

5-2006

## **THE DOUBLE THREAT OF TERRORISM: TERRORISM'S EFFECT ON RESTRICTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY GOVERNMENTS**

Christen Tave Romero

Follow this and additional works at: [https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/honors\\_etd](https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/honors_etd)



Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

---

THE DOUBLE THREAT OF TERRORISM:  
TERRORISM'S EFFECT ON RESTRICTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
BY GOVERNMENTS

A Thesis  
Submitted to the Undergraduate Faculty of the  
Louisiana State University and  
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Bachelor's of Arts & Sciences

in

The Department of Political Science

by

Christen Tave Romero

May 2006

## Table of Contents

Abstract.....	- 3 -
Introduction.....	- 5 -
Dependent Variables.....	- 9 -
Human Rights as a Dependent Variable.....	- 9 -
Independent Variables.....	- 12 -
Terrorism as Primary Explanatory Variable.....	- 12 -
Control Variables.....	- 15 -
Regime Type.....	- 16 -
Economic Indicators: GDP(PPP) Per Capita and Inflation.....	- 19 -
Regime Durability.....	- 21 -
Population Size and Population Growth.....	- 22 -
British Influence.....	- 23 -
Methodology.....	- 24 -
Empirical Results.....	- 26 -
Physical Integrity.....	- 26 -
Terrorism.....	- 26 -
Regime Type.....	- 29 -
Regime Durability.....	- 29 -
Economic Indicators: GDP(PPP) Per Capita and Inflation.....	- 30 -
Population Size and Population Growth.....	- 31 -
British Influence.....	- 32 -
Empowerment Index.....	- 33 -
Terrorism.....	- 33 -
Regime Type.....	- 34 -
Regime Durability.....	- 35 -
Economic Indicators: GDP (PPP) Per Capita and Inflation.....	- 35 -
Population Size and Population Growth.....	- 36 -
British Influence.....	- 37 -
Women's Rights.....	- 37 -
Terrorism.....	- 37 -
Regime Type.....	- 40 -

Regime Durability.....	- 40 -
Economic Indicators: GDP(PPP) Per Capita and Inflation.....	- 40 -
Population Size and Population Growth.....	- 41 -
British Influence.....	- 42 -
Conclusion .....	- 42 -
Tables.....	- 46 -
Works Cited .....	- 67 -

## Abstract

In the post-9/11 period, a variety of new legislation was introduced that sought to limit the rights of American citizens. This onslaught of freedom-restricting laws in the name of security prompted a very interesting question: *How much, on average, do governments restrict human rights after terrorist attacks?* In this study I use annualized data to measure three components of human rights—physical integrity, empowerment rights, and women’s rights. I then use two different measures of terrorism as my key explanatory variables—the absolute number of terrorist kills per year and the number of terrorist kills per capita per year. Models were run using a regression technique known as feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), which allows for heteroskedasticity and estimates first-order autocorrelation. Due to the terrorism data being coded differently from 1981-1997 (excluding 1993) than it was from 1998-2004 (including 1993), I generated an interaction variable. This variable describes the change in effect that terrorism has on human rights when using the old coding scheme and the new coding scheme. Models were then run analyzing the non-lagged effects of terrorism as well as the effect of terrorism lagged up to three years.

The results of this study indicate that terrorist attacks, both when measured using the absolute number of terrorist kills and when using the number of terrorist kills per capita, have an immediate impact on physical integrity rights. This effect is negative meaning that as the number of terrorist kills increases, physical integrity decreases. The results further reveal that the strength of the negative relationship diminishes in the first, second, and third years after the attack.

The findings describing empowerment rights differ from physical integrity. The results suggest that there is no strong, discernible relationship between terrorist attacks and the level of government respect for empowerment rights in the short- and medium-term, though the direction of the relationship is as anticipated.

Finally, the results of this study show a possible, weak relationship between terrorism and women’s rights. However, the results were mixed meaning certain models suggested a positive relationship, others a negative relationship, and still others no relationship. Even the results of

models indicating a connection between terrorism and women's rights show that the relationship is very weak.

I conclude from these findings that the severity of a country's terrorism does induce governments to repress civilians. Furthermore, I point out that of all the tools governments use as counter-terrorism measures, they most frequently employ the exact same methods as terrorists: killing, kidnapping, imprisonment, and torture. As a result, civilians are faced with a double threat from terrorism. First they must bear the actual terrorist attacks and second they must bear physical abuse from their government.

## Introduction

*And the British would hit back; they'd over-react. They always did....They never considered the mood of the country worth judging. They made rebels of thousands of quiet people who'd never thought beyond their garden gates. They were always our greatest ally; we could never have done it without them* (Doyle, 1999: 208)

The above quotation is taken from Roddy Doyle's *A Star Called Henry*, which is set amid the Irish war of independence in 1919. In this particular excerpt, the protagonist—Henry—recounts how the British government always responded with a harsh hand to attacks from the Irish rebels. Most telling, however, is that he describes how retaliation from the British government played right into the hands of the same people they were attempting to crush. Despite being set in 20<sup>th</sup> century Ireland, do Henry's words hold any lessons for us today?

The substantive research question investigated in this thesis is, *Does the number of deaths caused by terrorism result in government attacks on human rights?* As the United States has switched its focus from a figurative War on Drugs<sup>1</sup> to a literal War on Terror, so to has the world's attention converged on the causes and consequences of terrorism. The age-old conundrum of prioritizing security versus civil liberties reemerged in socio-political discourse with effervescent enthusiasm after 9/11 prompted the Patriot Act.<sup>2</sup> Suddenly, divergent lexicons emerged, one labeling the legislation's corollaries “guardians of liberty” and the other scolding those corollaries as “abuses of liberty” (Ramsay, 2006). To confuse the issue further, both sides

---

<sup>1</sup> G. Thomas Couser describes the “War on Drugs” as a “trope so entrenched in our discourse that it is very difficult to avoid in discussing the drug problem” (151).

<sup>2</sup> In reference to the USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law Pub.L. 107-56, which was signed into law on October 26, 2001.

firmly stated that their overarching goal was freedom. How did these two groups arrive at such divergent conclusions?

One significant problem with the contemporary debate between security and civil liberty is the difficulty of quantifying these topics. Surely, security does not always outweigh civil liberty or vice versa. In Britain's World War II blackouts, civilians were compelled to forego turning on lights for whole evenings to avoid bombardment from the German *Luftwaffe*. Most civilians gladly complied with these regulations, perceiving the security gained as more important than the freedom lost.

However, even the staunchest supporters of security preservation will acknowledge that taking away civil liberty for the good of security is not always justified. What if civilians are forced to completely forego political speech, voting rights, and religious observances in order to repel some distant, obscure, and implausible threat? In such cases, civilians will say that the loss of liberties greatly outweighs the benefit of additional security. Unfortunately, many instances where security and civil liberties are pitted against each other lack lucid resolutions. As previously mentioned, the Patriot Act is just one of those instances, and the controversy surrounding it shows just how divisive it can become.

This study will begin the long and arduous process of comparing not just civil liberties to security but examining issues of security in the broader context of human rights.<sup>3</sup> Specifically,

---

<sup>3</sup> There are many distinctions between *human rights* and *civil liberties*. Chambers (2003) and Guild (2004), for instance, both point out that the sources of *human rights* and *civil liberties* are fundamentally different. The latter, for instance, notes that the "definition of the citizen as fully integrated as a rights holder of civil liberties contrasts to the position of the foreigner who is not so constituted. While the foreigner may enjoy civil liberties as a by-product of his or her presence on the territory, he or she is not the intended rights holder...the universalism of human rights comes from the fact they apply to all human beings rather than just to citizens. Citizens benefit from human rights but do so because they are human not because they are citizens." (383, 5) For this study, human rights will be considered an umbrella term covering three types of rights (i) ethnic and religious rights, (ii) socio-economic rights and (iii) civil liberties.



this study will examine the *bête noire* of modern security issues—terrorism—and its effect on government respect for human rights. By evaluating the relationship between these two social phenomena, this study will add a vital piece of information to the debate. It will answer such questions as *How much do governments tend to repress the citizenry after terrorist attacks?* and *When governments do repress the citizenry after terrorist attacks, what sort of repression—physical, civil, or social—does it resort to?* Only after tackling these questions can we ultimately undertake the larger task of prioritizing security and human rights and answering such questions as posed by Schmid and Crelinsten (1993: 15): “[D]o we have to tolerate a certain level of terrorism for the sake of maintaining the civil liberties and political rights which we cherish.”

However, the implications of this study extend far beyond just determining the primacy of human rights and security. Its findings will also have important consequences for those who use violence as a means of achieving socio-political ends. The immediate objective of terrorism is to, as Schrepel (2005: 83) puts it, “kill one; scare a hundred.” However, this goal is simply an intermediary acting as a means to achieve even broader objectives. These objectives are in turn motivated by four factors: 1) adverse *physical circumstances*, 2) perceived need for *security*, 3) want of *self-determination* and 4) desire for *social respect* (Wagner, 2006). While physical circumstances, security, self-determination, and social respect of citizens within a nation may be affected by additional factors, one factor is always the government in place and its attitude towards human rights. Should the results of this study indicate that terrorist activity significantly degrades civilians’ rights, it will ignite some interesting questions regarding the efficacy of violent tactics by non-state actors. *If using terrorist tactics leads to a more repressive environment, are such tactics worth the price?* As the track record of terrorism is already

“abysmal,”<sup>4</sup> additional consequences may not only provoke the question but actually persuade certain terrorist groups or individuals to seek alternate means to their ends. Even when considering secessionist terrorist groups or groups who wish to overrun the administrative apparatus, any repression that must be endured during their campaign will warrant a closer look at alternate, non-violent methods.

Just as any significant relationship between terrorist actions and government repression should prompt a reevaluation of the utility of terrorism, so should such results induce further discussion regarding state responses to terrorism. Repression has multiple negative effects. The obvious immediate effects are that human rights are taken away, and civilians and the international community begin harboring such sentiments as anger, discontent, sorrow, and frustration towards the culpable government. More theoretical consequences include altering of the very values and support upon which many governments rest. Specifically speaking of democracy, Wilkinson (2000; 73) points out that “it is a serious error to underestimate the potential of the weapon of terrorism for affecting major political changes in a democracy, or even for destroying democracy itself.”

---

<sup>4</sup> “History shows that terrorism has been more effective as an auxiliary weapon in revolutionary and national liberation struggles. Most of the key modern theorists and leaders of revolutionary insurgency, such as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara, have recognized the dangers of depending on terrorism and have come down against giving it the major role in the struggle for revolution. The few cases where terrorism plays a major part in bringing about sweeping political change arose in a limited number of colonial independence struggles against foreign rule. Included in this group would be the circumstances surrounding the end of the British mandate in Palestine after the terrorist campaigns of Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization) and Stern (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) and the British decision to withdraw from the Suez Canal zone base, together with the campaigns which led the British to withdraw from Cyprus and Aden, and the French to withdraw from Algeria....Even taking into account the influence of terrorism as an auxiliary tactic in revolutionary and independence struggles, and in the rise of fascism between the First and Second World Wars, the overall track record of terrorism in attaining major political objectives is abysmal” (Wilkinson, 2000: 21-2).

A second negative effect is that, just like terrorism, government actions in responding to terrorism usually prove counter-productive if repressive measures are taken.<sup>5</sup> By stripping the citizenry of various human rights, the state fuels much of the anger that inspired the violent activity in the first place. Thus, cyclical patterns of terrorist exploits and government repression can occur with both sides never achieving peace for their constituents.

## **Dependent Variables**

### **Human Rights as a Dependent Variable**

Our model begins with the basic question: *To what degree does terrorism affect a state's level of human rights?* Necessary in our evaluation of this subject is a reliable set of human rights data. Unlike many previous studies examining aspects of state repression, I will use a broad definition of human rights and not simply invoke the Political Terror Scale (PTS). While PTS remains one of the most widely utilized rating systems of human rights (Stohl, Carelton, and Johnson, 1984; Stohl and Carelton, 1985; Carelton and Stohl, 1987; Gibney, 1988; Gibney and Stohl, 1988; Poe, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Gibney and Dalton, 1996; Keith, 1999 2002; Poe, et al., 1999), those who use it to quantify human rights erroneously equate the broad concept only with rights of physical integrity (Apodaca and Stohl, 1999, Anderson, et al., 2002). However,

---

<sup>5</sup> "It must be a cardinal principle of a liberal democracy in dealing with the problems of terrorism, however serious these may be, never to be tempted into using methods which are incompatible with the liberal values of humanity, liberty and justice. It is a dangerous illusion to believe one can 'protect' liberal democracy by suspending liberal rights and wrongs of government. Contemporary history abounds in examples of 'emergency' or 'military' rule carrying countries from democracy to dictatorship with irrevocable ease.....another kind of betrayal is the deliberate suspension or limitation of civil liberty on grounds of expediency....there is also abundant evidence to show that such responses play into the hands of terrorists and, if prolonged, become totally counterproductive. An example of an emergency measure employed by the British authorities that is now widely recognized as having been counterproductive was internment without trial in Northern Ireland," a power that has not been used since the mid 1970s and which the Labour government formally abandoned in 1998. ...Terrorist violence greatly increased following the introduction of internment, and the total number of deaths from terrorism in Northern Ireland in 1972 (467) is the highest ever" (Wilkinson 2000, 115).

human rights as defined by the *UN Declaration of Human Rights* is highly multidimensional and includes such aspects as socio-economic rights, civil liberties, religious tolerances, women's rights, and, last by not least, rights to physical integrity (United Nations General Assembly, 1948).

In order to capture a broader essence of human rights, I will use Cingranelli and Richards' (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, which provides quantitative measures of 12 dimensions of human rights<sup>6</sup> (Cingranelli and Richards, 2008). Like PTS, CIRI sources its data from "ideologically and politically neutral" Amnesty International *Annual Reports* and the more politically inclined *U.S State Department Country Reports on Human Rights* (Apodaca and Stohl, 1999: 188; Sobek, et al., 2006). The inclusion of the CIRI dataset limits the scope of this study to 1981-2004 and 195 countries (Cingranelli and Richards, 2008). I will use this set of countries and years to define my unit of analysis—country-year—which is a country and a specific year for which indicators are measured. Several country-years are excluded from this study for such reasons as insufficient data, complete collapses in political authority, and/or periods of government interruption.

Whereas PTS uses a five-point ordinal scale to indicate the level of physical state repression in a country (Apodaca and Stohl, 1999; Butler and Mitchell, 2007), the CIRI Human Rights Dataset uses a three-point ordinal scale to gauge multiple components of physical and empowerment rights (Butler, 2007; Cingranelli and Richards, 2008)<sup>7</sup>. These components are then aggregated to form broader variables—physical integrity and empowerment index.

---

<sup>6</sup> Extrajudicial Killing, Disappearance, Torture, Political Imprisonment, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Movement, Electoral Self-Determination, Workers' Rights, Women's Political Rights, Women's Economic Rights, and Women's Social Rights

<sup>7</sup> Freedom of religion and freedom of movement are initially scaled using either "0" to denote no freedom or "1" to denote complete freedom. However, they are then rescaled on a three-point ordinal basis in order to conform to the

For components of women's rights, the CIRI Human Rights Dataset uses a four-point ordinal scale. CIRI does not generate an overall score for the conditions of women within a country as it does for physical integrity and empowerment rights. For purposes of this project, however, I aggregated measures of women's social conditions, women's economic conditions, and women's political conditions into a single aggregated variable—Women's Conditions Index.

The Physical Rights Index is an additive index that is constructed from three-point ordinal measures of Extrajudicial Killings, Political Imprisonment, Tortures, and Disappearances. Each of the four dimensions is given a score of "0" if it happens on a large scale (50 or more annual occurrences), "1" if it sometimes occurs (1-49 annual occurrences), or "2" if there are no recorded occurrences in a given year. These scores are then aggregated in the Physical Rights Index, which ranges from 0 (no respect for physical integrity rights) to 8 (full respect for physical integrity rights) (Sobek, et al., 2006; Cingranelli and Richards, 2008)<sup>8</sup>.

The Empowerment Index is an additive scale that aggregates measures of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, electoral self-determination, and workers' rights. Freedom of religion and freedom of movement are coded "0" where governments restrict these liberties and "1" where government places no restrictions on these practices. Each of the three dimensions is given a score of "0" if these rights were severely restricted or denied in a given state, "1" if these rights were moderately observed, and "2" if these rights were virtually unrestricted in a given year (Sobek, et al., 2006; Cingranelli and Richards, 2008). The

---

Mokken Scaling Analysis, which requires all variables to have identical ranges. Thus, scores of "0" for these two components remain as "0." Scores of "1" become scores of "2" in the aggregated indices.

<sup>8</sup> The Cronbach Alpha measure of internal consistency for Physical Integrity components is 0.7856.

Empowerment Index totals these dimensions and produces a score ranging from 0 (no respect for empowerment rights) to 10 (full respect for empowerment rights).<sup>910</sup>

Finally, I have constructed an aggregated variable—Women’s Conditions Index—to measure respect for a country’s female population in social, political, and economic terms. In the CIRI dataset, these three dimensions are on a four-point scale. A score of “0” indicates that this dimension for women was not encoded in a country’s law for a given year. A score of “1” indicates that the right was guaranteed by law but not effectively enforced by the government. A score of “2” indicates that the right was guaranteed by law although some low-level discrimination towards women still existed. A score of “3” indicates that the right was guaranteed by law and robustly enforced by the government (Sobek, et al., 2006; Cingranelli and Richards, 2008). The Women’s Conditions Index then totals these three facets of female rights and yields a score ranging from 0 (no respect for women’s rights) to 9 (full respect for women’s rights).<sup>11</sup>

## **Independent Variables**

### **Terrorism as Primary Explanatory Variable**

In order to evaluate the effect of terrorism on human rights in a given country, I will use the records of over 80,000 terrorist attacks compiled within the University of Maryland’s Global

---

<sup>9</sup> Aggregating components of the Empowerment Index results in an 11-point ordinal scale because Cingranelli and Richards rescale the two dichotomous indicators, freedom of religion and freedom of movement, from 0-1 to 0-2 in order to conform to the Mokken Scaling Analysis, which requires all variables to have identical ranges.

<sup>10</sup> The Cronbach Alpha measure of internal consistency for Empowerment Index components is 0.8674.

<sup>11</sup> The Cronbach Alpha measure of internal consistency for Women’s Rights components is 0.7578.

Terrorism Database as my unit of analysis<sup>12</sup>. Unfortunately, two separate coding schemes for the START data were used. Data entries between 1970-1997 (excluding 1993) are included within Global Terrorism Database 1 (GTD1) while entries for 1993 and 1998-2004 are included within Global Terrorism Database 2 (GTD2).

Whereas GTD1 only requires a single open-source report for events to be coded as terrorist attacks, GTD2 requires multiple independent open-source reports or else a single highly credible source. (START, 2006). Furthermore, the two sets classify terrorism using varying definitions. The former describes such activity as the “threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree, 2007: 92). In order to be included in the dataset, events must meet this definition. For GTD2, however, violent events must meet more stringent guidelines to be included in the dataset. First, each incident must meet three necessary criteria: 1) it must be intentional, 2) it must entail some level of violence<sup>13</sup>, and 3) it must not be perpetrated by sub-national (government affiliated) individuals. Furthermore, each incident must meet two out of three of the following criteria: 1) the act must have political, economic, religious or social objectives<sup>14</sup>, 2) there must be an intent to intimidate, coerce, or convey some message to the public, and 3) the action must not occur within the context of war (GTD2 Codebook, 2007: 10-11). The end result is that, on average, GTD2 defines fewer incidents as terrorism than would be coded as such using GTD1 criteria.

---

<sup>12</sup> The Global Terrorism Database is an open-source database whose data entries between 1970-1997 were donated by the Pinkerton Global Information Services (PGIS) and further evaluated using funds from the National Institute of Justice. Subsequent work on the initial data as well as the research of post-1997 data was funded by the U.S Department of Homeland Security (START, 2007).

<sup>13</sup> “Violence” includes violence against property.

<sup>14</sup> Acts aimed solely at gaining profit do not satisfy this condition.

The GTD measures terrorist events in two different ways—number of terrorist attacks and number of terrorist kills. To codify terrorist activity, my study will employ the number of terrorist kills per country-year as its independent variable. By including the number of deaths caused by terrorism, I account for the severity of terrorist attacks.<sup>15</sup> Simply including the number of terrorist attacks and not kills per year would fail to convey the severity of terrorism in a country, and unfortunately, other gauges of severity (property damage, emotional impact, etc.) are not widely available. Finally, I will construct two varying sets of models, one using the absolute number of kills by terrorism and the other *per capitalized* number of kills for each country. More populous countries may have the tendency to view a few civilian deaths as relatively insignificant in comparison to much smaller countries. Thus, solely using the raw number of civilian deaths as the independent variable would not account for the added provocations these governments invoke per civilian death. On the other hand, human life does have a least a minimal intrinsic worth independent of population size. Thus, by creating a model using the absolute number of terrorist kills, I take into consideration this base value of human life.

Due to the inherent quality of fear that terrorism injects within affected populations, I expect that coefficients for the number of kills will be negative when evaluating separate effects on physical integrity rights, empowerment rights, and women's conditions. I suspect that governments will react to terrorist events quickly and harshly in order to hamper any future attacks and seek retribution for the attacks already executed. Thus, I hypothesize that terrorist actions will have a depressive effect on values of physical integrity rights. Moreover, I predict

---

<sup>15</sup> A test of correlation between number of terrorist attacks and the number of terrorist kills shows that the two measures are highly correlated (0.7399).



this effect will appear robust in years concurrent with the terrorist actions that affect them. I also expect the strength of this effect to diminish over time.

I further hypothesize that government reactions to terrorism will not affect empowerment rights and women's conditions as significantly as they do physical integrity rights. Counter-terrorism efforts probably focus specifically on the guilty individuals, and the very nature of terrorism assures that government retribution will be harsh. Because reductions in a nation's overall empowerment index or women's conditions would surely penalize innocent individuals, I posit that most governments opt for physical repression instead of reductions in women's rights and empowerment rights. Any government objective that does seek to decrease these two broad sets of liberties would require focus on cultural aspects that are deeply entrenched within societies and not easily purged. Thus, I hypothesize that while onslaughts of terrorist activity will result in decreases in empowerment rights and women's conditions, I expect these reductions to be minor.

### **Control Variables**

To reiterate, I will be examining the effect of the independent variable—terrorism—on the dependent variable—subcomponents of human rights. Terrorism will be measured by absolute number of kills and by number of kills per capita. The subcomponents of human rights to be examined in my models include physical integrity, empowerment rights, and women's rights. However, to isolate the effect of terrorism on human rights it is necessary to control for a host of other of variables that influence government respect for such rights.

## **Regime Type**

The first control variable in this study is the nature of the regime in each country. For two decades institutional commentary regarding human rights has centered on its correlation with and derivation from democratic structures (Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995; Schmitter & Karl, 1996; Richards, 1997; Rummel, 1997; Poe, et al., 1999; Zanger, 2000; Davenport and Armstrong 2002). In recent years, the generally held notion among scholars is that democracy has a strong, positive correlation with human rights (Evans 2001). Carothers (1994) goes several steps further, asserting not only a stout correlation between the two variables but equating them as “two sides of the same coin.”

Certainly several studies have warned against an overly assumptive mindset when considering the causal relationship between liberal democracies and human rights (McCorquodale & Fairbrother, 1999; Evans, 2001). Democracies are susceptible to certain factors that harness a corrosive effect on civil liberties. Evans & Hancock (1997) and Evans (2001) point specifically to the economic susceptibility of democracies to transnational corporations, which “often take precedence over the needs of the community as a whole, for example, in areas of trade union, environmental, taxation and human rights regulation” (Evans 2001, 626). Moreover, democracies are frequently guilty of the most egregious abuses of civil liberties in both physical and intellectual arenas. Whether in the least developed countries—as in Nigeria’s public execution of nearly a dozen members of a civil-environmental activist group—or in the most industrialized nations—including the race-based imprisonment of Japanese-

Americans in 1940s United States—instances of democracies violating fundamental rights are pervasive (Adeola, 2000; Yamamoto, et al., 2003).

Despite admonitions cautioning the reader or researcher against preemptive assumptions of an overwhelming causal relationship between human rights and democracy, one must realize that democratic constitutions offer at least nominal assurances of physical integrity and empowerment rights (Evans 2001). Printed pledges of respect for human rights act as an added impetus for democratic leaders to respect civilians who function not only as constituents but as elected officials' source of power. Autocratic leaders, on the other hand, do not derive their authority from the will of national electors and are thus less institutionally inclined to respect such rights. Furthermore, democracies, by design or by default, utilize varying degrees of self-determination as a type of social outlet. This acts as a public valve releasing some of the pressures formed by the inevitable discontent with government policy. Nation-states able to release some of this pressure are far less prone to separatist movements and large-scale revolutions (Wilkinson, 2000), thereby reducing government proclivities for repression (Poe, et al., 1999). Moreover, institutional proposals designed to significantly increase democracy can be realized in a relatively short period of time while other policies that alter human rights measures such as economic growth typically take several years (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005).

To measure democracy and autocracy I have chosen to use Polity IV data, which scales individual states on a scale ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). These calibrations are formed by first affording each state a score on an eleven-point scale measuring autocracy; subcomponents of this measure include evaluations of competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of participation. States are also scored according

to a democracy indicator based on an eleven-point scale measuring openness of executive recruitment, constraint on the chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation. To construct the final polity score, the autocracy scale is subtracted from the democracy scale. This results in an additive scale with score increases denoting increases in democracy. For reasons already mentioned, I hypothesize that with increases in polity score will come increased deference for physical integrity rights.

Unfortunately, the Polity IV dataset is imperfect in a variety of ways. Polity IV, for instance, does not account government policies on certain national subgroups like the Palestinians in occupied territories of Israel. This can lead to a significant variance between quantitative and qualitative perspectives when analyzing certain countries (McHenry and Mady, 2006). Gleditsch and Ward (1997) further critique Polity IV's multipath aggregated score system, which can theoretically confer an identical score to two countries with very different administrative systems. Lastly, certain democracy subgroups that are used in Polity measures have considerable more influence over the final Polity score than others (Gleditsch and Ward, 1997).

Conceding the imperfect nature of Polity IV, for the issues pertaining to this study the dataset remains highly useful. Gleditsch and Ward (1997) critique the specific labeling of countries as either *democratic* or *autocratic*; they do, however, admit the usefulness of Polity IV when juxtaposing democracy and autocracy between countries. This study concerns just that—*comparing* democracy/autocracy between countries—and is not interested in branding countries. Other critiques of Polity IV—mainly concerning redundancy issues in measures of authority, failure to test intercoder reliability, and the absence of a dimension of democracy gauging

civilian participation—have largely been refuted (Marshall, et al., 2002; Hoffman, 2005). Ultimately, Polity IV is a useful indicator of how varying degrees of democracy and autocracy. As mentioned, I posit that increases in Polity IV scores will result in increases in human rights indicators.

### **Economic Indicators: GDP(PPP) Per Capita and Inflation**

A strong predictor of human rights levels in a given country, all things held equal, is the strength and relative stability of its economy (McKinlay and Cohan, 1975; Stous and Claude, 1976; Park, 1987; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Boswell and Dixon, 1990; Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, et al., 1999; Apodaca, 2001; Keith, 2002; Horowitz, 2004). Poorer countries face high levels of popular discontent, the prevalence of discontent, and thus an increasing likelihood of government violence. Moreover, regimes in harrowing financial situations find themselves stripped of the ability to use economic incentives for mitigating civilian dissatisfaction. Repression, either by physical force or limitation of empowerment rights, becomes an increasingly more feasible option in response to dissidence within the national populace (Poe, et al., 1999). In heavily stratified societies, economic success generally has the added long-term effect of creating a middle-class, compelling democratic changes, and indirectly creating a regime type more likely to ensure basic civil liberties (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005).

To codify economic status in this study, two variables highlighting different fiscal aspects are used. First, it is necessary to gauge individual financial levels among the civilian population. Many studies only utilize national economic indicators. In doing so, such analyses ignore the obvious fact that national measures are absolute and do not take into account population.

Absolute measures of capital are relative, and a meager amount of resources for one country may prove to be an abundance for a nation-state whose population is several times smaller.

Furthermore, researchers usually resort to using per capita gross domestic product (GDP) official exchange rate (OER) to gauge levels of individual and national economy (Beal 2006). Unfortunately, GDP(OER) measures largely skew the financial picture of a country by 1) exaggerating the difference between production and consumption, 2) pinning changes in GDP(OER) to exchange rates, which are often artificially high/low and do not properly reflect fluctuations in home-currency-denominated GDP, and 3) relying on market-exchange rates that fail to account for the primary set of goods and services a country generates by focusing solely on a narrow basket of products (Beal, 2006; United States, 2006). A more informative measurement of individual and state financial welfare and the one preferred by economists is per capita GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP). A nation's GDP(PPP) "is the sum value of all goods and services produced in the country valued at the prices prevailing in the United States." (United States, 2006). The inclusion of a much larger basket of goods and the direct measurement of those goods in its formulation makes GDP(PPP) a more appropriate control variable for cross-national analysis. In this study, I hypothesize that increases in GDP(PPP) will produce conditions more conducive to respect for human rights.

To fully evaluate economic standing, inflation will also be included as a predictor variable. While GDP(PPP) may translate a nation's economic success in *per capita* terms, finances are never distributed on a completely equal basis. Thus, GDP(PPP) does not wholly reflect public psyche about the economy, though it does give a good indication of current economic status. The effects of inflation and deflation, on the other hand, are felt by all citizens. Frustration with real price changes may lead to unruly behavior and elicit repressive government

responses. Thus, I hypothesize that increases in inflation will cause decreases in government respect for human rights.

### **Regime Durability**

To further control for non-terrorist effects on human rights, regime<sup>16</sup> durability will be included as a predictor variable in this model. *Durability* specifically refers to the number of years a particular government regime has been in place without experiencing significant alterations<sup>17</sup>; changes in regime are likely to alter respect for human rights during periods of transition (Zanger, 2000). While several researchers have commented on reasons for the negative effect of increased government durability on government repression (Ferree and Singh 2006; Saxton and Benson, 2006), a few more considerations are posited here. First, increased regimental endurance creates an atmosphere of greater government credibility. Each additional year in office allows regimes to disseminate and ingrain their legitimacy thereby diminishing the need to abuse dissenters; citizens simultaneously familiarize themselves with the system and learn to work within its confines to achieve various ends. As Ravi and Ross (2003) note, when government credibility is high, oppositional forces can do little to inspire rebellions. Thus, governments are less inclined to check popular discontent with repressive measures simply because some of this contempt is either placated or channeled within bureaucratic tools of redress.

---

<sup>16</sup> Stephanie Lawson (1993: 185) defines a political regime as: ‘...the formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and of its relations with the borders society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not.’ Kitschelt (1992: 1028) offers a similar description of regime; he suggests that regimes are the rules and political resources that actors use to exercise authority on a “bounded constituency.”

<sup>17</sup> According to Polity IV data, significant changes in regime type are defined as changes of three or more points on the polity scale in three years or less.

The argument works well when considering democracies as well as autocracies. With time democratic governments are able to better formulate democratic institutions that “develop to protect rights, predictable administration of those rights, and viable policy and opposition alternatives (Ferree and Singh, 2006: 50). While less obvious, increased durability in more autocratic governments is likely to have similar repercussions (in terms of human rights). During the formative years autocracies are likely to face high amounts of resistance to the new system. This vulnerable position makes repressive measures—physical or otherwise—significantly more appealing. Thus, in this study I hypothesize that increases in regime durability will directly influence human rights indicators.

### **Population Size and Population Growth**

Several studies have indicated the importance of including population size as a determinant of the level of human rights (Henderson, 1993; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, et al., 1999). The nature of the human rights data employed in this study necessitates the use of population as a control variable. CIRI data categorizes physical integrity dimensions into three groups based on absolute numbers of abuses. For instance, when coding for *political imprisonment*—one dimension of *physical integrity*—countries incarcerating 50 or more political prisoners are given a score of “0”; countries incarcerating 1-49 political prisoners are given a score of “1”; and countries who do not imprison any political prisoners in a given year are given a score of “2.”

In more populous countries, a greater number of citizens are available to partake in public dissent thereby exposing an even greater number of people who may face government repression (Poe, et al., 1999). Thus, by controlling for population this model takes into account



the possibility that high readings of physical rights abuses may partially be due to the greater abundance of citizens who either partake in or are accused of partaking in seditious activities and are physically abused by the government.

A second motivation for including population as a predictor variable is that larger populations place additional stresses on national resources (Donnelly and Howard, 1988; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, et al., 1999). Such strains often cause discontent among civilians who would bask in abundance if there were fewer national inhabitants; this in turn creates a volatile state that is more likely to subdue manifestations of dissatisfaction with repressive measures.

Using the same reasoning, population growth is included as a predictor of respect for human rights. Significant increases in population during a given year are likely to add to fears of resource scarcity thereby agitating the citizenry and leading to government repression to such disturbances. Thus, I hypothesize large populations and influxes in population will result in decreases in all three subcomponents of human rights—physical integrity, empowerment rights, and women’s rights.

### **British Influence**

In this work, I have coded all former members of the British Empire with a value-score of “1” while all states free of previous British control received scores of “0.” Several former studies have considered the import of former British influence in shaping a country’s human rights climate (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Boswell and Dixon, 1990; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, et al., 1999). As Boswell and Dixon (1990) posit, Britain was relatively more inclined to support representative government institutions and Protestant notions of individualism that in turn promoted democratic values. Poe, et al. (1999) also point to certain cultural phenomena resulting

from former British rule that are not easily quantifiable in any other manner. In this study, therefore, I hypothesize that countries that were formerly under control of the British crown will have increased respect for human rights.

## **Methodology**

Due to the pooled time-series cross-sectional nature of the data in this study, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation methods may not be appropriate. Pooled data violate OLS assumptions, which may distort the estimators as well as skew model t-scores and tests of statistical significance for the independent variables (Kmenta, 1986; Greene, 1993; Gujarati, 1995; Moon, et al., 2004; Powers and Garand, 2007). Ostrom (1978), for instance, specifically notes problems arising from the following OLS assumptions in pooled times-series regressions:

- 1) The error term has a constant variance over all cross-sectional observations
- 2) The error term has a mean value of zero
- 3) The error terms corresponding to different moments in time are not correlated

To account for these potential problems with OLS as a method of analysis, I estimate my models using another regression technique, feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). This model allows for heteroskedasticity across panels with no cross-sectional correlation and is “estimated using panel-specific estimates of first-order autocorrelation” (Powers and Garand, 2007).

In order to examine the delayed effects of terrorism on human rights, I will create additional variables that lag the effect of terrorist attacks by one, two, and three years. A non-lagged variable of terrorism was also used. In all, the results from the models will offer insight into the relationship between terrorism and physical integrity, empowerment rights, and women’s rights from the year of the terrorist incidents until three years after the incidents.

Lagging variables also helps solve the problem of endogeneity. In other words, since I employ

yearly aggregated data in this study, it is difficult to determine whether levels of human rights effect levels of terrorism or vice versa. By lagging the effect of the independent variable, one can have more confidence in the causal sequence.

As previously mentioned, the data describing terrorism was coded differently from 1970-1997 (excluding 1993) than it was in 1993 and 1998-2004. I will create an interaction variable to overcome this inconsistency in coding rules. In order to do this, I will first generate a binary variable coding “old data” (1970-1997, excluding 1993) as “0” and “new data” (1993, 1998-2004) as “1.” I will then create a variable that represents the change in effect of terrorism coded under the new scheme from terrorism coded under the old coding scheme. To do this, I will multiply the binary variable by the variable representing terrorist kills or terrorist kills per capita, depending on the case

Understanding the results of this interaction term requires the following interpretations; first, the coefficients for terrorism under the old system should be understood as the change in human rights per unit increase of terrorism coded using the old coding scheme. The coefficient for the coding marker (dummy variable) is the change in y-intercept value for terrorism’s effect on human rights (i.e. the level of human rights for countries with no terrorist attacks). In order to determine the effect of terrorism that was coded using the new coding scheme, one must add the value of the “new data” coefficient to the “old data” coefficient.

## Empirical Results

### Physical Integrity

#### Terrorism

In Tables 1 and 2 I report the FGLS estimates for two models: the first examining the effect of the number of terrorist kills on physical integrity rights and the second examining the effect of the number of terrorist kills *per capita* on physical integrity. When examining the models with non-lagged independent variables, the latter model explains a large part of the variance in physical integrity rights (pseudo- $R^2 = 0.3466$ , Wald  $\chi^2 = 1153.69$ , prob < 0.0001), while the model focusing on the absolute number of terrorist kills performs slightly better in this respect (pseudo- $R^2 = 0.3823$ , Wald  $\chi^2 = 1596.14$ , prob < 0.0001).

Terrorist activity, both when measured in terms of the number of kills per capita and absolute number of terrorist kills, has a statistically significant, negative effect on physical integrity thereby affirming our hypothesis. As can be seen in Table 1, under the past coding rules for terrorist activity, every additional death caused by terrorism results in a decrease of physical integrity rights by roughly 0.0015 units ( $p < 0.001$ ). We can also see that this negative and statistically significant relationship holds for nearly model regardless of the coding scheme that is used for terrorism. Note here the statistically insignificant coefficient for the interaction variable (new coding scheme), which indicates that the influence of terrorist attacks under the new coding scheme is not statistically distinguishable from its influence under the old coding scheme.

In Figure 5, I have graphed predicted values for both the old and new data when all other variables are held constant; the figure illustrates how high rates of civilian deaths at the hands of

terrorists prompt harsh reactions from state apparatuses. According to both the older and newer coding schemes, nations experiencing 1000 annual deaths by terrorism will see a 1.4885 point decrease in these physical integrity rights. On the 9-point ordinal CIRI scale, these changes indicate sizeable reductions in physical integrity rights.

The robust relationship between terrorism and physical repression is further supported when evaluating the relationship between the number of terrorist kills per capita and physical integrity indices. The results in Table 2 illustrate that increases in terrorist kills per capita result in statistically significant and substantial negative shifts in physical integrity rights. Under the old coding scheme, a country of 20 million civilians and experiencing 1000 fatalities as result of terrorism has a physical integrity score 0.2917 lower than a country without any fatalities, *ceteris paribus* (see Table 7). The more contemporary coding scheme leads to an even greater decrease of -2.6364 in physical integrity rights in a country of the same population size, again holding all other variables constant.

In the models evaluating the effect of lagged terrorist activity (i.e., terrorist actions in previous years) on human rights, we can note a less slightly vigorous yet ongoing effect on physical integrity. The results in Table 1 indicate that terrorist attacks that took place one, two, or three years ago, respectively, continue to have an influence on physical integrity rights. We can see from Table 1 that an increase of one civilian fatality as a result of terrorism causes a 0.0015 decrease in physical integrity rights during the same year as the terrorist event whereas this curtailment of rights only decreases by 0.0011, 0.0013, and 0.0011 in the first, second and third years following the attack, respectively. When employing the newer coding scheme, the effect of same-year attacks corresponds with the older coding scheme. The coefficients actually increase by 0.0008, 0.0004, and 0.0006 in the first, second and third years following the attack,

respectively; however, after adding these values to the coefficients for old data, one is able to see that the nature of the relationship between terrorism and physical integrity remains intact in the lagged years. That is, while the new coding scheme still points to a negative relationship between terrorist attacks and physical integrity, this effect is weaker under the new coding scheme as compared to the old one.

Models using the number of kills per capita as its basis of measures also indicate a difference in the diminishing effect of terrorism between the old and new data over time. One can see in Table 2 that for the older coding scheme, a single unit increase in the number of terrorist kills per capita results in a 5833.882 point decrease in physical integrity rights while the first, second, and third years following terrorist incidents experience decreases of only 4117.486, 4356.532, and 3766.134, respectively.

In more concrete terms, in a nation of 20 million citizens, 1000 civilian fatalities due to terrorism would result in a reduction in physical integrity by 0.2917 points in the concurrent year, 0.2059 points in the first year after the event, 0.2178 points in the second year after the event, and 0.1883 in the third year after the event, *ceteris paribus*. When the newer coding scheme for terrorism is used, the immediacy effect of these violent acts appears much more acute. According to this model, 1000 civilian deaths due to terrorism in a country 20 million inhabitants would result in a 2.6364 decrease in physical integrity rights in the same year as the terrorist event. In first, second, and third years after the terrorist activity, physical integrity would decrease by only 0.3988, 0.4094, and 0.3789 points<sup>18</sup>.

---

<sup>18</sup> Due to the fact that the three subcomponents of human rights (dependent variables) and terrorism (independent variable) were measured using yearly aggregates, it is impossible to distinguish whether physical integrity rights violations are a response to terrorism, or if changes in terrorism are responses to changes in human rights. However, given that the relationship between physical integrity and human rights holds even in models using lagged independent variables, I am confident that the relationship exists as specified in my hypothesis.

The results of the analyses strongly support the original hypothesis. According to these findings, deaths incurred as a result of terrorism considerably diminish physical integrity rights. Ultimately, one can conclude that governments use—at least as part of their counter-terrorist strategies—techniques within the terrorists’ own arsenals: torture, execution, detainment, and kidnapping. Moreover, the results the data coded under the old coding scheme suggest that, when governments do use physical repression to respond to terrorism, the reaction tends to be swift. However, the extent of this immediacy effect is difficult to fully comprehend due primarily to the two variations in coding schemes. According to models employing the old coding scheme for terrorism, the immediacy effect exists albeit to a much less extreme degree than in the models using the newer coding scheme.

### **Regime Type**

When evaluating the effect of polity indicators on physical integrity, our hypothesis of a strong, direct relationship was strongly supported. Both when coding terrorist kills in absolute and per capita terms, the link between democracy and respect for physical integrity rights remains strongly positive. In other words, as nations become more democratic, the chance that they will violate the physical integrity rights of their citizenry decreases. The results in Tables 1 and 2 imply that a one unit increase in a state’s democraticness results in at least a 0.0903 increase in physical integrity rights.

### **Regime Durability**

Like the polity measure, regime durability significantly influences governmental respect for the physical liberties of its civilian populace. We can see that, in both Table 1 and 2, this causal relationship is highly significant and strongly positive. Even the model suggesting the

least robust relationship implies that a year increase in durability results in a 0.0050 increase in physical integrity. Thus, in nations with over one hundred years of relatively stable government structures such as the United States, Canada and New Zealand, we expect to see at least a half-point increase in physical rights indicators, *ceteris paribus*.

### **Economic Indicators: GDP(PPP) Per Capita and Inflation**

When considering economic aspects and their relative effect on physical integrity rights, the effect of GDP(PPP) per capita is clearly stronger than that for inflation. In each of the eight separate models examining physical integrity rights, GDP(PPP) per capita exhibited a direct and significant effect ( $p < 0.001$ ) on physical integrity. As shown in Table 1, even the model resulting in the weakest relationship between GDP(PPP) per capita and physical integrity, a financial augmentation comparable to one thousand U.S dollars would result in a 0.0608 increase in government deference for these liberties. Thus, when accounting for the impact of economic conditions on physical integrity rights, increases in GDP(PPP) per capita clearly function to increase government compliance with these basic rights. The other economic indicator used to measure health of national economies—inflation—did not reach significance in any of the models assessing factors of physical integrity. It can be concluded then that rises in a country's prices have no effect on the government deciding whether or not to use physical repression against its citizenry. Overall, these results reveal that, despite the fact that both variables depict aspects of a nation's economic well-being, not all aspects of economic health affect a nation's level physical integrity.



## Population Size and Population Growth

When examining the impact of population on physical integrity rights, one notes a negative association. The estimates in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that, in all models measuring the causes of physical integrity variance, population maintains an indirect and strongly significant relationship with this human rights sub-component. The results in Table 1 show that, even when considering the least vigorous relationship, nations with 1 million more inhabitants tend to have a 0.0045 point lower score on CIRI's 9-point scale than nations with 1 million fewer inhabitants, *ceteris paribus*<sup>19</sup>. This decrease in physical integrity rights coincides with our earlier hypothesis that larger population sizes place downward pressure on human rights levels.

As previously mentioned, CIRI coding schemes bestow countries with a physical integrity index based on four sub-components of this broad human rights category: torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances. For each of these components states are graded on a three-point ordinal scale based on the absolute number of violations of each of these sub-components. Considering this type of measurement, one reason that nations with larger populations have lower scores of respect for physical integrity rights is simply that there are more people to physically oppress. Another important consideration is that larger populations are typically associated with additional increased strains on national resources (Henderson, 1993; Poe and Tate, 1999). This tension begets not only additional unrest among the

---

<sup>19</sup> When accounting for outliers as defined by nations with a population greater than one billion people, the negative relationship between population size and physical integrity remains. In fact, when examining physical integrity in nations of fewer than one billion inhabitants, the effect of population size appears even more robust than when including these large nations. The weakest causal effect of population size in countries with fewer than one billion inhabitants was -0.0091 ( $p < 0.000$ ). This accounts for both models using absolute number of terrorists killed as its key explanatory variable and in models using number of terrorist kills per capita as its key explanatory variable. This coefficient suggests a much stronger relationship than in models including outliers where the strongest relationship exhibited was -0.0055 ( $p < 0.000$ )[a difference of 0.0036].

civilian populace but also additional limits on the types of apparatuses the government has available to quell dissent within state borders.

As with population size, our original hypothesis also suggested that positive changes in population would result in decreased distribution of national resources and restricted government tools for quelling dissent; I thus speculated that population growth would diminish physical integrity rights. These expectations appear to be confirmed: out of the seven models in which population growth reached statistical significance, six demonstrate how such growth decreases human rights. In the single model in which population growth did not reach statistical significance, the variable still approached levels of significance and indicated an indirect relationship with physical integrity rights. Overall, one can safely conclude that population growth does have a negative effect on physical integrity rights.

Population growth surely diminishes respect for physical integrity for many of the same reasons that population size results in decreased levels of such rights. However one additional factor impacts government respect for physical integrity and is unique to increase of population growth: immigration. An influx of immigrants results not only in increases of inhabitants but also transformations in social, economic, and ethnic equilibriums and invasions of novel ideas and political agendas, all of which can cause apprehension within the government.

### **British Influence**

Unfortunately, this study is unable to disentangle the significance of the relationship between respect for empowerment rights and influence of British control. Nevertheless, the nature of the relationship, if it does exist, seems to be direct. In Table 1, which reports results of models using the absolute number of terrorist kills, no strong relationship occurs though two

models approach significance. The non-lagged model suggests that earlier membership in the British Commonwealth may result in current advancements in the realm of physical integrity by 0.1778 points ( $p < 0.054$ ). In the model evaluating the two-year lag effect, British influence increased physical integrity scores by 0.1522 ( $p < 0.098$ ). In the models constructed using one- and three-year lags, the coefficient for British influence did not reach significance.

The inconsistent estimates of this variable are further blurred by the results from the models using the number of terrorist kills per capita (see Table 2). British influence approaches statistical significance in the non-lagged and one-year lag model. The former implies that London's imperial grasp over a country increases respect for physical integrity by 0.1942 points ( $p < 0.045$ ) on the CIRI scale while the model lagging terrorism by one year shows an increase of only 0.1616 points ( $p < 0.100$ ). The other models failed to produce significant results. One must note, however, that in all cases the coefficients are positive and in a few cases in which British influence does not meet levels of significance it still approaches such levels. Thus, the results suggest that any relationship between British influence and physical integrity is almost certainly positive, however, it is unclear whether a relationship exists in the first place.

## **Empowerment Index**

### **Terrorism**

My earlier hypothesis suggested that terrorism would diminish a nation's empowerment index, which includes freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, workers' rights, and electoral self-determination. I based my hypothesis on the prediction that governments would punish terrorists primarily through physical means yet use attacks on more abstract liberties as a secondary weapon.

The results of this study show that, despite the severe reduction in physical integrity rights following terrorist activity, levels of empowerment rights remain relatively stable in the post-event period. The results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that only one of the coefficients in the four models using absolute number of terrorist kills or in the four models using number of terrorist kills per capita reached significance. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, in the results of models employing the number of terrorist kills per capita, the old and new data all indicate a negative relationship between terrorist kills and empowerment rights when significance is not considered. In other words, the data does not wholly support the notion that there is no relationship between terrorism and empowerment rights. Instead, it suggests that there may be a slight decrease in empowerment rights following increases in the number of people killed by terrorism.

One reason for the less acute relationship between terrorism and empowerment rights may be the problematic nature of targeting justice. Removing empowerment rights from a nation as a whole or even from a small section of society would inevitably result in penalizing non-guilty parties. Even when measures designed to reduce empowerment rights are aimed at a particular section of society, they are bound to affect non-guilty parties. The inevitability of this may be one reason governments take different counter-terrorism approaches.

### **Regime Type**

As with physical integrity rights, a state's regime type significantly and positively affects empowerment rights. We note in Tables 3 and 4 that in all models examining empowerment rights, the relationship between regime durability and empowerment rights is highly significant ( $p < 0.000$ ). Even in the least robust case, an increase in one polity point results in a 0.3135 point

increase in the 11-point CIRI empowerment index scale. Thus, the results confirm my previous hypothesis that there is direct relationship between regime type and empowerment rights.

### **Regime Durability**

Increases in regime durability parallel increases in the empowerment index. The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest a very healthy relationship between these two factors with significance scores below 0.005 in all cases. From all of these tables, we can conclude that for each additional year a regime type continues in a particular nation without incurring drastic changes, government respect for empowerment rights increases. Thus, my hypotheses that regime durability and the empowerment index have a direct relationship is strongly supported.

### **Economic Indicators: GDP (PPP) Per Capita and Inflation**

Surprisingly, GDP(PPP) per capita did not exhibit a substantial relationship with empowerment rights in any of the eight models examining its effect on this human rights subcomponent, nor did this variable approach significance in any of the models (see Tables 3 and 4). At least part of the reason for this non-existent relationship is that a few of the wealthy Arabian oil-producing countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates maintain relatively high GDP(PPP) per capita measures and simultaneously low empowerment indexes. Culturally imbedded norms and long-standing regime types dominate this area and cause downward pressure on empowerment indicators. Other interesting cases, however, exist outside the Arab domain and exhibit, like their petroleum producing brethren, exceptionally high levels of wealth relative to population and simultaneously low levels of human rights. Such countries include Brunei and Equatorial Guinea, whose GDP(PPP) in 2004 was in the top quarter when compared to other nations' wealth. In the same year, however,

Brunei and Equatorial Guinea measured within the lowest quarter in terms of government respect for empowerment rights. Nonetheless, oil production is not a prerequisite for this antagonistic dichotomy, for it exists in oil-deprived Singapore and Greece as well. In the end, one can conclude that GDP(PPP) per capita neither bolsters nor diminishes empowerment rights.

The second economic factor included in this study—inflation—did not display any effect on government respect for empowerment rights. The findings reported in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that fluctuations in inflation had no bearing on whether liberties were respected or disregarded. Thus, my earlier hypothesis predicting a direct relationship between inflation and a country's empowerment index is not supported.

### **Population Size and Population Growth**

As in models examining the effects of terrorism on physical integrity rights, large populations exhibit a corrosive effect on respect for the more abstract liberties contained in the empowerment index. As noted in Table 3 and Table 4, even in the least robust example, a country supporting one million more inhabitants than another country will score 0.0030 points lower on the empowerment scale than the less populated country, *ceteris paribus*. Therefore, my previous hypothesis suggesting a negative correlation between population and empowerment rights is confirmed.

In addition to the reasons cited for their diminishing a state's physical integrity, large populations induce reductions in civil liberties on other grounds. Larger nations are more difficult to rule given the broader scope of personal (and thus competing) interests. Therefore, a government may choose to tightly control such liberties as freedom of movement, freedom of association, and electoral self-determination out of fear of instability.

Unlike population size, population growth is only tenuously linked to empowerment rights. The results in Tables 3 and 4 show that population growth does not meet standards of significance in any of the models. Thus, the results suggest that there is no bond between this variable and empowerment rights.

### **British Influence**

The fact that some countries were formerly under British jurisdiction seems to give no indication of the levels of empowerment rights in that country. The results found in Table 3, which use absolute number of terrorist kills as its key explanatory variable, indicate that there is no relationship between British influence and a nation's respect for these liberties. Likewise, Table 4 shows that all of the coefficients for British influence failed to reach significance in the results of models using the number of terrorist kills per capita as its key explanatory variable.

### **Women's Rights Terrorism**

In Tables 5 and 6 I report the FGLS estimates for two models: the first examining the effect of the number of terrorist kills on women's rights and the second examining the effect of the number of terrorist kills *per capita* on women's rights. When examining the models with non-lagged independent variables, the latter model explains a large part of the variance in women's rights (pseudo- $R^2 = 0.4042$ , Wald  $\chi^2 = 967.79$ , prob < 0.0001), while the model focusing on the absolute number of terrorist kills performs slightly better in this respect (pseudo- $R^2 = 0.4114$ , Wald  $\chi^2 = 950.46$ , prob < 0.0001).

The results of the analyses do not show terrorist activity to have an obvious, strong effect on women's rights in one direction or another. As can be seen in Table 5, when using past coding

rules, each additional terrorist kill results in a 0.0002 ( $p < 0.040$ ) decrease in women's rights. However, this relationship does not hold when analyzing the effect of absolute number of terrorist kills and the new coding scheme. We notice that, after aggregating the coefficients for number of kills (Old Coding Scheme) and Number of Kills (New Coding Scheme) (see Methodology), the effect of terrorism is reported as neutral. In other words, the old data suggests that 1000 terrorist deaths lead to a 0.2 point reduction on the 10-point Women's Right Index. The new data suggests that changes in the number of terrorist deaths do not have any impact on Women's Rights estimates.

When accounting for results using the number of terrorist kills per capita, the exact nature of the relationship between terrorism and women's rights remains unclear. The results in Table 6 illustrate that increases in terrorist kills per capita, as measured using the old coding scheme, produce no statistically significant change in the level of government respect for women's rights. The more contemporary coding scheme, however, suggests that there is actually a statistically significant and positive relationship between the number of terrorist kills per capita and women's rights. The coefficient for the number of terrorist kills per capita in this model—5000.304 ( $p < 0.027$ )—can be interpreted to mean that in a country of 20 million civilians, 1000 fatalities as a result of terrorism causes a 0.2500 point increase on the 10-point Women's Right Index.

In the models evaluating the effect of lagged terrorist activity (i.e., terrorist actions in previous years) on women's rights, we can again note the ambiguous nature of the effect of terrorism. The results in Table 5 fail to meet statistical significance in five of the six cases in which the effect of the absolute number of terrorist kills on Women's Rights is tested. The only instance in which the absolute number of terrorist kills does show a statistically significant



impact on women's rights is in the model lagging the independent variable by three years and using the old coding scheme. In this case, the results indicate that a single terrorist kill results in a 0.0001 (0.082) decrease in Women's Rights.

The ambivalent relationship between terrorism and Women's Rights is again apparent in the results of models using lagged number of terrorist kills per capita. We can see that in Table 6, the results of the model using a one year lag indicate a statistically significant and positive relationship between the number of kills per capita and Women's Rights. The results of the model using a two year lag of number of terrorist kills per capita indicate that there is a very small increase in Women's Rights per unit increase in the number of terrorist kills per capita as defined by both the old and new coding schemes. The results of the last model, which lags the independent variable number of terrorist kills per capita by three years, indicates that there is no statistically significant relationship between the number of terrorist kills per capita and Women's Rights.

The results of the models measuring the effect of terrorism on Women's Rights are interesting. The findings of models employing absolute number of kills as the key explanatory variable suggest a possible negative relationship between terrorist kills and Women's Rights. However, the findings of models employing the number of terrorist kills per capita indicate that, Women's Rights may have decreased after terrorist attacks in years coded using the old coding scheme (1981-1997 [excluding 1993]). In the post-1998 years, however, a change may have taken place on the world scene that altered the degree of government respect for Women's Rights.

Despite the tenuous nature of the relationship between terrorism and Women's Rights, one clear pattern does emerge. In every case evaluating these two variables, the change caused

by increases in terrorism were minor. Thus, while we cannot conclude with certainty the direction of the relationship between terrorism and Women's Rights, we can be confident that any changes caused by terrorism will be marginal.

### **Regime Type**

When evaluating the effect of polity indicators on women's rights, our hypothesis of a strong, direct relationship proved accurate. Both when coding terrorist kills in absolute and per capita terms, the link between democracy and respect for women's rights remains strongly positive. In other words, as nations become more democratic, the chance that they will restrict the rights of women declines. The results in Tables 5 and 6 imply that a one unit increase in a state's democraticness results in at least a 0.0469 increase in women's rights.

### **Regime Durability**

Like the polity measure, regime durability significantly influences governmental respect for the rights of women. We can see that, in both Tables 5 and 6, this causal relationship is highly significant and strongly positive. Even the model suggesting the least robust relationship implies that a year increase in durability results in a 0.0118 increase in women's rights. Thus, in nations with over one hundred years of relatively stable government structures, we expect to see at least a one-point increase in women's rights indicators, *ceteris paribus*.

### **Economic Indicators: GDP(PPP) Per Capita and Inflation**

When considering economic aspects and their relative effect on women's rights, the effect of GDP(PPP) is shown to be strong and significant. In each of the eight separate models

examining women's rights, GDP(PPP) per capita exhibited a direct and significant effect ( $p < 0.001$ ) on women's rights. As shown in Table 6, even the model resulting in the weakest relationship between GDP(PPP) per capita and women's rights, a financial augmentation comparable to one thousand U.S dollars would result in a 0.0587 increase in government respect for these liberties. Thus, when accounting for the impact of economic conditions on women's rights, increases in GDP(PPP) per capita clearly function to increase government compliance with these liberties.

The other economic indicator used to measure health of national economies—inflation—did not reach significance in any of the models assessing factors of women's rights. It can be concluded then that rises in a country's prices have no impact on a government decreasing women's rights. Overall, these results reveal that, despite the fact that both variables depict aspects of a nation's economic well-being, not all aspects of economic health affect a nation's level of women's rights.

### **Population Size and Population Growth**

When examining the impact of population on women's rights, one notes a statistically significant, negative association.. The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that population maintains an indirect and strongly significant relationship with this human rights sub-component in all eight models measuring causes of women's rights variance. The results in Table 5 show that, even when considering the least vigorous relationship, a nation with 1 million more inhabitants than another country tends to have a 0.0003 point lower score on the 10-point women's rights scale than the smaller nation, *ceteris paribus*. These findings coincide with our

earlier hypothesis that larger population sizes place downward pressure on women's rights levels.

As with population size, our original hypothesis predicted a negative relationship between population growth and women's rights. These expectations appear to be confirmed. The results of all eight models examining factors of women's rights scores indicate a statistically significant, direction relationship between population growth and women's rights (see Tables 5 and 6). Thus, the findings strongly support my hypothesis that population growth has a negative effect on women's rights.

### **British Influence**

The results from the models measuring the effect of terrorism on women's rights do not support my hypothesis, which predicted past British influence to positively affect women's rights. However, the findings indicate that the relationship between these two variables is strong and negative. The results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that British Influence reached significance in all eight cases. These results suggest that previously belonging to the British Empire decreases scores of women's rights by at least 0.5460 points on the 10-point Women's Rights Index, *ceteris paribus*.

### **Conclusion**

Henry's comments (quoted in the Introduction) appear to be as insightful today as they were in early 20<sup>th</sup> century Ireland. This study has shown that governments still violently repress the very citizens they are supposed to protect. As America disintegrates into factions over the

Patriot Act and the War on Terror, one can only imagine that those calling for the downfall of our society—like the Irish attackers did to the British—are only too pleased with the results of government action after September 11<sup>th</sup>.

Consider the following cases: On June 14<sup>th</sup>, 2006, an Israeli airstrike on two suspected Palestinian bomb-makers in the Gaza Strip resulted in 40 innocent Palestinians being wounded and six civilian fatalities. Among the dead were two Palestinian children. In September of the same year, the Kurdish city of Diyarbakir was rocked by a series of terrorist attacks. The Turkish government blamed the PKK—a terrorist organization—and detained 550 civilians. Over 200 of these detainees were children. A few months earlier, Donald Vance, an American security contractor working in Iraq, was detained by American forces and denied habeas corpus. For over three months, Donald was subjected to protracted periods of sleep deprivation and other torture methods. Though they deemed Donald a “threat,” the US military refused for several months to acknowledge the exact reason for his detention.

In each of the previous cases, governments set out on a retaliatory mission for recent terrorist activity. Unfortunately, these alarming incidents *cannot* be relegated to random, infrequent acts. The results of this study have offered strong evidence to the contrary. Governments *do* respond to terrorism, and they respond harshly. Evidence from the last two decades shows that of all the tools in a state’s arsenal, governments consistently choose the most austere form of counter-terrorism: physical repression.

The paradox is all too obvious: how do governments justify using the same types of tactics—murder, detainment, torture, and kidnap—that the terrorists use? Two responses, both paradoxical in their own right, arise. First, governments often claim that such severe methods are

taken in order to ensure the safety of its civilians. Yet, how can an approach that harms innocent civilians at the same time protect them? A second common response by the government is they employ harsh, physical tactics simply because they work. If that is the case, then the government is implicitly making the case for terrorist tactics.

The fact is that when terrorism occurs, civilians encounter a triple threat: on the one hand they face the initial terrorist attack and at the same time they must prepare themselves for increasingly likely government attacks against their physical rights. Moreover, threat of future terrorist attacks that are provoked by governments' brutal counter-terrorism measures. An interesting question in all of this is, *If both the government and the terrorists kindle terror in the hearts of the general population, then is not the government also guilty of terrorism?*

What does this research ultimately mean for you and me, the citizens? First, we must recognize that commonly used words such as “terrorism” and “counter-terrorism” are socially constructed and value-laden terms. The word “terrorist” usually evokes images of the “other”: a bomb-strapped Lebanese suicide bomber or maybe an extremist Indian Sikh. Surely, acts of extreme violence cannot be carried out by someone like us. The results examined in this study, however, defy conventional wisdom. Not only do people like us commit gross acts of violence against our physical well-being, but such acts are very often committed by the same people we elect to political office.

A foremost consideration for us—the citizens—is that we must always stand on guard, both against “terrorism” as carried out by sub-national groups and “terrorism” as carried out by our own government. Should we adhere to the all too common rhetoric that “you are either with us or against us,” we risk allowing one side to take advantage of us to our own detriment.

In the end, this study exposes who suffers the most when terrorism occurs. As the cases of the murdered Palestinians, imprisoned Kurdish civilians, and Donald Vance indicate, the average citizen incurs the most losses. *Who, then, benefits?* A final thought from Jack Dalton, another character in *A Star Called Henry*, is telling in this respect. Having brought Henry into a violent, Irish nationalist group committed to acts of terror, Jack states: “*We’re* deciding what’s going to happen next. Not them. If we do something, they’ll do something. It took us hundreds of year to figure it out but that’s what we’re doing now. Writing the history of our country” (Doyle, 1999: 209).

## Tables



**Table 1. FGLS regression results for model of physical integrity rights, 1981-2004, using absolute number of terrorist kills**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>No Lag</i>	<i>1 Year Lag</i>	<i>2 Year Lag</i>	<i>3 Year Lag</i>
Number of Kills (Old Coding Scheme)	-.0015** (0.000)	-0.0011** (0.000)	-0.0013** (0.000)	-0.0011** (0.000)
Coding Marker	-0.2504** (0.000)	-0.2486** (0.000)	-0.2472** (0.000)	-0.2392** (0.000)
Number of Kills (New Coding Scheme)	-0.0002 (0.552)	0.0008** (0.005)	0.0004 (0.060)	0.0006** (0.009)
Polity	0.0934** (0.000)	0.0917** (0.000)	0.0940** (0.000)	0.0941** (0.000)
Regime Durability	0.0065** (0.000)	0.0063** (0.000)	0.0057** (0.000)	0.0051** (0.001)
GDP(PPP) per capita (in thousands)	0.0608** (0.000)	0.0631** (0.000)	0.0632** (0.000)	0.0706** (0.000)
Inflation	-0.0000 (0.652)	-0.0000 (0.739)	-0.0000 (0.505)	-0.0000 (0.769)
Population (in millions)	-0.0045** (0.000)	-0.0049** (0.000)	-0.0047** (0.000)	-0.0047** (0.000)
Population Growth	-8.9809** (0.007)	-9.2203** (0.006)	-8.8334** (0.008)	-5.436 (0.109)
British Colonies	0.1778 (0.054)	0.1450 (0.120)	0.1522 (0.098)	0.0792 (0.405)
Constant	4.7254** (0.000)	4.7071** (0.000)	4.6708** (0.000)	4.5284** (0.000)
N	2931	2823	2697	2569
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.3823	0.3631	0.3815	0.3794
Wald $\chi^2$	1596.14	1690.71	2060.04	2208.35
Prob (Wald $\chi^2$ )	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: This model is estimated using feasible generalized least squares. The model assumes a heteroskedastic error structure across panels with no cross-sectional correlation and is estimated using panel specific estimates of the first-order autoregressive process. Variable coefficients are reported at the top of each cell while values of statistical significance are parenthetically expressed below.

\* p < .05; \*\* p < .01

**Table 2. FGLS regression results for model of physical integrity rights, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills per capita**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>No Lag</i>	<i>1 Year Lag</i>	<i>2 Year Lag</i>	<i>3 Year Lag</i>
Number of Kills Per Capita (Old Coding Scheme)	-5833.882** (0.000)	-4117.486** (0.000)	-4356.532** (0.000)	-3766.134** (0.000)
Coding Marker	-0.1734** (0.000)	-0.1929** (0.000)	-0.1916** (0.000)	-0.1906** (0.000)
Number of Kills Per Capita (New Coding Scheme)	-43427.46** (0.000)	8621.914 (0.156)	-2505.321 (0.588)	1140.015 (0.776)
Polity	0.0906** (0.000)	0.0903** (0.000)	0.0909** (0.000)	0.0925** (0.000)
Regime Durability	0.0063** (0.000)	0.0063** (0.000)	0.0055** (0.002)	0.0050** (0.004)
GDP(PPP) per capita (in thousands)	0.0648** (0.000)	0.0656** (0.000)	0.0686** (0.000)	0.0734** (0.000)
Inflation	-0.0000 (0.625)	-0.0000 (0.625)	-0.0000 (0.705)	-0.0000 (0.786)
Population (in millions)	-0.0054** (0.000)	-0.0055** (0.000)	-0.0054** (0.000)	-0.0054** (0.000)
Population Growth	-8.1210* (0.015)	-8.4695** (0.014)	-7.4855* (0.029)	-4.866* (0.155)
British Colonies	0.1942* (0.045)	0.1616 (0.100)	0.1579 (0.104)	0.0963 (0.332)
Constant	4.6697** (0.000)	4.6551** (0.000)	4.5926** (0.000)	4.4672** (0.000)
N	2932	2823	2697	2569
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.3446	0.3297	0.3440	0.3465
Wald $\chi^2$	1153.69	1110.68	1139.88	1103.85
Prob (Wald $\chi^2$ )	0.0000	0.0000	0.000	0.000

Note: This model is estimated using feasible generalized least squares. The model assumes a heteroskedastic error structure across panels with no cross-sectional correlation and is estimated using panel specific estimates of the first-order autoregressive process. Variable coefficients are reported at the top of each cell while values of statistical significance are parenthetically expressed below.

\* p < .05; \*\* p < .01

**Table 3. FGLS regression results for model of empowerment rights, 1981-2004, using absolute number of terrorist kills**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>No Lag</i>	<i>1 Year Lag</i>	<i>2 Year Lag</i>	<i>3 Year Lag</i>
Number of Kills (Old Coding Scheme)	0.0003 (0.755)	0.0000 (0.802)	0.0001 (0.313)	-0.0001 (0.626)
Coding Marker	-0.0139 (0.380)	-0.0139 (0.391)	-0.0146 (0.371)	-0.0159 (0.348)
Number of Kills (New Coding Scheme)	-0.0000 (0.705)	-0.0000 (0.796)	-0.0001 (0.309)	0.0001 (0.688)
Polity	0.3131** (0.000)	0.3146** (0.000)	0.3156** (0.000)	0.3215 (0.000)
Regime Durability	-0.0055** (0.000)	0.0051** (0.000)	0.0054** (0.000)	0.0055** (0.000)
GDP(PPP) per capita (in thousands)	-0.0008 (0.863)	0.0009 (0.821)	-0.0005 (0.907)	0.0014 (0.749)
Inflation	-0.0008 (0.146)	-0.0000 (0.179)	-0.0001 (0.265)	-0.0001 (0.295)
Population (in millions)	-0.0032** (0.000)	-0.0031 (0.000)	-0.0031** (0.000)	-0.0031** (0.000)
Population Growth	-5.1670 (0.068)	-4.2214 (0.150)	-2.506 (0.334)	-0.6598 (0.774)
British Colonies	-0.1179 (0.260)	-0.1736 (0.110)	-0.1005 (0.351)	-0.1796 (0.103)
Constant	5.9660** (0.000)	5.9731** (0.000)	5.89367** (0.000)	5.8094** (0.000)
N	2935	2824	2698	2569
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.6319	0.6331	0.6337	0.6381
Wald $\chi^2$	3829.18	3198.14	2964.73	2985.41
Prob (Wald $\chi^2$ )	0.0000	0.0000	0.000	0.000

Note: This model is estimated using feasible generalized least squares. The model assumes a heteroskedastic error structure across panels with no cross-sectional correlation and is estimated using panel specific estimates of the first-order autoregressive process. Variable coefficients are reported at the top of each cell while values of statistical significance are parenthetically expressed below.

\* p < .05; \*\* p < .01

**Table 4. FGLS regression results for model of empowerment rights, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills per capita**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>No Lag</i>	<i>1 Year Lag</i>	<i>2 Year Lag</i>	<i>3 Year Lag</i>
Number of Kills Per Capita (Old Coding Scheme)	-1136.487 (0.257)	-1244.327 (0.197)	-812.7946 (0.407)	-2041.964** (0.026)
Coding Marker	-0.0124 (0.410)	-0.0148 (0.369)	-0.0157 (0.344)	-0.0163 (0.327)
Number of Kills Per Capita (New Coding Scheme)	-8378.776 (0.144)	1105.1740 (0.764)	-942.8379 (0.763)	1056.053 (0.760)
Polity	0.3135** (0.000)	0.3154** (0.000)	0.3159** (0.000)	0.3211** (0.000)
Regime Durability	0.0053** (0.000)	0.0050** (0.000)	0.0050** (0.000)	0.0050** (0.000)
GDP(PPP) per capita (in thousands)	0.0002 (0.963)	0.0007 (0.858)	0.0007 (0.867)	0.0038 (0.285)
Inflation	-0.0001 (0.127)	-0.0001 (0.117)	-0.0001 (0.217)	-0.0000 (0.409)
Population (in millions)	-0.0032** (0.000)	-0.0031** (0.000)	-0.0031** (0.000)	-0.0030** (0.000)
Population Growth	-4.3681 (0.079)	-3.6700 (0.198)	-1.6895 (0.511)	0.0890 (0.961)
British Colonies	-0.1259 (0.224)	-0.1769 (0.099)	-0.1208 (0.259)	-0.1867 (0.086)
Constant	5.9572** (0.000)	5.9739** (0.000)	5.8957** (0.000)	5.7993** (0.000)
N	2936	2824	2698	2569
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.6325	0.6338	0.6348	0.6389
Wald $\chi^2$	4108.57	3202.88	3104.33	3149.48
Prob (Wald $\chi^2$ )	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: This model is estimated using feasible generalized least squares. The model assumes a heteroskedastic error structure across panels with no cross-sectional correlation and is estimated using panel specific estimates of the first-order autoregressive process. Variable coefficients are reported at the top of each cell while values of statistical significance are parenthetically expressed below.

\* p < .05; \*\* p < .01

**Table 5. FGLS regression results for model of women's rights, 1981-2004, using raw number of terrorist kills**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>No Lag</i>	<i>1 Year Lag</i>	<i>2 Year Lag</i>	<i>3 Year Lag</i>
Number of Kills (Old Coding Scheme)	-0.0002* (0.040)	0.0000 (0.610)	-0.0000 (0.609)	-0.0001 (0.082)
Coding Marker	0.0106 (0.548)	0.0012 (0.911)	-0.0004 (0.975)	-0.0005 (0.963)
Number of Kills (New Coding Scheme)	0.0002 (0.085)	-0.0000 0.922	0.0001 (0.488)	0.0001 (0.497)
Polity	0.0475** (0.000)	0.0468** (0.000)	0.0477** (0.000)	0.0508** (0.000)
Regime Durability	0.0118** (0.000)	0.0138** (0.000)	0.0138** (0.000)	0.0122** (0.000)
GDP(PPP) per capita (in thousands)	0.0594** (0.000)	0.0607** (0.000)	0.0612** (0.000)	0.0591** (0.000)
Inflation	-0.0000 (0.648)	0.0000 (0.830)	0.0000 (0.980)	0.0000 (0.456)
Population (in millions)	-0.0003** (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.000)	-0.0004** (0.000)	-0.0003** (0.001)
Population Growth	-11.2171** (0.000)	-9.3096** (0.000)	-8.7772** (0.000)	-10.9195** (0.000)
British Colonies	-0.5620** (0.000)	-0.6215** (0.000)	-0.6103** (0.000)	-0.5504** (0.000)
Constant	3.9944** (0.000)	3.9462** (0.000)	3.9201** (0.000)	3.9571** (0.000)
N	2807	2704	2589	2467
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.4114	0.4041	0.4088	0.4288
Wald $\chi^2$	950.46	1069.45	1164.41	1144.77
Prob (Wald $\chi^2$ )	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: This model is estimated using feasible generalized least squares. The model assumes a heteroskedastic error structure across panels with no cross-sectional correlation and is estimated using panel specific estimates of the first-order autoregressive process. Variable coefficients are reported at the top of each cell while values of statistical significance are parenthetically expressed below.

\* p < .05; \*\* p < .01

**Table 6. FGLS regression results for model of women's rights, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills per capita**

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>No Lag</i>	<i>1 Year Lag</i>	<i>2 Year Lag</i>	<i>3 Year Lag</i>
Number of Kills Per Capita (Old Coding Scheme)	-1026.341 (0.150)	1569.557* (0.015)	1182.09** (0.006)	404.7525 (0.406)
Coding Marker	0.0089 (0.586)	-0.0041 (0.667)	0.0003 (0.982)	0.0024 (0.807)
Number of Kills Per Capita (New Coding Scheme)	5000.304* (0.027)	3448.42* (0.035)	-598.8908 (0.664)	-676.361 (0.651)
Polity	0.0478** (0.000)	0.0479** (0.000)	0.0478** (0.000)	0.0513** (0.000)
Regime Durability	0.0141** (0.000)	0.0145** (0.000)	0.0139** (0.000)	0.0138** (0.000)
GDP(PPP) per capita (in thousands)	0.0591** (0.000)	0.0593** (0.000)	0.0616** (0.000)	0.0587** (0.000)
Inflation	-0.0000 (0.831)	0.0000 (0.865)	0.0000 (0.886)	0.0000 (0.606)
Population (in millions)	-0.0004** (0.000)	-0.0004** (0.000)	-0.0004** (0.000)	-0.0004** (0.000)
Population Growth	-10.9771** (0.000)	-9.7110** (0.000)	-9.0223** (0.000)	-11.1092** (0.000)
British Colonies	-0.5764** (0.000)	-0.6014** (0.000)	-0.5786** (0.000)	-0.5460** (0.000)
Constant	3.9638** (0.000)	3.9292** (0.000)	3.9131** (0.000)	3.9349** (0.000)
N	2808	2704	2589	2467
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.4042	0.4054	0.4102	0.4258
Wald $\chi^2$	967.79	1179.22	1253.32	1305.53
Prob (Wald $\chi^2$ )	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: This model is estimated using feasible generalized least squares. The model assumes a heteroskedastic error structure across panels with no cross-sectional correlation and is estimated using panel specific estimates of the first-order autoregressive process. Variable coefficients are reported at the top of each cell while values of statistical significance are parenthetically expressed below.

\* p < .05; \*\* p < .01

**Table 7. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using results number of terrorist kills per capita to determine reactions to 1000 civilian casualties**

Population	Old Coding Scheme		New Coding Scheme	
	Expected Value	Change in Expected Value (from zero deaths)	Expected Value	Change in Expected Value (from zero deaths)
5,000,000	3.5029	-1.1668	-5.3559	-10.0256
10,000,000	4.0863	-0.5834	-0.4298	-5.0995
20,000,000	4.3780	-0.2917	2.0333	-2.6364
30,000,000	4.4752	-0.1945	2.8543	-1.8154
40,000,000	4.5239	-0.1458	3.2648	-1.4049
50,000,000	4.5530	-0.1167	3.5111	-1.1586
80,000,000	4.5968	-0.0729	3.8806	-0.7891
100,000,000	4.6114	-0.0583	4.0037	-0.6660
200,000,000	4.6405	-0.0292	4.2500	-0.4197
300,000,000	4.6503	-0.0194	4.3321	-0.3376
400,000,000	4.6551	-0.0146	4.3732	-0.2965
500,000,000	4.6580	-0.0117	4.3978	-0.2719
600,000,000	4.6600	-0.0097	4.4142	-0.2555
700,000,000	4.6614	-0.0083	4.4260	-0.2437
800,000,000	4.6624	-0.0073	4.4348	-0.2350
900,000,000	4.6632	-0.0065	4.4416	-0.2281
1,000,000,000	4.6639	-0.0058	4.4471	-0.2226
1,100,000,000	4.6644	-0.0053	4.4515	-0.2182
1,200,000,000	4.6648	-0.0049	4.4553	-0.2144

\* Constant = 4.6697; Number of Kills/Capita (Old Scheme) = -5833.820; Number of Kills/Capita (New Scheme) = -43427.4600.

**Table 8. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using results number of terrorist kills per capita to determine reactions to 1000 civilian casualties, 1 Year Lag**

Population	Old Coding Scheme		New Coding Scheme	
	Expected Value	Change in Expected Value (from zero deaths)	Expected Value	Change in Expected Value (from zero deaths)
5,000,000	3.8316	-0.8235	3.6387	-1.0164
10,000,000	4.2434	-0.4117	4.0505	-0.6046
20,000,000	4.4492	-0.2059	4.2563	-0.3988
30,000,000	4.5179	-0.1372	4.3250	-0.3301
40,000,000	4.5522	-0.1029	4.3593	-0.2958
50,000,000	4.5728	-0.0823	4.3799	-0.2752
80,000,000	4.6036	-0.0515	4.4107	-0.2444
100,000,000	4.6139	-0.0412	4.4210	-0.2341
200,000,000	4.6345	-0.0206	4.4416	-0.2135
300,000,000	4.6414	-0.0137	4.4485	-0.2066
400,000,000	4.6448	-0.0103	4.4519	-0.2032
500,000,000	4.6469	-0.0082	4.4540	-0.2011
600,000,000	4.6482	-0.0069	4.4554	-0.1998
700,000,000	4.6492	-0.0059	4.4563	-0.1988
800,000,000	4.6500	-0.0051	4.4571	-0.1980
900,000,000	4.6505	-0.0046	4.4576	-0.1975
1,000,000,000	4.6510	-0.0041	4.4581	-0.1970
1,100,000,000	4.6514	-0.0037	4.4585	-0.1966
1,200,000,000	4.6517	-0.0034	4.4588	-0.1963

\* Constant = 4.6551; Number of Kills/Capita (Old Scheme) = -4117.4860; Number of Kills/Capita (New Scheme) did not reach statistical significance.



**Table 9. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using results number of terrorist kills per capita to determine reactions to 1000 civilian casualties, 2 Year Lag**

Population	Old Coding Scheme		New Coding Scheme	
	Expected Value	Change in Expected Value (from zero deaths)	Expected Value	Change in Expected Value (from zero deaths)
5,000,000	3.7213	-0.8713	3.5297	-1.0629
10,000,000	4.1569	-0.4357	3.9653	-0.6272
20,000,000	4.3747	-0.2178	4.1832	-0.4094
30,000,000	4.4473	-0.1452	4.2558	-0.3368
40,000,000	4.4837	-0.1089	4.2921	-0.3005
50,000,000	4.5054	-0.0871	4.3139	-0.2787
80,000,000	4.5381	-0.0545	4.3465	-0.2460
100,000,000	4.5490	-0.0436	4.3574	-0.2351
200,000,000	4.5708	-0.0218	4.3792	-0.2133
300,000,000	4.5780	-0.0145	4.3865	-0.2061
400,000,000	4.5817	-0.0109	4.3901	-0.2025
500,000,000	4.5839	-0.0087	4.3923	-0.2003
600,000,000	4.5853	-0.0073	4.3937	-0.1988
700,000,000	4.5863	-0.0062	4.3948	-0.1978
800,000,000	4.5871	-0.0054	4.3956	-0.1970
900,000,000	4.5877	-0.0048	4.3962	-0.1964
1,000,000,000	4.5882	-0.0044	4.3966	-0.1959
1,100,000,000	4.5886	-0.0040	4.3970	-0.1955
1,200,000,000	4.5889	-0.0036	4.3974	-0.1952


\* Constant = 4.5926; Number of Kills/Capita (Old Scheme) = -4356.5320; Number of Kills/Capita (New Scheme) did not reach statistical significance.

**Table 10. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using results number of terrorist kills per capita to determine reactions to 1000 civilian casualties, 3 Year Lag**


Population	Old Coding Scheme		New Coding Scheme	
	Expected Value	Change in Expected Value (from zero deaths)	Expected Value	Change in Expected Value (from zero deaths)
5,000,000	3.7139	-0.7532	3.5233	-0.9438
10,000,000	4.0905	-0.3766	3.8999	-0.5672
20,000,000	4.2788	-0.1883	4.0883	-0.3789
30,000,000	4.3416	-0.1255	4.1510	-0.3161
40,000,000	4.3730	-0.0942	4.1824	-0.2848
50,000,000	4.3918	-0.0753	4.2012	-0.2659
80,000,000	4.4201	-0.0471	4.2295	-0.2377
100,000,000	4.4295	-0.0377	4.2389	-0.2283
200,000,000	4.4483	-0.0188	4.2577	-0.2094
300,000,000	4.4546	-0.0126	4.2640	-0.2032
400,000,000	4.4577	-0.0094	4.2671	-0.2000
500,000,000	4.4596	-0.0075	4.2690	-0.1981
600,000,000	4.4609	-0.0063	4.2703	-0.1969
700,000,000	4.4618	-0.0054	4.2712	-0.1960
800,000,000	4.4624	-0.0047	4.2719	-0.1953
900,000,000	4.4630	-0.0042	4.2724	-0.1948
1,000,000,000	4.4634	-0.0038	4.2728	-0.1944
1,100,000,000	4.4637	-0.0034	4.2731	-0.1940
1,200,000,000	4.4640	-0.0031	4.2734	-0.1937

\* Constant = 4.4672; Number of Kills/Capita (Old Scheme) = -3766.1340; Number of Kills/Capita (New Scheme) did not reach statistical significance.


**Figure 1. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills per capita**




**Figure 2. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills per capita, 1 Year Lag**




**Figure 3. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills per capita, 2 Year Lag**



**Figure 4. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills per capita, 2 Year Lag**




**Figure 5. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills**




\*Data for this figure comes from Table 1

**Figure 6. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills, 1 Year Lag**




\*Data for this figure comes from Table 1

**Figure 7. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills, 2 Year Lag**



\*Data for this figure comes from Table 1

**Figure 8. FGLS regression predictions for model of physical integrity, 1981-2004, using number of terrorist kills, 3 Year Lag**



\*Data for this figure comes from Table 1



## **Figure 9. Cronbach Alpha Measures of Internal Consistency of Human Rights Indices**

### **Physical Integrity**

Average interitem covariance:	0.2734502
Number of items in the scale:	4
Scale reliability coefficient:	0.7856

### **Empowerment Index**

Average interitem covariance:	0.2638986
Number of items in the scale:	6
Scale reliability coefficient:	0.8674

### **Women's Conditions**

Average interitem covariance:	0.2641536
Number of items in the scale:	3
Scale reliability coefficient:	0.7578

.

**Figure 10. Correlation Matrices for Physical Integrity Rights and Dependent Variables**

	physint	nkillc~a	startd~f	snkill~a	polity~m	durable	gdp~1000	infltn	popltn~0	popltn~h	british
physint	1.0000										
nkillcpta	-0.1653	1.0000									
startdiff	-0.0133	-0.0615	1.0000								
snkillcpta	-0.1601	0.0758	0.1583	1.0000							
politydem	0.3989	-0.0281	0.1533	-0.0082	1.0000						
durable	0.2957	-0.0493	0.0004	-0.0139	0.2441	1.0000					
gdppppc1000	0.4834	-0.0506	0.1725	-0.0135	0.4565	0.6089	1.0000				
infltn	-0.0592	0.0769	-0.0407	-0.0061	0.0116	-0.0691	-0.0547	1.0000			
popl~1000000	-0.2293	-0.0220	0.0081	-0.0123	-0.0130	0.1468	-0.0419	-0.0107	1.0000		
popltngrth	-0.2593	0.0105	-0.1441	0.0126	-0.4666	-0.1704	-0.3364	-0.0312	-0.0489	1.0000	
british	0.0062	0.0317	-0.0483	0.0007	-0.0285	0.1951	-0.0304	-0.0165	0.0334	0.1703	1.0000

**Figure 10. Correlation Matrices for Empowerment Index and Dependent Variables**

	empinx	nkillc~a	startd~f	snkill~a	polity~m	durable	gdp~1000	infltn	popltn~0	popltn~h	british
empinx	1.0000										
nkillcpta	-0.0368	1.0000									
startdiff	0.0186	-0.0613	1.0000								
snkillcpta	-0.0318	0.0758	0.1584	1.0000							
politydem	0.7901	-0.0274	0.1538	-0.0079	1.0000						
durable	0.1971	-0.0492	-0.0005	-0.0140	0.2438	1.0000					
gdppppc1000	0.3677	-0.0506	0.1725	-0.0135	0.4554	0.6090	1.0000				
infltn	-0.0290	0.0769	-0.0406	-0.0061	0.0117	-0.0693	-0.0548	1.0000			
popl~1000000	-0.1043	-0.0220	0.0084	-0.0123	-0.0127	0.1465	-0.0422	-0.0107	1.0000		
popltngrth	-0.3606	0.0103	-0.1450	0.0124	-0.4681	-0.1687	-0.3348	-0.0313	-0.0492	1.0000	
british	-0.0432	0.0318	-0.0484	0.0009	-0.0301	0.1947	-0.0311	-0.0162	0.0336	0.1689	1.0000

**Figure 12. Correlation Matrices for Women's Rights and Dependent Variables**

	wocond	nkillc~a	startd~f	snkill~a	polity~m	durable	gdp~1000	infltn	popltn~0	popltn~h	british
wocond	1.0000										
nkillcpta	-0.0251	1.0000									
startdiff	0.0921	-0.0645	1.0000								
snkillcpta	-0.0215	0.0951	0.1586	1.0000							
politydem	0.5306	-0.0275	0.1414	-0.0063	1.0000						
durable	0.3715	-0.0495	-0.0106	-0.0131	0.2403	1.0000					
gdppppc1000	0.4952	-0.0553	0.1514	-0.0112	0.4455	0.6118	1.0000				
infltn	-0.0237	0.0926	-0.0407	-0.0063	0.0120	-0.0697	-0.0551	1.0000			
popl~1000000	-0.0274	-0.0233	0.0092	-0.0125	-0.0142	0.1482	-0.0409	-0.0111	1.0000		
popltngrth	-0.4731	0.0014	-0.1355	0.0100	-0.4678	-0.1650	-0.3288	-0.0319	-0.0511	1.0000	
british	-0.1452	0.0197	-0.0443	-0.0029	-0.0195	0.1966	-0.0208	-0.0163	0.0323	0.1581	1.0000

## Works Cited

- Adeola, F.O. (2000) Cross-National Environmental Injustice and Human Rights Issues—A Preview of Evidence in the Developing World. *American Behavioural Scientist* 43:686-706.
- Anderson, Christopher et al. (2002), Political repression and Public Perceptions of Human Rights. *Political Research Quarterly* 55:439-456.
- Apodaca, Clair. (2001) Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights after the Cold War. *International Studies Quarterly* 45:587–602.
- Apodaca, Clair, and Michael Stohl. (1999) United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance. *International Studies Quarterly*. 43:185-198.
- Beal, Amanda L. (2006) Federalism, Checks, and the Welfare State: A Cross National Analysis.
- Bhavnani, Ravi, and Michael Ross. (2003) Announcement, Credibility and Turnout in Popular Rebellions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 47:340-366.
- Boswell, T., and W. Dixon (1990) Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross-National Analysis. *American Sociological Review*. 55: 540-559.
- Carelton, David, and Michael Stohl. (1987) The Role of Human Rights in US Foreign Assistance Policy. *American Journal of Political Science* 31:1002-1018.
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2006) The World Factbook. 2 April 2008 [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/].
- Cetis (2007) GTD2 (1998-2004). Online. Internet.
- Chambers, Samuel A. (2003) Ghostly Rights. *Cultural Critique*. 54:148-177.
- Cingranelli, David L. and David L. Richards. (2008) *The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset Version 2008.03.12*. <http://www.humanrightsdata.org>.
- Couser, G.Thomas. (1990) Seeing through Metaphor: Teaching Figurative Literacy. *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 20:143-153.

- Davenport, Christian, and David A. Armstrong, II. (2004) Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996. *American Journal of Political Science*. 48:538-554.
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno et al. (2005) Thinking Inside the Box : A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights. *International Studies Quarterly*. 49:439-458.
- Dean, McHenry Jr., and Abdel-Fattah Mady. (2006) A Critique of Quantitative Measures of the Degree of Democracy in Israel. *Democratization*. 13:257-282.
- Donnelly, Jack, and Rhoda E. Howard. (1988) Assessing National Human Rights Performance: A Theoretical Framework. *Human Rights Quarterly*. 10:214-248.
- Evans, Tony. (2001) If Democracy, Then Human Rights? *Third World Quarterly*. 22:623–642.
- Ferree, Karen E., and Smita Singh. (2006) Institutional Duration and Growth in Africa. *Studies in Comparative International Development*. 40:30-54.
- Gibney, Mark, and Matthew Dalton. (1996) The Political Terror Scale. *Policy Studies and Developing Nations* 4:73-84.
- Gibney, Mark, and Michael Stohl. (1988) *Human Rights and US Refugee Policy. In Open Borders? Closed Societies? The Ethical and Political Issues*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Mihael D. Ward. (1997) Doubt Take: A Reexamination of Democracy and Autocracy in Modern Polities. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 41:361-383.
- Greene, William. (1993). *Econometric Analysis* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition). New York: Macmillan.
- Guild, Elspeth. (2004) The Variable Subject of the EU Constitution, Civil Liberties and Human Rights. *European Journal of Migration & Law*. 6:381-294.
- Gujarati, Damodar. (1995) *Basic Economics* (3<sup>rd</sup> edition). New York: McGraw-Hill.

- Henderson, C. (1993) Population Pressures and Political Repression. *Social Science Quarterly*. 74:322-333.
- Hofferbert, Richard and Louis Cingranelli (1996) "Democratic Institutions and Respect for Human Rights." *Human Rights and Developing Countries*. London: JAI Press.
- Hoffman, Amanda L. (2005) Political Parties, Electoral Systems and Democracy: A Cross-national Analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*. 4:231 – 242.
- Hoffman, Bruce. (1998) *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Horowitz, Shale. (2004) Human Rights in the Post-Communist World: The Roles of National Identity, Economic Development and Ethnic Conflict. *International Journal of Human Rights*. 8:325-343.
- Keith, Linda Camp. (1999) The United National International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior? *Journal of Peace Research* 36:95-118.
- Keith, Linda Camp. (2002) Constitutional Provision for Individual Human Rights 1966-1977: Are they More than Mere Window Dressing? *Political Research Quarterly* 55:111-143.
- Kmenta, Jan. (1986) *Elements of Econometrics* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition). New York: Macmillan.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. (1992) Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations? *American Political Science Review*. 86:1028-1034.
- LaFree, Gary, and Laura Dugan. (2007) Global Terrorism Database, 1970-1997. College Park, MD: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
- Lawson, Stephanie. (1993) Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization. *Comparative Politics*. 25:183-205.
- Lewis, Jeffrey B. and Drew A. Linzer. (2005) Estimating Regression Models in Which the Dependent Variable is Based on Estimates. *Political Analysis* 13:345-364.
- Marshall, Monty G. et al. (2002) Polity IV, 1800-1999 Comments on Munch and Verkuilen. *Comparative Political Studies* 35:40-45.

- Moon, Sangho, Alex Sekwat, and Rodney E. Stanley. (2004) Testing the Assumptions of Pooled Time Series Cross-Section al Regression Analysis Through ARIMA and Interrupted Time Series Modeling: Beck and Katz Revisited. *Western Social Science Conference*. Salt Lake City, Utah.
- Poe, Steven C. (1991) Human Rights and the Allocation of US Military Assistance. *Journal of Peace Research* 28:205-216.
- Poe, Steven C., and C. Neal Tate. (1994) Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 88:853–872.
- Poe, Steven C., C. Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith. (1999) Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study covering the Years 1976-1993. *International Studies Quarterly* 43: 291-215.
- Powers, Timothy J. and James C. Garand (2007) Determinants of Invalid Voting in Latin America. *Electoral Structures* 26: 432-444.
- Ramsay, Maureen. (2006) Can the Torture of Terrorist Suspects be Justified? *International Journal of Human Rights* 10:103-119.
- Rummel, Rudolph J. (1997) *Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Saxton, Gregory D. and Michelle A. Benson. (2006) Structure, Politics, and Action: An Integrated Model of Nationalist Protest and Rebellion. *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*. 12:137-175.
- Schmid, P. Alex and Crelinsten, D. Ronald (1993) *Western Responses to Terrorism*. New York: Frank Cass & Co.
- Schmitter, Phillipe and Terry Lynn Karl. (1996) What Democracy Is and Is Not. *Journal of Democracy* 2: 75-88.
- Schrepel, W. (2005). Paras and centurions: Lessons learned from the Battle of Algiers. *Peace and Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology* 7: 1-76.
- START (2007). National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. University of Maryland.26 April 2008 [<http://www.start.umd.edu>].



Stohl, Michael, and David Carelton (1985) The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carer to Ronald Reagan. *Human Rights Quarterly* 7: 205-229.

Stohl, Michael, David Carelton, and Steven Johnson (1984) Humn Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance from Nixon to Carter. *Journal of Peace Research* 21 (2): 125-126.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (1948) General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III).

Wagner, Richard V. (2006) Terrorism: A peace Psychological Analysis. *Journal of Social Issues* 62: 155-171.

Wilkinson, Paul. (2000) *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal Response*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Zanger, Sabine C. (2000) A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violation, 1977-93. *Journal of Peace Research* 37: 213-233.