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**THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENCE:  
DOSTOYEVSKY AND HEIDEGGER**

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Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Martin Heidegger are important representatives of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thought. They influence fiction and philosophy in a way which makes these fields simultaneously more rigorous and more accessible. Dostoyevsky is considered an innovator of psychological fiction while also possibly the greatest novelist ever; Heidegger introduces hermeneutics to modern thought in creating his complex ontology, and yet his work is of interest to people other than scholars. The reason for these writers' seemingly paradoxical intellectual momentousness and far-reaching popularity is their concern with issues which are pressing to the modern age, such as nihilism. The greatest problem of all history, that of human existence, is the source of nihilism; each man recognizes this problem as the ultimate end of his thinking. The writings of Heidegger and Dostoyevsky are in part a response to the rationalist tradition and are also claimed (without either's consent) as foundational texts of existentialism. Yet the disciplines, methods, styles, and conclusions of these two figures are totally different from each other. Dostoyevsky's later work, which is both more mature and more his own, is characterized by his Russian Orthodox Christian perspective. Heidegger, on the other hand, can be distinguished by one of his major methods of approaching philosophizing -- phenomenology, a technique originated by his teacher Edmund Husserl. Their differences are not irreconcilable, however. Dostoyevsky and Heidegger agree on the character of the fundamental existential issues; they diverge in their responses to those issues, partly due to their genius in their respective disciplines of philosophy and literature.

Rationalism provides the basic problems which confront modernity. Growing out of the individualism of the Protestant Reformation and the mechanism of Copernican astronomy, this philosophy provides a revolutionary formulation of human being as a singular, given, absolute

subjectivity. Nature under this model is dehumanized, for the thinking subject is posited in opposition to a world of objects that can be manipulated as resources. Thus, a decentering and devaluation of human life takes place, ironically at the same time as -- and as a result of -- a movement designed to bring specifically human powers to the fore. This decentering is made manifest in the technological transformations of labor and in increasing social isolation, characteristic aspects of modern mass culture. The Crystal Palace and the London slums are extreme results of Rationalism. Around the turn of the twentieth century, movements within the worlds of art and thought responded to this legacy with radically new analyses and treatments of human being.

In Being and Time, originally published in 1927 at the beginning of his writing career, Martin Heidegger attempts to answer the contradictions of rationalist culture by providing what he calls a "fundamental ontology." He believes the philosophical tradition after Descartes to be nothing more than reworkings of the Frenchman's system which remain under the same assumptions as to the nature of Being. For Heidegger, there is much to be discovered in the *sum* that Descartes innocuously presupposed; he focuses narrowly on the individual in order to perform a phenomenological re-evaluation of Being. This fundamental ontology proceeds by exploring "Dasein," his term for an existence characterized by the ability to question Being. Human being is the object of this analysis due to its priority as the ontological being, and Heidegger posits that it is not a transcendental substance, such as *res cogitans*, but is essentially its existence. His idea of existence reveals that human being is actually a manifold of modes of being. In his concept of "Being-in-the-world," Heidegger explains how Dasein is composed of aspects such as a world, a Being-with others, and a Being-one's-self. Opposing this new, plural

conception of existence to the abstract, epistemological "I" of Descartes, Heidegger shows the previously-ignored importance to one's self-understanding of everydayness, utilitarian concerns, and the world in which one dwells. Instead of the pose of contemplation, Heidegger considers action, temporality, and thrownness as keys to identity. As can be inferred from its characteristics, the self is not given according to him, and in Being and Time one of Heidegger's main aims is to disclose that mode of being of Dasein which he calls the "authentic." As he develops it, authenticity is the inherent possibility for individuality of every Dasein, achievable through choosing and winning one's self, as opposed to the Dasein that primarily is not its own -- the inauthentic. Freedom becomes a concern of existence as it had not been under the rationalist model. Therefore, Heidegger is in essential conflict with the earlier tradition.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky shares with Heidegger both a concern with the possibilities of human being and an antagonistic position towards rationalism. In his last novel, The Brothers Karamazov, completed in 1880, he provides a radically different approach to the study of existence. Originally a disciple of Vissarion Belinsky, the father of Russian criticism, Dostoyevsky comes to denounce the idea of self-renunciation that his mentor championed, which is expressed in the famous line: "It deeply moves your heart to realize that the most down-trodden man, the lowest of the low, is also a human being, and is called your brother." Dostoyevsky perceives the emphasis on commonality over individuality inherent in the idea of "humanity." He has problems as well with extolling suffering as a virtue in his fiction after his Siberian prison experience which taught him the horrible absurdity of it. Reason and conscience are replaced for Dostoyevsky by psychology; man is not a simple substance but multifaceted, composed of the sensual and intellectual natures, the underground and Christian possibilities. This plurality

receives illumination in Mikhail Bakhtin's insight that Dostoyevsky's work is polyphonic. The philosophic position of The Brothers Karamazov, for example, is not a result of some authoritative voice (e.g., that of the "hero") but of the dialogic relationship of radically different individuals. The main characters internalize this debate -- as Alyosha Karamazov does by considering the positions of his brothers (i.e. violence against his father or the denial of God). Furthermore, Dostoyevsky discerns that self-understanding comes not from abstract thought, but rather from a person's actions and interactions with others in specific situations, whether these acts be criminal or compassionate. Even then, one can even fail to achieve understanding, as does Ivan Karamazov, the perpetual thinker. Thus, for the Russian novelist as for the German philosopher, the self is a function of action, and this possibility of freedom is an essential aspect of being human.

Therefore, Dostoyevsky and Heidegger are representatives of a modern movement in thought formed in part as a reaction to a past dominated by the rationalist conception. This reaction, furthermore, is characterized by an understanding of man as a being that is not singular, given, or subjective but rather complex and the result of action -- in other words, what may be described as an existentialist understanding.

A good way to begin to grasp the basic outlook of these two authors is to attempt to correlate Heidegger's thought, as represented by Being and Time, to the experience of the narrator in Dostoyevsky's short story, "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man." This comparison suggests that the two writers agree on four major points: there is for each a "public" way of being and three distinct steps to any higher way of being -- recognizing a power above oneself,

understanding the factual possibilities it provides, and taking appropriate action in care for others. These mutually accepted points form the basis for the claim that Heidegger and Dostoyevsky are existentialists.

Although the writers share these and many other points of similarity, their treatment of ideas is radically different. Dostoyevsky never makes explicit terminological reference to existential conditions but depicts these conditions as features of the "underground," a major unifying theme of his fiction. Heidegger, in contrast, is not concerned with these conditions in themselves but only as a way of revealing the authentic mode of Dasein, a key concept in his philosophy. Thus, since Dostoyevsky represents and personifies them in a dialogical narrative while Heidegger catalogs them as inauthentic, the term "existential stages" shall therefore be employed to refer to these commonly conceived ways of being which are dealt with in such radically different fashions.

In part one of "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man," the nameless narrator admits that he has always been ridiculous; he attempts to separate himself from others because he feels out of place. For this feeling of being "not-at-home" in the world, Heidegger uses the term "uncanniness." This experience is fundamental to the story of Dostoyevsky's narrator. The first result of his uncanniness is that he can distinguish his own state from what, to use Heidegger's terminology, he perceives as the "fallenness" of other people. Heidegger characterizes "fallen" Dasein as being self-entangled, alienated, and tranquilized, all brought on by "Being-lost in the publicness of the 'they'" (Heidegger, Being 220). In the case of the ridiculous man, people seem odd to him because they are engrossed in meaningless pettiness; he tells some acquaintances who are arguing, "'[g]entlemen,' I said, 'you really don't care, you know'" (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 333).

Thus, the first existential stage that Dostoyevsky's narrator identifies is the public individual. This is a basal and somewhat inferior being of man, yet neither Dostoyevsky nor Heidegger believe that one could ever exist entirely outside of it (communication for example requires a certain level of conformity in order to be viable). The true public individual, however, is characterized by total conformity at the expense of his or her own self. In Dostoyevsky's Notes from Underground, this stage of existence is represented by those whom the undergroundling addresses as "you gentlemen" -- the above-grounders. These include the vacuous office workers whom the narrator both despises and envies for their ability to be conventional. He declares, "I'm alone and they are *everyone*" (Dostoyevsky, Notes 31). Heidegger understands this existence to have been made possible through the institution of modern services such as newspapers and mass transit. Thus, one becomes absorbed in the larger culture of shared experiences; there is a tendency in modernity towards averageness. Every Dasein is like the next: "we take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge . . . we find shocking what they find shocking" (Heidegger, Being 164).

For the ridiculous man, the second result of the uncanny is that he comes to realize the presence of a power above himself, and this revelation is the impetus for the next stage after the public one. From the sense of separation from others and their everyday world of concern, Heidegger says that one comes "face to face with the 'nothing' of the world; in the face of this 'nothing,' Dasein is anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-Being" (Heidegger, Being 321). Dostoyevsky's narrator echoes this idea when he says that "nothing matters." For both writers, the "Nothing" names a force experienced beyond and opposed to oneself, and



against which one is powerless; this power above oneself seems to be the first major point of agreement for the writers regarding the possibility of a human existence beyond the public stage.

It might be suggested that the public man could envision a power above himself in the "they," but this entity does not have the same character as the "Nothing." The public man participates in the larger "public," and his conformity provides him a sense of power and importance. A true "power above oneself," however, evokes awareness of and desire for freedom due to its complete subjugation of the individual. In the case of the ridiculous man, he is tormented by his idea that "nothing matters," and he tries to cut himself off from society to live in the freedom he believes that this condition affords him.

Thus, for Dostoyevsky, a second existential stage is the "underground," as the figure is developed in Notes from Underground. The recognition of freedom is the crucial characteristic of this stage, for the realization of being constrained by a power above oneself provides the impetus for the undergroundling's revolt against the public that will spawn later stages. The underground stage clearly is an advance from the public stage, for only when a person realizes a power above himself can he conceive of the human freedom integral to any higher mode of existence.

Nevertheless, despite its necessity for reaching a higher mode, the underground stage is a negative state of being. Dostoyevsky intends this figure to evoke the visual images of depth and foulness. The ridiculous man is isolated, agitated and anxious. The ridiculous man's experience before his dream exemplifies its negative aspects. He declares, "*I would not have cared* if the world existed at all or if there was nothing anywhere" (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 332). He manifests this negative mental state in his lifestyle; he says, "I spend the night sitting in my armchair and doing nothing. I only read in the daytime. I just sit there, without even thinking" (Dostoyevsky,

"Dream" 335). To use Heidegger's term, the narrator is "alienated" from the world around him. Another negative aspect appears when the ridiculous man decides one night on the way home to kill himself for the odd reason that he sees a small star. Immediately afterward, he is accosted by a small, pathetic girl who "called out desperately, 'my mummy, my mummy!'" (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 334). He rationalizes his not helping her by saying, "I would soon become non-existent, and then nothing would exist" (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 336). The narrator is so deluded he believes everything is only a show put on for his torment (similar to Descartes' idea of the malignant deity in his Meditations). In Heidegger's terms, the ridiculous man can be understood to be self-entangled as well as alienated, and his response to the revelation of a power above oneself proves to be inadequate and undesirable. Thus the underground stage falls into Heidegger's negative mode of being -- the inauthentic. The underground is merely a reactionary revolt against the faceless bulk of the public, made without any answer or alternative, yet disallowing the possibility of rejoining. It is a descent that must be made, however, in order to rise beyond the public condition of non-entity.

Dostoyevsky's ridiculous man is deluded in believing that he has given up. He shows his attachment to his world through the extensive descriptions of his apartment and his rowdy neighbors; yet he concludes, "I never care . . . so utterly do I forget them" (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 336). Furthermore, he has had a gun for two months since he first contemplated suicide, yet he has not killed himself; if "nothing matters," then why does he use the chance appearance of a star as a weak prop for his decision? The idea of suicide, therefore, is another highlight of his delusion. Finally, he thinks he does not care for people and has proven it, but this is his greatest delusion. He tries to convince himself:

Why, the reason I had stamped my feet and shouted so brutally at the poor child was to assert that 'far from feeling pity, I could even afford to do something inhumanly vile now, because two hours hence all would fade away.' Do you believe me when I say that this was the reason why I had shouted? (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 336)

In his compulsive rationalization, however, the narrator reveals his fear of care that sparked his actions towards the little girl.

This vain attempt by the ridiculous man to deny his care for others, which Heidegger terms "solicitude" (Heidegger, Being 158), is a result of not accepting existential guilt, for Dostoyevsky's narrator wants to be his own master and deny his "thrownness." But for Heidegger, Dasein is thrown into the world and is a basis; "[i]t is never existent *before its* basis, but only *from it* and *as this basis*. Thus, 'Being- a-basis' means never to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up" (Heidegger, Being 330). Dostoyevsky's narrator is a human being and consequently subject to care, and his denial is inappropriate and delusional. Therefore, he is "ridiculous," for he cannot have the absurd autonomy he desires, and this very wish makes him inauthentic. The ridiculousness of the narrator before his dream is supplementary to the underground, for it reveals further possible negative aspects of this existential stage.

The underground provides, in the conceptions of a power above oneself and freedom, only a part of the insight into a higher mode of human existence, and its defects must be remedied. The next stage after the underground seems to be suggested in Heidegger's concept of the "resolute." For Heidegger, Dasein's actual possibilities with which to respond to the realization of a power above itself come both from the conception of freedom and from the resoluteness

towards death, "in which one is ready for anxiety" and accepts guilt (Heidegger, Being 343). The ridiculous man is given the opportunity to attain this resoluteness through his dream, which acts as the Heideggerian "call of conscience." This call "is not to be tied up with an expectation of anything like a communication" (Heidegger, Being 318). The dream, however, does remove him from his usual perception of the world and makes the earth unfamiliar (uncanny) so that he becomes open to the possibilities that were always there. This stage is characterized by formulating practical possibilities with which to respond to the realization of a power above oneself; therefore, it will be labeled the "mental" stage.

In his dream which forms the central section of the tale, the ridiculous man places his revolver to his heart, "whereas I had definitely decided to shoot myself through the head" (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 321). His desire to eradicate the heart, traditionally symbolic of the spring of emotions, reveals his fear of being subject to irrepressible feelings such as pity. The narrator's invocation to the "Ruler of all" to bring about a wiser order of things also shows that he is desperate for some other way of being. He proves this desire for life by declaring his love for the earth and its people, but says, "I could not love them without hating them" (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 328). Only when he dreams of the other earth and the pure souls that inhabit it does his ambivalence change, as he first comprehends that human beings can exist without being evil. This new understanding the ridiculous man gains is an example of the possibilities that spring from his uncanniness.

The crucial effect of the ridiculous man's dream comes as he witnesses with horror the fall of these beautiful people: "[t]hey learned to lie . . . very soon blood was shed for the first time . . . then science was introduced . . . they grew evil," which ends with their conceiving the idea that

"[k]nowledge is superior to feeling, consciousness of life is superior to life" (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 346-48). In this way their minds conquer their hearts, meaning that they only believe in the truth that can be scientifically proven; they "refused to believe that they had once been innocent and happy" (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 347). As the narrator beholds this great fall in his dream, he is strangely transformed; so overcome is he with sorrow that he implores them to let him suffer by crucifying him. Thus ends his dream.

In this mental stage, the ridiculous man approaches Heidegger's authenticity; Dostoyevsky's narrator allows possibilities, such as the belief in mankind's essential goodness, to manifest before him as he had not before. He also seems prepared for the existential anxiety evoked in the underground stage, for the ridiculous man takes action, choosing to sacrifice himself in his dream for a belief. He is contemplating possibilities that include mankind; this scope shows that he is moving from his previous "alienation" towards a solution that he can live by. The narrator is still "self-entangled," however, for this experience is actually a dream and he is only at the level of thought.

The ridiculous man's transition from the mental stage begins when he offers to be crucified in his dream. For Heidegger, Dasein's being-guilty means being the basis of a nullity, and from this essential nullity springs all possibilities, including morality (Heidegger, Being 330-32). In his dream sacrifice, Dostoyevsky's narrator seems to acknowledge his own death as his final possibility and yet paradoxically as the source of all his possibilities. It is the ultimate act of free will, taking on death, done in an attempt to open the dream people's eyes to the fact that they are not essentially evil.

Upon his offer to sacrifice himself, the ridiculous man immediately awakens, and is then prepared to face the Nothing. He declares,

I have seen the Truth, and . . . I know that people can be beautiful and happy without losing their ability to dwell on this earth . . . let it never, never come true, let paradise never be (after all, I do realize that!), I shall anyway go and spread the Word (Dostoyevsky, "Dream" 350).

This powerful statement expresses the narrator's shift from the mental stage to the final one. Instead of vainly attempting to deny his heart, the narrator learns how to live at once with both care for his world and with the knowledge that "nothing matters," that is, by loving others -- solicitude. In this way the ridiculous man can finally lose his self-entanglement, as he becomes able to find meaning in life without trying to find it in himself. Thus he cannot give up, even though he realizes his preaching is futile, for the possibility of universal happiness is much more important than his mere life. The "nothing matters" does not disappear as the narrator was afraid it would if he rejoined the world; rather, it is turned for him from a reason for suicide to a reason for living. This is his resolution of freedom and care, and therefore this stage is the "emotional" stage.

As seen in the experience of the ridiculous man, solicitude seems the necessary result of realizing one's actual possibilities. This is suggested in Being and Time; "[r]esoluteness brings the Self right into . . . solicitous Being with Others" (Heidegger, Being 344). Solicitude is the action that must be taken to move from the mental stage. "[t]o hear the call [of conscience] authentically, signifies bringing oneself into a factual taking-action" (Heidegger, Being 341). For Heidegger,

care for others seems to take two forms: the solicitous as well as a suggested "authenticating" type. Heidegger describes the latter:

Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others. Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another. (Heidegger, Being 347)

In the experience of the ridiculous man there seems to be a parallel to this idea of "authenticating" care for others. He wants people to be like him in understanding after his dream, for mankind's goodness seems only too apparent to him. Furthermore, he cannot be authentically with others until they understand his truth. The narrator believes he has accepted guilt -- ceasing to struggle against thrownness through the act of taking on care for others in his dream sacrifice and his preaching -- thus seemingly conquering the final characteristic of the public, self-entanglement. Therefore, he seems to have reached in his passage from the underground to emotional stage the mode of existence that Heidegger calls the authentic. The narrator becomes his own self, a preacher, and is different from others in a meaningful way -- not just as an antisocial wretch. To conclude, the final form of the ridiculous the reader seems left with is the narrator's view of mankind as a pathetically comic thing that will not recognize its own potential for goodness. His preaching is thus a noble absurdity, and the crowd's heckling of it seems only to reveal his final superiority.

From this reading of Dostoyevsky's story using Heidegger's terms, it may be concluded that both writers are concerned with human freedom and responsibility to others -- basic existential issues. They similarly analyze the possibility of any higher mode of human existence as requiring three major conditions: the initial recognition of a greater power, the factual possibilities it provides, and the result of action in the suggested mode of care for others. It does not seem incorrect, on the grounds of their close agreement, to claim finally that Dostoyevsky's existential short story "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" might represent a Heideggerian fiction (if such a thing were to exist).

Despite their shared existential concerns, Martin Heidegger and Fyodor Dostoyevsky are very different writers. The differences seem to be crucial to each thinker's individual end. Understanding their divergence seems most approachable through attempting to discern what Dostoyevsky truly intended in his "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man." The conclusions drawn above about this story were a result of looking at it purely existentially -- not in relation to the body of Dostoyevsky's work. For Dostoyevsky, the experience related in "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" is completely of the underground. Proof of this strange and shocking claim results from comprehending the meaning of the ridiculous man's continuous differentiation from his world and his lack of solidarity with others that should seemingly result from his care for them.

People act as a constraint to the ridiculous man; for example, by accosting him, the little girl destroys his selfish solitude. The dream provides for him a way to deal with the reality that disrupts him, the "to-him-intolerable variety of experience" (Holquist 159). That in his dream he holds his gun to his heart rather than to his head suggests how his subconscious carries out his



real desires. Thus, his dream is an escape from his unhappy condition, not an answer to it. The trees and the beasts and even the stars had a living tie to the dream-people; all Nature had a common tongue and everything was universal beauty and love. The dream, according to James Michael Holquist, "seeks to eradicate *differences* between selves, the pronouns 'you,' 'I,' 'mine,' and 'yours,' would collapse into a homogenized *One*" (Holquist 156). The narrator incorrectly takes this dream vision as a possibility for real life. Awake, he demands that others see the wisdom of this oneness and conform to his dream. Only then will he love others. Thus, although professing solicitude, he remains isolated, and he deals with the real world that does not conform to his desires through abstractions.

He further distances himself from people by attempting to absorb them into his fantasy, and he feels magnanimously superior to them through his "truth." The ridiculous man does not actually accept his existential guilt in his caring as he had thought. He attempts instead to master reality through a new tactic. He takes his dream, which is a desire and not a real possibility (as seen by the sentient trees), and turns it into an idea, solicitude. The difficulty with Dostoyevsky's story comes from the fact that, although he is in the underground stage, the ways in which the narrator distances himself from others can be misread as genuine thought or care; however, there seems a clear distinction for Dostoyevsky.

The ridiculous man's pride in his idea shows through his humble facade of living for others, and this is one of the dangerous aspects of the mental stage in Dostoyevsky's work. The emphasis at this stage of being can be subtly shifted from the "nothing" to one's own mind, which imparts self-pride through the solutions to the problem of existence that it can conceive. The man of ideas, according to Monroe C. Beardsley in his essay, "Dostoyevsky's Metaphor of the

"Underground," "will begin to construct another state by force, on the principle of enlightened self-interest or general ignorance, [and] tell men to love one another" (Beardsley 284). This narcissism at the creation of a new order, however, eventually leads back to the misanthropy of the underground (that spawned the revolt against the old order), because reality does not conform itself to the utopian vision. This is Dostoyevsky's meaning of nihilism, "a revolt destined to futility" (Beardsley 272). The humanistic lover of mankind can thus despise and destroy individuals through "care."

This nihilism is Dostoyevsky's final conception of the ridiculous, the absurd replacement of order with order, though the narrator of his story does not go so far as to punish others for failure to conform to his ideal. The ridiculous man believes his preaching to be somehow noble in its absurd fruitlessness, a sacrifice made without any hope for actual paradise due to mankind's ignorance, despite his belief in their possible goodness. Yet he is, for Dostoyevsky, deluded and ludicrous, and the reader is to laugh with the heckling crowd at this ridiculous man.

The ridiculous man's position, however, is not an isolated oddity avoidable by any sensible reader. The initial existential reading of "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" can, in fact, be made easily, for the reader seems actively maneuvered by Dostoyevsky into falling into the same trap as the narrator of the story and looking at care from an abstract, conceptual perspective. This story captivates both the logical and the idealistic side of human being through its brilliant writing, which allows one to make the same mistakes as the narrator. It begins to seem natural to believe, with the ridiculous man, that eternal order and happiness would be simple if only everyone else would understand. Dostoyevsky, however, reveals through this trap the reader's own capacity for self deception and forceful enlightenment of others.

Thus, Dostoyevsky's intention in "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" appears to act as a criticism of the Heideggerian position articulated in the analysis of the story. Heidegger acknowledges the progression towards authenticity as requiring the Nothing (the power above oneself), resoluteness towards the real possibilities it brings, and taking action on these possibilities in the suggested care for others. The ridiculous man seemed to work through these issues similarly in his narrative; however, Dostoyevsky finds fault with his character's conclusions. Just as the ridiculous man chooses only the idea of care, so does Heidegger's care seem to be a only a possible logical result of authenticity and is not explored in Being and Time. While other similarities between this philosophical text and the short story are much more strained, there seems to be sufficient ground to claim that Heidegger's authenticity is merely a new "truth" comparable to the narrator's. Acting as conscience for others does not seem overtly aggressive, yet neither does the ridiculous man's preaching. Any concrete ethical conclusions made by Heidegger would fail according to this reading of Dostoyevsky, and the fact that the philosopher does not make any only corroborates Dostoyevsky's sense of the essential impossibility of thought systems to account for and include all human experience. It seems that any system could result in destructive nihilism when its conceptual ideal, a function of the mental stage, fails to correspond to reality. Therefore, Dostoyevsky does not take the simple existential approach to the problem of human life characterized by "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man," but must find something more profound upon which to base his attempt at an answer.

In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoyevsky submits a synthesis of his poetic vision. In the novel, which seems to approach life itself in its complexity, Dostoyevsky attempts to address what he understands as the most important possibilities of human existence. As his Notes from

Underground examines that stage of existence, The Brothers Karamazov is Dostoyevsky's study of the opportunities of escape from the underground.

Before discussing Dostoyevsky's final novel, two points should be made. First, in struggling to find neutral terms to deal with the differing treatments of the "existential stages," one can already see an important difference in Heidegger's and Dostoyevsky's existential explorations. They differ in the type of experience that they choose to be concerned with. In the novels, the characters usually are unemployed idlers with strange passions and overactive minds who are put in extreme situations. This is partially the result of the constraint that fiction requires an interesting plot. Heidegger, on the other hand, can hardly be recognized to be talking about people in Being and Time; his work is so abstract that the clearest image one gets is Dasein holding a hammer. Heidegger focuses on the everyday in order to be taken seriously as a scientific philosopher, while Dostoyevsky explores existence with situations and characters that are fantastic and outrageous. Thus, while their existentialisms are similar in their mutual ultimate concern for human freedom, their modes of inquiry necessarily produce rather different results in their work.

Second, although Dostoyevsky, as a writer of fiction, cannot state his ideas as directly or abstractly as Heidegger can, the requirements of his medium provide his strength. His myriad of characters, viewed narrowly, can be seen to represent the various existential ideas that compose the broad modes of authentic and inauthentic. Through the characters, Dostoyevsky brings life to these philosophic abstractions. Thus, his fiction serves to test the validity of existential insights and to reveal other possibilities of being through its relationship to concrete fictional experience. Keeping these two points in mind while attempting to understand these thinkers seems beneficial.

Dostoyevsky, as a result of representing human nature and experience in the creation of fictional works, realizes that the simplest imaginable escape from the underground is through violence. The underground is an exclusively internal revolt against the outside world, and therefore any action-taking can break one out of the underground nonexistence. Beardsley, who superbly maps out the ways Dostoyevsky envisions to escape from the underground, designates it as the first metamorphosis. This "physical" stage is not a desirous state to remain at for obvious reasons; its answer to the underground is brute strength, and this revolt is often characterized in Dostoyevsky's fiction by acts of anarchy and evil. However, only through suffering and repenting for what he has done can the Dostoyevskian hero be redeemed and genuinely freed from the underground. Examples of this experience are found in Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, the story of Rodion Raskolnikov, as well as in the trial of Dimitri Karamazov. The Brothers Karamazov is very difficult to summarize, but is, in its most basic reduction, the story of Dimitri's transformation; he is convicted of a crime that he desired to commit. Dimitri declares, "I didn't kill Father, but I've got to go" (Dostoyevsky, Brothers 560). Siberia, the place he is to be sent for penal servitude, becomes his symbol of salvation. This similarity to Dostoyevsky's own experience reveals the difference between his early "rationalist" understanding of innocent suffering as a virtue which reveals brotherhood and the later idea, captured in the figure of the "criminal," of voluntary, guilty suffering as a sign of redemption. The man of violence and passion must accept punishment and suffer to be purified; Dimitri's submission is extraordinary because he realizes his fault despite not committing the act.

Otherwise, this violence can have disastrous results. The individual who does not suffer and is unrepentant does not escape the underground and becomes a character of Beardsley's

second metamorphosis, the mental stage. Similar to the ridiculous man, his thought will be a logical explanation and ideological imperative for the universal anarchy that his brutish, unpremeditated actions have shown exists. Raskolnikov comes perilously close to this rationalizing in his attempt to defend his murder of an old pawnbroker through a twisted conception of his doing the greater good for mankind. This type of character is found in Smerdyakov, the wicked epileptic of The Brothers Karamazov, who murders his master Fyodor Karamazov and defends this act with the assertion that "everything is lawful" (Dostoyevsky, Brothers 592).

The mental stage seeks to overthrow the old order not with violence but with logic. Its answer to the underground is the mind, and it is a very dangerous stage for Dostoyevsky; few of his characters who attempt this route are salvageable. Ivan Karamazov is perhaps the best example of a purely cerebral anarchist; he claims it is easier to renounce God's world than reason. His revolt seems much more honest and less self-centered than the ridiculous man's; Ivan has great trouble with the suffering of innocents, and he would not accept a paradise that was built on the blood of one child. It has been suggested that Dostoyevsky planned to show the escape of each brother from the underground. Only Dimitri's exists; however, Ivan's escape is hinted at in The Brothers Karamazov and would consist of taking on guilt. He feels superior to others due to his revolutionary thoughts but is repulsed by the actual murder of his father, Fyodor. When he learns that Smerdyakov committed the murder based on one of his own ideas and realizes his similarity to that twisted servant, Ivan goes mad. He confesses at the trial of his brother Dimitri that Smerdyakov was the actual killer and that he gave the murderer the intention. He accepts

responsibility and begins to take on guilt and suffering for the actions of his ideological double, a beginning to any future reformation Ivan is to have.

The third chance for escape is found in the emotional stage. Solicitude, however, has to be re-understood; for Dostoyevsky, it is not linked to an attempt to change the world on the example of the ridiculous man, but is rather acting without any designs. The answer to the underground presented by this stage is love, which does not claim the ability to make others better. It is not conditional on improvement or change, but is given to people as they are. It responds to the actual variety of human experience. The best example of this, the third of Beardsley's metamorphoses, is the youngest Karamazov brother, Alexey. While it may seem that his love is not active, this is definitely not the case. Dmitry Tschizewskij explains Alexey's position:

What are his cares about Dimitri, his talks with the Boys and with Ivan, with Liza and Grushenka, even his keeping silent company with his father, but constant, untiring action? In these actions are united in a singular way activity and passivity (talking and listening), concern for others and calm acceptance of others' concern for himself, aid to others and consciousness of his own need for aid, active love for others and becoming loved by others, the union of seriousness with joking and play. (Tschizewskij 800)

Therefore, he shows the operation of the emotional stage, which is neither pure action or thought. Alyosha, as he is fondly called, also becomes a role model for those around him through his honesty. Furthermore, he treats even the ugliest of personalities, such as his father, with love; thus, his experience of care is completely the opposite of the ridiculous man's. This stage also

marks the beginning of the acceptance of existential guilt, for accepting solicitude means realizing mankind's shared plight as thrown beings and the value of other's lives.

Thus, for Dostoyevsky, a basic state of human being is ignorance of freedom -- the public existence -- but the most pathetic stage is that which realizes that freedom exists but cannot make a grasp for it -- the underground existence. There are three routes from the underground to true freedom, and they are through violence, thought, or love. Suffering is the key to escape, and this is the experience that Dostoyevsky is most interested in. Yet what about the previous claim that he wished to avoid portraying it in his writing due to the early relationship with Belinsky? There is an essential difference between the suffering which reveals sentimentalized brotherhood and Dostoyevsky's later understanding, present in his great novels, that it is necessary to be an individual in order to be with others in real community. As previously seen, each of these three actions creates a self out of the previous non-entity. Therefore, none of the stages of escape -- the physical, mental or emotional -- is superior (despite the opinions of critics who, however, cannot agree on one brother), for in each there is the possibility of escape from the underground. This is seen concretely in the Karamazov brothers. Dimitri overcomes his passion and violence and is prepared to go to Siberia, while Ivan confesses in court against all reason and begins his escape, and Alyosha, without the protection of the monastery hermitage in which he spent his youth, maintains his integrity throughout the novel, although his test seems yet to come. Yet none of these stages represent Dostoyevsky's supreme vision of human life, for even Alyosha's goodness can be corrupted.

The ultimate mode of human existence for Dostoyevsky is represented by the elder Zosima, the monk who is mentor to Alyosha in The Brothers Karamazov. Despite all the



existential advances made previously in recognizing the importance of freedom and the value of care for others, there remains the possibility for decline and return to the underground in any of those stages. Christianity to Dostoyevsky provides the solution to the problem of human life, for only here is the true greater power, God, accepted. The final acceptance of existential guilt comes from realizing God's supremacy, for then the solution cannot be one's own (as per the ridiculous man's idea) but is His. This difference can be seen in comparing the dream crucifixion of the ridiculous man to the Savior's actual death. Christ did not ask to be killed, and he took on others' sins, while the ridiculous man begs for death as punishment for his own guilt, destroying the dream-world paradise. Only action can provide a self, but only God can guarantee it -- otherwise one becomes trapped in that very self (Ivan's predicament). All the Karamazov brothers, including Alyosha, question God. Alyosha is distanced from the strict religious position at his introduction, as the narrator gives the opinion that "[Alyosha] was simply a lover of humanity, and that he adopted the monastic life because at the time it struck him as the ideal escape for his soul struggling from the darkness" (Dostoyevsky, Brothers 13). Therefore, Father Zosima is the best representative of this stage -- the Christian.

The elder Zosima is the most mysterious and secretive of all the major characters of The Brothers Karamazov. He is the least understood critically, and his position in "The Russian Monk" is hardly cited in comparison to the preceding chapter "The Grand Inquisitor," both of which are central in the novel. In fact, Book VI seems to touch the essence of Dostoyevsky, yet, as Walter Kaufmann claims, "most readers fail to distinguish between Dostoyevsky's views and those of the Grand Inquisitor" (Kaufmann 14). Zosima is neither to be ignored nor taken as the only character of interest. This is so because, as Nathan Rosen claims in his essay, "Style and

Subject in The Brothers Karamazov," Dostoyevsky could not reveal the mysteries of the three conversions about which Zosima speaks because they prefigure the Karamazov brothers' experiences. The elder Zosima is only a part of the polyphony with the other characters on the model that Mikhail Bakhtin presents in Problems of Dostoyevsky's Poetics, and this explains why the masterpiece is not about the life of the monk. Although he is the model of the true Christian, the routes which lead to him are crucial both in themselves and as means of understanding his mystery, and therefore must not be forgotten.

Christianity overcomes the nihilism inherent in a person's private attempt at a solution to the problem of existence and maintains the self which is won through action. The essence of Christianity for Dostoyevsky, however, is the promise of eternal life. The Bible has become translated into modern ethics (by the Tolstoys of the world), but ultimately truth does not lie in science. For this reason, claims Lev Shestov in his Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, Raskolnikov chooses the story of Lazarus -- as Dostoyevsky himself sees in the Gospel not this or that moral philosophy, but the pledge of immortality, the one sovereign idea that mankind can live by, the only basis for human existence. One cannot be accountable for actions without an after world, without which no amount of logic can evade nihilism. Immortality and the subsequent possibility of forgiveness are Zosima's answer to Ivan's problem of the suffering of innocents.

Only through the acceptance of Christ is true freedom attained. For Dostoyevsky, this is so because humanity cannot ultimately know good from evil. The disturbing nature of this enigma is present in Dimitri Karamazov's famous lament, "I can't endure the thought that a man of lofty mind and heart begins with the ideal of the Madonna and ends with the ideal of Sodom" (Dostoyevsky, Brothers 97). Thus, the possibility of personal, existential freedom requires

understanding the necessity of all men's freedom, and this for Dostoyevsky is a person's most difficult task. Beardsley relates, "Christ, says Dostoyevsky, saw this truth about man and came to bid him cherish and preserve this freedom of will despite all the suffering and peril its preservation entails" (Beardsley 289). Therefore, through living in God, the elder Zosima has the power to take on the burden of others' guilt. This taking guilt does not mean Zosima judges, for he is not God and so shares in the essential guilt of humanity. Zosima exhorts, "no one can judge a criminal, until he recognizes that he is just such a criminal as the man standing before him, and that he perhaps is more than all men to blame for that crime" (Dostoyevsky, Brothers 300). Through accepting his own, the monk is able to take on (but not take away) others' guilt, to remove pain and allow life. Furthermore, his taking on the burden of others' guilt is the opposite of Ivan's Grand Inquisitor, who takes on the burden of others' freedom. The Inquisitor claims, "man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he can hand over that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born" (Dostoyevsky, Brothers 235). Ivan's cardinal chooses the position of Satan and would grant mankind happiness through the forces of miracle, mystery, and authority which Christ refuses. The Inquisitor's understanding becomes the final result of every stage but the Christian for Dostoyevsky: true freedom is unattainable without God.

Dostoyevsky's strength derives from his contact with human experience through the medium of fiction. His claim that an idea system, such as the fundamental ontology in Being and Time can be seen to be, will ultimately lead to nihilism is backed with the example of the ridiculous man. Heidegger seems comparable to the Grand Inquisitor in that he takes away man's freedom to rebel by explaining "how things really work." Without this essential underground

capacity for free choice, one can never become fully human; God signifies much more than Heidegger's comparable concept, the "Nothing." The Brothers Karamazov is Dostoyevsky's testament to the value of Christian faith for all times.

Although his position in Being and Time may be more sympathetic towards the beginning of "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" than Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Martin Heidegger also has necessary problems with the initial existential reading of the short story. Just as the novelist brings his own character to task over the central figure of the underground, the philosopher's critique is formed on the basis of the key concept of authenticity. By means of a final re-evaluation of Dostoyevsky's story, Heidegger's actual philosophy will be examined.

For Heidegger, the concluding experience related in "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" is inauthentic, and therefore no attempts to relate this narrative to the designs of his project of fundamental ontology are possible. Put simply, this experience is inauthentic because the ridiculous man chooses pure solicitude. Due to this choice, he exists only for others; he has no self-centered ambition or potential. Authenticity, on the other hand, is achieved by accepting the responsibility to be one's own self. A good way to expose the problems Heidegger has with the ridiculous man's solicitude is to examine the ethical dimension of Being and Time.

In The Fragile "We", Lawrence Vogel explores this concern over the implications of Heidegger's fundamental ontology and concept of authenticity. According to Vogel, there are three ways to read Being and Time with these issues in mind. The first he calls the existential, a misreading made by Jean-Paul Sartre, which takes the death analysis as Heidegger's central insight. Understanding authenticity in terms of a lone hero leads to the claim that the individual

has arbitrary moral authority -- what Vogel calls subjectivism. Thus, Sartre takes as the starting point for philosophizing a phrase of Dostoyevsky's, "If God didn't exist, everything would be possible." Yet both Heidegger and Dostoyevsky seem to venture beyond this simplistic conclusion.

The second reading is the historicist, and Vogel asserts it is the only one that can be maintained by the text or was intended by the author. Heidegger's idea of "historicality" suggests looking to one's own time and situation in order to root (ethical) possibilities. Through a critical re-appropriation of the past for the future, the individual is bound to the authority of the community. In this way timeless commandments are avoided, but the individual is not allowed arbitrary authority. Yet, as Vogel points out, this historicality is actually almost as arbitrary as the existential ethical reading. Although the individual's choice is limited as a historically oriented decision, no criterion is provided for judging the situation one is in. Vogel calls this ethical relativism; it seems hardly different from the conclusion of the existential reading, as neither reading provides a ground for judgment beyond whim or circumstance. This addition only serves to illuminate Heidegger's own situation, for, as Vogel sees, "if one's choice of self is governed by the authority of tradition, then there seems to be no standpoint from which one can criticize the prejudices of one's group" (Vogel 8).

The third reading, Vogel's cosmopolitan, is similar to the appropriation of Heidegger in the original "Ridiculous Man" analysis: Heidegger seems to lend himself to this sort of interpretation, which focuses on Being-with others and "authenticating" care. Vogel labels the latter "liberating solicitude" (Vogel 70). However, the cosmopolitan care model is only an interpretation of Being and Time and, as Vogel diplomatically puts it, "requires a creative

supplementation of Heidegger's text at odds with the author's intentions" (Vogel 9). Therefore, the early claim that the short story, "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man," might represent an actual Dostoyevskian or Heideggerian position is finally shown to be false, though some of its existential insights remain valid. Heidegger's view becomes clear when it is distanced from the ridiculous man's resolution of care.

Heidegger's basic innovation working throughout Being and Time is that all metaphysics are founded on a false ontology. From this philosophical vantage-point, he can critique Dostoyevsky's theological position represented in The Brothers Karamazov. Through this critique, furthermore, the essential features of his early philosophy will become clear. Heidegger's phenomenological ontology of authenticity anxiety, and death seems to provide the benefits which Christianity strives for, an escape from nihilism to existential freedom.

First, important doctrines of Christianity do not correspond to phenomenological experience. The best example is the concept of immortality, which Dostoyevsky values highly. Heidegger, in his fundamental ontology, brackets any questions about afterworlds and denies the traditional understanding of them. He claims, "[o]nly when death is conceived in its full ontological essence can we have any methodological assurance in even *asking what may be after death*, only then can we do so with meaning and justification" (Heidegger, Being 292). This "bracketing" is a method of phenomenology, a discipline originated by Heidegger's mentor Edmund Husserl. Heidegger states that, "Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object" (Heidegger, Being 62). Concerning the second term, he says, "'phenomenology' expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'To the things

themselves!' It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings" (Heidegger, Being 50). Dostoyevsky seems to make an explicit attack on phenomenology, though it of course came after his death, through his character Father Zosima. The monk contends,

in science there is nothing but what is the object of sense. The spiritual world, the higher part of man's being is rejected altogether, dismissed with a sort of triumph, even with hatred. The world has proclaimed the reign of freedom . . . Nothing but slavery and self-destruction! (Dostoyevsky, Brothers 292)

Yet Heidegger probably would agree with this apparent denunciation, because active destruction of the traditional ontology is for him the only way to an understanding of the true nature of Being.

Two concrete examples of Heidegger's insightfulness which results from this approach are the previously discussed experience of conscience, which will provide a model of the function of phenomenology that also applies to the second phenomenon, immortality. After removing the encrusted meaning and significance placed on conscience as something that warns or reproves, Heidegger proceeds to reveal its actual function as a call simply to ownness and possibilities.

What is most audacious about Heidegger's monumental project of fundamental ontology is his belief that, as Hubert Dreyfus perceives, "it is only to make manifest what we already know"

(Dreyfus 27). Returning to the concept of immortality, which as claimed previously is not according to Heidegger experiential, the phenomenological outlook obviously leads to a critique of Christianity. Although the afterlife is for Heidegger an unfounded and possibly empty concept, it does affect man in a concrete way by depriving one's death of meaning. If life is lived so that an afterworld will be attained, this means changing one's behavior on earth. Thus, one does not live with concern for the fact that he or she will end, which would entail a completely different

orientation towards one's time on earth. The possibility of anxiety in the face of death, which is key for Heidegger to developing a sense of ownness, seems to be removed from mankind by the belief in immortality.

A second critique that Heidegger's philosophy seems to lead to is that, if God is the representative of this immortal future possibility, then one must conform to whatever this deity represents. Thus, a communal "truth" is created which serves as an answer to all mankind's existence. Yet for Heidegger, as seen previously in his philosophical response to Descartes, human being is essentially possibilities. Dasein is not an object, and thus does not have a single *telos* or goal; he explains this point in detail in his examination of Dasein's possibility of being a whole.

Heidegger would agree that man is an entity that is unfulfilled, what he calls Dasein's "not-yet," and that death plays a role in the process of fulfillment. However, "ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself," for Dasein's not-yet is not the same as the unripeness of a fruit (Heidegger, *Being* 289). The analogy also implies that, if there is no single way Dasein must live (no certain human "ripeness"), then there are no eternal ethical conclusions possible. For Heidegger, the role of death is to cause anxiety so that this life will be lived authentically and in a fulfilling manner. Anticipation is "that *way of being* in which Dasein *is towards* its death" (Heidegger, *Being* 291). This does not mean desiring the actualization of death, for this is just another way to deny one's possibilities. In anticipation, "one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factual possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped" -- death (Heidegger, *Being* 308). Therefore, fulfillment does not occur in another life, but, on the contrary, requires remaining grounded within



one's own life-situation, and some of the ethical implications of this historicism were seen previously. This situatedness is in fact based upon Heidegger's concept of Being-in-the-world, the character of which influences many of his insights.

"Being-in-the-world" is a unitary phenomenon. It is constituted by three equiprimordial aspects: the in-the-world, the entity which it is, and the Being-in as such. The second aspect has already been examined as the "who" which Dasein is, normally the "they"-self or in authenticity one's own self. The first aspect, the concept of world, is obviously crucial to Heidegger's emphasis on situatedness and historicity. World, it must be remembered, is a characteristic of Dasein and not the objective totality of entities, which is termed the "present-at-hand." It is therefore the everyday world of Dasein's concern, of equipment "ready-to-hand," which Heidegger takes as his basis for philosophical insight. This differentiation from the tradition is the obvious result of the phenomenological outlook and leads to surprising differences; Heidegger claims, "[a]s long as we take our orientation primarily and exclusively from the present-at-hand, the 'in-itself' can by no means be ontologically clarified" (Heidegger, Being 106). Therefore ontology has proceeded, prior to his effort, by categorically ignoring "significance;" this concept forms the difference between his existential and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Between Dasein and any other entity, there is an involvement in something, and this relationship is reference. The totality of references or involvements which are undertaken by Dasein are done so for-the-sake-of something. This "for-which" is significance -- "Dasein 'signifies' to itself: in a primordial way it gives itself both its Being and its potentiality-for-Being as something which it is to understand" (Heidegger, Being 120). Thus, Dasein exists to order the world for its diverse ends, and the world exists to be organized as equipment "towards-which" to accomplish these

ends. Heidegger in this way replaces the detached transcendental model, in which Being is made a substance without understanding its "be-ing," with an active engaged existence.

Being-in-the-world's third aspect is Dasein as its "there," the Being-in. Understanding and state-of-mind are the two equiprimordial ways of being the "there." State-of-mind or mood, the "how one finds oneself," is realized by Heidegger to be disclosive of the world for Dasein; "having a mood brings Being to its 'there'" (Heidegger, Being 173). Yet, "'to be disclosed' does not mean 'to be known as this sort of thing'"; his example of fear clarifies this non-epistemic disclosure. Only in the state-of-mind of fear can one perceive something as threatening, for "threatening" is not an objective quality of the thing itself. State-of-mind is important because it reveals Dasein's facticity, the "that one is," and also the "that one has to be," which is thrownness. "The 'that-it-is' of facticity never becomes something that we can come across by beholding it," according to Heidegger (Heidegger, Being 174). Thus, Heidegger makes the subject of his philosophy such academically-disregarded phenomena as state-of-mind, which in turn serves to reveal human existence as grounded in everyday living in the world.

Understanding, the other half of Being-in, is equally important to Heidegger's concept of the "there." It is the "what one can be," the disclosure of Dasein's possibilities (within the factual situation that state-of-mind discloses). The reason why Dasein always presses forward into possibilities is "because the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call 'projection'" (Heidegger, Being 183). Dasein's projection, the "become what one is," occurs through significance. Thus, facticity is ultimately potentiality -- which Dasein is as projective Being. Being-in-the-world, therefore, is finally synonymous with Dasein. It combines all of Heidegger's various existential insights of possibilities, anxiety, and thrownness. This manifold is

so awkward it is ultimately reduced by Heidegger to what he perceives as the primordial defining phenomenon of Dasein -- care. Dasein is for-the-sake-of itself, and anxiety is over one's potentiality. Thus, the fundamental definitions at the beginning of Being and Time provide a foundation for his historicism, and these must be ignored to claim the later "existential" sections as Heidegger's essence.

Third, returning to the critique of Christianity, the result of this misconceived "truth" is that freedom is actually lost. The best way to reveal this loss is to return to the topic of ethics. A moral code is necessary to sustain the concept of immortality. Eternity seems meaningless without the threat of punishment or the promise of reward for mortal behavior. If everyone was guaranteed an existence beyond this earthly one, what would be the purpose in differentiating the afterlife? What would death mean? Furthermore, God must represent all that is valued in Christianity, and since God is eternal these values are made so as well. This morality removes man's complete freedom through sanctifying certain behaviors and outlawing others with divine support. In The Brothers Karamazov, the inability of mankind to choose correctly between the ideals of beauty, Dimitri's Madonna and Sodom, seems to prove that Dostoyevsky successfully avoids positing a strict morality and that man is unquestionably free. However, although unable to know good and evil with certainty, humanity still must choose and act. Therefore, even if the matter is much complicated by Dostoyevsky, only goodness will bring reward and thus his morality is behavior modification removing basic freedom.

Authenticity is for Heidegger more primordial than a predilection for either good or evil, as the choice of one's own self. In choosing possibilities, Dasein is constantly *not* all the other possibilities. This lack is, as discussed before, what Heidegger means by Dasein's guilt and being

the basis of a nullity. "The primordial 'Being-guilty' cannot be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself" (Heidegger, Being 332). He claims, "[f]reedom, however, *is* only in the choice of one possibility -- that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them" (Heidegger, Being 331). Being responsible for one's projective being entails resoluteness within the situation one is factually in at the time. Thus, Dasein is not limited to the pre-determined possibilities of either failing or succeeding to conform to absolute external standards, but rather is that entity which must create its own being in relation to the fact that there is only the background of the Nothing against which it exists.

Fourth, just as Heidegger was previously claimed to have a hidden tendency towards nihilism which erupts at the eventual failure of any man-made system to answer the problem of existence, Dostoyevsky's religion can be counter-critiqued with the same charge of this hidden fault. Faith is the foundation for a new rational system which results from accepting immortality as "truth." Instead of dealing with what it does not like, Christianity evades the truth of death being Dasein's end with a fabrication which gives an irrational basis for a system far more complicated than fundamental ontology (all the dogmas, doctrines and rituals). Thus, Dostoyevsky would fall victim to the dreaded charge of nihilism, for he seems to be attempting transcendence to a "truth" or unity although he tries to hide it through his existentialism. He can be understood as a system builder who does not finish the job, just as Heidegger was argued to be earlier.

Furthermore, the concept of nihilism must be clarified. There are in fact two types, and confusion results from an unsystematic way in which the term is thrown around without this differentiation. The first type of nihilism, which Dostoyevsky is now accused of, shall be termed

transcendental. It focuses upon some "truth" or eternal at the expense of the temporal, man. The nihilism which Heidegger was accused of earlier in our re-analysis of "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" in the discussion of Dostoyevsky is also of this kind. Dostoyevsky would critique him as having to draw some sort of conclusion, such as solicitude, which could then be seen to go awry. But Heidegger's thought in fact does not seem to allow this appropriation. Thus, God, as stated previously in the conclusion of Dostoyevsky's position, *does* signify much more than the Nothing, although the intention of this statement as well as the charge of nihilism seems reversed.

In conclusion, immortality is not phenomenological and yet excludes anxiety, "truth" removes the possibilities which death could allow, morality denies the freedom which authenticity allows, and God leads to transcendental nihilism while the Nothing just nothing. It can now be understood how resoluteness is the only way to accept one's guilt, a phenomenon of existence recognized by all involved. The purely existential appropriation of guilt, in solicitude from realizing thrownness and thus escaping self-entanglement, was realized to be untenable. One remains, like the fictional ridiculous man or the real Sartre, trapped in oneself, in ethical subjectivism. The Christian appropriation of guilt, in solicitude from realizing other's freedom and thus escaping judging, was also realized to be untenable phenomenologically because ultimately conformity rather than potentiality is the result. Similarly to the phenomenon of conscience examined earlier, guilt is turned by the tradition into sin instead of discerned phenomenologically as thrownness, with the result that morality is emphasized over possibilities. Heidegger seems completely at odds with the Christian understanding.

God becomes merely another idea that can be perverted, as "care" was by the ridiculous man. Furthermore, Heidegger seems to be able to claim the promise of true freedom in his

philosophy that Dostoyevsky strives for without resorting to blind faith. He, interestingly, has the same idea of an act of disburdening freedom as Dostoyevsky does in his Grand Inquisitor.

Heidegger's term for the act of removing another's care is "leaping in" -- which is opposed to "leaping forth," an action which allows the other to take on his own care authentically (Heidegger, Being 158). The doctrine of immortality, furthermore, could be interpreted as the "leaping in" of God, who takes away mankind's care as the world of concern. There is no need for concern or anxiety if one is immortal, and in this way the concept of what human existence *is* changes under this doctrine. This is the false ontology of Christianity which Heidegger is attempting to replace.

Yet what is the real "substance" of the idea of a free and authentic Dasein, the proffered vision of the phenomenological outlook? The focus of Heidegger's work seems to be on openness almost to the exclusion of exploring the real actions which it supposedly allows; Dasein seems to be glorified for having possibilities and yet the substantive character of authentic action seems ignored or avoided. While the Christian outlook is characterized by conformity to the commandment of the "right" choice, the philosophy of Heidegger is individual centered and therefore ultimately the possibility of free choice, even within the bounds of a historical situation, leads ultimately to the question "why choose?".

The difference between Dostoyevsky and Heidegger is thus reducible to the contrast between the chosen power above oneself: God or the Nothing. The answer the Nothing provides to the problem of existence is nothing, the emptiness of the death that is a reality for each Dasein. This is an undeniably bleak picture of human being, despite however many possibilities and choices are allowed before the end. Fundamental ontology seems to be ultimately pessimistic, yet Heidegger would claim his work is only realism, mankind's first true understanding of its Being,

and comparing it to the promises of fantasy is inequitable for it only seems pessimistic due to our ancient, deeply-embedded delusions.

Heidegger's concept of historicity cannot, however, help to fight this charge of pessimism. Dasein "discloses current factual possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them *in terms of the heritage*, which that resoluteness, as thrown, *takes over*" (Heidegger, Being 435). The hermeneutical circle of understanding also reveals that one's perspective is always rooted in a particular situation. If the context is the basis for all possibilities, then there are no transhistorical meanings, values, goals, or ideals. Although Heidegger tries to combat groundlessness with the idea of the historical situation which is always the prior base of our projects, historicity leaves Dasein fundamentally groundless because one can only appropriate historically conditioned possibilities. There is no ultimate metaphysical meaning to Dasein's projects or future.

Yet this condemnation may turn out to be stuck in the ways of traditional thinking which Heidegger is trying to overcome, for Being, not human being, is the issue. Is Being then Heidegger's comparable term for God rather than Nothing, as had been presupposed? He states in Being and Time that "*Being is the transcendens pure and simple*" (Heidegger, Being 62). His project of fundamental ontology is never completed, so it cannot be proven to succeed in evading transcendental nihilism. Furthermore, if the design were carried out nihilism may be unavoidable, as Dostoyevsky would claim of any system. On the other hand, Nishitani Keiji claims that transcendence is not beyond the world but to Dasein's world itself. He understands selfhood as transcendence; "in the act of transcending beings, a distinction is made between what is 'self' and what is not, on this basis the self relates *itself* to the beings it has transcended. This is what it means for a self to 'be'" (Nishitani 163). Therefore, the possibility of transcendence comes from

Nothing, and Being is not transcended to but rather that which transcends out of itself -- pure and simple. It seems Heidegger has to remain with the Nothing as the ultimate ontological factor in order to retain his phenomenological validity. "*Ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit*: every being, as far as it is a being, is made out of nothing" (Heidegger, "Metaphysics" 255).

Heidegger's philosophy thus would fall into the second type of nihilism -- existential nihilism. This is the nihilism of the Nothing. The charge of meaninglessness seems difficult to avoid if Heidegger is not positing another "truth" in his concept of Being. While this position does not apparently remove humanity's necessary freedom in any way, it almost provides excessive freedom. Man exists with the qualification only that he will die, that the Nothing will eventually swallow Being.

Heidegger creates in Being and Time a systematic understanding of human existence through a philosophical writing which focus on everyday experiences, as opposed to the extraordinary in Dostoyevsky. Although his work certainly falls short of answering the problem of existence, Heidegger sees it as an improvement over the past two thousand years of ontological thought and a step towards a true understanding of Being. Walter Kaufmann relates,

twenty years after the publication of Being and Time, [Heidegger] writes:

"Philosophy could hardly have been given a clearer demonstration of the power of this oblivion of Being than it has furnished us by the somnambulistic assurance with which it has passed by the real and only question of Being and Time."

(Kaufmann 35)



It should now be evident how Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Martin Heidegger agree in their fundamental existential insights yet respond to these issues in an antithetical manner, in part due to their genius in their respective disciplines of philosophy and literature. It seems that their differences are ultimately irreconcilable. Rather than being existentialists who provide different interpretations of one subject, Heidegger and Dostoyevsky are thinkers whose phenomenological or Christian standpoint ultimately changes the character of the core existential insights.

Furthermore, there is a problem arising from the examination of these opposed positions. Dostoyevsky proves that nihilistic anarchy is the result of attempting to solve the problem of existence from oneself without God. Heidegger shows that blind belief in the eternal leads to the "truth" of the "they." The options seem to be either the pessimism of the isolationist or the conformism of the mass man. Thus, Heidegger ends portrayed as a system builder abstracted from life while Dostoyevsky is conceived as a fantasy-bound moralizer. These characterizations are completely at odds with the writers' intentions, and yet are brought out in their contrast. Therefore, the early claim that both Heidegger and Dostoyevsky are responding to rationalism through existentialism is made questionable. The analysis seems about to fall apart into chaos as its basic distinctions and premises are questioned, but this fragmentation will in fact begin to bring everything together.

That Dostoyevsky and Heidegger are to be considered in some way as rationalists seems confusing because it muddles all the supposedly distinctive positions presented. However, it is an insight into the basic structure of the entire argument. The philosophic position of each of these thinkers can be and has been reduced to a simple dualism. Heidegger perceives the Nothing and this leads to anarchy, while Dostoyevsky believes in God and this provides a definite morality.

This dualism is characterized by what shall be suggested as their "cosmological" and "anthropological" perspectives. Ultimately, the issue in these perspectives is basis. In Dostoyevsky's case, there is a concrete ground for human life, yet there is no possible confirmation of the eternal. A. Boyce Gibson points out this fact; "[t]heoretically, Ivan's criticisms are unanswered: Alyosha, in particular, simply agrees with him: and Dostoevsky himself held them to be 'irrefutable'. The answer is to go forward from theory to practice" (Gibson 176). For Heidegger, on the other hand, it seems impossible to provide any basis for human actions because of his discovery of the Nothing, as demonstrated earlier. Thus, Heidegger's strength is his cosmological orientation; Dostoyevsky's, the anthropological.

Furthermore, the reason why each writer's thinking may be characterized as rationalism is that each one's weakness is characteristic of it. In an imaginary arrangement, if Heidegger and Dostoyevsky were placed on a horizontal axis near the poles of "science" and "faith" respectively, Rene' Descartes could be placed on a vertical axis towards the pole of "reason." Descartes claims the eternal to be universal reason and professes no real morality but only an imperative to rational action. Thus, Descartes is instantly repudiated for having the faults of both Dostoyevsky and Heidegger -- the unprovable and unlivable. To finish this experiment, the opposite pole of this vertical axis, "life," can be represented by another Frenchman, Jean-Paul Sartre. In Being and Nothingness he states, "[n]othingness lies coiled in the heart of being -- like a worm" (Sartre, Being 21). Sartre, therefore claims no transcendental eternal, yet makes this the grounds for positing a self-generating, purely existential morality. It is obvious how Sartre is opposed on this issue to Descartes, whose first moral maxim in the Discourse on Method is, "to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering constantly to the religion in which by God's grace I had been

instructed since my childhood, and in all other things directing my conduct by opinions the most moderate in nature, and the farthest removed from excess" (Descartes, Discourse 18). Therefore, it was appropriate to claim that Heidegger and Dostoyevsky each in his own way responds to rationalism, which they commonly understand to be misguided, although each retains one of the weaknesses of that outlook.

Yet, if Descartes was all wrong, then is not Sartre's position the most favorable and least assailable? No, for the pure existential position as represented by Sartre is too extreme and irrational; his morality verges on animalism. He claims, "[m]an is nothing else but that which he makes of himself," and later, "[i]f values are uncertain, if they are still too abstract to determine the particular, concrete case under consideration, nothing remains but to trust in our instincts" (Sartre, "Existentialism" 349, 355). A philosophy of absolute reason is just as misconceived as the approach from pure consciousness. Thus, Heidegger and Dostoyevsky fall in between. The vertical axis, it is realized, represents only the variation of historical attempts -- which range from the biological or mathematical standpoints -- to deal with the fundamental dualism which the horizontal represents as the greatest problem of all western thought, the ultimate incompatibility of the anthropological and cosmological perspectives. Is there then a position between reason and life, and more importantly between faith and science? This graphing exercise may be entertaining, but it does not seem extremely enlightening. The concept of a dualism of cosmological and anthropological perspectives, however, necessarily leads to a figure which can illuminate this entire structure.

In The Will to Power, Friedrich Nietzsche declares, "[k]nowledge and becoming exclude one another. Consequently, 'knowledge' must be something else: there must first of all be a will

to make knowable, a kind of becoming must itself create the deception of beings" (Nietzsche, Will #517). Nietzsche seems to be appropriate to introduce at this point for many reasons. Like Heidegger and Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche is claimed as an existentialist, for he too is deeply concerned with man's freedom. He is between Heidegger and Dostoyevsky historically (most of his important writing occurred in the 1880's) and in other, more substantial ways -- such as being both a novelist and philosopher. Understanding his intermediary status, furthermore, will reveal that Nietzsche's philosophy highlights the way in which Heidegger and Dostoyevsky are taking sides in *the* traditional western dualism which has existed since ancient Greece -- Being and Becoming.

Nietzsche's ontological concept is the "will to power," it is what is. In his notes he explains:

My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (--its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on-- (Nietzsche, Will #636)

However, Nietzsche wants his version of will to be life-affirming, not pessimistic as his mentor Schopenhauer's earlier conception of it is. Nietzsche claims, "what he calls 'will' is a mere empty word. It is even less a question of a 'will to live'; for life is merely a special case of the will to power" (Nietzsche, Will #692). An added difficulty to this problem arises in Nietzsche's perception of a fundamental division of the will to power. Schopenhauer held that this division

was the loss of a "primal unity," while in the Christian Genesis there is a similar primordial division in God's separation of light and darkness. This division for Nietzsche takes the character of Being and Becoming, a dualism which has existed since the pre-Socratic philosophers Parmenides and Heraclitus. Man must exist in Being, even though it is an Apollonian illusion, because he attains greater will to power through these illusions. But, stepping back into the cosmological viewpoint, one realizes that reality is actually of the character of Becoming -- Dionysian. Man needs value and his "truth" as a life-preserving fiction, a sense of direction capable of forming and containing energies so that he will not dissipate in confusion and meaninglessness. However, the ultimate "truth" for Nietzsche is the relativity of all truths, which Plato is instrumental in obscuring for nearly two millennia.

Plato measured the degree of reality by the degree of value and said: The more "Idea," the more being. He reversed the concept "reality" and said: "What you take for real is an error, and the nearer we approach the 'Idea,' the nearer we approach 'truth.'" (Nietzsche, Will #572)

How then does one uphold an idea such as Aristotle's "law" of contradictions (which is necessary for life) when the cosmological perspective shows it is not ultimately true? Nietzsche's answer to this is the idea of the "transvaluation" of all values. Both perspectives are necessary and must be fused in the creator -- awareness of the necessity and relativity of value. Thus, Nietzsche cannot reconcile the ancient dualism, but attempts to escape pessimism through a philosophy which accepts both sides. The first doctrine which results from transvaluation is the "overman." The overman is the anthropological *telos* of the will to power. Yet, as Richard Lowell Howey correctly perceives, "No matter how fully and richly a man lives, there is still

always the possibility for future self-overcoming" (Howey 131). Thus, the dialectic of transvaluation allows Becoming to completely infect Being; the overman is a "value" which undermines all permanence.

This dialectic is also discovered in the second doctrine which comes from transvaluation, "the eternal recurrence of the same," which Nietzsche claimed as his greatest thought. Eternal recurrence is the result of the cosmological perspective, for the simple repetition of a single life is devoid of a *telos*, a reward or a purpose. And yet, like the overman, it is an idea completely infused with the essence of the other side of the dualism; this repetition continues forever. Nietzsche believed in the possibility of eternal recurrence because,

[i]f the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force . . . it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination would at sometime or another be realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of times. (Nietzsche, Will #1066)

Furthermore, eternal recurrence is only important philosophically if it is taken literally. Howey, in his otherwise perceptive work Heidegger and Jaspers on Nietzsche, fails to recognize this fact in presenting his interpretation of this crucial doctrine. He erroneously believes, "*if there were no repetitions at all*, if this is the 'once and only' Life, *then* the imperative to create 'eternal' moments could raise man's struggle to the greatest heights of nobility and tragedy" (Howey 150). This misunderstanding reveals exactly how difficult and extraordinary this idea is.

The eternal is not figurative for Nietzsche, and the recurrence is not to be ignored. Nietzsche's doctrine gives mankind a real sense of the eternal, as one is allowed and condemned

to live the exact same life over and over again forever. It affords a concrete morality, as one lives with the hope of an eternal happiness. Yet, by the same law, it allows only one life, completely free, and ultimately promises nothing, no reward or punishment or even meaning for this existence which one cannot even know one is repeating. Thus, there can be no return to the primal unity of the will as Schopenhaur and the young Nietzsche desired, but only attempts to embrace Being and Becoming. "It becomes clear that Nietzsche wishes to transform what has been traditionally regarded as a dualism into a 'dialectical monism,' thus achieving a synthesis of Heraclitus and Parmenides" (Howey 49). "To impose upon becoming the character of being -- that is the supreme will to power" (Nietzsche, Will #617)

Therefore, Nietzsche's "will" is finally understood as life-affirming. In the place of the traditional life-denying values Nietzsche envisions the overman, a writer of "new tablets." Out of the empty despair of meaninglessness there arises the real hope attaining an enduring happiness in an eternal recurrence. Humanity gains the joyful wisdom of its limitations, the conditions which define its true possibilities. There arises a joy and celebration of life itself as the tragic.

While Sartre and Descartes provide interesting philosophies, perhaps ultimately the only tenable positions for a conscientious modern thinker are faith, science, or something that attempts to bridge these extremes. Nietzsche is therefore in between Heidegger and Dostoyevsky in a truly important sense. Heidegger obviously recognizes the relevance of Nietzsche to his thought, having written four books devoted to his predecessor. Dostoyevsky has equal commonality with Nietzsche; the German writer, upon discovering the great Russian late in his career, praised his psychological insight and declared, "[h]ow liberating is Dostoyevsky!" (Nietzsche, Will #823). Dostoyevsky interestingly and appropriately puts in the mouth of Ivan Karamazov's devil,

[b]ut our present earth may have been repeated a billion times. Why, it's become extinct, been frozen; cracked, broken to bits, disintegrated into its elements, again 'the water above the firmament,' then again a comet, again a sun, again from the sun it becomes earth -- and the same sequence may have been repeated endlessly and exactly the same to every detail, most unseemly and insufferably tedious . . . .

(Dostoyevsky, Brothers 611)

Yet is eternal recurrence actually a viable alternative? Can one truly live by the idea of the overman? Is this nonsense about everlasting "tragic joy" supposed to be taken seriously? Or are these ideas for Nietzsche's sake alone? Zarathustra, Nietzsche's alter-ego, says, "One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil. And why do you not want to pluck at my wreath? . . . Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves" (Nietzsche, Thus 190). These mystical statements contain another of Nietzsche's central ideas, although Heidegger for one does not seem to pick up on it. Transvaluation is employed to reverse the old hierarchy of Being and Becoming, and this Heidegger understands well. Focusing on the pronouncement "God is Dead" as the key to understanding Nietzsche's thought, Heidegger claims, "Nietzsche holds this overturning of metaphysics to be the overcoming of metaphysics. But every overturning of this kind remains only a self-deluding entanglement in the Same that has become unknowable" (Heidegger, "Word" 75). Therefore, he believes Nietzsche never escapes the terms of metaphysics, and concludes he is merely the literal anti-Christ, the lion of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Yet Nietzsche's reversal is ironic and for his time and situation alone. Eternal recurrence is not important as a "truth," but as a lesson about the essence of "truth." It is just as possible as the Christianity it attacks; this is intended to reveal the createdness of all "truth." Thus, Nietzsche is only tipping the scales



towards Becoming in order to reset mankind's balance. This is the reason why he does not want blind followers but rather creators of new values, companions not disciples.

This discussion of Nietzsche's intentions brings up a topic hitherto avoided -- metaphysics. For Nietzsche, metaphysics is the task of the creator, and is dead as long as one version is "true." Even eternal recurrence must be "disposed of" (Nietzsche, Will #1057). He supports the ignored Becoming only in order to return metaphysics to life. Therefore, he ultimately wants to deconstruct this "irreconcilable" binary opposition -- in this early example of Derridian supplementarity -- through his inversion. Heidegger, however, understands "metaphysics" narrowly as any system where a suprasensory world supports and determines the sensory world (Heidegger, "Word" 65). "Nihilism for Heidegger is equatable with metaphysics" (Howey 79). Therefore, his philosophical role and the function of his fundamental ontology is to move past the dualism of metaphysics and establish his "Being." Nietzsche merely pointed the way to overcoming; "[d]espite all his overturnings and revaluings of metaphysics, Nietzsche remains in the unbroken line of the metaphysical tradition" (Heidegger, "Word" 84). Dostoyevsky, at the other extreme, would claim that metaphysics is the curse of the overeducated man, as exemplified by Ivan and his devil. "And masses, masses of the most original Russian boys do nothing but talk of the eternal questions!" (Dostoyevsky, Brothers 215). The modern individual thinks that a little learning can "cure" faith but is condemned to lack that which even the simplest Russian peasant has! One can regain faith, which is the foundation of human existence, only through suffering. Thus, all three writers recognize the need to get beyond metaphysics as a static system. The final options are: a new system which is finally correct -- the monism of Being which solves metaphysics, a recognition of the dualism in any system -- metaphysics as essentially

self-overcoming and dialectical, or a revitalizing of the old system through the necessity of action -- metaphysics as the impossible attempt to comprehend God.

Heidegger, Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche all agree that the end of metaphysics is aesthetics (though what the term "end" means may differ). Texts become for Heidegger traces of man's primordial understanding and must be linguistically excavated. Towards the end of his career, he turns to poetry as preontological, nearly mystical signs of his "Being." Kaufmann explains,

[t]he method which he recommends is to recall what has been thought, instead of thoughtlessly assuming that we know it all or that in view of modern progress the beginnings have long been surpassed. On the contrary, our common sense is alienated from the source of our being, and we must enlist the aid of uncommon creations such as, for example, hymns by Holderlin. (Kaufmann 39)

Nietzsche, however, views metaphysics itself as an art, the creation of the world of Being. The Apollonian and Dionysian, from Nietzsche's early typology of art The Birth of Tragedy, are characteristics as well of his mature conception of metaphysics. Thus, he claims in The Will to Power to hold, "[a]n anti-metaphysical view of the world -- yes, but an artistic one" (Nietzsche, Will #1048). Dostoyevsky understands virtue and suffering rather than rationalizing as the creation of one's self. "One of the recurrent and fundamental thoughts in Dostoevsky's writing is that life itself is a whole art and that to live means to make an artistic work out of oneself" (Jackson 2). Thus Heidegger's art is an academic search, Nietzsche's is metaphysical creation, while Dostoyevsky's is simply living. These three thinkers provide extremely cogent solutions to the problem of existence, variously similar and dissimilar to each other, existential yet beyond existentialism, which the post-modern world must consider as its intellectual heritage.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Martin Heidegger present in The Brothers Karamazov and Being and Time a magnum opus which remains uncompleted, each being only one third of a projected whole masterwork. Heidegger's Being cannot be comprehended, and beings such as Dasein are studied as hints of it; Christianity similarly cannot be explained by Dostoyevsky, as its mere outlines appear through the Karamazovs. The demonstration of the limitations of knowledge may be a greater contribution than any of their other insights into the human condition.

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BIOLOGICAL  
SARTRE  
LIFE

FINITE

MORAL

ETERNAL  
RECURRENCE

OVER  
MAN

COSMOLOGICAL  
HEIDEGGER  
SCIENCE

ANTHROPOLOGICAL  
DOSTOYEVSKY  
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