1964


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THE SPEAKING OF JOHN SHARP WILLIAMS
IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS DEBATES,
1918–1920.

Louisiana State University, Ph.D., 1964
Speech–Theater

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THE SPEAKING OF JOHN SHARP WILLIAMS IN THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS DEBATES, 1918-1920

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Speech

by

Jerry Allen Hendrix
B.A., East Texas State College, 1956
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August, 1964
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ABSTRACT

Significant among the advocates of United States entry into the League of Nations during the debate in the United States Senate concerning ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi. From December 3, 1918, through March 18, 1920, Williams delivered twenty-one addresses from the Senate floor urging ratification of the treaty and the attached covenant of the League of Nations.

Each of the four periods of the debate was studied in terms of the occasions on which Williams spoke, his listeners, and one representative speech from each phase, examined as a stimulus designed to elicit from his listeners a particular response.

This evaluation of Williams' speaking, accordingly, was concerned, first, with the establishment of causality between his appearances before the Senate and that body's subsequent rejection of the treaty and, second, with Williams' degree of technical perfection as a speaker.

Evidence does not exist to support an inference isolating a speech or a group of Williams' speeches as the stimulus directly responsible for the behavioral responses of his listeners in this situation. Nor does existing evidence permit the establishment of any degree of causality between Williams' speaking and the defeat of the treaty.

In pleading his cause before his fellow senators, moreover,
Williams failed to utilize the available means of oral persuasion. His singular strength lay consistently in his dependence upon ethical proof. That is, he depicted himself as a man of high integrity and good will, whose aim was peace among the nations of the world, a goal to which most senators at least paid lip service.

Generally haphazard in organizing his speeches, all of which were impromptu, Williams refused to concern himself with his listeners' ability to comprehend and retain his arguments. Since his position in the debate was well known by all his listeners, Williams should have organized his speeches more obviously by clearly stating his theses, by previewing his arguments, by introducing each argument with appropriate transitional material, and by summarizing his arguments in his concluding statements to refresh his listeners' memories.

Williams further failed logically to substantiate arguments vital to his cause: that the discussion in the Senate of the League had been unfair, that Lodge's assertions about the League had been in error, and that the United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations.

The speaker's use of emotional proof, his attempt to stimulate within his listeners emotional responses to his arguments, was limited essentially to appeals to the listeners' motives of self-preservation, patriotism, and social responsibility. This means of persuasion was probably restricted by Williams' recognition of his colleagues' lack of susceptibility to emotive speech.

Consistently verbose and rambling in his style, Williams' average sentence length was forty words. The impromptu nature of his addresses,
together with his propensity toward wordiness, probably contributed most to his failure to achieve clearness and impressiveness.

A final appraisal of the planter-spokesman for the League of Nations must recognize the impossibility of the establishment of causality as well as the technical failure of Williams as a speaker.
Organizations aimed ostensibly at the establishment of inter-
national peace such as the Quadruple Alliance, 1815; the American Peace 
Society, 1828; the International Peace Conference, 1848; the Interna-
tional League for Peace and Freedom, 1867; the International Women's 
Peace Society in Europe, 1896, and the Nobel Peace Foundation, 1910, 
illustrate Fleming's observation that "dreams of a parliament of man and 
federation of the world began centuries ago and plans for a league to 
keep the peace were proposed long before the twentieth century."¹

The first important American peace proponent was Theodore 
Roosevelt, who, prepared by previous experience as mediator in the Russo-
Japanese war, told the Nobel Prize Committee in 1910 that "... it would 
be a master stroke if those great powers honestly bent on peace would 
form a League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but 
to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others."²

Still a powerful advocate of a league of nations to preserve 
peace as late as 1915,³ the Rough Rider was joined in his belief by his

¹Denna F. Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 
²The Independent, LXVIII (May 12, 1910), 1027.
³Theodore Roosevelt, America and the World War (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1925), pp. 80-81.
former protege, William Howard Taft, a league spokesman as early as 1914 and leader of the League to Enforce Peace. This organization, formed in Philadelphia's Independence Hall on June 17, 1915, had as its objective the establishment of an agreement among nations:

1. To submit all justifiable questions to an international court of justice both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction;
2. To submit all other questions to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation;
3. To jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any member committing acts of hostility against another before submitting to arbitration or conciliation;
4. To hold periodic conferences to formulate and codify international law.

A third distinguished American, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, joined the league forces when, in Washington on May 27, 1916, he addressed a meeting of the League to Enforce Peace.

Probably it will be impossible to stop all wars, but it certainly will be possible to stop some wars, and thus diminish their number. The way in which this problem must be worked out must be left to this league and to those who are giving this great subject the study which it deserves. I know the obstacles. I know how quickly we shall be met with the statement that this is a dangerous question which you are putting into your argument, that no nation can submit to the judgment of other nations, and we must be careful at the beginning not to attempt too much. I know the difficulties which arise when we speak of anything which seems to involve an alliance, but I do not believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace.

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Speaking from the same platform was the man who would become the most important advocate of a league of nations and whom both Roosevelt and Lodge would soon bitterly oppose on this issue. Recorded as privately favoring an organized peace movement as early as 1914, Woodrow Wilson publicly pledged his support of the League to Enforce Peace for the first time as he spoke, following Lodge, on the evening of May 27, 1916. Wilson contended that the United States at the close of the war should enter into a universal association of nations to preserve the freedom of the seas and to prevent any war begun without warning or without full submission of the causes of the conflict to the peoples of the world. Anxious personally to assist in the actual institution of a league of nations and, of all league proponents, in the most favorable position to do so, Wilson further developed his proposals in his "War Message," April 2, 1917; his appeal to the Russian people, May 26, 1917; and, ultimately, in his "Fourteen Points," January 8, 1918.

To implement his fourteenth point, "a general association of nations" to secure "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike," however, Wilson first had to contend with that Constitutionally created bludgeon of the

7Wilson had told his brother-in-law, Dr. Stockton Axson, a visitor in the White House, of his views favoring a league of nations. Fleming, op. cit., p. 7.


foreign policies of other less feared and hated Presidents, the Senate of the United States. Acutely aware of the Constitutional provision that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur," the Senate had sometimes rejected treaties for reasons that had nothing to do with the wisdom of the foreign policy involved. Holt has noted that these reasons "can usually be traced either to the struggle between the President and Senate for the control of foreign policy or to the warfare of the President's political opponents who hope to secure some partisan advantage."

Resistance in the Senate to the view that the United States should enter a league of nations had been expressed as early as January 5, 1917 by Senator William E. Borah. Link has suggested, however, that three of Wilson's decisions made between October and December, 1918, were the most influential factors in crystalizing Senate opposition to ratification of the treaty:

The first was his decision to issue an appeal to the country on October 25 for the election of a Democratic Congress, and by so doing to make the forthcoming election a specific test of national confidence in his conduct of foreign affairs. The second was his decision to ignore the Senate and the Republican party in discussions of the possible terms of the settlement and in the appointment of the American delegation to the Paris conference, and to name only such men as he thought would be loyal to him and his ideals and subordinate to his direction.

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10 For the history of conflict between Presidents and the Senate over the making of foreign policy, see W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933).

11 Holt, op. cit., p. v.
The third was Wilson's decision to go to Paris in person, as the head of the American Commission.  

Link further observes that, although the first two decisions were "egregious mistakes," the wisdom or foolishness of these decisions is far less important than the fact that they clearly transformed into a partisan issue the ratification of whatever treaty Wilson might help to write. In addition to making certain that Republicans would oppose and Democrats would support his treaty, Wilson, by ignoring the Senate in his appointment of commissioners and by deciding to go himself to Paris, "made it inevitable that the treaty fight would renew in virulent from the old conflict between the President and the upper house for control of foreign policy."  

Still another factor which aroused conflict in the Senate was Wilson's determination to incorporate in the peace treaty the Covenant of his proposed League of Nations. Confident that the Senate would not dare to reject the entire treaty and "break the heart of the world," he defiantly boasted that

When that treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will find the covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant that you cannot dissect the covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure. The structure of peace will not be vital without the League of Nations, and no man is going to bring back a cadaver with him.  

Braden has divided the ensuing senate debate on the Versailles Treaty into four phases: (1) the phase beginning with the opening of the lame duck session of the Sixty-fifth Congress, which convened  

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December 2, 1918, through the middle of February, 1919, during which the Republicans attacked Wilson and the League without any specific knowledge of what would be contained in the treaty; (2) the second phase, which began when the first unofficial draft of the Covenant became available in the middle of February, 1919, through July 10, 1919, when Wilson submitted the official treaty to the Senate for ratification; (3) the third phase, from July 10 until November 19, 1919, when the Senate rejected the Treaty for the first time; and (4) the final phase, which concluded with the second defeat of the treaty in March, 1920.  

These four phases of the debate will be known in this study as the following: (1) the pre-covenant debate; (2) the unofficial covenant debate; (3) the first covenant debate; and (4) the second covenant debate.

Significant among League advocates in the Senate and, in Braden's view, the only senator "able to hold his own with Borah and other League opponents," 16 was John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, who from December 3, 1918, through March 18, 1920, delivered twenty-one major addresses from the Senate floor urging ratification of the treaty and the attached Covenant of the League of Nations.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to assess the influence upon public behavior of Williams' speeches in the Senate. According to Thonssen and

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16 Ibid., 281.
Baird, the extent of the influence of speeches upon the behavior of specific audiences and, ultimately, upon the behavior of society may be determined in terms of six measures: (1) the immediate surface response to the speeches; (2) the readability of the speeches; (3) the technical perfection, or quality, of the speeches; (4) the speaker's wisdom in judging trends of the future; (5) the delayed response to the speeches; and (6) the long-range effects of the speeches on the social group.18

Plan of the Study

To achieve these goals of analysis and evaluation, the study will include seven chapters. Chapter One, an introduction, provides a brief background of the debate and outlines the purpose and methodology of the study.

Chapter Two, "The Speaker," presents a brief treatment of Williams' background, education, speech training, the few available findings on his speech preparation and delivery, and an outline of his part in the development of the controversy prior to the beginning of the debates.

Chapters Three through Six constitute analyses and evaluations of Williams' speaking in the four phases of the debate, each chapter including a description of the speaking occasions, the listeners, the Mississippian's speeches during the period, and a detailed analysis and evaluation of one representative speech.


18 Ibid.
The seventh chapter will constitute general conclusions of the study.

Sources and Contributory Studies

Most valuable of primary sources are the Congressional Record, which contains all the speech texts selected for study, and the John Sharp Williams Papers in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress, which provide considerable insight into the Mississippian's motivation and behavior.

The Senate debate has been treated extensively by Fleming, Bailey, Holt, Micken, Chappell, and Braden. More intensive studies of the roles of various individuals involved include those of Osborn, who has written the definitive biography of Williams; Braden, who pioneered the rhetorical study of individual senators

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19 Fleming, op. cit.


21 Holt, op. cit.


24 Braden, op. cit.


involved in the debate; Henderlider; Garraty; Blum; Johnson; McKenna; Leopold; and Jessup. The entire speaking careers of Senators Cummins, Johnson, Knox, and Reed have been studied rhetorically and are of some value in the present study.

Williams' speaking in the League of Nations controversy has been studied in terms basically of the speaker's argumentation, with little attention to emotional or ethical proof and no treatment of style or delivery.


Although his biography of Williams includes a chapter on the Mississippian's role in the Senate treaty fight, Osborn limits his analysis and evaluation of Williams' speaking to observations of a general nature and makes no attempt at the establishment of causation. Micken also treats Williams' speaking in the debate in general terms, although he acknowledges Williams' importance as one of the leading figures in the fight.

Authenticity of Speech Texts

Two reasons have been advanced to indicate that the remarks of Congressmen as they appear in the Congressional Record are not necessarily the remarks as actually spoken. First, it is argued that each member of Congress has the right to revise, delete, or amplify his remarks before they are printed, or to "... omit the speech in its entirety or even substitute a new text." A second objection to textual authenticity is that the editors of the Record freely correct errors or discrepancies of diction, grammar, quotation, reference, and style as a matter of form, even before submitting the copy to the speakers involved. Micken, however, argues that the Record text is practically authentic, since (1) busy in the press of legislation, the senators can give only perfunctory attention to revision of proofs; (2) on many occasions senators must be limited in their editing by the rush to print

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39 Osborn, op. cit.
which characterizes the publication of the Record; (3) the honor and
good sense of the senators, as well as their jealousy of forensic reputations, make extensive tampering with remarks unwise; (4) the Record
text is the official version of the League debate upon which the senators were willing to stand, with no denial by any senator that he was properly quoted on earlier comments when the Record was referred to during the argument; and (5) the Record text is essentially oral rather than literary in style.

The debate contained in the Record for 1919 does not smell of the lamp, it is not overly literary, it has not wholly lost the flavor of immediate, often unpremeditated oral expression. The writer can vouch for the verisimilitude of these debates as reported, as can anyone who reads them. They still strike fire in the advocate's heart, still elicit the peculiar thrill of a point well made, the anticipatory satisfaction of a dilemma approached and skirted, and the special delights of forensic thrust and parry.\footnote{Micken, op. cit., p. 12.}

In addition to the evidence establishing textual authenticity advanced by Micken, other evidence exists to verify the texts as they appear in the Congressional Record.

First, the reports of Williams' speeches in the New York Times, the most complete texts to be found aside from those in the Congressional Record itself, may be considered the unedited versions of the speeches recorded by staff reporters rather than copied from the Record, which could have been tampered with prior to public exposure.\footnote{The limitation of space in the newspaper naturally required the selection of only the most significant excerpts from the individual senators participating in the debates.} That the reports in the Times constitute a separate source of texts from those in the Record is indicated by Chester M. Lewis, Chief Librarian of the New York Times.
The Congressional Record material probably appears about the same time as the morning edition of the Times. Presumably, then we would not wait for publication of the Record to obtain texts.  

This opinion was verified by Lauren D. Lyman, a member of the Times staff in 1918.

The New York Times relied on its staff reporters for the coverage of the debates in Congress at the period of John Sharp Williams' time. It may well be that in the Times' Current History and in the Sunday features the writers used the Congressional Record for reference, but for the daily stories the coverage was from the floor and the gallery directly by the staff.

Moreover, a verbatim comparison of the excerpts of the speeches published in the Times with the texts in the Record reveals significant similarity. The differences seem to be those that would normally be expected of a reporter attempting to copy the remarks of a speaker, rather than those that would be expected if the reporter were taking his excerpts directly from the Record itself.

A first minor difference appears in the paragraph structure, punctuation and grammatical tenses. A second difference is the substitution of words in the Times excerpts that are similar in meaning but phonetically different. This discrepancy in transcription could have been caused by the position of the reporter in the press gallery behind the speaker who customarily addressed the Chair, thereby keeping his back to the press gallery reporters. These seemingly phonetic substitutions include "exploit" for "exhibition," "heresy" for "idiocy," "constitutional-oiled arrangements" for "constitutional toilet arrangements," and "cosmetics upon the base" for "cosmetics upon the face."

46 Letter of Lauren D. Lyman to the writer, August 14, 1963.
Finally, there are omissions of words in the Times excerpts, as compared with the same excerpts from the Record, which indicate that the reporters were either unable or unwilling to quote Williams entirely verbatim. These omissions do not seem significant enough, however, to justify exclusion from this study of an analysis and evaluation of the speaker's style.

In addition to the validity of the New York Times text excerpts as separate reports from those of the texts in the Congressional Record and the significant similarity between these two separate textual sources, a second reason exists for trusting the authenticity of the Record texts. Had Williams wished to make himself appear in a better light than afforded by the Record, he surely would have edited out all the extraneous remarks, such as interruptions by other senators and the heckling and disapproval expressed toward him by the occupants of the galleries. The fact that he did not exclude these often unfavorable extraneous remarks lends credibility to the accuracy of the Record.

A third reason for accepting the Congressional Record's authenticity as a textual source is the loose conversational style of Williams' sentences. The style is not comparable with other examples

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47 See Appendix 1. I have included comparable excerpts from both the Times and the Record side by side so that the reader of this study may make his own comparison of texts. I have enclosed the differences within brackets.
of Williams' published works. Had Williams edited his remarks before their publication in the Record, he very likely would have corrected his rambling style and possibly would have revised his rambling organization.

A final reason for accepting the textual authenticity of the Congressional Record is that on the one known occasion during the League debates when Williams did edit his remarks before publication, he freely acknowledged making the revisions in his personal correspondence, and the newspaper accounts in this instance differ significantly from the Record text.

Following his fiery speech of October 16, 1919 against Irish-Americans who placed the welfare of Ireland above that of America, he deleted from his remarks, before their publication, some things which he felt he should not have said. In a letter to W. D. Vandiver, Williams explained

I was not drunk when I made the speech but I did have a drink or two and there were some things I said that I thought I ought not to have said and I struck them out of the Record,—that part about threatening letters. I was in a bad humor when I made the speech or I would have confined the speech to the Sinn Feiners and I would have given the facts about the Irish pretense in the Revolutionary and Civil Wars.49

48 See Thomas Jefferson, His Permanent Influence on American Institutions (New York: Columbia University Press), 1913. This is a series of eight carefully edited lectures delivered at Columbia University. See also "The University of Virginia and the Development of Thomas Jefferson's Educational Ideas," an address before the St. Louis meeting of the Association of State Universities, June 28, 1904; "Federal Usurpations," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XXXII (1908), 185-211; "Control of Corporations, Persons and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce," Ibid., XLII (1912), 310-330; and "The Only Peace Worth Having," Win the War for Permanent Peace (New York: League to Enforce Peace, 1918), pp. 173-78. The latter is an address delivered before a League to Enforce Peace assembly in Philadelphia, May 16, 1918. Its style shows remarkable restraint and compactness in comparison with Williams' speeches appearing in the Record during the League debates.

49 Letter of John Sharp Williams to W. D. Vandiver, October 25, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 48.
Williams also apologized the following day to Irish-American Senator James D. Phelan.

I am afraid I said some things in my speech yesterday calculated to hurt your feelings and the feelings of some other good friends of mine of Irish derivation. I am awfully sorry for it. I kept my speech out of the Record with a view of revising it, and shall revise out of it what I think could be offensive to anybody, personally or racially.\(^50\)

On October 17, 1919, the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, exulted from its front page that "Williams rips Irish from 'I' to 'H' in Senate," "Goes the limit despite friends' plea, 'cut it out.'"\(^51\) That newspaper's account of Williams' remarks is verified by the account appearing the same day in the *New York Tribune*.\(^52\) Neither of these accounts agree with the version of the same speech in the *Congressional Record*. This is the only occasion during the entire debates in the Senate of the League issue on which Williams' remarks in the *Record* do not coincide with those published in the newspapers.\(^53\)

The texts of the speeches of John Sharp Williams which appear in the *Congressional Record* are sufficiently authentic to justify rhetorical analysis, including stylistic analysis, for the following reasons:

1. Williams was generally too busy to edit his speeches.

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\(^50\) Letter of John Sharp Williams to James D. Phelan, October 17, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 48.

\(^51\) *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 17, 1919, p. 1.

\(^52\) *New York Tribune*, October 17, 1919, p. 2.

\(^53\) A few excerpts of the speech appear in the *New York Times*, October 17, 1919, p. 2; but not to the extent that the Senator is quoted in the anti-League *Chicago Daily Tribune* and *New York Tribune*. 
2. The rush of the publication of the Congressional Record did not allow Williams enough time to edit his speeches.

3. The honor and good sense of the senators precluded their tampering with their speeches.

4. The senators stood on the Record texts as the official version of the debates and never complained of having been misquoted when quoted from that source.

5. The Record text of Williams' speeches is essentially oral rather than literary in style.

6. The textual excerpts in the New York Times may be considered unedited versions of Williams' speeches, and they are decidedly similar to those texts in the Congressional Record.

7. Williams did not edit out of the Record texts extraneous interruptions and other expressions which tend to place him in an unfavorable light.

8. Williams did not polish the style of the texts so that they would be consistent with the literary style of his other publications.

9. On the one known occasion when Williams did edit his remarks before their publication in the Record, he freely confesses having made the deletions, and the newspaper accounts of his remarks differ significantly from those appearing in the Congressional Record.

The writer therefore considers the speech texts in the Congressional Record sufficiently accurate to evaluate their quality, or
technical perfection, in terms of structure, logical proof, emotional proof, ethical proof, and style.\(^{54}\)

\(^{54}\)Detailed criteria for such evaluation are set forth in Thonssen and Baird, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 331-404.
CHAPTER II

THE SPEAKER

John Sharp Williams (1854-1932), the descendent of distinguished military forefathers who had served as officers in the Revolutionary, Mexican, and Civil Wars, began his own twenty-eight year career in the public service with his election to the United States House of Representatives in 1893.

Interested as a youth in such books as the works of Herodotus, Plutarch, Shakespeare, Milton, Defoe, Swift, Pope, Fielding, Smollett, Hume, Robertson, Gibbon, Burns, and Scott, John Sharp Williams began his education during the Civil War in private schools in Yazoo City. At the close of the war, when Williams was nine years old, he was placed in a Memphis school. Becoming seriously interested in religion while in Memphis as a youth and from a family of Methodists and Presbyterians, he heeded the old Southern aristocratic myth that, of the many roads to Heaven, a gentleman would travel only the Episcopalian way, and joined the Episcopal Church.

At age thirteen Williams entered the Kentucky Military Institute at Lyndon, of which he was later to remark, "I spent two years as a cadet being taught the duty of not walking pigeon-toed and [of] getting up to a drumbeat and going to bed when a horn blew." Although the

1Osborn, op. cit., p. 10.

2Ibid., p. 11.
young cadet often played baseball, his primary interest was books, especially those on history, English, mathematics, and Latin.

In 1870 the Mississippian began his college education at the Episcopalian University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee. Member of the Sigma Epsilon Society, an excellent student, and popular with faculty and students alike, Williams nevertheless failed to finish his education at Sewanee because of his natural independence, a personal characteristic which was to become more apparent during his later career in public life. Failing one morning to salute the university's President, General William C. Gorgas, the Mississippian was promptly dismissed and sent back to Cedar Grove Plantation, where, within a few weeks he had decided to continue his studies at what was then recognized as the leading institution of higher learning in the South, the University of Virginia.

John Sharp matriculated at the University at Charlottesville at the middle of the session of 1870-71, remaining there until the close of the regular session in the summer of 1873.

Rhetoric, along with Latin, modern languages, history, and literature, was part of his first year's program. His second year's studies included French and moral philosophy, the latter under the famed Professor William H. McGuffey, in whose class John Sharp won the professor's annual prize for best scholar. German, natural philosophy, history, political science, and literature completed his third year's studies.

Among the most important of student activities at the University of Virginia at this time were those of the two literary societies,
the Jefferson and the Washington. Each society annually awarded a gold medal to the member chosen by his associates as the best debater in the senior class. On the "society closing night" of 1873, the Jeffersonians presented Williams its gold medal, an award to which the Mississippi Senator later referred as one of the proudest moments of his life.

That same year the Virginia Beta Chapter of the Phi Beta Kappa honorary scholastic society made Williams a member, not the least of indications of his ability as a scholar.

Since the requirements for a degree at the University of Virginia included subjects that were of no interest to Williams, he decided, rather than taking a degree, to continue his education abroad at the University of Heidelberg.

Osborn indicates that Williams may have been discouraged from extensive study at Heidelberg by his distaste for the Prussian military system which was an integral part of life at the German university. After eight months of attending lectures at Heidelberg, the Mississippian moved to a branch of the College of France at Dijon, where, remaining for more than a year, he took courses in French literature and French history.

His two years in Europe provided the future statesman with a store of experiences and information which few of his later contemporaries in national politics could equal.

Already ambitious for a career in public life by the time of his return from Europe in 1876, Williams decided that his fortune lay in a legal education. That same year he entered the law school at the

\[^{3}\text{Ibid.}, p. 19.\]
University of Virginia, then under the direction of Professor John B. Minor. Although only eighteen per cent of Professor Minor's law students during the years 1870-1880 were awarded their degrees, John Sharp distinguished himself, not only by being among the small group of graduates, but by completing his studies in the record time of one year.

A graduate of the University of Virginia Law School in 1877, Williams that same year married Elizabeth Dial Webb of Livingston, Alabama, whom he had met during his earlier study at Charlottesville. Having worked during previous summer vacations for the Memphis law firm of Turley, Harris, and McKisick, the Mississippian, already a member of the Tennessee Bar, decided to return with his bride not to Memphis but to the family plantation, Cedar Grove. In addition to managing the debt-ridden plantation, the young lawyer that same year opened a law office in Yazoo City in partnership with D. R. Barnett, who agreed that Williams would not be heavily employed in the summer months between sessions of court. Accordingly, the Williamses spent the first three summers of their married life in Charlottesville, where John Sharp continued his political education by reading books from the university library.

In 1890 Williams announced that he intended to seek the nomination for United States Congressman from Mississippi's fifth Congressional District. Undismayed by his loss of the nomination in this first attempt, he would try again in 1892. Williams lost his first campaign to Joseph H. Beeman, the Populist candidate and prominent member of the Farmers Alliance of Mississippi. In his second attempt, this time against Populist candidate and Methodist minister of Attala county,
W. P. Ratliff, Williams won the Democratic nomination, which in Missis­
sippi is tantamount to election. Thus John Sharp Williams went to
Washington in 1893 for the last session of the Fifty-second Congress.

Describing Williams as one of the "bright spots" in the Demo­
cratic delegation, Colliers magazine notes that

when Senator Williams first came to Washington as a youthful 
and unreconstructed rebel, he wouldn't walk up the front steps 
of a building that was flying the United States flag over the 
stoop, but no one in Congress better represents enlightened 
Americanism than the gentleman from Mississippi.4

During his tenure in the House of Representatives, Williams dis­
tinguished himself as a prominent spokesman in several important debates. 
The first of these was the controversy over the Dingley tariff. A 
member of the minority opposition to the tariff, Williams protested 
against the bill as it was before the House and ridiculed it after its 
passage. Although the southern Congressman was virtually helpless 
against the Republican protectionist majority, his speaking attracted 
the favorable attention of the national press, as did his speaking 
against the Gold Standard Act of 1900.

Most important of the issues on which Williams spoke in his 
early political career, however, was that of American imperialism. He 
advanced three arguments in several speeches in the House against 
United States expansion into the Philippines: (1) it would require a 
vast standing army which would bleed the substance of the people; (2) 
the territory was not near our base of operations; and (3) the Filipinos 
could not be assimilated as Americans.5 In developing the latter

4Colliers, LIX (April 21, 1917), 15.
5Osborn, op. cit., p. 87.
argument, Williams indicated that he would never vote to annex oriental pauper laborers in competition against his own constituents.

Having received national attention in his ten years of service in the House of Representatives, Williams' name was placed before the House as Democratic nominee for Speaker of the Fifty-eighth Congress. The Republicans, controlling a majority of thirty-one votes, elected their nominee, Joseph G. Cannon; Williams automatically became minority leader. As minority leader, he was appointed to the powerful Committees on Ways and Means and Rules. Having secured these appointments, he resigned his positions on the Committees on Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and Insular Affairs, on which he had served ten, four, and two years respectively.

Osborn attests to the wisdom of the Democrats' choice for their new minority leader.

The qualifications upon which Williams was chosen minority leader seem to have been his keen intellect, which had been developed through extensive as well as intensive education, his readiness and versatility upon the floor on all occasions, the sincerity of his loyalty in courageously defending the principles of Jeffersonian democracy, and his ever-present sense of justice and courtesy in parliamentary routine.6

Sydnor further suggests Williams' success as minority leader.

"His immediate predecessors had exercised little authority, and the Democrats had become noted for being as unrestrained as a herd of wild steers. With little apparent effort, Williams speedily brought order out of chaos."7 Osborn adds to the picture of Williams, the Representative, who

6Ibid., p. 107.

... did not have the opportunity of proving himself a constructive statesman during his career in the House as he was, with the exception of his first Congress, a member of the minority. His constructive influence is shown in amendments to Republican measures, in the change in policy of the Democrat of the House, and in his definite influence on the Democratic party.  

Williams won a bitter Democratic primary contest with Governor James K. Vardaman in 1907 for the United States Senate term which began in 1911. Although victor by only 648 votes, Williams' nomination returned him to Washington, where, at the special session of the Sixty-second Congress, beginning on April 5, 1911, he first appeared as a member of the Democratic minority in the Senate.  

Of the Mississippian's senatorial career, Sydnor observes that

His career in the lower house gave him immediate recognition in the Senate, where he attained membership in the finance committee and on the foreign relations committee; but since he no longer had to fight against radical leadership in his party or against a dominant opposition party, he appeared less prominent than formerly. He was in close agreement with President Wilson in respect to the entrance of the United States into the World War and its vigorous prosecution, and he also strove to secure the entrance of the United States into the League of Nations.  

It is this last aspect of Williams' senatorial career, his part in the battle for Senate ratification of the Versailles Treaty, including United States entrance into the League of Nations, with which this study will be primarily concerned.

Williams the Debater

Bailey has described in general the Southern senators who participated in the League debate.

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8 Osborn, op. cit., p. 142.
9 Ibid., p. 174.
10 Sydnor, Dictionary of American Biography, p. 278.
Most of the Democratic senators were from the Solid South, where party loyalty was a fetish closely associated with racial supremacy and the "Lost Cause" of 1861-1865. They were generally the products of a one-party system, and some of them had been elected and reelected for decades with little or no opposition. It was said with more than a grain of truth that if a Southern Democrat maintained his party allegiance, voted the straight ticket, and kept out of jail, he could be reasonably sure of being returned to Congress. This situation did not make for the ablest type of legislator.\textsuperscript{11}

John Sharp Williams, however, does not seem to fit Bailey's stereotype of mediocrity. Gratham observes that

The most vociferous Southern Wilsonian, and probably the ablest, was John Sharp Williams. He was constantly championing Wilson and the League, was not connected with compromise negotiations, and approved of only one of the Lodge reservations. He poured contempt upon irreconcilables, and once charged the League opponents with finding in the treaty "sun specks, mare's nests, new discoveries of presidential sins."\textsuperscript{12}

Mowry describes Williams as "... brilliant, unconventional, and amiable, ... the essence of cotton-planting traditionalism, an ardent advocate of states' rights, and one of the last of Jeffersonians."\textsuperscript{13}

Fleming briefly treats four of Williams' speeches during the course of the debate and refers to the Mississippian as one of the keenest and most independent minds in the Senate.\textsuperscript{14} In his study of Lodge, Shriftgiesser evaluates Williams as "... one of the keenest students of international affairs ever to sit in the Senate."\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{11}Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, p. 54.


\textsuperscript{14}Fleming, op. cit., p. 96.

On Williams' retirement from the Senate, the *New York Times* said of the senator: "His wit, his satire, his ample scholarship are as well known as the Capitol. In the Senate, more and more, he has taken a perfectly independent position . . . . He was frank and fearless. But he got sick of the show. He has gone back to his books and his plantation." 16

Also in 1923, Harold de Wolfe Fuller, editor of the *Independent* observed that

Through the retirement of John Sharp Williams the Senate suffers a loss it can ill afford. For the veteran Mississippi Senator stood, not only by reason of his scholarship, his brilliance as a speaker, and his political ability, but also by reason of a quality which seems even rarer in the Senate than any of these--genuine personal independence. 17

Reviewers of the Osborn biography referred to Williams as "... a significant and colorful Congressional leader;" 18 a Southern statesman who "... spent thirty years in the House and Senate, scouring fools with his sharp tongue; overwhelming the clumsy in debate; enriching public discussions with his wide knowledge and ready anecdote; and through it all, going his frank and independent way;" 19 "... a sharp and eloquent debater, a boon companion, a popular figure with


the conservatives of both parties;"\(^20\) and "... a favorite congress-
man of scholars because he was a learned man, he had a political philos-
ophy that gave maturity and consistency to his political actions, and he
could speak and write lucidly about his philosophy."\(^21\)

Of those who were first-hand observers of Williams in action,
Wilson's Vice-President, Thomas R. Marshall, who presided over the
Senate during the entire debate, is perhaps the most eloquent in his
praise of the Mississippian. In a personal letter to Williams, follow-
ing the Senator's reply to Borah of September 29, 1919, the Vice-
President wrote: "I have always been amazed at the clarity of your
thought and expression. Of course like all impatient Presiding Officers
I have sometimes wished you would not speak. But I would rather be the
author of the speech you made last night than all I have ever said."\(^22\)
Marshall reserved highest praise for Williams again in 1925, when in his
memoirs, he wrote:

Of all the men I have ever known, John Sharp Williams had the
most intimate knowledge of world history and world politics.
At a moment's warning he was ready to defend the principles
in which he believed and to fortify them with historic illus-
trations. His speeches were always luminous and entertaining,
and the records will disclose among them some of the most bril-
liant passages in English literature. He had also the courage

\(^{20}\) Roy F. Nichols, Review of John Sharp Williams: Planter-
Statesman of the Deep South, by George C. Osborn, Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 229 (September, 1943),
p. 211.

\(^{21}\) Charles S. Sydnor, Review of John Sharp Williams: Planter-
Statesman of the Deep South, by George C. Osborn, The Journal of
Southern History, IX (November, 1943), 582.

\(^{22}\) Letter of Thomas R. Marshall to Williams, September 30, 1919,
Williams Papers, Box 48.
of his convictions. He sat across the aisle from Senator La Follette.\textsuperscript{23}

Wilson's Treasury Secretary and wartime Director-General of the Railroads, William G. McAdoo, recognized Williams as one of the most prominent of Democratic senators.\textsuperscript{24} In his memoirs, McAdoo lauds the Mississippian as "... a scholar, and a brilliant one. . .," and "... probably the best-read man in either house."\textsuperscript{25}

"Uncle Joe" Cannon, Speaker of the House of Representatives during Williams' tenure in that body, said that, as a rough and tumble debater, Williams had no equal in American history.\textsuperscript{26} Cannon's successor, Champ Clark, ranked Williams with the greatest debaters America has produced.\textsuperscript{27}

Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts believed that some of Williams' sentences deserved to be ranked with Chaucer, and numerous colleagues of Williams wrote to Osborn that the Mississippi Senator had "enlivened and raised the usual humdrum debates to a level of intellectual stimulation."\textsuperscript{28}

Scholars in the field of speech have also emphasized Williams' role as a speaker in the debate. Braden writes that


\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26}George C. Osborn, (editor), Selected Speeches of John Sharp Williams (Unpublished manuscript in Mississippi Department of Archieves and History, 1938), i.

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid.
Only John Sharp Williams, senator from Mississippi, was able to hold his own with Borah and other League opponents. But many of his speeches were extemporaneous and even impromptu. Nevertheless, his interchanges with Borah are some of the finest in the entire debate. Other Democrats demonstrated little understanding of how to cope with the anti-League.

Dickey lists Williams as one of the figures "... who will make rich research projects ..." in the study of southern oratory.

Dickey further notes that Mississippi "... need never apologize for such men as John Sharp Williams in the twentieth century, but she has been considerably impoverished in men noted for advanced thinking since his retirement from the United States Senate in 1923."

Not all the reports of Williams as a participant in the League debate have been complimentary. Osborn notes that "one has only to wade through the Record of this period to conclude that if anyone needed protection against the 'gas attacks' of august Senators, it was the Senate when listening to the senior Senator from Mississippi."

Similarly, in a discussion of the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of 1918, the New Republic dismissed Williams as "... an able partisan, but scarcely a discreet statesman."

Williams characterized himself as "... simply a debater, a very good one maybe, but still only a debater." Not quite so favorable

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31Ibid., p. 461.
32Osborn, op. cit., p. 357.
33"At the Capitol, Leadership in Foreign Affairs," New Republic, XIV (April 27, 1918), 389.
34Micken, op. cit., p. 29.
was the Mississippian's evaluation of the Senate debate on the League of Nations. At the close of the debate, following the final defeat of the treaty, in an address before the Mississippi legislature, Williams denounced his opposition in the Senate as a "Poison Squad," and the debate itself as the "most incoherent gabfest in human history."35

Osborn refers to the debate, however, as "the most impassioned fight of Willisma1 public career,"36 and certainly some of the Senator's utterances early in the debate indicate his sincere idealism, as in his reply of December 4, 1918, to Senator Reed.

There is or is not a God. And God either is or He is not a prince of righteousness and justice. If it be true that fools only dream of peace and fools only dream of an agreement amongst nations whereby peace can be perpetuated, then there is no God of righteousness and mercy and no God of justice and no God of mercy, or else, on the other hand, if there be a God of justice and righteousness and mercy He has given me and you a common sense and a common conscience whereby we can be guided in peace consummation. Common sense means merely the sense of all average men in the aggregate, and common conscience the conscience of the average man throughout the world. If He has given us common sense and common conscience, He has given it to us as an instrumentality whereby we can reduce the world to order and to peace and to progress and to civilization, and whereby we shall not be forced to go to the Prussian junker system of universal armament, one man and one nation and people suspecting the other all the time.37

Although opinion as to his value in the Senate may be mixed, most observers agreed that John Sharp Williams, the brilliant, unorthodox planter-statesman, was indeed an important man, addressing an important audience on one of history's most important problems: the preservation of world peace.


36 Osborn, op. cit., p. 360.

37 U. S. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3d Sess., 1918, LVII, Part 1, 84.
Appearance and Personality

As a "debutant" in the Fifty-third Congress, Williams appeared . . . a slender man five feet, nine and one-half inches in height, head medium for his body and topped with a heavy crop of dark brown hair. His deep-set blue eyes looked out beneath thick, shaggy brows. These penetrating eyes were usually aided by a pair of gold-rimmed spectacles. A straight, middle-sized nose protruded above a brown, untrimmed mustache. This new member was practically deaf in his right ear. He was clad in plain clothes which had been adjusted with indifferent hands. 38

Osborn later describes the Mississippian's first appearance in the Senate, a special session of the Sixty-second Congress called by Taft to reconsider his trade agreement with Canada. Having changed in appearance somewhat from his days as fiery minority leader of the House, Williams'

. . . hair appeared to be a little grayer, and at a distance, looked as though "it had been cuddled into shape by the eider duck." His mustache was "a little scaggier" and drooped "like moss of the trees of the Southern swamps." His mouth looked as if it had "been lured away by heavy cuds of tobacco or big cigars." Clear eyes, just as bright and all-seeing as ever, pierced through gold-rimmed glasses over clothes that "needed to be pressed just as much as ever." His girth had expanded till he seemed "at all times well-fed." Mentally he had grown even sharper--"till he should be known now as John Sharper Williams." 39

Dickson further corroborates the Mississippian's sloppy appearance as being

. . . blown, disheveled, extemporaneous, neglected, surprised . . . in appearance; with his strange second-hand clothes of the mound building period, his picturesque gaiters, his mysterious and melancholy eyes, and his general air of incognito . . . . It was even hinted that the Gentleman from Mississippi bought coats and breeches ready made, off a shelf. But nobody supplied him with hand-me-down opinions. These

38Osborn, op. cit., p. 36.
39Ibid., p. 178.
were his own; and he had his own frank, fearless, vigorous method of expressing them.40

Lovable, humorous, the perfect southern gentleman, Williams was intensely loyal to his friends and

... won and held the loyalty of other men. No bars of class or wealth or position fenced them apart. His friends are found among all kinds of people: the bluecoat at the street-corner, tyrannizing over traffic, the Irishman sitting as keeper at a Senate doorway, the man mixing toddies behind a bar, the diplomat representing our Government at the Court of St. James, or the President directing the destinies of our nation.41

Osborn suggests, however, that Williams after midsummer 1918 was often very bitter in replying to an adversary, probably because of his deep personal involvement in the war effort,42 his advancing age,43 and the loss of his daughter, Julia. Osborn reports that

In May, 1917, the Senator admitted to a friend that he was getting too old to enjoy life. He was "suffering with a bad case of Anno Domini; toddies don't taste good to me like they used to; cigar flavor is not what it once was. I still enjoy poetry and flowers and I enjoy my public life while the excitement and fight is on, but I have reached the point of life when it bores me when the excitement and fight are off."44

Along with these factors, Williams' animosity toward Lodge may have influenced the Mississippi Senator's behavior. Williams' secretary, who was with him in Washington until 1912, reports that his chief never attempted to hide his contempt for the Sage of Nahant. Although


41Ibid., p. 124.

42Osborn, op. cit., p. 332.

43He was sixty-four in 1918.

44Osborn, op. cit., p. 332.
writers frequently coupled the names of Lodge and Williams as the two
great scholars of the Senate, this always infuriated the latter, who
regarded Lodge as a "puritan mountebank."\textsuperscript{45}

Williams' bitterness may have been given further stimulus by
his having been passed over in Wilson's selection of peace commissioners
to accompany him to Paris. On this subject, Micken speculates that

There is only inference to be drawn from the probability that
Williams would have liked serving on the Treaty Commission
that President Wilson took to Paris. As in the case of
Hitchcock and Tom Walsh, one can only guess as to how this
omission by the President affected the intensity and effec­
tiveness of Williams' defense of the treaty.\textsuperscript{46}

An additional factor to consider in an assessment of Williams'
personality is his hearing loss, present since childhood but having pro­
gressively worsened by the time of the treaty fight. The loss had not
reached an extreme stage by 1919, but Williams is pictured sometimes as
"going over close to an opponent and cupping his hand behind his ear in
an effort to hear what was being said."\textsuperscript{47} Other senators made sarcastic
references to Williams' deafness on several occasions, as in Reed's
comment that "what I wanted to get before the Senate was this gentle­
man's . . . statement which the Senator from Mississippi did not hear
throughout, I am sure, or he would not have singled out a single sentence
and made it the subject of his bitter criticism."\textsuperscript{48} During the Missis­
sippian's interchange of remarks on December 3, 1918, with Illinois

\textsuperscript{45}Letter of Peter Stubblefield to the writer, July 8, 1963. Mr.
Stubblefield now resides in Vaughan, Mississippi.

\textsuperscript{46}Micken, op. cit., p. 32.

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48}U.S. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 85.
Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman, James Watson, Senator from Indiana reports that he walked up to his Republican colleague, Sherman, who was also hard of hearing, and spoke into Sherman's good ear: "Lawrence, you seem to be having a pretty hard time here;" whereupon Sherman replied, "yes, Williams and I are having a hell of a debate. Neither of us hears a word the other fellow says and neither of us gives a damn."\(^{49}\)

A final characteristic of Williams' personal behavior which merits attention was his drinking. Osborn insists that the Senator was "never drunk while on official duty in the Senate."\(^{50}\) In his address against Irish-Americans who put the welfare of Ireland above that of the United States of October 16, 1919, however, the Mississippian indulged in bitter invective that he later struck from the Record. Afterwards he confided to Senator Watson that, although not drunk, he had "had a drink or two."\(^{51}\) He further defended his behavior, telling the Indiana senator that "one time I made up my mind that I would never take another drink, that I would quit forever. I abstained absolutely for six months, and I tell you the honest truth, Jim, when I say that in all that six months I never had an original thought."\(^{52}\)

Although disheveled in appearance and often bitter in debate, John Sharp Williams was generally held in high regard by his Senatorial colleagues. His hearing loss sometimes made him the butt of unfriendly


\(^{50}\) Osborn, op. cit., p. 332.

\(^{51}\) Watson, op. cit., p. 288.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
criticism, and his drinking attracted some attention, especially on the occasion of his address against the Irish-Americans of October 16, 1919. In all, his appearance and personality could not always be considered assets in his attempts to influence the public behavior.

Speech Preparation and Delivery

Aside from his appearances in the Senate, Williams did not speak in public during this period. Asked by Wilson's secretary, Joseph Tumulty, to speak at the annual banquet of the Hudson County Bar Association in January, 1919, Williams, expressing his thanks for the invitation, replied that "I have quit going out to make speeches . . . except under urgent circumstances."53

In all, twenty-three speaking invitations appear in the Williams Papers during the period from January 24, 1919 through February 3, 1920, all of which Williams declined for reasons of duty, health, or to be with his family. On February 4, 1919 he telegraphed Governor T. W. Bickett of North Carolina that he would not be able to accept a speaking invitation at the North Carolina Conference for Social Service because he was "sick."54 He sent a similar wire to William H. Taft, who had invited him to speak at the Southern Congress for the League of Nations in Atlanta.55 In March, 1919, he declined the invitation of

53 Letter of John Sharp Williams to Joseph P. Tumulty, January 13, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 43.

54 Telegram of John Sharp Williams to T. W. Bickett, February 4, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 43.

55 Telegram of John Sharp Williams to William H. Taft, February 17, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 44.
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, stating as his reason, "I want to get home to my children and grandchildren . . . and to make a long trip back . . . would be more than I would like to stand."  

On other occasions, Williams declined speaking invitations outside the Senate because of his wife's poor health, his own health, and his obligations in the Senate. Invited to take to the lecture circuit by L. J. Alber, President of Affiliated Lyceum Bureaus of America, Williams replied, "You are mistaken; I am not 'filling a number of speaking engagements'; don't expect to fill any. I don't see any chance to go out on the lecture platform. Congress here of late is almost in continuous session; and while it is in session, a Senator has no right to leave for the purpose of making money for himself."  

The senator's private papers indicate that no "urgent circumstances" arose during the period of the debate on the League of Nations. There is no evidence to indicate that Williams spoke publicly outside the Senate chamber during this period at all.

Williams expressed his own views concerning Congressional oratory, sometimes wishing that Senators would stop calling for a quorum every time one of them made a speech. This required the other members to leave their offices to come to the floor to listen to long, boring talks for hours at a time. Much more good could be accomplished, he felt, "than sitting here listening to one another."  

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56 Letter of John Sharp Williams to Carl Kelsey, March 5, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 44.

57 Letter of John Sharp Williams to L. J. Alber, November 20, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 49.

occasion during the League debate, he wrote to a friend that only "God could shut Senators' mouths, make them quit talking about nothing."

God alone, in Williams' opinion, could direct their attention to "what is worthwhile, and to the weightier matters of the law."^59

All of Williams' speeches in the Senate during the League of Nations Debate seem impromptu in nature. Certainly the Mississippian drew extensively on his broad education and his intimate familiarity with world history and international law, but his speeches exude spontaneity and lack the close organization of the manuscript. There is no evidence to indicate that any of his speeches during this period were prepared in advance of their delivery. Dickson lends further credence to the impromptu nature of the addresses in his observation that . . . since that first proud day when young John Williams began to practise law before a Yazoo County Squire, he had reveled in sporadic scrimmages. To prepare a set oration, to memorize and spout, was not his forte. He preferred to take the words, the reasoning, the logic from an adversary's lips, than demolish him with stronger reasons and clearer logic of his own.60

Dickson notes also Williams' preference for the debate during his earlier career in the House of Representatives, as opposed to his later speaking under the restrictive rules of the Senate.

The atmosphere of the House exactly suited him. He delighted to mix in sudden emergencies that arose upon its floor, with flash of rapiers, with thrusts given and received. Quick thinking and prompt action stirred his blood, kept him vividly alive. Steadily his reputation grew as one of the very readiest and most resourceful debaters that had ever appeared in public life.61

^59 Letter of John Sharp Williams to T. H. Brown, August 14, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 47.

^60 Dickson, op. cit., p. 136.

^61 Ibid., p. 108.
Of Williams' speech preparation, Osborn notes that "throughout his entire public career the greatness of Williams lay in his ability as a 'catch as catch can' debater. Very few of his numerous speeches, delivered in either chamber of the National Legislature, were prepared speeches." 62

The only manuscript in the senator's Mississippi papers suggests that he employed the extemporaneous method more often than the other types. 63 Williams begins this address with the observation that "It is my habit to speak extemporaneously when I have time to prepare in my mind the thoughts that are to be clothed in words while speaking. For that I haven't had time for this occasion, and therefore have written down a few things which I shall read." 64

Mr. Joseph Wills, Superintendent of the Senate Press Gallery, a first-hand observer of the speaker, recalls that the senator never spoke from manuscript. Instead he always arose and spoke in an impromptu manner. 65

Nor did Williams have time to prepare his replies to his adversaries in the Senate during the League debates. He sometimes criticized his opponents who spoke from manuscript. In his reply to Senator Sherman

62 George C. Osborn (editor), Selected Speeches of John Sharp Williams (Unpublished manuscript in Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 1938), p. i.

63 Undated, unpublished manuscript of speech delivered before the Jackson Kiwanis Club, found in Mississippi Department of Archives and History. References to Babe Ruth's popularity may indicate that the speech was delivered in the 1920's.

64 Ibid., p. 1.

65 Personal interview of the writer with Mr. Joseph Wills, August 12, 1963.
on December 3, 1918, Williams observed sarcastically that "we were told that there was going to be a regular hurricane--perhaps an explosion of a volcano--and we have listened to the speech, or to the reading of the writing, rather, of the Senator from Illinois." At another point in the same address, Williams said of his opponent, "He read his speech, of course, and read it with good emphasis; read it in fine style, as he usually does, and with a degree of acting that made it funny at times, even when the Senator was seeking to be serious. . . ." 

Williams further expressed his contempt for manuscript delivery of speeches in his reply to Lodge on August 12, 1919.

The Senator can stand there and read, read, reread--not speak--his carefully prepared sentences with the view of controlling politics in America as well as he can, but he cannot blot out the fact that while I am a citizen of America I am also a citizen of the world.

In the same address, Williams scorns Lodge's "... carefully drawn and midnight-light finished periods of his speech." Williams preferred to speak extemporaneously, but in the League debates he probably spoke impromptu. Neither speech manuscripts nor extemporaneous speech outlines or notes are to be found in the senator's Washington papers.

Finally, Williams himself provides evidence that his speech-making during the League controversy was entirely of an impromptu nature. In a letter to a friend who had requested speech manuscripts, the

66U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 28.
67Ibid., 29.
68U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3785.
69Ibid., 3789.
Mississippian confessed, "I haven't made any set speeches this session-- didn't consider any of them worthy of being printed separately in pamphlet form, hence I will just have to send you the Record containing the respective speeches."\textsuperscript{70}

Evidence concerning Williams' methods of delivering his speeches is extremely limited. The writer has discovered no descriptions of the Mississippian's voice. Micken notes that it must have been durable to have withstood the extensive use made of it by the Senator.\textsuperscript{71} Various sources attest to the conversational manner in which Williams spoke, in contrast with the "oratorical" poses of some of his opponents. In his comparison of Williams with Senator Joseph W. Bailey in a debate on the tariff in 1911, Osborn relates that "Bailey orated; Williams talked. The Texan's action showed carefully studied poses; the Mississippian's manner was as 'democratic as a coon-skin cap.'"\textsuperscript{72}

Dickson reports that Williams "... never seemed to be 'making a speech'; certainly he never acted the part of a statesman delivering a masterpiece, never thrust his left hand into the breast of a Prince Albert coat while his right hand flourished the Declaration of Independence."\textsuperscript{73} To this Dickson adds that "when hearing John Sharp Williams the listener instinctively appreciates his earnestness, his direct method of telling what he feels, and making the hearer feel it."\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{70}Letter of John Sharp Williams to Henry Cabell Dixon, July 28, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 46.

\textsuperscript{71}Micken, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{72}Osborn, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 184.

\textsuperscript{73}Dickson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 110.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 111.
Williams' biographer, George C. Osborn writes

Had I found anything on Williams' delivery I would have included it in my book on him, but as I recall, I found nothing. Only an occasional mention of his southern drawl, ribald stories--though not vulgar--his sometimes raising the right forefinger to point at the audience, but no walking back and forth, no spell binder tactics, no hypnotic oratory. JSW was essentially a debater, not an orator.75

Two first-hand observers have expressed difficulty in recalling specific descriptions of Williams' delivery. David Lawrence, a press gallery reporter already of syndicated fame in 1918, writes of the senator that "he had a very interesting manner of delivery, but I could hardly describe it. He did speak slowly at times, and depended a good deal on satire."76

John D. Rhodes, an official reporter of debates for the U. S. Senate, who was a constant observer of Williams, writes that

I can recall how attentive we would all be when he spoke, for "he spoke as one having authority." His hearing was impaired, and he usually would have his hand cupped behind his ear. There have been Senators who would attract a big audience, and I am sure Senator Williams was one of them.77

In reply to a questionnaire concerning Williams' delivery, Rhodes described the senator's posture as "erect and easy," facial expression, "earnest"; intelligibility, "of course"; articulation, "good"; pronunciation,"perfect"; and sincerity, "marked."78

Williams the impromptu debater was at home in the Senatorial skirmishes on the League of Nations issue. Evidence indicates that he

75Letter of George C. Osborn to the writer, August 6, 1963.
76Letter of David Lawrence to the writer, September 30, 1963.
77Letter of John D. Rhodes to the writer, November 11, 1963.
78Ibid.
did not specifically prepare any of the speeches he delivered during the fifteen months of debate. He was critical of colleagues who prepared manuscripts and read them in the Senate. Although observers of Williams have expressed difficulty in recalling descriptions of the Missippian's voice and physical behavior, it seems likely that he may be described most accurately as a "debater" rather than an "orator."
CHAPTER III

THE PRE-COVENANT DEBATE

December 2, 1918 - February 14, 1919

The Occasion

This chapter is concerned with an analysis of the occasions on which Williams spoke during the period, December 2, 1918 - February 14, 1919. Secondly, it presents description of the audiences which the speaker sought to influence, and finally it presents a detailed analysis and evaluation of one representative speech made by Williams during the pre-covenant debate.

John Sharp Williams had been appointed a delegate at large to the World Court Congress which met at Cleveland, Ohio, May 12-14, 1915. Unable to attend, he had expressed "heart sympathy for the inauguration of a court which should constitute a sort of amphictyonic council of the civilized nations of the world."¹

Despite the fact that the President had not presented a treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent, the senators began debating among themselves, during the third session of the Sixty-fifth Congress, concerning the plausibility of a league of nations.

As asked by William Howard Taft, the former President, to submit

¹Letter of John Sharp Williams to John Hays Hammond, April 29, 1915, Williams Papers, Box 10.
for publication his views on peace, the Mississippian suggested an international council consisting of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Germany, Russia, and Italy, which would control the high seas. Since the first three of these countries actually controlled the seas, Williams believed that their membership in an international council could guarantee its success. The organization's objective, in Williams' view, should be to "cut off from intercourse with the civilized world any nation which confessed itself barbarian by refusing arbitration."  
Any nation going to war without arbitration, then, would be considered "beyond the pale of civilization." Retaliation against such a nation, which had declared war without reference to the international council, would include the cessation of commercial and personal intercourse, blockading that nation's coast line, and allowing that nation to travel upon the high seas only to its own three-mile limit.

Following the World Court Congress in 1915, Williams' next experience with an international organization devoted to the aim of world peace came three years later. Prominent among the group of speakers at the national convention of the League to Enforce Peace held in Philadelphia on May 16-17, 1918, Williams addressed the assembly on "The Only Peace Worth Having." Ruling out a "compromise peace" and an "armistice," he observed that "in the present war a real peace is to be found in a world

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2 Letter of John Sharp Williams to William H. Taft, November 9, 1916, Williams Papers, Box 20.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Win the War for Permanent Peace (New York: League to Enforce Peace, 1918), pp. 173-78.
treaty, promulgated by us, constituting the concert of Europe and America, and accepted by Germany and her vassal states. Williams' criteria for "a peace which is a peace" must "remove, first, present occasions of war; second, the world temptation of world armament which invited war; third, all future recourse to new and barbarous war expedients." In addition to advocating territorial and racial readjustments based on self determination, Williams reiterated his previously stated views on a peace treaty. He further proposed strengthening the force behind the treaty, noting that

The nation attempting to override agreed settlements or to break promises must know that it will put itself "beyond the pale of the law" of the civilized world, and that it will confront, first the nonintercourse of the world in commerce, trade and passenger traffic, as long as it remains outside the pale of the new international law, and second, if that be found not sufficient, must face its armed forces.

Also antedating Williams' participation in the first phase of the Senate debate were his expressions of approval of Wilson's proposals for ending the war and organizing the peace.

On August 1, 1917, Pope Benedict XV sent a communication to the belligerent peoples expressing his desire to see the war end on terms honorable to all concerned. Voicing his objections to the Pope's proposals in a letter to Colonel House, Wilson observed

(1) That no intimation is conveyed that the terms suggested meet the views of any of the belligerents and that to discuss them would be a blind adventure; (2) That such terms constitute no settlement but only a return to the status quo ante and would leave affairs in the same attitude that furnished a pretext for

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6 Ibid., p. 173.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p. 177.
the war; and (3) That the absolute disregard alike of all formal obligations of treaty and all accepted principles of international law which the autocratic regime still dominant in Germany has shown in the whole action of this war has made it impossible for other governments to accept its assurances on anything, least of all on the terms upon which peace will be maintained. 

In a conference on August 17, 1917 with Wilson and Senators Martin, Pomerene, Swanson, Lodge, Knox, and Bradegee, assembled to discuss the Pope's peace note, Williams thought that the Pope should be told "with every diplomatic politeness . . . that it was none of his business." 

Through Secretary of State Lansing, Wilson replied to the Pope on August 27 that

No peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindicative action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did not choose. . . . We seek no material advantage of any kind. 

Although Williams generally approved Wilson's note as "one of the best papers ever offered to the world," the Mississippian noted that the President's reply "went very far against any punitive measures." 

Germany, in the Senator's opinion, should be compelled to pay for damages and atrocities to Belgium.

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10 Ibid., 221.


12 Letter of John Sharp Williams to Woodrow Wilson, August 29, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 1.

13 Ibid.
To the Senator's letter, Wilson replied, "... I am greatly delighted that you thought so well of my answer to the Pope. There seemed to me no other answer and, therefore, this one was comparatively easy to write."\(^{14}\)

Wilson first set his Fourteen Points before Congress as his program for peace on January 8, 1918. In a letter to the President, Williams described the message as the best thing the former had done. To this he added that he was saying a great deal because the President had "done some devilish good things of that sort."\(^{15}\)

On October 14, 1918, the same day that Wilson sent his conditions-of-peace note to the German government, Williams expressed in the Senate his own views as to what the peace proposals should be. He agreed with Senator Reed, who had preceded him on the floor, in that both felt that the armistice must be a dictated one.\(^{16}\) Moreover, Germany must be told that "before we cease firing at you, you must drop your arms, drop them where you are."\(^{17}\) Williams further outlined eight proposals: (1) the German government must guarantee that the armistice negotiation period will not be used for reorganizing its army; (2) the Allies must be put in possession of Essen, Mannheim, the steel and iron works in Westphalia, and other strategic points that will prevent secret reorganization of the army during the peace negotiations; (3) before an armistice can begin, German armies must withdraw from Serbia, the

\(^{14}\)Baker, Woodrow Wilson, p. 245.

\(^{15}\)Letter of John Sharp Williams to Woodrow Wilson, January 9, 1918, Williams Papers, Box 2.

\(^{16}\)U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 11217.

\(^{17}\)Ibid., 11218.
territory of the Czecho-Slovaks, Bosnia, and Herzegovina; (4) there must be a plebiscite of the German people to insure their support of a peace treaty; (5) a commission should be organized to discover all stolen property and send it back; (6) it should be declared in the treaty that no indebtedness made by Germany or Austria in prosecuting the war should ever be paid in order to discourage future investment in aggressive wars; (7) Germany would pay a reparation equal to the total of the indebtedness canceled; and (8) seized properties of German and Austrian citizens and their ships should be sold and the families of people who died on the Lusitania, Arabic, and Sussex indemnified as well as restoration of Belgium, northern France, and Serbia with the remainder. Finally, Williams expressed confidence in Wilson's ability to organize one piece of machinery, if it might be so called, consisting altogether, nearly, of imponderabilia, and that will be an "Amphictyonic council of the civilized world," a league of nations to secure and enforce the peace of the world, first by commercial pressure, and if that fail then by force itself, just as the municipal law is ultimately enforced by force itself, although in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of a thousand no resistance is made to its execution.\(^{18}\)

The Immediate Occasion

Having adjourned on November 21, 1918, the Sixty-fifth Congress opened its third session on December 2, the same day that Williams returned to Washington from his home at Cedar Grove Plantation.

On December 3, 1918, several events occurred which shaped the course of coming events and, in part, influenced the speaking of John Sharp Williams.

In a letter to Albert Beveridge, dated December 3, Lodge outlined

\(^{18}\)Ibid., 11219.
the position he would take as leader of his party and as primary oppo-
nent of Woodrow Wilson.

I think it would be a mistake to admit that the League would be a good thing, but I think we should make a mistake if we met the proposition with a flat denial. The purpose of the League—that is, the preservation of world peace—we are all anxious to see, but what we oppose is the method. Now the strength of our position is to show up the impossibility of any of the methods proposed and invite them, when they desire our support, to produce their terms. They cannot do it. My own judgment is that the whole thing will break up in conference. There may be some vague declarations of the beauties of peace, but any practical League that involves control of our legislation, of our armies and navies, of the Monroe Doctrine, or an international police, and that sort of thing, then our issue is made up, and we shall win. We can begin by pointing out these dangers, and that I am sure will be done.¹⁹

Republicans were quick to take up the Lodge strategy for defeat of the League. That same day, the day before Wilson sailed for Europe, Senator Sherman of Illinois introduced a concurrent resolution in the Senate declaring the Presidency vacant.²⁰ As soon as Sherman had finished, Senator Knox of Pennsylvania rose and introduced a resolution in which he reiterated United States war aims: "to vindicate the ancient rights of navigation as established under international law and . . . to remove forever the German menace to our peace." Following this observation, the resolution declared: (1) that Wilson should confine himself to the war aims at the Peace Conference; (2) "That for the safeguarding of those aims the first essential is a definite understand-
ing that, the same necessity arising in the future, there shall be the same complete accord and cooperation with our chief cobelligerents for


²⁰U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 21.
the defense of civilization"; and (3) "That any project for any general league of nations or for any sweeping change in the ancient laws of the sea . . . should be postponed for separate consideration not alone by the victorious belligerents, but by all the nations if and when at some future time general conferences on those subjects might be deemed useful."21

Speech of December 3, 1918

Interrupting Sherman several times during his explanation of his resolution, Williams spoke immediately at the conclusion of Sherman's address. The Mississippian, drawing upon his classical education, began his defense of Wilson with a phrase from Horace's Epistle to the Pisos, "Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus." "Mountains are in labor: there is born a ridiculous mouse."22

Thus began the first of five occasions on which John Sharp Williams spoke in the Senate of the United States during the first phase of its debate on ratification of the Versailles Treaty, with its accompanying covenant of the League of Nations. The dates of these five addresses were: December 3, 1918; December 4, 1918; December 6, 1918; January 14, 1919; and February 15, 1919.

Since actual negotiation of the treaty could not begin until after Wilson's arrival in Paris on December 14, the speaking done in the Senate during the first three occasions on which Williams spoke centered around the advisability of Wilson's going to Europe; senators discussed the proposed league of nations only in general terms.

21Ibid., 23.

22Ibid., 28 (From Horace's Epistle to the Pisos).
Sherman's address of December 3 emphasized the cumulative evils which would arise when Wilson left American soil.

How can the President receive ambassadors representing sovereign power when absent from the seat of government, and particularly if he be within an alien sovereignty? Is it possible for him to make civil appointments even from the American ambassador's department in France, or can he order troops on the application of a State to protect it against domestic violence? Can he pardon or reprieve offenders while absent in Europe? Who will dispatch troops if required to enforce the laws of the United States and the orders of courts? The President cannot execute the laws under his oath of office while he is in a foreign country and unable to exercise executive power at the seat of Federal Government.23

To this tirade of questions, along with Sherman's avowal that the absences of previous Presidents from American soil had been brief and had "led to no such complications as the absence of the President at this time might do,"24 Williams replied with a lengthy impromptu address, the thesis of which was that Wilson's attendance at the peace conference is in the best interests of the American people.25 In support of this thesis, Williams contended, first, that Wilson would not lose the sovereign power of the United States while abroad because the President does not personify the sovereignty of the American Republic, but shares the sovereignty with other elected representatives. Arguing analogously, Williams maintained that, just as kings do not lose the sovereignty of their countries when visiting another empire, so the President does not lose his official status when making a trip to

23Ibid., 26.
24Ibid., 27.
25This thesis was not overtly stated in the speech but was clearly the implication of Williams' three major arguments.
another country. He noted that other Presidents including Washington, Roosevelt, and Taft, had left the country without having been antagonized by members of the opposing party. Williams' strongest support for his first contention was that the Constitution does not stipulate that the absence of the President from the territorial limits of the United States constitutes inability or temporary or permanent vacation of the office. The Mississippian further observed that this was not a Constitutional stipulation because the framers of the Constitution had foreseen the necessity of Presidential absences. In the remainder of the speech Williams defended Wilson's choice of going to Paris, arguing, secondly, that presidents are frequently misled and, therefore, need to understand the actual situation at first hand, rather than leaving the work to messengers.

Finally, Williams argued that a league of nations to abolish war would be practicable because any civilized country daring to make war without first submitting its grievances to arbitration could be declared beyond the pale of civilization as "an enemy of mankind." 26

On December 4, 1918, Senator Reed of Missouri, in a lengthy extemporaneous address, warned that a League of Nations would put the United States "into controversies and broils and battles and wars of Europe": a situation "contrary to every tradition of our country." 27 Additionally, Reed argued that such a league would not work because of the continuing prevalence of race hatred and race ambition. Rather than sending "an endless stream of courage and heroism, but still of flesh and blood, across the distant seas to fight in foreign lands

26 Ibid., 29-31.
27 Ibid., 87.
over quarrels between races that do not speak our tongue and whose
delights and wrongs we do not understand," Reed recommended the course of
isolationism, the Fortress America.

It may be wicked, it may be the very acme of brutality, but I
protest that if this great country of ours but knows its mission
it will stay here within its seagirt shores, protect itself,
retain its independence, suffering no diminution of its sover-
eignty by agreements with other powers, making only that character
of agreement I have so often referred to, and that it will seek
to continue as the great guiding influence upon the Western Hemi-
sphere; that we shall bind to us by ties of commerce and of love
those great and virgin countries that lie to our south; that we
shall seek to direct the energies of our people and the energies
of their people to an honest interchange of products; that we
shall make the Monroe doctrine an inviolable doctrine of nations;
and that we shall seek always and at all times, by kindly counsel
and by generous aid, to help to maintain the peace and the happi-
ness of this world.28

Speech of December 4, 1918

Immediately following Reed's declaration of isolationism, John
Williams replied, accusing his adversary of avoiding and evading
the issue which he defined as the idea that all men who dreamt of a
permanent and just peace were fools.29 Reed had raised this issue by
reading a letter from one of his Kansas City constituents who made the
statement: "Fools are running around dreaming foolish dreams, making
much noise, and disturbing sober thought. We shall be induced to sell
our birthright for a mess of pottage if we are not careful."30

Williams contended that just as the pioneers in Missouri and
Mississippi had formed a league of individuals to uphold law and justice
among themselves, so the nations of the world needed such a league.

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28 Ibid., 87-88.
29 Ibid., 88.
30 Ibid., 84.
Stating his point perhaps too simply, the Mississippian said

We are simply going to say that hereafter, by the grace of God and by our own might, conjoined and not disunited, that "any civilized country, or country pretending to be civilized, that dares to make war upon another without either consenting to arbitration when it is offered or offering arbitration upon its own part shall become the common enemy of mankind," and we will deal with it like the early pioneers in Missouri dealt with a horse thief or a murderer, that is all.31

Williams further cautioned that the world must learn that it is wrong to let each man be his own judge and own executioner, otherwise civilization will never be transferred into enlightenment. In an exchange with Reed concerning the Monroe Doctrine, Williams contended that the Doctrine "will cease to be at all, because there will take its place a Monroe Doctrine of the entire world, and a Monroe Doctrine merely confined to the Western Hemisphere will cease to exist."32 Reed then countered that the European countries might be able to control the tribunal, thus overwhelming the might of United States military resources. In making this contention, Reed implied that the United States would be utterly without friends, including Great Britain, an implication for which Williams sharply criticized the Missourian.

Mr. WILLIAMS. He [Reed] could not keep from betraying the fact that back of it all was either a hatred or a fear of Great Britain. He spoke very contemptuously of "the blockade of the North Sea." If it had not been for the blockade of the North Sea, we would have been whipped today; Germany would have been successful.

Mr. REED. The Senator misunderstood me.

Mr. WILLIAMS. No; the Senator said: "From whom do we fear attack, unless it is from Great Britain herself?"

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mr. REED. Let me make the statement. It will take but one second.

31Ibid., 88.

32Ibid., 89.
The thought I sought to express was that there was but one nation in the world that could injure us, and I said that it was unthinkable that she would attempt it; but there was only one that could, and that was Great Britain. That is very different from saying that I feared attack from her.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I understand, yes. The innuendo was there, however.

Mr. REED. Well, all right.\textsuperscript{33}

Williams indicated further that he wanted the English-speaking peoples, because they were peace-loving, to control the seas of the world. Additionally, he desired to see behind each nation's solemn plighted word, "a force which the barbarous people of the world would fear to defy. His opponents had invoked the sacred name of Washington; Williams believed, with Thomas Jefferson,

not in the perfection of humanity but in its "indefinite perfectability." You may tell me this, that, or the other desirable thing can not be done because of human nature, but my answer is that all you have got to do is to change your own human nature and use your own influence to change other people's human nature until there shall be a revolution in human nature that will suit new conditions.\textsuperscript{34}

In the conclusion of this address, however, he recognized the necessity of armed force, even to change human nature. "Put force behind your league or your alliance or your agreement or whatever you call it. Put behind it also the willingness that when fair arbitra-
tors decide against the other fellow you are going to make him submit."\textsuperscript{35}

On December 6, Senator Borah of Idaho vigorously attacked the idea of a league of nations.

Mr. President, let us be perfectly candid with the people of this country and tell them what this scheme of a league to enforce peace means. It means the creation of a superinter-
national court and turning the Army over to their direction

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, 90.

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}
if it has any virility. It means the abandonment of Washington's Farewell Address. It means the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. It means that we will enter into entangling alliances with Europe. I am not in favor of it. I am not in favor of any league of nations which infringes in the least upon the sovereign power of the people of the United States to direct and control the destiny of this Nation.36

Speech of December 6, 1918

In beginning his rebuttal of Borah's speech, Williams restated the Idahoan's contention. "The whole sum and substance reduced to its last analysis of all the Senator said most eloquently is that he contends we have a right to be the judge in our own quarrels ourselves. That is all."37 Following this, Williams states his own thesis, the exact opposite of what Borah's had been. "I do not believe that any individual or any nation has a right to say: 'I shall be the sole judge in my own quarrel; I shall try the case; I shall give judgment; and I shall execute the judgment.'"38

In support of this thesis, Williams noted that there are two ways of keeping peace in the world: by a league of civilized nations or by the domination of one great power, the latter of which Prussia and Germany had just attempted. These two alternatives formed the framework upon which Williams developed the remainder of his address. The rejection of the League of Nations by the United States and the subsequent fruition of the second alternative, the Mississippian continued, "must result in the carrying out of the German idea by somebody else and

36Ibid., 196.
37Ibid., 197.
38Ibid.
impartial arbitrament, and as between nations there ought to be the same thing.\footnote{41}

Williams concluded his reply to Borah of December 6 with the observation that a league of nations, far from being merely idealistic, would be the "highest form of practicalness." The Mississippian likened a league of nations unto a federal league of states--the United States. "If there is any pattern for a league of nations in the world today, it is the American Republic, this Union of indestructible States, still remaining States, but giving up a certain degree of independence in order to accomplish a grander result."\footnote{42}

The world's attention during the next few weeks was focused not upon the United States Senate, but upon Woodrow Wilson, welcomed in Europe with receptions, popular ovations, conferences with leading international figures, and projected by the press into a Messiah of Peace.

Republican Senators, probably resentful that the President had proceeded to Paris without taking any Republicans or even any Senators of either party with him, were becoming more active in their campaign of opposition to the President's scheme. On December 18, during the peak of Europe's enthusiastic reception of Wilson, Senator Knox elaborated on his resolution of December 3 which had urged postponement of consideration of a league of nations until after peace had been made separately. The former Secretary of State proposed, instead of a league

\footnote{41}{Ibid., 199.}

\footnote{42}{Ibid.}
of nations, an understanding for "concerted action" by the United States and European powers, when their mutual interests were menaced.43

Following a conference with Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge on December 21 warned that the Senate might exercise its prerogative of rejecting or altering treaties if "extraneous provisions wholly needless for a peace with Germany" were unwisely added to the document to be prepared at Versailles. Such provisions, the Sage of Nahant added, "would surely be stricken out or amended, no matter how many signatures might be appended to the treaty."44

Replies to Lodge and Knox came on January 2 and 3 from the democratic Whip, Senator James Hamilton Lewis of Illinois,45 and on January 7 from Senator Porter J. McCumber, Republican of North Dakota.46

On January 14, motivated by the announcement of the League to Enforce Peace of its series of regional congresses to gain popular support,47 William E. Borah delivered his second address of the session. Dismissing Wilson's suggestion of a league of nations as an organization of the "moral forces" of the world which "we shall watch with interest . . .," the Lion of Idaho specifically attacked the proposal of the League to Enforce Peace. Avoiding direct attack upon Wilson or upon any Democratic senator, Borah admonished that the adoption of a

43Ibid., 603-609.
44Ibid., 724.
46Ibid., Part 2, 1083-1088.
league of nations to enforce peace would mean the installation of peace-
time conscription, the maintenance of a large navy, the imposition of
high taxes, the sending of troops abroad, and the renunciation of the
policies of Washington and of Monroe. Borah further implied that,
while Wilson was recommending a league based on moral force, his admin-
istration was making preparations for a league based on armed force.
The adoption of such a scheme, Borah prophesied, would signify the end
of Americanism.

Instead of our own Government, controlled and directed by the
intelligence and patriotism of our own people, instead of
American standards and American principles, instead of devotion
to our institutions and to our own flag, we are to have an inter-
national superstate resting upon Prussian force, with a vast army
of repression, a superstate in which the national spirit stands
rebuked and the international flag is the sole symbol of our
hopes.48

Speech of January 14, 1919

Replying to Borah with equal conviction, John Sharp Williams
immediately delivered his shortest speech of this phase of the debate.
Senator Charles S. Thomas of Colorado having yielded the floor, Williams
proceeded to read into the Record two poems written by Katrina Trask
shortly after her sons had been reported to be dead in the action of
the war. The Mississippian interjected that "this was written by a
woman whose boys were dead, not written by me or any other man who was
in the safest bomb-proof position on the surface of the earth, to wit,
the floor of the Senate of the United States."49 The poem closed with
the lines:

48U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 1387.
49Ibid., 1388.
This potent league of nations will need no gun nor sword,
Its order is the law of the Everliving Lord--
"The Everliving Lord," who still exists, I do not care
what you say about it--

The law of harmony, all brutal war shall cease--
Its corner stone is justice, its translucent walls are peace.
Rise, citizens! Arise from the weary, blood-drenched sod,
Proclaim the league of nations--sealed with the seal of God!

"Translucent walls!" Anybody not a fool can see through
them. They are translucent--God is behind them. Ultimately
you must see Him, whether you will or not.
"With the seal of God," and thank God, not with the seal
of the Senate of the United States, unless the Senate shall
hereafter indicate a sufficient degree of common sense to
affix its seal, which I doubt.\textsuperscript{50}

Immediately following this, Senator Borah caustically replied,
"Mr. President, may I thank the Senator from Colorado for yielding to
the Senator from Mississippi that we might be regaled by that profound
discussion of the league of nations?"\textsuperscript{51}

Despite the brevity of Williams' reply, Fleming argues that few
senators would have undertaken to reply spontaneously to so effective
an expression of hatred of the league idea as that of Borah's. Fleming
further evaluates the exchange between Borah and Williams.

No better demonstration of the variety of men's minds need be
asked. Two of the keenest and most independent minds in the
Senate look at the same proposal: one saw in it only degrada-
tion to his beloved country and danger to human liberty every-
where; the other saw only the hand of God himself pointing
inexorably to a safer and happier world in which there would
be greater freedom and less sorrow for all peoples.\textsuperscript{52}

The speech of January 14, 1919, concluded Williams' speaking

\textsuperscript{50}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52}Fleming, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 96.
in the first phase of the debate, when the idea of a league of nations had been only generally proposed by its proponents.

After speechmaking in Europe, Wilson succeeded on January 25 in persuading the delegates to the Peace Conference to adopt a resolution declaring that the League of Nations would be an integral part of the treaty. On February 14 the first draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations was completed, and the following day, as Wilson presented the draft to the Conference, it was published in American newspapers.

The debate would now proceed into its second phase, with unofficial copies of the Covenant in the hands of the senators and Wilson sailing home to exert as much persuasion as possible for its favorable reception.

The Audience

Members of the United States Senate are concerned with influencing the behavior of three audiences. First, they are concerned with their colleagues in the Senate, upon whom rests the ultimate responsibility for success or failure of treaties submitted by the President. Secondly, they are concerned, in varying degrees, with influencing their home constituents—the American public. The third and least important group with whom senators are concerned are those who sit in the Senate galleries. An analysis of the three audiences John Sharp Williams faced, then, includes the Senate, the public, and the galleries.

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The Senate

Still a reality during the "lame duck" session of Congress which convened December 2, Democratic control of the Senate, lost technically in the November elections, would not give way officially to a shaky Republican majority of two until March, 1919. In addition to the natural partisan division of opinion on the league issue, Democrats Reed, Poindexter, Watson, and Penrose had denounced, while Republicans Walsh of Montana, Owen, and Phelan had defended a league in the session prior to the "lame duck," thus affording John Sharp Williams basis for immediate audience analysis.55 To these indications were added resolutions by Cummins,56 Knox,57 Sherman,58 Frelinghuysen,59 and Borah,60 and speeches of Kellogg,61 and Sherman to indicate further Republican disapproval of a league. Further criticism of the league idea came from influential Republican leaders, Henry Cabot Lodge and Philander Knox and

55 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 11561-11567; 11622-11626.
56 Ibid., 3d Session., 1918, LVII, Part 1, 3.
57 Ibid., 23.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 69.
60 Ibid., 71, 124.
61 Ibid., 73-77.
62 Ibid., 26-27.
63 Ibid., 603-609.
64 Ibid., 723-728.
Democrats, Smith of Georgia, Thomas, and Myers.

Republican support of the league, on the other hand, came in many public speeches from former President Taft, from the outright defection of Senator McCumber of North Dakota, and from the refusal of some Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee to report the Knox resolution recommending peace negotiations separate from creation of a league of nations.

The Public

Modern techniques of polling public opinion were unknown at this time. Albig reports that public opinion polls prior to 1935 were usually not systematic and were unrepresentative in their methods of

65 Ibid., 859.
66 Ibid., 994-999.
67 Ibid., 1318-1331.

sampling.70 One of the hazards of "straw-polling," as it was conducted by newspapers during this period, was that ballots printed in the newspapers could be clipped and returned by readers who chose to do so. Ardent partisans, therefore, might mail in large numbers of ballots to make a good showing for their side. Slightly less hazardous were the street interviews of passers-by and the house-to-house polling conducted by some newspapers.71 The more scientific methods of representative polling began in 1935 with the formation by Dr. George Gallup of the American Institute of Public Opinion.72 Other polling organizations, the Fortune Quarterly survey, the Crossley and the Roper organizations began operations in the mid 1930's.73

In order to determine the climate of public opinion after 1917, however, the senators were forced to rely primarily upon the reports of pressure groups and newspapers. A large segment of the public probably remained inarticulate because of the inadequacy of the "straw polls." Prior to 1917, virtually no dissent was recorded in the United States to the idea of an organization of nations designed to preserve peace and to replace the old balance of power concept which had repeatedly led to war.74

This section considers, first, the groups, individuals, and publications which favored the League of Nations idea during this phase of the debate.

71 Ibid., p. 179.
72 Ibid., p. 181.
73 Ibid., pp. 182-185.
74 Fleming, op. cit., p. 12.
Groups favoring the League

Most significant among the pro-league pressure groups was the League to Enforce Peace.

League to Enforce Peace. In order to influence the Senate to ratify a peace treaty including a league of nations, the executive committee of the League to Enforce Peace decided in January of 1919 to hold regional, state, and local conventions, to initiate a campaign of newspaper advertisements, and to enlarge the operations of its speakers bureau. To supervise this program an Emergency Campaign Committee was created.\(^75\)

During February, 1919, under the direction of the Emergency Campaign Committee, nine regional congresses, designed to arouse public opinion, were held in New York, Boston, Chicago, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, St. Louis, Atlanta, and Portland, Oregon. The same group of speakers attended all the congresses which were held from February 5 to March 1.\(^76\) Traveling 8,000 miles and addressing 175 audiences attended by 300,000 people, the party of speakers included William H. Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, Frank P. Walsh, Henry Van Dyke, \(\ldots\)

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\(^76\) The Atlantic Congress at New York City, February 5; the New England Congress at Boston, February 6 and 7; the Great Lakes Congress at Chicago, February 10 and 11; the Northern Congress at Minneapolis, February 12 and 13; the Northwestern Congress at Portland, Oregon, February 16 and 17; the Pacific Coast Congress at San Francisco, February 19 and 20; the Mountain Congress at Salt Lake City, February 21 and 22; the Mid-Continent Congress at St. Louis, February 25 and 26; and the Southern Congress, at Atlanta, Georgia, February 28 and March 1. "A Peripatetic Pilgrimage," *The Outlook*, XXI (February 19, 1919), 298-299.
Henry Morgenthau, George Grafton Wilson, James W. Gerard, Herbert S. Houston, and Edward A. Filene.

Bartlett indicates that the congresses were highly successful in creating public interest and in raising funds. Each congress recorded its support of a league of nations by passing resolutions, copies of which were sent to Wilson and senators from states within the congress' region.

Three typical resolutions from the various congresses were:

Resolved: That in the formation of a League of Nations with adequate economic and military sanctions to guarantee the peace we see the triumph of American ideals, the realization of American hopes and aspirations, the next step forward in human progress, the beginning of a new era in material, moral, industrial and political well-being for ourselves and for all mankind.

We pledge our unrestricted support to the President of the United States in his advocacy of a League of Free Nations for the purpose of securing and maintaining enduring peace.

We are convinced that the public opinion of the United States is in favor of a League of Nations to maintain the peace of the world . . .

Such were the activities of this most powerful pro-league pressure group during the first phase of the controversy in the Senate.

Other Groups

On November 16, 1918, the Executive Committee of the Associated

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77 Bartlett, op. cit., p. 114.


79 Adopted by the Great Lakes Congress, Chicago, February 10, 1919. Ibid.

80 Adopted by the Atlantic Congress, New York, February 6, 1919. Ibid.
Advertising Clubs of the World sent a telegram to President Wilson promising its support of the League. After reviewing the President's proposed league, the telegram declared that "this League of Nations would be an essential agency of plan and progress in the era of reconstruction on which this world is entering."\(^{81}\)

The League of Free Nations Association, whose object was "to promote a more general realization and support by the public of the conditions indispensable to the success, at the Peace Conference and thereafter, of American aims and policy as outlined by President Wilson," issued its statement of principles, along with the signatures of 100 distinguished men and women on November 26, 1918.\(^{82}\)

Pope Benedict XV reaffirmed the support of the Catholic Church of the League in his New Year's message to America, issued December 31, 1918. In his message, the Pope expressed the hope that the Peace Conference might result in a new world order, with a League of Nations, the abolition of conscription, and the establishment of tribunals to adjust international disputes.\(^{83}\)

Also on December 31, the faculty of Clark College, of Worcester, Massachusetts, announced its unanimous endorsement of the plan for a League. President Edmund C. Stanford, along with his twenty-two faculty members, were among the first of such groups to officially endorse the League.\(^{84}\)

\(^{81}\) *New York Times*, November 17, 1918, p. 8.


\(^{84}\) *Ibid.*, January 1, 1919, p. 3.
"American business records itself unqualifiedly in favor of such international association as you have been advocating . . .," reported the United States Chamber of Commerce, with reference to its referendum taken in December, 1915, polling the national membership of the Chamber. A subsequent report, issued on February 4, 1919, noted that "... it is reasonable to assume that a vote taken today would in the light of larger experience and deeper thought upon this subject, be productive of even larger majorities."85

The last of the organizations to endorse the League idea during this period was the Organization Committee of the American Labor Party of New York City. On February 27, the Committee adopted a resolution in support of the League and recommended that the Central Federated Union of New York, the Brooklyn Central Labor Union, and the Women's Trade Union League take up the matter at their next regular meeting. In addition to endorsing the League, however, the Committee resolution expressed the "confident hope that the plan now being considered will be extended to include real self-determination in Ireland as well as in all other disrupted territories. . . ."86

Individuals Favoring the League

Among the individuals outside the government who favored the League were such prominent figures as William H. Taft; A. Lawrence Lowell, President of Harvard; Frank P. Walsh, former Chairman of the War Labor Board; and Oscar Straus, former ambassador to Turkey.

A surprising development occurred during the mass meeting at

86Ibid., February 28, 1919, p. 2.
Carnegie Hall on the evening of January 10. Among the speakers was Oscar Straus, who revealed the "innermost conviction" which former President Theodore Roosevelt had expressed to him on December 23, when Straus visited the hospitalized Roosevelt. According to Straus, the Rough Rider, who had previously opposed the League, had revealed a belief in the necessity of a league.87

Publications in the United States were generally favorably disposed toward the idea of a league during this period. The committee on information of the League to Enforce Peace reported that during the six weeks prior to September 8, 1917, 149 of 152 newspaper editorial comments were favorable to the principles of the League.88 Fleming indicates that this preponderance of sentiment for the league among newspapers continued through 1918.89

On December 11, 1918, the New York Times editorially observed that public opinion favoring the League is "rapidly becoming universal."90 "It is only by the force of public opinion," continued the Times, "that the League of Nations project can be carried to international enactment, and that in response to that force it will be enacted is more than an inference, it is a practical certainty, because of the horror of war engendered by the bloody strife ended by the armistice signed a month ago today."91

87Ibid., January 11, 1919, p. 2.
88Bartlett, op. cit., p. 89.
89Fleming, op. cit., p. 165.
91Ibid.
The *Times* again prophesied virtual unanimity of favorable public opinion in its editorial of December 23.

It is . . . inconceivable that men of right mind and good conscience are going to oppose a League of Nations. Differences as to the constitution of the League, as to its powers, the opportune time for its creation, there may be, but never in the history of the world were there so many men to whom conviction has been brought that the nations must league together to destroy the plague of war and make peace lasting.92

In John Sharp Williams' home state of Mississippi, newspapers of this period seemed much more concerned with local and regional affairs than with international events. Both major newspapers in Jackson, however, declared themselves in favor of the League during this period.93 Enjoying a high degree of independence from the whims of his home-state constituents as well as their virtually blind admiration and pride in having sent to Washington the last of the genteel planter-statesmen, Williams was probably more concerned with public opinion on a national scale than with the views of provincial Mississippians.

Finally, Fleming's sampling of newspaper editorial opinion throughout the country during this first phase of the debate substantiates his view that such expressions of sentiment were overwhelmingly in the League's favor.94

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Opposition to the League

Not all reports of public opinion agreed with the generalization that there was a great ground swell of pro-league sentiment. This section considers the groups, individuals and publications which opposed the League of Nations idea during this phase of the debate. As early as January, 1917, the New Republic reported gathering opposition to the league principles generally, and particularly to the League to Enforce Peace.

As we have indicated, the opposition springs from many diverse sources. It derives from pacifists who repudiate use of force even in the interests of international order, from militarists who refuse to seek peace even by means of possible coercion, and lawyers who resent any attempt to find a basis for international law except abstract right, recognized precedent and the voluntary consent of free and absolute sovereigns.95

Of the three groups, the editorial indicated that the first and last were to be feared, while public revulsion toward war would render the second group powerless.96 By December, 1918, the Wichita Eagle reported that, although there had been no opposition lately to the President's peace program, there was now much "working assiduously behind the scenes against the President's plans."97

Arguments voiced against the League declared that Washington had warned against it; it would be a departure from the Monroe Doctrine, would involve the United States in entangling alliances, would place it in a subordinate position in a foreign organization, would send its sons to die on foreign battle fields fighting for things in which the


96Ibid.

97Cited in Literary Digest, LIX (December 7, 1918), 21.
United States had no interest, and would open the United States' gates to hordes of oriental laborers.98

Among the groups opposed to the League were the disenchanted liberals, who had become increasingly concerned over Wilson's involvement of the United States in the war. Having generously supported both the foreign and domestic policies of the Wilson administration, many liberals believed that their leader's peace proposals were designed to perpetuate the evils of the old order rather than to promote democratic war aims.99 Adler observes that the growing liberal unrest was a definite factor in the formation of an anti-Wilson coalition. "The group expected too much from the peace. If disappointed, they were ready to give up hope of reforming Europe and to return to their older task of cleaning house at home."100 Wilson's opponents rejoiced that even his own former supporters now rejected his proposals.

Less significant but quite active groups with small membership, the hundred percenters carried the nationalistic dogma to a point where they began to talk like home-grown fascists. A magazine entitled America First wanted to bring patriotism to homes and schools. Senator Borah thought the name "perfectly captivating." The True American Publishing Company dedicated itself to fighting the atheists who kept the name of God out of the Treaty of Versailles. The league of Loyal Americans...

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100 Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction. (New York: Abelard-Schuman, Ltd., 1957), p. 51. This topic is treated extensively in the chapter "The Liberal Defection."
promised to fight for "one Tongue, One Ideal and One Flag."
The biographer, Louis A. Coolidge of Boston, headed the Sentinels of the Republic, while an American Flag movement aimed to put the national colors in each home in the land. Springing up indigenously all over the country, these organizations represented the stirrings of a revived nationalism. Whatever their immediate purpose or pet phobia, they all shared one thing in common: they look back at an earlier America that had been shielded from the world and they demanded an end to European entanglements.  

One of the most prominent of individuals opposed to the League, who made known his opposition during this phase of the debate, was William Randolph Hearst. At the Carnegie Hall pro-league mass meeting of January 10, 1919, Norman Hapgood explained that Hearst was unable "to understand the power of the soft answer, the only instrument of progress which he could use was the axe."  

Hard-pressed to find newspapers which publicly had announced their opposition to the idea of a league during this phase of the debate, Fleming cites, as League opponents, the Providence Journal, the New York Sun, and, from deep in the home territory of Henry Cabot Lodge, the Lowell Courier-Citizen.  

The Galleries

The third audience, with whom Williams would be only nominally concerned during this phase of the debate, was that group sitting in the galleries. A rule of the Senate prohibits any overt manifestations of audience reaction from the galleries, such as laughter, applause, or booing the speaker. On two occasions during the speeches of December 3, 

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101 Ibid., p. 116.
103 Fleming, op. cit., p. 167.
1918, the Vice-President, presiding officer of the Senate, warned the occupants of the galleries that he would clear the galleries if they did not obey the rules of the Senate. The instance of this invocation of the rules followed a joke by Senator Sherman as he was replying to Williams. Sherman was expressing mock fear that the innocent Wilson would be tempted into compromise by the decadent old Europeans.  

Also on December 3, during Williams' speech, the Mississippian was interrupted by Senator Sherman who noted that, since Wilson had previously instructed delegates to negotiate treaties for him, he should do so on this occasion. Williams replied that Wilson, thus far, had not had any delegates in Europe to instruct, and added, "and by the way, he had not instructed the Senator from Illinois, and if he had and the Senator had obeyed his instructions, he would have been much wiser."

To the ensuing laughter and applause in the galleries, the Vice-President retorted:

Just a moment. This is the last warning of the Chair to the galleries. They must stop their manifestations. The Chair instructs the sergeants at arms at the doors that if applause or any other manifestation occurs in the galleries the galleries must be cleared.  

The occupants of the galleries thus displayed their awareness of John Sharp Williams' presence. During the first covenant debate, however, the galleries would be packed with Irish-Americans interested in securing self-determination for Ireland and seeking to bring pressure to bear, especially upon recalcitrant senators such as Williams.

Of his Senatorial audience Williams knew that opinion was divided

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105 Ibid., 29.
roughly along party lines during the pre-covenant debate. With defec-
tions on both sides, however, Williams could expect forty-three senators
to favor the league while fifty-three would probably oppose it.

The American public, on the other hand, was strongly in favor
of the league during the pre-covenant debate. Groups which indicated
their approval included the League to Enforce Peace, the Associated
Advertising Clubs of the World, the League of Free Nations Association,
the Roman Catholic Church, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and
the Organization Committee of the American Labor Party of New York City.

William Howard Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, Frank P. Walsh, Oscar
Strauss, and Theodore Roosevelt were among the prominent individuals
who declared themselves for the league.

Publications in the United States were almost unanimous in
their support of the league during the pre-covenant debate.

Among the few opponents of the league, however, were the dis-
enchanted liberals, who, expecting too much from the peace settlement,
wanted Wilson to resume his programs of domestic reforms. Small but
active groups of "hundred percenters" agitated for "America first,"
the nationalistic ideal of an America shielded from the world. William
Randolph Hearst and a few newspapers also opposed the league.

Finally, the occupants of the Senate galleries who listened to
Williams during the pre-covenant debates expressed on one occasion
their approval of his proposals by laughing at and applauding his joke.

Williams' task, then, was to influence, so far as possible, the
votes of twenty-one senators. Sixty-four votes in the Senate would be
required to ratify the Treaty. Williams could only count on the votes
of forty-three of his colleagues.
The Representative Speech

December 3, 1918

The remainder of this chapter is concerned with a detailed analysis and evaluation of John Sharp Williams' address of December 3, 1918. It has been chosen as the representative address of this phase of the debate because it includes both a defense of Wilson's personal participation in the Peace Conference and a defense of the idea of a league of nations.

In addition to analysis and evaluation of the speakers' organization, the representative speech is studied in terms of the speakers' invention. Invention includes the threefold division of logical, emotional, and ethical proof. The first of these is concerned with the speaker's argumentative development. Emotional proof refers to the means Williams used for stimulating emotional responses within his listeners, and ethical proof concerns Williams' methods of implementing his audience's impression of the speaker as a man of integrity, intelligence, and good will. An examination of the speaker's style, or word choice and arrangement of words, is the third aspect of the representative speech, and, finally, the effectiveness of the speech is measured in terms of the immediate surface response to it, its readability, its technical perfection, Williams' capacity for judging trends of the future, the delayed response to the speech, and its long-range effects upon the social group.106

106 Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., pp. 455-459.
Organization

Basic to an understanding of the speech is a general outline and analysis of its structure.

Outline of the Speech:

Introduction

I. Ridicule of Senator Sherman's tirade against Wilson: parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.

Body

Implied thesis: (President Wilson's attendance at the peace conference is in the best interest of the American people, for)

I. Wilson will not lose the sovereign power of the United States while he is abroad, for

A. The President does not personify the sovereignty of the American Republic.

B. Kings do not lose the sovereignty of their countries when visiting another empire.

C. Other presidents have left the country without being antagonized by members of the opposing party. (digression)

D. The Constitution does not stipulate that absence of the President from the territorial limits of the United States constitutes inability or temporary or permanent vacation of the office.

E. Short absences have never deprived kings, emperors, or presidents of their official functions. (repetition)

F. This speech does not sound like Senator Sherman. (digression)

G. The great men produced by this war cannot be torn down from the pedestal on which humanity has placed them. (digression)
II. Wilson may be as ignorant of foreign affairs as Sherman assumes him to be, for
A. A President is frequently misled without first-hand information.
B. Criticism of the President's participation in the peace conference has been a partisan matter. (digression)

III. A league of nations is practicable, for
A. The allied nations alone, rather than the whole civilized world, can agree to a treaty of peace.
B. The threat of force will prevent any country from going beyond the pale of civilization.
C. The two English-speaking races by themselves can bring about world peace for 100 years.
D. Wilson must go to Versailles. (digression)

Conclusion
I. Republicans are making a mistake in criticizing Wilson.

Analysis of the Organization
In addition to a general outline of the speech, an analysis of the organization in terms of its craftsmanship and in terms of its adjustment to the audience is appropriate. Craftsmanship may be evaluated in terms of the traditional scheme, basically the Aristotelian plan which includes the introduction, the statement, the proof, and the peroration.\(^{107}\) Conformity of the speech to this traditional plan of organization probably contributes to the effectiveness of the speaker in accomplishing his purpose. Thonssen and Baird point out that "most

\(^{107}\text{Ibid., p. 398.} \)
speeches will doubtless follow the traditional scheme, for experience has fixed it as fundamentally good."^{108}

Thonssen and Baird observe, however, that a speech conforming to the principles of good organization may be ill-adapted to the specific audience for which it is intended. In other words, the so-called natural or logical structure may not coincide with the most effective sequence of presentation. It may be necessary to alter the natural order sharply to accommodate the speech to certain people.^{109}

Gray and Braden elaborate upon plans of organization other than the traditional plan, which they classify as "deductive order," because the speaker's thesis is stated at the outset of the speech.^{110} According to Gray and Braden, other plans of organization include the problem-solution arrangement, inductive order, and implicative order.^{111} The problem-solution pattern is essentially inductive, since it concludes with an "action step," or statement of the course of action the speaker would like his audience to follow. Inductive order differs from deductive order in that the thesis is stated last in the speech. Implicative order is defined as leading up to the proposition indirectly, or making the development of the speech "so pointed that the audience frames the proposition without being told specifically what it is."^{112}

The speaker's selection of an organizational plan should be

108 Ibid., p. 402.
109 Ibid., p. 401.
110 The thesis is called the "statement" in the traditional plan of organization.
112 Ibid., p. 364.
consistent with his analysis of his audience. With a hostile audience, the speaker may more effectively accomplish his purpose by advancing from the least controversial points toward the points of greatest disagreement. In short, he may wish to build a solid foundation before he risks a direct statement of his proposition.\textsuperscript{113} In some cases he may not wish to risk stating his proposition at all. If the audience is largely hostile the speaker may present the proposition by implication.\textsuperscript{114}

Craftsmanship. Thematic emergence, method of division and arrangement, and rhetorical order in disposition are the concerns of an evaluation of the craftsmanship of the speaker's organization.

1. \textit{Thematic emergence}. Williams did not directly state his thesis that Wilson's attendance at the peace conference was in the best interests of the American people. Rather, the three main arguments advanced in the speech, that Wilson will not lose the sovereignty while abroad; that Wilson may be ignorant of foreign affairs, and that a league of nations would be practicable, developed the thesis by implication. By asking in his closing remarks how the attacks upon Wilson and upon the league would help the American Republic and American influence in Europe, Williams implied that Wilson's presence at Versailles, unencumbered by the attacks of political opponents, would be beneficial to the American Republic and to American interests.\textsuperscript{115}

2. \textit{Method of division and arrangement}. In this, as in all of Williams' speeches in the league debate, the basis of division and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113}Ibid., p. 363.
\item \textsuperscript{114}Ibid., p. 364.
\item \textsuperscript{115}U. S. \textit{Congressional Record}, op. cit., 29.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
arrangement of the material was logical in order. Of the types of logical order described by Thonssen and Baird, Williams' address of December 3, 1918 may best be characterized as refutative in nature. In his opening remarks Williams indicated that his speech would be refutative.

Amongst the complex concatenations of endless adjectives to which we have just listened I have failed to find any argument of any description. I find, upon the contrary, that the contention of the Senator from Illinois violates the precedents of Presidents who have reigned if not ruled in this country hitherto, or, to use a true American term, have presided in this country hitherto. Williams made no attempt at a point-by-point refutation of Sherman's speech, since he said, as he said, failed to find any argument. Nevertheless, Williams' address was a counter-attack in defence of Wilson and in defense of the league, both of which had been attacked by Sherman.

3. **Rhetorical order in disposition.** Williams introduced his lengthy remarks with a distinctly partisan view that Sherman had made much ado about nothing in his accusations that Wilson had surrendered the sovereignty of the United States. Rather than attempting to render his opponents favorably disposed toward him, Williams probably antagonized them with the Latin phrase, "Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculous mus," or "Mountains are in labor: There is born a ridiculous mouse," from Horace's *Epistle to the Pisos*. Sherman himself responded briefly to one of Williams' early barbs. Laughter and applause in the galleries followed one of Williams' comments, and the Vice-President threatened to clear the galleries as a result. These responses indicate

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117 U. S. *Congressional Record, op. cit.*, 29.
that Williams' introductory remarks at least enlisted the attention and interest of the audience present. In observing in his introduction that Sherman had violated the precedents of other Presidents, Williams prepared the way for the development of his first idea, that Wilson would not lose the sovereignty of his office by attending the peace conference.

Williams did not preview his main points, nor did he include a statement of his thesis at any point in the speech. The body of the speech consisted of an elaboration of the three main arguments, although Williams digressed in developing each of the arguments. His conclusion consisted of a series of rhetorical questions.

I want to leave you this thought: How is all this going to hurt him? How is it going to help you? How is it going to help your posterity? How is it going to help the American Republic? How is it going to help American influence in Europe? How is it going to accomplish any good end of any description for the purpose of civilization or democracy or humanity? 118

By scolding his listeners in his concluding remarks, Williams probably failed to inspire them with a favorable opinion of himself. He recalled, however, that the nation's interests were at stake and that he believed these interests to be more important than any of the partisan opposition that had been expressed toward Wilson and toward the league.

Analysis of the Organization in Terms of Audience Adjustment

By December 3, all senators had not made public their views on the league or on Wilson's plans to attend the peace conference. In addition to the normal partisan division of fifty Republicans and forty-six Democrats, however, Reed, Poindexter, Watson, and Penrose had

118 Ibid., 31.
have been more consistent with the speaker's purpose. In view of this inconsistency it seems likely that Williams did not deliberately plan the sequence of organization at all.

In addition to the inconsistency of the organization with the nature of the content, a second criticism of Williams' organization with respect to his audience adjustment may be raised. The speaker made no attempt at logical consistency in the arrangement of his materials. Of the seven arguments which should have supported the first main argument, that Wilson would not lose the sovereign power while abroad, the fifth, that short absences had never deprived the sovereignty of kings, was a repetition of the second, the sixth, that the speech did not sound like Sherman, a digression designed to discredit Senator Sherman, and the seventh, that great men of the war cannot be torn down, a further digression designed to compliment Wilson. Of the two subsidiary arguments supporting the second main argument, the second, that criticism of Wilson had been partisan, was a digression aimed at leveling the charge of partisanism at Wilson's opponents. Finally, of the four arguments in support of Williams' contention that a league of nations was practicable, the fourth, that Wilson must go to Versailles, was a digression.

A third criticism of Williams' organization of his address of December 3 is that, since it is impossible to be certain of the speaker's organization in reading the text of the speech in the Congressional Record, it must have been a hopeless task to comprehend the arrangement of the material simply by listening to it. Williams gave no clues whatsoever as to the order of his presentation. Rather, he seemed intent upon disorder. Williams' lack of clear organization made difficult not
only listener comprehension but retention of the material as well. Fortunately, those who were interested could read the Senator's remarks in the Congressional Record.

Summary of the Organization.

In his speech before the Senate of December 3, 1919, Williams advanced by implication the thesis that President Wilson's attendance at the peace conference was in the best interests of the American people. In support of the thesis, Williams argued that Wilson would not lose the President's sovereignty while abroad, that it was desirable for Wilson to negotiate in person at the peace conference, and that a league of nations was practicable. The speech was arranged in refutative order, although the refutation was general in nature rather than specifically point-by-point.

Williams ridiculed his most important listeners, his opponents, in introducing his speech. After preparing the way in his introductory remarks for his first argument, he developed the three contentions, digressing somewhat in each. Finally, he concluded by again scolding his opponents while reminding them of the importance of national interests as opposed to partisan politics.

Williams failed to adjust effectively to his listeners. His implicative organization was inconsistent with the abrupt chastisement of the speech. Several logical inconsistencies are obvious in the arrangement of the material, and the speech is so long, involved, and so lacking in any of the organizational devices which implement the listeners' comprehension and retention, that the speech must be deemed organizationally incomprehensible.
Invention: Argumentative Development

Thonssen and Baird note that:

. . . the ideas which live within the memories of succeeding generations, and the ideas whose integrity is tested and appraised more often in later history are the ones which deliberative speakers have developed in addresses on the burning issues of their time. 119

This description is appropriate to the ideas Williams developed in his addresses before the Senate on the League of Nations. In his address of December 3, 1918, Williams responded principally to the remarks of Senator Sherman of Illinois, who had questioned the wisdom of the President's personally attending the peace conference at Paris.

This section tests not only the severity and strictness of the argumentative development of the speech but evaluates the logical credibility of Williams' arguments in terms of adjustment to his listeners.

Argumentative Development of the Thesis

In support of the thesis that Wilson's attendance at the peace conference would be in the best interests of the American people, Williams argued that the President would not lose the sovereignty of the republic while abroad, that Wilson's critics could have been right in their contention that the President was ignorant of foreign affairs, and that a league of nations was practicable.

The logical validity of each of the major arguments may be tested by recasting them into syllogistic form. As a hypothetical syllogism, the first argument may be stated as follows:

119 Ibid., p. 334.
Major Premise: If the President does not lose the sovereignty of the American Republic while abroad, his attendance at the peace conference will be in the best interests of the American people.

Minor Premise: The President will not lose the sovereignty while abroad.

Conclusion: His attendance at the peace conference will be in the best interests of the American people.

Since the question of whether Wilson could attend the peace conference and still retain the nation's sovereignty had been raised by Sherman and other opponents of the league, Williams probably assumed that the minor premise of the argument should be supported. He explained, first, that the President could not lose the sovereignty because he did not possess it according to the terms of the federal constitution.

. . . in no true sense does the President of the United States personify the sovereignty of the American Republic any more than a Senator does or a Member of the House of Representatives. They are a part of the representatives of the sovereignty, which is the people. 120

Williams thus made his argument more credible to the senators by contending that they themselves possessed as much of the sovereignty of the republic as did the President.

Williams' second means of supporting the premise that Wilson would not lose the sovereignty was by the inductive means of argument from analogy. He reasoned that, since kings did not lose the sovereignty of their countries when visiting another empire, the President would not lose the sovereignty while attending the peace conference. This is among the weakest of the Senator's arguments since the differences between a

120 Ibid., 30.
ruling monarch and an elected President of the United States outweigh the similarities. Williams apparently forgot the intimate familiarity of his listeners with the Constitution of the United States as well as their knowledge of the operation of forms of government other than a republic. The use of this analogy, then, seems inconsistent in that it directly followed a supporting argument which depended upon the listeners' knowledge of the Constitution. It should have been obvious to Williams that his listeners would immediately recall that an absolute monarch could, if he wished, delegate absolute power to whomever he wished to serve in his place during his absence from the country. Since the Constitution allows a President of the United States no such luxury, however, Williams' choice of analogy was poor.

Williams' third attempt to support the premise that the President would not lose the sovereignty while abroad was a digression from the issue. Instead of contending that other presidents had left the country without losing the sovereignty, he said that they had left without being antagonized by members of the opposing party. No one had ever accused Washington, Roosevelt, or Taft of having lost sovereignty because of trips outside the territorial limits of the United States, the Senator maintained. In essence, he contended indirectly that since no complaints had been heard in these past instances of presidential absence, there must have been no loss of sovereignty. He possibly assumed his listeners would, of their own initiative, take the argument to its ultimate conclusion: that since there must have been no loss of sovereignty in past instances of presidential absence, there could be no such loss in Wilson's case. The argument, as Williams stated it, was
irrelevant to the premise it should have supported: that Wilson would not lose the sovereignty while abroad. As stated, the argument may have constituted effective ethical proof, but if completed it could have constituted effective logical proof as well. If Williams believed many of his listeners to be "narrow legalists," as he later accused them of being, then he should have completed the argument. A narrow legalist would probably have been influenced more readily by the presence of logic than by its absence.

Relying again upon his listeners' familiarity with the American Constitution, Williams contended, as a fourth means of supporting the premise that Wilson would not lose the sovereignty, that the Constitution did not stipulate that absence from the territorial limits of the United States constitutes inability or temporary or permanent vacation of the President's office. Williams recognized the one principle upon which all senators agreed: that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Because of this fact, this is the strongest of the support Williams offered for his premise. The argument is impressive when stated in the form of a hypothetical syllogism.

Major Premise: If the American Constitution does not stipulate that the President's absence from the United States constitutes a loss of sovereignty, then such absence does not constitute such loss.

Minor Premise: The Constitution does not so stipulate.

Conclusion: The absence of the President from the United States does not constitute a loss of sovereignty.

The syllogism is technically valid in that its minor premise affirms the antecedent, and the conclusion affirms the consequent. The strength of
the argument, however, lies in Williams' analysis of his audience. How could any of his senatorial listeners, especially the narrow legalists, resist the force of the document they had sworn to uphold?

Williams' fifth argument in support of the premise that Wilson would not lose the sovereignty while abroad was a restatement of his second argument. He reiterated his contention that kings, emperors, or presidents had never been deprived of their official functions because of short absences from their countries. Williams made no attempt to strengthen the analogy in using it a second time. Its repetition could have added little to the logical validity of the premise in question.

The sixth argument, that the speech had not sounded like Senator Sherman, was a digression which could be considered useful as ethical proof but logically irrelevant. The same is true of the seventh argument, that the great men produced by the war could not be torn down from the pedestal on which humanity had placed them.

Williams' support for the premise that Wilson would not lose the sovereignty while abroad could have been logically valid to his listeners only in the two instances in which he invoked the American Constitution in Wilson's defense by contending that the Constitution had not granted the President any more of the sovereignty than it had to the senators themselves and that the Constitution did not stipulate that short absences of the President constituted vacation of his office.

Williams' assumption that only the minor premise of the syllogism needed support may itself be questioned. He apparently believed that his audience would accept the major premise that if the President did not lose the sovereignty of the American Republic while abroad, his attendance at the peace conference would be in the best interests of the
American people. This premise assumed that the interests of the people would be served by Wilson's trip because he would not lose the sovereignty by going. In addressing his remarks primarily to those in the Senate who opposed Wilson's trip, Williams appropriately retaliated on their own grounds, which had been the accusation that the trip would mean the loss of national sovereignty.

Williams' second major argument, cast into the form of a categorical syllogism, may be stated as follows:

Major Premise: A President who is kept ignorant of foreign affairs should attend the peace conference personally rather than rely on messengers to negotiate for him.

Minor Premise: Wilson may be as ignorant of foreign affairs as Sherman assumes him to be.

Conclusion: Wilson should attend the peace conference personally rather than rely on messengers to negotiate for him.

Again Williams determined that the major premise would be accepted by his listeners without question and that the minor premise should be given support. In attempting to support the minor premise, Williams argued, first, that a president is very frequently misled. He contended that, like a king, a president is subject to the information that people choose to give him. To strengthen the analogy, Williams cited Presidents Grant and Washington as having been misled. Williams asserted that Washington had been misled by the "whisperings of the New England Federalists." This instance is not historically accurate, since Washington had maintained his policy of non-entangling alliances despite the contrary advice of Hamilton and Jefferson. The record is somewhat

clearer in Grant's case. Williams' observation that the Old Warrior had been misled "very many times" may be authenticated historically. Williams made no particular accusations regarding Wilson's advisers, but merely intended to suggest a further reason in favor of the President's attendance at the peace conference. Among Wilson's opponents, to whom Williams especially addressed his remarks, Henry Cabot Lodge, the former Harvard professor of history, would certainly have challenged Williams' accuracy in supporting his analogy. That the Sage of Nahant failed to challenge the Mississippian may have signified indifference or unwillingness to bother with such a minor detail.

Williams made no further attempt to strengthen the premise that Wilson may have been ignorant of foreign affairs. Instead he digressed in order to castigate his opponents for partisanship in their criticism of the President's participation in the peace conference.

Williams' final argument in support of his thesis that Wilson's attendance at the peace conference would be in the best interests of the American people was that a league of nations, presumably the product of the conference, would be practicable. The argument and its relationship to the thesis may be seen in the form of a hypothetical syllogism.

Major Premise: If the United States can become a member of a practicable league of nations, then Wilson's attendance at the peace conference is in the best interests of the American people.

Minor Premise: The United States can become a member of a practicable league of nations.

Conclusion: Wilson's attendance at the peace conference is in the best interests of the American people.

122 Ibid., pp. 378-383.
As in the two preceding arguments, Williams again strengthened the minor premise in order to prove that the league of nations would be practicable. First, in support of the premise he contended that the allied nations alone could keep world peace by isolating any offending nation. He observed that, since the allied nations controlled the seas, they alone without the cooperation of any of the other nations of the world could cut off any country that attempted to make war upon another country. Williams further contended that the threat of united force would prevent any country from going beyond the pale of civilization and that even Hohenzollern would have been afraid to go into war against such a league. If the allied nations could not all agree to support a league, Williams maintained further, then the two English-speaking countries alone could bring about world peace for 100 years. Great Britain and the United States controlled not only the sea power of the world but a significant share of its resources as well, he asserted. Arthur S. Link verified the historical accuracy of Williams' reasoning. In 1916 Congress had authorized the Navy Department to construct a new fleet comparable to that of Great Britain. Although the program had been shelved in order to build destroyers and patrol craft designed to hunt submarines, in December, 1918 the Navy Department presented plans to Congress for a three-year building program that would give the United States definite naval superiority over the British fleet. In addition, immediately after the Armistice, the British expected to receive most of the ships of the defeated German navy. Williams' listeners were, of course,

123 Link, op. cit., p. 278.
familiar with the plans for expansion of the navy, and his argument that the English-speaking nations alone could control a league of nations and make it practicable was logically creditable to the members of the Senate as well as to the general public.

Summary of Logical Proof

Williams' logical strength in his address of December 3, 1918 lay in his methods of developing his three supporting arguments for his thesis. To the first of these arguments, that Wilson would not lose the sovereign power of the United States while abroad, Williams lent logical credibility for his audience of senators by contending that Wilson could not lose the sovereignty because the Constitution had not delegated it exclusively to him and that the Constitution did not stipulate that Presidential absence from the United States constituted a loss of sovereignty.

Williams' second supporting argument, that Wilson may have been as ignorant of foreign affairs as Sherman had assumed him to be, was weak in that the speaker presented no evidence of Wilson's ignorance. Rather, he relied upon the historical examples of misinformation of Washington and Grant, the former of which was historically inaccurate.

Williams' third supporting argument, however, was logically valid to his listeners in that he contended that a league of nations could be practicable even if only the two English-speaking countries supported it. His listeners, knowledgable of the naval strength of the world's powers, probably accepted his observation that the two English-speaking countries were dominant in terms of naval power and resources.

Aside from his frequent digressions during the speech which may
have antagonized many of his listeners, Williams' logic was probably acceptable to most of the members of the Senate.

As previously noted, the general public had had no opportunity to express opinion concerning Wilson's proposed attendance at the peace conference. Their favorable reaction toward the league idea itself, however, probably indicated a similar willingness to accept Williams' defense of the President's trip.

Invention: Emotional Proof

Thonssen and Baird observe that logical proof "... is not enough, by itself, to complete the task of inducing belief or action."\(^{125}\) Bower Aly clarifies this concept by offering the Aristotelian interpretation that "if audiences were perfect, the only means necessary to persuasion could be found in the enthymeme, a kind of rhetorical syllogism constituting reasonable proof. But since audiences are not perfect, the public speaker must employ other means of persuasion as well."\(^{126}\)

The other two means of inducing belief or action are those of emotional proof and ethical proof. Of emotional proof, Aristotle noted that audiences might be persuaded "when they are brought by the speech into a state of emotion; for we give very different decisions under the sway of pain or joy, and liking or hatred."\(^{127}\)

Thonssen and Baird delineate the means of analyzing emotional proof as a consideration of the speaker's audience analysis and

\(^{125}\)Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., p. 358.


adaptation in terms of his specific appeals to various impelling motives and their corollaries. 128

Audience Adaptation

John Sharp Williams was addressing himself primarily to his fellow senators who would or would not act upon Senator Sherman's concurrent resolution declaring the Presidency vacant when Woodrow Wilson departed for Versailles. A seasoned veteran of thirty years service in the Congress, Williams knew his audience as did few others in the Senate. In his address of December 3, 1918, he appealed primarily to the motives of self-preservation and patriotism, or national pride. The very reason for a league of nations was that of self-preservation, so it is natural that Williams based much of his emotional appeal upon this motive.

Williams' first appeal to the motive of self-preservation was in his observation that the Constitution had taken care of the American people and was very much superior to any form of bolshevism or autocracy in the world. His point in this reference was that the Constitution has not stipulated that brief absences from office rendered the Presidency vacant. 129

A second instance of this appeal was in Williams' warning not to leave the job of peace negotiation to messengers. He admonished that "... with all of the errors that may occur of misinterpretation and misconstruction, there is a danger of our fighting one another. Then, what becomes of the dream of peace? What becomes of 'the parliament of

128 Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., p. 359.
129 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 29.
man'? What becomes of the 'federation of the world'? What becomes of the dream of the poets and the vision of the seers?"130 Thirdly, Williams appealed to the motive of self-preservation by pointing out that Wilson

... is going to do what he thinks is right, not only for America, but for the world; and he is going to try to get out of this, if he can, by heart-to-heart talks with Lloyd George and Clemenceau and the Italian premier and the Belgian king and the balance of them, a comparatively permanent and a just peace and, if possible, a league of nations to preserve the peace of the world.131

Self-preservation included the declaration of war if necessary, as Williams indicated in his fourth appeal to this motive. If a nation offended the league of nations by making war upon one of its members, that nation would be ostracized commercially and militarily and declared "beyond the pale of civilization." Williams asserted that the league of nations would declare that nation to be the "enemy of mankind," and the group would "make united war against it."132

In his final appeal to self-preservation, Williams warned that continued attacks on Wilson would result in weakening the country and undercutting its international influence.

We want to have all of the influence we can over there with them to bring about a permanent and just peace; as nearly as possible "a parliament of man and a federation of the world"; and what are you doing here? Weakening your own agent every day, throwing adjectives at his head, accusing him virtually of idiocy, of un-Americanism--weakening him in the council, so that if you can help it America shall not predominate but somebody else will.133

130 Ibid., 30.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., 31.
133 Ibid.
Williams' second type of motive appeal in his address of December 3, 1918 was that to the corollary motive of patriotism or national pride. As a first instance of this appeal, Williams attempted to impress his listeners with the greatness of Wilson, a reason for national pride.\textsuperscript{134} A second example of an appeal to the motive of national pride was in Williams' indication of the strength of the United States as a world power. He pointed out that, even though most of the other countries of the world might oppose a league of nations, the United States and Great Britain would be able to enforce the ideals of such a league.

These United States have the second largest navy in the world, and before many years roll around we will have the largest. I tell you that if nobody else goes into the league of nations except the English-speaking races, . . . they and we, with our law, our language, and our courage and resources on land and at sea, are enough.\textsuperscript{135}

A final instance of Williams' appeal to the motive of patriotism was his definition or explanation of Wilson's trip to Versailles. Wilson was going to Europe, the senator maintained, "... to try to consummate--the dream of poets, the vision of prophets, the heart-wish of good men and good women for a thousand years--peace, honorable peace, permanent peace, just peace. . . ."\textsuperscript{136} Thus Williams attempted to associate the United States with the altruistic purpose for which its President left the country.

Williams' use of emotional proof, then, was limited to appeals to two motives: self-preservation and patriotism.

\textbf{Invention: Ethical Proof}

Two thousand years before Emerson declared that "what you are

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
thunders so loudly I cannot hear what you say," Aristotle had recognized that a speaker's personality and character exert perhaps the strongest of all influences upon the reception of his ideas.\textsuperscript{137} Aristotle adds that this influence, or trust, should be created by the speech itself, rather than left to depend upon antecedent impressions of the speaker.\textsuperscript{138} Thonssen and Baird further define this concept of "ethical proof" as the speaker's skill during his speech in establishing credibility through high character, or integrity, intelligence, and good will toward his listeners.\textsuperscript{139} This section is concerned with an analysis of John Sharp Williams' attempts, in his address to the Senate of December 3, 1918, to reinforce his personal credibility in terms of his integrity, intelligence, and good will.

**Integrity**

Williams revealed his high moral character generally by associating himself with Wilson and with the cause of world peace, both of which he portrayed as virtuous and elevated. In one instance of this association, Williams also managed to castigate his opponents in the same phrase.

Mr. President, I believe in loyalty to a cause when it is a good cause, to a man when he is a good man and a strong man and an able man. . . . He [Woodrow Wilson] is so much greater, he is so much wiser, he is so much longer visioned, he is so much gentler visioned than the men who think they are making political capital by attacking him that there is no comparison.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{137}Cooper, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{138}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{139}Thonssen and Baird, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 385.
\textsuperscript{140}U. S. \textit{Congressional Record}, \textit{op. cit.}, 30.
Williams further associated himself with Wilson's objectives: "... peace, honorable peace, permanent peace, just peace; just even to our enemies, but not overmerciful to them, because in order to be just they must pay retribution." 141

The Mississippian emphasized his own lack of partisan selfishness by pointing out his loyalty to national objectives above those of his party.

I stood upon this floor six months ago, I believe, or eight, and I said that if the blackest Republican ran against the best Democrat that ever existed, and that Democrat had not supported this war from beginning to end and the Republican had, I would vote for the Republican. I was accused of partisanship for making that statement. As a matter of fact, it was the most extremely unpartisan utterance that could be made by anybody. 142

Throughout the address, Williams bestowed enthusiastic praise upon Wilson and his cause. He attested to Wilson's great wisdom in personally going to Versailles several times in the speech. He referred to Wilson as one of the nation's five greatest Presidents, a prophet, and one of the greatest of world leaders to emerge from the war. He indicated that Wilson was intent upon doing "what was right" not only for the United States, but for the world. Williams associated the league of nations with the best interests of the people of the world. He exclaimed that Wilson's cause could "bring about the peace of the world for a hundred years..." 143 He combined his praise for the President with criticism of his immediate listeners.

... there is not one of you that will go to your bedside tonight and tell God in secret converse that you believe that

141 Ibid., 31.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
he [Wilson] is either unpatriotic or dishonest or that he has any purpose in the world except not only the good of the American Republic but the general welfare of the civilized world.\footnote{144}

Williams' third means of revealing his high moral character was that of linking his opponents in the Senate with what was not virtuous. This was his most frequently used form of ethical proof. He appeared to be angry that the Republican Senators would sponsor such a joint resolution as that of Sherman's which would declare the office of the Presidency vacant on Wilson's departure for Europe. In his introductory remarks Williams castigated the Illinois senator.

We were warned of a tornado of dissent to the President's trip. . . . we have listened to the speech, or to the reading of the writing rather, of the Senator from Illinois. That, I suppose, is the tornado and the volcano and the explosion which were to take place; and we are now left with the results. \textit{Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus}. (Mountains are in labor: there is born a ridiculous mouse.)\footnote{145}

The Mississippian further pointed out that Sherman's speech had contained no argument. Sherman's contention had violated the precedents of Presidents who had in the past departed from the country without such criticism. Further, Sherman was making a mistake in presenting such a resolution. Williams expressed disbelief that Sherman would be "guilty" of such an "endless concatenation of complex adjectives." Williams attacked Sherman's method of delivering his speech.

He read his speech, of course, and read it with good emphasis; read it in fine style, as he usually does, and with a degree of acting that made it funny at times, even when the Senator was

\footnote{144}{Ibid.}
\footnote{145}{Ibid., 28.}
seeking to be serious, and still funnier at other times when he
was not seeking to be serious.\textsuperscript{146}

He urged that "no real lawyer, publicist, or real man of real common
sense" could believe that Wilson was doing wrong. Not only were the
opposition senators not genuine lawyers or men of real sense, but they
may not even have been human. "Gentlemen may bark and gentlemen may try
to bite--'try to bite,' I say; they cannot bite; they may bark--."\textsuperscript{147}

The Republican senators who had gone to hear Wilson speak on December 2
had been impolite, and, because of a "gentlemen's understanding," had
refused to applaud the President. Further, they were "hypocrites" for
charging Wilson with a crime because he wanted Democrats elected to
office. The senators, he maintained, had short memories because they
had forgotten that all great Presidents had been members of political
parties and had been loyal to them. To this he added a slap at Senator
Lodge by exclaiming: "Going all the way, I reckon, from the remote West
plumb to New England, where the Brahmins live!" Not only did Williams
refuse to believe the accusations Sherman had made, but he refused to
believe that Sherman himself believed them. He accused the opposition
senators of being unpatriotic, of attempting to weaken America by
attempting to weaken her chief agent of foreign affairs. Additionally,
he accused the Republicans of not having respected the Constitution
until they had been able to use it against Wilson. "All at once, nicely
caught with the little complexities of constitutional toilet arrange-
ments, cosmetics upon the face, chiefly, you try to make a scapegoat out

\textsuperscript{146}\textit{Ibid.}, 29.

\textsuperscript{147}\textit{Ibid.}
of Wilson."148 In a withering blast of sarcasm, Williams declared, "Of course, when a Senator attacks anybody he is being attacked by a sort of a German superman; almost an American Hohenzollern, that is capable of everything wise and nothing foolish, not even an utterance accidentally."149 In his concluding words, the Mississippian again pilloried the Republicans with the advice that their criticism of Wilson would do the country more harm than good.

A fourth means of establishing his high character consisted in Williams' removing the unfavorable impressions of Wilson's trip to Europe that had previously been established by the opposition senators. Williams emphatically urged the absolute necessity of Wilson's personal presence for the treaty making in Versailles. This would far outweigh the inconvenience of having the chief executive out of the country for a short time, and it would under no circumstances indicate a vacation of the Presidency as the Republican senators had claimed.

The creation of the impression of complete sincerity was Williams' fifth means of establishing his high character. His accusations against his opponents were straightforward and open. He made no particular attempt at subtlety. As a public servant of thirty years, he had become familiar with most of his colleagues in the Senate. He felt no compunction or even restraint in severely chastizing those responsible for the anti-Wilson resolution.

Intelligence

Williams first attempted to establish his intelligence in terms

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148 Ibid., 31.
149 Ibid.
of "common sense" by emphasizing the practicality of the league idea. He compared this enormous international scheme with the justice and preservation of peace at the local level.

You never see the force of the constable and the sheriff behind the justice of the peace or the circuit court, except when he opens court and declares it adjourned; but everybody knows it is there, and, as a consequence, nobody defies it, or at least nobody but a very reckless man. And so in this agreement you will not have to whip the country that wants to get beyond the pale of civilization, because it will not get there. It will be afraid to try. Even Hohenzollern would have been afraid to go into this war if he had known the civilized world was going to face him.  

A second illustration of Williams' intelligence was his familiarity with the issues at stake in the partisan controversy over Wilson's trip and the league idea itself. Additionally, his intimate knowledge of history was apparent in the references to the activities of past Presidents comparable to Wilson. Finally, Williams demonstrated his familiarity with the classics of literature in his apt quotation from Horace's Epistle to the Pisos: Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus, "mountains are in labor: there is born a ridiculous mouse."

Good will

There is one instance of praise for the Republican opponents in Williams' address. He pointed out that the American people had returned a Republican Congress in the 1918 elections because, on the whole, the Republicans had been more loyal to the war effort than had the Democrats. "I have come to the conclusion that the American people put you in office in these two Houses because they thought maybe you could be more
safely trusted to stand behind the President than a lot of our fellows could be."151

Williams' second method of gaining the good will of his listeners was by means of identifying himself with their problems. He realized that American influence in the treaty-making at Versailles would be imperative, and that most Americans were anxious for permanent peace following the recent holocaust. He therefore used the first person plural to identify himself with all Americans: "We want to have all of the influence we can over there with them to bring about a permanent and just peace; as nearly as possible 'a parliament of man and a federation of the world.'"152

A third method of establishing good will, as already mentioned, was Williams' candor and straightforwardness. Finally, to offset any personal partisanism that may have been attributed to him, Williams freely said that he would have bolted the party to vote Republican had there been Democratic candidates unwilling to support Wilson and the war effort in the recent elections.

Consciously or unconsciously, Williams relied most heavily on ethical proof to accomplish his purpose—the defeat of the Sherman resolution—in his address of December 3, 1918. He attempted to implement his high character, intelligence, and good will by means of (1) associating himself and Wilson with the cause of world peace; (2) emphasizing his own lack of selfishness; (3) enthusiastically praising Wilson and his cause; (4) linking his opponents with what was not virtuous; (5)

151 Ibid., 30.
152 Ibid., 31.
removing unfavorable impressions of himself, of Wilson, and the cause of world peace; (6) creating the impression of complete sincerity; (7) using "common sense"; (8) showing familiarity with the issues of the day; (9) praising his listeners; (10) identifying himself with his listeners' problems; (11) proceeding with candor and straightforwardness; and (12) offsetting any personal reasons he may have had for giving the speech.

Style

In addition to the rhetorical aspects of organization and invention, the latter encompassing logical, emotional, and ethical proofs, a third aspect of the speaker's art should be examined. This aspect is style, which Bryant and Wallace define as "that quality in speaking which results from the selection and management of language." From the point of view of the rhetorical critic, an analysis and evaluation of style is important because the speaker's "... language, interpreted by the delivery, creates in the listener the first and quickest impression of the message of the speech, the sort of person the speaker is, and the tone and mood of the occasion." Concerning the evaluation of the speaker's style, Thonssen and Baird observe that "... there are two sets of materials which are more likely to open listeners' minds to the ideas of the speaker: (1) elements that make for clearness, and (2) elements that make for impressiveness in discourse. This

154 Ibid., p. 251.
section, then, is concerned with these two elements in John Sharp Williams' address to the Senate of December 3, 1918.

**Clearness**

Any attempt to analyze Williams' style must be prefaced with a note on the speaker's delivery. The impromptu nature of his delivery affected the nature of his style to a considerable degree. There is no evidence to indicate that Williams ever addressed the Senate from manuscript or even made use of notes. He criticized his colleagues who read their speeches from manuscript.\(^{156}\) The nature of the occasion demanded either that a senator make an impromptu reply to an adversary or that he prepare his reply to be given several days following the initial speech, depending upon the schedule of business in the Senate. Williams invariably chose to make his replies on the spur of the moment, gaining the advantage of immediacy at the expense of an extremely loose style.

However loose Williams' oral style may have been, it could never be described as obscure. First, Williams thoroughly understood the ideas he expressed in his speeches. His familiarity with the machinery of treaty-making and with the issues involved seems to justify Vice-President Marshall's praise of the Mississippian's "intimate knowledge of world history and world politics."\(^{157}\)

A second element of Williams' style that failed to contribute to its clarity was his word selection. The bluntness of his criticism may have offended many of his colleagues, and many may have failed to

\(^{156}\)U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 28.

\(^{157}\)Marshall, op. cit., p. 301.
understand him. His classical allusion to the words of Horace was probably familiar to some of the senators, although it may have been puzzling to many of the average Americans who read the speech in the Congressional Record. In context, Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus was clearly criticism. Williams' selection of words was not appropriate, then, in the sense that he could have been misunderstood. There are no words in the text of the speech which are obsolete even today. Some of his words, however, may have been unfamiliar to the senators. To demonstrate the variety of vocabulary at Williams' command, he referred to Sherman's speech as a "concatenation," to the objective of the league as "impartial arbitrament," and to the right of every language to "homologate" itself with its own nationality. Within the same text, however, he often used such forceful monosyllabic verbs as "rid," "cut," "lost," "doubt," "bite," "bark," "tear," "die," "jumps," "hurt," and "beat."

The lack of appropriateness and intelligibility failed to contribute to Williams' clearness in terms of discerning word selection.

A third element of style that contributed to its clarity was the simplicity of sentence structure. Probably because of the impromptu nature of the speech, Williams' sentences were anything but simple in structure. He made frequent use of compound, complex, and compound-complex sentences. In a sampling of ten paragraphs from the speech, Williams used a total of twelve simple, eight compound, twenty complex, and fifteen compound-complex sentences. Of the 55 sentences, only

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158 As I show later, the average sentence length is 40 words.

159 The speech contains 51 paragraphs. I counted the types of sentences in every fifth paragraph for my representative sampling.
twelve were simple in structure. This seems to indicate a tendency toward complexity which probably detracted from the element of clarity in style. Indeed, such sentences as the following 133 word example give the impression of being "endless concatenations" in themselves.

Does the Senator from Illinois imagine that the President does not know that heart-to-heart talks with the other great men whom this war has developed—without taking it for granted now that the President regards himself as a great man; I merely so regard him; but my opinion is not worth more than that of the Senator from Illinois, and the Senator from Illinois regards himself, perhaps as most Senators do, as a greater man than Woodrow Wilson—but supposing he is right; the President is here; he occupies the position; he must act; and wanting to act, the more ignorant he is, as the Senator assumes him to be, the more he ought to want to confer with these great men and to find out from them what ought to be done.\[160\]

A fourth element that contributed to clarity of style was the use of definitions, examples, and illustrations to clarify ideas. By means of definition, Williams clarified what he meant by the sovereignty of the United States. His definition clearly showed that since the President did not personify his country's sovereignty, the President could not lose the sovereignty by leaving the country. Williams also clearly defined the concept of a league of nations. He stipulated in layman terminology the various means by which such an organization would preserve peace. Williams probably used too many examples and illustrations in this address. Fewer examples and illustrations would have served his purpose more effectively in this writer's judgment.

A fifth element of clarity in style was control over the details in the speech. Williams seemed not always to be in control of the details. Rather than tersely, directly coming to the point, the

\[160\]U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 29.
Mississippian unnecessarily labored each point with involved elaborations. In reading the text of the address, it is not always apparent which materials were essential and which were less essential. In the midst of so much invective against the Republican members of the Senate, the reader often loses sight of the justification of Wilson's trip and of the league idea itself. The details of the speech, excessive and not always relevant, did not contribute to clarity of style.

A sixth element of clarity was organizational integrity, or the orderly sequence of ideas. Williams' ideas were in anything but an orderly sequence. Again, this appears to have been the fault of the occasion--an impromptu reply to Senator Sherman.

A seventh element of clarity was that of proper transition materials designed to bridge the gap between parts and to suggest the direction in which subsequent material will move. There were no such transitions in this address discernable to this writer. The speech was completely unplanned, and it appears that Williams had not formed the habit of employing transition material to serve as guideposts to his listeners.

A ninth element that contributed to clarity in style was the adequacy of the logical materials: assumptions, evidence, and argument. As pointed out in an earlier section of this chapter,\(^{161}\) Williams logical proof was generally valid. It suffered somewhat, however, from the Senator's constant tendency to digress.

A final element of clarity was that of suitable summaries designed to refresh the listeners' memories with the outline of the

\(^{161}\)See p. 96.
speech and with the interrelation of details within individual points. Williams did not employ this technique at all. There were no summary statements to be found in his address of December 3, 1918.

In attempting to assess the clarity of Williams' speaking style, it is necessary to consider not only the ten elements just discussed, but the nature of the occasion as well. There may have been compensation for the speaker's lack of clarity in the very impromptu nature of the speech which contributed to its obscurity. Surely such spontaneity must have made some contribution to clarity of style.

Impressiveness

The first element of style that may have contributed to impressiveness was that of the sources of persuasion: logical, emotional, and ethical materials.162 As pointed out earlier in this chapter, Williams' strongest form of proof was his ethical materials, with which he attempted to implement the force of his personal character. He was probably most impressive in his attempts to link his opponents with what was not virtuous.

A second element of impressiveness was the use of imagery. The seven types of imagery, visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, kinesthetic, tactile, and thermal, are defined as "... the avenues by which impressions may enter our awareness."163

Williams appealed first to visual imagery in his Latin quotation,

162See the specific sections of this chapter concerning each of these types of proof, pp. 96, 100, 105-6.

Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. Most of his fellow senators were probably able to understand this allusion, and visually to enjoy or despise it, depending upon their affiliation. A second instance of visual imagery was Williams' hypothetical pretense that he was Wilson. He said that he would not want to stay in Washington and send cable-grams to his representatives to insist upon this or to "die in the trench" for that, etc. The reference to dying in the trench was probably powerful visual imagery to listeners who had so recently experienced war. A third instance of visual imagery, also reminiscent of the war, was Williams' explanation that Washington's second administration had failed because he had not had the support of an organized political party but only "... volunteers in every little engagement." 164

Williams' fourth example of visual imagery was his insistence that the American people would recognize Republican malice and hate for what it was. He asserted that if his opponents should give themselves "two weeks' rope," that "at the end of two weeks of unlimited rope the American people will have spotted you, and there will be enough of them getting religion and going on the mourners bench and confessing before God and man that they made an awful mistake in the vote they cast at the last election. ..." 165

A fifth instance of visual imagery was Williams' reference to Wilson's "Scotch jaw," a symbol, according to the Mississippian, of fearless leadership. 166

Sixth, Williams, in explaining the practicability of the league idea, asserted that "... when the first man started and told

164 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 30.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid.
people that they had to stop their private rows and quit killing one
another and go to a court of justice . . .," somebody had said it would
be impractical. In a further militant vein, Williams noted the hypo­
thetical words of someone who might ruefully say that such a humanitar­
ian idea as the league could not work because "Sherman will not put his
weapon up, and Williams will not 'bury his club. . . .'" An eighth
instance of visual imagery was the Senator's sarcastic observation that
the Republicans had never respected the Constitution until it became
useful to them. "All at once, nicely caught with the little complexities
of constitutional toilet arrangements, cosmetics upon the face, chiefly,
you try to make a scapegoat out of Wilson." Finally, Williams again
inveighed against the Republican opponents of Wilson by comparing them
individually to a "German superman" or an "American Hohenzollern," both
references of which would stir visual images of the outspread mustaches
of the Kaiser.

Williams employed two instances of auditory imagery in his
address of December 3, 1918. First, he ridiculed his opponents by tell­
ing them that they might "bark" but not "bite," or that they would have
great difficulty defaming Wilson. Second, the Senator urged Wilson's
opponents, upon discovering any of the Chief Executive's mistakes, to

167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid., 31.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid., 29.
"call attention from the housetops. . . " Such practice, he insisted, would be appreciated by everyone, especially the President.

The third type of imagery that Williams employed was kinesthetic. The first example was his explanation of instances when rulers of other nations had been deposed because of absence. This had only happened, he maintained, when revolutions had occurred in the ruler's absence. These absences, he observed further, had actually been "flights for fear" of revolution that was anticipated. A second instance of kinesthetic imagery was Williams' observation that a President might "run down to Mexico" and exchange courtesies with Diaz without vacating his office. Third, he noted that Great Britain had just demonstrated the meaning of domination of the sea: "constriction, throat-grappling, starvation if necessary. . . " Finally, he chided his opponents by telling them that, rather than hurting Wilson, they were "digging their own graves."

Tactile imagery was the final type employed in the December 3 address. First, Williams caustically remarked that "gentlemen may bark and gentlemen may try to bite. . . " Second, he warned his opponents that they could not "tear" Wilson down from the pedestal on which

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172Ibid.
173Ibid., 29.
174Ibid.
175Ibid., 31.
176Ibid.
177Ibid., 29.
A third instance of tactile imagery was Williams' criticism of members of his own party who had been "... sticking the President every chance they got with a fine Italian dagger." Williams' final example of tactile imagery was his criticism of his opponents as having had little respect for the Constitution until they thought they could use it to their own advantage. "Oh, the iron hand in the velvet glove...," Williams insisted.

Williams employed four types of imagery in his address of December 3: visual, auditory, kinesthetic, and tactile. These instances of imagery probably contributed to Williams' impressiveness. Had this been a prepared speech, perhaps the speaker would have had even more opportunity to employ this means of implementing his style.

A third element of impressiveness was variety in sentence structure as to length, complexity, and form, or position of words. Probably because of the impromptu nature of Williams' speaking, his speech was not characterized by short sentences. His sentences ranged from three to 115 words in length. The average sentence length in the speech of December 3, 1918 was 40 words. According to Flesch's standard, then, Williams' style was "Very Difficult." In addition to being lengthy, the sentences were generally complicated in structure. Williams piled

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179 *Ibid.*, 30


181 I have used Rudolf Flesch's formula to determine Williams' sentence length. The formula is as follows; (1) I took numerical samples from every third paragraph in the speech; (2) Each sample started at the beginning of the paragraph; (3) Each sample consisted of the number of words in complete sentences by the number of sentences in the sample.
clause upon clause, tied loosely together with semicolons and commas. Had he prepared a manuscript in advance, the sentences would probably not have been as long or as loosely constructed. As mentioned earlier, however, the urgency of immediate reply to Sherman's attack upon Wilson seemed to outweigh the advantage of a polished manuscript which would have been delivered several days after Wilson had embarked for Europe.

As already discussed, Williams' tendency toward complexity of sentence structure did not enhance the clarity of his style.\(^{182}\) It is equally unlikely that this tendency enhanced his impressiveness.

Raymond G. Smith lists five forms of sentences in terms of the position of words: the question, the periodic sentence, the loose sentence, the balanced sentence, and the parallel sentence.\(^{183}\) Of these types the loose sentence is least likely to enhance a speaker's impressiveness.\(^{184}\) The loose sentence, however, was the form most

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This gave me the average number of words in Williams' sentences; (5)
Then I compared the sentence length with Flesch's descriptions:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Words</th>
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<tr>
<td>Very Easy</td>
<td>8 or less</td>
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<tr>
<td>Easy</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fairly Easy</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Standard</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Fairly Difficult</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Difficult</td>
<td>29 or more</td>
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\(^{182}\) See pp. 109-10.


frequently used by Williams in his address of December 3. Of the 55 sentences in the sampling taken, ten were questions, five periodic, 36 loose, one balanced, and three parallel. The looseness of Williams' sentences could not have enhanced the stylistic impressiveness, either with his listeners or his readers.

Stylistic impressiveness may be achieved in a fourth way: the use of devices for emphasis, such as repetition, climax, rhythm, tropes, and figures. Williams made effective use of the device of repetition. His first instance of repetition in the address was with reference to the men who wrote the American Constitution.

They were men who excited the admiration of Gladstone; they were men who excited the admiration even of Napoleon Bonaparte, with all his war madness; they were men who received the praise even of the Hohenzollerns.

In seeking to detract from his opponents' effectiveness, Williams repeated his "theme" from Horace at three different points in the speech. Additionally he sought to place his enemies in a bad light by observing that Sherman "... read his speech, of course, and read it with good emphasis; read it in fine style..." Further, the Mississippian doubted "... if any real lawyer, any real publicist, any real man of real common sense believes that Woodrow Wilson is doing anything wrong..."

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185 This is the same sampling as used to determine the simplicity of sentence structure. I again counted the types of sentences in every fifth paragraph for my representative sampling.

186 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 29.

187 Ibid.

188 Ibid.
Williams maintained that, if he himself were President, he would not want to remain in the United States sending instructions to his delegates by cablegram "... to insist upon this or insist upon that, or die in the trench with this proposition or that, for France may not want it, or Italy may not want it, or England may not want it. ..."\textsuperscript{189}

Leaving the work of peace negotiation to messengers, Williams insisted, might lead to disaster. "Then, what becomes of the dream of peace? What becomes of 'the parliament of man'? What becomes of the 'federation of the world'? What becomes of the dream of the poets and the vision of the seers?"\textsuperscript{190}

In another repetitious series of questions, Williams attempted to prick the consciences of his opponents in the Senate.

Is there one of you who does not really think in the bottom of your heart that he is doing the best he can? Is there one of you who thinks he is guided by a dishonest purpose? Is there one of you who thinks that he is motivated by an unpatriotic purpose? Is there one of you who thinks he deserves the adjectives that have been poured out on his defenseless head this morning?\textsuperscript{191}

Williams concluded his address with another series of questions designed to vindicate his Commander-in-chief.

How is all this going to hurt him? How is it going to help you? How is it going to help your posterity? How is it going to help the American Republic? How is it going to help American influence in Europe? How is it going to accomplish any good end of any description for the purposes of civilization or democracy or humanity?\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{189}Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{190}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{191}Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{192}Ibid.
Repetition was Williams' most effective method of implementing the impressiveness of his style.

As pointed out earlier, Williams rarely used the device of climax, or the periodic sentence. Additionally there was no discernible consistent rhythm in the speech. The impromptu nature of the address probably ruled this out entirely.

Final considerations of devices for emphasis which contribute to impressiveness in speech were tropes and figures. Of the types of tropes and figures considered by Thonssen and Baird, Williams used allegory, synecdoche, irony, hyperbole, and catachresis.

Williams first allegorically noted that Americans would see Republican malice toward Wilson for the partisanism it truly was. "All in the world you have got to do is to give yourselves two weeks' rope, and at the end of two weeks of unlimited rope the American people will have spotted you, and there will be enough of them getting religion and going on the mourners bench and confessing before God and man that they made an awful mistake in the vote they cast at the last election. . . ." 193

Williams' reference to the hypocrisy of his opponents as "the iron hand in the velvet glove," constituted his use of synecdoche. 194

Williams' only use of irony was in his description of Senator Sherman's speech.

We were told that there was going to be a regular hurricane--perhaps an explosion of a volcano--and we have listened to the speech, or to the reading of the writing, rather of the Senator from Illinois. That, I suppose is the tornado and the volcano

193 Ibid., 30.

194 Ibid., 31.
and the explosion which were to take place; and we are now left with the results. Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus.\footnote{Ibid., 28.}

The Senator may have been heeding his own injunction against the use of irony, which he voiced to a friend the following year.

Jokes in the United States Senate, especially long drawn, delicate irony, are dangerous. The audiences there and in the country are not quite intelligent enough to take it in the proper spirit. I have had some little experience trying irony before audiences who had no particular ironical gift.\footnote{Letter of John Sharp Williams to Wickes Wamboldt, September 3, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 47.}

Williams made use of hyperbole in five instances in his speech. First, he said that his opponents would not be able to tear any of the great men produced by the war from the pedestal on which humanity had placed them.\footnote{U. S. \emph{Congressional Record}, \emph{op. cit.}, 29.} Second, he noted that, were he Wilson, he would not want to stay at home instructing his delegates by cablegram ". . . to insist upon this or insist upon that, or to die in the trench with this proposition or that. . . ."\footnote{Ibid., 30.} His third instance of hyperbole was in again accusing the opponents of ". . . sticking the President every chance they got with a fine Italian dagger."\footnote{Ibid.} Fourth, he warned the Republicans that "you are digging your own graves when you try to dig his. . . ."\footnote{Ibid.} Finally, he urged his opponents, if they found that Wilson had made a mistake, to call attention to it "from the housetops."\footnote{Ibid.}
Catachresis was the final type of trope in the address of December 3, 1918. Williams first warned his opponents that they "may bark" and "try to bite," thus borrowing the descriptive language appropriate to dogs to entreat his opponents. Second, he substituted the word "asses" for "men" in his observation that every man of good sense occasionally lacks confidence except for those who are asses. Finally, he noted that humanitarianism was probably useless, since "Sherman will not put his weapon up, and Williams will not 'bury his club.'"

Failing to use any figures in his address of December 3, Williams employed the tropes of allegory, synechdoche, irony, hyperbole, and catachresis. Of these he most frequently employed the hyperbole.

Evaluation of Williams' Style

Although Williams thoroughly understood the issues involved in the debate and chose ideas that were readily intelligible to his listeners, his effectiveness as a speaker probably suffered because of several shortcomings in his style. First, he was too verbose. His sentences often seem endless. Second, he was almost totally lacking in organization. Third, he used words which may not have been instantly intelligible to his listeners. These weaknesses were particularly damaging to Williams' clarity as a stylist.

Despite effective use of several types of imagery, a particularly engaging ethos, effective use of repetition, and a penchant for

\[202\text{Ibid.}, 29.\]
\[203\text{Ibid.}, 30.\]
\[204\text{Ibid.}\]
pithy hyperbole, Williams fell short of stylistic impressiveness because of his excessive complexity and length in sentence structure.

In view of Williams' education at the University of Heidelberg, it seems unfortunate that he was not influenced by Schopenhauer's concept of "chastity" in style.205

Effectiveness

As John Sharp Williams stood at his desk on December 3, 1918 to address the President of the Senate, he was surrounded by galleries that were "well filled"206 and whose occupants were apparently enthusiastically concerned with the issues being debated. Vice President Marshall, the presiding officer of the Senate, had previously cautioned the occupants of the galleries against laughter during Senator Sherman's address.207 The spectators again violated the Senate rule against overt manifestations during Williams' reply to Sherman. Sherman interrupted Williams to observe that Wilson had all along been instructing his foreign representatives from the White House rather than personally traveling to foreign lands to issue instructions. To this Williams retorted "Well, he has not had any delegates over there thus far, and by the way, he has not instructed the Senator from Illinois, and if he had and the Senator had obeyed his instructions, he would have been much

"The listeners in the galleries responded with "laughter and applause." The Senators themselves responded with customary partisan indifference to their opponents. The *Atlanta Constitution* reported that "the debate between Senators Sherman and Williams continued about two hours, but no other senators joined in the discussion except to ask occasional questions. Many Republican and Democratic senators left their seats when the speaker of the opposition party was addressing the Senate." No senator other than Sherman interrupted Williams. Fleming reports that many Democratic senators were unhappy with Wilson's decision to go to Paris. "Many of the President's friends in his own party, dispirited by the election, shared in the discontent. Some felt that the taking over of the cables by Executive Order at this time was a blunder; others that the cabinet needed overhauling. Democratic morale was low as the President departed."

Bailey explains that the idea of Wilson's trip to Paris was a natural target for his Republican opponents.

He was the only Democrat since Andrew Jackson to serve two consecutive terms, and he had pushed through Congress a sweeping program of domestic reform. These measures had trod on the toes of many big-business tycoons, who were preponderantly Republican and who were determined to turn back the clock to the good old days of conservatism. If the President were to dictate a liberal peace, his prestige would soar so high that

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208 Ibid., 29.
209 Ibid.
he might run for a third term, or possibly hand-pick his successor. Wilson and his work had to be undone at all costs.212

Delayed response to Williams' defense of Wilson came from the Christian Science Monitor, which termed the address "... one of the ablest speeches of his long parliamentary career."213 Recognizing the significance of the league idea and Williams' attempt to defend it along with Wilson's duty to attend the conference, the New York Times editorialized

John Sharp Williams has said many memorable things in the last four years. While America was neutral he was not afraid to say that the war involved moral issues more important than the incidental financial losses its operations might bring to some individuals. On the eve of the Peace Conference he has spoken again in words that the whole American people ought to remember: "The United States and Great Britain can maintain a League of Nations even if other nations refuse to have a part in it. We can agree that any civilized nation that makes war upon another without first submitting the questions in controversy to an arbitration tribunal shall be outside the pale of civilization; that the freedom to operate on the high seas shall be denied to her; that access to the raw materials and markets which the two nations control shall be denied to her; and in that way we can keep peace in the world for a hundred years if we only have the courage to do it.

The League of Nations begins with the collaboration of the English-speaking peoples. That, says Senator Williams, is what the President is going to Europe to accomplish, and so on such an errand the President must have the full sympathy of all Americans who have studied world politics.214

The New Orleans Times-Picayune indirectly approved of Williams' stand in his address of December 3 by castigating his opponent.


In total disregard of the lessons taught by the world war regarding the need of unity and harmony in the ranks of those who fight for a common cause. . . . Senator Sherman of Illinois puts his faith in the efficacy of oratorical barrage of fire, and bombards the Democratic Party and its leaders in and out of season, whenever the spirit moves.\footnote{215}

The conservative New York Tribune, on the other hand, severely criticized Williams' defense of Wilson and the League. Of the address, the Tribune editorialized

It illustrates the absolute befuddlement of the public mind with regard to the President's purposes so that no one can take Mr. Williams' remarks seriously. They fly in the face of any normal and commonsense interpretation of the league of nations and freedom of the seas declarations embodied in Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Articles. They are extravagantly contradictory of the ideas which the President seemed to be conveying in the statements of peace conditions which he has been making for the last twenty-three months.

What is Mr. Williams' definition of freedom of the seas? It is that the two leading naval powers in the world--Great Britain and the United States--shall assume joint control of the seas. No other nation is hereafter to make war without being boycotted by these two naval powers, without suffering exclusion from the high seas and an embargo on all the raw materials and other products carried in ocean commerce. Pope Alexander VI divided the South Atlantic between Spain and Portugal. Great Britain and the United States are to divide all the seven oceans between them and their fiat is to be law on all, just as Secretary Olney once said that, under the Monroe Doctrine, the fiat of the United States was law on the American Continent.

This is a curious elaboration of the sense of President Wilson's Article II, which promises: "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants."

If the policing of the seas is to be put into the hands of two paramount nations, what becomes of the theory of a league of nations, great and small, free and equal? Mr. Williams is not the man to run away from his own logic. He says:

The two English-speaking countries, the United States and Great Britain, can maintain a league of nations, even if France, Belgium, Italy, and other nations refuse to have a part in it. If the two English-speaking

\footnote{215}'Republicans Fall Out,' New Orleans Times-Picayune, December 10, 1918, p. 8.
nations go into it we can, by our sea power, by our control over raw materials, by our control over natural resources, force the other nations of the world to do the league's bidding.

Is this the promised end of Mr. Wilson's dream of internationalism? We cannot believe that Mr. Williams is right when he says: "That is what Woodrow Wilson is going to Europe for." Great Britain is a friend of the United States. But when did we renounce our traditional friendship for France? Or Italy? Or Belgium? Or Japan? When did we lay aside our chivalrous regard for the sovereign rights of the smaller nations?

The natural assumption must be that Mr. Williams doesn't know any more about the President's intentions than do the other 99,999,999 Americans in whose behalf the trip to Paris was projected.

If he is right about the freedom of the seas then the freedom of the seas is already a ghost out of the international law books.

If he has accurately forecast the form which the league of nations is to take then Heaven help the league of nations.216

This was the most severe treatment given Williams by a large metropolitan newspaper during this phase of the debate. The Tribune's criticism of Williams is unjust in that the senator is quoted out of context and made to appear a war monger rather than a preserver of peace. Williams pointed out that in order to keep peace, all nations must cooperate to prevent one nation's declaring war upon another. But even if all nations could not agree to prevent any one among them from warring, then the allied, or English-speaking nations, could accomplish the task.

Hereafter we will declare beyond the pale of civilization any civilized country that dares make war upon another without having previously offered to leave the question in controversy to a fair and impartial arbitrament; and if any country will do it, that country will be declared beyond the pale of civilization.217

Then, following this explanation of the goals of the League, Williams outlined the measures that would become necessary should a country

decide to make war upon another without reference to the League organization. Only in this instance, according to the Williams proposals, would the United States and Great Britain resort to rigid control of the seas. So long as nations were content to live in peace with each other, there would be no "joint control" of the seas, nor would there be a division of the seven seas, as the Tribune charged Williams with advocating. Williams' recommendations did not, as the Tribune melodramatically predicted, indicate that "freedom of the seas is already a ghost out of the international law books."

No other major American newspaper expressed opinion on Williams' speech of December 3. The San Francisco Chronicle voiced doubt that the Senate would ratify the treaty, but later itself endorsed the League proposal.

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch praised Wilson's intention to go to Paris and decried those who attempted "to weaken or hamper him in the effort to realize his program and the national aims in the peace settlement."

The Atlanta Constitution urged that the senators defer their debate on the peace treaty until it came before them in "the regular and orderly way."

The pro-League Baltimore Sun enthusiastically praised Wilson's

218 "The President's Trip," (editorial) San Francisco Chronicle, December 5, 1918, p. 16.
219 "League of Nations" (editorial) Ibid., December 9, 1918, p. 14.
220 "Unity on Our Peace Aims," (editorial), St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 4, 1918, p. 18.
221 "Untimely Debate," (editorial), Atlanta Constitution, December 6, 1918, p. 8.
efforts and condemned Sherman as an "ass."222

A final indication of delayed response to Williams' address of December 3, 1918 was that the resolution proposed by Sherman that the office of the Presidency be declared by the Congress to be vacant on Wilson's departure for Europe was never considered for a vote. While it is unlikely that Sherman seriously thought that his resolution would be considered at all, Williams' immediate denunciation of it may have contributed to its failure.

In addition to the measure of immediate surface response and to delayed response to a speech, Thonssen and Baird recommend four other tests of effectiveness: (1) readability; (2) technical perfection; (3) the speaker's wisdom in judging trends of the future, and (4) long-range effects of the speech on the social group.223

It is probable that Williams' address did not appeal to the general readers of the Congressional Record. As pointed out in an earlier section concerning style, Williams often unnecessarily labored his points, his average sentence length was 40 words, and his sentences were excessively complex.

The speech of December 3, 1918 was not a model of technical perfection. Its organization was rambling with frequent digression, it was not always logically sound, and it was stylistically poor. Williams' use of ethical and emotional proof was superior, but hardly "perfect." Not enough information concerning delivery exists to make a judgment.

Williams was, on the other hand, perceptive in judging the

222 "Sherman of Illinois," (editorial), Baltimore Sun, December 7, 1918, p. 6.

223 Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., pp. 455-58.
trends of the future. Unfortunately for the United States, the "future" would come only at the conclusion of another international holocaust beyond the imagination of anyone who sat in the chamber of the Senate in 1918.

Although the proposals expressed in Williams' addresses during this period have been embodied in the United Nations Organization, it is impossible to establish a causal relationship. This is particularly true since Woodrow Wilson, rather than Williams, was the source for most of the ideas voiced by the latter.

Was John Sharp Williams an effective speaker during the pre-Covenant debates? This critic replies that he was effective despite his shortcomings of organization, style, logic, and tangible results. He was an effective speaker in that, by means of ethical appeal primarily, he made himself credible to his audiences. Because of his intrinsic ethos, Williams was worthy of belief.
CHAPTER IV

THE UNOFFICIAL COVENANT DEBATE

February 15, 1919 - July 10, 1919

The Occasion

The unofficial text of the Covenant was published in American newspapers on February 15 and was favorably received by the press. The St. Louis Globe Democrat, speaking for many newspapers, assessed it as primarily a moral force, and was inclined to think that the main value of the League, both in the preservation of the peace and in the promotion of the welfare of mankind, will be found in the machinery of international cooperation which it creates, and in the habit of mutual consideration it will establish. It is sufficient for the moment that it is born, and no birth of history, save one, is of greater importance to mankind.1

That same day, February 15, Lodge requested in the Senate "that the terms of the League of Nations, printed in all the newspapers, may be printed in the Record and also as a Senate document for convenience and use." Pittman of Nevada immediately asked that to this be added the remarks of the President at the time of his presentation to the Third Plenary Session of the Peace Conference. Wilson had said, "it is practical, and yet it is intended to purify, to rectify, to elevate."2 Lodge and Knox declined comment on the Covenant until they had read it

1Fleming, op. cit., p. 118.
2Public Papers, V, 428.
carefully. John Sharp Williams, however, presented, on February 15, a defense of Wilson and the League, although he made no specific references to the newspaper version of the covenant. This would be the first of three occasions during this phase of the debate on which Williams spoke. The remaining two were June 5, and June 9, 1919.

*Speech of February 15, 1919.* Williams argued, first, that three sets of people were "trying to throw cold water" on the President: the Bolshevists, the female bonfire burners in Lafayette Square, and a few senators and representatives in the Congress of the United States. He observed that a League of Nations would be practical: "Idealism in its highest form is the most practical thing in this world." He declared that Wilson needed, above all else, the sympathy of his own people. Finally, Williams argued that any possible league of nations would be better than none at all.

I have never insisted upon the league of nations because I was not competent to define the league of nations until our allies had had their equal say. But I have insisted upon a league of nations, and as I said here upon the floor of the Senate once before, I would rather it would begin with 14; but if it could not begin with 14, I would rather it would begin with the 7 allies; and if it could not begin with the 7 allies, then I would rather it should begin with France, Great Britain, and the United States; and if I could not have it begin in that way, I would have it begin with the English-speaking, self-governing Commonwealths of the British Empire and the English-speaking, self-governing States in these United States rather than not to begin at all. After the beginning it will evolve itself just as this American Union evolved itself from the old New England confederacy and from the commercial agreement between Virginia and Maryland.

That same evening Williams received from Wilson in Paris a cable indicating that the President had finished drafting the Covenant the

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3*U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit.*, 3442.
preceding night. Wilson invited Williams to dine with him at the latter's earliest convenience after the President's return so that they could consider the Covenant of the League article by article before it came up for debate in Congress.\(^5\) The Senator accepted the invitation provided that his health continued to improve.\(^6\) Wilson sent similar invitations to all members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He then made a public announcement that he was returning and that he had asked that the members of Congress not discuss the League until he had held his conferences with the committee members.

On February 17, Williams asked that a speech by former President Taft, delivered at Missoula, Montana, be inserted into the *Congressional Record*. Williams praised the speech, urging public support of the League of Nations: "It bears the usual Taft earmarks of clarity and brevity of expression and legal and judicial ability."\(^7\)

Unimpressed with the President's request for postponement of debate by Congress until his arrival, Senator Vardaman of Mississippi on February 18, urged that the whole proposal be discussed, vivisected, and analyzed, and torn to pieces until its every defect be found, but always without partisanship and without the "spirit of fault-finding." He warned against the twin evils of the "mesmeric power of the

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\(^5\)Letter of Woodrow Wilson to John Sharp Williams, February 14, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 2.

\(^6\)Letter of John Sharp Williams to Joseph P. Tumulty, February 17, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 2.

\(^7\)U. S. *Congressional Record*, op. cit., 3538.
President's personality" and the influence of "presidential patronage."\(^8\)

Completely disregarding the President's request, Senator Miles Poindexter of Washington began the assault on the Covenant on February 19. Poindexter raised five specific objections to the League:

1. That under it we surrendered the power of disarmament;
2. That it called for compulsory arbitration of all questions, without exception;
3. That it would compel the United States to "participate in the wars and controversies of every nation" and to assume the burdens of a mandate over any part of Europe, Asia, or Africa that was assigned to it;
4. That the International Labor Bureau would interfere in our domestic affairs;
5. That the United States would surrender to other nations the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations in arms and ammunition."\(^9\)

To Poindexter's address there was no formal reply from the Democratic side.\(^10\) Summoning the ghost of Washington on February 21, however, Borah, speaking to crowded galleries and a large attendance of the Senate itself,\(^11\) declared that the treaty violated the Monroe Doctrine and gave the British Empire five votes to our one.\(^12\)

Reed of Missouri added to the onslaught the following day, arguing that Great Britain would control the League and that, in any controversy, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan would always vote against the United States. Talking to packed and excited galleries, Reed discussed the articles of the Covenant one by one, discovering in each one multiple

\(^8\)Ibid., 3656.

\(^9\)Ibid., 3748.


\(^12\)U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3748.
evils which, when combined, he claimed, would destroy United States sovereignty.

On February 24, the date of Wilson's return from Paris, Senator Lewis of Illinois replied to the League critics. Lewis insisted that the United States had an obligation to preserve the peace and that best means of insurance was a League of Nations. He reminded the League critics that if Britain had five votes, the western hemisphere controlled fifteen votes. He argued that the combined power of a league could overwhelm any power that wanted to make war on one of its members. After all, Germany would not have attacked had she realized what she ultimately would be facing. The power and usefulness of the League would be determined by the force of public opinion behind it.13

Wilson returned to the United States from Paris on February 23, 1919. His ship landed at Boston, where, at the invitation of Bostonians, he delivered a speech at Mechanics Hall that same evening. Wilson had received conflicting counsel from two different groups of advisors. One group wanted him to say nothing specific until he had held his conference with Congressional leaders; the other group urged him to reply to the League critics. The fact that Wilson was going to speak in Boston annoyed Lodge, who commented bitterly, "Mr. Wilson has asked me to dinner. He also asked me to say nothing. He then goes to my own town and makes a speech--very characteristic."14 Wilson attempted in his Boston address to please both factions of his personal advisors. First,

13 Ibid., 4125-4135.
he talked of what he had done in Paris and of the reasons for delay. He reported that our country was trusted throughout the world and that no nation suspected the motives of the United States. In the latter part of the speech, however, Wilson attacked his opponents with a withering blast.

We set up this Nation to make men free and we did not confine our conception and purpose to America, and now we will make men free. If we did not do that all the fame of America would be gone and all her power would be dissipated. She would then have to keep her power for those narrow, selfish, provincial purposes which seem so dear to some minds that have no sweep beyond the nearest horizon. I should welcome no sweeter challenge than that. I have fighting blood in me and it is sometimes a delight to let it have scope. . . .

On February 26, thirty-four senators and congressmen attended dinner and the conference with Wilson at the White House. Senators Borah and Fall were the only absentees. Borah had written Wilson's Secretary, Tumulty,

I am sure no suggestion of mine would modify in the slightest the views of the President, and nothing could induce me to support the League . . . or anything like it . . . . It would not be fair to accept information which I could not feel perfectly free to transmit to my colleagues or use in public debate. . . . I mean no personal disrespect to . . . the President. . . ."

At the White House Conference the President was questioned on a wide range of subjects. One of his chief inquisitors was Brandegee of Connecticut, who afterwards issued the famous statement: "I feel as if I had been wandering with Alice in Wonderland and had tea with the Mad Hatter." Fleming notes that "on the major question of surrender of

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15Public Papers, V. 432-440.


17Cited in Fleming, op. cit., p. 134.
sovereignty, the President was said to have taken the position that recession of American sovereignty was not a new precedent, being an incident of every treaty."\(^{18}\)

Despite warnings from Calvin Coolidge of popularity of the League in Massachusetts, Lodge had determined to go ahead with his criticism of Wilson's scheme without regard for political consequences.\(^{19}\) To Wilson's complaint that Lodge and Knox of Pennsylvania had refused to ask questions or take part in the conference, Lodge replied that he had asked "at least three" questions covering "some rather essential points," although he felt that the group had "learned nothing."\(^{20}\)

On February 27, Hitchcock of Nebraska, acting Minority Leader of the Senate, spoke in defense of the League much in the same idealistic vein as the Wilson defense: the future would embrace a new age of liberty, statesmanship, and philanthropy, guided by the League of Nations.\(^{21}\)

Lodge, however, presented on February 28 what Fleming has referred to as the "classic" first speech for the negative in any debate. Urging caution and giving some indication of the dilatory tactics to which he would later resort, the Sage of Nahant admonished that

> We are asked . . . to give up in part our sovereignty and independence and subject our own will to the will of other nations . . . . We are asked, therefore . . . to substitute internationalism for nationalism and an international state for pure Americanism. . . . I am not contending now that these things must not be done. I have no intention of opposing a blank negative to propositions which concern the peace of the world . . . . but I do say, in the strongest terms, that these things

\(^{18}\)Ibid.

\(^{19}\)Garraty, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

\(^{20}\)Ibid.

\(^{21}\)U. S. *Congressional Record, op. cit.*, 4414.
I have pointed out are of vast importance. . . . What I ask, and all I ask, is consideration, time, and thought.22

During this time Williams became active in inserting editorials supporting the League into the Record. On February 25 alone, he requested that a letter on the League crisis, the Boston speech of President Wilson, and three other editorials be printed. Senator Smoot of Utah interrupted Williams' last request to scold, "I think, Mr. President, that the Senator from Mississippi has already asked today to have put into the Record two or three editorials. I want to say to the Senator from Mississippi that every page of the Record costs the government of the United States over $60." Smoot subsided, however, when Williams reminded him that he had the right not only to have these items printed but to read them aloud on the floor.23

Declining a friend's invitation to make a speech because the dentist had been trying to "assassinate" him for about two weeks, Williams at this time was physically unable to take part in the debate.24 He would have to wait for new bridgework to replace the extracted teeth before he would be again in action. Among those who recognized the loss at this critical time to the proponents of the League was William H. Taft, who expressed to the Mississippian his wishes for quick recovery.25

During the remaining days before adjournment of the third session

22Ibid., 4528.
23Cited in Micken, op. cit., p. 34.
24Letter of John Sharp Williams to A. V. Snell, March 3, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 44.
25Letter of William H. Taft to John Sharp Williams, February 21, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 44.
of the Sixty-fifth Congress on March 4, 1919, Senators Knox, Lenroot, Frelinghuysen, Hardwick, and Sherman joined Lodge in voicing opposition to the Covenant in the Senate, while McCumber, unconstrained by the dictates of his party leaders, was the sole Republican defender of the League.

In the course of his defense of the Covenant on March 3, 1919, McCumber insisted that what "we ought to do is be absolutely honest with ourselves. If we do not want any kind of an agreement to maintain the peace of the world, in Heaven's name let us say so and be done with it."\(^2\)

Also of the opinion that the Senate needed to take a forthright stand on the issue, Senator Brandegee, early on Sunday morning, March 2, suggested to Lodge that such a declaration should be made public. Brandegee, Lodge, Knox, and Cummins together obtained thirty-seven signatures during March 3, and, just before midnight of that same day, Lodge, the master parliamentary strategist read it into the Record in the most effective way. Any attempt to pass a resolution with only thirty-seven signers, not all of whom were present, would meet certain defeat. Garraty notes that "for it to be presented, voted upon, and defeated would have destroyed a good deal of its psychological value, if not of its actual importance.\(^2\) In this delicate position, Lodge placed his faith in the impetuousness of the Democrats." With steady voice but perceptibly shaky hand, Lodge read

\[\ldots\text{Resolved} \ldots\text{That is it the sense of the Senate that while it is their sincere desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace and general disarmament, the constitution of the league of nations in the form now proposed}\]

\(^2\)U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4882.

\(^2\)Garraty, op. cit., p. 354.
to the peace conference should not be accepted by the United States; and be it Resolved further, That it is the sense of the Senate that the negotiations on the part of the United States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany . . . and that the proposal for a league of nations . . . should be then taken up for careful consideration. I ask unanimous consent for the present consideration of this resolution.28

Garraty explains that "this was the critical point. If unanimous consent were granted the resolution would be voted down. But Lodge was clearly out of order, and his resolution was a direct attack on the Democratic leadership. Surely, he had reasoned, someone would object. He was not disappointed."29 Senator Swanson immediately objected to the introduction of the resolution. Lodge replied, "Objection being made, of course I recognize the objection. I merely wish to add, by way of explanation, the following: The undersigned Senators of the United States . . . hereby declare that, if they had had the opportunity, they would have voted for the foregoing resolution. . . ."30 Lodge then proceeded to read off the names of the thirty-seven signers, a dramatic thrust at the League proponents.

There was some feeling that Wilson would be reluctant to call a special session of the Republican Congress. To insure the calling of a special session before July 1, therefore, certain vital appropriations bills were ignored, and the third session of the Sixty-fifth Congress adjourned on March 4, 1919.

That same evening Wilson and Taft together addressed New Yorkers

28U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4974.
30U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4974.
in the Metropolitan Opera House. It was here that Wilson warned the senators that when he returned again from Paris with the official treaty, they would find it impossible to separate the Covenant from the treaty "without destroying the whole vital structure."  

Wilson nonetheless had been warned that there would certainly be a battle in the Senate. In addition to his "Round-Robin" resolution, Lodge had disclosed his inclination toward delay of the treaty in committee. Lenroot added the possibility of amendment as a strategy against the Covenant: "In my judgment the country will approve the proposed constitution if certain material modifications are made and other provisions simplified and made clear." Finally, Johnson, Reed, Brandegee, Moses, McCormick, Knox, La Follette, Poindexter, Thomas, and their leader, Borah, the "Mirabeau of the Batallion of Death," promised the strategy of outright rejection. 

Despite his boast in New York, Wilson, back in Paris, obtained changes in the Covenant to meet the objections that had been raised in the Senate. Having successfully threatened to quit the conference and return home, Wilson managed to secure a means for withdrawing from the League, an addition to Article XV exempting domestic matters from the consideration of the League, while leaving the definition of domestic issues to the discretion of the Council, a provision making the acceptance of a colonial mandate voluntary, and a further amendment that "nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional  


32 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4569-4572.
understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the peace of the world."33

The new draft of the Covenant with Wilson's amendments was unofficially published on April 28, and on April 29 Lodge held an important conference with Borah in which the Idahoan conceded that his fondest hope, the outright defeat of the League, was not possible. He agreed, however, to cooperate with Lodge forces in supporting amendments, although he would still vote against final passage of the treaty. According to this arrangement, the Irreconcilables would have their way if the treaty failed, but if not, the amended treaty would still be less objectionable than the Wilsonian proposal.

Determined to hold out for more drastic alterations in the Covenant than those Wilson had been able to arrange, Lodge later in the afternoon of April 29 joined Senator Curtis of Kansas in telegraphing all party colleagues requesting that they refrain from commenting upon the revised Covenant until after a party strategy conference. Successful in this move to hold the party line, Lodge's next step would be the packing of the Committee on Foreign Relations. But the first session of the Sixty-sixth Congress would not convene until May 19, 1919.

During the interim period Senators Borah, Reed, and Thomas conducted a rousing anti-league meeting in Boston, after which Borah toured Troy, Rochester, Albany, Cleveland, and cities in Colorado and the West.

Relatively inactive because of his health, John Sharp Williams

returned to Cedar Grove Plantation and made no public appearances during the interim period.

Financed by the Frick and Mellon millions and prepared for battle by strategy conferences, the anti-League forces were also in control of the Committee on Foreign Relations, with Majority Leader Lodge its chairman, at the beginning of the special session on May 19.

**Speech of June 5, 1919.** Not until June 5 did John Sharp Williams again see action on the Senate floor. On May 20 Senator Johnson had introduced Senate Resolution Number 12, calling on the Secretary of State to transmit a copy of the Peace Treaty, then under discussion with the Germans, to the Senate. A lengthy debate ensued concerning the advisability of making the treaty public at this time. The debate reached its peak on June 5 when Hitchcock proposed a resolution that there be a Senate investigation into Lodge's and Borah's claim that "New York interests" had received advance copies of the treaty. Williams insisted that the treaty, during its negotiation, was none of the Senate's business. He quoted George Washington as having denied the right of the Senate to interfere with treaty negotiations. "The language that General Washington used is this: 'The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy. . . .'" Arguing that the President should be left alone to perform his constitutional function until the treaty was completed, Williams declared that . . . from the beginning of this discussion down to now there has been a plain, palpable, and obvious effort and desire, or something that looked like it, to nag and worry and bedevil the

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President of the United States, not with regard to the making of a treaty but with regard to its negotiation, and every possible step has been taken to create in foreign countries the impression that his own people are not behind him.36

Following speeches of McCumber, who believed that printing the treaty would not be inappropriate, and Thomas, who branded the motion to print the treaty a political move, Borah concluded the day's discussion with the observation that the League was a party issue and that no one should deny it as such. The Lion of Idaho praised the Republican party for its belief that America should continue to control its own affairs and, upholding the principles of Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln, stand aloof from the broils of Europe.37

Also on June 5 the question of Irish independence was interjected into the debate. A resolution approved by the Foreign Relations Committee and presented by Borah requested the American Peace Commission to secure a hearing before the peace conference for representatives of Ireland. Remark ing that the resolution was "very ill advised," Williams objected to its immediate consideration. When the vote on the resolution was taken on June 6, Williams was the only senator voting "no." Williams received heavy criticism from the Irish element in the United States, but the Mississippian did not care "a continental damn if all the Sinn Feiners in the world passes [sic] a resolution condemning me... I will sleep just as sound, eat just as well, and drink just as cordially."38 He simply believed that the United States Senate had no more right to pass

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 680.
38 Letter of John Sharp Williams to E. S. Edwards, June 17, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 46.
a resolution advising England to grant Irish independence than the British Parliament had a right to pass a resolution advising the United States to grant the Philippines their independence. Representatives of the Irish-American Union, who often crowded the Senate galleries during the League debate, would have their chance to retaliate vocally against Williams.

Contrary to John Sharp's wishes, on June 6 both Johnson's resolution to transmit the treaty to the Senate and Hitchcock's resolution to investigate the "New York interests" passed.

Speech of June 9, 1919. On June 9 Borah called for unanimous consent of the Senate to print the final draft of the treaty which he had obtained from Frazier Hunt, staff correspondent of the Chicago Daily Tribune. In a heated and personal debate, McCumber, Pomerene, Hitchcock, and John Sharp Williams voiced strong objections to the publishing of a text as a breach of faith with the United States peace commissioners. Williams took issue with Lodge and Borah, who had maintained that the League was strictly a partisan issue.

Williams argued that the discussion of the treaty in the Senate had not been fair. In support of this thesis, he contended, first, that partisanship had entered the debate. He made the forthright accusation that both Borah and Lodge had publicly indicated that they considered the Covenant a political party issue. Then, the Mississippi senator asked to be corrected, if wrong, about either of his colleagues. Borah granted his silent assent; Lodge had by this time, "disappeared from the Chamber."39

39U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 792.
A second reason for the unfairness of the Senate discussions of the treaty had been, according to Williams, that the senators were attempting to usurp the power of treaty negotiation from the President. Williams declared that the senators "have been engaged for days and weeks and months in trying to destroy the confidence the American people ought to have in him [Wilson] as their representative." Following this, he chided his colleagues: "You have full power to make or to amend or to modify a treaty, but you have no power to negotiate one at all."41

After inserting as a part of his remarks an editorial entitled, "Reason or Passion," which attacked Senator Reed's argument that the majority of peoples in the proposed League would be colored, the Mississippian exclaimed that "... nothing was ever more stupid than that appeal of the Senator from Missouri." In refutation of Reed's argument, Williams contended that the white man's country would continue to be governed by the white man; that "... not a single move could be taken that would affect the interests of the United States of America in the league of peace, or in the council of the league, except upon a few unimportant matters of parliamentary and administrative procedure, without a unanimous vote;" and that, even without a veto in the League, the vote of the United States, great, strong, popular, and military as it is, would constitute a veto.43

Following his third contention, essentially that Reed had been

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 795.
43 Ibid.
unfair in his demagogic appeal to the southern people, Williams maintained, fourth, that Lodge deliberately took positions opposite to those of Wilson because of partisanship. As an instance of this, Williams cited Lodge's objection to the exclusion of the Monroe Doctrine from the original draft of the Covenant. When Wilson later announced that he had secured within the Covenant the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the entire world, the Mississippian continued, Lodge was again disagreeable, maintaining that the Monroe Doctrine is not a regional question and that no country, outside the United States, has a right to decide or pass on, or interpret it.44

Following this accusation of extreme partisanship on the part of Lodge, Williams contended, fifth, that Borah's position in the debate is that of an American "junker."45

I do not mean by that that he sympathized with the Germans in the war. I do not mean by that that the Germans could have gotten any more help from him than from me—not a particle; but his idea of State sovereignty is exactly the same as that of Bismarck and as that of Kaiser Wilhelm and as that of the Prussian junkers. His position is that there must be no limitation upon the sovereignty of a country, its independent sovereignty. He nods his head in approval. I knew he was honest, and I know I was honest, and I knew that I could not misrepresent him.46

Williams characterized Borah as a reactionary who would have the United States go directly back to its isolationistic status of 1913.

Williams' sixth reason for arguing that the discussion of the League had not been fair was that its opponents lacked imagination. They

44Ibid., 796.
45Ibid., 797.
46Ibid.
were the "legalists who can see nothing in the present and hope for nothing in the future except as based upon a precedent in the past." 47

As for himself, the Senator explained that

I belong to that class of men who dream, and who are not ashamed of dreaming; who dream of a better world and want it, and, in so far as they are worthy to pray to God at all, pray to Him for it, a world where not only individual men shall govern themselves, though in my own case I may have failed, but where communities shall govern themselves, and where nations shall govern themselves, and where, above all things in the world, humanity all over the world shall govern itself by common concert of action and common accord between nations in behalf of the right and justice and peace. 48

Finally, Williams admitted that the entry of the United States into the League of Nations would mean self-limitation of sovereignty. But, he argued, the Constitution itself had imposed a self-limitation of sovereignty. He emphasized the self-limitation as opposed to outside limitation. A treaty, a world treaty, or a league of nations is self-limitation of sovereignty, which Williams identified as the ultimate assertion of sovereignty in his eloquent conclusion.

. . . when the State of Mississippi has a suit with the State of Idaho it becomes outside limitation in a certain sense by the decision of the Supreme Court. But was it the surrender of any essential right of sovereignty upon the part of either? No. Why not? Because each consented to it, each agreed to it. In other words, because the so-called limitation of sovereignty was an assertion in the highest degree of sovereignty.

Mr. President, I reckon I have talked enough. 49

Williams spoke once more during this second phase of the debate. On June 16 he again asked that large passages from the New York Times be inserted into the Record as part of his remarks. Senator Smoot again

47 Ibid., 798.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 799.
objected to the insertions, and Williams replied that he found the "great editors of the great metropolitan papers . . . know so much more about the situation . . ." that he wanted the public to have a chance to read them.  

The Audience
As in Chapter III, this section will attempt to describe the observable trends in the three audiences with whom John Sharp Williams was concerned as he spoke: the members of the Senate, the American public, and the audience seated in the galleries.

The Senate
Additional senatorial alignment on the league issue came as a result of the publication of the first draft of the Covenant on February 14. In newspaper interviews, Senator Smith of Michigan, Senators New, Wadsworth, and Spenser declared their opposition. Although Democratic Senator King branded the League a threat to the Monroe Doctrine, Democrats Robinson, Ransdell, McKellar, Shafroth, Thompson, Pomerene, and Pittman issued their enthusiastic praise.  

The anti-league New York Sun on February 26 published a poll of the senators serving in the forthcoming session. Indicating thirty-one for, twenty-one "disposed to favor," twenty-two opposed and twenty-two

\[\text{\textsuperscript{50}}\text{Ibid., Part 2, 1156.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{51}}\text{New York Sun, January 16, 1919, p. 5; February 16, 1919, pp. 1, 7; February 18, 1919, pp. 1, 3. New York Times, February 18, 1919, p. 1.}\]
"inclined against" the League, the poll disclosed that, although a majority of all the senators were favorably inclined, the issue was divided primarily along partisan lines.

Despite the dramatic indication of the Round Robin that more than thirty-three, or the one-third plus one of the Senators needed to kill the treaty, were opposed to the treaty with a league of nations, all hope was not yet lost. The League to Enforce Peace on April 30 issued a poll, published in the New York Times which indicated

For the League: Ashurst, Beckham, Culberson, Fletcher, Gay, Gerry, Harris, Henderson, Hitchcock, Johnson (S.D.), Jones (N.M.), Kendrick, Kirby, McCumber, McKellar, Myers, Norris, Nugent, Owen, Phelan, Pittman, Pomerene, Ransdell, Robinson, Sheppard, Smith (Ari.), Trammell, Harrison, Walsh (Mass.), Walsh (Mont.), Wolcott.

Disposed to favor: Bankhead, Capper, Chamberlain, Curtis, Dial, Gronna, Jones (Wash.), LaFollette, McNary, Martin, Nelson, Overman, Shields, Simmons, Smith (Md.), Smith (S.C.), Stanley, Swanson, Townsend, Underwood, Williams.


Inclined against: Ball, Calder, Colt, Edge, France, Frelinghuysen, Hale, Gore, Johnson (Cal.), Kellogg, Kenyon, King, Keyes, Lenroot, Lodge, Newberry, Page, Phipps, Smith (Ga.), Sterling, Sutherland, Thomas.

New York Sun, February 26, 1919, p. 2.

Disposed to favor but later to become opponents, Gronna, La Follette, Curtis, and Norris may have indicated indecision, while Democrats Reed, Thomas, Gore, King, and Smith (Ga.) served notice that they would not be administration followers.

Democrats for the Covenant: Ashurst, Bankhead, Beckham, Chamberlain, Culberson, Fletcher, Gay, Gerry, Gore, Harris, Harrison, Henderson, Hitchcock, Johnson (S.D.), Jones (N.M.), Kendrick, King, Kirby, McKellar, Martin, Myers, Nugent, Overman, Owen, Phelan, Pittman, Pollock, Pomerene, Ransdell, Robinson, Sheppard, Shields, Simmons, Smith (Ariz.), Smith (S.C.), Smith (Ga.), Smith (Md.), Stanley, Swanson, Thomas, Trammell, Underwood, Walsh (Mont.), Williams, Wolcott.


sixty-four for, twenty doubtful, and twelve senators opposed to the Covenant. In partisan terms, this poll listed only Reed and Walsh of Massachusetts as Democratic opponents, while Republicans were more widely scattered among the three groups.

Adding to the confusion was a poll conducted supposedly by league opponents which appeared the same day in the anti-league Washington Post. Citing thirty-four Republican opponents, this poll listed all the opponents whose names had appeared in the League to Enforce Peace poll. Capper, Elkins, Gronna, Janes, Kellogg, Kenyon, McCumber, McNary, Nelson, Norris, Smoot, Spenser, Sterling, and Townsend, whose names had appeared in the favorable column of the former poll, however, were excluded entirely from the latter poll.

An informal poll published on May 16 listed fifty-five senators as favoring amendments, thirty-four opposed to any amendments, and seven undecided.


Senators opposed to any amendments: Ashurst, Beckham, Culberson, Dial, Fletcher, Gay, Gerry, Harris, Harrison, Henderson, Hitchcock, Johnson, Jones (N.M.), Kendrick, Kirby, Martin, McKellar, Nugent, Overman, Pittman, Pomerene, Randell, Sheppard, Simmons, Smith (Ari.), Smith (Md.), Smith, (S. C.), Stanley, Swanson, Trammell, Walsh (Mass.), Walsh (Mont.), Williams.

On July 9, the day before Wilson presented the Treaty to the Senate, Republican leaders announced their poll of the Senate, favoring the passage of reservations to the treaty, a feat requiring only a simple majority rather than the two-thirds majority required to pass the treaty itself. In addition to forty-nine sure votes for reservations, the Republican leaders confidently predicted the support of Myers, Thomas, and Walsh of Massachusetts, doubtful Democrats who reportedly favored reservations with respect to Article X, the Monroe Doctrine, and domestic questions. The Republicans conceded thirty-eight sure votes to the group against reservations.\footnote{New York Times, July 9, 1919, pp. 1, 3.}

The Public

During this phase of the debate, public opinion was such that even the League's principal Senate opponent, Henry Cabot Lodge, expressed despair at the great wave of enthusiasm for the League.

The great mass of the people, the man in the street, to use a common expression, the farmers, the shopkeepers, the men in small business, clerks and the like, in short the people generally, did not understand the treaty at all, had had no opportunity even to read the provisions of the League except in the draft which Mr. Wilson had brought back when he returned in February, and that knowing nothing about any of the details of the treaty their natural feeling was, "Now the war is over, and let us have peace as quickly as possible. . . . The vocal classes of the community, most of them clergymen, the preachers of sermons, a large element of the teaching force of the universities, a large proportion of the newspaper editorials, and finally the men and women who were in the habit of writing and speaking for publication, although by no means thoroughly informed, were friendly to the League as it stood and were advocating it.\footnote{Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), pp. 146-147.}
This analysis of public opinion during the unofficial covenant debate includes a discussion of the groups, individuals and publications which favored the League, followed by an exposition of the groups, individuals, and publications which, during the same period, opposed the League.

Groups Favoring the League

A. The League to Enforce Peace. As in the first phase, the League to Enforce Peace during the second phase of the debate was the best organized and most active of the groups favoring the League.

Bartlett reports that the leaders of the League to Enforce Peace were "overjoyed" with Wilson's amendments to the Covenant, which included six of the seven proposals made by Charles Evans Hughes, the majority of the suggestions made by Elihu Root, and all of the recommendations made by Taft, Lowell, and the League to Enforce Peace itself. 59

The Emergency Campaign Committee of the League made plans at its April 30 meeting for a series of state "Ratifying Conventions," which would coordinate activities of all pro-League organizations and workers.

Concentrating effort in fifteen states, which included New York, New Jersey, the New England states, Pennsylvania, and the Middle West as far as Nebraska, the Ratifying Conventions, held in a series like the regional congresses, began in Burlington, Vermont, on May 21 and concluded in Albany, New York, on July 7. 60

Prominent among the speakers at the Ratifying Conventions were William H. Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, Hamilton Holt, Herbert S. Houston,

59Bartlett, op. cit., p. 126.
60Ibid., p. 127.
Stephen S. Wise, Dwight W. Morrow, Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Frank Crane, President William O. Thompson of Ohio State University, and Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, the foremost leader of woman suffrage in America.

The League to Enforce Peace became active during this phase in publicly circulating pamphlets, circulars, speeches, and articles by prominent pro-league figures. Beginning May 21, a series of twenty-seven articles designed to explain to the public the exact nature of the Covenant was distributed to about eighty selected newspapers. Patterned after the Federalist Papers, the articles were called "The Covenanter." They were written by Dr. Lowell, William H. Taft, Henry W. Taft, and George Wickersham, and were later widely distributed in pamphlet form.\(^61\)

The League aimed its activity frankly at the creation of public opinion which could be converted into pressure upon the senators for ratification of the Covenant.

Bartlett notes that the League reached the peak of its activity during May and June, 1919.

Its headquarters staff of 115 employees occupied two entire floors of the Bush Terminal Sales Building. It had state organizations in all the states, and county organizations in at least one-third of the counties of the nation. Ten thousand people had official positions in the various branch offices of the league, 50,000 people were enrolled as volunteer workers, and its list of available speakers reached 36,333 persons. It was estimated that during May, 1919, 12,000 addresses per day were being given by league speakers. Its mailing list contained the names of approximately 300,000 enrolled members. It was not considered unusual for the New York office to send out a half million copies of a particular publication.\(^62\)

The League was active additionally in publicizing its own public

\(^{61}\)Ibid., p. 129.

\(^{62}\)Ibid., pp. 127-128.
opinion polls. In March, 1919, the League issued the statement that 150 leading newspapers of the country favored the League of Nations. By April 27, the League polls reported that seventeen state legislatures had passed concurrent resolutions favoring the League of Nations during 1917-18, while thirteen legislatures had followed suit in 1919.

Other polls released by the League reported that the League of Nations was favored by (1) the necessary two-thirds of the Senate, sixty-four senators; (2) the majority of the 12,000,000 farmers of the United States; and (3) the majority of big business.

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63 New York Times, March 17, 1919, p. 2. This report also indicated that a recent vote on the question taken at Amherst disclosed 300 students in favor of the League, with only 6 opposed. Also cited was a poll conducted by the Portland Oregonian, which registered 17,825 for the League and 109 against it. Senator Capper of Kansas was cited as the authority for the statement that Kansas was overwhelmingly in favor of the adoption of the world alliance.

64 1917: Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas.
    1918: Florida, Kentucky; Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Wisconsin.

Two state legislatures not included in the list for 1919 approved the League although not by direct concurrent resolution endorsing the League without reservation. In Missouri, instead of ratifying the resolution, the House of Representatives adopted one of its own which approved the League so long as the League did not interfere with national sovereignty and the Constitution. The resolution adopted by the Massachusetts Legislature called for a peace treaty first and the formation of a league afterward. New York Times, April 28, 1919, p. 2.

65 Ibid., May 1, 1919, p. 1.
66 Ibid., May 6, 1919, p. 2. This report additionally indicated that resolutions had been adopted by 193 organizations, including the American Agricultural Association, Farmers' Educational and Co-operative Union of America, Farmers' Equity Union, Farmers' National Council, Farmers' National Reconstruction Conference, National Board of Farm Organizations, National Federation of Gleaners, National Grange, and the Non-Partisan League. It also reported that fifty-five prominent agriculturists, representing every state in the Union, were mobilizing the farmers of the country for a "drive" on the United States Senate when the League of Nations treaty was presented for ratification.

67 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., Part 2, 2063.
B. Women's Organizations. Women's organizations were particularly active during the phase of the debate in expressing their support for the League. On February 14, the Interallied Suffrage Congress, meeting in Paris, adopted a resolution, proposed by Mrs. Juliet Barret Rubles of the United States delegation, which declared that "the coming peace should be a peoples' peace, which it could not be if women were not consulted, and that the League of Nations should not be an alliance of Governments only, but a general alliance between the peoples of the world."68

With Carrie Chapman Catt as its President, the National American Woman Suffrage Association passed resolutions on March 28 endorsing the League of Nations and urging the government of the United States "to bring about the prompt redress of all legitimate grievances" as a safeguard against revolution by violence.69

At its closing session of the National Chapter, the Daughters of the American Revolution on April 19 urged ratification of the League Covenant by the Senate.70

Finally, a group in New York, under the leadership of Miss Elizabeth Marbury, formed a League of Nations Association, the purpose of which was to "crystallize in the minds of the American people the value of the League." Apparently not an organization composed exclusively of women, the League of Nations Association elected as its President Judge Martin T. Manton.71

69 Ibid., March 29, 1919, p. 4.
70 Ibid., April 20, 1919, p. 2.
C. Labor Organizations. Also significant during this phase of the debate were the endorsements of labor organizations. James P. Boyle, head of the Central Labor Union of Brooklyn, explained to a luncheon of the League of Free Nations Association at the Hotel Commodore on March 8 that the members of the newly organized American Labor Party favored the League Covenant. Other speakers at the same luncheon, Richard Roberts, pastor of the Church of the Apostles of Brooklyn; Dr. J. Ryan of the Catholic University, Washington; and Mary E. McDowell, head of the University Settlement, Chicago, "united in emphatically asserting that labor desired that a League of Nations be constituted at the Peace Conference."73

The national convention of the Brotherhood of Trainmen, meeting in Columbus, Ohio, passed a resolution on May 18 favoring ratification of the League Covenant. The convention additionally assured President Wilson by letter that he had the Brotherhood's "fullest confidence and wholehearted support in your endeavor for the welfare of humanity."74

On June 9 at its Atlantic City meeting, the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor reported that it felt the terms of the Covenant would make the world "safe for democracy."75 On June 21 the poll of the entire convention indicated that 29,750 members supported, while 420 members opposed the Covenant.76 This endorsement, however, was qualified by a statement showing sympathy for Ireland.

72 Ibid., March 9, 1919, p. 1.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., May 19, 1919, p. 17.
75 Ibid., June 10, 1919, p. 5.
76 Ibid., June 21, 1919, p. 3.
D. Farmers' Organizations. In addition to the active support of the League to Enforce Peace, various women's organizations and labor groups, farmers were active in expressing their support of the League during this period.

On March 3, 1919, five national farmers organizations pledged their support of the League of Nations in a memorandum addressed to President Wilson. The memorandum stated that "unless such a League can be established the war will have been fought in vain," although it additionally proposed some amendments to the League constitution.77

The National Grange, which had expressed its support of the League as early as November of 1918, issued a statement on March 27, 1919, that the League had "won the united support of the farmers of the country."78

E. Educators and Students. Groups of educators also expressed approval of the League during this phase of the debate. Meeting in Chicago on February 28, 1919, a national convention of educators adopted a resolution favoring the League.79 On March 1, 1919, the Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association endorsed the League.80

In addition to the opinions expressed by educators, groups of students were polled during this phase of the debate. Ninety-eight percent of the student body of Williams College were found to be in favor

77Ibid., March 4, 1919, p. 2.
78Ibid., March 30, 1919, p. 9.
80New York Times, March 1, 1919, p. 3.
of the League; a vote taken at chapel at Denison University showed 300 for and 29 opposed; and at Yale, 814 students were for and 284 against.

F. Religious Groups. The One-hundred and thirty-first General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, meeting in St. Louis on May 19, adopted resolutions approving the proposed League of Nations, as did the United Synagogue, maintaining that world peace was an ideal of the Jewish people at its annual convention at the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York on June 17.

Individuals Favoring the League. Only one individual of prominence outside the government endorsed the League during this phase of the debate. On March 11, William Jennings Bryan proclaimed that "the League of Nations is the greatest step toward peace in a thousand years. The idea of substituting reason for force in the settlement of international disputes is in itself an epochmaking advance." He further suggested amendments to the proposed constitution of the League, which, among other things, would preserve specifically the Monroe Doctrine, enlarge the proportionate voting power of the United States, and make it clear that each member nation might decide for itself whether it

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82 New York Times, April 1, 1919, p. 10.
83 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 2067.
85 Ibid., June 17, 1919, p. 20.
86 Ibid., March 12, 1919, p. 1.
Publications Favoring the League. As the following table indicates, the nation's newspapers were active during this phase of the debate in conducting straw polls of public opinion. These polls indicated, as Lodge predicted, an overwhelming majority of opinion favorable to the League without modification.

A newspaper poll conducted by the *Literary Digest* confirmed the view of Lodge, Borah, and other prominent figures in the debate, that the nation's press generally favored United States entrance into the League. In a questionnaire sent to editors of all daily newspapers in the United States, the *Digest* asked the editors for their views of their respective communities toward joining the proposed League. Of the total of 2,042 daily newspapers in the United States, 1,377 replied to the questionnaire. The *Digest* reported that 718 editors unconditionally favored the League, 181 opposed, and 478 favored it conditionally.88

Politically, the independent and Democratic editors favored outright ratification, while Republicans favored it conditionally. Sectionally, strongest support for outright ratification came from the southern editors, while others were more equally divided. In each clearly defined region, the sentiment was for the League, and in no one state was there an opposing majority. The great majority of the editors favored a league of nations in some form. Notable exceptions were the *Boston Transcript*, the *New York Sun*, the *Kansas City Star*, the *Chicago

87Ibid.

88*Literary Digest*, LXI (April 5, 1919), 13-14.
# TABLE I

NEWSPAPER POLLS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Newspaper</th>
<th>Favored</th>
<th>Modified</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
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<tr>
<td>Binghampton (N. Y.) Press</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1,831</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston Post</td>
<td>11,247</td>
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<td>Bridgeport Standard Telegram</td>
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<td>1,425</td>
<td>4,709</td>
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<td>Des Moines Capital</td>
<td>328</td>
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<td>New Brunswick (N.Y.) Times</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>New York Globe and Commercial Advertizer</td>
<td>65,250</td>
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<td>Washington Herald</td>
<td>4,875</td>
<td>1,163</td>
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</table>

**SOURCES:**

*Boston Post,* March 15, 1919, p. 1; March 31, 1919, p. 13; April 7, 1919, p. 13.


*Washington Herald,* April 4, 1919, p. 3.
Daily Tribune, the Washington Post, and the Hearst chain of newspapers. 89

Among the pro-league newspapers cited by Fleming during this phase are Springfield (Ill.) Republican, Philadelphia Inquirer, New York Evening Post, Minneapolis Tribune, and St. Joseph News-Press. The New York Tribune, a pro-league newspaper during phase one, had by this time become an important member of the opposition press.

In Williams' home state, the Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger remained a steadfast supporter of the League and of Wilson during the second phase of the debate. On June 14, 1919, the Clarion-Ledger editorially described the Versailles Treaty as "a document of interest, of international interest, and [one that] will live in history as one of the greatest productions of the world." 90 On July 10, 1919, the Clarion-Ledger editorialized that

President Wilson is a man of great force and firm decisions and usually gets what he goes after. A few Republicans, assisted by Senator Reed of Missouri, who misrepresents the Democracy of that state in the United States Senate, have vociferously declared that the League of Nations will never be endorsed by the body of which they are members. It now remains to be seen whether President Wilson or these blatant politicians, headed by Borah and abetted by Reed, stand highest in the confidence of the people. 91

Church periodicals and farming journals were also surveyed during this phase of the debate: both were overwhelmingly in favor of the League.

89 George Harvey, Henry Clay Frick (New York: Scribners' Sons, 1928), pp. 325-326.


91 "Confident of Success," (editorial), Ibid., July 10, 1919, p. 4.
The *Literary Digest*, in its issue of March 29, 1919, disclosed that

Party ambitions and party issues are plentifully charged in the lay press as explaining attitudes for or against the League of Nations. Violent language may be used in some cases, but, without violent language, just as deep conviction seems to actuate the religious press, with this difference—that not one member of it, so far as we have observed, opposes the League *in toto*.92

Professor W. J. Campbell, Rural Extension Secretary of the League to Enforce Peace, conducted a nation-wide canvass of the agricultural press on the subject of League ratification which revealed an "overwhelming proportion" of farming journals in favor of ratification.93 Of the sixty-six farm papers surveyed, including "nearly every prominent publication of this kind,"94 sixty-two unqualifiedly favored the League, two favored ratification conditional upon a clearer understanding of the Covenant's meaning, one was non-committal, and only one paper, the *Tennessee Farmer and Southern Statesman*, published in Knoxville, was absolutely opposed to the League.95

One aspect of the indirect audience which plagued John Sharp Williams as well as other league advocates was the growing public apathy and lack of concern with foreign affairs after the declaration of the armistice. Swollen with wartime prosperity and eager to relax the tensions and responsibilities of Wilsonian idealism, the American public was increasingly less aware of the struggle over peace negotiations and the

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92 *Literary Digest*, LX (March 29, 1919, 32.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
league and more aware of the skyrocketing inflation, the violent and disturbing industrial disputes, the bloody race riots in major cities, and the rumors of Bolshevik activity which dominated the newspaper headlines of 1919. Link notes that the successful establishment of the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia in November, 1917, followed by the spread of communism into Germany, Hungary, and other parts of Europe, and the creation in Moscow on March 2, 1919, of the Third International, or Comintern, "... set off a wave of new hysteria in the United States. No other development of the postwar era so well reflected the insecurity of the American people as the way in which they react to fantastic rumors of an equally fantastic Bolshevik uprising in their midst."96

**Groups Opposed to the League.**

A. **The League for the Preservation of American Independence.** In March, 1919, the League for the Preservation of American Independence was organized to counteract the efforts of Taft and the League to Enforce Peace. With the former editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, Colonel Henry Watterson, as its president, the organization made plans for the establishment of a speakers bureau and an intensive publicity campaign throughout the country, all of which would be supported by voluntary contributions.97 The organization was to have eight regional, Vice presidents who were to "mobilize" American thought in their eight sections. The objective of this "mobilization," according to one of the organization's press releases, would be having every voter "thrust upon him the necessity for thinking over the issues involved and giving consideration


to the American rights which the 'declaration of principles insists are at stake and for which the country has fought more than once.'

In its Declaration of Principles, released to the public on March 31, 1919, the League for the Preservation of American Independence raised eleven objections to the existing Covenant of the League of Nations.

1. "It legalizes war in seven cases and makes it compulsory in three."
2. "By binding us to protect distant nations from aggression it will force us, in the event of trouble between any two league members, either to default on our promise as to the price of peace, or again to send our boys to fight overseas, no matter what we may think of the merits of the quarrel."
3. By forcing us to abandon the Monroe Doctrine it binds us to submit ourselves to the decision of an international council in case a foreign nation were to gain a foothold on this continent by acquiring Cuba or Mexico, or were to menace our Pacific coast by securing a naval base at Magdalena Bay.
4. It violates United States sovereignty.
5. It may force us into a war "without even the right on our part to determine on which side we shall fight."
6. It forces conclusions of an international labor bureau upon American laborers.
7. It may prevent us from protecting ourselves from undesirable foreign immigration.
8. It will not destroy secret diplomacy.
9. There are no provisions for withdrawal.
10. It will bring permanent and entangling foreign alliances.
11. "If the constitution is not intended by its framers to mean what fair interpretation finds in it, then its ambiguity, vagueness, and uncertainty are such as to require its thorough reconstruction or prompt rejection."

Even with Reed, Borah, and Poindexter participating in the drafting of preliminary plans, the organization was slow in getting started and lacked adequate funds. On April 21, 1919, the chairman of the organization's Executive Committee, George Wharton Pepper, wrote to various senators that unless adequate funds were made available, the "wisest plan"

98 Ibid., March 31, 1919, p. 2.
99 Ibid.
was to suspend activities. In May, however, Henry Clay Frick and Andrew Mellon began to finance the organization. This aid, along with that of the Irish-Americans, enabled the organization to finance speaking campaigns, mass meetings, and to disseminate literature, including speeches by Borah, Thomas, Knox, Johnson, and other prominent anti-leaguers. Disagreement arose during the fall of 1919, however, over support of mild or strict reservations and over which speakers to finance.

B. The Hyphen Groups. The three principal "hyphen groups," the German-Americans, the Italian-Americans, and the Irish-Americans, expressed their opposition to Wilson by opposing American entrance into his League of Nations.

German-Americans associated Wilson with their own mistreatment and suppression during the war, and they believed that the terms reached by the Peace Conference were unjust. Bailey provides vivid description of many of the German-Americans.

These people hated Wilson for having asked Congress to declare war, and for having prosecuted the war. They hated him for having visited a punitive peace on Germany, with its reparations, territorial excisions, and various humiliations—all seemingly in violation of the Fourteen Points. They were completely impervious to the argument that if it had not been

100 Letter of George Wharton Pepper to James Reed, April 21, 1919, Borah Papers, cited in Braden, "Rhetorical Criticism of Borah's Speeches," p. 288.
103 Braden, "Rhetorical Criticism of Borah's Speeches," p. 289.
104 Ibid.
for Wilson the peace would undoubtedly have been more severe than it actually was.105

A second major "hyphen" group opposed to American entrance into the League was the Italian-Americans, especially concentrated in New York and Massachusetts. They bitterly resented Wilson's efforts to wrest control of the Yugoslav port of Fiume away from Italy. Speaking to an enthusiastic crowd of Italian-Americans in Boston on Columbus Day, 1919, Dr. Joseph Santosuosso vigorously attacked Wilson's Fiume policy and even condemned Mrs. Wilson for having accompanied her husband to Europe.106 One of the most active of Italian-American agitators against Wilson was the president of the New York City Board of Alderman and future mayor, Fiorello H. La Guardia.107

Most vociferous, powerful, and best organized of the "hyphen" pressure groups was the Irish-Americans, who wanted self-determination applied to Ireland. Although the German-Americans outnumbered the Irish-Americans nearly two to one, Bailey observes that the Irish were more important politically because

First of all, the German-Americans were normally Republicans anyhow, and could be counted on to oppose the Democratic Wilson. Secondly, the Irish were generally Democratic and were vital elements in the great urban machines which controlled pivotal states like New York and Massachusetts. Every Irishman whom the Republicans could turn against Wilson represented a gain of more than one vote: one taken away from the Democrats and one added to the Republicans.108

106 Ibid., p. 24.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., p. 25.
Believing that Wilson would favor a policy of self-determination for Ireland as a part of his negotiations at Versailles, the Irish-Americans were among the ranks of League supporters during the first phase of the debate and continued as such until March, 1919. One national Irish leader, Reverend F. X. McCabe, president of DePaul University declared in an address in Chicago on December 8, 1918 that

We are here to settle once and for all where the people of Chicago stand on the question of self-determination for Ireland. We are here to voice our support of the greatest man in history, travelling today across the seas in the interests of the small nations--Woodrow Wilson.\(^{109}\)

A mass meeting of Irish-Americans in New York's Madison Square Garden on December 10 passed a resolution asking that Ireland be permitted to apply the principle of self-determination.\(^{110}\) In the course of the meeting, Cardinal O'Connell referred to the President as "once Wilson of America, now Wilson of the World."\(^{111}\)

A prominent speaker at the series of regional congresses of the League to Enforce Peace in February, 1919, was the Irish-American spokesman, Frank P. Walsh, of New York, former joint chairman of the War Labor Board, later a vigorous League opponent.

Five thousand Irish-American delegates from all areas of the United States attended the Friends of Irish Freedom convention in Philadelphia February 22-23, 1919, at which the delegates: (1) organized a fund-raising campaign with a goal of $1,250,000 for the following six months; (2) passed a resolution urging Wilson in his Versailles

\(^{109}\) *Chicago Daily Tribune*, December 9, 1918, p. 1.

\(^{110}\) *New York Sun*, December 11, 1918, p. 14.

\(^{111}\) Ibid.
negotiations "to apply to Ireland the great doctrine of national self-determination;" and (3) dispatched to plead the cause of Irish self-determination personally before Wilson a committee consisting of Daniel F. Cohalan, justice of the New York Supreme Court; John F. Goff, former justice of the New York Supreme Court; and Edward F. Dunne, former governor of Illinois. Unable to see the President during its first week in Washington, the committee was finally granted a brief interview on March 4. Wilson refused to hear the committee, however, pending the withdrawal of Daniel F. Cohalan, who had been implicated in the Sinn Fein Anti-British plots during the War.

The Sinn Feiners, regarding this as an insult, hissed the names of Wilson, Taft, and Lloyd George at a meeting attended by one-thousand members at the Central Opera House of New York on March 6. With Cohalan as their guest, delegates of four Irish Societies of Boston passed an anti-Wilson resolution at a meeting on March 17:

Americans of Irish blood were grievously offended at the action of President Wilson at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York last night in refusing to meet a committee named by the Irish Race Convention at Philadelphia until Justice Cohalan had withdrawn from the room.

Three thousand Irish-Americans hissed the President's name at a Boston meeting at which Thomas, Beveridge, and Borah were principal speakers. Further displays of alienation toward the League occurred

113 Ibid., March 5, 1919, p. 2.
115 Ibid., March 6, 1919, p. 1.
in Brooklyn, \(^{117}\) Rochester, \(^{118}\) and Chicago. \(^{119}\)

In Paris Wilson courteously but informally talked with the Irish-American delegation from the United States, although he refused to press for Irish self-determination in the peace negotiations. \(^{120}\)

The United States had fought Germany, not Britain (though some Irish-Americans would have preferred to fight Englishmen); and self-determination was generally applied only to former enemy territory. Wilson had enough insoluble and vexatious problems worrying him at Paris without taking up the questions of self-determination for India, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Ireland. Yet the Irish-Americans never forgave him for not doing the impolitic and the impossible. \(^{121}\)

Disappointed at the failure of the delegation, "President" Eamon de Valera, of the so-called Irish "Republic," stumped the country from March until December, 1919, to stir up greater resentment toward Wilson and opposition toward the League.

Although John Sharp Williams had in earlier years encouraged the Irish movement for home rule, \(^{122}\) he had been the lone senator to vote against the Senate resolution favoring Irish independence. \(^{123}\) Irish-Americans, therefore, especially after June 6, 1919, were a hostile segment of the audiences addressed by the Senator.

A final group in opposition to the League during this phase of

\(^{117}\) New York Sun, March 10, 1919, p. 5.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., March 17, 1919, p. 2.

\(^{119}\) Chicago Daily Tribune, April 6, 1919, p. 3.

\(^{120}\) Bailey, op. cit., p. 27.

\(^{121}\) Ibid.

\(^{122}\) Osborn, op. cit., p. 350.

\(^{123}\) Supra. (Chapter IV, pp. 143-144).
the debate was the New York Women's Republican Club which, on March 11, adopted a resolution declaring the constitution of the League "a menace to our republican form of Government."\textsuperscript{124}

**Individuals Opposed to the League.** Three prominent individuals outside the government expressed opposition to the League Covenant during this phase of the debate: Charles Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, and Colonel George Harvey.

Having earlier declared himself thoroughly in favor of the establishment of an international court,\textsuperscript{125} Charles Evans Hughes, in an address before the Union League Club on March 26, analyzed the proposed League Covenant article by article and suggested that it be amended:

1. By explicit provision as to the requirement of unanimity of decision.
2. By suitable limitation as to the field of the League's inquiries and action, so as to leave no doubt that the internal concerns of States, such as immigration and tariff laws, are not embraced.
3. By providing that no foreign power shall hereafter acquire by conquest, purchase, or in any other way any possession on the American Continent or the islands adjacent thereto.
4. By providing that the settlement of purely American questions shall be remitted primarily to the American nations, and that European nations shall not intervene unless requested to do so by the American nations.
5. By omitting the guarantee of Article X.
6. By providing that no member of the League shall be constituted a mandatory without its consent, and no European or Asiatic Power shall be constituted a mandatory of any American people.
7. By providing that any member of the League may withdraw at its pleasure on a specified notice.\textsuperscript{126}

Former senator and Secretary of State, Elihu Root, in a letter

\textsuperscript{124}\textit{New York Times}, March 12, 1919, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{125}\textit{Ibid.}, March 9, 1919, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{126}\textit{Ibid.}, March 27, 1919, p. 1.
to Will H. Hays expressing his views on the League, approved the idea of the Covenant but suggested amendments which would provide:

1. For limiting international arbitration to justifiable questions, excluding political questions, and defining justifiable disputes.
2. For the holding of general conferences from time to time for the codification and development of international law.
3. For reserving purely American questions, such as the Monroe Doctrine and immigration, from League control.
4. For the right of any nation to terminate at the end of five years, by giving one year's notice, its obligation to help maintain territorial and political integrity.
5. For verification of limitation of armaments.
6. For the revision of the League covenant within from five to ten years after the signing of the treaty and for the right of any nation, then or thereafter, on one year's notice, to withdraw from the League.  

Colonel George Harvey, editor of the North American Review and of Harvey's Weekly, had by this time become one of the League's most outspoken, vitriolic, and influential enemies. In a speech at the Columbia Club in Indianapolis on March 17, Harvey cried that "there is much confusion in the minds of our people. They are just beginning to awaken to the fact that they are being led into a quagmire. The makeshift document now existing will be amended no doubt and the time of its adoption may be postponed, but the menace will remain."  

To a gathering of Chicago bankers on March 15, 1919, Harvey labeled America a "cat's paw." He further declared that no foreign power cared for the "welfare of the United States or was giving a thought to it except to gain advantage and to obtain control of America's vast resources." Additionally, he said that the people were asked "to divest our nation of its

127 Ibid., March 31, 1919, p. 1.
128 Ibid., March 18, 1919, p. 3.
full independence and its most cherished tradition, and to sacrifice in part at least our sovereignty. 129

Publications Opposed to the League. Among the newspapers which joined the opposition to the League during this phase were the Kansas City Star, the Spokane Review, and the New York Tribune. 130

The Galleries

No response was recorded in the Congressional Record to anything that John Sharp Williams said during this phase of the debate. The Irish-Americans who packed the galleries in phase three would be active in their exchange of responses with the senior senator from Mississippi.

Summary of Williams' Audience During the Unofficial Covenant Debate

The Round Robin list of senators and all the polls taken during the unofficial covenant debate had indicated that there would not be enough votes for ratification of the treaty. Moreover, the Republicans were confident that reservations to the treaty would receive fifty-two votes, three more than the simple majority required to attach the reservations. Ratification of the treaty itself, however, required a two-thirds majority, or sixty-four votes. Since the Republicans were sure of fifty-two votes, only forty-four senators could be expected to support the league. Williams' "target group" 131 in his speeches during the unofficial covenant debate, then, consisted of the twenty senators who could combine their votes with the forty-four league supporters in order to

129 Ibid., March 16, 1919, p. 11.
130 Fleming, op. cit., p. 193.
131 Gray and Braden, Public Speaking, op. cit., pp. 146-47.
ratify the treaty. These are, at best, estimates of the numbers of senators favoring the respective positions, and no two polls of the senatorial preferences agreed. Even though fifty-two senators may have favored reservations, Williams could not be assured that the remaining forty-four favored the treaty in its unaltered form. Nevertheless, Williams' objective was to concentrate upon influencing those senators who were not already league supporters but who were not unalterably opposed to its ratification.

Even though public opinion overwhelmingly favored ratification of the treaty and American participation in the League of Nations during the unofficial covenant debate, the senators themselves, jealous of their constitutional prerogative in the ratification procedure and concerned with victory for their own party, were not responsive to the expressions of public opinion.

The Representative Speech

Delivered on the eve of Wilson's official presentation of the Treaty to the Senate, Williams' address of June 9, 1919, included all the arguments advanced in his other two speeches made during the unofficial covenant debate. Williams himself identified this speech as his principal address on the League of Nations. 132

As in the preceding chapter, the analysis and evaluation of the speech consists, first, of an investigation of Williams' speech.

132 Letter of John Sharp Williams to Ben H. Irwin, July 28, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 46; and letter of John Sharp Williams to B. L. French, July 26, 1919, Ibid.
organization; second, his argumentative development; third, his emotional proof; fourth, ethical proof; fifth, style, and finally, effectiveness.

**Organization**

A detailed outline is the first requisite to understanding and analysis of the organization of Williams' address of June 9, 1919.

**The Outline of the Speech**

**Implied thesis:** The discussion of the League has not been fair (for)

I. Partisanism has entered the debate (for)

A. Lodge has admonished his followers to wait for word from some indefinite source, supposed to be a Republican caucus, before taking action.

B. Borah contends that the Republican party ought to throw itself as a party into the breach against the covenant of peace.

C. The attacks against Wilson are similar to those that were leveled against George Washington by "discontented characters" who

1. sought to impede the measures of the government generally

2. sought to destroy the confidence which it is necessary for the people to place, until they have unequivical proof of demerit, in their public servants.

II. Senators are trying to usurp the power of treaty negotiation from the President (for)

A. They must realize that the Constitution gives them full power to make or amend or to modify a treaty, but not the power to negotiate one at all.

B. They dare not accuse Wilson of having been influenced by ambition or interested motives.

III. Reed's charge that the League of Nations will be dominated by "black supremacy" is stupid (for)

A. The appeal was designed to stir prejudice in the South.
B. Reed knows that the white man is entitled to govern the white man's country, the brown man the brown man's country, and the black man the black man's country in international affairs.

C. Reed is guilty of inaccuracies (for)

1. He included Cuba as a colored country, while it actually has a majority population of whites.

2. He knew that only in minor administrative matters could any action be taken in the League contrary to American interests without a unanimous vote.

3. He knew that even without a veto, our military might would constitute a veto.

IV. Lodge has inconsistently opposed Wilson from the time of the early negotiations of the Treaty (for)

A. First he pressed for the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine in the Treaty.

B. When Wilson managed to include the Monroe Doctrine in the Treaty, Lodge changed his mind and turned against it.

C. Before he became leader of Wilson's Republican opposition, Lodge used to say "politics stopped at the coast," and "never went any further."

D. Now Lodge is inconsistent in his policies (for)

1. First he argues for inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the League Covenant.

2. Now that it is included, he says that the Monroe Doctrine is not a regional question, but a question that no other country is entitled to interpret but ourselves.

V. Borah's position is that of an American "junker," (for)

A. His idea of State sovereignty is exactly the same as that of Bismarck and as that of Kaiser Wilhelm and as that of the Prussian junkers.

1. He believes that a State has a right to do whatever it chooses to do.

2. He believes there should be no limitation upon the sovereignty of a State except its inability to physically execute its decrees.
(Borah agrees with this analysis and points out that this was also George Washington's view.)

B. Borah fails to recognize the fact that no country ever entered into a treaty with the smallest other country in the world without surrendering or limiting part of its sovereignty (for)

1. When we entered into an agreement with Mexico to pursue bandits into each other's territory, we surrendered part of our sovereignty.

2. Any time we settle a dispute in court, we are surrendering sovereignty.

VI. The opponents of the League lack imagination (for)

A. They want to return to 1913 (for)

1. They want to be concerned at Versailles with quarrelling over boundaries rather than "meeting there with common accord to secure the peace of the world."

2. They are narrow, provincial, and selfish.

B. They do not recognize the difference between civilized life and animal life (for)

1. Animals must always start where their forefathers started.

2. Man can accumulate and profit from past experience and dream of the future.

Conclusion

VII. The self-limitation of sovereignty in our entry into the League of Nations would be desirable (for)

A. A world treaty, or a league, is a self-limitation, not an outside limitation.

B. It is not the surrender of any essential right of sovereignty on the part of any nation, because all nations agreed to it.

C. The so-called limitation of sovereignty would be an assertion of the highest degree of sovereignty.

Analysis of the Organization

An analysis of speech organization should consider the speaker's craftsmanship and his organizational adjustment to his audience.
Craftsmanship. An evaluation of craftsmanship concerns thematic emergence, method of division and arrangement, and rhetorical order in disposition.

1. **Thematic emergence.** The thesis of Williams' address of June 9, 1919, was that the discussion of the Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations by the members of the United States Senate had been unfair. Williams at no time in the speech overtly stated this thesis, but the statement of his main ideas and their development make it clear to the reader that this is what he intended to say.

2. **Method of division and arrangement.** As in all his other addresses on the League issue, Williams organized his remarks in a refutative pattern. He argued against his opponents for their partisanship in the debates, for their attempts to usurp the treaty-making power of the President, for Reed's misrepresentations of "black supremacy," for Lodge's partisan opposition to Wilson and the Senator's inconsistencies, for Borah's ideas of state sovereignty, and for the League opponents' lack of imagination. After taking up each of these arguments, Williams concluded that America's entry into the League of Nations was desirable.

3. **Rhetorical order in disposition.** Williams' introductory remarks probably enlisted the audience's attention and interest immediately, since he at once proclaimed that he, unlike Lodge and Borah, would be above partisan politics. A statement of this kind causes cynically raised eyebrows, as well as sneers from many of the lawmakers. Williams directly asked his opponents to correct him if they did not consider the League a party question. This request was followed by "a pause." 133 The

133 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 792.
introduction probably rendered only a portion of the audience well disposed toward the speaker. His enemies, no doubt, retained their enmity toward him. The introduction did succeed, nevertheless, in preparing the way for ideas that were to come.

The body of the speech, as previously indicated, consisted of the six main ideas and the development of each. The organization of this speech was considerably stronger than that of previous addresses by the Mississippian. He seemed less inclined to wander or digress. The speaker included transitional statements occasionally to indicate that he was about to speak upon a new point. By beginning a new thought with the statement that "nothing was ever more stupid than that appeal of the Senator from Missouri," Williams informed his listeners that he was about to develop a new subject. In addition to stating the topic sentence first in developing new points, Williams was, at one point, even more explicit. "Now I come to the Senator from Idaho." Williams elaborated on each of his main points with clarity and lack of digression in this address.

His conclusion seemed to be an emotional peroration in the true Aristotelian tradition. First, Williams implemented his own ethos by rendering the audience well-disposed toward himself and ill-disposed toward the opponents of the League. At the same time, Williams put the audience into the right state of emotion.

134 Ibid., 795.
135 Ibid., 796.
Mr. President, when you think of the men who have died upon the battle fields with their eyes unclosed, glaring and fleering at the sunlight and the moonlight, arms torn and gone, legs twisted and torn, gassed and yet living; when you think of the women at home mourning for them, when you think of the children left fatherless and without much of a mother's care, because the mother is disheartened and can not give them the old care, is there anything in the world even promising some relief from that sort of thing that you and I are not prepared to embrace if we can?  

He also magnified those ideas which favored his own case.

There is nothing in the world more pathetic, there is nothing more tragic, there is nothing more insane and idiotic—and I use the words advisedly—than war. There never was a just war on both sides since the world began. Somebody was wrong somewhere. All we ask is that there shall be some impartial tribunal to determine who is wrong and to enforce the decent opinion of the world upon the wrongdoer.

In addition, he minimized the views of his opponents.

The Senator steps in the arena and talks about "the sovereignty of this Nation." Who gave this Government sovereignty? The people. Who decided to divide the sovereignty between our dual sets of government? The people. How did they do it? Through the voice of the Constitution. What was the voice of the Constitution? Self-limitation, not outside limitation. That is all a treaty, or a world treaty, or a league is.

Finally, he refreshed the memories of his audience in his closing comments.

And yet when the State of Mississippi has a suit with the State of Idaho it becomes outside limitation in a certain sense by the decision of the Supreme Court. But was it the surrender of any essential right of sovereignty upon the part of either? No. Why not? Because each consented to it, each agreed to it. In other words, because the so-called limitation of sovereignty was an assertion in the highest degree of sovereignty. Mr. President, I reckon I have talked enough.

137 Ibid., 799.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
Enlisting the attention and interest, if not the sympathy, of his immediate audience, Williams then proceeded in his introductory remarks to prepare the way for the development of his ideas. The body of the speech was a lucid statement and development of six main ideas. The conclusion of the speech was virtually a model of Aristotelian rhetoric. The speech, had it been delivered before an audience of typical Americans, probably would have been considered a vigorous and moving refutation of those views of the League opponents and a justification for American entrance into the League. Delivered as it was to the members of the United States Senate with only the galleries representing the "average" Americans present, the address probably fell upon partisan, and therefore "deaf" ears.

Analysis of the Organization in Terms of Audience Adjustment

As in his address of December 3, 1918, Williams on June 9, 1919, again faced a group of senators, the majority of whom were opposed to his own position. He chose, therefore, to direct his speech to those senators who may have been on the margin of commitment, a group whom Williams' hoped would constitute the number necessary for ratification of the Versailles Treaty.

Williams presented the thesis by implication in a climactic order. He criticized specific opponents of the League, such as Lodge, Borah, and Reed, in the first five arguments of the speech. As a climax, however, he indicted all opponents of the League as men who lacked imagination.

Williams' arguments, or main divisions of the speech, were more consistent logically than in his address of December 3, 1918. Each of
the six main arguments bore a specific causal relationship to the thesis of the speech.

Unlike his previous speeches, the address of June 9, 1919, contained a few organizational devices designed to implement the listeners' immediate comprehension of the speech. In this respect, however, Williams fell far short of effective "oral" organization. He did not present a preview of the arguments he intended to discuss. He failed clearly to identify each new major section of the speech, and he failed to review his arguments in his concluding remarks.

A justification for Williams' disregard of techniques of "oral" organization may be presented in view of his decision to organize the speech by implication. If his intention was subtlety, however, the content of the speech was inconsistent with the organization. He boldly named his opponents and discussed them in sarcastic terms. He said that Reed's argument had been "stupid," that Borah was a "junker," and that Lodge was inconsistent. The critic, therefore, may well raise the question: Why should Williams have attempted to arrange his material in a subtle, implicative fashion if he was, at the same time, intent upon castigating opponents to their faces? These two purposes seem to have been in conflict with each other.

Since all the members of the Senate were, by June 9, thoroughly familiar with Williams' purpose in the debate, there seems no valid reason why he should not have stated his thesis overtly at the outset of the address, previewed his arguments against the League opponents, developed each argument concisely, and summarized the arguments along with his emotional peroration. Had he done this, the marginal opponents
of the League would have been immediately and clearly aware of Williams' objections to the conduct of the League opponents in the debate up to that time.

Invention: Argumentative Development

The severity and strictness of the argumentative development and the logical credibility of Williams' arguments in his address of June 9, 1919, are the concerns of this section.

Argumentative Development of the Thesis

In support of the thesis that the discussion in the Senate of the League of Nations had been unfair, Williams argued, first, that partisanship had entered the debate. As a hypothetical syllogism, the argument may be stated as follows:

Major Premise: If partisanship has entered the debate, then the discussion of the League of Nations has been unfair.

Minor Premise: Partisanship has entered the debate.

Conclusion: The discussion of the League of Nations has been unfair.

In his attempt to impress the twenty senators who might conceivably cast their votes with those already in favor of the League, Williams attempted, by inductive argument, to prove that partisanship had entered the debate.

First, he cited the past behavior of Lodge as a specific instance of partisanship. Lodge, he pointed out, had considered the League only as a party question and had urged his Republican followers to take no action "until they could hear further from some indefinite source, supposed to
be a Republican caucus."\textsuperscript{141} Not only was this an accurate reference to partisanship on Lodge's part, but it was an instance with which the twenty senators whom Williams hoped to influence were familiar. On April 29, Lodge had sent a telegram to all Republican senators in which he suggested ". . . that Republican Senators reserve final expression of opinion respecting the amended league covenant until there has been an opportunity for conference."\textsuperscript{142} Since the twenty senators with whom Williams probably was most concerned were themselves Republicans, they had received Lodge's telegram and Williams' accusation of partisanship was, to them, logically credible.

As a second instance of partisanship in the Senate debates concerning the League, Williams observed that Borah had urged the Republican party to throw itself into the breach against the League. This too was an accurate instance of partisanship toward the League. Borah had, in early May, 1919, participated in a nation-wide anti-League speaking tour.\textsuperscript{143} Additionally, the Lion of Idaho had, from the floor of the Senate, openly referred to the League as a party issue and had praised Republicans for wanting to stand aloof from Europe's broils.\textsuperscript{144} Williams' second instance of partisanship, then, was also logically credible to his listeners, all of whom were familiar with Borah's views concerning the League.

Williams' third means of supporting the premise that partisanship

\textsuperscript{141}\textit{U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit.}, 792.
\textsuperscript{142}Fleming, \textit{The United States and the League, op. cit.}, p. 196.
\textsuperscript{143}\textit{Supra.}, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{144}\textit{U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit.}, 680.
had entered the debate was by analogy. From Lodge's biography of George Washington, Williams quoted Washington himself complaining about "discontented characters" who sought to impede the measures of the government generally and to destroy public confidence in the President. Williams then accused Wilson's opponents of having been "engaged for days and weeks and months in trying to destroy the confidence the American people ought to have in him [Wilson] as their representative." As Washington observed, his enemies had not waited for unequivocal proof of demerit before engaging in their destructive measures. Neither, asserted Williams, had Wilson's opponents waited for unequivocal proof of demerit. Instead, they had been "nagging," "bedeviling," and taking advantage of every little uncrossed "t," undotted "i," or "q" not followed by a "u," in order to discredit Wilson. The analogy should have been logically valid for Williams' listeners, since Lodge had not only telegraphed his followers to withhold comment on the revised Covenant, but earlier he had instigated the Round Robin and threatened to delay the treaty in committee. Additionally, Lenroot had expressed a desire for modifications of the covenant, and Borah and nine other irreconcilable senators had advocated outright rejection of Wilson's work. Wilson's opponents,

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146 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 792.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Supra., pp.139-142.
150 Supra., p. 141.
therefore, had not waited for unequivocal proof of demerit before trying
to destroy public confidence in him.

Williams' second argument in support of the thesis that the dis-
cussion of the League had been unfair was that the senators were trying
to usurp the power of treaty negotiation from the President. As a
hypothetical syllogism, the argument could be stated as follows.

Major Premise: If senators are trying to usurp the power of
         treaty negotiation from the President, then
         the discussion of the League has been unfair.

Minor Premise: Senators are trying to usurp the power of
         treaty negotiation from the President.

Conclusion: The discussion of the League has been unfair.

Williams again sought to strengthen the minor premise of the argument
in order to influence the twenty senators who could conceivably ratify
the treaty. Realizing the familiarity with and respect his listeners
held for the American Constitution, Williams attempted to show that
Wilson's opponents were violating its principles. He argued that the
Constitution had given senators "full power to make or to amend or to
modify a treaty," but "no power to negotiate one at all." The sen-
ators had absolutely no right, Williams urged, to interfere with the
negotiation powers of the President. The question which must have
arisen in the minds of Williams' listeners was, "Have Wilson's opponents
really attempted to usurp the power of the President?" Some senators
had expressed their views on the general nature of the League idea. Some
had signed the Round Robin urging that settlement of peace with Germany

151 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 792.
152 Ibid.
be given priority to consideration of the League in the peace conference. Some senators had committed themselves to outright rejection of the League, and others had promised to press for amendments. The senators, as American citizens, had exercised their constitutional prerogatives to express their views. Williams granted this, but he strenuously objected to more official interference.

... you force upon the Senate now, with a partisan majority and with a few men on this side of the Chamber who are seeking reelection and think it is popular, an official utterance of the Senate of the United States as a body interfering with the negotiation powers of the President.\(^{153}\)

The "official utterance" to which Williams referred was Borah's resolution to print the final draft of the treaty which he had obtained from the Chicago Daily Tribune.\(^{154}\) Since the Constitution stipulates that the President shall lay treaties before the Senate for its advice and consent, Williams' argument that Wilson's opponents would usurp this function by urging an official printing of the treaty before the presentation of it by the President was partially credible logically. The printing of the treaty, however, was probably not mistaken for the negotiation of it by any of Williams' listeners. Wilson was clearly exercising his constitutionally granted executive power in a more forceful and personal manner than had any of his predecessors. Few of Williams' listeners probably believed that the discussion in the Senate had interfered with the making of the treaty.

Williams' second point in the development of the premise that the senators were trying to usurp the President's treaty negotiation power

\(^{153}\)Tbid.

\(^{154}\)Supra.
was a digression which may have been effective as ethical proof rather than logical proof. He asserted that Wilson's opponents did not dare to accuse the President of having been influenced by ambition or interested motives.

The third major argument in support of the thesis was that Reed's charge that the League of Nations would be dominated by "black supremacy" was stupid. This argument, too, may be restated in the form of a hypothetical syllogism.

Major Premise: If Reed's charge that the League of Nations will be dominated by "black supremacy" is stupid, then the discussion of the League has been unfair.

Minor Premise: Reed's charge that the League of Nations will be dominated by "black supremacy" is stupid.

Conclusion: The discussion of the League has been unfair.

In support of the minor premise, Williams contended, first, that the appeal had been designed to stir prejudice in the South. This argument was designed more as ethical proof to discredit Reed than as logical proof to substantiate the "stupidity" of Reed's charge. Reed did, however, direct his speech specifically to the men of the West and South.155

Second, Williams argued that Reed knew that the white man was entitled to govern the white man's country, the brown man the brown man's country, and the black man the black man's country in terms of international affairs. By clever use of the words "entitled to govern," Williams seemed to say that racial sovereignty in international affairs was a fact. Since the brown men who lived within the boundaries of empires

155U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 246.
controlled by white men obviously could not exercise control over themselves in foreign affairs, Williams' argument could not have been valid to any of his listeners who may have mistaken his statement for fact. If, on the other hand, his listeners understood him perfectly, his argument that races were entitled to govern themselves in international affairs did not substantiate his charge of Reed's "stupidity." Rather, it would seem to support Reed's claim that, if the black nations controlled their own foreign affairs, or were entitled to do so, then the black nations could conceivably outnumber the nations of the world controlled by white men. Whether Williams' listeners understood him or failed to understand him, they probably were not influenced by the "logic" of the foregoing argument.

Williams' third supporting argument for the premise that Reed's charge had been stupid was an accusation that the Missourian had been inaccurate. Williams presented a series of inaccuracies to account for Reed's stupidity. First, he said that Reed had misrepresented Cuba as a colored country, while Cuba's population, Williams maintained, actually was 66 per cent white. Since Reed himself did not challenge the accuracy of this statistic when he immediately interrupted Williams, the latter's version was probably accepted as accurate by all members of the audience.

The third inaccuracy Williams indicated was that Reed had known that only in minor administrative matters could any action be taken in the League contrary to American interests without a unanimous vote. Since the first provision of Article Five of the Covenant, concerned with voting and procedure, clearly stipulates that "decisions at any meeting of the assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the
Members of the League represented at the meeting,\textsuperscript{156} and since this article had not been controversial or under attack, most of Williams' listeners should have been familiar with its provisions. The article had appeared in the same form in the unofficial drafts of the Covenant which were in the possession of all senators. As logical proof, therefore, this inaccuracy, as indicated by Williams, was probably credible to his listeners.

Of equal logical validity to Williams' listeners was the Senator's third accusation of inaccuracy on the part of Reed. Williams contended that Reed knew that even without a veto, the military force of the United States would constitute a veto in the League organization. Acutely aware of the magnitude of their country's military might, the senators probably accepted this accusation as unquestionably true.

Only the inaccuracies of which Williams accused Reed, therefore, seemed to have been relevant and acceptable as logical proof that Reed's charge (that the League of Nations would be dominated by "black supremacy") was stupid. Williams failed to support his characterization of Reed's attempt to stir southern prejudice as "stupid."

Williams' fourth major argument in support of the thesis that the discussion of the League had been unfair was that Lodge had inconsistently opposed Wilson from the time of the early negotiations of the treaty. The logic of the argument may be tested if the argument is stated as a hypothetical syllogism.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Major Premise:} If Lodge has inconsistently opposed Wilson from the time of the early negotiations of the treaty, then the discussion of the league has been unfair.
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{156}Cited in Fleming, \textit{The United States and the League, op. cit.}, p. 537.
Minor Premise: Lodge has inconsistently opposed Wilson from the time of the early negotiations of the treaty.

Conclusion: The discussion of the League has been unfair.

In support of the minor premise, Williams observed that, first, Lodge had pressed for the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine in the Treaty. Then, when Wilson had included the recognition of the Doctrine, Lodge had abruptly declared himself opposed to its inclusion in the Covenant. This was a logically valid accusation of inconsistency with which most of Williams' listeners should have been familiar. On learning that the Monroe Doctrine had received no attention in the first draft of the Covenant, Lodge had complained, "Are we ready to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and to leave it to other nations to say how American questions should be settled and what steps we shall be permitted to take in order to guard our own safety or to protect the Panama Canal?" After Wilson had succeeded in attaching the Monroe Doctrine amendment to Article 10 of the Covenant, Lodge had decided that the Doctrine had not been an international understanding and should not have been carried into the League of Nations. Lodge's earlier statement had clearly indicated that he had felt American entrance into the League would have meant abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. As Williams' listeners could see, however, the Sage of Nahant had indeed reversed himself when Wilson had been victorious in securing the Monroe Doctrine amendment despite formidable French opposition. Since adoption of the

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157 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 724.
158 Fleming, op. cit., p. 185.
159 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 729.
newly revised Covenant could not have meant abandoning the Monroe Doc-
trine, Lodge was forced into an embarrassing reversal.

Also in support of the premise that Lodge had inconsistently
opposed Wilson from the time of early negotiations of the Treaty, Williams
contended that Lodge had once said that politics stopped at the coast and
never went any further. John A. Garraty, Lodge's most recent biographer,
verifies the fact that Lodge had held and practiced this belief during
the period of American imperialism in the 1890's. Garraty notes that the
Venezuela boundary affair of 1895 "... enabled Lodge to practice his
theory that politics should stop at the water's edge." During this
crisis, Lodge advocated bipartisan support of President Cleveland.
Garraty further observes of his subject, however, that "in later years
he was not always able to maintain this high standard of patriotic non-
partisanship in foreign affairs."160 Since most of the senators were
familiar with Lodge's record in the Senate, this accusation of incon-
sistency should have been logically credible to them.

Williams' fifth major contention in support of his thesis was
that Borah's position was that of an American "junker." The logical
relationship of this contention to the thesis may be seen by stating the
argument in the form of a hypothetical syllogism.

Major Premise: If Borah's position is that of an American
"junker," then the discussion of the League
has been unfair.

Minor Premise: Borah's position is that of an American "junker."

Conclusion: The discussion of the League has been unfair.

In support of the premise that Borah's position was that of an American

junker, Williams argued, first, that Borah's idea of state sovereignty was exactly the same as that of Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm, and the Prussian junkers. Williams further stipulated that Borah, like the junkers, believed that a state had a right to do whatever it chose to do and that there should be no limitation upon the sovereignty of a state except its inability physically to execute its decrees.

Williams' listeners probably accepted the Mississippian's analysis of Borah's position as logically valid, since Borah himself accepted it. Not only did Borah accept Williams' definition of "junker" as being applicable to his own position, but he observed that it had also been George Washington's view.161

Having had Borah himself accept the premise by definition that the Idahoan was an American junker, Williams further contended, in support of the same premise, that Borah failed to recognize the fact that no country had ever entered into a treaty with another country without surrendering part of its sovereignty. As instances of this, Williams cited our agreement with Mexico to pursue bandits into each other's territory and the settling of any dispute in court. By analogy, then, Williams attempted to show that any treaty with another nation involved loss of sovereignty. His justification for the degree of sovereignty to be lost in the event that the United States became a member of the League was that the purpose would be preservation of peace. Williams had already sought to minimize the loss of sovereignty by pointing out that only in minor administrative matters could any action be taken in the League contrary to American interests without a unanimous vote. He had also

161 U.S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 797.
assured Reed that even without a veto in the League, our military might would constitute a veto. Since these last two conditions were materially true and acceptable logically to his listeners, the contention itself, that Borah failed to recognize the fact that no country had ever entered into a treaty with another country without surrendering part of its sovereignty, was probably logically credible to the listeners.

The statement of this contention, however, could have been more effective as logical proof had it stressed the insignificance of the loss of sovereignty. A more pertinent statement might have been, "Borah fails to recognize the insignificance of the loss of sovereignty as compared with the gain of the preservation of world peace." This statement would have provided superior support for the premise that Borah's position was that of an American junker.

Williams' final major contention in support of his thesis was that the opponents of the League lacked imagination. The relationship of this contention to the thesis becomes clear when the argument is stated as a hypothetical syllogism.

Major Premise: If the opponents of the League lack imagination, then the discussion of the League has been unfair.

Minor Premise: The opponents of the League lack imagination.

Conclusion: The discussion of the League has been unfair.

In support of the minor premise Williams contended, first, that the League opponents wanted to return to the quarreling of 1913 and, second, that they did not recognize the difference between civilized life and animal life.

That the condition of world politics in 1913 was that of constant boundary dispute and quarreling cannot be questioned. Williams'
argument that the rejection of the League would result in a reversion to the state of international affairs as they were in 1913 was probably logically valid to his listeners, the members of the Senate. They were in a better position than most other Americans to know precisely the state of world affairs before and after the war. To them, a reversion to the status quo ante bellum would surely signify exactly what Williams predicted, a renewed state of international dispute rather than international peace.

A second reason Williams gave for his accusation that the opponents of the League lacked imagination was that they did not recognize the difference between civilized life and animal life. Animals, he maintained, must always start where their forefathers started, while man can accumulate and profit from his past experiences and dream of the future. Williams contended, by implication, that by rejecting the League, the Senate would be ignoring man's accumulated past experience with war and repudiating man's dream of world peace. Williams' argument may be clarified by restatement as a disjunctive syllogism.

Major Premise: Either the United States will accept the League of Nations and profit from past human experience, or the United States will reject the League and revert to the animalistic state of affairs prevalent before the war.

Minor Premise: The opponents of the League will try to prevent United States' entry into the League.

Conclusion: If the opponents of the League have their way, the United States will reject the League and revert to the animalistic state of affairs prevalent before the war.

Although this syllogism is invalid because of the probable nature of the conclusion, it illustrates the reasoning Williams attempted to use to
support the premise that the League opponents lacked imagination. While
the senators may not have regarded the situation of 1913 as animalistic,
they probably recognized the inevitability of either of the two alterna-
tives Williams suggested. These alternatives were, essentially, that
the United States could return to the quarrels of 1913 or it could pro-
gress to the civilized preservation of world peace. Williams' argument,
therefore, that the League opponents lacked imagination was probably
logically credible to his listeners.

In the conclusion of his speech, Williams restated the argument
that he had previously used against Borah: that the self-limitation of
sovereignty required by our entry into the League would be desirable.

Summary of Argumentative Development. Williams' logical strength lay
in his arguments that partisanship on the part of Lodge and Borah had
entered the debate; that Reed had been inaccurate, though not stupid,
in his arguments against the League; that Lodge had been inconsistent in
his opposition to the League, and that the League opponents lacked
imagination.

Less credible to his listeners as logical proof were Williams' arguments that the senators were trying to usurp the power of treaty
negotiation from the President; that Reed's charge of League domination
by black supremacy was stupid, and that Borah's position was that of an
American junker.

Perhaps aware of his own inadequacies in terms of logical validity,
Williams again in his address of June 9, 1919, relied heavily upon ethical
proof as a means of persuasion.
Invention: Emotional Proof

Audience Adaptation.

As in all his previous speeches in the League debates Williams addressed primarily the audience he knew so well, the members of the United States Senate. The division of opinion in the Senate was clear. Williams knew that a majority of the senators opposed ratification of the Treaty, and that there was a small militant group led by Borah and Lodge who, with their insistence on the "crossing of every 't' and dotting of every 'i,'" could prevent even the possibility of ratification. Williams, then, would exert every effort in this address and in subsequent addresses to discredit these foes of the Treaty. His emotional proof consisted of four basic motive appeals: appeals to patriotism, to security, to ethnic pride, and to self-preservation.

In appealing to patriotism Williams, first, accused his opponents, Lodge and Borah, of partisanism and selfish motives. A second instance of Williams' appeal to patriotism was his observation that, like those enemies of George Washington, the enemies of the League were united in "trying to destroy the confidence the American people ought to have" in Woodrow Wilson as their representative.

Not only were Borah and Lodge attempting to destroy public confidence in Wilson, but they sought also to "impede the measures of the government generally." A fourth appeal to patriotism was Williams' reference to the similarities between Washington's description of

162U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 792.
163Ibid.
164Ibid.
himself as a "public slave," and Wilson's "confession that he also had become a "public slave."\(^\text{165}\)

Security was a second motive appeal Williams used, as he warned his listeners of the danger involved in failing to ratify the Treaty. He pointed out that

Under the judgement of the justice of the peace or of the court, I or the Senator from Utah might be forced to do something that he or I did not want to do; but the world has agreed that in the settlement of individual controversies it is better to run the risk of the court's making a mistake than it is to leave men to cut one another's throats, and the settlement of individual controversies is of less importance than the solution of national and international questions by arbitration; because if the Senator from Utah and I agree to cut one another's throats it does not affect anybody but the Senator from Utah and me and our wives and our children; but when two nations go in to cut one another's throats it cuts the throats of all, everybody—the people that did not want it as well as the people that did want it—the women and the children and the nuns and the priests and the preachers and the lawyers and the beggars upon the streets, and everybody in the world.\(^\text{166}\)

A third motive appeal was that of ethnic pride. Williams remarked of the English-speaking people that

We were wise. The war has proven that we were wise. The English-speaking race to-day dominates—not by its navy, not by its military force, but by its common sense and its statesmanship and its commercialism and its literature this entire world; and to what does it owe it? It owes it to the fact that Great Britain was an island and were an island continent, and that during peace times, at any rate, we could leave the industries of the people unburdened and untrammeled. Schoolhouses went up, cathedrals and churches, highways, philanthropic associations, everything in the world that sums up civilization.\(^\text{167}\)

Williams' final use of emotional proof was his appeal to the motive of self-preservation, and, simultaneously, to the sentiments of

\(^{165}\) Ibid.

\(^{166}\) Ibid., 797.

\(^{167}\) Ibid.
his listeners. In describing the consequences of failure to ratify the Treaty, Williams vividly depicted the horrors of war.

Mr. President, when you think of the men who have died upon the fields with their eyes unclosed, glaring and fleering at the sunlight and the moonlight, arms torn and gone, legs twisted and torn, gassed and yet living; when you think of the women at home mourning for them, when you think of the children left fatherless and without much of a mother's care, because the mother is disheartened and cannot give them the old care, is there anything in the world even promising some relief from that sort of thing that you and I are not prepared to embrace if we can?\(^\text{168}\)

In his address of June 9, 1919, then, Williams attempted to influence his listeners by means of four types of motive appeals: patriotism, security, ethnic pride, and self-preservation. The degree of susceptibility of the senators to such emotional appeals is impossible to assess. The senators would have been eager, however, to disassociate themselves with partisanism and impeding the government. The appeal to security was couched in the most immediate terms, a hypothetical illustration involving the Senator from Utah. Finally, the senators could have been expected to be proud of the accomplishments of the English-speaking peoples and horrified at the terrors of war. Williams, then, probably exercised the best available means of persuasion in terms of emotional proof, although it seemed less significant than his use of ethical proof.

Invention: Ethical Proof

Character

Williams attempted to implement the audience's impression of his personal integrity by linking his opponents with what was not virtuous,

\(^{168}\)Ibid., 799.
by bestowing praise upon his own cause by associating himself with virtue, and by giving the impression of complete sincerity.

First, Williams attempted to link his opponents, Lodge and Borah, with the unvirtuous cause of partisanism. He accused both Lodge and Borah of opposing Wilson simply because he was a member of the opposition party. 169

A second instance of ethical appeal by questioning the virtue of his opponents was Williams' assertion that Lodge and Borah were trying to impede the measures of the government generally. Third, he observed that these men were attempting to destroy confidence in Wilson, an equally unvirtuous endeavor. Fourth, he accused his opponents of attempting to establish an official utterance of the Senate which would interfere with the treaty-negotiation powers of the President. "No state in this union ever had any control of any foreign relations. No Senator or ambassador from a state ever had any. You have full power to make or to amend or to modify a treaty, but you have no power to negotiate one at all."170 Fifth, Williams compared Lodge and Borah with those enemies of George Washington who had attacked their President. "Are there any two men in the Senate that are more capable of better 'barbing and well pointing an arrow' than the leader of the majority of the Republican side and the leader of the minority upon that side--both probably candidates for the Presidency."171 Sixth, Williams accused his opponents of seeking Irish-American votes at the expense of American

169 Ibid., 792.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid., 793.
security and world peace. "You have not yet introduced any resolution against Japan providing for the independence of Korea, lately conquered and very much oppressed. Why? Because you know Great Britain will be good humored with you and Japan will not be, and because there are a lot of Irish-American votes in America, and there are no Korean votes in America that is the honest God's truth about you." 172

A seventh instance of Williams' attempt to discredit his opponents was his accusation that Senator Reed had been guilty of distorting facts relative to racial supremacy in the League and relative to the United States' veto power in the League. 173 An eighth instance of this kind of ethos was Williams' representation of Lodge as a man of partisan inconsistency. He accused the Massachusetts Senator of, first, wanting the Monroe Doctrine included in the League Covenant. Then, Williams pointed out that Lodge had changed his mind when Wilson had succeeded in including the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant. The obvious conclusion which Williams advanced was that Lodge would oppose Wilson regardless of the policies of the latter. 174

A ninth example of this kind of ethos was Williams' assertion that Lodge lacked imagination. The Mississippian maintained that the Sage of Nahant

... has only a reasoning capacity, and a very highly respectable reasoning capacity, and a very highly respectable historical information, which enables him to make a very clear statement of something, but he can not put any heart and soul into it, because he has no Celtic imagination. He has pure Anglo-Saxon, Teutonic, exhaustive, and exhausting methods. 175

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172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., 795.
174 Ibid., 796.
175 Ibid.
Tenth, Williams labeled Borah an American "junker." He pointed out that Borah would take the position that there must be no limitation upon the sovereignty of the United States. This, he said, was the same position as that of Bismarck, and of Kaiser Wilhelm, and of the Prussian junkers. Borah's position lacked virtue because he failed to recognize the necessity of limiting national sovereignty in order to accomplish international peace among nations.\footnote{ibid., 797.}

Finally, Williams again indicted Lodge and Borah as "narrow legalists," "who can see nothing in the present and hope for nothing in the future except as based upon a precedent in the past."\footnote{ibid., 798.}

These are the eleven instances of Williams' attempt to establish his own integrity by linking his opponents with that which his listeners would not consider virtuous.

Williams' second means of establishing his integrity was by bestowing praise upon his own cause. Specifically, he pointed out, first, that Wilson, unlike his partisan opponents, did not talk about his assailants.\footnote{ibid., 793.} A second instance of Williams' attempt to associate himself with virtue was his insistence that he was a spokesman of "race supremacy, race integrity, race purity, and to making this country a white man's country all over."\footnote{ibid., 795.}

A third instance of self-praise was the Mississippian's comparison of himself with his opponents. He labeled Lodge and Borah "narrow legalists," "who can see nothing in the present and hope for nothing in the future except as based upon a precedent in the past."\footnote{ibid., 798.}

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legalists," while referring to himself as a member of that class of men
"who dream of a better world." 180

A final instance of self-praise, or self-association with virtue,
was Williams' identification of himself with "right" as opposed to
"might." "All I can say is that I spew out, as far as I am concerned,
the idea that this government representing the United States desires to
reserve to itself any power whatsoever to execute the cause of might
against the cause of right." 181

The third means Williams used to implement ethos in terms of high
personal integrity was by creating the impression of complete sincerity.
In criticizing Borah, he expressed his personal fondness of his opponent
and added that

I do not want to put myself in the attitude of a preacher and
of reading him a lecture. God knows I have no right to take
that attitude toward any human being on the face of the earth;
but I would in a friendly way counsel him to consider most the
atmosphere of the world and the atmosphere of the United States
and a little bit less that atmosphere of the Washington Post and
Washington Republican bosses of the Senate Chamber. 182

Additionally, Williams enhanced his sincerity with further praise
for his opponent, although in praising Borah he impugned the motives and
integrity of Lodge.

Now I come to the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Borah]. He is of a
different type. He does not pretend to be a Brahmin. He would
acknowledge himself not quite a paragon but an ordinary, common
citizen. He would not base his right to express public opinion
upon his scholarship or upon his pedigree. 183

180Ibid., 798.
181Ibid.
182Ibid., 793.
183Ibid., 796.
By questioning the virtue of his opponents, by praising his own cause, and by giving the impression of complete sincerity, then, Williams attempted to establish with his listeners an impression of high personal integrity.

Intelligence

Williams employed two methods of creating a self-image of a man of intelligence. First, he pointed out the lack of wisdom on the part of his opponents, and second, he emphasized his own intelligence in practical affairs. In short, he presented himself as a man of common sense.

First, he reflected upon the lack of good sense of Lodge and Borah. He said that the question of presidential authority to negotiate a treaty had been so clearly established that it could only be disputed by a man with "the intelligence of a Bronx Hill goat, who recognizes no higher ambition in life than eating a tin can." This indictment of Lodge and Borah, however, was more subtle than his attack upon Senator Reed. Williams directly accused Reed of having distorted information regarding racial supremacy and asserted that "nothing was ever more stupid than that appeal of the Senator from Missouri."  

In a final attack upon the wisdom of his opponents, Williams recognized their integrity and their sincerity in their efforts to discredit the League of Nations. "Their honesty I can fully recognize, their intellectual integrity I rather admire, but their wisdom I can not

184Ibid., 792.
185Ibid., 795.
perceive, because if they be right with regard to nations in international affairs the same principle would be right as regards individual affairs and as regards affairs between states in the American Union."186

In presenting himself as a man of common sense, Williams, first, made use of the argument from analogy to demonstrate the similarities between the local government of individuals and the international government of nations. He argued that in entering an agreement with Mexico mutually to pursue and capture bandits across Federal boundaries, each nation had surrendered a degree of its sovereignty. He argued, additionally, that when individual disputes are settled in court, this too is a surrender of some individual sovereignty. He concluded that individuals could cut one another's throats with little harm to other individuals. He added, however, that "when two nations go in to cut one another's throats it cuts the throats of all, everybody--the people that would not want it as well as the people that did want it--the women and the children and the nuns and the priests and the preachers and the lawyers and the beggars upon the streets, and everybody in the world."187

A second instance of Williams' presentation of himself as a man of common sense was that of his penetrating analysis of civilization.

What is civilization? It is the massing together at a given time of the accumulations of the past. How does a man differ from the brutes of the field? Simply by the fact that from one generation to another he can accumulate. The cat and the dog and the tiger and the lion start where their forefathers started. We started upon the shoulders of our forefathers; and all that accumulation, from generation to generation, spells civilization.

186 Ibid., 798.
187 Ibid., 797.
Man is the only monument building creature, because he is the only one that considers the past. He is the only creature that dreams of the future and "has visions," because he is the only one that thinks of the future to any great extent. And here step in the Prussian and American junkers, including my good, dear friend from Idaho, and they tell us, "Do not, above all things in the world, let there be even a suspicion of the limitation of your sovereignty," as if a voluntary limitation were any less an act of sovereignty than the failure to make a limitation.\textsuperscript{188}

In a third attempt to enhance his ethos as a man of common sense, Williams presented a simplified explanation of the nature of sovereignty.

What is the difference between a savage and civilized man? One puts limitations upon his individual sovereignty, and the other does not. What is the difference between a civilized nation and a savage or barbarous nation like Turkey? One puts limitations—whether by unwritten law, as in Great Britain, or by written law, as here—upon its free action and the other does not; and of all the men who have stood in this Chamber, in eloquent words and in eloquent thought approving and applauding the idea of putting a self-limit upon the operation of National Government, the Senator from Idaho stands at the front. The Constitution of the United States is nothing but the people's self-limitation upon their dual agencies of Government.\textsuperscript{189}

A fourth instance of a common sense explanation was Williams' observation that the United States would never be overpowered by the force of world opinion should it join the League of Nations.

Oh, you tell me, now, then, if this peace goes into effect the United States might be forced to do something it does not want to do. It has, in the first place, a veto power, and if the public opinion of the world became so powerful that that veto power did not count, then the United States ought to be made to do what common humanity and common sense and the interests of the world demand. That time will never come. There is no fear of it. I have no fear at all of the world running up against the United States.\textsuperscript{190}

Finally, Williams seems to have intended leaving his listeners

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 797-98.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 798.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
with the impression that he was a man of common sense by declaring that citizens of the United States were already accustomed to self-limitation of sovereignty. He compared the United States Constitution, an agreement among the states to limit their sovereignty, with an international agreement among nations to limit their sovereignty.

What was the voice of the Constitution? Self-limitation upon the sovereignty of the States and the sovereignty of individuals. Self-limitation, not outside limitation. That is all a treaty, or a world treaty, or league is. And yet when the State of Mississippi has a suit with the State of Idaho it becomes outside limitations in a certain sense by the decision of the Supreme Court. But was it the surrender of any essential right of sovereignty upon the part of either? No. Why not? Because each consented to it, each agreed to it. In other words, because the so-called limitation of sovereignty was an assertion in the highest degree of sovereignty.  

Williams' methods of enhancing his intelligence consisted of emphasizing his opponents' lack of wisdom and of presenting himself as a man of common sense.

**Good Will**

Williams generally presented himself as a man with his country's best interests at heart. He criticized as harmful to the country the partisanship shown by Lodge, Borah, and Reed. He decried their attempts to usurp the constitutional prerogative of the President in negotiating treaties, and he rebuked narrow provincialism, urging, as the best policy for the country, the self-limitation of some degree of national sovereignty.

Throughout this address, as in all his addresses, Williams was a spokesman for world peace. On some occasions he demonstrated good will toward some of his opponents who were among his listeners. Specifically,

191Ibid., 799.
he expressed personal good will toward Borah and urged him to reconsider his position. ". . . I would in a friendly way counsel him to consider most the atmosphere of the world and the atmosphere of the United States and a little bit less the atmosphere of the Washington Post and Washington Republican bosses and of the Senate Chamber." 192

Summary of Ethical Proof

As in previous addresses, Williams again relied most heavily upon ethos as his primary mode of proof. He sought to discredit his opponents by linking them with causes not in the best interests of the United States. He presented himself, on the other hand, as a spokesman for United States interests, as a man of intelligent common sense, and as a man of good will.

Style

Clearness

As in his address of December 3, 1918, Williams spoke in an impromptu fashion. This type of delivery probably contributed to a lack of clearness in the address of June 9. Factors which compensated for the resulting lack of organization, however, included the speaker's thorough understanding and knowledge of the ideas involved in the debate. Additionally, his word choice was that of the cultured planter class he represented. The appropriateness of his words may again be questioned on the basis of his severely critical expressions toward his colleagues. From the standpoint of clearness, however, Williams could not have been misunderstood by any adult who heard him or who may have read the text of

192 Ibid., 793.
his speech. Further, there are no words in the text of the June 9 address which have lost either their currency, reputability, or intelligibility today.

This speech, however, lacked the variety in word choice which Williams had displayed in his address of December 3. There were few of the forceful monosyllabic verbs that had appeared in the previous text, although in his emotionally loaded conclusion, Williams employed such simple, yet descriptive, adjectives as "torn," "gone," "twisted," and "gassed." 193

In addition to a thorough understanding of the ideas in the debates and discerning word selection, a third means for evaluating clarity of style was the complexity of sentence structure. Again, Williams made frequent use of compound and complex sentences, but, unlike the previous address, he also frequently used simple sentences. In a sampling of ten paragraphs from the speech, 194 Williams used twenty-nine simple sentences, seven compound, fourteen complex, and ten compound-complex sentences. This indicates that Williams was probably clearer in his presentation of June 9 than he had been on December 3, 1918.

A fourth element contributing to clarity was the use of definitions, examples, and illustrations to clarify ideas. Williams was especially concerned with defining the term "sovereignty" and showing that in any organized society, some degree of sovereignty must be sacrificed. In this connection, he attempted to convince his listeners that the

193 Ibid., 799.

194 I counted the types of sentences in every fifth paragraph for my representative sampling.
self-limitation of sovereignty required by any treaty between nations was "an assertion in the highest degree of sovereignty." Williams provided examples of self-limitation of sovereignty by pointing out instances of the settlement of individual disputes in a court of justice rather than upon a public highway, and instances of the self-government of men and communities of men. His most striking illustration was his description of the tragedy and horror of the men who had died in battle and the sorrow of their dependents.

Williams was less successful in terms of the fifth element of clearness, control over the details in the speech. As in the speech of December 3, he seemed unable to avoid involved elaborations. He grew especially involved in devoting fifteen paragraphs to the abuses suffered by George Washington at the hands of his political foes. He used seventeen paragraphs to develop the idea of sovereignty.

Although he seemed to elaborate at some length on the political enmity existing in the Senate toward the President and on the concept of sovereignty, Williams thereby did discriminate between the essential and the less essential materials. These two ideas were vital to the support of his thesis that the discussion of the League had been unfair.

With respect to the sixth element of clarity, organizational

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195 Ibid., 799.
196 Ibid., 797.
197 Ibid., 798.
198 Ibid., 799.
199 Ibid., 792-3.
200 Ibid., 796-98.
integrity, Williams seemed somewhat more orderly in this presentation than in the speech of December 3, 1918.\textsuperscript{201} Also, as previously pointed out, he included transitional statements which bridged the gaps between parts of the speech and which suggested the direction in which subsequent material would move. As previously indicated, however, Williams had no justification for failure to make more frequent use of transitional material to clarify the organization of the address.

A seventh consideration is the adequacy of the speaker's logical materials. As indicated previously, Williams' evidence and arguments generally lent credibility to his address.

Williams included no specific summaries, an eighth element of clarity, although he did refresh the memories of his listeners when, in his concluding remarks, he referred again to the concept of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{202}

With respect to clearness, then, Williams' thorough understanding of his material, his word choice, his more frequent use of simple sentences than in previous speeches, his attention to definition of the key term, "sovereignty," his use of striking illustration, and the general logical credibility of his arguments to his listeners contributed to the clarity of his presentation.

Unfortunately, the speaker failed adequately to organize his material for oral presentation. Probably because of the impromptu nature of the address, the listeners must have had difficulty in determining precisely what the speaker intended to say. The most logical point in the speech for a review of the arguments would have been in the conclusion.

\textsuperscript{201}Supra., p. 86.

\textsuperscript{202}U. S. \textit{Congressional Record}, op. cit., 799.
Williams did not summarize his arguments at any time in the address. Moreover, his use of transitional material was so sparing that the likelihood that any of his listeners could have outlined his speech on merely hearing it was remote.

Additionally, Williams exercised little control over details in his speech. His elaborations were excessive and hindered, rather than implemented, the clarity of his style.

**Impressiveness**

The first element which contributed to Williams' impressiveness in style was his reliance upon ethical proof as his primary means of persuasion. Throughout the speech he sought to discredit his opponents by demonstrating their selfish interests as opposed to his own altruistic purpose: securing world peace through United States participation in the League of Nations.\(^{203}\)

Williams' use of imagery constituted a second element of impressiveness, although he employed less imagery than in his previous addresses. He limited his style to two types of imagery: visual and tactile.

His first instance of visual imagery was his allegation that the matter of responsibility for the making of treaties had been "too clearly settled for dispute by any man with the intelligence of a Bronx Hill goat, who recognizes no higher ambition in life than eating a tin can."\(^{204}\) A second instance of visual imagery was his comparison of Borah and Lodge with the individuals who had attempted to detract from the character of

\(^{203}\)Supra.

\(^{204}\)U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 792.
George Washington. Of his colleagues from Idaho and from Massachusetts, the Mississippian asked

Are there any two men in the Senate that are more capable of better "barbing and well pointing an arrow" than the leader of the majority of the Republican side and the leader of the minority upon that side--both probably candidates for the presidency?205

A third instance of visual imagery was Williams' emotional reference to the men who had died upon the battlefields "with their eyes unclosed, glaring and fleering in the sunlight and the moonlight, arms torn and gone, legs twisted and torn, gassed and yet living."206 A fourth instance of visual imagery was Williams' reference to Wilson's "stiff, long lower jaw."207 A sixth use of visual imagery was Williams' reference to Borah's accusation that ex-President Taft was a "walking corpse."208

Williams' single instance of tactile imagery was his insistence that

it is better to run the risk of the court's making a mistake than it is to leave men to cut one another's throats, and the settlement of individual controversies is of less importance than the solution of national and international questions by arbitration.209

Williams' sentence structure did not contribute to his impressiveness. In a sampling of the first 100 words of every third paragraph, Williams' average sentence length proved to be forty-two words. In a sampling of every fifth paragraph of the speech, however, there were twenty-nine simple sentences, seven compound sentences, fourteen complex

205 Ibid., 793.
206 Ibid., 799.
207 Ibid., 793.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid., 797.
sentences, and ten compound-complex sentences. In terms of sentence form, a sampling of every fifth paragraph revealed six questions, two periodic sentences, twenty-two loose sentences, and six balanced sentences. Williams' sentences, therefore were generally too long and too loose to contribute effectively to impressiveness of style.

A final stylistic device which contributed to Williams' impressiveness was his use of tropes. First, he employed an allegory to illustrate that a peace-loving country could promote world peace.

If you sow the seeds of might and power and empire and unlimited sovereignty, the chances are that you will reap a harvest of that sort raised on some other people's field, not on your own; and if you sow seeds of accord, harmony, peace, self-limitation, then of those seeds some day you will reap the harvest that you planted, and it is the only destiny that I know of that is both good and manifest.210

Second, Williams made use of a synecdoche to depict the unjust treatment Wilson's enemies had accorded him.

Without waiting until they have "unequivocal proof of demerit," to quote the language of George Washington, they and their foolish followers have been nagging, have been bedeviling, have been on the outside taking advantage of every little uncrossed "t" or undotted "i," or a "q" not followed by a "u," in order to arouse distrust of our representative in Europe--our representative, whether we are Republicans or not.211

Williams' third use of trope took the form of irony.

Oh, they come from Massachusetts--these infallible guides--they come from Idaho; they come from Missouri; they come from all around the country, as you know. They are such "infallible guides" that "one is at no loss for a director at every turn." One may be at a bit of a loss about following the directions if he is a good American, an unhyphenated patriot, and devoted to his own country, without any regard to a "fatherland" in Europe--if he is just an American and nothing more, and spews out hyphens.212

210 Ibid., 798.
211 Ibid., 792.
212 Ibid., 793.
A fourth instance of the use of trope was Williams' two hyperboles. In castigating the opponents of Wilson who would argue the right of the President to make treaties, Williams diminished the matter by observing that it was "too clearly settled for dispute by any man with the intelligence of a Bronx Hill goat, who recognizes no higher ambition in life than eating a tin can." Williams additionally diminished things below the truth by remarking that Lodge had come into the Senate chamber a few days earlier and had "literally made the air blue with apprehension as to what was going to happen to us when Europe got hold of the Monroe Doctrine, on the ground that it was not mentioned in the treaty."  

Summary of Style

In his address of June 9, 1919, Williams' stylistic strengths in terms of clearness were his thorough understanding and knowledge of the ideas involved in the debate and the clarity of his choice of words. He used more simple sentences than in previous addresses, but still relied heavily upon compound, complex, and compound-complex sentences. He was especially clear in his definition of the term, "sovereignty," and in his illustration concerning the men who had died in battle. His greatest shortcoming, in terms of clarity, was his lack of good speech organization. His listeners probably had difficulty in following the development of his discourse. This along with his excessive elaborations probably outweighed the positive aspects which contributed to his clarity.

213 Ibid., 792.
214 Ibid., 796.
In terms of impressiveness, Williams' greatest strength lay in his use of ethical proof. He portrayed himself as a disciple of peace, while depicting Wilson's opponents as proponents of war. Williams' use of imagery and tropes probably implemented the impressiveness of his style.

The complexity of his sentences, however, detracted from his impressiveness. His sentences were generally too long and too loose, a shortcoming arising from the impromptu nature of the address.

Williams' style would have been more effective in influencing his "target group" had he organized the material more carefully and had he used obvious transitional material to keep the organization before his listeners. Additionally, he talked too long and in too much detail, and he again failed to recognize the virtue of brevity.

**Effectiveness**

John Sharp Williams rose in the Senate on June 9, 1919 to deliver his principal speech on the League of Nations at approximately 2:30 p.m. The *Washington Post* reports that the Mississippian spoke for an hour and a half "in what opposition leaders charged was a filibuster."\(^{215}\) Concluding shortly before 4 o'clock,\(^ {216}\) Williams had "lambasted the Republicans,"\(^ {217} \) and had "shouted" that "the Senator from Idaho wants no limitations put on our government."\(^ {218} \)

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\(^{216}\) *Washington Post*, op. cit.

\(^{217}\) *Chicago Daily Tribune*, op. cit.

\(^{218}\) *Washington Post*, op. cit.
Immediate Surface Response

Very little mention of Williams is made in the major newspapers of the United States on this occasion, other than to summarize the content of the speech. The newspapers in Williams' home state of Mississippi, while reporting routine Associated Press accounts of Williams' speeches on their front pages, generally limited their editorial comments to items of local interest. On occasion, the Mississippi newspapers editorialized on the League and on Wilson, but they infrequently judged the activities of their own elected representatives.219

There were three overt responses to Williams' speaking on June 9, 1919. First, Williams observed that Borah had referred to former President Taft as a "walking corpse," but that Borah, if he really wanted to become President himself, should study the opinions of the entire people of the United States rather than that only of the Republican majority of the Senate. Borah replied, "The Senator from Mississippi would not want me to take the advice of ex-President Taft as to how to become President, would he?" To this Williams retorted, "Well, the advice of the ex-President as to how to become President would be very bad advice; but the advice or the example of the Senator from Idaho as to how to be the next President would be infinitely worse advice."220

A second overt and immediate surface response to Williams' speaking was the interchange of remarks with Senator Reed. Williams argued that Reed had "had to fudge like all the world" to make it appear that the majority of nations represented in the League of Nations were colored.

219 For example, see the editorial comment from the Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, June 10, 1919, p. 4., Supra., p. 162.

220 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 793.
Williams took issue with the statistics Reed had presented, whereupon the Missourian asked for the floor to make a correction. Reed pointed out that he had quoted from the *Encyclopedia Britannica* the population percentages of both the white and colored races in Cuba. Williams accepted the correction, but stated further that the states of Mississippi, Louisiana, and South Carolina had lower percentages of whites than did Cuba. In spite of this, Williams reasoned, these states were still parts of a "white man's country," and, as such, would represent the interests of the white race in the League.221

A third overt response occurred when Williams, having dismissed Lodge as merely a partisan enemy of Wilson and the League, expressed respect for Borah's honest difference of opinion. The Idahoan, Williams said, was a Prussian "junker," or an "American junker" at heart because of his belief in the unlimited and independent sovereignty of the United States. Williams asked Borah, "... is not that a correct statement of the Prussian position so far as he understands it?" Borah replied, "I rather think that is correct. It is also George Washington's view." To this Williams countered, "Ah! Now the Senator is trying to bring in poor old George as an ally of the Prussian junker." This remark was followed by laughter in the galleries, but the Vice-President made no attempt to suppress it.222 No other immediate surface responses to the speech were recorded.


Delayed Response

The Williams Papers are filled with letters of congratulation from the citizens of Mississippi and various other states. The letters represent the opinions of individuals in all walks of life and occupations. A few of the letters are critical, but these are exceptions rather than the rule. 223

More significant are the two responses during this period of the debate from Woodrow Wilson. On July 25, the President wrote to Williams that he thought the latter had been "holding up the cause in the Senate" in an admirable way. 224 On August 1, Wilson responded to the replies that Williams had made in the Senate to the enemies of the League. "I am reassured whenever I find my judgment running on all fours with yours, and you may be sure I approve of these replies and rejoice in the spirit of them." 225

There were significant newspaper responses to the idea of the League itself during this period, although, in most of them, Williams was not specifically mentioned. For instance, the San Francisco Chronicle observed that "we could get on very nicely with a league. If it can keep the world's peace we shall never disturb it." 226 Other newspapers which editorially supported the League during the Unofficial Covenant

223 These letters are found in the General Correspondence of the Williams Papers, Boxes 45 and 46.

224 Letter of Woodrow Wilson to John Sharp Williams, July 25, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 2.

225 Letter of Woodrow Wilson to John Sharp Williams, August 1, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 2.

Debate were the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 227 the *Atlanta Constitution*, 228 the *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, 229 the *Baltimore Sun*, 230 the *Chicago Daily News*, 231 and, of course, the *New York Times* continued its support of the League, Wilson, and of Williams, the latter of whom it had editorialized We say that Senator Williams sees . . . ineptitude and vascillation in the Senate . . . because his keen and vigorous intellect cannot miss them. It is not Mr. Williams alone, among these 110,000,000 people, who is "disgusted with the whole political situation." At any rate, his conscience is clear; he has kept unswervingly to one course, and his voice has always been strong and clear for sturdy and straightforward dealing with these problems.232

The previously anti-League *New York Tribune* modified its stand on the League with the publication in the nation's newspapers of the unofficial version of the Covenant.

The Tribune notes that "a basis for solid judgment seems maturing. This judgment promises to be, first, that there is enough good in the Covenant to warrant its general acceptance, and second, enough weight in the criticisms lodged against it to require its qualification when accepted. The conclusion naturally follows that there should be ratification, but ratification with reservations.233


The Washington Post, however, remained a steadfast opponent of the League, contending that the League would be stronger than the United States and thereby force the United States to give up sovereignty. 234

The Christian Science Monitor summarized press reaction to the League of Nations during the Senate's debate on the unofficial covenant. So far, then, as American press comment is any indication, public sentiment on the western side of the ocean looks upon the recent Senate performance somewhat as a parent looks upon a child playing with fire, tolerating while deprecating the rash experimentation, but on the watch all the while lest anything of real value be damaged. 235

The delayed responses to Williams' address of June 9, 1919, then, came in the form of letters from his constituents and from the general public, most of which were complimentary. Secondly, and more significantly, Woodrow Wilson expressed his approval of Williams' efforts to uphold the League's cause in the Senate. Finally, while there were no specific newspaper responses to Williams as such, the majority of American newspapers supported the ideas he espoused in his addresses.

Readability

As in his address of December 3, 1918, Williams again labored his points unnecessarily and, with an average sentence length of forty-two words, probably did not appeal to the general readers of the Congressional Record.

Technical Perfection

Although clearer organizationally than the speech of December 3,


the address of June 9 was not a model of technical perfection in any respect. Williams' greatest strength was his use of ethical proof. Again, not enough information concerning delivery exists to make a judgment.

Wisdom in Judging Trends of the Future

Williams was again perceptive in judging trends of the future. The partisanship and isolationism of Wilson's opponents was largely responsible for the delay of America's entry into an organization designed to implement international peace until the conclusion of a second world war.

Long-range Effects upon the Social Group

No causal relationship may be established between Williams' representative speech of the unofficial covenant debate and the establishment of the United Nations Organization. At best, Williams must be considered a supporting voice for the real force behind the idea of a league of nations, the personal force and intellect of Woodrow Wilson.

During the unofficial covenant debate, John Sharp Williams, despite his shortcomings of organization, logic, style, and tangible results, made himself credible to his listeners by means of his ethical appeal. Although the development of his ideas may have been difficult for his listeners to follow, Williams was, because of his intrinsic ethos, worthy of belief.
CHAPTER V

THE FIRST COVENANT DEBATE, JULY 10-NOVEMBER 19, 1919

The occasions during the first covenant debate on which Williams spoke, the audiences he faced on these occasions, and a detailed analysis of his address of August 12, 1919, are topics of concern to the student of Williams' speaking during this period.

The Occasion

Having sailed from Paris on July 1, 1919, Wilson laid the Treaty before the Senate on July 10. In his accompanying address, as he presented the Treaty to the Senate, he reviewed our basis for entry into the war, the difficulties of the peace conference, and the part which he felt the United States should play. The President concluded that:

The stage is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. Armenia shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.¹

Senatorial responses to this address ranged from Brandegee's caustic description, "soap bubbles of oratory and souffle of phrases."² to John Sharp Williams' observation that


²Fleming, op. cit., p. 237.

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I think that in breadth of vision, in height of humanitarianism, in fundamental world statesmanship and delicacy of dove-tailed English the address is the greatest thing that the President has ever uttered, and when I say that, that means the greatest thing ever uttered by any President of the United States since Lincoln died. His words are a fitting close to his magnificent, unselfish, and, upon the whole, effective work at Paris as a member of the Peace Conference.\(^3\)

With the official version of the Treaty finally in their hands, the Senators could now earnestly begin their discussion and diversionary tactics.\(^4\)

Williams spoke on ten occasions during this phase of the debate: July 15, 24, and 28; August 12, September 11, 26, and 29; October 2, and 16, and November 10.

**Speech of July 15.**

The treaty at last in his hands on July 10, Lodge dared not risk an immediate vote. As chairman of the all-powerful Committee on Foreign Relations, he could delay the vote as long as necessary to kill the Treaty. First among his stable of stratagems was an oral reading of the Treaty, line by line, in the meetings of the Committee.

While Lodge was engaged in reading the Treaty, a task which usually found him alone or with a clerk in the committee room,\(^5\) Senator Swanson, on July 14, gave the opening speech on the official Treaty.\(^6\) A League advocate, Swanson stressed the deterrent power of Article 10 and


\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 294-295.

\(^6\) This would normally have been the opening speech, but the Senate, of course, had been debating the Treaty since the preceding December.
its defensive value. The authority of Article 10, however, was moral rather than legal.\footnote{U. S. \textit{Congressional Record}, op. cit., 2532-42.}

On July 15 Senator Norris stated his principal objection to the Treaty, the Shantung settlement.\footnote{Ibid., 2591.} Lodge introduced a resolution inquiring whether Japan and Germany had signed a treaty during the war.\footnote{Ibid., 2597.} Hitchcock resented Lodge's assertion that the Treaty contained a gift to Japan of 36,000,000 Chinese. Norris, Lodge, and Fall quickly attacked the Democratic leader in return.\footnote{Ibid., 2603-8.}

John Sharp Williams rose to speak in defense of the Treaty, including the Shantung provision. He argued, first, that Shantung had been a necessary compromise on Wilson's part. "I do not approve of the Shantung proviso in the treaty, and I will venture to say that the President of the United States did not."\footnote{Ibid., 2609.} Williams further contended that anyone in the Senate, had he been a member of the commission, would have regarded the Shantung proviso as a "rock wall too high to climb and too thick to butt through,"\footnote{Ibid.} and would have acted as Wilson had acted. "We could not have everything our own way," maintained the Mississippian.

A friend wrote me the other day about this question. I told him he reminded me a little of one of my daughters once. She had straight hair, and another of the little girls had curly hair. The little straight-haired one was a little envious of the curly-haired one. One day the curly-haired girl was complaining of
some hardship of some sort, fancied, of course, and the other one turned to her and said, "Well, you can't have everything and curly hair."13

Williams argued that Japan would not give up Shantung except by war. "Do we want our boys sent to Asia to whip Japan out of Shantung, when there are 400,000,000 of Chinamen who ought to do their own fighting in their own cause?"14 He believed that Japan intended to keep her agreement under the Treaty.

I believe Japan is going to keep faith. If I had any suspicion to the contrary, I would not utter it now. If I had an agreement with the Senator from North Carolina, or if there were an agreement between him and the Senator from Colorado, a sacred agreement, and I even suspected that one or the other might not keep it, I would keep my mouth shut until I found out whether he was going to do it or not, unless I wanted to be insulting. The Senate does not want to insult friendly powers.15

To Williams' expression of confidence in Japan, Borah replied that

We do not anticipate war with Japan; but one thing the American people will never submit to when the facts are known--they will never remain a party to a treaty which has the effect of oppressing millions upon millions of people. We may not draw out now; but when the facts are revealed from time to time, as the debate and consideration goes on, as it will go on for weeks and months, when the true import of this transaction is known, the American people will refuse to break up and dismember the Chinese nation. I say, therefore, Mr. President, while I do not anticipate and certainly do not want trouble with Japan, we will still have the courage to do the honorable thing.16

An exchange between Williams and Borah followed in which the two Senators attempted to define the means of withdrawal from the League once it had

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 2612.
been joined. Williams became sarcastic in response to Borah's questioning and read in full an account by Clark McAdams of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* of what would happen if the Senate were to debate "Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep." A brief interchange of remarks between Williams and Fall followed in which the senator from Utah attempted to improve upon the former's sarcasm. Borah, however, dismissed the entire interchange with the observation that "I am very fond of the Senator from Mississippi, but I think his taste for poetry is perfectly rotten." 17

Speech of July 24

On July 24 the subject of the treaty between the United States and France, which guaranteed the temporary protection of the latter by the former in case of unprovoked aggression by Germany came before the Senate. Brandegee criticized Wilson for not laying this treaty before the Senate along with the Treaty of Versailles. Brandegee argued that the President could present the French treaty to the Senate either in person or by sending a representative either of whom

will always be polite and courteously and gladly received; but having tried his case before the jury, before the Senate, as his equal copartner in the treaty-making power, now he sends for the individual jurymen and wants to argue with each one of them separately. 18

In replying to this, Williams rebuked Brandegee for comparing the Senate to a jury hearing a case.

Of course, he knows that the Senate is no jury. What was his object in using that phrase, and then saying that the President was talking to "the individual members of the jury" after the case had been heard? He knew that the assumption that the


Senate is a jury is unfounded in fact. His object was simply to leave an impression or to insinuate an impression that the President had been guilty of doing something highly improper and sinister, as would have been the case with a lawyer who argued a case before a jury and then had gone into the jury room or somewhere else and talked to individual jurors about the case. A lawyer who would have done that ought to have been disbarred.19

Williams noted that Brandegee had been careful to make no outright assertions, but had implied the analogy for the specific purpose of casting doubt upon Wilson's constitutional prerogative of seeking the advice and consent of the Senate in making treaties. In support of his contention that the President was acting within his rights to consult with individual senators, Williams cited the examples of Jefferson's having consulted Randolph and others about the treaty with France for the acquisition of Louisiana and of McKinley's having consulted with senators concerning the ratification of the Spanish-American treaty annexing the Philippines.

Employing another analogy, the Mississippian contended that, just as there was nothing the lamb of Aesop's fable could have said that would have satisfied the wolf whose real purpose was to eat the lamb, there was similarly nothing that Wilson could say or do to satisfy senators who were intent upon "eating him up" politically.

Finally, Williams argued that it had been expedient for Wilson to submit, first, the Treaty of Versailles and at some later time the treaty with France. This procedure, said Williams, would allow the Senate to concentrate upon the more important of the two treaties and would avoid boring the Senate in a speech so long that the country would not have

19 Ibid., 3080.
read it. Regardless of whether the President laid both treaties before the Senate within the same day, the same week, or the same month, both would be before the Senate at the same time. This procedure would then have met the "common sense" requirements of Article 4 of the French-American Treaty.

The present treaty will be before ratification submitted to the French Chambers for approval. It will be submitted to the Senate of the United States at the same time the treaty of Versailles will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. 20

Speech of July 28

On July 28, Williams again responded to the criticism that had been leveled against Wilson by Brandegee, Lodge, and Borah. First, he accused Brandegee of having pretended to deliver an impromptu attack upon Wilson's failure to lay before the plan the "impromptu" rebuke. 21

Brandegee and Lodge had both said that the Franco-American Treaty, to the best of their knowledge, had not been published in the United States until it appeared in Harvey's Weekly, the publication from which Brandegee had read the Treaty into the Congressional Record on July 24, continued Williams.

Wonder of wonders! This great editor of a great weekly is quoted to the effect that to "the best of their knowledge" this treaty had not been published in the United States at the date of his editorial.

Yet it was carried in full by the Associated Press on July 3, and publication of an agreement thought to have been negotiated between us and France was published as Paris news prior to that. 22

20 Ibid., 3077.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 3231.
The New York evening newspapers, continued Williams, had printed the treaty on July 3 and the morning newspapers had printed it on July 4. The conclusion which must be drawn from all this, he said, was simply that the Republicans were attempting to make a partisan issue of the Franco-American Treaty.

Williams' second contention was that the League of Nations would not destroy the sovereignty of the United States as its critics claimed. In its support he cited several analogies, which included the Senate itself as ninety-six men who had not lost their sovereignty, the thirteen colonies which did not lose their sovereignty, and a definition of civilized society itself, which imposes limitations without loss of sovereignty. The only instance in which the other nations would unanimously turn against the United States, Williams continued, would be when it was "plainly and palpably and obviously wrong."23

Finally, Williams stated another objection which had been advanced against United States' participation in a league of nations: that you cannot change human nature. He began his refutation of this objection by exclaiming, "What a stupid, barbarous utterance that is!"24 In developing this thought, Williams stated his most powerful analogy contained in the speech. He quoted the opposition as having maintained that war and fighting were an essential part of human nature and that difficulties could not be settled in any other way.

Can you not? The Senator from Montana described today how they quit settling difficulties that way and began to settle them in other ways out in the mining camps in Montana. They proceeded

23Ibid., 3234.
24Ibid.
to settle them first by self-appointed vigilance committees and then by regularly organized courts. What had happened? They had changed the human nature of the camp, and the human nature that was not willing to be changed was kicked out of the camp; and every nation upon this globe that is not willing to change its human nature far enough to leave questions in controversy to fair arbitral determination, instead of going around and cutting one another's throats by way of settlement, will be kicked out of the civilized arena, and ought to be kicked to death. What will happen to them will be what happened in the mining camps. The persistent criminals who did not want to "surrender their sovereignty" were lynched, The fellow that did not accept the new order and was not willing to change his nature that far was just simply carried out and hung to the limb of a tree.  

Williams concluded by saying that he hoped the day would never come when God would curse him for failing to help humanity because he had seen specks on the sun.

Speech of August 12

On August 12 Senator Lodge delivered his first prepared attack after Wilson's formal submission of the Treaty. Lodge introduced his two hour presentation with the preamble of the covenant itself, after which he added, "Brave words, indeed!" They do not differ essentially from the preamble of the Treaty of Paris, from which sprang the Holy Alliance.  

Article 3, Lodge contended actually gave the League the right to interfere in the internal conflicts of its members. By the terms of Article 3, which allowed the Assembly of the League to "deal with" any matter affecting the peace of the world, the League could conceivably order American troops anywhere in the world, to intercede in revolutionary movements or internal conflicts of any magnitude.

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 3778.
Lodge further denied the existence of a difference between a legal and a moral obligation in connection with Article 10. As a signatory, the United States might well be obligated to help Japan defeat China in Shantung or send American troops to Arabia to assist King Hussein of Hedjaz in his struggle with the Bedouins. In short, we would fulfill both the letter and the spirit of the Covenant or face international dishonor.

Lodge contended that American troops and ships might be ordered to any part of the world by nations other than the United States. He urged that it be made perfectly clear that not even a corporal's guard could ever be ordered anywhere except by constitutional authorities of the United States.

Fervently asserting his plea for America first, Lodge concluded the address with the observations that

We would not have our politics distracted and embittered by the dissentions of other lands. We would not have our country's vigor exhausted, or her moral force abated, by everlasting meddling and muddling in every quarrel great and small, which afflicts the world. Our ideal is to make her ever stronger and better and finer, because in this way alone, as we believe, can she be of the greatest service to the world's peace and to the welfare of mankind.27

Lodge had arranged for Senate adjournment until 2 p.m., the hour when his speech began. Although it is impossible to determine the number of senators present on the floor at any given time following roll call, it is likely that more than the usual number of colleagues were present.

The galleries were filled with women's organizations and veteran marines from Chateau Thierry who had paraded in Washington at noon. The New York Times reports that

27 Ibid., 3784.
As Mr. Lodge ended his speech, Senators on the Republican side went forward to shake his hand, while the galleries rang with applause. The cheers that went up from the Marines could be heard throughout the corridors of the Capitol. It sounded very much like the roar that breaks loose at a ball park when the home team wins the game in the ninth inning. Nothing like it has been heard in all the debate on the League or, for that matter, in any debate running back for years.  

As the uproar subsided, John Sharp Williams arose and caustically declared

Mr. President, I hesitate very much to undertake to reply extemporaneously and in a few minutes to the greatest possible prepared presentation of the selfishness of American policy ever made even by the Senator from Massachusetts. I would have to have more egotism than even I have if I thought I could answer fully "off the bat" the things the Senator from Massachusetts has been cogitating and laboriously studying to express for three weeks, more or less, with a view to capturing the Senate and the galleries whose occupants have come by announcement to hear him today. It is not a new presentation of the personality of the Senator from Massachusetts. He has always attempted to make a show of himself.  

The New York Times notes that at this point the occupants of the galleries "hissed." Vice-president Marshall warned the audience to observe the rules of the Senate against such outbursts and added that "they ought to be ashamed of themselves."  

Following Marshall's rebuke, Williams accused Lodge of having named himself as "about the only man devoted to Americanism and devoted to the United States." To Lodge's contention that we must render service to the world of our own free will, Williams replied that "we are too indissolubly connected with one another for that."  

The Mississippian protested further that no nation could render

29 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3784-85.
30 Ibid., 3785.
service of its own free will, because each nation is bound and responsible to every other nation through traditions, history, religion, law, literature, and commerce.

Williams maintained, second, that Lodge, in his "crossing of 't's and dotting of 'i's," had neglected one of the "weightier matters of the law," that of peace among the nations of the world.

A third Lodge contention which Williams attacked was that all the brave attempts at world peace in the past had failed and that the League would be no exception. To this Williams replied that past attempts had failed because "the world had not then reached the state of civilization where the receptiveness of the world could meet the initiative of the dreamer." Williams pointed out the fallacy in Lodge's analogy that, since the Holy Alliance had failed, the League of Nations would fail. The important difference which outweighed the similarities of the two organizations, according to Williams, was that the Holy Alliance, unlike the League of Nations, was an organization of autocrats seeking to perpetuate autocratic power.

Williams' fourth reply was to Lodge's contention that the United States' entrance into the League would mean a surrender of nationalism. "Where does this narrow chauvinism come from?" inquired the Mississippian. "It comes from original tribal relations, and the world is past that." He declared that the real question before the American people was not the amendment of specific articles of the Covenant, which he equated with more crossing "t's" and dotting "i's." The real question, in his words, was: "Take it all in all, as a measure for the advancement of civilization

31 Ibid.
and peace and humanity and justice, does it meet with your approval or does it not?"32

A fifth objection raised by Williams was that Lodge had not really touched on the question of the peace of the world.

Even more objectionable than this to Williams was Lodge's narrow partisanship in coming before the Senate

... with a typewritten presentation, carefully prepared for three weeks or more, with the idea of appealing to the galleries—beforehand invited to come—even more than to the Senate, an appeal to the galleries thus invited not in the interest of peace, not in the interest of humanity, not in the interest of the mothers of children, not in the interests of the sweet-hearts of young men, but in the interest of narrow chauvinistic policy, which shall be mainly tortured here at home for the purpose of securing Republican partisan success.33

To Lodge's contention that the United States might be controlled by the League, Williams retorted that the only possibility of our being controlled by the League would be in the event that we were unanimously opposed by its members on an issue. In this event, the other nations would be right and we should be "palpably and plainly and obviously wrong."

Lodge had further contended that the phrase of the covenant which had cited any war or threat of war as a matter of universal concern would involve us in unnecessary conflicts. Williams pointed out that such matters would be brought before the League for investigation and recommendations. These recommendations, Williams maintained, would not be "orders" or "mandates" as Lodge had claimed. Contrary to Lodge's statements, the League simply did not specify that all the powers had a "right"

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 3786.
to "call out" American armed forces. This had been a false accusation on the part of the Massachusetts senator and had been made only to "tickle the ears of the groundlings, although it made the judicious to grieve."34 Not only was the League incapable of involving any of its signatories in conflict, but the organization would be weaker than the original confederacy of the thirteen American colonies, an organization similarly powerless to "summon a single soldier," or "levy a single dollar of taxes."

Far from making "slaves" of us, as Lodge had contended, the League could operate in important matters only with the unanimous vote of the council, an organization which would include the ambassador from the United States. Williams posed his refutatory question, "in ordinary, plain, Mississippi planter's common sense, leaving out finesse, leaving out 'possibilities,' and all that. Can you imagine a case with which we could be confronted where the whole world except ourselves would be against us unless we were wrong?"35

Lodge had argued that the League would force the United States to admit immigrants of all nationalities. Williams replied that

There is not a word in all this treaty that undertakes to decide what men shall enter into the United States or what goods shall enter in. On the contrary, by omission in the first place and by direct expression to the contrary in the second place, all consideration of questions of that sort is excluded from the jurisdiction of the League.36

Lodge had also argued that the League would not advance the cause of world peace. Williams replied that, although the threat of force was

34Ibid.
35Ibid., 3787.
36Ibid.
behind the League, that it, like the Monroe Doctrine, was intended primarily as an instrument to keep the peace. Only in the event that a lawless nation, after submission to arbitration, had refused to abide by the arbitral decision could there be the use of force.

Lodge had suggested that "misery and suffering" would follow economic pressure upon nations to make them keep the peace. Williams maintained that embargos would be enforced only to make nations "keep their plighted word." The misery and suffering which such nations might experience, could not compare with our own misery and suffering just experienced in the World War. The purpose of threatened embargos would be the avoidance of war. Lodge, Williams observed, seemed to have no indignation against war because "he has never felt it." 37

Williams dismissed Lodge's objection to the League's "unconstitutionality" with the observation that the Supreme Court would pass judgment on the League just as on any other law. Williams additionally maintained that we could no longer afford to be "disinterested" as Lodge urged, and that "Americanism" meant not merely defense of isolationism, but "now and then of indignation and offense against the powers of unrighteousness and wrong. . ." 38

In asking us "not to forget the millions of people of foreign birth and derivation in the United States" that perhaps we cannot tie to ourselves nor to the American Republic, Lodge had really be concerned with avoiding offense to the "hyphenates." This appeal Williams labeled a political and party appeal.

37Ibid.
38Ibid.
Lodge had said that we were under no obligation to anyone except France in our Revolution. Williams retorted that we were under obligation "to every man who went in and came out without an arm or a leg, whether a Belgian, a Frenchman, or a Briton." We could not go back to the original isolation of 1914, because "... isolation as a fact has ceased to exist, as you must admit that it has."

The Monroe Doctrine, Williams concluded, had become an "international understanding," just as the proposed League would be. Nobody could be the sole judge of his own case under the proposed League. Williams ended his impromptu statement with the assurance, however, that "... they can not decide against us except by unanimous vote."

Speech of September 11

On September 11, Williams again attacked the Lodge amendments to the Covenant. His attack was aimed directly at the report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, which Lodge had authored. Williams accused Lodge of dishonesty in attempting to kill the Treaty indirectly through amendments which would render it innocuous.

Indirectly Williams denounced Lodge's nationalistic pride and desire for isolation.

Patriotism! Yes, the grandest feeling in the world, pride in the Government and pride in the flag for all that it emblemises. But when you begin to make a thing to worship of that flag in itself as a representative merely of our force and will, regardless of right and justice, then you have not only disgraced yourself but you have disgraced the flag; you have hauled it down from its high place in the world and you have dragged it in the slime of chauvinism.

39Ibid., 3788.
40Ibid., 3789.
41Ibid., 5232.
After reasserting his own patriotism and declaring that his view went beyond the country's borders, Williams had inserted into the Congressional Record an editorial from the New York World entitled "Lodge's Prussian Report." Following this, Williams accused Lodge of attempting indirectly to defeat the League by attaching amendments which would be unacceptable to the other signatories.

Williams stated his thesis in the form of a disjunct. "Adopt this league of nations for peace or go back to the condition before this world tragedy." If the latter condition were fulfilled, Williams prophesied, then all succeeding generations would live under a "cloud of international suspicion, fear, and hate, while every nation went armed, not because it wanted to fight, but because of abject fear that some other nation did want to fight and might at any moment call upon her to do so."  

Speech of September 26

On September 26, Williams accused Senator Johnson of returning to his home state of California "to mend political fences." Johnson replied that he was going to many states to speak against the Covenant. Williams and Johnson also debated the relative strength of Great Britain as a member of the League. Johnson maintained that Great Britain would have six times the representation of the United States because of the commonwealth countries. Williams replied that the commonwealth countries would vote independently of the mother country.

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 5235.
44 Ibid., 5970.
45 Ibid., 5973.
Pursuing still a third thesis, Williams defended Wilson from a charge of "'misrepresentation' or of something else" made "the other day" by a senator whom Williams failed to identify. Williams contended that Wilson "stands high in the estimation of the American people because of his honesty of soul and of intellect, because of his high idealism, because of his lofty thought, because of his capacity for clear expression, because of his patriotism, and above all because of his Americanism."46

Finally, Williams argued that the League Covenant would be easier to amend than the United States Constitution, which had been adopted with its defects. The League Covenant could similarly be adopted and later corrected as the United States Constitution had been by the first ten amendments. The Treaty, then, would not have to be sent back to the Paris Conference and resubmitted to Germany.

Williams closed his impromptu remarks with a plea for idealism.

Idealism, in the long run, wins, because behind it is "the divinity that shapes our ends, roughhew them as we may." In the long run God's purpose is accomplished, and that is always idealism and the thing which prophets have foretold and which poets have sung and which Christ, the Prince of Peace, preached, will come some time or other, whether practical politicians in their miserable littleness and vanity cynically grin at it or not.47

Speech of September 29

On September 29 Borah, in a lengthy speech, warned against the forces seeking to undermine the honored traditions of Americanism as enunciated by Washington and Lincoln. Among the evil forces whom Borah

46 Ibid., 5974.
47 Ibid., 5975.
listed were men who sent bombs through the mails and the League to En­
force Peace, which sought to destroy traditions by ridiculing them.

Williams eventually interrupted Borah and ridiculed his speech
as far-fetched and irrelevant.

Mr. President, it would be strange, indeed, if I had not
enjoyed and appreciated some of the oratorical flights of the
Senator from Idaho. It would be much stranger if, possessing
ordinary common sense, I did not desire to bring him down
from those empyrean heights to some consideration of facts. 48

Williams further remarked that anyone other than Borah, attempting to
connect the League with "Negro lynchings, capitalistic insolent utter­
ances, and with the proletariat tyranny of labor in America," 49 would
have met with laughter from both the floor and the galleries.

Williams' first contention in refutation of Borah's arguments
was that America cannot stand alone as Borah had suggested. He observed
that while the German Junkers had sung a song similar to "America Over
All," they had never sung anything like "America Standing Alone."

Second, Williams contended that Borah had misinterpreted the
beliefs of Washington and Jefferson. The essential goal of men in the
present century, as well as of men in Washington's time, is that of "a
just and enduring peace." Washington's and Jefferson's policies of
isolation had been the best means at the time for securing this goal. In
view of changed world conditions, however, this means could no longer be
effective.

Third, Williams argued that Wilson was working for the same goal
as that of Washington and Jefferson, but with a means in keeping with the
times—the League of Nations.

48 Ibid., 6080.
49 Ibid.
Williams concluded with an appeal to his colleagues to take decisive action on the League issue.

If you want to kill the league and the treaty, kill it; if you want to bludgeon it, bludgeon it. Come to the issue as quickly as you can and be done with it, only do not poison the life out of it. If you are not willing to make this attempt for a just and enduring peace for the entire world, just say so.50

Speech of October 2

On October 2 the Fall amendments were voted upon and rejected. The speeches on these amendments were limited to five minutes for each senator.

Williams spoke following Lodge and briefly replied to Lodge's arguments. The Mississippian maintained that Lodge's position had been inconsistent. Williams said that Lodge had first urged that an announcement be made "if the world wants America at any time in the cause of independence and peace of small nations or the liberty of the world, she can have her."51 Williams further accused Lodge of announcing, "in the next breath," that when he now has the opportunity to make good that statement, he declines.

A second inconsistency in Lodge's position was his declaration that we do not want to fix boundaries in Europe. To this Williams replied

Well, we have already fixed them. Everybody in America wants to recognize the independence from Turkey of Palestine and Armenia and Thrace, and from Austria-Hungary of Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia, and the independence from all three of the great autocratic powers of Poland. Then the Senator [Lodge]

50 Ibid., 6083.
51 Ibid., 6266.
Williams pointed out that none of the proposed amendments would change the treaty's establishment of the boundaries. "They simply say that we, having helped fix them, shall have nothing to do with securing them."53

In addition to pointing out these inconsistencies in Lodge's speech, Williams attacked Brandegee's statement that we ought "to stand out from under" the Treaty to avoid being kept in Europe a few years to insure the terms and boundaries set by the Treaty. To this Williams replied that it would be inconsistent for the United States not to finish what it had started. "Standing out from under" Williams implied, would amount to not keeping our word.

Williams concluded his five minute speech with a biblical allusion. "Am I my brothers keeper?" Cain Inquired; and God replied substantially, "Yes; to some extent you are."54

Speech of October 16

The most interesting of all of Williams' appearances in the Senate was that of October 16, 1919, when he spoke against the Irish-Americans. The Chicago Daily Tribune reports that

Senator Williams began by moving over to the Republican side of the chamber and flourishing a copy of the resolution recently adopted by the confederate veterans indorsing the league of nations. He then delivered a glowing eulogy upon the confederate veterans, assailed the Johnson amendment, giving the United States as many votes in the league as the British empire, as "a Sinn Fein proposition."

52 Ibid., 6267.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
Then he recalled that some one had recently given the Irish credit for defeating the south in the civil war.

"As a matter of fact," he said, "the Irish never whipped the south at all. They could not whip the south in one country. It is a part of the braggart nature of the Irish. I am tired of this vanity and nonsense. I do not care how many Irish vote the Democratic ticket."

At this juncture Senator Hitchcock, in alarm, moved over to the Republican side also, and taking a seat beside the Mississippi senator, tried to persuade him to desist. His efforts were futile. Mr. Williams continued: "I am tired of this whole Irish pretense. They never won the war of the revolution and they contend they did. I am tired of this eternal lie. I am tired of the intimidation that I have received at my office for three or four months, most of the letters signed anonymously. A great number of them are signed with a 'Mac' or an '0.' Among other things I have received threats of assassination.

"If they think I am afraid of one of them, or a hundred of them, they are mistaken. I understand their game. It is that the Democratic party dares not defy the Irish vote. As I understand the situation, the Democratic party is not defying anybody.

"We have finally reached the point where no man can be a real American unless he is an Irish-American or a German-American, or some other sort of a hyphenated American."

Senator Phelan, himself of Irish blood, was on his feet in an instant, fairly boiling with rage at Senator Williams' remarks. Senator Brandegee of Connecticut had the floor, however, and Senator Phelan had to reply to Senator Williams in the form of an interrogatory.

"I would like to ask the senator if he thinks it perfectly fair for a senator to leave this side of the chamber and, taking his place on the other side, make a speech which, in the eyes of strangers looking down upon this body, might be attributed to a member of the Republican party?" Senator Phelan asked.

Loud laughter broke out in the senate and in the galleries, and the vice-president ordered the doorkeepers to eject those who laughed.

No ejections took place, however, and Senator Phelan continued.

"I desire further to ask this question, if the senator would consider it opprobrious for the managers of the Dublin horse show, to post upon the gates of the inclosure, during the intermission between the races, that 'these gates are closed in order to prevent the escape of welshers?"
"Or would the senator think that in making a comparison between
the Irish in battle and the Irish in peace, that the south,
having accepted the situation and yielded to superior forces,
should also record such conduct on the part of the Irish who
fight, but never surrender?

"The fact is that the south, after a valiant struggle, gave way
because there was no moral force behind their cause. They were
fighting for slavery, whereas the Irish always fight for
freedom.

"I recommend to the senator from Mississippi that he go and live
in Ireland, because as was said by a Chinese mandarin who had
observed that he would rather live in Ireland than in any other
land, explain that 'it is the only country in which the Irish
have nothing to say.'"

Senator Gerry also praised the patriotism of the Irish.

The New York Times, on the other hand, observed only parenthetically that
Williams had spoken from the wrong side of the Senate.

Senator Williams, who spoke from the Republican side of the
Chamber, asserted that the Sinn Feiners might take a lesson
from the veterans of the Confederacy who, when the war was over,
did not keep it up by shooting at the Yankees "from behind
trees."56

The Times, however, included more of the content of the harangue.

The New York Tribune referred to Williams' speech as the "sensa-
tion of the day."57 Only the anti-League Chicago Daily Tribune featured
the story on its front page, appropriately headlined, "Williams Rips
Irish From 'I' to 'H' in Senate."

The New York Times and the New York Tribune corroborate all the
details presented by the Chicago Daily Tribune. Williams did speak from
the Republican side of the Senate Chamber, Hitchcock did attempt to

restrain him, and Phelan and Gerry, both League advocates, did angrily reply to the Mississippian. Williams deleted from the Congressional Record his harshest remarks, including the reference to the threats of assassination which had come to him in the mail from Irish-Americans.

The following day Williams sent a note of apology to Senator Phelan.

I am afraid I said some things in my speech yesterday calculated to hurt your feelings and the feelings of some other good friends of mine of Irish derivation. I am awfully sorry for it. I kept my speech out of the Record with a view of revising it, and shall revise out of it what I think could be offensive to anybody, personally or racially.\(^58\)

A week later Williams clarified his revision of his remarks in a letter to his friend, W. D. Vandiver, a U. S. Subtreasury official in St. Louis. It is evident that the newspapers had been correct in quoting Williams' reference to threats upon his life. Williams himself corroborates the thesis that this was part of the speech which he struck from the Congressional Record.

I was not drunk when I made the speech but I did have a drink or two and there were some things I said that I thought I ought not to have said and I struck them out of the Record,--that part about threatening letters. I was in a bad humor when I made the speech or I would have confined the speech to the Sinn Feiners and I would have given the facts about the Irish pretense in the Revolutionary and Civil Wars.\(^59\)

Aside from his attack upon the Irish-Americans, Williams argued on October 16, that the Shantung amendment would be defeated by the common sense of the Senate. He reasoned that this was true because the

\(^{58}\)Letter of John Sharp Williams to James D. Phelan, October 17, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 48.

\(^{59}\)Letter of John Sharp Williams to W. D. Vandiver, October 25, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 48.
"average American citizen that says that he cares whether Shantung is under Japanese or Chinese sovereignty is more or less talking through his hat."\textsuperscript{60} He compared the excitement being aroused by the proponents of the amendment with the agitation for American control of the Philippines which had resulted from Dewey's conquest of Manila. Williams thus indirectly accused the proponents of the Shantung amendment of partisanship.

Williams' prediction proved accurate when, at 5 p.m. on October 16, the amendment designed to restore the economic privileges on the Shantung Peninsula to China was rejected by a vote of 35 to 55.\textsuperscript{61}

**Speech of November 10**

Williams' wrath against the Irish-Americans was again aroused on November 10, when Senator Walsh of Massachusetts discussed Article 11 of the Covenant which provided for hearings for subject races.

If I believed, as I do believe, that the subject races of Europe are debarred from a hearing under Article 11 of this covenant, because it is a domestic question, I ask you what your opinion would be of me, honestly believing that, if I sat here, an offspring from people of a subject race, and did not cry out in protest against the declaration made all over this country that under article 11 there was provision made for hearings of the differences between subject races and their oppressors?\textsuperscript{62}

Williams replied that instead of an offspring from people of a subject race, Walsh "ought to stand here as a Senator of the United States." The Mississippian argued further that no man could be loyal to two countries. Only the American Indians could claim to be 100 per cent Americans. "Every man who can take an oath of allegiance to the United

\textsuperscript{60}U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 7006.

\textsuperscript{61}\textit{Ibid.}, 7013.

\textsuperscript{62}\textit{Ibid.}, 8207.
States 'without mental reservation,' must mean what he says." Williams pointed out that he had no particular grievance toward the Irish. On the contrary, he had long held great admiration for Edmund Burke, Tom Moore, and Oliver Goldsmith. He defended his previous speech, noting that he had not attacked the Irish race, but rather the pro-German Irish in Ireland and the Irish in the United States who had not lived up to their responsibilities as American citizens.

Williams concluded that he too was proud of his European ancestors, but he demanded that American foreign relations be conducted in terms of 100 per cent American interests.

The American Indian was the real American, you know, at the beginning, and is yet. But when we came here and undertook this Government, this greatest experiment of human liberty upon the surface of the earth, we made an implicit agreement with one another that we would consecrate and dedicate ourselves to that purpose. We left Europe behind us when we did.  

Lodge replied caustically in his colleague's defense that "... I do not wonder that the Senator from Mississippi recoils from the words 'subject races.' He is familiar with a subject race; he lives among them." Williams made no further speeches during the first Covenant debate. The Senate attached fourteen reservations to the Treaty exactly matching Wilson's fourteen points. The Treaty with reservations, however, failed to pass by a vote of 39 to 55 on November 19, 1919.

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63 Ibid., 8208.
64 Ibid., 8211.
65 Ibid.
The Audience

The audience Williams faced in the first Covenant debate had much in common with the audiences he had confronted previously. However, the opposition to the League became stronger during this period. As in the previous chapters, the audience section will be divided into three segments, the members of the Senate, the American public, and the audience seated in the galleries.

The Senate

Newspaper polls of senatorial preferences published subsequent to the presentation of the treaty to the Senate indicated that the vote in the Senate would fall short of the necessary two-thirds for approval.\(^66\) During July, therefore, Wilson interviewed Republicans whom he felt might be most favorable to the League. Calder, Capper, Colt, Cummins, Edge, Kellogg, Kenyon, Keyes, Lenroot, McCumber, McLean, McNary, Nelson, New, Newberry, Page, Spenser, Sterling, and Watson were among the group,\(^67\) but many of these announced their determination not to concede following the Presidential interviews. Philander Knox, Republican of Pennsylvania, became an Irreconcilable on July 19,\(^68\) and on July 28, Charles S. Thomas, Democrat of Colorado, gave notice of his opposition to the treaty without reservations.\(^69\) Colt, Cummins, Kellogg, Lenroot, McNary, and Spenser


\(^{67}\)New York Times, July 18, 1919, p. 1; July 19, p. 1; July 23, p. 1; July 24, p. 1; July 26, p. 1; July 29, p. 1; July 31, p. 1; August 1, p. 1; August 2, p. 1.

\(^{68}\)Washington Post, July 20, 1919, pp. 1, 9.

declared themselves in the Mild Reservationists group during the first weeks of August, while in late August, Irreconcilables Brandegee, Borah, Fall, Johnson, Knox, Moses, Poindexter, and Reed insisted that eight other senators would include themselves in their group.

By September 15, Republican leaders could rejoice at Lodge's estimate that forty-nine Republicans plus six Democrats supported the Lodge reservations. On the other hand, Hitchcock observed that, with the exception of the Shantung Amendment, forty Democrats and twenty Republicans would oppose any of the Lodge amendments.

By November, 1919, the battle lines in the Senate were clearly divided into four groups: Irreconcilables, Strict Reservationists, Mild Reservationists, and League supporters. Prominent among the Irreconcilables, who desired outright defeat of the treaty, were Brandegee, Borah, Johnson, Poindexter, and Reed. This group consisted of three Democratic and fourteen Republican senators. The second group, the Strict Reservationists, wanted to weaken the Treaty by attaching amendments and reservations. These twenty-eight senators were led by Lodge and Knox. The third group, the Mild Reservationists, advocated only interpretative reservations to the Treaty. Prominent among this group of ten Republican senators were Colt, Kellogg, McCumber, and McNary. The fourth group, the League supporters, were led by Hitchcock, Williams, Pittman, and Swanson. Other strong League advocates among this group of

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70 Ibid., August 1, 1919, p. 1; August 14, 1919, p. 1.
71 Ibid., August 27, 1919, p. 1.
72 Ibid., September 15, 1919, p. 1.
73 According to Hitchcock, only twelve Republicans would oppose the Shantung Amendment. Ibid., August 26, 1919, p. 1.
thirty-eight senators were McKellar, Owen, Robinson, and Walsh of Montana. Braden notes that "six to eight other Democrats, however, were in the doubtful column."\(^7\)\(^4\) Thus, even though four-fifths of the senators favored the treaty in one form or another, no single group alone commanded the two-thirds of the votes necessary for ratification.

**The Public**

**Groups Favoring the League**

A. The League to Enforce Peace. During the months of August, September, and October, the League to Enforce Peace continued officially to work, largely through its newly established branch in Washington, D. C., for ratification of the Covenant without reservations. Under the direction of Harry N. Rickey, the Washington branch expanded its personnel and operations to include distribution to senators of publications of the League, resolutions adopted at public meetings, petitions for the Treaty, and the solicitation of money and support for the treaty in the form of letters to senators.\(^7\)\(^5\) Wilson's speaking tour precluded the necessity for further congresses and speaking campaigns on the part of the League. Such plans were not made because League officials felt the President's tour would be effective.

During this phase of the controversy, divisions of opinion regarding ratification of the treaty with or without reservations arose among the leaders of the League. While officially continuing to advocate ratification without reservations as late as September, 1919, the League was

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\(^7\)\(^5\) Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
by this time unofficially split into factions by Taft's advocacy of ratification with reservations.76

Despite Taft's attempts to unite the Mild Reservationists in a program, the League remained officially against compromise until November 18, when the executive committee officially declared the League in favor of the Lodge reservations.77 Partly out of Taft's partisan affiliations and partly because the former President felt that only with Lodge reservations could the treaty be ratified at all, the opponents of compromise on the executive committee capitulated. In Bartlett's view, this capitulation rendered the only major source of leadership for the American public, aside from Wilson, ineffectual.78

B. Women's Organizations. The largest of the women's organizations to endorse the League was the National American Women's Suffrage Association.79 Several other women's organizations followed suit.80

C. Labor Organization. Prominent labor leaders were included on the programs of the two great speaking tours of the League to Enforce Peace during 1919. That organization listed more than 3,100 pro-league speakers

76 Ibid., p. 149
77 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 8873-8874.
79 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 7481.
80 Among the other national women's organizations to endorse a league of nations: National Society of Daughters of the American Revolution; General Federation of Women's Clubs; National Council of Women, Council of Jewish Women; Dames of Malta; Woman's Auxiliary Southern Commercial Congress. Ibid., 7481.
from labor groups. Labor officials accounted for a substantial number of endorsements for the League Covenant.

D. Business and Professional Organizations. On August 25, 1919, the National Economic League announced that its members had voted 519 to 166 in favor of ratifying the Treaty "without complicating, delaying, or invalidating reservations." Numerous business organizations, both national and state level, endorsed the League Treaty during this phase of the debate.

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81 Ibid.

Endorsements of the League during this period also came from the American Bar Association, a large number of college presidents, who were among the 250 prominent men petitioning immediate and unqualified support on September 14; and the more than fifty leading college professors and university presidents who were among state committee men of the League to Enforce Peace. Of the ninety faculty members at Mount Holyoke College participating in a League opinion poll conducted on October 12, fifty voted for the League as it stood, twenty-seven for interpretative reservations, eleven for amendments and two against the League.

E. College Students. Three hundred votes were cast in a poll of the summer student body and faculty of Columbia University on July 24, 1919. Since the group consisted largely of women teachers drawn from practically every state in the Union, the balloting was looked upon as "an interesting experiment tending to show how women are thinking on public question." For adoption of the League without qualification were 124

State Organizations: Illinois Lumber and Builders Supply Dealers Association; Kansas Live Stock Association; Maine State Board of Trade; Nebraska Retail Hardware Association; New Hampshire Manufacturers Association; Retail Lumber Dealers of New York; Master House Painters and Decorators Association of Ohio; Wisconsin Retail Hardware Association; Wisconsin Sheet Metal Contractors Association; and Wisconsin State Bottlers Association. U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 7482-7487.

85 Ibid., 7486-7487.

86 New York Times, September 15, 1919, p. 3.

87 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 7482-7486.

votes, for outright rejection, 30; and for adoption of the Covenant with reservations, 146.89

On October 1, in a poll of opinion among students of Harvard, 1686 ballots were cast. Favoring adoption of the League as it stood were 690; 380 favored reservations which would not recommit the Treaty to the Peace Conference; 319 advocated amendment; and 289 rejected the League altogether.90 In a similar poll on October 11 at Mount Holyoke College, 585 votes were cast. The majority of votes favored a League of Nations, although only 148 favored the Covenant as it stood. Voting for interpretative reservations were 187, for amendments, 231; and against the League, 19.91

F. Religious Organizations. At the Methodist Centenary Exposition in Columbus, Ohio on July 5, 1919, resolutions approving the League were adopted at the close of the meeting.92

Receiving President Wilson on his arrival to speak in Salt Lake City on September 23, a delegation from the Mormon Church assured the Chief Executive of the support of a "large Majority" of the members of the Church. President Grant of the Church had declared his organization to be officially in favor of the adoption of the treaty without changes. The News, the official Church organ, also urged the Treaty's support.93

On September 28, the Indiana Conference of the Methodist

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89Ibid., July 25, 1919, p. 2.
90Ibid., October 1, 1919, p. 3.
91Ibid., October 12, 1919, p. 10.
92Ibid., July 6, 1919, p. 6.
93Ibid., September 24, 1919, p. 1.
Episcopal Churches, meeting in Indianapolis, adopted a resolution endorsing the League.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, September 29, 1919, p. 3.}

The House of Bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America, meeting in a triennial general convention in Detroit on October 10, adopted a similar resolution. Leading members of the House of Deputies of the same organization expressed the opinion that the same resolution would be passed there.

In a meeting at Baltimore on October 15 addressed by its President, William H. Taft, the Unitarian Church's General Conference adopted a resolution favoring the League of Nations. The resolution expressed the hope for the "ratification of the Peace Treaty now before the Senate of the United States, with such reservations or interpretations only as shall not endanger or unduly delay its passage."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, October 18, 1919, p. 13.}

The National Council of the Congregational Church adopted resolutions urging ratification of the Covenant on October 23, 1919. The resolutions called for ratification "without amendments and with only such reservations as shall strengthen the moral influence of the United States."\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, October 24, 1919, p. 3.}

On October 23, the Baptist missionary convention of the state of New York adopted resolutions favoring the League in the convention's final business session at Gloversville, New York.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

The three thousand citizens of the New York section of Jewish
Women meeting on October 23, adopted unanimously a resolution endorsing the Covenant.\textsuperscript{98}

As a final note regarding the support of organized religion during this phase, 3,000 of 13,000 speakers who had pledged to give addresses for the League of Nations were clergymen,\textsuperscript{99} and collective endorsements of the League from church organizations represented the views of millions of church members.\textsuperscript{100}

G. Soldiers. In response to an inquiry by Senator Kenyon regarding the opinion of soldiers returning from the front, Senator Hitchcock, citing an editorial from The Stars and Stripes, maintained that the American soldier "overwhelmingly favored" the League Covenant. The senator also stated that The Stars and Stripes "was not subject to censorship except that it could not exercise military management of the war."\textsuperscript{101}

Individuals Favoring the League. One prominent individual expressed his endorsement of the Covenant during this phase of the debate. In an address to the students of Stanford University on October 2, Herbert C. Hoover, formerly the Economic Director for the Supreme War Council, exclaimed that "if the League of Nations is to break down, we must at once prepare to fight!" He emphatically warned that "the peace treaties cannot be carried out without the League. If the League fails

\textsuperscript{98}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{99}\textit{U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit.}, 7481.

\textsuperscript{100}\textit{Ibid.}, 7481, 7486, and 7487.

the treaties also fail. In that event, civilization will be taken back to the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{Publications Favoring the League.} The editorial views of publications during this phase of the debate remained much the same as expressed in previous phases. Williams continued to receive editorial support from Mississippi newspapers. One notable example of this was the editorial praising his digression to the race problem during his pro-League speech of September 29.\textsuperscript{103}

More to the point was another note of praise for the senator which seems to apply to his pronouncements on domestic affairs as well as on foreign policy.

Senator John Sharp Williams never fails to speak right in meeting when he has anything to say. He is not afraid of his political future and caters to no man or sets of men, political party, or business interests. He treats all alike and says what he thinks, not only concerning matters of politics, but equally as plain in his statements concerning differences between capital and labor.\textsuperscript{104}

Although Williams was not mentioned specifically, an editorial on November 18 accused Republicans of "playing politics all along" during the debate on the League.\textsuperscript{105}

\textbf{Groups Opposed to the League.} League opposition during this phase of the debate shows no increase in quantity of new opposition expressed. Although there are no new individuals reported in opposition to the

\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., October 3, 1919, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{103}Supra., p. 241. "Omaha Has It," (editorial), Jackson Daily Clarion-Ledger, September 30, 1919, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., October 22, 1919, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., November 18, 1919, p. 4.
League during this phase, this section will treat groups and publications opposed.

A. The League for the Preservation of American Independence. On August 20, the League for the Preservation of American Independence made public an open letter to members of the Senate. Expressing strong opposition to the existing draft of the Covenant, the letter would be "sent out broadcast" to the people of the United States. First, the letter affirmed:

1. That no treaty obligations should be assumed which impair (a) the right of self-defense and of friendly succor. (b) the right to manage our own domestic affairs and to maintain our traditional policies.

2. The right of self-defense and of friendly succor is destroyed by Article XV of the covenant; that the right to refuse to go to war is destroyed by Article X of the covenant; and that the right to manage our own domestic affairs and to maintain our traditional policies is imperiled by Articles XVI, XXI, and XXIII.

3. That if these provisions of the covenant were good but obscure they would require interpretation, but they are vicious and clear, what they need is amendment. 106

Secondly, the letter specifically recommended:

1. That the Senate should refuse to advise and consent to the making of the treaty with Germany unless its advice and consent is expressly made subject to such reservations as the Senate shall specify.

2. That when consent has thus been given to the treaty the Senate should maintain its reservations even if other powers hesitate or decline to approve them, and should not under any circumstances yield to pressure exerted from abroad.

3. That the reservations to be made by the Senate in giving consent to the treaty should include the following: (a) The United States should reserve the right to fight in self-defense or otherwise as it pleases. (b) The United States should reserve the right to ignore a call to arms from the Council or the Assembly. (c) The United States should reserve the right to control its own domestic policies and immigration practices. 107


107 Ibid.
B. The American Defense Society. A second group expressing its opposition to the League during this phase in the form of a letter to senators was the American Defense Society. Signed by a list of prominent men, including Charles Steward Davidson, John R. Rathom, George G. Agnew, Richard Washburn Child, Dr. William Harnaday, Newton W. Gilbert, Lee de Forest, William Guggenheim, Robert Appleton, Dr. L. L. Seaman, C. S. Thompson, Raymond L. Tiffany, J. P. Harris, and Charles Larned Robinson, the letter raised ten objections.

1. The United States would surrender sovereignty.
2. Other nations would have a voice in interpreting the Monroe Doctrine and the size of our defenses.
3. The United States would be committed to a blind, general upholding of possibly secret treaties.
4. The Covenant contains several deliberate traps in phraseology.
5. Past attempts at reservations "in connection with partial surrenders of sovereignty have been heretofore declared to be void and of no effect by the Supreme Court . . . and are idle and ineffective except as they may be deemed to morally justify a subsequent refusal in a given case to comply with requirements."
6. The evils are becoming more apparent in the Covenant's attempt to insure self-determination for various countries.
7. The United States will be involved in numerous racial and social wars of Europe.
8. "The foundation of several hundred wars within the next century or two has been securely laid by the nominal adoption, the partial application of, and the partial refusal to apply the impossible doctrines of the self-determination of races which is contrary to our fundamental doctrines as a nation."
9. "To adopt the covenant and to simultaneously advocate race-consciousness, the self-determination of peoples, and the multiplication of nations is not the part of wisdom."

Two "splinter" political parties expressed opposition to the League during this phase. On August 30, 1919, the People's Independent Party declared its opposition,\(^{108}\) and on September 4, the National

\(^{108}\text{i.e.}, \text{August 30, 1919, p. 18.}\)
Socialist Party, in a declaration of principles adopted at its Chicago meeting, endorsed without qualification the Soviet Republic of Russia and condemned the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{Publications Opposed to the League.} In a poll taken both by street interview and by mail, with no provisions to avoid duplicate voting, the \textit{Washington Post} revealed that 2,204 of its readers were opposed to any league at all. Favoring joining with reservations were 1,466; and favoring joining the League without qualification were only 1,380. The votes returned by mail reflected greater opposition to the League than did the votes of the street interviews.\textsuperscript{110}

The \textit{Vicksburg (Miss.) Herald} appeared mildly opposed to the League in July, but by September it had become antagonistic. On July 17, the \textit{Herald} noted that "as John Sharp Williams says, Wilson was wise in accepting the Shantung settlement. But how much wiser would he have been had he not raised the issue of the 'secret treaties' from which he has emerged with sad loss of American dignity and prestige."\textsuperscript{111} By September 28, the \textit{Herald} editorially protested that

\ldots the United States is \ldots congenitally unfitted for membership in any such association as the League of Nations. The Herald took this view in the beginning of the contest for the League of Nations, and it is being proved in the inflexibility of Senate resistance to attacks and appeals which have finally broken down the League champions.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., September 5, 1919, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{110}\textit{Washington Post}, August 27, 1919, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{111}"A Bluff that Failed," (editorial), \textit{Vicksburg Daily Herald}, July 17, 1919, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{112}"The President's Breakdown," (editorial), \textit{Ibid.}, September 28, 1919, p. 4.
Finally, the Herald on October 22 accused Wilson of attempting to coerce senators into ratification of the Covenant.\textsuperscript{113}

The Galleries. The occupants of the galleries were particularly vocal in their responses to Williams on two occasions during the first Covenant debate. As already described, overt manifestations occurred on August 12, 1919, \textsuperscript{114} and on October 16, 1919.\textsuperscript{115}

Summary of Williams' Audience During the First Covenant Debate

The various estimates of senatorial preferences again indicated, as in the unofficial covenant debate, that the League advocates would be unable to muster the required sixty-four votes for ratification of the treaty. Wilson had failed in his attempt, by personal interview, to convert a significant number of Republican League opponents.

Seventy-six of the senators had declared themselves in favor of the treaty, although ten of these favored mild reservations while twenty-eight favored strict reservations. The seventeen Irreconcilables, comprising the remainder of the ninety-three senators who had committed themselves, could be ignored for purposes of ratification.

Like his Chief in his unwillingness to compromise by attaching reservations to the treaty, Williams could depend only upon the votes of the thirty-eight League supporters. His strategy, then, was to discredit Lodge, the leader of the Strict Reservationist group. By exposing

\textsuperscript{113}"Will the United States Share the Burden of Civilization?" (editorial), \textit{Ibid.}, October 22, 1919, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Supra.}, pp. 232-33.

\textsuperscript{115}\textit{Supra.}, pp. 243-45
Lodge's selfish motives and the fallacies of his opposition to the League, Williams hoped to attract many of the Mild Reservationists as well as the Strict Reservationists. If he could convert the ten Mild Reservationists along with only sixteen of the twenty-eight Strict Reservationists, these twenty-six votes, combined with the thirty-eight votes of the League supporters, could ratify the treaty.

Williams' attack, therefore, was against Lodge, who had defied the bulk of public opinion by delaying the treaty in committee and by raising objections to the basic idea of a league of peace.

The Representative Speech

This section consists of a detailed analysis and evaluation of Williams' address of August 12, 1919. This address included Williams' rebuttal to all the arguments raised against the League and was issued against the League's most significant opponent, Henry Cabot Lodge.

The analysis and evaluation includes treatment of Williams' speech organization, argumentative development, emotional proof, ethical proof, style, and effectiveness.

Organization

A detailed outline necessarily precludes the analysis and evaluation of the speech.

The Outline of the Speech.

Introduction: Williams hesitated to reply extemporaneously to Lodge's address, but he replied at length despite his hesitation.

Implied Thesis: Lodge's assertions about the League are in error. (for)

I. No nation can render service to the world of its own free will. (for)

A. We are too indissolubly connected with one another for that.
B. The man of the twentieth century who says that any country can direct its own course to please itself has not sense enough to be a member of a town council.

II. Lodge has neglected one of the "weightier matters of the law"—the peace of the world. (for)

A. He has ridiculed Wilson's plea for world peace.
B. He is more concerned with Republican policies in the Senate.
C. He says that past attempts at peace have failed. (for)
   1. The world was not civilized enough for peace.
   2. The Holy Alliance failed.
D. He says the League will rob us of our nationalism.
E. He never recognized peace of the world as the primary question. (restatement)
F. He says the League will attempt to make us make war.
   1. The League's real weakness is that it does not go far enough.
   2. Its orders should be followed by physical force if necessary.

III. The League will not make slaves of us as Lodge charges. (for)

A. Everything of any importance must be done by the council by unanimous vote.
B. The League will not force the United States to admit all nationalities.
C. We will be able to withdraw from the League after two years notice if we have complied with our international obligations.

IV. Lodge's other objections are not true. (for)

A. The League is not an organization that must be carried out by war.
B. Embargos, or economic pressure, will be enforced against nations only to make them "keep their plighted word."
C. The United States Supreme Court will pass judgment upon the League if it is unconstitutional.
D. Lodge's appeal to "Americanism" is really an appeal to isolationism.

E. We are under obligation not only to France, as Lodge argues, but also to all countries that helped us win the war against the Central Powers.

F. Questions coming under the Monroe Doctrine are excluded from the consideration of the League.

1. Other members have as much right as we to determine whether a question comes under the Monroe Doctrine.

2. Other members cannot decide against us except by a unanimous vote.

Conclusion

I. Apology for Lodge's speech.

II. Promise to reply to it in detail.

Analysis of the Organization

This section presents an analysis in terms of craftsmanship and in terms of audience adjustment.

Craftsmanship. Craftsmanship of the organization refers to thematic emergence, method of division and arrangement, and rhetorical order in disposition.

1. Thematic emergence. Williams again did not overtly state his thesis, that Lodge's assertions about the League had been in error. The statement and development of his main arguments, nevertheless, made clear his general criticism of the speech just completed by the Sage of Nahant.

2. Method of division and arrangement. Williams again organized the speech in a refutative pattern. Each argument corresponded to an argument presented in Lodge's speech.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{116}U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3778-84.
3. **Rhetorical order in disposition.** Williams' opening remarks probably enlisted the attention and interest of the senators to the same extent that it did the listeners in the galleries. The occupants of the galleries "hissed" and became so indignant at Williams' opening remarks that Vice-president Marshall was forced to rebuke them for their behavior.\(^{117}\)

The senators apparently were able to restrain their own reactions to the Mississippian's introductory comments, since no senatorial outbursts or responses of any kind were recorded. The bluntness of Williams' words probably failed to contribute to rendering the listeners well disposed toward the speaker. His friends probably retained their respect for him, while his enemies undoubtedly were unchanged by his bitter attack upon Lodge. The introduction, nevertheless, clearly prepared the way for the ideas that were to come.

The body of the speech consisted of the statement and development of the four arguments: that no nation can render service to the world of its own free will; that Lodge had neglected the peace of the world; that the League would not make slaves of us, and that Lodge's other objections to the League were not true. The organization of the speech was clearer than the past efforts of the Mississippian, because he introduced each new argument with the same transitional statement: "Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts says . . . ."

Williams developed each argument with greater clarity and fewer digressions than in any of his previous speeches.

Unlike his address of June 9, 1919, Williams made no attempt at an Aristotelian emotional peroration. His sole purpose in his conclusion was

\(^{117}\text{New York Times, August 13, 1919, p. 3.}\)
seemed to be that of discrediting Lodge. First, however, he apologized for his own extemporaneous reply.

Mr. President, I want to apologize to the Senate for this so-called speech. I think it is a species of almost unutterable egotism for any human being to rise in his place in the Senate and attempt to answer extemporaneously a carefully, long-time prepared—lamplight-prepared—and written speech by the Senator from Massachusetts, in which he has probably weighed every word, weighed every comma and every period, with the view of avoiding criticism as far as could be, and with the view of helping the Republican Party all that he could with a careful, wise, taught, trained intellect, and with a great deal of information. I would not have undertaken to answer him at all to-day but for the fact that I did not want what he said to go into the Record, even for to-morrow, without something to show that somebody differed with him about the carefully drawn and midnight-light-finished periods of his speech. Later, on some day, I shall make a considered and careful reply, weighing words and phrases. That I could not do to-day, of course.118

Williams' concluding sentences were, obviously, pure sarcasm, since he made no prepared addresses during the entire debate and continued to criticise those who read from their prepared manuscripts.

Analysis of the Organization in Terms of Audience Adjustment

Williams again addressed a majority of opponents to his basic idea of acceptance of the League, since both groups of reservationists could be considered members of the opposition. He chose to discredit the leader of the Strict Reservationists with the hope of converting some of them, along with the Mild Reservationists, to his position: ratification of the treaty without reservation. He presented his thesis to the hostile group, therefore, by implication. Implicative order, however, was not essential to effectiveness, since all members of the group, by this time, knew Williams' purpose in the debate. The order of arguments

118 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3789.
seemed neither climactic nor anti-climactic, since all the arguments
dealt with Lodge's objections to the League, and since all received
approximately equal space and emphasis in the speech.

The major divisions of the speech were consistent logically with
the thesis. Unlike his previous addresses, however, the speech of
August 9 was more "oral" in organization. The reader of the text may
readily determine the points at which Williams began each new argument
by the identifying statement: "Mr. President, the Senator from
Massachusetts says . . . ." Williams' listeners were probably more capa-
ble of following the speaker's thought because of these obvious transi-
tional statements.

The major criticism of Williams' organization in the two previous
representative speeches is equally applicable to the speech of August 9.
There seems to have been no justification for implicative organization
in view of the speaker's bluntness in criticizing Lodge. Since all of-
Williams' arguments were straightforward presentations of refutation,
then, the speaker should have been more consistent in his organization.
That is, he should have made it equally blunt. Obvious organization not
only would have been more consistent with the content of the address,
but it also would have been more in keeping with his listeners' ability
to ferret out his arguments as well as their patience in doing so.

All members of the Senate were aware of Williams' position and
purpose in the debate. No reasonable justification can therefore warrant
the speaker's failure to state his thesis clearly at the outset of the
speech, to preview each of his arguments against Lodge, and to review
these arguments in his concluding remarks.
Invention: Argumentative Development

This section treats the severity and strictness of the argumentative development and the logical credibility of Williams' arguments to his listeners in his address of August 12, 1919.

Argumentative Development of the Thesis

In support of his thesis that Lodge's assertions about the League had been in error, Williams argued, first, that no nation can render service to the world of its own free will. The relationship of the argument to the thesis becomes clear when restated as a hypothetical syllogism.

Major Premise: If no nation can render service to the world of its own free will, then Lodge's assertions about the League are in error.

Minor Premise: No nation can render service to the world of its own free will.

Conclusion: Lodge's assertions about the League are in error.

In his effort to influence the followers of Lodge and the Mild Reservationists, Williams strengthened the minor premise by contending that all nations were too indissolubly connected with one another for any one nation to render service to the world of its own free will and that any man of the twentieth century who maintained that a country could direct its own course to please itself did not have the sense to serve on a town council.

In support of the first of these contentions, Williams argued by analogy that one must always consult his neighbors.

I cannot render service in Yazoo County, Mississippi of my own free will. I must consult the other people who are my neighbors. Yazoo County can not render service of its own free will. It
must consult the other counties in Mississippi. Mississippi can not render service of its own free will. It must consult and agree to a line of conduct with the balance of the States of the United States. The United States can not, if they would, render service of their own free will. Ties of commerce, literature, law, religion, ties of history, ties of future idealism as well as of past traditions, bind us to the balance of the world; and the man who stands forward in the twentieth century and says that any country—I care not even if it be this country, the greatest and the wealthiest if not the most intelligent country upon the surface of the earth—can direct its own course to please itself, regardless of the balance of the world, has not sense enough to deserve to be a member of a town council.119

As logical proof, this argument probably failed to convince the senators that a country could not do as it pleased. The points of likeness in Williams' analogy were obviously outweighed by the points of difference to such listeners as the members of the Senate. The senators were, of course, aware of the existence of definite laws which would prohibit independent action on the part of counties within states and on the part of states within the United States, while no such law among nations existed. In the absence of such international law and organization, most senators probably believed that "Might" could make "Right," although many hoped, as Williams hoped, that a league of peace would become a reality.

Williams' second argument in support of his thesis was that Lodge in his attack upon the League Covenant, had neglected the peace of the world. As a hypothetical syllogism, the argument may be restated as follows:

Major Premise: If Lodge has neglected the peace of the world, then his assertions about the League are in error.

Minor Premise: Lodge has neglected the peace of the world.

119 Ibid., 3785.
Conclusion: His assertions about the League are in error. First, in support of the minor premise, Williams accused Lodge of having ridiculed, "with an absolute, cold, New England, Brahmin cynicism," Wilson's plea for world peace. Williams probably referred to Lodge's question: "Are ideals confined to this deformed experiment upon a noble purpose, tainted, as it is, with bargains and tied to a peace treaty which might have been disposed of long ago to the great benefit of the world if it had not been compelled to carry this rider on its back?" Williams' contention that Lodge had ridiculed Wilson's version of world peace, then, was true. But Lodge had obviously not, as Williams argued in his minor premise, neglected world peace. The Massachusetts senator simply believed that a league of peace would not work. The argument, therefore, that Lodge had ridiculed Wilson's plea for world peace could not have been construed to support the premise that Lodge had "neglected" world peace.

Second, in support of the minor premise, Williams contended that Lodge was more concerned with Republican policies in the Senate than with world peace. Williams made no attempt to develop this assertion. His listeners probably recognized it as a partisan attack designed to discredit Lodge. As such, it was intended to be ethical, rather than logical, proof.

Third, Williams took issue with Lodge's argument that, since all past attempts at world peace had failed, the League would also fail. Lodge had begun his speech with a history of past efforts at peace which had failed. He had concluded that the League would also fail.
Williams attacked Lodge's analogy, pointing out differences which, he maintained, outweighed similarities.

The Senator after a while concludes his historical recitation of all the attempts that have been made for the peace of the world by bringing in the Holy Alliance, and he attempts to identify the Holy Alliance with this league of peace. Why, you might as well attempt to identify the son of one father and mother with the son of another father and mother, forgetting the birth source of each altogether. The Holy Alliance came from autocrats seeking the perpetuation of autocratic power. It failed. Does it follow necessarily, therefore, that an agreement between the peoples of the earth seeking peace in the name and interest of popular power shall fail?\textsuperscript{123}

Here Williams used the same technique of questioning the position of his opponent that Lodge had used against Wilson's plea for world peace. The senators probably realized that the differences were more pronounced than the similarities in Lodge's analogy, although Williams again failed to prove that Lodge had "neglected" world peace.

Fourth, Williams took issue with Lodge's assertion that the League would rob Americans of their nationalism.

Do you imagine, Mr. President, that I surrender my nationalism whenever I confess myself an inhabitant of the earth, subject to international influence and international ethics and international ideals and international traditions, any more than I surrender my identity as my father's son because I meet your daughter or your son in just intercourse?\textsuperscript{124}

The question probably uppermost in most senators' minds at this time was, which would take greater precedence, the national law of the United States or the international law of the League of Nations. Williams implied that the two would never conflict. Most senators probably disagreed with this, although the followers of Wilson were willing to

\textsuperscript{123}Ibid., 3785.

\textsuperscript{124}Ibid.
subordinate the law that they, as senators, made to the international law of the League if this subordination would result in world peace. Williams failed to argue that the end result of world peace would justify the sacrifice of national law to international law under certain circumstances. Williams, therefore, avoided the real issue and, as a result, probably failed to influence his listeners with this instance of logical proof.

Finally, in support of the minor premise that Lodge had neglected the peace of the world, Williams took issue with Lodge's assertion that the League would attempt to make us make war. Lodge had made this interpretation from the phrase of the Covenant which said that "any war or threat of war is a matter of universal concern." Williams argued that the League would not attempt to make us make war or even apply economic pressure. He pointed out that any menace to world peace would be brought before the Council for recommendation, a measure requiring unanimous vote. The League itself, maintained Williams, could force no nation to make war. Williams' correction of Lodge was an accurate reflection of Articles 11 and 5 of the Covenant, which stipulated that in the event of a war or threat of war a meeting of the Council could be called. Decisions of the Council, according to Article 5 however, required the unanimous consent of all members of the League. Since the senators were familiar with the Covenant itself, Williams' challenge probably constituted effective logical proof of Lodge's error. It seemed logically related to the premise that Lodge had neglected the peace of the world, since he had argued, erroneously, that the League would promote war.

125 From Article 11 of the Covenant.
Williams expressed his own view, however, that the League should be empowered to make war if necessary.

Williams' second argument in support of his thesis, the argument that Lodge had neglected the peace of the world, was probably only marginally acceptable to the senatorial listeners. A more effective statement of the argument and, probably a more accurate reflection of Williams' thought, would have been the statement: "Lodge does not believe the League will be practicable." Had this been the statement of the second main argument of the speech, the supporting materials would have been more relevant and effective. The argument and its supporting contentions would have been stated as follows:

II. Lodge does not believe the League will be practicable. (for)
   A. He has ridiculed Wilson's plea for world peace.
   B. He is more concerned with Republican policies in the Senate.
   C. He says that past attempts at peace have failed.
   D. He says the League will rob us of our nationalism.
   E. He never recognized peace of the world as the primary question.
   F. He says the League will attempt to make us make war.

In the writer's opinion, then, Williams failed to make the most effective use of logical proof in this case as an available means of persuasion.

Williams' third major argument in support of the thesis that Lodge's assertions about the League had been in error was that the League would not make slaves of us as Lodge had charged. The argument's relationship to the thesis may best be seen when restated as a hypothetical syllogism.

126 This would not have been merely a restatement of the main argument had the main argument itself been restated as I have recommended.
Major Premise: If the League will not make slaves of us as Lodge charges, then his assertions about the League are in error.

Minor Premise: The League will not make slaves of us as Lodge charges.

Conclusion: His assertions about the League are in error.

First, in support of the minor premise, Williams reminded his listeners that, as a member of the League, the United States could hardly be considered a slave to the League in view of the necessity for a unanimous vote of the Council for any important recommendation. Again, the senators' familiarity with Article 5 of the Covenant probably enhanced the logical effectiveness of this contention.

Second, Williams maintained that the League would not make slaves of us because it would not force the United States to admit all nationalities as Lodge had said it would. To Lodge's charge, Williams queried, "Where does he find that in the treaty?" Williams again resorted to his strongest argument against Lodge's attacks. "Everything of any importance must be done by the council by unanimous vote, and our representative must vote for it." Familiarity with Article 5 probably made this argument logically credible to the senators.

Third, Williams supported the premise that the League would not make slaves of us by insisting that, contrary to Lodge's assertion that we could not get out of the League unless all the other powers of the world let us out, we would be able to withdraw from the League after

127 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3786.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., 3782.
two years notice if we had complied with our international obligations. He further pointed out that we would never seek to retire from any kind of partnership without paying our share of the liabilities of that partnership. Since we would always be honest in our international dealings, he continued, we would not need to fear the unanimous vote of the League against us to prohibit our terminating our membership. This argument was probably credible to the senators, since they were proud of the honesty of the United States in international affairs and since the Covenant specifically stipulated, as Williams had indicated, that

Any member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.¹³⁰

By quoting specifically from the Covenant itself, then, Williams effectively refuted Lodge's contention that membership in the League would make slaves of citizens of the United States.

Williams' fourth major argument was that Lodge's other objections to the League were not true. As a hypothetical syllogism, the argument may be stated as follows:

Major Premise: If Lodge's other objections to the League are not true, then his assertions about the League are in error.

Minor Premise: Lodge's other objections are not true.

Conclusion: His assertions about the League are in error.

Williams took issue with a series of six of Lodge's arguments to support the premise that the objections raised by the Massachusetts senator were not true.

¹³⁰ From Article 1 of the Covenant, quoted in Fleming, The United States and the League, op. cit., p. 535.
First, Williams contended that the League was not an organization that must be carried out by war as Lodge had charged. Williams' refutation of this charge was threefold. He first compared the League with the Monroe Doctrine which could have been construed as a war measure since the threat of force was behind it. It had, on the contrary, been a peace measure and had been successful for one hundred years, he urged. Second, he argued that only lawless nations would be punished and that the first punishment would not be war. Further, he maintained that the United States would never be the victim of such punishment because she would always abide by arbitral decisions.

The senators probably believed that the threat of force behind the Monroe Doctrine had kept the peace in the Western hemisphere for one hundred years. Therefore, Williams' first counter-attack upon Lodge should have been logically credible to his listeners. Article 16 of the Covenant supported his second argument, that lawless nations would be punished, but not at first by force. The article outlines arbitration as the first measure, economic boycott as the second, and war as the third measure to be taken against nations refusing to abide by League recommendations. This attack, in view of the senators' familiarity with the Covenant, was probably logically credible. The third attack, an appeal to American honor, was probably logically credible to a group of men who had recently sent their sons into battle largely because of American honor.

Second, Williams contended that economic pressure would be enforced against nations only to make them "keep their plighted word." Lodge had decried the "misery and suffering" that follow economic pressure
upon nations to make them keep the peace. Williams effectively answered this argument by pointing out that the effects of embargos were much less terrible than the effects of war. His emotional description of the misery and suffering of the boys in the trenches and the mothers at home was probably effective in influencing the senators so recently affected by those terrors. Williams, therefore, effectively implemented logical proof by means of emotional coloration.

Third, Williams answered Lodge's charge that United States' entry into the League might be unconstitutional.

Suppose it was; the Supreme Court would declare it to be unconstitutional just like it might declare any other law to be unconstitutional. Of course it is my duty not to vote for a treaty that I think is unconstitutional; but suppose I thought it was constitutional, and suppose the Supreme Court of the United States thought it was not, the treaty would not be valid.

This reply probably constituted effective logical proof for the senatorial listeners because of their high regard for the American Constitution and their knowledge that the Supreme Court could indeed exercise jurisdiction over a treaty following its negotiation by the President and ratification by the Senate.

Fourth, Williams' contended that Lodge's appeal to "Americanism" had, in reality, been an appeal to isolationism. Lodge had said

You may call me selfish, if you will, conservative or reactionary, or use any other harsh adjective you see fit to apply, but an American I was born, an American I have remained all my life. I can never be anything else but an

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131 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3783.
132 Ibid., 3787.
133 Treaties were declared subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
American, and I must think of the United States first, and when I think of the United States first in an arrangement like this I am thinking of what is best for the world, for if the United States fails the best hopes of mankind fail with it. I have never had but one allegiance—I cannot divide it now. I have never loved but one flag and I cannot share that devotion and give affection to the mongrel banner invented for a league. Internationalism, illustrated by the Bolshevik and by the men to whom all countries are alike provided they can make money out of them, is to me repulsive. National I must remain, and in that way I, like all other Americans, can render the amplest service to the world. 134

Williams replied, "My Americanism is not merely defensive; it is not merely a question of isolation; it is a question now and then of indignation and offense against the powers of unrighteousness and wrong, and I am willing to take up the cudgels against them." 135 Williams failed to point out the faulty generalization of which Lodge had been guilty in his attempt to identify internationalism with the Bolshevik. Further, Lodge had implied that the United States would fail should it enter the League. Williams' reply, therefore, was probably not logically credible to his senatorial listeners, since he made little attempt at anything other than an emotional response.

Fifth, Williams attacked Lodge's contention that we owed no debt to any country other than France in our Revolution. Again, Williams' reply was primarily of an emotional rather than a logical nature.

We are under obligations to every man who served in the war with Germany and came out unscathed; we are under double obligations to every man who went in and came out without an arm or a leg, whether a Belgian, a Frenchman, or a Briton. We are under everlasting obligations to the shades and the ghosts of the dead of all three of those armies. It all marks one thing: We are under obligations to them and they are under obligations to

134 Ibid., 3784.
135 Ibid., 3787-88.
us, and neither of us can do away with the obligations, and none of us can go back to the original isolation. Lodge had spoken in terms of legal, treaty obligations of the United States to other powers. Williams failed to present effective refutation of Lodge's point because he argued in terms of moral obligations. The senators, not often given to legislative action prompted by emotional stimuli, probably failed to respond to this instance of the substitution of emotional proof for what should have been logical proof.

Finally, Williams took issue with Lodge's contention that, since questions coming under the Monroe Doctrine are excluded from the consideration of the League, who would decide whether the principles of the Monroe Doctrine apply to a particular case? Williams granted that when questions of that nature presented themselves, the other members of the League could sit in judgment upon them. He again based his refutation, however, on Article 5: the provision that recommendations of the Council required unanimous vote. Williams' reference to Article 5 probably constituted effective logical proof that such questions involving the Monroe Doctrine would not be decided against the United States.

Williams' support for his fourth argument, that Lodge's other objections to the League were not true, was in part logically credible to his senatorial listeners. His logical strength lay in his reliance upon the Covenant itself. Because of the senators' familiarity with the Covenant, Williams was probably most credible logically when refuting Lodge's contentions by means of reference to various articles of the Covenant. He was probably weakest logically when substituting emotional

136 Ibid., 3788.
proof, vivid illustration, and unsupported generalization for specific evidence. Thus, four of Williams' six counter-contentions probably seemed logically valid to his listeners: that the League need not be carried out by war; that economic pressures were not as terrible in their effects as war; that the United States Supreme Court would judge the constitutionality of the League if necessary; and that questions involving the Monroe Doctrine would not be decided against the United States. Less valid logically to his listeners were Williams' contentions that Lodge's appeal to "Americanism" had really been an appeal to isolationism and that we were under obligation, not only to France, but to every other nation which had participated in the World War as well.

**Summary of Argumentative Development**

In his address of August 12, 1919, Williams failed to make effective use of logical proof as a means of persuasion. He failed to validate logically his first major argument against Lodge (that no nation could render service to the world of its own free will), because he relied upon a single, weak analogy for support. He failed even to state his second major argument effectively. Williams attempted to argue that Lodge had neglected to consider the peace of the world, while Lodge had obviously taken the matter into consideration. He had considered world peace unattainable and clearly said so. He had not "neglected" it. A more accurate statement of Lodge's position would have been that he had considered the League itself impracticable.

Williams also failed to substantiate logically two of his final six objections to Lodge's contentions. Only Williams' argument that the League would not make slaves of us as Lodge had charged was logically
credible to his listeners, because only in support of that argument had Williams used the Covenant itself as evidence against his opponent.

Admittedly, the critic should not expect polished perfection in any respect from an impromptu presentation such as Williams' speech of August 12. His long legislative experience, nevertheless, would warrant greater attention to the wording of his contentions and their support with specific, tangible evidence, rather than with shallow analogy and the substitution of emotional for logical proof.

Invention: Emotional Proof

In his address of August 12, 1919, Williams appealed to four motives: self-preservation, social responsibility, patriotism, and preservation of tastes.

The first instance of Williams' appeal to self-preservation was his accusation that Lodge had not been concerned with world peace, with which the Mississippian equated the saving of American lives.

Has he [Lodge] shown the slightest heart sympathy with the desire of the world to have peace? Has he shown any sympathy with the desire of the mother that her son shall not uselessly die upon the battle field? Has he shown the slightest degree of sympathy with the wish of the father that his son should die only a noble death, in defense of his country, and without regard to any other quarrel that the world might have originating in Serbia or China?  

Williams' second appeal to self-preservation was his observation that the machinery of the League would avoid fighting and therefore save lives.

Are we, individual against individual, to fight our quarrels out? Are we, county against county, to fight our quarrels out? Are we, nation against nation, to fight our quarrels out, when we can of our own free will construct some machinery that will come to a

137Ibid., 3785.
fainter and a more just conclusion of our quarrels?  

A third instance of Williams' appeal to self-preservation was his argument that the treaty at no point gave any right to the League to call out American soldiers or sailors. Fourth, he argued that declaring an embargo against a country would result in far less suffering than would a declaration of war.

The misery and suffering that would follow blockading somebody to make them keep the peace, to keep them, rather, from violating the covenants of peace, because it only applies to those who have taken the covenant upon their souls! How does that compare with the misery and suffering of the boys in the trenches and the mothers at home and the fathers seeking careers for the boys while they were suffering the hardships of the trenches and the horrors of gas attacks and the shattering of limb from limb by shrapnel and shell? Why should the Senator grow so pathetic about the suffering of nations visited with embargoes to make them keep their plighted word--that is all there is to it--and say so little about the horrors of war otherwise inescapable?

Fifth, Williams appealed to self-preservation by implying that the United States could have saved lives by entering the war earlier than she did.

The Senator pays a high tribute to the idea that we "ought to remain disinterested." We remained disinterested in this war over a year longer than we ought to have remained disinterested. From the day that the Lusitania went to the bottom with its precious cargo of women and children we ought to have ceased to be disinterested.

Finally, he appealed to self-preservation by asserting that failure to ratify the League would result in a return to barbarism, while ratification of the League would result in more civilized world conditions.

138 Ibid.
139 Ibid., 3786.
140 Ibid., 3787.
141 Ibid.
Are you going back to the conditions of 1914 and leave it to accident and incident and murder and mid-sea assassination to bring us in or are you going to say beforehand upon what grounds we are going in and upon what grounds we are going to stay out?  

Williams appealed to the motive of social responsibility four times in his address of August 12. First, he urged the senators to ratify the Treaty because it would result in the advancement of civilization, an obligation to be fulfilled by the members of the Senate.

Take it all in all, as a measure for the advancement of civilization and peace and humanity and justice, does it meet with your approval or does it not? If as a whole it does not, cast it aside; but if as a whole it does, although, in your opinion, some things in it ought to be amended, then you are a narrow-minded, selfish ass if you cast it aside. You are not only a narrow-minded ass, but you are a narrow-minded barbarian, because you throw aside justice and humanity and civilization and peace for a clause, the crossing of a "t" or the dotting of an "i."  

Second, Williams employed a negative appeal to the motive of social responsibility. He observed that Lodge had neglected his obligations to his countrymen. He pointed out that Lodge had invited the listeners in the galleries to attend not in the interests of peace, not in the interest of humanity, not in the interests of the mothers of children, not in the interests of the sweethearts of young men, but in the interest of a narrow Chauvinistic policy, which shall be mainly tortured here at home for the purpose of securing Republican partisan success.  

Williams' third appeal to the motive of social responsibility concerned the United States' obligations to be honest in its dealings with other members of the League should it become a member. He drew an

142 Ibid., 3788.
143 Ibid., 3785.
144 Ibid., 3786.
dictate the immigration policy of the United States. Williams replied that "if there is a question well settled in international law, it is that a nation has the right to say who shall be welcome in its house, just as I have the right to say who shall be guest in my house." Williams pointed out that action on the part of the League required unanimous consent of the Council. The Council, he maintained, would never unite against the United States in forcing upon it an immigration policy.

Summary of Emotional Proof

In his address of August 12, 1919, Williams attempted to influence his listeners by means of appeals to four motives: Self-preservation, social responsibility, patriotism, and preservation of tastes. Although the listeners in the galleries had displayed their emotions in response to the address of Lodge and in response to the remarks of Williams until upbraided by the Vice-president, the senators were probably much less demonstrative in their responses to their colleagues. Since no estimate of the emotional state of the senators can be made, the critic must merely assume that they were far less subject to such appeals than were the lay listeners of the galleries. Rather than seeking extensive emotional response from his listeners, then, Williams concentrated his efforts upon discrediting the character and motives of his chief antagonist: Lodge.

Ibid., 3787.
Character

As noted previously, Williams' objective in his speech of August 12 was probably that of discrediting to the greatest possible extent the leader of the opposing forces, Henry Cabot Lodge. One indication that this was the Mississippian's goal was his extensive use of negative ethos, the numerous attempts on Williams' part to link Lodge with that which would not be considered virtuous. Williams generally attempted throughout the speech to indicate that Lodge had deliberately misrepresented the Covenant for purposes of arousing hostility toward it. Additionally, Williams frequently made specific indictments against Lodge's integrity.

Williams' specific attempts to undermine Lodge's integrity included his accusation that Lodge had paid "a high tribute to himself as being about the only man devoted to Americanism and devoted to the United States." Williams also accused his opponent of being more concerned with the "crossing of 't's' and dotting of 'i's'" than with the substance of the Covenant itself. At five points in the speech, he accused Lodge of appealing to the Senate and especially to the galleries in such a way that the latter "tickled the ears of the groundlings, although it made the judicious to grieve." Further, Williams said that Lodge had no sympathy with world peace or with the suffering and

\[149\] Ibid., 3785.

\[150\] Ibid.

\[151\] Ibid., 3785, 3786, 3787, 3788.
terrors engendered by war. He contended that, rather than showing sympathy with "breaking the heart of the world," Lodge had, with "an absolute, cold, New England, Brahmin cynicism that invites the scorn of every honest, human-loving man," merely made fun of the phrase. Additionally, Lodge, Williams maintained, was more concerned with the success of Republican policies than with the peace of the world; was guilty of "narrow chauvinism;" had read, not spoken his "carefully prepared sentences with the view of controlling politics in America as well as he can." Moreover, Williams asserted that Lodge had never consented to be naturalized under the world's terms. He has never consented to record himself as a child of God and an inhabitant of the globe and a citizen of the world or, if so, he failed to let any knowledge of the fact slip his lips this morning.

Lodge had also been a "narrow-minded, selfish ass and barbarian" to cast aside the Covenant, said Williams. He further accused Lodge of having "no indignation in his breast against war" because he had never felt it; and, finally, that Lodge had sought the votes of "hyphenated classes who confess their patriotism to be 50-50; at any rate, not 100 per cent American."

152 Ibid., 3785.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid., 3787.
160 Ibid., 3788.
In addition to attempting to discredit the integrity of Lodge, Williams attempted to strengthen his own integrity by portraying himself as a patriotic American deeply concerned with maintaining the peace of the world. In his introductory remarks, Williams emphasized his own humility in replying with an impromptu speech to Lodge’s carefully prepared oration.

Mr. President, I hesitate very much to undertake to reply extemporaneously and in a few minutes to the greatest possible prepared presentation of the selfishness of American policy ever made even by the Senator from Massachusetts. I would have to have more egotism than even I have if I thought I could answer fully "off the bat" the things the Senator from Massachusetts has been cogitating and laboriously studying to express for three weeks, more or less, with a view to capturing the Senate and the galleries, whose occupants have come by announcement to hear him today.161

Williams carefully defined his own Americanism so that it would contrast with the accusations which he had made against Lodge.

My Americanism is not merely defensive; it is not merely a question of isolation; it is a question now and then of indignation and offense against the powers of unrighteousness and wrong, and I am willing to take up the cudgels against them.162

In his final instance of ethos designed to implement his own integrity, Williams again emphasized the contrast between his purpose and that of his opponent. "I am going to favor the government of this country regardless of men with 50-50 patriotism."163

Intelligence

Williams did not attack Lodge's intelligence. On the contrary, he emphasized the deliberateness with which he believed his opponent to
be misrepresenting the Covenant. Williams stressed his own familiarity with the Covenant and thus attempted to implement within his listeners the impression that he was a man of considerable sagacity. He often cited the Covenant itself, although he made no direct quotations from it, to disprove one of Lodge's arguments. In each of his counter-arguments against Lodge, Williams attempted to depict his opponent as having deliberately falsified the meaning of the Covenant, while he represented himself as the true interpreter of the document.

**Good will**

In his attempt to discredit Lodge, Williams suggested that his opponent, with his cynical contempt toward the idea of world peace, was not a man of good will toward his listeners and toward the American people. As the proponent of peace, however, Williams depicted himself as a man of good will toward all humanity.

**Summary of Ethical Proof**

Williams concentrated his use of ethical proof in an attempt to discredit the integrity of Henry Cabot Lodge. In so doing he probably hoped to influence as many as possible of the twenty-eight Strict Reservationists to abandon their chief. By thinning the ranks of the Strict Reservationists, Williams probably hoped to influence the ten Mild Reservationists to accept the Treaty in the form in which Wilson had presented it to the Senate for ratification. Williams' only hope of gaining the sixty-four votes necessary for ratification was the conversion of all of the ten Mild Reservationists' votes and at least sixteen of the Strict Reservationists' votes. He apparently hoped to accomplish this conversion by means of discrediting the strongest of the Reservationists, Lodge himself.
Clearness

The first aspect of Williams' style which contributed to the clarity of his address of August 12 was his thorough knowledge and understanding of the ideas involved in the debate. He clearly demonstrated his familiarity with the Covenant and his ability to point out errors in Lodge's interpretations of that document.

A second aspect of style which contributed to clearness was Williams' discerning word selection. The appropriateness of his words may be criticized, however, on the basis of their harshness. As indicated earlier in the section concerned with ethical proof, Williams exerted little restraint in his attempt to discredit Lodge's integrity. His choice of words were current, nevertheless, since they are in current usage even today. His words were reputable, but may not have been intelligible at all times to all senators. Some of the senators may not have been familiar with the words, "inchoately" and "termagant." Variety characterized Williams' word choice, since he often chose forceful monosyllabic verbs such as "blot," "fight," "break," "slip," "cast," "run," "threat," "lose," and "shout." Additionally, he frequently used vivid monosyllabic nouns, such as "ass," "slaves," and "fools." In contrast to such words as these were polysyllabic words: "inveigh," "derivation," "cognizance," "chauvinistic," "problematical," "scholasticism," "diabolical," and "contemptuously."

Simplicity of sentence structure was a third aspect of style which

164Supra.,
contributed to Williams' clarity. In a representative sampling of sentences, the Senator used a total of thirty-five simple sentences, six compound sentences, thirteen complex, and sixteen compound-complex sentences.165

A fourth element of style contributing to Williams' clarity was his use of definitions, examples, and illustrations. He was concerned throughout the speech with defining and clearly explaining the terms of the Covenant, particularly the stipulation that the League could not, as Lodge had charged, override the United States. He pointed out several times that action or recommendations on the part of the Council required unanimous consent.

Williams frequently employed examples to disprove arguments which had been advanced by Lodge. Typical of his use of example was his hypothetical example in which he extended Lodge's reasoning to expose its fallacy.

If there is a question well settled in international law, it is that a nation has the right to say who shall be welcome in its house, just as I have the right to say who shall be a guest in my house. But suppose that were not true; suppose that you can imagine half of the world combining against the United States to make us admit Japanese immigrants. I started to say negro immigrants from the West Indies, but we are already admitting them by our own will and power, and they are infinitely less desirable citizens than the Japanese; but that is because you boys up North do not want to lose any votes when you go before the negroes in your States. But suppose that combination to make us admit Japanese were sought, how many nations could you get to combine against us? Could you get Great Britain? Why, if she undertook to force Japanese immigration upon Canada, or Chinese or Japanese immigration upon Australia, or either one or the other upon South Africa or New Zealand tomorrow, she would break up the British Empire by internal revolt. Do you imagine any of the great wise

165I counted the types of sentences in every fifth paragraph of the speech for my representative sampling.
statesmen of Great Britain, who, whatever else they have been in the past have never been fools, do not know that? 166

Williams additionally used vivid illustrations, as in his previous addresses, to describe the horrors of war, which would result, he predicted, from our failure to ratify the treaty.

Williams was unable in his address of August 12, 1919, to avoid unnecessary elaboration and excessive detail. The speech could have been far more succinct and directly to the point. The senators, like this reader, would probably have been relieved at a short presentation on Williams' part for a pleasant change.

Williams used transitional material to a greater extent in this address than in his past speeches. As previously noted, he introduced each new point with a statement of Lodge's argument that he intended to refute. Williams failed, however, to summarize his arguments at any point in the speech. He seemed totally indifferent to his listeners from the standpoint of refreshing their memories.

While the speaker's knowledge of his subject, his discerning word selection, his simplicity of sentence structure, his use of definitions, examples, and illustrations, and his use of transitional statements may have implemented his clarity of style, Williams could have made his presentation far clearer. He could probably have curbed his tendency to elaborate at such excessive length and he could have made the structure of the speech more obvious by summarizing his arguments at strategic points in the speech, particularly in his concluding remarks.

166 Ibid., 3787.
Impressiveness

Although too harsh for the occasion, Williams' use of ethical proof to discredit Lodge probably impressed his listeners. Primarily through detracting from the character of his opponent, Williams implemented the force of his own personal character.

A second aspect which contributed to his impressiveness was his use of imagery. He employed visual imagery by describing the suffering of soldiers in the trenches as well as the suffering of their loved ones, a circumstance which would result from failure to ratify the Covenant. Additionally, he provided vivid description of the individuals to whom we were indebted, those who had lost arms or legs or even their lives. Further, he referred to the sinking of the Lusitania with its loss of precious cargo, and he asked the senators if they intended to drift until they were shot at.

As in his previous speeches, Williams' sentence length failed to contribute to his clarity or to his impressiveness. His average sentence length in the address of August 12, 1919 was thirty-two words.\(^{167}\) Moreover, in a representative sampling of paragraphs, Williams used loose sentences to such an extent that his impressiveness was impaired.\(^{168}\) As previously indicated, however, Williams employed primarily simple sentences rather than more complex forms. Shorter sentences and more compact sentence construction would doubtless have contributed significantly to the speaker's impressiveness.

\(^{167}\) This was determined by sampling the first 100 words of every third paragraph in the speech.

\(^{168}\) In sampling every fifth paragraph, I found that Williams used 22 questions, 6 periodic sentences, 42 loose sentences, and 7 balanced sentences.
Repetition as a device for emphasis was an aspect which frequently characterized Williams' style in his address of August 12. First, Williams asked, "Mr. President, how can any nation, how can any people, how can man render service of their own free will?" Second, he observed that "I cannot render service in Yazoo County, Mississippi of my own free will . . ., Yazoo County cannot render service of its own free will. . . . The United States cannot render service of its own free will." Third, he raised a series of questions concerning Lodge's sympathy with the desire of the world for peace.

Has he shown the slightest sympathy with the desire to have it? (world peace) . . . Has he shown the slightest heart sympathy with the desire of the world to have peace? Has he shown any sympathy with the desire of the mother that her son shall not uselessly die upon the battle field? Has he shown the slightest degree of sympathy with the wish of the father that his son should die only a noble death . . .?

Fourth, Williams praised the brave words of the past expressing the desire for world peace. "Mr. President, they were brave words; they were true words; they were honest words; and they were words worthy of the worship of mankind. Jesus Christ uttered some of them. Alfred Tennyson uttered some of them. Immanuel Kant uttered some of them. Henry IV of France uttered some of them." Williams' fifth instance of repetition was a series of questions designed to raise sympathy for the League.

Are we, individual against individual, to fight our quarrels out? Are we, county against county, to fight our quarrels out? Are we, nation against nation, to fight our quarrels out, when we can of our own free will construct some machinery that will come to a fairer and a more just conclusion of our quarrels?

169Ibid., 3785.
170Ibid.
171Ibid.
172Ibid.
173Ibid.
Sixth, Williams described his own interpretation of Senator Borah's position.

Now, I understand some men in connection with this question. I understand the man that frankly comes forward and says, "I am an American, and I am nothing else, and I do not want to be anything else. I do not acknowledge that I do inhabit the earth. I do not acknowledge that I have any duty to Frenchmen or British or Italians or Germans or anybody else."174

Seventh, Williams castigated Lodge, who had, according to the Mississippian, made an appeal to the galleries, "not in the interest of peace, not in the interest of humanity, not in the interests of the mothers of children, not in the interests of the sweethearts of young men, but in the interests of a narrow Chauvinistic policy..."175 Finally, in reply to Lodge's claim that we were under obligation only to France, Williams observed that

We are under obligations to every man who served in the war with Germany and came out unscathed; we are under double obligations to every man who went in and came out without an arm or a leg... We are under everlasting obligations to the shades and ghosts of the dead of all three of those armies.176

A final aspect of style which contributed to Williams' impressiveness was his use of tropes. First, he employed a synecdoche by accusing Lodge of opposing the Covenant by means of the "crossing of 't's' and dotting of 'i's.'"177

Irony was a second type of trope Williams used to some extent in his address of August 12. At several points in the speech, he accused Lodge of having "tickled the ears of the groundlings, although it made

174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., 3786.
176 Ibid., 3788.
177 Ibid., 3785.
the judicious to grieve."\textsuperscript{178} Williams also used irony in describing Borah's position. "I plant myself on George Washington notwithstanding steamships and wireless and everything else."\textsuperscript{179} The Mississippian made further use of irony in accusing Lodge of using a "velvet glove in an iron hand."\textsuperscript{180} Further, Williams employed irony in his reference to Lodge, that "the Senator seems to have no indignation in his breast against war. He has never felt it."\textsuperscript{181} Williams' final note of irony was directed against the hyphenated Americans.

If there be any men in America whom, because of their "foreign derivation," as the Senator from Massachusetts calls it, we have got to nurse and hug and kiss in order to make them say that they are genuine Americans, I decline to hug or nurse or kiss them. So far as I am concerned they can go to the uttermost boundaries of Sheol and Sahara.\textsuperscript{182}

Factors which probably contributed to Williams' stylistic impressiveness, then, were his use of ethical proof, his use of visual imagery, his predominantly simple sentence structure, his use of repetition in his choice of words and their arrangement, and his use of synecdoche and irony. He probably could further have enhanced his impressiveness, however, by using shorter and more compact sentences.

\textbf{Summary of Style}

Three important stylistic liabilities hampered Williams' stylistic clearness and impressiveness in his address of August 12, 1919, to

\textsuperscript{178}Ibid., 3786, 3787.
\textsuperscript{179}Ibid., 3786.
\textsuperscript{180}Ibid., 3787. This usually is stated as an iron hand in a velvet glove, but Williams, under the pressure of an impromptu presentation, seems to have slipped.
\textsuperscript{181}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182}Ibid., 3788.
When Lodge had finished, the gallery spectators "arose as one person" and rewarded the Sage of Nahant with a greater manifestation of applause than anyone in the Senate could recall. The audience in the galleries "stood and cheered for fully five minutes, the women waving their handkerchiefs and the men their hats." The marines waved their steel helmets and shouted their approval of Senator Lodge's attack upon the league covenant. Vice-president Marshall "was wholly unable to control the visitors in the galleries, and he gave up his efforts to restore order when the first spontaneous outburst occurred." When the first outburst subsided, Marshall began to admonish the galleries, and the cheering "broke out anew in a second demonstration that lasted for two minutes." When order was finally restored "... one of the few men in the galleries who had not taken part in the demonstration shouted: 'Why don't some of you Democrats answer?'" The man's cry was greeted with a wave of laughter, and, at that moment, John Sharp Williams arose to reply to Lodge.

188 Robert T. Small in the Atlanta Constitution, op. cit.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
Immediate surface response

Following Williams' introductory declaration that Lodge's address had been "the greatest possible prepared presentation of the selfishness of American policy ever made even by the Senator from Massachusetts," the Congressional Record described the immediate response from the listeners as merely "manifestation in the galleries." The New York Times, however, described this response as "hissing." The New York Tribune, reporting the magnitude of the applause for Lodge, observed that "even more striking were the hisses and catcalls from all parts of the galleries..." for Williams. Corroborating the reports of hisses, the Atlanta Constitution observed that "... the galleries broke all restraint ... and hissed Senator Williams so loudly that he could not proceed."

So forceful was the response from the galleries to Williams' opening remarks that the Vice-president was forced to pound his gavel "... with all his strength and finally brought about sufficient calm to deliver a lecture on senate rules." Although there were no further overt responses to Williams during the remainder of his speech, the spectators again expressed their disapproval with the "same vigorous hisses and catcalls" when, an hour

195 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3784.
196 Ibid.
197 New York Times, August 13, 1919, p. 3.
199 Atlanta Constitution, op. cit.
later, Senator Hitchcock replied to Lodge.  

In addition to the responses from the galleries, Williams received responses from two of his colleagues in the Senate. First, Borah interrupted Williams when the latter pointed out that, in order to gain its independence, the United States had agreed to defend the territorial integrity of France in the West Indies. This, Williams added, was what the senators were now saying we could not constitutionally do in the case of entering a league to guarantee territorial sovereignty of other nations. Borah interrupted to reaffirm his position. "That," he said, "we should not do." In the exchange that followed, Williams said that Borah had claimed that entry into a league of nations would be unconstitutional. To this Borah replied that he had never argued that a treaty could change the Constitution of the United States. Williams then explained that he thought Borah had contended that by protecting the sovereignty of another power the United States would be usurping the right of Congress to declare war. Borah made no reply to this explanation.

Immediately following Williams' speech, Hitchcock rebuked his colleague. "Mr. President, I think the Senator from Mississippi has, perhaps, been a little oversevere in denouncing the Senator from Massachusetts . . . ." Williams interrupted, "I did not denounce him." Hitchcock continued, "... because the Senator from Massachusetts elected to condemn the idea of a league of nations. Now, it is true that the Senator from Massachusetts did that to-day; but I hold in my hand an extract from a very able address of the Senator from Massachusetts . . . ." Williams

\[201\] New York Tribune, op. cit.

\[202\] U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3788.
again interrupted, "Mr. President, I hope the Senator from Nebraska will pardon me for one interruption. I do not want it to appear that I denounced the Senator from Massachusetts. I may have denounced some of his utterances." Hitchcock replied, "I will accept that correction," and he then proceeded to present a speech in opposition to the views expressed by Lodge.203

Delayed response

As in previous phases of the debate, congratulatory letters and telegrams, along with a few which were critical, came to Williams following each of his speeches from citizens in all parts of the United States.204 Perhaps the most significant response to Williams' speaking in the first covenant debate came before his address of August 12. On July 25, Woodrow Wilson had written, "... let me say how admirable it seems to me you are holding up the cause in the Senate. ..."205 There is no indication that Wilson changed his opinion of the value of Williams' support in the Senate, although there is no specific commendation from the President among the Williams Papers concerning the address of August 12.

Newspaper editorial response to the idea of the League remained virtually unchanged during the first covenant debate from what it had been during the unofficial covenant debate. Williams himself was nowhere

203Ibid., 3789.

204Williams Papers, Box 47.

205Letter of Woodrow Wilson to John Sharp Williams, July 25, 1919, Williams Papers, Box 2.

The delayed responses to Williams' address of August 12 came from letters from the public, from his constituents, and, indirectly, from the newspaper editorial support of the league idea, for which Williams was one of the three principal spokesmen.

\textbf{Readability.}

As in previous addresses, Williams' lengthy impromptu presentation of August 12, with its average sentence length of thirty-two words, probably overwhelmed the average reader of the \textit{Congressional Record}, as indeed, it may have overwhelmed the senators themselves.

\textbf{Technical perfection}

Williams' address fell short of technical perfection in all rhetorical respects. Organizationally, it should have been deductively arranged and more obvious to the listeners. Logically, the speaker failed to state his contentions accurately at times and failed to support some contentions with specific evidence. Emotional proof was not employed extensively, but the speaker concentrated on negative ethos, discrediting Lodge while portraying himself as a Senate spokesman for peace. Stilistically, the address failed to be impressive or clear because of its verbosity and lack of obvious organizational material.
Wisdom in judging trends of the future

Essentially the same evaluation of previous addresses applies to Williams' speech of August 12, 1919. While he was not, of course, the primary spokesman for the League, his views reflect the tenets adopted twenty years later by the United Nations Organization.

Long-range effects upon the social group

The impossibility of establishing a causal relationship between Williams' speaking and the subsequent establishment of a league of peace in the form of the United Nations Organization forces the critic to consider Williams a supporting voice for Woodrow Wilson and, possibly, a significant obstruction to Lodge and Borah.

During the first covenant debate, Williams failed in his objective of discrediting Lodge to the extent that enough of his followers would defect to permit ratification of the treaty. The fact that Williams, at this time, was virtually ignored by metropolitan newspapers may indicate that his strength as a League proponent had diminished by August, 1919.
CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND COVENANT DEBATE

November 20, 1919-March 19, 1920

The Occasion

Following the first defeat of the Treaty on November 19, 1919, the force of public opinion, overwhelmingly in favor of the adoption of a league of nations, prompted some senators to further consideration of the Lodge reservations. Fleming comments that:

The failure of the Senate to approve the Treaty struck the multitudes who resented or regreted the reservation campaign as a world tragedy such as had seldom happened. To still larger numbers, who did not feel the sense of epochal decision, it seemed simply incredible that the dispute should not be compromised in such a way as to allow the United States to participate in the liquidation of the war and the establishment of peace, on a somewhat more stable basis at least.1

Even Lodge himself by December, 1919, had recognized the compromise spirit.2 Failing to convince Wilson to withdraw the Treaty and resubmit it to the Senate, however,3 Lodge had reverted to his "stand pat" position by December 18. On that date he called a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee to consider Knox's separate peace resolution.

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1Fleming, op. cit., p. 402.
2Lodge, op. cit., pp. 192-93.
3This would have again placed the Treaty in the hands of the Foreign Relations Committee.
The committee, acting despite protests of its pro-Administration members, favorably reported the resolution on December 20.

Thus Lodge had again proved his impervious control of the votes for reservations. Still a recluse, Wilson indicated his own inflexibility by informing Jackson Day diners on January 8 that "we cannot rewrite this treaty," and insisting that the matter be settled by the sovereign people in the next national election. Although there was much enthusiasm among the audience of Democrats present at the Jackson Day dinner, an audience which included John Sharp Williams, Fleming observes that the next day senators and representatives of both parties were "cool to the idea." Blum reports that Wilson's intolerance of compromise pleased only the irreconcilables. On January 13, Senators Kenyon and Owen initiated a joint compromise. Following informal meetings among various senators, the "Bi-partisan Conference" met on January 15 with Senators Lodge and New representing the Strict Reservationists, Kellogg and Lenroot representing the Mild Reservationists, and Hitchcock, Simmons, Walsh, Owen, and McKellar representing the League supporters.

The Irreconcilables were not directly represented in the conference, but on January 23, just as the conference seemed near agreement on a reservation to Article 10, a group of Irreconcilables summoned Lodge to its own meeting in Senator Johnson's office. When the Irreconcilables

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4Albert Shaw, Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson, II (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1924), 1163.

5Letter of John Sharp Williams to Gilbert Hitchcock, January 9, 1920, Williams Papers, Box 50.

6Fleming, op. cit., p. 404.

pointed out to Lodge that any compromise reservations would probably be known as the Hitchcock reservations and would deliver credit for saving the Treaty into the hands of the Democrats, progress in the effort at compromise ceased. 8

On January 26, Lodge announced that there could be no compromise of principle and that, in his view, it would be impossible to secure ratification of the Treaty if any changes were attempted in reservations concerning Article X or the Monroe Doctrine. 9

Also on January 26, Wilson announced for the second time his willingness to accept reservations so long as they were only interpretative. He had earlier made this concession in his second conference with the Committee on Foreign Relations on August 19, 1919. The interpretative reservations which Wilson proclaimed acceptable in January, 1920, however, were the "Hitchcock Reservations," which the President himself had written before starting his Western tour the previous autumn.

Despite the gestures of compromise on both sides, the combatants realized by this time that no reservations of other than Republican authorship could be accepted, especially with Wilson confined to his sickroom.

The Democrats' notice of January 30 that they would call the Treaty up in the Senate on February 9 ended all hopes for the success of a bi-partisan conference. 10

Last-minute attempts at conciliation by Viscount Grey, the British

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9Ibid., p. 410.
10Ibid., p. 414.
Ambassador, failed. The Treaty was reconsidered in the Senate on February 9. Referred again to the Committee on Foreign Relations, it was reported back to the Senate the next day with the Lodge reservations. Debate on the Treaty was resumed on February 16 and continued until March 19. The second covenant debate actually includes only this period of one month. During this month, however, the senators made the Lodge reservations more objectionable to Wilson and finally included a declaration favoring self-determination for Ireland.

The occasions on which Williams spoke during the second covenant debate were March 4, March 17, and March 18, 1920.

Speech of March 4, 1920

On March 4, the Senate adopted two reservations to the Treaty: those covering Shantung and the selection of American representatives upon organizations created by the Treaty, such as the League of Nations and other commissions. The discussion of Shantung began with Senator Lodge’s amendment striking out the names of China and Japan from the Shantung reservation which had formerly read: "The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan." Of this deletion, Fleming comments:

The declaration thus boiled down was likely to serve two purposes, to lay a moral censure upon Japan, mildly stated it is true after all the fulminations upon the subject, and to make it difficult for President Wilson to accept the reservations by repudiating his signature to the Shantung articles as something immoral and unnecessary. Aside from challenging also the honor of the Japanese and Allied statesmen who had agreed originally to the reservation if

11U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3848.
the President swallowed it, the statement was of little or no practical value. In view of Japan's promise to the Peace Conference to return the province to China the United States was perfectly free to support China in the case without the reservation.12

Following the passage of the Lodge amendment by a vote of 69 to 2, Hitchcock proposed a substitute for the Shantung reservation to the effect that the United States understood that Japan would return German rights and interests to China at the official end of the war by the adoption of the Treaty.13 In support of his substitute reservation, Hitchcock argued that Lodge and his followers had not really been concerned for the interests of China, but rather had sought a means for attacking Wilson.14

In response to Hitchcock, Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin inquired as to why Wilson had not taken the same action in the Shantung situation that he had taken in the Fuime situation. Wilson had issued a statement to the Italian people on April 23, 1919, indicating that they had no claim to Fuime, the Austria-Hungarian port on the Adriatic coast. Williams now argued that the Fuime and Shantung situations were not analogous. The conditions which had existed when Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan entered into the Shantung agreement had never changed, while the secret treaty of London concerning the Adriatic coast and the town of Fuime had been made with Austria-Hungary, an autocratic power which had been defeated in the World War. Since the government of Austria-Hungary no longer existed, the Fuime agreement could not be compared with the


13 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 3848.

14 Ibid., 3849.
Shantung agreement, an arrangement among the still stable governments of Japan, Great Britain, France, and Italy. If the circumstances were analogous, Williams continued, Fuime would be turned over to Italy. Wilson had had the right to point out that the war had completely changed conditions in the Adriatic. He had no right, Williams maintained, to ask four sovereign powers to set aside a treaty.

Williams additionally argued that Japan's demands in the Shantung arrangement were not unreasonable. The Senate was in accord with three of her four demands: an open door to foreign trade; a place for foreigners; a free port for all foreigners. Japan had fourthly demanded an entre-port in the harbor of the bay at Shantung. Although this fourth objective was distasteful to many Senators, Williams inquired of it:

Is that more than England has in Hongkong? Is it more than France has in Indo-China? Is that more than we have at Shanghai? Is that less than we want? I thought we were all seeking an "open door" in China for the trade of the white race with the oriental population. If that has not been our chief object, then I have been deceived about what our chief object has been.15

Speech of March 17, 1920

On March 17 Williams attacked a resolution that had been proposed by Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin. He objected, first, that the resolution would have seemed harmless to Germany during the war. Second, he added that "its uncontrolled power" sounded like the German Kaiser talking, and that "grave concern" implied that an action must be taken. A third objection raised by Williams was that the resolution obligated the United States to do nothing.

After citing his three objections to the proposed resolution,

15 Ibid., 3850.
His speech of March 18, 1920 was Williams' last utterance in the Senate during the League debates. The following day he resolutely followed Wilson's leadership unswervingly and helped defeat ratification of the treaty for which he had fought so hard simply because he, like his bedridden Chief, obstinately refused to accept the Covenant in any but its "purest" form.

Audience

The Senate

Because of the compromise spirit during the second session of the Sixty-sixth Congress, the issue shifted from acceptance with or without reservations to acceptance with mild or strict reservations. From the published reports of senatorial preferences during this phase of the debate, Braden has concluded that a majority of the senators of both parties favored ratification of the Treaty. 18

The January 23 conference of Lodge with the Irreconcilables in Senator Johnson's office had ended all hope of compromise and from the resumption of debate on the Covenant for the second time until its second defeat on March 19, the League opponents succeeded only in making the Treaty more objectionable to Wilson.

The struggle in the final phase of the debate took place between the proponents of the "Lodge Reservations," and those senators who favored the "Hitchcock Reservations." 19


Finally, the Treaty with November's Lodge Reservations intact came before the Senate for ratification and failed by seven votes. Wilson's twenty loyal supporters, including John Sharp Williams, joined with the fifteen Irreconcilables to reject the "Lodge" Treaty.

Fleming writes of the Treaty's defeat that "it was difficult to see a clear victory for anyone except the battalion of death, as the Senate moved to pass a resolution for separate peace with Germany. The triumph of the bitter-enders, too, would have to stand the test of the future."\(^{20}\)

In a less philosophic outburst, John Sharp Williams told his fellow Mississippians that the Treaty squabble "more than anything in my life made me come nearer to doubting the cause of democracy; some times almost in the providence of God Himself."\(^{21}\)

The Public

Available evidence indicates an overwhelming desire on the part of the American public generally to encourage the Senate to ratify the Treaty. The New York Times reported that

with public opinion urgently demanding some solution of the impasse, it did seem unthinkable that none could be found. Even Senator Lodge appeared hopeful when visited by a massed body of official representatives from twenty-six great national organizations whose combined membership totaled 20,000,000 voters. This delegation, calling in turn upon Lodge and Hitchcock, urged immediate ratification of the treaty on a basis "that will not require its renegotiation."\(^{22}\)

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\(^{21}\) The Vicksburg Herald, March 27, 1920, p. 1.

A. The League to Enforce Peace

Following the first defeat of the Treaty in November, 1919, the League to Enforce Peace launched its drive for a compromise ratification in January, 1920. Sponsored jointly by the League and the American Federation of Labor, a conference was held at Washington on January 13, 1920. It was attended by representatives of thirty-three organizations including the International Association, and the National Women's Christian Temperance Union. The conference declared itself in favor of immediate ratification of the treaty "on a basis that will not require re-negotiation," and "with such reservations as may secure in the Senate the necessary two-thirds vote."23

The compromise efforts, like the League itself, ultimately failed because it could not bring sufficient pressure to bear on Henry Cabot Lodge to propose a set of reservations agreeable to Wilson. William Harrison Short, secretary of the executive committee of the League to Enforce Peace, analyzed the failure of his organization.

... the facts are that the action taken at our Executive Committee Meeting on November the 13th, when we decided to issue a statement that we gave out from Washington on November the 18th, knocked us to pieces pretty badly. The Republican members of our organization throughout the country had already deserted us to a considerable degree because of the partisan opposition of the Republican machine. We had, therefore, rebuilt our organization largely out of Democrats. This alienated a great many of those. As an illustration of the results, I had a meeting here in my office with the Executive Committee of the New York State Branch and, in spite of my utmost efforts—and I never fought more desperately in my life—they absolutely refused to do a blessed thing, directly and avowedly because of that vote.24


B. Women's Organizations

Alone among women's organizations endorsing the League for the first time was the Women's Nonpartisan Committee for the League of Nations. The New York Times reported that resolutions calling upon the Senate to ratify the treaty of Versailles "with only such reservations as will not send it back to the Allies or require a separate treaty with Germany" were passed unanimously by 200 persons at a dinner by Women's Nonpartisan Committee for the League of Nations.25

C. Business and Professional Organizations

Several Chambers of Commerce passed resolutions in favor of ratification following the Senate's first defeat of the Treaty in November. Among these were the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York,26 The Cleveland Chamber of Commerce,27 the Directors of the Chicago Board of Trade,28 The Executive committee of Merchants and Manufacturers Association of Baltimore,29 the Boston Chamber of Commerce,30 and the Southern Commercial Congress.31

D. College Faculties and Students

Among college faculties urging speedy ratification of the Treaty

26New York Sun, December 5, 1919, p. 13.
28Ibid., p. 1.
29Ibid., December 21, 1919, p. 2.
31Ibid., December 11, 1919, p. 3.
following its first defeat were Cornell University, Union Theological Seminary, and Wells College.

The Intercollegiate Treaty Referendum organization contributed importantly to the establishment of public opinion among college students and faculty. In a questionnaire survey of 670 colleges and universities, 410 replied as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratification without reservations</td>
<td>33,499</td>
<td>3,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed in any form</td>
<td>11,073</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratification with Lodge reservations</td>
<td>19,917</td>
<td>1,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise Lodge and Democratic Reservations</td>
<td>40,437</td>
<td>4,352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thomas A. Bailey observes that

This poll is significant, for it seems to have been the closest thing to a "solemn referendum" on the issue that the country had. Even though the colleges were strongly pro-League, there was much sentiment for the Lodge reservations and for compromise. It seems probable that such sentiment was even stronger among the masses.

E. Religious Groups

In November, following the first defeat of the Covenant, in a survey of more than 1,700 clergymen, the National Committee on the Church and Moral Aims of the War concluded that ministers were 20 to 1 in favor of unconditional entry into the League.

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32 Ibid., December 7, 1919, p. 2.
33 Ibid., December 14, 1919, p. 2.
34 Ibid., December 21, 1919, p. 2.
36 Bailey, op. cit., p. 401.
On December 11, 1919, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America adopted resolutions endorsing the League of Nations and calling upon the ministers and churches of the nation to exert every possible influence upon the President and the Senate to secure immediate ratification "with such reservations only as are necessary to safeguard the Constitution of the United States."\(^{38}\)


Last week's overwhelming vote of the faculties and students of the American colleges and universities in favor of ratifying the covenant without reservations, or only with such reservations as will honorably compromise the differences between the factions in the Senate favoring some kind of a League of Nations, must have given Senator Lodge and his drastic reservationists and Senator Borah and his Battalion of Death a severe jolt.

Of the 158,078 votes taken in 410 institutions, 61,494 favored a compromise to permit immediate ratification, 48,232 favored the treaty without change, 27,970 expressed themselves in accord with the Lodge programme, 13,943 favored killing the treaty and the League, and 6,449 would negotiate a new treaty with Germany. In other words, less than one-tenth of the vote favored Borah and less than one-fifth favored Lodge. President Wilson's uncompromising stand evoked more support than the Lodge and Borah proposals combined. In fine, nine-tenths of the voters are in favor of ratification in some form and seven-tenths are for a League more virile than the Foreign Relations Committee would have it.

This vote, in which the mature judgment of the faculties corresponds with the idealism of the students, has been confirmed by every other test so far taken in the country. The result of a postal-card poll of returned soldiers and sailors from Southern Massachusetts made by Mr. Frank L. Andrews of Fall River showed that 554 voted for the League unamended, 5 for reservations and 12 were opposed.

The American Federation of Labor at its annual meeting in July voted 29,000 in favor of the covenant and 400 against it. At a

\(^{38}\)New York Times, December 12, 1919, p. 3.
meeting of the national and State officers at Washington on December 13, 1919, the vote was 240 to 3 in favor of ratification, two of the three dissenters being unredeemed Irishmen.

The Church Peace Union took a Nation-wide poll of the ministers of the country, Protestant, Catholic and Jewish. The vote was 17,309 in favor and 816 against--most of those in opposition being Irish Catholics.

Fourteen daily newspapers from ten States have just taken a very significant poll of their readers. The total vote was 48 per cent for no reservations, 35 per cent for a compromise, 10 per cent for the Lodge reservations, 7 per cent for no League. Most of the papers were in Republican Congressional districts. The poll of the Portland Oregonian, which is not included in these percentages, was 11,096 for unamended ratification, 665 for compromise, 112 for the Lodge reservations and 228 for no treaty.

I have addressed thirty meetings in ten States in the last three months on the League of Nations--North, South, East and West. Before I presented my case I invariably called for a show of hands from the audience. With one exception (on the New York east side) every assemblage voted about the same, not only those who came knowing they were to hear an address in favor of the League, but those ready-made audiences such as composed the City Club of Cleveland, the Teachers' Association of Minnesota and the Southern Commercial Congress, which came for the occasion and not for the speaker. I found that about 60 per cent were in favor of the treaty as presented by the President, 30 per cent were for mild reservations and the remaining 10 per cent were scattered between the drastic reservationists and bitterners.

If all these straw votes are not sufficiently conclusive, the last doubt of where the country stands on the covenant must have been removed when the official representatives of twenty-six national organizations waited on Senator Lodge and Senator Hitchcock last week and urged them, in behalf of the majority and minority factions which they represent in the Senate, to get together, to compromise their differences and to ratify the treaty without delay. When practically all the official organizations of the land, representing, among other classes, the farmers, the workers, the churches, the schools and colleges, the women, unite on a programme of this kind, it is the American people that is speaking.

From the above expressions of American sentiment it is evident that the present alignment of the country on the League of Nations differs radically from that of the Senate. In other words, the Senate does not represent the American people on this issue.
The Senators, therefore, have two imperative duties to perform if they would satisfy the people whose servants they are.

First--They must compromise their differences so that sixty-four of the eighty Senators favoring some kind of a League of Nations will ratify the treaty.

Second--They must agree upon such a compromise as will permit the President to transmit it to our allies for their acceptance, rather than to project the issue into the next Presidential election.

If the Senate in ratifying the treaty so emasculates it as to force the President to the latter course, there can be little doubt as to what the people will do at the next election both to the party and the individual Senators who are responsible for the delay.39

Individuals Favoring the League. Most notable among the individuals favoring the League during the second covenant debate was William Jennings Bryan. At the Jackson Day dinner in Washington on January 8, Wilson's former Secretary of State chose to take issue with his chief. As one of the guests of honor at the dinner Mr. Bryan made a speech which contained a plea for keeping the treaty out of politics. He argued that the treaty should be ratified without delay; that there should be compromise on the part of the Democratic Senators if necessary to bring this outcome.40

Publications Favoring the League. As in previous phases, most newspapers reported public opinion in favor of the United States' entrance into the League of Nations. On December 3, 1919, the Baltimore Sun reported that 11,545 of its readers favored joining, as opposed to 567 who were against the League.41

41 Baltimore Sun, December 3, 1919, p. 6.
On January 16, 1920, Senator Hitchcock read into the Congressional Record a public opinion poll taken by the Rochester Times-Union, "a combination of two newspapers, one Democratic and one Republican." The poll reported 1706 readers favored ratification with reservations, 789 with reservations acceptable to Wilson, 166 favored Lodge reservations, 122 favored compromise on reservations, and 39 complete rejections.42

On January 18, the Oregon Journal reported that, of its readers polled, 12,765 favored joining, 702 were for compromise, 121 were for Lodge reservations, and 248 were against joining.43

Typical of pro-League editorial response to the second defeat of the Covenant was the New York Times reference to the "Senate's prolonged and disgraceful exhibition of mean-spirited partisanship and incompetence."44 The New Orleans Times-Picayune bitterly observed that

It is well that the shameful and humiliating chapter of the "treaty debate" in the Senate is finished. It is better to have no treaty than a treaty which carries with it reservations and expressions insulting to our former allies, a hodge-podge of pander to alien-minded vote-groups in America and an affront to the comrades in arms of a brief sixteen months ago.45

Groups Opposed to the League. Late in November, 1919, following the Treaty's first defeat, the National Labor Party passed a resolution condemning the Peace Treaty and the League of Nations covenant "... on the ground that they do not conform to President Wilson's Fourteen Points

42U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 1604.


and is not in the interest of the working classes.\textsuperscript{46}

In January, the Committee on Political Reforms of the Union League Club of New York reported that the League in its present form should not be accepted, nor should the Republican Party permit itself to be driven into a false attitude. Its leaders have for many years been in favor of a safe, sound, practical and conservative League of Nations or League to Enforce Peace. The issue at the present time is not as to the fundamental and vital principle of a League of Nations, but solely whether this particular draft in its present form, avowedly tentative and subject to amendment and revision and clearly imperfect and dangerous as its wording now stands, shall or shall not be adopted and ratified. That the Senate may wisely and patriotically advise.\textsuperscript{47}

The American Protective Tariff League, at its annual meeting in New York on January 22, 1920 unanimously adopted resolutions urging the immediate declaration of peace with Germany and that the League was "unalterably opposed to the covenant of the League of Nations as presented and opposed to any league of nations which endangers the sovereignty, entity and independence of the United States of America."\textsuperscript{48}

Two other anti-league organizations active during the final phase of the debate were the American Women Opposed to the League of Nations and the Committee of American Business Men. The latter organization was formed after the first defeat of the treaty to organize opposition among business men of the East to the League. The most notable function of this organization was its banquet in New York on January 19, 1920, attended by 1,000, to honor senators who had voted for reservations. The

\textsuperscript{46} New York Times, November 26, 1919, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., January 9, 1920, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., January 23, 1920, p. 32.
gathering of prominent anti-leaguers was addressed by Senators Johnson and Reed.49

Typical of editorial comment among those newspapers opposed to the League was that of the New York Tribune, expressed the day following the Treaty's defeat.

. . . from the beginning there was little chance. The inefficiency and self-sufficiency of our only negotiator created a bedevilment whose waves never could be quieted. In the final hour, completing his disservice, he was able to command enough Senators to drive a knife into the heart of his own work.50

The Galleries

The occupants of the galleries had been particularly vocal in their responses to Williams during the first Covenant debate. Overt manifestations had occurred on August 12, 1919,51 and on October 16.52 No responses from the galleries were recorded, however during the second Covenant debate.

Summary of Williams' Audience During the Second Covenant Debate

Despite the overwhelming ground swell of public opinion in favor of adoption of the covenant in such a form that the treaty would not require re-negotiation, Borah and his coterie of seventeen Irreconcilables refused even to consider ratification of the treaty with either the Lodge or the Hitchcock reservations. Ratification of the treaty in either of its two forms was impossible because only thirty-three votes were required for its defeat.

The Irreconcilables, therefore, combined their votes with the

49New York Sun, January 20, 1920, p. 5.
51Supra., pp. 232-33.
52Supra., pp. 244-45.
Strict Reservations for a total of forty-five votes to defeat the treaty with the Hitchcock reservations, while the Irreconcilables shifted their allegiance to the twenty loyal Wilson supporters, including Williams, to defeat the treaty with the Lodge reservations.

Williams' only hope for adoption of the treaty in the form approved by Wilson was to persuade enough Strict Reservationists, or pro-Lodge senators, to combine their votes with the League supporters and the Mild Reservationists for ratification of the treaty with the Hitchcock reservations.

When Williams presented his last plea for the "Wilson" League on March 17, 1920, therefore, his "target group" included sixteen Strict Reservationists.

The Representative Speech

This section consists of a detailed analysis and evaluation of Williams' address of March 17, 1920. The address was representative of Williams' speaking in the second covenant debate because in it he made his final plea for ratification of the covenant with the Hitchcock reservations. In his other two addresses of the second covenant debate, Williams limited himself to criticism of specific amendments.

The analysis and evaluation includes treatment of Williams' organization, argumentative development, emotional proof, ethical proof, style, and effectiveness.

Organization

The following is a detailed outline of the speech.
Introduction

I. Williams dismissed the Lenroot amendment as a "little foolish amendment, which, of course, does not cut much figure."53

II. Williams proposed that "... the best thought and the highest thought of every man might be well directed to the question of keeping the peace and settling disputes, whether they were individual, industrial, or international, by some fair, arbitral, common board."54

III. "This whole question came back to this: Will you or will you not voluntarily limit your own sovereignty to the extent necessary to bring about 'peace on earth and good will among men?'"55

Thesis: The United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations. (for)

Body

I. The League is in operation and is going to work. (for)
   A. It is stronger than the concert of Europe ever was, (for)
      1. It includes Japan.
      2. It includes several of the strongest South American countries.
   B. The United States Senate is powerless to prevent its operation.

II. The United States cannot be an independent and uncontrolled power. (for)
   A. Other nations should have their rights.
   B. Uncontrolled power is an old Middle Age concept. (for)
      1. The day of the lord's castle on the hill has passed.
      2. Today all nations are interdependent with one another.

III. Entering the League with the Lodge reservations would emasculate the League. (for)
   A. All the nations in the League would be equally sovereign.
   B. All would impose exactly the same limitations that we would have.

53U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4461.
54Ibid.
55Ibid.
Conclusion

I. I would rather the United States stayed out of the League than to enter it with such reservations and conditions as emasculated the agreement. (for)

A. The European countries and Japan may be able to preserve the peace of Europe.

B. The Monroe Doctrine may preserve peace in the Western Hemisphere.

Analysis of the Organization

This section presents an analysis in terms of the craftsmanship and the audience adjustment of the organization of Williams' address of March 17, 1920.

Craftsmanship. Organizational craftsmanship concerns thematic emergence, method of division and arrangement, and rhetorical order in disposition.

1. Thematic emergence. Williams came closer to stating his thesis in this address than in any of his previous addresses. In his fourth paragraph, he explained the three positions being taken by the senators.

This whole question comes back to this: Will you or will you not voluntarily limit your own sovereignty to the extent necessary to bring about "peace on earth and good will among men?" There are two sides, either one of which may be right, and nobody between them can be right.\(^5^6\)

Williams then observed that Borah and the Irreconcilables, one of the sides which could have been "right," favored no entangling alliances of any description. Outlining his own position, Williams noted that

The other side is the side which I take, which is that no country can live for and by itself; that it must live interdependent and not independent; and that in living in that way it must agree upon

\(^{56}\text{Ibid.}, 4461.\)
a modus vivendi with the remainder of the world whereby they can all live in peace with one another.  

Of the third position in the debate, Williams commented:

Now, the men in between us two, that want to devitalize and emasculate and poison the League of Nations so that it shall not amount to anything except words, in my opinion, are clearly wrong.

Considering the three major arguments of the speech, however, Williams did not literally state his thesis. The arguments that the League was already in operation and was going to work; that the United States could not be an independent and uncontrolled power; and that entering the League with the Lodge reservations would emasculate the League seem to support a thesis, the most succinct statement of which is: "The United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations." Since Williams did not state his thesis in these words, the thematic emergence must, at least to a partial extent, be considered implicative in nature.

2. Method of division and arrangement. As in his previous addresses, Williams divided his material according to the refutative requirements of his subject. Each argument corresponded generally to arguments that had been raised against our entry into the League, although the speech did not reply to arguments raised in any specific speech as had Williams' address of August 12, 1919.

3. Rhetorical order in disposition. Williams probably succeeded in his opening remarks in enlisting the attention and interest of his listeners and in rendering them well disposed toward himself. He raised

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57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.
the compelling question of nations' getting along with one another and then identified his position with that of Jesus Christ.

Fellow Senators, it has seemed to me since I was a boy as if the world were composed of a lot of people, a lot of nations, a lot of races, a lot of religions, and a lot of people everywhere who ought to seek to get along with one another. It has seemed to me since I first conceived the idea of the purposes of Jesus Christ that His purpose was to be a Prince of Peace and that the Christian religion consisted chiefly in trying to live a peaceable life with another individually and nationally. It has seemed to me that whether you were Roman Catholic, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, or Mormon, you could all agree upon one thing, and that was that the best thought and the highest thought of every man might be well directed to the question of keeping the peace and settling disputes, whether they were individual, industrial, or international, by some fair, arbitral, common board. 59

Preparing the way for his ideas to come, Williams also argued, in his introductory remarks, that "there is no such thing as an independent and uncontrolled sovereignty amongst civilized countries." 60

The body of the speech consisted of the statement of Williams' three arguments: that the League was already in operation and would work; that the United States could not be an independent and uncontrolled power; and that entering the League with the Lodge reservations would emasculate the League. Williams elaborated upon each of these arguments, although not to the extent that he had in the past elaborated, often in excessive detail.

Williams' concluding remarks were in the Aristotelian tradition. He attempted to render his audience well-disposed toward himself, and ill-disposed toward his opponent by realistically assuming that the Senate would not ratify the covenant with the Hitchcock reservations and expressing the hope that peace would prevail because of the operation of the

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
League in Europe and the operation of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. In order to render the listeners ill-disposed toward the adoption of the Lodge reservations, Williams observed that they would cause the League to fail, and, therefore they would also cause world peace to fail.

A second Aristotelian characteristic of Williams' peroration was that he made his own case seem more important and vital to the preservation of peace by linking it with Jesus Christ and his world peace philosophy. He depreciated the adoption of the Lodge reservations by identifying them as a cause for failure of Christ's world peace philosophy.

Third, the peroration was designed to excite emotions by appealing to the listener's desires for self-preservation and legislative success, and, finally, Williams attempted to recall the facts of his case to his listeners. He specifically discussed his own proposal as a workable proposition for the preservation of world peace, and he discussed the adoption of the Lodge reservations as a means for the destruction of world peace. Although making an impromptu speech, Williams systematically attempted to capture the sympathy of his listeners for himself, while alienating them from Lodge; he attempted to magnify his own case, while depreciating Lodge's; he attempted to arouse the emotions of his listeners; and he attempted to refresh their memories.

I would infinitely rather that the United States stayed out of the league than to enter it with such reservations and conditions as emasculated the agreement. I have a hope that Great Britain and France and Italy and Holland and the Scandinavian powers and

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61 The characteristics of the Aristotelian peroration are cited in Lane Cooper, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, op. cit., p. 240.
Switzerland and Japan may make it a working proposition for the preservation of peace in Europe, we can make the Monroe Doctrine here a working proposition in favor of the preservation of peace in the Western Hemisphere. But if we go in with reservations that render the original agreement invirile and emasculate, then the whole thing will fail; and when it fails, we fail; and when we fail, Jesus Christ fails, and with Him his world peace philosophy. 62

The introduction, body, and conclusion of Williams' speech, then, adhered to the Aristotelian tradition, although the speaker may have made no conscious attempt at such adherence.

Analysis of the Organization in Terms of Audience Adjustment

Williams' overt presentation of his thesis in his address of March 17 was in keeping with the bluntness of his remarks to his colleagues. 63 Since he stated each of his main arguments, and since the listeners already knew his position, no justification existed for the implicative development of a thesis. The thesis, as previously noted, may be considered partially implicative in its development because Williams did not make such an unequivocal statement as: "The United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations." His interpretation of the three positions in the debate, however, clearly leads the reader, and probably leads the listeners, to infer the above statement of Williams' thesis.

The major divisions of the speech were consistent logically with the thesis. The lack of obvious transitional material, however, makes an absolutely accurate determination of what Williams intended to be his

62 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4462.

63 As I previously indicated, Williams did not literally state his thesis in the form with I take it to be. He gave a clear indication of the nature of the thesis, however, in the fourth paragraph of the speech.
main arguments impossible. The impossibility on the part of the reader of determining main points was probably shared by the Senator's listeners.

As in Williams' previous addresses, all members of the Senate were aware of his position and purpose in the debate. His failure to state his thesis unequivocally; his failure to preview his arguments; his failure to indicate, obviously, by means of clear transitional wording; and his failure to summarize his arguments in his concluding remarks, therefore, seems unjustifiable. The writer concludes that, organizationally, Williams was indifferent toward his listeners. He showed no concern for their facility in comprehension or retention of the arguments presented in his speech of March 17, 1920.

Invention: Argumentative Development

This section is concerned with the severity and strictness of the argumentative development and the logical credibility of Williams' arguments to his listeners in his address of March 17, 1920.

Argumentative Development of the Thesis

In support of his thesis that the United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations, Williams contended, first, that the League was already in operation and was going to work. The relationship of this contention to the thesis becomes clear when both are restated in the form of a hypothetical syllogism.

Major Premise: If the League is in operation and is going to work, the United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations.

Minor Premise: The League is in operation and is going to work.

Conclusion: The United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations.
In attempting to influence the defection of several Strict Reservationists, Williams strengthened the minor premise of the argument by maintaining that the League already was stronger than the concert of Europe ever had been. This was true, he said, because, in addition to the European powers that had already entered the League, Japan and several of the strongest South American countries had become members.

Since the senators were familiar with the countries which had entered the League at that time, and, since Williams was correct in that the numerical strength of the League did outweigh the previous concert of European powers, this argument was probably logically credible to the senators. 64

Williams attempted, second, to strengthen the premise that the League would work by pointing out that the members of the Senate were powerless to prevent the League's operation.

You can not help it if you want to; you are powerless in men and money and navy and army to prevent it if you want to. If you think you can fight the world you are mistaken; you can not. They have made up their minds that they will keep the peace of the world against any lawless outcast nation; and if you want to be a lawless outcast nation, be one if you choose, but you can not win along that line. 65

Again, in view of the powers which had already become members of the League, Williams' argument probably constituted logically credible proof to his listeners that the League and its continuing operation was an accomplished fact.

Williams' second major argument in support of his thesis was that the United States cannot be an independent and uncontrolled power. The

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64 Fleming, *The United States and the League*, op. cit., p. 545.
65 U. S. Congressional Record, *op. cit.*, 4461.
argument may be restated and clarified as a hypothetical syllogism.

Major Premise: If the United States cannot be an independent and uncontrolled power, it should enter the League without the Lodge reservations.

Minor Premise: The United States cannot be an independent and uncontrolled power.

Conclusion: It should enter the League without the Lodge reservations.

In support of the minor premise, Williams contended, first, that the other nations should have their rights.

I do not want to be, in the community in which I move, an uncontrolled power; I want you to have your rights; I want the Senator from Texas to have his; I am willing to give—and I am speaking as a citizen of the United States—I want to give to all the people on earth their rights. I do not want to be "uncontrolled" nor "independent," and no nation on the surface of the earth can be uncontrolled or independent.66

This argument probably failed to impress the listeners as logically credible because Williams failed to establish a definite causal relationship between the operation of the United States as an independent and uncontrolled power and the infringement upon the rights of other nations. He failed, in short, to answer the question: Why cannot the United States operate independently and, at the same time, avoid infringing upon the rights of other nations? Many of his listeners, particularly the Strict Reservationists to whom he probably intended to direct his remarks, may not have been willing to assume that the United States, operating as an independent and uncontrolled power, would automatically infringe upon the rights of other nations.

Second, in support of the premise that the United States cannot be independent and uncontrolled, Williams argued that the concept of

66 Ibid.
uncontrolled power was an "old Middle Age concept."  

There was a time when every community was independent, with the lord's castle on the hill and the village below, and they fought the world for their side arms and for their food. That has passed long ago, and the very word "independent" in connection with a nation is a misnomer today. Great Britain is not independent; France is not independent; you are not independent; we are all interdependent with one another; and if we are not, then we are uncivilized, and we sink to barbarism tomorrow, or else we declare war upon the world and the world declares war upon us; and in that sort of a war any particular nation must fall.

The weakness of this supporting argument lay in Williams' failure to define the "interdependency" he claimed for all nations. He failed to recognize degrees of independence as opposed to interdependence. This supporting argument may be restated as a disjunctive syllogism to clarify Williams' logic.

Major Premise: Either nations are interdependent, or they are uncivilized.

Minor Premise: Our nation is not uncivilized.

Conclusion: It is interdependent.

The weakness which probably occurred to Williams' listeners, especially those already hostile toward his thesis, was that the two alternatives of the major premise were not mutually exclusive. Most listeners in 1920 would have concluded that, despite modern shipping, transoceanic communication, and the airplane, the Western Hemisphere was still separated from the continent of Europe by an ocean, and that, therefore, the United States could, in fact, enjoy a greater degree of independence than could the countries of Europe.

Williams' second major argument, then, that the United States

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67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
could not be independent and uncontrolled, probably failed to influence the members of his "target group," because he failed to demonstrate logically, first, that if the United States were independent, other nations would suffer automatic infringement upon their rights. His second failure was to demonstrate logically that the United States must make a choice between the two absolute alternatives of interdependence or barbarity.

Williams' third major argument in support of the thesis that the United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations was that entering the League with the Lodge reservations would emasculate the League itself. The argument may be restated and clarified as a hypothetical syllogism.

Major Premise: If entering the League with the Lodge reservations will emasculate the League, then the United States should enter without them.

Minor Premise: Entering the League with the Lodge reservations will emasculate the League.

Conclusion: The United States should enter the League without the Lodge reservations.

Williams supported his minor premise by arguing that, since all nations in the League would be equally sovereign, all nations would, therefore, impose exactly the same limitations that we, by adopting the Lodge reservations, would impose.

If they did let us in with the [Lodge] reservations, then, entering a league with other nations every one of which would be equal and sovereign and equally sovereign, they would have exactly the same limitations that we would have, and the League of Nations would be emasculate and invirile, as incapable of perpetuating itself as an emasculated man might be, and the world in a few years would have the object lesson of an unsuccessful League of Nations; and the minute they saw an unsuccessful League of Nations, the average man in America and Great Britain and France and Italy could not make the distinction, and when you said to him, "This thing failed because it
was defective," he could not understand that. He would just simply say: "The experiment of a league of nations has failed. It has gone down. It has been unable to do anything. It was invirile. It was emasculate. It accomplished nothing." Then you shall have discouraged every seer and every prophet and every poet that had dreamt about world peace, and you shall have discouraged him for fifty years to come if not for a hundred. 69

Like his second major argument, Williams' third argument probably failed to influence the members of his target group. Williams begged the question by merely asserting that the Lodge reservations would weaken the League. He failed explicitly to explain how these reservations would render the League powerless. Why, the listener might wonder, would the adoption of reservations similar to the Lodge reservations by the entire membership of the League render it inoperable? Williams failed to provide an answer.

Williams seems to have been inaccurate in his evaluation of the Lodge reservations. Thomas A. Bailey observes that "most of the reservations were irrelevant, inconsequential, or unnecessary. Some of them merely reaffirmed principles and policies, including the Monroe Doctrine and control of immigration and tariffs, already guaranteed by the Treaty of Versailles or by the Constitution of the United States." 70 Bailey further notes that "Wilson repeatedly expressed a willingness to accept mild reservations, and had in fact worked out a list with the Democratic leaders that differed only slightly from that of Lodge." 71 The essential difference between the Lodge reservations and the Hitchcock reservations was that the former had, in the second reservation, stipulated that a

69 Ibid., 4462.
70 T. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, op. cit., p. 620.
71 Ibid., p. 621.
joint Congressional resolution would be required to carry out the provisions of Article X of the Covenant. Wilson had steadfastly urged his followers to accept no compromise concerning Article X, the "heart of the Covenant." Lodge, of course, had been equally unwilling to compromise.

In his unswerving devotion to the wishes of Wilson, Williams failed to consider that "practically all Democratic senators desperately wanted to accept the [Lodge] reservations, but a majority of them were literally too afraid of Wilson to oppose him." Not only, then, did Williams fail to explain why he believed the Lodge reservations would "emasculate" the League, but he failed as well to realize that the reservations, particularly the second Lodge reservation concerning Article X of the Covenant, were likely to be of ephemeral importance in practice.

Summary of Argumentative Development

In terms of logical proof, then, Williams had made only his first argument credible to his listeners. He could, indeed, prove that the League was already in operation and that it would continue to operate despite the wishes of the United States Senate. Concerning the more

72Article X was stated as follows: "The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." Cited in Fleming, The United States and the League, op. cit., p. 538.

73Arthur S. Link, American Epoch, op. cit., p. 233.

74Fleming, op. cit., p. 438. Both Fleming and Bailey express the view that the Lodge reservations would not have seriously weakened the League.
delicate issues of whether the United States could be independent and uncontrolled or whether the Lodge reservations would emasculate the League, however, Williams was less than logically credible. He therefore failed effectively to utilize logical proof, one of his available means of persuasion.

Invention: Emotional Proof

In his relatively brief address of March 17, 1920, Williams attempted to arouse emotional responses within his listeners by appealing to three of their motives: social responsibility, patriotism, and self-preservation.

In his introductory remarks, Williams appealed to the motive of social responsibility with the observation that the questions of keeping the peace and of one nation's getting along with another should be the "highest thought of every man." A second reference to the social responsibility of the senators was Williams' declaration that the "highest worship I could pay to God was to try to live in peace with other people." He commented further that "it seems to me now that the highest reason for which God created man was that he might cooperate with other men in maintaining peace as a means toward progress and civilization." Third, he urged his colleagues that "every civilized nation recognizes limitations upon its sovereignty. If it fails to do so, it

75 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4461.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
sinks into barbarism."\textsuperscript{78} His final appeal to his listeners' motive of social responsibility was his admonition that they must be willing "to surrender a part of our individual liberty in order to secure peace."\textsuperscript{79}

Williams appealed to the senators' motive of patriotism by suggesting that those most patriotic concerning the Monroe Doctrine had, by defeating the League, given up the Doctrine, because South American countries would enter the League.

If a half dozen South American powers enter into the League of Nations, this great operating concern outside of which you choose to remain and which you can not defeat on sea or on land, which you can not fight on sea or on land--it is too powerful for you--if those South American countries enter into it, and we have a quarrel with one of them, it simply appeals to the League of Nations. Then we shall not face them but we shall face the League of Nations, which means the civilized world. So while you are quarreling here and talking about the Monroe Doctrine you have surrendered it and given it up.\textsuperscript{80}

As a practical matter of self-preservation, Williams appealed to his colleagues to appraise the League realistically and, essentially, to realize that, since the United States could not succeed in fighting the entire League, the best policy would be to join the League.

If you think you can fight the world you are mistaken; you can not. They have made up their minds that they will keep the peace of the world against any lawless outcast nation; and if you want to be a lawless outcast nation, be one if you choose, but you can not win along that line.\textsuperscript{81}

A second instance of the Mississippian's appeal to his listeners' motive of self-preservation was his ultimatim that the senators could accept either of two alternatives: recognize the United States' interdependency

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81}Ibid.
upon other nations and join the League, or sink into barbarism and "fall."

You are not independent; we are all interdependent with one another; and if we are not, then we are uncivilized, and we sink to barbarism tomorrow, or else we declare war upon the world and the world declares war upon us; and in that sort of a war any particular nation must fall. 82

Finally, in his conclusion, Williams appealed to self-preservation by vividly predicting that, should we enter the League with the Lodge reservations, we could prepare for the collapse of world peace.

But if we go in with reservations that render the original agreement invirile and emasculate, then the whole thing will fail; and when it fails, we fail; and when we fail, Jesus Christ fails, and with Him his world peace philosophy. 83

**Summary of Emotional Proof**

As in his past addresses, Williams failed to make extensive use of emotional proof as a means of persuasion. In his address of March 17, 1920, he limited the types of motive appeals to those of social responsibility, patriotism, and self-preservation. The appeals used, however, were couched in the language of Williams' listeners and probably accurately reflected the general overall objectives of all the members of the Senate.

**Invention: Ethical Proof**

In his address of March 17, 1920, as in his previous addresses, Williams relied heavily upon ethical proof as a means of persuasion. By portraying himself as the spokesman in the Senate for world peace and by depicting the opponents of the League as the enemies of world peace,

82 Ibid., 4462.
83 Ibid.
Williams probably hoped to win the votes of enough Strict Reservationists to ratify the Covenant.

**Character**

In an effort to sustain his identification with world peace, which he had in his past addresses attempted to establish, Williams reflected that

> It has seemed to me all the time, with all my individual defects of every description, that the highest worship I could pay to God was to try to live in peace with other people. I admit that I have not been able to do it always with the hot, quick, Welsh temper that led me now and then to strike when I ought not to have struck, but it has seemed to me and it seems to me now that the highest reason for which God created man was that he might cooperate with other men in maintaining peace as a means toward progress and civilization.\(^{84}\)

While associating himself with the ideals of humanity and peace, Williams attempted to link his opponents with the opposite concept, the destruction of peace and the perpetuation of war. The Lodge Reservationists, Williams maintained, were determined to "devitalize and emasculate and poison the League of Nations so that it shall not amount to anything except words."\(^{85}\) Further, the opponents of the League, he said, were advocating a "Middle Age concept."\(^{86}\)

Williams declared that the opponents of our entry into the League, as well as those who would "emasculate" the League with the Lodge reservations, were advocates of the end of civilization; they were advocates

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\(^{84}\)Ibid., 4461

\(^{85}\)Ibid.

\(^{86}\)Ibid.
of barbarism; and they were advocates of the "fall" of the United States. Moreover, he said the opponents of the League would cause the United States, in an undesirable way, to "stand out" among nations.

... pretty nearly all the remainder of the world has gone into this league; we "in the forefront files" of the army of time alone stand out, and stand out how? By a certain 13 or 15 "irreconcilables" and "bitter-enders," who read the riot act to the Senator from Massachusetts and told him what he had to do with this treaty, and the Senator from Massachusetts surrendered and put all their requirements in, and then they concocted it all so that they knew that I and about 26 other Senators on this side could not vote for it in the way they had fixed it up. They have thus arranged to beat the treaty and to beat the League of Nations and to keep the greatest civilized country in the world out of it.

In addition to their other sins, the opponents of the League, Williams contended, would cause the League itself to fail in the eyes of the world.

... the minute they saw an unsuccessful League of Nations, the average man in America and Great Britain and France and Italy could not make the distinction, and when you said to him, "This thing failed because it was defective," he could not understand that. He would just simply say: "The experiment of a league of nations has failed. It has gone down. It has been unable to do anything. It was invirile. It was emasculate. It accomplished nothing."

Not only would the League's opponents be responsible for its failure, but, worse than that declared Williams, they would discourage "every seer and every prophet and every poet that had dreamt about world peace, and you shall have discouraged him for fifty years to come if not for a hundred."
Finally, Williams attempted to discredit Lodge and the Reservationists by warning that

... if we go in with reservations that render the original agreement invirile and emasculate, then the whole thing will fail; and when it fails, we fail; and when we fail, Jesus Christ fails, and with Him his world peace philosophy.91

Intelligence

In addition to attempting to discredit the integrity of his opponents, Williams suggested to his listeners that the enemies of the League and those who favored the Lodge reservations were not intelligent in their judgments.

Any man who thinks that the United States can be an "independent and uncontrolled power" is either a knave or an ass. No country can be an independent, uncontrolled power on the surface of this earth, not even we, the most powerful people in the world.92

Summary of Ethical Proof

Although his goal in speaking on March 17, 1920 was probably that of converting some of the votes of the Strict Reservationists if possible, Williams gave indications of awareness of the hopelessness of his, and Wilson's position. He admitted that the Irreconcilables and the Bitter Enders had forced Lodge into such a position that agreement among the four factions was impossible. Williams retained his vigor in this, his last effort on behalf of the League, in his continuing effort to discredit the integrity, the intelligence, and, indirectly, the good will of the enemies of American entry into the League of Nations. Primarily by casting a shadow of doubt upon the integrity of his opponents Williams apparently

91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 4461.
hoped, either to accomplish his purpose, or to forestall what he recog-
nized to be the inevitable defeat of the Covenant in the Senate. It was
this means of persuasion upon which he relied heaviest. Although his use
of ethos reflected what should have been the goals of the elected repre-
sentatives of the American people, a desire for world peace, as the
people themselves had repeatedly expressed it, it must be noted that his
efforts were overwhelmed by the other political factors operating against
the ratification of the Covenant.

Style

Clearness

As in his previous addresses to his colleagues, Williams' thorough
understanding and knowledge of the ideas involved in the second covenant
debate contributed to his ability to present the address clearly. His
familiarity with the Covenant, for instance, permitted him to associate
it with the teachings of Jesus Christ, while he could associate the oppo-
nents of the Covenant with the overthrow of Christ's philosophy of world
peace.

A second aspect of style which contributed to Williams' clearness
was his discerning word selection. With the exception of his harshness
in labeling his opponents "either knaves or asses,"93 the Mississippian's
language was appropriate to the occasion and to his purpose, probably a
last-ditch effort toward ratification. His choice of words enjoyed
currency in 1920 because the words are those in current usage today.
Moreover the words were reputable and intelligible to his listeners

93Ibid., 4461.
because of their general simplicity. Williams' variety of word choice may be demonstrated by contrasting his use of monosyllabic verbs expressing action, such as "strike," "sink," "live," "give," "take," "fail," "step," "fight," "face," "win," "fall," "fixed," and "beat," with his use of such polysyllabic words as "devitalize," "emasculate," "misnomer," "concocted," "innocuous," "neutrality," "invirile," and "perpetuating." Williams' choice of words was discerning, then, with respect to their appropriateness, currency, reputability, intelligibility, and variety.

A factor which failed to contribute to Williams' clarity was the excessive complexity of his sentence structure. In a representative sampling of sentences from the address, Williams used a total of seven compound-complex sentences, five complex sentences, four compound sentences, and only one simple sentence.94

The second aspect of style which contributed to clearness was Williams' use of definitions to clarify ideas, his use of examples, and his use of illustrations. At the outset of his speech, the Senator defined for his listeners, and identified his own cause with, the purpose of the Christian religion.

It has seemed to me since I first conceived the idea of the purposes of Jesus Christ that His purpose was to be a Prince of Peace and that the Christian religion consisted chiefly in trying to live a peaceable life with another individually and nationally.95

A typical instance of Williams' use of examples to amplify his argument was his enumeration of the powers that had already entered the League and had made it a working concern.

94I counted the types of sentences in every fifth paragraph of the speech for my representative sampling.

95U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4461.
Not only France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan—the great powers—have entered into the League of Nations and have made it a working concern, which I hope they can make operate for the peace of the world without our intervention and without our modifications and without our membership, if we do not choose to go in, but the three Scandinavian countries have gone in; Switzerland has gone in.96

Williams also used illustrations to support his arguments. He argued, for instance, that the idea of a nation's being "independent" and "uncontrolled" was "an old Middle Age concept."97 He illustrated this argument with the observation that

There was a time when every community was independent, with the lord's castle on the hill and the village below, and they fought the world for their side arms and for their food. That has passed long ago, and the very word "independent" in connection with a nation is a misnomer today.98

Organizationally, Williams may have left his listeners "in the dark" to the same extent that the reader of the text in the Congressional Record has difficulty in determining just what the Senator's major arguments were. If this writer's speculation is correct, that the main arguments were that the League was in operation and would continue to work; that the United States could not be independent and uncontrolled; and that entering the League with the Lodge reservations would emasculate the League; then the sequence of ideas was orderly, and the speech demonstrated organizational integrity in that the main arguments supported the thesis. The major criticism of Williams' organization is related directly to his clearness in style. He failed to employ any transitional material whatsoever to bridge the gaps between the parts of his speech.

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 4462.
Consequently, the reader is forced to speculate as to the actual organizational intentions of the Senator.

An additional shortcoming which affected Williams' clearness was the inadequacy of his argumentative development. As indicated previously, the writer believes that Williams failed effectively to utilize logical proof, and, therefore, impaired the clearness of his style.

Finally, Williams failed at any point in the address to summarize his arguments. He did manage, as pointed out previously, to remind his listeners of his general position in the debate in his concluding remarks. The absence of summaries and transitional material in the speech, however, vitiated the speaker's clearness to the extent that his knowledge of the subject, his discerning word selection, and his superior use of definitions, examples, and illustrations were probably rendered ineffectual.

Impressiveness

Ineffective in his use of logical proof and limited in his use of emotional proof in his address to the Senate of March 17, 1920, Williams relied heavily upon ethical proof as a means of persuasion and as a means of impressing his listeners.

The second aspect of style, then, which contributed to Williams' impressiveness was his use of imagery. He employed visual imagery, first, in support of the idea that independence of nations and individuals was "an old Middle Age concept."

There was a time when every community was independent, with the lord's castle on the hill and the village below, and they fought the world for their side arms and for their food.99

99 Ibid.
As a second instance of visual imagery, Williams expressed fear that "blinded by our population, our wealth, and our power, the European might let us in [the League] regardless of the Lodge reservations." As a final instance of visual imagery, Williams warned that, should we enter the League with the Lodge reservations, the League "would be emasculate and invirile, as incapable of perpetuating itself as an emasculated man might be." 

Williams utilized auditory imagery in his observation that the Irreconcilables and Bitter Enders had "read the riot act to the Senator from Massachusetts and told what he had to do with this treaty," after which Lodge had surrendered to the pressure.

In explaining that he had not always been able to live in peace with everyone, Williams employed tactile imagery. "I admit that I have not been able to do it always with the hot, quick, Welsh temper that led me now and then to strike when I ought not to have struck. . . ." Williams' final instance of imagery was also tactile in nature. He asserted that the League of Nations "must have teeth in it, and it must not be emasculated so that it is foredoomed beforehand to failure."

As previously noted, Williams' sentence structure was excessively complex in his address of March 17, and failed to contribute either to the clearness or the impressiveness of his style. Nor did sentence length

100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., 4461.
104 Ibid.
or sentence form contribute to Williams' impressiveness. His average sentence length was forty-seven words, and the sentence form was predominantly loose. Neither sentence length, complexity, nor form, therefore, contributed to Williams' impressiveness.

A third aspect of style which probably contributed to Williams' impressiveness was his use of repetition as a device for emphasis. In explaining his general purpose in his introductory remarks, he noted that "it has seemed to me since I was a boy as if the world were composed of a lot of people, a lot of nations, a lot of races, a lot of religions, and a lot of people everywhere who ought to seek to get along with one another." A second instance of repetition was his explanation of Borah's position in the debate.

One side is the side of the Senator from Idaho, who does not want any entangling alliances of any description with anybody and says that the United States is "sufficient to itself" and can live by itself and must live by and for itself and does not ask for any help from anywhere and will not give any help to anybody.

In contending that world order and peace among nations required a surrender of some degree of sovereignty, Williams declared that

When these States entered into this Union, when the Provinces of Holland entered into their union, when the Cantons of Switzerland entered into their union, they all understood that there must be a surrender of some degree of State, or cantonal, or provincial sovereign power in order that the purposes of the union might be accomplished.

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105 My sampling included the first 100 words of every third paragraph in the speech.

106 In sampling the sentences from every fifth paragraph in the speech, I discovered five periodic, ten loose, and two balanced sentences.

107 U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 4461.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.
Williams also used repetition in describing the entrants into the League.

Not only France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan—the great powers—have entered into the League of Nations and have made it a working concern, which I hope they can make operate for the peace of the world without our intervention and without our modifications and without our membership, if we do not choose to go in, but the three Scandinavian countries have gone in; Switzerland has gone in; Brazil has gone in; Argentina has gone in; Chile has gone in. . . .

The Mississippian used repetition further in a series of statements concerning the undesirability of independence and of being "uncontrolled."

I do not want to be, in the community in which I move, an uncontrolled power; I want you to have your rights; I want the Senator from Texas to have his; I am willing to give—and I am speaking as a citizen of the United States— I want to give to all the people on earth their rights. I do not want to be "uncontrolled" nor "independent," and no nation on the surface of the earth can be uncontrolled or independent.

Williams spoke at some length against the concept of a nation's being independent and uncontrolled. He used repetition in listing those countries which, in his view, were neither independent nor uncontrolled.

Great Britain is not independent; France is not independent; you are not independent; we are all interdependent with one another. . . .

In describing the reaction of the average man to an unsuccessful League of Nations, Williams again used repetition.

He would just simply say: "The experiment of a league of nations has failed. It has gone down. It has been unable to do anything. It was invirile. It was emasculate. It accomplished nothing."

Williams' concluding statements were highly repetitious in nature.

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110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., 4462.
113 Ibid.
I have a hope that Great Britain and France and Italy and Holland and the Scandinavian powers and Switzerland and Japan may make it a working proposition for the preservation of peace in Europe; and if they make it a working proposition for the preservation of peace in Europe, we can make the Monroe Doctrine here a working proposition in favor of the preservation of peace in the Western Hemisphere. But if we go in with reservations that render the original agreement inirrele and emasculate, then the whole thing will fail; and when it fails, we fail; and when we fail, Jesus Christ fails, and with Him his world peace philosophy.114

Williams' eight instances of repetition as a device for emphasis, then, may have contributed to the impressiveness of his style.

A final aspect of style which may have contributed to Williams' impressiveness was his use of the tropes of irony and hyperbole. He employed irony, first, in his description and evaluation of Borah's position in the debate.

. . . the Senator from Idaho . . . does not want any entangling alliances of any description with anybody and says that the United States is "sufficient to itself" and can live by itself and must live by and for itself and does not ask for any help from anywhere and will not give any help to anybody. That may be right.115

As a second instance of irony, Williams contended, with Senator Sheppard of Texas, that the United States, by not entering the League, would "stand out" among nations.

As the Senator from Texas has said, pretty nearly all the remainder of the world has gone into this league; we "in the forefront files" of the army of time along stand out, and stand out how? By a certain 13 or 15 "Irreconcilables" and "bitter-enders," who read the riot act to the Senator from Massachusetts and told him what he had to do with this treaty, and the Senator from Massachusetts surrendered and put all their requirements in, and then they concocted it all so that they knew that I and about 26 other Senators on this side could not vote for it in the way they had fixed it up.116

114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., 4461.
116 Ibid., 4462.
Williams employed hyperbole, by making his description of events beyond the strict line of truth, in expressing his hope that the League would have "teeth" in it, and in his observation that his opponents had "read the riot act" to Senator Lodge.

Factors which contributed to Williams' stylistic impressiveness, then, were his use of ethical proof, imagery, repetition, and tropes. Aspects of style which probably failed to contribute to the speaker's impressiveness were his ineffective use of logical proof and limited use of emotional proof, and his excessively long, loose, and complex sentences.

Summary of Style

Although Williams did, in his address of March 17, 1920, recognize the virtue of brevity, his address was a stylistic failure. His most serious shortcoming was the lack of clarity caused by his failure to employ transitional material and his unwillingness to summarize his remarks at any point in the speech. Because of his indifference to "oral" organizational methods, neither the reader nor the listener could have positively identified the speaker's main arguments. In addition to the shortcoming of a lack of clarity, the speaker's generally long, loose, and excessively complex sentences probably rendered his speech unimpressive to his listeners.

Effectiveness

Immediate surface response

There were no manifestations of response from the occupants of

117 Ibid., 4461.
118 Ibid., 4462.
the galleries of the Senate when Williams spoke on March 17, 1920.

Immediate surface response came, however, from two of the Senator's own colleagues. First, Senator Sheppard of Texas interjected a comment as Williams was speaking. Williams was explaining that the states which became the United States, the provinces that became Holland, and the cantons that became Switzerland had all realized that they must individually give up some degree of sovereignty in order to become a union. Sheppard then observed, "And the nations that have already entered into the League of Nations have done the same thing." To this Williams replied, "I am glad the Senator from Texas has reminded me of that."

A second response to Williams came following his comment that

... pretty nearly all the remainder of the world has gone into this league; we "in the forefront files" of the army of time alone stand out, and stand out how? By a certain 13 or 15 "irreconcilables" and "bitter-enders" who read the riot act to the Senator from Massachusetts and told him what he had to do with this treaty, and the Senator from Massachusetts surrendered and put all their requirements in, and then they concocted it all so that they knew that I and about 26 other Senators on this side could not vote for it in the way they had fixed it up. They have thus arranged to beat the treaty and to beat the League of Nations and to keep the greatest civilized country in the world out of it.

Senator Johnson of South Dakota asked Williams "if it is not also true that none of the great powers of the world, aside, possibly, from Switzerland, have attached any conditions or reservations to the original treaty as presented to them?" Williams replied that China had

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119 Ibid., 4461.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 4462.
122 Ibid.
wanted to attach reservations but had been told by the council that she could either enter the league without reservations or stay out, and China had chosen the latter course. The Swiss reservation had been merely the innocuous retention of Swiss neutrality, which, Williams pointed out, had been recognized by all European powers years ago. Williams went on to say that the council, consisting of European countries primarily, would not treat the United States as it had treated China. Because of American wealth and power, the council, Williams feared, would admit the United States regardless of the attachment of the Lodge reservations.  

Delayed Response

Williams was not directly mentioned in any of the editorial comments of major metropolitan newspapers concerning the league debates following his speech of March 17, 1920. Most of these newspapers continued their policies toward the League of Nations established during earlier phases of the debate. A significant exception to this was the San Francisco Chronicle, formerly a league proponent, which editorialized that

In fact the treaty would be found entirely unworkable with the obligations of this country so utterly different from those of other countries. It is best to forget the treaty, for to make it the issue in a Presidential campaign might have very serious international results. Drop it.

Indirectly the Chronicle criticized Williams for his obstinate support of

123 Ibid.

124 See page 303 for the list of major metropolitan newspapers I consulted.

the League Covenant in only its purest Wilsonian form. "The only noticeable cleavage following a [party] line that can be traced is the evident disposition of Southern Senators to stick to the President right or wrong. And that may have been politics." 126

Although the newspapers failed to respond to Williams' speech in the Senate on March 17, 1919, there was some recognition of his role in the debates following his address before the Mississippi Legislature on March 26, 1920, after the final defeat of the treaty. All major metropolitan daily newspapers carried reports of the content of the speech. One of these, however, editorially urged Williams to stay in the Senate to carry on the fight against the "hypocrisy" and "two-by-four" statesmen who had defeated the treaty.

Senator John Sharp Williams, addressing the Legislature of Mississippi, says that he would rather be a dog and bay at the moon than to spend one minute in the Senate after the expiration of his term of office. Senator Williams goes to that body representing the people of Mississippi. At times he has done a service to the country by tearing the mask of hypocrisy from senatorial fakirs and two-by-four statesmen.

It is a good thing if a few men of intelligence and ability are in the United States Senate even if a majority of that body is of a low standard of intelligence and without any idea as to the fitness of things. A few able men ought to remain in the Senate to teach the other members manners, common sense, and to keep them somewhere in the neighborhood of the principles underlying the Constitution of the United States. A few wise men are needed everywhere, in the Senate as well as around homes of the feeble-minded and those suffering under the handicap of invincible ignorance. 127

Readability

Williams' address of March 17 was probably less readable than

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126 Ibid.

some of his past addresses had been, because his average sentence length was forty-seven words.

Technical perfection

Rhetorically, Williams' address of March 17 was a failure. Lack of clarity in organization; failure logically to substantiate two of the speech's three major contentions; limited use of emotional proof; lack of variety in approach to ethical proof, in that the speaker again attempted to discredit his opponents while portraying himself as the Senate spokesman for world peace; and lack of clearness and impressiveness of style because of Williams' refusal to summarize his arguments or to indicate the main divisions of the speech by means of transitional material and his long, complex, and loosely constructed sentences hampered the speaker's technical perfection.

Wisdom in judging trends of the future

Williams' general position, that the United States should become a member of the League of Nations, of course, reflected the position of Woodrow Wilson, whose ideas have since been embodied in the United Nations Organization. Williams' specific position in his address of March 17, however, reflected his, and Wilson's uncompromising stand, that no Covenant except the "Wilson" Covenant would be acceptable. This lack of flexibility probably was detrimental to the general concept of world peace. Had Williams and other of Wilson's followers been willing to compromise enough to allow the United States to become a member of the League, perhaps the difficulties which Williams proclaimed would "emasculate" the League could have been worked out among the members by mutual consent.
Long-range effects upon the social group

As in previous attempts to establish a causal relationship between the speaking of John Sharp Williams on particular occasions in the Senate and the course of subsequent events, the critic is forced to recognize the absence of evidence which would warrant any conclusion at all.

If Williams' purpose in the second covenant debate was to discredit Lodge to the extent that enough of his followers in the Senate would rebel so that the treaty could be ratified, then the critic must conclude that the speaker failed to accomplish his purpose. No such rebellion occurred, and the treaty was, of course, defeated in the Senate. Its defeat cannot be attributed to Williams' failure or success in speaking. Arthur Link's speculation concerning the causes for the defeat of the treaty are worthy of consideration.

Certainly Lodge and his Republican friends must share a large measure of the guilt for one of the most tragic episodes in American history. Had they been less interested in the election of 1920 and more concerned with their country's good, they would have suppressed personal and partisan ambitions and met the champions of the League half way. In addition, the irreconcilables, who used every device to defeat ratification, must share a large part of the guilt, for their unscrupulous propaganda helped confuse the public as to the implications of American membership in the League.

On the other hand, what shall we say of Wilson's conduct in this, his greatest and most fateful battle? Because of his consuming hatred of Lodge he, too, refused to compromise; he ignored the advice of his best counselors and threw away the only possible chance for ratification. He, therefore, shared with Lodge and other Republicans responsibility for breaking the heart of the world. Moreover, those Democratic senators who voted against ratification with reservations out of fear of the Wilsonian wrath served neither the national interest nor the cause of international peace.128

obligation is to evaluate the effort put forth by the speaker. In short, the critic must ask, "Faced with apparently insuperable odds against him, did John Sharp Williams utilize effectively the available means of oral persuasion?"

This critic replied that Williams made no effort in the final stage of the debate to change the odds against him, which were not insuperable; and that he did not utilize effectively the available means of oral persuasion.

In his observation that twenty-three Democrats had remained "stubbornly loyal" to Wilson's wish to reject the Treaty with the Lodge reservations, Bailey points out that

In view of the fact that the plain alternatives were a treaty with reservations or no treaty at all, twenty-one realistic Democrats forsook their leader and voted for approval. If only seven of the faithful twenty-three had shifted their votes, the decision would have been reversed.\(^1\)

John Sharp Williams was among the seven who could have shifted their votes. Moreover, he probably was influential enough to have persuaded six other senators to shift their votes with him, had he made the effort to do so. Then, had Wilson pigeonholed the Treaty, Williams at least would have had the satisfaction of knowing that he had exerted his utmost effort to realize his announced goals: the purposes of Jesus Christ, making the League of Nations a working concern, bringing about peace on earth and good will among men, preventing the United States from being a "lawless outcast nation," and avoiding "breaking the heart of the world."

In his address of September 26, 1919, Williams had argued that, since many of the senators had expressed dissatisfaction with the

\(^1\)Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, op. cit., p. 622.
Covenant as it was, it could be adopted and then modified as the United States Constitution had been. "Adopt it with its defects, since it is heading in the right direction, and then proceed to amend it," the Mississippian had urged. Faced with the obvious alternatives of adopting the Covenant with the Lodge reservations or outright rejection of the Covenant, however, Williams chose finally to advocate the latter course. In view of the generally "irrelevant, inconsequential," and "unnecessary" nature of the Lodge reservations, the critic can conclude only that Williams' fear of arousing the sickbed wrath of his Chief prompted him to ignore his own plea: "Adopt it with its defects, since it is heading in the right direction, and then proceed to amend it."

Not only did Williams fail to modify his position adequately to permit the accomplishment of his overall goal, but in pleading his cause before his fellow senators, he failed to utilize the available means of oral persuasion. Williams' persuasive strength lay consistently in his dependence upon ethical proof. He depicted himself as an assistant to the "Messiah" himself, whose aim was peace among the nations of the world, a goal to which most senators at least paid lip service. Williams' reliance upon "proponent of peace" ethos, along with consistent castigation of his opponents, however, should have been only one part of a concerted persuasive effort utilizing effective techniques of organization, logical proof, ethical proof, and style.

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2U. S. Congressional Record, op. cit., 5975.

3Bailey, A Diplomatic History . . ., op. cit., p. 620.

4Inadequate evidence precluded a criticism of delivery in this study.
Williams' organization was generally weak in that he refused to concern himself with his listeners' ability to comprehend and retain his arguments. In his speech of December 3, 1919, he failed to identify the arrangement of his material to the extent that an outline of the speech must be considered speculation. In addition to several logical inconsistencies within the speech itself, Williams' remarks were so long and involved that the speech must have been, to his listeners, organizationally incomprehensible.

Although his address of June 9, 1919, contained a few organizational devices designed to implement his listeners' comprehension, such as stating topic sentences first in the development of new ideas and indicating that he was about to criticize the activities of Senators Reed and Borah by naming each of the senators as he began his criticisms of them, Williams again fell short of clarity in terms of "oral," or relatively obvious, speech organization. The inclusion of clear transitional material would have aided both Williams' listeners and his readers in determining, with some assurance of accuracy, the Mississippian's position in the debate. Only in his address of August 12, 1919, was Williams at all sensitive to his listeners in terms of organizational clarity. Presenting a series of arguments in opposition to those just previously delivered by Lodge, Williams introduced each new counter-argument with the transitional statement, "Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts says . . .," or a similar choice of words.

In his speech of March 17, 1920, Williams reverted to organizational unintelligibility. Absolute accuracy in determining the speaker's thesis and main supporting arguments is impossible, simply because Williams refused to exert any effort to make himself clear. The mere
inclusion of ordinal numbers, "first," "second," etc., to identify the progression of arguments, would, with minimal inconvenience to the speaker, have clarified for listeners and readers alike the final policy statement of the "unadulterated" League's chief Senate protagonist.

Since his position in the debate was well known by all his listeners, Williams should have made his organization more obvious by clearly stating his theses, by previewing his arguments, by introducing each argument with appropriate transitional material, and by summarizing his arguments in his concluding statements to refresh his listeners' memories.

Successful in his address of December 3, 1918, in contending that a league of nations could be practicable even if only the two English-speaking countries supported it, Williams, nevertheless, failed in subsequent addresses logically to substantiate arguments vital to his cause.

In his speech of June 9, 1919, Williams' logical validity in his contentions that his opponents had been guilty of partisanship, inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and lack of imagination was outweighed by his failure to substantiate logically his claims that opposition senators were trying to usurp the treaty-making power from the President, that Reed's charge of League domination by black supremacy was stupid, and that Borah's position was that of an American junker.

On August 12, 1919, Williams failed to validate logically his opposition to Lodge's argument that no nation could render service to the world of its own free will. Attempting to argue that Lodge had neglected to consider the peace of the world, a matter which Lodge obviously had taken into consideration, Williams failed even to state the
refutative argument correctly. In short, Williams failed in all but one instance to refute effectively the speech Lodge had previously presented because he relied heavily upon shallow analogy and emotional and ethical proof as a substitute for specific, tangible evidence.

Williams made only one of his three arguments logically credible to his listeners in his address of March 17, 1920. He substantiated only his contention that the League was already in operation and that it would continue to operate despite the wishes of the members of the United States Senate, an unnecessary statement of an accomplished fact. The speaker failed, however, to contend with logical credibility that the United States could not remain uncontrolled and independent and that the Lodge reservations would emasculate the League.

The speaker's use of emotional proof was limited essentially to appeals to the listeners' motives of self-preservation, patriotism, and social responsibility. In all four stages of the debate in the Senate, Williams contended that the preservation of peace, and thus the preservation of his listeners as well, depended upon the entry of the United States into the League of Nations. Additionally, in all four stages of the debate, he maintained that the senators, out of love for their country, should ratify the Treaty and insure entrance into the League. Moreover, Williams argued consistently throughout his speeches to his colleagues that ratification and subsequent membership in the League was an obligation which the senators owed, not only to their fellow Americans, but to the world as well.

This means of persuasion, however, was probably limited by the nature of the audience. The senators, as Williams had learned from years of service in the Congress, were, as a group, probably not
susceptible to an abundance of emotionalism on the part of those who addressed them.

Williams' style was consistently verbose and rambling. His average sentence length was forty words. The impromptu nature of the addresses, along with Williams' propensity toward wordiness, probably were the two factors most responsible for the speaker's lack of clearness and impressiveness.

A final appraisal of the speaking of John Sharp Williams in the League of Nations Debate in the Senate, 1918-1920, therefore, must be twofold. Williams failed effectively to exercise all the available means of oral persuasion, and, at a time when independent statesmanship could have insured the entry of the United States into the League of Nations, John Sharp Williams either was incapable or unwilling to exercise independent statesmanship for fear of party reprimand.
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"The University of Virginia and the Development of Thomas Jefferson's Educational Ideas," an address before the St. Louis Meeting of the Association of State Universities, June 28, 1904.
"The first [exploit] that they made of themselves, what was it?" asked he.

"They went over to the House the other day to listen to the President make an address with a sort of [gentleman's] understanding that they were not to applaud him. They did not know what he was going to say, but there was a sort of a gentleman's understanding that they were not to applaud him."

"He had hurt their feelings by saying that he thought the Democrats ought to be elected to office."

"The hypocrisy [of it! ] Charging Woodrow Wilson with a great crime because he wanted Democrats elected to office. Even that objection was not well founded, because when he found men upon his own side who were not true to the war and true to the ideals of the war, his word went out against them just as significantly as it went out in favor of democracy generally."

"Some of you think [over there] that you beat the President. You did not beat the President. The people beat the Democratic Party at the last election. Do you know why? Because your party, taking it upon the percentage basis, had been truer to the war than we had—and when I say we, I mean my party. We had men in the other wing of this Capitol [and we had men here] who were sticking the President with a fine Italian dagger every chance they got.

I have come to the conclusion that the American people put you in office in these two houses because they thought maybe you could be more safely trusted to stand behind the
President than a lot of our fellows could be. That may be an error, but that is my opinion, because I have found a good many Mississippi Democrats talking that way, even Mississippi Democrats who never voted any other ticket than the Democratic ticket, and would not do so to save their lives. But we [have] got rid of [them, and] the people ought to have known that we [have gotten rid] of them [before we went into this.] I imagine the difficulty the Senator from Illinois will have, together with all of the wiser men behind him who are going to spend the next two weeks attacking Woodrow Wilson, in persuading the old Indiana Democrat in the Vice-President's chair that he should qualify as President of the United States while Woodrow Wilson is [over] having heart-to-heart talks with Clemenceau and Lloyd George. You might just as well try that on me if I had happened to be Vice President. You know that sort of camouflage does not go."

"'Oh, well,' you tell me, 'but maybe Italy will not agree; maybe France will not agree; maybe Japan will not agree; maybe Roumania has private irons in the fire; maybe Serbia has, so that you can not get her to join in the agreement,'[I tell you that] the two English-speaking races by themselves can do it."

"I tell you that] if [nobody else goes into the league of nations except the English-speaking races, the great confederacy of States here, the great confederacy of Provinces over there, Great Britain, Scotland,
"If" the two English-speaking nations go into it, we can by our sea power, by our control over raw materials, by our control over [natural] resources, [force the other nations of the world to do the league's bidding.] We can agree that any civilized nation that makes war upon another without first [submitting] the questions in controversy to [an arbitration tribunal] shall be outside of the pale of civilization, [and that the freedom to operate] upon the high seas [shall be denied to her, that access to the raw materials and markets which the two nations in the league shall control shall be denied to her, and in that way we can keep] peace in the world for 100 years if we only have the courage to do it.

That is what Woodrow Wilson is going to Europe for.

Senator Williams warned the Republicans that they would be "digging their own [political] graves" by making personal attacks upon the President while he is abroad.

"We want to have all of the influence we can [while] over there to bring about a permanent and just peace as nearly as possible, [but] Wales, Ireland--except the Sinn Feiners, who amount to practically nothing--the Canadians, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the South Africans, the most loyal of all Britain's Provinces, because she acted most magnanimously toward them, they and we with our law, our language, and our courage and resources on land and at sea, are enough.

By our sea power, by our control of raw material, by our control of the [economic] resources [of the world, such as iron and copper out in your country, gold farther Northwest, and cotton down South, without which nobody can exist, we alone, if the balance of the world will not come into it,] can agree that any civilized nation that makes war upon another without first either [agreeing or offering to leave] the question in controversy to [fair and impartial arbitrament] shall be outside of the pale of civilization [and our enemy, and that their travel and traffic] upon the high seas [shall be terminated. We two--Republic and Empire--alone can bring about the] peace of the world for a hundred years if we have the courage to try.

That is what Wilson [has gone to Europe to try to consumate--the dream of poets, the vision of prophets, the heart-wish of good men and good women for a thousand years--peace, honorable peace, permanent peace, just peace; just even to our enemies, but not over-merciful to them, because in order to be just they must pay retribution.]

"You are digging your own graves when you try to dig his."

"We want to have all of the influence we can over there [with them] to bring about a permanent and just peace; as nearly as possible ["a
what are you doing here?" he continued. "Weakening your own [case] every day, throwing [mud] and accusing him virtually of [heresy] of un-Americanism, weakening him in the councils that, if you can help it, America shall not predominate, What do you want to do it for?"

"All at once, nicely caught with little complexities of [constitutional-oiled] arrangements, cosmetice upon the [base] chiefly, you try to make a scapegoat out of Wilson. Well, you [can't] make a scapegoat out of anybody [who] is not a goat to start with."

"I want to leave this thought: How is all this going to hurt him? How is it going to help you? How is it going to help your posterity? How is it going to help the American Republic? How is it going to help American influence in Europe? How is it going to accomplish any good end of any description for the purposes of civilization, or democracy, or humanity?"

Speech of June 9, 1919

New York Times, June 10, 1919, p. 2

"Senator John Sharp Williams took the floor and made a lengthy speech, in which he criticised Senators Lodge, Borah, and Reed vigorously. He read from a Life of George Washington, by Senator Lodge, and made analogies between President Wilson and President Washington. In this history, Washington was quoted as speaking of parliament of man and a federation of the world; and] what are you doing here? Weakening your own [agent] every day, throwing [adjectives at his head,] accusing him virtually of [idiocy,] of un-Americanism--weakening him in the council, [so] that if you can help it America shall not predominate, [but somebody else will.] What do you want to do it for?"

"All at once, nicely caught with the little complexities of [constitutional toilet] arrangements, cosmetice upon the [face,] chiefly, you try to make a scapegoat out of Wilson. Well, you [can not] make a scapegoat out of anybody [that] is not a goat to start with,[and especially not if he is wiser than the man who attacks him is--and frequently he is; not always; of course never when a Senator attacks him."

"I want to leave [you] this thought: How is all this going to hurt him? How is it going to help you? How is it going to help your posterity? How is it going to help the American Republic? How is it going to help American influence in Europe? How is it going to accomplish any good end of any description for the purposes of civilization or democracy or humanity?"

"That there are in this as well as in all other countries discontented...
'discontented [people,] who tried to impede the Government,' and Senator Williams said the description fitted Senators Lodge and Borah perfectly."

[characters,] I well know; as also that these characters are actuated by very different views; some good, from an opinion that the general measures of the Government are impure; some bad, and, if I might be allowed to use so harsh an expression, diabolical--'

Think of that adjective coming from the serene Father of his Country; diabolic! It sounds like the Wilsonphobia of today--
inasmuch as they are not only meant to impede the measures of the Government generally, but more especially as a great means toward the accomplishment of it, to destroy the confidence which it is necessary for the people to place, until they have unequivocal proof of demerit, in their public servants.

Mr. President, if Gen. George Washington, afterwards President, had had in immediate contemplation the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Idaho, he could not better have expressed himself when describing their conduct toward and their words about the present Chief Magistrate . . . .

"You are nagging and bedeviling the Administration and taking advantage of every undotted 'i'; you are trying to arouse [discord among the people toward the Chief Executive] in Europe," said Senator Williams, addressing Senator Borah and the Republican side.

"With waiting until they have 'unequivocal proof of demerit,' to quote the language of George Washington, they and their foolish followers have been nagging, have been bedeviling, have been on the outside taking advantage of every [little uncrossed "t" or] undotted "i," [or a "q" not followed by a "u," in order to] arouse [distrust of our representative] in Europe--[our representative, whether we are Republicans or not. . . .]

Alluding to the resolution expressing sympathy with Irish aspirations introduced by Senator Borah and passed by the Senate, Mr. Williams, who cast the sole vote against the resolution, said:
"There are stories in the newspapers about Korea having national aspirations, but you have not yet introduced any resolution against Japan, providing for the independence of Korea, lately conquered and very much oppressed. Why? Because you know Great Britain will be good-humored with you and Japan will not be, and,[while] there are a lot of Irish-American votes, there are no Korean votes in America. That is the honest God's truth about you."

"You have not yet introduced any resolution against Japan providing for the independence of Korea, lately conquered and very much oppressed. Why? Because you know Great Britain will be good-humored with you and Japan will not be, and [because] there are a lot of Irish-American votes [in America, and] there are no Korean votes in America. That is the honest God's truth about you."

Speech of August 12, 1919

New York Times, August 13, 1919, p. 3.

"I hesitate very much to undertake to reply to the greatest possible prepared presentation of the selfishness of American policy [in an extemporaneous answer that I must make in a few minutes,"] he said. "I would [need] to have more egotism than [I ever had before if I said] I could answer 'off the bat' the things the Senator from Massachusetts has been cogitating for three [months,] more or less, with a view to capturing the Senate and the galleries today."

"It is not a new presentation of the personality of the Senator from Massachusetts. He has always attempted to make a show of himself."

Senator Williams went on to say that he had intended saying that the Senator from Massachusetts "has always attempted to make a show of himself as being non-partisan and fair and impartial."

"As I was about to say, the Senator from Massachusetts has always attempted to make a show of himself as being 'nonpartisan,' or 'nonsectional,' and fair and impartial."
"I have no respect for the man who opposes any American [policy,] [not because he is against it as an American,] but because of [his] hatred of somebody in Europe."

I have some respect--not much--for the German-American who opposes American policies because of 'love for the Fatherland, but I have no respect [at all] for the man who opposes [good] American [policies] because of hatred of somebody in Europe.
VITA

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