Toward an effective and humane counterinsurgency

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TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE AND HUMANE COUNTERINSURGENCY

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

In
The School of Human Resource Education
and Workforce Development

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Abstract

Preliminary research isolated a set of thirteen candidate principles that military officers need to understand to conduct effective and humane counterinsurgency. A meta-synthesis of eight classical theorists of counterinsurgency sought support for and consensus on these principles and discovered considerable consensus on all of them. Therefore, this set could be considered a “classical” model of counterinsurgency for use in counterinsurgency campaign planning.

The contemporary global political environment is very different from that the classical theorists faced. Therefore, additional research attempted to understand the changes in the environment and in the nature of insurgency to determine the changes necessary to update the classical model. The most important changes in the environment included the end of the Cold War and of superpower rivalry, the increase in the number and influence of important non-state actors, urbanization, and globalization of media and communications technologies. Corresponding changes in the nature of insurgency included the changed objectives of insurgent groups; the globalization of local national struggles; the formation of global terrorist groups that can be perceived as insurgencies; the advent of networked, rather than hierarchical, insurgent organizations; and increased emphasis on the use of media to generate support for insurgent causes and to spread fear.

Nevertheless, analysis found the classical principles to be remarkably durable. While the tactics and techniques needed to put each principle into action might be very different from those of the 1950s and 1960s, the principles remain valid, and are still useful for campaign planning.
Chapter 1

Introduction and Justification

Nation-building is an activity that has been in the American news often since the intervention in Somalia in 1992, and it has engendered a good deal of debate over the appropriateness of U.S. involvement in nation-building efforts and over what means should be employed. Much debate centers on the commitment of military resources to the often-difficult and dangerous situations where opportunities for nation-building are found. Conspicuous failures, such as the deaths of American soldiers in Somalia in 1993, depicted in the book, *Blackhawk Down* (Bowden, 1999), and the 2001 movie of the same name, have convinced many Americans that we should not intervene in failed states because the prospects for success are too small or because these activities are inappropriate uses of military capability (Von Hippel, 2000). On the other hand, many persons and organizations have criticized the U.S. for failure to intervene in Rwanda and for permitting the genocide there to continue (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 2000). Bonner (1994) reports praise for French military peacekeepers that did intervene there.

What Is Nation-building?

Before beginning a lengthy discussion of nation-building, it is appropriate to seek a consensus on a definition of the term as it is used in professional and scholarly literature. Some have objected to the term, “nation-building” because it improperly uses the term “nation”—which refers to people and culture—when it really means “state”—the capacity of the government to govern. Fukuyama (2004a) put it this way: “What we are really talking about is state-building—that is, creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems, and the
like.” (para. 4). While state-building is the more accurate term, nation-building is far more common in scholarly and professional literature and on American editorial pages. It is the one used by political leaders in speeches designed to garner support for policy, and so it is the one I will use. That said, however, for our purposes, the terms are synonymous.

Dobbins, Jones, Crane, & DeGrasse (2007) state, “Nation-building, as it is commonly referred to in the United States, involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors” (p. xvii). Dobbins et al believe there is great potential for achieving success in nation-building efforts provided the purposes for which the intervention is undertaken are matched by the resources committed to it. This is the definition I will use, because Ambassador Dobbins is among the most highly respected thinkers on nation-building, and because it does not require democratization, which is much more difficult than the creation of a stable state.

Payne (2005), who differs with Dobbins and his colleagues in their view on the efficacy of nation-building, describes it as “the idea of invading and occupying a land afflicted by dictatorship or civil war and turning it into a democracy” (para. 2). Von Hippel (2000) writes, “Nation building, which really means state building, has over the years signified an effort to construct a government that may or may not be democratic, but preferably is stable.” She continues, “Today, nation building normally implies the attempt to create democratic and secure states” (p. 96). She explains that military intervention precedes the beginning of nation-building efforts, and that a military presence is integral throughout the effort. Only military organizations have the capability to establish security, repress spoilers, protect relief and development workers and supplies, and ultimately, to permit the formation of a legitimate state, capable of maintaining
order and encouraging further development. The consensus among these scholars is that the military is a key player—or perhaps the key player—in the nation-building intervention.

**Where Are We Going?**

At issue in this study is the role of the U.S. military in nation-building activities. I will argue that humanitarian concerns and national interest can justify nation-building, and that a military presence is required, due to the weakness of the local government, to provide an atmosphere of security in which the remainder of the nation-building effort can move forward. I will introduce the various roles the military might play in nation-building—roles that vary with the situation, but vary primarily with the degree of security available. We will examine the various roles apportioned to the military, observe the reasons why the military is not as good at nation-building as it might be, and discuss how the performance of the military can be improved. Finally, we will select the activity characterized by the most violent situations faced by the military in nation-building—counterinsurgency warfare—and seek ways in which military officers can become better at counterinsurgency, where “better” is defined as achieving U.S. policy objectives—which, in counterinsurgency, by definition, is supporting the local national government to establish a stable state—with as little violence and human suffering as possible.

We will omit any discussion of policy—that is, whether or not it is appropriate for a nation to use its military to assist a state, or coerce groups within a state, to work toward a peaceful future, in general or in specific cases—because the military in the United States is a tool of policy and not a policymaking institution. Rather we will treat the decision to intervene as made, and focus only on the ways in which the military can affect or facilitate policy objectives with as little violence and as little cost in human life and suffering as possible.
This study will explore the military’s possible roles in nation-building; specifically, it will seek to determine the principles military officers engaged in counterinsurgency operations need to understand.

**Why Nation-build?**

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identify three “opportunities” for nation-building as “the prevention of civil war in currently peaceful environments; the shortening of conflicts in currently war-torn environments; and the reduction in the risk of the resumption of conflict in post-conflict situations” (p. 2). This demonstrates that the need for nation-building is found in states in conflict—those involved in civil war or those with sizable insurgencies; states emerging from conflict; and states too weak to exercise the authority characteristic of legitimate governments, and in which violence might break out at any time. All of these can be called failed states, and these are the places that require international assistance for nation-building.

Nation-building can be justified on humanitarian grounds. The Human Security Report (Human Security Centre, 2005) observed that since 1992, the number of wars in the world has declined by half, and the number of persons killed, wounded, or displaced by conflict has declined by a greater proportion. The same document, after a detailed study of the conditions which lead to stability and peace between states and also within states, concluded that an upsurge in international activism, led primarily by the UN, which has been freed from the stasis caused by the Cold War, has played a critical role in reducing political violence around the world. This activism includes activities such as conflict management, conflict prevention, post-conflict peace-building, preventive diplomacy, and peacemaking. For example, peacemaking efforts (those that seek to stop on-going conflicts) have increased from four in 1990 to 15 in 2002 (Human Security Centre, 2005). The same report argues that international interventions are
more widely supported, that post-conflict peacekeeping operations are more common, and that the international community is more likely to use force to deter groups or states from undermining peace agreements or to use economic coercion to encourage compliance. UN action is evidence of an international consensus that intervention for the purpose, usually with an effective military component, is considered desirable if it results in a decrease in violence, and ultimately in an increase in human welfare.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that post-conflict relapses into violence make up about half of civil wars around the world, and conclude that improved interventions in post-conflict situations are the most cost-effective way of reducing violence and the resulting human suffering. Dobbins et al (2007) argued that international military interventions are often the only means to prevent post-conflict society from slipping back into violence. Kaysen and Rathjens (2003) argued for the formation of a volunteer UN military, in part, because this would increase the willingness of member nations to act in dangerous situations. Only the military can stop fighting and enforce order. For example, Bonner (1994) asserts the French army saved the lives of thousands of people by halting the genocide in Rwanda during its intervention there. Von Hippel (2000) explains that military inventions in failed states stem, in part, from popular reaction to media coverage of human suffering which prompts democratic governments to intervene. Once order is restored, relief and development activities resume, and ideally, a government is formed which permits the transition of security functions to local authorities, and therefore, the disengagement of foreign soldiers.

Nation-building, or more specifically, U.S. participation in nation-building, may also be justified by U.S. national interests. Von Hippel (2000) argues the U.S. declined to intervene in Rwanda in the spring and summer of 1994, largely due to the negative popular reaction to the
deaths of U.S. soldiers in Somalia in October, 1993. However, the U.S. chose to intervene in Haiti in September, 1994, because it perceived its interests were involved in the latter case. The Bush administration justifies the nation-building efforts underway in Iraq and Afghanistan as denying a haven to global terrorist groups and bettering the poor conditions of instability and poverty thought to breed terrorists. The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (2006) names terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, the top threat to U.S. national security for the next several years. Defense Secretary Gates thinks nation-building so essential to U.S. security interests that he has called for the development of “soft power” in the form a cadre of experts capable of managing reconstruction and stabilization projects in failed states (Matthews, 2008). Dobbins thinks nation-building so important that he is afraid that the U.S. experience in Iraq, and the difficulties encountered there, will convince the U.S. public and Congress that Americans should not engage in nation-building (as cited in Hegland, 2007).

How Prevalent Is Nation-building?

The United States is no stranger to nation-building. Boot (2002) makes the case that the U.S. military has a great deal of experience in small wars and in nation-building. Experience in the Philippines, in Central America, and throughout the Caribbean has provided considerable precedent for the use of American power to promote stability in failing states. Dobbins et al (2007) have observed that the U.S. has participated in nation-building seven times since 1991—in Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, the U.S. has the most experience of any Western nation in nation-building activities. Moreover, the pace of nation-building has increased dramatically, from a new U.S. intervention once every 10 years during the Cold War to one every two years since 1992 (Fukuyama, 2004a). The pace of UN activities has increased even more, from a new intervention every four years to two per year
(Dobbins et al., 2007). The missions are also becoming more complex and ambitious, which means that interventions take longer and are more expensive (Dobbins et al., 2007; Human Security Centre, 2005).

Despite the common perception that nation-building often fails, the Human Security Centre (2005) attributes the global decline in violence in failed states to the intervention of the international community in the form of nation-building efforts. The RAND Corporation determined that the UN enjoys substantial success in two-thirds of its nation-building missions, and that the U.S., which takes on more difficult missions, still succeeded in 50% of its efforts (Dobbins et al., 2007). The reconstruction of Germany and Japan following World War II is often cited as a clear example of nation-building success (Dobbins et al., 2003). All of this indicates that there is a substantial hope for success.

Of course, nation-building also has its critics; Payne (2006) studied 51 attempts to nation-build by the U.S. or Great Britain since 1850. He found exactly 14 successes for the unimpressive success rate of 27%. However, Payne’s definition of nation-building requires intervening in a failed state and “turning it into a democracy” (p.599). Thus “successful” nation-building needs to confirm that military intervention led to “a democracy that lasted at least several decades” (p. 603), which is a considerably higher hurdle than “transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors” (Dobbins et al., 2007, p. xvii). Also, Payne contends that even in the 14 cases that were “successes,” there is often not sufficient evidence that the military intervention actually helped the democratic process.

What Are the Military’s Roles in Nation-building?

The military’s roles in nation-building vary with time and place, and specifically with the relative security of the nation-building situation. In general, the less secure the local situation,
the more difficult it is for non-military actors, critical to nation-building efforts, to work. Severe
difficulty would result in the failure of nation-building efforts, the likely resumption of violence
and an increase in suffering. Therefore, the worse the security situation, the more important the
military becomes as a part of nation-building.

While a more comprehensive discussion of the evolution of U.S. military doctrine that
relates to nation-building—which the military calls “stability operations” (Dobbins et al,
2007)—and counterinsurgency is contained in the next chapter, an overview is helpful here. The
most recent version of Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0 (2008), the capstone document for doctrine
concerning Army operations, conceives of potential operational environments as 1) stable peace,
which provides the best opportunity for sustained human development; 2) unstable peace, in
which conflict could break out; 3) insurgency, in which disaffected groups within a state are
currently fighting the government; and 4) general war, in which states violently contend for
advantage against one another. The Army’s broad categories of activities in these environments
include peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations, irregular warfare,
and major combat operations. Only peace operations and irregular warfare require substantial
stability operations, or nation-building; these are the only ones of interest here.

Two types of peace operations require substantial military commitment. According to
Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3 (1999), in peacekeeping, soldiers monitor a voluntary accord
between groups, and there is rarely violence that requires a military response. The long-standing
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) are peacekeepers who monitor the 1979 accords
between Israel and Egypt. On the other hand, peace enforcement will “compel compliance” with
accords affecting groups that might not wish to cease fighting. FM 3-0 (2008) explains that
peace enforcement might require violent military action that varies in intensity. An example is
the enforcement of the air exclusion zone protecting Kurdish refugees in 1991 as part of
Operation Provide Comfort and many activities in the Balkans.

Small groups of specially-trained experts perform the U.S. military tasks associated with
most forms of irregular warfare. Usually, these experts provide expertise, training, and advice to
local national governments and their militaries, and there is no need to develop capacity to do
these things. Only counterinsurgency requires the mass commitment of U.S. soldiers, who must
be trained appropriately to conduct the difficult military activities—and many activities that are
not quite “military”—associated with counterinsurgency efforts.

**How Is Counterinsurgency Related to Nation-building?**

Counterinsurgency is related to nation-building in that counterinsurgency is the hardest
military role in the most violent and difficult nation-building environments. In fact,
counterinsurgency is a microcosm of nation-building, with all its inherent difficulties combined
with the problems caused by a very poor security environment. Due to the lack of security,
many of the developmental tasks that are better performed by the local national government with
assistance from other agencies, international organizations, or civil society organizations, must
be performed by soldiers. This point cannot be overstated: in counterinsurgency environments
soldiers must do more than fight insurgents and guard facilities. They must also do a host of
other activities designed to persuade citizens, some of whom are insurgents or sympathizers, to
support the government (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005). Ideally, both nation-building and its
most difficult subset, counterinsurgency, should be interagency and multinational efforts. If they
are not, because the other organizations lack the security they require to work, the
counterinsurgency effort, which may be all the nation-building going, must still be multi-
disciplinary, and soldiers must have the skills to do the key tasks associated with it until the security situation improves sufficiently for other organizations to relieve soldiers of these tasks.

Counterinsurgency is important because success in the counterinsurgency effort makes possible many of the other nation-building activities that build a sustained peace and make possible sustainable human development. Successful counterinsurgency is a successful competition for the loyalty of the population; it implies the government is perceived as legitimate, and that it delivers security and other important services to the people. Furthermore, successful counterinsurgency is conducted in a way that minimizes violence and the human suffering associated with it. Simply put, the more proficient the counterinsurgent, the more quickly the government can govern, the more quickly peace is restored, and the fewer people who are killed, wounded, or displaced. That is why it is important to study counterinsurgency warfare.

What Is Counterinsurgency?

To describe counterinsurgency, we must first understand insurgency. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, defines an insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” (p. 1-1). Therefore, counterinsurgency is “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (FM 3-24, p. 1-1). Some notable examples of counterinsurgency are U.S.-led multinational attempts to aid the government of Iraq to defeat insurgent groups there; the NATO-led activities against a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan; and the British colonial government’s struggle against Communist guerrillas in Malaya. Notable insurgencies include the Chinese Communists’ struggle against the Nationalist government in the 1920s-30s and their subsequent struggle against the Japanese occupiers in the 1930s-40s; the
Sandinistas’ defeat of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua; Castro’s overthrow of the Batista regime in Cuba; and arguably, the American colonies’ struggle for independence against Great Britain begun in 1775. In addition, Lacy (2003) and Kilcullen (2004), among others, have argued that the phenomenon of Al Qaeda is a “global insurgency” that might best be addressed through counterinsurgency techniques.

Other terms used by scholars, practitioners, and journalists to describe political and military events associated with the attempt to change a government, secede from a state, or throw off an occupier (and the attempts to prevent these) include revolution, revolutionary war, rebellion, civil war, guerilla war, irregular war, people’s war, mutiny, insurrection, asymmetric war, partisan war, small war, revolt, uprising, and others. Which one is most appropriate depends upon the time and place, the era, the tactics used, and the perspective of the writer.

Why Do Americans Do Nation-building and Counterinsurgency So Badly?

Dobbins et al (2007) explain several critical reasons why Americans have gotten a slow start at nation-building. The first is that the pace of nation-building has increased dramatically, from one new intervention per decade during the Cold War to one new intervention every two years since 1989. Moreover, these interventions have pursued more ambitious goals, and therefore become more lengthy and expensive, possibly because the U.S. was freed from the constraint of superpower competition. But early difficulties, especially in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, have made the American people and the Congress suspicious of the long term commitment of soldiers abroad. Consequently, the development of doctrine during the Clinton administration began slowly, and the Defense and State Departments did not develop the capability to carry out these missions. No special training was available, no guidelines were published, and this sort of service was not considered career-enhancing (Dobbins et al, 2007).
The Bush administration was against the use of U.S. soldiers for nation-building before the events of 9-11 changed the president’s mind. The difficulties encountered in Iraq, however, are forcing both State and Defense to begin efforts to develop capacity for nation-building.

This study also begs the more focused question: Why does the military do nation-building badly? The primary reason is that for many years, policymakers, citizens, and military officers believed that nation-building was a distraction from the military’s primary mission. George W. Bush, as a presidential candidate in 2000, said, "I don't think our troops ought to be used for what's called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war" (quoted in Fukuyama, 2004a, para. 1). His criticism was directed against the perceived misuse of American soldiers by the Clinton administration in interventions around the world.

Weigley (1973), in a very influential work, concluded that the American style of waging war attempted, through firepower and attrition, to utterly destroy the military of an opposing state. In this view, fighting is an alternative to negotiation rather than part of the bargaining process, despite Clausewitz’s influential dictum that “war is politics by other means.” The short title of Weigley’s book, The American Way of War has become shorthand for this attitude in discussions of strategic military operations. Weigley’s thesis, though not undisputed, is widely accepted and frequently cited in policy debates concerning the use of the military instrument of national power. Cassidy (2004) referred to this attitude as the “big war paradigm” and described it as “an obstacle to learning how to fight guerillas” (p. 42).

The American tradition of civilian control of the military reinforces Weigley’s American way of war because it increases the separation between political and military spheres (Echevarria, 2004). This has the very laudable effect of preventing the military from taking too much power in our society, and has the additional laudable effect of limiting the interference of
political leaders in ongoing military operations, yet it removes the subtlety from the use of the military instrument of national power as a diplomatic tool, and reduces it to a bludgeon whose sole purpose is to beat down recalcitrant adversaries.

Evans (1987) thought the trauma of the military experience in Vietnam inhibited the discussion of “low intensity conflict” (LIC) among American military officers and other members of the national security intelligentsia. This inhibited the military’s willingness to discuss, and therefore to learn from, the experience in Vietnam. Furthermore, Evans thought military officers disliked the ambiguity of the political nature of counterinsurgency operations, and the resulting constant need to consult with civilian authorities and experts. This had the effect of diluting military authority and increasing civilian interference in “military” affairs.

Things are changing, however. Officers have realized the need to overcome qualms about the political nature of LIC environments; in other words, their preference for victory, given the commitment of U.S. forces to Iraq and Afghanistan, has trumped their desire for autonomy within conflict situations. In fact, Marine General Pace, chairman of the joint chiefs, has observed that "Our civilian agencies are under-resourced to meet the requirements of the 21st century” (quoted in Hegland, 2007), and Defense Secretary Gates has called for the development of “soft power” in other agencies of the U.S. government (Matthews, 2008), because these men realize that soldiers alone lack the skill set required for success in nation-building and counterinsurgency environments. Finally, according to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the absence of powerful enemies means that, in the first decade of the 21st century, terrorists, particularly those armed with weapons of mass destruction, are the most credible and dangerous threats to U.S. security. Officers understand that capturing or killing terrorists, and removing
their havens in failed states, which may be done through nation-building, constitute the military’s most important mission in 2008.

The final reason we do it badly, despite our growing realization that it is important, is that nation-building and counterinsurgency are hard. Fukuyama (2004a) said “we must remember that nation-building is inherently difficult” (Failure to Anticipate section, para. 1). President Bush, in 2003, even before the outbreak of insurgency in Iraq, said, “Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own…” (quoted in Fukuyama, 2004a, para. 2). Hegland quoted Dobbins, who she referred to as the “maestro” of nation-building, as saying he wrote several important Rand studies on nation-building, in part, so that "nobody could ever again go up to Congress and say we could do this on the cheap” (quoted in Hegland, para. 4). The Army field manual for counterinsurgency, *FM 3-24* (2006) and Nagl (2006) quote an unnamed Special Forces officer in Iraq, who said “Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare—it is the graduate level of war,” which requires a fundamentally different approach than massing the effects of fire and maneuver to destroy enemy military forces.

However, for reasons that we have already seen, the need for nation-building remains. Dobbins is so convinced of its importance that he worries the American public will learn the wrong lesson from our experience in Iraq, and oppose nation-building efforts in the future. He said, "The Pentagon and the administration have reflected on their experience in Iraq and concluded that we need to do better next time, while most of the public and Congress have reflected and concluded that we need to not do this the next time" (quoted in Hegland, 2007, para. 13).
Is There Hope?

The short answer is yes. The State Department, the Defense Department, the uniformed military, other government agencies, scholars and policymakers now have observed a gap exists between what events on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown we need to know and what we actually know.

Military professionals and scholars are closing this gap. They are reading the old counterinsurgency classics by authors such as Lawrence, Mao, Guevara, and Galula. They are writing about counterinsurgency. *Military Review* published a special issue in October, 2006, where all the articles related to counterinsurgency. A perusal of the website of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) will unearth dozens of articles relating to counterinsurgency experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although many of the articles are about how to do tactical tasks better—doing things right—there is still an expanding body of literature that attempts to determine and do the right things.

All the thought about counterinsurgency is leading to a paradigm shift overtaking the Army. Soldiers are beginning to understand that insurgency is not defeated by force alone, but is defeated through a combination of combat operations, effective public information, governance capacity-building and economic development (Chiarelli and Michaelis, 2005). The new paradigm decreases the emphasis on violent action and increases that on all the other activities required in counterinsurgency. The publication of the new counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24 (2006), which downplays the role of combat operations as a part of the counterinsurgency effort, is an acknowledgement that fighting alone is insufficient, and the subsequent elevation of its principal author, General David Petraeus, to the command of all troops in Iraq, shows that change is taking place.
There has been an explosion of interest in counterinsurgency with many more publications from soldiers, diplomats, journalists, and policy wonks. Even the public is interested, as evidenced by the reprint of classic books on counterinsurgency, such as the Marines’ *Small Wars Manual* (2005) (three separate reprints are available at Amazon.com), originally published in 1940; Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (2006), written in 1964; the University of Chicago Press printing of *FM 3-24* (2007); and the proliferation of books on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the global war on terror.

This study of counterinsurgency is to advance this process of learning. More effective counterinsurgency prefers to persuade people to support their government, and fights selectively and only when necessary. Effective counterinsurgency also reduces the level of violence, achieves policy objectives faster, begins sustainable development sooner, costs less money, kills fewer local nationals, and results in fewer military casualties.

**Why Is This Study Significant?**

My argument in nutshell is this: Nation-building saves human lives, decreases human suffering, and increases human welfare. It increases the security under which people live, and makes possible sustainable human development. The military has a key role in nation-building because it provides security for the remainder of the effort, because it alone can coerce recalcitrant groups to lay down their arms, and because it can enforce peace. A powerful insurgency poses the greatest threat to nation-building efforts; it makes the environment violent and leads to the loss of human lives and an increase of displaced persons. Military organizations must know how to engage and defeat insurgency in order to return the society to peace. Moreover, during the conduct of counterinsurgency, many of the capacity-building, development, and relief tasks normally associated with nation-building are conducted by soldiers.
in order to relieve suffering and persuade the population to support the government over the insurgent, ending the conflict. Therefore, effective counterinsurgency saves lives.

**What Are the Research Questions?**

In the course of my inquiry I found it necessary to explain the nature of counterinsurgency, and its relationship to nation-building and to human well-being; to examine the roles that military forces play in enhancing human well-being in difficult and violent environments; and to examine the quality of the military’s performance as counterinsurgents. My own experience in Iraq suggested there was room for improvement in the military’s performance, and my research has uncovered substantial literature that shares this perception. Therefore, a gap exists between what the average officer knows about counterinsurgency and what he or she needs to know. Thus, I sought to answer the question, “Why do Americans do nation-building and counterinsurgency so badly?” which of course, begs the question, “How can we do it better?”

Therefore, the research question which drives this inquiry is simply this: “What principles do military officers need to understand to conduct counterinsurgency effectively and humanely?”

**What Are the Research Objectives?**

The further identification of specific objectives may help to clarify and articulate the expectations of research results. In this case, the literature and available data limit the inquiry to a qualitative methodology. Nevertheless, preliminary research suggests a rigorous and systematic qualitative examination of the most influential literature—that we might describe as “classic” literature—on insurgency and counterinsurgency will independently identify a set of principles upon which considerable consensus exists. This sort of effort is not unprecedented;
Indeed other lists of principles exist. For example, Galula (1964) published several lists, including, among other things, the prerequisites for successful insurgency, some “laws and principles for counterinsurgency warfare” (p. 71), and a proposed strategy containing a step-by-step procedure for conducting a counterinsurgency campaign. Another notable example is FM 3-24 which contains a list of “historical principles” (p. 1-20-1-24) another of “contemporary imperatives” (p. 1-24-1-26), and still another of “paradoxes” (p. 1-26-1-28). Still an empty niche in the literature exists that a systematic examination of classical works will fill by producing independently a list of principles sufficiently agreed upon to be fairly described as a classic theory of counterinsurgency. At a minimum, this systematic examination will illuminate the strength of the consensus surrounding each identified principle and will also highlight any “caveats” or debates for further examination, either as part of this study or in subsequent investigations. A set of principles each showing strong consensus suggests a degree of validity that is current as of the time that the classical literature was published.

Since the heyday of classic counterinsurgency thought was in the 1960s in the U.S. (Evans, 1987; Kilcullen, 2006a), some inquiry into the changes in the global political environment and in the nature of insurgency will be necessary to determine the changes necessary to counterinsurgency theory. Preliminary research suggests that several authors agree that urbanization; globalization; the development of transportation and communication infrastructures; the growth of transnational organizations; and changes in the organizations, motivations, and likely objectives of insurgent groups require a reexamination of counterinsurgency principles (Hoffman, 2007; Metz & Millen, 2004; Metz, 2007; Kilcullen, 2005; Cobbold, 2006). Using the set of principles—which we might term “classic” theory—that emerge from the systematic examination of the classic literature as foundation for further
inquiry, this study will determine some of the changes necessary to the classical theory that are appropriate for facing 21st century insurgency. A review of literature suggests there is not yet consensus on these issues, so there is opportunity for new theoretical insights.

The modified framework that emerges from this second examination needs to be compared with the literature emerging from “contemporary experience” (FM 3-24, 2006), which will provide a test of any new theoretical implications that arise from previous analyses, and may also gauge the understanding of theory in current practice. It will also provide one additional opportunity for theoretical syntheses.

Therefore, the objectives of this study are:

1) Identify principles of effective and humane counterinsurgency theory inherent in the “classic” works.

2) Determine the strength of the consensus that exists on each of the identified principles and identify “caveats” or disagreements for further examination.

3) Identify and describe changes in the classic principles required by changes in the contemporary environment and in the nature of insurgency.

4) Test modified principles against literature emerging from “contemporary experience” to determine additional changes required to a list of counterinsurgency principles.
Chapter 2

Review of Literature

Diversity of Literature

The diversity of literature concerning counterinsurgency is great. Soldiers, diplomats, policymakers, and scholars are debating the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. Since key elements of a total counterinsurgency effort are not “military” in their essence, development workers are also contributing to the discussion. Journalists are observing events on the ground in failed states. They provide accounts of the activities of insurgents and counterinsurgents in action, and some of these observations have implications for the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. Their accounts are the basis of historical case studies and illuminate contemporary practice, which FM 3-24 (2006) describes as the ways to study counterinsurgency. The editorial pages also contain a lot of information about counterinsurgency strategy and policy.

As I have studied the phenomena surrounding counterinsurgency, I have made it a point to separate the literature into several categories to improve my ability to evaluate the quality of a particular source. These are: 1) “Classical literature” which is usually a book and which appears on reading lists or bibliographies that are published by key organizations or in professional journals. The presence of these works on reading lists indicates that they have credibility among scholars and practitioners. 2) Professional literature, which is usually from a periodical and written by a scholar or practitioner—a soldier, diplomat, policymaker, or development worker. These are usually peer-reviewed journals, either professional military journals or journals dealing with international affairs, national security policy and the like. Occasionally, I have included as professional literature the opinion of an author accepted elsewhere in the professional literature. For example, the testimony of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker before Congress I have
considered professional literature. 3) Doctrinal literature from the military or another U.S. government agency. These are authoritative because they affect individual and organizational behavior abroad, because they undergo rigorous review and concurrence procedures, and because they are usually works of scholarship in their own right. 4) Qualitative methodology. As the design of this study suggested itself, I was obliged to seek a methodology appropriate to the research question and available data, and to understand the capabilities and limitations of this method. 5) Newspaper accounts, which I have limited to background information and to the occasional documentation of a particular fact. 6) Editorials in major media. Editorialists are usually informed people in a general sense, but may or may not be informed about the particulars of counterinsurgency practice. I am reluctant to rely upon an editorial for matters of a theoretical or practical nature, but occasionally I have read something in an editorial which I followed up by checking the writer’s facts.

The first four categories are credible in an academic sense, and I have pulled extensively from literature of these natures. The latter two categories are not scholarship, and I have relied upon them little. I have cited newspaper accounts to document several particular facts, such as the role of the French army in restoring order to Rwanda (Bonner, 1994). I have not cited any editorials, but recognize that editorials do shape the policy debate. Most policy issues are not the concern of this study, however.

Much of the literature on counterinsurgency is published in military journals. *Parameters* and *Military Review* were particularly helpful in studying counterinsurgency, and many other journals for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy have published on this topic as well. *Military Review* published a special issue on counterinsurgency in October, 2006, which is an excellent place to start a study, and each of these articles contains references. *Parameters*, a
journal of the Army War College, has a cumulative index located at
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/a-index.htm and which links to full-text PDFs of
most of the articles. The Army War College also hosts the Strategic Studies Institute which
publishes on a variety of national security topics. The Army War College, the Naval
Postgraduate School, the National Defense University, the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Center of
Excellence, and the Army Command and General Staff College all have excellent libraries with
many electronic resources that are available to the public. Many of these institutions publish
reading lists on various defense-related topics, including counterinsurgency.

Most military journals and manuals are indexed by Google, so a simple search will
uncover specific articles or PDF versions of many manuals. Footnote-chasing through Google is
simple and usually returns a full-text peer-reviewed article from a military journal as a PDF file
or one that can be “captured” as a PDF. A search for a specific article will often uncover
something from the same author or on a closely related topic that is helpful as well.

The problem with military manuals is that they are indexed by number and not by title, so
the researcher has to know which one he or she wants to see. Global Security provides a 2002
index to Army manuals at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/, and
the firm makes some manuals available for reading online. Some of these are obsolete manuals
that the military has not published in digital form. Once a researcher knows which manual he or
she wants, it can usually be located through Google.

The reading lists described in Chapter 3 are all excellent sources. Additionally, the Small
Wars Journal website publishes an annotated reading list and houses a “reference library.” The
latter contains links to resources that are available in the public domain. The Army’s
Professional Writing Collection draws from a variety of professional journals that impact on
issues relating to the Army. Its homepage provides links to a number of research organizations, and can be located at http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting. The Australian Army publishes a “Senior Officers Professional Digest” which pulls from a variety of professional journals on topics of interest to senior officers. The June 2008 issue can be found at http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lWSC/docs/SOPD_61.pdf. Finally, journals such as Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Monthly, and The Washington Quarterly contain scholarship on nation-building and counterinsurgency. These journals make some articles available to the public. Others are available for purchase or may be obtained through LSU’s electronic library resources. For example, these three journals are indexed in Academic Search Complete, and full-text articles are available for download to scholars who have appropriate privileges.

**The Knowledge Gap and the Evolution of American Military Thought**

The joint military community in the United States has engaged in a conversation about military operations, the changing nature of its missions, and the effect of military action on the total security environment of the post-Cold War world. The Army, for example, during the Cold War, prepared primarily to confront the Soviets on the plains of Europe or to confront the armies of other nation-states on an unambiguous battlefield. This core mission took priority over other commitments, and affected the organization, equipping, and funding of the Army. This mission discouraged the use of the Army for other missions because of the imperative need for the Army to be available for this one (Echeverria, 2004; Cassidy, 2004; Nagl, 2002; Evans, 1987). Also it convinced several generations of military officers that fighting major wars was their vocation, and that other things were not. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Army both became available for use elsewhere and for other purposes, and the new security environment required it to rethink its role.
In 1993, the Army deliberately expanded its thinking beyond operations as a part of general war, and began discussing military “operations other than war” (OOTW). There was considerable debate over the semantics of the term; it separated the environment in which military operations would occur into two categories—war and other than war (Fastabend, 1997). Some objected to the term because the situations encountered in the real world did not fit neatly into one category or the other. Some thought it diluted the Army’s warrior ethos and distracted from its core warfighting mission, while others thought it did not go far enough to describe new activities the Army needed to learn. In the latter’s perspective, “OOTW was brought into the house of doctrine, but then perniciously quarantined in a back closet with its own unique principles and special considerations, reinforcing the perception of OOTW as being completely ‘other than’ what the [Army does]” (Fastabend, 1997).

In the late 1990s, the Army debated the merits of the OOTW terminology, and the implications of the changing world, and drafted a new version of its keystone Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations. Published as doctrine in 2001, FM 3-0 (2001) clarified the OOTW category somewhat. Now military operations were divided into offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. The latter two were considered operations other than war. Stability operations—which Dobbins et al (2007) described as the Defense Department’s term for nation-building—“promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis” (FM 3-0, 2001, p. 1-15). Support operations “employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering” (FM 3-0, 2001, p.1-16). Stability
operations may or may not require violent action to achieve policy goals, while support operations usually will not.

In addition, given the military experience of the post-9-11 world, the distinction between war and “other than war” inherent in the term, OOTW, has given way to a vision of the military conducting operations that are both war—fighting, shooting, maneuvering—and other than war—humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping—in close proximity to each other in both space and time, in what Marine Commandant Charles Krulak, referred to as “the three block war” (quoted in FM 3-06, 2006). The entire quote is instructive:

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same day...all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the “three block war.” (p. 1-7)

Thus the term, OOTW, has given way to “full spectrum operations,” defined in the again-revised FM 3-0 (2008) as when “forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously... to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative... They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment” (p. 3-1). “Lethal” action, of course, refers to attempts to kill, capture, or coerce adversaries or destroy their equipment or supplies. “Non-lethal” action is exactly that—actions that do not kill anyone, but seek to gain advantage in other ways, such as those which affect popular perceptions of U.S. policy, support local national authorities, provide humanitarian assistance, or persuade adversaries to discontinue hostilities.

The military also attempted to categorize conflict by its intensity in order to aid doctrinal understanding of missions and roles that it might be called upon to play. The first “spectrum of
conflict” categorized conflict into high, medium, and low intensity (Fastabend, 1997). The latest incarnation of the spectrum of conflict describes potential operational environments as 1) stable peace, which provides the best opportunity for sustained human development; 2) unstable peace, in which conflict could break out; 3) insurgency, in which disaffected groups within a state are currently fighting the government; and 4) general war, in which states violently contend for advantage against one another (FM 3-0, 2008).

Broad categories of military activities, termed “operational themes,” describe the “character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time” (FM 3-0, 2008, p. 2-3). Each operational theme corresponds broadly with a range of environments described by the spectrum of conflict. FM 3-0 (2008) offers a graphic of the spectrum of conflict overlaid with corresponding operational themes (p. 2-5). The graphic is reproduced as Figure 2-1.

Coping with the last environment, general war, almost exclusively through major combat operations, has been the military’s self-perceived raison d’etre for most of American history (Weigley, 1973). It is very good at it; there is a huge body of doctrinal, scholarly, and professional literature, and in this environment, there is not yet a need for nation-building, which cannot be effective during hostilities. Therefore, it is not object of this study.

At the other end of the spectrum, stable peace and its associated activities, peacetime military engagement, offer no great military challenges, and the military’s role in whatever developmental activities may be ongoing is relatively small.

Limited interventions are, by definition, limited in scope, that is, in time, space, and resources (FM 3-0, 2008). Typically, they involve skills very similar to those used in major combat operations. Examples include missile strikes against terrorist training camps following the attack on the USS Cole, or air combat with Libyan MiGs over the Gulf of Sidra in the 1980s.
The military is very good at these, and their definition precludes nation-building. Once nation-building begins, the operation is no longer limited.

![Figure 2-1. Spectrum of Conflict and Operational Themes (FM 3-0, 2008).](image)

However, the environments described by the center of the spectrum are characteristic of the societies which need, and provide the opportunities for, nation-building. The military operations associated with these environments—peace operations and irregular warfare—are those that require greater understanding from military officers.

Figure 2-2 below, taken from FM 3-0 (2008, p. 2-4), illustrates the types of operations that the military may be required to conduct under each operational theme. Peace operations and irregular warfare are the categories that contain the military activities that are found in nation-building efforts.

Of the component operations of peace operations (see above), only two—peacekeeping and peace enforcement—normally require prolonged commitment of military forces. The others
Figure 2-2. Types of Operations Required Under Operational Themes.

are defined in FM 3-0 (2008) as being predominantly diplomatic or economic in scope. In fact, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3 Peace Operations (1999) includes chapters only on peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Peacekeeping “consists of military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement” (FM 3-0, 2008, p. 2-8), and does not normally require peacekeepers to engage in violent action. For example, in 1991, I participated in the longstanding Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission that monitors the 1979 peace accord between Israel and Egypt.

Peace enforcement, on the other hand, “involves the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order” (FM 3-0, 2008, p. 2-9). Peace enforcement might require violent action, and if of sufficient duration or intensity, require limited intervention, irregular warfare, or even major combat operations to enforce the peace.
Of the component operations of irregular warfare, foreign internal defense, support to insurgency, combating terrorism, and unconventional warfare are conducted typically by small groups of specially trained military personnel. There is no need for a large effort to develop capacity within this small cadre. Only counterinsurgency requires a significant portion of the military, mostly Army and Marines, to execute, and it is the one type of operation that requires a major effort to learn new principles to govern strategy and operational art.

**The American Way of War**

Weigley (1973), in a very influential work, concluded the American style of waging war attempted, through firepower and attrition, to utterly destroy the military of an opposing state. In this view, fighting is an alternative to negotiation rather than part of the bargaining process, despite Clausewitz’s influential dictum that “war is politics by other means.” The short title of Weigley’s book, *The American Way of War* has become shorthand for this attitude in discussions of strategic military operations. Weigley’s thesis, though not undisputed, is widely accepted and frequently cited in policy debates concerning the use of the military instrument of national power. Cassidy (2004) referred to this attitude as the “big war paradigm” and described it as “an obstacle to learning how to fight guerillas” (p. 41).

Echeverria (2004) examined this attitude and likened it to European attitudes like that of von Moltke, who believed that political leaders should determine who should be fought and why, but that political leaders should then leave the fighting up to professional military officers, who presumably know best how to go about it.

The problem with this view, and with American subscription to it, is that it leads to a separation between the political ends of warfare and the military means used to pursue them. Military officers thus equate winning wars with winning battles, rather than with the
achievement of policy aims that prompted military action (Echeverria, 2004). Therefore, both military officers—responsible only for defeating the enemy’s military—and political leaders—responsible only for determining who needed to be defeated and why—have had trouble grappling intellectually and practically with the hard work of tying the two loose ends together and turning military victory into strategic political success (Echeverria, 2004). In other words, “we spanked ‘em, now what?”

Boot (2002) argued that Weigley’s view was insufficient to explain the American way of war. Boot looked to history and argued that the US military had a significant “small war” tradition. He wrote that American involvement in conflicts such as that with the Barbary pirates, various Indian wars, the Philippines insurrection; and interventions, such as those in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua constitute significant military experience, and that an understanding of an American way of war must include an understanding of limited war. Cassidy (2004) made a similar observation, arguing that we can look to our own history for lessons on fighting small wars. In 1940, the Marine Corps, after its experiences in Central America, thought small warfare, counterinsurgency, and nation-building—or “pacification” as it was known then—was a significant part of its mission, and published the *Small Wars Manual* (1940) to capture the lessons learned. The manual has experienced a resurgence of popularity, and a reprint can be purchased in book stores in 2008.

The American tradition of civilian control of the military reinforces Weigley’s American way of war because it increases the separation between political and military spheres (Echeverria, 2004). This has the very laudable effect of preventing the military from taking too much power in our society, and has the additional laudable effect of limiting the interference of political leaders in ongoing military operations, yet it removes the subtlety from the use of the
military instrument of national power as a diplomatic tool, and reduces it to a bludgeon whose sole purpose is to beat down recalcitrant adversaries.

The Powell Doctrine, associated with the First Gulf War of 1991, states that wars should be fought only for vital national objectives, should use overwhelming force, and must have clear political objectives and popular support (Echeverria, 2004). This doctrine serves to restrict policymakers’ use of force in “small wars” and reinforces the military’s belief that it is only for big wars that involve “vital” interests. (A similar formulation is associated with former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who preceded Powell, and is sometimes referred to as the Weinberger Doctrine.) This is in direct contention with Boot’s thesis—that our military prowess, technologically and organizationally, allows us to use the military instrument to achieve limited ends without great cost in casualties or expense (Boot, 2002).

Evans (1987) thought the trauma of the military experience in Vietnam inhibited the discussion of “low intensity conflict” (LIC) among American military officers and other members of the national security intelligentsia. He thought that the failure of U.S. policy and the pre-eminent role of the military in executing it—the loss of the war—created an organizational denial similar to the psychological state of denial induced in individuals by a traumatic event. This inhibited the military’s willingness to discuss, and therefore to learn from, the experience in Vietnam. In fact, this state also affected policymakers, diplomats, and scholars, none of whom wanted to be perceived as advocating the commitment of the nation to another such experience. Research on low intensity conflict declined greatly throughout the 1960s, and was very sparse until the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq revived an interest in counterinsurgency.

Evans (1987) speculated that military leaders avoided building competence in, or capability for, low intensity conflict environments for fear that such competence might tempt
policymakers to commit the military to these environments, which are detrimental to the military’s perceived core mission.

In addition to the effect of the Vietnam experience, Evans (1987) argued the military’s lack of interest in low intensity conflict is due to several factors: 1) conventional officers’ suspicion of the elite units that would likely dominate LIC environments; 2) the low technology nature of LIC that would inhibit procurement of more technical systems needed for more intense conflict; 3) the political nature of LIC, in which the constant consultation with political, economic, and other experts dilutes military authority and increases civilian “interference” in “military” affairs; and 4) the belief that other missions are more important than LIC.

Things are changing, however. These arguments are mitigated somewhat by contemporary operating environments. Current commitments are too great for elite units to handle, and they require all officers to develop competence for dealing with them. Technology is moving onto the LIC/counterinsurgency battlefield. Night vision devices; networked command, control, and communication (C3) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; precision munitions; unmanned aerial vehicles; robots; jammers; sensors; and a host of other technologies are serving daily on the battlefield. Furthermore, the need for larger systems has decreased given that currently there are no “peer competitors” to threaten the U.S. and to require their procurement.

Officers have realized the need to overcome qualms about the political nature of irregular warfare environments given the commitment of U.S. forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. Marine General Charles Krulak’s observations about the “three block war” and the “strategic corporal” (1999) have highlighted the need for the development of political awareness and subtlety in the execution of military duties down to very junior leaders. The sentiment is very similar to that
expressed by his father, Marine General Victor Krulak, in 1966 in reference to Marine operations in Vietnam: “You cannot win militarily. You have to win totally, or you are not winning at all” (quoted in Nagl, 2002, USMC and the Combined Action Platoon Section, Para. 1).

Officers also have realized the importance of interagency partners to the overall effort. Marine General Peter Pace, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has observed that "Our civilian agencies are under-resourced to meet the requirements of the 21st century” (quoted in Hegland, 2007) and Defense Secretary Gates has called for the development of “soft power” in other agencies of the U.S. government (Matthews, 2008), because these men realize that soldiers alone lack the skill set required for success in nation-building and counterinsurgency environments. Finally, the absence of powerful enemies means that, in the first decade of the 21st century, terrorists, particularly those armed with weapons of mass destruction, are the most credible and dangerous threats to U.S. security (Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006). Officers understand that capturing or killing terrorists, and removing their havens in failed states, which may be done through nation-building, constitute the military’s most important mission in 2008.

Research and discussion can accelerate this trend and ensure that it reaches a greater variety of officers and soldiers. There is still a critical need because of the importance and inherent difficulty of these missions. Fukuyama (2004a) said “we must remember that nation-building is inherently difficult.” Bush, in 2003, even before the outbreak of insurgency in Iraq, said, “Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own…” (quoted in Fukuyama, 2004a, p. 1). Dobbins said, "The Pentagon and the administration have reflected on their experience in Iraq and concluded that we need to do better next time…” (quoted in Hegland, 2007). Despite its importance, American officers still understand nation-building and counterinsurgency poorly. Fukuyama (2004b) has said, “We need to focus a great
deal more thought, attention, and research on this area” (p. 17). Payne (2006) has said, “There is no theory on which it is based; it has no proven technique or methodology; and no experts know how to do it” (p. 609). Carson (2003) has said, “…many military personnel do not understand the critical role the military plays in this mission” (p. iii).

**Evolution of a Theory**

**Small Warriors, Partisans, and Revolutionaries**

Guerrilla war, small war, partisan war or whatever title writers have given to this class of war is not new in human history. It has been practiced probably since before history was recorded. Whenever one side of a conflict was observably weaker than the other, people have resorted to guerrilla war to continue fighting when a single decisive battle would be lost. Classical theorists of war in the West, known primarily for their writings relative to conventional war, have nevertheless observed the phenomenon and commented upon it. Clausewitz (1832/1984) thought the guerrillas or partisans were an adjunct to conventional forces that were particularly prevalent when a nation was resisting an invader. Guerrilla forces would harass the invader, nibbling at his flanks, lines of communication, supplies, and ambushing small groups of his soldiers. This causes the invader great difficulty, increases the cost of his war, and diverts resources from the major fighting when the regular armies meet. Guerrillas were not to confront the invader in a direct way; to do so would mean their destruction and the end of their effectiveness to their cause. They were instead to be “nebulous and elusive” (quoted in Kalyanaraman, 2003, p. 173), offering the invader no target, but sapping his will to go on. In this way, the partisans contributed to the exhaustion of the invaders and added to his defeat by the nation’s regular forces.
Jomini also thought of guerrilla warfare in terms of resistance to an invader. He believed a popular uprising caused great difficulty to the invader when it was formed around a nucleus of trained regular solders. He thought guerrillas were not capable of decisively defeating an invader without regulars, and that popular rising without the support of regulars would ultimately be suppressed. However, well led and supported guerrillas could control the countryside around an invader’s forces, so that he controls only the ground he is standing on. The guerrillas who know every facet of the ground can move around the invader, striking him where he is weakest and fading away before he can respond (Kalyanaraman, 2003).

Marx and Engels also believed guerrillas were adjunct to regular forces. Marx observed that guerrillas may enjoy some success when they are in small groups, but these are incapable of the decisive defeat of regular forces, whether these are the forces of an invader or of the regime. He thought that once guerrillas concentrated into larger formations, they could be found and defeated. Engels thought the regular tactics of his day adequate to cope with guerrilla bands large enough to be a threat to regular armies. A large regular army was simply too powerful to face in battle; only a popular uprising involving substantial participation by masses of the people offers any hope of slowing a powerful army. Even then, the guerrillas are very likely to lose (Kalyanaraman, 2003).

The authors above did not focus on guerrilla war; Clausewitz and Jomini are widely-respected and often-read military thinkers, but their writings focused on regular warfare founded in the European experience of warfare between nation-states. Marx and Engels were not military thinkers at all, but were political theorists and observers of history. They observed that the popular uprisings throughout Europe in the mid-1800s were defeated by the forces of the regime, and that 19th century European warfare was dominated by regular armies.
Imperial Wars: Callwell

The increasing pace of colonialism and imperialism in the late 1800s led to a great many conflicts between European nation-states and non-European entities of various types. This focused European attention on the phenomenon and tactics of a different sort of warfare. Callwell (1906), a British officer with experience in these “small wars,” sought to classify and study the experience of colonial powers in fighting small wars, and he is among the first Western theorists to specialize in the theory of small wars. His method was a study of historical cases to determine the characteristics of small wars, and the methods that work or do not. I was unable to determine when he wrote the first edition of his conclusions and recommendations, but he published a second edition in 1899 and a third in 1906.

His definition of small war was very broad: “Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field” (Callwell, 1906, p. 21).

He argued that small wars came in three varieties: 1) campaigns of conquest or annexation; 2) campaigns for the suppression of insurrections or lawlessness or for the settlement of conquered or annexed territory; and 3) campaigns undertaken to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy (p. 25). In the first, Callwell observed that the more organized the resistance offered by a foreign king or potentate, the more rapidly it could be defeated. By offering battle to superior European forces, the local national armies—irregular to the European eye—were usually quickly crushed, the annexation affected, and resistance
ended—unless the defeated peoples resorted to guerilla warfare following the defeat of their states. In this case, the struggle became characteristic of the second type of small war. This type of small war is very analogous to the current conflict in Iraq. U.S.-led multinational forces accomplished the initial defeat of the regime speedily, but large segments of the population have resorted to guerilla warfare, and have proven difficult to subdue or co-opt.

The second type was almost always characterized by guerilla action on the part of segments of the local national population. They might rebel for any number of reasons, and their guerilla tactics of ambush, rapid attacks against dispersed targets, assassination, or brigandage were difficult for the colonial power or local national regime, usually allied to a colonial power, to suppress, simply because the guerillas were hard to find and come to grips with. As Callwell observed, “the crushing of a populace in arms and the stamping out of widespread disaffection by military methods… are most difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion, and are always most trying to the troops” (p. 26). Most of the remainder of Callwell’s work is an examination of the considerations and tactics required to successfully prosecute counter-guerilla warfare.

The third style of warfare is termed by the U.S. Army today as “limited intervention.” Callwell observed that it, like all other forms of warfare, is undertaken in pursuit of a political objective. Depending upon the objective, a limited amount of force may be sufficient to accomplish it, and occupation of the enemy’s territory may not be required. In this case, the colonial power need not engage guerrillas. If the political objective requires the overthrow of the local national government, and popular resistance forms, then once again, the war becomes one of the second type.

Therefore, we turn again to Callwell’s observations on guerilla war because his conclusions in many regards are still pertinent, and fit in with the literature that follows. He
observed that war against irregulars was very different than conventional European wars of his day. The latter had rules, generally well-known, that governed the behavior of armies in the field both with regard to strategy, operational art, and tactics and with regard to what constituted lawful behavior of the combatants. Irregular war, however, had no rules, but was driven by the specifics of each case and the diversity of conditions faced. Determining the right strategy and tactics against a particular native enemy required historical and cultural perspective. The examples in Callwell’s book helped give the former, and the latter required regular military leaders to gather some cultural intelligence on their adversaries’ key leaders, economic and political ways of life, and on factors such as religion or cultural attitudes that might motivate the local nationals to fight. He insisted that officers study “the habits, the customs, and the mode of action on the battlefield of the enemy” (p. 33). For example, Callwell observed that Boers and Zulus were very different enemies although located very close together in terms of global geography.

Callwell insisted that small wars need a “well defined objective” (p. 378) so that soldiers know when they are winning—or losing. He admitted military objectives may be hard to define when there are no power centers or centers of population.

Callwell observed that terrain is very important in choosing how to fight. Terrain drives operational and tactical decisions much like wind speed and direction drove the decisions of old sailing ship captains. The advantages sought from terrain have not changed. In general, the adversary on the highest ground or the one with cover and concealment has the advantage. Operationally, remote and inaccessible terrain gives irregulars a place to hide, and causes regulars great difficulty. Also, the differences between desert, mountains, and jungles are critical to campaign planning. The terrain dictates where soldiers on both sides can move.
Today, with burgeoning populations, rapid urbanization, improved mapping, satellite imagery, reconnaissance aircraft, and helicopter transportation, remote areas are much less remote. Nevertheless, modern insurgents can still hide in remote areas, although they are less effective when removed from the population. They can hide in semi-remote areas—those that are out of the way, but not really hard to get to, and that are seldom under the observation of security forces. Finally, insurgents can hide among small town populations where security forces seldom go or in urban populations where the number of people prevents close scrutiny and also prohibits the use of very destructive weaponry that is available to regular armies. This “human terrain” often provides the 21st century guerrilla with the ability to remain undetected.

The terrain may also dictate the economic conditions of the populace from which the guerrillas are drawn. One land lends itself to farming, another to hunting, and still another to herding. The campaign plan may be to attack the economic life of the guerrillas in order to convince them that fighting is not worthwhile; to force them to defend their food stores, thus forcing them to give battle; or destroy their capacity to make war by destroying or removing food stocks.

Callwell noted that in small war campaigns, regulars often lack reliable information about the terrain and about the enemy. Nevertheless, these sorts of intelligence are as essential for small wars as they are for conventional war. A lack of intelligence about the terrain, due to the fact that regular troops are often foreign and due to the fact that in Callwell’s day most of the world was unmapped, led to all sorts of tactical and logistical problems. Commanders did not know how best to move forces, what obstacles they might encounter, or where they could find water or other key resources. The lack of knowledge of the terrain caused great navigational problems, and feeling lost caused commanders to doubt themselves. Finally, the tactical
advantage to the guerrillas who are at home on the terrain, who understood how to live there and
could move rapidly and accurately around regular forces, was frustrating to regular soldiers. In
many campaigns their primary struggle was against the terrain and not the guerrilla enemy.

Intelligence about the enemy was important primarily because the tactical problem of
regulars fighting irregulars is finding the irregulars and forcing them to give battle. A key
tactical principle for guerrillas is to refuse battle unless the time and place is carefully chosen to
be of advantage to them. Then the guerillas will run away before the regulars can mass against
them and destroy them.

Regulars seldom know the strength and disposition of their guerilla enemy, and in remote
areas or areas with a population sympathetic to the guerilla cause, regulars have the greatest
difficulty obtaining this information. Yet their movements are obvious to the population, and
since people talk, and since the social networks in underdeveloped regions depend upon word of
mouth, good intelligence on the regulars will reach the ears of the guerrillas—either because of
the people’s sympathy to them or simply because a regular army’s movements are good gossip.

Also the regular commander may not know how supportive of the guerrillas a population
is, and so cannot judge how far a people will go to “put forth their entire strength” (p. 49).
Obviously, a small group of brigands despised by the local population are easier to find and
destroy than a popular guerrilla leader with a large band made up of the neighbors and family
members of the local populace.

The most controversial element to Callwell’s counter-guerrilla warfare to today’s
counterinsurgency theorist is his advocacy of the burning of crops, confiscation of livestock, and
similar actions against an insurgent population. The issue is relevant, however, because it strikes
at the heart of the debate between the coercion and the “hearts and minds” schools of thought in counterinsurgency.

He thought one method of fighting guerrillas was to confiscate livestock; burn crops, buildings, or food stores; or attack other economic activities. This style of warfare occurs when the regulars can find no other power centers to attack. The possible effects of this destruction are to persuade the enemy that fighting is not to his advantage; to deprive him of wealth and critical resources; or to force him to defend his herds or possessions, thus bringing him to battle. Callwell quotes a Lord Wolseley as advising that, when there is no capital city, “your first object should be the capture of whatever [the guerrillas] prize most, and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a conclusion,” and that the enemy “can be touched through his pocket” (p. 40). Perhaps a modern example of this is the air war against the Serbs. In this instance, military aircraft destroyed electric relays from power plants to Serbian cities. The people were left without electricity, and Serbian government ceased its aggression.

However, Callwell also observed that the destruction of crops and stored food is harsher than stealing cattle, possibly because the hardship it forces on the locals is greater or perhaps because many traditional cultures of that time understood that the victor always carries away the spoils (cattle, etc.), but wanton destruction breeds enmity. Often the government of the regulars ultimately would like to “acquire the friendship of the people which its armies are chastising” (p. 41), and so too much destruction is not “expedient.” He further observed that the regulars’ “purpose is to ensure a lasting peace. Therefore, in choosing the objective, the overawing, and not the exasperation of the enemy, is the end to keep in view” (p. 42). He also admitted that much of these tactics “may shock the humanitarian” (p. 40).
The issue is still relevant. Is it morally permissible to cause the suffering of civilians because they are the same population from which the insurgents are drawn? Is it expedient to do it? How can the counterinsurgent tell the difference between a guerrilla fighter who has no uniform, a guerrilla supporter who does not fight, but who provides support to fighters, and an innocent person who lives there? Is it necessary to break the will of these people to resist? Does their proximity to or relationship with a guerrilla band imply that they support it?

Callwell also laid out a prescription for defeating guerrillas that was used successfully against the Boers. The essential steps were:

1) Partition the area to contain guerrillas within a single partition or detect them when they cross into another, depriving them of mobility and surprise.

2) Clear our resources that might serve as supplies for guerrillas.

3) Establish outposts which are minimally manned; the garrisons should be just large enough to resist assault from a guerrilla band, but no larger in order to free troops for other operations.

4) Establish larger bases where supplies can be stored, troops rested or trained, and animals reconditioned.

5) Establish “flying columns” that are as small as possible to enhance mobility and to saturate the operational area. These are to find the guerrillas and destroy them. Mobility was essential; in Callwell’s day this implied mounted men in most places. Mounted men could drive in confiscated livestock, and catch up to fleeing guerrillas.

6) Freedom of movement is given to low echelons (command is decentralized) so that low ranking leaders can exploit intelligence quickly.

7) Intelligence is vital. Scouts and informants are critical to finding the enemy.
8) Counter-intelligence is also critical. A “secret service” and alert police force are critical to defeating guerrillas.

Class Struggle: Lenin

Vladimir Lenin, as a Communist revolutionary, thought that the revolution to speed the historical process of the conversion of capitalist economies into Marxist ones would be led by wage-earning workers in an urban setting. Nevertheless, the Communist Party in Russia before the 1917 Revolution debated the merits of guerrilla warfare being waged with or without Party leadership in various areas inside Russia. Lenin weighed into the debate with a pamphlet entitled Guerrilla Warfare (1906/1965). He did not dwell extensively on the strategy or tactics of a guerrilla struggle, but focused on the totality of the Marxist struggle through any of its various means, and not merely through “guerrilla” war. The value of Lenin is that he highlights the political nature of the struggle, and explains other tactics of the struggle that insurgents may use to further their aims. Also, the urban nature of Lenin’s view of the Marxist struggle may help to understand the tactics of modern guerrillas which function increasingly in an urban environment.

Lenin believed that, as the struggle continued to develop through various economic and social conditions, different forms of struggle emerge and become the primary means of struggle for a time before being displaced by another. For Lenin, “the struggle” referred to all means employed to hasten the conversion of a capitalist economy to a Marxist one, but Lenin’s ideas can be extended to struggles on behalf of other causes. In fact, the term “struggle” is a particularly useful one, in that it highlights the essentially political nature of an attempt to radically alter a society, whereas words such as “war,” ”conflict,” or the like place an emphasis on the violent aspects of such an attempt.
For Lenin, Marxism demanded the Party’s selection or suppression of a form of struggle to be judged on whether or not it facilitated the total struggle. Any form of struggle which advanced the cause was valid and should be encouraged. Any that did not, for whatever reason, should be condemned as inexpedient. Various forms of struggle include the general strike, the mass political strike, street barricade fighting, political demonstrations, peasant revolts, armed uprising, peaceful parliamentary struggle, partial military revolts, partial peasant revolts, guerrilla war, and civil war. He thought people would intensify the struggle to the point of armed uprising, guerrilla war, or civil war when the causes of poverty, hunger, or unemployment become so great that people felt they had little to lose by fighting.

Lenin believed that when enough individuals were dissatisfied to the point of armed uprising, that guerrilla warfare resulted. He wrote, “Guerrilla warfare is an inevitable form of struggle at a time when the mass movement has actually reached the point of an uprising” (p. 217). He answered the criticism that guerrilla war caused disorganization within the Party by arguing that it was Party weakness that was unable to take the inevitable guerrilla war under its control. Powerful economic and political causes bred guerrillas, and the Party cannot eliminate these, rather, it must take control of the guerrilla struggle and organize it in service to the Marxist struggle. Lenin stressed the need for the organization of the Party to give voice, direction, and organization to the people’s struggle. Like other theorists, he knew the revolutionary organization was critical to direct the successful insurgency.

A Sense of Self: Lawrence and the Arab Revolt

T. E. Lawrence was a British officer, and a leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. As such, he played the role of an insurgent fighting with Arabs against their Ottoman overlords. He wrote several works that have become classics of
counterinsurgency warfare. *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1991 (the most common of several versions was originally published in 1926)) is his memoir of his service and details the actions he and his comrades took as they fought their way across Arabia. *Twenty-seven Articles* (1917) is his advice to soldiers designated to be advisors, particularly to Arabs. Much of this article is still pertinent 90 years later, and should be required reading for American officers and non-commissioned officers who are assigned as advisors. The real meat of his view on insurgency and therefore, the material most useful for the study of counterinsurgency is his article entitled *Evolution of a Revolt* (1989), originally printed in 1920. All quotations are from this work.

Lawrence, unlike most of his British contemporaries, recognized the potential strength of Arab irregulars in the particular context of the Arabian desert during WWI. Most serving British officers of the time thought nomadic Arab tribesmen incapable of defending or attacking prepared positions, and wanted to use European advisors to train Arab regulars in the same manner as European soldiers. While Lawrence recognized the Arab weakness in positional warfare, he thought in the specific time and place in which he found himself that the Arabs could contribute mightily to the defeat of the Turks, and ultimately gain their independence.

Lawrence objected to the European obsession (his term) with the “the dictum of Foch that the ethic of modern war is to seek for the enemy’s army, his center of power, and destroy it in battle” (p. 3). Such a confrontation would certainly result in an Arab defeat. Perhaps after a long training period under British tutelage, Arab regulars might displace the Turks, but at a cost in casualties the Arabs were unwilling to pay. Rather Lawrence observed that the value of Arab irregulars was in their “depth” or their ability to move freely and rapidly about the desert and to be in unexpected places. This mobility, which Lawrence likened to mobility of ships on the ocean, allowed a small number of Arab irregulars to tie up huge numbers of Turk regulars in
Hejaz region of Arabia. In essence, the Arabs forced the Turks into perpetual defense throughout the Hejaz.

Lawrence’s thought, while not revolutionary, still required him to step out of the cultural and institutional mindset of the British officer. He recognized that Arab nomads had no organized forces to present a target the Turks could destroy. Moreover, he recognized that driving the Turks from the city of Medina was unnecessary, even counterproductive. Such an action would have required military capacity the Arabs did not possess, personnel and resources the British were unable to spare, and which would be unwelcome in territory the Muslim Arabs viewed as holy. Moreover, the Turks were not a threat to anything important sitting primarily in Medina, or along the railroad that fed their garrison there. Since the Arabs controlled the other 99% of the Hejaz, the Turks could do no harm where they were. Moreover, if driven out, they would join the main army opposing the British in Sinai, and if taken prisoner, they would require feeding and guards in Egypt. The Arab cause was best served by avoiding direct conflict—and the attendant casualties—required to drive the Turks out, and by not accepting British help that would be difficult to get rid of later. The British cause was also best served by encouraging the Turks to stay. As Lawrence put it:

If [the Turk] showed a disposition to evacuate too soon, as a step to concentrating in the small area which his numbers could dominate effectively, then we would have to try and restore his confidence, not harshly, but by reducing our enterprises against him. Our ideal was to keep his railway just working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and discomfort to him (p.12).

Lawrence also understood the military objective of the Arabs was not to kill Turks, but simply to control all of Arabia without Turkish rule. The Arabs’ objective was not military at all, but political in its nature. The Arabs were fighting for a cause—for freedom, which each man would prefer to live to enjoy. Thus, by avoiding confrontation, the Arabs denied the Turks
a target, went about their business, and waited the Turks out while the wider war took its toll on the Ottoman Empire.

Lawrence considered the problem of command from both strategic and tactical viewpoints and found in each the same “elements, one algebraical, one biological, and a third psychological” (p. 7). Considering the first, he concluded that to control the geographic area of Arabia, the Turks would need so many posts, manned by so many men each, such that 600,000 men would be required to suppress the Arab revolt or “the combined ill wills of the local Arab people” (p. 8). The Turks had only 100,000 men available.

The biological element was the “breaking point” (p. 8), which was the point at which men in combat or units in combat break and quit fighting. Arab irregulars were not disciplined into units; rather they were individuals, where each casualty deprived a family of a son, brother, husband, or father. The irregulars could not endure the casualties that a regular unit would, and the irregular commander had to recognize that fact.

Moreover, this element could be considered in reference to materials as well as men. In the context of this struggle, the Turks were more vulnerable through their materials, which were more scarce than their men. Ultimately, the Arabs never intentionally engaged the Turks, but rather attacked the railways which fed the Turk garrisons. The Arabs contained the Turks by the threat of the “vast unknown desert” (p. 10) out of which the Arabs would materialize at some unexpected place and attack. The populace aided this style of fighting by providing “perfect intelligence” so that the Arab irregulars could “plan in completely certainty” (p. 10).

The psychological element was perhaps the most important. The conduct of the revolt required irregular commanders to lead and motivate individual soldiers without the assistance of institutional coercion or unit cohesion. It was essential for them to understand the “mood” of the
men, and to cultivate an image of victory in their minds. Face to face leadership and propaganda were both essential to this activity, with propaganda having the capability to expand a leader’s influence greatly. Lawrence identified five audiences for propaganda—the Arab irregulars, the Turk soldiers opposing them, the Arab nation supporting the revolt, the Turk nation supporting their soldiers, and the neutrals looking on. He identified the printing press as “the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander” (p. 11). This realization anticipates a great deal of modern thought about the value of information operations in a counterinsurgency struggle.

Lawrence understood the primary importance of the psychological realm, and that the people were the center of gravity for the success of the revolt. He wrote “We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter” (p. 12). He also asserted that a successful revolt required a friendly population in the sense that the populace would not betray rebel movements to their enemies.

He also understood the value of cultural awareness to a multinational effort. He knew that not “a single Arab would have remained with the Sherif if he introduced British troops into the Hejaz” (p. 3). This appreciation for the cultural sensitivities of potential allies is important to the modern counterinsurgent today. It helps in the cooperation with allies, and with the wooing of the populace. It helps to mitigate the home field advantage of the insurgent.

**Advent of People’s War: Mao Zedong**

Mao Zedong, as a Communist revolutionary, wrote two very influential works discussing how and why to go about fighting a protracted guerilla war. His works became manuals for revolutionaries seeking to overthrow governments in the post-WWII period. Vo Nguyen Giap,
who commanded North Vietnamese forces during U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, was a student of Mao, and so Mao became very influential among American students of insurgency. Because he was so influential among revolutionaries, good counterinsurgents also read his work to better understand guerrilla movements and organizations. Mao’s influence was so great that Metz (1995) criticized then-current counterinsurgency doctrine for applying only to a “Maoist People’s War;” and others (Hoffman, 2007; Kalyanaraman, 2003; Kilcullen, 2005) refer to the Maoist “model” or “conceptualization” when discussing a popular rural insurgency.

Mao wrote both works, *On Guerrilla War (1937/1961)* and *On Protracted War (1938/1967)*, during the late 1930s when the Japanese had occupied key parts of China, and both Chinese Communists and Nationalists were seeking to expel them. Large portions of the latter explain why a strategy of protracted war was the only viable course for a large and populous, but militarily weak China. He argued that if the Chinese regular armies were to mass in several places in China, and permitted the Japanese to do likewise, that the result of these several battles would be the destruction of the Chinese armies, which were the centerpiece of Chinese national strength. Mao thought it much more advantageous to admit that Chinese forces lacked the capacity to oppose the Japanese in what he termed “positional” warfare, a set-piece battle the Chinese were certain to lose. He argued that China had no alternative but to engage in protracted war—a series of small engagements dispersed throughout China—that avoided decisive battles, but bled off the strength of the Japanese until the relative strengths of the contending armies were reversed. A process of years of small intermittent contacts, with time and place always chosen by Chinese guerrillas, would weaken the Japanese. Simultaneously, the experience of guerrilla warfare would train and strengthen Chinese forces until they could shift to the offensive in
conventional war and expel the exhausted Japanese. Mao likened guerrilla attacks to the biting of “innumerable gnats” that would ultimately exhaust the “giant” of Japan (1937, p. 54).

Mao thought all warfare was political in its essence. There was a reason that men, organizations, or states resorted to armed struggle, and that reason was political. This cause provided the motivation for individuals to fight. In the Chinese context, the cause was to expel the Japanese from China, and this cause was so important that Communists discontinued their struggle against the Nationalists until the Japanese were defeated. Mao envisioned guerrilla warfare as the organization of “vast” numbers of peasants to bleed the strength from the Japanese invaders. Political goals had to reflect the “aspirations of the people” to elicit sympathy, cooperation, and assistance; without a clearly defined political goal, guerrilla warfare efforts would fail. Guerrillas and the population supporting them need a “precise conception of the political goal of the struggle” (1937, p. 88). An indefinite political goal, poor leadership, and failure to work with the people bring guerrilla failure.

Mao believed that the people were essential to the struggle, which was protracted and characterized by guerrilla operations. The people provided the recruits and support that sustained the guerrilla army. The people’s silence or passive non-cooperation with foreign soldiers hid the guerrillas, and the people reported their observations of Japanese movements to guerrilla leaders.

Mao’s conviction that the people were the essence of the struggle cannot be overstated. This theme pervades his writing, and has produced several often-quoted expressions. In discussing the relationship that should exist between the people and the guerrillas, Mao wrote, “The former may be likened to water, the latter to the fish who inhabit it” (1937, p. 93) and “the fountainhead of guerrilla warfare is in the masses of the people” (1937, p. 73). Furthermore, he
argued guerilla warfare “derives from the masses” and “it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and co-operation” (1937, p. 44).

According to Mao, the Chinese guerrilla was on the progressive side of history. He thought that Communist guerrillas would be victorious because counter-revolutionary guerrillas oppress the masses and lack a base in the people; therefore, they are easy to destroy. Since revolutionary guerrillas fight in the interest of the people, they have a broad base in the people, and can count on the people to support them with supplies and information. Moreover, the people who support the guerrillas will not share information with their enemies, allowing the guerrillas to avoid contact on unfavorable terms. In effect, the people allow the guerillas to hide among them.

Mao understood the value of propaganda and political education to motivating guerrilla soldiers and the population from which they are drawn. Propaganda was necessary to unite the “class groups” of the masses to conduct guerrilla war, and guerrilla success depended upon leaders working with the people to bring about “internal unification.” Finally, he believed in the power of persuasion; he wrote, “The people must be inspired to co-operate voluntarily. We must not force them, for if we do, it will be ineffectual” (1937, p. 82). Only volunteers are acceptable guerrillas; “vicious people,” criminals and those of low character were not acceptable.

Guerrilla strategy depended upon “alertness, mobility and attack;” it sought to “avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws” (1937, p. 46). The guerrilla “attacks the enemy in every quarter” (1937, p. 50), and attempts “to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken large forces; to attack enemy lines of communications; to
establish bases capable of supporting independent operations in the enemy's rear, to force the enemy to disperse his strength” (1937, p. 53). The goal was to dissipate the enemy’s strength, exhaust him, render the region ungovernable, and force his withdrawal. To be most effective, guerrilla activity was coordinated as closely as possible with the activities of the regular Chinese army.

Guerrillas depended upon mobility and dispersion to survive and carry on the struggle to a successful conclusion. When the enemy was over-extended in defense, guerrillas harassed and demoralized him; when guerrillas were encircled, found themselves on ground which did not favor them, or were short of supplies with which to fight, they dispersed and withdrew. They also disperse to promote mass movements over a wide area. Mobility was key; Mao wrote, “the guerrilla must move with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind” (1937, p. 102).

Despite the pain guerrillas cause his enemy, Mao thought that guerrillas were incapable of winning a decisive victory—tactically or strategically. The guerrilla was an important adjunct to the surviving “orthodox” Chinese forces, and guerrillas could, over time, develop into “orthodox” forces capable ultimately of defeating the Japanese after the protracted struggle had weakened them.

Mao believed in the need to organize the people to conduct guerrilla warfare. He quoted Lenin’s work entitled Guerrilla Warfare, “Evil does not exist in guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized and undisciplined activities that are anarchism” (quoted in Mao, 1937, p. 46). The Party used propaganda and leadership to organize people into guerrilla squads that could be assembled into larger units. The Party taught the people of an area to arm and to organize into two groups: one for combat and another for self-defense. The combat group was smaller and composed of persons willing and able to fight full time. They were generally to remain near
their homes, in the terrain that they knew well, and they were to be led by local officers to facilitate cooperation with local people. The self-defense group was made up essentially of the whole population. The people performed “local sentry duties, securing information of the enemy, arresting traitors, and preventing the dissemination of enemy propaganda” (1937, p. 80).

Mao recognized that protracted guerilla warfare had an international dimension. He knew that international material aid and sympathy against Japan would be invaluable, and he knew propaganda directed against enemy soldiers and against the Japanese home population could enhance and accelerate the demoralization of the Japanese war effort. Mao thought the oligarchic nature of the Japanese regime would lead to the disaffection of the Japanese public, with catastrophic effect on their ability to conduct the war. This is a very important insight. Today, insurgents specifically target the home population of states engaged in counterinsurgency in order to undermine their will and force the withdrawal of foreign soldiers. With global communications available today, these efforts have tremendous potential to succeed, and therefore, foreign counterinsurgents must take measures to mitigate and respond to this threat (Claessen, 2007).

Mao was emphatic about the need for guerrilla soldiers and political cadres to treat the people well. He thought a large part of Japan’s problem in China was due to their “peculiar barbarity” (1938, p. 14) in their treatment of the Chinese people, and their tendency to engage in “naked plunder” (1938, p. 23). These actions created an environment of absolute hostility among the peasants that Japanese operated among, so they found themselves surrounded by a hostile people. The people’s hostility greatly facilitated the ability of the Chinese resistance to organize the people and operate with impunity among them. This is also a key point for modern counterinsurgents. Mao knew that foreigners already suffered a disadvantage because they were
not like the local people in culture, speech, or mannerisms. It is important the counterinsurgent not to add to that disadvantage by mistreating or humiliating the people.

Mao was also emphatic that guerrillas must treat the people well in order to gain and maintain their support. He promulgated his famous “three rules and eight remarks” to enforce his desire that guerrillas treat the people with respect. These were:

Three rules:

- All actions are subject to command.
- Do not steal from the people.
- Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks:

- Replace the door when you leave the house.
- Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
- Be courteous.
- Be honest in your transactions.
- Return what you borrow.
- Replace what you break.
- Do not bathe in the presence of women.
- Do not without authority search those you arrest.

Finally, Mao is credited with providing a model of guerrilla warfare that has become a commonly-used taxonomy for describing the present nature of the struggle and the level of organizational development of the insurgent organization (Kalyanaraman, 2003). While Mao’s formulation of the model in On Protracted War was very contextual to the Chinese experience in the 1930s, Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap used the model successfully against the U.S. in the 1960s-70s, and made it popular among scholars and practitioners of irregular warfare. According to Kalyanaraman (2003), the first stage consists of preparation to organize the people politically, engage in propaganda, and create bases. Violence during this phase is limited to selective terror, assassinations, sabotage, and small guerrilla actions. The second stage is characterized by an increase in the intensity of guerrilla operations and the political expansion of
the movement from its initial base areas into adjacent areas to enlarge the “liberated zones.”

Once the guerrilla movement has gained sufficient strength to approach parity with government forces (and its foreign supporters), has formed regular formations capable of offensive actions against the regime, and has established itself as the de facto government in significant areas of the national territory, it shifts to the third phase of insurgency, characterized by “mobile war” in which it attacks and destroys the enemy state.

**Tying the Loose Ends: Galula**

David Galula was a French officer who served in World War II, and also gained experience in irregular warfare in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria. His book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, originally written in 1964, has become a textbook for the conduct of counterinsurgency war. It is required reading for mid-career U.S. Army officers in service schools, and Nagl, in his foreword to a 2006 reprint, described Galula’s work as having “primacy of place in the canon of irregular warfare.” My assessment is that his book is the single most concise, comprehensive and useful study of counterinsurgency. It explains the nature of insurgency, explores strategic issues, and also suggests tactics that are effective in the majority of cases. It is well worth reading in its entirety.

Galula understood that all warfare seeks political goals, but that the conduct of what he termed “revolutionary war” was particularly political in its nature. Contrary to conventional war in the Western tradition where politics take a backseat during the conflict and emerge again at the conclusion of hostilities, the operations designed to secure the objective in insurgency—the people—were “essentially of a political nature” (p. 9). He argued that every military move had “to be weighed with regard to its political effects and vice versa” (p. 9).
In order to succeed, Galula argued, the insurgent needed the ideological power of a cause that would motivate people to participate in the one-sided, asymmetric struggle against the government, which wields all the power of the national state. The cause was necessary to attract the critical mass of active participants, and create an environment filled with passive supporters who would not betray the movements of guerrillas and political cadres. He knew that the cause must attract the sympathy of a substantial portion of the populace; an insurgency with a narrow base among the people will likely fail. At the beginning of the conflict, the cause was the only real asset of the insurgency, whereas the government had the army, police, civil administration, and all the instruments of power.

He also observed that the cause was often a negative statement, “Since it is easier to unite ‘against’ than ‘for,’ particularly when the components are so varied, the general cause will most probably be a negative one, something like ‘throw the rascals out’” (p. 24) So the word “grievance” can also describe the reason people are fighting the government.

Galula, like Mao, understood that “revolutionary war” was asymmetric in its nature. He pointed out the advantages of the government were many:

Endowed with the normal foreign and domestic perquisites of an established government,[the counterinsurgent] has virtually everything—diplomatic recognition; legitimate power in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; control of the administration and police; financial resources; industrial and agricultural resources at home or ready access to them abroad; transport and communications facilities; use and control of the information and propaganda media; command of the armed forces and the possibility of increasing their size (p. 6-7).

Yet, the government’s great advantage in assets was balanced by the great responsibility it had to maintain order in the face of an insurgency. Against this, the insurgent had the attraction of his cause; the strategic initiative, in that, he could potentially operate and organize for a long time
before the government became aware of his activities; and the fact that disorder is much easier to produce than order.

Galula knew that the people were the center of gravity in “revolutionary warfare.” He wrote that effective government requires the “tacit or explicit agreement of the population” (p. 8), while the insurgency requires the “complicity of the population [which] is the key to guerrilla warfare… and it has been expressed in the formula of the fish swimming in the water” (p. 50). He explicitly stated that the people were the “objective,” that the side which successfully controlled the population would win the conflict. He knew that without the support of the people, the insurgents could conduct “commando-style operations” using the same tactics as guerrillas, but could not fight “true guerrilla war,” and that without the people, guerrillas cannot be distinguished from bandits (p. 19).

Furthermore, the people provide intelligence—both ways. They provide intelligence to the side they favor and deny it to the other, to the side which protects them, or to the side which can threaten them most effectively. Galula conceived of the population as made up of a minority of active supporters of the insurgents, a minority of loyalists, and a great mass of people who are essentially neutral, and who decide who they will support based on which side is likely to win. He wrote, “Intelligence is the principal source of information on guerrillas, and intelligence has to come from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe” (p. 72).

The most succinct statement of the importance of winning the support of the population, which is much more important than merely killing guerrillas, is:

A victory is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. If one is destroyed, it will be locally re-created by the other; if both are destroyed, they will both be re-created by a new fusion of insurgents from the outside… A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population (emphasis added) (p. 77).
Propaganda is a tool used to gain influence over the population. The insurgent has an advantage in that he can lie and misinform, and he is judged by what he says rather than by what he does. On the other hand, the government has responsibilities to the population. Its actions speak louder than its words, and if the government lies, it will likely be found out, and is discredited for good. So for the government, propaganda is a secondary weapon; it can be used to inform, but not to mislead the people. Nevertheless, propaganda was critical to the counterinsurgency effort.

Either antagonist must be able to control the population in order to win. The insurgent will sell its cause to enlist support, it may threaten people who are not supportive, or it may kill those that it believes cooperates with the government. The government can use a variety of tools to increase its control over the population of a contested area. Galula advocated taking a census so that officials understand who belongs in the local area, and can plan interactions with the population that are appropriate for the level of security. In gathering the census, soldiers and other officials meet with and inform the people and engage in face-to-face propaganda to solicit support. The government will also impose restrictions on movement—no one can leave his home for more than 24 hours without a travel pass, and no one can entertain out-of-town visitors without a visitor’s pass. The system of passes not only controls the movement of persons, but provides an “alibi” for the people to refuse to help the guerrillas. The government might also order the people to do some work in their community, with pay, because it makes the people work with the government, and the “order” also provides an alibi.

The tactical principles that govern “revolutionary war” are the familiar guerrilla tactics espoused by other authors. Mobility is critical to both sides. Galula adds that guerrillas can avoid effective efforts in a single jurisdiction by moving into an adjacent one, and back as
necessary. Galula also recognized that dispersal was essential for the survival of guerrilla forces. The insurgents will mass for an attack, and then disperse to avoid the counterstroke. In this way, the insurgent often gains the tactical initiative. The government cannot refuse battle because it must protect the population, which means that most engagements are fought on the guerrilla’s terms. The guerrilla, on the other hand, will always refuse battle accept on his terms because he often has nothing to defend. If the population of an area is supportive of the guerrilla, the government cannot find him and bring him to battle. If the population supports the government, it may be possible to catch him and force him to fight.

Galula agreed with Mao that insurgency required protracted conflict. In fact, this is how Galula distinguished between insurgency and coup d’état. In essence, the guerrilla must pursue a strategy of protracted conflict because he lacks the strength to oppose the state, and because the state is not so weak as to be vulnerable to a coup. In fact, the insurgent may be at work for a long time before the government becomes aware of his presence. In this sense, the insurgent has the strategic initiative; he can be at work without the government knowing it is under attack.

Galula thought that guerrillas were unlikely to succeed against a moderately strong state. The insurgent army would have to grow into one that is capable of defeating the national army in order to win the conflict militarily.

Secure bases and “liberated zones” are important to guerrilla success. The insurgent provides administration in liberated zones, providing the order that the government could not, and demonstrating his superiority to the government. Late stage insurgencies have regular military bases with a functioning government providing services. For example, Mooney (2007) describes the manner in which Hezbollah provides social services in southern Lebanon. Also,
secure bases are required to raise, train, and equip the insurgent regular armies that will destroy the national army.

Effective organizations are required to control and direct the population. The insurgency usually will begin with the formation of a party that initiates the struggle by organizing supporters and teaching the population the aims of the struggle. Since the first violent guerrilla actions are designed to sow disorder, a loose, decentralized organization can be effective, but as the insurgency grows, the organization must increase in complexity and take on more complicated tasks.

The importance of having an organization that would, in turn, organize and direct the activities of the people could not be overstressed. Galula wrote:

Objectively, there is no difference between ordinary, everyday bandit activity in almost every country and the first guerrilla actions. What makes it possible for the guerrillas to survive and to expand? The complicity of the population. This is the key to guerrilla warfare, indeed to the insurgency, and it has been expressed in the formula of the fish swimming in the water. The complicity of the population is not to be confused with the sympathy of the population; the former is active, the latter inactive, and the popularity of the insurgent’s cause is insufficient by itself to transform sympathy into complicity. The participation of the population in the conflict is obtained, above all, by a political organization (the party) living among the population (emphasis added), backed by force (the guerrilla gangs), which eliminates the open enemies, intimidates the potential ones, and relies on those among the population who actively support the insurgents. Persuasion brings a minority of supporters—they are indispensable—but force rallies the rest. There is, of course, a practical if not ethical limit to the use of force; the basic rule is never to antagonize at any one time more people than can be handled. (p. 49-50).

He added, “In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at the grass roots” (p. 79). Trinquier (1964), another French counterinsurgency expert, agreed with Galula about the importance of the people, and directed that the counterinsurgent create similar organizations to oppose insurgent organizations and to control and direct the people’s resistance to insurgency. Ultimately, both the government and the insurgency also want to create local self-defense organizations—militias,
concerned citizens’ groups, neighborhood watches, etc—loyal to its side, that can defend the homes of its members and assist the mobile units of the fighting armies.

The government had an additional organizational problem; it must coordinate the activities of military, police, administrators, social workers, etc. Effective counterinsurgency requires that it creates the organization necessary to coordinate the activities of all government organs within an area.

Galula documented two “patterns” that insurgent movements might take. The first, which he termed the “orthodox pattern,” he associated with insurgent movements led by national communist parties. It is broken down more than Mao’s model, but is very similar.

Step 1. Create the party. Ideally the party is disciplined, strong, well-organized, both in its open and clandestine organizations.

Step 2. Create the united front. The party initiates or joins other opposition organizations in a united front. It will abandon its allies as it becomes necessary and as movement grows strong. The united front takes subversive action to forestall the regime’s reaction to the growing insurgency. The party shepherds its allies toward the party’s agenda, and prepares the populace for accepting party leadership

Step 3. Initiate guerrilla war. The party begins guerrilla war when conditions are “ripe” (p. 49). Operations may be characterized by classical guerrilla tactics—small raids, ambushes, hit and run attacks, etc. They may also include acts of terror, such as assassinations, bombings against non-military targets, and the like.

Step 4. Movement warfare. The party creates regular military formations in order to destroy the government’s army. Insurgent units attack and overwhelm isolated regular units with brief contacts, but do not attack entrenched regular units in prepared positions. They do not
abandon guerrilla war, but move guerrilla operations into contested areas. Now, the insurgents have a multi-tier organization: regulars, guerrillas; and militias that defend the “liberated zones.”

Step 5. Annihilation campaign. When the insurgent gains military, political and psychological dominance his activities will increase and overwhelm the state.

Galula posited some counterinsurgency responses to the orthodox pattern. In the “cold” struggle, while the insurgent is operating in Steps 1-2, many insurgent activities are legal and low profile. The government may not be aware of embryonic insurgent organizations, or legal insurgent organizations may be mistaken for peaceful political opposition groups. When the government becomes aware of the insurgent’s unlawful intentions, they can: 1) Act against insurgent leaders; 2) Act to decrease conditions causing popular dissatisfaction and redress grievances, co-opting the insurgent’s cause; 3) Infiltrate the movement and lessen its effectiveness; or 4) Reinforce its political machine so that it is less assailable.

The first of these works for totalitarian regimes, who need not worry about the legal niceties; if cause has little appeal; if the government already has accepted legal powers permitting action; or if the government can prevent publicity. The second is a great solution to eminent insurgency because it takes real action toward solving the country’s problems. The third might or might not work depending upon the effectiveness of the insurgent leaders and upon the ability of the agents to disrupt insurgent activity. The last may take the form of developing capacity to repress the people, or it may consist of developing the capacity of the government to deliver services, provide security, and promote confidence.

During the “hot” struggle, when the insurgent is operating in Steps 3-5, he is easier to attack with the various organs of the state, and more repressive legal measures become palatable to the government, the legal non-insurgent opposition, and the population, and therefore, easier
to approve. Conventional forces have difficulty coming to grips with guerrillas who refuse to stand and fight, because the regulars often lack the intelligence needed to find and fix the guerrillas. This intelligence must come from the populace. Destroying guerrillas is not decisive because they can be replaced faster than they are caught or killed, unless there are simultaneous activities designed to control and influence the population to support the government. The population’s support will supply the intelligence needed to bring guerrilla bands to battle and destroy them, and to identify and remove members of the insurgent’s political organization located among the people.

The other pattern, Galula termed the “bourgeois-nationalist pattern.” The advantage of this pattern is that it did not rely upon years of grass roots organizational effort. If successful, it could leap from Step 1 to Step 3 in a short time, but its use of terror had the potential to backfire and alienate the people. This pattern differed from the orthodox pattern only in Step 1-2; Steps 3-5 were identical. The first two steps were:

Step 1. Engage in blind terror. The purpose of terror was to gain publicity, and perhaps attract supporters. Operations are completed as spectacularly as possible to attract the most attention. The regime could respond with press censorship to lessen the effects of insurgent operations.

Step 2. Engage in selective terror. The purpose here is to isolate the counterinsurgent from the masses, to involve the population in the struggle, and to gain at least passive complicity from the populace.Selective terror involved killing low-ranking government officials, policemen and teachers—those close to the population—to make terror effective in local communities. The insurgents collect money from the population; some refusing to pay are executed, those who do pay are now complicit with insurgents.
Galula provided a way to assess the strength of a regime, and its capacity to resist insurgency. The characteristics of the regime to be assessed in determining its strength, and therefore, in determining the need for capacity-building efforts to head off insurgency included:

1) Absence of problems- without problems the insurgents have no cause.
2) National consensus- willingness of the people to accept and back the regime.
3) Resoluteness of counterinsurgent leadership.
4) Counterinsurgent leaders’ knowledge of counterinsurgency.
5) The machine for the control of the population (political structure, administrative bureaucracy, police and armed forces).
6) Geography.

Galula observed that a regime need not be popular to be strong; many totalitarian states are quite strong because they have efficient, perhaps brutal, state machinery capable of sowing “terror and mutual suspicion” (p. 27). This iron control rules out the launching of insurgency. Against such a state, terror was still possible, because it could be executed by a single individual, but one person or a small group is unlikely to overthrow a state. Finally, an external crisis may provide the opportunity for insurgency to begin.

In summing up his discussion of the prerequisites for successful insurgency, Galula writes: “(1) a cause, (2) a police and administrative weakness in the counterinsurgent camp, (3) a not-too-hostile geographic environment, and (4) outside support in the middle and later stages of an insurgency—these are the conditions for a successful insurgency” (p. 42).

Galula posited some “laws and principles” of counterinsurgency—tenets that must be obeyed in order to conduct a successful counterinsurgency effort. They are:
First law: Support of population is as necessary for counterinsurgent as for insurgent. The government can “clean” an area, but cannot prevent the return of insurgents to that area once the mass of soldiers are withdrawn for use elsewhere. Only the people of the area can keep it clean, therefore the government must organize the people to resist the return of insurgents.

Second Law: Support is gained through an active minority. In any insurgency, an active minority supports the government and another minority supports the insurgency. The neutral majority can be influenced, and must be influenced in order for one side to gain victory. In counterinsurgency, the government will need to identify local leaders that are loyal and organize them against the insurgent minority. Galula went so far as to say, “Every operation, whether in the military field or in the political, social, economic, and psychological fields, must be geared to that end” (p. 77). Effective propaganda shows that the government is superior to the insurgent alternative.

Third Law: Support of population is conditional. The government must demonstrate that it has “the will, the means, and the ability to win.” (p. 78). Loyalist local leaders cannot emerge and the neutral majority will not rally to the government’s cause until they feel somewhat secure from insurgent threat.

Fourth Law: Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential. Fighting an insurgency is very expensive; the government will need to assemble and concentrate a great deal of resources and many personnel. This implies the need to concentrate forces in prioritized areas, clean them, organize them, and move to other areas.

Galula also laid out a cookie-cutter operational plan for the defeat of insurgency in a selected area (p. 80):
1) Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.

2) Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength; install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.

3) Establish contact with the population, and control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.

4) Destroy the local insurgent political organizations.

5) Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.

6) Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the incompetents; give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.

7) Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.

8) Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.

When a village or neighborhood is cleared, small groups of solders can live there to prevent the insurgent from returning until village self-defense can fend for itself with little help. The turning point is when leaders emerge among the loyalists; once they are committed, they do not want the insurgent to return. Once basic security is assured and population is separated from the insurgent, the government can use its interagency capabilities to provide services and gain popular support.

In closing, one of the key points Galula has for military officers engaged in counterinsurgency is that “the objective [in revolutionary war] is the population, military and political actions cannot be separated, and military action—essential though it is—cannot be the main form of action” (p. 84). This is important because a military officer, trained his whole professional life to seek out and destroy his enemies, finds it easy to forget that the objective is
the people. When he stomps about the countryside searching for a few guerrillas that he will have a hard time catching, he is likely alienating the population that he needs to succeed. He forgets that the destruction of a few guerrillas is of little gain. If he antagonizes the people, they are easily replaced or augmented. It is not unusual for a clumsily-executed military operation to create more guerrillas than it destroys. An American infantry lieutenant and Iraq war veteran of my acquaintance (who I will not identify) recently told me that “we made more insurgents than we killed or captured.” When I asked why, he said “because we behaved too aggressively in sector, and pissed the people off.”

State of the Art: Guidance from Multinational Corps- Iraq (MNC-I)

Students and practitioners of counterinsurgency can find a concise (three pages), up-to-date statement of the principles that govern the U.S. military’s interaction with the Iraq population in the guidance statement of the Multinational Corps- Iraq (MNC-I) to subordinate military units. MNC-I is the headquarters for U.S. and multinational forces in Iraq. The priority of military efforts (“our focus”) is to protect the Iraqi populace; this “is the clearest, most visible demonstration of excellence in the practice of counterinsurgency” (p. 1). Furthermore, MNC-wants to reduce the level of violence, creating time for the government of Iraq to become more capable and secure, creating the opportunity for national reconciliation, and facilitating the “delicate tasks” of capacity-building and gaining the confidence of the people.

The statement instructs military leaders to think about, talk about, and operate on the bases of ten principles:

1) Secure the people where they sleep. Counterinsurgents must secure the people in their homes with their families. Once they are secured, they cannot be abandoned or the insurgent
will return, and terrorize those who have supported the government. Units must control areas that are clear, and should prioritize effort to secure most important areas first.

2) Give the people justice and honor. Foreign hands that bring security must also give justice and honor or the people will view multinational soldiers as oppressors and occupiers.

3) Integrate civilian and military efforts. Also, soldiers must get out of armored vehicles and walk; it is impossible to influence and control people when soldiers are isolated from them.

4) Intelligence is developed at low level. Patrols of all types observe things that combine to form intelligence, and a steady U.S. presence may lead to unsolicited tips. It is the low-level intelligence that is most actionable.

5) Every unit advises Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) partners. Building the capacity of Iraqi forces is U.S. soldiers’ ticket home. The ISF will eventually carry the load; they must be trained and ready as soon as possible. Also, multinational units must be aware that Iraqis will emulate them—for better or worse.

6) Include ISF in multinational operations. Foreign troops do not have a “feel” for the environment, and local troops lack the firepower and supporting arms available to U.S. units. The combination of the two is more powerful than either alone.

7) Attack the network behind the improvised explosive device (IED). Forces must use all assets—unmanned aerial vehicles, rapid reaction forces, helicopters—to pursue IED-setters. Units need to be proactive, innovative and follow-up to defeat insurgent networks.

8) Be first with the truth, and know that actions are louder than words. Units must communicate with local audiences frequently and honestly.
9) Make people choose, but convince them to choose to support the government. All activities should be oriented toward getting people to choose the government. Once they, choose, counterinsurgents must protect them from insurgent reprisal.

10) Influence local leaders who can sway blocks of people to support the government.

Challenge of the 21st Century

Know the Enemy, Understand the Social Environment

Lewis (1990) describes the reasons why many Muslims resent the West in general and the U.S.—the leader of the West—in particular. Lewis points out that Islam is not a monolithic creed and that Muslims are not of the same mind, nevertheless, some observations apply in general. Muslims remember a time when Islam was a dominant force and the community of Muslims was the world’s leading civilization. The last several hundred years of Western dominance is humiliating to them, and frustrating to them because God is supposed to favor them. Moreover, they cannot shut us out; Western media pervades the world and threatens to change who they are. Also, they deeply resent the friendship the U.S. shows to Israel. In the Arab mind, Israel has stolen their lands and dislocated their people. Al Qaeda and similar groups wish to expel Western influence from Muslim lands. Lewis believed, in 1990, that the West should refuse to over-react to minor provocations and let the Muslim world come to terms with modernity without too much interference.

Freidman (1999) described the pressure that modernization and globalization puts on all societies. This pressure is most acute on traditional societies that have not had the opportunity to modernize at a pace that provides for more gradual change. These societies desire to participate in the bounty of the modern world, but are concerned about the changes modernity will require
of them. Their conflict produces frustration and anger that may be directed against Western
models of modernity (Lewis, 1990).

Huntington (1993) described the “clash of civilizations” that he thought brewing along
the frontiers of Islam. The very different ways in which Western and Islamic peoples view the
world will lead to cultural conflict that is different from the ideological or economic conflict of
the recent past. Religious differences and differences of values will force Western and Islamic
“civilizations” (and perhaps that of the Chinese) into conflict. The matter is made more acute by
the fact that modern communication and transportation systems are making the world smaller.
Modernity is uprooting people from longstanding local identities, and non-Western peoples are
demonstrating the will and the capability to resist Western cultural dominance.

In working with foreign cultures, it is critical that soldiers, diplomats, relief and
development workers understand key features of the host culture. This reduces
misunderstanding and provides insights that can make capacity-building efforts much more
effective. It is hard to over-state the value of this understanding; as McFarland (2005) argued,
“engagement with local populaces has become so crucial that mission success is often
significantly affected by soldiers’ ability to interact with local individuals and communities” (p.
62).

Patai’s The Arab Mind (2002) attempts to explain features of the Arab belief system and
behavior that might mystify a Western observer. Patai appears on reading lists for soldiers, but
he is not without critics, especially since Patai himself was an Israeli. De Atkine (2004), who
has assigned the book as an instructor, and has written a foreword to a 2002 reprint of Patai’s
work, published a short summary of this criticism, and answered it somewhat. In another article,
De Atkine (1999) explains characteristics of Arab culture that Westerners perceive as inefficient,
but an understanding of which should improve the performance of advisors and soldiers assigned to assist Arab allies. This article was required reading for my mid-career Army officer’s course at the Command and General Staff College. Connable (2004) attempted to explain Iraqi cultural facets to a military audience by figuratively describing Marines as being from Mars while Iraqis are from Venus.

Renzi (2006) argued the need for “ethnographic intelligence” in understanding the cultures and needs of people in the host nation. Particularly, he thought the most pressing need was to understand the social networks of the populace so that insurgents could be separated from the people in the least violent way. He qualified the term, “intelligence,” suggesting that “information” was equally descriptive, but that he retained the use of “intelligence” to highlight the “military utility” of the information gathered (and perhaps to sell a gentler notion to pragmatic Army officers). In context, this “utility” is not confined to combat operations, but is useful for getting along with the people of an area and for helping them meet their needs.

Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, and Smith (2006) described the Army’s attempt to better understand cultural differences and local issues at very low level. They described the formation of Human Terrain System (HTS) teams made up of area experts, linguists, and social scientists, particularly anthologists, that conduct research and fieldwork to better understand the "cultural intricacies" (p. 8) of the local people. The intent is to understand grievances and motivations that increase the people’s support for the government and decrease violence by mapping the “‘human terrain’—social, ethnographic, cultural, economic, and political elements of the people among whom a force is operating” (p. 9), and enhance military units’ ability to “understand and respect the culture” (p. 11). The program was widely criticized by anthropologists as “enabling the kill chain” (Vine, 2007) and violating professional ethics by subverting the principle of informed
consent. How can anyone “consent” to be interviewed or studied when the researcher arrives with an armed band of soldiers? Weinberger (2007) reported on the disapproval of the executive board of the American Anthropology Association for HTS for a variety of professional ethics reasons, including “informed consent.” The collision of professional ethics and counterinsurgency effectiveness is unfortunate; The New York Times (Rohde, 2007) reported a brigade commander in Afghanistan as saying that combat operations in the brigade’s area had decreased by 60% since the arrival of the human terrain team assigned to his brigade. The Christian Science Monitor (Peterson, 2007), probably reporting on the same HTS team, described the anthropologist as perceiving progress not only in understanding the people, but also in the evolution of the soldiers’ attitudes toward the people as moving “away from firepower to a smarter counterinsurgency” (An Anthropologist at Work Section, Para. 4). The main beneficiaries of a decrease in violence are the local populace.

Cobbold (2006) thinks that 21st century warfare will often be characterized by asymmetry simply because no entity can compete effectively against the U.S. or another Western military. He argued that the 21st century environment is also characterized by the global media capable of instantaneous transmission of images around the world. This ability makes the media message extremely influential and affects the manner of decisions made by democratic governments. Furthermore, he thought countries will attempt to shape the world through coalitions, but these will be coalitions of the willing, because international organizations are plagued by the unwillingness of member states to bear shares of the burden.

Krulak (1999) describes the need for the “three block war” fought by “strategic corporals,” those low level leaders whose actions will have strategic consequences for good or ill. The actions of junior leaders and individual soldiers have a large effect on the perceptions of
local people and, via global media, the perceptions of a world audience. Moreover, the line between combatant and non-combatant will be increasingly blurred, and adversaries will resort to asymmetric warfare to achieve their aims.

Claessen (2007) explains how insurgents “attack” the public will of democratic populations to force the withdrawal of their armies from areas of conflict. Using the global media, insurgents craft messages that counterinsurgency efforts are ineffective and repressive, and that insurgents are fighting for a good cause. By persuading the populace of the foreign counterinsurgent that the struggle is inappropriate and unworthy of the cost, the insurgent effectively defeats the foreign counterinsurgent and removes his support from the local national government. This has the interesting effect that democratic governments prefer to keep counterinsurgency efforts low key, so that the war is conducted out of mind of the home population. Lynn (2005) acknowledges that popular support in the U.S. is the “center of gravity” of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts abroad, and so the defeat of U.S. popular will results in the failure to achieve policy objectives.

**Urbanization**

The world’s population numbered 2.52 billion in 1950 and had increased to 6.46 billion in 2005. Moreover, the percentage of the population living in urban centers has increased from 29.0 percent to 48.7 percent during the same period (UN, 2006). The huge increase in urban populations has had many effects on facets of modern life, including the practice of insurgency.

The first wave of modern urban insurgency took place in the 1960s and 1970s, mostly in Latin America and Europe. Most of these movements were branded “terrorist” due to the nature of their operations, which included robbery, assassination, kidnapping, and bombings.
(Kalyanaraman, 2003). Some movements, like the Baader-Meinhoff, never had wide popular appeal, while others, such as the Provisional IRA managed to attract a corps of supporters.

The “urban guerrilla” derived several advantages from operations in urban areas. Niezing (1974) observed that urban society was vulnerable to disruption by political violence, which could cause great inconvenience and considerable expense to the government. The government might also over-react to insurgent violence and act in repressive ways that prove counter-productive. Indeed, sometimes insurgents acted deliberately in an attempt to provoke repression (Mack, 1974). Kalyanaraman (2003) pointed out that the mass of people provide good cover for insurgents in the same way that inhospitable terrain hides the rural insurgent. However, urban insurgents can remain in contact with the people which they hope will support their cause. Kalyanaraman also observed that leaders of revolutionary political movements of this time were likely to be city-bred and educated, and had difficulty relating to the peasantry. Finally, an urban setting provided better access to the media that insurgents need to spread their message and draw attention to their cause. Wiberg (1974) even speculated that some urban insurgencies may be products of the media, instead of manipulators of the media.

Perhaps the most important theoretical implication for urban insurgency is that the support of the people is not as critical as it was for a Maoist model people’s war. The urban guerrilla can support himself by robbery and ransom, and need not rely on the people’s support for food or other supplies (Marighella, 1969). Moreover, the clandestine nature of the urban guerrilla is difficult to reconcile with the need to mobilize the masses for victory (Kalyanaraman, 2003). Perhaps this is a reason that few urban guerrillas can claim any real success (Wiberg, 1974) unless they are accompanied by a legal political wing that can publicly represent the same interests and constituencies.
The legacy of urban guerrillas for 21st century practice is that insurgents can hide more easily among urban masses than in remote hinterlands, and still have access to the local and global networks which support them. Additionally, the practice of insurgency requires the manipulation of media to garner support, spread terror, and influence the political decisions of their adversaries (Kilcullen, 2005; Metz and Millen, 2004). Like the 1970s urban guerrilla, 21st century insurgents can disrupt society and coerce governments without a great deal of local popular support. This implies that counterinsurgency designed to separate the insurgents from the people are less effective than when facing a popular movement like that described by Mao.

**Global Insurgency, Most Serious Threat**

The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (2006) states that global terrorists groups constitute the most serious threat to U.S. security for the next several years. The possibility of these groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction makes them even more dangerous. This assessment of the threat they cause has provoked some discussion as to the best ways to counter this threat.

Kilcullen (2005) and Lacy (2003) have argued that groups like al Qaeda and its affiliates are better perceived as a global insurgency than as a permutation of traditional terrorists. The implication of this argument is that theory developed for fighting al Qaeda and similar groups would be better based in, and developed from, counterinsurgency theory than from counter-terror theory.

Lacy (2003) pointed out that insurgencies arise out of discontent, when grievances are not or cannot be addressed within an existing political system. He observed that popular discontent permits the mobilization of people and resources with which to fight an established order. He believed that this described al Qaeda and its affiliates, with their effectiveness enhanced by
global communication and transportation technologies that allow them to mobilize globally rather than merely within a single nation. Lacy argued that existing low intensity conflict theory as embodied in then-current Air Force doctrine (he wrote before the publication of FM 3-24) was helpful to understanding how to combat this phenomenon. The theory taught that insurgency was a contest for “legitimacy” between the established order and those who were unhappy with it. The side which gained legitimacy in the eyes of the people won. Moreover, the legitimacy of a nation where attacks were taking place was not the only issue, but that the legitimacy of the U.S. as a global leader was also at issue. Finally, Lacy observed that popular perceptions had more to do with legitimacy than the actual actions of the actors involved, hinting that operations to manage perceptions are crucial to the effort on both sides. Lacy observed that the “multifaceted” approach demanded by counterinsurgency theory was the best way to enhance the legitimacy of the current order.

Kilcullen (2005) reviews the apparent strategy of Islamist groups and concludes that there is a “jihadist” movement, but that it consists of “a loosely aligned confederation of independent networks and movements, not a single organization” (p. 602). He argues that it is best understood, however, as an insurgency—“a popular movement that seeks to change the status quo through violence and subversion” (p. 604). Terror is merely a tactic that they employ along with propaganda, subversion, and open warfare.

The terrorist “paradigm” considers terrorists to be “unrepresentative aberrant individuals” with whom we will not negotiate so as not to encourage further terror (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 605). The insurgency paradigm recognizes that insurgents are representative of popular grievances which we might legitimately seek to redress through negotiation and compromise. These insurgents’ methods are unacceptable, but their grievances may be legitimate. This implies a
“whole-of-government” approach for addressing the conflict rather than merely a military or law enforcement approach.

Metz (1995) anticipated the changes in insurgency that threatened the sufficiency of then-current 1990s counterinsurgency theory. He observed that counterinsurgency doctrine in the U.S. was designed to address a Maoist people’s war, but that the nature of insurgency groups and the causes that motivate them were changing. Insurgency was becoming ethnically or religiously-based, and likely to advocate some form of succession or separatism. The problem for the local national government, if it was perceived as oppressing a particular sect or ethnic group, was that its (lack of) legitimacy was defined in ethnic terms. Since ethnicity is something that cannot be changed, it was difficult for the government to gain legitimacy among the meaningful segment of the population. Religions, of course, are similar in that people are unwilling to change. The implications for U.S. policy were that we could intervene in circumstances where there was little hope of resolution at any reasonable cost. Furthermore, the larger the U.S. commitment, the greater the psychological assurance to the local national government that it need not undertake appropriate reform, which exacerbates the problem and might prolong the conflict. Metz argues that the U.S. should be selective about where it chooses to intervene, should act as part of a coalition, and should seek indirect support options, rather than the commitment of U.S. forces.

Hoffman (2007) weighed into this debate by criticizing the “classicists’” influence in the new counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24). He thought the manual was a good start to understanding counterinsurgency, but that the classical writers were addressing mid-20th century insurgency and not the new variations of globalized insurgency characteristic of the 21st century. He details the changes he perceives in insurgency practice that should require changes in
counterinsurgency practice as well. He advocates the revision of counterinsurgency theory into “neo-classical counterinsurgency” to account for these changes.

However, the problem with the enlargement of counterinsurgency theory to account for global insurgency is that it may obscure the practices needed to address local insurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan. Those “classical” principles need to be understood at all ranks—private through general—in order to cope with large scale intervention within a nation. The more nebulous global insurgency networks will never be grappled with using significant military force (unless the insurgents choose it, such as al Qaeda in Iraq—and then counterinsurgency theory is not really helpful, because the “hearts and minds” of men who go to a country to fight Americans cannot be won), and so the average soldier need not understand the nuances of the global effort. This suggests that two counterinsurgency models might be more appropriate for two types of insurgency than one large model capable of handling both.

The seeds of synthesis (that the U.S. actually needs two models) may already exist. Metz and Millen (2004) argue that insurgencies may be classified into two types—national and liberation. They argue that existing doctrine focuses on national insurgencies, and that liberation insurgencies may require a different strategy. National insurgencies are ones in which “the primary antagonists are the insurgents and a national government which has at least some degree of legitimacy and support” (p. 2). Each side seeks to win over neutral persons in a contest for legitimacy. On the other hand, liberation insurgencies “pit insurgents against a ruling group that is seen as outside occupiers (even though they might not actually be) by virtue of race, ethnicity, or culture” (p. 2). The insurgents attempt to “liberate” their nation from alien occupation.

Metz and Millen (2004) also suggest two broad categories of counterinsurgency—victory and containment. In the former, the U.S. would assist a government, judged to be at least
somewhat legitimate, to defeat the national insurgency it faces. In the latter, the U.S. might attempt to contain the effects of a national insurgency against a government judged to be less legitimate, that is, where the insurgents have legitimate grievances the government is unwilling to redress. For liberation insurgencies, Metz and Millen believe a strategy of victory is a “very long shot” (p. vii) and that a strategy of containment would be more logical. Along these lines, the global insurgency of jihadist groups is a liberation insurgency in the sense that the jihadis have successively portrayed themselves as liberators to important segments of the Islamic world. Given their dispersion and global support networks, they cannot be defeated in any relevant sense. Therefore, a strategy of containing the effects of jihadists’ campaigns may be the best one to pursue.

**Current Debates and Contemporary Practice**

One debate is between the “hearts and minds” and the coercion schools of thought. The former is represented by most of the classic authors discussed above and embodied in current U.S. doctrine. Kahl (2007) in the course of reviewing FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* (2006) gives a quick summation of the coercion school of thought. The coercion school holds that counterinsurgents should use coercion to force the population to abandon any support for the insurgency. The school believes that the regime should increase the cost of supporting the insurgency by reprisals and collective punishments. The problem with this approach is two-fold. It ignores morality and violates Western values (Kahl, 2007) and surrenders the global struggle—a contest over ideals—to terror by adopting it. This also ignores the need to maintain domestic support for the counterinsurgency effort and ignores the value of the support of the rest of the world. Also, this approach, despite the clear success of repression in some cases, may not accomplish the objective. In many other cases, brutal repression has achieved only a temporary
effect, and in others it has strengthened popular resentment against the regime and therefore, strengthened the insurgency. Lynn (2005) observed that unrestrained or indiscriminate violence leads to the “three R’s—resentment, resistance, and revenge” (p.27). Kahl (2007) notes that some authors have observed that counterinsurgency theory effective against nationalists and communists in the last century may not be effective against religiously motivated guerrillas whose hearts and minds cannot be won.

Another debate stems around the need for additional counterinsurgency theory. Strickland (2005) argued that classical theory, appropriately applied to today’s situation, tells counterinsurgents what they need to know to be successful. The insurgencies currently facing the U.S. are not, in their essence, different from the insurgencies of the 20th century. His argument appears contextual to Iraq or Afghanistan, however, and may not consider the global insurgency suggested by Lacy (2003), Kilcullen (2005) or Metz and Millen (2004). Others agree that there were valuable lessons to be learned from the past. Sepp (2005), for example, thought it possible to extract a list of “best practices” from a study of historical cases. He generated a list of “successful operational practices” which included assurance of human rights for the populace, effective law enforcement, population control measures, and participatory political processes, among other things. Coffey (2006) and Andrade and Willbanks (2006) argued that the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam, which integrated security and development efforts within a single political unit, such as a hamlet or village, provided a model for a similar program adapted for Iraq.

Many others recognize the value of the old classics without suggesting that theoretical development should stop. Marston (2007) provided a review and summary of the work of Gwynn (1934), Kitson (1971), Galula (1964), and Thompson (1966) as a vehicle to
understanding and applying classic lessons to a changing environment. Tomes (2004) provided a summary and synthesis of Galula, Trinquier (1964), and Kitson (1971), highlighting common themes. He believed “rereading” the classics did not provide all the answers, but that reading them showed that some problems, and therefore some solutions, might not be original to the present. Still others think the contemporary environment requires a systematic re-examination of theory to determine what changes are necessary. Metz (1995) argued that U.S counterinsurgency doctrine (as of 1995) was based on a model of a Maoist People’s War, but that not all insurgencies fit the model. Therefore, he argued, some doctrinal assumptions might be obsolete. Metz and Millen (2004) took this re-examination seriously, producing theoretical progress by distinguishing between “national” insurgencies and “liberation” insurgencies.

Aylwin-Foster (2005), a British brigadier, offered the Army a friendly, but explicit and comprehensive critique designed to help improve U.S. government and Army counterinsurgency practices from early in the Iraq insurgency. A brief summary of his ideas, in his own words, reads like this:

My overriding impression was of an Army imbued with an unparalleled sense of patriotism, duty, passion, commitment, and determination, with plenty of talent, and in no way lacking in humanity or compassion. Yet it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiffly hierarchical outlook, a pre-disposition to offensive operations, and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head-on. (p. 3).

The pre-disposition to offensive operations was such that it led to the neglect of hearts and minds activities and efforts to build legitimacy, and often created unnecessary conflict with the Iraqi people. Aylwin-Foster even quoted an unnamed Army colonel as saying in 2004, “If I were treated like this, I’d be a terrorist!” (p. 3).

Chiarelli and Michaelis (2005) explained the multi-disciplinary activities of the 1st Cavalry Division during its tenure in Baghdad in 2004-2005. It organized activities along
several “lines of operations” (LOOs), including combat operations, train and employ security forces, essential services, promote governance, and economic pluralism, all performed primarily by soldiers. These activities had the expressed aim of enhancing the legitimacy of local institutions, and producing the following: “A secure and stable environment for Iraqis, maintained by indigenous police and security forces under the direction of a legitimate national government that is freely elected and accepts economic pluralism” (p. 7).

**Some Tentative Syntheses**

A reading of several classic works of counterinsurgency suggests tentative agreement on some principles that is worthy of further investigation. These are:

1) Insurgency is political in its nature; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); and a long-term solution is political, not military, in its essence.

2) The people are the center of gravity. The side that can command the people’s allegiance will win. This idea has several corollaries:

   a. The government must be able to provide security. If it cannot, it cannot be perceived as legitimate, and cannot command the people’s allegiance.

   b. People can be persuaded. Respectful treatment, redress of grievances, and provision of services from the government will decrease perceived grievances and reduce support for insurgency.

   c. Propaganda is important in persuasion. It affects popular perceptions of both insurgent and counterinsurgent.

   d. People and resources need to be controlled to separate the insurgents from the people who support them.

3) There are fundamentals to guerrilla operations.
a. A secure base is essential to a growing insurgent movement.

b. External support is critical to having sufficient resources to be successful.

c. Tactical mobility and dispersal are essential for insurgent survival.

4) There are also fundamentals to counterinsurgency.

a. The government must understand the limits of its authority and behave in accordance with the law. It must be perceived as fair and as providing equitably for all citizens.

b. Interagency, multi-disciplinary, multi-faceted operations are necessary to win.

There is no long-term military solution to any significant insurgency.

We have seen that Lawrence, Mao, and Galula explicitly state most of these ideas. Gwynn (1934) and Guevara (1963) have similar views. More recent practice and scholarship suggest that these essentials are still important. This study will ascertain which other classic theorists say the same, the extent to which current scholarship agrees, and then determine what additions to theory are required to address the changing nature of 21st century insurgency.
Chapter 3

Methodology

Introduction

To address the question, “What principles do military officers need to understand to conduct counterinsurgency effectively and humanely?” it is necessary to seek an appropriate method for inquiry. The selected methodology needs to be sufficiently rigorous to claim validity, but also sufficiently flexible to cope with the data that exist.

The diversity of scenarios addressed by insurgency and counterinsurgency is great, varying with the geographical location, the time in which the struggle occurs, the intensity of the struggle, the technology available, the cultural features of the combatants, and a host of other issues. Moreover, the theoretical literature is either the work of practitioners going about their business or scholarship that is a study of these practitioners’ activities in pursuit of their goals.

Therefore, the broad study of counterinsurgency is not amenable to quantitative analysis, and the literature reflects this. Only a few studies have made use of even the simplest quantitative analysis. Merom (2003) used opinion polling data to explain why democracies lose small wars. Scholars (Dix, 1983; Davies, 1962; Wickham-Crowley, 1987) have used statistics to describe socio-economic conditions inside a country facing a revolutionary struggle, compare cases, understand where revolutionary movements are likely to occur, and determine their prospects for success. These studies are useful in understanding why men are fighting—their cause or grievance. The cause motivating insurgents will emerge as a key principle in this study, but the detailed investigation of causes is not my topic.

More often, the study of counterinsurgency uses a qualitative methodology because of the large number of variables that affect the outcomes of these struggles. FM 3-24 (2006), the
Army’s and Marine Corps’ new counterinsurgency manual, endorses case study methodology, stating “principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations… must be grounded in historical studies, [and] informed by contemporary experience” (quoted in the Foreword). A search through Academic Search Complete using the keyword, “counterinsurgency,” located 255 articles, many of which were historical case studies or studies of the “contemporary experience.” Among the classics, Callwell (1906) illustrated his points by reference to specific cases; Galula (1964) interpolated theory from a study of cases, whether those in his own experience or those he studied; and West (1985) examined the experience of a Marine squad posted in a Vietnamese village with such detail that he reconstructed dialog among the participants based on extensive interviews. Nagl (2002), a widely read study—nine of the 255 articles discussed above were reviews of this book—compared the capacity of the British Army to learn and adapt in order to defeat insurgency in Malaya with the inability of the U.S. Army to do the same in Vietnam.

Some studies examined the work of one theorist in detail. Clark (1988), for example, examined the work of Guevara. Others compared the work of two theorists. Anderson (1970), for example, compared Mao and Lawrence, concluding that the “similarities far outnumber the differences” (p. i) despite “the very different environment and times in which each of our leaders, Mao and Lawrence, practiced their strategy and tactics” (p. 13). Marston (2007) provided a review and summary of the work of Gwynn (1939), Kitson (1971), Galula (1964), and Thompson (1966) as a vehicle to understanding and applying classic lessons to a changing environment. Tomes (2004) provided a summary and synthesis of Galula, Trinquier, and Kitson, highlighting the common themes. These works provide some precedent for this study, but I could locate no study that attempts comparisons as ambitious or as systematic as this study.
Meta-Synthesis

A variety of qualitative approaches exist, but the objective of this study requires a synthesis of theoretical literature. Finfgeld (2003) defines a metasynthesis as “a complete study that involves rigorously examining and interpreting the findings (versus the raw data) of a number of qualitative research studies” (p. 894).


Finfgeld (2003) found the results of meta-synthesis are “theory building, theory explication, and substantive descriptions of phenomena” (p. 893), and Finlayson and Dixon (2008) described the aims of meta-synthesis as theory building, theory development, and higher level abstraction. Estabrooks, Field, and Morse (1994) encouraged researchers to move past “one shot” research studies and to continue the “incremental business of accumulating knowledge” (p. 510).

I want to compare the findings of several key counterinsurgency theorists on a list of principles that represent the understanding required for effective counterinsurgency practice. This is a theory-building activity that moves past individual case studies, and is designed to inform practice. Meta-synthesis appears to offer an appropriate methodology.
Problems with Meta-Synthesis

Despite its potential usefulness, daunting methodological problems exist in synthesis (Dixon-Woods et al., 2007). McCormick et al. (2003) report that qualitative meta-analysis techniques “are relatively new and poorly developed” (p. 934), and that “there is a sense that qualitative meta-analysis has not yet achieved legitimacy with qualitative researchers” (p. 935). Finlayson and Dixon (2008) add that qualitative meta-synthesis is “time consuming and is laced with an array of unresolved philosophical, methodological and terminological controversies” (p. 60).

Since no firm guidelines for meta-synthesis exist, a wide variety of methodologies have been used to complete meta-synthesis projects (Finfgeld, 2003). There is even considerable debate that guidelines are necessary. Some researchers argue that guidelines restrict creativity and limit the accumulation of some types of knowledge. Others argue that some standards are necessary to ensure sufficient rigor for any given research to claim validity (Whittemore, Chase & Mandle, 2001). Dixon-Woods, Shaw, Agarwal, and Smith (2004) argued there is no consensus on the characteristics that define quality research, and no consensus on the need for criteria for quality. Sandelowski, Docherty, and Emden (1997) stated one reason for the lack of firm criteria for the selection of research reports for inclusion in meta-synthesis is the belief that valuable data may be lost if unnecessary restrictions exclude some research. For this reason, it is critical that researchers disclose the criteria they have used to select studies for meta-synthesis. Finfgeld (2003) also states there is no consensus on which data sources are best for meta-synthesis.

Despite these difficulties, Dixon-Woods et al. (2007) report that the number of papers reporting synthesis of qualitative research is increasing, and that the rapid increase in the
development and criticism of qualitative methods is increasing the rigor of this research. McCormick et al (2003) observe that published accounts of qualitative findings have proliferated in the health sciences. Moreover, the synthesis of qualitative research is moving from nursing into other disciplines (Dixon-Woods et al, 2007).

A wide variety of synthesis methods are in use and under development to enable qualitative meta-synthesis (Finlayson & Dixon, 2008). These range from interpretive approaches to integrative techniques with strict research strategies similar to those of quantitative meta-analysis. Finlayson and Dixon (2008) conceive of the range of methodologies as a continuum rather than a set of discrete techniques. They believe that the purpose of the study drives the selection of synthesis method. The proper framing of the research question provides focus and determines preliminary search criteria.

Overview of Method

While the details of the method will continue to unfold below, an overview at this point may be helpful in discussion of reliability and validity, population and sample, development of the instrument, and data management.

My expectation was that the answer to the research question would consist of a list of principles or concepts that specify key understanding that counterinsurgents need to be effective and humane. An initial inquiry suggested that there exists some tentative consensus upon these principles among “classical” authors in the counterinsurgency literature. I believed that further systematic inquiry could uncover a set of these principles.

The inquiry consisted of a three stage process. In Stage 1, I conducted a meta-synthesis of classical counterinsurgency literature. I developed criteria for evaluating works of counterinsurgency theory to determine which are “classics.” I used a coding sheet developed
during preliminary research to organize quotes from each work. I selected from among the quotes of a single theorist those that best represent his position on each topic. These were inserted in a comparison matrix alongside the quotes of other theorists on the same topic. Then I searched for similarities and contradictions for explicit treatment in the findings.

As the classic works were somewhat dated, in Stage 2, I examined additional influential and scholarly works, particularly in periodical literature, in order to determine what additional concepts needed to be considered. For example, urbanization has had an effect on the usually rural character of past irregular war. What additional considerations must counterinsurgents take into account when dealing with an insurgency that is based in major urban centers? What theoretical changes does urbanization require? Additionally, the globalization of media and the growth of the internet have made insurgency possible on a global scale. Kilcullen (2005) and Lacy (2003), among others, have argued that Al Qaeda is best perceived and addressed as a global insurgency. What changes to theory does this require? Stage 2 exposed several modifications to the principles found in Stage 1.

In Stage 3, I coded recent periodical literature into the modified list of principles obtained in Stages 1 and 2. This tested the validity of theoretical syntheses gained in Stages 1 and 2 against recent experience and scholarship, and provided one additional opportunity for synthesis.

**Reliability and Validity**

In qualitative research, reliability and validity are difficult because of the inherent subjectivity of the subject matter, and the focus on the “uniqueness of human situations and the importance of experience” (Harper, 2005, p. 46). Whittemore et al (2001) examined the debate surrounding the need for standards for validity and reliability in qualitative research. There is no agreement that standards are necessary, and certainly no agreement on what they should be, so
Whittemore et al (2001) reviewed ten different sets of validity criteria. There is a great deal of variation in the words used to signify criteria, but many are analogous to reliability and validity concepts found in quantitative and experimental research. Reliability refers to the stability of findings and validity refers to the truthfulness of findings (Whittemore et al, 2001).

Several concepts appear useful to this investigation. Whittemore et al (2001) cite Lincoln and Guba (1985) as translating “internal validity to credibility, external validity to transferability, reliability to dependability, and objectivity to confirmability” (Whittemore et al, 2001, p. 523). Lincoln and Guba also identified credibility as among the most important considerations for qualitative research.

The research design proposed here addressed these criteria well. Credibility was addressed by the strict procedure by which I had chosen the “classics” and by the use of quotations from each theorist, thus allowing him to speak for himself. Transferability was addressed by the synthetic nature of the analysis. Several classical theorists agreeing on a principle suggests the results are transferable. Dependability was also suggested by the design; the dispersal of the theorists in time—1899 to 1972—and additional synthesis sought in current periodical literature in Stage 3 of the study suggested the results are dependable over time. Finally, the clear explanation of the path I followed as I moved through the research provides confirmability, or what other authors have referred to as auditability (Sandelowski, 1986).

The single largest threat to the credibility of this study was the possible existence of significant biases that I hold. The use of research teams is known to increase the integrity of qualitative results (Finfgeld, 2003), in part, by reducing the bias associated with any individual researcher. Because no funds are available to hire additional researchers/raters, and the large quantity of the data precludes use of volunteer raters, no other rater was available to develop
coding instruments or to code results separately. This study addressed rater reliability issues only by the submission of the coding instrument to a subject matter expert in counterinsurgency prior to coding and the submission of completed raw coding sheets to the same expert for confirmation that the coding was reasonable. This expert, Mr. Stephen Henthorne, agreed that the coding sheet provided a fair, but not exhaustive, list of candidate principles, and that the completed coding was a fair representation of the theorists’ work.

Additional techniques for reducing bias associated with the researcher and enhancing credibility include the use of supporting evidence in the form of “raw data,” particularly quotations. Finfgeld (2003) found that quotes are very useful evidence in publication because they allow readers to grapple with the original evidence and remove a layer of researcher interpretation. My design was heavily dependent upon quotations, which also offered a mechanism to limit the influence of my biases on findings.

Triangulation—the “approach of using several referents in a study to converge on the truth” (Harper, 2005, p. 48)—is also useful to building credibility. A degree of triangulation exists in Stage 3 of the design where current periodical literature was compared to the results of synthesis from Stages 1 and 2.

**Preliminary Research and Researcher Perspective**

Finfgeld (2003) observed that in the “investigations conducted since 1994, it appears that most researchers had done preliminary studies in their metasynthesis areas of interest. Thus, in many cases, the researchers’ own incremental work appears to have guided their topic selections” (p. 898). While I have no published work on this topic, the preparation of this dissertation is not the first encounter I have had with the theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. Moreover, the often subjective nature of qualitative inquiry suggests
reliability is improved and possible biases illuminated by an understanding of the researcher’s perspective and background. Therefore, I offer a brief explanation of my experience and perspective.

While still in high school, I read a number of histories, memoirs, and fictional accounts of the U.S. experience in Vietnam. Perhaps my interest was due to my father’s service there, and perhaps, as I grew older, my plans to serve as a military officer increased my interest. I studied topics relating to counterinsurgency, revolution, and Marxism as part of an undergraduate degree in international affairs at Georgetown University from 1985-1989. American counterinsurgency efforts in El Salvador were ongoing during this period, and the Reagan Administration was caught illegally assisting Contra rebels against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

While at Georgetown, I participated in ROTC, and upon graduation was commissioned as an Army officer. I was assigned as a light infantryman, which meant that I walked a lot in preparation for deployment to places where foot-mobile infantry would be important to any war effort. At that time, this implied employment in primarily rural areas (today foot-mobile infantry is considered key to controlling urban areas as well). It also meant I was well trained in the small unit tactics that would characterize counter-guerrilla fighting in rural areas. Accordingly, I studied works on small unit actions and counterinsurgency, primarily in Vietnam and Malaya.

The recent resurgence of my interest in counterinsurgency and the motivation for this inquiry is due to my experience in American counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq in 2004-2005. I was posted as the Louisiana National Guard’s 256 Brigade’s civil-military operations (CMO) officer (a brigade is composed of about 3800 soldiers). CMO officers are responsible for many Army interactions with the local populace and the local national government, and for programs which are not concerned primarily with providing security to the populace. CMO officers have
no command authority; rather they are members of a commander’s staff, and advise him on civil-military matters.

My location in the hierarchy of military units was such that I was able to speak often to Iraqis on the street, an opportunity that was rare for my counterparts at higher headquarters, and also able to participate in policy discussions at the embassy, which was not possible for my counterparts at lower levels.

My observations convinced me that the Army could conduct more effective and more humane counterinsurgency if we could understand this environment and the special considerations it requires, and then use this understanding to inform training and future operations. The purpose of effective counterinsurgency is not to kill more guerrillas, but to shape the environment so that the local national government can govern justly and legitimately. Effective counterinsurgency makes this possible, decreases resistance to the government, persuades people that their interests lie with the government, and decreases violence. Effective counterinsurgency is a moral activity.

After Dr. Burnett, then committee chair, agreed that counterinsurgency warfare was an appropriate topic for Human Resource Education, I began a more systematic examination of counterinsurgency theory. The purpose of this activity was to understand the nature of the data, determine feasible research questions and begin development of an instrument for coding data in subsequent investigation.

**Instrument Development**

In preliminary research, before any design for this inquiry had suggested itself, I read the work of Callwell (1906), Mao (1937/1965), and Galula (1964). I began to see similarities in their thought. I constructed a preliminary instrument, essentially an outline, using Mao’s *On
Guerrilla Warfare as a base, addressing topics in the same order that Mao did. Mao was selected because I was familiar with the work of Mao through my professional experience, and because he is very influential in the development of theory of insurgency and counterinsurgency (Metz, 1995; Hoffman, 2007). Hammes (2004) thought Mao the intellectual father of a form of modern protracted asymmetric war, which Hammes termed “fourth-generation war,” and which he defined as war “which uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit” (p. 2). Fourth-generation warfare began with Mao’s efforts in China against the Nationalists, the Japanese, and the Nationalists again. Hammes believes the U.S. will not need to fight conventional war in the near future because no nation or non-state actor can oppose America in this way. Rather, opponents’ relative military weakness forces them to adopt asymmetric war, and they choose this arena because history suggests asymmetric war can succeed. Hammes argues that the U.S. has lost this form of war three times—in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia—and that it is the form of war waged by U.S. opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan. O’Neill, in the foreword to Taber (1965/2002), credits Mao with providing a blueprint and the “main inspiration and impetus” (p. vii) for the successful prosecution of revolutionary war in China, in Vietnam against both French and Americans, and in other places around the world. Since the Vietnamese general Giap was a student of Mao (Kalyanraman, 2003), the best of his American adversaries also became students. Mao’s influence is significant, and so I thought Mao a reasonable place to start.

I began outlining the work of other theorists using this preliminary instrument. The purpose of this activity was to organize my notes across theorists so that their thoughts on each topic suggested by Mao appeared in the same order for each theorist in my notes. After
constructing several of these outlines, I observed some tentative syntheses, and refined my preliminary instrument, grouping ideas by their relationship to each other rather than in the order Mao addressed them. I used this secondary instrument to pool the ideas of several theorists as part of the literature review, and again I refined my instrument to better capture the ideas expressed. At this point, I developed the method outlined above to systematically pursue the investigation, and increase the rigor of the study.

The third revision instrument is, of course, still heavily dependent upon my judgment, and therefore potentially subject to my biases. In order to improve the reliability of the instrument and limit the effect of my bias, the instrument was submitted to a subject matter expert on counterinsurgency appointed to my committee for this purpose. This committee member, Mr. Stephen Henthorne, reviewed and assisted me to refine the instrument and confirmed my coding of the data.

**Population**

Stage 1 required a means to identify “classic” theorists from among the many authors who have published on insurgency, counterinsurgency, guerrilla war, or irregular war. I defined a population of works by combining the reading lists of several military organizations and one soldier-scholar, who wrote a rigorous and influential book based on research into the counterinsurgency efforts in Malaya and Vietnam, and who is widely read among military officers today. Details are found below.

In order to be considered “classical,” a theorist must meet the following criteria:

1. he must have significant influence in the study and practice of counterinsurgency (influence criterion),
2. his work(s) must focus on the strategic or operational level of the struggle (level criterion), and

3. he must be a practitioner of insurgency or counterinsurgency, who wrote during or after his experience (a theorist who wrote before his experience is regarded as a “scholar” and is deferred from Stage 1) (practitioner criterion).

The first criterion required a method for gauging the theorist’s influence. I have identified four authoritative “reading lists.” The first is published by the Commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center (CAC) which provides the headquarters for the Army’s Command and General Staff College, the mid-career service school for officers. The staff college is regionally accredited to confer the degree of Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS), and is an important influence on doctrine. The second is a compilation of two lists from the U.S. Marine Corps. One is entitled “Supplemental Reading for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels Deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan” and the other is “Counterinsurgency Reading List: For Marines deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.” Each is divided into sections; I have selected the sections in which the word “counterinsurgency” appears and then pooled the lists. The third is compiled by Nagl (2006), who is author of a recent influential book (Nagl, 2002) that appears in other lists. His list is published under the title Learning Counterinsurgency: An Annotated Bibliography (2006). The fourth is the section of the annotated bibliography contained in FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (2006) labeled “The Classics.” FM 3-24 is a manual jointly published as Army and Marine Corps doctrine for counterinsurgency. A theorist appearing on three of the four lists had sufficient influence to be considered “classical.”

The second criterion required an examination of the work in question. If a work is focused on tactical tasks—that is to say, it is about doing things right, whatever those things
are—it was not the subject of this study. Rather this study examined works with strategic or operational implications—doing the right things—and that is specific enough to provide candidate principles. Hammes (2004) distinguished concisely between tactical, operational, and strategic. He wrote:

U.S. military discussion divides war into strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The strategic level sets the goals, allocation of resources, and overall timeline for the conflict. The operational level develops the campaigns that tie a series of battles together to achieve the strategic goals. The tactical level covers the battles themselves; the techniques, procedures, and tactics for fighting (p. 215).

The third criterion required an examination of the theorist’s biography. A practitioner must have participated in a significant insurgency or counterinsurgency effort, and have written about his experience during or after the struggle. His theoretical work must be informed by previous experience for inclusion in Stage 1. The sample selected for Stage 1 met all three criteria.

Pooling the reading lists produces a population of 87 total works. Several authors appear multiple times: Lawrence appears in the list three times; Fall, Metz, O’Neill, West, Krepinevich, and Maass all appear twice. Of the 87 works, nine have multiple authors: eight have two, and one has three. In addition, three have institutional authors including the U.S Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the Russian General Staff.

Sample

Applying the influence criterion to the compiled list, I obtained a sample of eight theorists with the requisite influence to be classics. Callwell (1906), Galula (1964), Kitson (1971), Lawrence (The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1926/1991)) appeared on all four lists. The remainder, Thompson (1966), Trinquier (1964), West (1972/1985), and the Marine Corps’ Small
Wars Manual (1940), appeared on three lists. All eight met the level and practitioner criteria as well.

Multiple works by Lawrence were included in the population. The Seven Pillars of Wisdom appeared on all four component lists, Twenty-seven Articles (1917) appeared on two, and Anatomy of a Revolt (1920) appeared on one. I read all three. The first is a memoir that recites the events of the Arab Revolt during World War I and Lawrence’s participation in them. It reads easily, and while it is possible to extract Lawrence’s thought from the book, it is a tedious process because the purpose of the book is to tell the story of the Arab revolt, and not to relate observations that have theoretical implications. The second is Lawrence’s advice to European advisors taking positions at the sides of Arab leaders. Although some observations are dated, the work is still a must-read for officers assigned as advisors, and a helpful source for increasing cultural awareness, but it is not a work of the theory of counterinsurgency. The last is a periodical article intended to explicitly and concisely state Lawrence’s theoretical observations. Exercising my judgment as researcher, I coded this work in preference to The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. I also extracted quotes from the Twenty-seven Articles (1917) in order to capture Lawrence’s thoughts on troop professionalism and cultural awareness that were insufficiently contained in Anatomy of a Revolt.

Additionally, two works by West were in the population. One is a description of the battle of Fallujah, which appeared on the Marine Corps’ component list. It is not appropriate for our analysis as it refers to operations that are conventional in character, and not of the same nature as counterinsurgency. His other work, The Village (1972/1985), differs somewhat from the other works in the sample. It tells the story of a Marine Combined Action Platoon (CAP) that lived in a Vietnamese village and fought alongside Vietnamese militia to provide security
for the villagers and for the nation-building activities of the South Vietnamese Revolutionary Development cadres. This work has the character of a memoir also, although the author was not a member of the squad depicted in the book. Still it is possible to extract theoretical implications from the work, and since no more concise version of West’s thought exists, I coded *The Village*. West was a Marine officer in Vietnam who had the opportunity to observe the operations and counterinsurgency success of the CAPs. His Vietnam experience shaped his perception of events, and led to the writing of *The Village* following series of interviews with the Marines and their Vietnamese comrades.

The remaining six “theorists” (one is the Marine Corps) appear only once each in the population, so I coded each of their works. I was unable to determine the original publication date of the first edition of Callwell’s *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (1906). A second edition was published in 1899 and a third in 1906. Callwell studied a large number of small wars, classified them, and extracted lessons for the conduct of them. It is therefore a synthetic work in itself, and contains some theoretical implications that are remarkably valid today. I obtained a scanned copy of the 1906 edition. I have read and coded portions of the book. Other portions contain tactical advice that is obsolete and not germane to the study. I coded Chapters 1-4, 7, and 11.

The Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* (1940) was produced following the Marines’ participation in numerous small wars between the Spanish American War and the outbreak of World War II. It presents characteristics of small wars, principles of strategy, advice on the relationship of the Marines with the State Department and local national agencies. These topics are of interest to this study. It also gives advice on organization of the force (based upon Marine
organization of the time), training, and tactical advice. These issues are beyond the scope of this study. I coded all sections of Chapter 1, portions of Chapter 2, and all sections of Chapter 5.

Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964) was the work of a French officer with experience as a combatant in World War II and Algeria. He also witnessed irregular warfare as an observer in China and in Greece. In the early 1960s, he reflected upon his experience, studied historical cases of insurgency, and produced a highly influential work on the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. Nagl, in the Foreword to a 2006 edition of Galula’s work, describes it as “having primacy of place” among the classics of counterinsurgency, and Galula is required reading for U.S. Army officers in service schools. I coded this entire book.

Trinquier (1964) was also a French officer with experience in China, Indochina, and Algeria. He goes into great detail describing the organization of the guerrillas, especially the urban guerrillas who fought in Algiers. Trinquier also elaborates on the organization the government needs to counter insurgent efforts. He is controversial because much of what he says can be considered advocacy of what might be termed politely as “aggressive” interrogation. I coded his whole book.

Thompson was among the key architects of the British counterinsurgency success in Malaya, and was for a time an advisor to the U.S effort in Vietnam. His work, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966), is an account of a successful counterinsurgency effort. I coded the entire book.

Kitson (1971/1974) was a British officer with counterinsurgency experience against the Mau Mau in Kenya and also in Malaya. He served as a peacekeeper in Cyprus, and when writing *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping*, originally published in 1971, he was a brigade commander serving in Northern Ireland. I coded the entire work.
In order to improve reliability, I have applied my judgment only to the selection of a less-widely known work of Lawrence, and ignored portions of Callwell’s book and the *Small Wars Manual* because they do not meet the level criterion.

**Data Management**

Quotes from classic theorists were coded into an instrument—a list of principles representing the understanding required of effective counterinsurgents—to allow comparison and synthesis of theorists’ thoughts on each principle. The instrument is found at Appendix A. Stage 1 culminated with the synthesis of a list of principles from the classic theorists.

Since the “classic” works were somewhat dated, in Stage 2, I examined more recent periodical literature to determine what modifications to the list of principles were necessary. Specifically, I wanted to account for urbanization and the globalization of information systems. I uncovered several important implications, but found the results were remarkably stable. Stage 2 findings were pooled with Stage 1, and the theoretical implications examined, resulting in a couple of observations that may have theoretical importance.

Stage 3 tested the list of principles emerging from Stage 2 against additional contemporary scholarship. The goal of this stage was to confirm or refine the list as appropriate, identify consensus for addition to the theoretical base, and identify issues subject to contention for additional research. I accomplished this stage by coding recent literature into the same instrument as used in Stage 1 until saturation occurred. Disagreements among theorists were discussed explicitly in the findings.
Chapter 4

Findings of the Study

Stage 1: A Firm Foundation

The procedure used to collect and sort data was straightforward. I simply read the works, highlighted anything I thought important to the theorist’s argument or otherwise interesting. Then I transferred these quotations into a word processor document and sorted the data by principle onto a series of coding sheets, one per theorist, as approved by the subject matter expert, Mr. Henthorne.

Sorting provided some difficulty. Many items could apply to multiple principles, and the principles themselves are often closely related. For example, the principle that “Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support” is related to “Government must establish the rule of law” because a great deal of the behavior proscribed by professional behavior is also proscribed by law, and the results on the counterinsurgency effort of widespread unprofessionalism is exactly the same as if the government behaved unjustly in violation of the law. Another example is that “The political struggle is always primary” is very closely related to “Military action is not sufficient to win.”

Furthermore, the outline structure of the coding sheet contained in Table 4-1 shows relationships between principles. For example, the idea that the people are the center of gravity implies the government will need to provide them security, to influence and persuade them, and to control them with reasonable restrictions in order to earn their support and isolate them from the insurgency, which denies their support to the insurgency. In turn, people are influenced and persuaded by troops that behave professionally and are culturally aware, and by an effective information campaign that explains government actions and highlights progress. Of course,
propaganda is an important means of persuasion for the insurgent as well. So a quotation dealing
with persuading the populace might also be appropriate for propaganda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-1: Coding Categories and Candidate Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: The population is the center of gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support to the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign counterinsurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases to build strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During coding, the outline structure was not available to me; I had to code a quotation discreetly under a principle. If it could fit under two or even three principles, I coded that quotation under each initially. During the selection of data for the results tables, I attempted to remove this redundancy and avoid repeating quotes. I was almost successful.

I frequently had more relevant quotations than I could possibly use, and therefore, I selected those that I thought best represented the theorist’s thought and that provided the most clarity without commentary from me. It is possible that another researcher could pick other
quotations that would be just as valid, but I do believe the ones I have selected are representative of the theorists’ ideas, and therefore, the overall intent of each theorist and the consensus among all theorists that emerge from meta-synthesis are more certain. In other words, another selection of other quotes would not greatly change the findings that emerge from this stage of the research.

I tried to keep my commentary to a minimum so that each theorist could speak for himself. I clarified acronyms, supplied the antecedents for pronouns, and such things to assist the reader. I may have added emphasis to several quotations; any italics in the results are mine. Quotation marks in the data are the theorist’s. I also found it useful on occasion to shorten a quotation to make room in the results tables for an additional quotation or to clarify the significance of the quotations to the principle under which I listed it. Typically, I dropped dependent clauses, lists of examples, or other things. I worked hard not to change the meaning of the sentence. Table 4-2 contains a couple of examples of this from Thompson (1966).

Any investigation of this nature is open to charges of proof-texting, the process by which someone carefully selects quotes to agree with a prior agenda or to serve a conscious bias. I had no agenda, with the possible exception that I think that the practice of counterinsurgency can be made more humane with the understanding of the principles I have illuminated here, and as is suggested by the title of this report. Fortunately, there is significant evidence to believe governments and armies can practice counterinsurgency humanely; indeed, most of the theorists thought it expedient as well as right to do so. Otherwise, I simply wished to know the answer to the research question. I had no conscious bias.

Additionally, my experiment is very replicable. I found the books at the university and local public libraries. The works of Callwell, Lawrence, and Trinquier I was able to find online. Callwell and Trinquier are also available as reprints. While it is extremely unlikely that another
researcher would choose the exact same quotations, I think it would be difficult to come to much
different conclusions on this set of principles.

Table 4-2: Samples of shortening a quotation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long</th>
<th>Short</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and</td>
<td>There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with guerilla actions for government forces to act outside the law,</td>
<td>with guerilla actions for government forces to act outside the law…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the excuses being that the processes of law are too cumbersome,</td>
<td>Not only is this morally wrong, but… it will create more practical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not</td>
<td>difficulties… than it solves (Thompson, 1966, p. 52).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>designed for an insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to be</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong, but…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government than it solves (Thompson, 1966, p. 52).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another researcher could also identify other principles for investigation. I do not imagine
that my list is exhaustive, and I know that there are other principles in the literature. For
example, I have identified the need for a study of insurgent organizations and detailed treatment
of intelligence gathering and handling to be important. They are topics for additional research.

General Findings

A rigorous and systematic meta-synthesis of this literature produced considerable
consensus. Small differences of opinion among the theorists are due largely to differences of
perspective based on the time a theorist wrote or the side of the conflict he was on. Callwell,
Lawrence, and the Marines (Small Wars Manual) wrote before World War II, before the
beginning of the Cold War and the break-up of the colonial empires. Their perspective on asymmetric conflict differs somewhat from the writings of Trinquier, Galula, Thompson, and Kitson.

Callwell, for instance, discusses broader phenomena than insurgency. “Small wars” include campaigns of conquest and punitive campaigns as well as the protracted suppression of insurrection. Therefore, while sustained operations generally featured regular troops opposed by irregulars in a struggle characterized by guerrilla tactics, Callwell’s regulars did not face an insurgency in the same sense as did the post-war counterinsurgents. Since his irregulars were defined by their ethnic, tribal, national or religious identities, and not by their adherence to a political cause, Callwell’s observations on “the cause” are different from the other theorists. Furthermore, given the transportation and communication infrastructures available in the time in which Callwell’s case studies were played out, governments did not truly penetrate into the vastness of the lesser-developed world. Consequently, Callwell is very thin on interagency cooperation and on the use of propaganda.

Lawrence’s work was qualitatively different from the others because he was the sole insurgent in the group. Consequently, he had little to say about counterinsurgent operations such as interagency functioning or the rule of law, and nothing to say about the need to provide security for the population. Those topics just do not come up.

The Marines, by contrast, have much to say about interagency functioning, particularly with the U.S. State Department, and also much to say about multi-national cooperation with various agencies of the host nation. Since their interventions in small wars invariably were assisting other countries, they also had a lot to say about troop professionalism and cultural awareness.
Trinquier, Galula, Thompson, and Kitson are all products of the post-war world, where “wars of national liberation” were often led by communist parties and assisted by the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China or their client states. Their adversaries were usually students of Mao, and practiced a rurally-based, mass mobilization model following Mao’s stages of insurgency. (A brief discussion of these stages is found in Chapter 2.) Only Trinquier had much to say about urban insurgents whom he termed “terrorists.” Each of these men espoused remarkably similar counterinsurgency strategies. Trinquier, Galula, and Thompson gave comprehensive treatment of the development of national strategy and operational campaign plans. Kitson covered much of the same ground, but his work focused primarily on the Army’s role in counterinsurgency.

Indeed, these theorists collectively make up what might be termed a “classical school” of counterinsurgency, and Hoffman (2007) termed the modern proponents of their ideas “classicists” in his critique of current doctrine as represented in FM 3-24. He thought FM 3-24 is too dependent on the prescriptions of the “masters,” and that their theories need more adaptation to meet the needs of 21st century counterinsurgency. His ideas will be examined more closely in Stage 2. Hoffman specified the past “masters” as Kitson, Galula, and Thompson.

West’s work was also different from the others. He presented an ant’s eye view of the Vietnam War as conducted in a single village. He describes the activities of a small collection of individuals conducting their own tiny war. It is not a work of theory, but if theory is what we get from reading the others, a detailed example—theory in action—is found in West, and we can observe many of the principles there.

Despite the differences in perspective, there is remarkably little contradiction. A theorist may not address an issue, or he may approach from a different direction, have a different
emphasis, or merely imply something someone else explicitly states, but no one really
contradicts another on any important theoretical principle except one. The sole exception is this:
Trinquier argues that harsh interrogation of “terrorists” is necessary and morally justifiable. His
argument runs like this: An urban guerrilla—a “terrorist,” in Trinquier’s words—is fighting for a
political cause that he considers noble (or he has been coerced into terrorism); he is not merely a
psychopath or a criminal for profit. Although he attacks civilian targets, it would be hypocritical
to condemn him out of hand for this given the widespread bombing of cities by regular forces
during WWII. But he does not carry arms openly or wear a uniform or distinctive insignia, and
so he does not face the risk of a regular soldier that he will be killed or injured in combat.
Rather, the risk he runs is that he will be interrogated harshly if he is caught. The interrogation is
justified because he has time sensitive information the counterinsurgent needs to locate other
terrorists. Since they do not wear uniforms, there is no other way to find them. Once he has
given this information, Trinquier specifies that he is to be treated well. The consensus among
other theorists is that “harsh interrogations” are wrong and not beneficial to the government’s
cause. At a minimum, such activities reduce support for the government among the populace
and also around the world.

A couple of additional issues emerged from the synthesis that are appropriately discussed
before moving into the details. Trinquier, Galula, Thompson, and Kitson all described
successful insurgency as moving through several recognized stages enroute to victory over the
government. These are very similar to those stages described by Mao, and that are termed by
contemporary scholarship as the “Maoist model” (Metz, 1995). A discussion of Mao’s three
stages is contained in Chapter 2. A similar five-stage model of insurgency posited by Galula is
also discussed in Chapter 2, and Galula also presents an alternative model more reliant upon terrorism. Again, I have discussed this briefly in Chapter 2.

Modern scholars (Hoffman, 2007; Metz, 1995) are questioning the value of the rurally-based, mass mobilization “Maoist” model in light of recent experience. They argue that urbanization has led to the decline of rurally-based insurgencies; that urbanized insurgencies are less dependent upon the support of the people; and recent insurgencies, such as the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, have not exhibited the sequential progression through recognized phases (Hoffman, 2007) and detailed organizational structure of Maoist insurgencies (Metz & Millen, 2004). This issue will addressed more completely in Stage 2.

With the exception of Callwell, each theorist thought that each side the conflict was supported by an active minority of the population. There was widespread consensus that the bulk of any population would prefer to sit the conflict out. Therefore, the struggle was one between two active minorities to influence and control the uncommitted middle. The situation is not different from U.S. political cycles in which each major party has a “base” and the election results hinge on the ability of the parties to attract the support of voters in the center.

Despite the criticisms of Hoffman (2007) and others, the classic theorists still have a lot to say. A particular tactic or program adapted for 1960s rural communities may not translate directly to 2000s urban centers. However, if one steps back away from the specifics of the situation, changing his perspective somewhat, he will see that the purposes for which these tactics and programs were pursued are still valid. Tactics will change; indeed FM 3-24 (2006) says that “if a tactic works this week, it might not work next week” (p. 1-28), but the principles involved probably do not change, because human needs have not changed that greatly. Kilcullen (2007) called a list of principles similar to mine “enduring fundamentals” (slide 68).
For example, Thompson advocated a program to build strategic hamlets, and Trinquier used the same term to denote a similar program. A strategic hamlet is both a collection of homes grouped in such a way as to provide security for its residents from insurgent coercion and the organization of the population of the hamlet for self-defense. Strategic hamlets also allow the government to provide services to hamlet residents. While converting a common rural hamlet into a strategic hamlet is an obsolete idea for rooting out insurgency among urban populations, the purposes—the principles—that the hamlets served are still operative. People still require security from insurgent coercion so that they are free to choose to support the government. They still need be controlled to prevent them from helping the insurgent, whether voluntarily or otherwise. They still want and need essential services. As Thompson put it: “The fundamental aim behind the establishment of the security framework based on strategic hamlets is to isolate the insurgent both physically and politically from the population” (p. 123). While this is more difficult in an urban area, and will require different tactics and techniques, the fundamental aim is still valid. So the classics can still inform us.

The generic campaign strategy contained in FM 3-24 (2006) is described “clear-hold-build” and denotes the concentration of counterinsurgent power in a specified area experiencing overt insurgent activity. The counterinsurgent “clears” the area of insurgents (and ultimately of underground political organization members); “holds” it against the return of insurgents; and “builds” a government presence there so that the people are controlled and can see the benefit of supporting the government. Thompson referred to a similar process as “clear, hold, winning, won” (p. 111); Galula advocated an eight-step plan with greater detail, but along the same lines; Trinquier and Kitson advocated similar methods.
Examination of the Results by Principle

Extracting relevant key syntheses requires the detailed examination of the results tables, and the interpolation of these results. The results are presented as a series of thirteen three-page tables dispersed among my remarks in the following pages. Each table includes a brief discussion of the implications of the syntheses. More detail is found in the remarks below.

**Principle 1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary.**

Insurgents, like all other people who fight wars, are fighting for some political objective. Unlike conventional war, however, the antagonists in an insurgency campaign do not discontinue or greatly subordinate political action to military action. Rather, the political objective is always in view, political action takes place prior to and alongside military action, and achievement of political effects always takes primacy over military action. An examination of the results in Table 4-3 will demonstrate the following:

The cause (or grievances) provides the motivation that mobilizes a sufficient following to begin insurgent political organization and eventually violent resistance to authority. Callwell does not examine this phenomenon in great detail, but he does observe that 19th century Afghans resisted the British because they perceived British presence in Afghanistan to be an “insult to their nation and their faith” (p. 36). Lawrence articulated the cause of the Arab Revolt as seeking “national freedom” (p. 2). The *Small Wars Manual* noticed that revolutions start with “real or fancied grievances” causing popular “discontent” until resistance breaks out (p. I-20). It goes on to say explicitly that causes are political, social, or economic, which foreshadows the dominant trend of post-war counterinsurgency. The post-war theorists—Trinquier, Galula, Thompson, and Kitson—understand the essentially political nature of the conflict. Their comments with theoretical import focus on the value—indeed, the necessity—of an insurgent
Table 4-3. Principle 1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
<th>Lawrence (1920)</th>
<th>Small Wars Manual (1940)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The country [Afghanistan] was in a state of suppressed anarchy, the tribes scarcely acknowledged the Amir to be their King, and when Kabul fell and the government such as it was, ceased to exist, the people generally cared little; but they bitterly resented the insult to their nation and to their faith which the presence of British troops in the heart of the country offered (p. 36).</td>
<td>In it was Sherif Ali, Feisal’s eldest brother, with more tribal forces, and the beginnings of an Arab Regular Army, recruited from officers and men of Arab Blood, who had served in the Turkish Army, and were now willing to fight against their old masters for their national freedom (p. 2). We were serving a common ideal, without tribal emulation, and so we could not hope for any esprit de corps to reinforce our motives (p. 18). Then I thought of the Arab aim, and saw that it was geographical, to occupy all Arabic-speaking lands in Asia. In the doing of it we might kill Turks; we disliked them very much. Yet ‘killing Turks’ would never be an excuse or aim. If they would go quietly, our war would end. If not, we would try to drive them out: in the last resort we would be compelled to the desperate course of blood, on the maxim of ‘murder’ war, but as cheaply as possible for ourselves, since the Arabs were fighting for freedom, a pleasure only to be tasted by a man alive (p. 7).</td>
<td>Political revolutions ordinarily result from real or fancied grievances, existing in the minds of some few men, but many other causes may produce them. The word ‘discontent’ sums them up. As soon as discontent becomes general a party is formed which often becomes strong enough to offer resistance to the government (p. I-20). In some revolutions, particularly of economic origin, the followers may be men in want of food (p. I-30). The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people (p. I-18). The application of purely military measures may not, by itself, restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social (p. I-15). The solution of such problems [grievances causing a disturbance] being basically a political adjustment, the military measures to be applied must be of secondary importance and should be applied only to such extent as to permit the continuation of peaceful corrective measures (p. I-16).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The terrorist should not be considered an ordinary criminal. Actually, he fights</td>
<td>The insurgent cannot seriously embark on an insurgency unless he has a well-grounded</td>
<td>Every insurgency... requires a cause... (p. 21).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within the framework of his organization, without personal interest, <em>for a cause he considers noble and for a respectable ideal</em>, the same as the soldiers in the armies confronting him (p. 20).</td>
<td>with which to attract supporters (p. 13).</td>
<td>Given a basic cause, many other issues can be tacked onto it... At the same time, all local seeds of conflict within a community can be exploited... There is always some issue which has an appeal to each section of the community... (p. 21).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions political, economic, psychological,</td>
<td>The first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply making trouble is</td>
<td>All governments are vulnerable to criticism, and every grievance, shortcoming or abuse will be exploited... Corruption is always another credible charge and rarely fails to stick (p. 22).</td>
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<tr>
<td>military—that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked—ideological, social, religious, economic—any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be conquered (p. 6).</td>
<td>an attractive cause (p. 18).</td>
<td>First principle [first basic principle of counterinsurgency]. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable (p. 50-51).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Our war aims must be clearly known to the people. They will have to be convinced that if we call upon them to fight at our sides it can only be in defense of a just cause. And we should not deceive them (p. 49).</td>
<td>Since it is easier to unite “against” than “for,” particularly when the components are so varied, the general cause will most probably be a negative one, something like “throw the rascals out” (p. 24).</td>
<td>Fourth principle [fourth basic principle of counterinsurgency]. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas. (p. 55).</td>
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<tr>
<td>As long as the revolutionary situation exists, even in a dormant form, as long as the problem that gave rise to the insurgency has not been eliminated, the danger persists (p. 137).</td>
<td>The insurgent has a formidable asset—the ideological power of a cause (p. 7).</td>
<td>To carry out these aims [controlling the population and neutralizing the armed forces] there is a joint [insurgent] political and military organization, with the military always subordinate to the political. Support for the political aim of gaining control over the population by continued subversion and terror is always the primary task of the communist guerilla units (p. 30).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Essential though it is, <em>the military action is secondary to the political one</em>, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population (p. 89).</td>
<td>He [the counterinsurgent] has to arm himself with a competing cause (p. 101).</td>
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</table>
An insurgency is political in its nature. Like conventional conflict, it is fought for political reasons, but unlike conventional conflict, political maneuvering and political organization are not set aside while hostilities are joined. Rather these constitute the primary dimension of the conflict. Insurgents engage in military action at times and at places that are carefully chosen to maximize the political effect of the attack. Likewise, the government must weigh every planned operation in terms of its political effects. An operation which kills or captures insurgent fighters, but creates grievances among the population, is a net loss for the government.

Insurgents draw popular support by endorsing a cause or championing a grievance. The government counters by addressing grievances or developing a “counter-cause” to regain or retain support.

Caveat: Mao thought guerrilla warfare could not be decisive, but that it was a process of slowly destroying government strength while building insurgent strength until conventional insurgent units could defeat government units in battle.
having a cause to motivate its initial supporters and mobilize support and sympathy in the broader population. There is consensus on the idea that the government must address the issues or grievances that constitute the insurgents’ cause to woo away their support. The post-war theorists also observe that a cause or grievance can be manipulated by a party which may care little for the popular cause, but has an agenda of its own that is served by using the cause to generate popular support.

There is widespread consensus across the board that the struggle between the insurgent and the government is essentially political, and that political activity takes priority over military activity. Even Callwell, who does not delve deeply into insurgent causes, observed from a colonial powers’ perspective that “beating of the hostile armies is not necessarily the main object” (p. 42) of a small war campaign. The object of such campaigns was “to ensure a lasting peace” (p. 42).

**Principle 2: The population is the center of gravity.**

The “center of gravity” as a military concept refers to “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act… the loss of a center of gravity ultimately results in defeat” (FM 3-0, 2008, p. 6-8).

An examination of the results in Table 4-4 will demonstrate the overwhelming consensus that the population is the center of gravity in asymmetric conflict. The quotes indicate that both sides must have the support of the people, and that the support of, or control of, the people is necessary to win. Since the primary military and political problem for the counterinsurgent is simply finding the insurgents, the theorists agreed widely that the support of the people was necessary to provide the intelligence needed to locate and destroy insurgent armed units and
Table 4-4. Principle 2: The population is the center of gravity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
<th>Lawrence (1920)</th>
<th>Small Wars Manual (1940)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>He [a regular European commander] perceived that he had to deal not with a hostile army but with a hostile population (p. 128-129).</td>
<td>Then I estimated how many posts they [The Turks] would need to contain this attack in depth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of these hundred thousand square miles… The Turks would need six hundred thousand men to meet the combined ill wills of all the local Arab people. They had one hundred thousand available (p. 8).</td>
<td>With all this accomplished [restoration of normal government or an improvement of government], one should be able to leave the country with the lasting friendship and respect of the native population (p. I-32).</td>
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<td>The crushing of a populace in arms and the stamping out of widespread disaffection by military methods, is a harassing form of warfare even in a civilized country with a settled social system; in remote regions peopled by half-civilized races or wholly savage tribes, such campaigns are most difficult to bring to a satisfactory conclusion (p. 26).</td>
<td>We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: a presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter (p. 12).</td>
<td>This fact is further emphasized because in the small wars we are dealing not only with our own forces, but also with the civil population which frequently contains elements of doubtful or antagonistic sentiments. The very nature of our own policy and attitude toward the opposing forces and normal contacts with them enable the personnel of our Force to secure material advantages through the knowledge and application of psychological principles (p. I-17).</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is so often the case that the power which undertakes a small war desires to acquire the friendship of the people which its armies are chastising (p. 41).</td>
<td>Our aim was to seek its weakest link, and bear only on that till time made the mass of it fall. Our largest available resources were the tribesmen, men quite unused to formal warfare, whose assets were movement, endurance, individual intelligence, knowledge of the country, courage (p. 12).</td>
<td>Every native is a potential clever opponent who knows the country, its trails, resources, and obstacles, and who has friends and sympathizers on every hand (p. I-15).</td>
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<td>In irregular campaigns it is always doubtful how far the people of the hostile country, or in minor operations, hostile tribe, will put forth their entire strength (p. 49).</td>
<td>It gave us priceless advantages in pursuit, for the force renewed itself with fresh men in every new tribal area, and gave us always our pristine energy (p. 18).</td>
<td>The extent to which the intelligence service can obtain information depends largely on the attitude adopted toward the loyal and neutral population. The natives must be made to realize the seriousness of withholding information, but at the same time they must be protected from terrorism (p. I-26-27).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Spanish troops were obstructed by the intense hostility of the inhabitants. They could get no good information of the rebel movements, while the rebels were never in doubt about theirs. An insurgent was distinguished from the peaceful cultivator only by his badge which could be speedily removed, and by his rifle which was easily hidden (p. 132).</td>
<td>It [rebellion] must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent active in a striking force, and 98 per cent passively sympathetic (p. 22).</td>
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116
**Table 4-4 (cont).**

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<td>We know that the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population (p. 8).</td>
<td>… the insurgent has involved the population in the conflict since its beginning; the active participation of the population was indeed a sine qua non for his success (p. 15).</td>
<td>An insurgent movement is a war for the people. It stands to reason that government measures must be directed to restoring government authority and law and order throughout the country, so that control over the population can be regained and its support won (p. 51).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The inhabitant in his home is the center of the conflict (p. 29).</td>
<td>Objective: The Population… If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war (p. 7-8).</td>
<td>It is most important that province chiefs and the responsible military commanders should fully understand the concept which lies behind successful anti-communist guerrilla operations, i.e. <em>the physical and political separation of the guerrillas from the population</em>. One must get all the 'little fishes out of the water' and keep them out; then they die (p. 123-124).</td>
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<tr>
<td>It is accepted that the final stake of modern warfare is the control of the populace (p. 104).</td>
<td>The First Law [of Counterinsurgency Warfare]: The Support of the Population Is as Necessary for the Counterinsurgent as for the Insurgent (p. 74).</td>
<td>Without the people's support, the Viet Cong cannot win… (p 130).</td>
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<td>According to Mao Tse-tung, it [the unconditional support of the population] is as essential to the combatant as water to the fish (p. 8).</td>
<td>What makes it possible for the guerrillas to survive and to expand? The complicity of the population. (p. 50).</td>
<td>The political aim is to gain control over the population, starting in the rural areas, and to destroy the government's prestige and authority… (p. 29).</td>
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<td>An army can throw itself into a campaign only when it has the moral support of the nation (p. 27).</td>
<td>But the turning point really comes when leaders have emerged from the population and have committed themselves on the side of the counterinsurgent (p. 82).</td>
<td>The guerrillas are now operating within the population, and this is the period when one can apply Mao Tse-tung's dictum that the guerrilla must be to the population as little fishes in water. The population is not only providing the guerrilla with his food and intelligence, but giving him perfect cover and concealment. Dressed as a peasant, the guerrilla, except when he is carrying arms, is indistinguishable from the rest of the people. In fact, he can be both a peasant by day and a guerrilla by night (p. 34).</td>
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<td>The bulk of the population is by habit or tradition normally devoted to established authority and the forces of order. The people will be ready to help if we ask their aid, on the condition that we will at all times support and protect those who are on our side (p. 33).</td>
<td>A victory is that [the destruction of the insurgents’ organization] plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population (p. 77).</td>
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<td>Modern warfare requires the unconditional support of the populace (p. 19).</td>
<td>Intelligence is the principal source of information on guerrillas, and intelligence has to come from the population (p. 72).</td>
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<td>The goal of modern warfare is control of the populace, and terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since it aims directly at the inhabitant. (p. 16).</td>
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Table 4-4 (cont).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kitson (1971)</th>
<th>West (1972)</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<tr>
<td>... the government itself will be trying to retain or regain the support of the population. It is this interplay of operations designed by both sides to secure the support of the population (p. 48).</td>
<td>The police believed that the Viet Cong, for their part, would have to attack the combined unit or lose influence among the villagers (p. 22).</td>
<td>The antagonists compete for legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. The one that controls the populace will win the conflict. This control can be gained by persuasion, by terror, by organization, and by restriction of the movement of people and resources.</td>
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<td>Translate into normal terms the aim of the government is to regain if necessary and then retain the allegiance of the population, and for this purpose it must eliminate those involved in subversion. But in order to eliminate the subversive party and its unarmed and armed supporters, it must gain control of the population (p. 50).</td>
<td>The [VC] district committee had to defeat the attempt [to pacify the village with the combined unit] and disprove the theory that a few Americans could work among many Vietnamese (p. 42).</td>
<td>The population under insurgent control provides material support, sanctuary, and intelligence to the insurgency. They do this willingly or because they are coerced.</td>
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<td>Thus, in the way that the first aim of those involved in subversion is to gain control of the people so that the purpose of the uprising can be achieved, so also the first aim of these involved in counter subversion is to gain control of the people... (p. 50).</td>
<td>[At the beginning of the Americans’ tenure in the village, the American squad leader described the VC control of the village as] “It’s their turf” (p. 19).</td>
<td>The counterinsurgent must deny these things to the insurgency in order to defeat it.</td>
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<td>These [early insurgent] cells in their turn have to work on the people around them in order to get the degree of support required, which may range from benevolent neutrality to the provision of funds, equipment or intelligence (p. 35).</td>
<td>The Viet Cong so dominated the three My Hue hamlets that any stranger ran the risk of being denounced as a GVN [government] spy. The villagers were organized into committees, the better to watch each other while working for the common cause of the National Liberation Front (p. 21).</td>
<td>The principal tactical problem in counterinsurgency is finding the insurgents. Someone among the people knows who they are, therefore, counterinsurgents rely on the people for the intelligence they need to find and eliminate insurgent military and political organizations.</td>
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<td>All actions designed to retain and regain the allegiance of the population are relevant to the process of collecting background information because its provision is closely geared to the attitude of the people (p. 97).</td>
<td>From the villagers, the PFs [militiamen] had heard that a large enemy force planned to attack that night (p. 34).</td>
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political cadres. Callwell, Lawrence, the *Small Wars Manual*, and Thompson all agree that a population in arms is more difficult to defeat than a mere army.

The point that the people are the center of gravity cannot be overstated. The next five principles will examine in more detail the ways in which the population is influenced and controlled.

**Principle 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support to the government.**

Callwell and Lawrence had nothing to say about this principle. For Callwell, the “people” were generally defined by an ethnic or religious grouping, so he did not give much attention to entering a nation at war with itself and wooing the uncommitted bulk of the populace, and would not expect a rebel group to terrorize or intimidate their own, so the people would not need protection. Lawrence was an insurgent, and his “people” were also ethnically defined in such a way that Arabs were unlikely to actively support the Turks. The character of Lawrence’s war was such that intimidation of the population of the Hejaz was unnecessary.

An inspection of the results in Table 4-5 will indicate a couple of items of consensus: first, the people cannot support or provide information to a government which cannot protect them, and second, insurgents can extort material and moral support, and prevent the populace from sharing information with the government through coercion or “terror.” A quote from Trinquier suggests that counterinsurgency requires the development of a self-defense capacity in the people. While the *selected* quotes from other theorists to do not demonstrate this, the concept is found within their work. For example, the *Small Wars Manual* discusses the establishment of local national “constabularies;” Thompson advocated the strategic hamlet, which included a
Table 4-5. Principle 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support to the government

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
<th>Lawrence (1920)</th>
<th>Small Wars Manual (1940)</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>While the peasant hopes for the restoration of peace and order, the constant menace and fear of guerrillas is so overpowering that he does not dare to place any confidence in an occasional visiting patrol of the occupying forces (p. I-25).</td>
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<td>When the patrol leader demands information, the peasant should not be misjudged for failure to comply with the request, when by so doing, he is signing his own death warrant (p. I-25).</td>
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<td>The extent to which the intelligence service can obtain information depends largely on the attitude adopted toward the loyal and neutral population. The natives must be made to realize the seriousness of withholding information, but at the same time they must be protected from terrorism (p. I-26-27).</td>
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<td>The population will be honeycombed with hostile sympathizers, making it difficult to procure reliable information. Such difficulty will result either from the deceit used by hostile sympathizers and agents, or from the intimidation of friendly natives upon whom reliance might be placed to gain information (p. I-14).</td>
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</table>
In the presence of this permanent danger surrounding him [the citizen], he has the depressing feeling of being an isolated and defenseless target. The fact that public authority and the police are no longer capable of ensuring his security adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety. He is more and more drawn to the side of the terrorists, who alone are able to protect him (p. 16-17).

The intended objective [of terror], which is to cause the population to vacillate, is thus attained (p. 17).

Since the stake in modern warfare is the control of the populace, the first objective is to assure the people their protection by giving them the means of defending themselves, especially against terrorism (p. 29).

[If the insurgent organization is strong enough to intimidate them], the inhabitants will reject any responsibility [cooperation with the government] that might subject them to the adversary’s retaliation (p. 31).

A few brutalities, such as savagely executed preventive assassinations in the surrounding villages, will cow the inhabitants into providing for the maintenance of the bands and will discourage them from giving useful information to the authorities (p. 24).

This is not necessarily so because the population’s attitude in the middle stage of the war is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety. Which side gives the best protection, which one threatens the most, which one is likely to win, these are the criteria governing the population’s stand. So much the better, of course, if popularity and effectiveness are combined (p.14).

The counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent (p. 119).

Effective political action on the population must be preceded by military and police operations against the guerrilla units and the insurgent political organizations (p. 78-79).

Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population (p. 79).

It is essential for the communists to eliminate or neutralize potential opponents. There will be a spate of murders of... prominent citizens... This policy of wholesale murder has a further purpose, which can only be described as selective terrorism designed to keep the local population completely cowed (p.24).

The first step after [clearing an area] is to create the conditions in which the population has the security to exercise the choice between supporting the insurgent forces and supporting the forces of the government (p. 142).

[It is essential to] give the conditions which make it safe for a villager to decide to support the government against the insurgent (p. 142).

In these circumstances [areas which are not yet secure] no effort should be made to involve the inhabitants on the side of the government: it is merely asking them to commit suicide (p. 114).

When they [government military patrols] arrive at a village, they will find it vacated except for women, children and old men, none of whom will be prepared to give any information or even to fraternize willingly with the government forces. These people know only too well that within a few days the government forces will withdraw, and that anyone who has stepped out of line will have his throat cut by the insurgents (p. 34).
### Table 4-5 (cont).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kitson (1971)</th>
<th>West (1972)</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The means by which... these people [insurgents]... get what they want from the population as a whole vary considerably but are likely to include the spoken, written, and broadcast word with coercion in the form of blackmail and even physical violence thrown in where necessary (p. 35).</td>
<td>Thanh [the police chief] believe that the accommodation between the Vietcong and most of the villagers was based, not upon political ideology, but upon the villagers’ sense of self preservation. The Viet Cong were stronger than the PFs [militia], and it was wiser to obey the stronger side (p. 62).</td>
<td>Callwell and Lawrence had little to say on this topic. The experiences of both men were in environments where traditional modes of life were still practiced. The people that provided Callwell’s and Lawrence’s irregulars did not require security from any government.</td>
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<td>During the early stages of preparation in rural or urban areas the party has little need for armed forces because it is concerned with gathering of support by mean of the various forms of persuasion and non-violent coercion already described. But eventually the moment arrives when persuasion has to be supplemented by rougher methods and strong-arm groups have then to be brought into (p. 39).</td>
<td>None [villagers] called out [to the passing combined unit patrol], or waved, or in any way acknowledged what they saw, lest a watching neighbor interpret the action as an active commitment to the GVN [Government] cause and denounce the waver to the Vietcong (p. 95).</td>
<td>Other theorists believe a government is constituted to provide security to the people. A government which cannot do that, cannot be perceived as legitimate, and cannot command the allegiance of the people.</td>
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<td>In the Philippines the communist party issued its Strategy Directive in 1946 but it was not until 1950 that the People's Liberation Army started their military offensive, although before that, coercion was used on uncooperative elements of the population (p. 32).</td>
<td>The Popular Forces had no formal rank structure and the district chief had never even appointed a leader... because he did not want to waste a good man on a suicidal assignment (p. 15).</td>
<td>Insurgents can extract all manners of support and require silence from the people with effective intimidation.</td>
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<td>If a pacified area is allowed to slip back completely under insurgent control it will be more difficult to reclaim, because many those sympathetic to the government will have shown their hand during the period of the government's ascendancy and will have been killed when the insurgents regained control (p. 133).</td>
<td>He [an anti-VC school teacher] was not there, or rarely did he dare go home in the evening. His father, however, was there, and they [the VC] killed him... Yet, six days a week, he walked down the road to the school room and taught children, an act for which he was marked for assassination (p. 23).</td>
<td>The government must provide the people with security before it can expect people to rally to the government’s side, provide the information necessary to find the insurgents, and deny the insurgents the support they need to survive.</td>
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village militia; and West describes in detail the operations of such a militia in cooperation with a Marine squad.

**Principle 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government.**

Quotes on the need for the government to influence or persuade people to support the government, found in Table 4-6, reinforced the importance of persuasion (as opposed to coercion or control) as a tool to gain popular support, the need for the people to be persuaded the government had the capability and will to win, and the importance of the government being perceived as providing benefits to the people. The strongest consensus was on the principle that the government must convince the people that it can win. All theorists, except Lawrence (the only insurgent), have comments to this effect. There was also strong consensus that the government should be seen as providing benefit to the people and acting in the interests of the people. The Marines wanted to be perceived as “friendly” (p. I-46) to the local national people and enjoy a “cordial relationship” (p. I-45) with them.

Callwell was out of sync with the others. His work suggests persuasion of a rebellious people is best affected by threatening or destroying something they value, usually flocks or herds, and he wrote that that objective of a small war campaign might be to inflict “punishment” (p. 41) on the rebels. However, he tempered his remarks by writing the “purpose [of a campaign] is to ensure a lasting peace. Therefore, in choosing the objective, the overawing and not the exasperation of the enemy is the end to keep in view” (p. 42).

**Principle 2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support.**

The results for this principle are contained in Table 4-7. Callwell and Lawrence were mute on this subject. In a European man of Callwell’s era, the treatment of the “natives” by soldiers would not be given much thought. Also, Callwell usually envisioned the bulk of a local
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
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<tr>
<td>“In planning a war against an uncivilized nation who has, perhaps, no capital,” says Lord Wolseley, “your first object should be the capture of whatever they prize most, and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most rapidly to a conclusion” (p. 40).</td>
<td>We had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: a presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter (p. 12). The third factor in command seemed to be the Psychological… of which our propaganda is a stained and ignoble part. Some of it concerns the crowd, the adjustment of spirit to the point where it becomes fit to exploit in action, the prearrangement of a changing opinion to a certain end (p. 11). We could not knit man to man, for our tribesmen were in arms willingly, by conviction. There have been many armies enlisted voluntarily: there have been few armies serving voluntarily under such trying conditions, for so long a war as ours. Any of the Arabs could go home whenever the conviction failed him (p. 18).</td>
<td>Every means should be employed to convince such people of the altruistic intention of our Government (p. I-23). Every endeavor should be made to assure the civilian population of the friendliness of our forces. No effort should be spared to demonstrate the advantage of law and order and to secure their friendly cooperation (p. I-46). Cordial relationship between our forces and the civilian population is best maintained by engendering the spirit of good will (p. I-45). In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population (p. I-32). Once armed force is resorted to, it should be applied with determination and to the extent required by the situation (p. I-13). Delay in the use of force, and hesitation to accept responsibility for its employment when the situation clearly demands it, will always be interpreted as a weakness. Such indecision will encourage further disorder, and will eventually necessitate measures more severe than those which would have sufficed in the first instance (p. I-27).</td>
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</table>
The surest means of gaining their [the people’s] confidence will be to crush those who want to oppress them (p. 49).

As long as we have not arrived at such a point [where people feel safe from insurgent intimidation], any propaganda, any solution, however skillful, will be ineffective on a populace infected by clandestine organisms that penetrate like a cancer into its midst and terrorize it (p. 49).

During the course of interrogations, we should always bear in mind that the majority of individuals arrested, if we have enough flexibility, can change camp. Many among them have passed over to the service of the enemy only through duress … If we generously offer them another path with our protection, they will become our most faithful collaborators (p. 37).

Once peace has been established, even in a small part of the territory, extensive and generous social assistance will be of prime importance in bringing to our cause many people who are unhappy and often disoriented by the military operations and who will not have always understood the underlying reasons for them (p. 50-51).

The Fourth Law: Intensity of Efforts and Vastness of Means Are Essential…

The operations needed to relieve the population from the insurgent’s threat and to convince it that the counterinsurgent will ultimately win are necessarily of an intensive nature and of long duration (p. 79).

The counterinsurgent needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win (p. 79).

The Third Law: Support from the Population Is Conditional…

… the emerging counterinsurgent supporters will not be able to rally the bulk of the population so long as the population is not convinced that the counterinsurgent has the will, the means, and the ability to win (p. 78).

A practical method [of redressing grievances], therefore, would consist in investigating objectively the people’s demands, making a list of them, crossing out those that cannot be granted safely and promoting the rest (p. 103).

Security by itself is not enough to make the peasant willingly choose to support the government. Without it he cannot, even with it he still may not. The next step, therefore, is to influence his choice, which must still remain a free choice. He can only be made to choose freely to support the government if the government can show him that what it has to offer is something better than the insurgent can offer him (p. 143).

Finally, if its cause is to be effective, the government must demonstrate both its determination and its capacity to win. These are the foundations of popular support. After all, there are not many backers for a losing side. At the height of an insurgency, if the issue is evenly balanced, neither the government nor the insurgent cause is a matter of great importance. At that stage there is only one political question: ‘Who is going to win?’ (p. 69).

All this [measures to improve governance and provide services] helps to give the impression not only that the government is operating for the benefit of the people but that it is carrying out programs of a permanent nature and therefore intends to stay in the area. This gives the people a stake in stability and hope for the future… (p. 113).
This means that persuasion will become more important in comparison with armed offensive action, although both will continue to be required (p. 199).

Before considering ways in which the government can coordinate its efforts in order to achieve its aim, it is necessary to point out one fundamental matter, which is that few individuals can possibly support a government which is obviously going to lose, even if they sympathize with its policies and detest those of the insurgents (p. 50).

Such a program [to regain or retain the allegiance of the population] should include measures designed to maintain and if possible increase the prosperity of the country... because not only is prosperity itself a potent weapon in the struggle against those who wish to overthrow the existing order, but also there would be little point in defeating the insurgents only to be left with a ruined community (p. 50).

The [government’s] program should also cater for rectifying genuine grievances, especially those in which the enemy are exploiting as part of their cause, and for attracting support by implementing popular projects and reforms. (p. 51).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kitson (1971)</th>
<th>West (1972)</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>This means that persuasion will become more important in comparison with armed offensive action</em>, although both will continue to be required (p. 199).</td>
<td>The [police] raids only bought time, while affecting the localized perceptions of the villagers concerning the relative strengths and chances of success of the two opposing sides (p. 22).</td>
<td>Callwell’s “persuasion” centered on military action designed to convince his enemy that resistance is futile and too expensive to contemplate. The destruction or confiscation of property also denied the enemy the resources needed to continue to fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before considering ways in which the government can coordinate its efforts in order to achieve its aim, it is necessary to point out one fundamental matter, which is that few individuals can possibly support a government which is obviously going to lose, even if they sympathize with its policies and detest those of the insurgents (p. 50).</td>
<td>This upset Lam [the police chief], who insisted it was up to the marines and the PFs [militia] to dominate the night. If they could not, the village would remain under Vietcong control. No police work, no RD [Revolutionary Development organization] promises, no political popularity of Phoc [a local official], could compensate for the lack of military superiority within the seven hamlets (p. 43).</td>
<td>Lawrence explained how the Arab Revolt relied entirely upon persuasion. The <em>Small Wars Manual</em> wanted Marines to develop a cordial relationship with local national people, and not to show indecision that could be construed as weakness.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Such a program [to regain or retain the allegiance of the population] should include measures designed to maintain and if possible increase the prosperity of the country... because not only is prosperity itself a potent weapon in the struggle against those who wish to overthrow the existing order, but also there would be little point in defeating the insurgents only to be left with a ruined community (p. 50).</td>
<td>[Following a series of intelligence indicators that the squad (10-12 men) would be attacked by a large VC unit] It was not for nothing. In a sense, it was the most important battle the Americans at Fort Page [the combined unit outpost] ever prepared to fight. They had chosen to stay; the PFs [militia] knew it, and soon so would the entire village (p. 195).</td>
<td>Otherwise, there is consensus on three points: the government can persuade the people to give it their support if: 1) it can demonstrate the will and the capacity to win the struggle; 2) it is willing to redress legitimate grievances; and 3) it will sponsor development activities to demonstrate that it acts in the people’s interests and can provide benefits that insurgents cannot.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The [government’s] program should also cater for rectifying genuine grievances, especially those in which the enemy are exploiting as part of their cause, and for attracting support by implementing popular projects and reforms. (p. 51).</td>
<td>Yet the children of Viet Cong families were free to attend the school after it was built, and they did so (p. 219).</td>
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Table 4-7. Principle 2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support

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<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
<th>Lawrence (1920)</th>
<th>Small Wars Manual (1940)</th>
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<td>[The following are from <em>Twenty-seven Articles</em> (1917)]</td>
<td>Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can (p. 1).</td>
<td>A failure to use tact when required or lack of firmness at a crucial moment might readily precipitate a situation that could have been avoided had the commander been familiar with the customs, religion, morals, and education of those with whom he was dealing (p. 1-19).</td>
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<td>Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the expedition. To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds (p. 2).</td>
<td>Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them (p. 3).</td>
<td>The personal pride, uniform, and bearing of the marines, their dignity, courtesy, consideration, language, and personality will have an important effect on the civilian attitude toward the forces of occupation (p. 1-29).</td>
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<td>Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your own side, and avoid criticism of theirs (p. 4).</td>
<td>… care should be exercised not to humiliate the natives. They are usually proud and humiliation will cause resentment which will have an unfavorable reaction. Nothing should be said or done which implies inferiority of the status or of the sovereignty of the native people (p. 1-30).</td>
<td>The indoctrination of all ranks with respect to the proper attitude toward the civilian population may be accomplished readily by means of a series of brief and interesting lectures (p. 1-31).</td>
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<td>In brief, a feeling of mutual respect and cooperation between members of the military forces and civil officials on a basis of mutual independence of each other should be cultivated (p. 1-43).</td>
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Nevertheless, even if some brutality is inevitable, rigorous discipline must always be enforced to prevent wanton acts. The army has the means of demanding and maintaining firm discipline. It has at its disposal its own system of justice, precisely created to check quickly misdeeds or crimes committed by military personnel in the exercise of their duties. The army must apply the law without hesitation (p. 48).

These [operations] they [soldiers] should carry out firmly, but with tact and discretion, not to alienate themselves unnecessarily from the people with whom they will be in permanent contact (p. 90).

[During a cordon and search operation] Every inhabitant is individually and privately interrogated, without any resort to violence (p. 77).

Since antagonizing the population will not help, it is imperative that hardships for it and rash actions on the part of the forces be kept to a minimum. The units participating in the operations should be thoroughly indoctrinated to that effect, the misdeeds punished severely and even publicly if this can serve to impress the population. Any damage done should be immediately compensated without red tape (p. 108-109).

The necessity for eradicating the insurgent political agents from the population is evident. The question is how to do it rapidly and efficiently, with a minimum of errors and bitterness (p. 123-124).

The one vital aspect of civic action which the army failed to develop was good, strict, disciplined behavior towards its own population. Without that, all assistance or other good works in the rural areas, which the army can so admirably provide for the population, and which would contribute generally to better relationships, are so much eyewash (p. 60).

It is only natural that in these circumstances [troops encounter uncooperative civilians] troops will begin to lose their temper. If nothing else, chickens and vegetables will be seized from the villages, and any suspects picked up will be ill treated and tortured to provide information… with the result that most search-and-clear operations, by creating more communists than they kill, become in effect communist recruiting drives (p. 34).
There are plenty of other ways of getting background information and most soldiers and policemen are quite capable of getting it in a friendly and civilized way, provided that they are told what is required (p. 130).

Traditionally a soldier is trained and conditioned- to be strong, courageous, direct and aggressive but when men endowed with these qualities become involved in fighting subversion they often find that their good points are exploited by the enemy. For example firm reaction in the face of provocation may be twisted by clever propaganda in such a way that soldiers find the civilian population regarding their strength as brutality, and their direct and honest efforts a helping to restore order as the ridiculous blunderings of a herd of elephants (p. 200).

The officers were aware from their own surveys that over 40 percent of the marines disliked the Vietnamese… in addressing the problem, the marine command had written that its surveys ‘suggest that of our squad leaders… less than one in five marches forth with a positive attitude toward the ARVN [South Vietnamese Army] and the PF [Popular Forces militia], and that probably one third go forth with a strong dislike for the local people. This is not just academic. It is costing us lives’ (p. 11).

[Marine General] Walt asked the battalion officers to send only men who could get along with the villagers [to the Combined Action Platoon]… it slowed the selection procedure (p. 11).

[Following a destructive and deadly attack on the combined unit, and American Marine said:] “This is our village” (p. 134).

There was strong consensus that the professional behavior of soldiers will decrease resistance and avoid antagonizing the populace needlessly.

West suggests that American dislike for Vietnamese was “costing us lives” (p. 11).
national group—a tribe or the following of a religious leader—to be rebellious. Callwell’s insurgent was defined by his ethnic or religious identity, and any members of the group encountered by soldiers were likely to be naturally sympathetic to the irregular warriors. Lawrence was an insurgent himself, and would not explain to the Turkish government how to undermine support for the Arab Revolt. However, Lawrence also wrote *Twenty-seven Articles* (1917) describing the attitudes and behaviors a Western advisor to an Arab leader would need to cultivate. In this forum, his advice is to be courteous and professional, showing deference to the leaders and a slight superiority to underlings so as to work within the class structure of Arab society at that time. He advised also to “never lay hands on an Arab” (p. 3) because it will fuel resentment.

In other works, there emerged a strong consensus that the people should be treated tactfully and with respect. The *Small Wars Manual* was the strongest on this point. The Marines also thought that soldier bearing and carriage displayed professionalism, which affected local national attitudes toward the Marine force, which in turn, affected campaign outcomes. Interestingly, West quoted some Marine Corps documents from 1960s Vietnam that indicated a majority of Marines thought poorly of the Vietnamese. The documents also contained the Marines’ institutional realization that this attitude cost lives. Fortunately, West’s story is about a group of Marines who felt differently about the Vietnamese. These men lived and worked with the Vietnamese daily; their impressive success was directly related to their ability to work with local nationals on the basis of mutual respect and friendship.

Another consensus emerged on the need for the army to discipline itself to behave professionally and not to mistreat the people in any way. Trinquier mentioned the need to punish
soldiers, and Thompson even observed that poorly behaved soldiers could create more insurgents than they kill.

**Principle 2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign counterinsurgents.**

An examination of the selected quotes for this principle, found in Table 4-8, indicate the consensus on the need for cultural awareness was considerably weaker than for most other principles. This was unexpected and contrasts strongly with the huge importance that the current U.S. Army leadership places on it. Therefore, I need to explore why.

Callwell argued that officers need to study “the enemy” in detail before setting the campaign plan. He neglects the remainder of the population throughout his work except in one instance when he writes, “In irregular campaigns it is always doubtful how far the people of the hostile country, or in minor operations, hostile tribe, will put forth their entire strength” (p. 49). Otherwise “the enemy” refers to the group opposing imperial forces, usually ethnically distinct in some way, and the remainder of the people is ignored. Nevertheless, he has stated the importance of understanding the cultural features of the enemy when planning a campaign.

Lawrence comments on the religious objections Arabs have to non-Muslim armies in the Hejaz, on their cultural incapacity for regular warfare, and on the need to take their cultural strengths into account when choosing a form of warfare more conducive to these strengths. Moreover, Lawrence’s *Twenty-seven Articles* (1917) is completely about cultural awareness given that its purpose is to advise British officers who will assume duties as advisors to Arab leaders. Overall, Lawrence was a big advocate of cultural awareness.

The *Small Wars Manual* advocates the need for cultural awareness strongly, in keeping with the consensus of modern opinion. It is the post-war theorists Trinquier, Galula, and Thompson who neglect the topic, possibly because they believed that colonial administrators


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<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
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<tr>
<td>It is that in small wars the habits, the customs, and the mode of action on the battlefield of the enemy should be studied in advance (p. 33).</td>
<td>… nor would a single Arab have remained with the Sherif if he introduced British troops into the Hejaz (p. 3).</td>
<td>That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for the existing emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to be expected from any actions which may be contemplated. By this study and the ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided and the success of the undertaking assured (p. 1-18).</td>
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<td>But when conflicts of this nature are in prospect, the strength and the fighting methods of the enemy must always be most carefully considered before any decision as to the form of operations to be adopted is arrived at; the tactics of such opponents differ so greatly in various cases that it is essential that these be taken fully into consideration (p. 29).</td>
<td>It was impossible to mix or combine tribes, since they disliked or distrusted one another. Likewise we could not use the men of one tribe in the territory of another (p. 18).</td>
<td>The correct application of the principles of psychology to any given situation requires a knowledge of the traits peculiar to the persons with whom we are dealing (p. I-19).</td>
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<td>… but they [the Afghans] bitterly resented the insult to their nation and to their faith which the presence of British troops in the heart of the country offered (p.36).</td>
<td>… it occurred to me that perhaps the virtue of irregulars lay in depth, not in face, and that it had been the threat of attack by them upon the Turkish northern flank which had made the enemy [the Turks] hesitate for so long (p. 4).</td>
<td>The knowledge of the people at any given moment of history involves an understanding of their environment, and above all, their past (p. I-19).</td>
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<td>Uncivilized races attribute leniency to timidity (p. 148).</td>
<td>The Arab Army just now was equally chary of men and materials: of men because they being irregulars were not units, but individuals, and an individual casualty is like a pebble dropped in water: each may make only a brief hole, but rings of sorrow widen out from them. We could not afford casualties (p. 9-10).</td>
<td>A knowledge of the character of the people and a command of their language are great assets… If not already familiar with the language, all officers upon assignment to expeditionary duty should study and acquire a working knowledge of it (p. I-26).</td>
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There are three main forces which influence the people of a country: nationalism and national policies, religion and customs, material well-being and progress (p. 63).

A government must also pay the closest attention to the second main force, that of religion and customs, often complicated by the most conservative superstitions, which more than any other is capable of releasing the strongest emotional feeling (p. 64).

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### Table 4-8 (cont).

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<tr>
<th>Kitson (1971)</th>
<th>West (1972)</th>
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<tr>
<td>No matter how well a person [from an allied nation] from outside a the country may think that he knows the way in which the minds of the local people work, he is none the less likely to make mistakes when preparing propaganda for them (p. 78-79).</td>
<td>The noncommissioned officer chosen to lead the volunteer squad was known to like the Vietnamese (p. 12).</td>
<td>The consensus on the need for culturally aware soldiers was not as strong as I expected. Callwell admitted the need to understand the habits and customs of the enemy. Lawrence gave examples where cultural knowledge was important to achieving his objectives. West described the interpersonal relationships developed between Vietnamese villagers and American Marines due, in part, to the Marines capacity to act within the culture. The <em>Small Wars Manual</em> is completely consistent with modern opinion on the value of culturally aware soldiers, and Kitson shows some appreciation of the matter.</td>
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<td>Instead, commanders would be better employed in explaining the fundamental realities of the situation to their subordinates and in encouraging them to submerge themselves in the atmosphere of the country. Only by so doing will they be able to see things from the point of view of the population whose allegiance they are trying to regain and retain (p. 201).</td>
<td>The marines saw too much of the villagers, and lived too closely with them, not to be affected by their personal grief (p. 36).</td>
<td>However, the post-war theorists—Trinquier, Galula, and Thompson—had much less to say. Thompson acknowledged the need to consider culture, the others said nothing significant. Perhaps, with long colonial experience, they thought themselves sufficiently knowledgeable about local cultures or perhaps they had enough local national presence on appropriate staffs that the issue did not come up.</td>
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<td>[An officer] had instructed the Marines to be meticulous in material matters on such visits [to the homes of villagers]. Four bottles of warm beer cost a PF [militiaman] one-tenth of his monthly salary. As a host, a PF could be put in debt after a few visits by a thoughtless, guzzling American friend (p. 246).</td>
<td>The marines had accepted too many invitations to too many meals in too many homes to believe they were not liked by many and tolerated by most (p. 102).</td>
<td>Whatever else they may have been, the summertime invitations [for Americans to socialize with villagers] were a signal that the invitors did not expect Viet Cong retribution for their actions. Nor were the invitations given out of fear of the Americans… These Americans lived in their village, ate their food, worked with their men, died in their paddies (p. 247).</td>
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were sufficiently knowledgeable of local national cultures, or perhaps they believed that they had
enough local nationals working beside them, that they did not perceive awareness as an issue.
Heuser (2007) took both Trinquier and Galula to task for this oversight writing that “their lack of
emphasis on and sympathy for cultural differences, and local resistance against becoming French
clones may have been the Achilles heel of their counterinsurgency operations” (p. 155) in
Algeria and Vietnam. Kitson, one-half generation later, was sensitive enough to know that
outsiders could not execute effective propaganda because that task required a cultural insider,
and he advocated commanders encouraging soldiers to “submerge themselves in the atmosphere
of the country” (p. 201). West’s quotations are not theoretical in their nature, but tend to refer to
interpersonal relationships between Marines and villagers, but I think these would not have been
possible without Marines having learned to fit into village cultural life.

**Principle 2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple
audiences.**

The informational dimension of asymmetric war is critically important. The essential
weakness of the insurgency in its early stages requires insurgents not to confront the government
in open combat. Successful insurgents survive by avoiding decisive military confrontation long
enough to win. They do this “either by making the political and psychological realms decisive…
or by postponing decisive military encounters until they weakened the government through
guerrilla, political, and psychological operations” (Metz & Millen, 2004, p. 5). Since the
insurgents are fighting in the “political and psychological realms,” counterinsurgents must
oppose them there, particularly since effective insurgents cannot be cornered and destroyed
militarily.

Several themes emerge from the selected results, located in Table 4-9. Propaganda is the
most effective method asymmetric antagonists use to persuade the public to support their side

135
Table 4-9. Principle 2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
<th>Lawrence (1920)</th>
<th>Small Wars Manual (1940)</th>
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<td>We had to arrange their minds in order of battle, just as carefully and formally as other officers arranged their bodies; and not only our own men's minds, though them first: the minds of the enemy, so far as we could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the nation supporting us behind the firing line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict, and the neutrals looking on (p. 11).</td>
<td>In extremely remote, isolated, and illiterate sections an educated revolutionary leader may easily lead the inhabitants to believe that they, in the act of taking up arms, are actually engaged in repelling invasion. <em>Many such ruses are employed</em> in the initial stages and recruiting is carried on in this manner for long periods and the inhabitants are in a state of ignorance of the actual situation (p. I-21-22).</td>
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<td>The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander (p. 11).</td>
<td>Every endeavor should be made to assure the civilian population of the friendliness of our forces. No effort should be spared to demonstrate the advantage of law and order and to secure their friendly cooperation (p. I-46).</td>
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Propaganda at home also plays its part in the public support of small wars. An ordinary characteristic of small wars is the antagonistic propaganda against the campaign or operations in the United States press or legislature (p. I-28).

At this time [as the intervention is drawing to a close], public opinion shows little patience in the enterprise, and accepts with less patience any explanation for the delay necessary to bring the operation to a close (p. I-29).

To off-set this situation [the perception of Marine intervention as unfriendly], recourse must be had to propaganda clearly stating the definite purpose of the intervening forces in order to show the friendly aid that is being offered to the country (p. II-4).
| Internal warfare within a population, particularly in cities… there is also an intensive propaganda effort, destined primarily to make the steps that are taken understood (p. 43). |
|---|---|---|
| People who know our adversaries will not protest in submitting to inconveniences they know to be necessary for the recovery of their liberty. But our enemies will not fail to exploit the situation for their propaganda needs (p. 48). |
| Our war aims must be clearly known to the people. They will have to be convinced that if we call upon them to fight at our sides it can only be in defense of a just cause. And we should not deceive them (p. 49). |
| With the gradual return to peace, however, propaganda will play an important role in causing the sometimes impatient masses to understand the variety of problems that must be resolved before a return to normal existence is possible (p. 49-50). |

Table 4-9 (cont).

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<td>An efficient propaganda machine can turn an artificial problem into a real one (p. 22-23). The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use every trick; if necessary, he can lie, cheat, exaggerate. He is not obliged to prove; he is judged by what he promises, not by what he does. Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weapon for him (p. 14). The counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and to his past, and for him, facts speak louder than words. He is judged on what he does, not on what he says. If he lies, cheats, exaggerates, and does not prove, he may achieve some temporary successes, but at the price of being discredited for good… For him, propaganda can be no more than a secondary weapon, valuable only if intended to inform and not to fool. A counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda (p. 14-15). To be sure, the better the [government’s] cause and the situation, the larger will be the active minority favorable to the counterinsurgent and the easier its task. This truism dictates the main goal of the propaganda—to show that the cause and the situation of the counterinsurgent are better than the insurgent’s (p. 77). Thus, a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun (p. 94).</td>
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<td>The communists are not slow to make propaganda capital out of all excesses committed by the government, with the result that most search-and-clear operations, by creating more communists than they kill, become in effect communist recruiting drives (p. 35). [In information services] There needs to be a closely integrated effort so that the government speaks with one voice. The task naturally falls into two categories: information work directed at the insurgents… and information work directed at the public… The aim of the first is to reduce the will of the insurgents to fight and to encourage surrenders, while the aim of the second is to rally the population to the side of the government… (p. 90). These [public information] services are responsible for putting across all that the government is trying to do in accordance with its policies. The services are responsible for publishing and making known all new laws and regulations and the reasons for them, and for giving publicity to the government's achievements in the material field (p. 95). If the function of information is to inform, that of propaganda is to persuade. In order to persuade people of something, it is necessary that it should be believed. There are certain guiding principles on which the information services should work. The most precious propaganda asset of the government is its credit in the eyes of the people (p. 96).</td>
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Table 4-9 (cont).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kitson (1971)</th>
<th>West (1972)</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the first place there is the obvious one directly concerned with the progress of a particular campaign which covers the production of news sheets by illegal printing presses and the making of broadcasts by illegal wireless stations. <strong>These activities form a most important part of any subversive campaign,</strong> particularly in the early stages when the population is being mobilized to support the cause (p. 17).</td>
<td>For a week he [an effective VC operative] displayed his captives [government officials] in a series of hamlet’s, and then one noon in the main marketplace of the Phu Longs [VC hamlets] of the beheaded all five (p. 42).</td>
<td>The military weakness of the insurgent forces him to confront the government in the psychological dimension. He will use propaganda to sell his cause, to magnify grievances, to complain of government excesses and miscues. The government must answer his charges, promote their own programs, and explain their actions.</td>
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<td>It [the government] must also promote its own cause and undermine that of the enemy by disseminating its view of the situation, and this involves a carefully planned and coordinated campaign of what… must regrettably be called psychological operations (p. 71).</td>
<td>A propaganda squad scattered dozens of leaflets… The Vietnamese [language] message stressed that the GVN [government] was going to lose the war, so it would better for the people to join the victors [the VC] (p. 126).</td>
<td>The government may not lie.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The next area in which the army can make a contribution before the outbreak of violence lies in the field of psychological operations and propaganda, where the government not only has to counter the steps which the enemy are taking to get their cause across to the population, but also has to put across its own program in an attractive way (p. 77).</td>
<td>The [pro-government] fair began at noon on Christmas Day and the people came in droves, using the RD [a government agency] coercion [the fair was mandatory] as an excuse to gather and gossip, to gamble and to be entertained (p. 153).</td>
<td>There are multiple audiences: the insurgents, government forces, the local national population, and the world population. If the government is receiving support from a foreign supporter, the population of the supporting nation is also vulnerable to propaganda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>From one side of the world to the other the organizers of subversion have access to the people through these means [all sorts of media] and although the same channels of communication are available to those involved in protecting the existing order, they seldom manipulate them so skillfully as their opponents (p. 17).</td>
<td>They [singers] were followed by a series of skits, each containing a political message but which were well received because the village actors had laced them with ribald humor (p. 155).</td>
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<tr>
<td>A propaganda squad scattered dozens of leaflets, some in English… the message ran: “Stop raping our women and butchering our babies, leave our country, refuse to fight, and protest the war.” The names of two U.S. senators to whom the marines should write were given (p. 126).</td>
<td>A propaganda squad scattered dozens of leaflets, some in English… the message ran: “Stop raping our women and butchering our babies, leave our country, refuse to fight, and protest the war.” The names of two U.S. senators to whom the marines should write were given (p. 126).</td>
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and to undermine the other. Also, there are multiple audiences to be influenced. For example, Lawrence identifies five separate audiences: the combatants of each side, the supporters of each side, and the “neutrals looking on” (p. 11). Claessen (2007) has made the case that a foreign counterinsurgent is most vulnerable through his home population, who may abandon support for the war and force the withdrawal of their government’s soldiers, and the *Small Wars Manual* made the same observation over sixty years earlier. Finally, insurgent propaganda may mislead or manipulate populations, but a government attempt to do the same eventually results in the loss of credibility.

Callwell had nothing to say about propaganda and little to say about the press. Again, this may be because the rebels are defined by their ethnic identity and not by their self-chosen adherence to an ideology. His only remark about the press was to observe that the press sometimes gave away information that was valuable to the rebels. Lawrence, on the other hand, understood he needed to influence multiple audiences—indeed the press coverage of his exploits is probably why we know of him—and he emphatically stated that the “printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory…” (p. 11).

The *Small Wars Manual* understood the motivational power of the insurgent cause and of a charismatic leader. The Marines also understood that they were under attack in the “United States press and legislature” (p. 28), and that their campaign was vulnerable to this “attack.”

The post-war theorists agree that propaganda is an important part of the insurgent’s campaign, and that insurgents will use propaganda to manipulate public perception of current events to their favor. They also agree an information program needs to be part of the government’s campaign as well, and that a government cannot lie in its campaign because a lie will be discovered and the government’s credibility will be damaged. All acknowledge the
existence of multiple audiences. Galula even addressed each audience separately (insurgents, counterinsurgents, and the populace) in the chapter of his book explaining the development of a counterinsurgency campaign plan.

**Principle 2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent.**

Principle 2 has demonstrated the importance of the people to the outcome of an asymmetric struggle, and we have examined the role of persuasion in gathering people’s voluntary support. However persuasive either side can be, most theorists observed that only an active minority would voluntarily support either side, and the remainder of the populace would prefer to remain neutral until it was apparent which side would win. Therefore, the ability to control the people was crucial to winning this vital center of gravity.

Controlling the people can be accomplished in a couple of ways. Insurgents are known to control people through terror, which extorts compliance, support, and silence from the common people; Principle 2A discussed this in more detail. Governments can also use terror, but that is discredited among these theorists, as we will see when we examine Principle 4A. A government can also use the punishments associated with the law to deter people from supporting the insurgency. Table 4-10 shows that governments also control people with a variety of measures including a census, identification cards, travel passes, curfews and other measures, and they may control valuable resources, such as food, munitions, certain machine parts, and so on, to prevent the insurgents from using them. The purpose of these measures is to make it impossible for sympathizers to support active insurgents, and give neutral people an excuse not to. This undermines the insurgent’s terror campaign; he cannot extort from a person who cannot help him without attracting the attention of authorities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
<th>Lawrence (1920)</th>
<th>Small Wars Manual (1940)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Clearing the country of supplies and, in some cases, rendering it impossible for an enemy to exist in the country at all owing to no food or shelter being left, may become part of the program. (p. 133).</td>
<td>We were in occupation of 99 per cent of the Hejaz. The Turks were welcome to the other fraction till peace or doomsday showed them the futility of clinging to our window pane (p. 6).</td>
<td>Another advantage of such government is the authority to require natives to carry identification cards on their persons constantly. It has been found that the average native is not only willing and anxious, but proud to carry some paper signed by a military authority to show that he is recognized (p. I-25).</td>
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<td>The adoption of guerilla methods by the enemy almost necessarily forces the regular troops to resort to punitive measures directed against the possessions of their antagonists, It must be remembered that one way to get the enemy to fight [so he can decisively defeated] is to make raids on his property (p. 145).</td>
<td>They [the riding camels] lived on grazing as we marched (we never gave them grain or fodder), and after their six weeks on the road they would be worn thin, and have to be sent to pasture for some months’ rest, while we called out another tribe in replacement, or found fresh riding-beasts (p. 16).</td>
<td>The ability of a hostile force to oppose the intervening force may be limited by the availability of subsistence, natural resources, finances, arms, equipment, and ammunition. The forces opposing the intervention often live off the country by forcing contributions of money, subsistence, and other supplies from the peaceful inhabitants, or by donations from local civilians sympathetic to their cause (p. II-3).</td>
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<td>But when there is no king to conquer, no capital to seize, no organized army to overthrow, and when there are no celebrated strongholds to capture, and no great centers of population to occupy, the objective is not so easy to select. It is then that the regular troops are forced to resort to cattle lifting and village burning and that the war assumes an aspect which may shock the humanitarian (p. 40).</td>
<td>The destruction of the crops and stores of grain of the enemy is another way of carrying on hostilities. This method of warfare is more exasperating to the adversary than carrying off livestock; for while they appreciate the principle that the victor is entitled to the spoils, wanton damage tends to embitter their feeling of enmity (p. 40-41).</td>
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Table 4-10. Principle 2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent
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<th>Table 4-10 (cont).</th>
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<td>We know that it is not at all necessary to have the sympathy of a majority of the people in order to rule them. The right [insurgent] organization can turn the trick (p. 4).</td>
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<td>[Insurgent] Control of the masses through a tight organization, often through several parallel organizations, is the master weapon of modern warfare… Only when we have created a similar organization… (p. 30).</td>
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<td>First, they [the government] conduct a careful census of the entire population (p. 31).</td>
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<td>[An identity card] in the course of frequent checks, enable us to keep tabs on each individual (p. 32). In case of emergency, this organism [the self-defense organization] would be in a position to establish without delay very strict control over food supplies, animals, and all resources our adversaries could use against us (p. 33).</td>
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<td>The inhabitants are allowed to leave the village only by the gates, and all exits will be controlled. They are permitted to take neither money nor supplies with them. (p. 74).</td>
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<td>A census is also taken of all animals—draft animals… and bovines… will be branded with the card number of their owner. We know how important supplies are to the guerrilla (p. 75).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kitson (1971)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The [government] committees [working among the people] provided a framework which helped to engender a feeling of security and commitment amongst the people which in turn encouraged them to give information. This enhanced still further the power of the teams which were able to impose effective sanctions or work for the benefit of the community, according to the extent to which the people were supporting the government. In short the system greatly increased the power of the government in the areas where it was working (p. 80).</td>
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<td>In Algeria the French developed the system to a far greater extent by sending out teams into the towns and countryside whose job was to set up a complete chain of committees and cells supporting the government on similar lines to those established by the enemy. In this way they got right under the skin of the population, and by introducing identity cards, branding livestock with the identity card numbers of their owners, and by other similar methods they soon imposed a tight control over the people. As the system developed the influence of the government increased. (p. 80).</td>
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<td>All the teenagers were forced to participate [in a pro-government rally and fair]; such mandatory attendance absolved of the participants from later retribution by the Viet Cong (p. 153).</td>
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<td>Things were so comfortable many store owners had stopped getting a cut of their earnings to the VC (p. 259).</td>
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In the literature, “control” has two connotations. It refers to a beneficial control where the government directs activities so that they are accomplished in an orderly way. This is like the control our government exerts over us. They force us to drive on the right of the road, to stand in line, or even to submit to security procedures at airports. We understand the purposes and benefits of this control, and voluntarily submit to it. When an insurgent establishes a government in a “liberated zone,” he does the same. “Control” also refers to the ability to coerce compliance. Most remarks of this nature refer to the terror activities of the insurgency, but the government has significant coercive abilities as well.

Callwell paid a great deal of attention to the need for “clearing the country of supplies” (p. 133) rebels could use while resisting, and to the destruction of property to bring guerrillas to battle, force their capitulation, or punish their rebellion. Again, he is a little out of sync, but similar things may work in a modern setting. Laws permitting the seizure of assets probably discourage illegal activities of all types, and denying the enemy resources is always important to warfare. Lawrence understood his war with the Turks was best accomplished not by fighting, but by controlling the “sea” of the desert that surrounded the “islands” of towns controlled by Turks. He controlled the countryside through the cultivation of “desert power” supplied by the tribes who lived on it and by camel-mounted tribal warriors drawn from them.

The Small Wars Manual briefly discussed basic population control measures such as the identification card. The importance of this measure and similar ones to keep track of people and resources pervades the work of post-war theorists, and West gives a couple of examples of the value of a village census. West also shows how the control of people’s movement was valuable to the Viet Cong before the intervention of the combined unit of Marines and village militia.
Principle 3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases to build strength.

The relative military weakness of the insurgency requires it to avoid decisive military confrontation with the government until it can build military and political power. One way insurgents avoid contact is to hide. The selected quotations in Table 4-11 show unanimous consensus that insurgents require secure bases or sanctuaries to rest, refit, receive recruits, train, and absorb the external support required to develop political and military capacity. Sanctuary areas also provide the opportunity to extend incremental insurgent control over increasingly larger segments of the national territory and population. Insurgents find sanctuary in rugged or remote terrain, across the borders of adjacent states, between jurisdictions within a state, or among the people.

Principle 3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support.

Table 4-12 shows the utility of external support to an insurgency. Support from outside the country provides the insurgency with the material it needs to fight and perhaps with advice and training. External support greatly complicates the counterinsurgent’s problem. Callwell described the difficulty caused by the hostility to regular forces of a people adjacent to the rebels he is fighting. Lawrence did not make his need for external support explicit, but Lawrence’s presence was a form of external support, and Lawrence discussed the use of weapons and other materials that were of foreign manufacture. He also mentions the importance of a secure route from his “seabases” (see Table 4-11) to the locations his irregulars chose to fight. I did not find a place where the Small Wars Manual discussed the issue, but their presence was a form of external support, although it was usually to a government. The remainder of the theorists show
Table 4-11. Principle 3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need for sanctuary or bases to build strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
<th>Lawrence (1920)</th>
<th>Small Wars Manual (1940)</th>
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<tr>
<td>The terrain has much to say to effective conduct of partisan warfare on the part of the enemy… Hilly and broken ground or districts clothed in jungle growth and thickets especially lend themselves to these very desultory operations (p. 127).</td>
<td>The process was to set up ladders of tribes, giving us a safe and comfortable route from our sea-bases (Yenbo, Wejh or Akaba) to our advanced bases of operation. These were sometimes three hundred miles away, a long distance in lands without railways or roads, but made short for us by an assiduous cultivation of desert-power; control by camel parties of the desolate and unmapped wilderness which fills up all the centre of Arabia (p. 14).</td>
<td>It [widely distributed forces] gave us priceless advantages in pursuit, for the force renewed itself with fresh men in every new tribal area, and gave us always our pristine energy (p. 18).</td>
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<td>It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it: such a base as we had in the Red Sea Parts, the desert, or in the minds of the men we converted to our creed (p. 22).</td>
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<td>Table 4-11 (cont).</td>
<td>Trinquier (1961)</td>
<td>Galula (1964)</td>
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<td>Sometimes the inhabitant's home is the guerrilla's refuge, where he can disappear in case of danger (p.64).</td>
<td>The role of geography, a large one in an ordinary war, may be overriding in a revolutionary war. <em>If the insurgent, with his initial weakness, cannot get any help from geography, he may well be condemned to failure before he starts</em> (p. 35).</td>
<td><em>The jungle terrain provided a safe initial sanctuary. Given an established base or sanctuary from which to work, the first aim of any insurgent movement must be to gain momentum by capturing more weapons, ammunition and explosives</em> (p. 29).</td>
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<td>In the villages, however, we of ten find one or two empty houses, where the bands usually stay while in transit, which we can occupy (p. 73).</td>
<td>…what results can the counterinsurgent expect from his operations in these other [non-priority] areas? To prevent the insurgent from developing into a higher form of warfare, that is to say, from organizing a regular army. <em>This objective is fulfilled when the insurgent is denied safe bases</em> (p. 81).</td>
<td>Training camps for new recruits, however, are normally maintained still within the jungle areas, together with supplies and ammunition dumps and small armories which are early established to make primitive weapons and to repair those which are damaged (p. 32).</td>
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<td>This territory [inside a neighboring state friendly to the insurgent] will very often serve as a base of departure for attacks launched into our territory. It is there that the enemy will, at the opening of hostilities, set up his command structure, and will shape it gradually into the provisional government he hopes to set up on our territory as soon as there is a large enough area conquered (p. 97).</td>
<td>[Insurgents set up:] Regular bases, areas garrisoned by regular troops (at rest, in training, or in the process of being organized) and local troops, with an openly functioning government carrying out administration, economic policy, taxation, justice, education, and public services, safe from enemy penetration… [And] Guerrilla bases, with active regular troops in addition to the other types, fully organized under the insurgent’s political control, with administrative organs devised to function either openly or underground, as circumstances dictate… (p. 55).</td>
<td>They [areas for expansion of insurgent control] are also likely to be areas along the boundary lines between government administrative regions or provinces in which there is a lack of co-ordination on the part of the government. Guerilla units can often find sanctuary merely by crossing such boundaries from one government operational area to another (p. 37).</td>
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<td>The border areas [between jurisdictions] are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and this advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape (p. 35).</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is a very clear distinction between the jungle bases and… 'popular' bases. The jungle bases are areas where, without much risk of interference, guerilla units can obtain rest and sanctuary, where ammunition, food and other supplies can be stored… and where recruits can be trained and tactical headquarters established… The 'popular' bases, by contrast, are the villages under insurgent control from which most of the supplies and recruits are obtained… (p. 37)</td>
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Table 4-11 (cont).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kitson (1971)</th>
<th>West (1972)</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<tr>
<td>The size of the armed [guerrilla] groups naturally depends on the plan of campaign which in turn depends on such factors as the cover afforded by the terrain, the proximity or otherwise of a friendly country, the availability of weapons, recruits, food and money, and above all on the political situation (p. 40).</td>
<td>In 1960 the Viet Cong movement had started to gain momentum, and four years later the Viet Cong could realistically claim control over most of [the province’s] villages and over all the jungle, allowing their main forces to establish a huge base camp in the mountains (p. 8). Several villagers had given a similar report: an enemy main-force unit had come across the river from the Phu Longs [VC-controlled villages and base camp] and entered Binh Yen Noi [a hamlet in the friendly village] (p. 73-74). They [the VC attack force] had come across from [VC controlled] Thoung Hoa village . . . where they had rehearsed and planned the attack for two weeks (p. 112).</td>
<td>Insurgents need bases or sanctuaries to rest, refit, train, integrate recruits, and receive supplies. Without sanctuaries, the insurgents have difficulty building their strength. Rugged terrain, the borders of neighboring states, the lines between jurisdictions, and the people can provide sanctuary.</td>
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<td>From the start of the [Malayan] emergency the central, state and district committees all operated from camps within the jungle but many of the branch committees lived with squatters on the jungle edge. Later these committees also moved inside the jungle… (p. 43).</td>
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<td>In the earlier stages the war is fought by people who strike at a time and place of their own choosing and then disappear. Sometimes their disappearance is achieved by the physical process of movement into an area of thick cover such as a jungle, and at other times by merging into the population. In either case those who are supporting them by the provision of money, food, recruits, intelligence, and supplies rely for their security on remaining anonymous. The problem of destroying enemy armed groups and their supporters therefore consists very largely of finding them (p. 95). (also in mobility)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Callwell (1906)</td>
<td>Lawrence (1920)</td>
<td>Small Wars Manual (1940)</td>
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<td>In irregular campaigns it is always doubtful how far the people of the hostile country, or in minor operations, hostile tribe, will put forth their entire strength. <em>The attitude, moreover, of neighboring peoples and tribes is at times a subject of great uncertainty.</em> [It is a] very serious inconvenience… when a neighboring tribe unexpectedly assumes an unfriendly demeanor (p. 49).</td>
<td>We had great quantities of light machine guns [obtained from the British], used not as machine guns, but as automatic rifles, snipers” tools, by men kept deliberately in ignorance of their mechanism, so that the speed of action would not be hampered by attempts at repair (p. 17). On some occasions we strengthened tribal raids by armored cars, manned by Englishmen (p. 17).</td>
<td>… funds… may be received from foreign sources for the purchase of modern arms and munitions of war. As a result, the intervening force usually finds the forces opposing them armed and equipped with modern weapons and capable of sustaining themselves in the field for an unlimited period (p. II-3). Due to the ease with which modern arms and equipment can be obtained from outside sources, it can be expected that, in the future, irregulars will have weapons and equipment equally as effective as those of the intervening forces (p. II-5). Irregular forces in active operations always attract foreign soldiers of fortune of varied experience and reputation whose fighting methods influence the character of opposition encountered (p. II-6).</td>
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Table 4-12 (cont).

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<td>The enemy, however, before moving to open warfare, will attempt to assure himself of the support of one or more friendly, nonbelligerent foreign nations (p. 97).</td>
<td>Outside support to an insurgency can take the form of: 1. Moral support, from which the insurgent will benefit without any effort on his part, provided his cause goes along with “the wind of history”… Moral support is expressed by the weight of public opinion and through various communications media. Propaganda is the chief instrument of moral support, used to sway public opinion when it is adverse, or to reinforce existing public sympathy. 2. Political support, with pressure applied directly on the counterinsurgent, or indirectly by diplomatic action in the international forum… 3. Technical support, in the form of advice to the insurgent for the organization of his movement and the conduct of his political and military operations… 4. Financial support, overt or covert. 5. Military support, either through direct intervention on the insurgent’s side or by giving him training facilities and equipment (p. 39).</td>
<td>In view of the greatly expanded base of support for the insurgents in those areas of the countryside under their control, there will be a corresponding increase in the insurgent capacity to absorb further aid from outside. Whereas in the past this aid may have been limited to a continual flow of small parties of men and materials, the insurgent movement will now be in a position to absorb whole regular units and heavier weapons (p. 166).</td>
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<td>Material support and the assurance of strong and continuing aid from abroad are essential to maintaining a high morale among those fighting in our interior (p. 98).</td>
<td>When diplomatic intervention proves ineffective, attempts will be made to establish along the frontiers of the territory under attack a system capable of depriving the enemy of delivery of support from without (p. 99).</td>
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<td>They [the Vietminh] continued to receive all their military provisions from the outside… We were never able to stop that traffic (p. 100).</td>
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<td>If our opponents [in Algeria] are stalemated, if they have not been successful in creating guerrilla units larger than company size, it is in large part because the border fence has not permitted them to receive the supplies vital to the normal development of their activities (p. 100).</td>
<td>If our opponents [in Algeria] are stalemated, if they have not been successful in creating guerrilla units larger than company size, it is in large part because the border fence has not permitted them to receive the supplies vital to the normal development of their activities (p. 100).</td>
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<tr>
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<th>West (1972)</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<tr>
<td>Such a situation [insurgents were strong enough to oppose the government in open combat] could arise if, for example, a significant number of government troops were to defect to the enemy, or if the insurgents were supported from outside the country (p. 4).</td>
<td>The rumor [that members of an enemy unit spoke with North Vietnamese accents] upset the PFs [militia]… The North Vietnamese fought in platoon-, company-, and battalion-sized units (p. 74).</td>
<td>There was wide acknowledgment of the prevalence and value of external support to insurgents. Without it, insurgents can rarely build the capacity they need to overthrow any moderately efficient state.</td>
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<td>Sometimes when the impetus for subversion comes from a foreign power or when a foreign power is in sympathy with the cause, the organizers are allowed to make use of broadcasting facilities in the friendly country concerned (p. 17).</td>
<td>Nguyen Son, the quick tempered leader of the local forces [VC] in the Phu Longs [a VC-controlled area] had been reinforced for the attack [on the combined unit fort] by the 5th Company of the 409th NVA Battalion [North Vietnamese Army] (p. 112).</td>
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<td>[As of 1971] Russia, China, and Cuba, in particular, openly encourage what they like to call wars of national liberation which is to say any form of subversion or insurgency carried out in such a way as to advance their interests (p. 19).</td>
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<td>In many cases other nations took advantage of these uprisings and gave support of one sort or another, either because they genuinely sympathized with the aims of the subversive movement, or because it was in their interest to see the existing government replaced by the insurgents (p. 43).</td>
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they value external support to the insurgent movement. Galula lists the types of support as moral, political, technical, financial, and military.

**Principle 3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival.**

We have seen that the relative weakness of the insurgent causes him to avoid decisive contact with government forces. If he did not, the government would quickly destroy him and the struggle would be resolved. Insurgent forces can avoid contact through dispersal and mobility. By moving quickly about the contested areas, insurgents can avoid destruction by superior government forces, and they can mass at the time and place of their choosing to deliver a blow to the government. These military blows are always calculated to serve a political purpose, such as embarrassing the government, increasing the cost of the government’s effort, undermining government morale, etc. When mass is not needed they remain dispersed to avoid detection, or when an insurgent unit is faced with a contact it does not want, it simply disperses to avoid destruction. Effective counterinsurgent forces attempt to match or exceed insurgent mobility in order to bring units to battle as part of the larger counterinsurgent campaign. The results are in Table 4-13.

**Principle 4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law.**

On this topic Lawrence and West had little to say. Most likely, the insurgents in Lawrence’s experience were governed by tribal tradition, and Lawrence talked about the lack of “discipline” in the Arab irregular army, where men served because they believed in the cause and not because any law compelled them. West’s protagonists also had relatively little to say about the law. One passage discussed captured suspects as being able to choose between jail and a government indoctrination center, but the main thrust of the passage was about the district government’s use of the indoctrination center to recruit informants (p. 22). Otherwise, West
The enemy lives in fact from hand to mouth, and it follows from this that he does not need communications as a channel for replenishing food or warlike stores, nor does he need lines of communications to retreat by if defeated. Warriors such as form the enemy in small wars simply disperse when they are worsted. They disappear in all directions, but unless awed by their experience into submission they are ready to collect again should an opportunity offer at a later period (p. 86).

The rapidity of the hostile movements, which arises partly from the freedom from impedimenta and partly from the singular marching power which are characteristics of irregular warriors, prejudices the course of the campaign to their great benefit. If defeated they disperse, so that the victory cannot be followed up (p. 87).

The troops [fighting guerrillas] forming such columns must be thoroughly equipped for the tasks they have to perform, and they should be able to travel light. Mobility is the first essential (p. 136).

To regular troops such antagonists are very troublesome, they shun decisive action and their tactics almost of necessity bring about a protracted, toilsome war (p. 32).

… the very essence of partisan warfare from the point of the enemy being to avoid definite engagements (p. 125).

If the action had continued till the enemy had changed his dispositions to resist it, we would have been breaking the spirit of our fundamental rule of denying him targets (p. 15).

In consequence, we aimed at the widest distribution of forces, in order to have the greatest number of raids on hand at once, and we added fluidity to their ordinary speed, by using one district on Monday, another on Tuesday, a third on Wednesday (p. 18).

At length we developed an unconscious habit of never engaging the enemy at all. This chimed with two numerical plea of never giving the enemy’s soldier a target (p. 10).

Our war should be a war of detachment: we were to contain the enemy by a silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves till the moment of attack. This attack need be only nominal directed not against his men, but against his materials: so it should not seek for his main strength or his weaknesses but for his most accessible material (p. 10).

We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind, and we wanted nothing material to live on, so perhaps we offered nothing material to the killing. It seemed a regular soldier might be helpless without a target. We would own the ground he sat on, and what he could poke his rifle at. (p. 8).

If these large groups [of irregulars] can be engaged and decisively defeated, armed opposition to the intervention may be brought to an end and an early peace achieved. If this fails, the larger groups either retire to more remote areas, or are dispersed into numerous small bands which remain in the same general locality, and the action becomes one of protracted guerrilla warfare (p. II-5).

Further, by energetic patrolling of the area and vigorous pursuit of the hostile forces once contact is gained, the irregulars should be forced to disband completely or to move to more remote and less fertile areas (p. II-6).

Their [irregulars] knowledge of the terrain and their mobility permits them to move quickly and safely to avoid combat and then to launch an attack against a defenseless village or some isolated outpost (p. II-5).
Table 4-13 (cont).

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<td>We are trying in the course of repeated complex operations to seize an adversary who eludes us (p. 4).</td>
<td>…the insurgent is obliged to remain fluid at least until he has reached a balance of forces with the counterinsurgent (p. 12).</td>
<td>To start with, they [armed guerrilla units] are seldom concentrated (except for an action on their own initiative), and are scattered over wide areas of jungle or other inaccessible terrain. Even if, as a matter of luck, the government forces make contact, the action is immediately broken off by the guerrillas (p. 31).</td>
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<td>Dispersion is a necessary part of their [insurgents’] defense (p. 52).</td>
<td>The trouble here is that the enemy holds no territory and refuses to fight for it. He is everywhere and nowhere (p. 72).</td>
<td>The net result is that large-scale military operations based on very meager intelligence are mounted to seek out and destroy these units. Guerilla units are designed to cope with exactly this form of government reaction. To start with, they are seldom concentrated (except for an action on their own initiative), and are scattered over wide areas of jungle or other inaccessible terrain (p. 31).</td>
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<tr>
<td>… the guerrilla's greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of an area (which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the support given him by the inhabitants (p.62).</td>
<td>The insurgent is fluid because he has neither responsibility nor concrete assets; the counterinsurgent is rigid because he has both, and no amount of wailing can alter this fact for either side (p. 12).</td>
<td>The requirement is for a small, elite, highly disciplined, lightly equipped and aggressive army, with a supporting air force and navy of sufficient capability to make the army highly mobile… (p. 62).</td>
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<td>He chooses the terrain and imposes it upon us (p. 63).</td>
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<td>If we were to have an opportunity to meet this enemy on the traditional field of battle, a dream vainly pursued for years by many military commanders, victory would be assured in a matter of hours (p. 8).</td>
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<td>Except for the rare exception, it [the fight against the guerrilla] will never achieve spectacular results (p. 65).</td>
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<td>… the army will operate in light detachments p. 44).</td>
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Table 4-13 (cont).

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kitson (1971)</th>
<th>West (1972)</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<td></td>
<td>In the earlier stages the war is fought by people who strike at a time and place of their own choosing and then disappear. Sometimes their disappearance is achieved by the physical process of movement into an area of thick cover such as a jungle, and at other times by merging into the population. In either case those who are supporting them by the provision of money, food, recruits, intelligence, and supplies rely for their security on remaining anonymous. The problem of destroying enemy armed groups and their supporters therefore consists very largely of finding them (p. 95).</td>
<td>Viet Cong doctrine [was] to avoid fights with strong forces and not to use guerrillas in steady combat (p. 41).</td>
<td>The insurgent must avoid military confrontation with the superior forces of the government while his is weak. Therefore, the essence of “guerrilla warfare” is highly-mobile, widely-dispersed units that concentrate to fight and then disperse before the government can react. In this way they survive as their strength grows and the government’s wanes. It follows that counter-guerrilla units must also be mobile and widely dispersed. The principle also applies to political cadres. If they are found, they are easily arrested, and so they must be very effective at moving about, or very effective at hiding, or both.</td>
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Table 4-14. Principle 4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
<th>Lawrence (1920)</th>
<th>Small Wars Manual (1940)</th>
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<tr>
<td>… but in the suppression of a rebellion the refractory subjects of the ruling power must all be chastised and subdued.” Still there is a limit to the amount of license in destruction which is expedient (p. 41).</td>
<td>Wholesale destruction of the property of the enemy may sometimes do more harm than good (p. 149).</td>
<td>If the local judicial system is weak, or broken down entirely, it is better to endow the military authorities with temporary and legal judicial powers in order to avoid embarrassing situations which may result from the illegal assumption (p. 1-7).</td>
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<td>Similarly in Burma great care was taken not to exasperate the people of the newly acquired province, and to punish only the dacoits [guerrillas] and marauders who invested the country and were reducing it to anarchy… but great care had to be exercised not to punish villages which were merely victims of dacoity [rebellion by the dacoits]. Fines were sometimes inflicted to make the villagers give up their arms if it was thought they were in league with the marauders. (p.147-148).</td>
<td>Our military forces must not assume any judicial responsibility over local inhabitants beyond that expressly provided by proper authority (p. 1-7).</td>
<td>National policy and the precepts of civilized procedure demand that our dealings with other peoples be maintained of a high moral plan [sic] (p. 1-13).</td>
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<td>Although this procedure [a functioning local national judiciary allied to the ruling party] is not always conducive to the best interests of the military forces, it is a situation that normally exists and must be accepted (p. 1-44).</td>
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<td>Reprisals and punitive measures may result in the destruction of lives and property of innocent people; such measures may have an adverse effect upon the discipline of our own troops (p. 1-27).</td>
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<td>Adherence, on the part of our personnel, to the dictates of the local laws and regulations… is essential… to the end that we maintain the respect and confidence of the community as a whole (p. 1-44).</td>
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<td>When it has been decided to kill someone sometime somewhere, with the sole purpose of terrorizing the populace and strewing a certain number of bodies along the streets of a city or on country roads, it is quite easy under existing laws to escape the police (p.18). The fact that modern warfare is not officially declared, that a state of war is not generally proclaimed, permits the adversary to continue to take advantage of peacetime legislation (p. 27). Statute law can be modified by emergency law, and laws of procedure and evidence can be simplified. There is nothing to prevent a government enacting very tough laws to cope with the situation, but the golden rule should be that each new law must be effective and must be fairly applied (p. 53).</td>
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<td>If insurgents, though identified and arrested by the police, take advantage of the many normal safeguards built into the judicial system and are released, the police can do little. Prompt adaptation of the judicial system to the extraordinary conditions of an insurgency, an agonizing problem at best, is a necessity (p. 31). Since legal changes are slow, the counterinsurgent may be tempted to go a step further and to act beyond the borders of legality. A succession of arbitrary restrictive measures will be started, the nation will soon find itself under constraint, opposition will increase, and the insurgent will thank his opponent for having played into his hands (p. 66). Can the counterinsurgent use terrorism too? It would be self-defeating since terrorism is a source of disorder, which is precisely what the counterinsurgent aims to stop (p. 74).</td>
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<td>No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his secret from him (p. 21). The organization [of citizen’s to promote internal security] will have to be seriously controlled, so that it remains solely a means of protection against the external enemy [the insurgents] and does not become a vehicle for internal political pressure (p. 34). The arrested cell members normally ought to be punished according to laws, since they have taken part in a conspiracy against the government. Nothing, however, is normal in a revolutionary war. If the counterinsurgent wishes to bring a quicker end to the war, he must discard some of the legal concepts that would be applicable to ordinary conditions… Leniency seems in this case a good practical policy (p. 126).</td>
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<td>In the pre-insurgency circumstances of murder and terror, it is very likely that the normal processes of law and order will fail to cope with the situation (p. 25-26). Second principle [second basic principle of counterinsurgency]. The government must function in accordance with law [Thompson devoted a complete section to this issue] (p. 52).</td>
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<td>Nevertheless, even if some [army] brutality is inevitable, rigorous discipline must always be enforced to prevent wanton acts. The army has the means of demanding and maintaining firm discipline. (p. 48). It puts torture and the shooting of captured terrorists in their proper place: however great the provocation, both are crimes and the latter is murder (p. 54).</td>
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Statute law can be modified by emergency law, and laws of procedure and evidence can be simplified. There is nothing to prevent a government enacting very tough laws to cope with the situation, but the golden rule should be that each new law must be effective and must be fairly applied (p. 53). Second principle [second basic principle of counterinsurgency]. The government must function in accordance with law [Thompson devoted a complete section to this issue] (p. 52).
Table 4-14 (cont).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kitson (1971)</th>
<th>West (1972)</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<tr>
<td>An excellent example [of civil military cooperation] concerns the way in which the Law should work. Broadly speaking there are two possible alternatives, the first one being that the Law should be used as just another weapon in the government's arsenal, and in this case it becomes little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of unwanted members of the public... The other alternative is that the Law should remain impartial and administer the laws of the country without any direction from the government. Naturally the government can introduce new legislation to deal with the subversion which can be very tough if necessary, and once this becomes law legal services will administer justice based on it. But the resulting situation is very different from that described in the first alternative because in the second case the officers of the law will recognize no difference between the forces of the government, the army, or the uncommitted part of the population. Anyone violating the law will be treated in the same way, and the full legal procedure, complete with its safeguards for the individual will operate on behalf of friend and foe alike. As a rule the second alternative is not only morally right but also expedient… (p. 69).</td>
<td>The man had been busy haranguing crowds and organizing support for a Buddhist struggle against the Saigon government. Acting on an informer’s advice, Lam had the man seized at his home, where a quick search revealed correspondence which identified the prisoner as a member of the Viet Cong… Yet the prisoner spent less than a day in jail before his political friends of convinced the district chief it would be unwise to press charges (p. 6).</td>
<td>Callwell did not discuss the need for the “rule of law” possibly because the legal system in remote lands was not greatly developed, but he did stress the need for restraint in the authority’s use of violence. Also, colonial governments often imposed law and a measure of order on regions that had been characterized by intermittent warfare. Thompson reports that a village headman, asked in 1942 if he was glad the colonialists were being driven off by the Japanese, replied, ‘You slept in peace under the British’ (Thompson, p. 123). Lawrence had nothing to say about the law. Disputes among Arab tribesmen were settled in traditional ways. In the Twenty-seven Articles (1917), he instructs future advisors to Arabs to remain above the ‘feuds.’ West observed a failure of the law, and the negative impact it had on the morale of police and militia facing the Viet Cong daily. The Small Wars Manual stressed the need to respect local national legal authority and to operate within the authority granted Marines by their orders. The post-war theorists agreed on several ideas: 1) the peacetime law might be insufficient to deal with a counterinsurgency effort and need to be changed; 2) the government must obey the law, and enforce the law fairly. Caveat: They disagree on interrogation techniques.</td>
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For the purposes of this study no account will be taken of the simplest method of all, which is to suppress the movement by the ruthless application of naked force, because although non-violent campaigns are particularly vulnerable to this sort of action, it is most unlikely that the British government, or indeed any Western government, would be politically able to operate on these lines even if it wanted to do so (p. 87). |
expressed disappointment at the corruption of the South Vietnamese government in two particulars: First, a politically connected man was found to be a member of the Viet Cong, but was released quickly from jail which hurt the morale of men risking their lives to find and arrest or kill insurgents. Second, connected individuals were diverting humanitarian aid supplies for their personal benefit and damaging the credibility of the government.

Callwell did not discuss the law, as there probably was no effective law in many of the areas from which his cases were drawn, but he was emphatic that there is a limit to the utility of destruction. He maintained that too much destruction created enmity while the objective of the campaign was usually to gain the “friendship of the people” (p. 41) and a “lasting peace” (p. 42).

The *Small Wars Manual* discussed the military assumption of civil authority in extreme cases, and then the need to remain inside the limits of whatever authority Marines were permitted. They also believed U.S. operations should remain on a high moral plane, and that Marines must respect local national legal authority.

The post-war theorists were agreed that the law that existed in peacetime may be insufficient to cope with the demands of an insurgency, and that the laws needed to be changed. They insisted, however, that the government must act within the law, and that soldiers who violated the law should be subject to discipline. Only Trinquier says anything else. As we have seen, he advocated harsh interrogation of captured terrorists, but the remainder of his work suggests that this activity should be legally permitted, and otherwise he joined the others in affirming that the government should behave within the limits of the law. The most harsh and direct condemnation of Trinquier’s opinion on interrogation comes from Thompson who declares torture and summary executions “both are crimes and the latter is murder” (p. 54). An examination of the results in Table 4-14 will show the strength of the consensus on these items.
Principle 4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required).

Callwell and Lawrence had little to say about interagency operations, probably because the environments they operated in lacked an institutional structure that would permit interagency operations. Otherwise, an inspection of Table 4-15 will show that the need for interagency operations was the subject of strong consensus. Several principles emerge: First, all others agree on the importance of a variety of agencies working together to attack insurgency with a combined plan featuring military, political, social, and economic initiatives to improve the legitimacy of the government. The *Small Wars Manual* adds that cooperation must be multinational when one state comes to the aid of another. Second, the government must have or must develop the institutional capacity to administer the combined program effectively. Finally, the program is best administered with a unified command structure.

The consensus among the theorists is remarkable. Despite the differences in perspective and some differences of emphasis, a majority of theorists agreed on every issue, and usually the consensus was much stronger than a mere majority. In my judgment, an attempt to quantify the strength of consensus on each item would not add to the value or quality of this research. There are too many implications contained in the results, and the quotations contained in the results tables are too few to believe that we have exhausted all the implications in the work of a particular theorist. Indeed, one of my hardest tasks was to narrow the results such that they would fit into the tables. I was able to identify only one major disagreement, that concerning the use of harsh interrogations. The considerable strength of the consensus on each item suggests that this list of principles could be used as a model for counterinsurgency campaign planning. The planner would address each principle within the plan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Callwell (1906)</th>
<th>Lawrence (1920)</th>
<th>Small Wars Manual (1940)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>In small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function and the State Department exercises a constant and controlling influence over the military operations (p. I-4).</td>
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<td>In general, a plan of action states the military measures to be applied... The same consideration must be given to a part to be played by local government and the civil population. The efforts of the different agencies must be cooperative and coordinated to the attainment of the common end (p. I-16).</td>
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<td>The organization of a native military and police force is undertaken (p. I-6).</td>
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<td>Native troops, supported by marines, are increasingly employed as early as practicable in order that these native agencies may assume their proper responsibility for restoring law and order in their own country as an agency of their government (p. I-7).</td>
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<td>Finally, when order is restored, or when the responsible native agencies are prepared to handle the situation without other support, the troops are withdrawn (p. I-8).</td>
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<td>The application of purely military measures may not, by itself, restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social (p. I-15).</td>
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<td>Table 4-15 (cont).</td>
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<td>Internal warfare within a population, particularly in cities, generally involves an extensive police operation. There is also an intensive propaganda effort, destined primarily to make the steps that are taken understood. A broad social program follows, the objective of which is to give the people the material and moral assistance necessary to permit them to resume their normal activities quickly after operations are over (p. 43). Such projects include construction of new roads, or the repair of those that have been sabotaged; construction of new strategic hamlets to receive people falling back from the danger areas; school construction, and economic development of the department to give displaced persons means of subsistence. A well-conceived plan, executed with determination, courage, and foresight, will save from needless distress a population that will have had more than its share of suffering (p. 81). It will be the role of the social services to lessen the miseries war engenders (p. 50). Since it is the population that is at stake, the struggle will assume two aspects: Political—direct action on the population; and military—the struggle against the armed forces of the aggressor (p. 40). Victory no longer depends on one battle over a given terrain. Military operations… are of only limited importance and are never the total conflict (p. 6-7).</td>
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<td>Destroying or expelling from an area the main body of the guerrilla forces, preventing their return, installing garrisons to protect the population, tracking the guerrilla remnants—these are predominantly military operations. Identifying, arresting, interrogating the insurgent political agents, judging them, rehabilitating those who can be won over—these are police and judicial tasks. Establishing contact with the population, imposing and enforcing control measures, organizing local elections, testing the new leaders, organizing them into a party, doing all the constructive work needed to win the wholehearted support of the population—these are primarily political operations. The expected result—final defeat of the insurgents—is not an addition but a multiplication of these various operations; they all are essential and if one is nil, the product will be zero. Clearly… counterinsurgency must respect the principle of a single direction. A single boss must direct the operations from beginning until the end (p. 87). The counterinsurgent leader… has to take into account the problems of the various civilian and military components of his forces before reaching a decision, especially when their actions interrelate intricately and when their demands often conflict with each other (p. 90). Adapting the judicial system to the threat, strengthening the bureaucracy, reinforcing the police and the armed forces may discourage insurgency… (p. 67).</td>
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<td>Third principle [third basic principle of counterinsurgency]. The government must have an overall plan… This plan must cover not just the security measures and military operations. It must include all political, social, economic, administrative, police and other measures which have a bearing on the insurgency (p. 55). It is essential, too, that there should be a proper balance between the military and the civil effort, with complete coordination in all fields, Otherwise a situation will arise in which military operations produce no lasting results because they are unsupported by civil follow-up action. Similarly, civilian measures, particularly in areas disputed with the insurgents, are a waste of time and money if they are unsupported by military operations to provide the necessary protection (p. 55). Without a reasonably efficient government machine, no program or projects, in the context of counter-insurgency, will produce the desired results (p. 51). If the government performance is going to be effective and keep pace with the aspirations of the people, while at the same time creating an atmosphere of order and stability, the main essentials to establish a sound administrative structure (p. 70).</td>
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Table 4-15 (cont).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kitson (1971)</th>
<th>West (1972)</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<tr>
<td>But the important aspect from the point of view of the military officer engaged in countering insurgency is not to know how to build up overall government programs so much as to understand how totally interdependent all the various measures must be, and how important it is that they should not cut across each other (p. 51).</td>
<td>The police wanted no part of the night patrols. Although well trained and not afraid to run ambushes, they left such military chores to the Marines and PFs [militiamen]… His men [the police] were day people, specialists in the intelligence rather than the operational field of war (p. 51).</td>
<td>Callwell and Lawrence had little to say about interagency functioning. The institutional infrastructures of their experiences were so underdeveloped as to make this unimportant.</td>
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<td>Even in the operational sphere civil and military measures are inextricably intertwined (p. 52).</td>
<td>Although the RDs [Revolutionary Development cadres] carried weapons, their task was not to beat the enemy by force. They were supposed to show the villagers that the Saigon government cared for them and that the Viet Cong were to be shunned (p. 38).</td>
<td>The remaining theorists greatly stressed the need for a multi-disciplinary, interagency approach to counterinsurgency. Given the political nature of this type of conflict and the social, political, or economic nature of the insurgents’ cause, military force was insufficient to win. Indeed, its purpose was to make political action among the people possible. They also stressed the need for a unified plan directed by a unified command structure, and the need to develop the administrative capacity of the government to address the nation’s problems effectively.</td>
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<td>On the one hand military officers are required to initiate proposals for wearing down and defeating insurgents which representatives of other government departments have to scrutinize in order to ensure that they do not cut across long-term government aims (p. 52).</td>
<td>Within a few days it was apparent that the RDs were of little use. Few of them were from the village, many were in their teens and none were married. [Their leader] frequently looked like an exasperated Boy Scout master with a high spirited troop. Send them to work in the fields, and he would find them trying to coax the girls into the bushes (p. 38).</td>
<td>The Small Wars Manual also stressed the need to cooperate on a multi-national level.</td>
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<td>Soldiers, policemen, local volunteers and junior officials of departments such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works would all have to work together on such an operation [to destroy guerrillas, impose curfews, deny food and resources] (p. 52).</td>
<td>The district adviser, [Marine] Major Braun was concerned with reports that as the Marines at the fort became more proficient in patrolling, they tended to shoulder more tactical responsibilities and to shove the PFs [militia] and even the police assigned (p. 63).</td>
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In this connection it is worth pointing out that as the enemy is likely to be employing a combination of political, economic, psychological and military measures, so the government will have to do likewise to defeat him (p. 7).
Now we turn to the task of testing these “classical” principles against the contemporary environment.

**Stage 2: Update for the 21st Century: Understanding the Environment**

The review of literature indicated that classical ideas on counterinsurgency might be outdated by changes in the contemporary global political environment and in the nature of insurgency (Hoffman, 2007; Kilcullen, 2006a; Metz, 1995). To determine the relevance of the classical principles uncovered in Stage 1 and to achieve Objective 3 of this study—identify and describe the changes to the classical model that are necessary—I found it necessary to explore these criticisms more closely.

**Changes in the Contemporary Environment**

A number of authors, from a variety of backgrounds, have joined in describing the changes in the global environment. Hoffman (2007), Cobbold (2006), Mills (2007), Metz (1995), Metz (2007), Kilcullen (2006a), and others have contributed to the following list:

1. More states are in the international system than during the Cold War.

2. The proliferation of important and powerful non-state actors, including corporations, NGOs, international organizations, transnational terrorist organizations, all sorts of media organizations, and others.

3. More news agencies, more outlets and more websites, capable of transmitting imagery, which is much more powerful than mere text description. Hoffman (2007) even pointed out that some analysts consider the media to be participants in the conflict.

5. Globalized information and communication technologies, particularly the internet, permit the mobilization of support internationally.

6. Perception management is more difficult without a monopoly on media.

7. The incidence of state sponsorship has declined with the end of the Cold War. Revolutions are no longer exported as part of superpower rivalry.

8. Increasing incidence of state failure.

9. War in many regions is becoming endemic; entire generations know nothing but conflict.

10. Urbanization; conflict is increasingly conducted in densely populated areas. The tactics used, particularly bombings, rely on terror to divide society. In this environment bystanders are always present to bear witness to violent action, and the media is available to spread the news globally.

11. Western home populations are now vulnerable to a terrorist threat.

Given, as Hoffman (2007) contends, that counterinsurgency campaigns are won in the “political and psychological dimensions” (p. 79), global information systems provide a new battlefield. Global media certainly affect sympathies and can affect political decision-making. The media choose what is shown based upon the biases of journalists, the prevailing attitudes of their primary audiences, and on what is likely to produce either ratings or enhance journalistic reputations. Modern insurgents, guerrillas or terrorists, are very good at manipulating the media to get their message out (Mills, 2007).

Hoffman (2007) believes this has several important implications. The battlespace—a conceptual “space” that includes the physical battlefield plus the friendly and enemy forces and civilian population in it, as well as the electromagnetic spectrum and, most important for our
purposes, the information environment (FM 3-0, 2001)—is much more complex and difficult to define. It is more difficult to define the nature, strategy, structure, and means of the adversary. States no longer monopolize media, and the insurgents have become very effective at getting their message out. Metz (1995) has added that the end of the Cold War has changed the U.S. definition of its interests, and the UN is freed from the stasis imposed by superpower rivalry.

**Changes in the Nature of Insurgency**

A number of authors (Hammes, 2004; Cobbold, 2006; Cohen, Crane, Horvath & Nagl, 2006) have commented that the overwhelming military superiority of the U.S. has discouraged potential adversaries from facing U.S. military forces in conventional battle. However, potential adversaries also recognize our weakness in protracted asymmetric conflict. Cohen *et al* (2006) are representative; they write, “They respect our immense firepower and logistical capabilities; they do not have equal regard for our strategic acumen or operational skill in fighting [asymmetric] wars” (p. 53). Hammes argues that the U.S. has lost this sort of asymmetric conflict on three occasions—Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia—and that this is not lost on our potential adversaries.

Lacina (2007) has observed that in regions with weak rule of law, insurgents may survive as criminal organizations without popular support. She argues that counterinsurgency strategy must deal with the weakness in the rule of law which, she argues, is the source of turmoil in many regions.

Hoffman (2007) argues that insurgent organizations are no longer the tight, well disciplined, hierarchical organizations described by Trinquier, Galula, or Thompson. Today’s insurgent organizations are flatter and more federated; they may also be linked to organized crime. Kilcullen (2006a) argues modern insurgents operate “more like a self-synchronizing
swarm of independent, but cooperating cells” (p. 6), and also he calls the jihadist movement a global insurgency comprised of “a loosely aligned confederation of independent networks” (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 602). The implication is that counterinsurgents have less insurgent organization to attack; therefore they have more trouble winning. The flip side is that until insurgents can organize themselves they are unlikely to topple any reasonably effective government and seize national power. Insurgents may be able to stretch out the conflict indefinitely, however. Metz (2007) observes that in protracted situations like this, when the U.S. is not already committed to a side, the insurgency is not the real threat to U.S. interests, but the instability that results from protracted conflict is. In such situations, the appropriate policy response is not to assist the regime to gain victory, but to assist parties to the conflict to resolve their dispute.

Hoffman (2007) also contends that insurgents may not seek clearly defined objectives; particularly they may not desire to overthrow a government. Strictly speaking, according to our definition of insurgency from Chapter 1, this prevents us from describing such groups as insurgents; however, his point does highlight the difficulty of coming to grips with these issues. Mills (2007) argues insurgent objectives may have more to do with political aspirations of a local national leader or with the interests of an external sponsor. Some groups may benefit from the state of anarchy that results from sustained conflict and may not want peace. Kilcullen (2006a) adds that some groups may not want power, but only to scavenge from the carcass of a failed state; other groups may merely want to expel foreigners from the country.

Hoffman (2007) also points out that urbanization has provided the new “terrain” in which insurgents hide. In urban areas, insurgents have access to people and to money, strangers are not out of place, and lucrative infrastructure targets abound, because the population is dependent
upon infrastructures and government services. The population density limits the government’s ability to collect intelligence, to enforce the law, or conduct military operations. Additionally, urban areas provide the opportunities for insurgents to support themselves with criminal acts so that they are less dependent upon the populace for everyday support. Perhaps most importantly, insurgents have increased access to media for disseminating their message. Hoffman believes that counterinsurgency is won in the political and psychological dimensions; a “compelling narrative” disseminated through modern information technology can generate a critical advantage for the side that does it best.

Kilcullen (2005) adds that transnational movements, such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates, are best perceived as insurgencies, therefore, in addition to national insurgencies, there are transnational ones as well. These transnational organizations have no unified command structure, may not attempt to control territory or create a shadow government, do not collect taxes, and do not attempt to have frequent personal interactions with a local population. Al Qaeda’s objective is more ambitious than seizing power in a single state; it is the establishment of a caliphate from which they can attack the West.

If, as Kilcullen (2005) has argued, the confrontation between jihadist groups and the West is best perceived as a global insurgency, the West should prefer a permutation of counterinsurgency doctrine to combat this threat over counter-terror doctrine. The essence of Kilcullen’s argument is that the counter-terror paradigm perceives the terrorist as an aberrant and evil individual with whom we do not negotiate, while the counterinsurgency paradigm considers the insurgent to be an individual with a cause or a grievance that may be legitimate. The apparent popularity of Al Qaeda in corners of the Islamic world indicates that Al Qaeda has a considerable constituency. This, in turn, suggests that a significant number of Muslims perceive a legitimate
grievance against the West. Part of an effective counterinsurgency response would be to address this perception. Moreover, a counterinsurgency paradigm would open an opportunity for “compromise and negotiation” (p. 605) and for hearts and minds campaigns designed to persuade Muslims we are not their enemies, and which might isolate jihadists psychologically and ideologically from the remainder of the Muslim community.

In this paradigm, terror is not the definition of the group (“the terrorists”), but simply is a tactic that an insurgent group, in this case, a transnational one, uses to achieve its goals. The use of terror as a tactic is not new; we have seen it in classical insurgency as well.

Several other authors adopt similar perspectives to Kilcullen’s. Sederberg (1995), writing before September 11, 2001 and before Al Qaeda was commonly known, observed that “If we consider terrorism as one possible tactic available to a challenger group engaged in a political struggle we push the question of response back into the political context where it belongs” (p. 309). He argued that conciliation addressing the political causes of conflict was more appropriate to a just and long-term solution to the underlying political problem than a strictly military response. Solving the political problem, he thought, will end terror. Atran (2004) argued that “military and counterinsurgency actions are tactical, not strategic, responses to suicide terrorism” (p. 67) that fail to address the underlying problem. He proposed a layered counter-terror approach that defended sensitive populations and installations from attack and sought out terrorist networks with intelligence and military action, but emphasized understanding and acting upon the root causes of terror through political, economic, and social programs. (Atran’s definition of counterinsurgency is likely very different—too focused on military action—from the practice described by classical model. The classical model includes political, economic, and social programs.)
Other authors question the ability of hearts and minds approaches to deal with religious or ethnic insurgencies (or terrorists). Hoffman (2007), for example, argued religious conflicts are not amenable to compromise or to political settlement, and that economic inducements are not effective against religious convictions. Ajami (1997), on the other hand, says, “A frightened middle class [in Middle Eastern states], desperate to hold on to its small cultural liberties against the Islamists' reign of virtue and terror, is willing to sanction and live with autocratic rule” (p. 145), suggesting that a measure of despotism is favorable to the rule of radical Islam. Kerry (no date), in a yet-unpublished memoir of his service in Iraq as an advisor to an Iraqi Army brigade, describes the events following the capture of a jihadist suicide bomber who failed to reach his target. Kerry’s humane treatment of the young man and Kerry’s willingness to protect him from the threat of harsh treatment by the Iraqis contrasted starkly with his expectations of his treatment following capture, with his false impressions of Americans, and also with the manner in which he would have treated Kerry had their positions been reversed. Ultimately, the young jihadi agreed to speak out on Iraqi television acknowledging the humane treatment he had received. This suggests that it is possible to win hearts and minds of some radical Muslims, and Ajami’s comment indicates that the Muslim community is hardly monolithic in its support of jihadist groups.

**Implications of the Contemporary Environment for the Classical Principles**

**Principle 1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary.**

The objective of modern groups may not have the specificity exhibited by the examples found in the classical theorists. They may be satisfied to fracture or paralyze the state (Hoffman, 2007), or individuals may fight because it is a job, a means of providing for themselves (Kilcullen, 2006a). They may be paid with money from outside the local system. Soldiers in
Iraq have captured individual insurgents who planted bombs or carried arms because they were paid by one of the insurgent organizations fighting inside Iraq. This turns the normal relationship of the people supporting the insurgents on its head; the insurgents may support the people with a job. We know from classical theory that the political struggle is primary. Global media has increased the propaganda and political dimension of any given conflict (Kilcullen, 2006a) so that the military dimension is even less important than in the classical era.

The fact that a group does not aim to take power may have more to do with its assessment of its own capability—that goal is beyond its reach—than with its actual desires. Kilcullen (2006a) cites Cordesman (2006) who observed that insurgent groups in Iraq have not established internal sanctuaries, won significant engagements, or done other things that successful classical insurgencies have done. However, their activities have halted the development of the state. Cordesman’s point was that, in the traditional sense, the insurgents were not in any danger of winning, but they appeared, at the time, to be denying victory to the U.S. and the new government. I caveat his thought with this one. The insurgents’ limitations are probably due to a lack of capacity—they cannot hold a sanctuary against U.S. and government soldiers. Indeed, Metz and Millen (2005) observed that at the time, the Iraqi insurgency was young and sorting itself out. The insurgents’ limitations may also relate to a priority of activities. They want Americans out, the diverse groups can agree on that, and they will each adjust their objectives once Americans leave.

For a group to want to perpetuate a state of anarchy, its leaders must expect to profit in some way, collectively or personally, from disorder. This group must still establish itself with sufficient strength to survive and then to prosper in that environment. At any rate, the group’s
leaders are fighting for a reason, and the rank and file members are also fighting for a reason. Either or both of these may be “attacked” through political or psychological means.

If the group’s goals are unacceptable to the government, such that redress of grievance is not possible, the government will have to coerce them to stop fighting. Many groups fighting today are founded on an identity (religious or ethnic). They may be members of the same tribe or clan, or beholden to a warlord, that refuses for whatever reason to seek accommodation. Ironically, Callwell (1906), who was often out of sync with the other classic theorists, has much to say about this situation (Kilcullen, 2006a). Indeed, many of the enemies faced by the British Empire were tribes, and were led by tribal leaders. They could not be persuaded out of that identity, and had to be brought into compliance with force.

For Callwell, the insurrection of an entire relatively homogenous group, the members of which overwhelmingly supported the insurgents, but who could be easily identified as members, was more easily resolved by force. This is still true. For example, the U.S. military campaign with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban was somewhat analogous to many small war campaigns that Callwell studied. The U.S. military found the Taliban and its supporters easy to pick out and subsequently easy to defeat. For insurgents that cannot command the loyalty of an entire relatively homogenous population, and few groups can today, the difficulty in imposing a solution by force is that counterinsurgents cannot easily identify insurgents from among the remainder of the population. But these insurgents are vulnerable to an integrated, interagency counterinsurgency campaign designed to isolate them from the population or even from a global constituency.

A group or groups that are successful at reducing a country to anarchy without having the capacity to seize power is not too great a problem for a foreign counterinsurgent. When the cost
becomes too great to stay, he can take his tattered credibility and leave, as did many colonial powers from their former colonies and the U.S. from Vietnam (Lynn, 2005). In fact, forcing the “occupier” out may be the limited objective—the cause—of an insurgent group that lacks the capacity to take power, or this may be the shared cause that binds together disparate groups, who will fight each other once the foreigner leaves. The government of the foreign counterinsurgent nation is rarely threatened with its own collapse. The Republicans lost the 2006 mid-term elections badly, at least in part due to conditions in Iraq, but the government was not in any jeopardy. The real victims are the common people of the failed state.

So it is possible for an insurgent group’s agenda or the cause it espouses to be something other than taking control of the state, but still this cause exists, whatever it is, and it may be amenable to political action. The principle is still valid. Campaign planners will still need to determine and address the reason insurgents are fighting.

Principle 2: The population is the center of gravity.

Kilcullen (2006a) observed that terrorists do not require a mass base. This idea is not new. Galula (1964) discussed it as part of the “bourgeois-nationalist” pattern of insurgency discussed in Chapter 2 and movements have operated without a mass base. However, I do not know of any movement without a mass following that has succeeded in taking power from an efficient government, although there may be some that have extracted significant concessions or have destabilized a weak regime to the point of collapse.

Global communications make it possible for insurgents to seek moral or financial support globally. Kilcullen (2006a) posits that the winner in an asymmetric conflict may be the side that can mobilize global and regional support in addition to support from the local population. For
example, Siqueira and Sandler (2006) cite the Tamil Tigers and the Irish Republican Army as two groups who are very successful at fundraising among expatriates.

Nevertheless, the fact that movements have existed without a mass base does not imply that most movements do not seek or do not need the support of the local populace. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) learned how much their group relied on the support of the Iraqi Sunni community when they lost it in late 2007. The “Sunni Awakening” has displaced AQI from its former stronghold in Anbar province, and the jihadis are being driven from the country as of the summer of 2008. So, the principle still applies.

**Principle 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support to the government.**

Since the modern insurgent needs less from the people, Hoffman (2007) believes he may not seek significant support from them, or may coerce from them what he needs. In the latter case, effective protection of the people from the insurgent will deny him whatever support he requires from them. Admittedly, this is more difficult than in the classical model. Lynn (2005) argues that security is critical to legitimacy; if the state cannot provide the former, it does not enjoy the latter. I personally have known Iraqis who have been killed or kidnapped, and I have seen the chilling effect that these actions have on the people nearby. The principle that people need security has not changed.

**Principle 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government.**

It certainly helps the government’s cause to convince people it has the will and capacity to win. This has not changed. The foreign counterinsurgent is vulnerable, however. Supporting governments have often left when the cost of staying became too high (Lynn, 2005). In fact, Claessen (2006) has argued persuasively that the foreign policy of a democracy engaged in
counterinsurgency is vulnerable to the decay of home population’s support for the war. In other words, the people at home are a democracy’s center of gravity.

The improvement of people’s living standards and the redress of their grievances is still powerful counterinsurgency. Chiarelli and Michaelis (2005) demonstrate the coincidence between insurgent activity and the lack of basic services in the Sadr City section of Baghdad. They also demonstrate the correlation of increased funding to hire Sadr City residents to work on infrastructure projects—decreasing unemployment and increasing the availability of services—with the decrease in insurgent activity. Apparently, this sort of persuasion is still useful.

**Principle 2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support.**

Courtesy and respect never hurt. For a foreign counterinsurgent, the troops’ professionalism reduces the natural resistance people have to foreign occupation, and lengthens what Petraeus (2006) called the “half-life” of the “army of liberation.” For the local national counterinsurgent, courtesy and professionalism reduces resistance from the local population, and enhances the perception of the government in the international arena. A poorly perceived government is denied external support that may be critical. Hammes (2004) explains how negative perceptions of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua led to the abandonment of the regime by the Western world. This principle still appears to be important.

**Principle 2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign counterinsurgents.**

This principle only applies to a counterinsurgent that is from a different culture than the populace. Understanding a culture decreases cultural *faux pas* and aids in communication. McFarland (2005) explains the mere translation of spoken or written words may be insufficient to convey meaning. The way in which a man speaks is influenced by his culture, and a mere
translation may not accurately convey meaning. Understanding a culture also decreases the
natural resistance people exhibit toward outsiders, and so cultural awareness increases the “half-
life” of the “army of liberation” (Petraeus, 2006). Aylwin-Foster (2005), in a critique of
American military performance in the early stages of the effort in Iraq, cites the lack of
understanding of the culture to be a major impediment to mission accomplishment.

**Principle 2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple
audiences.**

Propaganda has increased in importance. The number of information outlets and the
internet have made it possible for anyone to convey a story to the rest of the world. The impact
is huge, and counterinsurgents cannot afford to abandon this battlespace to their enemies. The
importance of effective information campaigns can hardly be overstated. As important as it was
in the classical era, it is more so now.

**Principle 2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the
insurgent.**

The support of a local population may not be as critical for the modern insurgent as it was
for his classical predecessor. Modern insurgents have other methods for generating support, and
a small group can carry out a terror campaign without the benefit of popular support or a tightly
controlled organization. However, in many cases, particularly those likely to involve large
numbers of U.S. soldiers abroad, the support of the local populace is still critical to significant
success. For example, local Iraqi insurgent groups still need control of local populations just like
the classical groups, and even Al Qaeda in Iraq was crippled when it lost the cooperation of
Sunni leaders in the summer of 2007. The incidence of terror, such as assassinations of key local
leaders, demonstrates the insurgents still value control over the populace.
The counterinsurgent must still have control over the population in order to defeat insurgency. This control is, in many ways, more difficult. There is no practical way to control people’s movements or communications in cyberspace, for example. Indeed, coping with the challenges of modern communications technology is among the most important challenges that today’s counterinsurgents face. Classical theory still insists that control is important, but it does not recommend any techniques.

Principle 3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases to build strength.

Insurgents can work in small cells among urban populations or among friendly rural populations, but the movement cannot grow without sanctuary areas to rest, refit, integrate recruits, train, or receive support. If the only physical sanctuaries to be found are contained within a single building in a city, such as an apartment, a garage, or a warehouse, growth is limited. However, insurgents can communicate their messages, study new techniques, receive advice and support in “cyber-sanctuaries” online. So this principle still applies.

Principle 3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support.

External support is still critical. With a decrease in state sponsorship of insurgency, insurgent groups have turned to other methods for generating support. Siqueira and Sandler (2006) think external sponsorship is critical for insurgent success, and posit that external support can come from diaspora support and outside financing as well as from states, such as Iran, that are still sponsoring insurgency. Outside financing comes from several sources. It is raised from sympathetic individuals around the world, often via the internet, or it may come from illegal activities, such as narcotics, or from alliances with organized crime.
**Principle 3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival.**

The imperative of an insurgent remaining hidden or out of reach and of avoiding contact with government forces except on the insurgent’s terms has not changed. The tactics have. Insurgents are far more likely to hide among urban populations than in inaccessible terrain as in the past. The trick for the government is still to find and root them out.

**Principle 4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law.**

This principle remains important to maintaining legitimacy and receiving external support. Important objections to U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have to do with our treatment of captured enemy combatants. The abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghreib bought the U.S. a great deal of resistance from the Iraqi people, and caused a howl of protest from our own population (our center of gravity) and from the rest of the world, particularly the Western allies, which we wanted to help us. A local national counterinsurgent also has to be perceived as obeying the law and operating within human rights limitations. Hammes (2004) details the way in which the Sandinista insurgency successfully depicted the Somoza regime as corrupt and abusive, which effectively denied the regime the external support that it needed. It is possible that the conditions of an insurgency may require changes to the law to facilitate counterinsurgent efforts. For example, U.S. law changed in important ways following the 9-11 attacks.

**Principle 4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required).**

This principle was very important in the 1950s and 1960s. It is more important now. Urban populations are much more dependent on government services than rural populations a half-century ago. Also urban insurgents are less vulnerable to military attack than their rural
forebears. These changes require an integrated, interagency plan addressing social, political, and economic factors in addition to military factors.

It appears that all of the classical principles identified in Stage 1 of this study are still valid. Indeed, the use of propaganda has dramatically increased in importance, and the value of interagency cooperation has also increased. The support of the population is less important for urban insurgents to survive, but it appears that it is still crucial to insurgent success, if success is defined as taking national power from the government. Furthermore, the professionalism and the cultural awareness of foreign counterinsurgents are better seen to be important. It is certain that the tactics and techniques associated with each principle will be different than they were in the past, but each principle will still need to be addressed as part of a comprehensive campaign plan.

A New Theoretical Insight?

There are additional implications to the changes in the environment and in insurgency that provide an opportunity for new theoretical insight. The literature contains recognition that local insurgencies have developed global reach. Propaganda efforts, enabled by modern communications technologies, particularly the Internet, permit the delivery of insurgent messages to a world audience (Hoffman, 2007) and the “attack” of the home population of a foreign counterinsurgent, which is also his center of gravity (Claessen, 2007). The Internet permits the solicitation of moral and financial support globally, and allows insurgent groups to receive advice and cooperation from similar groups. It is even possible for local insurgent groups to physically attack the home population of foreign counterinsurgents or the citizens of third nations through terrorism.

The literature also contains arguments that global terrorist networks intervene in local conflict and exploit local grievances by sponsoring the violent activities of local insurgent
groups. They also conduct terrorist activities in stable states such as the United States or Western Europe (Kilcullen, 2005). In addition, the literature suggests that Western policy makers should perceive these networks as an insurgency and apply to them a counterinsurgency paradigm.

However, I have not found in the literature an indication that theorists have explored the question: “Can we apply the same modification of counterinsurgency theory to both problems?” In order to distinguish between the two, “local national insurgency” will refer to an insurgent group that is a product of local grievances fighting within a state to achieve a set of objectives; “transnational insurgency” will refer to global terrorist networks that operate globally, that may sponsor local national insurgent groups, and are serving global objectives. The former begin locally and expand operations abroad as they develop the capacity to do so. The latter have a global agenda and seek to pursue it by aiding like-minded groups engaged in local conflict. It is also possible that affiliates of global network will enter a conflict and establish themselves as one of the competing groups. Al Qaeda in Iraq is an example of this.

Conceptually, this distinction is important in determining policy and in adopting tactics and techniques. Unfortunately, neither policy nor tactics is the topic of this study. Rather this study attempts to generate a list of principles that would aid campaign planning at the operational level of conflict. One lesson that has emerged from this study is that the classical principles are relevant to internal conflict—that is conflict within a state. Since the research question asked “what principles do military officers need to understand…” and since the vast majority of military officers engaged in counterinsurgency will be engaged in an internal conflict, these principles, and the modifications noted in Stage 2, appear remarkably valid. It remains to be
seen whether these principles are appropriate to assist national strategists, who may or may not
happen to be military officers, fighting the global dimension of insurgency.

Practically speaking, it is important to observe who is conducting operations against local
national insurgencies and who is conducting operations against transnational insurgencies.
Military officers, indeed, all members of the military to the lowest ranks, their interagency
partners, and local national counterparts are fighting both the former and the latter locally or
internally. Other agencies, the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense;
national level intelligence agencies; law enforcement agencies; and others; and their counterpart
agencies in other nations around the world are fighting the global operations of both the former
and the latter. While it is axiomatic that a national strategy for counterinsurgency would
mobilize all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and
economic—whether in the global or local national arenas, the relative share of the
counterinsurgency effort carried by the military is much greater in the local national arena than
in the global arena.

Therefore, a strategist at State, Justice, or Homeland Security would not say, “I work to
combat global/transnational terrorist groups” (which, according to Kilcullen (2005), we should
combat using a counterinsurgency paradigm). Rather, the same strategist would say, “I work to
combat the global effects of both transnational and local national insurgent groups.” Similarly, a
soldier committed to counterinsurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere would not say, “I am
fighting a local insurgency.” He would say I am fighting the local effects of both local national
insurgents and the affiliates of transnational insurgencies. A picture of this concept might look
like Figure 4-1.
Transnational insurgency
- has local objectives
- motivated by global grievance
- may accept support from transnational groups
- may conduct operations internationally through propaganda and terror

Local national insurgency
- has local objectives
- motivated by local grievance
- may accept support from local grievances
- may conduct operations internationally through cooperation

Transnational insurgency
- has global objectives
- motivated by global grievance
- sponsors insurgents motivated by local grievances
- conducts direct attacks against targets in states in pursuit of global agenda

Figure 4-1: The Levels of Insurgent Effects.

Conceptually, Americans think we have two problems: The first is the Global War on Terror (GWOT), represented by the column on the right, which Kilcullen (2005) and others have argued is actually a “global insurgency.” This network has an affiliated group of mostly foreign (not Iraqi) recruits that have traveled to Iraq to fight Americans. It also has affiliates, many not Afghani, that seek to rebuild sanctuary in Afghanistan in cooperation with the Taliban. The second problem, depicted by the column on the left, is made up of the local national insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Iraq, the “insurgency” has actually been several groups (Metz, 2004) fighting the U.S.-led multi-national force and the government of Iraq, and often fighting each other. The matter is complicated by the entrance of foreign fighters affiliated with Al Qaeda in
Iraq to fight Americans. In Afghanistan, the Taliban is fighting the new Afghani government. In theory, they want to return to power. They are assisted by Al Qaeda who wants the restoration of sanctuary and to fight the Western troops involved there.

Some people insist on viewing the situation in Iraq as part of the GWOT. I argue this is not really a useful idea for several reasons: First, there were no jihadis in Iraq until the opportunities to fight the coalition led them there. Second, there has been a substantial Iraqi resistance which is not related to jihadi objectives and grievances. Third, the multi-disciplinary counterinsurgency techniques that soldiers (and a limited number of interagency partners) use in Iraq are working on both Iraqi resistance groups and on jihadists. In other words, the essentially classical counterinsurgency campaign to isolate the insurgents, regardless of their motivations, is working as of the summer of 2008. Finally, the GWOT creates a conceptual lens (Mooney (2007) suggested this idea in reference to U.S. policy toward Hezbollah in southern Lebanon) which has confused our view of the Iraqi campaign, and caused us to focus too long on the pursuit of the “enemy” and not long enough on separating him from the people, convincing the people to point him out for arrest, or even convincing him to stop fighting and go home. Of course, the situation in Iraq is related to the GWOT in that it draws jihadis there that might otherwise be making trouble elsewhere, and in that a U.S. failure in Iraq would be heralded as a disastrous defeat by Al Qaeda and others, potentially increasing the threat from them in the future (Metz, 2004). The case that Afghanistan is part of the GWOT is much stronger, but there is no reason to believe that increasing insurgent activity in the summer of 2008 cannot be addressed with modifications of an essentially classical model of counterinsurgency.

In other words, the classical model, with small conceptual modification (and larger tactical modification), is proving to be effective where our soldiers are fighting insurgents among
regardless of the motivation of the particular insurgents. Indeed, it is probably easier to separate foreign-born jihadis from the population than the native insurgents, in part, because the jihadis are outsiders and are subject to the same “half-life” rule that Americans are.

In the global arena, soldiers, in large numbers, are not confronting the enemy, so their knowledge of appropriate theory for conducting that struggle is moot. The interagency strategists in Washington or in embassies around the world need to know how to combat these effects. Thus, the real conceptual division between sets of techniques developed to combat local national effects and transnational effects needs to be where the people involved change—at the battle handover.

If we insisted on having a single model for all counterinsurgency, it might look like an onion with concentric layers that correspond to the layers of strategy required to meet all insurgents’ threats. Tentatively, it might look like Figure 4-2.

In the tentative “onion” model depicted here, I have identified four levels that require separate campaign plans. Expanding from the center, we have the local operational level, the theater strategic level, the U.S. national strategic level, and the global strategic level. The first is the “tip of the spear” where American soldiers encounter both insurgents and common people on the streets and in rural areas of nations in conflict. At this level, soldiers provide security and conduct focused combat operations, assist in governance capacity-building, train local national security forces, assist in the restoration of essential services, and encourage economic pluralism (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005; FM 3-24, 2006). These categories of activities are termed logical lines of operation (LLOs) in FM 3-24.
The second level develops the overall strategy for the campaign in the local nation, integrating the LLOs at that level. Additionally, it is concerned with isolating the insurgents from external support through border interdiction, denying sanctuary areas throughout the country, and assisting the host nation to develop national political, economic, and security institutions to assist in the subsequent development of the country.

The third is concerned with protecting the American center of gravity, which is U.S. public support of a counterinsurgency or nation-building effort abroad (Claessen, 2007). At this level, the U.S. government is also concerned with defending American borders, controlling the movement of people and materials across our borders, developing defensive strategies and damage mitigation plans in the event of an attack on American soil.

The final level concerns American diplomatic, informational, military, and economic initiatives to isolate global insurgents and the global dimension of local national insurgencies. These include all sorts of aid to develop capacity of partner nations in the rule of law, law enforcement, strategic intelligence, and so on. They also include cooperation with the
counterpart agencies of all governments that will assist us. Military support at this level is almost entirely training, advising, and supporting foreign militaries, but it may include the rare precision attack on identified key targets, i.e. if bin Laden were located, the military or other agency might employ violent action to kill or capture him.

The real difference in execution from one level to another may not be in separate lists of principles or other types of models that guide action, but in the people and agencies that conduct the effort at each level. The military carries the lion’s share of the burden at the first two levels whenever U.S. troops are committed to counterinsurgent combat. At the larger two levels, other agencies carry the burden. There is a “battle handover” between the second and third level.

My original research question asked “what principles military officers need to understand to conduct effective and humane counterinsurgency.” That question presupposed the large scale commitment of soldiers to a local national insurgency. I now see that this does not necessarily answer “what principles American strategists need to understand…”

I think the list of classical principles with modifications will serve campaign planners at the local operational level well and is probably useful to theater strategic planners as well. My guess is that the list of principles will also assist planners at the global strategic level, although the techniques will be very different. The causes and objectives of the important groups, the relevant populations, the information environment, the nature of external support and sanctuary, the nature of mobility and dispersal, the legal infrastructure, and the nature of interagency and multinational cooperation will all be very different. But these issues will all still be relevant, and so the identified principles will still be useful.

Given that the people and agencies conducting the effort, the answers to relevant questions, and the techniques selected for implementation are very different beneath and above
the battle handover line, it might be best to address each situation with a separate modification of counterinsurgency theory. It might be best to have two or more models, sharing a common ancestry, that each addresses a different level of conflict. Given the uniqueness of every situation in which counterinsurgency is an appropriate response (i.e. Iraq is very different from Afghanistan), one of these several general models will be selected and refined to be most useful in that situation. The list of principles can serve as one basis of more specialized models.

I have imagined the use of these principles as a checklist that tells campaign planners the things that need to be addressed. I have imagined that the list might be useful in both the global and local national arenas. I have not claimed that the list is exhaustive, and I expect that users of the list would modify it to be more useful at the level in which they work.

It is likely that additional models will be useful for understanding the entire counterinsurgency problem. Some of these will nest within this list of principles, such as the LLOs model, that is one way of looking at interagency coordination. Other models may be parallel. A systems analysis model, such as that found in Lynn (2005), is a graphical depiction of an insurgency. The model depicts key relationships and resource and influence flows among actors, but does not provide the detail that would enable campaign planning. A model such as this might be useful alongside a set of principles such as I have produced. These models may vary from level to level.

**Stage 3: Testing the Model Against Contemporary Experience**

Stage 2 showed that the classical principles emerging from Stage 1 are remarkably durable despite important changes in the contemporary political environment and in the nature of insurgency. Of course, the practical application of the principles required important modification
for use at the tactical level. It only remains to test the list of principles against the judgment of recently published scholarship.

The research objective that motivated the Stage 3 investigation was the fourth: “Test modified principles against literature emerging from ‘contemporary experience’ to determine additional changes required to a list of counterinsurgency principles.” Since Stage 2 required no additions or deletions from the list of principles, I coded a series of articles from the last decade in the same way I coded classical theorists in Stage 1. The results are presented in a series of thirteen one-page tables in the following pages.

The list of principles remained durable and relevant. In fact, little further discussion was required. Most of the key points were discussed in Stage 2. The tables contain some discussion internally; the section in each labeled “Caveats and Commentary” contains additional quotes that seemed to challenge the consensus or voice a disagreement. These are contained in quotes to distinguish them from my commentary which is in bold face type.

Only two more issues can benefit from clarification. One, the consensus that cultural awareness is important for a counterinsurgency effort comes out much more strongly in the recent scholarship than it does in the classical literature (see Table 4-21). The recent literature asserts strongly that cultural awareness is critical to the efforts of foreign soldiers to conduct counterinsurgency. Two, the classical theorists believed that the government must establish security in an area before the significant interagency work could begin (see Table 4-28). This created an established sequence for localized counterinsurgency campaigns. However, Chiarelli and Michaelis (2005) and Mooney (2007) have argued that economic recovery and restoration of essential services are helpful in the struggle to establish security. This implies simultaneous efforts to establish security and build political and economic capacity. This may be because
urban residents depend on government services, critical infrastructures, and economic exchange for daily necessities. A rural population is much more self-sufficient, at least in the short run, growing its own food and making do without water systems, sewer, trash collection, and the like. Therefore, in rural areas there is not as strong an imperative to restore or maintain these systems. In fact, in some rural areas, these systems have never existed.

The remainder of the issues presented requires no commentary other than what appears in the table. The authors are quite capable of speaking for themselves.
Table 4-16. Principle 1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary

**Contemporary Quotations:**

… specific grievances against the ruling regime usually supplied the most compelling arguments for the [insurgents’] claim to legitimacy (Lynn, 2005, p. 22).

… the insurgent can inflict a political penalty on the government by prolonging the conflict, changing the perception of its nature (e.g., from a “war of liberation” to a “war against imperialist oppression and cruelty”), and/or increasing its cost. None of these require the insurgent to attain military victory (Claessen, 2007, p. 99).

If there is little change in the number of violent incidents, whether the military outcome is tactical victory or defeat almost does not matter: the constituent concludes that ‘realities’ do not fit his expectations and becomes frustrated [and suspends his support of the government’s effort] (Claessen, 2007, p. 101).

With the mass migration of humanity to cities and the inability of developing nations to keep abreast of basic city services relative to growth, discontent erupts. Such conditions create advantageous conditions ripe for fundamentalist ideologue recruitment (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 5).

The security of the people must be assured as a basic need, along with food, water, shelter, health care, and a means of living. These are human rights, along with freedom of worship, access to education, and equal rights for women. The failure of counterinsurgencies and the root cause of the insurgencies themselves can often be traced to government disregard of these basic rights (Sepp, 2005, p. 9).

At a somewhat finer level of resolution, successful insurgencies had four characteristics in common…

Effective ideology. There are many variants of effective insurgent ideologies, but [they] are unifying and mobilizing (Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 3).

An insurgency is born when a governing power fails to address social or regional polarization, sectarianism, endemic corruption, crime, various forms of radicalism, or rising expectations. The margin of error is narrower for an outside occupying power than for an inept or repressive national regime as people tend to find the mistakes or bad behavior by one of their own more tolerable than that of outsiders (Metz, 2004, p. 26).

This attitude was sufficiently well ingrained throughout the Vietnam era that the enemy’s destruction on military terms prevailed as the dominant operational intent, despite the many indicators that might have driven the Army towards the necessary realization that the military objectives must be subordinate to wider political goals (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 8).

**Caveats and Commentary:**

“Victory against the fervent and fanatical individual who finds the notion of transcendence through death enticing rather than forbidding, will not be gained by out-governing those that do not seek to govern. Nor will the solution to today’s so-called ‘irregular’ challenges be found by laminating yesterday’s framework into current doctrine and strategy” (Hoffman, 2007, p. 84).

Hoffman believes the hearts and minds of religiously-motivated people cannot be won by better governance or better economic opportunity. I think he is wrong. Not everyone is a fanatic, and political, social, and economic overtures can separate the many average Muslims from the fanatic Islamists.
Table 4-17. Principle 2: The population is the center of gravity

**Contemporary Quotations:**

For a counterinsurgency to succeed, the majority of the population must eventually come to see insurgents as outsiders, as outlaws (Lynn, 2005, p. 27).

The LLOs [logical lines of operation- a model of interagency coordination espoused by FM 3-24] clearly situate the population as the centre of gravity in COIN… According to the FM, stability and security lead to Host-Nation legitimacy which is mostly a function of popular perception (Mattox & Rodgers, p. 109).

The majority of the counterinsurgent’s electorate is only marginally interested in politics. In a democracy, three types of actors can generate the political interactions necessary to make the neutral majority choose sides on an issue: the government, the opposition, and active minorities (Claessen, 2007, p. 98).

The first group [of several groups] defined as insurgents (and terrorists) [in Iraq] were those who cannot be changed, who cannot be influenced, and who, although politically and ethnically different in scope, had essentially the same desired endstate— to perceptually delegitimize the current Iraqi Government and drive a wedge between the Iraqi populace and coalition forces (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 5).

The war on al-Qaeda and its surrogates can be viewed as a global counterinsurgency in which the United States and its coalition partners endeavor to isolate and eradicate the base and other networked terrorist groups who seek sanctuary, support, and recruits in ungoverned or poorly governed areas where the humiliated and the have-nots struggle to survive (Cassidy, 2004, p. 41).

Simultaneously, Hezbollah developed a popular base by providing social services to the neglected and impoverished Shia community (Mooney, 2007, p. 32).

The key to winning the war against the insurgency is to separate the insurgents from the surrounding population (McFate, 2005, p. 40).

Similarly, the operational art of counterinsurgency remains fundamentally concerned with displacing enemy influence from social networks, supplanting insurgent support within the population, and maneuvering to marginalize the enemy and deny them a popular base. Thus, at the operational level, counterinsurgency remains a competition between several sides, each seeking to mobilize the population in its cause. The people remain the prize (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 6).

Observation Number 4 reminds us that increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success… we began to realize that more important than our winning Iraqi hearts and minds was doing all that we could to ensure that as many Iraqis as possible felt a stake in the success of the new Iraq (Petraeus, 2006, p. 5).

**Caveats and Commentary:**

“The insurgents were wealthier than the population, and routinely paid poverty-stricken locals to conduct attacks for cash. Thus, efforts to isolate the insurgents (intended, based on classical theory, to hurt the guerrillas… had precisely the opposite effect [of depriving people of income]” (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 7).

This is a special case where isolating insurgents prevented them from paying common people to plant bombs, etc. Improved economic opportunities will decrease incidence of this phenomenon.

“A successful insurgency requires only the active support of a small cadre and acquiescence from the rest” (Metz, 2004, p. 32).

Metz, among others, explains that an active minority of supporters can take power if the neutral middle—the uninterested, uncommitted, fence-sitters—acquiesce.
**Contemporary Quotations:**

Historically, the critical test of legitimacy is the ability of one side or the other to guarantee the security of the population (Lynn, 2005, p. 23).

Lessons learned... Success cannot be achieved without providing the general population with security (Lynn, 2005, p. 27).

Intimidation of the people, in particular, those who work for the coalition, public sector employees, and government officials is a technique used quite effectively... It takes few insurgents specifically targeting a small group of select individuals to achieve resonance across a large portion of the population (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 5-6).

‘Kiss of Death’ syndrome
We ‘surge’ into areas and introduce civil programs, which exposes moderates and cooperative leaders to insurgents. Then security improves, we reduce our presence in that district. Then insurgents kill those who cooperated with us (Kilcullen, 2007, slide 22).

Every insurgent attack that occurs, even if the attackers lose more lives than the defenders, is a victory for the insurgents because it fuels fear among the public and dissatisfaction with the governing power, both within the beleaguered country and internationally (Metz, 2004, p. 33).

Further, those who viewed the attainment of security solely as a function of military action alone were mistaken. A gun on every street corner, although visually appealing, provides only a short-term solution and does not equate to long-term security grounded in a democratic process (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 4).

What is certain, though, is that the delicate tasks of building governmental capacity and gaining the confidence of the people will not be accomplished in an environment characterized by chaos, violence, and fear (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1)

We must secure the population. This is our focus. It is the clearest, most visible demonstration of excellence in the practice of counterinsurgency (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1).

Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles...

1. Secure the people where they sleep. Population security is our primary mission, one that will take time, and one we must carry out deliberately (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1).

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### Table 4-18. Principle 2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support to the government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contemporary Quotations:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Historically, the critical test of legitimacy is the ability of one side or the other to guarantee the security of the population (Lynn, 2005, p. 23).</td>
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We ‘surge’ into areas and introduce civil programs, which exposes moderates and cooperative leaders to insurgents. Then security improves, we reduce our presence in that district. Then insurgents kill those who cooperated with us (Kilcullen, 2007, slide 22). |
| Every insurgent attack that occurs, even if the attackers lose more lives than the defenders, is a victory for the insurgents because it fuels fear among the public and dissatisfaction with the governing power, both within the beleaguered country and internationally (Metz, 2004, p. 33). |
| Further, those who viewed the attainment of security solely as a function of military action alone were mistaken. A gun on every street corner, although visually appealing, provides only a short-term solution and does not equate to long-term security grounded in a democratic process (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 4). |
| What is certain, though, is that the delicate tasks of building governmental capacity and gaining the confidence of the people will not be accomplished in an environment characterized by chaos, violence, and fear (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1) |
| We must secure the population. This is our focus. It is the clearest, most visible demonstration of excellence in the practice of counterinsurgency (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1). |
| Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles... |
| 1. Secure the people where they sleep. Population security is our primary mission, one that will take time, and one we must carry out deliberately (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1). |

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### Caveats and Commentary

The people's need for security has not changed. If anything, the people’s dependence upon infrastructure and government services has increased due to urbanization. The vulnerability of these to attack makes the government’s job of maintaining order and ensuring safety more difficult.
### Table 4-19. Principle 2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government

#### Contemporary Quotations:

Insurgents and counterinsurgents vie for the allegiance of a people, but an intervening power does well simply to gain willing compliance with its policy. To speak of winning hearts and minds is probably misleading (Lynn, 2005, p. 24).

The ultimate determinant of the outcome in an insurgency is the perception of the eventual outcome held by the parties involved—the insurgents, the counterinsurgents, the population, and, to a lesser extent, other actors. If the counterinsurgents are able to create and sustain the impression that no matter how long it takes, they will ultimately persevere, they will (Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 8).

Observation Number 2 is that, in a situation like Iraq, the liberating force must act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an Army of occupation (Petraeus, 2006, p. 4).

This race against the clock in Iraq has been complicated by the extremely high expectations of the Iraqi people, their pride in their own abilities, and their reluctant admission that they needed help from Americans, in particular (Petraeus, 2006, p. 4).

The essence of Observation Number 5—that we should analyze costs and benefits of operations before each operation—is captured in a question we developed over time and used to ask before the conduct of operations: ‘Will this operation,’ we asked, ‘take more bad guys off the street than it creates by the way it is conducted?’ (Petraeus, 2006, p. 5).

… as soon as possible after completion of an operation, we explained to the citizens in the affected areas what we’d done and why we did it (Petraeus, 2006, p. 6).

#### Caveats and Commentary

The increasing importance of the political and psychological dimensions of the struggle increases the emphasis that the government must place on persuasion. Moreover, the government’s inability to control information flows means that the insurgents’ story will be told. The government must have a story that can compete.
### Table 4-20. Principle 2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support

#### Contemporary Quotations:

Military forces learned to act in a way that did not convey the impression that they regarded the general population as enemies. A population that increasingly saw counterinsurgents as providing security was increasingly likely to support them and provide them with vital intelligence (Lynn, 2005, p. 27).

Setting the right tone ethically is another hugely important task [for military leaders]. If leaders fail to get this right, winking at the mistreatment of detainees or at manhandling of citizens, for example, the result can be a sense in the unit that ‘anything goes.’ Nothing can be more destructive in an element than such a sense (Petraeus, 2006, p. 10).

Your actions at the tactical level resonate throughout the communities you protect and are amplified beyond - shaping how audiences across the world perceive the state of progress in Iraq. What you do, how you do it, and how people view it—everyday—matters (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1).

Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…

2. Give the people justice and honor. Iraqis value justice and honor. In the counterinsurgency fight, we want the hands that bring security to be the hands that help bring justice and honor as well… As a rule, treat Iraqis with genuine dignity and respect so as to earn their trust. Deal with complaints and abuses quickly and publicly (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 1-2).

As an illustration of the contrasts, one senior Iraqi official who worked closely with the Coalition had his house twice subjected to routine search by U.S. Army personnel. On one occasion the troops displayed exemplary awareness of cultural sensitivities, such as appropriate treatment of women in the household. On the other, the aggressive behavior of troops from a battalion newly arrived in theatre led to his formal complaint, with consequent apology from a U.S. General Officer (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 5).

The other widely held view, amongst non-U.S. participants in theatre, was that the U.S. Army was too often insensitive to the cultural nuances of the situation. In practical terms this amounts to a variation of the ‘too kinetic’ theme [too much emphasis on violent action], since the effect was potentially the same—to undermine popular support for the Coalition campaign (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 5).

The most short-sighted statements I hear are: ‘They only understand force.’ Or, ‘If only we could take the gloves off, we could win.’ The truth is that everyone understands force, and everyone can be battered or intimidated by violence, but such use of violence generates the three ‘Rs’: resentment, resistance, and revenge (Lynn, 2005, p. 27).

#### Caveats and Commentary

The increased incidence of foreign intervention into internal conflicts of various types requires a high standard of professionalism to counteract the phenomena that Mills (2007) described as “national chauvinism.”

Local national soldiers must behave professionally to convince people that the government offers security and justice.
### Table 4-21. Principle 2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence

#### Contemporary Quotations:

Hence, it may be impossible for counterinsurgent forces to perceive the true meaning of insurgent actions, or influence populations and their perceptions, without access to local culture. Many links in the jihad – and virtually all the grievances and energies that circulate within it – are culturally determined. Culture is intimately connected with language, since humans use language to make sense of reality and communicate meaning. Therefore, in counterinsurgency, linguistic and cultural competence is a critical combat capability (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 613).

Linguistic and cultural competence must exist at several levels within a counterinsurgent force. At the most basic level, everyone in the force – regardless of role – must have a basic degree of cultural awareness…At the intermediate level, planners, intelligence personnel, civil-military operations teams and advisers need higher levels of cultural understanding… At the highest level of cultural capability, key personnel need an ability to use culture to generate leverage within an insurgent system… At this level, individuals are bilingual and bi-cultural, and can exploit cultural norms and expectations to generate operational effects (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 613).

This clear understanding of cultural norms directly applied to our actions when planning, preparing, and executing all operations (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 9).

Cultural awareness and understanding how insurgents gain support from the center of gravity became the important campaign consideration (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 9-10).

Moreover, in Iraq (a community-based insurgency), or Afghanistan (a tribally-based insurgency), the blood feuds and community alienation arising from this would be more severe than in Vietnam, where professional party cadres (often from other districts) were often key targets (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 7).

Moreover, whilst they were almost unfailingly courteous and considerate, at times their cultural insensitivity, almost certainly inadvertent, arguably amounted to institutional racism (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 3).

The other widely held view, amongst non-U.S. participants in theatre, was that the U.S. Army was too often insensitive to the cultural nuances of the situation (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 5).

Observation Number 9, cultural awareness is a force multiplier, reflects our recognition that knowledge of the cultural ‘terrain’ can be as important as and sometimes even more important than, knowledge of the geographic terrain (Petraeus, 2006, p. 8).

Working in another culture is enormously difficult if one doesn’t understand the ethnic groups, tribes, religious elements, political parties, and other social groupings—and their respective viewpoints; the relationships among the various groups; governmental structures and processes; local and regional history; and, of course, local and national leaders. Understanding of such cultural aspects is essential if one is to help the people build stable political, social, and economic institutions (Petraeus, 2006, p. 8).

Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…

7. Include ISF in your operations at the lowest possible level. When it comes to language capacity, cultural awareness, and a having a ‘feel’ for what is normal in the local environment, Coalition forces are at a natural disadvantage (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 2).

#### Caveats and Commentary

**Most modern authors think cultural awareness is critical to the success of an international intervention. Foreign soldiers are already at a disadvantage, and the inability of those soldiers to interpret cultural nuances and behave in a culturally sensitive manner undermines their effort. This modern consensus is much stronger than the classical consensus.**
Table 4-22. Principle 2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contemporary Quotations:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lessons learned...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular support within the United States is our most vulnerable center of gravity (Lynn, 2005, p. 27).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Diplomacy and Development. Getting the right message across with cultural nuances, and linking security and development, is as important—and difficult—to do today as it was in Vietnam (Mills, 2007, Contemporary constraints section, para 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a result, there are two fronts in a counterinsurgency: the insurgent’s population base, and the counterinsurgent’s electorate (Claessen, 2007, p. 98).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computers and the Internet, cell phones, and fax machines have enabled small, well-organized groups to gain media traction and set parts of the political agenda (Claessen, 2007, p. 99-100).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right or wrong, the fence-sitters (and the population as a whole) believe that because America put a man on the moon, it can do anything—and do it quickly. When we fail to produce…they believe it is because we, as a coalition, do not want to fix it (Chiarelli &amp; Michaelis, 2005, p. 7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational campaigns explain to the population what they can do to help their government make them secure from terrorist insurgents; encourage participation in the political process by voting in local and national elections; and convince insurgents they can best meet their personal interests and avoid the risk of imprisonment or death by reintegrating themselves into the population through amnesty, rehabilitation, or by simply not fighting (Sepp, 2005, p. 10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information operations are vital, as locals who perceive that the deployed force is providing them a tangible benefit are much more likely to inform of possible dangers and plots (Mooney, 2007, p. 31).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN ops are fundamentally perception management operations in which we shape the perceptions of the population, the enemy, our own side and a global audience (Kilcullen, 2007, slide 46).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More generally, given pervasive media presence, the demeanor of a single soldier or official instantaneously communicates more about the state of a campaign than any public information operation (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency, itself flowing from information technology, globalization, and the international flow of people, has changed the nature of psychological warfare, making it easier to transmit information and build linkages, but harder to sustain (Metz &amp; Millen, 2005, p. 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Be first with the truth. Since Soldier actions speak louder than what PAOs say, we must be mindful of the impact our daily interactions with Iraqis have on global audiences via the news media…we should remember to communicate to local (Arabic/Iraqi) audiences first. U.S. global audiences can follow (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caveats and Commentary:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda is even more important than before. Communication technology ensures the insurgents’ story will get out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“This article holds that to maintain resolve, the counterinsurgent should seek to minimize publicity about the conflict rather than try to drum up public support for it” (Claessen, 2007, p. 97).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4-23. Principle 2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent

#### Contemporary Quotations:

Control arises from a combination of coercion and consent. The more any government has of one, the less it needs of the other. Counterinsurgents almost always lack the coercive power to control the environment – thus building consent is key (Kilcullen, 2007, slide 45).

Insurgents rely on members of the population for concealment, sustenance, and recruits, so they must be isolated from the people by all means possible. Among the most effective means are such population-control measures as vehicle and personnel checkpoints and national identity cards (Sepp, 2005, p. 10).

The isolation achieved in Malaya was literal and physical, but in a more figurative sense, counterinsurgents must be able to isolate insurgents from their support base to achieve victory (Lynn, 2005, p. 26).

As chaotic and unsafe conditions continue, it becomes increasingly likely that the governing authority’s inability to control the situation will attract some citizens to the insurgents’ cause (Bensahel, 2006, p. 285).

The acceptance of this tripartite ethnic – religious division [Sunni, Shia, Kurds] underpinned the way in which the Interim Iraqi Council was organized. It also increasingly grounded the way in which the US occupation force, like Saddam before it, sought to establish and maintain control via the use of what were perceived as traditional tribal leaders and structures (Berger & Borer, 2007, p. 210).

#### Caveats and Commentary

Control of information is much more difficult than before. Control of movement can be enhanced by networked computer databases, there is so much movement, both locally and about the globe, that control is still very difficult and resource intensive. Nevertheless, control of people and of resources is necessary for effective counterinsurgency.
Table 4-24. Principle 3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need for sanctuary or bases to build strength

Contemporary Quotations:

… because of the phenomenon of failed and failing states, and under-administered areas between states (such as the tribal areas on the Pakistan/Afghan border). This allows geographical sanctuary for insurgents, while international flows of information and finances provide ‘cyber-sanctuaries’ (like the Al Qaeda Internet presence described above) for insurgents (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 608).

Border crossings must be restricted to deny terrorist insurgents a sanctuary and to enhance national sovereignty (Sepp, 2005, p. 11.)

The task force could win engagements by killing or capturing an insurgent emplacing an improvised explosive device, and it could win battles by targeting, disrupting, and killing off insurgent cells. But it could only win the campaign if the local populace revealed insurgent and terrorist cells and, accordingly, denied sanctuary (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 9).

We also chose an indirect approach, through co-option of the populace using information operations, to deny the terrorist physical and psychological sanctuary in an effort to thwart their objectives (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 6).

The global reach of the United States is likely to preclude any nation, even Iran or Syria, from providing overt sanctuary to Iraqi insurgents, causing the movement to remain more inchoate than the Palestinian insurgency, with Iraqi leadership shadowy and its form a loose amalgamation of diverse groups unified only by a shared dislike of U.S. occupation. For the United States, this news is both good and bad as this form will limit the strength of the insurgency but will also make it headless, without a clear center of gravity, and thus difficult to kill (Metz, 2004, p. 31).

Would-be insurgents and terrorists go where the people and money are; they seek security by hiding among the population and within the complexity of a modern-day metropolis. Sanctuary and safe bases were gained in the past through distance and complex terrain, far from a government’s power center (Hoffman, 2007, p. 76).

The classic guerrilla setting was the mountainous hideout, the dense forest, or wild jungle. These settings offered sanctuary for insurgent forces to train and rest. They also afforded the insurgent the cover, protection, and sustenance required. This type of cover and support is even greater in cities with heterogeneous populations, locations in which guerrillas may freely exist (Hoffman, 2007, p. 76).

Yet if even a small percentage of the local population is sympathetic to the militants’ cause, they can provide the sanctuary and local intelligence necessary to conduct insurgent operations (Bensahel, 2006, p. 279).

Caveats and Commentary

Sanctuary is still necessary, but it is not the same as in the 1950s and 1960s. Today, insurgents seek sanctuary by hiding among urban populations. Additionally, insurgents can seek material, moral and financial support; advice and recruits online as well as publish propaganda. The internet creates as cyber-sanctuary that has many of the same benefits as a physical sanctuary.
### Table 4-25. Principle 3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support

#### Contemporary Quotations:

Because outside aid for insurgents is primarily material support, the best way to stop it is by interdicting the flow of equipment, not undermining popular support within the outside power. This fight is more physical than political (Lynn, 2005, p. 25).

Whereas major outside states intervened on the part of insurgents during the Cold War, in today’s era of globalized economies and globalized insurgency, assistance comes from non-state actors—individuals and radical Islamic groups eager to attack what they see as the anti-Islamic United States (Lynn, 2005, p. 27).

Border crossings must be restricted to deny terrorist insurgents a sanctuary and to enhance national sovereignty (Sepp, 2005, p. 11.)

A method of obtaining resources In the broadest terms, insurgents need five types of resources: 1) manpower; 2) funding; 3) equipment/supplies; 4) sanctuary; and, 5) intelligence. These can be provided, seized, or created. Provided resources can come from outside sponsors, domestic supporters, or from the ineptitude of the counterinsurgents (e.g., the government may provide sanctuary by being unaware of the presence of the insurgents) (Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 3).

Insurgent movements can no longer depend on external sponsors for all or most of their resources and therefore must devote an extensive amount of effort to fundraising or income generation (Metz & Millen, 2005, p. 4).

Clearly, the insurgents require access to resources, particularly arms and money (Metz, 2004, p. 28).

Population control and border security can shut off physical support (Crane, 2007, p. 59).

In today’s interconnected world, financial support for an insurgency can come from a variety of sources (Crane, 2007, p. 59).

#### Caveats and Commentary

External support is still critical. It is more likely to come from non-state actors or from diaspora populations than during the Cold War.
Table 4-26. Principle 3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival

Contemporary Quotations:

By contrast, today’s insurgents often employ diffuse, cell-based structures and ‘leaderless resistance’ (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 7).

No equivalent [to highly developed Viet Cong political infrastructure] exists in Iraq or Afghanistan, where independent cells and micro-movements cooperate in constantly shifting alliances of convenience (Kilcullen, 2006a, p. 7).

Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…

4. Get out and walk - move mounted, work dismounted… Patrol on foot to gain and maintain contact with the population and the enemy. That's the only way to dominate urban terrain (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 2).

Additionally, the globalized, media-savvy nature of today’s insurgents contrasts with their bottom-up, cellular organizational structure. The former allows them unparalleled access to sources of support, recruits and marketing, while their operational structure both provides security and assists it in replicating itself and its actions without active leadership oversight. Thus domestic insurgencies have to be confronted internationally and in many dimensions with unprecedented demands for intelligence gathering and analysis, interoperability and flexibility, and cultural sensitivity and understanding (Mills, 2007, Introductory section, para 3).

Unless you [the tactical counterinsurgent] ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently out-run and outmaneuver you (Kilcullen, 2006b, p. 104).

Mobility is imperative (Cassidy, 2004, p. 42).

As evidenced by the insurgencies in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Columbia, rural insurgencies have not vanished, but the complex terrain of the world’s amorphous urban centers is fast becoming the insurgent and terrorist’s jungle of the twenty-first century (Hoffman, 2007, p. 76).

Caveats and Commentary

Mobility and dispersal are still essential. Today, insurgents are more likely to be dispersed among urban populations than in the past, and mobility now might include the ability to travel internationally.
Table 4-27. Principle 4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law

**Contemporary Quotations:**

As a result, the government became even more blind and dependent on the wrong kind of counterinsurgent operations and resorted to illegal actions contrary to its laws and its own people’s concept of justice. Arrest without clear cause, imprisonment without trial, torture, and summary executions could produce short-term results, but undermine the government’s legitimacy and eventually lead to defeat (Lynn, 2005, p. 25).

Although brutally repressive dictatorships use terror and torture against their own people and survive by doing so, the United States cannot afford to use such tactics. It is given that whatever U.S. forces do will be subjected to intense media scrutiny: secrets are nearly impossible to keep. Morality should guide us, but even if the cynical might cast it aside, realists would still have to admit that if the United States were to support horribly oppressive regimes, doing so would undercut public support of U.S. foreign policy (Lynn, 2005, p. 25).

Each of our case studies and the contemporary SMT [social movement theory] works discussed above indicate that omitting or insufficiently employing the ‘Governance’ LLO [logical line of operation-an interagency coordination model] is severely damaging to COIN campaigns (Mattox & Rodgers, p. 112).

Based on the evidence detailed above, leaders planning COIN [counterinsurgency] campaigns must focus on emphasizing the rule of law and ensure political inclusion is an integral part of their strategic planning in COIN (Mattox & Rodgers, p. 112).

In turn, an incorrupt, functioning judiciary must support the police (Sepp, 2005, p. 9).

Emergency conditions dictate that a government needs a single, fully empowered executive to direct and coordinate counter-insurgency effort (Sepp, 2005, p. 11).

One of the most widely recognized of these [accepted counterinsurgency] principles is the fact that counterinsurgency operations should focus on developing effective governance and enhancing the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Mooney, 2007, p. 33).

If good governance and enhancing governmental legitimacy are key to defeating an insurgency, then the long-term solution to the cycle of violence in Lebanon requires more than military action; such as economic development, social reconciliation, and the enhancement of government capacity (Mooney, 2007, p. 34).

Clearly, Western liberal democracies cannot resort to repression of the population, (Aylwin-Foster, 2005, p. 4).

**Caveats and Commentary**

Effective governance is still critical. The government must still obey the law, or the world will know of it. Emergency legal measures may still be required to cope with the demands of insurgency.
Table 4-28. Principle 4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contemporary Quotations:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likewise, successful classic counterinsurgency in the Americas, Africa and Asia has been closely tied to improvements in governance, integrated administrative systems and joint inter-agency action (Kilcullen, 2005, p. 607).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of Effort. Having a single actor with the authority to direct effort down all the lines of operation remains key to success today, as it was when the British used a committee system to achieve unity of effort in Malaya (Mills, 2007, Contemporary constraints section, para 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace. Penetration did not occur merely through synchronization of the battlefield functions, but that and more: local infrastructure improvement; training of security forces, understanding and educating the fundamentals of democracy; creating long-lasting jobs that would carry beyond short-term infrastructure improvement; and, an information operations (IO) campaign that supported the cultural realities of the area of operations (Chiarelli &amp; Michaelis, 2005, p. 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL deployed [to southern Lebanon] without any organic civil affairs or information operations units, leaving it without a structured means to interface with local leaders, to craft and disseminate messages, or to leverage information and influence the population (Mooney, 2007, p. 31).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of the insurgents from the supporting population requires provisioning economic, social, and police security to the civilian population; establishing trust, especially through long-term relationships; and removing incentives for joining or supporting the insurgency (McFate, 2005, p. 40).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Number 7… is that everyone must do nation-building (Petraeus, 2006, p. 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Number 10 is… that success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations (Petraeus, 2006, p. 8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instead, these ten points lay out key, mutually reinforcing principles…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Integrate civilian and military efforts - this is an interagency, combined arms fight… we must purposely synchronize efforts to improve local security with initiatives aimed at making progress in governance and economic development. This requires fully integrating our civilian partners into all aspects of our operations (MNC-I Guidance, no date, p. 2).</td>
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<tr>
<th>Caveats and Commentary:</th>
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<tr>
<td>The importance of interagency functioning cannot be overstated. The complexity of an essentially political problem requires the complexity of a multi-disciplinary response. There is one change:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“No longer is it acceptable to think sequentially through stability operations and support operations by believing that if you first establish the security environment, you can work sequentially toward establishing critical infrastructure and governmental legitimacy then drive toward economic independence” (Chiarelli &amp; Michaelis, 2005, p. 15).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furthermore:</td>
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<tr>
<td>“The proponents for heavy military assistance point to the need to stabilize the security situation first, but the requirement for jobs and services has proven to be an equally essential part of the security equation in post-conflict interventions” (Mooney, 2007, p. 36).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The classical theorists usually taught that security had to be established before nation-building can begin. These two articles conclude that nation-building initiatives must be part of establishing security.</td>
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Chapter 5

Summary and Recommendations for Further Research

Summary

Preliminary research isolated a set of thirteen candidate principles that military officers need to understand to conduct effective and humane counterinsurgency. A metasynthesis of eight classical theorists of counterinsurgency seeking support for and consensus on these principles discovered considerable consensus on all of them. This led me to conclude that all principles were valid, and that the set could be considered a “classical” model of counterinsurgency for use in counterinsurgency campaign planning. The classical principles are found in Table 5-1 on the following page.

The contemporary global political environment is very different from that the classical theorists faced. Therefore, additional research attempted to understand the changes in the environment and in the nature of insurgency to determine the changes necessary to update the classical model. The most important changes in the environment included the end of the Cold War and of superpower rivalry, the increase in the number and influence of important non-state actors, urbanization, and globalization of media and communications technologies.

Corresponding changes in the nature of insurgency included the changed objectives of insurgent groups; the globalization of local national struggles; the formation of global terrorist groups that can be perceived as insurgencies; the advent of networked, rather than hierarchical, insurgent organizations; and increased emphasis on the use of media to generate support for insurgent causes and to spread fear.

Nevertheless, analysis found the classical principles to be remarkably durable. While the tactics and techniques needed to put each principle into action might be very different from those
of the 1950s and 1960s, the principles remain valid, and are still useful for campaign planning in an insurgency localized to a single national state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-1: Principles of Effective and Humane Counterinsurgency</th>
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<tr>
<td>1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: The population is the center of gravity</td>
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<tr>
<td>2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support to the government</td>
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<tr>
<td>2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government</td>
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<tr>
<td>2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support</td>
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<tr>
<td>2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign counterinsurgents</td>
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<td>2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences</td>
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<tr>
<td>2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent</td>
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<tr>
<td>3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases to build strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival</td>
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<tr>
<td>4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law</td>
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<tr>
<td>4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required)</td>
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</table>

The analysis also determined that the globalized nature of insurgency, where local national insurgencies can spill over a state’s borders and achieve global effects, and where transnational insurgencies can achieve effects both globally and locally, suggested the refinement of two or more counterinsurgency models that, while sharing common ancestry, permit the development and utilization of different techniques to combat them. The models should focus not on the definition of the insurgent group as a local national or transnational insurgency, but upon the arena—global or local—where each type achieves its effects. Furthermore, it was
posited that the list of principles emerging from the metasynthesis and examined in the light of the contemporary environment might serve as a common starting point for multiple more specialized models. Research indicates the principles are very useful for opposing local national insurgencies, or more precisely, for combating the local national effects of any insurgency. The hypothesis that the principles might be useful for combating transnational insurgent effects is a topic for further research.

Finally, the model was tested against recent scholarship reflecting recent experience in countering both localized and global insurgency. This additional level of synthesis confirmed the validity of the list of principles for localized counterinsurgency and again suggested it may be valid for combating globalized insurgency as well.

**Recommendations for Further Research**

I found several additional topics to be interesting as I conducted this research:

1) This study suggested that the list of classical principles may form the basis of a model for addressing the effects of globalized insurgency. Additional research on this topic may support or reject this hypothesis.

2) Other research efforts have led to various lists of principles that might be useful for conducting counterinsurgency (Please see the last section of Chapter 1 for some examples). A metasynthesis performed on these lists would be informative. A researcher would need to divide the lists into categories, i.e. descriptions of insurgency, recommended counterinsurgent strategies, “imperatives” (FM 3-24, 2006), “enduring principles” (Kilcullen, 2007), and so on, and then compare across each category to illuminate useful theory.

3) Kilcullen (2006b) asserted that some people were good at counterinsurgency while others were not. If this is true, it may be possible to identify traits that make one good at
counterinsurgency or separate those likely to be good from those who just are not suited to it. Several good temperament sorters and personality tests exist. Results from one or more of these tests compared to the performance of individuals with counterinsurgency experience may produce some correlations. The problem will be to define a “good” counterinsurgent. Currently, I know of no good way to do that.
References


Lawrence, T. E. (1991) *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph*. Anchor. (The most popular of several versions was originally published in 1926).


Appendix

Coding Sheet

1: Insurgency is political in its essence; it is fought for political reasons (a cause or grievance); the political struggle is always primary

2: The population is the center of gravity

   2A: People require security and protection from intimidation before they can give support to the government

   2B: People can be influenced or persuaded to support the government

      2B1: Polite and professional soldiers decrease resistance and encourage support

      2B2: Cultural awareness increases influence for foreign counterinsurgents

      2B3: Propaganda is effective and important to influence multiple audiences

   2C: Government must control people and resources to isolate the insurgent

3A: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents need sanctuary or bases to build strength

3B: Insurgent operations: Successful insurgents usually require external support

3C: Insurgent operations: Mobility and dispersal are essential to insurgent survival

4A: COIN operations: Government must establish the rule of law

4B: COIN operations: Effective interagency functioning is required; Military action is not sufficient to win (capacity-building will be required)
Vita

Adam Shilling was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in 1967. He attended Live Oak High School in Watson, Louisiana, and graduated from the Louisiana School for Math, Science, and the Arts in Natchitoches, Louisiana.

Adam accepted an ROTC scholarship to Georgetown University. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science in foreign service and a commission as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army in 1989. After serving as an infantryman and a peacekeeper, Adam left the Army in 1994 to pursue an interest in international development. This interest led him the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness at LSU. Adam obtained his master’s degree in agricultural economics in 1996.

He taught high school for two years and returned to graduate school in 1998. He received a master’s degree in human resource education in 2001 and a doctorate in the same in 2008. He has also taught college coursework in statistics and quantitative research methods.

He served as the civil-military operations officer for the 256 Brigade of the Louisiana National Guard in combat in Iraq in 2004-2005. He was responsible for many interactions between the Brigade and Iraqi civilians. His experience there inspired this dissertation project.

Adam was selected a finalist in the Presidential Management Fellows Program in 2008, and has accepted a fellowship with the Center for Army Analysis at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Adam is the father of a son, Caleb, of whom he is very proud. The two have visited a number of countries around the world.