The Path Not Taken: Martin Heidegger & a Politics of Care

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THE PATH NOT TAKEN:
MARTIN HEIDEGGER & A POLITICS OF CARE

A Dissertation

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# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iii

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... v

Chapter
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

Part I. Heidegger, Politics, & The Political
2. Heidegger & Politics In Context .......................................................................................... 14
   I. Heidegger’s Politics .............................................................................................................. 14
   II. Heidegger Before *Being and Time* ............................................................................. 18
   III. Three Approaches .......................................................................................................... 24

3. The Taken Path ....................................................................................................................... 58
   I. The Communitarian & Authoritarian Moment ................................................................. 69
   II. The Moment of Place & Polis .......................................................................................... 90
   III. The Defensive Moment .................................................................................................. 116

Part II. From Selfhood To Solicitude: Heidegger’s Politics Of Care
4. Three Fundaments ............................................................................................................... 126
   I. Authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) ......................................................................................... 127
   II. Dasein-with (*Mitdasein*) .............................................................................................. 137
   III. Care (*Sorge*) ................................................................................................................. 157

5. On Conscience & Responsibility ......................................................................................... 168
   I. The Three Fundaments: A Brief Re-Visitation ................................................................. 168
   II. On Conscience (*Gewissen*) ............................................................................................ 169
   III. Responsibility & ‘Originary Ethics’ ............................................................................... 177
   IV. Import for a Politics of Care ............................................................................................ 185

6. The Path Not Taken: A Politics Of Care ............................................................................ 187
   I. *Práxis, Poiësis, Phronësis* .............................................................................................. 188
   II. A Politics of Care ............................................................................................................. 198

7. On A Politics Of Care In Heidegger’s Later Works .......................................................... 211
   Ends ........................................................................................................................................ 222

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 231

Vita ................................................................................................................................................. 242
Abstract

This volume addresses two particular lacunae in the scholarship concerning the intersections between Martin Heidegger, politics, and the political. First, it traces the politico-philosophical path that Heidegger took as he moved on to more ontic considerations after publishing his master work – *Being and Time* – and identifies three significant ‘moments’ in that progression: the Communitarian and Authoritarian moment; the Moment of Place and Polis, and the Defensive Moment. Second, it presents a robust vision of a nascent ‘politics of care’ in *Being and Time*, dependent upon three key elements: authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*), Dasein-with (*Mitdasein*), and a special type of care (*Sorge*) – authentic solicitude. The politics of care described herein additionally has several Aristotelian elements, including the notions of human flourishing, *práxis, poiēsis*, and *phronēsis*.
Another day. I follow another path, 
Entering the leafing woodland, visit the spring 
Or the rocks where the roses bloom…

-Friedrich Hölderlin

Chapter 1: Introduction

Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*) is, unquestionably, one of the most influential and important texts of the twentieth century. Enquiries concerning the intersection between the Heideggerian corpus and the political have, however, been rife with speculation and great debate. This volume is not intended to reignite the debate centered on whether or not Heidegger’s philosophical texts also contain a vestige of his personal politics. Instead, the ambition of this project relates to Heidegger’s philosophical choices as he moved on to more ontic considerations after *Being and Time*.

I begin with the premise that a political theory, albeit in nascent form, does indeed exist in *Being and Time* – and that its foundations are the three fundamental notions of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*), Dasein-with (*Mitdasein*), and a special type of care (*Sorge*), authentic solicitude (*Fürsorge*). The project of the current work is twofold: to elaborate on the nascent political theory in *Being and Time* and, secondarily, to explain why Heidegger did not develop this theory himself. In other words, what will be accomplished is the development of a Heideggerian ‘politics of care’ out of an existing structure in *Being and Time*. Indeed, the task at hand is to identify the extant theory, to elaborate upon it in a way that Heidegger did not choose, and to initiate a discussion of the possible consequences of this extant theory.

Furthermore, the importance and originality of the current work is threefold. First, although the question of the relationship of Heidegger’s philosophy to his politics has been a
matter of considerable interest in the scholarly world, a Heideggerian political theory unrelated to his theories on a potential *Führer-state* has never been attempted. Crafting a positive political theory from the fundaments in *Being and Time* is of significance, not only as a central part of understanding Heidegger as a philosopher, but also for its meritorious implications for the study of political theory. Second, as it may safely be argued that one of the fundamental questions of political theory writ large is how human beings ought or should live together, the nascent theory elaborated upon and investigated in this work has potentially far-reaching implications. Third, beyond serving an interpretive function, this exploration of a nascent politics of care could serve to transform our way of thinking about human relationships, ethics, and care of one another.

Never has there been a riper time for discovering new and innovative ways in which to seriously address Heidegger’s relationship to political theory. Within the last two years, the last installment in Heidegger’s self-directed collected works has been published in Germany – the “Black Notebooks.” Preliminary analyses of Heidegger’s personal, philosophical journals seek to offer final and incontrovertible evidence, not of Heidegger’s linkage to the Nationalist Socialist Party, but of his anti-Semitism. It therefore seems that it is timely to identify and pursue new potential pathways for Heidegger’s thought to traverse, chiefly in a primary text that was published before Heidegger’s personal foray into politics. The volume at hand seeks to achieve just that – a new way in which to view Heidegger’s thought previous to his involvement with National Socialism, specifically located in *Being and Time*. In this endeavor, I hope to create something entirely new: a politics of care as is in nascent form in the 1927 text – heavily influenced by the works of Aristotle. Here, Heidegger’s alternative path is carefully constructed and delineated. It leads to a political theory that he did not pursue, but exists nonetheless. What is special about *Being and Time* is not only its ontological profundity, but its bold scope – its
courage to attend to what had not been attended to properly in philosophy before – the everyday world.

As the key premise of the current work focuses almost entirely on *Being and Time*, it is worth noting at this point that the idea that several ‘paths’ are available to Heidegger as he moves on to more ontic considerations after 1927 is not entirely new. Lawrence Vogel,¹ for example, contends that any interpretation of the framework set forth in *Being and Time* is dependent upon how one chooses to view Heidegger’s concept of ‘authenticity’ therein. This is especially true as, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger sees ‘authenticity’ (*Eigentlichkeit*) and ‘inauthenticity’ (*Uneigentlichkeit*) as possibilities for many of his key concepts.

According to Vogel, depending upon whether one chooses to emphasize certain other importation notions in *Being and Time*, one’s interpretation of ‘authenticity’ or, more specifically, authentic existence, will change. For Vogel, then, three distinct possibilities open themselves to Heidegger after *Being and Time*: the ‘existentialist’ interpretation, the ‘historicist’ interpretation, and the ‘cosmopolitan’ interpretation. First, if emphasis is placed on ‘being-unto-death,’ then authenticity may be viewed as essentially an emphasis on ‘radical freedom.’ Certainly, this is how Jean-Paul Sartre interprets Heidegger on this point and possibly why Sartre chooses to view Heidegger as an existentialist. Second, if one chooses to interpret authenticity as ‘authentic historicality,’ then ‘destiny’ and ‘historicality’ become the emphasis of authentic existence. This would, of course, mean that Heidegger supported a more ‘conservative’ political stance, or at least a philosophical position that has more conservative political implications. Should we choose to accept that Heidegger indeed intended authentic existence to mean ‘authentic historicality,’ then this may prove to be a link between Heidegger and his sympathy

for what the Nationalist Socialists were attempting to accomplish in Germany during the time of
the Third Reich. The third option that Vogel presents is to place interpretive emphasis on
‘being-with-others.’ To be sure, this interpretation of authenticity in *Being and Time* is more
embedded in the text, but it would mean that Heidegger chose intersubjective caring as the main
thrust of authentic existence.

However, I contend here that the first of Vogel’s interpretive ‘paths’ cannot, in fact, be
either supported by what is present in *Being and Time*, or by Heidegger himself. Heidegger’s
1947 “Letter on Humanism,” for example, can be convincingly read as a direct response to the
existentialist interpretation of concepts in *Being and Time* as laid out by Sartre. If, as Sartre
argues in “Existentialism is a Humanism,” “one must take subjectivity as one’s point of
departure,” that the ‘radical freedom’ Sartre finds in Heidegger originates from this ultimate
subjectivity, then Sartre misreads Heidegger’s account of authentic existence. In point of fact,
and an issue that Heidegger makes quite clear in the “Letter,” Dasein, human existence, lies
beyond the reach of Cartesian subjectivity or ‘metaphysical’ discussions of human essence:

> What man is – or, as it is called in the traditional language of metaphysics, the
> ‘essence’ of man – lies in his ek-sistence. But ek-sistence thought in this way
> is not identical with the traditional concept of *existentia*, which means
> actuality in contrast to the meaning of *essential* as possibility. In *Being and
> Time* (p. 42) this sentence is italicized: ‘The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its
> existence.’ However, here the opposition between *existentia* and *essential* is
> not under consideration, because neither of these metaphysical determinations
> of Being, let alone their relationship, is yet in question. Still less does the
> sentence contain a universal statement about Dasein, since the word came into
> fashion in the eighteenth century as a name for an ‘object,’ intending to
> express the metaphysical concept of the actuality of the actual. On the
> contrary, the sentence says: man occurs essentially in such a way that he is the
> ‘there’ [das ‘Da’], that is, the clearing of Being. The ‘Being’ of the *Da*, and
> only it, has the fundamental character of ek-sistence, that is, of an ecstatic
inherence in the truth of Being. The ecstatic essence of man consists in ek-
sistence, which is different from the metaphysically conceived existentia.²

What we are left with are the two other interpretive emphases on key concepts in Being
and Time that Vogel astutely delineates: the historicist and the cosmopolitan. The first of these
paths, the Heidegger seems to have actually taken, leads him to a strange and incomprehensible
foray into National Socialism, as is evidenced from the political theory he describes in Nature,
History, State and also in Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language. As Vogel
puts it,

Through the lens of a reading of Being and Time that puts weight on
Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s ‘historicality,’ the existentialist
interpretation, which places so much emphasis on Being-unto-death, looks
one-sided. The principle of historicality— the idea that authentic existence
demands the subordination of the individual to a ‘communal destiny’ – calls
into question the interpretation of fundamental ontology as a radical
individualism that estranges the person from his community and places him
‘beyond good and evil.’³

For the Heidegger of Being and Time, the ‘historicist’ interpretation, with its emphasis on Being-
unto-death, destiny, and historicality, could indeed be considered a potential ‘path’ open to him
after Being and Time.

However, there was another path accessible to him, the ‘path not taken,’ which leads to
close relationships between human beings defined by an authentic solicitude – an attitude of
caring, of attentive watchfulness, and allowance of others to reach their full human potential on
their own terms. While Vogel terms this ‘path’ the ‘cosmopolitan,’ I aver that this is a

² Martin Heidegger. “Letter on Humanism.” In Basic Writings. Edited by David Farrell
Krell, 229. Note: As Farrell Krell points out, “Heidegger writes Existenz as Ek-sistence, in order
to stress man’s ‘standing out’ into the ‘truth of Being.’ Humanism underestimates man’s unique
position in the clearing of Being (Lichtung des Seins), Heidegger argues, conceding that to this
extent he rejects the humanistic tradition. For it remains stamped in the mold of metaphysics,
engrossed in beings, oblivious to Being,” 215.

³ Vogel. The Fragile We, 49.
misnomer. The potential for a political theory in *Being and Time* cannot be ‘cosmopolitan’ in nature, although it is easy to see why Vogel makes this mistake. Such a cosmopolitan interpretation would be far too ‘metaphysical’ and Kantian for Heidegger. To be sure, Vogel argues that the existentialist and historicist interpretations are ‘inadequate.’\(^4\) However, Vogel’s larger project in *The Fragile We* is clearly to determine that morality is present in Heidegger. Such a cosmopolitan viewpoint would indeed require that a shared morality be present in a worldwide, single, human community. More than this, and more to the point of the current project, a universal cosmopolitan state would require these same elements: a state that encompasses all the peoples of the world; a state that has no spatial boundaries; a state structured according to a metaphysical foundation; and one where, politically, nationality and differences of culture are rendered completely inconsequential. In fact, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger specifically disavows any Kantian interpretation of his theories – especially that of conscience. What I propose in this work is something different – not proof for the potential for a cosmopolitan state in *Being and Time*, but one that still takes into account an emphasis on being-with-others in caring and authentic solicitude, a politics of human flourishing that has weighty implications for our current age. Yet, there are other ways in which to view Heidegger’s ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity.’ One of these is to look to his life and to the world in which he was reared, centered as it was on Catholicism.

Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein (*Daseinanalytik*) in his master work was, perhaps, heavily influenced by his childhood and education. Although Heidegger received an education from the Jesuits, and planned to become a priest, by 1918, he was neither a theology student nor a Catholic philosopher. Through his encounters with Catholicism and the political life of the small

\(^4\) Vogel. *The Fragile We*, 69.
village in which he was reared, Heidegger began to seize upon the basic foundation for *Being and Time* – historical life, which he also believed was the foundation of all philosophizing itself: “Philosophy to Heidegger became the art of the ‘growth of Dasein for itself.’ This turn toward the everyday world has a polemical accent, aimed against a philosophy [Catholicism mediated by St. Thomas Aquinas, the Catholic and Aristotelian apologist] that still believes it knows man’s calling.”

Through careful thinking, investigation, and intellectual labor, Heidegger eventually lights upon the notion that ‘Being-there,” Dasein, is human existence. To wit, he determines that human existence is predicated upon the ‘there’ of ‘being-there.’ He begins to reveal, in various lecture courses and writings, “those structures that are presented as ‘existentials’ in *Being and Time* – ‘Being-in’ (*In-Sein*), ‘state of mind’ (*Befindlichkeit*), ‘deterioration’ (*Verfallen*), ‘care’ (*Sorge*). He finds the formula for a ‘Dasein that is concerned with its own potentiality-for-Being.’

Between 1923 and 1927, Heidegger continued his work on these themes. There were those who knew that he was working on a major project, but no one was prepared for the bold confidence of *Being and Time*. This amazement was partially due to the fact that Heidegger then was not yet regarded as a constructive philosopher but as the virtuoso interpreter of philosophical tradition, a man who knew how to present it like no one else, a man who dealt with Plato and Aristotle the way Rudolf Bultmann [a Lutheran theologian at Marburg] dealt with Christ – revitalizing them.

The publication of *Being and Time* changed that perception. Heidegger’s masterwork is, indeed, constructive. Its very language is intended to both obscure and illuminate the everyday world –

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6 Ibid., 147.
that which should be close to us, but is ever slipping from our grasp: “That which is ontically
closest and well known, is ontologically farthest and not known at all; and its ontological
signification is constantly overlooked.”

*Being and Time* was, in fact, Heidegger’s most involved undertaking. In it, he describes
his project as an:

‘existential analysis,’ and the fundamental determinants of *Dasein* are
‘existentials.’ This concept has given rise to numerous misunderstandings,
but it was created simply in analogy to the traditional concept of ‘category.’
Traditional philosophy customarily called the fundamental determinants of its
‘objects’ categories, such as space, time, extension, and so on. As *Dasein* to
Heidegger is not an object that is present but ‘existence,’ he calls his
fundamental determinants not categories but existentials.

Heidegger begins *Being and Time* with a key question: What is the meaning of Being? From
there, he constructs what he calls an ‘analytic of Dasein’ in which the essential structures of
existence, being human, and human relationships are investigated – all in relation to time, or
temporality, and thus death (finitude). *Being and Time* is traditionally read as a work that is
everly philosophical in nature; there is no direct mention of politics or of the political in the

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7 Safranski. *Martin Heidegger*, 147; Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time*. Translated by
this work, I have chosen to follow several different conventions when it comes to writing about
Heidegger. First, I have chosen not to hyphenate the term ‘Dasein.’ Although Joan Stambaugh,
who met with Heidegger several times during his life, insists that Heidegger intended for
‘Dasein’ to be written ‘Da-sein’ in order to emphasize the fact that it refers to ‘there-being,’
hyphenating the term is simply not traditional, or very clear. This should serve to make the
current work more understandable and allow for easier reading. Additionally, I have chosen to
offer both the page numbers in the Macquarrie/Robinson translation in addition to the traditional
means of referring to Heidegger’s collected works and their corresponding numbers in that
catalogue. As such, GA 2, for example, refers to *Being and Time*. After ‘GA 2,’ the section of
the original text will be designated and then the line number. For example, GA 2: 26; L 118
refers to *Being and Time*, § 26, line 118. Lastly, I have chosen to capitalize ‘Being’ where it
refers to existence and not to an entity. This is an old convention, but not one that is accepted by
all those who study Heidegger. However, for the uninitiated, capitalization of ‘Being’ assists in
greater understanding.

8 Ibid.
text. It is a philosophical exploration of the everyday world in which human beings find themselves. Heidegger asks us to think critically about what human relation to Being is, what our relationships to one another signify, and how we, as humans, are all interconnected. As indicated, the current work focuses specifically on Heidegger’s magnum opus – Being and Time – as a place of origination for a political theory that he did not pursue, but which may be appropriated from this primary text.

The two main questions to be answered in the current work are, again: 1) What is the nascent political theory termed a politics of care and based in the fundaments of authenticity, Dasein-with, and authentic solicitude that may be appropriated from Being and Time and 2) If there were two paths open to Heidegger as he moved to ontic considerations after Being and Time, what was the actual path that he took and why? Thus, during the course of this investigation, it will be necessary to turn to works other than Being and Time in order to fully understand the full potential implications of a Heideggerian politics of care. As such, I look to Nature, History, State and Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language for evidence concerning the philosophical and political path that Heidegger’s work took post-1927. I also seek out Heidegger’s interpretation of the uncanny in Being and Time in his work exploring “Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’,” which offers a detailed explanation of Heidegger’s views on the Sophoclean tragedy of Antigone – and, by proxy, his perspective concerning the alienation and homelessness Dasein experiences in the everyday world. Finally, in a concluding chapter of this work, I explore Heidegger’s later essays, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” “The Thing,” and “On the Question Concerning Technology” as a text in which a politics of care might exist in a more mature form.
Part I of this volume, “Heidegger, Politics, & the Political” begins with a chapter concerning “Heidegger and Politics in Context” and develops the path that Heidegger actually chose. I term this: “The Taken Path.” The first of these chapters investigates the intersections between Heidegger and politics, both philosophically and politically speaking. Such an exploration begins with the offering of the historical context in which Heidegger came to the notions he develops in Being and Time, with an eye to the ‘Heidegger Affair.’ I then determine that the existing literature regarding the interplay between Heidegger’s corpus and the political may be divided into four ‘approaches:’ that of a focus on the biographical, connecting Heidegger’s personal politics and position concerning authentic historicality with his foray into National Socialism; that of a critique of Heidegger’s views concerning modern liberal democracy, capitalist structures, regarding Heidegger as having fascist or totalitarian leanings; that of a focus on Heidegger’s method as a point of criticism, arguing that it is politically dangerous to privilege the ontological over the ontic, theory over practice; and, finally, that perspective that identifies something of the political in Heidegger’s collected works, but does not go so far as to offer a thorough explanation – or to suggest an actual political theory out of Being and Time. Furthermore, I speculate as to why Heidegger chose the path that he did – and not the path suggested here.

The third chapter, “The Taken Path” is a venture onto the political path that Heidegger actually took, one associated with the ideals of the Nazi Party, of National Socialism, and of authoritarian leanings. Here, Heidegger’s alleged refusal to take another, more progressive or liberal path will be discussed. Most importantly, however, there is to be found in this third chapter a detailed explication of several of Heidegger’s important works (Nature, History, State; Hölderlin’s Hymn Der Ister; and Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language).
that lend themselves to a greater understanding of the “Taken Path” – both philosophically and politically, for they are frequently intertwined in these specific texts. In sum, I set forth a framework in Chapter Three for this discussion by revealing three distinct ‘moments’ that serve to represent the path that Heidegger took. These moments include 1) The Communitarian and Authoritarian Moment (evidenced mainly in student protocols for the lecture series *Nature, History, State*); 2) The Moment of Place and Polis (concerning the work of Jeff Malpas on Heidegger’s understanding of space and place and Heidegger’s work on the tragedy *Antigone*); and 3) The Defensive Moment (centered around lecture notes from the seminar *Logic As the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*).

Chapter Four begins Part II of this work, “From Selfhood to Solicitude: Heidegger’s Politics of Care.” “Three Fundaments” is dedicated to a serious-minded, detailed exegesis of three concepts in *Being and Time* that are fundamental to the creation of the aforementioned ‘new’ politics described by this work. These concepts are as follows: *Eigentlichkeit* (Authenticity), *Mitdasein* (Dasein-with), and *Sorge* (Care). Additionally, in Chapter Five, two other important concomitant notions – that of ‘conscience’ and ‘originary responsibility’ will be discussed in a short interlude. Understanding these basic concepts, and the aforementioned two related notions, found in *Being and Time* will prove key to comprehending the political structure that will be drawn out of them.

The sixth chapter of this work, “The Path Not Taken: A Politics of Care,” describes the political theory that may be appropriated from its nascent from *Being and Time*. Here, it will be made clear that the ‘politics of care’ offered in the current work is based on the notion of ‘authentic solicitude’ – a special type of care toward others that allows human beings to co-disclose their ownmost possibilities to themselves and to experience care as a ‘leaping-ahead’
and not a ‘leaping-in’ for others. It is Aristotelian, both in scope and intention, a politics of human flourishing. In this chapter, I fully expound upon, not only the structure of such a political theory, but also its potential far-reaching implications.

The last, and seventh, chapter of this volume (“On a Politics of Care in Heidegger’s Later Works”) is devoted to the argument that the politics of care in *Being and Time* may be found in the idea of ‘dwelling’ in Heidegger’s later works: “The Thing,” “Building Dwelling Thinking,” and “On the Question Concerning Technology.” I then offer some concluding thoughts concerning the entirety of this work, including what the potential consequences of the politics of care might have for ‘letting beings be,’ for human flourishing as authentic solicitude, and, tentatively, love.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger situates human existence in the world – a ‘there’ world. In that existence, human Being is either constantly threatened by the ‘there,’ by absorption, or invited to authentic existence. Both and either take place in the context of the existence of the ‘there.’ In this sense, perhaps, it is legitimate to say that human Being is dependent upon the existence of others, both negatively and positively. As Heidegger works Dasein out of this dilemma, or points the way out of this dilemma, he establishes a consideration for achieving potential, for authentic existence. In short, he creates an ‘ethic’ of Being, a sense of ‘originary responsibility’ that extends, literally, to being-there as being-with. Heidegger recognizes the fact that the world is essentially a with-world, one that requires care for others. This results, as I will argue, in an Aristotelian politics purposed to allow for human flourishing effected by watchful, concerned, caring – and a political orientation that allows authentic Dasein to better relate to other authentic Dasein in the world, not as equipment or ‘things,’ but as human beings with their own possibilities, ones that they determine themselves. Each of my contentions will be
addressed in due course. First, it is necessary to examine Heidegger’s brief foray into National Socialist politics and what scholars have done with the so-called Heidegger affair as they try to explain its presence in the context of *Being and Time*, as well as other of Heidegger’s writings.
Chapter 2: Heidegger & Politics in Context

I. Heidegger’s Politics

Martin Heidegger seems to have had before him two paths after having laid out his fundamental ontology in *Being and Time*. The first of these paths, as it is argued here, is the one that led him to National Socialism and an authoritarian stance concerning Hitler’s plans for Germany. The second path – the one he did not take, the one that leads to a surprisingly progressive kind of political theory – is the larger subject at hand.

Throughout his corpus, Heidegger seems to have developed an antipathy toward Western subjectivism, modernity, metaphysics, and thus any system of politics supported by these structures. In later writings, he goes so far as to call for a return to a ‘homeland’ that is a-political, comprised of the elements of the fourfold – earth, sky, divinities, and mortals – a dwelling within this primordial oneness. Heidegger sees the Western political tradition as involving a good deal of violence and a tendency toward mastery and domination. He might agree with Sheldon Wolin’s comment that, “Western political systems have sought to concentrate, and hence increase, the instruments of violence in the hands of the state and to diminish the means of violence available to private groups.”

This perspective becomes more understandable when it is recalled that Germany was in the throes of political and economic disarray following the First World War – and during the Weimar Republic. Importantly, though Germany’s Republic lasted only fourteen years, its effects were calamitous, namely in the financial sector, and helped to usher in a period of economic and political instability that would prove a fertile ground for the authoritarianism of

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the Nazi Party. The idea of democracy, for someone living in post-Weimar Germany, would, likely, never have been separate from the two constants of chaos and violence. Indeed, Heidegger seems to have fallen prey to these attitudes himself. Yet, Germany’s post-World War I foray into democracy was not Heidegger’s only influence; his early life also offers some clues as to how his particular outlook on politics was formed.

Often seen in his infamous peasant smock or touting his jaunty Basque beret on semester breaks, Heidegger was born and spent most of his life in the small hamlet of Messkirch and the surrounding area near Wildenstein Castle and the Benedictine abbey in Beuron, altogether a “quiet, monastic world.” On his father’s side, he was of peasant stock himself, a familial outgrowth of that people, who were also craftsmen. His mother’s side was much the same, though the Heideggers lived in the area of Wildenstein Castle in the 1700s and still own a home there that Martin Heidegger frequented in his adulthood.² Though Martin eventually broke with the Catholic Church, he owed it much of his education and financial support. Indeed, he nearly became a Jesuit priest, leaving the order after a mere two weeks, suffering from a heart condition that would plague him all his life. More than this, however, was what he witnessed as a battle between the world of Catholicism and the world of liberalism in the larger area of Baden. As a seminarian at Constance in Freiburg (from 1903-1906), Heidegger experienced the vast differences that existed between the seminarians and other students – as well as “between seminary and cheerful city life” and “between the Catholic world and the liberal civilian environment.” Heidegger was a member of a group set apart and this

superficial one, indulging in momentary stimulations; here painful effort, and out there mere activity; here, the striking of roots, and out there untrammeled behavior; the ones making things too hard on themselves, with the others seemingly taking the more comfortable path; the ones being profound, the others being frivolous; the ones remaining faithful to their own ego, while the others lose themselves in dissipation.\footnote{Ibid., 10, 13.}

This unique perspective – one of two distinctive, separate worlds which Heidegger viewed as elite and hardworking or social excess – were, as Safranski notes, most likely the impetus for his distinction between ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity,’

Whilst at the Freiburg Theological Seminary (1909-1911) Heidegger was a student of Carl Braig (a “theologian of antimodernism”) and was a member of the League of the Grail (\textit{Gralbund}) which was “a strictly antimodernist faction of the Catholic youth movement whose spiritual leader was the Viennese Richard von Kralik, a zealot for the restoration of a pure Catholic faith, as well as of the ancient Holy Roman Catholic Empire of the German nation.” Furthermore, in Messkirch, Heidegger grew up under the local tradition of venerating Abraham a Sancta Clara, “a Christian-Socialist, populist, crude, pious without being a bigot, rooted in his native soil, and also anti-Semitic” as a ‘role model. It is important to point out, however, that there is proof that young Heidegger seems not to have been anti-Semitic himself. This is evidenced in at least one now published letter to the Freiburg University Denazification Committee written by Karl Jaspers in December of 1945, in which he vilifies Heidegger and recommends his suspension from teaching for a number of years: “In the 1920s Heidegger was not an anti-Semite.” Whether he had become one by 1933 is still a matter of public debate. Jaspers further claims that “To a certain extent I acknowledge the personal excuse that Heidegger was according to his nature unpolitical; the National Socialism which he embraced had little in
Furthermore, Safranski rightly avers that it was the Nazi party’s anticlericalism and antimodernism that were at least a part of why Heidegger was eventually drawn to it – and drawn to it he was.

Heidegger’s exact involvement with National Socialism remains difficult to decipher. There are very few truly verifiable accounts of Heidegger’s actions surrounding his associations with the Nazi Party. Those facts that can be verified will be presented here, briefly. According to Safranski, prior to 1933, Heidegger’s support for the party was mere ‘political opinion.’ After 1933, he seems to have decidedly taken what may be considered ‘action.’ Heidegger’s specific actions in question are 1) his acceptance of the Rectorship at the University of Freiburg, then controlled by the party and 2) that he joined the Nazi Party ten days after accepting the rectorate, on May 1, 1933. Heidegger claims that he was asked to accept the rectorate because he was considered apolitical – having never belonged to any political party before 1933. His reasons for accepting the rectorate may have been just this: to protect the German university system from some of the worse elements of Nazi ideology. He did, however, become Rector at Freiburg and accepted the suggestion that he join the party once in office. The rest is unclear, especially the question of Heidegger’s true motives. What is sure is that he was forced to resign the rectorate in April of 1934 because he refused to replace at least two deans at the university with members of the party. He tendered his resignation, was vilified in party publications, and questioned by

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the Gestapo. By 1938, it was forbidden to mention his name in any academic or journalistic arena. Heidegger never attended any party meetings, but also never rescinded his membership.\(^5\)

However, it is certain that National Socialism seems to have captured Heidegger’s imagination to some degree and meant more to him, perhaps, than a fleeting political stance or opinion.

Heidegger saw Hitler’s Germany as an opportunity for greatness, a new beginning for the nation:

“He regarded the party as a force of order amid the hardships of the economic slump and the chaos of the collapsing Weimar Republic, and above all as a bulwark against the danger of a communist revolution.” Safranski quotes Heidegger as explaining his ‘slip up’ thus: “Greater men have made such mistakes – Hegel saw Napoleon as the World Spirit, and Hölderlin saw him as the prince of the feast to which the gods and Christ had been invited.”\(^6\)

II. Heidegger Before \textit{Being and Time}

Beyond the possible socio-political influences that surrounded Heidegger prior to and after the First World War, it is important to understand the context of \textit{Being and Time} itself within the Heideggerian corpus. Just after his release from the novitiate with the Jesuits in Tisis, Austria, (due to his heart condition and seemingly failing health) Heidegger begins his studies at Freiburg. Most notably, he publishes a few articles with an anti-modernist stance in some Catholic periodicals.\(^7\) By 1927, the year that \textit{Being and Time} is finally published, Heidegger has already married, produced two sons, been appointed to Marburg University, and begun a love affair with Hannah Arendt.

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\(^7\) Safranski. \textit{Between Good and Evil}, xi.
His scholarly interests seem to have been heavily influenced by his time with the Jesuits. In spite of his later antipathy toward Catholicism, Heidegger seems to have taken to the life of that world. Of his life in the seminary as a ‘sexton’s lad’ (assisting with church services and ringing the bells), he writes,

The mysterious fuge in which the church feasts, the days of vigil, and the Passage of the seasons and the morning, midday, and evening hours of each day fitted into each other, so that a continual ringing went through the young hearts, dreams, prayers, and games – it is this, probably, that conceals one of the most magical, most complete, and most lasting secrets of the tower.

Heidegger often retreated to his cabin at Todtnauberg, to the solitude of that environment, and to its concomitant environment that was conducive to time for thinking seriously about the problems of philosophy. As Safranski writes,

…the world into which he felt ‘thrown’ was not that of Messkirch at the end of the last century, where he was born on September 26, 1889, where he passed his childhood, and where he was always fond of returning. He felt ‘thrown’ only when he was ejected from this domestic world that had shielded him from the presumptions of modernity.  

In fact, it is likely that the idea that Dasein is a ‘thrown’ entity was likely inspired by the very separateness he felt as a seminarian, as one of two worlds, as has been mentioned before. Thus, Heidegger the student and the applicant for Habilitation is largely concerned with, as Safranski astutely points out, beginnings: “He wishes to be a master of beginning. It was to the beginnings of philosophy in Greece that he looked for a past future, and it was in the present that he hoped to find the spot where, in the middle of life, philosophy is always born anew.”

Heidegger’s early writings (GA 1, Frühe Schriften) were published a mere four years before his death – and he seems to have been reluctant to publish any of his work previous to

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8 Ibid., 2.

9 Ibid., 1.
Being and Time. Even this early collection includes only his doctoral dissertation (“The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism: A Critical and Positive Contribution to Logic”) and his work for Habilitation (“The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus”). Other than this, extant writings before Being and Time consist, in the main, of a few articles, including 1911 essay entitled “Psychology of Religion and the Subconscious,” several book reviews published between 1910 and 1911, and several poems.

As early as December of 1924, Heidegger delivered a lecture concerning Aristotle in Cologne entitled “Being-there and Being-True According to Aristotle: Interpretations of Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI” (“Dasein und Wahrsein nach Aristoteles: Interpretation von Buch VI der Nikomachischen Ethik”) in which he has already chosen some of the now-familiar terminology we find in Being and Time:

The being-with-one-another of human beings…constituted through these ways of discursive speech [Rede] is the being-with-one-another of discursive speech [Gerede]. One sees, one judges, one wishes, one has needs in the manner in which one talks, in the manner in which everyone speaks. Therefore, the Everyone [das Man]: a curious phenomenon of the most immediate Dasein of the human being, one that governs an entire way of being [in the world], the way and manner in which the world is seen, judgmentally criticized, and questioned.10

Our picture of Heidegger before 1927 thus becomes clear: it is that of a once-seminarian, accustomed to living a monastic life amidst the hustle and bustle of a world that he considered to be inauthentic, ruled by the ‘Everyone.’ Martin Heidegger remained, for his entire life, in the same region of Germany – he lived and died in his monastic world. As a scholar, and an

individual, he seems to have been a series of sets of contradictions, a complicated man. As Karl Lowith remarks, though emotionally, of Heidegger:

A Jesuit by education, he became a Protestant through indignation; a scholastic dogmatician by training, he became an existential pragmatist through experience; a theologian by tradition, he became an atheist in his research, a renegade to his tradition cloaked in the mantle of its historian.\(^\text{11}\)

In the end, if there is an obvious political ‘stance’ in any of Heidegger’s works, it is anti-subjective and antimodernist. This is because, in great many of his writings, antipathy toward Western subjectivism can be seen. His anti-subjective ethos can be seen in some of his later works, as when he argues that “Every nationalism is metaphysically an anthropologism, and as such subjectivism” and in his call for Germany to “transpose itself – and with it the history of the West – from the center of their future happening into the originary realm of the powers of Being.”\(^\text{12}\)

In his quite late discussions of the Fourfold, Heidegger appears to be strictly a-political, contending that ‘mortals’ ‘dwell’ in the intersection with ‘earth,’ ‘sky,’ and ‘divinities;’ there can be no separation between these, and thus no room for subjectivism.

Even in Being and Time, there is proof of this opposition to modern subjectivism. There, thrown beings have abandoned Being, their own existence; they remain ‘homeless’ while in the clutches of the everyday world. Heidegger writes:

One of our first tasks will be to prove that if we posit an ‘I’ or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall completely miss the phenomenal content [Bestand] of Dasein. Ontologically, every idea of a ‘subject’ – unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic character – still posits the


subjectum…along with it, no matter how vigorous one’s ontical protestations against the ‘soul substance’ or the ‘reification of consciousness.’\textsuperscript{13}

Heidegger seems convinced, if his work is to be taken as a whole, that the practice of modern politics is entirely wrong-headed. In his investigations into technology, he avers that these kinds of political systems (like that of constitutional democracies and communisms) are in the firm grasp of metaphysics and, therefore, unable to enable human beings to confront the dangers of the then burgeoning technological world. In fact, in the Der Spiegel interview, Heidegger specifically states:

I would characterize them [the constitutional democracies of Western Christendom] as half truths because I do not see in them a genuine confrontation with the technological world, because behind them there is in my view a notion that technology is in its essence something over which man has control. In my opinion, that is not possible. Technology is in its essence that which man cannot control by himself.\textsuperscript{14}

There is difficulty, however, in translating this antimodernist stance into a support for Nazism or fascism in Being and Time. For one, its publication is historically situated during a time when Heidegger had not yet even begun to think of his potential allegiance to the Nazis. Second, the language of the text suggests a dedication, not to racism and biologism, but to an antipathy toward modernism of any kind. Finally, Heidegger’s purpose in writing Being and Time seems to have been wholly philosophical, not political – although there is sage political content therein that he seems nearly wholly unaware of. What Being and Time seems to represent, most of all, is the serious attempt of a somber scholar to fully investigate what he believes had not been sufficiently explored since the time of the ancient Greeks; the first lines

\textsuperscript{13} Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, 72 (GA 2: 10; L 46).

printed in the work are from Plato’s *Sophist*: “For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression ‘being’. We, however, who used to think we understood, have now become perplexed.” An inquiry into existence is the focus of the work and, he contends, “Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of *time* as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of *Being*.15 How these notions, and their concomitant philosophical underpinnings, are read is a matter of interpretation. Here, the interpretation is that, though Heidegger did not intend *Being and Time* to produce a political theory, it exists nonetheless.

To be sure, it would be impossible to put to rest the great debate concerning Heidegger’s politics. Even those interpretations that find something of fascism in his *magnum opus* will always gain support. That is not the express purpose of this work. However, there is enough evidence for the assumption that Heidegger, though potentially in agreement with the Nationalist Socialist principles of the Third Reich and perhaps even an anti-Semite from 1933 onward, was not anti-Semitic or a member of the Nationalist Socialist Party when he wrote *Being and Time*, though this has not prevented other scholars from attempting to find fascism in every page of every work he ever wrote. There is also sufficient evidence that the path Heidegger took out of *Being and Time* was clearly one of a man who is torn, and whose political leanings take him quite far afield from his master work. Two of these texts (*Nation, History, State* and *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*) that clearly fall into this category will be presented in an upcoming chapter in this volume. Both of these texts represent seminars and lecture courses offered by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg during the period just after *Being and Time* was published (1933-1934).

15 Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time*, 20 (GA 2: 1;L 1).
Before that, however, it is necessary to revisit some of the approaches that other scholars have taken to the intersection of Heidegger’s politics and his philosophy. While a few of these approaches break from the traditional way of interpreting the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and his politics, most of them address what has been termed here the ‘biographical approach’ – attempting to read Nazism into Heidegger’s already published texts in the light of what is known about the man himself. There is no doubt, in other words, that there are works in which Heidegger addresses politics quite directly; these are worth examining. In that vein, the remainder of this chapter will serve as a study of key selections from the existing literature concerning Heidegger and his relationship to politics. Three different approaches, ranging from the ‘biographical’ to the strictly political, will be explored. While the next chapter of this work will effect a return to the focus at hand – *Being and Time*, for now, we must turn to Heidegger’s critics and supporters. From this, it will be instructive to learn what Heidegger takes from *Being and Time* as he moves forward in his philosophical works – and what he leaves behind or wholly ignores.

III. Three Approaches

Heretofore, the extant work on Heidegger’s politics can be placed within three identifiable approaches: 1) those scholars, like Richard Wolin, Richard Polt, and Dominique Janicaud, who are most critical of Heidegger, of his foray into National Socialism, and who claim that his Nazism is apparent in his philosophical writings; 2) those, like Emmanuel Levinas, who focus primarily on Heidegger’s method for their critical analyses, arguing that prioritizing the ontological over the ontic is a misstep; 3) and, finally, the approach including the largest amount of scholarship presented here – those, like Fred Dallmayr, W.R. Newell, Cecil L. Eubanks, David Gauthier, Gregory Schufreider, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Leslie-Paul Thiele, who
have examined *Being and Time*, found something positive in the work as it pertains to politics, but have not ventured so far as to recognize the nascent theory identified and elaborated upon in this work or to have attempted to craft a political theory out of *Being and Time*. While some of these approaches offer much in the way of looking at Heidegger’s work as a whole, at his biography, at politics, and at *Being and Time* specifically, they do not complete the project of creating a politics out of *Being and Time* – that is the purpose of this text.

The First Approach

For many Heideggerians and other scholars, the key problematic issue with Heidegger is that, though he never intended for his philosophy to be constructed as a political theory, he was involved with the Nationalist Socialist party for a time and this speaks to his personal politics. Specifically, he became a member of the party on May 1, 1933, just ten days after receiving the post of Rector at the University of Freiburg. Less than one year later, in April of 1934, Heidegger resigned his position as Rector and ceased attending meetings for the Nationalist Socialist party – yet he remained a nominal member until the party was dismantled at the end of World War II, never officially removing himself from their ranks. Importantly, during the denazification hearings in 1949, the French military declared his involvement in the party the actions of a ‘follower’ or ‘fellow traveller’ (*Mitläufer*),\(^\text{16}\) or one who succumbed to the pressure

\(^{16}\) See Jeffrey K. Olick’s. *In the House of the Hangman: The Agonies of German Defeat, 1943-1949*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. In this text, Olick explains that the denazification hearings were a complex affair. The German Council of States (Länderrat) was formed in March of 1946 and soon the “Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism” was soon passed. These two occurrences left the next phase of the denazification hearings squarely in German hands and one of their first actions was to require that any German who was eighteen years of age or older was required to submit a registration form in order to receive their food rations. According to Olick, 13 million Germans filed these forms, though only 3.5 million had their case forwarded to separate ‘hearing panels’ (*Spruchkammern*). Olick writes, “The result of these hearings was a classification of the examinee into one of five categories: major offender (*Hauptschuldig*), offender (*Belastete*), minor offender
of the movement, but who neither inwardly shared in its convictions nor resisted them. Differing accounts of Heidegger’s eleven months as Rector muddy the historical waters. Students of Heidegger’s, like Max Müller, who was eventually to blame Heidegger for the downfall of his academic career due to his anti-Nazi sentiments argue that either Heidegger never spoke a word concerning his personal politics in class nor engaged in subtle subversion of the party during class discussions: “Not one of his students ever thought of politics then. There was never a political word in his classes.” Further complicating the issue is that Heidegger himself was a strangely shy individual, often mistaken in the hallways for a janitor as opposed to an imminent professor. Yet, even his most ardent supporters cannot deny that Heidegger was a member of the Nazi Party; that he believed in or included these aforementioned themes in his philosophical works continues to be the subject of highly contentious debate.

The first approach may be represented by a group of scholars who have interpreted Heidegger’s work and its intersection with politics focus, in the main, on biographical elements – they look to the Heideggerian corpus and analyze it within the framework of his actual biography (mainly his association with National Socialism) and then attempt to discover this attitude in his philosophical works. In *The Politics of Being*, for example, Richard Wolin certainly interprets Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism as an outgrowth of his philosophy. Wolin maintains that, “Heidegger’s experience with Nazism in the early thirties continued to have a

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defining influence on his thought.”

He cites Heidegger’s speech “German Students,” in which Heidegger argues that, “The Nationalist Socialist Revolution is bringing about the total transformation of our German Da-sein.”

Wolin cites, also, the testimonies of Toni Cassirer and Eduard Baumgarten in which these two former students of Heidegger claim that he believed fully in the tenets of National Socialism. Continuing in this vein, Wolin perpetuates the oft-cited claim (denied by Heidegger himself in the well known Der Spiegel interview) that Heidegger attempted to bar his former mentor, teacher, and friend Edmund Husserl from using the University of Freiburg libraries simply because he was Jewish. In point of fact, Wolin argues that the Heideggerian concept of history and historicity (historical authenticity) may lead us to believe that “being-in-the-world” is historically situated for Heidegger and, thus, that human beings are inextricably chained to the world. This world, for Wolin, is also the world of the real and of the political. He stands firm in the assumption that this also means that Heidegger’s life and work are linked in a similar manner.

Furthermore, Wolin claims that if Dasein is indeed a concept that can be placed in or understood through a historical lens, then each Dasein must be a product of a certain age and of the cultural influences of that particular epoch. He comments that Heidegger himself must have understood the weight of his encounter with National Socialism because of his understanding of Dasein as inherently socio-political. Through an analysis of Heidegger’s rectorship address, Wolin uses Heidegger’s employment of the terms struggle (kampf) and storm (sturm) to tie his other philosophical works back to Nazi ideals.

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19 Ibid., 3.
As for the concept of authenticity, Wolin remarks that authentic Dasein is so separated from the social, the community (as experienced in inauthentic everydayness), that democratic ideals and individual voices are repressed. If individualism is inauthentic for Heidegger, he continues, then Heidegger must also be undemocratic. Instead, Wolin contends that Heidegger’s philosophy is heavily laden with decisionism\textsuperscript{20} – “a quasi-Nietzschean approach to ethics, a valorization of the ‘radical will’ or heroic self-assertion.”\textsuperscript{21}

Finally, Wolin offers his most damning critique of Heidegger’s work as far as politics are concerned – he argues that the result of Heideggerian philosophy is a “radical devaluation of the life-world”\textsuperscript{22} and that this is inherently dangerous. If the ‘they,’ in other words, of everydayness is inauthentic for Heidegger, then the ‘life-world’ is valueless and, according to Wolin, so are others in the ‘life-world.’ Here, there is also a critique of Heideggerian privileging of ontological matters over the ontic and, thus, of politics, which, for Wolin, necessarily involves the independent action of individual persons.

Richard Polt\textsuperscript{23}, much like Wolin, looks to Heidegger’s biography, to his actions and behavior, in order to interpret Heidegger’s politics. In fact, his work is a general introduction to Heidegger’s philosophy; it is not a commentary on Heidegger’s politics or the intersection of that philosophy with politics. However, in a short section of Chapter Five of Heidegger: An Introduction, Polt addresses “Heidegger’s politics: facts and thoughts,” which is of use for the

\textsuperscript{20} As in a type of political system in which morals and values are the products of decisions made by legal, jurisprudential, or other political entities.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 29.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 49.

purposes of this work. Although Polt refuses to go into detail about the “Heidegger Affair,” he, too, reverts to Heidegger’s conception of the *Volk* as proof that Heidegger’s philosophy has influenced his politics – or vice versa. For example, Polt maintains that, “There are indeed elements of *Being and Time* that not only allow for a pro-Nazi decision, but appear to point in that direction. No one can avoid a shudder upon encountering the words *Volk* and *Kampf* (people and struggle) in Heidegger’s discussion of authentic historicity.”

Polt also directs our attention to a little-known dialogue in *Country Path Conversations*\(^\text{25}\) in which a ‘younger man’ is speaking to an ‘older man’ in what Polt terms a “Huxlean” vision of the future in which technology has taken over the lives of human beings and everything is seen as a commodity, including people. Here, Polt addresses a key line, spoken by the younger man: “devastation also rules precisely where land and people are untouched by war’s destruction.”\(^\text{26}\) This is a fascinating passage because, while at first glance it may seem to strengthen the connection between Heidegger and National Socialist principles, there is clearly another interpretation of this kind of struggle (*kampf*) – that it could be useful in opening up a clearing in which Being may shine through. Polt writes, “We must learn to stop taking Being for granted, and instead, notice it precisely *as* something that is granted – as a gift.”\(^\text{27}\) What Polt is most likely referring to here is the idea that ‘struggle’ might mean something entirely different in

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 162.


\(^{26}\) Ibid., 172.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., 173. Emphasis in original.
Heidegger’s work – mainly, that the kind of ‘struggle’ Heidegger refers to is one of Dasein wrestling itself from das Man, from the everydayness that keeps it living an inauthentic existence.

In this first type of approach – the biographical – Dominique Janicaud offers a more ‘emotional’ account of Heidegger’s politics than do Wolin or Polt. Janicaud further reviles Heidegger on the concept of the Volk and seems to misinterpret Heidegger’s remarks concerning this ‘group’ for whom Being is its destiny. In other terms, Janicaud reads the Volk as a separate and actual, real, prescriptive community, existing for Heidegger as the inheritor of all that is authentic. However, this seems incorrect, as Heidegger did not intend the Volk to be seen in this way in Being and Time. There, it is presented as the authentic counterpoint to ‘the public,’ but not, it seems, as the ‘inheritor’ of all authenticity. Both Janicaud and Wolin argue that Heidegger is participating in an ethnocentric movement, geared specifically toward and accessible only to the German people. Yet, though Heidegger does speak of Germans as a specific Volk in Being and Time, he elsewhere writes of a ‘homeland’ as a place that is not necessarily tied to a particular place or people.  

Depending almost entirely on the “Rectorship Address,” Janicaud believes the concept of Volk to be a “Destinal Historicism,” leading only to totalitarianism and to the tyranny of one culture and ethnicity over all others – thus, connecting Heidegger’s work back to National Socialist ideals. Janicaud further accuses Heidegger of a non-traditional apoliticism, “which has nothing to do with regular indifference toward politics or with the ‘apolitical’ stance of Being and Time, [but] is based on a reinterpretation of the world situation as a function of his reading

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of the history of metaphysics.” In this respect, Janicaud may be fair in pointing to Heidegger’s resistance to modernization and technology, yet should this ‘apoliticism’ be viewed as negatively as Janicaud suggests?

In sum, those like Wolin, Polt, and Janicaud who place Heidegger’s work within the framework of his political behavior generally attribute the legitimacy of their stance to Heidegger’s “radical devaluation of the life-world.” As for authenticity, for example, Wolin remarks that authentic Dasein is so separated from the social, the community (as inauthentic) that it represses democratic ideals in which each individual has a voice and is granted power through that voice. He claims that this kind of individualism is inauthentic for Heidegger and must, therefore, be undemocratic. Yet, neither Heidegger’s Dasein, nor his account of ‘being-in-the-world’ is based on the idea of a modern Cartesian subject; therefore, these concepts cannot contain a ‘self-asserting’ will at all. Authenticity, for Heidegger, is not achieved through willing. Rather, it is achieved through the questionability of Being that is opened up in unconcealment to those human beings who, turning momentarily away from everydayness, understand that Being is opened to them. This is not, as Wolin claims, an undemocratic or decisionist schema – one that would look to the proper authorities in an authoritarian manner. Instead, it allows beings to open themselves to be exposed to the unconcealment of existence.


30 The Politics of Being, 29.
However, truth itself, in Heidegger’s work, is not dependent on values, but acts instead as a clearing;\(^3\) here, truth is attached to Being instead of beings, to existence as opposed to those who exist. Wolin’s most grievous error is that he often confounds what has been termed the “two Heideggers” (the man and the philosopher) and offers little evidence to support the thesis that the entirety of the Heideggerian corpus is either anti-democratic or decisionist in nature.

Even Polt must admit that Heidegger is not concerned with fascist or totalitarian ideologies, that he is not interested in storm (sturm) or stress (drang) themselves, as tools with which to control or alter people’s lives, but instead describes these, in the Heideggerian context, as a kind of opportunity for an awakening to Being to truly occur. In other words, Polt contends that if utopian conditions existed and persisted in the world, then Being could not be recognized as the gift that Heidegger describes it to be. There would be no trauma or shock to force us out of our everydayness and into the clearing of the meaning of Being. Yet, Polt often falls prey to some of the same misunderstandings as Wolin – that of focusing too intently on an attempt to find Heidegger’s personal politics in his philosophical work.

In the end, Janicaud’s analysis does not differ much from that of Wolin or Polt in the sense that his contentions concern the supposed anti-democratic leanings of Heidegger the man. This biographical approach to examining the political in Heidegger offers little true illumination of the matter as it seeks to move backward through his works and lectures in order to find small portions of text that may then be used to critique Heidegger’s philosophy itself – as opposed to his actual political actions as a person. Though biography may always serve to offer a context for an individual thinker’s work, it should certainly never be considered the sole place from

\(^{3}\) In Heideggerian terminology, a ‘clearing’ or ‘lighting’ (Lichtung) is a space in which light may be allowed in, as if understanding were a clearing in a thickly wooded area of the forest.
which to draw meaning from the texts in question. Thus, Janicaud, Wolin, and Polt ought not be criticized for merely looking to Heidegger’s biography for answers, but, instead, for looking only to the experiences he had during his lifetime and attempting to make this information suit their purposes when it comes to textual analysis.

The Second Approach

A second approach to Heidegger and politics is taken by Emmanuel Levinas,32 who argues that too much priority has been given to the ontological over the ethical in Heidegger’s work. This, for Levinas, is dangerous in the extreme. It is of interest to note that Levinas does seem to focus his critique on Being and Time insomuch as he is uncomfortable with Heidegger’s preoccupation with the ontological as opposed to the ontic. Of course, Levinas does not so much find a politics in Being and Time as he sees an obsession that is dangerously obtuse and perhaps explains Heidegger’s momentary relationship with fascism. By way of further explanation, as a philosopher who has concerned himself with the pre-originary responsibility for the Other (Autrui), Levinas is against any attempt to totalize alterity and, thus, to destroy the Other. Furthermore, any politics that privileges the ontological over the ethical, as Levinas sees Heidegger to have done, does ‘violence’ to the Other in that it is hierarchical and, thus, forces the suppression of the Other by definition.

Levinas has privileged the Other over even one’s self in an attempt to create a new ethics,33 one that sets the Other above and beyond ourselves in order to prevent this very


‘violence.’ However, though Levinas’s work has been seen, at least within the last fifteen years, as a suitable place from which to appropriate everything from new systems of ethics to feminist ideals, his privileging of the Other is not as anti-ontological as it seems at first glance. In *Le temps et l’autre* (Time and the Other), Levinas explores the ways in which solitude, or loneliness, expresses itself in Heidegger’s work. Levinas critiques Heidegger’s vision of community and truth, declaring that:

> All the analysis in *Being and Time* points to the impersonality of life, to *Dasein* being lonely. Furthermore, does solitude borrow its tragic character from nothingness or from being deprived of others, which death emphasizes?...Finally, the Other, in Heidegger, appears in the essential situation of *Miteinandersein* – in reciprocity with the Other … the preposition *mit* (with) describes this relationship. It is, so, an association of side-by-side, around a common term, and, more precisely for Heidegger, around the truth. This is not the same as a face-to-face relationship.

It becomes clear, then, that what Levinas finds objectionable in Heidegger’s privileging of the ontological over the ethical is the very association that this work addresses – being-with others in an co-disclosive community. What Levinas takes issue with is not that human beings are ‘with’ others, but that this is not enough for him, for people to exist side-by-side and ‘around’ the truth. Instead, he insists on a face-to-face relationship, one which he distinguishes from merely being-with others. For Levinas, the face-to-face relationship is deeper, more intimate, and offers more opportunities for care and, in the end, for ethics. Levinas’s focus is on Heidegger’s method – the ontological – and he determines that because the priority goes to the

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36 Ibid. Translated by Andrea D. Conque.
ontological, the ontic, the ethical, the Other, alterity, are overshadowed and done ‘violence.’ How, Levinas asks, could a politics with such a foundation ever truly consider others?

Levinas’s critique of Heidegger, however, stems from the argument that the ontological is privileged over the ethical. While it may be the case that there is no true ethics, not one that is normative or prescriptive, in Heidegger’s work, it must be asked whether Levinas is correct in that this necessarily leads to a lack of compassion or care. For Levinas, the face-to-face relationship is of the greatest import and he believes that in privileging the Other over our very selves, being called to this relationship by something pre-originary, that he has succeeded in solving the problem of the ethical. However, what many neglect to investigate in Levinas’s work is that his concept of the Other, of alterity, is not what it seems at first glance. An alternative reading of the connections between Heidegger and Levinas, including the implications for feminisms, offers the view that there is more to be found in Heidegger than Levinas’ musings on the problematic notion of privileging the ontological over the ethical. Levinas argues, throughout his work, for an ethical relationship to the Other which is, in point of fact, based on his mentor Heidegger’s conception of Dasein. It is the very vulnerability and nudity of the face of the Other that calls us to ethical responsibility. For Heidegger, this would be entirely an ontological movement; for Levinas, it is ethical. The face-to-face relationship Levinas describes can be seen as an outgrowth of Heideggerian philosophy in the sense that “My own subjectivity may only be found in its displacement and deposition, in “la denucleation du moi” (the rupture or denucleation of one’s selfhood). In sum, it is not the upholding of the

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ontological over the ethical that Levinas truly objects to; instead, it is, strangely, Heidegger’s break from metaphysics and Cartesian subjectivity that Levinas takes issue with. Levinas criticizes Heidegger for his focus on the meaning of Being, yet replaces his view with one that simply reiterates the kind of subjectivism that has plagued modern politics. Though Levinas claims that our relationship to the Other is one of responsibility, it may also be seen as one that places certain human beings in a privileged position – to respond to the call of ethics as ones who are privileged to begin with. This kind of subjectivism might always be considered a kind of privileging of one over another.

To be sure, Levinas appropriates many of his ideas from Heidegger, though he might have been loth to admit the extent to which this is true. His main critique of Heidegger is that he does not take into account the kind of responsibility that is akin to ‘accountability.’ For Levinas, accountability is such an important concept that he bases his entire philosophy on a responsibility for the Other and makes it pre-originary, extending beyond and through human existence. In point of fact, Levinas not only focuses on this idea of responsibility as accountability, but also embraces it to such a degree that individual subjects are responsible for Others, for those in a position of alterity.

A responsibility for the Other is also what individuates human beings in Levinas. This is so thoroughly the case that there is no way to escape the call of responsibility as accountability for Levinas. Each individual person is made unique by the fact that they are irreplaceable in their responsibility to the Other. Subject is created by this unique relationship and it stands at the ready to respond to its duty to Others who are near (prochain). When an individual is near to

Levinas refers to the way in which an individual ego, or self, can only be discovered through a rupture in my own “self.”
an Other (in the sense of alterity, difference, otherness), this sense of accountability is awakened and the subject is shocked into understanding what its actions should be. For Levinas, this is a debt and one that can never be fully repaid or calculated; it is limitless and, more than this, can also never be reciprocal. This responsibility is described as a kind of power, but not one that includes an authority. The relationship between Same and Other is entirely based on an unidirectional accountability. Same is ‘held hostage’ by Other in its responsibility as accountability:

Man has to be conceived on the basis of the self putting itself, despite itself, in place of everyone, substituted for everyone by its very non-interchangeability. He has to be conceived on the basis of the condition or uncondition of being hostage, hostage for all the others who, precisely qua others, do not belong to the same genus as I, since I am responsible even for their responsibility.

What Levinas seeks to accomplish is to further clarify and identify that which he sees as missing from Heidegger’s account – a personal obligation to Others in a factical, ontic, and real way. What he neglects, however, is that another responsibility, an ontological form divorced from the concepts of duty and accountability, already exists in Heidegger’s work by Being and Time.\(^{39}\)

The Third Approach

Finally, there is a third group – those who look at Being and Time for the intersections between Heidegger and the political and find some sense of the political therein, but not a full development of a political theory Being and Time. In other words, these scholars describe the political in Heidegger in such a way that their theories serve to assist in identifying what is here termed a ‘politics of conscience,’ but do not go as far as constructing one out of Being and Time; that is the central intention of this work.

First, Fred Dallmayr develops a Heideggerian critique of Heidegger’s potential for the ‘political’ within texts such as *Being and Time*, the *Letter on Humanism*, and the oft-ignored “Hebel- The House-Friend.” In this approach, attention is given to the idea that: “Although he never claimed to be a political theorist, politics nevertheless has come to overshadow a work ostensibly of a purely philosophical character.” Dallmayr’s understanding of the intersections between Heidegger’s works and politics makes great strides toward recognizing “the inadequacy of a univocal or monolithic image of Heidegger – whether the image is that of the inveterate fascist, the liberal antifascist, or the pure philosopher completely above the political fray.” As such, Dallmayr avers, he seeks “to delineate precisely the contours of an alternative political perspective in Heidegger’s thought, one at odds with traditional metaphysics and the prevalent ideologies of his time.”

Fred Dallmayr’s project is, thus, to offer alternate readings of both the Heideggerian corpus and of the philosopher’s personal political actions through the lens of Heidegger’s political musings. In *The Other Heidegger*, there is to be found a well-crafted and sympathetic account. Dallmayr argues that Heidegger’s personal politics came to ‘overshadow’ an otherwise ‘pure’ philosophy. As a political theorist, Dallmayr perhaps best understands what a political reading of Heidegger’s work might be, but he argues also that, “these implications seemed to [him] to be both profound and far-reaching in several domains – including the conception of social action, the status and meaning of freedom, and the relation of individual and political community.”

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42 Ibid., 6.
It is important to note at the outset that Dallmayr is not a naïve apologist for Heidegger. He understands that there always remains a barrier to those who wish to find something other than National Socialism in Heidegger’s work. He claims, “I could not (and do not intend to) bypass the stark fact of Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazis in 1933 and beyond, an involvement that has been the initial obstacle to my rapprochement.”

Dallmayr’s alternative reading of Heidegger pivots on the distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the political,’ “between politics seen as concrete policy making, on the one hand, and politics construed as basic regime or paradigmatic framework, on the other.” Here, Dallmayr places Heidegger in the realm of the ‘political’ as opposed to the arena of ‘politics.’ He writes, “Heidegger’s promising contributions to political thought are located on the level of ontology or paradigmatic framework (the political) rather than that of practical policy and ideology (which is the level of his Nazi involvement),” a distinction that serves as a ‘central guidepost’ to this work as for Dallmayr’s.

Interestingly, when speaking of Heidegger, Dallmayr places democracy on both the level of the political and of politics. Democracy, about which several of Heidegger’s detractors claim he is against, is ‘political’ for Dallmayr in that it is “revealed in diverse partisan policies and complex power struggles, activities that simultaneously conceal its status as a regime (on the level of ‘the political’).” This is juxtaposed in Dallmayr, especially in the second chapter, with what he believes to be Heidegger’s only available contribution to the matter – something more like the ‘political’ or theoretical than akin to ‘politics,’ which would require more concrete

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43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 9
45 Ibid.
textual evidence. By way of explanation, Dallmayr insists that democracy requires the latter as opposed to the former.

As for the field of social action (and, perhaps, also of a Heideggerian political community), Dallmayr points to Heidegger’s use of “the classical polis [as] a place of questioning and unsettled openness, [whereas] modern politics aims at the implementations of historical plans.”

Even the term Volk has a different meaning in Heidegger for Dallmayr; he claims that this term does not necessarily refer to an actual, historical and factual people, as of the people of Germany, but more to an ideal, a common ground, or a hope. When viewed together, these approaches amount to the view that Heidegger’s connection to the political is very different indeed than previously thought. Instead of a reformulation of National Socialist brands of racism, biologism, and overpowering tyranny, there is to be found, instead, a polis, where questioning is foremost and a community that is open and continually questions the meaning of its existence, its relationship to Being itself.

In a chapter entitled, “Heidegger as ‘Friend of the World,’” Dallmayr specifically cites Heidegger’s treatment of ‘friendship’ in Being and Time as it pertains to ‘listening:’ “Listening, Heidegger writes, involves the ‘existential openness of Dasein as co-Being for the Other,’ particularly for the ‘voice of the friend that every Dasein carries with it.’” Furthermore, Dallmayr maintains, the essay “Hebel – the House-Friend” “alert[s] us to the importance of friendship in our own time, and especially to the need for a house-friend of the world.” In these

46 Ibid., 10.

47 “Hebel – the House-Friend” was composed for the poet Johann Peter Hebel, who, though away from his homeland, was continually drawn to it in spirit.
instances, Dallmayr sees the potential for a Heideggerian community and for genuine world fellowship.

Here, and for Dallmayr, freedom comes with the ‘letting-be’ of beings through becoming Dasein, determined by the open clearing of Being. In other words, “Da-sein is not equated with a cogito or an ego-consciousness, but rather marked by care for engagement in being.” This second approach suggests that there is room for moral-political action within political communities in which co-being is a ‘letting-be of others who are also co-present.

Second, W.R. Newell contends that Heidegger’s thought is more politically radical than classic interpretations suggest. He argues that the seeming political conservatism found in Heidegger’s work should be reconsidered as nothing less than revolutionary. Newell’s focus is on two of Heidegger’s early works: *Being and Time* and *An Introduction to Metaphysics* and on the notions of freedom and community.

In keeping with the argument that Heidegger’s work represents an anti-subjective ethos, Newell contends that any interpretation of Heidegger’s early work as supportive of radical individualism or apolitical must be rethought. Newell bases this assertion on the fact that “A certain kind of sociality is, for Heidegger, constitutive of human life at the most basic, ontological level, of man as he is apart from any particular regime, society, or culture.” This is evidenced in *Being and Time* by Heidegger’s reexamination of fundamental ontology.

48 Ibid., 5


50 Ibid., 775.
Newell’s contention that the ‘everyday’ circumstances of ‘world’ have alienated us cannot be dismissed. He argues that the alienation of beings, for Heidegger, goes as far as to cause an alienation, not only from others, but also extends to alienation from our very selves. Our primordial relationship with being-with is destroyed by the they-self and beings seem to stand idly by while becoming more “unsociable” with one another in the meantime. This phenomenon of ‘they-self’ causes us to be misled – causes human beings to believe that they are alone in the world amongst ‘others.’

The above leads Newell to speculate on what kind of “authentic political community” could exist within the confines of Heidegger’s thought. He avers that in one particular section of *Being and Time*,

Heidegger reiterates that the resolve to face our finitude always involves the choice we have already made with others as a ‘community’ (*Gemeinschaft*) and a ‘people’ (*Volk*). This choice...guides our ‘fates’ (*Schicksal*) as individuals ‘in advance’ as the ‘destiny’ that comes down to us as the community’s unique historical existence. ‘Destiny’ is profoundly collective. It is no mere aggregate ‘put together...out of individual fates,’ since individuality itself is but a one-sided abstraction from the relationships of ‘being-in’ the world and ‘being-with’ others.\footnote{51}{Ibid., 779. The specific section refers to here is Division II, Chapter 5 of the original text.}

From this, Newell argues that there are several inferences that can be made about what an authentic political community, one in which a recommitment to fundamental ontology has been made, might look like. Yet, he maintains, this can only be done negatively – one can only be sure of what a Heideggerian authentic political community would *not* include. To begin with, Newell argues, the emergence of this political community could not involve a simple reformation of current practices. Newell writes, “Ordinary political controversies about improving institutions, morality, culture, or the distribution of wealth are not radical enough in Heidegger’s...
view, since the very familiarity of these disputes and their objects keep us chained to the everyday ‘present.’”  

Furthermore, Newell characterizes Heidegger’s underdeveloped idea of a political community as one that is so radical that it must leave behind every vestige of culture, identity, and other notions so as to become some vague effort at returning to a “protean, indeterminate nothingness which overturns all existing conditions without developing them or being developed by them.” Yet, Newell’s attempt at defining a Heideggerian political community should not be dismissed as some nebulous attempt to reconcile Heidegger’s early works with politics. Instead, the importance of Newell’s work lies in the fact that, in his view, the idea of a radical political community of this sort is a natural outgrowth and heightened reaction to the work of Enlightenment theorists who suggest that political communities may be founded upon distinct foundations – like that of a recognizable and overarching notion of human nature. As Newell puts it, “Despite the many and considerable differences among them, Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche shared a profound antipathy for the selfish materialism and vulgarity which the liberal political theorists of the Enlightenment had, in their view, elevated as the definition of human nature.” Newell’s efforts thus represent an attempt to “place Heidegger at the heart of twentieth-century political theory as it moves between the Scylla and Charybdis of revolutionary passion and the search for an objective standard of reform.”  

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52 Ibid., 779.

53 Ibid., 780, 783-784.
Theodore Kisiel\textsuperscript{54} takes a different approach to Heidegger and politics, that of revealing that there is a crossroads at which point Dasein-with (\textit{Mitdasein}), truth (\textit{aletheia}), language, and politics – these four – meet in Heidegger’s work. Kisiel argues that when Heidegger accomplishes the “very first listing of the three modes of truth’s concealment, [he] attributes two of them directly to the language of rhetoric, and so enlists not only the philosopher, but the rhetorician-statesman into the gigantic struggle (\textit{kampf}) of ‘wresting’ the truth from its concealment…”\textsuperscript{55} It is, then, the prerogative of both philosophers and rhetorician-statesmen to struggle to accomplish truth’s unconcealment. This ‘wresting’ cannot be successful without the involvement of \textit{Mitdasein} and language; \textit{aletheia} as truth in its unconcealment is at stake.

Furthermore, Kisiel claims that a privileged status should be given to language as speech when interpreting Heidegger. In this case, then, \textit{Mitdasein} becomes also “speech community, a being-with that is at once a speaking-with, whose basic goal is coming to an understanding or agreement (\textit{Verständigung}) with one another…the protohermentutics of communication and the accord it brings to the public sphere.”\textsuperscript{56} Practically speaking, \textit{Mitdasein} has far-reaching political implications for the political realm (as a public sphere and speech community) that has a vested interested in coming to agreement on important matters. This is not a simple matter, however; truth must be ‘wrested’ from language – there is conflict and struggle here as well. The everyday clamor of talk must be ignored in order to see truth in its unconcealment. This

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\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 141.
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‘being-with’ and ‘speaking-with’ is related to the notion of Dasein as thrown-in-the-world and, as a result, part of the world itself, with others in everydayness.

As human beings are thrown beings-in-the-world, community matters to Heidegger. Becoming authentic Dasein is also related to temporality, to a specific time, to a particular community in Being and Time. This is the very nature of its thrownness, its being-there. Language, Kisiel argues, in its authentic form, allows ‘understanding,’ allows a community to prosper. Because “the political, which is a basic human possibility, a distinctive mode of being human, is the reason a state comes to be and is,”57 there must necessarily exist a ‘being-with’ as a speech community and there must also necessarily exist authentic speech and language for it to survive. As Kisiel writes, “The be-ing of the state is rooted in the political being of human beings, who as a people decide for this state and support it.” There must be a connection, thus, between the people and the state and a “statesman or leader is a leader insofar as he understands and examines and actualizes, in the vital disclosure of his true being, what a people and a state are.”58

For Kisiel, being-with-one-another necessitates a shared and common language, a way of understanding one another. This, in turn, revealed to him the importance of rhetoric (as opposed to ‘idle talk’) as a means of ‘wresting’ the truth from its concealment. A political state, according to Kisiel, is one that includes a statesman who experiences the disclosure of his own Being and, thus, is able to maintain a successful state in which there are also others who experience the disclosure of their Being.

57 Ibid., 145.

58 Ibid.
Cecil Eubanks and David Gauthier’s 2011 work on Heidegger\(^5\) and Levinas, on the other hand, focuses on the Heideggerian response to the rise of subjectivism in modernity and how this, in a Hegelian sense, has given rise to the concept of the ‘homeless spirit,’ including a critical address of the idea of ‘homecoming’ in Heidegger. Heidegger’s ‘homecoming project,’ as Eubanks and Gauthier term it, is a line that runs through the entirety of his corpus.

The problem is stated simply enough – modern subjectivism has, for Heidegger, resulted in an alienation of the spirit that Hegel first drew attention to. Man has, due to this stance, this focus on subjectivity, become a ‘homeless spirit,’ without a home or place in which to truly exist. Heidegger’s intention, then, is to return man to the homeland, which he has been deprived of due to Cartesian subjectivist claims. As Eubanks and Gauthier put it, “As it stands, the homeland of Heidegger’s imagination is the ‘Da’ or ‘there,’ in which man ‘ek-sists’ in a state of ‘nearness to Being.’”\(^6\) Furthermore, as modern subjectivism could be seen as the product of pre-modern metaphysics, a true homecoming for Heidegger would be the return to a pre-metaphysical as well as pre-subjective stance. Eubanks and Gauthier contend that the return to a homeland (or Heimat) for Heidegger would entail revisiting a kind of existence in nearness to being that has not existed in the Western world since the time of the Greek antiquity.

Heidegger’s ‘anti-subjective ethos,’ Eubanks and Gauthier claim, leads him to determine that modern politics has been heavily affected by this same Cartesian error – the privileging of subjectivity over all else. Specifically, in \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger makes a distinction


between community and public spaces. For Heidegger, the public sphere is the locus of ‘idle talk’ (*Gerade*) and, thus, inauthenticity. Eubanks and Gauthier further aver that Heidegger sees all modern politics as wrapped up in subjectivity and, thus, powerless against determining or defining the relationship between human beings and their existence, Being. Furthermore, the inauthenticity of the ‘they-self,’ of the public space, is what Dasein must guard itself against.

However, Eubanks and Gauthier are quick to point out that there are other places within *Being and Time* in which collective action or community are encouraged, thus lending credence to the project of this work – a politics of intersubjectivity that exists within this self-same volume. To be truly authentic, Heidegger maintains, Dasein must necessarily be connected to the actions, as a whole, of a people, of a community. \(^{61}\) To put it more simply, modern politics is ensconced in metaphysics because of its subjective nature; thus, it also presupposes a particular vision of what human beings actually are – one that is, for Heidegger, a wholly incorrect assumption. In fact, to presuppose, to pretend to believe to know what human beings are would, in Heidegger’s view, put Being beyond questioning, beyond what authenticity demands, what Dasein demands.

This, as Eubanks and Gauthier explore, is the very reason that Greek antiquity so fascinated Heidegger – because the practice of ancient Greek politics not only entertained constant questioning, but also, in fact, encouraged it. Thus, it is not that Heidegger is against politics as such; it is only that Heidegger does not approve of modern politics with its global and technological trappings. Instead, Heidegger is attempting, not to erase or to argue against politics as a whole, but to recover what was lost in the political art of the ancient Greeks –

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mainly agonistic, hierarchical elements. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary, to be sure, for Eubanks and Gauthier to move well beyond *Being and Time* and, and as a matter of course, they do not embrace a Heideggerian politics as such. However, their work serves to contribute to a richer and more robust understanding of Heidegger and the relation of his corpus to politics, especially modern politics. Here, it is useful to turn to the work of Gregory Schufreider for a more specific view on Heidegger, community, and various elements found in *Being and Time*. Schufreider also claims that there is, indeed, a political theory to be gleaned from Heidegger’s master work.

Gregory Schufreider⁶² has also fully investigated Heidegger’s views on community and, from these explorations, has determined that there are intimations of a political philosophy within the Heideggerian corpus. Specifically turning his attention to Heidegger’s conception of the Greek *polis*, Schufreider argues that the *polis* is not to be confused with the city-state, but instead is to be seen as the ‘historical site’ the ‘Da,’ the place of Dasein. Schufreider, thus, translates the Heideggerian *polis* as ‘community’ – a movement that is particularly important to the project of this work. For Schufreider, the Heideggerian *polis* exists in the “convergence of the various paths – poet, thinker, statesman, priest – of those creative leaders who, through their creative work, shape and form the cultural-historical world of a people.”⁶³ Furthermore, Schufreider contends, the state then becomes only one facet of the community as a whole, not the directive force of a political community. In other words, the community itself, comprised of varied and numerous individuals, converges in synthesis to create the *polis* – the state is the work

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⁶³ Ibid., 28.
of one individual person. In other terms, it is the polis that is associated with the Volk whereas community is the Dasein of a people.

More importantly, Schufreider goes on to argue that it should not be surprising to find the beginnings of a politics of co-determination in Heidegger’s work – his anti-subjectivist stance is well known. When discussing Being and Time in particular,

...one who thinks it a work in ‘existentialism’ tends to imagine the solitary individual struggling for authenticity in the face of the anonymity of das Man, in which case the self, as that Dasein individuated before its own death and resolutely assuming the fate of its finite freedom, comes to be seen in stark contrast to the only sense of collectivity developed to any degree in this unfinished work: the public, or that to which Dasein is constantly in a state of falling in order to avoid being a self. It is also the case, however...that late in the work Heidegger promises us the complete analysis of authentic selfhood will treat, as well as individual Dasein, its belonging to a community; not, presumably, to the anonymous collectivity of the crowd, but to a ‘people.’

It is this very point that Schufreider makes that has a great impact on the purpose of this work: that, for Heidegger, the ‘destiny’ of a ‘people’ has little to do with ‘fate’ or ‘predestination,’ as has been previously assumed. Schufreider terms this a “phenomenology of destiny” and reveals it to be a

way of talking about that course of human life determined not by individuals alone, but in their ‘Being-With-Others,’ and especially in the line which makes a concrete suggestion how it is that in being-with-one-another something like a community may be set forth: Only in communicating and struggling does the power of destiny become free. For it is in the communication (Mitteilung) and struggle of being-with (Mitsein) one another that each individual is carried beyond itself and its personal fate, transported into those genuinely collective commitments.

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64 Ibid., 30-31. See also: Heidegger. Being and Time, 429-437(GA 2:73-74;LL 375-386).

65 Ibid.
If, in Heidegger’s later work, it is the “...polis, not all paths to the realms of beings, but the foundation and scene of man’s Dasein, the point at which all these paths meet...”\(^{66}\) that is the site at which ‘community’ happens or exists, then certainly there is not only the potential for a positive sense of ‘community’ to be found within Being and Time, but perhaps an authentic politics of being-with that may be appropriated from it.

Leslie-Paul Thiele, maintains that what can be understood out of Heidegger that is useful for a study of the political is his notion of ‘freedom.’ Thiele designates three important types of freedom: negative, positive, and postmodern. The concept of ‘negative liberty’ is “freedom for constraint”\(^{67}\) and Thiele argues that it may be traced back to the Renaissance and the Reformation as connected to the desire for privacy. As he writes, it represents “a sacrosanct area of personal freedom over which the individual has complete jurisdiction and which demands protection from all external interference, whether that of the church, state, or society.” For one, Isaiah Berlin associated this kind of freedom with liberalism, as one of its key features. ‘Positive liberty,’ on the other hand, designates a different kind of freedom – “not a freedom from, but a freedom to.”\(^{68}\) Yet, as Thiele avers, “positive liberty entails doing not only what one desires, unhindered by external constraints, but what one should desire, unhindered by internal constraints such as irrational drives, weaknesses of character, false consciousness, or even...


\(^{67}\) Thiele, “Heidegger on Freedom: Political, not Metaphysical,” 279.

\(^{68}\) Ibid.
shortsighted judgment.” As for ‘postmodern freedom,’ Thiele defines it as freedom ‘in.’

Taking from Michel Foucault, he maintains that such a postmodern conception of liberty bears features of both negative and positive liberty...[and] entails the struggle to remain free from definitions of the self that prescribe its telos...In contrast to the freedom from (constraints) of negative liberty and the freedom to master a rationally or collectively defined self) or positive liberty, postmodern liberty might be thought of as a freedom in.

For Thiele, however, Heidegger’s understanding of freedom is quite different. In fact, it is difficult to describe:

There is no direct, unavoidable and obvious translation of Heidegger’s ontological perspective on freedom into a specific political practice. At the same time, our self-understandings as individuals and members of collectivities have important political ramifications. In attempting to answer the question, What shall be done? The discovering and maintaining of a sense of self becomes an essential part of any doing. Our actions in the world stem from, feed into, and flow through our identities. If, then, we accept with Heidegger that ‘the highest dignity of [man’s] essence...lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment – and with it, from the first, the concealment – of all coming to presence on this earth’ (1977b 32), it follows that our daily comportment would reflect a certain worldly solicitude. Were modern humanity to discover its dignity in freedom understood as an interrogative disclosure rather than a willful mastery, then significant changes in political culture would be foreseen.

This, Thiele terms ‘disclosive freedom,’ a Heideggerian concept of freedom in which the world is not deserted by Dasein (nor is Dasein left alone, homeless, in the world), but, instead, it suggests “Quite the opposite: it entails the formation of dynamic worldly relationships,

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., 280.

71 Although this was the case when Thiele penned this particular account, further in this chapter a newly translated work (Nature, History, State 1933-1934) has indeed made this statement now questionable.

relationships all the more dynamic because they are no longer constrained by the limitations of a subject/object dichotomy."\(^73\)

This kind of freedom, as Thiele makes clear, seems almost unique in the history of accounts of the subject. Certainly, pre-Socratic Greek politics were intimately tied to one idea of freedom – both in the use of persuasion as opposed to force and in negative freedom (freedom from) and positive freedom (freedom to) in many ways.\(^74\) However, Heideggerian freedom in the context of the work at hand requires no language at all, no rhetoric; instead, it operates through unconcealment and silence.

Thiele points to several potential political implications for Heidegger’s ‘disclosive freedom,’ including support for ecological politics\(^75\) and as evidence of a means by which to disrupt patriarchal conceptions of independence and mastery.\(^76\) Yet, Thiele does not venture far enough into what are argued here to be further implications of Heidegger’s ‘disclosive freedom.’ In arguing for what he believes to be the ramifications of this kind of thinking, Thiele seems to miss an important point: that ‘letting beings be’ occurs outside of language and in direct opposition to the public realm. It may be reasoned, as has been stated before, that this is the very issue with Heidegger and this nascent theory of politics – that it is not political at all, that it

\(^73\) Ibid.

\(^74\) Here, it is useful to think of the kind of politics found in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* – councils and assemblies ruled the day; this was an egalitarian system, founded on the idea that the noble class could freely persuade others. Also, it should be noted that the concepts of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedom come to Thiele from Isaiah Berlin’s distinctions in his 1958 text “Two Concepts of Freedom.”


ignores the ontic and factual world in which human beings live. Freedom for Heidegger, then, is something that is revealed to Dasein, particularly in the moment of its rupture with das Man, in which it begins to understand a disclosure of itself to itself. The concept of Heidegger’s freedom that is closest to this ‘revelatory’ freedom is that of Craig M. Nichols’s.

Nichols contends that, in Being and Time, Heidegger sets forth a ‘primordial freedom,’ one that is ‘positive’ in the traditional sense of the term. Here, freedom is what Dasein possesses as a being that is full of possibilities; it is “Dasein’s authentic potentiality for being.” What is important about Nichols’s work is that he connects freedom, and intimately, to the idea of ‘care.’ He writes,

In thus circumscribing the structural whole of Dasein, Sorge emerges as the primordial unifying phenomenon between the traditional schism of theory and praxis (thematized by Plato and taken up in the Kantian architectonic as the division between phenomena and noumena, or theoretical v. practical reason). This is due to Heidegger’s revolutionary concept of freedom – a freedom as revelation which not only founds the very possibility of something like a ‘free will,’ but also the disclosure of beings.

In other words, the kind of freedom to be found in Being and Time is a ‘disclosive freedom,’ but it could also be termed ‘freedom as revelation.’ This freedom opens, or reveals, one’s own possibilities to oneself; this is how it reveals or discloses. Thus, it is quite radical when compared with other types of freedom that have come before. It cannot be a freedom from or a freedom to. It cannot even be a freedom in. Instead, it is a freedom for possibilities, for the revelation of these choices that are made when heeding the silent call of conscience. For to whom and from whom does the call go out? It goes out from Dasein to itself and frees it to be itself in the most authentic manner.

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True freedom, in this context, is a release from the clamor of *das Man*, from the power structures it creates, and from an individual being defined by anything other than their authentic relationship with Being. Though it seems odd, this liberation also marks the moment of the overcoming of subjectivism. The result is self-determined determination, yes, but defined negatively – as refusing to be defined by others and choosing the possibility of being defined by one’s own relationship with Being. Here, overcoming *das Man* represents the liberty to pursue other, myriad, possibilities, not merely one’s own subjective interests, and to exist in a state of nearness to Being.

The phrase ‘free will’ cannot even touch the kind of freedom authentic Dasein possesses. More than this, it is grounded in care, in considerateness and toleration – not only projecting inward to Dasein itself, but also outward toward Others. In resoluteness, without reservation of any kind, Dasein chooses care, which was always part of its constitution, and that care expands into a kind of ontological responsibility. Determining that such political notions are present in *Being and Time*, however, will require careful attention to the text.

In the final and fourth approach to Heidegger’s relationship to politics there are those who have explored texts like *Being and Time* and found in them an interesting and different way of looking at politics in Heidegger’s work. However, none of these fully develop Heidegger’s politics, particularly as it is present in *Being and Time*. Newell, for one, argues that Heidegger’s stance is not apolitical because of the sociality inherent in his thought. He bases this on Heidegger’s account of fundamental ontology, in which ‘being-with’ is destroyed by the ‘they-self.’ Yet, human beings experience alienation in the inauthentic world of the They. Newell speculates on how human resolve to face death, a main component of reaching authenticity for Heidegger, is already guided by the choices humans make with others as a community and as a
people. Here, destiny is collective; there is no aggregate of persons, but instead an intentional community. Newell, however, does not speculate on what a Heideggerian political community would actually look like; he can only hypothesize as to what features it would not have—namely, any ‘ordinary’ political concerns like retaining culture or distributing scarce resources. Newell’s contribution here is to offer a starting point—albeit a radical one—for determining what an authentic Heideggerian political community might look like. What Newell claims is that such a community would be the outgrowth of an annulling of everything that has come before it without having been influenced by that past.

Kisiel contends that the politics in Heidegger’s work may be located at the meeting place of *Mitdasein*, *aletheia* (truth/unconcealment), and language. Here, it is Heidegger’s placement of language, in particular of the rhetorician-statesman that interests Kisiel, pointing toward wresting truth from concealment. Kisiel further argues that language is given such a priority in Heidegger’s work that *Mitdasein* itself could be described as a ‘speech community’ or ‘being’ whose goal is to allow persons to come to an ‘understanding.’ Authentic language in Heidegger, for Kisiel, allows a community to prosper in understanding because any political community is comprised of human beings who must exist together. Thus, there must also exist an understanding between them in order not only to maintain a shared identity, but also in order to function.

It is in this way that *Dasein* and *Mitdasein* are connected in a political sense. The forgetfulness of Being has created an abyss between beings and their Being. Even the question of Being itself has been forgotten and, with it, the ability to exist authentically as *Dasein*. The ‘homelessness’ that arises from this forgetfulness of Being forces the ‘homeless’ being to search out a ‘homeland,’ a community, that is not based on nationality or patriotism, but on the very
idea of ‘being-with’ and ‘speaking with’ others who are also questioning their own Being. Here, rhetoric is the opposite of ‘idle talk’ (the purview of the they-self) and is, in this way, authentic in Heideggerian terms.

While Eubanks and Gauthier have crafted an excellent and well-reasoned argument concerning Heidegger’s stance toward the political, they have not crafted a politics of intersubjectivity from Heideggerian origins, specifically in *Being and Time*. In other words, the work of Eubanks and Gauthier does not center on finding a particular political theory in Heidegger, but seeks, instead, to determine a new means by which to look at the intersections between Heidegger and the political.

Schufreider’s contribution is that one must look at the Heideggerian *polis* as not only a ‘historical site,’ but a community that has the potential to be one of authentic Being-with because its origins are not simply a convergence of disparate subjects, but instead a synthesis of these. Here, the very destiny of a people is not a mere conglomeration of differing attitudes and perspectives, but is instead a phenomenological account in the sense that each individual (each Dasein in its authenticity) is truly part of a collective political community in their being-with others and care for one another. Additionally, Thiele and Nichols offer a succinct and interesting interpretation of ‘freedom’ in Heidegger’s work, but no cogent description of the political as a whole or to how a political theory might be created from their offerings.

It becomes clear, then, that there has been a long history of interpreting the intersections between the work of Martin Heidegger and political considerations. Yet, while the three approaches delineated here have offered some insights as to how the Heideggerian corpus relates to politics, none have gone so far as to appropriate his work as an original political theory. On the contrary, there are very few scholars who contend that Heidegger has presented much that is
of use to political scientists – other than a re-working of Nationalist Socialist ideals and a strategy for oppressive regimes.

Yet, our study of Heidegger and the political is incomplete. The first half of this volume, concerning Heidegger, politics and the political, exists in order to set forth a context in which a politics of care exists in *Being and Time* – the path not taken by Heidegger. That Heidegger chose another path is now abundantly clear. What remains is to identify its sources in Being and Time. In short, and to repeat, there are at least two identifiable political theories in Being and Time. The first is the nascent theory, what I call a ‘politics of care,’ that will be investigated and given explanation in the second part of this volume (again, what I refer to as the ‘path not taken’). The other, the taken path, which can be found, albeit not developed, in Being and Time is more prominently found in works such as *Nature, History, State* that supports the idea of a *Führer-state*.

In the following chapter, I will investigate the choices Heidegger has before him as he moved forward from *Being and Time* to *Nature, History, State*. Second, I briefly speculate as to why it is that Heidegger seems to have neglected the nascent theory in *Being and Time* in favor of the theory he sets forth in *Nature, History, State* and add that there are three ‘representative moments’ in Heidegger’s work that are useful to our discussion: the ‘Communitarian and Authoritarian Moment,’ the ‘Moment of Place and Polis,’ and the ‘Defensive Moment.’
Chapter 3: The Taken Path

In general, the terms ‘political’ and ‘theory’ are usually meant to qualify one another. ‘Theorizing’ suggests an attempt to come to a deeper understanding of a particular concept, while a broad definition of ‘political theory’ could be said to deal with understanding the complex interrelations between human beings when they live together – how ideas, values, attitudes, and orientations between human beings ought to successfully work. A political theory may also deal with questions of order, justice, rule, authority, human nature, or power; it may, in fact, address any issue of importance to politics. In the context of the above definitions of a ‘political theory,’ it is clear that Heidegger does not develop an immediately recognizable one in *Being and Time*; in fact, there are very few places in his corpus where a systematic political theory may be found. However, there are ways in which to frame a discussion of Heidegger’s politics during the time after which he wrote *Being and Time* and one of these comes from the aforementioned Lawrence Vogel,¹ who contends in *The Fragile We* that there are at least three choices that confront Heidegger as he moves toward more ontic considerations after *Being and Time*. These three choices center on the way in which authenticity might be interpreted, depending upon which notion of Heidegger’s is being put into play at the moment.

As has been briefly discussed, Vogel’s analysis highlights, not only the extent to which *Being and Time* is a seminal Heideggerian text, but also the simple fact that several political and philosophical paths originate from the work. In fact, Vogel goes so far as to comment that “despite his [Heidegger’s] insistence in *Being and Time* itself that fundamental ontology only

describes the essential structures of human existence, the distinction between authenticity and
inauthenticity carries prescriptive weight.”
What Vogel strives to discover in his investigations concerning the choices confronting Heidegger after 1927 is a ‘fundamental ethics,’ though not a system of morality. Yet, the current work seeks to move beyond the question as to whether or not there is an ethics to be found in *Being and Time*, but identifies, instead, a political theory therein.

To the end of searching for a political theory in *Being and Time*, Vogel’s ‘interpretations of authentic existence’ – “the existentialist, the historicist, and the cosmopolitan” – are useful in discovering, not only what Vogel calls ‘plausible versions’ of “the personal ideal depicted in *Being and Time*,” but also political possibilities that are potentially present in the text. In other words, Vogel claims, and rightly so, that interpretations of *Being and Time* are nearly always at the mercy of one particular ‘lens’ or another. Depending upon whether the ‘existentialist,’ ‘historicist,’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ lens is applied, each interpretation will yield very different results.

The first of these – that of a focus on being-toward-death – corresponds to an existential emphasis on radical freedom; the second of these, that of a focus on authentic historicality and tradition, seems to emphasize the destiny or historicality of individuals and of the *Volk*:

The principle of historicality – the idea that authentic existence demands the subordination of the individual to a ‘communal destiny’ – calls into question the interpretation of fundamental ontology as a radical individualism that estranges the person from his community and places him ‘beyond good and evil.’

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2 Ibid., 7.
3 Ibid.
This perspective implies a more conservative political stance, or has more conservative political implications. As Vogel describes it,

What I call the historicist reading of *Being and Time* grants equiprimordiality to facticity and transcendence, to thrownness and projection. One can never absolutely rise above the particular time and place into which one has been cast: the heritage and community into which one already belongs and which one can never wholly master ‘from the ground up.’

The third, that of a focus on being-with-others, is far more imbedded in his work. Heidegger, as has been shown, does address this third choice, and eloquently so, but he does not often follow its path. The path considered in this work as a whole is a combination of the first and third choices and is full of interesting and sophisticated political possibilities. However, Heidegger’s actual path is the second – one focused on authentic historicality, on historical destiny. Keeping Vogel’s distinctions in mind, as they are useful ways to categorize authenticity and ontic concerns, this second path must be traced.

That Heidegger chose the path of authentic historicality is certain – in 1933, this path was essentially the one that led to his involvement with National Socialism. It would be impossible to discuss here every possible political move that Heidegger made – either in his texts or in his personal life. Others, like Wolin, Safranski, Janicaud, and Dallmayr have already attempted this daunting task. However, this is a topic that may not be fairly pushed aside or ignored. The contention here is that, while one political theory and political ideology is present in *Being and Time* (what is, in this work, termed a ‘politics of care’) Heidegger chose the path of authentic historicality. It must, therefore, be determined why this divergence occurred, even if Heidegger’s answers seem unsatisfactory.

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4 Ibid., 49-50.
The question concerning this divergence or divergences is this: If the political theory found in Heidegger’s master work is, as will be shown later, evidenced in the text why did he choose not to pursue it? There are at least four identifiable reasons for Heidegger’s seeming choice not to develop such a political theory: 1) his own, personal, political choices blinded him; 2) at least in Being and Time, he privileges the ontological over the ontic; 3) Heidegger had an antipathy toward modernity in general and, therefore, an antipathy toward modern politics; 4) in other works, like the ones that will be considered forthwith, he privileges culture, tradition, and historicality over other potential important political matters.

Perhaps the most tempting of these three explanations, and one that has been repeated frequently by those who study his work, is that Heidegger himself did not wish to see the true political impulses of this thought – already being mired in his own personal political choices. In other words, he was simply not interested in pursuing investigations into the political, having already tasked himself with determining an ontological framework for human existence. Yet, there are other explanations ready to hand.

Heidegger’s reluctance or refusal may also be related to his distaste for ‘anthropology.’ If that term were applied to the discipline of political philosophy as a whole, then accounts of human nature and factical considerations such as anthropology seem to fall by the wayside. This suggests the same privileging of the ontological over the ontic, as is clearly evident in Being and Time – to the fault of leaving little room for politics, ethics, or other practical matters. For example, Conque and Eubanks have previously argued that it is this very ‘forgetfulness’ of the Aristotelian emphasis on culture and tradition that led to his failure to write a true politics of his

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5 Conque, Andrea D. & Cecil L. Eubanks. Mit-dasein, Authenticity, and Care: Heidegger’s Other Politics. Paper delivered at the 2012 Louisiana Political Science Convention at Louisiana State University, 2012.
own based on the fundamentals in *Being and Time*. Or, more frankly, that Heidegger may have failed to pay sufficient attention to the practical political considerations of Aristotle, even while engaged in a lifelong ‘conversation’ with him through his work.\(^6\) To wit, many scholars, notably Walter Brogan and Franco Volpi,\(^7\) have traced the varied and complex connections between Heidegger’s work and Aristotle.

Whereas Brogan seeks to determine these linkages for the purpose of more fully understanding Heidegger’s specific approach to phenomenology, Volpi believes Heidegger to have ‘ontologized’ Aristotle to the degree that he argues that *Being and Time* could, in fact, be viewed as a ‘translation’ of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. What is certain is that Heidegger spent a great deal of his time studying Aristotle in his early career. Many of the courses Heidegger taught at Freiburg and Marburg were dedicated to some aspect of Aristotle’s thought and he seems to have continued this ‘conversation’ with Aristotle, as Brogan points out, “into the twenties and thirties with courses on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric, Metaphysics*, and *Physics*, as well as extended analyses of Aristotle’s treatment of logic and truth.”\(^8\) It is Volpi’s work, however, that makes it seem as if Heidegger may have ignored Aristotle when it comes to the political:

\(^6\) The argument that the politics of care found in *Being and Time* is, in fact, distinctly Aristotelian, will be made in the fifth chapter of this volume. Therein, it will be shown that Heidegger has not ignored Aristotle entirely after all.


\(^8\) Brogan. *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 3.
Heidegger reads the *Nicomachean Ethics* as an ontology of human existence, centered on an interpretation of human existence (*Dasein*) as *práxis*. This reading inspired a renaissance of practical philosophy in Germany and beyond. However, as Arendt has shown, Heidegger’s ontologization closes *práxis* within a solipsistic horizon that deforms its political sense. It is this closure, which proves especially damaging when Heidegger begins to understand *Dasein* in relation to history and community, that many of his students have sought to reverse in their own work, thereby restoring a political dimension to a philosophy profoundly influenced by Heidegger.  

Second, in the main, it is Heidegger’s distaste for modernity that seems to prompt him, in *Being and Time* (and other, later, works such as “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” and “On the Question Concerning Technology”) to re-think human existence. For Heidegger, this means nothing less than a radical de-subjectivization or de-modernization of the human being. Heidegger’s distrust for the political seems to stem from his distrust of modernity itself—including modern understandings of political theory.

Traditionally, when speaking of political theory, the modern era has been defined by a focus on the Cartesian subject. This movement was accompanied by the scientific revolution as emblematic of the relationship between subject and object. Although some, like Hegel, would argue that the focus on the subject began at an earlier moment (with Socrates, perhaps), in the classic definition, the work of René Descartes is the origin. The ‘Cartesian split’ between body and mind is most often considered to be the hallmark of the emergence of what is now referred to as the ‘subject.’ Cecil L. Eubanks defines the modern era nicely:

Modernity has many characteristics: the development of technology, as illustrated in the emerging capacity of the machine to produce an abundance of material commodities, which will result in the industrial revolutions; a growing faith in reason and the concomitant ability to create and sustain large organizations of scientific inquiry and rational planning, from the modern university to the bureaucracies of the modern state; an optimism often associated with this faith that leads to a belief in the progressive capacity of reason and technology to enrich the lives of human beings; and, finally, the

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capacity of the autonomous individual to govern itself and engage in unfettered economic competition, which will lead to the influential forces of liberal democracy and capitalism.\textsuperscript{10}

Such focus on subjectivity, compared to older types of political order, like that of tribalism (focusing on a decidedly group consciousness) creates, for Heidegger, a problematic issue within the modern milieu. Simply put, the movement toward subjectivity, and away from group consciousness, has caused a rift, not only between human beings and one another, but also within the very order of their souls. In directing attention toward subjectivity, the sense of commonality and community that was once shared between human beings has been lost.

Hegel, in fact, argues that locating the moment of this rupture is difficult, but that Socrates may mark an axial moment in history – one in which human consciousness was transformed and subjective consciousness arose. Referring to what he now terms the ‘principle of subjectivity,’ Hegel writes, “it was in Socrates, that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the principle of subjectivity – of the absolute inherent independence of Thought – attained free expression.”\textsuperscript{11} For Hegel, this moment cannot have had greater influence. As Eubanks maintains,

\begin{quote}
The principle of subjectivity that Socrates represents was, for Hegel, a monumental development in human history. With the emergence of what he called the ‘inner world of subjectivity,’ there was a concomitant rupture of reality…As Socrates went about Athens, questioning any who would listen and illustrating to them that their knowledge of the Good was incomplete, he invoked the principle of subjectivity; and when, at his trial, he admitted that he had, since childhood, listened to an inner voice (\textit{daimonion}) that instructed
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{11}G.W. F Hegel. \textit{The Philosophy of History}. Translated by J. Sibree. New York: Dover Publicatons, 1956: 268-271. Hegel, in fact, argues that locating the moment of this rupture is difficult, but that Socrates may mark an axial moment in history when human consciousness was transformed and subjective consciousness arose.
him on matters of good and evil, he invoked the image of himself as an Oracle. Thus, when Athens convicted him of inventing new gods and sentenced him to death, it was a decision, in Hegel’s mind, ‘of unimpeachable rectitude.’

The result is what Hegel called the ‘homeless spirit,’ a subject who has made the world of thought, and not the state, his home. The focus on subjectivity by which modernity is characterized has been profoundly alienating, giving rise to a renewed search for reconciliation with a ‘home’ that has been lost. For Hegel, this development of the nomadic subject is a tragic character in the modern age; for Heidegger, this ‘homelessness’ is a byproduct of both the liberation of thought and subjectivity. Hegel’s arguments, in fact, correctly assume a distinctly nihilistic character in modern thought. When Nietzsche, the last vestige of modernity, the man Heidegger called the ‘last metaphysician,’ concludes with the ideal of willful subjectivism, Heidegger agrees with Hegel and considers the movement toward subjectivism to be a rational and logical outgrowth of a trend that Descartes unknowingly began. In *Nature, History, State*, he goes so far as to contend that there were three ‘great disintegrations’ in the history of thought since the Middle Ages:

1. The collapse of dogmatic-ecclesiastical faith, of the concept of creation, occurred in the wake of the first dissolution of a great bond: man became a self-legislating being that wills to, and must, found his own Being himself. This is the source of Descartes’ search for a *fundamentum absolutum*, which he found in the conviction *ego cogito, ergo sum*. The Being of man based on reason, that is,

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14 Martin Heidegger. *Nietzsche*, Volume III: *The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*. Edited by David Farrell Krell. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi. New York: Harper and Rowe, 1987, 161. “In the thought of the will to power, metaphysical thinking itself completes itself in advance. Nietzsche, the thinker of the thought of the will to power, is the last metaphysician of the West.” Emphasis in original.
mathematical ratio, which is elevated to the decisive power of the world.

2 The second disintegration consists in the disintegration of the community – the fact that the individual himself is the final court of appeal.

3 Descartes carries out the sharp separation between mind and body. In this way, in the privileging of subjectivism, of the individual spirit, Heidegger intimates, the concept of sovereignty, of full mastery and oppression, came to be in the first place. One cannot conceive of an individual person who rules above others without also conceiving that man is a law unto himself and that individuals, not communities, should be the driving thrust of relationships between persons, whether these be simple social communities or political ones.

The problem of modernity can then, for Heidegger, be traced to its root cause – a focus on subjectivity that leaves individual persons alienated and without community, lost in das Man. The political consequence of this is a deficit of political community in the sense that there is necessarily a loss of connection to one another or of a shared worldview that might make political order practical (and possible). There is a loss of embedded-ness in the world here that is troubling. If human beings are indeed nomadic subjects, wandering the earth, without a home to speak of, then what becomes of the search for order, for the commonality that makes politics a reality? In other words, Heidegger rejects the Sartrean solution – that of radical individualism.

In place of a Sartrean radical individualism and in works, engaged below, other than Being and Time, Heidegger touches upon the subject, by addressing the issues of founding, struggle, hierarchy, and place – all the while wrapped in an obsession with the polis, made all the more understandable given his antipathy toward modern, subjectivist politics. Even more to the

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point, his behavior, in addition to these musings, is laden with language that seems to privilege culture and tradition. In these instances, Heidegger seems to be fully ensconced in the land, people, and language of Germany. All of these considerations, separately and together, blind him to his own insights regarding politics. Thus, Heidegger chooses historicality as his authenticity, neglecting radical freedom and intersubjective caring. We shall see evidence of this in this chapter.

To be sure, Vogel’s analysis is perceptive. There do seem to have been at least three ‘choices’ available to Heidegger after having written Being and Time when it comes to viewing authentic human existence. Vogel concludes that Heidegger chooses historicality. However, I submit that there are, in addition to three ‘choices,’ three ‘representative moments’ concerning the philosophical and political path that Heidegger took directly after 1927: the ‘Communitarian and Authoritarian’ moment; the ‘Moment of Place and Polis;’ and the ‘Defensive Moment.’ While Vogel lists three ‘choices’ confronting Heidegger after 1927 – all related to varying interpretations of authenticity – each of the ‘moments’ presented here signifies and encompasses a particular point in Heidegger’s thinking after Being and Time.

While not all of the components of these moments may be traced directly back to Heidegger’s 1927 work, they do represent a continuous path out of Being and Time. To be sure, the matter of Heidegger’s taken path is more nuanced and complex than a simple movement toward Vogel’s historical interpretation; it involves various iterations of politics that are more, and sometimes less, associated with historicality, or with specific versions of historicality. In what follows, these three original ‘representative moments’ – the ‘Communitarian and Authoritarian Moment,’ the ‘Moment of Place and Polis,’ and the ‘Defensive Moment’ – will be
fully discussed, each with their own corresponding representative Heideggerian text or group of
texts.

The “Communitarian and Authoritarian Moment” could be described as the point at
which Heidegger falls prey to both communitarianism and authoritarianism. This moment, one
that could be considered ‘closest’ to Vogel’s authentic historicality is most easily represented by
the recently translated Nature, History, State 1933-1934, a collection of student ‘protocols,’ or
graded notes, taken during a seminar of the same name given by Heidegger at Freiburg during
the winter semester. Here, Heidegger attempts a rough sketch of a political theory based on
these principles. Additionally, in these protocols, it is clear that the notion of ‘historicality’ –
described in Being and Time as a way that beings are affected by temporality, by history, by their
past – has now been put to the service of suggesting the greatness of a Führer state, led
specifically by Adolf Hitler.

Second, there is the “Moment of Place and Polis,” as seen in the work of Jeff Malpas and
Heidegger’s own discussions of the Sophoclean tragedy, Antigone in Hölderlin’s Hymn: “The
Ister.” In this second moment, Heidegger’s thought is clearly informed by ‘historicality,’ place,
struggle, and the agonal character of Greek political life. Third, there is the “Defensive
Moment,” in which Heidegger seems to draw closer to the modes of authenticity he laid forth in
Being and Time, but now chooses to see different consequences for these ideas. Logic as the
Question Concerning the Essence of Language nicely characterizes the third moment.

In these three representative moments, Heidegger’s early disdain for ontic considerations,
as was present in Being and Time, has been abandoned. Here, the ontic is confronted directly
and factual life is presented, not as something for which Heidegger has contempt, but as a reality
of human existence. Thus, it is not a question of whether or not Heidegger was either
disinterested in writing about political concerns or did not care to, for some reason or another, expand upon the concepts he began with in *Being and Time*. On the contrary, this chapter serves to trace his taken path and shall be investigated here in its course.

I. The Communitarian & Authoritarian Moment

During the winter semester that spanned 1933-1934, Heidegger seems to have been well entrenched in the ideology of National Socialism. He was then the first Nationalist Socialist rector of the University of Freiburg and, at that time, was an official member of the Nazi Party. In 2013, Richard Polt and Gregory Fried published the first English translation of a portion of Heidegger’s papers housed in the German Literature Archive (*Deutches Literaturarchiv*) in Marbach (item DLA 75.7265).16 Marion Heinz is credited with quite inadvertently unearthing these student ‘protocols’ in 1999 and, as it turns out, they were from a lecture series Heidegger gave at the University of Freiburg entitled “On the Essence and Concept of Nature, History, and State” in the winter semester that spanned November 3, 1933 to February 23, 1944 – offered in ten course sessions. It must be noted from the outset that these ‘protocols’ are lecture notes that were written by students in the course and then given to Heidegger himself. What must be taken into account, in other words, is that Heidegger read these protocols and, also, made some notations on them in his own hand, though they are not considered part of his collected works. Though the fact that Heidegger did not write *Nature, History, State* himself perhaps lends some lack of credibility to the protocols themselves, it is likely that Heidegger confirmed their accuracy and that he may have approved of the bulk of what is written in them.

16 Martin Heidegger. *Nature, History, State 1933-1944*. Translated and edited by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. Here, the protocols have been treated as what they really are – transcribed notes taken from specific named or unnamed students in the lecture course. Thus, their names have been used, when possible, and credit given where credit is due.
According to Polt and Fried, after having been discovered, these protocols were distributed selectively among several scholarly sectors by way of simple word of mouth and eventually published in German in 2009. Until recently, however, they remained largely unknown to students of Heidegger or to those without a unique proximal advantage. They consist, entirely, of student reports written for the purposes of the lecture series; Heidegger’s own dialogue on the matter is wholly absent. Thus, it is difficult to determine not only their authenticity, but also their accuracy. Yet, Polt and Fried insist that these lecture notes remain accurate and tenable evidence as to what was covered in the course during that semester.

This particular text is of significance largely because it seems to be one of the only extant examples of an attempt by Heidegger to craft a political philosophy as such. However, Nature, History, State may also be seen as a movement toward the path that Heidegger perhaps eventually chose – that of a “communitarian and authoritarian political philosophy,”17 that of authentic historicality. As evidence of Heidegger’s choice, Polt and Fried aver that in this lecture series, “Heidegger sketches a political philosophy consistent with his views on the historicity of Dasein or human existence, that explicitly supports Hitlerian dictatorship and suggests justifications for German expansionism and persecution of the Jews.”18 In other words, Polt, Fried, and Vogel view authentic historicality and authentic historicity as potentially dangerous notions – ones that amount to advocating a hierarchical, authoritarian governmental structure and thus lending credence to Nazi political ideology.

The ideas that are presented in Nature, History, State are certainly of a communitarian and authoritarian nature. To be clear, communitarianism stresses the links that exist between the

17 Ibid., 2.

18 Ibid., 1.
individual and his or her community, on their interdependence, while authoritarianism suggests acceptance of or submission to authority.\textsuperscript{19} Both of these impulses appear to be present in \textit{Nature, History, State}. As Fried and Polt point out, “In a retrospective on his teaching written around 1945, Heidegger refers to the seminar as developing a ‘critique of the biologistic view of history.’”\textsuperscript{20} However, although it is true that Heidegger “consistently rejects the reduction of human beings to the biological, including biological racism…[his] most distinctive concern in the seminar, and its primary point of interest for most readers today, is the development of a communitarian and authoritarian political philosophy.”\textsuperscript{21}

The first four class sessions recorded by students in \textit{Nature, History, State} involve mainly preliminary concerns. In the first session (November 3, 1933 – Karl Siegel), Heidegger begins the lecture course by presenting his plan – to determine what the phenomena of ‘nature,’ ‘history,’ and ‘state’ are and to do this without leaning upon either traditional conceptions of these terms or on ‘scientific’ or ‘epistemological’ considerations. Session 2 (November 17, 1933 – Wolfgang Feuerschutze) seems to consist of a discussion of \textit{natura} and \textit{physis}, with special attention paid to their historical context. Heidegger opines that \textit{physis} in particular “originally referred not just to a particular domain of beings, but to all beings in their very way of Being.”

\textsuperscript{19} It is neither necessary nor possible to enter into a long discussion of the full scope of either communitarianism or authoritarianism. Each of these has its own, long history of scholarly discussion. However, if the reader desires to delve deeper into these subjects, they should see (on communitarianism) the work of Alasdair McIntyre (1984), Michael J. Sandel (1998), and Michael Walzer’(1990). For good discussions of authoritarianism, see Feldman (1997 & 2003) Lavine,Lodge, and Freitas (2005), Stenner (2005), and Lodge, Polichak, and Taber (2002).

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 2. The text that Fried and Polt refer to here is cited as \textit{Semiaire: Hegel – Schelling}, ed. Peter Trawney, GA 86 (2011), 898.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
In Session 3 (date not indicated – Marliese Kremer), it is revealed that ‘history’ and ‘time’ are more intimately related to one another than ‘time’ and ‘nature.’ Additionally, it is emphasized by Heidegger that “time cannot be understood merely through quantitative measurements of the duration of events.” Session 4 clarifies this understanding of time as different from the Kantian or Newtonian perspective. For human beings, Heidegger claims, time is another matter altogether. Kant and Newton “take time as an objective or subjective dimension within a uniform, linear structure, but in human existence we must make decisions about which times are significant.”

It is not until the fourth session of the lecture series meets that any real discussion of politics or political theory emerges.

It is necessary at the outset, however, to mention some distinct differences between the path that Heidegger took in Nature, History, State and the one he set forth in Being and Time. Marion Heinz, for one, maintains that the content of Being and Time had to be radically altered in order to properly fit the new tenets in Nature, History, State. Specifically, she cites a change in Heidegger’s definition of human existence and in the relationship between individual persons and others as evidence of this important shift. For example, in Being and Time, a ‘people’ comes to be first through individual Dasein. Because Dasein’s existence is inherently a being-with-others in the world, Dasein is ontologically determined by this relationship. In Nature, History, State, however, human beings are defined in a fundamentally different way, by a return to Aristotle’s conception of man as the political animal, the zoon politikon. This movement serves to considerably transform the basic ontological determination of beings. In Being and Time,

22 Ibid., 2-3.

beings are defined by their individual Dasein and by being-with; in *Nature, History, State*, beings are defined by wholly political considerations.

Additionally, Heinz argues, in *Nature, History, State*, care is re-defined as, not directed toward other Dasein, but as the purview and purpose of “care for Being within the community of the *Volk* and for this community itself.”24 In other words, in *Being and Time*, one could become authentic Dasein and remain open to an infinite number of possibilities for existence. The happening of becoming authentic Dasein occurs in the questioning of the meaning of Being from within a with-world of other Dasein who relate to one another through care. Now, in *Nature, History, State*, there remains only one possibility for Dasein – to become a member of a very precise political community, that of the *Führer* state as part of the ‘true’ *Volk*.

In point of fact, there is much in *Being and Time* that must be nearly completely reconstructed in order to fit the new framework of *Nature, History, State*, not the least of which are the notions of care and of the silent call of conscience. It is care, in *Being and Time*, that is the vessel by which Dasein is able to reach an authentic relationship with other Dasein. This is accomplished, in one way, when Dasein are able to share the bond of a common interest that, in turn, ‘stirs’ the Dasein of others. When people share a common goal, they care for one another in a deep sense for the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. They are freed by one another to develop a richer understanding of themselves. Heidegger makes this point clear:

> A being-with-one-another which arises [entspringt] from one’s doing the same thing as someone else, not only keeps for the most part within the outer limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The Being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust. On the other hand, when they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus become *authentically* bound together,

24 Ibid., 73.
and this makes possible the kind of objectivity [die rechte Sachlichkeit], which frees the Other in his freedom for himself.²⁵

The term ‘Dasein’ itself is not used in *Nature, History, State*, but it is clear that in that text, what brings together Dasein is no longer a freeing relationship of common interests, but only one – political – interest, one community, one state under a common leader. The ‘authentic alliance’ described above thus takes on new meaning.

The silent call of Heidegger’s brand of conscience in *Being and Time* is also no longer present by the time he offers the seminar on *Nature, History, State*. In Division II of *Being and Time*, the potentiality of Dasein is only attested to in the authentic ‘voice of conscience,’ Heidegger makes certain to distinguish this conscience from Kant’s concept of the same; it is not an internal voice that becomes the barometer of morality and justice. Instead, it is the silence that occurs when Dasein stops listening to the clamour of the unauthentic ‘they.’ In *Nature, History, State*, however, persuasion and coercion are presented as two means by which a leader can implement the will of the people and convince them to work toward a common goal. It requires no leap of logic to maintain that the ‘conscience’ of *Being and Time* – that which was revealed to Dasein from itself when the ‘they’ is silenced – has been replaced by 1933 with the idea that external persuasion can lead a human being to care for others. Yet, this care remains only for the will of the people, that nebulous whole, and for the words of a leader – not for individual Dasein.

As for ‘concern,’ which is presented in *Being and Time* as considerateness and tolerance of others, allowing Dasein a deeper understanding of itself apart from the inauthentic ‘they,’ this conception seems to be wholly missing from *Nature, History, State*. There, the new *Volk* will

²⁵ GA 2: 26; L 122.
include only Germans – and only those who live within the Reich. Being-with, care, and authenticity no longer open up all possibilities for the freedom of Dasein; all roads now lead to the same destination – to the Führer state.

Furthermore, as Heinz contends,

Otherwise than in *Being and Time*, philosophy no longer has the role of calling the particular Dasein to authentic, finite existing by means of existential projections; the task of philosophy is now to interpret the historical moment and to bring Dasein before its historical decision as a political being.\(^{26}\)

The connection between Heidegger’s philosophical undertakings in *Being and Time* to politics is also extended to the idea of space. In *Being and Time*, the space of a people is not particularized; it is the ‘there’ of being-there, to be sure, but is expressed differently in *Nature*, *History, State*. In sum, it is in Sessions 5-10 that Heidegger sets forth his attempt at a political theory in 1933.

In Session 5 (January 12, 1934 – author not indicated), it becomes clear that Heidegger views the connections between the concepts of “nature,” “history,” and “state” to exist as embedded, concentric circles. The state is viewed as existing within history and both the state and history are embedded within the idea of nature. The unknown author records Heidegger as having commented, “If we ask about the state, we are asking about ourselves.”\(^{27}\) Thus, it is suggested that it is the essence of a state, and not its historical meaning, that is important to uncover:

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\text{…we can take the state (1) materially: just as substances and living things belong in the realm of the nature, citizens, officials, tax offices and the like belong in the realm of the state. (2) We can take the state formally: then we ask how, in what way, something is. We then understand by ‘state’ a way of Being in which humans}
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\(^{26}\) Heinz, “*Volk and Führer*,” 73.

are – It is in this way, then, that we primarily want to grasp the essence of the state, and not as an area of history.

In other words, “the people is the being that is in the manner of a state, the being that is or can be a state.”

For the participants in the lecture course and, ostensibly, Heidegger, the mere shadowy idea of ‘order’ is not enough – the concept is too vague. Heidegger, according to the author of the Session 5 protocol, harkens instead back to Aristotle and Plato for whom “the question of the essence of the state begins with the question: who rules, who is permitted to rule?” In this way, “order in the sense of mastery, rank, leadership, and following” becomes the focus.

Session 6 (January 19, 1934 – Ital Gelzer) found the discussion moving toward a working definition of the actual term ‘state’ and its possible meanings. The conclusion reached during that meeting is this: that “status means condition, it means a mode of Being, and so state, that is status rei publicae literally means the mode of Being of a people.” Gelzer notes that the traditional definition of politics is “every practical and theoretical occupation in the state and having to do with the state.” Interestingly, he then offers in his report the notion that the polis truly means “the state as community…the sole site where all the state’s Being took place – it was where everything happened that we characterize as the state.”

Yet, Heidegger, through Gelzer’s protocol, is quick to clarify that, in his estimation, the Aristotelian zōon politikon and the Roman animal sociale cannot and do not “therefore mean that we must be communal beings…simply because we cannot survive alone or because, for better or

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28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 41.
for worse, from our first day of life onwards we are naturally surrounded by other people.”

Remarkably, Gelzer writes that,

Rather apart from such biological considerations, human beings are truly the ζόον politikon because to be human means: in a community, to carry in oneself the possibility and the necessity of giving form to fulfilling one’s own Being and the Being of the community. Human beings are a ζόον politikon because they have the strength and the capacity for the polis, and here the polis is not conceived as something already subsisting in advance, but rather as something to which human beings can and must give form. But in this sense, the human being certainly ‘belongs to the polis’ or is politikos as the living being, that is which has the possibility and the necessity of existing in the polis.

As time progressed, Heidegger argues, “the word politics was subjected to further narrowing,” beginning in the “…Renaissance, when the individual human being, as the person, was raised up as the goal of all Being…” Gelzer further records, “Thus politics, art, science and all the others degenerate into domains of the individual will to development, and this is all the more as they were expanded through gigantic accomplishments and thus became specialized.”

At this point in the session, Heidegger sounds out a call to the people of the current age to,

counter this danger in order to attempt to give back to politics its proper rank, to learn to see politics again as the fundamental characteristic of human beings who philosophize within history, and as the Being in which the state fully develops, so that the state can truly be called the way of Being of a people.

What follows is a discussion reported by Gelzer concerning the substance and meaning of the components of the state – the people (das Volk), described as:

something other than the mere sum of the citizens of a state. We mean something even more binding than race and a community of the same stock;

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31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., 41-42.

33 Ibid.
namely, the nation, and that means a kind of Being that has grown under a common fate and taken distinctive shape within a *single* state.\(^{34}\)

Session 7 (February 2, 1934 – Ingeborg Schroth) then begins with an inquiry into what correlations there may be between the state and the people. Every relation here is described ontologically. The fundamental relationship that exists between beings and Being found in *Being and Time* is similarly structured here in the relationship between beings and the state in that they are concerned with it and conscious of it. Schroth writes, ‘The people, the being, that actualizes the state in its Being, knows of the state, cares about it, and wills it.’\(^{35}\)

The author of this protocol states that ‘the people’, furthermore, are capable of not only gaining political knowledge, but also of expressing their will in the form of either support for or rejection of the state’s doings. This, in turn, means that the people have a responsibility toward the state and for the state; the state, once constructed, cannot be separated from the will of the people, but the people remain separate from the state in the sense that they are not dependent upon the state to exist as a community, an entity that expresses its will.

According to Schroth’s account, the primary drive of the people to fulfill this responsibility is “the urge for the state, by *erōs* for the state,” for the shared will of the people. One form mentioned as an expression of the people is a constitution – “constitution and law are the actualization of our decision for the state – they are factical attestations of what we take to be our historical task as a people, the task that we are trying to live out.” Knowledge of and concern for these things is not only, Schroth reports, the purview of politicians, leaders,

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 43.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 48.
statesmen, and the like, but “belongs to the Dasein of every individual human being who takes upon himself the struggle and responsibility of his people.”36

Session 8 of the seminar (February 16, 1934 – Helmut Ibach) is a polemic concerning the Volk and a Volk-based state. The participants in the seminar are taught that having a political leader is important, but that the people require “a tradition that is carried on by a political leader.”37 Ibach then suggests that, in the history of German politics, the lack of attention to the connection between the people, their customs and traditions, and the state was, indeed, the failure of Bismarck and the Second Reich.38

In this session, there seems to be clear evidence of Heidegger’s possible attempts to bring his philosophy in line with that of Nationalist Socialist principles. The people are revealed as the key component in any true state. Yet, he is quick to draw a distinction between his ideas and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of a social contract. Whereas Rousseau, Ibach records, believed that government should draw its authority from individual persons who enter into a contract social freely, thinking of their own well being. Heidegger avers that this kind of state cannot truly be based on the people – at least not in a philosophical sense. By this, he indicates that Rousseau’s state, though also connected to the people in a marginal way, would be a lesser kind of state because it “would no longer be the state in the sense of the political as the fundamental character of Western man, who exists on the basis of philosophy…”39

36 Ibid., 47, 48, 49.

37 Ibid., 52.

38 Perhaps Heidegger is referring to the religious, and thus political, turmoil between Protestants and Catholics during Otto von Bismarck’s Kaiserreich and his reactions to such tensions (Kulturkampf).

Here, the Being of a people seems to be historical in character, as they exist in a particular space and place – temporally and geographically. Ibach mentions that, for Heidegger, the concepts of space and place have nearly always been criteria used for the description of the individuation and uniqueness of any one thing, person, or people. Yet, it soon becomes clear that Heidegger does not intend for ‘space’ and ‘place’ to be understood as simple location or geography. In fact, in later portions of this chapter, the theme of Being as unconcealed in a particular place will be more fully explored. Instead, human beings, unlike other animals, are related to space differently; they do not merely exist within a location as a fish does water, for example. This is mainly through their ability to ‘master’ a particular area in which they have settled, thereby making it their own.

Still, it remains to be seen how a people’s space is connected to their state. When, Ibach reports, a person is born to a particular geographical region – the mountains, the sea, farmland – the relationship they have to that land is specific; it is his or her ‘homeland,’ the place of their birth. On the other hand, “We can speak of the state only when rootedness in the soil is combined with the will to expansion, or generally speaking, interaction.” In order for a state to truly be a state, it must not, then, exist in isolation, but must interact with others, with other peoples, other groups. Interaction, in this eighth session, is the way in which people may call their ‘homeland’ their ‘state.’ If they do not, Heidegger warns, then they have “not step[ped] out beyond their connection to the homeland into their authentic way of Being – into the state [and] are in constant danger of losing their peoplehood and perishing.”

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40 Ibid., 55.
Thus far, strong connections may be observed between the notions contained in Ibach’s protocol and Nationalist Socialist ideology. Additionally, in this account, nomadic peoples seem to have neither a homeland nor a true state and, thus, no access to authentic Being as a people; Germans who do not live within the confines of the Reich “have a German homeland, but…are deprived of their authentic way of Being.” The obvious use of terms like ‘rootedness in the soil’ need not be analyzed in great detail in order for evidence of Nazi propaganda to seemingly become apparent; the language itself is quite similar to that used by representatives of the Third Reich. Yet, in a short, and last, section of this protocol, Heidegger clearly means to distance himself from his contemporaries’ views on the importance of folklore (Volkskunde), which was pressed upon German citizens during the Third Reich.

In Session 9 (February 23, 1934 – Emil Schill), there is a discussion concerning the relationship of the people to the state – whether they must be seen as two disparate entities or whether they should be understood as one. Through Schill’s notes, it becomes clear that the ‘people’ is, indeed, something that exists both before the creation of any state and after that state has either changed or been destroyed. To be sure, Heidegger maintains, it can be difficult to determine the nature and character of a people because in a state that is already set in place, there are far too many internal and external influences at work that affect the people as part of the state.

Political philosophers, the argument continues, have always restricted their questioning to one or the other – people or state – and in this way treated the subject of their relationship in such a way that it “is always played out with a certain polarity, within the difference between people and state as a being and its Being.” For Heidegger, the state cannot be merely a “purely formal

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41 Ibid.
category.” The question of order, he reasons, has been treated as a hierarchy, as a dichotomy between the ruler and the ruled, the likes of such treatments already belies the assumption that “necessarily and from the start takes the people as ‘the mastered’ in the real sense of the word, thereby in principle denying the people a will of their own.”

In that kind of order, where “mastery becomes sovereignty,” it does so because “the supreme force is taken as the essence and expression of the state.” What Heidegger terms ‘intermediaries,’ like governmental institutions, are the means by which the sovereign implements the will of the state, thus causing the people to lose “a direct, living relation to the state.” It is this ‘direct living relationship’ that is key. The will of the people must become manifest in the state; otherwise, it is not a proper state at all, but an ordered relation of subordination and oppression.

The will of a people is defined in this session as an active engagement wherein “What the one who acts wills is a willing Being among others.” Yet, the will of an individual and the will of a people are not to be conflated – they are structurally different. The will of an individual is described here as ‘free,’ whereas the will of a people is more complex, more difficult to pinpoint. Thus, Schill writes, “The will of the people is not the sum of individual wills, but rather a whole that has its own, originary characteristics.” This is presented as one of Heidegger’s critiques of democracies, that there is always, for leaders and others, “the question of the consciousness of the will of the community.” For him, this is too challenging a thing to continually attempt to determine and observe to be an effective means of ordering a state. Heidegger’s solution is for

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43 Ibid.
the people to “direct the fundamental attitude of [their] communal Being toward this actuality of people and leader in which both as a single actuality are not to be separated.”

Session 10 (also held on February 23, 1934 – author not indicated) was the last session of that winter semester and it contains, in the main, a further investigation into the question of a people and a state. Most significantly, there is the suggestion that the ‘ruler and ruled’ dichotomy must be disrupted. In Session 9, it was determined that a people are separate from the state in the way that they are not dependent upon a particular state for either their character or their existence. Now, the idea is expressed that if a state changes or is altered in any way, it is due to the will of the people itself – what they themselves choose. Here, the ‘ruled’ cannot mean the ‘oppressed;’ the role of the ruler is to guide the people toward certain goals. What ruling is presented to mean in Session 10 is that the only true power of a ruler (and, thus, the reason for a hierarchical system of rank and power) is to show the people in which direction they must go in order to accomplish the goals they will to be accomplished. “Under this rule,” Heidegger argues, “there are ruled people who are not oppressed.” They are not oppressed because the ruler is meant only to implement the will of the people. This implementation, in turn, may be effected in two ways – either through persuasion or through coercion. Furthermore, coercion is described as an unseemly technique; this would only result in compliance with the ruler, here termed a ‘negative relation.’ Instead,

The true implementation of the will is not based on coercion, but on awakening the same will in another, that is, the same goal and engagement or

44 Ibid., 59, 60. The meaning of this statement is wholly unclear. Perhaps Schill himself did not fully understand what Heidegger meant and simply recorded it in his notes exactly as Heidegger said it. If we are to speculate, it perhaps has to do with the intimation that the ‘people’ are not individuals, but a whole and that the leader must be aware of this and bring himself or herself in concert with them.
accomplishment…This implementation is not a momentary yes-saying, but a decision of the individual.

This is meant to lead to true freedom. The unknown author writes, “The highest actualization of human Being happens in the state” and the Führer state is the “actualization of the people in the leader.”\footnote{Ibid., 61, 62, 64.}

So, it becomes necessary to determine how Heidegger’s statements during this seminar course should be understood in the greater context of German politics in 1934. First, it should be understood that political life under the Third Reich could not be separated from cultural or social life – they were forcibly made one and the same. This is difficult for many Westerners to comprehend, especially those living in the United States, because many people in this portion of the world habitually make a sharp distinction between their private lives and their public or political lives. Politics, for the most part, is seen as only one portion of a person’s life, not an integrated whole that singly defines an individual’s very existence.\footnote{George L. Mosse (1966). \textit{Nazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich}. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, xx.}

However, in Germany, under Hitler’s rule, “politics was the consciousness of race, blood, and soil, the essence of the Nazi definition of human nature.”\footnote{Ibid.} Everything was controlled – information, art, culture, lifestyle, and attitude – for the Nazi state was a totalitarian, communitarian, and authoritarian regime. If follows that it is an even more demanding and complex task to understand the statements of Heidegger from within such a highly and precisely orchestrated milieu, especially one in which there was a forceful push toward unity and national identity, mainly focused on returning to an idyllic past.
Moreover, it must be remembered that Nazi propaganda, most particularly in 1933, when Hitler came to power, was not at odds with the ideology of many persons living in Germany; he simply took advantage of the already existent desire of the people to return to a time when family, morality, and tradition mattered. As George L. Mosse puts it, “Nazism was overthrown by a foreign war, not by an internal revolution, and a larger resistance to Nazism grew up only as the war was being lost.” Being a member of the new Germany meant belonging and an escape from alienation. It was a cultural revolution, not an economic one, and it was thus highly effective:

What was shocking to most was that Hitler’s racism was real: How many said: ‘He will become respectable in office,’ and repudiated his racism, which ‘no sensible person could believe’! But the racism and all that it meant proved to be not excesses but an integral part of the ideology, and those who hoped differently were doomed to disappointment.

Without that element, that of a cultural revolution, Mosse controversially points out, such nineteenth century bourgeois morality “should not be unfamiliar, for it pervades Gaullism in France and much of conservatism in the United States.”48 It was an answer to the impersonality of the industrial age, from the alienation and isolation that it created – thus, it was easy to accept.

Marion Heinz, who indeed discovered these protocols during the course of earlier research, Polt and Fried, all agree that the Heidegger that is represented in On the Essence and Concept of Nature, History, and State is a Heidegger who falls entirely in line with National Socialist ideology and, in fact, is fully supportive of a Führer state. They also concur, that Heidegger’s philosophy in these texts offers proof of the depth of his involvement by 1933 in propagating and reinforcing a communitarian and authoritarian political perspective. In other words, “that the substance of Heidegger’s philosophy consists in justifying and politically and

48 Ibid., xli, xl, xxvii.
propagandistically validating the *Führer* state, the ideology of blood and soil, and other core elements of the Nazi world view.”

Heidegger’s treatment, especially during this time period, of the notion of the *Volk* is crucial due to the fact that the term itself was highly politicized during the Third Reich. Part of the Nazi vision for a new world was one in which the folklore (*Volkskunde*) of the German people would serve as a unifying force of culture and custom – the way to a proper ideology (*Weltanschauung*). The Nationalist Socialist Party took such an interest in disseminating such seemingly innocuous works and stories that there were entire publications dedicated to this one end. Among such items supported, and in fact sponsored, by the Nazis appeared as part of Alfred Rosenberg’s (head of the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP) Militant League for Social Culture (*Kulturgemeinde*) in at least two journals: Art and the People (*Kunst und Volk*) and Ethnicity and Homeland (*Volksstum und Heimat*). The Cultural Community (*Kulturgemeinde*) additionally published a series of books, promoted by the Book Circle (*Buchring*) on various themes such as Nordic mythology, Icelandic mythology, German folklore, humor, customs, mores, and more.

At bottom, these actions were meant to be far more than informative – they were an insidious means for attempting to make Germans understand themselves as both unique in the world and superior to all other cultures – politically. This is, perhaps, best briefly evidenced by the simple existence of Otto Schmidt’s book, *Folklore as a Political Task*. It is clear that the Party perceived the danger of a Germany as it then existed: diverse and disjointed. These publications, thus, were meant to serve the real political end of unification and homogeneity.

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The immense and powerful influence such a ‘German folklore’ movement had on the German idea of the *Volk*, of the people, even extended into university classrooms, where professors were asked to teach such courses as “Folk and State,” “Mores, Customs, and Folkish Prophesy,” and “The Science of Folk and Race.” Furthermore, the idea of the *Volk* spread out in wider circles, nearly deifying the peasant class in Germany and carefully presenting such a figure as a warrior in the fight between ‘alien’ cultures and ‘true German’ ancestral history. This movement was also tied up in the ideas of ‘blood’ and ‘soil,’ of the “Blood-and-Soil-Programs (“Blut-und-Bodenprogramm”), that sought to revive peasant ideology in the hearts and spirits of the German people, but also to connect these to their ‘race.’  

In the eighth session of *Nature, History, State*, however, Heidegger instead takes a different perspective. He makes the point that, “people and space mutually belong to each other.” On the one hand, he maintains that the relationship a people has with its space is something that an individual cannot understand unless they are within that space and time – experiencing the culture, mores, and customs of a particular people, being part of a people. On the other hand, he also affirms that folklore is *not* an acceptable means by which to cause an individual or group to understand this relationship. Now that it is understood what Heidegger meant exactly by using the particular term ‘*Volkskunde,*’ it may be argued that he was, in fact, separating himself to some degree from the Nazi folklore movement. For Heidegger, folklore is simply a ‘mishmash’ of cultural debris that anthropologists might find of interest – things that have much to do with the mythology of a people, but little to do with their current existence and “which no longer have anything to do with a specific people in its historical Being.” Thus,  

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folklore is not suited to ask about what belongs specifically to a people; often it even does the very opposite.” Heidegger goes so far as to say that it is “a misunderstanding and an error to believe that one can awaken the consciousness of the Volk with the help of folklore. We must above all guard ourselves against being overly impressed by the word ‘folk.’”

Robert Bernasconi has already tackled the difficult question of Heidegger’s meaning in this seminar in his 2013 critical essay, “Who Belongs? Heidegger’s Philosophy of Volk in 1933-4.” More than a critical analysis of the student protocols, Bernasconi’s essay seeks to place Heidegger’s comments within a historical and political context. First, it is important to note that Bernasconi believes Heidegger to have been fully invested in Nazism during the period of the seminar, but is also quick to point out that the National Socialist movement was far from ‘uniform’ at that time. In other words, there were many different points of view concerning how the Third Reich would settle itself out in the end and, for Bernasconi, there is ample evidence that Heidegger believed himself to be a powerful enough voice in that milieu to change the scope and direction of what Germany would become. This means that Heidegger was also often placed at significant philosophical and competitive odds with other scholars when it came to the vision of his own Volk and state.

Pointedly, Bernasconi argues, a large part of Heidegger’s defense of his actions during the war “rested on his claim that in company with many intellectuals he worked to transform


53 Ibid., 109.
some of the essential formulations of National Socialism (GA 16: 398). The problem, Bernasconi avers, is that all the emphasis placed on blood, soil, people, and unity only serves to betray the fact that there was a great deal of disunity, both within the Party and among the citizens. Heidegger knew this and also understood that one of the ‘frontlines,’ so to speak, in these debates, was to be German universities. This explains, at least in part, Heidegger’s claim that he accepted the Rectorship at Freiburg in order to influence some of these grand schemes and to protect the educational system from external forces that threatened to overtake it.

None of this, of course, serves to excuse Heidegger’s actions during that time, but perhaps can offer a deeper explanation of Heidegger’s thinking as it turned to communitarian and authoritarian politics. Certainly, it is representative of the Communitarian and Authoritarian Moment in his thought. In *Nature, History, State*, it is the Dasein of the *Führer* that creates a state – through his interaction with the people’s will. This is described as a type of rule under which no one is oppressed, but all have freely determined to give up their will to a sovereign. Yet, Heidegger is no Thomas Hobbes or John Locke. Now, instead of preservation of life or property, it is, from a philosophical-political point of view, preservation from the threat of nihilism that becomes paramount. The ruler in Heidegger’s *Führer* state must use persuasion to convince the people of their common goals – and each individual must understand their acquiescence to that leader. This Communitarian and Authoritarian Moment does not last long, however, for Heidegger – only for the period of about one year.55

54 Ibid., 110. Note: GA 16.

55 Recall that the seminar that is *Nature, History, State* was offered at Freiburg during the time that Heidegger was rector (the ten sessions spanned from November 23, 1933 to February 23, 1934; Heidegger resigned in April of 1934).
II. The Moment of Place & Polis

That Heidegger meant to extend and transform his work in *Being and Time* to meet the demands of overcoming nihilism is clear. It is also clear that he intended for some notions in his master work to shift in order to underpin National Socialist ideology by the winter of 1933-1934. However, this desire to overcome nihilism has leads Heidegger to a second moment in the path taken – the Moment of Place and Polis. Out of *Being and Time*, Heidegger finds the means by which to also extend and transform his conceptions of ‘place’ and add the importance of the *polis*, which is informed by his understanding of historicality. In this second moment, both agonistic conflict and hierarchical structure may be found as well as a very particular understanding of place and space.

The second half of *Being and Time* offers the implication that fully realized authenticity necessitates that Dasein pursue collective action. One interpretation of this necessity is that Dasein must subordinate its interests to some ‘communal destiny.’ In *Being and Time*, Heidegger maintains that “complete authentic occurrence of Dasein” necessitates an attempt to realize the ‘destiny’ (*Geschick*) that signifies “the historicizing of the community, of a people.”

In several of his later works (*An Introduction to Metaphysics*, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” and Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”), Heidegger assumes a similar stance towards the political. In *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger calls upon the German nation to save Europe and the world from the threat of nihilism. And in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger argues that the founding of a political state is a means by which ontological truth comes to presence:

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“Another way in which truth occurs is the act that founds a political state.” On such occasions, Heidegger’s project is political indeed. What is to be made of Heidegger’s seemingly ambiguous attitude towards the political in some places and his seeming adherence to it in others? What is the importance of place and time for Heidegger?

Already, Heidegger’s treatment of temporality and place has been deemed problematic. In §6 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger puts the matter quite plainly in a portion entitled “The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology.” His analysis reveals a clear, determinative description of his views concerning temporality, history, and, most importantly, tradition.

First, time is argued to be a determinative factor in the existence of Dasein. The world in which Dasein finds itself must be affected by the time in which it lives. Heidegger calls this condition ‘temporality.’ Heidegger has already mentioned at this point in the text that, “Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as its ontically constitutive state.” More clearly, Dasein, as a unique state that could only happen for human beings, already understands something, though perhaps only an intimation, about the fact that it exists.

However, Heidegger sagely points out, “whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint.” This estimation is, to be sure, a bit like common sense: human beings are the only entities that have the ability to question their own existence and when they do, their starting point must always be from within

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59 GA 2: 5; L 17.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.
their own temporal milieu. In other terms, no human being truly has any real access to time besides his or her own.

Yet, Heidegger rightly maintains that temporality cannot be seen as merely ‘being in time,’ existing in one age or another. Still, time must be considered because human beings understand themselves in this way – as living in a ‘time’ – and it would be difficult to conceive otherwise. This is the very reason that Heidegger believes in the necessity of ‘destroying’ that concept of history, especially that of the history of ontology.

Heidegger contends that, “Dasein’s Being finds its meaning in temporality.”62 However, this very understanding has also served as “the condition which makes historicality possible as a temporal kind of Being which Dasein possesses, regardless of whether or how Dasein is an entity ‘in time.’”63 What Heidegger argues vehemently against is ‘tradition’ becoming ‘master’ of Dasein’s inquiry into Being. His idea of history is entirely separate from notions that have come before, though he admits that history has determined Dasein’s way of thinking about the past. Still, he maintains that the real spirit of history – and its importance to human existence – has become concealed by the very way in which it has been attended to in the past. He explains this through a discussion of the dangers of tradition.

Tradition, according to the Heidegger of Being and Time, when it becomes ‘master’ of Dasein, ‘transmits’ itself in such a way that it ‘becomes inaccessible’ to Dasein. He writes, “Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial ‘sources’ from which the categories and concepts handed down to us

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62 Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, 40 (GA 2: 6; L 19).

63 Ibid. Heidegger defines ‘historicality’ thus: “Historicality, as a determinate character, is prior to what is called ‘history’” (GA 6; L 19).
have been in part quite genuinely drawn.” Dasein thus ‘forgets’ its own, true origins and understands them only in an inauthentic, concealed way. Heidegger goes so far as to maintain that:

Dasein has had its historicality so thoroughly uprooted by tradition that it confirms its interest to the multiformity of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophical activity in the most exotic and alien of cultures; and by this very interest it seeks to veil the fact that it has no ground of its own to stand on.64

It becomes clear that Heidegger’s intention, thus, is to destroy at least a few previous notions of history and the place of human beings in it so that its true nature may be revealed to Dasein. Specifically, this disdain for the common understanding of history points to the notion that history and tradition are dangerous things to contemplate, that they are rife with a perspective whose time has ‘past.’

Philosophy, for Heidegger, has misunderstood the place of human beings in the world – and failed to question existence thoroughly enough. Not one person, he avers, has crafted a true ontology of Dasein. Temporal matters always make this task nearly impossible. For the Greeks, the present was the ‘time’ that mattered; if beings understand themselves according to ancient Greek conceptions of Being, then they understand this as their ‘presence’ in a world. For Descartes, simply being aware of one’s existence is what matters; again, this perspective comes out of the present. Naming that which exists, that a person can think of, the I think therefore I am (‘je pense donc je suis’) – all of this denotes a particular kind of understanding of existence, one dependent on time.

Heidegger seeks to disrupt this continuum, to destroy what has been written and thought about ontology in general before, and to replace it with a new way of understanding the

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64 Ibid., 42 (GA 2: 6; L 21).
relationship between beings and Being. Being is, for Heidegger, “something ‘a priori’; it is not pieced together, but is primordially and constantly a whole.”\textsuperscript{65} In \textit{Being and Time}, ‘place’ is described as a kind of portion of the world in which beings dwell and Dasein presented as a spatial being within the world:

And even when Dasein explicitly addresses itself as ‘I-here,’ this locative personal designation must be understood in terms of Dasein’s existential spatiality. In Interpreting this…we have already intimated that this ‘I-here’ does not mean a certain privileged point – that of an I-thing – but is to be understood as Being-in in terms of the ‘yonder’ of the world that is ready-to-hand – the ‘yonder’ which is the dwelling place of Dasein as concern.\textsuperscript{66}

There exists, in other words, a ‘spatial relationship’ between Dasein, its world, and Others in the world. This topic will be taken up more completely in the forthcoming discussion of dwelling. However, it is important to note here that Dasein experiences a particular kind of \textit{dwelling} when it encounters the world into which it has been thrown. As thrown, Dasein exists in a fallen, inauthentic state. There are some things, and entities, that Dasein views as ‘ready-to-hand,’ as objects:

‘Fallenness’ into the ‘world’ means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Through the Interpretation of falling, what we have called the ‘inauthenticity’ of Dasein may now be defined more precisely. On no account, however, do the terms ‘inauthentic’ and ‘authentic’ signify ‘really not,’ as if in this mode of Being, Dasein were altogether to lose its Being. ‘Inauthenticity’ does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world – the kind which is completely fascinated by the ‘world’ and by the Dasein-with of Others in the ‘they.’\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 65 (GA 2; L 41).

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 155 (GA 2: 26; L 119).

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 220 (GA 2: 38; LL 175-176).
It is this ‘fallenness’ that remains the sticking point for many interpretations of the political use of *Being and Time*. For, it is here that Heidegger discusses the inauthenticity of ‘publicness’ and, it is often claimed, therefore politics. Yet, the ‘idle chatter’ of the public, inauthentic ‘they’ is not the only way in which Heidegger takes politics to task. His antipathy toward modern politics, as opposed to ‘older’ forms, is especially noticeable.

Here, it may be useful to draw a brief distinction between the ancient and modern concepts of politics – as these concepts depend upon conceptions of subjectivity. Heidegger sees modern politics as permeated by the spirit of subjectivity because it is metaphysical in nature. That is to say, modern politics presupposed a given interpretation of the Being of beings, an interpretation that is beyond the realm of questioning. In contrast, the practice of politics in ancient Greece was non-metaphysical. Because it did not presupposed a metaphysical foundation, the practice of the Greek political art invited questioning. As Heidegger puts it in his 1942 lecture on Hölderlin’s hymn “The Ister,” “the *polis* is the realm and the place around which everything question-worthy and uncanny (*Unheimlich*) turns in an exceptional sense.”

Viewed from this perspective, Heidegger’s critical stance to politics is really a reflection of his antipathy toward modern politics. Conversely, Heidegger’s more politically-charged pronouncements are manifestations of his attempt to recover the ancient Greek concept of the political.

Of course, this raises an obvious question, one that brings forth the connection of place with *polis*: What is the ancient Greek concept of the political for Heidegger? Here, it is instructive to note that the motif of struggle (*Auseinandersetzung*) permeates Heidegger’s

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writings. In Being and Time, his emphasis on struggle is evinced in a discussion of how the Volk realizes its destiny through communal ‘struggling,’ suggesting a ‘battle’: “in communication and in struggling does the power of destiny become free.”

In his 1935 Metaphysics lecture, Heidegger’s stress on struggle is exhibited in his discussion of how the founder creates the polis through the performance of ontological violence. He writes, “The violence-doing of poetic saying, of thoughtful projection, of constructive building, of state-creating action, is not an application of faculties that the human being has, but is a disciplining and disposing of the violent forces by virtue of which beings disclose themselves as such, insofar as the human being enters into them.”

In its celebration of struggle and place, Heidegger’s thought (even in Being and Time) evinces a discernible enchantment with the agonistic character of Greek political life. As his student, Hannah Arendt notes, political action in the Greek polis was agonal in character and that “the public realm itself, the polis, was permeated by a fiercely agonal spirit, where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show through unique deeds or achievements that he was the best of all (aien aristeuein).” Considered from this vantage point, Heidegger’s emphasis on struggle may be a manifestation of his attempt to recover the agonistic aspect of the animated world of the polis.

Heidegger’s celebration of the agonistic character of life in the polis is at one with his attraction to its hierarchical social structure. The Heideggerian stress on hierarchy appears at

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69 Heidegger. Being and Time, 436 (GA 2: 74; L 384).

70 Heidegger. Introduction to Metaphysics, 167.

numerous times in his writings. In *Being and Time*, it manifests itself in a brief yet significant mention of the ‘hero’ who will spearhead the Volk’s attempt to realize its historical destiny.\(^7_2\)

For Heidegger, the full attainment of ontological authenticity necessitates that Dasein seize upon “the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero…”\(^7_3\) In the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, an explicit elitism colors Heidegger’s discussion of the process by which select individuals found “the site of history” and, in so doing, “rise high in historical Being and creators, as doers.”\(^7_4\)

In these places, Heidegger demonstrates a discernible, if subtle, enchantment with the emphasis on hierarchy that characterized the outlook of the ancient Greeks. Indeed, the philosophical thought of post-Socratic Greek philosophers who stand opposed to Greek politics also exhibits this Greek sense of hierarchy. The most obvious example is Plato’s *Republic*, in which Socrates conceptualizes a city where philosopher-kings rule over guardians and ordinary craftsmen. Considered from this perspective, Heidegger’s elitism is a manifestation of his attempt to recover the sense of rank that characterized both Greek politics and philosophy.

While agonistic conflict and a hierarchical structure are important features of the Heideggerian political vision in this moment, yet another significant aspect of Heidegger’s political theory is his stress on the significance of place. The Greek practice of politics was necessarily place-bound. Indeed, Heidegger often stressed that the proper translation of *polis* is not ‘city-state,’ but ‘site.’ He writes, “The *polis* is the site of history, the Here, in which, out of

\(^7_2\) Heidegger. *Being and Time*. Translated by John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson, 436 (GA 2: 74; L 385).

\(^7_3\) Ibid.

\(^7_4\) Heidegger. *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 163.
which, and for which history happens.”75 In defining polis as site, Heidegger suggests that the Greek practice of politics was spatially circumscribed; thus, the moment of place and polis becomes significant to understanding Heidegger’s intentions in this second moment in the taken path.

It is here that it is crucial to turn to Jeff Malpas’s *Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World.*76 From the outset, Malpas’s work struggles to bring the ideas of ‘space’ and ‘place’ into the current understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy – and this will be extended here to his politics. Malpas does something truly unique here in the sense that, instead of privileging only ontology, he also points out that the ‘Da’ of Dasein must be in a particular space or place, thus privileging also place. What and where is the ‘there’ of ‘Being-there’? This is the question Malpas seeks to answer. He “take[s] place as the central concept in Heidegger’s thinking…[as having] attempted a thinking of being that is culturally oriented to the concept of place as such.”77

Yet, Malpas clarifies that this ‘concept of place’ is not “a function of human responsiveness or affectivity, as a social or cultural ‘construction,’ or else as nothing other than a neutral site.”78 Instead, place is to be seen as the site of Dasein or, rather, that Dasein is the place of Being. Malpas views presence (as such) as an event, much like Heidegger views ‘event’ or ‘happening’ (*Ereignis*) as an occurrence or experience; place is much akin to this happening as it

75 Ibid., 162.
77 Ibid., 2.
78 Ibid., 2-3.
is both an unconcealment and a concealing or concealment. In other words, place is a site, on the one hand, and something or somewhere that is, at the same time, always slipping away in its concealment, its difficulty to be apprehended. Malpas asserts, “I would view the distinctions that are at play here – between being and beings, between presencing and what is present, between the ground of intelligibility and intelligibility – as having irreducible equivocity to them… ‘iridescence.’”

Furthermore, Malpas reads the difference between Being and Time and Heidegger’s later work as the difference between a focus on temporality as grounding the meaning of Being and place as the grounding factor in Being. This is where Malpas’s arguments about topology, about space and place come to the forefront. He argues that it is not time or temporality that gives Being meaning (as a limiting factor), but also the ‘where’ of Being – the site of Being, the ‘there’ of Being-there that defines existence for Heidegger.

Using Heidegger’s concept of Mitdasein, Malpas develops this idea of place and its importance. He writes, “The presencing or disclosedness of a being is always a matter of its coming to presence in relation to other beings. This is why, for Heidegger, presencing or disclosedness is inseparable from the happening of a world.” Here, it is the place of Being, which has before been relegated by other interpretations to simple and inauthentic everydayness, which becomes of the most importance. Each authentic Dasein and, by proxy, also each

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79 Much as aletheia (ἀλήθεια) has a double meaning in many of Heidegger’s works.

80 Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology, 12. The term ‘iridescence’ is coined by Malpas.

81 The term ‘topology’ normally refers to the study of the spatial arrangement and relation of one or more geometric properties to others. Here, Malpas intends to refer to his detailed investigation of the notion of ‘place’ in Heidegger’s work.

82 Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology, 14.
authentic human being as well, is already in the world; this has simply not been disclosed as of yet in the inauthentic world of everydayness. In the world, however, there are other beings – this is the place of presencing, the site at which Mitdasein is revealed to itself.

The import and impact of the concept of Mitdasein is one that cannot be separated from any political account of Heidegger’s philosophy, as will be seen in Chapter 4 of this volume. For, is it not this very concept that is at the heart of the debate about Heidegger’s politics (both personal and theoretical)? If Heidegger’s philosophy is intrinsically anti-democratic, say, in the way that it is totalitarian or supports tyranny, then how could Mitdasein be such a seemingly central theme in his writings, as the current work at hand suggests? Mitdasein shows its importance, according to Malpas, because “The question of being concerns the presencing of beings as what they are, and so as they emerge both in their relatedness and their differentiation.”

Malpas maintains that it is the happening of Being itself that must be, also, a place of presencing for beings. Clearly, “the ‘happening’ that is at issue here is the ‘happening’ of the very things that we encounter in our concrete and immediate experience with the world,” in everydayness.

Malpas’s analysis reveals that, in and through the realm that is the happening of Being, the concept of ‘place’ offers a better understanding of how the world, in all its everydayness and inauthenticity, is still the site of Being. It is the world, that place that allows Dasein to come to presence with others. Place, for Malpas, is equally a gathering; more specifically, it is a gathering in which there is unity and there is also no privileging of one being over another. Place, here, gathers together a multiplicity of beings – while preserving difference.

83 Ibid., 14.

84 Ibid., 15.
However, Malpas also recognizes that these concepts – especially that of ‘space,’ ‘place,’ and ‘belonging’ – are exactly the ideas that, for good reason, seem to strengthen the ties between Heidegger and Nazism. Criticisms of this sort have already been discussed here at length, but Malpas argues that these are not true critiques of Heidegger’s personal politics, but of the notion of “the politics of place as such.” Malpas further argues that cultural theorists, such as David Harvey, believe that:

Heidegger’s Nazi associations, coupled with the evident centrality of place and notions in his thinking (especially notions of belonging, rootedness, homeland, and so forth), seem often to be taken as providing a self-evident demonstration of the politically reactionary and ‘dangerous’ character of place-based thinking.

Indeed, it was seen earlier that Wolin, Janicaud, and others have criticized Heidegger’s philosophy, and personal politics, on these very grounds. Scholars of this ilk take such place-based ideas as dangerous because they seem to call up images of cultural absolutism, tyranny, fascism, and, also, of biologism, racism, and ethnocentrism. In Malpas’s words, “place has indeed emerged as politically problematic.” However, this problem does not apply merely to Heidegger, but also to the broader world of politics. Certainly, it cannot be applied to Heidegger alone.

Malpas continues by professing that, “Heidegger never seems to have himself subscribed to such biologically based notions” as a “‘homeland’ based in race,” which is sometimes how he is taken. As Malpas claims:

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85 Ibid., 18.
86 Ibid., 21.
87 Ibid., 23.
[Heidegger’s] conception of both the ‘people’ and the ‘homeland’ appears to have had its foundation in notions of ‘spirit,’ ‘culture,’ and ‘community’ understood as quite separate from notions of race and biology (a distinction for which there could be no place within Nazi ideology), or, indeed of mere geographic location.\(^{88}\)

In fact, it was only through the Nazi misuse and re-interpretation of the German homeland (Heimat) tradition that it began to have negative political implications. The original Heimat tradition was one that was not inextricably or necessarily linked with race or biologism. Instead, it was more related to issues of “civic pride…[and] respect for the particularity of local life and tradition.”\(^{89}\) In short, although Heidegger might have a fondness for the older, more traditional version of the Heimat tradition, it was not the Nazi interpretation of the term that he had in mind when he used the word, especially in his later works. Clearly, “The subsumption of the individual to the State, the Nation, and to the ‘People’ that is characteristic of fascist, and totalitarian politics would thus seem to be in tension with the emphasis on the particular and the local that is characteristic of the Heimat tradition.”\(^{90}\)

Malpas’s text, then, offers a useful reading of Heidegger and his relation to the politics of space and place. Though “Place and notions of place… [have been] given powerful employment across the political spectrum,” yet, “…the notion can, and does, serve a range of political ends, including those of fascism and totalitarianism, as well as progressivism.”\(^{91}\) It is this idea that Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole, and specifically Being and Time, serves as a beginning point for a more progressive political theory that will be of interest later. The politics of space and

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\(^{88}\) Ibid.

\(^{89}\) Ibid., 25. Originally attributed (by Malpas) to Celia Applegate.

\(^{90}\) Ibid., 25.

\(^{91}\) Ibid., 27.
place matter. Similarly germane to the topic at hand is Heidegger’s 1942 treatment of related notions in Antigone. Here, not only is there a focus on the idea of the polis, but also on concepts that relate to how human beings fit into their geographical and societal surroundings.

Any scholarly treatment of the connections and relationships between space, place, people, and community must also include Heidegger’s idea of the ‘homely,’ ‘hearth,’ and other concepts as found in two important texts. There are, in fact, only two works of Heidegger’s in which the Sophoclean tragedy of Antigone is discussed: An Introduction to Metaphysics and Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister.” It is in these works that is found perhaps some of the most important passages in Heidegger’s corpus relating to the political. Heidegger’s inquiry into Antigone is salient here as a road-marker along the path not taken because of its focus on both the nature of human beings (including their relationship to Being) and to the politics of place and home. As has already been stated, the polis could be, for Heidegger, the ‘there’ of ‘being-there,’ the locus of the Da of Dasein. The ancient Greeks, he suggests, had insight that has been forgotten; they knew the site of Being and, also, comprehended the relationship of human beings to it. In this section, Heidegger’s investigation of the character of Antigone is explored, mainly through his use of the notion of the ‘uncanny’ (das Unheimlich or “That which is not of the home”92) or ‘unhomely’ (unheimisch) and of Antigone herself as ‘supreme uncanny,’ to further elucidate the connections between Heidegger’s interpretation of the character of Antigone, Greek political thought, and conceptions of the polis.

In the aforementioned work on “Der Ister,” Heidegger identifies how Hölderlin sets up rivers as locations where human beings dwell, where they make their abode. In this poem, the

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river the Ister becomes the dwelling place of human beings. Furthermore, this is how Heidegger intends to speak of humanity in this text – as having a ‘locality,’ possessing a dwelling and as dwelling in it.  He argues that “The essence of the river consists in its being the locality and journeying for human beings as historical, and thus in its sustaining the essence of the historicality of Western humankind” and maintains that the ‘unity’ of ‘locality’ and ‘journeying’ signify the means to understand the essence of history. The ‘foreign,’ he avers, may only be understood when it is compared to the ‘homely.’ That which is foreign to an individual person, when they have journeyed, is only ‘foreign’ in the sense that it is not ‘home.’ Furthermore, ‘the uncanny,’ being that which is not of the home, becomes, for Heidegger, a defining characteristic of human being:

Uncanniness does not first arise as a consequence of humankind; rather, humankind emerges from uncanniness and remains within it – looms out of it and stirs within it. The uncanny itself is what looms forth in the essence of human beings and is that which stirs in all stirring and arousal: that which presences and at the same time absences.

For Heidegger, the ‘uncanny’ is “the basic trait of the human essence.” In Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister.” Heidegger’s focus is only on lines 322-375 of Antigone, on what is often referred to as the “Ode to Man,” the first choral ode. He translates the first lines of this section

93 See the seventh chapter in this work for a full treatment of dwelling.


95 Ibid., 72.

thus: “Manifold is the uncanny, yet nothing beyond the human being prevails more uncannily.”\textsuperscript{97} It is this idea of the ‘uncanny’ or ‘the strangest’ (‘to deinotaton’) that becomes important; “This one word encompasses the extreme limits and abrupt abysses of [man’s] being.”\textsuperscript{98} The engagement of Dasein with wonder or strangeness (deinon) is one of violence and of power, but also represents the unity of the various conceptions of uncanniness. The uncanny, Heidegger explains, can be seen as the ‘ground of human beings’ because it has several different meanings. If the word uncanny is taken to mean ‘the fearful,’ ‘the powerful,’ or ‘the inhabitual,’ then these words can be taken in a myriad of differing ways. Something fearful, Heidegger explains, can cause either anxiety or awe in its presence; something powerful can do the same; the inhabitual is that which is unfamiliar to beings. It is the ‘unity’ of these concepts, in the sense that they may take on all meanings at once, that is clear to Heidegger and he uses the term ‘uncanny’ to represent the coming together of these three in one word – to suggest that which is not of the home. Yet, Heidegger does not mean to suggest that human beings wander in their journeying because they have no home, no ‘rootedness.’\textsuperscript{99}

The force of the uncanny “casts us out of the ‘homely,’ i.e., the customary, familiar, secure.”\textsuperscript{100} Yet, as Heidegger avers, man is the prime example of uncanniness because it is man that will act violently, thus, expose himself to a lack of the ‘homely.’ The ancient Greeks, he

\textsuperscript{97} Martin Heidegger (1996). \textit{Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”} 52. Note: Other translations run: “There is much that is strange, but nothing that surpasses man in strangeness” (Heidegger, \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}, p. 146) or “There are many wonders, but nothing more wonderful than man” (Sophocles, \textit{Antigone} (1979). Trans. Kenneth McLeish. London: Cambridge University Press.

\textsuperscript{98} Heidegger, \textit{An Introduction to Metaphysics}, 149.

\textsuperscript{99} Heidegger. \textit{Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”} 73.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 150.
argues, understood this relationship between man and being and it has been hitherto inaccessible to further generations.

The *polis* is, “rather, the place, the there, wherein and as which historical being-there is…it is political, i.e., at the site of history.”\(^{101}\) Again, it seems to be, as Malpas has argued, the place or site of the *Da* of Dasein; the very same Dasein of *Being and Time*. Here, in the *polis*, there is a constant ebb and flow of concealment and unconcealment occurring both because of the nature of the uncanny itself and the way in which, as Heidegger maintains, the Greeks understood man’s very relationship to Being. Here, there is a sense of the way in which “locality and journeying bear the essence of becoming homely.”\(^{102}\)

Heidegger mentions that the ‘adventurer’ cannot be considered to be ‘unhomely;’ that person is seeking something outside of their known world. The ‘homely,’ then is not necessarily a place at all; it is a remembering of that which has been forgotten – namely, Being. The uncanny brings human beings – the only beings that *can* forget their Being, having already at one time known it – to a presencing in absence with feeling at home. The uncanny ‘looms,’ it is a ‘coming forth,’ it is whatever is not familiar, not ‘at home’ with individual understandings of what it means to be ‘at home.’ This ‘not homely’ is a lack of nearness to Being, not from a particular geographical location, a homeland, a culture. It is something more than this. In fact, *The Ister* is not the only point in Heidegger’s work in which he discusses ‘uncanniness.’ As early as *Being and Time*, he already had a notion of this kind of ‘unhomeliness.’ In his discussion of anxiety in §40, Heidegger has this to say: in everyday discourse and the everyday interpretation of Dasein furnish our most unbiased evidence that anxiety as a basic state-of-mind is disclosive in the manner we have shown. As we have said earlier, a state-of-mind makes manifest ‘how one is.’ In anxiety, one feels ‘uncanny.’ Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety comes proximally to expression: the ‘nothing and nowhere.’ But here ‘uncanniness’ also means ‘not-being-at-home’ [*das Nichtzuhause-sein*]. In our first indication of the phenomenal character of Dasein’s basic state and in our clarification of the existential meaning of ‘Being-in’ as distinguished from the categorical signification of ‘insideness,’ Being-in was defined as ‘residing

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\(^{101}\) Ibid., 152.

alongside….’ ‘Being-familiar-with…’ This character of Being-in was then brought to view more concretely through the everyday publicness of the ‘they,’ which brings tranquillized self-assurance – ‘Being-at-home,’ with all its obviousness – into the average everydayness of Dasein. On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the ‘world.’ Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the ‘not-at-home.’ Nothing else is mean by our talk about ‘uncanniness.’

Here, Heidegger intends to make clear that ‘fallenness’ occurs when Dasein is lost in the ‘they.’ Familiarity is not presented as positive; quite the opposite, ‘uncanniness’ is the more desirable experience: “When in falling we flee into the ‘at-home’ of publicness, we flee in the face of the ‘not-at-home;’ that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein – in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being.” It is this very ‘uncanniness’ that, Heidegger avers, “pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its very lostness in the ‘they’…” Uncanniness assists Dasein in being free for its own possibilities.

One illustration of ‘locality and journeying’ and of being ‘not homely’ is found, for Heidegger, in the character of Antigone. According to him, she is, herself, the ‘supreme uncanny.’ He writes, “She is the poem of becoming homely in being unhomely…in the proper and supreme sense.”

Antigone is, of course, a tragic tale. Creon, the King of Thebes, has managed to fend off the Argive army and, in so doing, saves his city. Yet, he has also decreed that any soldier who fought on the side of the Argives must not be given a burial, but must instead be left to rot in the sun. Antigone and her sister, Ismene, have recently experienced the death of two of their brothers: Eteocles and Polynieces. However, while Eteocles fought on the side of Thebes, Polynieces fought with the Argives. Thus, Eteocles has been given a proper burial, in


103 Ibid., 121.
accordance with tradition and with the law of the gods, while Polyneices has been left to the elements of nature.

Antigone deems Creon’s decree to be both unfair and against the will of the gods, so she sets forth to bury her brother, Polyneices, without permission and on pain of her own death. This is a familial matter, Antigone argues, not a matter for the state. Teiresias, a soothsayer, attempts to warn Creon of what happens to men who disobey the law of the gods and replace it with their own laws. However, Creon refuses to listen. What transpires after is that Antigone is caught attempting to bury Polyneices and is sentenced by Creon – not to an immediate death, but to entrapment alive in a nearby cave, where she will surely, but not quickly, die a horrifying death. She is entombed and proceeds to take her own life. This spurs Haimon, Creon’s son and Antigone’s betrothed, to commit suicide at her body’s feet; his mother then also takes her own life, leaving Creon to contemplate whether or not his decisions as ruler of Thebes have been wise.

When Antigone buries Polyneices against the express pronouncement of Creon, she becomes ‘unhomely’ in that she becomes a journeyer, removed from the hearth of her city and dwelling. Her very punishment, in fact, will be, not only a mere death or execution, but also a death and life that will occur sealed within a cave (a most unhomely locale) far outside her home. Yet, she is also the supreme uncanny in that she understands that her conduct involves an eventual fate from which she cannot turn.

Of Antigone’s relationship with the uncanny, Heidegger writes, “The uncanny is nothing other than this: the fact that she takes as her all-determinative point of departure that against which nothing can avail…that is destined for her and of which no one knows whence it has arisen.” Antigone is both the supreme uncanny and “within the homely [as unhomely] in a way
that exceeds every other being unhomely. She looms over the site of all beings not merely like
Creon…Rather, Antigone even steps out of this site altogether. She is utterly unhomely.”104 She
is removed entirely from the hearth, the place where homeliness resides, and cast out. However,
she becomes more homely than those like Creon, who will still dwell at their hearths, because of
the very uncanniness of her character. This is because “The very ones who expel the most
unhomely one from the hearth indeed appeal, in the same words, to a knowledge of theirs that
they distinguish from that of others…”105 Those that are homely know what homeliness and
hearth are and, indeed, use this knowledge to punish Antigone, shunning her from her hearth.

Yet, she becomes the one who is most homely, even in her brief exile before her death,
because she is connected to Being in a way that the others around her cannot be. The uncanny
must remain excluded from the hearth, but uncanniness, as the very essence of man, also allows
him the most homely position, the position of Being. Heidegger maintains, “Antigone comes to
be removed from all human possibilities and placed into direct conflict over the site of all beings
and into a sublation of the subsistence of her own life.”106 She makes herself unhomely in the
sense that she accepts destiny, and in fact moves toward it, as that which is most proper to her.

Heidegger’s exploration of Antigone (both the character and the tragedy) is most useful in
a discussion of the politics of place and polis. Unconcealment, authentic openness, and true
dasein must occur as and in place and space. When Heidegger refers to unconcealment as a
‘clearing,’ it is a very space and place that is opened up in that movement. Uncanniness is the
essence of man; it is uncanniness that leads to the unhomely in the way that it is a removal from

104 Ibid., 103.
105 Ibid., 105-106.
106 Ibid., 103.
hearth. Yet, uncanniness also allows beings to experience the homely *par excellence*. The unhomely, too, is the lot of man.

Place, can, however, be seen as politically problematic. It can mean exclusion, limits, and boundaries in a negative sense. Heidegger himself, as has been noted, has been heavily criticized on this account. Specifically, he has been held accountable for his focus on the notion of place in Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister.” A privileging of the notion of place, for some, could lead to a debate over the use of words like ‘nation,’ ‘tribe,’ and ‘people.’ A political philosophy based on such ideas could quickly begin to resemble an all-too exclusionary view of the politics of place as one that leads to totalitarianism, in which there is no limit to the authority of the state itself.

Furthermore, Heidegger contends that the polis (πόλις) is:

not some special or isolated region of human activity. Yet the fact that all activity and occasioning undertaken by human beings as historical has in every respect the πόλις as its site, as the locale to which it belongs, is not to be conflated with the modern ‘totality’ of the ‘political,’ which historically is quite different in kind. This merely leads to a falsification of the Greek by way of the modern and indeed of the modern by way of the Greek.

Here, Heidegger clearly intends for the Greek notion of politics, at least in his understanding, to be placed at odds with modern conceptions of the same:

The fundamental modern form in which the specifically modern, self-framing self-consciousness of human beings orders all beings is the state. For this reason, the ‘political’ becomes the definitive self-certainty of historiographical consciousness. The political is defined in terms of history grasped according to consciousness, that is, experienced in a ‘technical’ manner. The ‘political’ is the way in which history is accomplished. Because the political is thus technical and historiographical fundamental certainty of all action, the ‘political’ is marked by an unconditional failure to question itself.

What all of this seems to amount to is a privileging, not only of the Greek understanding of ‘politics’ and the ‘political,’ but also to a purposeful placement of these terms as antithetical to
‘modern’ politics. Here, Heidegger clearly prefers the way in which Greek politics, unlike his description of modern politics, leaves room for questioning. For him, this also signifies the difference between the Greek understanding of ‘historical’ and the modern notion of the same. The uncanny, which can only occur for Heidegger in the Greek polis, is the unhomeliness that defines being human. It requires suffering, bearing, but “does not mean the mere ‘passivity’ of accepting and tolerating, but rather taking upon oneself …making it through to the end, that is, properly experiencing.”\(^\text{107}\)

Here, Antigone is the perfect example of a true Greek hero or heroine as Heidegger depicts them – not as ‘silent sufferers,’ ‘martyrs,’ or ‘masters.’ Instead, what is worthwhile to notice in the character of Antigone is that she exemplifies “the truth of being as a whole and in keeping with the simplicity in which it appears,” the form and inestimable beauty of Heidegger’s vision of Greek tragedy. Antigone is not a being like Creon; she ‘looms’ over him because she has ‘step[ped] out of this site altogether. She is utterly unhomely.”\(^\text{108}\)

However, Heidegger’s insistence that the Greek polis, as seen in Antigone, is an example for that particular experience in which to occur; the ‘there’ of ‘being-there’ begins to take on a different character, one that is perhaps more positive. Antigone is faithful, in her uncanniness, to Being itself, not to Creon and not to Creon’s state. She does not worry herself over the law of the king, but is true to her own intuitions, even though she knows that it will lead to her demise. She concerns herself only with what she believes to be the truth and with what she understands as right. In this way, Antigone remains entirely outside of all other human existence from the moment that she decided to flout Creon’s decree. This is when she begins to dwell in the area of

\(^{107}\) Ibid., 94, 103.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., 103.
the uncanny and not at her ‘homely’ hearth. Still, she is homely in the sense that she has been true to Being and not to a particular nation, state, or geographic location. Her very literal unhomeliness is a spiritual one as well, if it can be referred to in such a manner without conjuring images of Western Christian dogma. Here, the term spiritual is used to indicate a movement of her essence, a means by which Antigone finds a home in being as opposed to the city of Thebes. The polis, after all, did not consist solely of a governmental structure; it tied human beings together in other ways as well.

It is worth mentioning that the polis was comprised of a government centered in one town, but including the surrounding rural areas, in which more than political considerations were taken into account. To wit, being a citizen of a particular polis meant sharing, not only in its governance, but also in its spiritual and social life. The Greek polis, like that of Athens, was meant to knit together political, religious, and cultural elements. Additionally, there was not one particular form of government that every polis shared; any given polis might be ruled by a tyranny, oligarchy, or democracy equally. Hierarchies, however, did exist within an individual polis. Mainly, these consisted of the strata of citizens and non-citizens (like women, slaves, resident aliens, and children). It is only at such a site as the polis, as described here, that Heidegger maintains Being can be truly unconcealed. The polis, now used as a specific Heideggerian term denoting homeliness, is the place and space and Antigone is illustrative of the essence of man, of the supreme uncanny in her homely unhomeliness. What is at issue for Antigone is her loss of the homely, the familiar, the place in which she does not simply live, but dwells, creates relationships with others, and finds her home.

Antigone is, to be sure, cast out from the hearth. For Heidegger, this action is of extreme importance as he imagines the hearth to be Being: “For all its unhomeliness, the unhomely
remains within the sphere of being. The unhomely remains related to the homely.” In Heidegger’s interpretation of Antigone, it is the one who is uncanny that is exiled from the hearth, from the center of homeliness, from other beings. Antigone’s expulsion from the hearth results in a specific kind of relation: “This rejection tells us that the uncanny one has an essential relation to the hearth, but it is that of forgetting and blindness, as a result of which he or she is unable to have being in view or in thoughtful remembrance [Andenken].”

“The hearth,” then, “is accordingly the middle of all beings, to which all beings, because and insofar as they are beings, are drawn in the commencement. This hearth of the middle of beings is Being. Being is the hearth.” Hearth “gathers everything around it – that wherein all beings have their site and are at home as beings.” Heidegger makes it clear here that the polis is the site of Being and of humankind’s home. The polis is the site, also, of struggle, of bearing that which must be done, as the character of Antigone’s actions show. Yet, the polis is also reminiscent of Heideggerian notions of history as it relates to place.

For Heidegger, as has been shown, the type of questioning that Antigone participates in may only occur in a ‘polis,’ a site in and at which beings dwell, the home of humankind. Antigone’s uncanniness seems to derive from her separation from this human dwelling place, the site of the hearth. If Dasein is a temporal being, one defined by historicality, then it exists in a specific place and space. In Being and Time, there are already intimations of the notions set forth in the moment of place and polis. Not only do place and site matter, but Dasein’s encounter with history and with historicality are of import as well.

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110 Ibid., 112-113.
The description of ‘history’ (Geschichte) begins in Being and Time with the simple understanding that Dasein is a temporal being, one that is affected by the past, exists in the present, and looks toward the future. As Heidegger argues in Being and Time, “fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others” and thus” its historicizing is a co-historicizing and is determinative for it as destiny (Geschick).” “This,” Heidegger claims – in a phrase that seems to point directly to the ancient Greek idea of the polis as the site of the ‘there’ of Dasein – “is how we designate the historicizing of the community, of a people.”111

A simple explanation of ‘historicity’ would be to call it the method of inquiry used by Dasein to determine its historicality. What is Dasein’s ‘historicity’? It is the way in which Dasein is affected by its past, whether aware of this fact or not: “Dasein factically has its ‘history’, and it can have something of the sort because the Being of this entity is constituted by historicality.” Here, the future must necessarily be determined by what has past. For Heidegger,

The more authentically Dasein resolves – and this means that in anticipating death it understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility – the more unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the less it does so by accident. Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and ‘provisional’ possibility driven out. Only Being-free for death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence, it snatches one back form the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one – those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly – and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals]. This is how we designate Dasein’s primordial historicizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet chosen.112

111 Ibid., 436. (GA 2: 74; L 384).

The most important portion of this passage when it comes to historical destiny and the moment of place and *polis* is the last line – here, it is clear that history is inherited by Dasein from itself, that it is ‘passed down’ as a kind of inescapable context. Yet, resoluteness, in allowing Dasein to choose its own possibilities, means that *fate* operates in another way.

Thus, the moment of *polis* in Heidegger’s work is clearly a moment in which hierarchy and struggle exist, but also where a sense of belonging is also important. Otherwise, Antigone would not be described as uncanny in her unhomeliness, her removal from hearth and home. This second moment still contains some elements of *Being and Time*, especially the notion of belonging to a community and a shared destiny. Yet, it is, perhaps, for Heidegger, now Germany with a Greek sign on the door. It is still the German people who will eventually have to choose their destiny – albeit, it seems, with Nazi elements now removed. For, it is also in Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” that Heidegger draws a distinct line between, not only ancient Greek and modern understandings of politics and the political, but also between Germany and the rest of the West. Germany alone, it looks as if, can somehow combat the ahistoricity of Americanism, for example, which Heidegger attributes to its quality of ‘measurelessness’ and deems “properly dangerous…because it emerges in the form of the democratic bourgeoisie and mixe[s] with Christendom, and all this in an atmosphere of a decided ahistoricality.” Clearly, the first of the these two moments – the communitarian and authoritarian moment – and the second – that of place and space – have revealed, not only Heidegger’s distaste for modern politics, but also of any politics that refuses to acknowledge history in the way he styles it. Yet, there is a third moment to which attention should be paid, a moment in which Heidegger appears

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113 Attributed to Dr. Cecil L. Eubanks, conversationally.

to desire to completely leave behind, not the language and the content of *Being and Time*, but all traces of National Socialism. This is ‘The Defensive Moment.’

III. The Defensive Moment

By the summer semester of 1934, Heidegger’s personal life had been altered in at least one significant way – he had resigned his post as rector at the University of Freiburg. This was, to him, an act of political defiance. Why, exactly, he resigned is a matter of much public debate, however – as has already been pointed out. It was always Heidegger’s contention that he had turned away from Nationalist Socialist ideals – and that this could be evidenced in a lecture course delivered that same year: *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*.\(^{115}\) Additionally, it is well known that a portion of Heidegger’s own defense of his actions during the war revolved around proving that he did not ever believe in biologism or racist lines of thought. Instead, he often invoked the concept of spirit (*Geist*) as verification of this fact. In a letter to the Rector of the University of Freiburg, November 4, 1945, Heidegger directly refers to the *Logic* course as evidence that he rebuked biologism. He writes:

> During the first semester that followed my resignation I conducted a course on logic and under the title, the doctrine of *logos*, treated the essence of language. I sought to show that language was not the biological-racial essence of man, but conversely, that the essence of man was based in language as a basic reality of *spirit*. All intelligent students understood this lecture as well as its basic intention. It was equally understood by the observers and informers who then gave reports of my activities to [Ernst] Krieck in Heidelberg, to [Alfred] Bäumler in Berlin, and to Rosenberg, the head of Nationalist Socialist scientific services. Thereafter began a malicious polemic against my thought and person in *Volk im Werden*, a review edited by Krieck…No member of the Freiburg University faculty was defamed to such

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a degree during the years 1933-34 in newspapers and journals, and, in
addition, in the journal of the Hitler Youth, *Will and Power*.

He is able to make the above claim concerning logic, spirit, and language because *Logic* marks,
in many ways, a return to the context of the framework originally delineated in *Being and Time,*
including investigations into Dasein, the meaning of being human, a *Volk,* a state, and the
concept of language. Here, he seems to be defending his position concerning his foray into
National Socialism by way of retreating to his ideas in *Being and Time.* Thus, Heidegger’s
insistence is here termed the ‘Defensive Moment,’ in which he determines to ‘explain’ his
personal political connection to Nazism.

The time period during which *Logic* was offered to students at Freiburg came just after
Heidegger’s resignation from the Rectorate. His precarious personal position within both the
university and the larger political background of Germany in 1933-34 perhaps contributed to his
return to language and terminology in *Logic* that is similar to that found in *Being and Time.*
These three elements mark out another of Heidegger’s paths – one separate from *Nature,*
*History, State and Being and Time.* It is the path of the ‘Defensive Moment.’ Whether
Heidegger sufficiently divorces himself from Nazi biologist principles in the *Logic* is a

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116 Martin Heidegger (1992). “Letter to the Rector of Freiburg University, November 4,
1945.” In Richard Wolin’s *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader,* 61-66. Interestingly,
Emmanuel Faye (a controversial figure in the debates concerning Heidegger’s allegiances to
Nationalist Socialism – and reviled, rightly so, as an irresponsible scholar on the subject)
included a discussion of this lecture course in his 2009 book: *Heidegger: The Introduction of
Nazism into Philosophy.* However, it is the opinion of many (including myself) that he has
completely misread Heidegger’s intentions in this lecture course.
problematic issue; there is at least some proof that this claim is true.\textsuperscript{117} However, the ideas of communal destiny and \textit{Volk} are still heavily discussed.

It is not necessary to replicate here all of the arguments found in \textit{Logic} as much of it is not relevant to the task at hand, being concerned with the notions of ‘language’ and ‘logic’ themselves. Proceeding forward, it is only required that the portions of the lecture series relating to politics be studied. Bernasconi, for example, asserts that both \textit{Nature, History, State} and \textit{Logic} are heavily influenced by the polemics of the period in which they were offered. This seems to be less clear in the \textit{Logic} and more precise in \textit{Nature, History, State}. Additionally, and importantly, Bernasconi also sees fit to point out that, in agreement with Derrida’s estimations, Heidegger wished to focus on the idea of spirit (\textit{Geist}) when discussing concepts such as \textit{Dasein} and \textit{Volk}, as opposed to racially charged or informed argumentation.

In \textit{Logic}, it seems that Heidegger furthers the account of the \textit{Volk} in \textit{Being and Time} by now relating it to the placement of individual \textit{Dasein}. Alternatively, in \textit{Being and Time} it is individual \textit{Dasein}, individuated by being-toward-death, that leads, along with the silent summons of conscience, to care and concern for others. In \textit{Logic}, this is extended to the concept of belonging to a \textit{Volk}.\textsuperscript{118} Bernasconi additionally contends that \textit{Logic} is evidence of how “the 1934 course represents a more serious philosophical effort on his [Heidegger’s] part to theorize

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\begin{itemize}
  \item It should be noted from the outset that, although this lecture series is derived wholly from transcriptions of student notes during meetings, it is officially considered to be part of the \textit{Gesamtausgabe} (GA 38), of Heidegger’s collected works – unlike \textit{Nature, History, State}.
  \item It is vital to mention at this point that Heidegger makes a distinction in \textit{Logic} that he has not made elsewhere up to this point: namely, that there is a difference between \textit{the Volk} and \textit{a Volk}. Importantly, \textit{a Volk} is privileged.
\end{itemize}
what it meant to belong to a *Volk* along the lines already developed in *Being and Time*, where the notion of spirit was called into question (SZ 48, 117).”

Yet, more careful attention to the text and the ideas within must be paid. It is not enough simply to read through *Logic* looking for particular terminology while ignoring its usage and context. If responsibly and meticulously read, the whole of the 1934 *Logic* lectures is an outright rejection of National Socialist ideology, though subtly crafted. Indeed, Heidegger meant to extend the concepts he delineated in *Being and Time*, but seems also to be fearful to be completely forthcoming in *Logic* as his personal circumstances had changed after his resignation as Rector. He may have been frightened of speaking out too loudly while the Third Reich still held power over those at the University of Freiburg. This suggests that the logic course may be read in such a way that proves Heidegger was making a subtle attempt to undermine Nazism (as he himself argued in the 1945 letter). It may also serve as evidence that Heidegger was, in 1934, walking the fine line between drawing negative attention to himself as one who no longer agreed with National Socialism and being perceived as fully agreeing with those same principles.

From the beginning of *Logic*, the notion that the study of logic is a science is discarded. It is determined that logic is intimately related to language as it is a pursuit that necessarily involves speaking or talking. Indeed, Heidegger roundly rejects the idea that philosophy can be any kind of science at all; it must, instead, be a pursuit that surpasses scientific inquiry and aims

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120 This method has been employed by many who believe that, for example, the use of the term *Volk* at all in *Being and Time* has significance based solely on its presence in the text. Cf. the work of Johannes Fritsche, for example. This is not, to be clear, how Bernasconi goes about things. In fact, he specifically dismisses this method.
at a kind of knowing that lies ‘beyond’ science.\textsuperscript{121} Thus, the study of logic cannot be a ‘scientific’ pursuit. Accordingly, it is the rejection of the conception of ‘science’ that holds the key to understanding this text’s true political significance. Upon closer inspection, any scientific distinctions, specifically those based on biology or race, are also set aside. Here, there is an argument against science as the means by which to determine the characteristics and attributes of being human and, furthermore, to determine what it means to be part of a political community. Heidegger’s approach to political matters is far subtler than in \textit{Nature, History, State}, but it is unmistakably present.

First, it is made clear that the root of the very word ‘logic’ is logos (\textit{λόγος}), understood as that which is said or spoken. From here, it is reasoned that the capacity for language is something unique to human beings. The human being is not merely the rational being, but also the being that speaks. It is then argued that the human being must also be a ‘self,’ which leads to the question of ‘ourselves.’ Heidegger describes this as a specific relation of ‘reference.’ For, how can an ‘I’ be spoken of if not in reference to its opposite relation, a ‘we.’ Eventually, this leads Heidegger to his final argument that language, not the silent summons of conscience as in \textit{Being and Time}, serves a preserving role in the destiny of the Dasein of the \textit{Volk}: “Language is the ruling of the world-forming and preserving center of the historical \textit{Dasein} of the \textit{Volk}. Only where temporality temporalizes itself, does language happen; only where language happens, does temporality temporalize itself.”\textsuperscript{122}

In \textit{Logic}, a \textit{Volk} is made a \textit{Volk} by the virtue of their decision to become one. There is a distinction drawn here between making a decision and being \textit{resolute}. Resoluteness is defined

\textsuperscript{121} Martin Heidegger. \textit{Being and Time}, 84-89 (GA 38: 5; LL 58-61).

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 144 (GA 38: L 26).
differently in *Logic* than in *Being and Time*; in 1934, resoluteness now serves as the means to a specific community, to a *Volk*. Heidegger gives the example in *Logic* of someone attempting to cease smoking in order to illustrate the difference between making a decision and being resolute. A smoker, Heidegger claims, may make the decision to stop smoking, yet never do so. If that same person displays resoluteness toward quitting, however, then they will have already ceased. Resoluteness, here, is something quite more than making a definite decision; it is a degree of adherence to one’s goals that can never be shaken because that individual who is resolute will have already moved past decision to action.

This is one reason why it is possible that Heidegger launches a criticism of liberalism as an outgrowth of Cartesianism in *Logic* – individual Dasein must be resolute in becoming a community, not merely make the decision to do so as in social contract theories. Yet, this resoluteness of persons to become a people is not without its issues for politics. Now, contrary to *Being and Time*, the historical situatedness of a people comes to the forefront. Folklore is rejected in favor of *lore* (*Kunde*) alone. History is now a happening and projects itself into the future instead of remaining something past. It was not thus in *Being and Time*; there, history is what brings Dasein to its ownmost fate. History, in *Logic*, is also “indifferent in which region of occurrences”¹²³ some succession of events takes place or happens. History only happens for human beings in the sense that they are both defined by and *make* history – it is described as something ‘deliberate.’¹²⁴ Thus, lore (*Kunde*) is distinguished from folklore (*Volkskunde*).

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¹²³ Martin Heidegger. *Logic as the Question Concerning Language*. Translated by Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Uma, 72 (GA 38: 17).

¹²⁴ Ibid., 75 (GA 38: 18).
Lore is the deliberate willing of a people to carry their ‘history’ into the future; it is the kind of history that can be questioned and investigated, not a tally of events that have occurred in the past. Heidegger avers, “By lore of history, we understand the respective manner of the manifestness, in which an era stands in history, in such a way, to be sure, that this manifestness also carries and leads the historical being of the era.”¹²⁵ The human being makes a decision in which one, with others, stands. Still, for Heidegger, it is a mistake to view history from the viewpoint of individual accomplishments. This would not properly be considered lore, but what Otto Spengler and the Lamprecht Institute were engaging in – namely, a values-based science of history.¹²⁶

The positioning and resoluteness of a people is then further broken down into what is the most problematic evidence for the contention that Logic represents a subtle undermining of the reality of National Socialism. There are three separate concepts presented in Logic. The first of these is the duo of “mandate and mission;” the second of these is the notion of “labor;” the third of these is the kind of ‘being attuned through mood’ that results in a “more original unity and belongingness.”¹²⁷ Of the three, mandate and mission are the most vague. Mandate is defined as what may be effected by the determination of a people and mission as “that which earlier on essences as our essence.”¹²⁸ Labor is determination that leads to creation in its essence. Third,

¹²⁵ Ibid., 80 (GA 38: 19).

¹²⁶ Ibid., Note: Heidegger specifically criticizes Otto Spengler’s Decline of the West and the Lamprecht Institute by name.

¹²⁷ Throughout this section, it will not be difficult for readers of Hannah Arendt to pick out the portions of Logic that inspired texts such as The Human Condition, namely ‘vita activa’ and ‘homo faber.’

¹²⁸ Martin Heidegger. Logic as the Question Concerning Technology, 108 (GA 38: 24).
‘being-attuned-through by a mood’ rules over the other concepts in its ability to cause human beings to ‘open’ or ‘lock’ themselves to other beings, choose to make themselves available to others or to choose to remain closed to them.

These three conceptions are important because they strike similarities with Nazism – unity and belongingness are dependent upon laboring toward a mandate or mission, upon opening oneself up to what the destiny of a people could be. Dasein becomes a wholly historical being, reaching out in determination to its mandate and mission through labor and attunement. In its historicity, then a Volk must experience the kind of unity that the Nazis so yearned for in, for example, the entirety of the Volkish movement.

Lastly, and most notably, in Logic, the concept of Care (Sorge) is also transformed. Care for others becomes care for knowing about the historical situatedness of the Dasein of a Volk; it also becomes the care for freedom. The essential characterization of Dasein as care is carried through in Logic from Being and Time. However, it is now defined as “care of determination, its awakening, overtaking, and preservation.”129 In Being and Time, Dasein represents being-there as an almost state that is reached when a human being begins to question their existence; now, “care as care for freedom is the care of knowing and being-able-to-know about the essence of all beings.”130 In other terms, care of and concern for other is extended in Logic to a care for all others that is ‘awakened’ and ‘preserved’ in the concept of freedom. Here, care comes through ‘responsibility’ and ‘creational language in the historical labor.”131 Dasein must now not only

129 Ibid., 145 (GA 38: 30).
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
question and be responsible for its own being and, through this, exhibit care toward others, but must also take part, through genuine language, in understanding the very Being of others.

What results from all of this inquiry is that *Logic* really denotes a call for socialism, not fascism or authoritarianism as, it could be argued, comes through in *Nature, History, State*. Furthermore, as Bernasconi maintains, there is a different thrust to Heidegger’s criticism of Cartesianism in *Logic* as opposed to in *Being and Time*. In the main, in *Being and Time*, it was conducted under the rubric of a destructuring of the history of ontology, where destructuring means tracing the categories we habitually take for granted back to the originary experiences that shaped them (SZ 22)...But in *Logic*, the overcoming (*Überkommen*) of both genuine and non-genuine tradition is said to take place not under the guidance of the Greeks, but in the name of ‘socialism,’ where the term ‘socialism’ as the title for the formation of our historical being must enter the crucible of historical resoluteness (GA 38:165; L 136). Socialism is not to be understood in terms of a changed economic mentality, a ‘dreary egalitarianism,’ or ‘as aimless common welfare.’ Rather socialism wills hierarchy, the dignity of labor, and the unconditional priority of service (GA 38: 165, L 136-7).132

Thus, surprisingly, while *Logic* remains part of the taken path for Heidegger in 1934, the tenor and direction of his philosophical inquiry has changed in several subtle ways. For one, in *Nature, History, State*, he argues for full support of a leader and the Führer state (*Führerstaat*). *Logic*, on the other hand, finds Heidegger leaning far more toward socialist principles and dismissing the current thinkers of his day who maintained allegiance to the idea that the German people would be led to an ideal state through the Third Reich and its principles. While Bernasconi argues that this suggests hierarchy within a state, it should be submitted that *Logic* focuses on socialism as the foil for individualism – that which Heidegger saw as the greatest mistake of philosophical questioning – not as support for the brand of socialism that the Nazis

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argued for. What Heidegger seems to have intended is, not economic or social equality, but an equality of human essence, a philosophical equality.

It should now be clear that, when confronted with the possible ontic consequences of the seminal notions he set forth in *Being and Time*, Heidegger chose a very specific path – what Vogel might refer to as the path of ‘authentic historicality.’ In 1933-34, Heidegger devises a political theory in *Nature, History, State* (The Communitarian and Authoritarian Moment). Later, He trifles with returning to the agonistic, place-based, hierarchical politics of the ancient Greeks in *An Introduction to Metaphysics, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,”* and other works (The Moment of Place and Polis). Lastly, in 1934, he again re-envisions community as what he terms the ‘Dasein of the Volk.’ Throughout all of these machinations, Heidegger seems to have had encounters with various ways in which to craft a political theory out of *Being and Time*. Yet, there was another path open to him – one that he clearly did not see as a possibility and certainly did not pursue. That ‘path not taken’ (a Heideggerian politics of care in *Being and Time*) will be fully explicated shortly. However, it is necessary first to describe the three fundaments under consideration in this work that will lead us to a Heideggerian politics of care: authenticity, Dasein-with, and care. In addition, two concomitant notions – that of conscience and ‘originary responsibility’ – will prove to be of great importance in this endeavor.
Part II. From Selfhood To Solicitude: Heidegger’s Politics of Care

Chapter 4: Three Fundaments

Heretofore, the emphasis has been on the political path, or path and variations, taken by Heidegger. As has been seen, that path has roots in Being and Time, namely the perceived claims of historicality, yet was developed and altered well beyond the confines of that text. There are elements of a new political theory in Being and Time and this chapter explores three of these significant concepts that are central to any understanding of Heidegger and the potential for political theory. What the first three portions of the current chapter, then, aim to do is to further elucidate each of these three important ideas – authenticity (Eigentlichkeit), Dasein-with (Mitdasein), and care (Sorge) – for the purpose of allowing better comprehension of these complex notions before moving forward to other matters – namely the suggestion of a political community based upon these three fundaments.

At this early stage in the discussion at hand, that concerning the three fundaments and how they relate to one another, it is helpful to recall that Heidegger goes about his analysis in Being and Time using a particular method, one he calls an ‘existential analytic.’ What he intends by using this term is to make a distinction, for the sake of clarity, between ‘existential’ and ‘existentiell.’ Whereas ‘existentiell’ refers to being-in-the-world in an ontic sense, ‘existential’ refers to being-in-the-world in an ontological sense. Furthermore, to understand the existentiell, all that needs to be done is to live an everyday life and to experience the world as it appears; to understand the existential, however, is to experience life from a more theoretical perspective.

In Being and Time, it is the existential analysis that allows for the questioning of Being and for the determination of Being’s structure. Another way of putting this is to say that Dasein’s actions may not be considered authentic unless they are existentiell considerations
informed by an existential (theoretical, ontological) analysis and then applied to actual, ontic life. Keeping these considerations in mind will be important to understanding the following chapter. Indeed, Heidegger’s analysis is so dependent upon the interaction of these two concepts that they cannot be detached from one another. The existential analysis acts as a way of interpreting Being and must be applied in the existentiell experience of Dasein – this, as will be seen, will amount to living authentically.

I. Authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*)

The first main portion of this chapter begins with an exploration of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity as it is found in *Being and Time*. It is necessary to commence with this first of the aforementioned three fundaments because it offers a glimpse into, not only this key structure of Being relevant to the task at hand, but also because it signifies how, for Heidegger, humans live in a shared world. This Heideggerian conception will lead to investigating what his notion of community truly is – one that, perhaps much as in the works of Aristotle, the human being finds itself *and*, for Heidegger, also finds others.

For Heidegger\(^1\), the original question – and, perhaps, the only question that must be the task of philosophy, is the question of the meaning of Being, of existence and of the relationship that beings have to that existence. As such, it is necessary that he discover what kind of being would be attuned to and interested in questioning that very relationship. Heidegger goes about this in a very specific way. First, he describes the kind of being that would be interested in the possibilities of its own existence (an explanation of Dasein). Second, he determines how beings related to one another in the everyday world (*Mitsein*); third, he describes how those that are

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\(^1\) The following section (concerning the three fundaments) is indebted to Andrea D. Conque and Cecil L. Eubanks, “Mitdasein, Authenticity, and Care: Heidegger’s Other Politics.” Paper presented at the Louisiana Political Science Convention, Baton Rouge, LA. February, 2012.
authentically Dasein might relate to one another outside of the everyday and inauthentic world of 
*das Man*. In fact, throughout *Being and Time*, authenticity and inauthenticity are, in the main, 
dependent upon one thing at their root: an inauthentic being, in Heidegger’s terminology, 
projects itself upon *das Man* (the ‘they’), whereas an authentic being projects itself onto its 
ownmost possibilities. Thus, there may exist an authentic and an inauthentic mode for each of 
the three fundamentals discussed here, based on the direction of the projection of a being’s ‘self.’ 
Beginning with an explanation of the core concept of Dasein, this chapter will serve as an 
examination of three fundamental and important related notions, in both their inauthentic and 
authentic forms. This will critically inform that claim that another political theory lies within 
Heidegger’s reach, the path not taken.

Recall that Dasein may be translated, literally, as ‘being there.’ In choosing this 
particular phraseology, Heidegger clearly points to the factical positioning of a certain kind of 
being in the world. Time and temporality are important here because they affect beings and their 
factical position in the world around them. Dasein already finds itself in a particular world that 
is populated with other beings, among many things (existentiell being-in-the-world). Authentic 
Dasein, however, possesses the capability of transcending *das Man* and its own factical situation 
– this is what makes Dasein different than any other being (existential being-in-the-world).

Dasein is, more than anything, a being of possibilities. Two of the key possibilities that 
are open to Dasein are *authenticity* and *inauthenticity*. Because each Dasein has its own 
possibilities, authenticity and inauthenticity are potential modes of being for Dasein.\(^2\) Primarily, 
and in most cases, Dasein exists in an inauthentic mode. Being thrown into the world, Dasein 
finds itself caught among the ‘they,’ *das Man*, the collective that controls everyday life. *Das

Man is such a pervasive and powerful force of inauthenticity that Dasein will find it impossible to escape without first experiencing anxiety. Only then can Dasein find its authentic mode of existing. When Dasein frees itself from the ‘they,’ it retrieves its lost self and thereby becomes authentic and may act in an authentic manner as well.

Thus, Dasein is also inherently a temporal being in the sense that, finding itself thrown into the world, its particular factical context, it is essentially a being ruled by possibilities. There are only two temporal certainties for Dasein: birth and death; these two serve as bookends to all other possibilities. The transcendence that Dasein accomplishes in ‘being-there’ is due to its ability to recognize that one of its possibilities is to relate directly to and be interested in its own existence. In this movement, Dasein ‘chooses’ to retrieve itself from the lostness it experiences in the ‘they’ and to live authentically, informed by an existential, ontological way of being. Between past and future, Dasein experiences the present in ‘being-there.’

It is clear, therefore, that Dasein is a being full of possibilities that are, in some part, determined by the facticity or factical components of the world in which it finds itself. However, though Dasein understands itself through these possibilities, it is also not bound by them. Remember: Dasein may choose which possibilities to pursue and which to refuse to pursue. Perhaps this particular ability that Dasein possesses might be called a ‘possibility-toward-existence,’ ruled not by factical considerations alone, but also by becoming a being who questions, interrogates, and investigates its own being – a being that lives the existential life. In other words, the possibilities of Dasein are not limited to what or who surrounds it. To be sure, others are part of Dasein’s existence; yet, they are not the primary defining characteristic of Dasein. Instead, its concern for its own existence is what most clearly defines Dasein.
What Heidegger intends here is to call beings to action, to make beings aware that their relationship with existence is one that must be questioned in order to make the necessary flight from the distractions of the everyday world and of the ‘they.’ Whereas the ‘where’ of Dasein is the ‘there,’ the ‘who’ of Dasein is the being who has begun to interrogate its own existence and to do it with careful consideration and thought. Dasein is the being that thinks of its existence, wonders about it, and makes the determination to embrace its ownmost possibilities.

For Heidegger, Dasein is an entity (being) for which Being (existence) is ‘at issue.’ Dasein is ‘being-there.’ This ‘being-there,’ or presencing, is important to note. Heidegger begins *Being and Time* with the argument that philosophers like Plato and Aristotle did not go far enough into their inquiries concerning existence. He argues, “On the basis of the Greeks’ initial contributions towards an Interpretation of Being, a dogma developed which not only declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect.” To counter, Heidegger argues that Being cannot be categorized or understood by turning to descriptions of beings without having first fully understood what the meaning of Being is. To wit, Dasein, a being, an entity, that questions its own existence, opens itself up to its ownmost possibilities. Dasein, in other words, always has the ability to choose. Heidegger writes, “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself.”

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3 Ibid., 23-24 (GA 2: 4).

4 Ibid., 21 (GA 2: 1; L 2).

5 Ibid., 310-311 (GA 2: 53; L 266).
As beings in *Being and Time*, human encounters with other entities are within the context of a ‘world’ that is shared, a world into which Dasein has been thrown, as opposed to having created or chosen. Heidegger describes this everyday life, however, as deeply alienating:

Being-in-the-world,” he argues, “is in itself *tempting* [versucherisch]…since the way in which things have been publicly interpreted has already become a temptation to itself in this manner, it holds Dasein fast in its fallenness…Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the ‘they,’ it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding of the state-of-mind that goes with it. The supposition of the ‘they’ that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’, brings Dasein a *tranquility*, for which everything is ‘in the best of order’ and all doors are open. Falling Being-in-the-world, which tempts itself, is at the same time *tranquillizing* [beruhigend]…Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing; it is at the same time *alienating*.…This alienation closes off from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of genuinely foundering.6

Living among the ‘they’ is, for Heidegger, alienating in the sense that it removes human beings from their own possibilities and limits them to the possibilities that are presented to them by and through the ‘they.’ If Dasein is lived in such a way that it does not have access to its ownmost possibilities, possibilities chosen by Dasein, then Dasein experiences alienation. As Heidegger puts it, “Even in our Being ‘among them’ they are *there with* us; their Dasein-with is encountered in a mode which is indifferent and alien.”7 It is quite simple: when a being finds within themselves the potential for seeing and pursuing new possibilities, then they are already on the way to an authentic mode of Being.

Here, Heidegger describes the world in which humans live as a place much like a house of mirrors – what is seen is not necessarily what is real, authentic. The ordering of everyday life becomes limiting and ‘closes’ beings off to the possibilities of their own existence. Still, this

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6 Ibid., 221-224 (GA 2: 177-179).

7 Ibid., 157-158 (GA 2: 26; L 121).
comfortable daily way of living, though restrictive, tempts beings into submission to it, into thinking no further about their lives, their existence. For Heidegger, this is the ultimate missed opportunity. To live in the tempting world of comfort without truly recognizing it as the chaotic place that it is – and accepting this gladly – is no existence at all in Being and Time. It is inauthentic in the sense that it amounts to assimilation. Every choice that seems to be made of an individual’s own accord is, in reality, controlled by the faceless, nameless group that Heidegger refers to, in common parlance, as the ‘they,’ as in ‘they’ say to do this and that or ‘they’ believe x, y, and z to be true. Because there are no true choices when an individual is under the sway of the ‘they,’ they are living inauthentic lives, limited lives that are not their own to make choices within.

Furthermore, the ‘world’ in which humans co-exist seems to them to be permanent, and fixed, as well as inauthentic. Contrariwise, Heidegger maintains that the world is malleable and impermanent – one has only been deceived when one views it as static and unchangeable. In order to overcome the modern homelessness or alienation that humans in the modern world experience, they must attain ‘authenticity’ through ‘freedom towards death.’ As Heidegger puts it,

Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom toward death which is free of the illusions of the ‘they,’ and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.\footnote{Ibid., 310-311 (GA 2: 53; L 266).}

The everyday world, for Heidegger, is full of simple and meaningless encounters with others – the Anyone, the ‘they-self,’ the nameless, faceless persons who stand ‘ready-to-hand,’ almost as objects. It is a place and space in which many things are “obscured by the all-
pervasive predominance of the existential category of *das Man*, according to which I am one-like-many in an average being-with-one another.\(^9\) To be sure, individual *Dasein* must fight against the illusory and seemingly concrete world of the ‘they-self’ in order to attain authenticity, to choose that possibility that is open to them. Newell, in fact, compares this movement with the ‘overpowering force’ of Being that must be struggled against in an agonistic way, a war (*polemos*).\(^10\) Thus, authenticity is only gained through great effort exerted against the they-self. It is then, Newell adds, that this struggling against inauthenticity must begin with the understanding of the possibility of each individual person to generate a world with others. The ‘structures of possibility’ that Newell uncovers “do not imply a universal definition of human behavior. They imply, he\(^11\) says, neither the ‘primitiveness’ of a universal anthropology (a kind of Rousseauistic state of nature) nor a universal ideal not yet achieved.”\(^12\)

Thus, human beings as a group are not, according to Heidegger, a set of disparate individual subjects who have been gathered together in a central geographic location, like that of the traditional meaning of the word ‘world;’ instead, they are always and already *Da* there, thrown into the world in which they find themselves. Being-in-the-world and being-with-others are “equiprimordial dimensions of the original moment of struggle to build a home in the midst

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9 Kisiel. “In the Middle of Heidegger’s Three Concepts of the Political,” 141.

10 As Newell points out, the term *polemos* is the ancient Greek word for ‘war.’ See also Gregory Fried’s *Heidegger’s Polemos: From Being to Politics.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

11 Heidegger.

of history.”¹³ Modernity, in Heidegger’s estimation, has exacerbated the alienating conditions of everyday life. This alienation may, again, be soothed by an individual experiencing life authentically, existentially – mainly, through the realization of freedom-toward-death and its concomitant consequences.

When a human being becomes authentic, when Dasein is authentic, he or she is able to exist beyond the influence of the they-self and to begin to participate anew in the struggle to create a new ‘world.’ Anxiety, for example, ‘rootlessness,’ and alienation are experiences that draw Dasein away from they they-self and allow the shattering of the illusory nature of the world, revealing what is actually there – a mutable world of possibility. Anxiety comes from the most likely of places in Heidegger: the consciousness of human finitude – again, freedom-toward-death.

In Being and Time, ‘average everydayness’ always serves to cover over or conceal what is truly authentic. The best example of this is found in Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein’s relationship with death. In the average, everyday world, the they-self convinces Dasein that death is something that is inevitable for every human being. This much is known, Heidegger admits, by every being – that every human being must come to an eventual end. However in ‘experiencing,’ as far as a person can, the death of others, the concept of death becomes covered over. As Heidegger expresses this notion, “Dying is leveled off to an occurrence which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to nobody in particular.”¹⁴ The they-self has so dealt with death as to make it something that does not happen to me, but to others. Yet, for Heidegger, death is exactly what individuates an individual and brings Dasein back from inauthenticity.

¹³ Ibid., 777.

¹⁴ Heidegger. Being and Time,, 76-77 (GA 2:51); 296-298 (GA 2: 51; L 253).
When Dasein remains lost in the ‘they,’ every factual potential possibility has already been decided for it – Dasein no longer has access, so to speak, to any of its ownmost possibilities. The only way in which Dasein can return from this state is in ‘making up for not choosing,’¹⁵ by deciding its own possibilities for itself. As Heidegger contends:

…because Dasein is lost in the ‘they,’ it must first find itself. In order to find itself at all, it must be ‘shown’ to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested.¹⁶

Here, Heidegger avers that, though the ‘they’ is a powerful force that seems to determine the movement and thought of beings, Dasein has the ability to escape its pull. In this way, Dasein must ‘find itself’ in its ‘lostness.’ Up to this point in Being and Time, Heidegger has described how Dasein experience inauthentic everyday life as influenced by the ‘they.’ Now, he offers a way for Dasein to remove itself from the falsely limited possibilities that the ‘they’ sets forth. What this amounts to is a kind of ‘giving testimony’ or offering evidence for other possibilities of Dasein. In the world of the ‘they’, Dasein experiences alienation in the sense that it has been removed from its own possibilities – the ones that are unique to one or another particular Dasein.¹⁷

Releasing oneself from the clutches of the ‘they’ merely opens up possibilities for Dasein. In and of itself, the ‘they’ is inauthentic, to be sure, but this does not mean that other relationships between beings are not possible. To wit, Heidegger also designates two other

¹⁵ Ibid., 312-313 (GA 2: 54; L 268). (‘Nachholen einer Wahl’).

¹⁶ Ibid. Note: This ‘attestation’ will be in the form of care, the third fundament.

¹⁷ As it turns out, and as it will later be shown, the attestation of Dasein is intimately related to the concepts of conscience and care. Dasein’s potentiality will be ‘attested’ to (and Dasein will be ‘saved’ from the lostness of the ‘they’ by the ‘voice of conscience’ (see Heidegger. Being and Time, 298-299 (GA 2: 51; L 254).
categories or aspects of Being that are equiprimordial with Dasein: *Mitsein* (being-with) and *Mitdasein* (co-existence or Dasein-with)\(^{18}\). These three are equiprimordial because they are equal in stature in the grander sense of Being.

The import and impact of the concept of *Mitsein* is one that cannot be separated from any account, political or otherwise, of Heidegger’s philosophy. *Mitsein* shows its importance because this question of others and their interrelatedness is at the heart of the question of Being and of the possibilities of Dasein. Yet, it is still a deficient mode that Dasein experiences when Dasein is merely being-with others. The clamour and distraction of the everyday world is that from which Dasein must shy away – indeed, flee from – in order to develop an authentic relationship with and understanding of its own Being. Simple ‘being-with’ others remains in the category of experiencing life from the perspective of the existentiell; authentic acting and Being can only be reached or achieved through the ontological, the existential.

‘Being-with’ suggests that one is simply among others, surrounded by them, on a daily basis, in everyday life. This is, again, a deficient mode of being for Heidegger, represented by the ‘they,’ the nameless, faceless masses of people one encounters throughout one’s daily life who hold no meaning or true relationship with them except that they have all been thrown into the same world, the same time and place. Truly ‘being-there’ and taking advantage of the possibilities that Dasein recognizes and acts on requires more than this; it requires something

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\(^{18}\) Joah Stambaugh translates *Mitdasein* as ‘co-existence,’ while Macquarrie and Robinson simply take the literal translation to be ‘Dasein-with.’ For the purpose of the easier flow of language, the term has been left in its original form in this work with the understanding that, as Heidegger himself was to some degree vague on this particular point, its meaning will be questioned and investigated herein. Preliminarily, however, it seems that Macquarrie and Robinson are correct to include the importance of Dasein in their choice, as the entire term would end up as ‘being-there-with.’ They also point out (see p. 514 – Glossary) that with the term *Mitsein*, “this expression is usually followed by a prepositional phrase introduced by *mit.* Rather than writing ‘Being-with with...’ , we have usually omitted the second ‘with.’”
other than the distraction of strangers, crowds, peoples who are encountered every day, but who
disttract Dasein form understanding its relationship to Being. These distractions are to be
avoided, for they are not part of any authentic mode of being and, as such, are deficient. Human
beings are indifferent to others in this everyday manner. In Being and Time, Heidegger speaks of
‘passing-by-one-another’ and ‘not-mattering-to-one-another,’ which are clearly inauthentic and
indifferent modes of Mitsein, or ‘being-with.’ Here, beings that merely exist next to and around
each other are merely ‘with’ one another. They slip into objects, things with which other beings
ought not be and are not concerned. People become something that one must tolerate, deal with,
avoid being distracted by, as opposed to other beings for whom one cares or for whom one has
concern. Does Heidegger, then, delineate a particular mode of being that is not deficient, but that
also involves a relationship to others in an authentic way? The answer is that Heidegger does do
this – through a discussion of authentic Mitdasein.

II. Dasein-with (Mitdasein)

In Being and Time, Heidegger outlines several different ways in which beings may exist
with one another in the world. These include ‘Being for one another’ (Für-einandersein), ‘Being
among-one-another’ (Untereinandersein), ‘Being together with’ (Sein bei), ‘Being-with’
(Mitsein), and ‘Dasein-with’ (Mitdasein). Of these, Mitsein and Mitdasein are the most
pervasive throughout the text and they must be distinguished, first and foremost, from one
another before continuing. The task of deciphering Heidegger’s exact meaning, however, is
complicated by his seemingly loose usage of the terms. For the task at hand in this work, precise definitions will be necessary for better understanding of Heidegger’s meaning.

*Mitdasein* represents a very particular existential relationship within *Being and Time*. Already, as has been seen, Dasein can only have knowledge of itself through being-with others in the world in which it finds itself. However, this relationship has thus far been inauthentic, one in which Dasein only encounters others on a particular basis, almost as objects. One of the essential characteristics of Dasein, then, is that it is a certain kind of being, one that exists in the world with others, one that encounters others, “from out of the world, in which concernfully circumspective Dasein essentially dwells.”

The first mention of either *Mitsein* or *Mitdasein* occurs in Chapter IV of Division I of *Being and Time*. Importantly, it is entitled “Being-in-the-World as Being-with and Being-one’s Self. The ‘They’ *(Das In-de-Welt-sein als Mit-und Selbstein, Das ‘Man’).*” From the beginning, Heidegger makes it clear that the essential character of Dasein is ‘being-in-the-world,’ and, consequently, ‘being-with-others.’ There can be no world for Dasein without others in it; this is a natural part of living in the world and dwelling in it. The structures of both *Mitsein* and *Mitdasein* are, therefore, co-determined by being-in-the-world.

Here, ‘being-with’ (*Mitsein*) describes Dasein essentially, even when others are not physically present or seen. Even ‘being-alone’ is possible only in the negative space or absence of *Mitsein*. In other words, “because Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being

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20 Ibid., 153-155 (GA 2: 26; L 118).

21 Co-determination refers to the fact that both beings in the world do not exist without others also being in the world and that the concepts of ‘being-with’ (authentic and inauthentic) are both determined by being-in-the-world.
already implies the understanding of others.”\textsuperscript{22} Others, it is understood, exist within the world; they are unavoidable. However, the knowledge that beings have of others is often distorted by the limited and pervasive viewpoint of the ‘they’ and so beings develop a particular understanding of their relationship with others in the world. Furthermore, “This understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being, which, more than anything else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible.”\textsuperscript{23}

When Heidegger makes the claim that “The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt],”\textsuperscript{24} he means that there is no world without Others (Anderen). Accordingly, Mitsein is a consequence of being-in-the-world, of the simple fact that there are many beings that live within the world. Yet, this ‘with-world,’ is not authentic. Being-with others can only be authentic being-with when beings have plucked themselves from the influence of the ‘they’ and become aware of their own possibilities. As Heidegger writes, “Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitdasein].” Thus, the difference between Mitsein and Mitdasein is made clear: Mitdasein is a structure of Mitsein, which might now be taken to mean ‘collectivity’ as opposed to merely ‘being-with.’ Mitdasein is the kind of existence that those who are ‘freed for the world’ experience. If Mitsein is further understood as ‘collectivity,’ then it is evident that this structure is related to the inauthentic, to das Man. A collective in this sense would be, for Heidegger, part of das Man, the crowd, the everyday public. If Mitsein refers to simply being-in the world with Others, then Mitdasein specifically indicates those beings who have already

\textsuperscript{22} Heidegger. \textit{Being and Time}, 159-161 (GA 2: 26; L 123).

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 153-155 (GA 2: 26; L 118).
become Dasein, escaped from \textit{das Man}, and are ‘themselves’ with others. Authentic \textit{Mitdasein} can be nothing other than authentic being-with others freed from \textit{das Man}. A simpler way to look at the difference between \textit{Mitsein} and \textit{Mitdasein} would be to define \textit{Mitsein} as merely being in the \textit{presence} of others who are inconsequential and to define \textit{Mitdasein} as the relationship between beings who are truly themselves and in the \textit{company} of others who are also truly themselves (in other words, no longer under the influence of the ‘they’).\textsuperscript{25}

\textit{Das Man} (as, again, Heidegger often refers to the ‘they’) is clearly inauthentic, something to be avoided; the ‘idle chatter’ of others is considered here to be the height of inauthenticity. Seemingly, Heidegger chooses this neutral and impersonal terminology to highlight the suggestion that others in the world of Dasein are neither unique nor irreplaceable. Yet, even though \textit{das Man} is a phenomenon related to the conception of Dasein itself, in the positive sense of being primordial to it, it is inauthentic. In order to experience an authentic mode of being, the self cannot be separate from \textit{das Man}, but must instead recognize \textit{das Man} as an ‘essential existential’ in its own right. Because Dasein lives in the world with others and because it can only understand itself in relation to others within the context of the world, both \textit{Mitsein} and \textit{Mitdasein} are of import here.

However, “even if Others become themes for study, as it were, in their own Dasein, they are not encountered as person-Things ready-to-hand…”\textsuperscript{26} Simply because there can and may exist an inauthentic relationship between Dasein and Others does not mean that they cease to

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 153-155 (GA 2: 26; L 118); “Being-in is Being-with Others;” the terms used here are unique to this work and are not used by Heidegger himself (presence v. company).

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 156-157 (GA 2: 26; L 120). Additionally, it is helpful to note that Heidegger insists on the fact that “…the world, Dasein-with, and existence are \textit{equiprimordially disclosed}…,” 176-177 (GA 2: 26, L. 137).
remain human beings and become ‘things.’ On the contrary, even in inauthentic relationships with Others, the world is still shared among beings. What Heidegger intends here is to point out that being-with suggests a relationship between one being and others that they encounter on a daily basis – the person from whose shop a book has just been bought or the individual from whom one buys groceries. In these instances, being-with is closer to being-around or being-surrounded by others. This is the existentiell mode of being-in-the-world that was discussed earlier here – the mode in which human beings have not yet ‘escaped’ from the confines of the influence of the ‘they,’ of *Das Man*, and have not yet begun to act authentically.

What authentic *Mitdasein* comes to represent, on the contrary, is an authentic relation between beings (Dasein) who are concerned with their existence and exist within a world with others who have also chosen the possibility of being Dasein. This is the existential, theoretical and ontological perspective that allows Dasein to act authentically. It should be remembered that becoming Dasein, remaining in the grip of *das Man*, authenticity, and inauthenticity are all possibilities that Dasein may choose from. It is this choice that will determine whether Dasein remains inauthentic or becomes authentic. In this context, authentic *Mitdasein* becomes a relationship, in other words, from one Dasein to another Dasein – and it is an authentic relation. To clarify, *Mitdasein* suggests something other than simply being surrounded by others in the world; now, beings that have become Dasein are able to reach one another and relate to one another on a different, and *perchance*, more ‘authentic’ level than before. This ability to choose the possibility of acting authentically must, as was mentioned earlier in the section concerning

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27 To be clear, it is impossible for Dasein to ever fully escape from *das Man*. As beings, we will always encounter other beings in our daily lives. We will always buy books from a bookseller or groceries from the grocer. However, though it is impossible to escape everydayness entirely, in *Being and Time*, it is clear that ‘escaping’ the ‘influence’ if *das Man* is possible – and desirable.
authenticity, be realized by a particular Dasein, through an existential perspective, and then applied to ontic life before authenticity can be reached. Once, however, authenticity is accomplished for an individual Dasein, relationships with other Dasein take on new and different meanings, mainly connections between authentic beings as opposed to beings that are simply ‘ready-to-hand.’ Authenticity, as has been shown, can only be accomplished through the interaction between the existential and existentiell ways of looking at life – the existential analysis functions as a way to interpret what authentic ways of Being should be and then these are applied to ontic, existentiell, life in turn. Existential analysis leads to understanding of existentiell modes of being-in-the-world. A being that does not understand that it may choose to live out its own possibilities, on the contrary, will not have chosen authenticity as an option, not having ever thought of it as an option.

Perhaps it would be useful here, in order to clarify the distinction between Mitsein and Mitdasein, to briefly turn to a passage concerning the same themes from The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Here, Heidegger seems to have been a bit plainer as to what is meant by ‘being-with’ Others. He writes,

For the being-there of Da-sein means being with others, precisely in the manner of Dasein, i.e., existing with others. The question concerning whether we human beings can transpose ourselves into other human beings does not ask anything, because it is not a possible question in the first place. It is a meaningless, indeed nonsensical question because it is fundamentally redundant. If we really think the concept and essence of man in asking whether or not we can transpose ourselves into another human being, then we soon realize we cannot think this question through to the end. Being-with belongs to the essence of man’s existence, i.e., to the existence of every unique individual in each case….Thus, the ability to go along with …the ability to transpose oneself, is also questionable where other human beings are concerned, but it is questionable even though, indeed precisely because,
in accordance with the essence of his being man always already finds that he is with others.  

Here, it is clear that Heidegger means that being-with cannot be a question at all – at least not one that is worth asking. This is not because the question itself is not important or that being-with is an impossibility, but exactly the opposite: that being-with is so central to human nature and existence that it can hardly be contradicted, if not even noticed. That human beings exist with others is such a natural thing that Heidegger seems to have become frustrated in even having to explain it. To wit, he further writes:

It is precisely this inconspicuous and self-evident going alongside one another, as a particular way of being with one another and being transposed into one another, that creates the illusion that in this being alongside one another there is initially a gap which needs to be bridged, as though human beings were not transposed into one another at all here, as though one human being would have to first have to empathize their way into the other in order to reach them.

What is evident here is that Heidegger’s conception of Mitsein, even of Midasein, requires the reader to comprehend that all human beings are connected by being-in-the-world whether they acknowledge it or not. Acknowledgement of this fact is not necessary. Beings in the world live ‘alongside’ one another in such an ‘inconspicuous’ and ‘self-evident’ way such that there is only an ‘illusion’ of being apart from others. That Heidegger recognizes this illusion should illuminate something about how he understands being-with, namely that it is an innate condition of humanity – one that he feels is so well understood that it ought to require little explanation. In Being and Time, it is not some function of society or ‘civilization’ or ‘progress’ that defines or determines the fact that beings live in a world with other beings. Instead, this

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29 Ibid., 206.
living amongst one another is considered a simple fact of life. Furthermore, the ‘they’ is not created or sustained by any external force either. It is not, in other words, the ‘natural’ result of intersubjectivity that beings in the world seem ready-to-hand objects; it is the fact that human beings exist and that they are all thrown into the world with one another. What Heidegger seems to suggest here is less a condemnation of society as a whole, of its institutions, or with particular cultures than an observation about the world itself – that there are many people in it, that they are born into whatever world they are born into and whatever time they are born into without their permission – they are thrown into an existence with others. The logical consequence of this state of affairs is, for the Heidegger of Being and Time, to observe that living amongst other people is not only an unavoidable condition of life, but may also be perceived from at least two different perspectives: inauthentic relationships with others and, on the other hand, authentic relationships. If living in a world with others is unavoidable, then, as Dasein can choose other possibilities, it can also choose to identify the fact that it can either treat others as objects that are ‘ready-to-hand’ in the world or as other beings who are in the midst of questioning their own existence.

This is all a great deal to take in, to be sure. Heidegger means to say that being-with others is important, but that it is the way that beings are with others that matters in the end. In fact, he seems desperately to want to draw attention to the reality of human existence – that human beings exist already in a world with others and that they must now determine how those other beings will be treated. Will they continue to be largely ignored and treated as objects to be used or will they fully realize the potential for choosing their own possibilities and reach beyond the power of the ‘they’? Turning again to the method that Heidegger is using – existential analysis – ontic, everyday life is illuminated by and determined by ontological revelations that are then to be applied again to ontic life. There is a process to be noticed here – the ontological
clarifies the ontic in such a way that perspective of the ontic changes and then those changes inform the ontic life. *Mitsein* then takes on a new meaning – the ‘being-with’ of Dasein who are not simply being-in-the-world, but are now ‘freed-within-the-world.’

Thus, Dasein-with (*Mitdasein*) has, in *Being and Time* a rather precise designation. Heidegger avers,

> Yet one must not fail to notice that we use the term ‘Dasein-with’ to designate that Being for which the Others who are [die seinden Anderen] are freed within-the-world. This is so too for those who are Daseins with us [die Mitdaseinden], only because Dasein is itself is essentially Being-with.  

Heidegger is making a very important distinction here; what he is saying is that Dasein, the being with possibilities, with choices, is also a with-being. He is, at the same time, making the claim that only beings that have become authentic Dasein are ‘with’ others in this elevated and privileged sense. Not only is Dasein essentially being-with, but it is also only possible for those beings who have made a choice, who have freed themselves from the clutches of *das Man* to experience an *authentic relationship* with one another – that of Dasein to Dasein. The world does not fall away in this context; it still remains, but it is also no longer an issue for Dasein as an existentiell problematic. What is left as an issue for Dasein is its Being. The existential analysis, having informed what will happen in the existentiell world, has been incorporated into Dasein’s ontic existence. Heidegger explains the interactions between world, Dasein, *Mitsein* and *Mitdasein* in the following way:

> Since the worldhood of that world in which every Dasein essentially is already, is thus constituted, it accordingly lets us encounter what is environmentally ready-to-hand as something with which we are circumspectively concerned, and it does so in such a way that we encounter the Dasein-with of Others. The structure of the world’s worldhood is such that Others are not proximally present-at-hand as free-floating subjects along

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with other Things, but show themselves in the world in their special environmental Being, and do so in terms of what is ready-to-hand in that world. Being-with is such that the disclosiveness of the Dasein-with of Others belongs to it; this means that because Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. This understanding, like any other understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being, which, more than anything else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible.\footnote{Ibid., 159-161 (GA 2: 26; L 123).}

What is more, Being-with others in an authentic manner frees Dasein and Others with it.

“Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of others to the extent that it is freed by its world for a Being-with. Only so far as one’s own Dasein has the essential structure of Being-with, it is Dasein-with as encounterable for Others,”\footnote{Ibid., 157-158 (GA 2:26; L 121).} Heidegger writes.

It has already been mentioned that Dasein accomplishes the task of removing itself from the influence of \emph{das Man} only through anxiety (\emph{Angst}). When a being becomes anxious, this is an indication that they are beginning to understand that there is something subtly ‘wrong’ about the limitations placed on their possibilities by the ‘they.’ This is the ‘anxiety’ that Heidegger will further explicate in subsequent sections of his master work. In \emph{Being and Time}, attunement (being in different moods, like anxiety) is described thus: “What we indicate \emph{ontologically} by the term ‘state of mind’ is \emph{ontically} the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned.”\footnote{Ibid., 172-173 (GA 2: 29; L 134).} As a being that exists in the world, Dasein experiences this attunement as another essential existential. For Heidegger, attunements affect ‘state-of-mind’ – the way in which beings comport themselves toward one another in the world. If moods are different ways in which human beings are oriented towards one another, then they also affect the way in which
beings deal with others in the world. On these occasions, beings may find others to be aggravating, pleasant, comfortable to be around, or even threatening. Attunements, in other words, inform one’s disposition toward everything and everyone around them. When it is said that a person is ‘in a mood,’ this is usually what is being referred to – an attitude or positioning toward the world around them.

Heidegger offers a discussion of attunement as a way of describing the interactions that beings have in the world with one another. He states that, “What we indicate ontologically by the term ‘state-of-mind’ [Befindlichkeit] is ontically the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, or Being-attuned [Stimmung].”34 Moods of this kind, Heidegger explains, are imposed upon beings, not chosen. If a being is ‘in a mood’ or a particular ‘state-of-mind,’ then it is not because of anything that they have done or thought; instead, it is because a mood has come over that being, taken it over. Attunements have existential import; they are significant for the reason that they are telling clues to the thrownness of human beings. Having no control over something as simple as a mood or a state of mind is indicative of being thrown into the world. As such, the attunements of fear and anxiety, as described by Heidegger in Being and Time, have an impact on our understanding of Mitdasein.

Fear & Anxiety

Attunement is closely connected to being-in-the-world in the sense that “We have seen that the world, Dasein-with, and existence are equiprimordially disclosed; and state-of-mind is a basic existential species of their disclosedness, because this disclosedness itself is essentially Being-in-the-world.”35 Although there are several of these attunements, these moods, these

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34 Ibid., 172-173 (GA 2: 29; L 134).

35 Ibid., 176-177 (GA 2: 29; L 137).
states-of-mind of which Heidegger speaks, the focus of this section of the work at hand will be on the attunements of fear (Furcht)\(^{36}\) and of anxiety (Angst). These attunements, though radically different, are often, according to Heidegger, confused with one another. These are, not unimportantly, connected to the way in which beings relate to one another in the world into which they are thrown. They make beings aware of how they encounter different ‘who’s’ and ‘what’s’ in the world and allows them to understand the disposition they already have toward them. These are the two attunements that bring Dasein out of the ‘they’ and back around to its authentic self and, thus, to a relationship of Mitdasein – of those Dasein ‘freed within-the-world.’

The first of these attunements investigated here is Furcht, which “always reveals Dasein in the Being of its ‘there…’”\(^{37}\) For Heidegger, Dasein is ‘the fearful being itself.’ However, this does not mean that the existential mode of fear experienced by Dasein is a mode of weakness as well. Dasein’s fear is, instead, a fearing for and, therefore, Dasein is not really ‘afraid’ in the traditional sense. Dasein fears only for Mitdasein and, in this way, is both affected and not affected by this seemingly close tie to others. What “one ‘is apprehensive about’ is one’s Being-with with the Other, who might be torn away from me.”\(^{38}\)

Furcht and Angst, as one would imagine, are what Heidegger refers to as ‘kindred phenomenon.’ As previously stated, these attunements are so closely related that they are often confused for one another. Their attributes seem so similar that what one often thinks of as fear is

\(^{36}\) The Macquarrie and Robinson convention of capitalizing these two terms (Furcht and Angst) has been preserved in this work, as they are capitalized throughout the original German text as well.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 180-181 (GA 2: 30; L 141).

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 181-182 (GA 2: 30; L142).
really only anxiety. According to Heidegger, the difference is that angst must always be the cause of Furcht. Furcht is considered by Heidegger to be an ontic, existentiell, and thus inauthentic phenomenon belonging to the world of the ‘they’ that always has an identifiable object. Angst, however, does not have an object; this is exactly the nature of anxiety – that it has no true object. Angst is ‘about’ nothing. Dasein experiences the attunement of Angst about its very being-in-the-world.

However, as Angst itself can never be fully aware of the object of its anxiousness, since its object is literally nothing and nowhere, for Dasein, the world of the present loses its meaning and becomes inconsequential. Angst “collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance. In anxiety one does not encounter this thing or that thing which, as something threatening, must have an involvement.” This attunement is always important and, yet, it does not ‘exist’ anywhere. Thus, the being-in-the-world of Dasein becomes completely informed and defined by Angst, whose object of anxiousness is, in turn, about being-in-the-world. Here, inauthentic Mitsein and the world itself both collapse and prevent Dasein from knowing itself. On the other hand, it is this very attunement that will free Dasein for itself. Consequently, “Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of

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39 Here, fear is meant to be experienced as ‘fearing about’ rather than fearing a particular thing like one would fear a snake, spiders, or heights. As Heidegger puts it, in these instances, he means fear to be understood as a particular kind of state-of-mind (GA 2: 30; L 141).

40 Many people experience angst (anxiety) in this way when they experience what is commonly known as a ‘panic attack.’ A panic attack feels every bit the same as fear, but it has no object. For example, if a person were to see a deadly snake, ready to strike at them from a close distance, they would be experiencing fear. When a panic attack occurs, there is no real object to ‘blame’ for the accompanying feeling of fear. There is, instead, only anxiousness about ‘nothing.’

41 Heidegger. *Being and Time*, 230-231 (GA 2: 40; L 186).
understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted." However, “Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities.” Dasein’s possibility of an authentic composition of being-in-the-world seems somehow lost amidst this attunement; yet it is not lost.

This is the existential (ontological form), as is evident, that individuates Dasein. In other words, through granting Dasein a glimpse of its potential, Angst also allows Dasein to understand how it may individuate itself – of its own volition. Angst may be seen as the gateway to ultimate possibility and, also, of disclosure and individuation. The attunement of Angst in its individualizing and potential-opening nature, “brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being.” This is the disclosure of which Heidegger speaks. Disclosure is nothing more and nothing less than a revealing of possibilities to Dasein. Let it be recalled that, for Heidegger, the only thing that a being has as their own is their death. Here, death represents the possibility of the impossibility of existence, ruled by temporality. All relation to Others must also involve this relationship to death – in the everydayness of the world, this is dissolved in a being’s death. In death, one is alone and possibilities are no longer expressed without, but only within. In revealing possibilities, disclosing Dasein to itself, Angst may be interpreted as an essential attunement in the formation of individuation. Dasein is only successfully individuated when it has first experienced the disclosure that Angst provides. Furthermore, Dasein must experience its own

42 Ibid., 231-232 (GA 2: 40; L 187).
43 Ibid., 232-233 (GA 2: 40; L 188).
44 Ibid., 235-236 (GA 2: 40; L 191).
individuation in order to be its authentic self, to relate to others in an authentic manner. If Dasein does not redeem itself from the lostness of the ‘they,’ it cannot have other, authentic, relationships with other Dasein. Here, anxiety and fear prod Dasein out of the world of the ‘they’ and to an authentic mode, thus releasing it for authentic relationships with other authentic Dasein.

*Mitdasein*, however, can also be seen as a *transcendental condition* in that it exists regardless of the presence or the absence of Others in the world. It is not necessary for an individual to unburden itself of the limitations of the ‘they’ and to become authentic. Dasein must *choose* whether to remain in the grip of the ‘they’ self or to release itself from it. However, it is important to remember that the concept of ego does not exist for Heidegger; Dasein is not an expression of an individual ego. Thus, Dasein is not the representation of an ego either.

Instead, it is the very questioning of Being itself that becomes the understanding of Being—and this is not possible without *Mitdasein*. It is implied in *Being in Time* that any disclosure or disclosedness of Being is not only phenomenological truth as such, but also transcendental truth (*veritas transcendentalis*). As disclosure and phenomenological truth, “And the transcendence of Dasein’s Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical *individuation*.”

Though Heidegger mentions the concept of individuation only once in *Being and Time*, in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (GA 29/30), he discusses the notion more fully, as we have seen. Eric Sean Nelson interprets the appearance of

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45 Ibid., 62-63 (GA 2: 7; L 38). This radical individuation is the reason, perhaps, that Sartre determines Heidegger’s Dasein to be indicative of ‘radical freedom.’

46 Eric Sean Nelson. *Individuation, Responsiveness, Translation: Heidegger’s Ethics*. In *Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking: Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad*
individuation in *Being and Time* correctly: he argues that, traditionally, there has been little
discussion of the term as scholars have taken it to be self-explanatory, “Individuation is already
self-evident,” Nelson reminds, “since we are already individuals.” Yet, this is not the kind of
individuation that Heidegger refers to in *Being and Time*. There, “the question of individuation
is an issue concerning not ‘what’ but ‘who’ one is. It is bound up with the enigma of how the
self can know itself in its facticity, that is, that which resists the self and its appropriations,
including its own self, compelling factical life to interpret and translate itself.”

Dasein, as a being with access to unlimited possibilities, all of which are at its disposal,
has its own freedom at issue when it makes the choice between the world of the ‘they’ and the
world of authentic relationships. As Nelson points out, “The coming to freedom and
responsibility involved in the individuation of human being-there…occurs or is enacted as a
response to the facticity of one’s own existence, especially as disclosed in the inescapability of
one’s own death.” As can be seen, anxiety (*Angst*) and fear (*Furcht*) determine Dasein’s
decisions, its choices – yet this is in response to the reality of the fact that death is an immanent
possibility for all beings. In fact, it may be the only possibility that is certain in the existence of
beings besides the fact of their birth. What is at issue in the idea of individuation, then, is the
very possibility of being-one’s-self, of knowing that death is a certainty, determining how to deal
with that certainty, and loosening the grip of tradition, of the public realm, of *das Man*.

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(Contributions to Phenomenology, Volume 65). Ed. Frank Shalow. Springer: Netherlands,

47 Ibid., 270.

48 Ibid.
This ‘individuation’ should not be understood as anti-social or against sociality, however. As Nelson astutely reveals, individuation is associated with ‘loneliness’ and ‘solitude,’ to be sure, but “solitude is not a means of escaping the world, but encountering it.” It is this function of ‘encountering’ the world that makes a difference to the social component of individuation. Furthermore, “Solitude, as separation from participation in the continuous hum of everydayness, is the breakdown of connection through encountering finitude.” The realization of the finitude of beings, in other words, is unsettling and shocking – it drives Dasein to look elsewhere, outside of the ‘they,’ for other possibilities. At the same time, individuation causes Dasein to ‘come into its own,’ so to speak, to render itself separate from das Man, but not from others in the world. Individuation frees Dasein to encounter who and what it will instead of what it has been told to encounter. In connection to sociality and ego, Dasein’s encountering its finitude amounts to encountering a new way in which to look at the world in which it dwells and exists; “Nor is encountering one’s finitude equivalent to idealistically reducing the world to the ego and its concerns, as such egoism is part of the average everydayness that is in question.”\[49\] Experiencing anxiety and fear are similarly jarring to Dasein in that these attunements may lead to escape from inauthenticity and ‘average everydayness.’

In its disclosure due to the attunement of angst, coupled with an authentic structure of Mitdasein, Dasein’s possibilities are revealed to it and only then is it able to live its ownmost possibilities, to potentially transcend beings with Being. This transcendence must not, however, be considered to relate to metaphysical transcendence, but rather to its ecstatic (standing outside

\[49\] Ibid., 271.
oneself) and temporal sense as a ‘horizon.’

Becoming oneself in individuation allows authentic Dasein to relate to others in the world in a different manner.

Turning, then, specifically to authentic Mitdasein, to an authentic social component of evading das Man, it becomes clear that if Dasein is intended by Heidegger to indicate a being who is present in the world, then that world must be, as he says, a with-world (Mitwelt).

Although it is not the case that a being that is Dasein cannot exist without the existence of others, it is the case that Mitdasein indicates others who are also Dasein and who live in the same world as one another. They encounter one another both authentically and inauthentically. Encounters with Others are inauthentic when they are likened to das Man, which does not engage its thought or existence the way that Dasein does. Authentically, one meets with others in the sense that they are also dwelling in the world and are also introspective; they are already in the same world.

Heidegger does not mean for Mitdasein to be understood as beings that encounter one another in such a way that one can only discern between others and themselves by comparing them and finding them different. Here, Mitdasein is not a relationship with others in the traditional sense or in the sense that, for example, Levinas avers, but rather a relationship of place and space with and between Dasein that are involved in an inquiry as to their own ontological nature.

Individuation & Being-with

In fact, a careful analysis of the means by which Heidegger and Levinas describe, respectively, the process of individuation may help to elucidate the matter. Levinas’s concept of individuation represents an essential departure from Heidegger. For Heidegger, individuation, as has been shown, takes place through Angst, furcht, and a realization of one’s own finitude.

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50 Heidegger. Being and Time, 62-63 (GA 2: 7; L 38).
Individuation in Levinas, however, occurs through the Other, alterity, and concern for the Other’s death. The main difference, therefore, between individuation in Heidegger and individuation in Levinas, is that, in Heidegger, beings are irreplaceable as themselves and in Levinas, beings are irreplaceable in the Other.

Levinas’s concepts of Same and Other seem to stand in almost direct opposition with Dasein and Mitdasein. However, for Levinas, the Other is positioned much in the same place as angst is for Heidegger. Whereas anxiety and fear disclose Dasein and reveal Dasein’s possibilities, the Other disquiets the Same and awakens it. Levinas prescribes that beings must orient themselves ‘for-the-other’ and that it is through disquietude and responsibility for-the-other that this relationship is significant and individuating. This relationship, in other words, can signify, for Levinas, the concern for an Other’s death. Levinas sees individuation as related to an ego, to a “subjectivity of the ‘me’” that is informed by the Other. For Levinas, the face-to-face relationship between beings should be given privilege, yet he does not see that this is possible in Heidegger’s interpretation of existence in *Being and Time*. In fact, individuation in *Being and Time* is quite different.

In *Being and Time*, it is through care for others that Dasein reaches an authentic relationship with others who are also Dasein when, for example, they share bonds of interest. As Heidegger writes,

> when [beings] devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus become authentically⁵¹ bound together, and

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⁵¹ There has been some small debate over whether the use of the term ‘authentic’ is truly warranted here or whether another word should have been used. In the original German, however, the term used is ‘*eigentliche,*’ which could be translated as ‘actual’ or ‘authentically.’ Here, it is taken as ‘authentically.’ Others have, in fact, translated Eigentlichkeit (authenticity) as ‘ownedness’ (see John Haugeland’s translation) because the root word ‘*eigen,*’ means ‘own.’
this makes possible the right kind of objectivity [die rechte Sachlichkeit],
which frees the Other in his freedom for himself. 52

Mitdasein, unlike Mitsein, seems to be inherently free in character as presented in Being
and Time. In § 26, Heidegger distinguishes between the two by way of offering this explanation:

Being-in is Being-with Others [Das In-Sein ist Mitsein mit Anderen]. Their
Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Das innerweltliche
Ansichsein dieser ist Mitdasein]…Yet one must not fail to notice that we use
the term ‘Dasein-with’ to designate that Being for which the Others who are
[die seienden Anderen] are freed within-the-world. This Dasein-with of
Others is disclosed within-the-world for a Dasein, and so too for those who
are Daseins with us [die Mitdaseienden] only because Dasein in itself is
essentially Being-with 53.

Yet, if there are things that individuate beings, what ties them together in the world in which they
live? It cannot merely be the fact that they exist ‘alongside’ one another. This would mean that
being-with would remain in the category of being inauthentic, even between Dasein. How does
a being become authentic Dasein, fleeing das Man? Heidegger contends that this is
accomplished, in the main, through Sorge (care). It is this freedom, this ‘stirring’ of one’s own
Dasein, that one finds in other Dasein. When people work in common, care for one another, and
exhibit care toward one another, they free one another also to have a deeper understanding of
themselves as Dasein. This ontic phenomenon causes Dasein, as it were, to come full circle.
The ontological, existential analysis informs the existentiell, ontic existence of Dasein. A
common purpose becomes that which offers human beings an authentic relation with Others
around a particular Dasein. Care is analyzed existentially, used as a hermeneutic for Dasein to
comprehend care, and then put into action in the existentiell world. It is, thus, the care structures

52 Ibid., 158-159 (GA 2: 26; L122).
53 Ibid., 155 (GA 2: 26; L 118).
of being-with and toward Others that is the locus of authentic possibilities for the political in
*Being and Time.*

III. Care (*Sorge*)

If authenticity offers a glimpse into how one may live in a shared world and the idea of *Mitdasein* points to how one may authentically live in that same world, then care (*Sorge*)\(^{54}\) may serve as the foundation or lynchpin for making conjectures about what a political theory based on these fundaments might look like. As with the notions of *Mitsein* and *Mitdasein*, the term *Sorge* (usually translated, again, as simply ‘care’) is used in varying and diverse ways in *Being and Time*. In fact, there is continuing debate over the terminology of care in that particular text. The literal translations are as such: *Sorge* suggests a kind of anxiety or worrying about the future; *sorgen (sich sorgum um)* is to worry about something; *sorgen für* means to take care of something or provide for something; *das besorgen* denotes concern, as in concerning oneself with something.

It has already been noted that Dasein’s existence occurs in a with-world, one with others. What is left is to determine what the actual structures of *Sorge* might be and to delineate a few of its specific meanings. To be sure, Dasein has a multitude of what might be called ‘concerns.’ When Heidegger uses the term *besorgen*, a kind of concern for what is at hand in the world is denoted. Thus, caring for others can either be authentic or inauthentic. As a fallen being, thrown into the world, Dasein ‘cares about’ its own existence; existence matters to Dasein. This is because Dasein is always already being-in-the-world, is ‘ahead’ of itself. In other words, Dasein exists in a complete network of meaning – Dasein is care (*Sorge*), but it also has concerns

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(Besorgen). What matters to Dasein is not only the ready-to-hand in the world, but also a ‘caring for’ (Fürsorgen) others. Authentic Dasein has, as part of its very composition, care. Yet, in Being and Time, Heidegger moves beyond the originary meaning of care as simply part of Dasein’s existence. Instead, he further delineates between simple care, caring for, and solicitude.

Heidegger begins his discussion of care in Being and Time in Division I by describing it as Dasein’s “existential meaning.” From the outset, he distinguishes care – which is the existential or ontological hermeneutic used to interpret care - from concern (Besorgen) – which is the ontic, or existentiell, version of the term. He writes:

In contrast to these colloquial ontical significations, the expression ‘concern’ will be used in this investigation as an ontological term for an existentiale, and will designate the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. This term has been chosen, not because Dasein happens to be proximally and to a large extent ‘practical’ and economic, but because the Being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as care. This expression too is to be taken as an ontological structural concept...it has nothing to do with ‘tribulation,’ ‘melancholy,’ or the ‘cares of life,’ though ontically one can come across these in every Dasein. These – like their opposites, ‘gaiety,’ and ‘freedom from care’ – are ontically possible only because Dasein, when understood ontologically, is care. Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world [Sein zur Welt] is essentially concern.

The ontic meaning of care, then, is characterized by the ontological sense of the word. Dasein, as a being in the world, experiences care (and thus concern) for others in the world as part of its singular existence, its way of going about Being-in-the-world. Care for others is only ontically possible because it can be described ontologically. This description should also make clear the way in which concern is ontically possible only in care. Concern becomes the ontic, yet authentic way in which Dasein experiences care.

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55 Ibid., 65-67 (GA 2: Part I; L 41).

56 Ibid., 83-84 (GA 2: 12; L 57).
Furthermore, Heidegger does not wish for care, or its third form (other than care and concern) – solicitude (Fürsorge)\(^7\) to be misunderstood in everyday, ontic ways. Averring the contrary, he offers,

In contrast to this [leap-in], there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead of him [ihm vorausspringt] in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care,’ but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a ‘what’ with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.\(^8\)

Yet, these are not “pieces belonging to some composite, one of which might sometimes be missing; but there is woven together in them a primordial context which makes up the totality of the structural whole [of Dasein] which we are seeking.”\(^9\) Here, and above, Heidegger seems to assert both that Dasein is essentially care and so is Being-in-the-world. In fact, he argues that “Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ [vor] every factual ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially and à priori; this means that it always lies in them.”\(^10\)

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\(^7\) As John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson note (see p. 157 footnote, Being and Time), this term has no equivalent in English. Joan Stambaugh (see p. 119 in her translation of Being and Time) translates it more literally, as ‘caring for,’ but ‘solicitude’ seems to capture more essentially Heidegger’s original intent and usage. In current English, ‘solicitude’ preserves the notion that someone is cared for while also capturing its double meaning as an anxious kind of worry, unease, or apprehension. Meaning, ‘solicitude’ conjures up ‘attentive’ caring or earnest attention. It should also be noted that this ‘apprehension’ has something to do with ‘anxiety’ and ‘fear’ as attunements in this sense.

\(^8\) Heidegger. Being and Time, 158-159 (GA 2: 26; L 122).

\(^9\) Ibid., 65 (GA 2: 41; L 41).

\(^10\) Ibid., 238 (GA 2: 41; L 193).
Thus, the structure of Being outlined in *Being and Time* contains an ontic expression of Dasein that reveals itself in selfhood and freedom. It also contains an ontic expression of *Mitdasein* that recognizes a community of self-knowing Dasein that are concerned, not only with their own Being, but also about other beings, specifically other Dasein. In that world, structured ontologically as it is by the ground of care, the inauthentic nature of *das Man*, the being-with that is merely something to tolerate, the manner in which human beings treat others as mere objects of destiny, gives way to the possibility for an authentic community of Dasein, all of which are seeking, or have gained, authenticity as beings in the world. If Dasein is already, in its default position as thrown into the world, inauthentic and deals with others in a deficient mode, must this continue to be the case? To be sure, this question has already been partially answered. It has been shown thus far that this need not be the case – Dasein may have an authentic Dasein-with with others and this is dependent upon care being an essential characteristic of Dasein.

In *Being and Time*, there is yet a further distinction made between concern (*Besorgen*) and solicitude (*Fürsorge*). Heidegger offers this by way of explanation,

> Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand could be taken in our previous analyses as concern and Being with the Dasein-with of others as we encounter it within the world could be taken as solicitude.\(^61\)

Thus, if being-in-the-world is essentially care, as Heidegger points out above, then being-together-with is ‘taking care of.’ Accordingly, it is solicitude that is the term used when speaking of the *Mitdasein* relationship between Dasein and Others. Adding to this, just as care is not an isolated expression of concern for oneself,\(^62\) so, too, care and concern for the Other are not

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\(^61\) Ibid., 237-238 (GA 2: 41; L 193).

\(^62\) Ibid., “So neither does ‘care’ stand primarily and exclusively for an isolated attitude of the ‘I’ toward itself.”
a kind of ‘leaping in’ for another (Einspringen), but a ‘leaping ahead’ (Vorausspringen) of the other in solicitude. This is also part of authentic being-with. As a being that exists in the world, Dasein is always the being that is ahead-of-itself in this regard; it is always the being that exists within the context of the structure of care. These ontological structures, it is important to note, are prior to any factical attitude or position; they are ontological priorities to ontic possibilities.

Perhaps the most useful way to continue this analysis of care is to analyze the ‘Myth of Care’ found in Being and Time, a strikingly poetic moment in the text and the clearest description of what Heidegger actually means by care:

Once when ‘Care’ was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. ‘Care’ asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead. While ‘Care’ and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which seemed a just one: ‘Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since ‘Care’ first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called ‘homo’, for it is made out of hummus (earth).’

Heidegger’s use of this Roman myth is central to an understanding of care. In it, Cura (Care, Concern) is the figure that creates human kind out of pliable clay from the river she happens to cross. She (lest it be forgotten that Cura is a goddess, not a god) then asks the King of the

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63 Ibid., 241-243 (GA 2: 42; LL 197-198). In a footnote on page 243, Heidegger explains that he took this myth “from K. Burdach’s article. ‘Faust und die Sorge.’ The translation is from Burdach.” Division I, Chapter 6, footnote v. Note: The poem was originally written by Galus Julius Hyginus (64 B.C. – AD 17), poem 220 of Fabulae. It is, as far as can be known, the only time that Cura is personified in Roman mythology.

64 It is certain that this fact no doubt serves at times to upend Christian mythology (specifically that of the creation myth wherein humankind is created from clay as well, but in the image of a male god and not by a woman – or, technically TWO women).
gods, *Jovis* (Jupiter) to endow humankind with a spirit, with *geist*. Though he agrees, he also expresses a desire for humanity to bear his name, to be given credit for his part in its creation. Yet, no sooner does *Cura* refuse to allow *Jovis* to give his name to what she initially crafted, but *Tellus* (Earth/‘Mother Earth’) appears and insists that, because humankind has been crafted out of clay, of earth, of her body, that it bear her name instead. Significantly, it is not the King of the gods who arbitrates, and finally resolves, their dispute, but *Saturnum* (Saturn), the God of Time. He decides that each of these three shall have their own particular purview over humanity – *Jovis* will receive its soul upon its death, *Tellus* will have its body. However, it is *Cura* who will remain in possession of humanity throughout its life, its existence, its being-there. Therefore, it seems that Heidegger has gone to great lengths to explicate just how important care is to beings in the world – she rules them, but they do not have her name. Rather, as from the earth, they are given, not the name of *Tellus*, but the word for what their substance is, for where they dwell.

“Man’s *perfectio* – his transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities (projection) – is ‘accomplished’” Heidegger writes, “by ‘care.’”

But with equal primordiality ‘care’ determines what is basically specific in this entity, according to which it has been surrendered to the world of its concern (thrownness). In the ‘double meaning’ of care, what we have in view is a single basic state in its essentially two-fold structure of thrown projection.

Heidegger chooses to focus on what he terms the ‘double meaning’ of care in the above myth, which had already been pointed out by K. Burdach, that “calls attention to a double meaning of

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65 It should be noted that the use of this myth also serves to show the entire complex matrix of Dasein in *Being and Time*. Time, Earth, and Care all have their place in the life – and death – of human beings.
the term *cura* according to which it signifies not only ‘anxious exertion’ but also ‘carefulness’ and ‘devotedness’ [‘Sorgfalt,’ ‘Hingabe’].”

Heidegger does not mention care again until Division II, where he connects it to temporality and to death. There, the coming to be of care is found in the ‘call of conscience’ where “*conscience manifests itself as the call of care*; the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Beingalready-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being.” There are three separate ways, according to Heidegger, to look at the care that is the Being of Dasein: “It comprises in itself facticity (thrownness), existence (projection), and falling.” Yet, this should not be taken to mean that care only exists in the ‘fallen’ world of *das Man*. Sociality, authentic sociality, also comes into play. Heidegger offers,

Thrown into its ‘there,’ every Dasein has been factically submitted to a definitive ‘world’ – its ‘world. At the same time, those factual projections which are closest to it, have been guided by its concernful *lostness* in the ‘they.’ To this lostness, one’s own Dasein can appeal, and this appeal can be understood in the way of resoluteness. But in that case this *authentic* disclosedness modifies with equal primordiality both the way in which the ‘world’ is discovered (and this is founded upon this disclosedness) and the way in which the Dasein-with *[Mitdasein]* of Others is disclosed. The ‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its content,’ nor does the circle of Others get exchanged for a new one; but both one’s Being towards the ready-to-hand understandingly and concernfully, and one’s solicitous Being with Others, are now given a definitive character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their-selves.

It is worth, then, taking a moment to develop a brief understanding of the term ‘resoluteness’ [*Entschlossenheit*], or ‘determination’ as it is sometimes understood and translated. Heidegger understands ‘disclosedness’ as accessing ‘primordial truth;’ resoluteness is

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66 Heidegger. *Being and Time*, 243-244 (GA 2: 42; L 199).

67 Ibid., 83-84 (GA 2: 57; L 57).

68 Ibid., 329-330 (GA 2: 58; L 284).

69 Ibid., 343-345 (GA 2: 60; LL 297-298).
the way in which disclosure occurs eminently. Dasein permitting itself to be removed from das Man, from its conformism, can counteract fallenness in the ‘they’. When Dasein becomes resolute, it becomes itself, authentically. This is not to be understood as simply refusing to participate in social customs or norms but, instead, as Dasein throwing itself into something else – namely, the solicitous way in which it can be with Others in an authentic manner, even becoming the conscience of Others, as will be shown in a later section of this work. Thus, being resolute, or determined, implies becoming authentic; it also suggests sociality with others. As can be noted in the above passage, the ‘world’ in which Dasein finds itself does not disappear, nor do Others within that ‘world.’ What changes, instead, is Dasein’s decision to become resolute, to solicitously interact with Others who are already there with it in the world. This, in turn, frees others for their own authentic Being, and to determine for themselves, as resolute Dasein has done, what possibilities they will follow for themselves (and not for the ‘they’).

Sociality is not destroyed in this movement, but made better, more authentic, founded upon solicitousness toward others as opposed to simply existing beside them in the world.

Resoluteness, Heidegger contends,

…as authentic Being-one’s-Self does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating ‘I.’ And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with others [fürsorgende Mitsein mit den Anderen].

Care then becomes not only an essential structural component of Dasein, but also what allows for the “authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole.” Being-with could, up until now, have been seen as an indifferent mode of existing with others. However, when the concepts of care

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70 Ibid., 344-345 (GA 2: 60; L 298).
and concern are taken into account, a different sort of being-with takes shape and reveals itself. What care does for Dasein is to allow it to choose to ignore these deficient modes and relationships and to act consciously against the indifference of das Man. Thus, care and knowledge of one’s own Dasein occurs first and then genuine concern for Others. What is left is the potential for a community of self-knowing Dasein who have chosen their care and knowledge of self and Others freely through the myriad possibilities that are open to Dasein. While simply ‘caring’ for Others seems to fall short, authentic care and concern are a ‘calling’ that Dasein answers.71

For Heidegger, inauthentic solicitude is just this – a ‘leaping-in’ for the Other, a relationship in which “the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him.” As has been shown, in Being and Time, solicitude may also be a ‘leaping ahead’ of the Other, however. Thus, authentic solicitude is meant to indicate the humanity of human beings and to free them for themselves and for their care. As Heidegger writes, “solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance. Like solicitude, these can range through their respective deficient and indifferent modes up to the point of inconsiderateness or the perfunctoriness for which indifference leads the way.”72

Though Heidegger offers no concrete examples of solicitude, Hayim Gordon offers this:

The educational relationship that Fyodor Dostoyevsky describes in The Brothers Karamazov, between Father Zosima, the elder, and Alyosha Karamazov, is an example of solicitude in which Dasein leaps ahead of the Other…Father Zosima relates with wisdom to Alyosha’s potentiality-for-being, carefully and lovingly instructing him what to do so that he can live

71 This will lead Heidegger to a discussion of conscience.

72 Heidegger. Being and Time, 158-159 (GA 2: 26; L 122); Ibid., GA 2: 26; L 123.
what Heidegger would call an authentic life of care. Alyosha responds with deep love and strict obedience to Father Zosima’s solicitude.73

Solicitude, then, is a very specific kind of caring, one that leads others to take up possibilities of their own; it is not a selfish or self-serving enterprise, but one that seems to be guided by caring love for others, by a desire to assist others in becoming what it is possible for them to be. Yet, care also has a distinctly temporal meaning in the second division of Being and Time.74 Dasein’s existence is not a singularity, but a unity; and care is presented as the fundamental structure that underlies human existence. Furthermore, if care is to exist, Heidegger contends, then temporality must be the à priori transcendental condition for it. Dasein may only become open to its possibilities in the context of temporality. The Dasein of the present must begin to understand that its cultural-historical milieu defines it in such a way that it hinders and constrains Being. In other words, without understanding time as a unity between traditional understandings of the past (what has already passed), the present (that which is occurring), and the future (that which will come to pass) instead of a linear progression of the aforementioned, then Dasein may never achieve authenticity. More clearly, without comprehending time as a unity and not as a progression, Dasein will never come to pursue its ownmost possibilities, but will continue to pursue the limited and constraining possibilities posited by das Man.

Authenticity, Dasein-with, and care are presented in this chapter as the major fundamental notions in Being and Time that will lead to a politics of care. However, there are two other important concepts – that of conscience and of ‘originary responsibility’ – that should


74 Heidegger. Being and Time, 93 (GA 2: 65).
assist in providing a richer background for the political theory described in the penultimate chapter of this volume. The first is found in *Being and Time* itself; François Raffoul proffers the second. In the following interlude, Chapter 5, it will be shown that the call of conscience expressed in *Being and Time* is evidence, not only of the potential for authentic solicitude, but also of an ‘originary ethics’ in that same work, a responsibility to and for the Other. These elements will be necessary to examine in order to construct a politics of care out of *Being and Time*. 
Chapter 5: On Conscience & Responsibility

I. The Three Fundaments: A Brief Re-Visitation

Let us begin by summarizing what we have already learned concerning the three major fundaments in *Being and Time* that will allow for the construction of a politics of care. As may be seen from the above discussion, Dasein is essentially a temporal being, bracketed by the certainties of birth and death; it is a being with infinite possibilities – including those of political action and ethical postures. Authentic Dasein can escape the ‘they.’ It is not bound by the possibilities of the external world into which it has been thrown. It is not ruled by factical considerations alone, but facticity (real-world existence) is one of its distinct possibilities.

Let it be recalled that, in *Being and Time*, everything is treated as having an authentic and inauthentic comportment or ‘mode.’ For Heidegger, the world into which human beings are thrown is a world of inauthenticity. As Dasein becomes authentic, it begins to understand that it may transcend the world of *das Man* and ‘be-there,’ to determine its own possibilities in the present, ‘be-itself.’ Authentic existence affords Dasein an escape from the alienation of the ‘they;’ upon realizing authenticity, Dasein can exist beyond the influence of inauthentic possibilities. Dasein-with (*Mitdasein*) is a structure of Being-with (*Mitsein*). Both of these modes of existence with others may be authentic or inauthentic. There may be authentic Being-with and Dasein-with or inauthentic Being-with and Dasein-with. Yet, authentic Dasein-with represents a specific interrelation between individual Dasein: Dasein has authentically opened itself up to its ownmost possibilities alongside other Dasein who have similarly become ‘themselves.’ Care (*Sorge*), as another essential structure of existence, serves as the ‘condition’ for which ontic (existentiell) existence is possible for Dasein: “the existential [ontological] phenomena of death, conscience, and guilt are anchored in the phenomenon of care.” The call of
care is what Heidegger has referred to as ‘conscience,’ which summons Dasein uncannily from itself and to itself. Conscience makes Dasein aware of ‘Being-guilty.’

Care, importantly, is also treated both authentically and inauthentically in Being and Time. When Heidegger presents the Myth of Care in § 42 of the text, he seems to hearken back to the Roman understanding of care as having a double meaning – that of both anxious worry (Sorge) and of solicitude (Fürsorge). Dasein’s very immersion in the ‘they’ seems to be a flight from the kind of care that is anxious worry, while true solicitude is a sort of ‘tending’ to others. As Warren T. Reich has it,

… anxious care never totally dissolves: In the everyday world we cannot avoid the dual sense of care-as-anxiety and care-as-solicitude. Accepting the kinds of beings we are entails embracing a deep ambiguity in which we know that worrisome cares may drive us to escape and that solicitous care can open up our possibilities for us.

As has been discussed, there are also two forms of solicitous care – that of ‘leaping in’ for others and that of ‘leaping ahead’ of them. Leaping-in is treated as inauthentic, leaping-ahead as an authentic means of giving another back their care. While Dasein is a being defined by care in its very essence, Heidegger’s concepts of conscience and François Raffoul’s notion of an ‘originary’ responsibility in Being and Time offer further insight into what care truly means – and, therefore, into what a politics of care might look like.

II. On Conscience (Gewissen)

The interplay between Being-in-the-world and the ‘They’ (das Man) in Being and Time is originally an inauthentic relationship for Dasein – before it becomes authentic Dasein through questioning the meaning of its own existence and coming to the realization that other, unlimited

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75 See especially §58 of Being and Time (“Understanding the Appeal, and Guilt”), beginning on p. 325.

possibilities are open to it. This movement is nothing less than Dasein becoming authentic. Yet, what must occur in order for Dasein to have this ‘realization,’ if it could be called that? Does Dasein simply begin to question its relationship to existence and then, in one swift motion, somehow become authentic? This would, at the very least, seem to be faulty reasoning on the part of Heidegger. However, this is not the case; Heidegger does, indeed, provide an explanation for this seemingly sudden conversion from inauthenticity to authenticity, this act of disclosure that seems to occur – it is the ‘silent call of conscience.’

At the very outset of Division II of *Being and Time*, Heidegger avers that,

> When Dasein’s lostness in the ‘they’, that factical potentiality-for-Being which is closest to it (the tasks, rules, and standards, the urgency and extent, of concernful and solicitous Being-in-the-world) has already been decided upon. The ‘they’ has always kept Dasein from taking hold of these possibilities of Being. The ‘they’ even hides the manner in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly choosing these possibilities. It remains indefinite who has ‘really’ done the choosing. So Dasein makes no choice, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. This process can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back to itself from its lostness in the ‘they’.

Nevertheless, Dasein must have some means of accomplishing this feat. How is Dasein to ‘bring itself back to itself from its lostness’? Dasein must choose, yes, but at this point it is entirely enveloped in the inauthentic world of the ‘they’ and so it must first ‘find itself,’ then choose to make the choice to choose. As strange as this may sound, Heidegger explains that “choosing to make this choice” is the way in which Dasein “decide[s] for a potentiality-for-Being” and “mak[es] this choice from [its] own Self.” Dasein, in other words, must make the choice to choose authentic existence; it must make this formal, attest to it in this way. For Heidegger,
“this potentiality is attested by that which, in Dasein’s everyday interpretation of itself, is familiar to us as the ‘voice of conscience’ [Stimme des Gewissens].”

Heidegger makes it clear that this ‘voice of conscience’ should not be taken to have biological origins, nor theological or spiritual ones: “It ‘is’ only in Dasein’s kind of Being, and it makes itself known as a Fact only with factical existence and in it.” Moreover, conscience has a ‘disclosing’ character and is “revealed as a call [Ruf].” The call of conscience makes an appeal to Dasein, it ‘summons’ it “to its ownmost Being-guilty.”

Conscience is the phenomenon that allows the din of the ‘they’ to be interrupted, to stop for a moment so that other possibilities for Dasein might make themselves known as possibilities. From its immersion in the ‘they,’ Dasein ‘hears’ conscience calling and cannot help but to ignore the ‘they,’ if only momentarily. As individuated beings, thrown into the world as Dasein are, Dasein’s experience is strange, ‘uncanny.’ The individual self seems incompatible with its life in the they-world. This is, to be sure, an uncanniness that stems from being thrown into the world, perhaps away from the homely dwelling. If “Dasein fails to hear itself, and listens away to the ‘they’; and this listening-away gets broken by the call if that call, in accordance with its character as such, arouses another kind of hearing, which, in relationship to the hearing that is lost, has a character in every way opposite.” Conscience then, discloses Dasein to itself, from its self when the call of conscience is truly heard.

Heidegger insists that conscience is not to be understood in the Kantian sense – as an inner understanding of what is just, as a moral or value judgment. Here, conscience is what Dasein ‘hears’ when it stops listening to the they-self and begins to understand its own

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77 Heidegger. Being and Time, 312-313 (GA 2: 54; LL 268-269).

78 Ibid., 314 (GA 2: 54; L 269).
possibilities, completely removed from the possibilities that the they-self has already laid out for it. One cannot ‘hear’ the call of conscience, for example, with any of the five senses. Instead, it is a kind of communication that does not require speech. It reveals itself in silence. In fact, the ‘call of conscience’ comes directly from Dasein, passes over itself, and then returns to itself. Both the summoned and the summoner are one and the same – they are both Dasein.\footnote{Ibid., 316-319 (GA 2: 55-56; LL 271-274).}

This relationship is, likewise, uncanny. As beings that are thrown into the world, the lure of remaining in the inauthenticity of the they-self is a difficult one to ignore and the call of conscience is “unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice.” Heidegger asks, “What could be more alien to the ‘they,’ lost in the manifold ‘world’ of its concern, than the Self which has been individualized down to itself in uncanniness and been thrown into the ‘nothing’?” In fact, Heidegger further explains that, “The call [of conscience] discourses in the uncanny mode of keeping silent. And it does this only because, in calling the one to whom the appeal is made, it does not call him into the public idle talk of the ‘they,’ but calls him back from this into the reticence of his existent potentiality-for-Being.”\footnote{Ibid., 321-322 (GA 2: 57; LL 277).} Let it be recalled that, in Being and Time specifically, the ‘uncanny’ is one of the defining characteristics of human essence. It is this idea of the uncanny, or the ‘strangest,’ that becomes important. The force of the uncanny casts human beings out of the situation of being ‘homely,’ out of what is known to them as their dwelling place: “In its ‘who’, the caller is definable in a ‘worldly’ way by nothing at all. The caller [in the call of conscience] is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial,
thrown Being-in-the-world as the ‘not-at-home’ – the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the ‘nothing’ of the world.”

It becomes clear, then, that Heidegger’s understanding of conscience is intimately related to authenticity, but what of its association with Being-with and with care? As it comes to be, both care and Dasein-with are connected closely with the concept of conscience:

The proposition that Dasein is at the same time both the caller and the one to whom the appeal is made, has now lost its empty formal character and its obviousness. Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being.

According to Heidegger, conscience’s call is that of one word: ‘Guilty!’ This uncanny call is clear: “Whatever the ways in which conscience is experienced or interpreted, all our experiences ‘agree’ on this ‘Guilty!’” Conscience may take the form of a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ conscience – one that either negates or affirms that human beings have guilt. However, Heidegger points out, importantly, that this ‘Being-guilty’ should not be understood in the ‘everyday’ sense. It should not be considered a debt or an ‘owing.’ Instead, it should be understood as the call of care, an existential responsibility: “Being-guilty constitutes the Being to which we give the name of ‘care.’” Furthermore, “Conscience is the call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world – the call which summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty” and

This responsibility, this call of conscience, is attested to in resoluteness: To this lostness [in the they], one’s own Dasein can appeal, and this appeal can be understood in the way of resoluteness. But in that case this authentic disclosedness modifies with equal primordiality both the way in which the

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81 Ibid., 321 (GA 2: 57; L 277).

82 Ibid., 322 (GA 2: 57; L 277).
‘world’ is discovered (and this is founded upon that disclosedness) and the way in which the Dasein-with of Others is disclosed.\textsuperscript{83}

The intersection between authenticity, Dasein-with, and care is thus described in \textit{Being and Time}.

For Heidegger, human beings are ‘thrown-in-the-world’ and it is this thrownness that must be dealt with. Dasein, the being that \textit{is there}, is what human beings have the potential to \textit{authentically} become. Being itself is what is initially concealed. In \textit{Being and Time}, the first half of the text is concerned with this thrownness and inauthenticity, while the second half is concerned with asking how a self, but not an ego, might emerge from this thrownness into authenticity. In the first half, human beings are nearly enslaved; they ask what embeddedness constitutes their environment. The second half asks what Dasein might make of that environment into which it is thrown. Dasein is always also a Being-with, a Being-with-others, and this is what threatens to both obscure Dasein and, later, to free it. It is the everydayness of family, work, and other obligations that cause beings to forget to see that Being is concealed. The first half of \textit{Being and Time} is the story of that flight from Being; the second half is about authenticity and anxiety. How does Dasein come to anxiety? It is, for Heidegger, the fear of death, the fear of ceasing to be. Dasein comes to the realization that the world is not grounded and that, therefore, there is no reason to be, to exist.

The call of conscience alerts Dasein to the falseness of the world of the ‘they’ and to its own possibilities. Human beings are not, in other words, at home. They have no dwelling. With this awareness comes anxiety as Dasein’s reaction to the fundamentally unsettling condition of realizing its thrownness. There are but two choices left to Dasein, it seems: either to choose a flight back into conformity and to disown their own Dasein, taking refuge in their ‘they-self’

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 326-327, 333, 335 (GA 2: 58-59; LL 281, 286, 289); 334 (GA 2: 58; L 288).
Dasein or to choose to ‘own up’ to what it means to be Dasein – to choose to hold on to a life of anxiety with no expectation of a grounding of Being or of life. This ‘owning up’ to the anxiety of thrownness causes a kind of liberation for Dasein. The notion of not being at home and asking where that home can be found is one of the questions of Heidegger’s that holds interest for politics. The answers are partly to be found in the ontological model he creates. In Being and Time, Being is allowed to expose itself; human beings allow a clearing for the meaning of Being to appear – they do not cause it to appear.

The call of conscience is the foil for inauthentic everydayness; it calls Dasein back from this inauthentic mode and back to its freedom for possibilities. In care, this frees others for their possibilities as well. For, Dasein is never a subject for Heidegger. Dasein is fundamentally characterized by Being-in-the-world with Others and when the notion of ‘guilt’ comes into play, it is not because Heidegger wishes for the ‘Guilty!’ to be some moral compass by which humans find their place in the world, ethically speaking, but awakens within Dasein a solicitous comportment toward Others nonetheless. This process should be understood, not as a religious revelation, but a kind of constant summons:

The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into words at all; yet it remains nothing less than obscure and indefinite. Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent. In this way it not only loses none of its perceptibility, but forces the Dasein which has been appealed to and summoned, into the reticence of itself.84

Conscience, in Being and Time, is presented as ‘silent’ because it is not a thing, a voice, a debt; it is the area in which concern for others exists, one mode that can be chosen from many. Here, ‘being-guilty’ does not, again, mean owing a debt or being responsible for someone in the sense of ‘owing’ them and the ‘appeal’ that the call of conscience makes is not only a call away

84 Ibid., 318 (GA 2: 56;L 273).
from inauthenticity, but also what alerts human beings to ‘wanting to have a conscience.’\textsuperscript{85} If the appeal of conscience, its summons, has been properly heeded, then the possibility opened up for Dasein is that of understanding the true phenomenon of ‘being-guilty’ as the need for conscience. This kind of conscience suggests, not ‘feeling guilty’ because of having done or failed to do a particular thing – it is more primordial than that, it comes from Dasein to Dasein in such a way that suggests an awakening of care as opposed to an already existing system of morality.

It is the “call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world – the call that summons Dasein to its ownmost potential-for-being-guilty. And corresponding to this call, wanting-to-have-a-conscience emerges as the way in which the appeal has been understood.”\textsuperscript{86} Conscience calls Dasein back, away from the inauthentic ‘they;’ yet, it also calls Dasein to itself and to Others. Recall that, in authentic solicitude, Dasein may ‘become the conscience of others’ and allow Others ‘their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their-Selves.’ Here, wanting-to-have-a-conscience is clearly something beyond already having a traditionally understood ‘conscience’ that would or could be affected by other belief. It is pure Dasein, wanting, aching to be more than what it is in the inauthentic world, comporting itself solicitously toward Others.

Yet, there can be no true understanding of what Heidegger intends in his investigations of the notion of conscience without the possibility of an ethics in Heidegger’s work. The claim that there is such an ‘originary ethics’ in the Heideggerian corpus, originating in \textit{Being and Time} is supported by the work of François Raffoul and it is addressed in the next section – that of the concept of ‘originary responsibility.’

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 334 (GA 2: 58; L 288).

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
We have already seen that ‘conscience’ takes on a meaning in *Being and Time* that is different from traditional notions of the same. It is not to be understood in the Kantian sense; it is a call summoning Dasein to itself and to authentic solicitude toward Others. The call of conscience is the call of care, authentically disclosing Dasein to itself and the Dasein-with of Others: “The very concept of Dasein thus includes a responsibility to the other: to the other entity, to the other Dasein, and to itself as another: Dasein is Care.”

In “Heidegger and the Origins of Responsibility” and *The Origins of Responsibility*, François Raffoul provides the necessary foundation, not only for an ‘originary ethics’ in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, but also for a non-solipsistic, non-subject-centered understanding of responsibility and care. The politics of care presented in the last chapter of this volume is heavily dependent upon the notions of authenticity, Dasein-with, and care; Raffoul’s conception of an ‘originary ethics’ offers further insight into how sociality operates within *Being and Time*. This is a key problematic issue to address before moving forward with a politics of care because other interpretations of Being-with have created a picture of *Being and Time* in which Heidegger’s Dasein is solipsistic, incapable of being a political being because of its seeming lack of empathy and ability to authentically engage with other beings in the world. Raffoul’s work shows both of these critiques to be untenable. Additionally, reconceptualizing Heideggerian responsibility in the way that Raffoul does opens up a space for, not only the ‘ethical’ to exist in *Being and Time*, but also for a deeper understanding of the connection between authentic solicitude and alterity – a key notion in our politics of care.

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Raffoul’s ‘originary responsibility’ is dependent upon correctly conceptualizing Heideggerian responsibility in *Being and Time*. That is, what is key for Raffoul is that responsibility should be re-thought in terms of Heidegger’s understanding of the word. Raffoul begins by parsing out various notions of ‘responsibility’ itself. Traditionally, understandings of the term ‘responsibility’ have meant something close to ‘culpability,’ this is clearly not Heidegger’s usage:

The concept of responsibility has traditionally been associated, if not identified with, accountability, under the authority of a philosophy of free will and causality, itself resting upon a subject-based metaphysics…In such an enframing, it may well be the case that the phenomenological and ontological sources of what is called ‘responsibility’ have remained obscure and neglected.

Raffoul chooses Heidegger’s concepts of ‘facticity’ and ‘alterity’ as a means by which to more clearly understand his seemingly radical new type of responsibility – one that could be argued to be a purer and more accurate accounting of the importance of its meaning. In short, Raffoul poses the crucial question: “…what is the import of the thought of facticity for ethics, and more particularly for our rethinking of responsibility, of the senses of being responsible?”

Heidegger’s ‘responsibility’ is what Raffoul refers to as “a primordial, factical, and finite responsibility, one that manifests the essential exposure to alterity of human beings.” He maintains that, customarily, there are three things necessary for a definition of responsibility: there must, first, be a subject and, second, that subject must have free will and, third, agency; the subject in question must, in other words, have control over their actions and must have freedom of will to act. Or, rather, the subject must act of its own accord in order to act in responsibility and accountability. Raffoul argues that, perhaps, the very notion of responsibility was first set

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88 Ibid., 205-206.

89 Ibid., 205.
forth by Aristotle in the sense that Aristotle distinguishes between a voluntary and an involuntary act, giving the subject agency even as early as the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Raffoul avers that this understanding of responsibility is further identified, by Aristotle, to be part of the subject’s capacity to ‘deliberate’ and make right decisions. What this amounts to is what Raffoul identifies as the beginning of a connection between the idea of responsibility and the ability to make rational, free decisions – and thus to be culpable for them, to have certain ideas as to what one should do and then *choose* whether or not to act on these impulses. This conception of ‘responsibility’ flows historically through to Kant and it is with him that causality is added as a key component. Responsibility in Kant, as Raffoul has it, becomes intimately related to autonomy, to self-rule. Because the subject is rational and capable of ruling itself, it is therefore responsible in its very freedom and dependent upon morality – it becomes a ‘moral subject.’ It is not until Jean-Paul Sartre, Raffoul contends, that the notion of responsibility no longer needs a foundation or ground of this moral sort.

Raffoul’s brief analysis amounts to a short history of different types of normative ethics. Aristotle contents that human beings ought to habituate themselves to particular character traits, or virtues. Kant presents a deontological, or duty-based account of ethics, dependent upon rationality and a good will. He offers a ‘categorical imperative’ of duty – that one should act in accordance with any particular maxim by first determining whether not that maxim cold become a universal law (one that is not self-contradictory). For Utilitarians, like Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill, ethical decisions should be made on the basis of a consequentialist calculus – on what will afford the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons. Raffoul concludes that in the context of normative ethics, Heidegger’s formulation of ‘responsibility’ may seem lacking. In fact, he maintains, this is not the case: “Heidegger did not so much neglect the ethical
dimension of existence than instead radically transform the way that such a dimension is to be thought." Raffoul then delineates the specific characteristics of such a re-thinking of ethics – an ‘originary ethics.’

While Raffoul admits that “Heidegger does not propose a system of morality, a body of prescriptive norms and values,” he also contends that this is due to the fact that Heidegger “instead rethinks the site of ethics and the ethical, by way of a critique of the metaphysical tradition, in order to retrieve the phenomenological and ontological origins of what has been called in our tradition ‘ethics.’” For Raffoul, Heidegger’s understanding of ‘responsibility’ has a more originary source than those that are dependent upon the subject and the ego. Heidegger believes in the human capacity for empathy, for example, but that it issues from something more primordial than the subject.

Dasein is not – and never could be – a subject. This would be too Cartesian, too metaphysical for Heidegger. Raffoul avers, however, that “In at least three aspects, responsibility defines the essence of Dasein, it constitutes selfhood, and finally, it defines man’s relationship to being, that is, his very essence.” Thus, he contends, “We see from the outset that responsibility is not thought as a consequence of a subject ‘owning’ his or her actions, but is instead approached in terms of a response to an event that is also a call – the call of Being” or the call of conscience. The selfhood of Dasein is thus composed of, and individuated by, this call of Being. Dasein’s ‘originary responsibility’ is, in this context, to respond to this call by being ‘itself.’ It is in this way that “The facticity of responsibility reveals the alterity of Dasein. In that

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91 Ibid., 279.
sense, factical responsibility could no longer be taken as solipsistic, or egoistic, but needs to be unfolded in its essential relation to alterity.”

Ethics, then, for Heidegger, is understood “in terms of our relationship to Being, not as some theoretical principles to apply, but as the very unfolding of human existence.”

Furthermore, as Raffoul contends,

In Heidegger’s work, the question of ethics is situated in and arises out of the very event of being and its givenness. Traditional accounts of ethics are indeed phenomenologically ‘destroyed’ or deconstructed, but in order to retrieve a non-metaphysical, non-theological, more original sense of the ethical. For instance, when Heidegger takes issue with ethics as a metaphysical discipline in “Letter on Humanism,” it is with the intent of uncovering a more originary sense of ethics as ‘authentic dwelling’ and ‘standing-in’ the truth of Being. Even when in Being and Time he takes issue with the distinction between good and evil, characterized as ‘ontic,’ it is in order to retrieve an original guilt (Schuldigsein) that is more originary than good and evil morality and which provides an ontological foundation to morality (SZ 286)...Instead, Heidegger retrieves what he calls the dimension of ‘being-with,’ that is the originary being-with-others of Dasein...

The salient point to be taken here is that “Heidegger rethinks the site of ethics.” Raffoul writes, “In Being and Time, Heidegger clarifies that no ‘values,’ no ‘ideal norms’ float above factical existence, precisely because there is nothing above factical existence!”

The significance of this statement is astounding. Instead of ignoring the ontic, it is clear that Heidegger places, at least in some sense, the ontic in a privileged place. Indeed, he has placed facticity at the heart of human existence in such a way that it must be considered a key feature of his philosophy when it comes to ethics, especially in Being and Time. Dasein’s

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possibilities remain the same – Dasein may be inauthentic or authentic, accept or reject its possibilities. This is freedom. Care, Raffoul argues, is part of “a practical-ethical understanding of Dasein.” In fact, “In its very definition, Dasein is determined as care, a care or a concern for its own Being, that is, not in abstract theoretical terms, as the reflexive subject of the modern tradition, but in a radically practical-ethical sense.” Yes, there is a particular Dasein that is defined by care and caring for others, but this Dasein is not a subject reaching out to another subject in the way that ethics has been traditionally thought.

It is important to note the features of such an originary ethics. Raffoul carefully sets these forth. The first feature denotes the fact that “ontology and ethics are not different spheres. Ontology is not some domain of principles that would then be ‘applied’ to an ontic ethical sphere. Ontology is (originary) ethics and ethics is ontological.” Thus, the two are one and the same conception:

Ethics, as it turns out, is ethos, referring to the ‘abode of man.’ It is human beings’ sojourn on the earth, their very being as dwelling and inhabiting…and incalculable finite dwelling of human beings, an authentic inhabiting in the openness of being, and designates humans’ sojourn as mortals in the finite dimensionality of being. Ethics has become an ethics of finitude, of finite being.

It is from the above commentary that Raffoul is able to construct the second feature of originary ethics, that of its removal from ‘results’ or ‘production of effects.’ Rather, it is “solely theoretical or contemplative.”

Instead of being connected to a particular subject or agency, ethics “requires the most radical loss of self, and it is in this madness that, properly attuned, one is drawn toward, opened to, the gift of Being.” There is, as it seems, no potential for application, no Kantian or Utilitarian

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95 Ibid., 287, 289-290.
formula to follow; there is only a kind of ethics that “occurs outside of reference to both ground and utility.” Raffoul refers to this movement as the ‘de-subjectivizing’ of ethics. In fact, this is the third feature of a Heideggerian originary ethics, that it be radically removed from all association with the subjective and, instead, rely on the ‘event’ of Being. Raffoul suggests that freedom, in this context, can exist ‘without will’ and amount to ‘letting beings be’ – what we have already identified here as part of authentic solicitude.⁹⁶

To summarize, within this framework, responsibility itself is importantly divorced from such notions as the ‘subject’ or ‘ego.’ Responsibility becomes, “not a human characteristic, but, instead…a phenomenon that belongs to being itself.” Being itself is the ethical. Raffoul deduces that responsibility, in Heidegger, cannot be equated with classical notions of accountability: “Care, concern, solicitude, anxiety, authenticity, being-guilty” – Raffoul lists all of these as “different names for such originary responsibility…” In this responsibility, Dasein becomes responsible for itself first, through the call of conscience. For Raffoul, there is an ‘otherness’ or alterity to the call and being-with, as also constitutive of Dasein, means that care will extend to others. As Raffoul writes,

Authentic solicitude does not attempt to appropriate the other, but does justice to the infinite alterity of the other. Only in that sense can Dasein become, as Heidegger put it, ‘the conscience of others.’ In them appears that responsibility, once it is understood away from the tradition of egology, signifies an essential exposure to the other…⁹⁷

This revelation, of the radical reformulation of responsibility that Heidegger effects in *Being and Time*, has a weighty impact on the politics of care developed in the current work. For example, Vogel, who explores many similar issues in *The Fragile We*, remarks that Heidegger is

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⁹⁶ Ibid., 147, 291, 297.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 301, 310, 331.
unaware of the fact that the idea of authenticity is, indeed, *factual* and that, furthermore,

“Authenticity appears to imply moral subjectivism or relativism.” This suggests, not only a lack
of ethics in Heidegger’s text, but also a denunciation of empathy. Raffoul proves that notions
such as ‘empathy’ come before any ‘with’ relationship to the Other. Heidegger himself writes,

“Empathy does not first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of Being-with does ‘empathy’
become possible…” Raffoul emphasizes that, if Dasein is care, solicitude “frees the other for his
or her own Being-toward-death and his or her own potentiality-for-Being: it therefore lets the
other be *as other.*” Or, more to the point:

> It then appears that responsibility, once it is understood away from the tradition of
subjectivity, causality, and free will, signifies an essential exposure to the other and
cannot be simply reduced to a responsibility for a self-asserting itself. Returning to
the origins of responsibility thus allows one to reveal its facticity and otherness,
which are in fact its very possibility. It is in such a nexus of responsibility,
facticity, and otherness that the site of ethics, of an ‘originary ethics,’ is to be
situated in Heidegger’s work.\(^9{8}\)

Most essentially, as can be seen from the arguments above, it is the connection that
Raffoul makes with *Mitsein* that clarifies the issue as it relates to our purposes here. Even in
*Being and Time*, it is on the basis of this individuating character of the call of care, the call of
Being, that Heidegger lays the foundation for being with others by being oneself: “Being with
Others belongs to the Being of Dasein, which is an issue for Dasein. Thus as Being-with, Dasein
‘is’ essentially for the sake of Others. This must be understood as an existential statement as to
its essence.” Because *Mitsein* is an essential characteristic of Dasein, Raffoul is able to argue
that, “the other cannot be approached in the context of egohood (as alter-ego), for instance, in the

\(^9{8}\) Lawrence Vogel. *The Fragile We*, 1-2; Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time*, 162 (GA
schema of the ‘intersubjective’ relation between the ego and the alter-ego.\textsuperscript{99} For the Heidegger of \textit{Being and Time}, being-with others in an authentic manner is a relationship between ‘subjects’ or ‘egos,’ but a way in which Dasein may allow others to ‘be’ – what Raffoul calls the ‘radical loss of self.’

IV. Import for a Politics of Care

What Raffoul’s analysis of responsibility offers us is a way in which to define an ‘originary ethics’ in Heidegger that is, in fact, an ‘originary responsibility’ to others. We know that this is an important aspect of \textit{Being and Time} to consider as we move on toward a robust description of the politics of care found in this same volume. I have already posited that authentic solicitude, as a specific care structure, is the key to understanding such a politics of care. Perhaps it is now possible to imagine how true ontological or ‘originary’ responsibility may be understood in Heidegger’s master work. A space for both ethics and responsibility in \textit{Being and Time} has been opened up by Raffoul, thus clearing a path for the foundation of a political theory based on those insights – for practical, ontic concerns.

These are, in fact the very problematic issues that needed to be addressed before a politics based on the fundamentals in \textit{Being and Time} could be constructed. As is now clear, care as authentic solicitude is not simply the extension of an internal morality that reaches out from one subject to other subjects. Rather, they are the basis for dealing with contemporary issues of community in the political sense.

Ethical considerations are clearly present in \textit{Being and Time}; therefore, what is ‘opened up’ by the previous analyses of conscience and responsibility is a space, not only for the ethical, but for the political – for authentic social relationships between authentic Dasein. Here is a very

different Heidegger than has heretofore been presented – one who is concerned with both ethics and with care and responsibility; one that is concerned with facticity and alterity. The call of conscience is the call of care; it is also the call of Being itself. Conscience summons Dasein to itself, to its own possibilities. It also allows Dasein to ‘leap-ahead’ of the Other, to free the Other for his or her ownmost potentiality-for-Being – to allow the Other to be free as his or herself. This ‘letting beings be’ through authentic solicitude is an originary ethics that sits at the core of the politics of care that will be examined forthwith. It is through true sociality and care for one another that such a political theory is possible.
Chapter 6: The Path Not Taken: A Politics of Care

Throughout this volume, we have traversed the complex relationship of Martin Heidegger to the political. Heidegger was placed in the context of his personal politics, of his extensive corpus, and of scholarly work on the interactions between his writings and the question of politics. It has also been shown that, of the paths available to him after publishing *Being and Time* in 1927, the one he chose was that which he offers in *Nature, History, State* – wherein he describes the *Führer* state. That political theory, found in *Nature, History, State*, is the only extant example of a Heideggerian attempt at crafting a political theory *as such*. An analysis of these aforementioned contexts, intersections, and theories comprises the first half of this volume – “Heidegger, Politics, and the Political.” Part II of the current work addresses Heidegger’s movement from what I term ‘selfhood to solicitude,’ a flight from modern notions of politics as centered on the Cartesian subject and toward authentic, solicitous, political relationships with other Dasein. Toward that end, the second half of the text at hand included a careful exegetical account of the three ‘fundaments’ I argue are at work in the politics of care described herein. ‘Originary responsibility’ and ‘conscience’ were presented as concomitant notions to authenticity, Dasein-with, and care as part of a necessary ‘rounding out’ of the foundational concepts upon which a politics of care might be built.

In this chapter, I turn to a robust description of this politics of care I have appropriated from *Being and Time* and determine it to be Aristotelian in scope, following Heidegger’s interpretations of action (*práxis*), production (*poiēsis*), and prudence (*phronēsis*) along with Aristotle’s description of the ‘good life.’ ¹⁰⁰ ¹⁰⁰ Beginning with a brief recollection of the basic ideas

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¹⁰⁰ To wit, in the *Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes between theory and practice (*theoria* and *práxis*). This dichotomy results in the understanding that there are *two* forms of human excellence for Aristotle: the ‘person of theory’ (the philosopher) and the ‘person of practice’ or
set forth in *Being and Time*, this chapter will then progress to a discussion of *práxis*, *poiēsis*, and *phronēsis* as presented in the same text, paying special attention to the connections between the works of Heidegger and of Aristotle. Through this account of Aristotelian conceptions and their counterparts in *Being and Time*, the promised politics of care will be fully described – as related to Aristotelian notions. In the last section of this chapter, I argue that the nascent theory of a politics of care in *Being and Time* might be found in more complete form in some of Heidegger’s later works, including “The Thing,” “Building Dwelling Thinking,” and “On the Question Concerning Technology.”

I. *Práxis, Poiēsis, Phronēsis*

When Heidegger invokes Plato’s *Sophist* in the opening lines of *Being and Time* he, in effect, alerts the reader to the fact that he will return to ancient Greek conceptions of existence in order to phenomenologically investigate Being. What is more, Heidegger’s return to these various ancient Greek conceptions in *Being and Time* is not limited to what has been referred to as his ‘Platonic bias,’ but instead relies heavily on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is Franco Volpi’s contention, for example, that Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, and other neo-Aristotelians are only able to confront this ‘Platonic bias’ of Heidegger’s (like that of privileging the ontological over the ontic) *through* their exposure to Heidegger’s own investigations of ‘action’ (the mature man – the *Spoudaios*). A person of theory’s excellence lies in that he or she possesses the intellectual virtues (like that of prudence) and their ‘realm’ is set as the ‘school.’ On the other hand, the person of practice is excellent because he or she possesses the moral virtues and their realm is the ‘city.’ This is the basic distinction between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ that Aristotle makes. Furthermore, he distinguishes between production and action in that action (*práxis*) occurs for its own sake, while *poiēsis* exists for sake of what is produced (perhaps artifacts). While the corresponding disposition of *poiēsis* is technique (*techne*), the corresponding knowing for *práxis* is prudence or ‘practical wisdom’ (*phronēsis*). *Phronēsis*, additionally, is one of the intellectual, that is to say not one of the ‘moral,’ virtues. In other words, it can be learned, but does not require the kind of habituation that the moral virtues do. As an intellectual virtue, *phronēsis* could also be translated as ‘deliberating well’ in order to lead to ‘right action.’
Aristotle. Specifically, Volpi mentions two lecture courses offered by Heidegger during his time at Marburg: *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* – winter semester, 1921-22 and *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity* – summer semester, 1923. Volpi contends that the aforementioned former students of Heidegger’s who became neo-Aristotelians were intellectually forged by their struggle to incorporate his teachings while, at the same time, break free of his philosophical influence. To this end, Volpi points out that these neo-Aristotelians (whose number also include Joachim Ritter, Leo Strauss, Hans Jonas, and Max Horkheimer) “were responsible for the widespread debate on the problem of *praxis* that took place in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s and which became known as the ‘rehabilitation of practical philosophy.’”

There is no doubt that many of Heidegger’s students took up the study of Aristotle – and that their work was likely influenced by Heidegger’s own analyses. Whatever the case, from this evidence of Heidegger’s attention to Aristotle, Volpi extracts a fascinating hypothesis:

…it is an almost continuous engagement with Aristotle that paves the way for *Being and Time*, and this *magnum opus* reflects the motivation behind this engagement to the point that one could say, albeit provocatively, that it is a modern ‘version’ of the *Nicomachean Ethics* – a ‘version’ in which unexpected structural analogies between Aristotle’s practical philosophy and Heidegger’s project of an existential analysis come to light.

To wit, Volpi maintains that, “Heidegger appropriates the fundamental categories of Aristotle’s practical philosophy. He transforms them into constitutive determinations for the Being of man, which is to say that he ‘ontologizes’ them and nullifies their practical-

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102 Ibid., 32.
moral force.” According to Volpi, Heidegger accomplishes this through a “thematic engagement with Aristotle in the period leading up to Being and Time” that is:

characterized by three fundamental problems that stand at the center of the work, namely:
1) the problem of truth, understood in the ontological sense as the opening and disclosure of meaning, no understood in terms of the validity of judgment;
2) the problem of the ontological constitution of human life, understood as Dasein;
3) the problem of temporality, understood in an originary or non-naturalistic sense, as the constitution of Dasein in its potentiality-for-Being (Seinkönnen).

For ease of argument, Volpi chooses to address only the second problem – that of the ontological constitution of human life, of Dasein. He contends that, “My hypothesis is that the line of philosophical inquiry of the young Heidegger in the 1920s was determined by the search for a unitary sense that could support the plurivocity of beings” and that Heidegger found this in his inquiries into Aristotle. More specifically, “Through a study of Aristotle, and in particular the Nicomachean Ethics,” Volpi avers,

Heidegger came to the conviction that theoría represents but one of the possible modalities by which man approaches things and discovers them. Beyond and prior to theoría, there lies the uncovering attitude of práxis and póiesis, in which man relates to beings and brings their characters to light. Interpreting Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics within the thematic horizon of phenomenology, but going beyond Husserl’s overly theoretical understanding of subjectivity, Heidegger discovered in Aristotle a phenomenology of human existence richer and more original that that developed by Husserl. The Aristotelian one in fact deals with the three fundamental uncovering moments of life: póiesis, práxis, theoría, and the three corresponding dispositions: téchne, phrónesis, and sophia.103

Volpi proceeds to reason that Dasein is the ‘ontologization’ of práxis and care the ‘root of the practical structure of existence.’ As there are many portions of Being and Time that correspond to the Nicomachean Ethics, Volpi feels assuredly correct in calling Heidegger’s master work a ‘translation’ of Aristotle’s Ethics.

103 Ibid., 32, 34-36.
While Volpi concludes that *Being and Time* is a ‘translation’ of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, albeit also an ‘ontologization’ of the same, Jacques Tamineaux argues that Heidegger *radicalizes* the ancient Greek text. In the main, Tamineaux avers that, “fundamental ontology, in its very structure, involves a specific reappropriation of the Greek distinction between *praxis* and *poiesis*.“⁴ In *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being*, Walter Brogan maintains, against Volpi and Tamineaux, that “Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* is primarily an ontology of human being”⁵ and is closely associated with the project of *Being and Time*. We will return to Brogan’s distinction in good time; first, it is necessary to follow Tamineaux’s arguments a bit more closely, as Heidegger’s use of *práxis* in *Being and Time* must be established before we can move on to its political implications.

“In Greek,” Tamineaux offers, “the verb *poiein* and the substantive *poiesis* designate an activity involving things rather than people, whereas the verb *prattein* and the substantive *praxis* designate an activity concerned first and foremost with the agents themselves.” This distinction between actions involving ‘things’ and actions involving persons is an important one to Tamineaux’s argument that Heidegger ‘reappropriated’ the *Nicomachean Ethics* in *Being and Time*. “For the Greeks of the city,” Tamineaux maintains, “such an excellence, such an [acting well] *eu prattein* resided in the very activity of the citizen, in [political *práxis*] *politeuein*.” Tamineaux’s analysis reveals that the aforementioned are key components of Arendts’s

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⁴ Jacques Tamineaux. *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, 112. Please note that Tamineaux’s text does not include the correct diacritical mark in ‘práxis’ or other Greek terms. I have faithfully preserved his words as they appear in the original. Additionally, it should be remembered that the term ‘fundamental ontology’ is traditionally used to refer to Heidegger’s full project in *Being and Time*.

…analyses that decisively identify some of the essential features by which praxis is differentiated from poiesis…Whereas poiesis, or the productive activity, is characterized by the univocity of its model, of its means and of its goal, the activity of praxis is thoroughly ambiguous because it connects one or several individuals to others…Moreover, poiesis is reversible whereas praxis is irreversible…In short, poiesis prevents individualization. In contrast, the activity of praxis fundamentally promotes individualizing, by providing a plurality which allows individuals to differ from one another while at the same time maintaining similarities.106

For Tamineaux, Arendt’s distinctions between poiesis and praxis owe a large debt to Heidegger – specifically, to the Aristotelian nature of Being and Time, itself indebted to Heidegger’s study of the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean Ethics.107 More specifically, in Tamineaux’s reading, authenticity amounts to praxis, while inauthenticity may be viewed as poiesis. The inauthentic pubic realm of the present-at-hand that ‘covers up’ human existence corresponds to poiesis, the realm of production. Praxis, thus linked in Heidegger’s Being and Time to authentic existence, exists for itself, not for a product external to it. Furthermore, Aristotle makes a further distinction in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. In matters of praxis, the soul has a certain disposition (hexis) whose function is disclosure; as Tamineaux observes,

Techne aims at a goal, a product that is external to the technites. Phronesis aims at a goal that intimately concerns the phronimos: the goal of acting well, eupraxia …Phronesis is a doxastic (deliberative) virtue. But because there is no doxa without a debate between varying and opposing views, phronesis is not limited to what matters to the phronimos alone. One could not possibly be phronimos by


107 In Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology, 116, Tamineaux reproduces a portion of Heidegger’s ‘letter-preface’ to William T. Richardson’s Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967, x-iii in which Heidegger writes, “a renewed study of Aristotle’s treatises (especially Book IX of the Metaphysics, or Theta, and Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics) resulted in the insight into aletheia as a process of revealment and in the characterization of truth as non-concealment, to which all self-manifestations of beings pertains.”
being involved exclusively with oneself. This is why *phronesis* is identical to political wisdom.\(^{108}\)

Tamineaux concludes that Heidegger’s assertion that Dasein exists only for its own sake creates a paradox – that Heidegger transposes Aristotle’s *práxis*, leaving only a solipsistic ego in place of authentic Dasein. Aristotelian *práxis*, of course, requires sociality, requires the prudence (*phronēsis*) of the citizen. Yet, is *Being and Time* a ‘reversal’ or ‘ontologization’ of these themes in the *Nicomachean Ethics*? In order to begin to clarify further what the politics of care in *Being and Time* consists of, it is necessary to determine the exact debt that Heidegger owes to Aristotle in that context. For this, we must turn to Walter Brogan’s perspective on the matter.

Brogan’s reading of *Being and Time* and its relationship to the *Nicomachean Ethics* does not insist on a Heideggerian ‘reversal,’ ‘translation,’ or ‘ontologization’ of Aristotle. Instead, his …intention is to offer a reading of the *Ethics* that draws it in close proximity to Heidegger’s *Daseinanalytik* in *Being and Time*, though Heidegger’s project was motivated by the need to overcome psychologism and epistemological subjectivity as the dominant approaches to the study of human being, whereas here [in the *Nicomachean Ethics*], the problem is more fundamentally the need to retrieve a sense of human excellence that is not reducible to normative or biological interpretations.

In this view, *phronēsis* (practical wisdom) is the way in which Dasein becomes entirely and wholly itself, the means by which Dasein reaches its ownmost potentiality-for-being-a-whole, the path that leads away from the inauthentic ‘publicness’ of the ‘they’ and toward a different and authentic way for human beings to relate to one another. As Brogan rightly avers, the …apparent retreat from everyday practical involvements back into a concern for one’s own being is neither for Heidegger nor for Aristotle a form of solipsism, but the only genuine basis for human community…that cannot be reduced to the kind of relating derived from the structures of *technē* or those operative in modern

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\(^{108}\) Tamineaux. *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, 124-125.
technology...Heidegger’s account of genuine *phrōnēsis* and *práxis* are ...to be found in Division II of *Being and Time*, in which he discusses Dasein’s potentiality-for-being-a-whole in terms remarkably similar to Aristotle’s own understanding of the life that is characteristic of the happy person.109

At this point, it should be clear that there are definite connections between Heidegger’s *Being and Time* and the works of Aristotle that allow us to re-think human community in new ways. It has rightly been established that Heidegger’s *Daseinanalytik* in *Being and Time* owes much to his lifelong ‘conversations’ with Aristotle. We have just seen how Aristotle’s conceptions of *práxis* and *phronēsis* heavily influence many key components of *Being and Time*, whether through a ‘translation,’ ‘ontologization,’ ‘radicalization,’ ‘reversal’ or a new understanding of Aristotle’s *Ethics*. Now the fundamental claim of the current volume may be fully proffered: foundationally, the ‘politics of care’ in *Being and Time* is Aristotelian. Heidegger offers a phenomenological approach to Aristotle that may be converted into an ontological politics of flourishing and authentic life.

Such an ontological politics of care as found in nascent form in *Being and Time* is one of human flourishing, of authentic Dasein seeking its potentiality-for-being-a-whole. It is Aristotelian in scope. In Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, Aristotle’s distinctions between *práxis* and *poiēsis* are translated into the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity, so too does the mode of truth (*aletheuein*) prudence, or practical wisdom get ‘translated.’ As Daniel L. Smith points out, “Just as *phronesis* is the *aletheuein* that facilitates right desire, resoluteness is the *aletheuein* that fosters authentic care.”110 I argue that these connections should be taken one step further: as the politics of care in *Being and Time* is rooted in authentic solicitude, it can be


inferred that, just as *phronēsis* is, for Aristotle, the adeptness of right judgment in matters of politics, *phronēsis* takes on the character of a political notion in *Being and Time* in the form of resolute, authentic solicitude. Recall the basic character of Aristotle’s understanding of politics.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* (originally intended as part of the same volume), human beings associate themselves with one another in various ways, have different relationships to one another. For Aristotle, the ‘highest’ and most important of these relationships is political association. Here, political association exists for one purpose – the sake of the good life, the life of virtue, the life of the highest kind of human ‘flourishing’ or ‘happiness’ – *eudaimonia*. *Eudaimonia*, often translated as ‘objective well doing,’ is the very function of politics for Aristotle; it is a particular activity of the soul in conformity with virtue (excellence, *arête*). Moral virtues function to allow citizens to ‘choose well,’ but it should also be recalled that Aristotle is not prone to giving out normative or prescriptive models of human behavior when it comes to ethics. Instead, the moral virtues are acquired through habituation and education.

In Aristotle, politics cannot exist without sociality; he defines a political community thus, in the opening lines of the *Politics*:

> Since we see that every city-state is a kind of community and that every community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what they believe to be good), it is clear that every community aims at some good, and the community which has the most authority of all and includes all the others aims highest, that is, at the good with the most authority. This is what is called the city-state or political community.  

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In sum, Aristotle’s political community is one of political association informed by prudence and its purpose is to fulfill or to seek the development of human potential. It is a hybrid community of friendship, contemplation, and place. To wit, Tamineaux observes, “[práxis] is the activity by which individuals relate to one others in their sharing of words and deeds; in such a sharing, what is at issue is their being-together and the exercise of all the virtues that this sharing presupposes: temperance, courage, justice, and prudence [phronēsis].”

Heidegger’s meditations on Plato’s Sophist offer key evidence for the claim that a Heideggerian political community in Being and Time is also Aristotelian. In his reading of the Sophist, Heidegger not only maintains that Aristotle’s construction of aletheia is connected to ‘being-there,’ to the very definition of Dasein (“disclosure…is itself a mode of Being…of the beings we call human Dasein”), but also that “Aristotle conceives of this mode of Being as [aletheuein, disclosive, taken out of hiddenness].” The same text, in which Heidegger seems to work out many of the themes he will later expound upon in Being and Time, contains these short passages: that phronēsis discloses “the right and proper way to be Dasein” and “[phronēsis] is nothing other than conscience set in motion…” Most importantly, Heidegger also writes, “Insofar as [man, anthropos] is the [political animal, zoon politikon], [práxis] is to be understood as a mode of being-with-others.”

These passages show, at the very least, that Being and Time is likely heavily influenced by the idea that Aristotelian phronēsis is synonymous with Heidegger’s notion of ‘conscience.’
the crucial element of authentic care that allows Dasein to circumvent and interrupt the ‘they’ to pursue its ownmost possibilities as oriented toward itself and others. In Aristotle, *phronēsis* is the kind of prudence that is relevant to determining how to act virtuously, which encourages political virtues. Though *phronēsis* is presented (in Aristotle) as separate from the practical virtues as an intellectual virtue, it is intimately connected to them. A person cannot make good political judgments without understanding moral and intellectual virtues. To clarify, in order to determine why and how we make political judgments, we must first know something about them; *phronēsis* allows the encouragement of the practical virtues.

To recapitulate the vital orientation toward the Other that associating *phronēsis* with authentic solicitude illuminates: Dasein is thrown, at the mercy of the ‘they.’ The ‘alien voice’ of conscience is what Dasein ‘hears’ when it stops ‘listening’ to the ‘they-self.’ Conscience (which we may now identify as prudence or *phronēsis*) is a kind of communication that reveals itself, not in speech, but in *silence*. The silent call of conscience issues forth from Dasein, passes over itself and the ‘they-self,’ and returns to itself – the summoner and the summoned are the same Dasein. This is ‘resoluteness:’ “…the truth of Dasein which is most primordial because it is authentic…Resoluteness…is only that which, in care, is the object of care [in der Sorge gesorgte], and which is possible as care – the authenticity of care itself.” Furthermore, Heidegger writes, “…what one resolves upon in resoluteness has been prescribed ontologically in the existentiality of Dasein in general as a potentiality-for-Being in the manner of concernful solicitude.” Solicitude (*Fürsorge*) is distinguished from mere ‘concern’ (*Besorgen*), which suggests a close relationship between Dasein and ‘things’ that are ready to hand (*poiēsis*.) Authentic solicitude goes beyond any ‘equipmental’ relationship between Dasein; it occurs between Dasein who are ‘freed within-the-world’ (*Mitdasein*). In *Being and Time*, the notion of
‘caring for’ is, in other words, ontologically neutral. ‘Caring for’ may mean ‘indifference;’ it may mean true interest or concern. This depends upon whether it is authentic or inauthentic. Solicitude, too, may be authentic or inauthentic. Inauthentic solicitude consists of a kind of ‘domination’ over another’s care. When Dasein ‘leaps-in’ for another, the other’s care is taken away from them in the sense that one of their ownmost possibilities has been usurped. This is why Heidegger prefers to describe authentic solicitude as ‘leaping-ahead,’ not ‘leaping-in.’ ‘Leaping-ahead’ does not deprive others of their ownmost possibilities. On the contrary, the Other is freed for their own possibilities.\footnote{Martin Heidegger. \textit{Being and Time}, 343-344, 348 (GA 2: 60 – “The Existential Potentiality-for-Being which is Attested in the Conscience”). A particularly nice ‘ontic’ example of authentic solicitude can be found in Irene McMillin’s \textit{Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations}. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013, 227: “My nephew and I are going to the park. He is just learning to tie his shoes, and as I watch him struggle with the task, I find myself increasingly motivated to take the thick awkward laces from his little hands and do it myself...But as I watch him struggle, I admire his sheer will to achieve this ability in spite of continued frustrating setbacks and I restrain myself from taking this opportunity to practice for him...because I recognize – and desire to nurture – his existence in its wholeness. I do not leap in and take over this careful struggle from him – I hold myself back in a type of restraint that is nevertheless characterized by a hovering attentiveness, an expressive encouragement and recognition of his struggle.”} It is upon the notion of authentic solicitude \textit{(phronēsis)} that the politics of care, appropriated from \textit{Being and Time}, settles.\footnote{Written ‘graphically,’ this suggests that Aristotelian \textit{phronēsis} = Heideggerian conscience = resolute care = authentic solicitude.}

II. A Politics of Care

\textit{Phronēsis} directs proper judgment and action in Aristotle – and it is distinctly associated with proper political judgment. Tamineaux, for example, misses this connection when he writes, “The fact that the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} also turns out to be an inquiry into politics and that \textit{phronesis} is the capacity of judgment in political matters completely fails to attract Heidegger’s
I aver that this is incorrect; Heidegger does not fail to be attentive to the ontic, nor to the political. We must simply understand how to properly read *Being and Time* through an Aristotelian lens. If the purpose of politics is the development of human potential, of flourishing, here defined as letting others ‘be,’ then the politics of care in *Being and Time* is Aristotelian indeed. Aristotle understands the necessity of ethics for solving political problems; *Ethics* and *Politics* were part of the same treatise. For Aristotle, as for the Heidegger of *Being and Time*, the human being is a social and political creature that lives in a world in which persons naturally desire to live together authentically, to ‘be with’ one another in some meaningful way, to avoid simply living *alongside* one another. Aristotle’s political community is a hybrid one of friendship, place, and contemplation. Heidegger’s notion of authentic solicitude shows us that the ‘good life,’ the authentic life, is about ‘letting beings be.’ At its base, ‘letting beings be’ does not suggest an orientation of indifference toward others. On the contrary, it advocates for attentive, watchful, authentic care. Thus, in *Being and Time*, the ‘good life’ is the authentic life, the life of escape from the ‘they,’ from idle chatter, and from the ‘public.’ This does not mean, however, that an *authentic* political community is not possible.

This brings us to an interesting and problematic issue. There are those, like Wolin, who argue that there can be nothing of the political in *Being and Time* because of the very nature of the inauthenticity of the public realm. Wolin contends that, although sociality is importantly constitutive of Dasein, it is an inauthentic sociality. Here, it seems that Wolin conflates Heidegger’s distinctions between what he terms ‘the public’ and what he calls ‘the people.’ With Robert J. Dostal, I maintain that this is a key variance to note.

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115 Jacques Tamineaux. *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, 142.
Dostal writes, “Being and Time suggests, but does not develop, the thesis that the politics of society are the politics of ‘the public’ – alienating, uprooting, inauthentic – while the politics of a community are the politics of a people – historically rooted, caring, authentic.” He further contends that ‘the public’ is the ‘they-self, a signification of Dasein’s fallenness in a world that attempts to define it by certain predetermined categories. Moreover, in Being and Time, ‘the public’ is defined by three separate characteristics, identified by Dostal: distantiality (Abständigkeit), averageness (Durchschnittlichkeit), and leveling down (Einebrung), as described in § 27.116

Dostal corrects argues that the difference between ‘the public’ and ‘the people’ is one of the distinctly political moments in Being and Time. Referring to ‘the public,’ Dostal claims, “it is described in terms of ‘subjection,’ ‘dominion,’ and ‘control.’” In the fallen realm of ‘the public,’ everything is muted and homogenized. Human beings no longer have any intrinsic value or unique worth in the public eye; everyone is leveled down in a kind of overarching sameness. In Being and Time, Heidegger argues that ‘the public’ is the entity that dominates its members through homogenization in an almost sinister and surreptitious way:

Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein gets interpreted, and it is always right – not because there is some distinctive and primary relationship-of-Being in which it is related to ‘Things,’ or because it avails itself of some transparency on the part of Dasein which it has explicitly appropriated, but because it is insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness and thus never gets to the ‘heart of the matter’ [auf die Sachen]. By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone.

The above passage shows that living inauthentically is thus to live in the public realm *par excellence*, to be oppressed without being aware of that peculiar, unidentified, and yet strangely felt pressure to become ‘the same.’\(^\text{117}\)

‘The people’ (*das Volk*), on the other hand, is another notion entirely. The first mention of ‘the people’ in *Being and Time* is in § 74 (“The Basic Constitution of Historicality”). Note that this is the only mention of the term ‘community’ (*Gemeinschaft*) in the text:

But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historicizing is a co-historicizing and is determinative for it as a destiny [*Geschick*]. This is how we designate the historicizing of the community [*Gemeinschaft*] of a people [*des Volkes*]. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived of as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities.

In this same section, in a footnote, Heidegger refers the reader to § 26 (“The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with”), which describes Dasein’s authentic existence as dependent upon care and responsibility. This is, furthermore, the same section concerning ‘considerateness’ and ‘forebearance’\(^\text{118}\) and where this passage may be found: “Thus, as Being-with, Dasein ‘is’ essentially for the sake of Others.” As Dostal puts it, “…in inauthenticity we do not care for one another. Without care, we constitute only a society, not a community.” The suggestion is clear – ‘the public’ is inauthentic, whereas ‘the people’ is authentic; ‘society’ is inauthentic, whereas ‘community’ is authentic.

It seems that the ideal community of Dasein in *Being and Time* shares similar characteristics with the natural political community of Aristotle in which everything is directed toward living authentically, living the ‘good life,’ flourishing. For Heidegger, the authentic

\(^{117}\) Ibid., 521; Heidegger. *Being and Time*, 165 (GA 2: 27; L 127).

\(^{118}\) Recall that Tamineaux was credited earlier in this chapter with identifying these virtues as Aristotelian: “temperance, courage, justice, and prudence (phronesis).”
Dasein is the ‘happy’ Dasein. It is the Dasein that is no longer fettered by *das Man* and by the limitations of that mode of existence. Additionally, authentic Dasein-with promotes authentic, meaningful sociality that sets itself up in contradistinction to the inauthenticity of everyday life within the world of equipmentality. The fact that each Dasein is unique does not prevent Dasein from authentic Being-with or authentic Dasein-with. In ‘listening’ to the call of conscience, for example, individuated Dasein orients itself positively toward itself and toward the Other. Emerging from thrownness, authentic Dasein finds room for moral-political attitudes toward the Other. Recall that, in authentic solicitude, Dasein can ‘become’ the ‘conscience’ of others, become a prudential (*phronêtic*) summons to the Other not only to ‘be-there,’ but to be themselves. I argue that our originary responsibility toward the Other (in authentic solicitude) is to what unites us, to what brings us together in meaningful communities – our emergence out of inauthentic life and into the ‘good life’ of the authentic world.

Aristotle defines happiness as the highest virtue. To live well, to be virtuous, to exercise prudence in determining ‘right action’ – these are the key attributes of the good citizen. The purpose of political life is for all persons to achieve a life of excellence. In *Being and Time*, any existing Dasein, by definition, may live an authentic life, a meaningful life, a happy life. Yes, Dasein is individuated, made itself, by its unique comportment toward death and by the silent call of conscience. Yet, in *Being and Time*, conscience does not hand down moral judgments – it discloses Dasein to itself and through itself, thus disclosing others to Dasein. True, authentic solicitude does not consist in abandoning the Other, but in embracing her. ‘Letting others be’ does not mean abandoning the Other to their own emergence into authentic modes of existence; it means allowing them an existence free from domination and oppression, leaving them room to flourish in their own way, on their own terms. As Brogan offers:
…community and relationality properly understood in an Aristotelian manner, apart from the modern liberal notion of community founded on sameness, is also at the basis of the authentic experience of self-analyzed [Dasein] in Division II of Being and Time. Were this acknowledged, resolute Dasein would be seen to be at the same time both the moment of existential solitude and the ecstatic openness to the other as other.119

For what is respect for alterity other than allowing the Other to flourish, to ‘be’ themselves, to pursue their ownmost possibilities? Yet, a word about the formal structure – or lack thereof – of this politics of care must be added.

Admittedly, Heidegger’s politics of care is a framework or blueprint, a description of a potential political community that has Aristotelian elements. As there are many ways in which to define the pursuits of political theory as a discipline, there are also various and sundry ways by which to view specific political theories. In order to define the ‘politics of care’ herein, it must be determined what constitutes a ‘political theory.’ To be sure, there are many different kinds of political theories. For one, there exist normative political theories. These kinds of political theories address, in the man, topics such as equality, justice, rights, and a whole host of other related considerations. There are also ‘historical’ political theories – those political theories that seek to engage past philosophers and to identify what political problems (and solutions) these theories might have addressed that have continued relevance today. We could also view political theories as self-reflective, about our own political lives and experiences. In the main, then, a political theory could be any theory that has something to do with the political relationships amongst human beings. These relationships are traditionally presented as suggestions for the organization and basis of a particular governmental structure, for answering questions about justice, order, authority, and the like. For example, Aristotle’s view on politics insists that, because all associations aim at some good, the Greek city-state (polis) must aim at the highest

119 Brogan. The Twofoldness of Being, 150.
good due to the fact that it contains all other associations (like that of families). He concludes that man must be a ‘political animal’ and can, therefore, only achieve the ‘good life’ by being citizens of a state that works to maximize the happiness of everyone. However, a political theory may also be a theory that suggests, as I have intimated, an orientation that typifies the thinking of a particular group, community, or even nation. A ‘political theory’ may then be a principle, an ideological belief, or an ‘orientation.’ The politics of care described herein is closest to an ‘orientation’ than any other type of political theory.

Traditionally, what have been deemed ‘pre-political’ texts such as Homer’s *Iliad*, have been viewed as such because there is no city-state (*polis*), strictly speaking, to be found therein. This could be due, in part, to traditional readings of Aristotle that describe the *polis* as a structured and formal city-state. Drawing on the work of Victor Turner and Dean Hammer, it is possible to read the political (including Heidegger’s politics of care) in fruitful ways, albeit against traditional methods.

For Turner and Hammer, politics can be seen as ‘performance,’ ‘activity,’ an ‘ongoing flow,’ ‘constant transition,’ a ‘field,’ as opposed to a true ‘structure; such as that of the *polis*. Instead of being composed of varieties of organization (as proponents of structuralist-functionalist approaches might contend), or as a product of evolutionary processes, it is possible

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120 For example, whereas ‘fascism’ could be expressed as advocating an authoritarian, hierarchical governments, ‘democracy’ might best be defined as the specific political ‘orientation’ of those persons who believe that government should be by and for the people and ‘liberalism’ might be articulated as a political ‘orientation’ that supports the gain of social progress through the alteration of certain laws (as opposed to violent revolution, say).
for politics to be ‘constituted narratively.’ The ‘political’ in this politics of care is without traditional structure, but certainly not contrary to sociality.

Dean Hammer avers that there have been, thus far, two distinct schools of thought when it comes to the history of how politics emerged in societies. Both the structuralist-functionalist approach, which “define[s] politics by particular functions, such as the maintenance of order or of the legitimate use of force” and evolutionary approaches, in which “societies were seen as progressing through stages of political development, with each stage defined by a functional equilibrium between social groups…[wherein scholars] attempt to identify, and classify, politics in structuralist and functionalist terms.” What resulted from scholarly research concerning the Homeric world was, in brief, a large taxonomic system by which political societies could be categorized and catalogued, leaving the world of Achilles in the realm of the ‘pre-political.’ The Homeric world was deemed ‘pre-political’ because it was thought to have no state or government, to be deficient in terms of “institutional forms and roles that emerge later: notions of citizenship, a system of governance, and a ‘mutually defining process between the individual and the political system’ in which politics, as an autonomous sphere, defines human life.” Contrariwise, what Hammer seeks to offer is a way of thinking about the political and politics that is no longer tied to structure, but defined by activity instead. Heidegger’s politics of care falls roundly into this category.

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Against traditional structuralist-functionalist approaches, Hammer appropriates “a process view of politics as articulated by Turner…a view of politics that emphasizes, not static structures, but the ‘flow’ of ‘social processes:’ the succession of events, the seeking of goals, the ordering of relations, the emergence of conflict and resolution.” With reliance on Turner, Hammer views the proper unit of ‘political analysis’ as a ‘field’ that is “not defined by institutional boundaries, but it constituted by groups engaged in political activity.” This “political field can expand and contract” according to the needs of the community. Hammer writes, “Political fields are not just institutions established to resolve issues, but are also arenas in which communities continually define who they are.” Thus, according to this rubric, processes that may now be defined as ‘political’ include:

…questions of authority and legitimacy, the exercise of persuasion and force, the emergence of demands or claims on the community, issues of conflict that threaten community organization, and ethical questions of relationships, obligations, and responsibilities to others.123

Taking from Hammer the idea of the ‘political’ as inclusive of ‘ethical questions of relationships, obligations, and responsibilities to others,’ Heidegger’s politics of care should be seen less as a politics of power relations or institutions and more as a politics of sensitivity, of attitude, of orientation. It works as a political ‘field’ in the sense that it addresses the problematic of ethics through ‘originary responsibility’ to others in authentic solicitude. In fact, this political theory connects the two disparate ideas of ‘selfhood’ and ‘solicitude.’ Dasein remains individuated, but is constituted in an orientation toward others.

For the Heidegger of Being and Time, life is fragile and fleeting. Immersion in the world of the ‘they-self’ is inauthentic because it prevents Dasein from seeing itself, and others,

123 Ibid., 8-10, emphasis mine.
properly. In the background of this inauthentic life is ‘the nothing,’ death, non-existence. We distract ourselves with our everyday lives because it is comfortable. Yet, this also means that we do not see our own nature, the nature of others, or the nature of the world properly. Only in emerging from inauthenticity to authenticity do we begin to become ourselves, to be ‘happy,’ to live the ‘good life.’ This takes a certain type of disclosure – that of the silent call of conscience. Dasein must ‘find itself,’ must decide its own possibilities for itself.

It is not surprising that the politics of care in Being and Time should turn out to be Aristotelian. Heidegger regularly critiques modern notions in his work and seems to desire to effect a return to earlier, more ‘primordial’ questions of existence. Recall that Heidegger agrees with Hegel concerning the ‘homeless spirit,’ the end result of the modern era – Nietzsche’s radical subjectivity. If the politics of care is ambiguous on the finer points of real-world political action, it is because such an ontological model seeks to bring something other than subjectivity to the forefront – this model highlights the degree to which human beings are embedded. Dasein, being-there, is an embedded form of existence. One is never alone (inauthentically or authentically), never separate from others, never a free-standing ego. If, as Heidegger avers in Being and Time, it is true that forgetting the question of the meaning of Being has had an immense impact on the history of philosophical thought since the time of the ancient Greeks, then it stands to reason that this forgetfulness has influenced the history of the political as well.

The politics of care in Being and Time stands above and beyond modern political notions that are characterized by a focus on the subject; it seeks to find a source for existence and political community that is more originary, more closely tied to the understanding of community as ‘we,’ rather than ‘I.’ Authentic Dasein is care; authentic Dasein-with is characterized by its solicitous orientation toward the Other. Thus, ethics and politics – like human existence – have a
more originary source; authentically caring for others, ontologically speaking, then becomes, not holding power over them (as das Man does), but freeing them for themselves, allowing them to flourish and to live the ‘good life.’ The authentic Dasein is ‘happy’ in that it is free to pursue its own possibilities, free from oppression or domination. Authentic solicitude requires that we allow others to define their own happiness in their own terms, to flourish without our ‘leaping-in’ and disrupting their progress toward authentic life. For the Heidegger of Being and Time, we cannot authentically dominate another’s care or take their care away from them. As the ‘conscience’ of others, we watch over one another in loving guidance, but without ‘leaping-in’ for them, freeing them for their own possibilities as human beings.

It should be mentioned at this point that there is a current body of literature that addresses such concepts as an ‘ethic of care’ or a ‘politics of care’ from the perspective of nursing care, care for the elderly, or care for the differently abled or disadvantaged. Such treatments of ‘care’ as political insist on ‘care-taking’ in its most literal sense – taking care of others, especially those in need of assistance. From the view of a Heideggerian politics of care, this sense of care is not lost, but intensified. This political theory suggests that no human person ought to be denied his or her ownmost potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. What this really means is that when we ‘take care’ of others, it is not in abandoning them to their own struggle, but in assisting them to direct their efforts without overtaking their care for them. It preserves the human ability to become his or her authentic Self – as defined by that person. Furthermore, it suggests a watchfully attentive stance toward Others in their effort to move toward their own possibilities, to flourish and to be happy.

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124 See, for example, David Engster & Maurice Hamilton, eds. Care Ethics and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Additionally, feminist theorists have pointed out that care ‘ethics’ is often seen as feminine and/or relating to women alone.
As human beings, we share our lives from our births up to the point of our deaths. Yet, this sharing also, in *Being and Time*, is designated as attentive, as encouraging human flourishing and movement toward what Aristotle described as the ‘good life.’ Although the everyday, inauthentic world, for Heidegger, makes it impossible to confront the fragility of our lives, it is the constant presence of ‘the nothing’ that makes a politico-ethical orientation toward the Other possible in *Being and Time*. Whereas Aristotle’s claim in the *Ethics* and the *Politics* is that the ‘good life,’ living well, requires the acquisition of both the intellectual virtues (such as wisdom [*sophia*] and prudence [*phronēsis*]) and the moral virtues (such as courage and generosity), he also maintains that the function of the well-ordered state is to assist in the acquisition of these virtues by the citizens. For Aristotle, as for Heidegger, we are ‘thrown’ into a world; this would matter to Aristotle because the person who acquires all the virtues must still contend with external situatedness – elements of a person’s life that are not under their control (like being born into a state that does not encourage learning the intellectual virtues or habituation of the moral virtues). When we speak of issues of social justice, for example, Aristotle would ask us to identify what our responsibilities are to those who have not attained all of the virtues. In the well-ordered state, it is the legislator who must possess *phronēsis* in order to advise persons how to ‘act rightly.’ Similarly, in *Being and Time*, *phronēsis* is tantamount to ‘conscience.’ When Dasein becomes the conscience of others, it is not to direct them toward a particular virtue or set of virtues, but to his own concept of the ‘good’ or ‘well-lived’ life – dwelling authentically with others in authentic solicitude by allowing others to retain a free openness to their own possibilities without interference from external sources (like that of *das Man*).

In other words, to ‘act rightly’ and to live well, in the Aristotelian sense, is now, in *Being and Time*, to allow other to do what is ‘right,’ directed by the disclosive ‘guidance’ of
conscience. Thus, a Heideggerian state based on the politics of care herein might exist for a similar purpose to Aristotle’s – to direct human beings to the good life – now the life of authenticity – by ‘leaping-ahead’ of them in authentic solicitude. When we ‘leap-ahead’ of the Other, we act as a summons to them by authentically Being-ourselves while others do the same. In this way, we co-disclose one another’s potentiality and, in so doing, liberate one another for the happiness that is the good life – this is what may be appropriated from the nascent theory in *Being and Time*.

Yet, the politics of care presented in this section remains somewhat incomplete. However, there is at least one place in Heidegger’s later work where the themes relating to a politics of care seem to be developed in a more mature context. Specifically, in “Building Dwelling Thinking (*Bauen Wohen Denken*), the concept of ‘dwelling’ (originally introduced in *Being and Time*), the notion of the ‘fourfold’ in “The Thing” and “Building Dwelling Thinking,” and his attack on technology in “On the Question Concerning Technology” offer a more complete understanding of Heidegger’s politics of care.
Chapter 7: On a Politics of Care in Heidegger’s Later Works

I have argued that a more ‘complete’ formation of the ‘politics of care’ described herein may be found in Heidegger’s later works. The ‘politics of care’ in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” “The Thing,” and “On the Question Concerning Technology” is directly tied to Being and Time, to be sure, but in unconventional, subtle, and vague ways. I will trace the most important of these ‘ways’ in the following section – paying special attention to Heidegger’s notions of ‘dwelling’ and the ‘fourfold.’ I maintain that understanding these concepts represent a continuation of the ‘path not taken,’ the path of the politics of care. In the main, these of Heidegger’s later works suggest that human dwelling within the fourfold (of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals) is an magnification, or intensification, of the kind of authentic solicitude found in Being and Time – and of the politics of care therein. First, we turn to Heidegger’s notion of ‘dwelling.’

Dwelling

The concept of ‘dwelling’ (bauen) has been central to Heidegger’s thought, even as early as Being and Time. There, dwelling is described as essential to human existence in the world. In § 12, Heidegger enters into a discourse on the meaning of ‘Being-in.’ In Being and Time, he maintains that, “By this ‘in’ we mean the relationship of Being which two entities extended ‘in’ space have to each other with regard to their location in that space.” Yet, he is also quick to point out that this ‘Being-in’ ought “not to be explained ontologically by some ontic characterization, as if one were to say, for instance, that Being-in a world is a spiritual property, and that man’s ‘spatiality’ is a result of his bodily nature (which, at the same time, always gets ‘founded’ upon corporeality.” Instead, Heidegger focuses on the etymology of the word ‘in,’ which he contends “is derived from ‘innan’ – ‘to reside,’ ‘habitaire,’ “to dwell [sich auf
...‘Being-in’ is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.” Inhabiting, or ‘dwelling within’, a place has special significance in Being and Time. It refers to something more than existing in one place or another in the world:

The expression ‘bin’ is connected with ‘bei,’ and so ‘ich bin’ [‘I am’] means in turn ‘I reside’ or ‘dwell alongside’ the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. ‘Being’ [Sein], as the infinitive of ‘ich bin’ (that is to say, when it is understood as an existentiale) signifies ‘to reside alongside…,’ ‘to be familiar with…’ ‘Being-in’ is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.

Heidegger does not do very much to elucidate the concept of ‘dwelling’ in his master work. Other than in the above passage, the word ‘dwell’ is used in other senses in Being and Time (as in ‘dwelling on’ something or used to explain uncanniness or homelessness of spirit as ‘never-dwelling-anywhere’).

For the Heidegger of Being and Time, dwelling is not merely the way in which human beings live in a specific geographical locale in the world. This concern cannot be expressed in a ‘colloquial’ manner; Heidegger maintains, instead, that: “This term has been chosen not because Dasein happens to be proximally and to a large extent ‘practical’ and economic, but because the Being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as care.” Importantly, one of the subsequent detailed discussions of ‘dwelling’ in Being and Time comes in §26 on “The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-with.” Therein, ‘dwelling’ is presented as a natural and essential part of Middasein, as a means by which Dasein encounter other Dasein in authentic concern (solicitude). Dasein may experience the feeling of not being ‘at-home,’ but this is a deficient mode of Being for Heidegger. Here, it is clear that ‘dwelling’ is meant to refer to the opposite – to feeling ‘at-

125 Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, 79-80, 82-83, 305, 398 (GA 2: 12; LL 53-54 and 56 & 53; L 261 & 67; L 347).
home’ in one place or another. As Heidegger puts it, “The concept of ‘facticity’\textsuperscript{126} implies that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.”\textsuperscript{127} True dwelling, then, requires authentic concern, authentic solicitude, for others and for the bonds between human beings that live alongside one another.

Later, however, in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger expands on these themes. In this text, written after what is called the ‘Turn’ (\textit{die Kehre})\textsuperscript{128} in his thinking post-\textit{Being and Time}. Beginning with the questions “1. What is it to dwell?” and “2. How does building belong to dwelling?” Heidegger embarks on an etymological genealogy of the words ‘building’ and ‘dwelling:

What, then, does \textit{Bauen}, building, \textit{mean}? The Old English and High German word for building, \textit{bauen}, means to dwell. This signifies: to remain, to stay in a place. The real meaning of the verb \textit{bauen}, namely, to dwell, has been lost to us. But a covert trace of it has been preserved in the German word \textit{Nachbur}, neighbor. The neighbor is in Old English the \textit{neahgebur; neay}, near, and \textit{gebur}, dweller. The Nachbar is the \textit{Nachbebur}, the \textit{Nachgebauer}, the near-dweller, he who dwells nearby…Now to be sure the old word \textit{bauen}, to build, is really to dwell; it also gives us a clue as to how we have to think about the dwelling it signifies…The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans \textit{are} on the earth is \textit{Baun}, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as mortal. It means to dwell. The old

\textsuperscript{126} In \textit{Being and Time}, the term ‘facticity’ (\textit{Faktizität}) is described thus: “Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein’s ‘facticity.’ This is a definite way of Being [Seinsbestimmtheit], and it has a complicated structure…”, 82 (GA 2: 12; L 56).

\textsuperscript{127} Martin Heidegger. \textit{Being and Time}, 82 (GA 2: 12; L 56).

\textsuperscript{128} Whether or not Heidegger’s corpus ought to be considered to represent at least three ‘moments’ in his work (late, middle, and early Heidegger) is still a topic of debate. Derrida sees Heidegger’s work as monolithic; many other insist that the terminology is so different in these three ‘periods’ that there is no ‘through-line’ in Heidegger’s thought. Still, Heidegger himself insisted that the turn (\textit{die Kehre}) actually occurred somewhere in 1930 and then fully matured in the early 1940s. The shift is signified by this interest in ‘dwelling’ as a concept.
word *bauens*, which says that man *is* insofar as he *dwell*, this word *bauens* however *also* means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine. Such building only takes care – it tends the growth that ripens into its fruit of its own accord.

Heidegger continues to connect the term *bauens* to “the Gothic *wunian,*”

…which means: to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace.  
The word for peace, *Freide,* really means the free, *das Frye,* and *fry* means: preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something, safeguarded. To free really means to spare…To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature.

Heidegger concludes that: “The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. It pervades dwelling in its whole range. That range reveals itself to us as soon as we reflect that human being consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the earth.”

Here, a bit differently than in *Being and Time,* dwelling opens up and clearly defines human spaces; it installs the fourfold – any site, as location, arranges space into sections. In Heidegger’s terms, the ‘fourfold’ (earth, sky, divinities, and mortals) *gathers* or assembles the place wherein human beings dwell. When Heidegger writes of the now famous example of a bridge over a stream, he intends to remark on how a structure built by humans can bring together these four elements. Above the bridge is the sky, below is the earth and the waters that originally attracted the builders to that location. Divinities are above and mortals have constructed the bridge below.

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“Building Dwelling Thinking” (originally delivered in 1951 as part of the Darmstadt Symposium on *Man and Space* on August 5th) is often considered part of a grouping of three lectures given during the period of 1950-1951 which includes “The Thing” (*das Ding*, 1950 – given as a lecture to the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts on June 6th) and “…Poetically Man Dwells…” (1951, given at “Bühlerhöhe” on October 6th). There are, indeed, very similar concepts discussed in each.
The Fourfold

The structure of the fourfold gathers the four elements of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals into a ‘oneness.’ Heidegger argues that these four exist as one because “By a primal oneness the four – earth and sky, divinities and mortals – belong together in one.” Dwelling is the means by which mortals are part of the fourfold: “Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as the sky.” Dwelling itself is the “fourfold preservation of the fourfold.” Mortals are connected to the divinities because they “await the divinities as divinities.”\(^{130}\)

When we think of one of the elements of the fourfold, we are already thinking of the other three portions that are gathered with it. Imagine again the bridge. The bridge, Heidegger explains, is what gathers the fourfold of the earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. The banks of the river would not be set apart as banks if the bridge did not exist; the banks would not be connected to one another by the bridge and would, therefore, not be set apart in the same manner if the bridge did not exist: “The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream.”\(^{131}\)

In the same way, the bridge gathers the earth by gathering the visible landscape around the built thing that is the bridge. The landscape, or earth, might not be noticed if the bridge were not in existence. Importantly, the bridge allows the mortals and the stream to exist at the same time. The mortals can utilize the bridge to cross the stream and the stream is allowed to flow in the way that it originally ran.

The bridge also gathers the fourth portion of the fourfold: the divinities. Indeed, “the bridge gathers, as the passage that crosses, before the divinities – whether we explicitly think of, and visibly give thanks for their presence, as in the figure of the saint of the bridge, or whether

\(^{130}\)Ibid., 149-151.

\(^{131}\)Ibid., 152.
their divine presence is obstructed or even pushed wholly aside.” As a thing, the bridge gathers the fourfold in its own, unique manner. ‘Things,’ such as the bridge, both install and arrange the fourfold. The four portions of the fourfold co-determine one another and cannot be thought apart from one another as a primal oneness. Each ‘thing’ negotiates a different relationship with earth, sky, divinities, and mortals. Here, buildings are not dwelling places. Heidegger lists bridges, railway station, highways, dams, and market halls as places that “are in the domain of our dwelling…but they are not dwelling places.”

For Heidegger, ‘dwelling’ and ‘dwelling places’ are not the same things:

The truck driver is at home on the highway, but he does not have his shelter there; the working woman is at home in the spinning mill, but does not have her dwelling place there; the chief engineer is at home in the power station, but he does not dwell there. These buildings house man. He inhabits them and yet does not dwell in them, when to dwell means to take shelter in them…Yet those buildings that are not dwelling places remain in turn determined by dwelling insofar as they serve man’s dwelling. Thus dwelling would in any case be the end that presides over all building. Dwelling and building are related as end and means. However, as long as this is all we have in mind, we take dwelling and building as two separate activities, an idea that has something correct in it. Yet at the same time by the means-end schema we block our view of the essential relations. For building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling – to build is in itself already to dwell.

Thus, simply building a bridge or other structure is not the whole of dwelling. Building would simply be an activity of humankind; it is the care for others, what building an abode means, which seems to be the most important in dwelling. Dwelling insists that human beings make something more of that construction, that they imbue it with care – care for others.

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132 In “The Thing,” Heidegger avers that a ‘thing’ is not the same as an ‘object.’ A ‘thing’ must be self-supporting and independent; it must be the aim of what the ‘maker’ intended or prepared.


134 Ibid., 145-146.
In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger seems to be using the term ‘dwelling’ in the same way he has done in *Being and Time* in his etymological analysis of the term *bauen*. He chooses the words “to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for” to describe the fundamental character of dwelling. To dwell, for Heidegger then, is to care – to care for the place in which one lives, to care for others. If beings are separated from their true dwelling, their homely place, then they enter into the realm of uncanniness, an ultimate strangeness, as the familiar and cared-for has fallen away. Antigone, it will be recalled, experiences this very uncanniness because she has been taken from her home, but also because of what being taken from her home has meant. It means that she has been removed from the care of *others*, specifically her family; no one can help her. Ismene, her sister; Haemon, her betrothed; Eurydice, the mother of her betrothed – none of these will succeed in preventing her removal from hearth and home. She has been taken from their ‘buildings,’ but also from their dwelling place, from being cherished and preserved, from their care.

The issue of dwelling becomes even clearer when viewed from the perspective of politics. Eubanks and Gauthier mark the connection between politics and dwelling as part of Heidegger’s project to subvert what he sees as modern, subjective politics. They write that, “in his later utterances, this anti-subjective stance manifests itself in Heidegger’s argument that all modern political systems are in the grip of metaphysics and, hence, are incapable of facilitating a confrontation between modern man and global technology.”\(^{135}\) If this is true, and everything points to its accuracy, then has the sense of the ‘near’ been replaced with a false sense of nearness that threatens human dwelling?

Heidegger’s “The Thing” and “On the Question Concerning Technology” help to answer this question. It is a question of the loss of what he terms ‘nearness’ that is at issue. He begins “The Thing” by stating that “All distances in time and space are shrinking…yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance.” In “On the Question Concerning Technology,” he makes this argument stronger – and identifies what dangers technology poses for human existence and authentic dwelling.

The Enframing

Following Heidegger’s critique of technology in the current age, we see that the very forgetfulness of Being and refusal to question it (which lies at the heart of Heidegger’s critique of Western metaphysics and of the modern political focus on subjectivism) are a product of a dangerous technological mindset that plagues the very ethos of the current age. He deems this technological mindset the ‘Enframing’ (das Gestell). Furthermore, it is this very danger of forgetfulness, false nearness, and homogenization of humanity that human Dasein must be wary of if they are to avoid nihilistic and fascist political doctrines in the future – ones that threaten true dwelling, which Heidegger describes as being ‘at peace.’

This peace is disrupted, for Heidegger, by technology. It is not of actual specific technological advancements that Heidegger speaks; it is of the ‘mindset,’ the ‘Enframing,’ and the false sense of nearness that they bring, with which he is concerned. Things gather; technology does not. Technology homogenizes in that it makes distances between persons seem as if they are ‘nearer.’

For example, when we speak on the telephone, we ‘feel’ as if we are

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136 For Heidegger, these technological items include the airplane and the telephone; in 2016, this could easily apply to Facebook and other social networking sites – in these instances, people believe themselves to be ‘nearer’ to others when, in fact, they are experiencing a false sense of nearness. For example, people rarely actually communicate on a one-to-one, personal basis with ‘friends’ on Facebook, but they feel as if they have when they have read their
‘near’ to the person on the other end of the line. Heidegger would argue that we are not really ‘nearer,’ geographically or otherwise, to that person. When we believe that we are ‘nearer,’ we are, in fact, deceived. What Heidegger wrestles with is the loss of ‘nearness’ that technology allows. With the loss of this true nearness comes the loss of human relationships – and potentially the ‘good,’ authentic life. In transforming the world environment, technology (in Heidegger’s sense of the word) has transformed human Being and the human being’s perception of his or her place in time and space. This signals that the modern world is in jeopardy, that human beings are moving farther away from their understanding of their relationship to existence – and to others. In other words, when human technology homogenizes, human beings themselves are homogenized, leading to other, perhaps political, dangers. To be clear, it is the essence of technology that Heidegger finds dangerous, not a particular technological advancement or invention. This essence, he avers, prevents human beings from seeing themselves as anything other than objects: “As a destining, it banishes man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering. Wherever this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing.”\(^{137}\)

According to Heidegger, the ‘Enframing’ of technology (the ‘mindset’ it encourages) is comprised of three distinct elements: production, transformation, and consumption. As such, the Enframing includes a vision of human existence that can be quantified, controlled, and used up. While human beings erroneously believe, he maintains, that it is technology that stands in

relation to human beings as a desirable resource, it is actually human beings that stand ‘in reserve’ and as a resource for technology. What, then, happens to the being that has been thus transformed by the Enframing? This being is no longer even a being, but an object to be chewed up, used, and discarded – not to be treated with authentic solicitude – a resource, not a person. People now view themselves as ‘commodities:’ “Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it.”\(^{138}\)

Within the ‘Enframing’ or technological mindset, every being is treated in the same way – as a homogenous commodity to be produced, transformed, and consumed. Human beings appear to themselves as ‘Bestand,’ – as that which is available for sale (‘stock’), or what is held ‘in reserve’ or, more broadly, that which is ready as ‘resource.’\(^{139}\) We could say that it is the antithesis of authentic solicitude, which allows others to be their own authentic selves, to be unique and individuated in a pre-originary manner. The only consequence, Heidegger claims, is nihilism – and this kind of thinking has already arrived. A human being in the grips of technology as Heidegger describes it, that (knowingly or unknowingly) is ‘standing reserve’ for technology, cannot have an authentic, good life. They become objects to be thus produced, transformed, and consumed: “As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.”\(^{140}\)

\(^{138}\) Ibid., 311.

\(^{139}\) Ibid., 322.

\(^{140}\) Ibid., 332.
Later, Heidegger presents the concept of the ‘fourfold’ as a foil for the dangers of technology. Things gather; objects do not. The fourfold ‘gathers;’ technology cannot. A false sense of nearness has destroyed human dwelling as it is presented in “Building Dwelling Thinking” and in *Being and Time*. Dwelling in the fourfold is an *intensification* of authentic solicitude in *Being and Time* – and of the politics of care identified and described in the current work. It suggests *caring*, whether in the sense of ‘tending’ as one does with one’s garden, or in the sense of ‘attending to’ relationships with others. Dwelling comes before building for Heidegger because human beings already inhabit the world, live in it, are affected by it, attend to others and to their hearth and home. In dwelling, human beings do not simply take ‘shelter,’ they ‘cherish,’ ‘protect,’ ‘preserve,’ and ‘care for’ in the original sense of the world *bauen*.

The political theory presented in this volume suggests that no human person ought to be denied his or her ownmost potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. Furthermore, a politics of care recommends that the kind of relationships human beings enter into with one another in the world should be informed by authentic solicitude, by caring for one another in a manner that does not take care away, does not ‘caretake,’ thus preserving a human being’s ability to become his or her authentic Self. In turn, this politics of care implies that, as a political orientation towards the Other, authentic care ought to allow persons to direct their own lives, to determine for themselves what their ownmost possibilities are – to flourish in the Aristotelian sense, but supported by loving guidance, acknowledgement of each person’s struggle to attain authenticity, and attentive encouragement. A true politics of care, rooted in authentic solicitude and seen from the perspective of its Aristotelian connections, suggests a ‘nurturing stance’ toward others in their effort to define their ownmost possibilities as human beings. This politics of care is
brought to full flower in Heidegger’s later works, but is first embedded within the pages of *Being and Time*, the key elements of which should be remembered as this volume concludes.

Ends

The analytic of Dasein set forth by Heidegger in *Being and Time* begins with the insistence that human existence has not yet been fully determined, that the ‘question of Being’ “has today been forgotten.”141 This becomes Heidegger’s task in the text – to interpret and fully investigate the meaning of human existence. His method, as explained in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, is phenomenological, requiring a combination of ‘reduction,’ ‘construction,’ and ‘deconstruction.’142 Everything in *Being and Time* is viewed as belonging either to the inauthentic (*Uneigentlichkeit*) realm of the ‘they,’ of ‘equipmentality,’ or to the authentic (*Eigentlichkeit*). In point of fact, the first Division of the text deals with the inauthentic, or fallen realm, while Division II’s focus is on the authentic. It is in Division II that the key components of an authentic politics of care may be found, as has been argued.

141 Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time*, 21 (GA 2: 1; L 2).

142 As Jacques Tamineaux explains, “Reduction takes the phenomenological seeing back from the attention paid to beings and directs it toward the understanding of the Being of those beings, an understanding which resides in Dasein. [Reduction means ‘leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever might be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the Being of this being (projected upon the way it is unconcealed)’ (21; 29)]. Construction consists of the bringing into sight of the ontological structures of beings, in a ‘free projection’ enacted by the one who thinks. [But this construction itself, which requires a conceptualization adjusted to the illumination of ontological structures, is not separable from a specific debate with the tradition]. Deconstruction, thus, consists in critically (that is to say with all the discernment possible) exposing the phenomenal origin of the ontological concepts – which have now become traditional, self-evident, and standard.” Jacques Tamineaux. *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 118-119. Here, Tamineaux cites portions of Heidegger’s *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
Being and Time teaches us that life is fragile and fleeting. This, in fact, is the source of our anxieties and unhappiness. From the moment we are born, we experience what Heidegger terms ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit). We are thrown into a world, into a particular social milieu; thus, we get the impression that we have little control over many of the elements of our lives: “As something thrown, Dasein has been thrown into existence. It exists as an entity which has to be as it is and as it can be.”

In its thrownness, Dasein finds itself in the world of the ‘they’ – a realm in which every person is focused upon themselves and their daily routines. Because Dasein is thrown, it experiences anxiety (Angst) over the fragility of its own existence. Fearful of the inevitability of death, which Heidegger astutely refers to as ‘the nothing’ (das Nichts), and of the fact that every human life will eventually end, Dasein feels the uncanniness of its own existence in the face of ‘the nothing.’ This fear causes Dasein to seek out ways in which to distract itself from the obviously fragile and brief time it is in existence.

We are, in other words, terrified of ‘the nothing,’ so we distract ourselves with the comforting everydayness of inauthentic existence; jobs and daily routines become ways in which to forget that ‘the nothing’ looms over us all: “In the face of its thrownness Dasein flees to the relief which comes from the supposed freedom of the they-self.” According to Heidegger, we spend a good portion of our lives distracting ourselves from ‘the nothing,’ indulging in ‘idle chatter’ (das Gerede). By ‘idle chatter,’ Heidegger means the entirety of our everyday lives: rising for work, gossiping, reading the latest news reports, commuting, and engaging in many other trivial activities – these are all forms of the kind of ‘idle chatter’ in which we indulge with

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143 Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, 321 (GA 2: 57; L 276).

144 Ibid.
the purpose of distracting ourselves from the delicacy of our existence. When we ignore ‘the
nothing’ thus, we are inauthentic; we do not come face-to-face with the truth of our own
existence. In avoiding the truth of the nature of the world, we fail to understand our true selves.
Instead of taking full advantage of the time that we have to live, the time during which we are
present in the world, we allow the terror of death to drive us to petty distractions so that we
might persuade ourselves that ‘the nothing’ is not a constant presence in our lives.

From the vantage point of this anxious, inauthentic mode of existence, other beings
cannot be seen any more clearly than one sees oneself. If we choose to hide a few simple truths
from ourselves – that ‘nothingness,’ death, happens to all living beings and that, in this way, we
are all interconnected, the consequence is that we do not feel less anxious or happier about our
finitude; instead, we feel more anxious and unhappy about it. Our anxiety would dissipate if we
could only learn to ignore the idle chatter of our everyday lives and reach a deeper understanding
of our relationship to existence and the end of that existence.

In the fourth chapter, we discovered that part of living ‘authentically’ requires a special
relationship to Others. Being-with Others may be in a ‘fallen’ mode or an ‘authentic’ mode.
Care, or concern, for Others may similarly be ‘fallen’ or ‘authentic.’ Heidegger himself falls into
a kind of ‘inauthenticity’ when he ‘escapes’ into historicality – and certainly in his brief escape
into Nazi nihilism. I discover a different sort of politics in Being and Time, based on the
solicitude of care that opens up an authenticity that requires a special relationship to Others.

We also determined that there exists a radical ‘de-subjectivization’ of ethics in Being and
Time, one that allows Heidegger to re-think the site of ethics, as Raffoul maintains, to find its
more ‘originary source.’ Raffoul avers that care, authentic care, is part of an understanding of
Dasein that is ‘practical-ethical;’ it is not subjective, but instead demands ‘the most radical loss
of self.’ From this perspective – that of *Being and Time* as a text containing an ‘originary ethics’ – it is possible also to see authentic solicitude as a key component of a politics of care, a progression from selfhood to solicitude.

Heidegger tells us that, “The compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world’ indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon.” Furthermore, Division II of *Being and Time*, entitled “Dasein and Temporality,” is devoted to examining Dasein’s ‘authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole’ through analyses of ‘conscience as the call of care,’ ‘care and selfhood,’ and ‘resoluteness’ among other topics. Taken together, these aforementioned components seem to define living authentically with Others as bound by a sense of unity with those with whom we dwell. This unity exists because all human beings share a commonality – the anxious fragility of existing against the backdrop of ‘the nothing.’ In *Being and Time*, this unity is the basis of authentic solicitude. These notions of ‘unity,’ dwelling, and of authentic solicitude bring to mind Pope Francis’s recent encyclical, “On Care for Our Common Home.”

In this papal document, Pope Francis issues a call for commitment to environmental concerns across the globe – especially that of ‘preserving’ or ‘keeping’ the earth in stewardship. He writes:

> We are not God. The earth was here before us and it has been given to us…Although it is true that we Christians have at times incorrectly interpreted the Scriptures, nowadays we must forcefully reject the notion that our being created in God’s image and given dominion over the earth justifies absolute domination over other creatures…The Biblical texts are to be read in their context, with an appropriate hermeneutic; recognizing that they tell us to ‘till and keep’ the garden of the world (cf Genesis 2:15). ‘Tilling’ refers to cultivating, ploughing, or working, while ‘keeping’ means caring, protecting, overseeing, and preserving. This implies a mutual responsibility between human beings and nature. Each community can take from the bounty of the earth whatever it needs for subsistence,

\[145\] Ibid., 178 (GA 2: 53; L 53).
but it also has the duty to protect the earth and to ensure its fruitfulness for coming
generations.\textsuperscript{146}

It is difficult not to see Heidegger in this understanding of ‘care’ and of ‘keeping.’ We
know that the Catholic Church took on Heidegger’s early education and that he was familiar with
such social teachings. For Pope Francis, the idea of ‘keeping’ and ‘preserving’ mean an end to
the belief that Biblical texts give human beings permission to treat the earth however they wish,
to cause its ruination – to master the earth instead of preserving it. This propensity to seek out
ways in which to determine how care and responsibility, keeping and preserving a human home
on earth, is paralleled in Heidegger and in the recent writings of Pope Francis.

The interplay between dwelling and care serves to create a better understanding of what it
means to be part of an interwoven structure of relationships between human beings, others, and
their dwelling place. Furthermore, such an arrangement promotes authentic political dwelling, if
it can be seen as existing with the purpose of creating a peaceful place in which to live in
nearness to Being. What becomes clear is Heidegger’s hope, as appropriated in a more robust
politics of care that includes the notion of dwelling, is for all human beings to dwell together, to
flourish authentically, to ‘keep’ their peaceful dwelling place, and perhaps to create a political
community based on these fundaments.

If responsibility could be understood, not as oppressive or ‘taking away’ care, but as
caring solicitude, as letting other beings ‘be’ to develop their own potential, then the political
world could be radically re-thought. The politics of care presented in this volume takes into
account that human beings are capable of being co-disclosive, of leading one another to dwelling

\textsuperscript{146} Pope Francis. “On Care for Our Common Home.” Papal encyclical. Huntington, IN: Our
together in care. It advocates a responsibility for others that is not one of mastery or domination – both of which could be said to be modern impulses.

For, the question will surely be asked: Does freeing others for their own possibilities result in their wanting to dominate others? Furthermore, is this drive for mastery and domination inherent in human nature? What shall we do about such attempts? To these concerns, I simply respond that the authentic Dasein that has been freed for its ownmost possibilities would not, upon being freed, desire to master or dominate others. Likewise, the politics of care given explanation herein provides a therapeutic remedy for any human propensity toward mastery and domination. In point of fact, this politics of care, rooted as it is in an authentic solicitous comportment toward others, fosters trust, sincerity, considerateness, and – most interestingly – non-dominating love.

The Possibility of Love as Authentic Solicitude

First, let it be remembered that the very concept of authentic solicitude purposefully precludes the existence of a power dynamic of domination between authentic Dasein. Care, as ‘leaping-in,’ sets up the conditions for perpetual inequality between Dasein – someone must always take the position of being ‘cared for;’ another must be the ‘care taker.’ Authentic solicitude decenters this power structure of ‘care taker’ and ‘cared for.’ For Heidegger, ‘leaping-in’ to ‘take someone’s care’ away from them is tantamount to domination, to tyranny. Heidegger suggests that we ‘leap-ahead’ (Vorausspringen) of another’s care. As Dostal rightly points out of ‘leaping-in’: “This relation is inevitably one of dependence, if not domination/subordination… ‘leaping-ahead’ does not relieve another of his burdens or care but ‘gives it back to him
authentically’ (SZ, 122; BT 159).”

Authentic solicitude, then, provides a therapeutic remedy for mastery and domination; there can be no oppressive or dominating type of authentic solicitude in its very constitution.

Patricia J. Huntington touches on this potential for non-dominating power structures between Dasein. She insists that part of Heidegger’s grand vision was “to wean westerners of anthropocentrism and an ethos of domination.” Heidegger says much the same when he offers that there is “…joy in the presence of the Dasein – and not simply the person of a human being whom we love.”

I further submit the preliminary thesis that it is the love of other Dasein that is authentic solicitude – and binds together a people in community.

It is true – Heidegger does not often speak or write of love. Yet, Derrida alerts us to several passages in Heidegger’s personal letters that offer some insight as to how love might be akin to authentic solicitude and, thus, the politics of care presented here:

In his correspondence with Hannah Arendt in the years 25-28, we find the precise elements, not extensively developed but still explicitly present of a thinking of love which could fill the gap between the improper [inauthentic] and proper [authentic] of the with in Being and Time. In the correspondence, love is, indeed, qualified as the genuine space of a ‘we’ and of a world that can be ‘ours,’ and represents the genuine ‘taking care’ of the other, since its formulation, borrowed from Augustine, is volo ut sis: ‘I want you to be what you are.’ Thus love is a mitglauben, a shared faith in the ‘story of the other’ and a mitergriefen, a shared grasp of the potential of the other’…

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149 Jacques Derrida. “The being-with of being-there.” Continental Philosophy Review 41, no. 1, 15. Note that these letters were written to Arendt during roughly the same period during which Heidegger was working on and publishing Being and Time.
This love, as a structure of Being-with and authentic solicitude seems to make sense in the context of Being and Time. Here, love is authentic solicitude – allowing others, assisting others to ‘be what they are’ with us. Here, willful domination has no place in human relationships; there is only this precise kind of love: the attentive, caring, consideration of others that allows us to truly apprehend them as they define themselves. Tentatively, I suggest that this may make the politics of care offered here sound a bit utopian; and, perhaps, it is. Perhaps there is no way to deal with those authentic Dasein for whom domination and mastery is one of their ‘ownmost’ possibilities. Yet, I maintain that the Heidegger of Being and Time cannot conceive of such an authentic Dasein – one that tends towards mastery and domination. For him, authentic solicitude is the result of answering the silent call of conscience, which frees us from das Man. In being freed, authentic Dasein understands what it means to be freed for its ownmost possibilities and would not wish to limit the possibilities of others. Authentic solicitude, in Being and Time is a thus a kind of love in that it frees us while allowing us to remain with one another – to flourish.

Coda

As we have seen, authenticity, Dasein-with, and care (in its special form as authentic solicitude) are the cornerstones of the ‘politics of care’ that is the ambition of this work. This politics is founded upon the simple unity of human existence, the means by which Dasein comes to terms with the eventuality of ‘the nothing,’ and authentic, solicitous relationships between authentic Dasein. The politics of care in Being and Time is one of human flourishing, the main feature of which is to encourage human beings freely to pursue their ownmost possibilities in Being-there with one another – perhaps in love. In this way, the politics of care in Being and Time is distinctly Aristotelian, encouraging human being to thrive, to dwell together successfully. In this era, one in which concern for the world’s people and dwelling places are
rising to issues of greater import than ever, it would be wise to consider such a political theory – one in which human community rooted in authentic solicitude is privileged. The political and philosophical path this politics of care takes is defined by important care structures, ones that we would do well to give our full attention in the current age.
Bibliography


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Vita

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