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The existence of preference outlier committees in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives

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THE EXISTENCE OF PREFERENCE OUTLIER COMMITTEES
IN THE 1999-2008 LOUISIANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Political Science

by
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ABSTRACT

In recent years the complexity of understanding the politics of committee assignment, has led to lively scholarly debates. At the heart of this debate lie three theories of legislative committee development: the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory. Each of these theories attempts to explain legislative committee assignments through one single legislator motivation: legislator interest, party, or institutional interest.

This dissertation argues that one single motivation as espoused in the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory is not likely to explain all legislator committee assignments. Instead, Legislators committee assignments are likely to be a reflection of multiple motivations, thereby calling for a combination of the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory. To address this hypothesis, this dissertation examines support for all three theories of legislative organization in the Louisiana House of Representatives.

For the purposes of this dissertation, I rely on legislator membership on Louisiana's sixteen standing committees during the 1999-2008 Louisiana House Legislature. As discussed in detail in this study, Louisiana's non-compliance with proportional committee representation allows scholars to test the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theories with limited constraints.

Second, this dissertation argues that current measurements of legislator committee preferences are incomplete. To address this problem, this dissertation provides a comprehensive measurement of legislator committee preferences based on legislator personal and constituent characteristics. This research introduces a new measurement of committee membership based on committee member Caucus membership.

With this dissertation, I find support for the informational theory over the distributive theory and minimal support for the major party cartel theory. Support for the theories of legislative committee development is dependent upon the measurement used to explore the extent to which committee look like the membership of the whole chamber. I further find support for each of these theories varies across time and committee. Thereby, leading support for the hypothesis that legislators committee assignments are a reflection of multiple motivations: constituents, party, and institutional interest.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Theoretical Importance

Since the beginning of the Republic, political analysts have expressed the importance of committees to the legislative process. This importance has not only created suspicion among many political analysts, but is also revealed in a statement made by Woodrow Wilson (1885): “The House sits, not for serious discussion, but to sanction the conclusions of its committees as rapidly as possible. It legislates in its committee-rooms; not by the determination of its majorities, but by the resolutions of its specially commissioned minorities; so that it is not far from the truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work” (Wilson 1885, 78 as cited in Frisch and Kelly 2006, 11). Suspicions surrounding committees, highlighted in Wilson’s remark, date back to the founding of the Republic. Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison feared committee power would lead committees to create factions promoting the interest of the few (Frisch and Kelly 2006).

This fear is still very much alive in today’s powerful committee system. All bills introduced in the legislature must first pass through committees, where they are fully scrutinized and then reported with recommendations to non- members concerning the merits of the bill. For the most part, legislation passed by committees is rarely overturned on the House floor (Hall 1996).

The centrality of committees as well as their influence on the passage of legislative policy has led to a proliferation of committee research among scholars. Most of this research has centered on committee assignments. The importance of committee assignments to the passage of policies is noted in Frisch and Kelly’s comment, “who is sitting in the committee

room when public policy is made is perhaps more important than the votes taken on the floor to pass the legislation” (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 12). The suspicions of Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson, and James Madison are brought to fruition with the distributive theory.

Earliest theories of committee assignments begin with the distributive theory, which was first introduced by Niskanen. Under this theory, legislators with the highest level of demand for services are granted membership onto committees providing them with the greatest chance of achieving benefits for their district (Krehbiel 1990). For instance, according to the distributive theory, legislators representing agriculture districts are granted membership onto the agriculture committee. The implications of this theory for representative policies are daunting. Arguably, if the distributive theory holds true then legislators on committees will represent policies beneficial to their constituents at the expense of the whole state.

The distributional theory first came under attack in the 1990s, beginning with Krehbiel’s book, “Information and Legislative Organization,” where he lays out his informational theory of congressional organization. Krehbiel, a noted researcher in committee assignment, finds legislators are not granted committee assignments based on the needs of their district; instead they mirror the characteristics of the legislature as a whole, which is a major deficiency of the distributive theory. Contrary to the implications of the distributive theory for representative policies, if the informational theory holds true then legislators on committees will produce policies beneficial to the whole state and not a select few.

Conversely, Cox and McCubbins (1993) later contribute to the debate over committee assignment, claiming the major tenets of the distributive and informational theory are

unacceptable. Researching the distributive and informational theory, Cox and McCubbins argue legislators are placed onto committees to represent the interest of the majority party. Committee membership is not determined by the legislative institution or individual legislators, but by the legislative majority. The impact of this theory on legislative policy is the creation of policies beneficial to the majority at the expense of the few.

In recent years the complexity behind understanding the politics of committee assignment has led to lively scholarly debates. At the heart of this debate lie three different theories of legislative committee development: the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory. Each of these theories seeks to explain legislative committee assignments through one single legislator motivation: legislator interest, party, or institutional interest. This dissertation argues one single motivation as espoused in the distributive, informational, or major party cartel theory is not likely to explain all legislator committee assignments. Instead, legislators' committee assignments are likely to be a reflection of multiple motivations, thereby calling for a combination of the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory.

To test this proposal, I create a model of legislator committee assignments. In this model, relying on data obtained from the 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committees, I test the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory by determining whether legislators seek committee assignments based on the single motivation of their constituents, party, or institution. Individual legislator characteristic measures are chosen based on the prior measurements used in legislative committee assignment literature: legislator ideology, interest group scores, political party affiliation, district characteristics, and occupation.

Furthermore, a new legislator characteristic measurement is introduced based on legislator caucus membership.

In this dissertation, I provide support for my hypothesis. Finding, that legislator committee assignments do not reflect one isolated individual legislator characteristics as proposed by the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory instead legislator committee assignments are a product of multiple-motivations. All Louisiana committee membership assignments are not representative of individual legislator interest, party interest, or the interest of the legislature. Instead, Louisiana committee assignments are a reflection of both individual legislature interest and the interest of the whole legislature.

1.2 Chapter Overview

In Chapter 2, I provide a theoretical foundation for my analysis, state my hypothesis, and provide an overall literature review. While in Chapter 3, I lay out data and model specifications. Furthermore, in Chapter 4, I explain my analysis and findings. Additionally, in Chapter 5, I conduct legislative interviews with 2012 Louisiana House representatives, as well as, one former legislator in order to develop a deeper understanding of the Louisiana committee assignment process through the eyes of legislators themselves. Lastly, in Chapter 6, I conclude with an overview of my findings, limitations of my analysis, and avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Theoretical Effect of Committee Composition

The widely accepted influential role legislative committee assignments play in the passage of legislative policies is undeniable. As stated earlier by Frisch and Kelly, ““who is sitting in the committee room when public policy is made is perhaps more important than the votes taken on the floor to pass the legislation” (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 12).

Having said this, our empirical understanding of “who is sitting in these rooms” is less clear. Currently, three theories dominate our understanding of the legislative committee assignment process: the distributive, informational, and major party cartel. Each of these models offers a different theoretical and legislator motivation behind the legislative assignment process, as well as its potential impact on legislative policy. Naturally, in order to understand the committee assignment process through the eyes of these theories one must first understand the theoretical environment in which each theory emerges.

Importantly, the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory all differ on why committees exist, the role committees’ play, who committees are responsible too, the theoretical and legislator motivation behind the legislative assignment process, as well as the potential consequences of committee membership on legislative policy.

2.1.1 Distributive Theory

Chronologically speaking, the distributive theory precedes both the informational and major party cartel theories in its theoretical development, with elements dating back to the 19th century writings of Wilson (1885) and McConachie (1898). These early scholars cite the committee’s independence and its powerful policy making roles in the legislative process (Maltzman 1997), each is a major tenet of the distributive theory. Since this philosophy’s

inception, the distributive model predominates the view of legislative committee organization, until it is challenged by the formalization of the informational theory in the 1990's with Krehbiel's influential work, *Information and Legislative Organization*.

Under the distributive theory, congressional committees exist in a majoritarian institution composed of legislators seeking their own self-interest. Put eloquently by Groseclose and King (2000), "Congress is like a collection of minority interests trying to divide up a pie." Each minority is composed of legislators seeking their own self-interest, who want as large of a specific piece of pie as possible in order to secure benefits for their districts and increase their chances for reelection. Importantly, the piece of pie each legislator desires differs depending on the needs and aspirations of that legislator. For example, a group of legislators representing a district primarily agricultural in nature will seek an agricultural slice, while another group may seek an urban slice (Groseclose and King 2000).

In order for legislators to achieve their benefits by passing policies favorable to themselves, in a majoritarian institution, they must first form a majority. In order to achieve this aim, legislators engage in logrolling: forming a coalition, or voting block, with legislators seeking a different slice of the pie. However, since representatives are looking out for their own best interest, once these interests are obtained Groseclose and King (2000) reported a potential for legislators to renege on their agreement with each other.

Arguably, this is where committees come into play. Committees are created to combat the problem of logrolling by facilitating trade and allowing legislators to provide distributive benefits to their district while dispersing the costs to the whole legislature (Groseclose and King 2000). In order for committees to meet their intended goals, committees

are granted several important rights, such as gatekeeping. In the committee system before bills are presented to the whole legislature for passage, all bills are reported to committees with jurisdiction over them. Under gatekeeping powers, committee members can refuse to report a bill out of committee for a vote by the whole legislature (Maltzman 1997), in turn killing the bill.

Under the distributive theory, committees are autonomous creatures, independent of control from the parent legislature, subservient to the needs of legislators. Moreover, the distributive theory legislators self-select onto committees that provide them with the greatest chance of achieving benefits for their district (Krehbiel 1990). Consequently, as Weingast and Moran (1983) note committees are stacked with members representing similar concerns to each other and different interests than the whole legislature. For instance, a legislator representing a district that is majority agriculture in nature will self-select onto the agriculture committee. Members from urban districts will self-select on committees with jurisdiction over areas like banking, urban and welfare, to provide the most benefits they can to their inner-city constituents (Krehbiel 1990). Based on this idea of self-selection, one can assume that policies resonating from these committees will be antithetical to the interest of the legislature as a whole.

Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the distributive theory suffers from several key weaknesses: the idea of self-selection; a strong committee autonomy; and the stacking of committees with members representing similar interest based in part on constituent characteristics. Once again, the distributive theory is grounded in the premise that all committees are autonomous and assignments are based on legislative self-selection, thereby allowing committees to be stacked according to the interest of the party. Under the

distributive theory, committees and their assignments are independent of influence by the parent chamber or other outside forces, such as party. Instead, committee assignments are based on a pure self-selection basis, whereby legislators themselves choose the committee assignments they desire. These wishes may reflect constituent concerns, which might aid legislators in their reelection bids. However, in 1993 Cox and McCubbins followed by Frisch and Kelly in 2006 all note that the idea of pure committee autonomy and self-selection have not held up with the facts.

In reality, statistical evidence shows the number of committees that are stacked with members representing specific constituencies or ideologies are far more limited than the literature pronounces (Cox and McCubbins 1993), thereby allowing the possibility that other forces such as the party impact the legislative committee assignment process. A finding further substantiated by Frisch and Kelly's (2006) results indicating that, "only about 50 percent of members are assigned to their preferred committee" (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 22). Finally, research on the distributive theory has been primarily relegated to Congress, although limited research exists at the state house level and research at the senate level has largely been neglected (Eualu 1984). Notably, the bulk of research has offered little support in favor of the distributive theory at the congressional level (Krehbiel 1991). Further noting the lack of empirical support for the distributive theory, in his 1991 book, *Information and Legislative Organization*, Krehbiel clearly expresses empirical limitations of the distributive theory stating:

As a former subscriber to the orthodox distributive view of legislatures but an increasing skeptic regarding its fit with a similarly impressive body of empirical research, I regard it as important in this book to confront the distributive-theoretic predictions pertaining to legislative organizations head-on. Intuitiveness may be a nice property of theories, and surely it deters challenges from skeptics. However, positive social science is not primarily

about the intuitiveness of theoretical arguments; it is about derivation and assessment of refutable hypotheses. The appropriate standards in this context are standards of evidence rather than intuitiveness, and while distributive theories are strong on intuitiveness, they have proven here to be rather weak in terms of evidence. Theory says: committees are composed of heterogeneous high-demanders. Evidence says: probably not true. Theory says: special rules are adopted mainly to facilitate gains from trade. Evidence says: false. Theory says: legislatures commit to restrictive postfloor procedures to enhance distributive committee power and cross-committee logrolling. Evidence says: false again (Krehbiel 1991, 247-248).

Within this citation, Krehbiel refers to the mounting growth of empirical evidence against support for the distributive theory tenet that committees are composed of heterogeneous members representing different views from those of the whole legislature. Moreover, support for special rules and restrictive postfloor procedures to aid the distributive nature of committees is lacking.

Taking these weaknesses into account, both observational and empirical studies (Wilson 1885; Goodwin 1970; Fenno 1973; Shepsle and Weingast 1984) have noted support for the distributive theory (Maltzman 1997). Historically speaking, evidence in favor of the major tenets of the distributive theory: committee autonomy, committee policy domination, legislator committee self-selection, are cited in the early observational works of Wilson (1885). While observing congressional committees, Wilson notes the seemingly autonomous nature of committees dictating public policy to the majority (Maltzman 1997). This observation is further noted in Goodwin's (1970) study, where he notes evidence that the approval of committee decisions by the whole chamber is primarily a formality (Maltzman 1997).

Speaking indirectly towards the distributive theories idea of the non-representative nature of committees, Marvick's 1950 study in reference to the Agriculture, Interior, and Merchant Marine Committee revealed:

that committees of Congress vary in their representative character, some being fairly representative of the House or Senate, while others being dominated by members from particular regions or economic interests....Congressmen naturally seek assignment to committees having jurisdiction over matters of major concern to their districts and states (Marvick 1950, 281 as cited in Eualu1984, 588).

Picking up on these historical observations, research in the 1970's through the 1990's also notes the accommodation of legislative committee assignments. Notably, legislative research at the state and congressional level abounds on the importance of committee assignments to individual legislators and the willingness of legislative leaders to accommodate these requests (Westefield 1974; Shepsle 1978; Bullock 1985; Francis 1986, Hamm 1987; Hedlund 1989). In Bullock (1985, 791) also expresses this view citing "in recent years, House Democrats have strived to honor the requests made by its members" (Achen and Stolarek 1974; Shepsle 1978).

Possibly, one could argue, support for the distributive theory moved away from its dependence on historical observations to empirical support in the latter half of the twentieth century. The formalization of the theory, began with scholars empirically exploring the theoretical tenets of committee autonomy, policy domination, and legislator committee assignments in such works as Sheplse 1978; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Alder and Lapinski 1997; Hurwitz, Moiles and Rhode 2001; and Battista and Richman 2011. In these scholarly works, researchers turn their focus to empirically determining the reasons behind individual legislator committee requests, and whether committee members preferences differ from the preferences of the whole chambers, by comparing the characteristics of individuals (such as constituent, ideology, interest group scores) residing on committees to the characteristics of the whole legislature, through a difference of mean or median test. If, as the distributive theory predicts, committees are stacked with individual legislators

representing specific interests, then these committees would represent characteristics unrepresentative of the characteristics of the whole legislature. Therein providing support for the self-selection hypothesis. Support for the distributive theory is illustrated in part in four major works of congressional studies: Shepsle (1978); Weingast and Marshall (1988); Adler and Lapinski (1997); and Hurwitz, Moiles and Rhode (2001).

In his 1978 study, titled “Giant Jigsaw Puzzle,” Shepsle empirically evaluates the notion that legislative leaders accommodate legislator committee requests made in part by their constituent characteristics, through what he terms the “interest-advocacy-accommodation syndrome.” Under this notion, legislators divulge their policy and their constituent interest to legislative leaders responsible for committee assignments in order to obtain the desired committee assignments. Further, leaders want to accommodate these requests in order to build strong working coalitions (Hedlund 1989). In his 1989 article Hedlund cites Shepsle as stating:

At every stage in the committee assignment process, then...there is an effort to fit the pieces of the giant jigsaw puzzle together in a responsive fashion. The matching of assignments to requests, constrained only by scarcity, is both a guiding principle and an accurate description of the committee assignment process (Shepsle 1978, 238 as cited in Hedlund 1989, 599).

Building support for this notion and in turn for the distributive theory, Shepsle finds congressional freshmen in the 86th through 93rd Congress make committee requests and are granted these requests in part based on their constituency’s geographic characteristics. Specifically, they report 83 percent of freshmen House Democrats receiving their committee preference, with 59 percent receiving assignments to top committees (Bullock III 1985). Following Shepsle’s empirical lead, scholars such as Weingast and Marshall (1988); Adler and Lapinski (1997); Hurwitz, Moiles and Rhode (2001); and Battista and Richman (2011) formalize the distributive theory by conducting empirical tests on the self-selection

hypothesis and the idea that committees are stacked with members representing specific interests.

Weingast and Marshall (1988) find additionally support for the distributive theory by exploring the extent to which legislators self-select onto committees to achieve benefits for their constituents. Finding committees in the 1978 U.S. House legislature are composed of legislators strongly supporting policies found under individual committee jurisdictions (Sandahl 2005).

In 1988, Weingast and Marshall begin their study by laying out a theory of legislative institutions similar to firm and contractual institutions. Extending the basic principles of the theory of firm such as the costs associated with trade and how these costs can be reduced, Weingast and Marshall propose three assumptions. First, legislators are accountable their constituents. If they pass legislation that is not in the best interest of their constituents, they could face retaliation at the polls in their next election. Keeping this thought in mind, legislators seek to pass legislation that is “politically relevant” to their constituents. According to Weingast and Marshall (1988), politically relevant legislation is any legislation of extreme interest to a section of constituents in these legislators district (Sandahl 2005).

Moreover, political parties are no longer able to disperse benefits to legislators who tow the party line or promise legislators positions of power in the legislature, rendering parties useless in constraining legislator’s behavior. Furthermore, the authors argue legislators are unable to pass legislation themselves. They rely on other colleagues to help them pass policies that are important to their constituents. One way lawmakers entice each other to support their bills is through logrolling, or vote trading. Legislators can always withdraw their support (Sandahl 2005).

Additionally, the authors argue the legislative committee system is defined by the following three conditions: jurisdictional system, seniority system, and bidding mechanism for committee seats. Under the jurisdictional system of committees, bills can only be heard or altered by committees that have sole rights over that bill's specific policy area. On the other hand, seniority system prevents legislators from being removed from their committee seats or passed over for chairmanship of a committee if they are next in line. Lastly, legislators seek to increase their chances of reelection by self-selecting onto committees that represent their constituents' interest. Weingast and Marshall term the process by which vacant committee seats are assigned to legislators, the bidding mechanism (Sandahl 2005).

Furthermore, as noted by Sandahl (2005), "Weingast and Marshall test their model of legislative organization by stating the following three propositions: "the assignment process operates as a self-selection mechanism, committees are not representative of the entire legislature but are composed of 'preference outliers,' or those who value the position most lightly, and that committee members receive the disproportionate share of the benefits from programs within their jurisdiction" (Sandahl 2005, 7).

Using interest group ratings and committee assignments, Weingast and Marshall (1988) hypothesize committees will contain members who seek the most benefits for them, on the following committees: Armed Services: International Relations: International Relations - International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee: Interstate Commerce - Consumer Protection and Finance Subcommittee: Education and Labor - Economic Opportunity Subcommittee, and Environmental subcommittees. In accordance with their hypothesis, Weingast and Marshall find defense, foreign aid, consumer protection, labor, and environment committees all contain committee members who are highly interested in

policies enacted under these committees. The researchers help to show that legislators choose committees that will benefit their constituents by seeking membership onto committees with jurisdiction over specific policy areas (Sandahl 2005).

In 1997, Adler and Lapinski go one step farther than Shepsle (1978). Using constituency characteristics to determine whether legislators disproportionately seek membership onto House Congressional committees during the period of 1943-1994, the authors create a measurement of need based on legislator economic, social, and geographic district characteristics. This measurement is rooted in the gains from exchange theory. According to this theory, congressional committees contain legislators who represent congressional districts with a high demand for the policy benefits enacted under that committee (Adler and Lapinski 1997). In accordance with the distributive theory, Adler and Lapinski find most legislators seek membership onto committees that provide constituent benefits to their districts.

In addition to Adler and Lapinski's (1997) study, Hurwitz, Moiles and Rhode (2001) provide additional support for the distributive theory. Finding the Agriculture and the Agriculture and Rural Development Subcommittee of the Appropriation Committee are overrepresented by members representing farming and rural districts. On the Agriculture committee three-fourths of its members represent district with high farm employment. Two-thirds of the members on the Agriculture Committee represent districts with a high rural population.

Furthermore, Battista and Richman (2011) argue limited support found for the distributive theory in state legislature is dependent in part upon the statistical methods used to determine legislator preferences. Unlike in Congress, the authors note unrepresentative

state committees are often identified through the use of common measurements of ideology such as NOMINATE scores or the National Federation of Independent Business Scores (Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004; Prince and Overby 2005). Claiming these scores could possibly underrepresent the likelihood of finding committees holding high jurisdiction-specific preferences (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Sprague 2008; Fortunato 2009; Hall and Grofman 1990; Synder 1992), the authors rely on measurements of legislator preferences, based on a measurement of need and legislator responses to the Project Vote Smart's National Political Awareness Test (NPAT). Responses from the NPAT test are used to measure the spending and voting preferences of legislatures. The test found that some state committees are over-represented by members representing high need districts and high-spending members.

2.1.2 Informational Theory

Balking against the conventional wisdom of the distributive theory of congressional committees dominating throughout the 1960's and 1970's (Krehbiel 1991), in the 1980's scholars such as Maass (1983), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989, 1990) bring the central tenets of the informational theory to the forefront of twentieth-century congressional committee studies. Turning away from the traditional viewpoint of committees as autonomous creatures acting in the best interest of their members at the expense of the whole, the informational theory offers a much more optimistic view of committees (Groseclose and King 2000).

Under the informational theory committees are subservient to the wishes of the whole chamber, existing chiefly to provide information and specialization to the legislature regarding the outcomes of considered policies. Legislators are enticed to promote this type

of committee system because by knowing the potential outcomes of policies lawmakers implement, legislators can better ensure that they themselves act in accordance with the wishes of their constituents. A tenet further expanded by Frisch and Kelly (2006), who note by understanding policy ramifications, legislators are more apt to pass policies supported by voters, therein strengthening their reelection efforts. Placing members onto committees with dissimilar viewpoints to each other, but similar viewpoints to the interests of the whole legislature ensures: the subservient nature of committees; the submission of complete information about the bills to the legislature as a whole; and promoting policies in line with the wishes of the whole chamber (Maltzman 1997).

Importantly, the informational theory recognizes the incentive of legislators to promote their constituent wishes over those of the whole legislature, Maass (1983) according to Maltzman (1997) notes: “committees tend inevitably to challenge the whole House for control of the legislature’s business...Committee may...become master rather than servant of the House” (Maass 1983, 42 as cited in Maltzman 1997, 15). In order to circumvent this problem the legislature has several tools at its disposal, but the two that get most attention are committee appointment power and legislative rules.

Specifically speaking, to promote policies beneficial to the whole legislature, as well, as provide credible information concerning these policies, the chamber appoints member on to committees who represent the views of the whole legislature. Krehbiel (1991) notes:

Other things being equal, heterogeneous committees enhance informational efficiency without distributional losses. The key concept is confirmatory signaling. If a committee is composed of policy specialists whose preferred outcomes bookend the preferred outcome of the legislature’s median voter, opportunities for credible transmission of private information are enhance (Krehbiel 1991, 96).

Specifically speaking, when committees represent similar viewpoints to the whole legislature, committees have no reason not to promote policies which are in line with the floor or which will provide full and competent information about a bill to the floor (Groseclose and King 2000).

Second, the legislature creates tools, such as legislative rules, to ensure committees promote policies in line with the wishes of the whole legislature. Notably, the legislature retains the right to amend legislation reported out of committees in order to shape it to fit the floor's median viewpoint (Groseclose and King 2000). Moreover, each bill emerging from committees must be voted on by the whole chamber. Therefore, the chamber will review over bills and prevent the enactment of bills not in line with its wishes. Additional tools the legislature holds include: discharge process, suspension of the rules, and special rules for floor consideration. Furthermore, the legislative institution can entice committees to promote policies beneficial to the whole by restricting committee jurisdiction and by reducing committee staff (Maltzman 1997).

Consequently, several scholars (Maltzman 1997; Frisch and Kelly 2006) note important weaknesses in the theoretical tenets of the informational theory. One major weaknesses of the informational theory is that for it to work in an ideal situation the legislative chamber needs complete information on the motives and policy preferences of legislators. However, in reality then information is not available (Maltzman 1997). For instance, legislators may misrepresent their ideology in order to receive prestigious committee assignments or leadership positions on committees. One example of changes in legislator ideology, is party switching resulting from shifts in constituent ideologies, in the hopes of achieving reelection. Furthermore, under the informational theory, once the true

preferences of legislators are revealed they are not often removed from the committee assignment process because of the need for committee specialization. The constant removal of legislators reduces the effectiveness of the chamber to receive informed policy positions from the committee (Maltzman 1997). Another limitation of this theory is the broad policy jurisdiction of committees and the ability to place legislators onto committees that represent the median view of the whole legislative chamber in regards to every policy the committee entertains (Maltzman 1997).

Additionally, for the informational theory to hold true, under the basis of the majoritarian principle, if committees were composed of members unrepresentative of the whole legislature then the legislature will reject the committee's membership. Frisch and Kelly go on to say that the merit of this assumption is debatable. Initial, committee membership is chosen by committee on committees not by the whole legislature. Committees on Committees are composed of a small number of both Democrat and Republican legislators. To date, committee membership created by these committees have never been seriously challenged by the party caucus. Second, the floor routinely accepts committee assignments presented to them by the party caucus according to Frisch and Kelly (2006).

Taking these potential problems into account, today's scholarly research lends overwhelming support to the informational theory (Battista 2004; Krehbiel 1991; Overby and Kazee 2000; Sandahl 2005) over any other theory of committee organization. This support is rooted, as Maltzman 1997 notes, in both traditional (Fenno 1966; Robinson 1963; Cooper 1970; Galloway 1976; Alexander 1916) and formal scholarly works (Maass 1983; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990).

While many scholars agree over the subservient role of committees to the preferences of the whole chamber during the modern congresses, this view of committees, as Maltzman 1997 cites, was also noted in the early Federalist and Jefferson periods. Galloway (1976) asserts:

During the Federalist and Jefferson periods, it was the general practice of the House of Representatives to refer legislative subjects to a committee of the whole in order to develop the main principles of legislation, and then to commit such matters to select committees to draft specific bills.....the committees were regarded as agents of the House which kept control over them by giving specific instructions as to their authority and duties (Galloway 1976, 84-85 as cited in Maltzman 1997, 14).

A second tenet of the informational theory, observed in the early Jeffersonian Congresses, and espoused by Polsby (1968) is the creation of committees to promote institutional maintenance, or to serve the needs of the whole legislative institution, by creating a formalized division of labor to address the growing legislative agenda, thereby providing specialized and essential information to the body. Observing the early Jeffersonian Congresses, Cooper (1970), notes during the years of the early congress, the institution created the committee system as a means to “process the information necessary to address its agenda” (Cooper 1970, 49-50 as cited in Maltzman 1997, 20).

Rooted in empirical support at both congressional (Maas 1983; Krehbiel 1991) and state levels (Overby and Kazee 2000), the informational theory has moved to the forefront as the predominate theory of legislative committee organization. This is in part because of the influential works of the following scholars: Krehbiel (1991); Overby and Kazee (2000); Overby, Kazee, and Prince (2004).

In 1991, Krehbiel provides support for the informational theory in the 96-99th Congress in the United States of Representatives and the 99th Senate Congress. Arguing, if the distributive theory holds true then legislators ranking high on political interest group

scores will seek membership onto committees representing policies reflected in those scores. Using several interest group scores to test his hypothesis as well as conducting a difference of mean and median test to compare the policy positions of committee members to the policy positions of the whole House, Krehbiel (1991) finds most legislators do not disproportionately seek membership onto committees based on their interest (Sandahl 2005).

Specifically, using the Americans for Democratic Action interest group scores in the 99th Congressional House, Krehbiel (1991) finds some committees do hold policy positions unrepresentative of the policy positions of the whole. These committees include: Foreign Affairs, Education and Labor, Post Office and Civil Service, Armed Services, and District of Columbia. Leaving Krehbiel to argue there is a place for both the distributive and informational theory in explaining the role of committees in the legislative process (Sandahl 2005).

Following Krehbiel's (1991) lead, Overby and Kazee (2000) find substantial support for the informational theory and minimal support for the major party cartel theory in twelve state houses: Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. Seeking to determine whether committee members on control committee are less likely than non-control committees to contain views unrepresentative of the views of the whole state house, Overby and Kazee use survey's, roll call votes, modified roll call votes, and constituent characteristics to measure legislator ideology (Sandahl 2005). For the purposes of their research, these two scholars define control committee as the most powerful committees in each state legislature (Overby and Kazee 2000). Comparing the mean ideology scores of

control and non-control committee members to the mean ideology scores of the whole house, the authors find overwhelming support in favor of the informational theory (Sandahl 2005).

In addition, it appears, for the most part, committee members do not represent views unrepresentative of the views of the whole house in any of the twelve state houses analyzed. This finding holds true regardless of whether legislators are members of control or non-control committees. For example, using the 1992 Louisiana Association of Business and Industry, pro-business group scores, ranking legislators by their support on bills supported by the LABI, Overby and Kazee (2000) find Louisiana legislators do not represent views unrepresentative of the views of the whole state legislature on Louisiana's two only control committees: the Ways and Means and Appropriations. This finding holds true on the rest of Louisiana's committees, with the exception of three committees.

So, building on Overby and Kazee's 2000 study, Overby, Kazee, and Prince (2004), find additional support for the informational theory in forty-five state legislatures. Using the same statistical techniques as Overby and Kazee (2000), the authors find overwhelming support, in all states, that legislators do not disproportionately seek membership onto control or non-control committees based on interest group scores. For the most part, committees not representative of the views of the whole are rare in state legislatures.

In 2011, Hamm, Hedlund, and Post use legislator occupation to determine whether U.S. state legislatures take advantage of the individual expertise of their members, as expressed through the informational theory, under which as noted by Gilligan and Krehbiel's (1987), and Krehbiel (1991), "legislative bodies use the experiences of their members to enhance specialization and expertise development through committees" (Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011, 305). If the informational theory holds true, Hamm, Hedlund and Post (2011)

expect committees to be overrepresented by legislators holding occupations directly related to the jurisdiction of each standing committee. For example, the judiciary committee will be overrepresented by members with previous or current occupations in law.

Hamm, Hedlund, and Post (2011) test the specialization tenet of the informational theory for the years 1909-1989 across five committees (Agriculture, Education, Insurance, Judiciary, and Labor) in five states (Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin). Finding as a whole, committees are overrepresented by members possessing specific occupations related to the jurisdiction of each committee. Specifically, the authors find substantial support for the informational theory in the Judiciary and Agriculture and weaker but still strong support in the Education, Labor, and Insurance committees. Additionally, overall support for the informational theory varies across state, time, and committee.

2.1.3 Major Party Cartel Theory

Based on the conventional wisdom of the weakening role of parties in their ability to influence legislators both the informational and distributive theories relegate the function of “party” as obsolete in the legislative committee system. This information is documented in the works of Shepsle (1979), Weingast and Marshall (1988), and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) where the role of party is simply not mentioned or assumed away (Cox and McCubbins 1993). However, in 1993 Cox and McCubbins, develop and test a third competing legislative committee organization theory, the major party cartel. Arguing the absence of the worth of the party in informational and distributive theories is not reality, that in fact, they suggest, committees are not autonomous as assumed by the informational theory, but are indeed controlled by the legislative majority party (Cox and McCubbins

1993), and the rights of the minority party are significantly excluded (Groseclose and King 2000).

Laying out the major tenets of the major party cartel theory, in their 1993 book, *Legislative Leviathan*, Cox and McCubbins state:

Our view is that parties in the House-especially the majority party-are species of 'legislative cartel.' These cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. First, the legislative process in general-and the committee system in particular-is stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because members of the majority party have all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of the majority party, and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rule and policed by the cartel's leadership (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2).

Comparatively speaking, the vision Cox and McCubbins espouses relating to the majority party and its role in legislative committees, stands in direct opposition to the distributive and informational theories. Unlike the distributive theory under which committees are created to promote the interests of the individual legislators, or the informational theory where committees are formed to serve the institutional needs of the legislative body, according to the major party cartel theory, committees are created to pursue the interests of the majority party.

Notably, in order to achieve this purpose, under the major party cartel theory, the majority party controls legislator committee assignments, by stacking members onto committees that either reflect the median view of their party as a whole, or are more extreme than their party (Maltzman 1997). To avoid bipartisan coalitions which might pursue interests contrary to the party's wishes, legislative leaders stack their members (Maltzman 1997).

With this in mind, Cox and McCubbins (1993) and Aldrich and Rhode (2000) all provide support for the premise that legislators are disproportionally placed onto committees based on their adherence to the median view of the majority party. Using legislator based ADA interest group scores along with Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores (to measure ideology) to test for unrepresentative committees in the 87th through 97th U.S. House, Cox and McCubbins (1993) examine the following committees: Agriculture, Appropriations, Armed Services, Banking, Commerce, District of Columbia, Education and Labor, Foreign Affairs, Government Operations, House Administration, Interior, Judiciary, Merchant Marine, Post Office, Public Works, Rules, Science, Veterans, and Ways and Means (Sandahl 2005).

For the most part, Cox and McCubbins (1993) find Democrat and Republican committee members hold views representative of their party and unrepresentative of Congress as a whole. Republicans hold views similar to their party except on the Rules, Commerce, and Government Relations committees in three of eleven Congresses. In seven of the eleven Congresses, Republican committee members on the Ways and Means as well as on the Public Works committees represent views more conservative than their whole party (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Similarly, Cox and McCubbins (1993) find the same results using Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores and difference of medians test for the 80th to the 100th Congresses (Sandahl 2005).

Following Cox and McCubbins lead, Aldrich and Rhode (2000) extend the major party cartel theory to the U.S. Appropriations Committee. Under this study, Aldrich and Rhode find Republican committee members on the U.S. Appropriations committee are influenced by the Republican majority leader (Sandahl 2005). Granted these findings under

the cartel theory, not all committees are of equal importance to the majority party. For instance, committees with narrow jurisdictions (ex. Agriculture Committee, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs) do not represent issues that will adversely affect the whole party, but only small defined districts. Because of their limited impact, under the major party cartel theory the majority party in an effort to win as many seats as possible for its members, will often allow legislators to self-select onto these committees (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

In contrast, committees with broader important jurisdictions (example Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Public Works and Transpiration), affecting national policy interests, membership will reflect the views of the entire party (Cox and McCubbins 1993). For the simple reason that these committees allow the majority party the greatest amount of influence over committees representing jurisdiction over Congress' broad policy agenda (Frisch and Kelly 2006). As a result, the majority party leadership will place party loyalist and members who represent the views of the whole party onto these committees (Frisch and Kelly 2006).

A premise noted by Cox and McCubbins, and substantiated through legislator interviews (Masters 1961; Manley 1970; Hinckley 1983), and empirical evidence (Rhode 1991; Maltzman and Smith 1994). Collaborating the effects of party loyalty and narrow versus broad committees' jurisdiction on legislator committee assignments can be seen in Hinckley's (1983), comment: "On the committees the leadership considers most critical, party loyalty is an important assignment criterion ..." (Hinckley 1983, 149 as cited in Cox and McCubbins 1993, 165). Manley (1970) further notes, "... the jurisdiction of the Ways and Means, then, is enough to generate leadership concern about who is recruited to the committee..." (Manley 1970, 24 as cited in Cox and McCubbins 1993, 164). Masters (1961)

additionally finds in the postwar House, those legislator committees appointments to exclusive committees were assigned differently than those on non-exclusive committees, suggesting a need for the party leader's stamp of approval (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Empirically speaking, both Cox and McCubbins (1993) and Maltzman (1997) reveal that committee jurisdiction affects whether committees are indeed representative or not representative of the views of the whole party. Specifically, using Americans for Democratic Action interest group scores and Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores while conducting either a difference of mean test or median test, Cox and McCubbins show that committees with broader jurisdictions are more likely to composed of members representing the views of the whole party, then committee representing narrow jurisdictions (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

In their, 1994 study Maltzman and Smith reveal that committee jurisdiction over salient or non-salient issues does affect whether committees are stacked according to the median ideological view of the majority party, or support for the major party cartel theory. The authors expect to find committee members on committees representing salient issues are more likely to represent the views of the party then members on committees representing non-salient issues. Using roll call votes obtained from "contested amendments from the 94th, 96th, 98th, and 100th Congress," the authors test their hypothesis in the U.S. Agriculture, Appropriations and Energy and Commerce committees. The Agricultural, Appropriations, and Energy and Commerce committees are chosen based on their jurisdiction over salient and less salient issues. Specifically, the Agricultural committee maintains jurisdiction over less salient issues then the Appropriations and Energy and Commerce committees (Sandahl 2005).

In sum, Maltzman and Smith (1994) find support for their hypothesis in the Agriculture and Appropriations committees and non-support in the Energy and Commerce Committee. Adding support to their hypothesis, the authors find that out of “all the committees examined the Agriculture committee is most likely to express views divergent from the majority on the House floor” (Sandahl 2005, 18). In turn, support for the major party cartel theory is in part dependent upon the committee being analyzed (Sandahl 2005).

Diverting from the major tenets of the major party cartel theory, Cox and McCubbins (1993), then turn their attention to a residual theoretical question emerging from the major party cartel theory which is: why legislators defer control to the majority party? The authors rooted their answer in the idea of collective dilemmas - that is:

situations in which the rational, but unorganized action of group members may lead to an outcome that all consider worse than outcomes attainable by organized action-are inherent in the drive to be reelected in a mass electorate and in the process of passing legislation by majority rule (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 84).

That is to say, Cox and McCubbins argue legislators defer control of the legislative committee system to the majority, because the idea those legislators cannot in and of themselves achieve benefits for their districts alone, therein turning towards political parties. The majority party promotes cooperation between majority party members by controlling, “committee authority, assignments to committees, the production and scheduling of committee products, and the control of floor deliberations....” (Weingast and Shepsle 1994, 163). Expanding on this idea, Cox and McCubbin further note legislators are enticed to adhere to the wishes of the party, because of their desire for reelection, since reelection is in part dependent upon the collective reputation of their party (Weingast and Sheplse 1994). By toeing the party line both legislators and the majority party benefit, legislators by obtaining

key leadership positions, party campaign contributions and other resources (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Importantly, even with the advantage legislators gain by following the majority party's wishes, the majority party is still faced with the possibility of committee member reneging on their support. To prevent this from happening, the majority party uses several powers at its disposal: denying legislators committee seats, creating and destroying committees, assigning committee resources, controlling the jurisdiction of committees, granting committee chairs agenda-setting powers, determining how many members committees will be composed of, and what percentage of committee seats will be granted to the majority and minority party (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Currently, supporters of the major party cartel theory are facing harsh criticism. Most of this criticism revolves around the weakening of congressional parties. Notably, the major party cartel theory bulks conventional post World-War II wisdom (C. Jones 1964; Dodd and Oppenheimer 1977; Truman 1959) of the faded role of parties and their inability to affect legislative outcome (Maltzman 1997). As Maltzman 1997 highlights in Wilson's quote,

...within Congress no visible, and therefore no controllable party organization. There is always a majority and minority, indeed, but the legislation of a session does not represent the policy of either; it is simply an aggregate of the bills recommended by Committees composed of members from both sides of the House...(Wilson 1885; 1985, 99 as cited in Maltzman 1997, 23).

Arguably, the limited role of parties to affect legislative outcomes is in part accredited to the perceived inability of political parties to entice legislators to follow the party's wishes and internal fights within the parties (Maltzman 1997).

In response to the weakening role of parties, proponents of the major party cartel theory argue that this criticism is time-bound, that it is in the post-reform era, but the “party is not over” (Weingast and Shepsle 1994). That in fact, as Weingast and Shepsle (1994) notes recent research points to parties as playing an increasing role by affecting legislative outcomes, citing the growing power of parties present in the works of scholars such as Collie and Cooper 1989, Bach and Smith 1988, and Rhode 1991, including: the increasing power and role of the Speaker; the use of the Rules Committee by political leadership; an increase in the use of multiple referrals and restrictive rules; and the decrease in open rules (Weingast and Shepsle 1994).

2.2 Evaluation of Existing Legislative Organizational Theories

In response to examining several scholarly works on the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory, I argue the data supports combining the distributive, informational and major party cartel theories. To date, absolute support for either of these theories is unsubstantiated.

As a result, I argue this variance is in part due to the multiple motivations behind legislator committee requests. The reliance of committee organizational theories in explaining committee assignments based on one single legislator motivation (legislator interest, party, or institutional interest) is problematic (Frisch and Kelly 2006; Maltzman 1997; Sprague 2008). Instead, legislator’s committee assignments are likely to be a reflection of multiple motivations.

Overtime scholars have found that legislators seek committee assignments based on multiple motivations (Bullock III 1976; Deering and Smith 1997; Fenno 1973; Frisch and Kelly 2006) and that committees differ in their ability to aid these motivations (Maltzman

1997; Sprague 2008) thus, creating a finding attacking the very heart of the informational and distributive theory.

A sentiment echoed and supported loudly in Frisch and Kelly's (2006) work, *Committee Assignment Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives*. In this body of literature, they call into question the use of one legislator motivation to explain legislator committee assignments. Contrary to the presentation of reelection motivations provided in the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories, Frisch and Kelly find constituency concerns do not predict most congressional member's committee preferences. Instead, "Most congressional members expect professional fulfillment, which means assignments need to be responsive to other professional goals" (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 19). Indeed even according to Frisch and Kelly (2006), Shepsle (1978) considered a strong supportive figure of the distributive theory, notes that not all committees assignments are based on constituency related reelection motives. Krehbiel (1991), a landmark figure supporting the informational theory, also marks the importance both the distributive and informational theory play in explaining committee organization in the legislative process.

Committee Assignments Based on Multiple Motivations first came to the scene with Fenno's 1973 work, *Congressmen in Committees*. In his landmark study, Fenno analyzes committee membership on twelve committees in the House of Representatives for the 84th through 89th (1955-1966) Congresses (Frisch and Kelly 2006).

Interviewing individual legislators, Fenno finds legislators are motivated to seek committee assignments based on three goals: to make good policy, appease constituents to obtain reelection, and to gain prestige in the legislative chamber (Fenno 1973). Stating

legislators often chose committee assignments based on a combination of these three goals, all of which change over time. A statement reinforced below:

All congressmen probably hold all three goals. But each congressmen has his own mix of priorities and intensities-a mix which may, of course, change over time....The opportunity to achieve the three goals varies widely among committees (Fenno 1973, 1 as cited in Frisch and Kelly 2006, 72).

Providing additional support for Fenno's (1973) multiple-motivation thesis, both Charles S. Bullock (1976) and Deering and Smith (1997) find legislators seek committee assignments based on multiple motivations (Frisch and Kelly 2006). In his 1976 article, "Motivations for U.S. Congressional Committee Preferences: Freshman of the 92nd Congress," Bullock conducts interviews of 52 of the 53 freshmen in the 92nd Congress, finding that legislators seek committee membership based on the multiple goals (Smith and Deering 1984 as cited in Frisch and Kelly 2006) of reelection, policy, and prestige. Interviewing House freshmen in the 97th Congress, Smith and Deering (1984) find similar results (Frisch and Kelly 2006).

In sum, following Frisch and Kelly's (2006) multi-motivation lead, I argue one single motivation as espoused in the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory is not likely to explain all legislator committee assignments. Instead, Legislators committee assignments are likely to be a reflection of multiple motivations, thereby calling for a combination of the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory (Krehbiel 1991) Based on this premise, I argue support for the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theories in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House legislative committees will be mixed.

2.3 A Case Study of Louisiana

With this in mind, in order to fully understand Louisiana House legislator standing committee assignment preferences, in light of the informational, distributive, and major party

cartel theories, one must not only grasp the political environment surrounding Louisiana committee assignments, but also both the formal and the informal rules that govern committee organization.

2.3.1 Formal Rules

Formally, in the state of Louisiana, all legislator House Standing Committee assignments and chair positions are chosen by the Speaker, who is selected by the majority party (House Rule 2.5), with partial exception of the Appropriations Committee. Presently, there are sixteen standing committees in the Louisiana House: Administration of Criminal Justice, Agriculture, Forestry, Aquaculture and Rural Development, Appropriations, Civil Law and Procedure, Commerce, Education, Health and Welfare, House and Governmental Affairs, Insurance, Judiciary, Labor and Industrial Relations, Municipal, Natural Resources and Environment, Retirement, Transportation, and Ways and Means (Louisiana House of Representatives 2012, Citizen Guide/House Rules).

Notably, according to Louisiana House Rule 6.3, legislators are restricted to serving on more than three standing committees at one time. Specifically, in a given legislative session representatives are granted membership onto only one Morning Committee, Afternoon Committee, or Weekly Committee (Louisiana House of Representatives 2012, Citizen Guide/House Rules). Moreover, under House Rule 6.7, Morning Committees are identified as the Appropriations, Civil Law and Procedure, Commerce, Transportation, Highways and Public Works, and Ways and Means. Committees designated as Afternoon Committees include: Administration of Criminal Justice, Education, Health and Welfare, House and Governmental Affairs, Insurance, and Natural Resources and Environment. Lastly, Weekly Committees are as follows: Agriculture, Forestry, Aquaculture, and Rural

Development, Judiciary, Labor and Industrial Relations, Municipal, Parochial and Cultural Affairs, and Retirement. Particularly, according to House Rule 6.3, committee chairmen of Morning or Afternoon committees are prevented from serving on any other standing committee. Similarly, chairmen of Weekly Committees must refrain from membership onto more than two standing committees (Louisiana House of Representatives 2012, Citizen Guide/House Rules).

Importantly, the Speakers of the House have very few formal limitations placed on them when granting committee assignments. However, these limitations do exist. For example, Speakers must share the decision of committee membership on the Appropriations Committee with House legislators. Whereas the Speaker selects eighteen Appropriation members, while the House legislators select the remaining seven from legislators representing congressional districts in which they reside (House Rule 6.4). Secondly, the Speaker of the House is restrained by House Rule 6.4 to appoint Appropriation committee members according to several criteria: “one member shall be a resident of each of the Public Service Commission districts respectively, one member shall be a resident of each of the congressional districts respectively, and six members shall be appointed from the state at large” (Louisiana House of Representatives 2012, Citizen Guide/House Rules).

Lastly, unlike in many U.S. state legislatures, the Speakers of the Louisiana House of Representatives are not constrained by the formal rule of proportional representation. Under this rule, minority and majority party members are guaranteed committee assignments onto all committees based on the percentage of seats they hold in the House (Inside the Legislative Process 1996, 4-4 -4-5). Therefore, the Speaker must grant a specific amount of seats to each

party. In turn, arguably because Louisiana does not abide by this rule, its Speakers are freer in their selection of committee assignments.

2.3.2 Informal Rules: Committee Request and Speaker Committee Selection

Conventionally, Louisiana House legislators make their committee request known to the Speaker through either formal requests placed in writing or by verbal requests (Louisiana House legislator anonymous interviews 2012). Additionally, Louisiana House Speakers often grant legislator committee requests based on various methods. Informally speaking, according to a staff member in the Louisiana House of Representatives, Speakers often have in mind how they want to compose a committee. For instance, they may want a particular committee makeup to contain members who represent a specific party, race, gender, or geographic boundaries (the north/south boundaries in Louisiana). Moreover, in practice, since Speakers have always been selected from the legislative body and have served many years as representatives, one can assume an individual legislators' personal and professional relationship with the Speaker can play a role on their selection to specific committees (anonymous legislator interview 2012).

Additional insight into, how and why Louisiana Speakers choose committee assignments is provided in the August 1995-1996 study "Inside the Legislative Process". Under this study, researchers sent a questionnaire to Louisiana's Clerk of the House, to the Secretary of the House, or to one of their staff members inquiring, what criteria the appointing authorities consider when making their membership selections for committees (Inside the Legislative Process 1996). According to this study, the Speaker of the Louisiana House grants committee memberships based on preference, seniority, tenure, political party,

and geographic location. Occupation, experience, competency, and gender do not play a significant role.

2.3.3 Informal Power of the Louisiana Governor over Committee Selection

While the Speaker formally enjoys the formal power of selecting committee chair and members, the true power lies in the hands of the governor. Informally, according to a Louisiana House legislator interviews, Louisiana is unique in the amount of power the governor wields. When the governor is interested he will not only strongly influence the selection of the Speaker, but also dictate to them who to choose for committee chairman as well as advise the Speaker on committee membership selection (anonymous legislator interviews). A well-known example, of the power the governor yields over committee chair and member assignments occurred in March 2004. During, this year House Representative Troy Hebert, committee chairman of the House Insurance committee, was removed from his chairmanship by Speaker Joe Salter, under the direction of Governor Kathleen Blanco, after Hebert voted against a critical vote on a tax issue (renewal of a tax on business utilities) for the governor. After his removal from chairmanship, Representative Hebert famously referred to the Governor as “Queen Bee.”

2.3.4 Why Louisiana?

Louisiana’s non-proportional representation requirement provides scholars an excellent opportunity in which not only to test the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theories but also to predict how these theories will fare in Louisiana. Notably, as discussed earlier, Louisiana is one of twelve states that do not apply proportional representation to committee assignments (Inside the Legislative Process 1995-1996). The idea of proportional committee representation is to allow minority party members their right

to committee seats based on their percentage of members in the legislature. Theoretically this intent has substantial implications regarding the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories alike. First, the distributive theory argues that committee membership is granted to legislators with the highest need (those representing districts with a large interest in the policies enacted under the jurisdiction of specific committees) for membership onto that committee. Therefore, regardless of party these committees will be overrepresented by members representing specific districts. Under proportional representation, this theory will not necessarily hold true. For example, say a majority of minority members represent districts with a high need for membership onto a specific committee compared to the percentage of majority party members, under proportional representation minority members will not be overrepresented on these committees; in turn, constraining the testing of the distributive theory (Groseclose and King 2000).

Furthermore, applying major party cartel theory in proportional representation, states face similar problems with the distributive theory. As mentioned previously, one tenet of the major party cartel theory is that the majority party will overstack majority party members onto committees, especially those of vital importance to the majority party regardless of the percentage of seats the minority party holds in the legislature. Under proportional representation, the major party is constrained in its ability to stack committees with majority party members (Groseclose and King 2000). Again, biasing support against the majority party theory in these states.

Overall, states adhering to the idea of proportional committee representation, limits the testing of the distributive and major party cartel theory. In fact, arguably proportional representation biases ones findings in favor of the informational theory (Groseclose and King

2000). As a result, Louisiana's non-compliance with proportional committee representation allows scholars to test the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theories with limited constraints.

In sum, appearing in the concluding section of this chapter, I reemphasize the major tenets of the informational, the distributive, and the major party cartel theories as well as lay out the testing of my hypotheses generated from expected support for these theories in light of Louisiana's non-proportional committee representation requirement.

2.4 Summary

Informational Theory. As mentioned earlier according to the informational theory, legislators are motivated to maintain and support the legislative institution. One way they maintain the stability of the legislative institution is to create policies beneficial to the whole house (Frisch and Kelly 2006). Under this theory, representative policies are created by none other than representative committees. By creating committees composed of members representing varying views from one another, accurate information is more likely dispensed to the whole legislature (Krehbiel 1991). For the informational theory to hold true, though, committee membership characteristics must mirror the characteristics of the whole House. So, under this theory, I expect to find committees will represent a heterogeneous membership (i.e. members representing different characteristics from one another).

In keeping with current committee assignment literature, in order to determine whether committee members represent similar interest to the whole House, this dissertation relies on two methods used to test committee and House characteristics: the difference of mean and difference of median test. Both are chosen in order to provide more than one avenue for testing the informational theory. Under these tests, this study compares the

difference median (means) of committee members to the difference of median (means) of the whole legislature. Thus, if median (mean) of committee members are found to be similar to the median (mean) of the whole legislator, then this study will have found support in favor of the informational theory.

Distributive Theory. Under the distributive theory, legislators seek membership onto committees to represent the needs of their constituents. According to this theory, legislators self-select onto committees with jurisdiction over policies representative of the views of their constituents. This self-selection leads to production of unrepresentative policies. These policies are passed in part through legislative logrolling, the process of lawmakers passing legislation beneficial to one politician in the hopes of that representative returning the favor (Krehbiel 1991).

Based on the tenets of the distributive theory, if legislators seek committee assignments based on their constituent concerns then legislative committees will contain committee members with similar characteristics to one another. These characteristics will not represent the characteristics of the whole legislature. For example, legislators representing agricultural districts will seek membership onto the agricultural committees. Therefore, the distributive theory holds true if the median (mean) of legislator committee characteristics are found to be different from the median (mean) view of the whole legislature.

Major Party Cartel Theory. According to the major party cartel theory, legislators do not self-select onto committees as expressed through the distributive theory, rather, are placed onto committees by the majority party. Under this theory, the main purpose of committees is to promote policies beneficial to the majority party. One way the majority

party achieves this goal is by stacking membership onto control committees with legislators representing the median view of the whole party. Control committees are those committees directly affecting “the success of policy issues important to the majority, such as the Appropriations Committee” (Aldrich and Battista 2002; Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Notably, in order to promote goodwill with its members’, parties will allow legislators to self-select onto committees with jurisdiction over issues of minor importance to the party, but substantial importance to the representatives districts.

According to the major party cartel theory, the majority party has several tools at its disposal in order to keep committees in line with the party’s goals. First, the majority party can not only elect the Speaker of the House, but it also can set the rules of the legislature. Speakers maintain great powers in the United States legislature by controlling the following when: bills are voted on by the legislative floor; the rules committee; the number of seats a committee possess; and which individual majority party members are placed on which committee - all of which constrain legislators from acting against the wishes of the party (Sandahl 2005). If the major party cartel theory holds true, hypothetically, I expect to find Democratic legislators on control committees will represent the views of the whole Democrat Party and contrary views to the whole party on constituent committees.

Even more, I expect to find mixed support for the distributive, the informational, or major party cartel theory. Based on findings of previous research that legislators choose committee membership based on a combination of motivations (Frisch and Kelly 2006; Bullock III 1976; Fenno 1973), and that committees differ in their ability to meet this motivations (Maltzman 1997; Sprague 2008).

CHAPTER 3: METHOD

I explore support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories, in sixteen standing committees in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House, by laying out two models of legislator committee assignments. In the first model, I test support for all three theories by determining whether legislators seek committee assignments based on one individual legislator preference such as those based on: constituent demographics, party affiliation, occupation, caucus membership, or ideology. These preferences are measured based on the current trend of operationalizing legislator committee preferences. The significance of this study is twofold. First, it goes one step farther by introducing a new measurement of legislator committee characteristics based conceivably on legislator party caucus membership. Arguably, this measurement creates a more comprehensive tool for examining legislator committee preferences. For example, Louisiana House Caucus members promote policies directly related to the jurisdiction of Louisiana House Standing Committees. Debatably, this relationship will entice caucus members to seek membership onto committees promoting policies close to their caucus goals.

Second, this study presents an original model using similar data and measurements as in model one. Working on the premise that legislators choose committee assignments based on multiple considerations; therefore, support for the three theories of legislative committee organization is broader in contrast to current trends that seek to provide isolated support for each theory. Louisiana is chosen for its non-proportional committee representation requirement. Reasonably, by choosing a state without this characteristic, this study can test the distributive theory, informational, and major party cartel theory with limited restraints.

This dissertation provides support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory by conducting a difference of median and mean test to determine how far committee member views are from the views held by the whole Louisiana legislative house body. Committee members' median (mean) scores are achieved by taking the average of how committee members voted on bills in the Louisiana House for the years 1999-2008. Similarly, the whole chamber's median (mean) score is obtained by taking the average of how the whole chamber voted on bills in the Louisiana House for the years 1999-2008.

I report my results using both difference of mean and median test for two reasons: first, generalizability and second theoretical appropriateness. Comparing the results found using the difference of medians test to those found using the difference of means tests for preference outliers in the Louisiana House of Representatives; I offer two distinct tests of the distributive, informational and major party cartel theories.

Over the years, as Battista and Richmond (2011, 5) note, the analytical methods used to test the major tenets of the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories have evolved from the simple use of a "difference of mean tests (Weingast and Marshall 1988) to rank-sum difference of median tests (Cox and McCubbins 1993) and finally to direct simulation of the null data-generating process using Monte Carlo difference in median test (Groseclose 1994)."

Proponents of the difference of median test argue that its ability to determine committee representativeness is strongly rooted in theoretical foundations. Battista (2004) states,

The theoretical logic behind comparing medians is well established. If legislators are assumed to have single-peaked preferences (as all models have assumed) and legislators are arrayed along only one dimension (also a common assumption), the median voter theorem applies and the median

preferences is a Condorcet winner (Downs 1957; Black 1958). That is, the preferences of the committee collapses to its median legislator's preference, and the preferences of the chamber collapse to its median legislator's preference. Therefore, to compare the collective preference of a committee to that of its chamber, we need to compare median preferences.

Collaborating Battista's argument in favor of the difference of median test, other well-known scholars such as Cox and McCubbins 1993, Groseclose 1994, Hall and Grofman 1990, Kiewiet and and McCubbins 1991, Krehbiel 1990 and 1991, Londregan and Snyder 1994, Poole and Rosenthal 1997, and Alder and Lapinski 1997 have also advocated the utilization of the median approach (Adler and Lapinski 1997).

Moreover, Battista (2004) notes the primary justification for the continued use of difference of mean test is statistical tractability, the ability to generalize from study to study. He further states when theories of committee development first came to the scene, many scholars lacked the knowledge or the ability to use the theoretically more appropriate difference of median test. This test required scholars to use methods new to political science, such as the Wicoxson rank-sum test. These methods lead many scholars to choose to organize their studies of the three theories by conducting a simple difference of mean test over the more complex difference of median test. This choice is amplified by Groseclose's (1994) finding that difference of median and mean test produced similar results to one another. Presently, this justification is weakening with increased statistical knowledge and the increase of less expensive computing power (Battista 2004). Second, Groseclose's (1994) finding has been called into question with Battista's 2004 study. In that study, Battista provides evidence that the use of difference of mean test is not a reliable substitute for the difference of median test "in comparing committees and chambers because their estimates of representativeness can differ wildly in either direction (Battista 2004, 167)."

Finding difference of means test is more likely to produce unrepresentative committees compared to the whole legislature than a difference of median test will produce.

In this dissertation, the distributive theory and informational theory are tested by comparing the mean and median score of committee members to the mean and median score of the whole chamber. The mean and median scores tell us whether committee members represent characteristics similar to the characteristics of the whole legislature. If a majority of members on a specific committee are found to represent similar characteristics to the whole chamber then that committee is said to represent the characteristics of the whole (Sandahl 2005), therein providing support for the informational theory. Conversely, if a majority of members on a specific committee are found to have characteristics unrepresentative of the whole chamber (Sandahl 2005), then support is found for the distributive theory.

The major party cartel theory is tested by separating 1999-2008 Democrat and Republican standing committee members into two groups. In order to test the major party cartel theory I look at the Democratic Party members in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives. “I compare the median (mean) score of Democrat committee members for a specific committee to the median (mean) score of the remaining Democrats not in the committee. If the Democrat committee member median (mean) scores are found to be similar to the median (mean) score of the whole house Democrat party, then that committee is said to be composed of Democrat member’s representative of the views of their party” (Sandahl 2005, 28).

Testing the expectation that support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory is mixed; this study creates a multiple-motivation model combining all measurements of legislator motivations into one analysis. Results obtained from difference

of median and mean test conducted to analyze the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theory are evaluated under one single model.

In order to provide a strict test of the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theory, these three theories are tested using a strict standard of statistical significance (.05 level). By using this level of significance, I can say that support for these theories is accepted or rejected with 95% confidence.

3.1 Measuring Legislator Motivations

Currently, scholars are debating traditional measurements of legislator committee preferences used to test the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories. This debate centers on the use of a single measurement of legislator characteristics, such as district characteristics, occupation, party identification, interest group scores and ideology, to fully capture legislator committee preferences (Sprague 2008). This flaw is often blamed for creating confusing and misleading results in favor of either the informational, the distributive or the major party cartel theory. In this dissertation, I address this debate by evaluating support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory in light of one single measurement of legislator characteristics. I then add to the current literature by testing these theories using a measurement of legislator characteristics based on a combination of legislator district characteristics, occupation, party identification, interest group scores and ideology.

Arguably, legislator committee characteristics are difficult to operationalize. Representative committee characteristics, in addition to their own attitudes, are often affected by several outside pressures such as legislator district characteristics, ideology, interest group scores, and party. The use of legislator roll call votes and interests group scores to measure

legislator ideology, a well-documented pressure on legislator preference, to determine legislator committee motivation dates back to the earliest studies of legislative committee organization (Cox and McCubbins 1993). The strength and weaknesses of each has long been debated.

One major strength of using interest group scores to measure legislator ideology is the ability of these scores to capture what Rhode (1991) terms legislator ‘operative’ preferences (Sprague 2008). These inclinations “refer to the preferences that actually govern the voting choice, when all other forces pressuring the member in one direction or other are taken into account” (Rhode 1991, 41). Legislator constituency, interest groups, party leaders, and individual legislator own attitudes, are included among these forces (Rhode 1991). Debatably, by capturing these different influences a more valid measurement of legislator motivations is created.

In practice, methodologically speaking, interest group scores are not created to provide a measurement of legislator ideology, but to determine which legislators are supportive of their cause (Fowler 1982). To obtain their goal, these groups create their scores by determining how many times legislators vote in line with the group’s policy positions (Sprague 2008), often choosing controversial nonpartisan issues to determine their ratings (Cox and McCubbins 1993). By choosing these types of issues, interest groups are able to identify both Democrats and Republicans supportive of their cause. Sequentially creating scores with both liberal and conservative supporters and interfering with the separation of conservatives and liberals (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

In addition, critics argue interest group scores are often compiled from a limited number of votes. Basing legislator interest group ratings on a few votes makes interest group

scores for individuals unstable over time, causing these scores to fluctuate and change from Congress to Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993).

Conversely, another measurement of legislator ideology, Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores, faces harsh methodological criticism. Similar to interest groups scores, these attacks often focus on the ability of these scores to capture the true ideology of legislators. Critics state the sole reliance of Poole and Rosenthal's scores on legislator floor roll call votes compromises the value of these scores as a measure of ideology (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Arguing Poole and Rosenthal scores are not capable of taking into account all the aspects of legislator roll call preferences opponents reject the score. For instance, as Battista and Richman (2011) note, legislator roll call votes usually occur after logrolls or other coalitions have been created (Hall and Grofman 1990), and intra-committee vote trades (Glenn R. Parker and Suzanne Parker 1998; Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004). Furthermore, legislators can and do alter their votes from committee to the house floor. How legislators votes on a bill in committee, is not necessarily representative of how they will vote on the floor (Glenn R. Parker and Suzanne Parker 1998; Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004).

Sidestepping the problems associated with legislator roll call votes, scholars use legislator district characteristics (Adler and Lapinski 1997) and occupation to measure legislator committee preferences. In 1997 Adler and Lapinski pave the way for using district characteristics to identify legislator committee preferences by developing and coining a measurement of legislator 'need.' This measurement uses district characteristics to determine how compelling membership onto a specific committee is to an individual legislator. Legislators' identified as representing a high need for membership onto a specific committee are those representing districts whose policies fall under the jurisdiction of that

committee. For example, a legislator representing a district mainly agriculturally in nature has the highest expected need for membership on the agriculture committee. Support for the distributive and informational is based on whether committees are overrepresented by “high need” legislators compared to the whole legislature.

One strength of using district characteristics as a measure of legislator committee preferences is its ability to directly measure “a critical component of a legislator’s operative preferences, constituent interest” (Sprague 2008, 311). A major obstacle of this measurement is its ability to fully explain legislator motivations. Critics argue that to draw a true picture of legislator preferences, scholars must take into account the personal goals of legislators that cannot be fully explained through this measure (Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004).

Unfortunately as presented here, current measurements of legislator motivations face several weaknesses. The main weakness is the inability of these measurements to fully capture all legislator committee motivations. Legislator caucus and delegation membership provides us with a different angle to understanding legislator committee membership, by providing more information concerning legislator motivations.

One major strength of legislator caucus and delegation membership is its direct applicability to a wide range of committees. Similar to interest group scores, legislator membership in these organizations provides data of individual legislator interests. The quantity of state caucus and delegations as well as the different areas of interest they cover, allows scholars to obtain a vast amount of legislator interest data. This data is directly applicable to determining legislator committee assignment choices. More importantly, unlike interest group scores which are created to identify legislators supportive of their individual cause, caucuses are created with the goal of promoting policies directly beneficial to

legislator constituents. Arguably, this focus creates a close measurement of individual legislator interests.

Nevertheless, legislator caucus membership is not the silver bullet. Perhaps, this measurement faces some of the similar weaknesses of previously mentioned measurements of legislator committee preferences. First of all, caucuses do not provide a measurement of legislator interest for all committees. In Louisiana, caucus membership does not explain legislator membership on the Appropriations, Civil Law, Judiciary, Retirement, or Ways and Means committees. Additionally, legislator caucus membership does not capture all of legislator committee preferences. It does not account for legislator personal goals, party, or ideology.

Furthermore, one drawback of the use of caucus membership to explain legislator preferences is the direct correlation between district characteristics and caucus membership, even after controlling for party, committee, electoral security, and seniority (Miler 2011). Specifically, in 2011 Miler finds legislator district characteristics affect whether legislators choose membership onto specific caucuses. Arguably, the inherent connection between constituent characteristics and caucus membership characteristics affects the extent to which caucus membership can offer any new additional information over and beyond district characteristics. Addressing this critique one major strength of the caucus membership measurement is its ability to offer a more refined measurement of legislator preferences as seen in the case of the Acadiana Caucus, Jefferson, Orleans, and Capital Region Delegations. Due to the fact, that while constituent characteristics may affect whether a legislator chooses to join a specific caucus it does not reveal the whole picture. For example, unlike individual constituent characteristics, caucus membership in the Acadiana Caucus, Jefferson, Orleans,

and Capital Region Delegations narrows constituent characteristics to specific geographical areas.

To illustrate, under Table 3.3 the district characteristic percent employed in wholesale or retail trade is a factor expected to positively affect whether legislators seek membership onto the Commerce Committee. If this holds true, one can infer two things. First, legislators representing districts with a high percentage of their constituents employed in wholesale or retail trade disproportionally seek membership onto the Commerce Committee. Second, it is plausible that policies reflected out of the Commerce Committee will represent regions with a high percentage of their district employed in wholesale or retail trade at the expense of the whole state.

Conversely, as Appendix Table A.1 reveals legislators residing on the Jefferson, Orleans, and Capital Region Delegations significantly represent districts employed in wholesale or retail trade as well as specific geographic regions in the state. Therefore, instead of policies reflected out of the Commerce Committee representing all areas of the state with a higher percentage of constituents employed in wholesale or retail trade as the former example would assume, these policies may represent the wholesale or retail interests of a specific geographical area at the expense of the whole state.

Notwithstanding this, caucus membership on the Rural and Black Caucus, could potentially suffer from the correlation problem associated with constituent characteristics and caucus membership. As a whole, it is difficult to differentiate any additional information provided by membership onto the Rural Caucus and Black Caucus not already captured through district characteristics. This being the case, these two caucus variables may

duplicate the same measurements already examined through constituent characteristics in Table 3.3.

On this occasion, this analysis uses legislator district characteristics, interest group scores, legislator ideology, party, occupation, and legislator caucus and delegation membership to investigate support for the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theories in sixteen standing committees in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives.

3.2 District Characteristics

Undeniably, Alder and Lapinski's 1997 study revolutionize research on legislative committee composition. Contending, representatives join committees based on their district characteristics, Adler and Lapinski further explore the extent to which district characteristics affect legislative committee membership. Using U.S. Census district data, as well as, data from various sources, the authors begin their study by creating a measurement of representative need. This need is directly related to the percentage of a legislator's district characteristics falling under the jurisdiction of each committee. Importantly, the higher the percentage of these characteristics the higher the legislator need. Hypothesizing committees are composed of legislators representing a high need (or districts with a high percentage of economic, social, and geographic characteristics falling under the jurisdiction of each committee), Alder and Lapinski analyze their data by conducting a Monte-Carlo difference of median test.

Seeking to extend Alder and Lapinski's (1997) research on district characteristics and legislative committee composition to the state level, Table 3.1 uses Alder and Lapinski's

Table 3.1: Constituency Characteristics as Determined by District Need and Committee Type

Committee	Constituency Characteristics	Districts Types with the Highest Expected Need
Administration of Criminal Justice	* African Americans	*Districts with a high % of African Americans, high % of individuals living in urban areas, and high % below poverty line
	* Population Density	
Agriculture	*% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	*Agricultural districts
	*Percent living in rural farming areas	
Civil Law	* % urban	*”Districts with high levels of interests in civil rights and legal issues” (Adler and Lapinski 1997)
	* Population Density	
Commerce	*% of district employed in wholesale and retail trade	*Districts with a high % of its pop. employed in wholesale & retail trade, finance, insurance, and real estate
Education	*% of district attending public elementary and high school	*District with a large % of its pop. that attends public elementary and high school
	* Median family income	
	District contains higher education institution (major universities with their branches and technical college)	
Health and Welfare	% of district with disabilities	% of district with disabilities
	% employed in healthcare	% employed in healthcare
	% of district age 55 or over	% of district age 55 or over
	% below poverty line	% below poverty line
Gov’t Affairs	% of district employed in public administration	% of district employed in public administration
Judiciary	* % of African Americans	*”Districts with high levels of interest in civil rights and legal issues” (Alder and Lapinski 1997).
	* Percent Urban	
	High Population Density	
	% below poverty line	
Labor	% employed in manufacturing	* Districts with a high % of pop. employed in manufacturing
Municipal	Orleans delegation	
	% of district employed in local government	
Retirement	% of district age 55 or older	High % of district age 55 or older
Transportation	* % of district employed in transportation and warehousing	*District with a high % of its pop. employed in transportation and warehousing
Note: * Obtained from Adler and Lapinski’s (1997) study. No * indicates this author’s expectation of districts with the highest expected need for membership onto a specific committee based on the jurisdiction of the committee. Appropriations, Ways and Means and Natural Resources are excluded because district characteristics are lacking.		

study to relate legislator district need with committee membership. Following the authors’ lead, this dissertation relies on U.S. Census data in order to create a measurement of legislator need. Notably, not all measurements used by Adler and Lapinski are easily available at the state level. Furthermore, not all committees in the Louisiana House standing committees are examined in Alder and Lapinski’s congressional study including: Health and

Welfare, Governmental Affairs, Municipal, Retirement, and Labor. In both of these cases, I use Census district data most directly related to the jurisdiction of each committee. Lastly, standing committees such as Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Natural Resources are excluded because district characteristics are lacking.

Measurements of legislator district characteristics for the years 1999-2008 are obtained from various sources. Since the 1990 Census does not provide a break down by House district, data for the years 1999-2001 is obtained from the 1996 and 1998 Almanac of State Legislative Elections. Data for the years 2002-2008, however, is provided by the U.S. 2000 Census with the exception of poverty, household income, and the percent of African Americans. Poverty data, on the other hand, is provided by the 2006 Almanac of State Legislative Elections for the years 2001-2008. When available, the most current data are used for each district characteristics. Following this premise, for the years 2006-2008, the variables average household income and the percent of African Americans in each house district is provided by the 2006 Almanac of State Legislative Elections. It is important to note, though, since Louisiana House standing committees maintain jurisdiction over multiple policy areas, several census measurements are used to capture as many dimensions of the committee as possible.

3.3 Poole and Rosenthal W-Nominate Scores

Legislator roll call ideology is based on Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), which are created from legislator vote choice on contested (unanimous) congressional floor roll call votes. Relying on these votes, representatives are arranged along a liberal, moderate, and conservative spectrum which range from “-1.00 (strong liberal) to +1.00 (strong conservative)” (Ardoin and Garand 2003). Hence, allowing

researchers to determine how liberal or conservative an individual legislator is compared to whole legislative body (Sandahl 2005).

For the purpose of this analysis, Poole and Rosenthal scores are extended to the state level. Additionally, in this dissertation contested roll call votes are defined as all votes recorded in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House Legislature digest that contain at least five legislators voting contrary to their counterparts (Sandahl 2005). All 105 legislators in the Louisiana 1999-2008 House are used in this analysis, except for those who leave or are replaced in the legislative year being studied. In which case, these legislators are excluded because of the lack of roll call data available to accurately determine their voting ideology. In all, from 1999 to 2008 this study looks at two thousand, one hundred and thirty-one contested roll call votes. Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are computed with the help of Dr. Bratton using Poole and Rosenthal W-Nominate Roll Call Analysis Software. Table 3.2 provides a yearly breakdown of the contested votes used to create legislator ideology.

Table 3.2: Contested Roll Call Votes by Year

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
# of contested roll call votes	343	45	338	32	323	280	165	267	138	200	2,131

3.4 Party

Legislator Party identification data is obtained from the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives. Legislators are coded zero if they are Democrat and one if coded Republican.

3.5 Legislator Interest Group Scores

Legislator interest group scores are created from Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI) interest score. These scores rank legislators according to their vote on bills that promote pro-business stances. Legislators are ranked on a 0 (legislator does not

vote according to the interest of the LABI) to 100 scale (legislator votes according to the interest of the LABI). Legislators are positioned on this scale according to roll call point values. These values are dependent upon two factors: first, whether legislators vote in accordance with the wishes of the LABI, and second the deemed importance by the LABI of these individual votes on bills to the business community (LABI 2012/Voting Records).

3.6 Legislator Caucus Membership

Along with LABI interest group scores, an additional measurement of legislator interest is obtained through legislator caucus membership. Caucuses include: Acadiana Delegation, Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus, Independent Caucus, Jefferson Delegation, Orleans Delegation, Republican/Democrat Delegation, Rural Caucus, and Women's Caucus. Each of these delegations promotes legislation important to their caucus' goals.

The Acadiana Delegation goal is to promote policies that affect the following parishes: Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Avoyelles, Calcasieu, Cameron, Evangeline, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, LaFourche, Point Coupee, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary, Terrebonne, Vermilion, and West Baton Rouge (Acadian Legislative Delegation 2012).

The purpose of the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus is to enact policies that positively promote the interests of their constituents: "implementing, and promoting, policies that allow citizens fair and open access to educational and economic advancement opportunities, providing leadership in challenging policies which hinder the progress of African Americans, organizing and maintaining a networking system in Louisiana that links together elected officials, faith-based civic organizations, business and colleges and universities for identifying cutting-edge issues that affect Louisiana's African American

citizenry and developing and implementing community-based programs, meetings and forums for the distribution of information and serving as a united public voice for the African American population in Louisiana” (Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus 2012).

Furthermore, the aim of the Capital Region Delegation is to bring legislators representing districts in the capital region together to produce positive results for the region. “While each member maintains representation of their district’s priorities, the Delegation works as a coalition to elevate those priorities that are regional in nature to the next level” (Capital Region Delegation 2012). Because the Capital Region Delegation was created in 2008, this is the only year analyzed in this study. Parishes in the Capital Region include: Ascension, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberville, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, St. Helena, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana (Louisiana House of Representatives). Both the Jefferson and New Orleans Delegations seek to promote policies that better individuals living in these parishes (Capital Region Delegation 2012).

The objective of the Rural Caucus is to promote policies that better the condition of individuals living in rural parishes. The Rural caucus is the largest caucus in the Louisiana state legislature (Rural Caucus 2012). Additionally, the intention of the Independent Caucus and Republican and Democrat Delegation members is to promote policies beneficial to their individual party. Similarly, the Jefferson Delegation and Orleans Delegations seek to promote policies beneficial to individual living in the districts represented by the Jefferson and Orleans Delegations (Jefferson and Orleans Delegations 2012).

Further, the goal of the Louisiana’s Women’s Caucus is to address issues concerning women. The mission of this caucus is two-fold. First, is to “prepare the next generation of women’s leaders” (Women’s Caucus 2012). Second, is to “serve as the premiere voice and

leading monitor of issues, legislation and policies, which impact women, including fighting for breast cancer awareness, pay equity, expanded child care services, domestic violence prevention, better healthcare and more economic development opportunities” (Women’s Caucus 2012).

Consequently, in this analysis I use legislator caucus membership to determine how closely Louisiana committee preferences represent the views of the whole chamber. In order to conduct this test, this dissertation extends Alder and Lapinski’s (1997) district and committee related measurements and hypothesis to caucus membership. In 1997, Alder and Lapinski explore the link to which district characteristics affect committee membership by relating legislator need to committee type and membership composition. Under this study, the authors hypothesize committees are composed of members who represent districts with a high percentage of economic, social, and geographic characteristics falling under the jurisdiction of each committee. Noting the higher the percentage of district characteristics falling under the jurisdiction of a specific committee, the higher the legislator need for membership onto that committee.

Extending Adler and Lapinski’s 1997, classification of legislator need to state level caucus membership, this study seeks to determine how closely committee preferences represent the views of the whole chamber by exploring the extent to which district characteristics of legislator caucus members affects Louisiana 1999-2008 standing committee membership. Legislator district characteristics are used to identify the number of caucuses and delegations members representing district types with the highest expected need for membership onto a specific committee. In Table 3.3, I not only use Alder and Lapinski’s

(1997) classification of legislator need, committee type, and membership composition, but in addition I also include legislator caucuses and delegations.

Data for Louisiana House 1999-2008 caucus members' district characteristics are obtained from U.S. Census and Almanac of State Legislative Elections. Specifically, the 2000 U.S. Census data is used to provide legislator district information for all years used in this analysis with two exceptions. First, for the years 1999-2001 the 1990 U.S. Census data does not provide individual legislator district data. Therefore, data for these years is obtained from the 1996 and 1998 Almanac of State Legislative Elections. Second, data for the years 2002-2008 are provided by the U.S. 2000 Census with the exception of poverty, household income, and percent of African Americans. Poverty data is provided by the 2006 Almanac of State Legislative Elections for the years 2001-2008. For the years 2006-2008, the variables average household income and the percent of African Americans in each house district is provided by the 2006 Almanac of State Legislative Elections. Data for legislator caucus membership is obtained from the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives or the Caucus' themselves.

In addition, not all measurements of legislator need used by Adler and Lapinski are easily available at the state level. Moreover, not all committees in the Louisiana House standing committees are examined in Alder and Lapinski's congressional study including: Health and Welfare, Governmental Affairs, Municipal, Retirement, and Labor. In both of these cases the most appropriate census data is used. Further, standing committees such as Appropriations, Civil Law, Judiciary, Retirement, and Ways and Means are excluded from

Table 3.3: Legislator Caucus Membership on Committees as Determined through Constituent Characteristics

Committees	District Types with the Highest Expected Need as defined by Adler and Lapinski	Identified Caucuses and delegations whose members represent districts types with the highest expected need
Administration of Criminal Justice	* Districts with a high % of African Americans, high % of individuals living in urban areas, and high % below poverty line	Black Caucus
Agriculture	*Agricultural Districts	Acadiana Delegation Rural Caucus
Commerce	* Districts with a high % of pop. employed in wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, and real estate	Orleans Delegation Jefferson Delegation Capital Region Delegation
Education	*District with a large % of its pop. attends public elementary and high school, avg. of district household income	Black Caucus Rural Caucus
Environment	Districts with a high % of natural resources	Rural Caucus Acadiana Delegation
Health and Welfare	% of districts with disabilities, % employed in healthcare, *% of district age 55 or over, % below poverty line	Black Caucus Rural Caucus
Government Affairs	% of district employed in public administration	Black Caucus
Insurance	*% of district employed in insurance	Capital Region Delegation
Labor	Districts with a high % of the pop. employed in manufacturing	Acadian Caucus Rural Caucus

(table continued)

Municipal	Districts with a high % of pop. employed in local government	Black Caucus
Natural Resources	Districts with a high % of natural resources	Acadian Caucus Rural Caucus
Transportation	* District with a high % of its pop. employed in transportation and warehousing	Jefferson Delegation
<p>Note: *Obtained from Adler and Lapinski's (1997), no * data is based on this author's expectation of districts with the highest expected need for membership onto a specific committee based on the jurisdiction of the committee. Appropriations, Civil Law, Judiciary, Retirement, and Environment Committees are excluded because of the lack of district and Caucus characteristics directly related to the jurisdiction of the committee.</p>		

this table because of the lack of legislator district characteristics directly related to the jurisdiction of these committees. Lastly, due to limited membership both the Independent and Women's Caucuses are omitted from this analysis.

3.7 Legislator Occupation

Legislator occupation characteristics are obtained from the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives and from Kathleen Bratton. Occupation is coded one if a legislator belongs to a specific occupation and zero if not. Legislator jobs are chosen based on whether they directly relate to each committee's jurisdiction. For a list of these occupations and the committees they relate to, please refer to Table 3.4. As a result of the lack of legislator occupations relating to the jurisdiction of specific Louisiana House committees, the following committees have been removed from this analysis: Appropriations, Environment, Government Affairs, Labor, Municipal, Natural Resources, Retirement, Transportation, and Ways and Means.

Table 3.4: Occupation Characteristics and Committee Types

Committee	Legislator Occupation
Administration of Criminal Justice	Lawyer, Law Enforcement
Agriculture	Cattleman, Farmer
Civil Law	Lawyer, Law Enforcement
Commerce	Wholesale Trade, Retail, Financial Planner, Communication Company Executive, CEO, Business Owner, Businessman, Business Consultant, Tax Consultant, CPA, Accountant, Investment Banker, Real Estate
Education	Educator, Coach, College Administrator, Professor, Educational Administrator, Athletic Director
Health and Welfare	Occupations related to health (such as a nurse, psychologist, physical therapist, or welfare (any profession that was focused on addressing poverty or socioeconomic status--most commonly social work, official positions in non-profit agencies, positions in government agencies designed to address poverty or the needs of the disadvantages) (Dr. Bratton).
Insurance	Insurance Owner/Agent
Judiciary	Lawyer, Law Enforcement
Note: Appropriations, Environment, Government Affairs, Labor, Municipal, and Natural Resources, Retirement, Transportation and Ways and Means Committees are excluded because of a lack of legislator occupations directly related to the jurisdiction of these committees.	

3.8 Conclusion

In sum, this chapter provides a detailed account of how this study examines support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives. I begin by laying out two models of legislator committee assignments. In the first model, I test the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories by determining whether legislators seek committee assignments based on individual committee preferences. In fact, to achieve an accurate result, I use a difference of mean and a difference of median test to measure how closely individual committee member preferences represent the views of the whole chamber. Following the current trend in committee research, legislator committee preferences are measured using: legislator ideology, interest group scores, political party affiliation, district characteristics, and occupation. In addition to this, I introduce a new legislator characteristic measurement based on legislator caucus membership. Lastly, using similar data and measurements as model one, I explore the extent to which legislators choose committee assignments based on multiple considerations.

CHAPTER 4: STATISTICAL RESULTS

Traditionally, the study of legislator committee assignments revolves around three main theories: informational, distributive, and major party cartel. Particularly, at the root of these theories lies an explanation of legislator committees assignments based on one single legislator motivation: legislator interest, party, or institutional interest. In contrast, this study adds to the current literature by arguing legislator committee preferences are not likely to be explained through a sole motivation; rather, a combination of motivations. With this in mind, I create and develop a multi-motivational approach to testing the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theory.

Furthermore, this dissertation seeks to provide a more accurate test of the theories of legislator organization by analyzing and developing a broader approach to testing the three theories. Presently, many researchers (for example Cox and McCubbins 1993; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Krehbiel 1991; Glen R. Parker, Suzanne Parker, Copa, and Lawhorn 2004, Overby and Kazee 2000) examining the major tenets of the three theories of legislative organization seek to provide support based on narrow measurements of legislator committee preferences. The current reliance of scholars on limited measurements of legislator committee preferences to test legislator committee development theories has several drawbacks. The main disadvantage of these limited measurements is their inability to fully capture all legislator committee motivations. For instance, if scholars rely solely on district characteristics to measure legislator committee preferences, they capture the role constituent interest plays in legislator committee membership, but not the role of legislator personal goals (Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004).

With this in mind, this dissertation seeks to fill this methodological gap by employing several measurements of legislator committee preferences including: legislator ideology, party, district characteristics, occupation, interest group scores, as well as introducing a new measurement based on legislator party caucus membership.

Under these circumstances, this dissertation seeks support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories by determining whether committee members represent views contrary to the views of the whole, similar to the whole, moreover whether majority party committee members represent views similar to the majority party on control committees.

As a result, this analysis finds mixed support for the distributive and informational theories and furthermore, and minimal to no support for the major party cartel theory. Support for the theories of legislative committee development is dependent upon the measurement used to explore the extent to which committee look like the membership of the whole chamber. I further find support for each of these theories varies across time and committee. Thereby leading support for the expectation that legislators' committee assignments are a reflection of multiple motivations: constituents, party, and institutional interest.

In keeping with the traditional terminology used in previous studies to test the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theories, standing committees in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives found to contain members unrepresentative of the views of the whole legislature are identified as preference outlier committees. For the purposes of this paper, preference outlier committees are those committees composed of

members who represent mean (median) views divergent from the mean (median) views of the whole legislature or their party.

To conclude, this chapter begins by examining support for the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theory, by organizing its results according to two models of legislator committee assignments. First of all, in the first model, the three theories of committee development are tested using individual legislator committee preferences: legislator ideology, interest group scores, political affiliation, district characteristics, occupation, and legislator party caucus membership. Relying on these measurements, a difference of mean and a difference of median test are used to determine how closely individual committee member preferences represent the views of the whole chamber. After this, using similar measurements and data as model one, mixed support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory is determined by creating a comprehensive analysis of model one.

4.1 Testing the Informational and Distributive Theory

In Tables 4.1 – 4.8, this dissertation seeks support for the informational and distributive theories. The informational theory is tested, by determining whether Louisiana House committee members represent views similar to the views of the whole legislature. Conversely, the distributive theory, predicts committee members will not represent views similar to the views of the whole legislature. To determine support for these two theories, this study relies on both Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, district characteristics, and party caucus membership.

4.1.1 Ideology

Relying on Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores and difference of median test to probe for preference outliers in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committees, Table 4.1 reveals evidence of Louisiana House committees as preference outliers in twenty of one hundred and seventy cases. Out of these cases, the only consistent committees composed of legislators representing different ideologies from the whole legislature are the Ways and Means and the Transportation Committees. Accordingly, over a ten year span, these two committees show responsibility for sixty percent of the outlier cases found in the Louisiana House standing committees. Specifically speaking, the Ways and Means Committee constitutes forty percent of the outliers and the Transportation Committee only twenty percent (a preference outlier committee only for the years 2004-2007). More importantly, similar results are also found in Tables 4.2 and Appendix Table A.12-A.21 using the difference of mean test.

Adding to these results, Appendix Tables A.2-A.4 and A.7-A.10 clearly show for the years 1999-2001 and 2004-2007, only between .05 percent and thirty percent of committee members on the Ways and Means Committee represent ideologies similar to fifty-five to sixty percent of non-committee members. In fact as displayed in Appendix Figures A.4.1 through A.4.4, the ideological leaning of Ways and Means Committee members' floor voting patterns compared to the House as a whole tend to be concentrated towards the moderate liberal end of the liberal/conservative continuum. Non-committee members voting patterns tend to range from moderate to strong conservative. In Appendix Figure A.4.1-A.4.3 both the 1999, 2000, and 2004 Ways and Means Committee members voting patterns tend to concentrate toward the liberal end of the liberal/conservative continuum. Non-committee

Table 4.1: Difference of Medians for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate Scores

Louisiana House Standing Committee	Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores										Number of years committee is a preference outlier
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Agriculture	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Appropriations	N	N	N	Y*	N	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	0
Civil Law	N	N	N	Y**	Y***	N	N	N	N	N	2
Commerce	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Education	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	1
Environment	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	0
Health and Welfare	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Government Affairs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Insurance	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y***	N	Y*	N	2
Judiciary	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Labor	N	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Municipal	N	N	N	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	N	Y*	0
Natural Resources	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Retirement	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Transportation	N	N	Y*	N	N	Y**	Y***	Y***	Y***	N	4
Ways and Means	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	N	Y***	Y**	Y***	Y***	N	8
Number of committees in a given year that have significant differences	1	2	3	2	1	3	4	2	2	0	20
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee</p> <p>Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are produced by a program created by Poole and Rosenthal with the help of Dr. Bratton. They are based on Louisiana House contested roll call votes and range from -1 (strong liberal) to 1 (strong conservative).</p> <p>Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01</p> <p>Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier</p> <p>Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005</p>											

Table 4.2: Difference of Means for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate Scores

Louisiana House Standing Committee	Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores										
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Number of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	0
Agriculture	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Appropriations	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	Y**	N	Y*	N	1
Civil Law	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Commerce	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Education	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	Y**	1
Environment	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Health and Welfare	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Government Affairs	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	1
Insurance	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	0
Judiciary	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	0
Labor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Municipal	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	Y*	1
Natural Resources	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Retirement	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y**	Y**	N	3
Transportation	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y***	Y***	Y***	N	4
Ways and Means	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y**	N	Y***	Y**	Y***	Y***	N	8
Number of committees in a given year that have significant differences	2	1	1	2	0	4	4	3	3	1	21
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee</p> <p>Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are produced by a program created by Poole and Rosenthal with the help of Dr. Bratton. They are based on Louisiana House contested roll call votes and range from -1 (strong liberal) to 1 (strong conservative)</p> <p>Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01</p> <p>Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier</p> <p>Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005</p>											

members tend to shift more toward the conservative end of the continuum. Conversely, Appendix Figure A.4.4 in 2008 displays evidence that Ways and Means Committee members are more conservative in their voting patterns than in 1999, 2000, and 2004. Non-committee members are more evenly disbursed in their voting patterns, but still concentrate toward the conservative end of the spectrum.

In the end, the statistical analysis presented in Table 4.1 and 4.2 and further expanded on in Appendix Table A.2-A.21 provide overwhelming evidence that Louisiana House legislators represent ideologies similar to the whole House. As a result, overall support for the informational theory is confirmed with the exception of two House committees - Ways and Means and Transportation.

4.1.2 LABI Interest Group Scores

Alternatively, using LABI business interest group scores instead of Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores and a difference of median test to examine preference outliers in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committees, Table 4.3 reveals, for the most part, committee members and non-committee members represent similar business interest. Having said this, there is a slightly higher occurrence of preference outlier committees using LABI scores than Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores. Namely, preference outliers occur in twenty six out of one hundred and seventy cases. That is to say, six more times than found using Poole and Rosenthal scores.

Similar to the results found using Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores, the Ways and Means and Transportation Committees contain the greatest amount of preference outliers. For the years 1999-2008, the Ways and Means Committee is a preference outlier committee for nine out of ten years. Likewise, but, without the same magnitude, the

Transportation Committee represents interests different from the whole legislature for four out of ten years. Conversely, contrasting the results found using Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores, in Table 4.3 the Appropriations Committee is an outlier for three (2004, 2006, and 2007) of the ten years analyzed.

Expanding on this finding, Appendix Table A.22-31 provides specific percentages of committee and non-committee members representing interests in favor of the LABI. For instance, in Appendix Table A.22 for the year 1999 twenty one percent of Ways and Means Committee voted more often than not for policies in the interests of the LABI compared to fifty-two percent of the whole legislature. Additionally, in 2004 Appendix Table A.27 reveals eleven percent of Ways and Means Committee members voted more often the not in favor of the interests of the LABI compared to fifty-three percent of non-committee members.

By the same token, Appendix Figures A.4.5 through A.4.8 also shows a deeper understanding of the findings in Table 4.3. Collaborating the results describe in Appendix Table A.22-A.31, by comparing the pro-business (conservative) or liberal ideological leanings of committee members to the 1999, 2000, 2004 and 2008 to the Louisiana House as a whole, Appendix Figures A.4.5 through A.4.8 provide evidence that Ways and Means Committee members voting patterns are more liberal than non-committee members whose voting patterns are more pro-business.

Altogether, Table 4.3 and Appendix Tables A.22-A.31 provide evidence that the 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committee members and non-committee members represent similar business interest. This being the case, support for the informational theory is established with the primary exception of the Ways and Means Committee as well as a few

isolated exemptions, including but not limited to the Appropriations and Transportation Committee.

Incidentally, it is important to note, as shown in Table 4.4 and Appendix Tables A.32-A.41 there is a slightly lower occurrence of outliers found using the difference of mean test. Indeed, displayed in Table 4.4 committees are preference outliers in nineteen of hundred and seventy cases. Notwithstanding this, both statistical tests still provide similar results for the Ways and Means Committee and Transportation Committees.

4.1.3 Summary

On the whole, evaluating the results in Tables 4.1 through 4.4, preference outliers are rare in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House Legislature. The Ways and Means Committee is the only committee to consistently be a preference outlier. Portraying results found using both difference of median and mean tests Tables 4.1 through 4.4 reveal overall support against the distributive theory and in favor of informational theory. Louisiana House legislators do not disproportionately gain membership onto the 1999-2008 Louisiana House committees, based on their ideology or interest group scores. This finding is supported in the following committees: Administration of Criminal Justice, Agriculture, Appropriations, Civil Law, Commerce, Education, Environment, Health and Welfare, Government Affairs, Insurance, Judiciary, Labor, Municipal, Natural Resources, and Retirement. The Ways and Means is the only committee to substantially show that its membership is disproportionately composed of members representing specific ideology and interest group scores.

4.1.4 Legislator District Characteristics

Indeed, support for the informational theory and against distributive theory is further substantiated through legislator district characteristics. Using the same statistical methods as

Table 4.3: Difference of Medians for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using LABI scores

Louisiana House Standing Committee	LABI scores										Number of years committee is a preference outlier
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	Y**	N	N	1
Agriculture	N	Y***	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	1
Appropriations	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	Y**	Y***	N	3
Civil Law	N	Y*	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	0
Commerce	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	Y*	0
Education	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	1
Environment	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	0
Health and Welfare	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Government Affairs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Insurance	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	2
Judiciary	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Labor	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	1
Municipal	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Natural Resources	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Retirement	Y**	Y***	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	2
Transportation	N	N	N	N	N	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	N	4
Ways and Means	Y**	Y***	Y**	Y***	Y**	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y**	N	9
Number of committees in a given year that have significant differences	4	4	1	1	2	3	4	4	3	0	26
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee</p> <p>Louisiana Association of Business and Industry Interest group scores (LABI) range from 0 (legislators do not vote in accordance with the interest of LABI) to 100 (vote in accordance with the interest of LABI)</p> <p>Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01</p> <p>Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier</p> <p>Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005</p>											

Table 4.4: Difference of Means for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using LABI scores

Louisiana House Standing Committee	LABI scores										
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Number of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Agriculture	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	1
Appropriations	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	Y*	Y**	N	1
Civil Law	N	Y**	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	1
Commerce	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	Y*	Y*	0
Education	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y*	N	N	N	1
Environment	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Health and Welfare	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Government Affairs	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Insurance	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Judiciary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Labor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Municipal	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	Y*	N	N	1
Natural Resources	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	0
Retirement	Y*	Y**	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	1
Transportation	N	N	N	N	N	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	N	4
Ways and Means	Y**	Y***	Y***	Y**	N	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y**	N	8
Number of committees in a given year that have significant differences	1	4	1	1	0	4	2	2	3	0	18
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee</p> <p>Louisiana Association of Business and Industry Interest group scores (LABI) range from 0 (legislators do not vote in accordance with the interest of LABI) to 100 (vote in accordance with the interest of LABI)</p> <p>Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01</p> <p>Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier</p> <p>Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005</p>											

employed for Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores, as well as, LABI interest group scores, Table 4.5 - 4.6 reveals, for the most part, Louisiana House standing committees in 1999-2008 are not overrepresented by members representing district characteristics that differ from the whole.

Namely, out of 270 cases in Table 4.5, Louisiana House standing committees contain preference outliers in only 23 cases. Out of these 23 cases, the Agriculture Committee is responsible for 17 of them, the Health and Welfare Committee for four, and the Judiciary Committee for two.

Specifically, in regards to the Agriculture Committee, Appendix Table A.42-A.47 and A.51 reveals for the years 1999-2004 and 2008 between eighty-two and ninety-four percent of Agriculture Committee members represent districts with an above median percentage of their district employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting compared to between twenty-four and thirty-eight percent of non-committee members. Further, providing supplementary evidence to the results found in Table 4.5, Appendix Figure A.4.9 and A.4.10 display evidence that Agriculture Committee members tend to represent districts with moderate to high levels of individuals employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing industry. In contrast, non-committee members tend to represent districts with significantly smaller amounts of their district employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing than committee members. Moreover, in Appendix Figure A.4.11 and Appendix Figure A.4.12, 2004 and 2008 committee members tend to represent districts with moderate to less moderate percentages of their district employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing. Non-committee members primarily represent districts with constituents rarely employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting, or fishing.

Table 4.5: Summary of Results for Determinants of Preference Outliers Using the Difference of Medians for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using Constituency Characteristics

Louisiana House Standing Committee	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Number of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice											
% African American	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Pop. density	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
% of pop. living in urban areas	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
% poverty	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Agriculture											
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	10
% living in rural farming areas	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	N/A
Civil Law											
% of pop. living in urban area	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Pop. density	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Commerce											
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Education											
% of district attending public elementary and high school	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Median family income	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0

(table continued)

Health and Welfare											
% of district with disabilities	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
% of district employed in healthcare	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	Y*	Y**	Y**	Y**	N	N	3
% of district age 55 or over	Y*	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
% poverty	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Government Affairs											
% of district employed in public administration	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Judiciary											
% African Americans	N	Y*	Y**	Y*	Y**	Y*	N	N	N	N	2
% Urban	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Pop. density	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
% poverty	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Labor											
% in manufacturing	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Municipal											
% of district employed in local government	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Retirement											
% of district age 55 or older	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	0
% on social security	N	N	N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0
Transportation											
% employed in transportation and warehousing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0

(table continued)

Number of committees in a given year that have significant differences	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	16
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee, N/A data unavailable Legislator district data is obtained from various sources including Almanac of State Legislative Elections and the U.S. Census Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier, under the Agriculture committee % living in rural areas is defined as N/A to prevent double counting the committee as a preference outlier due to the fact that the committee is already counted as a preference outlier for those years Out of 270 cases there are 23 instances of preference outliers</p>											

Lastly, the results in Table 4.5 and Appendix Table A.42-A.51 are further substantiated through a difference of mean test displayed in Table 4.6 and Appendix Tables A.52-A.61. In contrast, to the difference of median test, the difference of mean test does identify a slightly higher occurrence of preference outlier committees. However, both tests provide similar results to each other. So, with the exception of the Agriculture Committee overall, the results in Table 4.5-4.6, and Appendix Table A.42-A.61 display the greatest support for informational theory and minimal support for distributive theory. Indeed, the existence of preference outliers in 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committees is rare. Above all, committee members tend to represent similar district characteristics to the whole legislature.

In sum, the absence of support for the distributive theory using Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, and constituent characteristics in the Judiciary, Administration of Criminal Justice, Commerce, and Civil Law Committees is not surprising since these committees traditionally lack jurisdiction over district related policies and therefore are unlikely to attract legislators seeking their districts interests (Maltzman 1997). However, in alignment with the expectations of the distributive theory, which states that support for the theory is most likely to be found in committees providing specialized benefits to its members, support for the distributive theory is found in the district related Agriculture Committee.

Furthermore, support for the distributive theory in the Agriculture Committee provides substantial support for Maltzman's (1997) contention that support for the distributive theory is most likely found in constituent based committees, such as the Agriculture Committee and not in policy or prestige committees. According to Maltzman

(1997), constituent committees often deal with low salient issues or those issues of low interest to a wide range of individuals (Maltzman 1997). Importantly, since low salient issues do not often attract a lot of attention, legislatures primarily do not place a lot of pressure on committee members to pass policies beneficial to the whole. Therefore, support for the distributive theory is more likely to be found in constituent committees than in policy or prestige committees that deal with more salient issues (Maltzman 1997). Additionally, support for the distributive theory in the Ways and Means, a control committee handling important issues (such as monetary issues), is particularly interesting since it stands in contrast to traditional congressional findings as noted by Overby and Kazee (2000) that control committees are not likely to be outliers (Krehbiel 1990).

4.1.5 Occupation

Furthermore, this study uses legislator occupation to determine support for the specialization tenet of the informational theory. Under this tenet legislatures create committees to provide specialization and information to the legislature as a whole (Maltzman 1997). One way legislatures increase their specialization is by tapping into the expertise of individual legislators, as seen through their occupations (Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011). As a whole, this analysis reveals Louisiana House standing committees are not overrepresented by members representing occupations directly related to jurisdiction of specific committees, therein providing overall support against a major tenet of the informational theory.

In fact, after examining the Louisiana House Administration of Criminal Justice, Agriculture, Civil Law, Commerce, Education, Health and Welfare, Insurance, and Judiciary Committees, Table 4.7 reveals a difference of mean test preference outlier committees exists

Table 4.6: Summary of Results for Determinants of Preference Outliers Using the Difference of Means for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using Constituency Characteristics

Louisiana House Standing Committee	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Number of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice											
% African American	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Pop. density	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	0
% of pop. living in urban areas	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
% poverty	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Agriculture											
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	10
% living in rural farming areas	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	N/A
Civil Law											
% of pop. living in urban area	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Pop. density	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	0
Commerce											
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	0
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0

(table continued)

Education											
% of district attending public elementary and high school	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Median family income	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Health and Welfare											
% of district with disabilities	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
% of district employed in healthcare	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	Y**	Y**	Y**	Y**	N	4
% of district age 55 or over	Y*	Y**	Y**	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	2
% poverty	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Government Affairs											
% of district employed in public administration	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Judiciary											
% African Americans	N	Y**	Y**	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	Y**	3
% Urban	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Pop. density	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
% poverty	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	1
Labor											
% in manufacturing	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Municipal											
% of district employed in local government	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0

(table continued)

Retirement											
% of district age 55 or older	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
% on social security	N	N	N	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0
Transportation											
% employed in transportation and warehousing	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Number of committees in a given year that have significant differences	1	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	20
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee, N/A data unavailable Legislator district data is obtained from various sources including Almanac of State Legislative Elections and the U.S. Census Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier, under the Agriculture committee % living in rural areas is defined as N/A to prevent double counting the committee as a preference outlier due to the fact that the committee is already counted as a preference outlier for those years Out of 270 cases there are 27 cases of preference outliers</p>											

in only 18 out of 80 cases or 23 % of the time. Having said this, with the exception of the Education Committee, for at least one out of the ten years analyzed, every committee is overrepresented by members with occupational backgrounds related to policies falling under the jurisdiction of these committees.

Specifically speaking, Table 4.7 shows for the years 2004, 2006, and 2008 the Louisiana House Agriculture Committee is overrepresented by legislators with previous or current job experience as cattlemen and farmers. Additionally, in 2000-2001, and 2008 the Administration of Criminal Justice and in 2002-2003, and 2008 the Judiciary Committees are overrepresented by legislators with law or law enforcement backgrounds.

Furthermore, for the years 2004 and 2006 the Commerce and in 1999 and 2008 Health and Welfare Committees are overrepresented by members who were once or are currently employed in commerce or health and welfare occupations. Lastly, in 2002-2004, and 2006 the Insurance Committee is overrepresented by legislators with job backgrounds in insurance industry (i.e. insurance salesmen).

In sum, for the most part, Louisiana House standing committees represent similar backgrounds to the legislators in the whole house, thereby providing support against the specialization tenet of the informational theory. However, having said that, it is important to note more preference outlier committees are found using the occupation measurement than Poole and Rosenthal Ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, or district characteristics scores. Taken as a whole, for the years 1999-2008, Louisiana House standing committees identified as the Administration of Criminal Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Welfare, Insurance, and Judiciary Committees are preference outlier committees twenty-three percent of the time. In rare cases, Louisiana House standing committees are

Table 4.7: Summary of Results for Determinants of Preference Outliers Using the Difference of Means for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using Legislator Occupation

Louisiana House Standing Committee	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	# of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice											
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	N	Y***	Y***	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y***	3
Agriculture											
Cattlemen/Farmer occupation	N	Y*	N	N	N	Y**	N	Y***	N	Y***	3
Civil Law											
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	1
Commerce											
Commerce occupation	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	Y***	N	N	2
Education											
Education occupation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Health and Welfare											
Health and Welfare occupation	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	2
Insurance											
Insurance occupation	N	N	N	Y**	Y**	Y**	N	Y**	N	N	4
Judiciary											
Lawyer/ Law Enforcement occupation	N	N	N	Y***	Y***	N	N	N	N	Y***	3
Number of committees in a given year that have significant differences	1	1	1	2	2	3	0	3	0	5	18
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee, N/A data unavailable Legislator occupation data is obtained from various sources including Dr.Brattton and the Louisiana House of Representatives, occupation is coded (1) if a legislator belongs to a specific occupation and (0) if not Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier</p>											

overrepresented by legislators currently or once employed in fields related to policies falling under the jurisdiction of these committees compared to the job occupations of the whole house. Additionally, subsequently due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable used in this analysis, a difference of median test was not conducted.

Lastly, empirical support against the specialization tenet of the informational theory found in Table 4.7 is further substantiated through a preliminary test of Louisiana committee stability over time. Noted scholars as recently as 2011 remark, “committee membership stability is important to fostering committee expertise and knowledge” (Jewell 1962, 94 as cited in Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011, 304). Exploring this idea, scholars such as Hamm and Hedlund (1994) have found “the best predictor of committee continuity is the percentage of members who serve in the previous legislative session (Hamm and Hedlund 1994, as cited in Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011, 305).” Therefore, I examine committee membership stability in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives, by comparing the percentage of legislators residing on the same legislative committee in current and past legislative sessions. However, for legislator committee stability to exist, legislators’ must be reelected (Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011). Exploring legislator turnover in the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 Louisiana House legislative sessions, I conclude with the exception of 2008 legislator turnover is rare. For the most part legislators are reelected from one session to the next.

Further, conducting a quick preliminary analysis of a small sample of legislator committee membership stability from session to session, I find membership is somewhat stable from 1996 to 2000 and 2000 to 2004 but there is unquestionably movement. In the case of several legislators I examined, representatives usually changed membership on at least one committee. Further the turnover rate in 2008 was substantial, leading to several committee membership changes from 2004 to 2008. In all, based on this finding, it is probable to assume that committee membership instability in the Louisiana House could foster a lack of committee specialization.

4.1.6 Caucus and Delegation Membership

Examining all 17 Louisiana House standing committees across the years 1999 through 2008, Table 4.8 using a difference of mean test reveals significant evidence that when compared to non-committee members, Louisiana House committees are overrepresented by members representing caucuses with a direct stake in the policies enacted under their jurisdiction. Indeed, this finding is substantiated in fifty percent or more of the years analyzed for the following committees: Agriculture, Governmental Affairs, Insurance, Municipal, and Natural Resources. Likewise, the same results were revealed for thirty to forty percent of the years studied in the: Commerce, Education, Environment, Health and Welfare, and Labor Committees. In all, with the exception of the Administration of Criminal Justice, Appropriations, and Retirement Committees, every committee in the Louisiana House of Representatives are overrepresented by members representing specific caucuses for at least one of the ten years analyzed.

Moreover, breaking down the results found in Table 4.8 by individual years, this study shows for the years 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2008, 29% of committees are preference outliers. In the years 2001, 2002, and 2006, 35% of Louisiana standing committees are preference outliers. In 2004, 2005, and 2007, 41% of Louisiana House standing committees are preference outliers.

Specifically, looking only at standing committees representing preference outlier committees fifty percent or more of the time in Table 4.8, this analysis shows the Agriculture Committee is overrepresented by legislators representing the Rural Caucus. Further, the Government Affairs Committee and Municipal Committees are overrepresented seven out of ten years by the Acadiana, Rural, or the Jefferson Delegation. Moreover, the Insurance

Committee is a preference outlier committee for eight out of ten years, by the Acadiana, Jefferson Delegations and the Black Caucus. While the Natural Resource Committee, on the other hand, is overrepresented six out of ten years by the Acadiana Caucus. Finally, the Labor Committee is a preference outlier committee for six years, either by the Rural, Acadiana, or the Black Caucus and the Jefferson or Orleans Delegations.

In sum, in Table 4.8, there is moderate support for both distributive theory and informational theory. Most importantly, support for the distributive theory depends on the year and committee being analyzed. For instance, in 2005, support for distributive theory is found in fifty-nine percent of Louisiana House committees while in 2004, support was in forty-one percent of committees. Notably, preference outlier committees appear in both prestigious and highly sought after Louisiana House committees such as the Agriculture and Natural Resource Committees, as well as in non-prestigious Louisiana House committees including the Municipal, Commerce, and Insurance. Furthermore, the findings in Table 4.8 stand in direct contrast to the overall results in favor of informational and against distributive found using Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, district characteristics, and occupation.

Admittedly, support for the distributive theory using legislative caucus membership variables do not conform to caucus constituent membership based expectations. As state previously, one potential problem with the use of caucus membership to explain legislator preferences is the direct correlation between district characteristics and caucus membership. This correlation can be seen in the similar results found between caucus membership and constituent characteristics in Table 4.5 and 4.8. In the same way, as Table 4.8 displays for the most part caucus members are not more likely to be overrepresented on committees with

jurisdiction over policies directly related to their members' constituent characteristics, with the exception of the Agriculture, Natural Resource, Municipal and Health and Welfare Committees.

However, in keeping with this study's expectations, the measurement Black Caucus does provide additional information over that gained through constituent characteristics. To illustrate, in Table 4.8 the Black Caucus is overrepresented on the Municipal Committee for seven out of ten years studied. Notably, as revealed in Appendix Table A.1, the Black Caucus is overrepresented by members representing districts with a large percentage of African Americans as well as a large % of their district employed in local government. While percent of a district employed in local government does not affect whether legislators join the Municipal Committee in Table 4.5, membership on the Black Caucus does affect membership onto the Municipal Committee in Table 4.8. Diving deeper into the constituent characteristics of the Black Caucus, I find the percent black in a district affects membership onto the Municipal Committee in Table 4.8. A district characteristic tapped into by the Black Caucus, but not assumed to affect membership onto the Municipal Committee by constituent characteristics.

Notably, in Table 4.8, contrary to constituent and caucus expectations, the Civil Law, Environment, Governmental Affairs, Insurance, and Education Committees, are sporadically overrepresented by Caucuses representing district characteristics seemingly unrelated to the jurisdiction of each of these committees.

While this finding is contrary to expectations, it does provide support for the distributive theory. More importantly, while not expected several committees are overrepresented by geographic oriented caucuses. For example, the Insurance Committee is overrepresented by

the Jefferson and Orleans Delegation. This result, could cause policies promoted out of the Insurance Committee to support the interests of the Jefferson and Orleans Delegations at the expense of the whole state. Finally, as a result of the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable used in this analysis, a difference of median test was not conducted.

4.2 Testing the Major Party Cartel Theory

This dissertation seeks support for the major party cartel theory by testing Hypothesis Three. Under this hypothesis the majority party, that is the Democrats, in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives, stack standing committees in the Louisiana House with Democrat members representing the full range of views found in that party. Specifically speaking, the major party cartel theory predicts this finding will especially hold true for important legislative committee, that is, those committees representing broad issues that affect the whole party, and less likely in more jurisdiction specific committees where policies only affect a few (Maltzman 1997). To determine support for the major party cartel theory, this study relies on both Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores and LABI interest group scores.

4.2.1 Ideology

Exploring through Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores and by conducting a difference of median test, in Table 4.9, the results provides overall support against the major party cartel theory. For the most part, preference outlier committees are rare in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House. Overall, standing Democrats committee members represent views similar to those of the whole House Democrat Party. Unlike, as predicted under the major party cartel theory, representative committees are not more likely found on broad Louisiana committees than jurisdiction specific Louisiana committees. In fact, preference outlier,

Table 4.8: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preferences Outliers Based on Caucus Membership Using the Difference of Means Test for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives

Louisiana House Standing Committee	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	# of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice											
Acadiana Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
+Black Caucus	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	0
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0
Agriculture											
+Acadiana Caucus	N	Y*	Y*	Y*	N	Y*	N	N	N	Y*	0
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y**	1
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
+Rural Caucus	Y**	Y**	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y**	Y***	Y***	Y***	10
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0
Appropriations											
Acadiana Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0

(table continued)

Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0
Civil Law											
Acadiana Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	Y**	Y**	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	2
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0
Commerce											
Acadiana Caucus	N	Y*	Y**	Y**	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	2
+Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	0
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	0
+Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y***	1
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	0
+Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0
Education											
Acadiana Caucus	Y**	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y**	N	N	N	3
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
+Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y*	1
+Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y*	0

(table continued)

Environment											
+Acadiana Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N/A	0
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	Y**	Y***	Y***	N/A	3
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N/A	0
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N/A	0
+Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N/A	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Health and Welfare											
Acadiana Caucus	N	Y*	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	0
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
+Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y**	Y**	Y*	N	3
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
+Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	N/A
Government Affairs											
Acadiana Caucus	Y**	Y**	Y**	Y**	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	5
Jefferson Delegation	N	Y**	Y**	Y**	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	4
+Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	Y*	N	0
Rural Caucus	Y**	Y**	N	N	N	Y**	Y*	Y*	Y**	N	4
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0

(table continued)

Insurance											
Acadiana Caucus	N	Y**	N	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	1
Jefferson Delegation	Y**	N	N	Y*	Y*	Y**	Y**	Y**	Y**	N	5
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	1
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	Y**	Y**	N	Y**	Y**	Y*	N	4
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
+Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0
Judiciary											
Acadiana Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	1
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	NA	N/A	N	0
Labor											
+Acadiana Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	1
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y**	1
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	Y**	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	2
+Rural Caucus	N	N	Y**	Y**	Y**	N	N	N	N	Y***	4
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0

(table continued)

Municipal											
Acadiana Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
+Black Caucus	Y**	Y***	Y**	Y*	Y*	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y*	7
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	Y***	N	N	N	N	1
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N//A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y*	0
Natural Resources											
+Acadiana Caucus	Y***	N	N	N	N	Y***	Y**	Y***	Y***	Y***	6
Jefferson Delegation	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	1
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
+Rural Caucus	Y*	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0
Retirement											
Acadiana Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0

(table continued)

Transportation											
Acadiana Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
+Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	1
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0
Ways and Means											
Acadiana Caucus	N	Y**	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	1
Jefferson Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y*	N	0
Black Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Orleans Delegation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Rural Caucus	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Capital Region Delegation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N	0
# of committees in a given year that have significant differences	5	5	6	6	5	7	7	6	7	5	59
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee, N/A data unavailable Legislator caucus data is obtained from various sources including the caucuses themselves and the Louisiana House of Representatives, caucus is coded (1) if a legislator belongs to a specific caucus and (0) if not Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier + represents caucuses or delegation expected to be overrepresented on each committee in Table 3.5 Data is unavailable for the Capital Region Delegation from 1999-2007 due to its creation in 2008 Data for the Environment Committee is unavailable (N/A) in 2008 due to it merging with the Natural Resource Committee in the same year # of years a committee is a preference outlier total takes into account for some years a committee is a preference outlier for more than one characteristic</p>											

unrepresentative committees are found in both broad and jurisdiction specific committees. In other words, preference outlier committees occur in only fourteen out of one hundred seventy cases. Out of these fourteen cases, the Agriculture, Governmental Affairs, and Ways and Means Committees represent sixty-four percent of the cases, but even so, neither of these committees displays a consistent pattern of support as preference outlier committee.

Moreover, supplementing Table 4.9 findings of a few preference outlier committees in the 1999-2008, looking specifically at the Ways and Means Committee, Appendix Table A.76-A.85 shows in 1999 twenty four percent of Democrat committee members represent ideological views similar to fifty-seven percent of Democrat non-committee members. In 2004 and 2005, twenty-eight percent of Democrat committee members represent views similar to fifty-seven percent of Democrat non-committee members. Additionally, in Appendix Table A.78, in 2001 eighty percent of Democrat members on the Agriculture Committee represent ideological views similar to forty-two percent of Democrat non-committee members. In 2004, forty-two percent of Democrat non-committee members represent similar views to seventy-nine percent of Democrat Agriculture Committee members, compared to 2008, eighty two percent of Democrat committee members and forty-one percent of non-committee members demonstrated a similar view. Additional information on other significant committees is shown in Table 4.9, Appendix Tables A.76-A.85.

Appendix Figures A.4.13-A.4.24 add to these results in Table 4.9 and Appendix Table A.76-A.85, by displaying the distribution of Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores for both Democrat committee and Democrat non-committee members on specific Louisiana House standing committees. In 2004 Appendix Figure A.4.18, reveals Democrat Ways and Means committee members are more liberal than their party. Further examination of

Appendix Figure A.4.21 revealed that in 2004 Democrat Appropriation committee members are more conservative than their party members. For the same year, as demonstrated in Appendix Figure A.4.16 and A.4.17 Democrats on the Governmental Affairs and Municipal Committees are more liberal than their party as a whole. Lastly, Appendix Figure A.4.12 exposes in 2008 the Democrats on the Agriculture Committee are more conservative than their party.

Even more importantly, similar results are found in Table 4.10 and Appendix Tables A.86-A.95 using a difference of mean test. However, comparatively speaking, a slightly higher occurrence of preference outlier committees is found using the difference of mean test over the difference of median test. Still, for the most part, these differences are accounted for by the Municipal, Parochial and Cultural Affairs Committee. Under the difference of median test the Municipal Committee is a preference outlier committee in the year 2004, whereas the difference of mean test shows it to be a preference outlier committee in 2003-2004, and 2006-2007.

In sum, in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 with the primary exception of sporadic support for the major party cartel theory in the Agriculture, Governmental Affairs, Municipal, and Ways and Means Committee, Democrat committee members represent similar views to the whole party.

4.2.2 LABI Interest Group Scores

Furthermore, in alignment with the preceding findings, LABI scores provide minimal support for major party cartel theory. Namely, conducting a difference of median test in Table 4.11, this analysis finds there are only nine cases out of one hundred and seventy where Democrat standing committee members do not represent similar business interests to the whole Democrat Party. The Agriculture Committee accounts for three of these cases.

Table 4.9: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preference Outliers Based on Party Using the Difference of Medians for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate Scores

Louisiana House Standing Committee	Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores										
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	# of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Agriculture	N	N	Y***	N	N	Y**	N	Y*	N	Y**	3
Appropriations	Y**	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Civil Law	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Commerce	N	Y*	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	Y*	0
Education	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Environment	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	Y*	N	0
Health and Welfare	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Government Affairs	N	Y**	Y**	N	N	Y**	N	Y*	N	N	3
Insurance	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Judiciary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Labor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Municipal	N	Y*	Y*	N	Y*	Y**	N	N	N	N	1
Natural Resources	Y**	N	N	Y*	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	1
Retirement	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Transportation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Ways and Means	Y**	Y*	N	N	N	Y**	Y**	N	N	N	3
# of committees in a given year that have significant differences	3	2	2	1	0	4	1	0	0	1	14
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee</p> <p>Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are produced by a program created by Poole and Rosenthal with the help of Dr. Bratton. They are based on Louisiana House contested roll call votes and range from -1 (strong liberal) to 1 (strong conservative)</p> <p>Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01</p> <p>Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier</p> <p>Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005</p>											

Table 4.10: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preference Outliers Based on Party Using the Difference of Means for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate Scores

Louisiana House Standing Committee	Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores										
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	# of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Agriculture	N	N	Y**	N	N	Y**	Y**	Y**	N	Y*	4
Appropriations	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Civil Law	N	N	N	Y***	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Commerce	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Education	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Environment	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Health and Welfare	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Government Affairs	N	N	Y**	N	N	Y**	Y*	Y**	N	N	3
Insurance	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	0
Judiciary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Labor	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	0
Municipal	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y***	Y*	Y**	Y**	N	4
Natural Resources	Y**	Y**	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	3
Retirement	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Transportation	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	0
Ways and Means	Y*	Y**	N	N	N	Y*	Y**	N	N	N	2
# of committees in a given year that have significant differences	1	3	2	2	1	3	2	3	1	0	18
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee</p> <p>Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are based on a program created by Poole and Rosenthal with the help of Dr. Bratton. They are based on Louisiana House contested roll call votes and range from -1 (strong liberal) to 1 (strong conservative)</p> <p>Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p<.05, and ***p<.01</p> <p>Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier</p> <p>Data for 2000-2003 obtained from Sandahl 2005</p>											

The Governmental Affairs and Municipal Committees each furnish support in two cases. Providing additional information to Table 4.11, and looking specifically at the Agriculture Committee in the Appendix Table A.97, A.101-A.102, seven percent of Democrat committee members on the 2000 Agriculture Committee support pro-business policies moderately to highly supported by the LABI compared to forty-nine percent of Democrat non-committee members. In 2004, seventy-seven percent of Democrat committee members support pro-business policies moderately to highly supported by the LABI compared to forty-two percent of Democrat non-committee members. Lastly, in 2005 seventy-five percent of Democrat committee members represent pro-business views moderately to highly supported by the LABI compared to forty-two percent of non-committee members.

Moreover, supplementing the results found in Table 4.11 and Appendix Table A.101 and A.105, Appendix Figure 4.26 reveals 2004 Democrat committee members hold more conservative pro-business views than Democrat non-committee members. Additionally, Figure 4.27 shows that 2008 Agriculture Democrat Committee members and non-committee members both hold moderate conservative pro-business views.

Furthermore, collaborating the results found in Table 4.11, difference of mean test in Table 4.12 provides overall support against the major party cartel theory. Having said this, Table 4.12 does find a higher occurrence of preference outlier committees using the difference of mean test over the Table 4.11's difference of median test. Specifically, Table 4.12 shows six more cases of preference outlier committees than Table 4.11. Particularly important, the Natural Resource Committee and Labor Committees are preference outlier committees for the first time under the difference of mean test. Additionally, this test finds a

higher occurrence of times than the Transportation Committee, Agriculture, Governmental Affairs Committees are preference outliers.

In sum, for the most part, Table 4.11 and 4.12 reveals support against the major party cartel theory. As a whole, Democratic membership on the 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committees, represent similar business interests to the whole Democrat party. Conversely, while preference outlier committees are rare they do occur in the Agriculture, Governmental Affairs, Municipal, and Transportation Committee. In all, there appears to be limited support for Cox and McCubbins (1993) contention the majority party will place members' representative of the views of the whole party onto control committees, and allow members to self-select onto less important committees. In fact, arguably the overall support for representative committees in both control and non-control committees bolsters support for the informational theory.

4.3 Overall Findings

As a final point, in the remaining section of this chapter the results in Tables 4.1-4.12 are compared to evaluate the expectation of mixed support for the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theory. Table 4.13 finds when including all measurements used in this analysis, mixed support for this expectation. As a whole, 1999- 2008 Louisiana standing committees provide support for both the informational and distributive theories, and minimal to no support for the major party cartel theory.

However, these results do not paint the whole picture. Breaking down results reported in Tables 4.14-4.17 shows support for each of these theories is dependent upon the measurements used to examine support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory. Using Poole and Rosenthal Ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, and

Table 4.11: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preference Outliers Based on Party Using the Difference of Medians for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives LABI Scores

Louisiana House Standing Committee	LABI Scores										
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	# of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Agriculture	N	Y***	N	N	N	Y**	Y**	Y*	N	N	3
Appropriations	N	N	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	0
Civil Law	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Commerce	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Education	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Environment	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Health and Welfare	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Government Affairs	N	N	Y***	Y***	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	2
Insurance	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Judiciary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Labor	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	0
Municipal	N	N	Y*	Y*	N	N	N	Y**	Y**	N	2
Natural Resources	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Retirement	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Transportation	N	Y*	Y**	N	N	N	N	Y*	Y*	N	1
Ways and Means	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	1
# of committees in a given year that have significant differences	0	1	2	1	0	1	2	1	1	0	9
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee</p> <p>Louisiana Association of Business and Industry Interest group scores (LABI) range from 0 (legislators do not vote in accordance with the interest of LABI) to 100 (vote in accordance with the interest of LABI)</p> <p>Significance Level ranges from *p=<.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01,</p> <p>Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier</p> <p>Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005</p>											

Table 4.12: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preference Outliers Based on Party Using the Difference of Means for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives LABI Scores

Louisiana House Standing Committee	LABI Scores										
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	# of years committee is a preference outlier
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Agriculture	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y***	Y*	N	N	2
Appropriations	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Civil Law	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Commerce	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Education	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	0
Environment	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	0
Health and Welfare	N	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	N	N	N	0
Government Affairs	N	N	Y**	Y**	N	Y*	N	Y**	N	N	3
Insurance	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Judiciary	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	0
Labor	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	Y*	N	1
Municipal	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y*	Y***	N	N	2
Natural Resources	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	2
Retirement	N	Y**	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	1
Transportation	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	Y*	Y**	Y**	N	3
Ways and Means	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y**	N	N	N	1
# of committees in a given year that have significant differences	1	1	1	2	0	3	3	3	1	0	15
<p><i>Note:</i> N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee</p> <p>Louisiana Association of Business and Industry Interest group scores (LABI) range from 0 (legislators do not vote in accordance with the interest of LABI) to 100 (vote in accordance with the interest of LABI)</p> <p>Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01,</p> <p>Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier</p> <p>Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005</p>											

constituency characteristics Tables 4.14-4.15, reveal that as a whole the informational theory describes committees in the Louisiana House. In turn, most committee members represent the views of the whole legislature. Conversely, surprisingly when the Louisiana caucus membership and the occupation measurements are used to determine the existence of unrepresentative committees in the Louisiana House, Tables 4.16-4.17 show different results. When these measurements are examined, these tables reveal mixed support for the informational and distributive theories. The most substantial support for the distributive theory is found using committee caucus membership.

4.4 Critique of the Results

All told, general support for the informational theory above the distributive theory, with the exception of occupation and party caucus and delegation, in Tables 4.1-4.15, are consistent with the findings of most scholarly researching studying committee organization. Moreover, limited support for the major party cartel theory is present in all the years analyzed with few random exceptions. However, it is important to note that the existence of preference outlier committees appears to differ across time and measurements. Notably, in many cases this variance appears even within the same legislative session. For example, support for the distributive theory in the Administration of Criminal Justice Committee appears randomly across three legislator preference measurements: ideology, LABI interest group scores, and occupation. Specifically, in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 the Administration of Criminal Justice Committee is composed of legislators representing different ideological viewpoints and business interests from representatives in the whole legislature for one out of ten years.

Table 4.13: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on the Combination of Legislator Ideology, Party, LABI Interest Group Scores, Party Caucus Membership, Legislator Occupation by Counting the Number of Preference Outliers

Louisiana House Standing Committees	Distributive	Informational	Major Party Cartel
Administration of Criminal Justice	Mixed	Mixed	N
Agriculture	Y	N	Mixed
Appropriations	Mixed	Mixed	N
Civil Law	Mixed	Mixed	N
Commerce	Mixed	Mixed	N
Education	Mixed	Mixed	N
Environment	Mixed	Mixed	N
Health and Welfare	Y	N	N
Government Affairs	Y	N	Mixed
Judiciary	Mixed	Mixed	N
Insurance	Y	N	N
Labor	N	Y	N
Municipal	Y	N	Mixed
Natural Resource	Y	N	N
Retirement	N	Y	N
Transportation	Mixed	Mixed	N
Ways and Means	Y	N	Mixed

*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support,, 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% or less is no support for the theory (N)

Similarly, in Table 4.7 the Administration of Criminal Justice Committee is overrepresented by legislators with occupations in law or law enforcement in three of the ten years analyzed: 2000, 2001, and 2008. Importantly, as Table 4.1, 4.3, and 4.7 reveals variance in support for the distributive theory in the Administration of Criminal Justice appears to not only be random, but is also inconsistent within legislative sessions. However, in a few cases support for the distributive theory is systematic. For instance, the Agriculture Committee provides consistent support for the distributive theory across several legislator preference measures: legislator district and caucus membership. To illustrate, in Table 4.5 from 1999-2008 the Agriculture Committee is consistently overrepresented by members representing districts with a large percentage of their population employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting. Similarly, in Table 4.8 for all ten years the Agriculture Committee is statistically overrepresented by members belonging to the Rural Caucus. Indeed, support for the distributive theory in the Agriculture Committee appears so much and so consistently this is not likely to be a random result.

Moreover, one reason the existence of preference outliers differ across time and measurements, may be legislative turnovers, bringing in new legislators with different interests based on political aspirations, prestige, policy orientation and the like; thereby, causing legislator ideology and committee membership ideology to change from year to year. Upon evaluating these possibilities there appears to be some support for the turnover explanation. Gathering legislator turnover data from the Louisiana House for 1999-2002, and the Book of the States for the years, 2003 through 2008, it appears turnover rates in general are limited. For 1999-2008 the turnover rate was ten or less, with the exception of 2004 and 2008, however. In 2004, for instance, 20 membership changes occurred

Table 4.14: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on Ideology and Interest Group Scores by Counting the Number of Preference Outliers

Louisiana House Standing Committees	Distributive	Informational	Major Party Cartel
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	Y	N
Agriculture	N	Y	Mixed
Appropriations	N	Y	N
Civil Law	N	Y	N
Commerce	N	Y	N
Education	N	Y	N
Environment	N	Y	N
Health and Welfare	N	Y	N
Government Affairs	N	Y	Mixed
Insurance	N	Y	N
Judiciary	N	Y	N
Labor	N	Y	N
Municipal	N	Y	Mixed
Natural Resources	N	Y	N
Retirement	N	Y	N
Transportation	MIXED	MIXED	N
Ways and Means	Y	N	Mixed
*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support., 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% or less is no support for the theory (N)			

Table 4.15: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on Constituency Characteristics by Counting the Number of Preference Outliers

Louisiana House Standing Committees	Distributive	Informational	Major Party Cartel
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	Y	N/A
Agriculture	Y (100%)	N	N/A
Civil Law	N	Y	N/A
Commerce	N	Y	N/A
Education	N	Y	N/A
Health and Welfare	Mixed	Mixed	N/A
Government Affairs	N	Y	N/A
Judiciary	N	Y	N/A
Labor	N	Y	N/A
Municipal	N	Y	N/A
Retirement	N	Y	N/A
Transportation	N	Y	N/A
*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support,, 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% or less is no support for the theory (N)			

Table 4.16: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on Committee Caucus Membership Counting the Number of Preference Outliers

Louisiana House Standing Committees	Distributive	Informational	Major Party Cartel
Administration of Criminal Justice	N	Y	N/A
Agriculture	Y (100%)	N	N/A
Appropriations	N	Y	N/A
Civil Law	N	Y	N/A
Commerce	Mixed	Mixed	N/A
Education	Mixed	Mixed	N/A
Environment	Mixed	Mixed	N/A
Health and Welfare	Mixed	Mixed	N/A
Government Affairs	Y	N	N/A
Judiciary	N	Y	N/A
Labor	Mixed	Mixed	N/A
Municipal	Y	N	N/A
Natural Resource	Y	N	N/A
Retirement	N	Y	N/A
Transportation	N	Y	N/A
Ways and Means	N	Y	N/A
*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support,, 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% or less is no support for the theory (N), N/A means the theory cannot be tested using caucus membership			

Table 4.17: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on Occupation by Counting the Number of Preference Outliers

Louisiana House Standing Committees	Distributive	Informational	Major Party Cartel
Administration of Criminal Justice	N/A	Mixed	N/A
Agriculture	N/A	Mixed	N/A
Civil Law	N/A	N	N/A
Commerce	N/A	N	N/A
Education	N/A	N	N/A
Health and Welfare	N/A	N	N/A
Insurance	N/A	Mixed	N/A
Judiciary	N/A	Mixed	N/A
*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support., 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% or less is no support for the theory (N), N/A means the theory cannot be tested using caucus membership.			

representing 19% of the 105 elected legislators, and in 2008, there is a substantial turnover in state legislators. Louisiana witnessed a tremendous membership transformation - out of 105 legislators, there are 63 (60 %) membership changes.

Further, another possible explanation for committee preference outliers to vary from one year to another may be the ideology of the chamber change from one year to another, but the committees ideologies are remaining constant. If so, then arguably this instance is explained by the fact that the committees are changing but in reality they are not. Exploring this possibility, this dissertation compares the ideology of the committee to the ideology of the whole Louisiana House. Preliminary findings do not offer support for this discrepancy which leads to the conclusion that committee membership ideology is changing correspondingly with the ideology of the legislature.

Additionally, one potential explanation for variation in support for the distributive theory across constituent measurements used in this analysis may be due to the inherent variation associated within these measurements. Specifically, it is plausible to assume preference outlier committees are more likely to be found when using constituent characteristics not uniformly found throughout the state. To illustrate, if there were a few agricultural districts in Louisiana, then one would expect legislators representing these districts to disproportionally seek membership onto the agricultural committee compared to a majority of legislators representing non-agricultural districts. Conversely, if a constituent measurement characteristic were found consistently within the entire state, then committees with jurisdiction over issues related to these characteristics will be sought after by legislators representing the whole state and not specific districts.

Evaluating this possibility, I conduct a preliminary analysis of results found in support for the distributive and informational theory in Table 4.5. Finding, no support for the contention that variance in legislator district characteristics affects the likelihood of finding preference outlier committees. Specifically, in 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 the constituent measurements % of African Americans in a district, and % employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting vary significantly across the state. However, in the case of % of African Americans it does not appear to increase the likelihood of finding preference outliers. Likewise, there is little variance in the factor % employed in healthcare across the state, but this factor is a preference outlier in the Health and Welfare Committee for the years 2004-2006.

CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATOR INTERVIEWS: THE LOUISIANA COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION: THROUGH THE EYES OF LOUISIANA HOUSE LEGISLATORS

What can be gained from qualitative data that cannot be gained from quantitative data? Multiple scholars such as Campbell and Fiske (1959); Jick (1979); and Pearce (2002) express the importance of using both of these methods to evaluate the research question at hand. In the same light, I evaluate committee assignments in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House Legislature, by employing both qualitative data expressed through legislator interviews and quantitative data as seen in empirical analysis, obtained from legislator roll call votes, constituent characteristics, interest group scores, ideology, occupation, and caucus membership. In particular, Pearce is apt when she advanced the following concept:

Research sometimes elect to study a single research question using multiple methods. Using more than one approach reveals multiple pieces of evidence that serve as “building blocks” in the research endeavor (Liebersson 1992). Also, methods that vary in form and focus act as checks on one another, adding supplementary features and compensatory strengths to the mix (Axinn, Fricke, and Thornton 1991; Burgess 1982; Denzin 1970; Massey 1987; Sieber 1973). This complementarity may be achieved by allowing a set of different research methods to interactively evolve, using one to inform the other, strengthening the overall research process, yielding richer data, and increasing the depth of insight for interpreting the findings (Pearce 2002, 104).

Expanding on this comment, Pearce argues the use of different techniques to study a particular phenomenon has several key advantages, such as their ability to divulge different evidence from one another and thereby painting a more complete picture of the research question, adding validity to the finding, (Pearce 2002), and opening up areas for future research (Jick 1979). Equally important, is the unexpected finding, that results are not similar across various research methods. In this event, these unanticipated results can open up areas for review that scholars have not yet considered in their analysis (Jick 1979).

Additionally, the use of qualitative data alongside quantitative data analysis has the key advantage of contributing differently to the knowledge and understanding of a particular phenomenon. Unlike statistical methods, qualitative methods, such as interviews, allow scholars to explore complex and delicate features of an occurrence not captured through empirical means (Ritchie 2003). For example, empirical data focuses on understanding and measuring a particular manifestation through numbers, while on the other hand, qualitative research methods allows researchers to address the questions of who, how, and why (Ritchie 2003). Specifically, by employing both statistical analysis and face-to-face legislator interviews in this paper, I can extend the understanding of committee organization in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House from empirically revealing that either committees support the informational, distributive, or major party cartel theory; to developing a stronger understanding of the underlying reasons and motivations encompassing the deeper questions of why and how committees in Louisiana are representative of the views of the median majority party or the whole legislature - a question not answered through empirical data.

Furthermore, it is important to understand the context in which a particular phenomenon occurs (Ritchie 2003). While both quantitative and qualitative analysis allow for this type of knowledge, qualitative analysis, on the other hand, is a superior application. For example, in this study, quantitative analysis reveals the number of committee members representing specific demographic (constituent), occupations, and ideologies (party and interest group) compared to the whole chamber, unfortunately, it does not convey the process in which legislators request or receive committee assignments. For instance, in the Louisiana House the Speaker formally assigns committee seats, but informally the Governor has a

major say as to who is placed on which committee, thereby diminishing the overall power of the Speaker.

Therefore, my empirical findings show substantial support for the informational and major party cartel theories. So, the aim of this chapter is to determine whether support for these findings are further substantiated in views of Louisiana house legislators, individuals with an important perspective on committee development, as well as to shed light on some potential underlying reason for these findings not revealed through statistical analysis. Specifically, looking at who is responsible for allocating committee seats in the Louisiana house, the motivations surrounding the allocation of these seats, legislator motivations which may initiate committee request, and legislators' perception of the Louisiana house committee process as a whole. Hence, by conducting face to face legislator interviews in combination with our empirical analysis, this study benefits from the perceptions obtained from participants with first-hand experience of the legislative committee assignment process. This in turn, will develop a deeper understanding of Louisiana legislator committee assignments, by specifically scrutinizing the motivations, incentives, and intent expressed by legislators themselves vis-à-vis committee assignment request and assignments.

5.1 Previous Qualitative Literature Review on Committee Assignments

Before, 1950 limited research exists on congressional legislative committee assignments (Eualu 1984); remarkably, most of the early reports cited in committee assignment research focuses on congressional committee studies appearing in the sixties and seventies. Several of these early findings depend at least in part on legislator interviews. These dialogues are employed to help clarify the motivations which may encompass legislator committee request and their assignments (Master's 1961; Gertoz 1976; Shepsle

1978), the degree legislators freshmen legislators receive their requested committee requests (Gertoz 1976; Shepsle 1978), legislator committee request motivations (Fenno, 1973; Bullock III 1976), and lastly the motivations behind Committee on Committee's assignments of legislator's to congressional committees (Masters 1961).

In 1976 Gertoz uses interview data, to determine the success rate of legislators receiving their preferred committee seats. Meeting with freshmen congressional House members in the 89th, 90th, and 91st Congresses, Gertoz (1976) asks such questions as: "One of the first important decisions you have to make after you were elected had to do with the committee or committees you wanted to serve on? What thoughts did you give to this matter?" (Gertoz 1976, 696). In an effort to expand on legislators answers to this question, Gertoz often asked follow up questions such as: "Why?" or "Which Committee did you most prefer?" (Gertoz 1976, 696). His results reveal that freshmen legislators are most often assigned to committee seats they most prefer and those legislators who did not, were often transferred to their preferred committee later on in their second or third term.

Contrary to Gertoz (1976) who focus his whole examination of legislator committee success rates on interview data, Shepsle in his 1978 study, "The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle," examines this question using data collected from question and answer sessions to supplement his empirical analysis gained from data on legislator committee list requests. Unlike the latter data, interview data allows Shepsle to state: "to breathe some life into this request data, as well as track down a number of specific descriptive details of the committee assignment process not available in the public record..." (Shepsle 1978, 8). Particularly, through interviews of Freshmen Democrat members and their administrative assistants on the Ninety-fourth Congress Ways and Means Committee, or the Democratic Committee on Committee,

Shepsle not only gains in-depth personal information from legislators and their assistants on how they campaigned for specific committee requests (i.e. endorsements from interest groups, their state delegation, etc.), why they sought membership onto committees, but also develops an understanding of freshmen legislators' initial perception of the general committee process.

In all, using empirical and interview data, Shepsle reveals most legislators request committee assignment based on their constituent interests. Additionally, the Democrat Committee on Committees seeks to accommodate legislator requests. For example, in the Eighty-seventh through Ninety-third Congresses, almost 60% of Freshmen Democrat Legislators received their top committee request. Additionally, eight out of ten of these legislators received some sought-after committee request (Shepsle 1978). Specifically, some factors affecting legislators receiving their first preference committee request include: whether legislators are facing a competitive environment for a committee seat, if the representative's predecessor previously resided on a particular committee. Importantly, the region a legislator represents, and their electorally-security does not appear to play a role in legislator committee assignment success.

Turning away, from understanding whether legislators receive their requested committee seats, interview data has also been used to focus attention towards understanding "Why?" legislators receive their requested committee seats. Arguably, one of the major qualitative works on the allocation of legislator committee seats, dates back to Master's 1961 study, "Committee Assignments In The House of Representatives." In his 1961 landmark study, Masters' explores the allocation of committee seats in the 80th through 86th Congresses of the House of Representatives, addressing the question of what motivates committee on

committees to grant legislators specific committee requests through the use of qualitative data such as conducting personal interviews with members and staff of various committees as well as members of committees on committees and deans of state delegations, in addition to combing through personal letters, official documents, and personal observations (Masters 1961). These interviewees are chosen in part on the basis of the important role legislators' play in the committee assignment process. Rooted in part on legislator interviews, Masters finds congressional committee assignments are a product of many factors other than party loyalty such as: seniority, geography, professional background, interest groups, religion, and ethnic or racial factors. Importantly, the relevance of these factors depends on the type of committee being analyzed.

Similar in significance, interview data is a key to understanding the motivations behind legislator committee request (Bullock 1976; Fenno 1973; Smith and Deering 1983). In Fenno's (1973) groundbreaking work, *Congressmen in Committees*, he conducts interviews of congressional legislators seeking assignments onto House Committees in the 84th through 89th Congresses (1955-1966), asking, "Why did you want to get on the _____ committee in the first place?" (Fenno 1973, 2). In turn, finding legislators seek committee assignments for a combination of several reasons: constituents, making good policy, and gaining prestige in the legislative chamber.

Collaborating Fenno's 1973 finding, Bullock (1976) focuses solely on legislator interviews of 53 freshmen congressional legislators serving in 1971, to determine the motivations behind freshmen legislators' committee choices. In total, 18 interviews are conducted with legislators and 68 with staff members. Bullock states "staff members were often better respondents than congressmen since the former gave fuller attention to the

questions, provided more answers, and allowed more time for the interview” (Bullock III 1976, 202-203). Examining legislator responses, Bullock III finds legislators do seek committee assignments based on multiple motivations: goal of reelection, prestige, and making good policy. Out of these factors, most legislators commented when choosing committee assignments, the motive of making good policy preceded both reelection and prestige. Notably, of all the legislators interviewed, only less electorally secure ones declared reelection as the primary reason for their committee assignment more often than policy making concerns (Bullock III 1976).

Even more importantly, in his opening statements, Bullock III (1976) quickly addresses an important concern with Fenno’s analysis: the issue of question wording. Bullock III argues the framing of Fenno’s question to congressional legislatures, “Why did you want to get on the _____ committee in the first place” (Fenno 1973, 2), not only assumes that legislators want the seats they receive; it also leads to the conclusion that every committee assignment in the House is desirable. Bullock argues, by asking a slightly different question than Fenno, “What committees did you want to serve on? Why?” (Bullock III 1976, 202), one is able to capture more information about legislator committee preferences such as what committees legislators perceive as undesirable and what committees legislators wanted to receive, but did not (Bullock III 1976).

Since its publication, Frisch and Kelly (2006) note succeeding research has not only deemed Bullock III’s question wording as superior to Fenno’s, but also employed it in latter research on congressional committees (Smith and Deering 1984;1997). Questionably, the results of these studies have become “the basis of the most widely accepted typology of congressional committees” (Deering and Smith 1997). Specifically, by imploring the

question, “What committees did you want to serve on? Why?” Bullock distinguishes between legislators’ perceptions of desirable and less desirable committees, finding the following six committees are perceived by legislators as helping to secure their reelection bid: Agriculture, Armed Services, Interior, Merchant Marines, Public Works, and Veterans’ Affairs. But, committees deemed influential in policy matters are Banking and Currency, Education and Labor, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Judiciary. While prestige and influential committees include the Appropriations and Ways and Means, and lastly undesirable committees include the District of Columbia, Government Operations, House Administration, Internal Security, Post Office, Rules, and Science and Astronautics (Bullock III 1976). Collaborating Bullock III’s (1976) results are Deering and Smith (1997) using the same question wording as Bullock III, find similar results to Bullock III’s (1976) committee typology (Frisch and Kelly 2006).

In Smith and Deering (1983), “Changing Motives For Committee Preferences of New Members in the U.S. House, the authors seek to develop a further understanding of legislator committee motivations by focusing exclusively on legislator interviews conducted of freshmen in the 97th Congress. Replicating Bullock III’s (1976) legislator interviewing method of legislators in the 92nd Congresses, the authors evaluate and compare the legislator committee preference motivations of legislators in the 97th Congresses to Bullock’s results found in the 92nd Congress. Finding as a whole Fenno’s typology of legislator committee motivations, reelection, policy, and prestige explain legislator committee motivations. Even more importantly, legislator committee motivations change overtime, in part to the changing roles in Congressional House procedures or policy agendas (Smith and Deering 1983). Lastly, unlike Bullock III, the authors find that most legislators seek committee assignments

based on district-oriented motivations rather than policy motivations (Smith and Deering 1983).

Moreover, legislator interviews are also used to study policymaker committee motivations and how these motivations affect committee behavior in single committee studies. To illustrate, Perkins (1980) focuses her sole analysis on interviews. Specifically, members on the 92nd and 93rd House Judiciary Committees are asked:

“When you entered Congress in (date), what were your three committee requests?” “Why did you want to be on the Judiciary Committee?” “What benefit do you get from being on the Judiciary Committee?” “Does it help you with reelection?” “Give you policymaking influence?” “Give you influence within the House?” “Members were asked if they agreed with such generalizations as, “The New York Times writes that you....; is this correct?” “Is it a fair generalization?” (Perkins 1980, 374).

Legislators responses to these questions are corroborated or refuted through additional interviews with congressional members, committee staff members, staff director and counsels of the House Judiciary Committee, interest groups, members of the executive branch (for ex. Department of Justice), political reporters, and other congressmen, as well as written documents (such as newspaper articles) accounting the behavior of interviewed legislators. It is important to note, interviewees are promised anonymity, as well as the fact that Perkins uses follow-up questions to verify participants’ answers (Perkins 1980).

To put it briefly, taking issue with Fenno’s (1973) finding that committees contained members with high goal agreement scores to each other, for instance members on X committee highly agreed that they joined a particular committee for the goal of reelection. Perkins analysis reveals that members on the Judiciary Committee do hold different goal priorities (reelection, policy, prestige or other career) from each other. Further, these mixed goals affect the structure and behavior of the committee. To illustrate, among many findings Perkins interviews reveal as a whole, legislators seeking assignment onto the Judiciary

Committee for policy concerns appear to “spend the most time on Judiciary Committee affairs” (Perkins 1980). Specifically, legislator representing policy goals on the committee are referred to in interviews as “present and active”, while a few legislators citing reelection as a priority for gaining membership are described as “minimally present.”

While most qualitative research focuses understanding legislator motivations and perceptions of committees at the congressional level, research at the state level has also been explored (Hedlund 1989; 1990; Hamm and Hedlund 1989). In the form of example, interview data has also been instrumental in providing contextual information about state House and senate committees (Hamm and Hedlund 1994), although this work is limited. In their (1994) study, Hamm and Hedlund explore legislator perceptions on the importance of committees to the legislative decision making process, how much power committees are perceived to hold, and who influences committees (Hamm and Hedlund 1994). They employed both state legislator interview data as well conducting a content analysis, i.e. “...the systematic examination of texts or transcripts to translate textual information into “data”...” (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 345), to in part reveal legislator perceptions of the state committee assignment process (Hamm and Hedlund 1994). Notably, in order to gauge legislator perceptions of state committees, Hamm and Hedlund send out mail questionnaires to each House and Senate chamber in eighteen states evaluating the time between 1971-1986. In total over 4,630 legislators participated in the study. Then two follow-up questionnaires are disseminated in order to verify legislator responses.

Importantly, these interviews reveal several important findings about the state committee system. To name a few: legislators perceive committees to be a focal point in legislative decision making; committee members are seen by legislators as specialist in their

area of jurisdiction, however, not as much as their cohorts in Congress; representatives see committee members as spending a good amount of time on committee work; and committee members are receiving less committee assignments.

5.2 Data and Method

In this chapter, I develop a deeper understanding of the Louisiana committee assignment process by interviewing individuals with first-hand knowledge of the committee process, current 2012 Louisiana House Legislatures. These interviews are conducted to tap into several main topics. First, the formal and informal norms of the committee assignment process, the self-perception legislators have of committee assignments versus their perception of how representatives as a whole are assigned to committees, and their perception of how other legislators are assigned to committees. Specifically, to determine whether the overall empirical findings of this study in favor of the informational and major party cartel theory are further substantiated in the views of Louisiana house legislators, and if so, to shed light on the potential underlying reasons for these findings not revealed through statistical analysis.

I begin the qualitative analysis by conducting face to face interviews with six current legislators in 2012 Louisiana House of Representative and one former 2004-2008 Louisiana House member now serving in the 2012 Louisiana House Senate. By focusing interviews solely on legislators themselves and not on staff members, I hope to circumvent some of the potential problems noted by scholars (Frisch and Kelly 2006) as associated with relying on legislator personal staff to reveal legislator committee preferences. To illustrate, Frisch and Kelly (2006) argue against substituting legislator staff members in place of legislators themselves to gauge legislator committee preferences, stating: “It seems unlikely that all staff

members, or even most of the staff, who were interviewed would have access to their member's complete committee preferences and the rationale for those preferences" (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 346). Likewise, as Frisch and Kelly note Eulau (1985) comments "It is difficult to accept that one person can serve as a surrogate or agent for another when it comes to a psychological variable like 'motivation'" (Eulau 1985, 234 as cited in Frisch and Kelly 2006, 346).

Further, for the purposes of this study, with the exception of one legislator, I primarily focus on interviews with legislators serving in the 2012 Louisiana House, due to accessibility issues of questioning a representative sample of former legislators in the time frame of this study, namely 1999-2008. Moreover, the potential inherent bias exists of asking former legislators, to accurately recall and provide complete information on their committee assignment preferences and request during their service in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House Legislature. Additionally, interviews are conducted in early May 2012, near the beginning of the legislative session after committee assignments are complete, in the hope that the assignment process is still fresh in legislator's minds. Likewise, careful considerations are made to ensure responses are representative of state in categories such as region, party ideologies, race committee chairs, rank and file members, legislators residing on prominent and less prominent committees as identified through legislator interviews, and incumbent and freshmen legislators.

Specifically, the bulk of the interviews conducted in this study focus on seasoned legislators (those who have served at least one term in office), because these legislators have gone through the committee process more than one time, therefore, they are in a more informed position to provide data concerning the process. Additionally, many legislators

begin jockeying for committee assignments for the next four years during their current term in office, a practice not available to freshmen legislators. Therefore, unlike freshmen legislators, season legislators can provide information concerning the lobbying actions of legislators seeking committee assignments in prior legislative sessions leading up to the current allocation of committee seats.

Furthermore, for this investigation, interviews were conducted with legislators who received both prestigious and less prestigious committee assignments. According to Cox and McCubbins (1993), in the legislative process, representatives are often assigned to prestigious committees as a reward for toeing the party line. Those same researchers, Cox and McCubbins(1993), went on to state since prestigious committees deal with salient issues that affect many districts, the majority party will want to stack these committees with legislators loyal to them (Maltzman 1995). Considering this, it can be assumed that legislators who reside on choice committee assignments may have a more favorable view of the committee assignment process than those residing on less prestigious committees, therein providing different interpretations of the committee assignment process. For the purposes of this study and based on Louisiana House legislator interviews, prestigious committees are those committees that are identified by respondents as committees highly sought after by most legislators. Specifically, three committees are consistently cited by interviewed legislators as highly sought committees: Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Commerce. One legislator notes, “Money committees are particularly important because they help legislators secure funding for their districts.” Less sought committees include: Insurance, Agriculture, Retirement, Civil Law, Municipal and Parochial, and Labor.

Additionally, this study focuses on questioning members of the both the majority party, Republican, and minority party, Democrats, in the 2012 Louisiana House of Representatives. For the simple reason that in the Louisiana House committee assignments is the responsibility of the Speaker, a majority party member; therefore, it can be assumed that representatives associated with the party currently out of power will have a different view of the committee assignment process than those representing the party in power. Further, one limitation of the interviews conducted in this study is its full reliance on African American and white males, and the exclusion of white females, Hispanics and independents, and legislators representing the far north east and deep south east regions of Louisiana. Regrettably, time constraints did not allow me to pursue these interviews with more vigor. Furthermore, because only one Hispanic currently resides in the Louisiana House, for the sake of anonymity, this individual was omitted from the survey. For additional demographic and region information on of interviewed 2012 Louisiana House legislators please refer to Table 5.0 and Figure 5.0.

Importantly, all interviews are conducted face to face with legislators at the Louisiana House Capitol. Time spent on each of these interviews ranges from twenty minutes to an hour. During the actual interview, legislators are read a scripted questionnaire, comprising of eleven questions. These questions focus on: the formal and informal process of legislator committee assignment; legislator perceptions of the committee process in general i.e. what they believe motivates legislators in general to request specific committee assignments; why committee members are granted these assignments; why they themselves choose committees assignments; why they felt they are granted committee assignments; what committees legislators perceive as desirable or less desirable and why; and lastly if they felt that

committee membership is representative of the interest of the whole, a specific party, or legislator constituent interest. Follow-up questions are used to prompt legislators to elaborate on their responses, as well as to make sure I correctly understand their answers. At times legislators did veer from the questions asked, providing this author with additional contextual information of the legislative process as a whole. Moreover, in keeping with other scholarly works and in order to promote candid legislator responses all respondents remain anonymous. Additionally, information obtained from the interviews is recorded immediately following the legislator question and answer session. For a sample of the questionnaire and a copy of the letter provided to each respondent refer to Appendix B.

Table 5.0: 2012 Louisiana House Interview Demographics

	Total Number of Interviews	% of African Americans Interview	% of Members of the Majority Party Interview	% Season Member Interview	Number of Standing Committee Chair Interview	% of Members of a least one Prominent Committee Interview
Louisiana	6	33%	50%	67%	33%	67%

* The total number of African Americans in the 2012 Louisiana House chamber is 23, whites 81, and Hispanics 1 (Louisiana House of Representatives). For the 2012 Legislative session the majority party is Republicans. In total there are 58 Republicans, 45 Democrats, and 2 Independents in the whole Louisiana House. Season members are defined as those members who have at least one full four year term in office prior to the 2012 legislative session. There are sixteen standing committees in the Louisiana House. Prominent committees are identified by legislators as having more notoriety than other committees: Ways and Means, Appropriations, Commerce. Importantly, one additional interview conducted is not represented in Table 5.0 of a legislator residing in the 2004-2008 Louisiana House.




Figure 5.0: Region of the State Represented through Interviews

5.3 Results

5.3.1 Formal and Informal Committee Assignment Procedures

For the purpose of understanding the manner in which committee assignments are granted in the 2012 Louisiana House, it is important to first understand the distinction between the informal and formal process of Louisiana legislative committee assignments. While on one hand, formal knowledge of the committee assignments process is easily accessible through Louisiana House Rule 2.5 of the Louisiana constitution, with the partial exception of the Appropriations Committee, stating committee assignments are granted by the Speaker of the House, who is elected from the majority party, on the other hand, informal knowledge of the Louisiana legislative process is lacking. In an effort to obtain knowledge of this informal process legislators are asked, how are Louisiana committees assigned informally?

One legislator observes the informal process of the legislative committee assignment process as follows:

You are asked to rate your preference assignment choices from one to three....

Additionally, one legislator explains that he went one step farther:

When requesting assignments he submitted to the Speaker a resume with his occupation and experience which reveal how well suited for the committees on which he wanted to reside.

A further legislator notes the informal role the governor plays in the legislative committee assignment process:

Assignments are dispensed by the Speaker with input from the Governor based on our knowledge and his interest.

5.3.2 Legislator Assignment Success

Turning away, from the procedural elements of the committee assignment process, the bulk of the interview questions presented in this chapter pertains to legislator motivations and perception of the legislative committee assignment process. In the first part of the interview instrument, legislators are asked whether representatives receive the committee assignments they request? For the most part, minority and majority party legislators as well as freshmen and incumbent representatives perceive every effort is made to accommodate at least one of the legislators requested committee assignments, or that representatives receive their sought after committees at least half of the time. As one 2012 incumbent Republican Louisiana House legislator states:

Other than the Appropriations Committee, which is hard to get membership on because it deals with money, there is every effort to match legislators with at least one of their choices.

Corroborating this view a Democrat freshmen legislator notes:

Yes, mostly everyone gets their top one or two.

Taking a slightly different view of committee assignment success of legislators, one seasoned Republican house assembly member remarks:

Yes and No. If a lot of legislators want to be on a specific committee and there is not enough slots some will get them and some will not.

Substantiating this view, one Democrat incumbent legislator simply comments:

It's about fifty-fifty, 50% of the time "yes," and 50% of the time "no."

In all, Louisiana House legislators concede that every effort is made to accommodate at least one of their requested committee assignments. However, due in part to the limited number of committee seats available, some legislators will not receive their requests. Furthermore, representative assignment success is also dependent upon the type of committee on which

they seek membership. In the main, however, most legislators stated that it is difficult to gain membership onto the money committees because of the high demand for these committees among legislators.

5.3.3 Legislator Perception of Factors Affecting Committee Assignment Decisions

In an effort to understand assembly member's view of the committee assignment process, questions are offered to participants to determine what factors they themselves believe are important to achieve successful committee assignments. Essentially, representatives' beliefs may affect the way legislators maneuver in the committee assignment process to obtain their requested committee seats. Therefore, legislators are asked, not only about their awareness of the formal and informal committee assignment process, but also why they perceive legislators as a whole do or do not get their requested committee assignments. Specifically, one legislator observes:

Legislators are chosen for committee membership based on several factors: (1) politics evolving around their position, for instance the governor plays an important role in the selection of the Speaker who in turn selects committee chairs and members. Members are often selected for committee positions if they philosophical believe the way the governor does in order to promote the governor's agenda, (2) members' ability or expertise in a specific area, for instance, legislators on the Transportation Committee have a background in Transportation Affairs, Appropriations Committee in finance affairs, Education Committee members often have a background in Education, and the Civil Law and Procedure Committee has a lot of Lawyers. In sum, committee expertise is very important (3) for diversity on the committees, for instance gender, race, party affiliation and region all play an import role - compared to the past, today's party caucuses play a much larger role than in the past.

Validating the role expertise plays in legislator committee assignment success, a Democrat legislator comments:

Legislators get the assignments they request based on their background and on their knowledge of the issues pertaining to the committee.

Adding further insight into legislator committee assignment success by explaining the importance of not only the house speaker, and governor but also the role a legislator's constituency plays in their committee assignment triumph, a legislator offered the following,

Committee members are placed onto committees by Speaker and with input by the Governor. Committee assignments in part depend on: party affiliation, region. Speakers try to accommodate legislators from certain region who want membership onto that committee because it relates to their constituent concerns.

Moreover, several legislators express the importance of seniority. An incumbent and freshmen legislator both remark:

Time of service or seniority plays a role.

Conversely, another legislator credits legislator committee assignment success to the ability of legislators to join together in an effort to lobby the Speaker to place an agreed upon legislator onto a specific committee, explaining:

I wanted a member on the Appropriations committee that represented the area of the state I was from. In order to achieve this purpose, I united several legislators from my area to promote one candidate for membership on this particular committee to the Speaker, the Speaker agreed....in part because the Speaker could make happy a bunch of legislators at one time.

Indeed, one legislator explains success in the committee assignment process in light of lobbying speaker candidates, stating:

Most legislators put down a list of the committees they would like to be on and committees they would like to chair. When legislators believe they are relatively secure in their reelection bid for the next four years, they will begin jockeying with their peers who are seeking support for their run for Speakership... In turn, saying I will support you for Speakership if you support me for specific committee assignments and chair assignments... However, there are only so many spots on each committee and committee chairmanships. Therefore, a Speaker candidate will try to sway legislators to be on another popular committee. For example, I have already promised this chairmanship to legislator A, but I will put you on another popular committee for instance the Appropriations....

Confirming this view, an additional legislator offers further insight into committee assignment process achievement, commenting:

...Discussions are made informally with Speaker candidates who are trying to win Speakership. The speaker and legislator will say, I will support you for speaker if you place me on the committees I want to be placed on.

Moreover, one legislator acknowledges the part legislator qualification, occupation, seniority on the committee, and governor plays in the success of legislators receiving their requested committee assignments, but explains these factors are secondary to the committee composition wishes of the Speaker:

Legislators are placed onto committees based on their qualifications, occupation, served on that committee before or as a chairman before, the governor plays a role depending on the speaker, who works well with the Speaker, what relationship does the legislator have with the Speaker. Although, committee assignments are not granted on seniority and not necessarily on qualifications, it really depends on the individual Speaker, style of the Speaker, and the mixture that the Speaker wants on committees. In general, some speakers are more involved in the policy debate others are more relaxed and let the body handle their affairs themselves. Same goes with the influence of the Governor on the Speaker, it in part depends on the Speaker.

In total, based on representative responses the following factors are regarded by legislators to affect the success of lawmakers in receiving their requested committee seats: expertise (occupation, knowledge of the issues pertaining to the committee), governor, Speaker of the house, party affiliation, diversity in region, race, and gender, seniority, the ability of legislators to join together to petition the Speaker to place an assembly member onto a specific committee, and the lobbying of speaker candidates.

5.3.4 Legislator Individual Assessment of Factors Shaping Committee Success

In an attempt to differentiate between the general factors legislators perceive to affect committee assignment success versus the individual success of the interviewed legislators themselves, I ask legislators what factors they believe impacted their committee assignments.

In all, respondents did not articulate different factors between the two. Responding, their answer to the question also applied to their own individual perception of the factors affecting their legislative committee assignment success. However, this question did prompt one legislator who replied to the inquiry as to why do you think legislators as a whole receive the committee assignments they request with the statement: “I don’t know,” but went on to state that “He was assigned to his committees based on his occupation and experience.”

5.3.5 Legislator Committee Request Motivations

Equally important, to our understanding of a legislator’s perception of committee assignment success, as well as, the success rates of legislators receiving their requested committee seats are the criteria or underlying motivations representatives rely on to determine their committee request. Notably, revealing-legislator committee assignment motivations (such as to represent constituents interests, to promote good policy, or to gain influence within the House) to the Speaker, could affect whether legislators receive their preferred assignment.

As seen, in one Louisiana House legislator explanation of the important role a legislator’s constituency interest plays in the assignment of legislators to specific committees:

...Legislator may get passed over for a committee seat, if someone else has priority because they are from the area that has particular needs falling under that committee.

Another legislator notes:

...One of the most important reasons legislators receive their committee request is based on their constituent interest...

Moreover, a legislator's motivations and goals for membership may also be important implications for upcoming legislation which will pass through the committee. As expressed earlier by one Louisiana House Representative:

I wanted to be on the Judiciary to reform the penal system.... I was here to make a change: "To correct some of Louisiana's past errors and make it better for tomorrow."

Indeed, while talking with this member he alluded to the fact that if he were assigned membership onto the Judiciary, he would promote policies on the Judiciary solely in line with his political philosophy of reforming the penal system.

Furthermore, an incumbent legislator comments:

I particularly wanted an assignment on the Highway Committee in order to promote the needs of my constituents...and the fact that I ran on issues pertaining to this committee.

Likewise, during the interview with this legislator, he alluded that he sought membership onto the Highway committee based on his constituent characteristics, to promote Highway bills that specifically support his district.

Further, another legislator, express the role constituent as well as his own personal philosophy plays in his support for specific legislation:

I sought membership onto committees primarily for constituent reasons. However, my political philosophy is not always in alignment with my district on every issue. In these circumstances, sometimes I will vote against my personal philosophy in alignment with my constituents and sometimes not, it depends on the issues. If my philosophy is not in alignment with my constituents, I will try to educate them on why I voted the way I did.

In total, understanding legislator committee motivations offers important insight into the legislative committee process by not only revealing that legislator committee motivations affect representative committee assignment success, but by also letting known the role it may play in the type of legislation reported out of committees.

5.3.6 Legislator Perceptions of Representative Committee Request Motivations

In turn, based on the notable role legislator committee motivations play in the legislative committee process, I seek to develop an understanding of how Louisiana House legislators perceive their own committee motivations, as well as, that of their fellow legislator's motivations by pursuing the following set of questions: "in general what do you believe motivates Louisiana House legislators to request certain committee assignments; do legislators' districts ask them to join certain committees; what about their party; moreover, do interest groups motivate individual legislators to join specific committees;" and lastly, "specifically speaking, what factors motivate individual legislator's request for membership onto specific committees?"

Indeed, one legislator states:

Legislators as a whole are motivated to seek committee assignments based on constituents and expertise in a specific area... I was motivated by policy expertise, and a background in education.

Additionally, another representative express not only the role constituents play in lawmaker committee motivations, but also his own individual motivation, revealing:

Constituents, you run on a specific platform and you want to gain membership onto committees that meet those needs for instance if you represent a district with a lot of rural hospitals you want to be on the committee that deals with this issue...

Likewise, several assembly members perceive legislators as well as themselves as driven by multiple motivations when pursuing committee assignment requests, responding:

Legislators are motivated by their interest- is it something they care about personally, their occupation, and constituent needs.... I was personally motivated to request membership onto my requested committees based on interest (something I cared about), constituent needs, and the ability to make change through policies.

Said another:

Legislators want to join committees for constituent reasons- what is the biggest topic in their district, occupation, and making policy...I primarily sought membership onto specific committees based on constituent reasons. However, my background (experience and occupation) in areas falling under a specific committee's jurisdiction also played a role.

Corroborating the role various motivations play in lawmakers committee request, another representative, express:

Representatives seek committee assignments based on their region (constituents), occupation and experience, and party in 2012. Specifically, legislators want to be on a committee that relates to their region. Furthermore, in 2012, party is playing more of a role then it did in 2008.

Adding further insight into the preferences behind assembly members committee assignments as well as themselves himself, a legislator disclose the influence of outside interest groups on representative committee motivations, pronouncing:

Some legislators seek committee assignments that can help them finance their campaign, for example if you are on the commerce committee banks may give you money for your campaign.... For myself, I sought committees that I was interested in, those that were fun, based on my constituents and background, as well as the fact that sometimes important legislation comes through these committees.

Additionally, when asked the same question one lawmaker states his primary motivation for obtaining membership onto a specific committee was policy making opportunities:

I wanted to be on the Judiciary to reform the penal system. My primary reason for wanting to be on specific committees was to promote policies, I believed in. I was here to make change: "To correct some of the Louisiana's pass errors and make it better for tomorrow."

On the whole, it appears that assembly members are motivated to seek committee assignments based on multiple factors, including: constituents, influencing policy, party, and interest groups. Specifically, as revealed in Table 5.1 and 5.2 a majority of interviewed Louisiana House Representatives rank constituent and policy making preferences as the top

two motivations for both individual legislator and legislators as a whole when making committee request. Although, seventy one percent of interviewees specifically mentioned legislators in general are motivated by constituent motivations compared to fifty-seven percent stating policy making concerns. Conversely, seventy-one percent of representatives cited policy making motivations compared to fifty-seven percent of those mentioning constituent motivations to explain their own committee assignment preferences. Surprisingly, interviewed legislators do not mention gaining “prestige” in the chamber through membership onto specific committees, as a motivating factor, for legislators in general or for they themselves, to gain membership onto a specific committee.

Table 5.1: Louisiana Legislator Committee Request Motivations as a Whole (in percentages)

	Total Number of Interviews	Constituent	Policy Making	Interest Group	Party	Prestige	N/A
Legislators	7	71%	57%	.14%	.14%	0%	.14%

*Policy expertise category combines those legislators mentioning both wanting to make good policy, something they are interested in or care about, expertise, background, or an occupation in the policy areas under a specific committees jurisdiction. The N/A categories refer to legislators who did not respond to the question. Prestige refers to legislators motivated to gain membership onto a specific committee allowing members to gain influence in the House.

Table 5.2: Individual Louisiana Legislator Committee Request Motivations (in percentages)

	Total Number of Interviews	Constituent	Policy Making	Interest Group	Party	Prestige	N/A
Legislators	7	57%	71%	0%	0%	0%	.14%

*Policy expertise category combines those legislators mentioning both wanting to make good policy, something they are interested in or care about, expertise, background or an occupation in the policy areas under a specific committees jurisdiction. The N/A category refers to legislators who did not respond to the question. Prestige refers to legislators motivated to gain membership onto a specific committee allowing members to gain influence in the House.

5.3.7 Diverse and Representative Committee Assignments

Lastly, in an effort to determine whether the overall empirical findings in the preceding chapters of this study in favor of the informational and major party cartel theory and against the distributive theory are further substantiated in the views of the lower house members of the Louisiana State Legislature, as well as, to determine potential underlying reasons for this finding, I ask representatives the following question: “in general, do you believe committee membership is reflective of the preferences of the chamber as a whole; if not, what preferences do you believe committee membership reflects; is it individual legislator district interests, party interests?” If the informational theory holds true, then legislators will perceive the legislator make-up of committees as representative of the characteristics of members in the whole chamber. Conversely, the distributive theory holds true if legislators view committees as stacked with members representing specific interests. Likewise, the majority party theory is substantiated if legislators perceive committees as stacked in favor of the majority party.

In all, a majority of interviewees perceived the composition of Louisiana House committees to accurately reflect the overall composition of the whole legislature. As seen, in one incumbent Democrat legislator’s response:

Almost always, and purposively the design of committees represent diversity or a good blend of the legislature as a whole. For the most part the Governor and Speaker can achieve a committee with political philosophies in accordance with theirs while still maintaining a diverse (ex. race, gender, region) and representative committee to the whole. Alternatively, there are only rare cases when this cannot be achieved, and in this case the Governor or Speaker will stack the committee with legislators supportive of their philosophy. There are several reasons the Governor wants diverse and representative committees: the governor does not want to be seen as not diverse, the Governor wants minority opinion shared in that forum (or committee), and lastly he/she wants to make sure they reflect positively in a broader respect across the country.

Likewise, an incumbent Republican state house lawmaker comments:

In general the legislature tries to balance committees, or create representative committees by region, party, and race.

Furthermore, a seasoned Republican states:

Yes, I have found with three different speakers that every effort is made to accommodate them, but sometimes committee membership is stacked on sensitive committees (those committees affecting what the Governor and Speaker want).

Additionally, a former Democrat House legislator expresses:

Yes, when I served the Speaker tried to create balanced committees representing the interest of the whole legislature based on demographics, race, and gender.

Similarly, a Republican incumbent legislator divulges,

Yes, as a whole the Speaker tries to create balanced committees, however the representative nature of committees depends on the Speaker. For instance, ... the mixture that the Speaker wants on committees.

Conversely, a Democrat assembly member takes an alternative view of the representative nature of 2012 legislator committee assignments noting,

At one time yes, committees were representative of the demographics of the whole legislature, however in 2012 there are some committees that are stacked with members to meet the goal of the Governor. That being the case, because the governor only needs a certain number of legislators to pass a bill out of committee, representatives are thrown a bone and placed onto committees who represent views contrary to the Governor.

In sum, for the most part, legislators' responses to these limited interviews substantiate the empirical findings in support for the informational found in the preceding chapters. In all, most legislators' comments fall in line with the major tenets of the informational theory. Therefore, representatives, as a whole, perceive committees in the Louisiana House legislature to be representative of the demographic characteristics of the whole legislature. Conversely, support for the major party cartel theory is limited to the 2012

legislative session. Specifically, one legislator states, before 2012 committees members are representative of the demographics of the whole legislature; however, during this 2012, session committees are stacked in the favor of the governor who is a member of the majority party.

5.4 Conclusion

On the whole, legislator interviews support several general conclusions. First, in accordance with the self-selection hypothesis of the distributive theory, which states that the assignment process primarily allows legislators to self-select onto committees by accommodating their committee request (Frisch and Kelly 2006), as a rule 2012 Louisiana House legislators remark every effort is made to accommodate at least one of their requested committee assignments.

Second, legislator request specific committees based on multiple factors such as: constituent requirement, desire to influence policy, party affiliation, and interest group influence. Specifically, as revealed in Table 5.1 and 5.2, a majority of interviewed Louisiana House Representatives rank constituent requirement and policy making preferences as the top two motivations for both individual legislator and legislators as a whole when making committee request. This finding provides support for the contention of not only this writer, but also of others (Fenno 1973; Bullock III 1976; Smith and Deering 1983), that legislators seek committee assignments based on multiple motivations.

Third, legislators perceive the success of lawmakers in receiving their requested and legislators in general requested committee seats as dependent upon different factors: area of expertise (occupation, knowledge of the issues pertaining to the committee), governor's inclination, Speaker of the house preference, party affiliation, diversity in region, race, and

gender, seniority, the ability of legislators to join together to petition the Speaker to place an assembly member onto a specific committee, and the lobbying of speaker candidates. Worth mentioning is, while the Governors do not play a formal role in the legislative committee assignment process, they play a significant role in influencing the Speaker to decide the makeup of legislative committees.

Lastly, the findings of this chapter and the previous chapter provide substantial support for the informational theory. Specifically, 2012 assembly members as a whole perceive committees in the 2012 Louisiana House legislature to be representative of the demographic characteristics of the whole legislature. Moreover, contrary to the overall empirical findings presented in earlier chapters, only one legislator notes support for the major party cartel theory in the 2012 legislature, stating in this session committees are stacked in the favor of the governor, a member of the majority party.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Testing the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives this study examines the expectations laid out by each of these three theories. First, Louisiana House committee members represent views different from the views of the legislature as a whole; thereby, providing support for the distributive theory. Second, Louisiana House committee members represent views similar to the views of the entire legislature, in alignment with the major trends of the informational theory. Third, Louisiana House Democrat committee members represent views similar to the Democratic Party in the full House on control committees, providing evidence in favor of the major party cartel theory. Lastly, support for the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theory will be mixed in the Louisiana House.

Through the evaluation of the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theory and the introduction of a more comprehensive measurement of legislator preferences at the state level, based on legislator ideology, interest group scores, district characteristics, party, occupation, and caucus membership, this study has provided a more complete test of the three theories of committee development.

Further, this analysis has contributed to our understanding of the legislator committee assignment process at the individual state level in an important way. It has highlighted the importance of understanding the contextual and political environment surrounding legislator committee assignment at the state level in hypothesizing, testing, and explaining the emergence of preference outlier committees and support for the theories of legislative organization. To date, these considerations have been largely absent in the testing of the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory at the state level.

Additionally, this study's overall importance is highlighted not only by the "increasing number of important policy matters (e.g. welfare, healthcare)...being returned to the state legislative arena (Francis 1989 as cited in Overby and Kazee 2000, 702), but also by the powerful role today's committees play in the state legislative process, particularly in terms of gatekeeping (Maltzman 1997). Under this, power committees have the ability to stop legislation, through such actions as tabling a bill for further study, from every being voted on by the house floor. For this reason, this study's finding of mixed support for the informational and distributive theory and substantial support for the major party cartel theory has important implications for the types of policies emerging from Louisiana distributive committees. Possibly, Louisiana committees providing support for the distributive theory could send policies to the House floor that do not benefit the whole legislature, rather the few on committees. It is this study's hope that by highlighting the existence and potential effects of distributive committees on policies in the Louisiana House, that legislators will intensely evaluate the policies emerging from these committees.

Specifically speaking, evaluating several measurement of legislator committee preferences, including legislator ideology, interest group scores, district characteristics, occupation, and party, this study found the most substantial support for the distributive theory in the Agriculture, Ways and Means, Municipal, and Natural Resources Committee. However, among these committees, the jurisdiction of the Agriculture and Natural Resource Committees offer legislators the most distributive benefits. In turn, for the most part, support is found favoring the informational theory.

6.1 Limitations

Similar to congressional studies and previous state studies, this study also suffers from several legislator committee preference measurement limitations. While, this study has sought to minimize these problems through a comprehensive measurement of legislator committee preferences such as: legislator ideology, interest group, party affiliation, district characteristics, occupation, and legislator caucus and delegation membership, these limitations are still present.

Methodological speaking, Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are created from contested roll call votes. Notably, because legislators may vote differently on the floor than they do in committee meetings (Parker and Parker 1998; Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004) these scores may not represent legislator true ideology. For instance, Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are unable to capture legislator preferences revealed through intra-committee vote trades (Parker and Parker 1998; Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004) or through logrolls (Hall and Grofman 1980).

One limitation of this study's use of Poole and Rosenthal's contested roll call votes is the limited number of contested votes in the years 2000 and 2002. For the year 2000 there are only 45 votes and in 2002 only 32 votes were cast. Debatably, basing a legislator's ideology off of such a scarce sample of votes is problematic in that it offers very few opportunities to gage the true ideology of individual legislators.

Furthermore, similar to ideology scores the use of Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI) interest group scores to determine legislator ideology also faces limitations. These scores are often based on very few roll call votes and are meant to evaluate individuals supportive of their cause. Traditionally LABI voting scores are based on bills in

several different policy areas including: Civil Justice, Education, Employee Relations (such as issues involving right to work, drug testing, unemployment, and workers compensation), Energy (issues involving oil and gas), Environmental Quality, Governmental Reform, Health Care, Small Businesses, Taxation and Finance, Trade, Tourism and Transportation, and Technology Advancement.

Notably, because important LABI issues coming up for a vote during legislator sessions vary from year to year, such as bills levying new taxes which are only offered during odd years, legislator LABI voting records are likely to fluctuate, sometimes radically depending on the issue (LABI). Therefore, a legislator's voting record for one year may not reflect their pro-conservative business ideology (LABI), therein resulting in a miss-measurement of legislator ideology.

Additionally, similar to Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores as well as LABI interest group scores, district characteristics also face limitations. Relying on Adler and Lapinski's (1997) study, this dissertation uses district characteristics to determine how compelling individual committee membership is to a particular legislator. The more compelling this membership is the higher the likelihood that a legislator will seek membership onto that particular committee. For instance, under this premise a legislator representing a district with a majority of its constituents employed in agriculture will seek membership onto the agriculture committee.

One drawback of this legislator committee preference indicator is the potential miss-measurement of legislator district characteristics. For example, legislators seeking membership onto the Health and Welfare Committee may be compelled to join this committee based on district characteristics other than the percentage of districts with

disabilities, percent employed in healthcare, percent of district aged 55 or older, and percent below poverty line. Arguably, by not capturing the correct district characteristics enticing legislators to join specific committees, this study could bias itself against support for the distributive theory.

Sidestepping some of the limitations, legislator caucus and delegation membership offers an alternative measurement of legislator district characteristics. Research shows legislators choose caucus membership based on their constituent characteristics, even after controlling for party, committee, electoral security, and seniority (Miler 2011). Hypothetically, the amount of caucus and delegations as well as the areas of interests they cover, allows scholars to capture several legislator district characteristics at one time through their membership onto each caucus or delegation. For instance, legislators representing heterogeneous districts may seek membership onto several caucuses and delegations to represent their constituents. However, similar to previous measurements of legislator committee preferences caucus membership and delegation also face limitations. For example, the policy interests of individual caucuses and delegations do not directly relate to the jurisdiction of all committees in this analysis such as: Appropriations, Civil Law, Judiciary, Retirement, and Ways and Means. Because of that exclusion, this measurement cannot be universally applied to all committees, therein providing only a partial test of the informational and distributive theory.

Additionally, the measurement of legislator occupation suffers from several measurement issues. First, a legislator's occupation does not necessarily mean they an interest in committees related to their job field. Second, this measurement's problems can be seen in the fact that legislators may not represent enough occupations falling under the

jurisdiction of each committee to determine correctly whether legislators seek membership onto committees based on their occupation. This limitation can be seen in this dissertation, where the following committees were excluded based on lack of legislator occupations related to the jurisdiction of each committee including: Appropriations, Environment, Governmental Affairs, Labor, Municipal, Natural Resources, Retirement, Transportation, and Ways and Means.

6.2 Implications

Taking these limitations into account, this dissertation offers several important contributions to the study of committee organization. Notably, one major contribution of this dissertation revolves around the use of several different measurements of legislator preferences. Indeed, unlike legislator ideology based on Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores, the measurements of occupation, legislator caucus membership, and constituent characteristics appear to offer a better measurement of legislator preferences. As previously stated, legislator ideology scores are based on legislator votes on bills occurring in each legislative session. However, not every bill is relevant to every issue and not every issue is relevant in every session. Therefore, representative ideologies are likely to fluctuate from year to year. Conversely, measurements of constituent characteristics, caucus membership, and occupation are not faced with similar problems. For the simple reason that, for the most part, a legislator's previous occupation or district characteristics remains constant from session to session.

Furthermore, research on the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory has been plagued by theoretical and methodological debates. Support for these theories has traditionally been in favor of the informational theory and has varied according to

measurements, statistical methods, and time periods analyzed. Using similar legislator preference measurements as previous studies, this analysis finds substantial support for the informational theory. However, while this support is still strong it is somewhat diminished with the introduction of legislator party caucus membership. Under this measurement there is an increase in support for the distributive theory. Possibly, this increase points to the fact that this measurement is capturing an element of legislator committee preferences not previously measured through either current measurements of preference outliers such as ideology, interest group, party, district characteristics, or legislator occupation. In turn, highlighting the importance of continuing to develop and improve on current measurements of legislator preferences.

Secondly, in contrast to previous state studies which only look at a few measurements of legislator preferences, by providing a comprehensive measurement of legislator committee preferences, this study was able to provide a more robust test of the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theory and therein provide more substantiated support for its findings. It also points to the stability of support for the informational theory across different measurements of legislator committee preferences.

6.3 Further Research

In the future this dissertation provides several avenues of research. Importantly, the governor is extraordinarily influential in Louisiana committee assignments. This analysis neither evaluates governor policy initiatives for a given year, nor does it scrutinize the stacking of committees with members supportive of the governor's agenda representing these issues. Next, as a whole, Louisiana preference outlier committees are not always the same across an election cycle. During one legislative session a committee is a preference outlier

and not at another session. While this study has evaluated several possible reasons for this finding, one such explanation might be that the composition of the legislator changes from year to year as a result of either legislator turnover at the end of an election cycle or legislator resignation because of such reasons as illness or employment, which in turn might lead to changes in legislator ideology, interests, party, or occupation. Therefore, committee composition represents the characteristics of the legislature during that given year. Having said that, this dissertation still does not have a firm explanation of why preference outlier instability exists overtime. This challenge offers, therefore, a line of research for future scholars to unstitch.

Moreover, scholars may want to pursue an extension of this dissertation's time period in order to include the year 2011. During that time, Louisiana House district lines were redrawn, resulting in the changing the demographic characteristics of several House districts, allows scholars the opportunity to determine potential effects of this case on legislator committee assignment preferences and support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory.

Further, party research leaves open a line of research for future scholars to investigate. This study finds substantial support for the major party cartel theory in the state of Louisiana, which is not dependent upon the same ideology of the governor nor the majority of the Louisiana House. It would be interesting to determine whether these results differ depending on the ideological extremism of the governor. For instance, hypothetically suppose the governor were a far left liberal and the whole legislator's ideology were less extreme, would one still see substantial support for the major party cartel theory?

Lastly, research on committee organization, in light of the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theory at the state senate level is lacking. It would be interesting to see if the results found in the House mirror those in the Senate. Unlike in the Louisiana House the Senate has only 39 seats. Arguably, as espoused by Prince and Overby (2005), this difference may have substantial impacts on support for the informational and distributive theory as well. Initially, because state senators generally represent larger and more heterogeneous districts than state representatives, senators may have a more difficult time determining which committees offer the most benefits to their constituents as a whole, in turn resulting in less support for the distributive theory (Prince and Overby 2005).

At the same time, in contrast, as Prince and Overby (2005) note state senates may find more support for the distributive theory because of the fact that state senates often have the same amount of committees as the house but their members are “spread more thinly than house members” (Prince and Overby 2005) on these committees. Therefore, “it is possible that state senates—which are informationally overtaxed relative to lower chambers—are organized along less informational lines than are analogous lower houses and rely heavily on the lower houses for the information needed to pass good laws (Prince and Overby 2005, 9).” Therein, resulting in more preference outlier committees at the senate than house level; which is in fact what they find in their article “Legislative Organization Theory and Committee Preference Outliers in State Senates.”

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APPENDIX A: EXTRA RELEVANT MATERIAL

Table A.1: District Characteristics of Caucus Members

Louisiana Caucus and Delegation	1999	2000	2004	2008
Acadian Caucus				
% of district Black	N	N	N	N
% of district employed in farming	Y (over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y (over)
Avg. of district household income	N	N	N	N
% of district employed in manufacturing	Y (over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y (over)
% of district employed in service industry	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% of district employed in government	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% of district age 55 or older	N	N	N	N
% of district receive social security benefits	N	N	N	N
% of district attending public schools	Y (over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y (over)
% employed in wholesale and retail trade	N	N	N	N
% employed in transportation	N	N	N	N
% of individuals with disabilities	N	N	N	N
% employed in finance and insurance	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y (under)
% employed in healthcare	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
District contains correctional institution	N	N	N	N
Jefferson Delegation				
% of district Black	N	N	N	N
% of district employed in farming	N	N	N	N
Avg. of district household income	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y (over)
% of district employed in manufacturing	N	N	N	N
% of district employed in service industry	N	N	N	N
% of district employed in government	N	N	N	N
% of district age 55 or older	N	N	N	N
% of district receive social security benefits	N	N	N	N
% of district attending public schools	N	N	N	N
% employed in wholesale and retail trade	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y (over)
% employed in transportation	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y (over)
% of individuals with disabilities	N	N	N	N
% employed in finance and insurance	N	N	N	N
% employed in healthcare	N	N	N	N
District contains correctional institution	N	N	N	N
Black Caucus				
% of district Black	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y (over)
% of district employed in farming	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
Avg. of district household income	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% of district employed in manufacturing	N	N	N	N

(table continued)

% of district employed in service industry	Y(over)	Y (over)	Y(over)	Y(over)
% of district employed in government	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y (over)	Y(over)
% of district age 55 or older	N	N	N	N
% of district receive social security benefits	N	N	N	N
% of district attending public schools	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)
% employed in wholesale and retail trade	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% employed in transportation	N	N	N	N
% of individuals with disabilities	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)
% employed in finance and insurance	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% employed in healthcare	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)
District contains correctional institution	N	N	N	N
Orleans				
% of district Black	N	N	N	N
% of district employed in farming	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
Avg. of district household income	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)
% of district employed in manufacturing	N	N	N	N
% of district employed in service industry	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)
% of district employed in government	N	N	N	N
% of district age 55 or older	N	N	N	N
% of district receive social security benefits	N	N	N	N
% of district attending public schools	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% employed in wholesale and retail trade	N	N	N	N
% employed in transportation	N	N	N	N
% of individuals with disabilities	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% employed in finance and insurance	N	N	N	N
% employed in healthcare	N	N	N	N
District contains correctional institution	N	N	N	N
Rural Caucus				
% of district Black	N	N	N	N
% of district employed in farming	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)
Avg. of district household income	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% of district employed in manufacturing	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)
% of district employed in service industry	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% of district employed in government	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% of district age 55 or older	N	N	N	N
% of district receive social security benefits	N	N	N	N
% of district attending public schools	N	N	N	N
% employed in wholesale and retail trade	N	N	N	N
% employed in transportation	N	N	N	N
% of individuals with disabilities	N	N	N	N
% employed in finance and insurance	N	N	N	N
% employed in healthcare	N	N	N	N

(table continued)

District contains correctional institution	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
Capital Region Delegation				
% of district Black	N/A	N/A	N/A	N
% of district employed in farming	N/A	N/A	N/A	N
Avg. of district household income	N/A	N/A	N/A	N
% of district employed in manufacturing	N/A	N/A	N/A	N
% of district employed in service industry	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
% of district employed in government	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y
% of district age 55 or older	N/A	N/A	N/A	N(under)
% of district receive social security benefits	N/A	N/A	N/A	N
% of district attending public schools	N/A	N/A	N/A	N
% employed in wholesale and retail trade	N/A	N/A	N/A	Y(under)
% employed in transportation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N
% of individuals with disabilities	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
% employed in finance and insurance	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)	Y(over)
% employed in healthcare	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)	Y(under)
District contains correctional institution	N	N	N	N

Table A.2 Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	42% (N=12)	51% (N=91)	.3346	.563
Agriculture	33% (N=15)	52% (N=88)	1.8389	.175
Appropriations	58% (N=19)	48% (N=84)	.6545	.419
Civil Law	67% (N=12)	47% (N=91)	1.5985	.206
Commerce	47% (N=17)	50% (N=86)	.0491	.825
Education	65% (N=17)	47% (N=86)	1.8797	.170
Environment	58% (N=12)	48% (N=91)	.4226	.516
Health and Welfare	31% (N=16)	53% (N=87)	2.5279	.112
Government Affairs	54% (N=13)	49% (N=90)	.1117	.738
Insurance	58% (N=12)	48% (N=91)	.4226	.516
Judiciary	42% (N=12)	51% (N=91)	.3346	.563
Labor	47% (N=15)	50% (N=88)	.0570	.811
Municipal	46% (N=13)	50% (N=90)	.0672	.795
Natural Resources	56% (N=18)	48% (N=85)	.3184	.573
Retirement	73% (N=11)	47% (N=92)	2.6546	.103
Transportation	38% (N=13)	51% (N=90)	.7271	.394
Ways and Means	.05% (N=19)	60% (N=84)	18.2502	.000***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.3 Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	62% (N=13)	48% (N=92)	.8568	.355
Agriculture	41% (N=17)	51% (N=88)	.5654	.452
Appropriations	63% (N=19)	47% (N=86)	1.7250	.189
Civil Law	58% (N=12)	48% (N=93)	.4206	.517
Commerce	47% (N=17)	50% (N=88)	.0493	.824
Education	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Environment	54% (N=13)	49% (N=92)	.1109	.739
Health and Welfare	41% (N=17)	51% (N=88)	.5654	.452
Government Affairs	60% (N=15)	48% (N=90)	.7683	.381
Insurance	60% (N=15)	48% (N=90)	.7683	.381
Judiciary	50% (N=14)	49% (N=91)	.0015	.969
Labor	69% (N=16)	46% (N=89)	2.7913	.095*
Municipal	36% (N=14)	52% (N=91)	1.2323	.267
Natural Resources	60% (N=15)	48% (N=90)	.7683	.381
Retirement	80% (N=10)	46% (N=95)	4.1066	.043**
Transportation	57% (N=14)	48% (N=91)	.3751	.540
Ways and Means	16% (N=19)	57% (N=86)	10.5606	.001***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.4 Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2001				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	18% (N=11)	53% (N=94)	4.8284	.028**
Agriculture	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Appropriations	63% (N=19)	47% (N=86)	1.7250	.189
Civil Law	70% (N=10)	47% (N=95)	1.8538	.173
Commerce	29% (N=17)	53% (N=88)	3.2822	.070*
Education	71% (N=17)	45% (N=88)	3.6004	.058*
Environment	62% (N=13)	48% (N=92)	.8568	.355
Health and Welfare	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Government Affairs	53% (N=15)	49% (N=90)	.1016	.750
Insurance	63% (N=16)	47% (N=89)	1.2715	.259
Judiciary	23% (N=13)	53% (N=92)	4.1514	.042**
Labor	71% (N=17)	45% (N=88)	3.6004	.058*
Municipal	58% (N=12)	48% (N=93)	.4206	.517
Natural Resources	47% (N=15)	50% (N=90)	.0571	.811
Retirement	64% (N=11)	48% (N=94)	.9790	.322
Transportation	69% (N=16)	46% (N=89)	2.7913	.095*
Ways and Means	6% (N=18)	59% (N=87)	16.8004	.000***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.5 Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2002				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	55% (N=11)	49% (N=94)	.1239	.725
Agriculture	71% (N=17)	45% (N=88)	3.6004	.058*
Appropriations	68% (N=19)	45% (N=86)	3.3139	.069*
Civil Law	13% (N=8)	53% (N=97)	4.7486	.029**
Commerce	38% (N=16)	52% (N=89)	1.0917	.296
Education	50% (N=18)	49% (N=87)	.0020	.965
Environment	50% (N=14)	49% (N=91)	.0015	.969
Health and Welfare	47% (N=17)	50% (N=88)	.0493	.824
Government Affairs	33% (N=15)	52% (N=90)	1.8351	.176
Insurance	35% (N=17)	52% (N=88)	1.6430	.200
Judiciary	42% (N=12)	51% (N=93)	.3346	.563
Labor	38% (N=16)	52% (N=89)	1.0917	.296
Municipal	29% (N=14)	53% (N=91)	2.8369	.092*
Natural Resources	47% (N=15)	50% (N=90)	.0571	.811
Retirement	55% (N=11)	49% (N=94)	.1239	.725
Transportation	39% (N=18)	52% (N=87)	.9829	.321
Ways and Means	83% (N=18)	43% (N=87)	9.9339	.002***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.6 Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2003				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	45% (N=11)	50% (N=94)	.0814	.775
Agriculture	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Appropriations	58% (N=19)	48% (N=86)	.6503	.420
Civil Law	10% (N=10)	54% (N=95)	6.9069	.009***
Commerce	40% (N=15)	51% (N=90)	.6350	.426
Education	41% (N=17)	51% (N=88)	.5654	.452
Environment	71% (N=14)	46% (N=91)	3.1006	.078*
Health and Welfare	50% (N=16)	49% (N=89)	.0017	.967
Government Affairs	53% (N=15)	49% (N=90)	.1016	.750
Insurance	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Judiciary	58% (N=12)	48% (N=93)	.4206	.517
Labor	31% (N=16)	53% (N=89)	2.5216	.112
Municipal	29% (N=14)	53% (N=91)	2.8369	.092*
Natural Resources	47% (N=17)	50% (N=88)	.0493	.824
Retirement	55% (N=11)	49% (N=94)	.1239	.725
Transportation	39% (N=18)	52% (N=87)	.9829	.321
Ways and Means	47% (N=17)	50% (N=88)	.0493	.824
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.7 Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	36% (N=11)	51% (N=94)	.8513	.356
Agriculture	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Appropriations	32% (N=19)	53% (N=86)	2.9883	.084*
Civil Law	50% (N=8)	49% (N=97)	.0008	.978
Commerce	63% (N=19)	47% (N=86)	1.7250	.189
Education	63% (N=16)	47% (N=89)	1.2715	.259
Environment	60% (N=10)	48% (N=95)	.4853	.486
Health and Welfare	42% (N=19)	51% (N=86)	.5107	.475
Government Affairs	30% (N=10)	52% (N=95)	1.6854	.194
Insurance	72% (N=18)	45% (N=87)	4.4775	.034**
Judiciary	36% (N=14)	52% (N=91)	1.2323	.267
Labor	50% (N=10)	49% (N=95)	.0010	.975
Municipal	42% (N=12)	51% (N=93)	.3346	.563
Natural Resources	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Retirement	56% (N=9)	49% (N=96)	.1433	.705
Transportation	72% (N=18)	45% (N=87)	4.4775	.034**
Ways and Means	21% (N=19)	56% (N=86)	7.5224	.006***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.8 Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2005				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	2% (N=15)	54% (N=90)	6.1021	.014
Agriculture	50% (N=14)	49% (N=91)	.0015	.969
Appropriations	32% (N=19)	53% (N=86)	2.9883	.084*
Civil Law	60% (N=10)	48% (N=95)	.4853	.486
Commerce	58% (N=19)	48% (N=86)	.6503	.420
Education	73% (N=15)	46% (N=90)	3.9686	.046**
Environment	43% (N=7)	50% (N=98)	.1333	.715
Health and Welfare	47% (N=19)	50% (N=86)	.0431	.836
Government Affairs	44% (N=9)	50% (N=96)	.1016	.750
Insurance	82% (N=17)	43% (N=88)	8.7453	.003***
Judiciary	56% (N=16)	48% (N=89)	.3416	.559
Labor	55% (N=11)	49% (N=94)	.1239	.725
Municipal	42% (N=12)	51% (N=93)	.3346	.563
Natural Resources	50% (N=16)	49% (N=89)	.0017	.967
Retirement	64% (N=11)	48% (N=94)	.9790	.322
Transportation	26% (N=19)	43% (N=86)	8.0340	.005***
Ways and Means	26% (N=19)	55% (N=86)	4.9983	.025**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.9 Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2006				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	46% (N=13)	50% (N=92)	.0674	.795
Agriculture	50% (N=14)	49% (N=91)	.0015	.969
Appropriations	44% (N=18)	51% (N=87)	.2242	.636
Civil Law	44% (N=9)	50% (N=96)	.1016	.750
Commerce	61% (N=18)	47% (N=87)	1.1668	.280
Education	65% (N=17)	47% (N=88)	1.8703	.171
Environment	50% (N=8)	49% (N=97)	.0008	.978
Health and Welfare	59% (N=17)	47% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Government Affairs	50% (N=10)	49% (N=95)	.0010	.975
Insurance	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Judiciary	41% (N=17)	51% (N=88)	.5654	.452
Labor	45% (N=11)	50% (N=94)	.0814	.775
Municipal	42% (N=12)	51% (N=93)	.3346	.563
Natural Resources	53% (N=15)	49% (N=90)	.1016	.750
Retirement	73% (N=11)	47% (N=94)	2.6464	.104
Transportation	84% (N=19)	42% (N=86)	11.1653	.001***
Ways and Means	17% (N=18)	56% (N=87)	9.3821	.002***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.10 Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W-nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2007				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	38% (N=13)	51% (N=92)	.7263	.394
Agriculture	36% (N=14)	52% (N=91)	1.2323	.267
Appropriations	42% (N=19)	51% (N=86)	.5107	.475
Civil Law	56% (N=9)	49% (N=96)	.1433	.705
Commerce	65% (N=17)	47% (N=88)	1.8703	.171
Education	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Environment	50% (N=8)	49% (N=97)	.0008	.978
Health and Welfare	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Government Affairs	44% (N=9)	50% (N=96)	.1016	.750
Insurance	71% (N=17)	45% (N=88)	3.6004	.058*
Judiciary	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Labor	45% (N=11)	50% (N=94)	.0814	.775
Municipal	33% (N=12)	52% (N=93)	1.4207	.233
Natural Resources	44% (N=16)	51% (N=89)	.2517	.616
Retirement	73% (N=11)	47% (N=94)	2.6464	.104
Transportation	79% (N=19)	43% (N=86)	8.0340	.005***
Ways and Means	16% (N=19)	57% (N=86)	10.5606	.001***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.11 Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal's W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	50% (N=14)	49% (N=89)	.0015	.969
Agriculture	47% (N=19)	50% (N=84)	.0429	.836
Appropriations	58% (N=24)	47% (N=79)	.9735	.324
Civil Law	50% (N=14)	49% (N=89)	.0015	.969
Commerce	42% (N=19)	51% (N=84)	.5116	.474
Education	40% (N=15)	51% (N=88)	.6358	.425
Environment	53% (N=17)	49% (N=86)	.0956	.757
Health and Welfare	41% (N=17)	51% (N=86)	.5663	.452
Government Affairs	53% (N=19)	49% (N=84)	.0906	.763
Insurance	50% (N=10)	49% (N=93)	.0010	.974
Judiciary	31% (N=16)	53% (N=87)	2.5279	.112
Labor	56% (N=9)	49% (N=94)	.1440	.704
Municipal	32% (N=19)	54% (N=84)	2.9981	.083*
Natural Resources	53% (N=17)	49% (N=86)	.0956	.757
Retirement	73% (N=11)	47% (N=92)	2.6546	.103
Transportation	42% (N=19)	51% (N=84)	.5116	.474
Ways and Means	47% (N=19)	50% (N=84)	.0429	.836
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.12 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	.1679 (N=12)	.1535 (N=91)	-.01442	-.0879
Agriculture	.1657 (N=15)	.1534 (N=88)	-.0124	-.0828
Appropriations	.2115 (N=19)	.1424 (N=84)	-.0690	.5094
Civil Law	.2955 (N=12)	.1367 (N=91)	-.1588	-.9727
Commerce	.1291 (N=17)	.1603 (N=86)	.0313	.2207
Education	.2561 (N=17)	.1352 (N=86)	-.1209	-.8558
Environment	.1776 (N=12)	.1522 (N=91)	-.0254	-.1546
Health and Welfare	-.0966 (N=16)	.2015 (N=87)	.2981	2.096**
Government Affairs	.1061 (N=13)	.1623 (N=90)	.0562	.3548
Insurance	.1813 (N=12)	.1517 (N=91)	-.0296	-.1805
Judiciary	.0578 (N=12)	.1680 (N=91)	.1102	.6731
Labor	.1557 (N=15)	.1551 (N=88)	-.0006	-.0039
Municipal	-.0126 (N=13)	.1794 (N=90)	.1920	1.2206
Natural Resources	.3273 (N=18)	.1187 (N=85)	-.2086	-1.523
Retirement	.3252 (N=11)	.1348 (N=92)	-.1903	-1.124
Transportation	.0767 (N=13)	.1665 (N=90)	.0898	.5676
Ways and Means	-.1912 (N=19)	.2335 (N=84)	.4247	3.2934***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.13 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.0617 (N=13)	-.1981 (N=92)	-.1364	-.762
Agriculture	-.2639 (N=17)	-.1653 (N=88)	.0986	.615
Appropriations	-.0603 (N=19)	-.2080 (N=86)	-.1477	-.966
Civil Law	-.0144 (N=12)	-.2028 (N=93)	-.1883	-1.018
Commerce	-.1922 (N=17)	-.1791 (N=88)	.0131	.081
Education	-.1246 (N=17)	-.1922 (N=88)	-.0676	-.421
Environment	-.0313 (N=13)	-.2024 (N=92)	-.1711	-.957
Health and Welfare	-.2355 (N=17)	-.1707 (N=88)	.0648	.404
Government Affairs	-.0545 (N=15)	-.2023 (N=90)	-.1478	-.878
Insurance	-.1559 (N=15)	-.1855 (N=90)	-.0296	-.175
Judiciary	-.2077 (N=14)	-.1772 (N=91)	.0306	.176
Labor	-.0035 (N=16)	-.2132 (N=89)	-.2097	-1.284
Municipal	-.1986 (N=14)	-.1786 (N=91)	.0200	.115
Natural Resources	-.0444 (N=15)	-.2040 (N=90)	-.1596	-.949
Retirement	.1441 (N=10)	-.2155 (N=95)	-.3596	-1.813
Transportation	-.0984 (N=14)	.1940 (N=91)	-.0955	-.550
Ways and Means	-.6272 (N=19)	-.0827 (N=86)	.5444	3.782***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.14 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2001				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.1109 (N=11)	.1021 (N=94)	.2130	1.303
Agriculture	.1165 (N=17)	.0727 (N=88)	-.0439	-.320
Appropriations	.0931 (N=19)	.0768 (N=86)	-.0163	-.124
Civil Law	.3028 (N=10)	.0563 (N=95)	-.2465	-1.448
Commerce	.0269 (N=17)	.0900 (N=88)	.0631	.461
Education	.2381 (N=17)	.0492 (N=88)	-.1889	-1.392
Environment	.2264 (N=13)	.0591 (N=92)	-.1673	-1.098
Health and Welfare	.0138 (N=17)	.0925 (N=88)	.0787	.575
Government Affairs	.0738 (N=15)	.0808 (N=90)	.0070	.048
Insurance	.2372 (N=16)	.0515 (N=89)	-.1857	-1.334
Judiciary	-.1815 (N=13)	.1167 (N=92)	.2981	1.982*
Labor	.2888 (N=17)	.0394 (N=88)	-.2494	-1.850
Municipal	.0891 (N=12)	.0786 (N=93)	-.0105	-.066
Natural Resources	.1140 (N=15)	.0741 (N=90)	-.0399	-.277
Retirement	.2182 (N=11)	.0636 (N=94)	-.1546	-.942
Transportation	.1649 (N=16)	.0645 (N=89)	-.1005	-.717
Ways and Means	-.3094 (N=18)	.1603 (N=87)	.4697	3.737***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.15 Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2002				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.1195 (N=11)	-.2499 (N=94)	-.1304	-.999
Agriculture	-.1711 (N=17)	-.2489 (N=88)	-.0777	-.715
Appropriations	-.1181 (N=19)	-.2624 (N=86)	-.1443	-1.395
Civil Law	-.5809 (N=8)	-.2079 (N=97)	.3730	2.539**
Commerce	-.1862 (N=16)	-.2453 (N=89)	-.0591	-.529
Education	-.2602 (N=18)	-.2313 (N=87)	.0289	.271
Environment	-.2826 (N=14)	-.2291 (N=91)	.0535	.453
Health and Welfare	-.1954 (N=17)	-.2442 (N=88)	-.0488	-.447
Government Affairs	-.2789 (N=15)	-.2292 (N=90)	.0498	.434
Insurance	-.3676 (N=17)	-.2109 (N=88)	.1567	1.452
Judiciary	-.2463 (N=12)	-.2350 (N=93)	.0114	.090
Labor	-.3388 (N=16)	-.2178 (N=89)	.1210	1.088
Municipal	-.2904 (N=14)	-.2280 (N=91)	.0624	.529
Natural Resources	-.3763 (N=15)	-.2129 (N=90)	.1633	1.437
Retirement	-.3045 (N=11)	-.2283 (N=94)	.0763	.582
Transportation	-.3016 (N=18)	-.2228 (N=87)	.0789	.742
Ways and Means	-.0186 (N=18)	-.2813 (N=87)	-.2628	-2.541**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.16 Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2003				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee Member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.0759 (N=11)	-.2550 (N=94)	-.1791	-1.378
Agriculture	-.2052 (N=17)	-.2423 (N=88)	-.0371	-.340
Appropriations	-.1177 (N=19)	-.2625 (N=86)	-.1447	-1.400
Civil Law	-.4713 (N=10)	-.2115 (N=95)	.2598	1.932
Commerce	-.3629 (N=15)	-.2152 (N=90)	.1477	1.297
Education	-.3598 (N=17)	-.2124 (N=88)	.1474	1.364
Environment	-.1017 (N=14)	-.2570 (N=91)	-.1533	-1.325
Health and Welfare	-.2521 (N=16)	-.2334 (N=89)	.0187	.167
Government Affairs	-.0597 (N=15)	-.2657 (N=90)	-.2060	-1.823
Insurance	-.3564 (N=17)	-.2131 (N=88)	.1433	1.325
Judiciary	-.1882 (N=12)	-.2425 (N=93)	-.0542	-.430
Labor	-.3344 (N=16)	-.2186 (N=89)	.1157	1.041
Municipal	-.3474 (N=14)	-.2192 (N=91)	.1282	1.091
Natural Resources	-.2389 (N=17)	-.2358 (N=88)	.0031	.029
Retirement	-.3197 (N=11)	-.2265 (N=94)	.0932	.712
Transportation	-.2870 (N=18)	-.2258 (N=87)	.0612	.575
Ways and Means	-.2525 (N=17)	-.2331 (N=88)	.0193	.177
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.17 Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.0122 (N=11)	.0594 (N=94)	.0716	.4374
Agriculture	.1405 (N=17)	.0348 (N=88)	-.1058	-.7788
Appropriations	-.1538 (N=19)	.0973 (N=86)	.2511	1.963*
Civil Law	.0795 (N=8)	.0496 (N=97)	-.0299	-.1580
Commerce	.2238 (N=19)	.0139 (N=86)	-.2099	-1.6318
Education	.2361 (N=16)	.0188 (N=89)	-.2173	-1.5752
Environment	.1679 (N=10)	.0397 (N=95)	-.1282	-.7523
Health and Welfare	-.0319 (N=19)	.0704 (N=86)	.1023	.7874
Government Affairs	-.3076 (N=10)	.0897 (N=95)	.3973	2.389**
Insurance	.1973 (N=18)	.0218 (N=87)	-.1755	-1.3300
Judiciary	-.0479 (N=14)	.0673 (N=91)	.1152	.7828
Labor	.0305 (N=10)	.0541 (N=95)	.0236	.1384
Municipal	-.24 (N=12)	.0896 (N=93)	.3296	2.1359**
Natural Resources	.1355 (N=17)	.0357 (N=88)	-.0998	-.7347
Retirement	.1659 (N=9)	.0412 (N=96)	-.1247	-.6974
Transportation	.2998 (N=18)	.0006 (N=87)	-.2992	-2.3048**
Ways and Means	-.2801 (N=19)	.1252 (N=86)	.4053	3.2680***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.18 Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2005				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.3025 (N=15)	-.0317 (N=90)	.2708	1.9081*
Agriculture	-.0898 (N=14)	-.0674 (N=91)	.0224	.1507
Appropriations	-.2834 (N=19)	-.0233 (N=86)	.2600	2.0202**
Civil Law	.0402 (N=10)	-.0820 (N=95)	-.1222	-.7118
Commerce	.0733 (N=19)	-.1021 (N=86)	-.1754	-1.3485
Education	.169 (N=15)	-.1103 (N=90)	-.2793	-1.9703*
Environment	-.082 (N=7)	-.0696 (N=98)	.0124	.0615
Health and Welfare	-.0718 (N=19)	-.0701 (N=86)	.0018	.0136
Government Affairs	-.1822 (N=9)	-.0599 (N=96)	.1223	.6793
Insurance	.1161 (N=17)	-.1064 (N=88)	-.2225	-1.6435
Judiciary	-.0454 (N=16)	-.0749 (N=89)	-.0295	-.2099
Labor	-.0759 (N=11)	-.0697 (N=94)	.0062	.0374
Municipal	-.2034 (N=12)	-.0532 (N=93)	.1502	.9499
Natural Resources	.0415 (N=16)	-.0905 (N=89)	-.1320	-.9429
Retirement	.2588 (N=11)	-.1089 (N=94)	-.3677	-2.2846**
Transportation	.3557 (N=19)	-.1645 (N=86)	-.5203	-4.3061***
Ways and Means	-.4579 (N=19)	.0152 (N=86)	.4731	3.8564***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.19 Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2006				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.2062 (N=13)	-.0569 (N=92)	.1493	1.0058
Agriculture	-.105 (N=14)	-.0709 (N=91)	.0341	.2362
Appropriations	-.2595 (N=18)	-.0373 (N=87)	.2222	1.7289*
Civil Law	-.0318 (N=9)	-.0795 (N=96)	-.0477	-.2722
Commerce	.0671 (N=18)	-.1049 (N=87)	-.1719	-1.3306
Education	.0744 (N=17)	-.1044 (N=88)	-.1788	-1.3525
Environment	-.0956 (N=8)	-.0738 (N=97)	.0219	.1181
Health and Welfare	.0045 (N=17)	-.0909 (N=88)	-.0954	-.7172
Government Affairs	-.2643 (N=10)	-.0555 (N=95)	.2088	1.2569
Insurance	.063 (N=17)	-.1022 (N=88)	-.1652	-1.2479
Judiciary	-.0495 (N=17)	-.0804 (N=88)	-.0310	-.2323
Labor	-.1131 (N=11)	-.0710 (N=94)	.0421	.2623
Municipal	-.2473 (N=12)	-.0533 (N=93)	.1940	1.2661
Natural Resources	.0829 (N=15)	-.1018 (N=90)	-.1848	-1.3273
Retirement	.2225 (N=11)	-.1103 (N=94)	-.3328	-2.1197**
Transportation	.3296 (N=19)	-.1649 (N=86)	-.4945	-4.1928***
Ways and Means	-.4057 (N=18)	-.0071 (N=87)	.3986	3.2073***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.20 Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2007				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.2588 (N=13)	-.0799 (N=92)	.1789	1.0905
Agriculture	-.2304 (N=14)	-.0824 (N=91)	.1480	.9296
Appropriations	-.3205 (N=19)	-.0538 (N=86)	.2667	1.9228*
Civil Law	-.0477 (N=9)	-.1072 (N=96)	-.0595	-.3068
Commerce	.0993 (N=17)	-.1410 (N=88)	-.2404	-1.6506
Education	-.0081 (N=17)	-.1203 (N=88)	-.1122	-.7627
Environment	-.0744 (N=8)	-.1044 (N=97)	-.0300	-.1465
Health and Welfare	-.0222 (N=17)	-.1175 (N=88)	-.0954	-.6477
Government Affairs	-.2777 (N=9)	-.0856 (N=96)	.1920	.9939
Insurance	.1034 (N=17)	-.1418 (N=88)	-.2452	-1.6848*
Judiciary	-.0539 (N=17)	-.1114 (N=88)	-.0575	-.3902
Labor	-.1392 (N=11)	-.0978 (N=94)	.0414	.2335
Municipal	-.3066 (N=12)	-.0757 (N=93)	.2309	1.3637
Natural Resources	.0238 (N=16)	-.1247 (N=89)	-.1485	-.9869
Retirement	.2245 (N=11)	-.1403 (N=94)	-.3648	-2.0990**
Transportation	.2462 (N=19)	-.1790 (N=86)	-.4252	-3.1541***
Ways and Means	-.4381 (N=19)	-.0279 (N=86)	.4102	.0031***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.21 Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	.1279 (N=14)	.1233 (N=89)	-.0047	-.0291
Agriculture	.2209 (N=19)	.1019 (N=84)	-.1190	-.8423
Appropriations	.216 (N=24)	.0959 (N=79)	-.1201	-.9271
Civil Law	.2192 (N=14)	.1089 (N=89)	-.1103	-.6891
Commerce	-.0297 (N=19)	.1586 (N=84)	.1884	1.3404
Education	-.1418 (N=15)	.1692 (N=88)	.3110	2.0352**
Environment	.1912 (N=17)	.1106 (N=86)	-.0807	-.5452
Health and Welfare	.2018 (N=17)	.1085 (N=86)	-.0933	-.6308
Government Affairs	.2082 (N= 19)	.1048 (N=84)	-.1033	-.7307
Insurance	.1077 (N=10)	.1256 (N=93)	.0179	.0966
Judiciary	-.0979 (N=16)	.1647 (N=87)	.2626	1.7561*
Labor	.0883 (N=9)	.1273 (N=94)	.0390	.2001
Municipal	-.0816 (N=19)	.1704 (N=84)	.2520	1.8059*
Natural Resources	1.9124 (N=17)	.1106 (N=86)	-.0807	-.5452
Retirement	.2516 (N=11)	.1086 (N=92)	-.1430	-.8058
Transportation	.0135 (N=19)	.1489 (N=84)	.1353	.9588
Ways and Means	.1361 (N=19)	.1211 (N=84)	-.0150	-.1056
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.22 Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	42% (N=12)	47% (N=90)	.1065	.744
Agriculture	47% (N=15)	46% (N=87)	.0024	.961
Appropriations	53% (N=19)	45% (N=83)	.4036	.525
Civil Law	67% (N=12)	43% (N=90)	2.3202	.128
Commerce	53% (N=17)	45% (N=85)	.3867	.534
Education	65% (N=17)	42% (N=85)	2.8489	.091*
Environment	42% (N=12)	47% (N=90)	.1065	.744
Health and Welfare	25% (N=16)	50% (N=86)	3.3934	.065*
Government Affairs	38% (N=13)	47% (N=89)	.3479	.555
Insurance	33% (N=12)	48% (N=90)	.8891	.346
Judiciary	17% (N=12)	50% (N=90)	4.7350	.030**
Labor	47% (N=15)	46% (N=87)	.0024	.961
Municipal	38% (N=13)	47% (N=89)	.3479	.555
Natural Resources	72% (N=18)	40% (N=84)	6.0127	.014**
Retirement	82% (N=11)	42% (N=91)	6.3386	.012**
Transportation	31% (N=13)	48% (N=89)	1.4054	.236
Ways and Means	21% (N=19)	52% (N=83)	5.8856	.015**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.23 Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	46% (N=13)	50% (N=92)	.0674	.795
Agriculture	18% (N=17)	56% (N=88)	8.2452	.004***
Appropriations	53% (N=19)	49% (N=86)	.0896	.765
Civil Law	75% (N=12)	46% (N=93)	3.5177	.061*
Commerce	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Education	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Environment	54% (N=13)	49% (N=92)	.1109	.739
Health and Welfare	41% (N=17)	51% (N=88)	.5654	.452
Government Affairs	67% (N=15)	47% (N=90)	2.0573	.151
Insurance	73% (N=15)	46% (N=90)	3.9686	.046**
Judiciary	50% (N=14)	49% (N=91)	.0015	.969
Labor	63% (N=16)	47% (N=89)	1.2715	.259
Municipal	43% (N=14)	51% (N=91)	.2872	.592
Natural Resources	40% (N=15)	51% (N=90)	.6350	.426
Retirement	90% (N=10)	45% (N=95)	7.2438	.007***
Transportation	50% (N=14)	49% (N=91)	.0015	.969
Ways and Means	16% (N=19)	57% (N=86)	10.5606	.001***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.24 Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2001				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	36% (N=11)	51% (N=94)	.8513	.356
Agriculture	47% (N=17)	50% (N=88)	.0493	.824
Appropriations	53% (N=19)	49% (N=86)	.0896	.765
Civil Law	70% (N=10)	47% (N=95)	1.8538	.173
Commerce	35% (N=17)	52% (N=88)	1.6430	.200
Education	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Environment	69% (N=13)	47% (N=92)	2.3051	.129
Health and Welfare	47% (N=17)	50% (N=88)	.0493	.824
Government Affairs	53% (N=15)	49% (N=90)	.1016	.750
Insurance	56% (N=16)	48% (N=89)	.3416	.559
Judiciary	46% (N=13)	50% (N=92)	.0674	.795
Labor	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Municipal	42% (N=12)	51% (N=93)	.3346	.563
Natural Resources	47% (N=15)	50% (N=90)	.0571	.811
Retirement	64% (N=11)	48% (N=94)	.9790	.322
Transportation	44% (N=16)	51% (N=89)	.2517	.616
Ways and Means	22% (N=18)	55% (N=87)	6.4777	.011**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.25 Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2002				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	36% (N=11)	52% (N=93)	.9150	.339
Agriculture	41% (N=17)	52% (N=87)	.6329	.426
Appropriations	53% (N=19)	49% (N=85)	.0644	.800
Civil Law	63% (N=8)	49% (N=96)	.5417	.462
Commerce	38% (N=16)	52% (N=88)	1.1818	.277
Education	59% (N=17)	48% (N=87)	.6329	.426
Environment	69% (N=13)	47% (N=91)	2.1978	.138
Health and Welfare	41% (N=17)	52% (N=87)	.6329	.426
Government Affairs	53% (N=15)	49% (N=89)	.0779	.780
Insurance	59% (N=17)	48% (N=87)	.6329	.426
Judiciary	50% (N=12)	50% (N=92)	.0000	1.000
Labor	56% (N=16)	49% (N=88)	.2955	.587
Municipal	62% (N=13)	48% (N=91)	.7912	.374
Natural Resources	60% (N=15)	48% (N=89)	.7011	.402
Retirement	64% (N=11)	48% (N=93)	.9150	.339
Transportation	61% (N=18)	48% (N=86)	1.0749	.300
Ways and Means	11% (N=18)	58% (N=86)	13.1680	.000***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.26 Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2003				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	9% (N=11)	29% (N=94)	1.9409	.164
Agriculture	29% (N=17)	26% (N=88)	.0782	.780
Appropriations	21% (N=19)	28% (N=86)	.3739	.541
Civil Law	50% (N=10)	24% (N=95)	3.0772	.079*
Commerce	33% (N=15)	26% (N=90)	.3977	.528
Education	35% (N=17)	25% (N=88)	.7721	.380
Environment	21% (N=14)	27% (N=91)	.2266	.634
Health and Welfare	25% (N=16)	27% (N=89)	.0268	.870
Government Affairs	33% (N=15)	26% (N=90)	.3977	.528
Insurance	29% (N=17)	26% (N=88)	.0782	.780
Judiciary	25% (N=12)	27% (N=93)	.0192	.890
Labor	50% (N=16)	22% (N=89)	5.2554	.022**
Municipal	21% (N=14)	27% (N=91)	.2266	.634
Natural Resources	24% (N=17)	27% (N=88)	.1021	.749
Retirement	18% (N=11)	28% (N=94)	.4523	.501
Transportation	33% (N=18)	25% (N=87)	.4937	.482
Ways and Means	6% (N=17)	31% (N=88)	4.4808	.034**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.27 Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	55% (N=11)	44% (N=93)	.4345	.510
Agriculture	63% (N=16)	42% (N=88)	2.2869	.130
Appropriations	22% (N=18)	50% (N=86)	4.6369	.031**
Civil Law	50% (N=8)	45% (N=96)	.0809	.776
Commerce	53% (N=19)	44% (N=85)	.5194	.471
Education	60% (N=15)	43% (N=89)	1.5517	.213
Environment	50% (N=10)	45% (N=94)	.1032	.748
Health and Welfare	42% (N=19)	46% (N=85)	.0894	.765
Government Affairs	40% (N=10)	46% (N=94)	.1204	.729
Insurance	61% (N=18)	42% (N=86)	2.2270	.136
Judiciary	43% (N=14)	46% (N=90)	.0356	.850
Labor	60% (N=10)	44% (N=94)	.9794	.322
Municipal	25% (N=12)	48% (N=92)	2.2330	.135
Natural Resources	41% (N=17)	46% (N=87)	.1323	.716
Retirement	56% (N=9)	44% (N=95)	.4272	.513
Transportation	83% (N=18)	37% (N=86)	12.7846	.000***
Ways and Means	11% (N=19)	53% (N=85)	11.2790	.001***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.28 Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2005				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	27% (N=15)	52% (N=90)	3.3615	.067*
Agriculture	57% (N=14)	47% (N=91)	.4751	.491
Appropriations	37% (N=19)	51% (N=86)	1.2776	.258
Civil Law	50% (N=10)	48% (N=95)	.0090	.924
Commerce	68% (N=19)	44% (N=86)	3.6590	.056*
Education	73% (N=15)	44% (N=90)	4.2956	.038**
Environment	14% (N=7)	51% (N=98)	3.5294	.060*
Health and Welfare	42% (N=19)	50% (N=86)	.3883	.533
Government Affairs	33% (N=9)	50% (N=96)	.9150	.339
Insurance	71% (N=17)	44% (N=88)	3.9362	.047**
Judiciary	38% (N=16)	51% (N=89)	.9263	.336
Labor	55% (N=11)	48% (N=94)	.1756	.675
Municipal	42% (N=12)	49% (N=93)	.2586	.611
Natural Resources	63% (N=16)	46% (N=89)	1.4660	.226
Retirement	73% (N=11)	46% (N=94)	2.8702	.090*
Transportation	84% (N=19)	41% (N=86)	11.7954	.001***
Ways and Means	21% (N=19)	55% (N=86)	7.0326	.008***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.29 Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2006				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	23% (N=13)	53% (N=92)	4.1514	.042**
Agriculture	43% (N=14)	51% (N=91)	.2872	.592
Appropriations	28% (N=18)	54% (N=87)	4.1096	.043**
Civil Law	44% (N=9)	50% (N=96)	.1016	.750
Commerce	67% (N=18)	46% (N=87)	2.5539	.110
Education	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Environment	38% (N=8)	51% (N=97)	.5008	.479
Health and Welfare	65% (N=17)	47% (N=88)	1.8703	.171
Government Affairs	50% (N=10)	49% (N=95)	.0010	.975
Insurance	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Judiciary	47% (N=17)	50% (N=88)	.0493	.824
Labor	45% (N=11)	50% (N=94)	.0814	.775
Municipal	33% (N=12)	52% (N=93)	1.4207	.233
Natural Resources	53% (N=15)	49% (N=90)	.1016	.750
Retirement	73% (N=11)	47% (N=94)	2.6464	.104
Transportation	89% (N=19)	41% (N=86)	14.8107	.000***
Ways and Means	17% (N=18)	56% (N=87)	9.3821	.002***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.30 Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2007				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	46% (N=13)	50% (N=92)	.0674	.795
Agriculture	29% (N=14)	53% (N=91)	2.8369	.092*
Appropriations	21% (N=19)	56% (N=86)	7.5224	.006***
Civil Law	56% (N=9)	49% (N=96)	.1433	.705
Commerce	65% (N=17)	47% (N=88)	1.8703	.171
Education	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Environment	50% (N=8)	49% (N=97)	.0008	.978
Health and Welfare	53% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	.0948	.758
Government Affairs	56% (N=9)	49% (N=96)	.1433	.705
Insurance	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Judiciary	41% (N=17)	51% (N=88)	.5654	.452
Labor	45% (N=11)	50% (N=94)	.0814	.775
Municipal	33% (N=12)	52% (N=93)	1.4207	.233
Natural Resources	50% (N=16)	49% (N=89)	.0017	.967
Retirement	73% (N=11)	47% (N=94)	2.6464	.104
Transportation	84% (N=19)	42% (N=86)	11.1653	.001***
Ways and Means	26% (N=19)	55% (N=86)	4.9983	.025**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.31 Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	36% (N=14)	42% (N=89)	.1719	.678
Agriculture	26% (N=19)	44% (N=84)	2.0174	.156
Appropriations	42% (N=24)	41% (N=79)	.0103	.919
Civil Law	57% (N=14)	38% (N=89)	1.7971	.180
Commerce	21% (N=19)	45% (N=84)	3.7532	.053*
Education	47% (N=15)	40% (N=88)	.2522	.616
Environment	29% (N=17)	43% (N=86)	1.0890	.297
Health and Welfare	53% (N=17)	38% (N=86)	1.2476	.264
Government Affairs	47% (N=19)	39% (N=84)	.4192	.517
Insurance	20% (N=10)	43% (N=93)	1.9797	.159
Judiciary	38% (N=16)	41% (N=87)	.0842	.772
Labor	44% (N=9)	40% (N=94)	.0549	.815
Municipal	37% (N=19)	42% (N=84)	.1494	.699
Natural Resources	29% (N=17)	43% (N=86)	1.0890	.297
Retirement	45% (N=11)	40% (N=92)	.1116	.738
Transportation	37% (N=19)	42% (N=84)	.1494	.699
Ways and Means	47% (N=19)	39% (N=84)	.4192	.517
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.32 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	52.75 (N=12)	55.9 (N=90)	3.15	.3327
Agriculture	.1657 (N=15)	.1534 (N=88)	-.0124	-.0828
Appropriations	60.7895 (N=19)	54.3253 (N=83)	-6.464	-.8274
Civil Law	62.3333 (N=12)	54.6222 (N=90)	-7.7111	-.8168
Commerce	57.1177 (N=17)	55.2118 (N=85)	-1.906	-0.2328
Education	60.1177 (N=17)	54.6118 (N=85)	-5.5059	-.6739
Environment	56.1667 (N=12)	55.4444 (N=90)	-.72222	-.0762
Health and Welfare	44.4375 (N=16)	57.5930 (N=86)	13.1555	1.5872
Government Affairs	53.3846 (N=13)	55.8427 (N=89)	2.4581	.2687
Insurance	52.0833 (N=12)	55.9889 (N=90)	3.9056	.4127
Judiciary	50.75 (N=12)	56.1667 (N=90)	5.4167	.5728
Labor	52.2667 (N=15)	56.0920 (N=87)	3.8253	.4443
Municipal	50.5385 (N=13)	56.2584 (N=89)	5.7200	.6262
Natural Resources	68.7222 (N=18)	52.7024 (N=84)	-16.0198	-2.0423*
Retirement	72.6364 (N=11)	53.4615 (N=91)	-19.1748	-1.9869*
Transportation	47.1539 (N=13)	56.7528 (N=89)	9.5990	1.0547
Ways and Means	39.6842 (N=19)	59.1566 (N=83)	19.4724	2.5644**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.33 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	43.0769 (N=13)	43.5543 (N=92)	.4774	.054
Agriculture	26.8824 (N=17)	46.7045 (N=88)	19.8222	2.587**
Appropriations	42.4737 (N=19)	43.7209 (N=86)	1.2472	.165
Civil Law	60.5833 (N=12)	41.2903 (N=93)	-19.2930	-2.155**
Commerce	43.3529 (N=17)	43.5227 (N=88)	.1698	.021
Education	45.1765 (N=17)	43.1705 (N=88)	-2.0060	-.254
Environment	50.9231 (N=13)	42.4457 (N=92)	-8.4774	-.963
Health and Welfare	44.2353 (N=17)	43.3523 (N=88)	-.8830	-.112
Government Affairs	50.6667 (N=15)	42.3000 (N=90)	-8.3667	-1.010
Insurance	51.6000 (N=15)	42.1444 (N=90)	-9.4556	-1.143
Judiciary	45.4286 (N=14)	43.1978 (N=91)	-2.2308	-.260
Labor	54.1875 (N=16)	41.5730 (N=89)	-12.6145	-1.575
Municipal	41.0714 (N=14)	43.8681 (N=91)	2.7967	.327
Natural Resources	46.2667 (N=15)	43.0333 (N=90)	-3.2333	-.389
Retirement	62.3000 (N=10)	41.5158 (N=95)	-20.7842	-2.141**
Transportation	44.0714 (N=14)	43.4066 (N=91)	-.6648	-.078
Ways and Means	27.5263 (N=19)	47.0233 (N=86)	19.4969	2.665***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.34 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2001				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee Member	Non Committee member	Mean difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice	57.7273 (N=11)	63.0638 (N=94)	5.3366	.544
Agriculture	61.1176 (N=17)	62.7727 (N=88)	1.6551	.203
Appropriations	66.7368 (N=19)	61.5698 (N=86)	-5.1671	-.662
Civil Law	76.4000 (N=10)	61.0421 (N=95)	-15.3579	-1.514
Commerce	55.1765 (N=17)	63.9205 (N=88)	8.7440	1.076
Education	67.4706 (N=17)	61.5455 (N=88)	-5.9251	-.727
Environment	69.7692 (N=13)	61.4783 (N=92)	-8.2910	-.911
Health and Welfare	56.4118 (N=17)	63.6818 (N=88)	7.2701	.893
Government Affairs	64.2000 (N=15)	62.2222 (N=90)	-1.9778	-.230
Insurance	72.1250 (N=16)	60.7753 (N=89)	-11.3497	-1.367
Judiciary	58.4615 (N=13)	63.0761 (N=92)	4.6145	.506
Labor	65.7059 (N=17)	61.8864 (N=88)	-3.8195	-.468
Municipal	59.9167 (N=12)	62.8387 (N=93)	2.9220	.309
Natural Resources	59.4667 (N=15)	63.0111 (N=90)	3.5444	.412
Retirement	70.9091 (N=11)	61.5213 (N=94)	-9.3878	-.959
Transportation	61.3750 (N=16)	62.7079 (N=89)	1.3329	.159
Ways and Means	42.8333 (N=18)	66.5747 (N=87)	23.7414	3.109***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.35 Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2002				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	59.1818 (N=11)	63.0430 (N=93)	3.8612	.405
Agriculture	59.7059 (N=17)	63.2069 (N=87)	3.5010	.442
Appropriations	65.6842 (N=19)	61.9529 (N=85)	-3.7313	-.492
Civil Law	74.6250 (N=8)	61.6354 (N=96)	-12.9896	-1.188
Commerce	58.7500 (N=16)	63.3409 (N=88)	4.5909	.565
Education	66.0000 (N=17)	61.9770 (N=87)	-4.0230	-.508
Environment	67.6923 (N=13)	61.9121 (N=91)	-5.7802	-.653
Health and Welfare	55.7647 (N=17)	63.9770 (N=87)	8.2123	1.040
Government Affairs	62.7333 (N=15)	62.6180 (N=89)	-.1154	-.014
Insurance	69.4118 (N=17)	61.3103 (N=87)	-8.1014	-1.026
Judiciary	63.6667 (N=12)	62.5000 (N=92)	-1.1667	-.127
Labor	64.3125 (N=16)	62.3295 (N=88)	-1.9830	-.244
Municipal	62.2308 (N=13)	62.6923 (N=91)	.4615	.052
Natural Resources	66.2000 (N=15)	62.0337 (N=89)	-4.1663	-.499
Retirement	70.8182 (N=11)	61.6667 (N=93)	-9.1515	-.964
Transportation	66.0556 (N=18)	61.9186 (N=86)	-4.1370	-.534
Ways and Means	40.8889 (N=18)	67.1860 (N=86)	26.2972	3.600**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.36 Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2003				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee Member	Non Committee member	Mean difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	63.3636 (N=11)	67.8085 (N=94)	4.4449	.695
Agriculture	67.0588 (N=17)	67.3977 (N=88)	.3389	.064
Appropriations	61.2632 (N=19)	68.6860 (N=86)	7.4229	1.470
Civil Law	78.5000 (N=10)	66.1684 (N=95)	-12.3316	-1.875
Commerce	71.1333 (N=15)	66.7111 (N=90)	-4.4222	-.790
Education	70.3529 (N=17)	66.7614 (N=88)	-3.5916	-.675
Environment	68.9286 (N=14)	67.0989 (N=91)	-1.8297	-.317
Health and Welfare	63.1875 (N=16)	68.0899 (N=89)	4.9024	.901
Government Affairs	67.8000 (N=15)	67.2667 (N=90)	-.5333	-.095
Insurance	72.7059 (N=17)	66.3068 (N=88)	-6.3991	-1.209
Judiciary	64.0833 (N=12)	67.7634 (N=93)	3.6801	.597
Labor	71.6875 (N=16)	66.5618 (N=89)	-5.1257	-.942
Municipal	68.5714 (N=14)	67.1538 (N=91)	-1.4176	-.245
Natural Resources	66.7059 (N=17)	67.4659 (N=88)	.7600	.143
Retirement	64.9091 (N=11)	67.6277 (N=94)	2.7186	.424
Transportation	65.8333 (N=18)	67.6552 (N=87)	1.8218	.350
Ways and Means	61.4706 (N=17)	68.4773 (N=88)	7.0067	1.325
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.37 Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	68.8182 (N=11)	73.7850 (N=93)	4.9668	.8493
Agriculture	78.625 (N=16)	72.2841 (N=88)	-6.3409	-1.2777
Appropriations	65.6667 (N=18)	74.8488 (N=86)	9.1822	1.9606*
Civil Law	74.25 (N=8)	73.1771 (N=96)	-1.0729	-.1584
Commerce	75.7895 (N=19)	72.6941 (N=85)	-3.0954	-.6642
Education	83.2 (N=15)	71.5843 (N=89)	-11.6157	-2.3200**
Environment	72.9 (N=10)	73.2979 (N=94)	.3979	.0650
Health and Welfare	67.1579 (N=19)	74.6235 (N=85)	7.4656	1.6188
Government Affairs	69.1 (N=10)	73.7021 (N=94)	4.6021	.7538
Insurance	77.7222 (N=18)	72.3256 (N=86)	-5.3966	-1.1384
Judiciary	69.5714 (N=14)	73.8333 (N=90)	4.2619	.8086
Labor	73.9 (N=10)	73.1915 (N=94)	-.7085	-.1157
Municipal	63.25 (N=12)	74.5652 (N=92)	11.3152	2.0436**
Natural Resources	76.7647 (N=17)	72.5747 (N=87)	-4.1900	-.8616
Retirement	79.3333 (N=9)	72.6842 (N=95)	-6.6491	-1.0413
Transportation	88.0556 (N=18)	70.1628 (N=86)	-17.8928	-4.0394***
Ways and Means	61.1053 (N=19)	75.9765 (N=85)	14.8712	.0011***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.38 Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2005				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	59.7333 (N=15)	68.8778 (N=90)	9.1444	1.3531
Agriculture	75.2857 (N=14)	66.3846 (N=91)	-8.9011	-1.2783
Appropriations	61.6316 (N=19)	68.8837 (N=86)	7.2521	1.1781
Civil Law	72.5 (N=10)	67.0526 (N=95)	-5.4474	-.6717
Commerce	76.9474 (N=19)	65.5 (N=86)	-11.4474	-1.8786*
Education	79.6 (N=15)	65.5667 (N=90)	-14.0333	-2.1020*
Environment	59.5714 (N=7)	68.1429 (N=98)	8.5714	..8997
Health and Welfare	66.6842 (N=19)	67.7674 (N=86)	1.0832	.1748
Government Affairs	61 (N=9)	68.1875 (N=96)	7.1875	.8463
Insurance	71.8824 (N=17)	66.7386 (N=88)	-5.1437	-.7966
Judiciary	62.1875 (N=16)	68.5393 (N=89)	6.3518	.9611
Labor	64.8182 (N=11)	67.8936 (N=94)	3.0754	.3951
Municipal	59 (N=12)	68.6774 (N=93)	9.6774	1.3011
Natural Resources	77.5 (N=16)	65.7865 (N=89)	-11.7135	-1.7918*
Retirement	80.2727 (N=11)	66.0851 (N=94)	-14.1876	-1.8513*
Transportation	84.4211 (N=19)	63.8488 (N=86)	-20.5722	-3.5129***
Ways and Means	48.3158 (N=19)	71.8256 (N=86)	23.5098	4.0902***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.39 Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2006				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	61 (N=13)	64.8478 (N=92)	3.8478	.5604
Agriculture	64.7143 (N=14)	64.3187 (N=91)	-.3956	-.0594
Appropriations	55.9444 (N=18)	66.1149 (N=87)	10.1705	1.7165*
Civil Law	62.8889 (N=9)	64.5104 (N=96)	1.6215	.2005
Commerce	72 (N=18)	62.7931 (N=87)	-9.2069	-1.5499
Education	68.4706 (N=17)	63.5796 (N=88)	-4.8910	-.7980
Environment	61.125 (N=8)	64.6392 (N=97)	3.5142	.4120
Health and Welfare	69.0588 (N=17)	63.4659 (N=88)	-5.5929	-.9133
Government Affairs	55.3 (N=10)	65.3263 (N=95)	10.0263	1.3103
Insurance	71 (N=17)	63.0909 (N=88)	-7.9091	-1.2968
Judiciary	64.7059 (N=17)	64.3068 (N=88)	-.3991	-.0649
Labor	58.3636 (N=11)	65.0745 (N=94)	6.7108	.9111
Municipal	53 (N=12)	65.8387 (N=93)	12.8387	1.8327*
Natural Resources	69.8667 (N=15)	63.4556 (N=90)	-6.4111	-.9953
Retirement	72.2727 (N=11)	63.4468 (N=94)	-8.8259	-1.2018
Transportation	80.6842 (N=19)	60.7674 (N=86)	-19.9168	-3.5912***
Ways and Means	50.7222 (N=18)	67.1954 (N=87)	16.4732	2.8471***
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.40 Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2007				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	56 (N=13)	63.5326 (N=92)	7.5326	.9238
Agriculture	51.2857 (N=14)	64.3407 (N=91)	13.0550	1.6677*
Appropriations	44.9474 (N=19)	66.5 (N=86)	21.5526	3.2288**
Civil Law	61.7778 (N=9)	62.6771 (N=96)	.8993	.0934
Commerce	74.1765 (N=17)	60.3636 (N=88)	-13.8128	-1.9203*
Education	68.5882 (N=17)	61.4432 (N=88)	-7.1451	-.9806
Environment	59.625 (N=8)	62.8454 (N=97)	3.2204	.3170
Health and Welfare	65.1765 (N=17)	62.1023 (N=88)	-3.0742	-.4203
Government Affairs	60.4444 (N=9)	62.8021 (N=96)	2.3576	.2448
Insurance	70.6471 (N=17)	61.0455 (N=88)	-9.6016	-1.3227
Judiciary	62.4118 (N=17)	62.6364 (N=88)	.2246	.0307
Labor	61 (N=11)	62.7872 (N=94)	1.7872	.2030
Municipal	55.5 (N=12)	63.5161 (N=93)	8.0161	.9499
Natural Resources	67.0625 (N=16)	61.7978 (N=89)	-5.2647	-.7033
Retirement	71.8182 (N=11)	61.5213 (N=94)	-10.2969	-1.1772
Transportation	83.2632 (N=19)	58.0349 (N=86)	-25.2283	-3.8523***
Ways and Means	47.4211 (N=19)	65.9535 (N=86)	18.5324	2.7405**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.41 Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non-Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	66.3571 (N=14)	66.5169 (N=89)	.1597	.0446
Agriculture	64.4737 (N=19)	66.9524 (N=84)	2.4787	.7858
Appropriations	65.75 (N=24)	66.7215 (N=79)	.9715	.3348
Civil Law	68.0714 (N=14)	66.2472 (N=89)	-1.8242	-.5101
Commerce	63.8947 (N=19)	67.0833 (N=84)	3.1886	1.0129
Education	65.8 (N=15)	66.6136 (N=88)	.8136	.2339
Environment	67.2353 (N=17)	66.3488 (N=86)	-.8865	-.2682
Health and Welfare	68.0588 (N=17)	66.1861 (N=86)	-1.8728	-.5674
Government Affairs	67.7895 (N=19)	66.2024 (N=84)	-1.5871	-.5022
Insurance	64.9 (N=10)	66.6667 (N=93)	1.7666	.4266
Judiciary	65 (N=16)	66.7701 (N=87)	1.7701	.5232
Labor	66.5556 (N=9)	66.4894 (N=94)	-.0662	-.0152
Municipal	66.2105 (N=19)	66.5595 (N=84)	.3490	.1103
Natural Resources	67.2353 (N=17)	66.3488 (N=86)	-.8865	-.2682
Retirement	66.6364 (N=11)	66.4783 (N=92)	-.1581	-.0398
Transportation	65.7368 (N=19)	66.6667 (N=84)	.9298	.2940
Ways and Means	67.6842 (N=19)	66.2262 (N=84)	-1.4580	-.4613
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.42: Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on Louisiana House standing committees
1999

Louisiana Standing Committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-Square for Median Difference	Prob-Value
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	58% (N=12)	46% (N=93)	.6235	.430
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	94% (N=16)	38% (N=89)	16.8131	.000***
Education				
Median family income	41% (N=17)	51% (N=88)	.5654	.452
Health and Welfare				
% of district age 55 or over	69% (N=16)	43% (N=89)	3.6986	.054*
Judiciary				
% African Americans	50% (N=12)	47% (N=93)	.0308	.861
Labor				
% in manufacturing	27% (N=15)	50% (N=90)	2.8125	.094*
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	55% (N=11)	46% (N=94)	.3065	.580
% on social security	36% (N=11)	47% (N=94)	.4329	.511

Statistical significance

*p=<.10

**p=<.05

***p=<.01

Table A-43: Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2000				
Louisiana Standing Committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-Square for Median Difference	Prob-Value
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	62% (N=13)	46% (N=92)	1.1525	.283
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	94% (N=17)	38% (N=88)	18.3502	.000***
Education				
Median family income	63% (N=16)	47% (N=89)	1.2715	.259
Health and Welfare				
% of district age 55 or over	71% (N=17)	42% (N=88)	4.6637	.031**
Judiciary				
% African American	71% (N=14)	44% (N=91)	3.6713	..055*
Labor				
% in manufacturing	38% (N=16)	48% (N=89)	.6373	.425
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	50% (N=10)	46% (N=95)	.0493	.824
% on social security	40% (N=10)	46% (N=95)	.1454	.703

Statistical significance

*p=<.10

**p=<.05

***p=<.01

Table A.44: Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2001				
Louisiana Standing Committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-Square for Median Difference	Prob-Value
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	64% (N=11)	46% (N=94)	1.2638	.261
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	94% (N=17)	38% (N=88)	18.3502	.000***
Education				
Median family income	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Health and Welfare				
% of district age 55 or over	65% (N=17)	43% (N=88)	2/6521	.103
Judiciary				
% African Americans	75% (N=12)	44% (N=93)	4.0722	.044**
Labor				
% in manufacturing	35% (N=17)	49% (N=88)	1.0541	.305
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	45% (N=11)	47% (N=94)	.0073	.932
% on social security	36% (N=11)	47% (N=94)	.4329	.511

Statistical significance

*p=<.10

**p=<.05

***p=<.01

Table A.45: Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2002				
Louisiana standing committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-values
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	64% (N=11)	48% (N=94)	.9790	.322
Pop. density	45% (N=11)	50% (N=94)	.0814	.775
% pop. living in urban area	40% (N=10)	51% (N=92)	.4435	.505
% pop. below poverty line	55% (N=11)	49% (N=94)	.1239	.457
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	82% (N=17)	26% (N=88)	19.7305	.000***
% of district living in rural farming areas	88% (N=17)	29% (N=85)	20.5645	.000***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	38% (N=8)	51% (N=94)	.5426	.461
Pop. density	75% (N=8)	47% (N=97)	2.2484	.134
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	19% (N=16)	30% (N=89)	.8922	.345
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	19% (N=16)	30% (N=89)	.8922	.345
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	29% (N=17)	45% (N=88)	1.4973	.221
Median family income	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402

(table continued)

Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	53% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.1551	.694
% of district employed in healthcare	53% (N=17)	41% (N=88)	.8422	.359
% of district age 55 or over	47% (N=17)	40% (N=88)	.3128	.576
% of pop. below poverty	65% (N=17)	47% (N=88)	1.8703	.171
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	40% (N=15)	48% (N=90)	.3125	.576
Judiciary				
% African American	75% (N=12)	46% (N=93)	3.5177	.061*
% Urban	55% (N=11)	49% (N=91)	.1019	.750
Pop. density	50% (N=12)	49% (N=93)	.0012	.972
% poverty	67% (N=12)	47% (N=93)	1.5928	.207
Labor				
% in manufacturing	50% (N=16)	43% (N=89)	.2939	.588
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	43% (N=17)	41% (N=91)	.0242	.876
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	30% (N=10)	42% (N=95)	.5483	.459
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	47% (N=17)	34% (N=88)	1.0375	.308

Statistical significance

*p=<.10 **p=<.05 ***p=<.01

Table A.46: Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2003				
Louisiana standing committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-values
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	64% (N=11)	48% (N=94)	.9790	.322
Pop. density	45% (N=11)	50% (N=94)	.0814	.775
% pop. living in urban area	40% (N=10)	51% (N=92)	.4435	.505
% pop. below poverty line	55% (N=11)	49% (N=94)	.1239	.725
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	82% (N=17)	26% (N=88)	19.7305	.000***
% of district living in rural farming areas	88% (N=17)	29% (N=85)	20.5645	.000***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	30% (N=10)	52% (N=92)	1.7739	.183
Pop. density	70% (N=10)	47% (N=95)	1.8538	.173
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	21% (N=14)	30% (N=91)	.4038	.525
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	14% (N=14)	31% (N=91)	1.6154	.204

(table continued)

Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	35% (N=17)	44% (N=88)	.4738	.491
Median family income	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	56% (N=16)	47% (N=89)	.4455	.504
% of district employed in healthcare	63% (N=16)	39% (N=89)	2.9740	.085*
% of district age 55 or over	44% (N=16)	40% (N=89)	.0611	.805
% of pop. below poverty	63% (N=16)	47% (N=89)	1.2715	.259
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	40% (N=15)	48% (N=90)	.3125	.576
Judiciary				
% African American	83% (N=12)	45% (N=93)	6.1953	.013*
% Urban	64% (N=11)	48% (N=91)	.9171	.338
Pop. density	33% (N=12)	52% (N=93)	1.4207	.233
% poverty	67% (N=12)	47% (N=93)	1.5928	.207
Labor				
% in manufacturing	50% (N=16)	43% (N=89)	.2939	.588
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	43% (N=17)	41% (N=91)	.0242	.876

(table continued)

Retirement				
	36% (N=11)	41% (N=94)	.1070	.744
% of district age 55 or older				
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	44% (N=18)	34% (N=87)	.6409	.423

Statistical significance

*p=<.10

**p=<.05

***p=<.01

Table A.47: Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2004				
Louisiana standing committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-values
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	64% (N=11)	48% (N=94)	.9790	.322
Pop. density	27% (N=11)	52% (N=94)	2.4336	.119
% pop. living in urban area	50% (N=10)	50% (N=92)	.0000	1.000
% pop. below poverty line	55% (N=11)	49% (N=94)	.1239	.725
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	82% (N=17)	26% (N=88)	19.7305	.000***
% of district living in rural farming areas	88% (N=17)	29% (N=85)	20.5645	.000***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	50% (N=8)	50% (N=94)	.0000	1.000
Pop. density	38% (N=8)	51% (N=97)	.5008	.479
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	37% (N=19)	27% (N=86)	.7775	.378
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	21% (N=19)	30% (N=86)	.6426	.423
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	38% (N=16)	44% (N=89)	.2212	.638
Median family income	63% (N=16)	47% (N=89)	1.2715	.259

(table continued)

Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	56% (N=18)	47% (N=87)	.4242	.515
% of district employed in healthcare	67% (N=18)	38% (N=87)	5.0287	.025**
% of district age 55 or over	50% (N=18)	39% (N=87)	.7354	.391
% of pop. below poverty	61% (N=18)	47% (N=87)	1.1668	.280
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	30% (N=10)	48% (N=95)	1.2336	.267
Judiciary				
% African American	71% (N=14)	46% (N=91)	3.1006	.078*
% Urban	46% (N=13)	51% (N=89)	.0882	.767
Pop. density	36% (N=14)	52% (N=91)	1.2323	.267
% poverty	64% (N=14)	47% (N=91)	1.4082	.235
Labor				
% in manufacturing	60% (N=10)	42% (N=95)	1.1769	.278
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	33% (N=12)	42% (N=93)	.3252	.568
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	22% (N=9)	43% (N=96)	1.4281	.232
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	28% (N=18)	38% (N=87)	.6658	.415

Statistical significance

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table A.48: Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2005

Louisiana standing committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-values
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	57% (N=14)	48% (N=91)	.3751	.540
Pop. density	43% (N=14)	51% (N=91)	.2872	.592
% pop. living in urban area	42% (N=12)	51% (N=90)	.3778	.539
% pop. below poverty line	50% (N=14)	49% (N=91)	.0015	.969
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	1% (N=14)	25% (N=91)	29.6881	.000***
% of district living in rural farming areas	86% (N=14)	32% (N=88)	14.7189	.000***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	50% (N=10)	50% (N=92)	.0000	1.000
Pop. density	40% (N=10)	51% (N=95)	.4010	.527
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	37% (N=19)	27% (N=86)	.7775	.378
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	21% (N=19)	30% (N=86)	.6426	.423
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	36% (N=14)	44% (N=91)	.3365	.562
Median family income	64% (N=14)	47% (N=91)	1.4082	.235

(table continued)

Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	56% (N=18)	47% (N=87)	.4242	.515
% of district employed in healthcare	67% (N=18)	38% (N=87)	5.0287	.025**
% of district age 55 or over	50% (N=18)	39% (N=87)	.7354	.391
% of pop. below poverty	61% (N=18)	47% (N=87)	1.1668	.280
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	33% (N=9)	48% (N=96)	.7031	.402
Judiciary				
% African American	63% (N=16)	47% (N=89)	1.2715	.259
% Urban	47% (N=15)	51% (N=87)	.0782	.780
Pop. density	38% (N=16)	52% (N=89)	1.0917	.296
% poverty	63% (N=16)	47% (N=89)	1.2715	.259
Labor				
% in manufacturing	55% (N=11)	43% (N=94)	.5753	.448
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	33% (N=12)	42% (N=93)	.3252	.568
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	18% (N=11)	44% (N=94)	2.6346	.105
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	33% (N=18)	37% (N=87)	.0768	.782

Statistical significance

*p=<.10

**p=<.05

***p=<.01

Table A.49: Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2006				
Louisiana standing committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-values
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	53% (N=15)	49% (N=90)	.3751	.540
Pop. density	47% (N=15)	50% (N=90)	.2872	.592
% pop. living in urban area	46% (N=13)	51% (N=89)	.3778	.539
% pop. below poverty line	47% (N=15)	50% (N=90)	.0015	.969
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	1% (N=14)	25% (N=91)	29.6881	.000***
% of district living in rural farming areas	86% (N=14)	32% (N=88)	14.7189	.000***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	56% (N=9)	49% (N=93)	.1219	.727
Pop. density	33% (N=9)	51% (N=96)	1.322	.310
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	37% (N=19)	27% (N=86)	.7775	.378
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	21% (N=19)	30% (N=86)	.6426	.423
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	36% (N=14)	44% (N=91)	.3365	.562
Median family income	50% (N=14)	49% (N=91)	.0015	.969

(table continued)

Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	58% (N=19)	47% (N=86)	.8072	.369
% of district employed in healthcare	63% (N=19)	38% (N=86)	3.9038	.048**
% of district age 55 or over	47% (N=19)	40% (N=86)	.3949	.530
% of pop. below poverty	58% (N=19)	48% (N=86)	.6503	.420
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	33% (N=9)	48% (N=96)	.7031	.402
Judiciary				
% African American	56% (N=16)	48% (N=89)	.3416	.559
% Urban	53% (N=15)	49% (N=87)	.0782	.780
Pop. density	38% (N=16)	52% (N=89)	1.917	.296
% poverty	50% (N=16)	49% (N=89)	.0017	.967
Labor				
% in manufacturing	55% (N=11)	43% (N=94)	.5753	.448
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	42% (N=12)	41% (N=93)	.0029	.957
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	17% (N=12)	44% (N=93)	3.3045	.069*
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	32% (N=19)	37% (N=86)	.2136	.644

Statistical significance

*p=<.10 **p=<.05 ***p=<.01

Table A.50: Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2007				
Louisiana standing committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-values
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	46% (N=13)	50% (N=92)	.0674	.795
Pop. density	46% (N=13)	50% (N=92)	.0674	.795
% pop. living in urban area	45% (N=11)	51% (N=91)	.1019	.750
% pop. below poverty line	38% (N=13)	51% (N=92)	.7263	.394
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	1% (N=14)	25% (N=91)	29.6881	.000***
% of district living in rural farming areas	86% (N=14)	32% (N=88)	14.7189	.000***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	56% (N=9)	49% (N=93)	.1219	.727
Pop. density	67% (N=12)	47% (N=93)	1.5928	.207
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	41% (N=17)	26% (N=88)	1.5792	.209
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	24% (N=17)	30% (N=88)	.2527	.615
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	35% (N=17)	44% (N=88)	.4738	.491
Median family income	41% (N=17)	51% (N=88)	.5654	.452

(table continued)

Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	53% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.1551	.694
% of district employed in healthcare	59% (N=17)	40% (N=88)	2.1115	.146
% of district age 55 or over	47% (N=17)	40% (N=88)	.3128	.576
% of pop. below poverty	47% (N=17)	50% (N=88)	.0493	.824
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	40% (N=10)	47% (N=95)	.1974	.657
Judiciary				
% African American	59% (N=17)	48% (N=88)	.7018	.402
% Urban	50% (N=16)	50% (N=86)	.0000	1.000
Pop. density	41% (N=17)	51% (N=88)	.5654	.452
% poverty	47% (N=17)	50% (N=88)	.0493	.824
Labor				
% in manufacturing	55% (N=11)	43% (N=94)	.5753	.448
Municipal				
Orleans delegation				
% of district employed in local government	42% (N=12)	41% (N=93)	.0029	.957
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	18% (N=11)	44% (N=94)	2.6346	.105
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	32% (N=19)	37% (N=86)	.2136	.644

Statistical significance

*p=<.10 **p=<.05 ***p=<.01

Table A.51: Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2008				
Louisiana standing committees	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-values
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	40% (N=15)	52% (N=89)	.7011	.402
Pop. density	47% (N=15)	51% (N=89)	.0779	.780
% pop. living in urban area	43% (N=14)	51% (N=87)	.2873	.592
% pop. below poverty line	40% (N=15)	52% (N=89)	.7011	.402
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	89% (N=19)	24% (N=85)	29.4634	.000***
% of district living in rural farming areas	89% (N=19)	28% (N=82)	24.3326	.000***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	50% (N=14)	49% (N=87)	.0016	.968
Pop. density	36% (N=14)	52% (N=90)	1.3206	.250
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	32% (N=19)	28% (N=85)	.0846	.771
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	26% (N=19)	28% (N=85)	.0285	.866
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	50% (N=16)	42% (N=88)	.3490	.555
Median family income	44% (N=16)	51% (N=88)	.2955	.587

(table continued)

Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	53% (N=17)	48% (N=87)	.1239	.725
% of district employed in healthcare	53% (N=17)	40% (N=87)	.9414	.332
% of district age 55 or over	41% (N=17)	40% (N=87)	.0053	.942
% of pop. below poverty	59% (N=17)	48% (N=87)	.6329	.426
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	42% (N=19)	48% (N=85)	.2342	.628
Judiciary				
% African American	63% (N=?)	48% (N=88)	1.1818	.277
% Urban	67% (N=15)	47% (N=86)	2.756	.150
Pop. density	44% (N=16)	51% (N=88)	.2955	.587
% poverty	56% (N=16)	49% (N=88)	.2955	.587
Labor				
% in manufacturing	25% (N=8)	46% (N=96)	1.2994	.254
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	47% (N=19)	39% (N=85)	.4710	.493
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	55% (N=11)	39% (N=93)	1.0246	.311
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	42% (N=19)	35% (N=85)	.3107	.577

Statistical significance

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table A.52 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

1999				
Louisiana Standing Committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	33.4167 (N=12)	31.8172 (N=93)	-1.5995	-.2179
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	11.0625 (N=16)	5.1685 (N=89)	-4.9790	.000***
Education				
Median family income	28637.76 (N=17)	29305.13 (N=88)	667.3603	.3168
Health and Welfare				
% of district age 55 or over	21.3125 (N=16)	18.8539 (N=89)	-2.4586	-2.1607*
Judiciary				
% African Americas	31.25 (N=12)	32.0968 (N=93)	.8468	.1153
Labor				
% in manufacturing	17.5333 (N=15)	20.5444 (N=90)	3.0111	1.6011
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	20.2727 (N=11)	19.1064 (N=94)	-1.1663	-.8574
% on social security	25.8182 (N=11)	25.4362 (N=94)	-.3820	-.2116

Statistical significance

*p=<.10

**p=<.05

***p=<.01

Table A.53 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2000				
Louisiana Standing Committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	31.7692 (N=13)	31.0544 (N=92)	-.7149	-.1027
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	11.0588 (N=17)	5.1023 (N=88)	-5.9566	-5.2035***
Education				
Median family income	31759.06 (N=16)	28737.09 (N=89)	-3021.973	-1.4123
Health and Welfare				
% of district age 55 or over	21.64796 (N=17)	18.76136 (N=88)	-2.8857	-2.6262**
Judiciary				
% African Americas	43.0714 (N=14)	29.3077 (N=91)	-13.7637	-2.0838**
Labor				
% in manufacturing	19.4375 (N=16)	20.2360 (N=89)	.7985	.4311
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	20.9 (N=10)	19.0526 (N=95)	-1.8474	-1.3078
% on social security	26.4 (N=10)	25.3790 (N=95)	-1.0211	-.5429

Statistical significance

*p<.10

**p<.05

***p<.01

Table A.54 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on Louisiana House standing committees

2001

Louisiana Standing Committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	33.2727 (N=11)	30.8936 (N=94)	-2.3791	-.3180
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	11.0588 (N=17)	5.1023 (N=88)	-5.9566	-5.2035***
Education				
Median family income	31341.82 (N=17)	28783.35 (N=88)	-2558.471	-1.2226
Health and Welfare				
% of district age 55 or over	21.2353 (N=17)	18.8409 (N=88)	-2.3944	-2.1567**
Judiciary				
% African Americas	45.4167 (N=12)	29.3011 (N=93)	-16.1156	-2.2934**
Labor				
% in manufacturing	19.1177 (N=17)	20.3068 (N=88)	1.1892	.6589
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	20.1818 (N=11)	19.1170 (N=94)	-1.0648	-.7823
% on social security	25.9091 (N=11)	25.4255 (N=94)	-.4836	-.2679

Statistical significance

*p<.10

**p<.05

***p<.01

Table A.55: Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2002				
Louisiana standing committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	31.7273 (N=11)	32.7021 (N=94)	.9749	.1230
Pop. density	42359.55 (N=11)	42584.16 (N=94)	214.6141	.4721
% pop. living in urban area	66.7 (N=10)	73.2826 (N=92)	6.5826	.6997
% pop. below poverty line	24.2091 (N=11)	23.2606 (N=94)	-.9485	-.3584
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	3.5294 (N=17)	1.1705 (N=88)	-2.3590	-.49845***
% of district living in rural farming areas	1.7058 (N=17)	.4235 (N=85)	-1.2824	-6.2165***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	66.125 (N=8)	73.1915 (N=94)	7.0665	.6790
Pop. density	43437.5 (N=8)	42489.44 (N=97)	-948.0567	-1.8338*
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	15.3125 (N=16)	15.3034 (N=89)	-.0091	-.0176
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	3.875 (N=16)	3.9551 (N=89)	.0801	.2087
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	17.8824 (N=17)	17.9432 (N=88)	.0608	.0544
Median family income	42232.35 (N=17)	39681.56 (N=88)	-2550.796	-.8388
Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	36.6471 (N=17)	36.0455 (N=88)	-.6016	-.3243
% of district employed in healthcare	12.9412 (N=17)	12.1136 (N=88)	-.8275	-1.1950
% of district age 55 or over	20.5882 (N=17)	19.9318 (N=88)	-.6564	-.7769
% of pop. below poverty	25.6471 (N=17)	22.9182 (N=88)	-2.7289	-1.2490
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	5.6 (N=15)	5.8111 (N=90)	.2111	.3955

(table continued)

Judiciary				
% African American	42.1667 (N=12)	31.3656 (N=93)	-10.8011	-1.4299
% Urban	75.0909 (N=12)	72.3407 (N=91)	-2.7503	-.3043
Pop. density	42796.92 (N=12)	42531.32 (N=93)	-265.5941	-.6074
% poverty	26.4583 (N=12)	22.9602 (N=93)	-3.4981	-1.3852
Labor				
% in manufacturing	9.8125 (N=16)	10.2584 (N=89)	.4459	.4159
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	6.9286 (N=14)	7.2418 (N=91)	.3132	.7371
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	20.4 (N=10)	20 (N=95)	-.4	-.3764
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	4.8235 (N=17)	4.1932 (N=88)	-.6303	-1.8192*

Statistical significance

*p<.10

**p<.05

***p<.01

Table A56: Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2003

Louisiana standing committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	31.7273 (N=11)	32.7021 (N=94)	.9749	.1230
Pop. density	42369.55 (N=11)	42584.16 (N=94)	214.6141	.4721
% pop. living in urban area	66.7 (N=10)	73.2826 (N=92)	6.5826	.6997
% pop. below poverty line	24.2091 (N=11)	23.2606 (N=94)	-.9485	-.3584
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	3.7059 (N=17)	1.1364 (N=88)	-2.5695	-5.5559***
% of district living in rural farming areas	1.7647 (N=17)	.41176 (N=85)	-1.3529	-6.7069***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	59.9 (N=10)	74.0217 (N=92)	14.1217	1.5145
Pop. density	43342.4 (N=10)	42479.49 (N=95)	-862.9053	-1.8472*
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	15.2143 (N=14)	15.3187 (N=91)	.1044	.1908
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	3.7143 (N=14)	3.9780 (N=91)	.2637	.6515
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	18.0588 (N=17)	17.9091 (N=88)	-.1497	-.1339
Median family income	42023.53 (N=17)	39721.9 (N=88)	-2301.632	-.7564
Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	37.125 (N=16)	35.9663 (N=89)	-1.1587	-.6102
% of district employed in healthcare	13.1875 (N=16)	12.0787 (N=89)	-1.1088	-1.5699
% of district age 55 or over	20.25 (N=16)	20 (N=89)	-.25	-.2879
% of pop. below poverty	26.0938 (N=16)	22.8685 (N=89)	-3.2252	-1.4438
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	5.6 (N=15)	5.8111 (N=90)	.2111	.3955

(table continued)

Judiciary				
% African American	45.6667 (N=12)	30.9140 (N=93)	-14.7527	-1.9701*
% Urban	81.2727 (N=12)	71.5934 (N=91)	-9.6793	-1.0768
Pop. density	42212.5 (N=12)	42606.73 (N=93)	394.2312	.9035
% poverty	28.15 (N=12)	22.7419 (N=93)	-5.4081	-2.1698**
Labor				
% in manufacturing	9.8125 (N=16)	10.2584 (N=89)	.4459	.4159
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	6.9286 (N=14)	7.2418 (N=91)	.3132	.7371
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	20.5455 (N=11)	19.9787 (N=94)	-.5667	-.5568
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	4.6667 (N=18)	4.2184 (N=87)	-.4483	-1.3138

Statistical significance *p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01

Table A57: Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2004

Louisiana standing committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	35.5455 (N=11)	32.2553 (N=94)	-3.2901	-.4155
Pop. density	41841.82 (N=11)	42645.91 (N=94)	804.0967	1.7942*
% pop. living in urban area	70.4 (N=10)	72.8804 (N=92)	2.4804	.2631
% pop. below poverty line	25.1546 (N=11)	23.15 (N=94)	-2.0045	-.7591
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	3.7059 (N=17)	1.1364 (N=88)	-2.5695	-5.5559***
% of district living in rural farming areas	1.7647 (N=17)	.41176 (N=85)	-1.3529	-6.7069***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	72.125 (N=8)	72.6809 (N=94)	.5559	.0533
Pop. density	42378 (N=8)	42576.82 (N=97)	198.8247	.3787
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	16 (N=19)	15.1512 (N=86)	-.8488	-1.7836*
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	3.7368 (N=19)	3.9884 (N=86)	.2515	.7039
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	17.5 (N=16)	18.0112 (N=89)	.5112	.4463
Median family income	43824.69 (N=16)	39423.96 (N=89)	-4400.732	-1.4208
Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	37.5 (N=18)	35.8621 (N=87)	-1.6379	-.9065
% of district employed in healthcare	13.8889 (N=18)	11.9081 (N=87)	-1.9808	-3.0334**
% of district age 55 or over	21.0556 (N=18)	19.8276 (N=87)	-1.2280	-1.4987
% of pop. below poverty	25.6833 (N=18)	22.8793 (N=87)	-2.8040	-1.3141
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	5.1 (N=10)	5.8526 (N=95)	.7526	1.1899

(table continued)

Judiciary				
% African American	41.5714 (N=14)	31.2198 (N=91)	-10.3517	-1.4649
% Urban	65.8462 (N=13)	73.6292 (N=89)	7.7831	.9295
Pop. density	42206.93 (N=14)	42616.25 (N=91)	409.3242	1.0032
% poverty	26.4357 (N=14)	22.8868 (N=91)	-3.5489	-1.5040
Labor				
% in manufacturing	10.3 (N=10)	10.1790 (N=95)	-.1211	-.0922
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	6.9167(N=12)	7.2366 (N=93)	.3199	.7045
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	19.6667 (N=9)	20.0729 (N=96)	.4063	.3646
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	4.0556 (N=18)	4.3448 (N=87)	.2893	.8437

Statistical significance

*p<.10

**p<.05

***p<.01

Table A58: Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2005				
Louisiana standing committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	35 (N=14)	32.23077 (N=91)	-2.7692	-.3882
Pop. density	42206.79 (N=14)	42616.27 (N=91)	409.489	1.0036
% pop. living in urban area	68.75 (N=12)	73.1556 (N=90)	4.4056	.5068
% pop. below poverty line	25.5429 (N=14)	23.0242 (N=91)	-2.5187	-1.0616
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	4.2857 (N=14)	1.1319 (N=91)	-3.1538	-6.5781***
% of district living in rural farming areas	1.9286 (N=14)	.4318 (N=88)	-1.4968	-6.9192***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	69.2 (N=10)	73.0109 (N=92)	3.8109	.4044
Pop. density	42338.9 (N=10)	42585.13 (N=95)	246.2263	.5193
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	15.8947 (N=19)	15.17442 (N=86)	-.7203	-1.5071
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	3.7895 (N=19)	3.9767 (N=86)	.1873	.5235
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	17.7143 (N=14)	17.9670 (N=91)	.2527	.2085
Median family income	44471 (N=14)	39421.24 (N=91)	-5049.758	-1.5447
Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	37.5 (N=18)	35.8621 (N=87)	-1.6379	-.9065
% of district employed in healthcare	13.8889 (N=18)	11.9081 (N=87)	-1.9808	-3.0334**
% of district age 55 or over	21.0556 (N=18)	19.8276 (N=87)	-1.2280	-1.4987
% of pop. below poverty	25.6833 (N=18)	22.8793 (N=87)	-2.8040	-1.3141
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	5.2222 (N=9)	5.8333 (N=96)	.6111	.9189

(table continued)

Judiciary				
% African American	38.5 (N=16)	31.5393 (N=89)	-6.9607	-1.0361
% Urban	66.3333 (N=15)	73.7241 (N=89)	7.3908	.9375
Pop. density	42262.06 (N=16)	42615.54 (N=89)	353.4768	.9151
% poverty	25.45 (N=16)	22.9843 (N=89)	-2.4657	-1.0992
Labor				
% in manufacturing	10.0909 (N=11)	10.2021 (N=94)	.1112	.0883
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	7.0833 (N=12)	7.2151 (N=93)	.1317	.2895
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	19.6364 (N=11)	20.0851 (N=94)	.4487	.4407
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	4.1667 (N=18)	4.3218 (N=87)	.1552	.4515

Statistical significance

*p<.10

**p<.05

***p<.01

Table A59: Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2006				
Louisiana standing committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	37.0533 (N=15)	34.2233 (N=90)	-2.83	-.4176
Pop. density	42268.67 (N=15)	42610.51 (N=90)	341.8444	.8613
% pop. living in urban area	70.6154 (N=13)	72.9326 (N=89)	2.3172	.2756
% pop. below poverty line	24.9533 (N=15)	23.0944 (N=90)	-1.8589	-.8047
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	4.2857 (N=14)	1.1319 (N=91)	-3.1538	-6.5781***
% of district living in rural farming areas	1.9286 (N=14)	.4318 (N=88)	-1.4968	-6.9192***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	74.3333 (N=9)	72.4731 (N=93)	-1.8602	-.1882
Pop. density	42286.67 (N=9)	42587.46 (N=96)	300.7917	.6052
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	15.7368 (N=19)	15.2093 (N=86)	-.5275	-1.0981
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	3.7895 (N=19)	3.9767 (N=86)	.1873	.5235
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	17.4286 (N=14)	18.0110 (N=91)	.5824	.4810
Average family income	50424.79 (N=14)	48460.19 (N=91)	-1964.599	-.5283
Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	37.8421 (N=19)	35.7674 (N=86)	-2.0747	-1.1761
% of district employed in healthcare	13.7895 (N=19)	11.9070 (N=86)	-1.8825	-2.9372**
% of district age 55 or over	21.2105 (N=19)	19.7791 (N=86)	-1.4315	-1.7927*
% of pop. below poverty	24.8158 (N=19)	23.0384 (N=86)	-1.7774	-.8468
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	5.2222 (N=9)	5.8333 (N=96)	.6111	.9189

(table continued)

Judiciary				
% African American	37.4 (N=16)	34.1292 (N=89)	-3.2708	-.4959
% Urban	71.4667 (N=15)	72.8391 (N=87)	1.3724	.1733
Pop. density	42312.75 (N=16)	42606.43 (N=89)	293.677	.7594
% poverty	23.9875 (N=16)	23.2472 (N=89)	-.7403	-.3283
Labor				
% in manufacturing	10.0909 (N=11)	10.2021 (N=94)	.1112	.0883
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	7.1667 (N=12)	7.2043 (N=93)	.0376	.0827
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	19.0833 (N=12)	20.1613 (N=93)	1.0780	1.1052
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	4.1053 (N=19)	4.3372 (N=86)	.2319	.6902

Statistical significance

*p<.10

**p<.05

***p<.01

Table A60: Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2007

Louisiana standing committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	31.7308 (N=13)	35.0370 (N=92)	3.3062	.4593
Pop. density	42305.69 (N=13)	42597.85 (N=92)	292.1555	.6920
% pop. living in urban area	68 (N=11)	73.1978 (N=91)	5.1978	.5759
% pop. below poverty line	23.5 (N=13)	23.3402 (N=92)	-.1598	-.0649
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	4.2857 (N=14)	1.1319 (N=91)	-3.1538	-6.5781***
% of district living in rural farming areas	1.9286 (N=14)	.4318 (N=88)	-1.4968	-6.9192***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	74.3333 (N=9)	72.4731 (N=93)	-1.8602	-.1882
Pop. density	42306 (N=9)	42585.65 (N=96)	279.6458	.5625
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	15.8824 (N=17)	15.1932 (N=88)	-.6892	-1.3772
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	4.0588 (N=17)	3.9205 (N=88)	-.1384	-.3699
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	17.6471 (N=17)	17.9886 (N=88)	.3416	.3055
Average family income	48222.59 (N=17)	48818.64 (N=88)	596.0481	.1735
Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	36.6471 (N=17)	36.0455 (N=88)	-.6016	-.3243
% of district employed in healthcare	13.5294 (N=17)	12 (N=88)	-1.5294	-2.2464**
% of district age 55 or over	21 (N=17)	19.8523 (N=88)	-1.1477	-1.3666
% of pop. below poverty	23.9059 (N=17)	23.2546 (N=88)	-.6513	-.2960
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	5.5 (N=10)	5.8105 (N=95)	.3105	.4882

(table continued)

Judiciary				
% African American	36.8177 (N=17)	34.2046 (N=88)	-2.6131	-.4059
% Urban	72.125 (N=16)	72.7326 (N=86)	.6076	.0788
Pop. density	42350.18 (N=17)	42602.53 (N=88)	252.3576	.6684
% poverty	23.7412 (N=17)	23.2864 (N=88)	-.4548	-.2066
Labor				
% in manufacturing	9.9091 (N=11)	10.2234 (N=94)	.3143	.2497
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	7.3333 (N=12)	7.1828 (N=93)	-.1505	-.3309
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	19.0909 (N=11)	20.1489 (N=94)	1.0580	1.0435
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	4.1053 (N=19)	4.3372 (N=86)	.2319	.6902

Statistical significance

*p<.10

**p<.05

***p<.01

Table A61: Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees

2008

Louisiana standing committees	Committee Member	Non-Committee Member	Mean Difference	t
Administration of Criminal Justice				
% African American	32.1933 (N=15)	35.2236 (N=89)	3.0303	.4457
Pop. density	42526.33 (N=15)	42574.79 (N=89)	48.4532	.1211
% pop. living in urban area	67.4256 (N=14)	73.1609 (N=87)	5.7323	.7044
% pop. below poverty line	23.6733 (N=15)	23.4214 (N=89)	-.2520	-.1089
Agriculture				
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	3.7368 (N=19)	1.0824 (N=85)	-2.6545	-6.1394***
% of district living in rural farming areas	1.6316 (N=19)	.4146 (N=82)	-1.2169	-6.1231***
Civil Law				
% of pop. living in urban area	72.3571 (N=14)	72.3678 (N=87)	.0107	.0013
Pop. density	42185.79 (N=14)	42627.22 (N=90)	441.4365	1.0777
Commerce				
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade	15.8947(N=19)	15.1647 (N=85)	-.7300	-1.5198
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real estate	3.9474 (N=19)	3.9294 (N=85)	-.0180	-.0500
Education				
% of district attending public elementary and high school	18.5 (N=16)	17.8636 (N=88)	-.5540	.5808
Average household income	45720.81 (N=16)	49094.18 (N=88)	3373.369	.9632
Health and Welfare				
% of district with disabilities	38 (N=17)	35.8966 (N=87)	-2.1034	-1.1459
% of district employed in healthcare	12.1177 (N=17)	12.2184 (N=87)	.1007	.1460
% of district age 55 or over	20.6471 (N=17)	19.8621 (N=87)	-.7850	-.9360
% of pop. below poverty	24.6412 (N=17)	23.2264 (N=87)	-1.4147	-.6450
Governmental Affairs				
% of district employed in public administration	5.3158 (N=19)	5.8941 (N=85)	.5783	1.1931

(table continued)

Judiciary				
% African American	49.0313 (N=16)	32.1966 (N=88)	-16.8347	-2.6250**
% Urban	80.5333(N=15)	70.9419 (N=86)	-9.5915	-1.2190
Pop. density	42198.81 (N=16)	42634.89 (N=88)	436.0739	1.1260
% poverty	25.0313 (N=16)	23.1716 (N=88)	-1.8597	-.8283
Labor				
% in manufacturing	8.25 (N=8)	10.3854(N=96)	2.1354	1.4818
Municipal				
% of district employed in local government	7.3158 (N=19)	7.1647 (N=85)	-.1511	-.4002
Retirement				
% of district age 55 or older	20.4546 (N=11)	19.9355 (N=93)	-.5191	-.5132
Transportation				
% employed in transportation and warehousing	4.6316 (N=19)	4.2353 (N=85)	-.3963	-1.1831

Statistical significance

*p=<.10

**p=<.05

***p=<.01

Table A.62: Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.5833 (N=12)	.3333 (N=93)	-.25	.3995
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.1875 (N=16)	.1124 (N=89)	-.0751	.7589
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.4167 (N=12)	.3548 (N=93)	-.0618	.8352
Commerce Commerce occupation	.5882 (N=17)	.3864 (N=88)	-.2019	.4341
Education Education occupation	.5882 (N=17)	.2759 (N=87)	-.3124	.2214
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	.625 (N=16)	.0112 (N=89)	-.6138	.0102**
Insurance Insurance occupation	.0833 (N=12)	.1505 (N=93)	.0672	.8097
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	.4167 (N=12)	.3548 (N=93)	-.0618	.8352
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.63: Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.6154 (N=13)	.25 (N=92)	-.3654	.007***
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.1176 (N=17)	.0227 (N=88)	-.0949	.0622*
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.4167 (N=12)	.2796 (N=93)	-.1371	.3319
Commerce Commerce occupation	.2941 (N=17)	.375 (N=88)	.0809	.5298
Education Education occupation	.5625 (N=16)	.3034 (N=89)	-.2591	.3221
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	0 (N=17)	.1477 (N=88)	.1477	.5361
Insurance Insurance occupation	.1069 (N=15)	.0318 (N=90)	.0890	.2640
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	.3571 (N=14)	.2857 (N=91)	-.0714	.5897
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.64: Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

2001				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.6364 (N=11)	.2447 (N=94)	-.3917	.0062***
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.0588 (N=17)	.0455 (N=88)	-.0134	.8149
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.3333 (N=9)	.2813 (N=96)	-.0521	.7438
Commerce Commerce occupation	.3529 (N=17)	.4545 (N=88)	.1016	.6946
Education Education occupation	.5294 (N=17)	.3068 (N=88)	-.2225	.3836
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	.0588 (N=17)	.1364 (N=88)	.0775	.7455
Insurance Insurance occupation	.125 (N=16)	.1124 (N=89)	-.1449	.8851
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	.4167 (N=12)	.2688 (N=93)	-1.0625	.2905
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.65: Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

2002				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.6364 (N=11)	.3085 (N=94)	-.327853	.2855
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.1176 (N=17)	.1364 (N=88)	.0187	.9378
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.375 (N=8)	.3402 (N=97)	-.0348	.9220
Commerce Commerce occupation	.4 (N=15)	.3371 (N=89)	-.0629	.6395
Education Education occupation	.4706 (N=17)	.4205 (N=88)	-.0501	.8831
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	.0588 (N=17)	.2386 (N=88)	.1798	.5883
Insurance Insurance occupation	.6471 (N=17)	.1136 (N=88)	-.5334	.0286**
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	1.1667 (N=12)	.2366 (N=93)	-.9301	.0013***
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.66: Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

2003				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.6364 (N=11)	.2872 (N=94)	-.3491	.2536
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.1176 (N=17)	.1364 (N=88)	.0187	.9378
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.3 (N=10)	.3263 (N=95)	.0263	.9345
Commerce Commerce occupation	0 (N=14)	.2198 (N=91)	.2198	.4084
Education Education occupation	.5294 (N=17)	.4091 (N=88)	-.1203	.7240
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	.0625 (N=16)	.2247 (N=89)	.1622	.6332
Insurance Insurance occupation	.6471 (N=17)	.1022 (N=88)	-.5448	.0248**
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	1.083 (N=12)	.2258 (N=93)	-.8575	.0030***
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.67: Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.4545 (N=11)	1.108 (N=93)	.6530	.4154
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.1176 (N=17)	.0114 (N=88)	-.1063	.0158**
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.375 (N=8)	1.0938 (N=96)	.7188	.4374
Commerce Commerce occupation	.5263 (N=19)	.25 (N=84)	-.2763	.0175**
Education Education occupation	.375 (N=16)	.2841 (N=88)	-.0909	.7277
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	.0556 (N=18)	.1279 (N=86)	.0724	.7570
Insurance Insurance occupation	.1667 (N=18)	.0345 (N=87)	-.1322	.0279**
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	1 (N=14)	1.0444 (N=90)	.04444	.9510
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.68: Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

2005				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.4286 (N=14)	1.1429 (N=91)	.7143	.3193
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.1429 (N=14)	.2088 (N=91)	.0659	.8545
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	1.2 (N=10)	1.0316 (N=95)	-.1684	.8397
Commerce Commerce occupation	.5263 (N=19)	.4767 (N=86)	-.0496	.8794
Education Education occupation	.3571 (N=14)	.4725 (N=91)	.1154	.7936
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	.5556 (N=18)	.2299 (N=87)	-.3257	.4078
Insurance Insurance occupation	.1579 (N=19)	.2442 (N= 86)	.0863	.7869
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	1.5 (N=16)	.9663 (N=89)	-.5337	.4318
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.69: Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

2006				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.4 (N=15)	1.1556 (N=90)	.7556	.2779
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.1429 (N=14)	.0110 (N=91)	-.1319	.0055***
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	1.3333 (N=9)	1.0201 (N=96)	-.3125	.7203
Commerce Commerce occupation	.6316 (N=19)	.2381 (N=84)	-.3935	.0007***
Education Education occupation	.2857 (N=14)	.2857 (N=91)	0	1.0000
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	.0526 (N=19)	.1279 (N=86)	.0753	.7408
Insurance Insurance occupation	.1667 (N=18)	.0345 (N=87)	-.1322	.0279**
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	.9375 (N=16)	1.0674 (N=89)	.1299	.8485
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.70: Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

2007				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.3077 (N=13)	1.4240 (N=92)	1.1162	.1824
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.1429 (N=14)	.3077 (N=91)	.1648	.7059
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	1.4444 (N=9)	1.2708 (N=96)	-.1736	.8607
Commerce Commerce occupation	1.1176 (N=17)	.4651 (N=86)	-.6525	.1103
Education Education occupation	.7647 (N=17)	.5 (N=88)	-.2647	.5678
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	.5882 (N=17)	.3295 (N=88)	-.2587	.5757
Insurance Insurance occupation	.1765 (N=17)	.3409 (N=88)	.1644	.6840
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	.9412 (N=17)	1.3523 (N=88)	.4111	.5842
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.71: Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.6 (N=15)	.2360 (N=89)	-.3640	.0037***
Agriculture Cattleman/Farmer occupation	.2105 (N=19)	.0235 (N=85)	-.1870	.0014***
Civil Law Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation	.5714 (N=14)	.2444 (N=90)	-.3270	.0117**
Commerce Commerce occupation	.5789 (N=19)	.4235 (N=85)	-.1554	.2224
Education Education occupation	.0625 (N=16)	.0795 (N=88)	.0170	.8161
Health and Welfare Health and Welfare occupation	.0588 (N=17)	0 (N=87)	-.0588	.0229**
Insurance Insurance occupation	0 (N=10)	.0106 (N=94)	.0106	.7460
Judiciary Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation	.5625 (N=16)	.2386 (N=88)	-.3239	.0082 ***
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.72: Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives Created from Caucus Membership and Membership on Louisiana House Standing Committees by Committee

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice				
Acadiana Caucus	.25 (N=12)	.2581 (N=93)	.0081	.9526
Jefferson Delegation	.1667 (N=12)	.1183 (N=93)	-.0484	.6359
Black Caucus	0 (N=12)	.2043 (N=93)	.2043	.0851*
Orleans Delegation	.3333 (N=12)	.1828 (N=93)	-.1505	.2237
Rural Caucus	.6667 (N=12)	.6452 (N=93)	-.0215	.8847
Agriculture				
Acadiana Caucus	.5625 (N=16)	.2022 (N=89)	-.3603	.0022***
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=16)	.1461 (N=89)	.1461	.1044
Black Caucus	.0625 (N=16)	.2022 (N=89)	.1397	.1847
Orleans Delegation	.0625 (N=16)	.2247 (N=89)	.1622	.1379
Rural Caucus	.875 (N=16)	.6067 (N=89)	-.2683	.0390**
Appropriations				
Acadiana Caucus	.3158 (N=19)	.2442 (N=86)	-.0716	.5227
Jefferson Delegation	.0526 (N=19)	.1395 (N=86)	.0869	.3025
Black Caucus	.1053 (N=19)	.1977 (N=86)	.0924	.3484
Orleans Delegation	.1579 (N=19)	.2093 (N=86)	.0514	.6162
Rural Caucus	.7368 (N=19)	.6279 (N=86)	-.1089	.3732
Civil Law				
Acadiana Caucus	.1667 (N=12)	.2688 (N=93)	.1022	.4509
Jefferson Delegation	.25 (N=12)	.1075 (N=93)	-.1425	.1615
Black Caucus	.1667 (N=12)	.1828 (N=93)	.0161	.8926
Orleans Delegation	.0833 (N=12)	.2151 (N=93)	.1317	.2875
Rural Caucus	.6667 (N=12)	.6452 (N=93)	-.0215	.8847

(table continued)

Commerce				
Acadiana Caucus	.2941 (N=17)	.25 (N=88)	-.0441	.7065
Jefferson Delegation	.0588 (N=17)	.1364 (N=88)	.0775	.3790
Black Caucus	.4118 (N=17)	.3864 (N=88)	-.0254	.8460
Orleans Delegation	.2353 (N=17)	.1932 (N=88)	-.0421	.6945
Rural Caucus	.6471 (N=17)	.6477 (N=88)	.0007	.9958
Education				
Acadiana Caucus	.0588 (N=17)	.2955 (N=88)	.2366	.0414**
Jefferson Delegation	.0588 (N=17)	.1364 (N=88)	.0775	.3790
Black Caucus	.1765 (N=17)	.1818 (N=88)	.0053	.9587
Orleans Delegation	.1765 (N=17)	.2045 (N=88)	.0281	.7935
Rural Caucus	.7059 (N=17)	.6364 (N=88)	-.0695	.5871
Environment				
Acadiana Caucus	.4167 (N=12)	.2366 (N=93)	-.1801	.1825
Jefferson Delegation	.25 (N=12)	.1075 (N=93)	-.1425	.1615
Black Caucus	.25 (N=12)	.1720 (N=93)	-.0780	.5138
Orleans Delegation	.0833 (N=12)	.2151 (N=93)	.1317	.2875
Rural Caucus	.75 (N=12)	.6344 (N=93)	-.1156	.4351
Health and Welfare				
Acadiana Caucus	.3125 (N=16)	.2472 (N=89)	-.0653	.5864
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=16)	.1461 (N=89)	.1461	.1044
Black Caucus	.3125 (N=16)	.1573 (N=89)	-.1552	.1403
Orleans Delegation	.25 (N=16)	.1910 (N=89)	-.0590	.5913
Rural Caucus	.75 (N=16)	.6292 (N=89)	-.1208	.3566
Governmental Affairs				
Acadiana Caucus	0 (N=13)	.2935 (N=92)	.2935	.0234**
Jefferson Delegation	.3077 (N=13)	.0978 (N=92)	-.2099	.0317**
Black Caucus	.3077 (N=13)	.1630 (N=92)	-.1446	.2085
Orleans Delegation	.3846 (N=13)	.1739 (N=92)	-.2107	.0767*
Rural Caucus	.3846 (N=13)	.6848 (N=92)	.3002	.0342**

(table continued)

Insurance				
Acadiana Caucus	.4167 (N=12)	.2366 (N=93)	-.1801	.1825
Jefferson Delegation	.3333 (N=12)	.0968 (N=90)	-.2366	.0190**
Black Caucus	.1667 (N=12)	.1828 (N=93)	.0161	.8926
Orleans Delegation	.1667(N=12)	.2043 (N=93)	.0376	.7618
Rural Caucus	.5833 (N=12)	.6559 (N=93)	.0726	.6244
Judiciary				
Acadiana Caucus	.25 (N=12)	.2581 (N=93)	.0081	.9526
Jefferson Delegation	.1667 (N=12)	.1183 (N=91)	-.0484	.6359
Black Caucus	.0833 (N=12)	.1935 (N=93)	.1102	.3554
Orleans Delegation	.1667 (N=12)	.2043 (N=93)	.0376	.7618
Rural Caucus	.6667 (N=12)	.6452 (N=93)	-.0215	.8847
Labor				
Acadiana Caucus	.2 (N=.15)	.2667 (N=90)	.0667	.5887
Jefferson Delegation	.1333 (N=15)	.1222 (N=90)	-.0111	.9049
Black Caucus	.2667 (N=15)	.1667 (N=90)	-.1	.3564
Orleans Delegation	.2667 (N=15)	.1889 (N=90)	-.0778	.4904
Rural Caucus	.6 (N=15)	.6556 (N=90)	.0556	.6802
Municipal				
Acadiana Caucus	.3077 (N=13)	.25 (N=92)	-.0577	.6597
Jefferson Delegation	.0769 (N=13)	.1304 (N=92)	.0536	.5877
Black Caucus	.3846 (N=13)	.1522 (N=92)	-.2324	.0420**
Orleans Delegation	.3077 (N=13)	.1848 (N=92)	-.1230	.3043
Rural Caucus	.5385 (N=13)	.6630 (N=92)	.1246	.3836
Natural Resources				
Acadiana Caucus	.5556 (N=18)	.1954 (N=87)	-.3601	.0013***
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=18)	.1494 (N=87)	.1494	.0812*
Black Caucus	.0556 (N=18)	.2069 (N=87)	.1513	.1315
Orleans Delegation	.1111 (N=18)	.2184 (N=87)	.1073	.3049
Rural Caucus	.8333 (N=18)	.6092 (N=87)	-.2241	.0711*

(table continued)

Retirement				
Acadiana Caucus	.3636 (N=11)	.2447 (N=94)	-.1190	.3979
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=11)	.1383 (N=94)	.1383	.1911
Black Caucus	.1818 (N=11)	.1809 (N=94)	-.0010	.9938
Orleans Delegation	.0909 (N=11)	.2128 (N=94)	.1219	.3438
Rural Caucus	.8182 (N=11)	.6277 (N=94)	-.1905	.2145
Transportation				
Acadiana Caucus	.3846 (N=13)	.2391 (N=92)	-.1455	.2656
Jefferson Delegation	.0769 (N=13)	.1304 (N=92)	.0535	.5877
Black Caucus	.2308 (N=13)	.1739 (N=92)	-.0569	.6222
Orleans Delegation	.2308 (N=13)	.1957 (N=92)	-.0351	.7697
Rural Caucus	.6923 (N=13)	.6413 (N=92)	-.0510	.7217
Ways and Means				
Acadiana Caucus	.1579 (N=19)	.2791 (N=86)	.1212	.2785
Jefferson Delegation	.0526 (N=19)	.1395 (N=86)	.0869	.3025
Black Caucus	.2632 (N=19)	.1628 (N=86)	-.1004	.3083
Orleans Delegation	.3158 (N=19)	.1744 (N=86)	-.1414	.1664
Rural Caucus	.5263 (N=19)	.6744 (N=86)	.1481	.2252
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.73: Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives Created from Caucus Membership and Membership on Louisiana House Standing Committees by Committee

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice				
Acadiana Caucus	.4615 (N=13)	.2717 (N=92)	-.1898	.1633
Jefferson Delegation	.2308 (N=13)	.1087 (N=92)	-.1221	.2148
Black Caucus	0 (N=13)	.2174 (N=92)	.2174	.0626*
Orleans Delegation	.3077 (N=13)	.1848 (N=92)	-.1230	.3043
Rural Caucus	.6923 (N=13)	.6413 (N=92)	-.0510	.7217
Agriculture				
Acadiana Caucus	.4706 (N=17)	.2614 (N=88)	-.2092	.0839*
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=17)	.1477 (N=88)	.1477	.0921*
Black Caucus	.0588 (N=17)	.2159 (N=88)	.1571	.1336
Orleans Delegation	.0588 (N=17)	.2273 (N=88)	.1684	.1141
Rural Caucus	.8824 (N=17)	.6023 (N=88)	-.2801	.0269**
Appropriations				
Acadiana Caucus	.3158 (N=19)	.2907 (N=86)	-.0251	.8302
Jefferson Delegation	.1053 (N=19)	.1280 (N=86)	.0226	.7887
Black Caucus	.1579 (N=19)	.1977 (N=86)	.0398	.6928
Orleans Delegation	.2632 (N=19)	.1860 (N=86)	-.0771	.4518
Rural Caucus	.6842 (N=19)	.6395 (N=86)	-.0447	.7154
Civil Law				
Acadiana Caucus	.25 (N=12)	.3011 (N=93)	.0511	.7183
Jefferson Delegation	.25 (N=12)	.1075 (N=93)	-.1425	.1615
Black Caucus	.1667 (N=12)	.1935 (N=93)	.0269	.8255
Orleans Delegation	.0833 (N=12)	.2151 (N=93)	.1317	.2875
Rural Caucus	.6667 (N=12)	.6452 (N=93)	-.0215	.8847

(table continued)

Commerce				
Acadiana Caucus	.4706 (N=17)	.2614 (N=88)	-.2092	.0849*
Jefferson Delegation	.0588 (N=17)	.1364 (N=88)	.0775	.3790
Black Caucus	.1176 (N=17)	.2045 (N=88)	.0869	.4084
Orleans Delegation	.1765 (N=17)	.2045 (N=88)	.0281	.7935
Rural Caucus	.7059 (N=17)	.6364 (N=88)	-.0695	.5871
Education				
Acadiana Caucus	.25 (N=16)	.3034 (N=89)	.0534	.6702
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=16)	.1461 (N=89)	.1461	.1044
Black Caucus	. (N=16)	.2022 (N=89)	.0772	.4736
Orleans Delegation	.0625 (N=16)	.2247 (N=89)	.1622	.1379
Rural Caucus	.8125 (N=16)	.6180 (N=89)	-.1945	.1363
Environment				
Acadiana Caucus	.3077 (N=13)	.2935 (N=92)	-.0142	.9172
Jefferson Delegation	.1538 (N=13)	.1196 (N=92)	-.0343	.7285
Black Caucus	.0769 (N=13)	.2065 (N=92)	.1296	.2697
Orleans Delegation	.1538 (N=13)	.2065 (N=92)	.0526	.6604
Rural Caucus	.7692 (N=13)	.6304 (N=92)	-.1388	.3315
Health and Welfare				
Acadiana Caucus	.1176 (N=17)	.3296 (N=88)	.2119	.0809*
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=17)	.1477 (N=88)	.1477	.0921*
Black Caucus	.2941 (N=17)	.1705 (N=88)	-.1237	.2386
Orleans Delegation	.2353 (N=17)	.1932 (N=88)	-.0421	.6945
Rural Caucus	.7647 (N=17)	.625 (N=88)	-.1397	.2740
Governmental Affairs				
Acadiana Caucus	.0667 (N=15)	.3333 (N=90)	.2667	.0363**
Jefferson Delegation	.3333 (N=15)	.0889 (N=90)	-.2444	.0075***
Black Caucus	.3333 (N=15)	.1667 (N=90)	-.1667	.1305
Orleans Delegation	.3333 (N=15)	.1778 (N=90)	-.1556	.1663
Rural Caucus	.4 (N=15)	.6889 (N=90)	.2889	.0302**

(table continued)

Insurance				
Acadiana Caucus	.5333 (N=15)	.2556 (N=90)	-.2778	.0291**
Jefferson Delegation	.2 (N=15)	.1111 (N=90)	-.0889	.3379
Black Caucus	.1333 (N=15)	.2 (N=90)	.0667	.5472
Orleans Delegation	.2 (N=15)	.2 (N=90)	0	1.000
Rural Caucus	.6667 (N=15)	.6445 (N=90)	-.0222	.8691
Judiciary				
Acadiana Caucus	.2857 (N=14)	.2967 (N=91)	.0110	.9339
Jefferson Delegation	.1429 (N=14)	.1209 (N=91)	-.0220	.8183
Black Caucus	.2857 (N=14)	.1758 (N=91)	-.1099	.3344
Orleans Delegation	.3571 (N=14)	.1758 (N=91)	-.1813	.1165
Rural Caucus	.5714 (N=14)	.6593 (N=91)	.0879	.5261
Labor				
Acadiana Caucus	.3125 (N=16)	.2921 (N=89)	-.0204	.8709
Jefferson Delegation	.1875 (N=16)	.1124 (N=89)	-.0751	.4057
Black Caucus	.25 (N=16)	.1798 (N=89)	-.0702	.5148
Orleans Delegation	.3125 (N=16)	.1798 (N=89)	-.1327	.2256
Rural Caucus	.6875 (N=16)	.6404 (N=89)	-.0471	.7200
Municipal				
Acadiana Caucus	.2857 (N=14)	.2967 (N=91)	.0110	.9339
Jefferson Delegation	.0714 (N=14)	.1319 (N=91)	.0604	.5273
Black Caucus	.4286 (N=14)	.1538 (N=91)	-.2748	.0146***
Orleans Delegation	.2857 (N=14)	.1868 (N=91)	-.0989	.3940
Rural Caucus	.5 (N=14)	.6703 (N=91)	.1703	.2181
Natural Resources				
Acadiana Caucus	.4 (N=15)	.2778 (N=90)	-.1222	.3414
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=15)	.1444 (N=90)	.1444	.1181
Black Caucus	.2 (N=15)	.1889 (N=90)	-.0111	.9201
Orleans Delegation	.2667 (N=15)	.1889 (N=90)	-.0778	.4904
Rural Caucus	.6667 (N=15)	.6444 (N=90)	-.0222	.8691

(table continued)

Retirement				
Acadiana Caucus	.3 (N=10)	.2947 (N=95)	-.0053	.9726
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=10)	.1368 (N=95)	.1368	.2152
Black Caucus	.1 (N=10)	.2 (N=95)	.1	.4485
Orleans Delegation	.1 (N=10)	.2105 (N=95)	.1105	.4108
Rural Caucus	.8 (N=10)	.6316 (N=95)	-.1684	.2934
Transportation				
Acadiana Caucus	.3571 (N=14)	.2857 (N=91)	-.0714	.5897
Jefferson Delegation	.0714 (N=14)	.1319 (N=91)	.0604	.5273
Black Caucus	.2857 (N=14)	.1758 (N=91)	-.1099	.3344
Orleans Delegation	.1429 (N=14)	.2088 (N=91)	.0659	.5702
Rural Caucus	.6429 (N=14)	.6484 (N=91)	.0055	.9684
Ways and Means				
Acadiana Caucus	.1053 (N=19)	.3372 (N=86)	.2319	.0454**
Jefferson Delegation	.0526 (N=19)	.1395 (N=86)	.0869	.3025
Black Caucus	.3158 (N=19)	.1628 (N=86)	-.1530	.1267
Orleans Delegation	.3684 (N=19)	.1628 (N=86)	-.2056	.0430**
Rural Caucus	.5789 (N=19)	.6628 (N=86)	.0838	.4934
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.74: Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives Created from Caucus Membership and Membership on Louisiana House Standing Committees by Committee

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice				
Acadiana Caucus	.3636 (N=11)	.2872 (N=94)	-.0764	.6033
Jefferson Delegation	.1818 (N=11)	.1170 (N=94)	-.0648	.5415
Black Caucus	.1818 (N=11)	.1489 (N=94)	-.0329	.7766
Orleans Delegation	.3636 (N=11)	.1809 (N=94)	-.1828	.1545
Rural Caucus	.7273 (N=11)	.6383 (N=94)	-.0890	.5633
Agriculture				
Acadiana Caucus	.4706 (N=17)	.2614 (N=88)	-.2092	.0849*
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=17)	.1477 (N=88)	.1477	.0921*
Black Caucus	.1176 (N=17)	.1591 (N=88)	.0414	.6670
Orleans Delegation	.0588 (N=17)	.2273 (N=88)	.1684	.1141
Rural Caucus	.9412 (N=17)	.5909 (N=88)	-.3503	.0053***
Appropriations				
Acadiana Caucus	.2105 (N=19)	.3140 (N=86)	.1034	.3759
Jefferson Delegation	.1053 (N=19)	.1279 (N=86)	.0226	.7887
Black Caucus	.1053 (N=19)	.1628 (N=86)	.0575	.5323
Orleans Delegation	.2632 (N=19)	.1860 (N=86)	-.0771	.4518
Rural Caucus	.6842 (N=19)	.6395 (N=86)	-.0447	.7154
Civil Law				
Acadiana Caucus	.375 (N=8)	.2887 (N=97)	-.0863	.6109
Jefferson Delegation	.25 (N=8)	.1134 (N=97)	-.1366	.2638
Black Caucus	.125 (N=8)	.1546 (N=97)	.0296	.8247
Orleans Delegation	.125 (N=8)	.2062 (N=97)	.0812	.5854
Rural Caucus	.625 (N=8)	.6495 (N=97)	.0245	.8905

(table continued)

Commerce				
Acadiana Caucus	.2632 (N=19)	.3023 (N=86)	.0392	.7378
Jefferson Delegation	.0526 (N=19)	.1395 (N=86)	.0869	.3025
Black Caucus	.1579 (N=19)	.1512 (N=86)	-.0067	.9418
Orleans Delegation	.1579 (N=19)	.2093 (N=86)	.0514	.6162
Rural Caucus	.7895 (N=19)	.6163 (N=86)	-.1732	.1556
Education				
Acadiana Caucus	.0625 (N=16)	.3371 (N=89)	.2746	.0267**
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=16)	.1461 (N=89)	.1461	.1044
Black Caucus	.0625 (N=16)	.1685 (N=89)	.1060	.2817
Orleans Delegation	.125 (N=16)	.2135 (N=89)	.0885	.4202
Rural Caucus	.5625 (N=16)	.6629 (N=89)	.1004	.4437
Environment				
Acadiana Caucus	.5 (N=10)	.2737 (N=95)	-.2263	.1382
Jefferson Delegation	.3 (N=10)	.1053 (N=95)	-.1947	.0766*
Black Caucus	.2 (N=10)	.1474 (N=95)	-.0526	.6633
Orleans Delegation	.1 (N=10)	.2105 (N=95)	.1105	.4108
Rural Caucus	.7 (N=10)	.6421 (N=95)	-.0579	.7186
Health and Welfare				
Acadiana Caucus	.2222 (N=18)	.3103 (N=87)	.0881	.4604
Jefferson Delegation	.0556 (N=18)	.1379 (N=87)	.0824	.3388
Black Caucus	.3333 (N=18)	.1149 (N=87)	-.2184	.0188**
Orleans Delegation	.2222 (N=18)	.1954 (N=87)	-.0268	.7980
Rural Caucus	.7222 (N=18)	.6322 (N=87)	-.0900	.4715
Governmental Affairs				
Acadiana Caucus	.2 (N=10)	.3053 (N=95)	.1053	.4923
Jefferson Delegation	.2 (N=10)	.11579 (N=95)	-.0842	.4467
Black Caucus	.2 (N=10)	.1474 (N=95)	-.0526	.6633
Orleans Delegation	.5 (N=10)	.1684 (N=95)	-.3316	.0124**
Rural Caucus	.5 (N=10)	.6632 (N=95)	.1632	.3089

(table continued)

Insurance				
Acadiana Caucus	.3333 (N=18)	.2874 (N=87)	-.0460	.7004
Jefferson Delegation	.2778 (N=18)	.0920 (N=87)	-.1858	.0294**
Black Caucus	0 (N=18)	.1839 (N=87)	.1839	.0487**
Orleans Delegation	.1667 (N=18)	.2069 (N=87)	.0402	.7011
Rural Caucus	.6111 (N=18)	.6552 (N=87)	.0441	.7248
Judiciary				
Acadiana Caucus	.2857 (N=14)	.2967 (N=91)	.0110	.9339
Jefferson Delegation	.1429 (N=14)	.1209 (N=91)	-.0219	.8183
Black Caucus	.2143 (N=14)	.1429 (N=91)	-.0714	.4935
Orleans Delegation	.1429 (N=14)	.2088 (N=91)	.0659	.5702
Rural Caucus	.7143 (N=14)	.6374 (N=91)	-.0769	.5792
Labor				
Acadiana Caucus	.4 (N=10)	.2842 (N=95)	-.1158	.4500
Jefferson Delegation	.3 (N=10)	.1053 (N=95)	-.1947	.0766*
Black Caucus	.1 (N=10)	.1579 (N=95)	.0579	.6319
Orleans Delegation	.3 (N=10)	.1895 (N=95)	-.1105	.4108
Rural Caucus	.6 (N=10)	.6526 (N=95)	.0526	.7433
Municipal				
Acadiana Caucus	.1667 (N=12)	.3118 (N=93)	.1452	.3041
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=12)	.1398 (N=93)	.1398	.1696
Black Caucus	.5 (N=12)	.1075 (N=93)	-.3925	.0003***
Orleans Delegation	.5 (N=12)	.1613 (N=93)	-.3387	.0055***
Rural Caucus	.5 (N=12)	.6667 (N=93)	.1667	.2596
Natural Resources				
Acadiana Caucus	.5882 (N=17)	.2386 (N=88)	-.3496	.0035***
Jefferson Delegation	.0 (N=17)	.1477 (N=88)	.1477	.0921*
Black Caucus	.1765 (N=17)	.1477 (N=88)	-.0287	.7654
Orleans Delegation	.1176 (N=17)	.2159 (N=88)	.0983	.3586
Rural Caucus	.7647 (N=17)	.625 (N=88)	-.1397	.2740

(table continued)

Retirement				
Acadiana Caucus	.1111 (N=9)	.3125 (N=96)	.2014	.2091
Jefferson Delegation	.1111 (N=9)	.125 (N=96)	.0139	.9049
Black Caucus	.1111 (N=9)	.1563 (N=96)	.0451	.7218
Orleans Delegation	.2222 (N=9)	.1979 (N=96)	-.0243	.8633
Rural Caucus	.5556 (N=9)	.6563 (N=96)	.1007	.5499
Transportation				
Acadiana Caucus	.3333 (N=18)	.2874 (N=87)	-.0460	.7004
Jefferson Delegation	.1111 (N=18)	.1264 (N=87)	.0153	.8591
Black Caucus	.1111 (N=18)	.1609 (N=87)	.0498	.5967
Orleans Delegation	.1111 (N=18)	.2184 (N=87)	.1073	.3049
Rural Caucus	.6111 (N=18)	.6552 (N=87)	.0441	.7248
Ways and Means				
Acadiana Caucus	.1579 (N=19)	.3256 (N=86)	.1677	.1498
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=19)	.1512 (N=86)	.1512	.0714*
Black Caucus	.2632 (N=19)	.1279 (N=86)	-.1353	.1403
Orleans Delegation	.4211 (N=19)	.1512 (N=86)	-.2699	.0075***
Rural Caucus	.6316 (N=19)	.6512 (N=86)	.0196	.8730
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.75: Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives Created from Caucus Membership and Membership on Louisiana House Standing Committees by Committee

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice				
Acadiana Caucus	.2667 (N=15)	.3034 (N=89)	.0367	.7764
Jefferson Delegation	.2 (N=15)	.1124 (N=89)	-.0876	.3472
Black Caucus	.1333 (N=15)	.1798 (N=89)	.0464	.6638
Orleans Delegation	.2 (N=15)	.1910 (N=89)	-.0090	.9357
Rural Caucus	.6667 (N=15)	.6517 (N=89)	-.0150	.9112
Capital Region Delegation	.1333 (N=15)	.1798 (N=89)	.0464	.6638
Agriculture				
Acadiana Caucus	.4737 (N=19)	.2588 (N=85)	-.2149	.0652*
Jefferson Delegation	.0526 (N=19)	.1412 (N=85)	.0885	.2960
Black Caucus	0 (N=19)	.2118 (N=85)	.2118	.0274**
Orleans Delegation	.0526 (N=19)	.2235 (N=85)	.1709	.0891*
Rural Caucus	1 (N=19)	.5765 (N=85)	-.4235	.0003***
Capital Region Delegation	.0526 (N=19)	.2 (N=85)	.1474	.1272
Appropriations				
Acadiana Caucus	.32 (N=25)	.2911 (N=79)	-.0289	.7859
Jefferson Delegation	.12 (N=25)	.1266 (N=79)	.0066	.9317
Black Caucus	.08 (N=25)	.2025 (N=79)	.1225	.1612
Orleans Delegation	.2 (N=25)	.1899 (N=79)	-.0101	.9119
Rural Caucus	.68 (N=25)	.6456 (N=79)	-.0344	.7553
Capital Region Delegation	.2 (N=25)	.1646 (N=79)	-.0354	.6866
Civil Law				
Acadiana Caucus	.1429 (N=14)	.3222 (N=90)	.1794	.1756
Jefferson Delegation	.0714 (N=14)	.1333 (N=90)	.0619	.5194
Black Caucus	.0714 (N=14)	.1889 (N=90)	.1175	.2843
Orleans Delegation	.2857 (N=14)	.1778 (N=90)	-.1079	.3453
Rural Caucus	.5714 (N=14)	.6667 (N=90)	.0952	.4907
Capital Region Delegation	.2143 (N=14)	.1667 (N=90)	-.0476	.6650

(table continued)

Commerce				
Acadiana Caucus	.2105 (N=19)	.3176 (N=85)	.1071	.3609
Jefferson Delegation	.1579 (N=19)	.1176 (N=85)	-.0402	.6355
Black Caucus	.3158 (N=19)	.1412 (N=85)	-.1746	.0701*
Orleans Delegation	.2632 (N=19)	.1765 (N=85)	-.0867	.3910
Rural Caucus	.4737 (N=19)	.6941 (N=85)	.2204	.0690*
Capital Region Delegation	.2105 (N=19)	.1647 (N=85)	-.0458	.6371
Education				
Acadiana Caucus	.125 (N=16)	.3295 (N=88)	.2045	.1018
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=16)	.1477 (N=88)	.1477	.1022
Black Caucus	.3125 (N=16)	.1477 (N=88)	-.1648	.1111
Orleans Delegation	.125 (N=16)	.2045 (N=88)	.0795	.4626
Rural Caucus	.5625 (N=16)	.6705 (N=88)	.1080	.4087
Capital Region Delegation	.3125 (N=16)	.1477 (N=88)	-.1648	.1111
Health and Welfare				
Acadiana Caucus	.2353 (N=17)	.3103 (N=87)	.0751	.5406
Jefferson Delegation	.1176 (N=17)	.1264 (N=87)	.0088	.9211
Black Caucus	.1765 (N=17)	.1724 (N=87)	-.0041	.9681
Orleans Delegation	.2353 (N=17)	.1839 (N=87)	-.0514	.6269
Rural Caucus	.6471 (N=17)	.6552 (N=87)	.0081	.9493
Capital Region Delegation	.1765 (N=17)	.1724 (N=87)	-.0041	.9681
Governmental Affairs				
Acadiana Caucus	.2632 (N=19)	.3059 (N=85)	.0427	.7160
Jefferson Delegation	.2105 (N=19)	.1059 (N=85)	-.1046	.2163
Black Caucus	.2105 (N=19)	.1647 (N=85)	-.0458	.6371
Orleans Delegation	.2105 (N=19)	.1882 (N=85)	-.0223	.8257
Rural Caucus	.6316 (N=19)	.6588 (N=85)	.0272	.8236
Capital Region Delegation	.1053 (N=19)	.1882 (N=85)	.0830	.3923

(table continued)

Insurance				
Acadiana Caucus	.4 (N=10)	.2872 (N=94)	-.1128	.4634
Jefferson Delegation	.1 (N=10)	.1277 (N=94)	.0277	.8038
Black Caucus	.2 (N=10)	.1702 (N=94)	-.0298	.8151
Orleans Delegation	.1 (N=10)	.2021 (N=94)	.1021	.4408
Rural Caucus	.8 (N=10)	.6383 (N=94)	-.1617	.3115
Capital Region Delegation	.1 (N=10)	.1809 (N=94)	.0809	.5252
Judiciary				
Acadiana Caucus	.3125 (N=16)	.2955 (N=88)	-.0170	.8922
Jefferson Delegation	.0625 (N=16)	.1364 (N=88)	.0739	.4161
Black Caucus	.25 (N=16)	.1591 (N=88)	-.0909	.3815
Orleans Delegation	.3125 (N=16)	.1705 (N=88)	-.1420	.1883
Rural Caucus	.4375 (N=16)	.6932 (N=88)	.2557	.0486*
Capital Region Delegation	.25 (N=16)	.1591 (N=88)	-.0909	.3815
Labor				
Acadiana Caucus	0 (N=9)	.3263 (N=95)	.3263	.0412**
Jefferson Delegation	.3333 (N=9)	.1053 (N=95)	-.2281	.0486**
Black Caucus	.4444 (N=9)	.1474 (N=95)	-.2971	.0243**
Orleans Delegation	.3333 (N=9)	.1789 (N=95)	-.1544	.2657
Rural Caucus	.2222 (N=9)	.6947 (N=95)	.4725	.0041***
Capital Region Delegation	.3333 (N=9)	.1579 (N=95)	-.1754	.1871
Municipal				
Acadiana Caucus	.3684 (N=19)	.2824 (N=85)	-.0861	.4633
Jefferson Delegation	.1053 (N=19)	.1294 (N=85)	.0241	.7762
Black Caucus	.3158 (N=19)	.1412 (N=85)	-.1746	.0701*
Orleans Delegation	.2105 (N=19)	.1882 (N=85)	-.0223	.8257
Rural Caucus	.5789 (N=19)	.6706 (N=85)	.0916	.4527
Capital Region Delegation	.3158 (N=19)	.1412 (N=85)	-.1746	.0701*
Natural Resources and Environment				
Acadiana Caucus	.6471 (N=17)	.2299 (N=87)	-.4172	.0005***
Jefferson Delegation	.1176 (N=17)	.1264 (N=87)	.0088	.9211
Black Caucus	0 (N=17)	.2069 (N=87)	.2069	.0395**
Orleans Delegation	.1176 (N=17)	.2069 (N=87)	.0892	.3980

(table continued)

Rural Caucus	.8235 (N=17)	.6207 (N=87)	-.2028	.1099
Capital Region Delegation	.1765 (N=17)	.1724 (N=87)	-.0041	.9681
Retirement				
Acadiana Caucus	.3636 (N=11)	.2903 (N=93)	-.0733	.6192
Jefferson Delegation	0 (N=11)	.1398 (N=93)	.1398	.1884
Black Caucus	.0909 (N=11)	.1828 (N=93)	.0919	.4511
Orleans Delegation	.1818 (N=11)	.1935 (N=93)	.0117	.9265
Rural Caucus	.8181 (N=11)	.6344 (N=93)	-.1838	.2297
Capital Region Delegation	.0909 (N=11)	.1828 (N=93)	.0919	.4511
Transportation				
Acadiana Caucus	.3684 (N=19)	.2824 (N=85)	-.0861	.4633
Jefferson Delegation	.1053 (N=19)	.1294 (N=85)	.0241	.7762
Black Caucus	.2105 (N=19)	.1647 (N=85)	-.0458	.6371
Orleans Delegation	.0526 (N=19)	.2235 (N=85)	.1709	.0891*
Rural Caucus	.8421 (N=19)	.6118 (N=85)	-.2303	.0572*
Capital Region Delegation	.1579 (N=19)	.1765 (N=85)	.0186	.8484
Ways and Means				
Acadiana Caucus	.3684 (N=19)	.2824 (N=85)	-.0861	.4633
Jefferson Delegation	.1053 (N=19)	.1294 (N=85)	.0241	.7762
Black Caucus	.2105 (N=19)	.1647 (N=85)	-.0458	.6371
Orleans Delegation	.2105 (N=19)	.1882 (N=85)	-.0223	.8257
Rural Caucus	.6316 (N=19)	.6588 (N=85)	.0272	.8236
Capital Region Delegation	.1579 (N=19)	.1765 (N=85)	.0186	.8484
*= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01				

Table A.76 Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	25% (N=8)	52% (N=65)	2.1252	.145
Agriculture	43% (N=14)	51% (N=59)	.2890	.591
Appropriations	73% (N=15)	43% (N=58)	4.3572	.037**
Civil Law	50% (N=6)	49% (N=67)	.0012	.972
Commerce	45% (N=11)	50% (N=62)	.0772	.781
Education	55% (N=11)	48% (N=62)	.1418	.707
Environment	50% (N=8)	49% (N=65)	.0017	.967
Health and Welfare	38% (N=16)	53% (N=57)	1.1444	.285
Government Affairs	20% (N=5)	51% (N=68)	1.8455	.174
Insurance	57% (N=7)	48% (N=66)	.1898	.663
Judiciary	43% (N=7)	50% (N=66)	.1292	.719
Labor	50% (N=10)	49% (N=63)	.0022	.963
Municipal	44% (N=9)	50% (N=64)	.0974	.755
Natural Resources	73% (N=15)	43% (N=58)	4.3572	.037**
Retirement	60% (N=5)	49% (N=68)	.2452	.620
Transportation	30% (N=10)	52% (N=63)	1.7295	.188
Ways and Means	24% (N=17)	57% (N=56)	5.8950	.015**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.77 Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	82% (N=11)	44% (N=63)	5.2323	0.022**
Agriculture	67% (N=15)	46% (N=59)	2.0904	0.148
Appropriations	67% (N=15)	46% (N=59)	2.0904	0.148
Civil Law	50% (N=6)	50% (N=68)	0.0000	1.000
Commerce	71% (N=14)	45% (N=60)	3.1714	0.075*
Education	44% (N=9)	51% (N=65)	0.1265	0.722
Environment	50% (N=8)	50% (N=66)	0.0000	1.000
Health and Welfare	62% (N=13)	48% (N=61)	0.8398	0.359
Government Affairs	14% (N=7)	54% (N=67)	3.9446	0.047**
Insurance	33% (N=9)	52% (N=65)	1.1385	0.286
Judiciary	45% (N=11)	51% (N=63)	0.1068	0.744
Labor	50% (N=8)	50% (N=66)	0.0000	1.000
Municipal	22% (N=9)	54% (N=65)	3.1624	0.075*
Natural Resources	62% (N=13)	48% (N=61)	0.8398	0.359
Retirement	80% (N=5)	48% (N=69)	1.9304	0.165
Transportation	38% (N=8)	52% (N=66)	0.5606	0.454
Ways and Means	32% (N=19)	56% (N=55)	3.4699	0.062*
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.78 Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2001				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	50% (N=10)	50% (N=62)	0.0000	1.000
Agriculture	80% (N=15)	42% (N=57)	6.8211	0.009***
Appropriations	69% (N=16)	45% (N=56)	2.8929	0.089*
Civil Law	80% (N=5)	48% (N=67)	1.9343	0.164
Commerce	46% (N=13)	51% (N=59)	0.0939	0.759
Education	56% (N=9)	49% (N=63)	0.1270	0.722
Environment	63% (N=8)	48% (N=64)	0.5625	0.453
Health and Welfare	54% (N=13)	49% (N=59)	0.0939	0.759
Government Affairs	14% (N=7)	54% (N=65)	3.9560	0.047**
Insurance	75% (N=8)	47% (N=64)	2.2500	.134
Judiciary	36% (N=11)	52% (N=61)	0.9657	0.326
Labor	50% (N=8)	50% (N=64)	0.0000	1.000
Municipal	17% (N=6)	53% (N=66)	2.9091	0.088*
Natural Resources	58% (N=12)	48% (N=60)	0.4000	0.527
Retirement	50% (N=6)	50% (N=66)	0.0000	1.000
Transportation	29% (N=7)	52% (N=65)	1.4242	0.233
Ways and Means	33% (N=18)	56% (N=54)	2.6667	0.102
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.79 Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2002				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	60% (N=10)	48% (N=62)	0.4645	0.496
Agriculture	53% (N=15)	49% (N=57)	0.0842	0.772
Appropriations	44% (N=16)	52% (N=56)	0.3214	0.571
Civil Law	0% (N=4)	53% (N=68)	4.2353	0.040**
Commerce	42% (N=12)	52% (N=60)	0.4000	0.527
Education	70% (N=10)	47% (N=62)	1.8581	0.173
Environment	67% (N=9)	48% (N=63)	1.1429	0.285
Health and Welfare	54% (N=13)	49% (N=59)	0.0939	0.759
Government Affairs	57% (N=7)	49% (N=65)	0.1582	0.691
Insurance	33% (N=9)	52% (N=63)	1.1429	0.285
Judiciary	33% (N=9)	52% (N=63)	1.1429	0.285
Labor	71% (N=7)	48% (N=65)	1.4242	0.233
Municipal	57% (N=7)	49% (N=65)	0.1582	0.691
Natural Resources	25% (N=12)	55% (N=60)	3.6000	0.058*
Retirement	29% (N=7)	52% (N=65)	1.4242	0.233
Transportation	50% (N=8)	50% (N=64)	0.0000	1.000
Ways and Means	61% (N=18)	46% (N=54)	1.1852	0.276
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.80 Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2003				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	50% (N=10)	49% (N=61)	0.0023	0.962
Agriculture	57% (N=14)	47% (N=57)	0.4296	0.512
Appropriations	63% (N=16)	45% (N=55)	1.4407	0.230
Civil Law	20% (N=5)	52% (N=66)	1.8469	0.174
Commerce	36% (N=11)	52% (N=60)	0.8709	0.351
Education	44% (N=9)	50% (N=62)	0.0970	0.755
Environment	78% (N=9)	45% (N=62)	3.3450	0.067*
Health and Welfare	58% (N=12)	47% (N=59)	0.4719	0.492
Government Affairs	43% (N=7)	50% (N=64)	0.1288	0.720
Insurance	44% (N=9)	50% (N=62)	0.0970	0.755
Judiciary	56% (N=9)	48% (N=62)	0.1616	0.688
Labor	43% (N=7)	50% (N=64)	0.1288	0.720
Municipal	14% (N=7)	53% (N=64)	3.8081	0.051*
Natural Resources	46% (N=13)	50% (N=58)	0.0629	0.802
Retirement	57% (N=7)	48% (N=64)	0.1913	0.662
Transportation	25% (N=8)	52% (N=63)	2.1292	0.145
Ways and Means	41% (N=17)	52% (N=54)	0.5895	0.443
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.81 Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	33% (N=9)	52% (N=60)	1.0524	.305
Agriculture	79% (N=14)	42% (N=55)	6.0309	.014**
Appropriations	41% (N=17)	52% (N=52)	.5920	.442
Civil Law	67% (N=6)	48% (N=63)	.7952	.373
Commerce	78% (N=9)	45% (N=60)	3.3640	.067*
Education	57% (N=7)	48% (N=62)	.1929	.660
Environment	57% (N=7)	48% (N=62)	.1929	.660
Health and Welfare	46% (N=13)	50% (N=56)	.0624	.803
Government Affairs	0% (N=6)	54% (N=63)	6.3837	.012**
Insurance	70% (N=10)	46% (N=59)	2.0097	.156
Judiciary	55% (N=11)	48% (N=58)	.1454	.703
Labor	50% (N=6)	49% (N=63)	.0014	.970
Municipal	13% (N=8)	54% (N=61)	4.8964	.027**
Natural Resources	73% (N=11)	45% (N=58)	2.8795	.090*
Retirement	60% (N=5)	48% (N=64)	.2481	.618
Transportation	80% (N=5)	47% (N=64)	2.0359	.154
Ways and Means	28% (N=18)	57% (N=51)	4.5028	.034**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.82 Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2005				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	33% (N=12)	53% (N=57)	1.4770	.224
Agriculture	67% (N=12)	46% (N=57)	1.7578	.185
Appropriations	47% (N=17)	50% (N=52)	.0443	.833
Civil Law	71% (N=7)	47% (N=62)	1.5296	.216
Commerce	56% (N=9)	48% (N=60)	.1633	.686
Education	71% (N=7)	47% (N=62)	1.5296	.216
Environment	67% (N=6)	48% (N=63)	.7952	.373
Health and Welfare	50% (N=12)	49% (N=57)	.0031	.956
Government Affairs	20% (N=5)	52% (N=64)	1.8484	.174
Insurance	67% (N=9)	47% (N=60)	1.2524	.263
Judiciary	55% (N=11)	48% (N=58)	.1454	.703
Labor	43% (N=7)	50% (N=62)	.1284	.720
Municipal	38% (N=8)	51% (N=61)	.5020	.479
Natural Resources	50% (N=10)	49% (N=59)	.0025	.960
Retirement	50% (N=4)	49% (N=65)	.0009	.976
Transportation	67% (N=6)	48% (N=63)	.7952	.373
Ways and Means	28% (N=18)	57% (N=51)	4.5028	.034**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.83 Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2006				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	50% (N=10)	49% (N=59)	.0025	.960
Agriculture	75% (N=12)	44% (N=57)	3.8460	.050*
Appropriations	44% (N=16)	51% (N=53)	.2544	.614
Civil Law	67% (N=6)	48% (N=63)	.7952	.373
Commerce	38% (N=8)	51% (N=61)	.5020	.479
Education	56% (N=9)	48% (N=60)	.1633	.686
Environment	71% (N=7)	47% (N=62)	1.5296	.216
Health and Welfare	60% (N=10)	47% (N=59)	.5382	.463
Government Affairs	17% (N=6)	52% (N=63)	2.7956	.095*
Insurance	56% (N=9)	48% (N=60)	.1633	.686
Judiciary	40% (N=10)	51% (N=59)	.4025	.526
Labor	29% (N=7)	52% (N=62)	1.3360	.248
Municipal	25% (N=8)	52% (N=61)	2.1335	.144
Natural Resources	44% (N=9)	50% (N=60)	.0966	.756
Retirement	25% (N=4)	51% (N=65)	1.0011	.317
Transportation	67% (N=6)	48% (N=63)	.7952	.373
Ways and Means	41% (N=17)	52% (N=52)	.5920	.442
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.84 Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2007				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	50% (N=10)	50% (N=58)	.0000	1.000
Agriculture	67% (N=12)	46% (N=56)	1.6190	.203
Appropriations	53% (N=17)	49% (N=51)	.0784	.779
Civil Law	67% (N=6)	48% (N=62)	.7312	.393
Commerce	43% (N=7)	51% (N=61)	.1593	.690
Education	56% (N=9)	49% (N=59)	.1281	.720
Environment	83% (N=6)	47% (N=62)	2.9247	.087*
Health and Welfare	50% (N=10)	50% (N=58)	.0000	1.000
Government Affairs	33% (N=6)	52% (N=62)	.7312	.393
Insurance	56% (N=9)	49% (N=59)	.1281	.720
Judiciary	60% (N=10)	48% (N=58)	.4690	.493
Labor	29% (N=7)	52% (N=61)	1.4333	.231
Municipal	25% (N=8)	53% (N=60)	2.2667	.132
Natural Resources	67% (N=9)	47% (N=59)	1.1525	.283
Retirement	50% (N=4)	50% (N=64)	.0000	1.000
Transportation	50% (N=6)	50% (N=62)	.0000	1.000
Ways and Means	44% (N=18)	52% (N=50)	.3022	.582
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.85 Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	67% (N=6)	48% (N=46)	.7536	.385
Agriculture	82% (N=11)	41% (N=41)	5.6497	.017**
Appropriations	55% (N=11)	49% (N=41)	.1153	.734
Civil Law	71% (N=7)	47% (N=45)	1.4857	.223
Commerce	27% (N=11)	56% (N=41)	2.8825	.090*
Education	36% (N=11)	54% (N=41)	1.0377	.308
Environment	63% (N=8)	48% (N=44)	.5909	.442
Health and Welfare	70% (N=10)	45% (N=42)	1.9810	.159
Government Affairs	38% (N=8)	52% (N=44)	.5909	.442
Insurance	25% (N=4)	52% (N=48)	1.0833	.298
Judiciary	33% (N=9)	53% (N=43)	1.2093	.271
Labor	25% (N=4)	52% (N=48)	1.0833	.298
Municipal	38% (N=13)	54% (N=39)	.9231	.337
Natural Resources	63% (N=8)	48% (N=44)	.5909	.442
Retirement	50% (N=4)	50% (N=48)	.0000	1.000
Transportation	42% (N=12)	53% (N=40)	.4333	.510
Ways and Means	67% (N=9)	47% (N=43)	1.2093	.271
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.86 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.046 (N=8)	.0135 (N=65)	.0595	.3149
Agriculture	.1284 (N=14)	-.0218 (N=59)	-.1502	-1.0079
Appropriations	.1691 (N=15)	-.0349 (N=58)	-.2040	-1.414
Civil Law	-.0795 (N=6)	.0148 (N=67)	.0943	.4387
Commerce	-.0901 (N=11)	.0242 (N=62)	.1143	.6945
Education	.0681 (N=11)	-.0038 (N=62)	-.0719	-.4359
Environment	.0146 (N=8)	.0061 (N=65)	-.0085	-.0452
Health and Welfare	-.0966 (N=16)	.0361 (N=57)	.1327	.9348
Government Affairs	-.3424 (N=5)	.0327 (N=68)	.3751	1.6331
Insurance	-.0749 (N=7)	.0157 (N=66)	.0906	.4518
Judiciary	-.0146 (N=7)	.0093 (N=66)	.0239	.1190
Labor	-.1123 (N=10)	.0260 (N=63)	.1383	.8081
Municipal	-.1498 (N=9)	.0291 (N=64)	.1788	1.002
Natural Resources	.2553 (N=15)	-.0572 (N=58)	-.3125	-2.2091**
Retirement	-.0752 (N=5)	.0131 (N=68)	.0883	.3776
Transportation	-.069 (N=10)	.0191 (N=63)	.0881	.5134
Ways and Means	-.1781 (N=17)	.0632 (N=56)	.2413	1.7634*
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.87 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal score and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.1760909 (N=11)	-.470254 (N=63)	-.2941631	-1.8952*
Agriculture	-.3569333 (N=15)	-.4442203 (N=59)	-.087287	-0.6219
Appropriations	-.1812667 (N=15)	-.4888814 (N=59)	-.3076147	-2.2621**
Civil Law	-.305 (N=6)	-.43725 (N=68)	-.13225	-0.6398
Commerce	-.3957857 (N=14)	-.4337 (N=60)	-.0379143	-0.2626
Education	-.45 (N=9)	-.4232769 (N=65)	.0267231	0.1544
Environment	-.2685 (N=8)	-.4456818 (N=66)	-.1771818	-0.9789
Health and Welfare	-.4801538 (N=13)	-.4150984 (N=61)	.0650555	0.4381
Government Affairs	-.6808571 (N=7)	-.3999552 (N=67)	.2809019	1.4748
Insurance	-.5105555 (N=9)	-.4148923 (N=65)	.0956632	0.5538
Judiciary	-.3703636 (N=11)	-.4363333 (N=63)	-.0659697	-0.4153
Labor	-.48375 (N=8)	-.4195909 (N=66)	.0641591	0.3524
Municipal	-.5958889 (N=9)	-.4030769 (N=65)	.192812	1.1236
Natural Resources	-.1683077 (N=13)	-.4815574 (N=61)	-.3132497	-2.1750**
Retirement	-.0672 (N=5)	-.4525652 (N=69)	-.3853652	-1.7454
Transportation	- .51275 (N=8)	-.4160758 (N=66)	.0966742	0.5316
Ways and Means	-.6271579 (N=19)	-.3572182 (N=55)	.2699397	2.1501**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.88 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal score and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2001				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.1465 (N=10)	-.1648387 (N=62)	-.0183387	-0.1269
Agriculture	.0632667 (N=15)	-.2216491 (N=57)	-.2849158	-2.4082**
Appropriations	-.0244375 (N=16)	-.2016786 (N=56)	-.1772411	-1.4972
Civil Law	-.0058 (N=5)	-.1739701 (N=67)	-.1681702	-0.8595
Commerce	-.1632308 (N=13)	-.1620847 (N=59)	.001146	0.0088
Education	-.1115556 (N=9)	-.1695397 (N=63)	-.0579841	-0.3839
Environment	-.01725 (N=8)	-.1804219 (N=64)	-.1631719	-1.0334
Health and Welfare	-.1947692 (N=13)	-.1551356 (N=59)	.0396336	0.3051
Government Affairs	-.5582857 (N=7)	-.1196462 (N=65)	.4386396	2.7344***
Insurance	-.117875 (N=8)	-.1678437 (N=64)	-.0499688	-0.3143
Judiciary	-.3407273 (N=11)	-.1301148 (N=61)	.2106125	1.5410
Labor	-.199875 (N=8)	-.1575937 (N=64)	.0422812	0.2659
Municipal	-.4231667 (N=6)	-.1385758 (N=66)	.2845909	1.6017
Natural Resources	-.0021667 (N=12)	-.1943167 (N=60)	-.19215	-1.4537
Retirement	-.1171667 (N=6)	-.1663939 (N=66)	-.0492273	-0.2723
Transportation	-.3705714 (N=7)	-.1398615 (N=65)	.2307099	1.3857
Ways and Means	-.3093889 (N=18)	-.1132593 (N=54)	.1961296	1.7347
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.89 Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal score and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2002				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.085 (N=10)	-.0714516 (N=62)	.0135484	0.1070
Agriculture	-.1220667 (N=15)	-.0605088 (N=57)	.0615579	0.5724
Appropriations	-.0321875 (N=16)	-.0850893 (N=56)	-.0529018	-0.5033
Civil Law	-.55825 (N=4)	-.0448088 (N=68)	.5134412	2.8366***
Commerce	-.0198333 (N=12)	-.0840333 (N=60)	-.0642	-0.5477
Education	-.0207 (N=10)	-.0818226 (N=62)	-.0611226	-0.4836
Environment	-.1134444 (N=9)	-.0676032 (N=63)	.0458413	0.3466
Health and Welfare	-.0603846 (N=13)	-.0761864 (N=59)	-.0158018	-0.1389
Government Affairs	.1568571 (N=7)	-.0981231 (N=65)	-.2549802	-1.7634
Insurance	-.2245556 (N=9)	-.0517302 (N=63)	.1728254	1.3217
Judiciary	-.1426667 (N=9)	-.0634286 (N=63)	.0792381	0.6001
Labor	.1167143 (N=7)	-.0938 (N=65)	-.2105143	-1.4457
Municipal	.0102857 (N=7)	-.0823385 (N=65)	-.0926242	-0.6286
Natural Resources	-.2736667 (N=12)	-.0332667 (N=60)	.2404	2.1105**
Retirement	-.1314286 (N=7)	-.0670769 (N=65)	.0643517	0.4361
Transportation	-.027375 (N=8)	-.0790781 (N=64)	-.0517031	-0.3715
Ways and Means	-.0185556 (N=18)	-.0915926 (N=54)	-.073037	-0.7251
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.90 Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal score and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2003				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.0372 (N=10)	-.205 (N=61)	-.1678	-1.1880
Agriculture	-.1683571 (N=14)	-.1845614 (N=57)	-.0162043	-0.1299
Appropriations	-.0739375 (N=16)	-.2126182 (N=55)	-.1386807	-1.1791
Civil Law	-.327 (N=5)	-.1703333 (N=66)	.1566667	0.8114
Commerce	-.3156364 (N=11)	-.15675 (N=60)	.1588864	1.1697
Education	-.3227778 (N=9)	-.1608387 (N=62)	.1619391	1.0948
Environment	.0395556 (N=9)	-.2134355 (N=62)	-.252991	-1.7323
Health and Welfare	-.1835 (N=12)	-.1809322 (N=59)	.0025678	0.0194
Government Affairs	-.0277143 (N=7)	-.1981719 (N=64)	-.1704576	-1.0316
Insurance	-.2362222 (N=9)	-.1734032 (N=62)	.062819	0.4216
Judiciary	-.0772222 (N=9)	-.1964839 (N=62)	-.1192616	-0.8031
Labor	-.0857143 (N=7)	-.1918281 (N=64)	-.1061138	-0.6392
Municipal	-.4801429 (N=7)	-.1486875 (N=64)	.3314554	2.0505**
Natural Resources	-.2293846 (N=13)	-.1706034 (N=58)	.0587812	0.4587
Retirement	-.3371429 (N=7)	-.1643281 (N=64)	.1728147	1.0461
Transportation	-.40225 (N=8)	-.1533175 (N=63)	.2489325	1.6155
Ways and Means	-.2524706 (N=17)	-.1589815 (N=54)	.0934891	0.8076
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.91 Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.1304 (N=9)	-.1266 (N=60)	.0039	.0236
Agriculture	.1201 (N=14)	-.1900 (N=55)	-.3100	-2.3275**
Appropriations	-.1915 (N=17)	-.106 (N=52)	.0855	.6635
Civil Law	-.1032 (N=6)	-.1293 (N=63)	-.0262	-.1324
Commerce	.0306 (N=9)	-.1507 (N=60)	-.1813	-1.1060
Education	-.073 (N=7)	-.1332 (N=62)	-.0602	-.3264
Environment	-.073 (N=7)	-.1332 (N=62)	-.0602	-.3264
Health and Welfare	-.2899 (N=13)	-.0893 (N=56)	.2007	1.4303
Government Affairs	-.577 (N=6)	-.0842 (N=63)	.4928	2.6176**
Insurance	.0966 (N=10)	-.1650 (N=59)	-.2616	-1.6881*
Judiciary	-.1321 (N=11)	-.1261 (N=58)	.0060	.0394
Labor	-.1595 (N=6)	-.1240 (N=63)	.0355	.1798
Municipal	-.6141 (N=8)	-.0632 (N=61)	.5509	3.4347***
Natural Resources	.0107 (N=11)	-.1532 (N=58)	-.1639	-1.0869
Retirement	-.0282 (N=5)	-.1348 (N=64)	-.1066	-.4971
Transportation	.0962 (N=5)	-.1445 (N=64)	-.2407	-1.1311
Ways and Means	-.2847 (N=18)	-.0714 (N=51)	.2133	1.7185*
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.92 Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2005				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.4423 (N=12)	-.3448 (N=57)	.0974	.9393
Agriculture	-.1599 (N=12)	-.4043 (N=57)	-.2444	-2.4432**
Appropriations	-.3709 (N=17)	-.3588 (N=52)	.0121	.1315
Civil Law	-.2156 (N=7)	-.3783 (N=62)	-.1627	-1.2563
Commerce	-.3908 (N=9)	-.3574 (N=60)	.0333	.2840
Education	-.2249 (N=7)	-.3772 (N=62)	-.1524	-1.1748
Environment	-.1922 (N=6)	-.3779 (N=63)	-.1858	-1.3407
Health and Welfare	-.4148 (N=12)	-.3506 (N=57)	.0641	.6160
Government Affairs	-.6126 (N=5)	-.3422 (N=64)	.2704	1.8150*
Insurance	-.2457 (N=9)	-.3792 (N=60)	-.1335	-1.1478
Judiciary	-.3166 (N=11)	-.3703 (N=58)	-.0537	-.4979
Labor	-.3713 (N=7)	-.3607 (N=62)	.0106	.0807
Municipal	-.5688 (N=8)	-.3346 (N=61)	.2341	1.9474*
Natural Resources	-.281 (N=10)	-.3755 (N=59)	-.0945	-.8451
Retirement	-.3513 (N=4)	-.3624 (N=65)	-.0112	-.0660
Transportation	-.107 (N=6)	-.3860 (N=63)	-.2790	-2.0487*
Ways and Means	-.5054 (N=18)	-.3111 (N=51)	.1943	2.2354**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.93 Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2006				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.314 (N=10)	-.3677 (N=59)	-.0537	-.4987
Agriculture	-.1473 (N=12)	-.4047 (N=57)	-.2574	-2.7044**
Appropriations	-.3534 (N=16)	-.3619 (N=53)	-.0085	-.0948
Civil Law	-.3362 (N=6)	-.3622 (N=63)	-.0260	-.1931
Commerce	-.3903 (N=8)	-.3560 (N=61)	.0343	.2893
Education	-.3289 (N=9)	-.3646 (N=60)	-.0357	-.3167
Environment	-.1861 (N=7)	-.3795 (N=62)	-.1934	-1.5650
Health and Welfare	-.2877 (N=10)	-.3722 (N=59)	-.0845	-.7864
Government Affairs	-.6535 (N=6)	-.3320 (N=63)	.3215	2.4932**
Insurance	-.3453 (N=9)	-.3621 (N=60)	-.0168	-.1488
Judiciary	-.4656 (N=10)	-.3420 (N=59)	.1236	1.1566
Labor	-.4233 (N=7)	-.3528 (N=62)	.0705	.5617
Municipal	-.6193 (N=8)	-.3259 (N=61)	.2933	2.5933**
Natural Resources	-.2862 (N=9)	-.3710 (N=60)	-.0848	-.7547
Retirement	-.4558 (N=4)	-.3540 (N=65)	.1017	.6276
Transportation	-.1757 (N=6)	-.3775 (N=63)	-.2018	-1.5226
Ways and Means	-.4506 (N=17)	-.3303 (N=52)	.1204	1.3849
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.94 Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2007				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.4331 (N=10)	-.4486 (N=58)	-.0155	-.1447
Agriculture	-.3154 (N=12)	-.4744 (N=56)	-.1589	-1.6305
Appropriations	-.4227 (N=17)	-.4542 (N=51)	-.0315	-.3599
Civil Law	-.3477 (N=6)	-.4559 (N=62)	-.1082	-.8136
Commerce	-.4883 (N=7)	-.4415 (N=61)	.0468	.3756
Education	-.471 (N=9)	-.4425 (N=59)	.0285	.2546
Environment	-.3323 (N=6)	-.4573 (N=62)	-.1250	-.9417
Health and Welfare	-.4323 (N=10)	-.4487 (N=58)	-.0164	-.1535
Government Affairs	-.6302 (N=6)	-.4285 (N=62)	.2017	1.5357
Insurance	-.3018 (N=9)	-.4684 (N=59)	-.1666	-1.5150
Judiciary	-.5017 (N=10)	-.4368 (N=58)	.0649	.6085
Labor	-.5019 (N=7)	-.4399 (N=61)	.0619	.4974
Municipal	-.6959 (N=8)	-.4130 (N=60)	.2828	2.5170**
Natural Resources	-.4133 (N=9)	-.4513 (N=59)	-.0380	-.3401
Retirement	-.509 (N=4)	-.4424 (N=64)	.0666	.4140
Transportation	-.3242 (N=6)	-.4581 (N=62)	-.1340	-1.0102
Ways and Means	-.5052 (N=18)	-.4251 (N=50)	.0800	.9379
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.95 Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	-.3912 (N=6)	-.2997 (N=46)	.0914	.4950
Agriculture	-.1024 (N=11)	-.3660 (N=41)	-.2637	-1.8834*
Appropriations	-.2503 (N=11)	-.3264 (N=41)	-.0761	-.5266
Civil Law	-.1496 (N=7)	-.3353 (N=45)	-.1857	-1.0836
Commerce	-.4604 (N=11)	-.27 (N=41)	.1904	1.3372
Education	-.3655 (N=11)	-.2955 (N=41)	.0700	.4842
Environment	-.1559 (N=8)	-.3383 (N=44)	-.1825	-1.1266
Health and Welfare	-.1465 (N=10)	-.3493 (N=42)	-.2028	-1.3758
Government Affairs	-.3758 (N=8)	-.2984 (N=44)	.0774	.4729
Insurance	-.5383 (N=4)	-.2913 (N=48)	.2470	1.1263
Judiciary	-.5063 (N=9)	-.2692 (N=43)	.2371	1.5520
Labor	-.6715 (N=4)	-.2802 (N=48)	.3913	1.8197*
Municipal	-.3577 (N=13)	-.2945 (N=39)	.0632	.4637
Natural Resources	-.1559 (N=8)	-.3383 (N=44)	-.1825	-1.1266
Retirement	-.311 (N=4)	-.3102 (N=48)	.0008	.0036
Transportation	-.3058 (N=12)	-.3116 (N=40)	-.0059	-.0418
Ways and Means	-.3049 (N=9)	-.3114 (N=43)	-.0065	-.0416
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.96 Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	50% (N=8)	48% (N=64)	.0069	.934
Agriculture	50% (N=14)	48% (N=58)	.0134	.908
Appropriations	67% (N=15)	44% (N=57)	2.4727	.116
Civil Law	33% (N=6)	50% (N=66)	.6116	.434
Commerce	45% (N=11)	49% (N=61)	.0518	.820
Education	55% (N=11)	48% (N=61)	.1830	.669
Environment	63% (N=8)	47% (N=64)	.6950	.404
Health and Welfare	38% (N=16)	52% (N=56)	1.0167	.313
Government Affairs	40% (N=5)	49% (N=67)	.1595	.690
Insurance	43% (N=7)	49% (N=65)	.1028	.749
Judiciary	57% (N=7)	48% (N=65)	.2259	.635
Labor	40% (N=10)	50% (N=62)	.3447	.557
Municipal	44% (N=9)	49% (N=63)	.0715	.789
Natural Resources	67% (N=15)	44% (N=57)	2.4727	.116
Retirement	60% (N=5)	48% (N=67)	.2790	.597
Transportation	30% (N=10)	52% (N=62)	1.6102	.204
Ways and Means	35% (N=17)	53% (N=55)	1.5799	.209
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.97 Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created LABI Scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	45% (N=11)	40% (N=63)	0.1294	0.719
Agriculture	7% (N=15)	49% (N=59)	8.9555	0.003***
Appropriations	47% (N=15)	39% (N=59)	0.2929	0.588
Civil Law	50% (N=6)	40% (N=68)	0.2424	0.622
Commerce	50% (N=14)	38% (N=60)	0.6410	0.423
Education	44% (N=9)	40% (N=65)	0.0648	0.799
Environment	50% (N=8)	39% (N=66)	0.3330	0.564
Health and Welfare	38% (N=13)	41% (N=61)	0.0283	0.866
Government Affairs	57% (N=7)	39% (N=67)	0.8841	0.347
Insurance	56% (N=9)	38% (N=65)	0.9583	0.328
Judiciary	45% (N=11)	40% (N=63)	0.1294	0.719
Labor	38% (N=8)	41% (N=66)	0.0344	0.853
Municipal	33% (N=9)	42% (N=65)	0.2208	0.638
Natural Resources	31% (N=13)	43% (N=61)	0.6247	0.429
Retirement	80% (N=5)	38% (N=69)	3.4637	0.063*
Transportation	13% (N=8)	44% (N=66)	2.9258	0.087*
Ways and Means	37% (N=19)	42% (N=55)	0.1451	0.703
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.98 Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created LABI Scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2001				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	70% (N=10)	47% (N=62)	1.8581	0.173
Agriculture	60% (N=15)	47% (N=57)	0.7579	0.384
Appropriations	69% (N=16)	45% (N=56)	2.8929	0.089*
Civil Law	60% (N=5)	49% (N=67)	0.2149	0.643
Commerce	46% (N=13)	51% (N=59)	0.0939	0.759
Education	44% (N=9)	51% (N=63)	0.1270	0.722
Environment	63% (N=8)	48% (N=64)	0.5625	0.453
Health and Welfare	38% (N=13)	53% (N=59)	0.8449	0.358
Government Affairs	0 % (N=7)	55% (N=65)	7.7538	0.005***
Insurance	75% (N=8)	47% (N=64)	2.2500	0.134
Judiciary	55% (N=11)	49% (N=61)	0.1073	0.743
Labor	25% (N=8)	53% (N=64)	2.2500	0.134
Municipal	17% (N=6)	53% (N=66)	2.9091	0.088*
Natural Resources	50% (N=12)	50% (N=60)	0.0000	1.000
Retirement	67% (N=6)	48% (N=66)	0.7273	0.394
Transportation	14% (N=7)	54% (N=65)	3.9560	0.047**
Ways and Means	39% (N=18)	54% (N=54)	1.1852	0.276
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.99 Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created LABI Scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2002				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	70% (N=10)	46% (N=61)	1.9961	0.158
Agriculture	53% (N=15)	48% (N=56)	0.1240	0.725
Appropriations	69% (N=16)	44% (N=55)	3.1274	0.077*
Civil Law	50% (N=4)	49% (N=67)	0.0008	0.977
Commerce	42% (N=12)	51% (N=59)	0.3363	0.562
Education	44% (N=9)	50% (N=62)	0.0970	0.755
Environment	63% (N=8)	48% (N=63)	0.6289	0.428
Health and Welfare	38% (N=13)	52% (N=58)	0.7473	0.387
Government Affairs	0% (N=7)	55% (N=64)	7.5499	0.006***
Insurance	67% (N=9)	47% (N=62)	1.2442	0.265
Judiciary	56% (N=9)	48% (N=62)	0.1616	0.688
Labor	14% (N=7)	53% (N=64)	3.8081	0.051*
Municipal	17% (N=6)	52% (N=65)	2.7916	0.095*
Natural Resources	58% (N=12)	47% (N=59)	0.4719	0.492
Retirement	57% (N=7)	48% (N=64)	0.1913	0.662
Transportation	25% (N=8)	52% (N=63)	2.1292	0.145
Ways and Means	44% (N=18)	51% (N=53)	0.2271	0.634
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.100 Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created LABI Scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2003				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	50% (N=10)	41% (N=61)	0.2863	0.593
Agriculture	36% (N=14)	44% (N=57)	0.3056	0.580
Appropriations	44% (N=16)	42% (N=55)	0.0190	0.890
Civil Law	60% (N=5)	41% (N=66)	0.6943	0.405
Commerce	36% (N=11)	43% (N=60)	0.1851	0.667
Education	33% (N=9)	44% (N=62)	0.3361	0.562
Environment	33% (N=9)	44% (N=62)	0.3361	0.562
Health and Welfare	42% (N=12)	42% (N=59)	0.0020	0.964
Government Affairs	29% (N=7)	44% (N=64)	0.5958	0.440
Insurance	56% (N=9)	40% (N=62)	0.7474	0.387
Judiciary	33% (N=9)	44% (N=62)	0.3361	0.562
Labor	43% (N=7)	42% (N=64)	0.0012	0.973
Municipal	43% (N=7)	42% (N=64)	0.0012	0.973
Natural Resources	54% (N=13)	40% (N=58)	0.8765	0.349
Retirement	57% (N=7)	41% (N=64)	0.7056	0.401
Transportation	25% (N=8)	44% (N=63)	1.1000	0.294
Ways and Means	47% (N=17)	41% (N=54)	0.2115	0.646
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.101 Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	44% (N=9)	49% (N=59)	.0693	.792
Agriculture	77% (N=13)	42% (N=55)	5.1876	.023**
Appropriations	56% (N=16)	46% (N=52)	.4993	.480
Civil Law	33% (N=6)	50% (N=62)	.6084	.435
Commerce	56% (N=9)	47% (N=59)	.2050	.651
Education	67% (N=6)	47% (N=62)	.8667	.352
Environment	67% (N=6)	47% (N=62)	.8667	.352
Health and Welfare	46% (N=13)	49% (N=55)	.0363	.849
Government Affairs	17% (N=6)	52% (N=62)	2.6747	.102
Insurance	50% (N=10)	48% (N=58)	.0102	.920
Judiciary	36% (N=11)	51% (N=57)	.7776	.378
Labor	50% (N=6)	48% (N=62)	.0057	.940
Municipal	25% (N=8)	52% (N=60)	2.0096	.156
Natural Resources	64% (N=11)	46% (N=57)	1.1990	.274
Retirement	80% (N=5)	46% (N=63)	2.1399	.144
Transportation	80% (N=5)	46% (N=63)	2.1399	.144
Ways and Means	39% (N=18)	52% (N=50)	.9109	.340
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.102 Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2005				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	50% (N=12)	47% (N=57)	.0275	.868
Agriculture	75% (N=12)	42% (N=57)	4.2987	.038**
Appropriations	47% (N=17)	48% (N=52)	.0053	.942
Civil Law	57% (N=7)	47% (N=62)	.2710	.603
Commerce	67% (N=9)	45% (N=60)	1.4723	.225
Education	71% (N=7)	45% (N=62)	1.7392	.187
Environment	50% (N=6)	48% (N=63)	.0124	.911
Health and Welfare	33% (N=12)	51% (N=57)	1.2228	.269
Government Affairs	20% (N=5)	50% (N=64)	1.6727	.196
Insurance	44% (N=9)	48% (N=60)	.0474	.828
Judiciary	27% (N=11)	52% (N=58)	2.2154	.137
Labor	43% (N=7)	48% (N=62)	.0771	.781
Municipal	25% (N=8)	51% (N=61)	1.8895	.169
Natural Resources	70% (N=10)	44% (N=59)	2.3044	.129
Retirement	50% (N=4)	48% (N=65)	.0080	.929
Transportation	67% (N=6)	46% (N=63)	.9348	.334
Ways and Means	28% (N=18)	55% (N=51)	3.9227	.048**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.103 Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2006				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	50% (N=10)	49% (N=59)	.0025	.960
Agriculture	75% (N=12)	44% (N=57)	3.8460	.050*
Appropriations	56% (N=16)	47% (N=53)	.4054	.524
Civil Law	50% (N=6)	49% (N=63)	.0014	.970
Commerce	38% (N=8)	51% (N=61)	.5020	.479
Education	44% (N=9)	50% (N=60)	.0966	.756
Environment	43% (N=7)	50% (N=62)	.1284	.720
Health and Welfare	70% (N=10)	46% (N=59)	2.0097	.156
Government Affairs	17% (N=6)	52% (N=63)	2.7956	.095*
Insurance	56% (N=9)	48% (N=60)	.1633	.686
Judiciary	30% (N=10)	53% (N=59)	1.7384	.187
Labor	14% (N=7)	53% (N=62)	3.8158	.051*
Municipal	13% (N=8)	54% (N=61)	4.8964	.027**
Natural Resources	44% (N=9)	50% (N=60)	.0966	.756
Retirement	25% (N=4)	51% (N=65)	1.0011	.317
Transportation	83% (N=6)	46% (N=63)	3.0496	.081*
Ways and Means	41% (N=17)	52% (N=52)	.5920	.442
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.104 Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2007				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	40% (N=10)	48% (N=58)	.2345	.628
Agriculture	50% (N=12)	46% (N=56)	.0506	.822
Appropriations	29% (N=17)	53% (N=51)	2.8333	.092*
Civil Law	50% (N=6)	47% (N=62)	.0228	.880
Commerce	43% (N=7)	48% (N=61)	.0553	.814
Education	56% (N=9)	46% (N=59)	.3006	.584
Environment	50% (N=6)	47% (N=62)	.0228	.880
Health and Welfare	50% (N=10)	47% (N=58)	.0407	.840
Government Affairs	33% (N=6)	48% (N=62)	.4976	.481
Insurance	56% (N=9)	46% (N=59)	.3006	.584
Judiciary	30% (N=10)	50% (N=58)	1.3694	.242
Labor	43% (N=7)	48% (N=61)	.0553	.814
Municipal	13% (N=8)	52% (N=60)	4.3464	.037**
Natural Resources	56% (N=9)	46% (N=59)	.3006	.584
Retirement	25% (N=4)	48% (N=64)	.8301	.362
Transportation	83% (N=6)	44% (N=62)	3.4757	.062*
Ways and Means	44% (N=18)	48% (N=50)	.0672	.796
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.105 Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	% Committee members above median	% Non-committee members above median	Chi-square for Median Difference	Prob-value
Administration of Criminal Justice	33% (N=6)	41% (N=46)	.1401	.708
Agriculture	45% (N=11)	39% (N=41)	.1490	.700
Appropriations	45% (N=11)	39% (N=41)	.1490	.700
Civil Law	57% (N=7)	38% (N=45)	.9436	.331
Commerce	45% (N=11)	39% (N=41)	.1490	.700
Education	45% (N=11)	39% (N=41)	.1490	.700
Environment	50% (N=8)	39% (N=44)	.3631	.547
Health and Welfare	50% (N=10)	38% (N=42)	.4755	.490
Government Affairs	38% (N=8)	41% (N=44)	.0327	.857
Insurance	25% (N=4)	42% (N=48)	.4260	.514
Judiciary	44% (N=9)	40% (N=43)	.0745	.785
Labor	25% (N=4)	42% (N=48)	.4260	.514
Municipal	38% (N=13)	41% (N=39)	.0266	.870
Natural Resources	50% (N=8)	39% (N=44)	.3631	.547
Retirement	25% (N=4)	42% (N=48)	.4260	.514
Transportation	25% (N=12)	45% (N=40)	1.5336	.216
Ways and Means	44% (N=9)	40% (N=43)	.0745	.785
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.106 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

1999				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	42.875 (N=8)	49.9219 (N=64)	7.0469	.6006
Agriculture	48.2857 (N=14)	49.3448 (N=58)	1.0591	.1134
Appropriations	57.4 (N=15)	46.9649 (N=57)	-10.4351	-1.1573
Civil Law	37.5 (N=6)	50.1970 (N=66)	12.6970	.9555
Commerce	48.0910 (N=11)	49.3279 (N=61)	1.2370	.1204
Education	51.8182 (N=11)	48.6557 (N=61)	-3.1624	-.3080
Environment	54.625 (N=8)	48.4531 (N=64)	-6.1719	-.5257
Health and Welfare	44.4375 (N=16)	50.4821 (N=56)	6.0446	.6821
Government Affairs	39.2 (N=5)	49.8806 (N=67)	10.6806	.7373
Insurance	42 (N=7)	49.9077 (N=65)	7.9077	.6356
Judiciary	49 (N=7)	49.1539 (N=65)	.1538	.0123
Labor	39.1 (N=10)	50.7581 (N=62)	11.6581	1.1000
Municipal	47.7778 (N=9)	49.3333 (N=63)	1.5556	.1392
Natural Resources	63.6667 (N=15)	45.3158 (N=57)	-18.3509	-2.0772**
Retirement	56.4 (N=5)	48.5970 (N=67)	-7.8030	-.5377
Transportation	41.2 (N=10)	50.4194 (N=62)	9.2194	.8671
Ways and Means	41.2353 (N=17)	51.5818 (N=55)	10.3465	1.2008
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.107 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2000				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	38.36364 (N=11)	32.33333 (N=63)	-6.030303	-0.6952
Agriculture	22.26667 (N=15)	36.01695 (N=59)	13.75028	1.8263
Appropriations	33.8 (N=15)	33.08475 (N=59)	-.7152542	-0.0929
Civil Law	51.66667 (N=6)	31.60294 (N=68)	-20.06373	-1.8086
Commerce	37.57143 (N=14)	32.21667 (N=60)	-5.354762	-0.6796
Education	29.11111 (N=9)	33.8 (N=65)	4.688889	0.4958
Environment	41.75 (N=8)	32.19697 (N=66)	-9.55303	-0.9643
Health and Welfare	33 (N=13)	33.27869 (N=61)	.2786885	0.0343
Government Affairs	33.71429 (N=7)	33.1791 (N=67)	-.5351812	-0.0506
Insurance	36.66667 (N=9)	32.75385 (N=65)	-3.912821	-0.4136
Judiciary	38.63636 (N=11)	32.28571 (N=63)	-6.350649	-0.7324
Labor	30.5 (N=8)	33.56061 (N=66)	3.060606	0.3072
Municipal	23.88889 (N=9)	34.52308 (N=65)	10.63419	1.1326
Natural Resources	43.92308 (N=13)	30.95082 (N=61)	-12.97226	-1.6234
Retirement	57.8 (N=5)	31.44928 (N=69)	-26.35072	-2.2074**
Transportation	18.625 (N=8)	35 (N=66)	16.375	1.6740
Ways and Means	27.52632 (N=19)	35.2 (N=55)	7.673684	1.0916
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.108 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2001				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	54.7 (N=10)	48.80645 (N=62)	-5.893548	-0.6140
Agriculture	57.4 (N=15)	47.57895 (N=57)	-9.821053	-1.2107
Appropriations	60.875 (N=16)	46.41071 (N=56)	-14.46429	-1.8502
Civil Law	55.2 (N=5)	49.20896 (N=67)	-5.991045	-0.4582
Commerce	44.38462 (N=13)	50.77966 (N=59)	6.395046	0.7419
Education	45.88889 (N=9)	50.15873 (N=63)	4.269841	0.4248
Environment	60.375 (N=8)	48.28125 (N=64)	-12.09375	-1.1526
Health and Welfare	46.30769 (N=13)	50.35593 (N=59)	4.04824	0.4685
Government Affairs	27.28571 (N=7)	52.03077 (N=65)	24.74505	2.2829**
Insurance	60 (N=8)	48.32813 (N=64)	-11.67188	-1.1117
Judiciary	51.54545 (N=11)	49.27869 (N=61)	-2.266766	-0.2451
Labor	33.875 (N=8)	51.59375 (N=64)	17.71875	1.7074
Municipal	34.33333 (N=6)	51.01515 (N=66)	16.68182	1.4045
Natural Resources	52.25 (N=12)	49.1 (N=60)	-3.15	-0.3530
Retirement	58 (N=6)	48.86364 (N=66)	-9.136364	-0.7618
Transportation	31.28571 (N=7)	51.6 (N=65)	20.31429	1.8518
Ways and Means	42.83333 (N=18)	51.88889 (N=54)	9.055556	1.1899
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.109 Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2002				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	56.4 (N=10)	49.03279 (N=61)	-7.367213	-0.7890
Agriculture	55.73333 (N=15)	48.55357 (N=56)	-7.179762	-0.9036
Appropriations	60.125 (N=16)	47.14545 (N=55)	-12.97955	-1.6964
Civil Law	54.25 (N=4)	49.8209 (N=67)	-4.429104	-0.3132
Commerce	48.33333 (N=12)	50.42373 (N=59)	2.090395	0.2402
Education	44.77778 (N=9)	50.83871 (N=62)	6.060932	0.6198
Environment	55.375 (N=8)	49.39683 (N=63)	-5.978175	-0.5808
Health and Welfare	45.38462 (N=13)	51.12069 (N=58)	5.736074	0.6822
Government Affairs	26.42857 (N=7)	52.65625 (N=64)	26.22768	2.5028**
Insurance	56.55556 (N=9)	49.12903 (N=62)	-7.426523	-0.7605
Judiciary	54.22222 (N=9)	49.46774 (N=62)	-4.75448	-0.4857
Labor	27.42857 (N=7)	52.54688 (N=64)	25.1183	2.3880**
Municipal	33.33333 (N=6)	51.61538 (N=65)	18.28205	1.5867
Natural Resources	60.08333 (N=12)	48.0339 (N=59)	-12.04944	-1.4037
Retirement	64.42857 (N=7)	48.5 (N=64)	-15.92857	-1.4783
Transportation	42.75 (N=8)	51 (N=63)	8.25	0.8033
Ways and Means	40.88889 (N=18)	53.18868 (N=53)	12.29979	1.6729
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.110 Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2003				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	63.9 (N=10)	60.06557 (N=61)	-3.834426	-0.5790
Agriculture	62.92857 (N=14)	60.03509 (N=57)	-2.893484	-0.4994
Appropriations	56.6875 (N=16)	61.74545 (N=55)	5.057955	0.9207
Civil Law	68.4 (N=5)	60.01515 (N=66)	-8.384848	-0.9349
Commerce	64.54545 (N=11)	59.88333 (N=60)	-4.662121	-0.7333
Education	55.55556 (N=9)	61.33871 (N=62)	5.783154	0.8374
Environment	62.88889 (N=9)	60.27419 (N=62)	-2.614695	-0.3771
Health and Welfare	58.66667 (N=12)	61 (N=59)	2.333333	0.3791
Government Affairs	49 (N=7)	61.875 (N=64)	12.875	1.6964
Insurance	66.11111 (N=9)	59.80645 (N=62)	-6.304659	-0.9138
Judiciary	57.22222 (N=9)	61.09677 (N=62)	3.874552	0.5595
Labor	51.28571 (N=7)	61.625 (N=64)	10.33929	1.3523
Municipal	58 (N=7)	60.89063 (N=64)	2.890625	0.3735
Natural Resources	64.15385 (N=13)	59.81034 (N=58)	-4.343501	-0.7302
Retirement	61.57143 (N=7)	60.5 (N=64)	-1.071429	-0.1383
Transportation	50.125 (N=8)	61.93651 (N=63)	11.81151	1.6488
Ways and Means	61.47059 (N=17)	60.33333 (N=54)	-1.137255	-0.2102
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table obtained from Sandahl (2005)

Table A.111 Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2004				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	65.1111 (N=9)	65.1695 (N=59)	.0584	.0096
Agriculture	75.7692 (N=13)	62.6546 (N=55)	-13.1147	-2.6188**
Appropriations	62.4375 (N=16)	66 (N=52)	3.5625	.73333
Civil Law	68.5 (N=6)	64.8387 (N=62)	-3.6613	-.5029
Commerce	65 (N=9)	65.1864 (N=59)	.1864	.0305
Education	76.6667 (N=6)	64.0484 (N=62)	-12.6183	-1.7704*
Environment	76.6667 (N=6)	64.0484 (N=62)	-12.6183	-1.7704*
Health and Welfare	57.6154 (N=13)	66.9455 (N=55)	9.3301	1.8170*
Government Affairs	53.1667 (N=6)	66.3226 (N=62)	13.1559	1.8496*
Insurance	69.7 (N=10)	64.3793 (N=58)	-5.3207	-.9165
Judiciary	63.8182 (N=11)	65.4211 (N=57)	1.6029	.2854
Labor	62.8333 (N=6)	65.3871 (N=62)	2.5538	.3504
Municipal	51.75 (N=8)	66.95 (N=60)	15.2	2.4742**
Natural Resources	70.6364 (N=11)	64.1053 (N=57)	-6.5311	-1.1744
Retirement	68.4 (N=5)	64.9048 (N=63)	-3.4952	-.4416
Transportation	82.8 (N=5)	63.7619 (N=63)	-19.0381	-2.5139**
Ways and Means	60.6111 (N=18)	66.8 (N=50)	6.1889	1.3374
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.112 Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2005				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	53.5833 (N=12)	57.8597 (N=57)	4.2763	.5767
Agriculture	72.8333 (N=12)	53.8070 (N=57)	-19.0263	-2.6946***
Appropriations	59.6471 (N=17)	56.2885 (N=52)	-3.3586	-.5147
Civil Law	64.8571 (N=7)	56.2419 (N=62)	-8.6152	-.9291
Commerce	59.3333 (N=9)	56.7833 (N=60)	-2.55	-.3050
Education	67.4286 (N=7)	55.9516 (N=62)	-11.4770	-1.2440
Environment	57.1667 (N=6)	57.1111 (N=63)	-.0556	-.0056
Health and Welfare	54.5 (N=12)	57.6667 (N=57)	3.1667	.4266
Government Affairs	42 (N=5)	58.2969 (N=64)	16.2969	1.5253
Insurance	58.8889 (N=9)	56.85 (N=60)	-2.0389	-.2438
Judiciary	49 (N=11)	58.6552 (N=58)	9.6552	1.2694
Labor	55.2857 (N=7)	57.3226 (N=62)	2.0369	.2183
Municipal	42.5 (N=8)	59.0328 (N=61)	16.5328	.0578*
Natural Resources	70.5 (N=10)	54.8475 (N=59)	-15.6525	-2.0139**
Retirement	62.25 (N=4)	56.8 (N=65)	-5.45	.6522
Transportation	74.5 (N=6)	55.4603 (N=63)	-19.0397	-1.9578*
Ways and Means	46.2222 (N=18)	60.9608 (N=51)	14.7386	2.3931**
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.113 Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2006				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	52.6 (N=10)	52.7288 (N=59)	.1288	.0197
Agriculture	62.5833 (N=12)	50.6316 (N=57)	-11.9518	-2.0263*
Appropriations	52.625 (N=16)	52.7359 (N=53)	.1108	.0203
Civil Law	49 (N=6)	53.0635 (N=63)	4.0635	.4981
Commerce	51.5 (N=8)	52.8689 (N=61)	1.3689	.1903
Education	50.5556 (N=9)	53.0333 (N=60)	2.4778	.3627
Environment	57.2857 (N=7)	52.1936 (N=62)	-5.0922	-.6698
Health and Welfare	59.4 (N=10)	51.5763 (N=59)	-7.8237	-1.2088
Government Affairs	36.3333 (N=6)	54.2698 (N=63)	17.9365	2.2778**
Insurance	57.7778 (N=9)	51.95 (N=60)	-5.8278	-.8568
Judiciary	49 (N=10)	53.3390 (N=59)	4.3390	.6654
Labor	42.2857 (N=7)	53.8871 (N=62)	11.6014	1.5478
Municipal	34.875 (N=8)	55.0492 (N=61)	20.1742	2.9851***
Natural Resources	56 (N=9)	52.2167 (N=60)	-3.7833	-.5545
Retirement	41 (N=4)	53.43077 (N=65)	12.4308	1.2765
Transportation	69.6667 (N=6)	51.0952 (N=63)	-18.5714	-2.3650**
Ways and Means	48.2941 (N=17)	54.1539 (N=52)	5.8597	1.1063
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.114 Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2007				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	44.6 (N=10)	46.7586 (N=58)	2.1586	.3235
Agriculture	45.75 (N=12)	46.5893 (N=56)	.8393	.1353
Appropriations	41.1765 (N=17)	48.1961 (N=51)	7.0196	1.3015
Civil Law	51 (N=6)	46 (N=62)	-5	-.6012
Commerce	43.2857 (N=7)	46.8033 (N=61)	3.5176	.4526
Education	46.7778 (N=9)	46.3898 (N=59)	-.3879	-.0556
Environment	49.5 (N=6)	46.1452 (N=62)	-3.3548	-.4028
Health and Welfare	44.6 (N=10)	46.7586 (N=58)	2.1586	.3235
Government Affairs	43.6667 (N=6)	46.7097 (N=62)	3.0430	.3653
Insurance	53.7778 (N=9)	45.3220 (N=59)	-8.4557	-1.2252
Judiciary	39.1 (N=10)	47.7069 (N=58)	8.6069	1.3053
Labor	42.2857 (N=7)	46.9180 (N=61)	4.6323	.5968
Municipal	34.875 (N=8)	47.9833 (N=60)	13.1083	1.8304*
Natural Resources	48.6667 (N=9)	46.1017 (N=59)	-2.5650	-.3679
Retirement	38 (N=4)	46.9688 (N=64)	8.9688	.8977
Transportation	62.8333 (N=6)	44.8548 (N=62)	-17.9785	-2.2362**
Ways and Means	44.8333 (N=18)	47.02 (N=50)	2.1867	.4084
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				

Table A.115 Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory

2008				
Louisiana House Standing Committee	Committee member	Non Committee member	Mean Difference	T
Administration of Criminal Justice	57.8333 (N=6)	59.7174 (N=46)	1.8841	.3666
Agriculture	59.6364 (N=11)	59.4634 (N=41)	-.1729	-.0430
Appropriations	58.5455 (N=11)	59.7561 (N=41)	1.2106	.3010
Civil Law	63.5714 (N=7)	58.8667 (N=45)	-4.7048	-.9862
Commerce	57.9091 (N=11)	59.9268 (N=41)	2.0177	.5025
Education	61.9091 (N=11)	58.8537 (N=41)	-3.0554	-.7634
Environment	60.5 (N=8)	59.3182 (N=44)	-1.1818	-.2595
Health and Welfare	63.6 (N=10)	58.5238 (N=42)	-5.0762	-1.2353
Government Affairs	58.25 (N=8)	59.7273 (N=44)	1.4772	.3246
Insurance	57 (N=4)	59.7083 (N=48)	2.7083	.4398
Judiciary	61.2222 (N=9)	59.1395 (N=43)	-2.0827	-.4804
Labor	57 (N=4)	59.7083 (N=48)	2.7083	.4398
Municipal	60.3077 (N=13)	59.2308 (N=39)	-1.0769	-.2839
Natural Resources	60.5 (N=8)	59.3182 (N=44)	-1.1818	-.2595
Retirement	57.75 (N=4)	59.6458 (N=48)	1.8958	.3076
Transportation	59.75 (N=12)	59.425 (N=40)	-.325	-.0833
Ways and Means	60.1111 (N=9)	59.3721 (N=43)	-.7390	-.1701
*= p<.10				
**= p<.05				
***=p<.01				




Figure A.4.1 Distribution of W-nominate Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 1999




Figure A.4.2 Distribution of W-nominate Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 2000




Figure A.4.3 Distribution of W-nominate Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 2004




Figure A.4.4 Distribution of W-nominate Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 2008




Figure A.4.5 Distribution of LABI Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 1999




Figure A.4.6 Distribution of LABI Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 2000

Non-committee Member Committee Member




Figure A.4.7 Distribution of LABI Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 2004

Non-committee Member Committee Member




Figure A.4.8 Distribution of LABI Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 2008




Figure A.4.9 Distribution of Percent Employed in Farming for Members and Non-Members of the Louisiana House Agriculture Committee, 1999




Figure A.4.10 Distribution of Percent Employed in Farming for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Agriculture Committee, 2000

Non- Committee Member Committee Member




Figure A.4.11 Distribution of Percent Employed in Farming for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Agriculture Committee, 2004

Non-Committee Member Committee Member




Figure A.4.12 Distribution of Percent Employed in Farming for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Agriculture Committee, 2008




Figure A.4.13 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Agriculture Committee, 1999




Figure A.4.14 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Civil Law Committee, 1999




Figure A.4.15 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Agriculture Committee, 1999




Figure A.4.16 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Governmental Affairs Committee, 2004

Non-Committee Member Committee Member




Figure A.4.17 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Municipal Committee, 2004

Non-Committee Member Committee Member




Figure A.4.18 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 2004




Figure A.4.19 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture Committee, 2004




Figure A.4.20 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Labor Committee, 2004




Figure A.4.21 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Appropriations Committee, 2004




Figure A.4.22 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture Committee, 2008




Figure A.4.23 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Appropriations Committee, 2008




Figure A.4.24 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Retirement Committee, 2008




Figure A.4.25 Distribution of LABI scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture Committee, 1999




Figure A.4.26 Distribution of LABI scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture Committee, 2004




Figure A.4.27 Distribution of LABI scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture Committee, 2008




Figure A.4.28 Ideology scores for Democrat and Republican members of the Louisiana House of Representatives, 1999




Figure A.4.29 Ideology scores for Democrat and Republican members of the Louisiana House of Representatives, 2000




Figure A.4.30 Ideology scores for Democrat and Republican members of the Louisiana House of Representatives, 2004




Figure A.4.31 Ideology scores for Democrat and Republican members of the Louisiana House of Representatives, 2008

APPENDIX B: SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW INSTRUMENTS

B.1 Consent Form for a Non-Clinical Study

1. Study Title: Testing the Informational, Distributive, and Major Party Cartel Theory in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives
2. Performance Site: Louisiana House of Representatives, legislator or former legislator office, when legislators are not available for face to face interviews a mail survey will be conducted
3. Investigators: The following investigators are available for questions about this study,
M-F, 8:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m.
Trisha Sandahl 921-6048
4. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to add to current research on state legislative committee assignment
5. Subject Inclusion: Former and present Louisiana House legislators or their staff, specifically interviewing senior legislators, Democrat and Republican legislators, committee chair, as well as legislators residing on different committees from each other
6. Number of Subjects: 5-8
7. Study Procedure: This study will verbally ask legislators a set of scripted questions concerning legislator committee assignment in the Louisiana House. Prior to verbal interviews a consent form plus questionnaire will be emailed to each participant to review over. For mail surveys a consent form, questionnaire, and paid postage will be provided.
8. Benefits: This study will add to scholarly understanding of the assignment of legislators to committees in the Louisiana House.
9. Risk: The only risk of this study is the inadvertent release of legislator answers to the questions presented in this study. However, every effort will be made to maintain the confidentiality of the study records. Files will be kept in a secure location in which only the investigator has access.
10. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty or loss of any benefit to which they might otherwise be entitled.
11. Privacy: Results of this study may be published, but no names or identifying information will be included in the publication. Subject identity will remain confidential unless disclosure is required by law.
12. Signature:

This study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have any questions about

the subjects' rights or other concerns, I can contact Robert C. Mathews, Institutional Review Board, (225) 578-8692, irb@lsu.edu, www.lsu.edu/irb. I agree to participate in the study described above and acknowledge the investigator's obligation to provide me with a signed copy of this consent from.

Subject Signature: _____ Date: _____

B.2 Questionnaire:

Question 1: Do legislators generally get the assignments they request? If not, how are Louisiana committee assignments assigned (formally and informally)?

Question 2: Why do you think legislators do or do not get the committee assignments they request?

Question 3: Which Louisiana House committees are most sought after and why? Do these committees offer constituent benefits, policy benefits, or prestige benefits to a legislator? Which committees are less desirable and why? Are committee request more often granted on least sought after committees compared to more desirable committees?

Question 4: When you entered the Louisiana House Legislature, what were your three top committee assignment requests?

Question 5: In general what do you believe motivates Louisiana House legislators to request certain committee assignments? Does a legislator's district ask them to join certain committees? What about their party? Lastly, do interest groups motivate individual legislators to join specific committees?

Question 6: Specifically speaking, what factors motivate your request for membership onto specific committees?

Question 7: In general, what factors do you believe affect whether or not legislators receive the committee assignments they request? In your particular case, what factors do you believe affect or affected whether you receive or have received your requested committee assignments?

Question 8: Could you tell me more about these factors, generally and specifically?

Question 9: Speaking of these factors, what do you believe is the relative weight of each of these factors in determining whether legislators receive their committee request? Are some of these factors more important than others?

Question 10: In general, do you believe committee membership is reflective of the preferences of the chamber as a whole? If not, what preferences do you believe committee membership reflects? Is it individual legislator district interests, party interests?

Question 11: Generally speaking, during committee requests and assignments is there an emphasis on placing legislators which a particular viewpoint or area of expertise onto a specific committee?

VITA

She was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in April 1978, to Thomas and Patricia Sandahl. She is married to Clay Ourso and is the mother of two beautiful children named Brooke and Bennett. She is a graduate of St. Jude Catholic Elementary School and St. Michael the Archangel Catholic High School. After high school, she continued her catholic education by attending Spring Hill College in Mobile, Alabama. She began college unsure of her academic path, until she took her very first political science class. She graduated from Spring Hill College in May 2000 with a Bachelor of Science of Political Science. After college, her interest in the study of political science led her back home and to graduate school at Louisiana State University, where she completed her Master's degree in political science with a concentration in American government in 2005. She continued her education by completing her Doctorate of Philosophy in Political Science in 2012.