Probing the finance gap theory: does gender affect campaign contributions?

Rhonda Wrzenski

Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation

https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/1471

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
PROBING THE FINANCE GAP THEORY:
DOES GENDER AFFECT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS?

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
Requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by
Rhonda Louise Wrzenski
B.A., Hastings College, 2003
M.A., Louisiana State University, 2005
August 2010
DEDICATION

To My Mother:

Who always believed in the power of an education and who you gave me a reason to look up after a storm.

To My Father:

Who taught me the value of hard work, persistence, and making your dreams come true.

To My Sister:

Who was a source of support and encouragement whenever I needed someone to lean on.

To My Husband:

For believing in me even when I did not.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I wish to express my great appreciation to Dr. Robert Hogan for the countless hours that he spent mentoring me throughout graduate school. His training helped me to understand, appreciate, and develop a great love of state legislatures, state politics, and political parties and interest groups. His advice and painstaking guidance carried me through many challenges as I completed the dissertation and were invaluable in helping me finish. I am also grateful that I had the opportunity to work with him over the years as a teaching and research assistant. These experiences helped me become a better researcher, data manager, teacher, presenter, and scholar. I will never forget the effort that went into mentoring me and I will always appreciate his assistance while I was on the job market. I look forward to our continued collaboration on research projects in the future.

Next, I wish to thank Dr. James Garand for believing in me even before I arrived on campus. It was because of his kindness and responsiveness that I chose to attend Louisiana State University and I’m grateful I had the opportunity to learn from him over the years. He has been a wonderful mentor and source of support throughout my graduate program. His encouragement, time and advice have been invaluable to me as my dissertation co-chair, major professor, and job market advisor. I’ve learned so much about the institution of Congress and about conducting research from him and I look forward to working together in the future.

I also wish to express my thanks to the other members of my dissertation committee: Dr. Kathleen Bratton, Dr. William Clark, Dr. Margherita Zanasi and Dr. Kirby Goidel. I appreciate your feedback and the time each of you took to serve on my committee. In addition, I wish to express an additional thank you to Kathleen for her
advice and guidance while I was on the job market and for everything she taught me
about women and politics and American politics generally.

Finally, I wish to thank my family and husband for their unfailing support. This
achievement is bittersweet for me because it is not one that I could share with my parents
during their lifetime. Nonetheless, I am grateful for the principles they instilled in me
that helped me make it through the educational process. Their belief in hard work,
gratitude, faith, and fortitude is what kept me going when times got tough. I am also
grateful to my father for his financial assistance during my undergraduate education as I
would not be where I am today without it. I also want to thank my sister for all the times
she was there when I needed someone to share in my triumphs or to console me when I
was frustrated or felt defeated. She is as much my friend as she is my sister. Finally, I
wish to thank my husband. He has been there for me every step of the way from the
lowest of lows to the highest of highs. He has soothed my fears, wiped away my tears,
provided endless hugs and made it possible for me to take the time and space I needed to
complete my education and dissertation. I know this required many sacrifices on his part
but through it all he has been my greatest champion.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION..............................................................................................................ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................................iii

LIST OF TABLES.........................................................................................................viii

LIST OF FIGURES.......................................................................................................xi

ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................xii

CHAPTER 1: THE PUZZLE OF AGGREGATE FINANCIAL PARITY AND WOMEN’S UNDER-REPRESENTATION.................................................................1
   Theoretical Explanations for Women’s Under-Representation...............................8
   The Role of Campaign Finance in Women’s Under-Representation.......................17
   Outline of the Dissertation......................................................................................24

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTOR AND CANDIDATE BEHAVIOR .................................................................26
   Total Campaign Contributions .............................................................................27
   Donations from the Party ......................................................................................28
   Donations from Business and Labor Groups .........................................................34
   Donations from Ideological Groups ......................................................................39
   Campaign Self-Finance .........................................................................................42
   Examining the Size of Campaign Donations .........................................................45

CHAPTER 3: MODELING THE FUNDING LANDSCAPE OF STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS.............................................................................................48
   Modeling the Contribution Patterns of Donors to Male and Female Candidates ........50
   Dependent Variables ............................................................................................50
   Independent Variables .........................................................................................51
       Candidate-Level Factors ..................................................................................51
       District-Level Factors ....................................................................................59
       State-Level Factors .........................................................................................61
   Description of the Data and Selection Criteria ....................................................70

CHAPTER 4: EXAMINING TOTAL CAMPAIGN RECEIPTS........................................75
   Previous Research on Total Campaign Contributions ..........................................75
   Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total Campaign Receipts...79
   Discussion ...........................................................................................................82
   Variables and Hypotheses ....................................................................................83
       Candidate-Level Factors ..................................................................................83
       District-Level Factors ....................................................................................84
       State-Level Factors .........................................................................................85
Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total
Campaign Receipts.................................................................86
Discussion.............................................................................95

CHAPTER 5: EXAMINING PARTY DONATIONS.............................97
Previous Research on Party Contributions..................................97
Hypotheses Concerning Gender’s Relationship to Party Contributions.............99
Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative
Party Receipts........................................................................101
Discussion.............................................................................111
Control Variables and Hypotheses..............................................113
  Candidate-Level Factors......................................................113
  District-Level Factors........................................................114
  State-Level Factors.............................................................114
Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative
Total Party Receipts..................................................................115
Discussion.............................................................................115

CHAPTER 6: EXAMINING CORPORATE, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGICAL
INTEREST GROUP CONTRIBUTIONS..........................................125
Previous Research on Interest Group Contributions...........................125
Hypotheses Concerning Gender’s Relationship to Interest
Group Contributions...................................................................127
Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative
Interest Group Receipts................................................................130
  Business and Labor Unions..................................................130
  Ideological Interest Groups..................................................133
Discussion.............................................................................135
Control Variables and Hypotheses..............................................135
  Candidate-Level Factors......................................................136
  District-Level Factors........................................................137
  State-Level Factors.............................................................137
Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative
Total Business and Labor Union Receipts...................................138
  Business Donations.............................................................138
  Labor Donations.................................................................146
Discussion.............................................................................153
Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Economic
Interest Group Sectors and Ideological Interest Groups.........................155
Discussion.............................................................................159
Conclusion...............................................................................160

CHAPTER 7: EXAMINING CAMPAIGN SELF-FINANCE AND
CONTRIBUTION SIZE..............................................................161
Previous Research on Campaign Self-Finance and Contribution Size...........162
Hypotheses Concerning Gender’s Relationship to Campaign
Self-Finance and Contribution Size..............................................164
LIST OF TABLES

1.1 Percentage of Female State Legislators in Lower Chambers in 2000 and 2010.................................................................2

1.2 Number and Percentage of Women by Type of Race and State..............5

1.3 Number of Women Running and Elected in 2000 by State......................7

3.1 Level of Legislative Professionalism Categorized by States in the Analysis.....63

3.2 Campaign Finance Law Stringency Categorized by States in the Analysis......64

3.3 Interest Group Strength Categorized by States in the Analysis................65

3.4 Term Limits in Effect Categorized by States in the Analysis..................66

3.5 Hypothesized Variable Directions for my Full Model.............................69

4.1 Total Campaign Receipts by Gender and State....................................79

4.2 Total Campaign Receipts per Eligible Voter by Gender and State.............81

4.3 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Fundraising by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients).................................86

4.4 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Fundraising by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients).........................................................90

4.5 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Fundraising by Candidates Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized Coefficients)...............93

5.1 Mean Party Committee Receipts by Party Affiliation, Gender and State.................................103

5.2 Mean Party Receipts from Leadership PACs, Candidate Committees and Party Officials, Candidates and Former Members by Party Affiliation, Gender and State.........................................................106

5.3 Total Party Receipts per Eligible Voter by Party Affiliation, Gender and State.................................................................110

5.4 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Party Fundraising by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients).................................117

5.5 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Party Fundraising by Candidates Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized Coefficients).........121
6.1 Total Business and Labor Receipts by Gender...............................132
6.2 Total Liberal and Conservative Ideological Interest Group Receipts by Gender.................................................................134
6.3 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Business Fundraising by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients).................................139
6.4 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Business Fundraising by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)........................................141
6.5 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Business Fundraising by Candidates Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized Coefficients)......................145
6.6 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Labor Fundraising by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)..............................................147
6.7 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Labor Fundraising by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)...........................................150
6.8 Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Labor Fundraising by Candidates Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized Coefficients)......................152
6.9 Effects of Gender on Funding Raised From Various Economic Sectors and Ideological Organizations.................................................................157
7.1 Total Amount Self-Financed by Gender.......................................................166
7.2 Percentage of Campaign Receipts from Small, Medium, and Large Donations by State.................................................................168
7.3 Percentage of Campaign Receipts from Small Donations by Gender and State ($200 or less).............................................................170
7.4 Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Self-Financed by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)........................................175
7.5 Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Self-Financed by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)...........................................178
7.6 Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Rose from Small Donations by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)......................181
7.7 Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Rose from Small Donations by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)………………………………………………………185

7.8 Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Rose from Small Donations by Candidates Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized Coefficients)………………………………………………………………187

8.1 Effect of Gender on the Amount and Size of Contributions………………193

8.2 Effect of State-Level Factors on the Amount and Size of Contributions………196
LIST OF FIGURES

5.1 Median Party Committee Receipts by Party and Gender…………………………105

5.2 Median Leadership PAC, Candidate Committee, and Individual
Party Donor Receipts by Party and Gender……………………………………109
ABSTRACT

In our field, scholarly literature contends that women win a similar percentage of the vote and raise a similar amount of money as their male opponents when they campaign (Newman 1994; Burrell 1994; Seltzer et al. 1997; Dolan 2006; Darcy et al. 1994; Wilhite and Theilmann 1986; Burrell 1985; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986; Welch et al. 1985). However, women are still underrepresented at all levels of government and this may be a function of biases in the campaign finance network that have gone largely undetected. Differences may be more readily apparent at the sub-national level and among particular classes of donors. Using descriptive and OLS regression analysis, I examine the differences between male and female state legislative candidates in total campaign receipts from various financiers, but more importantly I examine the subcategories of contributions from political parties, businesses, labor unions, and ideological interest groups. Although there may be few differences between male and female candidates in total contributions, these differences may be expressed among particular types of donors. In addition, I analyze campaign contribution size and campaign self-finance in order to determine whether gender also factors into these aspects of the campaign process. Using data from 24 state legislatures and two electoral cycles (1997-1998 and 1999-2000) I explore these questions among incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates in both contested and uncontested races.

After conducting my analysis, I find gender is often a statistically significant predictor of the total amount of contributions received, as well as the percentage contributed to one’s own campaign, and the percentage received from small donors. However, I find that candidate status plays a mediating role in shaping campaign receipts. In short, in many cases, female incumbents raise less but female open seat contestants
raise more. Also, I find that women tend to raise a larger portion of their campaign contributions from donors contributing $200 or less but that they also tend to contribute less to their own campaigns. In addition to gender effects, I also find that a host of other factors play a role in determining how much a candidate raises and contributes.
American politics is at once a story of equality and inequality. The Nineteenth Amendment sparked the expansion of our electorate and gave previously disenfranchised women the right to vote. Along with practicing the right to vote, women have become far more active in other types of political activity, such as writing their members of Congress, signing a petition, or running for office (Conway 2001).

In 1994, the National Women’s Political Caucus examined the success rates of male and female candidates competing in general elections for all major political offices (state house, state senate, U.S. House, U.S. Senate and the governorship) over a six-year period (1986 to 1992) (Newman 1994). The resulting report famously concluded that gender\textsuperscript{1} did not hamper a woman’s chances of being successful and that “when women run, women win” (Newman, 1994). Subsequent studies have reached the same conclusion (Burrell 1994; Seltzer et al. 1997; Dolan 2006; Darcy et al. 1994). Yet, despite these achievements, massive inequalities still exist. Women remain descriptively underrepresented at both the state and federal level.

In the 111\textsuperscript{th} congressional session, women make up approximately 18\% of the U.S. House of Representatives and approximately 17\% of the U.S. Senate (“Women Representatives” 2009). Although these numbers represent record highs in both bodies according to the Center for American Women and Politics (2008), they are nowhere near demographic parity. The same is true at the sub-national level, where few state legislatures come close to having equal numbers of women and men (Sanchez 2005).

\textsuperscript{1} Although sex is a biological characteristic and gender is a social construct I choose to use gender throughout the document in place of sex. I argue this term better represents the context of this dissertation since I am exploring how socially constructed roles and characteristics affect behavior on the part of the donor and candidate.
Table 1.1 illustrates the level of female representation in each of the lower state houses across all 50 states. The states that I include in my latter analysis chapters are in bold. The table makes a comparison of the level of representation in 2000 (one of the electoral periods under examination here) and, again, in 2010 (the most recent electoral period). In addition, the table shows the percentage change in representation between the two time periods and also provides information on the level of professionalism across all 50 states. In this manner, it should be apparent that my sample of 24 states is representative of many of these different contexts.

Table 1.1: Percentage of Female State Legislators in Lower Chambers in 2000 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>2000 % of Women in State House</th>
<th>2010 % of Women in State House</th>
<th>% Difference</th>
<th>Level of Professionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pennsylvania</strong></td>
<td><strong>12%</strong></td>
<td><strong>13%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>Professional</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tennessee</strong></td>
<td><strong>17%</strong></td>
<td><strong>16%</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1%</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hybrid</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska²</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wisconsin</strong></td>
<td><strong>20%</strong></td>
<td><strong>22%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>Professional</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² Nebraska is a unicameral legislature and the percentage denotes the percentage of women in this chamber.
Table 1.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>2000 % of Women in State House</th>
<th>2010 % of Women in State House</th>
<th>% Difference</th>
<th>Level of Professionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Hybrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colorado</strong></td>
<td><strong>34%</strong></td>
<td><strong>38%</strong></td>
<td><strong>4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hybrid</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23%</strong></td>
<td><strong>25%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table demonstrates that there is a large amount of variation across the states in terms of the percentage of women in the lower state house. In both time periods, women make up at least eight percent of the legislature in every state but never attain more than 42 percent of the total seats. The lowest levels of representation can be found in Alabama, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, where the
percentage of women in the legislature does not rise above 15% in either time period. On the other hand, in Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Vermont and Washington, the percentage of women in the legislature does not fall below 30% in either time period. However, it is important to keep in mind the number of women exceed one-third (or 33%) of the legislature in only nine states. Comparing the time periods one can see that the percentage of women increases in 29 states while it decreases in 17 states.

The greatest gains in female representation have taken place in Mississippi, North Carolina, New Jersey, and Hawaii where women have increased their share of seats in the legislature by more then 10% over the last 10 years. On the other hand, the level of female representation has declined the most in Arizona, Nevada, Washington, Oregon and Louisiana. The largest decline is in Arizona where a woman’s share of legislative seats was reduced by 14%. When female representation dips below the national average, it may be indicative of an unfriendly electoral environment where women are less likely to be recruited, to receive positive news coverage, or to be as politically interested and ambitious. As such, this may have repercussions for their ability to raise money and to run a competitive campaign.

When women compete for office in states where representation levels are low, they may be especially strategic about when they decide to throw their hat in the ring. Darcy et al. (1994), Fulton et al. (2006) and Palmer and Simon (2001) argue that women are less likely to run as sacrificial lambs and more likely to enter a race as an open seat contestant, as a challenger against a weak incumbent, or when partisan tides are most favorable. In this manner, their chances of winning should be increased as they can compete on a more level playing field. One important research question is whether
women tend to be more strategic about when they run. In Table 1.2 I attempt to answer this question by examining the number and percentage of women who compete as incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates in contested races across each state in my analysis. The percentages represent the number of women who constitute a particular category compared to the number of men. So, for instance, in Alaska, there are seven female incumbents and 28 male incumbents, resulting in women making up 20% of all contested incumbents.

**Table 1.2: Number and Percentage of Women by Type of Race and State**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Challenger</th>
<th>Open Seat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are a number of things that can be surmised from this table. First, women do appear to be acting strategically, at least in one sense. In looking at the number of
women in open seat races, one can see that the highest numbers of entry correspond to the states that have enacted term limits (California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Ohio and Oregon). In running a difference of means test between female open seat candidates in term limited and non term limited states, I find that the mean difference between these groups is statistically significant ($t=2.67$). Thus, it appears that women are taking advantage of these opportunities and contesting at higher rates. They may assume that various electoral obstacles will be less pronounced when they can avoid running against a strong incumbent. Second, the table illustrates that women constitute similar levels across the three categories of candidates. Some notable exceptions to this are Alaska, Georgia and Pennsylvania, where the percentage of challengers who are women is more than double the percentage of incumbents who are women. Given that more women are located in these pipeline races, one might expect the number of women legislators to increase. On the other hand, one can see that in Texas, women comprise a much higher percentage of the incumbents than challengers. While this means that women in Texas run from a position of strength given all the advantages that incumbents enjoy, it also means that the pipeline for future women officeholders is not as full. Third, although the number of women in open seat races is not as high as those running as challengers or incumbents, they do make up the largest percentage of women competing as compared to men in any category. This suggests that women are indeed running in elections where their opportunities for success are higher (Smith and Fox 2001; Gaddie and Bullock 1997; Burrell 1994).

Although it is important to know the distribution of women across types of races, it is also useful to get a sense of how successful women are when they run. According to a report by the National Women’s Political Caucus, women win when they run. This
report reached this conclusion after examining federal and state elections between 1986 and 1992. But, is this assessment still accurate in 2000? In Table 1.3, I present analysis that shows the total number of women who ran during the 1999-2000 electoral cycle, as well as the number of women who were elected in 2000. The table is sorted by the percentage of women who were elected.

Table 1.3: Number of Women Running and Elected in 2000 by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number Elected in 2000</th>
<th>Number Ran in 2000</th>
<th>Percentage Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearly, across each state house under analysis, women run at higher rates than they are elected. However, in all but six states, women are more likely to win than to lose when they run and over all they average a 58% rate of success. In particular, women
tend to be most successful in getting elected in Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Texas, while they face the most difficulty in Alaska, California, Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania.

Now that we have a better sense of the level of women’s representation, how that level has changed over time, and where women tend to concentrate their electoral energy, its time to switch gears and examine the theoretical underpinnings of women’s underrepresentation. In other words, why do not women run for office at the same rate as men do and why has the percentage of women in state legislative office reached a plateau in recent years?

**Theoretical Explanations for Women’s Under-Representation**

Previous research points to a number of explanations for why women are under-represented within the political establishment. First, scholars point to sociological theories, arguing that women were often kept from gaining the skills, education and experience necessary to pursue office until the passage of Title VII in 1964 and the 1972 Higher Education Amendments (Conway 2001). Today, women have more access to the educational and occupational paths necessary to be successful and are more likely to have a career outside of the home; however, women are still outnumbered in the types of professions that normally serve as a conduit to office (Clark 1994; Darcy et al. 1994). In addition, many cultural stereotypes and social norms still persist in our society. Contemporary women are even now more likely to be the primary caregiver for their children and to carry the burden of domestic responsibilities (Robinson and Godbey 1999; Dubeck 1976; Gertzog 1979; Welch 1978; Dodson 1997; Elder 2004).

In a national survey of potential male and female candidates conducted by Fox and Lawless (2004b) the authors find, “Women who live with a spouse or partner are
nine times more likely than men to be responsible for more of the household tasks; the numbers are similar for childcare arrangements” (p. 6). They conclude that women who are primarily responsible for household tasks are 15% less likely to consider a bid than those who rely on their partner to do the majority of the household workload (Fox and Lawless 2004b). These demands, coupled with the demands of the workplace, may make it far more difficult for women to run and to receive the support of their families when they are pondering a bid for office. It may also make it more difficult for women with children to receive support from voters and the media because the general impression is that these candidates should make their family their main concern. As a result, women with children may postpone a bid for office at least until they are older (Moncrief et al. 2001; Darcy et al. 1994).

Doing differently could open female candidates up to outside criticism, especially if their children are young or have special needs. A case in point: when Sarah Palin ran for the office of Vice-President as the Republican nominee in 2008 she was frequently criticized for doing so because of her responsibility as a mother to her five children. The same criticism was only infrequently levied on President Barack Obama despite his having two young children of his own. This has resulted in some critics arguing that there is a double standard in the media and in society (Estrich 2008).

Women may also face discouragement in running for office on a variety of other fronts or for reasons beyond familial responsibility. Although studies have found that similarly situated men and women are as likely to be successful when they run for office, they have not found that women and men vote for female candidates at the same rate (Burrell 1994; Seltzer et al. 1997; and Dolan 2006). For instance, an October 2007 press release from the University of Iowa described the poll results for the leading Democratic
candidates in the 2008 election. Hillary Clinton had the highest projected vote percentage among women (33% to Obama’s’ 26.5% and Edwards’s 16.8%) while she was the furthest behind among men (at 22.5% compared to Edwards’s 25% and Obama’s’ 26.7%). Since women are more likely to value descriptive representation and to identify ideologically with other women (or to share feminist attitudes or policy beliefs), it is not surprising that women are more accepting or approving of female candidates, at least some of the time (Rosenthal, 1995a; Dolan 2006). However, like all voters, women also consider other factors (incumbency, party affiliation, etc.) when choosing a candidate and these may not always put women out on top (Dolan 2006). In primary elections, where party is not an available cue, gender may affect voters as they make assumptions about candidate issue positions, traits, and viability (Butler 2006; Koch 2000; McDermott 1997; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Brown et al. 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Although this could potentially benefit women, Butler (2006) finds that women must actually “be of higher quality” to be successful in the primary (p. 14).

Certainly, there is a willingness by both sexes to vote for a qualified female candidate. However, some scholars have demonstrated that, for some voters, this stated willingness to support women candidates may reflect social desirability more than a willingness to vote for women candidates.

According to a Northern Illinois University press release, in 2006 a team of political scientists at NIU gave a baseline group of respondents a list of four statements and asked them how many made them “angry or upset” (NIU Office of Public Affairs, 2007). Then, a fifth statement, “a woman serving as president” was added to the list and given to the test group (NIU Office of Public Affairs 2007). With this addition, the
number of angry or upset responses jumped to 26 percent. Perhaps most troubling, researchers didn’t find education or gender had any effect on the outcome.

Fox and Smith (1998) also find evidence of voter bias in their study of college students in California and Wyoming. They find that students consistently tend to favor hypothetical male candidates in Wyoming by a margin of 9.5% to 12.4% and that they also give individual male candidates higher thermometer ratings. Neither of these findings occurred among the California students, which points to the possibility of regional or cultural based bias. This should not be surprising given the findings that women tend to be more successful in certain political contexts (Hogan 2001a; Darcy et al. 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Rule 1990; Squire 1992).

In addition, Fox and Smith (1998) found that students give socially desirable responses when asked “If your party nominated a woman for president, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job?” (p. 409). The authors speculate that bias may not appear in some studies because voters are not aware of their own biases, or because candidates respond differently “when asked about women candidates in the abstract (e.g., a qualified woman) than when asked about them in concrete detail (e.g., Carol White, who believes….)” (p. 409).

Anzia and Berry (2009) agree that the selection process may be different for male and female candidates. The authors argue that women must be “the most talented, hardest working…. most qualified, politically ambitious females to emerge as candidates” as a function of voter bias, sex discrimination, and underestimating campaign qualifications (Anzia and Berry, 2009, p. 1). To test for this possibility, the authors examine the performance rates of female officeholders. They find that congresswomen
sponsor legislation at higher rates, garner more co-sponsors and acquire more federal spending for their districts as compared to congressmen (Anzia and Berry, 2009).

Voter bias is not the only electoral hurdle that women may face. Women may also receive differential treatment from the media. Studies indicate that women tend to receive less coverage and more unflattering coverage of their campaign when compared to male candidates. Kahn (1994) conducts a content analysis of newspaper coverage in 48 states over a six-year period in the 1980s. She finds that women receive less total coverage, less issue coverage and more unflattering coverage about their chances of victory (Kahn, 1994). In particular, the author finds that the news media is more likely to discuss the lack of financial resources for female candidates of all types when compared to male candidates (Kahn 1996).

The media has also been charged with providing disparate coverage that reinforces unflattering or traditional sexual stereotypes. Kahn (1996) finds that the media tends to ascribe more feminine traits to female candidates and more masculine traits to male candidates despite the fact that women often try to emphasize more masculine traits in their campaign communications. In addition, Kahn (1996) argues that the media tends to spend less time focusing on “feminine” issues (i.e. education, health care, poverty, women’s rights, etc.) in their coverage (Kahn, 1996, p. 94). Instead, viewers and readers are offered more personal coverage of women candidates. Everything from clothing and hairstyle choices to personality traits are more likely to be discussed for women than men (Bystrom et al. 2004).

Since many individuals have never met their representative and are even less familiar with their challenger, they are more likely to base their candidate presumptions on the information they receive from the print and broadcast media (Kahn, 1994).
Consequently, if a candidate receives unfavorable coverage or not enough coverage to appear viable, voters may be unwilling to cast a ballot for them.

Media personalities may also express their dislike of particular female politicians in a more direct and straightforward way. This type of disdain is less concealed and easier for the average viewer to detect. For example, when Hillary Clinton ran for president in 2008, she faced many negative and gender-specific comments from reporters in the news media. Chris Matthews, an MSNBC host, who attributed her success to her husband’s infidelity, referred to Clinton as a “she-devil” (Seelye and Bosman, 2008). Glenn Beck called Clinton, “a stereotypical bitch” while MSNBC host Tucker Carlson, said, “[T]here's just something about [Hillary Clinton] that feels castrating, overbearing, and scary.” Carlson is also quoted as saying, “When she comes on television, I involuntarily cross my legs.” (Seelye and Bosman 2008; “NOW’s Media Hall of Shame,” 2008, p. 1). But, criticism of Hillary Clinton wasn’t limited to cable and radio. Other journalists went after more personal characteristics. For instance, an entire Washington Post article was devoted to the subject of her cleavage baring attire (Givhan 2007).

One could argue that these examples point to the presence of sexism in modern day political campaigns and serve as another example of why women may not pursue office as frequently as men. With repeated exposure to such high-profile remarks and with little backlash against them, women of all ages may feel discouraged from running or may feel a general sense of being unwelcome in the world of politics. Although women may be more successful in their bids for less visible offices, clearly the possibility of voter hostility and prejudice are still factors each woman must consider.

Discouragement is not only possible at the mass level but may also be a problem among political, economic, and party elites. The idea that women have faced challenges
on the road to entering politics is not new. In 1955, French sociologist, Maurice Duverger proposed the “male conspiracy” argument (Duverger 1955). This was a theory that tried to explain women’s non-participation in political affairs. It argued that women were being excluded from power by elites who were focused on preserving their own hegemony (Darcy et al. 1994). Since then, a number of authors have found that women face a tougher time getting the nomination of the party or are discouraged from running (Werner 1968; Rule 1981; Fox and Lawless 2004; Carroll 1994). Others have argued that women are more likely to be put up as “sacrificial lambs,” running in races where their chances of success are dismal (Seligman 1961; Carroll 1994). Scholars have even argued that women may face a tougher time acquiring the financial support necessary to run a successful campaign (Werne 1968; Faucheux and Herrnson 1999).

There could be a number of reasons for these responses. Sanbonmatsu (2005, 2006) has found that some party leaders are skeptical about the ability of women to get elected. This skepticism may not always be erroneously placed given the historically high reelection rates of incumbents, and the likelihood that women will not be running from that advantaged position (Welch et al. 1985). As a result, parties and other donors may shy away from encouraging women either verbally or financially to run for office. In addition, men are more likely to hold coveted leadership positions in legislatures where inter-candidate transfers are allowed between leaders and candidates, and women may be overlooked (Thompson et al. 1998).

Besides the theories above, Fox and Lawless (2004a, 2004b, 2010) argue that women simply have less political ambition. They believe this dearth of ambition is a function of two primary factors. First, they find that women receive less encouragement to run from political elites like party leaders, elected officials and political activists. This
is problematic because candidates are twice as likely to consider a bid for office if they have been recruited by influential elites. Second, they find that women believe they are less qualified to run. This belief is especially damaging because women are more likely than men to base their decision to run off of these personal appraisals. These findings are based on responses from the Citizen Political Ambition Study, a national survey of individuals whose occupational employment matches that of most officeholders.

Sanbonmatsu (2006) also finds support for Fox and Lawless’ (2004b) argument in several interviews with state representatives, senators, and party leaders. The idea that women lack political ambition, or at least feel less qualified, is echoed most directly by Senator Jennifer Veiga from CO:

Men are much more willing to jump into it than women. You need to push women a lot harder to do it, and for whatever reason, they feel like they’re not as qualified or they’re not as ready. I don’t know who’s sending them that message necessarily, but it certainly seems to be one that’s fairly universal from the folks I’ve talked to (Sanbonmatsu, 2006, p. 126).

Elder (2004) also finds gender differences in ambition among college and high school students in New York. She surveys four different age cohorts (i.e., junior high students, high school students, college students and a sample of registered voters). She finds that only female junior high students are more likely to have considered running for office, to claim they would like to be president someday, to believe a political career would be desirable and to be politically interested (Elder 2004).

But, women do not just trail behind men on measures of ambition; they also suffer from a general lack of confidence. Elder (2004) finds that, “college and high school women were significantly less likely then their male counterparts to think that they would win if they put together a good campaign” (p. 40). The author also finds that high school women, college women, and adult women are less likely to respond positively when
asked whether they are “knowledgeable enough to be good politicians” (p. 40). These findings are especially troubling because they point to gendered beliefs and stereotypes persisting even among younger cohorts.

Finally, social scientists recognize that politicians are often strategic about when they run for office (Black 1972; Brace 1984; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Rohde 1979; Stone et al. 2004). Women may be especially strategic about whether and when to run for office (Fulton et al. 2006; Palmer and Simon 2001). If women feel less confident in their qualifications, their ability to get elected, and their ability to compete financially, then they may attempt to offset these perceived disadvantages by opting into a race they feel they have a better chance of winning (Fox and Lawless 2004a; Fox and Lawless 2004b; Elder 2004; Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006). In other words, women may follow a strategy whereby they wait to run until they can compete in an open seat election, in races where the incumbent is vulnerable or weak, and/or when partisan tides are running in their favor (Fulton et al. 2006; Palmer and Simon 2001). Palmer and Simon (2001) find evidence that this is exactly what happened in 1992 when women gained seats in record numbers. Their success was prompted by the unusually high number of open seats, which were a result of the recent redistricting process and the banking scandal in the United State House of Representatives. Although this strategic behavior could mean more women will be successful when they do run, it comes at the cost of women contesting fewer races overall, and thereby hurting their total legislative representation.

Women may even wait to run until they can compete against a female incumbent (Palmer and Simon 2005). The authors argue that a successful female incumbent provides a ‘strategic signal’ to other female candidates that, “the woman was able to
neutralize the stereotypes or make them work to her advantage” (Palmer and Simon, 2005, p. 47). This leads to increased competition for female incumbents, as they experience more contested races, especially in the primary. This heightened competition is likely to offset the electoral advantages that often come with incumbency.

As a result, in spite of the parity that exists between male and female candidates in terms of electoral outcomes, female incumbents face a more rigorous electoral environment and incur higher ‘costs’ in achieving reelection. Male and female incumbents may have the same success rates, but women have to work harder to retain their seats (Palmer and Simon, 2005, p. 58).

Besides weighing when to run and where their entry might be most successful, women also have to think about how they will raise the money they need to compete effectively. No one can deny that money plays a critical role in one’s ability to campaign successfully and to achieve electoral success, thus, it is possible that the campaign finance process may also play a role in women’s under-representation. I explore this possibility below.

The Role of Campaign Finance in Women’s Under-Representation

One of the greatest concerns for candidates, whether male or female, is money. Moncrief et al. (1996) conduct a survey of veteran state legislators in an effort to ascertain how legislatures have evolved. They find that approximately 79% of all respondents believe fundraising takes “more time and effort” then in the past (p. 63). Today, that statistic would probably be even higher given the increasing sophistication of campaigns, the media-centric nature of campaigning and the restrictions on campaign financing at the state level. What this statistic does not say, and cannot say given that most legislators prior to 1979 were male, is whether women are affected disproportionately.
A number of studies set out to answer this question. The majority of these studies found that women are generally not disadvantaged and any findings of funding disparities were attributed to differences in candidate attributes rather than any overt discrimination (Burrell 1985, 1990, 1994; Gaddie and Bullock 1995, 1997; Uhlander and Schlozman 1986; Wilhite and Theilmann 1986; Darcy et al. 1984; Darcy et al. 1994; Thompson et al. 1998; Werner 1997; Seltzer et al. 1997; Fox 2000). The most comprehensive state-level assessment to date comes from several working papers by Hogan (2008, 2007, 2001a, 2001b). In these papers, the author analyzes campaign finance data for state legislative candidates in 20 states across two election cycles. He finds that men and women spend similar amounts of money in pursuit of a state legislative seat and they receive a similar electoral payoff for each additional dollar of spending. However, women are slightly more successful than men in obtaining general election votes.

Given the importance of money in successful campaigns and the lack of gender based funding disparities, it is puzzling that women have not been more successful in gaining seats in the legislature. Frankly, it is my opinion that our field has been too quick to discount the role of fundraising and that there are many reasons to believe differences can be found at the sub-donor or sub-national level. For instance, it is certainly possible that many of the barriers already discussed (media bias, elite bias, lack of confidence, disproportionate household and childcare responsibilities, etc.) will be manifested in elements of the campaign finance process. As such, women may have to invest more of their own money into their campaign or may receive smaller donations from donors who lack confidence in the electoral ability of women. In addition, if women lack legislative influence they may struggle to raise money from access-oriented donors. Each of these outcomes could impede the campaign finance process for women but it is quite possible
that none of these elements would be detected by researchers who focus solely on total campaign receipts.

There are a number of theoretical reasons to believe that women might struggle in the campaign financing process. First, recent interviews demonstrate that women do not just lack confidence in campaigning; rather, they also lack confidence in raising money for campaigns (Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009). Although, arguably, no one enjoys asking for money when campaigning, women may be more concerned about their ability to compete financially with men or may have different attitudes about the fundraising process. Jenkins (2007) demonstrates through state legislative surveys that, “women are more concerned then men about their ability to raise funds” (p. 236). These feelings are well captured in the survey output of Sanbonmatsu et al. (2009), who reports that 56% of women believe it is harder for them to raise money while only 9% of men believe women have a tougher time. Jenkins (2007) also finds support for this viewpoint in her survey data of major party state legislative candidates. She finds, “while women may raise as much money as men, they must work harder to do so by asking more sources and using a wider variety of techniques and services” (p. 236). Women may also struggle in the fundraising process because they raise money in lesser increments either because they do not feel comfortable asking for large sums of money or because they are not aggressive enough in seeking contributions (LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006). LeMieux (2009) contends that women, “often feel it is egotistical to ask for money for their own campaign” (para 16). This could be an issue given Grenzke’s (1989) finding that PACs are more likely to make donations to either their personal friends or to those who are aggressive in asking for money.
Other theories contend that some women may face bigger hurdles in the fundraising process because they are not as integrated into political and fundraising networks or because the gatekeepers of these networks are largely male (Conway 2001; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009). This belief was shared by a number of interviewees from Sanbonmatsu’s (2006) work. One interview subject even seemed to mirror the above argument, “I think fund-raising is a major, major barrier, and I think a lot of women just haven’t had the life, business, or professional experience that can give them the credibility and stature and the aggressiveness to successfully fund-raise” (Sanbonmatsu, 2006, p. 125).

It is certainly possible that women are not alone in these apprehensions. Donors may also share them and may, as a result, be less likely to make an investment in female candidates. In other words, just as women may be strategic about when to run (Fulton et al. 2006; Paul and Simon 200; Darcy et al. 1994) so too may donors be strategic about whom they allocate funds to. Just like candidates, donors are likely to consider the candidate’s probability of success when making a donation. After weighing the costs and benefits associated with contributing to various candidates, they are likely to make a donation to the person who demonstrates the best return on their investment. For instance, many donors want to gain access to influential members of the legislature. Therefore, they are more likely to contribute to candidates who are party leaders, who have more legislative experience, and who are members of the majority party (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock, 1985; Brunell 2005). On the other hand, the driving force behind donations from more policy centric ideological groups may be the previous voting record of the candidate and their party affiliation (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). In addition, it is possible that gender
also enters the strategic calculations of various donors. Donors may use gender, especially in open seat races, as a proxy for a candidate’s ideology or likely voting behavior (Thomas and Wilcox 1998; Poggione 2004; Burrell 1994; Bratton 2005; Thomas 1994). In addition, if donors have preconceived stereotypes about gender, they may reference these inadvertently in their decision making calculus.

In the case of party support, some state and local parties are accused of being unwilling to recruit women or of being skeptical about their ability to win. For instance, one party leader in Ohio states, “In some counties the local party leaders don’t believe a woman can carry their district, which hurts the recruiting effort” (Moncrief et al. 2001, pp. 103). This type of negative mind-set could seep into contribution decisions and put women at a disadvantage. In addition, donors may be dissuaded from contributing to a candidate based on unflattering or sexist media coverage or on personal stereotypes that women are not as qualified for office or that a male candidate would simply do a better job.

There are also reasons to believe that corporate contributors might be less supportive of women candidates. These groups tend to follow an access-oriented approach, giving money to influential members of the legislature, those in the majority party, or to incumbents who appear to have electoral security (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock, 1985; Brunell 2005). Since women are less likely to run as incumbents, to hold these leadership positions, and to have established friendships or connections with lobbyists, they may be overlooked by interest groups wishing to gain access. In addition, as I explain later, the philosophy and membership of corporate groups is unlikely to be as sensitive to women.
Knowing that these attitudes exist, a number of organizations have been predicated on the notion that women have a difficult time raising large sums of money early in their campaign. Groups such as EMILY’s List (Early Money is Like Yeast), WISH List (Women in the Senate and House), and the Alabama Solution have been created to help overcome this perceived obstacle by giving women special training and acting as a source of fundraising support. Unfortunately, the simple existence of these groups may help stoke the perception that women are weaker candidates or less politically and financially connected. Thus, these groups’ good intentions could actually cause more harm then good.

Besides the potential to face setbacks in raising money from certain donors, this problem may only be compounded if women also need more donations to get the same electoral benefit. For example, the amount of money required for women to be successful may vary depending on the gender composition of the electoral match-up (male vs. male, female vs. female, male vs. female). Research in this area has produced inconsistent findings (Herrick 1996; Burrell 1985; Hogan 2001b). At the congressional level, Herrick (1996) finds that among challengers, “the value of campaign spending and party strength is greater for men than women” (p. 68). In an earlier study, Burrell (1985) finds the exact opposite. Female challengers receive more ‘bang for their buck’. At the state legislative level, Hogan (2001b) finds, “that women incumbents receive a smaller portion of the vote for each dollar expended” (p. 11) but that overall spending patterns tend to “purchase” the same amount of votes regardless of gender. Hogan (2001b) also finds that male incumbents tend to spend more per eligible voter when they face a challenge from a female candidate. Finally, Palmer and Simon (2005), find that female incumbents endure a more competitive environment when they run, in part, because they
increase the number of women who compete against them from both their own party and from the opposite party. Thus, if women face more electoral competition and if they get less mileage out of the money they do raise, then they may not feel the potential for winning justifies the time and resources involved in getting there.

Finally, if women are more responsible for household and childcare duties this may affect their ability to put enough time into campaigning and fundraising. In writing about his experiences running for the Vermont state legislature, Ralph Wright states, “the bad news is that if you want to be truly competitive, you will have to work harder and be more organized than you’ve probably ever been in your life” (Wright, 2005, p. 3). This may be a tall task for women who feel torn between the demands of their political ambitions and the demands of being a mother and wife.

In summary, the compilation of these potential fundraising pitfalls may lead women to invest more of their own money into their campaign or to endure smaller donations at the hands of wary donors. It is also possible that women may receive fewer repeat contributions due, in part, to beliefs that women are less politically and financially connected and that they have different attitudes about the fundraising process (Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Conway 2001). In addition, women may also struggle to raise money from corporations and certain types of party donors. Although all of these aspects may make the fundraising process more difficult for women, it is quite possible that none of these pitfalls would be detected by researchers who merely explore total campaign receipts or who limit their research to the congressional level where women tend to be more experienced fundraisers and more politically connected. Thus, this project attempts to dig deeper and to explore how each of these facets affect the fundraising ability and outcomes of both male and female state legislative candidates.
Outline of the Dissertation

Besides worrying about elite support, when candidates (whether male or female) decide to run for office they must consider how difficult it will be to raise the funds necessary to compete successfully. The goal of this project is to determine whether or not women are disadvantaged in the campaign fundraising process and whether men receive preferential treatment from political donors. Is campaign financing a reasonable explanation for women’s under-representation? Is it reasonable to assume that women’s campaign receipts will be on par with men’s so long as incumbency, majority party status, and leadership status are taken into account? Is the nature of raising money different for men and women? If so, how might this difference have consequences for the candidacy decisions of women that the current scholarly literature has overlooked?

To answer these questions, the chapters to come examine the differences between male and female state legislative candidates in terms of total candidate contributions and contributions from various financiers (the party, interest groups, etc.) by the average house district population. A variety of candidate, district and state-level control variables are also included in the analysis. These variables measure a wide variety of factors from candidate gender and past electoral competition to state legislative professionalism and campaign finance stringency. The data is collected on open seat, contested and uncontested races in 24 states across two election cycles (1998 and 2000) for all major party candidates.

Chapter 2 examines the theories behind contribution patterns by various donors ranging from the political parties to business donors, as well as what role gender plays in giving. In addition, I examine the theoretical underpinnings for total campaign contributions and campaign self-finance. Chapter 3 explains my model for testing the
possibility of gender bias in the campaign finance process. I describe the data utilized in my study and provide a description and explanation of each of the dependent and independent variables operationalized in my model. Chapter 4 examines the total amount of donations received by male and female state legislative candidates in 1998 and 2000. Chapter 5 explores what factors influence the contribution behavior of party donors and what role, if any, gender plays in the donor decision-making process. Chapter 6 focuses on contributions from a wide variety of interest groups. In particular, I concentrate on the donor behavior of businesses, labor unions and ideological interest groups. In my final analysis chapter, Chapter 7, I examine two under-studied aspects of the campaign finance process, campaign self-finance and contribution size. Finally, Chapter 8 provides an overview of the findings from the analysis in the previous chapters before concluding with some insight into possible areas for future and continuing research.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTOR AND CANDIDATE BEHAVIOR

If, as discussed in the last chapter, perception affects women’s attitudes about fundraising, and raising money is an essential component of running for office, then it is certainly possible that donors may perceive these attitudes or share them. Women may worry that they won’t get the financial support they need and donors may be more reticent to give it under the assumption that women are not as safe of an investment (Sanbonmatsu 2005; Fox 1997). In other words, the same self-defeatist attitudes that plague some women may also affect how donors, political activists and other groups approach and contemplate the campaigns of male and female state legislative candidates.

If these perceptions are true, then it is important to understand objectively and empirically where the biases exist among financiers and how this affects the amount of money that women collect from various donors, and ultimately whether they decide to run. Unfortunately, research on gender and campaign finance tends to focus on aggregate campaign expenditures and receipts without paying as much attention to the motivations and behavior of particular groups of donors.

Although looking at total candidate contributions is important, it reveals very little about whether gender differences exist. In addition, previous scholarly literature largely rules out any funding disparities in this area (Newman 1994; Burrell 1994; Seltzer et al. 1997; Dolan 2006; Darcy et al. 1994; Wilhite and Theilman 1986; Burrell 1985; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986; Welch et al. 1985). To get a better sense of the campaign funding process, one needs to look beyond the aggregate sum each candidate collects to the individual funding sources and sub-categories of contributions. In addition, one needs to examine the size of donations made to both male and female candidates. In other words, do women have to raise more of their money in small increments from a
large number of donors? This is an aspect of the fundraising process that has received very little attention but could affect the nature of campaign finance.

Below, I explore the theoretical underpinnings of donor behavior. I begin with an examination of total campaign receipts and continue with a look at political parties, interest group donors (businesses, labor unions, and ideological interest groups), and campaign self-finance. I conclude with an examination of what factors influence the size of these donations.

**Total Campaign Contributions**

As previously discussed, many studies do not find significant monetary differences between male and female total candidate fundraising or spending. It is possible that this may be a function of examining all donor sub-groups together instead of disaggregating them. As noted, I hypothesize that women will be advantaged by particular donors while others will be less generous in their contribution behavior. As a result of looking at contributions in this manner, it is possible that I may find evidence of bias in the fundraising process where others have failed to do so before.

I expect to find that female candidates are largely on par with their male opponents given the previous findings on gender and total campaign receipts (Newman, 1994, Burrell 1994, Seltzer et al. 1997, Dolan 2006 and Darcy et al. 1994, Wilhite and Theilmann, 1986; Burrell, 1985 and Uhlaner and Schlozman, 1986). As previously discussed, areas where women may face a disadvantage (business contributions, self-finance, contribution size) will be countered by areas where women might be advantaged or at least break even with their male counterparts (ideological group donations, labor union contributions, etc.). Thus, if I find differences in donor behavior, I expect them to be located at a more particularistic donor specific level as opposed to in the aggregate.
I intend to begin my analysis by testing a model that examines total contributions. Previous studies have not always included many controls when examining total campaign receipts (i.e. Thompson and Moncrief 1998) and many studies have not examined this question at the state-level. Thus, it is important to start here so that I can see whether gender differences might be more prominent at this level among similarly situated candidates and so that I can gain a better understanding of the factors that influence total campaign contribution size. In this manner, the reader can become familiar with my model as each of the variables discussed will have some application to the various donor sub-groups in the chapters that follow the examination of total campaign receipts.

**Donations from the Party**

Previous research has demonstrated that political parties often follow different strategies when deciding how to allocate candidate donations. Thompson et al. (1994) finds that the majority party tends to follow a “protectionist strategy” where support is given primarily to vulnerable incumbents in competitive races in the hope that the party can maintain their majority. On the other hand, the party out of power tends to follow an “additive strategy” where donations are given to competitive challengers in the hope of making in-roads to party control (see also Herrnson 1989). Less is known about what role, if any, gender plays in the decision-making calculus of parties. Do parties tend to contribute more heavily to women’s campaigns or do they concentrate their resources more directly on male candidacies?

Until recently, the field has mostly limited its examination of parties and gender to exploring whether there are advantages or disadvantages in recruitment patterns. Interestingly, there is a lack of consensus among scholars in this area on whether strong parties advantage or disadvantage female candidates. What scholars can agree on is the
important role parties’ play in the recruitment process. In their survey of state legislative candidates, Moncrief et al. (2001) find that just under 75% of respondents spoke with local party officials about their candidacy while half also spoke with state party officials and other political officeholders. Since women are less likely to be self-starters, these recruitment contacts can be essential in persuading women to run, so long as the conversation is encouraging.

Certainly, the historical relationship between women and the party has been icy.

When women entered the political house they initially thought they would be accepted as full and equal partners by party men. As in a marriage, their duties and roles would be different, but their contribution would be important enough for the men to solicit their advice and pay attention to their concerns. It took several years for party women to realize that they were naïve. The experience of women in the parties, as in marriages, varied considerably; a lot depended on the proclivities of individual party men. Working in the parties was like a traditional marriage and, for most women, not a very good one. Men were still head of the household and made all the important decisions, but, as in a bad marriage, women did not run the home; they were largely servants (Freeman, 2000, p. 229).

Traditionally the operative message from party leaders was ‘no woman need apply’ for a party nomination. In the 1980’s, while female candidates were still rare, women’s campaigns were highlighted by the parties, and ‘a woman could win this’ became an occasional theme (Burrell, 1994, p. 99).

But, has this relationship thawed since the 1980s? Do parties believe women can win when they run or do they harbor old stereotypes that women are simply not as viable?

The answer depends on whom you ask. In examining the average party contribution and coordinated expenditure to congressional candidates between 1980 and 1990, Burrell (1994) finds that neither party has financially disadvantaged female candidates and states, “In the 1990s, women candidates have become mainstreamed in the parties, and are treated like any other candidates” (Burrell, 1994, p. 99). Darcy et al. (1994) agree that women are not just sacrificial lambs, as some have contended, and they
argue, along with Moncrief et al. (2001), that women are as likely, perhaps more likely, to receive encouragement and support from party leaders.

Despite these positive assessments, some authors argue that women are not as welcome in the Republican Party. Shiner and Thrush (2009) report that the Republican Party has become far less supportive of women who have moderate policy positions on issues like abortion and health care. Representative Debbie Wasserman of Florida is quoted in the article as saying, “This is a party that doesn’t respect women, a party that doesn’t believe women are equal to men. I don’t think they attract women to their party, I think they repulse women” (Shiner and Thrush, 2009, p. 2). This may indeed be the case as fewer Republican women are willing to challenge Democratic incumbents while the reverse remains untrue (Shiner and Thrush 2009).

Like Shiner and Thrush (2009), Fox and Lawless (2010) also find evidence that recruitment bias is especially pronounced in the Republican Party. However, the authors also find that party leaders, elected officials and political activists from both parties are less likely to recruit women and less likely to concentrate their efforts on getting them to run over time. This is especially troubling given that the women under examination are as politically interested and professionally qualified as the men.

However, partisan discouragement is not necessarily confined to one party or another. Niven (1998) also conducts a four-state survey with county party leaders and potential female legislative candidates. The author finds that 64% of female respondents believe party leaders have discouraged them or someone they knew from running. Just over 40% of these respondents believe male party leaders supported men first in true good ol’ boy fashion. The authors also find that while “only 24% of male party chairs indicate that their top candidate for a future state legislative race is a woman, 47% of
female party chairs indicate that their top candidate is a woman” (Niven 1998, p. 72). In a survey of state legislative winners, losers, and dropouts in Florida, Niven (2004) also finds more evidence of bias,

Men are disproportionately more likely to dropout of races their party was unlikely to win while women are disproportionately more likely to dropout of races their party was unlikely to lose. A survey of declared candidates offers a clear explanation for this anomaly. Men receive encouragement from political elites to run in favorable districts and discouragement from political elites to run in unfavorable districts. Women receive the opposite messages. Moreover, women report being more apt to value the input they receive from political elites (Niven, 2004, p. 12-13).

Along with Niven (1998 and 2004), Sanbonmatsu (2006) argues that women may face skepticism at the hands of party leaders. Although some party leaders may believe women can be more successful in some conditions (gaining crossover voters, positive voter stereotypes about trustworthiness, added excitement and attention that comes from a woman running), others believe women can be disadvantaged under other conditions (some voters may be unwilling to support women, women running in rural areas). In Sanbonmatsu’s (2006) interviews, the author finds that party leaders believe women can be successful but they also feel their chances of success depend on where they are running, among other things. Sanbonmatsu (2006) reports that “[n]one of the party leaders I interviewed thought twice about whether men could win election in all districts in their state—a question often asked about women candidates” (p. 119).

This is not meant to imply that parties are resistant to the influx of female candidates at all levels of government or in all states. Since research demonstrates that women are often more successful when institutional, district and state-level conditions are favorable for their election it is not unreasonable to think that party leaders are more inclined to their candidacies when the conditions or the timing is right (Darcy et al. 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Rule 1990; Squire 1992; Hogan 2001a). For instance, the presence
of female legislative or party leaders can make a major difference in whether women are recruited or overlooked (Sanbonmatsu 2006). Often, the impetus is from women but it does not have to be. Ralph Wright, the former speaker of the Vermont House of Representatives, made a concerted effort to recruit women as a means to increasing Democratic representation in the House. In the course of 14 years, 19 additional women were elected, accounting almost entirely for the Democratic gains (Wright 2005).

Unfortunately, the desire of maintaining a “good old boys” network may be especially pronounced at the local level. Several authors find that local party leaders can be especially unwelcoming to female candidates (Moncrief et al. 2001; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Darcy et al. 1994).

At the local level, I suspect it is a less accessible process for women. I think in some of these small counties, it is a creaky, older structure, and so it is less accessible. These folks may be entrenched and used to doing business the old way, which didn’t include women. And again, not necessarily in an antagonistic way, but in a sort of last generation view of what women’s roles were or could be (Sanbonmatsu, 2006, p. 135).

Thus, it is possible that recruitment efforts, organizational support and financial donations may not be as forthcoming from the local party when compared to the state party.

Legislative campaign committees are another source of funds for candidates. These groups are typically headed by party leaders and charged with recruitment, raising and distributing campaign money, targeting legislative districts, and providing media or other technical assistance (Moncrief et al. 2001; Rosenthal 1995b). Typically, funds and support are directed to challengers and open seat contestants who may have more difficulty securing funds or to candidates embroiled in competitive elections. These organizations may be more open to helping women than some local parties but their degree of support may be a function of the number of female leaders and members in the
legislature. Thus, the more women in office, the more likely legislators will know viable female candidates personally and the more likely they will have formed a favorable impression about female officeholders and their electability. This should translate into a greater effort to help women candidates through the legislative campaign committee, especially if other women believe their help could translate into more political power for their voting bloc or caucus if female representation goes up.

These are important distinctions to keep in mind when analyzing party contributions. In order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between the party and female candidates, I examine whether differences exist in the amount of contributions that are made by each candidate’s respective party. I examine the average party contribution made to male and female candidates across all 24 states by candidate status. I also break party contributions up into two distinct groups, those from the party committee and those from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual party donors. My general expectations regarding the relative effects of gender on party contributions when other factors are controlled are as follows. On the one hand, I might find that once a woman has moved from the recruitment stage to actually declaring their candidacy that the party will support them financially, especially since they will have had ample opportunity to dissuade those who appear unelectable from running in the first place. On the other hand, I might find that women face a tougher battle in gaining contributions from the party leadership or from individual party donors because of the negative stereotypes expressed above or because they are not as invested in getting women into office and wish to protect their own hegemony.
Donations from Business and Labor Groups

One prominent and highly studied source of candidate funds are corporations and labor unions. In order to understand the allocation decisions of interest groups or their affiliated PACs, it is necessary to first appreciate why these organizations make campaign contributions. Gopoian et al. (1984) argues that there are four primary concerns that interest groups have when making decisions about donating money: “parochial issue concerns, broad ideological concerns, access, and power” (p. 260-263).

In the first group, parochial issues concerns, PACs are expected to focus their contributions on those candidates who support their particularized viewpoints. These groups are sometimes referred to as special-interest groups in the literature because they have a very narrow agenda. Thus, candidates who serve on or chair committees of interest to the interest group or who exhibit a supportive voting record on the interest groups’ issues, particularly crucial votes, will be more likely to receive campaign donations (Gopian et al. 1984; Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and Snyder 1994; Gordon 2001; Grier and Munger 1993; Esterling 2007; Evans 1988).

The theory behind the second group, broad ideological concerns, argues that interest groups are not solely focused on particularized policies, and as a result, are looking to support candidates who have the same basic ideological agenda as the interest group in question (Gopoian et al. 1984). Here, PACs may contribute most of their support and funds to members of a particular party whose values they share (Brunell 2005; Rudolph 1999; Evans 1988).

The third group, access, is focused on the degree to which PACs are able to gain access to political officeholders. The reasons for wanting access are primarily two-fold. The first goal may involve an offensive strategy whereby interest groups establish
relationships with officeholders so they will have an opportunity to persuade, provide information, lobby, or give advice to legislators on policy matters (Austen-Smith 1995; Hall and Wayman 1990; Chin et al. 2000; Herndon 1982). Interest groups want face time with legislators so they will think of them favorably or at least listen to their position when the time is right. The second goal may involve a defensive strategy whereby interest groups establish relationships for the purpose of keeping channels of communication open so they can prevent officeholders from taking action that would be detrimental to the cause of the group (Gopoian et al. 1984; Grenzke 1989; Hall and Wayman 1990). Following this strategy, PACs will tend to donate to candidates, particularly incumbents or political leaders, who look unbeatable as a way of preventing hard feelings or as a way to stifle opposition during the next legislative session (Cassie and Thompson 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990).

The final group, power, follows the opposite strategy from access. Here, interest groups are focused on donating to those in tight electoral contests whose electoral future is uncertain (Wright 1985). Following this perspective, if a PAC contributes to officeholders in electoral jeopardy and they subsequently win, then that interest group will not only have gained access to the member but also may have acquired some level of control or influence. “The PAC that can claim to have been a decisive coalition partner in a close election is in a position not only to gain access, but to exercise claims upon the candidate” (Gopoian et al., 1984, p. 263).

For reasons of parsimony, these four theories are frequently reduced to two; one being an ideological or election based approach and the other being a strategic or access oriented approach. An ideological strategy typically involves interest groups focusing their donations on members of the political party most closely aligned with the group’s
ideology and those candidates who share and vote according to the viewpoints or issue positions of the interest group (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). In addition, interest groups that follow an ideological strategy are more likely to support challengers and candidates in tight electoral contests (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). On the other hand, interest groups following an access-oriented approach tend to give money to incumbents, political leaders, committee chairs and members of key committees, those who support the interest group’s agenda on key votes, members of the majority party, and those who appear to be running well ahead of their opponent (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock, 1985; Brunell 2005). Clearly, candidate characteristics, voting record, and electoral considerations play a large role in who gets money and who does not.

The question is what role gender might play, as a candidate characteristic, in determining whether or not candidates receive donations from each of these types of interest groups. On the one hand, most scholars find that PACs tend to make contribution decisions based on the characteristics of the candidates or the electoral contest itself. These characteristics include majority party status, political party affiliation, ideology, voting record, leadership position, committee chairmanship, incumbency status, previous electoral margin, etc (Gopoian 1984; Clawson et al. 1986; Wright 1985; Herndon 1982; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005; Grier and Munger 1993; Grenzke 1989; Evans 1988; Deitz 2007). Since women are underrepresented at all levels of government, they are less likely to run from the advantageous position of an incumbent or to have been in office long enough to have earned prestigious leadership positions and committee assignments. In addition, they are less likely to have a voting record or a record of service that would make donors more
comfortable with providing large donations. Thus, women might face somewhat of a disadvantage in fundraising against male officeholders, especially from donors who are pursuing an access-oriented strategy. However, once these characteristics are controlled for and like groups are compared to like (incumbents with incumbents and challengers with challengers) the funding differences could very well vanish.

There are also more reasons to believe that women could be disadvantaged. If, as stated earlier, women are less likely to have established strong financial and political networks and if women feel less confident about asking for money, then they may be overlooked by some interest groups. In open-ended interviews with officials representing a wide variety of industries, Grenzke (1989) finds that PACs are more likely to make donations to either their personal friends or to candidates who aggressively ask for money. He notes, “PACs, like other political groups, tend to give to friends and to people who ask for help, even when more ‘rational’ criteria would suggest diverting their contributions to House members who are more powerful, more supportive, and running in more competitive districts” (pp. 260).

In addition, the philosophy and membership of corporate groups is unlikely to be as sensitive to women as that of labor unions. Labor unions are more inclusive of people from various ethnic and racial backgrounds and socio-economic status. They are also supportive of the rights of working women. A quick glance at the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) website, and “human, civil and women’s rights” stands out as one of the key issue platforms of the organization. The following quote also illustrates how the organization’s platform could bleed into the political arena.

Today, the union movement is in the forefront of efforts to ensure that the gains of the past are maintained and to fight for those still denied opportunity and equality.
From its struggles to ensure U.S. workplaces are free of discrimination to its battles to ensure that the hard-earned right to vote is secure for all, the union movement continues to fight for the poor and the oppressed (AFL-CIO, 2009, para 3).

Hence, if the focus is on ensuring equality, then this group, and others like them, might be more likely to support female candidates in an effort to create a more representative and diverse governing structure.

Given these differences, I expect when various other conditions at the state, district and candidate levels are controlled for that women, on average, will have a disadvantage relative to men in funds received from access-oriented groups such as business interests or corporations. However, among election-oriented (or ideologically-oriented) groups such as labor unions, women, on average, may be advantaged relative to similarly situated men. In a survey of state legislators in 2002, Thomas and Wilcox (2005) find just this, as women are 12% more likely to report labor unions as a source of strong electoral and financial support while men are 17% more likely to report businesses as a source of strong electoral and financial support. Among specific single-issue groups, I would expect that the relative advantages would vary depending on whether the organizations are supportive of conservative or liberal leaning groups.

It is also important to note that my examination of interest group donations includes contributions from individual donors affiliated or associated with these organizations. Fellowes and Wolf (2004) argue that including individual donations in with PAC donations provides a better picture of the total fundraising effort. In addition, individual interest group donors tend to follow the same basic strategies as the organizations they are affiliated with when deciding whom to contribute to. Most of these donors can be safely categorized into one of two groups: “investors” or “ideologues” (Francia et al. 2003). Based on my previous discussion, I anticipate that
business donors are more likely to act like investors while labor union and ideological interest group donors are more likely to be ideologues.

Investors are donors that have a financial stake in the outcome of an election and will make a donation in an attempt to further or protect their corporate interests (Francia et al. 2003). Often, this group of donors will make contribution decisions based on how a particular candidate treated their business in the past. This group of contributors is more likely to give to incumbents and to legislators who serve on committees of special interest to business or that indirectly reflect business concerns, such as health care, trade, and tax policy (Francia et al. 2003).

Unlike investors, ideologues are less likely to contribute primarily for financial gain or industry advantage. Instead, they are more likely to focus on either a particular policy or a series of policies and invest in candidates who share their viewpoint and philosophy (Francia et al. 2003). However, the argument could certainly be made that ideology and policy advantage are more intertwined for this group of donors and that getting a similarly minded candidate elected may very well be in their financial or political interest. Ideologues may also focus their contributions on a particular party if that party tends to lean more favorably in the direction of the donor on that issue. Thus, contributions may be given to either advantage a particular candidate or in an attempt to shift the partisan/ideological direction of the legislative body more broadly (Francia et al. 2003). For this reason, ideologues are more likely to funnel money to close races than investors are.

**Donations from Ideological Groups**

Unlike business donors, ideological interest group donors are most apt to follow an electoral or ideological strategy. When making a donation, these groups will tend to
focus on candidates who share their policy positions and beliefs, or are closely aligned with their ideological viewpoint (McGhee and La Raja 2008; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). In some cases, the interest group may funnel the majority of their donations to a particular political party because they are more sympathetic to their cause (e.g. gay and lesbian rights to Democrats or pro-life to Republicans).

There are a variety of channels or mechanisms that ideological groups can use to influence legislators and lawmakers. Research on this topic addresses lobbying and litigation efforts, candidate endorsements, interest group rating systems, and etc. However, less attention seems to be given to the act of providing campaign contributions. When talking about PAC donations, the focus is often on contributions made by corporations, labor unions, trade industries and leadership committees. When thinking about the potential for gender differences in single-issue interest group PAC allocation, this research often focuses exclusively on women’s groups like EMILY’s List, WISH List, the National Organization for Women (NOW) and the National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC). However, there are other types of groups that may also exhibit a bias in favor of, or perhaps against women candidates. But, these other issue areas remain woefully under-examined.

Research on female-centric organizations demonstrates that they are very valuable to female candidates both financially and politically. These organizations help recruit, train and fund women (Rozell 2000; Fox and Lawless 2010). Women--especially Democratic women--often reap the rewards through earlier funding, which translates into more campaign receipts throughout the campaign, and higher general election vote percentages on Election Day (Tankersley 2005; Francia 2001). Financial contributions to
these groups tend to come from women who are politically active, affluent, and more ideologically polarized than non-donors (Day and Hadley 2002). In addition, these groups may also play a role in getting women to become more active in the political process through requests for donations, voter registration drives, or other political events (Fox and Lawless 2010). This could, in turn, encourage women to become more politically engaged, which may lead to more women ultimately running for office or making the political connections necessary to consider a bid.

Unfortunately, little is known about what role women’s groups play at the state legislative level or who the donors are. Even less is known about the role of other single-issue groups that focus on policy issues, whether controversial or non-controversial, or partisan or non-partisan. Thus, the question remains, do these groups respond differently to male and female candidates and, if so, why?

The National Institute on Money in State Politics collects data on a wide variety of ideological or single-issue interest groups. Each state varies as to how many of these groups are in action. Some groups represent especially conservative viewpoints, such as those focused on pro-life, Christian conservative and anti-labor viewpoints. Other groups represent especially liberal viewpoints, such as those focused on gay/lesbian rights and issues, minority/ethnic groups, women’s issues, pro-choice issues, pro-environment issues, anti-gun issues, human rights issues, and etc. Other interests are more general and could be seen as either supporting liberal or conservative viewpoints depending on the policy focus, these include: health and welfare, tax issues, term limits and elderly/social security issues.

Given that more of the aforementioned groups appear to exercise a liberal agenda and focus on issues with which women are often identified, I anticipate that female
candidates will receive a larger share of their funding from these types of groups than their male counterparts. Since historically women have been identified with and supportive of women’s rights and social welfare policies I would anticipate that liberal leaning interest groups would be very interested in getting women who share their viewpoints into office (Poggione 2004; Thomas and Wilcox 2005; la Cour Dabelko and Herrnson 1997). In addition, some of these groups, particularly those focused on women’s interests, may receive pressure from their membership base to support female candidates or may fear looking unsupportive of the very sex they are advocating for if they do not give token contributions to female legislators. In order to test for this, I include two dependant variables -- one that includes contributions to candidates from left-leaning interest groups and another that contains contributions from right-leaning interest groups.

**Campaign Self-Finance**

To round out my examination of funding sources, I look at another under-studied revenue supply, the candidate. Examining campaign self-finance is important because donors who have to contribute more to their own campaign may face disadvantages in building grass-roots support and may find it harder to acquire revenue from other sources (Steen, 2000).

The self-financing of campaigns has drawn increasing media attention since the early 1990’s. A number of candidates (H. Ross Perot, Mitt Romney, Steve Forbes, Michael Bloomberg, John Kerry, and Hillary Clinton) pour millions of their own dollars (either successfully or unsuccessfully) into their electoral contests (Cook 2008). Steen (2000) reports that “[i]n the 1998 election cycle, candidates for the U.S. House and Senate loaned and contributed more then $50 million in campaign funds (10% of all
receipts) to their own campaigns, and 77 candidates self-financed more then $100,000” (p. 1). At the state legislative level, a survey of just over 350 state legislative candidates reveals that the second largest source of campaign funds comes from a candidate’s own revenue sources or personal loans (Faucheux and Herrnson 1999). This amount is twice the percentage candidates report receiving from interest groups and four percent more than the amount they receive from parties (Faucheux and Herrnson 1999). It is possible that campaign self-finance plays such an important role because of state contribution limits on both individuals and corporations.

Clearly then, campaign self-finance is an important source of funds for legislative candidates, yet, very few studies, to my knowledge, examine this phenomenon at the federal or state level, despite its potential explanatory power. Two exceptions are Steen’s (2000, 2006) works, which have taken the most comprehensive look at this topic to date. She examines electoral contests between 1992 and 1998 for the U.S. House of Representatives. In particular, she examines the role of candidate self-financing in “the quality of the candidates involved, the level of competition, the outcome of the vote, and the incentive and experiences that elections provide for representatives” (Steen, 2000, p. 7). Steen finds a number of things. First, she finds that self-financers are often politically inexperienced and lack name recognition and the support of political networks. Second, the presence of a self-financed candidate can reduce political opposition. Third, self-financing can increase a candidate’s chances of electoral success but raising funds the “old fashioned way” is far more effective because campaign donations equal more voter support and signal other donors about the strength of the candidate’s campaign. Fourth, most self-financing is loan based, which allows candidates to recoup their losses by either writing off the loan as a loss or repayment of the loan after winning - with
money from PACs hoping to gain access after the fact. Finally, the few self-financed candidates who win their races typically transition to traditional sources of funding when they run again (Steen 2000; Cook 2008).

Although these findings shed much light on the process of candidate self-finance, they do not account for what role, if any, gender plays. Nor, do they address the role of self-finance at the state legislative level. As a result, we still do not know whether it is reasonable to assume that women self-finance their campaigns to a greater extent than their male counterparts? To my knowledge, no study has answered this question. However, there are theoretical reasons to believe that this might be the case.

First, as argued previously, women may feel less confident in their ability to raise funds or may simply believe the process will be more difficult for them.

The bottom line is that women are not skilled fund-raisers. As a psychologist, I think that the Southern culture conditions women to be polite (‘Never make others uncomfortable’) but does not teach them to be assertive in asking for what they need. Southern women are far more at home giving dinner parties then calling friends and associates to ask for checks (Whiting, 1998, para. 6).

These beliefs are not exclusive to the South. Faucheux and Herrnson’s (1999) survey of state legislative candidates bears this out. They find that female respondents are 50% more likely to believe they will have a harder time building the resources necessary to be competitive. Given these expectations, women who decide to run may believe they will need to invest more of their own money into their campaign.

Second, if women are not as integrated into political and fundraising networks, then they may have to offset this shortcoming with more of their own start-up money. This may be especially true for female challengers who lack the characteristics that interest groups look for when they are trying to gain access to influential members of the legislature or to incumbents (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985;
Women running as challengers and open-seat contestants may also need more money to pull off a victory either because they are running from the disadvantaged position of a challenger or because the race is especially competitive. In addition, running from these positions often means that candidates have less name recognition and this could make it more difficult for women to secure contributions from PACs, parties, and individuals at a time when women need larger sums of money to get their message out (Johnson 2008). Once they demonstrate that they can be competitive and gain more name recognition, getting funding should be less of a factor.

I examine whether these assumptions are accurate by including a dependent variable that measures the average amount men and women have personally contributed to their own campaign across each state in the analysis. I expect to find that women put more of their own money into their campaign when compared to men.

**Examining the Size of Campaign Donations**

Unfortunately, very little research has been conducted in this area. Most of the speculation about contribution size revolves around the amount that individuals contribute, particularly to presidential candidates. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) tracks the size of donations received from individuals in Presidential campaigns and with the rise in internet donations this area has received more attention recently. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in the most recent presidential election Barack Obama acquired 54% of his contributions from donors contributing $200 or less while 32% of his contributions came from donors contributing $2,300 or more. In addition, 13,120 individuals (9%) contributed the maximum allowable amount in both the primary and general ($4,600 in total). On the other hand, John McCain received 34% of his contributions from donors contributing $200 or less while 49% of his contributions
came from donors contributing $2,300 or more. In addition, 6,654 individuals (16%) contributed the maximum allowable amount. These findings point to interesting differences between the two campaigns in their donor base and possibly in their campaign strategy.

Brown et al. (1995) and Francia et al. (2003) find that significant presidential and congressional donors (those giving over $200) tend to be more politically involved than the average citizen, they are more likely to have strong partisan beliefs, and they are more likely to be well educated, wealthy, white and male. In addition, Francia et al. (2003) find that donors tend to be older, more frequent church attendees, more involved in voluntary organizations and more likely to belong to the legal, business, medical, education, media or government profession. Other scholars find that political interest, political knowledge, and even geographic location/population density can play a role in contribution decisions and likelihood of solicitation (Grant and Rudolph 2002; Wiltse 2005; Lowry 2007). They also find that the “economic base” for each party is different (p. 43). Democratic donors tend to be better educated while Republican donors tend to have larger incomes (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). Both groups of authors also note the importance of personal relationships in building donors and in acquiring donations.

How does this research compare to other studies at the congressional or state level? I am aware of two congressional studies on this topic. The first is Burrell’s (1994) research, which examines both the average PAC contribution and the average total amount raised in contributions of $500 or more for federal candidates from 1980-1990. Only in 1988 did women surpass men in raising money on these dimensions. However, once controls are introduced, gender is not a statistically significant predictor of
campaign size. The second is Baker’s (2006) examination of U.S. Senate elections between 1998 and 2004. In her study, she concludes that women tend to receive smaller donations from individual donors.

Do women receive smaller donations when compared to their male counterparts? To test for this relationship, I include several dependant variables that group donors into categories according to their level of giving: small (contributions up to $200), medium ($201-1,000), and large ($1,001-5,000). I suggest that women receive more small donations than do men. I base this belief on two theoretical arguments. First, as discussed earlier, women may be less likely to receive donations, particularly of a sizable nature, from access-oriented groups. Since corporations tend to have more sizeable financial resources I would expect this to result in smaller contributions on average for women. In addition, I expect women to be more successful in attracting individual contributions from other female donors, which should, on average, be smaller then those coming from corporations, parties or labor unions (Francia et al. 2004; Brown et al. 1995; Baker 2006; Mooney 2009). Second, given the theories that women are less politically and financially connected, have different attitudes about the fundraising process, and may face skepticism from elites about their ability to get elected, one could conclude that women will receive smaller donations than their male counterparts (Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Conway 2001).
CHAPTER 3: MODELING THE FUNDING LANDSCAPE OF STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

This dissertation focuses on open seat, contested and uncontested elections to 24 state legislatures in 1998 and 2000 among major party candidates (independent and third party candidates are excluded). Unlike the majority of earlier research studies, the focus is neither on the congressional level nor is the focus on only one or a small number of states at the sub-national level. Examining campaign finance activity at the state legislative level is important for a number of reasons. First, the state legislature is a major entry point for many officeholders. Often state legislators go on to have careers as state senators, governors, congressmen, even lobbyists. Some candidates may not have first-hand campaign experience prior to running for state office, and these elections should inform how they view, organize, fundraise and run for subsequent offices. More importantly, state legislative candidates will form connections with donors and other political and party elites prior to running for federal office. This heightened political experience should render many of the theories about female confidence, ambition, recruitment, and political and financial networking void at the federal level. Thus, the state legislative setting should be the most promising avenue for detecting gender discrimination, if it exists.

Second, the devolution revolution has given more power and responsibility to state legislatures, interest groups have taken on a more prominent role in some state legislatures, and most states have become more professionalized (Petracca 1992; Squire and Hamm 2005). All of these factors should affect the campaign finance environment and may matter for how donors react to candidate gender and for the entry decisions of both male and female candidates. As state electoral contests become more expensive and
as donors concentrate more funds at the state legislative level, the need to understand donor behavior becomes even more paramount.

Third, studying campaign finance in a wide variety of states at the state legislative level is important because it allows researchers to examine a large number of district and institutional factors across many different “laboratories” as opposed to just the two institutions found at the federal level (Jewell 1982). This enhances generalizability and allows for a more rigorous test of theory. In turn, this could shed new light on the study of campaign finance at the congressional level or, at the very least, should enhance our confidence in findings at the state legislative level or open up the area to further research.

Finally, state legislative elections, especially open seat elections, tend to take place in a low information environment. Unlike high profile presidential or congressional elections, state legislative voters may not be as knowledgeable about the candidate’s beliefs, background or issue positions. As such, voters may be more reliant on information shortcuts like party affiliation and incumbency status (McDermott 1998). In addition, the state electoral environment may increase the use of gender as a cue for voters and possibly even donors (McDermott 1998). Here, voters and donors may use gender as a way of deducing a candidate’s ideology and policy beliefs. If so, examining the state legislative environment may be especially appropriate given that this electoral level may present a promising avenue for uncovering gender effects on donor behavior.

This dissertation takes advantage of this variation by examining approximately half of the states in the U.S. I use this broad sample of 24 states to examine the contribution patterns of candidates to their own campaigns and of various donors to candidates. In addition, I look at total campaign receipts and the size of campaign donations. I now provide an overview of the model I use to test these relationships.
Modeling the Contribution Patterns of Donors to Male and Female Candidates

In my analysis, I use a variety of dependent and independent variables to help account for the state legislative fundraising landscape. In this section I explain each of these variables in turn, how they are measured, and what my theoretical expectations for them are.

Dependent Variables

I have a number of dependent variables which are designed to capture the funding landscape for both male and female state legislative candidates. The first set of variables represents the amount of money contributed in terms of total campaign receipts and total receipts by several categories of donors (political parties, corporations, labor unions, etc.). The second set of variables, accounts for the variance in giving across each state in the analysis. Here, total campaign receipts and total receipts by donor class are divided by the average house district population in a given state and year. This results in a total for each candidate per potential voter (all voters over the age of 18) in the voting age population. Since candidates from more populous states will tend to spend more money to get their message out and to campaign effectively, it is important to account for this variation (Hogan and Hamm 1998; Sorauf 1992; Wright 2005). Such a technique works to standardize the contributions to facilitate cross-state comparisons. My last set of dependent variables looks at the percentage of contributions received from self-financing and small contributors. Such a comparison is useful because it allows one to examine the relative amount received in relation to the total. For instance, it may be more meaningful to find that women raise two percent more of their total contributions from small donors as opposed to saying they raised $1,000 more in small donations.
Independent Variables

In addition to the dependent variables in this analysis, I include a number of independent variables in order to control for a host of factors that could account for a candidate’s contribution amount and size. I begin by examining the operational and conceptual definitions of the candidate-level factors.

Candidate-Level Factors

Gender

As discussed in my last chapter, there are a number of reasons to believe that gender will play a role in the contribution decisions of various donors. However, I hypothesize that gender will not play much of a role in total campaign receipts given the variety of scholars who do not find a statistically significant difference between male and female candidates on this dimension. Yet, I anticipate that women will receive more in contributions from the party, from labor unions, and from liberal leaning ideological interest groups. Female candidates, on average, may be more aligned with the philosophy and policy beliefs of these organizations and these groups are more likely to contribute to candidates in tough electoral contests, which may be better suited to the type of races women find themselves in. I also expect that women will receive more in small donations (contributions under $200) and will contribute more to their own campaign. This outcome may occur because donors may contribute less to women if they are unsure of their ability to win and if they do not have an established relationship with the candidate. This may lead women to make up the shortfall by contributing more to their own campaign. Finally, I expect women will receive fewer contributions from businesses and corporations. Generally, these groups follow an access oriented strategy and women are less likely to have acquired the characteristics that would make them
more attractive to this type of donor. This information is represented for each candidate in the analysis and is measured with a dichotomous indicator where 1 identifies a female candidate and 0 is attributed to male candidates. This variable represents an alternative, more parsimonious, measure of gender that does not account for the dynamic of the race.

Gender of the Opponent

As just discussed, donors may be influenced by the gender of a particular candidate. However, donors may also be influenced by the gender of the opposing candidate. Generally, studies have not accounted for this but it may be that donors base their donation decisions on whether the competition is a man or a woman. Given the lack of research on this dimension, it is difficult to speculate which type of races might be most advantageous and it is possible that the effects may cancel out. On the one hand, women might be most disadvantaged when they face a male opponent, as women are most likely to be disadvantaged by stereotypes in this electoral environment. On the other hand, Fulton (2008) found that challengers tend to spend more when they face a female incumbent as opposed to a male opponent. Thus, it is possible that female incumbents will be particularly disadvantaged regardless of their opponent. These variables take the form of dichotomous indicators that represent the gender context of a particular race. One variable identifies whether or not a woman was running against another woman, another variable identifies whether a woman was running against a man, another variable accounts for whether a man was running against a woman, and the final variable is made up of races in which a man ran against another man. When the opponent’s gender is controlled for in the multivariate analysis, the cases in which men run against men are used as the comparison category.
Candidate Status

When looking at all contested candidates together, I include two dummy variables that measure the status of the candidate. It is important to account for candidate status because incumbents and open seat candidates tend to be better financed or to have larger war chests when compared to candidates running as challengers against well established opponents (Hogan, 2007; Burrell, 1994; Box-Steffensmeier, 1996; Krasno et al., 1994). In addition, certain donors may be more receptive to these candidates either because they have qualities that are missing in challengers, such as name recognition, or because they hope to influence a tight electoral contest one way or the other. Thus, I expect incumbents and open seat candidates to have higher campaign receipts both in total contributions and in contributions from all types of other donors (party, business, etc.) than challengers. In addition, I expect that incumbents will put less of their own money into their own campaign given their higher probability of being electorally secure and the likelihood they will raise more from various donors. Finally, I expect incumbents will receive more in large donations because of their skill in campaigning, their array of political and financial connections, their name recognition, and their experience in the legislature. To measure this, I include one variable that identifies whether or not a candidate is an incumbent and another variable that identifies whether a candidate is running in an open seat race. The comparison category includes challengers.

Chamber Party Leadership

Legislative leaders, whether male or female, are valuable candidates that are courted by all types of contributors, especially access-oriented donors. These donors are looking to gain access to the gatekeepers of the legislative decision-making process because they have influence over the success of legislation and are most likely to be in a
position to persuade the rank and file to support, or at least not actively voice their
dissension, for legislation that favors the interests of that particular group (Moncrief et al.
of this relationship.

For the reasons above, I expect to find that legislative leaders receive more
donations and larger donations from access-oriented groups like businesses. This should
also be the case because these leaders are likely to have established personal relationships
with donors that provide contributors with an incentive to help them remain in office
(Grenzke 1989). In addition, these candidates should receive more money from
individual corporate and labor union donors because they are more likely to have name
recognition, to be covered in the media and to be on the priority list for the organizations
they work for. I also expect to find that legislative leaders invest less of their own funds
into their campaign because they should have larger war chests and established
fundraising sources from prior elections (Francia et al. 2003; Box-Steffensmeier 1996).
As a result of these fundraising advantages, party leaders frequently find themselves in an
influential position to allocate funds to other candidates through legislative leadership
committees or through party or candidate campaign committees (Larson 2004; Mocrief et
al. 2001). This should only enhance their ability to collect larger donations in general
and donations from the party in particular. Finally, party leaders may receive more from
labor unions as these groups desire an ideological connection and will often consider
party affiliation and prior voting history as a surrogate for ideology. Party leaders should
be very loyal to the party and, as such, labor unions may use this as a cue in determining
proximity on issue positions of importance to the group. Thus, given the hypothesized
fundraising advantages across the board, I would expect party leaders to receive more in
total campaign receipts. This variable is dichotomous and coded so an incumbent candidate receives a 1 if they are a party leader and 0 if they are a rank and file member of the legislature.

Committee Chairs

In much the same way as legislative leaders, male and female legislators who chair standing committees should receive more contributions over-all and larger contributions than officeholders who simply serve on the committees. This should be especially true for legislators who chair prestigious committees or committees that determine the fate of bills that are of great import to a variety of economic and special interests (Endersby and Munger, 1992; Romer and Synder 1994; Grenzke 1989).

I expect that committee chairs receive more contributions from businesses, whose primary mission is to seek access to influential legislators. However, I also expect legislators to receive funds from labor unions who tend to follow an ideological strategy, especially if these members chair committees that have jurisdiction or import over their interests. Knowledgeable individual donors may also contribute more campaign funds to these candidates either through the businesses and labor unions they work for or because they care about a particular policy issue that the committee chair presides over. For much the same reason as legislative leaders, I expect committee chairs to receive larger donations than those in the basic rank and file and that they will have to put less of their own money into their campaign. This variable is dichotomous with standing committee chairs receiving a value of 1 and rank and file committee members receiving a value of 0.

Years of Service

In the last decade, political scientists have argued that a connection exists between the amount of time a congressman has been in office and the amount of money they
receive from donors (Grier and Munger, 1993; Rudolph, 1999). I speculate that there are several reasons for this connection. First, the longer a member has been in office the more familiar they should become with the legislative and campaign process and the more skilled they should be in working with members of their constituency and in making and passing legislation (Garand and Burke 2006; Wright 2005). They should be more equipped to use their expertise and connections to help contributors meet their policy goals. In addition, these individuals have an established voting record and should have more sway over the policymaking process, which should help them gain contributions from like-minded donors. Second, they are more likely to have earned their way onto more prestigious committees or into a leadership post. Finally, these individuals are more likely to know what types of fundraising appeals work and with which constituencies and should also have established relationships with donors and groups that will make it easier to ask for contributions and to receive them (Brown et al. 1995; Grenzke 1989; Francia et al. 2003). In fact, this is exactly what Grenzke (1989) finds in her work. She states that candidates will accrue more in campaign donations if they have developed the type of long-standing relationships that come with seniority, or if they take an aggressive stance in pursuit of campaign dollars.

For these reasons, I expect access-oriented groups to be more likely to contribute, and to provide larger donations when they do. I also expect candidates with more years of service to receive more in total campaign contributions. On the one hand, I expect seniority to lead to less campaign self-finance. On the other hand, I do not anticipate that this variable will matter much for either labor unions or parties. Only if these candidates appear vulnerable should party contributions become a significant source of revenue for officeholders. Finally, I expect seniority will have a positive effect on the size of
contributions received by candidates. This variable is continuous and simply represents the number of years a member has served from the time they were first elected until the last year of their current session (1998 or 2000).

Political Party Affiliation

Contributors often divide along partisan lines with business groups favoring Republican legislators and labor unions favoring Democrats (e.g. Cassie and Thompson, 1998; Herndon 1982). I expect to find the same basic pattern in this analysis. However, I also anticipate that this variable will matter more for groups favoring an ideological strategy. Labor unions and ideological groups are more likely to pay attention to party affiliation because they care about whether a candidate will share their policy positions and beliefs (McGhee and La Raja 2008; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). Since party is one of the simplest cues for making assumptions about ideology, donors are expected to hone in on this candidate characteristic when making contribution decisions. I also expect Republicans to obtain heftier contributions from the party and corporate donors given that Republican organizations are often perceived to have a large fundraising base at their disposal and conservative donors are frequently associated with higher personal incomes (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). Given these expectations, I anticipate Democrats will raise more from small donors. Finally, in terms of campaign self-finance, I am unsure which direction this relationship will take. On the one hand, Republicans may invest less of their own money given that they should do well in collecting contributions from a majority of the donors examined here. However, Republicans, as a group, may have better personal financial situations and may be able to finance their campaigns to a greater extent as a result. This
variable is dichotomous and coded 1 if the candidate is a Democrat and 0 if the candidate is a Republican.

Majority Party Status

Donors who wish to gain access to influential members in the chamber will be more likely to make donations and donations of a larger size to officeholders from the majority party (Cox and Magar 1999; Rudolph 1999; Thompson et al. 1993; Cassie and Thompson 1998; Grenzke 1989). Thus, I would expect majority party members to receive more in total campaign receipts and more from businesses. In addition, majority party members may receive more from the party as the majority party may be more established and organized and may have a larger pool of funds to draw from than the party out of power. However, groups that follow more of an ideological strategy (labor unions), should be less likely to pay attention to majority party status and more likely to focus on party affiliation and prior voting history (Rudolph 1999). Nevertheless, majority party members may still receive more from labor unions because, as Cox and McCubbins (1993) explain, majority party members tend to have the upper hand in policymaking and procedural matters. In addition, majority party members tend to have a seat distribution advantage on the most prestigious committee assignments. Finally, majority party members are more likely to be successful when using their leadership powers to get their agenda realized because they have gate keeping powers that allow them more control over the procedures under which bills are or are not considered (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). Given that majority party members are valuable to a wide variety of donors, I would expect them to receive fewer small donations and to contribute more to their own campaigns. In the dataset, this variable is coded 1 for all candidates
who are from the majority party and 0 for all candidates who are from the minority party.³

**District-Level Factors**

**Past Electoral Competition**

Political parties and labor unions are likely to concentrate on the previous electoral margin of the candidate. If a candidate is supportive of a group’s agenda but appears to be in danger of losing their seat or is in a very competitive race, they should receive higher levels of support in their bid for office (Thompson et al. 1993; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). Alternatively, if a challenger sounds like a good fit for an organization, then that party or interest group should support this individual, especially if the opposition looks vulnerable (Thompson et al. 1993; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005).

As to the other aspects of the campaign finance process, I am unsure which direction these relationships will take. Candidates running in a historically competitive district may need to invest more of their own money into their campaign. Further, they may receive more in small donations and less in total contributions because donors may not feel as assured that their investment will reap a reward. In addition, a competitive race will tend to be more expensive and may require more of an investment by the candidate. It may also be true that, candidates may invest less of their own money and may get more from larger donors and total campaign contributions because some donors may invest heavily in candidates facing tight electoral contests. This may mean that

³Note that prior to 2000, state legislative incumbents in Washington shared chamber control. Therefore, incumbents of neither party are coded as being in the majority.
candidates will not need to invest as much of their own money if they can secure large
donations from other donors.

This variable measures past competition within a district in the previous election. It is calculated by taking the winner’s percentage of the two-party vote in the last election and then subtracting it from 100. Thus, if a candidate in the previous election faced no opposition (they won with 100% of the two-party vote) then their competitiveness score will be zero. Alternatively, if the race is competitive and the candidate wins only 55% of the vote, then the competitiveness measure would be 45. In other words, higher values mean that the incumbent is more vulnerable. Higher values also indicate that a district is particularly competitive.

Number of Candidates in the Previous Primary Election

Just as the previous degree of general electoral competition matters, so too does the amount of competition in the previous primary. Although some candidates may be unchallenged in the general election, it is quite possible they faced a challenging road in the primary to get there. For instance, Palmer and Simon (2005) find that the electoral context is different for male and female incumbents. They argue that women face stiffer electoral competition and that they tend to be more of a magnet for challengers, especially female, from within and outside of their party (p. 39). This heightened level of competition may cause women to change their fundraising strategy and may affect how much effort they put into building a war chest, collecting money early in the campaign season, and etc.

As with past electoral competition, I anticipate that candidates will raise more in receipts from groups that monitor electoral competition (e.g. political parties and labor
unions). This variable details the number of candidates that ran in the legislator’s primary in the most previous primary election.

Amount Raised by the Opposition

I anticipate this variable will have a positive and statistically significant effect on total campaign receipts, on total business receipts, on total labor receipts, on total party receipts, and on self-finance because I assume the fundraising process has a reactive element. Although this relationship may be more pronounced in terms of campaign spending, it is certainly true that candidates’ fundraising efforts take into consideration their opponent or potential opponent. For example, candidates raise war chests in the hopes this will dissuade potential challengers from running against them. In addition, candidates may invest more in fundraising if their opponent is running a highly professionalized and public campaign. Savvy candidates should be able to pick up on cues, like the degree of media exposure, to help them determine whether they need to invest more time into raising money to stay competitive. This variable is present in the dataset for contested races. It measures the total campaign receipts and total receipts per eligible voter for the opposing candidate. Thus, for an incumbent, this variable represents the amount of money raised by the challenger and vice versa.

State-Level Factors

Legislative Professionalism

The degree of professionalism within state legislatures varies widely across all 50 states. Professional state legislatures tend to have longer sessions, higher member salaries and greater levels of staff support (Moncrief et al. 2001). In addition, officeholders in these chambers are far less likely to hold a job outside of their role as a state legislator. Incumbents from professional legislatures are also more likely to
maintain their office or to aspire to a higher office (Berry et al. 2000 and Carey et al. 2000). Since professional legislatures are often the source of innovative policies, access-oriented groups are likely to work harder to make a connection with incumbent state legislators. In addition, incumbents from these legislatures are more likely to be reelected, and this should increase the likelihood that access oriented groups (e.g. businesses) will invest in their candidacies (Berry et al. 2000).

Although incumbents are more likely to be elected, gaining a seat in a professional legislature can have its difficulties given the desirability of the office. Both incumbents and challengers are likely to have some prior office holding experience, and campaigns tend to be more expensive given that these types of legislatures are often found in populates states (Moncrief et al. 2001). Once a candidate has gained office in this type of legislature, they can expect future elections to be more frequently contested, although the level of competition should not be as high as, “legislators in professional states have a clear advantage over challengers in terms of fundraising and generally receive a higher vote percentage” (Hogan, 2004, p. 1298-1299). In addition, professional legislatures often have high levels of party contestation, as well as active parties and legislative campaign committees. Thus, parties, businesses and labor unions should contribute more heavily, leading to higher overall total campaign receipts and fewer small contributions. In addition, candidates may rely more heavily on self-finance given the expensive nature of these campaigns and the high start-up costs.

To measure legislative professionalism, I use the standard measure by Squire (2000), which factors in legislative session length, legislator salaries and staff resources. The scale ranges from 0 to 1 with greater values indicating higher levels of professionalism. For the purposes of descriptive analysis, I also use Kurtz’s (1990)
categorization of professionalism which puts state legislatures into categories using legislative resources and time spent serving the legislature. Below, Table 3.1 illustrates where the states in my analysis fall on each of Kurtz’s categories from least professional (citizen) to most professional.

Table 3.1: Level of Legislative Professionalism Categorized by States in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>GA, ID, IN, ME, NM, RI, UT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid</td>
<td>AK, CO, FL, IA, KY, MN, MO, OR, TN, TX, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>CA, IL, MI, OH, PA, WI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Campaign Finance Laws

Each state in the U.S. has campaign finance laws that range from allowing nearly unlimited contributions to setting strict limits on the size of contributions that can be made by various organizations or individuals (Alexander, 1991; Gross and Goidel, 2003; Jones, 1984; Malbin and Gais, 1998; Michaelson, 2001; Thompson and Moncrief, 1998; Schultz, 2002 and Witko, 2005). The stringency of these laws should have a definitive effect on the contribution strategies employed by interest groups. Since parties and individuals are less regulated, campaign finance laws should have only an indirect effect on their contributions. Although, Baker (2006) points out that limits on individual donations tend to disproportionately disadvantage women.

Since incumbents tend to be advantaged in the fundraising process, I expect campaign finance reform to have more of a negative impact on their ability to raise money (Hogan et al. 2009; Burrell 1994). Alternatively, stringent laws should offer some benefit to challengers, as they should level the playing field and rectify some of the contemporary fundraising imbalances (Hogan et al. 2009). When taken as a whole, I expect that stricter campaign finance laws will reduce the amount that a candidate
receives from every type of donor in the analysis and that it will increase small donations and increase the need for campaign self-finance.

To measure campaign finance law stringency, I use a method which classifies state laws into three categories (coded 0, 1 and 2). The first category encompasses each state that allows unlimited contributions from corporations, labor unions and other PACs. The second category encompasses each state that sets a limit on corporate and union contributions or prohibits them completely but allows unlimited contributions through PACs. Finally, the third category encompasses each state where PAC contributions are limited to some degree and corporate and labor contributions are either prohibited or limited. In 1998, just over half of the states in the analysis had the most stringent contribution limits while five states had some limits in place and five states allowed unlimited contributions. The only change to take effect between 1998 and 2000 was in Missouri, which moved from allowing unlimited contributions to having some limits in place. Below, Table 3.2 illustrates which states fall into each of these categories.

Table 3.2: Campaign Finance Law Stringency Categorized by States in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 (More Lax)</td>
<td>CA, IL, MO (1998), NM, OR, UT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>IA, IN, MO (2000), PA, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (More strict)</td>
<td>AK, CO, FL, GA, ID, KY, ME, MI, MN, OH, RI, TN, WA, WI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interest Group Strength

Given the variation in interest group populations across the states (see Gray and Lowery 1996 and Thomas and Hrebenar 2004), I expect to find that the strength of these interest groups has an effect on the contribution strategies of donors. If interest groups are strong and active, they are more likely to be at the forefront in researching candidate history, making contributions to candidates, organizing fundraisers and creating issue
advertising. If the state’s interest group population is dense, then interest groups and lobbyists are more likely to join forces to convince officeholders of their position and to find innovative ways to grab the attention of candidates and officeholders.

Where interest groups are more inactive and weak, candidates should receive less in total campaign contributions and contributions should be smaller from businesses and labor unions. This lack of support may require candidates to reach deeper into their own personal bank accounts to fund their campaign and may result in candidates receiving more small contributions. On the other hand, when interest groups are strong and active, party organizations may contribute less. I use Thomas and Hrebenar’s (2004) measure of interest group strength, which categorizes states on a four point scale from complementary/subordinate (0) to dominate (3). Higher values on this dimension indicate the presence of stronger interest groups. Table 3.3 below illustrates where each of the states in my analysis fall on these dimensions.

Table 3.3: Interest Group Strength Categorized by States in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>0 (Lowest)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MI, MN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CO, IN, ME, PA, RI, WI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AK, CA, GA, IA, ID, IL, KY, MO, NM, OR, TN, TX, UT, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (Highest)</td>
<td>FL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presence of Term Limits

Beginning in the 1990s, state legislative term limits became a hot topic as voters grew increasingly comfortable with the idea of limiting the term length of state legislators. Voters supported term limits for a wide variety of reasons, which Stein et al. (2002) overview in their article. They state that term limits were favored by those who were unhappy with the political process, by women and minorities who believed the
process might create a gain in descriptive representation, by Republicans who were more frequently the party out of power, and by voters who were of the opposite party from their representative (Stein et al. 2002).

The first term limits took effect in California and Maine in 1996, one year before the beginning of the first electoral cycle under examination here (NCSL, 2010). As such, I have included a control for them in my analysis which accounts for whether or not term limits were in effect for each state during the 1998 and 2000 elections. Table 3.4 below illustrates which states had term limits during this time.

**Table 3.4: Term Limits in Effect Categorized by States in the Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not In Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK, FL, GA, IA, ID, IL, IN, KY, MN, MO, NM, OH, PA, RI, TN, TX, UT, WA, WI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA, CO, FL, ME, MI, OH, OR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may take some time after the inception of term limits for donors to regulate their contribution strategy and figure out what works best for them. On the one hand, some groups may contribute more heavily when term limits are in place as they may hope that term limited members will use their last years in office to introduce legislation that is favorable to the group’s position. In addition, term limits will create more open seat contests which may lead to increased donations by groups that normally contribute to tight electoral contests or that are trying to get their preferred candidate elected. Term limits may also limit the financial advantages that come with being a party leader or committee chair for those whom are about to be termed out of office (Apollonio and Raja, 2006), thus reducing over-all donations. Also, some donors may make an effort to establish connections elsewhere by redirecting their donations or reducing their donations to members they know will be out of office soon. In this manner, they can work to build
a relationship and gain access to the next group of legislators. Thus, it is unclear whether term limits will have a positive or negative effect on total campaign receipts, on the receipts of various types of other donors, on campaign size and on self-finance. This variable takes the form of a dichotomous indicator where a value of 1 means that term limits are in effect within a given state and a 0 means that they are not.

Chamber Competition

Another factor that may affect the total amount raised by a candidate, as well as the total amount raised from various donors, is the percentage of seats held by the majority party in the state legislature. If a candidate is a member of a party that has a commanding hold on the legislature, they may receive more money because their party is behind the wheel and thus most likely to dictate the legislative agenda and what types of policies are passed. However, if the partisan balance in the legislature is close to evenly split, contributions may be directed more to challengers and open seat candidates as these races offer the best opportunities for donors to influence the partisan balance in their favor.

When the partisan balance in the chamber is close, I expect candidates to receive more from the party, from businesses and from labor unions because each of these donors has an investment in seeing one or the other party in control of the chamber. However, the relationship between this variable and campaign self-finance and contribution size is less clear. If donors are not sure which party will take control, they may hedge their bets and donate smaller amounts to candidates from both parties, which may lead the candidate to invest more in their own campaign to make up for the shortfall in donor contributions. The obverse reading would be that some donors may invest more heavily because they hope it will lead to their favored candidate winning and this may help to
offset the costs involved so that a candidate will not have to contribute as much to their campaign. This variable calculates the percentage of seats in the chamber held by the minority party. I expect that higher values on this variable will translate into larger campaign finance totals, especially for challengers and open seat contestants.

Presidential Election Year

One variable that may affect the amount raised is whether candidates are running in a presidential election year. Generally, turnout is higher and voter interest and attention is heightened during years in which a presidential election is held. This may have a positive affect on total campaign fundraising levels, on donations received from various types of donors, and may increase the amount received in small donations. Conversely, donors may receive more pressure in an election year to contribute to races at the federal or presidential level or they may choose to direct their resources more to these campaigns because they feel having ties to these members is more valuable or they are simply more invested in the outcomes of these elections. If the latter is true, this may dampen contributions from the party, businesses, and labor unions and may result in candidates having to invest more in their own campaigns. To account for this I have included a dichotomous indicator where the 1997-1998 election cycle is coded 1 and the 1999-2000 election cycle is coded 0.

Having now explained the measurement and theoretical expectations concerning each of the variables in my analysis, I include a table below that summaries the hypothesized direction for each of these variables. Below, in Table 3.5, a positive relationship is denoted with a plus sign and a negative relationship with a minus. When there are theoretical reasons to believe the variable could take either direction I include both symbols. Finally, when I do not have a hypothesized relationship for a variable,
either because the literature is largely silent on the topic or I do not believe it will play much of a role, I indicate this with a zero.

**Table 3.5: Hypothesized Variable Directions for my Full Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total Campaign Receipts</th>
<th>Party Donations</th>
<th>Business Donations</th>
<th>Labor Union Donations</th>
<th>Self-Finance</th>
<th>Small Donations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+/-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Candidate Spending</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Full Model

Campaign Receipts per Eligible Voter = \( a + b_1 \) (woman vs. woman) + \( b_2 \) (woman vs. man) + \( b_3 \) (man vs. woman) + \( b_4 \) (incumbent) + \( b_5 \) (open seat) + \( b_6 \) (party leader) + \( b_7 \) (committee leader) + \( b_8 \) (years of service) + \( b_9 \) (party affiliation) + \( b_{10} \) (majority party status) + \( b_{11} \) (previous electoral competition) + \( b_{12} \) (number of candidates in the previous primary) + \( b_{13} \) (amount raised by the opposition) + \( b_{14} \) (legislative professionalism) + \( b_{15} \) (stringency of campaign finance laws) + \( b_{16} \) (interest group strength) + \( b_{17} \) (term limits in effect) + \( b_{18} \) (chamber competition) + \( b_{19} \) (presidential election year).

In addition to understanding my model, it is also important to have a sense of my decision framework regarding the selection of the states and time periods in my sample, as well as where I acquired my data. This next section explains each of these aspects in turn.

**Description of the Data and Selection Criteria**

This study takes advantage of the opportunity for variation and the larger pool of candidates at the state legislative level by examining just under half of the states in the U.S. The states under examination include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. These states were chosen for a variety of reasons. First, an effort was made to focus on states that have single-member districts.\(^4\) Single-member and multi-member districts should be separated because of the various

---

\(^4\) As of 1998, the following states had multi-member districts in the lower houses: Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington and West Virginia. I included Idaho and Washington in my analysis because these states have
differences between the two electoral types. Scholars argue that single-member districts tend to disadvantage women and minority groups while multi-member districts tend to increase the importance of money in campaign success and lead to more expensive elections generally (Hogan and Hamm 1998; Darcy et al. 1994). In addition, comparing incumbents directly with challengers is a more parsimonious task when general election contests are limited to no more then two candidates, one from each party (excepting Louisiana’s nonpartisan blanket primary system). Second, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey and Virginia were all excluded because they conduct off-year election contests. Finally, the state sample was also selected as a function of data availability. Campaign finance data was not assessable on the Follow the Money website for one or both of the electoral cycles in Alabama, Delaware, Mississippi, Nebraska and Oklahoma. Despite not having a full 50 state sample, these states do provide variation on important factors such as region, interest group impact, degree of professionalism, inter-party competition levels and culture. Additionally, the states vary on another critical component—i.e., campaign finance laws.

Only lower state houses are examined in this analysis, as for the states in this sample, elections are always held in a two-year rotation, which ensures that all members of the legislature can be examined for both electoral periods. Looking at elections to the state senate is more complicated given that some states hold elections every two years while others hold elections every four years.

post systems where candidates run for legislative office in the same geographic area. For this analysis, each of these posts is treated as a separate election.
The electoral cycles 1998 and 2000 were selected partly as a function of data availability for the independent variables in the analysis. However, more importantly these elections were selected because enough time elapsed from the date of redistricting to allow for competition in the districts to regularize and for candidates to have a clear picture of their constituency. Additionally, by selecting elections at the end of the redistricting cycle, I should be able to eliminate the possibility that my measure of previous electoral margin is clouded by the proximity of redistricting. Finally, enough time should have elapsed for candidates to base entry decisions, and for donors to base fundraising decisions, on factors other than redistricting.

I chose to examine general elections exclusively for a couple of reasons. First, primaries tend to be more low-key affairs with less media attention, name recognition, and challenger quality. This is likely to have an affect on donor contribution patterns and voter turnout. As a result, some interest groups, especially big contributors, may wait to influence an election until the Democratic and Republican candidates have been established. In addition, candidates tend to put more of their own money into these campaigns, which limits the breadth and scope of the type and amount of donors for examination. Focusing on general elections eliminates many of these problems and allows for a more detailed examination of the contribution patterns to male and female state legislative candidates.

The primary dataset used in this analysis was obtained and coded from the Institute on Money in State Politics, a nonprofit organization that collects data in paper and electronic form from state disclosure agencies (About Our Data, n.d., para 1). Reports are obtained and uploaded by the Institute into a dataset, which contains all candidates in the primary and general election at the state legislative level (About Our
Data, n.d., para 1). The dataset contains data on the campaign contributions of each Democratic and Republican candidate who ran in an open, contested or uncontested race in the general election. This information can be obtained from the website www.followthemoney.org. Each record in the dataset contains information on the contributor/industry that made the donation, who the recipient of the donation was, the amount that was given to the candidate and, in some cases, the date that the contribution was made. The primary advantage of using this data is that each donation is categorized into a number of economic sectors according to “economic interest codes” (About Our Data, n.d., para 2). The economic sectors retain the same identification from state to state although some classifications may be excluded due to a lack of applicability in some states. The website contains a designation for agriculture, candidate contributions, communications and electronics, construction, defense, energy and natural resources, finance, insurance and real estate, general business, health, ideology/single issue, labor, lawyers and lobbyists, other/retiree/civil servants, party and transportation (About Our Data, n.d., para 6). The data collection was made possible by two grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0215450 and SES-0215604), which were awarded to the principal investigators: Dr. Robert Hogan of Louisiana State University and Dr. Keith Hamm of Rice University.

In addition to the aforementioned dataset, I also obtained data on each incumbent candidate’s personal and professional attributes (such as their gender, term of service, party affiliation, etc.) This data was obtained either directly from the Secretary of State or the Clerk of the House or from the book State Legislative Leadership, Committees and Staff for the years 1998 and 2000 published by the Council of State Governments. In the case of candidates who were not successful in their bid for office, much of this
information is simply not applicable (such as previous voting record, chamber leadership, committee chairmanship, etc.) and is therefore not included. For the variables that are applicable to non-incumbent candidates, such as gender and party affiliation, an effort was made to collect this data for each candidate.

I was able to obtain information on the party affiliation of the non-incumbent candidates from either election returns or the website www.followthemoney.org. Data on the gender of both the incumbent and non-incumbent candidates was obtained from the Center for American Women on Politics, an organization that lists the gender of all female candidates for political office.

Besides individual level characteristics, data was collected on several district and state level factors. Demographic district level data was obtained from the book Legislative Elections: Voting Patterns and Demographics by Barony et al. published in 1998. Data on the campaign finance laws in each state was obtained from Campaign Finance Law, a publication by Feigenbaum and Palmer for both 1998 and 2000. If questions arose concerning some particular aspect of the laws more information was sought from the state oversight agencies. Election materials came from each state’s election division either via a personal request from an official working in that department or through the department’s website.
CHAPTER 4: EXAMINING TOTAL CAMPAIGN RECEIPTS

This chapter and the remaining analysis chapters explore just how viable campaign finance is as an explanation for women’s under-representation. I make an effort to answer the following questions: Are women’s campaign receipts on par with men’s so long as incumbency, majority party status, leadership status, etc. are taken into account? Is the nature of raising money different for men and women? Are women advantaged by some types of donors but disadvantaged by others? My exploration of these questions begins with an in-depth look at total campaign receipts. In general, I expect to find differences between male and female state legislators across the various types of donors but not necessarily in total campaign receipts. In some cases, I expect these differences will advantage female candidates while in other cases they may put women at a disadvantage.

Previous Research on Total Campaign Contributions

There has long been a perception that women have a hard time raising money and competing with men financially. Candidates, party activists, and various types of donors have all shared personal experiences and perceptions of the obstacles that women face in the campaign fundraising process (Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Moncrief et al. 2001). Burrell (1994) argues that these beliefs are based on three basic assumptions. The first is that, “women are psychologically unsuited to asking for money for themselves” (Burrell, 1994, p. 102). In other words, while women may not think twice about raising money for charity, a political organization, or a child’s fundraising project, it is another thing when it involves raising money for something that benefits them directly. Second, women may struggle to raise money because they are less connected professionally, socially, and politically to the types of donors and networks
necessary to raise money (Burrell, 1994). Third, assuming that number two is false and women make their case to approximately the same number and type of donors, it is possible that they do not get the same results for their time and effort. In other words, donors may harbor stereotypes about female candidates and their ability to compete successfully. These stereotypes may prevent donors from investing in women candidates or to even discourage their candidacies.

Despite the electoral gains that women have made in some states and the proliferation of women’s political organizations to help with campaigning and fundraising, if these stereotypes persist, they may derail the candidacies of some women or make it less likely that women run in the first place. The goal of this dissertation is to help reconcile perception with reality. Most of the scholarly literature in political science since the 1980s concludes that when women run they win and that women can be successful fundraisers (Newman, 1994; Burrell 1985, 1990, 1994; Gaddie and Bullock 1995, 1997; Uhlander and Schlozman 1986; Wilhite and Theilman 1986; Darcy et al. 1984, 1994; Thompson et al. 1998; Werner 1997; Seltzer et al. 1997; Fox 2000). When differences in campaign finance are found between male and female candidates they are attributed to differences in status as men are more likely to be incumbents or to hold leadership positions within the legislature. Thus, when female incumbents are compared to male incumbent these differences disappear (Burrell, 1985).

However, given the difficulties inherent in examining campaign finance at the state legislative level, many of these studies occur exclusively at the congressional level. Obviously, this poses some challenges for extrapolation as congresswomen tend to be more established candidates with a built-in network of donors and political contacts and previous experience campaigning, fundraising, working with the media, appealing for
votes, etc. Therefore, it may not be safe to assume that what holds true at the federal level will also be the case at the sub-national level. In addition, congressional campaigns can often be very expensive affairs. The Federal Election Commission reports that congressional candidates who ran for office between 2007 and 2008 raised close to $1.5 billion and spent close to $1.4 billion during that time period. In addition, between Jan. 1 and Dec. 31 of last year, congressional campaign receipts were close to $600 million, which represents almost an 18% increase since 2007 (Federal Election Commission, 2010). Although state legislative campaigns have become more expensive, especially in professional states, many still fail to reach the financial excess of a race for the U.S. House or Senate.

Many sub-national studies of campaign finance are conducted with a very limited sample of states or have been single-state studies (Thompson and Moncrief, 1998) making generalizations difficult. The most comprehensive state-level assessments come from a couple of sources. The first is a book chapter by Thompson and Moncrief (1998) which examines campaign contributions to male and female state legislative candidates across 18 state legislatures. The authors examine the 1992 electoral session which has been referred to as “The Year of the Woman”. The authors find that women actually outperform men in their fundraising capabilities. However, the authors qualify this conclusion by saying that women have a much more difficult time when competing for a seat in a professional legislature. The author’s also caution that their sample of states does not contain many Southern states which may be problematic since these states tend to be home to cultural factors that can disadvantage women in fundraising. Although this study provides a rare multi-state assessment of campaign finance, it is rather limited in terms of the number of controls for the district and state electoral environment. For
instance, this study does not account for the strength of interest groups, the level of previous competition in a district, or the stringency of campaign finance laws.

The second multi-state set of analyses of campaign finance are included in several papers by Hogan (2008, 2007, 2001a, 2001b). These studies examine male and female state legislators across 20 states and two electoral cycles. The author finds that male and female candidates tend to spend the same amount of money in running for a seat in the state legislature and that other factors (such as leadership status and opposition spending) tend to affect total campaign spending. However, these studies are focused on campaign spending and not campaign fundraising and therefore do not have quite the same research objectives in mind. For instance, when looking at total spending exclusively, one does not get a sense of the degree of effort that went into raising this sum of money nor do they know how much of that money was contributed by the candidate themselves. In other words, at the end of the day, a woman may raise and spend a sum of money that is equal to that of a man; however, the woman may have had to collect more donations to reach this total if they received smaller contributions. Thus, I argue it is fundamentally important to our understanding of gender and campaign finance to examine campaign fundraising more in-depth and across a large array of states. For now, my analysis is limited to an examination of total campaign contributions. My primary research question is concerned with whether male and female state legislative candidates raise similar amounts of money across the large array of state in the analysis.

I begin this analysis with a descriptive exploration of total male and female campaign receipts before performing a more detailed analysis that controls for other mitigating factors that might account for any differences I find below.
Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total Campaign Receipts

An initial way to determine whether differences exist between male and female legislators is to examine the mean and median on total campaign receipts across each state. I include both the mean and median because the median is less sensitive to outliers, such as instances when a small number of candidates raised a sum far higher or lower than average. For instance, legislative leaders may raise tens to even hundreds of thousands more than a challenger running for the first time. Table 4.1 displays the mean and median total contributions received for both contested and uncontested races for men and women across the 24 states. The table is sorted according to the mean contribution received by the male candidates.

Table 4.1: Total Campaign Receipts by Gender and State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Men Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Women Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>4,769</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>5,394</td>
<td>4,324</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>4,990</td>
<td>3,864</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>9,121</td>
<td>7,217</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>12,821</td>
<td>10,960</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>12,013</td>
<td>10,577</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>13,951</td>
<td>10,479</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>19,588</td>
<td>17,675</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>21,776</td>
<td>19,031</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>21,577</td>
<td>13,197</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>24,736</td>
<td>16,033</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>22,864</td>
<td>21,094</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>23,268</td>
<td>23,039</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>24,503</td>
<td>17,173</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>23,261</td>
<td>19,278</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>26,510</td>
<td>21,240</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>28,141</td>
<td>23,261</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>31,687</td>
<td>21,696</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>31,899</td>
<td>24,391</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>34,157</td>
<td>24,169</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>31,191</td>
<td>24,141</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>34,697</td>
<td>25,202</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>27,009</td>
<td>18,645</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>38,794</td>
<td>34,505</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>46,515</td>
<td>35,837</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>43,549</td>
<td>30,152</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>47,805</td>
<td>38,236</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>43,916</td>
<td>26,096</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>37,562</td>
<td>19,362</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>51,527</td>
<td>31,773</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>53,668</td>
<td>28,305</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>56,180</td>
<td>50,685</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>62,206</td>
<td>50,275</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>68,891</td>
<td>36,913</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>57,147</td>
<td>29,704</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>83,550</td>
<td>61,545</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>93,315</td>
<td>89,455</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>83,931</td>
<td>47,743</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>59,691</td>
<td>39,350</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>108,032</td>
<td>98,663</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>117,325</td>
<td>103,754</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>123,768</td>
<td>89,441</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>116,689</td>
<td>84,136</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In looking at the table, it is apparent that there is a great deal of variation across the states in terms of total campaign receipts. In California men and women raise above $450,000 on average while in Rhode Island the average total is below $5,000 for both men and women. In addition, there tends to be great variation in the distance between the average contribution for men and women in a number of the states. For instance, the largest difference is in Illinois where men receive over $106,000 more in total campaign receipts on average than women do. The second largest contribution difference is in another professional state, Ohio, where men out-raise women, on average, by just over $24,000. On the other hand, in some states the differences are incredibly slight with women receiving $404 more on average in Minnesota and $202 in Wisconsin. In examining the average total across all of the states in the analysis it is interesting to see that when compared to men, women have a slightly higher median contribution but a slightly lower mean contribution. Finally, in looking at each state individually, one finds that women out-raise men on the median total contribution across 12 of the states in the analysis while men outperform women in the other half. This suggests that women are capable fundraisers who can compete with men or even exceed the total coffers of their male opponents in some cases.

The next table, Table 4.2, provides a different perspective on campaign receipts by examining total receipts divided by the house district population. This figure provides an estimate of the total amount received by each candidate per potential voter in the

Table 4.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Men Mean</th>
<th>Men Median</th>
<th>Men Number</th>
<th>Women Mean</th>
<th>Women Median</th>
<th>Women Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>212,225</td>
<td>112,542</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>105,818</td>
<td>84,359</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>465,875</td>
<td>285,734</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>470,501</td>
<td>326,862</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66,630</td>
<td>23,928</td>
<td>6,203</td>
<td>63,848</td>
<td>24,888</td>
<td>1,978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In examining the average total across all of the states in the analysis it is interesting to see that when compared to men, women have a slightly higher median contribution but a slightly lower mean contribution. Finally, in looking at each state individually, one finds that women out-raise men on the median total contribution across 12 of the states in the analysis while men outperform women in the other half. This suggests that women are capable fundraisers who can compete with men or even exceed the total coffers of their male opponents in some cases.
voting age population. Controlling for population is important because campaigns tend to be more expensive in populous districts and accounting for this variation may facilitate comparisons.

Table 4.2: Total Campaign Receipts per Eligible Voter by Gender and State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Male Median</th>
<th>Female Median</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this table, it is again apparent that there is a fair amount of variation between each of the states under consideration. In Colorado, Idaho, Michigan and Rhode Island male and female candidates raise, less then 45 cents per eligible voter while in Alaska, Iowa, Illinois and Oregon both male and female candidates raised over $1.10 per eligible voter in the district. One interesting change from the previous table is Alaska. Once
population is accounted for, this state has the highest median contribution for both men and women. In looking at the difference between the male and female median total contribution per eligible voter, one sees that women out-raise men in 13 states and men exceed the totals raised by women in 10 states. Women do exceedingly well in fundraising in Oregon where the difference is 70 cents in their favor while men have the greatest advantage in Illinois where their total exceeds a woman’s by just over 35 cents per eligible voter. Again, on the whole, women can compete with men. However, they are more successful in their endeavors in some states versus others.

Discussion

Finally, as we saw in chapter one, just as there is variation across the states in the number of women running and winning, so too is there variation in the amount of money women and men raise. Although, men raise $2,782 more than women on average, women’s median contribution is $960 higher than men’s. However, when examining the median total contribution per eligible voter, men out-raise women by about one cent per eligible voter.

Given the great variation across the states in the number of women running and in the amount of money being raised, it is imperative that these differences be explored more fully. Although gender may play a role in this variation, there are many other factors that should also account for these differences. Thus, I control for the various candidate, district and state-level factors that play a role in the contribution decisions of donors. Below, I describe my hypotheses and measurements for each of the variables in my model.
Variables and Hypotheses

In this chapter I examine total contributions received by male and female state legislators accounting for the voting age population in each state. The total contribution encompasses every recorded contribution per candidate on the Follow the Money website. It includes donations from 19 economic sectors such as agriculture, energy and natural resources, government agencies, health, lawyers and lobbyists, party, and transportation. The contributions represent donations from a variety of sources including labor unions, corporations, individuals and parties. I examine total campaign receipts per eligible voter because fundraising is so strongly affected by the number of potential voters that need to be contacted. Each candidate’s total contributions per eligible voter are used for all 24 states in my analysis across both electoral periods (1997-1998 and 1999-2000). There are a number of demographic, district and state-level factors that I anticipate may have an effect on total campaign receipts. Below, I discuss each of these variables in turn and explain their hypothesized relationships to the dependent variable.

Candidate-Level Factors

First, given the previously mentioned array of findings that have not demonstrated a statistically significant difference between men and women in total contributions, I hypothesize that differences between the two types of candidates will be slight. I expect that gender differences may be exhibited more clearly when looking at particular types of donors versus the total array of donations. Second, I expect incumbents and open seat candidates will have higher total campaign receipts than challengers because these candidates will tend to be better financed or will have larger war chests when compared to candidates running as challengers against well established opponents (Hogan, 2007; Burrell, 1994; Box-Steffensmeier, 1996; Krasno et al., 1994). Third, I expect
Republicans to receive slightly higher total campaign receipts overall given that Republican organizations are often perceived to have a large fundraising base at their disposal and conservative donors are frequently associated with higher personal incomes (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). Fourth, I expect majority party members, party leaders, committee leaders, and more senior members will receive more in total campaign receipts. Because these members tend to have more gate keeping and policy making authority, I anticipate donors want to gain access to them. In addition, members with these characteristics may be more skilled at fundraising and are more likely to have established connections with various types of donors (Cox and Magar 1999; Rudolph 1999; Thompson et al. 1993; Cassie and Thompson 1998; Grenzke 1989; Sorauf, 1992; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005; Moncrief et al. 2001; Cassie and Thompson 1998; Clucas 1992; Larson 2004; Grier and Munger 1993).

**District-Level Factors**

Besides candidate-level factors, there are also features unique to a district that can affect fundraising. The three factors that I pay particular attention to in this analysis include the level of competition in the last general election, the degree of opposition faced by a candidate in their primary in the last election, and the amount raised by the opposition. First, previous electoral competition should have a positive or negative effect on total campaign contributions. In instances where the election result hangs in the balance, both access and election oriented contributors are likely to make donations. Recent history of a contested primary is also likely to result in larger total campaign receipts for similar reasons. The level of spending by the opponent is an even more proximate indicator of the competitiveness of the district and should be positively associated with campaign receipts.
State-Level Factors

Finally, in addition to the aforementioned candidate-level and district-level factors, there are a number of system-level factors that are known to impact the amount of money raised by candidates. First, I anticipate that candidates will raise more when running for a seat in a professional legislature as these races tend to be more expensive (Moncrief et al. 2001). In addition, parties and interest groups should be more active here given the level of contestation and the desirability of acquiring ties with members who make this their career. Second, I expect that campaign finance laws will dampen the total amount that candidates receive because these laws make it more difficult for donors to provide large sums of money to candidates (Hogan et al. 2009; Burrell 1994). Third, I expect to find that the strength of interest groups has a positive impact on total campaign receipts because businesses and labor unions should be better organized and more active when interest groups are strong and this should translate into more contributing. Fourth, as discussed earlier, term limits may have a positive or negative impact on total campaign receipts. If groups wish to buy access then they may not contribute to members who are in their last term (Appollonio and Raja 2006). On the other hand, donors may contribute more to these members in a last ditch effort to reach them before they depart. In addition, term limits will create more open seat contest opportunities and this may translate into higher donations as donors try to establish a relationship or influence a contested election one way or the other. Fifth, like term limits, I am unsure whether chamber competition will have a positive or negative effect on total campaign receipts. On the one hand, if a candidate is a member of a party that has a commanding hold on the legislature, they may receive more money because their party is behind the wheel and thus, most likely to dictate the legislative agenda and what types of
policies are passed. On the other hand, if the partisan balance in the legislature is close to evenly split, contributions may be directed more to challengers and open seat candidates as these races offer the best opportunities for donors to influence the partisan balance in their favor. Finally, I expect candidates will raise more in a presidential election year as voter attention and interest tends to be heightened during this time and this may lead donors to contribute more than normal.

**Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total Campaign Receipts**

This analysis examines what factors play a role in determining the amount of total campaign dollars that candidates receive per eligible voter in the district. I first perform several OLS regression analyses that examine the model for all candidates and then conduct separate analyses for contested, uncontested and open seat candidates. Given that several scholars find that fundraising differences are a function of differences in candidate status, it is important to test whether gender will have any explanatory power once these factors are controlled for (Burrell, 1985). Below, Table 4.3 presents the coefficients and significance levels for all candidates in contested races by the gender of the candidate, as well as the gender of the candidate and their opponent.

**Table 4.3: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Fundraising by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.84***</td>
<td>-0.85***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.75***</td>
<td>0.75***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>5.08***</td>
<td>5.08***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.19***</td>
<td>-0.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6,067</td>
<td>6,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.

In the first model, I examine all candidates who ran in a contested race by the gender of the candidate and their opponent while in the second model I examine the effect of gender without controlling for the gender of the opponent. These models explain about 24 percent of the variance and most of the variables are statically significant. Interestingly, in neither model, is gender significant. Among candidate level factors, incumbents and open seat candidates raise more than challengers, party leaders raise a staggering $5.08 more per eligible voter, while Republicans, members with more seniority, and majority party members raise more per eligible voter. All of these factors point to the power of incumbency and the difficulty in running as a challenger, particularly against a candidate with some type of chamber leadership role. This analysis also tends to support earlier findings that Republicans are well-financed candidates (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003; Aldrich 1995).
Turning to the district level factors, when the previous election was more competitive candidates tend to raise one cent more per eligible voter (more precisely – for every one-unit increase in the competition variable that ranges from 0 (no competition) to 50 (high competition), total contributions increased by one cent per eligible voter). Past primary competition does not appear to affect campaign contributions.

In terms of the state-level factors, legislative professionalism does not seem to have an impact on total campaign receipts. However, the coefficients for each of the other state-level factors are rather large. Strict campaign finance laws (as opposed to more lax ones) reduce the total amount that candidates raise by 19 cents per eligible voter, the presence of strong interest groups increases the amount of money raised by 19 cents (for every one-point increase on the 0 to 3 point scale), and when term limits are in effect candidates raise 12 cents less per voter. In addition, candidates tend to raise less in a presidential election year but they raise more when their opposition raises more money.

In analysis not shown, I estimate these models using state dummy variables in place of the state-level factors. It is important to estimate the model using dummy variables as these can control, to some degree, for state-level effects that are not measured here, such as the culture of the state, the socio-economic status of the voters, or the public attitudes of citizens.\(^5\)

Having now examined the results when all of the contested candidates are grouped together, I will shift gears and repeat the analysis from table 11 separately for incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates in contested races. As before, I also

\(^5\) When using state dummy variables in place of state-level factors, I found there was no change in the significance or direction of any of the measures of gender when all contested candidates were grouped together. When contested incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates are examined separately I found one primary difference. For contested open seat candidates, I found that the woman vs. man measure became an insignificant predictor of total campaign receipts while the man vs. woman measure became a significant predictor. Finally, when looking at uncontested open seat candidates, I found that gender became an insignificant predictor of total campaign receipts when state dummy variables were used.
divide the analysis for each class of candidate so that one model examines the gender of the candidate exclusively and the other model also takes into account the gender of the opponent. The results are shown on the next page in Table 4.4 below.

Starting with incumbents, the models explain about 25 percent of the variance and, again, many of the coefficients are significant. Here, one can see that women and men raise different levels of money when facing a male challenger. In comparison to male incumbents, female incumbents raise 28 cents less per voter when facing a male opponent. This finding could demonstrate that donors respond to these types of races differently and tend to curtail their donations when a woman faces a man or they could signal that women struggle more to raise money when their opponent is a man. In looking only at the gender of the candidate, I find that female incumbents raise 21 cents less per voter than male incumbents. This statistically significant relationship provides some evidence that female incumbents are not financially advantaged and may have to work harder to stay competitive against their male opponents.

As expected, in terms of candidate characteristics, incumbents are advantaged when they are party leaders, when they are more senior and when they are members of the majority party. This is not surprising since these values tend to be highly prized by donors wishing to gain access to powerful, more experienced members of the legislature.

Incumbents tend to be advantaged when legislatures are professionalized, when interest groups are strong and when the partisan balance in the chamber is close. Incumbents are more likely to have the characteristics and access that interest groups value and it is likely that donors will be more likely to fork over dollars when it is going to a candidate in a highly professionalized chamber, as these legislatures tend to be policy innovators.
Table 4.4: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Fundraising by Incumbents, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.76*</td>
<td>-0.80*</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.28*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.16+</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.84****</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>-0.39***</td>
<td>-0.38***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>1.61***</td>
<td>1.61***</td>
<td>-0.88***</td>
<td>-0.88***</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.32***</td>
<td>-0.32***</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>-0.13+</td>
<td>-0.14+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
<td>-0.08+</td>
<td>-0.08+</td>
<td>-0.17+</td>
<td>-0.17+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>0.57***</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>1,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
In addition, incumbents should have a more extensive network of donors that they can use to offset an expensive election. Thus, they should be especially advantaged when running for a seat in a professional legislature as these campaigns tend to be very expensive affairs (Thompson et al. 1998). As before, candidates tend to be disadvantaged in a presidential election year and by strict campaign finance laws. Incumbents are hit the hardest (when compared to challengers and open seat contestants) on this dimension. This is not surprising since these laws were put into place in an attempt to level the playing field and reduce the incumbency advantage (Hogan et al. 2009). Finally, incumbents tend to raise over 55 cents more per eligible voter when their opponent is a competitive fundraiser. Incumbents are far more reactive than challengers on this variable which supports the earlier findings of Krasno et al. (1994).

In looking exclusively at challengers, I see that these models explain about 14 percent of the variance. Here, female challengers raise 17 cents more per eligible voter than male challengers when competing against a male incumbent. In addition, in analysis not shown, female challengers also raise 16 more than male challengers when they each face opponents of the opposite sex. Both of these relationships are statistically significant. In looking exclusively at the gender of the candidate, I also find that women raise 14 cents more per eligible voter when compared to male challengers. This shows that female challengers are able to raise money successfully and can collect more than similarly situated men. However, at the same time, female challengers may need to raise more money than men to produce the same electoral outcome.

As with incumbents, challengers raise more when they are Republicans and when the previous election was more competitive. However, unlike incumbents, being a member of the majority party does not play a statistically significant role. Finally, in
looking at state-level factors, challengers lose 88 cents per voter when running for a seat in a professional legislature. Again, since these races tend to be very high-profile, expensive affairs, it means the challenger faces an even steeper uphill battle for office. Challengers are still benefited by strong interest groups but not nearly as much as incumbents are. Challengers also tend to be disadvantaged in presidential election years and when term limits are in place. Perhaps this is the case because donors are more likely to give to term limited incumbents in a last ditch attempt to get them to sponsor favorable legislation before they leave office. Or, the most viable candidates may compete in open seat races versus as challengers. Lastly, challengers’ fundraising is far less sensitive to incumbent funding than incumbent fundraising is to challenger fundraising. This suggests that there may not be much a challenger can do to raise more funds against a well-funded incumbent when compared to other subsets of candidates.

Finally, in looking at open seat races, I see that these models explain a fair amount of the variance at 39 percent. Again, female open seat contestants raise more than similarly situated men. Women in contested open seat races raise approximately 18 cents more per eligible voters than their male counterparts. In addition, there are differences based on the gender of the opponents. First, female open seat candidates raise 16 cents more than male candidates when both face male opponents. However, female open seat candidates raise 28 cents more than male open seat candidates when each face an opponent of the opposite sex. Again, each of these relationships is statistically significant and shows that female open seat candidates can out-raise men. However, again, I do not know if women need more money to get the same electoral benefit or if women psychologically feel their best defense is a good offense.
In terms of the other variables in the analysis, Republican open seat contestants raise more than Democrats, while being a member of the majority party increases one’s level of funding. These cues may be valuable to donors who do not have incumbency to rely on and may lead to more or larger donations. In addition, a previously competitive primary tends to lead to higher campaign totals, especially for open seat candidates. Finally, when examining state-level factors, I find that the direction and significance of these variables is similar to that for the other types of candidates. Generally, the financial benefits and disadvantages are somewhere between those of incumbents and challengers.

Now, that I have examined the contested races I turn to an analysis of the uncontested races. It is important to study uncontested races as well because of the need to understand whether donors treat these races differently or whether they contribute to uncontested candidates based on different factors. In these races, the candidate’s only challenge will come from the primary, if at all. Thus, candidates may become focused on building a war chest to stave off the possibility of future challenges versus on raising money for the purpose of beating their opponent. As a result, donors may react to this motivation differently.

Below, in Table 4.5, I present the results for two models. The first model looks at the factors that influence contribution levels to uncontested incumbents. The second model examines the factors that influence how much is raised by open seat candidates who ran unopposed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
<td>0.45*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.5 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>3.17***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Served</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>1.22**</td>
<td>1.73*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.25***</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.50*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance

In examining uncontested incumbents, I find that the model explains 15 percent of the variance. As with contested incumbents, uncontested female incumbents raise less than men. Perhaps women are not as adept as men in building war chests or women may not feel it is as important to focus on fundraising when they do not have an immediate challenge. Again, as with contested incumbents, party leadership and seniority are important factors in garnering more donations although these qualifications do not yield as much of a financial advantage to uncontested candidates. Unlike before, not as many of the state-level coefficients are significant. However, candidates here still raise more when running for a seat in a professional legislature and when interest groups are strong. In addition, they tend to raise 25 cents less when strict campaign finance laws are present. As previously discussed, these findings tend to fit with other findings in the literature and with earlier findings here.
Finally, in examining uncontested open seat races, it is interesting to note that women tend to raise 45 cents more per eligible voter than men in the same situation. Perhaps donors are more receptive to women in this environment because women who run here are likely to be the most strategic or may have such strong qualifications that they remain unchallenged at this level. In addition, candidates tend to raise more when the previous election was competitive, when legislative professionalism is higher, when campaign finance laws are more prohibitive, and when interest groups are strong. The only statistically significant relationship that hinders uncontested open seat candidate’s total campaign receipts is the imposition of term limits.

Discussion

Having just performed an analysis of total campaign receipts per eligible voter I can now answer a number of my research questions. Despite previous findings that gender does not have a statistically significant impact on the total amount raised, I find otherwise here. When breaking the analysis down by type of candidate and by contested versus uncontested races, I can see that gender does play a role in the fundraising process. Female incumbents tend to raise less than male incumbents in both contested and uncontested races. On the other hand, female open seat candidates tend to raise more than men in both contested and uncontested races. Female challengers also tend to outperform male challengers in the fundraising process. These results are encouraging to those who are supportive of women candidates because they demonstrate that women make an effort to be successful fundraisers in environments in which they are not advantaged by name recognition, the incumbency advantage, etc. Since women are more likely to run as open seat candidates or challengers, and since it does not appear that women raise less in these environments, one might conclude that women can be
successful on Election Day. However, once these women are in office, they may have a harder time remaining competitive fundraisers and this may hurt their ability to remain in office long-term.

Besides my key independent variable of interest, I find many other variables have a statistically significant impact on the total amount raised. In terms of contested races, candidates tend to raise the most per eligible voter when they are party leaders, have longer service records, are Republicans, are members of the majority party and when their opponent raised more. Given the importance of some of these access-oriented characteristics, it may not be surprising that female incumbents raise less than male incumbents since they are not as likely to have these characteristics. In addition, contested candidates were generally disadvantaged by the presence of term limits, in presidential election years, and when strict campaign finance laws were in place, while being advantaged by strong interest groups. In terms of uncontested races, again, I find that party leadership and years of service have a positive impact on total campaign receipts, as does the presence of strong interest groups. However, I notice that many of the state-level coefficients have less of a significant impact on the total amount raised.
CHAPTER 5: EXAMINING PARTY DONATIONS

Chapter 4 examined the total amount of donations received by male and female state legislators. Such a perspective provides an initial comprehensive outlook, but it may mask important differences between men and women within specific categories of contributions. In this chapter, I explore what factors influence the contribution behavior of party donors and what role, if any gender plays in the contribution decision-making process.

Previous Research on Party Contributions

Generally, research on gender in relation to party contributions has been rather limited in scope. In the case of party scholarship, much of the literature has focused on the role of parties in recruiting women to run for office. Far less attention has been paid to how parties treat women during the campaign process. Although there are limits to what is known about how these sub-groups structure their contributions, it is possible to draw some conclusions about their behavior based on other findings in the literature. One common finding is that women need encouragement to run (Fox and Lawless, 2000). Party leaders, elected officials, political organizations, and family members make up much of this recruitment base (Fox and Lawless 2004a, 2004b, 2010; Moncrief et al. 2001; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009). Parties play an especially critical role in recruiting women. Sanbonmatsu et al. (2009) find, “Women are more likely than men to say that party support was very important to their decision to run. Women are also more likely to cite their party, rather than an organization, as the most influential source of encouragement for their candidacies” (p. 3).

Historically, women faced difficulty gaining the party’s nomination and encouragement (Freeman, 2000; Burrell, 1994; Werner, 1968; Rule, 1981). However,
many scholars argue that not much has changed and that parties still have not warmed up to women (Shiner and Thrush, 2009; Fox and Lawless, 2010; Niven, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2006). There are a number of reasons why this might be the case. First, women may be excluded or discouraged because men are more likely to be in charge and may not want to see women infiltrating their organizations (Darcy et al., 1994). Second, party leaders may avoid recruiting women because they believe female candidates will have a harder time getting elected (Sanbonmatsu, 2005, 2006). This belief could be based on the notion that women lack political ambition, that women lack confidence in their qualifications and fundraising ability, or that women lack financial and political connections (Fox and Lawless 2010; Werner 1968; Faucheux and Herrnson 1999; Elder 2004; Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009). Others argue that women are simply less likely to be running as an incumbent or to have the sort of leadership characteristics that make them more attractive candidates (Welch et al., 1985; Thompson et al., 1998).

If women are discouraged in the recruitment stage it stands to reason that they might also face discouragement when fundraising. Unfortunately, this issue is under-examined at the state-level or much of the data are based on interviews, and there have been few efforts to engage in a close and thorough examination of campaign finance records. Interestingly, there is a disconnect between qualitative and quantitative studies. Beginning with quantitative studies at the congressional level, I find little evidence of discrimination. Burrell (1994) reports that women are not financially disadvantaged by parties and are at least as likely to receive support. Wilhite (1988) finds that women were financially advantaged by party contributions in 1982 but that the Republican Party was more generous in their support of women during the 1980-1982 time period. Finally,
Thomas and Wilcox (2005) examine the 2002 general election and find differences between male and female candidates in terms of party and candidate status. The authors conclude that male and female challengers tend to receive about the same amount of money from both of their respective parties. However, female incumbents receive much more than men from the Republican Party while female open seat contestants receive less than men from the Republican Party.

In looking at interview data at the county and congressional level, scholars find that parties are less supportive of women candidates. In these studies candidates and party leaders state that women are discouraged by the party and that this is especially prevalent within the Republican Party (Shiner and Thrush, 2009; Fox and Lawless, 2010; Niven, 1998). In order to sort out these discrepancies and gain a better understanding of the relationship between the party and female candidates, I intend to examine whether any differences exist in the amount of contributions that are made by each candidate’s respective party.

The goal of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of how the parties treat women and to discover whether any discrimination exists in the fundraising process. I begin with a brief statement of my hypotheses as they relate to various types of party donors. Then, I conduct a descriptive exploration of male and female campaign receipts before moving on to a brief overview of my model. Here, I detail my hypotheses as they relate to partisan donors. Finally, I perform a more detailed multivariate analysis that controls for other factors that might account for any differences.

**Hypotheses Concerning Gender’s Relationship to Party Contributions**

Based on previous research, I think female candidates will be advantaged by some elements of the party and disadvantaged by others. Previous research indicates that there
are different components of political parties and these components have varying goals and perform separate actions. Scholars often break the party up into three components: party in the electorate, party in government and party organization (Hershey 2006; Weisberg 2000; Key 1964). When referring to the party in the electorate scholars tend to think in terms of individuals who identify with one particular party or another and those who consider themselves to be independent. When thinking of the party in government the focus is on political officeholders at all levels of government. Finally, the party organization consists of the national committee, state and local party committees, as well as a myriad of other groups like the Young Republicans and Democrats (Bianco and Cannon, 2009). Some of these components are likely to be more supportive of women candidates than others. For example, women tend to be very active members within the party organization and have had a more lengthy history in this capacity as compared to female officeholders (Freeman, 2000).

Here, I distinguish between these various elements by separating the party committee from leaderships PACs, candidate committees and party officials, candidates and former members. I separate these entities into two categories because it is possible that these two types of donors will follow a different strategy when contributing to candidates. On the one hand, I expect women will face more of an uphill battle raising money from leadership PACs, candidate committees, and party officials, candidates and former members. Given the underrepresentation of women in the legislature and in key leadership positions, I would not expect women to have the personal relationships and established networks in place that would make it easier for them to garner money from these sources. In addition, members of the party leadership, as well as party officials, candidates and former party members may be resistant to what some may consider an
the party committee may be more receptive to female candidates. Although Sanbonmatsu (2006) has demonstrated that local parties are more hostile to women, there are reasons to believe that many state parties would be open to funding female candidates. First, the party’s prime objective should be to maintain or to gain seats regardless of the candidate’s characteristics. Second, once a woman has moved from the recruitment stage to actually declaring their candidacy, it may be that the party will support them financially, especially since they will have had ample opportunity to dissuade those who appear unelectable from running in the first place. Third, Matthews’ (1984) finds that women often participate in service to the party prior to running for office. As such, women are likely to develop relationships with this organization and this should help overshadow any negative assessments and stereotypes that the organization might have and open the doors to more contributions.

On the whole, when donations from all of these parts of parties are considered in combination (when party committee funding is combined with funding from candidate committees, leadership PACs, and individual party donors), I expect women to come out slightly ahead given that party committee donations tend to make up a higher percentage of contributions to candidates generally.

Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Party Receipts

Before discussing contribution differences for men and women, it is important to first detail the gender breakdown by party. In my analysis, the men are nearly evenly split by party (48% Democrats and 51% Republicans). Women, however, are much more
likely to be Democrats than Republicans (58% to 42%). In addition, women constitute 28% of all Democratic candidates and 21% of all Republican candidates.

An initial way to determine whether differences exist between male and female legislative candidates is to examine the mean contribution on party campaign receipts across each state by the party affiliation of the candidate. However, there are a number of ways that party contributions can be examined. On the website Follow the Money, party contributions include donations from candidate committees, joint candidate committees, leadership PACs, party committees, party officials, candidates and former members, as well as small and unitemized contributions from the party. From these classifications, I created three categories that I feel best classify the various components of party contributions. The first category looks exclusively at party committees, which are the result of collective decisions made by the organization. This category makes up 9% of the contributions men receive on average and 11% of the total that women receive on average. The second category includes donations from candidate committees, leadership PACs, and Democratic and Republican officials, candidates, and former members and are therefore the result of individual decisions of specific party officials. This category makes up 3% of the contributions men receive on average and 4% of the total that women receive on average. Finally, the third category combines contributions from these two categories into one measure for the most comprehensive examination of party contributions.

My measures are designed to capture each of these party components. The party committee measure largely represents the notion of party organization, since the committee will be charged with performing a number of traditional organizational functions like recruiting candidates for office, generating support among voters for their
roster of candidates, and providing a source of revenue in the election, etc. On the other hand, candidate committees, leadership PACs and party officials, candidates and former members, best represent party in government and party in the electorate. These donors will either be private citizens that are strongly affiliated with a political party or officeholders. It is important to account for each of these categories because there are theoretical reasons to believe donors will have different motivations based on whether they are political officeholders, devoted party members, or the party organization itself. For instance, the party organization may be focused on maintaining or increasing their numbers above all else while political officeholders may be resistant to electing women because they have a history of working primarily with men and wish to maintain the status quo. The question is whether these motivations actually translate into contribution differences. To answer this question I begin with a descriptive analysis of party committee receipts. Below, in Table 5.1 I examine the total amount of contributions received from the party committee across each type of race in the analysis (contested and uncontested races) by gender, state and party affiliation.

**Table 5.1: Mean Party Committee Receipts by Party Affiliation, Gender and State**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male Mean</td>
<td>Female Mean</td>
<td>Male Mean</td>
<td>Female Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>3,134</td>
<td>5,074</td>
<td>4,836</td>
<td>4,824</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>95,015</td>
<td>191,843</td>
<td>16,874</td>
<td>28,222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>1,805</td>
<td>2,296</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>6,292</td>
<td>13,856</td>
<td>11,125</td>
<td>28,783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>2,154</td>
<td>1,908</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>3,328</td>
<td>4,450</td>
<td>9,686</td>
<td>11,748</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>1,541</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>843</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>49,212</td>
<td>19,265</td>
<td>46,348</td>
<td>31,429</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>11,232</td>
<td>17,692</td>
<td>7,769</td>
<td>13,011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>1,864</td>
<td>4,683</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>662</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>12,127</td>
<td>6,985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,982</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>2,699</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Democrats Male Mean</th>
<th>Democrats Female Mean</th>
<th>Republicans Male Mean</th>
<th>Republicans Female Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>3,083</td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>1,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>3,013</td>
<td>5,309</td>
<td>3,353</td>
<td>4,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>10,718</td>
<td>13,344</td>
<td>38,565</td>
<td>11,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>8,697</td>
<td>12,856</td>
<td>9,685</td>
<td>16,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>9,258</td>
<td>3,147</td>
<td>14,308</td>
<td>19,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>4,781</td>
<td>3,856</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>13,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>16,482</td>
<td>8,350</td>
<td>17,023</td>
<td>26,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>1,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>12,908</td>
<td>11,739</td>
<td>9,213</td>
<td>9,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>1,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,858</td>
<td>14,417</td>
<td>9,644</td>
<td>10,529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 shows there is a great deal of variation across the states, between men and women and between Democrats and Republicans. In Idaho, Maine, Rhode Island, and Utah the average party committee contribution never exceeds $2,000 from either party to either gender while in California, Illinois and Ohio the average party committee contribution never dips below $10,000. Such differences are due in large measure to the large differences in average district populations that exist across states. In comparing Democrats to Republicans, it is clear that the Democratic Party committee in California and Indiana funds candidates of both genders more generously than the Republican Party committee while the Republican Party committee in Florida, Iowa, Michigan and Pennsylvania funds candidates of both genders more generously than the Democratic Party committee. On a state by state basis, the Republican Party committee invests more than the Democratic Party committee in both male and female candidates in 13 of the 24 states under consideration. Finally, when comparing male Democrats to female Democrats, women’s average contributions exceed those of men in 16 states. There is a great deal of variance here with women raising just $3 more on average in Rhode Island
and $96,828 more on average in California. On the other hand, male Democrats exceeded the average contribution to female Democrats by just over $260 in Georgia and almost $30,000 in Illinois. In comparing male Republicans to female Republicans, women raise more from the party committee in 17 states with their mean advantage ranging from $52 more in Missouri up to $17,658 more in Florida.

Now that I have examined the mean contribution differences from the party committee, I also take a moment to display the over all median difference as a point of comparison. Below in Figure 5.1, I provide the median contribution for party committee campaign receipts according to the party and gender of the candidates.

![Figure 5.1: Median Party Committee Receipts by Party and Gender](image)

Figure 5.1: Median Party Committee Receipts by Party and Gender

Here, one can see that the over all median contributions are much lower than the mean contributions, which demonstrates that some states contribute far more to some
candidates than is generally true for others. This could be a function of the
competitiveness of the district, the composition difference in the chamber, or the strength
of the party relative to other types of donors. As with the mean contributions, it is again
clear that female candidates tend to raise more from the party committee when compared
to men. Female Republicans raise $260 more than male Republicans while female
Democrats raise $298 more than male Democrats. However, it is also clear, that
Republicans receive more from the party committee when compared to Democrats. The
median contribution for both male and female Republicans exceeds that of their
opponents by over $245.

Having examined the contribution differences by party committee, I now turn to
an analysis of the differences between male and female Democrats and Republicans on
another measure of party donations. Table 5.2 examines the total amount of
contributions received from leadership PACs, candidate committees, and party officials,
candidates and former members across each type of race in the analysis (contested and
uncontested races) by gender, state, and party affiliation.

Table 5.2: Mean Party Receipts from Leadership PACs, Candidate Committees and
Party Officials, Candidates and Former Members by Party Affiliation, Gender and
State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male Mean</td>
<td>Female Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>99,845</td>
<td>34,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>1,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>10,501</td>
<td>8,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>2,316</td>
<td>2,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male Mean</td>
<td>Female Mean</td>
<td>Male Mean</td>
<td>Female Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>2,073</td>
<td>1,635</td>
<td>3,418</td>
<td>2,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>1,748</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>1,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>3,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>2,820</td>
<td>3,672</td>
<td>1,938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>3,016</td>
<td>5,213</td>
<td>6,749</td>
<td>9,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>3,491</td>
<td>2,342</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td>3,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>1,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>1,758</td>
<td>3,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>1,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>1,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,837</td>
<td>3,005</td>
<td>4,742</td>
<td>4,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One thing that is evident from Table 5.2 is that the mean contribution received by male and female Democratic and Republican candidates is smaller in all but five states than the mean contributions of party committees. The exceptions to this are in California, Georgia, Michigan, Rhode Island and Utah. Also, when examining Tables 5.1 and 5.2, party donors tend to be the least generous in Rhode Island and the most generous in Illinois and California. When comparing the number of states where women raise more than men regardless of party affiliation, the rate is almost twice as high when the donor is the party committee. Women raise more than men, regardless of party affiliation, in 12 states when the donor is the party committee but they raise more in just seven states when the donations are coming from leadership PACs, candidate committees, and individual party donors. In only four states, (Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, and Oregon) do female Democrats and Republicans exceed the amount raised by male Democrats and Republicans on both types of donations. In addition, when examining Table 5.2, one can see that the overall mean from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual
party donations is higher for male Democrats but not for male Republicans. Here, Democratic men raise, on average, $1,832 more than Democratic women while Republican men raise, on average, $250 less than Republican women. This provides some evidence that Democratic women tend to be more successful at fundraising when the donor is the party committee. In addition, both Tables 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate that the Republican Party tends to support male and female candidates at similar rates while there is greater variance between donations from male and female Democrats.

When examining the overall differences from table 5.2, I see that on a state by state basis, the Republican leadership PAC, candidate committee and individual donors, invest more in both male and female candidates in nearly half the states in the analysis. When comparing male Democrats to female Democrats, women’s average contributions exceed those of men in 11 states. The average mean advantage for women ranges from $33 in Iowa to almost $2,200 dollars in Oregon while the average mean advantage for men ranges from just $5 in Rhode Island to just over $65,000 in California. When comparing male Republicans to female Republicans women maintain a mean advantage in 14 states of anywhere from close to $17 in Maine to $2,889 in Oregon.

Although women are able to compete with men in raising money in many of the states in the analysis, they do slightly less well when party is not factored in. In analysis not shown, women raise $3,046 more, on average, from the party committee while men raise $953 more on average from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual party donors. But, what are the overall differences on this dimension with regard to the median? Below in Figure 5.2, I illustrate the median contribution from these donors according to the party and gender of the candidates.
As with party committee donations, Republicans contribute more to both male and female candidates when compared to the Democratic Party. In addition, women raise more regardless of party affiliation. Leadership PACs, candidate committees and party officials, candidates and former members, donate $100 more to Republican women while Democratic women receive $90 more than Democratic men. This provides some evidence that donors respond not only to the gender of candidates but also to the party of candidates or some combination thereof.

Having examined separately the major sources of party contributions (party committees, candidate committees, leadership PACs and individual party donors), it is now time to see how contributions vary when these two donation sources are grouped.
together. It is important to account for population because states vary a great deal on this dimension and campaigns are run very differently depending on population size. In a small district, candidates may be able to reach voters on foot while in a populous district a candidate may have to rely on expensive media time on local television stations or in state newspapers (Wright 2005). Below, in Table 5.3, I examine total partisan contributions according to the house district population. This figure provides an estimate of the total amount received by each candidate from the party per potential voter in the voting age population.

Table 5.3: Total Party Receipts per Eligible Voter by Party Affiliation, Gender and State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male Mean</td>
<td>Female Mean</td>
<td>Democratic Difference</td>
<td>Male Mean</td>
<td>Female Mean</td>
<td>Republican Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table illustrates that women from both parties generally raise more in total party contributions per eligible voter. In four states Democratic men raise more than women and in five states Republican men raise more than women. Across these states, the fundraising advantage for women ranges from one cent more per eligible voter to 22 cents more for Democratic women in Alaska. It is also interesting to note that there are rather large differences across the states in terms of how each party approaches donations. For instance, in Colorado, Kentucky, Michigan, and Washington both parties contribute about the same amount of money per voter to men and to women. Thus, there are not large differences between what each party gives and to the amount they contribute to men and to women. On the other hand, in New Mexico and Oregon the Republican Party provides at least four times as much in donations as the Democratic Party. In addition, in some states party donors seems to concentrate their donations more heavily to one particular gender or another. For instance, in Alaska Republican men get 39 cents more per eligible voter than Republican women while Democratic women get 22 cents more per eligible voter than Democratic men. Other stark contrasts occur in Florida and Oregon where Republican women get between 13 and 22 cents more than Republican men per eligible voter. This variation highlights the many facets of donor behavior and the myriad ways in which differences can present themselves.

Discussion

As with total campaign receipts, I find much variation in the amount of money that is raised across the states and by male and female candidates. Earlier, in my theory chapter, I was unable to propose a hypothesis about party donors due to the discrepancies within the scholarly literature. Following my descriptive analysis, I find that female Democrats and Republicans tend to be slightly advantaged by all types of party donors.
However, I also find that Republican women tend to raise more than Democratic women from the party committee, leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual party donors. This finding is somewhat surprising since one might expect the Democratic Party to be more open towards women based on earlier scholarly findings (Shiner and Thrush, 2009; Fox and Lawless, 2010; Niven, 1998). However, it may simply signal that the Republican Party is better organized and financed or that the party is looking to expand their voter base by attracting more conservative women to the legislature. These differences point to the importance of examining contributions in detail and also provide us with a greater understanding of the fundraising landscape for each gender and for each party.

When taking party out of the equation and looking solely at the mean differences for men and women, one finds that women raise more from the party committee but less from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual party donors. Interestingly, these findings seem to reconcile differences in the literature. Previously, scholars found few partisan differences in terms of over all contributions but interviewees have described a great deal of bias by some party members, local party officials, etc. (Burrell 1994; Wilhite 1988; Shiner and Thrush 2009; Fox and Lawless 2010; Niven 1998). In addition, it has been proposed that women may be held back by elites who wish to preserve their own hegemony (Darcy et al. 1994; Duverger 1955). Here, I find evidence that supports both ways of thinking. In terms of total contributions, women tend to raise slightly more than men, but, they do not raise as much from individual party donors (officials, candidates and former members) or from leadership PACs. In light of the aforementioned arguments, these findings are quite logical.
However, once again, there are many other variables that need to be accounted for besides gender. There are a number of factors that should play an important role in contribution decisions by party donors. I briefly lay out my hypotheses in relation to these variables before I move on to a multivariate analysis.

Control Variables and Hypotheses

In this chapter I examine the total amount of contributions from the party accounting for the voting age population in each state. Party contributions include donations from the party committee, candidate committee, leadership PACs, and party officials, candidates and former members.

Candidate-Level Factors

It is possible that some factors may play more of a role in determining the size of a party donation than others. Unlike the previous chapter, where I was examining total campaign receipts, here the theoretical expectations may be more defined for some characteristics than others. For instance, seniority may be an important characteristic for donors generally but it may not play a role here where party donors are more likely to pay attention to characteristics like election competition (Thompson et al. 1994). Therefore, I will only review my hypotheses as they pertain especially to donations from the party.

First, I expect women will acquire slightly more from party donors for the reasons described above. Second, I expect party leaders will raise more from the party because these members may serve as a conduit to fellow rank and file partisans (Larson 2004; Hogan 2007). Third, I anticipate that candidates who are members of the majority party will raise more since the majority party may be more established and organized and may have a larger pool of funds to draw from than the party out of power. Finally, based on
my descriptive analysis, I think that Republicans will generally receive more from party donors than Democrats (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003; Aldrich 1995).

**District-Level Factors**

As with total contributions, I expect that candidates will be responsive to the amount that their opponent is raising and will raise more from both the party in reaction to the level of donations received by their opponent (Hogan 2007). In addition, I expect that party donations will be more forthcoming when a candidate is running in a more competitive district and when there were a large number of candidates in the previous primary election. Thompson et al. (1994) finds that parties tend to follow either a “protectionist strategy” or an “additive strategy” when making decisions about funding. In other words, variables like chamber competition and previous election competition should matter a great deal to this sub-group of donors as they are more likely to focus their funds on vulnerable incumbents in competitive races or to competitive challengers in either the hopes of maintaining their majority or making in-roads to party control.

**State-Level Factors**

As with total campaign receipts, it is possible many of the hypothesized relationships will hold true here as well. I expect various party donors to contribute more when candidates are running for a seat on a professional legislature (Thompson et al. 1998). These campaigns tend to be more expensive and these legislatures tend to produce innovate legislation, which should lead to more contributions by the party. Second, I expect campaign finance laws will reduce the amount that is raised from party donors, as with total campaign receipts, candidates, especially incumbents, find it harder to raise funds when there are limits on what they can receive from certain donors (Hogan et al. 2009). Third, I anticipate that party contributions will be reduced when interest
groups are strong. Evidence suggests that strong interest groups tend to disadvantage other types of donors, such as the party (Gray 2004). Fourth, parties may contribute more in a presidential election year as a function of being better organized or races being more responsive to partisan tides. However, it is also just as possible that the party will donate less because they have to focus their attention on candidates running in more high-profile races. As a result, they may be more strategic about who gets funds and how much they receive. Fifth, I anticipate parties will be especially active when there is a close balance between the parties in the chamber. If few seats separate the party in power from the party out of power I anticipate that both parties will have a strong interest in trying to maintain or build upon their seat distribution (Thompson et al. 1994; Herrnson 1989).

**Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total Party Receipts**

This analysis examines what factors play a role in determining the total amount of party campaign dollars that candidates receive per eligible voter in the district. In using the model above, I perform several OLS regression analyses that estimate the model for all candidates and then separately for contested, uncontested and open seat candidates. Given that several scholars find that fundraising differences are a function of differences in candidate status, it is important to test whether gender will have any explanatory power once these factors are controlled for (Burrell, 1985). Below, Table 5.4 presents the coefficients and significance levels for all candidates in contested races by the gender of the candidate and their opponent. I did not construct models for the gender of the candidate exclusively because I find only one instance of statistical significance and the remaining coefficients mirror those for the models presented below. The difference occurs among contested incumbents where I find that female incumbents raise five cents less than male incumbents. The difference is only marginally significant at the .10 level.
In the first model I examine all candidates that ran in a contested race by the gender of the candidate and their opponent. This model explains about 16 percent of the variance and the coefficients for many of the independent variables are significant. However, none of the gender variables play a significant role. Instead, I find that incumbents and open seat candidates raise significantly more money from the party than challengers do. This is not too surprising given that party donors should focus their funds on races where they believe they have the best chance of preserving gains or making gains. In addition, as hypothesized, party leaders, majority party members, and Republicans raise more per eligible voter. In terms of district variables, I find that previous electoral competition has a significant impact on party contributions. Finally, there are a number of statistically significant state level determinants. Given the expensive nature of races for seats in professional chambers, it is not surprising to see that this variable has such a strong substantive impact. In addition, since campaign finance laws reduce the amount of money that candidates can raise from any particular source, I am not surprised to find that parties also contribute 10 cents less per eligible voter when stricter laws are in place. In addition, I find that the presence of a presidential election year and term limits reduce party contributions while strong interest groups and high levels of chamber competition and opponent fundraising increase donations.

Turning next to incumbents, I find that this model predicts approximately 27 percent of the variance. In analysis not shown, I find that female incumbents raise five cents less than male incumbents.
Table 5.4: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Party Fundraising by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.24***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td>-0.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.66***</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.09**</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                             | 6,067          | 2,283      | 2,283       | 1,499      |
| Adjusted R²                   | 0.16           | 0.27       | 0.09        | 0.34       |

*p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
In addition, I find that when incumbents face a challenge from a male candidate, the female incumbent will raise six cents less per eligible voter than the male incumbent, although the coefficient is only marginally significant. In addition to gender, many of the relationships found in the all contested model hold for incumbents as well. One relevant departure is the change in which measure of electoral competition is significant. For incumbents, party donors appear to pay more attention to the number of primary opponents in the previous election and a competitive primary reduces the amount that an incumbent raises by two cents per eligible voter. This could indicate that the party pays attention to electoral competition but that they are also more likely to fund incumbents that are secure.

In terms of differences in degree, one can see that professionalism has a larger impact on party contributing to incumbents than it does on party contributing to challengers or open seat candidates. Incumbents are likely to be the most skilled campaigners and may be the most accomplished at capturing resources from all types of donors, including the party. In addition, I find that incumbents are hit the hardest by stricter campaign finance laws. When these laws are in place incumbents raise 12 cents less per eligible voter versus just six cents less for challengers and open seat contestants. Since incumbents are attractive candidates to many donors and are likely to receive larger contributions, it is not surprising that campaign finance laws impact them to a greater degree. As such, these differences should help level the playing field a bit for challengers. Finally, I find that interest group strength is an important positive predictor of party contributions for incumbents. Perhaps interest group donations signal to the party who the most viable candidates are or parties donate more to incumbents when
interest groups are strong as a way of trying to maintain their loyalty against the desires of lobbyists.

Moving from incumbents to challengers, I again find that many of the relationships are similar to that of the first two models although a few relationships stand out for this group of candidates. First, challengers raise more from the party when the previous election was competitive. This demonstrates that parties may be following the additive strategy by funding strong challengers in the hopes they will be able to overtake potentially vulnerable incumbents. Second, although the relationship is not significant, the direction of the relationship for legislative professionalism is reversed for challengers. As expected, challengers are likely to find this environment the most competitive and, as a result, the party may write off many challengers in favor of funding races that are more definite.

In analyses not shown, when the analysis was re-done and the comparison category was man vs. woman instead of man vs. man, I found that female challengers raise eight cents more per eligible voter than male challengers when both face opponents of the opposite sex. This seems to indicate that female challengers either make more of an effort to raise money from the party when they have a male opponent or that the party recognizes that women need funding to be successful when running against a male incumbent. Either way, women seem to put more of an emphasis on raising money in this scenario than men do when facing a female incumbent.

In addition, challengers tend to raise more when they are Republicans, when they are members of the majority party, when the previous election was competitive, when interest groups are strong, when the chamber is competitive and when their opponent is raising more. On the other hand, challengers raise less when campaign finance laws are
strict, when term limits are in place and when it is a presidential election year. Most of these relationships conform to my earlier hypotheses.

Finally, in examining open seat races, I find that gender plays an important role here. There are a number of statistically significant relationships when examining the various gender by gender of opponent combinations. First, male open seat candidates raise 15 cents less per eligible voter when their opponent is a woman versus a man. Second, in analysis not shown, in comparison to female open seat candidates, male open seat candidates raise 18 cents less per eligible voter when facing a female opponent. Finally, in analysis not shown, when a male open seat candidate faces an opponent of the opposite gender, he will raise 14 cents less per eligible voter than when a female open seat candidate faces off against a man. These relationships all demonstrate that female open seat candidates are well financed in the face of a male challenge and that men have a more difficult time raising money from the party when they face a female opponent. This could indicate that women are running strategically and that the strongest female candidates run in open seat races and, therefore, get the most financial attention here. It could also indicate that the party believes women are as, or more, capable of winning these elections so long as they are financed at rates high enough to give them a financial advantage against their opponent. In addition to these models, I also reestimate my models using state dummy variables in place of state-level factors.\(^6\)

Now, that I have examined the contested races I turn to an analysis of the uncontested races. Although parties tend to focus their attention on competitive races

\(^6\) In terms of my primary independent variable of interest, I find that gender loses its significance across the board in the contested incumbent model. This difference is not surprising given that both of these relationships were only marginally significant before. In addition, I find that gender is no longer a significant predictor of uncontested open seat elections. Instead, all of the variance is explained by the state dummy variables. Since the effect is not consistent using different model specifications this suggests that the influence of gender is not very strong.
where the outcome is not a foregone conclusion, they may contribute to uncontested races as a way of warding off potential challenges. Therefore, it is important to examine whether the party bases their decision to contribute to uncontested candidates on the same factors as contested candidates or whether they weigh some factors differently. Below, in Table 5.5, I present the empirical results from two models. The first model looks at the factors that influence contribution levels to uncontested incumbents. The second model examines the factors that influence how much is raised by open seat candidates who ran unopposed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>0.37***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Served</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.

Beginning with uncontested incumbents, I find that gender does not play a statistically significant role in funding decisions for these types of candidates. Instead,
uncontested incumbents tend to receive more when they are party leaders, when they are running for a seat on a professional legislature, when term limits are in place, and when campaign finance laws are less stringent. In addition, party donors tend to pay attention to the degree of competition in the previous election. Save for term limits, all of these relationships match up rather closely with those of contested incumbents. The primary difference is in the party leadership variable. Here, party leaders receive a whopping 37 cents more per eligible voter, which is more than twice as high as that for contested incumbents. This could indicate that uncontested party leaders are valuable to the party either because of their important role in policy decisions or their ability to redistribute funds to others who do not enjoy their relative electoral security.

Finally, in examining open seat uncontested races, I find that gender and legislative professionalism are the only statistically significant explanations of donor behavior. Here, female candidates raise eight cents more per eligible voter from party donors than male candidates do. Perhaps these candidates are very well qualified or simply provide the best chance to diversify the legislature and policy viewpoints at the same time.

In addition to the models I present here, I also estimate models separately for the analysis for party committee donations and donations that came from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual party donors. I also conduct my analysis separately for Democrats and Republicans. Finally, I examine whether gender plays a role in the percentage of contributions received from various types of party donors.  

---

7 Generally, I find that the coefficient for gender is occasionally significant but that donors pay more attention to the gender of the candidate and the opponent when making contribution decisions. In addition, I find that gender plays a larger role in party committee donations when the dependent variable is based on the amount of money per eligible voter while donations from leadership PACs, candidate committees and individual donors factor more prominently for the percentage of contributions received. Finally, when separating the analysis by party, I find that there is no real consistency between which party measure is
Discussion

As with total campaign receipts, I find evidence in this chapter that gender plays a significant role in the contribution decisions of party donors, however, these relationships occur far less frequently here, especially when state dummy variables are used in place of state-level factors. After controlling for a variety of other factors, I find that the regression coefficients for gender are statistically significant for contested incumbents and uncontested open seat candidates. Female incumbents raise five cents less per eligible voter and female uncontested open seat candidates raise eight cents more per eligible voter than similarly situated male candidates. Women also do rather well against male and female opponents when running in contested open seat elections. As in the last chapter, I find that female incumbents raise slightly less in some circumstances but female open seat candidates raise more, regardless of contestation. These results demonstrate that the party is not opposed to funding women in most types of races and that they may even contribute more to their candidacies in certain electoral circumstances. This provides some evidence that regardless of the parties’ relationship with women at the recruitment stage, those who make it past this phase will tend to receive the financial support of the party.

In addition, these findings seem to indicate that the party does not focus all that much on gender when making campaign contributions. Instead, they concentrate more heavily on other types of characteristics. Perhaps this outcome is a result of women being strategic about when and where they run in an attempt to maximize the chance that their electoral outcome will be positive.

Affected most by gender. This suggests that the party committee may pay more attention to the state electoral environment than individual donors do and that gender is generally not a major factor in how parties distribute campaign money, regardless of which type of party donor is examined.
Besides my key independent variables of interest, I find that many other variables have a statistically significant effect on the total amount raised from the party committee, the candidate committee, leadership PACs and individual party donors. In terms of contested races, candidates tended to raise the most per eligible voter when they are party leaders, are Republicans (save for incumbents), are members of the majority party, when the previous level of electoral competition is high, and when their opponent raised more. Contested candidates are generally disadvantaged by the presence of term limits (save for incumbents), in presidential election years, and when strict campaign finance laws are in place, while being advantaged by strong interest groups, professional legislatures (save for challengers). In terms of uncontested races, again, for incumbents, I find that party leadership and previous electoral competition levels have a positive impact on total campaign receipts, as does running for a seat on a professional legislature. However, I do not find that my uncontested open seat model explains much of the variance in party contribution behavior.

Generally, I find that these factors play a similar role in explaining party donations as they did in explaining the total amount of campaign receipts raised. However, seniority does not have the statistical weight here that it does for total campaign receipts but previous electoral competition is more often a statistically significant factor across the various types of races. This is not surprising given that parties tend to focus more on gaining and maintaining seats in the legislature versus on gaining access to particularly influential legislators.
CHAPTER 6: EXAMINING CORPORATE, LABOR AND Ideological INTEREST GROUP CONTRIBUTIONS

As I alluded to at the end of chapter five, donors have different reasons for making contributions and they are likely to weigh certain factors more heavily than others based on their goals. In chapter four, I examined the total amount of donations received by male and female state legislators and in chapter five I examined contributions from various types of party donors. In this chapter I turn my attention to examining another major donor sub-group: interest groups. In particular, I examine donations from corporations, labor unions, and ideological interest groups.

Previous Research on Interest Group Contributions

Like political parties, interest groups play an important and rather sizeable role in the electoral fundraising landscape. These groups constitute a large percentage of total candidate campaign receipts and are critical to a candidate demonstrating to other donors that they are a viable contender (Hogan et al. 2009). Interest groups and political parties are also very strategic in their allocation of resources. However, according to the literature, they each follow different strategies when making contribution decisions. As discussed previously, political parties are primarily concerned with their status in the legislature. If donors are affiliated with the minority party in the legislature, their goal is to improve their margins and increase their seat distribution within the legislature (Thompson et al. 1994). On the other hand, if donors are affiliated with the majority party their goal is to stay that way since being the party in power has many benefits ranging from agenda control to policy creation (Thompson et al. 1994). Thus, these donors should pay more attention to factors like chamber composition and previous electoral competition levels. They may focus their attention on vulnerable incumbents or highly qualified challengers.
The strategy followed by interest groups depends on the type of interest group under examination. First, most scholars believe corporations and businesses tend to follow an access oriented or strategic approach. Here, donors are interested in gaining access to influential members of the legislature so that they can provide information, lobby, influence legislation, or work to limit the impact of detrimental policy on their organization (Austen-Smith 1995; Hall and Wayman 1990; Chin et al. 2000; Herndon 1982; Gopoian et al., 1984; Grenzke, 1989). These groups generally give money to incumbents, political leaders, committee chairs, majority party members, electorally secure candidates, and members of key committees that support the interest group’s agenda (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock, 1985; Brunell 2005; Thompson et al. 1994). Next, scholarly literature supports the view that labor unions tend to follow an ideological strategy (Sorauf, 1992; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1995; Brunell 2005). This means donors are most interested in contributing to members who share and vote according to their policy viewpoints or issue positions. As a result, these organizations are more likely to pay attention to the party affiliation of a candidate and to their voting record (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). Finally, much like labor unions, ideological interest groups tend to focus on ideological issues. However, their agendas are usually even narrower and more particularized than those of labor unions. As a result, donors are chiefly concerned with supporting candidates who are in agreement or willing to support their policy agenda or who are closely aligned with their ideological viewpoint (McGhee and La Raja 2008; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005; Gopoian et al. 1984). Thus, candidates who serve on or chair committees of interest to the interest group or who exhibit a supportive voting record on the interest groups’ issues,
particularly crucial votes, will be more likely to receive campaign donations (Gopian et al. 1984; Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and Snyder 1994; Gordon 2001; Grier and Munger 1993; Esterling 2007; Evans 1988).

**Hypotheses Concerning Gender’s Relationship to Interest Group Contributions**

Now that I have overviewed the theories behind the contribution decisions of each type of interest group and the factors that are most likely to lead to more donations, the question is what role, if any, gender plays in this equation. Most scholars argue that PACs tend to make contribution decisions based on the characteristics of the candidates or the electoral contest itself. Gender is rarely cited as one of the possible characteristics. Instead scholars point to majority party status, political party affiliation, party leadership, incumbency, previous electoral margin, etc. (Gopoian 1984; Clawson et al. 1986; Wright 1985; Herndon 1982; Eismeier and Pollock, 1985; Brunell; 2005; Grier and Munger 1993; Grenzke 1989; Evans 1988; Deitz 2007). Since I demonstrate that women are underrepresented at all levels of government, they are less likely to run from the advantageous position of an incumbent or to be in office long enough to have prestigious leadership positions and committee assignments. In addition, they are less likely to have a voting record or a record of service that would make donors more comfortable with providing large donations. Thus, women might face somewhat of a disadvantage in fundraising against male officeholders, especially from donors who are pursuing an access-oriented strategy.

But there may be additional disadvantages that women face as a result of their gender. For instance, some organizations base fundraising decisions on personal relationships and may be more likely to give to friends or to those who aggressively ask for donations (Grenzke 1989). If, as argued earlier, women are less likely to have
established, strong, financial and political networks and if women feel less confident about asking for money, then they may be overlooked by some interest groups (Whiting, 1998; Faucheux and Herrnson 1999; Jenkins 2007).

Labor unions, on the other hand, may be more open to donating to women given the diversified membership of these organizations in terms of socio-economic status, ethnic and minority status, and gender. Thus, they may take a more inclusive approach that favors diversifying the legislature and contributing to women because, in some cases, these candidates may better represent their ideological positions and beliefs. In addition, previous research has shown that women vote in a more liberal direction, are more supportive of social policies and more likely to be against tax cuts aimed at reducing government spending (Thomas and Wilcox, 2005: Poggione 2004; Dodson et al.; 1991). In addition, Thomas and Wilcox (2005) find in a survey of state legislators that businesses, pro-gun groups and pro-life groups are all more likely to support male candidates electorally and financially.

Unfortunately, gender has been relatively under-examined as an explanatory factor for interest group contributions from either corporations or labor unions. Most studies are conducted at the federal level and studies conducted at the sub-national level usually include limited controls and, in some cases, gender is not even among the variables tested (Thompson et al. 1994; Thompson et al. 1998; Jones and Borris 1985; Thomas and Wilcox 1998; Burrell 1994). However, for the reasons given above I expect that women will tend to be disadvantaged by corporate donors but I also think they will have an edge in gaining donations from labor unions.

Like sub-national research on corporations and labor unions, research on gender in relation to ideological interest group contributions has been rather limited in scope.
Gender tends to play a prominent role in discussions of donor behavior only for groups that exclusively support women or promote women’s rights, such as EMILY’s List. Unfortunately, this means less attention has been paid to the contribution patterns of other types of interest groups that do not have electing women at the heart of their agenda. Research on women’s political groups has shown that organizations are very valuable to women both financially and politically and that they play a larger role in recruitment for women than men (Rozell 2000; Fox and Lawless 2010; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009). These organizations can help women establish early funds, while being a source of campaign and fundraising support throughout the electoral process (Tankersley 2005; Fancia 2001).

Besides women’s issues, Thomas and Wilcox (2005) find that female legislators report receiving more fiscal, organizational and campaign support from women’s groups, pro-choice groups, environmental groups and labor unions in both 1995 and 2002 while men report receiving more support from the Christian Coalition, tax relief organizations, pro-life groups, businesses and gun owners. Other studies find that women are more active in legislating for welfare policies, family and children’s issues, women’s rights, etc. (Poggione 2004; Burrell 1994; Bratton 2005; Thomas 1994). Thus, one might expect donors to be more supportive of female candidates that promote their interests in the legislature.

Given these findings, I anticipate that women will have an easier time raising money from liberal ideological interest group donors but that men will raise more from conservative groups. First, women’s organizations should be especially attuned to the necessity of supporting women financially and should be primarily focused on helping women run and win. Second, women may be perceived by ideological interest groups as being more closely aligned with more traditional feminine issues such as social welfare,
education, etc. As a result, this perception may increase contributions from liberal groups but decrease contributions from conservative groups. Finally, given that women are more likely to be moderates or to align with the Democratic Party, and given that many of the groups in the analysis have a liberal agenda, one might expect donors to contribute more heavily to women because they expect them to be closer to their policy beliefs and positions.

I now turn my attention to exploring the accuracy of many of these claims. I begin this analysis with a descriptive exploration of male and female campaign receipts from various groups. Then, I provide a quick overview of my model and detail my hypotheses as they relate to the various controls in the analysis. Finally, I perform a more detailed multivariate analysis that controls for other factors that might account for any differences I find below. The analysis begins with business contributions, and then proceeds to labor contributions. I finish with an examination of the role gender plays in various economic sectors and its relationship to liberal and conservative ideological interest group contributions.

**Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Interest Group Receipts**

**Businesses and Labor Unions**

Before discussing the results of my descriptive analysis, below, I provide a brief overview of what constitutes each category. Businesses donations encompass a wide variety of economic sectors and include donations from: agriculture, communications and electronics, construction, defense, energy and natural resources, general business (i.e. retail sales, food and beverage, lodging and tourism, etc.), finance, insurance and real estate, health, health professionals, resource extraction, and transportation. Although this category encompasses a wide variety of business types, there are also commonalities
across them. It is highly likely that each of these categories will be focused on generating profits and that they will exhibit a conservative stance on economic and regulatory matters (Hogan et al. 2009). This view should lead to similarities in their contribution strategies and in the type of candidates that receive their donations. In addition, using a broad category provides a far more complete and meaningful assessment of business donors then would be the case if I simply examined the general business category alone.

It is also important to note that my measure includes donations from both organizations and the individuals affiliated with these businesses. As discussed in Hogan et al. (2009), there are a number of reasons why it may be prudent to examine interest group donations in this manner. To begin, organizations often bundle individual campaign contributions when making donations, making the two groups fairly indistinguishable. Second, Fellowes and Wolf (2004) found that including individual donations in with PAC donations provided a clearer indicator of, “the interest effort in affecting legislative voting” (Hogan et al. 2009, p. 9). Finally, state laws determine the contribution limits of interest groups and focusing exclusively on PAC donations may make it more difficult to capture this variance.

Conversely, categorizing labor donations is far more clear-cut. This category encompasses all donations from the three unions (general trade, public sector, and transportation) that are categorized as part of the labor sector on the campaign finance website, Follow the Money.

Below, Table 6.1 displays the mean, median and percentage difference in contributions from businesses and labor unions by gender. As one can see, business contributions make up about a third of total campaign receipts and constitute a larger percentage for male candidates than for female candidates.
Table 6.1: Total Business and Labor Receipts by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution Type</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business Contributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>24,018</td>
<td>18,527</td>
<td>5,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>5,895</td>
<td>5,421</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Mean</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Median</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Receipts</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor Contributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5,537</td>
<td>6,113</td>
<td>-576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>-187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Mean</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Median</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Receipts</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not only do men receive a larger share of their total campaign receipts from corporations, but they also acquire more money from these sources. Men receive about $5,491 more on average from corporations, which amounts to about a nine cent advantage per eligible voter in the district.

Turning to labor, one can see that female candidates have the mean and median contribution advantage from these donors. Here, women raise $576 more on average from labor unions and gain one cent more in median contributions per eligible voter in the district. In addition, in looking at the percentage of the total amount raised labor unions constituent approximately one percent more for women than men.

These findings largely conform to my expectations that when compared to men, women raise more from labor unions but less from businesses. Despite the evidence that women can raise more from labor unions, these results should not be taken to indicate that women do not still face fundraising obstacles. Since businesses make up such a large percentage of total receipts, a disadvantage here creates a large fundraising hurdle for women; especially given how much more ground women have to make up to reach parity.
with men. Whether these differences persist once other controls are added into the model remains to be seen.

**Ideological Interest Groups**

Now, that the descriptive differences between male and female candidates have been examined for businesses and labor unions, it is time to turn to donations from ideological interest groups. To be classified within this category, donations must come from an interest group that has a singular, particularistic policy focus. The campaign finance website, Follow the Money, has a pre-designated category that encompasses these groups. For the purposes of this analysis, ideological groups that can be categorized as liberal or conservative are examined. Across the states, there are more registered liberal leaning groups (liberal policy organization, pro-choice, pro-environment, etc.) than conservative leaning groups (anti-gun control, anti-labor, Christian conservative, etc.). I focus on groups that have an ideologically recognizable agenda because I anticipate these groups will be more or less favorably disposed to one gender or another. Since women are more likely to vote liberally and to support policies that are liberal, I expect that liberal groups will donate to women at higher rates and that men will receive more from conservative groups (Poggione 2004; Burrell 1994; Bratton 2005; Thomas 1994).

I now focus on whether differences exist between male and female legislators by examining the mean and median contribution, the per eligible voter mean and median contribution and the percentage of total campaign receipts for ideological interest group donations across each type of race in the analysis (contested and uncontested races) by gender.
Table 6.2: Total Liberal and Conservative Ideological Interest Group Receipts by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution Type</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal Ideological Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>-550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Mean</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Median</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Receipts</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservative Ideological Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Mean</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Median</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Receipts</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the whole, the results above in Table 6.2 support my earlier hypothesis that liberal leaning ideological groups are more inclined to contribute to female candidates. This is not surprising since many female candidates are affiliated with the Democratic Party and may be perceived by donors as being more sympathetic to or more moderate on issues of social policy (Poggione, 2004; Thomas and Wilcox 2005; la Cour Dabelko and Herrmson 1997). Here, one can see that women raise about $550 more on average from liberal groups, which amounts to approximately a one cent advantage per eligible voter in the district. On the other hand, men raise $112 more on average from conservative ideological groups, which amount to approximately a one-cent advantage per eligible voter in the district. Finally, in looking at the percentage I can see that donations from ideological interest groups make up about one cent more of the total amount of donations raised for women versus men.

Although women appear to be advantaged by donations from liberal groups, the differences are not dramatic and the amount of money being raised in this area is very
minor and makes up an exceedingly small percentage of total campaign receipts. Later in the chapter, I explore whether gender is a statistically significant predictor of donations from both liberal and conservative ideological interest groups when a full model of controls is run.

**Discussion**

This analysis demonstrates that interest groups respond to gender differently. When groups focus on gaining access, women tend to be disadvantaged. When groups focus more on ideological concerns women are more likely to come out ahead. Women are able to raise more than men across the board from labor unions and liberal leaning ideological interest groups. However, women are underfinanced by businesses relative to male candidates and this category alone accounts for close to one-third of all donations received in a campaign. Thus, while women may have an easier time appealing to some groups for funds they may have to work hard to raise what they need from others, especially if the places where they are advantaged make up a smaller percentage of total campaign receipts. These differences, again, point to the importance of exploring contributions more in-depth since simply combining all interest groups together would mask the differences that are actually present in the fundraising landscape.

However, once again, there are many other factors that need to be accounted for besides gender. I briefly lay out my hypotheses in relation to these variables below before moving on to the multivariate analysis.

**Control Variables and Hypotheses**

In this chapter I examine the total amount of contributions from business, labor and ideological interest groups accounting for the voting age population in each state. Business contributions account for a wide variety of economic sectors (agriculture,
health, transportation, etc.). Labor contributions encompass donations from public sector unions, general trade unions and transportation unions. Ideological interest group contributions encompass those from both conservative and liberal organizations. Given the different goals and strategies of each of these interest groups, I anticipate that certain factors will play more of a role for each donor group than others in determining the amount raised by candidates. Therefore, I only review my hypotheses as they pertain especially to these particular factors.

**Candidate-Level Factors**

First, for the reasons already discussed I expect women will raise more from both labor unions and liberal ideological interest groups and less from conservative ideological interest groups and businesses. Second, I anticipate that incumbents will be advantaged in donations from business groups because these candidates will be valuable to donors looking to acquire access and these donors are more likely to contribute to individuals that are electorally secure (Cassie and Thompson 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Thompson et al. 1994). Third, I anticipate that party and committee leadership will be especially important to businesses looking to gain access to influential members of the legislature (Hogan 2007). However, I also think this factor will matter for labor unions as these variables provide cues about a candidate’s party affiliation and policy positions. In addition, candidates who chair committees of interest to these groups should receive more from them in the hopes they will advocate on their behalf or introduce policy that is favorable to their interests (Gopian et al. 1984; Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and Snyder 1994; Gordon 2001; Grier and Munger 1993; Esterling 2007; Evans 1988). Fourth, party affiliation should also play a role. I would anticipate that Republicans will tend to receive more from businesses while Democrats should be favored by labor
unions. It is possible that this will be the case because Republicans tend to be more fiscally conservative and more aligned with the regulatory views of business than Democrats. Finally, I anticipate that majority party membership and years of service will be important factors for businesses as these donors are hoping to gain access to members in power who have more say over agenda setting and policy matters (Thompson et al. 1994; Rudolph 1999). In addition, majority party members may receive more from labor unions, as these candidates should ultimately have more control over setting the agenda and making policy (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

District-Level Factors

As with total and party contributions, I expect that candidates will be responsive to the amount that their opponent is raising and will raise more from both businesses and labor unions in reaction to the level of donations received by their opponent (Hogan 2007). In addition, I expect that labor contributions will be more forthcoming when a candidate is running in a more competitive district and when there are a large number of candidates in the previous primary election (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). I would not anticipate businesses to be as preoccupied with these factors as their goal is to contribute to members who are more electorally secure so that they will have a better chance of getting a return on their investment.

State-Level Factors

As with total and party campaign receipts, I expect many of the hypothesized relationships will hold true here as well. I expect businesses and labor unions will donate more when candidates are running for a seat on a professional legislature (Thompson et al. 1998). These campaigns tend to be more expensive and gaining access to members here may prove even more valuable since many of these members will be in the
legislature full-time and innovate legislation is more likely to occur in these chambers. Second, I expect campaign finance laws will reduce the amount that is raised from these donors, since limits tend to particularly reduce the amount that corporations and labor unions can contribute (Hogan et al. 2009). Third, I anticipate that both corporate and labor union contributions will be higher when interest groups are strong. Fourth, businesses and labor unions may contribute more in a presidential election year as a function of being better organized or they may contribute less as these groups will have more pressure on them to also fund other types of races and there may be less, over all, to give to any one candidate. Fifth, chamber competition may play some type of a role here. I do not anticipate that it will be as important with interest group donors as it is with party donors. However, businesses may use this information to calculate which members to contribute to in terms of coming away with the most access while labor unions may hope to maintain or increase the number of individuals in the legislature who tend to support their ideological views. Finally, it is possible that some groups will contribute more heavily when term limits are in place as they may hope that term limited members will use their last years in office to introduce legislation that is favorable to the group’s position. On the other hand, businesses may look to establish connections elsewhere and contribute less to term limited members because they know that they will soon loose access to them.

**Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Total Interest Group Receipts**

**Business Donations**

I perform several OLS regression analyses that examine the model for all candidates and then separately for contested, uncontested and open seat candidates. Table 6.3 presents the coefficients and significance levels for all candidates in contested
races by the gender of the candidate, as well as the gender of the candidate and their opponent.

Table 6.3: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Business Fundraising by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.44***</td>
<td>-0.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>2.68***</td>
<td>2.68***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.02+</td>
<td>0.02+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6,067</td>
<td>6,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance

Table 6.3 shows that the model explains about 28 percent of the variance. None of the gender variables are significant in either model but all of the other candidate-level factors are. As hypothesized, incumbents raise more from businesses when compared to challengers. Since, businesses are concerned with gaining access and challengers often face a difficult time against the incumbency advantage, it is not surprising that they raise
less. Open seat candidates also raise about 20 cents more per eligible voter than
challengers do. In addition, it is clear that businesses direct much of their money to
people in positions of power within the legislature. Here, party leaders raise $2.68 more
per eligible voter, while committee leaders raise 12 cents more and majority party
members receive 8 cents more. Republicans also make more from businesses, which is
also expected given their likelihood to fit more closely with the conservative agenda of
many corporate interests. In terms of district-level factors, it is clear that both measures
of previous competition play a significant role in the donation strategy of businesses.
Also, as was the case with total and party donations, candidates are reactive to the
amount raised by their competition and tend to raise more as their opponent raises more.
Finally, turning to state-level factors, I can see that, as in earlier chapters, strong
campaign finance laws reduce the amount raised by contested candidates. In addition, I
can see that strong interest groups, term limits, and high levels of chamber competition
all lead to more corporate donations.

Having now examined what factors affect all contested candidates together, I
move on to examine each group, incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates,
separately. Below, in Table 6.4 I present the results of each of these models for the
gender of the candidate and the gender of the candidate and their opponent separately.

Looking first at incumbents, I find that gender has a statically significant effect in
a couple of different ways. First, female incumbents raise approximately 10 cents less
per eligible voter when compared to male incumbents. In addition, I find that female
incumbents make about 13 cents less than male incumbents when both face off against a
male challenger. This finding provides some evidence that female incumbents are
disadvantaged by businesses when compared to male incumbents.
Table 6.4: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Business Fundraising by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.62***</td>
<td>-0.64***</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.31***</td>
<td>-0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.05†</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>2.57***</td>
<td>2.57***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.30***</td>
<td>-0.30***</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.28***</td>
<td>-0.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.37+</td>
<td>0.37+</td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
<td>-0.21**</td>
<td>-0.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>0.32***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.001+</td>
<td>0.001+</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.04‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>1,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
Although raising 10 to 13 cents less per eligible voter may not seem like much, it can translate into quite a financial barrier, especially for women in more populated districts. Given the desire of businesses to gain access to influential members of the legislature, it is not surprising to see that incumbents raise more when they are party leaders, when they have more seniority, and when they are members of the majority party. As before, Republicans also raise more although electoral competition does not seem to impact the financial decisions of donors in this model. However, it is clear that incumbents are able to keep up with the gains of challengers and will raise about 10 cents more per eligible voter from businesses when their opponent raises more. Finally, in examining the state-level factors one can see that most play a highly significant role in the decisions of business donors. Incumbents raise 21 cents more when term limits are in place and 32 cents more when comparing states where interest groups are weak to where they are strong. This is not surprising since strong interest groups should lead to better financed business donors and business donors may spend more on incumbents in an effort to gain their loyalty and get them to use what time they have left to support their interests. In addition, as with party and total campaign donations, campaign finance laws reduce the advantages of incumbents to the greatest extent.

Turning next to challengers, I find that when used in the single-indicator equation, gender is not statistically significant but in the model controlling for gendered context, female challengers raise three cents more than male challengers when they run against a male incumbent. This could indicate that women feel more pressure to focus on fundraising when they face a male incumbent. Or, it could be an indication that women who do decide to run against male incumbents are better fundraisers than similarly situated male challengers. This could be an indication again of the strategic aspect of
women running for office. As with incumbents, challengers raise more when they are affiliated with the Republican Party although their advantage is not nearly as large as that for incumbents or open seat candidates. Unlike with incumbents, I find that majority party status does not play a statistically significant role in the contribution strategies of businesses while previous electoral competition does. This is to be expected since a highly competitive district could signal the presence of a weak incumbent. Since business donors want to gain access to members of the legislature, they may hedge their bets and contribute to both incumbents and challengers or they may donate more to challengers so that they will have a connection to them if the challenger wins the electoral contest. Another major departure from the incumbent models is that neither term limits nor campaign finance laws have a statistically significant impact. It appears that business donors are more likely to focus their money on incumbents and open seat candidates when term limits are in effect. In addition, campaign finance laws should help to level the playing field for challengers so it is not surprising that they are impacting other types of candidates to a greater extent.

On the other hand, challengers are more likely to be affected when they run for a seat on a professional legislature. These candidates receive lower levels of funding from business donors when running in this environment. Since, business donors appear to be directing more to incumbents in this scenario it is not surprising that this would have a negative impact on challengers. Given the difficulty in gaining a seat in a professional legislature and the expense of a campaign, one might expect a challenger to be at a particular disadvantage and not a terribly attractive candidate to a business donor hoping to gain access. Otherwise, interest group strength and chamber competition both make it more likely challengers will raise slightly more from business donors. Finally, as with
incumbents, challengers raise more when their opponent raises more, however the total increase per eligible voter is one-tenth that of incumbents. This demonstrates that challengers have a harder time matching the gains of their opponent when compared to incumbents.

Finally, in looking at the last two models in Table 6.4 I can see that approximately 25 percent of the variance is explained for open seat candidates. In addition, gender is again having a statistically significant affect, with female open seat candidates raising approximately five cents more per eligible voter when compared to male open seat candidates. In addition, gender plays a statistically significant role when the gender of their opponent is factored in. First, female open seat candidates raise eight cents more per eligible voter than male open seat candidates when both face a male opponent. Second, when a male open seat candidate faces an opponent of the opposite sex they raise five cents more per eligible voter than a male open seat candidate who faces a male opponent. These relationships demonstrate that female open seat candidates are competitive fundraisers but they also show, in part, that women tend to raise more when they find themselves running against a male candidate. Perhaps women feel more threatened by a male challenge and believe they must work harder to attract business donors so that they can stay competitive. These races also provide evidence that both men and women running in open seat races raise more from businesses when their opponent is of the opposite sex.

In moving beyond gender, I see that Republicans and majority party members are again raising more. However, for these races, it is the number of previous primary opponents that is playing a role in contribution decisions. Businesses may use this information as a cue to determine which party faced the biggest obstacle in the primary
the last time out. This may aid them in deciding which candidate they should contribute to now. In terms of state-level factors, all of the relationships conform to the findings discussed earlier for challengers, although the coefficients are generally larger.

Understanding what factors influence business contributions in contested races is only half the story. It is also necessary to compare the results already discussed to those found in uncontested races. Thus, in Table 6.5 I present two models. The first model looks at the factors that influence business contributions to uncontested incumbents. The second model examines the factors that influence how much is raised by open seat candidates who ran unopposed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.41*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.12**</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>1.75***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Served</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.54*</td>
<td>0.77**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
Here, as with contested incumbents, one finds that uncontested female incumbents raise less than their male counterparts. On average, women raise 12 cents less per eligible voter. Perhaps female incumbents, face a greater challenge in getting the attention of business donors when compared to male incumbents or perhaps women do not feel as much pressure to raise more when they are running from the advantaged position of an incumbent. In addition to the similarity with gender, female uncontested candidates also raise more when they are party leaders, when they are Republicans, and when they have been in office for a longer period of time. I also find that many of the state-level factors maintain similar relationships for uncontested and contested incumbents.

Finally, turning to the last model in the table, one sees that uncontested female open seat candidates raise approximately 10 cents more per eligible voter than their male opponents, although this coefficient is only marginally significant. While one might expect businesses to be more supportive of male candidates in this situation, this does not seem to be the case. Otherwise, candidates tend to raise more when the previous election was competitive, when the legislature is more professional, when interest groups are strong and when chamber competition is high. Also, in analysis not shown, I ran these models using state dummy variables in place of state-level control variables.\(^8\)

**Labor Donations**

Now that I have examined the factors that play a significant role in the amount of money that candidates raise from business, it is time to turn to labor unions. Unlike

---

\(^8\) I found that in both my single-indicator equations and in the models controlling for gendered context, gender became an insignificant predictor of business donations for contested challengers, and contested and uncontested open seat races. Again, since the effect is not consistent using different model specifications this suggests that the influence of gender is not very strong. It could also suggest that other factors currently unaccounted for, such as the culture of the state or the socio-economic status of the voters might be playing a role. However, the contested and uncontested incumbent relationships were not impacted by the use of state dummy variables.
businesses, labor unions should be motivated more by ideological concerns than attempts to gain access to influential members in the legislature. Thus, it is important to divide my analysis so that each type of interest group is examined individually. As with my analysis on business, I first examine all contested candidates before separating my models out for each type of candidate (incumbent, challenger and open seat) that runs in a contested election. Finally, I examine how labor unions treat incumbents and open seat candidates in uncontested races. Below, in Table 6.6 I provide my findings for all contested candidates.

**Table 6.6: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Labor Fundraising by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
<td>0.003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
<td>0.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6,067</td>
<td>6,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance
As in Table 6.3, I do not find that gender has a statistically significant impact when all contested candidates are grouped together. Moving on to other candidate characteristics, I find that incumbents and open seat candidates receive more from labor unions than challengers do. Although it makes sense that donors would contribute more heavily to open seat candidates where races are likely to be more competitive, it is surprising that more funds are not directed to challengers since this goes against many of the arguments in the literature about the ideological strategy (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). However, it does conform to recent findings that labor unions focus on incumbency status when making donations (Hogan et al. 2009). As anticipated, I find that party leadership and party affiliation play a very strong role in the decision to contribute. This is to be expected since labor unions are more likely to fund members who are closely aligned with their ideological preferences and party serves as a cue to a candidate’s ideological beliefs. The biggest departures from the donation strategies of businesses are that labor unions focus far less attention on committee leadership and majority party status. In addition, Democrats tend to benefit from labor contributions as opposed to Republicans.

In terms of district-level influences, past district competition has a strong influence on labor contributions, which fits with scholarly speculations that labor unions tend to follow more of an electoral or ideological strategy. Finally, in looking at state-level influences, I find that many of these variables played a larger role in determining business contributions. However, as has generally been the case with other contributions, candidates receive more in donations when their opponent raises more but they raise less when it is a presidential election year and when campaign finance laws are strict.
Now that I have examined what factors impact labor union contributions when all contested candidates are grouped together, it is time to see if these relationships hold once the candidates are separated. Below, in Table 6.7 I examine incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates separately by the gender of the candidate and the gender of the candidate and their opponent.

Looking first at incumbents, I see that none of the gender variables in the first model are significant. However, I find that female incumbents tend to raise four cents less per eligible voter than male incumbents, although it is only marginally significant. This finding seems to follow a general pattern across contributors in which female incumbents raise less than their opponents. It is unclear why this is the case but it is possible that women may not feel as pressured to raise large sums of money once they obtain incumbency.

Although labor unions are theoretically supposed to follow more of an ideological strategy, I find evidence here that they also pay attention to more access oriented characteristics when making donations. This is similar to what Hogan et al. (2009) found in a recent study of business and labor donations. In particular, I find that party leaders receive about 46 cents more, while Democrats receive 18 cents more and majority party members gain four cents more per eligible voter. Seniority is also an important factor but committee leadership actually reduces contributions from labor unions by four cents per eligible voter. Perhaps this outcome is a function of committee leaders serving on a bevy of committees that either do not pertain to the interests of labor unions or directly counter them. Next, I find that neither measure of electoral competition serves a significant role. However, several state-level factors are significant.
Table 6.7: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Labor Fundraising by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001**</td>
<td>0.001**</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>1,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
Again, incumbents can expect to raise more when running for a seat on a professional legislature, when campaign finance laws are less stringent, and when their opponents are raising more. These relationships comport well to findings from other donor groups as well.

Turning next to challengers, I do not find any statistically significant relationships for gender. However, I do find that party affiliation is an important factor and that labor unions will tend to contribute nine cents more per eligible voter when a candidate is affiliated with the Democratic Party. In additions, candidates tend to raise more when the previous primary and general election were highly contested. This provides evidence to support the argument that labor unions tend to fund candidates in competitive electoral situations. In addition, as I found repeatedly across my analysis chapters, strict campaign finance laws have a chilling effect on donations while, on the other hand, candidates raise more when their opponents raise more. In addition, I find that strong interest groups benefit challengers and that term limits decrease their total contributions from labor unions.

Finally, when examining contested open seat races, one can see that the models closely resemble those for challengers but more of the variance is explained here. Again, I do not find that gender has any bearing on labor union contributions. However, once again, party affiliation, the number of primary opponents, campaign finance laws and opponent fundraising all have an impact.

In addition to scrutinizing contested races, it is also important to examine whether labor unions prioritize factors differently when candidates are running unopposed in the general election. In Table 6.8 I focus on the factors that impact labor union donations separately for incumbents and open seat candidates.
Table 6.8: Factors Affecting Per-Eligible Voter Labor Fundraising by Candidates Uncontested in the General Election (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.03+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Served</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance

Beginning with uncontested incumbents, I find that female candidates raise approximately two cents less per eligible voter when compared to uncontested male candidates. This finding mirrors that for contested incumbents. As with contested incumbents, I find that labor unions pay attention to party leadership and party affiliation. However, unlike contested incumbents, here committee leadership provides two cents more per eligible voter. Since the outcome of the election is assured, labor unions may invest more in these candidates because they hope a donation might lead them to be more favorably disposed to their agenda or to at least be less openly hostile. Turning to state-level factors, I find that labor unions contribute 19 cents more when the candidate is
running for a seat in a professional legislature but that they will contribute about five cents less when campaign finance laws are strict. These results mirror those discussed earlier for business contributors. Finally, I find that chamber competition is also a significant predictor of labor union behavior although the decrease in giving is very small.

Turning finally to uncontested open seat races, we can see that only about 10 percent of the variance is explained here. This outcome is similar to what we saw for party donations when gender and legislative professionalism were the only significant predictors. Here, instead of gender, I find that party affiliation and majority party status are significant factors and, ultimately, candidates can expect to raise eight cents more per eligible voter when they are affiliated with the Democratic Party and three cents less when they are members of the majority party. Although most of the variables are not significant here, it is important to note that this result conforms to much of what the literature argues, which is that party affiliation will be one of the most important determinants of labor union contributions (Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). In addition, as with the business donor models, I also ran these models using state dummy variables in place of state-level controls.  

**Discussion**

As with total campaign receipts, I find evidence in this chapter that gender plays a role in the contribution decisions of businesses. But, as with party donations, I find that it has a rather minor impact on labor union donations. After controlling for a variety of other factors, gender plays a statistically significant role in business contributions for contested and uncontested incumbents and contested and uncontested open seat

---

9 I did not find any changes in any of my models when the state dummy variables were used.
candidates. In addition, gender plays a factor in the amount raised from labor unions for contested and uncontested incumbents. In terms of donor strategy, I had anticipated that businesses would discriminate more against women and that labor unions would be more in favor of female candidates. However, once controls were introduced, I found that a candidate’s ability to garner funds had more to do with their candidate status. As in previous chapters, I find that female incumbents tend to raise less, regardless of their electoral status from businesses and labor unions and that female open seat candidates tend to raise more from business donors.

As anticipated, businesses tend to follow an access oriented strategy when making contributions. Here, party leadership, majority party status, and years of service were often significant factors. In addition, businesses tend to concentrate more of their contributions on Republican candidates. I also find that labor unions tend to contribute based on a combination of access oriented and ideological characteristics. However, the most frequently occurring candidate-level predictors of donations were tied to party, which is a strong cue of ideology. Unlike businesses, labor unions focus a larger share of their funds on Democrats.

Besides candidate level-factors, I found that campaign finance laws reduce the amount of contributions received from businesses and labor unions and strong fundraising from the opposition will increase the coffers of the competition in every instance for both types of donors. However, strong interest groups, term limits, and chamber competition are far more likely to have a positive, statistically significant impact in my business models. This could indicate that businesses are more reactive to the state campaign environment than are labor unions, at least according to the measures used in my models.
When comparing these findings to the party contribution models, I find a number of similarities and differences. First, majority party status, party leadership, and party affiliation are all important predictors of contributions from party donors. In addition, parties tend to donate more to Republicans which is in line with business donors but departs from the strategy of labor unions. Second, interest group strength plays more of a factor for business donors than for either labor unions or parties, while opponent fundraising and campaign finance laws have the same relationships across the board. Third, I find that term limits increase business donations in all but one instance but that they have the opposite effect on party donations. This may indicate that these donors follow a different strategy when contributing to candidates under term limits. In addition, I find that a presidential election year has a very limited role in the contribution behavior of businesses and labor unions but that it has a significant effect on party contributions. Perhaps parties feel more pressure to divide their resources across elections at all levels of government or to donate more to campaigns at the federal and presidential level. If so, this would reduce the amount of money available to candidates at the state-level and could account for this finding.

These comparisons indicate that there are many similarities across donor subgroups in the types of factors that influence whether someone gets a contribution but, at the same time, every organization is different and these differences will result in groups weighing some factors more importantly than others.

**Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Economic Interest Group Sectors and Ideological Interest Groups**

Having now discussed the overall fundraising landscape for candidates raising money from businesses and labor unions, it is time to see if gender plays a role across the various economic sectors that encompass business. In addition, I examine whether
women are advantaged or disadvantaged by contributions from liberal and conservative ideological interest groups. Below, in Table 6.9 I present the coefficients for gender for each category according to the per eligible voter contribution received. As with the earlier models, I present the results for all contested candidates, for contested incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates separately and finally for uncontested incumbents and open seat candidates. Given the many different sources examined, this table provides the coefficients resulting from the multivariable analysis for the gender variable only (dichotomous 1=woman, 0=man).

Below, in Table 6.9, I divide the economic sectors into those which I hypothesize are friendly to male candidates and those which might have closer ties to female candidates. I base these relationships on theoretical arguments that women tend to be more concerned with social welfare, education, and health care policies while men might be expected to take an interest in more traditionally masculine pursuits like agriculture or resource extraction. In addition, lawyers and lobbyists might maintain closer ties with male candidates given that women are still underrepresented in these professions and men might have more networks established with these types of donors than women.

On the whole, however, I find again that the results have more to do with the status of the candidate. Women tend to raise more when they are open seat candidates and less when they are incumbents. This is generally true regardless of the economic sector under consideration. Thus, I do not find that women excel in achieving donations from groups that might be more aligned with women anymore than I find they are hurt by groups that one might expect would be friendlier to male candidates. If anything, gender plays almost no role in the calculations of these various health care donors.
Table 6.9: Effects of Gender on Funding Raised From Various Economic Sectors and Ideological Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sectors</th>
<th>All Contested Candidates</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>Uncontested Incumbents</th>
<th>Uncontested Open Seat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesized to be Friendly to Male Candidates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance and Real Estate</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.03*</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Extraction</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers and Lobbyists</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hypothesized to be Friendly to Female Candidates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Professionals</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological Groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Groups</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.002**</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Groups</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
In terms of advantages and disadvantages, the greatest monetary differences between men and women can be found in finance, insurance and real estate, resource extraction, and lawyers and lobbyists, although the differences never amount to more than three cents per eligible voter. Turning to those relationships which are statistically significant, I find that female incumbents raise less from agriculture and finance, insurance and real estate. This outcome may be a function of fewer female incumbents having ties to these industries or of fewer women being located in districts that have agriculture as the chief economic constituent profession.

Moving on to challengers, I find that lawyers and lobbyists tend to contribute one cent more per eligible voter here. They are the only industry where gender seems to factor significantly into decision-making. Next, in looking at open seat candidates, I find that women raise one cent more per eligible voter from every donor group save for resource extraction. However, these relationships are reversed for uncontested incumbents where all “male friendly” donors contribute less to female candidates. Perhaps the male candidates in office are simply more closely aligned with the viewpoints of these industries than are female incumbents or perhaps women are only aggressive about asking for money from these industries when they are open seat candidates. Finally, I find that donors affiliated with the resource extraction industry contribute three cents more per eligible voter to uncontested open seat candidates. It is unclear to me why this outcome would obtain but it is possible that the composition of candidates’ within this group is somehow especially appealing to these donors.

Shifting gears and moving next to ideological interest groups, I had originally hypothesized that women would raise more from liberal leaning groups and less from conservative leaning groups. I find evidence to support my hypothesis for liberal groups
although I also find that conservative groups do not appear to base their funding decisions on gender. Instead, they pay more attention to factors like party affiliation, majority party status and party leadership.

Comparing these results to liberal ideological groups, one can see that the relationship is positive in every case. In addition, the relationships are statistically significant for every type of candidate under consideration. In these instances women generally raise one cent more per eligible voter when compared to similarly situated men. This is a rather stark change from the results presented in the economic sector section.

Clearly, liberal leaning ideological interest groups are consistently more likely to support women financially, regardless of whether they are incumbents, challengers, or open seat candidates and may be more open to their candidacies in general. This is not all that surprising since women may be a better ideological fit with the interests of ideological interest groups as compared to businesses.

**Discussion**

Generally, I find that the individual economic sectors presented in Table 6.9 tend to respond in a similar fashion to male and female candidates as all business contributors do. This should increase one’s confidence that my broad measure of business is capturing the same patterns as one might find in the individual industries. As I find throughout my analysis, women tend to be disadvantaged when they are incumbents and female open seat candidates tend to raise more. On the other hand, liberal leaning ideological interest groups tend to favor women regardless of their candidate status. These differences point to the importance of separating labor unions from businesses and ideological interest groups. This is especially so since I find that despite similarities in contribution factors, there are also differences in how each group allocates funds to
candidates. This is likely a result of the theoretical differences in contribution strategies, as well as the diverse policy and ideological objectives of each group.

Conclusion

On the whole, this chapter demonstrates that gender is more likely to play a role in the contribution decisions of businesses and liberal ideological groups but it has a minor role in the contribution strategy of labor unions and plays no role in the donor behavior of conservative ideological groups. Although, liberal ideological groups’ advantage women and some donors do not pay much attention to gender, it is important to keep in mind that liberal group donations make up a tiny fraction of all campaign donations while business donors make up about one-third. As a result, women may still need to pound the pavement to be successful, especially if they are incumbents. However, if female open seat candidates can expect to garner more support from these various donors, then there is little reason to believe they cannot be successful raising money or winning office. This may be why women opt more into open seat elections than into races where they are challengers. On the other hand, donors may contribute more to female open seat candidates because these women represent the most highly qualified, motivated candidates and these candidates may have selected into a race where they have a high chance of winning. Thus, donors may be able to pick up on these cues and may contribute more generously as a result of wanting to gain access to the most likely winner, which may be a woman.

In the next chapter I turn my attention to the individual candidate as a donor sub-group by examining campaign self-finance. In addition, I also focus my attention on the size of contributions received by state legislative candidates.
CHAPTER 7: EXAMINING CAMPAIGN SELF-FINANCE AND CONTRIBUTION SIZE

After reading the last few chapters, it is clear that candidates raise much of their campaign money from parties, businesses, labor unions and ideological interest groups. However, candidates do not always rely exclusively on outside contributors to finance their election. Candidates also fund their own campaigns. Given that female incumbents often raise less in both contested and uncontested races, one might expect these individuals to rely more on self-finance as a way of making up for this shortfall. In addition, where women have raised more than men, these receipts may have been collected in smaller contributions. Certainly, in one area where women are advantaged (liberal ideological groups) the mean donation is just a few hundred dollars. Thus, one might expect women to raise more in small donations either because they have fewer political and financial connections than men or because they feel less comfortable asking for money, especially large donations.

In this chapter I turn my attention to examining campaign self-finance. In addition, this chapter explores differences in campaign contribution size. Both of these elements are important to a comprehensive examination of campaign differences as they can impact the ease with which candidates raise money. A simple comparison of total campaign receipts may show few differences between male and female candidates, but this may belie the real story if women have to reach out to more donors to raise the same amount of money or invest more of their own money into their campaign. In this chapter I examine what role, if any, gender plays in these aspects and I explore what factors influence contribution size and the degree of campaign self-finance.
Previous Research on Campaign Self-Finance and Contribution Size

Campaign self-finance is an important source of funding for candidates at all levels of government. Presidential and congressional candidates often rely heavily on their own pocketbooks (Cook 2008; Steen 2000). In addition, a survey of 350 state legislative candidates revealed that the second largest source of campaign funds came from the candidate’s own revenue sources or personal loans (Faucheux and Herrnson 1999). Given the important role of campaign self-finance in the campaign process, it is surprising and disappointing that this topic has received very little scholarly attention over the years. The major exceptions to this are Steen’s (2000 and 2006) works and Hogan’s (1999) article.

Steen (2000) examines electoral contests between 1992 and 1998 for the U.S. House of Representatives. She examines what role candidate self-financing plays in candidate quality, electoral competition and outcomes, and the incentive to run for office. First, she finds that self-financers are often politically inexperienced and lack name recognition and the support of political networks. Second, she finds that the presence of a self-financed candidate can reduce political opposition. Third, she finds that self-financing can increase a candidate’s chances of electoral success but raising funds the old fashioned way is far more effective. Fourth, she suggests that most self-financing is loan based, which allows candidates to recoup their losses by either writing off the loan as a loss or repaying the loan after winning with money from PACs hoping to gain access after the fact. Finally, Steen shows that the few self-financed candidates who win their races typically make the transition to traditional sources of funding when they run again (Steen 2000; Cook 2008).
These sources provide a great deal of information on campaign self-finance at the federal level but they fail to address the role this process plays at the state legislative level. Hogan’s (1999) article helps fill this void. He examines candidate campaign contributions in Illinois, Kansas and Wyoming during 1986 and 1988. Like Steen (2000), he finds that candidates are more likely to finance their own campaign if they are not receiving enough financial support from various types of donors, especially interest groups. Hogan (1999) also believes that the need to self-finance may have consequences for both candidate entry decisions and the profile of the candidate who runs.

Although each of these pieces shines light on what is essentially a very under-studied topic, neither examines campaign finance across a large array of states and neither directly approaches the topic of gender. In this chapter I make an effort to determine whether gender plays a role in campaign self-finance, particularly after controlling for a wide variety of candidate, district and state-level factors.

Besides campaign self-finance, one might expect gender to play a role in the size of the donation received. Much of what we know about contribution size pertains to individual donors exclusively. Baker (2006) examines races to the United States Senate between 1998 and 2004. The author finds that women rely heavily on individual donors, and female donors, and that this dependence is more entrenched for women than men. In addition, Baker (2006) finds that women receive smaller individual contributions as compared to men.

Burrell’s (1994) study also examines individual donations to federal candidates but from 1980 to 1990. Her focus is on large contributions (those over $500). The author finds that male candidates raise more, on average, from large donors than female candidates in 1980, 1984, 1986, and 1990 while women did better in just one year, 1988.
However, Burrell (1994) does not find gender to be a statistically significant factor once candidate status and party affiliation are controlled. Thus, she does not seem to conclude that women are disadvantaged in the manner that Baker (2006) does.

**Hypotheses Concerning Gender’s Relationship to Campaign Self-Finance and Contribution Size**

There are reasons to believe that gender will have an impact on the extent of self-financing as well as on the prevalence of funding from small donors. Beginning with campaign self-finance, one might anticipate that women will invest more of their own money into their campaign. As I state repeatedly in this dissertation, women may not feel as confident in their ability to raise money or they may lack the connections necessary to effectively raise money from various types of donors, especially those seeking access (Whiting, 1998; Faucheux and Herrnson 1999; Evans 1988; Wright 1985; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Brunell 2005). If either or both of these theories pertain, then women may use their personal pocketbook to achieve two goals. First, using their own start-up money may help to reduce their level of anxiety about fundraising and buy them more time to raise money from other sources. Second, these self-made donations may jumpstart their campaign so that they can get their message out and gain more name recognition. By using their own money to accomplish these two goals, they should gain the attention of other types of donors and this may help them to bring in more contributions in the long run.

Turning next to the size of campaign donations, one might expect women to receive more contributions from small donors. As discussed in chapter six, women may lack many of the characteristics that would make them attractive to well-financed access-oriented donors. Women are also likely to rely more on contributions from individual donors, which are usually smaller in size than those from parties, corporations, and labor
unions (Baker 2006; Burrell 1994). In addition, women may not feel comfortable asking for large sums of money or they may face animosity or skepticism from elites about their ability to get elected and their place in the legislative environment. As such, women may rely upon a larger number of small donations or they may simply get fewer repeat contributions (Jenkins, 2007; LeMieux 2009; Conway 2001; Baker 2006; Fox 2007; Sanbonmatsu 2005).

I now turn my attention to exploring just how accurate these various assumptions are. I begin this analysis with a descriptive exploration of both campaign self-finance and the size of campaign contributions. Then, I provide a quick overview of my model and detail my hypotheses as they relate to the various controls in the analysis. Finally, I perform multivariate analyses that control for other factors that might account for any differences identified below. The analysis begins with campaign self-finance before moving on to an examination of donations from small contributors.

**Descriptive Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Campaign Self-Finance Receipts and Contribution Size**

**Campaign Self Finance**

On the campaign finance website, Follow the Money, candidate contributions are easy to identify and the data include every donation that was made to the candidate’s own campaign. Below, in Table 7.1 I present the mean and median contribution, the per eligible voter mean and median contribution and the percentage of total campaign receipts donated by the candidate to their own campaign across each type of race in the analysis (contested and uncontested races) by gender.

As one can see, when candidates do contribute to their campaign, on average the contribution is fairly sizeable and these contributions make up a higher percentage of
total campaign receipts than was found for ideological interest group donations in Table 6.2.

**Table 7.1: Total Amount Self-Financed by Gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution Type</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-Financed Contributions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>2,364</td>
<td>-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Mean</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Eligible Voter Median</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Receipts</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One can also see that women and men contribute approximately the same amount of money to their campaigns. On average women contribute about $56 more than men to their own campaign. However, when examining the percentage difference between male and female legislators, it is clear that self-finance makes up a higher percentage of total campaign receipts for men as compared to women. Thus, these contradictory estimates make it uncertain as to whether women or men put more into their own campaign. There are certainly many reasons to believe that women would self-fund their campaigns at a higher rate and that this would make up a larger percentage of their total receipts. However, this is not always the case. From a psychological point of view, it is possible that male candidates are more comfortable with dictating where the family finances will go because they may be the primary breadwinners. Similarly, female candidates may be the primary caregiver in their household and may feel more responsibility for the needs of their children and may feel guilty contributing large sums of money to their own campaign because they equate this with taking something away from their family. Later in this chapter, I explore whether this relationship becomes clearer once other control variables are considered.
Campaign Contribution Size

Unlike the measure for campaign self-finance, choosing how to define the size of campaign contributions was a bit more subjective. I define a small contribution as one that is $200 or less. Small contributions also include donations from all small and unitemized party contributions as these donations constitute small contributions from individual donors bundled together or contributions that are under the reporting threshold. For my purposes, I consider a medium contribution as one that ranges from $201-$1,000. Finally, a large contribution ranges from $1,001 to $5,000. To create percentages for each of these totals, the donor amount was divided by total campaign receipts. It is important to note that some states allow unlimited contributions and others place limits on PACs so this may account for some of the variation.

It is also important to note that I did not include all types of contributions in these measures. In examining small contributions I wanted to limit my analysis to group and individual donors. Since income can come from the candidate themselves (candidate self-finance, interest income, balance forward) or from outside sources (public subsidies), or from the party (party PAC expenses, party committee transfer, etc.), where many candidates will receive a standard contribution, I felt these categories did not represent sources of revenue where the candidate had to campaign for the donation. The sources I include represent contributions received from donors where the presumption of giving is not present, where there is competition between candidates to obtain the donation, and/or where the source of revenue is not coming from the candidate themselves.

---

10 The size variables exclude the following contribution sources: balance forward, candidate self-finance, interest income, non-contribution, public subsidy, candidate committees, Democratic officials, candidates and former members, joint candidate committee, party committee transfer, party committees, party PAC expenses, Republican officials, candidates and former members, and Third-Party officials, candidates and former members.
Now that I have explained how these variables were created, it is important to see the amount of variation across the states in the size of contributions received from small, medium and large donors. This is especially true given the differences in campaign finance laws. Below, in Table 7.2 I present the mean percentage raised from small, medium and large donations across each type of race in the analysis (contested and uncontested races) by state. This table is sorted according to the percentage raised from small donations.

**Table 7.2: Percentage of Campaign Receipts from Small, Medium, and Large Donations by State**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Mean Percent Raised from Small Donations (Below Zero to $200)</th>
<th>Mean Percent Raised from Medium Donations ($201-$1,000)</th>
<th>Mean Percent Raised from Large Donations ($1,001-$5,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In examining Table 7.2, it is readily apparent that most campaign contributions do not exceed $1,000. There are only five states in the analysis where donations over $1,000 constitute 10 percent or more of the total amount received by a candidate. These states are Illinois, California, Texas, Oregon and Ohio. Of these states, three are professional legislatures and three allow unlimited contributions. On the other hand, in approximately half the states in this analysis, large contributions constitute no more than two percent of the total amount raised. These differences illustrate the impact of campaign finance laws on the fundraising landscape and point out the importance of studying campaign finance at the state legislative level where variation is more pronounced.

In addition to the variation in large donations, one can see that there is also a fair amount of variation in the first two columns of the table. For instance, in Illinois small donations make up just 12 percent of a candidate’s total while they make up three-fifths of the total amount raised in Colorado. Also, I find that each state varies greatly on the ratio of contributions from small and medium donors. In some states, the percentage raised from small and medium donations is almost equal (Missouri, Idaho, Utah, Pennsylvania, and Ohio) while in others the amount raised from small donations is approximately twice to three times as high as that from medium donations (Wisconsin, Minnesota, Maine, Iowa and Colorado).

Although it is important to have a sense of the differences in contribution size across the states, my primary focus is on whether these differences extend to the gender of the candidate. Thus, in Table 7.3 I present the average percentage received in small donations by gender and state. This table is sorted according to the mean percentage difference between male and female candidates.
In the above table, one can see that there is also a fair amount of variation between the genders in the amount obtained from small donors (those contributing $200 or less). Women receive two percentage points more, on average, from small donors than men do. Overall, men receive more from small donors in one-third of the states under consideration while women raise more from small donors in the other two-thirds. When men receive more, the percentage differences are quite small, never going above four percent. However, when small donors favor women, one can see that the percentage difference ranges from just one percent all the way up to eight percent in Utah. Finally,
the differences in Table 7.2 are echoed here. Small contributions tend to make up a rather small percentage of donations in Texas, Illinois, California, and Florida but account for a large portion in Iowa, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.

Discussion

On the whole, I find that women contribute more to their own campaign in terms of mean donations but self-finance makes up a larger percentage of total contributions for male candidates. Thus, it is unclear whether women are more likely to invest heavily in their own campaign as a means of attracting contributors or to personally finance the start-up costs of their campaign. On the other hand, I find that small donations make up a larger percentage of total campaign receipts for female candidates. In addition, in analysis not shown, I find that men receive about one percent more from medium sized donations but that men and women receive approximately the same amount from large donors. Although large donors are financing men and women at about the same rate, these donors make up a small portion of total campaign receipts in most states. Thus, if men do better among those that contribute $201-$1,000 and women raise more from those who donate $200 or less it is certainly plausible that women will have to seek out more donors to raise the same amount as men.

At this point, these findings need to be examined using a more rigorous multivariate analysis that controls for other factors. Thus, I now turn to laying out my expectations in relation to my model and then proceed with a full analysis of the various factors that should impact campaign self-finance and contribution size.

Control Variables and Hypotheses

In this chapter I examine the percentage of self-financed contributions and the percentage received from small donors. I think that a number of factors, besides gender,
play a role in explaining how much a candidate contributes to their own campaign and in
the size of the donations they receive. I now review my hypotheses as they pertain to
these factors.

**Candidate-Level Factors**

First, for the reasons already discussed I hypothesize women will contribute more
to their own campaign and will receive more from small donors. Second, I anticipate that
incumbents will contribute less of their own money to their campaigns and that they will
receive more from larger donors. I think this will be the case because incumbents should
have enough connections in place to reduce the likelihood they will need to invest much
in their own campaign and they should receive more from larger donors because of their
level of experience in campaigning and in the legislative process. Third, I anticipate that
party leaders, committee leaders, majority party members, and candidates with more
years of service will invest less into their own campaign and will receive more from
larger donors. Again, it is possible that candidates with these characteristics will be
desirable to many types of donors and will, thus, not have to invest as much in their
campaign. I also believe these candidates will raise more from medium and large donors
because those who wish to gain access to these candidates may feel a larger contribution
will achieve this. Finally, party affiliation may also play a role although I am uncertain
which direction it will take. On the one hand, Republicans may invest less of their own
money given that they have done well with the majority of donors examined previously.
However, Republicans, as a group, may have better personal financial situations and may
be able to finance their campaigns to a greater extent as a result. In terms of donation
size, I would expect Democrats to raise more from small donors since they should do less
well with well-financed corporate donors.
District-Level Factors

On the one hand, candidates running in a historically competitive district, may need to invest more into their own campaign and may receive more in small donations because donors may not feel as assured that their investment will reap a reward. In addition, a competitive race will tend to be more expensive and may require more of an investment by the candidate. On the other hand, candidates may invest less of their own money and may get more from larger donors because some donors may invest heavily in candidates facing tight electoral contests and this may mean that a candidate will not need to invest as much of their own money if they can secure large donations from other donors.

State-Level Factors

In examining the many state-level factors, I expect that candidates will have to finance their campaigns at a higher rate but will receive more in large donations when running for a seat in a professional legislature. I expect this will be the case because these races tend to be expensive and may require more of a financial investment on the part of the candidate. On the other hand, donors may think it is important to have ties to these candidates because of the innovative nature of the policymaking process and that they will contribute more to establish or maintain these connections. Second, I expect that strict campaign finance laws will increase the amount candidates invest in their own campaign and will lead to smaller donations. If campaign finance laws limit the amount of money that PACs can give, this will lead to more small contributions and candidates possibly having to make up the shortfall from their own pocketbook. Third, I anticipate that strong interest groups will reduce the amount of money candidates invest in their own campaign and lead to larger donations. I expect this to be the case because interest
group contributions make up a large percentage of a candidate’s total amount raised and when groups are strong candidates should not have to worry about contributing as much of their own money. In addition, many interest groups, especially corporate donors, are well-financed and this should lead to larger contributions on average. Fourth, term limits could have either a positive or negative influence on campaign self-finance and contribution size. On the one hand, donors may concentrate their donations on members in their last term in the hope they will pass legislation of interest to the group. On the other, donors may look elsewhere hoping to establish connections to members that are not about to depart. Thus, depending on the approach taken by these groups, candidates will either receive smaller or larger contributions and will either need to finance their campaigns more or less. Fifth, much like my district-level variables, chamber competition could have either a negative or positive relationship to these variables for the same reasons described in the previous section. Sixth, given that my earlier chapters have shown that candidates tend to raise less from all types of donors in a presidential election year, I would expect donors to have to make up this shortfall by investing more of their own money into their campaign and I would expect them to raise more in small donations as donors may contribute more heavily to federal and presidential races instead. Finally, it is possible that candidates will invest more of their own money into their campaign and will receive fewer contributions from small donors when their opponents are well-financed. If candidates and donors believe a race is financially competitive, they are more likely to contribute higher sums so that the candidates can stay competitive.
Multivariate Analysis of Male and Female State Legislative Self-Finance and Contribution Size

Campaign Self-Finance

This analysis examines what factors play a role in determining the percentage invested in a candidate’s own campaign and in the percentage received from donations that are small (below $200). I begin this analysis with an examination of campaign self-finance and conclude with a look at contribution size. Since campaign self-finance should be more of a factor in contested races, I limit my analysis strictly to contested races, and to examining contested candidates (incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates) separately. However, I examine both contested and uncontested races in the latter half of the analysis. As its certainly possible that donors will respond differently to these electoral scenarios and may tailor their giving based on the competitiveness of a race. Over all, my goal is to see whether gender has any explanatory power once other factors are accounted for. Below, in table 7.4, I present the coefficients and significance levels for all candidates in contested races by the gender of the candidate, as well as the gender of the candidate and their opponent.

Table 7.4: Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Self-Financed by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.4 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>-0.01⁺</td>
<td>-0.01⁺</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6,067</td>
<td>6,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.

In the above table one can see that gender is a statistically significant predictor of the percentage of contributions that are self-financed. For women, self-financed contributions make up two percentage points less of their total amount raised. In addition, self-financing constitutes two percentage points less for a woman than a man when both face a male opponent, while a woman will put four percentage points less into self-financing than a man when both face an opponent of the same sex as them. Finally, in analysis not shown, self-financing constitutes two percentage points less when a woman faces a female opponent as opposed to when a man faces a female opponent. This implies that self-financing makes up a smaller share of all total campaign receipts for women and could imply that women are not investing as much in their own campaigns as compared to men.

Turning next to the other candidate-level factors, one can see for challengers self-finance makes up a larger share of their total receipts than it does for either incumbents or
open seat candidates. This is not surprising since challengers are not as likely to get as much from other sources and are likely to rely more heavily on their pocketbook to make up the difference. Otherwise, none of the other factors were significant predictors of the percentage a candidate invested in their own campaign.

Finally, in looking at state-level factors, I find that candidates contribute a smaller percentage to their own campaign when interest groups are strong and when chamber competition is high while they contribute a larger percentage when it is a presidential election year. Given that candidates tend to raise less when their election coincides with a presidential election, it is not surprising that self-finance would make up a larger share of the total. In addition, strong interest groups should contribute more and chamber competition may attract donors from both sides of the political aisle, both of which should bump up the total amount a candidate raises and reduce the need to self-finance.

Having now examined what factors affect all contested candidates together, I examine each group, incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates, separately. Below, in table 7.5 I present the results of each of these models for the gender of the candidate and the gender of the candidate and their opponent separately.

Beginning with incumbents, I find that gender does not have a statistically significant influence in either of my models. In addition, I find that self-finance makes up one percentage point less of the total raised by majority party members. Given that many donors value majority party status, one might expect that these candidates will be well taken care of and will not need to invest as much of their own money. Besides these factors, I find that the same state-level factors have influence here as was the case in table 7.4, although I also find that incumbents invest a higher percentage of their own money into their campaign when their opponent does as well.
Table 7.5: Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Self-Financed by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.04**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.02⁺</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.03⁺</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>-0.001**</td>
<td>-0.001**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.03⁺</td>
<td>0.03⁺</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>-0.002**</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>0.004*</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>1,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
Looking next at challengers, I find that this model explains less than one percent of the variance, which is far from ideal, and much lower than the other models. However, I also find that gender plays a significant role in the rate of challenger self-finance. Self-financing makes up four percentage points less of the total raised for female candidates. In addition, I find several effects for gender when the gender of their opponent is factored in. First, I find that male challengers facing an opponent of the same sex invest a six percentage point higher percentage into self-financing than female challengers facing an opponent of the same sex. Second, I find that for female challengers self-financing represents a four percentage point smaller percentage than that of male challengers when both face a male incumbent. Finally, I find that when a male challenger faces a male opponent, his self financing is three percentage points higher than what we observed when a male challenger faces a female opponent. These findings provide some evidence that campaign self-finance makes up a smaller percentage of total campaign receipts received by female candidates and that self-finance percentages are highest when a male challenger faces a male opponent.

Otherwise, I find that term limits increase the percentage that challengers invest in self-financing. This result may be due to donors investing more heavily in incumbents when they know they only have one more term to make a connection, thereby, forcing challengers to invest more in their own campaign. In addition, I find that self-financing makes up a smaller percentage of all campaign donations when chamber competition is high. As has been discussed previously, some donors may focus contributions on tight electoral races as a way of influencing the outcome, which may allow candidates to invest less into their own campaign over time.
Turning finally to open seat candidates, I find that self-financing makes up two percentage points less of the total raised for female candidates. In addition, I find that self-financing makes up four percentage points less of total campaign receipts for a female open seat candidate as compared to a male open seat candidate when both face an opponent of the same sex as them. Finally, in analysis not shown, I also find that self-financing makes up five percentage points more of all campaign receipts for a male open seat candidate as compared to a female open seat candidate when both face a female opponent. This seems to indicate self-financing makes up a higher percentage of all campaign receipts for male candidates.

In addition, I find that self-financing will make up a smaller percentage of the total amount raised when candidates are members of the majority party, when the previous election was competitive, when interest groups are strong and when chamber competition is high. On the other hand, candidates will invest slightly higher percentages into self-finance when campaign finance laws are imposing and when it is a presidential election year. Most of these relationships are similar to those already discussed for all contested candidates and incumbents.

As in previous chapters, I also ran these models using state dummy variables in place of the state-level control variables and using the total amount per eligible voter as the dependent variable in place of the percentage.11

11 I found very few differences when using state dummy variables. The only difference occurred in the contested open seat models, where both the gender of the candidate and of their opponent became insignificant predictors of the percentage invested in self-financing. It is important to keep in mind; however, that gender was only marginally significant before the state dummy variables were introduced. In addition, when the alternative dependent variable was used, I found that both types of my gender measures became insignificant predictors of the amount raised by self-finance across each of the models. The only difference being that in the contested open seat model, I found that male candidates invest three cents more per eligible voter in self-finance when facing a male opponent as opposed to a female opponent. These results are not all that surprising since earlier, in Table 7.1, we saw that the mean contribution to one’s campaign was only $56 higher for women but that campaign self-finance constituted one percent more of
Campaign Contribution Size

Now that I have examined the factors that play a significant role in campaign self-financing, it is time to turn to another important aspect of the fundraising landscape, the size of campaign contributions. In this analysis, I examine both contested and uncontested races by the gender of the candidate and the gender of the candidate and their opponent. I begin my analysis below, in Table 7.6, with a detailed analysis of all contested candidates together.

Table 7.6: Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Rose from Small Donations by Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
<th>All Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>-0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6,067</td>
<td>6,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.

the total amount raised for male candidates. Thus, it appears the differences are more pronounced with one examines self-financing in terms of the percentage points received.
Above, one can see that gender does play a fairly significant role in the percentage of donations received from small contributors. Small donations make up about two percentage points more of a female candidate’s total. In addition, regardless of the gender of the opponent, a female candidate will raise two percentage points more in small donations compared to a male candidate facing off against a male opponent. Finally, in analysis not shown, I find that a female candidate facing a male opponent will raise two percentage points more from small donors than a male candidate running against a female opponent. These results seem to indicate that women have more success generating revenue when it does not involve approaching larger donors. This might mean that women have to work harder at fundraising to stay competitive with men.

Besides gender, candidates raise eight percentage points more in small donations when they are incumbents but nine percentage points less when they are party leaders, two percentage points less when they are members of the majority party, and a fraction of a percentage point less when they are more senior. Although one might expect incumbents to raise less from small donations, it is quite likely that these candidates are skilled enough at fundraising that they are able to successfully acquire donations of all sizes. On the other hand, party leaders may raise more in large donations because they are expected to distribute some of what they raise to other rank and file party members.

Turning next to my district-level factors, I find that the number of primary opponents in the previous election negatively impacts the amount received in small donations. In other words, candidates are likely to receive a higher percentage of donations from larger donors when the previous primary was contested. This might indicate that donors pay attention to the electoral environment and tend to invest more in a competitive electoral environment.
In addition, I find that many of my state level-factors are significant. First, candidates running for seats in professional legislatures, tend to raise less in small donations. As I have stated before, professional races are expensive and candidates that gain seats in them are quite valuable to donors, thus it is not surprising that they tend to raise less here. Second, I find that campaign finance laws lead to more small donations. Again, this is to be expected given that stringent laws reduce the amount that a candidate can raise from PACs leading to smaller donations over all. Third, I find that when strong interest groups are in place, small donations make up a lower percent of the total amount raised. Again, I would expect this since interest groups should be better organized and better financed and thus may make larger contributions over all. Fourth, I find that candidates receive a higher percentage of their campaign total from small donors when it is a presidential election year. Since, earlier chapters have demonstrated that candidates tend to receive less from donors when it is a presidential election year; it is not surprising that this leads to smaller donations over all. In addition, donors may feel pressure to spread their funds out across more campaigns in a presidential election year, which will lead to smaller contribution over all. Finally, I find that small donations make up one percentage point less of total campaign contributions when an opponent raises more from small donors. This may reflect a particular donor making more of an investment in one candidate over another.

Now that I have examined the factors that influence the percentage of small contributions received for all contested candidates together, I move to a separate analysis of each type of contested candidate. Below, in Table 7.7, I present my model for incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates by the gender of the candidate and the gender of the candidate and their opponent.
Looking first at contested incumbents, I again find that gender is a rather influential predictor. First, as with all contested candidates, small donations make up two percentage points more of all donations received for female candidates. Second, a female incumbent facing a male challenger will gain three percentage points more in small donations than a male incumbent facing a male challenger. Finally, a male incumbent running against a female challenger will raise two percentage points more in small donations when compared to a male incumbent running against a male challenger. Again, these findings seem to imply that women make up more of their total campaign receipts with donations that are under $200.

As with all contested candidates, I find that party leaders, members of the majority party and senior members all receive a smaller percentage of small contributions. I imagine that these characteristics are valued by donors, especially those wanting to gain access, and that this will lead many donors to invest more than $200 in order to secure a connection to incumbents with these characteristics.

Turning next to district-level factors, I find that the number of opponents in the previous primary has a dampening affect on the amount raised in small donations. One might expect a candidate to focus more on netting larger donations if they believe the race will be competitive.

Finally, I find that candidates raise a smaller percentage of their total from small donations when they are competing for a seat in a professional legislature, when interest groups are strong and when their opponent raises more from small donors. However, candidates raise more in small donations when campaign finance laws are strict and when it is a presidential election year.
Table 7.7: Factors Affecting Percentage of Funding Rose from Small Donations by Incumbents, Challengers and Open Seat Candidates in Contested Elections (Unstandardized Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.55***</td>
<td>0.56***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
<td>0.34***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Woman</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman vs. Man</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man vs. Woman</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Service</td>
<td>-0.004***</td>
<td>-0.004***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>0.001+</td>
<td>0.001+</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
<td>-0.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02+</td>
<td>0.02+</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>-0.02***</td>
<td>-0.003+</td>
<td>-0.003+</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
<td>-0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>1,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
Moving on to examining challengers, I find that gender does not have a statistically significant impact in these races. Given that all challengers tend to start at a disadvantage without name recognition, one might expect men and women to raise a majority of their total funds from small donors. Therefore, it is not wholly surprising that gender does not play more of a role here. Given gender’s insignificance in this model, what other factors make a difference in the percentage raised from small donors? First, I find that Democrats tend to gain a higher percentage from small donors. This makes intuitive sense given that Republican organizations are often perceived to have a large fundraising base and individual donors affiliated with the Republican Party may have a higher income structure to draw from (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). Second, I find that many of the state-level factors mirror those found for the incumbents. The primary differences being that interest group strength is no longer a significant predictor while term limits is. Since corporations make up the largest share of interest group contributions and these organizations tend to be more access oriented, it is not surprising that this variable is not having an impact here. Also, it is possible that challengers maintain a higher percentage of small donations when term limits are in place because donors may funnel larger donations to term limited incumbents.

Finally, moving to open seat candidates I find that gender is once again an important element. As with all contested candidates and incumbents, I find that female open seat candidates collect a higher percentage of their total donations from small donors. In addition, a female open seat candidate will obtain approximately three percentage points more than a male open seat candidate when both face male opponents. Also, in analysis not shown, a female open seat candidate running against a male opponent will raise three percentage points more from small donors than a male open seat
candidate running against a female opponent. Again, it seems that small donors make up a larger share of the total amount accumulated by female candidates. Otherwise, most of the other significant relationships mirror those of challengers. The primary difference is that interest group strength dampens the percentage a candidate raises from small donors in much the same way as it did for incumbents.

Having now examined all of the contested races, one can see that there are many similarities across the models in terms of what factors are most influential. But, it remains to be seen whether these same influences will hold once a candidate faces no direct competition in the general election. In Table 7.8, I explore the factors that influence the percentage of small donations received for both uncontested incumbents and open seat candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.66***</td>
<td>0.47***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party Status</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Served</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Electoral Competition</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Primary Opponents</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>-0.17***</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
All significance levels are based on a two-tailed test of significance.
In examining uncontested incumbents, one can see that there are a lot of similarities between these candidates and contested incumbents. Like contested incumbents, party leaders, Democrats, and senior members all collect a smaller share from donors contributing $200 or less. Moving on to state-level factors, I find that candidates here raise less from small donors when interest groups are strong, when term limits are not in place, and when it is a midterm election.

Finally, in looking at uncontested open seat candidates, I can see that gender has the strongest impact here. Female open seat candidates raise about seven percentage points more in small donations when compared to male open seat candidates. In addition, I find that candidates tend to raise eight percentage points less from small donors when interest groups are strong and the presence of a presidential election year leads to a seven percentage point increase in donations of $200 or less. I also found these relationships among contested open seat candidates. In addition to conducting my analysis in the aforementioned manner, I also ran models using state dummy variables and models that replaced the percentage of contributions raised with the total amount raised per eligible voter from small donors.12

Discussion

As I find in each of my previous analysis chapters, gender has a significant impact on the campaign finance environment. Self-finance makes up a smaller share of the total contributions received by all contested female candidates and by female challengers and open seat candidates in contested races. In addition, small donations make up a larger

---

12 In terms of the gender of the candidate, I did not find any differences when state dummy variables were used in place of the state-level factors. On the other hand, when the total amount per eligible voter was used in place of the percentage raised, I found that gender lost its impact as a significant predictor of donation size for contested incumbents but became a significant factor in the contested challenger model. These differences point to the importance of running the analysis in different ways and using more than one measure of campaign contributions.
share of candidate totals for all contested female candidates, for contested female incumbents, and for contested and uncontested open seat candidates. Although I had anticipated that self-financing would make up a larger share of women’s total campaign receipts this does not appear to be the case. On the other hand, I did find evidence to support my hypothesis regarding contribution size. It makes sense that women would raise more from small donors. Women may be disadvantaged by negative stereotypes, they may not have all of the connections necessary to make inroads with larger donors, or they may be less confident or aggressive about asking for larger sums of money. The self-finance finding is more counterintuitive. It is possible that men simply have more control over their finances and do not face as much opposition from their spouse about the amount of money they contribute to their campaign. It is also possible that women may be less confident about their chances of success and simply play it safe when contributing money to their own campaign. Unfortunately, without interview data, one can really only speculate about this finding.

Besides gender, I also find that a number of other variables are statistically significant. On the whole, candidate-level factors did not play much of a role in terms of self-financing but I did find that party leadership, seniority, and majority party status all reduced the likelihood one would raise a larger percentage from small donors. This meshes well with earlier findings which showed that these factors tended to increase donations from businesses and parties. On the other hand, I find that district-level factors play a limited role on the percentage received from small donors and almost no role for the percentage raised by self-finance. This departs most dramatically from my findings in the chapters on party contributions and business donations. Finally, I find that a number of state-level factors matter. For starters, I find that candidates tend to invest a
larger percentage of their own money and raise a higher percentage from small donors when interest groups were weak and when it is a presidential election year. Next, I find that candidates invest more into their own campaign when chamber competition is low. In addition, in terms of predicting the percentage from small donors, I also find that candidates raise more in small donations when legislatures are less professional, when campaign finance laws are more severe, and when term limits are in place. This mirrors many of my earlier findings where candidates raise less from businesses, labor unions, and parties when campaign finance laws are strict (thereby leading to smaller contributions overall) but more from businesses when interest groups are strong and chamber competition is high (thereby increasing the likelihood of receiving larger contributions).

In short, it is interesting to note the connection between these earlier chapters and this chapter. In other words, how much a candidate accumulates from various donors seems to impact the amount of money they put into their own campaign and the distribution in the size of the donations they receive. In addition, certain circumstances seem to persist in influencing all aspects of campaign finance either positively or negatively. For instance, the presence of stringent campaign finance laws tends to impact both the amount a candidate receives from various donors as well as the overall size of their contributions. This is what makes incumbents such powerful opponents, they not only raise more from a wide variety of donors, but they also do not have to invest as much into their own campaign.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

One thing our field agrees on is that women are under-represented at all levels of government, including the state legislative level. An examination of representation levels across all 50 states in 2000 and 2010 shows that on average women make up just 23% of all state legislative seats in 2000 and 25% in 2010. Thus, on the whole, representation levels have only increased by two percent in the last ten years. However, examining representation on a state-by-state basis shows that female representation has actually decreased over the last decade in approximately one-third of the state houses in the U.S.

Over the years, a host of explanations have been offered to explain this degree of under-representation. Scholars argue that women hold fewer seats because they are outnumbered in professions that serve as a conduit to office (Clark 1994; Darcy et al. 1994); they are the primary caregiver and take on more of the burden of running a home (Robinson and Godbey 1999; Dubes 1976; Welch 1978; Dodson 1997; Elder 2004), they are discouraged from running by political elites and the media (Kahn 1996; Bystrom et al. 2004; Werner 1968; Rule 1981; Fox and Lawless 2004; Carroll 1994; Sanbonmatsu 2005), and they lack ambition and confidence (Fox and Lawless (2004a, 2004b, 2010).

Despite the validity of each of these theories, this dissertation focuses on yet another hypothesized factor in under-representation, campaign finance. Although there are some dissenting voices (Jenkins 2007; LeMieux 2009; Sanbonmatsu 2006; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2009; Baker 2006), many scholars argue that women raise as much as men when various candidate level factors are controlled and similar candidates are compared (Newman, 1994, Burrell 1994, Seltzer et al. 1997, Dolan 2006, Darcy et al. 1994, Wilhite and Theilmann, 1986, Burrell, 1985, Uhlaner and Schlozman, 1986, Welch et al. 1985)
However, I began this analysis with the belief that these findings are the result of the level at which much of the analysis is run, as well as the manner in which it is conducted. The state-level is an important place to examine gender differences because this is often the entry level office for many candidates. In addition, a large scale state study allows for more variance on state factors and thus, more confidence in the applicability of findings. Finally, a cursory examination of total campaign receipts might miss much of the variation going on between donors and in self-finance.

With the goal of rectifying these shortcomings, I began this project with a number of research objectives. First, I analyze the ways in which the nature of raising money might be different for men and women. In other words, in what sorts of places might women be advantaged and in what areas might they be disadvantaged? Second, I seek to determine what role, if any, gender plays in the campaign finance process. In other words, it is reasonable to conclude that a woman’s campaign receipts will be on par with men’s so long as various candidate-level, district-level and state-level differences are controlled for? Third, I seek to gain a better understanding of the way donors react to incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates, as well as contested and uncontested races. By the end of this document, I hoped the body of evidence would lead one to either accept or reject campaign finance as an explanation for women’s under-representation.

I have collected enough evidence to demonstrate that campaign finance is a reasonable explanation for women’s under-representation, at least in some contexts. Beginning with the first objective, I uncover a number of differences in how donors contribute to men and women at both the descriptive and multivariate level. Beginning with descriptive differences, I find that some donors are more receptive to female
candidates while others are less so. In particular, women raise less, on average, in total campaign receipts, as well as donations from business donors and conservative ideological interest groups. On the other hand, the average contribution received by female candidates is higher when it comes from both types of party donors, from labor unions, from liberal ideological interest groups and from small donors contributing less than $200. These findings seem to indicate that women raise less from access-oriented donors but do better with groups that follow more of an ideological strategy. In addition, women seem to do better when they are raising money from groups that take a more liberal position on regulatory and policy issues.

Although these differences are very insightful and point to the problem of examining contributions in terms of total campaign receipts only, one cannot assume they will hold once other controls are introduced. Thus, my second research objective is about discovering whether gender maintains its influence once similar candidates are compared to each other (incumbents with incumbents, etc.) and once other factors known to influence contributions are added into the model. Below in Table 8.1 I present the direction that gender took on the various aspects of campaign finance under examination. A zero indicates that I did not find a statistically significant relationship; a positive indicates that women earned more contributions or a higher percentage while a minus sign indicates the opposite. As you will note below, despite adding a host of other candidate, district and state-level factors into the analysis, I still find many cases in which gender plays a significant role in the finance process.

**Table 8.1 Effect of Gender on the Amount and Size of Contributions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seat</th>
<th>Uncontested Incumbents</th>
<th>Uncontested Open</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.1 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seat</th>
<th>Uncontested Incumbents</th>
<th>Uncontested Open</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Ideological Groups</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Ideological Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Finance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Donations</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings provide some additional insight into the campaign fundraising process and may have some implications for the level of women’s representation, particularly at the state level, and for the personal decision of whether to run for office. Women clearly raise the most from liberal ideological groups; however, these groups contribute some of the smallest amounts. So, women are unlikely to gain a lot of traction from this advantage. In addition, it is clear that gender plays less of a role in how candidates contribute to challengers but that donors tend to give more to open seat candidates and less to incumbents, regardless of the level of contestation. This may indicate that donors respond to the type of candidate running, as well as the gender of the candidate under consideration.

These findings may explain why more women opt into open seat races as Table 8.1 illustrates that women tend to raise more than male candidates from several types of campaign contributors. Given this outcome, one might conclude, as others have, that women will win when they run (Newman 1994; Burrell 1994, Seltzer et al. 1997, Dolan 2006 and Darcy et al. 1994). But, to win, women may very well have to invest more time
into connecting with a wide array of donors (Jenkins 2007). This may discourage many 
women from entering office or from running a campaign, especially if they have other 
pressing concerns, such as children. In addition, the fact that women tend to raise less as 
incumbents, could support earlier findings that women are more susceptible to campaign 
competition than men, in part, because female challengers are more drawn to their 
campaign and that female incumbents face better funded challengers (Palmer and Simon 
2005; Berch 2004). If either of these findings is true, women may eventually feel the 
costs of running for office are higher than the reward of holding office, which could 
impact representation rates long-term.

Besides gender, I found that a wide variety of other characteristics factored into 
donor behavior. In addition, many of these characteristics had more explanatory power 
than gender. Thus, while gender is a significant consideration for some aspects of 
campaign finance, it is just one of many factors that donors use when deciding who to 
give to and how much to give. I also notice that donors concentrate on different factors 
when weighing their contribution decisions. Thus, this dissertation largely supports 
everlier findings that businesses are more access-oriented, that labor unions follow more of 
an ideological strategy, and that parties are more focused on adding to or maintaining 
their share of seats in the legislature (Thompson et al. 1994; Hogan et al., 2009; Sorauf, 

I also find that the state environment plays a prominent role in the campaign 
finance process. The factors that had the most consistent effect were legislative 
professionalism, campaign finance laws, interest group strength, chamber competition, 
presidential election year, and opposition candidate funding. Below in table 8.1 I present
the direction that each of these factors tended to take on the various aspects of campaign finance under examination.

Table 8.2 Effect of State-Level Factors on the Amount and Size of Contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Increase Amount/Size</th>
<th>Reduce Amount/Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>Total contributions, Business contributions (contested incumbents and uncontested races) Party contributions,</td>
<td>Business contributions (contested challengers and open seat), Small donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Finance Laws</td>
<td>Small donations</td>
<td>Total contributions, Party contributions, Business contributions, Labor contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Strength</td>
<td>Total contributions, Party contributions, Business contributions</td>
<td>Self-finance, Small donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Competition</td>
<td>Total contributions, Party contributions, Business contributions</td>
<td>Self-finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Election Year</td>
<td>Self-finance, Small donations</td>
<td>Total contributions, Party contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Fundraising</td>
<td>Total contributions, Party contributions, Business contributions, Labor contributions</td>
<td>Small donations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As I alluded to at the end of chapter seven, many of these factors impact multiple aspects of the campaign finance process and tend to compound in either helping or hurting candidates raise money. For instance, campaign finance laws reduce the amount candidates raise from multiple donors and thereby increase the amount of small donations that candidates receive. This might ultimately raise the difficulty involved in generating campaign funds. In addition to this finding, one can also see that some types of donors respond more to certain factors than others and some donors are not all that attuned to any of these factors. For instance, labor is only consistently significant for two of the above factors while businesses are impacted by five of the six factors above.
How might these findings compare to today? Over the last decade campaigns have become increasingly expensive and donors, especially interest groups, have focused more attention on state legislative elections as a function of legislatures having more state policymaking power. These conditions might pose fundraising obstacles for women if they do not feel confident asking for large sums of money and if they do not have the financial and political networks necessary to generate enough to stay competitive in an increasingly expensive, high profile campaign environment.

On the other hand, women might face more recruitment and fundraising support today if more women have ascended to positions of power within the legislature since the late 1990s. Where women are more prominent members of the legislature, the impact of the good ol’ boys network should be reduced and women should face less difficulty in raising money from leadership PACs, candidate committees, and perhaps even local party organizations. In addition, there is some speculation that “Clean Money” campaigns may advantage female candidates as they generally involve public financing and limited spending (Thomas and Wilcox 1998). This environment may help women by reducing the fundraising advantages of incumbents and decreasing the amount of money needed to run a successful open seat election (Thomas and Wilcox 1998).

**Future Research**

There are a number of questions that remain and a number of ways in which this project can expand in the future. First, I would like to concentrate more intently on individual donors. Although my analysis includes an examination of these donors, ideally, I would like to more thoroughly separate out corporate donors from individual donors as it is possible that each group is motivated by different factors when making a donation. In addition, this is an area that could use more state-level research given that
some of the more prominent studies of individual donors focus on presidential and congressional campaigns (Brown et al. 1995; Francia et al. 2003). In addition, there are reasons to believe that gender might play an important role in this process given that many individual donors are male but that women tend to raise more from small donors (Baker 2006; Francia et al. 2003; Brown et al. 1995; Fox 2007).

Besides examining individual donors, I would also like to conduct an analysis on the timing of contributions in order to determine whether gender plays a role in garnering early money. Although a number of states would have to be excluded for missing data on this dimension, I should have a large enough sample to examine this factor across the various types of donors in the dataset. Currently, some organizations (EMILY’s List, WISH List, the Alabama Solution, etc.) are founded on the belief that women need early money to be successful and they need help acquiring it. But, are these groups right to assume that women need extra help raising early money? Scholarly research on this topic has been relatively scarce and mixed. At the federal level, Burrell (1994) examines the average amount raised by candidates during the first two reporting periods for the 1988, 1990 and 1992 elections. She finds that female incumbents, challengers and open seat contestants outpaced men on average campaign receipts in at least two if not all three-election periods. In addition, Leal (2003) studies U.S. Senate primary campaigns between 1988 and 1996 and finds that early money helps to attract donors by signaling to them that they are worth the investment. However, the author does not find that this affect is more pronounced for women. At the state legislative level, Mitchell (2009) examines the contributions to male and female state legislative candidates in the 2006 primaries. He finds that women are disadvantaged in early fundraising, save for open seat candidates, and notes that this could be especially problematic given the “low
information salience” of state legislative elections. These contradictory findings point to the need for more research in this area, especially at the state-legislative level, where studies are extremely scarce.

In addition to these two aspects, I would also like to examine how the outcomes found here impact the electoral fortunes of these various types of candidates. In other words, is there an electoral benefit to gaining more from business donors or to investing more of your own money into your campaign? Do these things make you more or less likely to win? Currently, I do not have data on the outcome of these races but that is something that could be tracked down and added, at least for a subset of states.

Finally, it might be possible to merge up parts of this dataset with the data I have on bill sponsorship. Although this analysis would involve a smaller subset of states, it would be interesting to see whether donors who raise the most also sponsor the most. In other words, does success in connecting with various types of donors, including lobbyists, impact their ability to pass legislation in the state house? Do candidates feel more pressure to sponsor legislation in an effort to maintain ties with these various donors? Besides this, it would be interesting to see if there is a connection between the amount of money a candidate collects from various types of donors (agriculture, health, education, etc.) and the type of legislation they tend to sponsor. Unfortunately, the sponsorship data does not account for the policy area in which a bill is sponsored. But, if I collect this data I could test this theory.

In short then, there are clearly a multitude of ways in which this project could expand. Plus, if the campaign finance website where most of my data was collected, ever decides to release their records to the public or to academic researchers, I can update my
study with data from more recent electoral periods or branch off into examining the role of campaign finance in state court and gubernatorial campaigns.
REFERENCES


VITA

Rhonda Wrzenski was born and raised in Wolbach, Nebraska, to the late LaVern and Louise Wrzenski. Rhonda graduated *cum laude* from Hastings College in 2003 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in media production and political science. Rhonda then enrolled at Louisiana State University where she received her Master of Arts degree in 2005 and will receive her Doctor of Philosophy in political science in 2010. After graduation, Rhonda will begin a tenure-track position as an assistant professor at Indiana University Southeast.