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The 'Heroe Fracasado' in the Novels of Unamuno, Baroja and Azorin.

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THE HÉROE FRACASADO IN THE NOVELS
OF UNAMUNO, BAROJA AND AZORÍN

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by

Janice Donnell Glascock
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ABSTRACT

Whereas Unamuno's preoccupation with being as an existential thinker has been established for quite some time, the rationale of this study is an attempt to widen the perspectives from which Azorín and Baroja are customarily viewed so as to include them in this same category.

Comparative biographical information reveals that following a period of severe personal crisis early in his career, all three men wrote using the Bildungsroman genre, i.e., the novel of education wherein the author pursues both philosophical and practical answers to the questions "Who am I?" and "What shall I do with my life?"

The center of interest in these novels is the héroes fracasado, who is defined as being synonymous with the existentialist hero of twentieth century literature because of their similar involvement in the existential "manoeuvre." That is, being a person who is unable to understand human existence in either scientific or idealistic terms, he comes to realize phenomenologically, through the stress of an intensely painful, spontaneous and subjective occurrence, his freedom to make definitive and decisive choices regarding his future for which he must be responsible in a contingent and seemingly purposeless world. This consciousness of constituting his essence through his existence is what distinguishes the héroes fracasado from the fracasado who is not similarly self-conscious.
Azorín's trilogy, *La voluntad*, Antonio Azorín and *Las confesiones de un pequeño filósofo*, is analyzed in detail as illustrating this process. The character Antonio Azorín goes from an inauthentic to an authentic existence through recognizing the possible use of his imagination as an exercise in freedom and choice, and his willed determination to do so.

With the exception of Roberto Hastings in the *La lucha por la vida* trilogy, Baroja's héro fracaado projects himself directly toward his goal from his spontaneity by means of his passion or instinct. This method of executing the existential "manoeuvre," while more mysterious, is shown to be equally as effective as when an announcement of will places the "manoeuvre" in the category of the problematic.

Unamuno's héro fracaado, like Baroja's and Azorín's, suffers a sensation of the nothingness of life. However, he undergoes this realization specifically through an anticipatory sensation of the nothingness of death. This is the tragic sense of life which Unamuno used as the basis for his philosophy of existence and as the criterion for his division of characters. Those lacking this sense are fracaados; those having it are héroes fracaados who may choose to exercise their freedom through either noluntad or voluntad.

This study reaches the conclusion that all three writers were vitally concerned with the question of being in an existential manner, as illustrated in their development of the héro fracaado.
INTRODUCTION

Although Miguel de Unamuno, Pío Baroja and Azorín were men of widely divergent temperaments, to group them under the designation "The Generation of '98" has become traditional. This term, is, of course, an application of José Ortega y Gasset's method of interpreting history, which subsequent scholars have utilized. In brief, Ortega uses fifteen years as the general time limit and he divides man's life into a series of fifteen year periods. He states that the two periods from ages 30 to 45 and 45 to 60 are the ones of influence. From age 30 to 45 a man develops his ideas about life; from age 45 to 60 he historically executes these previously formulated ideas. Thus in any period of history there will be two groups dynamically operative, "una consiste en recibir lo vivido -- ideas, valoraciones, instituciones, etc. -- por la antecedente; la otra, dejar fluir su propia espontaneidad." The younger group may be intellectually in accord with the older, thus producing "épocas cumulativas," or it may disagree with the older generation, thus bringing about "épocas eliminatorias y polémicas." What characterizes the spirit of a particular generation is the attitude which the majority of its individuals takes toward "tiempos de viejos y tiempos de jóvenes." The Generation of '98 was decidedly an época eliminatoria y polémica.

To study literature as movements in reaction against earlier literary expression is, of course, a quite common method. If one
were to apply this method to the Generation writers it would produce the expected drastic contrasts in matters of style, technique or aesthetics of language. In matters of point of view on almost any subject -- politics, society, religion -- an even more drastic contrast would result. However, as Ortega has said, "...la crítica literaria -- cuya misión primaria y esencial no es evaluar los méritos de una obra sino definir su carácter--, tiene, a mi juicio, que empezar por aislar ese objeto genérico, que viene a ser el elemento donde toda la producción alienta." The present study will attempt to follow this precept rather than establish contrasts.

The intellectual training of Unamuno, Baroja and Azorín is one of the most striking qualities of these writers. Unamuno was a philologist and a philosopher. He held the chair of Greek at the University of Salamanca. Baroja was a trained physician and a student of philosophy. Azorín studied law and practiced journalism as a profession. They were, therefore, well trained in the use of their minds and the fact that they are well disciplined in the world of ideas is quite evident in their writings. Nevertheless, in speaking of these men Ortega makes the pertinent observation: "Todos los pensadores y artistas que pueden considerarse como autores de la transición entre siglo xix y este siglo xx ... han coincidido en la apología de activismo. Al intelecto y la contemplación se prefiere ese otro modo de vida que gravita sobre la pasión y la voluntad..."

The contemporary Spanish Generation-scholar, Luis S. Granjel, has written very interesting, well documented and sensitive biographies of Unamuno, Baroja and Azorín which perhaps amplify Ortega's comment. As one reads these biographies one is struck by the fact
that early in the lives of these three men each passed through a period of extreme personal crisis. In each case, of course, the crisis was for a different reason, which emerged from the particular temperament of the man involved. Unamuno's problem was religious in nature, Baroja's was the problem of finding his place in the world, and Azorín's seems to have been largely of an emotional character. Following this crisis in their lives, however, all three men began writing with renewed intensity. They chose to use a particular form of fiction known as the Bildungsroman. This genre has been defined as the novel of education, that is, fictional biography centered on the hero's formation of and reaction to ideas about life which result from his experience. Colin Wilson calls it "A sort of laboratory in which the hero conducts an experiment in living," and goes on to say, "For this reason, it is a particularly useful medium for writers whose main concern is a philosophical answer to the practical question: What shall we do with our lives?" It has long been a truism among Generation scholars that certain of the writings of Unamuno, Baroja and Azorín are partially autobiographical in nature. It is also worth noting that the novels which have been so characterized are Bildungsroman in form, and contain inevitably the héroes fracasado as the center of interest.

To arrive at a definition of the héroes fracasado we would like to offer a description of his mental processes which will be hypothetical in nature for the purpose of exposition. As we shall see later in the various novels which we analyze, these mental processes are subject to initial variations due to different individual temperaments and circumstances. However, in all cases the héroes
fracasado is a person who will change under the dynamics of an experience which he may interpret with equal validity in either a positive or a negative light, depending on his native predisposition to optimism or pessimism.

Perhaps we can best start to define the héroe fracasado by contrasting him with persons whom he would call fracasados. First, however, it should be emphasized that both the fracasado and the héroe fracasado are individual men who find themselves in the world with other individual men and objects surrounding them. It is their reaction to this fundamental fact which divides them.

To the héroe fracasado, a fracasado is a person who accepts the world in which he finds himself existing with other men and material things surrounding him as real. The vast majority of people, of course, fall into this category. They are people for whom life is simpler than it is for the héroe fracasado. Unamuno expresses the héroe fracasado’s viewpoint on some of these people in the following passage from his Paisaje:

—¡Hermoso pueblo éste de Brianzuelo! ¡No tiene nada que ver y si mucho que sentir! ... Mira esa vaca ... ¿se le habrá ocurrido mirar alguna vez a las nubes y pensar qué sean?
—¡Ch, no! El espíritu de las vacas no tiene nada de nebuloso ni de soñador ... Es como el de los campesinos, que jamás sueñan.
—¿Qué jamás sueñan? Yo creo que no hacen otra cosa. ¿No crees tú que mientras trabajan piensan, eso que llamamos pensar nosotros? No, no: sueñan; no hacen más que soñar ...
—¿Y qué sueñan?
—¿Qué? Lo que tienen delante de los ojos; la realidad concreta y presente, el campo, el buey que pasa, el pájaro que vuela ... 
—¿Será que lo ven?
—No; es que lo sueñan. Su alma es lo que tienen delante: el universo, una inmensa nube que cambia sin cesar ...
For these people the awareness of the contingency of their state may be answered by their faith in revealed religion and their belief in God.

The term fracasado also covers those who may be called Alexandrians; those who accept the declaration that matter is essentially extension, that being the point of view that the real properties of any physical object are the quantitative ones, the ones which can be measured and expressed in objective laws. For the Alexandrians, the qualities of physical objects are reduced to the position of mere subjective effects of the human mind. The emphasis of this dualism is reflected in the grammar of the famous Cogito ergo sum -- in the placement of the principal and subordinate clauses. For the followers of this dictum the thinking man, and thus the abstraction, the idea, takes precedence over the man. The Alexandrians are people concerned principally with objects, and for this reason in the héroe fracasado's eyes there is not a great deal of difference between them and the peasants who are also concerned with what they see before them. Should the sense of contingency arise for the Alexandrians it may be answered by revealed religion or more in line with their thinking by deism, agnosticism or atheism.

The designation un fracasado also applies to the abúlico. In his Idearium español Angel Ganivet discusses the condition of abulia at some length. He defines this term as an illness in which the patient suffers from an extinction or grave weakening of the will. There is a common form of this illness which affects everyone from time to time. As Ganivet says:

¿A quién no le habrá invadido en alguna ocasión esa perplejidad del espíritu, nacida del quebranto de fuerzas
When the above situation becomes chronic it constitutes abulia. The principal physical symptom of the illness is an inability to carry out freely conceived acts. The abulico may begin to do something, but he rarely finishes his project. Ganivet says that this shows that the patient's will is not completely extinguished, just weakened. The principal intellectual symptoms of this illness are an inability to fix the attention on any new idea long enough to assimilate it, signs of mental agility only when concerned with happenings in the past, and a predilection for the idée fixe which may bring forth violent impulses. Although opinions as to the cause of this illness are various, Ganivet sees it as resulting from a lowering of functional energy. He conceives of functional energy as the internal assimilatory energy or the ability to synthesize. The relationship between a person's ability to synthesize and his will are very close, for a voluntary act results from the energy which a person and an idea produce. Ganivet concludes his discussion of abulia with the following significant statement:

En unos casos la idea fija, que es la que influye más energicamente sobre la voluntad, produce la determinación arrebatada, violenta, que alguien confunde con la del aleinado; en otros, la idea abstracta o la idea ya vieja, reproducida por la memoria, engendran el deseo débil, impotente, irrealizable; no existen las ideas más fecundas, las ideas sanas que nacen del estudio reflexivo y de la observación consciente de la realidad.  

The peasant who dreams the world, the Alexandrians concerned with objects, and the abulicos living their illness are all in the
Pauline sense "once born" people. They accept as real the primary state of givenness -- their lives in this world and the world around them composed of other people and things.

The **héroe fracasado** is a person who sees the world in which he finds himself existing with other men and objects surrounding him as unreal. His unusual degree of sensitivity forces this realization upon his consciousness. This is where he differs from the **abúlico**, for his condition stems not from a lowering, but from a raising of the ability to synthesize. To judge by exterior signs, the **héroe fracasado** may at times even act like a person suffering from abulia, for the awareness of the unreality surrounding him which results from his sensitivity may result in introversion, self-division and pessimism which hinder his actions. Augusto Pérez in Unamuno's *Niebla* makes the pertinent distinction when, after noticing a tramp one day, he says to himself: "...no me cabe duda de que no tiene nada que hacer ... Es un vago, un vago como ... ¡No, yo no soy un vago! Mi imaginación no descansa." This is a most astute observation on the part of Augusto Pérez, for the imagination working with the material presented to it is one of the major functions of the assimilatory process. And unlike the **abúlico**, what the **héroe fracasado** is concerned with is the conscious observation of reality and his reflective study of it as unreality.

Seeing the world as unreal quite naturally puts the **héroe fracasado** out of step with the Alexandrians. Luis J. Navascués delineates the underlying causes of this difference in the general introduction to his *De Unamuno a Ortega y Gasset* under the section "The Victorian Man and His Culture." His term Victorian Man is,
of course, the 19th century version of the Alexandrians previously mentioned. In order for a person not to have to stop and ask himself "first questions" continually, he needs a certain fund of basic beliefs which it is the function of the cultural moment to provide. Navascués sees the principal basic belief of the average Victorian Man as complete faith in science to find the answers to everything for everybody. As a result, all he has to do is wait and this is why he has been called 'hollow.' "He moves among people and things automatically, by inherited habits which he wants to preserve until the day of advent." The prominent leaders of Victorian thought, those who shape sciences and techniques, have progressivism as their guiding basic belief. Progress, which is sure, is the simple matter of the future discovery of many things. The people are then to be informed of the existence of these things and in this way we are to achieve perfection. "...therefore man would not change much, he would still be the same Victorian Man easily adapted to and enjoying the fruits of culture." Because of this viewpoint Victorian Man has also been called 'smug.' His values were the conquests of rationalism and the faith revealed by religion. Since the former conquests had not yet taken place Victorian Man could not know them, and since the latter revelations were his only by being borrowed from the past he did not truly believe in them. But he moved easily from the secular to the religious field because truthfully, "he was not interested in them but in the habits and rituals that permitted him to go on until the day of the Final Discovery."

The pressure of his personal present sense of contingency disturbs the héroe fracasado greatly. It is impossible for him to sit
and wait for the ultimate restoration of rationality. Besides, his observations of the changes in progress lead him to see that they are not part of a systematic arrangement proceeding on a forward linear path, but rather that they are haphazard and complex and proceed in many divergent directions. As a result he has no basis at all for belief in the pattern of things to come, for in his view, chaos is a potential outcome just as much as perfection. Faith revealed by religion is as unreal to him as the general secular beliefs, and this is true for the same reason: it negates the present life, concentrating on the other life. The héroe fracasado is thus forced to reject the Alexandrians and their civilized values. This is a nightmarish position. He is in the position of having to ask "first questions" constantly, beginning with the question of his own identity. Colin Wilson clearly delineates this quandary:

An interesting point, this: for what is identity? These men travelling down to the City in the morning, reading their newspapers or staring at advertisements above the opposite seats, they have no doubt of who they are. Inscribe on the placard in place of the advertisement for corn-plasters, Eliot's lines:

'Ve are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together
and they would read it with the same mild interest with which they read the rhymed advertisement for razor blades, wondering what on earth the manufacturers will be up to next. Some of them even carry identity cards -- force of habit -- that would tell you precisely who they are and where they live.

They have aims, these men, some of them very distant aims: a new car in three years, a house at Surbiton in five; but an aim is not an ideal. They are not play-actors. They change their shirts every day, but never their conception of themselves. ... These men are in prison. ... They are quite contented in prison -- caged animals who have never known freedom; but it is prison all the same. And the Outsider? He is in prison too ... but he knows it. His desire is to escape. But a prisonbreak is not an easy matter; you must know all about your prison, otherwise you might spend years in tunnelling, like the Abbé in The Count of Monte Cristo,
and only find yourself in the next cell.

And of course the final revelation comes when you look at these City-men on the train; for you realize that for them, the business of escaping is complicated by the fact that they think they are the prison. An astounding situation! Imagine a large castle on an island, with almost inescapable dungeons. The jailor has installed every device to prevent the prisoners escaping, and he has taken one final precaution: that of hypnotizing the prisoners, and then suggesting to them that they and the prison are one. When one of the prisoners awakes to the fact that he would like to be free, and suggests this to his fellow prisoners, they look at him with surprise and say: 'Free from what? We are the castle.' What a situation! 16

The héroe fracasado is miserable with the problem not only of his identity, but of his purpose, the meaning of existence, of truth and of knowledge. He needs solitude to think in, and yet this compounds the issue by increasing his awareness of his isolation. Also, he doesn't seem to get any place by thinking about the problem. The answer to the riddles of his identity, his purpose and the meaning of existence seem to be like a Chinese nest-of-boxes puzzle. Somehow the component elements fit snugly into one another, but he can't get the top off to begin solving the puzzle. Truth? It fares a little better. The héroe fracasado recognizes that there are two kinds of truth: the objective truth of \(2 + 2 = 4\) which is verifiable by the similitude with the experience of others, and which leads to an identity which can be transformed into abstract signs and related to other abstract signs. But there is also subjective truth, the truth which is affective, the truth which is his truth, the one on which he customarily acts because it seems the thing to do at the time. Objective truth may affect subjective truth, but the reverse is also valid, for the singling out of the original two to add to the other two is ultimately traceable to a matter of subjective experience. Hence
there is an ambivalence between the two kinds of truth which carries
over into the workings of knowledge. The identity of objective
truth is related to other identities by the method of knowledge
through the description of a process. The héroe fracasado has no
quarrel with this; there is nothing wrong with his reason. It is not
the objective knowledge of the world which he is seeing as unreal, it
is just that it is of no use to him at the present time when he is
concerned with "first questions," for by their very nature they are
unique. The only kind of knowledge left for him to work with is
subjective knowledge, for which he stands as the sole authority.

What does he know subjectively to be the truth right now? That
he has to do something because of the awful pain which he feels. He
is afraid that he is losing his mind. He can't do anything because
he doesn't know what to do; thinking has paralyzed his ability to act.
He doesn't want to feel like this. He wants to be balanced like other
people seem to be. Why is he unable to be like other people? No, he
cannot be like them because they are unreal. And what does this
unreality consist of? Objects. Not the practical objects of the world
themselves, but the people who are so involved with them that they
have come to know and even identify themselves as only objects in the
world with which they are contemporaneous. And what is real to the
héroe fracasado? Pain. His pain which of its own accord just is.
What frightening possibilities the spontaneity of this pain opens up!
Confrontation with its uncertainty and its impersonality makes him
terrifyingly aware that the essence of his very self is limited by
this spontaneity which is freedom. Like life and death this confron-
tation is not to be described but experienced to be meaningful.
Paradoxically, at this point it is the intelligence of the héroe fracasado which rescues him. He realizes that reality is his subjective consciousness of the intensity of his pain. This is the moment of truth for the héroe fracasado, his moment of *Sum ergo cogito*, the beginning of his authentic existence.

The héroe fracasado has been on the road to this point for a long time. He is a mature, complex person and has just come through an intensely complex experience, the full implications of which he will be some time in realizing. He is now passionately curious to know the truth about this reality which he has discovered. What is it? His preoccupation with unreality led to great pain for him. The intensity of this pain was such that it forced him to recognize it as real. The whole experience was frightful but the héroe fracasado is determined to find a way out of this maze in which he is lost, and to do so he has to occupy himself with what is real to him: the experience which was consciousness of his pain. When he analyzes the nature of this consciousness he sees that it was subjective and spontaneous, and that spontaneity is infinitely free. The urgency of his situation forces him to examine the implications revealed in this recognition of consciousness as subjective freedom.

The héroe fracasado realizes that his new-found freedom is a freedom to choose, not a freedom to obtain; but, he is also aware that this makes all the difference as far as he is concerned. He realizes with wonderful relief after what he has been through that he is now free not to be his past because he can choose to negate it and it can in no way govern him. He also realizes that he is not yet his future, but it is his future and will be what he makes it out of his subjective
freedom of choice. This puts the emphasis again on the present and brings with it in addition to freedom an awareness of his responsibility. This responsibility is not only for himself but to himself. It will be grounded on his discovery of a course of action which will allow him to live in an unreal world and yet be concerned with his reality. In order to do this he sees that he will have to accept certain elements which are matters of fact: his own body which supports consciousness and is not dependent on it, his sex, his race, his nationality, and so on. However, he is now aware that these matters of fact have no meaning for him independent of that which his consciousness constitutes, for this is an example of the application of his freedom. In a like manner the situation in which he finds himself is a matter of contingency, the meaning of which also depends on his freedom. But the héroe fracasado has decided to change his situation and to do this by utilizing his will in finding a course of action which is concerned with reality. This course of action must be in rapport with the matters of fact of his world and the world itself. It will lead to a project and the foundation of values which are entirely his own responsibility, but these values cannot be trivial or lack intensity because what he is doing is literally giving character to his own being.

If he can thoroughly assimilate the realizations from his moment of insight, the héroe fracasado can alleviate his agony over questions of his identity, his purpose and the meaning of existence. His imagination will play a large part in working out his problems, and discipline, too, will become very important to him. But the invaluable keystone to the entire effort is the strength and intensity of his will — his will to act on these realizations.
The foregoing description of a héroe fracasado concerns a person who is capable of interpreting the revelations of spontaneity in the light of possibility. He is basically an optimist. As was noted earlier, there may also be a pessimistic héroe fracasado, one who is incapable of this interpretation. When the latter thinks about his moment of insight, instead of concentrating mainly on the subjective element of consciousness, as the optimist has done, he concentrates on its spontaneity, on the dreadful fact of the existence of a spontaneity that transcends any self-determining that he may do. In other words, he is thwarted by the fact that his original spontaneity is beyond freedom, beyond any control whatsoever. The same moment of insight occurs to these two men. The difference in interpretation is, it seems, a matter of their internal affective states, i.e., the fact that one spontaneously posits an affirmative goal while the other spontaneously posits a negative goal. Either interpretation carries the weight of validity for the individual man.

The negative perspective leads to the view that one is never free. How? Preoccupation with unreality leads to pain of great intensity which forces the pessimistic héroe fracasado to recognize it as real. The whole experience is frightful, in fact, for the pessimistic héroe fracasado it is even worse than unreality. For when he examines the nature of reality (his consciousness) he realizes that it is subjective and spontaneous, but confrontation with the power of the latter quality grasps and holds his attention to such an extent that his feelings of urgency disappear before his awareness of his insignificance. As the optimist glides hurriedly over this view of the nature of reality as spontaneity (he sees it but because
he posits an affirmative goal he chooses to ignore these dreadful implications), so the pessimist does not stop to examine the positive possibilities of the nature of reality as subjectivity. Unreality and reality both lead to nihilism for him. Action depends ultimately on a belief in what is real, and to this man what is real is the fact that he can never be free. His choices are a return to unreality, which is not to be free for the héroe fracasado, or he can will not to be, he can choose death.
NOTES,

INTRODUCTION

1
The membership of this group has been disputed, and its very existence has been challenged. But, where admission has been made that a number of Spaniards, at the turn of the century, may be called the "Generation of '98," Miguel de Unamuno, Pío Baroja and Azorín are the sine qua non of its membership. For this reason they have been chosen for this study.

2

3
Ibid.

4
Ibid., p. 744.

5

6
Ibid., p. 187.

7

8
Study of the existentialist writers Soren Kierkegaard, Friedrich, Nietzsche, Karl Jaspers, José Ortega y Gasset, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus forms the basis for this definition of the héroe fracasado. It is not the intention in this study to especially plead the views of any particular philosopher, but rather to present the general existentialist point of view as being that which occurs in a particular type of character which I have called the héroe fracasado. This definition is based on my own interpretation of the existentialist material.


Unamuno was the first Generation writer to use this term. See: "En torno al casticismo," Op. cit., p. 107. However, he used it in passing without elaboration. Ganivet was the first to amplify the term and establish it as a principal element of thought among writers of the Generation of '98.


Ibid., p. 232.


Existence is traditionally defined as the correlative of non-existence, that is, parallel in meaning to being and non-being. But the word is used here in the etymological sense (Latin existere = to arise, to stand forth) to characterize the héroe fracasado's recognition of his ability to get beyond, to transcend himself, i.e., to be.

Also, it should be noted that this moment of insight may happen to a fracasado with the occurrence of some happening which impresses him sufficiently to shock him into reality, i.e., consciousness of his freedom to choose.
CHAPTER I

AZORIN

Between 1902 and 1904 Martínez Ruiz wrote three singular works: La voluntad; Antonio Azorín (Pequeño libro en que se habla de la vida de este peregrino señor), and Las confesiones de un pequeño filósofo. These works initiate a new stage in Martínez Ruiz’ life as a writer since they are his first venture into the novel. The three have come to be recognized as a trilogy because, in spite of an apparent superficial disconnection, they are concerned with the life of the principal character, Antonio Azorín. In commenting on the coolness of the initial reception of these works in Valencia Azorín says: "...no se podía ver entonces la coherencia que en el fondo, no en la superficie, existe en esos libros." This is perhaps because as a story of the life of Antonio Azorín they appeared in print in a confused order. Las confesiones de un pequeño filósofo, published last, deals with the early youth of the protagonist; La voluntad treats of him when he is older, and Antonio Azorín completes the trilogy chronologically. However, they should be read in the order in which they were written and published to capture the coherency of the development of Antonio Azorín from a fracasado to a héroe fracasado. This may be what Azorín had in mind when he commented:

Había una medula en la vida, independiente de la acción, y era preciso extraerla. No importaban ni las inconexiones, siempre aparentes y no reales, ni las faltas de ilación en el relato. Si se llegaba a lo de dentro, ¿para qué se quería lo de fuera? 2
Anna Krause calls *La voluntad* "...una autobiografía espiritual, que ocupa su lugar en la tradición extendida desde San Agustín a Rousseau y Amiel," which she thinks is completed in the other two books. Luis Granjel refers to the trilogy as:

"...testimonio de la crisis en que desemboca una evolución, tanto estética como personal, íntima ... Fruto de ella ... vino a ser una nueva actitud vital, una orientación estética, literaria e ideológica, a la que Martínez Ruiz no ha de traicionar ya nunca."

I both admire and accept the two above interpretations, being aware, as is Anna Krause, that Azorín has actually never confirmed their basic assumption: the autobiographical nature of the trilogy. This assumption has been the basis for criticism of these three works since their first appearance in print, and if the author has not affirmed it, neither has he denied it. He has stated that **Antonio Azorín** is one of his best works, and he refers to *La voluntad* in the same reference as a "libro escrito concienzudamente, con muchedumbre de notitas auténticas." His official biographer, Angel Cruz Rueda, makes no reference to the above two books being in any way autobiographical in his introduction to Azorín's *Obras completas*. He does say of *Las confesiones*: "Y de ahí que nos refiriera su infancia y adolescencia, no a la manera biográfica corriente, sino con delicadeza y emoción..." It has been pointed out repeatedly as supporting evidence to the assumption of the autobiographical nature of these works that, following the appearance of **Antonio Azorín**, Martínez Ruiz began using the name of this character as his pen name. Azorín has written three works which are stated to be autobiographical in nature: *Valencia, Madrid* and *Memorias inmemorables*. Certain passages of all three works obviously add strength to the basic assumption.
taken by critics of the trilogy. By and large, these volumes with
an admitted autobiographical content are written in Azorín's favorite
impressionistic style. The very nature of this style places the author
in the position of an observer, a detached spectator, who achieves the
effectiveness of what he is depicting more by evoking subjective and
sensory impressions of mood or atmosphere than by recreating objective
reality. This deliberate avoidance of intimate or personal biogra­
phical data -- which Unamuno and Baroja have amply furnished -- is a
fundamental facet of Agorín's personality. He, himself, comments on it
in the Memorias inmemoriales (in which, it is to be remembered, he
uses the device of writing about himself as an author and refers to
himself as "X" in order to preserve this very intimacy), by relating
it to the influence of his mother's propensity for secrecy. He says:

En X había, según su juicio, este recato ... Le manifestó
yo algunas veces que el subjectivismo de sus primeros años
de escritor -- el uso del yo que tanto se reprochaba --
era cosa encimera y que lo más recóndito y personal
continuaba escondido. Sonreía él y callaba. Pero he de
insistir ahora: esa exteriorización, en X, era cosa
transitoria y periférica; lo hondo no gustaba de manifestarlo
nunca. Ni en los escritos, ni a mí de palabra, ni a nadie,
ha revelado nunca X sus íntimos sentimientos.

This trait of Azorín's personality has been a source of annoyance
to scholars who have complained about it at length. It effectively
blocks producing "the definitive work" on Azorín. However, I would
like to suggest that this personality trait of Azorín's, taken in
conjunction with his ideas on what good literary criticism should be,
may be used to advantage by critics. His famous definition of a
classic writer which appeared in 1912 bears repeating:

Un autor clásico es un reflejo de nuestra sensibilidad
moderna. La paradoja tiene su explicación: un autor
clásico no será nada, es decir, no será clásico, si no
refleja nuestra sensibilidad. Nos vemos en los clásicos
a nosotros mismos. Por eso, los clásicos evolucionan;
evolucionan según cambia y evoluciona la sensibilidad de las generaciones. Complemento de la anterior definición: un autor clásico es un autor que siempre se está formando. No han escrito las obras clásicas sus autores; las va escribiendo la posteridad.

In 1929, in an article entitled "La crítica y la conciencia colectiva," he gives his ideas on good literary criticism which are pertinent to this study. Azorín states that erudition in regard to literary criticism is of secondary importance. It aids in establishing the ambiente in which a work has been produced, and in defining the actual state of affairs (las circunstancias) of the author. But erudition cannot answer such questions as "¿Cómo es por dentro esta obra? ... ¿De qué modo suena o disuena a nuestra mentalidad moderna?"

The answer to questions of this nature can only come from a sensitivity, perhaps allied with erudition, capable of capturing the underlying spirit which gives life to a particular literary work. To do this, "ha de ser creadora ... La crítica no puede crear valores nuevos; es decir, nuevas personalidades. Si puede suscitar nuevos estados de conciencia estética. La crítica debe ser ... una ampliación de la obra que se examine." Fundamentally, as Azorín points out, "La crítica es una opinión personal."

In light of the above, I would like to state that in my opinion Azorín is a classic author in his definition of the term: one in which we see ourselves. I propose to examine La voluntad, Antonio Azorín and Las confesiones de un pequeño filósofo, maintaining that the "por dentro" of this trilogy is the héro fracásado, or the twentieth century existentialist hero, and hope by an examination of this thesis to arouse a new state of awareness regarding these works.

To achieve the proper perspective, however, some facts concerning the
José Martínez Ruiz was born in Monóvar on June 8, 1873, the first child born to the mayor and his wife. When he was eight years old he was sent to a boarding school run by the Escolapios order in Yecla. He spent eight years in this school.

In 1888, he entered the University of Valencia to take the preparatory course for studying law. This was Martínez Ruiz' first taste of freedom from either parental supervision or religious influence. It was a gay time for the young man, and, like many a one before and since under similar conditions, he rebelled joyously against the teachings imposed during his youth. Since his family was ultra-conservative in its political thinking, Martínez Ruiz became a Republican under the leadership of Francisco Pi y Margall whose program championed anti-clericalism and social reform. As a result of associating with some of the disciples of Giner de los Ríos, the young man became deeply interested in krausismo. Like Pío Baroja, he was openly critical of the antiquated methods of education employed by his university, and besides, it soon became quite apparent that Martínez Ruiz was not interested in studying law. During the next few years, in order to continue his studies, he transferred to the Universities of Granada, Salamanca and Valladolid. This was a painful experience for Martínez Ruiz. His family insisted that he obtain a law degree and what he wanted to do was write.

In his first years in Valencia he started doing newspaper work for El Mercantil Valenciano, and his first publication, La crítica literaria en España, appeared in 1893. Other works of his apprentice-ship period were either literary criticism or politico-sociological
tracts.

In October, 1895, Martínez Ruiz abandoned the pursuit of his law degree and went to Madrid to try for a journalistic career. Although the author nowhere mentions it, as Granjel has noted, it is only reasonable to suppose that this defiance of parental wishes regarding his career is bound to have brought about an estrangement between father and son. In Madrid, Azorín reminisces about this period of his life. He recalls that he made the trip in a third class carriage, took lodgings in a very small room with a skylight window, and then because of a feeling of loneliness in the fading twilight, he went out into the life of the street. There in front of the Apollo Theater he observed something that interested him greatly:

...Cuatro o seis caballeros forman un grupo. Tiene uno de ellos unas blancas cuartillas en la mano y va leyendo algo, prosa o verso, que los demás escuchan atentos. Ahora de unos pocos pasos se halla el espectador — espectador que acaba de llegar de provincias — y ante él, inesperadamente, como azar dichoso, están vivos y auténticos, en su propio elemento, los personajes del drama. Del drama o de la comedia. El espectador no sabe lo que será. No se puede saber lo que será la vida de un muchacho que comienza a escribir: si drama o comedia. Pero él siente ansia irreprimible por ser uno de los actores de la comedia o del drama. Allí están, sí, allí están, escuchando lo que acaba de escribir uno de ellos. Y será acaso interesante. Dentro de unas horas, toda España lo va a leer impreso en la volandera hoja de un gran periódico. Tienen talento, ingenio, estos hombres. Son conocidos, populares, todos ellos. El que lee es un escritor, y los que escuchan lo serán también. Todo está con ellos y nada está conmigo. Andando el tiempo, puedo ser uno de ellos, y ahora, desconocido, sin valimientos, sólo tengo mi cuartito con el pobre menaje y con la ventana en el techo, que deja caer luz en las cuartillas ...

Through a letter of introduction he got his first job on El País, a Republican daily, but he was fired in February of the following year because of complaints about his opinionated views from some of
the paper's subscribers. These were not easy times for Martínez Ruiz. Because of the rupture with his family he was short of money and was once reduced for a period of about thirty days to living on two panecitos a day. The opening chapter of Bohemia, entitled "Fragmentos de un diario," describes this time, which painful as it was, still had its humorous moments. For example, the receipt of a letter from his mother reminding him that it was Lent, and admonishing him not to eat meat on Friday and to abstain on the other days. He spent his Sundays during this time in the museum contemplating the martyrs painted by Ribera, and he comments wryly, "Los he llamado compañeros." The loss of his job was a bitter blow to Martínez Ruiz, especially coming as it did so early in his career. However, he persevered so that his efforts finally were rewarded with a job on another newspaper, and from this time forward for a period of fifty years he actively and successfully practiced his chosen profession as a journalist.

In addition to his newspaper writing, Martínez Ruiz published ten works during this early period of his career. They consisted of four works of literary criticism, two politico-social tracts, two groups of short stories, one play, and his La vida en el siglo XVII, later to be revised and retitled El alma castellana (1600-1800). Literatura was his first publication after his arrival in Madrid. It dealt harshly with the contemporary scene and was the cause of much outraged comment by people who considered themselves injured by its publication. In fact, the book caused such a stir that Martínez Ruiz thought it prudent to leave the city for a few weeks. His Charivari came on the heels of Literatura. It purported to be a diary dealing with the author's recent experiences in the corrupt Madrid literary and
journalistic circles. Since he scorned to use even the roman à clef technique, the book created a scandal which caused it to be withdrawn from circulation. As Granjel remarks, if with this book Martínez Ruiz intended to make himself unpopular with his professional colleagues, he more than achieved his ambition.

A few months after the stir over Charivari died down, an event occurred which was very important in the young writer's life. The great Clarín, one of his literary idols and models, wrote a piece of literary criticism on Martínez Ruiz. Previously, Clarín had praised him in one of his reviews, but this second article after the furor of Charivari was unexpected moral support in a very trying period of the young man's life. Anna Krause notes Clarín's perspicacity in recognizing that Azorín's intellect was not obscured in his iconoclasm. Following the appearance of this piece, a firm friendship developed between these two men which continued until Clarín's death.

We must now examine these early works of Martínez Ruiz in an attempt to understand the change which is to take place in the personality of this young man. Starting with his earliest works, the quality which first strikes the reader is their self-confident tone. Neither in the handling of language nor in the ideas expressed do these folletos seem to be the product of a young, inexperienced writer. Martínez Ruiz, himself, has noted this same fact in a passage in Charivari. This evident self-confidence reflects his recognition of his own ability in the realm of literature. The intelligence which attracted Clarín's attention is quite evident, and it is an intelligence committed to the service of his great passion—literature. True, some of these early works are político-sociological
in nature, but works concerned with purely literary matters prevail numerically. In the latter, the depth of Martínez Ruiz' concern for this subject vibrates. He expresses his ideal: "Yo he procurado en estas páginas, pobres, pero honoradas, decir la verdad." In the next two sentences in this important declaration Martínez Ruiz states the attitude which he consistently maintains throughout the early period of his writing: "No vacilo en marchar contra el común de los tontos. Prefiero más la discreta aprobación de cuatro personal cultas que los aplausos rutinarios de los elementos sensatos..." He is an intellectual independent, a non-conformist who defiantly assumes the stance of moral indignation.

The reason for the above attitude is Martínez Ruiz' conception of the literary critic's function. He sees him as belonging to the political world, as being responsible for formulating and maintaining standards for social and literary renovation. This concept is what Navascués has called "the prophetic attitude toward their profession of the members of the Generation of '98. The artist -- whether writer, painter or musician -- becomes a prophet ... and placed in the center of his culture he assumes the role of its total interpreter." Martínez Ruiz' principal model for the role he has chosen to play has been pointed out:

A todo lo ancho de la obra, de extremoso tono personal, el autor trata de reencarnar la actitud con que, en su tiempo, Larra enfrentó la realidad política, social y libresca en que el destino le forzó a vivir. 22

In addition to Larra, he admired Clarín, Bonafoux and Frey Candil as critics. These latter, also given to the technique of trenchant expression when they thought it was called for, were also the young Martínez Ruiz' models. As a result he produces at times supercilious-
ness barely veiled by irony, belittling caricatures, and he shows a propensity for statements with a doctrinaire ring. He must have seemed insufferable, aggressive and impudent to many of his more mature colleagues. He was just a young man who had achieved nothing, and it must have been intolerable to find him assuming an air of authority which perhaps not even conspicuous success and distinguished ability could have made entirely becoming.

The theme of los viejos y los jóvenes runs through all of this early literature. It is frequently intertwined with the theme of España to result in a pessimistic view of the contemporary world. This stems from the fact that Martínez Ruiz is at this period of his life a strong proponent of the prevailing European intellectual ideals as a remedy for the ills which plague his country. He believes in the progress of science and its power through human intelligence and industry to solve Spain's dilemma. Martínez Ruiz has clearly pitched his tent in the camp of the followers of the Enlightenment. This camp is a small one in Spain at the turn of the century, and in it Martínez Ruiz is only a very junior member of the younger literary generation. This fact of existence is a constant irritant in light of his concept of what the role of a literary critic should be. It goes far to explain his anarchistic tendencies — always literally dynamic but only socially theoretical — as an expression of his posture of rebellion against the entrenched, and to him, incompetent, literary arbiters of the day.

Martínez Ruiz' works written while he was under the direct influence of Clarín show a gradual broadening of viewpoint. At Clarín's suggestion he was doing some extensive reading in the modern
European philosophers and writers. New names begin to appear in his articles -- Baudelaire, Leopardi, Flaubert, Guyau, Mirabeau, Montaigne, Ixart, Schopenhauer, Renan, Nietzsche. Through the reading of these writers Martínez Ruiz gradually discovered the quality of ambiguity. That is, recognition that when people of equal degrees of intelligence and honesty, people who understand each other quite clearly enough, can be still in disagreement about very serious convictions, then truth cannot be as narrow as a sectarian mind is likely to find it. This realization that the relativity of the individual subjective position with regard to thinking inevitably yields the quality of ambiguity forces recognition of the equal legitimacy of the point of view of the opponent. It brings as a corollary the possibility of one's own ability to change, and in place of the intransigent statement that he was going to tell the truth, Martínez Ruiz now expresses the rather surprising view:

No es independiente el que piensa siempre lo mismo. La consecuencia es el mayor enemigo de la independencia, porque consecuencia es pacto, yugo, compromiso de tener siempre igual criterio. Han pasado los tiempos de los sacrificios por una idea ... Lo esencial es vivir todas las ideas, conocer hombres diversos, gozar de sensaciones desconocidas ..., vivir, vivir todo lo que se pueda en extensión y en intensidad. 27

In 1900, Martínez Ruiz and Pío Baroja became friends. Baroja wrote the prologue to Martínez Ruiz' play La fuerza del amor. This prologue is quoted in its entirety below because, in my opinion it represents the most penetrating description of the young Martínez Ruiz which has ever been written. Through the use of keen psychological insight Baroja has penetrated to Martínez Ruiz' basic problem of existence: a division between the heart and the head. He expresses the core of this insight by emphasis on his obvious
moral rigidity ("... todo en él es claro y algo geométrico..."), and the strange fact that at the same time he disturbs many people who know him because they think him changeable (tortuoso). He points out that this same conflict is evident even in Martínez Ruiz' person. On the surface one sees only his inexpressive eyes, impassive and cold countenance and automatic gestures, whereas actually he is a highly impressionable, nervous and passionate young man. Baroja's explanation of why Martínez Ruiz is misunderstood by his colleagues is based on a basic difference in orientation. His colleagues have given their allegiance to objective ideals of a well-established religious or social nature, and they use a consistently preservative attitude toward this status quo as the unit of measurement by which they judge a person's sincerity. Martínez Ruiz, on the other hand, want to be true to himself and his entire orientation is toward the achievement of this subjective ideal. He has not yet acquired self-knowledge or self-understanding, but this is what he is so anxiously and feverishly searching for. He has, however, acquired an awareness of the truth and value of ambiguity, hence what may seem good to him today may seem bad to him tomorrow. Baroja states the reason for Martínez Ruiz' position in basic existentialist terms, to which he subscribes his personal approval: "Martínez Ruiz undoubtedly believes, as I believe, that the spiritual plan of our life depends on our ideas and our feelings; our feelings and our ideas do not depend on a preconceived plan." This sentence is a clear statement of a fundamental existential position; it is customarily summed up in the sentence: existence precedes essence. La voluntad, Antonio Azorín and Las confesiones de un pequeño filósofo give a picture of Azorín's route in his
search which leads to this conclusion. It is also noteworthy that
this searching quality, which Baroja sees as a matter of spirituality,
is the link which he thinks connects and distinguishes the then
rising literary generation.

La voluntad is a major work in the study of the fracasado.
In this work the simple people who "dream" what is in front of them,
the Alexandrians and the abúlicos are all not only examined analytically
as types, but they are also exhibited as states of existence which the
protagonist experiences in the process of his development. There also
runs through La voluntad the raw material of the héroes fracasados.
He does not develop in this volume, which concentrates primarily on the
fracasado. But by working the raw material produced in La voluntad
with the tools acquired in Antonio Azorín, the author produces the
héroes fracasados who is able to write Las confesiones.

La voluntad is divided into a prologue, three sections and an
epilogue. The prologue is a short narrative concerned with the con­
struction of the New church in Yecla. The relationship between the
prologue and the life of Antonio Azorín which follows is a symbolic
one. In 1775 the first stone was laid for the New church and the
foundation built; a succession of work stoppages and resumptions
occurred; long periods of inactivity transpired; revisions in arbi­
tectural plans were made; government funds were petitioned, allocated,
awaited, and finally the people of Yecla themselves transcended all
these difficulties and completed the church by their own efforts late
in the 19th century. Antonio Azorín, in a like manner, went through
a succession of new beginnings, long periods of idleness, changes in
direction and finally achieved his long sought after goal through self-
understanding and self-discipline.

The setting of the first part of the novel is Yecla. The town is important in La voluntad. It is the "dream" which the simple people have in front of them -- the centuries of tradition against which the townspeople react. Most of the people of Yecla accept the tradition, but others, like the protagonist, struggle to reject it. A few sentences from the opening description of Yecla evoke quite clearly the author's view of this town:

A lo lejos, una campana toca lenta, pausada, melancólica. El cielo comienza a clarear indeciso. Radiante, limpio, preciso, aparece el pueblo en la falda del monte. Aquí y allá, en el mar gris de los tejados uniformes, emergen las notas rojas, amarillas, azules, verdes, de pintorescas fachadas. En primer término destacan los dorados muros de la iglesia Vieja, con su formidable torre; más bajo la iglesia Nueva; más bajo, lindando con la huerta, el largo edificio de las Escuelas Pías, salpicado con los diminutos puntos de sus balcones. Y esparcidos por la ciudad entera, viejos templos, ermitas, oratorios, capillas... En las blanquecinas vetas de los caminos pululan, rebullen, hormiguean negros trazos que se alejan, se disgregan, se pierden en la llanura. Llegan ecos de canciones, traqueteos de carros, gritos agudos. La campana de la iglesia Nueva tañe pesada; la del Niño tintinea afanosa; la del Hospital llama tranquila. Y a lo lejos, riente, locuela, juguetona, la de las Konjas canta en menuditos golpes cristalinos...

A la derecha de la iglesia Vieja -- ya en la ciudad -- está la parte antigua del poblado. La parte antigua se extiende sobre escarpada península en apretujamiento indefinido de casas bajas, con las paredes blancas, con las puertas azules, formadas en estrechas callejuelas, que reptan sinuosas... El laberinto de retorcidas vías prosigue enmarañado. En el fondo de una calleja de terrenos tejadillos, el recio campanario de la iglesia Vieja se perfila bravío. Misterioso artista del Renacimiento ha esculpido en el remate, bajo la balaustrada, ancha greca de rostros en que el dolor se expresa en muecas horribles. Y en la nitidez espléndida del cielo, sobre la ciudad triste, estas caras atormentadas destacan como símbolo perdurable de la tragedia humana. 29

Antonio Azorín is introduced as a "mozo ensimismado y taciturno, habla poco y en voz queda. Absorto en especulaciones misteriosas...
sus claros ojos verdes miran estáticos lo indefinido." He reads prodigiously and eclectically: novels, sociology, criticism, travel books, history, dramas, theology and poetry. "Es un espíritu ávido y curioso; en esta soledad de vida provinciana, su pasión es la lectura y su único trato el trato del maestro."

The maestro is Yuste. The author has said that Yuste is an imaginary character and we will discuss him as such to avoid confusion. However, for the purposes of this study Antonio Azorín, Yuste and the author are considered to be one person. Yuste's function is to allow the author to write dialogues which appear to be conventional, but which are in fact monodiálogos or autodiálogos. Thus, though he is depicted as a character, Yuste represents the philosophical study and serious thinking which the author was doing in a search for truth. Their long conversations expose the author's conclusions from this intellectual inquiry concerning the world and his personal existential reality. Yuste is a symbol of a particular phase of the Alexandrian culture to which Azorín has attached himself in a rebellious reaction against the tradition represented by Yecla. The particular phase of Alexandrian culture which Yuste represents is the people who are under the tutelage of Kant and Schopenhauer. Nietzsche describes them as follows:

...In the meantime, there have arisen certain men of genius who, with admirable circumspection and consequence, have used the arsenal of science to demonstrate the limitations of science and of the cognitive faculty itself. They have authoritatively rejected science's claim to universal validity and to the attainment of universal goals and exploded for the first time the belief that man may plumb the universe by means of the law of causation. The extraordinary courage and wisdom of Kant and Schopenhauer have won the most difficult victory, that over the optimistic foundations of logic, which form the underpinnings of our
culture. Whereas the current optimism has treated the universe as knowable, in the presumption of eternal truths, and space, time and causality as absolute and universally valid laws, Kant showed how these supposed laws serve only to raise appearance ... to the status of true reality: in the words of Schopenhauer, binding the dreamer ever faster in sleep. This perception has initiated a culture which I dare describe as tragic. Its most important characteristic is that wisdom is put in place of science as the highest goal. This wisdom ... fixes its gaze on the total constellation of the universe and tries to comprehend sympathetically the suffering of that universe as its own.

Yuste is a man of theory engaged in a serious search for truth, an answer to the question "What is truth?" As such, regardless of personally disturbing results, he investigates scientifically and does not attempt to defend any idea a priori as the truth. And in this way:

Yuste va insensiblemente moldeando este espíritu sobre el suyo. En el fondo, no cabe duda que los dos son espíritus avanzados, progresivos, radicales; pero hay en ellos cierta inquietud, cierto desasosiego, cierta secreta reacción contra la idea fija, que desconcierta a quien los trata, y mueve cierta irritación en el observador frívolo, que se indigna, de no poder definir, de no poder coger estos matices, estos relámpagos, estas vislumbres rápidas, que él, hombre de una pieza, hombre serio, no tiene ni comprende ... irritación que es la del niño que no entiende el mecanismo de un juguete y lo rompe.

Broadly speaking, three areas of human activity are extremely interesting to Yuste: literature, politics and philosophy. Yuste's thoughts concerning literature are important in the study of Azorín as a literary man, but a detailed examination of them does not contribute materially to his investigation of the fracasado or the héro que fracasado; therefore, we will forego discussion of them.

Yuste's political thought stems from a desire for and a belief in the perfectability of man. He is also convinced of the importance of environmental determinism, and he thinks that the solution to
mankind's problems lies in changing el medio to bring about a greater equality among men. This is not possible, he realizes, as long as the private ownership of property is protected by force. Therefore, he subscribes to the use of force to oppose force. This is, of course, all theory, for when Azorín reminds him that a terrible fight will be the result of Yuste's proposed agricultural reforms, he remarks, "No, no ... la evolución es lenta." He foresees the small farms slowly falling into the hands of large financiers as people continue to leave the country to move to the city. He conceives of these mythical financiers as benevolent overlords who will bring in the proper machinery to make the now sterile land produce. They will re-attract the workers from the city with good jobs and prices will go down as a result of the plenty in the land. The author's awareness of the highly idealistic nature of this theory is seen in El Abuelo's reaction. El Abuelo, one of the typical workers who has been a witness to this conversation, "... calla ... Sus ojuelos brilladores miran de cuando en cuando a Yuste, y una ligera sonrisa asoma a sus labios."

It is not the possible violence as the outcome of social reform which disturbs Yuste, but the aesthetic consequences which de facto reform will entail. He realizes that he is concerned with secondary values; that the change is not only necessary, but, as he sees it, quite inevitable; nevertheless, it saddens him to think that "las viejas nacionalidades se van disolviendo ..., perdiendo todo lo que tienen de pintoresco, trajes, costumbres, literatura, arte ..., para formar una gran masa humana, uniforme y monótona..."

Yuste's constant pushing beyond the horizon of fixed ideas also
leads him to see that "esto que llamamos humanitarismo" is like a new religion.

El hombre nuevo es el hombre que espera la justicia social, que vive por ella, para ella, sugestionado, convencido. Todo va convergiendo a este deseo; todos los esperamos, unos vagamente, otros con vehemencia. El arte, la pedagogía, la literatura, todo se encamina a este fin de mejoramiento social, todo está impregnado de esta ansia ... 40

And thus a new dogma is being formed which is as rigid and as austere as the old. Everything must be subjugated to the end of social utility. Already in France in the popular universities it has been suggested that teaching should have as its objective the view that all the sciences end in socialism. And if this can happen in the sciences, what is going to become of art when it becomes a means and not an end in itself?

Y vamos a ver cómo se inaugura una nueva crítica que atropelle las obras de arte puro, que desconozca los místicos, que se ría de la lírica; y veremos cómo la Historia, ese arte tan exquisito y tan moderno, acaba en manos de nuevos bárbaros ... Y he aquí por qué yo me siento triste cuando pienso en estas cosas, que son las más altas de la Humanidad; en estas cosas, que van a ser maltratadas en esta terrible palingenesia, que será fecunda en otras cosas, también muy altas y muy humanas y muy justas. 41

In the sphere of practical politics Yuste notes that everybody talks about regeneration but nobody does anything. He sees as the reason for this the fact that the older men are skeptics and the younger men, in general, don't want to be "romantics." Romanticism was, in a certain manner, he says, the depreciation of money, and now the ideal is to get rich at all costs. "... y para eso, no hay como la política ...; y la política ha dejado de ser romanticismo para ser una industria, una cosa que produce dinero..." 42

The young men who are still capable of "romanticism" are treated in
the marvelous fable, "La protesta." They draw up a petition, attempting to bring the protest for regeneration to the level of practical reality, as a test case. It's direction flounders completely during their drive for signatures from the elder and wiser members of the community who are presented as skeptics and members of vested interests.

When politics goes from theory to practice during an election Yuste is furious with the results. "Y ha salido diputado, como siempre, un hombre frívolo, mecánico, automático, que sonríe, que estrecha manos, que hace promesas..." He is of the opinion that the credulous human race deserves what it gets. He raves that this is all still the result of the September revolution; the writer Campoamor, as a symbol of this entire generation, is strongly criticized. Finally he calms himself, retreating into the realm of theory with an appeal to his own belief in evolutionary determinism, "Después de todo, el medio es el hombre. Y ese diputado frívolo y versátil ... es producto de este ambiente de aplanamiento y de cobardía..." And Azorín compliments Yuste for achieving this degree of magnanimity, saying that in spite of his choleric outbursts he, like Alonso Quijano, el Bueno, is worthy of admiration, laughter and pity.

Azorín also loses his temper, when he learns that his suit for Justina's hand is being strongly opposed by her uncle. His reaction is to oppose this injustice by a vigorous campaign of action to win the girl. And in this instance Azorín violently rejects the philosophical state of impassivity and indifference urged by Yuste, buttressed with quotations from Plato and Tolstoy to the effect
that the kingdom of justice will come to earth through the sweetness of resignation.

---¡No, no! Eso es indigno, eso es inhumano, eso es bochornoso! ... ¡La rebelión pasiva! Eso es un absurdo: habría que ser como una piedra, y aun la piedra cambia, se agrega, se desgasta, evoluciona, vive, lucha ... ¡La rebelión pasiva! ¡Eso es un ensueño de faquires! ¡Eso es indigno! ¡Eso es monstruoso! ... ¡Y yo protesto! 

Y Azorín ha salido dando un violentísimo portazo. 46

Azorín, however, is not successful in regard to Justina. She decides to enter the Franciscan order and makes her novitiate.

As we have seen, Yuste's political theories and his method of investigation stem from philosophic and ethical assumptions. In a sweeping reduction he classifies all of this line of thinking under the heading of "Metaphysics." First there was theology which took the whole world as its province. With the passage of years theological investigations died out and philosophy was born. The eighteenth century philosophers, also claiming the whole world as their province, were followed by the Positivists, and now the sociologists prevail.

Los sistemas filosóficos nacen, envejecen, son reemplazados por otros. Materialismo, espiritualismo, escepticismo ..., ¿dónde está la verdad? El hombre juega con las filosofías para distraer la convicción de su ignorancia perdurable. Los niños tienen sus juguetes; los hombres los tienen también. Platón, Aristóteles, Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, Kant ... son los grandes fabricantes de juguetes... 47

Yuste does agree, however, that these are very useful toys, and he demonstrates with the amusing but condescending story of the two men chatting on a train to while away the time:

-- No conocemos la realidad -- dijo el hombre gordo, mirándose contritamente el abdomen.
-- No sabemos nada -- repuso el flaco, contemplándose tristemente las uñas.
-- Nadie conoce el númeron -- dijo el gordo.
-- Efectivamente -- contestó un poco humillado el flaco, --yo no conozco el númeron.
-- Sólo los fenómenos son reales -- dijo el gordo.
-- Si, sólo los fenómenos son reales -- repitió el otro.
-- Sólo vivimos por los fenómenos -- volvió a decir uno.
Sólo vivimos por los fenómenos -- volvió a repetir con profunda convicción el otro.
Y callaron en un silencio largo y triste ...
Uno era un filósofo kantiano, el otro, un empresario de barracas de feria. 48

The two men on the train reached an impasse in an attempt to discuss Being, but Yuste and Father Lasalde go into the matter in more depth in their conversations. Azorín, as usual, is a silent participant in these discussions. Father Lasalde is rector of the colegio de Escolapios and an archaeologist noted for his excavations of the Cerro de los Santos. These excavations have yielded a number of statues which antedate the coming of the Phoenicians to Spain.

Along with the statues of two women there is a curious one:

La estatua representa a un hombre de espacioso cráneo calvo, de ancha cara rapada. Sus ojos, en forma de almendra, miran maliciosamente; a los lados de la boca tiene dos gruesas arrugas semicirculares; sus orejas son amplias orejas de perro que bajan hasta cerca del cuello. Y sus labios y la fisonomía toda se contraen en una franca mueca de burla, en un jovial gesto de ironía. 49

Yuste jokingly identifies him as a skeptic, a pre-yeclanean Socrates. From there the talk veers quite easily to Plato, Thomas More and Utopias. Father Lasalde expresses an orthodox religious opinion on Utopian ideals when he remarks that all this is vanity; that man tries in vain to make a paradise out of earth. Yuste objects: But man is perfectable, Condorcet is right... don't you think so? Father Lasalde replies that he thinks as Gracían thought, and tells a fable from El Criticón with the moral that men are crueler than beasts. He amplifies this by pointing out that thus there will always be rich and poor men and good and bad men on earth, because paradise is not on earth. And for this reason he feels that even poor country women, like those represented by the statues,
women who can't even read, but who have love and faith and hope, are wiser than the vain men who laugh at everything, like the statue of the skeptic. In total sincerity, Yuste is forced to agree with him.50

This conversation is resumed in a second visit of the three men. Father Lasalde repeats his previous argument that man will never find happiness here on earth. Yuste offers the thought that, after all science, though it is the greatest of man's glories, is also the greatest of his vanities, since man's five senses hardly permit him to catch a glimpse of the immensity of nature. He remembers Montaigne as saying that man is a poor creature who neither knows anything nor has the ability ever to know anything. Father Lasalde points out that Montaigne, for all his skepticism, well knew that man lives only through faith, that it is faith that makes the bitternesses of this earth tolerable. Yuste agrees, and adds:

Y es lo triste que la fe se pierda! Y se pierda con ella el sosiego, la resignación, la perfecta ataraxia del espíritu que se contempla rodeado de dolores irremediables, necesarios!... (Tras larga pausa) Sí, el dolor es eterno... Y el hombre luchará en vano por destruirlo... El dolor es bello; él da al hombre el más intenso estado de conciencia; él hace meditar; él nos saca de la perdurable frivolidad mundana...51

And as Father Lasalde remarks, affably trying to restore the atmosphere of conversational pleasantry, "Amigo Yuste, amigo Yuste: es preciso creer...",52 Yuste slowly turns toward the statue of the skeptic, smiling jocosely as always, and it seems to Yuste that he is laughing at him, a poor European who has been saddened by nineteen centuries of Christianity. These two conversations are important to Yuste. His much-cherished ideal of the perfectibility of man finally bows to the
historical reality of man's demonstrated imperfection. This leaves Yuste empty-handed, for he does not have the spontaneous faith which Father Lasalde prizes so highly. His previous clever classification of this portion of his existence under the deprecatory heading of mere metaphysics now seems a juvenile act. And the fact that faith is a matter of spontaneity makes it beyond his control, just as it is beyond his control to widen his consciousness of nature beyond the limitation of his five senses. Yuste has now left the detached realm of ideas; this is a lack of which he is, at this moment, personally and acutely aware. It is his faith which is lost, and he is the one who is left alone with his sorrow. This is where his search for truth has taken him. And then slowly, very slowly, through a path long overgrown with the weeds of conscious thought and rationalization, Yuste recognizes his own spontaneity: an intensity of pain which he calls beautiful because it makes him aware that he is alive.

This could have been Yuste's moment of insight, but he let it slip away from him. Perhaps this is only to be expected; Yuste is primarily a thinker, that is, a manipulator of abstracts, and the signal which he received from a glance at the statue automatically returned him to his customary position of objective detachment--to the position of the panoramic vista of "espiritus avanzados, progresivos, radicales." For a moment Yuste had focused on the close-up of existential involvement, but this is not a landscape which is meaningful to him. This is the landscape of the "hombre serio ... de no poder coger estos matices, estos relampagueos, estas vislumbres rápidas..." One regrets that Yuste was not as aware of himself as
an existing human being as he was of himself as a machine for constructing abstracts. Had he been so aware, he might have been able to unite, in an enormous flash of lightening, his moment of insight with other realizations which he arrived at through his very clear use of logic:

---Todo pasa, Azorín... Y el mismo tiempo, que lo hace pasar todo, acabará también. El tiempo no puede ser eterno. La eternidad, presente siempre, sin pasado, sin futuro, no puede ser sucesiva. Si lo fuera y por siempre el momento sucediera al momento, daríase el caso paradoxal de que la eternidad se aumentaba a cada instante transcurrido. ... 
---La eternidad no existe. Donde hay eternidad no puede haber vida. Vida es sucesión; sucesión es tiempo. Y el tiempo cambiante siempre, es la antítesis de la eternidad, presente siempre. ...
---Todo pasa. La sucesión vertiginosa de los fenómenos son la única manifestación de la sustancia. Los fenómenos son mis sensaciones. Y mis sensaciones, limitadas por los sentidos, son tan falaces y contingentes como los mismos sentidos. ... 
---La sensación crea la conciencia; la conciencia crea el mundo. No hay más realidad que la imagen, ni más vida que la conciencia. No importa, con tal que sea intensa, que la realidad interna no acople con la externa. El error y la verdad son indiferentes. La imagen lo es todo. ... 55

The combination of the revelation of his own spontaneity and the thought expressed in this last paragraph -- sensation creates consciousness; consciousness creates the world -- could have produced a glimpse of the possibility of a whole new philosophy of existence for Yuste. It would have needed the concept of will to complete it in the field of practical reality, but the primary knowledge for such a philosophy -- the awareness that truth is subjectivity -- is quite clear to Yuste.

This whole experience is vastly disturbing to Yuste, and in spite of his deathbed assurance that he is calm, one senses that he
is calm, one senses that he is conscious, just below the level of knowledge, that somewhere he has missed a connection. Yuste dies an "hombre serio ... se indigna de no poder definir, de no poder coger ... estas vislumbres rápidas," and in an "irritación que es la del niño que no entiende el mecanismo de un juguete y lo rompe," he affirms his ignorance about the reality of the universe. "...La inmanencia o trascendencia de la causa primera, el movimiento, la forma de los seres, el origen de la vida ... , arcanos impenetrables..." He sums up his frustration regarding his personal existence with the words:

¡Ah, la inteligencia es el mal! ... Comprender es entristecer; observar es sentirse vivir ... Y sentirse vivir es sentir la muerte, es sentir la inexorable marcha de todo nuestro ser y de las cosas que nos rodean hacia el misterioso de la Nada. 58

And so Yuste continued to the end engaged in abstract thought.

Kierkegaard has commented on the type of man which Yuste represents:

Such an abstract thinker, one who neglects to take into account the relationship between his abstract thought and his own existence as an individual, not careful to clarify this relationship to himself, makes a comical impression on the mind, even if he is ever so distinguished, because he is in the process of ceasing to be a human being. While a genuine human being, as a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, finds his reality in holding these two factors together, infinitely interested in existing -- such an abstract thinker is a duplex being: a fantastic creature who moves in the pure being of abstract thought, and on the other hand, a sometimes pitiful professorial figure which the former deposits, about as when one sets down a walking stick... 59

Justina dies also. She is actually a peripheral character in La voluntad, drawn to represent the author's concept of environmental determinism. She expresses her view of life in the only two statements other than prayers which she makes in the book: "El cuidado
del día de mañana nos hace taciturnos,""La vida es un valle de lágrimas." Actually, the girl does not want to be a nun, but she is unable to resist the strong social and environmental pressure to which she is subjected. The start of Azorín's search for truth probably had its origin in the realization of the possible danger to one who did not resist it. He was determined to protect his individuality and for this reason he was disliked in Yecla. His view of life in the town is seen in the following comments:

La vida de los pueblos ... es una vida vulgar ... El peligro de la vida de pueblo es que se siente uno vivir ..., que es el tormento más terrible. ... Y de ahí el método en todos los actos y en todas las cosas; de ahí los prejuicios que aquí cristalizan con una dureza extraordinaria, las pasiones pequeñas ... La energía humana necesita un escape, un empleo; no puede estar reprimida, y aquí hace presa en las cosas pequeñas, insignificantes ... y las agranda.

Este sentirse vivir hace la vida triste. La muerte parece que es la única preocupación en estos pueblos ... Entierros, anunciadores de entierros que van tocando por las calles una campanilla, misas de requiem, dobleo de campanas ... todo esto es como un ambiente angustioso, anhelante, que no oprime, que nos hace pensar minuto por minuto ... en la inutilidad de todo esfuerzo, ... en que no valen afanes ni ansiedades, puesto que todo ... ha de acabarse, disolviéndose en la nada ... 62

Azorín consoles himself when Justina enters the convent with the possibility of subjectivity. "... Todo es la imagen, ... y como el mundo es nuestra representación, la vida apagada de una monja es tan intensa como la vida tumultuosa de un gran industrial norteamericano." And Justina's death does actually come in the midst of a mystic vision. The author's comment, however, when she takes the veil is "... su Voluntad ha muerto." 64

Azorín, aware that too much thinking has not only failed to solve his problems but has left him feeling "vivo medio vida," 65
decides to throw himself into the activity of the life of a journalist in Madrid. He departs from Yecla, taking with him two thoughts which appear to be the major gleanings from his time spent with Yuste: "¿qué importa que la realidad interna no ensamble con la externa? ... La imagen lo es todo ... La realidad es mi conciencia.

In Part Two of La voluntad Azorín has been in Madrid for a number of years. He has achieved some recognition as a writer, but the activity which this accomplishment involved has not proved as beneficial as he hoped. He realizes the root of the problem, "la reflexión y el autoanálisis -- matadores de la voluntad," but these are habits which have become very deeply ingrained in him. Much of the reflection which Azorín does in Madrid is a repetition of that done previously by Yuste. There is a difference, though, which is a matter of tone. Underlying the same thoughts there is now a deeper degree of despair visible in a frenetic note, signifying Azorín's weariness of his acute personal involvement with these problems and the beginning of chronic abulia.

En Madrid, su pesimismo instintivo se ha consolidado; su voluntad ha acabado de disgregarse en este espectáculo de vanidades y miserias ... en el fondo, no cree en nada ... Su espíritu anda ávido y perplejo de una parte a otra; no tiene plan de vida; no es capaz del esfuerzo sostenido; mariposea en torno a todas las ideas; trata de gustar todas las sensaciones. Así, en perpetuo tejer y destejer, en perdurables y estériles amagos, la vida corre inexorable, sin dejar más que una fugitiva estela de gestos, gritos, indignaciones, paradojas ... 68

The Madrid environment -- signifying the life of the Victorian Man -- has proved to be as debilitating as Yecla previously was. He makes a trip to Toledo, looking for a change, but the same grey vision pursues him there. The sights of Toledo evoke a long series of thoughts on Spanish literature, the conclusion of which is:
Hay que remontarse a los primitivos para encontrar algo espontáneo, jovial, plástico, íntimo; hay que subir hasta Bécquer, hasta el Romancero... hasta el incomparable Arcipreste de Hita... Sí... este espíritu jovial y fuerte, placentero y fecundo, se ha perdido...

And then the thought turns personal:

Yo no podría vivir en un pueblo como éste; mi espíritu inquieto se ahogaría en este ambiente de foscura, de uniformidad, de monotonia eterna... ¡Esto es estúpido! La austreidad castellana y católica agobia a esta pobre raza paralítica. Todo es pobre, todo es opaco, todo es medió. Aún los que se llaman demagogos son en el fondo unos desdichados reaccionarios. No creen en un dogma religioso, pero conservan la misma moral, la misma estética, la misma economía de la religión que rechazan... Hay que romper la vieja tabla de valores morales, como decía Nietzsche.

This mention of Nietzsche is amplified by Azorín shortly thereafter, in a long monologue beginning with the statement "... yo soy un determinista convencido." Azorín, preoccupied from childhood with time, could not help being interested in the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, and this expression of the senselessness of things, of the lack of telos in the universe fits superficially with his deterministic view. Actually, Azorín at this point does not understand Nietzsche, and he is especially confused on the very point which could have been of use to him: the doctrine of the Superman. A few quotations from Fernando Molina's article "Nietzsche: The Meaning of the Earth," are helpful in clarifying Azorín's misunderstanding:

... for Nietzsche the absence of eternal horizons... is not in itself a justification for a nihilistic orientation -- which is to say no orientation at all. ...man requires new values not only in respect to shaping his life, but also in respect to determining the significance of the world... Nietzsche's interest is to commend to man a positive valuation of the world... for, God is dead! [With this statement Molino says] Nietzsche depicts the decay, not of the institution of Christianity... but of the orientation of values and morals which has traditionally been derived from Christianity... But only a negative connotation should not be attributed to Nietzsche's metaphor
of the death of God, on the contrary, the lack of divine order implies no lack of value, for the horizon ... is at least open again ... [and] is of this world ... the advent of the overman is an explicit corollary of the death of God ... Nietzsche's overman is the person who ... himself establishes new values and affirms the significance of life in so doing ... 73

Azorín's concept of the Superman, at this point, is one for whom "el primer deber ... consistiría en llegar a todos los placeres por todos los medios, es decir, en ser fuerte..." He agrees with Nietzsche in theory that strength is a necessity,

...sólo que la energía es algo que no se puede lograr a voluntad, ... no depende de nosotros el poseerla ... Las cosas nos llevan de un lado para otro fatalmente; somos de la manera que el medio conforma nuestro carácter ... Acaso, al través del tiempo ... el individuo puede operar contra el medio ... Pero eso nosotros no lo veremos, no lo sentiremos, y lo que a mí me importa es mi propio yo, que es el Unico ... mi propia vida, que está antes que todas las vidas presentes y futuras ... 75

Azorín only understands half of Nietzsche's message, the doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, and he is, therefore, like Yuste, still searching the depths of those "arcanos impenetrables" by the light of environmental determinism. But the neglected half of his nature is expressing itself in increasing importunance.

Azorín's preoccupation with himself rapidly reached the level of acute anxiety. He complains of "este tedio de ahora ... que ... es inevitable ... mi pensamiento nada en el vacío, en un vacío que es el nihilismo, a desgregación de la voluntad, la dispersión silenciosa ... de mi personalidad." He again blames his heredity and environment for his condition; repeats that he has lost faith in literary endeavors and progress; re-examines his awareness of the passage of time carrying away his youth, leaving him with memories that are only a source of sadness. And through it all he is demanding of himself
an answer to the question "¿qué hacer? ... ¿qué hacer?". His friends (the members of the Generation) are no longer a source of stimulus to him, for he sees the group as "un anacronismo en el ambiente actual de industrialismo literario e industrialismo político." He joins them on the anniversary of Larra's death in their graveside tribute to his memory, and his empathy appears strikingly when he characterizes Larra as "ansioso e impotente," and he sees that Larra passed through life "amargado por el perpetuo no ser..." Finally, dwelling on his feeling that he is a "fracaso irremediable," he decides to leave Madrid. The author comments at this point:

Azorín es casi un símbolo; sus perplejidades, sus ansias, sus desconsuelos bien pueden representar toda una generación sin voluntad, sin energía, indecisa, irresoluta, una generación que no tiene ni la audacia de la generación romántica, ni la fe en afirmar de la generación naturalista.

These Madrid experiences depict Azorín's encounter with the absurd. Weary from the mechanicalness of his journalistic chores he observes in a shock of amazement that the Madrid society surrounding him reminds him of the old Dance of Death theme. Then the question "why?" occurs and with it the beginning of consciousness. At the real heart of this vision of the absurd for Azorín is an encounter with time. For some years he has been living on the future; time has carried him and he has been oblivious to it in his struggle for his career. He has not had to "sentirse vivir." Now, the weariness and mechanicalness of his life brings the realization that he is older; they force the admission that "he stands at a certain point on a curve that he acknowledges having to travel to its end." The nauseating vision of a future of carrying time, of "sentirse vivir," is "that revolt of the flesh [which] is the absurd."
In Part Three, Azorín goes back to Yecla. "Puede ser que el camino ... sea malo; pero, al fin y al cabo, es un camino." He stays in the monastery of Santa Ana for a few days and one of the friars lends him a book. Azorín is not really interested in the story of the Crucifixion written by a woman, but he casually begins to read it, and "poco a poco he ido experimentando una de las más intensas, de las más enormes sensaciones estéticas de mi vida de lector." The contrast between his previous state of monotonous desperation and the spontaneous enthusiasm which arose from reading this book affects Azorín greatly, and he looks at himself with startled attention:

Decididamente, no me conozco. Y todos los esfuerzos por llegar a un estado de espíritu tranquilo resultan estériles ante estos impensados raptos de fiera.

He then explains himself as he understands himself. It is a strange, bifurcated view which emerges. He conceives of la Voluntad somehow as being involuntary, as a result of spontaneous generation, as something over which he has no control. And he likewise conceives of thinking as a realm over which he also has no control. He does, in fact, conceive of himself as an automaton:

Yo soy un rebelde de mí mismo; en mí hay dos hombres. Hay el hombre-voluntad, casi muerto, casi deshecho por una larga educación en un colegio clerical, seis, ocho, diez años ... de compresión de la espontaneidad, de contrariación de todo lo natural fecundo. Hay, aparte de este, el segundo hombre, el hombre-reflexión, nacido alentado en copiosas lecturas, en largas soledades, en minuciosos autoanálisis. El que domina en mí, por desgracia, es el hombre-reflexión; yo casi soy un automata, un muñeco sin iniciativas; el medio me aplasta, las circunstancias me dirigen al azar a un lado y a otro ...

Yet the results of this are quite startling:

...Muchas veces yo me complazco en observar este dominio del ambiente sobre mí: y así veo que soy místico, anarquista,
Here Azorín is forced to acknowledge that since quite unbidden he experiences daily a great variety of emotional states his spontaneity is highly active. He then recognizes what is to be extremely significant to him in the future: the fact that he is a highly imaginative person.

At this point had the author only been concerned with the development of the héroe fracasado he might have gone right into the material covered in Antonio Azorín. However, La voluntad is a study of fracasados, so he continues his depiction of the abulico. The above thoughts contain concepts which are new to Azorín, but, true to type, he does not fix his attention on them long enough to assimilate them. Very shortly hereafter we find him back on his well-worn path of abstract ideas.

Azorín marries Iluminada, a friend of Justina's, described as "una muchacha inteligente, vivaz, autoritaria, imperativa ... un ejemplar de una voluntad espontánea y libre..." 88 He had previously thought of marrying her because with these qualities she could "vivir la mitad de mi vida, es decir, de ayudarme a vivir." 89

What follows the impulse of consciousness may be either a gradual return to the customary weariness or a definitive awakening. Antonio Azorín suffering from abulia is a picture of the former,
a return to an existence which the existentialists call inauthentic. It is inauthentic in Azorín's case because it is self-deceiving. Azorín uses abulia, at root a doctrine of determinism, to camouflage his cowardness in facing his freedom. He knows that "conciencia crea el mundo," but he avoids the responsibility of the commitment of freedom by a contradiction with himself. Sartre is helpful at this point:

Man will only attain existence when he is what he proposes to be. Not, however, what he may wish to be. For what we usually understand by wishing or willing is a conscious decision taken -- much more often than not -- after we have made ourselves what we are. I may wish to join a party, to write a book or to marry -- but in such a case what is usually called my will is probably a manifestation of a prior and more spontaneous decision. If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, man is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely on his own shoulders.

Antonio Azorín, actively engaged in willing the life of an abulico and at the same time fatalistically declaring that it is imposing itself on him, is simply not being honest with himself. This is the moral which La voluntad has to teach.

The epilogue to La voluntad consists of a series of letters between Pío Baroja and the author. Baroja made a trip to Yecla and while he was there he remembered his friend Antonio Azorín and looked him up. In a series of short, well-drawn sketches he stresses the moral: the end result of Antonio Azorín's failure to use his will to assign value to and assume responsibility for himself is "Antonio, el que está casado con doña Iluminada." The last letter is one by the author, and in spite of the above condition it closes on a note of hope: "¿Vivirá siempre Azorín aquí? Yo me resisto a
creerlo ... esta pasividad no es en él natural ... Instintivamente
 tiene horror a todo lo normal, a todo lo geométrico, a la línea
 recta..."94 This last line is, of course, a quotation from Baroja's
 article. It stands as a reminder that the "por dentro" of this trilogy
 is in Baroja's words the fact that "el plan espiritual de nuestra vida
 depende de nuestras ideas y nuestros sentimientos, no nuestros
 sentimientos y nuestras ideas de un plan preconcebido,"
 or as Azorín expresses it, "Sensación crea conciencia; conciencia crea el
 mundo."95

The novel Antonio Azorín continues the development of the
 héroe fracasado which the author began in La voluntad. It takes
 place chronologically in Antonio Azorín's life after his stay in the
 Santa Ana monastery. The end of La voluntad -- Azorín's return to
 Yecla, his marriage and subsequent stagnation -- when juxtaposed with
 Antonio Azorín represents an either/or view of life which the author
 had come to realize. That is, either one continued refusing to be
 responsible for one's self, as in La voluntad, or, one attempted to
 assume responsibility. Freedom is the issue. Antonio Azorín is a
 description of this attempt to pass from one condition to another, to
 move from inauthentic to authentic existence. The glimpses of the
 possibility of a philosophy of existence which the protagonist
 achieved in La voluntad made this attempt conceivable. These glimpses
 should be rapidly summarized in the interest of clarity.

Antonio Azorín painfully realized that his attempt to live life
 as the average Victorian Man of the Madrid journalistic circles led
 him to a feeling of utter futility, to a vision of the absurd. The
 absurd came from his demanding of this life a meaning incommensurate
with its potential. He also came to realize that the way of life of
the Alexandrians who had become followers of Schopenhauer resulted
in the view held by the prisoners in the castle, "We are the castle,"
which was to him totally unfulfilling. It was also basically unreal
because everything passes; to live is to change. In this constant
flux, man's subjectivity -- the sensations created by his consciousness
-- is the only truth of which he can be sure. This is his existence.
This is where he surges up and encounters himself, and in so doing he
does not discover an abstract "human nature" but a concrete human
reality which at this point is nothing. He will not be anything until
later. First man encounters himself and then he defines himself. He
will be what he makes of himself. This is the point of view treated
by Jean-Paul Sartre in his The Transcendence of the Ego: Outline of a
Phenomenological Description. Fernando Molina has explicated this
point of view in his Existentialism as Philosophy and we have been
guided by his explication. According to Molina, Sartre points out
that we become aware of the Ego subject to a basic qualification:
it is possible to intuit the Ego as an object of consciousness only
on the occasion of a reflective act on the part of consciousness.
Sartre conceives of transcendental consciousness as an impersonal
spontaneity. It determines its existence constantly in each instant
of life, ex nihilo. It is this spontaneity of consciousness which
makes possible the unity of the Ego, which is a perpetual synthesis
of past and present consciousness, a unity which is immanent. Conscious-
ness constitutes an Ego for itself out of this unity to mask its own
spontaneity from itself. For consciousness is frightened by the fact
that it senses that this spontaneity is beyond freedom, beyond self-
determination, since the self is but a passive product of this very spontaneity of consciousness. This is the dread which Sartre terms "a vertigo of possibilities," which can be understood "... only if consciousness suddenly appeared to itself as infinitely overflowing in its possibilities the I which ordinarily serves it as unity."

At the moment at which Azorin encounters himself he is quite sure of two facts about himself: first, that he is capable of a great intensity of feeling, and second, that he is a highly imaginative person. His intensity of feeling focuses in two intertwined and irreconcilable directions: his revulsion and revolt at the vision of the absurd, at the chaos and anarchy of the world and the meaninglessness of life, and together with this, his great need and desire for a vision of internal unity, a positive view of the world which will allow him to function. It is the latter need which, for the present, is going to occupy him. The big question for him is no longer "What is truth?," but "What is truth for me?" His relations to society do not concern him at this point. What he is primarily interested in is his relation to his inner self. Sartre's definition of subjectivism is: "...on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subjectivity and, on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity." Azorin intends to explore the possibilities of freedom which the discovery of his subjectivity has opened up to him by the use of his imagination.

In The Psychology of the Imagination Sartre discusses this exact point in a way which seems particularly applicable to Azorin. I have again been guided by Molina's explication of this work. For him, the concept of freedom is a separability from the world of a consciousness which is in the world. He made a distinction between perception and
imagination with respect to the modes in which each presents its object. The object of perception is real, by virtue of the fact that it is perceived against a background of total reality. In the case of the imagination, however, the object is posited as either absent or nonexistent, that is, as nothing in relation to the background of real things. It must be set over against the background of real things in order to be held as an image. For consciousness to be able to do this it must not be enmeshed in reality and determined by the effects of causality, for otherwise the object which it places against a background of reality is not an image but a real object. This ability to place itself over against the totality of reality is precisely what constitutes the freedom of consciousness. "Consciousness, in essence imaginative, posits the image as a nothing in relation to the real in which it is basically engaged, but which, in virtue of its imagination, it can transcend." For Sartre, the concept of meaning rests on his theory of the imagination and therefore on the nature of freedom. And thus "... imagination, far from appearing as an actual characteristic of consciousness turns out to be an essential and transcendental condition of consciousness."

Azorín's decision to investigate the possibilities of his own subjectivity by the use of his imagination is the condition of "despair" in Sartre's meaning of the term. For him, "despair merely means that we limit ourselves to a reliance upon that which is within our wills, or within the sum of probability which renders our action feasible." This is also the sum of Azorín's total commitment, at this point.

Antonio Azorín, like La voluntad, opens with a lengthy description of the countryside around Monóvar (in the province of Alicante)
and the farmhouse where Azorín is staying. There is a noticeable
difference between these descriptions and those given in La voluntad.
The author here uses a more realistic technique and produces thereby
a mood of serenity in contrast to the emotion-heavy impressionistic
descriptions of the previous work. This change is not only quite
refreshing, but also proclaims Azorín's change in perspective. Instead
of the author using his feelings -- which in La voluntad are
ultimately traceable to an abstract concept -- to evoke a mood or
atmosphere in regard to the external stimulus, he now allows the
external stimulus to speak for itself, to Antonio Azorín as well
as to the reader. Both of these techniques are attempts to govern
the subject matter. The former, although based on subjectivity, was
rigid because the subjectivity itself as well as the external stimulus
was under the control of a preconceived idea. The realistic technique
of Antonio Azorín is flexible precisely because the author allows the
objectivity of perception. It is curious, but it is as though
knowledge of the potential for freedom inherent in imagination
enabled Azorín to elect to control this factor in favor of a greater
degree of perception. All of the opening chapters of the book show
Azorín's new principle in operation.

Tired of the country, Azorín goes to Monóvar. His description
of daybreak in Monóvar in Chapter VII is an excellent example of his
new use of perception. A comparison with the opening description of
Yecla in La voluntad shows the difference quite clearly. In Yecla
the whole town was dominated by the bells. The bells ring in Monóvar,
too, but they are now simply one sound among the many of the busy
town. This new viewpoint is, however, more than just a matter of
technique; it brings into focus Azorín's awareness of the responsibility implied in freedom and the values of ambiguity. The way the author handles a theme already treated in *La voluntad* brings this out:

He aquí dos o tres seres humanos que viven en un caserón oscuro, que van enlutados, que tienen las puertas y las ventanas cerradas, que mantienen vivas continuamente una candelica ante unos santos, que rezan a cada campanada que da el reloj, que se acuerdan a cada momento de sus difuntos. Ya en esta pendiente se desciende fácilmente hasta lo último. Y el último es la muerte. Y la muerte está continuamente ante la vista de estos seres. Un día, una de estas mujeres se siente un poco enferma; suspira, implora al Señor; todos los que la rodean suspiran y imploran también. Ya ha huido para siempre la alegría. ¿Es grave la dolencia? No, la dolencia está en el medio, en la autosugestión; pero esta autosugestión acabará por hacer enfermar de veras a esta doliente y a todos los de la casa.

Así pasan dos o tres meses, y se va viendo que la enferma va empeorando ... ¿Para qué pintar las diversas gradaciones de este proceso doloroso? ... Bastaría abrir las puertas y dejar entrar el sol, salir, viajar, gritar, chapuzarse en agua freaca, correr, saltar, comer grandes trozos de carne, para que esta tristeza se acabase. ¿Eso esto no lo haremos los españoles ... 103

This passage brings Justina to mind, but the handling of the theme is here completely different. The impotent rage against the oppressive medio, so characteristic of Antonio Azorín in *La voluntad*, has disappeared. Azorín recognizes the contribution of el medio to the above human situation but he also places part of the blame on la autosugestión. The responsibility implied in freedom has made its appearance; it comes into play in the matter of the assignment of meaning. At the point where "Conciencia crea el mundo" meaning is the issue. Meaning strives to rest on truth, but before there can be any truth whatsoever there must be an absolute truth and the only absolute truth which Azorín knows is his immediate sense of himself. Through this he recognizes the influence of el medio, but also the power of la autosugestión, and on the strength of his recognition of
this truth he diagnoses the common human condition and prescribes its remedy. El medio is the historical situation with its limitations which defines man's fundamental position in the universe. It has an objective aspect of being by the fact that it is everywhere around him, and it has a subjective aspect in that it must be lived by him, and Azorín knows that man does not live if he does not freely determine himself and his existence in relation to el medio. This is the positive strength of auto-suggestion which the people in the caserón oscuro do not realize. Azorín knows that they do not realize it and probably will not, but beyond the matter of meaning lies the question of value. His commitment was to search for a vision of harmony in the world and the assessment of value is part of this search. As Azorín recognizes the uniqueness of his own subjectivity he also recognizes that this fact applies to everyone else. This is the fact of ambiguity which can be used, he sees, for artistic purposes, but far more important, it brings with it the quality of tolerance. Azorín sees that he cannot in fairness judge people who live in a state of inauthenticity by the strictness of authentic standards, by standards of the héroe fracasado. The bitterness so prevalent in La voluntad has, hence, disappeared.

The author utilizes this potentiality of the ambiguous for literary interpretation in his poetic handling of the death of the old lady who for ten years "no hace más que pensar en que se ha de morir." Antonio Azorín also takes advantage of his awareness of the existence of a variety of possible views on a subject to perform an act of charity and preserve and old man's "única alegría." When the unsuccessful old writer of zarzuelas asks Azorín for a critical
opinion of his work, Azorín says:

Azorín tiene, como no podía ser menos, su estética teatral, que algunos críticos han encontrado exagerada. Pero sería terrible que la sacase en esta ocasión. Mejor es que le parezcan bien todas las escenas y hasta las tres obras enteras. Sí, a Azorín le parecen excelentes las treszarzuela. 105

Azorín is also finding other values all around him in Monóvar, mainly in the simple everyday things. In contrast to Madrid, just to be able to stroll out the front door and look around is "una de las pequeñas voluptuosidades de provincias." He hears songs and guitar music that floats in from the dressmaking shop next door and "este concierto de melodías tan dulces, tan voluptuosas, ... traen a su espíritu consoladoras olvidanzas." The old man who, after a lifetime spent in the theater, weeps tears of joy at again hearing applause on the opening night of his company of amateurs is very touching. The three old men who wear old-fashioned, short velvet jackets and go every evening to sit on large stones in the garden and commune with each other more than talk are noteworthy for their dignity. A cleric who is happy in his work and his poverty receives Azorín's admiration and respect.

Azorín receives a letter from his uncle, Pascual Verdú, asking him to come to Petrel to see him before he dies. Azorín has not seen his uncle since childhood, but Verdú tells him the story of his life in a long letter. He is revealed as a sincere, religious man who is interested in poetry. He had to abandon his successful law practice in Madrid because of illness. The nature of this illness is not given specifically but it is apparently some form of nervous ailment, possibly fed by "autosugestión." As Yuste previously
was an example of the danger of excessive thinking, Verdú now serves as a warning of the possible danger of uncontrolled emotions. Azorín's reaction when they first meet is interesting. His imagination comes forward immediately to reinforce the tolerance which he is learning in his attempt to achieve a vision of harmony:

Un mundo de ideas le separa de Verdú; pero ¿qué importan las ideas rojas o blancas? Lo que importan son los bellos movimientos del alma; lo que importa es la espontaneidad, la largueza, la tolerancia, el impetu generoso, el arrebato lírico. Y Verdú es un bello ejemplar de esos hombres-fuerzas que cantan, ríen, se apasionan, luchan, caen en desesperaciones hondas, se exaltan en alegrías súbitas...112

Verdú is a man of old-fashioned sentiments, yet his mind is not closed. In the field of literature he defends the right of the young to establish their own criteria in opposition to "las consagraciones" of their elders. In fact, he believes the only men of true worth are those who do not have fixed ideas.113 However, he is worried about the materialism and atheism he sees invading all parts, sweeping away "las ideas consoladoras" and

Yo siento como desaparece de una sociedad nueva todo lo que yo mas amo, todo lo que ha sido mi vida, mis ilusiones, mi fe, mis esperanzas ... Yo no puedo creer que aquí remate todo, que la sustancia sea única, que la causa primera sea inmanente ... Y, sin embargo, todo lo dice ya en el mundo ..., por todas partes. 114

Then after a pause he adds:

--No, no Azorín; todo no es perecedero, todo no muere ... ¡El espíritu es inmortal! ¡El espíritu es indestructible! 115

Verdú dies shortly thereafter, peacefully uttering his cry of

"¡Mi espíritu! ... ¡mi espíritu!," and Azorín adds:

--¡Ha vuelto al alma eterna de las cosas! Todo ha tornado a quedar en silencio; el aire es luminoso y ardiente; en el fondo del patio, allá en el huerto, sobre el follaje verde, brillan las manzanas rosadas, las ciruelas de oro, los encendidos alberchigos. La mariposa blanca ha desaparecido. Y suena una campanada
Verdú's death brings out the message of the spirit transcending the flux of nature. It stands as a reminder that the vision of harmony which Azorín is pursuing is possible. At this point Azorín is still groping, but this groping is evidence of the persistence of his revolt from his encounter with the absurd. Azorín's evaluation of the many, small, ordinary things, his near stockpiling of the scenes of everyday multiplicity continues. In Las confesiones where Azorín comes to grips with the problem of the absurd the ordinary particular becomes the imperishable and yields for him a vision of unanimity.

This search is Azorín's ideal and the importance of having an ideal is underlined again when, after the funeral of the old man Don Victor, Sarrió comments curiously that he died crying for "mi bastón!" and Azorín says:

--No, querido Sarrió; no me parece raro. unos piden luz, más luz, cuando mueren; otros piden sus ideas; este pobre hombre pedía su bastón. ¡Qué importa bastón, ideas o luz! En el fondo, todo es un ideal. Y la vida, que es triste, que es monótona, necesita, querido Sarrió, un ideal que la haga llevadera: justicia, amor, belleza, o, sencillamente, un bastón con una chapa de plata. 117

Sarrió is short and fat. He lives in a spacious old house with his stout wife and three daughters. He is an epicure. "... no se apasiona por nada, no discute, no grita; todo le es indiferente. Todo, menos esos gordos capones... esos sólidos jamones..." and so on. Sarrió represents bodily health and earthly happiness, uncomplicated by ideas or emotions. This is the neglected side of Azorín and he shows that he realizes it. When Sarrió, after discovering an error in a cookbook complains:
¿Para qué sirven los sabios? ¿Para qué sirven estos libros que leemos, creyendo encontrar en ellos la verdad infalible? ... Y Azorín le ha dicho:
— Sí, querido Sarrió, los libros son falaces; los libros entristecen nuestra vida. Porque gastamos en leerlos y escribirlos aquellas fuerzas de juventud que pudieran emplearse en la alegría y en el amor. Y cuando llega la vejez y vemos que los libros no nos han enseñado nada ...

Sarrió is also a simple man, one of those for whom "en la vida no hay nada grande ni pequeño, puesto que un grano de arena puede ser para un hombre sencillo una montaña." Azorín enjoys his company and makes trips with him to Villena, Alicante and Orihuela.

In Orihuela they are invited to lunch with the bishop. He is a good man, "...uno de esos hombres espirituales que cuando comen lo hacen como a pesar de ellos, con discreción, dando a las elegantes razones que se cruzan entre los comensales más importancia que a las viandas." One of the thoughts which he tosses out is:

—Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Stirner ... son los bellos libros de caballerías de hogano. Los caballeros andantes no se han acabado; los hay aun ... Y yo veo a muchos jóvenes, señor Azorín, echar por las veredas de sus pensamientos descarriados. ¿Tienen talento? Sí, sí, talento tienen, indudablemente; pero la falta esa simplicidad, esa visión humilde de las cosas, esa compenetración con la realidad que Alonso Quijano encontró en su lecho de muerte, ya curado de sus fantasías ... Yo creo que debemos mirar la realidad.

Azorín thinks, but out of politeness does not say, that he agrees that everything in the whole world is worthy of study and respect, but he understands that things have to change because everything changes. He is polite again when the bishop offers the desert, limoncillos en almíbar, explaining that they are made by some nuns of the vicinity, and that whenever they appear on his table he sees them as a symbol of those pious women. Azorín is
struck immediately by the contrast between his two luncheon companions. The bishop is the man with the abstract approach to life whereas Sarrió's approach is concrete.

Sarrió calla y come. Yo barrunto que a Sarrió no le interesa mucho el símbolo de las cosas. El, al menos, puedo afirmar que no piensa en nada cuando saborea estos limoncillos. 123

Both men are involved with the limoncillos, but Sarrió undoubtedly enjoys the more intense form of pleasure.

Election day serves to illustrate clearly the basic change in Azorín. In La voluntad election results cost Yuste a complete day given over to an outburst of rage against the stupidity of the voters. But here, whereas the whole town is excited,

Azorín no comprende estas ansias; Sarrió permanece inerte. Los dos son algo sabios: uno, por indiferencia reflexiva; otro, por imposibilidad congénita. --Los hombres ... se afanan vanamente en sus pensamientos y en sus luchas. Yo creo que lo más cuerdo es remontarse sobre todas estas cosas que exasperan a la Humanidad. Sonríamos a todo; el error y la verdad son indiferentes. ¿Qué importa el error? ¿Qué importa la verdad? Lo que importa es la vida. El bien y el mal son creaciones nuestras; no existen en sí mismos. El pesimismo y el optimismo son igualmente verdaderos o igualmente falsos. En el fondo, lo innegable es que la Naturaleza es ciega e indiferente al dolor y al placer ... 124

This is an important declaration of Azorín's and one that can be easily misunderstood. It is a typical example of what has been called Azorín's position of detachment and disdain. But it should be noted that his indifference is "reflexiva." That is, it is a position which he has chosen to assume, a deliberate act stemming from a choice which he had to make to accept or negate involvement in a particular aspect of the world. This is a clear example of Azorín's creating his world by the choice not to become involved with
what he knows from experience can only lead to self-division and unfullfilment for him. Disdain, which is present, is one of the tools of negation. Also there is again the quality of ambiguity. This comes out more clearly in his example of the disagreements as to good taste in Pepita's fashion magazine:

Y pensemos que cuando a estas cosas llega la pasión de los hombres, ¿qué no será en aquellas otras que atañen muy de cerca a los grandes intereses y a los ideales perdurables? 125

Pepita is one of Sarrió's daughters. To Azorín she represents the elegance of simplicity and the naturalness of spontaneity. These are qualities which Azorín admires greatly and which he would like to achieve in his writing.

Azorín suddenly decides one day to leave Petrel. His visit to the provinces began as a spiritual retreat. His stay in Monóvar and Petrel was to give himself time to assimilate the possibilities inherent in his revelation of spontaneity. As a result of this rest he has now achieved a degree of internal unity, but he realizes that coping with the tremendous problem of the absurd still lies before him. Azorín has been highly tempted by the peace and happiness there to stay in Petrel, but he recognizes that he cannot. He is engañado. He must face the problem of the absurd and to do this he has to return to his life as a writer in Madrid.

Azorín's letters from Madrid to Pepita confirm this:

Pero es preciso estar aquí, Pepita; es preciso vivir en este Madrid terrible: en provincias no se puede conquistar la fama. La fama no estamos muy acordes los que vamos tras ella en lo que consiste; pero yo puedo asegurar que el fajo de cuartillas que emborrono todos los días, lo emborrono por conquistarla. 126

They also show how difficult it was for a newspaper man to
find either time or energy for independent writing:

Y cuando, después de haber estado todo el día hablando y escribiendo, me retiro a casa a estas horas, yo trato de buscarme a mí mismo, y no me encuentro. ¡Mi personalidad ha desaparecido, se ha disgregado en diálogos insustanciales y artículos ligeros!

Y yo no creo, Pepita, que haya un tormento mayor que este. Nos pueden robar nuestra hacienda, nos pueden robar la capa y el gabán; ¡pero robarnos nuestro espíritu! ¿Comprendes tú, Pepita, que haya una cosa más terrible que ésta?

Ahora son las dos ... yo me siento ante la mesa y arreglo las cuartillas. Pero no se me ocurre nada. Aquella espontaneidad que yo sentía afluir en mí, ya no la siento. Quiero reflexionar, me esfuerzo en hacer una cosa bien hecha, y me desespero y me aburro. Las cosas bien hechas salen ellas solas, sin que nosotros queramos; la ingenuidad, la sencillez, no pueden ser queridas. Cuando queramos ser ingenuos, ya no lo somos. 127

Azorín makes two more short trips, one to Torrijos and the other to Infantes. The description of these places in central Spain is highly realistic, and Azorín cannot help being concerned about the poverty and misery he sees there. In addition to this, "... he sentido una grande, una profunda, una abrumadora ternura hacia este pueblo muerto." He recognizes the need for enlightened political action:

... es preciso llevar al pueblo la seguridad de una vida sana y placentera. Un pueblo pobre es un pueblo de esclavos. No puede haber independencia ni fortaleza de espíritu en quien se siente agobiado por la miseria del medio ... El labriego, el artesano, el pequeño propietario ... se entregan ... a estos consuelos de la resignación ... habría que decirles que la vida no es resignación, no es tristeza, no es dolor, sino que es goce fuerte y fecundo; goce espontáneo, de la Naturaleza, del arte, del agua, de los árboles, del cielo azul, de las cosas limpias, de los trajes elegantes, de los muebles cómodos ... Y para demostrarles habría que darles estas cosas. 129

But he also sees:

Seamon sencillos: declaremos modestamente nuestra incompetencia. Y más valdrá, entre juzgar a los hombres
y echar el peso de nuestro voto u otra banda, no echarlo a ninguna, y no juzgar a nadie ni ser juzgado. 130

Again, as during elections in Petrel, Azorín resolves to try to settle the problems of his own life first before attempting to solve those of others, and

Es preciso volver a urdir estos artículos terribles todos los días, inexorablemente; es preciso ser el eterno hombre de todas horas, en perpetua renovación, siempre nuevo, siempre culto, siempre ameno.

Arreglo las cuartillas: mojo la pluma. Y comienzo... 131

Azorín's facing the absurd started with his return to Madrid.

When he resumed his life as a journalist he again met the same irritating demands of triviality which so annoyed him previously. But he learned that he could contain this portion of his life by his freedom of choice to assign or to negate value. 132.

The only area which he could not negate in this was his strong need for a vision of unity, for an absolute underlying the universe, and his equally strong inability to reject the actual chaos of the world which he saw surrounding him. This condition was the result of his educated reason. A savage would not have the problem. But Azorín recognized it as a part of him which could not be eliminated and which must be faced. For this reason he stated:

Yo quiero evocar mi vida; en esta soledad, entre estos volúmenes, que tantas cosas me han revelado, en estas noches placidas, solemnes, del verano, parece que resurge en mí, viva y angustiosa, toda mi vida de niño y de adolescente. Y si dejo la mesa y salgo un momento al balcón, siento como un aguzamiento doloroso de la sensibilidad cuando ... contemplo el titileo misterioso de una estrella en la inmensidad infinita. 133

Las confesiones de un pequeño filósofo es a deceptive book.

Cut of nostalgia Azorín has evoked scenes from his childhood and youth. In doing so he uses humor and gentle irony with such great
dexterity that the spiritual conflict embodied in this book can almost be overlooked because of the sheer artistry of the writer. Azorín's decision to use this method in his writing came out in Antonio Azorín when he decided to leave Petrel:

Nevertheless, when we consider Azorín's reason for writing Las confesiones we must recognize that this little book, for all it's deceptive charm, is an expression of Azorín's revolt at the absurd. Revolt seems like a strong word to use given the matter of fact attitude which prevails in this work. But the presence of revolt is there in Azorín's constant confrontation with the theme of time. Azorín's vision of the absurd, we have said, centered on the problem of time and death, for death is a corollary of the problem of time. In his chapter entitled "Los tres cofrecillos" he states the theme:

Si yo tuviera que hacer el resumen de mis sensaciones de niño en estos pueblos opacos y sordidos ... Escritiría sencillamente los siguientes corolarios:
"¡Es ya tarde!"
"¡Qué le vamos a hacer!" y
"¡Ahora se tenía que morir!"

Tal vez estas tres sentencias le parezcan extrañas al lector; no lo son de ningún modo; ellas resumen brevemente la psicología de raza española; ellas indican la resignación, el dolor, la sumisión, la inercia ante los hechos, la idea abrumadora de la muerte ... [son] los tres cofrecillos misteriosos e irrompibles en que se cierra toda la mentalidad de nuestra raza. 135
Azorín reveals his personal reaction to the atmosphere suggested by these sentences toward the end of *Las confesiones* when he revisits Yecla. He was walking through a garden with some old friends. Dusk fell and

... uno de los acompañantes ha dado unos golpes en el suelo con el bastón, y ha pronunciado estas palabras terribles:
— Volvamos, que ya es tarde.
Yo, al oírlas, he experimentado una ligera connoción.
Es ye tarde. Toda mi infancia, toda mi juventud, toda mi vida han surgido en un instante. Y he sentido — no sonríais — esa sensación vaga, que a veces me obsesiona, del tiempo y de las cosas que pasan en una corriente vertiginosa y formidable. 136

At the end of *Las confesiones* Azorín goes to revisit the colegio where he spent so many years. He was partially hesitant about this visit for fear that he would destroy "una ilusión consoladora." By not returning to the places of our childhood "... así conservamos engrandecidos los recuerdos de cosas que en la realidad son insignificantes." But he makes the visit.

Y después, cuando ha tocado una campana y he visto cruzar a lo lejos una larga fila de colegiales con sus largas blusas, yo, aunque pequeño filósofo, me he estremecido, porque he tenido un instante, al ver estos niños, la percepción aguda y terrible de que "todo es uno y lo mismo," como decía otro filósofo, no tan pequeño; es decir, de que era yo en persona que tornaba a vivir en estos claustros; de que eran mis afanes, mis inquietudes y mis anhelos que volvían a comenzar en el ritornello doloroso y perdurable. Y entonces me he alejado un poco triste, cabizbajo, apoyado en mi indefectible paraguas rojo. 138

The concept of the Eternal Return yields the vision of unity which Azorín has been seeking. Recognition of the inseparability of harmony and chaos is not "una ilusión consoladora" but a "percepción aguda y terrible." The persistence of this theme in so much of Azorín's writing is evidence of his determination to live facing the absurd in a posture of revolt. This revolt clearly preserves
what he has realized without distortion and with lucidity. The assumption of this position is the opposite of resignation, for the acceptance of resignation signifies that everything is over hence there is no need for consciousness to preserve the vision longer. One accepts something and puts it aside. Azorín is not resigned; he cannot be because the absurd is not settled. The concept of Eternal Return is not a doctrine which explains everything to thus relieve Azorín of the weight of his own life. On the contrary, it increases the burden which he must carry alone, in a posture of revolt. But it is this revolt which gives life its value.

If the vision of the absurd eliminates any possibility of eternal freedom for Azorín, it also releases him for a present workable freedom of action. A series of eternal presents is the sense of liberation occurring after facing the absurd. For after facing the possibility of death as the ultimate absurdity, Azorín realizes that his life, for the limit of time which it encompasses, is where the only reasonable freedom and harmony are possible. This is a view of life without consolation. As Camus says, it is the "sight of a ... transparent and limited universe in which nothing is possible but everything is given."
NOTES

CHAPTER I

1 Azorín, "Valencia," Obras completas


7 The reason for this statement will become clear later on when we take up the discussion of the trilogy.


11 When Azorín resumed his novelistic production in 1922 after a lapse of eighteen years he was interested in a variety of themes other than the héroe fracasado. It is interesting to note, however, the parallel which Azorín exhibits between the existential "manoeuvre" and the artistic experience as it involves the process of creating. See Robert E. Lott, The Structure and Style of Azorín's El caballero inactual, (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1963) for an excellent analysis of the artistic experience of the character Félix Vargas.

Granjel, Retrato de Azorín, p. 33.


Granjel, Retrato de Azorín, p. 45.


For example: "La crítica española adolece, en general, de falta de penetración; es más bien retórica que otra cosa. Este defecto está más acentuado en unos críticos que en otros; así, por ejemplo, Pardo Bazán y Picón, son más retóricos que Clarín y Altamira, que son precisamente los dos que quizá profundicen más en el espíritu del libro criticado, y eso que Alas muchas veces divaga, o mejor dicho, rellena sus artículos de horarascas inútiles, razón por la cual se hace un tanto pesado." Azorín, "La crítica literaria en España," C.p. cit., I., p. 24.

Martínez Ruiz, as a young writer, is looking for a job on a newspaper. He presents himself with his letter of introduction in hand to don Ricardo, the editor, who says:

"-¡Pero si yo creía que usted era un viejo! Formal ... Me lo figuré un señor de edad, metido en su pueblo tranquilamente y saboreando todos los libros nuevos que aparecen y escribiendo lo que le salía de ... ¡Me...! ¡Es una verdadera sorpresa...!" Azorín, "Charivari," Ibid., p. 246.


Granjel, Retrato de Azorín, p. 42.
23
For example: "La iglesia se me antoja un gran establecimiento de bebidas... espirituales; los creyentes verdaderos que llegan a ella con el alma dolorida, ansiosos de encontrar consuelo a sus penas, son los bebedores de gusto que entran en la tienda a fortificarse para continuar luego sus trabajos con nuevas energías; las beatas que invaden el templo, rezando automáticamente y golpeándose el pecho con la imposibilidad de muñecos mecánicos, son los borrachos empedernidos que cuelean por sus gaznates la bebida como si fuese agua clara..." Azorín, "Buscapies," Op. cit., I, p. 79.

24
For example: "Dibújanse en la literatura española dos agrupaciones con fines y procedimientos diferentes. Una, caracterizada por el luzanismo, por el amor rutinario a las tradiciones... es muy amplia [esta agrupación], por lo mismo que en ella son muy fáciles las falsificaciones... lo esencial en esto de ser académico... es ponerse serio, muy serio, y declarar en tono campanudo o en estilo comatoso sobre los motivos más triviales, tomando con frescura de la casa del vecino lo que haga falta, y sacando en todo caso, pegue o no pegue, el Cristo de nuestras tradiciones, con aquello de "nuestro insignes autores de novelas picarescas, que para ser naturalistas no necesitaron mancharse con el hediondo fango de la inmoralidad... De este modo pasa uno por sabio profundo... Estos son los que podríamos llamar obeliscos de la sabiduría española, es decir, monumentos, declarados por el Estado de utilidad pública o poco menos..." Ibid., pp. 106-107.

25
For example: "En literatura, la idea anarquista... también cuenta con sus hombres; hombres sinceros y energicos, que siempre han batallado por la exteriorización libre, ajena a todos cánones, desligada de falsos respetos y convencionalismos infantiles; escritores honrados que tienen el valor de escribir cuanto sienten y como lo sienten, sin atenerse a ridículas tradiciones ni temer los rayos vengadores de los falsos dioses.

En el arte literario, la sinceridad es lo primero; después, la lógica.

Y no basta esto. Es preciso también un temperamento de innovación y de crítica rigurosa, un energico espíritu de protesta contra lo irracional y lo ilógico, contra cualquier especie de crimen, entiendo por crimen... todo acta que hiera la libertad individual..." Azorín, "Anarquistas literarios," Ibid., p. 156.

26
For example: "En España, la cultura ha crecido mucho con las luchas políticas que han agitado la nación durante todo el siglo; pero nuestro atraso se evidencia cuando nos comparamos con otras naciones. Aún no se han impuesto aquí con toda su fuerza el derecho, la libertad, el deber. La tierra clásica del honor es la tierra de la arbitrariedad: en política, el caciquismo deshonoroso; en literatura, el elogio interesado y la censura rencorosa.
Se duda de si la ley del progreso es una verdad en España. ... El militarismo nos ahoga; la marcha de la reacción religiosa va subiendo. ... Los tributos aumentan, la industria muere, la agricultura decrece ... El labrador agoniza, roído por la usura y los impuestos ... La política es una escuela de criminales ... el sufragio es una mentira ... La instrucción pública apenas está extendida.

El tipo medio del escritor español se caracteriza por la impremeditación. Desdeña toda preparación detenida, toda reflexión laboriosa ... No concibe una existencia dedicada al trabajo puramente intelectual ... De nuestro horror a la meditación nace toda una literatura vacía y amplificadora ... Para él, la república literaria es una empresa de seguros: la defensa y el elogio son recíprocos.


"Hay entre nosotros, en la generación actual que empieza a vivir literariamente, una gran aspiración hacia el infinito, un ansia indeterminada a la idealidad. Desde este punto de vista, los escritores jóvenes de ahora, conocidos y desconocidos, son superiores en su mayoría a los de hace treinta o cuarenta años, no por ser más artistas ni más exquisitos, sino porque su alma está más abierta a las ideas ambientes.

Martínez Ruiz es un idealista algo extraño, idealista como puede ser un espíritu genuinamente español. En él todo es rectilíneo; su simpatía y su odio van en línea recta, tropezando aquí, cayéndose allá, sin doblarse nunca. En su alma no hay curvas, en sus sentimientos no hay matices, todo en él es claro y algo geométrico.

Y, sin embargo, Martínez Ruiz es un hombre que inquieta a los escritores que le conocen, porque le creen tortuoso.

La explicación de esto me parece sencilla. Martínez Ruiz, como todos los hombres que no se dejan llevar por supersticiones religiosas o sociales, es consecuente consigo mismo, pero no con los demás; y la inconsecuencia aquí es un crimen que no se perdona.

Martínez Ruiz cree indudablemente, como creo yo, que el plan espiritual de nuestra vida depende de nuestras ideas y de nuestros sentimientos, no nuestros sentimientos y nuestras ideas de un plan preconcebido. Esta idea impulsa a la inconsecuencia; el medio cambia, las representaciones intelectuales cambian también; ¿por qué no ha de cambiar el plan y la orientación de nuestra vida, si lo que hoy nos parece bien nos puede parecer mal mañana?

Pero entre la mayoría de la gente letrada nuestra, cambiar de orientación, cambiar de plan, es un crimen. Es más: no se cree en la sinceridad de este crimen. Aquí no se convence a nadie de que un hombre pueda sentirse íntimamente religioso y al poco tiempo íntimamente descreído; que el anarquista de alma pase a ser reaccionario de corazón; aquí no se comprende esto, porque hay muy pocos que busquen un ideal con ansia, con fiebre.

Martínez Ruiz lo busca de este modo, y vacila, va de aquí para allá; por esto tiene fama de tortuoso, cuando es un espíritu rígido, alma lineal de jacobino, de inquisidor o de calvinista.
Este misma antinomia entre la fama que tiene y su carácter, se observa entre su tipo físico y su tipo moral. Es impresionable hasta la exageración, y sus ojos son inexpresivos; es nervioso, y su aspecto es imposible; tiene fuego en su palabra, y su rostro es frío y su ademán automático.

Su personalidad no se destaca claramente en esta comedia _La fuerza del amor_, comedia bonita, documentada, discreta; un trabajo de erudición, de reconstrucción histórica, en donde Martínez Ruíz ha puesto la parte clara y neutra de su alma. Y esta parte es la menor energía de su temperamento, porque él no tiene una gran fantasía creadora de tipos, ni tiene tampoco ternura.

En donde hay que leer a Martínez Ruíz es en sus trabajos personalísimos, iracundos. Siente todo lo personal con una energía rabiosa; es sañudo, violento, extremado. Su personalidad me recuerda la de esos reaccionarios franceses como Mirecourt, Drummond y otros que defendieron y han devendido la reacción por antipatía hacia el ambiente mezquino que respiraban.

Martínez Ruíz es un espíritu esencialmente español, seco, amargo, sin ese soplo de poesía panteísta que aíta las obras de las almas del Norte. Como nuestros místicos, mira el ideal lejano, pero afirma bien los pies en la tierra.

El sueña alguna vez, no se olvida de que está aquí en el mundo. San Ignacio no se olvidaba tampoco.

Hechos, líneas, colores, pensamientos, contrastes, formas bruscas de las ideas, y en sentimientos, odios y colores, desprecios y admiraciones todo eso se encuentra en las obras de Martínez Ruíz; pero no busquéis en ellas una nube que os haga soñar, una ternura grande por una cosa pequeña, una vibración misteriosa que llegó sin saber cómo; no, en sus obras todo es claro, definido y neto.

Alegre su arte, sería un arte griego; amargo como es, es español, puramente español.

Sus obras parecen escritas por algún fraile casto y sombrío que viviera en una de esas llanuras claras e inundadas de sol de la Mancha," Pío Baroja, _Prólogo_ to "La fuerza del amor" by Azorín in _Azorín, Ibid._, pp. 737 – 739.


30 _Ibid._, p. 814.

31 _Ibid._, p. 832.

32 This statement was given in an interview to the press in 1942. It is quoted in Krause, _Op. cit._, p. 103.

33 It has been pointed out that Yuste is perhaps a composite character formed from real life people who influenced Azorín's youth. Some suggestions for the model are Clarín, Francisco Pi y Margall and Silverio Lanza. The chain of gold which Yuste wears in _La
voluntad and which Azorín, Carrión and Azorín's uncle Antonio wear in Antonio Azorín is a symbol of the doctrine which unites these men: "la aristocratización del hombre." Ibid., pp. 100-110.


36 Azorín defines el medio as: "La vivienda, la alimentación, la higiene, el traje, el reposo, el trabajo, los placeres." See: Azorín, Ibid., p. '821.'

37 Ibid., p. 894.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., p. 826.

40 Ibid., pp. 894-895.

41 Ibid., p. 895.

42 Ibid., p. 826.

43 Ibid., pp. 827-830.

44 Ibid., p. 844.


46 Ibid., pp. 851-852.

47 Ibid., p. 837.

48 Ibid., p. 838.
49  Ibid., p. 869.

50  Ibid., pp. 870-875.

51  Ibid., p. 889.

52  Ibid.

53  Ibid., pp. 832-833.

54  Ibid., p. 833.

55  Ibid., pp. 814-816, passim.

56  Ibid., p. 833.

57  Ibid., p. 897.

58  Ibid., p. 898.


61  Ibid., p. 812.

62  Ibid., pp. 834-835.

63  Ibid., p. 866.

64  Ibid., p. 886.

65  Ibid., p. 902.
Azorín confirms this statement: "Sea o no sea exacta la idea que tenemos de nuestro autor, el autor que nos interesa, que nos entusiasma, ese autor influirá en nuestro trabajo. Y acaso influya más si la idea es falsa. Porque entonces somos nosotros los que creamos ese autor, le creamos para nuestro caso, y escribimos la obra con arreglo a lo que deseamos.


The treatment of "Self-Deception" is an important chapter in Jean-Paul Sartre's *L'être et le néant*. It may be found unabridged and translated by Hazel E. Barnes in Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existential Psychoanalysis* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953).
Ibid., p. 993. As noted, this line is a quotation from Pío Baroja's preface to Azorín's play, Au fuertac del amor, text of which is included in our footnote No. 28, page 72. Azorín did not write La voluntad originally for publication (see: Cruz Rueda, Op. cit., I, p. lii) and this leads one to wonder, in view of the direct reference to Baroja's description of him, if perhaps Baroja's article was not the immediate impetus for the composition of La voluntad.

See our footnote No. 28, page 72.


Ibid., p. 86.


"...Todo está aún en silencio. La calle reposa. Y de pronto suena una campana dulce y aguda: el el umbral de una puerta aparece una vieja vestida de negro, con una silla en la mano. El cielo está azul; en lo hondo, las palmeras del huerto destacan sus ramas penduladas; detrás aparecen los senos redondos de la colina yerma ...

La ciudad ha despertado. Tintinea a lo lejos una herrería, y unos muchachos se han sentado en una esquina y tiran contra la pared, jugando, unas monedas.

El sol reverbera en las blancas fachadas; se abre un balcón con estrépito de cristales. Y luego, una moza se asoma y sacude contra la pared una escoba metida en un pequeño saco. Cuatro o seis palomas blancas cruzan volando lentamente ... Y en el horno cercano comienza el rumor de comadres, que entran y salen con sus tableros en la cabeza. Se percibe un grato olor a sabina y romero quemados ... Y una campana tane, a lo lejos, con lentas, solemnes vibraciones.

103
Ibid., pp. 1029-1030. This treatment of the caserón oscuro could also be considered an allegory of Spain as it was seen by the Generation writers. For a discussion of this type of material see Katherine P. Reding, "The Generation of '98 as seen through its fictional hero," Smith College Studies in Modern Languages, XVII, 3-4 (April-July, 1936), 1-125.

104
Ibid., p. 1031.

105
Ibid., p. 1047.

106
Ibid., p. 1025.

107
Ibid., p. 1026.

108
Ibid., pp. 1035-1037.

109
Ibid., pp. 1037-1038.

110
Ibid., pp. 1041-1042.

111
Ibid., p. 1059.

112
Ibid., p. 1066.

113
Ibid., p. 1077.

114
Ibid., p. 1067.

115
Ibid.

116
Ibid., p. 1081.

117
Ibid., p. 1080.

118
Ibid., p. 1068.
This results in a demand for solitude. Ortega y Gasset has very graphically described the result of Azorín's cultivation of solitude: "...no consiste ya simplemente en que se halle sin nadie al lado, sino que se ha convertido en una realidad, en un cuerpo transparente y sólido, en un caparazón cristalino que llevase en torno de su persona. Cuando alguien le habla se sorprende e inquieta como si de súbito le hubieran quebrado la vidriera de soledad circundante, o mejor, como si viviendo en una dimensión inusitada, sintiese que de pronto algún ser de nuestro mundo habitual se filtrara mágicamente en el suyo exclusivo. Ello es que nuestro Azorín emerge ante el interlocutor asombrado y trémulo como el pez estraiado de su 'acuarium.' La persona de este admirable y perdurable escritor ... va tomando un exquisito aspecto de ausencia y lejanía, de espectral inexistencia." José Ortega y Gasset, "Artículos (1924): Diálogo sobre el arte nuevo," Obras completas, III, p. 265.


Ibid., p. 90.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 91-92.

CHAPTER II
BAROJA

According to Luis Granjel, no violent emotional outburst marked the crisis in Pío Baroja's life. In fact, the most marked incident related to a crisis was in 1902 when Baroja made a change of residence in Madrid. At that time Baroja moved from No. 2 Misericordia Street to No. 34 Mendizábal Street.

A change of residence was not a new experience for Baroja. His father was a mining engineer and in Baroja's childhood the family moved frequently due to the demands of his father's profession. He was born in San Sebastián and the family moved to Madrid when he was seven. Two years later they moved to Pamplona. Baroja's memories of the five years spent in Pamplona were happy ones. There is a Huckleberry Fin-Tom Sawyer quality to them as he recalls:

Entre nosotros de chicos, se desarrollaba una brutalidad y una violencia bárbaras. Ahora, al pensar en ello, me sorprende. Quizá no tiene esto nada de raro ... Se hacían mil brutalidades: se rompían los faroles de las calles, se apedreaba a los chicos de las otras cuadrillas o del seminario, se tiraba piedras al palacio del obispo ... Al entrar en el Instituto nuestra preocupación era ser calaveras y atrevidos. Ibas a una churrería negra y lleno de humo de la calle de la Curia, bebíamos aguardiente matarratas, fumábamos, jugábamos los cuatro en los cafés y nos mostrábamos lo más fanfarrones posible. Debíamos de parecer todos crias de don Félix de Montemar, el Estudiante de Salamanca, de Espronceda. Había leído por entonces este poema ... Hice también fantásticas excursiones por el tejado de casa y por el de las casas de alrededores ... Una de las impresiones para mí de las más grandes fue el saber que un condiscípulo mío, al parecer voluntariamente, se había tirado de la muralla ... Vi también pasar por delante de mi casa ... a un reo de muerte, a quien llevaba a ejecutar en la Buelta del Castillo ... por la tarde, lleno de curiosidad,
sabiendo que el agarrotado estaba todavía en el patíbulo
fui sólo a verle y estuve cerca contemplándolo. Al volver
a casa no pude dormir, con la impresión, y el recuerdo me
duró mucho tiempo. 2

During these years Baroja and his brother Ricardo stumbled on
DeFoe's Robinson Crusoe and the novels of Jules Verne.

Sonábamos con islas desiertas,... Ricardo dibujaba y
dibujaba planos y croquis de las casas que construiríamos
en los países lejanos y salvajes.
Las dos variantes del sueno eran la casa entre la nieve,
con las aventuras subsiguientes de ataques nocturnos de
osos, lobos, etc., y el viaje por mar.
Mucho tiempo me resistí a creer que tendría que vivir
como todo el mundo; al último, no hubo más remedio que
transigir. 3

When he was in his final year of study for the bachillerato
Baroja's family again returned to Madrid. Baroja speaks of the
effect of this change of residence on him:

Al cambiar de sitio donde se vive, sobre todo en la
infancia, se cambia también de amigos. Todo ello, con los
años, va empujando al aislamiento y se tiende a sentirse
entre la gente un solitario... 4

Also, Baroja was fourteen years old and was going through the
normal adolescent changes. Thus, this change of residence, combined
with the psychological and physiological changes which were occurring,
caused him to feel insecure.

Uno de los fenómenos muy corrientes en el joven no
atrevido y poco sociable, al menos en mí se dio, fue el
quedar achicado con la fama de torpe y de no inteligente.
La mala fama inicial le sigue al chico como la sombra. Esto
pasa con frecuencia al que va a una tertulia y no sabe decir
una palabra a tiempo, o, si la dice, es una inoportunidad.
La pobre opinión dejada por primera vez le encoge el
espíritu y luego no sabe borrar la impresión producida en
los demás y conquistar un nuevo terreno. Es necesario
cambiar de ambiente para sentirse un poco ágil. 5

In regard to his awakening sexual drive, Granjel says that what
saved him was,

...un oscuro impulso ético siempre evidente en su vida;
también ayuda a conseguirlo su facilidad para idealizar sus sensaciones... Huye de la realidad para refugiarse en los reinos de la fantasía; sus lecturas —el Werther; los folletinescas franceses— facilitan la sublimación.  

Baroja speaks of his adolescent years to say that puberty is not a happy age but a time of turbulence and temptation. 

La ansiedad erótica nunca hubiera sido tan grande si la imaginación hubiera estado ocupada en algo intenso y fuerte en que pensar y realizar. Esto faltaba más que nada. La juventud se mueve como un péndulo entre la ansiedad y el fastidio, y el fastidio es consecuencia casi siempre de la inacción.  

After much indecision and for no particular reason, Baroja decided to study medicine. He comments about this event, "... me lanzé a estudiar una carrera como quien toma una pócima amarga." As one would expect, Baroja was not a good student. His nascent literary aspirations were one reason, but his curiosity about life around him is what primarily led him to find many things to do other than to attend classes. For the first time he became aware of social and political matters. He first read about the French revolution and immediately became a Republican. Somehow he wandered into an Anarchist meeting and "... se dejó captar fácilmente por la palabrería entre mística, retórica y sentimental del anarquismo teorizante de la época..." In school, physiology was the one subject which attracted him greatly until he realized that the subject, as it was being taught to him, had neither a metaphysical nor empirical basis in reality. However, the study of general pathology, ... tan denostada por él, tuvo la virtud... de despertar en su espíritu el interés por la especulación metafísica... las lecturas... le empujaron a leer... a Kant, a Fichte y a Schopenhauer; fue este último, el más asequible, desde luego, a una mente no educada para tales lecturas, quien más profundamente influyó en su espíritu, dando prestancia ideológica a su pesimismo, nutrido hasta entonces por sus propias inclinaciones temperamentales.
Baroja says of himself at this time, "Al anarquismo crítico, al pesimismo y un poco al budismo unía una marcada tendencia a la vagabundez."

One of Baroja's experiences with practical medicine was in a clinic for the treatment of women suffering from syphilis and skin diseases. It proved to be a disturbing and repulsive experience, and falling as it did in conjunction with the reading he was doing, the result was "El mundo me parecía una mezcla de manicomio y de hospital."

In both June and September of 1891 he received a doble suspenso in general pathology. As a result, he joined his family, now in Valencia, and studied there to take his examinations again. He took them in January and he failed. Baroja thought seriously about giving up medicine as a career at this point.

Había perdido la poca afición que tenía por ella. Como no conocía a nadie, no salía de casa, ni iba a ninguna parte; me pasaba los días tendido en el terrado y leyendo.

Years later in his speech given on his reception into the Spanish Academy, Baroja speaks of the effects of this inaction on a youth:

La inacción es algo terrible para el joven. En la vejez, el no tener ocupaciones es a veces agradable... pero cuando las fuerzas del organismo y del espíritu están en tensión al pensar: Nada tengo que hacer. No hay obra en que pueda colaborar, es algo desesperante. El comprender tal imposibilidad conduce al vivir con avidez en la vida refleja de la literatura...

Yo tenía en la juventud cierta rebeldía; pero era más bien una rebeldía forzada que otra cosa. No he pensado espontáneamente en ser rebelde por gusto. La rebeldía no me ha agradado nunca, me ha parecido vanidad y presunción. Soy más partidario de la disciplina; pero cuando la extravaganza y el capricho reinan, la rebeldía salta sin querer. Someterse a una disciplina lógica y cumplirla estrictamente... me parece admirable, una prueba de superioridad humana.
Finally Baroja realized that to start pursuing another career would require additional years of preparation and he decided to study seriously and methodically for the first time. As a result, within two years he had finished his thesis, a study of El dolor. He had his license to practice, and he secured a position as doctor in Cestona.

Baroja's stay in Cestona was marked by a total failure in the realm of personal relations. He did not get along with the small town bourgeoisie due to his social preference for los tipos curiosos. He and the other local member of the medical profession, an old surgeon from the Carlist army, had words. His attempts at romantic involvements came to nothing. So after a year he gave up his medical practice. A number of factors influenced this decision: the intellectual isolation of the place weighed heavily on him; he was tired of "riding horseback in the snow and rain, visiting distant old houses," and he felt that he lacked sufficient scientific knowledge and training to adequately carry out the grave responsibilities of a rural general practitioner.

He returned to Madrid to take over the business of running a bakery which belonged to his aunt. Both he and his brother Ricardo lived in this bakery on Misericordia Street and devoted themselves to becoming financially independent. Speaking of his venture as a small businessman Baroja says:

_Cogí ena época bastante mala. Era al final de la guerra de Cuba, y la vida de la industria y del comercio en Madrid estaba decaída. Para mi empresa me faltaba capital y no lo pude encontrar, por más ensayos que hice. Iba, venía, hablaba a uno y a otro. La verdad es que no encontré más que usureros. En aquella época los trabajadores madrileños comenzaron en todas las industrias a asociarse y a considerar como enemigo suyo al patrón ..._
Las dificultades de la industria eran muy grandes; a veces se presentaban, como dándose cita, varios cobradores con sus facturas en mi despacho, había que torearlos y hasta escaparse por una ventana, si era necesario.

La vida de pequeño industrial fue para mí una experiencia enérgica. Tuve que acudir a la Bolsa, y a los Bancos, convivir con gente misera y luchar con autoridades, policías y obreros. 17

During the time that he was running the bakery Baroja made friends with some young writers and newspapermen. These Madrid bohemians are discussed by him,

Estábamos bastante desarmados para recoger las impurezas de la calle. Fuimos vacunados con todos los virus infecciosos que corrían por el mundo, y tuvimos una segunda juventud tardía ... Yo me sentía un buen caldo microbiano; pero aceptaba las infecciones alegremente.

No todos pudieron hacerlo. Entre los compañeros, muchos tomaron su situación en trágico. A la pereza, al alcoholismo, a la maledicencia, al rencor y a la inutilidad para vivir ordenadamente, se unió en ellos el misticismo por el arte y la rebeldía cósmica que venía en el aire con la tendencia anarquista. Se destacaron tipos desastrosos, algunos de estos acabaron mal, muertos en plena juventud por la tuberculosis. Yo resistí porque no tomé muy en serio la bohemia. Me parecía también decoración y aparato escénico.

Cierto, llevaba una vida un tanto irregular; me acostaba tarde, me levantaba tarde, pasaba horas en el café, desambulaba por las calles, llegaba a casa a las altas horas de la noche; pero no me dejaba arrastrar por la resaca decadente...

A veces cuando volvía a casa, sentía como un fondo de amargura y de remordimiento ... ¿Arrepentido de qué? ... es que el que tiene la constitución de carácter moralista busca motivos de arrepentimiento, como el melancólico busca motivos de tristeza. 18

The bakery business didn’t get any better. If Baroja could have left it he would have, with pleasure.

En tiempos así, en que el fracaso se cierne, el hombre inadaptado tiende a replegarse sobre sí mismo y a separarse de los demás en ideas prácticas y teóricas. El éxito y el fracaso son como dos polos: el positivo y el negativo de la vida social. El horizonte es muy distinto contemplado desde uno o desde otro. El no ser como los demás, la divergencia, toma proporciones de gloria para el hombre del fracaso. Se siente un gran placer en hacer tabla rasa de todo, en sentirse raudosamente libertario. ...
El contraste, la contemplación de la existencia áspera y desnuda, tiende a una visión esqueletica de la vida. Se intenta sorprender en los demás y en sí mismo el hueso y las vísceras más que la piel, y se hace uno sin querer operador de rayos X...

La preocupación mía era escapar a las condiciones corrientes y vulgares de la vida.

Poder vivir sin someterse a la pragmática general es cosa difícil. Yo quería prestarme a una sumisión de fórmula y no pasar de ahí; pero cuando se quiere conseguir algo hay que prestarse a una sumisión profunda. Se está en la fila esperando a entrar en el teatro por la puerta grande, pensaba, y resulta que por otra puerta se ha ido colando gente avisada, y cuando se asoma la cabeza por el patio de butacas ya se encuentra todo ocupado.

¿Por dónde han ido entrando? No se comprende siempre la fuerza que tiene la atención constante y la sumisión verdadera.

Lo que yo pretendía era vivir con intensidad algún tiempo, no pasar momentos mediocres unos tras otros.

¿Pero cómo lograr esta tensión cuando no existía en el ambiente? 19

Baroja's desire for intensity in life was momentarily fulfilled from an unexpected source — the bakery business.

Hacia el año 1902, la crisis de nuestro pequeño negocio fue mayor, porque el amo de la casa nos comunicó que iba a derribarla.

Aqui vinieron nuestros apuros. Había que trasladarse a otro sitio, hacer obras; era indispensable algún dinero y no teníamos apenas nada. En este callejón sin salida, nos lanzamos de nuevo a especular a la Bolsa, y la Bolsa fue sosteniéndonos hasta que nos puso a flote...20

With the money that they made they built a new bakery at No. 34 Mendizábal Street. Baroja and his family moved to the floors above the bakery. The running of the bakery was turned over to a business manager and from this time forward Baroja devoted himself exclusively to writing.

Había sido médico de pueblo, industrial, bolsicista y aficionado a la literatura. Había conocido bastante gente. El ir a América no me seducía. Llegar a tener dinero a los cincuenta años no valía la pena para mí.

Quería ensayar la literatura.

Ya comprendía que ensayar la literatura daría poco resultado pecuniario, pero mientras tanto podía vivir pobremente, pero con ilusión.

Y me decidí a ello. 21
The preceding paragraph is a statement of Baroja's choice to live an authentic existence. This decision was based on his realization that the life which he had led to that point had been, in a certain sense, nothing, but that his proposed life as a writer, although truly nothing at this point, could be everything for him. Baroja realized that he was nothing but his possibilities, that he was a being who must make himself in his absence. His immediate life had been, in Thoreau's words, one of "quiet desperation," and it was from this position that his spontaneity took its stand against nothingness. His decision to write was the result.

Oddly, however, this expression of his need for the aesthetic experience (ilusión) is written in terms of a frank admission of defeat in his existential attempt to achieve fulfillment by practical means alone. And in spite of his rapid success as a writer this is a point of view which Baroja never lost. He does express esteem for his chosen profession on occasion, but there is frequently a defensive tone to these remarks, and scattered through his writings are observations, such as "El arte es un mullido lecho para los que nos sentimos vagos de profesión," which indicate that he conceived of writing as a second-class endeavor. César Barja has touched on this fact in pointing out the disparity between Baroja the man and Baroja the author. He notes that although his novels are full of men of action, Baroja himself was not this type of man. According to Barja, he was an intellectual who admired the life of the man of action as a permanently unachievable ideal. Baroja would have liked to be a man of action, but it appears that "...en vez de escribir Baroja ... la novela vivida, tenga que contentarse con vivir la novela escrita." This
statement seems to imply that the aesthetic experience served as a means of wish-fulfillment for Baroja, a method of compromise and adjustment with the facts of his existence. Indeed, Baroja's own remarks indicate that this was his own point of view at times. It is a plausible explanation and one which holds good for much of Baroja's writing, the Memorias de un hombre de acción series, for example; but it in no way explains why Baroja wrote his novels of fracasados and héroes fracasados wherein he concentrates with such intensity on the misery of human existence.

Perhaps the difficulty can be surmounted by realizing that "imagination" is a word with a proper meaning and with an improper one, commonly referred to as "make-believe." As R. G. Collingwood points out, there is always a distinction between "make-believe" and that which is called "real." The motive behind make-believe is the desire for the possession of something which we would enjoy if it were true. There is a selective mechanism at work in make-believe which chooses what is desired and represses what is unpleasant. Make-believe, hence, presupposes imagination, but in the act of making-believe, imagination operates under the censorship of desire. Make-believe, therefore involves a kind of lying -- salutary perhaps but still lying. Imagination proper, on the other hand, is indifferent not only to the distinction between the real and the unreal, but also to the distinction between choice and diversion. Baroja's novels of the héroes fracasado are works of imagination proper. According to Collingwood, the imaginative and the expressive are the two functions characteristic of art proper. There is a question of truth at issue here, for art is not indifferent to truth; it is in pursuit of it. The work of art
which an artist creates at a certain time he creates because he must. The imaginative construction is created to express an emotion arising within him at that unique point in his life. Hence:

If what an artist says on a given occasion is the only thing which on that occasion he can say; and if the generative act which produces that utterance is an act of consciousness, and hence an act of thought; it follows that this utterance, is far from being indifferent to the distinction between truth and falsehood, is necessarily an attempt to state the truth. In so far as the utterance is a good work of art, it is a true utterance; its artistic merit and its truth are the same thing. 25

Baroja confirmed his agreement with these ideas when he said in defending himself from the accusation of contradiction (knowing full well that the truth of art is the truth of individual fact at a given time and not the truth of intellectual relation):

"También me han acusado varias veces de versátil y de apóstata. ¿Apóstata de qué? Yo únicamente he pretendido ser fiel a la sinceridad espiritual y a lo que me parece lo verdadero, y sigo siéndolo. 26

A. B. Fallico's book *Art and Existentialism* suggests the possibility of an interpretation of Baroja's attitude which deserves thought. Following Benedetto Croce's lead, Fallico examines the nature of the art object as a work of execution. He says that it is a radical misconception to believe that the artist, working from an idea, manipulates his materials to produce a planned object. The work of art and its elements, he insists, cannot be predicted because they arise in the act of their execution.

The relation [of the elements of the art object to the artist] is one of conquest, of resolution of the inert and voiceless into the articulated word of the subject. It is at this base-level of the art elements that we first encounter our own seemingly miraculous capacity as existing beings to overcome, to transcend the brute "given" world and, as spontaneous or free agents, transform it into our own kind of substance and into our life-world. ...It is being
which is encountered ... and the transformation of the brute "given" in sensation into the aesthetic elements marks the point where art and life meet and are the same thing. 27

The existential experience and the aesthetic experience are thus fundamentally alike: a nothingness with a thrust of spontaneity at its center. But from a common source they go in divergent directions because art, for practical purposes is autonomous, whereas the spontaneity of life has to deal with the imposed project of being in the world with other people and things which automatically thereby limit freedom.

But if the creative act is evidence of a certain power, it also attests to a lack of being because it is a manner of being which needs to dream reality. Fallico terms this fact the "pathetic" in art, "pathetic" stemming etymologically from the Greek pathos, meaning suffering. The strangeness of this term as we originally encounter it, Fallico says, is due to the fact that art has traditionally come to be associated with the beautiful. This, he maintains, has always been a pervasive error in aesthetics. He offers as proof the many works of art which have nothing of the pleasant or desirable in them like Michelangelo's Pietà and Picasso's Guernica. He is not implying that the aesthetic is concerned with the unpleasant, either; his position is that the aesthetic is "utterly indifferent to such categories."28

Fallico maintains that the element of pathos is exhibited in existential reality by the fact that "it is something necessarily to-be-acted-in-and-upon,"29 and that the effort to change the unreal to reality at the practical level is evidence of strength. On the
other hand, pathos is shown in the aesthetic presence "by the fact that it comes, in its very being, as something which in no sense elicits or refers to action or to practical concerns." This is not to say that the aesthetic experience is an escape because it always moves within action and existence, but not toward or from it. But this necessity to have to make the real out of the unreal or vice versa in the aesthetic dimension is witness of the pathos in art and indicative of a radical disillusion with respect to all possible outcomes in the life of action and thought. The above would seem to have been Baroja's feeling regarding his change from an inauthentic to an authentic existence. Baroja made his decision to write in a condition of despair, that is, he decided to limit himself to a reliance upon what was within his will, or within the sum of probability which rendered his action feasible. This means to act without hope. Nevertheless, Baroja did act, and successfully. But in spite of the results he seems to hold himself accountable, not for what he chose to accomplish, but for what he did not choose to do. Behind this judgement there appears to lie an image of himself as he thought he ought to have been and was not. It is as though he were incapable of judging his own life in any but a negative fashion, that is, defining himself in terms of his unfulfilled possibilities, expectations, hopes and dreams. Contributing to this feeling is undoubtedly the fact that the aesthetic experience is disengaged. It returns to free reality-making for its own sake, not to create a substitute but a parallel reality.

If, with respect to absolute being, the practical and theoretical realities remain forever unfinished, aesthetic reality, although finished, is prematurely so. In this,
too, resides its pathos. In his tragedy, man is a being who must dream his answer to the question: Does being have any meaning? Prematurely, he answers either Yes, No or Maybe, indifferently. The prematureness is evidenced by the splendid indifference of the answer. Only a god, which man clearly is not, could create reality so indifferently. In its startling arrogation, all art is pathetic.  

Pathos remained Baroja's prime trait. This is what John Dos Passos has reference to when in contrasting Baroja's characters with the rogues of the picaresque novel he speaks of

... The corrosive of pity, which had attacked the steel girders of our civilization even before the work of building was completed, has brought about what Gilbert Murray in speaking of Greek thought calls the failure of nerve. In the seventeenth century men still had the courage of their egoism. The world was a bad job to be made the best of ... By the end of the nineteenth century ... humanitarianism had instilled an abnormal sensitiveness to pain -- to one's own pain, and to the pain of one's neighbors.  

It is this lack of egoism, this failure of nerve, the result of Baroja's suffering, which prevented him from recognizing the strength of his accomplishment in living without appeal. And as a result we find that Baroja, with 106 volumes of work in the areas of the novel, the essay, the short story, poetry, drama and autobiography to his credit, refers to himself as an abúlico and as a person who "... sospechaba fallar en situaciones en que se necesita un ánimo constante y persistente."  

The distinct difference between the ability people have to be conscious of something and to know something would seem to apply to Baroja in a number of instances, as we have seen. This difference also holds good for his novels of the fracasado and héroe fracasado. These novels are an expression of the emotions arising from his sense of the pathos of existence. It comes as no surprise to find that they contain existentialist material, for these are Baroja's venture
into the Bildungsroman genre. It also comes as no surprise to find that Baroja himself rejected existential philosophy as he understood it. But as Carmen Iglesias points out, he, like everyone else, was influenced by the climate of opinion of his times and "Baroja ... es existentialista por cuanto siente profundamente la angustia y el dolor humanos, cuya finalidad no comprende." Her excellent work, *El Pensamiento de Pío Baroja: Ideas centrales*, also shows that Baroja was not a systematic student of the various schools of philosophy. He was only interested in the direction which philosophy might be able to give to his life. This is an existentialistic point of view, and Baroja was also in agreement with the existentialists in believing that man's own subjectivity is the starting-point of all truth for him. He is likewise in accord with the existential view that it is the individual who is the subject and supporter of morality, and not society. Baroja was an agnostic who subscribed an *à priori* existence to the values of morality. It is on this question of morality that Baroja objected to existential philosophy. In the *Memorias* he tells of a discussion which he had with a proponent of this philosophy:

Puede ser también que el idealismo antiguo tuviera un prurito de rebajar, de desdén de lo vital y un deseo de reducirlo todo a ideas y conceptos, y que la filosofía existencial, si existe, luche, por lo contrario, por afirmar la importancia de la vida.

---El estudiar los hechos sin ideas anteriores, lo que se llama, al parecer, fenomenología, ¿dejaría una posibilidad de moral? --- le pregunto yo.

---Sí; dejaría una ética de cada caso --- contesta Fondane.

---Yo creo --- replico --- que una ética de cada caso no es una ética; ésta es general, o si no, no es nada. An existentialist answer to this problem is given by Sartre:

The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it extremely
embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any food à priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it.

... we are now on the plane where there are only men. Dostoievsky once wrote, "If God did not exist, everything would be permitted"; and that, for existentialism, is the starting point. Everything is indeed permitted ... and man ... discovers forthwith, that he is without excuse. That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does. 42

It is on this point of responsibility that Baroja is suspicious of existentialism:

Hay quien cree que esta filosofía existencial puede servir de legitimación y de tapadera a todas las tendencias egoístas y malvadas del hombre, ya sean individuales o colectivas.

Por la necesidad de lo existencial se puede defender el egoísmo propio, el sacrificio de los demás, y colectivamente, el despotismo y la conquista del espacio vital. 43

Sartre answers this objection by saying that it means,

... at bottom, "your values are not serious, since you choose them yourselves." To that I can only say that I am very sorry that it should be so; but if I have excluded God the father, there must be somebody to invent values. We have to take things as they are. And moreover, to say that we invent values means neither more or less than this: that there is no sense in life à priori. Life is nothing until is is lived; but it is yours to make sense of, and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose. Therefore, you can see that there is a possibility of creating a human community. 44

But leaving differences in ideas as to the nature of morality aside, it is our contention that in so far as Baroja solves the practical problem of "What shall we do with our lives?" he solves it with existential answers. Maurice Friedman makes the point which is well taken here:

"Existentialism" is not a philosophy but a mood embracing a number of disparate philosophies. The differences among them are more basic than the temper which unites them.
temper can best be described as a reaction against the static, the abstract, the purely rational, the merely irrational, in favor of the dynamic and concrete, personal involvement and "engagement," action, choice and commitment, the distinction between "authentic" and "inauthentic" existence, and the actual situation of the existential subject as the starting point of thought. 45

The temper described above could have been written with Baroja in mind.

The salient fact which distinguishes the héroe fracasado from the fracasado is, as we have seen, his authentic existence as distinct from the latter's inauthentic existence. These are two of the realms of Being: being-there and being-oneself. The third realm is being-in-itself. The given external world to which the person belongs as an original self rooted in a body and temperament and disposition and occupying a concrete situation in history is the realm of being-there, the level of the fracasado. A knowledge of this given external world composed of objects is assumed by people at the level of being-there to be the whole ambition of human thought. But at the point where reason is not satisfied with clarity and aims at unity and totality in knowledge, objectivity falls short. At this point philosophy begins not with what a person knows but with what he is. He turns from the public external world to the private internal world revealed by his consciousness of himself. He finds there liberty and choice. He is a person who must take up a position and become something willed in relation to a definite situation. This is not an act done once and for all but an act which has to be sustained by being perpetually renewed. This is the realm of being-oneself, the level of the héroe fracasado. In assuming this level the person also assumes his original self at the level of being-there,
not in a spirit of resignation, but as the basic conditions and resistances which maintain him in his flight in liberty. In metaphorical language, being-there is the plane; being-one-self is the engine composed of will and skill on which it runs. The flight is to being-in-itself. This flight can never be completely successful, for to accept one's historicity is to encounter limits which cannot be got over, around or under. Death, suffering, conflict and fault, inescapable in the human condition, define the permanent impossibility of man fully realizing himself in the world. They bring the realization of the necessary disillusion and despair on the further side of which is the possibility of transcendence. When man passes from being-there to being-one-self he has already transcended himself. But the condition being-one-self is projective in nature, that is, man has chosen to be or to have something which he has yet to realize, but which he must continue to struggle toward, for the only alternative to not being-one-self is a return to the level of being-there. Therefore, the goal of being-one-self is yet another level of transcendence, being-in-itself. But as Sartre points out,

Thus we are faced with symbolic structures of great complexity which have at least three levels ... the desire of being [being-in-itself], in its abstract purity, is the truth of the fundamental concrete desire, but does not exist in a real sense ... We have reached here an abstract structure which cannot at all be considered as the nature or essence of liberty, for liberty is existence and its existence precedes its essence; liberty is an emergence that is immediately concrete and is not distinguished from its choice, that is to say from the person. But the structure under consideration may be called the truth of liberty, that is to say that it is the human meaning of liberty. 46

The realm of being-in-itself considered as an abstract concept is of fundamental importance in understanding Baroja, and we will go
into this matter in its proper place. But in the main Baroja is concerned with the liberty of his characters, with what Blackham calls "the manoeuvre of existing individuals whose being is ambiguous (both bound and free, separated and joined) in a total existence which is ambiguous (finite and infinite) end and means, a plenitude and nothing)."

This material appears as early as Baroja's first novel, *La casa de Aizgorri*. Although it is most sketchily treated here, the heroine through an effort of will on her part, overcomes the deterministic predictions made for members of her family on the basis of their heredity.

The second novel of this trilogy, *El mayorazgo de Labraz*, also develops the material. The character of Bothwell, the English painter, who has settled in Labraz because he finds life there aesthetically rewarding is an example of existential choice. Bothwell is not a good painter and he knows it, but he likes to paint and this makes the difference as far as he is concerned. Although he applauds young Bengoa on his ideals of "progress," he does not agree with them because he sees mediocrity and conformity as the result of progress in that it will bring about the extinction of outstanding men, men capable of making and defending an existential choice.

Bothwell has made his choice to live the life of an aesthete. He expresses his philosophy as "Viva la bagatela!" and this is what he is interested in and what he is responsible for. The trip which he...
has decided to make and not the final destination is Bothwell's area of concern.

Don Ramiro, the Mayorazgo's adopted brother, presents the fracasado. He will assume no responsibility for his acts whatsoever.

"--Cuando me piden cuenta de mis actos -- añadió don Ramiro -- no me arrepiento, me asombro. Mis deseos son mis duenos, Creo en el sino que no se puede uno sustraer a su influencia. ... Si yo me hubiera hecho a mi mismo ..., y, además, al mundo que me rodea ..., entonces ¿quien sabe?, quizá tuviera remordimientos. Pero yo no me he hecho a mi mismo." 51

This refusal to take responsibility for himself leads Don Ramiro to be totally dominated by Micaela to the extent of a near murder and the theft of the Virgin's jewelled crown and ornaments to secure money for fleeing together to Madrid.

This act precipitates the crisis for the Mayorazgo, Don Juan. Don Juan is blind. As a result, he explains, "He vivido aislado ..., yo, sin que nadie me quisiera, me he helado en este mundo glacial." 52

The human companionship of his family and the townspeople is very important to him. When he is betrayed by his brother and Micaela he retreats into a dream world, interested only in being with Rosarito, the child abandoned by Micaela in her flight. The town officials, sensing the advantage to be gained from Don Juan's disturbed state, convince him that he is morally responsible to make restitution for the theft and he mortgages his lands to fulfill their expectations. The local doctor warns him against continuing to let himself be taken advantage of: "Tienes la fortaleza de un santo o de un estoico; yo lo que te pido es que seas hombre ..., sin la voluntad la vida es una sombra..." 53 Don Juan does not listen and his family soon reaches the point of not even having food left. Rosarito gets sick and the innkeeper's daughter, Marina, comes to nurse her out of affection and
Pity for the child. After the child dies Don Juan learns that the townspeople have been making Marina's presence in his house a source for licentious gossip. This uncalled for display of man's inhumanity to man arouses Don Juan to a state of fury, and in a rage of revenge and rejection he sets fire to the harvest and flees to the mountains. In the spring he secretly returns to see Marina. She asks him what he has done all alone through the winter in the mountains.

--He vivido -- contestó el Mayorazgo.
--¿Nada más?
--¿Te parece poco? Además he reconstruido mi vida; tengo un plan ... 54

The two leave together for the shores of the Mediterranean where Don Juan still owns a small house and garden, hoping for a better life under the blue skies. En route they meet a tramp. The tramp praises the values of freedom and adventure to be found in the life of the open road and the Mayorazgo says:

-- Me admira el oírte.
-- ¡Claro! Has vivido lleno de preocupaciones, entre gente supersticiosa. Eres esclavo de la sociedad.
-- Es cierto.
-- Yo, no; por no sujetarme ...
-- También tú veo que eres esclavo, esclavo de tu libertad --murmuró el Mayorazgo.
-- Es posible -- repuso el vagabundo.
-- Es seguro. 55

This exchange highlights Baroja's preoccupation with the question of being bound and being free. It is a central issue which appears again in Zalacaín el aventurero. Zalacaín brings out the vitalistic streak often noted in Baroja. He is a picture of a self-made man, fortunate in temperament and doubly fortunate in the times in which he lived. It was only necessary for him to flow with the stream of his surroundings to achieve not only success but a sense of fulfillment. Zalacaín has known the freedom of self-deter-
mination since his earliest childhood; for this reason he may be termed a héroe in contrast to the héroe fracasado who has to achieve his self-determination in his maturity. The fulcrum of Zalacain's personality is, in a sense, fullness, whereas in the héroe fracasado it is emptiness. Only when he is married and successful after the war, when "La vida sedentaria le irritaba," does Zalacain even sense the possibility of héroe fracasado problems. In reply to a compliment about his rapid rise to fame and fortune Zalacain says:

---¿Creerá usted que ya yo no tengo casi ambición?
---¿No?
---No. Sin duda, eran los obstáculos los que me daban bríos y fuerza, el ver que todo el mundo se plantaba a mi paso para estorbarme ... Ahora no tengo obstáculo, y ya no sé qué hacer. Voy a tener que intentarme otras ocupaciones y otros quebraderos de cabeza ... --- La verdad es que es usted un hombre pintoresco, amigo Zalacain.
---Pero la mayoría de los hombres son como yo.
---¡Oh, no! La mayoría somos gente tranquila, pacífica, un poco muerta.
---Pues yo estoy vivo, eso sí; pero la misma energía que no puedo emplear se me queda dentro y se me pudre. Sabe usted, yo quisiera que todo viviese, que todo comenzara a marchar, no dejar nada parado, empujar todo al movimiento, hombres, mujeres, negocios, máquinas, minas, nada quieto, nada inmóvil. 57

The conquering of obstacles gives an intensity to life which is of the greatest value to Zalacain. The action itself as the source of this intensity is what Zalacain values and not the results. The idea of "becoming," the projective aspect of being-onceself which is so important in existentialist thinking can clearly be seen here. 58 Carmen Iglesias cites this concept as central in Baroja's thought: "...lo afirmativo en Baroja va asociado a la idea de cambio, de evolución, de devenir," and she points out that Baroja was familiar with the fragments of Heraclitus, the originator of this idea. 59 We
should like to note further that Heraclitus is considered to be one of the forerunners of existentialist thought, principally for the striking existentialist quality of his sayings about the universal flow, the same point which so interested Baroja.

What is perhaps Baroja's most beautiful statement of this concept appears in *Camino de perfección* in his prose poem on the cadaver of the bishop of Segovia. *Camino de perfección* is the story of Fernando Ossorio. He is a young aristocrat, an unsuccessful painter and medical student who becomes involved in a passionate love affair with his cousin. As a result of this sensual involvement Fernando suffers a severe internal conflict because he also has a strong ascetic streak to his character. The pressure of this conflict builds to the point of mental hallucinations and psychosomatic pain. Fernando decides to get out of Madrid as a solution to the problem and he goes on a walking trip through Spain. Since this decision is basically a negative one, that is, he is running from his previous existence but not actively projecting himself into a new existence, it is only partially effective. His internal conflict between sensual and ascetic inclinations continues with first one side and then the other asserting itself in situations in which he becomes involved. He persists in a minute self-analysis to which he has become prone, but thinking does not solve the problem: "...el mundo de afuera no existe; tiene la realidad que yo le quiero dar. Y, sin embargo, ¡qué vida ¡esta más asquerosa!" Fernando makes a positive commitment to being-himself only when he falls in love and married Dolores. This is a decision of which he is conscious but which he does not know in the sense that he does not intellectually comprehend what he has done:
Algunas veces, la misma placidez y tranquilidad de su alma le inducía a analizarse, y al ocurrírselo que el origen de aquella corriente de su vida y amor se perdía en el inconsciencia, pensaba que él era como un surtidor de la Naturaleza que se reflejaba se sí mismo...

A few years later, just after the birth of his son, Fernando renews and reaffirms his choice and his commitment to his authentic existence, his Camino de perfección:

Fernando miraba a su mujer y a su hijo; de cuando en cuando tendía la mirada por aquellas heredades suyas, recién sembradas unas... Recordaba su vida... lentamente la costumbre adquirida de vivir en el campo, el amor a la tierra, la aparición enérgica del deseo de poseer y poco a poco la reintegración vigorosa de todos los instintos, naturales, salvajes.

Y como coronando su fortaleza, el niño aquel sonrosado, fuerte, que dormía en la cuna...

El ya no podía arrojar de su alma por completo aquella tendencia mística por lo desconocido y lo sobrenatural, ni aquel culto y atracción por la belleza de la forma; pero esperaba sentirse fuerte y abandonarlas en su hijo.

Movement in Baroja is always beneficial whether it is the simple action of going from place to place or the more complex existential "manoeuver" of choice, commitment and projection. By this means the actual situation of the existing person as a static fact is transcended and the dynamics of spontaneity and personal involvement are brought to the fore. Las aventuras, inventos y mixtificaciones de Silvestre Paradox is an example of this.

Silvestre Paradox, a forty-four year old unsuccessful inventor and student of las ciencias físicas naturales, lives alone in his garret in Madrid.

Silvestre estaba tan acostumbrado a la soledad, que hablaba solo o a lo menos con el perro, con la avutarda disecada o con la culebrilla. Sus observaciones, aun en la calle, las hacía a media voz...

Silvestre feels himself an outsider in the society to which he belongs.

Silvestre experimentaba por todo lo humilde una gran simpatía; amaba a los niños, a las almas candorosas;
detestaba lo petulante y lo estirado; tenía un gran cariño por los animales. Esas conversaciones de personas serias acerca de la política y de los partidos le exasperaban. Le repugnaba la prensa, la democracia y el socialismo ...

Silvestre reconocía el progreso y la civilización y se entusiasmaba con sus perfeccionamientos materiales, pero no le pasaba lo mismo respecto a la evolución moral; veía en el porvenir el dominio de los fuertes, y la fuerza le parecía, como cualquier jerarquía social, una injusticia de la Naturaleza.

¿Qué van a hacer el débil, el impotente ... en una sociedad complicada como la que se presenta; en una sociedad basada en la lucha por la vida, no una lucha brutal de sangre, pero no por ser intelectual menos terrible? 66

In addition Silvestre has quarreled with his only friend, Don Avelino Diz de la Iglesia, and

Don Avelino tampoco se presentaba en casa; no tenía Paradox con quién consultar sus dudas científicas, y abandonó sus trabajos. Asomado a la ventana, solía mirar, distraído, los paisajes de tejas arriba, las chimeneas, que se destacaban en el cielo gris, echando el humo sin fuerza, débil, anémico, en el aire plomizo de las lúgubres tardes de diciembre. 67

This solitude combines with the feeling of the uselessness of his life, in fact of everything, to bring on the condition of existential nausea.

Al anochecer, sobre todo cuando el cuarto se llenaba de sombras, le acometía a Silvestre una armazón de pensamiento, que subía a su cerebro como una ola, náusea de vivir, náusea de la gente y de las cosas, y se marchaba a la calle, y le disgustaba todo lo que pasaba ante sus ojos, y recorría calles y calles tratando de mitigar lo sombrío de sus pensamientos con la velocidad de la marcha.

--La Humanidad me molesta -- solía decir --; no quiero tratar a la materia viva, ni a la materia pensante; mis simpatías están por lo inerte. Y la inercia iba apoderándose de él. Empezó a no salir de casa y concluyó no saliendo de la cama; todo lo era indiferente: sus trabajos, sus animales disecados, hasta la culebra. Yock [el perro], también triste, le miraba a los ojos con melancolía.

--Siempre las mismas precauciones ... los mismos trabajos, el cansancio eterno de la eterna imbécilidad de vivir. ¿Para qué vivir tanto? Además, una sociedad bien organizada debía tener un matadero de hombres; allá irían los fracasados, las perdidas desesperadas, los vencidos, a que la piedad de los demás les eliminara de un mundo para el cual no tenían condiciones. 68
The gatekeeper realizes Silvestre's condition. He intervenes and talks Silvestre into moving into a nearby boarding house where he will have the company of people. But in the boarding house there is no one interested in science and Silvestre realizes that he needs the friendship of Avelino.

Silvestre makes the necessary diplomatic moves to reestablish the friendship and soon the two are eagerly involved in the idea of constructing a model submarine to be powered by liquid gas. It is the enthusiasm and intensity with which both men take up the project that makes it a different and far more interesting world for them. The submarine actually worked but they could find no one to back the construction of a full-scale model and also they discovered that it had already been invented.

Silvestre is soon forced to give French lessons to supplement his small income from an inheritance which is running out. He invents a diagram which combines the thinking of his favorite philosophers with the discoveries of modern science and gets it published in a magazine. The magazine soon folds, however, because of lack of subscribers. He then gets a job ghost writing installment stories for another magazine. The series is entitled "Los crímenes modernos," and Silvestre becomes acquainted with the Madrid underworld in his search for material. Don Avelino, meanwhile, loses his income also and comes...
to live with Silvestre. Silvestre takes on a job tutoring a young aristocrat but after he gets to know the family he quits because,

Cuando no se tiene más patrimonio que la conciencia ... vale más vivir mendigando por los caminos que no infecionar el alma en una madriguera confortable, en donde todo huele a podrido. 70

He and Don Avelino then invent a new type of mousetrap and construct a quantity of them which they are successful in selling to a Portuguese buyer. They next build a panoramic Christmas crèche which they also succeed in selling. Silvestre hides the money made in these two projects in his room only to have it stolen by a man whom he and Don Avelino have befriended. Unfortunately the latter lets word of this robbery get to their landlady, who believes that they have invented the story to keep from paying her. Silvestre is even forced to sell "la familia ... los bichos disecados,"71 to Dr. Labarata to partially appease her for back rent, which only makes her more sure that they are trying to cheat her. She even locks them in their room until they pay what they owe. On Christmas Eve they make their escape through the skylight and across the roofs, taking Yock with them. Cold, hungry and homeless in the snow on Christmas Eve they dream of going to sunny Valencia, Avelino's home. Avelino suddenly remembers his watch and they pawn it and buy train tickets for Valencia, for the train which leaves in the morning. They wander aimlessly again in the streets until they remember Dr. Labarata and go to his house. There a Christmas party is in progress and they join in the festivities and spend the night sleeping on the floor. In the morning they board the train:

---Oiga usted, ¿y en este pueblo no hay saltos de agua?
---No sé; pero creo que sí. Debe de haberlos.
— ¿Y no hay ninguna fábrica de electricidad?
— No, me parece que no. ¿Por qué lo preguntaba usted?
— Porque podíamos instalarla nosotros.
— Cháquela, Paradox ... Es verdad. Es usted el hombre del siglo.
— Sí, sí. Hay que estudiar eso. Quizás de esta hecha podamos hacernos ricos. No lo dude usted, ¡ricos! Y entonces, ¡que de inventos, amigo Diz!
— ¡Ya lo creo! — y Avelino entusiasmado, sacó la cabeza por la ventanilla y gritó, despreciando el frío y la nieve de fuera:
— ¡Bravo! ¡Bravo!
— ¡Hurra! ¡Hurra! — gritó Silvestre, asomándose a la otra ventanilla del vagón, desafiando con su entusiasmo y con su locura a la Naturaleza, muerta, indiferente y fría, que helaba y agarrababa sus miembros, pero que no podía nada contra su espíritu. 72

This spontaneous outburst of hope is not uncommon in Baroja.

It happens to Don Fausto Bengoa at the end of Las tragedias grotescas when he is attempting to comfort Nanette after the death of her sweetheart.


Nanette, con la cara inundada en lágrimas, hizo un gesto de negación violenta.
— Sí, sí — añadió don Fausto --. Todo se olvida, todo se borra. Ya ves tú, yo soy viejo, mi mujer y mis hijas me han abandonado, y, sin embargo, espero.

Y añadió esta frase, que resumía en aquel momento sus ideas:
— La vida, créelo, Nanette, no acaba nunca ... Siempre se está al principio ... y al fin. 73

Near the end of La ciudad de la niebla Baroja stops the story and steps forth as the author to present a short essay entitled "Renacimiento de la esperanza":

Hay en nosotros un impulso siniestro, que sale a flote en los momentos tempestuosos, de ira o de cólera, de desesperación o de tristeza, que nos arrastra a destruir con saña lo que está fuera o lo que está dentro de nuestro espíritu.

Este impulso, leñador gigante, tiene el brazo de titán y la mano armada de un hacha poderosa. El árbol de la esperanza crece siempre mientras la vida se desarrolla; el terrible leñador tiene obra siempre ...
Las ilusiones vagas, las ilusiones definidas, la rabia por creer y la rabia por dudar, se suceden en nosotros; y cuando ya no hay más que oscuridad y tinieblas en nuestra alma; cuando vemos ... que no hay porvenir para el hombre ni individual ni colectivamente ... Y cuando el horizonte de la vida aparezca desnudo y seco, cuando no quede ni una rama joven ni un retoño nuevo, cuando el terrible leñador haya terminado su obra, entonces la esperanza volverá a brillar como una aurora tras de las negruras de una noche tempestuosa, y sentiremos la vida interior clara y alegre. 74

The world of Silvestre Paradox is further developed to furnish the background for the trilogy, La lucha por la vida, which is perhaps Baroja's most outstanding work.75 John Dos Passos has succinctly described this world of Baroja's as ...

dismal, ironic, the streets of towns where industrial life sits heavy on the neck of a race as little adapted to it as any in Europe. No one has ever described better the shaggy badlands and cabbage-patches round the edges of a city, where the debris of civilization piles up ramshackle suburbs in which starve and scheme all manner of human detritus. Back lots where men and women live fantastically in shelters patched out of rotten boards, of old tin cans and bits of chairs and tables that have stood for years in bright pleasant rooms. Grassly patches behind crumbling walls where on sunny days starving children spread their fleshless limbs and run about in the sun. Miserable wineries where the wind whines through broken panes to chill men with ever-empty stomachs who sit about gambling and finding furious drunkenness in a sip of aguardiente. Courtyards of barracks where painters who have not a cent in the world mix with beggars and gutter-snipes to cajole a little hot food out of soft-hearted soldiers at mess time. Convent doors where ragged lines shiver for hours in the shrill wind that blows across the bare Castilian plain waiting for the nuns to throw out bread for them to fight over like dogs. And through it all moves the great crowd of the outcast, sneak-thieves, burglars, beggars of every description, — rich beggars and poor devils who have given up the struggle to exist, — homeless children, prostitutes, people who live a half-honest existence selling knicknacks, penniless students, inventors who while away the time they are dying of starvation telling all they meet of the riches they might have had; all who have failed on the daily treadmill of bread-making, or who have never had a chance even to enjoy the privilege of industrial slavery. 76

La busca, Mala hierba and Aurora roja, the individual titles of the trilogy, follow the life of two characters, Manuel Alcázar and
Roberto Hastings, in their struggle for survival in these surroundings. Baroja develops the concept of the *fracasado* and the *héroe fracasado* quite distinctly in these works. Manuel is the son of a maid in a Madrid boarding house where Roberto is a boarder. From the beginning Roberto, who is part English, is introduced as a person with a goal. He wants to recover a family fortune which has been lost through legal error. Roberto is very poor, but he teaches in an academy, gives English lessons and writes for a newspaper. He uses what he earns to conduct a search for the missing evidence. Roberto is Baroja's only character who knows the existential "manoeuvre."

He grows fond of Manuel and gives him such advice as:

---Hazme caso, porque es la verdad. Si quieres hacer algo en la vida, no creas en la palabra *im*posible. Nada hay imposible para una voluntad *energica*. Si tratas de disparar una flecha, apunta muy alto, lo más alto que puedas; cuanto más alto apuntes, más lejos irá.

Manuel miró a Roberto con extranéza, y se encogió de hombros. ??

Manuel is not moved by any particular ambition and he is content to drift into whatever job happens along — carpenter's apprentice, baker's assistant, garbage collector's helper — and in between jobs he just wanders around the streets, observing what there is to see.

He and Roberto discuss the situation one day:

---¿Y qué piensas hacer?
---Pues estar a lo que salga.
---¿Y si no sale nada?
---Creo que algo saldrá.
Roberto sonrió burlonamente.
---¡Qué español es eso! Estar a lo que salga. Siempre esperando ... Pero en fin, tú no tienes la culpa. ??

This last remark is merely a temporary peacemaker because Roberto does not approve of Manuel's attitude at all. However he gives him a place to stay in the garret which he shares with a
sculptor for whom Manuel poses. He easily drifts into the sculptor's circle of bohemian friends and Roberto brings him to task for this.

—¿Qué? Ya te he dicho varias veces lo que debes hacer ... buscar, buscar y buscar. Luego, trabajar hasta echar el alma por la boca.
—¡Pero si no tengo en dónde!
—Siempre hay donde trabajar si se quiere. Pero hay que querer. Saber desear con fuerza es lo primero que se debe aprender. Tú me dirás que no deseas más que vegetar de cualquier modo; pues ni eso conseguirás si te reúnes con los que vienen aquí al estudio; además de vago concluirás en sinvergüenza ...
—No, si yo no quiero ser como ellos. Yo ya sé que soy un obrero.
—¡Obrero! ¡Quía! ¡Ojalá que lo fueras. Hoy no eres más que un vago, y debes hacerte obrero. Lo que soy yo, lo que somos todos los que trabajamos. Muévete, activate. Ahora la actividad para ti es un esfuerzo; haz algo; repite lo que hagas, hasta que la actividad para ti sea un costumbre. Convierte tu vida estática en vida dinámica. ¿No me entiendes? Quiero decirte que tengas voluntad.

Manuel contempló a Roberto desanimado. Hablaban los dos en distinto idioma. 79

Manuel continues his haphazard career, working as a clerk in a photographer's shop, acting the part of the "son" in a con game, being an apprentice in a printing shop. He learns this last trade quite well but loses his job eventually because of drunkenness. Unable to find any work, Manuel spends a long period of time living in the world which Dos Passos has so well described. He eventually gets beyond this starvation level by going to work for a gambling syndicate in a minor capacity. Accidentally he is the witness to a murder committed by a former acquaintance of his. The police believe that he was an accomplice, but let him out of jail on the condition that he help them catch the murderer. He doesn't want to do this and gets out of it by threatening the head of the gambling syndicate with revealing information unless the man tells the police, who are in his pay, to release him. The man agrees, and Manuel is bothered by them no longer.
... sentía una sorda irritación contra todo el mundo; un odio, hasta entonces amortiguado, se despertaba en su alma contra la sociedad, contra los hombres ... Y rabioso, invocó a todos los poderes destructores para que redujesen a cenizas esta sociedad miserable. 80

In *Aurora roja* Manuel seems somewhat older. He has come to realize that not to choose to be oneself is still to make a choice. He and his widowed sister live together and Salvadora rooms with them. Manuel has another job in a printing shop and the two girls have opened a small children's clothing shop and give embroidery lessons. The economic situation is therefore fairly stable and they are even able to save some money. Manuel's ambition is to own his own printing shop and to marry Salvadora. When an advertisement appears in the paper offering a modern printing press for sale at a good price he goes to see Roberto about a loan. Roberto has become quite successful. He has won his suit regarding the family fortune and is happily married. He very generously lends Manuel the money and accepts a partnership in the firm.

As the name implies, *Aurora roja* is to a large extent concerned with the early anarchist movement in Spain and as such is outside the scope of this study. Manuel's brother Juan is an activist in the anarchist movement and Manuel attends some of the meetings with him. But his sympathy with the anarchists is largely philosophical, and when his brother becomes involved with the violent faction of the movement and defends his conduct with the theory of the end justifying the means Manuel gives his often-quoted reply:

*Pues te digo que eso es imbécil y es monstruoso. Y si a mí me dijeran que la felicidad de la Humanidad entera se podría conseguir con el lloro de un niño, y eso estuviera*
en mi mano, yo te digo que no le haría llorar a un niño, aunque todos los hombres del mundo se me pusieran de rodillas ...

Roberto asks him one day:

--¿No eres socialista?
--Psch.
--¿Anarquista, quizás?
--Sí; me es más simpática la anarquía que el socialismo.
--Claro! Como es más simpático para un chico hacer novillos que ir a clase. ¿Y cuál es la anarquía que tú defiendes?
--No; yo no defiendo ninguna.
--Haces bien; la anarquía para todos no es nada. Para uno, sí, es la libertad. ¿Y sabes cómo se consigue hacerse libre?
Primero, ganando dinero; luego, pensando. El montón, la masa nunca será nada ...

Then Roberto expresses his philosophy when Manuel asks him:

--Usted también es algo anarquista, ¿verdad?
--Sí; lo he sido a mi manera.

His rebellion started during early school days where he was accused of being lazy when he wanted to understand his lessons and not just learn them by rote. He was quite miserable,

..hasta que comprendí que hay que adaptarse al medio o aparentar conformidad con él. Ahora, por dentro, soy más anarquista que antes.
--¿Y por fuera?
--Por fuera! Si en Inglaterra llego a entrar en política, seré conservador.
--¿De veras?
--Claro! ¿Qué haría yo en Inglaterra siendo anarquista? Vivir oscurecido. No; yo no puedo despreciar ninguna ventaja en la lucha por la vida.
--Pero usted ha resuelto ya su problema ...
--Aún queda algo que conseguir ... El dominio, el poder. Si yo ya no deseara, estaría muerto. En la vida hay que luchar siempre...

Toward the end of _Aurora roja_ Roberto comes to visit Manuel and Salvador. He is preparing to go to England to live and he wants to deed his half of the printing press to Manuel as a gift. There is much talk about politics and philosophy and Roberto makes some noteworthy statements:
... Ahora sí, hay un medio de influir en la Humanidad, y es influir en uno mismo, modificarse a sí mismo, crearse de nuevo. Para eso no se necesitan bombas, ni dinamita, ni pólvoras, ni decretos, ni nada. ¿Quieres destruirlo todo? Destrúyelo dentro de ti mismo. La sociedad no existe, el orden no existe, la autoridad no existe. Obedeces la ley al pie de la letra y te burlas de ella. ¿Quieres más nihilismo? El derecho de uno llega hasta donde llega la fuerza de su brazo. Después de esta poda, vives entre los hombres sin meterte con nadie.

--Sí, pero usted no cree que fuera de uno mismo se puede hacer algo?

--Algo, sí. En mecánica podrás encontrar una máquina nueva; lo que no podrás encontrar será el movimiento continuo; porque es imposible. Y la felicidad de todos los hombres es algo como el movimiento continuo.

--¿Pero no es posible un cambio completo de las ideas y de las pasiones?

--Durante muchos años, sí. ...

--¿Pero usted no cree que con una medida energética podía cambiarse radicalmente la forma de la sociedad?

--No. Es más, creo que no hay actualmente ... ni una reforma tan radical que pueda cambiar las condiciones de la vida moderna en su esencia. Respecto al pensamiento, imposible. Se destruye un prejuicio; nace en seguida otro. No se puede vivir sin ellos.

--¿Por qué no?

--¿Quién va a vivir sin afirmar nada por el temor de engañarse esperando la síntesis última? No es posible. Se necesita alguna mentira para vivir. La república, la anarquía, el socialismo, la religión, el amor ..., cualquier cosa, la cuestión es engañarse. En el terreno de lo hechos no hay tampoco solución ...

--¿Y qué remedio habrá entonces?

--Remedio, ninguno. El remedio está en la misma lucha ...

--¿Y los débiles?

--A los débiles se les llevará a los asilos ...

--Pero eso es cruel ... ¿Y los criminales?

--Exterminarlos.

--Eso es feroz. Usted es muy duro ...

--Creeme! En el fondo no hay más que un remedio y un remedio individual: la acción. ... Ya que nuestra ley es la lucha, aceptémosla, pero no con tristeza, con alegría. La acción es toda, la vida, el placer. Convertir la vida estática en vida dinámica; éste es el problema. La lucha siempre, hasta el último momento, ¿por qué? Por cualquier cosa.

--Pero no todos están a bastante altura para luchar -- dijo Manuel.

--El motivo es lo de menos. El acontecimiento está dentro de uno mismo. La cuestión es poner en juego el fondo de la voluntad, el instinto guerrero que tiene todo hombre.

--Yo no lo siento, la verdad.

--Sí, tus instintos se funden en un sentimiento de piedad
This conversation is shot through with Darwinism, picturing man as the climax of the development of the living organism by an inevitable process from which aspiration, purpose and so forth are totally excluded. This idea clearly foreshadows the existential doctrine of a universe without meaning or purpose. But also throughout this conversation runs the matter of existential choice which restores to man the freedom which Darwinism denies him. Roberto talks in a cruel and inhuman fashion regarding the weak, but his actions toward them, as shown by his generosity to Manuel, are directly contrary to his expressed ideas. Roberto can and has chosen to be more human rather than less.

Manuel, for all the talk about lack of will and sentiments of pity, is as much a héroe fracasado as Roberto. On the level of knowledge he has known what it is to struggle under conditions wherein it becomes no mean accomplishment to make a living and maintain an ethical standard. On the level of consciousness he has done this by means of the existential "manoeuver" of liberty and choice and the commitment to limit himself to relying upon what was within the possibility of his will to accomplish. Manuel worked very hard to achieve the success of his commitment and in so doing he developed an affirmative and hopeful attitude toward life at the end of the book. Baroja's enthusiasm for this type of achievement is commented on by his nephew, Julio Caro Baroja: "Lo rico, lo aparatoso no le atraía. Pero un esfuerzo hecho en medio de la adversidad o de la pobreza era algo que le encantaba."
César Moncada of César o nada and Quintín of La feria de los discretos, on the other hand, are studies of fracasados. In both these books Baroja is concerned primarily with the idea of the man of action. César's action is in the interest of idealism, Quintín's is in the interest of himself. Neither of them are in basic conflict with the world surrounding them in that they adapt nicely to it; César tries to change it through political action and Quintín tries to get rich out of it. Both of them fail finally when their dormant ethical scruples are awakened. This happens to César when he realizes what a nasty business practical politics can be and to Quintín when he realizes that he cannot deceive the woman he loves to win her hand. The question of the interpretation of reality, the possibility of existential freedom and choice does not arise with these two characters.

El árbol de la ciencia is also the study of a fracasado, but Andrés Hurtado, unlike Quintín and César Moncada, is deeply preoccupied with the question of existential freedom. The anguish of this condition is more apparent in this work than in any of Baroja's other Bildungsroman novels. Andrés Hurtado, first as a medical student and then as a practicing physician is vitally concerned with the problem

---¿Qué hacer? ¿Qué dirección daré a la vida? --- se preguntaba con angustia. Y la gente, las cosas, el sol, le parecían sin realidad ante el problema planteado en su cerebro. 86.

In an endeavor to clarify his thinking he has long conversations with his uncle Iturrioz. Their point of view is quite different. Andrés is almost completely intellectually and idealistically oriented, being convinced that the truth which he seeks is to be found in the fields of science and abstract philosophy.
...Pero, bueno, tú, ¿qué vas a hacer? ... ¿qué plan tienes?
--Plan personal? Ninguno.
--¡Demonio! Tan pobre estás de proyectos?
--Sí, tengo uno; vivir con el máximo de independencia. En España, en general, no se paga el trabajo, sino la sumisión. Yo quisiera vivir del trabajo, no del favor.
--Es difícil. ¿Y como plan filosófico? ¿Sigues en tus buscamientos?
--Sí. Yo busco una filosofía que sea primeramente una cosmogonía, una hipótesis racional de la formación del mundo; después, una explicación biológica del origen de la vida y del hombre. ...
--Estás perdido -- murmuró Iturrioz--. Ese intelectualismo no te puede llevar a nada bueno. 87

Iturrioz, on the other hand, presents the point of view of existential reality:

... ante la vida no hay más que dos soluciones prácticas para el hombre sereno, o la abstención y la contemplación indiferente de todo, o la acción limitándose a un círculo pequeño. Es decir, que se puede tener el quijotismo contra una anomalía; pero tenerlo contra una regla general es absurdo ...
--¿Es qué no habrá plan ninguno para vivir con cierto decoro? -- preguntó Andrés.
--El que lo tiene es porque ha inventado uno para su uso. 88

Iturrioz also makes the point about the element of quality in life:

...pero yo hablaba de un aprovechamiento práctico, inmediato. Yo, en el fondo, estoy convencido de que la verdad en bloque es mala para la vida. Esa anomalía de la Naturaleza que se llama la vida necesita estar basada en el capricho, quizás en la mentira. 89

And he proceeds to use the moral from Genesis about the tree of life and the tree of the science of good and evil which grew in the center of paradise:

...El árbol de la vida era inmenso, frondoso y, según algunos santos padres, daba la inmortalidad. El árbol de la ciencia no se dice cómo era; probablemente sería mezquino y triste.
...Y tú sabes lo que le dijo Dios a Adán? ... "Comed del árbol de la vida, sed bestias, sed cerdos, sed egoístas, revolcaos por el suelo alegremente; pero no comáis del árbol de la ciencia, porque ese fruto agrio os dará una tendencia a mejorar que os destruirá." 90

He further amplifies his case:
Tú reconoces que, fuera del dominio de las matemáticas y de las ciencias empíricas, existe, hoy por hoy, un campo enorme adonde todavía no llegan las indicaciones de la ciencia. ... ¿Y por qué en ese campo no tomar como norma la utilidad? ... ese agnosticismo, para todas las cosas que no se conocen científicamente, es absurdo, porque es antibiológico. Hay que vivir ... La fe, dentro de lo natural, es indudablemente lo que tiene gran fuerza ... la fe sirve en el radio de acción de lo posible ... hay que conservarla. ... cerrando esa puerta y no dejando más norma que la verdad, la vida languidece, se hace pálida, anémica, triste. ... Yo no sé quién decía: la legalidad nos mata; como él podemos decir: la razón y la ciencia nos abullan. La sabaduría del judío se comprende cada vez más que se insiste en este punto: a un lado, el árbol de la ciencia; al otro, el árbol de la vida. 91

Andrés, of course, does not understand, and the bitter twist at the end of the book is that the science in which he has such faith is not capable of saving the lives of his wife, Lulú, or his baby, and proves too weak, also, when it is all he has left, to give him a reason to live.

The pathos of existential reality is nowhere more apparent in Baroja than in the life of Andrés Hurtado. The observation has been made regarding even the man of action in Baroja's works that "Todos estos personajes dejan una impresión de seres frustrados que, por diversas causas, no llegan a realizar del todo sus empeños hercicos. Incluso los que parecen más triunfantes..."92 In view of this, it is not surprising to find an extreme degree of suffering in a fracasado like Andrés Hurtado. Andrés was a "precursor" to the héroe fracasado, the man who solves his problem only to realize that it must be resolved again and again and again. Which brings us back to Baroja himself who observed of himself in his Memorias, written when he was an old man: "No hay en lo que he escrito ni serenidad o confianza ... He vivido en tono menor y casi todo lo que he escrito está en ese tono."93
This reference to the "tono menor" of his work reflects Baroja's lack of appreciation for what Fallico refers to as the nostalgic condition of art. In addition to standing as a testimony to man's ontological incompleteness, Fallico maintains the work of art also signifies a nostalgic condition (etymologically, nostos means "a return" and algos means "pain."). This nostalgia is not concerned with a return to a practical place or time; it is the nostalgia of the Being of spontaneity itself, without the submerged remembrance of which the artist would have no model for the creative act. It is only in the aesthetic, he maintains, that we ever, even remotely, approximate the completely made and formed. "Art keeps alive our sense of the omnipotent; it feeds the soul with its profoundest intimations of the divine -- of the memory, that is, of Being itself."94

Baroja could not have been the creative artist which he was without some consciousness of this condition of nostalgia as it relates to the level of being-in-itself. This is the "intensidad," the "tensión [que] no existía en el ambiente" which he sought when he decided to write. But nowhere in Baroja's Bildungsroman attempts do we find the creative process studied and given importance as in, for example, Azorín's El caballero inactual. And certainly nowhere in Baroja do we find the personal sense of tragic grandeur which is Unamuno's outstanding characteristic. This condition of nostalgia was not foreign to Baroja, but what he preferred instead was his courage and his reason, and this is what we find reflected in Baroja's vision of the world.

This reflection of Baroja's world included his own mind which, when it reached its limits, had to make a judgement and choose its
conclusions. At the point where the mind reaches its limits it comes face to face with the irrational. The resulting conflict between the irrational and the human nostalgia and need for unity produces the vision of the absurd.\(^{96}\) In the struggle which ensues either the vision of the absurd is maintained, and strength is drawn from this vision, or an escape from the tension of the position is effected by means of the existential "leap." This "leap" is the theme of the irrational as conceived by the existentialists. Jaspers has asked: "Does not the failure reveal, beyond any possible explanation and interpretation, not the absence but the existence of transcendence?\(^{97}\)

This question shows a reasoning, basically religious, wherein hope may be restored to a position from which there seems no way out, under, around or through. To accept this position and to make the existential "leap" is to restore the solace of the eternal to the world, but to the absurd mind, to do this is to ignore what the mind itself has brought to light. Ortega y Gasset makes the remark: "El sentimiento de la insuficiencia que padecen las ideas y valores de la cultura contemporánea es el resorte que mueve el alma entera de Baroja."\(^{98}\) The irrationality involved in the existential "leap" was as insufficient to Baroja as the irrationality of organized religion. As Camus says, the absurd man

\[\ldots\] is offered a solution in which all the past contradictions have become merely polemical games. But this is not the way he experienced them. This truth must be preserved which consists in not being satisfied. He does not want preaching \[\ldots\] [his] reasoning wants to be faithful to the evidence that aroused it. That evidence is the absurd. It is the divorce between [his] mind that desires and the world that disappoints, [his] nostalgia for unity, this fragmented universe and the contradiction that binds them together. \(^{99}\)
To meet the problems involved in the world in which he lived, Baroja presented the existential "manoeuver" as the answer to the question "What shall we do with our lives?" He did not present the existential "leap," for he maintained to the end the initial absurd position. To some this results in a vision of his world as: "... una exaltación del pequeño esfuerzo y del trabajo..." There is also the point of view that

...any other position implies for the absurd mind deceit ... that danger lies in the subtle instant that precedes the leap. Being able to remain on that dizzying crest -- that is integrity and the rest is subterfuge.
NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. Luis Granjel, Retrato de Pio Baroja (Barcelona: Editorial Barna, S.A., 1957) is the principal source for biographical information on this writer.


10. Ibid., pp. 86-87.


15  In this study Baroja "defendía que la vida normal daba una sensación de indiferencia ni dolorosa ni placentera." Ibid., p. 869.

16  Baroja, "Divagaciones apasionadas: Divagaciones de auto-critica," Ibid., p. 496.

17  Baroja, "Rapsodias: La formación psicológica de un escritor," Ibid., p. 888.

18  Ibid., p. 445.

19  Ibid., pp. 442-443.


21  Ibid.


This is Sartre's definition of despair. See our previous footnote No. 100 on page 78.


John Dos Passos, Rosinante to the Road Again (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1922), pp. 87-88.


Baroja's novels between the years 1900 and 1912 form the basis for this study. This terminal date was chosen because it marks the beginning of Baroja's lengthy preoccupation with the historical novel in the *Memorias de un hombre de acción* series. Of the eighteen novels written during these years only three are in no way germane to the subject under discussion. These three are: *El mundo es ansi*, *La dama errante* and *Los últimos románticos*, and they will not be mentioned. In some of the remaining novels material which is pertinent to this study is peripheral to the development of other principal themes. Novels of this type will be treated only as they relate to the *Bildungsroman* genre and the theme of the héroe fracasado.


57
Ibid., pp. 252-253.

58
Shanti Andía's restlessness at the end of Las inquietudes de Shanti Andía is similar to that which Zalacaín senses. The difference between the two men is, of course, one of age -- Zalacaín's restlessness is the frustration of possibility whereas Shanti Andía's is that of impossibility. Shanti Andía is then an elderly man who is spending his declining years in the Basque seacoast town of Izarte after a life of adventure on the high seas. He is happy with his wife and children, but "Cuando cambia el tiempo experimento la nostalgia de sentir la paz profunda del mar, de su abandono y soledad. ... En la primavera me produce una gran alegría; en el otoño un gran tristeza ... En esos días de noviembre ... me gusta pasear por la playa y saturarme de la enorme melancolía del mar y empaparme en su gran tristeza ... Yo me alegro de que mis hijos no quieran ser marinos ..., y, sin embargo ..." Baroja, "Las inquietudes de Shanti Andía," Op. cit., II, p. 1158.

59

60

61
¡Qué hermoso poema el del cadáver del obispo en aquel campo tranquilo! Estaría allí con su mitra y sus ornamentos y su báculo, arrullado por el murmullo de la fuente. Primero, cuando lo enterraran, empezarían a pudrirse poco a poco; hoy se le nublaría un ojo, y empezarían a nadar los gusanos por los jugos vitreos; luego el cerebro se le iría reblaneciendo, los humores correrían de una parte del cuerpo a otra y los gases harían reventar en llagas la piel; y en aquellas carnes podridas y deshechas correrían las larvas alegremente ...

Un día comenzaría a filtrarse la lluvia y a llevar con ella sustancia orgánica, y, al pasar por la tierra aquella sustancia, se limpiaría, se purificaría, nacerían junto a la tumba hierbas verdes, frescas, y el pus de úlceras brillaría en las blancas coñolas de las flores.

¡Qué hermoso poema el del cadáver del obispo en el campo tranquilo! ¡Qué alegría la de los átomos al romper la forma que los aprisionaba, al fundirse con júbilo en la nubulosa del infinito, en la senda del misterio donde todo se pierde! Baroja, "Camino de perfección," Op. cit., VI, p. 41.

62
Ibid., p. 58.

63
Ibid., p. 124.
In Paradox, rey Silvestre and Avelino become involved in adventures in Africa which, in the main, do not pertain to the subject under discussion. Only their enthusiasm at the prospect of the trip relates to our material, and it presents the same view as already discussed in Las aventuras, inventos y mixtificaciones de Silvestre Paradox.
80  Ibid., p. 516.


82  Ibid., p. 575.

83  Ibid., p. 576.

84  Ibid., pp. 644-645.


87  Ibid., p. 507.

88  Ibid., pp. 493-494.

89  Ibid., p. 510.

90  Ibid., p. 511.

91  Ibid., pp. 513-514.


As quoted by Camus, Ibid., pp. 32-33.


CHAPTER III

UNAMUNO

To turn to Miguel de Unamuno after reading Pío Baroja is to find a shift in focus which is concerned extensively with what was so characteristically absent in Baroja -- the third level of being, being-in-itself. This is not to imply in any way that Unamuno ignored the other two levels of being. On the contrary, as he himself says at the beginning of Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos: "El hombre de carne y hueso ... es el sujeto y el supremo objeto a la vez de toda filosofía." But as Julián Marías points out quite clearly regarding the matter of emphasis in Unamuno:

Se trata, pues, del problema del hombre, de la persona humana, y de su perduración. Y quien plantea esta cuestión es la muerte: se trata de saber qué es morir, si es aniquilarse o no, si morir es una cosa que le pasa al hombre para entrar en la vida perdurable, o si es que deja de ser, que no le pasa nada. Porque eso es lo angustioso e intolerable, como vio muy bien Unamuno: que no pasa nada.

Pero para esclarecer la cuestión de la muerte hay que saber primero de la vida; la muerte es siempre muerte de algo que vive ... El intento de conocer el destino humano después de la muerte obliga a plantear previamente el problema de ésta; y como el hombre consiste desde luego y por lo pronto de esa vida, a la cuestión única de Unamuno envuelve las del ser, la vida y la muerte del hombre, en esencial unidad. El tema de Unamuno, ya con alguna mayor precisión, es, pues, el hombre en su integridad, que va de su nacimiento a su muerte, con su carne, su vida, su personalidad y, sobre todo, su afán de no morirse nunca enteramente. 2

In reference to the above statement, Mario J. Valdés comments:

"Since Marías' study in 1943 this opinion has prevailed among
serious students of Unamuno," and adds that Marías himself restates this same interpretation in his *El existencialismo en España* in 1953.3

This emphasis in Unamuno is a matter of temperament. From his earliest years Unamuno was interested in religion. At age fourteen he felt a calling for the priesthood. During his early adolescent years, however, there also arose in Unamuno a desire for knowledge which was equal in strength to his religious inclinations. These two aspirations united in a peculiar way and "lo indujo al peligroso juego de racionalizar su fe y acabó por abandonarla en el más absoluto descreimiento; de puro querer creer perdió sus creencias, o, para ser más verades su fe en ellas."5

In 1880 at the age of sixteen Unamuno arrived in Madrid to study *Filosofía y letras* in the university. Here he began that wavering attitude which swung between rationalism and the desire to recover the ingenuous faith of his childhood years. Unamuno's intellectual formation in this period was influenced more by his own reading and his participation in the prevailing ambiente of Madrid than it was by his university work. Spencer, Darwin, Comte, Renan, Taine, Dilthey, Brentano, Bergson, William James, Hegel, Kant, Schopenhauer, Fichte, Schelling, Leopardi, Carducci, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Burns -- such were the authors which this devoralibros absorbed. The intellectual world of Madrid in these years in which Unamuno was there was peopled by such pre-eminent Spanish figures as Giner de los Ríos, Costa, Clarín, Menéndez y Pelayo, Juan Valera and Pérez Galdós. Also, Alarcón, Pereda, Padre Coloma, Pardo Bazán, Picón and Palacio Valdés were writing novels. The poetry of Campoamor and Núñez de Arce was
popular; Zorrilla was still writing and Bécquer was still remembered. In the theater the plays of Tamayo, Ayala and Echegaray were being presented. Krausismo was the dominating ideology of the period, or as Unamuno put it, "...era la época que con el krausismo soplaban vientos de racionalismo." It was during his stay in Madrid that Unamuno stopped attending mass.

In 1884 he returned to Bilbao, and

For two years Unamuno followed the prescribed practices of the church in an attempt to recover his childhood faith. He has described his feelings later in a letter to Clarín, and Paz en la guerra is taken by critics to contain autobiographical passages concerning this period. This attempt, largely centered in will power, failed. An article of his published in El Noticiero Bilbaíno in October of 1886 is very revealing regarding his frame of mind at this time:

Unamuno's marriage to doña Concha Lizárraga y Ecénarro lifted him
out of this period of very deep depression.

In 1891 he was named to the chair of Greek at the University of Salamanca, and, with the exception of his exile, he spent the rest of his life in that city. These years were ones of seeming tranquility for Unamuno, but "...escondéndose tras los afanes de cada día, se fue forjando y creciendo, hasta dominarle por completa, un acuciante problema, el de si a su muerte algo de lo que era sobreviviría; si moriría o no anodarse." Carlos Blanco Aguinaga points out the simplest explanation for this growing obsession:

> Al perder la fe de sus primeros años y llegar ... al fondo de su racionalismo, vio Unamuno con claridad que lo que verdaderamente echaba de menos en su carencia de fe o en su duda era el cielo que el catolicismo más cotidiano le tenía prometido. El descubrimiento de esta elemental verdad provocó la angustia que culmina en la crisis de 1897.

Sánchez-Barbudo's study on the subject of 1897, the crucial year in Unamuno's life, is a work minutely documented with letters written by Unamuno himself, and others, which refer to this period. The chapter entitled "Una experiencia decisiva: La crisis de 1897," contains Unamuno's own description of what actually happened at the climax of this crisis on that March night. It was a beautiful night, but he had not been able to sleep. For hours he had tossed and turned in bed. Suddenly an intense emotion seized him. He described it as being like a thundering shot which wounded him, and he emitted an uncontrollable cry. His wife awoke crying out — ¿Qué tienes, hijo mío? — and took him in her arms to calm him with caresses as one would a frightened child.

Although the above scene is narrated with an un-Unamuno-esque terseness of language, the dramatic melancholy of this scene is quite
apparent. William James, in *The Varities of Religious Experience*, considers similar happenings which occur to "... those persons who cannot so swiftly throw off the burden of the consciousness of evil, but are congenitally fated to suffer from its presence." The evil which Unamuno felt was the condition resulting from the long-persisting, importunate demands made on him by the antagonistic halves of his nature. This led to what James terms "fear of the universe," and caused his original optimism and self-satisfaction to be levelled to the dust. In studying this type of temperament James is quite clear that he is not referring to "any intellectual insanity or delusion about matters of fact ... [or] really insane melancholia." He terms this condition "morbid-mindedness" in contrast to "healthy-mindedness," but is quick to make the point that of the two, "...morbid-mindedness ranges over the wider scale of experience ... the method of averting one's attention from evil, of living simply in the light of the good, is splendid as long as it will work ... But it breaks down impotently as soon as melancholy comes." Unamuno's description of that March night is quite clearly his experience of the coming of melancholy. A further paragraph of James' is pertinent to this experience:

Recent psychology has found great use for the word "threshold" as a symbolic designation for the point at which one state of mind passes into another. Thus we speak of the threshold of a man's consciousness in general, to indicate the amount of noise, pressure or other stimulus which it takes to arouse his attention at all ... And just so we might speak of a "pain-threshold," a "fear-threshold," a "misery-threshold," and find it quickly overpassed by the consciousness of some individuals, but lying too high in others to be often reached by their consciousness. The sanguine and healthy-minded live habitually on the sunny side of their misery-line, the depressed and melancholy live beyond it, in darkness and apprehension...
The "threshold" which Unamuno crossed that night was the conscious recognition of his contingent state in an experience of dread. He referred to the experience as confronting "la Nada." J. H. Blackham, in commenting on Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* speaks of this condition using Heidegger's terminology, which is strikingly similar to Unamuno's, to say:

Dread is the experience of Nothing. What happens? The intelligible world constructed by personal existence, in which man feels safe and at home, the world of meanings, is nihilated and he is plunged back into the sheer "is-ness" of what is, his ship on which he is riding and voyaging disappears in the night and he finds himself in the deep waters and tastes their saltiness. This is an experience of brute existence denuded of meanings, the high-tension power of raw actuality; it uncovers the marvelousness of pure "is-ness," contingency, which reason covers up, and is therefore a revelation of Being. ...Nothing does not cancel Being but familiar forms of Being, and therefore puts Being again in question. 17

Unamuno spent the better part of a year recovering from that night. His immediate reaction was based on habitual action. The day following the crisis he entered a Dominican monastery in Salamanca for a stay of three days. On emerging he tried again, as when he returned from Madrid to Bilbao, to recover his faith by observing the practices of the church. Again he was not successful. In a letter to Clarín written at that time he speaks of himself in the third person to impersonalize to some extent these painful memories, and says:

...sufría mucho. Después de una crisis en que lloró más de una vez y hubiera sido un infierno su vida a no tener mujer e hijos, creyó en realidad haber vuelto a la fe de su infancia, y aunque sin creer en realidad, empezó a practicar, hundiéndose hasta en las devociones más rutinarias, para sugerirse su propia infancia. ... Pero se percató de que aquello era falso, y volvió a encontrarse desorientado, preso otra vez de la sed de gloria, del ansia de sobre-vivir en la historia. 18
Unamuno could not abandon his power of reason which is, of course, the initial step to the acceptance of dogma. His gradual acceptance of this fact of his nature is evident in his letter of October of that year to Juan Arzadán:

"Tengo tantas cosas que decirte! he pasado por tantas angustias íntimas! Me han revuelto hasta lo hondo los eternos problemas, el de la propia salvación eterna sobre todo. Me he sentido al borde de la Nada inacabable, y he acabado por sentir que hay más medio de relacionarse con la realidad que la razón, que hay gracia y que hay fe, fe que al cabo se logra queriendo de veras creer. ¿Si yo en realidad creo o es que tan sólo quiero creer? No lo sé. Ando desorientado, pero con mayor paz interior."

The unreality and solitude which were so much a part of this state are clearly brought out in his letter of December, 1897, to Jiménez Ilundian:

"...temo que si los cuidados de orden temporal y familiar se me alivian, resurjan más potentes mis hondas preocupaciones, las de orden inmaterial y eterno. Mi un momento dejo de sentir en lo hondo de mi espíritu el rumor de estas aguas ... Hay momentos en que me parece estar solo y que los demás no son más que sombras, espectros que se mueven y hablan."

Unamuno's letter of January of the following year to Ilundian shows the progress of his recovery as well as an important statement as to the part his writings played in this recovery:

"¡Si supiera usted qué noches de angustia y qué días de inapetencia espiritual! ... Me cogió la crisis de un modo violento y repentina, si bien hoy veo en mis escritos el desarrollo interior de ella. Lo que me sorprendió fue us explosión ... Y hoy me encuentro en gran parte desorientado, pero cristiano y pidiendo a Dios fuerzas y luz para sentir que el consuelo es verdad."

In speaking of the different levels of "morbid-mindefulness" James makes the point:

There are people for whom evil means only a mal-adjustment of things, a wrong correspondence of one's life with the environment. Such evil as this is curable, in principle at least, upon the natural plane, for merely by modifying the
self or the things, or both at once, the two terms may be made to fit ... 22

This observation would seem to apply aptly to Unamuno. Unamuno's attempt to modify the correspondence between himself and his environment rested upon his recognition that the internal conflict between his reason and his emotions brought about the experience of his own nothingness. This experience of his own nothingness was an awakening of consciousness for Unamuno, and he achieved the modification which he desired by converting this conflict -- the need to believe and the rational impossibility of soing so -- into the vital posture of both his life and much of his work, a posture which he himself defined as fe dudosa o agonica.

Unamuno's most complete expression of the philosophy which he evolved as an outcome of this whole experience is contained in Del sentimiento tragic de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos. It is quite easy to see an unbroken principle of both unity and continuity of Miguel de Unamuno the man in this book. In one sense, this is a very personal book and critics who have concentrated on Unamuno's preoccupation with the question of immortality have been inclined to consider it almost exclusively in this light. In a far more important sense, however, this is a book with universal interest in its development from an existential position of a Weltanschauung and a practical ethics to accompany it. That Unamuno's thinking places him in the existentialist camp is today generally recognized as a fact. 23 Valdes, for example, points out that

Unamuno, of course, owes much of his existentialist orientation to Kierkegaard. However, he is a forerunner of the philosophes of Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Jean-Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich.
The general similarities between Unamuno's second perspective (expressed most fully in *Del sentimiento trágico*) and the views of these contemporary philosophers are obvious to any reader of Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*, Sartre's *L'Être et le néant*, Jasper's *Der philosophische Glaube*, Marcel's *Le mystère de l'être*, or Tillich's *The Courage to Be*. However, there is a much deeper affinity linking Unamuno and this subsequent current of thought: a philosophical sensitivity to the modern individual's reality which Unamuno developed into an existentialist anthropology.

The importance of Unamuno's anticipation has not yet been fully appreciated by our age largely because of the fact that he wrote in Spanish. 24

José Huertas-Jourda's *The Existentialism of Miguel de Unamuno* is an attempt to fill this lacuna in English philosophical literature. He naturally draws heavily from *Del sentimiento trágico*, but because Unamuno's peculiarity of style and his lack of systematization which led him to scatter his thinking throughout the entire corpus of his works, Huertas-Jourda used the Obras completas by taking advantage of the method worked out by students of ancient philosophy to reconstruct a doctrine which is scattered in diverse texts in fragmentary fashion. The result is a superb piece of work which presents, but does not criticize or describe, the framework of Unamuno's thought with clarity and succinctness. I have taken the liberty of attempting a summary of the main thoughts of this work as the best way of stating Unamuno's extremely personal philosophy, to which his literary creations bear witness. However, such a summary by its nature will be incapable of doing justice to the subtleties of Huertas-Jourda's analysis and the original is recommended to the serious student.

Unamuno's theory of language is his starting place, for language was the main tool of knowledge for Unamuno. His analysis of language, however, led him to recognize its essentially ambiguous quality and "...forced him to abandon the guide of common sense as the sole
criterion of the adequacy of terms." This, of course, logically led him to be concerned with the problem of truth.

For Unamuno there are two kinds of truth, subjective truth, which is moral in nature, and objective truth, which is logical in nature. Since subjective truth rests on a Heraclitean recognition of the uniqueness of an experience, any objective corroboration is useless. The truth in this instance is a genuine belief which causes a person to act. The sincerity of intention and not the outcome of the act is the point at which judgement as to the validity of this kind of truth is to be made, for the contrary of this kind of truth is not an error but a lie. However, we need the symbols of language not only to transmit this unique experience to others, but even to represent it to ourselves; therefore, subjective truth must be aided by objective truth. Objective truth, on the other hand, is based not on the unique experience, but on the similitude of experience with that of others. Since cohesion is the criterion of this logical truth and identity is its aim, the opposite of objective truth is error. Science is built by this type of reason but "... science is directed to the knowledge of the fact, and must submit to the fact, and the fact is a matter of subjective experience." Thus, these two kinds of truth, although antagonistic, lend mutual aid to each other for their development as theories of truth. But when they are applied, when man uses them as a method of knowledge, they become diametrically opposed.

From his two theories of truth Unamuno posits two methods of knowledge; first, "the science of the head," composed of reason and intelligence, which holds sway in the sphere of logic and in the
matter of identities, and second, "the wisdom of the heart," which stems from the will, the imagination and feelings and is not amenable to formalization. All terms do not lend themselves to treatment by both methods of knowledge. Death, for example, can be handled only in the objective realm for it can be experienced only once and "we cannot conceive of ourselves as non-existent." Terms such as man and God, in contrast, are material proper for the subjective method of knowledge because of man's uniqueness and because God cannot be defined. Subjective knowledge, however, can never be completely transmitted by symbolization. Unamuno places the responsibility for the attempt "to conciliate the intellectual necessities with the affective necessities and the volitive ones" on philosophy. The proper method of doing this is "alternate affirmation of the contradictories," which will present the problem and create doubt, and from doubt springs the necessity to create a solution of one's own.

The experiencing of this opposition of the "science of the head" and the "wisdom of the heart" was for Unamuno the origin of his self-consciousness, his moment of "Sum, ergo cogito." The confrontation of his fear of death with the awareness of his unique irreplaceability and his desire to remain alive forever is what he terms the tragic sense of life. This is the fundamental problem for Unamuno and all of his works reflect this "unique and same fundamental thought which you see unrolling in multiple forms." This confrontation carries with it the seeds of its own solution, for while reason recognizes the possibility of its own cessation, this fact is not subjectively true. At most reason offers the law of the conservation of energy as permanence, but permanence in this form destroys the uniqueness of the
individual and therefore it is also subjectively untrue. In addition, on the vital issue, one's awareness of his unique irreplacebility, reason cannot take any position at all since this is material which is valid only for handling by the subjective method of knowledge. Unamuno saw that certainty concerning either mortality or immortality would have made life impossible for him. In a certain sense it may be said that at this point Unamuno's position is really Dubito, ergo sum, and it is one which he protected zealously for the rest of his life. But in order to move one must go beyond doubt and choose whether the "science of the head" or the "wisdom of the heart" is to take precedence. All one is aware of at this moment is the consciousness of pain. The alternatives are to say "No" and become a man of noluntad, or to say "Yes" and become a man of voluntad.

Unamuno choose the latter, aware that his consciousness of his own existence could remain subjectively true, could be a truth on which he could act, only at the expense of maintaining the pain of this awareness. For pain is "that completely irrational unitary element at the root of the individual,"\textsuperscript{35} whose form is "the sensation of one's own limit."\textsuperscript{36}

At the very depths of the consciousness of pain Unamuno encountered love, first in the form of a compassionate self-love which through projection extended itself to encompassing the entire universe. Love and pain are reverse sides of the same coin for Unamuno. This depth of consciousness was a primordial experience to Unamuno, the only certainty of which he never doubted, a revelation of being. Everything else, "the memories, the spectacle, the scenes that pass in front of us 'as in a cinema,'\textsuperscript{37} have ... no intrinsic existence except as we are
conscious of being conscious of them." If the first function of consciousness, then, is to awaken a person, its subsequent function is to furnish a basis for the person to keep himself awake. And so time became for Unamuno not a series of events but a continuous present of striving, of fighting with this "enigma of the Sphinx," as he called it. "I do not know, that is sure; possibly, I will never be able to know, but I want to know. I want it, and that is enough."

Love, according to Unamuno, is the dynamic element by means of which man moves from static contemplation of himself as he is to projecting himself toward what he would like to be. He conceives of the goal of consciousness as "to be, continuously, unique and irreplaceable," and to accomplish this "Love personalizes that which it loves ... and when love is so great ... then it personalizes everything and discovers ... this Consciousness of the Universe ... is that which we call God ... God is, then, the personalization of everything." At other times Unamuno reverses the point of view to that of this created God, and then "the unique consciousness aspiring merely to be, is but 'the projection of God in the finite!'" Thus, for Unamuno, God and man are mutually necessary. The act of projection reflected in the sentence "And it is through the one that we wanted to be, not through the one that we have been, that we will be saved or that we will be lost," is the "Unamunian 'leap'." Faith is the basis for this "leap," for as he says, faith is "the creative power, flower of the will, and its office is to create." Unamuno's emphasis in the act of projection is on intention, on what is wanted rather than on what is done. And so "the irrepressible desire of the
self-conscious man to remain aware and self-conscious, 'to be,
to be always and without end' [which] can only be felt where there
is doubt."47 Is also the basis for Unamuno's ethics:

But he who believes that he navigates, perhaps even without
a course, in a fickle and sinkable craft, does not have to
be moved by the fact that the raft moves under his feet and
threatens to founder. This one believes that he works, not
because he thinks his principle of action true, but in order
to make it so, in order to prove its truth, in order to
create for himself his own spiritual world.

My conduct has to be the best proof, the moral proof, of
my supreme desire. 48

Unamuno makes his best statement of his ethics of doubt as a variation
on a sentence of Séñancour's: "And if nothingness is what is in
store for us, let us make this an injustice."49 The behavior of the
self-conscious man in imposing his being on the merely conscious man,
"contributing to the extent of his power to the birth of another
self-consciousness," is for Unamuno a method of "proving his faith
by his conduct."50 This imposing, however, becomes an exchange, for
through it both men become modified, "the Sanchos 'Sanchopancizing'
the Quixotes, the Quixotes 'Quixotizing' the Sanchos."51 The fact
that Unamuno gives priority to the intention over the act in his
ethics gave rise to the objection that this might lead one to act in
a manner not acceptable to conventional morality. To this Unamuno
replied with Don Quixote's answer to the people who plagued him with
questions as to how he could be sure that he was bewitched: "I know
and hold true for myself that I am bewitched, and this suffices for
the security of my conscience."52

Most studies of Unamuno's philosophy or of his writings, even
those made by Unamuno himself, make no mention of a quality which
his writings contain to a striking degree because they are made
a posterori. This is the quality of serendipity, i.e., the ability while searching in a particular direction to make and recognize a discovery of a completely unexpected nature and the wisdom to appreciate the value of this discovery. Time and time again as one reads his novels one can see this happening to Unamuno, and it is through this quality that we see the intellectual life in action in the author and realize the profound meaning of the Bildungsroman genre for him. For this reason as we go chronologically through Unamuno's works which are pertinent to the héroe fracasado theme we will attempt to point out some of the occurrences of serendipity as they happen.

In the prologue to Tres novelas ejemplares y un prólogo, published in 1920, Unamuno gives the theory behind his fictional creations which he says holds good "... desde Paz en la guerra ... hasta las Tres novelas ejemplares." This theory is a clear statement of his concern with the fracasado and the héroe fracasado.

Y llamo ejemplares a estas novelas porque las doy como ejemplo ... ejemplo de vida y de realidad. ¡De realidad! ¡De realidad, sí! Sus agonistas, es decir, luchadores -- o si queréis los llamaremos personajes -- son reales, realísimos, y con la realidad más íntima, con la que se dan ellos mismos, en puro querer ser o en puro querer no ser, y no con la que le den los lectores ...

¿Cuál es la realidad íntima, la realidad real ... de un hombre? ... el que quisiera ser ... y [éste] es el real de verdad. Y por el que hayamos querido ser, y no por el que hayamos sido, nos salvaremos o perderemos." 55

The above theory gives rise to the héroe fracasado with the tragic sense of life and also to the opposite, the fracasado, who never achieves his self-awareness. Unamuno's héroe fracasado may be either one who chooses "querer ser" -- a hero of voluntad -- or one who chooses "querer no ser" -- a hero of noluntad. The quality which
these two types of hero share is the fact that they are creators.

The former is the person who wants to:

\[
\text{vivir en el mundo fenoménico ... y soñar la vida que es sueño ... El sueño es el que es vida, realidad, creación, La fe misma no es, según San Pablo, sino la sustancia de las cosas que se esperan, y lo que se espera es sueño. Y la fe es la fuente de realidad, porque es la vida. Creer es crear.} \]

The hero of nóvolad Unamuno also classifies as a creator, for "... el que quiere no ser, no es ¡claro!, una suicida. El que quiere no ser lo quiere siendo." 57

Concerning the fracasado who represents the concept of "no querer ser" or "no querer no ser" Unamuno says:

\[
\text{... difícilmente se saca una criatura poética, de novela [porque] esos personajes crepusculares ... que ... se dejan llevar y traer ... no tienen realidad íntima ... ese sujeto cotidiano ... a lo sumo será sombra de un sueño ...} \]

Basically, the fracasado is not capable of being a creator because he is not self-conscious.

In technique Paz en la guerra, Unamuno's first novel published in 1897, is atypical of the rest of his novelistic production. It is based on historical material concerning the second Carlist war which is handled in a realistic manner with long descriptive passages of both the paisaje and social ambiente. The interpretation has been advanced that the city of Bilbao taken as a collective character is the protagonist of this novel. 59 This is a perfectly valid interpretation which stems largely from the technique of the novel. However, from another point of view which is not governed by technique, Unamuno includes this novel among those which embody his theory of fiction concerned with the fracasado and the héroes fracasado. The character Francisco Zabaldide is the reason why Unamuno makes this statement. This character is drawn on material which is taken by
many critics to be autobiographical. However, the important point for this study is that this is héroe fracasado material. Actually, relatively little space in the novel is devoted to Pachico (Francisco Zabaldide), and the material presented is almost in capsule form. This is probably because at the time the novel was written Unamuno's understanding of the implications of the existential position was not yet clarified. Nevertheless, Pachico is quite clearly a héroe fracasado and he stands as an illustration of serendipity at work in Unamuno in this novel. For example, Pachico is out of step with the society in which he lives:

Era en su trato con los demás corriente, aunque reputado de chiflado serio. Hablaba mucho, pero siempre desde dentro, molestando a muchos su conversación por fatigosa y pedantesca, pues quería llevar la batuta en ella, volviendo tercamente a su hilo cuando se lo cortaban. Presentían a la vez que, haciendo abstracción del oyente y encastillado en sí mismo, éranle las conversaciones pretexto de monólogos, y las gentes figuras geométricas, ejemplares de la humanidad a que trataba sub specie aeternitatis. Preocupábanse mucho, por su parte, del concepto en que se le tuviera, doliéndole le juzgaran mal, y procurando ser querido y comprendido por todos, con honda preocupación de cómo se reflejase en las mentes ajenas. 60

Although Pachico wonders about what others think of him, he is also very much aware of his own individuality:

Al bajar entraron en un chacolí, y después de haber merendado, desatósele a Pachico la lengua. Hablaba a medias, explicándose por insinuaciones y oscuridades, saltando de un punto a otro ... Les dijo que todos tenían razón y que no la tiene nadie, y que lo mismo se le daba de blancos que de negros, que se movían en sus casillas como las piezas del ajedrez, movidos por jugadores invisibles; que él no era carlista, ni liberal, ni monárquico, ni republicano, y que lo era todo. "¿Yo? Yo con mote como si fuese un insecto seco y hueco, clavado en una caja de entomología, y con una etiqueta que diga: género tal, especie tal ... Un partido es una necedad..."

--Entonces tú, ¿qué eres?
--¿Yo? Francisco Zabaldide. 61
Pachico is concerned with an extremely important personal problem, an awareness of a lack of faith for which he feels a great need:

Vivía vida interior, acurrucado en su espíritu, empollando sus ensueños. Era su estado espiritual el de aquellos que sobre la base de la fe antigua, dormida y no muerta, han cobrado otra nueva, con vagos anhelos a una fe inconsciente que uniera a las dos. 62

Pachico also suffers a sense of his own contingency in an agony of fear:

Tenía momentos de desaliento. ...Apagada la luz para darse a meditar, y cuando no le rendía al punto el sueño, atormentába le el terrible misterio del tiempo. ... Tales reflexiones le llevaban ... a la emoción de la muerte, emoción viva que le hacía temblar a la idea del momento, en que le cogería el sueño, aplanado ante el pensamiento de que un día habría de dormirse para no despertar. Era un terror loco de la nada, a hallarse solo en el tiempo vacío, terror loco que sacudiéndole el corazón en palpitations, le hacía sonar que, faltó de aire, ahogando, caía continuamente y sin descanso en el vacío eterno, con terrible caída. 63

The novel ends with Pachico slowly recuperating from these attacks. He has formed the habit of walking in the mountains, keeping the sea in view in the distance. What strikes his attention on these walks is the eternal war which goes on in nature and the idea that "La guerra misma se encierra la paz." 64 As a result,

Todo se le presenta entonces en plano inmenso, y tal fusión de términos y perspectivas del espacio lleva le poco a poco, en el silencio allí reinante, a un estado en que se le funden los términos y perspectivas del tiempo. Olvidase del curso fatal de las horas, y en un instante que no pasa, eterno, inmóvil, siente en la contemplación del inmenso panorama la hondura del mundo, la continuidad, la unidad, la resignación de sus miembros todos, y oye la canción silenciosa del alma de las cosas desarrollarse en el armónico espacio y el melódico tiempo ... Es la guerra a la paz lo que a la eternidad el tiempo: su forma pasajera. Y en la Paz parecen identificarse la Muerte y la Vida. 65

When Pachico returns to Bilbao he makes his commitment to:
... la inacabable lucha contra la inextinguible ignorancia humana ... Así es como allí arriba, vencido el tiempo, toma gusto a las cosas eternas, ganando bríos para lanzarse luego al torrente incoercible del progreso, en que rueda lo pasajero sobre lo permanente. ...

En el seno de la paz verdadera y honda es donde sólo se comprende y justifica la guerra; es donde se hacen sagrados votos de guerrear por la verdad, único consuelo eterno; es donde se propone reducir a santo trabajo la guerra. No fuera de ésta, sino dentro de ella, en su seno mismo, hay que buscar la paz; paz en la guerra misma. 66

In Amor y pedagogía, which appeared in 1902, Unamuno first expresses as the theme of the novel one of the basic tenets of his philosophy: reason is the enemy of life. This novel like Azorín's La voluntad and Baroja's El árbol de la ciencia, is an attack on the philosophy of the Logical Positivists and the point is to show the fallacy in this Alexandrian type of thinking by illustrating the limitations of the intellect. In Unamuno's view, the Amor of the title leads to life whereas pedagogía which is based exclusively on razón leads to death.

The majority of the characters in this novel are fracasados. Avito Carrascal, the father of the protagonist, is a ...

... joven entusiasta de todo progreso y enamorado de la sociología. ... Vive Carrascal de sus rentas y ha llevado a cima ... sin que nadie de ello se percate, un hercúleo trabajo, cual es el de enderezar con la reflexión todo instinto y hacer que sea en él todo científico. Anda por mecánica, digiere por química y se hace cortar el traje por geometría proyectiva. Es lo que él dice a menudo: "Sólo la ciencia es maestra de la vida. ... Mas su fuerte está en la pedagogía sociológica ..." 67

With the idea of putting his sociological pedagogy into practice and creating a genius thereby, he decides to marry in order to have a son. While courting the object of his rational choice for a wife he meets and falls in love with Marina. They marry but Avito always feels that this concession which he made to love was a weakness on
his part, an act of betrayal against his reason.

Their child, Apolodoro, is born and Avito starts immediately exercising the theories of the Comtian sociologists. He is guided in his endeavors by his friend and teacher, the philosopher Don Fulgencio Entrambosmares. The name is significant. Don Fulgencio is not such an extreme case of inauthenticity as Avito, but he, too, lives mainly in the world of abstract ideas. He is a more human, more sensitive and more intelligent character than Avito, but in no wise a more self-conscious one.

As a very young child Apolodoro receives one of his most lasting impressions. As a part of his scientific education his father takes him to an animal research clinic:

—¡Oh, qué conejito, qué mono! ¡Qué ojos tiene! ... Y debe de tener frío. ¡Cómo tiembla!
—No, pequeño; no tiene frío. Es que se va a morir pronto.
—¿A morir? ¡Pobrecito! ... ¿Por qué no le curan?
—Mira, hijo mío: este señor le ha metido esa enfermedad al conejo para estudiarla ...
—¡Pobre conejillo! ¡Pobre conejillo!
—Para curar a los hombres luego ...
—¡Pobre conejillo! ¡Pobre conejillo!
—Pero mira, niño, hay que aprender a curar.
—¿Y por qué no le curan al conejillo?
Esta noche sueña Apolodoro con el pobre conejillo ... 68

This is a symbolic passage and the thought of the pobre conejillo runs through Apolodoro's mind when he has his first lesson with Don Fulgencio who lectures him not only on the glories of science but also along the lines of:

—Extravaga, hijo mío, extravaga cuando puedas, que más vale eso que vagar a secas. ... Que no te clasifiquen ...
Sé tú, tú mismo, único y insustituible. No haya entre tus diversos actos y palabras más que un solo principio de unidad: tú mismo ... 69

And when the boy leaves his lesson what strikes him is the human misery which he sees in the street and he senses that this is what he
feels in his own home.

The pressures to which Apolodoro is subjected in being educated to be a genius mount steadily.

Ese enjambre de ideas, ideotas, ideítas, idezuelas, psuedo-ideas e ideoides con que su padre le tiene asaetado van despertándole ensueños sin forma ni color, anhelos que se pierden, ansias abortadas. ¡Vaya un caleidoscopio que es el mundo! 70

As a result:

¡Con qué ansia coge Apolodoro la cama, por las noches. Son entonces sus auroras, las fiestas de su alma. ... El sueño es la fuente de la Salud, porque es vivir sin saberlo. ... En el ensueño nadie le enseña nada. ...

Acéstase casi todas las noches proponiéndose atrapar al sueño ... pero no hay medio ... siempre el sueño ... le atrapa antes de que él pueda atraparle... ¿Sucedrá lo mismo con la muerte?, piensa... 71

As Apolodoro goes into puberty awareness of his own subjectivity opens up for him. He becomes interested in writing, and when he is slightly older he falls in love with Clarita.

Empieza la Humanidad a cantar en él ...Revelásele la eternidad en el amor; el mundo adquiere a sus ojos sentido, ha hallado sendero el corazón ... Toca la substancialidad de las cosas ... Esto es lo único que no necesita demostrarse, que se demuestra por sí... 72

To this point Apolodoro has been living in the innocence of a solipsistic world. This innocence is rudely destroyed when he meets Federico who tells him that he, too, loves Clarita and that he intends to capture her. It is not what Federico says but the patronizing, deprecatory, insulting tone of his remarks which makes Apolodoro realize that he is being seen as an object, and an inferior object, by another. He wants to hit Federico but he doesn't because he doesn't know how to fight, and when he doesn't hit him, he becomes ashamed of himself. The result of this occurrence is that he is
drawn into Federico's orbit -- "¿Por quién me tomará este hombre?" and his own world dissolves and flows away. He becomes conscious not of himself, but of himself as he exists for Federico. With his solipsism cracked to pieces he experiences his own objectivity through experiencing Federico's subjectivity which causes the destruction of his own. This inaccessible dimension of his being which is thus revealed to him has a completeness and finality which he cannot touch, and the experience has a tremendous effect on Apolodoro. His inability to understand the problem which it creates leads directly to his suicide.

When Apolodoro publishes a love story which is received with indifference by his family and friends and is severely criticized by Don Fulgencio his thought is "¡Fracaso! ¡Fracaso completo! Nadie me hace caso; todos se burlan de mí, aunque me lo ocultan." Shortly after this he learns that Clarita is going to marry Federico. In a passion of fury he goes to provoke Federico into a duel, only to be again smoothly handled by Federico as though he were an object of negligible importance, with the effect that this again destroys his subjectivity leaving him unable to act. As he leaves Federico he is saying to himself in tears "Dimito, dimito..."

Apolodoro talks to Don Fulgencio in an attempt to secure some form of relief from the pain he is suffering. Don Fulgencio's idea of comfort is to tell the boy --"Bah! Eso no vale nada," and then discuss his own problems involving erostratismo. This latter, it seems, is the necessity one feels to sacrifice present happiness for the sake of posthumous fame since one no longer believes in immortality. Also he recommends having children as a guarantee of one form of
preservation in being. This whole ridiculous conversation is, of course, off the point, for Apolodoro's pain is a problem of a mode of living which he cannot handle and not the abstract question of what people would or might think of him after he is dead.

Apolodoro also talks to his father with no meeting of minds in the conversation.

Y empieza ahora un horror, un verdadero horror, tales son los despropósitos que al fracasado genio se le ocurren. Ocúrresele unas veces si estará haciendo o diciendo algo muy distinto de lo que se cree hacer o decir y que por esto es por lo que le tienen por loco los demás... Arde en deseos de verse desde fuera, como los demás le ven, y para lograrlo salirse de sí mismo, dejar de ser él mismo, y dejando de ser él mismo, dejar sencillamente de ser, ¡dimitir! 77

Apolodoro is struggling here with the fact that one can not be an object to himself. He is his senses and his body in their suffering condition, and when he wishes to make an object of himself -- an object which he could possibly understand and deal with -- he can't because he is identified with his senses and his body. Apolodoro's whole orientation in life has been toward abstractions, but his problem in life is a concrete one of the affective realm which intellectual training of the type he has had is not able to approach. Apolodoro cannot be an object to himself but he has experienced his own objectivity in his encounter with Federico, and this sensation of himself as inferior has been reinforced by the failure of his story and his loss of Clarita. Apolodoro is experiencing as a subject the limitations on his own liberty as they are imposed by others. The way out of this dilemma is to return to the solipsistic position and thus avoid becoming an object for another by making him an object for one's self. But Apolodoro cannot do this. His
transcendence is totally transcended and he is existing for himself as the form of his objectivity for another. This is a fully self-conscious position which César Barja's extension of Unamuno's observation "soy, luego pienso" to "siento, luego soy" expresses concretely. Under these conditions the only exercise of freedom which Apolodoro can conceive of is suicide. This is an authentic choice and, in making it he becomes a hero on noluntad. Unamuno calls this novel "una tragicomedia." The comedia part of the novel is his obvious use of caricature-like types in his attack on the positivistic philosophers, in which he is most successful. But in my opinion, he does not extend this technique to Apolodoro who, in spite of his youth, is a fully drawn héroe fracasado with the tragic sense of life.

The quality of serendipity appears in this novel in two places. First, the concern which Don Fulgencio feels for the magnum opus on which he is working because it is what will survive him after his death is the same concern which occupies Unamuno later in many of his works which do not fall within the scope of this study. The second occurrence of serendipity is seen in the serious treatment given to the importance of solipcism, which when treated positively becomes one of the fundamental characteristics of the héroe fracasado, as Unamuno develops him starting with Niebla, after he has done his re-reading of the Quijote. Both of these points may also be seen evolving as he does this re-reading.

In 1905 Unamuno published his Vida de Don Quijote and Sancho as an attack on the cervantistas whom he felt had concentrated on the study of the author with the result of thereby burying Don Quijote, who after all is principally why Cervantes is remembered.
The work is written in the form of commentaries on each of Cervantes' chapters. These commentaries, however, are neither just commentaries nor even very free interpretations. They show an attempt on Unamuno's part to imaginatively become Don Quijote and to re-live his life thereby. The result is that the Don Quijote presented is Unamuno's re-creation — el Caballero de la Locura and el Caballero de la Fe — in which an analogy with another andante caballero, San Ignacio de Loyola, plays a part. The quijotismo developed in this work has two aspects, according to César Barja:

... una, ... es esa ansia de sobrevivencia, el sentimiento de inmortalidad, problema central de la vida humana. Otra, que tal sentimiento es, como todo sentimiento, algo vital, nacido y alimentado en el corazón y, en resumen, afirmado y sostenido por el corazón, por la voluntad y por la fe, en contra de la razón.

Thus it is quite easy to see this work in terms of a preview of Del sentimiento trágico. However, the technique of submerging himself in Don Quijote to re-create him from this self-determining position is where serendipity was at work in Unamuno during his writing of Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho. As he eliminated Cervantes so that Don Quijote might be, so must the author as a determining agent disappear for any creature of fiction to emerge as self-conscious. This point is further developed in Niebla.

By the time of the publication of Niebla in 1914 Unamuno had reached not only the culmination of his philosophic position but he had also developed his own unique novelistic style which he called the nivola. The nivola, according to Unamuno, is concerned with the intimate reality of the character,
Julían Marias has analyzed the distinguishing characteristics of the *nivola* which result in it being a "*novela existencial o personal*," As he points out, the only world which Unamuno gives us in these novels is the world of the characters subject to their own time. What is important is what happens to the character and what he arrives at being in the process of the story. The "*novela existencial o personal* differs from the psychological novel in that the changing states of the mind, the conflicts of feelings are the true subject matter of the psychological novel. In the "*novela existencial o personal*", however, love, hate, sadness, envy -- whatever the affective state -- is a mode of being in an ontological manner. "... no es algo que le pase a uno, lo que en cierto momento se siente, sino lo que se es." Since the "*novela existencial o personal*" is an expression of life, this accounts for its dramatic and narrative qualities.

*Niebla* is the story of Augusto Pérez' development from a *fracasado* to a *héroe fracasado*. The story takes its title partly from the *nivola* technique which presents the characters' individual view of the world with the result that in the matter of interpersonal relations any interaction between characters rests basically, as it does with people in real life, on an impenetrability, a vagueness, a fog of subjects viewing objects. Augusto Pérez is a young man who has lived alone with two old servants since the death of his mother. He appears initially as a person who is rather will-less, but he is not an *abúlico*. As he comments one day after observing a tramp, "...Es un vago, un vago como...!No, yo no soy un vago! Mi imaginación no descansa." One day while concerned with his
own thoughts, without even being conscious of what he was doing, he follows a girl through the streets to her home. When the doorman of her house eyes him with curiosity Augusto does the expected and asks about the girl to cover his embarrassment. As he walks back home he daydreams about Eugenia, that they are in love with each other, that they will marry and have children, etc. Then suddenly he decides that is is really going to court the girl and win her away from her novio, and when he does he realizes "... ya tiene mi vida una finalidad; ya tengo una conquista que llevar a cabo." On the day on which Augusto gets to meet Eugenia through an accidental occurrence he returns home and, as is his custom, has a long conversation with his dog, Orfeo:

¿De dónde ha brotado Eugenia? ¿Es ella una creación mía o soy creación suya yo?, o ¿somos los dos creaciones mutuas, ella de mí y yo de ella? ¿No es acaso todo creación de cada cosa y cada cosa creación de todo? ¿Y qué es creación?, ¿qué eres tú, Orfeo?, ¿qué soy yo? ...

¿Qué vida está, Orfeo, qué vida ... Cada hora me llega empujada por las horas que le precedieron; no he conocido el porvenir. Y ahora que empiezo a vislumbrarlo me parece se me va a convertir en pasado. ... Estos días que pasan ... este día, este eterno día que pasa ..., deslizándose en niebla de aburrimiento. Hoy como ayer, mañana como hoy ...

Esta es la revelación de la eternidad, Orfeo, de la terrible eternidad. Cuando el hombre se queda a solas y cierra los ojos al porvenir, al ensueño, se le revela el abismo pavoroso de la eternidad. La eternidad que no es porvenir. 87

This preoccupation with being and time continues throughout the story. After Augusto finds out that he has been the victim of a confidence game played by Eugenia and her novio to get money from him with which to run away together it reaches its climax:

--¡Es que me ha hecho padre, Victor!
--¿Cómo? ¿Qué te ha hecho padre?
--Sí, de mí mismo! Con esto creo haber nacido de veras. Y para sufrir, para morir.
Si, el segundo nacimiento, el verdadero, es nacer por el dolor a la conciencia de la muerte incesante, de que estamos siempre muriendo. Pero si te has hecho padre de ti mismo es que te has hecho hijo de ti mismo también. ... ¿Te has encontrado nunca a tus propios ojos más interesante que ahora? ¿Cómo sabe uno que tiene un miembro si no le duele?...

—Y me devoro, me devoro. Empecé, Victor, como una sombra, como una ficción; durante años he vagado como un fantasma, como un muñeco de niebla, sin creer en mi propia existencia, imaginándome ser un personaje fantástico que un oculto genio inventó para solazarse o desahogarse; pero ahora, después de lo que me han hecho, después de esta burla, de esta ferocidad de burla, ¡ahora sí, ahora me siento, ahora me palpo, ahora no dudo de mi existencia real! 88

Augusto decides to commit suicide but before he does he goes to Salamanca to visit Miguel de Unamuno who had written an article on suicide which impressed him. 89 At this point the nivola technique is substituted for one of straight narration. When Unamuno, as the creator of the fictional character Augusto, tells him that he cannot commit suicide because he has decided that he will die very soon:

—¡Ah, eso nunca! ¡nunca! ¡nunca! — gritó.

—¡Ah! -- le dije, mirándole con lástima y rabia --. ¿Conque estabas dispuesto a matarte y no quieres que yo te mate? ¿Conque ibas a quitarte la vida y te resistes a que te la quite yo?

—Sí, no es lo mismo ... Es que yo quiero vivir, don Miguel; quiero vivir, quiero vivir ...

—¿No pensabas matarte?

—¡Oh! Si es por eso, yo le juro, señor de Unamuno, que no me mataré, que no me quitaré esta vida que Dios o usted me ha dado; se lo juro ... Ahora que usted quiere matarme, quiero yo vivir, vivir, vivir ... ¡Quiero ser yo, ser yo! Quiero vivir ... 90

When don Miguel remains adamant in his decision Augusto says:

—¿Con que no, eh? -- me dijo --, ¿Con que no? No quiere usted dejarme ser yo, salir de la niebla, vivir, vivir, vivir, verme, oírme, tocarme, sentirme, dolerme, serme: ¿con que no lo quiere?, ¿con que he de morir ente de ficción? Pues bien, mi señor creador don Miguel, también usted se morirá, también usted, y se volverá a la nada de que salió ... ¡Dios dejará de soñarle! Se morirá usted, sí, se morirá, aunque no lo quiera; se morirá usted y se morirán todos los que lean mi historia, todos, todos, todos,
Augusto does die shortly thereafter as his creator predicted, but before he does he fully understands his existence as a fictional character:

—Claro, yo no vivo. Los inmortales no vivimos, y yo no vivo, sobrevivo; ¡yo soy idea!, ¡soy idea! 92

Unamuno's novel, Nada menos que todo un hombre, which appeared in 1916, receives its title from Alejandro Gómez' description of himself. Alejandro is a strong-willed, self-made man who enjoys making his own destiny and being responsible for it.

Los que le trataban teníanle por hombre ambicioso y de vastos proyectos, muy voluntarioso, y muy tozudo, y muy reconcentrado. Alardeaba de plebeyo. 93

He buys the right to marry the beautiful Julia Yáñez from her family and after their marriage wins her desire for his love simply through the strength of his personality. But Julia does not know whether or not he loves her because of his quality of reconcentración. Basically Alejandro is a timid man and a proud one. Julia, however, recognizes only the latter quality, and it becomes a vital matter for her to know whether she is really loved for herself or whether she is just one of Alejandro's possessions. She starts a flirtation with a young count to provoke his jealousy. However, the count is one of the señoritos whom her husband disdains and his reaction to his wife's spending so much time in the company of this man is stated, "Me alegro, si eso te divierte. Es para lo que sirve el pobre mentecato." 94 Julia finally reaches an extreme state of exasperation and tells Alejandro that the man is her lover. Alejandro's reaction is,
He calls in two doctors to examine her sanity. The doctors are afraid that Alejandro will kill his wife and the count if they declare her sane, so they do what is expected of them. Julia is sent to a mental institution where she stays until she admits to her husband that she invented the story to make him jealous. Then she asks him if he loves her and as he reacts she gets a glimpse of his timidity as well as his pride:

Y entonces vio en Alejandro, su pobre mujer, por primera vez, algo que nunca antes en él viera; le descubrió un fondo del alma terrible y hermética que el hombre de la fortuna guardaba celosamente sellado. Fue como si un relámpago de luz tempestuosa alubrrase por un momento el lago negro, tenebroso de aquella alma, haciéndole relucir su sobrehaz. Y fue que vio asomar dos lágrimas en los ojos fríos y cortantes como navajas de aquel hombre. Y estalló:

—¡Pues no he de quererte, hija mía, pues no he de quererte! ¡Con todo el alma, y con toda la sangre, y con todas las entrañas; más que a mí mismo! ... 96

Shortly thereafter Julia gets very sick and dies. Alejandro, realizing that he doesn't want to live without her, opens his veins and dies also. This is his last strong-willed act and one which is performed in the completely authentic attitude of a héroe fracasado.

Although very short, Nada menos que todo un hombre is a quite powerful novel. In keeping with the subject matter, Unamuno drops the semi-mocking tone which pervades Amor y pedagogía and Niebla as the strong shadow of the author's personality. In fact, there is less of the author visible as author in this story than in any of the other works we are dealing with except Abel Sánchez. Unamuno uses the nivola technique to excellent advantage to develop the character of Alejandro as he reveals himself not only to Julia and the reader,
but to himself. It is in the latter connection that the quality of serendipity arises. When after Julia's death,

...sintió pasar, como una nube de hielo, su vida toda, aquella vida que ocultó a todos, hasta a sí mismo. Y llegó a su niñez terrible y a cómo se estremecía bajo los despiadados golpes del que pasaba por su padre y cómo maldecía a él, y cómo una tarde, exasperado, cerró el puño, blandiendo delante de un Cristo de la iglesia de su pueblo. 97

This is Alejandro's realization of his own nothingness, from which he decides on his act of noluntad. The overtones of the Oedipus complex contained in this passage bring the realization that the entire manner of being of Alejandro as it has been developed from the beginning of the story is entirely consistent with the psychological phenomena which this term describes. But as Alejandro was not aware of it until the pain of Julia's death revealed it to him, neither is the reader, because the technique of the nivola is built on the being of the character in time. Specifically, the matter of serendipity arises as the possibility of the use of psychological material with a reverse perspective within the nivola technique, i.e., a nivola in which the protagonist is aware of his basic motivating passion, as is the case with Joaquin Monegro in Abel Sánchez.

Unamuno says of his Abel Sánchez. Una historia de pasión, which appeared in 1917, that it is perhaps the most tragic of all of his novels. The theme of the story comes from the Bible, the envy and hatred which Cain felt for his brother Abel who was the favorite of God. The nivola technique is used again with the addition of the classic literary convention, the diary. This device, however, fits into the nivola structure to show Joaquin's psychological awareness of his passions as his manner of being. In this way it supports the
ontological structure of the nivola as internal dialogues do in other of Unamuno's novels.

Joaquín has envied his friend Abel from childhood because of Abel's ability to make himself popular. When Abel takes Helena, a girl whom Joaquin is courting, away from him

Con ...el cansancio de tanto sufrir volvíme la reflexión, comprendí que no tenía derecho alguno a Helena, pero empecé a odiar a Abel con toda mi alma y a proponerme a la vez ocultar ese odio, abonarlo, criar lo, cuidarlo en lo recóndito de las entrañas de mi alma. ¡Odio? Aún no quería darle su nombre, ni quería reconocer que nací, predestinado, con su masa y con su semilla. Aquella noche nací al infierno de mi vida. 99

In this projection of hatred as a way of existence Joaquin begins to affect himself with a form of consciousness which is generally termed bad faith.390 Note that in the above passage Joaquin is consciously aware that he himself is the originator of this action, but with the word "predestinado" he opens himself up to the possibilities of bad faith. This allows him to escape from himself by becoming a thing to which actions happen, which is to be inauthentic or in bad faith. One might say that Joaquin is lying to himself but this implies that he knows the whole truth which he is concealing, and such is not the case. The problem of bad faith arises because it is faith. Joaquin obviously does not believe himself to be in bad faith, and yet he does not believe himself to be in good faith; either, for in doing this, one simply and innocently believes in what one believes, and again such is not the case here. What Joaquin is doing is forging a concept of belief in bad faith without being consciously aware that he is in bad faith, which gives rise to his future conduct which is a Weltanschauung of bad faith.

Joaquin attends the wedding of Abel and Helena:
Olí claros y distintos los dos sís, el de él y el de ella. Ella me miró al pronunciarlo, ¡Y quedé más frío que antes, sin un sobresalto, sin una palpitación, como si nada que me tocase hubiese oído! Y ello me llenó de infernal terror a mí mismo. Me sentí peor que un monstruo, me sentí como si no existiera, como si no fuese nada más que un pedazo de hielo, y esto para siempre. Llegué a palparme la carne, a pellizcarme, a tomarme el pulso. "Pero estoy vivo? ¿Yo soy yo?" —me dije.

In the above passage Joaquín is not really concerned with the loss of the girl. What interests him is observing himself as an object to which this is happening, that is, reinforcing the point of view of his passivity, whereas actually he is producing his own reactions, tailoring them to his specific requirements.

This fact is even clearer when Abel falls ill and Joaquín is called in his capacity as a physician to cure him. He is tempted by the thought of Abel's possible death, but

Pero ¡no se morirá! -- se dijo luego --. No dejaré yo que se muera, no debo dejarlo; está comprometido mi honor, y luego ..., necesito que viva! Y al decir este "¡necesito que viva!", temblábale toda el alma como tiembla el follaje de una encina á la sacudida del huracán.

Joaquín's entire life, as he reveals it in his diary, is structured around accepting as evidence only that which will keep him in bad faith. He reads Lord Byron's Cain and the demonic concept becomes evidence which he accepts, for it reinforces his position. When he does make attempts to free himself from this hatred -- such as his speech in praise of Abel's painting and his resumption of the routine practices of devotion prescribed by the church -- he has in advance interpreted these attempts as evidence by which he will not be persuaded and transformed into good faith. And so he is not. Joaquín persists in his introspection to the point that:
... se sorprendió un día a sí mismo a punto de pedir a Dios, en infame oración diabólica, que infiltrase en el alma de Abel odio a él...! Ah, si me envidiase...!

Y a esta idea, sintió un gozo como de derretimiento, un gozo que le hizo temblar hasta los túetanos del alma, escalofriados, ¡Ser envidiado!...

"¡Mas no es esto -- se dijo luego -- que me odio, que me envidio a mí mismo?...

But this realization of the root of his trouble, this depth probing into the being of hatred, leads Joaquín nowhere because it again only reinforces the notion of himself as a thing. And here Joaquín arrests himself for the rest of his life, including his deathbed clearing of conscience in front of his family:

--¡Por qué he sido tan envidioso, tan malo? ¿Qué hice para ser así? ¿Qué leche mamé? ¿Era un bebedizo de odio? ¿Sí lo sido un bebedizo de sangre? ¿Por qué nací en tierra de odios? En tierra en que el precepto parece ser: "Odía a tu prójimo como a ti mismo." Porque he vivido odiándome; porque aquí todos vivimos odiándonos.

Joaquín is, of course, a fracasado, and a fracasado of the type, as is the hypochondriac, who to the observer appears that surely at any moment he will see what he is doing and change his conduct. However, he is unable to do so because his bad faith is still faith in accordance with which he acts in his intransigence, and this is perhaps why Unamuno considered Joaquín Monegro the most tragic of all of his characters. This question of bad faith is the element of serendipity which this novel reveals. Bad faith became a very important question again for Unamuno during his political exile and reappears as a basic theme in his Como se hace una novela written during this time.

San Manuel Bueno, mártir, written in 1930 but not published until 1933, was Unamuno's last novel. It is the most personal of all of Unamuno's novels, the whole story being a variation on the theme of Unamunian ethics, the culmination of which he expressed best in
the sentence: "Y si es la nada lo que nos está reservado, hagamos que sea una injusticia esto." 106

In this novel Unamuno abandoned the nivola technique and instead used straight narrative in the form of a memoria which was written by Angela Carballino when she was about fifty years old. Don Manuel Bueno, her parish priest whom the bishop is now recommending for beatification, is the subject of Angela's recollections. She has known him since childhood and presents him as a man totally devoted to working for peace and harmony among the members of his parish and to strengthening their belief in God and their faith in a life hereafter. When Angela was about sixteen years old she returned to her village from boarding school and it was at that time that she began to notice a curious thing about Don Manuel. During the recitation of the Credo said at mass Don Manuel prays aloud with the congregation, but

... al llegar a lo de "creo en la resurrección de la carne y la vida perdurable" la voz de Don Manuel se zambullía, como en un lago, en la del pueblo todo, y era que él se callaba. 107

Through careful observation and several shrewdly placed questions Angela comes to realize that a deep sadness lies behind all of Don Manuel's feverish activity in behalf of his parishioners. Angela's brother, Lázaro, returns from America. Lázaro, as a believer in "progress", is inclined to anti-clericalism and he is suspicious at first of Don Manuel's influence on the village, but as he gets to know him he agrees, "¡No, no es como los otros [curas] ... es un santo!" 108

During the illness and death of Angela's mother Lázaro and Don
Manuel became good friends and gradually Lázaro resumes attending mass. On the day when he goes first to communion, however, he feels impelled to tell his sister the truth about his apparent conversion. His incorporation into the religious life of the community, he says, was suggested by Don Manuel as a good example from which the whole town might profit. He tells his sister that his first reaction to this suggestion was:

"¿Pero es usted, usted, el sacerdote, el que me aconseja que finga?", él, balbuciente: "¡Fingir! ¡Fingir no! ¡eso no es fingir! Toma agua bendita, que dijo alguien, y acabarás creyendo." Y como yo, mirándole a los ojos, le dijese: "¿Y usted celebrando misa ha acabado por creer?" él bajó la mirada al lago y se le llenaron los ojos de lágrimas. Y así es como le arranqué su secreto. 109

Then in a description which brings Dostoevski's "The Grand Inquisitor" chapter to mind Lázaro tells how he came to see Don Manuel's motives and the sanctity which lay behind them:

Y no me olvidaré jamás del día en que diciéndole yo: "Pero Don Manuel, la verdad, la verdad ante todo," él, temblando, me susurró al oído -- y eso que estábamos solos en medio del campo --: "¿La verdad? La verdad, Lázaro, es acaso algo terrible, algo intolerable, algo mortal; la gente sencilla no podría vivir con ella." "¿Y por qué me la deja entrever ahora aquí, como en confesión?" le dije. "Porque si no, me atormentaría tanto, tanto, que acabaría gritándola en medio de la plaza, y eso jamás, jamás, jamás. Yo estoy para hacer vivir a las almas de mis feligreses, para hacerles felices, para hacerles que se sueñen inmortales y no para matarles. Lo que aquí hace falta es que vivan sanamente, que vivan en unanimidad de sentido, y con la verdad, con mi verdad, no vivirían. Que vivan. Y esto hace la Iglesia, hacerles vivir. ¿Religión verdadera? Todas las religiones son verdaderas en cuanto les consuelan de haber tenido que nacer para morir, y para cada pueblo la religión más verdadera es la suya, la que le ha hecho. ¿Y la mía? La mía es consolarme en consolar a los demás, aunque el consuelo que les doy no sea el mío." Jamás olvidaré estas sus palabras. 110

This knowledge strains Angela's relations with Don Manuel until he is forced to say to her:

--Pero tú, Angelina, tú crees como a los diez años, ¿no es
—¿Tú crees?
--Sí, creo, padre.
--Pues sigue creyendo ...
--Pero usted, padre, ¿cree usted?
Vaciló un momento y reponiéndose me dijo:
--¡Creo!
--¿Pero en qué, padre, en qué? ¿Cree usted en la otra vida?
¿Cree usted que al morir no nos morimos del todo? ¿Cree que volveremos a vernos, a querernos en otro mundo venidero?
¿Cree en la otra vida?
    El pobre santo sollozaba.
--¡Mira, hija, dejemos eso!

Lázaro becomes more and more closely associated with Don Manuel and finally Don Manuel tells him of the great internal struggle which he constantly wages. Lázaro relates this conversation to his sister:

¡Mi vida, Lázaro, es una especie de suicidio continuo, un combate contra el suicidio, que es igual; pero que vivan ellos, que vivan los nuestros. ... Sigamos, pues, Lázaro, suiciádandonos en nuestra obra y en nuestro pueblo, y que suene éste su vida como el lago sueña el cielo.

Angela attends the last Holy Week celebration at which Don Manuel assists and as he is giving her the Host:

... a mí me dijo: "Reza, hija mía, reza por nosotros." Y luego, algo tan extraordinario que lo llevo en el corazón como el más grande misterio, y fue que me dijo con voz que parecía de otro mundo: "... y reza también por Nuestro Señor Jesucristo..."

Angela was so upset by her reaction to this remark that she was forced to say something to him about it the next day:

--Llegué casa y me puse a rezar. Y al llegar a aquello de "ruega por nosotros, pecadores, ahora y en la hora de nuestra muerte," una voz íntima me dijo: "¿Pecadores?, ¿pecadores nosotros? ¿Y cuál es nuestro pecado? ¿Cuál es nuestro pecado, padre?
--¿Cuál? -- me respondió--. Ya lo dijo un gran doctor de la Iglesia Católica Apostólica Española, ya lo dijo el gran doctor de La vida es sueño, ya dijo que "el delito mayor del hombre es haber nacido." Ese es, hija, nuestro pecado: él de haber nacido.

Shortly after this Don Manuel dies in the church during the recitation of the Credo.
Angela closes her memoria with the thought:

Y ahora al escribir esta memoria, esta confesión íntima de mi experiencia de la santidad ajena, creo que Don Manuel Bueno, que mi San Manuel, y que mi hermano Lázaro se murieron creyendo no creer lo que más nos interesa, pero sin creer creerlo, creyendo. en una desolación activa y resignada. O es que creía y creo que Dios Nuestro Señor, por no sé qué sagrados y no escudriñaderos designios, les hizo creerse incrédulos. Y que acaso en el acabamiento de su tránsito se les cayó la venda. 115

Don Manuel, like Unamuno, had lost his original faith in God but through the use of his will he built a fe dudosa o agónica because of his need for immortality. He realized that he alone was responsible for this faith and he sustained it through his commitment to his world which he built on the strength of it. Don Manuel is a martyr because he spent his life in giving what to him was the greatest good, a simple belief in God and immortality, to his villagers although he himself did not possess this good. In doing this he is clearly acting as a héroe fracasado who exercises his freedom as a moral agent and a creator of values.

San Manuel Bueno, mártir is Unamuno's fictional masterpiece. The only story of his which challenges it in artistic merit is, in my opinion, his very short story La venda. 116

María, blind from birth, has developed the faculty of orientation so well that she can go anywhere she wants in the city with only the aid of her cane. María is married and has a baby when she agrees to an operation which an eye specialist wants to perform on her to restore her sight. The operation is successful and she is still in the hospital getting used to seeing when she learns that her father has had an attack and is dying. In a panic she rushes from the hospital, but once in the street she is completely disoriented
because she can see. Frantically she borrows a walking cane from a man in the street, covers her eyes with a handkerchief and in this way is able to find her way home. When her father makes vague gestures which show that he doesn't understand the bandage around her eyes, her brother insists that she remove it, not only to please the father, but so that she can see her father for the first and, perhaps, the last time. She refuses,

---Porque quiero verlo ... pero a mi padre ... al que nutrió de besos mis tinieblas, porque quiero verle, no me quito de los ojos la venda ... 117

Not understanding, her brother jerks the bandage off, and she faints. When she recovers she exclaims:

---¡Padre, padre! ¡No te he visto morir!
---Hay que cerrarle los ojos -- dijo a María su hermano.
---Sí, sí, hay que cerrarle los ojos ... que no vea ya ...

que no vea ya ... ¡Padre, padre! Ya estás en las tinieblas ...
... en el reino de la misericordia ...

At this moment her husband arrives with the baby who is crying because he is hungry.

Y exclamó en seguida:
---¡La venda! ¡La venda! ¡Tráeme pronto la venda, no quiero verle!
---Pero María ... 
---Si no me vendáis los ojos, no le doy de mamar.
---Sé razonable, María ...
---Os he dicho ya mi razón está en las tinieblas ...

La vendaron, tomó el niño, lo palpó, se descubrió el pecho, y poniéndoselo a él, le apretaba contra su seno murmurando:
---¡Pobre padre! ¡Pobre padre! 119

La venda is a true allegory. The character María is a symbol of faith, but she is handled as a rarity, unique and concrete. It is this use of symbolism which gives this story its powerful intensity so that it is not the concept of faith which María symbolizes, but the reality of it. Thus, María is a living symbol of faith, true, but
she is also a symbol of herself, and nowhere has the héroe fracasado
been presented more strikingly.
NOTES

CHAPTER III


2 Julián Marías, Miguel de Unamuno (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1943), pp. 19, 20, 21 passim.


4 Luis J. Granjel, Retrato de Unamuno (Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama, S. L., 1957), p. 68. This is the source used for biographical information on Unamuno.

5 Ibid., p. 71.


7 Granjel, Retrato de Unamuno, p. 86.


9 Granjel, Retrato de Unamuno, p. 145.


12 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

14 Ibid., p. 158.

15 Ibid., p. 160.

16 Ibid., pp. 132, 133.


18 Granjel, Retrato de Unamuno, p. 148.

19 Ibid., pp. 146-147.

20 Ibid., pp. 147-148.

21 Ibid., p. 147.


23 An opinion which is noteworthy in this connection is Julian Palley's: "I submit that Unamuno was the first existentialist novelist and Abel Sánchez (1917) the first existentialist novel." See: Julian Palley, "Existentialist Trends in the Modern Spanish Novel," Hispania, XLIV, (March, 1961), p. 22.


Valdés' statement that Unamuno is indebted to Kierkegaard for much of this "existentialist orientation" is supported by Oscar A. Fasel's conclusion to his article "Observations on Unamuno and Kierkegaard." Mr. Fasel states that the reason for this study is that although it is a "generally accepted idea that Kierkegaard is one of the great influences in Unamuno, [Fasel's comparative study of the two men revealed that] on all major issues ... there exist diametrically opposed views." (p. 443) As a result he concludes: "Clearly Unamuno's interest could not have been in Kierkegaard the thinker, but in Kierkegaard the man, the fighter, the individualist ... in a hostile world that tried to deprive him of his own convictions." (p. 448). See: Oscar A. Fasel, "Observations on Unamuno and Kierkegaard," Hispania, XXXVIII (December, 1955), 443-450.
Valdés does not explain why he calls Unamuno a "forerunner" of the modern existentialists, when it would seem from his remarks that he is anxious to establish Unamuno's position as a prime member of this group. Perhaps he is using the term simply as a temporal designation, for after all, Del sentimiento trágico was published in 1913 and Sein und Zeit, which is commonly considered to be the first philosophical exposition of the existentialist position, only appeared fourteen years later.

In discussing this matter of influence, it would seem that the extremely important and angry footnote in José Ortega y Gasset's "Pidiendo un Goethe desde dentro" should be brought to light. The entire footnote is too long to quote here, but he is speaking of Heidegger's book Being and Time and he states: "Apenas hay uno o dos conceptos importantes de Heidegger que no preexistan, a veces con anterioridad de trece años, en mis libros." (p. 403) He then illustrates with quotations from his Meditaciones del Quijote (1914), with quotations from some of his 1924 articles in La Nación, and also with quotations from his El tema de nuestro tiempo (1923). See: José Ortega y Gasset, "Pidiendo un Goethe desde dentro," Cp. cit., IV, pp. 403-404.

If one accepts José Sánchez Villaseñor's opinion: "Notwithstanding ... accentuated temperamental divergencies, Unamuno's and Ortega's ideological identity of central subject matter is surprising" as correct, as indeed study shows it to be, then one is led to conjecture that Unamuno is perhaps the link which connects Heidegger and the Generation of '98. See: José Sánchez Villaseñor, Ortega y Gasset, Existentialist (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949), p. 192. Also see Miguel Cruz Hernández "La misión socrática de Don Miguel de Unamuno," Cuadernos de la cátedra Miguel de Unamuno, III (1952), 46, which supports this view by reporting an interview which the author had with Heidegger wherein Heidegger pointed out the volumes of Unamuno's works in his library and made the remark that "... era el pensador español que más le había preocupado."


Ibid., p. 18.

Unamuno concedes that objective truth and subjective truth do meet in one instance: creative science which is directed toward the fact.

29. Ibid., p. 23. This is Huertas-Jourda's translation of Unamuno's "... sabiduría del corazón..." Ibid.


31. Ibid., p. 26. This is Huertas-Jourda's translation of Unamuno's "Y el ... problema de la filosofía es el de conciliar las necesidades intelectuales con las necesidades afectivas y con las volitivas." See: Ibid., p. 472.


35. Ibid., p. 36.


37. Ibid., p. 37. This is Huertas-Jourda's translation of Unamuno's "... como en un cinematógrafo..." See: Ibid., p. 621.

38. Ibid., p. 39.


This is Huertas-Jourda's translation of Unamuno's "El amor personaliza cuanto ama. ... Y cuando el amor es tan grande ... entonces lo personaliza todo y descubre ... esta Conciencia del Universo ... es lo que llamamos Dios ... Dios es, pues, la personalización del Todo ..." See: Unamuno, "Del sentimiento trágico," Op. cit., IV, p. 573.

The quotation is Huertas-Jourda's translation of Unamuno's "... o más bien yo proyección de Dios a lo finito ..." See: Ibid., p. 599.


The quotation is Huertas-Jourda's translation of Unamuno's "¡Ser, ser siempre, ser sin término." See: Ibid., p. 492.

This is Huertas-Jourda's translation of Unamuno's "Pero al que cree que navaga, tal vez sin rumbo, en balsa movible y anegable, no ha de inmutarle el que la balsa se le mueva bajo los pies y amenace hundirse. Este tal cree obrar, no porque estime su principio de acción verdadero, sino para hacerlo tal, para probarse su verdad, para crearse su mundo espiritual.

Mi conducta ha de ser la mejor prueba, la prueba moral de mi anhelo supremo." See: Ibid., pp. 666-667.

This is Huertas-Jourda's translation of Unamuno's "Y si es la nada lo que nos está reservado, hagamos que sea una injusticia esto." See: Ibid., p. 668.
175


52

Ibid., p. 60. This is Huertas-Jourda's translation of Unamuno's "Yo sé y tengo para mí que voy encantado, y esto me basta para la seguridad de mi conciencia." See: Ibid., p. 232.


53

Unamuno's novels which develop the héroes fracasados theme are: Paz en la guerra; Amor y pedagogía; Niebla; Nada menos que todo un hombre; Abel Sánchez, Una historia de pasión, and San Manuel Bueno, mártir. These are the novels around which this study is centered. Unamuno's Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho will be discussed briefly for reasons of logical concordance and one of his short stories, La venda, will be treated purely on the grounds of aesthetic appreciation. Unamuno's remaining novelistic production is excluded by definition as not being concerned with the héroes fracasados theme. For an excellent thematic classification and analysis of the literary corpus of Unamuno's work in its entirety see Valdés, Death in the Literature of Unamuno.

54


55

Ibid., pp. 980-981-982, passim.

56

Ibid., pp. 983-984.

57

Ibid., p. 983. Unamuno's position on suicide stands in sharp contrast to Albert Camus' as given in his The Myth of Sisyphus. This latter, however, was written seemingly as a tour de force to refute the charges of nihilism so frequently laid on the doorstep of the existentialist philosophers. However, as one who also can "understand only in human terms," Unamuno's position seems as logical to me as Camus'. It all depends on whether one wants to preserve one's conflict or not.
58. Ibid., pp. 982-985-987, passim.


61. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

62. Ibid., p. 69.

63. Ibid., pp. 69-70.

64. Ibid., p. 322.

65. Ibid., pp. 324-325-326, passim.

66. Ibid., pp. 326-327.


68. Ibid., p. 400.

69. Ibid., p. 412.

70. Ibid., p. 416.

71. Ibid., pp. 415-416.

72. Ibid., pp. 425-426.

73. Ibid., p. 431.
In Niebla Unamuno gives the origin of this word. Victor, a friend of Augusto Pérez', is writing a novel which he says he is producing "como se vive," sin saber lo que vendrá." He is putting in it "todo lo que se me ocurra, sea como fuere," and the important thing is that there be plenty of dialogue in it. Augusto's comment regarding this is:

--Pues, acabará no siendo novela.
--No, será ... , será ... nivola.
--¿Y qué es eso, que es nivola?

--Pues, le he oído contar a Manuel Machado, el poeta, el hermano de Antonio, que una vez le llevó a don Eduardo Benot, para leerlo, un soneto que estaba en alejandrinos o en no sé qué otra forma heterodoxa. Se lo leyó, y don Eduardo le dijo: "Pero eso no es soneto! ..." "No, señor, -- le contestó Machado --, no es soneto, es ... sonite." Pues así con mi novela, sino ... ¿cómo dije?, navilo ..., nebulo, no, no nivola, eso es, nivola! Así nadie tendrá derecho a decir que deroga las leyes de su género ... Invento el género, e inventar un género no es más que darle un nombre nuevo, y le doy las leyes que me place. See: Unamuno, "Niebla," Op. cit., II, pp. 776-777.

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Marías, Miguel de Unamuno, p. 51.

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Ibid., p. 52.
Valdés notes that Unamuno's use of this technique, especially the grotesque and absurd application of it, antedates Kafka's use of the same technique in his *Metamorphosis* by two years. See: Valdés, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

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Valdés points out that if Unamuno's article "Pirandello y yo," written in 1923, which is now available in Vol. X of the second edition of Unamuno's *Obras completas*, pp. 544-548, had been accessible, much scholarly speculation as to who originated this technique of the author's confrontation with his fictional character would have been settled earlier. Unamuno states that he and Pirandello were not aware of each other's work at the times that they wrote. See: Valdés, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

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*Ibid. *

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Unamuno, "Nada menos que todo un hombre," *op. cit.*, II, p. 1037.

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In this discussion I have been guided by Jean-Paul Sartre's chapter on mauvaise foi as translated by Walter Kaufmann in Kaufmann, *Op. cit.* , pp. 241-270. I have, however, in my discussion used the literal translation "bad faith" for a translation of mauvaise foi in place of his translation of "self-deception."


The plot of La venda was first written as a play in 1899. It was published in this form in 1913 and presented on the stage for the first time in 1921. The relato La venda appeared in 1900.

CONCLUSION

An attempt to widen the perspectives from which Azorín, Baroja and Unamuno are customarily viewed has been the rationale of this study.

Traditional interpretations of these writers are usually nationalistic in tone and tend to emphasize the rebellious confrontation of these men with the established society of their day. Their disagreement with this society is viewed as being brought to a head by Spain's disastrous war with the United States in 1898, which threw the image and the problem of Spain into sharp relief. Unamuno, Baroja and Azorín were concerned as writers to effect a reform in the national conscience, which would bring about the Europeanization of their country. The similar efforts which these men directed toward this goal is the basic reason why they have been grouped and historically labeled the "Generation of '98." Many other points of similarity among these men can be offered to sustain the validity of this classification with abundant clarity, as, for example, studies like Pedro Lain Entralgo's "La generación del noventa y ocho" contained in his España como problema show.

Of all of the affinities of these men, however, none is more characteristic of Baroja, Unamuno and Azorín than the way in which they maintain their individuality through a refusal to separate their life and their art. This is the point at which this study began. A comparative investigation of biographical infor-
mation on these three men elucidates the additional coincidence that each of them suffered a severe crisis of a personal nature at a fairly early stage in his career. Following this, they elected to use the Bildungsroman genre, i.e., the novel of education, or fictional biography centered around the hero's reaction to ideas about life which result from his experience. This type of novel served as a vehicle for the author to analyze the implications of the troubled period from which they had emerged. The length of time each author remained interested in this genre varied. Azorín wrote his trilogy, La voluntad, Antonio Azorín and Las confesiones de un pequeño filósofo, which he completed in 1904, and then did not write any other novels for a period of eighteen years. When he resumed his novelistic production he was attracted by a different type of material; however, in his later novels which deal with the author's problem in creating, there is an analogous treatment of the artistic experience and the existential experience as depicted in his earlier trilogy. Baroja was interested in the novel of education from the time he seriously started writing in 1900 until he branched off into the historical novel with his Memorias de un hombre de acción series in 1912. His later novels which bear a personal stamp fall more into the classification of memorias than novels of education. Unamuno's interest in the Bildungsroman genre remained alive throughout his entire life. The fact that he used it in his first and in his last novel makes this clear.

The héroe fracasado is the focal point of interest in the novel of education as these three writers use the genre. This type of character has been defined in this study as being synonymous
with the twentieth century existentialist hero, and this exact point provides the widened perspective of these writers which this study attempts to show.

Azorín's trilogy is illustrative of the héro fracosado in the process of emerging from an inauthentic to an authentic state of existence. This change takes place in Antonio Azorín when he recognizes his freedom and chooses to use his imagination to achieve the end which this experience has spontaneously posited. The revelation occurs in La voluntad and in the following work, Antonio Azorín, the title character is seen in the act of creating his new empirical ego. His projection of himself toward his new future also brings forth a re-defining of his past. The third work of the trilogy, Las confesiones de un pequeño filósofo, pre-Azorín's reflected reflection of his childhood as he stood in presence to it in an exercise of his new found freedom.

Baroja's novels abound in fracasados, which reveals the extent to which he was haunted by the pathos of human existence. Undoubtedly his scientific training, oriented toward cause and effect, greatly influenced this outlook. The difficulty encountered in interpreting Baroja's héro fracosado is not in the presentation of his anguish and suffering in a world whose meaning and purpose he does not understand. This is clearly recognizable existential material. The difficulty arises in interpreting his action to transform this world, because Baroja's héro fracosado acts toward a goal from his free spontaneity more often through passion or instinct than through willed determination. This form of the existential "manoeuvre" is more elusive to apprehend for explicative
and illustrative purposes, but, as Baroja shows, it produces an action, just as deliberation does, which solves the problem of existence and does so with equal efficacy.

The héroe fracasado in Azorín and Baroja basically confronts the problem of the nothingness of life. This is true of Unamuno's héroe fracasado, too, but in addition he confronts the problem of the anticipated nothingness of death. This added dimension to the structure of being is the human meaning of liberty for Unamuno. The awareness of this fact is as equal in importance for an understanding of his novelistic production as it is for an evaluation of his philosophical works. The anticipatory facing of the nothingness of death serves as the basis for his segregation of characters into either hérones fracasados or fracasados, as stated in his prologue to Tres novelas ejemplares y un prólogo. For him, both the hero of voluntad, who chooses to want to be ("querer ser") and the hero of noluntad, who chooses not to want to be ("no querer ser") have the tragic sense of life which only comes from having faced the anticipated nothingness of death. The fracasado in Unamuno's novels is so, precisely because he is not aware of this added dimension to the structure of being. Only in San Manuel Bueno, mártir does Unamuno fully illustrate the hero of voluntad reacting to his awareness of the anticipated nothingness of death. Don Manuel molding his faith and practicing his ethics by means of which he fills the nothingness of life illustrates the truth of freedom in action, as Unamuno saw it.

"To be or not to be" in the Shakespearean sense is the question for the existentialist hero of contemporary literature. It is herein shown to be the question not only for Unamuno, as has long
been recognized, but also for the héroe fracasado of Baroja and Azorín. This investigation has been undertaken to demonstrate this fact, for to establish all three writers as exponents of a view of life which occupies such a prominent place in the intellectual and literary currents of the modern Western world is to open up the possibility of interpretations far beyond the scope of the present study.
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