Understanding Americans' attitudes toward Latino and Asian immigration

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UNDERSTANDING AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD LATINO AND ASIAN IMMIGRATION

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

in

The Department of Political Science

by
Betina Cutaia Wilkinson
B.A., Loyola University New Orleans, 2004
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to explore the determinants of Americans’ attitudes toward immigration. I develop a measure of general support for immigration based on individuals’ responses to four immigration items: (1) support for increases in (legal) immigration; (2) feeling thermometer scores for illegal immigrants; (3) support for spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration; and (4) having “controlling illegal immigration” as a foreign policy goal. These items load on a single factor and permit us to generate a global pro-immigration scale that reflects Americans’ general views toward immigration. Further, I develop a comprehensive model of immigration attitudes that includes eight clusters of independent variables: (1) symbolic politics attitudes; (2) economic self interest; (3) demographic attributes; (4) feelings toward Hispanics and Asians, which are two groups commonly associated with immigration; (5) media effects; (6) values, including Americanism, moral traditionalism, egalitarianism, and views about important foreign policy goals; (7) religion effects; and (8) state racial, ethnic, and economic context. I find that Americans’ attitudes toward immigration are driven primarily by demographic attributes, feelings toward Hispanics and Asians, Americanism and other relevant values and views regarding foreign policy goals. Surprisingly, economic self interest plays almost no role in shaping immigration attitudes. Symbolic politics attitudes (such as political ideology and partisan identification) do not have a significant effect on support for immigration in the main model, yet the path model indicates that political ideology has a strong indirect and direct effect on immigration attitudes. Moreover, I find large differences in coefficients for Latino and Asian variables, signifying that further research should be conducted to explore why Americans view Asians and Hispanics differently.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

It is no surprise to find that the U.S. population has increased greatly from 1966 to 2006. Nonetheless, it is important to consider that the majority of the increase has been mostly due to a growing population of immigrants. According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2006), from 1966 to 2006 immigrants and their offspring born in the U.S. contributed to a U.S. population growth of 55 percent. Within this group of immigrants, Latino\(^1\) immigrants made up more than half of the addition, 53 percent. Furthermore, Asian and Pacific Islander immigrants and their children represented a 22 percent increase in the U.S. population due to immigration. Clearly, the American population is being shaped considerably by the influx of immigrants from other countries.

In addition to shaping the population, immigrants have influenced the United States culturally, socially, and politically. Population growth among Latinos has outpaced that of blacks, and Latinos are now the largest American minority. The Spanish language has spread nationwide, and there are other areas where languages spoken by Asian immigrants are common. Throughout various ranges of businesses and customer service firms, business customers have been given the option to be attended to in either English or Spanish, and never before has this occurred with any European language. Furthermore, a large number of bilingual and multicultural schools have been established nationwide, conveying the interests of some Americans in greater knowledge of multiculturalism.

Of course, these changes have heralded in a new wave of political conflict. Americans are sharply divided over the issue of immigration, particularly in terms of their views toward the increase in illegal immigrants and how to resolve issues relating to their legal status. There is considerable variation in Americans’ attitudes toward legal immigration, in part stemming from variation in question wording (Polling Report, 2006), but overall Americans tend toward keeping legal immigration levels either the same or below current levels. There seems to be a general consensus among Americans that illegal immigration needs to be reduced, but there is disagreement about whether illegal immigrants help or hurt the U.S. economy, as well as over what actions should be taken to stem the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. For instance, majorities of Americans support tough action on illegal immigration (e.g., building a fence on the U.S.-Mexican border, fining employers who hire illegal immigrants), while majorities of Americans are opposed to mass deportations of illegal immigrants and also support a guest worker program and/or efforts to offer illegal immigrants U.S. citizenship under certain circumstances. Clearly, Americans are divided—and internally conflicted—over how to address legal and illegal immigration.

What explains variations in Americans’ views toward legal and illegal immigration? While there has been some research on the topic, more remains to be done to understand the determinants of individual opinions about immigration, particularly in light of the high profile nature of discussions of immigration among elites, the media, and the mass public. In this paper I explore the determinants of Americans’ attitudes toward immigration. Using the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES) and data from the U.S. Census, I plan on developing and testing a general model of public opinion toward immigration, focusing on how support for illegal and legal immigration fluctuates as a function of economic self interest, symbolic politics, demographic characteristics, evaluations and perceptions of Latinos and Asians, media effects, Americanism and other values, religion effects and ethnic, racial and economic context. I intend on applying this model to the general population, including whites,

\(^1\) As is customary in most scholarly work that references people of Spanish origin, the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” will be used interchangeably in this study.
blacks, Hispanics and Asians. Towards the end of this paper, I plan on examining the relationship among independent variables and their effect on general support for immigration using structural equation modeling, specifically pathway analysis.
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There are few issues that have been as controversial in the United States and Western European countries as immigration. There is little doubt that immigration is an issue that divides most Western European countries, and the United States is not exempt from these debates. Some scholars have addressed the subject of mass attitudes toward immigration in Western Europe (e.g., Fetzer, 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). Americans’ attitudes towards immigration to the U.S. have also drawn some attention in the scholarly literature (Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996; Hood and Morris, 1998; Burns and Gimpel, 2000). Although scholars have developed and tested models that include a wide range of factors that are expected to shape public opinion toward immigration, there has been little effort to develop a comprehensive model that accounts for a wide range of variables related to immigration attitudes. In this section, I describe the clusters of explanatory variables that have been the subject of previous research on immigration attitudes.

2.1 Contact and Context

One of the most interesting and controversial ideas about what influences Anglos’ attitudes towards immigration to the United States is contact. Hood and Morris (1998) concentrate significant portions of their research on attitudes towards immigration on determining whether whites’ opinions regarding illegal and legal immigration are influenced by the contact that they have with immigrants, as well as if whites’ opinions differ based on the legal status of the immigrants with whom they are in contact. These scholars define the contact as “close and increased contact with an individual of a certain racial group produces a more favorable response to members of that group” (Hood and Morris, 1997; Amir, 1969, 1976; Jackman and Crane, 1980; Stephan, 1985).

Hood and Morris (1997) also examine the effects of demographic variables and contextual variables on whites’ opinion toward immigration policy. They conclude that racial context has a significant effect on whites’ immigration attitude formation, since whites living in areas with large Hispanic and Asian populations are likely to have positive evaluations of these minority groups. In their analysis of contextual effects, Stein, Post, and Rinden (2000) reach the same conclusion. Nonetheless, Hood and Morris find the opposite in California, a state with sizable and increasing populations of Latinos and Asians. Surprisingly, Hood and Morris find that whites living in California are more likely to have a negative outlook toward Asians and Hispanics. They hypothesize that living in a state with large and ever-increasing populations of Latinos and Asians, yet not having close proximity to these groups, causes one to view these groups negatively, perhaps even as threats.

Hood and Morris (1998) also explore the contact hypothesis further by investigating the impact of documented and undocumented migrant context on whites’ opinions towards immigration throughout the United States. In conjunction with the contact hypothesis, Hood and Morris observe that as the documented migrant population grows whites’ discontent with legal immigration decreases. On the other hand, they find that as the undocumented migrant population increases, whites’ discontent with undocumented immigration rises. They attempt to explain these findings by claiming that “the development of positive inter-group attitudes via contact is contingent upon the existence of significant, long-term, high-quality interaction” (Hood and Morris 1998: 11). In general, undocumented migrants cannot truly integrate themselves into a non-migrant social community and have long-term interaction with Americans without having certain privileged items members of social communities have, such as valid work permits, driver’s licenses, social security numbers, etc.
Moreover, Hood and Morris (1998) assert that another rationale for the difference that documented and undocumented contexts have on immigration opinion is the environment in which inter-group interaction occurs. When negative and intense opposition exists, the effects of inter-group contact are impeded. For example, in a state like California, which has adopted strong opposing views towards undocumented immigration, positive inter-group perceptions are unlikely to result in a positive and welcoming environment for undocumented migrants.

Hood and Morris (2000) concentrate their attention on whites’ attitudes toward immigration policies, especially regarding California’s Proposition 187. This initiative was designed to bar undocumented migrants from receiving access to state-level social service programs, health care services (except in an emergency) and public education (Hood and Morris, 2000: 194). Using data from the state of California, the scholars also compare the contact hypothesis with the inter-group conflict theory, which affirms that inter-group contact strengthens conflict between groups. Inter-group contact theory is grounded on racial proximity resulting in perceptions of threat, which then bring about social conflict (Kinder and Mendelberg, 1995: 403).

Hood and Morris (2000) make several interesting observations. The scholars conclude that Asian context has a significant and positive effect on whites’ vote choice. Thus, the larger the size of the Asian population, the less likely whites are to support Proposition 187 and perceive immigration negatively. On the other hand, Hood and Morris find that Hispanic context has a negative, yet insignificant, effect on Anglo vote choice on Proposition 187. As a result, Hood and Morris affirm that the contact hypothesis offers a constructive explanation for the way that Anglos vote on Proposition 187.

2.2 Economic Self Interest

Economic self-interest theory helps explain why U.S. citizens differ in opinion regarding immigration to the United States (Fetzer 2000). Fetzer defines economic self-interest as a strong fear of becoming poor or unemployed and suffering caused by decreasing finances or having a low salary and prestige employment. Fetzer reasons that, since low-skilled immigrants allegedly have a negative impact on American blue collar workers by depressing wages and creating job displacement, these American workers are disproportionately likely to oppose immigration.

Burns and Gimpel (2000) use nationwide data from 1992 and 1996 to examine the influence that diverse ethnic groups’ economic circumstances and stereotypes have as explanations for attitudes toward immigration policy. They concentrate their study of economics and its influence on attitudes towards immigration on individuals’ attitudes of the national economy and discover that it has a very consistent impact on negative stereotyping. Thus, those who are pessimistic about the national economy are likely to place blame on African Americans and Hispanics. In addition, those who are optimistic are likely to credit whites. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) seemingly would agree with Burns and Gimpel to a certain extent. Their work reinforces the idea that those who believe that the U.S. economy is worsening have more negative attitudes towards immigration and immigrants than those who sense that the economy is improving.
2.3 Symbolic Politics

Symbolic politics theories suggest that political attitudes and behavior are a function of broader, core attitudes (such as ideology and partisanship) that are developed through the socialization process. Some scholars have speculated that these core attitudes have an effect on individuals’ views toward immigrants and relevant policies.

Hood and Morris examine the role that political ideology and party identification play in influencing attitudes towards immigration. In their initial national search for causes of whites’ attitudes towards immigration, Hood and Morris (1997) find that whites who identify themselves as liberals are unlikely to favor restrictive levels of legal immigration. Moreover, Hood and Morris (1998) analyze results of a survey conducted nationwide and come to similar conclusions, as in their first study. Individuals with strong conservative standpoints are more likely to be suspicious (and thus more restrictive) of legal immigration than those with liberal viewpoints. Hood and Morris (2000) also come to the same conclusion when exploring the determinants of whites’ attitudes towards Proposition 187. They find that Republicans and conservatives are significantly more likely to favor Proposition 187 than Democrats and liberals.

Similar to Hood and Morris (1997, 1998, 2000), Burns and Gimpel (2000) analyze national data to determine Americans’ attitudes towards immigration. Unlike Hood and Morris’s findings, Burns and Gimpel conclude that conservatives have more positive views towards Hispanics than liberals. They affirm that conservatives view Latinos in a more positive light than liberals because Hispanics may be perceived as more hardworking and family-oriented than African Americans.

2.4 Demographic Characteristics

Scholars have also found that demographic attributes have an effect on the immigration attitudes of Americans (Hood and Morris, 1997; Hood and Morris, 1998; Hood and Morris, 2000; Binder et. al, 1997). The theoretical bases for these effects are undoubtedly reflected in other theoretical processes already noted in the literature. For instance, African Americans’ views toward immigration are likely to reflect either economic self interest—i.e., as blacks compete with Latino and Asian immigrants for jobs, they are less likely to support immigration—or symbolic politics attitudes associated with the civil rights of minorities.

The effects of several demographic characteristics on immigration attitudes have been explored in the literature. First, age has been found to have a significant effect on whites’ attitudes towards Proposition 187 (Hood and Morris, 2000). The scholars conclude that as age increases, respondents are more likely to favor Proposition 187. Likewise, Binder et. al (1997) find that age has a negative effect on immigration support in Texas; they find that older respondents exhibit greater support for restrictive immigration policies. Consequently, it appears that there is a generational effect in support for liberalized immigration.

Gender has also been found to have a significant influence on whites’ attitudes towards immigration. Specifically, Hood and Morris (1997) find that females are less likely to favor restrictive immigration policies than are males. It is worth noting that this finding stands in contrast to work on Latinos’ attitudes toward immigration by Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand (2006), who find that Latina women are more likely to support restrictive immigration policies than Latino men.
Socioeconomic status also matters. Regarding income, Binder et. al (1997) conclude that both whites and Mexican Americans with high incomes are more likely to favor strict immigration policies. In terms of education, numerous scholars find that education levels significantly influence attitudes towards immigration (Hood and Morris, 1998; Hood and Morris, 2000; Binder et. al, 1997; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). For instance, Hood and Morris (1998) find that as respondents’ education level increases, they are more likely to favor a liberalized immigration policy. Likewise, Hood and Morris (2000) also conclude that those who are highly educated are less likely to vote in favor of strict immigration policies (such as Proposition 187) than those with little or no education.

2.5 The Media

Besides the variables mentioned prior, the media should also have an effect on immigration public opinion. Although very little research has been conducted on the media’s effect on immigration attitudes in the US, it is critical to examine the numerous works that explore and stress the importance of the media’s effect on public opinion.

One of the primary and prominent works in the literature of media and public opinion is *News That Matters* by Iyengar and Kinder (1978). The scholars primarily explore the role that agenda-setting and priming have on individuals’ political attitudes and the role that priming and presidential character and responsibility shape public opinion. The scholars find that the length of time a television network spends covering a story, the way that a story is presented and the selection of a network’s news stories strongly influence Americans’ political attitudes. Iyengar and Kinder also conclude that individuals who are affected by a certain problem are more likely to accept their problem as a serious one, thus being predisposed to the influence of the media. Furthermore, although the politically involved are more likely to watch the news, they may not be more likely to be persuaded by the coverage. Nevertheless, the scholars find that the more one voluntarily watches television news, the more he or she becomes more receptive to what it says.

A more contemporary work that examines the media’s effect on public opinion is by Entman (1989). Unlike Iyengar and Kinder (1978), Entman explores how the media shapes public opinion through information processing. He finds that the media has an effect on what people think, but more specifically by affecting what individuals think about. The media influences public opinion by providing information regarding what people think about and by shaping how they think about it. In addition, the scholar argues that attitudes toward unfamiliar issues are more susceptible to the influence of the media than familiar issues.

On the other hand, Mutz (1994) explores whether the media hampers or facilitates the translation of personal experiences into political preferences. She argues that the media assists one in thinking about his/her own experiences when bringing up an issue. Based on the experiences that one had and the feelings that he/she attributed to the experiences, one’s political attitudes are formed. More specifically, Mutz finds that exposure to unemployment news is positively related to the impact of people’s personal experiences on presidential performance. Furthermore, increasing exposure to unemployment news results in increasing the extent to which national employment perceptions are generalized from personal experience.
In sum, the scholarly literature points to a number of possible issues that shape Americans’ attitudes toward immigration. Some scholars argue that economic self-interest is key to shaping attitudes towards immigration, while others suggest that demographic attributes, symbolic politics, contact and context play significant roles in shaping immigration attitudes. Some conclude that attitudes towards Latino and Asian immigrants compare, while others find that Americans view Latino and Asian immigrants differently. There appears to be some validity to the influence that these factors have on public opinion, yet additional research is needed to truly explore how Americans regard Latino and Asian illegal and legal immigration, the media’s effect on immigration attitudes and to determine the principal factors that shape immigration public opinion.
CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHODS

In this section, I lay out the general contours of my model of Americans’ attitudes towards illegal and legal immigration. I consider the effects of several sets of independent variables: (1) symbolic politics variables, such as partisanship and ideology; (2) economic self-interest, including variables that reflect respondents’ perceptions of economic stress and possible threat from immigrants; (3) demographic attributes, including gender, age, race and ethnicity, and socioeconomic status; (4) attitudes toward Hispanics and Asians, two groups widely associated with current and past immigration; (5) media effects including television and print media (6) Americanism and values, representing individuals’ core attitudes about the American political system and possible effects of immigration on the American way of life; (7) religion effects, including Catholic and Protestant; and lastly (8) contextual variables, including levels of and changes in the Hispanic population, Asian population, and unemployment rate in the respondents’ home state. The theoretical rationale for including these variables in the model is found below.

The data used in this study comes from the 2004 American National Election Study (ANES). This study surveyed a nationally representative random sample of 1,212 individuals 18 years or older by the 2004 election day. The survey was conducted immediately prior to and after the 2004 presidential election. There is a wide variety of academic and commercial surveys that include survey items relating to immigration, and in some cases there is a broader set of questions about the specifics of immigration. On the other hand, the ANES has a rich set of independent variables relevant to a study of Americans’ attitudes toward immigration, and many of these variables are not found in other surveys. Due to the complexity of this research topic, survey research is one of the most appropriate forms of collecting observations for my study since I am able to collect an extensive number of Americans’ immigration opinions with detail.

A summary of the variables used in this study can be found in the Appendix.

3.1 Dependent Variables

As a starting point, I discuss the various ways that I measure attitudes towards immigration. My main strategy is to incorporate four specific dependent variables into my analysis, and I use a principal components factor analysis to combine these four variables into a single scale.

The first dependent variable is support for (legal) immigration. This variable is based on the following question:

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

Some surveys include items that explicitly ask respondents about their support for legal and/or illegal immigration. As we will see, the ANES includes items that deal explicitly with illegal immigration, but none that explicitly mention legal immigration. However, while the word “legal” is not included in the text of this question, the reference to “immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States” (my emphasis) implies, I believe, some level of legal status. Consequently, this variable can serve as a measure of general attitudes towards legal immigration to the U.S. This variable is coded as a five-point scale, ranging from -2 for those who think that immigration should decrease a lot to +2 for those with the strongest level of support for increased
immigration. As can be seen in Table 1, this variable is heavily skewed in the anti-immigration direction. Approximately 47% of respondents support decreasing (legal) immigration, compared to only 10% who support increases in immigration. The model category (43%) is for “keep the same.” It would appear that Americans are generally tilted in the anti-immigration direction.

As stated prior, the 2004 ANES provides several ways to measure attitudes towards illegal immigration, and I incorporate three more dependent variables to accurately depict immigration public opinion. For my second dependent variable, I use a survey item that reflects Americans’ support for spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration. This variable is measured based on the following question:

*What about tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration? Should federal spending on tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration be increased, decreased, or kept the same?*

I use attitudes toward spending on border security as a measure of immigration attitudes. I suggest that support for a specific policy, such as spending on border security, can accurately represent attitudes toward immigration, especially illegal immigration in this case. Recently, discussions and protests regarding illegal immigration and enforcing stringent US/Mexico border security have erupted throughout the US, and more individuals are associating immigration with border security. This variable is measured as a three-point scale, coded +1 for respondents who prefer increased spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration, 0 for those who prefer to keep spending levels about the same, and -1 for those who support decreased spending on border security.

From Table 1, one can see that the vast majority (65%) of Americans support increases in spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration; here again, there seems to be a fairly strong sentiment against illegal immigration reported by ANES respondents.

For my third dependent variable I use the ANES measure of support for controlling illegal immigration as a foreign policy goal. This variable is based on the following item:

*Should controlling and reducing illegal immigration be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal at all?*

Unlike the spending scale on border security, this item measures how important individuals feel about the priority that should be given to illegal immigration. This variable ranges from 0 to 2, where 0 represents controlling immigration is not important at all, 1 signifies controlling immigration is somewhat important, and 2 represents respondents for whom controlling immigration is very important. A majority of respondents (58%) see controlling illegal immigration as “very important,” and an additional 37% see this goal as “somewhat important.”

Fourth, attitudes toward illegal immigration are measured through a feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants. Exploring individuals’ affect towards illegal immigrants taps into a more specific dimension of attitudes towards immigration particularly concerning the legality of those who immigrate to the US. This variable may directly capture individuals’ public opinion or provide a new perspective on measuring attitudes toward illegal immigration compared to the other dependent variables listed above. The feeling thermometer scale ranges from 0 (very negative feelings toward illegal immigrants) to 100 (very positive feelings towards illegal immigrants). The mean feeling thermometer score for ANES respondents is only 41, suggesting that most Americans view
undocumented immigrants unfavorably. Fully 74% of respondents categorize undocumented immigrants in either negative or neutral terms.

Table 1. Summary of responses to questions about immigration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for increased immigration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease a lot</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease a little</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep the same</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase a little</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase a lot</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 25</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 – 50</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 – 75</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76 – 100</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>41.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>24.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep the same</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign policy goal: control illegal immigration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat important</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, I combined these four items into a single scale through the use of principal components factor analysis, the results of which are reported in Table 2. These four variables are highly correlated with one another, and all four load on to a single dimension. Using the factor score from this analysis, I rescale the variable in the pro-immigration direction and hence denote it the “pro-immigration” scale (eigenvalue = 2.129, variance explained = 53%). This scale will be the primary dependent variable in my empirical analysis. In Figure 1, I overlay the histogram and kernel density plot for this variable. As one can readily observe, this variable is skewed to the left, meaning that most respondents fall on the “anti-immigration” side of the scale. Hence, this variable is balanced somewhat in the anti-immigration direction, though the large group in the middle of the distribution suggests that there are many moderates on this issue.

I find it noteworthy that attitudes toward legal and illegal immigration are so closely related to one another, to the point that a single dimension defines these attitudes. Some political commentators make a distinction between attitudes toward legal immigration and attitudes toward illegal immigration. The idea is that there are many Americans who are not opposed to legal immigration (or at least a discussion about appropriate levels of legal immigration) but who are strongly opposed to illegal immigration. My findings suggest that how Americans rank themselves on legal and illegal immigration are strongly related, suggesting that attitudes toward immigration are structured along a single dimension. A similar pattern is observed in attitudes toward legal and illegal immigration among Latinos (Rouse et al. 2006).

Table 2. Principal component factor results for immigration items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
<th>Scoring Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for increased immigration</td>
<td>-0.670</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>-0.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants</td>
<td>-0.749</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>-0.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on border security</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy goal: control illegal immigration</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>0.372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Independent variables: Symbolic Politics

As noted, symbolic politics attitudes, particularly partisan identification and political ideology, shape Americans’ immigration attitudes (Hood and Morris 1997, 1998, 2000; Burn and Gimpel 2000). These core attitudes are developed through the socialization process and influence the development of other, more peripheral attitudes. Given this, I suggest that attitudes toward immigration are shaped by partisanship and ideology.
In order to measure partisan identification, I utilize the standard seven-point scale, ranging from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican). I hypothesize that partisanship will be negatively related to immigration attitudes, with Republicans less supportive of immigration than Democrats. Regarding political ideology, I also rely on a seven-point scale measure with a range from 0 (strong liberal) to 6 (strong conservative). I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable will be negative, suggesting that conservatives are less supportive of expanded immigration than liberals. As noted prior, Hood et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) and Burns et al. (2000) disagree on whether partisan identification and political ideology have a positive or negative effect on immigration attitudes. However, most conventional discussions of the immigration issue suggest that Republicans and conservatives are more supportive of immigration restrictions, so I hypothesize a negative effect of partisan identification and political ideology on attitudes toward immigration.

![Histogram for distribution of respondents on pro-immigration scale.](image)

**Figure 1.** Histogram for distribution of respondents on pro-immigration scale.

Mean 0  
Standard deviation 1  
Median -0.17  

**Note:** The pro-immigration scale is based on a principal components factor analysis of four items: (1) support for increases in immigration; (2) feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants; (3) support for spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration; and (4) having “controlling illegal immigration” as a personal foreign policy goal. Eigenvalue = 2.129; variance explained = 0.532.
3.3 Independent Variables: Economic Self Interest

My second set of independent variables represents self interest, mostly economic self interest. Much of the debate about immigration—especially illegal immigration—deals with the question of whether immigrants take jobs from American citizens and/or provide low-wage labor that keeps wages for American citizens below what they otherwise would be. Moreover, many immigrants send at least some of their earnings back to family in their home countries, and this means a lower macro-economic benefit for local communities than would be realized if wages were being distributed to U.S. citizens. In the past decade, there has been a major influx of immigrants to the U.S., and there is widespread speculation that immigrants fill jobs at low wages that could be taken by American citizens at higher wages. This line of argument has been used in discussing conflict between Latinos and African Americans. Many black Americans contend that Latinos depress wages and fill jobs that African Americans could fill, and this translates into concern by black Americans about their job prospects. That this would influence the attitudes of the economically vulnerable, especially African Americans, is not surprising (Gay 2006). Of course, the counterargument, commonly cited by those who are supportive of free immigration, is that immigrants take unpleasant, low-wage jobs that American citizens would not be willing to take. The implication of this argument is that immigrants play a vital role in the U.S. economy by performing necessary jobs, and further that immigrants are not taking jobs away from any Americans.

I include several measures of economic self interest, including personal economic evaluations, national unemployment evaluations, labor union participation, unemployment status, household income and occupation. First, I consider the effect of respondents’ retrospective personal economic evaluation, which represents individuals’ perceptions of their own economic well-being over the past year. This variable is measured using a five-point scale, ranging from 0 (much worse) to 4 (much better). I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable is positive, suggesting that individuals who have positive (negative) evaluations of their personal economic condition are more (less) likely to support unrestricted immigration.

My second measure of economic self interest is the retrospective national unemployment evaluation variable. This variable reflects individuals’ perceptions of the national unemployment rate in the past year. I measure this variable using a five-point scale, again ranging -1 (worsened) to 0 (stayed the same) to 1 (improved). I speculate that individuals who perceive that the national unemployment rate has worsened or increased will be more likely to be threatened by immigrants and hence be more supportive of immigration restrictions; thus, I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable will be positive.

Participation in a labor union may also tap into individuals’ economic self interest and affect immigration public opinion. Individuals join labor unions to obtain protection of labor and wage rights; thus, those who are affiliated with labor unions may have established firm attitudes toward immigration and immigrants, whom they may perceive as economic threats. Consequently, my third measure of economic self interest is participation in a labor union in one’s household. This variable is measured on a scale from 0 (no one in the household participates in a labor union) to 1 (at least one person in the household participates in a labor union). Due to my speculation that individuals associated with a labor union perceive immigrants as economic threats, I suggest that if at least one person in the respondent’s household belongs to a labor union, the respondent is more likely to favor restrictive immigration policies than if the respondent has no connection to labor unions.
A fourth measure of economic self interest that I use in my model is respondents’ unemployment status. I create a binary variable, coded 1 for unemployed respondents and 0 otherwise. I suggest that those who are unemployed will be more likely to perceive an economic threat from expanded immigration and hence will be less likely to support unrestricted immigration.

My fifth measure of economic self interest is household income. Typically, household income falls into the demographic attribute category and is not considered a measure of economic self interest. However, this variable can tap into individuals’ economic self interest, since an individual may consider his/her financial status when exploring his/her attitudes toward immigration. As previously stated, Binder et al. (1997) argues that income has a positive relationship with Americans’ attitudes towards immigration, while Morris (2000) finds that income negatively shapes African Americans’ immigration public opinion. I suspect that this variable positively affects immigration attitudes. Thus, the higher one’s income, the less likely that one may perceive expanded immigration as an economic threat and, hence, be more supportive of relaxed immigration. In order to measure the effect that household income has on support for immigration, I create a 23-point scale ranging from 1 (for less than $2,999) to 23 ($120,000 and over).

My last measure of economic self interest is occupation, specifically Latino occupation. Due to my speculation that individuals who uphold employments similar to those of Latino immigrants may perceive the immigrants as economic threats and labor competition, I hypothesize that Americans who hold positions associated with Latinos may be less likely to favor expanded immigration. This variable is coded 1 for those who hold positions associated with Latinos and 0 otherwise. The following profession and industries are associated with “Latino occupations”: crop production, construction, food manufacturing, textile manufacturing, footwear manufacturing, landscaping, child care and home health care services, food services, automotive services, and laundry services. This list has been formed from common knowledge of positions frequently filled by Latino immigrants and by the Pew Hispanic Center’s 2004 Latino Labor Report by Rakesh Kochhar.

3.4 Independent Variables: Demographic Characteristics

In my model, I also consider the possibility that demographic attributes significantly influence Americans’ attitudes towards immigration. Specifically, I suggest that gender, age, education level, race and ethnicity, and having native-born parents shape Americans’ immigration attitudes.

First, I explore the effects of gender on attitudes toward immigration. I measure gender as a simple binary variable, coded 1 for women and 0 for men. Women generally hold more liberal attitudes than do men, so I suggest that women are more likely to favor immigration than men. Second, I measure respondents’ age, ranging from 18 to 90 years. Based on previous arguments by Binder et al (1997) and Hood et al. (2000), I expect the coefficient for this variable to be negative, indicating that older individuals will be less likely to favor relaxed immigration.

Third, the effect of education on immigration attitudes has drawn some scholarly attention, especially from Hood and Morris (1998, 2000) and Ha and Oliver (2006). I measure this variable on a scale from 1 (respondent has completed 8 grades or less and no diploma) to 7 (respondent has earned an advanced college degree). In conjunction with Hood et al.’s (1998) “education as liberalizing” argument, I hypothesize that as Americans’ education level increases, they are more likely to favor relaxed immigration.
I also consider the effects of race and ethnicity. Arguably, some racial and ethnic groups are directly and indirectly affected by immigration. Asians and Latinos are likely to have been immigrants or the children of recent immigrants, and many will have family members and friends who are immigrants. Moreover, African Americans may be pulled in different directions. On one hand, African Americans may be threatened by the influx of immigrants because of the economic consequences; on the other, African Americans may be sensitive to the civil rights issues associated with immigration and hence may be more supportive of relaxed immigration. In order to capture these effects, I include separate dichotomous variables for Latinos, Asians, and African Americans; each variable is coded 1 for respondents who are members of the relevant group, and 0 otherwise.

Finally, in addition to the typical demographic attributes described above, I consider the effect of having parents born in the United States. I create a binary variable, coded 1 for respondents with both parents born in the U.S., and 0 for all other respondents. I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable will be negative, suggesting that individuals with both parents born in the U.S. will be less supportive of expanded immigration than others. My reasoning is simple. Individuals with one or both parents born outside of the United States have been direct or indirect beneficiaries of immigration policies, and these individuals are also likely to have family and friends who are either immigrants themselves or who would like to immigrate to the United States.

3.5 Independent Variables: Feelings toward Hispanics and Asians

One set of variables that has drawn relatively little attention in the literature on immigration relates to attitudes toward groups that are usually associated with immigration—i.e., in this case, Hispanics and Asians. Arguably, individuals could develop attitudes toward immigration that are based on their affect toward and perceptions of the individuals whom they see as part of the immigrant population. Of course, the United States has in its pool of immigrants people from every country in the world, yet much of the discussion of immigrant populations among political elites and in the news media revolves around Hispanics and Asians. I speculate that individuals who have favorable views toward Latinos and Asians will be more predisposed to support relaxed immigration, while those whose views toward Hispanics and Asians are negative will be reticent in their support for greater immigration.

I use four indicators of attitudes about Hispanics and Asians, two for each group. First, I include in my model a Hispanics feeling thermometer and an Asians feeling thermometer; these variables are coded on a scale from 0 (highly unfavorable) to 100 (highly favorable). If individuals base their attitudes toward immigration, at least in part, on their affect toward Hispanics and Asians, I would expect the coefficients for these two variables to be positive. I hypothesize that individuals who view Hispanics and Asians in favorable terms will be more supportive of liberalized immigration; conversely, those who hold unfavorable attitudes toward Hispanics and Asians are expected to be less favorably disposed to immigration.

In addition, the ANES includes a series of items that relate to respondents’ perceptions of the attributes of four racial and ethnic groups—i.e., whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. The traits that are evaluated are hardworking, intelligent, and trustworthy, and each racial and ethnic group is evaluated by each respondent on a seven-point scale, coded so that the high score indicates that the group has that trait. I combined the three trait variables for Hispanics to create a single scale, denoted trait perceptions for Hispanics, that reflects the degree to which respondents perceive Hispanics as having these three positive attributes. I also created a similar variable for Asians, denoted trait perceptions for Asians, which represents respondents’ perceptions that Asians have these positive attributes. If individuals consider their evaluations of Hispanics and/or Asians in shaping their attitudes
toward immigration, I hypothesize that the coefficient for each of these trait variables will be positive. Americans who perceive Hispanics and/or Asians in negative terms should be less likely to support relaxed immigration.

3.6 Independent Variables: Media (Television, print and radio)

“The media make a significant contribution to what people think-to their political preferences and evaluations-precisely by affecting what they think about” (Entman, 1989: 347). Although very little or no research has been specifically conducted on the media’s effect on immigration attitudes among Americans, many scholars such as Entman (1989), Barker and Knight (2000), Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1998), Mutz (1994) and Jordan (1993) emphasize the importance of the media’s emotional and thought-processing effects on public opinion.

Thus, I include three measures of the media’s effect on immigration public opinion in my model. My first measure of the media’s effect on immigration attitudes is the level of attention an individual grants to national network television news. Iyengar and Kinder (1978) have provided extensive support that television news greatly shapes people’s attitudes toward policies and the importance that they attribute to certain policies. Consequently, I suspect that the more individuals watch national network television news, the more their immigration attitudes will be influenced by the television news. However, the television media generally portrays immigrants and immigration in a negative tone instigating perceptions of immigrants as economic threats amongst its viewers; thus, I suspect that the more individuals watch national network television news, the less likely that they will favor relaxed immigration. Frequency of watching national network television news is measured on a scale from 0 to 7, 0 representing watching national networks news zero days a week (no attention) to 7 representing watching national network news seven days a week.

A second measure of the media’s effect is the number of days an individual watches early and late local television news. Although this variable compares to the one above by measuring the effect of television news on public opinion, the topics and tone of the television news broadcasts differ from the national network news broadcasts. Early and late local television news broadcasts take a more casual, informal tone and are more brief and concise in their newscasts in comparison to national broadcasts. Nonetheless, similar to national news, I hypothesize that early and late local news broadcasts portray immigration with a negative tone prompting fear and anxiety among its viewers. Consequently, I suspect that this variable has a significantly negative relationship with favorable attitudes toward immigration. The frequency of watching early local news and late local news are two separate variables, originally coded 0 to 7 (indicating the number of days an individual watches early and late local news). These variables will be combined to form a single variable coded from 0 (not watch early and late local news) to 14 (watch both early and late local news seven days a week).

My third measure of the media’s effect on immigration attitudes is the number of days an individual reads newspaper news. Including newspaper news into my model provides a broader examination of the effect that television as well as print media has on Americans’ immigration public opinion. Similar to television news, newspaper news plays a significant role in shaping public opinion and policy preferences (Jordan 1993). I speculate that print media portrays immigration more often in a negative tone than in a positive one. Thus, I hypothesize that the more frequently one reads the newspaper, the less likely he/she will express favorable immigration attitudes. I code the frequency of reading newspaper news on a scale ranging from 0 (not read newspaper news at all) to 7 (read newspaper news seven days a week).
Talk radio shapes public opinion (Barker and Knight 2000). More specifically, these scholars find that talk radio host Rush Limbaugh’s negative messages caused significant changes in people’s attitudes toward salient issues from 1994 to 1996. Although I have found no research exploring the effects of talk radio on immigration attitudes, I suspect that talk radio shapes immigration public opinion. Similar to the hypotheses listed above, I speculate that talk radio is more likely to portray immigration negatively than positively. Consequently, I hypothesize that Americans who listen to talk radio are more likely to favor expanded immigration than those who do not listen to talk radio. This variable is coded as a binary variable, 0 representing not listening to talk radio to 1 representing listening to talk radio.

Besides the variables listed prior, I include an interaction independent variable measuring the effect of the frequency of conservatives and liberals watching national network news on the support for immigration. This variable tells the change in effect of political ideology for the frequency of watching national network news. I hypothesize that conservatives’ immigration public opinion is more likely to be influenced by watching national network news than liberals’ immigration attitudes. I pose this hypothesis, since as mentioned prior, I speculate that the national network news presents expanded immigration in a more negative tone than a positive one and conservatives are less likely to favor immigration than liberals. Thus, when conservatives watch national network news broadcasts on immigration, their unfavorable immigration attitudes are reinforced and increase.

3.7 Independent Variables: Americanism and Values Scales

The issue of immigration activates a wide range of core attitudes that help define how American citizens think about their country and its culture and language. For some Americans, immigration represents a threat to their sense of love-of-country, patriotism, and the important national symbols such as the flag, Mom, and apple pie. These Americans will support immigration only insofar as they see immigrants assimilating themselves into American culture and developing the same love-of-country and support for American symbols that they have. For these Americans, support for immigration drops considerably to the extent that they perceive immigrants as failing to immerse themselves into American culture or as being disrespectful to American culture, language, and symbols. For instance, one need only observe the reaction that many Americans had to the immigration protests held in March and April 2006—particularly when protest participants waved flags from their home countries—to see how powerful adherence to these symbols and images can be in the immigration debate. For other Americans, immigration represents a challenge to traditional sensibilities relating to social order, work ethic, morality, and the protection of American economic interests. Insofar as some Americans view immigrants as violating these common tenets of American culture or challenging the economic prospects of Americans, there is a tendency to oppose expanded immigration.

On the other hand, some Americans hold values and core attitudes that are likely to promote support for immigration. For some Americans, immigration is tied to efforts to open the American political and economic system to individuals from other countries, many of whom face poverty, inequality, and/or oppression. From this perspective, immigration is a major component of efforts to share the American dream with the less fortunate. Simply, immigration has the effect of creating greater global equality and protecting the human rights of the downtrodden.

I hope to capture these two perspectives with a series of independent variables that are designed to reflect the values that Americans see challenged and supported by immigration. First, I suggest that individuals who have a strong sense of patriotism, love of country, and adherence to American
symbols will be less supportive of immigration, yet more supportive of border security. In order to capture these effects, I plan on creating a *pro-Americanism scale* using five items from the ANES: (1) When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good? (2) There are some things about America today that make me feel ashamed of America. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree? (3) There are some things about America today that make me feel angry about America. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree? (4) How strong is your love for your country—extremely strong, very strong, somewhat strong, or not very strong? (5) Is being an American extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important to you personally? I hypothesize that this scale is negatively related to support for relaxed immigration.

Second, I plan on creating a *moral traditionalism scale* based on the following four items, all of which will be coded on five-point scales ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree): (1) the world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes; (2) the newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society; (3) we should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own; and (4) this country would have fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable is negative, indicating that individuals who score in the direction of moral traditionalism are less likely to support relaxed immigration than other individuals.

Third, I suggest that many individuals see immigration as a civil rights or equality issue. I speculate that those who have strong concerns with equality will be more supportive of relaxed immigration than individuals who do not share those concerns. I plan on creating a *pro-equality scale* based on individuals’ responses to six items, each one of which will be coded on a five-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree: (1) Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed; (2) we have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country; (3) one of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance; (4) this country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are; (5) it is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others; and (6) if people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.

Fourth, I include in my model two variables that represent the foreign policy goals of individual respondents. The ANES includes an item to assess the degree to which respondents view *human rights as an important foreign policy goal*; this variable is coded from 0 (not an important foreign policy goal) to 2 (a very important foreign policy goal). I suggest that many individuals view immigration as a human rights issue, and individuals for whom this is an important issue are expected to be more supportive of relaxed immigration than other citizens. Hence, I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable will be positive.

Moreover, a similar item is included in the ANES survey to reflect the importance given by respondents to “protecting jobs of American workers.” This variable, denoting *protecting jobs as a foreign policy goal*, is also coded on a three point scale, with a high score representing respondents who view protecting jobs as a very important foreign policy goal. Since immigration may be seen by many Americans as threatening the jobs of fellow Americans, I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable will be negative.
3.8 Independent Variables: Religion Effects

The effect of religion on immigration public opinion is a topic that has very little or no attention in the immigration public opinion literature. Thus, I am intrigued to determine if affinity to a Protestant faith versus the Roman Catholic faith results in a difference in support for immigration. These two religions differ on the precedent that many Protestant religions place a significant emphasis on evangelization, building a sense of community amongst its followers, and supporting strong, liberal social and political policies. However, the Roman Catholic Church is not prominent for its emphasis on evangelization, community building and supporting liberal social and political policies as other Protestant religions. Thus, I hypothesize that individuals who belong to Protestant religions are more likely to favor expanded immigration than Roman Catholics. Being Protestant has a positive effect on support for immigration, yet being Catholic has the opposite effect. I create a binary variable for each religious group and code 1 for Protestant/Catholic and 0 otherwise.

3.9 Independent Variables: Context

Finally, I include several contextual variables in my model. I suggest that individuals do not live in a vacuum, but rather they exist in a context that carries with it information that is relevant to immigration. The racial and ethnic attributes of individuals’ contexts, along with information about the state of the economy, can have an effect on how individuals think about immigration.

First, I consider the effects of the state Hispanic population percentage in 2004, the year of the survey. Based on the findings of Hood and Morris (1997), as the Latino state population increases, whites are more likely to have favorable attitudes towards immigration. Presumably, as individuals have more contact with Latinos, their views toward Latinos become more favorable, and this translates into attitudes that are more favorable toward relaxed immigration. I hypothesize that the coefficient for this variable will be positive.

On the other hand, change in Hispanic population may have a negative effect on immigration attitudes. Hood and Morris (1997) conclude that in the state of California (a state with a significant immigrant population), as the Latino immigrant population grows, Anglos are less likely to favor immigration. Similarly, Morris (2000) argues that as the Latino population increases, blacks are less likely to favor immigration. I suggest that rapid increases in the Hispanic population may challenge Americans’ ability to adjust to associated changes in culture, language, and economics. Given this, I hypothesize that short-term change in Hispanic population (measured from 2000 to 2004) will have a negative effect on attitudes toward immigration. However, I suspect that a long-term change in Hispanic population will have a positive effect on immigration attitudes.

I have similar expectations for the Asian population. Like Latinos, Asians are a racial group often associated with immigration, and hence their presence in individuals’ contexts should shape their attitudes toward immigration. The findings from previous research have been a bit mixed. Hood and Morris (1997) find that, as the Asian population increases, whites are more likely to favor immigration. Similarly, Morris (2000) finds that as the Asian population grows, blacks are more likely to favor immigration. On the other hand, Hood and Morris (1997) conclude that in the heavily immigrant populated state of California, the Asian population has a negative effect on attitudes towards immigration. Since I am making speculations regarding Americans’ immigration attitudes nationwide, I hypothesize that the state Asian population percentage in 2004 will be positively related to pro-immigration attitudes, but that change in the Asian population (from 2000 to 2004) will be negatively related to support for relaxed immigration.
Lastly, I also consider the effects of the level of and changes in unemployment. Individuals who reside in states with high unemployment rates should be particularly sensitive to immigration, since for many Americans, immigrants play a threatening role in economic well-being. I include state unemployment rate (in 2004) and change in state unemployment rate (from 2000 to 2004) as independent variables in my model. I hypothesize that the coefficients for both independent variables will be negative, indicating that respondents living in states with high unemployment rates or large increases in unemployment will have less favorable views toward immigration.
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Americans’ General Support for Immigration

In Table 3, I estimate a regression model for Americans’ general support for immigration. The coefficients for this model are divided into eight broad categories of independent variables that affect Americans’ attitudes toward immigration: (1) symbolic politics attitudes; (2) economic self interest; (3) demographic attributes; (4) feelings toward Hispanics and Asians; (5) media effects; (6) Americanism and value scales; (7) religion effects; and (8) contextual variables. At the outset, it is important to note that this model does a pretty good job in portraying Americans’ perceptions of immigration. The adjusted R squared for the model is 0.369, and variables from all of the categories of independent variables are found to have significant effects on general support for immigration.

Turning first to the symbolic politics variables, I find that the variables in this category do not have strong significant effects on the dependent variable. Partisan identification is unrelated to attitudes toward immigration; the coefficient for this variable is in the unexpected negative direction and fails to achieve statistical significance. On the other hand, the coefficient for ideological orientation suggests that this variable has a negative effect on Americans’ immigration attitudes, but the coefficient is only at the borderline of statistical significance. Overall, even with the most relaxed interpretation, these two symbolic politics variables do not make an important contribution to respondents’ immigration attitudes.

Much the same can be said regarding economic self interest variables. I am struck by the observation that only one of the variables in this category has a significant effect on Americans’ attitudes toward immigration. The conventional wisdom is that Americans’ attitudes toward immigration are shaped by concerns about the economic effects of immigration. However, contrary to what a large portion of the literature on immigration attitudes suggests, I can assert that Americans’ personal economic situation, the national unemployment rate, labor union participation, unemployment status and holding an occupation associated with Latinos do not significantly shape Americans’ general support for immigration. A possible explanation for these findings is that since the majority of the respondents in this study are white, whites may perceive immigrants more as cultural threats than as economic threats. A more in-depth explanation for this will be provided in the discussion regarding Americanism and value scales’ effect on support for immigration.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that Americans’ household income has a significantly positive effect on immigration attitudes ($b = 0.011$, $t = 1.73$). Thus, the higher Americans’ income, the more likely they are to favor immigration. A possible explanation for this finding is that those with higher income perceive immigrants as less of an economic threat than those who obtain lower incomes; thus, I conclude that wealthy individuals are more receptive to immigration than individuals in the middle and lower classes.

In terms of demographic attributes, I find that gender, education, being Black, being Hispanic, being Asian, and having parents born in the U.S. have discernible effects on Americans’ immigration attitudes. In accordance with the majority of research on immigration attitudes, I find that women are significantly more likely than men to support relaxed immigration. Also, education has a liberalizing effect on immigration attitudes; those with high levels of education are significantly more likely to favor immigration than those with a low education.
Table 3. OLS regression estimates for model of Americans’ general support for immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>t</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-0.678</td>
<td>-1.54*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Symbolic Politics Attitudes</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification [-]</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.22</td>
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<td>Ideological orientation [-]</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-1.37*</td>
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<td><strong>Economic Self-Interest</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Retrospective Personal Economic Situation [+]</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retrospective National Unemployment rate [-]</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>1.46</td>
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<td>Household participation in labor union [-]</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
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<td>Unemployment status [-]</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household income [+]</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>1.73**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latino Occupation [-]</td>
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<td><strong>Demographic attributes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender [+]</td>
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<td>1.74**</td>
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<td>Age [-]</td>
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<td>Education [+]</td>
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<td>Black [+]</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>2.49**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic [+]</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>2.37***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian [+]</td>
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<td>0.16</td>
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<td>Parents born in the US [-]</td>
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<td>-1.77**</td>
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<td><strong>Feelings toward Hispanics and Asians</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanics feeling thermometer [+]</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asians feeling thermometer [+]</td>
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<td>2.07**</td>
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<td>Trait perceptions of Hispanics [+]</td>
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<td>5.11***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trait perceptions of Asians [+]</td>
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<td>-1.91*</td>
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<td><strong>Media Effects</strong></td>
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<td>Frequency of watching national network news [-]</td>
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<td>Frequency of watching local network news [-]</td>
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<td>Frequency of reading newspaper news [-]</td>
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<td>Frequency of listening to talk radio [-]</td>
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<td>Interaction of watching national network news and political ideology [+]</td>
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<td><strong>Americanism and Value Scales</strong></td>
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<td>Pro-American scale [-]</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
<td>-5.94***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pro-equality scale [+]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moral traditionalism scale [-]</td>
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<td>Foreign policy goal: human rights [+]</td>
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<td>5.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy goal: protect jobs [-]</td>
<td>-0.394</td>
<td>-5.22***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion Effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic [-]</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>2.73***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant [+ ]</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>1.59*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Population (2004) [+ ]</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>2.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian population (2004) [+ ]</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate (2004) [- ]</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Hispanic Population [- ]</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
<td>-1.70**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Asian Population [- ]</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Unemployment Rate [- ]</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 707
Adjusted R² 0.369

Note: Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient.

***prob < .01  ** prob < .05  * prob < .10

Furthermore, the coefficient for Hispanic status is positive and significant (b = 0.347, t = 2.37), indicating that those who identify themselves as Hispanic are substantially more likely support to immigration than non-Hispanics. This finding makes sense since the majority of immigrants in the U.S. are Latinos, but I am surprised to find that the coefficient for Asian status is not similarly significant. Lastly, in accordance with my expectations, those whose parents were born in the U.S. are less supportive of immigration than individuals whose parents are foreign-born.

With regard to the variables representing respondents’ feelings toward Hispanics and Asians, I find only mixed support for my hypotheses. Of the two feeling thermometer items, only the Asian thermometer has the expected effect on immigration attitudes. As expected, feeling thermometer evaluations of Asians are positively related to attitudes about immigration; individuals who like Asians are more likely to support relaxed immigration than other individuals. On the other hand, the coefficient for Hispanic feeling thermometer scores is positive, yet it fails to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.

The variable in this cluster that has a striking relationship with the dependent variable is trait perceptions of Hispanics. Americans’ perceptions of Hispanics as hardworking, intelligent, and trustworthy has a strong, significant effect on Americans’ general support for immigration (b = 0.081, t = 5.11). It would appear that Americans associate Hispanics with immigration, since their perception that Hispanics have three positive traits is positively associated with their support for immigration. However, contrary to expectations, the relationship between trait perceptions of Asians and support for immigration is negative, suggesting that Americans who have positive perceptions of Asians as
hardworking, intelligent and trustworthy are actually less likely to support immigration. Clearly, Americans see Asians in a different light than Latinos, though an explanation for this difference awaits further research.

With regards to the media’s effects on immigration attitudes, I find that Americans are not influenced greatly by the media when developing their immigration public opinion. Table 1 indicates that television (local and national network news) and print media have no effect. Furthermore, I examine the effect that the interaction variable has on support for immigration. To restate, I hypothesize that the effect of watching national network news on support for immigration varies for liberals and conservatives. In this model, the interaction coefficient does not have a significant effect on immigration attitudes. Thus, a critical difference between conservatives and liberals in support for immigration based on watching national network news does not exist. On the other hand, the only form of media that has a significant effect on support for immigration is talk radio. In conjunction with my hypothesis, Americans who listen to talk radio are more likely to develop more restrictive immigration attitudes than those who do not listen to talk radio.

Besides media effects, I also consider the influence of Americanism and values on Americans’ support for immigration and find that these independent variables have perhaps the strongest effect on Americans’ general support for immigration. I find that the pro-American scale (b = -0.205, t = -5.94), moral traditionalism scale (b = -0.245, t = -6.29), support for human rights as a foreign policy goal (b = 0.279, t = 5.56) and support for protecting jobs as a foreign policy goal (b = -0.394, t = -5.22) are strongly related to the dependent variable. These effects are all in the expected direction. My findings suggest that those who strongly identify with Americanism, who support maintaining traditional morals, and who are strong supporters of protecting jobs as a foreign policy goal are less supportive of immigration. Also as predicted, those who support human rights as a foreign policy goal are significantly more likely to favor immigration. Unlike the other value scales, the coefficient for the pro-equality scale suggests that there is a small link between support for equality and immigration public opinion; those who support equality are slightly more likely to support immigration. Due to the highly significant effects that the variables in this category have on the dependent variable, I suspect that Americans are inclined to perceive immigrants as cultural threats (threats to the “American” culture), at least more than economic threats as mentioned prior.

In terms of religion effects, being Catholic and being Protestant have significant effects on Americans’ general support for immigration. Unlike what I hypothesized, being Catholic has a highly significant positive effect on immigration support (b = 0.221, t = 2.73). As a result, Catholics are more likely to support immigration than non-Catholics. The reasoning for this finding requires further explanation. However, as predicted, being Protestant also has a significantly positive effect on individuals’ support for immigration, but not to such a large extent as for Catholics.

Finally, I consider the effects of contextual variables. For the three contextual variables representing the current Hispanic population, Asian population, and unemployment rate, the results are somewhat mixed. For Americans who live in states with large Hispanic populations, there is a strong positive effect on immigration attitudes. This finding is wholly consistent with the contact theory. It suggests that as Americans have more contact with Hispanics, they develop more favorable views toward Hispanics, and this is translated into greater support for immigration since Hispanics are the largest immigrant group.

However, my findings suggest that the contact theory does not apply to the Asian population. The negative coefficient for this variable suggests that as the number of Asians increase, Americans
become less supportive of immigration. One interpretation is that this finding is in accordance with the inter-minority conflict theory, which suggests that as the number of Asians increase, the less likely are Americans to have a favorable view toward Asians. However, I find little evidence of animus toward Asians as their population increases. One alternative interpretation—to be explored in future research—is that many Americans view Asians as a “model” immigration group, and Americans may be willing to express strong anti-immigration sentiments even as they hold favorable views toward the traits that Asian Americans are perceived to hold.

Consequently, I suggest that changes in context may have an effect on immigration attitudes, and my findings are somewhat consistent with this notion. I find that increases in the Hispanic population are associated with significant declines in support for immigration. The coefficient for the change in Hispanic population coincides with my predictions. Controlling for the effects of other variables, I find that Americans who reside in states with the largest increases in the Hispanic population are systematically less supportive of immigration than those residing in states with only small changes in Hispanic population. On the other hand, it is also important to note that changes in the Asian population and the unemployment rate do not have a significant effect on Americans’ immigration attitudes. Although Asians are a large immigrant group in the U.S., they may not be identified as immigrants in the same way as Hispanics. More research is necessary to explore this phenomenon. Similarly, although being surrounded by Hispanics may shape immigration attitudes, being surrounded by unemployment and a change in the unemployment rate may not significantly influence Americans’ support for immigration.

4.2 Structural Equation Modeling: Pathway Analysis Model Development

In order to further understand the factors that shape Americans’ immigration attitudes, I employ structural equation modeling (SEM), specifically pathway analysis, to test the linkages among the 2004 ANES variables in Table 3. SEM includes several regression equations which are fitted simultaneously using maximum likelihood as the model estimator.

The conceptual model from my path analysis is illustrated in Figure 2. In this figure, the variables that may have an effect on support for immigration are divided into “core” and “peripheral” categories. The variables at the top of the figure are part of the core category. This category represents variables that are fixed, those that are not likely to alter. They include: political ideology, party identification, being Catholic, frequency of watching national network news, being Protestant, household income, unemployment status, being Hispanic, being Asian, having parents in the US, the percentage of Hispanics in one’s state and the percentage of Asians in one’s state. On the other hand, peripheral variables (listed in the middle of the figure) are those that may be shaped by core factors and are those that may directly affect support for immigration. These variables include: viewing human rights as a foreign policy, moral traditionalism values, viewing protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal, the Hispanic feeling thermometer and the Asian feeling thermometer.

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2 This is actually not supported by the data. In an auxiliary analysis (results not shown), I find that the size of the Asian population is unrelated to feeling thermometer scores for Asians.

3 Maximum likelihood is the standard method of estimating free parameters in structural equation modeling (Hoyle and Panter 1995), and is appropriate over other regression estimators when there are missing variables, such as in this study.
4.2.1 Theory

The conceptual model in Figure 2 examines the causal connections between core and peripheral variables. I expect that political ideology and partisan identification affect support for human rights as a foreign policy goal since support for human rights can often be associated with political beliefs as well as values. For example, liberals and Democrats may be more likely to support human rights as a foreign policy goal in comparison to conservatives and Republicans since many of liberals’ and Democrats’ beliefs and values place a strong emphasis on maintaining fairness, equality and justice for all. Furthermore, maintaining fairness and justice for all play key roles in upholding human rights (Ely-Yamin, 1993).

Another causal connection in this model can be found between religion and moral traditionalism values. Being Catholic or Protestant may also affect one’s emphasis on traditional family ties and upholding moral behavior, components of the moral traditionalism value scale. Since adhering to a certain religion may influence one to place more emphasis on upholding moral behavior compared to being non-religious, I argue that being Catholic or Protestant has an effect on support for moral traditionalism. Besides religion, watching national network news should also shape Americans’ support for moral behavior. Several scholars such as Baum (2002) and Hunt (1997) have found intriguing relationships between the media and support for morals.

Household income and unemployment status influence support for protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal since income and unemployment status measure individuals’ economic self interest, as noted prior. Protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal can also be a measure of economic self interest since those who support protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal may be concerned about their financial and/or employment situation.

However, although household income, unemployment status and protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal are measures of economic self interest, household income and unemployment status are core variables that do not change and influence whether an individual favors protection of jobs. Those who have a low household income and are unemployed may be more likely than the wealthy and employed to favor protection of jobs abroad.

Several factors shape the Hispanic feeling thermometer, which then affects support for immigration. Being Hispanic should have a significant relationship with the Hispanic feeling thermometer since I strongly suspect that being Hispanic has a considerable effect on how one feels about members of his/her race. Furthermore, being surrounded by Latinos in one’s state should influence how Americans feel about Hispanics since the individuals who are surrounded by Hispanics are able to see and learn directly about Latinos, thus, influencing his/her feelings about them. Lastly, having parents born in the US should shape Americans’ feelings toward immigrants. Individuals whose parents are immigrants are very likely to be influenced to view immigrants favorably, including Latinos, since they are the largest immigrant group in the US.

The last set of core/peripheral relationships involves the Asian feeling thermometer and being Asian and the Asian population. Being Asian should be strongly related to the Asian feeling thermometer since I speculate that being Asian has a great influence on how one feels about members of his/her race. Furthermore, being surrounded by Asians in one’s state should also affect how he/she feels about Asians since Americans are able to see and learn directly about Asians and, thus, form their opinions and feelings towards them easily.
Figure 2. Conceptual Model of Americans’ General Support for Immigration

Figure 2 also illustrates connections between peripheral variables and support for immigration. These peripheral variables are included in this path model since they have highly significant
relationships with support for immigration, as shown by the regression coefficients in Table 3, except the Hispanic feeling thermometer. This variable is included in the path model, nevertheless, since feelings towards the largest group of U.S. immigrants are very applicable to my study.

4.2.2 Political Ideology Pathway Model

Besides examining relationships among core and peripheral variables, the main focus of my use of path analysis in Figures 2 and 3 and Table 4 is to explore the direct and indirect effects of political ideology on support for immigration. Thus, the indirect effects of political ideology on the dependent variable will be portrayed through the direct effects of political ideology with all of the peripheral variables mentioned in Figure 2. However, it is important to mention that in order to examine the indirect and direct effects of political ideology on support for immigration, I am controlling for the effects of all the variables in Figure 2. In order to do this, I examine relationships between each core variable to each peripheral variable, each core variable to the dependent variable and each peripheral variable to the dependent variable. However, all of the relationships are not depicted (with arrows) in Figure 2 and 3 in order to maintain model clarity. The relationships that interest me the most are illustrated in Figure 3.

4.2.3 Theory and Methods for Political Ideology Pathway Model

Figure 3 explores political ideology’s direct and indirect effects on support for immigration. I have chosen to focus my path analysis on political ideology since it plays a prominent, interesting and central role in shaping immigration public opinion (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade et. al 1996; Hood et. al 1997; Hood et. al 1998; Hood et. al 2000; Wilkinson, Rouse, Nguyen and Garand 2007).

Besides political ideology, the regression estimates in Table 3 indicate that human rights as a foreign policy goal significantly shape immigration attitudes, a much more significant relationship than political ideology’s effect on the dependent variable. As mentioned prior, political ideology and support for human rights are related based on the idea that many liberals are more likely than conservatives to base their values and beliefs in maintaining equality, fairness and justice amongst all individuals of society. Furthermore, upholding human rights is often associated with maintaining fairness and justice amongst all. Consequently, I suspect that political ideology has a negative effect on support for human rights, indicating that conservatives are less likely to support human rights as a foreign policy goal compared to liberals.

I also hypothesize that political ideology influences support for moral traditionalism values. Components of the moral traditionalism value scale can be strongly associated with political ideology. Embracing family ties and supporting the idea that modern lifestyles result in society’s destruction and support for family ties can be linked to a conservative political ideology since conservatives may be more likely to value tradition than liberals and be less embracing in supporting individualism and maintaining equality and fairness among all when faced with social developments such as newer lifestyles (Smith 1990). Consequently, I argue that political ideology has a positive effect on support for moral traditionalism values. The more conservative one is, the more likely that he/she supports moral traditionalism values.
Political Ideology

- Foreign policy goal: human rights
- Moral Traditionalism
- Foreign policy goal: protect jobs
- Hispanic feel. therm.
- Asian feel. therm.

Support for Immigration

*** prob < .01 ** prob < .05  * prob < .10

Figure 3. Statistical Model of Support for Immigration: Political Ideology
In addition to being linked to human rights and moral traditionalism values, political ideology can affect economic issues such as support for protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal. Smith (1990) finds that political ideology is related to material concerns and government regulations; however, his findings do not make a clear argument that government intervention in economic concerns is a conservative/liberal issue more than a liberal/conservative issue. Consequently, I do not propose directional hypotheses between political ideology and supporting protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal.

Political ideology can also shape feelings toward Hispanics and feelings toward Asians. Smith (1990) finds that liberals are more likely than conservatives to support equal rights especially regarding race/ethnicity and civil liberties. Furthermore, liberals are more likely to push for state intervention than conservatives. “Trends favoring state intervention were... to protect equal rights, especially of “powerless” groups (minorities or the working class)” (494). Hence, I speculate that political ideology has a negative relationship with Hispanic and Asian feeling thermometers, indicating that conservatives are less likely to have positive feelings toward Hispanics and Asians than liberals.

In addition, I hypothesize that the peripheral variables have strong effects on support for immigration based on the reasoning presented in the prior methods section and since Table 3 portrays their significant effects on the dependent variable. Supporting human rights as a foreign policy goal and feelings toward Asians should have positive effects on support for immigration. On the other hand, support for protection of jobs as a foreign policy goal and support for moral traditionalism values should negatively and significantly affect support for immigration. The only peripheral variable from Figure 2 that does not significantly influence the dependent variable in Table 3 is the Hispanic feeling thermometer. Thus, I provide no directional hypothesis regarding this variable’s relationship with the dependent variable. Nonetheless, as mentioned prior, the Hispanic feeling thermometer is included in the political ideology path model since feelings towards the largest group of U.S. immigrants are very applicable to my study.

As mentioned prior, I also explore political ideology’s direct effect on support for immigration. Based on the reasoning presented in the earlier method section and the results on Table 3, I suspect that political ideology has significantly negative effect on the dependent variable. Thus, I hypothesize that conservatives are less likely to favor expanded immigration than liberals.

4.2.4 Empirical Results

In Table 4, I estimate the political ideology path analysis model found in Figure 3. The only core variable in this model is political ideology, yet the following peripheral variables are included: human rights as a foreign policy goal, moral traditionalism, protecting jobs as a foreign policy goal, the Hispanic feeling thermometer and the Asian feeling thermometer.

First, it is important to mention that my data and results generally support my hypotheses. Political ideology has a large impact on support for human rights as a foreign policy goal. As my statistical model indicates, political ideology negatively and significantly affects support for human rights as a foreign policy goal (path coefficient = -0.044). I also observe the statistically significant impact of political ideology on moral traditionalism values (path coefficient = 0.308), further highlighting the relationship between conservatives and support for moral traditionalism. More importantly, political ideology’s expected negative, direct relationship with support for immigration is further highlighted (path coefficient = -0.074). This coefficient indicates that conservatives are very much against supporting immigration.
Table 4. Political Ideology Model Path Coefficients: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects (standard coefficients shown)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Direct</th>
<th>Indirect</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology → Foreign policy goal: human rights</td>
<td>-0.044***</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology → Moral Traditionalism</td>
<td>0.308***</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology → Foreign policy goal: protect jobs</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology → Hispanic feeling thermometer</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology → Asian feeling thermometer</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Ideology → Support for Immigration</td>
<td>-0.074***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy goal: human rights → Support for Immigration</td>
<td>0.336***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Traditionalism → Support for Immigration</td>
<td>-0.260***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy goal: protect jobs → Support for Immigration</td>
<td>-0.400***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Feeling Thermometer → Support for Immigration</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Feeling Thermometer → Support for Immigration</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** prob < .01 ** prob < .05 * prob < .10

Contrary to my expectations, however, political ideology does not significantly impact feelings toward Hispanics and feelings toward Asians. A possible explanation for this finding is that feelings toward immigrants tap into feelings toward the act of immigration and the legality associated with this act. Thus, liberals may not directly associate Hispanics and Asians with minorities or individuals who are helpless. However, more research needs to be conducted to determine why this is so. On the other hand, it is important to mention that the pathway between political ideology and support for protecting jobs as a foreign policy goal was insignificant, reinforcing the hypothesized ambiguity of this relationship.
When it comes to the peripheral variables’ effects on support for immigration, all but one of the variables listed in Figure 3 have significant effects on general support for immigration. Supporting human rights as a foreign policy, moral traditionalism, and supporting protection of jobs as a foreign policy significantly shape the dependent variable in the hypothesized directions. Contrary to my expectations, the Hispanic feeling thermometer has a significantly positive relationship with support for immigration, indicating that Americans’ positive feelings toward Hispanics results in favorable attitudes toward expanded immigration in the US. Moreover, the Asian feeling thermometer does not have a significant effect on the dependent variable. A possible explanation for this is that Americans do not view Hispanics in the same way that they view Asians. Nevertheless, more research should be conducted to provide a better explanation for this finding.

In sum, conservatives have strong opposing attitudes toward immigration. Conservatives are less likely than liberals to see human rights objectives as appropriate for foreign policy and people who support human rights as a foreign policy are more likely to be pro-immigration. Conservatives are more likely than liberals to support moral traditionalism and people who support moral traditionalism are less likely to be pro-immigration. Furthermore, individuals who favor protecting jobs as a foreign policy goal are less likely to favor expanded immigration. However, Americans who have positive feelings toward Hispanics are more likely to be pro-immigration than those who do not exhibit positive feelings.
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Past research has focused on the immigration public opinion of specific racial groups and overarching theories regarding the factors that shape individuals’ attitudes toward immigration. However, previous scholarly works on this topic have failed to provide a comprehensive model of immigration attitudes that can be applied to all racial groups and include a variety of categories of factors that shape public opinion. Through the hypotheses posed in this paper, I expand on immigration public opinion research by exploring the determinants of Americans’ (whites, blacks, Hispanics and Asians) attitudes toward immigration. I develop a measure of general support for immigration based on individuals’ responses to four immigration items: (1) support for increases in (legal) immigration; (2) feeling thermometer scores for illegal immigrants; (3) support for spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration; and (4) having “controlling illegal immigration” as a foreign policy goal. These items load on a single factor and permit me to generate a global pro-immigration scale that reflects Americans’ general views toward immigration. Furthermore, I develop a comprehensive model of immigration attitudes that includes eight clusters of independent variables: (1) symbolic politics attitudes; (2) economic self-interest; (3) demographic attributes; (4) feelings toward Hispanics and Asians, which are two groups commonly associated with immigration; (5) media effects, including television, radio and print; (6) values, including Americanism, moral traditionalism, egalitarianism, and views about important foreign policy goals; (7) religion effects; and (8) state racial, ethnic, and economic context. In addition, unlike any other research on immigration public opinion that I have come across, I employ structural equation modeling, specifically pathway analysis, to test the linkages among the factors that may shape public opinion and the pro-immigration scale.

My findings have important implications. First, I am struck by how strongly my four immigration items load on a single dimension. To be sure, three of the four items are explicitly about illegal immigration, but the fourth item is arguably more relevant to legal immigration. The fact that items relating to legal and illegal immigration load so well on a single dimension is important. Many observers and commentators have made a clear-cut distinction between legal and illegal immigration, yet it appears that support for (and opposition to) legal and illegal immigration are strongly enough related that they reflect a single underlying immigration dimension.

Second, through the comprehensive model of immigration attitudes, I show that Americans’ attitudes toward immigration are strongly driven by demographic attributes, feelings toward Hispanics and Asians, Americanism and other relevant values and views regarding foreign policy goals. Surprisingly, economic self-interest plays almost no role in shaping immigration attitudes, despite its prominent place in contemporary debates about immigration in the United States. In addition, I find the difference in coefficients for Latino and Asian variables to be potentially important targets of future research. To be sure, Latinos and Asians are not the same. Latinos have a much larger share of the U.S. population, and there has been a great deal of attention paid to the influx of Hispanics—particularly from Mexico and Central and South American countries—and the rapid increase in the Hispanic population in the United States. But even given these differences, I am surprised to see the differences in the effects of Latino-related and Asian-related variables on attitudes toward immigration. Clearly, more research is needed to understand how Americans view these two groups in the immigration process.

Third and last, what does the future hold for immigration public opinion research? The research program on immigration attitudes is a long one. In this paper, I explore the attitudes toward immigration in the general population. Future research should be directed at more in-depth studies of immigration attitudes within various racial and ethnic groups. I have already begun work with
research collaborators on immigration attitudes within the Latino population (Rouse et al., 2006), and this work is being expanded to encompass African-American and Asian populations. Testing models of immigration attitudes among these various groups is more than an academic exercise. To the contrary, exploring the determinants of immigration attitudes in white non-Hispanic, African American, Hispanic, and Asian populations gives us great leverage over the testing of general immigration public opinion theories.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX: Description of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Immigrant Scale</td>
<td>Scale of support for immigration, based on principle components factor analysis of four items: (1) support for increases in immigration; (2) feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants; (3) support for spending on border security to prevent illegal immigration; and (4) having “controlling illegal immigration” as a personal foreign policy goal. Eigenvalue = 2.129; variance explained = 0.532.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Identification</td>
<td>Partisan identification scale, ranging from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Orientation</td>
<td>Political ideology scale, ranging from 0 (strong liberal) to 6 (strong conservative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Personal Economic Situation</td>
<td>Scale of personal economic well-being over the past year, ranging from 0 (much worse) to 4 (much better).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective National Unemployment Situation</td>
<td>Scale of national unemployment situation over the past year, ranging -1 (worsened in past year) to 0 (stayed the same) to 1 (improved in past year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Labor Union in Household</td>
<td>1 = at least one person in household participates in labor union; 0 = otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1 = unemployed respondents; 0 = otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>Household income scale ranging from 1 (for less than $2,999) to 23 ($120,000 and over)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1 = female respondents; 0 = male respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Age in years, range from 18 to 90 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Educational attainment scale, ranging from 1 (respondent has completed 8 grades or less and no diploma) to 7 (respondent has earned an advanced college degree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents born in the U.S.</td>
<td>1 = both parents born in the United States; 0 = otherwise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Occupation</td>
<td>1 = Latino occupation (Crop production; construction; fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty food manufacturing; animal slaughtering and processing; fiber, yarn, and threat mills; fabric mills, except knitting; textile and fabric finishing and coating mills; carpets and rugs manufacturing; textile product mills except carpets and rugs; knitting mills; cut and sew apparel manufacturing; apparel accessories and other apparel manufacturing; footwear manufacturing; specialty food stores; warehousing and storage; landscape services; home health care services; child day care services; restaurants and other food services; automotive repair and maintenance; car washes; drycleaning and laundry services); 0 = otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>1 = Hispanic respondent; 0 = non-Hispanic respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1 = Asian respondent; 0 = non-Asian respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>1 = African American respondent; 0 = non-African American respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanics Feeling Thermometer</td>
<td>Feeling thermometer scale for Hispanics, ranging from 0 (highly unfavorable) to 100 (highly favorable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians Feeling Thermometer</td>
<td>Feeling thermometer scale for Asians, ranging from 0 (highly unfavorable) to 100 (highly favorable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait Perceptions of Hispanics</td>
<td>Sum of three 7-point trait scales for Hispanics (i.e., hardworking, intelligent, and trustworthy). Cronbach’s alpha = 0.731.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait Perceptions of Asians</td>
<td>Sum of three 7-point trait scales for Asians (i.e., hardworking, intelligent, and trustworthy). Cronbach’s alpha = 0.756.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of watching</td>
<td>Scale of the number of days an individual watches national network television news, ranging from 0 (not watch) to 7 (watch national network news every day of the week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of watching early and late local news</td>
<td>Scale of the number of days an individual watches early and late local television news, ranging from 0 (not watch) to 7 (watch early and late local news seven days a week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of reading newspaper news</td>
<td>Scale of the number of days an individual reads the newspaper news, ranging from 0 (not read newspaper at all) to 7 (read newspaper news seven days a week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk radio</td>
<td>1 = listening to talk radio; 0 = not listening to talk radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Americanism Scale</td>
<td>Scale of support for Americanism and patriotism, based on principle components factor analysis of five items: (1) When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel extremely good, very good, somewhat good, or not very good? (2) There are some things about America today that make me feel ashamed of America. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree? (3) There are some things about America today that make me feel angry about America. Do you agree, neither agree nor disagree, or disagree? (4) How strong is your love for your country—extremely strong, very strong, somewhat strong, or not very strong? (5) Is being an American extremely important, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important to you personally? Items #2 and #3 are negatively loaded on this factor. Eigenvalue = 2.129; variance explained = 0.532.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Traditionalism Scale</td>
<td>Scale of support for moral traditionalism, based on principle components factor analysis of four items: (1) the world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes; (2) the newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society; (3) we should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own; and (4) this country would have fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties. Eigenvalue = 2.063, variance explained = 0.516.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**APPENDIX continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-equality Scale</td>
<td>Scale of support for equality principles, based on principle components factor analysis of six items: (1) Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed; (2) we have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country; (3) one of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance; (4) this country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are; (5) it is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others; and (6) if people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems. Eigenvalue = 2.508, variance explained = 0.418.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy goal: human rights</td>
<td>Scale representing degree to which respondent perceives human rights as an important foreign policy goal, ranging from 0 (not an important foreign policy goal) to 2 (a very important foreign policy goal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy goal: protect jobs</td>
<td>Scale representing degree to which respondent perceives protecting jobs of American workers as an important foreign policy goal, ranging from 0 (not an important foreign policy goal) to 2 (a very important foreign policy goal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>1 = Roman Catholic; 0 = otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1 = Protestant; 0 = otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic Population (2004)</td>
<td>State Hispanic population percentage, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate (2004)</td>
<td>State unemployment rate, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Hispanic Population</td>
<td>Change in Hispanic population percentage, 2000 to 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Asian Population</td>
<td>Change in Asian population percentage, 2000 to 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>Change in state unemployment rate, 2000 to 2004.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VITA

Betina Cutaia Wilkinson completes her Master of Arts degree in political science this spring majoring in American politics, with a minor in comparative politics. She specializes in Latino politics with a concentration in immigration public opinion. Ms. Wilkinson will begin the doctoral program at Louisiana State University in the fall. She earned a dual Bachelor of Arts in sociology and Spanish from Loyola University New Orleans. Her accomplishments include being named a 2007-2008 Minority Fellow by the American Political Science Association and receiving the Louisiana State University Huel D. Perkins Diversity Fellowship for 2007-2011, the 2007 Prestage-Cook Travel Award and the 2006 American Political Science Association Fund for Latino Scholarship (travel grant). Ms. Wilkinson has presented at various national and regional conferences. She is a member of the Louisiana State University’s political science department’s Graduate Student Association as well as a member of the American Political Science Association, Midwest Political Science Association, Southern Political Science Association, and the Southwestern Political Science Association. After obtaining her doctoral degree from Louisiana State University, Ms. Wilkinson plans on pursuing a career in academia.