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## **Modern Political Communication Challenges for the Central Chinese Government**

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# **Modern Political Communication Challenges for the Central Chinese Government**

Thesis by

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

In many developed and developing societies, the news media play an instrumental role in guiding social and political values. The consumption of such information often shapes how citizens view their country and government as relative to themselves and to the outside world (Lippmann, 1922). Consequently, the level of control political establishments possess over such information has been crucial in maintaining power. Whereas free speech and a free press are two key elements in maintaining a democratic government, control and manipulation of speech and the press have played critical roles in growing and preserving authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.

In the advent of the Internet age, conditional economic freedom, and unprecedented growth of wealth in China, Chinese citizens now have the means and will to affect their political environment (relatively safely compared to the past) as long as the government maintains its desire to keep a good international image. The current administration is trying to find the balance between social unrest and social appeasement. And, equally important, they seek the balance between national interests and global interests (which often correlate with other conflicting national interests) (Christensen, 2011).

This thesis outlines the history of China's media climate since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and its economic foreign policy agenda since 1978. Furthermore, it will focus on the increasing break between the government's control over both foreign policy and the media. It will then qualitatively analyze the extent of success the PRC has had in restoring that break in the past few years. Finally, it will include a report of the results followed by theoretical support.

## **II. LITERATURE REVIEW**

### **A. THE MESSAGE**

#### **- Models for communication**

Agenda setting (from the media, public, and or policymakers) is the system of “prioritizing issues in order of their importance” (Wang 2008). The media agenda includes the issues on which the media concentrate; the public agenda includes the issues on which the public focuses and thinks the government should address; and policy agenda includes the issues on which the government focuses (Wang, 2008).

These three agendas correlate in many ways. The media agenda affects the public agenda because the public learns about world issues, events, and facts often through media consumption. Thus, the media’s prioritization of issues often causes the public to regard such issues as important, too (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Besides the media, “political mobilization, social movements, and focusing events (e.g. accidents and disasters)” affect public agenda (Wang, 2008). Social movements and political mobilization have been increasing with the rise of the Internet, as shown above with the prevalence of the blogosphere and “netizens,” Chinese citizens who harness their political voice through the Internet (Wang, 2008).

When the public agenda becomes high in support, engagement, and discussion, it can affect the policy agenda. Such mounting public pressure comes in the form of mass dissenting commentary in online forums, local protests and other forms of public unrest, and leeway for Western ideological influence. In recent years, such pressure has proved effective in affecting policy agenda (Wang, 2008).

Wang (2008) analyzed the evolution of relationship between public agenda and policy agenda through the six models of policy agenda setting: “closed-door,” “mobilization,” “inside

access,” “reach-out,” “outside access,” and “popular pressure.” In the “closed-door” model, policy makers initiate the agenda and do not seek public support. This was mainly experienced in imperial China, before the “first information regime.” In the “mobilization” model, popular during the Mao Zedong era of the “first information regime,” policy makers also initiate the agenda, but they seek public support for it after. The “inside access” model, seen in some instances during the Mao Zedong era and prominent in the reform era (the second information regime), sets the agenda by official policy advisers (individuals or think tanks) who make proposals to policy makers. The public is excluded in this model, as dialogue is exclusive to policy advisers and makers. The “reach-out” model, not common in China, is when policy advisers also attempt to garner public support for their proposals so that the policy makers are more likely to accept them. The “outside-access” model is similar to the inside access model except that policy proposal initiators are citizens not officially designated as advisors. They are often social elites or intellectuals. While there have been examples of this model in China, it is not common (Wang, 2008).

#### **- The need for “mediated politics”**

In recent years, the most relevant of the six models Wang (2008) mentioned is the “popular pressure” model. This model engages the public agenda more than any of the others. Furthermore, in this model, the public is the initiator of the agenda and policy makers are the reactors. Government outsiders work to shape public opinion into a force that pressures the government into abandoning an old agenda and adopting a new one (Wang, 2008). In recent times, many of these powerful outsiders have been well-respected bloggers, political commentators and other members of what Wang (2008) describes as the “attentive public,” “those who are most interested and involved in an issue.” In an effective popular pressure

model, the attentive public greatly affects the rest of the general public and eventually the public agenda. The flow of influence is the following: individual members or groups within the attentive public → general public → public agenda → popular pressure on government → policy agenda change.

According to Wang (2008) the following four factors empower popular pressure enough to change policy agenda: stakeholder consciousness, the associational revolution, the changing role in mass media and the rise of the Internet. Stakeholder consciousness is the idea that as a society becomes more advanced and its citizens more wealthy, average people are no longer concerned with the greater “lot” of society than they are of their own personal interests (Wang, 2008). Thus, they are more self-aware. In pre-1979 (pre-reform) China, people were more complacent in following the directives of the government, thinking the greater good of society would benefit all. However, as society progressed, societal gaps developed between regions and between urban dwellers and rural dwellers. Furthermore, in urban areas and rural areas alone, people became more concerned with how to pursue their own personal improvement in the social, political and economic spheres (Wang, 2008). Importantly, changes in stakeholder consciousness have strengthened the voice of the public’s agenda enough to affect policy agenda on significant economic issues. According to Wang (2008), when citizens in western and northeastern China (more rural regions) felt neglected during the boom in urban cities, they were able to successfully pressure local officials and the central government. After many promises and neglected attempts, the State Council established the Leading Group for Western Development, starting the “Go-West” program to develop western China (Wang, 2008). Then, in 2003, popular pressure from the public in the northeast region to “reinvigorate” their local economy led to the

“Revitalizing the Old Industrial Bases” project by the Central Government to aid that region (Wang, 2008).

The association revolution was the vast development of special interests groups of which many are advocacy groups known as NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) (Wang, 2008). In 2004, an estimated 500,000 official and unofficial associations were operating in China (Wang & He, 2004). The mass media influence the public because editorial control over which issues are covered and emphasized shapes and drives the public agenda. Besides being effective from media → public, the media are also useful from public → media → public in building popular pressure. For instance, when NGOs, individuals and others have close ties to the media, they can push their messages through the media, and in turn, to the public. Finally, the rise of Internet has changed the landscape for public participation in political discussion, competing with and supplementing traditional mass media. “When an issue becomes the focus of netizens’ attention, traditional media will probe the issue and provide in-depth reports” (Wang, 2008). Furthermore, online social and forum debates often develop from traditional media reports (Wang, 2008). “Since [2003], the Internet has become a primary channel for the public to send messages, express ideas, comment on public affairs, and vent their spleen” (Wang, 2008). At present, online public opinion is exerting more and more influence on the public agenda setting” (Wang, 2008).

#### **- Framing in Chinese politics**

While media agenda setting determines which issues the audience thinks about, framing influences how the audience perceives and responds to such issues. The study of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) showed that varied presentations of identical decision-making scenarios influence people’s perception of the options and ultimately their choice. According the Goffman



(1974), framing has found a place in society because of the increasing complexity of the world coupled with the lack of time and ability the average person has to fully digest the facets of each issue. Communicators (the media, mostly whichever is the most powerful) engage in what Scheufele (1999) described as “frame building.”

It is important to recognize the potential influence the public, policymakers, and the media have on the stamina of any political regime. On a macro-level, “The activities of interest groups, policymakers, journalists, and other groups interested in shaping media agendas and frames can have an impact on both the volume and character of news messages about a particular issue” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Furthermore, as I will describe in-depth later, the increasing political communicative power of interests groups, journalists, and especially citizens in China have begun a trend of offsetting the power traditionally experienced by policymakers in China. Furthermore, I will later describe how China’s change in its foreign economic stance – from closed to open, and then to an economic superpower – has created a vast new audience comprised of the international community that also offsets the power of the Chinese government. These two offsets are threatening the stamina of China’s political structure and its agenda.

## **B. HISTORY OF MODERN CHINESE MEDIA**

In their quantitative study of political discourse in Chinese newspapers and blogs, Ashley Esarey and Xiao Qiang (2011) defined three information regimes changes in the realm of Chinese media. Differing from political regime changes, their study of information regimes focused on shifts in “the way people access and utilize information about politics” (Esarey & Qiang, 2011).

### **- Information Regime Change I**

After the China Communist Party (CCP) founded the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, all media were used strictly as a national propaganda vehicle for communist ideology. From 1949 until 1978, all of China's news media (newspapers, magazines, radios, etc.) continued to be state-owned enterprises and state-dominated (Esarey & Qiang, 2011). The government controlled what constituted "appropriate content" for all members and leaders of the nation, in schools, and in entertainment, political, broadcast and print media (Esarey & Qiang, 2011).

### **- Information Regime Change II**

The second shift they described occurred simultaneously with the implementation of the "open-door" policy in the early 1980s. After 1978, when China opened its society to the west in an effort to distance itself from the Soviet Union (Yao, 2010), its leaders began to realize the importance of changing certain aspects of their government in order to foster long-term economic growth. Deng Xiaoping, paramount leader of China from 1978 until 1992, oversaw various plans to westernize the economic structure of China (Economy, 2010). He made goals such as moving 50 percent of the population to urban cities, creating jobs by strengthening exports, and overall increasing the living standards of millions of Chinese. In adopting Western economic models, China's media institutions were then commercialized. State-owned media became increasingly dependent on advertising revenue and less dependent of state subsidies (Esarey & Qiang, 2011). However, the Chinese government maintained system of controlling the media by rewarding "self-censoring" institutions and punishing those whose content they deemed inappropriate (Esarey & Qiang, 2011). Nevertheless, the "repackaging" of the news

media during this era increased government influence because its new form was more attractive to citizens (Barme 1999; Brady, 2008).

This regime is particularly significant because the mass media market grew while the government still maintained control (Esarey & Qiang, 2011). They stated that the CCP's ability to suppress information quelled any threat from the Chinese Democratic Party, a growing anti-communist faction. In addition, public support for the CCP grew because public requests for undisclosed information were met more often than before, (after the government determined its importance) (Esarey & Qiang 2011).

### **- The "Internet Age," Information Regime Change III**

A publication about "China's Internet Situation," by the State Council of Information Office in 2010, estimated that more than 380 million Chinese have access to the Internet (29 percent of the country population), approximately 233 million people use the Internet via cell phone, and that there are 220 million bloggers.

The age of the Internet in the early 2000s provided a significant challenge to the Chinese government's post-1978 strategy of media control, because Chinese citizens were now exposed to worldwide news. The high number of blogs, fluidity of their existence, high number of users and lack of financial incentive in this medium removed much power from the government in controlling the flow of political discourse (Esarey & Qiang, 2011). There are more than one billion daily page views on the Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) in China, a forum for discussion hosted by 80 percent of Chinese Web sites (Esarey & Qiang, 2011). These forums also collectively have 10 million new posts per day.

Another important factor is the increase in bloggers who report on public affairs issues. They have become popular and prevalent among China's increasing blogger population (75

million in 2010 compared to only 8 million in 2009) (Esarey & Qiang 2011). These “netizens” have also become clever in evading censors through anonymous names and use of certain political correctness that escapes radars (Esarey & Qiang, 2011). In regards to fluidity, “blogs increase rapidly in size, have no fixed boundaries, and are capable of resisting state efforts to dominate information (Esarey & Qiang, 2001; Castells, 2009). However, the state still maintains some influence. In the fall of 2002, the CCP told editors exactly how to cover the Sixteenth Party Congress, when the new rulers of the PRC were presented, (Hamilton, 2003, p. xxii). Furthermore, if there was any lack of cooperation with their guidelines, party leaders said they would consider shutting them down (Hamilton, 2003, p. xxii).

Urban Chinese citizens, (who likely can afford the means of accessing the Internet more than rural Chinese) tend to make more organized demands, such as a cleaner environment, more cultural expression and governmental transparency (Economy, 2010). This is a significant fact considering China’s goal of urbanizing 400 million more Chinese by 2030, a 25 percent increase from the present (Economy, 2010). In addition, Chinese life expectancy is increasing (from 47 years in 1960 to 74 years now) (Economy, 2011), which means a larger amount of people will live longer. Nonetheless, experts like Christensen (2010) believe the current urban population trends will certainly raise the stakes for Internet censoring even more.

Besides the increasing political criticism and discussion in online newspaper commentary, endless amounts of bloggers are now reaching citizens via B.B.S. forums with their political criticism, commentary, and pluralism laced in writings with authentic pictures and/or quotes from government officials (Economy, 2010). According to Economy (2010), “In July 2010, bloggers provided firsthand accounts of a large-scale pollution disaster in Jilin Province, contradicting official reports...Thousands of people ignored government officials, angrily

accusing them of a cover-up, and rushed to buy bottled water.” Also, Economy (2010) discussed an example of how Internet polling was used to successfully create public and media support to stop the police pursuit of a journalist who members of the public voted innocent in an online poll (poll of 33,000). There have also been online-organized campaigns against the construction of dams and polluting factories, and protests about the idea of removing Cantonese from TV programs in Guangdong Province (Economy, 2010). The effect has also led to the rise in political respect of icons such as racecar driver and novelist Han Han, who has more than 410 million hits on his blog and posts about political issues (Economy, 2010).

Despite great strides, citizens and news reporters are still cautious about their words in newspapers, as evidenced by Esarey and Qiang’s findings, which is probably due to the continued reward/punishment system by the state for journalists and media companies. Regardless of the magnitude, the increased opportunity for communicative power for Chinese citizens is evident. The vast accessibility of the Internet, blogs, and organization Web sites has significantly increased the feasibility for citizens to engage in effective public political activism geared toward political framing and agenda setting, and protest organizing (Esarey & Qiang, 2011; Yang, 2009). Chinese President Hu Jintao has said, “Whether we can cope with the Internet is a matter that affects the development of socialist culture, the security of information, and the stability of the state” (Economy, 2010).

### **C. IMPLICATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES**

Esarey and Qiang’s (2011) study found that criticism of the state was higher in blogs than in newspapers, and that nationalist propaganda was higher in newspapers. Also, they found that blogs had a much higher amount of corporate criticism, which they hypothesized could be a result of corporate bribes to journalists.

One of the biggest concerns of top Chinese government officials since China opened its borders and economy more than three decades ago is how they can continue fostering national economic growth and micro-level regional and individual growth both while still maintaining stable authoritarian political and social control (Economy, 2011). “Chinese society is growing more complex, demanding and robust; on the other [hand], its authoritarian state remains committed to maintain a brittle form of social and political control” (Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2010). Throughout the early 2000s, and since the current regime in China took office in 2002, the state provided economic stimulus to strengthen the nation (Scissors, 2009). Between post-1978 and now, due to its political differences with other nations, China sought its legitimacy among its people on a performance basis, through economic improvement for citizens (Yao, 2010). The problem is, however, that the current regime of China’s leaders did not contain the expansion of their state economic stimulus, and expanded it even more in 2008 amid economic and GDP slowdown (Scissors, 2011). The resulting “income equality and internal and external imbalances” may be evidence of the instability of that strategy (Yao, 2010).

Deng Xiaoping’s theory for market reform was for China to peacefully and quietly rise as an economic power without intervening in matters outside its national interests. However, with the aftermath of the financial crisis, China’s leaders have realized that with their achieved status as a market-economy and the second-largest economy in the world behind the United States, their national interests may be intertwined with global interests (Economy, 2010). Additionally, most U.S. requests of China are equally directly related to Chinese interests, such as curbing nuclear proliferation or protecting international waters from pirates (Christensen, 2011).

## **- Maintaining Nationalism**

More than ever, China is embracing the need to have the legitimacy of its unique regime acknowledged by the global community, and, equally important, by its own citizens (Christensen, 2011).

However, appealing to both of those audiences is a difficult task. In the past, the People's Republic of China was able to relatively control the outbreak of protests through the containment and direction of political discussion and through military might (as seen in the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989). It is no secret that Chinese leaders are especially sensitive to domestic disorder stirred by foreign threats because of their country's history (Jisi, 2011). "From ancient times, the ruling regime of the day has often been brought down by a combination of internal uprising and external invasion" (Jisi, 2011). He cited the collapse of three previous ruling bodies in China. First, the collapse of the Ming dynasty in 1644 when the Manchus invaded from the north after a peasant revolt that captured Beijing, establishing the Qing dynasty. Second, the Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911 after internal revolts and invasions from Japanese and Western forces, establishing the Republic of China. Finally, the current People's Republic of China was established by a mass revolution rooted in communist ideology influenced by the Soviet Union (Jisi, 2011). Now, in a time of unprecedented global technology and influence, "The [Chinese] government currently seems more nervous about maintaining long-term regime legitimacy and social stability than at any time since the period just after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre" (Christensen, 2011).

Throughout the web of information both inside and outside China's borders, various well-respected Chinese/East-Asians bloggers stimulate dissenting commentary in Internet news and independent journalism forums. Inside China, Party leaders fear that nationalist criticism has

the potential to unify many otherwise disparate local protests against Chinese officials (Christensen, 2011). “Popular nationalism, the growth in the number of media outlets through which Chinese citizens can express their views, and the increasing sensitivity of the government to public opinion in a period of perceived instability have provided the space for attacks on the United States and, by association, criticism of Beijing's U.S. policy as too soft” (Christensen 2011). These critiques that call for more aggressive foreign policy toward the United States are from more than just ordinary citizens. Some authors of these critiques are active-duty military officers and scholars with Chinese state-run think tanks and universities (Christensen, 2011).

#### **- Maintaining Nationalism Simultaneously with Global Respect**

Christensen (2011) identifies two main problems from the magnitude of internal foreign policy pressure. First, it causes Chinese elites and officials to act in ways that alienate other countries in the international community (Christensen, 2011). Christensen cited the example of when Chinese Foreign Ministry officials responded harshly at the 2010 ASEAN meeting in Hanoi when various Asian states sided with Secretary of State Clinton. Also, he cited the drastic response to Japan when they jailed a fishing boat captain and his crew. All of these instances resulted in the alienation of China from the other countries. Second, this pressure results in a dilemma when the PRC wants to join other nations in their efforts to solve global problems Christensen (2011). For example, the PRC continues to turn a blind eye to nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran, regardless of whether they approve, because the nationalist element of society would perceive any aggressive stance against them as U.S. appeasement (Christensen 2011). China’s lack of aggression toward North Korea after the six-party talks in 2006 and 2007 was followed by criticism when North Korea refused to abide by the international community’s demands (Christensen, 2011). The inability to influence a small neighboring country and the



continued economic and diplomatic relations with North Korea have raised suspicion in regional capitals about China's long term intentions (Christensen, 2011). This trend may lead to regional countries strengthening their alliance and active cooperation with the U.S., which is directly against the PRC's expressed interest (Christensen, 2011).

Since the financial crisis and vast emergence of "netizens" it seems more important than ever for the PRC to seek a political communication strategy that garners international respect and internal nationalism. In order for the current form of Chinese government to survive, the people of China must be convinced that the economic decisions the PRC is making are within their long-term interests, despite its negative aspects. The CCP officials are now more aware of this need to win support with society and with the party in order to remain in power (Yao, 2010). Some experts have suggested more consistent and engaged communication efforts, "The central leadership should more vigorously inform the population of its own view, which is consistently more moderate and prudent than the inflammatory remarks found in the media and on Web sites (Christensen, 2011). An example of a misguided effort is how the PRC has an extensive organization of people who monitor discussion sites, and blogs, posting pro-party comments to help counterbalance discussion (Esarey & Qiang 2011).

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party stated in 2006 that "[China's foreign policy] must maintain economic construction as its centerpiece, be closely integrated in domestic work, and be advanced by coordinating domestic work and international situations" (Jisi, 2011). Overall, this has led to many anti-market reform tactics such as currency value manipulation, one of China's key strategic economic growth methods. This policy is causing external backlash within the international community, especially the International Monetary Fund (Economy, 2010) and the United States (Economy, 2010). Also, they've enacted stricter

guidelines for foreign investment, stricter state banks quotas, and forced the consolidation of major firms in sectors that are deemed critical to the state's prosperity (Scissors, 2011). In addition, China's enormous infrastructure growth and reliance on fossil fuels has made it the world's leader in global climate change and pollution.

#### **- Income Disparity and Citizen Welfare**

The struggle to maintain a positive level of Chinese nationalism is a response to public unrest stirred by the growing income gap disparity. China has the highest urban-rural income gap in the world, where urban citizens earn an average of 3.5 times more than rural citizens and only 45 percent of citizens live in cities (Economy, 2010). Evidence of such effects was sharp after increases in food and energy inflation that peaked in 2008 (Scissors, 2009) placed strain on lower-income families in China, who still comprise the majority. Overall, history has shown that the Chinese people are not afraid to mount organized resistance when the state fails to meet their needs (Yao, 2010). Furthermore, the increase in national income coupled with the stagnancy of residential income has increased the amount in which people "feel poorer" within their society (Yao, 2010). The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimated that annual increases in instances of social unrest have nearly doubled from 40,000 in 2001 (Yao, 2010) to more than 100,000 in recent years (Economy, 2010).

China has repeatedly taken a "pain-reliever" approach to unrest by investing in the infrastructure, education and healthcare of the area, as well as creating social programs of migration and unemployment assistance (Yao, 2010) and repealing taxes (Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2010) to economically balance these areas. However, none of their measures have been able to stop the increase in political protests, partially due to indirect problems caused by powerful interest groups and commercialized local governments whose influence often blocks

the equal distribution of wealth (Yao, 2010). In addition, the state's methods for pursuing economic growth inevitably suffocates some citizen-rights that it purports to enhance. These include arbitrary land acquisitions, strict monitoring of the Internet, the suppression of labor unions, and overlooked poor worker conditions (Yao, 2010).

#### **D. UNSTATED BUT EVIDENT GOALS**

George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham (2010) described a speech by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao as warning that "China's economy and national modernization process would be jeopardized if the country failed to undertake systematic political reform" (Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2010). Furthermore, experts like Christensen (2011) have said, "Mobilizing public support for government policies is expected to strengthen Beijing's diplomatic bargaining power while also helping consolidate its domestic popularity."

However, China has yet to release any document that describes its goals or how to achieve them (Jisi, 2011). China has shown consistent policy actions regarding domestic interests (Jisi, 2011). Politically, it is important to acknowledge that China now allows its citizens to openly discuss varying opinions about its political future (despite its continued suppression of external critics) (Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2010). However, there is no formally expressed grand strategy toward China's plan for its role on the global stage (Jisi, 2011). Such a role is inevitable because China has continued to emerge as a financial powerhouse amidst a global financial meltdown. According to Jisi (2011), there have been the following four developing changes in China's foreign policy strategy that suggest a central grand strategy that has not been explicitly expressed by the PRC:

1. Displaying an increased value in global security, which encompasses joining other nations in the fight against international concerns such as piracy and terrorism, as well as joining in UN peacekeeping missions.

2. Becoming more multilateral and issue-oriented in global issues such as “counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation, environmental protection, energy security, food safety, [land] and post-disaster reconstruction.” He states how these interests have complicated China’s individual relationships with nations like India and Iran, who are on the opposite side of the multilateral issues but still maintain important relations with China. With India, it is mutual refusal to be bound by carbon emission standards. Iran is a key supplier of oil for China but is a target for global pressure against nuclear proliferation
3. China’s concern in economic development is beginning to include social dimensions such as “economic efficiency, product quality, environmental protection, the creation of a social safety net, and technological innovation.” This includes the effort to build domestic consumption to improve the quality of life for China’s increasing population while reducing the dependence on exports for economic growth.
4. The fourth transformation he described is China’s new concern with developing the “cultural soft power of the nation,” the ability to influence the social values of other major nations. In the past, China’s understanding was that it could cooperate with other nations based on mutual interests, despite vastly different political and social ideology. Now, the government has recognized that such differences inhibit the ends of achieving and maintaining global respect and respect at home. (Jisi, 2011)

Those four transformations, in addition to the growing dilemma of stimulating nationalism and global respect on the social level have pinpointed the need to have a coherent communication strategy (Jisi, 2011).

### **III. STUDY**

#### **A. DISCUSSION**

The Chinese government's challenge is the task of framing through its political communication to stimulate positive dialogue among its people while simultaneously capturing international respect. Its current form of political and social government is not sustainable without updates (Gilboy & Heginbotham, 2010).

China has endured several great transitions since its beginnings regarding its media and economy. Overall, the reforms in China since 1979 (under the influence of Deng Xiaoping) have made great strides toward fostering more freedom in the media and the economy. China's economic reforms have been the cornerstone of its recent surge to an economic superpower. And, increased wealth among many citizens, the changed traditional media environment, the Internet and the emergence of "new media" (blogs, forum, and other social media) has allowed significant room for more public political awareness and expression.

In Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion*, he wrote that policymakers cannot base their decisions on the "will" of the people because the will does not always exist, thus many decisions are made based on insider opinions that are secret to the voting public (Lippmann, 1922, 313). However, the benefits of aggressive economic expansion and the Communist Party of China's authoritarian style of government have caused grave problems for the ideological and practical foundation of the Chinese government and its policies. As Lippmann (1922) further noted, it is impractical for policy decisions to be made only on the intuition of the decision maker. Now, the Chinese public makes its voice heard. The rise of the Internet and new media "netizens" has given Chinese citizens the forum to prove the existence and magnitude of their "will." Recently, citizens, scholars, government officials, journalists and others both at home and

abroad have criticized PRC policies for their adverse effects on Chinese citizens, the environment, and the global economy.

Within the changed media landscape, Chinese citizens now have more power than ever to express such criticism. Additionally, the new media landscape and the recent global importance of China has given the outside world the means and reason to monitor China's policies, events, and internal and external criticism closely. From my research above, I find that two serious threats to the Chinese government are (a) lack of positive nationalism and (b) lack of global respect. Like any world superpower, these criticisms are common. However, political communication and diplomacy efforts can harness the necessary nationalistic support and global respect to counterbalance.

Yet, China seems to remain in a struggle to effectively counterbalance such criticism. For instance, even though they have little official power, the Internet media have evolved as effective tools for citizens to express political concerns, and in many instances, such concerns pressure the government into a favorable response (Esarey & Qiang, 2011). Based on Esarey & Qiang's (2011) findings, it is apparent that China is moving toward a society with "mediated-politics." And, from Lippmann's (1922) themes, it is clear that the Chinese government, now moving toward a more "mediated-political" environment needs to engage their citizens in communication processes that foster healthier dialogue, most commonly through media consumption and production, in order to have long-term sustainability.

China must, if it plans to successfully continue growing by similarly criticized and "unconventional" policy, enact effective communication. I reviewed two measures of success: How well Chinese government officials have been able to affect frames in the media, making (a) certain controversial policies more palatable by "global" and "Western" standards, therefore

catering to the U.S., while (b) simultaneously fostering strength in Chinese nationalism. The former type of communication attempts to influence the perception in the international community to see previously controversial (highly criticized in the West) plans in a more respectable light. The latter attempts to both dissuade nationalistic Chinese citizens who think any soft play to international or “Western” interests is an act of “selling out” their country and its respectability, and strengthen support of the Chinese public about the government stance on various issues.

## **B. TOPIC OF EVALUATION**

I evaluated news articles from the *China Daily* about the issue of China manipulating its currency value to maintain a competitive export market and the U.S. congressional legislation aimed at combating that policy. My timeframe was after the global economic crises (2009-present). I searched the following on chinadaily.com.cn: “currency valuation,” “Congress currency valuation,” “United States tariff bill,” “exchange rate,” and “currency manipulation.” I chose to focus on these issues because they, especially the currency valuation issue as a whole, tend to receive a lot of attention in reports about U.S./Sino relations. Also, the issue of China’s currency valuation has economic effects on most other countries that trade internationally. While the currency valuation issue and the tariffs are only a few issues in grand scheme of global economic policy, they were adequate for my research in this study.

## **C. METHODS OF EVALUATION**

I examined agenda framing by the Chinese government in the media by categorizing media reports based on references to policymakers and their quotes about the specific policy issue. In ideal media environments, journalists may reference any word in which a policymaker says or writes. While policymakers cannot choose which of their words a reporter will reference

in his/her writing, they may exhibit control over such wording by carefully constructing their statements. They may choose, then, to speak about an issue in a specific style, fashion, capacity, etc. My hypothesis was that macro-level finesse in this practice should be evident when aggregate policymaker references/quotes in reporting about a specific issue possess certain characteristics that are consistent with the media frame surrounding that issue. On the micro-level, the quotes within an article should be consistent with the overall frame on the article. Once evidence of the correlation was established, I then studied the characteristics of those frames in the context that the policymaker(s)' references are at least partially responsible for the frame. At that point, I was able to answer whether China's policymakers created frames around certain issues that should satisfy pressure from internal (Chinese citizens) and external (international community) audiences. From reading about such issues in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, I was able to more easily recognize the frames implemented in the *China Daily*.

The policymakers' quotes in each article studied in *The China Daily* are categorized by one of the following distinguishing tones:

1. “**Negative**” – These articles have quotes from policymakers that engage the discussion with an aggressive, combative, dismissive and/or fear-mongering tone toward non-Chinese government ideology/interests/opinions with little or no emphasis on the need for cooperation or mutual benefit. Furthermore, it does not emphasize any demonstrated action toward such mutual benefit or cooperation. While conservative Chinese nationalists may receive these types of communication well, it probably isolates the other side and the international community.
2. “**Submissive**” – These articles have quotes from policymakers that engage non-Chinese government ideology/interests/opinions in discussion with a submitting tone, admitting fault, and promising better cooperation with the other side, but making no assertion of China's stance/viewpoint. This communication makes China look rather weak or at least not a world superpower. It may appease/please the other side and/or the international community, but it most likely will adversely affect nationalistic support.
3. “**Avoidance**” – These articles have quotes from policymakers that do not significantly engage non-Chinese government ideology/interests/opinions in discussion. They avoid the issue and typical criticisms of the other side and do not emphasize any cooperative



efforts or need for mutual benefit. This communication is non-beneficial because it portrays a shut-off, confused, and sometimes smug and ignorant government to the audiences. Furthermore, interests and agenda are not significantly discussed here with may leave room for much outside interpretation, which may be negative or positive. This communication does nothing to stimulate global respect or nationalistic support.

4. **“Diplomatic”** – These articles have quotes from policymakers that engage non-Chinese government ideology/interests/opinions in discussion that respectfully acknowledges the stance of the other side, but seeks to explain and/or assert (indirectly or directly) that the Chinese stance will benefit each party, or at least not harm the interests of the other side. This type of engagement shows that China is at least actively participating in the discussion by explaining its stance and considering the other side. Here, paying attention to the concerns of the international community shows respect and earnest will to engage in global issues, while staying grounded in national interests sends the message to the audience, especially nationals, that China is strong and working in the best interests of the government and/or its citizens. This type of communication is best because it probably does the least damage to global respect while fostering nationalistic support.

## D. RESULTS

As expected, Chinese policymakers have no trouble with conflicting media frames. When the quotes of policymakers in a story portray a certain frame, every other source, international or Chinese, reflects that same frame. In every instance that someone other than a Chinese policymaker was quoted, such as a U.S. official or a U.S. scholar, their quotes supported the frame purported by the Chinese policymakers’ quotes. Thus, it is no question that Chinese policymakers control the overall frames of the media stories in which they are quoted. Now the question remains, how good are they in communicating effective frames?

Overall Frames Per News Article			
Negative	Submissive	Avoidance	Diplomatic
8	0	1	23
(25%)	(0%)	(3%)	(72%)

Total Articles = 30  
Total Frames = 32

The majority of the communication frames in this study were either “negative” or “diplomatic.” The communication from the Chinese government (political officials and advisors from think tanks) in my study had the following **Negative** frames:

1. The currency value in China is not “undervalued.”
2. The U.S. has no right to control China’s currency policy or “point the finger” at China for its problems.
3. The economic problems of the U.S. are not a result of China’s currency value.
4. The economic problems of the U.S. will not improve significantly as a result of China adjusting its currency value to U.S. demands (letting it be determined by the open market).
5. The bills and tariffs from the U.S. Congress that seek to identify China a “currency manipulator” and impose restrictions on U.S. exports are protectionist measures that violate the rules of the World Trade Organization.
6. China is not in violation of any WTO rules and that means that the U.S. opinion that China is a ‘currency manipulator’ is meaningless. However, some communication suggests that the International Monetary Fund, not the WTO, controls the issue of currency.
7. The bills and tariffs from the U.S. Congress that seek to identify China a “currency manipulator” and impose restrictions on U.S. exports to China will result in a trade war between the two countries, will be a “lose-lose” situation, and will slow global economic recovery.

The communication from the Chinese government (political officials and advisors from think tanks) in my study had the following **Diplomatic** frames:

1. China’s current currency exchange rate reform is stable and will relieve the trade imbalance between the U.S. and China
2. China’s current currency valuation mechanism is “reasonable” because now it is a two-way flexible system that will behave more like the market and will gradually lead to appreciation and eventually to a completely market-based system.
3. China desires the market-based system for China’s currency exchange rate mechanism, but thinks a gradually and controlled route is the best way to attain it.
4. Good relations between the U.S. and China are crucial for solving an international issue such as the global economy and preventing another international financial crisis.
5. Neither country is perfect, but China has been actively working toward progressing as a market-economy and strengthening the economic relationship with the U.S.
6. China is on track to import more goods from the U.S. while slowing and stabilizing its economic growth, which will narrow its trade surplus with the U.S. This will support more economic balance between the two countries.

## - Trends

There tends to be more **Negative** framing right after the U.S. Congress passes any controversial bill that is not in line with Chinese interests. Also, **Diplomatic** framing is stronger when head Chinese officials travel to U.S. and vice versa.

There were about twice as many articles with overall diplomatic themes than negative themes in this study. It is important to note that while numerous stories began with a negative frame, the article as a whole was framed diplomatically. This is due partially to good agenda setting by the government. Combative and aggressive communication (which is defined as **Negative** by itself) becomes a part of a **Diplomatic** frame when it is accompanied by communication that addresses the concerns of the other side, defines how the government has addressed those concerns in the past, and/or shows a willingness to work toward compromise in the future. Overall, the communication effectiveness of the Chinese government regarding their currency valuation is good. Their communication asserts the Chinese position and remains firm and vested in the government's self-defined goals and interests for its country and people, while at the same time genuinely addressing international concerns.

However, there is still improvement needed in China's communication frames that combat U.S. and other international criticism. Some of the common frames conflict each other. For example, policymakers often say the yuan value will strengthen and improve the U.S. trade imbalance and then, at other times, they say the yuan value is not undervalued and will not affect the trade imbalance. This confusion of the central message deteriorates the credibility of the Chinese government and probably causes resentment from the international community and a lack of faith from some nationals. Nonetheless, the Chinese government is on the right path with its communication. If it continues to communicate diplomatically and develops more consistent

and centralized criticism, it will begin to sound more like a world superpower. Then, it will probably be respected in the international community for more than just its economic vigor, but also as a common player in various major international issues.

### **E. FUTURE RESEARCH**

My study evaluates how policymakers frame messages about policy. This is “active” in the sense that it is the attempt to shape or reshape a viewpoint of the audience. However, another relevant evaluation is to study the amount this changes the audience’s viewpoints and overall mood toward an issue, maybe in the form of less appearances of criticizing speech in blogs and online-newspaper commentary. This data would be a measure of the extent to which national and international audience members’ policy criticism changes to policy support. Unfortunately, in addition to language barriers for many researchers, the tremendous number of popular blogs and BBS forums in China would make this a difficult task. Furthermore, it would be exceptionally difficult due to the fact mentioned earlier that censoring agents sometimes shut down blogs or intimidate commentators into silence.

Also, because the members of international audience in this study are policy officials and critics, I think it would be hard to measure the effect that the Chinese government’s communication has on them, too. It is probably indirect, resulting from Chinese policymakers influencing China media coverage, which then influences international readers and other major news media like the New York Times who may feed from their reporting. Then, it may shape public opinion abroad, which will influence the issues in which the government officials in the country (e.g. the U.S.) focus. It’s safe to assume that the current criticisms of China by U.S. politicians are fueled by the issue’s ability to sway the public opinion, which is especially important in an election year. Thus, if China can influence U.S. public opinion from the other

direction, maybe it can redirect or at least silence some criticism of U.S. policy makers. Because China is increasingly in the spotlight internationally, I think their large media outlets should have some potential to advance that agenda. Nonetheless, it is still hard to measure.

## **F. LIMITATIONS**

My research is constrained to English-language newspapers and newspapers with English archives. It also does not use one of the biggest newspapers, the People's Daily, because it's state-run and only has English archives until October 2007. The *China Daily* is partially state-subsidized and has adequate archives. Many other large newspapers, like the *Global Times* (owned by People's Daily also), do not have archives.

As described above, there have still been recent instances when government officials threatened or "strong-armed" government media organizations to report a certain way. This type of corruption and state influence fostered public mistrust of many state-run and subsidized media organizations.

Therefore, I was left with the *China Daily*, a large English-only newspaper that caters to an international audience. I thought this paper sufficed because of its international audience and because some Chinese people (working abroad, bilingual) still read it. Moreover, I believe that the content of their reports are not significantly different from a Chinese language paper, because of the risk of a vast difference becoming exposed.

#### **IV. APPENDIX**

##### News Articles and Journals

A. Relevant articles found from the following search on chinadaily.com.cn: currency valuation

1. Yuwei, Z. “Yuan rise is not the cure: economists.” *China Daily*. Updated: Feb. 14, 2012. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/epaper/2012-02/14/content\\_14606467.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/epaper/2012-02/14/content_14606467.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic.** These policymaker quotes discuss the lack of positive outcomes for either the U.S. or China as a result of yuan appreciation. One quote by Yao Yang, a Chinese economist at the China Center for Economic Research (thinktank), asserts that even if China discontinues some of its exports, the U.S. will import those goods from another country because they don’t produce them anyway. Another by him suggests that rising labor costs in China (as a result of yuan appreciation) will cause American companies that manufacture in China to make less profit (e.g. Apple, Intel, etc.).
2. “China, US to discuss currency, arms sale.” (*Xinhua*) *China Daily*. Updated: Oct. 12, 2011 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2011-10/10/content\\_13865090.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2011-10/10/content_13865090.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic.** Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai designates “sound and stable” China-US ties as necessary foundations for tackling issues such as the yuan valuation and US arms sales to Taiwan. Also, he said that the U.S. Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011 (bill against China’s currency manipulation) would result in a lose-lose situation. Furthermore, he said it slow global economic recovery.
3. “US Senate passes yuan bill amid China’s opposition.”(*Xinhua*) *China Daily*. Updated: Oct. 12, 2011 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/world/2011-10/12/content\\_13873871.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/world/2011-10/12/content_13873871.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic.** This article contains quotes from Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai that refer to the potential risks of the U.S. Senate passing the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act. He cites a possible trade war, lose-lose situation, and bad relation development between the U.S. and China. The previous article contains the same quotes but has more that reflect a more diplomatic tone overall.
4. Jiao, W. & Haipei, C. “China: Yuan bill to hurt US job growth.” *China Daily*. Updated: Oct. 11, 2011 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2011-10/11/content\\_13865371.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2011-10/11/content_13865371.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic.** Many quotes in this article are also in the previous two, in addition to a few others that are similar.
5. “Bank official defends exchange rate regime.” (*Xinhua*) *China Daily*. Updated: Feb. 14, 2011 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2011-02/14/content\\_12000862.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2011-02/14/content_12000862.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic:** Quotes by Lu Mai, secretary general of the China Development Research Foundation, refer to his understanding that many facets of the discussion are misguided on some level. First, that the

gradual currency regime will not limit China's competitiveness, and second, that a stronger yuan will not have great consequences for Chinese exporters and economic growth. He comments that the recent currency regime reform has settled the imbalance. His quotes are diplomatic because he addresses the typical outside concern about the currency regime and the typical outside reasoning for wanting to change it. He breaks down the argument of the other side, and non-aggressively asserts that China's current method is the best.

6. Qingfen, D. "US moves will not cease trade spats, say experts." *China Daily*. Updated: Sept. 2, 2010 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-09/02/content\\_11248688.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-09/02/content_11248688.htm)
    - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes from Zhou Shijian, a senior economist at the Center for China-US Relations, reflect a warning tone that the U.S. should be cautious about actions that will affect US-China relations. He further advises that such actions would hurt US interests individually, as well as those of China.
  7. Yan, Z. "Reduce reliance on US T-bills, says Cheng." *China Daily*. Updated Apr. 1, 2010 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-04/01/content\\_11017426.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-04/01/content_11017426.htm)
    - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes from Yi Gang, head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, suggest that China should address the currency rate concerns of the U.S. and others by keeping the yuan at 'reasonable levels.' His words also suggest that China is working toward a completely market-based currency valuation. This is diplomatic because he also stands firm in China's need to maintain its current currency regime
  8. Cao, B. "Yuan forwards drop as Wen backs current valuation." (Bloomberg News) *China Daily*. Updated Mar. 16, 2010 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-03/16/content\\_11016863.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-03/16/content_11016863.htm)
    - i. **Negative.** Quotes by Wen Jianbo, China's premier, have a combative tone in this article. He asserts China's stance on its currency, but also shows aggression. "I don't think the renminbi [yuan] is undervalued," Wen said... "We oppose countries pointing fingers at each other and even forcing a country to appreciate its currency."
- B. Relevant articles found from the following search on chinadaily.com.cn: Congress currency valuation
1. Qingfen, D. "U.S trade bill breaks WTO rules." *China Daily*. Updated Mar. 08, 2012. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/business/2012-03/08/content\\_14785268.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/business/2012-03/08/content_14785268.htm)
    - i. **Strong Negative/ Diplomatic.** This article begins with a strong **Negative** tone from the Commerce minister, Chen Deming, who criticized Congress' trade bill (aimed at China) as violating the WTO and American law. He further criticized the U.S. for 'pointing the finger' at China instead of properly addressing its own problems. However, he then moved into a **Diplomatic** tone by saying that the Chinese government will work with the U.S. to stop any government subsidies that were prohibited by the "global trade arbitrator" (WTO). He was also assertive when he said that China must be tough and fight this issue if Obama signs the bill into law.

2. Qingfen, D. "Rise in imports help shrink trade surplus." China Daily. Updated: Dec. 11, 2010. [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-12/11/content\\_11692521.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-12/11/content_11692521.htm)
    - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes from a Ministry of Commerce spokesperson as well as from Zhang Yansheng, from China's 'top economic planning organization' reflect a diplomatic tone that downplays the concern over China's trade surplus. (The one concern of the U.S. is that China's practices result in unwarranted trade surpluses). However, these quotes discuss why the trade surplus is currently narrowing. Furthermore, the quotes suggest that yuan appreciation should occur, but at a more gradual level than demanded.
  3. "China watch developments in currency, fertilizer." (Xinhua) China Daily. Updated: Sept. 15, 2010. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/15/content\\_11308920.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/15/content_11308920.htm)
    - i. **Negative.** The quote in the article from Yao Jian has a combative tone. "Yao Jian said any attempt to use its trade surplus with the United States to pressure China on its exchange rate would be 'unreasonable.'" The article gives supporting rationale by citing statistics about the recent record-strength of the yuan appreciation against the dollar, however, it did not quote Yao himself in any other tone than combative.
- C. Relevant articles found from the following search on chinadaily.com.cn: United States tariff bill
1. "US duty violates international rules – minister." (Xinhua/China Daily). China Daily. Updated: Mar. 07, 2012. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/us/2012-03/07/content\\_14780284.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/us/2012-03/07/content_14780284.htm)
    - i. **Strong Negative.** Same quotes as previous article from Chen Deming, but also with many additional negative quotes.
  2. "US duty violates WTO rules." (Xinhua). Updated: Mar. 07, 2012. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-03/07/content\\_14777644.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-03/07/content_14777644.htm)
    - i. **Strong Negative/Weak Diplomatic.** Strong aggressive and combative tone from Chen Deming. He said that while China will follow the guidelines of the WTO, "[China doesn't] have the obligation to abide by any domestic laws and regulation that are not in line with the rules of international organizations." There is a hint of Diplomatic tone at the end but it is minor in scope.
  3. "Hu calls for global economic liberalization." *China Daily*. Updated: Nov. 14, 2011 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011huapec/2011-11/14/content\\_14093559.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011huapec/2011-11/14/content_14093559.htm)
    - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes from Hu Jintao, China's president, reflect a tone that asserts China's opposition against trade protectionist measures (laws or actions by a country that seek to protect the national economy's trading sector). Instead, he said he wants to build a balanced, inclusive, and win-win system.
- D. Relevant articles found from the following search on chinadaily.com.cn: exchange rate



1. "China, US trade imbalance questionable." (Xinhua). *China Daily*. Updated: Mar. 07, 2012. [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-03/07/content\\_14781284.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-03/07/content_14781284.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic.** Chen Deming's quotes urged the U.S. to reevaluate the trade relationship between China and the U.S> to see its importance and loosen restrictions on exports to China. Furthermore, he agreed that currency rates should be left to the open market, but asserted China's stance that it should be somewhat controlled when necessary (such as an economic crisis).
2. "Ensuring Stability." *China Daily*. Updated: Mar. 6, 2012. [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-03/06/content\\_14764773.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-03/06/content_14764773.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes by Wen Jianbo referred to China's lowered growth targets as evidence of the government's focus of stability. He also mentioned the strengthened "two-way flexibility" of the yuan, which would help stable appreciation.
3. "China sets 2012 growth target at 7.5%." (Xinhua/Agencies). *China Daily*. Updated: Mar. 5, 2012. [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-03/05/content\\_14756283.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-03/05/content_14756283.htm)
  - i. **Avoidance.** Quotes from Wen Jianbo referenced the issue of currency valuation, but only warned against protectionist measures and sharp fluctuations in exchange rates.
4. "US urged to lift tech export ban." *China Daily*. Updated: Feb. 17, 2012. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/us/2012-02/17/content\\_14631070.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/us/2012-02/17/content_14631070.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes from Xi Jinping, China's Vice President, suggested that recent reforms in China's yuan exchange rate formation mechanism have alleviated some of the U.S.-China trade imbalance. Now, he suggested, the U.S. must adjust its economic policies on exports to China to help alleviate the imbalance too, stressing that it is critical to work together.
5. Wu, J. "Xi urges US to adjust economic policies." *China Daily*. Updated: Feb. 16, 2012. [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-02/16/content\\_14618329.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-02/16/content_14618329.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic.** Same quotes as above.
6. Wu, J. & Chen J. "VP urges US to fix trade issues by changing economic policies." *China Daily*. Updated: Feb. 16, 2012. [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-02/16/content\\_14627373.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-02/16/content_14627373.htm)
  - i. **Diplomatic.** Same quotes as above with many additional quotes about the importance of the U.S.-China relationship.
7. Chen, W. & Fu, J. "Xi stresses benefits of Sino-US relations." *China Daily*. Updated Feb. 14, 2012. [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-02/14/content\\_14599136.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-02/14/content_14599136.htm)
  - i. **Strong Diplomatic.** Beginning quotes by Xi Jinping refer to the importance of the U.S - China relationship. "As economic globalization gathers momentum, China and the US have become highly interdependent economically. Such economic relations would not enjoy sustained, rapid growth if they were not based on mutual benefit or if they failed to deliver great benefits to the US. The Americans who know the real picture of

China-US economic relations, including those in the business community, will echo this point," Xi said. He further refers to some sore spots such as the international financial crisis and European debt crisis but reassures that U.S.-China cooperation toward mutual benefit is still critical for both countries.

8. Tan, Y. & Chen, W. "Envoy: VP visit will soon boost Sino-US relations." *China Daily*. Feb. 12, 2012. [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-02/12/content\\_14584739.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-02/12/content_14584739.htm)
    - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes by Zhang Yesui refer to the good progress of U.S.-China relations on issues including their exchange rate. He also spoke of the importance of future cooperation.
  9. Lan, Lan. "Yuan hits new high ahead of Xi's Visit." *China Daily*. Updated: Feb. 11, 2012 [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-02/11/content\\_14582574.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-02/11/content_14582574.htm)
    - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes by Zhang Jianping and Zhuang Jian, both senior economists at state banks, refer to the market-based nature of the appreciation of the yuan and how it will continue to rise as a result of government policy. Also, a reference of Cui Tianki mentions the opportunity to establish mutual trust on Xi's trip to the U.S. (which was approaching at the time).
- E. Relevant articles found from the following search on chinadaily.com.cn: currency manipulation
1. Zhao, S. "Wen given award for US job creation." *China Daily*. Updated: Mar. 06, 2012. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-03/06/content\\_14763263.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-03/06/content_14763263.htm)
    - i. **Strong Diplomatic.** Wen's quotes have a strong diplomatic tone, praising the economic relationship between the US and China and the success that the relationship has brought to New England and the U.S. as a whole. "None of the big economies are perfect, and neither are the Chinese and the US, but China is improving its market economy and intellectual rights to make the bilateral economic cooperation more mutually beneficial," he said.
  2. Cheng, G. & Tan, Y. "Vice President Xi's trip to address 'trust deficit' with US." *China Daily*. Updated: Feb. 10, 2012. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-02/10/content\\_14573690.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-02/10/content_14573690.htm)
    - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes from Cui Tianki discuss the need and opportunity for mutual trust between China and the U.S. He said that more trust would generate better economic and trade ties. He acknowledges the need the currency exchange rate reform, but focuses on China's slower pace toward that reform. Furthermore, he asserts that Vice President Xi's upcoming visit to the U.S. will not result in new currency reforms.
  3. Deng, Q. "Issue of currency is not a WTO concern: official." *China Daily*. Updated: Nov. 18, 2011. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-11/18/content\\_14115502.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-11/18/content_14115502.htm)
    - i. **Negative.** Quotes from various officials about how the issue of currency is not within the WTO jurisdiction and how the yuan was not a source of

- trade imbalance anyway. Does not show any diplomatic tone and criticizes U.S. economic structure and policy.
4. Zheng, Y. "Romney's attacks on currency and trade 'irresponsible.'" *China Daily*. Updated: Oct. 18, 2011. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-10/27/content\\_13984097.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-10/27/content_13984097.htm)
    - i. **Negative.** Quotes from Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Weimin, that have a strong nationalist and aggressive tone toward the U.S. "We think that that sort of frequently blaming others, looking for scapegoats and even misleading the public is an irresponsible attitude," he said. "China has achieved economic success over the last few years because it was brave enough to face challenges and improve itself by liberating minds, opening up and seeking win-win results, he added."
  5. Li, X. "Yuan bill passage strongly criticized." *China Daily*. Oct. 13, 2011. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-10/13/content\\_13880906.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-10/13/content_13880906.htm)
    - i. **Diplomatic.** Slightly negative tone at first due to only talk of all the bad consequences of the bill. However, then quotes from a think tank analyst stress that the bill is bad because now is a time for cooperation, both countries' benefit - "It is an untimely move given that the US and China need to work together to prevent another financial crisis and global recession," said Huang Yiping, chief economist of emerging Asia at Barclays Capital
  6. Tan, Y., Zhang, Y., & Li, X. "Experts warn of growing US trade protectionism." *China Daily*. Oct. 05, 2011. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-10/05/content\\_13837749.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-10/05/content_13837749.htm)
    - i. **Strong Negative.** Quotes from Ma Zhouxu and Shen Danyang, foreign ministry spokesmen, warn that US 'protectionism' against China will result in a trade war, hurt US-China ties, and violate the WTO rules. Their tone also suggests that the The Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Act as a whole is developed on an inaccurate perception on a 'currency imbalance' in China.
  7. Lan, L. "Yuan not to blame for trade gap with US." *China Daily*. Mar. 11, 2011. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-03/11/content\\_12152848.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-03/11/content_12152848.htm)
    - i. **Diplomatic.** Quotes from Chen Deming suggest that it is within China's interests to have a more flexible currency, and that China will reduce the bilateral trade deficit with the US by importing more goods from the US. However, he said that US bilateral trade deficits with other countries make are important too, and will still cause a U.S. overall trade deficit regardless China's actions.

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