about the brutal 1989 crackdown in Timisoara, and thus played a key role in ending the Communist control over Romania and the rest of the Eastern European countries (Puddington 2000).

After the 1989 regime change in Romania, relations between Bucharest and Washington did not evolve as fast as the majority of the Romanians would have liked. After the 1990 visit to Romania by then Secretary of State James Baker, and the anti-democratic events of early 1990s that culminated with the “Mineriada”—attacks by coal miners on peaceful protesters in the capital city of Bucharest—relations between U.S. and Romania became warmer. A strong catalyst for this was that, following the 1992 elections, Romania demonstrated a decisive turn

away from Russia in their foreign and domestic policies. Five years later, with Romanians actively pushing for EU and NATO membership, President Clinton visited Romania and was received with open arms by a large crowd. Despite the fact that in that very year Romania's bid for NATO membership had been put on hold due to American reservations about Romania's political and economic reforms, tens of thousands of Romanians still warmly welcomed the first American President to visit post-Communist Romania (CNN Time 1997).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and Romania's full support for the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan marked a new stage in U.S.–Romanian relations. A NATO member since 2004, Romanian troops have fought in Iraq and are still currently deployed in Afghanistan. American President George W. Bush has visited Romania twice, in 2002 and 2007. With Turkey denying Americans military access to their national airspace, Romania became an attractive alternative option for the geostrategic access to the Black Sea, and from there, to Iraq, Afghanistan and, if necessary, Iran. In 2005, Romanian President Basescu made his first official visit to Washington, and a year later, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Bucharest and signed an agreement that allowed for the use of the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base by U.S. troops. These moves toward military cooperation drew sharp criticism from Romania's longtime foe Russia, which saw this as an attempt to diminish Russia's influence in Eastern Europe.

The tensions between Russia and Romania escalated in 2010, when following a visit to Bucharest by Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, Romania agreed to host elements of the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach to European missile defense within the 2015 timeframe (Agenția Națională de Presă 2011). An article in the Russian newspaper Prava makes it very clear that the government in Moscow was less than pleased with the heightened level of military cooperation between Romania and the United States:

Contrary to the statements of the President of Romania, the missile defense deployment is directed precisely against Russia. We could take retaliatory measures such as deploying Iskander and transferring fighter bombers in the area. In this case, the United States and Romania, as they say, found each other. Russia will have to respond not only to the Americans but also to the Romanians. There is no guarantee that it will be one and the same response. For example, the deployment of Iskander in Transnistria is unlikely to impress Washington, but would be a different story for Bucharest (Trukhachev 2011).

And here lies one of the key components of U.S.–Romanian relations, and of Romania's pro-Americanism, especially when compared to French anti-Americanism. Yes, Romanians are more culturally similar to the Americans than the French are (see next section - public opinion data on cultural similarity). Yes, they did not like being scolded by French President Chirac when they decided to support the war in Iraq. Yes, Romanian immigrants to the United States are treated better and with more respect than are those who either travel to, or look for a better economic future in France. **But above all, Romania has always needed protection against Russia.** There is a saying, based on some historical facts, that every time Romanians have signed a peace agreement with the Russians, they lost a part of their territory.

As of this writing in 2011, just as was the case six decades prior, the U.S. is seen as by the government in Bucharest as the primary alternative to Russian influence, but unlike the post-WWII world, the U.S. needs Romania too due to its geostrategic location. Under these



circumstances, maybe it is not that paradoxical after all that despite being bombed by U.S. planes during WWII, sold to the Soviets at Malta, abandoned to Ceausescu for fifty years, criticized for slow democratic reforms after 1989, and all but ignored until 2002 in their attempts to join NATO, Romanians still are, and will for the foreseeable future be, pro-American.

#### **9.4. FRANCE, ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES: CULTURAL SIMILARITY AND ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

This section looks at elements of cultural similarity that have been found to have a significant relationship with attitudes towards the U.S. in Old and New Europe. Besides economic factors, geostrategic considerations, and domestic politics games (which were the foci of the previous three sections of this chapter), I argue here that cultural similarity is an additional, major influence on a country's levels of anti-Americanism. In the case of Romania and France, we are interested to see if their six-hundred years old friendship and francophone ties have created strong cultural similarities in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, or if their different levels of anti-Americans are actually reflected in different cultural characteristics regarding tolerance and religiosity.

The 2005 and 2006 waves of the World Values Survey provided the empirical data for an in-depth look at cultural similarity between a country from Old Europe – France, one from New Europe – Romania, and the United States. Discussions of levels of anti-Americanism in France and Romania were based on information from the 2005 Eurobarometer 63.4.

##### **9.4.1. ANTI-AMERICANISM**

While Romania's support for the 2003 war in Iraq has drawn sharp criticism from Paris, this was just one of many manifestations of different levels of anti-Americanism in Old and New Europe. In 2005, several questions from the Eurobarometer surveys measured feelings towards the United States in the 27 EU member states, and the differences between France and Romania are clear. The Charts visually presenting this data can be found in Appendix 1, after the bibliographic information.

Almost 59 percent of Romanians, compared to only 16 percent of French respondents, believe that the United States plays a positive role in supporting world peace. 57 percent of Romanians and 29 percent of the French see America's impact on economic growth worldwide as a positive one, while over 70 percent of those interviewed in France (compared to only 13 percent in Romania) think that USA plays a negative role in fighting poverty worldwide as well as in protecting the environment. Both the French (85 percent) and the Romanians (65 percent) support an EU foreign policy more independent of the United States. This finding suggests that pro-Americanism in Romania does not necessarily co-occur with negative attitudes towards the European Union. However, when asked to compare the two on several dimensions, only a little over 20 percent of Romanians compared to more than half of the French believe that the overall quality of life in Europe is much better or somewhat better than in the United States, and that Europe is ahead of the U.S. when it comes to fighting discrimination.

Two years after the Romanian government's support for the war in Iraq, this confirms the existence of a fairly clear divide in levels of anti-Americanism in France and Romania. It would seem that former Romanian President Ion Iliescu's decision to join the American-led "coalition

of the willing” was a reflection of a generalized pro-American feeling in an otherwise francophone society. As Chapters 3-8 have previously shown, there is a strong relationship between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism in Old vs. New Europe – the more anti-American Old Europe is less culturally similar to the United States than New Europe is. This chapter brings into focus another question: are France and Romania so culturally “dissimilar” to make one of them look more like the United States than its European “cousin”? The next section looks at two elements of cultural similarity, tolerance and religiosity, and how they are reflected in the cases of France, Romania and the United States. Charts presenting this data can be found in Appendix 9.

#### **9.4.2. TOLERANCE**

Before talking specifically about tolerance towards women, homosexuals and immigrants/foreign workers, let’s first take a look at what are considered important qualities in French, American and Romanian children. In the last place we can find “imagination”, with only 31 percent of Americans, 25 percent of the French and a little over 18 percent of the Romanians viewing this trait as important in their children. The most significant child quality for the French and the American is to be tolerant and respect other people in their societies (87 percent of respondents in France and 79 percent in the U.S. – compared to 60 percent in Romania), while for the Romanians is work ethic – 85 percent of Romanians (compared to 62 percent in both France and the United States) believe it is important for children to be taught to work hard in life. Over 50 percent of Americans and Romanians think that religious faith is a central child quality, while only 9 percent of the French agree with that point of view. Based on these answers, one would expect that levels of tolerance in France to parallel those in the U.S. than in the Romania – U.S. pairing, while in the case of religiosity, the U.S. and Romania should look more alike than the U.S. and France.

We begin our inquiry by looking at tolerance towards homosexuals and immigrants/foreign workers. When asked about what groups of individuals they would not want as neighbors, both France and Romania had higher percentage of respondents than the United States mentioning people of a different race, or who speak a different language, practice a different religion, and have AIDS, as well homosexuals and immigrants/foreign workers among the “undesirables.” For all three countries the most objectionable group as neighbors are the drug addicts, with the heavy drinkers coming in close second. While these answers might simply reflect the fact that Europeans are not used to live in as diverse neighborhoods as the Americans do, when asked about the justifiability of homosexuality, the U.S. and Romania present a fairly similar picture on intolerance. A percentage of French higher than those in Romania and the U.S. combined believes that homosexuality is always justifiable. Same scenario repeats itself when people are asked if, when jobs are scarce, domestic workers should be given priority over the immigrants.

Regarding tolerance towards women, while over 65 percent of respondents from France and the United States that men and women have equal rights in the job market, even when jobs are scarce, only 41 percent of Romanians share their views. Sexist/intolerant attitudes towards women and gender equality issues are also reflected in the views of those interviewed in Romania about women as business executives – more than half of respondents agree or strongly agree that men make better business executives and political leaders than women, compared to less than 25 percent in France and United States. Romania closes the tolerance towards women

gap when it comes to opinions on the importance of college education for boys and girls, although it still lags behind France and the United States – 80 percent of Romanians do not believe that a university education is more important for boys than for girls (compared to over 95 percent of the French and Americans). France is more culturally similar to the United States than Romania is on these topics related to tolerance towards women.

While on issues of gender equality there does not seem to be a positive relationship between cultural similarity and anti-Americanism, things change when we look at topics, such as abortion, divorce or single-parent household, in which gender and religious beliefs are closer intertwined. 62 percent of French respondents (compared to 52 percent of Americans and 48 percent of Romanians) approve of women as single parents, while over 25 percent believe that abortion and divorce are always justifiable. Only 7 percent of Americans and 4 percent of Romanians agree with this view on abortion, with only slightly higher percentages in the case of divorce. This latter observation brings to attention the importance of religiosity as an element of cultural similarity, supporting the results from the previous chapters which showed that faith was a remarkably strong predictor for levels of anti-Americanism: the more religious, the more pro-American. The next section looks at cultural similarity between Old Europe, New Europe and the United States in terms of their levels of religiosity.

### **9.4.3. RELIGIOSITY**

While officially an atheistic society for more than 50 years during Communism, Romania has been exhibiting for the last two decades something similar to a spiritual revival that makes this country from New Europe look more like the United States than secular France. For more than three in four respondents from Romania and the U.S. religion and God are very important or rather important in their lives, compared to less than half of the French. 93 percent of Romanians, 72 percent of the Americans and only 47 percent of the French consider themselves a religious person. It is also interesting to notice that while 17 percent of the French are convinced atheists, less than 5 percent of the Americans and less than one in a hundred Romanians has atheistic beliefs. This translates into higher trust in organized religions as well as more frequent church attendance in Romania and the United States, compared to France where over half of the people never attend religious services outside funerals and weddings. There is a clear faith-divide between France and Romania, and their different levels of religiosity match their different attitudes towards the United States: the more religious and more similar to the U.S., the more pro-American.

## **9.5. CONCLUSIONS**

This chapter has shown that not only are Romanians much more pro-American than the French, but Romania and France are also more culturally dissimilar than their francophone ties and six hundred years of shared history would have suggested. Table 9.5.1 summarizes the finding presented in the previous section regarding different levels of anti-Americanism in France and Romania.

**TABLE 9.5.1: ANTI-AMERICANISM IN FRANCE AND ROMANIA IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

	<i>FRANCE</i>	<i>ROMANIA</i>
<b>USA positive role in world peace</b>	15.6%	58.7%
<b>USA positive role in world economy</b>	29.2%	57.4%
<b>USA positive role in fighting world poverty</b>	10.7%	52.6%
<b>USA positive role in environment protection</b>	8.2%	56%
<b>EU foreign policy should be more independent of the USA</b>	84.9%	64.9%
<b>Europe is ahead of the USA on fighting discrimination</b>	52.1%	22.5%
<b>Quality of life in Europe is better than in the USA</b>	56.3%	25.5%

Two years after the onset of the Iraq war, the wave of anti-American feelings flowing from France failed to reach the Romanians for whom the United States is still very much a political, economic and social model worth emulating and an overall positive influence worldwide. In France, things are very different, and there are no signs of a renewed friendship between the two countries. Talking about French anti-Americanism, Pascal Bruckner explains that it will never truly disappear because it has become:

“[...] a life's work for a number of sociologists, novelists, philosophers, and artists. There is a stock of prejudices endlessly renewed and which emerge unchanged out of every crisis. The hatred for America as a nation derives from a mixture of ignorance, jealousy, and pettiness. It is usually accompanied by a pro-found nostalgia for French grandeur from the time of the Empire or Charles de Gaulle, and from resentment and worship of the past” (Bruckner and Golsan 2005, 18).

Romania and France are different on more than just their anti-Americanism levels. Those cultural ties bonding these two countries so tightly in the Interwar years were significantly weakened by fifty years of Communist rule in Romania, followed by twenty years of pro-Americanism. Table 9.5.2 summarizes the cultural similarities between Romania, France and the United States.

**TABLE 9.5.2: CULTURAL SIMILARITY – FRANCE, UNITED STATES AND ROMANIA IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

	<i>FRANCE</i>	<i>UNITED STATES</i>	<i>ROMANIA</i>
<b>Religious faith important for children</b>	8.7%	50.8%	64%
<b>Tolerance and respect for other people are important children qualities</b>	86.8%	78.7%	59.7%
<b>Religion very important in life</b>	13.0%	47.4%	58.0%
<b>God very important in life</b>	11.2%	57.8%	66.3%
<b>I am a religious person</b>	46.9%	72.1%	93.4%
<b>I never attend church services</b>	60.1%	25.6%	4.5%
<b>I have confidence in national churches</b>	46%	66.3%	88%
<b>Homosexuality is never justifiable</b>	14.8%	32.5%	73.0%
<b>Prostitution is never justifiable</b>	41.2%	43.2%	69.2%
<b>Abortion is never justifiable</b>	13.8%	25.5%	48.4%
<b>Divorce is never justifiable</b>	8.7%	5.8%	34.7%
<b>University education is more important for a boy than for a girl</b>	6.8%	7.9%	19.3%
<b>Disapprove of women as single parents</b>	26.4%	47.8%	38.2%
<b>Men make better political leaders than women do</b>	21.2%	24.7%	55%
<b>Men make better business executives than women do</b>	14.4%	16.5%	51.1%
<b>Employers should hire men instead of women when jobs are scarce</b>	18.1%	6.8%	35.2%
<b>Employers should hire domestic workers instead of immigrants when jobs are scarce</b>	42.1%	55.4%	65.1%

For as much as they dislike the United States, the French are more similar to the Americans in their views on gender equality than the Romanians are, with the exception of single motherhood issues. On other topics, such as homosexuality, abortion or the right of immigrants to jobs even in bad economies, Romania and the United States share slightly more intolerant attitudes than the French. But the issue that stands out as the single most striking difference between France on one side, and Romania and the U.S. on the other is religion. Secularism, so predominant in the French society, has failed to take roots in 21<sup>st</sup> century Romania, which could

be at least in part as a reaction to the forced atheism imposed by the Communist regime. Romania and the United States are religious, traditional societies, with conservative beliefs and mores. This particular aspect of cultural similarity has been found to be strongly correlated with levels of anti-Americanism, but the picture painted in this chapter is more complex than that. Romanians have come to see the U.S. as their strongest defense against possible trouble brewing in Moscow, while the French will never forget that “Pax Americanna” took over and effectively ended “La Belle Époque”:

France is a proud nation which regards itself as superior to all other nations in many important ways: it is usually just as negative toward other nations as it is toward the United States now. In this sense France is very much like the United States, which also regards itself as superior and a nation to which other peoples should want to come, rather than as a nation from which some of its citizens leave as emigrants (Rose 1952, 469).

The last chapter of this dissertation presents a summary of all the findings in this dissertation and opens the door for future research on anti-Americanism and cultural similarity in a divided European Union.

## CHAPTER 10 – CONCLUSIONS

Donald Rumsfeld may have been wrong about many things during his time as the Secretary of Defense for George W. Bush, but on one issue he was right. Old Europe, including countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium, is significantly more anti-American than New Europe, which includes countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary. In this project, however, I have made a number of observations that go beyond this simple conclusion. I examined factors that could be behind these different levels of anti-Americanism in Old Europe and New Europe, and one key answer that emerged was “cultural similarity.” There are, of course, other factors that impact attitudes towards the United States and Americans, such as the frequent travels to and from the U.S., a country’s trade ties with the American government, and people’s views on U.S. policies in the Middle East and towards the environment. But even when we take all these elements into account, cultural similarity still plays a significant role in why Old Europe is more anti-American than is New Europe. The United States and New Europe resemble each other more culturally than Old Europe and the U.S. do, particularly in their levels of religiosity. Secularism never took root in New Europe and the United States with the force that it has in Old Europe. Romanians and Americans go to church more often, pray more frequently, and place more importance on religion in their lives than do the French.

The second element of cultural similarity investigated in this dissertation is tolerance. There is a significant relationship between levels of anti-Americanism and tolerance towards women, immigrants/foreign workers and immigrants in Old Europe versus New Europe. New Europe and the United States are, in general, more intolerant than Old Europe. There is an exception here, however, in terms of gender equality issues. French and Americans are more likely than are Romanians to support equal rights to a job for men and women even when jobs are scarce. French and Americans are also more likely than are Romanians to view female politicians as equally qualified with their male counterparts for leadership positions. On other topics where religion tends to influence public opinion, however—such as in the cases of abortion or prostitution—Old Europeans have a more open-minded and tolerant attitude than do New Europeans and Americans. To draw a simplistic caricature outlining these findings—if you are from New Europe then you are relatively sexist, xenophobic, homophobic, religious, and pro-American relative to your Old European counterparts.

There are, of course, several avenues for advancement of this research program. For example, future work could take additional factors into account as potentially impacting levels of anti-Americanism, in terms of both cultural and non-cultural influences. Further, focusing on additional Old and New European countries, and viewing the relationship between cultural issues and public support of non-U.S. countries would help to identify the degree to which these findings are generalizable to other cases. But even without taking these additional steps, I believe that the results presented in this dissertation provide a better understanding of European anti-Americanism than was previously the case in the already extensive literature on this topic. There is a clear cultural divide in the European Union between Old Europe and New Europe that parallels their respective attitudes towards the United States and the American people.

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## APPENDIX 1

### WORLD VALUES SURVEY DATABASE – CODEBOOK

QUESTION	0	1	2	3	4	5
Important in life: Religion		Very important	Rather important	Not very important	Not at all important	
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	Not mentioned	Important				
Important child qualities: religious faith	Not mentioned	Important				
Which of the following groups you would not want as neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	Not mentioned	Mentioned				
Which of the following groups you would not want as neighbors: Homosexuals	Not mentioned	Mentioned				
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women		Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree		
Jobs scarce: Employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants		Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree		
A woman has to have children to be fulfilled	Not necessary	Needs children				

Table continued.

QUESTION	0	1	2	3	4	5
Marriage is an out-dated institution	Disagree	Agree				
Woman as a single parent	Disapprove	Approve				
Men make better political leaders than women do		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
University is more important for a boy than for a girl		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	
How much confidence do you have in Churches?		A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all	
Immigrant policy		Let anyone come	As long as jobs are available	Strict limits	Prohibit people from coming	
How often do you attend religious services (6 = Once a year, 7=Less often, 8=never, practically never)		More than once a week	Once a week	Once a month	Only on special holy days/ Christmas/ Easter	Other specific holy days
Do you consider yourself a religious person?		A religious person	Not a religious person	A convinced atheist		
Churches give answers to social problems	No	Yes				
How important is God in your life? (10 = very important)		Not at all important	2	3	4	5



Table continued.

QUESTION	0	1	2	3	4	5
Politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Religious leaders should not influence government		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Justifiable: homosexuality (10 = always justifiable)		Never justifiable	2	3	4	5
Justifiable: prostitution (10 = always justifiable)		Never justifiable	2	3	4	5
Justifiable: abortion (10 = always justifiable)		Never justifiable	2	3	4	5
Justifiable: divorce (10 = always justifiable)		Never justifiable	2	3	4	5

## APPENDIX 2

### VOICE OF THE PEOPLE – MILLENNIUM EDITION DATABASE CODEBOOK

QUESTION	1	2	3	4
How often do you attend religious services these days? (5 = once a year, 6 = less often, 7 = never, practically never)	More than once a week	Once a week	Once a month	Only on special holy days
Would you say that there exists one and only one true religion, that there is truth in many religions or that there is no essential truth in any religion?	One and only one true religion	Many true religions	No true religion	
How important is God in your life? (10 = very important)	Not at all important	2	3	4
Do you take some moments of prayer, meditation or something like that?	Yes	No		
Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs?	There is a personal God	There is some sort of spirit or life force	I don't know what to think	I don't really think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force
Education is more important for boys than for girls.	Agree	Disagree		
Both the husband and the wife should contribute to the household income?	Agree	Disagree		
On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.	Agree	Disagree		
When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women?	Agree	Disagree		
A woman needs to have children in order to be really fulfilled.	Agree	Disagree		
Sometimes when a woman says no to sex, she doesn't always mean it.	Agree	Disagree		

### APPENDIX 3

#### PEW 2002 DATABASE CODEBOOK

QUESTION	1	2	3	4	5
Is the influence of religious leaders very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in our country?	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	
Is the influence of immigrants very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad in our country?	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	
Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree	
Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree	
Our way of life needs to be protected against foreign influence?	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree	
We should restrict and control entry of people into our country more than we do now.	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree	
What kind of marriage do you think is the more satisfying way of life?	Husband provides for family, wife cares for house and kids	Both have jobs and take care of house and children			
Which one of these statements about belief in God comes closest to your opinion?	Not necessary to believe in God to have moral/good values	Necessary to believe in God to have moral/good values			
Which one of these statements about homosexuality comes closer to your opinion?	Homosexuality is a way of life society should accept	Homosexuality is a way of life society should not accept			
What is your opinion of the United States?	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	

Table continued.

<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
What is your opinion of Americans?	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	
In making international policy decisions, to what extent do you think the United States takes into account the interests of countries like our country?	Great deal	Fair amount	Not too much	Not at all	
In your opinion, do United States' policies increase the gap between rich and poor countries, lessen the gap between rich and poor countries, or do United States policies have no effect on the gap between rich and poor countries?	Increase gap between rich and poor	No effect	Lessen gap between rich and poor		
In terms of solving world problems, does the United States do too much, too little, or the right amount in helping solve world problems?	United States does too much	United States does the right amount	United States does too little	United States does nothing	
It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here, OR it's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here.	It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here	It's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here			
Outside of attending religious services, do you pray several times a day, once a day, a few times a week, once a week or less, or never?	Several times a day	Once a day	A few times a week	Once a week or less	Never
How important is religion in your life?	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	

## APPENDIX 4

### 2006 UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP, INVOLVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY SURVEY AND 2002 EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY DATABASE CODEBOOK

QUESTION	0	1	2	3	4
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish (5 = disagree strongly)		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree
How religious are you? (10 = very religious)	Not at all religious	1	2	3	4
How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions? (5 = only on special holy days, 6 = less often, 7=never)		Every day	More than once a week	Once a week	At least once a month
Qualification for immigration: good educational qualifications (10 = extremely important)	Extremely unimportant	1	2	3	4
Qualification for immigration: close family living here (10 = extremely important)	Extremely unimportant	1	2	3	4
Qualification for immigration: speak country's official language	Extremely unimportant	1	2	3	4
Qualification for immigration: Christian background (10 = extremely important)	Extremely unimportant	1	2	3	4
Qualification for immigration: be white (10 = extremely important)	Extremely unimportant	1	2	3	4
Taxes and services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less (10 = generally put in more)	Generally take out more	1	2	3	4
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (10 = cultural life enriched)	Cultural life undermined	1	2	3	4
Immigrants make country's crime problems worse or better (10 = crime problems made better)	Crime problems made worse	1	2	3	4
Better for a country if almost everyone share customs and traditions (5 = disagree strongly)		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree
Better for a country if a variety of different religions (5 = disagree strongly)		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree

## APPENDIX 5

### PEW 2007 DATABASE CODEBOOK

QUESTION	1	2	3	4
Is immigration a problem in our country?	Very big problem	A moderately big problem	A small problem	Not a problem at all
What is your opinion of the United States?	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable
What is your opinion of the Americans?	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable
The influence of religious leaders in our country is ____	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad
The influence of immigrants in our country is ____	Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad
Religion is a matter of personal faith and should be kept separate from government policy.	Completely agree	Mostly agree	Mostly disagree	Completely disagree
In making international policy decisions, do you think the U.S/ takes into account the interests of countries like our country?	Great deal	Fair amount	Not too much	Not at all
In making international policy decisions, do you think the United States take into account the interests of other countries around the world?	Great deal	Fair amount	Not too much	Not at all
What effect do U.S. policies have on the gap between rich and poor countries?	Increase gap between rich and poor	No effect	Lessen gap between rich and poor	
Which of the following phrases comes closer to your view?	It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading here	It's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here		

Table continued.

<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
Which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion about men and women as political leaders?	Men generally make better political leaders than women	In general, women and men make equally good political leaders	Women generally make better political leaders than men	
Which one of these comes closest to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?	Number 1 – It is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values	Number 2 – It is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values		
And which one of these comes closer to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?	Number 1 – Homosexuality is a way of life that should be accepted by society	Number 2 – Homosexuality is a way of life that should not be accepted by society		
Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray? (5 = never)	Several times a day	Once a day	A few times a week	Once a week or less
How important is religion in your life?	Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important
And which comes closer to describing your view?	The United States promotes democracy wherever it can	The United States promotes democracy mostly where it serves its interests		

## APPENDIX 6

### EUROBAROMETER 62 – 2004 DATABASE CODEBOOK

QUESTION	1	2	3
Should the EU foreign policy be more independent of the USA?	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	
USA role in peace in the world	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
USA role in fighting terrorism	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
USA role in economic growth worldwide	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
USA role in fighting poverty worldwide	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
USA role in environment protection	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in peace in the world	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in fighting terrorism	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in economic growth worldwide	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in fighting poverty worldwide	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in environment protection	Positive	Neither nor	Negative



## APPENDIX 7

### EUROBAROMETER 63 – 2005 DATABASE CODEBOOK

QUESTION	1	2	3
EU foreign policy more independent of the United States	Tend to agree	Don't know	Tend to disagree
USA role in peace in the world	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
USA role in fighting terrorism	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
USA role in economic growth worldwide	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
USA role in fighting poverty worldwide	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
USA role in environment protection	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in peace in the world	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in fighting terrorism	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in economic growth worldwide	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in fighting poverty worldwide	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU role in environment protection	Positive	Neither nor	Negative
EU compared to the U.S. – life quality (4 = definitely less good)	Much better	Somewhat better	Somewhat less good
Europe compared to the U.S. – scientific research	Europe ahead of the United States	At the same level	Europe behind the United States
Europe compared to the U.S. – medical research	Europe ahead of the United States	At the same level	Europe behind the United States

Table continued.

<b>QUESTION</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Europe compared to the U.S. – environment protection	Europe ahead of the United States	At the same level	Europe behind the United States
Europe compared to the U.S. – innovation technology	Europe ahead of the United States	At the same level	Europe behind the United States
Europe compared to the U.S. – healthcare system	Europe ahead of the United States	At the same level	Europe behind the United States
Europe compared to the U.S. – education	Europe ahead of the United States	At the same level	Europe behind the United States
Europe compared to the U.S. – fighting social disparities	Europe ahead of the United States	At the same level	Europe behind the United States
Europe compared to the U.S. – fighting unemployment	Europe ahead of the United States	At the same level	Europe behind the United States
Europe compared to the U.S. – fighting discrimination	Europe ahead of the United States	At the same level	Europe behind the United States

## APPENDIX 8

**TABLE SHOWING REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PEW 2007 – FORM B DATABASE,  
WITHOUT THE “OPINIONS OF GEORGE W. BUSH” INDEPENDENT VARIABLE**

**Dependent Variable: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable,  
somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?**

				t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.351	.171		13.772	.000
Free market	.148	.015	.157	10.133	.000
Protecting the environment.	-.023	.016	-.024	-1.490	.136
Church and State	-.048	.018	-.041	-2.655	.008
Stricter immigration	.030	.013	.035	2.279	.023
Children education	.071	.080	.014	.888	.375
Global warming	-.080	.019	-.066	-4.156	.000
Old Europe vs. New Europe	-.170	.026	-.100	-6.501	.000

## APPENDIX 9

### CHARTS SHOWING LEVELS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN FRANCE AND ROMANIA

(Chapter 9, section 9.4)

Chart 1 – USA role in world peace




Chart 2 – USA role in economic growth worldwide




Chart 3: USA role in fighting poverty worldwide




Chart 4: USA role in protecting the environment




Chart 5: Support for an EU foreign policy more independent of the USA




Chart 6: Europe compared to the USA on fighting discrimination





Chart 7: Europe compared to the USA on overall quality of life



## APPENDIX 10

### CHARTS SHOWING LEVELS OF TOLRANCE AND RELIGIOSITY IN FRANCE, ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES

(Chapter 9, section 9.4)

Chart1: Important child qualities






Chart 2: People that you wouldn't want as neighbors




Chart 3: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women




Chart 4: When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants




Chart 5: Men make better business executives than women do




Chart 6: Men make better political leaders than women do




Chart 7: Women as single parents




Chart 8: Education for boys and girls




Chart 9: Homosexuality – justifiable?




Chart 10: Prostitution – justifiable?




Chart 11: Abortion – justifiable?




Chart 12: Divorce – justifiable?




Chart 13: How important is religion in your life?




Chart 14: How important in God in your life?




Chart 15: Do you consider yourself a religious person?






Chart 16: How often do you attend religious services?





Chart 17: How much confidence do you have in churches?



## APPENDIX 11


### TABLE SHOWING CHANGES IN “FAVORABLE” AND “SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE” OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AS MEASURED BY THE PEW 2002 AND PEW 2007 SURVEYS

**Question: Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?**

<b>Country</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2007</b>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>73.8%</b>	<b>55.8%</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>70.2%</b>	<b>47.3%</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>77.4%</b>	<b>67%</b>
<b>Slovak Republic</b>	<b>65.8%</b>	<b>43.2%</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>70.6%</b>	<b>39.1%</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>70.6%</b>	<b>31.5%</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>73.8%</b>	<b>58.4%</b>
<b>Great Britain</b>	<b>81.8%</b>	<b>82%</b>

## APPENDIX 12

**CHART SHOWING CHANGES IN “FAVORABLE” AND “SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE” OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AS MEASURED BY THE PEW 2002 AND PEW 2007 SURVEYS**



## VITA

Madalina Cristina Hanes was born in 1977 in Ploiesti, Romania. After graduating from the “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” high-school, she was admitted to the University of Bucharest’s Political Science Department, from which she graduated in 2000, after spending a year studying abroad in Italy, at the “La Sapienza” University in Rome, thanks to an Erasmus scholarship granted by the European Union. In 2001, Madalina applied and was accepted into the Masters of Arts program at Indiana State University in Terre Haute, Indiana. In 2003, upon receiving her master’s degree from Indiana State University, Madalina (Maddie) Hanes enrolled in the doctoral program at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. During the next eight years, Madalina met her future husband, Sam Robison and got married (the couple welcomed their wonderful baby girl Sophia in 2010), started a full-time job with the Graduate School’s Admissions Office in July 2008, and in October 2011, a week after successfully defending her dissertation, received her American citizenship.