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Right Reason in Edmund Spenser's 'Faerie Queene'.

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LACEY, III, William Robert, 1921-  
RIGHT REASON IN EDMUND SPENSER'S FAERIE QUEENE. 

Louisiana State University and Agricultural and 
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RIGHT REASON IN EDMUND SPENSER'S
FAERIE QUEENE

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
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in

The Department of English

by

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May, 1967
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Completion of this investigation means not only the successful termination of a sometimes burdensome chore, for which I am grateful; it means, also, the termination of a relationship which I have found to be rewarding and stimulating. Consequently, as much as I rejoice in the one, so I reluctantly relinquish the other--the association with my adviser and committee--Mr. Lawrence Sasek, Mr. Esmond Marilla, and Mr. John Wildman. Too, the completion of this stage also concludes a pleasant relationship with Mrs. Helen Palmer, Mrs. Mary Jane Dyson, and Mrs. Emeline Staples of the Hill Memorial Library, Louisiana State University, and with Mrs. Margaret Salcido of the Library, University of Texas at El Paso. These pleasant associations having ended in a fruition of sorts, I trust that they will continue in other days and in other ways.

My indebtedness to my wife, Etoile, for her patient assistance is as measureless as my unbounded gratitude.

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ABSTRACT

The problem of finding unity in Edmund Spenser's *Faerie Queen* has exercised and fascinated scholars since the seventeenth century—since the days when John Milton could acclaim Spenser as a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas. The expectation of finding formal, classical unity has been disappointed, for Spenser as a man of the Middle Ages was concerned less with formal, structural unity than with thematic, didactic unity of purpose and intent.

The theme which Edmund Spenser used to unify *The Faerie Queen* was an inherent part of the so-called Elizabethan world picture, the traditional world-view which the Renaissance received from the Middle Ages and medieval interpretations, largely fostered by the Church, of classical anthropology and cosmology. The concept of right reason, which had descended from Socrates to full development in later Greek philosophy, transferred its allegiance from pagan classicism to Christianity; as a vital component of Christian Humanism, the concept of right reason served to unite the finite intelligence of created man with the infinite Wisdom of Almighty God. Theologically, this key link in medieval and Renaissance theology found its most explicit expression in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and Richard Hooker.

The concept of right reason, as modified by centuries of Christian Humanism, served Edmund Spenser as a unifying theme for his didactic epic. In Book I of *The Faerie Queen*, the Red Cross Knight
has to add to his naive faith worldly wisdom and theological sophistication, for the requisite right reason as a vital component of Christian Humanism must ground itself on philosophy, theology, experience, and knowledge, as well as upon faith. Sir Guyon, in Book II, learns the opposite aspect of the problem. Just as faith without knowledge is unavailing, so is knowledge without faith. Right reason presupposes wisdom, not mere learning. Books III and IV concern the regulation of interpersonal relationships through the dictates of right reason, so that Eros develops through Agape into Charity. Book V expands the interpersonal relationships of Books III and IV into the wider scope of social justice, wherein the titular knight, Sir Artesall, learns that Christian Humanism requires that mercy temper justice. In Book VI, Sir Calidore learns that the exercise of courtesy must originate in and lead toward basic Christian virtues.

The incomplete "Cantos of Mutabilitie" explore the validity of the concept of right reason—whether there exists an Infinite in which the finite mind of man can participate. Rebellious Mutabilitie elicits an enigmatic compromise from Nature. The poet, however, wiser than Mutabilitie, knows not to seek answers to supernatural problems from nature, majestic and powerful though she be. Rather, Spenser transcends the delusions of physical nature and appeals to his God for an answer; the answer which he receives to his petition validates the idealistic basis upon which right reason must rest.

Having independently arrived at a theological position remarkably similar to that of his contemporary, Richard Hooker, a position which has defined orthodox Anglicanism as a deliberate compromise between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism for succeeding generations, Edmund
Spenser died in 1599, without completing the ambitious task which he had undertaken. But his final ejaculatory prayer made the "leap of faith" to bridge the gap between the phenomenal world of "seeming" and the ideal world of being, and demonstrated the existence, necessity, and function of right reason as a channel of communication between the corresponding worlds of the transitory mundane and the eternal ideal.
CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

No dearth of material—criticism, commentary, or reaction—thwarts the student of Edmund Spenser's poetry; rather, an embarrassment of riches makes the task of selection and discrimination the first business with which he must concern himself. In the nearly four hundred years since the publication of the Shepheardes Calender with E. K.'s appended comments, Spenser criticism has flourished prodigiously, often revealing more exactly the contemporary critical idiosyncrasies than the meaning and techniques of the poet, so that a history of Spenser criticism parallels a history of English critical theory. William R. Mueller¹ points out that Spenser criticism has been at its best during two half-century periods, that between 1715 and 1762, and that between 1900 and 1950; and that, moreover, the bulk of criticism addressed itself to The Faerie Queene. Prior to the eighteenth century, E. K., Sidney, Jonson, Harvey, and Milton had remarked about the poet's work, but only Sir Kenelm Digby's attempt to explicate the twenty-second stanza of Canto

IX, Book II, and his Concerning Edmund Spencer constituted sustained efforts toward criticism; otherwise, seventeenth century criticism was brief and was directed more toward discussion of the propriety of Spencer's diction than toward versification, structure, or meaning.

Critics of the seventeenth century concentrated upon Spencer's verse form. Predictably, Thomas Rymer deplored Spencer's unhappy "choice of the stanza, which is in no wise proper for our language." John Dryden, with less perceptiveness than he exercised toward the poetry of Chaucer, damned Spencer with faint praise: he succeeded, Dryden said, as well as one could expect with his inappropriate stanza; and "only Mr. Waller among the English" excelled Sponsor's prosody. John Hughes in the preface to his Works of Mr. Edmund Spenser, (1715), and John Unton in the preface to his edition of The Faerie Queene of Edmund Spenser (1758) both expressed the idea that Spencer's choice of verse form was unduly restricting, and, if pleasant, also monotonous, redundant, and circumlocutory. Thomas Warton's opinion is perhaps the typical eighteenth-century one regarding Spencer's versification: "It is indeed surprising upon the whole, that Spencer should execute a poem of uncommon length, with so much spirit and ease, laden as he was with so many shackles, and embarrassed with so complicated a bondage of riming."

In addition to their attention to verse form, the seventeenth


century critics busied themselves with the structure of *The Faerie Quaene* as an epic. Thomas Rymer earlier had objected to Spenser's neglecting the models of Homer and Virgil in pursuit of Ariosto. He blamed the Italians for "debauching great Spenser's judgment," so that he neglected the classical virtues of uniformity and direction. Sir William Temple and Sir Richard Blackmore, too, found Spenser's lack of classical form and direction a blemish. Dryden criticized the lack of design and unity, and deplored the lack of epic subordination among the various heroes of the six books; and it was he who perpetuated the idea first expressed in Spenser's letter to Ralegh that Prince Arthur "shines throughout the whole poem and succors the rest, when they are in distress." 

Spenser's first editor, John Hughes, concurred with the neo-classical criticisms of *The Faerie Quaene*. If it must be judged in accordance with classical epic standards, comparison with Greek and Roman models will reveal *The Faerie Quaene* as a monstrosity; if, on the other hand, it be judged as a "Gothick" production, and if we admit that Spenser was not attempting a classical epic, then Spenser selected the kind of epic which best accommodated his peculiar kind of talent.

John Upton sought to excuse Spenser from Dryden's and Hughes's unfavorable criticism. In a classical example of oversimplification,
he stated: "The beginning is, the British Prince saw in a vision the Fairy Queen, and fell in love with her: the middle, his search after her, with the adventures that he underwent: the end, his finding whom he sought." 9

Warton, with regard to structure, closely followed Hughes. Spenser's plan best suits his genius. The poem as a whole lacks unity, but there is unity in each separate book. Because Spenser was not attempting classical poetry, it would be foolish to condemn him for failure to achieve classical verse, for "his poetry is the careless exuberance of warm imagination and a strong sensibility." 10

Richard Ward's "Letter VIII" of Letters on Chivalry and Romance indicates the shift from neoclassical to pre-Romantic standards in judging The Faerie Queen as an epic. The Faerie Queen, though lacking in classical unity, has its own kind of order, deriving both its structure and its characters "from the established nodes and ideas of Chivalry." Spenser's is a unity of design, not of action. The attempt to superimpose a classical unity through the introduction of Prince Arthur resulted in an unfortunate hybridization.

The conclusion is, that, as an allegorical poem, the method of the Faerie Queen is governed by the justness of the moral: as a narrative poem, it is conducted on the ideas and usages of Chivalry. In either view, if taken by itself, the plan is defensible. But from the union of the two designs there arises a perplexity and confusion, which is the proper, and only considerable defect of this extraordinary poem. 11


10 Var., I, 318.

11 Moral and Political Dialogues; with Letters on Chivalry and Romance (London, 1771), III, 139-338.
In 1747, Joseph Sponco devoted an entire chapter, "Defects of Spenser's Allegory," of his critical work, *Polymetis*, to a minute examination, comparing Spenser's use of the allegory with the classical. He enumerated the three faults which he considered primary: mixing pagan myths with Christian truths, misinterpreting classical allegories, and inability to invent his own allegories. As a classicist himself, Spence ignored the advice of such men as Hughes, Warton, and Hurd that Spenser should be judged by some standard other than the classical.

Warton perceptively initiated investigation of most of the problems concerning Spenser's use of the allegory. He felt that occasionally Spenser employs allegory "under which no meaning is couched," citing in particular the episode of Alma in her castle. A more deadly criticism repeated the Abbe du Ros's opinion that allegory is by nature boring. Dryden's suggestion that the characters in *The Faerie Queen* were all based upon real people in Queen Elizabeth's court opened a new line of investigation, and led Warton to wonder whether the allegory were not as much historical as it was moral. Sir Walter Scott in 1806 regretted that Spenser critics had not attended more carefully to historical identification of the characters; and Lowell, later in the nineteenth century, suggested that all of the characters were readily identifiable.

The course of Spenser criticism was charted within the first two hundred years after the poet's death; the four main problems had been enunciated, and the methods of attack decided upon. Warton's criticism is perhaps the first to delineate the four basic areas which still

12II, 83-84.
13II, 108-110.
define Spenser criticism: diction, versification, form and structure, and the use of allegory. In general, concern with diction occupied Spenser's contemporaries and other critics before the eighteenth century; versification and structure, the neoclassical critics; form and structure, the pro-Romantic critics; and versification and form, the romantic critics. Interest in Spenser's allegory is simultaneously pervasive and intermittent. Obviously, Ben Jonson, who would have Spenser read for his matter, and John Milton, who found Spenser a better teacher than Scotus or Aquinas, found in Spenser a poet who accepted the didactic responsibilities which the Renaissance rhetorical poetic imposed; and Spenser's didacticism, apart from frequent, brief gnomic apothegms, expresses itself allegorically through narrative. Joseph Spence in "The Defects of our Modern Poets, in their Allegories: Instanced from Spenser's Fairy Queen" (1747) does not touch upon allegorical interpretation; instead, he discusses Spenser's technical failure to achieve classical decorum in his use of allegory, stating that he "wandered . . . into . . . strange and inconsistent imaginations."¹⁴

Thomas Warton in 1762 accepted at face value Spenser's clearly expressed intention to write allegorically,¹⁵ and his criticism of Spenser's allegory has to do with how well Spenser achieved his

¹⁴Excerpted in Mueller, p. 36.

¹⁵In his "Letter to Ralegh," 23 January, 1589, Spenser expressed his allegorical intention: "Sir knowing how doubtfully all Allegories may be construed, and this booke of mine, which I haue entitled the Fairy Queene, being a continued Allegory, or darke conceit, I haue thought good as well for suoyding of gealous opinions and misconstructions, as also for your better light in reading thereof . . . to discover vnto you the general intention and meaning, which in the whole course thereof I haue fashioned, without expressing of any particular purposes or by-accidents therein contained. . . ." Quoted in Var., I, 167-170.
intention. Moreover, it was Warton who initiated the association between Spenserian allegory and such other manifestations of the allegorical temper as pageants, jousts, dumb shows, and masques; and he thought that "allegorical poetry . . . received its ultimate consumma-
tion in the Fairy Queen."¹⁶

Romantic disregard for didacticism and for allegory as a covert form of didacticism appears in its full development in William Hazlitt's Lectures on the English Poets. In the essay, "On Chaucer and Spenser," (1818), Hazlitt concluded that Spenser's poetry is "inspired by the love of ease, and relaxation from all the cares and business of life. Of all the poets, he is the most poetical." His characteristics are "exuberance of fancy," "endless voluptuousness of sentiment," "originality," "richness," and "variety." His poetry is "all fairy-land" where the reader wanders "among ideal beings." "He is the painter of abstrac-
tions, and describes them with dazzling minuteness."¹⁷ The reader perceives that Hazlitt valued Spenser not for content but for esthetic appreciation of craftsmanship; the perception becomes clearer from the statements that "the love of beauty, . . . and not of truth, is the moving principle of his [Spenser's] mind," and that "he [Spenser] luxu-
riates . . . in the extremes of sensuality or refinement." Perception becomes conclusion when one reads Hazlitt's comments on allegory:

Some people will say that all this may be very fine, but that they cannot understand it on account of the allegory. They are afraid

¹⁶Observations, II, 108. Immediately after establishing The Faery Queen at the apogee of allegorical poetry in English, Warton demolished the whole structure by continuing: "I conclude with the just and perti-
nent sentiments of the Abbe du Bos on allegorical action. . . . 'It is impossible for a piece, whose subject is an allegorical action, to interest us very much.'" (Pp. 108-109).

¹⁷London, 1924, pp. 52-53.
of the allegory, as if they thought it would bite them: they look at it as a child looks at the painted dragon, and think it will strangle them in its shining folds. This is idle. If they do not meddle with the allegory, the allegory will not meddle with them. "Nobody but Rubens could have painted the fancy of Spenser; and he could not have given the sentiment, the airy dream that hovers over it!" Spenser, Hazlitt implied, should be valued for his full and copious-to-the-overflowing language, for his exquisite versification, "the most smooth and the most sounding in the language," "a labyrinth of sweet sounds," which, like the waves of the sea, "lull the senses into a deep oblivion of the jarring noises of the world, from which we have no wish to be ever recalled." Spenser, to Hazlitt, is a painter of exquisite miniatures, idealistic, voluptuous, and visionary.

Coleridge, lecturing in 1818 upon "Allegory," stated that allegory "is incapable of exciting any lively interest for any length of time. . . . The duller and most defective parts of Spenser are those in which we are compelled to think of his agents as allegories." In his lecture on "Spenser," Coleridge noticed the following characteristics of his poetry:

1. "The indescribable sweetness and fluent projection of his verse."
2. "Scientific construction of the metre of the Faery Queene."
3. "Great skill in harmonizing his descriptions of external nature and actual incidents with the allegorical character and epic activity of the poem."
4. "Marvellous independence and true imaginative absence of all particular space or time."

"Page 56.
"Page 59.
"Pages 64-65.

5. "The quintessential character of Christian chivalry in all his characters."


7. "Fancy under the conditions of imagination. . . . He has an imaginative fancy, but he has not imagination; . . . feminine tenderness, almost maidenly purity of feeling, and above all, a deep moral earnestness which produces a believing sympathy and acquiescence in the reader." 22

In sum, Coleridge praised Spenser's versification, his descriptions, his achievement of "imaginative absence of all particular space or time," his illustrations of Christian chivalry, his nationalism, his "imaginative fancy," his moral seriousness, and his sensitivity; but, reiterating the statement of Warton and du Bos, he insisted that allegory is by nature dull, partaking as it does of the logical powers of reason rather than of the imagination, and that Spenser's allegory is inferior.

The American critic, James Russell Lowell, in 1875, continued Hazlitt's and Coleridge's depreciation of the allegorical significance in *The Faerie Queene*, and at the same time gave Spenser full credit for the new life which he breathed into English prosody with the publication of *The Shephearde Calender*. Spenser, he said, "did more than anyone else to redeem from the leaden gripe of vulgar and pedantic conceit" the literature of England. 23 "But no man," Lowell continues,

contributed so much to the transformation of style and language as Spenser; for not only did he deliberately endeavor at reform, but by the charm of his diction, the novel harmonies of his verse, his ideal method of treatment, and the splendor of his fancy, he made the new manner popular and fruitful. . . . He at first sought for

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22Pages 32-39.

23Lowell's essay, "Spenser," was first published in the *North American Review*, CXX (April, 1875), 334-394. It reappeared with minor revisions in *Literary Essays* (Boston and New York, c. 1899), IV, 265-353. I cite the revised form. This quotation is from page 276.
that remoteness, which is implied in an escape from the realism of daily life, in the pastoral.\textsuperscript{24}

The greatest tribute which Lowell could pay to the poetry of Spenser was to the effect that, boring (according to Lowell) as all allegorical writing is, Spenser's \textit{Faerie Queene} yet brings delight to the reader.

As a narrative it has, I think, every fault of which that kind of writing is capable. The characters are vague, and, even were they not, they drop out of the story so often and remain out of it so long, that we have forgotten who they are when we meet them again; the episodes hinder the advance of action instead of relieving it with variety of incident or novelty of situation; the plot, if plot it may be called, . . . recalls drearily our ancient enemy, the Metrical Romance. . . . Hazlitt bids us not mind the allegory, and says that it won't bite us or meddle with us if we do not meddle with it. But how if it bore us, which after all is the fatal question? The truth is that it is too often forced upon us against our will. . . . The true type of the allegory is the Odyssey, which we read without suspicion as pure poem, and then find a new pleasure in divining its double meaning, as if we somehow got a better bargain of our author than he meant to give us. . . . The moral of a poem should be suggested. . . . The vast superiority of Bunyan over Spenser lies in the fact that we help make his allegory out of our own experience. . . . As Bunyan rises not seldom to a natural poetry, so Spenser sinks now and then, through the fault of his topics, to unmistakable prose.\textsuperscript{25}

Wondering how so superb a poet as Spenser could be seduced into writing didactic allegory, Lowell then enunciates his "fascade" theory: Spenser, as an imaginative artist, had to subordinate his creative genius in order to interest his utilitarian contemporaries. "Allegory, as then practised, was imagination adapted for beginners, in words of one syllable and illustrated with cuts, and would serve both his ethical and pictorial purpose."\textsuperscript{26} Lowell advises modern readers to overlook the allegory, and use Spenser's poetry as a gallery of pictures

\textsuperscript{24}Pages 283-284.

\textsuperscript{25}Pages 322-324.

\textsuperscript{26}Pages 324-326.
"which we visit as the mood takes us, and where we spend an hour or two at a time, long enough to sweeten our perceptions, not so long as to cloy them," because the allegorical tendency was fashionable in Elizabethan times, and Spenser but assumed his allegorical mode as thoughtlessly as he did his ruff. But "no man can read the 'Faery Queen' and be anything but the better for it," for whoever can endure unmixed delight, whoever can tolerate music and painting and poetry all in one, whoever wishes to be rid of thought and to let the busy anvils of the brain be silent for a time, let him read in the "Faery Queen." There is the land of pure heart's ease, where no ache or sorrow of spirit can enter.27

Lowell's position, according to Mueller, "is the perfect summation of the entire romantic school."28 Spenser failed to achieve his didactic intention, because "so entirely are beauty and delight in it the native element of Spenser, that whenever in the 'Faery Queen' you come suddenly on the moral, it gives you a shock of unpleasant surprise, a kind of grit, as when one's teeth close on a bit of gravel in a dish of strawberies and cream."29

Following Hazlitt and Lowell in teaching that Spenser forgot his function as teacher and luxuriated in a sensuous enjoyment of esthetic delight, such critics as Emile Legouis30 and Denis Saurat31 in the twentieth century have perpetuated the idea that Spenser's allegorical and didactic pretensions were but a disguise for his hedonism.

27Page 353.
28Page 15.
29Lowell, p. 334.
30Spenser (New York, 1926).
Opposing critics were quick to answer Lowell. Professor Edward Dowden in his essay, "Spenser, the Poet and Teacher" (1884) denied that the reader should regard Spenser as "the weaver of spells, the creator of illusions, the enchanter of the Elizabethan age; and that his name is to us a word of magic by which we conjure away the pain of actual life, and obtain entrance into a world of faery." It was not as such that Milton valued Spenser; he considered his master as a teacher. Professor Dowden then cites Lowell's evaluation, and asks whether the modern reader should accept Milton's evaluation or Lowell's. "Was Spenser such a teacher 'sago and serious' to his own age? If so, does he remain such a teacher for this age of ours?" Dowden concluded that Spenser was just such a teacher, and that the high distinction of Spenser's poetry is to be found in the rare degree in which it unites sense and soul, moral seriousness and the Renaissance appetite for beauty. To incite and to conduct men to an active virtue is not only the express purpose of the Faery Queen, but as far as a poem can render such service, the Faery Queen has actually served to train knights of holiness, knights of temperance, knights of courtesy.

The serious, didactic purpose of Spenser's poetry is not mere facade to support a dome of many colored glasses; the reader must take seriously Spenser's stated intention and accept the poet as a teacher.

William R. Mueller points out that the dialogue between Lowell and Dowden epitomizes the critical arguments concerning the allegorical interpretation of Spenser's poetry; such a dichotomy exists among poets.


33Page 304.

34Page 306.

35Pages 328 ff.
as well as among critics. Milton's "sage and serious Spenser" finds his counterpart in Keats's

one who had by Mulla's stream
Fondled the maidens with the breasts of cream.36

Mueller's contention that the period 1900-1950 is one of the best in the history of Spenser criticism seems just, until we consider that the torrent of Spenser criticism at this date shows no evidence of diminishing, and that, consequently, we should extend the terminal date. The period since 1900 has produced not only voluminous criticism, but criticism of widely varying aspect: sources and analogues, historicity, theology, philosophy, ethics, status as a 'courtesy book,' as an English adaptation of The Courtier, as a continuation of the metrical romance, as a continuation of the courtly love tradition, imagery, prosody, order of composition, and so forth, ad infinitum et ad nausseum. The Shepheardes Calender has been studied as satire, as beast fable, as Puritan propaganda, and as autobiography. The Foure Hymnes have been ransacked for evidences of Neoplatonism and of Calvinism. They have been viewed as orthodox statements of Christian mysticism.

"For some," William Nelson states, "Spenser is an elfin voluptuary, for others he is a learned moralist and an eloquent, highly sophisticated artist."37

Furthermore, even among critics who accept Spenser's allegorical intention, divergences of interpretation arise. Is the emphasis in the allegory historical? contemporary? moral? ethical? ecclesiastical?


37Nelson, p. vii.
Dryden’s suggestion that every character in *The Faerie Queene* had his original in the court of Queen Elizabeth led to a spate of "identification criticism," which more or less effectively terminated with the acceptance of Professor Edwin A. Greenlaw’s insistence that the allegory is primarily philosophical rather than historical; however, Professor J. F. Kermode has recently sought to revive interest in historical interpretation. To refute C. S. Lewis’s description of the poet as "homely" and "churchwardenly," Professor Kermode suggests that such a "simplification" of Spenser has gone too far. "Spenser saw this world as a vast infolded mutually relevant structure, as inclusive as the Freudian dream; but he also saw it as disconnected, decaying, mutable, disorderly." To deprive interpretation of Spenser of all historical allegory is to discard "the adhesive which binds the dream image to immediate reality." On the other hand, he denies A. C. Hamilton’s contention that the "universal reference prevents our translating events into historical terms." The alert reader must keep in mind both the historical reality of Spenser’s England and the ideal to which he compared it. Spenser, Professor Kermode explains in another book, should not be thought of as standing "quite free of the past." He used

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40The Allegory of Love (London, 1936), pp. 311, 312.


the traditions—the rhetorical and philosophical—to teach delightfully from his "common stock of philosophy and studies in ancient authors" which he shared with his contemporaries. Spenser was, thus, more 'medieval' than we commonly think. It is necessary that Spenser be interpreted in terms of the time in which he lived. But Spenser's use of the past was for the purpose of illuminating the present, so that allegorically one might study the temporal in comparison with the eternal ideal.44 In a word, then, Professor Kermode argues that understanding of the tenor does not necessitate discarding the vehicle; that adequate comprehension of the poem demands retaining the rind with the kernel; that the historical and philosophical allegories are mutually supporting, and that to ignore the one is to distort the other.

Equally insistent that the reader not merely translate the vehicle into a disembodied tenor through a mechanical substitution of values are Professors Thomas P. Roche, Jr., 45 and Rosamond Tuve,46 both of whom insist that allegory is not only a "symbolic mode," but also an implication of ontological presuppositions, thus following Chesterton's description of the Middle Ages as having an essentially "sacramental" view of the world. Allegory, they maintain, is not only a rhetorical device, but is also a result of accepting a world view which encompassed what Professor Tillyard referred to as "the correspondences,"47 and


46Allegorical Imagery (Princeton, 1965).

which Professor C. S. Lewis called the "medieval model of the universe."48 The allegorical mode results no less, Professors Turve and Roche point out, from medieval philosophy than from handbooks of rhetoric. Consequently, to interpret allegory as if it were only a mechanical, rhetorical device is to deprive it of its significance as a statement about reality.

This schematic review of criticism has indicated the cyclical nature of interest in Spenser as an allegorist: ingenuous acceptance of his allegorical intention giving way to esthetic rejection of didactic poetry in general and of allegory in particular, followed by a renewed interest in the historical, philosophical, and theological meanings expressed through allegory. It is obvious, too, that sustained interest in Spenser's allegory has led to increasingly subtle and penetrating interpretations of both the allegory and of Spenser's use of the techniques of allegory. From Ruskin's naive interpretation in The Stones of Venice, in which the critic posited a one-for-one relationship between vehicle and tenor, as readily visible to the initiated as the value of "X" in an algebraic equation to a skilled mathematician, we progress to more sophisticated allegorical readings. One group of scholars has seen The Faerie Queene as a historical allegory;49 others interpret it as a poetic transcript of Calvin's Institutes;50 a third

49Charles Bowie Millican, Spenser and the Table Round (Cambridge, Mass., 1932); Edwin Greenlaw, Studies in Spenser.
50F. M. Padelford, The Political and Ecclesiastical Allegory of the First Book of the Faerie Queene (Boston, 1911); "The Spiritual Allegory of the Faerie Queene, Book I," JEGP, XXI (1923), 1-17; and E. Buyssens, "Calvinism in the Faerie Queene of Spenser," Revue Belge de Phil. et d'hist., V (1926), 1.
group explores all of Spenser's poetry for Platonism or neo-Platonism in various degrees of combination with Christianity;\textsuperscript{51} some see \textit{The Faerie Queene} as a continuation of the medieval metrical romance,\textsuperscript{52} as an adaptation of the Italian romance epic, as a revival of the Platonian \textit{Psychoamachia}, or as a restatement of the courtly love tradition.\textsuperscript{53} Most recently, Miss Tuve and Mr. Roche have attempted to expand the understanding of allegory and to reinterpret \textit{The Faerie Queene} in terms of their now conception.\textsuperscript{54} As a generalization, then, one might say that present-day scholars are finding the world of Spenser a much more complex one than earlier interpreters found it to be, that his craftsmanship was more sophisticated than earlier critics had thought, and that, consequently, his interpretation of his world-view is subtle and rewarding.

Because my thesis—that the concept of right reason pervades \textit{The Faerie Queene}, both as a philosophical concept and as a means of uniting the temporal with the eternal—requires an understanding of Renaissance methods of reading allegory, an understanding of the doctrine of right reason, and an application of both to Spenser's poetry, I shall proceed thus: First, I shall discuss the Renaissance understanding of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[51]\textit{J. S. Harrison, Platonism in English Poetry of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries} (New York, 1903); \textit{Robert Ellrodt, Neoplatonism in the Poetry of Spenser} (Geneva, 1960).
\item[53]\textit{C. S. Lewis, The Allegory of Love and English Literature in the Sixteenth Century} (Oxford, 1944).
\item[54]\textit{Rosemond Tuve, Allagogical Imagery}; Thomas P. Roche, Jr., \textit{The Kindly Flame}.\
\end{footnotes}
function and techniques of the allegory; second, I shall trace the history of the concept of right reason, and indicate that, if Spenser were a humanist, he would be familiar with the concept; third, I shall examine *The Faerie Queene* for indications of the presence of the concept expressed through both allegory and other equally prevalent rhetorical devices. Finally, I shall collate Spenser's statements about right reason, expressed both allegorically and non-allegorically, to determine his attitude toward the concept, and, using his adherence or non-adherence to the doctrine as a basis, attempt to evaluate his philosophical and ecclesiastical position.
CHAPTER II

THE TECHNIQUE OF ALLEGORY

William Hazlitt's assurance that "If they do not meddle with allegory, the allegory will not meddle with them" has not proved an effective talisman to students of Edmund Spenser. The poet's own age appreciated The Faerie Queene both as an esthetic experience and also as a significant didactic treatise, which Barnfield described as "passing all Conceit" so that it "needs no defence." Critical statements such as Thomas Nash's--"I would prefer to divino Master Spenser, the miracle of wit, to bandie line by line for my life, in the honour of England, against Spaine, Fraunce, Italy, and all the world"--persist into the middle of the seventeenth century. Within slightly more than sixty years, however, "the reputation of the English Virgil," who created "this our golden age," was beginning to tarnish, so that today A. C. Hamilton comments: "'Who knows not Colin Clout?' is not the rhetorical question it was once; and the modern reader is haunted by that vast disparity between the poet in his own age and what he has become to

ours."  As the taste for rhetorical poetry declined, so did the critical reputation and popular approval of Spenser and *The Faerie Queene*. The poet seems to have been aware, when he wrote his letter to Raleigh in 1589, that his method was not "the vso of these dayes." He realized that some "which had rather have good discipline delivered plainly in way of precepts, or sermoned at large, as they use, than thus cloudily enwrapped in Allegorical devices" would find his "dark conceits . . . displeasaunt." He continues: "But such, me seome, should be satsfisle with the vse of these dayos, seeing all things accounted by their showes, and nothing esteemed of, that is not delightfull and pleasing to commune sence."  

Thomas Rymer's disparagement of allegory is symptomatic of the period in his remark that, although Spenser "had a large spirit, a sharp judgment, and a *Genius* for *Heroic Poesie*," he participated in "the vice of those Times to affect superstitiously the Allegory," for "nothing would then be currant without a mystical meaning."  Rymer and his contemporaries sought literature that was "delightfull and pleasing to commune sence," so that Henry Reynolds's position was already becoming a lonely one when he wrote in 1632 denouncing his age for regarding poetry as "a superficall meere outside of Sence . . . never looking farther into those their golden fictions for any higher sence, 


or any thing diuiner in thom infoulded & hid from the vulgar, but lulled with the meruellous expression & artfull contexture of their fables.⁷ Professor Hamilton notices that "metaphors mark the change nicely: Dryden sees Milton as Spenser’s 'son', and his master; but to Popo he was 'like a mistress, whose faults we see, but love her with them all.'⁸ And the rational Addison found Spenser too unsophisticated for "an understanding age," so that

The long-spun allegories fulsom grow, While the dull moral lyes too plain below.⁹

Cowley’s delight in first reading The Faerie Queens he attributed to his youth when his "understanding had little to do with" his pleasure,¹⁰ and William Wordsworth responded to a Spenser completely unlike the one whom Milton had praised, referring to the Elizabethan poet as

sweet Spenser, moving through his clouded heaven With the moon’s beauty and the moon’s soft pace.¹¹

Such romantic interpretation rescued Spenser from the oblivion to which eighteenth-century critics had assigned him, but failed to take into account the serious, didactic aspects of The Faerie Queens. The insistence upon Spenser’s esthetic voluptuousness reached its crescendo in Lowell’s comments. Hamilton concludes that "it is surely a

⁷Mythomystes, in Spingarn, Critical Essays, I, 142. 149:

⁸Page 4.


¹¹Prelude, III, 280-281.
major irony . . . that the poet . . . became a dreamer, that the poem whose end is to move the reader to virtuous action became a Bower of Bliss where the reader is lulled asleep as Acrasia's victim.12

Dowden's reply to Lowell in 1882 initiated an over-reaction to the romantic position, so that recent Spenser critics have urged consideration of hidden allegorical significance at the expense of the narration and surface meaning, "over-reading" and allegorizing the "fable" out of existence. This critical bifurcation results in a kind of schizophrenic interpretation: Spenser wrote exquisite poetry; he also wrote didactic allegory. Never, according to such writers as Legouis and Saurat, the twain shall meet.13

In an effort to determine whether such a dichotomy is inherent in the poet, or whether it results from a faulty understanding of the nature of allegory, it will be profitable to examine the way in which Elizabethans understood allegory and its uses.

To the Renaissance rhetorician, the union between allegory and narrative was obvious, as their defining allegory as "continued metaphor" indicates. According to Henry Peacham, the purpose of allegory was "to ingraue the lively images of things, and to present them under deepe shadowes to the contemplation of the mind, wherein wit and judgement take pleasure, and the remembrance receiueth a long lasting impression."14 In this statement, Peacham attaches as much significance

12Page 5.


14The Garden of Eloquence (London, 1593), Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints (Gainsville, Florida, 1954), p. 27.
to the "liuely images of things" as he does to the allegorical meanings. "The allegory," Professor Thomas P. Roche, Jr., explains, "is contained by the narrative in the same way and to the degree that universals are contained by particulars. Particulars figure forth universals; the narrative figures forth the allegory." Sir John Harrington, too, accepted the unity of narrative and allegory.

First of all for the litterall sense (as it were the utmost barke or ryne) they set downe in manner of an historie, the acts and notable exploits of some persons worthy memorie; then in the same fiction, as a second rine and somewhat more fine, as it were nearer to the pith and marrow, they place the Morall sense, profitable for the active life of man, approving vertuous actions and condemning the contrarie. Manie times also under the selfsame words they comprehend some true understanding of naturall philosophie, or somtimes of politike gouernement, and now and then of diuinities: and these same senses that comprehend so excellent knowledge we call the Allegorie, which Plutarch defineth to be when one thing is told, and by that another is understood.

One first reads the work, and allegorical senses reveal themselves; abandoning the vehicle, the fable, in a random leap at the tenor or "moral," "can only flatten out the narrative and dull the experience that the narrative is attempting to create in the reader." Such transliterations into naive allegory as, for example, Ruskin's or


17Roche, p. 6.

18"Naive allegory," Northrop Frye, in Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, 1957), pp. 90-91, describes as "a disguised form of discursive writing, and belongs chiefly to educational literature on an elementary level, . . . so anxious to make its own allegorical points that it has no real literary or hypothetical center."

Padelford's deprive *The Faerie Queene* of literary worth and make of it a vague and inaccurate ethical, moral, philosophical, or ecclesiastical commentary. A sounder approach to allegory is Frye's statement in *Anatomy of Criticism* that "all commentary is allegorical interpretation, an attaching of ideas to the structure of poetic imagery." More specifically, he identifies the technique of the allegorist: "A writer is being allegorical whenever it is clear that he is saying 'by this I also (also) mean that.' If this seems to be done continuously, we must say cautiously, that what he is writing 'is' an allegory." The emphasis upon meaning more, not other, than he says lays emphasis upon both vehicle and tenor, much as Milton explained:

And if ought else, great Dards beside,
   In sage and solemn tunes have sung,
   Of Turneys and of Tropheyes hung;
   Where more is meant than meets the ear.

Insistence upon interpreting *The Faerie Queene* as a poetic transcript of learning, better suited to another medium than poetry, leads to a superfluity of conflicting interpretations. For example, Professor Berger points out that "a reader interested in learning about Sir Guyon, the hero of Book II, will find opinions in copious supply."

20 F. M. Padelford, "The Spiritual Allegory of *The Faerie Queene*, Book One," *JEGP*, XXII (1923), 1-17; *The Political and Ecclesiastical Allegory of the First Book of the Faerie Queene* (Boston, 1911).

21 Page 89.

22 Page 90.


One group of critics finds Guyon to be "the ideal English gentleman." A second interpretation makes him "prudish and smug." H. S. V. Jones and Lilian Winstanley find Sir Guyon to be an "ideal hero." W. R. C. Watkins sees in Guyon the ideal Christian knight. A. S. P. Woodhouse describes the actions in Book II as being "on the natural level only," so that there is "no significant reference to the Bible at all." Kate Warren finds Guyon deadly dull; and another group views him as a firmly drawn and fully developed character, while Bradner regards the portrait as poorly drawn. From this welter of critical interpretation one can clearly see that ignoring the narrative and thrusting into an interpretation in which "Guyon equals Temperance," "Una equals Faith," "Acrasia equals lechery," deprives the reading of narrative and artistic control, shifting it to the vagaries and whims of subjective reading. Hamilton has parodied the process by interpreting Book I of The Faerie Queen as an ideological allegory of modern Russian


26 Leicester Bradner, _Edmund Spenser and the Faerie Queen_ (Chicago, 1948), pp. 105, 135-137.


31 _Var._, II, 416.

Communism, or, parodying the historical allegorists, of Spenser's relationship with Shakespeare. "This kind of interpretation," he says, "is all too easy if only, to adapt Dr. Johnson's phrase, one will abandon the poem to it." 34

Rither Spenser's own age read him incorrectly or subsequent critics have, and the only way to restore The Faerie Queene to the high position it held both esthetically and "for its matter" is to examine the poem in terms of Elizabethan conceptions of the allegory. In order to see Spenser's poem through Elizabethan eyes, we shall first turn to Sir Philip Sidney's Defence of Poesie and then examine the poet's own criticism expressed in his letter to Sir Walter Ralegh.

The first order of business for Renaissance critics was to justify the very existence of literature. Joel E. Spingarn introduces A History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance by explaining the questionable role which imaginative literature occupied.

The existence and continuity of the aesthetic consciousness, and perhaps, in a less degree, of the critical faculty, throughout the Middle Ages, can hardly be denied; yet distrust of literature was keenest among the very class of men in whom the critical faculty might be presupposed, and it was as the handmaid of philosophy, and most of all as the vassal of theology, that poetry was chiefly valued. In other words, the criteria by which imaginative literature was judged during the Middle Ages were not literary criteria. Poetry was disregarded or contemned, or was valued if at all for virtues that least belong to it. 35

Indeed, some of the very factors which initiated Renaissance humanism militated against esthetic and literary appreciation of belles lettres, thus increasing the suspicion with which literature had been viewed

33 Pages 9-10.
34 Page 10.
35 New York, 1930, p. 3.
during the Middle Ages. The fideism of the Continental Reformers and the skepticism of such men as Montaigne and Agrippa did little to enhance the reputation of either human reason or human art. Agrippa's *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium* (1530, translated into English, 1569), in spite of its ambiguities and paradoxes, seemed to many a serious attack upon learning which argues that *nihil sitre felicissima vita*. The work was extremely popular in England; Barnaby Riche wrote in his *Allarms to England* (1578) that all the courtly young gentlemen wishing "to be curious in cauilling, propounding captious questions, thereby to shew a singularitie of their wisedomos" studied the work carefully.\(^{36}\) Writers and humanists widely denounced Agrippa's apparent attack upon learning and the arts, and Renaissance literary criticism began as a "defense" against such attacks as Agrippa's was supposed to be. Agrippa had reproached the poet for making "a clattering noise with the craftie coueringe of fables, and diseitfullie [devising] all thingos upon a matter of nothing."\(^{37}\)

Those defenders who followed the allegorical tradition insisted that Agrippa's criticisms arose from a failure to penetrate the delightful surface of poetry and recognize its hidden truth. But, according to Professor Hamilton, the allegorical defense was not the one which Sir Philip Sidney used in his *Defence of Poeties* (1595).\(^{38}\) Rather, Professor Hamilton says, Sidney sought to defend poetry "from

\(^{36}\)Quoted in Hamilton, p. 19.


\(^{38}\)Page 17. Appendix A, p. 350, discusses Sir Philip's concept of the right poet in detail.
the attacks of such critics as Plato, Agrippa, and Gosson by defining a kind of poet whom they had not acknowledged." The "right poet" does not imitate anything which ever has been, is, or shall be, but creates his own golden world. Since he does not pretend to be imitating fallen nature, he is neither a liar nor working at three removes from his subject. He presents his heroes not as they were, but as they should have been. He differs from the "Philosophicall Poet" in that he does not depend upon a superimposed frame of reference, but creates out of his "invention." There is, consequently, no reference to "levels of meaning," "pith," "rind," or "bark" in the Defence of Poecia. Sidney is not working in the allegorical tradition of Harrington, but approaches the kind of reading which we see in George Sandys's interpretation of the Narcissus fable:

Narcissus, a youth; that is, the souled of a rash and ignorant man; beholds not his owne face, nor considers of his proper essence or virtue, but pursues his shadow in the fountaine, and strivies to imbrace it; that is, admireth bodily beauty, frail and like the fluent water; which is no other then the shadow of the soule: for the mind doth not truly affect the body, but its owne similitude in a bodly forme. Such Narcissus, who ignorantly affecting one thing, pursues another; nor can ever satisfie his longings. Therefore he resolves into tears and perisheth: that is, the soule so alienated from it selfe, and doting on the body, is tortured with miserable perturbations; and dyes, as it were, infected with that poysone: so that now it rather appeareth a mortall body then an immortall soule. This fable likewise presents the condition of those, who adorned by the bounty of nature, or inriched by the industry of others, without merit, or honour of their own acquisition, are transported with self-love, and perish, as it were, with that madness . . . . But a fearfull example we have of the danger of selfe-love in the fall of the Angells; who intermitting the beatificall vision, by reflecting upon themselues, and admiration of their owne excellency, forgot their dependance upon their creator. Our Narcissus, now a flowre, instructs vs, that wee should not flourish too soonie, or be wise too timely, nor ouer-love, or admire our selues: which although hatefull in all ages, in youth is intollerable.39

In his reading, Sandys is not concerned with "levels of meaning," nor does he destroy the poetic image in order to extract the underlying meaning; rather, he invests the image with an interpretation which develops and exhausts the content. In the beginning of the passage, Narcissus is a youth, "now [he is] a flowre." Throughout Sandy's reading, this coalescence remains intact, and is never sacrificed to precept or example. The expansion of the image is in terms of the Elizabethan idea of correspondence, so that he interprets the story in terms of ascending the chain of being. "All poetry becomes allegorical in the Elizabethan age simply through energy and exuberance, the intellectual vigour and imaginative intensity with which it was read."\(^4^0\)

Professor Roche finds "the basis of allegorical reading" in the "analogical nature of the universe." He continues:

In an hierarchical universe where each thing has a fixed place the relationship of any two things in the same world or sphere may adumbrate the relationship of two other things in another world or sphere. The original pair do not lose their identity or relationship by such adumbrations; they simply call attention to other possible relationships through the fact that they themselves are related in such a way. The analogies are validated by the fact that the whole hierarchical structure with its often unseen web of interrelationships is contained within the mind of God, Who sees the relationship of all things one to another. In allegorical reading a further step is taken: since words represent things, words must represent this basic analogical relationship.\(^4^1\)

This being the situation, a given poetical fiction can adumbrate a multiplicity of meanings, for the correspondences within all nature provide the only connection between narrative statement and allegorical meaning. In a long narrative poem, however, interpretation of specific allegorical figures depends upon both the narrative control and the

\(^{4^0}\)Hamilton, p. 17.

\(^{4^1}\)Roche, p. 8.
relationship with the other allusions, "tropes," and allegories contained within the totality of the work.

Even though it was Sir Philip Sidney who most carefully defined the non-allegorical defense of poetry, his efforts were not unique. We have seen that Sandys's method of reading myths allegorically was conducive to Sidney's approach. Miss Tuve remarks that such a method of reading was explicitly demonstrated in the English translation of Christine de Pisan's L'Epître d'Othea. The translation by Robert Wyer, C. Hystoryes of Troye, Lepistre de Othea desesse de Prudence envoys a leesperit chevalreux Hector de Troye appeared in London about 1540, and hence was available to wide circulation even among those who could not read French. Miss Tuve explains that the

Othea is invaluable for our questions, because the author tells us outright how she expects to be read.

Christine tells one hundred stories . . . ; all are classical in provenance. She then append a prose "Glose," and thereafter a short prose discussion she entitles "Allegorie." We read the hundred, each first as a history or straightforward statement (i.e. "in the letter") and up through the Elizabethan period this may embrace such figurative senses as the parabolic meaning . . . . And then if we read each of the hundred in the two prose interpretations, which are two ways of reading the significance of the letter, we have at any rate one invincible authority providing what our book is trying to find: what distinguished allegory from other ways of reading, to mediaeval and Renaissance readers.42

Even closer in time to Sir Philip Sidney and Edmund Spenser than Wyer's translation (1540) was Lodge's use of medieval allegorical ideas in Catharos (1591). Miss Alice Walker has discovered medieval sources and medieval techniques in most of the stories which Lodge retold, so that his pamphlet provides evidence for the introduction of the methods

and content of the earlier period into the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{43}

The \textit{Cathros} borrowed freely from an eminently typical medieval genre, the moralized \textit{exempla}, which had flourished since the beginning of the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{44} Apparently, Lodge used the stories, not because they were amusing, but because he wished to use the morals at the end of them. "To the sixteenth-century borrower, universality or a usefulness independent of epoch resides precisely in the significancies."\textsuperscript{45} Miss Walker demonstrates conclusively that Lodge's \textit{Cathros} borrowed heavily from two sources; of the moralized \textit{exempla} he incorporated into the first half of his \textit{Cathros}, seven were simply transplanted from the \textit{Dialogues of Creatures}. The lengthy polemics against luxury, lechery, and other assorted vices he appropriated from \textit{La Somme de Peches et le Remede d'oeus} of the contemporary French Franciscan, Jean Benedicti. In indicating the easy availability of the \textit{Dialogues}, Miss Walker states that the book first appeared in print at Gouda in 1480, and that it was reprinted at least eight times in Latin, three times in Dutch, and twice in French before the end of the fifteenth century. The first English translation (other than Wyer's incomplete and unsatisfactory attempt) appeared in Antwerp in 1535.\textsuperscript{46}


\textsuperscript{44}Tuve, \textit{Allegorical Imagery}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{45}Tuve, \textit{Allegorical Imagery}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{46}Miss Walker refers to the \textit{Dialogues} as being anonymous; Johan Georg Theodor Grösse, in \textit{Die beiden ältesten lateinischen fabelbücher des mittelalters: des bishops Cyrillus Speculum sapientiae und des Nicolaus Pergamenus Dialogue creaturarum} (Stuttgart, 1880), ascribes it to Nicolaus Pergamenus; and Miss Tuve cites Rajna, \textit{Giornale storico}, vols. 3, 4, 10, 11 (1884-88), and J. T. Welter, \textit{L'exemplum dans la litt.} (Paris, 1927), pp. 357-360, as authority for attributing the \textit{Dialogues} to an "early-to-middle fourteenth-century" Milanese physician, Mayno de 'Mayneri (p. 5).
Miss Walker states categorically that Lodge used the 1535 Antwerp edition; even, however, if that English translation were not available, the Dutch, French, and Latin versions, in view of their popularity and wide distribution, would not be so recherché as to preclude Spenser's and Sidney's knowing them.47

The Dialogues of Creatures consists of 122 fables about animals, birds, fishes, elements, precious stones, and mythological beings. In each, the fable comes first, followed by a moral in couplet form, reinforced by further illustrations and, occasionally, by another fable; some of the morals are strengthened by quotations from the Scriptures and the Fathers, and sometimes there is an anecdote from late classical or medieval exempla. Modern readers often find the insipidity of some of the story sections objectionable; there is no tension, no paradox, no irony, no so-called epiphany, so dear to twentieth-century tastes. Rather, we are expected to recognize and delight in the plain similitude, and to relish apprehending a point of "mere prudential alertness, of cunning in the true and Baconian sense."

Obviously, not all of the stories fit even the loosest and most general definition of allegory. Some are mere prosopopeia: The Lead and the Gold in Fable 19, and the Topaz in Fable 16 are good examples, in which prosopopeia emphasizes an analogy between animate and inanimate. In the story of the Lead and the Gold, the Lead scolds the Gold for being "so prowde agayn me," when the base metal is "of the

47In Appendix C, p. 358, I quote from the fourth edition of the 1535 Antwerp version, STC 6815.

48Tuve, Allegorical Imagery, pp. 8, 9.
substance of metallys as well as thowc." The two submit to a trial by fire, the upstart lead vanishes, and the meek and virtuous gold is purified. The moral is that "much prowde people be in that same case thinking they have vertewe / which is not in them." In this fable, there is no allegory, no metaphor. The comparison is based upon analogous characteristics altogether literally attributed to the creatures; there is prosopopeia, but only on the level of speech. There is no basis for a fiction to which we can attach an allegorical reading.

"What counts is whether a metaphorically understood relation is used to take off into areas where a similitude can point to valuable human action, or to matters of spiritual import." The "valuable human action" Miss Tuve assigns to moral allegory and "matters of spiritual import," to allegory properly so-called. 49

That Spenser, in his "Letter to Ralegh," acknowledged no indebtedness to his medieval predecessors need not concern us; he was conscious of employing classical precedent, but not of his dependence upon a medieval legacy of exempla, sermons, morality plays, pageants, and popular romances. They were a part of his milieu, and he accepted them uncritically for incorporation into The Faerie Queene, much as Shakespeare, Lodge, and Jonson accepted the viable traditions which surrounded them. Even without Spenser's considering his medieval heritage, "The Letter" is vexing enough as it stands, and has been the subject of widely varying critical opinion, failing in its author's hope that it would direct the reader "to the wel-head of the History, that from thence gathering the whole intention of the conceit, ye may as in a

49Tuve, Allegorical Imagery, p. 13.
handful gripe at the discourse, which otherwise may haply seem tedious and confused."

Spenser refers to the first three books of *The Faerie Queene* as a "continued Allegory, or darke conceit." Henry Peacham had already defined allegory as "continued metaphor," which "serueth most aptly to ingraue the lively images of things, and to present them vnder daepe shadowes to the contemplation of the mind. . . ." 50 Does this "continued, continued metaphor" imply that the entire poem is to consist of one allegorical action? The word "continued" in the sixteenth century, as now, meant not only "continuous," but also "continual," or "repeated with brief intermissions, very frequent, regularly recurring," or "carried on in a series or sequence, connected together in succession." Consequently, Spenser in his "Letter" was not insisting that all of *The Faerie Queene* be interpreted as one uninterrupted allegory; rather, he calls attention to the discontinuous nature of the "allegory or darke conceit," stating that "many other adventures are intermedled, but rather as Accidents, then intendments." As Professor Alpers amplifies: "The phrase 'continued allegory, or dark conceit' in the Letter to Ralegh refers to the symbolic nature of Spenser's materials, but it does not guarantee or even imply that a fiction with a continuous double significance is the main poetic meaning in the Faerie Queen. " 51

Professor Hamilton believes that Spenser was appealing to a middle-class audience for approval of literature through his initial stress upon the didactic end of his poem, emphasizing the ethical and moral

50 Peacham, p. 27.

values which the reader obtains from consideration of such ideal characters as Arthur. Next, Spenser analyzes his fable according to the techniques of the "Poet historical." But, assuming the role of the "right Poet," he directs his attention not to the History itself, but to the "tail-head of the History," giving not a summary statement of the "fable" of the poem, but a "formalized pattern or argument." "The Letter," then, does not attempt to paraphrase the contents of the poem; it is but a schematic account, illustrating the differences between the historiographer and the poet. The poet is free to alter history in accordance with the needs of his theme, whereas the historian is not. Hamilton concludes: "If the letter is properly read, I would claim that there are no divergencies with the poem. Instead of remaining an obstacle, it ["The Letter"] should 'give great light to the Reader, for the better understanding,' as Spenser intended."52

Spenser's intention "to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline" may be found paraphrased in Fulke Greville's Life of Sidney, describing the purpose of the Arcadia as being:

to limn out such exact pictures, of every posture in the minde, that any man being forced, in the straines of this life, to pass through any straights or latitudes of good, or ill fortune, might (as in a glasse) see how to set a good countenance upon all the discountenances of adversitie, and a stay upon the exorbitant smilengs of change.53

Spenser expressed much the same idea when he compared the writing of Xenophon with that of Plato:

52 Hamilton, pp. 51-54.

Both Greville's and Spenser's statements echo Sir Philip Sidney's insistence that the reader "use the narration but as an imaginatio[n] groundplot of a profitable invention" and that the "right Poet" provide for emulation idealized portraits of perfect heroes which will "strike, perceive," and "possesse" the sight of the soul. Apparently, then, Spenser planned to submerge allegorical techniques within the techniques of the "right Poet." He intends to "poortraict" Arthur as "the image of a braue knight, perfected in the twelve private morall vertuos, as Aristotle hath devised, the which is the purpose of these first twelve booke." Thus, though the end of the poem is ethical—"to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline"—the poet's own purpose is to fashion the image of the perfect knight which will incite the reader to emulation. The "right Poet" strives to deliver an


55 *Defence of Poesie*, in *Complete Works*, ed. Albert Feuillerat (Cambridge, England, 1923), III, 1-46. The question of direct influence between Spenser and Sidney is a vexed one, unlikely ever to find satisfactory solution. Sidney's *Defence* appeared in 1595, five years after Spenser's "Letter to Raleigh." But as early as 1579, according to Spenser-Harvey correspondence, Sidney and Spenser were acquainted. "However the connection was formed, "Alexander C. Judson (The Life of Edmund Spenser [Baltimore, 1945], p. 59.) explains, "there can be no doubt that Spenser for a time . . . was on a friendly footing with Sidney." In a letter to Harvey, 15-16 October, 1579, Spenser reveals that he has discussed poetry and theories of poetry with Sir Philip and with Edward Dyer; and among the nineteen "lost" works of Spenser to which E. K. referred in the letter addressed to Gabriel Harvey concerning *The Shepheardes Calender* was a critical work, *The English Poete*. As a consequence of the two poets' simultaneous concern with criticism, one may say that either influenced the other, or that the influence was mutual.
image: Sidney in the *Defence* made the right poet responsible for illustrating "all vertues, vices, and passions, so that wee seeme not to heare of them, but cleerely to see through them."^56

"It is in this way that moral ideas may inform and sustain the poet's fiction," A. C. Hamilton points out, "but the fiction triumphs over them."^57 In Arthur, Spenser illustrates that golden world which never was, is not, and never shall be, following Plato in offering "doctrine by ensample." The defenders of poetry from the allegorical point of view, however, sought doctrine "by rule," in the allegory, not "by ensample" in the image. —

His [Spenser's] method, like that of the ancient poets, is to "ensample" a virtuous man, that is, to deliver an image of the virtuous man rather than to hide doctrine under the historical fiction of the hero. It is that difference we noted before between finding doctrine in Aeneas or under him, or that between looking through the image or outside it. Spenser absorbs rather than contradicts the literal level both by asserting the primacy of the poet's purpose over the poem's end, and by asserting its primacy over doctrine.^58

Allegory there is in *The Faerie Queene*, but subsumed within, not superimposed upon, image and fiction.

Northrop Frye's statement,

Within the boundaries of literature we find a kind of sliding scale, ranging from the most explicitly allegorical, consistent with being literature at all, at one extreme, to the most elusive, anti-explicit and anti-allegorical at the other. First we meet the continuous allegories, . . . and then the free-style allegories . . . Next come the poetic structures with large and insistent doctrinal interest, in which the internal fictions are exempla. . . . Then we have, in the exact center, works in which the structure of imagery, however suggestive, has an implicit relation only to

^56 Sir Philip Sidney, p. 15.

^57 Hamilton, p. 56.

^58 Hamilton, p. 57.
events and ideas. ... Below this, poetic imagery begins to recede from example and precept and become increasingly ironic and paradoxical.\(^9\)

has produced a reaction to the nineteenth-century Romantic tendency to differentiate sharply between symbol and allegory, as Blake, Coleridge, and, in the twentieth century, C. S. Lewis, had done.\(^6\) Graham Hough's *A Preface to the Faerie Queene* (New York, 1963) develops Professor Frye's concept of the "sliding scale" into a chapter, "Allegory in The Faerie Queene."

Dissatisfied with the arbitrarily imposed dichotomy between "symbolism" and "allegory," Professor Hough postulates a third kind of writing, based on the simple perception of a pattern of events. But, if there are more than two kinds, there are more than three; consequently, he moves from the linear "sliding scale" to a circular scheme for representing the degrees of allegory and symbolism in literature. "Theme" ("the moral or metaphysical 'abstract' element in allegory") and "image" (the "'concrete' characters, actions, or objects in which it [theme] is embodied") occur in all literature in varying proportions. In "naive allegory"\(^6\) theme overwhelmingly dominates image. At the opposite extreme occurs writing in which image is overwhelmingly dominant—"realism" or "reporting"—and which is "on the verge of passing out of literature." Representing his circular scheme by means of a clock dial, Hough places "naive" allegory at twelve o'clock, "realism" at six

\(^{59}\)Frye, p. 91.


\(^{61}\) A term which Hough borrowed from Frye, p. 90.
o'clock. Halfway between the two, at three o'clock he places "incarnational literature," such as Shakespeare's, in which "theme and image seem equally balanced," so that "any 'abstract' content is completely absorbed in character and action and completely expressed by them." In the first quadrant of the circle come: (1) "allegory proper," at one o'clock, in which theme is dominant, but in which "image assumes a vitality and interest of its own"; (2) at about one-thirty, 'humour' literature and the romance of types; (3) at two o'clock, what Frye called "freistimmige" allegories, in which "allegorical significance is picked up and dropped at will"; (4) and at two-thirty, "the poetic structures with a large and insistent doctrinal interest, . . . like the epics of Milton."

We shall omit the second quarter of the circle, and begin again at six o'clock with "realism," a "me plus ultra; any farther in that direction takes us outside literature altogether." Having arrived at the nadir of imagination, literature begins to return toward allegory. Between realism at six o'clock and symbolism at nine o'clock comes imagism, in which image begins to appropriate for itself values inherent in the thing it represents. There is a depreciation of theme, so that it can appear only surreptitiously. Progressing from imagism, the images "tend to acquire magical properties," "engaging in mysterious correspondences," and "entering into occult relations with vision." At this point, imagism slides imperceptibly into symbolism, at nine o'clock, opposite "incarnational" literature. Here, too, theme and image have equal weight, but symbolism lacks "the harmonious wholeness of incarnational literature," because the unity between them "is only a unity of tension." As the hand continues to move from nine o'clock
toward its starting place at twelve, it comes to rest at about ten-thirty on "emblem" or "hieratic symbolism," which finds a happier existence in such fields as iconography and religious imagery. There is "perhaps no literature written entirely in this modo," but it is a prominent component in such occult writing as Yeat's. Hieratic symbolism tends to break down because of its inflexibility and its limited ability to convey complex meanings; it tends to revert to naive allegory "where image is more flexible and obedient."62

Equipped with this scheme for recognizing and classifying allegory, Professor Hough determines Spenser's field of operation to extend from eleven o'clock to two o'clock—"from hieratic symbolism through naive allegory, allegory proper and the romance of types to the freestyle allegory where thematic significance is picked up and dropped at will."63 Even though Professor Hough finds that "allegory proper" constitutes the "centre" of Sponsor's technique, he does not agree with Frye that "The Faerie Queen as a whole is continuous allegory." In The Faerie Queen, then, Spenser is not writing an allegory; he is using many allegorical techniques to develop and make specific his theme. Hieratic symbolism he finds in the knights' heraldic devices—the red cross, the Cupid on Scudamour's shield, and some of the obviously pageant-like set-pieces, such as the procession of the seven deadly sins; he finds naive allegory in the castle of Alma (I disagree; Alma's castle is not allegory at all, but only simple analogy "based upon characteristics literally predicated" of the human body and the castle; nor

62 Hough, pp. 105-111.
63 Hough, p. 111.
is there any basis for a fiction to which we can attach an allegorical reading.) Book IV, he finds to consist of romance stories with typical significances; and allegory almost disappears from the pastoral episodes in Book VI. Nonetheless, the "allegorical cores" (in Lewis's terminology) are the centers of the book—Books I and II, and the central narratives in Books III and V.

From this, Professor Hough concludes that

Most of the letter [to Ralegh] is far more concerned with plan and narrative structure than with allegorical intention . . . with the disposition of the images than with discovering the theme hidden behind them. Here at the beginning we get a very strong though unintentional hint that as far as the structure of The Faerie Queen as a whole is concerned allegory is not so decisive a factor, theme not so dominant over image as we have sometimes been led to expect.

Paul J. Alpers argues that the interpretation of narrative poetry requires understanding of "how narrative action reveals poetic meaning," because much confusion has resulted from muddling narrative materials and poetic narration. Spenser's narrative materials he identifies as "stories, settings, and characters," and his poetic narration as a "sequence of stanzas." Failure to differentiate between the two, results in such interpretations as Ruskin's simple translation of "the narrative materials of Book I into abstract terms," and continues to exist in the current tendency to "define Spenser's technique by the poles of narrative and allegory." To identify too closely "what happens" poetically with "what happens" fictionally leads to inconsistencies in interpretation, for

64 Hough, p. 112.
65 Alpers, p. 27.
in turning narrative materials into stanzas of poetry, Spenser's attention is focused on the reader's mind and feelings and not on what is happening within his fiction. His poetic motive in any given stanza is to elicit a response. . . . His stanzas . . . are modes of address by the poet to the reader. For this reason, I call his use of narrative materials rhetorical.66

As a consequence of finding The Faerie Queene within the rhetorical tradition, Professor Alpers sees the "poetic coherence" of the poem in "the coherence of the reader's feelings and attitudes" rather than in "terms of fictional consistency."67 Consequently, to assume that Spenser's fiction is the main vehicle of his meaning is misleading, in that it leads to a Tassonian isolation of a "golden world" within the heterocosm of the poem, whereas Spenser's interest lay in moving the reader to heroic emulation of the poetic golden world.68 The Faerie Queene existed for didactic and utilitarian purposes as well as for esthetic reasons. Rather than sharing Tasso's insistence that the fable is the comprehensive and controlling action of the poem, Spenser followed Sidney and other sixteenth-century English critics in finding the "argument" of epic poetry in terms of the moral qualities of the hero. In the "Letter to Ralegh," Spenser classified epic poems according to the heroes' typifying either ethical or political virtue. Moreover, Sidney was more concerned with didactic efficacy than with the

66Alpers, p. 28.
67Alpers, p. 31.
68M. H. Abrams, in The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New York, 1953), pp. 326-327, differentiates between that poetry which has "intrinsic value only" and that which has "intrinsic value, but also extrinsic value, as a means to moral and social effects beyond itself": in the latter type of poetry, the intrinsic and extrinsic values should not be separated by the critic. The Faerie Queene, intending to "fashion a gentleman or noble person in the vertuous and gentle discipline," claims both intrinsic and extrinsic values.
nature of fiction, consistently referring to poetry as "a moral influence operating on the reader's mind."\textsuperscript{69} Professor Alpers continues: "For Tasso, the poet resembles 'el supremo artefice nelle sue operazioni' because he creates his own little world, the poem. For Sidney, the poet 'substantially worketh' by creating virtuous men. If this defines a golden world, it is a world of heroic readers."\textsuperscript{70} Spenser's purpose, he believes, is to produce such "speaking pictures" as Sir Philip Sidney recommended--pictorial images which do not merely describe, but which also 'move' the reader to a pre-determined emotional response. Evidence for this is the rhetorical use of affective epithets, as in the description:

\begin{verbatim}
For round about, the walls ycloathed were
With goodly arras of great majesty,
Woven with gold and silke so close and nere,
That the rich mettall lurked privily,
As faining to be hid from envious eye;
Yet here, and there, and every where unawares
It shewd it selfe, and shone unwillingly;
Like a discolourd Snake, whose hidden snares
Through the greene gras his long bright burnisht
backs declares.
\end{verbatim}

(III.xi.28)

Such epithets as "unawares," "unwillingly," and "faining to be hid from envious eye" are not visually descriptive; they serve rather to suggest directly the response which Spenser seeks to evoke through his "speaking picture" of Busyrane's tapestries. In addition, Spenser included such quasi-persuasive terms as "close and nere," "lurked privily," and "hidden snares."\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{69}Alpers, pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{70}Alpers, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{71}Alpers, pp. 36-37.
Professor Alpers concludes that neither narrative nor allegory is of foremost importance in *The Faerie Queene*; both coalesce in and derive from emotionally stimulating images. He goes on: "An episode in the *Faerie Queene*, then, is best described as a developing psychological experience within the reader, rather than as an action to be observed by him." 72

Such an interpretation whereby "allegorical encounters" and "emblematic figures" become the raw material for a rhetorical, didactic narrative clarifies both the function and the meaning of Spenser's allegories in *The Faerie Queene*. "Symbolic material," he concludes, "serves to enrich our responses, and not to complicate the significance of a translated or rationalized fiction." 73

The criticism of Professors Alpers, Hough, and Frye goes far to remove *The Faerie Queene* from such restrictive, Procrustean allegorical requirements as those which Professor Joshua McLennan sought to establish throughout "On the Meaning and Function of Allegory in the English Renaissance." 74 Attempting to determine what the Elizabethans meant by the word "allegory," Professor McLennan sought evidence from dictionaries and rhetoric books, from poems and passages which were described as allegories by their authors, and from the allegorical interpretations of classical and Biblical literature. Most of the lexicographers, he found, relied heavily upon Quintilian, directly or indirectly, defining "allegory" as "inversion" or "the use of words with more than one

72 Alpers, p. 41.
73 Alpers, p. 46.
74 The University of Michigan *Contributions in Modern Philology*, Number 6 (April, 1947).
moaning." Thomas Cooper, in *Elizete Dictionaris* (1559), Calopinus, in *Dictionarium Octo Linguarum* (1584), and John Minshou, in *The Guide into the Tongues* (1617), all obviously base their definitions upon Quintilian's. By 1658, Edward Phillips, in *The New World of English Words*, had re-phrased Quintilian's statement, so that "allegory" became "a mysterious saying, wherein there is couched something that is different from the literal sense." In the 1678 edition of *The New World*, he seems to have reverted to the more conventional definition: "Inversion or changing: In Rhetorick it is a mysterious saying, wherein there is couched something that is different from the literal sense." All of these definitions are so broad that they include many modes, such as irony and proverb, no longer considered allegorical. McLennan points out that the looseness of the definition probably arises more from the laxity with which the word was used than from any unwillingness of the lexicographers to arrive at a more precise meaning.

The rhetoricians leaned as heavily upon Quintilian as did the compilers of dictionaries. In general, they agreed that allegory means inversion, a continued metaphor, a passage in which the sense differs from the words. They discuss "pure" and "mixed" allegory, and indicate that other such figures as irony, proverb, and enigma are a part of the broader spectrum of allegory. Professor McLennan constructs two definitions from their remarks and examples: "(1) Allegory is any figure extended beyond a single word in which the words imply more than they state; (2) In its restricted sense, allegory signifies action with a systematic double meaning."75 Whatever their definitions, all agree

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75 McLennan, p. 4.
that allegory is vastly important, not only as an ornament, but also as a stimulus to the reader's emotions. Puttenham, for instance, describes allegory as "the courtly figure," whose function it is to "inveigle and appassionate the mind." To him, enigma, proverb, irony, hyperbole, periphrasis, and synecdoche are "souldiers to the figure allegoria, and fight under the banner of dissimulation." Alexander Gill's treatment of rhetoric is valuable, because he cites examples from recent English poets, including Spenser. After illustrating the word "allegory" with a two-stanza selection, he hastens to add that "totum Spenseri poema allegoria est, qua ethichen fabulis odocot."

"With the exception of Chapman's reference to 'the allegory driven through the whole Oddysseys,' . . . I have found no case in which a long poem other than the Faerie Queen is spoken of as being an allegory," continues Professor McLennan. He assumes that the word "continued" means continuous, and that in his "Letter to Raleigh," Spenser stated that The Faerie Queene was by the author's intention an uninterrupted, single, consistent allegory. "From these suggestions [in the "Letter to Raleigh"] and from the poem itself it seems reasonably clear that it was his intention to write a poem which both on the literal and the allegorical level would present a continuous narrative complete in itself."
After examining Elizabethan allegorical interpretations of classical literature and allegorical exegesis of the Scriptures, Professor McLennen concludes: (1) definitions tended to be broad and loose; (2) some definitions imply that allegory means a narrative with a systematic double meaning; (3) most poems called "allegories" during the period fall within the more restricted definition; (4) in the more restricted definition, allegories tend to be moral allegories; (5) historical allegory usually concerns events in the recent past, or, in the case of allegorical exegesis, events to come in the future. With regard to the function of allegory, he sums up his findings: (1) throughout the period 1550-1650, allegory maintains its high status as a rhetorical device for moving the affections of the reader; (2) critics believed that the ancients had concealed their wisdom under the cloak of allegory; (3) the device was frequently used to half-conceal remarks on contemporary affairs; (4) opinions about the allegorical exegesis of the Scriptures was divided into three groups, more or less equal in size: that a given passage had but one meaning; that the Bible contained some allegory, but that it should be interpreted only with great care; and that a more or less systematic double meaning is pervasive.

With Professor McLennen's conclusions, I do not agree. Even though he admits that the compilers of dictionaries were somewhat vague and loose in their definitions of allegory, because poets and critics used the term in a very general way, he seeks to limit allegory more than contemporary evidence warrants; and he fails to substantiate his argument that "the great majority of examples of allegory cited by authors

81 McLennen, pp. 37, 38.
of the period are consistent with the more limited definition.\textsuperscript{82}

Indeed, he admits that only "Chapman's reference to the allegory driven through the whole Oddysseys"\textsuperscript{82} and Spenser's "Letter to Ralegh," in the whole of Elizabethan literature, could support his claim that "allegory" to the Renaissance Englishman implied a systematic double meaning. He cites Spenser's use of the word "continued," and the poet's statement to Ralegh that the Faery Queene "stands for Glory, Arthur for Magnificence, the Rod Cross Knight for Holiness, etc," without taking into consideration Spenser's full statement:

In that Faery Queene I meane glory in my general intention, but in my particular I conceive the most excellent and glorious person of our soueraigne the Queene. . . . And yet in some places els, I doe otherwise shadow her. For considering she beareth two persons the one of a most royall Queene or Empresse, the other of a most vertuous and beautifull Lady, this latter part in some places I do express in Belphoebe, . . . So in the person of Prince Arthure I sette forth magnificence in particular, which vertue for that (according to Aristotle and the rest) it is the perfection of all the rest, and containteth in them all, therefore in the whole course I mention the deedes of Arthure applyable to that vertue, which I write of in that book.\textsuperscript{83}

According to Spenser, then, there is at least double meaning, but one could hardly call it "systematic." A more apt contemporary description of Spenser's use of allegory appears in Henry Peacham's \textit{A Garden of Eloquence}:

The use of an \textit{Allegorie} serveth most aptly to ingraue the lively images of things, and to present them under deepse shadowes to the contemplation of the mind, wherein wit and judgement take pleasure, and the remembrance receiueth a long lasting impression, and where as a \textit{Metaphore} may be compared to a starre in respect of beautie, brightness and direction: so may an \textit{Allegorie} be fitly likened to a figure compounded of many stars, . . . which we may

\textsuperscript{82}McLennen, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{83}"Letter to Ralegh," \textit{Var.}, I, p. 168.
call a constellation, that is, a company or conjunction of many starrses.84

Among recent critics, Professor Lewis has said much the same thing:

It is . . . easy to misunderstand the sentence "Gloriana is Elizabeth." She is Elizabeth in a sense which does not prevent Belphoebe from also being Elizabeth nor Elizabeth from being also a remote, unborn descendant of Arthegall and Britomart who are contemporaries of Gloriana. Modern readers, trained on a strict roman-à-clef like Dryden's Absalom, hardly know how to sit lightly enough to what is called "historical allegory" in Spenser. "Historical parallels" or "fugitive historical allusions" would be better names.85

Even though Professor Lewis was speaking specifically of the historical allegory, one may with justification extend his remarks to cover the use which Spenser made of allegory in other areas—moral and ethical. The same degree of nimbleness, the same reluctance to push for absolute consistency and parallelism between the vehicle and the tenor is required so that the "continued allegorie" conforms to Peacham's "constellation," rather than to a well-articulated, systematic, Newtonian universe. Moreover, as conservative, traditional, and as concerned with the maintenance of precedents and old forms as Spenser was—Professor Lewis has referred to him as "churchwardenly," "domestic," "thriftys"86—it would be difficult to imagine his writing what Professor McLennen refers to as the only long consistently allegorical poem written by an Elizabethan Englishman, a poem in which a systematic double meaning is pervasive. Spenser's innovations were not so daring as that.

84Peacham, p. 27.


86Allegory of Love, p. 321.
The interpretation of *The Faerie Queens* throughout the remainder of this paper relies upon the concept that Spenser used allegory allusively and as imagery; that he did not superimpose his long poem upon a consistent framework of allegory; that the image and the narrative are mutually interdependent; and that the effort to interpret the poem as a long, systematic allegory results not only in loss of literary and esthetic appreciation, but leads also to insurmountable difficulties of interpretation. There is no simple one-for-one relationship which obtains throughout the poem; the allegories are transitory, and must be interpreted imaginatively, in accordance with the affective diction the poet employed, rather than systematically, with a light hand rather than with philosophical dogmatism or intellectual pedantry. Allegory and fable frequently coalesce into "speaking pictures" so moving and so striking in themselves as to incite the reader to emulation of those which are to be imitated or to revulsion from those which should be avoided. In *The Faerie Queens*, Spenser employs what Miss Tuve calls "allegorical imagery" to deepen, intensify, and "show forth" the ethical, moral, and philosophical significance of the fable or fables. Allegory, thus, is subsidiary to narrative, and, as a consequence, is neither continuous, being a running commentary upon a series of interwoven narratives, nor self-authenticating, being the rhetorical means for affecting the reader's emotions toward the "fable" or "groundplot of inuention." Spenser first tells a story, and then, through rhetoric manipulates the reader's attitudes toward the events in the narrative. Tucker Brooke's reply to those critics, such as Macaulay, who denigrate *The Faerie Queens* because they feel that it, like all allegory, is dull, perhaps best explicates the degree to which Spenser's poetry is
allegory: "Allegory, forsooth! If the Faerie Queene is allegorical, so in their different ways are Hamlet and Tom Jones and the Book of Job; so is all great fiction and most poetry."87

CHAPTER III

THE CONCEPT

The term, "right reason," seldom occurs in conjunction with the poetry of Edmund Spenser; Professor Robert Hoopes has indicated that this is because Spenser, writing in an age when the doctrine was not under full-fledged, overt attack, did not feel the need to express his acceptance of it as stridently as did John Milton; the earlier poet, seeing no need for apologetics, merely accepted and used the concept as a basic postulate comprising a part of the "Elizabethan world picture," inherited from classical and medieval thinking.¹

The theory of right reason was innate in orthodox anthropology, having its roots in Greek thought and its baptism into Christianity by the early Church Fathers, and going back for its earliest enunciation to Socrates's attempt to equate knowledge with virtue, so that the history of the concept from Plato through Milton consists of commentaries upon this basic idea. According to Socrates, only that knowledge which enables man to become virtuous is good; and, even though that knowledge does not consist in specific factual information, nevertheless, virtuous living depends upon some kind of knowledge, because right thinking must precede the virtuous act. Thus, Socrates implies

that virtue can be taught. But what specific things must a man learn
to achieve virtue? Socrates, less concerned with the abstract nature
of the good than with the humanistic idea of "What is good for man?"
found the answer to these questions in human nature. "Instead of
looking for man's nature in those private desires, feelings and sensa­
tions which separate him from other men, he looked rather to the
rational elements that bind all men together in the bonds of a valid
knowledge and a universal moral insight," explains Arthur Kenyon
Rogers.² Socrates, then, assumes that, first, there are absolute values
underlying the flux of physical fact; second, absolute moral values are
in some way available to human beings; and third, man's happiness and
welfare depend upon his incorporating into his own life and acts those
moral values.

In The Republic, Plato, even while drawing heavily upon his
reminiscences of Socrates, further refines, clarifies, and systematizes
the thinking of his teacher. He apparently attempts to establish
principles that prepare a man for public life. The discussion of
"virtue," he therefore couches in terms of "justice." Plato, as his
teacher Socrates had done before him, asks the question, "Wherein does
man find his well-being, the 'virtue' which is the expression of his
proper function as a man?" Appealing not to theodicy, but to man qua
man, Plato teaches that virtue is its own reward; the unjust do not
enjoy their ill-gotten gains. This is the paradox which Plato attempts
to justify in his theory of the good, and he relies for his justifica­
tion upon a psychological explanation: in understanding the

²A Student's History of Philosophy, third edition (New York,
relationship between the human soul and justice or virtue, we must understand what we mean by "soul" as well as what we mean by "justice" or "virtue."

Because the state of psychological knowledge was insufficient for his argument, Plato began by examining social justice, or justice with regard to the life of the state. Justice exists in order. If the end of the state is the common good, injustice, by inducing strife, precludes order and harmonious action. Justice is knowing one's function and minding one's own business. "One's own business" depends upon where in the triadic hierarchy of society one happens to find himself—among the workers, among the warriors, or among the rulers. The just state coordinates and harmonizes the three groups in the interest of the common good.

By analogy, Plato applies this triadic hierarchy to man. In the human soul, corresponding to the lower social class of workers, farmers, and artisans, we find that more ignoble part of human nature—sensations, desires, and appetites. Like their counterparts in the state, these lower functions lack a system of order, and consequently must be subjected by some higher power to laws of temperance. The higher power charged with governing is the mind, or reason, the seat of wisdom. Just as it is the function of the appetites to obey, so the mind by adherence to order must rule. Between "reason's due regalitie" and man's concupiscent nature exists a third faculty, the irascible, corresponding to the warrior class in the state. This is the forceful, spirited aspect of man's nature, not in itself ignoble; it is the seat of those very heroic virtues which do not spring from wisdom. Because it is itself unintelligent and prone to the dictates of mere passion, it must heed
the commands of the mind and cooperate in taming the unbridled desires of the lower nature. In a real sense, these three faculties are distinct. Otherwise it would be impossible to imagine reason’s having to struggle with appetite. But they are not unrelated; each has its own function which good order demands that it accomplish. Because reason is superior to appetite, the body exists for the sake of soul. This relation Plato expresses in the famous allegory of the charioteer and the pair of winged horses, one of which is noble and spirited, the other, ignoble. Only with difficulty can the driver, reason, establish his mastery over them and achieve purposeful cooperation. The noble steed seeks to ascend the skies and contemplate divine beauty and wisdom. The ignoble one wishes to obey his nature and enjoy earthly things. Since, as in the state, justice depends upon the common good, it is the function of the driver to achieve harmony and direct his team to the heights of heaven; so the concupiscent and irascible in man must submit to reason, if man is to achieve his proper end. 3 Less figuratively, Plato restates the idea:

For the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others;—he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master, and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this

condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance."

Because man is man, characterized by his reason, not a brute, characterized by his lower nature, virtue is his natural goal; happiness eludes him unless he achieves true manhood, and accords reason her sovereignty.

That "wisdom which presides over" that "knowledge" which enables man to achieve due subordination, is inherent, for "certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes." Ability to learn exists in the soul, as the ability to see exists in the eye even before exposure to light; and as in the allegory of the Cave, the eye could turn from darkness to light only as the body moves, so the "instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being," and hence learn to enjoy the sight of the good. But human reason can be helped to achieve an approximation, a correspondence to, and an adumbration of, "the good"; for, unlike the other so-called "virtues of the soul" which "seem to be akin to bodily qualities" in that they can be "implanted later by habit and exercise," the virtue of wisdom "contains a divine element which always remains." This innate capability may become either "hurtful and useless" or "useful and profitable."^5

Plato, then, teaches that man by nature is reasonable, and must, to achieve his proper end, subordinate his being to the power of reason; to him, reason yields a certain, sure knowledge (not necessarily complete). The idea of good, "the immediate source of reason and truth


^5Plato, Republic, pp. 367-373.
in the intellectual; and ... the power upon which he who would act rationally ... must have his eyes fixed" is intellectually available. There is a way of knowing metaphysical ultimates; but—and here is the crowning paradox in the Platonic system:

According to Plato, even the keenest intellect cannot enter directly into the realm of knowledge of values, which is the climax of all Plato's philosophy. ... The process of knowledge is the gradual and life-long assimilation of the soul to the nature of those values which it endeavors to understand. Good cannot be understood as a formal, logical, external notion, until we have managed to share something of its inward nature.

One must in the final analysis characterize the Platonic system by its veneration for and reliance upon human reason—and, to Plato, reason embraces not more ratiocination, but doing good as well as knowing the true. Plato, in effect, equates virtue and knowledge, and emphasizes the fact that man, approaching virtue through wisdom and reason, achieves his ultimate end, a state of harmony with the nature of the universe.

This attitude toward reason, Aristotle shared with Plato; for him, (Aristotle), nature is "intelligible, beautiful, purposive, an organic whole," in some sense corresponding to the mind of man. But Aristotle refuses to accept Plato's dichotomy between the world of Forms and the world of things. True being is a characteristic of both, and reality, accordingly, inheres in the sensible world, nature being a fusion of matter and form. If, as Aristotle posits, all objects of nature strive to realize their ultimate, final form, and if the end of all things is

6Plato, Republic, pp. 366-367.


8Hoopes, p. 23.
return to the prime mover, then, provided that the first mover is good, the more form that matter acquires, the better it becomes. Hence, to Aristotle, value and the good would be unthinkable without the first mover. But the first mover shares a certain amount of its perfection with the creation. One must, says Aristotle, acknowledge that goodness exists both in the universe and in the first mover.

The universe, to Aristotle as well as to countless succeeding generations of thinkers, in its hierarchic arrangement according to degrees of perfection, provides proof of the existence of intellectual and moral absolutes. The purposive, benevolent arrangement of nature both produces and verifies man's knowledge of goodness.

Again revealing his indebtedness to Plato's thinking, Aristotle sees the soul as a hierarchic triad: the nutritive, the sensitive, and the intellective. By nature, the intellective faculty is the highest, since only it among the three can give rise to movement. In Aristotle's view, man enjoys a position at once both dangerous and enviable. This "perilous balance" results from his possessing mind and reason of the same sort as that which governs the universe, but which he can never relax without betraying his true being. Man can "never allow the law by which he should govern himself to degenerate." Violating the natural law or the moral law constitutes, thus, a violation of the law of his own human nature. Consequently, one who chooses a perverted end is not really using reason at all. Only that reason which advances the end for which it was created can be called right reason.

Aristotle bases his entire ethical position on the postulate that

\(^9\) Hoopes, p. 28.
happiness is man's greatest good, since happiness is the only good which he seeks for its own sake. Happiness, since it is something experienced, must be an activity in accordance with the nature of the individual. Since man's nature is essentially reasonable, "the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is man." His "lower parts"—the nutritive and the sensitive—man must subordinate, but not obliterate. By submitting them to the governance of reason, he establishes a harmony with a pre-existing system, and, thus, by acting rationally, man acts, to some extent, virtuously; conversely, moral actions reinforce man's rational nature. That is, the performance of right actions heightens man's awareness that reason is the highest principle of human life.

But to Aristotle, knowledge and virtue are not identical but analogous. True, the identity which Socrates taught seems to result, for there is neither dualism nor opposition between the two. Aristotle never suggests that a man might be "good" without intelligence. Right action must be based upon right thinking, and, conversely, right thinking arises from right action. Right reason seeks to establish true and valid conclusions from true and valid premises. Any good action is based upon two elements: knowing what to do and knowing how to do it. Virtuous actions, thus, require the existence of the rational faculty which Aristotle called "prudence," the virtue "which unites intellectual ability and moral excellence, eventually to be defined by Aquinas as recta ratio agilibium—'right reason about things

to be done." The immoral man is also the ignorant man, because prudence develops from exercise in right action. Happiness, the Aristotelian *summum bonum*, then, one may define as "activity in accordance with virtue."

In its classical development, the concept of right reason involves three assumptions toward reality: the existence of certain, absolute, unchanging, metaphysically grounded values; assurance that these values are intellectually comprehensible to man; and the belief that, if men are to have knowledge rather than mere opinions about these values, there must be some specific way of knowing them. The man who devotes himself whole-heartedly to virtuous living has found that way.12

The development of right reason among the Stoics constitutes

11 Hoopes, p. 31.

12 Much twentieth-century scholarship—notably that of A. O. Lovejoy (*The Great Chain of Being* [Cambridge, Mass., 1936]), Werner Jaeger (*Paideia*), F. M. Cornford (*From Religion to Philosophy*), and James K. Feibleman (*Religious Platonicism* [London, 1959])—has emphasized that the traditional view of Plato’s teachings results from an undue emphasis upon the Orphic mysticism both implicit and explicit in Plato’s writings and from an almost complete neglect of the Greek rationalism equally present there. "The chances are, then, that the Orphic writings pulled Plato (or Socrates) out of his true path a little and in the effort to abstract the philosophy from the theology and the mythology, he gave more emphasis to the Ideas than to the receptacle, an error which Aristotle tried to correct, with his own consequent over-emphasis on the other side. Plato was bowled over by Orpheus and never quite recovered his equilibrium. Metaphysical realism and this-worldliness was what he had wanted to advance; whereas metaphysical idealism and other-worldliness was the theology to which Orphism brought him," explains Feibleman (pp. 65-66). With such a view, Moses Hadas (*Humanism: The Greek Ideal and its Survival* [New York, 1960]) disagrees, arguing that the Orphic religious elements in Greek thought are innate and serve to temper the rationalism which his opponents find the "basic Greek thought." Regardless of whether the Platonic tradition coincides with Plato, we are concerned here with the tradition, much of which has been colored by the subsequent teachings of such thinkers as Philo, Proclus, and Plotinus, and it is the traditional interpretation which I shall continue.
essentially a formalization, a hardening, of the exploratory attempts by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to ground ethics in some absolute value; because Stoicism is essentially a system of ethics, however, Stoic philosophers appear to concern themselves only with ethics and to ignore metaphysics. To them, reason was natural, and nature was reasonable; but Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus, superficially opposed as they seem, all "tend to accept divine providence as a fact hardly open to argument." Cicero's definitions of virtue as "an equable and harmonious disposition of the soul making praiseworthy in whom it is found" and as "summed up as right reason" clearly echo the teachings of the earlier Greek teachers. Seneca grounded his statement, Virtus non aliud quam recta ratio est, in the twin germs of reason, "from which the virtues spring," and truth, "which cannot exist without reason." Epictetus taught that the power of judgment present in the soul presupposes the desire for right action as well as the desire for right knowledge. His emphasis was upon achieving a balance between will and reason. Intellect and will are blended in his thought so thoroughly as to imply, according to Hoopes, that "the unity of knowledge and virtue has ... become a commonplace." But the Stoic struggle between necessity and freedom vitiates much of Epictetus's thought, and resignation becomes overt. One incapable of successfully


14Tusculan Disputations, tr. J. E. King (Cambridge, England, 1945), IV.xv.34.


16Hoopes, p. 35.
pursuing the good must with equanimity accept failure. On the other hand, Marcus Aurelius, even while advocating serenity, does not propose any such flaccid acceptance of necessity. The tranquility which he espouses arises from the knowledge a man has that his actions are just. In this world, he says, nothing excels "justice, truth, temperance, fortitude," or "thy own mind's self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do according to right reason."^17

Throughout the so-called ethical period in Greek philosophy, as Professor Frank Thilly points out, order, harmony, and symmetry were key-words in any consideration of morality. Man must follow reason, govern himself in temperance. Both materialists and idealists agreed, too, that intellect is important, because right action must be based upon correct thinking. All agreed, further, on the kind of life which a man must live in order to achieve virtue. Wisdom, self-control, courage and justice were watchwords for hedonists and their opponents alike. In many respects, the ethical philosophy of Stoicism was superior to that of Plato and Aristotle; whereas both Plato and Aristotle had defended slavery, and both had succumbed to national prejudices (both looked upon 'barbarians' as inferior people), the Stoics introduced the ideas of universal brotherhood and equal rights for all human beings. "The solidarity of the human race became a central thought in their system. The notion of the dignity of man developed," and the concept of natural law as pertaining universally.

to man arose.\textsuperscript{18}

For some reason or combination of reasons not yet agreed upon, there occurred what has sometimes been referred to as a "failure of nerve." The classical assurance that man could attain wisdom and virtue and could control himself through his self-authenticating intellect gave way gradually to a "feeling of the need of help, both in the ethical and in the theoretical spheres." No longer secure in his belief that he could attain right reason, virtue, or salvation through the unaided activity of his reason, the philosophical man sought outside help in some form of divine revelation.\textsuperscript{19} Even among the Stoics arose the realization that no human being had fully achieved the ideal of the wise man, and that, thus, man in his own strength was unlikely to become wise, virtuous, or happy.

The ethical philosophies of the times contained elements of religious emphasis. Even though the Epicureans deliberately excluded metaphysical teaching, the Stoics sought the principle of morals in a divine command; and the spiritual monotheism in Aristotle's teaching, together with the tendency toward idealism in Plato, provided a precedent which enabled the aging Greek and Roman world to retrace its footsteps and convert its realistic philosophical edifice into a religious system. A period of eclecticism set in, adopting whatever appeared good in various systems, and endeavoring to piece together a satisfactory \textit{weltanschauung} from materials at hand. Even this, however,


did not satisfy those temperaments which rejected viewing the world as a mechanical interplay of atoms. Referring to those who could not find peace and power within themselves, Professor Murray comments:

The new quality is not specifically Christian. . . . It is a rise of asceticism, of mysticism, . . . of pessimism, . . . a conversion of the soul to God. It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is . . . , by means of a burning faith, by contempt for the world and its standards, by ecstasy, suffering, and martyrdom, to be granted pardon for his unspeakable unworthiness, his immeasurable sins. There is an intensifying of certain spiritual emotions; an increase of sensitiveness, a failure of nerve. 20

In addition to its own religious tendencies, the Graeco-Roman world encountered Oriental religions throughout the eastern part of the Empire which it incorporated into its world view, and "thus the soil of the ancient world of civilization, after bearing the fruits of arts and science, became the battleground of religions. Man's essential interest became thereby transferred for long centuries from the earthly to the heavenly sphere; he began to seek his salvation beyond the world of sense." 21

But the spiritual and intellectual power of Greek thought transformed even the non-rational religions which it incorporated. The religions imported were modified to satisfy not only the feelings, but also the intellect. Such a Graeco-Roman rationalization occurred with least restraint in the cosmopolitan Egyptian city of Alexandria, where all the diverse trends met most freely. The efforts to accommodate Greek systematic thought to Oriental religion divided into three main currents in Alexandria: (1) the attempt to combine Judaism with Greek


21 Windelband, I, 211.
speculation produced Jewish-Greek philosophy; (2) the effort to rear a
world-religion upon a Pythagorean framework produced Neopythagoreanism;
and (3) the attempt to make a religious philosophy of the Platonic
teachings resulted in Neoplatonism. The three currents shared certain
tenets: a belief in the transcendence of God, an acceptance of the
dualism of God and the world, the idea of a revealed and mystical know­
ledge of God, advocacy of asceticism and world-denial, and the belief in intermediary beings, demons, and angels. In the Jewish-Greek
philosophy, Orientalism dominates the Greek element, but in Neopla­
tonism, the Greek aspect is the stronger.

Plotinus, in his redaction of Plato, retained the doctrine of Eros
which Plato had introduced in the Symposium; according to that belief, the realms of intelligible and empirical being maintain some sort of
communion, even though they are ontologically discreet. The agency for
that communication, Eros, "spans the chasm which divides" the two
realms;²² and it is through the operation of Eros that man can approach
the good, incorporating himself into the recirculating current between
God and the world. But though the Platonic Eros provides a bridge
between the intelligible and the empirical beings, it also emphasizes
their differences, and, in effect, creates a dualism, inasmuch as the
price for admission into the stream consisted in purification, a purga­
tion of the soul of the "pollutions of mortality, and all colors and
vanities of human life."²³ In one sense, this is a restatement of the
position which Socrates had taken, that only the good man could know

²²Plato, Symposium, 202e-203a.
²³Plato, Symposium, 211e.
the good, that right reason requires right living. "Knowledge," however, has become transcendental knowledge in the *Symposion*.

To much of Plato's teaching, Plotinus remains true. His cosmology is both theistic and pantheistic. All created things are emanations from a transcendent First Being; they long to return to their first source, and forsake this world which is not their home, to return to fusion with the transcendent First Being from which they emanated. The proper method of return is through ethical purity and renouncing the world, the flesh, and the devil. But the soul, imprisoned in the body, cannot flee to its source. How can man reverse the process of emanation and free himself from the resultant laws of mechanical necessity? Herein lies Plotinus's dilemma: Why should the One, by definition good, resort to matter, by definition evil, in working out the process of emanation? Apparently, the Good is responsible for introducing evil into the creation.

From this cul-de-sac, Plotinus seeks to extricate himself by means of a thoroughgoing solipsism. As Ernst Cassirer interprets the solution, "The soul frees itself from the wheel of time and fate in that it considers itself as belonging only incidentally to the corporeal world."²⁴ From the duality implicit in this reasoning, Plotinus never escapes. According to him, true happiness results from a mysterious, non-rational ecstasy in which the soul literally separates itself from the body and fuses itself with the Divine Mind. Mortal, physical eyes cannot see the Divine Mind, The One, Pure Intelligibility; but the eyes of the soul can, and in a passive contemplation of utter perfection,

the soul finds both itself and its source. Such ecstasy, however, can be the possession only of the virtuous man. "God on the lips without a good conduct of life, is but a word."25

In Plotinus, the derogation of the world which was but implicit in Plato has become pivotal. Plotinus, for instance, does not concern himself with such mundane affairs as how man can found an ideal society. Ernest Barker points out that "he thus has no interest in the State; the 'Platonopolis' of which Plotinus dreamed is a hermitage rather than a polis. Indeed he has no interest in any form of society. . . . He is non-social as well as non-political."26 Plotinian philosophy, though largely based upon the Platonic, is by no means the philosophy of Plato; it is a corruption based upon limited selection and an altogether different intent. Plato's interest was philosophy, Plotinus's, religion. Feibleman points out that there are three characteristics of Neoplatonism which differentiate it from the philosophy of Plato: first, the emanation theory which, even though suggested by Plato, was developed into the key doctrine by Plotinus. One can always be sure, says Feibleman, that he is dealing with Neoplatonism, "by the image of the sun and of sunlight. The One is likened to the sun, and its emanations to sunlight. The One pours out its essence with no diminution in itself, until every existence is actualized." Second, Plotinus conceived the Platonic Ideas as being in the mind of the monotheistic God and in the Logos after they had been created by God. For Plato, the Ideas had been


co-eternal with the God or Gods, as the case may be. Third, the matter upon which form is imposed is not an emanation; through privation it is the cause of evil. Because the physical universe is the last emanation, being so far from the source of light, the only good purpose it can serve is to make a contrast with the good and the spiritual.27

In Neoplatonism one detects Plotinus's effort to preserve as much as possible of Greek rationalism while incorporating non-rational elements from Oriental religions. One of the Oriental religions with which Plotinus struggled was Christianity, which was beginning to appeal strongly to the Roman world-kingdom. Its spiritual monotheism, its eschatology, its doctrine of charity, and its example of the suffering Christ made it attractive to the religion-starved Romans. Oriental though it was in origin, Christianity was at least partially Graeco-Roman from the beginning. Judaism had been unable to resist completely the ethical, political, social, religious, and intellectual influences radiating from Rome, and so the Christian revolt against orthodox Judaism was one result. Hadas points out that Christianity received a liberal share of Greek thought from Judaism; he cites as evidence the book of Job as Greek tragedy, the Ecclesiastes, and the books of Ecclesiasticus.28

The new religion appeared at a propitious moment. The Pax Romana guaranteed easy distribution of ideas; the Stoic-inculcated feelings of brotherhood and universalism made Christian charity welcome; the increasing deism in philosophy made the transcendent God of

27Feibleman, p. 149.

28Hadas, pp. 103-107.
Christianity believable; and the widely accepted ideas of immortality, received from the Greek mystery religions and from Oriental religions, blended easily with Christian ideas of resurrection. Just as Christianity was in some measure a product of its age, so it accommodated itself to the conditions which it encountered. In appealing to the Greeks and Romans, it gradually absorbed the culture of the world which it was attempting to win. It sought to justify its faith to reason, and to fend off philosophical attacks. Patristic philosophy held in common that

Christianity is a philosophy, because it has a rational content, because it gives a satisfactory and universally intelligible answer to the questions which all true philosophers have endeavored to answer; but it is not a philosophy, indeed it is the direct opposite of philosophy . . . in so far as it is revealed truth and, hence, has a supernatural, divine origin, upon which alone the truth and certainty of its teaching ultimately rests.29

The early Apologists, abreast of their culture, appealed to the educated Greeks and Romans by using literature and philosophy, and for this reason, as Thilly points out, "the philosophical element generally predominates in their writings and . . . the purely religious aspect is . . . often relegated to the background."30

Anthropology presented perhaps the thorniest problem to those Apologists who wished to express the revealed teachings of Christianity in the more rational terms of Greek philosophy. No place existed for classical anthropocentric humanism. Patently, unaided man had not been capable of achieving complete virtue or the good life. The Christian doctrine of original sin was even more destructive of human satisfaction

30Thilly, p. 169.
than had been the Stoics' or the Neoplatonists' idea that the world was becoming progressively more evil. True, the first man had been created with the capability of choosing the good, but he chose the evil, thereby in some way infecting his progeny, so that they cannot unaided choose the good or eschew evil. Human wisdom can neither know nor pursue the good. Consequently, the classical idea that goodness, or the tendency toward the good, inhered in human nature no longer obtained. Man had to have outside help in his struggle with evil. Moreover, if man had been able to redeem himself, the Incarnation would have been pointless. But, by nature a slave to sin, he had to rely upon grace for his salvation, and to obtain grace, he had to believe in the revealed teachings of the Church. To this thinking, capable of dualistic interpretation as it is, the Manichaeans could subscribe by combining Christianity with the doctrines of Zoroaster. Man, according to them, was by nature evil, because his spiritual nature was enslaved by his evil physical body; only by extreme asceticism and by renouncing human ties to this physical world could he purify his soul and make it amenable to grace.

But another possible interpretation existed. Sin implies guilt, and guilt implies responsibility on the part of the sinner. Only a person free to choose can be held accountable by a just God. Hence, if man sinned, he must have been free. Again, an absolutely just and good God could not have originated sin; man himself, then, must be the author of sin, and, hence, free.

Questions about the dignity of man and the extent to which he could cooperate in his own rehabilitation "called all in doubt." Anthropology, then, presented the early Christian apologists with their first dilemma.
Moreover, early attempts to interpret primitive Christian doctrine in terms of philosophy resulted in "such grotesque constructions" and led to such "religious fantasticalness" that a violent reaction against philosophical interpretation set in among such Apologists as Tatian (Second Century), Tertullian (Second and Third Centuries), and Arnobius (Third and Fourth Centuries).  

Tertullian is typical of the extreme reaction. He was a lawyer, an ethical man of tender feelings, and he was "a ranting Fundamentalist" who preached a hell-fire doctrine. God is, according to him, absolute power. "'I would rather have a wicked God than a weak one,'" he said. Man is God's abject subject. Only fear of God produces morality. Man must obey God's laws unthinkingly. "'To know nothing in opposition to the Rule of Faith is to know all things. ... Romain in ignorance, lest you know what you ought not to.'"  

In De praescriptione haereticorum (c. 200), he wrote:

It is this philosophy which is the subject-matter of this world's wisdom, that rash interpreter of the divine nature and order. In fact, heresies are themselves prompted by philosophy. It is the source of "aeons," and I know not what infinite "forms" and "the trinity of man" in the system of Valentinus. He was a Platonist. It is the source of Marcion's "better God," "better," because of his tranquility. Marcion came from the Stoics. Again, when it is said that the soul perishes, that opinion is taken from the Epicureans. The denial of the restoration of the flesh is taken over from the universal teaching of the philosophers; the equation of matter with God is the doctrine of Zeno; and when any assertion is made about a God of fire, then Heraclitus comes in. Heretics and philosophers handle the same subject-matter; both treat of the same topics—Whence came evil? And why? Whence came man? And how? And a question lately posed by Valentinus—Whence came God? Answer: "From enthymesis and ectroma"! Wretched Aristotle! who taught them dialectic, that art of building up and

31 Windelband, p. 214.
32 John Herman Randall, Jr., The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion (Boston, 1958), pp. 39-40.
demolishing, so protean in statement, so far-fetched in conjecture, so unyielding in controversy, so productive of disputes; self-stultifying, since it is ever handling questions but never settling anything . . . . What is there in common between Athens and Jerusalem? What between the Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? . . . Away with all projects for a "Stoic," a "Platonic" or a "dialectic" Christianity! After Christ Jesus we desire no subtle theories, no acute enquiries after the gospel.

Tertullian, Randall points out, "shows what Christianity was like without Platonism—or Paul! . . . it is wholly legal in character."

But Tertullian's was not the only voice raised. Justin Martyr in his *Apology* (c. 150) utilized the logos concept to bridge the gap between pagan and Christian:

I prayed and strove with all my might to be found a Christian, not because the teachings of Plato are contrary to those of Christ, but because they are not in all respects like them; as is the case with the doctrines of others, Stoics, poets, and prose-authors. For each discoursed rightly, seeing that which was akin to Christianity through a share in the seminal divine reason (Word); but they that have uttered contrary opinions seem not to have had the invisible knowledge and the irrefutable wisdom. Whatever has been uttered aright by any men in any place belong to us Christians; for, next to God, we worship and love the reason (Word) which is from the unbegotten and ineffable God; since on our account He has been made man, that, being made partaker of our sufferings, he may also bring us healing. For all the authors were able to see the truth darkly, through the implanted seed of reason (the Word) dwelling in them. For the seed and imitation of a thing, given according to a man's capacity, is one thing; far different is the thing itself, the sharing of which and its representation is given according to his grace.

Even more specifically, Justin stated that 'those who live according to reason are Christians, even though they are accounted atheists. Such

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34 Randall, p. 40.
35 Bettenson, p. 7.
were Socrates and Heraclitus among the Greeks, and those like men.36

Clement of Alexandria, writing about the same time that Tertullian wrote his *De praescriptione haereticorum* (c. 200) stated that philosophy was necessary to the Greeks for righteousness, until the coming of the Lord. And now it assists towards true religion as a kind of preparatory training for those who arrive at faith by way of demonstration. For "Thy foot shall not stumble" if thou attribute to Providence all good, whether it belong to the Greeks or to us. For God is the source of all good things; of some, primarily, as of the old and new Testaments; of others, by consequence, as of philosophy. But it may be, indeed, that philosophy was given to the Greeks immediately and primarily, until the Lord should call the Greeks. For philosophy was a "schoolmaster" to bring the Greek mind to Christ, as the Law brought the Hebrews. Thus philosophy was a preparation, paving the way toward perfection in Christ.37

"The official attitude of the Greek and Latin Fathers to the Higher Education of their day was not uniform," according to Laistner.38 It would be misleading to imply that all, or even most, of them condemned pagan literature without qualification. The bases for their objections are obvious: literary allusions to polytheism, pagan immorality, the lure of rhetoric. But simple piety was not enough, for Apologists had the task of refuting sophisticated pagan opponents by reasoned arguments. The injunction to "avoid all books of the heathen," and "eschew . . . all strange writings" contrary "to the glorious Law of the Lord God,"39 if heeded, would have prevented the historic expansion of Christianity; consequently, the gradual rapprochement of Christianity and pagan culture continued. Basil the Great in his

36Bettenson, pp. 8-9.
38Laistner, p. 49.
39*Didascalica Apostolorum* 12, quoted in Laistner, p. 50.
Addaee advised that the entire pagan educational system be incorporated into Christian teaching, provided only that it continue to be regarded as a means, not as an end—a early statement of the familiar idea that philosophy should be a handmaid to theology. St. John Chrysostom also conceded the value of the pagan schools, his main point being that the moral purpose of education is more important than anything else.

Even less restrained in their admiration for classical culture and education were Eusebius of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory of Nazianzus has stated the case explicitly:

I take it as admitted by men of sense that the first of our advantages is education; and not only this our more noble form of it, which disregards rhetorical ornaments and glory, and holds to salvation and beauty in the objects of our contemplation; but even that pagan culture which many Christians spit upon, as treacherous and dangerous, and keeping us afar from God. For as we ought not to neglect the heavens, and earth, and air, and all such things, because some have wrongly seized upon them, and honour God's works instead of God; but to reap what advantage we can from them for our life and enjoyment, while we avoid their dangers; not raising creation, as foolish men do, in revolt against the Creator, but from the works of nature apprehending the Worker (Romans 1, 20 and 25), and, as the divine apostle says (II Cor 10, 5), bringing into captivity every thought to Christ; and again, as we know that neither fire nor flood nor iron nor any other of the elements is of itself most useful or most harmful, except according to the will of those who use it; and as we have compounded healthful drugs from certain of the reptiles, so from secular literature we have received principles of inquiry and speculation, while we have rejected their idolatry, terror, and pit of destruction. Nay, even these have aided us in religion, by our perception of the contrast between what is worse and what is better, and by gaining strength for our doctrine from the weakness of theirs. We must not then dishonour education, because some men are pleased to do so, but rather suppose such men to be boorish and uneducated, desiring all men to be as they themselves are, in order to hide

40 Text and translation of the Address will be found in the fourth volume of the Letters of St. Basil in the Loeb Classical Library.
what is appropriate to them among the common mass and escape the
detection of their want of culture.  

St. Ambrose's *De officiis ministrorum*, the first systematic manual
of Christian ethics, is based upon the *De officiis* of Cicero. At times,
St. Ambrose follows Cicero quite closely; the general arrangement of the
two books is similar; there are many direct quotations and more para-
phrases. But the later writer does not follow Cicero slavishly. For
Cicero's examples, drawn from Greek and Roman history and literature, he
substituted figures from Christian literature. The result is a book
thoroughly Christian in thought, but a book which uses freely whatever
elements of Stoic teaching that do not conflict with the teaching of
Christianity. The quality of St. Ambrose's *De officiis ministrorum*
assured its being read for centuries, and made it one of the major
channels of Stoic ethics from the Classical Period to the Middle Ages.  

Etienne Gilson attributes to Lactantius (Lucius Caelius Lactantius
Firmianus, Fourth Century) the feat of uniting "true philosophy" with
"true religion."  

Lactantius is known as the "Christian Cicero," for
it is he who quoted and preserved Cicero's famous definition of natural
law as "right reason in agreement with nature." He deplored St.
Cyprian's ineffectual apologetics in a dispute with a pagan: "He ought
to have been refuted not by the testimonies of Scripture, which he
plainly considered vain, fictitious, and false, but by argument and

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41PG 36, 508B-509A. The translation is by C. G. Browne and J. E.
Swallow, with some minor changes. See *Select Library of Nicene and

42Laistner, p. 64.

43*History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York,
Philosophers must be overcome with their own weapons. Lactantius defines the proper function of knowledge: "And I thus briefly define the sum of this knowledge, that neither is any religion to be undertaken without wisdom, nor any wisdom to be approved without religion." For him, knowledge is not a final end; man must seek some advantage from it. Although agreeing with the Stoics that only virtue can make a man happy, he refutes their belief that felicity comes only from the extirpation of desire. Just as knowledge, if it is to justify itself, must come to some advantageous fruition, so must suffering and restraint have cause and reason. "Virtue united with knowledge is wisdom," he writes, and wisdom enables man to approach God. Reciprocally, religion, "the worship of the true God with just and pious adoration," activates wisdom, so that it can differentiate between right and wrong. Wisdom, then, according to Lactantius, is another name for right reason, "for wisdom has been given . . . on this account, that, knowing the nature of good and evil things, he [man] may exercise the force of his reason in seeking the good and avoiding the evil." 

Lactantius, Hoopes points out, "is sufficient to remind us that the transition from classical to Christian culture cannot be characterized as a revolt against reason in the name of faith." In his thinking, we see bridged the gap between anthropocentric humanism and theocentric in an alliance which produces Christian right reason. The highest wisdom

45 Lactantius, I.2.
46 Lactantius, III.27, III.8, VII.4.
47 Hoopes, p. 63.
for him is the knowledge of God; in order to know God, man must exercise virtue and achieve ethical purification, as well as believe and struggle to understand. This radical anthropological reorientation again brings the concept of right reason into favor, and Lactantius, as Socrates before him had done, presupposes that God is inherently rational, and that man, God's creature, can participate in and to some extent understand that rationality.

Following Lactantius, St. Augustine dealt with the problem of man's rational capability to know and do the right. Unfortunately, St. Augustine is open to wildly differing interpretations, so that succeeding generations of advocates of opposing positions cite Augustinian proof texts. Herschel Baker in *The Dignity of Man* found that St. Augustine accorded human intellect little effective power:

> As if to complete the degradation of man's proud cognitive faculty, he [St. Augustine] made the highest knowledge (the awareness of God) a matter of divine illumination. This kind of knowledge comes to man, if it comes at all, only if God wills it: man is the sponge who passively absorbs the revealed vision which God grants him, not the consciously seeking rational agent who attains knowledge by his own efforts at comprehension.48

Man, as a fallen creature, then, has no capability to rise again to his created state of perfection. Divine illumination comes at the will of God, through faith, and not as a result of conscious rational effort. Etienne Gilson finds the Augustinian position less harsh:

> In his fallen state, man cannot save himself by his own strength. Since it was a creature of God, free will was good; but since it was but a creature, it could not be perfectly good. In other words, the fall of man was not necessary, but it was possible. Now, although he fell by his own free will, the free will of man is not sufficient to raise him again. This was, in Augustine, more than an abstract conviction. The decisive moment in his personal history had been the discovery of sin, of his

inability to overcome it without God's grace, and the experience of his success in doing so with divine help. This is the reason why, from the very beginning of his career, and even before knowing Pelagius, he wrote against him as if he had known him. The anti-Pelagian controversies, which began about 412, only encouraged him to stress still more forcefully the necessity of grace. True enough, one cannot sustain disputes of this kind for more than twenty years without occasionally overstressing certain points. Having to answer endless objections against the necessity of grace, Augustine had no reason to stress the rights of nature and of free will. His central position has always remained the same: it takes both grace and free will to achieve moral righteousness because grace is an aid granted by God to man's free will. If grace destroyed free will, there would be nothing left to receive its aid.49

At any rate, St. Augustine advocates a Christian use of pagan culture, saying: "Moreover, if those who are called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, have said aught that is true and in harmony with our faith, we are not only not to shrink from it, but to claim it for our own use from those who have unlawful possession of it."50 And he maintains that only the righteous may rise to an understanding of the truth. "The soul must be purified that it may have power to perceive that light, and to rest in it when it is perceived. And let

49Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, pp. 78-79. Hoopes points out that St. Augustine is not always responsible for the over-enthusiastic interpretations of Augustinianism; there is an Augustinianism, the result of a philosophical tradition and popular association, which is as far removed from St. Augustine as neo-Aristotelianism is from Aristotle, as neo-Platonism is from Plato, as Thomism is from St. Thomas, as Freudianism is from Freud. These heightened distillations of one aspect of St. Augustine's teachings—as for instance in Preserved Smith, The Age of the Reformation (New York, 1920), pp. 65, 584; Crane Brinton, Ideas and Men; the Story of Western Thought (New York, 1950), p. 313; and Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy, pp. 278-279—result in a narrowing of what the man himself thought and said. This kind of ossification, in addition to misrepresenting the thinker concerned, results also in isolating him from other similar thinkers, so that Plato and Aristotle, as well as St. Augustine and St. Thomas, become anti-theoretical (Hoopes, p. 230).

us look upon this purification as a kind of journey or voyage to our native land. 51

The Christian doctrine of creation makes impossible the easy classical naturalism, because it implies the dependence of the creature upon the creator. This dependence exists even with regard to knowledge. Gilson summarizes St. Augustine's position: "The only way to account for these characters of truth in the human mind is to admit that, every time it forms a true judgment, our mind is so to speak in contact with something that is immutable and eternal." 52 The Platonic Forms have been relocated in the mind of God (in accordance with Plotinus's teaching), and God becomes the agency responsible for the finite forms in the human intellect.

Consequently, even though all knowledge is ultimately from God, man, because of the vast gulf which separates him from his creator, can never attain complete knowledge of God. Believe, says St. Augustine, in order that you may understand. In teaching that spiritual knowledge is superior to physical knowledge, as wisdom is superior to science, St. Augustine increases the Christian tendency toward ratio sapientiae away from the classical ratio scientiae, so that the ratio sapientiae becomes the sole basis for all activities of the reasoning mind. Thus it discloses to men principles and truths which are in every way as immutable as the truths of mathematicians, and among these are knowledge


52Gilson, p. 6.
of God and the nature of good and evil. There is no questioning the significance of experience. He, too, acknowledges his existence in nature, but his world is a "nature transfigured." It is the theatre of divine activity. St. Augustine explains:

I labored to discern and to appraise everything according to its worth, taking some things on the evidence of my senses, inquiring about others which I felt were mingled with myself, numbering and distinguishing the reporters [the senses] themselves and, in the treasure-house of memory, resolving some things, storing up others, drawing out others... Thou art the abiding light which I consulted regarding all these, whether they were, what they were, and how they were to be evaluated.

Hoopes shows that Augustine, as Justin before him had done, attempted to reunite morality and truth, faith and reason, by demonstrating that both moral sin and intellectual error arise from a common origin—"a bad will grounded in a bad love." As sin arises from a wrong determination of the will, so error results from the effort "to make one's own truth," to place knowledge ahead of wisdom. A man must be, says St. Augustine, "upright and humble enough to know what is true." His emphasis upon man's fitness for receiving divine grace is by no means an advocacy of "Good Works." Rather, according to Hoopes,


55 Hoopes, p. 63.

56 Cochrane, p. 449.

he is thinking of man's naturally functioning in accordance with his highest principles, specifically the principle of reason. Human nature, being rational, prescribes rational conduct. No less than Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle, St. Augustine insists that the human being's specific function in the cosmic drama is to live virtuously according to the dictates of right reason.

There is no discontinuity in the Socratic fusion of knowledge and virtue; there is, however, a shift in emphasis, providing a fresh approach to the problem of sin and error. For St. Augustine, the objects of philosophy, truth and happiness, are inseparable from the objects of life itself. Truth always relates to God, and, consequently, St. Augustine is concerned not so much with the nature of reason, but with the manner in which Christians should exercise reason. He concludes that, though there is no such thing as a specifically Christian reason, there is a "Christian exercise of reason." 58

Because St. Augustine had so thoroughly succeeded in christening pagan philosophy, Boethius in the sixth century was able to write his Consolation of Philosophy with no overt reference at all to theology or to revealed religion, providing the Christian reader for more than a thousand years a paean to reason and its ethical utility. In his work, he produced a synthesis of the best ethical thought of the Greeks and the Romans, attempting "to account for the disparity between man's god-like aspirations and animal failures, to discover the grounds for distinguishing between good and evil human action, to evaluate the

relative importance of the things men strive for. 59 Apparently, his attempt was successful, for C. S. Lewis remarks that *The Consolation of Philosophy* and the Bible were the two most "germinal" books of the Middle Ages; 60 and Whitney J. Oates, in accounting for its importance, points out that "up to the recovery of the Classics in Renaissance, it was one of the few sources of information for the Greek Tradition." 61 Its long-lived popularity is attested by the fact that in English alone three notable translations were made: King Alfred's (ca. 890), Chaucer's (fourteenth century), and Queen Elizabeth's (sixteenth century). And C. S. Lewis explains that *The Consolation of Philosophy* was translated into Old High German, Italian, Spanish, and Greek; and into French by Jean de Meun. 62 Whatever originality Boethius exhibits concerns itself with his approach to the problem of Free Will and Providence. Otherwise, his philosophical importance is that of a conduit for ideas from one period to another, and among the ideas which he transmitted was that of the high place of reason in the human being.

Boethius wrote *The Consolation of Philosophy* in the first person. Musing one day about his sad lot, he noticed

a woman of majestic countenance whose flashing eyes seemed wise beyond the ordinary wisdom of men. Her color was bright, suggesting boundless vigor, and yet she seemed so old that she could not be thought of as belonging to our age. Her height seemed to vary:


sometimes she seemed of ordinary human stature, and then again her head seemed to touch the top of the heavens. And when she raised herself to her full height she penetrated heaven itself, beyond the vision of human eyes.63

His unannounced companion was the Lady Philosophy, come to lead him to the discovery and enjoyment of the supreme good best capable of fulfilling man's human aspirations. That *summum bonum* is the knowledge and love of God, for it is the only happiness which misfortune cannot steal away, inasmuch as it is within man and dependent upon his own rational control. In the tradition of humanism, Boethius makes "the liberating power of the mind, the self-mastery," deriving from a just evaluation of mutable, material satisfactions, the basis for his ethical doctrine.64 The Lady Philosophy, to Boethius, is both mundane ("of ordinary human stature") and celestial ("she penetrated heaven itself, beyond the vision of human eyes"). Indeed, it is only because Philosophy can penetrate "heaven itself" that Boethius accepts her philosophical approach to religion. Moreover, according to her teaching, "there is naturally implanted in the minds of men the desire for the true good, even though foolish error draws them toward false goods."65 The man who wishes to know the truth must know himself, must "turn the light of his inner vision upon himself," teaching his spirit that it "possesses hidden among its own treasures whatever it seeks outside itself. . . . The seed of truth grows deep within and is roused to life by the breath of learning."66 Consequently, because the human intellect

63 *The Consolation*, tr. Richard Green, Book I, Prose 1, p. 3.

64 *The Consolation*, tr. Richard Green, p. xv.


participates in the divine, the truly philosophical man will know the good. "My wings," Philosophy sings, "are swift, able to soar beyond the heavens." The "quick mind" which employs the wings of Philosophy can "mount the top of the swift heaven and share the holy light."  

The wicked man lacks either the strength of wisdom or the strength of temperance, and such men lose their very being, "since to forsake the common goal of all existence is to forsake existence itself." The wicked man loses his humanity, and, "since he cannot share in the divine nature," instead "becomes a beast." 

In his charming and seminal *Consolation*, Boethius has repeated in attractive literary form the best of classical anthropology; and the attractiveness of his vehicle assured his thought of serious attention and imitation throughout the medieval period.

In what he calls the "seminal period," the last age of antiquity, C. S. Lewis concludes that many writers were "perhaps half-consciously, gathering together and harmonising views of very different origin: building a syncretistic Model not only out of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoical, but out of pagan and Christian elements. This Model the Middle Ages adopted and perfected." Obviously, they constructed their model well, for it was not until the end of the seventeenth century that it was "totally and confidently abandoned," made obsolete by the new

67 *The Consolation*, tr. Richard Green, Book IV, Poem 1, p. 76.
69 *The Consolation*, tr. Richard Green, Book IV, Prose 3, p. 82.
70 *The Discarded Image*, p. 12.
model concocted by science and the theory of progress.

Rather condescendingly, Horschel Baker writes that "there was even a certain degree of literacy" in the five centuries following St. Augustine.72 Primarily, however, he feels that the period was a somewhat colorless, rather low plateau, erected upon the theological genius of St. Augustine and enforced by the organizational genius of Gregory the Great; an interim between the heights of Classical humanism and the outburst of the Renaissance, a static period intent only upon preserving its own institutions. Lewis makes plain, however, that this was not the case, saying that "the Middle Ages, like most ages, were full of change and controversy."73 Christopher Dawson, confirming Lewis's opinion, says that "the history of the early Middle Ages is remarkable for its discontinuous character."74 In "The Theological Development of Medieval Culture," Dawson develops his thesis by explaining that in matters of dogma, mid- and late-medieval religion was conservative, concerned chiefly with preserving its inheritance from the Patristic Period, no mean accomplishment in the face of pagan invasion from without and pagan immiscibility from within. In effect, he divides the period into three parts: the Patristic Period; the Dark Ages, the era of the conversion of the barbarians; and the late- or high-Middle Ages (the twelfth to the fourteenth century). Only in the third period was the Church the unrivaled mistress and teacher of Western society.75 We have examined the

75Dawson, pp. 95-98.
way in which the thinkers of the Patristic Period synthesized Classical and Christian thought about the role of man in the universe, and we have noted how Boethius in the increasing gloom of the approaching "Dark Ages," almost as if he were aware of his function, distilled and codified much of the best Classical thought for transmission to posterity. Occupied as she was for five centuries, fighting for her very survival, the Church was necessarily content to accept Patristic teachings while she set about assimilating the hordes of "barbarians" who willy-nilly became her responsibility. In the third stage, the Church enjoyed her hard-won victory and became "the mistress and teacher of Western society." Speculative thought again became possible, and philosophy, somnolent for five hundred years, awakened, just in time to join in conflict with the thought of the Moslems. It is significant that the most influential European thinker of the age was not a Christian, but the Spanish Moslem, Averroes. Two causes, then, spurred the Church again to embrace philosophy: her domestic affairs were in order, and once more she needed to fight a learned outside enemy with its own intellectual weapons. Again she heeded Lactantius's advice to the effect that pagans ought to be refuted "not by the Scripture and articles of faith, which they plainly consider vain, fictitious and false, but by argument and reason."

The revival of dialectic, David Knowles calls "the most remarkable feature of the mental awakening of the eleventh century"; it ascended in importance from a "perfunctory memory-technique to the principal place in education"; and its renewed vigor is inexplicable in terms of

76 Dawson, p. 97.
the discovery of new texts. Nonetheless, the "clarity of Gallic genius" flowered in north-western Europe, as dialectic skill grew. Soon, however, as confidence in the powers of dialectic and reason increased, and as the limits of the human mind seemed to recede further and further, controversy appeared. Modern rationalism made its appearance, accompanied by scepticism and pessimism, and, for the first time since the Patristic Period, major controversies of all kinds erupted. In a period of moral and religious earnestness, it was inevitable that the questions should arise: "Has dialectic a true place in Christian thought? And, if so, can any limit be assigned to the separate provinces of reason and faith?" In St. Anselm we meet the best example of those who answered this question in the affirmative. His motto to the Proslogion, "Fides quaerens intellectum," "faith seeking to understand," he explains: "I desire," he says, addressing God, "to understand in some measure thy truth, which my heart already believes and loves. And indeed I do believe it, for unless I believe, I shall not understand." He appears to have thought that articles of faith, for one who believed, were not only appropriate but also inevitable. Consequently, his "ontological proof of the existence of God" is addressed to those who already believe. Not all of the thinkers of the period, however, could echo St. Anselm's credo ut intelligam. St. Peter Damian, himself a schoolman and a rhetorician, opposed dialectic and rationalism, and Manegold of Lautenbach refers to philosophy as "useless to the theologian, and regards the mysteries of the faith . . .

78 Knowles, p. 94.
as upsetting and annihilating philosophical wisdom and human reason." 79 On the other hand, Peter Abelard courted heresy in his rationalism. As a result, "the re-entry of Neoplatonism, the re-examination of Augustine by technically skilled minds, and the contaminated doctrines of the Arab writers, ensured that in all departments of philosophical thought there should be disagreement and controversy." 80

Bernardus Sylvestris, whom Miss Helen Waddell identifies as a scholar or as the chancellor of the school at Chartres, 81 wrote De Mundi universitate sive megacosmus et microcosmus in the ancient form known as the menippian satire--alternating sections of prose and poetry--which Boethius had employed in The Consolation of Philosophy. The work concerns the creation of the universe and of man, from the point of view of the created. The shift from the faith of theology to the speculation of philosophy appears in Noys's speech on the nature and dignity of Man:

He shall be heavenly, earthly; by his care
Shall rule the earth, and reach the heaven by prayer,
For as the diverse sources whence he drew
His being, so himself will still be two; . . .
He shall drag forth to light the causes hid
In secret gloom, though Nature long forbid . . .
To him, unbounded, in all lands, I give
High crown and priesthood over all that live. 82

Procreation becomes one of man's natural--and therefore honorable--functions, and the Pauline and Augustinian depreciation of sex as, at

79 Knowles, pp. 96-97.
80 Knowles, p. 115.
82 Bernardus Sylvestris, De Mundi universitate sive megacosmus et microcosmus, II.ix, tr. C. S. Lewis in Allegory of Love, p. 96.
best, a necessary evil, vanishes. The sex organs, though created last and consequently of least value, nonetheless fulfill an honorable place in the human economy:

Pleasant and fitting both their use will be
When time and mode and measure do agree,
Else withering from the root all lives would fail
And that old Chaos o'er the wreck prevail.
Conquerors of Death! they fill each empty place
In Nature and immortalize the race. 83

Bernardus, then, effects a compromise between extreme asceticism and the pleasures of the material world. Professor Lewis finds in him "at last," a well integrated man who propounds a kind of naturalism capable of development. 84

This possibility of growth Alanus ab Insulis (Alain de Lille) exploited tediously in his Antiolaudianus with its pseudo-epic aspirations, and more interestingly in his Complaint of Nature, which followed Bernardus's and Boethius's example of the menippean satire. The Antiolaudianus tells the story of Nature's planning a superior creature who would sum up all possible good features; unequal to the task alone, she called upon her sisters, Concord and Youth, Laughter, Reason, Honesty, Prudence, Good Faith, and Virtus, followed last by Nobility. Even these assembled virtues realized their inability to produce a perfect creature, and elected Prudence and Reason to ascend to God in search of a soul for the perfect man. They began their ascent, but neither, unaided, could go beyond the brow of the world. Reason, who had reached her limit, remained behind while Theology bore

83 Bernardus Sylvestris, De Mundi, II.xiv, tr. in Lewis, Allegory of Love, p. 97.
84 Lewis, Allegory of Love, p. 98.
Prudence upward to the throne of God. Arrived there, Prudence petitioned divine aid. God heeded Prudence's request, and, after Noys had presented Him a perfect creature, endowed it with a soul. Each of the virtues gave the new creature, Man, her choicest gifts. Meanwhile, the infernal creatures, learning of the creation of man, deployed an army of vices to attack him. The virtuous man overcame the forces of vice, and his victory initiated the Golden Age.

The importance of the poem is two-fold: first, it establishes the allegorical method as a favorite device in medieval literature; and, second, it increases the emphasis upon classical, humanistic virtues, at the expense of the theological virtues which had held sway since the days of St. Augustine. It is, however, Alanus's Complaint of Nature rather than his AntioLaudianus which most interests us, because it is mercifully shorter, less pretentious, and of greater literary fruitfulness. Here, too, Alanus personifies Natura, who claims to be "vicegerent [sic] of God the Creator." Dismayed by enforced abstinence and sexual perversion which she attributes to the unnatural monkish teaching of asceticism, she exhibits to the poet his lofty position as a rational human being:

Thy spirit . . . I have stamped with vital powers, that it might not, poorer than the body, envy its successes. And in it I have established a power of native strength, which is the hunter of subtle matters in the pursuit of knowledge, and established them, rendered intelligible in the understanding. On it, also, I have impressed the seal of reason, to set aside by the winnowing fan of its discrimination the emptiness of falsehood from the serious matters of truth.86


86 Alain, Prose III, p. 25.
He recreates the classical estimation of a reason which participates in the divine, "taking its rise from a celestial source." The Platonic and Neoplatonic doctrine of Eros he retains, for reason "passes through the low levels of earth, and, watchful of heavenly things, turns again to heaven." As lust drags the human mind down to vice, and consequently to non-being, so conversely reason stimulates the mind to the serenity of virtue. The one [lust] dishonors man, and changes him to a beast; the other [reason] mightily transfigures him into a god. Reason illuminates the darkness of the brain by the light of contemplation. ... Reason makes man to talk with angels; lust forces him to wanton with brutes. Reason teaches man to find in exile a home; lust forces him in his home to be an exile.  

Natura, however, claims no divine authority; she is aware of her function as viceregent. Moreover, "it is not strange if ... theology does not extend me her friendship, since in many matters we are conscious, not of enmities, but of diversities. I attain faith by reason, she attains reason by faith. I know in order that I may believe, she believes in order that she may know." Alanus has established the efficacy of human reason and has anticipated St. Thomas's distinction between the role of reason in metaphysics and the role of faith in theology. In a word, he has restored to man his dignity and his wholeness, keeping alive and transmitting the concept of "right reason" as an inherent part of humanism. Alanus, Lewis writes, composed in The Complaint both the courtesy book and a theological treatise. The two functions do not conflict, for the naturalism of Chartres has given him a middle ground, enabling him to reconcile the "rigours of theology" and the "wantonness of the court." Goodness and courtliness both serve


88 Alain, Prose III, p. 30. Italics mine.
Natura, who, as vicerogent of God, is good. "It is not a question of grace redeeming Natura: it is a question of sin departing from Nature."89

Professor Lewis sees in the school of Chartres the culmination of the medieval Platonistic literature in the first half of the twelfth century. Twelfth-century Platonism was, of course, not twentieth-century Platonism; available to the earlier period were only Chalcidius's translation of the *Timaeus* and the pseudo-Dionysius, plus the Platonic and Neoplatonic teachings of such earlier writers as Boethius. Consequently, the school propounds a pagan Humanism which retains only the barest essentials of Christian teaching and Platonic idealism. "Its Natura is Claudian's. . . . She is the ruler of generation through the whole circle of life." The entire concept is "bathed in the atmosphere of a fertility cult, in which religion and sexuality mingle."90 Consequently, there is neither the asceticism of the monastic teachings, nor the prurience of the courtly love tradition.

Reason occupies a prominent position in *The Romance of the Rose*, also. Guillaume de Lorris in the first section of the poem approaches his subject allegorically, and from the standpoint of the philosophy of courtly love. The *Romance* is, in one respect, a continuation of the *Psyohomachia* tradition in which the various psychological components of the lover struggle for domination. The personified abstractions, each as Fair Welcome, Shame, Danger, and Reason are believable and interesting, because, as Emile Male, the art-historian, says, "the whole world


was a symbol" to the age of Guillaume.\textsuperscript{91} The poet introduces the poem as a dream, citing the authority of Macrobius for attending seriously to dream-visions. He states his theme as being "all the Art of Love,"\textsuperscript{92} and recalls a dream which he had had "five years or more ago," a dream in which he, as a young man, had dressed beautifully and gone for a walk along a stream, one spring morning. As he walked, he came upon a walled garden. Represented on the walls were such figures as Hate, Fraternity, Villainy, Covetousness, and Avarice. Sorrow and Old Age, too, were excluded from the garden, as were Poverty and Pope Holy [Hypocrisy]. The Dreamer finds a narrow wicket, knocks upon it, and summons the gate-keeper, Idleness, whose "dearest friend is Mirth, a genteel beau," the owner of the garden, an enchanted place, a "terrestrial paradise," a "better place than Eden for delight." The Garden of Mirth swarms with vitality, and the very birds pleasantly sing of love.

Admitted into the enchanted garden, the Dreamer meets the companions of Sir Mirth--Courtesy, Gladness, The God of Love, Sweet Looks, Beauty, Wealth, Lady Largesse, Franchise, Idleness, Youth--and Mirth, himself. The group interrupts its dancing, and the Dreamer sets out to explore the garden. The God of Love pursues him, and ensnares the Dreamer, who falls in love with the Rose. The God of Love teaches him the code of the courtly lover, after deciding that the Dreamer is neither a villainous nor an untutored man, and the Dreamer swears fealty and learns the Commandments of Love [the Dreamer has now become the Lover]:


"Beware of Villainy"; eschew gossip; exhibit courtesy; avoid vulgar speech; "in ladies' service labor and take pains"; fear pride; cultivate amiability and elegance in manners; dress as well as possible; keep yourself physically clean and neat; maintain cheerfulness; demonstrate athletic prowess; avoid the appearance of miserliness; think always about love, for half-hearted service is insufficient; and love constantly. Next, the God teaches the Lover the pains of Love, and, thus equipped with the lore of courtly love, the Lover seeks to apply his knowledge, only to be harshly rebuffed by Danger. "No man knows ill," he complains,

... who has not been in love?
No other anguish can with that compare.
Love had fulfilled his threat to give me pain.
No heart can o'er conceive or tongue recount
One quarter of my dolor. Scarcely stayed
My soul within my body when I thought
Upon my vermeil Rose, whom I must now desert.

(XIII.100-106)

In his misery, Reason "from her observation tower" comes to his aid.

To all appearances, she seemed

An angel come, perhaps from Paradise.
Nature could hardly frame a work so fair.
'Twas God himself, unless the Scriptures lies,
Who in his image and his likeness formed
This godlike one, and her with power endowed
To rescue men from rash and foolish acts,
Provided that her counsel they'll believe.

(XIV.10-16)

She advises him to abjure love.

"Nothing but foolishness is this disease
Called love; 'twere better it were folly named."

(XIV.54-55)

He should conquer his heart and heed his reason. The Lover angrily rejects Reason's advice.

Guillaume did not complete the Romances; an anonymous poet brought
the work to a conclusion which Jean de Meun considered inadequate, and Jean lengthened Guillaume's 4,058-line poem to 21,780 lines.

Reason, then, according to Guillaume, is of divine origin, capable of rescuing man from foolish acts, if he will but give her reign over his life. Otherwise, emotions lead him astray. Even though the Lover fails to heed Reason and continues his service to the God of Love, Guillaume implies that the Lover's woes arise from denying "Reason's due regalitie."

Even more than had Guillaume, Jean de Meun extols the role of reason. Once again, Reason reproaches the Lover for serving such a hard master as the God of Love, and advises flight. The Lover casts aside, once more, Reason's advice, and Reason returns to the attack, arguing from the standpoint of scholastic love. Procreation, not pleasure, is the purpose of love. But, because Nature has made the task a pleasant one,

... some of them would never lift a tool
But for the pleasure that entices them.
(XXI.142-143)

Taking Cicero's "The root of vice is lust," she continues demonstrating the dire results of becoming ensnared in unholy love. Youth is particularly susceptible to the blandishments of the physical, "but Age retrieves from folly (XXII.33)." "True love," she goes on

... should have its birth from noble heart,
Not of the carnal will that masters men.
(XXII.115-117)

Even, however, as Reason began expounding "the higher love," the God of Love

Out at one ear ... shoveled from my head
Whate'er in at the other Reason pitched.
(XXIII.3-5)
There is another kind of love besides the carnal, the lover’s teacher continues—friendship; and she discourses on philosophy, citing Boethius, Pythagoras, Livy, Seneca, Croesus, Manilius—almost a catalogue of "auctores" and "exempla." All her powers of persuasion fail, because Reason’s plain-speaking offends the Lover by violating the courtly code. Her efforts are useless to convince him that courtly euphemisms are far more salacious than her frank speech, and the Lover replaces Reason with Friend as his teacher, guide, and counselor. All told, Joan devoted slightly more than three thousand lines to the dialogue between Reason and the Lover.

Where Reason has failed, Friend succeeds, and the Lover ignores Famine’s taunt

Reason knows well your case, but could not turn
You from your folly. When you’d not believe
Her words, you fooled yourself most cruelly.
(XLVIII.177-179)

The God of Love pardons the Lover for having listened to Reason’s argument, and promises to succor him in his quest by calling his barons and seeking to rescue Fair Welcome from the donjon where Danger has placed him. Significantly, Love accepts the services of Constrained Abstinence and False Seeming, and they plan the assault. As Love and his barons breach the outposts and seem on the verge of victory, Danger, Fear, and Shame drive out the intruders. Love calls up his reserves. After some apathetic fighting, Love enlists the aid of Venus. She joins Love’s forces, and they threaten to reduce the castle. Natura, busy at her forge, sends Genius, her priest, to visit Love’s army and present the barons with a pardon. Venus sets the castle afire, and the defenders fly.
Jean de Meun's characterization of Nature and Genius is borrowed from Alainus, and rehashes much of Boethius. Nature recognizes that man's understanding is not something

\[\ldots\text{ provided him by me;}\]
\[\text{My jurisdiction does not stretch to that.}\]
\[\text{I'm neither wise nor powerful enough;}\]
\[\text{To make a creature so intelligent.}\]
\[\ldots\text{ but whatever God}\]
\[\text{Joins and rules with good intelligence}\]
\[\text{Is wise and good and strong without a flaw.}\]
\[\ldots\text{ It was the God who Maker calls Himself}\]
\[\text{Who planned and formed the intelligence of man}\]
\[\text{And gave it to him.}\]

\[(LXXX.31-99)\]

And what has man done with his divinely given intelligence? He has sought to out-smart God and to circumvent Nature.

With the various assessments of Guillaume's and Jean's theology and philosophy, we are not here concerned, except to note that both accept and transmit the Christian humanist's doctrine of Right Reason.

The doctrine reappeared in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas during the thirteenth century as a result of a restatement of Christian theology in the light of the revived Aristotelianism which had entered Europe through the teachings of the Arabs. Arabian philosophy, a fusion of Greek Neoplatonism and Mohammedanism, had challenged basic Christian doctrines. St. Thomas sought to vindicate traditional teachings through a fusion of medieval and Aristotelian teachings. Aquinas rejected the "ancient philosophers" (by which he probably meant the "Arabians"), and constructed a theology which expresses the efficacy, though not the self-authenticating sufficiency, of human reason. God, he insists, must have given man reason for some purpose. But before accepting completely Baker's description of Thomism as 'triumphant
rationalism," it is important to note that St. Thomas specifically limited the heights to which human reason might hope to rise:

It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides the philosophical sciences investigated by human reason. First, because man is directed to God as an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason . . . . But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation.

Hoopes conjectures that the best brief statement one might make about St. Thomas's philosophy is that it begins by differentiating between faith and reason, but devotes itself mainly to an attempt "to soften the distinction." Aquinas does not demonstrate that reason and faith are the same, but that they ultimately coalesce. Man's proper function is the knowledge of God, which may be attained by a way of faith and by a way of reason. Revealed truths are not susceptible to philosophical demonstration, nor are philosophical principles amenable to revelation. Theology, to St. Thomas, is the study of divine revelation, whereas philosophy originates in natural reason. Both theology and philosophy, however, lead to God, and cannot, consequently, contradict one another. All truth, all knowledge, both revealed and natural, has become valid for the Christian, and the problem of the so-called "double truth" is but imaginary.

All of God's creatures reveal their divine origin, all "participate in" the divine light, "a portion of which God has bestowed upon

93 Baker, The Dignity of Man, p. 197.

94 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York, 1945), I.i.1. This work will be cited hereafter as S.T.

95 Hoopes, p. 76.
him in the form of reason." 96 Right reason does not come from deduction or from insight, but is "a mode of being, a life, a vital activity, by which the knower is or becomes the known." 97 Prudence is "right reason about things to be done":

Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, . . . but not without understanding and prudence, . . . because it [prudence] is a habit of choosing, i.e., making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end; and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it. . . . Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence, and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done. 98

The function of prudence is to join moral virtues to intelligence; it is a "virtue that relates directly to the good through reason." 99 Because of its implication that reason must control the will, prudence might be called an intellectual virtue which shares with moral virtue the end of recta ratio agibilium:

Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason.

96 Hoopes, p. 77.


98 S.T., I-II.lxivii.4.

99 Hoopes, p. 81.
Consequently, an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently, prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life. 

God, according to St. Thomas, is rational; man, too, is rational.

Divine reason differs, insofar as man can apprehend, from human reason only quantitatively, for man is created in God's image and retains traces of God's rational perfection which permit him ultimately to comprehend God's purposes. But man in this life cannot wholly grasp divine truths; that understanding is reserved for the hereafter, and those truths must be accepted here and now on the basis of faith. They are not irrational, but human reason is too weak fully to comprehend them. St. Thomas concludes his argument as he began:

The end of life is the knowledge of God. Man achieves that knowledge by perfecting his most Godlike part, his reason. Because of the Fall, man is doomed never again in this life to experience the vision of God face to face. That is reserved for heaven, and heaven is reserved—though it sounds Pelagian to say so—for those who, among other things, use this world well. And that is only to say that Aquinas stands squarely in the tradition that stretches from Socrates and Plato through Lactantius and Augustine, the tradition of those who hold knowledge to be a function of being.

No sooner had St. Thomas effected his synthesis than evidences of deformulation appeared, as men came to doubt or reject his conception of God as essentially rational. "One of the ironies of intellectual history [is] that the scholastic synthesis of faith and reason had hardly attained its fullest statement before it began to crumble,"

\[100\text{S.T., I-II.lvii.5.}\]


\[102\text{Hoopes, p. 85.}\]
As the end of the "honeymoon between philosophy and theology." Again, for unexplained reasons, occurred a "failure of nerve" comparable to that which terminated the Classical Period in ancient philosophy. Thinkers began to widen the chasm between God and man by exalting God and disparaging his creatures. Generations had insisted that reason was man's distinguishing characteristic; consequently, reason became the scapegoat. The first significant indication of the divorce between faith and reason appeared in the voluntarism associated with the Franciscan, Duns Scotus. According to the voluntarists, the will, not the intellect, is the basic power within the soul. The intellect is but a servant which presents to the will objects and possibilities of choice. The final decision belongs to the will, and the will often acts independently of or even contrary to reason. This elevation of the will to regnancy insured in the only way possible true freedom, because a will subservient to reason lacks freedom.

To Duns Scotus, God's will commands the intellect. To consider God as a rational being limited his scope of action. God acts only as he wills, without regard for reason. Such an interpretation elevates God above not only the ability of human reason to reach him, but also above moral and physical law. "God does what he pleases, and thus creates right and wrong." Increasingly, throughout the fourteenth century, the gulf between God and man widened. William of Ockham,

104 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, p. 460.
105 Hoopes, p. 87.
though not the first to enunciate skepticism and antirationalism, best illustrates the modern tendency to discard the spirit of Christian humanism. "The road to Ockhamism was open before Ockham himself entered it," but it was he who conclusively severed reason and faith. His instrument was a complete nominalism which discarded all of the traditional bases realism had given man. Without "universals," there is no foundation for the realistic ontology which orthodox Christianity had always presupposed. To preserve his faith, Ockham posited the independence of reason and faith, and denied all rational bases for matters of faith. "By simply cancelling the possibility of rational explication of the content of revelation, Ockham demolishes the synthesis of reason and religion wrought by Aquinas." Such a severance of reason and faith makes possible the doctrine of the double truth and comes perilously close to the Lutheran and Calvinistic sola fides, as well as to Montaigne's skepticism.

Fideism and skepticism have in common the denial of the potency and the efficacy of human reason. The fideist— at least, the Christian fideist— believes that human reason was so corrupted at the Fall that it is no longer a valid guide to human life. The skeptic, on the other hand, believes that there are no empirical bases for validating the judgments of reason. Both, then, are in a sense antirationalists, and, consequently, opposed to the concept of right reason, which relies upon the "fusion of— and not the choice between— reason and faith."  

107 Hoopes, p. 91.  
108 Hoopes, p. 57.
Reformation theology with its obsessive emphasis upon human depravity perhaps eroded the foundations of the idea of right reason more than did any other factor. The Reformation did not, it is true, discover or invent human depravity; Western anthropology since St. Augustine had been heavily dependent upon the doctrine of original sin, and the doctrine was at least implicit in the official canons of the Council of Orange (529 A.D.), though it became explicit only at the Council of Trent (1543-1563). During the Medieval Age, however, the uncritically eclectic nature of theological thought enabled the doctrines of human merit and of human depravity to exist concurrently, mediated by the doctrine of grace, which emphasized the right use man must make of grace, once received.

The Reformers' immoderate emphasis upon the doctrine of original sin and its consequences attacked the concept of right reason from two sides. First, the Reformers taught that man is powerless to aid himself. Luther phrased it thus: "This is my absolute opinion: he that will maintain that man's free will is able to do or work anything in spiritual cases, be they never so small, denies Christ."109 Salvation is by no means the reward of anything a man can do; it is wholly God's prerogative. Second, by insisting that man was completely corrupted by the Fall, the Reformers deprived the human intellect of efficacy. Reason, they said, was corrupted along with the will and with every other human faculty. Consequently, human reason is unreliable, at least with regard to judging first principles, even though it was sufficient for guiding man in his practical affairs. With regard to

109 Martin Luther, The Table-Talk of Martin Luther, tr. William Hazlitt (London, 1872), pp. 119-120.
knowledge of God, Luther said that human reason can produce only "darkness and deception." Human reason, when it presumes to approach spiritual matters, is not only "blind and dark," but also the "whore of the devil," capable only of blaspheming and dishonoring "everything God has said or done." "

By "reason," apparently Luther means only the "logical faculty." He nowhere discusses reason in the "Christian humanistic sense of right reason," and he was repelled by the classical idea that man might achieve perfection, or even improve himself, by virtue of certain inherent capacities. To St. Thomas, good works, the good life, consists in acting in accordance with one's highest principle, that of reason:

Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God; indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act by its freewill, hence its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures.

The serene synthesis of faith and reason which St. Thomas completed was founded on a "faith in man's essential goodness and rational self-control." The doctrine of sola fides makes man's share in the


112 Hoopes, p. 103.

113 S.T., I-II.cxiv.l.

114 Hoopes, p. 105.
redemptive act insignificant, and elevates God to the position of inscrutable, Monstrous Will. Man must realize, according to Luther, that he can do nothing to effect his own salvation; all is in the hands of God, who elects some men for salvation and others for damnation.\textsuperscript{115}

The deification of the inscrutable, Monstrous Will proceeded apace and reached its apex in the God worshiped in Geneva, who, according to John Calvin, holds "the helm of the universe, . . . regulating all events." Any attempt to penetrate the mystery of God's activity is blasphemous, for "God has already shown that in his mere goodness he is bound by no laws, but is perfectly free."\textsuperscript{116} Such an elevation of God beyond the realm of speculation, such a notion of God as Absolute Will, vitiates the whole concept of natural law and the doctrine of right reason. Divine rules and commandments are valid and binding only because the Monstrous Will has decreed them, not because they are self-evident or right. It is at this point that faith and reason completely separate, for if man cannot rationally comprehend the good, then the good life will consist solely in obeying blindly the divine commands and prohibitions. Man, unable to understand, must simply obey. "The very essence of Calvinism may be said to lie in its view of God as the one force and power of the universe, whose purposes remain forever


hidden to man," explains Hoopes,\textsuperscript{117} and the natural consequence of such a conception is "the utter degradation of the human race."\textsuperscript{118}

Calvin appears to agree with the teachings of Christian humanism when he advocates introspection as a means of knowing God; the agreement, however, is only apparent, for, whereas the Christian humanist had assumed that, because man is made in God's image, and, consequently, mirrors in many respects the Divinity, Calvin urged that man look at himself to determine his own "ignorance, vanity, poverty, infirmity, depravity, and corruption."\textsuperscript{119} He continues: "Recollecting that we have nothing properly our own, [we] may feel our precarious tenure of all that God has conferred upon us, so as always to place our dependence upon him."\textsuperscript{120} Moreover, it is fatuous, he says, for man to recall his pre-lapsarian dignity and seek to exchange his lamentable present state for renewed innocence. Self-knowledge of former grandeur should rather impress upon man his wretchedness resulting from Adam's fall;\textsuperscript{121} disobedience brought death and ruin to the entire human race. Original sin, Calvin crisply defines as that "hereditary pravity and corruption of our nature, diffused through all parts of the soul rendering us obnoxious to the Divine wrath, and producing in us those works which the Scripture calls 'works of the flesh.'"\textsuperscript{122} Almost

\textsuperscript{117}Page 109.
\textsuperscript{118}Baker, \textit{The Dignity of Man}, p. 318.
\textsuperscript{119}Calvin, \textit{Institutes}, I.i.1.
\textsuperscript{120}Calvin, \textit{Institutes}, II.i.1.
\textsuperscript{122}Calvin, \textit{Institutes}, II.i.8.
gleefully, he describes the process of inheritance:

From a putrefied root . . . have sprung putrid branches, which have transmitted their putrescence to remoter ramifications. For the children were so vitiated in their parent, that they became contagious to their descendants: there was in Adam such a spring of corruption, that it is transfused from parents to children in a perpetual stream.\textsuperscript{123}

Like Luther, Calvin teaches that man's total corruption in the fall extends to his reason and his will. He argues that the philosophers who had for centuries insisted upon man's free will forgot the radical change in human nature consequent upon Adam's transgression. Man must constantly remind himself of his depravity lest he heed the blandishments of the philosophers "beyond what is right," and impute to himself greater worth and dignity than he deserves.\textsuperscript{124}

Calvin continues the Augustinian distinction between "natural talents," such as the understanding, judgment, and will, and "supernatural" or "spiritual" ones, inborn attributes revealing to man a direct knowledge of God. Adam's fall corrupted the "natural" talents, obliterated the "supernatural." As a consequence, man can still grope feebly about his workaday affairs.

For we perceive in the mind of man some desire of investigating truth, towards which he would have no inclination, but from some relish of it previously possessed. It therefore indicates some perspicuity in the human understanding, that it is attracted with a love of truth; the neglect of which in the brutes argues gross sense without reason.

Instead of justifying man's inordinate pride in his elevation above the brutes, however, the "desire of investigating truth" must be carefully controlled; otherwise it becomes a snare and a delusion. It

\textsuperscript{123}Calvin, \textit{Institutes}, II.i.7.

\textsuperscript{124}Calvin, \textit{Institutes}, I.xv.8, II.ii.4.
faints even before its entrance on its course, because it immediately terminates in vanity. For the dulness of the human mind renders it incapable of pursuing the right way of investigating the truth; it wanders through a variety of errors, and groping, as it were, in the shades of darkness, often stumbles, till at length it is lost in its wanderings; thus, in its search after truth, it betrays its incapacity to seek and find it.125

As reason remains vestigially, so the will; it, too, is totally incapable of aspiring for the good. No good works are therefore possible, because all human efforts proceed from a sinful will: "We are all sinners by nature; therefore we are all held under the yoke of sin. Now, if the whole man be subject to the dominion of sin, the will, which is the principal seat of it [sin], must necessarily be bound with the firmest bonds."126 The Fall, then, according to Calvin, has made both reason and will slaves of sin: and the Holy Spirit "knows that all the thoughts of men are vain and pronounces that all that the heart of man conceives is wholly bad."127 God is beyond reason, and man cannot attain to it; there is no rational way by which man can approach God.

Simultaneous with this fideistic onslaught upon reason was the revival of the skepticism of Greek philosophy by such thinkers as Montaigne. The skeptical or Pyrrhonic argument against reason springs from the conviction that, since all knowledge derives from sense impressions, which cannot be confirmed empirically, absolute knowledge is impossible. If one cannot know the unknowable, these skeptics argue, his only solution is to suspend judgment, to arrive at a state of imperturbability (ataraxia). Montaigne's "Apology for Raimond

125Calvin, Institutes, II.ii.12.

126Calvin, Institutes, II.ii.27.

127Calvin, Institutes, II.ii.25, II.ii.19, II.ii.18, II.ii.25.
Sebond" (ca. 1575) is the most thoroughgoing, but not the only, skeptical attack upon the concept of right reason. Agrippa's *De Incertitudine*, Nicholas of Cusa's *De Docta Ignorantia* (1440), and Pico's *Examen Vanitatis Doctrinae et Veritatis Christianae Disciplinarum* (1520), all questioned the human capacity to know.

Raimond Sebond, a Spaniard, completed his *Natural Theology* in 1436; the work apparently sought to call to the aid of Christian religion observations on the evidence of nature. Two books, he said in repeating an old argument, man has from God: the book of nature and the book of Scripture. The book of nature is self-authenticating, and provides authority for whatever is found in the Bible.

Two objections speedily arose concerning Sebond's book: first, the objection that Christian truth should not be made to depend upon natural truth; and second, that Sebond's arguments are weak and inconclusive. Ostensibly, Montaigne's "Apology" attempts to answer both objections. To the first, Montaigne retorts that no sane man would believe Christian truth without natural corroboration. To the second objection, Montaigne devotes the rest of the essay (more than two hundred pages), ostensibly vindicating Sebond's arguments, but in reality attacking reason itself.

The share we have in the knowledge of truth, such as it is, is not acquired by our own strength. . . . Our faith is not of our own acquiring; it is a pure gift from the bounty of another. It is not by virtue of our reason and our understanding that we have received our religion; it is by authority and by command from without. The weakness of our judgment is of more assistance to it than our strength, and our blindness more than our clearsightedness. It is by the mediation of our ignorance more than of our learning that we know anything of this divine wisdom. It is no wonder if our natural and earthly means cannot conceive that natural and celestial knowledge; let us bring to it from our own stock only obedience and submission, for, as it is written, "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and bring to nothing the
understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe" (Saint Paul to the Corinthians). 128

At times, Montaigne waxes Calvinistic:

The means that I adopt to subdue this frenzy, and which I think most fitting, is to crush and trample underfoot pride and human arrogance, to make them sensible of the inanity, vanity, and nothingness of man, to wrest out of their fists the wretched weapons of their reason, to make them bow the head and bite the ground under the authority and reverence of the divine majesty. 129

Sebond had used the traditional Renaissance commonplace, based upon Platonic and Aristotelian realism, that man, being made in the image of God, shares divine wisdom. These assumptions Montaigne reduces to ridicule, first paraphrasing them: "Of all the forms the most beautiful is that of man; God therefore is of that form. No one can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist without reason, and no reason can dwell anywhere else than in the human shape; God therefore, is clothed in human shape." 130 He asks, "Why cannot a goose say the same thing?" Man, then, cannot infer the attributes of God from his own nature. "Presumption is our natural and original disease." 131 Concerning divine things, man does not know, because he cannot know; to think otherwise is but presumption.

Moreover, Montaigne argues that "all knowledge is conveyed to us


129Montaigne, p. 106.

130Montaigne, p. 195.

131Montaigne, pp. 110, 189.
by the senses: they are our masters . . . the beginning and the end of human knowledge." In addition to providing reason with its "grist," they control life itself. Knowledge, then, which depends for its uncertain existence upon the vagaries of unverifiable sense impressions, is no fit guide to human life. Conceptual knowledge differs from person to person, and every "impression is a different thing from the object." On this basis, he defines reason: "I always call 'reason' that appearance of reflection which everyone forges in himself; this reason, of a character having a hundred contradictory attitudes on the same subject, is an instrument of lead and wax, ductile, pliable, and adaptable to all biases and all measures; there needs only the ability to know how to turn it." Montaigne's attack upon human reason leads him to a thoroughly Pyrrhonian conclusion: reason cannot judge certainly or absolutely, for it operates upon sense impressions which are unreliable, and which vary from person to person and from time to time. Moreover, reason itself is unreliable, able to discover only variety. Right reason is, therefore, a non-valid hypothesis, for what seems right in one time and place appears to the reason wrong in another time and place.

Renaissance fideism and skepticism both lead to acceptance of the Pyrrhonic attitude--man's reason is so undependable that he cannot act, think, know, or do anything with absolute assurance. The Reformers are incensed with reason's wickedness, the skeptics, with its impotence. Both groups would obliterate the idea of right reason.

132 Montaigne, pp. 251, 258-259.
133 Montaigne, pp. 266, 228.
Like Christian humanism, the larger complex of which it is a part, right reason proved reluctant to disappear under the carpet of history. Tomasso de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, revived the Thomistic fusion of reason and faith in his Commentary on the Summa, and it was Cajetan's exegetical technique which greatly influenced the exegesis upon which Richard Hooker based *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.*

Though Hooker's immediate motivation for writing *Ecclesiastical Polity* was an attempt to provide the Church of England a warrant for its extra-Biblical practices in the teeth of hot Calvinistic objections, he wrought better than he attempted; Herschel Baker refers to *Ecclesiastical Polity* as "the most sustained and noble plea in our language for an orderly universe comprising orderly social and religious institutions at the disposition of an orderly God." Father Marshall, as a theologian, phrases his encomium differently: "Hooker was not only defending the *Prayer Book* and the monarchy, he was also developing a massive theological system, based on contemporary Roman [Catholic] thinkers of the highest constructive importance." In attempting to provide a rationale for the Church of England's extra-Scriptural polity and ceremonial, he pictures a rational man in a rational universe governed by a rational God, and in so doing resuscitates the "classical-Christian concept of right reason, and declares the ontological reality and harmony of nature, reason, and morality." Then, "laws of

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136 Marshall, p. vi.
137 Hoopes, p. 123.
reason," Hooker argues,

have these marks to be known by. Such as keep them resemble most
lively in their voluntary actions that very manner of working
which Nature herself doth necessarily observe in the course of the
whole world . . . Law rational, therefore, which men commonly use
to call the Law of Nature, meaning thereby the Law which human
Nature knoweth itself in reason universally bound unto, which also
for that cause may be termed most fitly the Law of Reason; this
Law, I say, comprehendeth all those things which men by the light
of their natural understanding evidently know, or at leastwise may
know, to be be see ming or be see ming, virtuous or vicious, good or
evil for them to do.\textsuperscript{138}

In Book I, Hooker reiterates the Calvinistic propositions he is refuting: (1) "Scripture is the only rule of all things which in this life
may be done by man." (2) "In Scripture there must be of necessity
contained a form of Church polity, the laws whereof may in nowise be
altered." (3) "Our form of Church Polity is corrupted with popish
orders, rites, and ceremonies." (4) "Touching the several public duties
of Christian religion there is amongst us much superstition retained in
them. Concerning persons which for performance of these duties are
endued with the power of ecclesiastical order, our laws . . . are . . .
also corrupt." (5) "Our laws are corrupt . . . in matters belonging to
the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in that we have not . . .
certain lay elders." (6) "There ought not to be in the Church Bishops."
(7) "Unto . . . no prince . . . may be given such ecclesiastical dominion as by the laws of this land belongeth unto the supreme regent
thereof."\textsuperscript{139} Of the Law of Ecclesiastical Polity is arranged so that
each of the succeeding books handles one of the seven "points." The
answers which Hooker makes to these objections provide not only a

\textsuperscript{138}Richard Hooker, Of the Law of Ecclesiastical Polity (London,
1925), I.viii.9.

\textsuperscript{139}Hooker, headnotes to Books II-VIII.
criticism of Calvinism, but also an exposition of his own philosophy and theology, embodying Biblical, patristic, and scholastic thought. "In fact," says Father Marshall, "woven into this great controversial work is a *summa theologiae* with definite outlines and constructive doctrine."140 With Cardinal Cajetan, Hooker emphasized the necessity for sound reasoning in exegesis, and, at the same time, insisted upon the interpretation of the Scripture within the context of the Church. "No Scripture," Cardinal Cajetan had said, "is so clear, even when held by faith, that a false interpretation cannot extract any possible theological proposition from it. Therefore truth can only be found when the literal sense of Scripture is sought in agreement with the teachings of the saints."141 This method of exegesis Hooker agreed with. "That which is by right exposition buildeth up Christian faith," he says, "being misconstrued breedeth error; between true and false construction the difference reason must show."142 This insistence upon the coinherence of Church and Scripture was the tradition of both Cranmer and Jewell, but was opposed to the Bibliolatry of Luther and Calvin. Though he was familiar with the Fathers and found them helpful, Richard Hooker did not seek to reduce Anglicanism to the Church of the first four centuries. "He felt the Church of England to be continuous with the mediaeval Church, although he agreed that the mediaeval Church needed reforming."143

140Marshall, p. 44.


142Hooker, III.viii.16.

143Marshall, p. 50.
In matters of doctrine and morals, Scripture was prior to tradition, but it was the responsibility of the Church to develop the implications of the Scriptures in accordance with the needs of the times. The Church makes the Scriptures effective in the affairs of both individual and community. The misuse of Scripture produces rather than cures sin. The Church induces man to consider revelation favorably, and reason teaches those natural obligations not given by divine revelation, and provides sound methods of exegesis. Man, in order to understand, must interpret revelation through the use of reason, and must use natural and moral philosophy as a basis for his undertaking.

It is in matters of ecclesiastical authority that Hooker disagrees with Cajetan. "Hooker is more tentative than Cajetan," accepting human authority only insofar as it is subject to reasonable investigation. 144

Hooker argues that reason, not will, is the most characteristic attribute of God; so it is with man, whose will should be subservient to "that light of Reason, whereby good may be known from evil, and which discovering the same rightly is termed right." 145 Far from agreeing with Calvin that the Fall utterly corrupted man's reason, Hooker points out that, however weakened human minds may be by "the foggy damp of original corruption," it would be unreasonable to suppose that human reason is completely vitiated. 146 It is obvious that Hooker was always conscious of the thinking of Aristotle and of St. Thomas. All three agreed that "knowing the truth and doing good are ... 

144 Marshall, p. 54.
145 Hooker, I.vii.4.
146 Hooker; "A Learned and Comfortable Sermon ... in the Elect," I.3.
functions of the same reason."147

To Hooker, theology is based upon right reason. Only those who labor in God's service and strive untiringly to know God by the light of reason and the revealed word comprise the elect. Reason alone is no more sufficient for salvation than is faith alone.

The law of reason doth somewhat direct men how to honour God as their creator; but how to glorify God in such sort as is required, to the end he may be an everlasting Savior, this we are taught by divine law, which both ascertainteth the truth and supplieth unto us the want of that other law. So that in moral actions, divine law helpeth exceedingly the law of reason to guide man's life; but in supernatural it alone guideth.148

Neither faith nor reason is alone adequate; just as "nature hath need of grace," so "grace hath use of nature"; but "without belief all other things are as nothing, and it is the ground of those other divine virtues."149

Throughout the Ecclesiastical Polity, Hooker's underlying thesis is that reason exists "as a necessary instrument, without which we could not reap by the Scripture's perfection that fruit and benefit which it yieldeth"; reason does not exist merely to complete or supplement the omissions of the Scripture. Scripture cannot teach its own validity. All learning and all reason may properly be brought to bear in explicating Scriptural truths, because all knowledge is valuable. "There is in the world," Hooker says, "no kind of knowledge, whereby any part of truth is seen but we justly account it precious."150

147Hoopes, p. 126.
148Hooker, I.xvi.5.
149Hooker, III.viii.6, I.xi.6.
150Hooker, III.viii.10.
There is but one truth, that which man learns from the Book of God and that which he learns from the book of nature being the same; whoever reasons rightly (and right reason, as in the earlier humanists, includes doing rightly) may successfully seek Truth, bearing in mind, of course, that the Truth which he finds must be interpreted in terms of revealed Truth. "It sufficeth therefore that nature and scripture do serve in such full sort, that they both jointly, and not severally either of them, be so complete, that unto everlasting felicity we need not the knowledge of anything more than these two may easily furnish our minds with on all sides." 151

Hooker never doubts that, however feeble it may be, "the light of reason is there, and . . . it is to be nourished and not extinguished by man—who did not ignite it in the first place." 152 That reason man must recognize as "the general and perpetual voice of men," which is "as the sentence of God himself. For that which all men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught; and God being the author of Nature, her voice is but his instrument." 153

Because Edmund Spenser and Richard Hooker were contemporaries, and because they shared similar ideas on theological and ecclesiastical questions, 154 The Faerie Queene and Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity are mutually illuminating.

As an integral part of humanism, right reason originated in the

151 Hooker, I.xiv.5.
152 Hoopes, p. 145.
153 Hooker, I.viii.3.
154 See V. K. Whitaker, The Religious Basis of Spenser's Thought (Stanford, California, 1950).
thinking of Socrates, underwent development throughout the period of Greek and Latin philosophy, entered Christian anthropology, and survived the Renaissance and Reformation, finding its loftiest expression in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and Richard Hooker. But, because the concept was a widely dispersed, popular one, it found expression in belles lettres, too, throughout the late Middle Ages and well into the Renaissance—from Alain ab Insulis through Milton. It is in the complex of ideas known as Christian humanism that Spenser participates, and he adumbrates his philosophy through his poetic expression of right reason in *The Faerie Queene.*
CHAPTER IV

SPENSER'S USE OF RHETORICAL TECHNIQUES

To an extent which few twentieth-century readers comprehend or countenance, rhetoric fascinated the Renaissance writer and his audience. Professor C. S. Lewis points out that, as much as Tudor education differed from the medieval, it varied more radically from the modern; Renaissance devotion to rhetoric was a medieval inheritance which provided a transition between the "new learning" and the old. A change of taste occurred in the eighteenth century which "makes an invisible wall" between the modern reader and the Renaissance poet.¹ The degree to which education in the sixteenth century occupied itself with rhetoric, T. W. Baldwin² and Sister Miriam Joseph³ explore in considerable detail.

Professor Baldwin establishes that the grammar schools in Tudor England sought primarily to train their students in the arts of language. The schools imitated insofar as possible the curriculum of Saint Paul's, London, refounded by Dean Colet in 1510, a curriculum


²Shakespeare's Small Latine & Lesse Greeske (Urbana, 1944). Professor Baldwin's investigations provide the basis for the following resume of Tudor grammar schools.

³Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language (New York, 1947).
which Erasmus had planned and for which he wrote many textbooks. The school curriculum had as its aims the thorough inculcation of the ability to read, speak, and write Latin, and to produce an intimate knowledge of the leading Latin classics and a few of the Greek. Pedagogical methods matched in rigor the curriculum, consisting in incessant exercise in grammar, rhetoric, and logic. Rudimentary competence in English was presupposed of an entering six-year old boy. Students were expected to master grammar in the lower forms, logic and rhetoric in the upper. Throughout the entire grammar school, students first learned precepts, then employed them in literary analysis, and finally applied them as guides for their own compositions.

A boy in the lower forms began learning the rules of accidence from Lily's Latin grammar. After acquiring sufficient mastery of the language, he applied his knowledge to construing Sententiae pueriles, Catonie disticha moralia, and a Latin version of Aesop's fables. Next, he translated English into Latin, beginning, perhaps with mottoes from Vives's Satellitium, or perhaps with Sententiae Ciceronis, which the instructor dictated in English. Next, the teacher compared the boys' translations from English into Latin with the Latin original. Longer passages for translation into Latin might come from the English Bible, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, Wisdom, and Ecclesiastes being particularly popular. As he learned literary Latin, he also practised the colloquial. Typical conversations from Vives's Linguae Latinae exercitatio prepared him for obeying the rule that all conversation be conducted in Latin. Later familiarity with the Dialogi saecri of Castalio and the Colloquies of Erasmus prepared him for the more difficult tasks encountered in Terence, Plautus, or a Latin translation of
Lucian. Acquaintance with poetry began with the study of the Latin poetry of the Italian Renaissance poets, Mantuan and Palingonius.

In the upper forms, the students assimilated an integrated group of texts embodying the principles of logic and rhetoric in preparation for the assault upon advanced literature and composition. First they acquired painful grounding in the topics of logic through Cicero's *Topica*. Familiarity with the topics led to Susenbrotus's *Epitome troporum de schematum et grammaticorum et rhotoricorum*, which defined and illustrated one hundred thirty-two figures of speech. The master assuming his pupils' knowledge of Susenbrotus, the students progressed to Erasmus's *De dupliciti copiae verborum ad rerum*, which contained procedures for securing "copiousness": first, through diction--use of the figures and a wide vocabulary; second, through matter--the technique of "drawing" a subject through the "topics of logic" or the "places of invention." Application of these techniques they found illustrated in Erasmus's *Modus conscribendi epistolae* and in examples of classical letter writing. Having analyzed others' methods for securing copiousness, they attempted the composition of Latin epistles, first prose, then verse, using Cicero's epistles as models for prose, Horace's *Heroidium epistolae* for verse. *Ars poetica* served both as a model for epistolary style and as a treatise on poetry, so that students were prepared for analytical study of such poetry as Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, *Fasti*, *Tristia*, *Amores*, Vergil's *Elogia*, *Georgias*, *Aeneid*, Lucan's *Pharsalia*, Horace's odes, and the satires of Horace, Juvenal, and Persius.

Their method of study indelibly impressed poetic rhythms upon the students' minds. Memorizing the *Metamorphoses* at a set rate, they
recited each week's accomplishment to the form above them. In turn, they listened to the form below recite the lines which it had learned. One standard teaching method they enjoyed—if, to paraphrase Hooker, enjoy it they did—was to compose Latin prose and then convert it into one or more metrical forms. Daily exercises in grammar, rhetoric, and logic, accompanied their literary exertions. From such work as Melanchthon's Erotamata dialecticae they learned the forms of propositions and the rules for syllogistic reasoning. As they studied a poem, they construed, parsed, scanned, analyzed by topics and forms of logic and the figures of rhetoric, and then composed verses in imitation, observing the disciplines of grammar, logic, and rhetoric.

Meanwhile, as they progressed through their Latin instruction, the students acquired a more limited knowledge of Greek—first, grammar presented in Latin, translation from Greek into Latin, followed by reading and writing longer passages in both prose and verse, with appropriate attention to constructions, topics, figures, and the transliteration of prose to verse.

Obviously, such a regimen was strenuous. One sixteenth-century schoolmaster indicated that each hour of instruction required a minimum of six hours of preparation on the part of the students. The week, for grammar school boys, consisted of six days of work, each day requiring ten hours of concentrated classroom exercise. There were no long summer vacations, though there were frequent brief holidays. "How did they stand it? By not knowing that any other system existed. So far as they were aware, this was the order of Nature, therefore something to be endured; and those who did not die young had a happy faculty of
adjusting themselves to it." Moreover, the masters were stern enough disciplinarians to extract compliant tractability from all but the most rebellious and inept of their charges; corporal punishment enforced the masters' discipline. Professor Thompson cites the example of the vexed master who, unable to extract the proper answer to his question in the Catechism, "What is God?" thrashed the 'offender soundly, and then flung him back in his seat with the remark, 'Now maybe you'll remember what God is. God is Love.'\(^5\)

Having been graduated from Grammar School, students might go on for further training, although college and university education was not in Tudor days a matter of course. The universities existed primarily to provide professional training in law, medicine, and theology, or in the arts, and consequently, admission to their programs necessitated prior completion of the bachelor's degree. Colleges, by Tudor times more or less affiliated with the universities, accepted the products of the grammar schools and continued the kind of education which the students had begun. Entering college at the age of fifteen,\(^6\) they must have felt at home with the curriculum based firmly upon the medieval trivium and quadrivium. The first two years were devoted principally to rhetoric and Aristotelian logic, with a modicum of arithmetic and music.


thrown in for good measure. In their second year, they were admitted to disputations, and during their third and fourth years, they engaged in two disputations within the college and two in public. These disputations, the lectures they attended, and all of their other academic efforts were in Latin and were devoted to the "three philosophies" of Aristotle.

The end and rationale of these studies are obvious. They aimed at an intellectual discipline based on rhetoric and philosophy. One began by mastering the tools of learning, working from simple to complex: first the grammar of language, then its uses as an instrument of thought (logic) and communication or discourse (rhetoric, which included poetry). The logic studied included the predicables, categories, concepts of judgment, deductive and inductive reasoning, and fallacies.

Texts for the third and fourth year philosophical studies included Aristotle's scientific works, *Metaphysics*, *Ethics*, and *Politics*, so that Aristotle seems to have held his own as "the master of them that know."

Thus, in college as in grammar school, grammar, rhetoric, logic, and philosophy were the main fare. Modern languages were available, but remained without the required curriculum. The study of Greek became a part of the program, attracting some for the study of literature and philosophy, others for the study of theological and Biblical subjects.

At the end of four years, the successful "supplicant" received the bachelor's degree and could enter the University to pursue the M.A. degree. During the three years of his university residence, he studied

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7 This discussion of college and university studies is based largely upon Thompson, "Universities in Tudor England," cited above.

the "three philosophies." Subjects already familiar from undergraduate
days—Aristotle's metaphysics, natural philosophy (physics), and moral
philosophy—reappeared for more thorough examination.

Evaluation of Tudor education is difficult; much twentieth-century
information derives from Tudor theoretical discussions of what schools
ideally should do rather than from careful compilations of facts about
what schools did. Renaissance educators were no less sanguine in their
expectations than are twentieth-century educationists. Baldwin, Sister
Miriam Joseph, and Craig R. Thompson agree that the schools were remark­
ably successful in achieving their aims. On the other hand, Professor
Kenneth Charlton, Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of
Keelo, believes that "the negative side loomed large and practice in
the majority of [grammar] schools showed a gloomier face [than the
ideal extolled in Tudor theoretical works on education]."9 Professor
Charlton continues:

the Act Books of the dioceses . . . are likely to provide a rather
more objective picture, and in them we find reference to school­
masters like John Ireland of Halifax, who was found to be
completely ignorant of Latin, had never learned the first
rudiments of grammar, and could not read English. In between the
Richard Michills and the John Irelands lay a mass of pedantic
Holofernes who turned education into a grind of mechanical
repetition.10

Much of Professor Charlton's impatience with Tudor education stems
from his antipathy toward both Aristotelianism and rhetoric; other
sources of his discontent seem to lie in his preference for "practical"
and "scientific" education and in his post-Dewey concern for education

9Kenneth Charlton, Education in Renaissance England (London,

10Charlton, p. 127.
of the whole child. He does not deny that the better schools at least achieved their objectives; rather, he challenges the objective.

Apparently, lacking sufficient evidence about it, the twentieth-century student must judge the educational system of Renaissance England by its products. Few readers of Shakespeare, Spenser, Jonson, and Milton would deny that in at least a minority of cases the rhetorical approach to education succeeded to a dazzling extent. Obviously, the arts curriculum in university and college, and the grammar school curriculum did not attempt to prepare students for professions; and evaluation of professional education is not germane to this consideration.

In some way, Tudor education inculcated a life-long interest among its products in rhetoric, for they created an apparently insatiable demand for books on the subject. And, according to Professor Lewis, their enthusiasm was genuine. "We must picture them [medieval and Elizabethan poets] growing up from boyhood in a world of 'prettie opanorthosis', paranomasia, *isocolon*, and *similiter oadentia*. . . . You adored sweet Tully and were as concerned about asyndeton and chiasmus as a modern schoolboy is about cricketers or types of aeroplane."\(^{11}\)

Only a continued interest in the principles of rhetoric could support the rash of popular handbooks on the subject during the sixteenth century.\(^{12}\) In view of this widespread interest in and knowledge about

\(^{11}\) Lewis, *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century*, p. 61.

\(^{12}\) Sister Miriam Joseph lists fourteen such handbooks, many of which appeared in more than one edition within the century; and her list is highly selective. She includes: Thomas Blundeville, *The Arts of Logike* (1599); Angel Day, *The English Secretorie, with a Declaracion of Tropes, Figures, and Schemas* (1592); Dudley Foner, *The Artes of Logike and Rhetorike* (1584); Abraham Fraunce, *The Aroadian Rhetorike* (1588).
rhetoric, it is not surprising that poetry assimilated rhetorical principles to an extent the nineteenth-century romantics found objectionable, or that poets and writers in general expected their output to be read in the light of rhetoric. E. K.'s comments prefatory to Spenser's Shepheardes Calender and his "glosses" indicate the kind of reading which an Elizabethan poet might expect from his contemporaries:

No lesse I think, deserueth his wittiness in deviseing, his pithinness in uttering, his complaints of loue so loucly, his discourses of pleasure so pleasently, his pastorall rudeness*, his morall wisenesse, his dewe observing of Decorum euery where, in personages, in seasonis, in matter, in speach, and generally in all seemely simlycitie of handeling his matter, and framing his words.13

E. K.'s "glosse" on lines 61 and 62 in the "Ianvarie" Eclogue,

I loue thilke lasse, (alas why doe I loue?)
And am forlorne, (alas why am I lorne?)

reveals his rhetorical interest: "a prety Epanorthosis in these two verses, and withall a Paronomasia or playing with tho word, where he sayth (I loue thilke lasse (alas &c."14 The most acute reader would have observed Spenser's use of epanorthosis and paronomasia without E. K.'s "glosse." Few grammar-school boys would have had to inquire about the meaning of the terms. "Epanorthosis," or "correction," Peacham (p. 172) had described as "a figure which taketh away that that

and The Lauters Logike (1588); John Hoskyns, Directions for Speech and Style (written ca. 1599); Ralph Lever, The Arte of Reason, Rightly Termed, Witcraft (1573); Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1577 and 1593); George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (1589); Richard Sherry, A Treatise of Schemes & Tropes (1550) and A Treatise of the Figures of Grammar and Rhetorike (1555); Thomas Wilson, The Arte of Rhetorique (1553) and The Rule of Reason, Containing the Art of Logike (1551).


14Selincourt, pp. 16-17.
is said, and putteth a more meet word in the place, . . . written not with inke, but with the spirito of the living God, not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart. 2 Cor. 3.3." And paronomasia, a kind of pun, had been a favorite rhetorical device since the days of Aristotle. Even brighter readers would have considered the possibility of the "paranomasia" as being also based upon etymology, much as Spenser elsewhere defined "world" as "war-old," or in keeping with that popular etymology of "woman" as "woe man." This delight in the poet's technique of imposing aesthetic design upon the natural had as a precedent Ascham's warning: "Ye know not what hurt ye do to learning, that care not for wordes but for matter, and so make a deuorse betwixt the tong and the hart."15 Not only the writing but also the reading of literature demanded full attention to both the matter and its expression.

Professor Baldwin contends, in Shakespeare's Small Latine & Lesse Greeke, that on the basis of internal evidence alone, it is safe to argue William Shakespeare's completion of grammar school, so detailed is his knowledge of the kind of rhetoric taught there; knowing that Edmund Spenser completed not only grammar school, but also college and the university, we must assume that he had the same respect for and easy familiarity with rhetoric and "the three philosophies."

During a life not always marked by smiling fortune, Edmund Spenser's education was a happy accomplishment and a proud possession. Even though he was from a family of moderate means, he was able to secure the best learning then available in England. His name appears among those of the "poore scholers" of the "scholls about London" who

received gowns from the estate of Robert Nowell. Records of the same fund reveal that on 28 April, 1569, Spenser received additional financial aid upon "gowinge to Penbrocke Hall in Cambridge, Xs," and that twice, once in 1570, and again in 1571, he drew further money from it. He attended Merchant Taylors' School as a "poor boy," and Pembroke Hall, Cambridge, as a "sizar."

Entering the Merchant Taylors' School in 1561, one year after its founding under the mastership of Richard Mulcaster, Spenser participated in the rise of the reputation of the school, soon to be recognized as one of the foremost in the country. Mulcaster's learning, lack of pedantry (for a Renaissance humanist); humanity, and good sense appear in his Positions (1581) and his First Part of the Elementary (1582), published long after Spenser had graduated, but based upon Mulcaster's experiences as school master. Professor Charlton points out that Merchant Taylors' was one of the few schools in England which apparently lived up to its high-sounding intentions. Mulcaster was more interested in English and English composition than were most of his contemporaries; his linguistic achievements included not only the standard Latin, but Greek and Hebrew as well. His prose style was admirable, so admirable that Professor Lewis attributes to him Hooker's manner, quality of mind, and style, even though he is more euphuistic than Hooker, fonder of alliteration, and often deliberately obscure. He was a cautious man with a high regard for tradition and custom.

Apparentely, then, Edmund Spenser as a "poore scholer" at Merchant


17Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, p. 348.
Taylors' learned, in addition to Latin and the standard grammar-school curriculum, Greek and Hebrew. At any rate, Sir James Whitelocke, one of Mulcaster's graduates, reported that at Merchant Taylors' School, he was "well-instructed in the Hebrew, Greek and Latin tongues." And Lancelot Andrewes, another Mulcaster product, was able, when he was Dean of Westminster, to teach Greek and Hebrew to the boys of the Westminster School upper forms. 18

Upon his completion of the course at Merchant Taylors', Edmund Spenser went to Pembroke College, Cambridge, in 1569; he received the B. A. degree in 1572 and the M. A. in 1576. At Pembroke Hall, the young Sizar developed a close friendship with Gabriel Harvey, who became a fellow during the poet's second year there. The association—at least by correspondence—endured for years after Spenser left Harvey behind as a fellow at Pembroke.

In his years of schooling, from 1561 to 1576, Spenser acquired the background and perfected the temperament revealed in his poetry. In grammar school, if his experiences were typical, he surveyed Latin literature, subjecting it to an exceedingly close reading. As he read, analyzing the literature according to the topics of invention, he transcribed into his commonplace book, neatly arranged under the proper topic, notable ideas, expressions, and illustrations. He learned to read allegorically, to see the world as symbol, to detect universals in specifics, and to detect specifics in universals. He might have assimilated Mulcaster's disdain for easy style, because he wanted it 'to print depe cuen bycause it soomes dark, and contains a matter,

18 Charlton, p. 118.
which must be thrie lookt on, ear it be once gotten.”

He learned to achieve copiousness through "drawing" a subject through "topics" of logic. And, perhaps most important, he absorbed, through the close correlation of "baptized" pagan philosophy and Christian doctrine the view of the world implicit in all of his writing.

As a consequence, then, of his schooling, Spenser would have at his command a substantial body of knowledge, gleaned from the classics through the techniques of close, analytical reading; he would possess a detailed knowledge of the Christian faith and have an intimate acquaintance with the Bible; his study of grammar, rhetoric, and logic would provide him techniques not only for reading but for seeing the world in terms of correspondences and analogies, as well as techniques for utterance.


20An illustration of the manner of "drawing" a subject through the "topics" appears in Appendix D, p. 361.
CHAPTER V

RIGHT REASON IN THE FAERIE QUEENE

A. An Overview

The Renaissance insistence that art, as an imitation, hold up the mirror of contemplation to nature, as well as the oft-repeated Horatian half-quotatution, *ut pictura poesia*, has led many nineteenth and twentieth century critics through shallow interpretation to an unflattering and unnecessarily restricting view of both the basic intention of Renaissance poetry and also of the theoretical justification for rhetoric; the poetry of that period was no more concerned with photographic representation, heightened beauty, or pictorial representation in the naturalistic or idealistic manner than any other poetry. The dividing line which separates Renaissance poetry from the modern consciousness is not so simple as that, for it arises from basic differences in world outlook. The Renaissance poet, because he believed in the existence of universals, sought to relate his specific images to universal ideas; the modern, "scientific" poet, unconvinced of the existence of universals, avoids "universalizing" his images. Professor Tillyard's "Elizabethan world picture" and Professor Lewis's "discarded image" were in Edmund Spenser's day secure enough, whole enough, integrated enough, to justify absolute conclusions from which the modern poet and critic
shrink. In such a reasonable world as the Elizabethan enjoyed, a world which existed for the glory of God, a world in which divine purpose flashed forth "like shining from shook foil," speech was no less a manifestation of the pervasive beneficence of God than that other distinctly human characteristic--reason. Consequently, speech, as the manifestation of thought, enjoyed a dignity which romantic denigration of rhetoric would destroy.

Roger Ascham's warning against the tendency to separate words from content, style from meaning, was a thoroughly traditional one. Figures of speech and the "colours of rhetoric" do, indeed, act as "graces of language," as "the dressing of thought," as "embellishments," for they give to writing a veneer of "style"; but exomation is not the sole or even the chief function of figures. Aristotle highly regarded metaphor not only for the "charm and distinction," but also for its leading clearness and liveliness to thought. Longinus wrote of oratorical imagery that it could "infuse vehemence and passion into spoken words, while . . . combined with argumentative passages it not only persuades the hearer but actually makes him its slave."¹ Quintilian related the figures to the logos, pathos, and ethos of argument, pointing out that the figures lend "credibility to our arguments," excite "the emotions," and win "approval for our characters as pleaders."² Professor Edward P. J. Corbett sums up the traditional view of the utility of figures:

Because figures can render our thoughts vividly concrete, they help us to communicate with our audience clearly and effectively;


²Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, tr. H. E. Butler (London, 1920-1922), IX, i.
because they stir emotional responses, they can carry truth, in Wordsworth's phrase, "alive into the heart by passion"; and because they elicit admiration for the eloquence of the speaker or writer, they can exert a powerful ethical appeal.  

This traditional view, Professor Tuve insists upon, and Sister Miriam Joseph develops at length in Shakespeare's Use of the Arts of Language. Sister Miriam Joseph has classified the more than two hundred figures which the Tudor rhetoricians distinguished, disposed them under the four categories of grammar, logos, pathos, and ethos, and demonstrated that the three groups of rhetoricians during the Renaissance (the Ramists, the traditionalists, and the figurists) regarded the figures as being closely related to the topics of invention. Metaphor, for instance, involving comparison of like things, is intimately related with the topic of similarity while antithesis, on the other hand, involving the juxtaposition of opposites, is tied up with the topic of dissimilarity or contraries. Other figures were aimed directly at the reader's emotions; one such figure was the apostropho. Such figures as the comprobatio were effective in establishing the

6 Page 4.
7 Page 328.
8 Page 324.
9 Page 390.
All figures, Quintilian defined as "any deviation, either in thought or expression, from the ordinary and simple method of speaking, ... a form of speech artfully varied from common usage (Ergo figura sit arte aliqua novata forma dicendi)." Moreover, all rhetoricians divided figures into schemes and tropes. A scheme consists in an alteration of the ordinary arrangement of words, whereas a trope involves a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of a word. Hence, both schemes and tropes involve a turning or a transference, and both result in a change of "meaning."

This careful attention to and meticulous analysis of linguistic devices in Renaissance poetic reveals ontological presuppositions that either universals existed ante rem, in re, or post rem, or, as Abelard's moderate position developed it, universals existed in all three ways. Countering the nominalists, he insisted that, even though universals cannot be things, neither are they mere words. The word acquires universal meaning only by becoming a predicate (sermo), by means of a process possible only through conceptional thought (conceptus). Such thought gains that which is by its nature adapted to become a predicate through comparing the contents of a perception. "The universal is then the conceptual predicate (sermonism), or the concept itself." If the universal comes into existence in thought and judgment, and in the predicate which is possible only through thought and judgment, and if the universal exists only there, it is therefore in

10Pages 396-397.
11Institutio Oratoria, tr. Butler, IX.i.ii.
some way related to absolute reality, else we would not apprehend and predicate as if they (universals) had absolute existence. "This something is the likeness or similarity (conformitas) of the essential characteristics of individual substances." The universal exists in nature, not as numerical or substantial identity, but as a multiplicity with like qualities, and only when human thought has conceived it as a unitary concept is predication possible. Abelard explained this likeness of character in a multiplicity of individuals on the assumption that God had created the world according to archetypes which he carried in his mind (noys). According to his view, "universals exist firstly, before things, as conceptus mentis in God; secondly, in the things, as likeness of the essential characteristics of individuals; thirdly, after things, in the human understanding as its concepts and predicates acquired by comparative thought."12 This position of modified realism, Professor Windelband maintained, formed the basis of the position which both Avicenna and St. Thomas defended, and thus became a part of orthodox thinking,13 available to conservative thinkers in the sixteenth century.

Moreover, words, as symbols for universals thus abstracted, acquired a dignity and an existence of their own. This elevation of speech Professor Kenneth Burke traces to two related ideas in Christian theology: the Logos concept and the doctrine of creation by

13 Windelband, p. 299.
The analogy between "words" and "The Word" implicit in the Fourth Gospel, and explicit since St. Iranaeus's explication, remained viable through St. Anselm's teaching that faith comes as auditu, so that Professor Burke posits six analogies or correspondences, three of which are appropriate to the Tudor rhetoricians' claims for dignity:

1. "The likeness between words about words and words about The Word."

2. "Words are to non-verbal nature as Spirit is to Matter."

3. "The relation between the name and the thing named is like the relations of the persons in the Trinity."

The analogy between words and The Word led to an exalted evaluation of the creative function of the writer. The poet through the medium of words uttered builds a world in a manner similar to the way in which God the Father created the universe through utterance (equating the paradoxical statements in Genesis I: 3, "And God said Let there be light, and there was light," and in the Gospel According to Saint John I: 3, "All things were made by him [The 'Word'], and without him was not anything made that was made"). The poetically created world becomes a microcosm, a mirror of the macrocosm.

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15 "Before him [St. Iranaeus] the Fourth Gospel did not seem to exist for the Church: Iranaeus made it a living force. His conception of the Logos is not that of the philosophers and apologists; he looks upon the Logos not as the 'reason' of God, but as the 'voice' with which the Father speaks in the revelation to mankind, as did the writer of the Fourth Gospel" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed.).

16 Burke, pp. 33-34.

17 This idea Professor Thomas J. Stroup explores at length in _Microcosmos: The Shape of the Elizabethan Play_ (Lexington, 1965), in which
But the world which Spenser created in *The Faerie Queene* is no land of heart's desire for the escapist. Rather, it has extrinsic as well as intrinsic significance, and is concerned with moral and social effects beyond itself. *The Faerie Queene* is as much concerned with Elizabethan England as it is with the Land of Faerie, and Spenser, following Sidney, realized that no creation of post-lapsarian man could justly reflect a world of perfection. Faerie Land, the poet's creation, mirrors the realities of Spenser's England—Archimago, Duessa, Orgoglio, Acrasia, Trompart, and all; at the same time, even though he realized that the New Jerusalem is beyond either the reach of the poet or the scope of the poem, Spenser indicated that communication exists between the heavenly and the earthly cities. Faith and reason are the means by which the men of Faerie Land seek to rise to the limits of human capacity, while grace unmerited sustains them from above. By fashioning "a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline," Spenser meant that he would provide fictional models (Faerie Land) for emulation in England. He would illustrate the orthodox truism of Hooker: just as "nature hath need of grace," so "grace hath uso of nature;"

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he indicates that Tudor writers adopted the classical idea that "all the world's a stage," and made a reversal so that the stage became all the world. *En passant*, it is interesting to note that Spenser alluded to this idea once in the *Amoretti*, LIII (The Works of Edmund Spenser: A Variorum Edition, ed. Edwin Greenlaw, Charles Grovenor Osgood, and Frederick Morgan Padelford, Baltimore, 1932-1947, II, 217); once in a sonnet addressed to Gabriel Harvey, in 1586, p. 263; and that his first known literary endeavor was the versification of Van der Noodt's *Theatre for Worldlings*, pp. 1-26. The cited *Variorum Edition* will be referred to throughout this chapter as *Var.*

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but, "without belief all other things are as nothing, and it [faith] is the ground of those other divine virtues." William Nelson points out: "In Spenser's poem, intention is the soul, while the stories, characters, symbols, figures of speech, the ring of the verse itself, constitute the body:

... of the soule the bodie forme doth take:
For the soule is forme, and doth the bodie make
(E. B. 132-133)."

The intention--"to fashion a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline"--is pervasive in The Faerie Queene. It is the body which lacks "forme," and it is shapeless only when the reader fails creatively to order it by imposing upon it the shaping "soule," idea, theme. The poet offers the raw material, instructs the reader about the proper response, and expects him to follow directions and thereby, responding intellectually and emotionally, to accept the poet's statement of intention and re-order his life in terms of the unifying theme. Just as the poet orders his almost hopelessly diverse matter by imposing upon it his intention, so the reader should accept the poet's intention, presented with indirect and direct rhetorical persuasion, and impose the idea upon the incomplete matter of his own soul. It is the reader's business to dwell in Faerie Land only long enough to apprehend the model for imitation; Spenser's hope is to move men of flesh and blood to the "vertues" which he presents as models so that they, too, can escape the Wandering Wood, defeat Error, progress toward


the Hill of Heavenly Contemplation, and, having overcome the world, the flesh, and the devil, regulate their public and private lives according to "virtuous and gentle discipline."

Regarding, then, *Tha Faeris Queene* as an imaginative reflection of life in the workaday world of Tudor England, abstracted and heightenened into terms of universality, let us quickly analyze the "symbol" or "image" offered for emulation in each of the Books (for the "Book" or "Legend" is the primary structural unit of the poem).

Book I, or "The Legend of Holinesses," is the most carefully organized of the six completed Books, and is, consequently, the best known; familiarity, however, has not produced unanimity of interpretation.

The plot, in its barest and most non-controversial outlines, relates the story of an unsophisticated young man (the Red Cross Knight) whom Gloriana, the Queene of Faerie, grants the boon of rescuing the royal parents of Una, a lovely enough heroine for any romance, from a monstrous dragon that has forced them to cower in the safety of an armed castle. The rustic knight sets out with Una and her dwarf and encounters physical, moral, ethical, and spiritual challenges. Going as far as he can, sustained by his own resources, he eventually has to accept succor from Una and from Prince Arthur. Even though they help him to escape from the most climactic of his misadventures, more radical aid must prepare him for his battle with the dragon; Una leads him to Dame Coelia, who makes him better than new, so that he and Una go on to complete their primary mission. After a three-day fight, the rustic knight, who has learned his true destiny, slays the dragon, frees the captive parents, and becomes betrothed to Una. Una's father offers the knight not only the hand of his daughter, but also a paradisaical
future. The Red Cross Knight remembers his six-year obligation to
Gloriana and returns to complete his worldly duties, for he has
"promises to keep."

Book II, the "Legend of Sir Guyon" or the "Legend of Temperance,"
like Book I, is logically developed and consistent in its plot, proba­
bly because it closely parallels Book I, event for event, adventure for
adventure. Like Book I, again, it has been the subject of wildly
varying interpretations.

Archimago, the enchanter of Book I, encounters Sir Guyon and
tricks him into attacking the Red Cross Knight as a murderer and rav­
isher, for Archimago has learned that he cannot prevail against Una,
and so concentrates his hatred on the Red Cross Knight. Thus the poet
connects the adventures of Books I and II. Angrily, Sir Guyon seeks to
avenge the feigned crime, but just as he is about to attack the Red
Cross Knight, he sees his shield, "the sacred badge of my Redeemer's
death," and relents, craving pardon. The Knight forgives Sir Guyon's
impetuousness, and the two part on good terms, the Red Cross Knight
fading from the reader's attention. Sir Guyon, accompanied only by the
Palmer, continues his quest, which originated when the Palmer appeared
at the court of Gloriana, complaining of the way in which Acrasia, "a
wicked fay," had imprisoned many knights. Gloriana had appointed Sir
Guyon to return with the Palmer to destroy Acrasia. After parting with
the Red Cross Knight, Sir Guyon with the Palmer for guide meets many
adventures and sustains many temptations. Finally, after he has
refreshed himself at the Castle of Alma, he and the Palmer reach the
bower of Bliss, and listening to the Palmer's counsel, Sir Guyon
destroyed the enchantress who has been making beasts of fair young
knights. Sir Guyon, like the Red Cross Knight, had had to have outside aid in his struggles--Prince Arthur, the Palmer, Alma, and the ferry-man have all contributed to his victory. Moreover, even Arthur, in Book II, has had to depend on outside assistance.

Books III and IV (The Legends of Chastity and Friendship) are less well-organized than are Books I and II. After Alma's ministrations had cured them of their battle wounds--Prince Arthur had sustained his while fighting against Malogor, and Sir Guyon his, subduing the forces of Acrasia--the two resume their search for glory. They have no specified mission. Riding along, they fall in with Britomart, the titular heroine of Book III, a noble maid disguised as a knight, searching for her beloved, Arthegall, "whose image she had seen in Venus looking glas." Coming to the edge of a forest, they see a young lady (Florimell) fleeing a "griesly Foster," both riding their horses at full tilt. Prince Arthur and Sir Guyon set off in pursuit, but Britomart, having in mind her search for Arthegall, remains behind to journey alone. Her first adventure is at the Castle Joyeous with the Lady of Delight. She escapes the castle and encounters the Red Cross Knight, whom she tricks into praising Arthegall. Britomart resumes her search, and sees many adventures, all having to do with love. Meanwhile, Prince Arthur continues vainly to chase the fair Florimell, while his squire, Timias, pursues the Foster. The Foster and his two brothers ambush the pursuing squire, but Timias kills all three, receiving a grievous wound himself. By chance, Belphoebe comes upon Timias and cures him of his physical wounds; he, however, contracts another more subtle and more dangerous--he almost dies for love of Belphoebe, the chaste.
Florimell continues her flight long after the Foster has ceased to pursue her. Terrified in the unaccustomed woods, she loses her way and seeks hospitality from a witch. The witch's loutish son, in wonder at Florimell's beauty, seeks her favor. Terrified—as usual—she flees, and the lout becomes inconsolable. To avenge her son's hysterical frenzy, the witch sends a supernatural flesh-eating hyena after Florimell. The quarry saves herself from the hyena by jumping into the boat of a lecherous old fisherman. Her steed, however is less fortunate and falls prey to the hyena. As the hyena devours the horse, Sir Satyrane comes upon the scene, recognizes the dead steed and the abandoned belt as Florimell's, and futilely attacks the uncanny beast. No physical force avails, but Sir Satyrane finally binds the beast with Florimell's girdle and brings it to obedience.

Almost immediately, Sir Satyrane hastens to rescue a fair young knight from a "Ceauntesse" who holds him in lecherous servitude. Argante, the giantess, had captured the young man and made him vassal of her pleasures vile. Only the intervention of Palladine, another lady knight, rescues Sir Satyrane and the young knight, The Squyre of Dames. The young knight's cynical explanation of his quest and fall seems to amuse and disgust Sir Satyrane, who returns to his business only to find the bound hyena escaped.

The hyena's return convinces the witch that Florimell has escaped, and to assuage her son's grief, she fashions of snow a likeness of the fleeing Florimell, lovelier even than its original. The Snowy Maid delights the son only temporarily, however, for Braggadocchio, just escaped from Book II, abducts her from the frightened "chorle." The inflated and counterfeit man, Braggadocchio, courts her, but she spurns...
Florimell's escape seaward has not proved altogether happy; the lecherous fisherman attempts to rape Florimell, and her shrill cries bring Proteus to the rescue. This rescue, too, proves only apparent, for Proteus takes up the game where he has interrupted the fisherman. He abducts Florimell and takes her to his under-sea kingdom where he attempts to seduce her. Failing, because she remains true to her Faerie Knight, he throws her into a dungeon.

Sir Satyrane, meantime, encounters Sir Paridell and tells him of Florimell's supposed death. The two ride off together until they reach a castle where they seek entertainment. The owner is Malbecco, the miserly, jealous old husband of a beautiful young wife with a colt's tooth, Hellenore. At first, Malbecco denies them entry, so they seek refuge in a pig sty where a third traveler, Britomart, joins them. The three decide that they must join forces and gain entry to Malbecco's castle. Frightened, the miser admits them, and Paridell sets out to seduce Hellenore. She flees with him, taking all of Malbecco's treasure that she can lug and setting the house afire over what treasure remains. Malbecco, in a frenzy of indecision, knows not whether to pursue his wife or protect his treasure. The treasure wins. As soon as the flames die at his ruined castle, the miser turns his attention to recovery of his wife. Searching far and wide, he encounters Paridell, who assures him that, having had her, he no longer wants Hellenore. When Malbecco finds Hellenore, she is living as the common plaything of a herd of satyrs, apparently happy. The miserable old man contrives to sneak into the herd and talk with Hellenore—between innings, so to speak—only to learn that she prefers her present life
to returning to the old. Maddened with grief, disappointment, and greed, Malbecco becomes in truth the thing which he has symbolized—miserly cuckoldry.

Britomart and Sir Satyrano have left Malbecco's castle together. They see a giant, Ollyphant, brother to Argante, pursuing a young man. Britomart determines to rescue the giant's intended victim from obvious rape and perversion, and Sir Satyrano goes to help her. The fleet giant out-speeds them, fearing not Sir Satyrano, but Britomart, "the flower of chastity." He hides in a dense forest. Britomart goes on to discover a knight, Sir Scudamore, grieving over the fate of Amoret, held captive by Busirane. Trying to comfort him, Britomart offers to rescue Amoret. He leads her to Busirane's house, the entrance to which is protected by a wall of fire. Sir Scudamore believes the flames invincible, but Britomart is able to go through them. While Sir Scudamore waits outside, she rescues Amoret from the 'Vile Enchaunter,' the enchanted prison vanishes, and the wall of fire dies. Britomart and Amoret are dismayed to find that Sir Scudamore has disappeared.

As Amoret and Britomart resume their journey without Sir Scudamore, Amoret begins to fear both for her reputation and for her virtue, not knowing Britomart's true sex. They arrive at a castle, where a knight claims Amoret, and Britomart defeats him in combat. Then Britomart takes off her helmet and identifies herself as a woman, allaying the fears of Amoret. The two women, with a better basis for confidence, tell the stories of their love. Together, they leave the castle and soon meet two couples—two knights and their ladies. One of the ladies is Duessa, the other, Ate, accompanying Blandamour and "false Paridell." The two false knights want to take Amoret from Britomart, but
Paridoll, remembering his last encounter with her, does not dispute Blandamour's claim to priority of challenge. Unceremoniously, Britomart tumbles her challenger and goes on her way with Amoret.

Blandamour, concealing his chagrin, remounts and the four creatures of deceit go on their way until they meet Sir Scudamoro and Glauce, Britomart's nurse. Paridoll attacks Sir Scudamoro and is unhorsed.

Blandamour accuses Sir Scudamore of trickery. Duessa chides him for continuing to love Amoret, who has forsaken him for "another knight" (Britomart). Ate seeks to stir up strife, telling Sir Scudamore that she has seen Amoret and Britomart making love. Inflamed against Britomart, Scudamore almost attacks Glauce; the old nursemaid, keeping her wits, barely avoids conflict, but cannot calm the distraught knight.

The entire company, bickering and fuming, meets Sir Ferraugh, from whom Sir Blandamour wins the false Fiorimell. The strife which Ate has incited ends only when the Squire of Dames tells of a coming tournament. Blandamour and Paridoll reach accord. Journeying onward, they overtake four others, also on their way to the tournament: Cambell and Triamond, accompanied by their wives, Canacee and Cambina.

In Canto IV occurs the long-anticipated tournament for Florimell's girdle and hand. Britomart wins the fight, unwittingly defeating Sir Arthegall, who is disguised as a "Salvage Knight." The False Fiorimell wins the beauty contest and receives the girdle, but the girdle will fit only Amoret. Moreover, Britomart does not want the prize she has won and accepts Satyrane's suggestion that the false Fiorimell be allowed to choose her own mate; she chooses Braggadocchio. Britomart and Amoret go on seeking Sir Scudamoro; that love-smitten knight has just spent the night in the smithy of Care and is properly disgruntled,
a suitable companion for Sir Arthegall who is still upset because Britomart won the tournament. Because they both have a grudge against Britomart, they join forces as she appears. She unhorces both her attackers and continues the fight on foot until a lucky sword-stroke from Sir Arthegall sweeps off her helmet. Her beauty stays Sir Arthegall's ire and engenders adoration. Her obvious femininity also makes bootless Sir Scudamore's jealousy, and aided by Glaucce's reasonable persuasions, the four achieve amity, which, between Britomart and Sir Arthegall, ripens quickly into love—Britomart has achieved her quest. But before the two can wed, Sir Arthegall must complete a difficult quest, and so leaves the reluctant Britomart behind to search the forest with Sir Scudamore for Amoret, who unaccountably had wandered off as Britomart slept. A loathsome giant had captured Amoret and taken her to his cave, planning first to rape her and then eat her; but Amoret somehow escaped and fled, the giant in hot pursuit. They had met Timias, Prince Arthur's squire, and Belphoebe. Belphoebe had killed the giant. Prince Arthur had stumbled upon Amoret and Aemylia, reluctant companions in the giant's cave, and had cured them with a treatment of his magic liquor. The Prince had settled all the retinue, except Amoret, in Corflambo's castle, which he had taken by slaying that tyrant, and had gone on his way with Amoret. At this point, they meet Britomart and Sir Scudamore, who, searching for Amoret, have come upon Blandamour and Paridell fighting with two other knights for the possession of the false Fiorimell. Prince Arthur stops the quarrel.

Meanwhile, Marinell, having been cured by Tryphon (at Cymodoce's request) of the wound he suffered from Florimell, goes with Cymodoce to a wedding at Proteus's house. There, Marinell learns of Florimell's
love for him and contrives with Cymodoce's aid to procure her for his bride.

Book V recounts Sir Arthegall's adventures in "The Legend of Justice." Sir Arthegall, who has been reared by the goddess of Justice, Astrea, sets out to rescue Eirene from Grantorto. The iron man, Talus, is his groom who dispassionately metes out justice. In search for Grantorto, Sir Arthegall and Talus have the customary encounters and adventures with both new characters (Sanglier, Pollente, Munera, et al.) and characters familiar from previous books (Florimell, Marinell, Braggadocchio, Sir Guyon's long-lost steed, and others). Remaining true to Britomart, Sir Arthegall, nevertheless, falls into the power of Radigund, the Amazon; and Britomart, informed of his humiliating plight, has to go to his aid. Arriving in the land of the Amazons, Britomart kills Radigund and frees Sir Arthegall. Then Sir Arthegall resumes his quest, and as he subdues Adicia and the castle, Prince Arthur, who has come to his aid, kills another villain, the Souldan. Eventually, they arrive at the castle of Mercilla where a trial is underway. Duessa has aspired to Mercilla's crown. Mercilla passes a reluctant but inexorable judgment. Prince Arthur departs to rescue Belgae and kills Geryoneo. Sir Arthegall learns of Grantorto's plot against Eirene, and sets sail for the Salvage Islands, delaying only long enough to rescue Burbon from the rabble. With the help of Talus and his sword, Chrysaor, Sir Arthegall defeats and beheads Grantorto, and establishes true justice in the land. But before he can thoroughly reform the land, Sir Arthegall has to return to the Faery court to defend himself against slander and detraction.

Book VI deals with Sir Calidore in "The Legend of Courtesy." Sir
Calidore, pursuing the Blatant Beast, meets Sir Arthegall, who points him on his way. He comes upon a loving couple, Calepine and Serena; the Blatant Beast seizes Serena, and Sir Calidore sets out in hot pursuit. Prince Arthur and Timias, his squire somehow restored to his service, encounter Serena and the gentle savage who has rescued her. They go to a hermitage for rest, and leave Serena and Timias there so that the hermit may heal their wounds. Serena, after the hermit's treatments, departs with Timias only to have Disdain attack them. Upon Timias's being knocked down, Serena flees, only to be captured by savages, who strip her and prepare to sacrifice her. Calepine rescues her.

Meanwhile, Sir Calidore pursues the Blatant Beast over the face of the earth. On his quest he meets some shepherd folk and falls in love with the lovely rustic Pastorella, with whose foster-father, Meliboe, he stays. This idyllic interlude terminates when brigands attack the rustics in Sir Calidore's absence, destroy their goods, and take many captives to sell as slaves. Sir Calidore rescues Pastorella, but has to leave her behind as he completes his quest by finding and chaining the Blatant Beast. But mere chains cannot restrain the monster. He later breaks free again.

Beyond the first six books, we have the so-called "Cantoes of Mutabilitie," presumably Cantoes VI and VII of a further book. The first, Canto VI, relates the challenge which Mutability, daughter of Earth and Titan, directs against the sovereignty of Jove. In Canto VII, Nature, the judge, awards the decision to Jove. Two remaining stanzas contain the poet's prayer for a vision of God.

Complex and confusing as even this foreshortened and apocopated
resume is, it seems ridiculously frivolous as the basis of a poem of some thirty-five thousand lines: Were _The Faerie Queene_ no more than a narrative poem in the medieval romance tradition, quite obviously Spenser, with his economical story-telling technique, could have carried his characters through their requisite adventures with considerably more dispatch. The man who could initiate Book I of _The Faerie Queene_ at such a break-neck speed did not lack the ability to tell a businesslike story; conscious, however, of the Renaissance critical theory that the "right poet" is obliged to place his fable within the framework of a logically consistent "microcosm"—to interpret philosophically and morally his created world in a way applicable to his readers' experiences in their mundane situations—Spenser was not content merely to spin an adventurous tale. He first created a world—a frighteningly realistic Faerie Land—as the setting for the adventures of his representative characters. Lest his readers fail to "read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest" the significance of the action, he interpreted, explained, illustrated, and expanded with every rhetorical trick at his command the meaning of his fiction. In this way, Spenser as "right poet" revealed his claim to be taken seriously; he established his appeal of "ethos" by demonstrating his essentially moral grasp of cosmic problems.

Insistently overwhelming among the metaphysical problems of the sixteenth century was the question of the relationship between ultimate reality and the temporal. Spenser never questioned the existence of a supernatural reality; the fact that man, created in the image of God, had some share of divine reason; the idea of the fall which somehow and to some degree vitiated man's reason. Nor did he minimize the role of
unmerited grace. Most simply put, Spenser's problem seems to me: given Faerie Land and the New Jerusalem; given the idea of correspondence between them, how best demonstrate the communication whereby the planes of existence sympathetically respond?

The orthodox solution since the days of St. Thomas Aquinas lay in the distinction between metaphysics--man's efforts by means of his God-given reason to ascend the Hill of Contemplation--and theology, which included study of the revealed and the supernatural. Communication was, thus, a two-way street. Grace unmerited flowed from the godhead to man, while reason helped man both to approach God and to respond to grace. Reason, moreover, applied to ethics and morals. Right reason, in its simplest definition, was St. Thomas's "recta ratio agilibitum"--right reason about things to be done. Consequently, Richard Hooker's insistence that human will be subservient to human reason, that reason must interpret revelation, and that natural and moral philosophy must provide a basis for human understanding of the supernatural, culminates in the equation that "nature hath need of grace" just as "grace hath need of nature," even though faith is the prime prerequisite for both reason and grace, for "without belief all other things are as nothing, and it is the ground of those other divine virtues."22

The remaining sections of this chapter examine The Faerie Queene as Spenser's interpretation of the relationship and communication between "Faerie Land" and the New Jerusalem, between the temporal and the eternal, the "becoming" and being, the realistic world which he created to mirror the phenomenal world and the eternal New Jerusalem.

22 Hooker, III.viii.6; I.xi.6.
B. Right Reason in Book I

In his provocative article, "Nature and Grace in The Faerie Queen," Professor A. S. P. Woodhouse\(^2\) goes far toward demolishing the arguments of Miss Winstanley\(^2\) and Professor DeMoss\(^2\) to the effect that Spenser's virtue of holiness derived from a blend of Aristotle and Plato, or from Aristotle alone. Professor Woodhouse accepts as conclusive, moreover, Professor Padelford's arguments that Spenser's holiness is "a purely Christian virtue, and that the Institutes of Calvin furnishes a relevant gloss, while the Ethics of Aristotle does not.\(^2\)

Inasmuch as Professor Woodhouse bases his interpretation upon the discreteness of Hooker's statements that, as "nature hath need of grace," so "grace hath need of nature," it seems fallacious to ignore the foundation of Hooker's tripartite reasoning; the basis upon which Hooker reared his superstructure of grace and nature inheres in his insistence that faith must precede both, for "without belief all other things are as nothing, and it is the ground of those other divine virtues."\(^2\) At any rate, it is obvious that Hooker's contemporary,

\(^2\)ELH, XVI (1949), 194-228.

\(^2\)Lilian Winstanley, "Introduction" to Book II of her edition of The Faerie Queene (Cambridge, 1914).

\(^2\)W. F. DeMoss, "Spenser's Twelve Moral Virtues 'according to Aristotle,'" MP, XXVI (1918), [23-28; 245-270].

\(^2\)Woodhouse, p. 201, cites F. M. Padelford, "The Spiritual Allegory of The Faerie Queene, Book One," JEGP, XXII (1923), 1-17. He refutes (note 4, p. 197) the argument that P. N. Siegel made in "Spenser and the Calvinistic View of Life," SP, XLI (1944), 201-222. Professor Woodhouse maintains that Professor Siegel confuses the two orders and is otherwise imprecise in making distinctions necessary to determine Sponsor's religious position and allegorical intention.

\(^2\)Hooker, III.viii.6; I.xi.6.
Edmund Spenser, so interpreted his Church's teaching. Not only do the adventures in The Faerie Queen begin with "The Legend of Holiness" in which the Red Cross Knight learns to perfect his faith, but the first book itself opens with the titular hero already in possession of the Pauline "whole armour of God."

In the "Letter to Raleigh," Spenser indicates that the Red Cross Knight has naively accepted the Christian faith, blindly and unthinkingly donning it as casually as he would a new suit:

In the beginning of the feast, there presented himself a tall clownish yeoung man, who falling before the Queen of Fairies desired a boon (as the manner then was) which during that feast she might not refuse, which was that she might have the achievement of any adventure, which during that feast should happen, that being granted he rested him on the floor, unfitte through his rusticity for a better place. Soone after entred a faire Ladys in mourning weeds, riding on a white Asse, with a dwarfe behind her leading a warlike steed, that bore the Armes of a knight, and his speare in the dwarfs hand. Shee ... besought the Faery Queene to assygne her some one of her knights to take on him that exployt. Presently the clownish person upstarting, desired that aduenture: whereat the Queene much wondering, and the Lady much gainesaying, yet he earnestly importuned his desire. In the end the Lady told him that unlesse that armour which she brought, would serve him (that is the armour of a Christian man specified by Saint Paul v. Ephes.) that he could not succeed in that enterprise, which being forthwith put upon him with dewe furnitures thereto, he seemed the goodliest man in al that company, and was well liked of the Lady. And eftesoones, taking on him knighthood and mounting on that straunge Coursere, he went forth with her on that aduenture: Where beginneth the first book, vs.

A gentle knight was pricking on the playne.&c.28

Moreover, the poet introduces that ambiguous term, "seem," which characterizes his careful distinction between appearance and reality throughout Book I, so that a perceptive reader notes that the Red Cross Knight has only the outward appearance of the true believer. His is

28Var., I, 169.
only an impulsive, unreasoned, and unreasoning faith, wanting experience and an intellectual basis to sustain it, so that the petition of the demoniac's father (St. Mark 9: 24), "Lord, I believe; help thou my unbelief," would be appropriate.

Nonetheless, the Red Cross Knight has made the first step toward faith, "without which all other things are as nothing": he has acquired the "ground for those other divine virtues," and it is the business of Book I to trace his growth from spiritual naivete to spiritual maturity through a series of adventures calculated to indicate the roles of unmerited grace and right reason in the pursuit of Christian wholeness.

Book I opens with a procession: the Red Cross Knight, clothed in his so-far unearned armor, "his angry steede" chiding

... his foming bitt,
As much disdayning to the curbe to yield:
Full lolly knight he seemd, and faire did sitt
leads the way. Beside him is "a louely Ladie,"

Vpon a lowly Asses more white then snow,
Yet she much whiter, ...

Her loveliness, however, she hides under a black stole. She leads a "milke white lambe." Following

Behind her farre away a Dwarfe did lag,
That lasie seemd in being euer last,
Or weared with bearing of her bag
Of needments at his backs.

The significance of this vignette is not immediately apparent; indeed, its full import lies hidden throughout most of Book I, for it is the iconographical or emblematic basis for the entire "Legend of Holiness." The careful reader, accustomed to extracting universal significance
from specific detail would, however, observe immediately several points: the inexperienced Knight's clumsiness in controlling his steed; the apparent incongruity of attempting to pace the courser to the mincing steps of the "milke white lamb"; the presence of the "dwarfe" in an apparently serious role; and the poet's use of such affective language regarding the "dwarfe": "lag," "lasie," and "ruer last." But such a reader would hold in abeyance any inclination to impose a definitive interpretation until the author has exhausted rhetorical means of developing and clarifying the illogical and incongruous features of the procession. This clarification the poet immediately begins.

The reader who begins to impose allegorical meanings upon the poem from the outset wades in deep and dangerous waters. I have already pointed out that the sophisticated Renaissance reader would not make hard and fast allegorical identification of the characters who appear in the opening vignette. Rather, he would analyze carefully, keeping an open mind, knowing that this procession serves as a thematic introduction. The iconographic or emblematic introduction would alert the careful reader to look for further development of certain ideas, but the ideas would not immediately crystallize into idées fixes by means of which to interpret thematically the entire book. One accustomed to allegorical reading would recognize that the procession initiates a theme; he would not attempt to interpret definitively that theme in terms of only itself. He would allow the poet at his leisure (and Spenser has a great deal of leisure) to develop the significance and explain the meaning of the tableau. Unfolding the ramifications of the initial scene is the business of Book I of The Faerie Queene.
It is the incongruity of the first scene which initially excites the reader's curiosity. To the reader of that period, all of the figures in the scene were familiar. Professors Padelford and O'Connor believe that the source of Spenser's scene was *The Golden Legend*, an immensely popular translation of Jacobus de Voragine's *Legenda Aurea*. They point out further that Professor Chambers has found remnants of twenty-nine allusions to the legend of St. George in miracle plays; that Chambers "records specifically a St. George play enacted at Bassingbourne in 1577"; and that Warton "found the record of such a play presented in 1511." Professor Greenlaw agrees that "Spenser was following the ancient legend rather than contriving a subtle allegory of truth and innocence." The presence of the lamb accompanying Una was usual. Greenlaw cites an entry in "A Short English Chronicle":

This yere the Emperour of Almayne came in to Engelond and was at Saint Georges fest. And at the procession the Kyng went above him. And the first sotilte that came on the table was our Ladye armynge Seint George and an angill doinge on his sporys. The seconde sotilte was Seint George fightynge with the dragon, and the spere in his honde. The therde sotilte was a castell, and Seint George and the kynges doughter ledyng the lamb in to the castell gate.

Professor Schulze quotes Thomas Sharp's "A dissertation on the pageants or dramatic mysteries anciantly performed at Coventry* (London, 1825):

"Also upon the Condite in the Crosse Chepyng was seint George armed and kynges doughtr knelyng afore him with a lamb and the fador & the modor beyng in a toure a boven beholding seint George savyng their doughtr"


From pageant, legend, romance, and religious art, readers of Spenser's time knew to associate the St. George legend with such a procession of knight, lady, lamb, and page.

Thus, Spenser, in allegiance to Renaissance ideas of imitation, has begun his Book I with an altogether familiar scene. But also, in keeping with the theory of imitation, he has invested the scene with a now generalized meaning, a new meaning which immediately excites the reader's curiosity. What is the meaning of this tension? Why should the Rod Cross Knight simultaneously "prick" (spur) his horse and rein him in? What explains the Knight's having such a cumbersome party with him on an obviously urgent errand? Finally, the reader observes that, as the Knight paces his charger to the gait of the ass, the ass can travel no faster than the lady's lamb, and that the entire entourage, charger, ass, and lamb, must wait upon the "lasie" dwarf. With these questions in his mind, the experienced reader continues with the story, warily anticipating some narrative development to clarify the aenigma into allegoria.

Unexpectedly—indeed, almost miraculously—a sudden storm arises, and it rains so

That every wight to shrowd it did constrain,
And this faire couple ske to shroud themselues were fain.
(I.i.vi)

Reset by superficial difficulties which experience would have led them to expect, and which knowledgeable travelers recognize as only temporary inconveniences they seek

... some couert nigh at hand,  
A shadie grove not far away they spide,  
That promist ayde the tempest to withstand:  
Whose loftie trees yelad with sommers pride,  
Did spred so broad, that heauens light did hide,  
Not perceable with power of any starre:  
And all within were pathes and alleies wide,  
With footing worne, and leading inward farre:  
Faire harbour that them seemes; so in they entred arre.  

(I.i.vii)

An alert reader notices the ambiguities, "shadie," "promist," "pride," "heauens light did hide," a shade "not perceable with power of any starre," "pathes and alleies wide," "with footing worne and loading inward [not onward] farre," and "seemes." This heaping up of loaded diction, coupled with references to the rhetorical contrary of "the straight and narrow way," plus the metaphor of "summers pride," obscuring both "heauens light" and astral influence, reveal the author's attitude toward the episode. Entering the wood is a misstep. Moreover, the party's misstep is censurable, for they are "with pleasure forward led" (I.i.vii).

This first misadventure comes about more through ignorance and inattention to duty than through deliberate transgression. But, upon discovering Error's Den through a series of adventures over which he has no control, once having left pursuit of his legitimate goal, the Red Cross Knight deliberately provokes trouble, exhibiting unwholesome curiosity and wilfulness in the teeth of warnings from both the lady and her attendant dwarf. To her advice against rash action, the Knight replies:

Ah Ladie . . . shame were to reuoke  
The forward footing for an hidden shade:  
Vertue giues her selfe light, through darknesse for to wade.  

(I.i.xii)

The lady discloses that they are lost in the Wandring Wood, and that
the cave is "Errours don." She urges that the Knight not needlessly
deprove "a monster vile, whom God and man does hate" (I. i. xiii). Even
the sluggish dwarf becomes excited:

... Fly fly (quoth then
The fearefull Dwarfes:) this is no place for liuing men.
(I. i. xiii)

But the young Knight, "full of fire and greody hardimont," is
determined to flush out he knows not what, and so invades the cave.
Ironically, the poet notes that the Knight's virtuous illumination of
which had boasted is of low candle power:

... his glistring armor [made]
A little glooming light, much like a shade.
(I. i. xiv)

The feeble light which his armor generates enables him barely to
discern the monster nursing her thousand young "vpon her poisonous
dugs." The "little glooming light, much like a shade," is enough to
frighten the monster's progeny back into her mouth, but it serves only
to irritate the dam,

For light she hated as the deadly bale,
Ay wont in desert darkness to remaine,
Where plaine none might her see, nor she see any plaine.
(I. i. xvi)

She rushes out and is further dismayed by the unaccustomed brightness
of the daylight outside her cave. She attempts to retreat, but the Red
Cross Knight immediately engages her. She ensnares him helplessly in
her train until the lady

Cride out, Now now Sir knight, shew what ye bee,
Add faith vnto your force, and be not faint:
Strangle her, else she sure will strangle thee.
That when he heard, in great perplexitie,
His gall did grate for griefe and high disdaine,
And knitting all his force got one hand free,
With difficulty, the Red Cross Knight overcomes his foe [significantly, with his one free hand], and his lady congratulates him upon his victory.

The monster Error slain, he succeeds in unravelling the maze of roads in the Wandering Wood, and "with God to frend" leads his party back to its proper path, even now, however, distracted from his primary purpose by his thirst for new adventures.

The little party meets a pious-looking old man, attired as a religious, exhibiting all the outward signs of the devout life. At the Red Cross Knight's request, he tells them of a "homebred euill . . . that wasteth all this countrey farre and neare" (I.i.xxxi). The Knight pricks up his ears and asks the old man to lead them to the evil one. Ironically, the pious-appearing old man tells the too-eager Knight:

Far hence (quoth he) in wastfull wildernesse
His dwelling is, by which no liuing wight
May ever passe, but thorough great distresse.
(I.i.xxxii)

The lady, with feminine practicality, suggests that they rest, for the Red Cross Knight has had a hard day. Surely, she argues, he needs to recoup his forces, for even

The Sunne that measures heauen all day long,
At night doth baits his steedes the Ocean waues among.
(I.i.xxxii)

As if that humiliating comparison between the Knight's "little glooming light, much like a shade," in the encounter with Error were not sufficient, the poet forewarns the alert reader again that subtle machinations are to begin, putting into the lady's mouth the
questionable wisdom that "'ntroubled night they giuos counsell best"  
(I.i.xxxiiii).

The initial encounter with Archimag was a more subtle invitation  
to evil than the affair at the den of Error. Professor Neill indicates,  
however, that, though

there is no indication in the text that Red Cross should have  
suspected Archimago from the outset, John Deacon and John Walker  
(A Dialogicall Discourse of Spirits and Devils, London, 1601,  
p. 234), who cite St. Augustine (De Civit., II.xxvi) clearly  
indicate the need for suspicion: "The devil when he entendeth  
most deeply to circumuent and deceave the sonnes of Men: then he  
pretendeth the most religious and holiest shewes of all."  
Nicholas Remy (Demonolatry, tr. Ashwin, ed. Summers, [London,  
1930], p. 33) notes that the devil frequently deceives us in some  
form of righteousness, often assuming the habit of a monk.33

Apparently, then, the Red Cross Knight is repeating the pattern which  
he established in entering the Wandring Wood; once more lack of alert-  
ness has led him, unsuspecting, away from pursuit of his goal.

Though willing for the Red Cross Knight's naivete to blind him to  
Archimago's naturo, Spenser ironically exposes him to a situation which  
he cannot interpret, but which the perceptive reader quickly comprehends. The reader's apprehension becomes suspicion as he reads of the  
old man's tongue, "as smooth as glas," and suspicion becomes a certainty as, his guests sleeping, Archimago begins his black magic.

The point of Professor Neill's argument is that, had the Red Cross  
Knight not been already in a state of sin, having heeded his erotic  
dream and become confused about his relationship with the lady, it  
would have been impossible for Archimago to fool him with the

33 Kerby Neill, "The Degradation of the Red Cross Knight," in Don  
C. Allen and William R. Mueller, That Soueraine Light (Baltimore,  
counterfeit Una. In the words of the *Malleus Maleficarum*, "all witchcraft comes from a carnal lust," and the erotic dream has excited the Knight's "carnal lust." Unusual dreams, according to Professor Neill's interpretation, arise either from a distempered physical condition or from supernatural causes. Witchcraft can effect the properly distempered state of the body, but cannot invade the being of a man in a state of grace. The erotic dream which the Red Cross Knight experiences would have been powerless had his faith been perfect. But, because the Knight "slept soundly void of evil thought," he awakens from the dream which was contrary to his habitual moral purity. Apparently, he is sufficiently informed about witchcraft to be suspicious when he awakens from "this great passion of unwonted lust."

He started up, as seeming to mistrust
Some secret ill, or hidden foe of his.
(I.i.xl)\(^{34}\)

Even with his suspicions aroused, however, he cannot discern the falseness of the counterfeit Una. Barely controlling himself, he "gan himselfe advise / To prove his sense": he permits the phantasm to leave, returns to his bed, and the salacious dream recurs.

Archimago's first stratagem makes the Red Cross Knight doubt Una; consequently, when awakened by Archimago to view the couple "knit . . . in Venus shamefull chaine," the Knight has no repetition of the suspicion which he had experienced upon awakening from the first dream. Rather,

\[\ldots\] he burnt with gealous fire,
The eye of reason was with rage yblent,

\(^{34}\)Quoted in Neill, p. 104.
And would have slain them in his furious ire,
But hardly was restrained of that aged sire.
(I.ii.v)

His gullibility, misdirected suspicion, and lack of rational judgment have effectively separated him from Una. The separation becomes complete when the Knight abandons her to the hands of Archimago and leaves, taking the sluggish dwarf with him.

The events in Archimago's cottage closely parallel those which led the party astray into the Wandering Wood. First, lack of insight and positive moral stamina to pursue a legitimate goal permitted the Red Cross Knight to slide by default into an occasion for a more deliberate and more active transgression. In neither case was the Knight's perspicuity sufficient to guide him. At the den of Error, he had been sustained by both the dwarf and the lady, neither of whom he had heeded. At Archimago's cottage, he forsakes Una completely, but takes the dwarf with him on his further adventures.

After abandoning Una, the Red Cross Knight, angry, confused, and wilful, meets an all-too-eager adversary, named, significantly, Sans Loy. They fight with equal bestiality,

As when two rams stirt with ambitious pride,
Fight for the rule of the rich fleeced flocke,
Their horned fronts so fierce on either side
Do meete, that with the terror of the shocke,
Astonied both, stand senselesse as a blocke,
Forgetfull of the hanging victory.
(I.ii.xvi)

The Knight kills his opponent and seizes the lady, who, seeing her Sarazin champion fall "like the old ruines of a broken towre" (I.ii.xx), has tried to escape. The Knight comforts her and believes her story that she is an unfortunate princess named Fidessa. As she tells her story,
He in great passion all this while did dwell,  
More busying his quicke eyes, her face to view,  
Then his dull eares, to heare what she did tell.  
(I.ii.xxvi)

So charmed by her appearance that he fails to evaluate her story, the Knight swallows her baited hook and assumes responsibility for her. All the while, she exerts her wiles to infatuate him. The interrupt their travels to rest underneath two trees

... that faire did spred  
Their armes abroad, with gray moss essaycast,  
And their greene leaves trembling with every blast,  
Made a calm shadow far in compassa round:  
The fearefull Shepheard often there aghast  
Vnder them never sat, ne wont there sound  
His mery eaten pipe, but shund th'vnlucky ground.  
(I.ii.xxxviii)

As "faire seemely pleasance each to other makes" (I.ii.xxx), the Knight plucks a branch from one of the trees to make a garland for his new-found lady. The tree begins to bleed, as if it were a wounded man, and to shout a warning to the Knight. In rather garrulous terms, the tree tells the story of what has befallen

... this wretched Lady, my deare loue,  
O too deare loue, loue bought with death too deare.  
(I.ii.xxxi)

Identifying himself as Fradubio, the man-tree relates his complete acquiescence in seduction by Duessa, "a false sorceresse," from his wife, Fraelissa. Duessa's sorcery has obscured Fraelissa's honest beauty and counterfeited for herself an unearthly beauty. Fradubio, failing to differentiate between real and foigned beauty, between reality and appearance, had chosen Duessa for his own, abandoning his wife. One day he saw Duessa for her true self, and wished to slip away from her; but he knew that his escape must be well concealed, lest the sorceress retaliate by some enchantment. Because he was unable to
conceal his thoughts, however, Duessa surmised his plans for escape and
enchantment and Fraelissa, turning them into trees and planting them
in "this desert waste," where they are now destined to remain "til we
be bathod in a liuing well" (I.ii.xliii).

The Red Cross Knight's intellect fails to equate Fradubio's
situation with his own, but Fidessa reacts immediately. Afraid that
the Knight might see the similarity between his own predicament and the
one which led Fradubio astray, she resorts to the charming feminine
stratagem of fainting. The trick works, for the Knight, "too simple
and too trew, . . . oft her kist" (I.ii.xlv).

The titular hero is about to become involved in another episode
which, were his "eye of reason [not] yblent," he would avoid. This
time, however, his initial failure is not due only to lack of sophisti-
cation; he has surrendered himself to the guidance of his will. His
irascibility has reduced him in his fight with Sans Loy to bestiality,
and it is as an unthinking beast that he allows himself to be deluded
concupiscently by Duessa-Fidessa. Quite obviously, he is competing
beyond his capabilities, caught in a game with professionals who play
for keeps. But, his concupiscent and irascible natures chiding at the
bit, he is deliriously oblivious to his peril. Even the hair-raising
episode of the two talking trees, with the striking parallels between
their adventures and his own situation, fails to arouse his suspicions.
He fails to identify himself with Fradubio, Una with Fraelissa, Fidessa
with Duessa. This time, however, his heedlessness comes not from
naivote, but from the fact that he was

Still flying from his thoughts and gealous foare;
Will was his guide, and griefe led him astray.
(I.ii.xii)
Meanwhile, after sleeping peaceably through the events in the enchanter's cottage, Una awakens to find that the Red Cross Knight has deserted her, taking the dwarf with him. She sets out to overtake them, but overtake them, she cannot,

For him so far had borne his light-foot steeds,  
Pricked with wrath and fiery fierce disdain,  
That him to follow was but fruitless ease paine.  
(I.ii.viii)

Archimago, pleased that his plot to separate Una from her champion has succeeded, sets out further to confound with his "diuelish arts" the Knight's wronged lady,

For her he hated as the hissing snake,  
And in her many troubles did most pleasure take.  
(I.ii.ii.x)

As Una searches frantically and without avail, the Red Cross Knight enjoys the loose companionship of his new-found lady. They travel on, and finally stand before

A goodly building, brauely garnished,  
The house of mightie Prince it seemd to bee:  
And towards it a broad high way that led,  
All bare through peoples feet, which thither trauelled.  
(I.iii.i.ii)

But the Knight, beguiled by the pleasentries of his companion and by the appearance of the castle, fails to note that all of the tracks point inward; few of those which enter return. Nor does he observe that the walls, though "cunningly" built and high, were neither "strong nor thick," or that their golden glitter was only superficial tinsel "that purest skye with brightnesse they dismaid" (I.iii.iv). This castle, built upon sand, so that "evry breath of heauen shaked it," had hinder parts, that few could spie," "ruinous and old, but painted cunningly" (I.iii.v), and was topped by "a Diall [that] told the
timely howres" (I.iii.iv). In keeping with the broad, one-way street leading to the door, the entrance into the castle is easy, for Malucnu, the porter, denies no one who knocks. Accordingly, Malucnu introduces the two newcomers into the hall, richly decorated and filled with a throng of people waiting to catch a glimpse of the "Lady of that Palace bright" (I.iii.vi). They see her, shining

... like Phoebus fairest childe,
    That did presume his fathers firie wayne
    to rayne;

moreover, she

... inflames the skyen,
    With fire not made to burne, but fairely for to shyne.
    (I.iii.ix)

Proud, vain, she delights only in herself, "for earth she did disdayne."

But her foundation, like her castle's, and like Duessa's, is deformed: underneath her "scornfulfe feete, was layne / a dreadfull Dragon" (I.iii.x). The proud Lucifera has no rightful kingdom, but has usurped dominion over her subjects, whom she rules capriciously, following the counsel of six wizards.

Conducted by the usher, Vanitie, the Red Cross Knight and Duessa approach the presence courteously, but their courtesy impresses neither Lucifera nor her courtiers, who continue to exhibit rude boredom.

Nonetheless, they attempt to entertain their visitors, but appeared

... all their glorie vaine in knightly vew,
    And that great Princesse too exceeding proud,
    That to strange knight no better countenance allowd.
    (I.iii.xv)

Peremptorily, Lucifera summons her coach and "goes a procession,"

Adorned all with gold, and girdons gay
    That seemed as fresh as Flora in her prime.
    (I.iii.xvii)
Drawing her coach are "six unequall beasts," each bearing one of her
counsellors: *Idleness*, "the nourse of sin," rides a "slouthfull Asse";
*Gluttony*, a "filthie swyne"; *Lechery*, a "bearded goat"; *Avarice*, a
"Cornell loaden all with gold"; *Envy*, a "rauenous wolfe"; and *Wrath*, "a
Lion, loth for to be led" (I.iii.xviii-xxv). For wagon-master, Lucifera
employs *Sathan*, to drive her counsellors rough-shod over the
deliriously happy "huge routs of people." Duessa fittingly rides
beside Lucifera,

But that good knight would not so nigh repaire,
Him selfe estraunging from their joyaunce vaine,
Whose fellowship seemd far vnfit for warlike swaine.
(I. iii.xxxvii)

Having aired themselves, they return to the castle to find Sans Joy
newly come,

Enflam'd with fury and fiers hardy-hed,
He seemd in hart to harbour thoughts vnkind,
And nourish bloudy vengeaunee in his bitter mind.
(I.iii.xxxviii)

Enraged because the Red Cross Knight has slain his brother, Sans Loy,
he attacks the Elfin Knight. Lucifera commands them to settle their
disagreements in "equall lists." They consent, and, after an evening's
revelry, all retire.

Fidessa-Duessa steals into Sans Joy's chamber to explain her
presence with the Red Cross Knight, to warn the Sarazin of the Knight's
magic armor, and to pledge her secret aid in the morrow's battle.

Next morning when the Red Cross Knight and Sans Joy meet in their
contest at arms, they fight ferociously. They seem equally matched,
until the Knight interprets as meant for him Duessa's shout to Sans Joy:
'Thine the shield, and I, and all" (I.v.xi). Responding instantane-
ously to Duessa's words, the Elfin Knight musters superhuman strength
and almost slays his enemy. But as he lifts his hand for the coup de grace, a mysterious fog obscures the vanquished one, in response to Duessa's machinations. No less amazed than enraged, the Knight searches fruitlessly for his foe, but becomes mollified when the judges award him their favorable decision. He makes obeisance to Lucifera and dedicates to her his victory. Returning to the castle, this time the Red Cross Knight sits in the place of honor beside Lucifera to accept the plaudits of the enthusiastic subjects who line the way. To restore his wounds, Lucifera provides all medical art, while Duessa "all the while ... wopt full bitterly" (I.v.xvii). But, the poet assures the reader, her tears are crocodile tears, intended to ensnare

The foolish man, that pitties all this while
His mourneful plight, ... swallowed up unawares,
Forgetful of his own, ... [minding] anothers cares.
(I.v.xviii)

After she has wept the hero to sleep, Duessa returns to the black cloud that obscures Sans Joy. Finding him in critical condition, she enlists "griesly Night" to transport the well-nigh-dead Sarazin in her "yron charet" to Aesculapius for much needed repairs. Night and Duessa return from the underworld and find that the Red Cross Knight has surreptitiously fled, even though not yet fully recovered, for

... on a day his wary Dwarfe had spide,
Where in a dungeon deepe huge numbers lay
Of cautiuue wretched thrals, that wayled night and day.
(I.v.xlv)

The dwarf, having discovered that Lucifera's glittering House of Pride rests upon a foundation of misery, has shocked the Red Cross Knight into the realization that things are not what they seem.

The reader who has carefully analyzed the Red Cross Knight's failures in the Wandring Wood and in Archimago's cottage, recognizes the
events thus far in the Knight's adventures at Lucifera's palace as the unthinking prelude to a serious transgression. The poet, speaking directly to the reader, has interpreted the situation, pointing out characteristics which warrant caution. The castle only "seems" to be the house of "mightie Prince"; the broad highway has led many souls inward, but few have returned; the shoddily built walls lack strength, but are brilliantly decorated; the glitter of the walls "dismays" the purest sky; "ever breath of heuen shaked it"; its "Hinder parts," like Fradúbio's description of Duessa's, are "ruinous and old, but painted cunningly"; and the whole is capped by a clock to indicate its temporal nature. If the Knight observes these details, he does not heed the warning implicit in them. Only when he sees the patently obvious iconographical representations of sin in the procession does he suspect that things are not as they should be. At this apt moment, just as the Knight begins to evaluate the situation, Sans Joy appears, and the Red Cross Knight, caught off balance again, reverts to his uncontrolled, unthinking bestiality.

The most conclusive evidence of the Red Cross Knight's lack of reason is the parallel between his reaction to Una's cry, "Add faith unto your force," and to Duessa's, "Thine is the shield, and I, and all." Una's warning, addressed to the Knight, has enabled him to free one hand with which to choke Error. Duessa's shout, addressed not to the Knight but to Sans Joy, the champion misinterprets as Duessa's promise to him. Even this misinterpretation of the evil Duessa's promise of herself, however, spurs the Knight to overcome his enemy. He is as strongly influenced by an evil promise to another as by the pure advice from Una.
Moreover, Spenser indicates that in overcoming Sans Joy for his own ulterior motives, the Red Cross Knight departs farther from his cognition of reality: returning from the battle with Sans Joy, he does not find that Lucifera's "fellowship seemd far vnfit for warlike swaine" (I.iii.iii.xxxvii). Significant, too, is the fact that it is the Knight's "wary Dwarfe," no longer "lasie," who discerns the true nature of the House of Pride and alerts him to his mortal peril. But, even though the dwarf has convinced the Knight that the House of Pride is an evil place, the Knight laments having to desert Duessa, as he has never lamented deserting Una. He comprehends the physical danger which he faces, but he does not see through the deception which has led him astray.

Spenser aptly reveals his attitude toward the Knight's feelings:

As when a ship, that flyes faire vnder saile,
An hidden rocke escaped hath vnawares,
That lay in waite her wracke for to bewaile,
The Marriner yet halfe amazed stares
At perill past, and yet in doubt ne dares
To ioy at his foole-happie oversight:
So doubly is destreast twixt ioy and cares
The dreadlesse courage of this Elfin knight
Hauing escaupt so sad esamples in his sight.

(I.vi.i)

The Red Cross Knight is aware that he has escaped from a dangerous situation, but he does not understand how he did or what it was. His regret for having to leave Fidessa—Duessa behind at the Castle of Pride proves needless, for she speedily finds him as he rests beside a fountain. He has removed his armor and set his horse to graze. After the Knight has assuaged Duessa's feigned feelings of rejection,

... they gan of solace treat,
And bathe in pleasaunce of the ioyous shade,
Which shielded them against the boyling heat,
And with green boughs decking a gloomy glade,
About the fountaine like a girlond made.
(I.ii.iv)

The Knight does not know that this is a magic fountain, enervating all who drink from it. He drinks and loses his knightly virtue. But his erotic vigor remains unimpaired, for

... goodly court he made still to his Dame,
Pourd out in loosenesse on the grassy ground,
Both carelessse of his health, and of his fame.
(I.ii.vii)

Physically impotent and morally debased, he falls easy prey to "an hideous Geant horrible and hye" who comes upon the Knight

Who haplesse, and eke hopelesse, all in vaine
Did to him pace, and vattail to darrayne,
Disarmed, disgrast, and inwardly dismayde,
And eke so faint in euery ioynt and vaine,
Through that fraile fountaine, which him feeble made,
That scarsely could he weeld his bootlesse single blade.
(I.ii.xi)

Only at Duessa's intervention does the giant, Orgoglio, spare the Knight's life. She suggests that the giant take her for mistress, and make the Knight a prisoner. The giant follows her suggestion, and Duessa becomes his spoiled consort, dressed in "gold and purple pall, ... triple crown, / ... and royall maiestye." To heighten her majesty, Orgoglio gives her a monstrous beast of burden with "seuenfold head" (I.ii.xvi-xviii).

The dwarf, accompanying the Red Cross Knight and seeing his master vanquished, takes up the Knight's armor and speeds off to seek aid.

Once more, the reader notices that the Red Cross Knight has blundered unthinkingly into sin. Relieved to be rescued, he knows not how, from the House of Pride, he feels himself safe and removes his Christian armor at a fountain to rest. He fails to notice the similarity of this
fountain to the fountain where he first met Duessa; indeed, he does not associate his plight with Duessa at all. Consequently, when she reappears, as if in response to his wishes, the two resume their affair. Careless of both his reputation and his health, the Knight becomes so engrossed in his love-making that he does not perceive the debilitating effects of his experience until it is too late—Orgoglio is upon him before he can retrieve his armor or prepare to fight. Having shed not only "the whole armor of God," but also all reasonable restraint, he falls immediately, and finds himself a captive of Orgoglio.

By good fortune, the dwarf encounters Una, who swoons upon seeing "the signes, that deadly tydings spake"—the Red Cross Knight's armor. The dwarf, though he

Would faine haue dyde: dead was his hart within,
Yet outwardly some little comfort shewesi
At last recovering hart, he does begin
To rub her temples, and to chaufe her chin,
And every tender part does tosse and turne:
So hardly he the flitted life does win,
Vnto her nativue prison to retourne.

(I.vii.xxi)

Finally succeeding in his efforts to revive Una, the dwarf hears her complaint:

O lightsome day, the lampe of highest Ioue,
First made by him, mens wandering wayes to guyde,
When darkenesse he in deepest dongeon droue,
Henceforth thy hated face for euer hyde,
And shut vp heauens windowes shyning wyde
For earthly sight can nought but sorrow breed,
And late repentance, which shall long abyde.
Mine eyes no more on vanitie shall feed,
But seeled vp with death, shall haue their deadly meed.

(I.vii.xxiii)

The dwarf relates the Knight's experiences, and convinces Una that her champion's apparent infidelity has all resulted from "the subtil traines of Arohimago old." She immediately renews her love for and
faith in the Knight, now lying in a dungeon, and plans to find him and somehow rescue him. As the dwarf leads her toward Orgoglio's dungeon, they meet Prince Arthur and his squire. The noble Prince, sensing Una's sorrow, encourages her to tell him her troubles. She is reluctant, but his "goodly reason, and well guided speach" overcome her objections, and she tells her "storie sad," concluding with the account of the Red Cross Knight's present thralldom: "Remidolesse, for aie he [Orgoglio] doth him hold" (I.vii.ii). The Prince vows to rescue the Knight for her, and they set out, the "Dwarfe them guiding ouer right" (I.vii.iii).

Traveling sadly as the dwarf guides them, they arrive at the castle, "builded strong and hie." Prince Arthur dismounts and, accompanied by his squire, reconnoiters. Finding the entrance to the castle barred and unattended, he takes his magic bugle and blasts mightily upon it, so that "euery dore of freewil open flew" (I.viii.v). Followed by Duessa, the giant brings into play his deadly club; Prince Arthur avoids the blow and counter-attacks, severing the giant's arm. Wounded, Orgoglio brays so loudly that Duessa speeds to bring her dreadful beast to his aid; the squire attempts to divert the beast, but falls. Prince Arthur, beset by two fierce enemies, overcomes his foes only because Orgoglio accidentally

Did loose his [shield's] vele by chance, and open flew:
The light whereof, that heavens light did pass,
Such blazing brightness through the aier threw,
That eye mote not the same endure to vew.
(I.viii.xix)

Arthur's magic shield has overcome Orgoglio and the beast,

As where th'Almightyes lightning brond does light
It dimmes the dazed eyen, and daunts the senses quight.
(I.viii.xxvi)

Taking advantage of his adversaries' stupor, Prince Arthur kills the
giant. Duessa tries to flee, but the squire captures her. Una runs in to congratulate both the Prince and his squire and insists that they finish their task by rescuing the Red Cross Knight. Prince Arthur does so. So changed is the Knight by his confinement that Una is dismayed. Prince Arthur cheers up the former prisoner, advising Una that

\[\ldots\text{th'only good, that growes of passed feares,}\]
\[\text{Is to be wise, and ware of like again.}\]

(I.viii.xliv)

He allows Una to pass sentence on Duessa; Una has her disrobed and set free to wander in the woods. Disrobed, Duessa proves loathsome:

\[\ldots\text{her misshaped parts did them appall,}\]
\[\text{A loathly, wrinkleld hag, ill fauoured, old,}\]
\[\text{Whose secret filth good manners biddeth not be told.}\]

(I.viii.xlvi)

Their immediate enemies disposed of, Prince Arthur, his squire, the Red Cross Knight, and Una use Orgoglio's castle as a refuge in which to rest before continuing their quests.

As they rest, Prince Arthur tells the story of his life and love. When they recover, they prepare to depart, and Prince Arthur gives the Red Cross Knight a "boxe of Diamond sure, \ldots that any wound could heale incontinent," and the Knight reciprocates with

\[\text{A book, wherein his Saueours testament}\]
\[\text{Was writ with golden letters rich and braue;}\]
\[\text{A Workes of wondrous grace, and able soules to saue.}\]

(I.ix.xix)

Prince Arthur goes

\[\text{To sees his loue, and th'other for to fight}\]
\[\text{With Ihoss foe, \ldots }\]

(I.ix.xx)

But Una, still concerned about the Knight's wasted strength, determines to postpone their mission.

In the Orgoglio episode, the Red Cross Knight reaches the nadir of
his demoralization in his wanton looseness with Duessa at the fountain; for his imprisonment by Orgoglio grows directly out of his surrendering to his beastly lusts, and he becomes literally a victim of lust personified. From this predicament he is unable to save himself; nor is Una, after the dwarf summons her, able to rescue the Knight. Even Prince Arthur's efforts seem doomed until, miraculously, his magic shield paralyzes Orgoglio and Duessa's monster. Rescue from the dungeon, however, does not restore the Knight's spirits.

As Una and the Red Cross Knight ride, they meet an armed knight, Sir Treuisan, flying insanely from Despair. They stop him and learn his story; the Red Cross Knight determines to overcome Despair and seeks him in his dwelling,

... low in an hollow cave,
Farre vnderneath a craggie clift ypight,
Darke, dolefull, drearie, like a greddie grave.

(I.ix.xxxiii)

They enter the cave and discover Despair. A master of sophistry, Despair so overwhelms the weak arguments of the Knight that he seeks to kill himself. Una "snatcht the cursed knife" out of his hand,

And threw it to the ground, enraged rife,
And to him said, Fie, fie, faint harted knight,
What meanest thou by this reprochfull strife,
Is this the battell, which thou vauntst to fight
With that fire-mouthed Dragon, horrible and bright,

Come, come away, fraile, feeble, fleshly wight

... In heavenly mercies hast thou not a part,
Why shouldst thou then despeir, that chosen art,
Where justice growes, there grows eke greater grace

Arise, Sir knight, arise, and leave this cursed place.

(I.ix.liii-liv)

In reality, the Red Cross Knight's succumbing to Despair is a
continuation of his state of remorse engendered by three months of imprisonment in the dungeon of Orgoglio; Duessa's obvious duplicity has finally penetrated even the Knight's obtuse awareness. Where he had suspected Una's purity, he now sees Duessa's impurity. He had become disillusioned with Una upon seeing the false Una 'knit in Venus shamefull chains' with the lowly squire, but Una had not betrayed him into captivity as Duessa had done. He has had three months in which to compare Una with Duessa, and remorse has convinced him of his frailty. Arthur's arrival to rescue him, he construed as "the happy choyce of death" for him who

... here lye dying every stound,
   Yet liue perforce in balefull darknesse bound.
   (I.viii.xxxviii)

His feelings of guilt and unworthiness increase immeasurably with Una's forgiving welcome, for

   The cheerelesse man, whom sorrow did dismay,
      Had no delight to treaten of his griefe;
   His long endured famine needed more reliefe.
   (I.viii.xliii)

His guilt feelings become remorse, and his remorse becomes self-loathing when Una disrobes Duessa and demonstrates to him the stupidity of his choice. Una has realized that the period of refreshment in Orgoglio's castle is insufficient for the Knight's recovery and has planned an additional respite for his recuperation, physical and spiritual. Before she can institute her plan, however, the Red Cross Knight wilfully encounters Despair. Intellectually inferior, spiritually weakened, and physically moribund, the Knight is no match for the rhetoric of Despair, and so almost takes his own life. This time, Una recalls his flagging spirits with words sharper than her injunction, "Add faith unto thy
force," which had rallied him at the Den of Error. In the Cave of Despair, she chides him impatiently:

... Fie, fie, faint harted knight,
What meanest thou by this reprochfull strive?

(I.x.iii)

This time she points out to him that the psychomachic strife itself is "reprochfull," delaying his proper mission.

Once again, Spenser has employed parallels. Lust occasioned the Red Cross Knight's capture; and his imprisonment led to remorse. Almost immediately, improper concern with another's plight and burning anger to avenge the honor of knighthood provide the occasion for yet more serious error—the error of despair. Once again, only Una's intervention saves the Knight.

After rousing the Red Cross Knight from his near-fatal despair, Una, recognizing his even more feeble condition after this bout,

... cast to bring him where he chearen might,
Till he recovered had his late decayed plyght.

(I.x.ii)

Nearby is an "huntient house,"

Renowmd throughout the world for sacred lore,
And pure unsopotted life: . . . .

(I.x.iii)

She leads him to this house of Coelia. The porter, Humilita, gravely welcomes them and leads them in,

... stouping low;
For streight and narrow was the way, which he did show.

(I.x.v)

Reuerence, the squire, receives them "simple true, and eke unfained sweet" (I.x.vii), and escorts them to the gracious presence of Dame Coelia; there they encounter their hostess's two daughters, Fidelia and Speranza. A third daughter, Charissa, cannot greet the newcomers
because she has given birth to yet another of her innumerable children.

After Una and the Red Cross Knight rest,

Fair Una gan Fidelia faire request,  
To have her knight into her schoolhouse place,  
That of her heavenly learning he might taste,  
And heare the wisedome of her words diuine.  
(I.x.xviii)

Fidelia accedes and teaches the Knight from

... that her sacred Booke, with bloud ywrit,  
That none could read, except she did them teach,  

and she schools him in theology: "Of God, of grace, of iustice, of free will" (I.x.xix). And, his schooling complete, she demonstrates the powers appropriate to faith—she commands the sun, parts floods, moves mountains, for "Almightie God her gaue such powre, and puissance great" (I.x.xx).

Her teachings so kindle the Red Cross Knight's faith that he begins to yearn for deliverance from

... his wretched dayes:  
So much the dart of sinnfull guilt the soule dismayes.  
(I.x.xxxi)

Had not Speranza's hopeful teaching sustained him, the knowledge of his unworthiness would have overwhelmed him. Una finds him perplexed between despair and faith, and once more resorts to Coelia's counsel. Dame Coelia refers the Knight to the ministrations of Patience, who, in turn, subjects him to his subordinates, Amendment, Penance, and Repentance. Una, when the Knight returns, takes him to Charissa, by now recovered, and asks the fruitful Charissa to school him,

Now after all his torment well withstood,  
In that sad house of Penaunoe, where his spright  
Had past the paines of hell, and long enduring night.  
(I.x.xxxii)

Charissa begins her tutelage in goodness, love, righteousness, and good
deeds; she teaches him to avoid wrath and hatred, and "from thence to heaven she teacheth him the ready path" (I.x.xxxiii). She calls in, "his weaker wandring steps to guide" (I.x.xxxiv), a sober, wise old woman, Mercie, justly famous for her gracious liberality. Mercie escorts the Knight to "an holy Hospital," where the Seven Bead-men teach him charitable good works by example. Resting there awhile, the Knight readies himself for the ascent of the Hill of Contemplation, where dwells a holy man, blind to the world, but able to gaze upon the sight of God. With difficulty, the Knight climbs the mountain, assisted by Mercie. The holy man at first does not wish to be recalled from his spiritual repast, but respect for Mercie softens his attitude. Dame Mercie convinces him that the Red Cross Knight has come at the bidding of Fidelia to learn the Way. Contemplation leads the Knight to the highest mountain,

Such one, as that same mighty man of God,
That bloud-red billowes like a walled front
On either side disparsed with his rod
Till that his army dry-foot through them yod,
Dwelt forty dayes upon;

Or like that sacred hill, whose head full hie
Adorned with fruitfull Oliues all arownd,
Is, as it were for endless memory
Of that deare Lord, who oft thereon was found,
For euer with a flouring girdle crown'd:
Or like that pleasauant Mount, that is for ay
Through famous Poets verse each where renownd,
On which the thrise three learned Ladies play
Their heauenly notes, and make full many a lovelie lay.
(I.x.liii-liv)

From this prominence, Contemplation points out to his pupil a little path "both steepe and long" leading to the New Jerusalem, from which angels "to and fro descend." Contemplation explains that God has built this fair city
For those to dwell in, that are chosen his,
His chosen people purg'd from sinfull guilt,
With preious blood, which cruelly was spilt
On cursed tree, of that unspotted lam,
That for the sinnes of all the world was kilt.

(I.x.lvii)

The Knight remarks that the New Jerusalem far surpasses Cleopolis, here­
tofore the most radiant city he has seen, for "this bright Angels towre
quite dims that towre of glas" (I.x.lviii).

Rather surprisingly, Contemplation assures the Red Cross Knight
that Cleopolis is the fairest city of the mundane world, well worthy of
the efforts of its knights to maintain its glory. He reveals to the
Red Cross Knight his identity as St. George and discovers his glorious
destiny among tho saints

... when thou famous victorie has wonne,
And high amongst all knights hast hong thy shield,

but advises him, after completion of his mission, to restore Una to her
rightful eminence,

Thenceforth the suit of earthy conquest shonne,
And wash thy hands from guilt of bloudy field:
For bloud can nought but sin, and wars but sorrowes yield.

(I.x.lx)

The Knight asks immediate translation to the New Jerusalem, but Contem­
plation convinces him that he has unfinished tasks to complete for Una.
After his vision of the Heavenly City and his conference with Contem­
plation, the Knight returns to Una, and they leave Dame Coelia and her
three daughters.

In the episode of the House of Holiness, the reader first notices
the deliberate contrast which the poet makes with the House of Pride:
at the House of Pride, a well-beaten footpath leads to an easy entry,
an entry denied to none who applies; the porter, Malvenu, welcomes all
comers; and the guests are entertained with lavishness, which the Red Cross Knight initially recognizes as inappropriate and vulgar. The entrance to the House of Holiness is "streight and narrow," so that the visitors must "stoup low" to go inside. Humility is the gate-keeper, and Reverence, the squire who escorts them into the presence of Dame Coelia. The guests are entertained "simple true, and eke vnfained sweet."

Whereas Duessa at the House of Pride had sought to delude the Red Cross Knight, Una at the House of Holiness seeks to provide him with heavenly wisdom. At the House of Dame Coelia, there are no jousts, no legerdemain, no invocation of dark spirits. Rather, there are grave conversations about spiritual concerns and exercises to strengthen the Knight spiritually. Instead of skilled physical treatment for his wounds, such as he received at the House of Pride after his battle with Sans Joy, he receives at the House of Holiness the ministrations of

... a Leach the which had great insight
In that disease of grieued conscience.

(I.x.xxiii)

Moreover, as Mercie leads him from the House of Holiness toward the Hill of Contemplation, they encounter no such gehenna of wrecked wretches as they had seen at the House of Pride, where

... many corses, like a great Lay-stall
Of murdred men which therein strowed lay,
Without remorse, or decent funerall:
Which all through that great Princesse pride did fall
And came to shamefull end. And them beside
Forth rying vnderneath the castell wall,
A donghill of dead carkases he spide,
The dreadfull spectacle of that sad house of Pride.

(I.v.liii)

Rather, Mercie helps him along the narrow way toward a Holy Hospital, busy with restoring through acts of charity those who need help.
In contrast with the illegality of Lucifora's reign, the teaching at the House of Holiness is authoritative. Fidelia demonstrates the power of faith by moving mountains, and the Hill of Contemplation is comparable to Sinai, the Mount of Olives, and Olympus; the Old and New dispensations join with pagan reason for support.

Her Red Cross Knight now matured in wisdom, in strength, and in the favor of God and man, Una leads her champion toward her parents' besieged castle. As they approach, they hear a hideous roaring and, looking, see a dreadful dragon. The Red Cross Knight bids Una withdraw, and the poet asks the "sacred Muse, most learned Dame," to inspire his account of the battle.

The dragon ominously approaches as the Red Cross Knight prepares for battle. The two adversaries fight mightily to no conclusion until, burned in his armor by the dragon's fiery breath, the Knight unwittingly falls into a spring

Full of great vertues, and for med'cine good.  
Whylome, before that cursed Dragon got  
That happie land, and all with innocent blood  
Defyd those sacred waues, it rightly hot  
The well of life, ne yet his vertues had forgot.  
(I.xi.xxix)

Restored by his felicitous fall, the Knight awakens next morning ready once more to engage the astonished dragon. Miraculously--

. . . whether the reuenging steale  
Wære hardned with that holy water dew,  
Wherein he fell, or sharper edge did feele,  
Or his baptized hands now greater grew;  
Or other secret vertue did ensew--  
(I.xi.xxxvi)

the Knight's weapons have become effective against the dragon. But, again, the two fight to a draw, and again, the Knight miraculously escapes; he falls underneath the tree of life, from which
Consequently, the Knight arises once more, fit and eager for battle.

This day he achieves his victory, and the dreadful dragon dies:

So downe he fell, and forth his life did breath,
   That vanisht into smoke and clouds swift;
So downe he fell, that th'earth him vnderneath
   Did groane, as feeble so great load to lift;
So downe he fell, as an huge rockie clift,
   Whose false foundation waues haue washt away,
   With dreadfull poyse is from the mayneland rift,
   And rolling downe, great Neptune doth dismay;
So downe he fell, and like an heaped mountaine lay.

After the Knight has overcome the dragon, the populace of the embattled city rushes out to celebrate the victory. The "auncient Lord and aged Queene," Una's parents, approach St. George, and bowing low, thank and congratulate him. The children romp in unaccustomed freedom. All are curious about the man who has rescued them, but some are afraid to approach too near the dragon although it is obviously dead. They fear

Some lingering life within his hollow brest,
Or in his wombe might lurke some hidden nest
Of many Dragonets, his fruitfull seed.

The king celebrates with a regal banquet, at which the Red Cross Knight relates the adventures and misadventures which have beset him and Una. Invited to remain and enjoy a full and easy life as guest of the king, the Red Cross Knight declines, for he has obligations to the Faerie Queene for six years; he has "promises to keepe." But he plans to return and marry Una six years hence. Una appears, and for the first time,
the Red Cross Knight sees her resplendent in all her glory. At this point, a messenger rushes in, accusing the Red Cross Knight of adultery, perjury, and all manner of heinous crimes. Abashed, the Knight is unable to answer, but Una does not hesitate to explain the situation to the king; the messenger is none other, she says, than Archimago, "the falsest man alive." The king, Una's father, arrests Archimago and orders him bound in a "dungeon deep." This interruption over, the king publishes the marriage bans, and Una and St. George are betrothed. The Red Cross Knight delights in the life at the court, yet

He nought forgot, how he whilome had sworn,
In case he could that monstrous beast destroy,
Vnto his Faeris Queene backe to returne:
The which he shortly did, and Una left to mourne.
(I.xii.xli)

Thus Spenser expanded the bare statement of thematic intention in his "Letter to Ralegh" (Var., I, 169) into a plot; the plot he "inter-medled . . . with many other adventures, . . . but rather as accidents then intendments." His "Letter to Ralegh" has "oueronne" the intention and the plot, and directed the reader to the "wel-head of the History, that from thence gathering the whole intention of the conceit, [he] may as in a handfull gripe al the discourse" (Var., I, 170). From this "welhead of History" and this fable added thereto, let us interpret the "many other adventures" in the light of the intention both expressed in the "Letter to Ralegh" and developed in Spenser's microcosm, his "world of glass." We shall examine the reciprocally dependent manner in which Spenser has explicated the introductory icon and the narrative, so that the perceptive reader can assign at least tentative values to the figures in the icon and also gradually interpret the narrative development in the light of an increasingly clear realization of the poet's
meaning expressed in the opening pageant.

The Red Cross Knight's identity and significance become apparent in the emblematic opening scene: he is Everyman, Anyman, Adam, the archetype of any hero in any career novel; a callow young man setting forth on the adventurous highway to maturity. More specifically, as his armor and, above all, his shield indicate, he is the untried Christian setting forth on the Way. His guide and companion, Una, is Truth itself (any closer identification leads to insuperable difficulties),

whether it dwells among the pagan Satyrs (I,vi) or in the discipline of Christianity (IX). She guides Red Cross in his struggle with Error, and she saves him from Despair. His failures come after he doubts and abandons her. Her dominant role shows that Spenser accepted the humanist view of man's capacities which descended from the classics to medieval Christianity. Like Hooker, he gave it renewed expression in an Anglican setting; but he stayed closer than Hooker to the traditional emphasis upon grace as healing and emancipating, but not fundamentally changing, man's nature.35

At the outset, the Red Cross Knight follows Una with the best of intentions, but he does not understand her—who or what she is. His devotion is emotional, not intelligent, and he fails to comprehend her completely until, in the twelfth canto, he has overcome the world, the flesh, and the devil. The reluctant dwarf, Una's servant and the Knight's adviser, often an intermediary between the two, represents reason—"lasie" and laggard initially, so that the Knight is unable fully to appreciate Una; the dwarf becomes increasingly active, however, so that he eventually brings Una's desperately needed assistance to the chastened Red Cross Knight in Orgoglio's dungeon.

Identifications of all these figures are impossible from study of the initial scene, only; solely by seeing the characters in action can the reader ascertain their significance. For example, Una's lamb appears only in the opening vignette, and, consequently, eludes adequate identification, except as a convention in iconographic treatments of the St. George legend. Only the actions of the Red Cross Knight, Una, and the dwarf enable the reader to assign to them allegorical or symbolical value; only the figuring forth in narrative terms elucidates the nature of the universal significance contained within the specific image. In the psychomachic tradition, the initial icon represents the interior struggle for mastery of his being among the naive young knight's faculties; as he confusedly spurs and reins in his horse, submitting him to chaotically conflicting commands, so the Red Cross Knight mistakenly exacerbates and stifles his own faculties (horsemanship often reveals the degree of his characters' self-mastery in Spenser's The Faerie Queene), failing to regulate his concupiscent and irascible faculties with 'reason's due regalitie.' Because of his underdeveloped intellect, he sees Truth (whom I associate with Una) through a glass darkly—her radiant luminosity is concealed by her dark outer garments. His severely truncated or vitiated reason cannot reveal to him Truth in its wholeness, in spite of his confidence that "vertue giues her selfe light, through darknesse for to wade." So dominant is his irascible nature, so "full of fire and greedy hardiment" (I.i.xii), that he neither hears nor heeds Una's counsel of moderation and caution:

    ... the perill of this place
    I better wot then you, though now too late
    To wish you backe returne with foule disgrace,
    Yet wisedome warnes, whilst foot is in the gate,
To stay the steppe, are forced to retreat.

Therefore I read beware...

No more heed does he pay the small voice of Reason:

... Fly fly (quoth then

The fearefull Dwarfes:) this is no place for liuing men.

(I.i.xiii)

In rash self-confidence, he relies upon his own feeble prowess, even when Reason itself proclaims its inadequacy against Error; significantly, Reason makes no such concession until after Truth has indicated that it is Error's den at which they stand. The Red Cross Knight, then, dominated by his irascible faculty, ignores both Truth and Reason in his foolhardy reliance upon his own unaided strength to confront Error. That the error personified in the dragon is doctrinal becomes apparent when, under the Knight's attack, she vomits up "books and papers."

Moreover, it is his faith which Error attacks, leaping "fierce upon his shield." Editorially, the poet comments: "God helpe the man so wrapt in Errors endlesse traine" (I.i.xviii). Hard pressed by his antagonist, his imperfect and incomplete talismanic faith serves the Red Cross Knight but feebly until Truth urges, "Add faith vnto your force" (I.i.xix). The Knight's untutored, ignorant, and superstitious faith cannot sustain him against doctrinal error; he wants revealed truth and mature reason to avoid Error's den. Lacking both, only superstitious faith strengthened by Una's injunction enables him to avoid doctrinal error, for his natural reason is still too feeble at this point to aid him. Grace and Faith still have need of nature.

But not so simple is the Red Cross Knight's adventure with Archimago, which effectively separates him from Una. Whereas undiscriminating and naive faith has enabled the Knight to overcome obvious
doctrinal error, the subtle machinations of Archimago circumvent his defenses. Even "with God to frend," the Knight succumbs to Archimago's witchcraft, which, Professor Neill has convincingly argued, would have been ineffectual had the young man's spiritual health been whole. Significantly, he is able to overcome his indignation at the phantasm's attempts to seduce him, but when he sees the phantasm, whom he identifies as his companion, Una, "knit in Venus shamefull chaine" with another phantasm, "he burnt with gealous fire," so that "the eye of reason was with rage yblent" (I.ii.v). Archimago, having failed to separate him from Una by appealing to the Knight's sexual appetite, resorts to a temptation to the young Knight's pride and irascibility. To this temptation, the Knight is vulnerable; rage dethrones reason and establishes an unjust, disorderly, inharmonious economy in his mind. The encounter with Sans Loy might be interpreted literally as the Red Cross Knight's futile effort unaided to re-establish harmony, as an attempt to overcome the lawless and unjust domination of passion. The Knight prevails over Sans Loy, but only by yielding to his own baser nature. Moreover, yielding to passion exposes the young Knight to a subtler temptation to lust. Spenser's simile, comparing Sans Loy and the Red Cross Knight to "two rams stird with ambitious pride," fighting for "rule of the rich fleeced flock" (I.ii.xvi), is rhetorical comment to the effect that once passion usurps reason's "due regalitie," once man begins to descend the scale of being toward bestiality, complete animal lust is the result.

The "rich fleeced flock" over which the Red Cross Knight wins domination as the result of defeating Sans Loy is none other than Duessa. He loses no time establishing a working relationship with his
prize, temptation entering through "his quicke eyes" (I.ii.xxvi). As Donald R. Howard points out, the medieval contemptus mundi found its justification in I John 2: 15-16, where "all that is in the world," "the lust of the flesh," "the lust of the eyes," and "the pride of life," all comprising "love of the world," are set in opposition to "the love of the Father." Professor Howard continues by deriving from this locus classicus a psychological explanation for the occurrence of sin: "Gluttony, the lust of the flesh, had been the initial suggestion of the tempting serpent. Avarice, the lust of the eyes, had appealed to Eve and caused delectation. And vainglory, the pride of life, had brought in Adam a free and rational consent. 36

The Red Cross Knight, then, has already fallen completely into sin — once at the Cave of Error, once at Archimago's, once again in resorting to bestial irascibility in his fight with Sans Loy; now, he succumbs to another temptation of a different kind, the sin which St. Augustine referred to as "lust of the eyes" (Confessions, X.30-34). As different, however, as are the sins which the Red Cross Knight has committed so far, they have one feature in common: each indicates an inordinate attachment to the mutable world of fleshly existence. In orthodox theology, the world, having been created by God, was a thing morally indifferent, neither good nor evil; the sin of worldliness consisted in a too-enthusiastic response to the neutral world: the Red Cross Knight's excessive curiosity at the Den of Error constituted "lust of the eyes"; this same sin, in the guise of vainglory, made the young Knight unduly sensitive about Una's apparently contemptuous

treatment of him; and "pride of life" drove him to do battle with Sans Loy. Only after falling into these two sins does he submit to the temptation of lust of the flesh, as if the surrender to less obvious and less objectionable sins prepared the way for the more obvious and more heinous. Moreover, the poet quite frankly depicts the association between Duessa and the Red Cross Knight as a thoroughly lecherous one.

Lest this explanation appear too theological and too technical for a sixteenth-century layman, we need only recall Chaucer's grasp of theology in the parson's sermon:

In mannes synne is every manere of ordre of ordinaunce turned up-so-doun. / For it is sooth that God, and resoun, and sensualitee, and the body of man been so ordeyned that everich of thysse foure thynges sholde have lordshipes over that oother; / as thus: God sholde have lordshipes over resoun, and resoun over sensualitee, and sensualitee over the body of man. / But soothly, whan man synneth, al this ordre or ordinaunce is turned up-so-doun. / And therefore, thanne, for as muche as the resoun of man ne wol nat be subget ne obeisant to God, that is his lord by right, therfore leseth it the lordshipes that it sholde have over sensualitee, and eek over the body of man. / And why? For sensualitee rebelleth thanne agayns resoun, and by that way leseth resoun the lordshipes over sensualitee and over the body. / For right as resoun is rebel to God, right so is bothe sensualitee rebel to resoun and the body also.37

Chaucer's exposition of the orthodox medieval psychology of sin, of faculty psychology, of the tripartite nature of man, and of the function of reason as mediator between God and man provides a gloss upon the events, so far, in Book I of *The Faerie Queen*; the remainder of Book I has as its concern38 the spiritual and psychological impact


38 I here use the word "concern" in accordance with Howard's definition (*The Three Temptations*, p. 31): "On the grounds of some historic, mythic, or psychological theory, one may argue that a symbolic meaning was intended unconsciously by an author, was an unconscious expression of the beliefs and myths of his own age, or of
of a too-worldly orientation and submission to "the world, the flesh, and the devil"—of not heeding the Johanine injunction, "Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world" (I John 2: 15-16).

"Whan man synneth, a... ordre or ordinaunce is turned up-so-doun."
The Red Cross Knight's reason rebels against Truth, Faith, Una, God—first and only tentatively at Error's Den, later and definitively as a result of the Knight's deception at Archimago's. The Knight chooses the "lasie" and "laggard" dwarf in preference to Una. As a result of thus dethroning the Truth of Faith and relying unwisely upon frail, human, earthly reason, the Knight finds that reason unaided is insufficient to control "sensualitez"; even his attempt to restore due order is violent and bestial so that he acquires the characteristics of his opponent, Sans Loy. Moreover, "sensualitez" yields to "the body" as the Knight's affair with Duessa progresses, and he proceeds from innocence through suggestion and delectation to consent. Love of earthly things has made him forget his mission as a wayfaring, warfaring Christian knight; instead of pursuing the objective which he so eagerly requested as a boon from Glorianna, he voluntarily makes himself thrall universal archetypal forms. . . . It ["concern"] is something that happens in the relationship between the poet, his culture, and his work. Unlike "intention," it does not suggest an understood purpose; unlike "theme," it does not suggest a single, expressible idea; unlike "import," it does not suggest an effect on readers. The poet's consciousness of this concern is a matter of degree. . . . But in the work itself the concern—complex, paradoxical, often unresolved—is central in the formal structure as it is central in the poet's creative imagination. The concern of the poem is the informing dialectical force." [Author's italics.]
to earthly things, which are the snares of the devil.

Events in the narrative to this point enable the reader to make some tentative identifications of the characters in the opening pageant; the Red Cross Knight is the Christian knight on his worldly pilgrimage toward eternal life; Una is Truth, and the dwarf, the Knight's impotent and undeveloped (by no means "right") reason. The Knight only imperfectly comprehends the Truth in the nature of Faith, for instead of using the created world as a transparency, as a glass through which to see darkly the beauty of Faith, he becomes ensnared in the reflections which he sees mirrored. The Wandering Wood, Error's Den, and all of the aimless dallying which separate the Knight from his goal are the worldly snares which, as St. John had warned, seek to divert man from his true mission, the spiritual love of God. The dwarf, initially, occupies his proper position in the scheme which Hooker had preserved from medieval times, and which Chaucer's parson had graphically outlined: God (Una, Truth, Faith), reason, "Sensualitie," and "the body," a psychological adaptation of the hierarchical chain of being.

To make more explicit such an interpretation of the introductory icon, the poet traces in terms of actions and events the character dissolution which follows the Red Cross Knight's abandonment of truth and reason.

That complete and abandoned worldliness has not yet taken possession of the Red Cross Knight, even though he burns with lust for Duessa, Spenser makes clear at the Castle of Lucifera. The parade of the deadly sins fails to enchant him, and he thinks that Lucifera herself is too puffed up with her own importance. Indeed, the House of Pride and all the events which happen there represent the lure of the
transitory, mutable, earthly pleasures which serve to divert the aspiring Christian from his legitimate goal. After the Knight fails adequately (in Lucifera's and Duessa's opinions) to respond to the appeals of Idleness, Gluttony, Lochery, Avarice, Envy, and Wrath, he very nearly succumbs to a combination of Vainglory and spiritual pride. His worldly success in the tournament blinds him to the dangers of worldly attachments, and he gladly welcomes the ministrations of Lucifera; and, having been exposed to the world's evils without consciously embracing them, he becomes the victim of spiritual pride, thinking that his own virtue has sufficed to overcome temptation. But Stoic avoidance of sin and excess, because it lacks a metaphysical basis, produces only a grim and joyless self-satisfaction. Only the warning from his newly-awakened reason alerts him to the dangers which he faces in the House of Pride. He escapes, frightened with the palpable evidences of decay and dissolution which he sees about him; and his unaided reason, even while demonstrating the insubstantiality of the temporal, offers no hope of permanence and rest.

After his flight from involvement with the obviously illusory attractions of the fleeting sublunary world, where all is flux, all is Heraclitian fire, he succumbs to cynicism and ataraxia beside the magic fountain. Unburdened of his Christian knight's armor, he falls easy prey to Duessa's subtle invitation by immorally responding to lust of the flesh. Orgoglio, illustrating worldliness ("the world, the flesh, and the devil" of the Baptismal rite), traps the Knight into love of the world and things of the world by dangling his hook, baited with Duessa, before the young Knight's eyes. After the worldly giant has captured the Knight and imprisoned him in the charnel house of
naturalistic materialism, the dwarf, impotent to combat Orgoglio, and recognizing his own impotence, seeks aid from Una. But so knit up in his attachment to worldly things is the Red Cross Knight that the dwarf and Una are unable to pierce the walls of his prison to rescue him. Only the fortuitous intervention of Prince Arthur's supernatural power restores him to his freedom from worldly attachment.

At this climactic instant, this "fiery core," Spenser verifies the identifications, heretofore only tentative, of the characters in the introductory pageant, and the "allegorical" (I prefer the term "universal") significance of the narrative becomes unmistakable as pageant, character, and action coalesce. The Red Cross Knight, the young Christian knight, has become Everyman, and, as Everyman, recapitulates the universal drama of sin and redemption. Like all post-lapsarian men, he has but a severely truncated and infected reason. This enfeebled reason Spenser represents in the "dumb show" as the dwarf, "lasiu" and "laggard," loathe to bear Una's "bag of needments at his backe" (I.i.v). So Reason, the dwarf, is not only impotent; he is also rebellious toward his subjection to Una, or Truth. Consequently, the Red Cross Knight himself only dimly perceives Truth. Her own knew her not, because the Red Cross Knight, her own, was blear-eyed, looking through a glass darkly, so that he could not comprehend "the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." Unable to recognize Truth because his own ineffectual but proud reason has rebelled from its function of mediating between Truth and "Sensualitee," the Red Cross Knight must depend upon the feeble glimmer of his own rebellious human reason. "And by that way," Chaucer's parson tells us, "leseth reasoun the lordshippe over sensualitee and over the body, and al . . . ordre or
ordainance is turned up-so down." The Red Cross Knight becomes thrall to Orgoglio, his own passionate and sensual love of the world.

From this spiritual quagmire, not even the combined efforts of Reason and Truth can rescue the fallen Knight. An outside agency in the person of Prince Arthur must help by extirpating worldliness and restoring Truth and Reason to the Knight, so that Prince Arthur functions, in one sense at least, as a channel of grace for the Red Cross Knight.

Thomas P. Nelan places the Red Cross Knight's fall within the traditional framework of acceding to the calls of the world, the flesh, and the devil, presenting

the conformities between symbolizations of Redcrosse's spiritual enemies in the three figures—Archimago, Lucifera's House of Pride, and Duessa—and the moral theologians' triumvirate of man's assailants—the devil, the world, and the flesh—who allure man to the forfeiture of virtue and even of his salvation through his transgressions.39

As the Red Cross Knight's degradation follows the traditional medieval Christian scheme, so does his restoration to spiritual health. Grace infused—not "imputed"—emancipates him from his "Sensualitec," but does not fundamentally alter his nature; even though his

39"Catholic Doctrines in Spenser's Poetry," unpublished doctoral dissertation (New York University, 1943), p. 16. E. Hickey, in "Catholicity in Spenser," American Catholic Quarterly Review, XXXII (1907), 490-502, also places Spenser within the Catholic tradition on the basis of his analysis of temptations which face Red Cross; and Professor A. C. Hamilton, in "Spenser and Langland," SP, LV (1958), 533-548, has suggested that Spenser "would read Langland's poem as more than a Reformation tract ... [he would read it] as a religious vision central to his [Spenser's] own. Langland's poem was the unique Christian poem of epic proportions, and the single 'continued Allegory, or darke conceit,' written in England before his time" (pp. 535-536). According to Professor Hamilton's interpretation, then, the traditional steps in the process of turning from "the love of the Father" to "love of the world" would be Spenser's natural technique.
psychological and spiritual economy has been "justified," he still has not achieved sanctification, and a repetition of his former follies is not only possible, but even probable. We have already observed that Una's Truth, coupled with the Knight's human reason, has been incapable of restoring the Knight to even his earlier imperfect state; and we have seen that Arthur, as a channel of grace, unasked and unmerited, has freed the Knight from the bondage to worldliness. Una realizes that reinstatement to his former imperfect state promises no permanent reformation for the Red Cross Knight, and consequently, she determines upon a course of spiritual education which will effect fundamental changes in his nature. The truth of faith must be grounded not only in revealed truth, but must coinhere with a rational acceptance, insofar as metaphysics can approach theology. It is to achieve this spiritual education that Una plans to take the Knight to

... an auntient house not farre away,
Renowned throughout the world for sacred lore,
And pure unspotted life. . . .
(I.x.iii)

But apparently Una has not considered the psychological effects of his debasement upon the Red Cross Knight, nor does she know that the Knight has been unable to obliterate Sans Joy as an antagonist. His feelings of guilt and unworthiness, arising from realization that he has chosen Duessa in preference to Una, that his choice has been a perverted one, attaching him all the more securely to the "things of the world," bring a sense of debasement which the Renaissance called melancholy. Donald R. Howard points out that Christianity's counsel of perfection produced an almost unbearable tension in the life of every medieval Christian:
it demanded more of him than he could be expected to do. It asked
sainthood from men who, according to its own most fundamental
doctrines, were corrupted since the Fall by ignorance, concupis-
cence, and death. . . . To take seriously the responsibilities
of the Christian life was to submit oneself to an unending
struggle, a lifelong psychomachia between cupiditas and caritas,
between pride and humility, between temptation and virtue, between
this World and the next.40

Desperate feelings of unworthiness persisted into the Renaissance.
William Nelson cites a work illustrative of these feelings written in
Spenser's time by the preacher, Thomas Becon: A Dialogue between the
Christian Knight and Satan, Wherein Satan Moveth unto Desperation, the
Knight Comforteth Himself with the Sweet Promises of Holy Scripture.41
Robert Burton terminates his Anatomy of Melancholy with a treatment of
religious despair, an affliction which attacks "poor distressed souls,
especially if their bodies be predisposed by melancholy, they reli-
giously given, and have tender consciences."42 And Hooker, discussing
religious despair, apparently feels that it is a symptom of healthy
spiritual development:

Happier a great deal is that man's case, whose soul by inward
desolation is humbled, than he whose heart is through abundance
of spiritual delight lifted up and exalted above measure. Better
it is sometimes to go down into the pit with him, who, beholding
darkness and bewailing the loss of inward joy and consolation,
crieth from the bottom of the lowest hell, "My God, my God, why
hast thou forsaken me?" than continually to walk arm in arm with
angels, to sit as it were in Abraham's bosom, and to have no
thought, no cogitation, but "I thank my God it is not with me as
it is with other men." No, God will have them that shall walk in

40 Pages 38-39.

41 Nelson, p. 152. Becon's tract is reprinted in the Parker
Society's 1844 publication, "The Christian Knights."

42 Part 3, Sec. 4, Mem. 2, Subsec. 3.
light to feel now and then what it is to sit in the shadow of death. A grieved spirit is therefore no argument of a faithless mind.43

Abject contrition, then, according to Bacon, Burton, and Hooker, frequently accompanied spiritual growth, as the penitent Christian neophyte repeated, "Lord, I am not worthy." To Edmund Spenser, as to Richard Hooker, the confession of unworthiness was salutary so long as the penitent added the concluding statement, "but speak the word only, and my soul shall be healed." Moreover, Hooker's "going down into the pit" and the Red Cross Knight's descent into the Cave of Despair the sensitive Renaissance reader would associate with the symbolism attached to baptism, the symbolism of death to the "things of the world" and of rebirth to the "love of the Father."

Spenser, then, is in accord with both psychology and theology when he plunges the Red Cross Knight into the depths of despair as an early step in the ascent to sanctification. Moreover, the encounter with Despair enables the poet to employ dialectical exposition in restating the human condition which he has heretofore discussed only narratively, so that the Red Cross Knight recapitulates with increased intensity his humiliating debasement. Whereas in Cantos I-VIII, narrative has illustrated the Knight's foolhardiness in relying upon his own merely human intellect, the ninth Canto makes explicit the thematic significance of the narrative in the debate between the Knight and Despair; and the Knight bandies words with no more success than he has bandied weapons. His replies to Despair's sophistical rhetoric are orthodox, pedestrian.

and shallow, the product of unenlightened reason.

In the earlier Cantos, as we have seen, the Red Cross Knight ignored his mission and became foolishly involved in the pursuit of worldly pleasures and honors. In Canto IX, he presumes to interfere in the dispute between Despair and Sir Treuisan, rashly and deliberately seeking Despair. Hubris and failure to comprehend his own weaknesses have again enmeshed him in worldly affairs, chains from which he cannot escape unaided. Again, Una's injunction—this time a peremptory and impatient ejaculation—saves him:

... Fie, fie, faint harned knight, 
What meanest thou by this reprochfull strife? 
Is this the battell, which thou vauntst to fight 
With that fire-mouthed Dragon, horrible and bright?

Come, come away, frail, feeble, fleshly wight, 
Ne let vaire words bewitch thy manly hart, 
Ne diulish thoughts dismay thy constant spright. 
In heavenly mercies hast thou not a part? 
Why shouldst thou then despeire, that chosen art? 
Where justice growes, there grows eke greater grace, 
The which doth quench the brond of hellish smart, 
And that accurst hand-writing doth deface. 
Arise, Sir knight arise, and leave this cursed place. 
(I.ix.iii-liv)

Psychological perturbation has led the Red Cross Knight almost to suicide, despairing in his hope for salvation. As Becon in The Christian Knight had described the temptation to self-destruction, arising from despair, "the devil's principal weapons are Old Testament texts and the Knight's own conscience." But Una's active support insures Despair's defeat, for "infidelity, extreme despair, hatred of God and all godliness, obduration in sin, cannot stand where there is the least
Having thwarted the Red Cross Knight's death wish, Una continues with her plan to provide the "spark of faith, hope, love, [and] sanctity" at the House of Holiness.

The Red Cross Knight's adventures at the House of Holiness constitute what Professor Lewis refers to as "the allegorical core" of Book I, and the allegory remains as overtly didactic and medieval as it has been in the immediately preceding encounter with Despair, or as it had been in the procession of vices at the House of Pride. Superficially, the narrative recounts the Knight's sojourn at the House of Holiness, the seat of Dame Coelia and her three daughters, Fidelia, Speranza, and Charissa, where the Knight successfully undergoes restorative treatment for his disabilities (both spiritual and physical, for Spenser was a good enough psychologist to understand psychomatic relationships). One who has related the introductory emblem to the ensuing adventures of the Red Cross Knight has no difficulty in deciding that the incident means at least: the Red Cross Knight, overwhelmed by his sense of despair and unworthiness, follows the dictates of Truth and seeks spiritual succor.

Father Joseph B. Collins's *Christian Mysticism in the Elizabethan Age* interprets the episode in terms of orthodox Christian mysticism, the "attempt . . . of the individual soul to arrive at a self-proposed object, conceived as apart from itself in terms of the Absolute and

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final Reality. . . . The method of mysticism in general consists of purification of the soul, and by means of contemplation, its ascent to God." 47 Such an interpretation is not unique, for Professor Tillyard has concluded: "In sum the first book of the Faerie Queene is a Divine Comedy in Miniature." 48 Thus, he has placed Book I in the tradition of the spiritual pilgrimage of the Christian mystic, and both Padelford and Buyssens, while attributing the episode--fallaciously, in my opinion--to the introspection of Calvinism, 49 acknowledge that the entire first book is a pilgrim's progress, culminating in the Red Cross Knight's defeating the dragon, but explicable only in terms of the spiritual regeneration which the Knight experiences at the House of Holiness. On the basis of Sponser's almost perversely belligerent conservatism, medievalism, and orthodoxy, and because of the critical role which he assigned to reason, my interpretation follows that of Father Collins, rather than the reading of Professor Padelford and M. Buyssens.

Father Collins satisfactorily establishes as a separate and recognizable genre in Medieval and Renaissance literature the "Christian mystical tradition of the Pilgrimage of Life . . . [which works] can readily be classed as mystical treatises." He cites as belonging to

47 (Baltimore, 1940), pp. 1-2.


the tradition: 

Dacierius, or the Original Pilgrim: A Divine Dialogue, Showing the Most Compendious Way to Arrive at the Love of God, written anonymously in Spanish, translated into Italian, French, High and Low Dutch, and about 1587, into Latin; The Palioe of Honour (1501) by Gavin Douglas; The Pilgrimage of Perfection, anonymous, but printed by Pynson; and Philothoe's Pilgrimage to Perfection, John of the Holy Cross (1688). Father Collins continues by placing Book I of The Faerie Queens within the tradition of the Christian mystical pilgrimage of life:

In keeping with the fundamental conceptions of the type, the greater part of the Legend of Holiness in Book One, viz., the first nine cantos, depicts the successes and failures of the struggle of man, represented by the Red Cross Knight, against evil forces. In the House of Holiness, the specific discipline of Christian mysticism is prescribed to bring about a spiritual regeneration and final arrival at the sublime heights of mystical contemplation. Thus, the House of Holiness in the tenth canto stands apart from the other cantos as an allegory complete in itself of man's conversion and training toward spiritual perfection. And, moreover, it is an excellent exemplification, in form of allegory, of the methodology of Christian mysticism.

Dean Inge, Miss Underhill, and Professor Otto are in basic agreement with Father Collin's position that mystics, whether Christian, Platonic, Hindoo, or Jewish, employ a universally valid technique for achieving their arrival at the sublime heights of mystical contemplation. Dean Inge and Father Collins describe three steps in the "Way"; Miss Underhill divides the process into five plateaus. According to Miss Underhill, the way toward Reality or Union with God proceeds by

50 Pages 192-193.

successive steps upward, generally five in number. They are:

1. The awakening of the self to consciousness of Divine Reality, usually clear and abrupt, characterized by "intense feelings of joy and exaltation" (p. 169).

2. Purification of self, or purgation. Convinced that, paradoxically, "the beyond is within," the soul must be purified and must learn surrender to the Will of God. "This mortifying process is necessary not because the legitimate exercise of the senses is opposed to Divine Reality, but because those senses have usurped a place beyond their station; become the focus of energy, steadily drained the vitality of the self" (p. 220).

3. The illuminative stage, in which the soul begins to have a glimpse of God. This fleeting glimpse does not constitute the union with God, or the "spiritual marriage"; in the illuminative state, one simply passes "into the presence of God," while in the true Union, "he is swallowed up in the immensity and the deep quiet of the Godhead" (p. 220).

4. The Dark Night of the Soul, as St. John of the Cross called it, or the "mystic death," occurs when God seems to withdraw Himself from the soul of the mystic; this spiritually dry season separates the "state of beginners" from the "state of proficients," and is, itself, divided into two stages:
   a. Purgation of the senses
   b. Purgation of the spirit.

Following the extinction of the self, the soul desires nothing, asks nothing, is completely passive, and is thus prepared for
5. Union, which is the true goal of the mystic quest. In this state, one not only perceives and enjoys the Absolute Life, as in the illuminative stage; he becomes one with it (p. 171). Miss Underhill's five stages, Father Collins combines into three, which he refers to as: Purification, Contemplation, and Ascent. Because Miss Underhill's analysis is more detailed, and because the Red Cross Knight's experiences in the House of Holiness follow the more detailed exposition, I shall interpret that incident in the light of Miss Underhill's five-step analysis. Moreover, Dean Inge's explanation of the role of ethics unites the incidents in the House of Holiness to the pilgrimage theme. Dean Inge says:

The steps of the upward path constitute the ethical system, the rule of life, of the mystics. The first stage, the purgative life, we read in the *Theologia Germanica*, is brought about by contrition, by confession, by hearty amendment; and this is the usual language in treatises intended for monks. But it is really intended to include the civic and social virtues in this stage. They occupy the lowest place, it is true; but this only means that they must be acquired by all, though not all are called to the higher flights of contemplation. Their chief value, according to Plotinus, is to teach us the value of order and limitation... which are qualities belonging to the Divine nature.

Moreover, Inge interprets Plotinus: "The civic virtues *precede* the cathartic; but they are not, as with some perverse mystics, considered to lie outside the path of ascent."\(^{52}\) Consequently, we must interpret the Red Cross Knight's sojourn in the House of Holiness as an integral part of his pilgrimage; it is less a separate allegory, less complete in itself, than Professor Nelson and Father Collins would have us believe. The episode not only recapitulates the Red Cross Knight's overcoming the world, the flesh, and the devil; it explains, expands,
and extends the significance of the action that has preceded it. It serves, that is, not only as a summary, but as a further narrative development.

Book I of *The Faerie Queene* is complex, because the personality of the Red Cross Knight is complex. Miss Underhill has related the time-honored symbols through which mysticism enters literature to three general systems, each system corresponding to the temperament of the mystic. In effect, the Red Cross Knight incorporates all of those into his personality, as is proper for Everyman. First, Miss Underhill describes those who regard the Perfect as a "beatific vision exterior to them and very far off." Theirs is a flight to happier lands far away, and the images and symbols related to the pilgrimage are their natural metaphors. Second, Miss Underhill describes those "for whom mysticism is above all things an intimate and personal relation." These fall back upon imagery drawn from the language of earthly passion and marriage. The third group emphasizes the "Divine as a Transcendent Life immanent in the world and the self, and [is conscious] of a strange spiritual seed within them by whose development man, moving to higher levels of character and consciousness, attains his end." The second group utilizes imagery associated with marriage, and the third group, imagery associated with the "great Work" of the "Spiritual Alchemists." As a composite figure, the Red Cross Knight portrays all three temperaments, and Spenser utilizes all three basic systems of imagery to describe the Knight's spiritual adventures. The "Mystic Quest" imagery dominates the Red Cross Knight's chivalric pilgrimage;

53 Underhill, pp. 128-129.
the "Great Work" imagery, emphasizing regeneration, growth, or transmutation, his treatment in the House of Holiness; and the "Marriage of the Soul" imagery, the final canto. Dominant, however, is the "Mystic Quest" imagery, both because it coincides more completely with the chivalric-romance form of the narrative, and also because Spenser, like Plotinus, regards the civic virtues—ethics and morality—as necessary precedents to the cathartic process.

Following Miss Underhill's five-fold analysis of the spiritual ascent, we may interpret Book I:

1. The Red Cross Knight is awakened to the consciousness of Divine Reality when he receives as a boon from Gloriana the mission to rescue Una's ancient parents from the dragon.

2. The Knight's "purification of self, or purgation" occupies the adventures in Cantos I-VIII. He learns to subdue "sensualitie," to eschew his attachment to worldly things, and to aspire toward complete "love of the Father" through contemptus mundi.

3. The illuminative stage occurs after the Knight's release from worldly bondage to "sensualitie" at Orgoglio's prison. He realizes the folly and sinfulness of his pursuit of Duessa in preference to Una. Nonetheless, he does catch a glimpse of Truth, he does "pass into the presence of God," even though he does not achieve Union.

4. The "mystic death" or "Dark Night of the Soul" corresponds to the encounter with Despair and the preparatory events in the House of Holiness.

5. Union, in the mystics' sense, does not occur; the Red Cross
Knight is betrothed to Una in the final canto, but their union is delayed. Social obligations have a legitimate and urgent claim which the Knight must successfully heed before he can devote himself to the ecstasy of the mystic union.

On the other hand, interpretation of the Red Cross Knight's spiritual ascent in the House of Holiness most nearly conforms to Father Collins's three-fold analysis: Purification, Contemplation, and Ascent. Allegorically, Spenser represents the three stages by means of the House of Holiness, the Hospital of Mercy, and the Mountain of Contemplation—purification, contemplation and ascent.

In the House of Holiness, which Spenser also calls the "house of Penamnos" (I.x.xxxii), we find the poet's delineation of the purgative way—the "gradual purification of the Christian who has finally turned and entered upon the 'narrow road' which leads to perfect and lasting Holiness." That the Red Cross Knight should be conducted into the presence of Coelia by the porter, Humilita, even though the idea has many precedents in the literature of Christian mysticism, is a departure from classical Greek teaching. For the Christian mystics, however, humility marks the beginning of all spiritual progress. "Stouping low," the Red Cross Knight follows Humilita on the 'streight and narrow way,' and his soul becomes amenable to the heaven-born virtues, the

54 Collins, p. 194.

55 Comparison of the Knight's entrance into the House of Holiness (I.x.v-viii) with his entrance into the "sinfull house of Pride" (I. iiiiii.vi-vii) heightens the significance of the Christian imagery and the Biblical allusion. Such a comparison also indicates the care with which Spenser has used the rhetorical topic of difference to develop his argument.
first of which is Faith. In the "schoolhouse of Faith, the Knight acquires "celestial discipline," and "heavenly learning"; from Fidelia's "sacred Book, with blood writ," he learns truths

That weaker wit of man could never reach,
Of God, of grace, of justice, of free will.
(I.x.xix)

Fidelia's lessons, while increasing the Knight

To such perfection of all heavenly grace,
That wretched world he gan for to abhor,
And mortal life gan loath, as thing forlorn,
Grieved with remembrance of his wicked ways,
And pricked with anguish of his sins so sore,
That he desir'd to end his wretched days;
So much the dart of sinfull guilt the soule dismayes.
(I.x.xxi)

But in Fidelia's classroom, he does not plumb the depths of misery and self-accusation as he had in his encounter with Despair, for "wise Speranza gave him comfort sweet" (I.x.xxii). There is no repetition of the suicidal despair, even though his growing holiness leads him to contempt of the world and of himself, even though the recollection of his sins and faults grieves his soul. Hope calms and reassures him, and Coelia provides a leech, Patience, a physician of the soul who can cure a grieved conscience (St. Paul, in II Cor. 6: 4, names patience as an attribute of the ministers of God).

Once begun, purgation proceeds apace to cleanse away the residua peccati. Solitude, fasting, penitential garb of sackcloth and ashes--even corporal penance--are the Red Cross Knight's lot as he prays early

56 Father Collins (p. 195) quotes St. Thomas: "Order is two-fold: order of generation, and order of perfection . . . . In the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity . . . . But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope, because faith and hope are given life by charity. For charity is the mother and root of all the virtues" (Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 52, a. 4).
and late. Gradually, these ascetic practices assuage his remorse and restore him to spiritual health. Whereas at the Cave of Despair he had suffered natural remorse which moved him to thoughts of self-destruction, he adds supernaturally motivated repentance to remorse in the House of Caelia, so that there remains hope for amendment and regeneration of the soul to a new life. Purgation complete, he enters upon the Illuminative Way.

At the hands of Charity he attends the school of virtue,

Of lour, and righteousnesse, and well to donne,
And wrath, and hatred warely to shonne,

In which when him she well instructed hath,
From thence to heavan she teacheth him the ready path.

(I.x.xxxiii)

As Faith had sustained him throughout the stages of purgation, so Charity or divine love guides him through the Illuminative Way, step by step: love, righteousness, and good works. Mercy, Charity's daughter, demonstrates the truth of the Johanine Summary of the Law that agape leads to charity, in her "holy hospital" with its seven men of prayer and charity illustrating corporal works of mercy. The seven works of mercy culminate in charity very much as St. Thomas explained: "The sum-total of the Christian religion in respect to external works consists in the exercise of mercy."57 Father Collins points out that the Illuminative Way "is not a stage of quiet or of inaction, but one of working and doing good. It must include the requirements of the active life, which of necessity involves the seven corporal works."58 The active

57 Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 30, a. 4, ad 2; quoted in Collins, p. 200.
58 Page 200.
life and the contemplative life are not opposed. Activity must precede contemplation. 59

The Red Cross Knight remains for awhile in the Hospital of Mercy,

During which time, in every good behest
And godly works of Almes and charitee
She him instructed with great industree;
Shortly therein so perfect he became,
That from the first vnto the last degree,
His mortall life he learned had to frame
In holy righteousnesse, without rebuke or blame.
(I.x.xlv)

The Illuminative Way begins to merge gradually with the way of Union, beginning at the foot of the Mount of Contemplation (I.x.xlv), whence Mercy leads the Knight. At the top of the mountain lives an "aged holy man, Contemplation" (I.x.xlvi), into whose presence Mercy leads the Knight after the difficult ascent. The holy man is an accomplished mystic who often sees God

... from heauens hight,
All were his earthly eyen both blunt and bad,
And through great age had lost their kindly sight,
Yet wondrous quick and persant was his spright,
As Eagles eye, that can behold the Sunne.
(I.x.xlvii)

Reluctantly and only at the request of Mercy does he "lay his heavenly thoughts aside," for "he would not once haue moued for the knight."

Learning that Mercy has brought the Red Cross Knight to him for instruction, he becomes the Knight's spiritual director. The Red Cross Knight in contemplative ecstasy sees the heavenly Jerusalem

59 Reformation misunderstanding to the contrary notwithstanding, mystical theology had insisted upon this complementary association of the active with the contemplative. For instance, Walter Hilton, in The Scale of Perfection (I.ii), insists that "the active life consisteth in love and charity exercised by good corporal works, in fulfilling of God's commandments, and the seven works of mercy... Those works, though they be but active, yet dispose a man in the beginning to attain afterwards to contemplation."
. . . that God has built
For those to dwell in, that are chosen his,
His chosen people purg'd from sinful guilt,
With precious blood, which cruelly was spilt
On cursed tree, of that unspotted lam,
That for the sinnes of all the world was kilt.
(I.x.lvii)

He wishes to remain, but Contemplation points out that he must completo
his earthly pilgrimage before he can enter the "new Hierusalem."
Understanding that, once his earthly obligations have been discharged,
he will be able to return permanently to the heavenly city, the Red
Cross Knight's pilgrimage to perfection successfully ends.

Spenser has effectively represented the processes of the final
stage or way of the mystical life, leaving the Red Cross Knight fully
accomplished in the virtue of holiness through participation in the
recognizable steps in the mystical way of union--purgation, illumination,
and union. As a man now schooled in the virtue of holiness, the Red
Cross Knight is complete, and he goes forth adequately equipped for his
climactic encounter with the "old Dragon."

In his justifiable exhortations against seeking a too-systematic
allegorical interpretation of The Faerie Queene, Professor Lewis has
said that Spenser probably knew little of "technical theology," but
that he was
certainly in his own way, a religious man. And also a religious
poet. But the deepest and most spontaneous, and most ubiquitous
devotion of that poet goes out to God, not as the One of Plotinus,
or as the Calvinist's predestinator, nor even as the Incarnate
Redeemer, but as "the glad Creator" the fashioner of flower and
forest and river, of excellent trout and pike, of months and
seasons, of beautiful women and "lovely knights," of love and
marriage, of sun, moon and planets, of angels, above all of light.
He sees the creatures in Charles Williams' phrase as "illustrious with being." 60

On the other hand, Professor Kermode argues against such a drastic oversimplification, pointing out the poet's double vision through which he "saw this world as a vast infolded mutually relevant structure, as inclusive as the Freudian dream; but he also saw it as disconnected, decaying, mutable, disorderly." 61

Knowledge of "technical" systematic theology was not requisite to the mystics' attempt to experience knowledge of God directly, rather than through orthodox, institutional means. Indeed, it is their very effort to circumvent the sacramental and institutional requirements of organized religion through intimate personal experience that has resulted in the Church's wary attitude toward mystics. Moreover, the writing of the mystics depends little upon knowledge of systematic theology; Father Collins remarks that "mysticism was not to be found solely in the literature of theology or philosophy" (p. 75), but that "the accession of Queen Elizabeth in 1558 and a quarter of a century thereafter witnessed a steady flow of Christian mystical writings into England from foreign sources," probably because, "easily detached from all external ecclesiastical order, subjective in nature, Christian Mysticism furnished a means of fervent and personal intercourse and


union with God, open alike to Protestant and Catholic."

One illustration of such non-technical, non-theological, non-ecclesiastical, mystical literature of the sixteenth century is the translation which Princess Elizabeth made in 1544 as a New Year's gift to her step-mother, Katherine Parr: Queen Margaret of Navarre's Le Miroir de l'ame pecharese, which the Princess entitled The Mirror of the Sinful Soul. Subsequently, John Bole published the Princess's translation in 1548 as A Godly Medytacyon of the Christen Soule, Com-pyled in French by Lady Margaret Queene of Navarre; and Aptly Translated into Englysh by the Right Vertuose Lady Elisabeth, Daughter to our Late Soverayme Kyng Henry the VIII. In the Appendix of Christian Mysticism in the Elizabethan Age, Father Collins lists ninety-three mystical writings published in England in the sixteenth century, as an indication of the availability of such literature. Consequently, since mystical writings do not require theological sophistication, since there is excellent evidence that mystical literature circulated freely in Elizabethan England, and on the basis of the Red Cross Knight's spiritual regeneration in the House of Holiness, we may conclude that Spenser was conscious of the mystical tradition and that he employed it in his narrative of the young Knight's acquisition of holiness. In addition, the tradition of Christian Humanism defines right reason: "Where there is rational knowledge and judgment, there is reason. Where there is in addition an inclination of the will toward virtue, and the habit of trying to follow that inclination, there is right

62Collins, p. 81.
Mankind, however, in Adam's fall, forfeited his ability freely to choose, freely to exercise the decisions of right reason. Post-lapsarian man retains measures of reason, judgment, and the power of choice; he lacks, however, freedom to exercise fully those powers. He regains much of his forfeited freedom only through the effects of grace whereby reason and will coalesce. Consequently, right reason implies that innate human reason must be submerged, illuminated, and strengthened by divine grace. To the Christian Humanist, right reason results from rectifying and regenerating fallen man's human reason, from reparing him insofar as the ineradicable residuum of original sin permits.

The entire experience of the Red Cross Knight reveals Spenser's understanding of the orthodox techniques for restoring degenerate human reason to something approaching its paradisaic perfection; the Knight first learns to overcome the "things of the world," and then he learns through meditation the true "love of the Father"--the two means, continence and faith, which Medieval and Renaissance humanists specified for reestablishing fallen man to his rightful place in the chain of being. Having achieved holiness through continence and faith, the young Knight is now fit to continue his mission of sustaining the part of truth against error. Not only has Una told him that he is elected to the Kingdom, Contemplation has revealed to him his glorious destiny as St. George, patron saint of England. And Spenser through the rhetorical device of etymology has exemplified the translation of the Red Cross Knight, "of earth, earthy," to St. George's spiritual state of

sanctification, whereby he may dwell in Him [Christ], and He [Christ] may dwell in the Red Cross Knight, now St. George.

It is as St. George, not only justified but also sanctified, that the young Knight encounters Satan, and it is through heavenly grace that St. George is able to overcome the devil. Una refers to her champion as being "above all knights on earth, that battle undertake" (I.xi.ii). Moreover, the imagery which Spenser employs throughout the eleventh canto to contrast the dragon with St. George emphasizes that the battle is a fight between two worlds: the dragon, as worldliness, holds fallen Eden in captivity, and the transfigured Knight, representing other-worldliness, is determined to release Everyman from captivity. The dragon first appears as a feature of the landscape, an earthy lump arising from the topography,

Where stretcht he lay upon the sunny side
Of a great hill, himself like a great hill.

St. George, on the other hand, the poet identifies by "those glistring armes, that heaven with light did fill" (I.xi.iv). Preliminary sparring aside, the dragon soars into the air with both the Knight and his steed, only to find himself encumbered

As a hagard hauke presuming to contend
With hardie fowle, aboue his hable might,
His weareie pounces al in vaine doth spend,
To trusse the pray too heauen for his flight;
Which comming donowe to ground, does free it selfe by fight.
(I.xi.xix)

St. George, his spear miraculously glancing from the "bras-plated body" to the tender unprotected flesh under the monster's wing, enrages his adversary. The dragon, raging, counterattacks, so that the charger throws St. George to the ground. Returning to a pervasive image, the poet figuratively permits the character's beastly nature, his horse, to
dislodge St. George’s recently acquired self-mastery. But whereas in earlier episodes the Red Cross Knight’s failure to maintain a just hierarchy of his faculties had led to catastrophe, St. George quickly recuperates, for, right reason regnant, he is one

... who can quickly ryse
From off the earth, with durtie bloud distaynd,
For that reprochfull fall right fowly he disdaynd.
(I.xi.xxiii)

Here, obviously, the poet invites the reader to wider and even universal applications; by referring to “that reproachfull fall,” he extends his meaning from the literal event, to the psychological truism, to the original fall in which all men lost their perfect freedom of judgment. By the same token, Spenser indicates that the rider can regain control of his mount, that right reason can reestablish a fitting psychological economy, and that the man who through grace has acquired right reason can largely overcome his fall. But with exquisite theological nicety, the poet indicates that not all of the effects of the fall are overcome, for St. George remains “With durtie bloud distaynd”; post-lapsarian man never regains his posse non pecoare, is never in this mutable world completely reparadised. Furthermore, St. George must interrupt his rhapsodic spiritual union on the Mount of Contemplation because ethical and moral claims recall him to the world of affairs; nor can he remain indefinitely in Paradise, united with Una.

To reiterate the seriousness of the battle between St. George and the dragon, the poet in an epic simile heightens the violence and the universality of the stakes:

He [the dragon] cryde, as raging seas are wont to rore,
When wintry storme his wrathfull wreak does threat,
The rolling billowes beat the ragged shore,
As they the earth would shoulder from her seat,
And greedye gulf doth gape, as he would eat
His neighbour element in his revenge:
Then gin the blustering brethren boldly threat,
To move the world from off his stedfast henge,
And boystrous battell make, each other to avenge.

(I.xi.xxii)

In little, then, the poet epitomizes the theme of discord as threatening to dissolve the *concordia discord* in which regenerate human nature battles unregenerate, in which "love of the Father" attempts to subdue "love of all that is in the world." Under the limitations imposed by original sin, mankind, as concentrated in St. George, struggles to conquer the forces which lead him toward damnation.

St. George's miraculously guided stroke cripples the dragon so that he cannot fly, and the monster retaliates, belching forth such unbearable flames that the Knight's armor becomes a searing torment to him. The Knight "thought his armor to leave, and helmet to vnlace" (I.xi.xxvi), for it is the armor itself which intensifies the burning pain. But before he can take off the "whole armor of God," the dreadful dragon's coiled tail overthrows the Red Cross Knight and his charger; at once, another miracle occurs to succor the hard-pressed Knight: he stumbles into the well of life, which could restore life to the dead and "guilt of sinfull crimes cleane wash away" (I.xi.xxx). The supernatural efficacy of the well of life, the poet insists upon by his rhetorical comparison with well-known spas, famous for their physically therapeutic effects; neither Bath nor the "german Spa," neither Silo nor Jordon, neither Cephise nor Hebrus could compare with the restorative virtues of the well of life.

As evening falls, the dragon, thinking that he has overcome his enemy, crows his victory cry, and the Knight's "pensiue Ladie" fears
that her champion has been defeated. She prays and laments.

The poet has once again emphasized that the choice between that world which *seems*; or appears to exist, and the world which eternally *is*, is no easy one; even those strong in faith, temperate, possessed of right reason, fall. Even though they fall, however, they are protected by divine grace, and consequently, can rise again. Moreover, a determined resistance against the old dragon wounds him. As the serpent in the Genesis story was condemned to crawl upon his belly and ever afterwards to eat dust, so the dragon loses his ability to soar and becomes earth-bound.

The morning of the second day, St. George rises from the well of miraculous grace,

\begin{verbatim}
As Eagle fresh out of the Ocean waue,
Where he hath left his plumes all hoary gray,
And deckt himselfe with feathers youthly gay,
Like Eyas hauke vp mounts vnto the skies,
His newly budded pineons to assay,
And marueilos at himselfe, still as he flies.
\end{verbatim}

This apotheosis, this daring transfiguration whereby the Knight fights with a strength not his own, as a trained hawk flies with "newly budded pineons," deliberately evokes an association with Christ, or at least with an imitation of Christ, anticipating the figure in Father Hopkins's "The Windhover (to Christ our Lord)"

\begin{verbatim}
Brute beauty and valour and act, oh, air, pride, plume, here
Buckle! And the fire that breaks from thee then, a billion
Times lovelier, more dangerous, O my chevalier!
\end{verbatim}

Deliberately proving his newly restored might, St. George deals the dragon a fierce blow; and, for some reason, the sword is able to penetrate the monster's skull. Either, the poet explains, the holy water hardened the metal in the Knight's sword,
Or his baptized hands now greater grew;
Or other secret vertue did ensew.

(I.xi.xxxvi)

Never before had mere mortal been able to wound the dragon.

Pain from the unaccustomed wound infuriates the dragon, so that he thrusts his "mortall sting," "his angry needle" through the Knight's shield--that part of the Christian's armor which St. Paul equates with faith into his shoulder. So firmly imbedded is the sting that St. George has to sever the monster's tail to free himself. Even further enraged, the dragon rises upon his "vneuen wings" and attacks the shield again, this time with his claws. Because he cannot wrest his shield from the monster, again St. George resorts to his sword and forces the dragon to relinquish it. As he had done when hard pressed on the first day, the dragon once more resorts to his fiery breath to consume the Knight. Again,

It chaunst (eternall God that chaunce did guide)
As he recoyled backward, in the mire
His nigh forwearied feable feat did slide,
And downe he fell, with dread of shame sore terriflde.

(I.xi.xlv)

St. George falls under the tree of life, from which "a trickling strame of Balme, most soueraine" flows. The dragon "durst not approch, for he was deadly made" (I.xi.xlix), so St. George lies undisturbed, nearer death than life. Once more, Una prays the night away, and St. George rises with the sun on the third day, "all healed of his hurts and woundes wide" (I.xi.lii). As the fiery dragon attacks, roaring

64 St. Paul advocates use of "the shield of faith, with which you can quench all the flaming darts of the evil one." Eph. 6: 16.

65 St. George's sword has become St. Paul's "sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God." Eph. 6: 17.
his challenge, St. George fatally wounds him in the mouth.

In Canto XI, Spenser has emphasized that only regenerate man can overcome pride, sin, love of the world; that even regenerate man has lapses, but that grace again restores him; that St. George, protected in the whole armor of God, with the shield of faith, and with the Sword of the Spirit, has been able to free Una's ancient parents from their thralldom to "the direfull feend," and has restored Eden to its paradisiacal freedom, insofar as possible.

Having fought the good fight, St. George receives the thanks and congratulations of the populace in the besieged city, as

Then all the people, as in solemn feast,
To him assembled with one full consort,
Rejoycing at the fall of that great beast,
From whose eternall bondage now they were releast.
(I.xii.iv)

Una's aged father wants to "deuize of ease and euorlasting rest" (I. xii.xvii), but St. George tells him:

Of ease or rest I may not yet deuize;
For by the faith, which I to armes haue plight,
I bounden am streight after this emprize,
As that your daughter can ye well aduize,
Backe to returne to that great Faerie Queene,
And her to serue six yeares in warlike wize,
Gainst that proud Paynim king, that workes her teene:
Therefore I ought craue pardon, till I there haue beene.
(I.xii.xviii)

With true courtesy, the king understands, and offers to St. George his daughter's hand and his kingdom upon the Knight's return in six years. For the first time, St. George sees Una, not as she seemed to be, but as she truly is:

So faire and fresh, as freshest flowre in May;
For she had layd her mournefull stole aside,
And widow-like sad wimple throwne away,
Wherewith her heavenly beautie she did hide,
Whiles on her wearie iourney she did ride;
And on her now a garment she did weare,
All lilly white, withouten spot, or pride,
That seemd like silke and siluer wouen neare,
But neither silke nor siluer therein did appeare.
(I.xii.xxii)

But, because man in this life cannot enjoy union with God and therefore
must be content with occasional glimpses of the truth, St. George has
to return to his earthly pilgrimage. Contemplation and the beatific
vision are valid refreshments for the wayfaring, warfaring Christian,
but ethical and moral considerations have claims, too. St. George
heads his duty and rides off, after plighting his troth to Una and
agreeing to return in the alloted time.

John Milton's appraisal of Book II applies to book I as well:

As therefore the state of man now is; what wisdom can there
be to choose, what continence to forbear, without the knowledge of
evil? He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits
and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and
yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true warfaring
Christian. I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue
unexercised and unbroathed, that never sallies out and sees her
adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland
is to be run for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring
not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much rather; that
which purifies us is trial and trial is by what is contrary. That
virtue therefore which is but a youngling in the contemplation of
evil, and knows not the utmost that vice promises to her fol-
lowers, and rejects it, is but a blank virtue, not a pure; her
whiteness is but an excremental whiteness.66

C. Right Reason in Book II

In Book I of The Faerie Queane, Spenser developed the idea that
naive faith, unsupported by right reason, uneducated by experience, and
unsustained by divine grace, could not overcome the sin of concupis-
cence—the love of the world, the flesh, and the devil, in preference

to love of the Father. Book II, the poet employs to investigate the difficulties of the man perfected in the classical virtues, but unsupported by faith; temperate (as Spenser understood the term) for the sake of ataraxia, not for the sake of Christian charity; of the man whose classical reason did not constitute wisdom, because it lacked the capstone, relationship through right reason with the wisdom of God.

Professor Merritt Y. Hughes in "The Christ of Paradise Regained and the Renaissance Tradition" finds that

Milton's treatment of Christ as an ideal figure "above Heroic" ([P. R.,] I, 15), and his integration of that conception with both his theology and his cosmology resulted from a complex of historical forces .... Among the greatest of those forces was the effort of the preceding centuries to christianize the Aristotelian ideal of the magnanimous man--the effort which came to a head in the Arthur of The Faerie Queene, whom Professor H. S. V. Jones reminds us that Spenser regarded as a link uniting his "several virtues to God."67

Hughes continues by finding that the medieval conception of the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity, rather than Reformation misinterpretations of St. Augustine, and rather than Stoic ataraxia, "played a decisive part in the contemptus mundi of the hero of Paradise Regained."68

Of course, to embrace an interpretation that finds in Book II Christian didacticism is, in large measure, to reject Professor Woodhouse's complete separation of "the realm of nature" from the "realm of grace":

The two orders of nature and of grace were universally accepted as a frame of reference .... within [which] there was room for every

67 SP, XXXV (1938), 258. Professor Jones's article, cited by Hughes, is: "The Faerie Queene and the Medieval Aristotelian Tradition," JEGP, XXV (1925), 293.

68 Hughes, p. 258.
degree of difference in attitude and emphasis ... To the
Christian, of course, both orders were subject to the power and
providence of God, but exercised in a manner sufficiently
different to maintain a clear-cut distinction between the two. 69

Professor Theodor Gang anticipated my position:

They distinguished between nature and grace, natural and superna­
tural, flesh and spirit, the world and Christ, and many other
similarly paired concepts. But these distinctions are not all of
exactly the same kind .... Some of these pairs express a sharp
opposition; others such as "natural" and "supernatural" are not,
strictly speaking, pairs of opposites at all. It is therefore a
mistake to regard these pairs of concepts as special cases of one
grand antinomy; and even more misleading to say that this antinomy
can be assimilated to the distinction between the Two Realms, as
the earlier Protestants understood it. 70

Because theological views about the separation between God and fallen
man provide one of the bases for ascribing to the poet either Catholic
or radical Protestant thinking, it appears that Professor Woodhouse,
already convinced of Spenser's adherence to Calvinistic doctrines of
human depravity, has read into Books I and II of  The Faerie Queene 
a
more serious hiatus in the chain of being than has Professor Gang.
Assuming with Professors Virgil K. Whitaker and Robert Hoopes that
Spenser's position within the framework of Christian Humanism was
similar to the position which Richard Hooker espoused, I read  The
Faerie Queene  as arising from a body of doctrine which posits that the
chain of being is a continuum of which man is the middle link. 71

p. 195.

70 "Nature and Grace in  The Faerie Queene: The Problem Reviewed,"
ELH, XXVI (1959), 1.

71 Hoopes,  Right Reason in the English Renaissance; Professor
Hoopes further clarifies his position regarding Spenser's religious
position in "God Guide Thee, Guyon: Nature and Grace Reconciled in
to the arguments of both Hoopes and Whitaker are Professor A. C.
Hamilton's articles, "'Like Race to Runne': The Parallel Sturcuture of
Professor Woodhouse believed that Book I "moves (as has been generally recognized) on the religious level, of grace, and the remaining books (as has not been recognized) on the natural level." He found that while the Red Cross Knight is indeed microchristus, Guyon and the other titular heroes are but microcosmus. That Spenser utilizes the distinction between microchristus and microcosmus is obvious; it seems equally obvious that Book II, as well as Book I, moves on both levels, the level of nature and the level of grace. Not to realize that in Book II the poet is concerned with Sir Guyon's transmutation from the purely secular man to the whole Christian gentleman, it seems to me, is to miss completely the point of Book II, to destroy the parallel relationship between Books I and II, and to vitiate whatever thematic unity there may be in the incomplete Faerie Queene.

This discussion of Book II, then, derives from the following


Page 198. The distinction between microcosmus and microchristus Professor Woodhouse adapted from The Ancient Bounds (London, 1645), reprinted in Woodhouse's Puritanism and Liberty (London, 1932). That anonymous work made the distinction thus: "Christ Jesus, whose is the kingdom, the power, and the glory both in nature and in grace, hath given several maps and schemes of his dominions. . . . of his special and peculiar kingdom, the kingdom of grace. Which kingdoms, though they differ essentially or formally, yet they agree in one common subject-matter, man and societies of men, though under a diverse consideration. And not only man in society, but every man individually, is an epitome either of one only or of both these dominions. Of one only: so every man (who in a natural consideration is called microcosmus, and epitome of the world), in whose conscience God hath his throne, ruling him by the light of nature civil outward good and end. Of both: so every believer who, besides this natural conscience and rule, hath an enlightened conscience, carrying a more bright and lively stamp of the kingly place and power of the Lord Jesus, swaying him by the light of faith or scripture, and such may be called microchristus, the epitome of Christ mystical."
assumptions: Book II, as Book I had done, moves on both the religious and the natural levels; Book I illustrates through allegory the poet's belief that naive faith is insufficient to guide man without experience, grace, and authoritative instruction; Book II illustrates through allegory that man, no matter how reasonable, well instructed, and no matter how securely he maintains the classical virtue of temperance, nonetheless is incomplete without faith; Books I and II establish the primacy of faith grounded in right reason and wisdom as a prerequisite to the Renaissance ideal of the complete man; Books III, IV, V, and VI deal with basic social and personal problems such as love, justice, and courtesy, problems on the microcosmic level viewed in the light of the microchristic level (insofar as humanly attainable) attained by the titular heroes in Books I and II; "The Cantoes of Mutability" overtly debate the question of which "order," the natural or the religious, provides for mankind in general the more integrated conception of his role in the chain of being and the more ready way for man to achieve communion with God.

A commonplace of Spenser criticism points out that the encounter between Sir Guyon and the Red Cross Knight in Canto I of Book II comprises a narrative transition between the two books. Just as significant is the fact that the encounter makes a thematic transition, as well. Archimago, Duessa, and the Red Cross Knight, important characters in Book I, appear in the first episode of Book II, and each retains the identifying characteristics the reader had learned to associate with him in the first book. Archimago, for instance, Spenser identifies initially only by allusions to Book I:
That cunning Architect of cancred guile,
Whom Princes late displeasure left in bands,
For falsed letters and suborned wile.

(I.1.1)

These identifying characteristics no careful reader would fail to associate with Archimago; nor would he fail to interpret the deliberately and falsely contrived enmity between the Red Cross Knight and Sir Guyon as Archimago's attempt to engender discord between Holiness and Temperance. The enchanter is up to his old tricks again, seeking to substitute discord for unity, hatred for charity, love of the things of the world for love of the Father.

As the Red Cross Knight's encounter with Error in the first canto of Book I had foreshadowed emblematically his subsequent battle with the dragon in the eleventh canto, so the conflict between Sir Guyon and the Red Cross Knight foreshadows the action of Book II. Book II opens with a theological observation that man as a result of the fall has lost his pristine natural goodness, and that the posse peccare resulting from original sin is now his natural heritage: Archimago, as the personification of the eternal forces of evil, has escaped from his confinement and is again on the prowl. Realizing that Una is unassailable, Archimago concentrates upon debasing her beloved Red Cross Knight, much as Milton's Satan, convinced of God's invulnerability, concentrated upon the corruption of God's most favored creature, man. Moreover, repeating the ruse which had ensnared the Knight and separated him from Una, Archimago creates a visible lie, for

. . . vnder simple shew and semblant plaine
Lurckt false Duessa secretly vnseeen,
As a chast Virgin, that had wronged beene.

(II.i.xxii)

This entire episode is so overtly allegorical that it is one of
the few incidents in Tha Faeris Quaene capable of the "four level" analysis outlined in a letter attributed to Dante,\textsuperscript{73} and because emblematically (like the "dumb-show" before the play, so to speak) it contains in miniature the action and the significance of the entire book, we shall examine it carefully as an indicator of future events in the "Legend of Temperance."

The first two stanzas rapidly connect Book II with Book I, relate the significant events that have occurred in the meantime, and leave Archimago yearning for revenge, while Una

\begin{quote}
... enioyes sure peace for ouermore,  
As weather-beaten ship arriu'd on happie shore.
\end{quote}

(II.i.ii)

Archimago determines to employ every device, every stratagem, in his large arsenal of deceit to debase the Knight. But, having tried direct attacks to no avail in his previous adventures, he decides to work obliquely, for

\begin{quote}
... well he kend,  
His credit now in doubtfull ballaunce hong;  
For hardly could be hurt, who was already stong.
\end{quote}

(II.i.iii)

As the enchanter is casting about for a suitable device, "in hope to win occasion to his will" (II.i.v), he sees a "goodly knight," suitably armed, "marching vnderneath a shady hill." Significant to note are the facts that the "goodly knight" is in the shade and that by the rhetorical device of \textit{characterismus} the poet indicates his attitude toward the knight, who, we later learn, is Sir Guyon, the Knight of Temperance:

\footnote{Charles S. Singleton discusses both the authorship of the letter and the application of the "four-level" reading to Dante's own work in "Dante's Allegory," \textit{Speculum}, XXV (1950), 78-85.}
A goodly knight, all armd in harnesse meete,
That from his head no place appeared to his feete.

His carriage was full comely and uprighl,
His countenaunce demure and temperate,
But yet so sterno and terrible in sight,
That cheard his friends, and did his foes amate.

(II.i.v-vi)

Accompanying Sir Guyon is an old man,

A comely Palmer, clad in blacke attire,
Of ripest years, and haires all hoarie gray,
That with a staffe his feeble steps did stire,
Least his long way his aged limbes should tire:
And if by lookes one may the mind aread,
He seemd to be a sage and sober sire.

(II.i.vii)

In this vignetto, comparable to the iconographic procession which
initiated Book I, it is significant that, whereas the "lasic, laggard
dwarfe" had dawdled behind, obviously irritating the Red Cross Knight
and his charger with his slow pace, Sir Guyon has submitted himself to
the guidance of the "sage and sober" Palmer, and has in turn "taught
his trampling steed with equall steps to tread" (II.i.vii). Sir Guyon,
heedig his guide, has secured easy mastery over his mount, in contrast
to the Red Cross Knight's extremes. Approaching Sir Guyon, whom Spenser
has thus identified with the characteristics of temperance maintaining
mastery over his base nature by heeding reason, Archimago first begins
his assault upon this, his secondary goal, by flattery and by an appeal
to the temperate man's vainglorious regard for fame. Sir Guyon stops
to hear the old wretch's tale, a malicious fabrication to the effect
that a knight has raped the young woman whom he (Archimago, the "humble
miser") serves as squire. Inconced more with the knight's violation of
knightly honor than he is with his violation of the young woman, Sir
Guyon "therewith amoued from his sober mood" (II.i.xii), accompanies the
Squire to talk with the raped woman. Evidence of Sir Guyon's difficulty in restraining his temper appears in the poet's rhetorical description; Sir Guyon with "fierce ire" and "zealous haste" is quickly gone—apparently leaving the Palmer behind. The dishonored lady, urged by her Squire and by Sir Guyon, identifies her attacker as the Red Cross Knight. Amazed that the Knight of Holiness should be involved in such an affair, Sir Guyon nevertheless agrees to tax him with the lady's accusation. Duessa, true to her aptronym, feigns horror at the knight's determination to avenge her, for

As a chast Virgin, that had wronged beene:
So had false Archimago her disguised,
To cloke her guile with sorrow and sad toone;
And eke himselfe had craftily devised
To be her Squire, and do her service well aguisid.

(II.i.xxii)

Editorially, the poet explains that Archimago's function

... was to deceiue good knights,
And draw them from pursuit of praise and fame,
To slug in slouth and sensuall delights,
And end their daies with irrenowned shame.

(II.i.xxiii)

Archimago's ambition, thwarted in its attempt to separate Truth from the Red Cross Knight, has become cosmic. He has become Satan, seeking to trap all wayfaring Christians through appeals to their concupiscence.

Sir Guyon follows Archimago along unknown paths in search of the Red Cross Knight. They discover him in a situation which looks both backward to the Red Cross Knight's dalliance at the fountain with Duessa after their flight from the House of Pride, and forward to the Garden of Adonis and the Bower of Bliss. Archimago, eager to effect a conflict between the two knights, hastens Sir Guyon to further recklessness, and prays "God ye speed." "Inflamed with wrathfulnesse," Sir Guyon, the
Knight of Temperance, rushes toward the Red Cross Knight. Before the two can come to grips, however, the Red Cross Knight picks up his shield, and Sir Guyon is unable to attack.

The sacred badge of my Redeemers death,
Which on your shield is set for ornament.

(II.i.xxvii)

But even though Sir Guyon intellectually refrains from violence, it is only with difficulty that he controls his steed (his own animal nature). With great show of courtesy on both sides, they become reconciled and recognize their near-fight as the result of another of Archimago's tricks.

Appropriately, Sir Guyon's Palmer rejoins him, just as he recovers his temperamental equilibrium. The Palmer congratulates the Red Cross Knight upon the noble deeds and great reputation which resulted from his attainment of holiness, and contrasts his estate with Sir Guyon's:

. . . wretched we, where ye have left your markes,
Must now anew begin, like race to runne:
God guide thee, Guyon, well to end thy warke,
And to the wished haven bring thy weary barke.

(II.i.xxxii)

Professor Hamilton has found stated here the poet's intention to develop Sir Guyon's legend in parallel to St. George's, so that Sir Guyon, too, achieves sanctification, and Professor Hoopes has interpreted the Palmer's prayer as an indication that Book II, also, moves on the level of grace. Neither Hamilton nor Hoopes, however, has remarked upon the contrast in the Palmer's "God guide thee, Guyon," and

74 "'Like Race to Runne': The Parallel Structure of *The Faerie Queene*, Books I and II."

75 "'God Guide Thee, Guyon': Nature and Grace Reconciled in *The Faerie Queene*, Book II."
Archimago's "So God ye spooe." The deliberate contrast in the two prayers heightens the contrast between the Palmer's efforts to maintain sobriety in Sir Guyon's conduct and Archimago's efforts to disrupt Sir Guyon's calm, already retained with much difficulty. Moreover, this contrast identifies the adversaries who, like the personified abstractions of a miracle-play, struggle for possession of Sir Guyon's soul.

The Red Cross Knight, appropriately, acknowledges the Palmer's congratulations by attributing to divine grace his own success:

His be the praise, that this atchiou'ment wrought,  
Who made my hand the organ of his might;  
More then goodwill to me attribute nought:  
For all I did, I did but as I ought.  

(II.i.xxxiii)

The Red Cross Knight, his own story ended, has served to introduce a new cast of characters and to clarify the poet's intention in Book II; we see no more of him after Sir Guyon and the Palmer continue their quest, the Palmer pointing the way,

His race with reason, and with words his will,  
From foule intemperance he oft did stay,  
And suffered not in wrath his hastie steps to stray.  

(II.i.xxxiv)

As Sir Guyon and the Palmer travel toward their destination--the reader, so far, is ignorant of their mission--the shrilling cries of Amavia interrupt their progress. The unfortunate woman relates her story in a remarkably long and coherent speech for one

... halfe dead, halfe quicke,  
In whose white alabaster brest did sticke  
A cruell knife, that made a griesly wound,  
From which gusht a streme of gorebloud thick.  

(II.i.xxxix)

The handsome young man, "fit to inflame faire Lady with loues rage," now lying dead beside her had been her husband, Sir Mortdant. They had
lived happily together until he, as knights were wont, "pricked forth, his puissant force to prove" (II.i.1), leaving her pregnant. In his travels he had become entangled with Acrasia and her "Bowre of Blisse," located on a wandering island. Acrasia had seduced Sir Mortdant through a combination of rhetoric and drugs, "for he was flesh: (all flesh doth frailtie breed)" (II.i.iii). Delivered of her child, Amavia had set out to find and rescue her husband. She found him

In chains of lust and lawd desires ybound,
And so transformed from his former skill,
That me he knew not, neither his owne ill.

(I.I.IV)

The patient wife had slowly restored him to his former grace and beauty, and begun planning escape. Acrasia perceived their plan and beguiled the young knight to accept an enchanted cup which she had charmed with the curse:

Sad verse, giue death to him that death doest giue,
And losse of loue, to her that loues to lye,
So soone as Bacchus with the Nympha doest linke.

(I.I.IV)

Stopping to rest at a well, which unknown to them was a transformed nymph, Sir Mortdant had drunk from the cup and died. Distracted by the death of "my Lord my loue; my deare Lord, my deare loue," Amavia had mortally wounded herself, and as she approaches death, Sir Guyon and the Palmer arrive upon the scene, to find the infant dabbling in her ebbing heart's blood.

Sir Guyon's ministrations revive Amavia long enough for her explanation of the pitiful scene; she dies, leaving the infant for Sir Guyon and the Palmer to care for. Both Sir Guyon and the Palmer interpret the event. Sir Guyon sees it as
... the image of mortalitie,
And feeble nature cloth'd with fleshly tyre,
When raging passion with fierce tyrannie
Robe reason of her due rogalitie,
And makes it servant to her basest part:
The strong it weakens with infirmity,
And with bold furie armes the weakest hart;
The strong through pleasure soonest fallen, the weak
through smart.

(II.i.lvii)

More optimistic, the Palmer urges that compromise is possible, for

... temperance (said he) with golden squire
Betwixt them both can measure out a meane,
Neither to melt in pleasures what desire,
Nor fry in hartlesse griefe and dolofull teene.

(II.i.lviii)

Sadly, Sir Guyon and the Palmer bury Sir Mortdant and his wife, and after Sir Guyon makes a solemn vow to avenge their death, they depart, taking the "bloudie handed babe" with them.

This remarkable interlude demands close attention, for it reveals the kind of temperance with which Sir Guyon governs himself. Even though he is solicitous about insuring proper burial for the dead, he has an attitude toward suicide which indicates stoicism rather than Christianity. The Palmer apparently concurs, for he stifles his customary garrulity as Sir Guyon tells Amavia:

Ah farre be it (said he) Deare dame fro mee,
To hinder soule from her desired rest,
Or hold sad life in long captiuitee.

(II.i.xlviii)

This so neatly contrasts with Una's indignant shaming of the Red Cross Knight at the Cave of Despair that one must consider it deliberate and conclude that Sponser is using the "parallel with a difference" technique to illustrate the non-Christian nature of the initial temperance of Sir Guyon, the Knight of Temperance. Moreover, Amavia's words reveal her own non-Christian interpretation of her plight:
But if that careless heauens (quoth she) despise
The dome of just reuenge, and take delight
To see and pageants of mens miseries,
As bound by them to live in lines despight,
Yet can they not warne death from wretched wight.
Come then, come soone, come sweetest death to see,
And take away this long lent loathed light:
Sharpe be thy wounds, but sweet the medicines bee,
That long captiued soules from wearie thraidome free.

(II.i.xxxvi)

This attitude she reinforcing as she throws herself from Sir Guyon's arms back to the ground, "as hating life and light" (II.i.xlv), and begs him

Leaue, ah leaue off, what euery wight thou bee,
To let a wearie wretch from her dew rest,
And trouble dying soules tranquilitee.
Take not away now got, which none would give to me.

(II.i.xlvii)

Nor are the interpretations of the event which the Knight of Temperance and the Palmer express any more indicative of a Christian attitude. The Knight looks upon the tragedy as resulting from intemperance, while the Palmer can recommend only superhuman temperance as a palliative for the conflict between "pleasures whot desire" and "hartslesse grieffe and dolefull teene." None of the three mentions Christian charity which arises from agape to modify eros.

Spenser has presented the hero of Book II, then, as the classically temperate man, duly subordinated to his Palmer, Reason, making life's pilgrimage. The remainder of Book II depicts Sir Guyon's acquisition of faith as the apex of his spiritual endowments to augment his merely human reason and temperance.

The narrative and the allegorical interpretation of the narration in the second canto are as remarkable as the events in the first. Left with the responsibility of caring for the bloody-handed babe who has survived the tragic death of his parents, the Knight takes the child
into his arms, and the baby

    Can smyle on them, that rather ought to weepo,
    As carelesse of his woe, or innocent
    Of that was doen, that ruth emperced deepo
    In that knights heart, and wordes with bitter tears did steepo.  
(II.ii.i)

Sir Guyon's remarks at this point lend themselves to multi-level interpretation beyond the literal, narrative meaning. Allegorically or doctrinally, his comments indicate that in the mind of the poet (and in the minds of his more perceptive readers) classical legends about the declination from Golden Age perfection were types of the Old Testament account of the first "Fall, in which we sinned all." Tropologically, Sir Guyon's words apply to the true Christian's recognition of the impossibility of completely escaping the results of the fall through efforts directed toward self-improvement. And analogically, his statement applies to the willful separation man has effected between himself and God. Of course, the poet's and the readers' consciousness of these meanings beyond the literal, the Knight does not share, and it is precisely from this kind of dramatic irony and foreshadowing that the poet derives his suspense. Sir Guyon utters prophetic words that are wiser than he knows:

    Ah lucklesse babie, borne under cruel starre,
    And in dead parents balefull ashes bred,
    Full litle weenest thou, what sorrowes are
    Left thee for portion of thy life, and
    Poor Orphane in the wide world scattered,
    As budding branch rent from the native tree,
    And thrown forth, till it be withered;
    Such is the state of men: thus enter wea
    Into this life with woe, and end with misery.
(II.ii.ii)

But because "love doth loath disdainfull ricitee" (II.ii.iii), the Knight attempts to cleanse the hands of the child, washing them in the
water of the well. The blood-guilt inherited from his parents, however, no merely natural water can remove, and Sir Guyon is amazed. Editorially, the poet explains that the child's stained hands were God's tokens of His hatred for "bloudguiltiness," and, consequently, "might not be purgd with water nor with bath." The Palmer, "with goodly reason," attributes the permanence of the stain to natural magic in a euhemeristic interpretation of a myth, ending with the advice that the blot is ineradicable, and the Knight should

... let them still be bloudy, as befell,
That they his mothers innocence may tell,
As she bequeathd in her last testament;
That as a sacred Symbole it may dwell
In her sonnes flesh, to minde rouengement,
And be for all chast Dames an endlesse monument.

(II.ii.x)

The Palmer, Classical Reason, is incapable of attaining the truth that only revelation could yield, the Christian truth which for contrast the poet inserted in stanza four.

Because his Palmer is the only guide available to him, Sir Guyon follows him, afoot, the baby in his arms, to the Castle of Temperance, where, even though the edifice was

... an auncient worke of antique frame,
And wondrous strong by nature and by skilfull frame

(II.ii.xii),

the Knight participates in a rather tedious pageant illustrating the doctrine of the Golden Mean. Keeping in mind the horse-riding-horsemanship imagery which pervados The Faerie Queene, we conclude that Sir Guyon has inhibited, not sublimated, has stifled, not brought under control, his natural appetites and desires. 76 Human reason, even when

76 Miss Kathleen Williams, in Sponsor's World of Glass: A Reading of the Faerie Queens (Berkeley, 1966), points out (notes 4 and 5,
grounded in and fortified by the secular philosophical wisdom of the ages, cannot achieve active, loving, fruitful temperance as the orthodox Christian sees it, for without the transfiguring activity of agape to produce charity, only the extremes of eros and unnatural abstinence remain; the choice of either is death, spiritual or physical. As a consequence, the Palmer's conducting Sir Guyon to the House of Temperance leads the Knight to no valuable diairetisement. His charge to Medina as he leaves the baby with her declares Sir Guyon's pagan philosophy, unenlightened by Christian revelation and faith, unconcerned with Christian charity:

Then taking Conge of that virgin pure,
The bloodied-handed babe vnto her truth
Did earnestly commit, and conjure,
In vertuous lore to traine his tender youth,
And all that gentle nurture ensu'th:
And that so soone as ryper yeares he raught,
He might for memorie of that dayes ruth,
Be called Ruddymane, and thereby taught,
T'auenge his Parents death on them, that had it wroght.

(II.iii.ii)

Because Sir Guyon has lost his charger, he must accompany the Palmer on foot from Medina's castle; the poet again reverts to his horse-rider image. The Knight, by forsaking his noble aspiration and succoring Amavia, and because his "loye doth loath disdainfull nicitee," has abandoned physical control of his own natural appetites by dismounting. 'Vaine Braggadocio,' another aspect of the Knight's temperament in the psychomachic tradition, siezes his abandoned mount and flees,

p. 37) that "this rather hackneyed figure (which is of course 'ex Platonœ') . . . is to be met with in the emblem books signifying noble pride, etc. Sometimes the dangerous ease with which noble aspiration can become ignoble ambition is hinted at; e.g., in Apollis Symbolicon horses can convey such meanings as 'glorious animus'.'
And with selfe-loued personage deceiu'd,
He gan to hope, of men to be receiu'd
For such, as he him thought, or faine would bee.
(II.iii.v)

"Noble aspiration," in Miss Williams's words, has "become ignoble ambition," riding upon his "gloriosus animus." Vainglory and smug satisfaction with his own moderation follow Sir Guyon from the Castle of Temperance,

...asserting in great brauery,
As Peacocke, that his painted plumes doth prank.
(II.iii.vi)

He first encounters a miserable wretch, unarmed, whom he frightens into submission. But Trompart, coward though he may be, is no fool, and so discerns the hollowness of Braggadocchio's (Sir Guyon's) assumed superiority, and "blows the bellowes to his swelling vanity" (II.iii.ix). His natural appetites under the control of ignoble ambition and deceit, it is no wonder that the Knight meets Archimago, or that Archimago plans to entrap Sir Guyon through his own weakness and thus achieve his revenge against the Red Cross Knight,

For since the Roderosse knight he earst did weet,
To bee with Guyon knit in one consent,
The ill, which earst to him, he now to Guyon ment.
(II.iii.xi)

Another of Archimago's favorite weapons, flattery, wins the attention of Guyon-Braggadocchio-Trompart, so that the 'vile enchanter' sets the fragmented, disintegrated Knight against not only the Knight of Holiness, but also the ideal of temperance, the Knight's alter ego. Eagerly, madly, Braggadocchio exacerbates the Knight's irascible nature to a rage, so that he agrees to confound both Temperance and Holiness. In contrast to the courtesy which he displayed as a serenely integrated example of classical temperance entertaining the diners at the Castle
of Temperance, the literally demoralized Sir Guyon, controlled by ambition, deceit, and ire, forgets the respect due old age and scathingly addresses Archimago (whom, of course, he does not know as a source of evil) with a disdain reminiscent of the dependent vine's youthful contempt for the ancient oak in the "February Eclogue" of The Shep­heardes Calender. The experienced Archimago counsels Sir Guyon to prepare for his encounter with "two the provest knights on ground," and occasions a vituperative ad hominem reply:

Dotard (said he) let be thy depe advise;  
Seemes that through many yeares thy wits thee faile,  
And that weake eld hath left thee nothing wise.  

(Il.iii.xvi)

Nonetheless, Archimago insists upon arming him with Prince Arthur's magic sword, and frightens the boastful Knight by disappearing on his errand to fetch it. Fleeing in terror, Braggadocchio and Trompart seek sanctuary in a green forest where they encounter "a goodly Ladie clad in hunters weed" (Il.iii.xxi), obviously a classical goddess. The poet, through the use of the rhetorical device of enumeratio, describes her in terms which identify her with Boethius's Dame Philosophy, with the figure of Philosophy in Alain's Complaint of Nature, and with Reason in The Romance of the Rose, whatever resemblance she may bear to Venus.

She

... seemd' to be a woman of great worth,  
And by her stately portance, borne of heavenny birth.

Her face so faire as flesh it seemed not,  
But heavenly poutraict of bright Angels hew,  
Cleare as the skie, withouten blame or blot,  
Through goodly mixture of complexion dew;  
And in her cheekes the vermail red did shew  
Like roses in a bed of lillies shed,  
The which ambrosiall odours from them throw,  
And gazers sense with double pleasure fell,  
Hable to heale the sicke, and to reuise the ded.
In her faire eyes two living lamps did flame,
Kindled above at th'heavenly makers light,
And darted fyrie beams out of the same,
So passing pursuant, and so wondrous bright,
That quire beseau'd the rash beholders sight:
In them the blinded god his lustfull fire
To kindle oft assayd, but had no might;
For with dread Malestic, and awfull ire,
She broke his wanton darts, and quenched base desire.

(Il.iii.xxi-xxiii)

Even though this goddess is a composite personification of the philosophical virtues, she exciteth fear and desire in the mind of the knight, engaged as he is in what Professor Lewis has called the "Bellum intestinum," the battle for Mansoul. Trompart, who represents one aspect of Sir Guyon's being, is at first frightened, but manages, terrified, to rescue Braggadocchio, "mowed" like a coward in the bushes. The heavenly maiden sees the bushes quake and thinks her quarry is there. She advances to "marke the beast," and only Trompart's timely intervention preserves the cringing Braggadocchio—only skillful counterfeiting sustains groundless boasting. Braggadocchio timorously creeps forth, ludicrous in his purloined knightly gear, and tries to brazen his way out of an embarrassing situation by boasting of his prowess; but the two cannot effectively communicate. Braggadocchio is so impressed with the lady's physical beauty and with her obvious station that he cannot perceive the meaning of her remarks about the worth of action as opposed to courtly deceit and unmanliness. "Where ease abounds," she instructs him, "yt's eath to doc amis" (II.iii.xi). The high-minded lady cannot realize that her exhortations to the strenuous life of action are wasted on one so base as Braggadocchio. Her only appeal to Braggadocchio is physical, and he attempts to violate her. She vigorously repels him and flees. His encounter with one who would teach
him the way of honorable action reveals Braggadocchio's nature. He laments to Trompart:

... What foul blot
Is this to knight, that Lucio should again Depart to woods unvisited, and leave so proud disdain?  
(II.iii.xliii)

Lost further unexpected adventures befall them, Trompart and Braggadocchio hasten to escape from the forest, Trompart walking, Braggadocchio ignobly managing the courser, for

He had not trayned bene in cheualrie, Which well that valiant courser did discerne; For he despayed to tread in dew degree, But chaudd and form'd, with courage fierce and stern.  
(II.iii.xlvi)

In the meantime, Sir Guyon's nobler aspect, "the rightfull owner of that steed," painfully goes on foot

With that blace Palmer, his most trusty guide; Who suffred not his war'ding feet to slide, But when strong passion, or weake fleshlinessse Would from the right way seek to draw him wide, He would through temperance and stedfastnesse, Teach him the weake to strengthen, and the strong suppressse.  
(II.iii.ii)

Even in the near-schizophrenic state, however, brought about by the dualism of submission to classical reason and the wisdom of the ages, Sir Guyon is able to overcome Furor, "a mad man, or that feigned mad to bee" (II.iii.iii), and Occasion, who busied herself with "prouoking him by her outrageous talke" (II.iii.v). Seeking to rescue "a handsome stripling" whom Furor, egg'd on by Occasion, is cruelly tormenting, Sir Guyon finds himself attacked by

... a man of mickle might, Had he had governance, it well to guide; But when the franticke fit inflamed his spright, his force was vaile, and euerlasting more often wide, Then at the eyned marks, which he had shot; And oft himselfe he chaust to hurt vnares,
Whilst reason blend through passion, nought descride,
But as a blindfold Bull at random fares,
And where he hits, nought knowes, and whom he hurts,
Nought cares.
(Ill.iii.vii)

The Palmer sagely restrains Sir Guyon's immediate intention to meet violence with a violent counterattack, pointing out that neither weapon nor strength can overcome Furor; whoever would control madness must, he points out, begin by controlling his mother, Occasion. Sir Guyon heeds the Palmer's advice and first binds Occasion, whereupon Furor runs away, only to be caught and bound by the Knight.

After Sir Guyon gains control of Furor and Occasion, he turns his attention to Phedon, their intended victim, and learns that the young man has been driven to insane anger and jealousy through his best friend's machinations. In a rage, Phedon had poisoned his false friend and had sought to kill his beloved. As he had pursued Pryenc, his sweetheart, Occasion and Furor had joined the procession, pursuing him. Sir Guyon cautions the young man that "all your hurts may soone through temperance be easd" (II.iii.xxxiii), and the garrulous Palmer elaborates sententiously:

... Most wretched man,
That to affections does the bridle lend;
In their beginning they are weake and wan,
But soone through suffrance grow to fearefull end;
While they are weake betimes with them contend:
For when they once to perfect strength do grow,
Strong warres they make, and cruel batterie bend
Gainst fort of Reason, it to overthrow:
Wrath, gelosie, griefe, loue this Squire haue layd thus low.
(II.iii.xxxiv)

While Phedon begins to rehearse his lineage, Atin (Strife) dashes breathlessly upon the scene, unbraidying the Knight and threatening him with his fiery siblings, Cynochles and Pyrochles. Atin has come in
search of Occasion, at Pyrochles's request, and upon finding that Sir Guyon has bound the old hag, reviles him for attacking "silly weake old woman," and vows that Pyrochles will repay him for his deed. Atin hurst one of his

\[ ... two darts exceeding slit,\]
\[ And deadly sharpe ... whose heads [were] right\]
\[ In poysen and in blood, of malice and despit\]

(II.i.iii.xxxxvii)

But Sir Guyon, alert, interposes his shield and escapes injury. Atin speeds away and alerts the bloody Pyrochles to attack Sir Guyon. Because the Knight of Temperance is still afoot, he cannot hope to withstand the dreadful onslaught of Pyrochles, or Stubborn Perturbation, mounted as he is upon his blood-red steed, which "fomed ire."

Thus, it is fortunate that Sir Guyon's savage first blow glances from the opposing knight and kills the mount. Pyrochles reproaches Sir Guyon for killing his charger, and attacks him violently. The savageness of his onslaught forces the titular knight to withdraw temporarily, and

\[ Exceeding wroth was Guyon at that blow,\]
\[ And much ashamed, that stroke of living arme\]
\[ Should him dismay, and make him stoup so low,\]
\[ Though otherwise it did him little harme.\]

(II.v.vii)

His pride wounded, Sir Guyon retaliates and drives Pyrochles to insane fury; the wound

\[ But added flame vnto his former fire,\]
\[ That welnigh melt his hart in raging yre,\]
\[ No thonceforth his approved skill, to ward,\]
\[ Or strike, or hurtle round in warlike gyre,\]
\[ Remembered he, he car'd for his saufgard,\]
\[ But rudely ran'd, and like a cruelly armed.\]

(II.v.viii)

Sir Guyon retains his calm and coolly defeats his maddened enemy: after
establishing his mastery over Pyrochles by retaining his own imperturbability, Sir Guyon exhibits generosity by sparing the madman's life. He instructs his chastened victim:

\[
\text{Loose is no shame, nor to be lesser than foe,}
\text{But to be lesser, then himselfe, doth marre}
\text{Both losers lot, and victours praise alsece.}
\text{Vaine others overthrowes, who selfe doth overthrowe.}
\]

(II.v.xv)

Pyrochles explains that he has attacked Sir Guyon for wronging the aged Occasion and her son, Furor, and asks the Knight to free them; Sir Guyon turns the bound prisoners over to Pyrochles's disposition. Pyrochles hastens to enlarge the two, and no sooner has he begun to loosen the chains which bind Occasion than she begins to scold him for having lost the battle and to upbraid Sir Guyon for having won.

\[
\ldots \text{So matter did she make of nought,}
\text{To stirre vp strife, and do them disagree.}
\]

(II.v.xix)

After failing to set one knight against the other, she inflames the newly-freed Furor to attack his liberator. True to his name, Pyrochles responds with uncontrolled rage and succumbs to Furor, so that

\[
\text{At last he was compeld to cry perforce,}
\text{Helpe, O sir Guyon, helpe most noble knight,}
\text{To rid a wretched man from hands of hellish wight.}
\]

(II.v.xxiii)

But Sir Guyon heeds the Palmor's advice:

\[
\ldots \text{Deare sonne, thy causelesse ruth represse,}
\text{Ne let thy stout hart melt in pitty vayno:}
\text{He that his sorrow sought through wilfulness,}
\text{And his foe fettered would release agayne,}
\text{Deserves to tast his follies fruit, repented payne.}
\]

(II.v.xxiv)

Atin, who had fetched Pyrochles to the scene in the first place, runs to bring his brother, Cymochles, into the fray. Cymochles, a passionate man, fierce and fickle as the sea-waves, a man who alternates
between violence and sensual indolence, Atin finds indulging himself in Acrasia's "Tower of Blisse." In much the same manner as the Red Cross Knight had succumbed to indolence at the fountain with Dussa when Orgoglio had captured him, Cymochles has discarded his weapons and thrown himself with abandon into the intemperate enjoyment of sensuous idleness. In this enclosed garden reminiscent of The Romance of the Rose, he is too enervated even to participate properly in lust, but, as Professor Lewis has pointed out,Contents himself with skeptophilia. Only with difficulty can Atin arouse Cymochles from his voyeurism, for Cymochles

... like an Adder, lurking in the weeds,
His wandring thought in deep desire does steepe,
And his frail eye with apoyle of beauteousfeedes;
Sometimes he falsely faines himselfe to sleepe,
Whilese through their lids his wanton cies do peep,
To steale a snachat of amorous conceit,
Whereby close fire into his heart does creepe;
So, then deceuies, deceu'd in his deceit,
Made drunke with drugs of deare voluptuous receipt. (II.v.xxxiv)

Eventually, however, by appealing to the other extreme of his irascible nature, Atin incites Cymochles so that

... As one affright
With hellish feends, or Furies mad vprore,
He then vprose, inflam'd with fell despight,
And called for his armes; for he would algates fight. (II.v.xxxvii)

Hastily donning his armor to the tempo of Atin's prodding, Cymochles mounts "his courser strong" and goes in search of Sir Guyon to punish him for permitting Pyrochles's debasement.

Editorially, Spenser comments, linking Canto Five with Canto Six:

77 Allegory of Love, p. 332. Mr. Lewis glosses "skeptophilia" as "lust suspended."
A Harder lesson, to lerne Continence
In joyous pleasure, then in grievous paine;
For sweeteresse doth allure the weaker sense
So strongly, that vneathes it can refraine
From that, which feeble nature courts paine;
But griefe and wrath, that be her enemies,
And foes of life, she better can restraine;
Yet vertue vauntes in both their victories,
And Guyon in them all showes goodly matieries.

(II.vi.1)

This prudential tag recalls the sententia which Sir Guyon addressed to
the Palmer at the side of the dead Amavia:

The strong it [raging passion] weakens with infirmities,
And with bold furie armes the weakest hart;
The strong through pleasure soonest falles, the weak
through smart.

(II.i.ivii)

Cymocheles's encounter with Phaedria on the Wandering Island in the
midst of Idle Lake illustrates Sir Guyon's contention that "the strong
through pleasure soonest falles"; Phaedria recognizes in Cymocheles a
fellow-thrall of Acrasia, and seduces him into her magic gondola for a
sojourn at the Wandering Isle, for

So easie was to quench his flamed mind
With one sweet drop of sensual delight.

(II.vi.viii)

Having distracted him from one extreme, she enmeshes him in its
opposite, singing a daring parody on Christ's teaching (St. Luke
12: 22-34).

Behold, 0 man, that toilesome paines doest take,
The flowers, the fields, and all that pleasant growes,
How they themselves doe thine exemple make,
Whiles nothing envious nature them forth throws
Out of her fruitfull lap; how, no man knowes,
They spring, they bud, they blossome fresh and faire,
And deck the world with their rich romous shows;
Yet no man for them taketh paines or care,
Yet no man to them can his carefull paines compare.

(II.vi.xv)

After lulling him to sleep with her misguiding rhetoric, she once more
sets out in her boat, this time to intercept Sir Guyon and deter him from his pilgrimage to attack Acrasia. Finding him, she welcomes him into her boat, but refuses to give the Palmer a ride, as she had refused to take Atin, for she has no more need of reason than she has of strife. Even though he is reluctant to leave behind his faithful guide, Sir Guyon has no choice but to accompany Phaedria. Phaedria seeks to amuse the stern Knight who, even deprived of the Palmer's support, recognizes her as a distraction from his proper way. Arrived at the island, she tries to make him impotent as she had Cymochles;

But he was wise, and warie of her will,
And ever held his hand upon his hart;
Yet would not seem so rude, and thew he ill,
As to despise so courteous seeming part,
That gentle Ladie did to him impart,
But fairely tempring fond desire subdued,
And ever her desired to depart.

(II.vi.xxvi)

Sir Guyon's predicament and his reaction to it recall Sir Gawain's dilemma at the Castle of Dercilak; his two codes of conduct so conflict that he finds himself in an untenable position. As a knight, he cannot be discourteous to Phaedria; but as a temperate man, he cannot accede to her wishes. In the meantime, Cymochles has recovered from his lethargic trance and has gone to the shore to demand passage to the mainland so that he may continue his quest. Infuriated to find Sir Guyon with Phaedria, Cymochles attacks him. The Knight defends himself with a prodigious blow that astounds his adversary, and Phaedria, who has no regard for strife, tries to halt the bloodshed:

Doleful strife, and cruel eminie
The famous name of knighthood fouly shend;
But loathly semble, and gentle sayntie,
And in Amours the passing hours to spend.
The mightie martiall hands doe meete commed;
Of love they ever greater glory bore,
Then of their arms: 

"And is for Vanna loves renowned more, 
Then all his wars and spoiles, the which he did of yore."

(II.vi.xxxv)

She succeeds in quelling the sword-play, but Sir Guyon continues to insist that she return him to the mainland. Realizing that her reluctant guest is "a foe of folly and immocest toy" (II.vi.xxxvii), Phaedria accedes to his request and deposits him on the shore near Atin. Atin tries to move Sir Guyon to anger, but fails and "turns taile." As Atin continues his vigil on the shore, he sees in the distance his other master, Pyrochles, burning with rage and insanely attempting to quench his flames in the waters of the Idle Lake. Atin leaps in to help him, and sees Archimago standing on the shore, looking on in astonishment. Atin explains the situation to Archimago, and the old magician restores the flaming Pyrochles to health.

Sir Guyon, still separated from the Palmer, continues on his way, significantly smug and self-satisfied,

And euermore himselfe with comfort feedes, 
Of his owne vertues, and praye-se-worthy deedes.  

(II.vii.ii)

At the height of his spiritual pride, he comes upon Mammon, sunning his gold in

... a gloomy glade,  
Couer'd with boughes and shrubs from heauens light.  

(II.vii.iii)

Mammon identifies himself as "God of the world and worldlings" (II.vii. viii) and invites Sir Guyon to share his wealth, much as Satan tempted Christ in the wilderness. The Knight maintains that riches are the

... roots of all disquietness; 
First got with guile, and then preserv'd with dread,
And after spent with pride and lauishness,
Leaving behind them griefs and heauinesse. (II.vii.xii)

He refutes Mammon's claims of sovereignty, and Mammon, irritated that he cannot penetrate the Knight's defenses, asks why, if riches are so evil, men seek wealth. In a speech which completes the half-truths in Phaedria's song to Cymochles (II.vi.xv), Sir Guyon refutes worldly sophistry:

... through fowle intemperance,
Fraye men are oft captiu'd to couetise:
But would they thinke, with how small allowance
Untroubled Nature doth her selfe suffise,
Such superfluities they would despise,
Which with sad cares empeche our natuie joyes:
At the well head the purest streames arise:
But mucky filth his braunching armes annoyses,
And with vncomely weedes the gentle waue accloyes. (II.vii.xv)

Intemperance, he says, leads to "couetise" such as was not known in man's golden age; but man's loss of innocence in the fall engendered lust and greed. With renewed sophistry, Mammon argues that there are no absolute values, that circumstances alter cases, and that Sir Guyon is too harsh in condemning worldly wealth. He takes the Knight on a guided tour of his dominions, entering through a door next to the entrance into Hell. As they enter, the door slams and a monster begins censoring Sir Guyon's thoughts, so that, if he only covets any of Mammon's earthy treasures, he will be consumed. Nowhere does the Knight succumb to Mammon's temptations, even though he remains underground for three days in constant exposure to wealth, power, and lust, to ambition, infatuation, and envy. Even though he rejects Mammon's temptations for three days, Sir Guyon
...gan weaxe both weaka and man,
For want of food, and sleepe, which two vpbeare,
Like mightie pillours, this fraile life of man.
(II.vii.ixv)

He requests that Mammon return him to the earth's surface; according to their contract, Mammon can do nothing else; and Sir Guyon collapses.

So far, Book II has moved on the "level of nature"; Sir Guyon's temperance has illustrated the stultifying classical temperance which results from unduly inhibiting the natural desires and instincts without the sublimation of agape. As a consequence of attempting frigidly to deny his own animal nature, the young Knight has exhausted himself trying to master desires which are inherent in man, seeking a stoic ataraxia. The result has been psychological disintegration and spiritual pride, the spiritual bankruptcy being mirrored in the young Knight's physical collapse after enduring the supreme test in Mammon's cave. He has sought perfection by following the ethical dictates of philosophy, and failed; now the poet hints that, at the spiritual nadir of his career, Sir Guyon will begin to move on the "level of grace."

To indicate the change of planes, Spenser initiates Canto VIII:

And is there care in heavuen? and is there loue
In heavenly spirits to these creatures base,
That may compassion of their euis mue?
There is: else much more wretched were the case
Of men, then beasts. But O th'exceeding grace
Of highest God, that loues his creatures so,
And all his workes with mercy doth embrace,
That blessed Angels, he sends to and fro,
To serue to wicked man, to serue his wicked foe.
(II.viii.i)

As Sabrina in Milton's Comus first sought to repel her would-be seducer with ethical arguments from philosophy before resorting to the absolutes of Christianity, so the Knight of Temperance has sought to handle his mundane problems without recourse to the spiritual strength available to
Christians. Like Sabrina, he too finds that man must have outside help.

The Palmer, who has been separated from Sir Guyon since the expedition in Phaedria's boat, so that the Knight has been restrained only by habitus in his recent trials, hears a voice, "loud and clear," calling him to the side of the unconscious Sir Guyon. The Palmer sees an angel,

... a faire young man
Of wondrous beautie, and of freshest yeares,
Whose tender bud to blossome now began,
And flourish faire about his equall yeares;
His snowy front curled with golden heares,
Like Phoebus face adorne with sunny rayes,
Divinely shone, and two sharpe winged sheares,
Decked with divers hauers, like painted layes,
Were fixed at his backe, to cut his ayrie wayes.

(II.viii.v)

The angel, come to guard Sir Guyon in his unconsciousness, scolds the Palmer for deserting his charge in time of need, commends the Knight to his care, and vanishes. As the Palmer watches over the yet-stupified Sir Guyon, Pyrochles and Cymochles ride up, guided to the scene by Archimago. They demand that the Palmer relinquish Sir Guyon to them, so that they may take his armor and valuables. The Palmer's remonstrations are vain, as are his appeals to their honor, and they prepare to strip the Knight. Just at this crucial moment, as the angel had promised the Palmer,

Yet will I not forgoe, ne yet forget
The care thereof my selfe vnto the end

(II.viii.viii),

miraculous aid arrives. Archimago, who had led the furious brothers to Sir Guyon's side, recognizes Prince Arthur, "the provest knight aliiue," "flore of grace and nobilesse," as he approaches from the distance. Pyrochles and Cymochles prepare to fight, and Archimago reluctantly
arms Pyrochles with Prince Arthur's sword, which he had gone to fetch for Braggadocchio, even though he knows that the sword's magical properties make it useless against its owner.

Riding up, Prince Arthur salutes the group courteously, but Cymochles, Pyrochles, and Archimago only sullenly respond. The Prince, impressed with the character which he reads in Sir Guyon's immobile face, asks the Palmer about him. After the Palmer has rehearsed the situation to Prince Arthur, the noble late arrival seeks to reason with Pyrochles and Cymochles, for, he says,

\[ \text{Words well dispose} \]
\[ \text{Have secret powre t'appease inflamed rage.} \]
\( (\text{II.vii.xxvi}) \)

Failing to mediate the quarrel between the unconscious knight and the two angry young men, Prince Arthur finds himself attacked by Pyrochles and his own sword, Morddure. The sword will not harm its master, and Pyrochles becomes even more furious. But the Prince

\[ \text{. . . would not forsake his sell;} \]
\[ \text{For well of yore he learned had to ride.} \]
\( (\text{II.vii.xxxx}) \)

The royal knight attempts to overcome Pyrochles with his spear, but finds that Sir Guyon's shield is partial proof against his weapon. Nonetheless, he wounds the villain so that the brother, Cymochles, becomes angry and rushes into the fray. His first attack unhorses Prince Arthur, and puts him in dire peril for want of his sword, facing both of the angry brothers. Nevertheless, Prince Arthur succeeds in wounding Cymochles with his spear, but damages his spear so that it is no longer useful. The Palmer hands Sir Guyon's sword to the Prince, who
... like a Lion, which hath long time sought
His robbed whelpes, and at the last them fond
Amongst the shepheard swaynes, then waxeth woold ano. yond.
(II.viii.xi)

But the Prince suffers a disadvantage: he cannot attack the man hiding behind the portrait of the Faery Queene on Sir Guyon's shield. Nonetheless, he succeeds in mortally wounding Cymochles. Seeing his brother's defeat, Pyrochles attacks even more ferociously, "with revenge desiring soone to dye" (II.viii.xlvii). Coolly, the Prince, recognizing Pyrochles's recklessness, "suffred rash Pyrochles wast his idle might" (II. viii.xlviii). Eventually achieving the advantage, Prince Arthur magnanimously offers to spare the mad man's life, provided only that Pyrochles yield himself to him. Because the pagan rejects the proffered grace, the Prince, "sory yet withall," decapitates him.

As the Prince completes his overthrow of the pagans, Sir Guyon recovers his consciousness, and recognizes the faithful Palmer. The Palmer rehearses the events which have occurred during the Knight's coma, and Sir Guyon thanks the Prince for his aid. As they talk, Archimago and Atin flee, defeated.

In an adventure parallel to the Red Cross Knight's spiritual training in the House of Holiness, Sir Guyon and Prince Arthur journey to the House of Temperance, the poet commenting that

Of all Gods workes, which do this world adorne,
There is no one more faire and excellent,
Then is mans body both for powre and forme,
Whilez it is kept in sober gouernment;
But none then it, more fowle and indecent,
Distempred through misrule and passions base:
It grows a Monster, and incontinent
Both lose his dignite and native grace.
(II.ix.1)

As they ride, each relates his story to the other, and Sir Guyon
reveals his mission to destroy "false Acrasia and her wicked wills." They arrive at the closely guarded, well-secured House of Temperance, to be warned away by the watch, who informs them that the castle is under siege, and that all who seek entrance are slain by the besiegers. As the watch speaks, "a thousand villeins round about them swarm," armed appropriately as a "raskal crewe." The two knights counter-attack and force them to retreat. Returning to the castle, they, again, ask admission. When the lady of the castle learns of their request and of their having dispelled her besiegers, she has them admitted, welcoming them with fitting ceremony.

The House of Temperance is the human body, well-managed by Alma, the soul, so that the excellent economy of her management prevents all internal troubles; only from outside foes which try to penetrate her senses must she protect herself. She shows the two knights through her "castle," and they particularly enjoy their tour of the head, where they see Reason in operation, and where, in Reason's library, the memory, they become acquainted with the past. Prince Arthur becomes absorbed in Briton monuments, and Sir Guyon in "Antiquities of Faerie land." Only when Alma calls them to dinner do they relinquish their books.

Early the next morning, Sir Guyon and the trusty Palmer depart, leaving Prince Arthur behind as they press on toward Acrasia and her "Bowre of Blisse." Finding the ferryman as Alma had promised, they embark, and in a voyage comparable to Ulysses's they continue steadfastly toward their goal.

Meanwhile, the besiegers renew their attack upon the Castle of Temperance, probing for weaknesses by tempting all the senses. Prince
Arthur dons his "glitterand arms" and goes forth with his squire to attack the enemy. Maleger, the ghastly supernatural leader of the attackers, supported by Impotence and Impatience, and riding upon a tiger, shoots his arrows at the Prince. As Arthur, while fending off the arrows with his shield, attacks with his spear, Maleger flees on his tiger, easily outdistancing the Prince. Impatience and Impotence nearly overcome Prince Arthur, and the poet injects his opinion that

Full little wanted, but he had him slaine,
And of the battell balefull end had made,
Had not the gentle Squire beheld his paine,
And commen to his reakew, ere his bitter bane.

So greatest and most glorious thing on ground
May often need the helpe of weaker hand;
So feable is mans state, and life vsound,
That in assurance it may neuer stand,
Till it dissolued be from earthly band.

As his squire restrains Impatience and Impotence, the Prince attacks Maleger, knocking him to the ground with his "yron mace." Astonishingly, he rises from the blow which should have killed him, and the Prince attacks once more, this time with his sword. This strategy, too, fails, and the Prince, sensing that his adversary is supernatural, discards his weapons and attacks with his naked hands. After squeezing the life out of Maleger, only to have him bounce back once more upon touching the ground, Prince Arthur finally, again,

... hauing scruzd out of his carrion corse
The loathfull life, now loosed from sinfull bands

throws the lifeless body into a standing lake to deprive him of his magical response to contact with the earth. Seeing the overthrow of their leader, Impatience throws herself into the lake, and Impotence pierces her heart with one of Maleger's darts.
The fierceness of his battle has sorely tried Prince Arthur, so that his squire has to help him back to Alma's castle for recuperation.

Spenser, nearing the climactic moment in Book II, initiates Canto XII with a *reditus ad propositum*:

Now gins this goodly frame of Temperance
Fairly to rise, and her adorned hed
To pricke of highest praise forth to aduanee,
Formerly grounded, and fast setteled
On firme foundation of true bountihe; And this braue knight, that for that vertue fights,
Now comes to point of that same perilous sted,
Where Pleasure dwelles in sensuall delights,
Mongst thousand dangers, and ten thousand magick mights. 

With the Palmer as helmsman, the experienced boatman as navigator, Sir Guyon continues his way to Acrasia's "Bowre of Blisse," skirting all of the pitfalls associated with intemperance, greediness, gluttony, and intemperate mirth. The Palmer avoids the "quicksand of Unthriftihe," the "Whirlepoole of decay," and all of the dreadful sea monsters, but he responds to the boatman's exaggerated fears with the voice of calm reason:

Feare nought, (then said the Palmer well auz'd;
For these same Monsters are not these in deed,
But are into these fearefull shapes disguiz'd
By that same wicked witch, to worke vs dreed,
And draw from on this ioumery to proceeds.

Moreover, merely by touching the sea with his staff, he dispels the sea monsters. Too, he restrains Sir Guyon's impetuous wish to go to the aid of "that dolefull Mayd," assuring him that she is

But onely womanish fine forgery,
Your stubborne hart t'affect with fraile infirmity.

Steered by the Palmer, guided by the boatman, Sir Guyon rows the boat relentlessly onward, ignoring the Siren's song, a repetition of
Phaedria's lay:

O thou faire sonne of gentle Faery,
That art in mighty armes most magnifique
Above all knights, that euer battell tride,
O turne thy rudder hither-ward a while:
Here may thy stormes-bet vessell safely ride;
This is the Port of rest from troublous toyle,
The worlds sweet In, from paine and wearisome turmoyle.

(II.xii.xxxii)

Again the Knight heeds the Palmer's advice, and they press forward,
until, nearing the "Bowre of Blisse," they find themselves enveloped in
a dense fog, infested with all sorts of "fatal birds." These distractions they do not heed, and soon the Palmer reports:

... Lo where does appeare
The sacred soils, where all our perils grow;
Therefore, Sir knight, your ready armes about you throw.

(II.xii.xxxvii)

Landing, the Palmer accompanies Sir Guyon, "of nought ydred." They hear the bellow of beasts in heat running to attack them; the Palmer's staff quells them, and soon they arrive at the "Bowre of Blisse,"

A place pickt out by choice of best aliue,
That natures worke by art can imitate.

(II.xii.xiii)

The ivory gate tells the story of Jason and Medea, and "euer open stood
to all" (II.xii.xlvi). A false Genius, a kind of fertility god, presides over the garden and, as Pleasure's porter, welcomes all comers with a bowl of wine. The temperate Sir Guyon not only refuses his hospitality, but more vehemently throws down his cup and breaks his magic wand. The lovely garden might closely compare with Eden, "if ought with Eden mote compare" (II.xii.lii). But Sir Guyon, "bridling his will, and maistering his might" (II.xii.liii), pays no heed. None of the unnaturally lush beauty of the place attracts the Knight until they come to "two naked Damzelles" cavorting seductively in a lovely
fountain. Seeing them,

... he drew him nearer,

And somewhat gan relent his earnest pace,
His stubbome brest gan secret pleasance to embrace.

(II.xii.lxv)

Realizing that their prurient exhibition is succeeding, for they see in Sir Guyon's sparkling face

The secret signes of kindled lust appeare

(II.xii.lxviii)

they redouble their efforts. But the Palmer, over alert, "much rebukt those wandring eyes of his" (II.xii.Ixix), and warns the Knight that they have arrived at Acrasia's Bower. They come upon Acrasia and her deceived beloved, spent from their "late sweet toyle," and ensnare them in a subtle net which the Palmer had made especially for such a prey.

After binding Acrasia in "chaines of adamant," the Palmer frees Verdant, the young knight whom the wicked witch had enchained, lecturing him all the while. As the Palmer makes certain that Acrasia is secure, Sir Guyon methodically destroys her "Bowre-Gardin." The maddened beasts which the Palmer had calmed with his wand awake and seek to rescue their mistress, Acrasia, the witch who has enchanted them. Again the Palmer quiets them, telling the young Knight:

... These seeming beasts are men indeed,
Whom this Enchauntresse hath transformed thus,
Whylome her louers, which her lusts did feed,
Now turned into figures hideous,
According to their mindes like monstruous.

(II.xii.lxxxv)

Moved to pity, Sir Guyon persuades the Palmer to restore them to their former state. One, a hog, "night Grillez by name," wishes to remain an animal, and Sir Guyon philosophizes:
See the mind of boastly men,
That hath so soone forgot the excellency
Of his creation, when he life began.
That now he chooseth, with vile difference,
To be a beast, and lacke intelligence.

The Palmer, more worldly-wise, is less surprised at Grille's choice.
for he comments:

... The donghill kind
Delights in filth, and foulo incontinence:
Let Grille be Grille, and have his honguish mind.
But let vs hence depart, whilst wether serves any...

(II.xii.xii)

The destruction of Acrasia's "Bowre of Blisse" completes Sir Guyon's mission and concludes Book II of The Faerie Queene.

In Sir Guyon, the Knight of Temperance, Sponsore has portrayed the temperate man who achieves self-mastery only by denying his total humanity, by inhibiting rather than sublimating or controlling his appetites; Sir Guyon initially is the temperate man whose achievement is self-defeating and self-destroying. Under the guidance of the Palmer, his Reason, Sir Guyon controls increasingly powerful foes—anger with the Red Cross Knight, "disdainfull nicities" in his care for Amavia, Furor, Occasion, Atin, and Pyrochles; Phaedria and Mammon, he overcomes by virtue of habitus in the absence of the Palmer, but bereft of both Reason and Christian Wisdom, he perseveres to victory over Mammon only to arrive at a death-like state. Prudential wisdom, the secular philosophy of the ages, and mere intellectual human reason (ratio scientias), emblematically represented in the Castle of Temperance,

... an auncient worke of antique fame,
And wondrous strong by nature and by skilfull frame
(II.xi.xii).

are good; but they are, in all combinations possible, insufficient to
... See the mind of basely man,
That hath so soon forgot the excellence
Of his creation, when he life began,
That now he chooseth, with vile difference,
To be a beast, and lacke intelligence.

The Palmor, more worldly-wise, is less surprised at Grille's choice, for he comments:

... The dongsill kind
Delights in filth, and foule incontinent:
Let Grille be Grill, and haue his hoggish mind,
But let vs hence depart, whilst wether serues and wind.
(II.xii.lxxxvii)

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... an auncient worke of antique fame,
And wondrous strong by nature and by skilfull frame
(II.ii.xii),
are good; but they are, in all combinations possible, insufficient to
guide and sustain fallen man. That man who seeks by superhuman effort to achieve perfection through human means alone is doomed to failure. Extirpation of desire, the classical counsel to perfection, kills.

Just as it was the Red Cross Knight's task in Book I to perfect his faith through the acquisition of right reason, so in Book II it is Sir Guyon's task to perfect his temperance as a positive virtue which does not negate the human condition. Each knight initially possessed his titular virtue only imperfectly. The Red Cross Knight in his pilgrimage learned to accommodate himself to his armor of faith; Sir Guyon learned the techniques of self-control under the New Dispensation of grace through which love of the Father, not contemptus mundi, motivates man's temperate attitude toward the "things of the world." Having exhausted himself psychologically and spiritually in his encounter with Mammon, bereft of Reason, Sir Guyon learns from experience that there is "care in heauen" and

In heavenly spirits to these creatures base.
(II.viii.i)

An angel watches over him until Reason returns. Significantly, that angel scolds the Palmer for failure always to accompany Sir Guyon and promises aid whenever Reason is unequal to the task of preserving the Knight in virtue. Apparently, then, there is no conflict between man's natural reason and grace, provided that natural reason be properly subordinated.

Nor is there conflict between man's perfection and his responses to carnal desires; only after the angel restores Sir Guyon to his right senses do we have any indication that the Knight feels temptation. In the "Bowre of Blisse," the Palmer finds it necessary to
prompt his charge to overcome his desires; but in the Cave of Morson, there had been no desire. "Love of the Father" has restored the initially rather grim and self-righteous young man to complete and wholesome humanity.

Books I and II of *The Faerie Queen* demonstrate that knowledge can arise either through faith or through natural reason. Both come from God, and cannot conflict, but neither is self-sufficient. The whole man has need of both, for metaphysics and theology are interdependent.

D. Right Reason in Books III, IV, and V

Book I of *The Faerie Queen* emphasizes the incompleteness of naive faith without the support of natural reason; Book II, the weakness of natural reason unsupported by faith. Together, the "Legend of Holiness" and the "Legend of Temperance" reveal Spenser's orthodoxy concerning natural and divine law and their interrelationships. Natural law, that rule of reason implanted in all rational men, evolved by their participation in eternal law, inclines them toward proper actions and purposes. Divine law man apprehends through revelation. It parallels and goes beyond natural law without, however, contradicting it. In both, God-given reason operates, and it is reason which comprehends the correspondences between them.

In Books III and IV of *The Faerie Queen*, the poet in his "Legend of Chastitie" and his "Legend of Friendship" develops his conception of the role which charity plays in establishing the harmony which maintains both natural and divine law in human affairs. Both Books are concerned with interpersonal relationships, with ethics, as either a mirror of cosmic harmony in response to divine love, or as a reflection of cosmic
disintegration in spite of divine love. Because Books III and IV share a common theme and a common central figure, I have elected to treat them together. As Miss Kathleen Williams has pointed out, whereas Books I and II "have behind them a traditional framework, theological and moral, and although the narrative humanizes and actualizes it out of rigidity its firmness is felt," no such rigid framework underlies Books III and IV. Moreover, Miss Williams continues, the titular virtues of Books I and II, holiness and temperance, are interior, "achieved within one's self," but the virtues of Books III and IV, love, chastity, and concord, while personal, are also social, involving "not only one's own harmony but one's harmonious relations with others."78 Thus, there is a functional basis for the poet's relaxation of the rigid narrative line which he followed in the first two Books; his discussion moves out of the narrower and more nearly absolute world of the Red Cross Knight into the shaded and shifting world of human and social values in Books III and IV, so that the relatively loose thematic development of the Ariostean romance epic is more consistent with the terms of the more exploratory discussion. Moreover, I consider Books III and IV a unit because situations introduced and partially developed in Book III continue to Book IV for further development and, in some cases, for completion.

That the world of Books III and IV differs from the world of Books I and II, we at once comprehend in the initial action of Book III. Without by-passing the narrative to jump too eagerly at allegorical meanings, the reader sees that he is no longer in the circumscribed,

78Spenser's World of Glean, p. 35.
somewhat oppressive isolation of the first two books. Sir Guyon and Prince Arthur, having overcome Acrasia and Maleger and recuperated at the Castle of Alma, have departed in search of unspecified adventures. They encounter Britomart and Glance. Sir Guyon attacks the strange knight, Britomart, learning to his surprise that he is no match for his adversary, who promptly and unceremoniously knocks him from his horse. Immediately, the reader realizes that this is not Sir Guyon's day, it is not his story, and it is not his world. Whereas he and the Red Cross Knight had learned to function effectively in the Wandering Wood of Book I and the "Uncouth Way" of Book II, the "open plains" where Britomart defeats Sir Guyon has different ground rules. The ignominy of his defeat—even before he knows that Britomart is a woman—fills the Knight of Temperance with "disdainefull wrath," so that he rises "fierce," seeking revenge for his wounded pride. The Palmer helps Prince Arthur begin "his wrathful1 will with reason to asswage" (III.i.x-xi).

In the world of Books III and IV, holiness and temperance do not provide answers, for man is a social animal as well as an individual child of God; and the possession of right reason implies not merely knowing and achieving right reason as an individual. The possessor of right reason must apply his reason to form judgments within the social context where he finds himself. Britomart, when we first meet her, has already acquired the virtues of holiness and temperance, and rigidly disciplines her personality, already integrated by right reason; her task throughout Books III and IV is learning proper responses to society, to find her proper role as a chaste woman in an imperfect society. She must transform her rather frigid and selfish chastity into a generous and loving social love. Learning the dangers of perverted
love—love as a game, love as warfare, and love as lust—she perseveres until she learns the meaning of love in all its implications. She learns that erotic love has social implications from her adventures with Sir Satyrane and Sir Paride II at the house of Malbeco. She learns that fear of sexual desire can warp and destroy the human soul from her encounter with Amoret at the house of Busirane. She discovers from Sir Scudamour the dangers of possessiveness in the love relationship; from Amylia and Anyas the danger of love's becoming lust; from the six knights lying in wait outside Malecasta's castle, the dangers of considering love a game; from Malecasta, the danger of attributing to strangers purity of intent. Books III and IV, then, illustrate Britomart's learning through experience, both her own and the experiences of others, that "love of the Father" leads to love of "thine neighbor as thyself," that harmonious social relationships exemplify on the human level the concord established by divine law.

In Books III and IV, Spenser is less concerned with the establishment of right reason within the individual than he is with the social accommodation of the individual to divine law and to natural law; for with Spenser, no less than with Richard Hooker, reason is "that which bindeth creatures reasonable in this world, and with which by reason they may most plainly perceive themselves bound." That reason man improves with experience: "Education and instruction are the means, the one by use, the other by precept, to make our natural faculty of reason both the better and the sooner able to judge rightly between truth and error, good and evil" (Hooker, p. 163). But not all.

79 Pages 154 and 155.
"sentences of reason" are mandatory. Some are permissive, some are admonitory (Hooker, p. 181). Whereas in Books I and II the poet has been concerned with the mandatory sentences of reason, Books III and IV move into the realm of the permissive and admonitory sentences, wherein Britomart must choose the lesser of evils or the greater of goods.

In Book V, "The Legend of Artegall and of Ivstice," Spenser moves on to a consideration of that law which Hooker referred to as "the law of the Commonweal," having completed in Books III and IV his attention to that other foundation which "bears up public societies," "a natural inclination whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship" (Hooker, p. 188). Because post-lapsarian man no longer either knows or chooses inevitably the good, some restraints are necessary. As a preparation for Book V, Spenser had complained:

But antique age yet in the infancie
Of time, did liue then like an innocent,
In simple truth and blamelesse chastitie,
Ne then of guile had made experiment,
But voide of vile and treacherous intent,
Held vertue for it selfe in soueraine awe:
Then loyall looue had royall regiment,
And each vnto his lust did make a lawe,
From all forbidden things his liking to withdraw.

The Lyon there did with the Lambe consort,
And eke the Doue sate by the Faulcons side,
Ne each of other feared fraud or tort,
But did in safe securitie abide,
Withouten perill of the stronger pride:
But when the world woxe old, it woxe warre old
(Whereof it hight) and hauing shortly tride
The traines of wit, in wickednesse woxe bold,
And dared of all sinnes the secrets to unfold.

The noet's account, of the world's declination from initial perfection,

Hooker expressed:

And because the greatest part of men are such as prefer their own private good before all things, even that good which is sensual
before whatsoever is most divine; and for that the labour of doing
good, together with the pleasure arising from the contrary, doth
make men for the most part slower to the one and proner to the
other, than that duty prescribed them by law can prevail sufficient-
ly with them: therefore unto laws that men do make for the benefit
of men it hath seemed always needful to add rewards, which may more
allure unto good than any hardness deterreth from it, and punish-
ments, which may more deter from evil than any sweetness thereto
allureth. Wherein as the generality is natural, virtue rewardable
and vice punishable; so the particular determination of the reward
or punishment belongeth unto them by whom laws are made.80

Man, having fallen so far from his original perfection, must attempt by
human law to discipline himself through a series of rewards and punish-
ments. The man-made, but God-blessed, state is his instrument. Spenser,
as a Christian humanist, remembering that Astraea has deserted the
world, remembers also that the Incarnation had modified the harshness of
simple distributive justice. "To this ['the merciful love of the New
Testament'], human judgment must do its faulty best to approximate."81
That human judgment is faulty makes the task more difficult, especially
in the light of Henry Smith's statement reminding magistrates of their
duties that they should "consider what God would do, because they are
instead of God . . . . As we should think how Christ prayed before we
pray, and how he spake before we speak . . . so they should think how
Christ would judge before they judge, because God's law is appointed for
their law."82

Book V concerns itself as much with Sir Artegall's transformation
from the "Saluage Knight" of Book IV, the harsh and stern fighting
machine whose "word" is "Saluagesse sans finesse, shewing secret wit,"

80 Pages 192-193.
81 Williams, Spenser's World of Glass, p. 163.
82 The Magistrate's Scripture (1590), in Works (London, 1866),
I, 360. Quoted in Williams, Spenser's world of Glass, n. 10, p. 163.
into the realization that the remembrance of God's mercy undergirds every consideration of justice in the Christian state. Sir Artogall's transformation begins in Book IV after his meeting with Britomart, and love for the martial maid helps him add equity and mercy to his sense of justice.

But Spenser does not overlook the fact that justice in human society is often difficult of achievement, just as justice on the cosmic level is difficult of human understanding. Fallen man can only approximate through the use of the Christian humanist's right reason that justice which is inextricably bound up with Agape, charity, and Faith, for

All in the powre of their great Maker lie:
All creatures must obey the voice of the Most Hie.
(V.ii.x1)

Sir Artogall's quest is to learn that the legalistic justice of the Old Dispensation has been modified by the loving mercy of the New. If earthly justice is to approximate divine, it, too, must be tempered with love and mercy; as the Incarnation introduced Divine Love into the process of Atonement, or the just relationship between creature and Creator, so man must introduce Charity into the process of human justice, tempering severity with mercy.

Books III, IV, and V, then, deal with the nature of the relationship between the individual and society, the role of natural, human (positive) and divine law as man threads the maze of the human pilgrimage, where

So tickle be the termes of mortall state,
And full of subtile sophisms, which do play
With double senses, and with false debate,
T'approwe the vknown purpose of eternall fate.
(III.iii.xxvii)
E. Right Reason in Book VI

The sixth book of *The Faerie Queene*, "The Legend of S. Calidore or of Courtesie," falls into three parts. Initially, there are exempla of courtesy in the adventures involving Sir Calidore. From Canto III.xxv occur the various adventures of Calepine and Serena, Prince Arthur, Timias, and Mirabellae. Cantos IX-XII contain the so-called Pastorella Episode in which Sir Calidore dwells with Pastorella among the shepherds. Even though the book falls into three such separate sections, its unity is structural rather than thematic. That is, as in Books I, II, and V, a dominant character pursues a well-defined objective. Sir Calidore, the Knight of Courtesy, sets forth on a quest from the Faerie Court to destroy the Blatant Beast, and the tri-partite organization of the book is, I believe, intentional, because, first, it establishes Spenser's conception of courtesy by example and illustration; second, it broadens that definition by applying it to a widening circle of participants, some of whom achieve courtesy, some of whom do not; and, third, it illustrates the poet's contention that the pleasures of courtesy-as-policy can obscure the nature of true courtesy-as-spiritual-quality.

Twentieth-century criticism has in many cases regarded Book VI as a delightful respite following the rigorous harshness of Book V. Professor Lewis thinks it the greatest possible error to 'suppose that Calidore's long delay among the shepherds is a pastoral truancy of Spenser's from his moral intention. On the contrary, the shepherd's country and Mount Acidale in the midst of it are the core of the book,
and the key to Spenser's whole conception of courtesy." In like vein, Professor Graham Hough has explained: "At the beginning of canto x we are reminded that he [Sir Calidore] is leaving his quest and his promise. Yet he is hardly blamed for it, for he is pursuing a true happiness and peace, enough to cure him for ever of any delight in 'false blisse' or 'painted show.'" Professor Hamilton has said that "inevitably, Calidore's world becomes a romance in which the happy dream of pastoral innocence is realized in his discovery of Pastorella." Miss Williams, too, regards the pastoral digression in Book VI as Spenser's Land of Heart's Desire. Professor de Selincourt emphasizes that "the pastoral world was deeply associated with Spenser's own personal experience, and as he turns to it again, though his own story still has the character of naive impossible romance, its setting and its atmosphere grow at once more tender, more natural, more intimate." Delight in pastoralism—for, even though only three cantos of Book VI are, technically speaking, within the pastoral tradition, the entire book, as Miss Williams points out, acquires a pastoral atmosphere, "exists in one's memory as a pastoral one"—has, I believe, obscured Spenser's serious purpose in the 'Legend of Covrtesie.'

83 Allegory of Love, p. 350.
84 A Preface to the Faerie Queens, p. 208.
86 Spenser's World of Glass, pp. 189-223.
88 Spenser's World of Glass, p. 201.
More apposite are Upton's question, "Who can help thinking of Sidney's Areadia when he finds Sir Calidore misspending his time among the Shepherds,"89 and his comment upon Canto X to the effect that "Sir Calidore neglects his quest for the love of Pastorella: so Ulysses was detained by Calypso, Aeneas by Dido, Ruggiero by Alcina, Rinaldo by Alcina."90 Agreeing that Calidore's pastoral digression constitutes truancy are Professors Donald Cheney91 and A. Bartlett Giamatti.92 My reading of Book VI agrees with the opinions of Upton, Cheney, and Giamatti, rather than with those of Lewis, Hough, de Selincourt, Hamilton, and Miss Williams; and I shall interpret the Pastorella episode as being a truancy from duty and obligation, not as being an earned and delightful pastoral idyll. It is my argument that in Book VI the poet develops his idea that the pastoral vision of the ideal life is a false, deluding one, capable through its superficial attractiveness of diverting the pilgrim from his quest.

The poet establishes the relationship of Book VI with Book V in the meeting between Sir Artegall, the titular Knight of Book V, and Sir Calidore, the Knight of Courtesy of Book VI. Sir Artegall has completed his mission. Sir Calidore, en route to overcome the Blatant Beast, meets Sir Artegall returning to Court, very much as Sir Guyon, departing on his mission, encountered the Red Cross Knight in the


90Var. VI, 244.


initial action of Book II. The Knight of Courtesy realizes that his is
to be a difficult assignment:

But where ye ended haue, now I begin
To tread an endless trace, withouten guyde,
Or good direction, how to enter in,
Or how to issue forth in ways unused,
In perils strange, in labours long and wide,
In which although good Fortune me befall,
Yet shall it not by none be testifyde.
(VI.i.vi)

In courteous discourse which justifies the poet's earlier description
of him, Sir Calidore explains the nature of his mission and inquires
whether the older knight might have knowledge of the Blatant Beast's
whereabouts. Sir Artegall, indeed, has seen the Beast, but, self-
assured, the Knight of Justice "did nought regard his malice nor his
powre" (VI.i.ix). The two knights part, and Sir Calidore continues with
Sir Artegall's blessing. In his travels, Sir Calidore rescues a young
knight and his lady, slays Maleffort, and defeats and reforms Crudor
and Briana. In his second adventure, the Knight of Courtesy makes
Tristram his squire after seeing him kill the proud discourteous
knight, takes Aladine home, and lies to protect Priscilla's reputation.
In his third adventure, Sir Calidore blunders upon Calepino and Serena,
interrupting their private courtship. As Sir Calidore and Calepino
talk, Serena wanders away and is wounded by the Blatant Beast. Sir
Calidore pursues the Beast, and the poet's focus shifts to the activi-
ties of minor characters: Turpine, Blandina, the Salvage Man, Sir
Bruin, Matilda, Prince Arthur and Timias, and the Hermit. After Cale-
pine has rescued Serena from the Cannibals in the eighth canto, Sir
Calidore reappears, still pursuing his quarry.

Through narrative action, the poet has defined his conception of
courtesy as a basic, ethical virtue, rather than as a superficial social one. He has also indicated that Sir Calidore no more exemplifies perfection in his titular virtue than had the Red Cross Knight, Sir Guyon, Britomart, or Sir Artegall. Book VI, then, repeats the pattern of earlier books in which the central figure learns by experience the full meaning of his pilgrimage, the significance of his quest, and the full definition of the titular virtue.

As Book VI opens, Sir Calidore encounters the "comely squire" who, with his lady, has been humiliated by Sir Crudor and the Lady Briana. Briana's Seneschall, Maleffort, has sought to humiliate the squire and his lady, as he does all who use the Lady Briana's "stroight." Sir Calidore kills Maleffort, overcomes Sir Crudor, and establishes courteous, harmonious relationships among Briana and Sir Crudor and the "comely squire" and his lady. Because the "comely squire" and his lady have been innocent victims of a situation, Sir Caledore's courteous efforts reestablish them in felicity, secure from the ravening of the Blatant Beast. Courtesy, apparently, can establish complete harmony where there is no violation of conventions or mores. Moreover, Sir Calidore exhibits perfect courtesy as he patiently endures the Lady Briana's tirade.

After courteously aiding the "comely squire" and his lady, Sir Calidore continues his search for the Blatant Beast. As he travels, he comes upon Tristram, obviously a "gentle swain," but no knight, single-handed and afoot, as the lad slays a mounted knight, "Which armes impugneth plaine." Determining why the young man has broken "the law of armes," Sir Calidore learns that Tristram had reproved the knight for ungallant behavior to ladies. Mounted upon his charger, that
churlish knight had forced his lady to run before him, speeding her along with well-placed "thumpes" of his spear. Tristram's plea for more knightly consideration for the lady had prompted the villain to attack the apparently unarmed boy. Tristram had defended himself by hurling a dart into the knight's heart. The well-thumped lady, corroborating Tristram's story, reveals that as she and the knight rode through the wood, they came upon another couple beside a fountain

... in joyous iolliment
Of their franke loues, free from all gealous spyes.
(VI.ii.xvi)

Rather than retiring unobtrusively, as a gentleman would do, the lady's companion had sought to take advantage of the situation. Casting his own lady down from his charger, he had attacked the other knight, unarmed like the Red Cross Knight at the fountain with Duessa, to seize his terrified lady. He was able grievously to wound the knight, but the lady had escaped. Furious because the other knight's lady had escaped, the boorish knight had vented his ire upon his own lady. Such corroboration of Tristram's fearless innocence moves Sir Calidore to inquire about the lad's background. That background proves to be a noble one. Tristram is an exiled prince, living for the sake of anonymity in the rustic wilds. He persuades Sir Calidore to make him his squire. The Knight of Courtesy regrets that he cannot take the newly-made squire with him, but his mission against the Blatant Beast must be a solitary one. So Tristram dons the slain knight's armor and accompanies the lady as Sir Calidore continues his so-far relentless pursuit of the Blatant Beast.

Sir Calidore stumbles upon the lady and her knight whom Tristram's victim had so rudely disturbed. The distraught lady, concerned for the
life of her lover as well as for her own reputation, welcomes the
services of the Courtoous Knight. Together they bear the wounded
knight to a near-by castle.

Arriving at the convenient castle, Sir Calidore discovers that the
wounded man, Sir Alidine, is the son of their host, Sir Aldus. They
solicitously care for Sir Alidine, and, assured of his ultimate recov­
er, ponder the case of the Lady Priscilla's reputation. Her dalliance
with Sir Alidine was not only ill-advised; it had been forbidden by her
father, who intended her for a more advantageous union than with Sir
Alidine. Sir Calidore escorts the Lady to her home, first procuring
evidence to validate his somewhat equivocating version of the situation
to excuse the Lady's unexplained over-night absence from her father's
protection. Presenting the severed head of the intrusive knight who
had attacked the Lady Priscilla as she sat with Sir Alidine, but whom,
in turn, Tristram had slain, Sir Calidore, rather mendaciously,

... did present
The fearefull Lady to her father deare,
Most perfect pure, and guiltlesse innocent
Of blame, as he did on his Knighthood sweare,
Since first he saw her, and did free from feare
Of a discourteous Knight, who had her reft,
And by outrageous force away did beare:
Witness thereof he shew'd his head there left,
And wretched life forlorne for vengement of his theft.

(VI.iii.xviii)

Gracefully accepting the thanks of the relieved father and of the even
more relieved Priscilla, Sir Calidore doggedly resumes his pursuit.
Very soon after depositing Priscilla at her father's, the Courteous
Knight himself stumbles upon a pair of lovers, embarrassing both them
and himself. So courteously does Sir Calidore apologize that the young
knight forgets the business at hand; and Serena, "so his Lady hight,"
bored by the two men's talk, wanders off, enchanted with the loveliness of the wood. Sir Calidore and Sir Calepine, the amorous knight, continue their conversation until Serena's screams startle them into seeking her release from the Blatant Beast. Sir Calidore's vigorous attack leads the Blatant Beast to drop the screaming Serena and flee for his life, Sir Calidore in hot pursuit, as Sir Calidine comforts the wounded Serena.

The poet focuses his attention away from Sir Calidore for the remainder of the third canto, not to re-introduce the titular Knight until the ninth canto. Spenser assures the reader, however, that the Courteous Knight perseveres.

Through hills, through dales, through forests, and through plains
In that same quest which fortune on him cast.
(VI.ix.ii)

Content that Sir Calidore is adequately harrassing the Blatant Beast, the reader concentrates on others' activities. The first order of business involves Sir Calepine's efforts to find comfort and succor for Serena. A strange knight discourteously refuses to aid Sir Calepine as he fords a stream while bearing the wounded Serena; moreover, the "unknightly knight" is too cowardly to take offense at the depreca­tions which Sir Calepine, exasperated, hurls at him. Later, Sir Calepine is denied the hospitality of Sir Turpine's castle, and must, in spite of the pleas of the Lady Blandina, Sir Turpine's wife, care for the wounded Serena in the bushes before the castle. Meanwhile, Serena's condition deteriorates, so that Sir Calepine, absorbed in problems relating to his lady's very survival, cannot properly attend to the inhuman challenges of Sir Turpine. Sir Turpine, realizing that
Sir Calepine has more than he can do to care for Serena, takes advantage of Sir Calepine's disadvantage and attacks him as he, afoot, leads the horse along bearing the Lady Serona. Two fortuitous circumstances combine to protect Sir Calepine: he thinks of using Serena as a shield, and the Salvage Man comes to his defense. Sir Turpine, thwarted by Sir Calepine's evasions and terrified of the Salvage Man, flees, screaming, in a quite unknightly fashion. Their rescuer, the Salvage Man, proves also a benefactor to Sir Calepine and Serena, exhibiting in his crude way genuine courtesy and hospitality which others, higher-born, have not shown.

Her first natural fears of the Salvage Man assuaged, the Lady Serona learns to depend upon his earnest hospitality and rude wisdom, as he exhausts his woodsman's knowledge of herbs and home remedies to treat her wounds received from the Blatant Beast. Even though the Salvage Man's efforts avail nought in Serena's case, for reasons to appear later, Sir Calepine rapidly recovers his lusty vigor.

Enjoying his new-found strength, Sir Calepine wanders into the wood where he encounters a fierce bear, a terrified infant claspod in his bloody jaws. Even though unarmed, Sir Calepine attacks, forces the bear to relinquish his human burden, and kills the beast. Fortunately, Sir Calepine soon finds a lady bemoaning her childlessness, so that he quickly persuades her to accept the bear-child as her own, instructs her in beguiling her husband, and thus accommodates them all— the baby, himself, the lady, and Sir Bruin— to an awkward situation. Assured that the lady will provide his young charge, so reluctantly acquired, proper care, Sir Calepine seeks to return to Serena and the Salvage Man, their eager host.
Even Sir Calepine's most desperate efforts do not lead him back to Serena, still suffering the effects of the Blatant Beast's infectious bite. Eventually, despite her weakness, Serena tires of waiting for Sir Calepine's return and determines to seek her fortune without him. But the Salvage Man, usurping the arms which Sir Calopine had carelessly left behind, insists upon escorting her as she rides away on the now-rested horse. Assiduously attending her every need, the Salvage Man attempts to repair Serena's broken saddle. Prince Arthur and his young squire, Timias, almost miraculously reunited, come upon the ill-assorted pair, and immediately conclude that Serena has been kidnapped by her attendant. The squire leaps to attack the apparent criminal, but Serena's pleas prevent bloodshed and violence, so that the Prince is able to sift out the truth of the situation. The four, amity established, ride off together, as the Prince seeks to restore Serena's cheerfulness. Riding along, she relates her sad story, and the Prince vows to punish the guilty knight, Sir Turpine, responsible for her plight.

Fortunately, they come upon a hermitage just at nightfall; the hospitable anchorite, himself retired from a chivalric career, provides them of his best. Consequently, as the Prince departs on his mission, Serena and the wounded Timias remain with the hermit for care, rest, and treatment.

Not all his medical skill enables the hermit to restore his guests' health; but his psychological insight convinces him that their illness is not altogether physical. He convinces them that
... in your selfe your onely helpe doth lie,
To heale your selues, and must proceed alone
From your owne will, to cure your maladie.

(VI.vi.vii)

Serena and Timias heed the hermit's advice:

First leare your outward sances to refraine
From things, that stirre vp fraile affection.

(VI.vi.vii)

They learn the genealogy of the Blatant Beast and the etiology of their ill. Their prognosis, their spiritual guide tells them, is good, provided that they "auoide the occasion of the ill," for

... when the cause, whence euill doth arize,
Remoued is, th'effect surceaseth still.
Abstaines from pleasure, and restraine your will,
Subdue desire, and bridle loose delight,
Vse scanted diet, and forbear your fill,
Shun secresie, and talk in open sight:
So shall you soone repairs your present euill plight.

(VI.vi.xiv)

Learning to avoid the appearance of evil, they quickly recuperate.

Prince Arthur, meanwhile, together with the Salvage Man, seeks to avenge the inhospitable discourtesy of Sir Turpine, responsible for the sad plight of Serena and Sir Calepine. The strange pair arrives at Sir Turpine's castle. Rebuffed by the surly groom, the Prince and his newfound friend initiate a melee. As the Salvage Man occupies their reluctant host's retainers, the Prince defeats Sir Turpine, sparing his life only because the Lady Blandina, Sir Turpine's wife, hides him under her skirt. At the obsequious request of the Lady Blandina, the Prince spares Sir Turpine and stays the hand of the Salvage Man, who has continued to lay waste all who come against him.

Uneasy peace restored by the insincere pleas of the Lady Blandina, the Prince and the Salvage Man sleep the night away uneasily, leaving Sir Turpine's castle early the next morning.
After the Prince departs, the "malicious" and "ingrate" Sir Turpino plots revenge and persuades two ignorant and inexperienced young knights to attack Prince Arthur, promising them a bribe to accomplish that which he himself fears to attempt. To their sorrow, the two attack the Prince. One dies, the other, realizing the malicious intent of Sir Turpine, agrees to lure his dubious benefactor into the Prince's reach. He does so, and the Prince subjects the infinitely discourteous churl to the ultimate indignity; he hangs him by the heels from a tree as an object lesson to others.

As the Prince catches his breath, the poet's focus shifts to the "Fayro Mirabellae," condemned by Cupid for her arrogant disdain toward her suitors to a pilgrimage of penance. Cupid has consigned her to a fate like that which his lady had imposed upon the Squire of Dames: she must wander over the face of the earth, accompanied by Infamie and Despight, until she "had sau'd so many loues, as she did lose" (VI.vii.xxviii). For two years, she has been drearily wandering about the world, according to Cupid's sentence. Timias, who with Serena has left the hermit, cured, seeks to rescue Mirabellae, only to find himself thrall to her captors, Infamie and Despight. Seeing her protector fall, Serena flees in terror.

As Mirabellae and Timias go forward, prodded on by Infamie and Despight, they encounter Prince Arthur and Sir Enias, Sir Turpine's former dupe whom the Prince had spared. Initially, Sir Enias attempts to defeat the two captors of Mirabellae and Timias, but Prince Arthur has to rescue Sir Enias, too. As the Prince is about to slay Despight, the Lady Mirabellae intercedes, explaining: "My life will by his death haue lamentable end" (VI.viii.xvii). Recognizing the justice of
Cupid's sentence, she hopes to recover her humanity through the requisite expiation, and so continues her pilgrimage.

Serena's headlong flight from Timias's downfall exhausts her, and she collapses into a coma-like sleep. As she sleeps, cannibals discover her and, thanking their gods for such an unexpected windfall, wonder whether she will prove the more succulent for an uninterrupted sleep. They agree that when she awakens, they will first sacrifice her to their gods, since "by grace of God she there was sent" (VI.viii.xxxviii). After the ceremonial thanksgiving sacrifice to the deity who sent her, they plan a common meal. As she sleeps, they prepare. Their priest readies his grisly implements as their intentions waver. Some, attracted by Serena's beauty, wish to rape her, but, disciplined by their priest, they content themselves with planning their dainty banquet. When the Lady Serena awakens, her frightened screams avail nothing as the savages reenact the distribution of Our Lord's garments at the Crucifixion:

\[
\begin{align*}
\ldots & \text{ first they spoile her of her jewels deare,} \\
& \text{And afterwards of all her rich array} \\
& \text{The which amongst them they in pieces teare,} \\
& \text{And of the pray each one a part doth bear.} \\
& \text{(VI.viii.xli)}
\end{align*}
\]

In a horrible blend of sexuality, blood-lust, perverted religion, cannibalism, voyeurism, and sadism, the ceremony comes abruptly to a climax as the priest prepares to sacrifice their victim. But "Sir Calepine by chaunce, more then by choyce" (VI.viii.xlvi), stumbles in, slays the priest, dispatches the howling cannibals, and rescues the naked Serena. She is too ashamed of her nakedness to discover her identity to her rescuer.

The digression in Book VI thus far has been the poet's; all the
while, as Spenser has concentrated on the events of other characters, Sir Calidore has doggedly pursued the Blatant Beast. But in the ninth canto, the titular Knight deviates from his assigned quest.

Sir Calidore has traced the Blatant Beast the length and breadth of the land:

Him first from court to the citties coursed,
And from the citties to the townes him prest,
And from the townes into the countrie forsed,
And from the country back to private farmes he scorsed.

From thence into the open fields he fled,
Whereas the Heardes were keeping of their noat.

(VI.ix.iii-iv)

The Beast eludes him near the pastoral beauties which constitute Sir Calidore's temptation from duty. The Knight learns from the shepherds that they have not suffered from the onslaughts of the Beast. He shares their simple lunch and spends a pleasant time, relaxed and free from the tensions of his legitimate pursuit. Suddenly, the erring Knight

Saw a faire damzoll, which did weare a crowne
Of sundry flowres, with silked ribbands tyde
Yclad in home-made greenes that her owne hand had dye.

(VI.ix.vii)

Enchanted by the lovely shepherd-lass, Pastorella, and by the rustic charm of pastoral life, Sir Calidore accompanies the group from their pastures as they return home for the night, clumsily trying to adapt himself to the shepherd's skills in an effort to help his new-found friends.

The old shepherd, Meliboe, Pastorella's guardian, with his aged wife, courteously welcome Sir Calidore to their simple hospitality. After completing their evening meal, Sir Calidore and Meliboe begin a serious conversation in which the Courteous Knight extravagantly
praises the pleasures and virtues of the pastoral life. Meliboe has found the simple life satisfying, particularly in contrast to the sham and hypocrisy which he had observed in his former occupation as royal gardener. The old shepherd's words delight Sir Calidoro, for they are just the encouragement to abandon his arduous life that he has wanted to hear; he fails to hear Meliboe's full explanation. Sir Calidoro wishes

... th'heauens so much had graced mee,
As graunt me liue in like condition;
Or that my fortunes might transposed bee
From pitch of higher place, vnto this low degree.

(VI.ix.xxviii)

He misinterprets Meliboe's caveat:

In vaine (said then old Meliboe) doe mon
The heauens of their fortunes fault accuse,
Sith they know best, what is best for them:
For they to eack such fortune doe diffuse,
As they doe know each can most aptly vse.
For not that, which men couet most, is best,
Nor that thing worst, which men do most refuse;
But fittest is, that all contented rest
With that they hold: eack hath his fortune in his breast.

It is the mynd, that maketh good or ill,
That maketh wretch or happie, rich or poore:
For some, that hath abundance at his will,
Hath not enough, but wants in greatest store;
And other, that hath litle, askes no more,
But in that litle is both rich and wise.
For wisedome is most riches; fooles therefore
They are, which fortunes doe by vowes deuize,
Sith each vnto himselfe his life may fortunize.

(VI.ix.xxix-xxx)

So delighted is the young knight with Moliboe's concluding statement that he fails to heed the basis for that conclusion, and completely ignores the old man's advice that happiness arises from contentment with one's own lot. Failing to hear Meliboe's preliminary statement that happiness is an internal thing, dependent upon an attitude of
acceptance of one's lot, Sir Calidore seizes upon the conditional conclusion:

... fowles therefor
They are, which fortunes doe by vowes dueize,
Sith each vnto hismelfe his life may fortunize.

The Courteous Knight rashly concludes that

Since then in each mans self ....
It is, to fashion his owne lyfes estate,
Give leaue awhyle, good father, in this shoro
To rost my barcke, which hath bone boaton late
With stormes of fortune and tempestuous fate,
In seas of troubles and of toylesome paine,
That whether ouito from them for to retrate
I shall resolue, or backs to turne againe,
I may here with your selfe some small repose obtaine.
(VI.ix.xxxi)

He arranges to abandon his courtly station and live as a simple swain among his now-found friends, courting the lowly Pastorella, "feeding on the bayt of his owne bane" (VI.ix.xxiv). He abandons his courtly courtesy and woos Pastorella as if he were a shepherd swain; he discards his knightly armor for rustic weeds; his sword he exchanges for a shepherd's staff; his sophisticated amusements he trades for rustic ones--tournaments for wrestling, the cheer of court for bucolic song. Sir Calidore does not recall that the Blatant Beast is near at hand; that he has

... chaced him so nie,
That to the folds, where sheepe at night doe seat,
And to the little cote where shepherds lie
In winters wrathfull time, he forced him to flie.
(VI.ix.iv)

In his idiot's delight, Sir Calidore is unaware that he has brought the Blatant Beast with him, and that his own presence as a stranger who should maintain his own station, but does not, disturbs the community of shepherds. Coridon, Sir Calidore's rival for Pastorella, becomes
surlly and petulant, facing a kind of competition he regards as 
improver. Even Sir Calidore's courtesy is inappropriate and puzzling 
to his shepherd friends, so that his generous treatment of Coridon does 
more to commend him to himself than to Coridon.

As an indication of the ironic nature of the poet's attitude 
toward Sir Calidore's pastoral digression, the reader has but to note 
the introductory stanzas to the tenth canto. Viewing the Knight's 
experiences through the young man's own eyes, the poet has commented:

Thus did the gentle knight himself appear
Amongst that rusticke rout in all his deeds,
That even they, the which his rivals were,
Could not maligne him, but commend him needs:
For courtesie amongst the rudest breeds
Good will and favour. So it surely wrought
With this fair Mayd, and in her mynde the seeds
Of perfect love did sow, that last forth brought
The fruites of joy and blisses, though long time dearely
bought.
(VI.ix.xlv)

Only the deliberately ambiguous editorial comment, "though long time 
dearly bought," reveals the poet's attitude toward Sir Calidore's 
abandonment of duty for pleasure. Spenser's attitude becomes plainer 
when he begins Canto IX, wondering what has become of the Blatant Beast 
while Sir Calidore gambols on the green:

Who now does follow the foule Blatant Beast,
Whilst Calidore does follow that faire Mayd,
Vnmyndfull of his vow and high beheast,
Which by the Faery Queene was on hym layd,
That he should never leave, nor be delayd
From chaising him, till he had it attchieued?
But now entrapt of love, which him betrayd,
He mindeth more, how he may be relieued
With grace from her, whose love his heart hath sore
engrioued.

That from henceforth he meanes no more to sew
His former quest, so full of toile and paine;
Another quest, another game in view
He hath, the guerdon of his love to gaine:
With whom he myndes for euer to remaine,
And set his rest amongst the rusticke sort,
Rather then hunt still after shadowes vaine
Of courtly fauour, fed with light report
Of every blaste, and sayling alwaies on the port.

Ne cortes mote he greatly blamed be,
From so high step to stoupe vnto so low.
For who had tasted once (as oft did he)
The happy peace, which there doth overfow,
And prou'd the perfect pleasures, which doe grow
Amongst poore hyndes, in hils, in woods, in dales,
Would never more delight in painted show
Of such false blisse, as there is set for stales,
T'entrap unwary fooles in their eternall bales.

The irony implicit in the three stanzas becomes overt in the contrasts between honorable duty and personal contentment in the next stanza:

For what hath all that goodly glorious gaze
Like to one sight, which Calidore did vew?
The glance whereof their dimmed eyes would daze,
That never more they should endure the show
Of that sunshine, that makes them looke askew.
Ne ought in all that world of beauties rare,
(Saue onely Glorianaes heavenly hew
To which what can compare?) can it compare;
The which as commeth now, by course I will declare.

The poet develops his ironic contrasts by means of rhetorical questions and parenthetical insertions, recalling to the reader the poet's attitudes toward premature retirement from the battle of life in all the preceding books of The Faerie Queene. The contrast between the active, productive life, and the retired life recalls the Red Cross Knight's dalliance with Duessa, Sir Guyon's diversion with Phaedria, Britomart's indecision with Malecasta, and all of the mundane attractions which divert the Christian pilgrim from his proper "love of the Father." It is eros, self-love, not charity, which inclines Sir Calidore's heart toward truancy.

Significantly, it is soon after Sir Calidore's rapt contemplation
of his vision of the three graces dancing to Colin Clout's piping that the specious peace of Arcadia crumbles helplessly under the attack of evil. Meliboe, who had felt secure in his artificial Arcadia, all the shepherd-folk, and Sir Calidore's beloved, Pastorella, fall captive to a group of lawlessbrigands who steal their property, drive off their flocks, burn their homes, and plan to sell the captives as slaves. Evil uncaused and unprovoked has obliterated the imaginary paradise, for, as Spenser has told us in each preceding book, no return to pre-lapsarian Eden is possible in this world. Et in Arcaidia ego.

Significantly, too, Colin Clout apologizes because the song he pipes for the graces has ignored the "Great Gloriana"; Colin (the poet's alter ego), too, has been indulging his senses rather than discharging his duty.

But the catastrophe which plunged Meliboe to his undeserved death is, in some respects, a fortunate fall for Sir Calidore. Realizing at last the precariousness of the human condition, the Courteous Knight awakens from his idyllic lethargy, "dights" his armor, and resumes his proper role in the world of affairs. He rescues Pastorella from her captors, destroys the "Brigants," and acts as a proper knight should act, rescuing ladies and righting wrongs for the love of God, society, and humanity. His revived heroism, however, is too tardy to help old Meliboe, the rustic pastoral pacifist-philosopher, and his aged wife. They together with all the other shepherd-folk, except Pastorella, have been executed by the "Brigants"--ironically, for fear that the peaceful advocates of non-violence might attack their captors, who are engaged in a war among themselves.

Sir Calidore escorts Pastorella to a nearby castle, the seat of
Sir Bellamoure and his wife, the Lady Claribell. They discover that Pastorella is their long-lost daughter. As the newly-united family rejoices, Sir Calidore, restored to his manly virtue, resumes his quest, "that monstrous Beast by finall force to quell" (VI.xii.xxii).

Free from harassment as Sir Calidore has dallied in his pastoral idyll, the Blatant Beast has enjoyed a Roman Carnival of destruction, wreaking havoc wherever he has touched:

Through all estates he found that he had past,
   In which he many massacres had left,
      And to the Clergy now was come at last;
   In which such spoile, such hauocke, and such theft
   He wrought, that thence all goodnesse he bereft,
      That endlessse were to tell. The Elfin Knight,
   Who now no place vnsought had left,
   At length into a Monastere did light,
   Where he him found despyoyling all with maine and might.

Into their cloysters now he broken had,
   Through which the Monkes he chaced here and there,
      And them pursu'd into their dortours sad,
   And searched all their cels and secrets neare;
   In which what filth and ordure did appears,
      Were yrkesome to report; yet that foule Beast
   Nought sparing them, the more did tosse and teare,
   And ransacks all their dennes from most to least,
      Regarding nought religion, nor their holy heast.

From thence into the sacred Church he broke,
   And robd the Chancell, and the deskes downe threw,
      And Altars fouled, and blasphemy spoke,
   And th'Images for all their goodly hew,
      Did cast to ground, whilst none was them to rew;
   So all confounded and disordered there.
      (VI.xii.xxiii-xxv)

Finally cornering his quarry, Sir Calidore recognizes his nature. The Blatant Beast is mostly mouth. Small in comparison with the dragons which St. George had faced in Book I, nonetheless, the Blatant Beast is a dangerous adversary, for his mouth is all too well equipped for the damage which he wishes to inflict. His mouth
Moreover, the Beast was well equipped with constantly wagging tongues

Of sundry kindes, and sundry quality,
Some were of dogs, that barked day and night,
And some of cats, that wrailing still did cry,
And some of Beares, that grynd continually,
And some of Tygres, that did seemo to gren,
And snar at all, that ever passed by:
But most of them were tongues of mortall men,
Which spake reprochfully, not caring where nor when.

And them amongst were mingled here and there,
The tongues of Serpents with three forked stings,
That spat out poysone and gore bloody gore
At all, that came within his rauenings,
And spake licentious words, and hatefull things
Of good and bad alike, of low and hie;
No kesars spared he a whit, nor Kings,
But either blotted them with infamie,
Or bit them with his banefull teeth of iniury.

Sir Calidore by might and main conquers the Blatant Beast and
binds him in an iron chain to lead "like a fearefull dog." But Sir
Calidore no more attains a permanent victory than had Sir Guyon or the
Red Cross Knight. Sir Calidore's quest, too, the poet says, is an
unending one, and the barking slander, gossip, and despiteful railing
of the Blatant Beast demand the same eternally vigilant opposition as
do Acrasia, Mammon, the Monster of Error, and Duessa.

In "The Legend of S. Calidore or of Covrtesie," Spenser has
defined courtesy. Some of the exampla positively illustrate the virtue
as it exists in characters worthy of emulation; some negatively illus-
trate the virtue as it fails to operate in the characters who are not
worthy of emulation; and some illustrate that courtesy, like the other
virtues, often exists as a disguise for policy, as in the case of the
Lady Blandina. Courtesy is no less, to Spenser, than justice in daily affairs, and, like all of Spenser's titular virtues, presupposes the existence of such other traits as holiness, temperance, charity, concord. But in defining the virtue, Spenser also limits its efficacy.

Sir Calidore was able to establish the "comely squire" as his lady in a harmonious relationship with Sir Crudor and the Lady Briana because the squire and his lady had been innocent of violating conventions and mores. Like Sir Artegall, they were secure from the attacks of the Blatant Beast, and could afford to ignore him. Tristram, too, escapes culpability, and so Sir Calidore is able to direct him toward the noble ideals of true chivalry; and the lady whom Tristram rescues from her brutish knight escapes the Blatant Beast. On the other hand, Sir Calidore's courtesy can achieve only limited results for Sir Aladine and the Lady Priscilla, because their indiscreet behavior has made them liable to censure. The boorish knight who finds them involved in amorous dalliance wounds Sir Aladine, and jeopardizes the Lady Priscilla's reputation. Because the two young lovers have not avoided "the occasion of the ill," as the hermit later advises Serena and Timias to do, it is necessary for Sir Calidoro to employ equivocation to reinstate the compromised lady to her father's good graces. In order for courtesy to reestablish the harmony disrupted by indiscreet violation of

93 Interestingly enough, only in Book VI of The Faerie Queene does mendacity appear as a characteristic of the virtuous knights; and Spenser described Sir Calidore initially by saying that

\[\ldots\] he loathd leasing, and base flattery,
And loued simple truth and steadfast honesty. (VI.i.iii)

Apparently, Sir Calidore allows his advocacy of courtesy and the maintenance of a lady's good reputation to overcome his love of "simple truth and steadfast honesty."
custom, Sir Calidore must employ extraordinary measures.

A commonplace in Sponsor criticism regards Sir Calidore’s stumbling upon Sir Calopino and the Lady Serena, engaged in amorous dalliance as Sir Alidine and the Lady Priscilla had been, as a parallel to indicate the reactions of the courteous man who blunders upon an embarrassing situation. Sir Calidore’s tact, courtesy, and good breeding seem to be contrasts to the brutal knight’s intrusive rapacity. Had Sir Calidore made his apologies and gone about his business, leaving Sir Calepine and the Lady alone, such an interpretation would be valid. But the fact that Sir Calidore intrudes courteously, monopolizing Sir Calepine’s attention so that the Lady Serena wanders off, bored, into the woods, indicates that the Knight ofCourtesy misuses his titular virtue to charm, entertain, and ingratiate. Moreover, such an insistently intrusive monopolizing of another’s attention subjects the compromised lady to the attack of the Blatant Beast. Sir Calidore is able to drive the beast away, but the Lady Serena suffers more grievous wounds than did the Lady Priscilla or the unknown lady whose traveling companion Tristram became. Sir Calidore has substituted the reputation for courtesy for the genuine article, and his pseudo-courtesy has become a perversion which distracts him from his quest. His encounter with Sir Calepine and the Lady Serena results in Sir Calidore’s first encounter with the Blatant Beast, and it is the Blatant Beast which leads him into his pastoral idyll.

Other critics—most notably and most recently, Miss Kathleen Williams—have remarked about the air of freedom, the lack of restraint, characteristic of Book VI. Miss Williams comments:
There is a feeling of springing freedom, and this feeling mounts through the book. Because it exists everywhere in the characters and their adventures it can be intensely realized again and again in details of physical sensation. . . .

Delight and liberty are two of the keywords for this book. . . . The sense of release from tension and difficulty makes the comparison with Shakespeare's last plays unavoidable. 94

True, freedom is one of the key ideas in Book VI; but Spenser discusses irresponsible freedom as well as responsible, deserved freedom: he does not advocate license and self-indulgence when he cries "Liberty."

Initially, Sir Artegall exemplifies responsible freedom. He has nobly acquitted himself in his quest, and so, knowing himself

... from peril free,
Did nought regard his malice nor his powre.
(VI.i.ix)

The hermit who cares for Timias and the Lady Serena, too, demonstrates responsible, earned freedom. He is an old man, too aged to continue his youthful knightly exploits, and so has retired to a solitary life of contemplation and service to God and man, that "service which is perfect freedom." Spenser refers to the hermit's life, significantly, as being "like careless bird in cage" (VI.vi.iv), for he realizes that freedom from worldly restraint comes only to those who discipline themselves. He is aware, from his wide experience with men and their ways, that evil exists as a real force rather than as a mere absence of perfection, and that it is one's duty to combat active evil with whatever means is appropriate to his age and degree. The freedom and retirement which Meliboe advocates, on the other hand, arises from ignoring the existence of evil in the world. Disillusioned with the imperfections of society, he has withdrawn into a pastoral retirement and closed his

94Spenser's World of Glass, p. 190.
mind to the fact that evil threatens the innocent and the withdrawn as surely as it threatens others. He has sought an innocuous agrarian bliss, thinking that no one would envy him his meagre possessions. Consequently, he is as unprepared as Job had been, when undeserved evil envelops him.

Meliboe's withdrawal is merely short-sighted. His station in life has not demanded active martial service to the community; but Sir Calidore's supine relaxation to the blandishments of Arcadia is more serious. Not only should he know better, for he has encountered the rapacity of evil; he should also do better, for justice requires that every man discharge the obligation proper to his station. Consequently, his attempt to shirk his responsibility and indulge his passion for peace is both stupid and sinful. Sir Calidore's quest in Book VI involves, then, not only subduing the Blatant Beast which roams the world; it involves, also, his learning that those who, like Chaucer's Prioresse, "peyned . . . to countrefete cheere / Of court" often fail to attain courtesy, for true courtesy is that

Which of all goodly manners is the ground,
And roote of ciuill conversacion.
(VI.i.i)

Sir Calidore's misinterpretation of the virtue led him to seek

. . . but forgerie,
Fashion'd to please the eies of them, that pas,
Which see not perfect things but in a glas:
Yet is that glasse so gay, that it can blynd
The wisest sight, to thinkes gold that is bras.
(VI.Proem.v)

It was not difficult for Sir Calidore to recognize the boorishness and incivility of Sir Crudor and the Lady Briana; their disregard for harmonious social relations was patent, and the Lady's Seneschall,
Malfort, illustrated irascible contempt for the welfare and feelings of others. As a consequence of their obvious lack of human concern, Sir Calidore finds it easy to destroy Malfort and overcome Sir Crudor. Nor as judge of Tristram's slaying the brutal knight does Sir Calidore find difficulty in reaching a decision. Brutal, overt, anti-social action he recognizes with facility. Too, the titular Knight can recognize the courtesy in Sir Aldus's efforts to control his grief before company. All of these either clearly illustrate or blatantly violate even the crudest definition of courtesy, and Sir Calidore's discrimination of "outward shows" is adequate. But as less arbitrary situations, demanding more subtle delineations, arise, situations which require understanding of the basic nature of courtesy, Sir Calidore finds that etiquette book rules of thumb are inadequate, because that

... vertues seat is deewe within tho mynd,
And not in outward shows, but [by] inward thoughts defynd.
(VI.Proem.v)

As he encounters Sir Calepine and the Lady Serena, Sir Calidore himself illustrates his lack of courtesy. Intent upon exercising his ability to please, he tactlessly separates the two lovers. A similar fascination with the outward show of courtesy disrupts the peaceful calm of the shepherds as he vies with Coridon for Pastorella's affections; in his insensitivity, he competes unfairly. True, he realizes that courtly behavior is inappropriate, and soon abandons his chivalric code for a more bucolic one, but the shepherds are wiser than he. They know that true courtesy requires not so much the chameleon-like acquisition of a new personality as the natural display of one's own responsibility toward his station. Like Lear--Spenser's Lear as well as Shakespeare's--he has to learn that together with its privileges,
rank, station, degree, has responsibilities; that justice requires
every man to occupy his own niche effectively; that pleasant manners,
innocuous good fellowship, and denial of real distinctions in the human
estate comprise sentimentality, not courtesy. Ironically, the shep­
herds seem aware of this Renaissance truism long before catastrophic
events impress it upon Sir Calidore, for only with the destruction of
his false paradise does the Knight come to his senses, recognize his
responsibility, and resume the quest which, appropriately to his
station, he has undertaken.

A further indication that Sir Calidoro's conduct falls short of
courtesy is his intruding upon Colin Clout and the dancing ladies at
Mount Acidale; Spenser's affective diction indicates the poet's atti­
tude toward Sir Calidore's action. The Knight is a furtive sneak.

He durst not enter into th'open greene,
   For dread of them vnawares to be descryde,
   For breaking of their daunce, if he were seene;
   But in the couert of the wood did byde,
   Beholding all, yet of them vnospyde.
   There he did see, that pleased much his sight,
   That euen he him selve his eyes enuyde,
   An hundred naked maidens lilly white,
   All raunged in a ring, and dauncing in delight.

(VI.x.xi)

The story portrayed in the tapestry which Britomart saw in the House of
Busirane, too, reveals the same emphasis upon secret lust:

For round about, the wals yclothed were
   With goodly arras of goat maiesty,
   Wouen with gold and silke so close and nere,
   That the rich metall lurked priuily,
   As faining to be hid from enuious eye;
   Yet here, and there, and euery where vnwares
   It shewd it selve, and shone vnwillingly;
   Like a discolourd Snake, whose hidden snares
   Through the greene gras his long bright burnich backe

declares.

(III.xi.xxviii)
And the prurient prying of "Foolish God Faunus" is little different. Faunus, longing to gaze upon the naked Diana, bribes Molanna, the goddess's maid, to place him

... where he close might view
That neuer any saw, saue onely one.
(VII.vi.xlv)

But Faunus lacks Sir Calidore's finesse. So delighted is he with the sight of the naked goddess

That for great ioy of some-what he did spy,
He could him not containe in silent rest;
But breaking forth in laughter, loud profest
His foolish thought.
(VII.vi.xlvi)

The differences which separate Sir Calidore's "lust of tho eyes" from Cymochles's, from the imputation of the surreptitious ogling in the tapestry, inhere in the reactions of the observed, not in the reactions of the observer. And the similarities between Faunus's actions and Sir Calidore's are identical, with two exceptions: Sir Calidore has not arranged his peep show, and he is both too polite and too worldly-wise to break the spell by laughing. Sir Calidore does not, like Sir Guyon, accept reason's rebuke to "those wandring eyes of his" (II.xii. lxix). Apparently, Sir Calidore would have feasted his eyes indefinitely upon the naked dancing ladies, had they not discovered him and modestly vanished. Whatever courtesy Sir Calidore displays in the episode at Mount Acidale is directed toward Colin Clout, not toward the naked ladies upon whom the Courteous Knight has intruded.

On the whole, one might best compare the entire Pastorella episode of Book VI with the Red Cross Knight's ordeal in the Wandring Wood. Each knight digressed from his quest, "with pleasure forward led." But each knight, from the experience which he endures, learns a valuable
lesson. The Red Cross Knight learns to add metaphysical and theologi-
cal sophistication to his naive faith, so that his unfounded idealism
acquires the accoutrements necessary for mundane application; and Sir
Calidore learns that courtesy comprises more than good manners and a
pleasant relationship with people. He learns that, though courtesy
often expresses itself through manners and pleasant relationships with
others, it must, to be meaningful, rest upon a just appraisal of one's
self and of one's fellows; and that Christian justice inevitably
depends upon charity and Agape. He discovers that Courtesy is, ulti-
mately, a Christian virtue, because it arises from and expresses
Christian values; and because, so long as it remains but a superficial
policy, it is capable of selfish manipulation.

As the Red Cross Knight, after his proper education, after his
acquisition of right reason, is prepared to overcome the love of the
world, the flesh, and the devil, and to make his earthly pilgrimage
expressive of "love of the Father," so Sir Calidore, upon learning the
reality of evil, prepares to found his courtesy upon theological and
philosophical verities far superior to mere policy. Good manners and
consideration for one's fellows become virtues only when they proceed
from the strength of justice, love, and right reason, and only when one
is cognizant of the reality of evil. The pastoral digression has been
a mistake for Sir Calidore. But it has been a valuable, fortunate
mistake. He has learned that there is no paradise in this life. Man
must complete the arduous rigors of a pilgrimage and win his right
through conquest to any respite, for evil is real, and evil seeks out
and destroys those who would ignore it.

And, as Spenser teaches that there is no possible paradise in this
life, so he teaches that there is no permanent victory over evil. As Duessa escapos to haunt the Red Cross Knight again, as Archimage is eternally active, so the Blatant Beast suffers only a momentary defeat at the hands of Sir Calidore. Ever a realist, Spenser realizes that each man must always pursue his own virtue and overcome his own sins. Sir Calidore's victory over the Blatant Beast is a victory for one time and for one place. The Blatant Beast will appear and reappear, ultimately victorious, however, only if the Sir Calidores refuse to acknowledge his reality and combat him.

F. Right Reason in the "Cantos of Mutabilitie"

For a number of reasons, the "Cantos of Mutabilitie" present problems disproportionate to their slight dimension. Consisting only of two isolated cantos and two additional stanzas, the fragments were not published until after Spenser's death, when Matthew Lownes incorporated them into the 1609 Folio of The Faerie Queene as Two Cantos of Mutabilitie: Which both for Forme and Matter, appear to be parcell of some Following Booke of the Faerie Queene, Under the Legend of Constancie. Never before Imprinted. Lownes published the fragments as the sixth and seventh cantos, and as a part of the eighth. He did not assign the fragments to a specific, numbered Book of The Faerie Queene. Even though Lownes's judgment seems justified to most critics, others have disagreed with the prevailing opinion.95

In addition to disagreement about whether and where the fragments fit into the long poem, another dispute has arisen concerning the date of composition. Still another vexing question exists regarding Spenser's sources. Yet again, because the "Cantos of Mutability" bring

96 A running dispute of considerable asperity and undue longevity, in the light of its inconclusiveness, revolves around the date of Spenser's composition of the "Cantos of Mutability." Miss Evelyn May Albright began the argument with "Spenser's Reason for Rejecting the Cantos of Mutability," SP, XXV (1928), 93-127; and "On the Dating of Spenser's 'Mutability Cantos,'" SP, XXVI (1929), 482-498. Then, Professor Edwin Greenlaw wrote on "Spenser's 'Mutabilitie,"" MLA, XLV (1930), 684-703. Professor Frederick M. Padelford contributed "The Cantos of Mutabilities: Further Considerations Bearing on the Date," MLA, XLV (1930), 704-711; and William C. Maxwell, with Professor Padelford, added to the discussion "The Compound Words in Spenser's Poetry," JESP, XXV (1926), 498-516. Professor Douglas Bush entered the argument with "The Date of Spenser's 'Cantos of Mutability,'" MLA, XLV (1930), 954-957. Mrs. Josephine Waters Bennett expressed her views in "Spenser and Gabriel Harvey's Letter-Book," MP, XXIX (1931), 163-186. Professor Charles G. Smith's "Spenser's Theory of Friendship," MLA, XLIX (1934), 490-500, adds to the argument, as does Miss Janet Spencer's "Faerie Queene: An Interpretation" (London, 1934). Professor J. M. Purcell's "The Date of Spenser's Mutabilitie Cantos," MLA, L (1935), 914-917, likewise fails to terminate the dispute, a controversy which seems as pointless as it is fruitless.

97 Equally as unproductive and indecisive as efforts to date the "Mutabilitie Cantos" is the qualianversuchung approach. Spenser was notoriously eclectic, the Renaissance itself was a riot of syncretism, and, together with The Foure Hymnes, the "Cantos of Mutabilitie" are the poet's most extreme example of imposing poetic form upon a formless tissue, often composed of inconsistencies and apparently unrelated commonplaces. At one extreme, Professor Robert Ellrodt's Neoplatonism in the Poetry of Spenser (Geneva, 1960), and Professor C. S. Lewis's Allegory of Love, and Professor Rosemond Tuve's "A Medieval Commonplace in Spenser's Cosmology," SP, XXX (1933), 133-147, seem to agree, as Miss Tuve concluded that "no definite medieval source can or need be designated; Spenser was making use of commonplace material" (p. 147). On the other hand, there are scholars who find specific sources: Professors Oliver Elton, in "Giordano Bruno in England," QR, CXCVI (1902), 438-508; William Penn DeMoss, in The Influence of Aristotle's "Politics" and "Ethics" on Spenser (Chicago, 1920); Edwin Greonlavl, in "Spenser's Influence on 'Paradise Lost,'" SP, XVII (1920), 320-359; "Spenser and Lucretius," SP, XVII (1920), 439-464; "Spenser's 'Mutabilitie,'" and "Some Old Religious Cults in Spenser," SP, XX (1923), 216-243; Herrick Y. Hughes, in "Burton on Spenser," MLA, LII (1926), 545-557; Ronald B. Levinson, in "Spenser and Bruno," MLA, XLIII (1926), 675-681; and Evelyn May Albright, in "Spenser's Cosmic Philosophy and his Religion,"
together into one forceful argument a problem—the problem of mutabil-
ity which has occupied the poet intermittently throughout his career—the fragments assume great importance as the author’s final commentary
on much that had gone before in Books I-VI.

In my discussion of the "Mutabilitie Cantos," I shall follow the
editors of the Johns Hopkins Variorum, who considered the two and a
fraction cantos as belonging to an incomplete Book VII, and Professor
Lewis, who states that "we have there [in the 'Mutabilitie Cantos'] the
core of the book without the fringe." Also reasonable seems Miss
Kathleen Williams's statement that "pre-eminently the Mutability Cantos
can call up by the briefest of references the more detailed treatment
of earlier books, drawing all their diversity into unity."99

Consequently, as a result of the fragments' axial significance,
their summary, unifying nature, and their interrelationships with Books
I-VI of The Faerie Queene, the "Cantos of Mutabilitie" require detailed
examination, both as an incomplete book and in comparison with appro-
priate, related sections in the preceding six books.

Mutability is a Titaness, eager to depose Jove and reestablish her
line; her revolt against the reigning gods has already corrupted the
earth and all that dwells therein. Her sway over all that lives upon
earth is complete. As an opening attack against the gods, she rather


99 "Eterne in Mutabilitie": The Unified World of The Faerie
Queene," That Sovereigne Light, ed. William R. Mueller and Don C.
Allen (Baltimore, 1952), p. 43.
brashly accosts the moon-goddess, Cynthia, not only because the moon is the nearest neighbor to earth, but also because the lunar orbit separates her own mutable realm from the immutable realm of the reigning gods beyond. With complete self-assurance, she forces her way past Time, "were he lief or sory," not pausing until she comes before Cynthia, herself. Not in the least over-awed in the presence of the goddess, Mutability forthrightly

... bid the Goddesse downe descend,  
And let her selfe into that Ivory throno;  
For, shee her selfe more worthy thereof wend,  
And better able it to guide alone.  
(VII.vi.xi)

But Cynthia has no intention of supinely submitting to the Titaness's demands, for

... shee that had to her that soueraigne seat  
By highest Ioue assign'd, therein to beare  
Nights burning lamp, regarded not her throat,  
Ne yielded ought for fauour or for feare.  
(VII.vi.xii)

The two strong-willed women clash.

Yet nathemore the Giantesse forbare:  
But boldly preacing-on, raught forth her hand  
To pluck her downe perforce from off her chaire.  
(VII.vi.xiii)

The boldness of the Titaness's assault and the anticipated vigor of Cynthia's defense cause consternation, so that both the stars and the moon forget their accustomed motions. As a result of the celestial perturbation, darkness descends upon the world; and even the heavens, inexplicably darkened,

... wondred at that sight;  
Fearing least Chaos broken had his chaine,  
And brought againe on them eternall night.  
(VII.vi.xiv)

The puzzled celestial gods and goddesses confounded in their amazement,
and "Mercury, that next doth raigne," ascend to complain unto "the
king of Gods."

All of the frightennod gods and goddesses, puzzled over the unprec-
edented failure of the celestial lighting system, go to inquire of Jove
the meaning of "that suddaine lack of light." Jove, too, they find
disturbed by the untoward turn of events. He fears that old enemies,
once defeated, have again roused themselves to rebellion. He immedi-
ately dispatches Mercury

Downe to the Circle of the Moone, to knowe
The cause of this so strange astonishment,
And why shee did her wonted course forslowe.
(VII.vi.xvi)

Arriving at the scene where the Titaness struggles with Cynthia, the
messenger of the gods is amazed, but nonetheless charges Mutability:

Cease to molest the Moone to walke at large,
Or come before high Ioue, her dosings to discharge.
(VII.vi.xvii)

The threat of having to appear before Jove by no means subdues Mu-
tability,

Sith shee his Ioue and him esteemed nought,
No more then Cynthia's selfe; but all their kingdoms
sought.
(VII.vi.xviii)

Returning to the Court of Jove, Mercury relays the Titaness's chal-
lenging reply, and all the gods are "exceedingly amate,"

Sauz Ioue; who, chaunging nought his count'nance bold,
Did vnto them at length these speeches wise vnfold.
(VII.vi.xix)

The gods and goddesses who presently reign have achieved their mastery
by overcoming "th'Earths cursed seed," from which stock has arisen the
boldly presumptuous Titaness. The problem, Jove continues, is to
determine
What way is best to drive her to retire;  
Whether by open force, or counsel wise,  
Areed ye sonses of God, as best ye can devise,  
(VII.vi.xxix)

As the counsel of the gods continues, Mutability, "th'Earths daughter," plots her strategy. Soon, she decides, she should boldly follow Mercury and confront the gods in the depths of their consternation and despair. Her sudden arrival throws the celestial assembly into confusion; the gods and goddesses, not knowing how to react, seek to flee,

But Jove, all fearlesse, forc'd them to aby;  
And in his soueraigne throne, gan straight despose  
Himself more full of grace and Maiestie,  
That mote enchase his friends, and foes mote terrifie.  
(VII.vi.xxiv)

Even though Jove's august dignity frightens Mutability, she maintains her calm, even as the Chief of gods bids her state her case and explain her "idle errand." With dignity, "yet gathering spirit of her natures pride," she boldly answers, explaining that her genealogy entitles her to the throne which he and his cohorts have usurped. As she eloquently pleads her case, the gods not only listen; they also

... marked well her grace,  
Being of stature tall as any there  
Of all the Gods, and beautifull of face,  
As any of the Goddesses in place.  
(VII.vi.xxviii)

In reply to Mutability's eloquence, Jove wonders why mortals continue their assaults upon heaven, "and touch celestiall seates with earthly mire." Surely, he reasons aloud, the examples of hubris furnished by Typhon, Ixion, and Prometheus should have discouraged such inappropriate ambition. Waxing wroth, he contemplates driving her out of heaven, "thunder-driving" her to hell. But, taking up his lightening brand, he falters, for
when he looked on her lovely face,
In which, faire beams of beauty did appeare,
That could the greatest wrauth soone turne to grace
(Such sway doth beauty euon in Heaven boare)
He staide his hand: ... .
(VII.vi.xxxi)

Impressed with Mutability's beauty, Jove reflects, moreover, that,
should warfare between heaven and earth again break out,

... if Gods should striue with flesh yfere,
Then shortly should the progeny of Man
Be rooted out, if Ioue should doe still what he can.
(VII.vi.xxxi)

But, despite the power which he knows that Mutability's sister,
Bellona, excercises on earth, and which he suspects that Mutability her-
self possesses, Jove warns her that no mere mortal can challenge heaven,
for the reigning gods hold their authority by

... Conquest of our soueraine might,
And by eternall doome of Fates decree.
(VII.vi.xxxiii)

Inasmuch as nothing terrestrial can effectively challenge celestial
order, Jove continues his admonition:

Then ceasse thy idle claime thou foolish gerle,
And seeke by grace and goodnesse to obtaine
That place from which by folly Titan fell;
There-to thou maist perhaps, if so thou faine
Haue Ioue thy gratious Lord and Soueraigne.
(VII.vi.xxxiv)

But the Titaness, undaunted, rejects Jove's condescending efforts to
subvert her intention. She considers him no impartial judge, since he
is defendant in the case. Consequently, she appeals to the

Father of Gods and men by equall might;
To weet, the God of Nature, ... .
(VII.vi.xxxv)

Inwardly dismayed with his adversary's determination, Jove only with
difficulty conceals his chagrin as he arranges an appeal.
Presently, on Arlo Hill, all, "both heavenly Powers, and earthly wights," appear before the goddess, Nature. Arlo Hill is a natural choice for such an assembly,

Seeing of old the best and fairest Hill
That was in all this holy-Islands hights.

(VII.vi.xxxvii)

Once, Arlo Hill in particular and Ireland in general, had been the favorite haunt of Cynthia, "that is soueraine Queene profest / Of woods and forrests." Thence she had resorted for the chase and for amorous sport. The Edenic innocence of Arlo Hill, however, had been spoiled by Faunus's introducing evil into it, bribing Molanna with "Queene-apples, and red Cherries from the tree," that he might see her mistress, Cynthia, bathing nude. Cynthia's judgment had driven him out of her earthly paradise and stoned the foolish Molanna. Indignantly, Cynthia had abandoned Arlo Hill and laid a curse upon it.

To this cursed former paradise, Nature summons all her creatures. As the myriads assemble, only the tidy arrangements of "Nature's Sergeant (that is Order)" finds room for them all. After everyone is seated, the goddess herself, "great dame Nature," appears. Even greater in stature than the other gods, her sex remains a mystery, so well veiled is she, either to conceal the petrifying terror of her appearance, or to hide her blindingly transcendent beauty that

... it the Sunne a thousand times did pass,
Ne could be seene, but like an image in a glas.

(VII.vii.vi)

Her very garment is so resplendent that it reminds the poet of Christ's luminous garments at the Transfiguration. The stern and august goddess establishes herself in a pavilion, built for her use, not by craftsmen, but by the earth itself, for all created things pay homage to her.
Because her beauty and the splendor of her garb exceed Spenser's descriptive skills, citing Chaucer's example, he refers the reader to Alanus:

... old Dan Gaffrey (in whose gentle spright
The pure well head of Poesie did dwell)
In his Foules parley durst not with it mow,
But it transferd to Alan, who he thought
Had in his Plaint of kindes describ'd it well.

(VII.vii.ix)

Returning to the homage which all created things eagerly pay "great dame Nature," the poet exclaims that flowers spring up in her footsteps, the River Mole attires himself in his gayest garb to welcome her, and all the earth rejoices at the sight of her.

In a series of paradoxes, the poet establishes the mystery of Nature:

This great Grandmother of all creatures bred
Great Nature, euer young yet full of eld,
Still mouing, yet vnmooued from her sted;
Vnseene of any, yet of all beheld.

(VII.vii.xiii)

Mutability comes before this impressive figure "with meek obaysance and humilitie," stating her petition with artful rhetoric. First, she challenges Jove's usurpation of "the whole worlds raign," for the Titaness claims that

... heaven and earth I both alike do deeme,
Sith heaven and earth are both alike to thee.

(VII.vii.xv)

Having appealed to Nature's impartiality, she establishes her claim to regnancy; really, she says, Nature's acknowledgment of her rights would be but recognition of an already existing situation, for

... mauger Ioue, and all his gods beside,
I do possess the worlds most regiment;
As, if ye please it into parts diuide,
And every part inholders to consent,
Shall to your eyes appear incontinent.

(VII.vii.xvii)

She rehearses evidence of her dominion over all things. The earth itself, despite its appearance of permanence, changes constantly,

For all that from her springs, and is ybrode,
How-euer sayre it flourish for a time,
Yet see we soon decay; and, being dead,
To turne again unto their earthly slime:
Yet, out of their decay and mortal crime,
We daily see new creatures to arise;
Unlike in forme, and chang'd by strange disguise:
So turne they still about, and change in restless wise.

(VII.vii.xviii)

All the occupants of the earth, too, change from youth to age, from wealth to poverty, "from good to bad, from bad to worst of all." Most of all, men's minds, which they call immortal, change and fluctuate to accommodate themselves to changing conditions. The waters of the earth--oceans, rivers, lakes, pools--constantly toss and turn, keeping all the watery creatures in a state of flux. The air, too, dependence upon which is certain evidence of the frailty of life, is unstable.

Now, boyling hot: streight, frezing deadly cold:
Now, faire sun-shine, that makes all skip and daunce:
Streight, bitter storms and balefull countenance,
That makes them all to shiuer and to shake:
Rayne, hayle, and snowe do pay them sad penance,
And dreadfull thunder-claps (that make them quake)
With flames and flashing lights that thousand changes make.

(VII.vii.xxiii)

Even fire, though it may live forever, seems to consume itself, and devours all else, thus perpetuating itself only by destroying other forms of life.

Her analysis by division complete, Mutability sums up:

Thus, all these fowre (the which the ground-work bee
Of all the world, and of all living wights)
To thousand sorts of Change we subject see:
Yet are they chang'd (by other wondrous slightes)
Into themselves, and lose their native mights;
The Fire to Aire, and th'Ayre to Water sheero,
And Water into Earth: yet Water fights
With Fire, and Aire with Earth approaching noere:
Yet all are in one body, and as one appear:
(VII.vii.xxv)

Mutability and restless change have dominion over even the basic elements, although various gods claim to control their operations:

Vesta, the fire; Vulcan, the earth; Juno, the air; and Neptune, the sea.

To demonstrate that she, not the various gods, has dominion over all the earth, Mutability asks the Goddess Nature to assemble

The rest which doe the world in being hold:
As, times and seasons of the yeare that fall:
Of all the which, demand in generall,
Or judge thy selfe, by verdit of thine eye,
Whether to me they are not subiect all.
(VII.vii.xxvii)

At Nature’s command, Order initiates a procession of the seasons, beginning with spring; and after the seasons pass before the assembly, the months, beginning with "sturdy March" parade; Night and Day, followed by the Hours, next pass in review. At the end of the procession appear Life and Death,

Death with most grim and griesly visage seene,
Yet is no nought but parting of the breath;
Ne oght to see, but like a shade to weene,
Vnbodied, vnsoul'd, vnheard, vnseene.
(VII.vii.xlvi)

Her demonstration of the change and instability of life complete, Mutability asks of Judge Nature a verdict that all the lower world is subject to her, rather than to the gods.

In refutation, Jove admits that all beings in the lower world are changed by time, but asks who it is that "Tims himselfe doth moue"; do the gods not rule Timo? Sway over time, Mutability is willing to concede to Jove and his gods.
... The things
Which we see not how they are mov'd and swayd,
Ye may attribute to your selues as Kings,
And say they by your secret powre are made:
But what we see not, who shall vs perswade?
But were they so, as ye them faine to be,
Mov'd by your might, and ordred by your ayde;
Yet what if I can proue, that euen yee
Your selues are likewise chang'd, and subject vnto mee?

(VII.vii.xlix)

Mutability now changes the basis for her argument, treating such gods as Cynthia, Mercury, Venus, Phoebus, Mars, Saturn as solar bodies, all notoriously changeable. Moreover, she argues that Jove, himself, is "mortall borne," and hence, "thrall to mo." The movements of the spheres demonstrate alteration, so that only the "starrie skie doth still remaine," according to some; but even the permanence and stability of the sky, Mutability doubts:

Yet do the Starres and Signes therein still moue,
And euen if self is mov'd, as wizards saine.
But all that moueth, doth mutation loue:
Therefore both you and them to me I subject proue.

(VII.vii.lv)

Addressing the court and the assembled gods and goddesses, Mutability asks that, having proven her sway over all things, heavenly as well as earthly, she be acknowledged, under Nature, as the legitimate ruler of the universe. For a long while, Nature ponders her decision; at length, looking up "with chearefull view," she pronounces her verdict:

I well consider all that ye haue sayd,
And find that all things stedfastnes doe hate
And changed be: yet being rightly wayd
They are not changed from their first estate;
But by their change their being doe dilate:
And turning to themselues at length againe,
Do worke their owne perfection so by fate:
Then ouer them Change doth not rule and raigne;
But they raigne ouer change, and doe their states main-
taine.
Cease therefore daughter further to aspire,
And thee content thus to be rul'd by me:
For thy decay thou seekst by thy desire;
But time shall come that all shall changed bee,
And from thenceforth, none no more change shall see.

(VII.vii.iviii-ii>)

Thus, "great dame Nature" gives her verdict in favor of Jove's continued reign, dismisses the assembly, and disappears "whither no man wist."

In the two stanzas of "The VIII. Canto, unperfect," the poet meditates perhaps for the last time upon mutability:

When I bethinke me on that speech whyleare,
Of Mutability, and well it way:
Me seemes, that though she all vnworthy were
Of the Heavn's Rule; yet very sooth to say,
In all things else she beares the greatest sway.
Which makes me loath this state of life so tickle,
And loue of things so vaine to cast away;
Whose flowring pride, so fading and so fickle,
Short Time shall soon cut down with his consuming sickle.

Then gin I thinke on that which Nature sayd,
Of that same time when no more Change shall be,
But stedfast rest of all things firmly stayd
Vpon the pillours of Eternity,
That is contrayr to Mutabilitie:
For, all that moueth doth in Change delight:
But thence-forth all shall rest eternally
With Him that is the God of Sabbaoth hight:
O! that great Sabbaoth God, grant me that Sabaoths sight.

(VII.viii.i-ii)

With this prayer, Edmund Spenser concluded his poetic career.

Because the problem of mutability which had haunted Spenser throughout his career (specifically in The Faerie Queene, Proem. V.v.ii; The Ruines of Time; The ruines of Rome; and The Visions of Petrarch) received its final statement in the "Mutabilitie Cantos," critics have properly concentrated upon the concluding fragment and the so-called Adonis passage (III.vi.xxix-1, together with the III.vi. vii-ix prelude) as expositions of the poet's world-vision; but their
concentration has not always led to felicitous interpretations.
Instead of careful reading and attention to the poet's words, many
critics have imposed upon both key passages over-subtle imputations of
esoteric philosophical ideas. Professor Brents Stirling's articles,
"The Philosophy of Spenser's 'Garden of Adonis,'" "The Concluding
Stanzas of Mutabilitie," and "Two Notes on the Philosophy of Mutabilitie," admirably restore order and sanity to the conflated
confusion of unrestrained and irresponsible source-hunting. His posi­
tion is that, whatever the ultimate source of Spenser's ideas and
concepts, his cosmological views were all Elizabethan commonplace.
Correspondences between Spenser and Lucretius are only apparent. Wher­
ever Spenser seems indebted to Lucretius, Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and
Boethius's *De Consolations* are adequate and more likely sources. Simi­
larly, Professor Stirling finds more probable sources for apparently
Empedoclean influence in Golding's Prefatory Epistle to his translation

Note 97, p. 299, discussing Spenser's sources for the "Mutabi­
licitie Cantos," indicates various critical attributions of the poet's
ideas to assorted philosophers. Professor Greenlaw's "Spenser and
Lucretius," considering the two passages together, has found them
greatly indebted to the philosophy of Lucretius. Miss Albright's
"Spenser's Cosmic Philosophy and his Religion" attributes to Empedocles
most of the concepts in the Adonis passage. Mr. Levinson's "Spenser
and Bruno" finds the most likely source for Spenser's cosmological
ideas to be Giordano Bruno's *Spaccio de la Beattia trionfante*. Pro­
fessor Saurat, in his *Literature and the Occult Tradition*, finds the
same regrettable lack of Gallic logic in the Adonis passage that he
finds throughout Spenser. Mrs. Josephine Waters Bennett, in her
"Spenser's Garden of Adonis," *PMLA*, XLVII (1932), 46-78, writing
primarily to counter Professor Greenlaw's attribution to Lucretius,
substitutes a generalized medieval tradition which is most probably
Boethian Neoplatonism and Ovid's *Metamorphoses*.

Abstracted in *Var.*., III, 347-352.

*SP*, XXX (1933), 193-204.

*MLN*, L (1935), 154-155.
of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and in Renaissance Platonism and Aristotelianism.

Professor Stirling concludes:

It is an extremely common and simple philosophical scheme which finds its way into the Adonis episode. Phenomenal shapes arise from a union of form and matter; analogues for this could be found in almost any metaphysics. From what we know of Spencer's philosophy, however, his notions here were undoubtedly Platonic at base, with the union of Platonism and Ovid's "Philosophy of turned shapes" found in Golding's *Epistula*, as the probable immediate inspiration.

In any case, we know that here, as in *Mutabilitie*, Spencer was one with Elizabethan thought. From Golding it is seen that every item in the Adonis passage was an Elizabethan commonplace. It remained for Spenser to take over these ideas, so usual to former ages and races as well as to our own, and play upon them with a rare cadence and imagery.104

Viewing the Adonis passage and the "Mutabilitie Cantos" as supplementary treatments of cosmological problems within the inherited framework of the so-called Elizabethan world picture, of course implies Spencer's conservatism, orthodoxy, and traditionalism; such a view will not do for those who, like Professors Jones and Greenlaw, see the two passages as revealing Spencer's skepticism and dubiety occasioned by his anticipation of scientific materialism. My interpretation more nearly accords with Professor Stirling's than with those of Professors Jones and Greenlaw.

That Spenser attached particular significance to the Adonis passage and to the "Mutabilitie Cantos" is evident from the rhetorical heightening which characterizes both. Resorting to the rhetorical topic of *amplificatio* by *topothesia* or *topographia* (the "situation" or "description" of a place), he provides, in the case of the Adonis

104 "The Philosophy of Spenser's 'Garden of Adonis,'" *Var.*, III, 352.
passage, a generalized locus amoenus or pleasance, and in the case of
the counsel of the gods in the "Mutabilitie Cantos," a specific, localized pleasance. Topotheca or topegraphia is a type of energia or hypotyposis (a figure aiming at lively description and counterfeit representation drawn from the topics, an artificial argument) which Ernst Robert Curtius traces to Homer, and to which he attributes six characteristics: springs, plantations, gardens, soft breezes, flowers, and 'bird-voices.' The facts that the pleasance in the Adonis passage is generalized and that the pleasance in the "Mutabilitie Cantos" is localized are significant. In the one, the Adonis passage, the poet is describing that which is no more, and, consequently, that which can no longer be located in a world far gone from original righteousness. In the "Mutabilitie Cantos," his concern is with problems in this post-lapsarian world, and, consequently, he can localize the scene within the only world available.

The Adonis passage describes the nurture and education of Amoret in the Garden of Adonis; Amoret's conception and birth had been supernatural. Titan, who was the sun god Helios and the ancestor of Mutability, one day came upon Chrysogone sleeping nude beside a fountain. Chrysogone was the daughter of a fairy, Amphysia, "of double nature," a fay. Titan magically impregnated Chrysogone:

The sunne-beames bright vpon her body played,
Being through former bathing mollifide,
And pierst into her wombe, where they embayd
With so sweet sence and secret power vnspide,
That in her pregnant flesh they shortly fructifide.

(III.vi.vii)

Such a conception, miraculous as it may seem, the poet justifies:

... reason teacheth that the fruitfull seeds
Of all things living, through impression
Of the sunbeams in moist complexion,
Doe life conceiue and quickned are by kynd:
So afters Nlius invocation,
Infinite shapes of creatures men do fynd,
Informed in the myd, on which the Synne hath shynd.

Great father he of generation
Is rightly cald, th'author of life and light;
And his faire sister for creation
Ministreth matter fit, which tempred right
With heate and humour, breeds the living wight.

(III.vi.viii-ix)

Just as strange as the conception was the birth. Chrysogone delivered twins as she slept. To emphasize the Edonic, pre-lapsarian nature of the affair, the poet contrasts the conception and birth with those of fallen naturc:

Unwares she them conceiued, unwares she bore:
She bore withouten paine, that she conceiued
Withouten pleasure.

(III.vi.xxvii)

As Chrysogone slept, Venus and Phoebe discovered her, the two babes lying beside her. Phoebe

... to a Nymph her babe betoke,
To be vpbrught in perfect Maydenhed,
And of her selfe her name Belphoebe red.

(III.vi.xxviii)

Venus took the other twin to rear her in

... her joyous Paradise,
Where most she wonnes, when she on earth does dwell.
So faire a place, as Nature can devise:
Whether in Paphos, or Cytheron hill,
Or it in Gnidos be, I wote not well;
But well I wote by tryall, that this same
All other pleasant places doth excell,
And called is by her lost lovers name,
The Garden of Adonis, farre renowned by fame.

(III.vi.xxix)

This Garden of Adonis participates in an ancient tradition. In
antiquity the phrase referred to a potted plant or forcing bed in which
the seasonal cycle is expedited. In Phaedrus (276 B), Plato refers to
the concept:

Socrates: . . . Now tell me this. Would a sensible husbandman,
who has seeds which he cares for and which he wishes to bear fruit,
plant them with serious purpose in the heat of summer in some
garden of Adonis, and delight in seeing them appear in beauty in
eight days, or would he do that sort of thing, when he did it at
all, only in play and for amusement? Would he not, when he is in
earnest, follow the rules of husbandry, plant his seeds in fitting
ground, and be pleased when those seeds, which he had sowed reached
their perfection in the eighth month?106

The ancient female devotees of Adonis prepared quick-growing and quick-
fading herbs and plants in pots. The group of pots were called
"gardens of Adonis," and Shakespeare refers to them in Henry VI, Part I:

Thy promises are like Adonis' garden
That one day bloom'd and fruitful were the next.
(I.vi.6-7)

Adonis, like the Babylonian deity Thammuz, spends six months of the
year underground courting Proserpina, and six months of the year above
with Venus. Natalis Comes traces to the Orphic hymn authority for the
statement that Adonis is the sun "since he nourishes all things and is
the author of germination."107 Adonis is, therefore, an appropriate
symbol for the generative aspects of sexuality. But in Spenser's
Garden of Adonis there is neither mud nor sinful mire, for the poet has
followed the tradition which conflates the fruitfulness of the gardens
of Adonis with the Christian Edonic paradise, so that Cupid enters only
after laying aside his "sad darts" and becoming the innocent god of the

106 276 B, tr. Harold N. Fowler, The Loeb Classical Library (London,
1926), I, 567.

107 Mythologiae (Frankfort, 1581), p. 553. Quoted in Nelson,
p. 212 and cited in n. 26, p. 333.
innocent pre-lapsarian world where love and generation are untroubled by the deceits and lusts of the fallen world. The Garden is

... the first semiarie
Of all things, that are borne to live and die,
According to their kinds.
(III.vi.xxx)

Here

... all plentie, and all pleasure flowes,
And sweet love gentle fits amongst them throwes,
Without fell rancor, or fond jealosie;
Frankly each paramour his leman knowes,
Each bird his mate, ne any does enuie
Their goodly moriment, and gay felicitie.
(III.vi.xli)

The Garden of Adonis pictures the kind of love which was possible to man in some long-lost golden age of innocence, but which does not exist within the context of civilization.

Symbolic of the generative function of the Garden is the "stately Mount," right "in the middest of that Paradise," which goes beyond the veil of the "Venusberg" imagery and approaches the frankly anatomical mons veneris:

Right in the middest of that Paradise,
There stood a stately Mount, on whose round top
A gloomy grove of mirtle trees did rise,
Whose shadie boughs sharpe steele did neuer lop,
Nor wicked beasts their tender buds did crop,
But like a girlond compassed the hight,
And from their fruitfull sides sweet gum did drop,
That all the ground with precious deaw bedight,
Threw forth most dainty odours, and most sweet delight.

And in the thickest couert of that shade,
There was a pleasant arbour, not by art,
But of the trees owne inclination made,
Which knitting their rancke braunches part to part,
With wanton yuie twyne entrayld athwart,
And Eglantine, and Caprifole among,
Fashion aboue within their inmost part,
That neither Phoebus beams could through them throng,
Nor Aeolus sharp blast could worke them any wrong.

..................................................
There went faire Venus often to enjoy her deare Adonis joyous company, and reap sweet pleasure of the wanton boy; There yet, some say, in secret he doeth ly, lapped in flowres and pratius spycery, by her hid from the world, and from the skill of Stygian Gods, which doe her love enuy; but she her selfe, when ever that she will, possessteth him, and of his sweetnesse takes her fill.

(III.vi.xliii-xlvi)103

Throughout the Adonis passage, Sponsor rings changes on various interpretations of the Adonis myth, beginning with the miraculous conception of Amoret and Belphoeb, and continuing with Amoret's education in the Garden of Adonis, Venus's favorite haunt.

But even in the idyllic surroundings of the Garden of Adonis, Time appears; there is mutability. In the midst of perpetual spring and simultaneous harvest, even as Genius in his dual role as gate-keeper and artificer who compounds form and substance constantly generates new life, an enemy dwells:

"... wicked Time, who with his scyth address, Does now the flowring herbes and goodly things, And all their glory to the ground downe flings, Where they doe wither, and are fowly mard: He flyes about, and with his flaggy wings Beates downe both leaves and buds without regard, Ne euer pittie may relent his malice hard."

(III.vi.xxxix)

The "stately Mount," however, in which Adonis perpetually enjoys Venus's pleasures, and from which he need never return to Proserpine in the underworld, provides a kind of immortality,

All be he subject to mortalitie, Yet is eterne in mutabilitie, And by succession made perpetuall.

103 None of the commentators who complain that the so-called allegory describing the Castle of Alma have remarked about the "woodenness" of this anatomical "allegory," which is just as literal as the passage in III.ix.
Transformed oft, and chaunged diverslie:
For him the Father of all formes they call;
Therefore needs mote be llue, that lluing gives to all.

(III.vi.xivii)

So long as cyclical mutability continues to maintain through generation the constantly recurring vacancies in the numbers of the links of the great chain, so long will mutability's destructive tendencies be negated; for mutability's anabolism counteracts her catabolism. So long as creatures observe the natures of their beings, such harmony exists that the lion lies down with the lamb, and by a process which I should call creative evolution, were it not anachronistic, the perpetuity of the species lends a kind of immortality to the individual.

That such adherence to natural law no longer obtains is the basis for Alain de Lille's Complaint of Nature, in which Natura acknowledges herself inferior to God, so that her work is imperfect, His perfect. She acknowledges that she has known creation, while He is "innascibilius." Natura's function, according to Alain, is comparable to that of Spenser's Genius: She "coins the pure ideas of Noys." Natura has no concern with theology; but, even though she works all day over a hot forge, there is no conflict between her and God. They teach not contrary but different things ("non adversa, sed diversa"). Of all creatures, man alone fails to obey her, reserving himself from obedience to sexual love, the regulation of which Natura herself had conferred upon Venus. Spenser, too, complains that the sexual conventions of his time were contrary to man's nature. Otherwise, the training which Amoret received in the Garden of Adonis would have been adequate for a well-adjusted life in society. Society has perverted the beauty of natural love, so that Busirane is able to capture and torture Amoret,
and so that Sir Guyon in his peregrinations finds only mockeries of the Garden of Adonis—Phaedria's Wandoring Isle, the Garden of Proserpine, Acrasia's Bower.

But the classical solution to the succession of life and death, time and eternity, the relationship between the mutable and the immutable, was not a satisfactory solution. St. Augustine had enunciated a linear theory of time which supplanted the classical cyclical theory, so the apparent solution which Spenser found in the Adonis passage, while it might have been a satisfactory one in a never-to-return golden age, can no longer serve. Death and time have entered the world, man is no longer in Edenic bliss,\(^{109}\) and the problem of mutability acquires more sinister meaning and urgency than it had possessed.

With the problems of time, death, change, and mutability as they affect fallen man, the "Mutabilitie Cantos" are concerned; and the events of the "Mutabilitie Cantos" occur in a recognizable place in the existing world far gone from original righteousness. Arlo Hill, the poet tells us, had once been just such a locus amoenus as the Garden of Adonis, until the foolishness of Faunus, offending Diana (Cynthia, Phoebe), brought about the destruction of the Irish paradise. After "unparadising" the offensive Faunus, who had tempted Molanna with "Queene-apples, and red Cherries from the tree," as Satan had tempted Eve, Diana punishes Molanna and curses Arlo Hill:

There-on an haauy haplesse curse did lay,
To weot, that Wolues, where she was wont to space,

Should harbour'd be, and all those Woods deface,
And Thieves should rob and spoile that Coast around.

(VII.vi.iv)

The judgment of Nature, then, occurs in a fallen world, a world in which the cyclical interpretation, the only possible answer from Natura, is obviously incomplete.

In addition to recognizing that Arlo Hill is no longer a part of the world of gold, the critic of the "Cantos of Mutabilitie" must, insofar as possible, identify the various characters, and must observe throughout the poet's use of irony. The characters who make long speeches are of particular importance.

Surely, Professor Lewis was in error when he identified Nature as a veiled allusion to the Christian God: "When Nature personified enters his poem she turns out to be the greatest of his shining ones. In some respects, indeed, she symbolizes God Himself." Later, however, Professor Lewis more nearly approaches an accurate and allowable identification:

The modern reader is tempted to inquire whether Spenser, then, equates God with Nature: to which the answer is, "Of course not. He was a Christian, not a pantheist". His procedure in this passage would have been well understood by all his contemporaries: the practice of using mythological forms to hint theological truths was well established and lasted as late as the composition of *Comus*. . . . In the medieval allegories and the renaissance masks, God, if we may say so without irreverence, appears frequently, but always incoignito.

This explanation will not do, either, being inaccurate both historically (God does appear, for instance, in *Everyman*) and misleading. Since

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110 *Allegory of Love*, p. 330. What Professor Lewis means by the qualification, "in some respects," he does not explain, and I do not understand.

111 *Allegory of Love*, pp. 355-356.
the time of Alain de Lille, Natura had not been a god or a goddess, and had been metaphorically a representative of only certain delegated attributes of the Godhead. Spenser's Nature was no more than Alain's Natura concerned with theological or metaphysical speculation. The fact that Mutabilitie and Jove appeal their case to a judge who does not have or even claim jurisdiction is a part of Spenser's largely unappreciated irony.

Nor is Professor Lewis's equating Mutabilitie solely with "Corruption" valid. Mutability, it is true, Spenser does identify with the original Tempter who succeeded and brought sin into the world:

For, she the face of earthly things so changed,  
That all which Nature had establisht first  
In good estate, and in mett order ranged,  
She did pervert, and all their statutes burst:  
And all the worlds faire frame (which none yet durst  
Of Gods or men to alter or misguide)  
She alter'd quite, and made them all accurst  
That God had blest; and did at first prouide  
In that still happy state for ever to abide.  
(VII.vi.v)

Mutability, by definition, is responsible for the declination of the world from its original perfection. But change, as Spenser pointed out in the Adonis passage, has creative as well as destructive tendencies; Nature's judgment, also, stresses the "eterne in Mutabilitie" theme. Moreover, orthodox theology attributes some fortunate aspects to Adam's fall. Nature, not being God, cannot judge beyond her own realm; and Mutability, being Nature's hand-maiden, as Nature is God's vice-regent, knows that she will have a prejudiced hearing from Nature.

A part of Spenser's irony lies in the case with which Jove concedes a change of venue to a judge no more competent than he, for just

112 The Allegory of Love, p. 354.
as he is prejudiced in his own behalf, so is Nature concerned to estab-
lish her own servant's prerogatives. Another ironic circumstance lies
in the fact that it is Order who is Nature's sergeant and who estab-
lishes the regular succession of life and time. Nature subjects
Mutability to Order.

Equally erroneous is Professor Greenlaw's insistence that Mutabil-
ity expresses Spenser's own ideas and feelings. Such a naive
attribution of his characters' sentiments to the author would make of
Spenser, as of Shakespeare, a protean monstrosity, for both Spenser and
Shakespeare through their characters and fictions explore the relative
values of conflicting positions. Spenser had more "artistic distance"
than Professor Greenlaw would allow.

There seems to be no justification for assuming that the 'Mutabil-
itie Cantos' represents Spenser's bowing to the insistent demands of
approaching scientific materialism. Rather, the sixth and seventh
cantos illustrate the futility of approaching metaphysical and theolo-
gical problems with a rational, scientific technique. If, like
Mutability, the investigator insists to the gods that

... The things
Which we see not how they are mov'd and sway'd,
Ye may attribute to your selues as Kings,
And say they by your secret powre are made:
But what we see not, who shall vs perswade?
(VII.vii.xlii)

In the first two cantos of Book VII, the poet demonstrates the out-
side limit to which human reason can climb toward God. All Nature does
operate through Mutability, but Order is as characteristic of Nature's
operation as Mutability is. Further, Nature will not go, because the
natural cannot enunciate supernatural truth, the finite cannot
comprehend or judge the infinite. The Book of Nature, however it may correspond with the Book of God, cannot reveal the eternal truths of revelation. Ratio scientiae must make a leap of faith, must, like the Red Cross Knight, add faith unto its force. Worldly knowledge, valuable as it is in worldly affairs, cannot provide other-worldly answers, and one must realize that Nature is either a transparency through which one sees, or it is an opacity, through which one cannot see even darkly.

The leap of faith which enables the poet to see ultimate reality, not through a glass darkly, but face to face, Spenser makes in the two concluding stanzas of Book VII.

Right reason is not mere prudential reason, nor is it mere intellectuality; right reason includes knowledge of the divine as well as of the profane. And right reason affects not only the reason, but also the will to believe and the will to live in accordance with that belief.
CHAPTER VI

RIGHT REASON AS A UNIFYING THEME IN
THE FAERIE QUEENE

Even though Edmund Spenser did not live to complete his somewhat grandiose plan for a Faerie Queene "disposed into twelue bookees, Fash­ioning XII. Morall vertues," that portion which he did complete achieves a kind of unity and independence of its own. It would be fatuous to anticipate the poet's intentions in the projected books, but the fact that the work is incomplete should not discourage the reader's attempt to see plan, purpose, and thematic unity in the slightly more than six books which Spenser completed. Miss Williams has pointed out that:

Even as it stands, half-finished and culminating in the fragment of the presumed seventh book, the poem is a unified whole. For the kind of unity which Spenser achieves, though cumulative, is not architectural; he works not by adding section to section so that the structure is meaningless until it is finished, but by revealing new levels of a structure which we thought complete at our first sight of it.¹

Books I and II establish the interrelationships among faith, will, and knowledge, relationships essential to the acquisition of the Chris­tian Humanist's conception of right reason. In 'The Legend of Holinoose' and in "The Legend of Temperaunce," the Red Cross Knight and

¹Kathleen Williams, "'Eterne in Mutabilitie': The Unified World of The Faerie Queene," ELH, XIX (1952), 115.
Sir Guyon undergoes experiences which inculcate the principles of Christian right reason, St. Thomas's \textit{recta ratio agibilium}; the Red Cross Knight learns that "grace hath need of nature," Sir Guyon learns that "nature hath need of grace." Both knights learn that faith must precede and transcend both grace and nature. The first two books concern themselves with the individual's perfecting himself in Christian right reason.

Books III and IV, "The Legend of Chastity" and "The Legend of Friendship," treat the proper relationships between the individual, governed by right reason, and his fellow man. These books together constitute what Professor Lewis has called "a kind of central massif in \textit{The Faerie Queene}," and embody allegorically the orthodox teaching that Charity can spring only from Agape in agreement with Our Lord's Summary of the Law. Right reason involves not only right thinking, but it involves also the Thomistic and Aristotelian corollary, "activity in accordance with virtue." Under the names of Chastity and Friendship, Spenser included all proper interpersonal relationships among individuals.

Book V, "The Legend of Justice," extends interpersonal relationships from the realm of private individuals to the broader contexts of social justice, and it is the task of Sir Artegall, the titular Knight, to learn that the righteousness of legalism requires modification by mercy and charity, that the Old Dispensation has been tempered and modified by the New, so that considerations of charity must pervade attempts at social justice, just as it must influence the interpersonal

relationships.

"The Legend of Covrtosic," Book VI, explores the differences between courtesy as policy, courtesy as a social mask, and courtesy as an expression of Christian "love of the Father." Sir Calidore, the Knight ofCourtesy, learns that mere social courtesy can have disruptive effects if pursued for selfish reasons; the pleasures of companionship can deter one from the performance of his legitimate duties. As Books I and II had presented mirror images of two knights' pursuits of right reason, so Books V and VI present mirror images of two knights' experiences with the relationship between Christian duty and Christian Charity.

The fragment of Book VI, "The Mutabilitie Cantos," continues the widening ripples of import which began with the individual in Books I and II, continued to the individual in relationship to other individuals in Books III and IV, and expanded to problems of human society in Books V and VI; the scope of "The Mutabilitie Cantos" is cosmic, and the two complete cantos (which Lownes numbered VI and VII) explore the questions of whether any divine intellect exists in which man participates, and whether concord and harmony exist to impose order in the universe. The poet has thus surveyed the most significant problems of existence, beginning with the individual and ending with the cosmos. But in large measure, the movement of the poem is cyclical rather than wave-like, for with "The Cantos of Mutabilitie," Spenser returns to his first questions about the nature of faith which sustains after discursive, intellectual reason is exhausted. He has, in effect, created a world, peopled it with life-like characters, invested it with conflicting motives, allowed for the intrusion of evil, and
produced an image which reflects an orderly, reasoned reality. The question of whether there exist such order and such a reason as he has predicated, he raises in "The Mutabilitie Cantos." In the first two cantos, the questions and answers are confined to the realm of nature. Change, decay, mutability, seeks to disestablish permanence and to reinstitute primal chaos, challenging the existence of any potent champion of order, questioning the possibility of any power behind the mask of nature.

In the two stanzas of Canto VIII, "unperfite," the poet, having heard Mutability's charges, Jove's claims, and Nature's somewhat cryptic judgment, reflects, appealing to

... Him that is the God of Sabbaoth sight;
O that great Sabbaoth God, graunt me, that Sabbaoths
(VII.viii.ii)

The petition for a beatific vision completes the cyclical movement of the poem, for, as the Red Cross Knight upon the Hill of Contemplation had caught a glimpse of the Heavenly Jerusalem, so the poet ejaculates a prayer for a glimpse of eternal truth; as the Red Cross Knight had seen the integrated harmony, so the poet asks for such an insight.

But none of the major quests in The Faerie Queene is completed. The Red Cross Knight cannot gaze raptly at the Heavenly Jerusalem, forgetting that there exist dragons which must be slain. Sir Guyon only made Acrasia prisoner, and she is ever eager to escape. Britomart has to postpone her union with Artegall, Sir Artegall's herculean efforts cannot assure justice, and Sir Calidore can never terminate his search for the Blatant Beast. Mutability, sin, corruption, has removed forever the possibility of reestablishing the world's perfection. No man
finds paradise or completes his struggle in this world. The Red Cross Knight must eschew contemplation and continue his struggle, so long as he remains in this world as a man capable of fighting the good fight. Sir Guyon can never relax his vigilance against either the extreme of Acrasia or the opposite extreme of self-righteousness. Britomart must continue to regard the social implications of love lost private concerns engender public chaos. Sir Artegall can never relax his vigilant mercy in restraint of the literal-minded, legalistic Talus. Sir Calidore cannot succumb to the siren song of indolence and self-indulgence, for the Blatant Beast can be restrained but temporarily.

The noble activity of properly motivated men must constantly be opposed to the forces of chaos which would disrupt all order—social, natural, internal. All such efforts must be grounded upon right thinking, and, conversely, right thinking must eventuate in right action. Reason—not ratio scientiae, but ratio sapientiae, rest ratio—must dominate the will, just as the will must dominate the passions, and the hierarchical domination must result in appropriate action suited to the wise interpretation of any given situation. Reason, for Spenser, as it had for Plato, embraced not mere ratio-cination, but doing the good as well as knowing the true. And, agreeing with the Aristotelian teaching, Spenser acknowledged that goodness exists both in the phenomenal universe and in the First Mover. The orderliness of the universe for Spenser was evidence that intellectual and moral absolutes exist, so that the purposive, benevolent arrangement of nature both produces and verifies man's knowledge of goodness.

But Edmund Spenser was not only a humanist; he was a Christian
humanist, and his world view had to accommodate the role of evil, sin, mutability; for, as evil threatens good, as passions threaten rebellion against will, and will against reason, so mutability threatens to displace purposive harmony and substitute purposeless chaos. Spenser was too honest a realist to close his eyes to the fact that all is not right with the world. The fall of Adam and Eve had debilitated their progeny, and, in general agreement with the melancholy philosophy of the early Renaissance which saw history as the decline from original perfection, Spenser had to acknowledge the lack of goodness and perfection. Everywhere he looked, confronting him, were crimes, sin, death, destruction, hatred, evil.

"The Mutabilitie Cantos," as a fortunate conclusion to the six books of *The Faerie Queene*, consider the problems of evil, death, and change, the possible existence of a power beyond nature which can provide permanence and stability. If death and change could intrude upon Sir Calidore's pastoral idyll and infect apparent perfection, is there such a thing, the poet asked, as permanence and rest? He replied to his own question, "Yes, but not in this transitory world."

Tormenting questions of mutability had always haunted the pastoral world, as Professor Panofsky points out: "A discrepancy was felt between the supernatural perfection of an imaginary environment and the natural limitations of human life as it is. . . . This dissonance, once felt, had to be resolved."³ Professor Panofsky explains further that Renaissance painters, beginning with Giovanni Francesco Guercino,

had sought to normalize the spurious eternal perfection of the classical pastoral setting by incorporating a modernized medieval *memento mori*: two Arcadian shepherds, paused in wonder, study a human skull lying upon a decaying stone structure, while a mouse and a fly, "popular symbols of all-devouring time," consume whatever portions they find edible. Carved into the stone structure on which the skull lies are the words, *Et in Arcadia Ego*, a warning from death in Guercino's painting.\(^4\) Death repeats the warning in Book VI of *The Faerie Queene* as the brigands destroy the scene of Sir Calidore's pastoral idyll.

Can man realize his dreams of perfection? In the first five books of *The Faerie Queene*, Spenser's answer has been affirmative; but the poet conditions his affirmation with, "But not here, and not now." In Book VI, Sir Calidore's experiences illustrate the frustrating futility of expecting to find paradisiacal perfection in the hero and now.

'The Mutabilitie Cantos' explore the credibility of metaphysics and theology. Mutability would claim sway over all sensibly perceptible phenomena, and would deny reality to whatever lacks the pragmatically demonstrable features demanded by scientific materialism. Nature, however, whose handmaiden Mutabilitie is, disclaims both knowledge of and interest in whatever exceeds her own area of competence. But the poet is not content with the answer which discursive reason and materialistic positivism give. He wants the assurance that more than the possibility exists for cosmic order and design. He wants certain knowledge. Consequently, he transcends his mere intellectual faculty and seeks knowledge from participation in the Mind of the Maker.

\(^4\)Panofsky, pp. 307-308.
Right reason is not more intellect. The man with right reason not only knows the true, he also pursues the good. The good which he pursues, his *suum bonum*, is happiness. Teleologically, Spenser has returned to his First Cause.
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Throughout my discussion of Sir Philip Sidney's literary criticism, I rely heavily upon Professor A. C. Hamilton's idea that Sidney evolved an original conception of the poet and his function—the idea of the "right poet." In his *Defence of Poesie*, Sidney numbers three kinds of poets: those who "imitate the inconceivably excellencies of God"—David, Solomon, Orpheus, Amphion, Homer; those who "doe with matters Philosophicall, either Morall . . ., or Naturall . . ., or Astronomical . . ., or Historical . . "; and those whom he refers to as "indeed right Poets." The divinely inspired singers "may justly bee termed Vates"; about them, Sidney says little, as they are presumably above literary criticism. He doubts whether the second group deserves the name, "poet"—"Let Grammarians dispute" about the question. At any rate, he is sure that they cannot be inspired, inasmuch as they are "wrapped within the fold of the proposed subject," and do not follow their own "invention." Only the third group, the "right Poets," have proper inspiration, not the Platonic poetic frenzy which approaches lunacy, but the Christian kind of inspiration which "breathes into" and

1 Professor Hamilton expresses this idea in both *The Structure of Allegory in The Faerie Queene* (Oxford, 1961), and in "Sidney's Idea of the 'Right' Poet," *Comparative Literature*, IX (1957), 51-59.


3 *Defence*, pp. 9-10.
"lifts up with the vigor of his own invention." Sir Philip Sidney, then, rejects Plato's opinion that poetry comes from divine inspiration and is, consequently, "farre above mans wit"; rather, the "right Poet" operates within the "Zodiack of his owne wit." Consequently, it is in Plato that Sir Philip Sidney finds his adversary, and his strategy in the Defence is to expose the first two kinds of poets to Plato's attacks, and to defend the third kind, about whom Plato has nothing to say. This tactic allows him to side-step Plato's criticism by going beyond him.

It is the second kind of poet--the "Philosophical"--that the allegorical defense sought to rescue from attack. Sidney leaves these philosophical poets to the wolves and the grammarians, because, agreeing with Plato, he finds that they are three times removed from reality, like the "meaner sort of painters, who counterfet onely such faces as are sette before them." The third kind of poet--the "right Poet"--"bringeth his owne stuffe, and . . . maketh matter for a conceite," for "all onely proceedeth from their wit, being indeede makers of themselues." The first two kinds receive their matter from external sources--God or nature, but the "right Poet" goes "beyond and ouer all the workes of that second nature" and "bringeth things forth far surpassing her dooings." The "right Poet" imitates nothing. He creates his own nature and is, therefore, comparable to God. As a consequence, the poet imitates his vision, which he can make as nearly perfect as he wishes, and avoids the necessity for imitating fallen nature. He is in

4 Defence, p. 8.
a position to reject all arts and sciences, such as history and philosophy, which take their roots in nature. Not being constrained to imitating fallen nature, the "right Poet" imitates that golden world whose existence is contained within his own mind.6

The purpose of the "right Poet's" presenting the picture of his golden world is to move men to virtuous action. Man, since the fall, even though able to know the good, has been unable to control his will; it is the function of the "right Poet" to spur the will of his readers, so that they will emulate the examples set before them.7 "In Poesie, looking for fiction, they [the readers] shall use the narration but as an imaginative groundplot of a profitable invention."8 For this reason, the poet is superior to the historian. Because he does not pretend to write literal truth, the poet can present for emulation perfect heroes, whereas the historian cannot do so. The poet is superior to the philosopher, also, for the "Philosopher setting downe with thorne arguments, the bare rule, is so hard of utterance, and mistie to be conceived, that one that hath no other guide but him, shall wade in him till he be old, before he shall find sufficient cause to be honest."9 He believes that poetry effectively attracts the infected will of fallen man because its images "strike, pearce, [and] possess the sight of the soule."10 He illustrates his belief thus:

7Defence, p. 9.
8Defence, p. 29.
9Defence, pp. 13-14.
Whatsoever the Philosopher saith should be done, he [the "right Poet"] gives a perfect picture of it by some one, by whom he supposeth it was done, so as he coupleth the general notion with the particular example. A perfect picture, I say, for hee yeeldeth to the powers of the minde an image of that whereof the Philosopher bestoweth but a wordish description, which doth neither strike, pierce, nor possesse the sight of the soule. . . . Let us but hear old Anchises speaking in the middest of Troies flames, or see Ulysses in the fulnesse of all Calipsoes delights, bewaile his absence from baraine and beggerly Itheas. Anger the Stoikes said, was a short madness: let but Sophocles bring you Ajax on a stage, killing and whipping sheepe and oxen, thinking them the Army of Greekes, with their Chieftaines Agamemnon, and Menelaus: and tell me if you have not a more familiar insight into Anger, then finding in the schoolemen his Genus and Difference. See whether wisdom and temperance in Ulysses and Diomedes, valure in Achillies, friendship in Nisus and Burtalus, even to an ignorant man carry not an apparent shinning: and contrarily, the remorse of conscience in Oedipus; the soone repenting pride in Agamemnon; the selfe-devouring crueltie in his father Atreus; the violence of ambition in the two Theban brothers; the sower sweetnesse of revenge in Medea; and to fall lower, the Terentian Onato and our Chaucer's Pander so exprest, that we now use their Trades: And finally, all vertues, vices, and passions, so in their owne naturall states, laide to the view, that we seems not to heare of them, but clearly to see through them. But even in the most excellent determination of goodnesse, what Philosophers counsale can so readily direct a Prince, as the feyned Cirus in Xenophon, or a vertuous man in all fortunes: as Aeneas in Virgill, or a whole Common-wealth, as the Way of Sir Thomas Moores Utopia. . . For the question is, whether the fained image of Poetrie, or the regular instruction of Philosophie hath the more force in teaching? . . . Certainly, even our Saviour Christ could as well have given the morall common places of uncharitablenesse and humblenesse, as the divine narration of Dives and Lazarus, or of disobedience and mercy, as that heavenly discourse of the lost childe and the gracious Father, but that his through searching wisdome, knew the estate of Dives burning in hell, and of Lazarus in Abrahames bosome, would more constantly . . . inhabit both the memorie and judgement. Truly for my selfe (me seemes) I see before mine eyes, the lost childe disdainful prodigallitie, turned to envy a Swines dinner.11

The "right Poet," then, is able to provide images which contain the teachings of the philosophers. That this is Sidney's meaning we see from his interpretation of heroic poetry:

The Poet nameth Cyrus or Aeneas no other way then to showe what men of theyr names, fortunes, and estates should doe. 12

Only let Aeneas be wore in the tablet of your memory . . . and I thinkes . . . hee will be found in excellencie fruitefull. 13

Whom doe not the words of Turnus move? (the tale of Turnus hauing planted his image in the imagination) . . . 14

[The poet] bestow[s] a Cyrus vpon the worlde, to make many Cyrus's, if they wil learne aright why and how that Maker made him. 15

"Poetry," says Hamilton, "moves upwadrs, and so supplements the working of grace." 16

The influence of these ideas was vast. Hamilton citos evidences of indebtedness in Shakespeare (Touchstone's speech to Audrey: 'The truest poetry is the most faining.'), Sandys ('fiction, that spar of Gold, is the art: & truth well counterfeited, the honour of the Poet.'), Jonson ('the very Fiction itselfe as the reason, or forme of the worke'), and Marston:

(For tell me Crittick, is not Fiction
The soule of Poesies inuention?
Is't not the forme? the spirit? and the essence?
The life? and the essential difference?
Which omnit, emper, soli, doth agree
To heavenly discended Poesie?)

In conclusion, Hamilton says: "Its [the idea of the work of the "right Poot"] greatest creation is, I believe, The Faerie Queene." 17


13 I, 179-180.

14 I, 173.

15 I, 157.

16 The Structure of Allegory, p. 27.

17 The Structure of Allegory, p. 29.
APPENDIX B

Reproduced here are the "Texte," "Glose," and "Allegorie" of Christine du Castel's L'Épître d'Othéa, stories XXVI, XXVII, and XXVIII, translated by Robert Wyer, published about 1540 in London as There foloweth the C. Hystoryes of Troye (STC 7272).

Texte XXVI

Sybmytte the not/ to the Judgement
Ne to the counsayle, of kyng Mydas
To whom Iudgynge by rude intendeument
Were gyuen to Mydas the eares of an Asse.

Glose XXVI

Mydas was a kyng, whiche had small understanding, and a fable sayth that Phebus and Ran, God of shepherdes and herdes, stryved togother, and Phebus sayd that the sowne of a harpe was more to be praised than the sowne of a frestell or pype, and Ran contended to the contrary. And sayde that more was to be praysed the sowne of the frestell. Upon Mydas they put the Judgement of this dyscorde, and after that they had played aforde Mydas by long leysure, he Judged that better was the sowne of the frestel, and more to be praised. So saith the fable that Phebus was greatly . . . angry in dyspyte of this rude Judgement, caused hym to haue the eares of an Asse in demonstraunce that he had the entendement of an Asse, which so rudely hath gyuen Judgement. So may it be that a man Judge folysechely, agaynst a prince which causeth hym euuer after to beare vpon hym a sygne of foly which is the understanding of the eares of the Asse. So this fable is to be understand that the good knyght gyue not hym selfe to holde to folyseh Judgement, not grouwne vpon reason, nor he hym selfe ought not to be Judge of folyseh sentence, to this purpose saith one Philosopher, the fole is as a moll warpe, which hereth and understandeth not. And Diogine compareth the fole to a stone.
Allegorie XXVI

The Judgement of Mydas whereunto the good kynght ought not to holde hym, we may take for it Pilate which Judged the blyssed Sonne of God to be taken, bounde, and hanged, upon the gybet of the crosse, as a thefe, he beying without any tewe of offence so it is to be understand the good spryte ought to kepe hym fro gauying of Judgement vpon the Innocent. . . .

Texte XXVII

Tewe felowes yf thou haue, mo or las
Thou oughtest to go succour, / them at neede
Though it be to hell, where Hercules was
Where ben many soules, brennynga in glede.

Glose XXVII

A fable sayth that Pirotheus and Theseus, went in to hell to recouer Proserpine vpon Plute, which had her rauyshed, and curl had they ben appoynted yf it had not ben for Hercules, whiche was theyr companyon, whiche came them to succour, and dyd there so moche of armes, that he made all the company Infarnall affrayde, and cut the cheynes of Cerberus porter of hell. So woell Othea sayeth, that the good knyghte ought not to fayle his loyall felowe for doubts of paryll what ao auar it ba for loyall companys ought for to be as a mans proper thyng or cause. And Pythagoras sayeth, Thou ought to kepe the loue of thy frende dylygently.

Allegorie XXVII

Where the aucthoritie sayth that he . . . ought to succour his loyall felowes of armes, though it be to hell, we may understand that blyssed soules of Jesu Christ which brought forth the good soules of Holy Patriarkes & Prophets which ware in limbo & that example the good sprite ought to do, & to draw unto Hym al vertues. Beleve that article as faith. . . .

Texte XXVIII

Love and prayse, Cadmus so excellent
And his dysciples, holde thou in chyerte
He gaygned the fountayne, of the Serpente
With ryght great payne, aforo that it wolde be.
Glose XXVIII

Cadmus was a moche noble man and founded Thebes whiche cytie was greatly renomed, he set there a study & he hym selfe was moche profoundly lettered and of great scyence. And therefore sayth the fable that he daunted the serpent at the fountayne that is to understand the scyence and sages that alwayes springeth, the Serpent is noted for the payne and treauyle which it behoueth the student to daunts afore that he may purchase scyence. And the fable sayth, that he hym selfe became a serpent, which is to understand, he was a corrector and mayster of other. So wol Othea say that the good knyght ought to loue and honour the clerkes lettered, which ben grounded in science. To this purpose sayth Arystotle to Alexandre. Honour thy scyence and fortyfie it by good maysters.

Allegorie XXVIII

Cadmus whiche daunted the Serpent at the fountayne whiche the good knyght ought to loue, we may understand the blyssed humanite of Jesu Christ which domptad the serpent & gaigned the fountayne that is to say the lyfe of this world from the which he passed afore with great payne, and with great treauyle. Whereof he had perfyte victory when he rose agayne the thryd day, as sayth S. Thomas.
APPENDIX C

Following are illustrative selections from The Dialogue of Creatures Moralised, Antwerp, c. 1535, 4th edition (STC 6815).

Dialogo VIII

Of the see bankys and the see

The see is the father of the world/ the well of al showrys/ and the lodginge place of all floodys as the Philosofre sayth. For as it is writtyn Ecclesiastic primo. Al floodes entre the see and he yeldith them not agayn. And the flodes retourne to the place that they cam fro / that they shulde flowe agayne. This see is grete and large as it is wryttyn in the Psalme ciiu. And so the see by his magnificence and greate power went to the bankys and sayde. I Meruayle greatly ofthy hardnes and of thy styf harte. Thowe arte euyr contrary to me and withstandist me and fettyst me that I mays not eete the erthe and consume it as I wold doo. Wherefor I desire the to be removyd fro thy place / that I mays preuayl eate the erthe and put hym underfote or ellys I shall notte case to warre on the and put the to greate trowble. To whom the banke answerd and sayd. It is euyll sayd Brothir. For the maker of all things hath ordeyned me so / and I suffre great labour inchancynge the for the obedience that I owe to hym. Thou comyst uppon me oftyn tymes 4 puttist me to great gref. I bare thee 4 suffre thee pacyently for the loue of God / therefore thowe owyst not to multiplye unkynes wordies agayne me for that I may not change my place. This hering the see answerd in great wodenes / Thou mayest suffreth 4 suffre styl for I shal neuir let you to be in peace. But I shal bete 4 punysh thee with al my powr. The bank paciently put himself undir the yoke of obedience 4 sayde thus, Godemen may both Chyde and fyghte
And punysh them that doth not ryghte.
Every prelate & ruler owith to be manlye 6 resiste them that be synfull that thai preuayle not. Neuertheless Gregory saith, As the see euir rebellyth 6 repugnith agayn the bankys by whom it is refrayed & kept in kewye some personys in relygion euir rebell again ther prelatis. which can not coorse them nor bringe them to godenes. But good shepherdis nede not to drede the malicious thretyngis of them that be badde. But rather lyke as a wakyng
shepherd is wone to kepe his shepe from cruel beastis / so good curatiss owe to be diligent to conserve thare flocks from peryshing. Therfor saith Isidir. Hille shepherdis take no heed of ther shepe, but as it is rede in the Eangely of them that be but hybrid men which take no gret charge of the flocke / for & if they see the wolf comings anone they flee. When fle they away.

Certainly when they be stylle & dare not speke befor them that be myghty & of power & when thei be tymorous & fearful to withstonde them be synful & euyl dispaygd. Therfor Itherom comfortith & sayth let vs intend to please god / & as for the thretinge of man / we shal not node to care. Petrus comoster tellith that ther was a kyng of Macedome called phillipe & he besegid a cite callyd Athenis / & at last he spake to them of the cite & sayd. Deliuer me x oratours such as I shall choose among yow & I shall be confedrid with yowe / & go my waye. The most wise Creature callyd demostanes answerd to the kyng & sayde. Wolues on a tyme spake to the shepherdis & sayde. All the discorde betwene yow & vs cawseth your doggis yfro entende to bo at one with vs / deluyer vs yor dogs and we shal be frendys for euyr. And when they had so done, / the wolues at ther owne wyll douowryd the shepe. By the which example hitte apertyth howe grete perell hitte is whan doggis by whom is undirstonde prechowrs and Curatiss forsake ther flockys and be negligent to bark & proche agayne synno. for as softness is laudable in manner and ire is roprouable / so is it contrary in a dogge. For a softe dogge is not goode / But rathir more to be cherisshed for his fiersnes in tyme nedeful. And so discrrete fiersnes is comendable in hym that hath cure and charge of sowlys.

DIALOGO VII

Of the ayre / and the wynde

Knowe ye as the Philosofre sayth / that Ayre is the Spiracle of all thynges liuyng without whom all thynges is sons choked / and dyeth that is liuyng. The wynde also is the dryer of the erthe / the mouer of watres / & troubler of the Ayre. And becaws he is troubler of the ayre / the ayre cawset hym to be cyeled before the highe Iuge and maker of al thinges & sayd, 0 myghty Lorde and maker of al thynges / Loke vpon me I beseche the & haue mercy vpon me. Thou hast ordeyned me sufficyently / and indewyd me with great priuylege. Wherefore I gyue lawde and thanks vnto the. For thou hast made me to be chyfe of all thynges / But for this cause I am gretly troubled and vexed with the wynde / for he euuer maketh me colde and cawseth me to be Intemprate. Therefore I saye to hym / yf euuer from hensforth he presume to blowe vpon me / I wyll choke hym & put hym from his lyfe. To whom the maker answered and sayd / Ayre thou speakest nat woll. Though the wynde make the cold and bete the with his blast / neuertheless he yeldeth the purged and temperate / If it so were that the wynde blewe nat on the / thou shouldest be seke & corrupte bothe tedycous & hatefull to every man. Wherefore thou oughtest to loue hym and
conveyeth the in good estate / and so the ayre was pleased and sayd.

Correctors that correct be for our ownes good
We ought to loue / & to suffre with a glad mood.
So every Creature ought to loue them that correct them & sheweth them their vafus & entend to reduce them to goodness and to the way of truthe / For truly the seke man that denyeth to drinke the bytert drinke that his leche gyueth hym wyll nat suffre hym selfe to be cured / and so he shall neuer be deleyuered from his sekenes. & he that hateth his correctours / shal not be wel dyrected Werylye a man louith not his leche / when he wil not suffre hym that rebukyth hym for his goode. But trewe it is that Chrisostome saith. He shal haue hatrede that repreueth the synfull. And Seneca sayth. He sekyth a blame to hym selfe / that rebukith the wycked man. Suche be not wisemen, but rather they be folys / as saith Ecclesiastes. A wyseman louyth to be rebuked / but a fol is wrothe if he be correcte. Therfor correct a wyseman and he shal loue the. Proverb iv. Hitte is wryttyn in the lyfe of saynte Ambrose / that when Theodosius the Emperor had punyshed dyuers and dwellers of that countrey withoute delyberation and iugement. Ambrose the Archebishop of mylene expulsyd hym owte of the schirche / although he was a very Christen Emperor. And when the emperowre knewe itte / he sayd to Ambrose. Daudi comyttyd both adulterye and manslaughter. And Ambrose answerede. If thou hast folowyd hym in his errowre / folowe also the penaunce of hym. The Emperowre that herynge / was verye contryte inwardlye and dyd great penaunce and sayd. I haue founde a man of trouthe Ambrose the Bysshope. And so the Emperowr ordeyned that noman shulde be iugid to deth withoute vi days of respyghete / that Ire myght be swagyd and the mynde myght be the more clere that rightwysness might be sene in geuynge of iugemente.
APPENDIX D

An illustration of the process of "drawing" a subject through the "topics" of logic

Abraham Fraunce in Lawiere Logike relates that the topics of invention provide both a source of copiousness for the writer and a means of analytical interpretation for the reader:

If we shall... draw any one word through these generall places of invention, it will breeding a great plentie and varietie of new arguments, while wee marke what be the causes, effects, parts, whole, generall, speciall, subjects, adjunctes thereof, and so forth in all the rest; and this either in making and enditing our selves, or else in resolving, and as it were dismembring that which others have done [Fol. 81v].

Thomas Wilson in The Rule of Reason, Containing the Arte of Logike, illustrates the process.

And to make this thing more plaine, I will goe through the places, with one certaine words, and looke what helpe I shall find there, for knowledge of the same. The word shall be (a Kyng) or (a Magistrate.)

The Definition

The definition of a Magistrate. Every King or Magistrate, is the minister of God, for a good ends, to the punishing of naughtie persons, and the comforting of godly men.

The Genus

The Minister of God.

The Species

Either a Tyrant or a godly King, the one ruleth according to his lust, the other according to right and Justice.

Conjugates

The Officer, the Office, to beare an Office, if the Office cannot be spared, the Officer cannot be spared.

Adjuncts necessary

Wisedome, earnest labour, cunning in sciences, skilfull both of warre and peace, these al must needs be in every Magistrate.

Adjuncts contingent

To be liberall, to be frugall, to be of a temperate life, al these happen to be in good Magistrates.

Deedes necessary

To defende Religion, to enact godly Lawes, to punish offenders, to defend the oppressed: all these are necessarie in a King, and are never found in a Tyrant.

Subjects

Moses, David, Salomon, Ezechias, Josias, Charles the Emperour, Edward the sixt of the name King of England.

The efficient cause remote

God himselfe, or els the ordinaunce of God.

The efficient cause proximate

Unquiet subjects, rebelles, disobedient people, are the cause why Magistrates are ordained, that the rather they may bee ruled, and kept in good order.
The final cause of a Magistrate

This ends he must needs observe, that alwaies the people live in quietnesse, & in honest conversation passe their whole life.

Effects

Peace is made, the Realme enriched, all thynges plenteous, but where a Tyraunt ruleth, all thinges are contrary.

Testimony

The xiii to the Romans, let every soule be subject to the powers. I Peter, ii. Be subject to the King.

Adjuncts contingent

The Scepter is a token of Justice, even as a Sworde is a signe of revengement, or wrathe, paying of Subsidies, Taxes, Tributes, Rent, or any suche like, Yeomen of the Garde, and al other waiters, Soldiours in warre, the obedience of the subjects, the honour given unto him, triumphes made, running at the tilt, fighting at the Barriers, fighting at the Tourney. All these are contingentia to a King, that is, although these thinges bee not in a Common wealth, yet may there be a King, yea, and although there be no king in some Common weale, yet these thinges may be every ech one of them, as it was in Athens, where the people had the rule of the Common weale, and al was referred to their judgement.

Similitudes

That which the Sheepeheard is to the Sheepe, the same is the Magistrate to his Subjects. That which the master of the Shippe, is to the Shippe, or the master of an household, to his house, or the head to the whole body; the same is the Magistrate to his Subjects.

Comparison

Servantes must bee obedient, and subject to their Masters with all reverence, as we read in the Scripture: how much more then
should the subjects be obedient to their king and sovereign Lord, which by the ordinance of God, is appointed to rule, and to have governance over them [Fol. 54v-55v].

Even this example, exhaustive as it seems to be, does not search all the "places" or "topics" of logic. Wilson remarks that it is not always necessary to do so; one ought, however, to search most of them and use the arguments gathered there which best suit the purpose of the writer. Fraunce illustrates analysis, or reading based on logic, in his discussion of the Second Nymph of Virgil [Lawers Logike, Fol. 120r].

An even more exhausting example constitutes the conclusion to Dudley Fenner's Artes of Logike and Rhetorike [Middelburg, 1584]. Fenner logically analyzes the Epistle of St. Paul to Philemon in such detail and to such an extent as to seem tedious and confusing to readers unaccustomed to logical analysis.

2Quoted in Sister Miriam Joseph, pp. 343-344.
VITA

William Robert Lacey, III, was born in Kosciusko, Mississippi, 11 March, 1921, the son of Dr. William Robert and Mrs. Frances Sanders Lacey. After completing high school in the Kosciusko Public Schools, he attended Mississippi State College, State College, Mississippi. His education there was interrupted by four years' service in the Army of the United States during World War II. He returned to Mississippi State College and obtained his bachelor's degree in 1947. After graduation, he served as Director of Special Services, Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare, and with the American National Red Cross in Japan and Korea during and after the Korean conflict. Returning to Mississippi State University (formerly Mississippi State College), he received his Master's Degree in 1959. In 1961, he entered Louisiana State University, where he received the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in 1967.

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Major Field: English

Title of Thesis: Right Reason in Edmund Spenser's Faerie Queene

Approved:

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EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

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Date of Examination:

April 24, 1967